THE PORTRAYAL OF MADNESS
IN GEORG BÜCHNER'S LENZ AND NOYZECK
AND SOME POSSIBLE SOURCES

by

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Chapter One - Introduction

It was not until the last decade of the nineteenth century that the German psychiatrist, Kraepelin, first described the disease entity which he called *dementia praecox*. A further twenty years passed before the Swiss Eugen Bleuler, a colleague of C.G. Jung, suggested the name schizophrenia as more appropriate to the condition and described its clinical variants, including paranoid schizophrenia.

Long before this, in the short space between October 1835 and February 1837, a period marked by the most intense scientific and literary activity, the playwright Georg Büchner wrote two portrayals, both powerful and accurate, of this very illness whose existence the psychiatric profession was not to acknowledge for another sixty years. *Lenz* written in the autumn of 1835 is a narrative concerning an episode of madness in an eighteenth century poet J.M.R. Lenz, an episode which would now be labelled as schizophrenia. At the time of his death in February 1837 at the age of twenty-three, Büchner was engaged in writing a drama, *Woyzeck*, the theme of which is the oppression of man in a tyrannical society and whose central character is possessed by paranoia. Again, as in *Lenz*, the portrayal is utterly convincing in clinical terms, that is to say it presents accurately and in depth the picture of an individual who would now be diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. What was truly
remarkable was not so much that he was able to describe the mad behaviour and mad utterances of his subjects — he did after all have detailed historical sources in respect of both Lenz and Woyzeck in which examples of such behaviour and utterances were readily found — but that he showed such profound insight into the thinking and feeling underlying the psychosis, an insight which I hope to show was without parallel in either medical or literary portrayals of madness of his time.

Hypotheses

The substantial interval between Büchner's literary portrayals and the clinical descriptions of Kraepelin and Bleuler poses a problem which can be expressed in two ways:

What were the sources from which Büchner derived his picture of schizophrenia and his understanding of its processes?

Alternatively:

Why, when Büchner was so clearly able to recognize and describe the features of both paranoid and simple schizophrenia, was it not so recognized and described by the psychiatrists who were Büchner's contemporaries?

It is to consideration of the question in its first formulation that this work will be directed, but it is important to give some attention to the latter form, since the two cannot be totally separated.
A partial answer to the second question is provided by the perspective of ethnopsychiatry. In his work on the interaction between the manifestations of schizophrenia and the cultural setting in which it arises, Devereux has argued that just as the forms taken by mental illness and the significance attached to these vary from society to society at a given time, so variations in manifestations of illness and social responses to these manifestations occur at different historical periods. In these terms, schizophrenia is said to be the "type disorder" of Gesellschaft - that is a society where solidarity is mechanically determined, as compared with Gemeinschaft, where solidarity is organic. Gesellschaft is held to be the typical social organization of twentieth century industrial nations, and schizophrenia their typical mental illness [Devereux 215]. The "discovery" of schizophrenia around the turn of the century becomes explicable in these terms, and the implication is that schizophrenic illness would indeed have been rare in the 1830's when Büchner was writing. (This proposition will be examined in Chapter Six, dealing with psychiatrists' descriptions of mental illness in the early decades of the nineteenth century). It must be acknowledged that Devereux's explanation is highly speculative. It is certainly true that the forms taken by mental illness vary with its cultural setting. The classical manifestations of hysteria that presented themselves to Freud are now almost never seen, so
that conversion hysteria might be said to be the type
of disorder of his time (and place).

In the context of Büchner's oeuvre, Devereux's theory is lent
some credibility by the fact that both Lenz and Woyzeck were
neglected until they were rediscovered by Gerhardt Hauptmann
(1862-1946). Hauptmann, one of the first German writers to
involve himself with the social issues engendered by
industrialism, delivered a lecture on Büchner to the left-
wing avant-garde literary society Durch in Berlin in 1887,
during which he read passages from Lenz [Goltschnigg 42]. He
was to write in the short Novelle Bahnwärter Thiel a study of
madness and murder which drew heavily on both Lenz and
Woyzeck, and in Der Apostel a short story that explores the
thoughts of a man, possessed with religious mania, traversing
a mountain landscape [ibid. 154-161].

However, interest was still confined to a few. It is
significant that the psychiatrist Robert Gaupp, in his review
of portrayals of madness in art and literature written in
1911, does not mention either Lenz or Woyzeck, or their
author [Gaupp 11-23]. More general acceptance had to await
the interest which the works aroused in the Expressionist
school, with a proliferation of publications of Büchner's
works between 1909 and 1920 [Goltschnigg 48]. There is a
near-coincidence in timing between the publishing of
Bleuler's study of the schizophrenic group of illnesses in
1911 and the first-ever staging of Woyzeck in Munich in November 1913. In this sense, schizophrenia might be said to be an illness whose time had come.

In attempting to explore the question in its first formulation, whence did Büchner derive his insights into schizophrenia, I shall consider five hypotheses:

1. Büchner himself suffered from an illness resembling schizophrenia, and in describing the mental state of Lenz and of Woyzeck, he was describing his own experience.

2. He had the opportunity to observe the illness in a member of his family or in his circle of friends.

3. Büchner trained in medicine and came across cases in the course of his studies.

4. He derived insights from late Aufklärung and Romantic literature, in which madness was an important theme.

5. He had become familiar with accounts of schizophrenia-like illness in the medical literature of his time.

It is necessary immediately to qualify the last three of these hypotheses. The kind of biographical detail that might confirm his familiarity with the works of literature that will be here examined is not available to us. Nor can it be
confidently asserted that, apart from his immediate sources, Clarus and Oberlin, he had studied the psychiatric writings in which descriptions of schizophrenia-like illness were most likely to be found. It need not be demonstrated that Büchner was acquainted with certain works of literature, nor with the writings of the leading psychiatrists. We can only surmise what experience of clinical medicine and psychiatry he might have derived from his time in the medical schools of Straßburg and Gießen from a consideration of the state of medical education during his years there. Nonetheless, examination of the most important medical and literary writings on madness, as well as the nature of medical teaching in that field, will allow an understanding of the intellectual and social climate of Büchner's time in relation to madness, a climate of which he, as the son of a doctor, in a family in which scientific, medical and literary concerns were discussed, would have been deeply aware. Such an investigation will allow us to see which basic assumptions implicit in such discourse were shared by Büchner and where he was breaking new ground.

This enquiry will therefore consist of an analysis of the two major works, Lenz and Woyzeck, in which Büchner treated of madness, examining the immediate sources of these works and the social and personal circumstances which attended their creation. In order to maintain a historical perspective and
in order to allow an assessment of what was unique to Büchner's understanding of madness, this analysis will be preceded by sections dealing with relevant aspects of his life and relationships, his experience of medical education and the writings about mental illness, medical and literary, which had currency in the early decades of the nineteenth century.

Madness in Danton's Tod and Leonce und Lena

It is appropriate at this point to discuss why Büchner's first two plays have been excluded from the present study. Despite the claim that: "Alle Werke Büchners sind auch Chroniken von Erkrankungen" [Dedner 181], there is a critical difference between the treatment of mental illness in the two earlier works and that in Lenz and in Woyzeck.

The madness of Lucile in Danton's Tod, although shown in no more than two brief scenes, is by no means irrelevant to the theme of the play. Kubik likens the first manifestations of her disorder in IV,4 to the mad behaviour of Ophelia, with her snatches of song and fragmented, though meaningful, utterances, and sees this as a "traditionelle Poetisierung des Wahnsinns" [Kubik 16]. It (and indeed the scenes from Shakespeare) may be held to be more than this. Lucile's mad laughter is a defence against the horror of Camille's coming death: "Höre, die Leute sagen du müßtest sterben, und machen dazu so ernsthaftes Gesichter. Sterben! Ich muß lachen über
die Gesichter. Sterben! Was ist das für ein Wort? ...
Sterben! Ich will nachdenken." (Like Woyzeck: "Ich will
drüber nachdenke", she seeks to make sense of a hostile
world.) Camille in IV,5 sees her madness as a paradigm:
"Der Wahnsinn saß hinter ihren Augen. Es sind schon mehr
Leute wahnsinnig geworden, das ist der Lauf der Welt", and as
an escape: "Der Himmel verhelf ihr zu einer behaglichen fixen
Idee. Die allgemeinen fixen Ideen, welche man die gesunde
Vernunft tauft, sind unerträglich langweilig." The idea of a
comfortable delusion finds an ironic echo, at the close of
Leonce und Lena in Valerio's wish for a "kommode Religion".
Unlike Lenz and Woyzeck however, Lucile in her madness,
however significant, does not occupy centre stage, nor does
madness in any other character.

Danton himself is trapped in melancholy inaction of tragic
dimensions; but it is questionable whether he can be regarded
as sick. He shows himself in the first scene to be in love
with death: "Du süßes Grab, deine Lippen sind Totenglocken
... deine Brust mein Grabhügel, und dein Herz mein Sarg."
[I,1]. This is "Poetisierung". His melancholy is existential,
not pathological. Kubik [Kubik 22] writes of ".. Schuldgefühle ...
die seine psychische Zerrütung herbeiführen", but guilt feelings play only a limited part in
the genesis of his melancholy. In his confrontation with
Robespierre [I.6], his references to his failings compared
with Robespierre's virtue are an assertion of humanity rather than an expression of guilt. He is weary of the slaughter and wishes it to end, but here shows little sense of guilt for the Terror he has unleashed. He sets no great store by conscience, which is ".. ein Spiegel, vor dem ein Affe sich quält". He dramatises himself as a kind of Leonce, destined for a tragic rather than an absurd ending: "Das ist sehr langweilig immer das Hemd zuerst und dann die Hosen drüber zu ziehen und des Abends in's Bett und Morgens wieder heraus zu kriechen..." [II,1]. In this state it is preferable to be guillotined, rather than to inflict more carnage by political action. It is only at night, gazing out on to the streets which had witnessed so much slaughter, that Danton confronts the reality of what he had done, tormented by thoughts of the September Terror. But he does not dwell on these thoughts, and finds justification for his actions: ".. das war kein Mord, das war der Krieg nach innen ... Es muß ja Ärgernis kommen, doch wehe dem, durch welchen Ärgernis kommt." Rage over his impotence displaces all thoughts of guilt: "Puppen sind wir von unbekannten Gewalten am Draht gezogen; nichts, nichts wir selbst." [II,5].

When terms like "Krankheitsmotiv" are applied to the play, and "Krankheitssymptomatik" applied to the character of Danton [Kubik 14 and 22], it is important to establish criteria by which illness may be defined. It cannot be said
that the portrayal of Danton represents a realistic picture of depression, and certainly not of any form of madness. Danton is not preoccupied with depressive ruminations of guilt and self-blame; he is too articulate, and his thought, though heavy with disillusion and hopelessness, is expressed with a liveliness of image, not available to the clinically depressed. To argue this is not simply to take an anachronistic definition of illness from modern textbooks. Spieß, writing forty years before Dantons Tod, described obsessional guilt as a source of madness, and Büchner himself was, in Lenz and in Woyzeck, to integrate realistic portrayals of illness into works of powerful imagery.

Kubik argues that the manifestations of mental illness in Dantons Tod are confined to the Dantonist faction, and that it is their "Außenseiterposition" that favours the development of mental breakdown [Kubik 22-26]. It seems more plausible to argue that it is Danton's melancholy, born of disillusion, that has changed him from being a leader of the Revolution to being an outsider. In any case, it is one of the central questions of the play, a question that Büchner leaves us to decide for ourselves, whether it is on the one hand Danton and Lucile, or on the other St.Just, who sees conspiracies everywhere, and the cold and rigid Robespierre, who are the more sick.

To write, as does Kubik, of Leonce und Lena as a
thematisierung der melancholie”, and of büchner as so naming
Leonce’s illness [ibid. 28], is on the one hand to forget
that the piece is a comedy, and on the other to bring into
question the whole definition of illness. The passage on
which the supposed diagnosis of melancholy is based is in act
I, scene 1:

leoncE. daß die Wolken schon seit drei Wochen von Westen
nach Osten ziehen. es macht mich ganz melancholisch.

hofmeister. Eine sehr gegründete Melancholie.

Leaving aside the question of whether büchner is likely to
have made a sycophantic tutor the mouthpiece of his
diagnosis, or indeed whether the author of lenz and Woyzeck
could have made a sick man the subject of his satire, we must
ask whether Leonce’s “symptoms” are typical of melancholia.
Clearly they are not. The whole comedy of the passage, and of
much of the play, consists in the incongruence of Leonce’s
declared state of mind and the reasons he gives for it, as
in: “ich bekomme manchmal eine Angst um mich und könnte mich
in eine Ecke setzen und heiße Tränen weinen aus Mitleid mit
mir” [II,2]. We are invited to laugh at Leonce’s childish
narcissism, and at the same time at the narcissism of our own
often self-centred view of the world.

It is true that Leonce sometimes seems to be on the verge of
losing his hold on reality: “Ich wage kaum die Hände auszu-
strecken, wie in einem Spiegelzimmer, aus Furcht überall
anzustoßen, daß die schönen Figuren in Scherben auf dem
Boden lâgen und ich vor der kahlen, nackten Wand stünde."

[II,1]. However the juxtaposition of Leonce's Angst with Valerio's commonsense "Ich bin verloren" and his parodic "Ich werde mich nächstens in den Schatten meines Schattens stellen" reveals Büchner, not as portraying someone in the grip of depression, but rather as satirising Leonce's alienation, and the alienation of his class, from the real world.

In Dantons Tod madness is a secondary, though integrated, motif to the main political theme of the work. It is neither realistically nor circumstantially portrayed. Its main function is to bring into contrast Lucile's delusion and Danton's disillusion with the more terrible madness of the Terror. In Leonce und Lena, once again disillusion is a central theme of the play but, far from showing madness as a consequence, the author of Der Hessische Landbote is engaged in deflating the Romantic posturing which equated sickness and madness with heightened sensibility. In both plays the focus is on the political-existential situation of the protagonists. In Lenz and in Woyzeck the political-existential dimension remains of importance, but here we are concerned with real sickness, depicted in realistic detail, and this sickness is shown, not merely in its political setting, but in relation to the interpersonal and intra-psychic processes by which it has arisen.
A review of the literature

In the most recent work to examine sources of Georg Büchner's view of madness, Kubik (1991) takes as a starting point Dedner's dictum: "Alle Werke Büchners sind auch Chroniken von Erkrankungen" [Dedner 181]. She extends to Danton's Tod and Leonce und Lena the kind of attention which had been previously limited to Lenz and Woyzeck. She stresses the importance of interpreting the genesis of Büchner's portrayal of madness in the light of the prevailing psychiatric discourse of his time.

Relying on an interpretation which represents that discourse in terms of debate between the so-called Psychiker, those who believed mental illness to be rooted in sin, and the Somatiker, who attributed it to physical causes, she asserts that Büchner was, in Lenz and in Woyzeck, engaged in a critique of the Psychiker view of mental illness and of the treatment methods which they employed. In consequence, both Lenz and Woyzeck are seen to be the victims of a philosophy which was moralizing and rejecting and a treatment method which was physically repressive. This involves some confusion of the Psychiker issue with that of "moral management". In order to sustain the hypothesis, Oberlin and Kaufmann in Lenz are seen as representing medical viewpoints and fulfilling medical rôles, while in Woyzeck Kubik accords to the Doctor a therapeutic status which he would certainly not have accepted.
Like that of Kubik, the present study examines Büchner's view of madness, both in its manifestations and in its causes, in relation to the psychiatric thinking of his time but, after examining sources contemporary with Büchner, comes to a different conclusion concerning the significance of the Psychiker-Somatiker issue and identifies other elements in the psychiatric discourse that may have influenced Büchner's portrayal.

Lenz

Both Pascal (1978) and Swales (1977) demonstrate how Büchner's use of stylistic devices illuminates Lenz's thoughts and feelings, with continuously changing perspectives from objective to subjective which allow access to his inner world while at the same time enabling us to view these inner processes against the realities which surround him. As well as examining style, Kanzog (1975) relates the structure of the Novelle to the progress of Lenz's psychological disintegration. Parker also considers the question of literary style in comparing Büchner's portrayal with that of his source, Oberlin.

Comparison of the Büchner and the Oberlin version receives detailed attention, notably from Hinck (1969) and Pütz (1965), as well as from Knapp (1975) who also sees parallels between Büchner's world view and that of Lenz and the *Sturm und Drang* movement. This theme is taken up by Adey (1990),

In respect of the meaning that may be attached to Büchner's portrayal of madness in Lenz, two main approaches may be recognized, one examining the existential significance of Lenz's state, the other focussing on the portrayal as a realistic picture of illness. In general these approaches remain quite distinct. The most important studies within the latter category remain those by Irle (1965) and Payk (1974), both psychiatrists. Payk's paper is by far the more detailed of the two in listing the types of disturbance manifested by the fictional Lenz, although it fails adequately to illustrate most of these disturbances with reference to the text (a deficiency which the present study attempts to remedy). Both writers limit themselves to questions of clinical accuracy and do not attempt to interpret Lenz's madness in relation to his life situation. A rather different psychiatric approach is exemplified by Kudszus (1979) who explores the influence of such works as Lenz on the evolution of modern approaches to schizophrenia.

Commentators on Lenz's existential state offer various interpretations around the general themes of suffering and Kierkegaardian Angst [Viëtor (1937), Abutille (1969),
Mühlher (1951). Pongs (1935) sees the alienation in theological terms, as separation from God, whereas for Thorn-Prikker (1978) the basic issues are political and he resists what he sees as recent attempts to depoliticize the *Novelle*. Fuchshuber (1980) also focusses on the social dimension and draws parallels with states of alienation in present-day society. A general criticism of such approaches might be that they tend to lack specificity in relation to the text and to take insufficient account of the particular forms that Lenz's disturbance takes.

Both Sharp (1981) and Kubik (1991) relate the course of the poet's deterioration to the social and interpersonal dynamic of his interactions with his environment, especially to his interactions with Oberlin. Kubik, following Dedner (1987) in regarding all Büchner's literary works as in some way *Krankheitsgeschichten*, sees the course of Lenz's illness as exacerbated by Oberlin's failure as therapist, and Büchner as intending a critique of contemporary psychiatry. Sharp, while also giving weight to the dynamic of the relationship between Lenz and Oberlin, sets this in a wider social perspective and is perhaps alone among commentators in allowing importance to both dimensions.

The present study will attempt to examine Lenz's condition as a manifestation of illness in greater detail than is the case with Irle and Payk, while relating the particular
manifestations of that illness to psychodynamic factors implicit in his history and relationships.

Woyzeck

One of the difficulties in examining Büchner's artistic intentions in regard to Franz's madness is that the work remained a fragment, and an important contribution is that by Wetzel (1980), who has traced the evolution of the depiction of madness through the various drafts. However the fact of incompleteness has not in general inhibited commentators from coming to far-reaching conclusions about the significance of madness in the play, and indeed it may be justly claimed that sufficient of the text has come down to us to allow a more than tentative understanding of that significance.

Much more than was the case with Lenz, the medical discourse of the times has relevance to both the genesis of the play, and Büchner's use of his sources, and this is reflected in much of the literature. Much useful background, especially in relation to forensic issues in psychiatry is provided by Walker (1968), Eigen (1985), Marx (1968) and Dörner (1969). A more immediate issue of concern to the case of Woyzeck and Büchner's choice of the murderer as his central character is examined by Schönert in his study of the Kriminalgeschichte in nineteenth century German literature. Reuchlein (1985) contrasts Büchner's attitude to his criminal hero with that of E.T.A. Hoffmann towards the Schmolling case, a case which
is the subject of detailed study by Segebrecht (1978). Kubik (1991) and Henkelmann (1976) both see the case of the historical Woyzeck and Büchner's re-working of the story as set against the background of the so-called *Psychiker-Somatiker* split in German psychiatry. Both also, along with Glück (1985), stress the importance of the Doctor's role in the causation of Franz's madness through his failure to exercise proper care of his patient. These interpretations will be challenged in the present study.

The role of idealist philosophy in influencing both lay and medical views on madness and on the concept of liability before the law is given much attention by commentators, and the *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* of 1795 sets out Kant's views on the latter issue. Both Glück (1985) and Schwedt (1981) see Woyzeck as the victim of a society conditioned in its attitudes by the tenets of idealism. Martens (1957/58) sees the portrayal of Franz in the play as a refutation of the Kantian view of man.

Woyzeck is less rich in examples of schizophrenic thought and feeling than is Lenz and has not attracted the same attention from psychiatrists. Payk (1974) in his study of Woyzeck's psychopathology refers only to the content of Franz's hallucinations and not to his disordered thinking. The present study however attempts to find significance in the
content of his disintegrating thought, both in terms of its relevance to his life situation, and to how it stands in anticipation of modern interpretations of this aspect of schizophrenic illness as diverse as those of Jung (1958), Sullivan (1964) and K. Goldstein (1964).

We have seen in the literature on Lenz how a number of commentators concentrate on an existential interpretation of the poet's madness, and there is a similar emphasis by many writers on Woyzeck. Gundolf (1965), von Wiese (1961) and Grandin (1977-1978) stress the mythic and theological elements in the play, Grandin especially pointing to the apocalyptic quality of much of the language and imagery. Hinck (1969) sees Franz as standing in an elemental relationship to nature to the extent that his own identity becomes overwhelmed, while Hinderer (1977) links his psychological disintegration with powerlessness before the mysteries of "die doppelte Natur". Glück (1985) and Jancke (1979) see him as the victim of oppression; for the former it is political and ideological oppression that is decisive, for the latter the oppression of social conformity and the distortion of human nature involved in the processes of socialization. As has been argued in relation to similar commentaries on Lenz, such interpretations may be criticized for lack of specificity.
Madness in Literature

With regard to literary portrayals of madness before Büch­
nner, Reuchlein's comprehensive Bürgerliche Gesellschaft, Psychiatrie und Literatur (1986) provided valuable commentary, as well as a pointer to which texts might be most profitably studied.

Primary Sources

The present study relies, to a greater extent than most of the works referred to above, on primary sources in relation to the views on madness held by psychiatrists in the half­
century before Büchner wrote Lenz and Woyzeck. Amongst these, the journals edited by Moritz, Reil and Nasse proved a rich source both of descriptions of schizophrenia-like illness and of the theoretical discourse that was being conducted. Henke's Zeitschrift für die Staatsarzneikunde, appearing over a period from before the Woost murder until after Büchner's death, provided both case histories and an on-going account of the debate relevant to the question of Zurechnungsfähigkeit. Reference to texts by Reil, Heinroth, Hoffbauer, Nasse and Ideler demonstrates a move from theologically and somatically based interpretations of madness to a more social and humanistic view, a view that Büchner might be held to have shared.
Attribution of sources
Throughout the present study, reference is made to earlier investigations and to commentaries on the works from a variety of sources. Where this is so, acknowledgement of the source will be made either directly in the text, or in the form of a reference citing author and page number, as in for example: [Leibbrand 134]. Where no such attribution is made, it may be taken that the views expressed or the investigations described are those of the present writer.

Anachronism
When descriptions of illness from an earlier century are under consideration, there is an everpresent danger of misinterpretation arising from the equating of past diagnoses or past descriptions of illness with present-day categories. Thus, it would in general be mistaken to equate melancholia with the present-day concept of depression. In the present study, this has been avoided as far as is possible by trying to equate earlier descriptions with categories used in contemporaneous psychiatric writings.

However deliberate and, it may be argued, justifiable anachronism is used in comparing earlier descriptions of illness with descriptions, or with theories of psychogenesis derived from twentieth century psychiatric texts. This occurs in two contexts. Firstly, it allows some judgement to be made as to whether similar illnesses are being described across a
time interval of a century or more. Secondly, it enables us to see how Büchner and some of his predecessors stand in anticipation of present-day ideas on the sources of madness.

Woyzeck/Franz

Wherever the possibility of confusion exists, the historical Woyzeck will be referred to by his surname and Büchner's character by the forename that is given him in the later drafts of the play, namely Franz.
Büchner's experience of illness

The first hypothesis to be explored, namely that Büchner's insights resulted from his own experience of a schizophrenia-like illness, requires the answer to two questions. Was there anything in his personality to suggest a predisposition to such illness? Do the descriptions of the illnesses suffered by Büchner in 1833-34 suggest a psychotic, or near psychotic state? There have been speculative positive answers to both [Abutille 112, Mühlher 122-123].


*Büchner wrote [SWB II 421] of "Hirnhautentzündung" - meningitis. There is no justification for assuming that the illness of November 1833 was meningo-encephalitis.

Not many would concur with the foregoing pathography in its totality. It is difficult to accept the crude statement of the psychodynamics of the Büchner family - did all the children of these apparently divergent personalities grow up with a mixture of asthenic-sensitive and brutal character traits? - did Georg? Because he portrayed a murder in Woyzeck and self-flagellation in Lenz, did the author of these works himself manifest sado-masochistic tendencies? It may be questioned whether he had a "biologisch physisch abnorm zudeutende Persönlichkeit", mainly because it is difficult to know what the phrase means. At least the authors have explained that "bionegativ" more or less means "pathological" and that they use the term in order to avoid going into definitions of illness.

There remain however the questions of whether Büchner was "pre-morbid for schizophrenia" and even whether he might have

* An obvious error
herself experienced a psychotic breakdown similar to that of J.M.R. Lenz [Kubik 81]. One of the assumptions underlying this kind of postulate is that Büchner "must have" suffered from a psychosis of this nature to have known what it was like [Abutille 112]. Kerner sees "der abartige Leonce, der geisteskrank Lenz und in extenso der hilflos-stumpfe Massenmensch Woyzeck" as "Stigmata einer paranoid-halluzinatorischen Psychose" [Kerner 661] – the act of artistic creation as a psychiatric symptom.

There is, of course, a sense in which "... to describe at any level of intensity is to experience." [Sterne 86]. The implication of this statement is that entry to the experience may at least in part arise from the attempt to describe. This is not the paradox that it might at first seem. For the schizophrenic there is an unbridgeable gap between his inner world (of phantasy) and the outer world of reality, but it is a gap which exists to some degree for all of us: "... the need to bridge the gap is the source of creative endeavour" [Storr 222]. It is a commonplace, but one important to be stated in the context of Büchner about whose psychopathology assumptions are readily made, that we should not equate the author with his works. "One of the reasons that creative people are apt to be labelled neurotic even when they are not is that their psychopathology is also showing; but it is showing in their works, and not in the form of neurotic symptoms. The work is a positive adaptation, whereas neurosis
is a failure in adaptation" [ibid. 254]. The same may be said of psychosis. To be in touch with the mad part of oneself is not to be mad. Indeed to be confronted under stress with the mad part of oneself and to remain sane is a sign of considerable strength. Büttner suggests an identification of author with subject in Lenz to the extent that he "hat sich die Bedrängnisse dichterisch von der Seele geschrieben, um gesund zu bleiben" [Büttner 1967 43-44] - the creative act itself, not as a symptom as Kerner suggests, but as a form of therapy.

What must be considered therefore is not what must have been, but what reasonable conclusions may be drawn from the, regrettably, limited biographical data. Was there anything in Büchner's personality that might suggest that he might be susceptible to a schizophrenic breakdown ("prämorbid disposition für Schizophrenie")? Are there any features of the illnesses he suffered from in the winter of 1833-34 which suggest a psychotic episode, and in particular schizophrenia?

Predisposition to schizophrenia

The kind of person who may under unfavourable circumstances go on to schizophrenic illness is now often described under the term schizoid or borderline personality. Such an individual is said to have "many unfortunate defensive traits that are likely to make a person appear quite peculiar (even though he may often be brilliant or useful in isolated areas)
The capacity to form close relationships is limited. There is little drive towards emotional or active involvement with the outside world. [Beliak 55-57]. When these defensive mechanisms break down (as for instance when Lenz sought to become emotionally involved with Friederike Brion), behaviour and emotions are often wildly inappropriate and the outcome psychologically disastrous.

The psychological defence known as reaction formation whereby an individual attempts to over-compensate against an inner anxiety means that schizoid persons may present a wide variety of faces to the world. Thus they may be withdrawn and have strong feelings of inferiority or be overweening and pedantic. They may be dull and lead inconspicuous lives or may be rebels and martyrs [Weiner 120]. But their inner world is usually characterized by an inability to feel emotion and a sense of estrangement from others. These traits are sometimes said to grow out of the need to ward off hostile feelings [ibid. 120]. There is a disturbance of "perceptual ability" [Beliak 55], such that the individual's picture of the world and his understanding of others becomes to some degree distorted.

Such a person requires a favourable environment to retain some appearance of normality. Change of environment or other stress can bring about breakdown, manifested by the "emergence of full-blown delusions of obviously long
Büchner certainly showed some character traits which seem to resemble those that have been attributed to the schizoid personality, and he has been described as one who was continuously on the verge of breakdown save that "... die Besessenheit nicht zum sichtbaren Ausbruch gelangt." [Büttner 1948 103]. He was seen by many of his fellow students as peculiar, an outsider. That, to the beer-swilling apolitical extraverts among his fellow students at Gießen, he was a figure to be mocked [Johann 54], is not perhaps surprising. Yet the members of the Burschenschaft, who might have been expected to see in him a sympathetic ally, also found him remote. Differences in their respective political aims may have in part accounted for this, but Carl Vogt, one of Büchner's teachers, more closely shared his political views — he would very shortly follow Büchner into exile — and he too found him unapproachable: "Offen gestanden, dieser Georg Büchner war uns nicht sympathisch. Er trug einen hohen Zylinderhut, der ihm immer tief unten im Nacken saß, machte beständig ein Gesicht wie eine Katze, wenn's donnert, hielt sich gänzlich abseits, verkehrte nur mit einem etwas verlotterten und verlumpten Genie, August Becker, gewöhnlich nur 'der rote August' genannt." [Carl Vogt: Aus meinem Leben, quoted in Johann 54]. This association with Becker, who seems to have been held to be a very strange individual, doubtless heightened the impression of Büchner himself as odd.
Far from being passive and without drive, Büchner was instrumental in founding a branch of the Gesellschaft der Menschenrechte in Gießen in March 1834, and active in involving others. On the other hand, engaging in what for his time were extreme, and dangerous, political actions is fully compatible with being a schizoid outsider.

There is a telling account of Büchner's lectures at Zürich on comparative anatomy. The audience usually numbered about twenty. Büchner's presentation was clear and intellectually stimulating. He avoided the rhetoric and exaggeration that typified the "naturphilosophische Schule". He showed great attention to detail in his anatomical demonstrations which he always prepared himself. He was very reserved (zurückgezogen), but according to Lüning: "Wer mit dieser Feuerseele einmal in Berührung kam, dem schwand sie nicht wieder aus der Errinnerung." He could be vigorous, even over-vigorous in disputation. Lüning writes of ".... eine gewisse, äußerst dedizierte Bestimmtheit in Aufstellung von Behauptungen, die zwar von hoher Selbstständigkeit des Urteils zeugte, zuweilen aber doch ein wenig über das Ziel hinausschoß." Büchner here stands revealed as an introverted, disputatious individual, with considerable personal charisma, no doubt the same charisma which enabled him to lead others into dangerous political activity.

There is certainly considerable evidence in the person of Georg Büchner of a number of schizoid traits. If this strange and apparently isolated young man, who was moreover a rebel and nearly a martyr, could be shown to feel estranged from the world and to be impaired in his "perceptual ability", to be passive and without any drive towards active involvement with those around him, then there might be a case for holding him to be a schizoid individual, and therefore at risk for schizophrenia.

However, nearly all the evidence negates this possibility. If, at Gießen, he formed no close relationships, he had been only a few months previously in Straßburg been involved in a circle of friends with whom he shared lively political and philosophical interests. He had gone on walking tours with the Stöber brothers, to whom he continued to write in affectionate terms. His apparent isolation at Gießen may have indicated no more than his disappointment that the Hessian city was no Straßburg. Even after his return from Straßburg to Darmstadt, it is clear that he became outgoing and lively in congenial company. In October 1833, before his first matriculation at Gießen, he made an excursion to accompany one of his Straßburg friends, Alexis Muston, in the direction of Heidelberg. Muston's description of him at this time is far from that of a schizoid individual: "... coeur d'or en tout; fort instruit; assez gai, même aimable, on ne pouvait s'ennuyer avec lui." [Fischer, H. 274].
Finally, his letters again and again show evidence of a warmth of feeling, if at times combined with a capacity for intellectual detachment, that does not suggest the withdrawn individual that he was sometimes perceived to be. There is evidence that, even when he was most isolated, he never felt estranged from others. In his letter to his parents of February 1834, probably in response to a reproach over apparent arrogance on his part, he affirms his sense of humanity: "Ich verachte Niemanden, am wenigsten wegen seines Verstandes oder seiner Bildung... Der Verstand nun gar ist nur eine sehr geringe Seite unseres geistigen Wesens und die Bildung nur eine sehr zufällige Form desselben... Man nennt mich einen Spötter. Es ist wahr, ich lache oft, aber ich lache nicht darüber wie jemand ein Mensch, sondern nur darüber, daß er ein Mensch ist... und lache darüber mich selbst, der ich sein Schicksal teile" [SWB II 422-423]. It is true that schizoid individuals can relate to humanity in the abstract, while remaining distant from any individual; all the evidence suggests that Büchner could feel warmly towards the generality of mankind, and to his betrothed, his near friends, such as August Stöber, and to his family. He was no extravert, but neither was he markedly schizoid.

Episodes of illness
While warning against "unreflektierter Biographismus", Kubik discovers in the letters of the crisis period of 1833-34,
viewed in their totality, parallels with the depiction of illness in Büchner's literary work [Kubik 82 and 80]. Whatever the merits of this claim, detailed examination of the letters in which the writer describes his experience of illness by no means demonstrates how Büchner achieved his insights into the madness he portrayed in Woyzeck and in Lenz. What was that experience of illness, and in what terms was it described?

It is now widely accepted that even such clearly somatic illnesses as appendicitis are more likely to occur in an individual who has experienced a number of significant life events in a relatively short time. The summer and autumn of 1833 were for Büchner full of significant life events. The end of his time as a student at Straßburg coincided closely with his engagement to Minna Jaeglé, the daughter of his Straßburg landlord. The emotions which would normally attach to such an event were charged more deeply by the fact that he must almost immediately leave her, and that the engagement must for the time remain secret. In addition to the leaving behind of friends and sweetheart, there was now the added stress of settling in Gießen and trying to establish new friendships there, an endeavour which we have seen was by no means successful. The fragments of letters dating from this time give no indication of his feelings and it is only in December 1833, after his first illness, that he can write to
his Straßburg friend, August Stöber: "Ich wollte Dich nicht auch in's Lazarett führen und so schwieg ich. Du magst entscheiden ob die Erinnerung an 2 glückliche Jahre, und die Sehnsucht nach All dem, was sie glücklich machte oder ob die widrigen Verhältnisse, unter denen ich hier lebe, mich in die unglückseelige Stimmung setzen." [SWB II 421]. The circumstance implied in this letter, that he could not earlier give expression to his feelings of misery, may have enhanced the capacity of this succession of adverse life events to produce illness.

There may also have been some unresolved tension between Büchner and his parents. Indeed between a twenty-year old and the parents on whom he was still more or less totally dependent this would not have been surprising. But the apparently still unchallenged assumption that Georg would follow a medical career would have been at odds with his already growing absorption in politics, literature and science. Moreover it is not clear why the engagement with Minna had to remain concealed from his family. Stern writes here of an "unnecessary secretiveness" [Stern 84], suggesting that, by the time of the return to Darmstadt in late summer 1833, all obstacles to his engagement might have been held to have disappeared. The implication is that this brought to the fore anxieties in Büchner concerning the possible reaction of his parents to his sexual involvement.
If he were indeed "premorbid for schizophrenia", then all these difficult circumstances might have disposed him to psychotic breakdown. Illness did come, but took a rather different form.

Weakened by these long weeks under stress, Büchner moved to Gießen where he succumbed to meningitis, presumably viral, given its relatively mild course - "im Entstehen unterdrückt" [SWB II 421]. Although physically drained - "5 Wochen brachte ich daselbst halb im Bett und halb im Dreck zu" - he retained his intellectual vigour throwing himself into the study of philosophy, with a lively regard for its applicability to human existence: "... die Kunstsprache ist abscheulich, ich meine für menschliche Dinge müsse man auch menschliche Ausdrücke finden..." [ibid. 421]. He expresses his anger and frustration over political oppression and the meek subservience of the oppressed. Although viral illness can sometimes lead to prolonged and severe depression, it is clear that the letter to August Stöber of 9 December 1833 is not the letter of a depressed man, but of one growing in strength and confidence after a debilitating illness.

It is not until February of the following year that some depressed feelings surface in a letter to Minna: "Ich bin allein, wie im Grabe... Meine Freunde verlassen mich... in neuen Zeiten kann ich kaum Jemand starr anblicken, ohne daß mir die Tränen kamen." [ibid. 423]. Yet the rather dramatized
terms in which these feelings are expressed suggest that the depression was not too profound. It is in the following month that Büchner's mental balance began to be severely threatened, beginning (as do so many medical and literary descriptions of madness of the time) with fever: "Der erste helle Augenblick seit acht Tagen. Unaufhörliches Kopfweh und Fieber, die Nacht kaum einige Stunden dürftiger Ruhe.... ein beständiges Auffahren aus dem Schlaf und ein Meer von Gedanken, in denen mir die Sinne vergehen ... Ich erschrak vor mir selbst. Das Gefühl des Gestorbenseins war immer über mir. Alle Menschen machten mir das hippokratische Gesicht, die Augen verglast, die Wangen wie von Wachs, und wenn dann die ganze Maschinerie zu leiern anfing, die Gelenke zuckten, die Stimme herausknarrte und ich das ewige Orgellied herumtrillern hörte und die Wälzchen und Stiften im Orgelkasten hüpfen und drehen sah ..." [ibid. 424]. These symptoms suggest a temporary depersonalisation, and this has been held to indicate a schizophrenic episode [Mühlher 122-123]. If the symptoms experienced by Büchner are truly psychotic, they are, however, more suggestive of pathological depression. Jaspers* writes that in such depression: "Alles ist nicht mehr vorhanden, ist bloße Täuschung, ist bloß vorgemacht. Alle Menschen sind tot. Die Welt ist nicht mehr. Was an Ärzten und Angehörigen herantritt, das sind bloß 'Figuranten'". This comes close to

*Psychologie der Weltanschauungen 265, cited in Mühlher 126
Büchner's perception that everyone around him had the Hippocratic facies, the features of impending death. (There is a remarkable parallel to Büchner's description of his experience in a psychiatric textbook published two years after his letter: "Es ist als ob der Melancholische nur Leichenzüge, die bleichen Gespenster des Elends und der Noth vor sich erblickte, und vor seine Augen die Phantasmagorien ängstlicher, schwerer Traüme schwebten..." [Ideler 1836 606-607].)

Yet the broken sleep, confusion, distorted vision and hallucinated sounds suggest rather an acute delirium associated with fever than psychosis. This tends to be confirmed by his ability, within a day of the episode ending, to distance himself from the experience, even to make a joke of it: "Ich hätte Herrn Callot-Hoffmann sitzen können, nicht wahr, meine Liebe? Für das Modellieren hätte ich Reisegeld bekommen. Ich spüre, ich fange an, interessant zu werden." [SWB II 424].

Nonetheless, this illness seems to have triggered off a depression with some confusion and exhaustion and a sense of being cut off from his feelings: "Meine geistige Kräfte sind ganz zerrüttet. Arbeiten ist mir unmöglich, ein dumpfes Brüten hat sich meiner bemeistert, in dem mir kaum ein Gedanke noch hell wird. Alles verzehrt sich in mir selbst; hätte ich ein Weg für mein Inneres, aber ich habe keinen
Schrei für den Schmerz, kein Jauchzen für die Freude, keine Harmonie für die Seligkeit. Dies Stummsein ist mein Verdammnis" [ibid. 425]. "Geisteszerrüttungen" was the word chosen by Reil to represent mental illness in the title of his Rhapsodien of 1803, and the juxtaposition of "geistig" with "zerrüttet" may indicate that Büchner had some inkling here that his own mental health was endangered. Certainly the sense expressed in this passage that there were feelings locked inside that he could not get in touch with, together with an inner coldness: "Lies meine Briefe nicht – kalte, träge Worte" [ibid. 425], is as close as one comes to a schizophrenic element in Büchner's thought and affect.

However the main impression, heightened by comparison with Muston's description of him during the previous October [see above] is of a deeply depressive mood, and this is reinforced by the letter written, again to Minna a few days later, the much commented on "Fatalismus-Brief". The political nihilism of the earlier part of the letter need not be dwelt on here. What is relevant to the nature of Büchner's illness is the emotional flatness and feelings of emptiness which suggest a considerable degree of disturbance: "Ich habe nicht einmal die Wollust des Schmerzes. Seit ich über die Rheinbrücke ging, bin ich wie in mir vernichtet, ein einzelnes Gefühl taucht nicht in mir auf. Ich bin ein Automat: die Seele ist mir genommen." [ibid. 426]. Again the
mood is depressive. The reference to the "Rheinbrücke" points to the focus of the depression, so that we are entitled to think of the illness as reactive, that is, a grief reaction that has intensified and become almost autonomous.

There is a further reference to illness in a letter to his parents the following month, where he blames circumstances in Gießen for bringing him so low [ibid. 429], but he was able to return there for the summer semester, and his letters from then on show the liveliest interest in political events and he seems to remain cheerful, even in the face of danger to himself and his friends. In a letter of 2 July, he combines concern over the conviction of Schulz (who will later help to care for him in his last illness), with a scornful joke at the expense of the Archduke's political police [ibid. 429-430]. In the meantime he has been engaged with the writing and distribution of Der Hessische Landbote. In August 1834 he was the subject of investigation by Georgi, the prosecuting commissioner for the University at Gießen. It is as if the threat, and the excitement of being under threat, helped to lift him out of his depression.

It is even possible that he sought excitement in order that, by means of immersing himself in dangerous political activity, he would fill the emptiness of depression. "Büchners Schritt zum Handeln ist neben aller politischen Leidenschaft ein Versuch seelischer Rettung" [Büttner 1948
For Kerner, who holds that Büchner showed signs of a personality change following the attack of meningitis, the desperate political activity was a means of escaping the medical studies he had come to detest. Already "unter einem merkwürdigen Verfolgungswahn stehend", Büchner is said to have thereby perverted the course of his life in order to become persecuted [Kerner 658], thus achieving a self-fulfilling prophecy. A less convoluted argument might be that it was the experience of being persecuted that allowed him to empathize with the paranoid feelings of a Woyzeck.

From the foregoing it will be clear that Büchner suffered from some form of mental disturbance in the spring of 1834, which was probably of the nature of a depression, perhaps triggered off by a febrile illness. There is no evidence to suggest that it was any form of schizophrenia. Equally there is no evidence that there were any psychotic symptoms, except of a very transient nature during a fever-induced delirium. The most persuasive argument against Büchner having experienced a schizophrenic illness, however, lies in his subsequent history. Within the next three years, beginning with the writing of Dantons Tod, he entered into a period of fruitful artistic and scientific endeavour that has few parallels in the annals of genius. The outcome consisted of two major, and one not inconsiderable, dramas, a Novelle not
only of profound insight but brilliant technical innovation, and two widely-praised scientific papers. At the same time as he was engaged in his anatomical research, he was preparing a lecture course in German and classical philosophy. Intellectual and creative activity is by no means incompatible with the schizoid personality or even with schizophrenic illness, but such activity is likely to be sporadic and the product to be limited in its range and tending towards the fantastic. The sustained vigour and breadth of vision which produced both *Lenz* and *Über Schädelnerven*, the realism that permeates *Woyzeck* throughout the exploration of a deranged mind, all these are beyond the reach of one who has recently had a schizophrenic illness.

There remains the question, raised by Lange-Eichbaum and Kurth (see above), as to whether Büchner's death, said by his medical attendants to have been due to "Faulfieber", might have been due to suicide. There is evidence that at times after his move to Zürich he felt deeply unhappy. Apart from yet another separation from Minna, he believed (mistakenly) that his old friend and fellow-radical Minnegerode was dead [SWB II 462]. He was also likely to have been exhausted by the intellectual labours which he was undertaking, literary and scientific work, as well as preparation for teaching. All this, however, is inadequate reason to believe that he was suicidally depressed. On the contrary, a letter to Minna a
month before his death, shows a playful sense of phantasy: 

"Ich sehe dich immer so halb durch zwischen Fischschwänzen,
Froschzehen u.s.w. Ist das nicht rührender, als die
Geschichte von Abalard, wie sich ihm Heloise zwischen die
Lippen und das Gebet drängt? O, ich werde jeden Tag
poetischer, alle meine Gedanken schwimmen in Spiritus."

[ibid. 463]. A week later he writes of "die Freude am
Schaffen meiner poetischen Produkte" [ibid. 463], and a week
later still, in his last dated letter, he is looking forward
to moving into a new apartment with views of the lakes and
mountains [ibid. 464]. None of this suggests the state of
mind of someone with suicidal intent.

If suicide it was, then the only way this might have been
possible was by poisoning. (Kerner has suggested the
possibility of arsenical poisoning [Kerner 660]). However
seventeen days elapsed between the fairly sudden onset of the
final illness and death. Any poison would have had to be
taken very early in the illness, since he was in no condition
to administer more in the later stages. A slow-acting poison
would be very uncertain in its effects and would be an
unlikely choice for someone with Büchner's scientific
knowledge. The remission in the illness which occurred around
the eighth day is against the hypothesis of poisoning, unless
a further dose were administered at about that time which
would have been practically difficult and psychologically
improbable.
The diagnosis of typhus was made retrospectively, by the physician Lüning, only in 1877 [ibid. 660]. (Though Lüning knew Büchner and attended his lectures, he did not attend him in his final illness). The doctors who were in attendance, Zehnder and Schönlein spoke of "Faulfieber", an unspecified enteric fever. Schönlein was an acknowledged authority on the enteric fevers and wrote a book on typhus. He would have been aware of the symptoms of arsenical poisoning and was unlikely to have been mistaken as to his diagnosis. Furthermore, Haeser in his history of epidemic diseases describes an "exanthomatische Typhus" which occurred in isolated outbreaks in Central and Eastern Europe throughout the 1830's. A major outbreak in Great Britain in 1836-8 carried a recorded mortality of 10-16% [Haeser 671-685]. This illness, probably typhoid fever (typhoid and typhus were not recognized as separate diseases until the 1850's), may well have been the one of which Georg Büchner died. The evidence against the possibility of suicide is well-nigh overwhelming.

We have considered whether Büchner might have experienced a psychotic illness, and whether the undoubted psychological disturbance of 1833-34 might have been some form of schizophrenia. It is likely that the experience, albeit transient, of depersonalization and hallucination enabled him to empathize with the suffering of the psychotic Lenz and Woyzeck. However if, as has been here argued, it was not
schizophrenia*, then it is unlikely that the empathy would have extended to an insight into the disturbance of thought and feeling that characterizes that illness and that Büchner so profoundly understood. It is necessary to continue the search for the sources of this understanding elsewhere.

**Illness in Büchner's family**

The second hypothesis to be investigated is that Büchner saw in one or more of those close to him the progress of a schizophrenic illness and drew on this experience in writing *Woyzeck* or *Lenz*.

Within his family, only his parents and his two next-oldest siblings, Mathilde, two years younger, and Wilhelm, a year younger still, need be considered. The next surviving child, Luise, was only fifteen when her brother died, and only thirteen when he left home for the last time.

Neither his father nor his mother appear to have suffered anything remotely resembling a psychotic illness. Ernst Büchner had a successful career, vigorously pursued. He was "ein tüchtiger Arzt" and earned his promotion to

* If one were seeking a more accurate diagnostic label to characterise Büchner's psychological condition, then the combination of tendency to depression with episodes of hyperactivity and sleeplessness ("Ich sitze am Tage mit dem Scalpell, und die Nacht mit den Büchern." Letter of end November 1836 [SWB II 463]) would rather suggest hypomania. But given the quality of what came out of these episodes of hyperactivity, the degree of disturbance could not have been very severe.
Medizinalrat through his skill and diligence, and not through any family connections. He became a respected member of the political and medical establishment of Darmstadt [H. Mayer 30-31]. His devotion to his patients, and his equal dedication to medical science, inspired in his eldest son both admiration and a wish to emulate, a wish which co-existed uneasily with Georg's need to rebel [White 370-372].

Paranoid illness, such as Woyzeck's, often manifests itself in the forties, Ernst Büchner's age when Georg was growing to adulthood. It is true that a paranoid personality is often capable of a degree of worldly success. But there is nothing that we know of Ernst Büchner's interactions with his family or with the rest of the world to suggest anything faintly resembling psychosis. The most direct and revealing evidence of his character and his view of his world comes in his letter to Georg of 18 December 1836. This was clearly intended to express his wish for reconciliation, but reveals a remote individual to whom the expression of loving feelings did not come easily. He declares himself to be a caring father, but shows that the caring is conditional: "Nachdem Du nun aber mir den Beweis geliefert, daß Du diese Mittel nicht mutwillig oder leichtsinnig vergeudet .... sondern wirklich zu Deinem wahren Besten angewendet und ein gewisses Ziel erreicht hast, von welchem Standpunkte aus Du weiter...

*"Mittel" refers to the allowance which he had always paid "pünktlich"
A certain miserliness shows itself in Ernst Büchner's inability to tell Georg of the Christmas present he is sending him without mentioning in the same sentence how much it cost. Yet, however remote and authoritarian the father may have been, there is a sense of pride in his eldest son's achievement: "Ich bin recht begierig zu hören, wie es Dir bisher mit Deinen Vorlesungen ergangen...". [SWB II 500-501]. It is only affection that is painfully locked away. This is the letter of an emotionally deprived man who is continually aware of the need rigidly to control both inner feelings and the behaviour of others. There is, however, not a trace of paranoia.

Büchner's mother, Caroline Louise, is equally unlikely to have provided a source of her son's knowledge of schizophrenia. Again it is a letter written to Georg on learning of his safe arrival in Zürich that is most revealing. It is full of a sense of relief that he seems to be finally out of danger, and retails family news in a lively and spontaneous way. It is revealing, too, of the quality of her marriage: ".. denn obgleich wir uns gegenseitig nichts sagten; so hatten wir alle große Angst, und wir glaubten kaum
daß Du glücklich über die Grenze kommen würdest." It is difficult to suppose, given the tone of the rest of the letter, that it was she who was responsible for the unwillingness to talk about anxieties about Georg [ibid. 497-498]. Rather, it suggests that Ernst not only kept a tight rein on his own feelings but powerfully inhibited the expression of emotion by all the members of the family.

A further insight into the family dynamic and into her mother's personality is given by Louise Büchner, Georg's younger sister, in her largely biographical novel Ein Dichter. The mother, Luise in the novel, is portrayed as a gentle, caring woman whose continual concern is to resolve the tensions that arise between Ludwig (Georg) and his father. On the day of the Cato oration, Ludwig's father is concerned with the impression this will make on his fellow-citizens, the mother, however, identifies intensely with her son's nervousness: "... aber würde er gut sprechen, würde er nicht aufhören müssen? Dieser Gedanke beklemmte besonders das Herz der Mutter, welche die Schüchternheit ihres Ludwigs nur zu gut kannte..." [Luise Büchner 35]. Even allowing for the sentimentality of the portrayal, the picture emerges of a woman of great warmth and inner strength: "Was hatte sie nicht schon gelitten, wie viel gebeten, wie viel vermittelt, um den heftig aufstrebenden Sohn und den strengen entschiedenen Vater gegenseitig in gutem Einvernehmen zu
erhalten." [ibid. 74]. In the face of such a difficult situation, anyone with schizoid tendencies would have withdrawn.

Mathilde, two years younger than Georg, is the only one of his siblings of whom little is known, and it is probable that as the older daughter of the family she was expected to assume considerable responsibility for her younger brothers and sister, when her mother was unable to do so. There is no suggestion that she went spectacularly mad, but rather devoted her long life to the kind of good works expected of an unmarried woman of her social class [Johann 13].

Wilhelm, born in 1816, is an equally unlikely candidate for schizophrenia, and his career suggests a confident extravert, rather than a withdrawn schizoid personality. As a pharmaceutical chemist, he carried out successful research in the production of artificial dyes, he was enough of an entrepreneur to capitalize on his discovery, and rounded off a successful career by becoming an elected representative both to the Hessian Landtag and the German Reichstag [ibid. 13].

It is reasonable to conclude that, if Büchner did have the opportunity to observe the progress of a schizophrenic illness at close hand, it was not in his own family.
Illness in Büchner's friends

It would not be possible within the scope of this work to examine the biographies of all of Büchner's acquaintances to determine whether any had, to Büchner's knowledge, suffered from any significant mental disturbance. However, there are three individuals, well-known to him, in whom such disturbance may at one time have occurred: Weidig, his collaborator in the writing of Der Hessische Landbote, his friend from schooldays Karl Minnigerode, and a fellow-student at Gießen and fellow-conspirator August Becker.

Friedrich Ludwig Weidig was Büchner's senior by twenty-two years, and the relationship between the two was probably determined by their common purpose rather than any feelings of deep friendship. Politically, Weidig was a rather reluctant revolutionary, feeling himself forced into a more radical position by the failure of his hopes for liberal, constitutional reform following the Bundestag resolutions of June and July 1832 [Schaub 121]. He remained devoted to the idea of compromise. In Becker's description in his evidence before the court hearing of 1 September 1837: "Er war unter den Republikanern republikanisch und unter den Constitutionellen constitutionell" [ibid. 178]. His personal life was conventional, given his situation as the central figure of political opposition in Oberhessen; a family man, he combined the duties of schoolmaster in the Lateinschule at
Butzbach with the pastorate of the local Lutheran church, where the content of his sermons was as often political as theological. This essentially sane and humane, if fervent, man ended his life in prison, after being subjected for two years to physical and psychological cruelty including solitary confinement. Suicide in such circumstances is a sign of desperation rather than madness. Even if in the end Weidig did become psychotic, it is impossible that Büchner could have known of the circumstances as he himself died four days before his former collaborator [ibid. 134].

Büchner did know something of the circumstances of the breakdown experienced by his friend from schooldays, Karl Minnegerode. A letter written in early August 1835 shows that he not only had news of the cruelties perpetrated on his friend, but some insight into what the psychological effects were likely to be: "Daß Minnegerode in Friedberg eine Zeit lang Ketten an den Händen hätte, weiß ich gewiß... Er soll tödlich krank sein: wolle der Himmel, daß seine Leiden ein Ende hätten ... ich wäre in so einem Loch verrückt geworden." [SWB II 445-446]. Minnegerode's eventual release in May 1837 was on the grounds of mental and physical illness. However, as was the case with Weidig, if this illness took the form of a psychosis, then it was likely to have been as the result of severe and prolonged maltreatment in prison, and Büchner would not have been on hand to observe its effects. Cert-
ainly Minnegerode's subsequent history, death in ripe old age after a successful career in the United States as University teacher and clergyman [Schaub 135-136], would not suggest any special predisposition to mental illness. In many respects, the most likely candidate for schizophrenia in Büchner's immediate circle was his fellow-student at Gießen, August Becker. He had a reputation for eccentricity and seemed, rather like Büchner in his Gießen days, to have been somewhat isolated [Johann 54 and 64]. Like Minnegerode, he emigrated to America, and his career there, encompassing work as a circus acrobat and itinerant preacher [Schaub 136], suggests a degree of precariousness that could have been psychological as well as economic. (One thinks of the precarious existence led by Lenz in Russia in his last years.) However, he survived a prolonged period of hostile investigation following the break-up of the 1835 conspiracy, and the testimony he gave before an extended series of hearings between September and November 1837 [ibid. 176-182] reveals a mixture of shrewdness, composure and courage that gives an impression of considerable psychological strength in a highly stressful situation.

Again it seems that there is no evidence of any of Büchner's closest friends and associates having suffered a schizophrenia-like illness.
The accuracy and insight with which Büchner portrayed the psychotic collapse of his protagonists in both *Lenz* and *Woyzeck* have been frequently attributed to his experience as a medical student [Sharp 256, Jens 1964 267, Büttner 1967 82-83, Payk 105]. Kubik writes of Büchner's "medizinisch-fachlichen Kenntnisstand über psychische Krankheiten" [Kubik 7]. Such assertions are not backed by any reference to the state of university education in general in the 1830's, nor to the particular state of medical education in Giessen in the years 1833-1835, the years when Büchner was following his clinical studies there. What would his experience of medical education most likely have been, especially in relation to mentally ill patients?

Strasbourg, where his studies began, was one of the three *Écoles de Santé* (the others being at Paris and Montpellier) founded in 1794. There, under the new order of teaching instituted by Fourcroy, students were taught in the wards from their first day, even before they had a knowledge of anatomy or physiology. Fourcroy's summary of his method was: "Peu lire, beaucoup voir, beaucoup faire." The schools were thus devoted to the education of practical doctors and were divorced from universities and research institutes. Diagnosis was based on clinical observation including percussion and auscultation, backed up by the use of statistics and
anatomical pathology. Humoral theories as to the origins of disease were discarded and replaced by those based on localised pathology, the focus shifting from the symptom to the lesion. Cabanis and Bichat emphasised the influence of social conditions on disease [Ackerknecht 1957 1361-1363].

Thus, Strasbourg must have offered even first-year students the opportunity of contact with patients, but there is no evidence that mental illness was the subject of study by undergraduates. In any case, by the time Büchner became a student, the progress of medical education in France had become reversed with the growing influence of F.J.V. Broussais (1772-1838), who insisted there were no diseases, only symptoms, and that all were due to inflammation of the gastro-intestinal tract [Ackerknecht 1957 1364, Guthrie, D. 297].

In Germany, standards in the medical schools varied widely from place to place. Under the influence of Schelling's Naturphilosophie, vitalism became a dominant scientific philosophy [Puschmann 442-443]. This "by no means neglected the study of the special functions and component parts of the body, and did not ... make use of the soul to explain all, even the simplest, processes of life, but only had recourse to it to elucidate the ultimate active causes at work in the animal organism." [ibid. 462]. Practitioners of mesmerism and homeopathy claimed that their methods of cure acted directly
Nonetheless, there were significant departures from the dominance of Naturphilosophie. At Breslau in the 1820's and 1830's, Purkyne developed an experimentally based teaching of physiology, histology, human and comparative anatomy. He moved beyond the traditional lecture-demonstration and placed his students in the position of making their own observations and conducting their own experiments [Coleman 39-40].

Thus, it cannot be said that there was any generally accepted philosophy underlying medical science in German universities, and to understand Büchner's experience it will be necessary to examine the prevailing intellectual climate at Gießen (see below).

The teaching of psychiatry
With regard to psychiatry, there was little formal teaching anywhere in the first half of the nineteenth century. In Britain, Battie lectured at St.Luke's in London as early as 1753, but this was not continued by his successors. In the 1820's Sir Alexander Morison instituted lectures in both Edinburgh and London. Outside these capital cities, however, there was no formal instruction in mental illness, until 1842, when Conolly began to teach at the Hanwell Asylum in the Midlands [Dörner 119-121].

In Germany, it is likely that, at least in some medical
schools, students received tuition in mental illness somewhat earlier than in the United Kingdom. For instance, J.H.F. Autenrieth occupied the Chair of Anatomy and Surgery at Tübingen in the early years of the century, but soon became more interested in mental illness. He held an eclectic view in relation to psychopathology, which he held never to be the result of physical causes alone nor from "Seelenleiden" alone: "... er entsteht nur denn, wenn unglücklicherweise beydes zusammentrifft..."*

Reil taught at Halle, though not systematically, and Nasse, Reil's pupil, began systematic teaching at Bonn in 1834 [Eulner 260]. As Professor of Medicine there, Nasse made a significant contribution to medical education with his insistence that his students familiarize themselves with family, social and occupational aspects of the lives of their patients. To this end he encouraged them to study few cases in depth, rather than to have superficial knowledge of many [Schipperges 1981 111]. Earlier, at Halle, where he directed an asylum with 32 beds, he had spent one hour each day presenting the patients there to students [Marx 1991 11]. By contrast, in most centres where psychiatry was taught, this happened without exposing students to actual patients.

Concerning medical teaching at Würzburg in the 1830's, Rieger* writes: "Also ein gewaltiges Wesen und Lesen über Psychiatrie, aber offenbar rein aus Büchern und Papier, ohne jede Anschauung."

One reason for this divorce of theory and practice may have been that the new institutions for the insane were mostly located in places remote from the medical schools, in disused castles and monasteries. Another may have been that the practising psychiatrists did not wish their methods to be observed. The Julius-Spital at Würzburg was in the heart of the city, but the doctor in charge, Anton Müller, would not allow students on the wards, as he claimed they would disturb the quietness necessary to the care of patients [Eulner 259]. Those who, in the early years, taught psychiatry in the universities and wrote textbooks often had little experience of looking after patients [Marx 1990 363-364, 377, 380]. In only one centre, Heidelberg, was there an attempt to initiate teaching in the context of a University clinic caring for a large number of patients. This happened in 1827, under Groos, but it failed to become an effective teaching unit and by 1836 tuition in psychiatry had

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It is clear that in the first half of the nineteenth century what a medical student learnt about psychiatry depended on which university he attended and that, wherever he was, he would gain little or no experience of actual cases. It would not be until the later years of the century, with the development of a science of neuro-pathology and of the theories developed by Eduard Hitzig concerning the localization of brain function, that psychiatry became widely recognized as an acceptable subject of academic study [Eulner 260].

Teaching at Gießen

What can be said of Büchner's own medical education at Gießen from October of 1833 to March 1835?

It is likely that teaching in relation to mental illness was non-existent. (The first academic appointment in psychiatry at Gießen did not come until 1876, when Karl Spammer was made Privatdozent [Eulner 673]). Dörner gives an extensive list of those German universities which, in the 1830's and 1840's, were beginning to pay some attention to such illness, though often in a speculative way, "innerhalb naturphilosophischer und religiöser Systeme, vorgetragen von Ärzten oder Philosophen oder von solchen, die beides waren"
Dörner 303). Gießen does not figure in the list, although one of Büchner's teachers, J.B. Wilbrand is said to have been one of those instrumental in rediscovering mesmerism for Germany [ibid. 304]. We have seen that the vogue for mesmerism was related to vitalism, and thus to Naturphilosophie. And it is most probable, if other accounts of Wilbrand's methods are to be believed, that, if he did use mesmerism in his teaching, it was more likely to have been for effect rather than substance.

If Wilbrand adhered to the Romantic tradition, another teacher at Gießen, Justus von Liebig, was at the forefront of the scientific revolution which had begun around 1820 [McLelland 152]. He was the founder of physiological chemistry [Guthrie, D. 276] and, as an experimenter studying the effects of diet in soldiers, he was to provide the basis for an important theme in Woyzeck.

It is clear that medical teaching at Gießen embraced the most conservative, as well as the most advanced, philosophies of science and medicine. In the person of another of Büchner's teachers, the two tendencies co-existed. G.F.W. Balser taught, first as supernumerary Professor of Medicine, later in the Chair of Anatomy and Surgery, from 1804 until his death in 1846. That he was well known to Büchner as a declared radical is clear from a letter to his parents of 19 November 1833: "Gestern war ich bei dem Bankett zu Ehren der..."

Whereas notes taken at Baiser's lectures in 1817 [Handrack 260-264] show the great stress laid on polarity, irritability and sensibility in the genesis of disease (all concepts derived from the theories of John Brown [see below - Chapter Four]), by 1830 there is something of a contradiction in Baiser's thought. The content of his lecture courses demonstrates greater attention to the details of pathological anatomy (ibid. 321-323), arguing a more empirically based approach. Furthermore in a memorandum submitted to an inquiry by the Gießen medical faculty into the validity of homeopathy, Baiser attacks, not only homeopathy, but Brownian theories in general, and in doing so points to a general consensus against them: "... den Namen des Brown'schen Systems, und die Ausbreitung, welche es gefunden .... schon längst zu den großen Verirrungen gezählt wird, welchen die Heilkunde in den Händen der Anhänger dieser Lehre sich fügen mußte. .....Die medizinische Fakultät würde ihre Stellung und Würde ganz verkennen, wenn sie den Thorheiten und dem Schwindel der Zeit huldigen, wenn sie auf Gegenstände bei ihren Prüfungen eine Rücksicht nehmen wollte, welche zu den Verirrungen der Heilkunde gezählt werden müssen, - und wenn
...würde." [cited in Handrack 324-326]. Yet the notices of Baiser's lecture courses for the winter semesters of 1832-1834 continue to refer to "Krankheitszustände und Krankheitsformen des sensiblen und irritablen Lebensprozesses" and "Krankheitszustände und Krankheitsformen des vegetativen Lebensprozesses." [ibid. 246]. This is the unmodified language of Brownianism, and makes it appropriate to question just how much Baiser's views had changed.

If such ambivalence prevailed in the mind of a leading teacher in the medical faculty, it is not unreasonable to suppose that many students left Giessen with no coherent philosophy of medicine. That Büchner transcended such limitations was without doubt largely due to his active and inquiring mind, but may also have been helped by a feature common to all German medical schools of the time. The evolution of medical education was marked by a compromise between von Humboldt's ideal of "solitude and freedom" (Einsamkeit und Freiheit) in the pursuit of pure knowledge and the need to acquire a body of knowledge necessary for the practice of medicine. The opportunity certainly existed for a student to develop his own interests [Simmer 182-183]. The researches and dissections with which Büchner busied himself in his father's study in the early months of 1835 were certainly occasioned by the need to lie low following the
arrest of his friends and the threat of prosecution by Georgi in Gießen, but it is likely that he had been encouraged in the habit of private research by the tradition of "Einsamkeit und Freiheit". One of the Gießen teachers who influenced him most, Christian Wernekinck, was a specialist in diseases of the nervous system, but it was the Privatissimum in comparative anatomy that he gave in winter semester of 1833-34 that most engaged Büchner's interest [Porep 74], and probably helped to determine the direction of his scientific interests.

Indeed, it seems likely that, from quite early in his student days, Büchner intended to pursue a scientific career, rather than one in medical practice. In enrolling as a medical student he was according with his father's wish that he should follow in a family tradition that went back three centuries [ibid. 75]. But to study medicine had become a recognized way into the natural sciences [McLelland 156], and both Büchner's intellectual bent and his personality would tend to lead him in that direction.

It may therefore be reasonably concluded that Büchner's experience of medical education provided him with no contact with mentally ill patients, nor even with clinical descriptions of the symptoms and course of psychiatric illness. A more likely source of knowledge about psychiatric illness was the professional involvement of Büchner's father,
Ernst Büchner. It is true that the latter’s main clinical interests lay in the fields of surgery and anatomical research [Franz & Loch 68], but his appointment in 1821 as Stadtphysikus, and in 1824 as Medizinalrat, in Darmstadt required him to provide reports for the courts on cases where medical and psychiatric issues were at issue. A number of Gutachten written between 1824 and 1828 are still extant [ibid. 69]. He was both a subscriber and a contributor to Henke’s Zeitschrift für die Staatsarzneikunde which frequently contained articles and case histories relating to forensic psychiatry.

One of Georg Büchner’s Straßburg friends, Alexis Muston, writes in his journal of his interest in a work of Pinel’s, his Physiologie de l’homme aliéné appliquée à l’analyse de l’homme social [Fischer H. 344-346], and it has been suggested that Muston was likely to have learned of the work through Büchner, indicating that the latter was familiar with the writings of Pinel [Kubik 92-93]. The connection seems tenuous. It is indeed likely that Büchner would have read both Pinel and Esquirol, given his pervading interest in madness, and that ready access to the theories of contemporary French psychiatry was available to him through the library of a father, who was not only Francophile but had a professional involvement in questions of forensic psychiatry.
One of Ernst Büchner's appointments was as surgeon to the Hofheimer Hospital at Goddelau, a large psychiatric institution about eight miles south-west of Darmstadt [Franz & Loch 67]. (Goddelau was Georg's birthplace, but the family left there when he was three years old.) The physician-in-charge there was L.F. Amelung who was to enter the debate on the culpability of Woyzeck, in support of Clarus [Amelung 1827 48-49]. There is no evidence to suggest that Georg ever visited the Hofheimer Hospital with his father, but he would certainly have had the opportunity to do so, and would then certainly have had the chance, denied to most other medical students of his time, to see psychiatric patients at first hand. Whether this is so or not, it is likely that being the son of Ernst Büchner instilled into Georg a greater awareness of current concepts, if not the realities, of mental illness - and of the political issues surrounding it - than the experience of being a medical student at either Straßburg or Gießen could ever have done.

It is clear from this and the previous chapter that examination of the experiences that shaped Büchner's life provides only a tentative and partial explanation of his special insights into madness. It is necessary to continue the search by looking at the prevalent ideas of his time in both psychiatry and literature.
Chapter Four - Madness and Medicine

In many respects psychiatry in Germany developed later than in Britain or in France, and to some extent it borrowed both concepts and methods from these two countries. Nonetheless there were many features of that development that were special to Germany for reasons rooted both in social conditions and intellectual climate. This section will trace the growth of the new specialty and examine both the philosophical and medical ideas on madness that were part of the cultural inheritance handed down to Georg Büchner.

Madness and Society

The industrial revolution in England brought about, along with a new social class of urbanised workers, a broadly based middle class with a developed sense of identity. Much intellectual advance in the latter part of the eighteenth century derived from the influence and the ideals of this middle class and the development of psychiatry within medicine reflected the increasing political concern with human rights, together with a greater humanitarian concern in the natural sciences [Dörner 51-52]. Increased preoccupation with sensibility, the "Revolution des Gefühls", the new concept of "nervous disorders" and the Romantic movement in literature were not simply separate though contemporaneous trends. They had theoretical and practical influences on one another and had corresponding social functions: "...wie die
Political revolution in France also had a profound influence on the development of psychiatry, and as early as August 1790, the new Constituent Assembly was concerning itself with the guardianship of the insane [Castel 33-37]. In 1793, the recently appointed Pinel, in a profoundly symbolic act, struck the chains from forty patients at the Bicêtre Hospital in Paris. More significant was his less publicized practice involving "a methodical allocation of the insane within the hospice to various departments... The needs of each one are then worked out and foreseen, the various defects in their understanding are perceived according to their distinctive characteristics..."* Thus, not only were the insane seen as individuals with varying needs, but the basis was laid for the study of different forms of madness.

The revolution also released great creative energy in the field of science, freeing it from religious dogma and establishing the principle of free inquiry. Investigation into the causes of mental illness benefited from this release, and Cabanis attempted to establish a physiological basis for mental activity [Dörner 173].

Germany at the end of the eighteenth century had neither a

powerful and enlightened bourgeoisie as in England, nor a radical and liberating scientific philosophy engendered by revolution. Whereas in France and England scientific advance was supported by wealthy individuals and therefore mostly independent of authority, in Germany "science and philosophy were the exclusive province of the university" [Marx 1990 353]. Kleinstaaterei and conservatism prevailed. This had the effect of concentrating the attention of those in the forefront of intellectual exploration on the inner world, and especially on the Nachtseite. Mesmerism, with its focus on somnambulism and trance states intrigued the Romantics [ibid. 357]. Madness became a fruitful field for such speculation.

Writers on madness

In the Germany of the Aufklärung, it had been the philosophers rather than the physicians who had dominated thinking about madness. K.P. Moritz, himself an educationist, shared the editorship of the first journal concerning itself with mental illness, his Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde, with a succession of philosophers, among them Mauchart, who contributed such articles as "Über den eigentlichen Sitz des Wahnsinns" [Angst 22]. The contribution of philosophers continued into the second decade of the nineteenth century. The psychiatrist J.C. Reil founded two influential journals both of which were jointly edited with philosophers, the Magazin für die psychische Heilkunde of 1805-6 with Kayssler
The revolt against Enlightenment rationality, which began with the Sturm und Drang of the 1770's, deepened preoccupation with the dark side of the soul. Again it developed independently of medical thinking, and it was philosophers and poets who: "... machten sich im 'Sturm und Drang' daran, über ihr Inneres und seine Unvernunft nachzudenken, weshalb die späteren Psychiater ihren Gegenstand bereits bildungsbürgerlich präformiert fanden.....Die Psychiatrie als Medium bürgerlichen Selbstverständnisses wird im Deutschland des beginnenden 19. Jahrhunderts nicht unberührt davon sein, daß sie im 18. Jahrhundert diese Rolle nicht spielte und die englisch-französische Tradition nur unzulänglich verarbeitete." [Dörner 234]. It was not with a physician, but with the country pastor Oberlin, that J.M.R. Lenz sought help at the onset of his illness, and Augustin in Goethe's Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre was likewise cared for by a clergyman.

The Basle Peace Treaty of 1795 left the German states in a state of neutrality, whereby they were reduced to a Zuschauerrolle for the next ten years. It has been claimed that this contributed to the particular direction that
Romanticism was to take: "... eine Szene, auf der Literaten und Ärzte gleichermaßen von der Krankheit, der Nachtseite der Seele, vom Wahnsinn fasziniert sind. Es ist die Zeit, in der die Ärzte sich den Störungen der Seele poetisch und philosophisch zuwenden und die Dichter selbst die Ärzte ihrer Gefühle, ihrer empfindsamen seelischen, aber auch körperlichen Krankheiten sein wollen." [ibid. 252]. Marx asserts that this claim is itself an example of Romantic modes of thinking [Marx 1990 358]. Whatever the truth of the matter, it is possible to attach to the development of German medicine at this time the concept of "Romantische Medizin" [Leibbrand], in a way that would be quite inappropriate to developments in England and France.

Goethe mocked the "Lazarett-Poesie" of poets like Novalis and criticised the dictum of Schlegel: "Willst du ins Innere der Physik eindringen, so laß dich einweihen in die Mysterien der Poesie." [quoted in Leibbrand 49]. The speculations of the Scots physician, John Brown (1735-1788), had a particular appeal for those fascinated by the Nachtseite. Brown stressed the centrality in the pathogenesis of all disease, and therefore in its treatment, of the polarities of sthenia and asthenia. The analogous thinking that underlay much Naturphilosophie equated Brown's polarities with strength and weakness, body and soul, the outer and the inner world. For the Romantic temperament it was the asthenic polarity that was accorded the higher value [Dörner 255].
Whereas in France the intellectual climate of the Revolution had advanced research into somatic and social factors relating to madness, the dominance of Naturphilosophie in Germany inhibited such developments and promoted a subjective and literary approach. Laymen laid claim to equal authority in such matters with doctors, as is witnessed by Schelling's disastrous attempt to treat Caroline von Schlegel's daughter for a supposed "Nervenfieber" [Leibbrand 164f.].

Looking after the mad

In Germany at the end of the eighteenth century a change came about in how the insane were regarded by society - for the first time, they were seen as sick. "Bis dahin aber ist der Irre ein Wesen, das trotz aller medizinisch-psychopathologischen Systeme in der vergangenen Jahrhunderten seine praktische Existenz außerhalb fast jeder Krankheitsvorstellung findet." [Leibbrand-Wettley 50]. Their place had previously been the prison or the workhouse, and their associates vagabonds, criminals, beggars and homosexuals. Wagnitz, a Berlin clergyman, wrote (1791) of the inmates of workhouses in Germany:* "Unter den Armen sind nicht sowohl Arme im eigentlichen Sinne des Worts, sondern Epileptiker, Blödsinnige, Wahnsinnige, Melancholische,

Rasende usw. zu verstehen." Wagnitz excluded the insane from divine service, since only the reasonable were seen as capable of revering God. Prominent among the German insane were, not the industrialized urban poor as in England, but the oppressed, rootless and discarded soldiery [Crighton 117].

Despite his progressive reformist policies in relation to so many matters of health and sickness, the Austrian physician J.P. Frank at first saw the insane merely in terms of their threat to society, and the need for them to be restrained [Frank 1788 146]. However by 1827 he was writing: "Es ist noch nicht gar lange her, daß der Staat nichts weiter für die Irren that, als sie einsperrte, um sich für die menschliche Gesellschaft unschädlich zu machen. Jetzt kennen und üben wir eine noch andre, heilige Pflicht: Wir geben die Irren als brauchbare Glieder an die menschliche Gesellschaft zurück, und diesen doppelten Zweck, Sicherstellung der Menscheit vor den Ausbrüchen der Wahnsinnigen und Heilung der letzteren, müssen wir bei Organisation der Irrenanstalt vor Augen haben." [Frank 1827 223, Dörner 228].

This change in Frank's attitude reflects not only a more humane appreciation of the plight of the institutionalised insane, but also the greater therapeutic optimism engendered in the first two decades of the century by the contribution
of such physicians as Reil and Nasse.

J.G. Langermann (1768-1832) became something of an authority on mental illness and its management, although his theories were not based on any extensive clinical experience with the insane [Dörner 275]. His doctoral dissertation, often (erroneously) said to be the first on psychiatry emanating from a German university*, was none the less influential in the development of psychiatry and of psychiatric institutions in Prussia. Langermann opposed those who held to exclusively theological or exclusively somatic theories as to the causes of madness. Therapy was based on persuading the rational (healthy) part of the patient's soul to accept as a moral duty the necessity to correct one's errors. The physician's role was to tame the patient's passions and to shape his soul to the realities of the world. This was achieved in the early stages by punishment, and in the later stages by the discipline of work [Dörner 276].

The influence of Langermann was far from progressive and it did little in Germany as a whole to encourage the adoption of the more humane measures being practised in France and Britain. Prussian psychiatry was characterised by a paradox: "die Diskrepanz zwischen dem sittlichen Idealismus des

* Dissertatio de methodo cognoscendi curandique animi morbos stabilenda Jena 1797. However Friedreich (1830) lists a number of 18th century dissertations on madness from various German universities which preceded Langermann's.
Anspruchs und der Brutalität der Mittel, mit dem er realisiert werden soll." [ibid. 282]. One of the measures recommended by Langermann, made in the interests of economy, was the use of convicted criminals as ward attendants, a practice which continued in many institutions well into the 1830's [bid. 286]. In the foreword to the first issue of his Zeitschrift für psychische Ärzte, Nasse made a plea for enlightened reform of madhouses, a reform which would become the basis of an enlightened psychiatry: "Dürfte es doch manchen von unsern Irrenhäusern sehr zu wünschen seyn, daß von ihnen häufiger öffentlich die Rede wäre; sie stehen finster und verschlossen da, keine Üble Symbole der Natur des Krankseyns dessen unglückliche Opfer sie in sich verbergen. Es gilt, durch ein reges, gemeinsames Bemühen in die Natur dieses Krankseyns, in das dunkle Innere der von demselben ergriffenen Unglücklichen, so wie in die noch häufig nicht minder dunkeln Wohnungen derselben Licht zu bringen." [Nasse 1818 13].

In some German states, however, reforms did come about. With the advantage of a new hospital building at Sonnenheim in Saxony, Pienitz and Hayner were successful in introducing the principles and practice of the "moral treatment" which had been pioneered in England [Porter 18-19, Jones 49-50]. Such procedures were not without hazard. In 1821, L.F. Amelung was appointed physician in charge of the Irrenhaus at Hofheim in
Hessen (where Ernst Büchner also held an appointment as surgeon). Amelung had travelled in France and England and sought to follow the liberal ideas he had found there, including the removal of physical restraints. Dörner comments however that he failed to take into account that his buildings were not suitable, and that his staff were inadequately trained. The removal of bars from the windows of a three-storey building proved to be disastrous. (Amelung was to become in 1849 the murder victim of one of his own patients.) [Dörner 287-288].

The causes of madness

The Aufklärung - Stahl and Kant

This philosophical movement, with its twin emphasis on rationalism and humanitarianism may be said to have begun to be dominant in Germany in the late seventeenth century. Its effect on medical thinking may be seen in the writings of the physician Georg Ernest Stahl (1659-1734), while the leading exponent of rationalist philosophy, Immanuel Kant, played an important part in formulating a view of madness that was to influence doctors and as well as non-medical writers and thinkers until well into the nineteenth century.

Stahl during a long career as chemist and Professor of Medicine (at first in Halle, later in Berlin) developed theories concerning the nature of illness, physical and
mental, which contained the germs of the ambivalence that was
to dominate German psychiatry up to the time of Büchner, and
for long after, the question of the relative significance of
organic and of psychological determinants of mental illness.
Something of Stahl's stature may be inferred from the fact
that his scientific activities encompassed on the one hand
the origin of the the phlogiston theory in chemistry,
propounded while he was Professor of Medicine at Halle, and
on the other, the founding in 1723 of a College of Medicine
and Surgery at Berlin. Stahl came from a Pietist family and
the religious philosophy of Pietism was an important
influence throughout his life. At the same time he lived long
enough into the eighteenth century to become a significant
Enlightenment figure [Strube 11-19].

In De passionibus animi corpus humanum varie alterantibus of
1695, he attempted to propound a coherent system of medical
psychology. His starting point was the individual
temperament, based on the four humours, in the main
constitutinally determined, but subject to modification
through experience [Stahl 26]. Leibbrand comments on the
ambiguity in Stahl's writings as to the nature of the
interaction between soul and body, with primacy sometimes
accorded to one, sometimes to the other [Leibbrand 36], but
in De passionibus the issue seems in little doubt. Whereas
Galen had accorded primacy to physical factors in determining
the nature of the soul, for Stahl clearly the opposite was the case. "...es hängt von den Regungen des Gemütes (=anima) fast alles ab, was den menschlichen Körper physisch berührt. 

.... Mit Recht schließt man daher, daß es die Seele ist, die alle diese Bewegungen unmittelbar bewirkt, seien sie geordnet oder ungeordnet, vitaler oder animaler Art, ob sie zur Erhaltung des Körpers beitragen oder zu seiner Zerstörung, ob richtig oder falsch geleitet." [Stahl 25]. Passions are divided into passions of the soul and passions of the senses. The latter are more likely to be the direct and immediate causes of illness, whereas more delayed and concealed illness is likely to derive from the passions from within [Stahl 26-27]. It is tempting, though not perhaps justified, to equate these inner passions with repressed emotion. It is clear however that he was aware of the potential for pathogenesis when passion, especially anger, was suppressed. "Sehr wichtig ist die alltägliche Beobachtung, daß der Zorn, wenn er befriedigt wird, auch dem Körper keinen Schaden zufügt; daß er hingegen unterdrückt im Gemüthe einen anhaltenden Unmut und Groll hinterläßt....". Stahl acknowledges the part that social factors play in the repression of passions: "Dergleichen Fälle kommen in unserem geselligen Zustande sehr häufig vor....". Passions must be accommodated to social norms ("vergesellschaftet") with a balanced regimen, and a careful watch maintained lest they should suddenly erupt, and
"dadurch das feste Band der Lebenskräfte zerreißen..."* Stahl sees the intactness of these "Lebenskräfte" as necessary to health, and his system has been termed Vitalism. It is not difficult to see the madness of Lenz and of Franz Woyzeck in terms of the disruption of their "Lebenskräfte" by social forces.

Stahl had considerable influence on his immediate followers, those eighteenth century philosophers and physicians who were to shape the growing concern, both lay and medical, with mental illness. More significantly for the present investigation, this influence persisted well into the next century, as witness the translation into German in 1831-32, by the Psychiker physician Ideler, of Stahl's major and posthumous work, the Theoria medica vera.

As early as 1764, Immanuel Kant's concern with the nature of man, with Anthropologie, had found expression with an essay on mental illness [Jalley 204]. His involvement was theoretical rather than empirical and was an extension of his critiques of pure and practical reason and of judgement with their stress on self-consciousness and intuition [Hoppus 508]. Kant held that a pre-condition of the understanding of mental illness was a proper classification [Jalley 207] and a large part of his Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht was devoted to such a classification. This was however based on

little experience of mentally ill patients: "... so finden wir Kant, der viel allerdings viel über Geisteskrank... nachgedacht' oder sich von ihnen hatte 'erzählen lassen'..." [Kisker 19]. In this respect however he was hardly less qualified than many of the physicians of his time who were setting themselves up as experts on mental illness, and whose writings were to continue to be influential well into the nineteenth century [ibid. 19].

For Kant, any departure from the predominance of reason bordered on the pathological. Even emotion ("Affect") was suspect: "Affecten sind überhaupt krankhafte Zufälle (Symptomen)..." [Kant 254], although he acknowledges that certain emotions, especially those involved in laughter and weeping, might contribute to health [ibid. 261-263]. Whereas "Affect" is "stürmisch und vorübergehend", passion is both chronic and incurable. It is "die Neigung, durch welche die Vernunft verhindert wird, sie in Ansehung einer gewissen Wahl mit der Summe aller Neigungen zu vergleichen...". Thus the individual is prevented from making rational choices to the extent that freedom is impaired: "... und wenn der Affect ein Rausch, die Leidenschaft eine Krankheit sei, welche alle Arzneimittel verabscheut..." [ibid. 263-267]. Madness results from the pathogenetic effects of a passion on the faculty of reason: "Leidenschaften sind Krebsschaden für die reine praktische Vernunft und mehrentheils unheilbar: weil der
Kranke will nicht geheilt sein und sich der Herrschaft des Grundsatzes entzieht, durch den dieses allein geschehen könnte." [ibid. 267]. We shall see that the impairment of freedom implicit in Kant's view of mental illness was to become a central issue in the forensic debate that decided the fate of Woyzeck.

Thus from the point of view of Enlightenment rationalism, exemplified both by the physician Stahl and the philosopher Kant, a major factor in the production of illness was passion, "Leidenschaft". But, whereas for Stahl it represented a cause of illness when repressed, for Kant it constituted an illness in itself. Both Stahl and Kant may be seen as engaged in the search for a unifying explanation for the source of illness. Kant "was viewed by physicians as an enemy of dogmatism who was leading human reason back to its true vocation: self-enrichment through a genuine knowledge of the world of experience." [Risse 147].

"Romantische Medizin"

The search for a unifying theory in relation to pathogenesis which would enable some kind of order to be brought to a chaos of conflicting speculations and unconnected clinical observations was continued by the philosopher of Romanticism, Schelling [Risse 145]. The problem was that the unifying theory approved by both Kant and Schelling, namely the system proposed by John Brown, became the basis of a new dogmatism.
Brown's view that disease arose from an imbalance of the polarities of sthenia and asthenia, leading to varying degrees of excitability, had long since become discredited in France and in England. Yet Schelling embraced Brownian ideas as being in harmony with his own efforts to impose on natural phenomena a series of laws derived from philosophical contemplation. According to Schelling, man had once been at one with nature but had set himself apart through the artificial conventions of civilisation. The goal of philosophy, and of medicine, was to restore this breach [ibid. 155].

The influence of both Kant and Schelling is exemplified in the person of Andreas Röschlaub (1768-1835), Professor of Medicine at Bamberg, who argued that by following Kant's methodology medicine could become a rational science. Taking Brown's theory of excitability as a Kantian a priori principle, he constructed a system of laws governing health and disease and providing a basis for "Heilkunst", a comprehensive practice of medicine [ibid. 149-151]. As a friend of Novalis, Röschlaub influenced the ways in which the latter developed his preoccupation with illness [Leibbrand 92-93]. This in turn helped to formulate the Romantic conception of man's place in the world. Asthenia became the paradigmatic position of the Romantic hero, the polarity of man's being which ought to be actively cultivated [ibid. 93-96].
Not all physicians accepted unreservedly the move towards *a priori* theorizing. C.W. Hufeland (1762-1836), who was physician to the Prussian court, declared his aim to publish only writings derived from clinical experience*. Despite his intentions however he was unable to resist the trend. From the vitalism implicit in Stahl’s views on pathogenesis, and from the Brownian concept of polarity, Hufeland derived a polarity of heart and brain, which necessitated balance between the poles for health to be maintained. [Leibbrand 68-69]. Absolute health required "ein durchaus vollkommener regelmäßiger und harmonischer Zustand der Organe, Kräfte und Funktionen des menschlichen Wesens ... in den Klassen der verfeinerten und verkünstelten Menschen ... nach dieser Bestimmung, wäre jetzt der allergrößte Theil der civilisierten Menschen krank." [Hufeland 19]. There are two components in illness, the external precipitating cause and the reaction of the vital forces. Where there is no reaction, there is no illness, but on the other hand: "wo die Empfindlichkeit groß ist, wird der kleinste Reiz den heftigsten Sturm erregen." [ibid. 21] The stress on "Empfindlichkeit" might be said to mirror the devastation worked upon Werther by his "Empfindsamkeit".

Twenty years after Hufeland, a professor at Jena, D.G. v. Kieser (1779-1862), was adding yet another dimension to the

* J. pract. Arzneykunde 1796 2 1St. 1-2, quoted in Risse 153
concept of polarity in illness, positive/negative replacing sthenic/asthenic. Mental and physical life was subject to telluric magnetism, and the psyche was divided into a cognitive (positive) side and an emotional (negative) side [Marx 1991 15]. Positive polarity was associated "mit der ursprünglichen Tendenz des Lebens nach höherer Bildung" [Kieser 25]. On the other hand, predominance of the negative pole leads to illness, which is no longer, as in Novalis, seen as a higher state. The polarities come to represent the higher and lower parts of man, and illness becomes equated with sin: "So kann man Krankheit Egoismus der Natur nennen.... Eben so ist Sünde = Krankheit des Moralischen, da Sünde nur durch Alleinherrschen eines niederen Triebes entsteht." [ibid. 26]. Illness is also "Mißbrauch der Freiheit", and therefore to an extent self-inflicted. Kieser also described the impact of the physician on the healing process in terms of magnetic polarity, his benignity producing a positive magnetism that strengthened the polarity supporting health [Marx 1991 16 footnote]. In Kieser's terms, the Doctor in Woyzeck might be held to be reinforcing Franz's madness by his lack of benignity. Kieser was later to align himself with the forces of political repression and to equate the revolutionary aspirations of the masses with madness induced by immoderate passion [Dörner 306 and 351].
association of illness and sin was more explicitly argued. C.J.H. Windischmann, who combined the practice of medicine in Bonn with a chair in philosophy and history [ibid. 303], sought to show that the phenomena of galvanism were manifestations of a deeper spirituality in Nature [Windischmann 35-36]. Health lay in humility (Ergebenheit) and child-like faith, illness resulted from "Entzweiung des Geistes und der Natur" (echoing Schelling). "Das Gegenteil der Ergebenheit, des kindlichen Glaubens und stillen Hoffens ist aber die Lust und die Begierde, welche zunächst die Seele entzündet und durch die Gewalt dieser Entzündung die Natur entfremdet." [ibid. 40-41]. It followed that the healer himself must spurn worldly values and Windischmann complained about the loss of spirituality in the art of medicine and in the lives of its practitioners. Doctors were being satisfied with superficial materialist explanations and had lost understanding "der natürlichen Heilungswege." Patients who have been given up by their "beschränkten und im Materialismus befangenen Aerzte" turn to the "sympathetischen Curart", and are healed [ibid. 30]. Although the cause of illness was firmly located in the soul, Windischmann opposed any purely psychological approach to illness as merely a more refined materialism [v. Siebenthal 82].

In ascribing sickness to alienation from a God-given spirituality of nature, Windischmann was closely following
the ideas of Paracelsus some two hundred years before, with galvanism substituted for the earlier physician's "essences" [ibid. 58-62]. The sinner/patient often seemed in this formulation to be a helpless victim. It is alienation, the fact of sin, and not guilt about having sinned that determines the illness. For the early Romantics, however, - Hoffmann, Kerner, Eschenmayer - sin is not merely alienation, but the defiant choice of evil rather than good. Again, guilt has no role in the genesis of disease [ibid. 62ff.]. Illness came to have a symbolic, and ultimately idealised significance as in Novalis. The preoccupation of Romantic Naturphilosophie with the seeking of analogy between states of the world and states of the soul led to the abandonment by its adherents of all physico-chemico-physiological speculation, and a search for the meaning of illness [Leibbrand 74].

If such theorising constituted the death throes of a Romantic Naturphilosophie, which would give way to the advance of an empirically/experimentally based medicine, led by Virchow's science of cellular pathology, the debate about the relative importance of somatic and spiritual factors in the causation of mental illness continued into the 1850's and indeed, although the terminology has altered somewhat, is still unresolved.
Psychiker v. Somatiker?

An until recently prevailing view of the development of German psychiatry in the first three or four decades of the nineteenth century has been that it was dominated by the *Psychiker-Somatiker* dispute [Ackerknecht 1959 52-54, Verwey 20, Neuburger 137]. It is a view that is still advanced, and Kubik goes so far as to claim that Büchner was at least partly motivated in his portrayals of Lenz and Woyzeck by the wish to enter the debate [Kubik 121-127 and 138-145]. She writes of "die erbittert geführte Fachkontroverse zwischen 'Psychikern' und 'Somatikern' um den partiellen Wahnsinn" [ibid. 144]. Yet Nasse, an alleged *Somatiker*, on the title page of the first issue of his *Zeitschrift für psychische Ärzte*, acknowledges the participation of, among others, Heinroth, Hoffbauer and Haindorf, all reputed *Psychiker*, whose participation will continue throughout the years of its and its successor's existence (1818-1825). This hardly implies "erbittert erführte Fachkontroversie".

Neuburger's identification of two diametrically opposed schools [Neuburger 137] has now come under challenge. Schrenk denies the existence of a *Psychiker-Somatiker* divide. While acknowledging that there is no one German school by comparison with France where the Pinel/Esquirol tradition was dominant, he denotes all German psychiatrists as subscribing to a "spekulative Psychopathologie" [Schrenk 12]. Marx
acknowledges the existence of theoretical extremes represented by Heinroth and Jacobi, but demonstrates that even these extreme exponents differed little in their management of patients. Jacobi acknowledged that the recovering patient required insight derived from psychological and ethical guidance [Marx 1991 10-11], while Heinroth freely used physical methods of treatment, such as leeches, bleeding and blistering [Marx 1990 374], albeit with the addition sometimes of more overtly punitive measures. In regard to the others who have been allocated to one or other school, their theorizing usually allocated some importance to both organic and psychological factors [Pauleikhoff 187-189].

The emergence in the latter part of the nineteenth century of a scientific organically-oriented psychiatry has led to the confrontation between Psychiker and Somatiker being interpreted as one between non-scientific (philosophical) and scientific psychiatry. However, in contrast to contemporaneous trends in England and in France, developments in Germany were based on speculation rather than science [Galdston 357-359], and the proponents of both schools of thought based their arguments not on observation but on fundamentally conflicting views of the nature of the relationship between soul and body. "It is particularly striking that in the somaticist literature (from about 1800 onwards) ... we find cropping up time and again, in an almost endless series of repetitions and variations, the fundamental
somaticist thesis which states that the soul is not corporeal and cannot therefore become diseased” [Verwey 24-25]. Bodamer sees both views as developing from different aspects of Stahl's vitalism, while Verwey interprets Heinroth's anthropology as representing a Platonic, and Jacobi's an Aristotelean view of man [Bodamer 305, Verwey 24].

Commonly, ambiguity concerning the relative importance of mental and organic factors could be found in the views of one individual. While arguing an organic basis for madness, J.C. Reil, in his Rhapsodien über die Anwendung der psychischen Kurmethode auf Geisteszerrüttungen of 1803, nonetheless held that materially based cures were ineffective. Hence, treatment was to consist of psychological methods, some of which found their parallels in Goethe's Lila. While Reil did not go so far as to indicate how body and mind might interact, he insisted that physicians must be doctors to both body and mind [Marx 1990 363]. Moritz, in his Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde (1783-1793) was concerned both with the moral and the physical nature of man [Davies 23].

A collaborator with Reil in the editorship of one of his journals was J.C. Hoffbauer, a lawyer and philosopher, who as we have seen was regarded as one of the Psychiker. He proposed a predominantly psychological basis for mental pathology, but one rooted, not simply in the passions or in sin, but rather in the disturbance of one or other of three
"Vermögen", psychological faculties concerned respectively with intellect, emotion (including imagination and aesthetic sense) and desire. At the same time, he saw these faculties as influenced by a mind-body interaction, which was not a matter of metaphysical speculation, but was clearly to be inferred from observation: "So lehrt uns die Erfahrung auch einen Zusammenhang zwischen Körper und Seele. Auf Veränderungen im Körper folgen jeder Zeit gewisse Veränderungen in der Seele, und umgekehrt, gewisse Veränderungen in der Seele werden gleichfalls von körperlichen Veränderungen begleitet." [Hoffbauer 1802 198, cited in Pauleikhoff 41]. This psychology based on faculties represented an attempt to establish an internal dynamic which we will see developed in Büchner's time, in the writings of Nasse and Ideler.

Madness and Sin
It is in the person of J.C.A.Heinroth that we find the archetype of the Psychiker, although even this view has been recently disputed [Gauwenbergh 373-374]. Brought up in the pietist tradition, he first studied theology, then qualified in medicine and became Professor of Medicine at Leipzig, and in 1827 "Ordinarius der psychischen Medizin." He located the source of human functioning in the individual's spiritual life rather than in his physiology: "Aber menschlich lebt er nur im Bewußtseyn, und zwar auf den verschiedenen Stufen
derselben, von denen die Höchste zu erreichen, das Ziel seines Lebens ist." [Heinroth 1818 3]. The lowest step on Heinroth's hierarchy of consciousness is represented as sensuality: "Der Genuß ist sein Ziel, und der Zufall seine Gottheit" [ibid. 4]) and the highest is conscience, "eine innere Entgegensezung im Selbstbewußtseyn selbst" [ibid. 7]. There is a constant conflict between the demands of conscience and of "unseres Weltlebens und Selbstlebens". Following the dictates of conscience achieves "eine wundersame Harmonie unseres Innern mit sich selbst und der Welt" [ibid. 8-9].

This harmony, and with it the health and integrity of the soul are undermined by passion: "Alle Leidenschaft ist ein wahrhaft menschlichkrankhafter Zustand.... Der Wahn ist kein krankhafter Zustand des Gemüthes, sondern des Verstandes, aber im Gemüthe, nehmlich in der Leidenschaft, liegt der Grund des Wahns... Vom Wahn wird der Mensch nicht eher befreyt, als bis er von der Leidenschaft frey ist." [ibid. 26-27].* We shall later examine the implications of this view of psychopathology for forensic psychiatry in general, and for the case of Woyzeck, where much weight was attached to Heinroth's opinions. However his theories were seen as too idiosyncratic for general acceptance [Marx 1990 377]. For

* The pathological effects of passion are not, according to Gauwenbergh to be understood in relation to theological concepts of sin. In his view the key to interpretation of Heinroth's concepts is to be found in its parallels with Hegel's "theory of being" [Gauwenbergh 374-376]
posterity however, his system is of interest because of his
dynamic view of mental processes and pathology, an instance
being his use, with regard to melancholia, of the descriptive
term "Insichversunkenmachen", with its implication of a
process whereby the individual withdraws from contact with
the outside world into self-absorption. "He was probably the
first to whom the ideational content of the mentally sick
presented not merely a set of aberrations but a psychological
process full of meaning." [Zilboorg 471]. We shall seek to
demonstrate that Büchner, both in Lenz and in Woyzeck, sought
to find detailed meaning in the madness of his protagonists.
If we substitute "guilt" for Heinroth's "sin" in relation to
the mental havoc caused by passion, we come near to a modern
view of much psychopathology. And we shall see that in the
conflicts that drove Büchner's Lenz to madness guilt played
an important part.

The Somatiker View

The background of K.W.M. Jakobi (1775-1858) was similar to
that of Heinroth in many respects. He had a deeply Christian
faith, and in the course of his training was exposed to some
of the more extreme doctrines of Romantic medicine, being a
student at one time of Windischmann, who, as we have seen, so
closely identified illness with lack of spirituality that
only a spiritually pure doctor might heal it. But he also
studied abroad, notably in Edinburgh and London, so might be
considered to have held a less parochial view of mental illness than many other German psychiatrists. More importantly, he was in charge, at Siegburg, of a large (200-bedded) psychiatric hospital, which was to become the recognized centre of the teaching of psychiatry in Germany, so that, unlike many who claimed expertise in mental illness, his ideas were based on wide clinical experience. He used the opportunity that this post afforded him to gather a large number of detailed case histories, and to subject them to statistical analysis [Marx 1991 4-5]. He found concomitant physical disturbance in a majority of cases, by far the most common association being alcohol abuse. But illnesses such as enteric fever, haemorrhoids and tuberculosis were commonly found. Like that of Friedreich, his philosophical stance was that the immortal soul could not be ill, but in maintaining that mental life was not confined to the brain but involved the whole organism, he was coming close to a psychosomatic view of human functioning [ibid. 5-7].

Like Jacobi, J.B. Friedreich (1796-1862) has been firmly placed in the *Somatiker* camp. He was concerned to establish correlations between the forms of madness and co-existing physical conditions, often confirmed at post-mortem. This could lead him to unscientific conclusions, as in the case where the finding at autopsy of three hardened lymph nodes in the abdomen (lesions by no means uncommon) was held to ex-
plain the patient's delusion during his life that he had three frogs in his stomach [Neuburger 138 footnote]. This is same kind of error in interpretation as was made by another physician who might be seen to be a Somatiker, namely the Doctor in Woyzeck, when he attributed Franz's symptoms to a diet of peas. Friedreich's theoretical position was however by no means clear. He expressed himself unequivocally about the immediate precipitants of madness: "Worin liegt das Wesen, die nächste Ursache der Seelenkrankheiten? ist sie in der Seele selbst, oder im Leibe zu suchen? Die Theorie und Erfahrung spricht für das letztere; wir haben eine Menge von Beweisen, welche darthun, daß der nächste Grund einer Seelenkrankheit nicht in der Seele selbst, sondern immer nur in der Leibesseite zu suchen sey." [Friedreich 1829 152]. However the repetition of "nächst" suggests that he is here referring to immediate causation. His advice to doctors under "Quellen und Hülfsmittel der Diagnostik" to enquire into both somatic and psychological factors, into family history as well as religious, moral and intellectual background, into stressful life events as well as into physical illness, and exposure to harmful agents such as alcohol, and occupational hazards like lead [ibid. Kap. II], suggests that his overall view of madness may have been more complex.

The argument that Büchner was much concerned in Lenz and in Woyzeck with the Psychiker-Somatiker debate is not easily
sustained. The polarization of views between the two supposed factions was much less than has been held to be the case. The implications for patient care were minimal, since whatever theory an individual doctor might hold, his practice was likely to adhere to a generally accepted norm. If Büchner was, as Kubik suggests, concerned with attacking methods of treatment of the mentally ill, then it is unlikely that he would have limited that attack to proponents of one particular theory.

Notably absent from both Heinroth's and Jacobi's theorizing was any discussion of the influence of social factors. Heinroth does allow the influence of external stimuli on the intra-psychic process, but only to a minor degree [Verwey 20]. Büchner, though assuredly aware of both organic and theological theories of causation, was unlikely to have subscribed to either. This study will attempt to show, that like few of his contemporaries, he located the roots of madness in social forces and personal relationships and the internal conflicts that these generated.

Social factors and madness
In early nineteenth century Britain importance was attached by a number of writers to the role of social conditions in causing madness. An earlier age had discovered the sources of insanity in "sadness, fears and scares, jealousy, discontents between man and wife (the most lacerating of all grief), ...
loss of love and disappointment in marriage, destiny of friends and loss of estates."* Now insanity was seen to be related to social pressures outside the family and to the stresses of urbanisation. John Reid wrote that "madness strides like a Colossus in the country"#, and saw factories as "nurseries for and manufactories of madness".§

In France too, Esquirol, as well as exploring physical and psychological causes of madness, asserted that the quality of mental health was dependent on the level of education and on socio-economic well-being [Pauleikhoff 188]. In Germany however this question was largely unexplored, and this may have been in some part due to the unwillingness of the emergent psychiatric profession to enter a politically sensitive area [Trenckmann & Ortmann 336]. (We have seen that Schelling attributed mankind's ills to civilisation, and therefore to the processes of socialization involved, but this was expressed only in the most general terms.)

Around the turn of the century, it was left to writers of fiction, like Spieß (Biographien der Wahnsinnigen 1795-6) and von Kleist (Michael Kohlhaas 1808), to describe the course of madness in relation to the social stresses to which the

* William Drage: A Physical Nosonomy London 1665 67, quoted in McDonald 73


§ John Reid: Essays on insanity, hypochondriasis and other nervous affections London 1816 58, quoted in Donnelly 77
sufferer was exposed. It is significant that of those writing specifically on mental illness it was a philosopher, J.B. Erhard, who was among the first to discuss the issue.

Writing in 1794, Erhard allowed only a marginal role to somatic factors in the genesis of madness, but neither was passion seen as a necessary precipitant. The immediate cause was to be sought in "fixirte Vorstellungen" which were generated in the mind. "Alles, was körperlich ist, kann nur als vorbereitende Ursache, daß sich gewisse Vorstellungen umso leichter fixiren, angesehen werden.... Leidenschaften gehören unter die Gelegenheiten zu fixirten Vorstellungen. Sobald ein Affekt sich zur Leidenschaft ausdehnt, so ist schon ein Anfang des Wahnsinnes da..." [Erhard in Wagner Bd. 2 36, cited in Friedreich 1830 590-591]. The fundamental cause of madness, however, lies in the "Begehrungsvermögen". The desire to satisfy this covetousness can lead a susceptible individual into conflict with the moral law. This in turn leads to a departure from "gesunde Vernunft". On the one hand, the patient conceals from himself this departure from integrity, on the other, he develops anxious uncertainty about it [Erhard in Wagner Bd.2 41 cited in Friedreich 592-593]. Seen from the perspective of the late twentieth century, Erhard appears a figure of interest because of the implication, in respect of the fundamental cause of illness, of some degree of unconscious intra-psychic conflict. In relation to Büchner, his significance is in the role he
accords to social attitudes in the production of madness.

Among German psychiatrists, interest in social factors is first found in two individuals who were each, in initially very different ways, trying to establish a coherent anthropology to explain mental health and sickness. C.F. Nasse (1778-1851) was accounted a member of the somaticist faction, whereas K.W. Ideler (1795-1860) was held to be a committed Psychiker. By the 1830's, however, their views were beginning to resemble each other in a number of respects.

**Nasse and Ideler - Psycho-social Medicine**

Christian Friedrich Nasse studied at Halle under J.C. Reil, to whose chair he succeeded in 1815, before moving to Bonn as Professor of Medicine in 1819. He was a prolific writer on mental illness, and editor of two influential journals, *Zeitschrift für psychische Ärzte* of 1818-1822 and *Zeitschrift für die Anthropologie* of 1823-1826. The psychological doctor who was addressed in both these journals was adjured to combine with empiricism and with accurate clinical observation the intellectual rigour and insight of the anthropologist, that is, the philosopher who concerned himself with psychological processes. Nasse was in no doubt that attention to the physical condition of his patients could result in the cure of what was apparently mental illness [Nasse 1830 104-109]. Yet he was no dogmatic somaticist. We have already seen that he acknowledged the
participation of so-called *Psychiker* in his journals of 1818-1826. In the preface to the first issue, he criticizes doctors who attend only to physical findings and ignore the manifestations of their patients' inner life - emotions, passions and dreams [Nasse 1818 6].

Nasse continued throughout the 1820's and 1830's to develop his ideas concerning the interaction of mind and body and to develop a truly psychosomatic view of man and his illnesses [Schipperges 1959 22-23]. From the mid-1820's however, he was also seeking to determine the role of the processes of socialization in individual development, especially through his investigation of the role of language [ibid. 23-24]. He sought to impart this approach to his students at Bonn by insisting that they concentrate their attention on only a few patients, but that they study them in depth, getting to know their social and occupational circumstances as well as their family situation [Schipperges 1981 105-118]. By 1823, Nasse was acknowledging the predominant influence of family, social and psychological factors in influencing the course of human development: "Den mächtigsten Antheil auf der Gestaltung des Menschen hat aber die Seele; können wir gleich nicht bestimmt sagen, daß sie ihren Gefährten schaffe, so müssen wir doch anerkennen, daß sie seine Lebensrichtungen und dadurch seine Gestaltungen mannichfaltig und entschieden abzuändern vermögt..."
In the 1820's, Nasse was also evolving a more dynamic concept of mental activity. In a normal person, there was an on-going conflict between two drives, the sensual and the spiritual, and this conflict is deepened in mental illness: 

"Geben wir im Affect während des inneren Kampfes auf uns Acht, so gelingt es uns oft deutlich gewahr zu werden, daß die verschiedenen Regungen kein Zumal sind, sondern ein Hintereinander... Was nun diese Betrachtung des Affects ergibt, dürfen wir wohl mit einigem Recht auch auf den Zustand der Gemüthskranken und der Wahnsinnigen anwenden, bei diesen auch auf das gleiche Grund-Verhältniß schließend.... (Im Mörder) Liebe und Mordlust haben, wie er selbst uns nach der That erzählt, in seiner Brust, gekämpft, also, wenn nur auf Augenblicke, einander abwechselnd verdrängt." [Nasse 1825 A].

We have noted above that Erhardt postulated inner conflict as a source of disturbance, but Nasse here develops the idea more specifically, and links it with on-going ambivalence. What is new in psychiatric writing is the concept of introspection as a source of understanding, and the clear implication that there is a continuum between mental health and sickness. We shall see that these ideas were shared by the Psychiker, Ideler.
Karl Wilhelm Ideler was in charge of the psychiatric ward of the Charité Hospital in Berlin from 1828. He had already (1827, the year after the last issue of Nasse's *Zeitschrift für Anthropologie*) published his *Anthropologie für Ärzte* in which his declared aim was, like Nasse, to examine the nature of man from the point of view of both the somatic and the psychological (spiritual) forces which shaped it. There is no doubt that in this early work Ideler lays most stress on moral factors, and it is this which has led him to be labelled a *Psychiker*: "Im Menschen kämpfen die sinnlichen Triebe der Selbsterhaltung und Geschlechtsfortpflanzung dem ursprünglichen Streben des Geistes entgegen... So kommt die Sünde über den Menschen, hemmt die freie Außerung seiner Seele, und stürzt ihn in den Staub zurück, aus welchem sein irdischer Theil gebildet wird." [Ideler 1827 5]. Too much stress on somatic factors has led to a distorted view of man: "Die Ärzte waren, theils ihrer physikalischen Studien wegen, theils weil ihr Verstand mit Vorstellungen von Werkzeugen, auf welche die Anatomie so leicht führt, sich anfüllte, geneigt, das mechanische Verhältnis des Lebensprozesses vorzugsweise zu betrachten." [ibid. 168]. It was doubtless out of such conviction that Ideler used on occasion to preach to gatherings of his patients [Dörner 326]. Nonetheless, somatic influences are acknowledged; an individual's health, mental as well as physical, depends on
"die Fähigkeit seines Organismus, unbeschadet der Regelrechtigkeit seiner Kraftäußerungen, in die mannigfachsten Bildungsformen eingeführt werden zu können, so daß bald das höhere Nervensystem, bald die Musculatur, hier die Verdauungsapparat, dort die Sexualorgane gleichsam den Brennpunkt oder das Centralsystem des Ganzen bilden..." [Ideler 1827 232]. Harmony in an "Organengruppe" as for instance "zwischen dem Nervenleben und der Gefäßthätigkeit" is disturbed when one part is overstimulated, and this is subject to a periodicity: "also ein Ebben und Fluthen, welches nach einer bestimmten Regel der Periodizität durch alle Organenreihen verläuft." [ibid. 234-235].

In one important aspect, Ideler's Anthropologie für Ärzte differed from other German writers of the time (except Nasse), namely in the stress he placed on insight and introspection. Acknowledging that he himself had undergone a period of considerable mental disturbance, he saw this as, in its outcome, an experience that was both personally and professionally enriching: "Eine Regung Anderer, von welcher er" (sc. der Anthropolog) "kein Spur in seinem Bewußtsein wahrnimmt, kann sich ihm in ihren Wirkungen nur als ein unauflosliches Rätsel darstellen." [ibid. 11].

By 1835 Ideler had both changed the emphasis and broadened the scope of his ideas regarding mental pathology. The first volume of his monumental Grundriß der Seelenheilkunde
appeared during the year that Büchner was involved in the writing of *Lenz*, and the year before the first drafts of *Woyzeck* were begun. Ideler's early, simplistic view of sin as a source of derangement is rejected. This rather lies in disturbance of the impulses, "Gemüthstrieb", which are the source of goal-directed human activity. Some of these are inward-directed and concerned with personal integrity, some are directed outwards and affect socio-economic and interpersonal relationships: "Denn alle Gemüthstätigkeit des Menschen bezieht sich entweder als religiöser Trieb auf Gott, oder als Trieb der Selbstständigkeit auf seine eigene Person, oder als Geselligkeitstrieb auf andere Menschen." [Ideler 1835 241]. The complete list of these impulses is given as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impulse</th>
<th>Leidenschaft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religiöser Trieb</td>
<td>Wahrheitstrieb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trieb der Selbstständigkeit</td>
<td>Trieb des inneren Freiheit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehrtrieb</td>
<td>Trieb der äußeren Freiheit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herrschaftsriebe</td>
<td>Erwerbtrieb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebenstrieb</td>
<td>Egoismus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geselligkeitstrieb</td>
<td>Nachahmungstrieb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trieb der Familienliebe</td>
<td>Trieb der Menschenliebe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each motivation has its corresponding "Leidenschaft" and problems ensue when one of these becomes totally dominant. In this newly propounded system, the main residue of Ideler's earlier *Psychiker* posture lies in the prominence he gives to the "religiöser Trieb" which he equates with "Ehrfurcht vor Gott" and which is held to be basic to individual, as well as social, health and happiness [ibid. 244]. Furthermore the
healthy balance of the various "Gemüthstriebe" is equated with morality as well as health [ibid. 522]. There can be no doubt however that in giving importance to socio-economic stability and stability in family life Ideler is breaking new ground in German psychiatric thought.

Ideler now acknowledges that his earlier views had over-emphasized spiritual as against somatic factors [Pauleikhoff 121], and Marx sees the Grundriß as re-introducing the concept of repressed emotion as a pathogenic factor [Marx 1991 19]. (We have noted that shortly before the publication of the first volume of Grundriß, Ideler had published a translation of Stahl's Theoria medica vera in which such a theory was advanced.)

Another innovation in the Grundriß is that, where other psychiatrists are concentrating on terms like "Wahnsinn" or one of its many variants, Ideler now writes of "Furcht", "Angst", "Verzweiflung" [Ideler 1835 415]. He gives a moving account of how mourning can become depression: "Dies spricht sich aus in der Wirkung des Gemüths auf das Vorstellungsvermögen, insbesondere auf Sinn und Phantasie aus. Denn während der Gram das Bewußtsein in einen düstern Nebel einhüllt, durch welchen die umgebende Welt, Vergangenheit und Zukunft mit ihren Gestalten nur trübe, regungslos und nur auf geringe Ferne wahrgenommen werden, und die Phantasie ganz schweigt, oder die Bilder der Trauer..."
A further passage describes the entrapment of the madman in his delusion, and mirrors the psychological state of Franz in *Woyzeck*: "...stachelt dagegen die Furcht den Sinn, der mit gespannter Aufmerksamkeit auf die geringfügigsten Erscheinungen lauscht, und damit der Phantasie stets überflüssigen Stoff zu gespenstigen Schreckbildern darbietet. Gesellt sich nun noch der Aberglaube hinzu, welche hinter den natürlichen Vorgängen feindliche Dämonen wittert; so bannt sich die Furcht in einen bösen Zauberkreis, den sie mit fratzensafaten Gestalten bevölkert, um sich am leeren Wahn recht trostlos abzufinden, weil, wohin sie sich auch zur Flucht wenden mag, überall ihre eigene Hirngespinnste ihr den Weg versperren." [ibid. 415].

**Büchner and the psychiatric discourse**

The specific issue of the development of forensic psychiatry and its relevance to the *Woyzeck* case will be discussed in a later chapter. The more general survey of psychiatric thought that has been undertaken here is significant because it shows the relative lack of impact that such thought had on Büchner's portrayal of madness in *Lenz* and in *Woyzeck*. He was certainly not subscribing to an Enlightenment view of madness as loss of reason. Indeed he satirizes the importance attached to "Vernunft" in the sales-talk of the "Markt-
scherier" in Woyzeck H1,2 "DAS INNERE DER BÜDE". He rejects a theologically based view of sinful behaviour as a cause of derangement, although his main source for Lenz, the pastor J.F. Oberlin, clearly advanced such a view. There may be some reference to so-called Somatiker theories in the person of the Doctor in Woyzeck, who attributes Franz's deterioration to his diet of peas. Büchner's view of the validity of such theories can only be inferred from the value he places on the character in whose mouth they are put.

Kubik, in her detailed study of the importance of medical ideas in Büchner's literary work, makes much of the relevance of the Psychiker/Somatiker debate. She sees Lenz as in part a critique of Oberlin's, and by extension of the Psychiker view [Kubik 120]. Similarly, Büchner in Woyzeck is seen to be setting out an opposing view to that of his source Clarus, who is accounted a Psychiker [ibid. 160-161]. Leaving aside the question, which will be dealt with in the chapters on Lenz and Woyzeck, of whether these assertions are confirmed by a study of the text of these works, we have attempted to show in the present chapter that the Psychiker position was more complex, and less distinct from that of the Somatiker than Kubik appears to assume.

It is more to the point to consider, not what Büchner might have been arguing against in his portrayals of Lenz and Franz.

* Scene titles are those given by Werner Lehmann in his Historisch-kritische Ausgabe
Woyzeck, but rather wherein he located the influences that drove his characters mad, and determined the forms that their madness assumed. It will be argued in later chapters that these are to be found in issues relating to personal interaction and social exploitation. It is suggested that these issues were beginning to come to greater prominence in the writings of C.F. Nasse and K.W. Ideler. It cannot be assumed that Büchner, busy with literary composition, with scientific research and the preparation of a lecture course on philosophy, had time to devote to the 700 pages of the first volume of Ideler's Grundriss. It is perhaps more likely that through his father's professional involvement he became familiar with the journals in which Nasse was publishing his evolving ideas about the nature of madness. However, it is likely that the ideas put forward by both Nasse and Ideler were beginning to be common currency. Büchner developed and infinitely enriched these ideas in the portrayals of his madmen.
Introduction


"Die psychische Krankheit stellt sich als extreme Kampfsituation dar, als Feld der Auseinandersetzung mit den uns innewohnenden Mächten...." [Irle 7]

"Krankheiten besitzen in der Literatur und Realität einen
The first two of the above quotations, by psychiatrists, deny the validity of attempts by the creative writer to portray madness in a realistic and meaningful way, although they would no doubt allow the device, for artistic purposes, of using madness as a metaphor. The quotations from Jens and Irle, however, show why madness has continued to be a matter of absorbing concern in fiction and in drama. Engelhardt's contention that attitudes to madness in a given society constitute a diagnosis of that society's ills is taken further by Feder who sees literary interpretations of madness as both reflecting and questioning the social, cultural and psychiatric assumptions of their time [Feder 4]. If explorations of the interface between sanity and psychosis are to yield fertile insights into man's inner world and its relation to society and to nature, it follows that the perceptions of clinical psychiatry and the intuitive speculations of artistic creativity should enrich one another. Where such interaction does not occur, we are left, on the one hand, with the sterile observations of Clarus on Woyzeck and on the other with the wilder fantasies of Hoffmann.

There is considerable evidence that creative writers of the
Enlightenment and of Romanticism (for example, Goethe, Spieß, Klingeman, Hoffmann, Novalis) were familiar with contemporary medical writings, and derived from them both descriptions of mad behaviour and the clinical terms used in relation to them [Loquai passim]. The object of this section will be to examine texts of works written between 1774 and 1835 to discover how far their authors were successful in achieving authentic portrayals of madmen, what concepts of madness underlay these portrayals, and to what truths they sought to have access.

Goethe - Die Leiden des jungen Werthers (1774)

Although Werther uses the term "Wahnsinn" on more than one occasion to describe his condition, he does not at any time lose intellectual or emotional contact with the real world in the manner which characterises psychosis. His suicide is not even the outcome of an excessive or an ill-directed passion, both of which were for Kant and many other Enlightenment writers sure routes to madness. Werther's disillusion with the world seems rather to derive from a wounded narcissism. This narcissism is expressed in terms of "Empfindsamkeit", and there is here a foreshadowing of the views on pathogenesis of the Prussian physician, Hufeland. He postulated two components in illness, an external precipitant and the reaction of the vital forces. The greater the sensitivity (and it is greatest in the young), the more
severe the illness: "... wo die Empfindlichkeit groß ist, wird der kleinste Reiz den heftigsten Sturm erregen." Time and custom may desensitize "... wie man bey alten Hospitalwärtern, Todtengräbern, selbst alten Aerzten sieht. (Die jungen sind deshalb weit sterblicher.)" [Hufeland 21]. Hufeland is here writing some twenty years after the first publication of Werther, and there can be little doubt that, just as the work set a mood for a whole generation of young intellectuals, so it also influenced medical thinking.

Werther recovers well enough from his first rejection by Charlotte, and it is when he discovers that he does not get the social recognition that he feels he deserves that his world starts to disintegrate. Indeed, in his misery, Werther almost envies the man whom he meets by chance who had become mad through love of Charlotte. He is for Werther "der glückliche Unglückliche." [Werther 272]. Madness is seen as a kind of defence against suffering, against the excess of sensitivity that is his own undoing: "Elender und auch wie beneid ich deinen Trübsinn, die Verwirrung deiner Sinne, in der du verschmachtest! Du gehst hoffnungsvoll aus, deiner Königin Blumen zu pflücken - im Winter - und trauerst, da du keine findest, und begreifst nicht, warum du keine finden kannst. Und ich - ich gehe ohne Hoffnung ohne Zweck heraus, und kehr wieder heim wie ich gekommen bin." [ibid. 271].

In many respects, this passage in Werther anticipates the
portrayals of madness by Spieß in Biographien der Wahnsinnigen. There is a similar format - Werther comes across the madman by chance, and later learns the history from a third person, in this case the subject's mother. As so often in Spieß, the illness seems to arise from a single cause, an unrequited passion, and the onset is sudden, preceded by fever. All that is missing is the moral and didactic tone sometimes adopted by Spieß, to the effect that madness is a self-inflicted and avoidable condition. However, Werther, for all its preoccupation with its hero's turbulent state of mind and its ending in suicide, cannot be said to be a study of madness.

Goethe - Lila (performed 1777, revised 1778 and 1788, printed 1790)

Goethe's Singspiel was first performed privately at Weimar in 1777, and was intended to heal the marital difficulties that had arisen between Herzog Karl August and his wife Luise [May 1244]. In its original form, Goethe referred to the piece as "Operette" and "Feenspiel", suggesting no very serious purpose underlying the work. Yet the theme continued to be of considerable significance to him, shown by the fact that he returned to Lila with two revisions of the text over a period of eleven years. These reworkings show a "Vertiefung des Themas ... eine Verinnerlichung des Geschehens" [Diener 10], a move from the portrayal of a magical cure of a hypochondriac, to a more realistic depiction of psychosis,
with the cure effected by psychotherapeutic devices directed to the resocialization of the sufferer. To the last version, Goethe had given the description of "Festspiel", placing it in the category of works characterised by, initially, the depiction of a harmonious state, the disruption of that harmony through daemonic forces, and finally the re-establishment of harmony on a higher plane [ibid. 22].

The years 1776 to 1788 provided Goethe with considerable experience of mental disturbance amongst his friends, notably Lenz whom he first supported then rejected. With less severely disturbed individuals, he tried to act as a healer. On one of his journeys into the Harz mountains, he visited the hypochondriacally afflicted Plessing, with a view to helping him, and he involved himself in the problems that had arisen in the family of a court official, Einsiedel, referring to himself in the context as "moralischer Leibarzt". This would indicate that he identified strongly with the character of Verazio, the doctor who devises the means of Lila's cure [ibid. 32-33].

The heroine, Lila is portrayed as plunged in a melancholy that was precipitated by the false report of her husband's death and that persists after his reappearance. She responds to his homecoming by believing that he is a ghost, and comes to harbour the delusion that all her family and friends are merely spirits. In other respects, her thoughts and
utterances seem appropriate to her imagined situation, and thus she can be seen as suffering from a fixe Idee (monomania or partial insanity). Goethe does not use the term "Wahnsinn" to describe her condition, referring simply to "Krankheit" or "Elend". Diener sees Lila's madness as characterized by "Vorherrschen des Wahnidees", "Menschenscheu" and "Verfolgungswahn", and postulates a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia [ibid. 149]. However it cannot be said that her paranoia goes very deep. On her first appearance in the second scene of the play, she is indeed melancholy and distrustful of strangers, but within minutes shows herself as deeply trusting of a chorus of her friends (disguised as fairies): "Ich ergebe mich ganz euerem Rat, eurer Leitung. Wäre ihr Sterbliche, ich könnte euch meine Freundinnen heissen, euch Liebe geben und Liebe von euch hoffen. Tauscht mein Herz nicht, das Hilfe von euch erwartet!" [Lila 877].

Such an apparently conventional representation leads the psychiatrist Horst Geyer to see the portrayal of Lila as "Laienpsychiatrie", but to do so is to apply present-day criteria to an eighteenth century situation. If this is "lay psychiatry", then many of those physicians of the time who were writing on mental illness were writing like laymen. Indeed it could be argued that Geyer's assertion "daß der Nervenarzt .... sicher weiß, daß die echte Geistesstörungen
somewhat overstates the case for non-psychological
determinants of madness.

The main interest in Lila however lies not in the truth or otherwise of the depiction of the heroine's illness, but in the methods applied to bring about cure. Goethe, writing thirty years after the final version of Lila, describes it as dealing with "einer psychischen Kur, wo man den Wahnsinn eintreten läßt, um den Wahnsinn zu heilen [letter to Graf Brühl 1.10.1818, quoted in Diener 147]. Medications and physical remedies are rejected, indeed seen as worse than the illness itself. Thus, Lila's husband, Baron Sternthal: "Mir schaudert's, wenn ich an die Kuren denke, die man mit ihr gebraucht hat, und ich zittere, zu was für weitem Grausamkeiten gegen sie man mich verleiten wollte und fast verleitet hätte. Nein, ihre Liebe zu mir hat ihr den Verstand geraubt; die meinige soll ihr wenigstens ein leidlich Leben erhalten." [Lila 866]. Doctors are "Zahnbrecher" and there is talk of "Pferdearzneien." [ibid. 862].

A new doctor appears, however, Verazio (whose name promises a new kind of truth) bringing a fresh approach to treatment: "Es ist hier nicht von Kuren noch von Quacksalbereien die Rede. Wenn wir Phantasie durch Phantasie kurieren könnten, so hätten wir ein Meisterstück gemacht." [ibid. 870]. He devises a kind of psycho-drama in which Lila's family and friends
will present to her as the ghosts and spirits of her imaginings in order to make the kind of emotional contact with her that will draw her once again into the circle of those she loves. (Indeed the whole piece may be regarded as a kind of psycho-drama directed to the reconciliation of Goethe's patron with his wife and the alleviation of the latter's melancholy. [Reuchlein 1986 134].) The stratagem succeeds, significantly by allowing Lila to confront the feelings that underlay her melancholy and anxiety: "Eure Gegenwart ängstigt mich, eure Liebe! Nicht die Furcht vor dem Ungeheuer.... Eure Liebe, die ich mir nicht zueignen kann, treibt mich von hinnen..." [Lila 883].

Reuchlein rightly links such ideas to the emergent doctrines of Pinel and Reil on "moral" methods of the treatment of the insane [Reuchlein 1983 22-24]. He fails however to note the even more striking parallel between Goethe and Reil in the psycho-drama episode. In his Rhapsodien über die Anwendung der psychischen Kurmethoden auf Geisteszerrüttungen of 1803 Reil advocates that, on admission to hospital the madman should be received by attendants dressed in strange clothes, uttering in strange tongues and enacting strange roles. The main difference between Reil and Verazio is that the aim of the former was to unhinge the patient completely, and thus detach him from his delusion, in order that cure might begin, whereas Verazio's purpose was the somewhat gentler one of
integrating Lila once again into the society of family and friends. (This approach may be seen as exemplifying the homeopathic principle of treating like with like, illusion with illusion [Mora 59].) It is specially remarkable that final version of Lila, in which the theme of psychodrama was incorporated, preceded the appearance of Reil's work by some fifteen years. Goethe was acquainted with Reil, and mentioned the Rhapsodien in a letter shortly after its publication [Diener 154]. It is possible that he had earlier discussed the ideas put forward in the book with its writer, but the fact remains that the most influential texts in German on psychotherapeutic methods* had still to be published, when Goethe was completing Lila. However, one work did appear in the year before Lila's final version, which had some bearing on Goethe's theme. In Die Leidenschaften als Heilmittel betrachtet of 1787, F.C.G. Scheidemantel maintained that the passions which were held by many to be the cause of madness could be harnessed towards therapeutic ends. In melancholia, for instance, where passions were dormant, it was necessary to mobilize and stimulate them in order to effect a cure: "... die Leidenschaften ...in manchen Krankheiten mehr als alle angewandten und bekannten Heilmittel geleistet haben." [Scheidemantel VII, quoted in Diener 158].

It is true that forms of psychodrama were occasionally described in the earlier 18th century literature. These usually took the form of entering into the patient's delusion and enacting a contrived resolution, for example the appearance of a forgiving angel to one unhinged by religious guilt and doubt. The psychodrama in Lila, is directed towards reconciliation through the forces of love in the words of the chorus of Lila's friends:

"Wir in der Hülle
Nächtlicher Stille
Weihen
Den Reihen,
Lieben die Sterblichen;
Keine verderblichen
Götter sind wir ...

[Lila 878]

Wir helfen gerne,
Sind nimmer ferne,
Sind immer nah.
Rufen die Armen
Unser Erbarmen,
Gleich sind wir da!" [ibid. 880-881]

Goethe - Wilhelm Meisters Lehrejahre (1795-6)

Two influences, the one intellectual, the other emotional may have influenced Goethe in his choice of illness generally, and madness in particular, as the central dynamic of his novel, and in his approach to his chosen theme. He was much impressed by the ideas of pedagogy propounded by Rousseau in Emil, so much so that he took the young Fritz von Stein into his household in order to educate him according to Rousseau's principles. From this on the one hand springs the portrayal of Felix as a child of Nature, and on the other, and relevant
to this inquiry, Goethe's interest in natural healing and "Diätetik" [Gittinger 38]. In his personal life, he had been deeply affected by the visit to him in Weimar in 1776 of J.M.R. Lenz, still on the edge of psychosis: "Bei diesem Besuch erfuhr Goethe die Grenzen seiner eigenen psychischen Belastbarkeit." [ibid. 89]. He defended his own mental balance by withdrawal from personal involvement. Whereas previously he had been supportive of Klinger and Lenz in their troubles, he now broke with Klinger and excluded Lenz from the Weimar circle, sending him to Frau von Stein with the seemingly harsh injunction: "... ich verbitte mir auch alle Nachrichten von Ihnen oder Lenz" [cited Gittinger 89]. It seems likely that such experiences left Goethe with unresolved conflicts in relation to madness, conflicts which he resolved creatively in the writing of the Lehriahre.

Images of madness recur throughout the novel. Wilhelm's reason is threatened by his confrontation with the supposed unfaithfulness of Marianne. As in Kant, it is an excess of "Leidenschaft" which carries the seeds of madness. However, Wilhelm, sustained by the "schnellheilende Kraft der Jugend", does not succumb to his passion, but confronts it head on ("zu Feuer und Schwert") [Lehriahre 76]. He falls ill with a fever (fever is often the prodrome to madness in both medical and literary descriptions of the period - as in both SpieB and Reil) which, however is seen by Goethe as a benign and
healing process: "... daß die Natur, die ihren Liebling nicht wollte zu Grunde gehen lassen, ihn mit Krankheit anfiel, um ihm von der andern Seite Luft zu machen." [ibid. 76]. Like Hoffmann and, later, Büchner, Goethe uses the symbol of the abyss (Abgrund) to represent the danger from which his hero has escaped: "... sah er rückwärts auf den schrecklichen Abgrund, labte sein Auge an der zerschmetternde Tiefe ..." [ibid. 77]. (For Goethe, like Hoffmann, the "Abgrund" remains here a conventional image. Büchner integrates the metaphor more completely into his portrayal of Lenz's plight. The abyss literally opens up at his feet in the mountain passes, as well as threatening his fragile sanity.)

However, it is in the character of the blind harpist that madness is finally manifest. Augustin is predisposed to a certain instability of character and to religious "Schwärmerei" but his psychosis becomes fully manifest in the episode of the "Brandnacht" [ibid. 330 ff.], when, believing his life to be threatened by Felix, the harpist tries to set fire to the boy. Goethe provides no clear explanation of the origin of this particular delusion, although the last part of the novel traces the origin of Augustin's psychosis to the sexual passion which leads him to renounce his monastic vows and into an incestuous relationship with his sister. This is at first unwitting but later, when its nature is made known, is defiantly affirmed. Gittinger sees the circumstances
underlying Augustin's madness as conforming to the convention of what the lay public would expect in terms of psychogenesis. [Gittinger 95]. But cliché or not, it is the stuff of tragedy, and it is not to be wondered at that Augustin is described in terms of mythic significance. It is part of Goethe's achievement that he combines such description with accurate understanding of the inner world of the depressed.

Various interpretations have been made of the irrational fear that Felix inspires in Augustin. Paul Krauß sees the figure of the boy as a "wesenhafte Verkörperung" of Augustin's "wahnvollen Angst", an agent of divine retribution [Krauß 344]. He goes further and sees the episode where the boy is threatened with death and then spared as a reworking of the story of Abraham and Isaac [ibid. 344], though this seems to find no justification in the text.

Schöne regards the boy as, for Augustin, the embodiment of the child of his incestuous union with Sperata, and therefore as a perpetual reminder of his guilt. Such a proposition requires explanation of the fact that the harpist is mistaken as to the gender of his child, and Schöne's explication of this paradox, namely that Augustin would have no way of knowing, highlights the tenuousness of the whole argument [Schöne 64-66]. Speculation of this kind reaches its apogee
in Bennhold-Thomsen and Guzzoni's suggestion that the Brandnacht episode represents a symbolic self-castration [cited in Reuchlein 1986 155-156].

Reuchlein sees Augustin as a figure pursued by the furies and cites a number of parallels between his situation and that of Orestes in Iphigenie [ibid. 156-158] although the hero's fate in the play may be said to be relatively benign.

If the significance of the harpist's madness has provided a rich source of speculation, the descriptions of how his illness is treated are of historical, rather than speculative interest. In the latter part of the eighteenth century, madness was, as we have seen, as much the concern of theologians and philosophers as of the medical profession. Lenz, on the advice of his friends, sought the help of a country pastor and not a physician when he felt his reason threatened. Thus Goethe was reflecting an established practice when he has Wilhelm arrange for Augustin to go into the care of a "Landgeistlichen, der sich ein besonderes Geschäft daraus machte dergleichen Leute zu behandeln." [Lehriahre 336]. The regimen which the pastor imposed on his patient is "ein Denkmal des 'moral management'" [Gittinger 95-97]. It certainly parallels that of Samuel Tuke, who opened his Retreat, near York in 1796, the year in which Wilhelm Meisters Lehriahre was completed. "Außer dem Physischem, sagte der Geistliche, .... finde ich die Mittel
vom Wahnsinn zu heilen sehr einfach. Es sind eben dieselben,
wodurch man gesunde Menschen hindert wahnsinnig zu werden.
Man erzeuge ihre Selbsttätigkeit, man gewöhne sie an Ordnung,
man gebe ihnen einen Begriff, daß sie ihr Sein und Schicksal
mit so vielen gemein haben, daß das außerordentliche Talent,
das größte Glück und das höchste Unglück nur kleine
Abweichungen von dem gewöhnlichen sind; so wird sich kein
Wahnsinn einschleichen, und wenn er da ist, nach und nach
wieder verschwinden." [Lehrjahre 347]. The so-called "moral
treatment" of the insane had been widely accepted in England
since the mid-1750's [Porter 12], though its influence on
German psychiatry was slight until well into the nineteenth
century. Goethe was in touch with many of the German
physicians who were beginning to turn their attention to
mental illness, among them Reil and Langermann [Dörner 258 &
273]. These were not, at the time Goethe was writing his
novel, proponents of "ethische Psychiatrie", although
Langermann was later to become one [ibid. 275]. Wilhelm's
own exchanges with the mad harpist are characterized by a
calm rationality that appears to be therapeutic: "Der Alte
mochte nun sagen, was er wollte, so hatte Wilhelm immer ein
stärker Argument, wußte alles zum besten zu kehren und zu
wenden, wußte so brav, so herzlich und tröstlich zu sprechen,
daß der Alte selbst wieder aufzuleben und seinen Grillen zu
entsagen schien." Goethe's attitude to the question of moral
management is somewhat ambiguous. The pastor's aims for his
patient are set out with considerable sympathy and understanding, yet there is a sense in which the apparent cure which he achieves involves a conformity to bourgeois norms alien to Augustin's true self [Lehrjahre 596].

Augustin's state of mind is described by the doctor who shares with the pastor the duty of care for their patient. It shows many features of the affective content of psychotic depression: "Seit vielen Jahren hat er an nichts, was außer ihm war, den mindesten Anteil genommen, ja fast auf nichts gemerkt, bloß in sich gekehrt, betrachtete er sein hohles leeres Ich, das ihm als ein unermeßlicher Abgrund erschien." [ibid. 438]. Like Büchner in Lenz, Goethe goes beyond recording the behaviour and utterances of the madman, and attempts to describe something of his inner world. In this respect, the new significance attached to the word "Abgrund" is noteworthy. Whereas in the earlier passage commented on above it represents a metaphorical threat ready to engulf Wilhelm, here the abyss is within Augustin himself, an unfathomable emptiness. Goethe also has insight into the profound feelings of guilt and unworthiness, the feelings of separation from God and man, that characterise the depressive state: "...ich sehe nichts vor mir, nichts hinter mir, rief er aus, als eine unendliche Nacht, in der ich mir in der schrecklichsten Einsamkeit befinde, kein Gefühl bleibt mir als das Gefühl einer Schuld, die doch auch nur wie ein
entferntes unförmliches Gespenst sich rückwärts sehen läßt.... Kein Strahl einer Gottheit erscheint mir in dieser Nacht, ich weine meine Tränen alle mir selbst und um mich selbst." [ibid. 438]. Only in the last phrase does Goethe succumb to a conventionally literary view of depression. In other respects the portrayal of Augustin's illness is clinically coherent. For example, the kind of paranoid delusion expressed by Augustin in the episode of the 

*Brandnacht* is not uncommon in the severely depressed. In the main Augustin's thinking insofar as it is portrayed is free of delusional content, in contrast to the majority of characters described by Spieß.

The resolution of Augustin's psychosis is described with some ambiguity. Sharp points out that the harpist's final state of sanity closely resembles Lenz's final state of insanity, outwardly conformist but achieved only through the adoption of a false self. The pastor sees as his criteria for cure the restoration of a well-kempt exterior and the capacity to get on with others, and these goals are apparently achieved [Sharp 278]. Goethe does not at this point comment directly on Augustin's state of mind, although some inner peace may be inferred from the description: "daß an seinem bedeutenden Gesichte die Züge des Alters nicht mehr erschienen." [Lehrjahre 596]. On the other hand, the harpist's awareness of the precariousness of cure is indicated by his wish to
keep poison by him should he once again become overwhelmed. In the end, the cure cannot be sustained, having been achieved by enabling Augustin to repress knowledge of his guilty past. When he can no longer do this, having by chance seen some documents which reveal the truth, he slits his throat [ibid. 602-604].

Gittinger sees the illnesses that afflict the various characters in the *Lehrjahre* as psychosomatic in nature and the sufferers as insecure, leading rootless lives without a stabilising "Diätetik" and possessed of a death-wish [Gittinger 119-120]. Considering that the novel concerns itself for the most part with the destinies of a troop of strolling players, it is not surprising that lack of security is manifest in their lives, and Goethe hardly seems to be stating a theory of mental health as based in an acceptance of respectability.

Comparing the presentation of madness in *Werther* with that in the *Lehrjahre* twenty years later, we find a move from a conventional Enlightenment view to a deeper understanding of the inner world of madness, which in many ways anticipates Büchner's achievement in *Lenz*. Whereas, however, Goethe is exploring melancholia within a still relatively integrated personality, with Büchner we witness an almost total disintegration. Furthermore, the portrayal does remain conventional in other ways which Büchner transcends: "Diese
Figur" (Goethe's "Harfner") "entspricht ausgezeichnet dem falschen Bilde, das der Laie an Geisteskrankheiten zu sehen verlangt: Ein Mensch, der, umwittert von einem 'schauervollen Geheimnis' seiner Vergangenheit ..., auf einmal einen Brand anlegt ... - das ist etwas für die empfängliche Phantasie ..." [A.E. Hoche, quoted in Irle 16].

We shall see this theory of psychogenesis repeatedly exemplified in the Biographien der Wahnsinnigen of Christian Heinrich Spieß.

Christian Heinrich Spieß - Biographien der Wahnsinnigen (1795) Spieß (1755-99), a writer of Ritter- and Räuberromane, was one of the most popular authors of his day. Johann Friedrich Jünger, in his novel Fritz (1796), names him as one of the "Direktorium der fünf Lieblingsschreiber Deutschlands" (Jean Paul being one of the others.) [Promies 317]. In Walter Benjamin's Hörmodell, "Was die Deutschen lasen, während ihre Klassiker schrieben", Spieß is numbered among the trivialising "Scribenten" who are accused of pandering to the public's taste for horrific titillation, under the guise of advancing the cause of reason [ibid. 341]. It must be acknowledged that certain passages of his fictional Biographien der Wahnsinnigen would seem to support this view, notably the chapter "Das Hospital der Wahnsinnigen zu P." [Biographien 271-313] where the juxtaposition of apparent
friendliness and hidden menace is fully exploited. The narrator describes a young inmate in chains who "blickte sehnsuchtvoll nach uns heraus, küßte, gleich Kindern, seine Hand und warf diese Küße unserer Führerin zu......Treten Sie nicht näher! rief der Arzt.....Er ist, fuhr er fort, unter allen meinen Patienten der gefährlichste.... und würde sicher morden.....bald wird er auch die Sprache verlieren, die ihn noch allein vom Tiere unterscheidet." [ibid. 286-287]

However Spieß reveals a genuine warmth of pity for the insane which transcends the trivialities of the *Schauerroman*. In one story a young woman is delivered of a baby, who is immediately taken from her. After some days of delirium, the young mother seemed to become calm. "Sie bildete sich aus Wäsche und andere Flecke ein Kind, das sie mit der größten Sorgfalt pflegte und wartete, aber weh derjenigen, welche es nur versuchen wollte, ihr die elende Puppe zu rauben, sie war tagelang nicht zu besänftigen und wachte immer nachher einige Nächte am Bette des kleinen Abgotts." What deepens the sense of true pity in the above passage is Spieß's comment: "...ihre Raserei verwandelte sich in einen glücklichen Wahnsinn, welcher ihre Einbildungskraft irreführte und ihr gewährte, was ihr die Gesetze nicht erlauben konnten." [ibid. 175]. We have already met with the idea that an insane delusion may serve as a defence against
greater misery, in the case of the madman in Werther. It is a concept we shall find expressed often in Spieß, as well as in some Romantic portrayals of madness.

Reuchlein points to the moral-didactic purpose in the Biographien and relates this to the Aufklärung view of madness, namely that it arises from a departure from the dictates of reason and out of excessive or ill-directed passions [Reuchlein 1986 99-101]. It can therefore be avoided by living one's life according to the canons of moderate rationality. Spieß in his Vorrede writes: “Wahnsinn ist schrecklich, aber noch schrecklicher ist's, daß man so leicht ein Opfer desselben werden kann....Wenn ich Ihnen die Biographien dieser Unglücklichen erzähle, so will ich nicht allein Ihr Mitleid wecken, sondern Ihnen vorzüglich beweisen, daß jeder derselben der Urheber seines Unglücks war, daß es folglich in unserer Macht steht, ähnliches Unglück zu verhindern”. [Biographien 7]. The message is reinforced in his first volume by the inclusion of an engraving, after Goya, which bears the inscription in Spanish: "The sleep of reason brings forth monsters." Moved by a guided tour of a madhouse, Spieß's narrator apostrophises his readers: "Mensch! Achte den Wert deiner Vernunft! Ohne sie gleichst du dem Löwen, welchen man im eng vergitterten Kasten zur Schau umher führt" [ibid. 275]. The double implication is clearly, not only that loss of reason is something that can be guarded
against, but that it is legitimate to cage the sufferer and even to put him on show. Reuchlein explains the fascination that madness held for Aufklärung readers by pointing to the symbolic-metaphorical significance it held [Reuchlein 1986 125], as a Gegenwelt, a world that is shadow to the ordered and improvable society to which they aspired.

The life histories of Spieß's subjects do in some instances support his declared intent to show sufferers to be the authors of their own disorder. The two young officers who appeared to be bound to each other in a mute, melancholy folie à deux had independently fallen prey to hopeless passion for the same rich young woman. Their madness now persisted independently of its initial cause, so that attempts by their doctor to simulate some hope in the matter of their former love met no response [Biographien 276-279]. Lottchen, a parson's daughter, who becomes pregnant then loses her lover to the wars, goes suddenly mad at the sight of her father's funeral procession, blaming herself for precipitating his death. Despite the loving care of her father's parishioners during and after her confinement, she continues in her madness [ibid. 9-43]

More commonly, however, the sufferers seem to be helpless victims of the kind of circumstance generated by an unjust society. A typical history in this respect is told in the chapter "Das schöne irre Judenmädchen" [ibid. 130-181],
where a young girl falls in love, honourably, with a young officer, as he with her. Social forces prevent their marrying, and they separate. She hears false rumours of his marriage, but still experiences no more than normal unhappiness and, on the death of her father, converts to Catholicism and enters a nunnery. There her lover finds her again, helps her escape and marries her, only to die soon afterwards. Despite this train of misfortunes, she remains purposeful and in clear mind. It is only when arrested by the religious authorities, excommunicated, subjected to three months of solitary confinement and has her newborn child removed from her that she is overtaken by delusions. To hold her to be the author of her own madness would seem to be a very distorted allocation of blame.

Such misfortunes leading to a dire outcome are found again and again in the Biographien. The conscientious cashier who makes a mistake in his accounts and is threatened with prosecution and the ruin of his family succumbs to a deluded melancholy and, although the simple mistake is rectified, fails to recover [ibid. 282-284]. Friedrich M., an honest though impoverished craftsman, is imprisoned together with his wife and family, having been found guilty of theft as the result of false witness. He survives isolation and chains with his reason intact and rejoices in his release when, after some months, the true culprit is found. Madness
supervenes when he learns of the death, some months earlier of his wife, news which had been kept from him in his cell [ibid. 62-88]. It is difficult to match such accounts with Spieß's avowed aim of saving his readers from rashness. "Wie herrlich, wie erhaben," he ends his Vorrede, "würde ich mich belohnt dünken, wenn meine Erzählungen das leichtgläubige Mädchen, den unvorsichtigen Jüngling an der Ausführung eines kühnen Plans hinderten, der ihnen einst den Verstand rauben könnte." [ibid. 8-9].

Amongst the category of those whose reason is unhinged by force of circumstance, the case of the poor shoemaker [ibid. 301-308] in the "Hospital der Wahnsinnigen zu P." is of special interest in relation to Büchner's portrayal of Woyzeck some forty years later. Like Woyzeck, the shoemaker is precipitated into madness, not simply by misfortune, but by humiliation, in his case the humiliation of begging into which he is forced. The differences are that in Spieß a caring society succours the poor man's family, whereas Büchner shows the soldier and his woman and child in a world that is hostile to their aspirations. While the shoemaker's madness does not respond to a caring response, the content of his delusions is free from the persecution that haunts Woyzeck. The gulf that separates Spieß's optimistic world view from that of Der Hessische Landbote is here clearly charted.
Another resonance between the Biographien and Woyzeck concerns the fairground scene in the latter and the episode of the young man with the peepshow [ibid.309-314] in "Das Hospital der Wahnsinnigen zu P." The passage warrants extensive quotation:

"DER WAHNSINNIGE  Geben Sie acht, itzt wird das Spiel beginnen. Mit lauter Stimme Itzt schwebt eine Spinne eine Spinne in der Mitte des Gemachs, sie webt ihr künstliches Netz, alles ist fein und neidlich, alles schön und symmetrisch! Geben Sie Acht, viele Fliegen summen ohne Argwohn umher, eben hat sich eine im Netze verwickelt, die Spinne eilt herbei, saugt ihr das Blut aus und tötet sie qualvoll. Ebenso fangen uns die listigen Weiber, und wenn wir im Netze der Liebe verwickelt sind, so quälen und martern uns zu Tode - Heisa, da kommt ein lustiger Knabe, er macht Seifenblase und freut sich der schönen Farben. Der Tor bedenkt nicht, daß er sich einst im männlichen Alter mit Wehmut an dies Spiel erinnern wird. Er wird lieben, er wird Treue von seinem Weibe fordern, und diese wird gleich der schönsten Seifenblase in der Luft verschwinden.....

"Geben Sie acht, geben sie wohl acht! Itzt kommt das letzte und beste meiner Stücke. Nun, meine Herren, was sehen Sie?

"DER ARZT Einen Spiegel."
"DER WAHNSINNIGE Und in diesem?
"DER ARZT Nichts.
"DER WAHNSINNIGE Gar nichts?
"DER ARZT Rein nichts.
"DER WAHNSINNIGE Hm! Hm! Merkwürdig, aber wahr! Es ist der Spiegel der edlen und uneigennützigen Handlungen aller lebenden Menschen. Da sie nichts darinnen erblicken, so ist's erwiesen, daß alle, die auf Erde wohnen, vollkommene Taugenichtse sind. Ihr Diener, meine Herren, Ihr Diener!"

Not only does the image of the peepshow here prefigure that of the fairground, but there are similarities in the rhythm and pace of the language. An animal serves as metaphor for the concerns of men in both scenes and both scenes comment pessimistically on human potential - in Woyzeck: "Sehn Sie die Fortschritte der Zivilisation. Alles schreitet fort, ein Pferd, ein Aff, ein Kanaillelevogel!" [H.2.3]

If there is a discrepancy between theory and practice in the depiction of the causes of madness, what of Spieß's account of the forms such disorder takes? Here, at least, there seems to be a greater adherence to an Aufklärung view of madness as simply a loss of rationality. In the case of Friedrich M., described above, a doctor is called at the first manifestations of disorder: "Er beobachtete ihn genau und fand leider, daß sein Verstand, Gedächtnis und
Beurteilungskraft täglich mehr und mehr schwinde.." The faculties which the doctor finds to be in decline closely resemble the triad of components which Kant held to make up the higher "Erkenntnisvermögen", namely "Verstand", "Urtheilskraft" and "Vernunft". "Erkenntnisvermögen" stood in Kant's schema in opposition to "Sinnlichkeit", which represented not simply sensuality but, rather, exclusive concern with empirical experience [Kant 196-201.]

In case after case the main symptom is delusional thought, often highly systematised. The story of Esther L., the "Judenmädchen" is preceded by a long, highly circumstantial account, purporting to be "Die Geschichte der Karoline G. von H.". This is revealed in the last pages to be no more than a complex and consistently maintained delusion on the part of Karoline, and as the reader proceeds to the story of Esther he becomes gradually aware that Esther and Karoline are one and the same, and that Karoline's delusions are in fact Esther's. This device, while it achieves a remarkable narrative force, none the less conveys an impression of madness as a condition in which the sufferer displays considerable ingenuity in reconstructing her past. It is possible to view this as an attempt on the patient's part to maintain some kind of coherent identity, some kind of rationality in the face of an inner chaos. But in Spieß, for
the most part, the inner chaos is not hinted at, and this may reveal something of the limitations of the Aufklärung view. Delusions may also seem to be a defence against the conflicts aroused by the impact of external reality. When Wilhelm, the father of Lottchen's child, returns from the wars, she rejects him, clinging to her delusion that she and her child are angels in heaven, only to be united with Wilhelm when he joins them in heaven after death. Here the delusion is virtually the only sign of madness so that one can think in terms of a favourite psychiatric diagnosis of the times, *fixe Idee*.

In one chapter, "Der gläserne Okonom" [ibid. 44-61] the content of the delusion has a clearly paranoid quality. Jakob, the bailiff in question, finds that his relatives know and disapprove of his intended choice of wife, even though he has spoken to none of them. They must therefore have been able to see into his heart, hence the delusion that his chest must be made of glass. The idea, that they will see the hatred there and will therefore persecute him, stands in anticipation of modern psychodynamic theory that persecutory ideas in paranoia are a projection of the patient's own aggression. (The delusion that a part of the body is made of glass appears to have been a common one in the eighteenth century and goes back to Galen [Loquai 6]. Descriptions occur in many contemporary textbooks, for example in Reil's *Erkenntnis und Cur der Fieber*, where such symptoms are said to
be characteristic of "Verrücktheit" [Reil 1805 342-343]. In 
Nachtwachen. Von Bonaventura (1804) there is a description of 
a visit to a madhouse: "No. 2 und 3 sind philosophische 
Gegenfüßler, ein Idealist und ein Realist; jener laboriert an 
einer gläsernen Brust..." [Nachtwachen 146].) Again the 
application of the term fixe Idee seems appropriate to the 
later part of the course of Jakob's illness, during which, 
though persisting in his delusion, he can function with 
utmost effectiveness in the running of his family's farm. 
Such splitting is compatible with a diagnosis of paranoid 
schizophrenia.

On the whole Spieß devotes little space to description of the 
symptoms of madness. This is in contrast to the meticulous, 
often tedious, detail with which he catalogues the life 
events leading up to its onset. The book is after all called 
Biographien, and the author's declared purpose to illuminate 
the causes of breakdown. In some of the stories, however, he 
endows the content of the psychotic behaviour with 
existential significance. "Der staunende Konrad" [Biographien 
182-239] is twice on the brink of fulfilment of his love for 
the daughter of a wealthy merchant, a love which has overcome 
countless obstacles, only to be thwarted by circumstance. 
When he eventually succumbs to melancholy, his behaviour says 
something of its sources: "Er pflanzte im folgenden Frühling 
mit vielem Eifer im Garten Blumen, er pflegte sie sorgfältig.
Wenn eine derselben zu grünen und Knospen zu treiben begann, so riß er sie heraus.... Er baute unter dieser Zeit auch oft im Garten kleine Häuser aus Sand und Lehm.... Wenn sie aber ganz vollendet waren, so riß er sie mit hastiger Begierde auseinander und lachte laut auf, wenn die Stücke ringsumher flogen" [ibid. 235]. It is not difficult to see in this an enactment of the destruction of his hopes.

A notable feature in Spieß's attempts to account for the genesis of madness is his recurring insistence on the importance of heightened sensibility in the predisposition of individuals to breakdown. The word "Einbildungskraft"* appears in almost all the accounts, associated with such adjectives as "mehr als je beschäftigte" [ibid. 16] or 'erhitzten' [ibid. 53]. The concept of "glücklichen Wahnsinn" [ibid. 175], with the implication that psychosis protects the sufferer from even greater misery and disintegration, is a recurring theme, and again relates to enlightenment views of madness: "For classicism, madness in its ultimate form is man in immediate relation to his animality.... Animality, in fact, protected the lunatic from whatever might be fragile, precarious or sickly in man." [Foucault 1967 74].

It is not possible, on the basis of Spieß's descriptions to hazard a diagnosis in terms of present-day psychiatry. This, as we shall see, stands in contrast to Büchner's portrayal of

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*a term used by Kant in his Anthropologie to explain predisposition to madness [Kant 215]*
Lenz and Woyzeck. The very sudden onset of psychosis which is the almost invariable case in the Biographien would suggest a diagnosis of schizophrenia, since in other forms of psychiatric illness onset tends to be more gradual. The portrayal of Jakob in "Der gläserne Ökonom", although compatible with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, is by no means detailed enough to allow certain diagnosis. We shall see in Woyzeck a delineation that is much more complete. Psychiatrists contemporary with Spieß would most likely have diagnosed his subjects as suffering from partial insanity or fixe Idee.

Their main, and often only, symptom is delusional thought, in a form which is not typical of schizophrenia. In most of the Biographien, delusions arise from a disordered interpretation of events but are consistent within their own frame of reference. These have been called interpretative delusions and occur in a variety of psychiatric conditions. "They.... show that the patient's powers of reasoning and judgement are well preserved, and that he tries to keep order in the world of his experience" [Slater & Roth 272]. We shall see that Woyzeck tries to keep some kind of order in his world, but his delusions reach out in all directions.

A passage from a work by an Italian physician, Chiarugi, appearing in German translation in the same year as Biographien comments on the kinds of life events that trigger
off madness: "... der Mensch, welcher nach Ehrenstellen und Reichtum strebt, glaubt sich daher von einem tödlichen Streich niedergeworfen, wenn er seinen Zweck nicht erreicht; und zernagt sich das Herz durch einen bittern Schmerz, welcher oft von einer falschen Vorstellung seinen Ursprung nahm, oder, wenn er auch gegründet ist, doch eine übermäßige Größe erreicht hat" [Chiarugi 259f. quoted in Loquai 41]. Chiarugi was almost alone among doctors of his time in according to political and economic factors a role in the causation of melancholia, though it is the failure of bourgeois entrepreneurial aspirations, rather than grinding poverty and political oppression, that is given as the determining factor. Thus it corresponds to the life situations of many of Spieß’s subjects and, as we shall see, of Kleist’s Michael Kohlhaas, rather than to that of Woyzeck. Here with his reference to “falsche Vorstellung”, Chiarugi, like Spieß, seems to be allocating to social circumstances not only the origin of a delusive madness, but also the specific forms the delusion takes.

It is significant however that “Wahnsinn”, the term used almost exclusively by Spieß to denote the illness of his subjects, is used by Kant in his Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht for one of the categories of “Verrückungen” or “Gemüthsstörungen” and it is this category that most closely corresponds to the schizophrenic group of illnesses
as we now understand them. Under this head, Kant describes delusional thinking, paranoid ideas and ideas of reference [Kant 215]. It is true that the Anthropologie was not published until 1798, three years after the first appearance of Spieß's work, but it was based on lectures which Kant delivered some twenty years earlier, and the ideas contained therein were probably well known to those interested in such matters. Kant also stressed the subjective, inner logic shown in delusional thought.

"Der staunende Konrad" includes one of the few accounts by Spieß of the treatment accorded to his subjects — treatment, that is, other than confinement, often in chains: "Der Arzt versuchte ihm die sogenannte Eiskur, sie glückte vortrefflich, Konrad befand sich besser...die Vernunft behauptete aufs neue ihre Rechte." [Biographien 235]. In the last words of this passage, reason asserting its rights, Spieß is again revealed as an exponent of Aufklärung thought. It is accepted that madness is a disease to be treated by doctors. In this regard, Reuchlein sees him as a follower of Johann Christian Reil [Reuchlein 1986 128-129]. In "Das Hospital der Wahnsinnigen zu P." there is optimism as to the possibilities of cure: "Ich sah's so gerne, wenn Hoffnung in seinem" (i.e. the doctor's) "Augen glänzte, und hörte es mit größtem Vergnügen, wenn er wirklich durch Kunst und rastlose Bemühung dem schrecklichen Wahnsinn ein Opfer
In the stories themselves, however, the outcome is almost inevitably deterioration and death.

In many instances, Spieß stresses the normality of appearance of his subjects after they have become mad, and Reuchlein holds that this may represent a rejection on Spieß's part of Lavater's views on the interrelation of madness and physiognomy [Reuchlein 1986 124-125]. Whether or not this is so, this stress on apparent normality of appearance reinforces the impression in so many of the cases of partial insanity. "Hätte er nicht eine Kette hinter sich geschleppt, ich würde ihn nicht für wahnsinnig gehalten haben. Sein offener Blick, seine heitere Miene, sein lachelndes Auge wiedersprach dieser Vermutung ganz" [Biographien 309].

Spieß's attitude towards his subjects represents a transitional position between early and late Enlightenment views of madness: "Für die Literatur der rationalistischen Frühauflärung waren Kriminalität und psychische Krankheit verteilungswürdige und abscheuerregende Erscheinungsform und sozialer Devianz; ihre Darstellung zielte auf Kritik abweichenden Verhaltens und auf die Disziplinierung des Lesers durch abschreckende Beispiele ab" [Reuchlein 1985 5]. There is certainly a sense of the awful warning that his portrayals convey to his readership. But he also conveys a compassion
and understanding which typified changing attitudes in medicine and the courts in the first years of the nineteenth century, before the latter, as the result of the movement towards conservatism during the Restauration, began to take a harder line in regard to issues of responsibility before the law.

In summary, Spieß's declared intention was to show madness as rooted in passion and unreason, following Kant in Germany and Pinel in France [Grange 442-453]. However in the situations in which his characters find themselves it is most frequently harsh social circumstances which lead to their breakdown. In this sense he might be said to be anticipating Büchner who saw the madness of Woyzeck as determined by his interaction with his environment. Where Büchner differs from Spieß is in his rejection of the idea that madness might be a protection against something worse. Lenz's end in autistic withdrawal and Woyzeck's murder of the one person who made sense of his life represent the extremes of human misery.

Romanticism and Madness

For the Romantics, and especially for Hoffmann, madness was often the outcome of a rebellion against a hostile world, whereas for Lenz and Woyzeck it was a final capitulation which left Lenz no recourse but autism, and Woyzeck none but murder. "Dem konsequenten Romantiker wird die Welt des Wahnsinnigen zur Wirklichkeit; er schildert die Erscheinungen, wie sie subjektiv in dem Zerrspiegel des erkrankten Hirns
sich formen; seine abnormen Menschen leben in einer ebenso
abnormen Umgebung. ... Büchner, der Realist, gibt eine
objektive Darstellung des Seelenzustandes; indem er den
Geisteskranken in die ewig harmonisch Natur stellt, entgeht
er die Versuchung, auch die Umwelt gleichsam wahnsinnig
werden zu lassen..." [Landau 40]. This is to overstate the
contrast between Büchner and the Romantics. While he does not
idealise madness, and describes its manifestations in
accurate detail, he can hardly be said to place his
protagonists in a sane and harmonious setting. The concept of
an "ewig harmonische Natur" does not match the descriptions
of weather and landscape in Lenz, nor does Woyzeck's
"Umgebung", at least in the personae of the Captain and the
Doctor, appear as a model of sanity and balance. If, in Lenz,
Büchner shows the poet's retreat into autism as a defence
against intolerable inner conflict, it is a defence of the
self achieved at the expense of a total loss of creativity.

In Hoffmann, on the other hand, madness is often represented
as a higher, creativity-enhancing state. The idea of sublime
madness has a long history going back to classical times and
reaching forward into our own, witness the flirtation by
artists and writers with the artificial psychosis induced by
psychodelic drugs [Bader 109]. Today's conventional wisdom
tends to see the idea as "one of those blind alleys not
uncommon in the history of psychiatric thought" [Alexander &
Selesnick 140]. However neurophysiological research has suggested ways in which the creative and the psychotic processes might be linked, postulating a continuum of "Bewuβtseinsinhalt" between normal creative, psychotic and ecstatic states, with creativity and psychosis closely located on the continuum [Fischer 1970 20, also Fischer 1971 897-904].

Nachtwachen. Von Bonaventura (1804)
The pseudonym "Bonaventura" has successfully resisted definitive attribution for nearly two centuries. Schelling, Hoffmann, Jean Paul, Brentano, Caroline Schlegel-Schelling, as well as minor figures like Wetzel and Klingemann, have at various times been proposed as the author, but even statistical analysis of vocabulary and sentence structure has failed to yield conclusive results [Gillespie xii-xiii, Reuchlein 1986 306 footnote]. The choice of a pseudonym in the first place, and the author's successful covering of his tracks were, one may assume, necessitated by the subversive content of the work, on the one hand attacking the rationalist complacency of the Enlightenment, and on the other hand surpassing even the most extreme trends of Romanticism in alienation and ultimately nihilism.

The narrator, Kreuzgang, is an outsider, once a poet, now a night-watchman who observes the whole range of human folly, acted out from time to time by marionettes and a clown.
There are two visits to a madhouse [Neunte Nachtwache, Vierzehnte Nachtwache] in which Kreuzgang, temporarily an inmate, is trusted on account of his "unschädliche Narrheit" with the task of presenting the patients to the visiting doctor, Oehlmann. Madness is reason in a mad world: "No. 5 hielt zu verständige Reden. deshalb haben sie ihn hierher geschickt" [Nachtwachen 146]. Society empowers some madmen and locks up others: "Herr Doktor Oehlmann, ... wir laborieren zwar alle mehr oder minder an fixe Ideen: nicht nur einzelne Individuen, sondern ganze Gemeinheiten und Fakultäten, von denen zum Beispiel viele der letzteren neben dem Vertriebe der Weisheit auch einem bloßen Huthandel obliegen, wodurch sie sogar nicht weise Häupter bloß vermöge des leichten Aufdrückens eines solchen Hutes aus ihrer Fabrik in weise umzusetzen glauben; ... Oehlmann schüttelte hier seinen Doktorhut ... Sie schütteln, fuhr ich fort, weil mich der Himmel bloß zu einem Narren kreiert hat, und nicht der Kaiser zum Doktor?" [ibid. 144]. The world is a madhouse at large in which smaller madhouses are built "für besondere Narren". The delusions of those in the madhouse are preferable to the delusions of those outside [ibid. 142-144].

Illusion and reality become interfused. An actress playing the mad Ophelia can no longer distinguish between the acting of madness and madness itself: "Ihr Kammerchen stieß dicht an das meinige, und ich hörte sie täglich den Holzschuh und..."
Muschelhut ihres Geliebten besingen." [ibid. 200]. She writes to her Hamlet: "... So will ich denn, da ich mich aus der Rolle nicht zurücklesen kann, in ihr fortlesen bis zum Ende und zu dem *exeunt omnes*, hinter dem dann doch wohl das eigentliche Ich stehen wird. Dann sage ich dir, ob außer der Rolle noch etwas existiert und das Ich lebt und dich liebt." [ibid. 212]. The search for a true self involves a journey to the extremities of sanity, and of life itself. At the same time, even madness becomes a rôle, convincingly portrayed by a puppet, at the whim of a Kantian puppet-master, who can say "... manches Gute über die Freiheit des Willens und über den Wahnsinn in einem Marionettengehirne, den er ganz realistisch und vernünftig abhandelt ..." [ibid. 80].

Heinrich von Kleist - *Michael Kohlhaas* 1808-1810

Kleist's early views were influenced by an optimism derived from the *Aufklärung* and a belief in the supremacy of the intellect, but restlessness and eventually despair followed the so-called "Kantkrise" of 1801. A suicide note written on the day of his death expressed his conviction: "daß mir auf Erden nicht zu helfen war."

The *Novelle Michael Kohlhaas. Aus einer alten Chronik* represents the conflict of Kleist's Enlightenment aspirations and Romantic disillusion. Kohlhaas pursues his sense of injustice, in the face of an authority which is indifferent to his case, to its logical and ultimately bizarre and
violent conclusion. Reuchlein points to the integrity of Kohlhaas: "Bei Kleist ist der Verbrecher Kohlhaas nur die konsequente Fortführung des Bürgers Kohlhaas", contrasting this with the deep splitting that is seen in Hoffmann, as exemplified by Cardillac in Das Fräulein von Scuderi [Reuchlein 1986 293-294]. It is possible to see Kohlhaas' condition as exemplifying a fixer Wahn, of the type exhibited in so many of the Biographien der Wahnsinnigen. However, whereas Spieß's characters nearly always remain passive victims, Kohlhaas becomes a vengeful destroyer, only giving up his delusion when the rightness of his case is conceded. If fixer Wahn it is, then it is a madness that is amenable to reason.

A psychodynamically oriented analysis by Wijsen suggests that the motivating source of Kohlhaas' behaviour as an excessive narcissism which leads him to a totally egocentric view of the world. "Other people exist for him primarily to accentuate his self-esteem...... Kohlhaas perceives of people as assets. He is capable of rearranging his relationships with them, as if they were mere attributes and not subjects in their own right." [Wijsen 101]. Such an interpretation allows an understanding both of how Kohlhaas can progress to more and more inhuman behaviour, sacrificing his wife, abandoning his children and embarking on a trail of slaughter and destruction, and of how he can suddenly revert to the
role of good citizen when the rightness of his case, and therefore his worth as a man of good standing has been recognized.

We can see in Michael Kohlhaas the beginnings of an undermining of the Enlightenment view of madness as a departure from reason. If it is passion that causes Kohlhaas' madness, it is the passionate pursuit of rationality, of the logic of his case. There is a sense of the continuum between sanity and madness, which we have seen in the writings of the psychiatrist Nasse some two decades later. It is possible also to relate Kohlhaas' situation to the frustration of the "Gemüthstriebe", for instance those relating to truth and honour, postulated by Ideler in his Grundriß der Seelenheilkunde [see Chapter Four].

In Nachtwachen, the demolition of Enlightenment rationality is complete. There the author shows madness to be a matter of social definition, the definition being decided by those who can be reasonable because they have power. The furies that will pursue Franz Woyzeck have revealed themselves.

E. T. A. Hoffmann (1776-1822)

One of the recurring themes of German Romanticism, the idealization of madness, the close identity between artist and madman, is a central issue in the writings of E.T.A. Hoffmann. It is a theme which was of concern not only to the literati of the time, but also to those philosophers who were
beginning to work towards a scientific psychology. Schubert, in 1814, wrote of: "... durch den Wahnsinn und mitten in demselben eine gewisse Entwicklung und Ausbildung der höheren Seelenkräfte..." [Schubert 145, cited in Diener 187]. This postulate has found support in the present century in neurophysiological research involving electrical changes in the brain of individuals in states of arousal: "In unserem Modell sind die beiden Elemente, das Schöpferische und das Schizophrene, als zwei ineinander übergehende Phasen entlang einem Kontinuum zentralnervöser Erregung dargestellt." [Fischer 6]. In the visual arts, the features which have been held to be characteristic of schizophrenic art, namely "Formalismus, Physiognomisierung, Deformation, Symbolismus", are also said to be prominent in the work of highly creative artists [Bader 107].

Hoffmann can be seen as an early example of what Feder calls "aesthetic anti-rationalism", which began with the early nineteenth century and which persists to the present day. The madness typically portrayed in this aesthetic involved a total dissolution of the self [Feder 203-204]. Now it was no longer a question, as in the Enlightenment, of madness being shown as loss of reason manifesting itself in partial insanity, but of total disintegration of the ego. Whereas Enlightenment physicians like Reil saw mental health as characterized by a clear awareness of the self, Hoffmann held true self-awareness to be unattainable [Segebrecht 133-134].
If Hoffmann's protagonists court madness in their search for a more profound understanding of inner reality, then they pay a heavy price.

To Hoffmann, social conditions were of considerable concern and nature was seen as a dynamic force, but the social setting of his characters is only sketchily described, as are their natural surroundings. "Against the background of an apparently stable bourgeois society Hoffmann paints a picture of man trapped in a cage from which he tries in vain to break out. Primitive instincts that had previously seemed tamed suddenly overwhelm individuals, and demonic, unexplainable forces seem to rule the lives of persons who are caught in a deep identity crisis." [Daemmrich 23]. The importance of their art, if they are artists, and of their inner life is paramount.

His first story *Ritter Gluck* concerns a composer who is in despair because his artistic powers cannot match the richness of his vision, a crisis which he attempts to resolve by assuming the identity of the composer Gluck, whose music matches his ideals. Here madness consists in the hero allowing his self to be completely taken over by an idealised figure. "Der Unbekannte" (i.e. the *alter ego*) "besitzt nicht nur trotz seines Wahnsinns tiefe Einsichten, sondern er weist sich daneben offensichtlich gerade aufgrund und infolge seines Wahnsinns als kongenialer Interpret und
Nachschöpfer des Gluckschen Schaffens aus. Auch hier also wird dezidiert eine Assoziation von Wahnsinn und Genialität hergestellt, freilich abermals nicht für den oder jeden Wahnsinn schlechtin, sondern nur für den partiellen Wahnsinn bzw. die fixe Idee. " [Reuchlein 1986 254]. Here, as often in Spieß, the madness is only partial and although it seems to have taken over the artist's entire personality he is able to function in large areas of his life and being. The central delusion which Ritter Gluck entertains is symbolic of the impossibilities involved in artistic striving [Struc 78]. When he invites the narrator to hear the true version of Gluck's opera Armida, the narrator finds that the pages of the score are blank. "Absolute artistic insights, on the one hand, and their realization, on the other, seem two incommensurate propositions... Ritter Gluck in his precarious situation symbolizes a universal human condition, the tragic awareness of the distance between the ideal and the real." [ibid. 79-80]. A more conventional definition of delusion might imply that the truly deluded state (which in fact is that of Ritter Gluck) is not to be aware of the distance between ideal and real.

The theme of the tormented artist* is repeated in such works as the novel Lebensansichten des Kater Murr (1819-21), where

*The link between artistic creation and madness is more deeply explored in Hoffmann's story Der Kampf der Sänger, which will be examined in comparison with Büchner's Lenz in Chapter Nine.
the career of the venal and successful Kater Murr is counterpointed against that of the musician Kreisler, whose aspirations are blighted by the philistinism that Kater Murr represents. Such frustration need not necessarily lead to madness, and Kreisler's response is retreat into a detached irony, rather than psychosis. He finds some degree of fulfilment composing church music in a monastery, where he mocks worldliness: "Kreisler konnte sich nicht eines Lächelns erwehren, denn er gedachte, als der Abt von abgehärmtten, bleichen Todesgestalten sprach, so manches wohlgenährten Benediktiners und vorzüglich des wackern, rotwanglichen Hilarius, der keine größere Qual kannte, als Wein zu trinken von schlechtem Gewächs, und nur die Angst, die ihm eine neue Partitur verursachte, welche er nicht gleich verstand." [Kater Murr 248]. Although philistinism in the end prevails, there is little to suggest that Kreisler's withdrawal is psychotic.

Reuchlein [1986 228-229] reviews the theme of the idealization of madness by Romantic writers: "Hoffmann schließlich scheint sich nicht nur besonders häufig mit dem Wahnsinn beschäftigt zu haben, sondern diesem auch.... eine besondere Wertschätzung entgegengebracht zu haben. Entsprechend wird in literaturgeschichtlichen Darstellungen oftmals eine Nobilisierung des Wahnsinns als typisches Kennzeichen der Romantik begriffen." Thalmann, however, suggests that Hoffmann did not
go as far as most Romantic authors (she specifies Tieck, Novalis, Brentano) in idealizing madness as a higher state of spiritual development in which clarity and harmony will be achieved [Thalmann 244]. Yet Kuhn maintains that health was, in terms of literary interest, anathema to Hoffmann [Kuhn 306]. It is clear from the above that commentators have variously seen Hoffmann as one who shared the Romantic idealisation of madness and as one who distanced himself from that stance. Analysis of some of his works in detail will indicate how such widely differing views can come to be held, since Hoffmann shows himself to be ambivalent on the subject.

Hoffmann - Der goldne Topf (1813)
The word "Wahnsinn" appears frequently on the pages of Hoffmann's Märchen Der goldne Topf. Here, more than in most of his works, madness is a metaphor for a higher human striving. The hero, a student named Anselmus, is torn between love for Veronika, a beautiful young girl whose ambitions are to marry well and to have fine earrings, and Serpentina, infinitely more fascinating, but to court whom is to court danger and madness. Sanity is represented by the bourgeois family of Veronika and by Anselmus' own aspirations to become a Hofrat. Serpentina, on the other hand, can only be reached through hallucinations that appear sometimes enticing, sometimes threatening. In the end, Anselmus chooses Serpentina, though
just how free that choice is is far from clear. There is little doubt however where Hoffmann’s sympathies lie. He apostrophises his hero: "Ach, glücklicher Anselmus, der du die Bürde des alltäglichen Lebens abgeworfen, der du in der Liebe zu der holden Serpentina die Schwingen rüstig rührtest und nun lebst in Wonne und Freude auf deinem Rittergut in Atlantis! .... Ist denn überhaupt des Anselmus Seligkeit etwas anderes als das Leben in der Poesie, der sich der heilige Einklang alles Wesen als tiefstes Geheimnis der Natur offenbaret?" [Der goldne Topf 130]. If this is Romantic cliché, it none the less encapsulates a Romantic view of madness as a higher, holier state to which an artist might properly aspire.

Of special interest in relation to the present study is the form which madness takes in Der goldne Topf and the circumstances in which it arises. It consists entirely in hallucination and the hallucinations are predominantly visual, golden snakes and exotic plants and birds. A door-knocker becomes a persecuting witch, a messenger from Lindhorst is seen as a parrot. Throughout all this, Anselmus in no way loses his identity; he does not doubt that he is Anselmus, nor that the friends around him are who he knows them to be. Although Serpentina frequently changes form, from human shape to serpent and back, he knows her to be his beloved. This state contrasts strongly with that of the
Anselmus' hallucinations are typical, not so much of mental illness, as of organic disease or of intoxication, and intoxication is a recurring theme. Anselmus' first hallucinatory experience follows shortly after he has smoked a pipe of a tobacco which was a present from Veronica's father [ibid. 7-13]. (This association of events is underlined by Hoffmann in a passage where a worthy citizen and family man begs and is given a pipeful of the same tobacco [ibid. 15]. This can have little narrative purpose other than to raise the question in the reader's mind as to what sort of hallucinations this respectable citizen is about to experience and with what kind of hallucinogen the tobacco has been laced.) Such a gift makes the Konrektor Paulmann play a much more ambiguous role than is otherwise apparent. Anselmus' next hallucination, from doorknob into witchlike applewife comes immediately after "eins - zwei Gläsen des besten Magenlikörs" [ibid. 24-25] and alcohol in one form or another precedes some, though not all, similar experiences, notably the special punch prepared by Registratur Heerbrand, like the Konrektor a pillar of the establishment. This punch leads to an outbreak of hallucination in all who take it but, whereas for the Konrektor and Registratur the consequence is simply a hangover, Anselmus is shrunk into a well-stopped
It is well-known that alcohol can cause hallucinations, especially visual, but such an effect usually requires fairly high dosage over a long period. It can however, even in small doses, re-evoke earlier experience of other hallucinogens. Probably the most readily available of these in Hoffmann's day was opium and the question may be posed whether Der goldene Topf contains some coded reference to this. Of the contradictory demands of Hoffmann's public life as a judge and his inner life of phantasy and passion as writer and composer, Nussbächer comments: "Aus diesem bis an die Grenzen des Wahnsinns führenden Zwiespalt konnte ihn nicht die Ironie, nicht die Musik (und auch nicht der Alkohol) retten...." [Nussbächer 135-6]. Irle writes of "die literarische Einschätzung des Alkoholrausches bei einer Reihe von Romantikern." [Irle 33]. Specific to Hoffmann's situation was the marriage in 1812 of his great love, Julia Marc, to an elderly, but rich alcoholic. The Märchen dates from 1813.

For Daemmrich, Hoffmann's "psychological narrations' give the impression of an absurd rather than a tragic view of existence, because the characters either passively await their fate or suffer a senseless arbitrary doom." [Daemmrich 75]. This certainly is true of Anselmus, and to a lesser extent of Kreisler and of Heinrich von Ofterdingen in Kampf der Sänger. In the works of Büchner it might be said to be true of Leonce; but Danton, Lenz and Woyzeck are engaged in tragic confrontation with the forces which overwhelm them.
Die Elixiere des Teufels (1815-1816)

In Hoffmann's Elixiere these forces are daemonic and can be said to represent the inner conflict between instinctual drive and civilised aspiration, sinfulness and religiosity, id and superego. In a significant departure from the Aufklärung philosophy of Spieß, while yet using the terms that Spieß so often repeated, Hoffmann attributes to these powers an independent reality and existence: "... wohl magst du auch dann die sonderbaren Visionen des Mönchs für mehr halten als für das regellose Spiel der erhitzten Einbildungskraft." [Elixiere 7]. Such was the intellectual involvement of the medical profession in Germany in Romanticism, that Hoffmann's concerns here are also those of professors of medicine. A near contemporary of Hoffmann's, C.J.H. Windischmann, who combined medical practice with a Chair in History and Philosophy at Bonn, maintained the existence of a link, mediated by the forces of galvanism, between illness and sin. Health lay in humility and child-like faith: "Das Gegenteil der Ergebenheit, des kindlichen Glaubens und stillen Hoffens ist aber die Lust und die Begierde, welche zunächst die Seele entzündet und durch die Gewalt dieser Entzündung die Natur entfremdet." [Windischmann 40-41]. The protagonist in Die Elixiere des Teufels, defiantly chooses evil instead of quietism, alienation instead of oneness with God, and madness results.
Windischmann was writing in 1824. In Hoffmann's novel of 1815-1816 the forces of evil are unleashed in the monk, Medardus, by ingestion of the supposed elixir that had brought about the series of temptations undergone by Saint Anthony and had exposed to temptation everyone who had tasted it since. The question remains unresolved whether it is the power in the flask or the power of suggestion that is the active principle. (For Medardus' religious mentor it is irrelevant whether the relics of which the flask containing the elixir is one, are authentic or not [Elxiere 28]. The inference is clear however that it is the wish to experience temptation that contains the seeds of self-destruction.)

Madness here consists in a confusion of identity. Medardus is ambiguously (accidentally or not) the cause of the violent death of a young Count, Viktorin, and, learning that he resembles the dead man almost identically, he assumes his place in society. The circumstances of this merging of identities are ambiguously portrayed. On the one hand Medardus benefits from the material and sexual advantages of his new situation, on the other his inner world is at times taken over by the personality of the dead man: "'Die schleuderte ich hinab in den Abgrund', antwortete es aus mir hohl und dumpf, denn ich war es nicht der diese Worte sprach, unwillkürlich entflohen sie meinen Lippen." [Elxiere 54]. Medardus as narrator formulates this merging of identities in
language which is rather too lucid to reflect psychotic confusion: "... denn ich selbst bin Viktorin. Ich bin das, was ich scheine, und scheine das nicht, was ich bin, mir selbst ein unerklärlich Rätsel, bin ich entzweit mit meinem Ich!" [ibid. 69]. Thus far, it would be possible to represent the alter ego represented by Viktorin as a projection of a split-off (lascivious) part of Medardus' personality and therefore as having no existence in the external world. However as the novel progresses, such an interpretation becomes no longer compatible with the convolutions of the plot. The alter egos multiply, not only Viktorin (who has after all survived his fall over a precipice), but another Capuchin monk, also named Medardus, as well as the figure of the artist who reappears at critical junctures as a kind of conscience. These figures have an independent reality confirmed by the experience of other characters of the novel. Thus the second Medardus has been living in the care of a forester for two years while the first Medardus has been indulging in amorous intrigue and homicide on a country estate. The interpretation that the multiple alter egos are split-off parts of Medardus' psyche, though attractive in psychodynamic terms, becomes tenable only if everything, including the experience of the other characters, is taking place within Medardus' mind. Segebrecht accounts for this difficulty by seeing the whole narrative as Medardus' attempt to portray "seinen Lebensweg aus der Erinnerung als einen
Selbsterkenntnisprozeß" [Segebrecht 135].

Medardus does briefly experience hallucination but retains full insight, so that this does not seem to have a psychotic quality: "Da traten Gestalten aus meinem Leben hervor im düstern Walde. Ich sah meine Mutter, die Äbtissin, sie schauten mich an mit strafenden Blicken. - Euphemie rauschte auf mich zu mit totenbleichem Gesicht und starrte mich an mit ihren schwarzen glühenden Augen, sie erhob ihre blutigen Hände, mir drohend...." [Elixiere 138-139]. Again, as in Der goldne Topf, the hallucinations are predominantly visual.

In Die Elixiere des Teufels, madness consists in confusion of identity, occasional hallucination, religious mania and unbridled sexual greed and, as Hoffmann portrays it, it is these two passions that are predominant. Indeed he confines use of the word "Wahnsinn" almost exclusively to this context [Elixiere 34,35,37 and 47,49.]. The two passions become confused as in Medardus' lust after the figure of St. Rosalia. In both passions, the power to dominate is an important component, and the sexual passion leads to murder. Remorse, where it is felt, is brief and is subordinate to Medardus' need to escape the consequences of his actions. This kind of madness is psychopathy rather than psychosis. The origins of the madness lie, as for Kant, in immoderate passion.
In a telling counterpoint to the situation of Medardus is the portrayal of the madness of Hermogen, stepson of Medardus' paramour. This arises from an incestuous passion for his step-mother and expresses itself in "den wilden Ausbrüchen des wütenden Wahnsinns" which declined into "eine stillen Melancholie, die den Ärzten unheilbar schien". [ibid. 67]. In Spieß, madness so often strikes innocent victims of circumstance, and this is true to some extent of Hermogen, who is the victim of his step-mother's machinations. Medardus, on the other hand, actively seeks out the excitement of exposing himself to temptation and may be said to be the author of his own downfall, fulfilling what we have seen to be Windischmann's conditions for sickness born out of alienation from God.

Although in Elixiere, as in Das Fräulein von Scuderi, Hoffmann is dealing with crimes committed by mentally disturbed individuals, nowhere does he consider the deeds and the mental states of their perpetrators in relation to the law, or to the influence of the wider society which the law might be held to represent. (Büchner, in Woyzeck, although not directly dealing with legal culpability, will place his protagonist's crime in a setting which shows not only society's reaction to the crime, but its part in producing the criminal.) In Medardus, as in Cardillac in Das Fräulein von Scuderi, the passions lead to madness, evil and
compulsive action, but the lack of freedom implicit in this is not absolute. The passions can be and, in the case of Medardus, are overcome by a return to morality and religion [Reuchlein 1985 26]. There is a paradox in that the freedom of choice which allows a return to (approved) morality and religiosity would increase culpability in terms of the contemporary forensic debate.

Reuchlein postulates a conflict between Hoffmann, the conservative jurist, and Hoffmann, the “liberal-aufgeklärt” writer, expressed in the condemnation of Schmolling, and the sympathy and understanding shown to Medardus, Cardillac and Don Juan [ibid.38-42]. Certainly, at the time of the Schmolling case (1817), the legal profession was reacting with increased conservatism to the increasingly reactionary regimes which followed the Congress of Vienna. It could be argued however that the kind of person represented by Medardus, Cardillac and Don Juan were romantic and interesting figures, with whom Hoffmann found it easy to empathise, whereas Schmolling was not. In contrast, Büchner was able to see the humanity and uniqueness in Woyzeck, a vision that was denied to Romantic sensibilities.

Das öde Haus

A bringing together of contemporaneous medical views on madness is found in Hoffmann’s Nachtstück, *Das öde Haus* (1816-17). The narrator, in fear for his own sanity, consults
"Reils Buch über die Geisteszerrüttungen". "... das Werk zog mich unwiderstehlich an, aber wie ward mir, als ich in allem, was über fixen Wahnsinn gesagt wird, mich selbst wiederfand!" [Das üde Haus 474]. He seeks the help of a doctor who follows "das psychische Prinzip welches oft sogar körperliche Krankheiten hervorzubringen und wieder zu heilen vermag." The juxtaposition of "hervorbringen" and "heilen" suggests a certain scepticism on Hoffmann's part concerning "psychisch" or "moral" treatment, which in this case seems to consist of the common-sense prescription of a balanced regimen of work, exercise, relaxation with friends, together with a strengthening diet, and advice to get rid of the mysterious mirror which is apparently the vehicle for the patient's delusions. The narrator's suspected "fixer Wahn" is contrasted with the total madness of the Countess who is confined in the bleak house of the title. The origins of her madness lie, apparently, in disappointment in love. In this respect she resembles one of the pitiable madwomen in Spieß. Hoffmann however adds the Romantic spice of her brutal treatment at the hands of the steward set to mind her, of dramatic coincidence, together with a stolen infant and a mysterious gipsy woman. Hoffmann is suggesting that unseen forces are at work and provides alternative explanations in terms of two contemporary medical theories: firstly the influence of magnetism on health and disease, and secondly the views of Heinroth and the so-called Psychiker on the
psychogenesis of mental illness.

These latter are put into the mouth of one of the narrator's drinking companions to whom he had spoken of the mystifying happenings that had befallen him. "'Nun erst', fing ein älterer Mann an..., 'nun erst kann ich mich mit Ihren seltsamen Gedanken über Geheimnisse, die uns verschlossen bleiben sollen, einigermaßen befreunden. Gibt es geheimnisvolle tätige Kräfte, die mit bedrohlichen Angriffen auf uns zutreten, so kann uns dagegen nur irgend eine Abnormität im geistigen Organ Kraft und Mut zum sieghaften Widerstande rauben. Mit einem Wort, nur geistige Krankheit - die Sünde macht uns untertan dem dämonischen Prinzip ... Ich meine nichts anders als die Liebesverzauberungen, von denen alle Chroniken voll sind." [ibid. 478].

Magnetism, on the other hand, is postulated as an external force that can determine our thoughts and actions (a doctor of the company is speaking): "... das Wichtigste von allem bleibt mir immer, daß der Magnetismus manches Geheimnis, das wir als gemeine schlichte Lebenserfahrung nun eben für kein Geheimnis erkennen wollen, zu erschließen scheint..... Wie wenn es dem fremden Geiste unter gewissen Umständen möglich wäre, den magnetischen Rapport auch ohne Vorbereitung so herbeizuführen, daß wir uns willenlos ihm fügen müßten?" [ibid. 476-477]
Although Hoffmann gives equal weight to the presentation of both views, the complex outcome, involving as it does a number of individuals and a set of coincidences, suggests some external force as the determining factor. The fact that Hoffmann puts the arguments for magnetism into the mouth of "ein als scharfsinniger Beobachter bekannten Mediziner", whereas the proponent of Psychiker views is simply "ein al­"lder Mann..., der so lang geschwiegen", may give an indication of where Hoffmann's own views are to be found most closely reflected.

In summary, Hoffmann can be seen to be in no way concerned to convey a realistic picture of madness. He sees it rather as a metaphor for the conflicts emanating from human aspiration, especially artistic aspiration. The picture is distorted by Hoffmann's frequent shifts into ironic detachment and his tendency to focus on the grotesque. This contrasts with his predecessor Spieß, in whom ironic detachment is absent, and with his follower Büchner, who, although encompassing irony and appreciation of the grotesque, nonetheless treats madness with stark realism.

Achim von Arnim: Der tolle Invalide auf dem Fort Ratonneau (1818)

Ludwig Joachim von Arnim 1781-1831 (Achim von Arnim) was a contemporary of Hoffmann and, like Hoffmann, was firmly identified with the artistic aims and philosophical concerns
of Romanticism. In social background and temperament however they can hardly have been more unlike. Arnim came from an aristocratic family and spent much of his life managing his extensive estates. His approach to literature was that of an urbane dilettante. Yet Brentano, who was probably closest to him, detected "eine persönliche, wunderbare bange Schwermut". [Migge 732-733]. The deprivations of the post-war period made country life far from idyllic, and Arnim was never entirely at home either in the city or on his estates [ibid. 740]. Life none the less was on the surface uneventful. Hoffmann's life was by contrast tempestuous and his devotion to his art all-consuming. These differences are reflected in their varying treatment of the theme of madness, Hoffmann, as described above, sees it as an ever-present threat to the identity of the artist, at once a danger and an inspiration to artistic endeavour. In Arnim's Der tolle Invalide auf dem Fort Ratonneau, madness is handled with greater restraint than we find in Hoffmann, with little in the way of irony, even with sentimentality.

Arnim's Erzählung first appeared in 1818, in a collection of pieces by many authors under the title of Gaben der Milde, published as part of a charitable initiative towards the helping of destitute veterans. It tells the story of a French sergeant who receives a head wound in the Seven Years War and is befriended by a young German girl, whose mother leads an
irregular life with a succession of male partners. The mother discovers her daughter with the soldier and, thinking the worst, pronounces her undying curse. Rosalie, the daughter, is terrified and at the moment of the pronouncement feels: "als ob eine schwarze Fledermaus ihre durchsichtige Flügeldecken über meine Augen legte". Nonetheless, she defies her mother, who declares her possessed of the devil. Rosalie and Francoeur, the sergeant, marry. At the ceremony, the preacher reminds Francoeur of all that Rosalie has given up for him, even defying her mother's curse. The soldier "schauderte bei diesen Worten". Soon he is continually possessed by the image of the black-clad preacher who appears so threatening that Francoeur rages against clerics and churches. He tries to escape from these feelings of depression and paranoia by a kind of manic flight: "... um sich diesen Gedanken zu entschlagen, überlasse er sich jedem Einfall, er tanze und trinke und so in dem Umtriebe des Bluts werde ihm besser". [Invalide 301]. A return to military duties helps to maintain the improvement, but inactivity in winter quarters brings back Francoeur's restlessness: "... er trommelte tagelang, um sich zu zerstreuen, zankte, machte Händel, der Oberst konnte ihn nicht begreifen". [Ibid. 301]. Rosalie gives birth to a son and feels that the birthpangs have freed her from her mother's curse. However "Francoeur wurde immer mutwilliger und heftiger." An act of
Francoeur is not court-martialled but sent as part of his cure to the warmer climate of the south of France where, by the intercession of Rosalie with the Commandant of the garrison, he is put in charge of an isolated fort commanding the entrance to the harbour of Marseilles. Life here with his wife and child and two other soldiers proves peaceful and he is restored to health. His creativity is allowed expression in devising magnificent fireworks in preparation for the king’s birthday. However, rather as with Hoffmann’s heroes, this creativity is two-edged. The arsenal of the fort which provides powder for the fireworks also provides it for the cannons with which Francoeur later terrorises the people of Marseilles.

His return to sanity is undermined when he learns that Rosalie has told the Commandant of his history, and to his feelings of betrayal is added the torment of (unfounded) sexual jealousy. His paranoia is turned into indiscriminate aggression, expressed in his bombardment of the town, a bombardment in which, however, cannon-balls alternate with the most exquisite fireworks. This juxtaposition of destructive madness and aspiration to beauty in part...
resembles the situation of Hoffmann's heroes, but differs in one important respect. Whereas the latter are passively in the grip of madness, Francoeur is aware of his own power, and expresses it at once in the glory of his artistry and in manic rage.*

It is Rosalie who, by confronting this rage literally at the cannon's mouth, brings about his return once again to sanity. As befits a story that first appeared in a volume devoted to the well-being of the veterans of war, a happy ending follows in which not only is Francoeur returned to health and even to prosperity as the Commandant's adopted son, but Rosalie learns that her mother had relented and withdrawn the curse which had apparently precipitated the whole train of events.

Commentators have seen the Erzählung simply as an expression of the healing powers of love over the sway of madness [Rudolph 108, Bennett and Waidson 70]. Certainly, this would seem to be confirmed by the couplet with which von Arnim closes:

\[
\text{Gnade löst den Fluch der Sünde} \\
\text{Liebe treibt den Teufel aus.}
\]

The protagonists themselves see possession by the devil as the cause of madness. "Der Kommandant ... sagte leise: 'Der Tod unausbleiblich, auf Wahnsinn wurde von keinem

*Andre Breton in a letter to Paul Berger in 1948 claims Arnim as a forerunner of the Surrealists and there is indeed a surrealist quality in this passage [Migge 741]
Yet von Arnim's position is much more ambiguous than all this would imply. It is difficult to perceive wherein the sin referred to in the closing couplet lies. Rosalie is the innocent recipient of an uncaring mother's curse, Francoeur the helpless victim of a cruel war. Their situation is like that of the subjects of Spieβ' Biographien. If we substitute sense of guilt for sin, then the devil becomes an internalised, subjective devil, and possession metaphorical rather than literal.

Furthermore, the question of the place of the head wound in the genesis of Francoeur's madness is far from clear. We have seen that the surgeon attributed the disturbance entirely to the wound, which receives no further mention until the moment of Rosalie's confrontation of her maniacal husband: "Er riß Rock und Weste an der Brust auf, um sich Luft zu machen, er griff in sein schwarzes Haar, das verwildert in Locken
starrte und riß es sich wütend aus. Da öffnete sich die Wunde am Kopfe in dem wilden Erschüttern durch Schläge, die er an seine Stirn führte...." [ibid. 312]. It is following this opening of the wound that Francoeur comes to his senses; one might simply dismiss this coincidence as a kind of metaphor for the release of the psychological tensions that had driven him mad, were it not for the fact that some lines further on, when the wound is being dressed: "Der Chirurg wunderte sich, daß er keinen Schmerz zeigte, er zog ihm einen Knochensplinter aus der Wunde, der rings umher eine Eiterung hervorgebracht hatte; es schien als ob die gewaltige Natur Francoeurs ununterbrochen und allmählich an der Hinausschaffung gearbeitet habe, bis ihm endlich äußere Gewalt, die eigne Hand seiner Verzweiflung die äußere Rinde durchbrochen. Er versicherte, daß ohne diese glückliche Fügung ein unheilbarer Wahnsinn den unglücklichen Francoeur hätte aufzehren müssen" [ibid. 312-313].

From this passage it would appear, not so much that Arnim was keeping his options open as to the possibilities of organic v. spiritual genesis of madness, but that he is indicating an interaction of the two factors. There is an undoubted physical condition which, in the opinion of the surgeon, would have led to uncurable madness. It is a spiritual force, "die gewaltige Natur Francoeurs", which reverses the process, the kind of endogenous healing tendency postul-
Mörike's novel is of some significance as the work under consideration that comes nearest in time (the date of publication of its first version which is here examined was 1832) to the years when Büchner was conceiving and writing Lenz and Woyzeck. The theme of madness cannot be said to be totally integrated into the tortuous plot of Maler Nolten. The description of the heroine's total collapse into psychosis comes only in the final section of the book, but madness casts its shadow from the early pages and determines the destinies of all of the central characters. Even before the hero, Theobald Nolten, appears on the scene, it is said of his paintings that they are "...die Werke eines Wahnsinnigens... eines unscheinbaren verdorbenen Menschen..." [Maler 17]. His subject matter is seen to be unhealthy: "...eine trübe Welt voll Gespenstern, Zauberern, Elfen und dergleichen Fratzen, das ist's, was er kultivirt." Like Hoffmann's heroes, he is thought to court danger in such a pre-occupation and risks becoming an inmate of one of the "köstlichen Anstalten ..., worin man die armen Teufel logiert, die so ... einen krummen Docht im Lichte brennen -"
An important difference between Mörike and Hoffmann, however, is that the former places these views in the mouth of a proponent of old-fashioned artistic values, whereas in Hoffmann such dangers are intrinsic to the situation of his characters.

In the event it is Agnes, Nolten's betrothed, who becomes the victim of a psychotic illness. From the beginning she is seen to be deeply vulnerable, and soon after her betrothal she is brought near to death by "eine heftige Nervenkrankheit" whose origins are not explained, though the main symptoms are of weeping over her separation from her intended bridegroom. Reuchlein comments that Agnes' illness is not capable of being interpreted in terms of psychological causes [Reuchlein 1986 291-292], Agnes as "Inkarnation biedermeierlicher Sittsamkeit" being victim of a madness that "bricht .... auf somatischem Wege... von außen über sie und ihrer bürgerliche Existenz herein." [ibid. 291].

If this is true of her original breakdown, it cannot be held to apply to the circumstances of the relapse which follows on Agnes' meeting with a mysterious gipsy woman who predicts that she will be attracted not to her betrothed, but to her cousin, a young scholar who has recently come to visit her father. Though Agnes is shocked at such a prediction she realises that the gipsy is but reflecting something of which she herself is dimly and reluctantly aware: "Und doch, in dem
sieg auf's Neue in das Gesicht der Unbekannten sah, glaubte sie etwas unbeschreiblich Höhes, Vertrauenerweckendes, ja Längstbekanntes zu entdecken.... sie glaubte einer fremden entsetzlichen Macht anzugehören, sie hatte etwas erfahren, was sie nicht wissen sollte, sie hat eine Frucht gekostet, die, unreif von dem Baume des Schicksals abgerissen, nur Unheil und Verzweiflung bringen müsse." [Maler 52-53]. This confronts her with sexual feelings which her "biedermeierliche Sittsamkeit" cannot entertain and the conflict brings about a "Fieberanfall" from which she emerges into a state bordering on the psychotic. Her behaviour towards her cousin becomes inappropriately flirtatious reflecting her imperfectly repressed feelings [ibid. 57], and a variety of other unspecified occurrences leads her father to suspect madness and to call in a sympathetic doctor. In this passage Irle sees an anticipation of the psycho-cathartic techniques evolved by Freud and Breuer [Irle 69]: "Es ward ein Arzt zu Rath gezogen, und mit Hülfe dieses einsichtvollen Mannes gelang es gar bald, den eigentlichen Grund des Unheils aus dem Mädchen hervorzulocken. Hiebei mußte es für den aufmerksamen Beobachter solcher abnormen Zustände von dem größten Interesse seyn, zu bemerken, daß schon das Aussprechen des Geheimnisses an und für sich entscheidend für die Heilung war." [Maler 91]. In this extract the second sentence is even more significant than the first, in that Mörike seems to be stating a theoretical concept based on his
observation. (The concept is indirectly reinforced later in the novel where, in a recurrence of Agnes' illness, the opposite of an abreactive approach is proposed: "... man müsse bei dem Mädchen durch kein Wort, keine Miene den Grund ihres Kümmer, ihrer Absonderung anerkennen..." [ibid. 378]. The approach fails utterly.)

In regard to such an interpretation of the roots of Agnes' madness it is important to consider the role that the gipsy, Elisabeth, plays in the life of the hero, Theobald. She is one of the three women to whom he is attracted. Of these, Agnes may be said to represent the possibility of placid bourgeois contentment, his patron, the countess, an entry into the world of refined society and intellectual éclat, whereas Elisabeth seems to stand for a powerful and destructive (in terms of career and advancement) sexuality. When Theobald comes to confess his unfaithfulness to Agnes, he omits mention of his earlier relationship with Elisabeth [ibid. 367ff.]. When Agnes collapses on hearing his confession, Elisabeth reappears to claim Theobald, although he violently rejects her [ibid. 373].

Agnes' previous trust in Theobald's love had been sustained by the complex deceptions on the part of Larkens, an actor who, half in love with Agnes and perhaps not a little in love with Theobald, had fabricated a stream of letters to Agnes purporting to come from her betrothed. Theobald's confession
is prompted by his feelings of guilt when Larkens, overcome by weariness of life, poisons himself. Confronted anew by her own ambivalent emotions towards Theobald, and with the sham on which her dependence on him had been based, Agnes declines into a madness from which she will not recover.

Her mad utterances reflect the conflicts that had made her mad, rather as do those of Ophelia in *Hamlet*. "Guten Morgen, Heideläufer! Guten Morgen, Höllebrand! Nun, stell' Er sich nicht so einfältig! Schon gut, schon gut! .... Er bekommt ein Trinkgeld für's Hokuspokus." [ibid. 382]. She confuses the figures of Nolten, the man she believed she had loved, Larkens, whose letters had sustained that love and the cousin Otto, to whom she had felt drawn: "Weiβt du auch, warum Theobald, mein Liebster, ein Schauspieler geworden ist? .... Vor ein paar Jahren kam Nolten in den Vetter Otto verkleidet zu mir; ich kannte ihn nicht und hab ihn arg betrübt. Das kann ich mir in Ewigkeit nicht vergeben. Aber wer soll die Komödianten ganz auslernen! Die können eben Alles. Sie sind dir im Stande und stellen sich todt, völlig todt.... der leere Sarg liegt in der Grube, nur ein paar lumpige Kleiderfetzen drin!" [ibid. 384]. The sexual preoccupation underlying her psychosis is underlined by her delusion that a young woman friend is making love with Theobald [ibid. 388], and by the fact that she, Agnes, only feels at ease with a blind youth, blind therefore to her attractions. In the end
the requirements of "biedermeierliche Sittsamkeit" are satisfied: "Nun mag es enden wann es will, mir ist doch mein Mädchenkranz sicher, ich nehm' ihn in's Grab — Unter uns gesagt, Junge, ich habe mir immer gewünscht, so und nicht anders in Himmel zu kommen." [ibid. 400]. In the end Agnes drowns herself in a well that commemorates two earlier lovers, and Theobald and Elisabeth do not long survive her.

Mörike comes nearer to a realistic presentation of madness than any of his predecessors and shows considerable understanding of the processes of psychotic thinking. In some of Agnes' utterances there are suggestions of the "knight's move" logic typical of schizophrenia. Some of the contemporary literary conventions in regard to madness are still observed however. The subject collapses, or falls into a fever, at the onset of an attack. She is able to suppress her "Wunderlichkeiten" in the face of the "ernste und schaudervolle Wirklichkeit" of Larkens' death [ibid. 336], suggesting a voluntary arbitrariness in her condition that refers back to Enlightenment ideas that madness merely consists of a loss of rationality. There is a hint of the "glücklicher Wahnsinn" evoked by both Goethe and Spieß: "Ja, nichts geht über die Zufriedenheit — Gottlob, diese hab'ich..." [ibid. 386]. (In Maler Nolten, however, madness does not protect the sufferer from disillusion and death.) And although madness determines the fate of the protagonists
just as much as in Lenz and Woyzeck, the impact is softened for the reader by Morike's elaborate and often tedious plot and sub-plot.

Above all, what is missing from Morike and his predecessors, and what is clearly apparent in Büchner, is a sense of the desperateness of madness. The characters of Hoffmann and Arnim may be in desperate situations but there is no sense that the desperation stands at the centre of their madness. Indeed, that madness is often portrayed as protecting the sufferer from the harshness of his fate. There is thus, as well as ironic detachment, a sentimentality inherent in these portrayals, a sentimentality common to the Romantic world view. It is absent in Büchner and, curiously, in one writing in England at the same time, Thomas Carlyle. His Sartor Resartus "marks a transition from the Romantics to the Victorians because it adds one quality to the Romantic vision which had not yet become dominant - desperation." [Levine 143]. Sartor Resartus appeared between November 1833 and August 1834. The transition which Levine comments upon would be represented, much more violently, in the next few years in Lenz and in Woyzeck.
Before 1800

Descriptions of psychotic states are found in the earliest medical literature, but it was the Swiss physician Platter (1536-1614) who first attempted to distinguish psychotic illness from other kinds of mental disturbance. His classification included the categories of *stultitia* and *mania*, both of which included symptom-complexes suggestive of schizophrenia. A further sub-classification, *demoniacia*, which could be attached to either *stultitia* or *mania* seemed to have had a special correlation with what might now be called schizophrenia [Hoffmann, M. 18]. Platter's views as to the origin of these forms of psychosis may be inferred from the epithet he chooses.

By the latter half of the eighteenth century, psychiatrists and philosophers had developed more complex ways of classifying madness. Erhard, writing in 1794, delineates twenty-two varieties of "Wahnsinn" [Erhard 10f, cited in Friedreich 1830/1965]. None is equivalent to a comprehensive picture of schizophrenia, or indeed any other psychiatric illness. Each might be regarded as an example of a "fixer Wahn", although Erhard does not use that term. However, a number of them, taken together, could apply to the kinds of disturbance manifested by Lenz or Woyzeck.
Lenz at different times might, in Erhard's classification, be
held to be suffering from:

"16. Schwârmender Wahnsinn. melancholia energica. Der Kranke
fühlt sich von einem Gegenstande ganz hingerissen. Ihn zu
erhalten, wenn es ein wirklicher ist, oder ihn zu realisiren,
enner nur noch ein vorgestellter ist, ist sein einziger
Bestreben. Wird die Religion Gegenstand dieses Wahnsinnes, so
ist er

17. eifernder Wahnsinn. melancholia fanatica."

"18. Dumpfer Wahnsinn. m. attonita. Der Kranke ist
unbeweglich, wie ein Bildsäule, begehrt weder Speise noch
Trank u. dgl."

"19. Entzückter Wahnsinn. m. enthusiastica. Der Kranke hält
sich für begeistert, oder sucht begeistert zu werden. Er
sondert sich von andern Menschen ab, um ein heiliges Leben zu
führen u.s.f."

"20. Verzweifelnder Wahnsinn. m. catacriseophobia. Der Kranke
glaubt verdammt zu seyn, und ist darüber beängstiget. Er hat
alle Hoffnung zur Seligkeit verloren u.s.w."

"21. Rastloser Wahnsinn. m. errabunda. Dem Kranken ist
nirgends wohl: er flieht und weiß nicht wohin: am liebsten
geht er bei Nacht umher u. dgl."

In Lenz's case different features are more prominent at some
times than at others. For instance, "dumpfer Wahnsinn" might
be held to correspond to Lenz's state of mind at the end of
the Novelle, when he descends into catatonia, whereas "schwârmender" and "eifernder Wahnsinn" would relate more to his manic response to the Friederike episode.

Woyzeck, in Büchner's portrayal of him, might also be said to be suffering from "verzweifelnder Wahnsinn", but he also shows features of:

"1. Gemeiner Wahnsinn (Schwermut, melancholia vulgaris ). Der Kranke fürchtet Uebel, von denen er oft gänzlich entfernt ist oder ist einer Angst ausgesetzt, die ihn aller freien Thätigkeit beraubt, und von der er keinen Grund anzugeben weiß, oder seinen solchen angibt, der gerade seinen Wahnsinn beweßt."

"2. Furcht for Träumen. m. oneirodynia. Der Kranke hat hier nicht bloß schreckliche Träume, sondern ein Schweben zwischen dem Glauben an der Wirklichkeit des Traumes, und dem Bewußtseyn, daß es ein Traum war, quält ihn auch noch bei Tage. Leicht wird das Leiden so arg, daß er seine Träume unbedingt für Wahrheit hält, und dadurch in andere Arte des Wahnsinnes verfällt."

"11. Wahnsinn aus Aberglauben. m. superstitiosa. Jener Wahnsinn, der daraus entsteht, wenn jemand einbildet, er müsse sterben, oder ein anderes Unglück ausstehen, weil er so geträumt oder eine Erscheinung gehabt u.s.w."

The terms in which Erhard's twelfth category is defined are non-specific enough to apply both to Woyzeck and to Lenz.
"12. Fasselnder Wahnsinn. melancholia deliria. Der Kranke hat eine wunderliche Grille im Kopfe, die allem gesunden Verstande wiederstreitet."

Erhard's approach typifies that of many of the writers who were grappling with the problem of psychiatric classification. It is as if, in his preoccupation with the minutiae of nosology, Erhard was unable to see that the features he described could together appear in one individual, or could succeed one another in the course of one illness. This might give some explanation of why so much importance was attached, in both lay and medical accounts of madness, to the concept of fixe Idee.

J. C. Hoffbauer

Some of the difficulties relating to classification and terminology are illustrated by Hoffbauer's account of mental illness dating from 1803*. Whereas "Wahnsinn" was, at that time, commonly used, both by medical and lay writers, as an equivalent of what we might now call psychosis, and especially of schizophrenia-like psychosis, even categories where "Wahnsinn" was held to be specifically excluded might now be considered to involve considerable derangement with symptoms of delusion and paranoia. Under the heading "Blödsinn, der nicht mit Wahnsinn verbunden ist", Hoffbauer describes the following symptoms:

* Untersuchungen über die Krankheiten der Seele und die verwandten Zustände Bd. 2 Halle/Hannover 1803
"Erstens meisten schüchtern ... Denn er wird bey Andern immer feindliche Absichten gegen ihn voraussetzen...."
[Hoffbauer 1803 91-92].
"Zweitens sich leicht von Andern für beleidigt halten. ... Weil Blödsinnige dieser Art sich fast vor jedem Menschen fürchten, oder gegen ihn mißtrauisch sind...." [ibid. 92]
"Fünftens der Blödsinn wird sich öfter in einem Absprung von einer Sache auf eine andere, die mit ihr in keiner oder doch nicht in einer solchen Verbindung steht, worauf es in diesem Augenblicke ankommt, zeigen."

This is a trait also, according to Hoffbauer, shared by lively intellects, with the difference that they will eventually talk themselves back to the point where they started, whereas "Blödsinnige" do not [ibid. 99-100]. This disordered thinking is more like the disturbance of schizophrenic thought known as slippage, or knight's move, than might be expected of a present-day conception of "idiocy, without madness" (cf. Woyzeck's utterance, "schönes Wetter..."). Hoffbauer defines "Narrheit" as "eine Mischung von Krankheit und moralischer Verirrung" [ibid. 297] (we shall see that under "Narrheit" Reil was to describe a condition closely resembling schizophrenia). "Die wahnsinnige Narrheit" was, according to Hoffbauer, characterized by delusion, often relating to a single set of circumstances and therefore akin to what other writers were describing as "fixe
Idee". And, like "fixe Idee", this single delusion often served to protect the sufferer from worse [ibid. 298-299].

The hallucinations described by Hoffbauer in his three chapters on "Krankheit der Phantasten" [Hoffbauer 1807 45-55] are almost entirely visual, and therefore more suggestive of organic disturbance than of schizophrenia. Auditory hallucination receives only passing mention in a quotation from the British psychiatrist, Thomas Arnold [ibid. 85].

Paranoid delusions are described under two headings: "Der Unglückliche, der sich einbildet, der Gegenstand einer allgemeinen Verfolgung zu sein, leidet an einem schwermüthigen Wahnsinne." [ibid. 92]. At the same time, an individual who suffers from "falsche Vorstellungen", which may be persecutory, may be said to be suffering from "Wahnsinn aus Chimeren" [ibid. 98].

From the foregoing it is clear that Hoffbauer described symptoms of withdrawnness, distrust of others, delusional beliefs, disordered thinking, hallucination and persecutory ideas but, as we saw in the case of Erhard, there is no indication that these might be combined in the illness of one individual and constitute a single disease. The reason, in this instance, may be found in Hoffbauer's declared intent to base his classification, not on symptoms, not even on presumed causes, but on the location of disturbances in the
various psychological functions or "Vermögen" [Hoffbauer 1802 286-289]. Thus, disordered thinking would come under the head of "Geisteskrankheit", and hallucination under that of "Seelenkrankheit" [ibid. 299].

J. C. Reil

Hoffbauer's contemporary and sometime collaborator, J.C. Reil, also saw mental derangement in terms of the "Vermögen" involved. Where the capacity for forming ideas ("Vorstellungsvermögen") was disturbed, this could take the form either of inhibition, in which case the outcome was catatonic withdrawal, or of acceleration which manifested itself in "Gedankenjagd", or flight of ideas [Marx 1990 363]. This form of illness, termed by Reil "Narrheit", has been held by Harms to be very like schizophrenia [Harms 183]. Reil himself acknowledged that his definition of the condition was by no means clear: "Auch fühle ich es nur zu gut, daß die Narrheit weniger genau, als die übrigen Arten, definirt sey. Vielleicht ist es gar nicht einmal eine Art, sondern ein Chaos mehrerer specifisch-verschiedener Zustände, was ich unter diesem Namen zusammengestellt habe." [Reil 1803 396]. The use of "Chaos" in this context may reflect not only Reil's sense of disorder when faced with patients of this kind, but the chaos of their inner world: "Die Narren haben keine Hauptidee, sondern wechseln damit, und knüpfen in allen Lagen des Lebens Dummheiten an bizarre Streichen." [ibid. 396].
This mental state is elaborated in terms which could conceivably be applied to Lenz as he is shown in the first pages of the *Novelle*:  "In ihrem Vorstellungsvermögen waltet eine für ihre Kräfte zu schnelle Folge der Ideen ob; abenteuerliche Vorstellungen fluten zu, blitzen auf und verschwinden eben so schnell wieder; sie stehen isolirt und ohne Regel da, weil sie nicht gehalten und durch die Association in keine Verbindung gebracht werden können... Freude, Zorn und Traurigkeit wechseln miteinander ohne Grund, ohne einen besonderen Eindruck auf das Begehrensvermögen zu machen... Ihre Handlungen sind isolirt wie ihre Ideen..." [ibid. 397-398]. The outcome, according to Reil, for so many of these patients, namely a descent into "Blödsinn", might equally be held to parallel the state of Lenz in the last pages of the *Novelle*.

Further difficulties with regard to nomenclature arise in illnesses which were categorized as "Melancholie", as distinct from "Wahnsinn". Heinroth's *melancholia attonita* comes very close to the *catatonia* described by Kahlbaum in the later 19th. century, and to the catatonic schizophrenia of the twentieth [Jackson 157]. During the 19th. century, partial insanity (*fixer Wahn, monomania*) came to be regarded as an important part of the clinical picture of melancholia [ibid. 384], and it is likely that a number of such deluded patients would probably now be diagnosed as schizophrenic.
J.C.A. Heinroth evolved a comprehensive and elaborate classification of mental illness*, which with its "Ordnungen", "Gattungen" and "Varietäten" allowed thirty-six possible varieties of disturbance [Marx 1990 373]. Clinical observation tends to become lost amongst such minutiae, yet it is possible to find descriptions corresponding to what we might call reactive depression in his various categories of "Melancholie", and it is clear that he recognized manic-depressive states ("Scheue mit Melancholie und Tollheit") [Heinroth 1818 245].

With regard to schizophrenia-like illness, he provided, in his category of "reiner Wahnsinn", not only an account of the progress of such a disease, but a theory as to its origins. He saw it as occasioned by inability to deal with conflict involving the passions: "Wenn daher das Gemüth im gespanntesten leidenschaftlichen Zustande gleichsam sich selbst entzogen wird und nur in der Welt seiner Träume lebt, so gibt dies den Zustand des Wahnsinns." [Heinroth 38]. (This statement on the psychogenesis of the illness reflects both Psychiker views on causation and those of Oberlin on the sources of Lenz's madness.) Attachment to a dream world leads to delusion, seen as distorted perception and consequent misinterpretation of reality: "... was er mit den Sinnen

* Lehrbuch der Störungen des Seelenlebens, oder der Seelen-störungen und ihre Behandlung Leipzig 1818
The course of the illness is closely detailed. The prodromal stage consists of emotional outbursts, forgetfulness and neglect of the patient's usual concerns, indifference or hostility to others, self-neglect, sleeplessness and talking to oneself [ibid. 260]. Compare this with a twentieth century account of the onset of schizophrenia: "These patients appear increasingly unambitious, ... do not plan, ... tend to fail ... A history of protracted seclusiveness ... of lacking feelings, and of persons feeling distant. It may be reported that the patient has become even more quiet, dreamy and sensitive, or again hostile to others, sullen and suspicious. At times the patient's behavior is said to be strange, odd, eccentric ... at other times the behavioral change may be evidenced by persistently noisy, impulsive, disorderly, aggressive, recalcitrant actions...non-specific disturbances of sleep, especially in the form of wandering about at night..." [Weiner 112-113].

Heinroth further portrays the progress of his "reiner Wahn­sinn". Following the prodromal stage, the patient increasingly shows restlessness, purposeless behaviour, nonsensical speech. His attitude to others is marked either by contempt or by over-enthusiasm. As his condition worsens, he experiences auditory or visual hallucinations. He holds
conversations with people who aren't there, laughs inappropriately, shouts or recites aloud. He loses all normal reserve: "... er spricht wie ein Trunkener ohne Rückhalt das Geheimnis seines Herzens aus. Und dies ist der Höhe der Krankheit." [Heinroth 1818 260-263]. We shall examine in detail the manifestations of illness described in Lenz, but it is not difficult to recognize in Heinroth's account some of at least the outward manifestations of Lenz's state.

It is clear that Heinroth regarded "reiner Wahnsinn" as an episode of crisis which could be resolved in a number of ways. After a period during which increasingly long periods of lucidity supervened and the patient began to eat and sleep well, more or less complete normality could be restored, with perhaps only slight impairment of thought or slight over-excitability of the emotions [ibid. 263]. However, if the degree of suffering imposed by the illness had been so profound, or the continuing stress of life so severe, then full recovery is impossible. In such cases the patient may:

1. recover except for holding on to "eine sogenannte fixe Idee". To that extent he remains "verrückt".
2. lose his "fixe Idee", lapse into melancholy and withdraw into the self.
3. retain a degree of "fixe Idee", but still lapse into melancholy and eventually "Blödsinn".
4. waste away and die. [ibid. 263-265]
In the foregoing, there is the implication that a successfully integrated "fixe Idee" serves to protect the individual against an excess of misery, the "glücklicher Wahn" described by both Goethe and Spieß. It is noteworthy, also, that, in seeing dementia ("Blödsinn") as only one of the possible outcomes of the illness, Heinroth is nearer Bleuler than Kraepelin who first described schizophrenic illness. The latter saw dementia as an inevitable outcome, whereas Bleuler's conception allowed a variety of possibilities, and was more dynamic.

The symptoms described by Heinroth, and the variety of possible outcomes, correspond broadly to the group of schizophrenias described by Bleuler, with the exception of paranoid illness.

Heinroth goes on to describe a number of variations on the clinical picture of "reiner Wahnsinn". "Wahnsinn mit Verrücktheit" is characterized by greater intellectual impairment and more distorted phantasy. The patient is more irritable, and may preach sermons or devise schemes to save the world. Sufferers from "Wahnsinn mit Tollheit" are subject to maniacal outbursts and violent in their behaviour. The portrayal here is closer to the conventional lay view of madness: "... er ist ein Spiel des wildesten Traumes, in dem er es nur auf phantastische, schreckliche Gestalten und blutige Scenen zu thun hat. Das einzige was er lebendig fühlt
ist, daß der Anblick strömenden Blutes ihn beruhigen würde. Dieß zeigt sein hervorgetretenes, selbst mit Blut unterlaufenes, Auge, sein nach zerstörender Verletzung gleichsam lechzender Blick..." [ibid 271-282]. One is reminded of the frightening creatures described in Spieß's visit to the madhouse in his Biographien der Wahnsinnigen.

Applying Heinroth's categories to the case of Lenz, with his delusions of grandeur and his wild religious ecstasies, it is probably "Wahnsinn mit Verrücktheit" which most closely matches his symptoms.

Remarkably, Heinroth's descriptions contain no account of delusions of persecution, although it seems highly likely that some of his patients would have entertained them. In his classification, "Albernheit" and its variations are termed paranoia, and "Wahnsinn mit Verrücktheit" (discussed above) is termed Ecstasis paranoica, but this refers to the original sense of paranoia as a state of being beside, or outside, oneself, rather than the meaning which is now attached to it.

Friedrich Bird, who represents a Somatiker view of mental illness, writes (in 1834) of two main categories, "Wahnsinn" and "Melancholie". Psychological manifestations of these conditions receive little attention, and it is not possible to assume that in using these terms he is referring to the
same conditions that Heinroth was describing. Whereas in "Melancholie" the venous system predominates, "Wahnsinn" is characterized by overactivity of the arterial system. The origins of the disorder lie in the thorax, but the effects are on the brain, which may become inflamed. Pressure of blood in the head leads to "Gedankenflucht" and "Verwirrung", with "Tobsucht" the outcome of the most extreme form of excitation. Flight of ideas could equally refer to the thought disorders of schizophrenia or of mania and it is likely that Bird did not distinguish between them.

In "Wahnsinn" crises can occur, "durch Hülfe der Natur oder der Kunst". Completely resolved, these may lead to complete cure. Sometimes resolution is incomplete, for example when the pulses in the two carotid arteries remain unequal. Bird follows Heinroth in allowing that, in such cases, "Blödsinn" (dementia) may result, with or without "fixe Idee". Here, it is a case of the comprehension of the patient being so limited that it can only encompass one central idea. The "fixe Idee" which may supervene in "Melancholie" is somewhat different, serving as a kind of psychological defence: "... besser über eine Idee brüllen, als mehrere." [Bird 1834 144-185].

It may reasonably be argued that the Doctor in Woyzeck saw Franz's "fixe Idee" as being associated with limited understanding. By contrast, the delusions entertained by the
subjects of Spieß' Biographien were often seen as protecting them from deeper misery. Bird asserts that "fixe Idee" may be present in the absence of madness, in which case it is usually associated with some disturbance of the sense organs, for instance deafness. It will be noted that Clarus in his second Gutachten ascribes Woyzeck's hearing of voices to the result of tinnitus, a condition in which hearing may be severely distorted.

J. E. Esquirol

The view of psychosis held by Esquirol was not published in book form until 1838, but his writings on this subject had appeared in articles published between 1805 and 1825*, so that they may well have been known to Büchner. The thoroughness with which the French psychiatrist recorded his observations, including the content of his patients' utterances, allowed an analysis of the patterns of disease. This in turn made possible the clearer distinction of schizophrenia-like states from other forms of mental illness [Hoffmann, M. 35].

An even more important aspect of Esquirol's approach was his attempt to understand the content of psychotic thought in relation to the individual's life circumstances: "Halluzinationen sind bei Esquirol ... Ausdruck einer bestimmten seelischen Verfassung des Individuums, können

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* in the Dictionnaire des Sciences Médicales edited by C.L.F. Panckoucke
verstanden und interpretiert werden." [ibid. 35]. While one can see in the moral management of the insane the beginnings of a psychotherapeutic approach to psychosis, it is only with Esquirol that such therapy began to be based on more profound insight. Büchner's attempt to enter the inner worlds of Lenz and of Woyzeck stems from the same spirit of enquiry.

Esquirol describes "folie" as being characterized by disturbance of thought, emotion and physical function, and anticipates some modern thinking on schizophrenia in holding that madness may result from an inability adequately to coordinate a flood of sensory impressions [Esquirol 1838 I 3, Broen and Storms 307, McGhie 93, Venables 41]. He describes auditory hallucinations in some detail: "Il est des fous qui entendent des voix parlant très-distinctement, et avec lesquelles ils ont des conversations suivies. Ces voix viennent des nuages, des arbres, elles pénètrent à travers les murs, les pavés, elles suivent et fatiguent ceux qui les entendent le jour et la nuit ... elles leur tiennent des propos qui sont gais, érotiques, menaçants, injurieux." [Esquirol 1838 I 3-4].

Delusions "prennent le caractère des passions et des idées qui dominent l'aliéné" [ibid 111]. That is to say, they are the result and not the cause of the inner disturbance, but at the same time may become a way into the understanding of the patient's innermost thoughts.
In his chapter on "démence", Esquirol describes signs of thought disorder which are very like those found in schizophrenia - and in Woyzeck. "Aussi plusieurs ne déraisonnent que parce que les idées intermédiaires ne lient point celles qui suivent; on voit évidemment des lacunes qu'ils auraient à remplir pour donner à leurs discours, l'ordre, la filiation, la perfection d'un raisonnement suivi et complet. ... les idées les plus disparates se succèdent indépendantes les unes des autres, elles se suivent sans liaison et sans motif; les propos sont incohérents; les malades répètent des mots, des phrases entières, sans y attacher de sens précis; ils parlent comme ils raisonnent, sans avoir la conscience de ce qu'ils disent. Il semble qu'ils aient des comptes faits dans leur têtes, qu'ils répètent, obéissant à des habitudes anciennes, ou cédant à des consonnances fortuites." [Esquirol II 45].

Case Histories
We have seen from this account of some of the most influential psychiatric texts of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries a move towards a more coherent and comprehensive picture of schizophrenia-like illness even to the extent that it becomes possible to identify features of the illnesses that Büchner was portraying in Lenz and in Woyzeck. However, even with the two most complete accounts, those by Heinroth and Esquirol, it would be difficult to
infer that all or most of the symptoms they describe and categorize might occur in one patient in the course of one illness. That the portrayals fell short of completeness was almost certainly due to the fact that their authors, like Erhard, Hoffbauer and Bird, were concentrating on the task, essential to the developing science of psychiatry, of naming and classifying.

In order to understand how doctors and others engaged in the care of the mentally ill described and interpreted the illnesses of individual patients, it will be necessary to examine contemporary case histories.

An important source of such histories was the series of journals devoted to mental illness which appeared from the 1780's on, beginning with Karl Philipp Moritz' *Magazin zur Erfahrungseelenkunde* in 1783. The early issues encouraged contributions from a wide range of individuals and professions [Angst 15], and even the more medically oriented *Zeitschrift für psychische Ärzte*, edited by Nasse from 1818 to 1822, found space for important articles by the philosophers Grohmann and Weiß [ibid. 42-43]. Thereafter, the content of such journals became increasingly dominated by medical contributors, from France, Great Britain and America, as well as Germany. A major source of case histories of medico-legal importance was Henke's *Zeitschrift für die*
Staatsarzneikunde, which appeared throughout the 1820's and 1830's, and which would be well-known to Georg Büchner through his father's active involvement [Franz and Loch 69].

Significant for the genesis of Woyzeck was the frequency with which, in the early years, there appear accounts of madness in serving or retired soldiers. In the first six issues of Moritz' Magazin, ten of the fifteen cases relating to madness or melancholia in adult males concern serving or recently serving soldiers [Crighton 117].

Such a one was Mayer, a soldier who deserts, rejoins, then deserts again. He decides to starve himself to death and is found after 14 days in an emaciated condition. He recovers in hospital, and while still there he decides to murder his nurse. When she does not appear at the expected time, he attacks another patient, also a soldier, and stabs him three times. "In dem nachmaligen Gehör hat er gleich alles gestanden, und sehr bereuet, daß er das Leben einer unschuldigen Person zum Opfer seines Lebensüberdrusses gemacht. Auf befragen, wie ihm denn zumute gewesen als er diese hat begehen wollen? Antwortete er: 'bei Verrichtung der That sei ihm angst und bange geworden. Er will gern sterben, man solle ihm nur zeit zur Buße übrig lassen'" [Frolich 16-20].

No attempt was made by the author to attach a diagnosis to
the illness, although one might suppose that many doctors of the time might have seen the case as one of "periodische Tobsucht". In present-day terms, the combination of agitation, self-punitive starvation and motiveless, murderous aggression certainly suggests psychosis, likely to be of a schizophrenic nature. More to the point however are the parallels with Woyzeck's situation, especially in the apathy in the face of execution that Clarus reports in the first Gutachten: "'Es kann mir den Kopf kosten! Aber da mache ich mir nichts draus; - Sterben muß ich einmal'" [SWB I 544].

Another soldier, Christian Pragert, was the subject of a report by an unnamed contributor in the same volume [Magazin Bd.1.1 1783 24-29]. Like Meyer, he appears to have been something of a misfit, "immer etwas einfaltig und leichtgläubig". He was clumsy and could not do his military drills properly. He was frequently punished and became disgruntled. When poverty overtook his family ("kleine Haushaltung") he became totally disinclined to army life. He became very agitated, especially at night, couldn't sleep, read religious books and sang religious songs. Discharged from the army he entered a workhouse where he was quiet, industrious and gave no sign of disturbance of mind. Again there is no attempt to diagnose. Though he may indeed have been simple-minded (or even cleverly malingering), there remains also the possibility that this was a psychotic
episode in a schizoid individual. Büchner's Woyzeck, too, turned (vainly) to religion, although in a quieter mode.

Not all descriptions of madness were delineated in such vague and ambiguous terms: "Die Elektricität thut zur Erhaltung der jetzigen beste Welt und zu deren Wohlssein sehr vieles (?) beitragen, denn der Herr Professor elektrisirt die Kranken, die nichtsdenkenden und unvermögenden Bergknappen elektrisirt der Herr Professor; halt, ich irre, die Welt will, was will sie? elektrisiret seyn..... Daß der Herr Doctor von Kopfschmerzen spricht, ist eben die Ursach, daß die Wache nicht wohl bestellt, Spionen und Untreu vorhanden, und alsdann der Körper vermögend ist, allerlei Influenzien* und Franzosen einzquartieren; ..... die allervorkommenste Wahrheit, daß alle die, welche in die Hände derer Menschenschlächter fallen, ohnmöglich alle Sünder seyn können, und deswegen nennet Celsius die damaligen Medici, Bankerte, Hurenkinder, Spiegelärzte, Fegeteufel, welche auf dem Stuhl der Pestilenz sitzen." [Magazin Bd.2.2 1784 1-2].

These "sonderbare Aeußerungen des Wahnwitzes", which we might now translate as paranoid phantasies, are contained in a letter which is said to have arrived from Russia addressed to "Herrn Buchhändler W** in Berlin". The sender may have been a doctor, given his acquaintance with Celsius (perhaps a young doctor - Dörner mentions that it was frequent practice

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*"Influenzien" has the meaning of "induction currents", which would accord with the references to electricity in the text.
for young German doctors to launch their careers with a spell as personal physician to a nobleman in Russia). The letter is important as presenting a clear account of schizophrenic, and specifically paranoid, thought, such as can be found nowhere in more conventional psychiatric texts.

A number of case histories from the journals attest to the fact that doctors were familiar with illnesses in which paranoid delusions were prominent, usually being labelled "Monomanie" or "fixe Idee". A case report translated from the Edinburgh Medical and Surgical Journal concerns a retired naval surgeon who took up the study of animal magnetism and began to believe that he was possessed by magnetic forces. He fancied that enemies could effect evil on him by this means, and even travelled to Paris to try to escape their influence [Scott 118-120].

A self-report from Moritz' Magazin of 1788 records the sudden onset (the very day is specified) of the idea that people had been sent to kill the writer. At the same time he realised that such a belief was irrational: "...ob ich gleich nicht den mindesten hinreichenden Grund zu diesem Glauben hatte, und ich überzeugt war, daß keine Mensch so feindselige Gesinnungen gegen mich hege." In a diary kept over the next six weeks, the writer records the recurrence of these delusions, during which even friends are suspected of wishing to kill him, and their presence becomes unbearable. He
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retains insight and questions the origin of his ideas: "Ich kann es mir selten erklären, woher jene Empfindlichkeit augenblicklich entsteht. Am öftersten scheint sie mir eine Folge von Mißtrauen gegen meine Nebenmenschen zu seyn..."

He reports what we would now call ideas of reference: "Wenn zwei Menschen sich in der Gesellschaft in's Ohr zischeln, werde ich bange, verliere die Gegenwart meines Geistes, weil ich glaube daß man über mich übel spricht." He defends himself against the implied attack with a typically schizoid stratagem: "... und ich gebe mir oft das Ansehn eines Satyrikers, um meine Nachbarn in Gesellschaft in Furcht zu setzen". (Lenz in the Novelle, at the height of his madness, "schnitt ... entsetzliche Fratzen" [SWB I 98].) The outcome of the illness in the self-report is not recorded [unsigned 1788 20-24]. Although the label of "Hypochondrist" is attached to the writer, either by himself or by the editor, paranoid schizophrenia seems from a present-day standpoint to be the likeliest diagnosis.

Paranoid delusions were recognized as occurring in individuals over a wide range of age and social class. The Zeitschrift für die Staatsarzneikunde for 1833, the year of Büchner's return to Darmstadt, illustrates this in two reports. One is of a fourteen year old boy who believed himself to be constantly being stabbed in the neck by his enemies, "durch magische Kunst" [Graff 1833 174]. The
The diagnosis here is given as "ausgeprägter Wahnsinn mit fixer Idee". The second case is that of a 46 year old nobleman who hears voices threatening him with punishment. Werres, the attending doctor diagnoses "fixer Wahnsinn", but is almost unique in basing this not on the symptomatic presentation alone, but on the previous personality of the patient, who is said to be "unbiegsam" and "zum Jähzorn aufgelegt" [Werres 224].

One of the most detailed descriptions of the course of a psychotic illness, followed over a period of time, comes from the asylum at Hofheim, where Ernst Büchner was for a time surgeon [Franz and Loch 66]. The psychiatrist in charge, Ludwig Franz Amelung, published in 1824 an account of the cases admitted to the Hofheim institute, one of the earliest statistical surveys in German psychiatric writing. (Nasse, in his editorial foreword to the volume of Zeitschrift für Anthropologie in which the report appeared complained of the lack of comparable surveys from other centres.) As well as statistical data, Amelung included detailed accounts of some of the cases under his care [Amelung 1824 321-357].

Heinrich Berks, a man of 43, had lived with and supported his mother and had never married. He was regarded as a well-behaved and peaceable man, but of limited intellect, so that people sometimes made fun of him, and in consequence he became somewhat mistrustful of others. He had recently become
infatuated with a younger woman, who led him on and promised in jest to marry him although she was already promised to someone else.

He spoke several times of his intention to go to the Archduke to establish his rightful claim to his bride. Eventually he went to the Archduke's palace, where he was deemed to be mad and transferred to the Asylum at Hofheim. He arrived there bound hand and foot, with rolling eyes and foaming mouth, was abusive and threatening. At the same time he displayed a "Haltung des Körpers, welche stets einen erwarteten Angriff abzuweisen und zuvorzukommen schien." Anyone who came near him was thought to be an enemy, a devil or a potential killer. He remained several days in this "Paroxysmus von Wuth und Tobsucht." When offered food, he thought that meat was human flesh and that beer was blood. He thought anyone who approached him was a Jew, who meant to flay him. In time he became quieter, and was allowed, albeit in a straitjacket, into the yard where he would stand on the one spot for hours at a time, swaying rhythmically and saying a prayer that he must have learned as a child. He said he was surrounded by enemies and begged God to help him. "Auch jetzt noch konnte man sich ihm nur mit Vorsicht nähern." At the same time, Amelung records, he related well to the other patients, and even attached himself especially to one other male patient.

Amelung's treatment was a mixture of physical measures and
"moral" treatment. He prescribed a cold shower, from the height of one storey, on to Berks' shaven scalp. Afterwards he sought to win his confidence by promising to punish the perpetrator of the treatment, a deception which was successful. The patient continued to rave ("toben") from time to time, but not so badly, nor for so long. If he became sullen and uncooperative, he would respond to the doctor's earnest exhortations. He was now treated with the greatest love and care and all means of restraint were totally removed.

Amelung's view of the pathology underlying his patient's mania ("Tobsucht") was that he had had an inflammation of the brain, or of the meninges, which had responded to the cold shower to his head. In the meantime his mental condition continued to improve. "Er sprach und urtheilte über jede Sache vernünftig, bis auf die fixe Idee, daß er die Schulchristiane heirathen müßte." He deteriorated following a visit by his brother and what seemed most to upset him was "besonders der Umstand, daß ihn dieser nicht mitnehmen konnte", and he became more confused, uncooperative and stubborn. Treatment at this stage was "ein passendes psychisches Regimen mit Beihülfe mehrere Aderlässe wegen häufiger Congestionen nach dem Kopfe." Berks was eventually allowed home; this in Amelung's view would be therapy in itself, as well as a test of cure. There was no recurrence of
symptoms and, after one and a half years, still no sign of relapse.

While not ruling out the possibility of a psychological precipitant (usually in such cases one of the passions), Amelung in reviewing the case argues strongly for the seeking out of a physical cause. Indeed it becomes a point of professional competence to seek out "die innere Materielle, (die) dem Layen unerforscht bleibt." [ibid. 344].

A number of features of interest to the historian of psychiatry emerge from this report, notably the attention paid to both organic and psychological factors in causation and treatment and the evidence of the adverse effects of restraint and hospitalization on the course of the illness. What is of special relevance to the present study is the start and finish of the illness with a *fixe Idee*, and the progress of the illness between these two points. The gradual development of delusions with a strongly paranoid content in a context where it is possible to understand the reasons why they might have arisen parallels the portrayal of such delusions in the mind of Franz Woyzeck. Büchner's achievement in the play was indeed to render such madness intelligible.

It would be tempting to suppose that Büchner had read Amelung's report. There are many reasons why he might have done so. Amelung was, like him, educated and grew up in
Darmstadt [Schneider 11], though some fifteen years Büchner's senior, and Ernst Büchner was, however remotely, a medical colleague of the psychiatrist. Amelung also intervened in the debate over Zurechnungsfähigkeit and made reference to the Woyzeck case [Amelung 1827 47-120]. This article at least would have been on Ernst Büchner's bookshelves, since he both subscribed and contributed to the journal in which it appeared, Zeitschrift für die Staatsarzneikunde. It must be acknowledged however that there is no firm evidence to suggest that the creator of the character of Franz Woyzeck was familiar with the case of Heinrich Berks. However, it may be reasonably asserted that illnesses like that depicted in Woyzeck were claiming the attention of psychiatrists in the decade preceding the writing of the play.

If Amelung's case bears some resemblance to the case of Franz Woyzeck, then an account, written at great length, of the illness of a young man and appearing in the Zeitschrift für Anthropologie of 1825 [Zschr. 2 1825 321-336] may be held to show some parallels with the case of J.M.R. Lenz. The author was a doctor who does not subscribe his name, and the patient J.G.M., the youngest son of healthy parents. His personality before the illness is described as passive ("weich"), good-natured, somewhat timorous. He was not sociable and preferred to be with older people rather than with boys of his own age. He was studious and talented in mathematics, physics,
chemistry and philosophy. He was often busy with sketching and painting, all of which drew the approval of his parents and teachers. He was shy with girls and if they appeared reserved with him, he took this as rejection. Indication of an active, but secretive inner life appears in the description of his "Hang zu Sonderbarkeiten und Paradoxien". "... in seinem Blicke las man ein Gemisch von tiefer Reflexion und Satyre." [ibid. 322]. Thus far the picture is that of a deeply withdrawn, schizoid young man.

In his late teens he started to believe that a foul smell emanated from his nose, tried in vain to dismiss it from his mind by immersing himself in his painting, and in despair "unterließ er sich dem Laster der Selbstbefleckung...". He began to propound alchemical theories concerning a universal tincture, and claimed to have solved problems of cosmology and perpetual motion. Since he remained outwardly quiet and reasonable, his occasional flights of phantasy were put down to genius.

His first breakdown ("Anfall von Tobsucht"), which is not described, occurred soon after this, and he had to give up studies for a year. A second attack came when he resumed his studies, and was characterised by constant singing and raving. He smashed anything that came within reach. During this illness, he cursed his parents, brothers and sisters, expressing the belief that he was a changeling
A third attack followed shortly after he went to University, and the report includes a long letter by the patient to a friend, which reveals his state of mind. It begins with a long complaint against F., a mutual friend of the patient and the friend to whom the letter is addressed. "Ich vertraute dem F., umfaßte ihn als Freund, wollte ihm wohl, und habe in ihm endlich meinen ärgersten Feind erkannt. Es gibt teuflische, höllische Kunststücke, Naturkräfte, die F. kennt und benutzt...... F. ist ein Bauchredner: seine wahre Stimme hörtest du nie." (At this point the doctor writing the article comments that the recipient of the letter had at first taken this as a metaphor for someone who said one thing and thought another, but came to recognise it as "fixe Idee des Geisteskranken"). Through the "Bauchreden" and through his wide-eyed gaze, fixed on J.G.M.'s eyes, F. gained almost total power over him. "F. macht einem, wie es der Bauer bei uns nennt, den Nachlauf zu seinem Körper. Man muß immer an ihn denken - und denkt man nicht an ihn, so ergreift einen das entsetzlichste Misbehagen und eine fürchterliche Unruhe.... Ich war meiner Rede nicht mächtig, schwatzte albernnes Zeug, hatte besonders immer eine fürchterliche
Angst, bezog unwillkürlich Alles, was ich sah, auf mich, kurz als hätte ich gar keine Selbstständigkeit mehr." (The reference to loss of "Selbstständigkeit" may be held to imply some degree of loss of ego boundaries, a feature of schizophrenic breakdown, which we shall see is portrayed in Lenz.) J.G.M. describes what he suspects may have been a hallucination: "Da geschah es denn manchmal, daß ich eine Vision hatte, plötzlich auffuhr und fragte: Hast Du den Nebel nicht Übers Feld schweben gesehen?" (cf. Lenz's "... hören Sie den nicht die entsetzliche Stimme, die um den ganzen Horizont schreit..." [SWB I 100].)

J.G.M. goes on to describe a night when he had shared a pallet with F. in a hostelry: "Ich lag auf der rechten Seite, F. hinter mir; auf einmal fühlte ich eine abscheulich empfindliche Berührung auf der Stelle, wo das Herz liegt, so daß ich mit dem ganzen Körper auffuhr....Etwa einige Zeit nachher, wo ich wieder fest eingeschlafen war, berührte er mich auf die nämliche, die Seele gleichsam so empfindliche Weise.....Die zweimal mißglückte Art von Magnetisiren machte mich mißtrauisch. Ich beobachtete ihn nun schärfer als zuvor; dennoch liebte ich ihn unwillkürlich." He began to look for hidden meanings in various circumstances, finding a small coin he couldn't account for, a strangely folded piece of paper (cf. Lenz's "Hieroglyphen, Hieroglyphen -"). He dated the beginning of his many physical symptoms to the start of
his acquaintance with F. "Zu gleicher Zeit hatte ich so viele 
SaamenergieBungen. Dies alles machte mich so melancholisch, 
daß ich zuletzt verrückt ward."

The doctor remarks that at the time of writing the letter, 
J.G.M. was showing no clear signs of illness, but that 
shortly afterwards he relapsed into several weeks of raving, 
shouting, singing, writing verses and weeping. He did not 
sleep, tore his clothes, smashed windows and smeared himself 
with excrement. With a few of his earlier acquaintances he 
could be calm and speak with them for a little time; others 
he spat at and mocked. Whenever he thought he was not 
observed, he masturbated, and even when restrained he sought 
to masturbate in whatever way was possible. When remission 
eventually occurred he confessed to his friends that he had 
tried to exhaust and eventually to kill himself by 
masturbation.* (The frequency of threatening sexual 
phantasies and of disinhibited and inappropriate sexual 
behaviour in schizophrenia is well documented [Kraepelin 30-
31 and 42].)

The diagnosis made at the time was "periodische Tobsucht" 
with "fixe idee". From today's viewpoint, the amount of 
detail given allows one to consider the possibility of 
 schizophrenia with paranoid features.

* "Masturbatory insanity" was a name given in the mid-nineteenth century to a form of adolescent psychosis. This may have been a form of schizophrenia [Hare 523].
It is even possible on the evidence to formulate a tentative psychodynamic hypothesis in relation to the content of J.G.M.'s psychosis. Unconscious homo-erotic wishes on the part of the patient directed towards F. are projected on to the latter, and perceived as persecutory attacks.* (The hallucinated foul smell may be an expression of his disgust at these feelings.) Keeping F. continually in his thoughts is a way of trying to control this paranoia and masturbation a way of trying to cope with erotic impulses by producing a kind of sexual exhaustion. This formulation has some bearing on the case of the historical Lenz, whose pursuit of women associated with Goethe might be said to indicate homo-erotic feelings towards his fellow-poet, which in turn may have contributed to Lenz's madness.

The case description is of significance in that contains an account of psychotic thinking in the patient's own words, albeit recollected during a remission of the illness. We shall see how, in Lenz, Büchner's main addition to his source in Oberlin was his entry into the inner world of his subject's thoughts and feelings.

Not all case descriptions show this involvement in the feeling and phantasy of the patient. Jakobi, writing in 1826, describes his findings in a case of "fixer Wahn*. This patient had the delusion that he could hear the voice of God

* Freud analyses in detail the role of repressed homosexual impulses in the genesis of paranoia [Freud 9 129-223]
coming to him through saints and angels, but also through thunder. "Die Entfernung von der Nasenwurzel bis zur Protuber. occip. beträgt sieben Zoll, und die Entfernung von dem einen Proc. mastoid. zum andern 4.7/8 Zoll. ...an dem ganzen Schädel bemerkt man nichts Auszeichnendes, als in der Nähe der Vereinigung der Scheitelbein mit dem Sternbeine, vorzüglich da wo Galls theosophischer Sinn seinen Sitz haben soll, eine etwa vier Zoll lange, drei Zoll breite und vier Linien tief Einbeugung...." [Jakobi 81].

So far is Jakobi from acknowledging possible emotional factors that the condition of appearing to be on the edge of tears is described in language which purports to be objective and scientific: "Der Blick is wechselnd, starr und unstät; dabei hat die ganze vordere Fläche des Augapfels einen eigentümlichen, in dieser Art selten zu beobachtenden Glanz, der dem Anscheine nach von einem grösseren Wasserreichthum der sclerotica und cornea herrührt und dem Blick etwas widerlich Fremdes gibt." [ibid. 82]. Only the phrase "etwas widerliches Fremdes" departs from the strictly anatomical, and indicates Jakobi's sense of alienation from his patient.

The writer is clearly influenced by Gall's "Hirnorganenlehre" and gives little attention to the development of the "fixer Wahn", so that there is no possibility of understanding the content of the delusion in the context of the patient's life history. In this concentration on external appearances there
are obvious parallels with the first Clarus Gutachten, which appeared two years before Jakobi's paper: "... der Leib nicht aufgetrieben oder gespannt, und die Eingeweide desselben, so viel sich durch äußere Untersuchung erkennen läßt, von natürlicher Lage und Größe..." [SWB I 546]; parallels too with the Doctor's observations of Woyzeck in the play written ten years after Jakobi's paper: "Den Puls Woyzeck, den Puls, klein, hart, hüp fend, unregelmäßig" [H 2.7].

Jakobi's regime seems to have been firm but kind. He discoursed rationally with his patient about the latter's religious delusions. Treatment (effective) was a tincture of arsenic in gruel.

The hypothesis that schizophrenia is a disease of only recently widespread prevalence has been reviewed by Hare who finds evidence for and against the hypothesis equally unconvincing [Hare 528]. The case-histories described in this chapter suggest that schizophrenia-like illness, whether commonly occurring or not, was beginning to attract the attention of both the medical profession and the lay public around the end of the eighteenth century. We have seen how many of the symptoms described find parallels in the documents relating to the historical figures, Woyzeck and Lenz, and in Büchner's portrayals in the Novelle and in the play.
We do not need to hypothesize that Büchner had read the descriptions that have been here outlined in order to suppose that he was likely to be familiar with accounts of similar illness, and with psychiatric ideas about them. Given the particular circumstances of his family background, and the widespread concern, both medical and lay, about the causes of mental illness and its social implications, it is to be expected that he would be familiar both with the general discourse and with at least some of the literature, and that this would have influenced his interpretation of the Oberlin and Clarus documents.

We have also seen, in the self-report by a "Hypochondrist" and in the account of the illness of the student "J.G.M.", that the literature contained some descriptions of the content of psychotic feeling and thinking. However, nothing that has been here reported prepares us for the profound and sensitive awareness that Büchner shows of the suffering of his psychotic characters, nor for the detailed grasp of the complexities of their thought and feeling.
Chapter Seven - Büchner and J.M.R. Lenz

Introduction

In examining Büchner's portrayal of psychosis in Lenz, this and the following chapters will consider the factors, biographical, literary and political which motivated him to take Lenz as a subject for his Novelle. To identify the particular qualities, literary and psychological, of Büchner's approach, there will follow a comparison with two prose works of comparable length, both of which deal with madness, one dating from some twenty years before Lenz, and exemplifying something of the attitudes of German Romanticism, the second written in 1832, by Honoré de Balzac, who shared many of Büchner's characteristics as a writer, including the ability to combine realism with the grotesque.

When the subject of a work of imagination is a historical person, and the focus of attention is a well documented episode of illness, special difficulties arise in interpreting the dynamics of that illness. So that we may be clear as to what the particular contribution of the author is, and what legitimate inferences may be drawn, Büchner's portrayal will be compared with descriptions of Lenz before and during his breakdown, derived from Oberlin and from other sources. We shall consider how closely the depiction of Lenz's illness is congruent with clinical descriptions of schizophrenia, and finally how the significance of the poet's condition may be
Interpreted in existential and in psychodynamic terms.

Lenz as a subject

After some months during which his letters home from Straßburg had concerned themselves mostly with the fate of his Gießen and Darmstadt friends who were in prison or had recently been released, we find Büchner, in October 1835, writing of new possibilities that were opening up for him with the appearance of a new periodical, "ein großes Literaturblatt, Deutsche Revue betitelt", which was to be edited by Gutzkow and Wienbarg. "Vielleicht, daß Ende des Jahres noch etwas von mir erscheint." In his next letter, he writes: "Ich habe mir hier allerhand interessante Notizen über einen Freund Goethes, einen unglücklichen Poeten Namens Lenz verschafft, der sich gleichzeitig mit Goethe hier aufhielt und halb verrückt wurde... Ich denke darüber einen Aufsatz in der deutschen Revue erscheinen zu lassen." [SWB II 448]. He goes on mention his search for material for an article on a philosophic, or perhaps biological theme.

This series of concerns, namely the possibility of a regular income from Deutsche Revue, Lenz as the possible subject of an essay (rather than a work of the imagination), equally alongside other possible topics, even the cursory description of Lenz as "halb verrückt", points to an interest that initially seems to have been pragmatic rather than all-absorbing. Yet within weeks he had completed a draft of a
Novelle which is the expression of a profound empathy with his subject, and which reveals an astonishing insight into the inner processes of schizophrenic breakdown.

Among the more immediate factors which drew the story of Lenz to Büchner's notice was undoubtedly his friendship in Straßburg with Anton and August Stöber, who were later to edit the journal Erwina in which the Oberlin account of Lenz's stay with him in Waldersbach first appeared. It was this account that was to provide Büchner's main source. Still later, in 1842, August was to publish a biographical sketch under the title Der Dichter Lenz und Friederike von Sesenheim, and we know that it was through August that Büchner knew, not only of the Oberlin account, but of some unpublished letters of Lenz [Pütz 1]. The father of August and Anton, Daniel Ehrenfried Stöber, was the author of a life of Oberlin, published in 1831, and the funeral oration at Oberlin's funeral in 1826 had been given by Johann Jakob Jaeglé, the father of Büchner's betrothed.

It may be easily supposed that Büchner's sense of involvement was deepened by getting to know, again through the Stöbers', the landscapes of the Vosges where, more than half a century before, Lenz's life had come to a crisis point. "Ich habe mich ganz hier in das Land hineingelebt", he wrote to Gutzkow late in 1835. "... die Vogesen sind ein Gebirg, das ich liebe, wie eine Mutter, ich kenne jede Bergspitze und jedes
Tal und die alten Sagen sind so originell und heimlich und die beiden Stöber sind alte Freunde, mit denen ich zum erstenmal das Gebirg durchstrich." [SWB II 449]. If the old legends of the place could engage his imagination so completely, how much more vivid must have seemed the events Oberlin had described, when placed in the landscape Büchner had come to love.

The interest thus engendered began to take more specific form. Gutzkow, writing in an obituary notice, "Ein Kind der neuen Zeit": "Er wollte viel Neues und Wunderliches über diesen Jugendfreund Göttes erfahren haben, viel neues über Friederiken und ihre spätere Bekanntschaft mit Lenz."* The dynamics of the relationship between two such disparate personalities as Oberlin and Lenz also intrigued Büchner, as Gutzkow indicated in his review: "Sollte man glauben, daß Lenz Mitglied einer als frivol und transcendent bezeichneten Literaturrichtung je in Beziehung gestanden hat zu dem durch seine pietistische Frommigkeit bekannten Pfarrer Oberlin in Steinthal...? Büchner hat alles, was auf dieses Verhältniß Bezug hat, glaubwürdigen Familienpapieren entnommen."§

Although such considerations explain how Büchner came to be interested in the figure of Lenz and the story of his illness, they do not of themselves account for the intense

* Frankfurter Telegraph (Neue Folge) 3 Jg. Nr 42-44 Juni 1837 345 (quoted Hausschild 48)
§ Lenz: eine Reliquie von Georg Büchner [Telegraph für Deutschland Hamburg Jan 1839 34f (quoted Hausschild 50)].
identification of the author with his subject, an
identification which allowed such profound insight into
Lenz's madness. To examine this further it will be
necessary to look at the life events leading up to the poet's
arrival at the Steintal.

Lenz was born 1751 in Seßwegen, Lithuania. His father was a
Lutheran pastor in the pietistic tradition, his mother a
pastor's daughter. Jakob was the fourth child, and the second
son. He was the favourite of his father since he was the most
gifted, and of his mother since he was the most delicate. His
father hoped for a theological career for him and was
bitterly disappointed when he embarked on a literary (and
Bohemian) career in Straßburg. Lenz became a leading member
of the Sturm und Drang, a movement which dealt in "huge
emotions without a trace of irony" [Adey 64] and which was
seen by many contemporaries, and certainly by a succeeding
generation as nihilistic. Hausschild writes of "die
geläufigen Vorstellungen vom nur niederzerreiBenden und
oppositionellen Geist des Sturm und Drang" [Hausschild 50].

In Straßburg, Lenz met Goethe whose view of the relationship
is reflected in his reported remark: "Bist mir willkommen,
Bübchen. Es ist mir als ob ich mich in dir bespiegelt." Lenz
spoke of "Bruder Goethe" and of "unsere Ehe" [Hohoff
23]. In Part III of Dichtung und Wahrheit, Goethe describes
at some length his relationship with Lenz, and although he
accords the younger poet some transient brilliance, "wie ein vorübergehendes Meteor" [Dichtung und Wahrheit 636], his portrait of Lenz is somewhat condescending, the Olympian contemplating the minor writer who could not cope with life. His description of Lenz's appearance, though superficially affectionate, is laced with diminutives: "... ein allerliebste Köpfchen ... kurz ein Personchen, wie mir unter nordischen Jünglingen von Zeit zu Zeit eins begegnet ist..." [ibid. 528]. He is, according to Goethe, incapable of real love or real hate: "... im ganzen schien er nur zu sündigen, um sich straffen, nur zu intrigieren, um eine neue Fabel auf eine alte propfen zu können". Goethe sees this as a typical Sturm und Drang way of relating to the world, and therefore something that should not have outlived the cult of Werther [ibid.632-633 ].

Lenz was much influenced by Lavater and Herder, but developed inferiority feelings in respect of their lofty cultural aspirations. He dubbed himself "Schwein", which was probably in part satirical, contrasting his own more earthbound artistic aims with theirs, but which may also have been an indication of his low self esteem [Hohoff 30-31]. Lenz fell in love successively with Friederike Brion, Goethe's discarded lover (1772); Susanne Fibich (1774), von Kleist's sweetheart; Cornelia Schlosser (1775), Goethe's sister; and Henrietta Waldner von Freundstein (1775), an
heirress whom Lenz knew only from afar. It was when it became clear that Henrietta was about to marry, and when the break with Goethe became final, that the first signs of Lenz's illness became manifest. (It is possible to postulate that Lenz's propensity for falling in love with women seen as belonging to other men betokened a latent homosexuality, and here the close relationship of two of them with Goethe may be significant. It is held that homosexual guilt may play a part in the psychogenesis of schizophrenia, especially where there are paranoid features. Alternatively, the triangular relationship necessarily involved in relation to Lenz's choice of love objects may indicate unresolved Oedipal feelings. It is certainly possible to construct a plausible interpretation of Büchner's Lenz in terms of Oedipal conflicts.)

In 1775 Lenz came to Weimar for the last time, hoping to re-establish his relationship with Goethe, but Goethe rejected any overtures, writing in the November of that year of "Lenzens Eselei". It is likely that a scurrilous poem by Lenz on Goethe's relationship with Frau von Stein was largely responsible for Goethe's coolness. (It seems strange that Lenz put his hopes for renewed friendship at hazard in such a way, and one can only surmise that jealousy was largely responsible.)

Klinger, another friend from the Sturm und Drang period, was also in Weimar, but he too avoided any resumption of
friendship and for Lenz the Weimar visit ended in bitter disappointment. He wandered aimlessly for a time and then remembered the friendly reception he had received from Cornelia Schlosser, Goethe’s sister. It may be that Lenz was chiefly drawn to Cornelia because she too was psychologically disturbed and he recognised in her a kindred spirit [Hohoff 113]. When Lenz arrived in Emmendingen, she was in the late stages of pregnancy, was afraid of her husband and already hated the child she was carrying. Although Lenz continued to idealize her as a kind of Laura (Cornelia had earlier given him a present of a volume of Petrarch), it is likely that Cornelia was preoccupied with her own troubles and Lenz soon resumed his travels [ibid. 113].

Around this time Lenz wrote a short story, Der Landprediger, about a country parson who devoted himself to the wellbeing of his peasant parishioners, and it is likely that the model for the central figure was Pastor Oberlin, who had in his charge “die ärzte Pfarre im ganzen Land, Waldbach” [Landau 33], and who was beginning to be widely known for his good works. It seems likely also that Lenz’s disturbance was beginning to manifest itself and that he was already thinking of Oberlin as a possible source of help.

There followed a visit to Switzerland which somewhat revived his spirits by involving him in the literary life of Basel and Zürich, and friendship with Lavater and the blind poet
and herald of revolution, Pfeffel. But in June of 1777, news came to him of the death of Cornelia Schlosser and he returned to Emmendingen. Something of the emptiness he felt is shown in his lines on her death:

"Mein Schutzgeist ist dahin, die Gottheit, die mich führte
Am Rande jeglicher Gefahr
Und wenn mein Herz erstorben war."

A letter to Lavater*, written shortly after his arrival in Emmendingen shows a different aspect of his emotions at this time. After a brief reference to Cornelia's death, he concerns himself with news that Kaufmann has sent of his family, "Balsamtropfen... in meine Wunde...", and then launches into a series of trivialities [LWB III 533-534]. In this he may be showing some capacity for splitting off the part of his psyche that feels threatened by such devastating loss. Between June and December of 1777, his letters show little sign of any near-psychotic disturbance. But there is evidence of insecurity, in that he seems to feel that Lavater is not giving him the attention he craves. In October 1977, he writes to Sarasin from Zürich where he is staying with Lavater: "Ich befinde mich nicht wohl, lieber Freund! und will deswegen morgen eine kleine Reise zu Herrn von Salis tun". (Von Salis is a physician.) He makes no mention of his symptoms, but a little further on he sends compliments "von

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The letters written in this period of his life appeared in Tieck's edition of Lenz's works published in 1828, and would certainly have been known to Büchner.
den mit Geschäften überladenen Lavater und seiner erst matt aufkriechenden Frau.... Dürt ich um Ihre beiden Silhouetten bitten, Lavater will sie mir nicht geben." [ibid. 560]. The coincidence of some kind of illness with the existence of friction between him and a father-figure may be significant. Lavater was only ten years older than Lenz but his profession as a pietistic clergyman may have produced some identification with Lenz's own father, an identification strengthened, one may surmise, by the associations of his host's surname. This impression is confirmed by the next letter, in November, to Sarasin, which not only reveals further disgruntlement with Lavater, but contains a deliberate pun on his name: "Hier lieber Sarasi sitz ich wieder an La-Vaters Tisch, darf mit seiner Feder an Sie schreiben, einen Gruß an Sie schicken, obschon er Ihren Brief nicht gelesen." [ibid. 561]. At the end of November, having left Lavater's house, he writes: "Mein Aufenthalt in dem Hause des Herrn Pfarrer Lavaters sollte mich freilich in meinen Reden und Handlungen ein wenig fürsichtiger gemacht haben... vielmehr bin ich versichert, daß er meine ganze Art zu sein, nach seinem Gesichtspunkt diesesmal äußerst tadelhaft gefunden haben werde." [ibid. 564].

Such expressions of unease and distrust are far from psychotic, but they do prepare us for the ambivalence which he was to show towards Oberlin, another pietistic father-figure, and which would play an important part in his later psychosis.
A letter written on 12 December shows preoccupation with the association of morality and diet, citing such diverse sources as a textbook of physiology and a commentary on Gellert's odes. To modern ears the sequence of ideas expressed has the quality of the intellectual constructs sometimes found in schizophrenia but, given the nature of scientific discourse in Lenz's time, it may not be so bizarre. Certainly, it is around this time that the first psychotic episode occurred, thoroughly alarming his friends. More relevant may be his recalling, in the same letter, of the daughter of an acquaintance, "die ich noch oft in Gedanken das Schweizerliedgen in Meienfels singen höre" [ibid. 565-566], in the light of the importance that Büchner was to accord to the maid's song in the progress of Lenz's psychosis. Within a few weeks of this letter, Lenz was on his way to Waldersbach.

Büchner and Lenz

From the foregoing account of Lenz's life, a number of themes emerge to which commentators in various ways, and with varying degrees of appropriateness, have attributed Büchner's involvement in his subject. They may be summarised as follows:

1. Isolation and rejection
2. Failure in sexual relationships
3. The quality of peer relationships
4. Religious preoccupations.
5. Experience of severe mental disturbance
6. Ambivalent feelings about father-figures

All of these have some relevance to Büchner's own experience.
1. Abutille stresses similarities between Lenz and Büchner in that both had known isolation and rejection [Abutille 107]. While this is broadly true, the quality of isolation and rejection in the case of the two men differed greatly. Büchner's experience in this regard resulted from being at odds with a society which he saw as oppressive and with a father who did not share his views. He was however strengthened by the respect and love of his friends and a tender acceptance by the woman he loved. Lenz, on the other hand, was isolated from those whose regard he most highly sought and rejected by every woman whose love he tried to win. These experiences reinforced his poor self-image, whereas Büchner's self-confidence seemed to border sometimes on the arrogant. Nonetheless, there is some validity in Gundolf's dictum, which stresses Büchner's isolation: "Büchner gehört zu den Opfern, nicht zu den Schöpfern und Führern seiner Zeit; weder als Begründer noch als Vollender noch als großer Einsiedler, sondern als Empfänger und Träger von mehreren Strömungen, die sonst nicht so stark oder nicht derart verbunden erscheinen, ragt er in der deutschen Seelengeschichte hervor." [Gundolf 84].
2. Kobel sees Büchner's concern with Lenz as stemming from his identification of himself and his betrothed Minna with
the Goethe/Friederike/Lenz triangle. Thus: "Wie Friederike war Minna eine verlassene Liebende. Büchner möchte sich dabei mit Goethe vergleichen..." [Kobel 138]. At the same time, by sending to Minna, during the time of his separation from her, some poems of Lenz dedicated to Friederike, Büchner is said to be identifying with Lenz. Against this it may be said that Büchner plays down the Lenz/Friederike motif, even departing from Oberlin's account in this respect [see Chapter Nine]. In reality, there is no evidence of lack of success in Büchner's relationship with Minne, and the two situations cannot be equated.

A more plausible source of Büchner's identification with the Goethe/Friederike/Lenz triangle, through feelings on his part about a wronged young woman, is hinted at by one of his Straßburg friends, Alexis Muston. Writing of a walking excursion from Darmstadt with Büchner in September 1834, some two months after the latter's engagement to Minna, Muston describes his companion as "s'étant épris d'une sorte d'adoration mystique pour une fille perdue, qu'il rêvait de relever au niveau des anges..." [Fischer, H. 272-274]. The "fille perdue" has been held to be the piano teacher, Lotte Cellarius, one of whose pupils was Ludwig Büchner [ibid. 274]. It is likely that Büchner felt for her some tenderness which had to remain secret. More than two years after entrusting his secret to Muston, he writes to Ludwig from
exile in Straßburg: “Wenn du in die Klavierstunde gehst, so sage der Fräulein Lottchen einen schönen Gruß von mir, aber sage um des Himmelswillen Niemand ein Wort davon.” [SWB II 450]. There is about this message an adolescent quality, which matches his confidence to Muston two years before, and which matches also Lenz’s immature expectations of a relationship with Friederike.

3. Adey points to prevalence of the theme of sibling rivalry in Sturm und Drang literature [Adey 54]. Certainly for Lenz, feelings for Goethe, at once a much-loved friend and an envied, because more successful, rival in both love and literature, were central to how Lenz tried to conduct his life and his relationships. However, such feelings can have had little relevance for Büchner. There is little to suggest that, as the gifted eldest son of an admittedly talented family, he experienced any strong rivalry with his sisters or brothers; indeed Luise Büchner in the fictional portrait of Georg in her novel, Ein Dichter, shows him very much as the favoured son. Nor later in life did competitiveness feature in his relationships with his associates in politics or literature.

4. Abutille identifies as an important contributory factor to Lenz’s breakdown his frustrated “Glaubensnot” [Abutille 108-111], and implies that this was of some significance for Büchner. While it is true that the turbulence that marked his
increasing political disillusion must have sometimes led him to a wish for certainties, there is no evidence that he sought these in a belief in God, frustrated or otherwise, even having regard to his reported death-bed utterances. It is more likely, at the time when he was interesting himself in Lenz, that it was in science that he was seeking some firm anchor.

5. Equally contentious is Abutille's speculation about the origin of Büchner's insights into Lenz's psychotic inner world. He is in no doubt about the diagnosis: "Lenz, so wie Büchner ihn sieht, ist schizophren mit leichtem paranoiden Einschlag".* He goes on: ".... die Möglichkeit, daß ein Dichter so genau, so eindringlich von einer Psychose spricht, ohne dieser Krankheit als Irrenarzt begegnet zu sein, läßt nur einen Schluß zu: Büchner muß Vorformen dieser Krankheit selbst erlitten haben." [ibid. 111-112]. He quotes from the letter to Minne of March 1834, in which Büchner writes of "ein Meer von Gedanken, in denen mir die Sinnen vergehen...", and of how: "Ich erschrak vor mir selbst... ich fürchte mich vor meiner Stimme und - vor meinem Spiegel" [SWB II 424]. On this scanty evidence Abutille asserts: "... daß Büchner mehr als einmal derartige schizoide Anfälle erlitten haben muß." [Abutille 112]. Leaving aside the question of what "schizoide

* In Britain, the term "paranoid" is reserved for systematic delusions of persecution, whereas elsewhere in Europe it is applied to systematized delusions of any kind, including grandiose and religious delusions [Forrest 33].
Anfâlle" might mean (the term "schizoid" is applied rather to character traits or to psychological defence mechanisms than to episodes of illness), Büchner's state of mind as described in the letter is largely attributable to the meningitis that had afflicted him three months before, and is in any case much more suggestive of depression than of any schizophrenic process. "... aber ich habe keinen Schrei für den Schmerz, kein Jauchzen für die Freude, keine Harmonie für die Seligkeit. Dies Stummsein ist mein Verdammnis." [SWB II 425]. Sharp, more cautiously, points to the feelings of deadness and imminent madness pervading a number of Büchner's letters as a source of his insights into Lenz's condition and suggests moreover, citing Ludwig Büchner, that Georg's interest and understanding were heightened by his medical studies [Sharp 256]. While granting the validity of Sharp's first observation, one must question the second; it is unlikely that Büchner, as a medical student, had any systematic teaching in psychiatry, or any opportunity to observe the insane.*

6. Of the postulated sources of Büchner's identification with Lenz, the theme of ambivalent feelings about the father, and father-subsitutes, provides by far the richest vein for exploration. Both Lenz and Büchner were favoured sons, and both came to experience the weight of paternal expectations.

*For a review of the evidence concerning the nature of Büchner's illnesses and his experience of medical education, see Chapters Two and Three above.
Both at some cost sought to establish their own careers and their own sets of values. For Lenz, the cost was his sanity. For Büchner, the cost may even, it has been claimed, have been his life. In his psychoanalytic study, White suggests that Büchner's scientific aspirations were in some degree determined by his wish to find the acceptance by his father, that he had lost through political activity (itself interpreted as a rebellion against his father), while in literature he attempted to find his own self. The intensity of intellectual and emotional effort involved may have been such, that when the attack of typhoid came, he had neither the physical nor the psychological capacity to withstand it [White 424-425]. How ambivalent feelings about father-figures affected the course of Lenz's illness will be studied in greater detail when we come to examine the psychodynamics implicit in the Oberlin and the Büchner versions. It is sufficient for the moment to point to how, in both versions, the ebb and flow of his madness closely mirrored his changing relationship with Oberlin.

Literary influences
An early commentator, Gundolf, noted the correspondence between Büchner's subject matter and that of the Sturm und Drang [Gundolf 84]. Adey argues that Büchner takes familiar Sturm und Drang themes, but presents them "with post-Romantic insight". It follows therefore that a leading
exponent of the earlier school would have specially absorbing interest for him [Adey 62-63]. The two playwrights had in common a deep admiration for Shakespeare, though it is likely that the perspectives from which they viewed him varied widely.

Büchner was clearly influenced in his dramatic technique by the Sturm und Drang dramatists, above all by Lenz [Guthrie 1984 75]. There are obvious parallels between Die Soldaten and Woyzeck in terms of theme, and the situations of Mariane Wesener and Stolzius bear at least superficial comparison with those of Marie and Woyzeck. Sexual humiliation and self-abasement are recurring motifs in Lenz's works, from his first two dramatic works, Der verwundete Bräutigam and Dina, through to Der Hofmeister and Die Soldaten, with castration a prominent motif, and it is Woyzeck's humiliation at the hands of the Tambour-Major that precipitates the final tragedy. Both Lenz and Büchner give the theme a social and political dimension so that it comes to represent the hero's powerlessness and his exploitation by society. Lauffer in Der Hofmeister is, like Woyzeck, an anti-hero. "Nicht ein Held findet sich in einer verzweifelten Lage wieder, sondern eine mit einer Schwäche behaftete Figur." [Preuß 48-49].

The most telling similarities however are found in the rhythm and structures of the two works where the scenes become shorter and more fragmented as the tragedies reach their
inevitable end. The feeling of fragmentation and dissolution is heightened by the grammatical devices of ellipsis and anacoluthon common to both playwrights [Guthrie 1984 73-75]. The differences between the two works need not be elaborated here, but the most significant of these set Lenz's didactic purpose against Woyzeck's universality and the rather sentimental possibility of a reconciliation at the end of Die Soldaten against the pessimistic realism of Büchner.

**Political factors**

Of the considerations that drew Büchner to the subject of Lenz, the influence of Büchner's political interests was probably marginal. There were parallels between the political philosophies of *Sturm und Drang* and *Das Junge Deutschland*, and Hausschild speaks of Büchner as "dieser prärealistische Stürmer und Dränger des Vormärz" [Hausschild 164]. Büchner, however, although he associated himself with Gutzkow in order to see his earlier works published, cannot be said to share either the liberal politics or the artistic tendencies of the movement.

A more likely focus of political interest for Büchner was the material condition of the parishioners of Waldersbach, and in *Lenz* he provides a perspective that shows their miseries as based in poverty, while Lenz sees both the misery and the means to alleviate it as necessarily spiritual [Kobel 153, Lehmann 54]. Oberlin represents a kind of middle position
which concentrates in the main on spiritual succour, while following a programme directed to social and economic improvement: "Die Leute erzählten Träume, Ahnungen. Dann rasch ins praktische Leben, Wege angelegt, Kanäle gegraben, die Schule besucht." [SWB I 82].

Whereas social and political dynamics underlie the insanity of Woyzeck, "Lenz suffers from politics on a reduced scale, the politics of paternal and religious authority as they are embodied in their powerful representative Oberlin... Büchner's skepticism about the therapeutic aid which Oberlin has to offer is at the same time directed toward the notion of therapy itself within the context of an inequitable and dysfunctional society." [Sharp 279].

Once attracted to Lenz as a subject, it was inevitable that Büchner would endow his situation with political significance. But the main determinants of that attraction were almost certainly the parallels between Lenz's life experience and his own.
In order to show something of the true nature of Büchner's achievement in *Lenz*, a detailed comparison follows with two works of roughly the same period, both treating the subject of the madness of a writer. Hoffmann's *Erzählung* exemplifies in detail the relationship which the Romantic aesthetic held to exist between madness and creativity whereas, in *Louis Lambert*, a more realistic portrayal of catatonic illness nonetheless demonstrates a degree of idealization of madness.

**E.T.A. Hoffmann: Der Kampf der Sänger**

This work was first published in 1818, but a gulf exists between Hoffmann's picture of madness and that of Büchner, writing only seventeen years later. Both works concern poets, who react in different ways following the loss (to fellow poets) of women they hoped to win. Although the theme of madness is less exclusively a focus in *Der Kampf der Sänger*, than in *Lenz*, nonetheless Hoffmann repeatedly uses terms that emphasize this theme: "der Wahnsinn des Fiebers" [Kampf 171], "von eitelm Wahn betört" [ibid. 171], "von dem Wahnsinn törrichter Leidenschaft" [ibid. 172]. The choice of terms reflects something of both medical and lay descriptions of mental illness in Hoffmann's time; episodes of madness are often shown as beginning with fever, and the link of madness

* The description and classification of mental illnesses by J.C. Reil appeared in the fourth volume of his *Über die Erkenntnis und Kur der Fieber* of 1799. Marx [personal communication] has suggested that many episodes of dementia may indeed at that time have followed upon infectious illness.
with the passions has been discussed above [Chapter Four]. Magris has noted Hoffmann's interest in medical views on psychopathology, and the reference in his letters to discussions with a number of leading doctors [Magris 9].

The sufferer in question is Heinrich von Ofterdingen, a participant in the legendary *Wartburgkrieg*, and the story follows his perilous flirtation with madness in pursuit of his art.

The literary devices used by Hoffmann and by Büchner to open their narratives signal very different approaches to their theme. In Hoffmann, the narrator is discovered in a lonely study, day dreaming over a book on the Golden Age of the *Sängern* and their "holdseliger Kunst". A storm is raging, but the narrator's study is safe against it, a metaphor for the inviolability of the inner life against the harshness of the outside world: "Das wilde Brausen des Sturms, das Knistern des Feuers wurde zu lindem harmonischem Sauseln und flüstern, und eine innere Stimme sprach: 'Das ist der Traum, dessen Flügel so lieblich auf- und niederrauschen, wenn er das innere Auge weckt, daß es vermag, die anmutigsten Bilder eines höheren Lebens voll Glanz und Herrlichkeit zu erschauen'". [Kampf 161]. A further distancing of reality is achieved by the setting of the events in a distant but undefined past: "(die Sänger) ... deren Trachte, deren bedeutungsvollen Gesichter auf ein längst verflössene Zeit
hinwiesen" [ibid. 162]. Their state of mind is not given in
detail, but is indicated as being spiritually elevated, not
only by their "bedeutungsvollen Gesichtern": "Die... spielten
auf Lauten und Harfen und sangen mit wunderbaren helltönenden
Stimmen..." [ibid. 162]. None of them is, at this stage,
named.

By contrast, Büchner specifies identity and time with brusque
precision in the very first sentence: "Den 20. Jänner ging
Lenz durch's Gebirg." [SWB I 79]. The scene is set with the
precise detachment of a topographer, to the extent of
dispensing with a verb: "Die Gipfel und hohen Bergflächen im
Schnee, die Täler hinunter graues Gestein, grüne Flächen,
Felsen und Tannen." [ibid. 79]. In two telling sentences,
Büchner both involves the reader in and alienates him from
Lenz's mental state: "Er ging gleichgültig weiter, es lag ihm
nichts am Weg, bald auf- bald abwärts. Müdigkeit spürte er
keine, nur war es ihm manchmal unangenehm, daß er nicht auf
dem Kopf gehen konnte." [ibid. 79]. As in Hoffmann, there is
a storm, but the reader does not experience it, comfortably,
through the study windows, but disconcertingly, in
breathless, short clauses. The violence threatens to enter
into Lenz's being: "Nur manchmal, wenn der Sturm das Gewölk
in die Täler warf, und es den Wald herauf dampfte, und die
Stimmen an den Felsen wach wurden, bald wie fern verhallende
Donner, und dann gewaltig heran brausten ... riß es ihm in
die Brust, er stand, keuchend, den Leib vorwärts gebogen, Augen und Mund weit offen, er meinte er müsse den Sturm in sich fassen...." [ibid. 79].*

The contrast which is apparent in the opening paragraphs of the two works is maintained throughout their course. Both Hoffmann's Heinrich and Lenz undertake recourse to the supernatural, Lenz in his attempt to raise the dead child, Heinrich to make contact with the magical powers of Klingsohr in order to enhance his art. In Lenz, the episode is a brief, though critical, episode in the poet's decline into madness; Lenz's purpose is both to be Godlike and to seek a sign of God's favour. In Hoffmann, it is the wish to consort with the supernatural itself that contains the seeds of madness, being seen as a kind of fall from the state of grace in which all the Sänger: "... wie Priester einer Kirche lebten.... in frommer Liebe und Eintracht beisammen, und all ihr Streben ging nur dahin, den Gesang, die schönste Gabe des Himmels ... recht in hohen Ehren zu halten." [Kampf 167]. It is certainly possible to interpret the meeting between Heinrich and Klingsohr as the poet's confrontation with the dark side of himself, and the fact that it turns out to have happened in a dream lends force to this interpretation. However, as the narrative develops, Klingsohr comes to have an external, "real" existence, with resultant ambiguity as to whether the

* A detailed analysis of Büchner's language and its close correspondence with Lenz's mental state is found in Swales Chap. 11, and in Pascal 68-83.
forces determining madness are intrinsic or extrinsic to Heinrich's mind. This sense of ambiguity is further increased, as Klingsohr becomes more and more a figure of fun with a retinue of sycophantic spirits and a line in mumbo-jumbo: "(Klingsohr) sprach mit hellklingender Stimme Worte, die Wolfframb gar nicht verstand" [ibid. 191].

The Wolfframb referred to is Heinrich's fellow-poet and rival, who resists Klingsohr's blandishments and thereby retains virtue and sanity. And it is Wolfframb's virtue that eventually saves Heinrich. In an epilogue, Heinrich writes to him in a letter: "Am Rande des Abgrundes stand ich, und Du hieltest mich fest, als schon verderbliche Schwindel mich betäubten... vor Deinem Liede sanken die mächtigen Schleier, die mich umhüllten, und ich schaute wieder zum heiteren Himmel empor." [ibid. 212]. Sanity is lost when virtue is lost, and regained through piety. At the same time there is the suggestion that the devil has at least some of the best tunes. Heinrich's song comes close to winning the Wartburgkrieg, and Wolframb himself is tempted to risk madness for his art.

Although Hoffmann has used terms like "Wahnsinn" and "Gemütskrankheit" to describe Heinrich's condition, there is no

* In Reil's *Rhapsodien über die Anwendung der psychischen Kurmethode auf Geisteszerrüttungen* of 1803, he recommends surrounding the patient with strangely dressed attendants speaking in strange tongues in order to disorient the patient so that cure may begin.
attempt to describe his symptoms in other than Romantic cliché. There is a melancholy that is reflected in his poems, and a pallor and unsteadiness of gaze; the terms used to describe Heinrich's state of mind, "Abgrund", "Schwindel" and "Schleier die mich umhüllten" allow only the most tentative insight. Heinrich's plight is, in a sense, the plight of Faustus, and the threat appears to be not so much to his reason or his hold on the world as to his immortal soul, and it is in this sense that the threatening "Abgrund" should be understood. As against this there is the sense of excitement in dealings with the supernatural which characterizes so much of this particular Romantic preoccupation, with the suggestion that this could even help to bring about a transcendental creative state. But it was not only literary convention that Hoffmann was following; in linking madness with alienation from grace, he was reflecting an important trend in contemporaneous medical thought, which we have seen exemplified in the writings of C.J.H. Windischmann [See Chapter Four].

In contrast, Büchner in Lenz was locating the sources of madness, not in a fall from grace, but in the interactions of human beings one with another, and on the failure of human hopes. For Lenz, the "Abgrund" is immediate and threatening. There is no poetic melancholy in his state, only the violent disruption of thought and feeling, from which he escapes into
emptiness. On the other hand, the supernatural is dealt with in a matter-of-fact way: "(Oberlin) halte ihn nicht für einen hohen Zustand" [SWB I 85]. It might be seen to be a symptom, certainly not a cause of madness. Again in contrast, though Büchner may have been influenced by descriptive medical writing on madness, he was following no convention, but breaking entirely new ground in his exploration of underlying motivations.

Honoré de Balzac: **Louis Lambert**

An illuminating comparison may be made between *Lenz* and Balzac's *Louis Lambert*, (first published 1832). The portrayal of the protagonists of both works shows many features of catatonic schizophrenia [Stone & Stone 51], but whereas Lenz is at first shown as agitated and hyperactive, only later declining into apathy, Balzac concentrates on the autistic phase of Lambert's illness: "Il était resté pendant cinquante-neuf heures immobile, les yeux fixes, sans manger ni parler; état purement nerveux dans lequel tombent quelques personnes en proie à de violentes passions; phénomène rare, mais dont les effets sont parfaitement connus des médecins .... cette maladie, à laquelle le prédisposaient son habitude de l'extase et la nature de ses idées." [Lambert 134]. Where Büchner in *Lenz* plays down the effect of the relationship with Friederike, there is in Balzac a clear suggestion that agitation relating to sexual feelings
is a major factor in precipitating breakdown: "L'exaltation à laquelle dut le faire arriver l'attente du plus grand plaisir physique, encore agrandie chez lui par la chasteté du corps et par la puissance de l'âme, avait bien pu déterminer cette crise...." [ibid. 134-135]

There are significant differences in the way that those around them respond to the illnesses of Lambert and Lenz. At the onset of the illness, Lambert is taken to see Esquirol in Paris, while Lenz finds his way to the care of a country pastor, indicating something of the differences between French and German understanding of mental illness. Balzac delineates in some detail Lambert's pre-psychotic personality whereas, with Lenz, this can only be inferred from the depiction of his brief intervals of lucidity. Lambert is shown as a gifted, lonely young man, deeply studious, with a rich inner life and an absorbing concern with mysticism. There is, time and again, the suggestion that this schizoid inner world represents a higher, more desirable state, and that madness is an attempt to retain that inner world intact, although Balzac by attributing such views to the narrator, must be said to leave the question open: "- S'il est réellement en proie à cette crise encore inobservée dans toutes ses modes et que nous appelons folie, je suis tenté d'en attribuer la cause à sa passion. Ses études, son genre de vie avaient porté ses forces et ses facultés à un degré de
puissance au delà duquel la plus légère surexcitation devait faire céder la nature; l'amour les aura donc brisées ou élevées à une nouvelle expression que peut-être calomnierons-nous en la qualifiant sans la connaître. Enfin, peut-être a-t-il vu dans les plaisirs de son mariage un obstacle à la perfection de ses sens intérieurs et à son vol à travers les mondes spirituels.

Mon cher Monsieur, repliqua le vieillard après m'avoir attentivement écouté, votre raisonnement est sans doute fort logique; mais, quand je le comprendrais, ce triste savoir me consolerait-il de la perte de mon neveu?

L'oncle de Lambert était un de ces hommes qui ne vivent que par le coeur." [ibid. 138].

If this passage is not without some irony, there is a kind of sublimity in the description by Lambert's wife of their relationship: "Quand il parle, il exprime des choses merveilleuses ..... Aux autres hommes, il paraîtrait aliéné; pour moi, qui vis dans sa pensée, toutes ses idées son lucides. Je parcours le chemin fait par son esprit, et, quoique je n'en connaisse pas tous les detours, je sais me trouver néanmoins au but avec lui ..... Peut-être, un jour, Louis reviendra-t-il à cette vie dans laquelle nous végétions; mais, s'il respire l'air des cieux avant le temps où il nous sera permis d'y exister, pourquoi souhaiterions-nous de le
revoir parmi nous?" [ibid. 143-144]. It is still unclear whether the serenity belongs to Louis or to his wife, but Balzac goes on to enumerate a number of Louis' "choses merveilleuses", and these consistently suggest an inner exaltation which is far from tormented: "La résurrection se fait par le vent du ciel qui balaye les mondes. L'ange porté par le vent ne dit pas: 'Morts, levez-vous!' Il dit: 'Que les vivants se lèvent!'" [ibid. 151]. One of the pensées encapsulates a schizoid defence against the intrusions of reality: "Les faits ne sont rien, ils n'existent pas, il ne subsiste de nous que des idées." [ibid. 148].

Far from being a heaven, the inner world of Lenz is shown as a place of alternating exaltation and torment subsiding into a bleak emptiness as he moves from agitation to autism: "So lebte er hin."

Both the realism of Balzac's description and the acuteness of his insight into Lambert's inner state is shown by comparison with the psychiatrist Bleuler's description of autistic patients dating from 1911: "They do not react any more to influences from the outside. They appear 'stuporous' even where no other disturbance inhibits their will or actions. The external world must often appear hostile to them since it tends to disturb them in their fantasies... The apathy toward the outer world is then a secondary one springing from a hypertrophied sensitivity" [Bleuler 65].
Summary

To summarise, Hoffmann may be said to be using madness as a metaphor. There is a sense of it representing a defence against a harsh world, as the writer's study is a defence against the storm. Since it is a metaphor, it is not to be expected that it will be portrayed like "real" madness, and indeed Heinrich's state does not correspond to any recognisable psychiatric illness. Both Balzac and Büchner give a realistic picture of psychotic behaviour, Balzac of an autistic type of schizophrenia, Büchner of an agitated schizophrenia, declining into autism. Neither is concerned with madness simply as metaphor, though of course it has a universal significance in both.

The thought processes of Hoffmann's madman are sketchily and conventionally depicted; in Balzac they are shown as inspirational: only in Büchner are the delusional ideas and the chaotic emotional state of the psychotic convincingly displayed. In Der Kampf der Sänger, inner conflict is conveyed in highly symbolic terms; in Louis Lambert, insanity is the product of conflict between spirituality and sensuality. Büchner's achievement in Lenz is to show psychosis arising from a combination of intra-psychic and inter-personal conflict.

Both Hoffmann and Balzac reflect contemporary psychiatric thinking. The parallels between Hoffmann and Windischmann
have already been commented on, and Hoffmann was clearly familiar with the ideas of J.C. Reil. Balzac has Lambert treated (unsuccessfully) by Esquirol and, in allocating to excessive attachment to study and spirituality the reason for the onset of the illness, he was following theories of causation that had been around for many centuries, and which survived into the nineteenth century. Too much intellectual activity, according to Reil, raises the temperature of the brain, thereby depriving the body of its vegetative strength and weakening the resistance of the soul. [Reil 1805 111].

By contrast, Büchner, although he closely followed his (non-psychiatric) source in the description of Lenz's psychotic behaviour, was breaking completely new ground in his interpretation both of the causes of psychosis, and of the sufferer's inner world, and was anticipating the future evolution of psychiatric thinking in these matters.
Chapter Nine - Oberlin and Büchner

It is probable that, in writing Lenz, Büchner drew on a number of sources [Knapp 141-143], and we have examined a number of Lenz's letters that he almost certainly knew of. However the main resource utilized by Büchner, to the extent of the verbatim transcription of whole sentences, is undoubtedly the *Aufzeichnungen* written by J.F. Oberlin, in which is recorded the course of events following Lenz's arrival at the parsonage in Waldersbach.

The essence of Büchner's creative reworking of his sources has been encapsulated as: "Überliefertes in Wortlaut zu achten, Dokumentarisches in die Dichtung einzubauen ....die Verwandlung des Protokolls ins Seelen-Seismogram" [Hinck 209]. Comparison of the two versions, of Büchner with Oberlin, reveals the depth and subtlety with which this has been achieved. The very fact that the *Novelle* has come to us in a form that retains whole passages of Oberlin's account renders more significant the omissions, additions and alterations made by Büchner to his source.

The most obvious of these changes relates to Büchner's exploration of Lenz's inner world of thought and phantasy: "Er läßt innerseelische Phänomene aufleuchten, von denen Oberlin nichts weiß." [Irle 76]. In Oberlin, we can infer Lenz's state of mind only from his reported speech. Equally clear is the total omission of any reference to Friederike
Brion in Büchner's narrative, and the relative stress, compared with Oberlin, on the importance of the summons from Lenz's father. As well as being the most obvious, these are the most significant changes, and they will be the subject of closer analysis, but the literary means used by Büchner are themselves of relevance to an understanding of the different perspectives of the two accounts.

Pütz argues that Oberlin's account is less objective than might at first appear, and that he had possible motives in publishing his account other than that of contributing to psychological knowledge. He may have had the polemical intention of giving an awful warning against lasciviousness, or wished to justify his own management of the poet. Oberlin is held to be following a literary tradition, his presentation more self-conscious than its apparent simplicity might suggest: "Alle diese einzelnen Züge sind längst literarisch geprägt, und so bedient sich auch der Krankheitsbericht des Pfarrers erprobter Modelle; selbst die vorgegebene Anspruchlosigkeit ist stilisiert." [Pütz 4]. It is not a case of Oberlin simply presenting the facts in terms of recorded speech and observable behaviour whereas Büchner is free to ascribe feelings and motives and to invent conversations. The terms in which behaviour is reported reveal something of the pastor's attitudes. Thus Büchner neutrally describes Lenz's self-immersion in the fountain:
"Er stürzte sich in den Brunnenstein... er patschte darin"
[SWB I 81]; whereas Oberlin's account is comical and demeaning: "plattscherte darin wie eine Ente..." [ibid. 440].* Conversely, where Oberlin's account of an episode is straightforward, Büchner's variant is laden with meaning. In Lenz's first peaceful contacts with Oberlin's family, there is a significant variation by Büchner on the description in the Aufzeichnungen. Oberlin writes: "...er zeichnete uns verschiedene Kleidungen der Russen und Liefländer vor."
[ibid. 438]. In the Novelle this becomes: "Er fing an zu erzählen von seiner Heimat; er zeichnete allerlei Trachten." [ibid. 81]. This latter version not only carries much more emotional weight but, in the light of his later panic at the idea of returning home, begins to provide an indication of the psychodynamics of Lenz's madness, his ambivalent feelings about home, an ambivalence repeated in his relationship with Oberlin. His bizarre wish, "die Erde hinter dem Ofen setzen" [ibid. 79], becomes intelligible as a hope that he might bring his chaotic world to the safety and warmth of Oberlin's hearth.

Minor shifts of emphasis show how Büchner is able to identify with Lenz's emotions. Oberlin's: "Herr K. ... lud mich freundschaftlich ein, mit ihm zu seiner Hochzeit in die

*Not only is Lenz compared to a duck, but the verb "plattschern" [= platschern] has the connotation of "babbling on meaninglessly"
Schweiz zu gehen" [ibid. 452], becomes in Büchner: "Er
beredete Oberlin mit ihm in die Schweiz zu gehen" [ibid. 89].
Oberlin shows no recognition that his accepting the
invitation will have any effect upon Lenz, whereas Büchner
states the transaction as it might have been regarded from
the perspective of Lenz; immediately Lenz’s peace of mind is
threatened: "Lenz fiel das aufs Herz..." [ibid. 89, Pütz 12-
13].

Pütz remarks that: "... Büchner sich im zweiten Teil der
Erzählung häufiger und enger an die Vorlage hält" (i.e. to
Oberlin’s account) [Pütz 17]. Was Büchner running out of
inventiveness? Or out of time? Or was this simply, as Pütz
suggests, reflecting the constriction of Lenz’s inner world,
leaving Büchner with less to discover? Rather than any of
these, there is on the contrary in this section an ever
deepening exploration of Lenz’s phantasies: "...dachte er an
eine fremde Person, oder stellte er sie lebhaft vor, so
war es ihm, als würde er sie selbst, er verwirrte sich ganz
und dabei hatte er einen unendlichen Trieb, mit Allem um ihn
im Geist willkürlich umzugehen; die Natur, Menschen, nur
Oberlin ausgenommen, Alles traumartig, kalt." [SWB I 98].

Parker draws attention to Büchner’s use of verse to mark
critical stages in Lenz’s deterioration. The hymn sung by the
congregation, which ends "Leiden sei mein Gottesdienst",
representing an active seeking out of suffering in order
thereby to serve God, highlights for Lenz the whole question of human suffering and of a God who allows it, a motif that will recur throughout the *Novelle*. The song of the maid-servant:

Auf dieser Welt hab ich kein Freud
Ich hab mein Schatz, und der ist weit  [ibid. 92]

is related by Lenz to his own isolation and suffering. The third piece of verse is quoted by Lenz himself, in response to Oberlin's advice to turn to God. It is advice that Lenz cannot take because he cannot bear God's blinding light:

0 Gott in deines Lichtes Welle,
In Deines glüh'nden Mittags Helle
Sind meine Augen wund gemacht.
Wird es denn niemals wieder Nacht.  [ibid. 96].

The very existence of God pains him; not only is he separated from God, but the gulf between him and Oberlin is complete [Parker 104].

A further area of difference between Büchner and his source lies in the almost total absence of natural description in Oberlin, whereas the *Novelle* frequently counterpoints the weather and the landscape against Lenz's moods. This is not, according to Parker, simply a poetic device. Many of those who surround Lenz are at peace with nature. Lenz has an (invented) conversation with Oberlin, in which he expresses the view that the simplest and purest individuals are in closest touch with natural forces. Lenz has lost this capacity. [ibid. 105-107]
The literary devices we have considered mark differences in perspective between Büchner's view of Lenz and that of Oberlin. The most substantial differences, however, relate to:

1. The varying emphases given to the events of the narrative.
2. The extent to which Lenz's inner world is understood and conveyed.
3. The importance attached to the relationship between Lenz and Oberlin.
4. The importance attached to interactions between Lenz and the other inhabitants of the Steintal.
5. Views as to the causation of Lenz's madness.

1. Büchner's narrative follows closely the outline of events described by Oberlin with, however, the notable exception of the episode of attempted self-immolation with the knife, which in Oberlin's version is the critical factor in the decision to commit Lenz to care in Straßburg. It may be that this omission is simply an artefact caused by the gap which is thought to occur in Büchner's text at about this point. In the event however, the effect is to underline the greater emphasis in the Novelle on Lenz's inner disintegration.

Whereas Oberlin mentions only briefly Lenz's attempt to raise the dead child, Büchner makes it a major episode of the story and a key to Lenz's state of mind. The people in the house at Fouday seem indifferent to the death; Lenz identifies with
the loneliness and forsakenness of the dead girl. If he can be given the power to raise her, it will be a sign for Lenz of oneness with God, and failure is followed by the most terrible blasphemy. Parker shows how from this point, Lenz is portrayed as helpless in the grip of powerful forces. He does not seize on atheism, atheism seizes him. "Es faßte ihn eine namenlose Angst.... der Wahnsinn packte ihn.... nach einem Abgrund zu dem ihn eine unerbittliche Gewalt hinriß..." [SWB I 93-94]. Again and again, when Lenz acts, it is under some inner compulsion and Parker claims that Büchner thereby is casting doubt on Lenz's responsibility for his suffering, whereas Oberlin is firmly of the belief that Lenz has brought about his own madness by sinful acts and beliefs. [Parker 105]

A significant omission on Büchner's part is the absence of any reference by name to Friederike Brion, whereas Oberlin makes explicit, if speculative, connection between Lenz's deluded outcry: "Der Engel, sie liebte mich - ich liebte sie, sie war's würdig - o, der Engel! - Verfluchte Eifersucht! ich habe sie aufgeopfert..." [SWB I 462], and his later calling out in the courtyard of "einige Silben, die ich nicht verstand; seitdem ich weiß, daß seine geliebte Friedericke hiess, kommt es mir vor, als ob es dieser Name gewesen wäre..." [ibid. 464]. Irle suggests that Büchner wished to avoid the facile interpretation that Lenz's
psychosis was the result of unrequited love [Irle 77-78], though it is difficult to see that simply the omission of the beloved's name achieves this. What it does allow is an uncertainty about whether the feelings that are expressed are directed towards a lost love, or represent a childhood memory. These feelings form an integral part of his delusion, from his memories of a pre-psychotic peace which depended on her presence: "'wenn sie so durchs Zimmer ging, und so halb für sich allein sang, und jeder Tritt war eine Musik, es war so eine Glückseligkeit in ihr, und das strömte in mich über, ich war immer ruhig, wenn ich sie ansah...'" [SWB I 92], to his guilt about the woman's phantasized death: "'Ach sie ist tot! .... ich habe sie aufgeopfert...'"] [ibid. 94-95].

2. There can be no doubt that it is the focus on inner events that constitutes the main creative addition by Büchner to the Oberlin narrative. Pütz draws a distinction in this respect between Oberlin, the "Berichtstatter" and Büchner, the "Erzähler". The "Berichtstatter", does occasionally draw inferences as to Lenz's inner state, but these are superficial and only sketchily indicated as, when the poet gives his sermon "mit etwas zu vieler Erschrockenheit". The "Erzähler", on the other hand, tries to interpret the feelings underlying the manifest anxiety: e.g. "es war ihm als ob..." [Pütz 5]. For the most part, however, Oberlin indicates Lenz's state of mind only on rare occasions, and
then through Lenz's reported speech, the underlying meaning of which he makes no attempt to interpret.

Büchner by contrast conveys Lenz's thoughts and emotions in a number of ways. In the opening passage and throughout the text, the tumult of nature enters into, rather than reflects, Lenz's own tumultuous feelings, and periods of calm in nature tend to elicit episodes of calm in Lenz: "Ein Sonnenblick lag manchmal über dem Tal, die laue Luft regte sich langsam, die Landschaft schwamm in Duft, fernes Geläute, es war als löste sich alles in eine harmonische Welle auf.... Ein süßes Gefühl unendlichen Wohls beschlich ihn." [SWB I 84]. Throughout, his fantasies are reported directly without being expressed in speech, direct or indirect. "... ein heimliches Weinachtsgefühl beschlich ihn, er meinte manchmal seine Mutter müsse hinter einem Baum hervortreten..." [ibid. 83] and "... es war ihm, als könne er eine ungeheure Faust hinauf in den Himmel ballen und Gott herbei reißen..." [ibid. 93]. Although Büchner adheres to third person narration, there are instances where with verbs omitted, the boundaries between third and first person become blurred: "Er verzweifelte an sich selbst, dann warf er sich nieder, er rang die Hände, er rührte Alles in sich auf; aber todt! todt!" [ibid. 93].

Further evidence of Büchner's focussing on the inner events leading to Lenz's breakdown occur in instances of direct or
indirect speech appearing in the Büchner, but not the Oberlin, version. These recur throughout the *Novelle*, and provide telling instances of Lenz's psychopathology as Büchner understood it: "Es ist mir dabei oft, als fühlt'ich physischen Schmerz, da in der linken Seite, im Arm, womit ich sie sonst faßte" [ibid. 92], and: "... hören Sie nicht die entsetzliche Stimme, die um den ganzen Horizont schreit, und die man gewöhnlich die Stille heißt." [ibid. 100].

Irle and Payk, both psychiatrists, comment on the objectivity of Büchner's style in *Lenz*. It is "in kühlem und distanziertem Stil geschrieben" [Payk 105], and "in einer distanzierten, kühlen 'wissenschaftlichen' Weise geschrieben" [Irle 75]. One page later, Irle is quoting the passage: "Das Biegen seines Fusses tönte wie Donner unter ihm, er mußte sich niedersetzen. Es faßte ihn eine namenlose Angst in diesem Nichts: er war im Leeren!" Hardly cool or scientific! Distance and objectivity are only part of the story. Whereas Oberlin maintains a single perspective, that of a not always objective observer, Büchner's central dynamism consists in the changes in perspective, often quite rapid, whereby he moves between third person narration and interior monologue, providing a link between reality and Lenz's inner world: "We thus read simultaneously in two ways: on the one hand, we are ourselves, seeing Lenz both through the narrator's eyes and our own; on the other hand, we are Lenz, seeing himself
bewilderingly at once from the outside and the inside. As a result, we are acutely conscious of the reality of Lenz's mental distress, and of our own distance from it." [Adey 55]

Adey cites Werther where Goethe uses the device of an editor; both author and editor offer an alternative stance to that of Werther himself, whereas Büchner achieves the same end by varying his narrative perspective. "Moreover the endings of the two works point to a much more radical attitude towards perceptual breakdown on Büchner's part, for whereas Goethe's editor sustains the fiction of coherence when Werther himself is no longer able to do so, Büchner emphasizes that in Lenz's world, narrative is no longer possible - for Lenz at least, the rest is silence." [ibid. 66-67].

Perspective is again involved in perhaps the most striking of all the ways in which Büchner depicts Lenz's state of mind, that whereby he manages to suggest the fragility of the poet's sense of identity. The scene in the pastor's kitchen soon after the newcomer's arrival is at first described as Lenz, the outsider, would have seen it: "... das heimliche Zimmer und die stillen Gesichter, die aus dem Schatten hervortraten, das helle Kindergesicht, auf dem alles Licht zu ruhen schien und das neugierig, vertraulich aufschaute, bis zur Mutter, die hinten im Schatten engelgleich stille saß...". There is then a shift of focus on to the person of
Lenz: "... er war gleich zu Haus, sein blasses Kindergesicht, das jetzt lächelte..." [SWB I 81]. This is more than just, as is suggested by Pongs: "...das Idyll eines friedvollen, biederfrommen Pfarrhauses" [Pongs 139]. The passage not only demonstrates the child-like element in Lenz, but also suggests that Lenz has begun to feel safe because he feels like the child protected by the angelic presence of the mother in the background. Such weakening of ego boundaries is characteristic of the schizoid personality and of incipient schizophrenic breakdown.

3. The importance attached by Büchner to the interactions between Oberlin and Lenz will be examined in the section on psychodynamics. It will be sufficient here to note that Oberlin seems to be little aware that the nature of their relationship might be significant for the course of Lenz's illness. More importantly, he has little insight into the ambivalent nature of his own reactions to Lenz, on the one hand loving and caring, on the other disapproving and slightly contemptuous. The passage has already been cited where Oberlin compares Lenz in the fountain to a duck. Something of disapproval is apparent from their first exchange: "'Der Name, wenn's beliebt?' - 'Lenz' - 'Ha, ha, ist er nicht gedruckt?'". Oberlin's laugh seems to indicate that he has little admiration for what it is that has been printed.
To comment that Oberlin does not seem aware of the importance of such issues is not to criticise him. Questions of transference and countertransference between patient and therapist did not become an issue until Freud and his successors demonstrated their importance. The point is that Büchner, in contrast to Oberlin, did seem to have some understanding of them.

4. In Oberlin's account, the villagers of Waldersbach are mentioned only insofar as they impinge on the course of events, the maidservants who are frightened by Lenz's behaviour and have to be reassured, the men who have to be summoned to keep watch on Lenz, and then to conduct him to Straßburg. There is no mention, for instance, of the inhabitants of Fouday, and of their reactions to the death of the child there or to Lenz's attempts to revive her.

In Büchner, the villagers form an important part of Lenz's environment. On the day after his arrival in Waldersbach he goes out with Oberlin to meet them: "In den Hütten war es lebendig, man drängte sich um Oberlin, er wies zurecht, gab rat, tröstete; überall zutrauensvolle Blicke, Gebet." This passage establishes in Lenz's eyes, and in ours, the villagers as childlike and dependent, Oberlin as powerful and benevolent. The child part of Lenz may be said to identify with the villagers and to wish Oberlin to be a powerful and benevolent figure for him. The next sentence increases the
sense of identification between villagers and poet: "Die Leute erzählten Träume, Ahnungen." Pütz comments that the inhabitants of Steintal "stehen nicht nur im Kontrast zum Zustand des Kranken......, sondern ihre Träume, ihr Somnambulismus und ihre Vorstellungen von Erfaßwerden und Außer-sich-sein sind der Art Lenzens nicht fremd..... 'Traum' ist neben 'Schatten' das häufigste Substantiv, das ebenso bei der Darstellung von Lenzens Zuständen immer wiederkehrt." [Pütz 6-7].

Oberlin's parishioners, with the passive acceptance of their lot implicit in "Leiden sei all mein Gewinst", also become a focus for Lenz's desperate confrontation with the problem of suffering. Kobel stresses that Büchner is breaking new ground [Kobel 153] in recognising that the misery of Oberlin's parishioners has its base in poverty. Lenz aspires to lead them into "das göttliche", but Büchner's detachment allows us to see that this is part of Lenz's madness. Not content with trying to emulate Oberlin's quiet but dedicated strivings on behalf of his flock, he has to rival Christ, become God-like in himself, and try to raise the child Friederike from the dead. Failure leads Lenz into blasphemy, what Kobel [Kobel 155] calls "der Umschlag des Glaubens in Unglauben."

5. Oberlin's notes indicate that he is quite clear as to the cause of Lenz's madness: disobedience to his father, his rootless life, attachment to immoral literature and his
sexual promiscuity. To this extent he rejects Lenz and his inner world, and it is this rejection that in the end destroys his capacity to save the poet. Büchner avoids facile and judgemental formulations, and seeks significance both in Lenz's inner world and in the complexities of his relation to the outer world. This aspect will be considered in more detail in the section on psychodynamics.

This review of the differences between Oberlin's record and the Novelle has shown how Büchner has both deepened our understanding of Lenz's madness by exploring the poet's inner world, and at the same time made us aware of the network of relationships within which this madness has developed.

We must now move to a detailed study of how, in the Novelle, that inner world is portrayed.
Chapter Ten - Psychopathology in *Lenz*

For Silz, *Lenz* is a "marvellous study in mental deterioration, far in advance of its times. Had it been completed, it would probably have been one of the great psychological Novellen of the century." [Silz 166 footnote]. If this is damning with faint praise, at least attention is drawn to its value in purely psychological terms. Irle, noting that it was not until 1896 that Kraepelin gave the first coherent medical account of schizophrenic illness, pays Büchner the compliment of surmising that, if *Lenz* had been more widely known, the illness would have been recognized by psychiatrists much sooner. He also uses the completeness of Büchner's portrayal as evidence that the disease picture of schizophrenia had not changed with the change in social and cultural circumstances between Büchner's time and his own [Irle 82-83].

If psychiatry neglected *Lenz* in the later nineteenth century, then at least by the 1920's the *Novelle* and its subject received due attention. Weichbrodt, though he does not mention Büchner, concludes in his *Pathographie* that J.M.R. Lenz was suffering from a *Katatonie* [Weichbrodt 153-187]. This comment refers to the historical Lenz, but it could equally be held that Lenz, in Büchner's portrayal, is suffering from catatonia. The characteristics of this condition are described by Kraepelin: "... I may group together as catatonic forms of *dementia praecox* those cases
in which the conjunction of peculiar excitement with catatonic stupor dominates the clinical picture." [Kraepelin 133]. This conjunction is certainly found both in the Oberlin account and in Büchner's narrative, but it is Büchner who enters into the inner state of this succession of exaltation and despair. The climax of excitement occurs with the failure to bring the dead child back to life and is succeeded by the beginnings of catatonic stupor: "Am folgenden Tag befiehl ihn ein großes Grauen vor seinem geistigen Zustand, er stand nun am Abgrund..." [SWB I 94]. "Am folgenden Morgen kam Lenz lange nicht. Endlich ging Oberlin hinauf in sein Zimmer, er lag im Bett ruhig und unbeweglich. Oberlin musste lange fragen, ehe er Antwort bekam..." [ibid. 95].

At this point, however, Büchner departs from the Kraepelin depiction of terminal catatonia. Stupor implies intellectual and emotional emptiness. Only in externals, is Lenz shown to be stuporose. Though in a despair beyond even suicidal recourse, and losing hold on a sense of what is real, his mind is shown to be both agitated and seeking to understand the sources of his agitation: "Sehen Sie, jetzt kommt mir doch was ein, wenn ich nur unterscheiden könnte, ob ich träume oder wache: sehen Sie das ist sehr wichtig, wir wollen es untersuchen." [ibid. 96]. The end point for Lenz in the Novelle is a kind of inversion of this state, all the appearances of normality, but with an abandonment of both
hope and struggle: "Er schien ganz vernünftig, sprach mit den Leuten; er tat Alles wie die Andern taten, es war aber eine entsetzliche Leere in ihm, er fühlte keine Angst mehr, kein Verlangen; sein Dasein war ihm eine notwendige Last. - So lebte er hin." [ibid. 101]. Here again, Büchner is at variance with Kraepelin, for whom the last stages of catatonic stupor are inevitably characterized by the demented behaviour evident in the photographs of his patients [Kraepelin 38-41, 143 and 146-147].

W. Mayer, a psychiatrist, recognises the depth and accuracy of Büchner's understanding: "Wie er (Lenz) dann aus allen Qualen heraus abrupter, merkwürdiger in seinen Äußerungen wird, und uns schließlich das uns bekannte Bild schizophrener Dissoziation bietet, ist vom Dichter mit einer so unerhörten Einfühlungsfähigkeit geschrieben..." [Mayer, W. 890]. Irle sets this achievement against the conventional wisdom of the psychiatry of Büchner's time: "Die Geschlossenheit des Bildes einer Schizophrenie, die Genauigkeit der Phänomene, die ganze Schilderung, die den Morbus als Krankheitsein plastisch hervortreten läßt, will heute möglicherweise nicht mehr sehr erstaunen, nachdem uns die Symptomatik dessen, was wir als Schizophrenie bezeichnen, seit Kraepelin und E. Bleuler geläufig ist. Bedenkt man aber, wie tastend die Psychiatrie zur Zeit Büchners Krankheitsbilder kategorisieren konnte, so wird es evident, in welch klassischer Weise Büchner die Phänomene zu einem Ganzen vereint hat." [Irle 75].
Clinical features of schizophrenia present in Büchner's portrayal, on which Irle particularly remarks are: "Ich-schwäche" - Irle demonstrates how tellingly the loss of ego-boundaries is portrayed, together with the dream-like nature of Lenz's experience of the world, and the unreality of his personal relationships. He quotes from Büchner's text: "Dachte er an eine fremde Person, oder stellte er sie sich lebhaft vor, so war es ihm, als wurde er sie selbst; er verwirrte sich ganz und dabei hatte er einen unendlichen Trieb, mit allem um ihn im Geiste willkürlich umzugehen...." [Irle 81]. (Kanzog, too, points to how the inner and outer world become confused [Kanzog 188]: "... Augen und Mund weit offen, er meinte er müsse den Sturm in sich ziehen. Alles in sich fassen... oder er stand still und legte das Haupt in's Moos und schloß die Augen halb, und dann zog es weit von ihm, die Erde wich unter ihm, sie wurde klein wie ein wandelnder Stern...".) The lack of a sense of boundaries extends to Nature itself, and feelings of omnipotence that he can engulf the world are quickly succeeded by passivity and a sense of distance and alienation.

"Spaltungstendenzen" - Splitting in schizophrenia is twofold, a dissociation of thought and affect, and a dissociation of consciousness from action: "Eigentlich nicht er selbst tat es, sondern ein mächtiger Erhaltungstrieb; es
war, als sei er doppelt, und der eine Teil suche den andern zu retten und riefe sich selbst zu..." Irle comments on the convincing accuracy of Büchner's observation [Irle 81].

Portrayal of the inner world - Just as in the description of schizophrenic behaviour and utterance, Irle finds that the inner world is portrayed with coherence and consistency and with an insight not surpassed in psychiatric writings. Yet there remains "... ein Rest, eine Dunkelheit, in der LENZ auch von Büchner allein gelassen werden muß." [ibid. 76 and 81]. Büchner's achievement, according to Irle, is not merely to have given a convincing portrayal, but to have made schizophrenic experience intelligible: "Am Ende der BUCHNERschen Novelle ist man geneigt, die These von der grundsätzlichen Uneinfühlbarkeit schizophrenen Erlebens zu bezweifeln. Nicht deswegen, weil Motivationen aufgeheilt worden wären, weil angstvolles und abstruses Erleben auf seine Wurzeln zurückgeführt worden wäre... sondern einzig deswegen, weil durch die Sprache und Form der Aussage eine innere Verfassung, ein Fremdheitserlebnis und ein Erlebnis des Nichtmehrbewältigenkônnens mit dem daraus resultierenden Vernichtungsgefühl und Ausgehöhltsein zugleich so dargestellt wird, daß es dem Leser, und nicht nur dem psychiatrischen, dann evident wird." [ibid. 82]
Payk lists the classical symptoms of schizophrenia to be found in Lenz: "Ichstörungen, Halluzinationen, Wahn, Denk- und Affektstörungen, Angst- und Zwangsimpulse, ferner Katatonismen, Grimassieren, Getriebenheit und Suizidalität." [Payk 105]. To these might be added passivity, feelings of unreality and dissociation. Payk does not give detailed examples of these symptoms as they occur in the text of the Novelle, but the following excerpts exemplify the features he lists:

Ichstörungen: "... dachte er an eine fremde Person... so war es ihm, als würde er sie selbst..." [SWB I 98].

Halluzinationen: "... ein heimliches Weihnachtsgefühl beschlich ihn, er meinte manchmal seine Mutter müsse hinter einem Baum hervortreten, groß, und ihm sagen, sie hätte ihm Alles besichert... es wurde ihm, als hätte ihn was an der Stirn berührt, das Wesen sprach ihn an." [ibid. 83]

Wahn: "... er amusierte sich, die Häuser auf die Dächer zu stellen, die Menschen an und auszukleiden, die wahnwitzigsten Possen auszusinnen." [ibid. 98]

Denkstörungen: "Liebster Herr Pfarrer, das Frauenzimmer, wovon ich Ihnen sagte, ist gestorben, ja gestorben, der Engel.' - 'Woher wissen Sie das?' - 'Hieroglyphen, Hieroglyphen ... ja gestorben - Hieroglyphen.'" [ibid. 97]. (This closely follows Oberlin's account of the same episode.)
Affektstörungen: "... und erhob sich kalt und gleichgültig, seine Tränen waren ihm dann wie Eis, er mußte lachen." [ibid. 91]

Angstimpulse: "Es war ihm dann, als existiere er allein, als bestünde die Welt nur in seiner Einbildung, als sei nichts als er, er sei das ewig Verdammte, der Satan; allein mit seinen folternden Vorstellungen. Er jagte mit rasender Schnelligkeit sein Leben durch .... es war die Kluft unrettbaren Wahnsinns, eines Wahnsinns durch die Ewigkeit." [ibid. 99]

Zwangsimpulse: "Manchmal fühlte er einen unwiderstehlichen Drang, das Ding, das er gerade im Sinne hatte, auszuführen..." [ibid. 98]

Katatonismen: The whole course of Lenz's disintegration can be held to illustrate catatonic illness, but the following passage describes the autistic void which is its end-point: "... es war aber eine entsetzliche Leere in ihm, er fühlte keine Angst mehr, kein Verlangen; sein Dasein war ihm eine notwendige Last." [ibid. 101]

Grimassieren: "... und dann schnitt er entsetzliche Fratzen." [ibid. 98]

Getriebenheit: "... manche Gedanken, mächtige Gefühle wurde er nur mit der größten Angst los, da trieb es ihn wieder mit unendlicher Gewalt darauf, er zitterte..." [ibid. 89]

Suizidalität: Büchner specifically denies suicidal intent in
Lenz, but there are a number of episodes of self-injury, which might have been fatal: "Die halben Versuche zum Entleiben, die er indes fortwährend machte, waren nicht ganz Ernst, es war weniger der Wunsch des Todes, für ihn war ja keine Ruhe und Hoffnung im Tod: es war mehr ... ein Versuch, sich zu sich selbst zu bringen durch physischen Schmerz." [ibid. 99-100]

Passivity: "Es war ihm einerlei, wohin man ihn führte.... er war vollkommen gleichgültig." [ibid. 100-101]

Feelings of unreality: "... der rettungslose Gedanke, als sei Alles nur sein Traum..." [ibid. 82]

Dissociation (the splitting of thought and affect): "Den folgenden Morgen kam er mit vergnügter Miene auf Oberlins Zimmer. Nachdem sie Verschiedenes gesprochen hatten, sagte er mit ausnehmender Freundlichkeit: 'Liebster Herr Pfarrer, das Frauenzimmer, wovon ich Ihnen sagte, ist gestorben, ja gestorben, der Engel.'" [ibid. 97] (This passage appears almost word for word in Oberlin [ibid. 468-469].)

It is significant that of the above list, only two of the items are drawn from Oberlin's account.

Often, a number of these symptoms occur together, or in rapid succession: "... eine unnennbare Angst erfaßte ihn, er lief durchs Zimmer, die Treppe hinunter, vor's Haus; aber umsonst, Alles finster, nichts, er war sich selbst ein Traum, einzelne Gedanken huschten auf, er hielt sie fest, es war ihm, als
müsste er immer >Vater unser< sagen; er konnte sich nicht mehr finden, ein dunkler Instinkt trieb ihn, sich zu retten...."

[ibid. 81] in which anxiety, feelings of unreality, compulsive thoughts and a sense of being driven crowd upon one another.

A feature of *dementia praecox*, particularly in its catatonic form, described by Kraepelin is the holding of exalted ideas [Kraepelin 29-30 and 135], commonly, as illustrated in the final scene of Hogarth's *The Rake's Progress*, the idea that one is of exalted rank. Lenz does not demonstrate this, but his attempt to raise the dead child, may be seen as an expression of exaltation in an identification with God himself. Kraepelin's account of catatonic excitement contains many features that are paralleled by episodes in Lenz: "The patients become restless, sleepless, run about, carry on absurd conversations; their actions are impulsive and aimless, and they fall more or less rapidly into severe excitement: sometimes raving mania may break out quite suddenly, even in the middle of the night .... here and there religious ecstasy is observed." [Kraepelin 136]. These are terms which a scientific observer might apply to Lenz, to "sein Winseln, mit hohler, fürchterlicher, verzweifelnder Stimme" in the night, to his dash through the yard, his shouting aloud, his immersion in the water of the trough [SWB I 95], his "konsequent, konsequent ... inkonsequent,
inkonsequent” [ibid. 99], his compulsive praying, his exaltation and the ensuing blasphemy. But whereas for Kraepelin such manifestations are "impulsive and aimless", Büchner allows us to see meaning in the mad behavior.

The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Third Edition) of 1980 [Swinson 93] lists six symptom groups characteristic of active schizophrenia, of which Lenz as portrayed by Büchner exhibits at least three, namely: "Somatic, grandiose, religious or nihilistic delusions", "Repeated auditory hallucinations, more than a few words, not related to elation or depression", "Incoherence, loosening of associations, illogical thinking, or poverty of thought, with a.) Blunted, flat or inappropriate affect, b.) Delusions or hallucinations c.) Catatonic or grossly disorganized behavior". The presence of only one is sufficient for the diagnosis of schizophrenia to be considered, when associated with at least two of the group of "prodromal" symptoms, of which Lenz manifests five, namely: "Marked impairment in role functioning", "Markedly peculiar behavior", "Digressive, vague, overelaborate, circumstantial or metaphorical speech", "Odd or bizarre ideas, magical thinking, overvalued ideas, or ideas of reference", and "Unusual perceptual experiences". It seems then likely that Lenz would have been diagnosed as schizophrenic according to these criteria.
If the foregoing suggests that Büchner had a check-list of symptoms that he was determined to illustrate in a case history, we must remember that the check-list is an artefact of twentieth century psychiatry. Büchner had no such list, he was not describing a psychiatric illness but a suffering human being. What is remarkable is that no-one, psychiatrist or layman, had ever described suffering in exactly those terms before, and that the pattern of that kind of suffering has not changed in the intervening years.

It is appropriate here to examine the quality of Lenz's delusions as described by Büchner. A delusion is a false belief, false that is in respect of the cultural norms of a given society. The norms of the pietistic community into which Lenz has introduced himself are described by Karl Bart: "...die pietistische Ethik trage - im Gegensatz zur altlutheristischen und altcalvinistischen - das Kennzeichen der Forderung außerordentlichen Taten und Lebensgewohnheiten; sie empfehle wieder allerlei Übungen äußerer und innerer Askese zur Erlangen höherer Vollkommensheitgrade...." In Lenz, shared pietistic delusion is at its most intense in the remoter valleys: "Die Bewohner des Steintals leben in einer Atmosphäre religiöser Erregung und Ekstase; die mystische Erlebnisfreudigkeit Oberlins wird durch das tätifromme Leben des Seelsorgers noch gezügelt, aber die Menschen in den

\* in Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert, ihre Vorgeschichte und ihre Geschichte cited in Kobel 167
entlegenen, düsteren Hütten haben sich vom Rationalen weit entfernt. In Träumen und Ahnungen suchen sie Sinn und Zeichen." [Pütz 6-7].

The intense spirituality manifested in different ways by Oberlin and his parishioners expresses itself in ideas which might be thought to be delusional, and yet they are not mad. Oberlin recounts the feeling of the physical presence of an unseen power and owns that he too has heard voices: "Wie Oberlin ihm erzählte, wie ihn eine unsichtbare Hand auf der Brücke gehalten hatte, .... wie er eine Stimme gehört hatte, wie es in der Nacht mit ihm gesprochen...." [SWB I 83]. And again: "Oberlin versetzte ihm nun, wie er bei dem Tod seines Vaters allein auf dem Felde gewesen sei, und er dann eine Stimme gehört habe, so daß er wußte, daß sein Vater tot sei, und wie er heimgekommen, sei es so gewesen." [ibid. 85].

The people in the mountains deal in supernatural powers: "Oberlin sprach .... von Mädchen, die das Wasser und Metall unter der Erde fühlten, von Männern, die auf manchen Berghöhen angefaßt wurden und mit einem Geiste rängen." [ibid. 85]. Indeed, Oberlin's view is seen to be much more simplistic than that of Lenz. For, as Lenz develops a mystical and animistic interpretation whereby such simple spirits were in touch with the vital forces of nature, with stones, metals, water and plants possessed of souls, Oberlin simply
accepts the phenomena as they are: "Oberlin brach es ab, es führte ihn zu weit von seiner einfachen Art ab." [ibid. 86].

Lenz makes a visit to a hut in the mountains where an old woman croaks out songs, while a motionless girl soundlessly moves her lips. A man comes in "lang und hager ... mit unruhigem verwirrtem Gesicht". He goes up to the girl who is startled and becomes restless. "Er erzählte, wie er eine Stimme im Gebirge gehört, und dann über den Tälern ein Wetterleuchten gesehen habe, auch habe es ihn angefaßt und er habe damit gerungen wie Jakob. Er warf sich nieder und betete leise mit Inbrunst, während die Kranke in einem langsam ziehenden, leise verhallenden Ton sang." [ibid. 90]. If this seems at first like a visit to a madhouse, such behaviour is not, in this place and time, seen as strange. Büchner uses the scene as at once a counterpoint to and variation on Lenz's own state of mind. Lenz learns that this strange character has the reputation of a holy man and that people make pilgrimages to visit him. It is after this visit that Lenz's torment becomes more acute, with "Gebet und fiebere- haften Träume", and his own delusions more powerful.

Against this background, Lenz's smearing himself with ashes and trying to raise the dead seems less rooted in delusion than when seen from the viewpoint of *Sturm und Drang* which had nurtured Lenz, from that of Büchner writing in the 1830's, or indeed from our own. Oberlin's own comment on the
attempt to raise the dead child sounds to us strangely matter-of-fact: "Ich erfuhr ferner, daß Herr L.... ... ein zu Fouday so eben verstorbenes Kind, das Friedericke hieß, aufwecken wollte, welches ihm aber fehlgeschlagen" [ibid. 458], as if it might equally well have turned out otherwise. For Oberlin, the consequent blasphemy would seem not only the greater sin, but the greater delusion.

Essential to the concept of a pathological delusion is the strength with which it is held, and the appropriateness of the specific setting. (Thus to "speak with tongues" in a fundamentalist religious service might not be held to represent pathological delusion; but could well be so if the process were to continue after the service was over.) In terms of psychopathology, Oberlin's belief that he has heard voices has a different connotation from that held by Lenz, in that it is not held with the same intensity, and is not central to the way he conducts his life.

Here Büchner seems to be making the point that Lenz's mad thoughts and feelings do not in themselves constitute the source of his torment, since both Oberlin's pietistic delusions and the more extreme ecstasies of the mountain dwellers are compatible with some kind of equilibrium and survival, even with status in society. Lenz's sanity does not survive, because he cannot come to terms with the acceptance of suffering which acceptance of such religiosity demands. It
may be noted here that, for the only time in the *Novelle*, Büchner introduces in this context a technical term derived from contemporary psychiatry: "Am dritten Hornung hörte er, ein Kind in Fouday sei gestorben, .... er faßte es auf, wie eine fixe Idee." [ibid. 93].

From the foregoing, it is clear that Büchner's portrayal of Lenz provides a detailed picture of a state of mind which has since been designated as an illness called initially *dementia praecox* and later *schizophrenia*. Perhaps the most telling passage of the *Novelle* has not yet here been commented on: "Alles traumartig, kalt; er amusierte sich, die Häuser auf die Dächer zu stellen, die Menschen an- und auszukleiden, die wahnwitzigsten Possen auszusinnen. Manchmal fühlte er einen unwiderstehlichen Drang das Ding, das er gerade im Sinne hatte, auszuführen, und dann schnitt er entsetzliche Fratzen." [ibid 98]. In these two sentences he encapsulates both schizophrenic mood and thought, both enters into Lenz's mind and observes his grimaces, while at the same time conveying the struggle that is going on behind the grimaces. Yet another dimension is hinted at in the deliberateness of "... schnitt er entsetzliche Fratzen" with the implication of rôle performance and the kind of caricature that Laing has postulated in much schizophrenic behaviour. It is perhaps the most remarkable passage in a truly remarkable work.
Chapter Eleven - Madness and Angst in Lenz

Existential interpretation and its limitations

Karl Viëtor, in an oration in 1937, the centenary of Büchner's death: "Was Lenz in der Wehrlosigkeit seines kranken Zustandes schrecklich gesteigert erfährt, ist im Grunde das Leiden am Leid der Welt, das die Quelle für Büchners metaphysische Schmerzen ist." [Viëtor 193]. This focus on the existential dimension of Lenz's madness in Büchner's Novelle is characteristic of much of the analysis to which the work has been subjected during the present century. Such interpretations centre on the concept of Angst and Abutille reviews its various definitions by Kierkegaard, Freud, Heidigger and Tillich. He applies the insights thus derived not only to the literary works, but also to the "gymnasiale Schriften" and to the political and scientific writings: all are seen together to constitute a coherent Weltbild. For Kierkegaard, Angst derives from original sin which comprises not only actual sin but the possibility of sin (Der Begriff der Angst 1844). Fear has a specific object whereas "die Angst die Wirklichkeit der Freiheit als Möglichkeit für die Möglichkeit ist." This corresponds to Freud's distinction between real and neurotic anxiety, the latter's object being "eine Gefahr, die wir nicht kennen". Freud emphasises the importance of Angst in the formation of the superego. Heidegger's somewhat obscure central concept is quoted as: "Das Wovor der Angst ist das In-der-Welt-sein als
”... die Angst ist der Zustand, in dem ein Sein seines möglichen Nichtseins gewahr wird. Das Gleiche in kürzerer Form hieße: Angst ist das existentielle Gewahrwerden des Nichtseins.” [Abutille 6-13].

A basic difficulty in relating this kind of thinking to the situations in which Büchner's characters find themselves is that the creator of these characters would almost certainly have denied the relevance of these ideas to his work. Whereas the plight of Woyzeck is shown in the play as the result of a kind of determinism, it is a determinism dependent on a given point of history and a given social structure. Büchner would surely have rejected the absolute determinism of Kierkegaard and Heidegger. A further objection is that analysis of this kind takes no account of the specific experience of the individual, an approach that would have been alien to Büchner the scientist. (Freud's methodology would perhaps have been more acceptable in that he was attempting to derive general laws from repeated observation, and to highlight adaptive function as a response to anxiety.) Indeed, the role of adaptive function is important in consid-
ering concepts of health as distinct from sickness, and it is the possibility of health that seems to be missing from the theologians' Weltbild. It is part of Büchner's greatness that, for all his preoccupation with Lenz's illness, he endows the poet with the capacity to see health in Oberlin, and to glimpse the possibility of sanity and salvation in learning to be like him and in living the kind of life he lives. That he cannot achieve this lies partly in Lenz's own history, which he cannot discard, partly in Oberlin's failure to be the kind of person Lenz has perceived him to be. Thus there is determinism in Büchner, but it is a historical and therefore specific and not an absolute determinism.

Abutille links Lenz's frightening experiences outside Waldersbach with the kind of excitement related to magic and magnetism which the Romantics had done so much to engender. He comments that, by locating such experiences in a remote spot, Büchner was distancing himself from such irrationality. It seems implausible that Büchner felt the need to distance himself in this way. It is much more likely that the placing of this episode away from Waldersbach was determined partly by the historical events on which he based the fictional account, partly by the artistic aim of contrasting the two types of religious experience to which Lenz was exposed, the calm pietistic acceptance of the villagers in Waldersbach, and the more frenzied transports in the mountains.
Fuchshuber seeks to establish contemporary relevance for *Lenz* by relating its theme to teenage suicide and drop-out, and the wish for alternative life-styles. In an analysis of Büchner's working of Oberlin's raw material, she notes that Büchner "stellt die Personen in besonderen Konstellationen zusammen, und weist ihnen damit bestimmte Funktionen zu." The clear chronology set out with dates by Oberlin is replaced for the most part by more vague settings in time: "eines Morgens", "ein andermal", "um diese Zeit". In Fuchshuber's view, this intensifies the focus on Lenz's inner state. [Fuchshuber 147]. With a similar effect, Büchner substitutes general descriptive topographical terms ("Gebirg", "Ebene", "Hohe", "Tal") for Oberlin's place names. The recurrent use of "so" in natural descriptions heightens the feeling that nature is being seen from Lenz's perspective: "... so dicht..., so trág, so plump"; "so still, grau, dämmernd"; "es war ihm alles so klein, so nahe, so naB". The use of "so" repeatedly in Lenz's reported thought emphasises the effect still further. [ibid. 147-148]

Thorn-Prikker notes in contemporary criticism a tendency to depoliticise much of Büchner, and especially *Lenz* [Thorn-Prikker 1981 181-182]. He himself sees the *Novelle* as just as much an expression of the "political" Büchner as the *Landbote* or *Dantons Tod* and views Lenz's illness as a political and sociological phenomenon. Thorn-Prikker follows
the generally accepted practice of dividing the text into three parts, before, during and after Oberlin's absence from Steinthal, and sees these as corresponding to three different attempts by Lenz to retain some integrity, through art, religion and illness. In the first part, the Kunstgespräch does not only represent an expression of Lenz's artistic aims but is seen as an exposition of his aims in life and of his frustration at not being able to achieve them: "Ich verlange in Allem - Leben, Möglichkeit des Daseins....". The second strand, religion, does not only entail the finding of inner peace, but represents to Lenz the opportunity to find a useful role in the world by giving comfort and easing suffering. This aim is frustrated however by the congregation's passive acceptance of suffering, expressed in the hymn as "Leiden sey all mein Gewinst/ Leiden sey mein Gottesdienst." From then on, in Thorn-Prikker's view, religion plays an increasingly destructive part in Lenz's interaction with the world, from his contact with the gloomy and superstitious piety in the hut in the woods that brings no comfort to those that live there, through his failure to bring back to life the dead girl, to his blasphemous rebellion in the storm on the mountain and his final rejection of God as uncaring: "... aber ich, wär' ich allmächtig ... ich könnte das Leiden nicht ertragen, ich würde retten, retten..." [Thorn-Prikker 1978 62-64].
Here, Thorn-Prikker's analysis is devoted to showing Lenz's Angst as politically determined. His desire to bring comfort to the suffering is doomed to failure, because such ends can only be achieved, in this view, by political action. We are led into a dialectical argument whereby Lenz's historically impossible attempt to negate suffering leads to a doubling of suffering. "Indem der Masochismus Lenz zwingt, die Gewalt der Verhältnisse zu verinnerlichen, d.h. gesellschaftliche Leiden an sich selbst im individuellen Leiden nachzuvollziehen, um nicht das Gefühl zu haben, er sei gefühllos, erträgt er die Wirklichkeit eben nicht gefühllos, sondern gefühlvoll. Das Resultat ist, daß seine Intention, Leiden zu bekämpfen,...nur erfüllt wird, insofern er selbst leidet." [ibid. 78] His illness appears "nicht so sehr als Krankheit im medizinischen Sinn, sondern als psychische Reaktion auf eine Wirklichkeit, die ihm keine Möglichkeit der Verwirklichung seiner Intention gibt." [ibid. 70].

A problem with this kind of analysis is that it takes too little account of the specific forms that Lenz's madness takes, from the "physischem Schmerz, da in der linken Seite, im Arm womit ich sie sonst faßte", to the delusion that he has killed both his mother and Friedericke. And it is at least as plausible to see in Lenz's repeated self-injury and request for scourging an attempt to expiate the guilt aroused by (or more probably underlying) these delusions, as it is to hypothesise a dialectically determined masochism.
A more persuasive, and simpler, statement of Lenz's existential position is found in Gundolf, writing as early as 1929: "Lenzens Leiden ist geradezu die Auflösung des Ich in seine einzelnen Eindrücke und Gefühle. Werther vernichtet sich selbst, Lenz verliert sich ... und sucht sich vergebens..." [Gundolf 92].

Setting Büchner's oeuvre against the background of a deepening nihilism that was beginning to pervade German intellectual life, Mühlher sees all his protagonists as "Repräsentanten eines Typus: des radikalen Nihilisten", most strikingly so, the figures of Woyzeck and of Lenz [Mühlher 120]. Mühlher points to the frequency with which, in Lenz, such terms as "leer" and "nichts" occur, as: "Es faßte ihn eine namenlose Angst in diesem Nichts: er war im Leeren!", and argues that such Angst may be regarded as the psychological equivalent of an ontological nothingness [ibid. 132]. Such an explanation again takes no account of the specific form that Lenz's madness takes nor of the specific circumstances in which it arises, whereas Büchner gives considerable attention to both. It is questionable whether, given the circumstances, a more optimistic philosophy would have acted prophylactically.

Struc also sees Angst as central to Lenz's madness, along with suffering and absurdity. Angst is "the stark realisation of man's loneliness, impotence and nakedness in a
world he experiences as increasingly alien and meaningless.\[Struc 82-83\]. As an appreciation of Büchner's achievement, this is less than adequate. Büchner goes beyond generalities, which at least in our century have become commonplace, to examine what it is in human society and human interaction that leads to such devastating alienation.

Attempts to establish the primacy of theological/existential, rather than psychological, interpretations of the Novelle undervalue the originality of the insights that Büchner was bringing to literary expression. Hermann Pongs insists: "Als Kunstwerk, erschließt sich die Studie erst, wenn man hinter die Psychologie sieht: da wird die Seele des unglücklichen Lenz an ihrem Künstlertum begriffen als ein Schauplatz, auf dem hellen und dunklen Mächte des Daseins miteinander ringen, das menschliche Gefäß zersprengend." [Pongs 138]. This is to write about Büchner as if he were Hoffmann. Again: "'Hier weg, weg! nach Haus? Toll werden dort?'. Wir spüren in diesen Worten die metaphysische Angst: wo Oberlin, wo der Schutz des Heiligen um ihn aufhört, fangen die Dämonen an. ...ein Schwanken der Seele zwischen Gott und nichts, an dem hier vom Metaphysischen her erhellt wird, wofür die Folgezeit später psychologische Formeln fand." [ibid. 143-148]. Rather than a metaphysical Angst, Lenz is, in the passage quoted by Pongs, experiencing an anxiety rooted in his awareness of the pressures from his family to be other than his true self, and
of his own inability to assert himself in the face of these pressures. Far from psychological interpretations being imposed by posterity, it is precisely Büchner's achievement to have located the sources of Lenz's madness in human interactions. If the extremities to which Lenz is driven involve rebellion against God, and consequent despair, this is the outcome of a failure of human relationships, of what is perceived as a betrayal.

In the *Kunstgespräch*, Büchner carries the argument about art forward so that it becomes Lenz's defence of his strivings (for himself and for others): "Immer steigen, ringen und so in Ewigkeit Alles was der Augenblick giebt, wegwerfen und immer darben, um einmal zu genießen." This expresses, in Sharp's view, "an anti-teleological conception which is intrinsic to Büchner's view of nature and man" [Sharp 276]. When Lenz rejects idealism in art and insists on a realistic portrayal of life as it is, Parker holds that this refers also to Lenz's religious beliefs, which again separate him from the religious idealism of Oberlin and his parishioners.

Human misery is to be fought against and not sought out as an ideal. When Oberlin says that God is omnipotent, Lenz replies that if he were God he would do nothing but deliver men from their suffering. All he wants is: "Ruhe, Ruhe, nur ein wenig Ruhe, um schlafen zu können" [SWB I 99]. This Oberlin dismisses as blasphemous. Oberlin is shown by Büchner to be a
well-meaning man who looks after the welfare of his people, and is able to bring them comfort because they share his religious beliefs. What he cannot do is step outside the framework of these beliefs, in order to try to understand Lenz [Parker 109]. All he can offer is the advice to pray, advice which Lenz tries to follow throughout a whole night. Büchner stresses the stereotyped responses of both Oberlin and Kaufmann by appending to their advice in both cases "und dergleichen mehr". Oberlin has drawn Lenz into his world to the extent that Lenz has come to feel that "... nur in Ihnen ist der Weg zu Gott" [SWB I 94]. Oberlin's rejection, when it comes, is all the more devastating: "Alles, was er an Ruhe aus der Nähe Oberlins und aus der Stille des Tals geschöpft hatte, war weg; die Welt die er hatte nutzen wollen, hatte einen ungeheuern Riß..." [ibid. 97-98]

Parker answers criticism that Büchner's ideas on the problem of God and evil are trite and unsophisticated compared with Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche: "In Lenz Büchner was not concerned with philosophical ideas or beliefs, but with concrete experience, with the anguish of a hypersensitive man going 'mad', whose problems can nevertheless be those of any 'sane' person." [Parker 111]. Rather than good and evil, it is the problem of pain that preoccupies Büchner in Lenz, from the suffering of the villagers, who accept it with such passivity - "Leiden sey all mein Gewinnst" - to the
untimely death of the child, Friedericke. This is a theme which recurs in all the literary works: "The dialectic into which Büchner's characters are strung is not between good and evil, or fate and will, or hatred and love, but between feeling and unfeeling." [Stern 105].

The question of passivity, or rather of its absence, is central to the development of Woyzeck's madness. It is less of an issue in relation to Lenz, but it is appropriate to consider whether, as has been suggested, Lenz is "the essentially passive type of hero who most interested him" (sc. Büchner) [Lindenberger 75-76]. It may reasonably be argued that, on the contrary, he had a considerable capacity for self-assertion as, during one of his lucid intervals, in the Kunstgespräch. And it may be asked whether, if he had passively acquiesced in the acceptance of suffering and death in the way that Oberlin's parishioners did, he might not have escaped madness.

Perspectives - Oberlin, Büchner, Kraepelin
It is possible to trace shifts in perspective between Oberlin and Büchner, and between Büchner and Kraepelin, who was later to identify the cluster of symptoms shown by patients like Lenz as dementia praecox. These may be represented as a shift from the moralistic stance of the country pastor to the scientific stance of late nineteenth century psychiatry, with Büchner not so much occupying the middle ground as moving
beyond the limited viewpoint of both. He saw the sources of madness in intra-psychic rather than in organic processes, but denied that these were rooted in sinfulness, as Oberlin had asserted. "... die Ursachen der Krankheit werden von Büchner nicht mehr allein in der Subjekt angesiedelt, sondern in den Erfahrungen des Subjekts mit seiner Umwelt." [Thorn-Prikker 1981 185]. "The essential change that Büchner made in his source was to shift from Oberlin's limited perspective to one that illuminated Lenz's internal rationale." [Sharp 266]. Oberlin's understanding is constricted by his moral and religious partiality.

Büchner achieves moral objectivity without sacrificing psychological and emotional empathy. In respect of scientific attitudes, Büchner and Kraepelin may be said to stand within the same tradition, Büchner "at the threshold of a developing empiricism which by the end of the century had eradicated the speculative excesses of Naturphilosophie, Kraepelin inheriting the fruits of this process" [ibid. 267]. Yet, "Büchner's insight extended beyond the behavioral surface of the psychotic process into its internal reasoning, a reasoning which remained an enigma to Kraepelin." [ibid. 268].

The Kunstgespräch expresses Büchner's view that figures in a work of art have a motivation of their own and that love, however grotesque or hateful the object, is the key to understanding that inner motivation. Such a view underlines
the differences between Büchner's stance and both the moralising of Oberlin and the scientific objectivity of Kraepelin. "They give rise to the impression that Büchner foresaw a historical stage of psychiatry which had turned from symptom to experience and from individual to trans-individual psychology." [ibid. 269]
Chapter Twelve - Psychodynamics in Lenz

A complex ambivalence

In examining the psychodynamics implicit in the Novelle, it is essential to differentiate between the historical Lenz and the character as Büchner portrays him. From the biographical factors outlined in Chapter Seven, it would seem almost certain that Lenz's breakdown was the result of complexly interacting disappointments, rejections and loss: rejection by Goethe and Friederike, as well as by a succession of women whom he sought to love, disappointments in his literary career, the loss of Charlotte Schlosser. The impact of these life events on a man, already rendered insecure by his feelings of inferiority vis-à-vis Goethe, his guilt at his rebellion against his parents and, more speculatively, repressed homosexual guilt, may reasonably be supposed to account for his psychosis. Given this wealth of material, most of which Büchner almost certainly knew, the themes he does choose to focus on become the more significant.

There is general recognition that Büchner plays down the implications of Lenz's failed relationship with Friederike [Fuchshuber 153-154, Irle 77-78, Sharp 258]. Irle attributes this to a decision to avoid the facile formula: disappointment in love, disappointment at Weimar leads to drift into madness out of a longing for peace and oblivion,
(the "glücklicher Wahnsinn" postulated by, among others, Goethe and Spieß). And most are agreed that the main dynamic focus is on Lenz’s ambivalent relationship with his parents, although Irle maintains that even this is not unduly stressed. "Aber auch hier versucht Büchner nicht, die Störung des Verhältnisses zu sehr zu betonen....Büchner beschränkt sich auf eine kühle Phänomenologie, aus der die Krankheit, das Leiden, die veränderte Erlebenswelt Lenzens in um so plastischerer Weise deutlich werden." [Irle 79]. Against this it could be argued that the true measure of Büchner’s achievement is that he combines "eine kühle Phänomenologie" with a sympathetic understanding of the forces which are driving Lenz into madness.

What then are the psychopathological factors that lead to Lenz’s breakdown, factors indicated in the Oberlin narrative, but described with a much deeper degree of insight by Büchner? Lenz arrives at the valley disturbed, and we learn that the disturbance stems from guilt-laden feelings about his parents. The visit of his friend Kaufmann threatens the peace which he had begun to achieve, because it brings reminders of his earlier, troubled life: "Das bißchen Ruhe war ihm so kostbar und jetzt kam ihm jemand entgegen, der ihn an so vieles errinnerte, ... der seine Verhältnisse kannte." [SWB I 86]. Nevertheless, reassured by his belief that Oberlin has accepted him unquestioningly, he becomes more in
possession of himself, to the extent that he can talk about the aims he wishes to strive towards in his art and in his life. It is with Kaufmann's suggestion that he should return home, that he again becomes anguished under the threat that this represents to his peace of mind: "Hier weg, weg! nach Haus? Toll werden dort?... Es ist mir jetzt erträglich, und da will ich bleiben; warum? warum? Eben weil es mir wohl ist; was will mein Vater? kann er mehr geben? Unmöglich! Laß mich in Ruhe." [ibid. 89]. Oberlin is still seen by Lenz as the loving, accepting, non-demanding father to whom he may cling. At the same time, Lenz's act of disobedience leads to deepening guilt which manifests itself in the succeeding days and nights in the tormented, self-punitive religious preoccupations that lead to scarifications and icy immersions, and to his request to Oberlin to scourge him. His complex feelings about his father become split between his real father, his "adoptive" father, Oberlin, and his Father in heaven.

A second strand of Lenz's psychopathology relates to feelings about his mother. The powerful reassurance provided by the presence of a mother-figure has been noted in the scene in Oberlin's kitchen, and it is found again in the "Weinachtsgefühl" that signified the phantasised nearness of the mother. But there is an indication that his feelings are ambivalent: "... er erzählte Oberlin ganz ruhig, wie ihm
die Nacht seine Mutter erschienen sei; sie ... habe eine weiße und eine rote Rose an der Brust stecken gehabt...". [ibid. 85]. The psychoanalyst Melanie Klein has suggested that infantile rage against the mother, for what is seen as the rejection implicit in the withdrawal of the breast, results in the phantasizing of a good and caring breast and a bad, rejecting one. If it would be unjustifiable to insist on such an interpretation of Lenz's reported phantasy, at least we may remark on the possibility of its implying some ambivalence. The possibility is strengthened by the remarkable: "... sie sei gewiß tot; er sei ganz ruhig darüber." [ibid. 85]. The flatness of that statement, where one might have expected emotion suggests a psychotic withdrawal, a defence against feelings of guilt and pain, as well as indicating the schizophrenic nature of that psychosis, with its splitting of thought from affect. Büchner underlines the disturbing effect of this particular manifestation of madness by ascribing to Oberlin a response which appears to be an attempt to reassure not only Lenz but also himself, and which leads him into what are for him uncomfortable realms of magic and metaphysics: "Oberlin brachte es ab, es führte ihn zu weit von seiner einfachen Art ab." [SWB I 86]

The third strand of circumstance that relates to Lenz's breakdown concerns the dead child Friedericke and the
poet's frustrated love for Friederike von Brion. In Büchner's text no name is attached to this failed love, although the link is made quite clear in Oberlin's account. We know from Gutzkow that Büchner was especially interested in the Lenz/Brion episode and his failure to make reference to the coincidence of names is surely significant. It has been suggested that Büchner chose deliberately to play down the importance of the love affair, but this is difficult to sustain. In one of the few departures from the Oberlin narrative in the order of the events described, Büchner places Lenz's first reference to his unhappy love affair before the child's death. It is a maidservant singing of an absent lover that provokes the outburst to Madame Oberlin. In a striking passage Lenz is shown as identifying the song with his lost love, and that love with his own existential insecurity: "... wenn sie so durch's Zimmer ging, und so halb für sich sang, und jeder Tritt war eine Musik, es war so eine Glückseligkeit in ihr, und das strömte in mich über, ich war immer ruhig, wenn ich sie ansah.... Ganz Kind; es war als wär ihr die Welt zu weit, sie zog sich so in sich zurück.... da saß sie, als wäre ihre ganze Seligkeit nur in einem kleinen Punkt, und dann war's mir auch so..." [ibid. 92]. The child's death follows, in Büchner's narrative, directly. Lenz, following his failure to restore her to life is provoked to utter the most terrible blasphemies. It is this death that seems to lead to Lenz's conviction that he has destroyed both
his beloved and his mother.

By the following morning, his reason is at its most deranged, as he derives his certainty about the deaths from "Hieroglyphen". Again the split between thought and affect reveals itself in his composure ("mit vergnügter Miene") as he announces the conclusions he has drawn from the coded message [SWB I 85].

There are then three separate strands that combine to draw Lenz down into "die Kluft unretrttbaren Wahnsinns":

1. Ambivalent feelings towards father/Oberlin/God
2. Ambivalent feelings towards mother
3. Feelings toward child Friederike/beloved Friederike.

Is it possible to hypothesize links between these separate strands? Both beloved Friederike and mother were phantasized as angelic figures, both belonged to other men (it is not difficult to envisage Goethe as a kind of father figure for the younger poet) and in his phantasy Lenz has killed them both, perhaps in anger at the rejection implied. The attempt to raise the child Friederike may be seen, as an attempt not only to reverse the damage he has in phantasy done, but equally to be as all-powerful as God, and by implication more powerful than father/Goethe/Oberlin. Failure accentuates for Lenz feelings of his own impotence, against which he rages, blasphemously.
Thorn-Prikker goes so far as to postulate predisposing character traits in Lenz which help to determine the nature of the illness. He describes features of passivity which are pervasive to the extent that Lenz feels himself not to be an initiator of action, but its object: "es drängte in ihm", "das Drängen erschütterte ihn", "... nach einem Abgrund, zu dem ihn eine unerbittliche Gewalt hinriß". This kind of analysis might be said to confuse symptoms with causes. The "zwanghafte Züge" [Thorn-Prikker 1978 71], which are said to be part of Lenz's make-up, might just as validly be interpreted as symptoms expressing his inner feelings of helplessness in the face of psychological forces he does not understand.

Transference and countertransference

If it is remarkable that Büchner's portrayal is profound enough and sensitive enough to allow detailed speculation on the dynamics relating to the poet's past that underlay his illness, how much more remarkable it is to find Büchner showing understanding of the importance of the relationship between the patient and the person caring for him, what might be called in psychoanalytic terms transference and countertransference. Conventional wisdom in Büchner's day, both psychiatric and lay, would see mental illness as a given state, determined by life-events, or immorality, or physical causes, according to the school of thought
subscribed to. It was capable of modification, even cure, as
the result of the skill and benignity of the carer, and those
physicians who were not exclusively involved in repressive
and punitive therapies understood the importance of estab­
lishing a good relationship with their patients. What Büchner
was able to see beyond such generalisations was that the
nature of the communication, spoken and unspoken, between
patient and carer, was central to the course of the illness.
Examination of the course of Lenz's illness as depicted, in
outline in Oberlin, in subtle detail in Büchner, suggests
that this is indeed the main focus of the Novelle.

Lenz's gradual improvement after arriving at Oberlin's home
might be said to result from the loving acceptance of a
father figure, whereas his relapse comes when Kaufmann
arrives bringing messages from his father urging Lenz to
return home. When this is reinforced by Oberlin, Lenz becomes
agitated. "Er sagte ihm: 'Ehre Vater und Mutter' und
dergleichen mehr. Ober dem Gespräch geriet Lenz in heftige
Unruhe..." [SWB I 94]. A structural analysis by Fellmann,
cited by Sharp, identifies three stages in the Lenz-Oberlin
relationship as central to the dynamic. 1.) Lenz and Oberlin
in communion; 2.) Lenz on his own during Oberlin's journey to
Switzerland; 3.) Oberlin returns but no longer in communion
with Lenz. This might be translated in terms of interpersonal
dynamic as: 1.) Positive transference, i.e. Oberlin seen as a
good father; 2.) Lenz perceives Oberlin's absence as rejection; 3.) Negative transference, i.e. Oberlin seen as bad father. (The improvement in Lenz's condition after the first stage of the process might be held to correspond to what can occur in psychotherapy and is known as "transference cure", brought about by a strong positive identification by the patient with the therapist; as in most transference cures, the effect on Lenz was not long-lasting.)

Kubik attributes to Oberlin, after Kaufmann's arrival (presumably with details of Lenz's illness), a conscious decision to become the poet's therapist. She sees him as a failure in this rôle mainly because of his stereotyped responses [Kubik 59-60], and his response to Lenz's request to scourge him by offering him love instead of punishment: "Oberlins Therapie geht somit völlig am Patienten vorbei. Anstatt Lenz zu helfen, wirkt sie krankheitsverstärkend und treibt Lenz in immer größere Isolation." [ibid. 60]. The implication is that Oberlin's apparent loving response only served to increase Lenz's sense of guilt. It is unreasonable to suppose that, in Büchner's view, acceding to Lenz's request for punishment would have been a better course, and anachronistic to expect from Oberlin an interpretation of the request as way of dealing with guilt feelings.

Kubik rightly sees Oberlin's régime as akin to the moral
management which, following Tuke at York, had come to be widely accepted by psychiatrists; but it is again anachronistic to use the terms "Therapeut" and "Therapie", and misleading to suggest that Büchner intended a critique of a doctor-patient relationship that went wrong and indeed of a psychiatry based in moral attitudes [ibid. 61]. It is certainly the case that the historical Oberlin saw immorality as the source of the poet's madness, which was due to "... die Folgen seines Ungehorsams gegen seinen Vater, seiner herumschweifender Lebensart, seiner unzweckmäßigen Beschäftigungen, seines häufigen Umgangs mit den Frauenzimmern ..." [SWB I 478]. Yet, despite Büchner's practice of copying large tracts of Oberlin almost verbatim, this is one passage that he omits completely, leaving Oberlin's views as to the causation of Lenz's madness to be inferred from his exhortations to the poet to pray, and to honour the fifth commandment.

As to whether Büchner intended a critique of moral therapy, much of the psychiatry practised in the asylums of the time was still repressive and cruel, and might have been a fair target for his criticism, but such régimes in no way resembled either moral management or Oberlin's attempts to help Lenz. If the pastor failed, it was because, on the one hand, his understanding was constrained by his pietist beliefs, and on the other, because he could not meet Lenz's expectations of him as an ideal father.
Sharp sees as most illuminating for an understanding, both of the schizophrenic process and of literary works involving "schizophrenic" characters, models which see schizophrenia as the outcome of interpersonal dynamics especially within the family (H.S. Sullivan, Laing and his colleagues, but especially Gregory Bateson [Bateson 251-264]). "The confusion of fiction and reality is not the most misleading error in diagnosing literary figures as schizophrenic. More significantly, such a diagnosis can misrepresent and abridge the fictional situation in a manner analogous to the actual diagnoses of individualistic psychiatry. Schizophrenia no longer primarily connotes a pathological condition of the individual.... Schizophrenic behavior is no longer seen as isolated and eccentric actions, but as reactions whose logical motivation can be discovered in their context. In neither fact or fiction can a diagnosis of schizophrenia be considered an end in itself, an explanation of eccentric behavior, for this only serves to obscure the forces to which this behavior is a reaction." [Sharp 266]

It is not possible to sustain analysis of the communications between Lenz and the significant others in his life in terms of Bateson's "double bind", and in any case it is now generally accepted that double bind is not specific as a psychogenetic mechanism for schizophrenia [Angermeyer 110-111]. But Sharp's thesis, that Lenz's feelings about his
father and his interactions with Oberlin, to whom he transfers these feelings, hold the key to the genesis of his psychosis, is a persuasive one: "And if Oberlin is not a primary cause of this madness, Büchner implicates him as a catalyst in its downward course." [Sharp 259]. Sharp comments on J.S. White's interpretation that Oberlin represents an ideal father for Büchner and holds that this misses the ambivalence in Büchner's portrayal.

Certainly the relationship between Lenz and Oberlin undergoes profound change during the course of the Novelle. Lenz comes to the Steintal with high expectations of the pastor, and with the wish to be like one of his children, a wish that is initially gratified. On the other hand, Oberlin's reactions to Lenz are shown as being, throughout, ambiguous. We have already noted [Chapter Nine] the ambivalence in Oberlin's initial greeting to Lenz: "Ha, ha, ha, ist Er nicht gedrückt? Habe ich nicht einige Dramen gelesen, die einem Herrn dieses Namens zugeschrieben werden?" [SWB I 80]. None the less, Lenz's admiration of Oberlin, and his feeling of safety with him, continue for some time undisturbed: "... er mußte Oberlin oft in die Augen sehen, und die mächtige Ruhe, die uns über der ruhenden Natur, im tiefen Wald, in mondhell..." Oberlin responds positively to the "good
child" in Lenz: "Oberlin war sein Gespräch sehr angenehm, und das anmutige Kindergesicht Lenzens machte ihm große Freude."
[SWB I 82].

Just as Oberlin is equated in Lenz's eyes with a warming and nurturing Nature, so the coming of night fills the poet with thoughts of what it is like to be cut off from Oberlin's light, to be a child in the dark, to be blind and not able to look into Oberlin's eyes: "... eine sonderbare Angst, er hätte der Sonne nachlaufen mögen... es kam ihm die Angst an wie Kindern, die im Dunkel schlafen; es war ihm, als sei er blind..." [ibid. 82]. He is overwhelmed with a sense of unreality and threatening madness. He has a secret wish to become ill. It is as if he has become aware of Oberlin's inability to enter his own dark inner world.

There is however one critical point where Oberlin does share that inner world, in the involvement of both in religious mysticism. In so doing, "... Oberlin validates and thus nourishes Lenz's experience at the point where it will inevitably be harmful." [Sharp 270]. Landau comments on the emphasis placed by Büchner on Oberlin's "mystisch-visionären Zug, indem er (Büchner) ihn von Erscheinungen und Symbolismus reden ließ, und verstärkte dadurch noch die unheimlich gespenstische Stimmung. Versenkte er sich so in die Persönlichkeit Oberlins, ... so schlug ihm eine Welle verzückter Religiosität entgegen, die ihm den Berichterstatter
fast wertvoller werden ließ als den Bericht." [Landau 34]. Oberlin shows no sign of recognizing the inherent danger to Lenz and is strangely casual in response to Lenz's request to be allowed to preach: "'Sind Sie Theolog?' - 'Ja!' - 'Gut, nächsten Sonntag.'" This facilitates Lenz's wish to identify with Oberlin, an identification which is at first rewarding: "Er sprach einfach mit den Leuten, sie litten alle mit ihm, und es war ihm ein Trost, wenn er .... diese dumpfe Leiden gen Himmel leiten konnte." [SWB I 84]. However the rebel in Lenz cannot accept, as Oberlin does, the congregation's unresisting submission to suffering, and he is soon plunged into despair.

In regard to the "Konstellationen" of minor figures involved in interaction with Lenz, Fuchshuber notes a clear distinction between the inhabitants of Steintal and those of the remoter villages. Oberlin's villagers are on the one hand a calming and supportive influence. They "grüßen ruhig" and were "schweigend und ernst". On the other hand, they were alarmed by Lenz's mad behaviour, which provoked prayer in the Oberlin family and flight among the maidservants. By contrast, his wildness is accepted without surprise by the villagers of Fouday, though, far from finding this reassuring, Lenz is frightened by their superstition, which reinforces his own "unheimlich" tendencies. [Fuchshuber 149]. It would be more accurate to say that both "Konstellationen"
distress Lenz equally; in Waldersbach, he feels isolated and
alienated, in the mountains he is accepted but the prevailing
unreality reinforces and deepens his madness. In a sense
these reactions to Lenz mirror the ambiguities in Oberlin.
The religious enthusiasm which they share is heightened by
Oberlin's own account of his supernatural experiences and
excites Lenz to the extent of the exaltation in which he
tries to revive the dead child, with the consequent manic
despair in which he blasphemes against the God who has failed
him. Oberlin rejects however the excesses into which Lenz is
led.

In another form of rejection Oberlin, having accepted the
role of loving father, requires of Lenz the same kind of
conformity that is being demanded by his family at home:
"Dabei ermahnte er ihn, sich in den Wunsch seines Vaters zu
fügen, seinem Beruf gemäß zu leben, heimzukehren. Er sagte
ihm: 'Ehre Vater und Mutter' und dergleichen mehr" [SWB I
94]. Sharp points to the laconic "und dergleichen mehr" as
showing "Büchner's awareness of the unbridgeable gap between
the two men." [Sharp 275]. Lenz's deepening madness, after
his family's request, via Kaufmann, that he return home, and
after Oberlin's perceived rejection, represents a desperate
attempt to preserve his true self (Büchner at one point uses
the phrase "mächtiger Erhaltungstrieb") [ibid .278]. Whereas,
in Danton's Tod and Woyzeck, the protagonists find some sense
of existence within reality in the experience of pain, pain ultimately fails Lenz, and his disintegration ends in numbness and apathy. "Ceasing to suffer, he has relinquished his hold on the world" [Stern 151]. In the end when rage, and the consequent self-scourging and self-abasement, have exhausted themselves, the struggle is lost; Lenz's quietness and conformity represents the adoption of a false self: ".... er tat Alles wie die Andern taten, es war aber eine entsetzliche Leere in ihm .......So lebte er hin."

Büchner's achievement in entering into Lenz's world of madness is nowhere more impressive than in the charting of its ebb and flow in relation to the changing dynamic of the poet's relationship with the man in whom he had placed all his hopes of cure.
Chapter Thirteen - Büchner and the Woyzeck Case

(In this and the following chapters, the name "Woyzeck" will refer to the historical Woyzeck. Büchner’s character will be referred to as "Franz", except in direct quotation from the play or other sources, and the play itself will be indicated in the conventional form \textit{Woyzeck}.)

Woyzeck "das echteste, büchnerischste seiner Werke" [Gundolf 94]
"das kühnste und revolutionärste von Büchners Werken" [Viëtor 151]

While there is truth in Gundolf's assertion that \textit{Woyzeck} is a "Schicksalsträum aus unterer Sphäre", it is possible to dispute his view that it is neither a play with a message nor a study in human misery [Gundolf 94]. It is true that in \textit{Woyzeck} Büchner is in touch with the deepest springs of human feeling, thought and action, and expresses these in language of emotional power and directness. At the same time, there is a detached, analytical Büchner who locates these manifestations in a specific social \textit{niveau} and shows them as relating to human interactions. The pessimism, of which \textit{Woyzeck}, like \textit{Dantons Tod} is such a profound expression, anticipates what will become a prevailing "metaphysische Stimmung" [Viëtor 175] in the later nineteenth century. "Dies Bild des Menschen, dunkel und ohne Frieden, ist ein Kind der geschichtlichen Stunde, in der es errichtet wurde..." [ibid}
This picture is conveyed in a drama, whose episodic structure and minimal dialogue achieves both urgency and involvement: "So als würde der Zuschauer angerufen: schau dies an, und dies - und du wirst Woyzecks Geschick verstehen." [ibid. 152-153].

Any examination of the representation and meaning of madness in Woyzeck must address itself to the representation and meaning of madness in the society of Woyzeck's and Büchner's time, and in particular to that society's view of madness in relation to crime. We shall see that the branch of medicine which devoted itself to that relationship, namely forensic psychiatry, was much concerned with the question of freedom vs. unfreedom, and that this question is central to the situation of Franz in the play. The Clarus Gutachten, Büchner's main source, is remarkable for its depiction of a man clearly mad, clearly, that is, to us and it may be argued to most of his contemporaries - remarkable also for its conclusion that there existed no evidence of mental illness. The reasons for this contradiction will be examined in the light of the contemporaneous medico-legal debate; and the significance of that debate for Büchner's interest in the Woyzeck case, and for the portrayal of the character and predicament of Franz, will be considered.

Concepts of madness held by the doctors specialising in madness in Büchner's time are also of importance to an under-
standing of some of the references in the play, especially the use of the term *fixe Idee*. Something of the background to the use of this, and related terms such as monomania and *manie sans délire*, will be explored to try to clarify its use (and mis-use) by the Doctor in the play. The whole setting of the relationship between the Doctor and Franz raises questions of the social repercussions of the scientific philosophy of the time and this too will be examined.

**Büchner's choice of subject**

In Chapter Seven, it was argued that Büchner's interest in Lenz and his madness largely arose from a community of interest and experience, artistic, intellectual and emotional, between the two men. No such considerations could have been responsible for the choice of the murderer Woyzeck as the central figure in Büchner's drama. What could there be in common between a young man of genius from a cultured professional family, one to whom life seemed to be offering rich opportunities in his personal relationships and in his artistic and scientific endeavours, and an ill-educated ex-soldier, living a brute existence and murdering, eventually, out of despair? Büchner himself posed the question in terms that implied that the answer lay in a common, corrupt humanity: "Was ist das, was in uns lügt, mordet, stiehlt?" [Letter of 10 March 1834]. Writing to his family a month
earlier, he had postulated a determinism that governed such matters: "Ich verachte Niemanden, am wenigsten seines Verstandes oder seiner Bildung, weil es in Niemands Gewalt liegt, kein Dummkopf oder kein Verbrecher zu werden" [Letter of February 1834].

But the question still remains: why particularly Woyzeck? Why not Schmolling, whose case history contained at least as many dramatic possibilities, and on whom the death penalty had been urged by E.T.A. Hoffmann himself? Why not the murderer Dieß, whose story was still freshly remembered, especially in Darmstadt, and whose cadaver had lain in the dissecting rooms at Gießen, when Büchner was a student there?

Part of the answer may lie in the special circumstances of the medico-legal debate that surrounded the Woyzeck case, and the wider issues concerning, on the one hand, the nature of madness and, on the other, questions of free-will vs. determinism. The second Clarus Gutachten was not simply a supposedly scientific contribution to forensic psychiatry, but a contribution to a polemic which had begun long before Woyzeck murdered the widow Woost.

For Büchner, however, the case was not merely one that engaged his philosophical and political concerns. There were issues that brought the matter closer to home. The two Clarus Gutachten appeared in the Zeitschrift für die
Staatsarzneikunde, a periodical to which Büchner's father both subscribed and contributed [Ernst Büchner 39-72]. The archives of the Großherzogliches Medizinalkolleg in Darmstadt contain a number of manuscript records of opinions delivered by Ernst Büchner in matters of medico-legal dispute as well as his Gutachten on various murders [Franz & Loch 69]. The Darmstadt physician Amelung, who entered into the medical debate on the validity of the Clarus Gutachten (see below), was in charge of lunatics in the Landeshospital Hofheim, where Ernst Büchner held an appointment as surgeon [ibid. 67, Schneider 76]. It is possible to draw parallels between the life history of Woyzeck and that of Gardist Jünger, in whose case Büchner's father submitted a detailed Gutachten [Grighton 115-116]. There is therefore every reason to believe that medico-legal issues were discussed in the family home, and likely that they were of consuming interest to Georg from his early teens.

It is clear also that, in choosing the case of Woyzeck as the subject of drama, Büchner was following a literary trend which had begun in Germany in the later part of the eighteenth century. Meißner, a jurist and philosopher, had in 1783 given to this new genre the name "Kriminal-Geschichten", histories which, he declared, held the key "zur geheimen Geschichte des menschlichen Herzens" [Schönert 49]. Works within the genre could either be purely fictional, as in
Schiller's Der Verbrecher aus verlorenen Ehre, and Hoffmann's Das Fräulein von Scuderi, or were based on real cases and, although clearly intended for a lay readership, published in professional journals, such as Moritz's Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde of 1783-1793. The seventh volume in the series carries an article by "P." (presumably Pockels, one of Moritz' co-editors), the very title of which indicates the kind of attraction which the genre held for its readers: "Johann Hermann Simmen - ein braver Soldat, ein zärtlicher Vater, liebreicher Gatte, ehrbarer, ordentlicher, stiller Bürger und --- kaltblütiger Mörder seiner Anverwandten" [Pockels 28-73]. The sustained juxtaposition of the murderer's many virtues with the awfulness of his crime carries a sense of the fragile barrier between good and evil, and the row of dashes in the title indicates the titillation which many readers expected of the Kriminalgeschichte, and which "P." was anxious to provide. A further link with some of the popular, and scientific, concerns of the time was that "P."'s account was taken from an earlier one, attributed to Lavater, who is said to have used Simmen as a subject for physiognomonic analysis [Pockels 73].

The medico-legal debate
The question of insanity and its implications for accountability before the law has a long history, one of the earliest acquittals on the grounds that the accused was "de
non saine mémoire", occurring in the English courts in 1505 [Eigen 34-35]. From the earliest times, neither lunacy nor idiocy of themselves sufficed as a defence; the accused had to be judged incapable of forming an intent. Partial insanity was especially unlikely to succeed as a defence.

After 1760, in England, medical witnesses began to be called on to help decide such issues and were often faced with trying to show that the accused "intended his act physically, perhaps 'purposefully', but at the same time was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his action." [ibid. 38] Up to 1800, the acquittal rate in cases concerning offences against the person, where a defence of insanity was made, was fairly constant at around 40%. A 'cause célèbre' of 1800 had a profound effect on how insanity was viewed in the courts. On 15 May 1800, the accused in the case, Hadfield, had fired a pistol at King George III as he entered the royal box at Drury Lane Theatre. He gave as his motive that he was tired of life, and that he should certainly be killed if he were to make an attempt upon His Majesty's life.* The defence lawyer, Erskine, had no difficulty in bringing evidence of mad behaviour on Hadfield's part, and Hadfield was found not guilty, although ordered to be detained, and the case led to hastily passed legislation which allowed such cases to be

* cf. the frequent attribution, in the German literature, of "Lebensüberdrub" as a motive for murder, the crime being executed in order to achieve punishment by death. See also Grohmann's paper on the death penalty, discussed below.
held in a secure wing of Bethlem Hospital, rather than in prison [Walker 74-79]. Another consequence was that the acquittal rate in cases where insanity was a defence rose sharply to 60% [Eigen 41].

It is noteworthy that medical witnesses rarely ascribed the mad behaviour under consideration as due to physical causes, given that the medical literature of the time frequently stressed the physical basis of insanity. Neither did they offer psychiatric diagnoses, nor describe symptoms, nor use technical terms. (In his deposition on Woyzeck, Clarus would eschew diagnosis but used medical terminology in his account of his examination of the accused.) They were more likely to assert something along the lines of: "I have looked on him as a man insane." If asked to justify these opinions, they would cite the accused's inability to carry on a normal conversation. "'Incoherency' and 'flightiness' were the two most commonly heard characterizations of the conversations of the insane." [ibid. 44]

In England, the increasing tendency on the part of the courts to treat criminals as sick may be seen as the culmination of the Enlightenment movement towards more humane ways of treating the insane in general, and involved for the most part medical and legal professionals. Although in Germany by the later 18th. century, similar humane considerations applied, interest in criminality engaged a wider public than
those professionally involved, and engaged especially writers and philosophers. Kant, in his *Anthropologie* [§48], had argued that the determining of accountability before the law was a philosophic and not a medical question. Issues of guilt and criminality became of absorbing interest to the Romantic movement. Schiller, in 1792, wrote the introduction to the German translation of *Causes célèbres* by the French jurist Pitaval, and described the workings of the criminal mind as revealing "Triebfeder, welche sich im gewöhnlichen Leben dem Auge des Beobachters verstecken." [cited in Schönert 50].

The question of infanticide became the focus of social and literary concern in the 1770's and 1780's. In 1780 the Swiss reformer and writer on social matters, Pestalozzi, published an account of the situation of a young woman accused of killing her baby, one of the first attempts to relate the question of legal responsibility to the inner state of the accused [Reuchlein 1985 8]. The theme was taken up in the literature of the *Sturm und Drang*, notably in the play *Die Kindermörderin* of 1776 by H.L. Wagner, where the plight of the heroine is made the focus of criticism of society and of the law.

In a case where it had been argued that a woman accused of infanticide should be declared mad instead of executed, Kant commented: "Auf den Fuß dieses Arguments möchte es wohl leicht sein, alle Verbrecher für Verrückte zu erklären, die
man bedauern und kurieren, aber nicht bestrafen müßte." [Kant 119]. This clearly stated the issue that was to generate decades of debate, both in the professional and in the lay press, a debate with political ramifications which were ultimately to decide the fate of the murderer Woyzeck.

An early clash between the two parties to that debate occurred in the case, tried in 1804, of a theologian who murdered his wife and children to save them from supposed poverty. The documents of the Rüsau case make it clear that he was suffering from delusions of a psychotic nature and had acted under the influence of these delusions. Depositions from two doctors argued for clemency on the ground of Rüsau's mental state. The court however took an opposite view, persuaded by a specially constituted panel of doctors, lawyers and philosopher/theologians who argued that the accused was not deprived of his free will and that the death sentence was therefore appropriate for him and for "anderen dergleichen Leidenschaftlichen" [Dörner 241*]. It is significant for the whole subsequent debate that the court's reasons were delivered in such moralistic terms.

The medical profession was beginning to establish its author­ity with the courts in matters relating to madness and

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* citing Brachmann: Der Fall Rüsau; ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der forensischen Psychiatrie med. Diss. Hamburg 1921
criminality, but medical evidence was by no means always called. When it was called, doctors now delivered their opinions in more specific terms, and the medico-legal issues were becoming more clearly defined. By 1805, the obligation to call such evidence, in cases where the accused's Zurechnungsfähigkeit might be in doubt, was incorporated into the Prussian law [Reuchlein 1985 13].

Monomania and forensic psychiatry

The concept of partial insanity came to have considerable forensic importance. In Germany the term fixe Idee was usually applied, but its first and main exponent as a clinical entity was the French psychiatrist, Esquirol (1772-1840), whose De la monomanie appeared in Paris in 1840, although the term was current for twenty years before that. It was part of a tripartite classification, mania, monomania, and lypomania, with which he replaced the old concept of melancholy [Goldstein, J. 153-156]. "Lypomania and monomania are chronic cerebral affections, unattended by fever, and characterised by a partial lesion of the intelligence, affections or will." [Esquirol: De la monomanie 2.1, quoted by de Saussure 366].

Monomaniacal delusions could provoke murder by exaltation of the imagination or by heightening of the passions. Conscience may warn of the horror of the act but "the injured will,
overcome by the violence of the impulsion, yields, and the man is deprived of moral liberty. He is the victim of a partial delirium*; he is a monomaniac...." [ibid. 366-367].

Esquirol writes: "Much more frequently than is supposed, even by the physicians, the affective faculties of the insane are perverted, indeed entirely suspended. The most moral of men possessing the mildest dispositions and the gentlest manners, and who were perfectly regular in their conduct, have confessed to me that ideas of homicide had tormented them during their delirium, particularly at the commencement of their disorder. These deplorable impulses are provoked neither by hatred nor by anger, as with furious maniacs. They are, on the contrary, spontaneous, fugacious, and foreign even to the habitual delirium. They are not produced from without, either by conversation or acts." [ibid. 366-367]

Esquirol's third category of homicidal monomania seems to have particular relevance for the case of Woyzeck: "The impulse is sudden, instantaneous, unreflective, stronger than the will; the murder is committed without advantage or motive and often upon beloved persons" [ibid. 368]. Yet both Woyzeck and Franz in Büchner's portrayal show some degree of premeditation in the apparently deliberate prior purchase of the knife with which the murder was to be done. Woyzeck's (though not Franz's) behaviour after the crime would also

*De Saussure is here and elsewhere mistranslating the French "délire" which, in this context, means delusion.
correspond to Esquirol's account: "When the monomaniac has accomplished his thought and has killed, the affair is over for him. The object has been attained and after the murder he is calm; he does not usually try to hide." [ibid. 368]

De Saussure comments that Esquirol's cases probably covered a wide range of clinical entities from paranoia to neurosis, and that Esquirol took insufficient account of how the symptom of "partial delirium" evolved [ibid. 369].

It was as a result of proselytism by Esquirol's follower, Jean Étienne Georget (1795-1828), that monomania began to be used as a defence in the courts and that in 1828 the term monomanie homicide was first used [Goldstein, J. 162-166]. He so extended the concept that normal human feelings like nostalgia or sexual love or traits like fanaticism could, in certain circumstances, be classed as monomania. (The concept survives in such terms as kleptomania, megalomania or dipsomania.) Such a dilution of the definition of monomania obviously provided ammunition for those who attacked its use, and the implications of the diagnosis became the focus of heated medico-legal debate during the 1820's and 1830's. Georget wrote: "Does partial insanity or monomania destroy the criminality of an act and remove responsibility from the insane person who has committed it? Civil and criminal law have answered this question affirmatively by making no distinction between general insanity and partial insanity."
[De la folie 1822 cited in de Saussure 370]. Despite Georget's assertion, the legal relevance was fiercely contested, mainly by lawyers, though it was supported by a majority of doctors.

Although the diagnosis of monomania lacked clinical exactness (in present-day terms) and was often backed in the courts by fragmentary and often superficial descriptions, the medico-legal debate surrounding monomania led in the end to closer clinical observation, which enhanced the status of psychiatry. This in turn brought about more humane treatment of the insane generally, not merely in the law-courts [ibid. 395-396, Dörner 199-200]. The significance of the debate for Woyzeck is that the term used in German psychiatry for partial insanity was fixe Idee, the diagnosis attached to Franz in the play, with the implication that some at least would have argued for his being not accountable for his crime.

The concept of Zurechnungsfähigkeit "Woyzeck, der Mensch ist frei..." [SWB I 174].

In contradistinction to the situation in France where clinical description and diagnosis were held to be relevant to questions of legal accountability, a considerable weight of opinion in Germany, both medical and legal, gave priority to the question of free will.

Concern to establish clear criteria on the question of
accountability before the law was part of the Enlightenment movement towards rationalising and liberalising the law. The seventeenth century jurist, Samuel Freiherr von Pudendorf, had already introduced the concept of "Freiheit/Unfreiheit" as the decisive issue, and this criterion was unequivocally stated in the laws of Prussia in 1794: "Wer frey zu handeln unvermögend ist, bei dem findet kein Verbrechen, also keine Strafe statt."* [cited Reuchlein 1985 12].

The years following the Congress of Vienna of 1815 brought a reversal of the trend towards greater liberalisation of the law, and this was expressed in a hardening of attitudes in the courts in respect of those who might be held to be unzurechnungsfähig [ibid. 17-18]. According to a recent Marxist interpretation: "Die Psychiatrie, dem Selbstverständnis nach der Staatsarzneikunde nahestehend, beugt sich, freilich ohne viel bestürmt worden zu sein, den Interessen des bürgerlichen Vergeltungsstrafrechts." [Trenckmann & Ortmann 336]. But the psychiatric profession was much more divided than this analysis implies. Hitzig, writing on the Woyzeck case two years after it had ended with the execution of the accused, expresses concern over what he sees as excessive liberalism in forensic psychiatry, of "eine so große Schlaffheit unter dem Mantel der Humanität .... wenn nun eine bereitwillige gerichtliche Arzneikunde noch jeden Affect zum Wahnsinn

* Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten von 1794 Teil II, Titel 20, Abschnitt I, §16
Thus, the second and third decades of the nineteenth century were of particular significance in the debate on what constituted accountability before the law. Not only was there a political issue between the reactionary and the liberal factions, but the psychiatric profession in Germany was seeking to establish its identity, and itself became divided in the process. Those, such as Heinroth, who saw the origin of madness in sin, and those who, like Hitzig, wished to establish respectable credentials for their profession tended to align themselves with the forces of reaction. Those who saw mental illness as organically determined were logically bound to argue for diminished responsibility to apply over a wide range, and were also concerned to have their views accepted both by the legal Establishment and by society at large.

It must be acknowledged however that the views held by important figures in the debate could be ambiguous. One of the most prolific writers on psychiatry, J.C.A. Heinroth, devoted much attention to the problems attending the definition of legal responsibility. This he held to be linked to the possession of reason, and he discussed the difficulties which could arise when considerations of reason no longer apply [Heinroth 1825 115]. Possession of reason
confers freedom to choose one's actions, and this freedom is impaired in conditions in which an individual's personality is disturbed: "Da die Persönlichkeit, und die mit ihr verbundene Freiheit der Person, die Grundbedingung aller staatsbürgerlichen Beziehungen ist, so folgt, daß alle Zustände des Menschen, in welchen der Character der Persönlichkeit vorübergehend oder auf die Dauer aufgehoben ist, auch die staatsbürgerlichen Beziehungen der Menschen aufheben, während der Zeit und so lange sie Statt finden."

[ibid. 121]. These conditions apply to nearly all forms of mental disturbance. Heinroth writes, referring to: "Zustände ... welche man gewöhnlich Geisteszerrüttungen, Verstandesverwirrungen, Wahnsinn, Gemüthskrankheiten, Seelenkrankheiten überhaupt usw. nennt. Alle diese Zustände, so sehr sie ihren Äußerungen nach verschieden seyn mögen, haben das Gemeinschaftliche, daß in ihnen nicht bloß die Freiheit, sondern das Vermögen zur Freiheit selbst untergangen ist."

[Heinroth 1818 36]. Thus by implication he is making a case for diminished responsibility in the eyes of the law to apply over a wide spectrum of disturbance. At the same time, in relation to individual cases, he could take a very restricted view of what constituted Unzurechnungsfähigkeit, as in the case of Woyzeck, where Clarus claimed Heinroth as one of the authorities supporting his view of the accused's accountability.
Heinroth describes in great detail the signs of Unfreiheit, the list containing a great variety of symptoms of psychiatric illness. It must be said that the particular symptoms exhibited by Woyzeck, namely persecutory delusions and the hearing of voices, are not specifically mentioned. There is however a general implication that the individual in a state of Unfreiheit is acting under some inner compulsion. The importance of the inappropriateness of speech or action to a given situation is also repeatedly stressed.

A number of other writers recognised the equation of Zurechnungsfähigkeit with Freiheit, the latter consisting of the freedom to follow the dictates of reason. A further implication was that, in this sense, some were in any case less free than others, and that greater responsibility before the law was borne by "einen mit höherer Vernunft begabten, wohl erzogenen und ausgebildeten Mensch", than for someone who lacked those advantages [Mende 269]. (The relevance of this factor to the situation of Woyzeck is obvious.) The degree of freedom of the individual thus became a more important question than whether he suffered from mental illness in whatever form. The stress laid on the question of freedom is validated on two grounds, the first referring to a priori principles, the second on the grounds that in the absence of the concept of free will all systems of law and punishment are meaningless [Henke 1825 237].
Henke, who intervened in support of Clarus' conclusions in the Woyzeck case, was one of the most influential writers on forensic psychiatry. His definition of freedom was complex: "Freiheit, als das Vermögen vernünftiger Wesen, sich der Herrschaft der Sinnlichkeit zu entziehen, und ihr Thun und Lassen der Idee des Sittlichen-guten unterzuordnen, ist die nothwendige Voraussetzung der Zurechnungsfähigkeit und somit der Strafbarkeit." [ibid. 236-237]. There is no specific association with madness here, but it is none the less implied. Henke is critical, for example, of Langermann to whom he attributes the view that "im tiefsten Wahnsinn noch immer einige Erkennung des Moralgesetzes sichtbar sey" [ibid. 242], which would indicate that some vestige of freedom remained.

A German variant on the concept of monomania was *amentia occulta* (in effect, symptomless madness). Five years after the execution of Woyzeck, Henke continues to argue that the implications for forensic psychiatry are so profound that very convincing proofs of its existence are required. He maintains that these have not been demonstrated. He does not dispute that forms of mania exist to which some so-called cases of *amentia occulta* may belong, for instance periodic mania, *fixe Idee* or pathological anger (*iracundia morbosa*) [Henke 1829 246-252]. He describes the ambivalence of some criminals towards their crime: "Ich habe eine große Anzahl
Irren gesehen, die im Besitze ihres Verstandeskrafte zu seyn schienen, die die Entschlüsseungen, zu welchem sie mächtig hingezygogen wurden, bejammerten: aber sie gestanden, daß sie alsdann im Innern etwas fühlten, wovon sie keine Rechenschaft geben könnten, daß sie im Gebrauch ihres Verstandes eine Störung erlitten, die sie nicht beschreiben könnten ..."

Where "Verstand" seems to be intact in such cases, it is in fact overwhelmed by passion amounting to insanity. [ibid. 263-267]. Only "Verstand" confers the freedom of choice and self-determination that allows the possibility of Zurechnungsfähigkeit and, conversely, Unzurechnungsfähigkeit can be said to obtain only when "Verstand" is lost [ibid. 276].

One specific example quoted by Henke shows parallels to the hallucinations experienced by Woyzeck: "Ein Irre wird plötzlich sehr roth und hört alsdann eine Stimme, die ihm zuruft: 'tödte ihn, tödte ihn, er ist dein Feind, tödte ihn und du wirst frei seyn.'" [ibid. 264]. The clear implication is, that in such a case, Henke would consider "Verstand" to be sufficiently deranged as to render the accused "unfrei". Henke had totally reversed his earlier views by the time he wrote his 1832 textbook of forensic medicine. Now he acknowledges that partial insanity and fixer Wahn may be concealed. The patient does not give voice to his mad ideas and the madness may only become manifest when a serious crime
has been committed. In naming this condition "verborgener Wahnsinn", he seems to be accepting the possibility of *amentia occulta*. Indeed he implies that if such a condition is not found, it is because the physician has not looked hard enough. If the course of events has been adequately investigated, then it will be found that: "der Wüthende habe wenigstens *im Anfall* Vernunftgebrauch und Selbstbewußtseyn verloren." [Henke 1832 147-148].

As to the wider question of accountability before the law, this can only concern itself with free individuals, possessed of reason. As far as the courts are concerned psychiatric diagnosis is irrelevant: "Es kommt demnach für die Rechtspflege weniger darauf an: ob die in die Untersuchung stehende Person blödsinnig, melancholisch, wahnsinnig u.s.s. sey? als vielmehr darauf: ob sie für unfrei erklärt werden müsse?" [ibid. 134-136].

The changing and sometimes confusing views of Henke demonstrate the uncertainties and contradictions that typified psychiatric thinking at the time. There were opposing factions in the debate on what constituted liability before the law, but the lines on which that debate was conducted were now by no means clearly drawn. When a recognised authority like Henke could, in 1825, concur with Clarus when he stated that it was appropriate to punish an accused (Woyzeck), who heard voices telling him to kill, then in 1829
describe similar hallucinations as indicating *Unfreiheit*, and therefore exemption from legal accountability, it becomes understandable that scientific criteria in such matters could take second place to (often political) prejudice.

Groos, who was in 1824 physician superintendent of the mental hospital at Pforzheim, took a rationalistic, common-sense approach: "Indem also der Verbrecher das Verbrechen begehen wollte, in dem Augenblick, da er es beging, der Tugendhafte die Tugend ausüben wollte, wird mit Recht der böse Wille gestraft, der gute belohnt. Gehen wir in unsern Schlüßen philosophirend weiter und sagen mit Hrn. Heinroth: der Verbrecher, indem er das Verbrechen begehen wollte, hätte es trotz dieses seines Wollens unterlassen können, so verwandelt sich die vorige Klarheit in finstere Nacht; denn, wenn man nicht alles trügt, so heißt dies gerade so viel als: der Wille, etwas zu thun, hätte zu gleicher Zeit auch der Wille, es auch nicht zu thun, seyn können." [Groos 26]. This position he rejects as against all the laws of logic (yet it is exactly this ambivalence which is explored in Woyzeck).

Groos postulates a "Lebensfreiheit", which is a matter of everyday observation, and nothing to do with metaphysical concepts of freedom and necessity: "Der Mensch übt seinen Willen frei aus, er handelt also seinem Willen gemäß." [ibid. 28]. The "freedom" of an accused person can only be
understood in terms of his motives. In regard to motive however, Groos recognises that there is an often hidden necessity which is a part of human activity, even when the individual appears to be acting as a free agent: "Und somit ist selbst die Bemennung: 'Selbstbestimmungsfähigkeit' hypothetisch, mehr aussagend als erwiesen, also unpassend." [ibid. 29]. Thus Groos' "Lebensfreiheit" is heavily qualified and in the latter part of his article, he engages in the metaphysics he had earlier rejected, and postulates a determinism, which is not fatalistic or materialistic, but is derived from "dem angeborenen Zuge des Menschen nach Gott." Such freedom as exists is conditional.

The depth of ambiguity in Groos' position becomes clear, when having allowed a theologically based determinism, he attacks polemists like Grohmann and Meckel, who argued that crime arising from delusion or other mental disturbance necessarily involved Unfreiheit. Follow these arguments, writes Groos, and all penal institutions should be converted to madhouses. "Von Wissenschaft, deren Charakter sie (sc. "Freiheitslehre") ganz verläugnet, kann nicht mehr die Rede seyn." Only rational scepticism can save forensic medicine [ibid. 93-94].

Pfeufer, writing in 1826, points to the dangers of relying on assessments of Freiheit and Unfreiheit: "Wenn die Gerichtsarzte die Lehre von der Zurechnungsfähigkeit auf die Freiheit des Handelnden gründen, so müssen sie, bei den
verschiedenen Begriffen, die man mit Freiheit verbindet, nothwendig zu sehr unsichern und selbst zu ganz falschen Resultaten gelangen." [Pfeufer 449]. He quotes the Bavarian penal code as excluding from liability to punishment "Rasende, Wahnsinnige, Verrückte". The problem then is that classifications of mental illness and psychiatric diagnosis lack precision. "Wahnsinn" occurs in two forms, complete and partial, both excluding the possibility of legal accountability, even, in the case of partial insanity, "zwar selbst dann, wenn das während der Herrschaft der fixen Idee verübte Verbrechen nicht in dieser Idee seinen Grund hatte ..." [ibid. 451].

Medico-legal practice
It is in the detail of actual cases, rather than in theoretical argument, that a clearer picture of these issues emerges.

An insight into both the motives and the methods of those practising forensic psychiatry is provided by Hedrich in a case report in 1823 concerning a man alleged to have killed his father. He is aware of the public interest in matters of crime and punishment and refers to the Schmolling case. It is his intention both to advance knowledge of the psychology of the criminal and to defend doctors against the charge of the too ready use of the concept of Unfreiheit [Hedrich 197-198].
His examination of the mental state of the accused was conducted "theils durch Ocularinspektion, theils durch Befragung nach seiner physischen Entwicklung von Jugend auf zu erforschen, um zu sehen, ob er von der leiblichen Seite her eine feindselige Einwirkung auf seinen Gemüthzustand irgend bedingt worden seyn könne." [ibid. 199]. So the emphasis was firmly placed on the somatic rather than the psychological, on physical development rather than possible emotional factors. In this regard, the significant factors were held to be an absence of a family history of mental illness, and no evidence of worms, convulsions or sleepwalking [ibid. 201].

Even in his assessment of the accused's temperament, the main emphasis was placed on physical examination, in this instance the quality of the pulse: "Des Inquisiten Puls zeigte sich mäßig voll und eher langsam, als schnell, sein Temperament möchte eher phlegmatisch, als melancholisch zu nennen." [ibid. 201]. Whereas present-day usage assigns to "temperament" a mainly psychological meaning, Hedrich was attaching to the term a somatic reference that was essentially that of Galen.

There was some inquiry into the present mental state of the accused. His intellectual status was assessed by his ability to read and to remember dates, and by these criteria his "Ueberlegung" and "Urtheilkraft" were said to be unimpaired. His emotional state, rather like that of Woyzeck when he was
examined by Clarus, ranged from the relaxed to the apathetic: "... er sah mich bei seinen Antworten arglos und unbefangen an, so lange meine Fragen nicht seine jetzige Lage und Aussichten in die Zukunft betrafen, dann aber verlor er sich in die Trivialen: 'Mag's doch seyn, wie's will' u.s.w. ..." [ibid. 202]

Under the law of Saxony at the time, the death penalty could not be carried out in the absence of a confession [ibid. 197], and it seems likely that part of the medical examiner's task was to try to encourage or extract confession. The accused was made to attend the postmortem examination and to lay his hand on the head wounds on his father's corpse. He was then asked if he had caused them [ibid. 184].

Insofar as Hedrich's intention was to counter the charge that his profession was being soft on crime by overusing the defence of Unfreiheit, he achieved this by not himself using that defence. The accused's behaviour at the trial where he at first confessed, then withdrew his confession is attributed by Hedrich to "Verlocktheit und Bosheit", and he writes of the accused's capacity to produce "neue Märchen". His final conclusion was that there was "weder Beschränktheit seiner Beurtheilungskraft, noch Spuren irgend einer besonderen Geistesbeschaffenheit wahrzunehmen" [ibid. 204-206]. The outcome for the accused is not recorded.
Different conclusions were drawn in two cases reported in the same volume of the Zeitschrift für die Staatsarzneikunde which contained Hedrich's report. In the first, Meyn, a state physician in Schleswig, deals with the case of a young woman who drowned her child. No evidence of mental illness was found, but the possibility of a state of "Schlaftrunkenheit" was raised, and as in a similar case reported by Ernst Büchner [Büchner, E. 39-72], the question of legal responsibility was referred to the local Medical College. Their opinion was delivered in terms which showed some insight into and understanding for the psychological pressures to which the accused had been subject [Meyn 331-339]. Meyn takes some pride that, in this instance, the letter of the law was not followed, and that instead of punishment the accused was admitted to the insane asylum at Schleswig [ibid. 339].

The second case, reported by Dapping, physician in charge of an insane asylum in Bavaria, demonstrates yet another response to the problems facing the doctor in giving an opinion on Zurechnungsfähigkeit. The case concerned the murder by a woman of three of her four children. There was evidence that for four years before the crime, she had had spells of wandering aimlessly and talking without apparent reason. She had felt possessed by evil spirits. She was tormented by jealousy of her husband, and was obsessed by
religious thoughts and by the fear of punishment. She gave as her reason for the murder her wish that her children should be safe in heaven, and she wanted to be executed so that she could join them there. However she was apparently normal on the day of the murder, and Dapping quotes Reil, Hoffbauer and Pinel to support his view that this is a "Verstandeszerrüttung ... mit dem Wahnsinn nicht wesentlich verbunden", a case of melancholia occulta [Dapping 355]. At the same time she suffered from "falsche Vorstellungen" which caused her to misinterpret her own situation and her relationships to her family, and so could be said to be suffering from a "fixer Wahn" [ibid. 363]. The question here arises how Dapping, in the face of what might be said to be substantial evidence of mental illness, has to have recourse to concepts like melancholia occulta and fixer Wahn. A likely explanation is that the medical debate was so lively, and produced so much pressure on those engaged in forensic psychiatry for or against the concept of monomania and amentia occulta, that the process of diagnosis sometimes became distorted.

A view from Darmstadt
The contribution by the Darmstadt psychiatrist, Amelung, to the debate on Zurechnungsfähigkeit (1827) makes specific reference to Clarus and to the case of Woyzeck. Amelung sees the case as arising in the setting of a polemic concerning the nature of mental illness. On the one hand are the
proponents of materialism and determinism, subscribing to Gall’s Hirnorganenlehre. (Grohmann is cited as their leader). On the other hand are those who believe in a purely moral basis for mental illness. Clarus is seen as belonging to this school, and his Gutachten on the Woyzeck case as a contribution to the polemic: "Clarus ist in seinem Gutachten über den Mörder Woyzeck dem immer mehr überhand nehmenden Determinismus mit Erfolg entgegengetreten. Er verwarf die allzu große Beschränktheit des freien Willens und zeigte, daß allerdings eine Begierde nach Rache, ein Hang zum Morde vorkommen kann, ohne daß Seelenstörung zugegen ist." [Amelung 1827 48-49]. Amelung holds the moral dimension to be paramount. Things have gone too far, and moral freedom is being denied: "Ich glaube vielmehr, daß es für die menschliche Gesellschaft, zur Aufrechtung der Gesellschaft, der Moralität und der Sitten überhaupt besser sey, hierin etwas strenger als zu nachsichtig zu seyn ..." [ibid. 50].

Amelung discusses Georget on manie sans délire, periodic insanity and "partielle Verrücktheit, oder fixe Idee". Partial insanity is "ein Leiden des Verstandes" with its origin in a faulty "Einbildungskraft" and often following an illness involving an inflammation of the brain or "Nervenfieber". As an example of fixe Idee, he quotes a case of his own, a man who suddenly begins to hold the idea that he is being poisoned and shoots at the friend he believes is
Amelung describes how he "erstaunte über den Verstand dieses Mannes, der in allen Dingen sehr richtig dachte, ausgenommen daß er bei seiner fixen Idee blieb, er sey vergiftet worden ..." [ibid. 66]. Whereas the possibility of partial or temporary madness is acknowledged, the possibility of amnesia occulte as a form of mental illness is firmly denied: "Eine Wuth ohne Irreseyn gibt es nicht, sofern sie als eine Art der Geisteszerrütung betrachtet werden soll. Wo sie vorkommt, steht sie unter der Kategorie des Lasters und muß bestraft werden." [ibid. 70].

Although Amelung distinguishes between degrees of responsibility attached to various forms of madness, his observations reveal yet another source of ambiguity. In his clinical work he seems to adhere to an organic theory of pathogenesis (see Amelung 1824), but in his attitudes to legal accountability he lays stress on the moral freedom of the accused. He does not so much deny that crime associated with mental illness is materially (organically) determined, as fail, as Clarus does in the Woyzeck case, to recognize that clear signs of mental disturbance are present. The position he has taken in regard to public morality and the need for punishment renders such distortion logically necessary. The physician, who liberalized the care of his patients in his Hofheimer asylum [Schneider 176-178], still took a firm line against those, possibly insane, who became involved in crime.
Büchner's question, posed in a letter to Minna, and repeated in Dantons Tod: "Was ist das, was in uns lügt, mordet, stiehlt?" might have been answered by Franz Joseph Gall by the assertion: "It's all in the convolutions of our brains." Gall practised medicine at first in Vienna, later in Paris. He derived his theory of the localisation of bodily and mental faculties in specific parts of the brain from extensive dissection and from the study of hundreds of skulls. He postulated twenty-seven faculties or "Grundkräfte", each with its particular centre in one of the convolutions of the brain. The faculties ranged from simple instincts, such as sexual drives, to more complex social instincts, such as love for children and capacity for friendship. Among the more negative qualities which were held to have their own locations in the brain were "Würg- und Mordsinn" and "Hang zum Stehlen" [Oehler-Klein 1990 27-30]. In one sense Gall's ideas were a development from Lavater's theories on the relationship between character and physiognomy. The important difference was that, whereas for Lavater a person's features were an expression of his nature, for Gall human character and intellect were a function of the interaction of a number of organs of the brain [Temkin 277-278]. In the extension of Gall's ideas which came to be known as phrenology, it was supposed that the predominance of certain faculties could be deduced from the external
configuration of the skull.

The moral implications of such hypotheses were profound, and from 1801 accusations of endangering public morality and religion were directed against Gall's teachings. The private, though very fashionable, lectures given by Gall in Vienna were banned and it was these attacks that determined Gall's move to the freer atmosphere of Paris [ibid. 278].

The inadequacy of anatomically based explanations of human behaviour was the subject of much criticism. Büchner himself, in the review "Über den Selbstmord", dating from his schooldays, satirises the empirical basis of Gall's researches (as pursued by Professor Osiander in Göttingen):

"Es fehlt nur wenig, daß der Herr Professor in seinem heiligen Eifer über den blinden Heiden eine Sektion des Cato vornahme und beweise, daß derselbe einige Lot Gehirn zu wenig gehabt hätte" [SWB XI 21].

Although Goethe responded positively to Gall's theories, saw in them many parallels with his own anatomical interests, and described Gall's investigations as "der Gipfel der vergleichenden Anatomie" [cited in Oehler-Klein 1990 215], it was clear that their philosophical implications stood in stark opposition to the optimism of the Enlightenment. Where were the possibilities of progress and the perfectibility of man, when man's potential was almost totally circumscribed by
the anatomy of his brain? It is true that Gall had hypothesised the existence of an "Erziehungsfähigkeit", but the potential of this was itself subject to predetermined limitations. The Romantics were able to accept, and indeed were enthusiastic about, physiognomy in the Lavater mode, but the determinism implicit in Hirnlehre was anathema [Temkin 278]. E.T.A. Hoffmann drew a self-portrait, satirically annotated to show "die Mephistophelesmuskel oder Rachgier und Mordlust - Elixiere des Teufels". In Das Fräulein von Scuderi, Cardillac is portrayed as subject to powerful impulses to steal and to murder, but is able to resist them, in contradistinction not so much to Gall's theories as to popular interpretations of them which would have Mordlust seen as irresistible [Oehler-Klein 1990 280 and 287].

Gall was not simplistically materialist and determinist, though he was held to be so by most of his contemporaries. He held moral freedom to be subject to biologically determined motivations: "La liberté morale n'est donc autre chose que la faculté d'être déterminé et de se déterminer par des motifs." [Temkin 285].* Man possesses a number of higher organs (faculties) in the brain, providing a number of motivations, and has a choice between conflicting motives. In effect, action is determined by the strongest of these motives, which will often be a "moral" motive. The question of choice is

* from Gall/Spurzheim: Anatomie et physiologie du système nerveux en général, et du cerveaux en particulier Paris 1818
thus a deeply ambiguous one [Temkin 286]. What Gall was proposing resembled nothing so much as a non-theologically based concept of original sin. Man was endowed with benevolence, a religious sense and other socially desirable qualities. He was also endowed with the capacity to murder and steal. Whether or not such crimes were actually committed, whether the impulses which might lead to them were resistible or irresistible, depended on anatomical and physiological factors in the brain. It was thus possible to use the Hirnorganenlehre to argue that crime was a disease.

Büchner was clearly familiar with Gall's theories, and there are many references in the literary works. A version of the opening speech of Dantons Tod, subsequently discarded, makes play with an allusion to cuckoldry: "Sieh die hübsche Dame... Sie hat ungeschickte Beine und fällt leicht, ihr Mann trägt die Beulen dafür auf der Stirn, er hält sie für Witzhöcker und lacht dazu" [cited in Oehler-Klein 1985 18].

Oehler-Klein writes that the confusion whereby syphilitic gummata of the skull are interpreted by the sufferer as "bumps" indicating intelligence was a common satirical theme of the times, and suggests that Büchner is here engaged in satirising Gall, rather than the gullibility of the cuckold. It is however likely that Büchner the comparative anatomist had considerable respect for the systematic energy with which Gall conducted his efforts to provide an empirical basis for
complex human variability, however bizarre these efforts may seem to us now. A reference to these comparative studies occurs in Danton's exchange with a citizen on the nature of those who could instigate the Terror:

Bürger. Wie kann man nach einem solchen Verhör soviel Unglückliche zum Tod verurtheilen?

Danton. ... die Revolutionsmänner haben einen Sinn, der anderen Menschen fehlt, und dieser Sinn trägt sie nie.

Bürger. Das ist der Sinn des Tiegers. [IV,2]

Gall's localisation of the Mordsinn was based on comparison of the brains of carnivores and herbivores, and an area of the temporal lobe, particularly prominent in the former, was held to be the site of the instinct for slaughter. The allusion to the tiger relates to Gall's assertion that the tiger kills even when it is not hungry, and that the corresponding centre in its brain is particularly developed [Oehler-Klein 1985 24]. Heinroth, too, recognises the presence of animality and particularly of tiger-like qualities in man: "Kreiset dann das Blut des Tigers in seinen Adern?" [Heinroth 1833 138]. For him however this did not result from anatomical features shared by animal and man, but was the result of moral degradation which could eventually produce organic change.

For Woyzeck many of Gall's ideas are of significance. The reference in the fairground scene to "Viehsionomik" harks
back to Lavater, but the whole concept of equating man's faculties with those of animals derives from Gall. The barker's: "Alles Erziehung habe nur eine viehische Vernunft..." should be regarded in the light of Gall's demonstration of the large number of anatomical features shared by the brains of animals and of humans, and his assertion that the possession of reason is the outcome of a chance development of the antero-superior parts of the brain [Temkin 283-284]. Above all, the questions posed as to the nature of freedom, both in the abstract: "Woyzeck, der Mensch ist frei...", and in particular of just what kind of freedom is available to Franz, are central to the play and are foreshadowed in the complexities of Gall's arguments regarding free choice.

Gall's theories stood in contradiction of psychiatric notions which found the source of mental illness in sin and depravity, and which linked Zurechnungsfähigkeit to the degree of freedom and the moral sense possessed by the accused. We shall see that Büchner located Franz's madness neither in sinfulness nor in organic causes, whether determined by a diet of pulses or by anatomical predisposition.

Büchner's response to Gall was more ambivalent than that of the Romantics. In the fairground scene he could satirise some of the more foolish inferences derived from his teaching. But
the basis of these teachings in anatomical research would have appealed to Büchner the scientist. More fundamentally, there was something in the pessimism and fatalism implicit in Gall's philosophy something which accorded with Büchner's own world view.

The Woyzeck case

Debate over the rightness of the proceedings which led to the execution, on 27 August 1824, of the accused Woyzeck, was conducted both in the professional and in the public press. In his introduction to the Clarus Gutachten, Henke gives some account of the public concern. Notable among the newspapers which took up the issue was the Jena'sche Literaturzeitung in which, in 1824, appeared a criticism of the second Clarus Gutachten, criticism which led to the making public of the contents of the earlier Gutachten of 1821, which now appeared with an introduction and vindication of Clarus by Henke himself. Earlier, Nürnberg newspapers had carried reports of Woyzeck having previously suffered from mental illness, and it was these that had led to the court appointing Clarus to investigate the accused's mental state.

In the medical debate, lines were drawn by the publication of two broadsheets:

The debate was bitter, with accusations of bad faith on both sides. Grohmann wrote of: "der Leipziger Weizeck, für den ich, freilich zu spät, mein Gutachten in der Nasse'schen Zeitschrift gegen herrn Dr. Clarus gab, ist auch das luculenteste Beispiel, was eine einseitige gerichtsarztlichte Beurtheilung schadet." [Grohmann 1830 122]

The *Zeitschrift für Criminal-Rechts-Pflege in den preußischen Staaten* of 1825 carried reviews by a judge, signing himself "D.H.," of the Clarus and Marc broadsheets. In respect of the Clarus paper, the reviewer contents himself with summarising Clarus' version of events and of his

*The initials "D.H." conceal the identity of the Berlin jurist, Julius Eduard Hitzig, a friend and the first biographer of E.T.A. Hoffmann. As the editor and publisher of the *Zeitschrift für die Criminal-Rechts-Pflege in den preußischen Staaten*, he was from 1825 to exert an important influence in legal circles throughout Germany [Segebrecht 1967 86-89]. Segebrecht sees him as a representative of the liberal-enlightenment concept of law, in contrast to the reactionary-Romantic stance of Hoffmann [ibid. 131]. In the light of his review of the issues raised by the Woyzeck case, he might be regarded as rather less than liberal. However attitudes among jurists were less clear-cut than might at first appear.
findings, concluding with the conclusion that there were no
grounds for believing that Woyzeck was "im Zustande einer
Seelenstörung" before, during or after the murder. He
acknowledges but does not dwell on Marc's assertion that
Woyzeck was physically, and almost certainly, mentally ill
("gemüthskrank") at the time of the crime.

The reviewer does however quote at length, and with obvious
approval, the section where Clarus deals with Marc's
arguments regarding a defence of *amentia occulta* (a defence
which had already been adduced in the Schmolling case). For
Clarus the implications are that once it has been admitted as
a defence then one would have to admit a mania for arson,
brawling or thieving, "und am Ende für ein jedes Verbrechen
einen besonderen Trieb oder einen instinktartigen Zwang, eine
Notwendigkeit des Handelns..... hierdurch aber die Wirkung
der Gesetze zu lähmen, und die gerichtliche Medizin um ihr
wohlverdienstes Ansehen zu bringen." ["D.H." 496]. "Ein
blinder Antrieb zu verbrecherischen Handlungen" should only
be accepted as a defence in cases where there is over­
whelming confusion.

Finally the question of legal responsibility is considered in
relation to overexcitable temperaments like that of Woyzeck.
It is not a case of whether it is easy or difficult to resist
impulses, but of the possibility or impossibility of
resisting them: "Erst da, wo diese Möglichkeit aufhört, ist
die Grenze der Zurechnungsfähigkeit, welche die gerichtliche Medicin festhalten muß...." [ibid. 498].

D.H. ends with a flourish: "Hört, hört, ihr Aerzte! Dann werdet ihr nicht zu klagen haben, daß wir Richter euch nicht hören."

The questioning of the rightness of the court's decision did not end with Woyzeck's execution, nor even in the months and years immediately following. In 1835, a year before Büchner began work on the play, the psychiatrist J.B. Friedreich wrote of the sentence as exemplifying "keine Zurechnungsfähigkeit leider, aber wieder einen schauderhaften Justizmord" [cited in Reuchlein 1985 45]. Even forty years after the event, the case was still being referred to (by a psychiatrist J.A. Schilling) as a judicial murder [ibid. 46]. It is clear that Woyzeck was widely seen as a victim of a reactionary judiciary, carrying out the policies of a reactionary government.

Other influences were at work, however, than those of political reaction. The emergent profession of psychiatry, and especially of forensic psychiatry, in Germany was concerned to achieve a respectable identity. We have seen how, in this process, the definition of Zurechnungsfähigkeit became a central issue, doctors being concerned to establish the importance of their speciality to the courts, and at the same
time not to be appearing to be soft on criminals. The debate within the profession, which has been reviewed above, and the apparent indecisiveness of such authorities as Henke must be seen against this background.

At the same time, in the legal profession, there was a similar trend towards "Verfachlichung" [Schönert 54]. The late eighteenth century had seen a sharing of assumptions between the public at large and the judiciary on the nature of crime and the appropriateness of punishment. The first decades of the new century, however, saw increasing specialisation in legal training and a greater rigidity in matters of penal policy. The administration of justice became increasingly divorced from the influence of public opinion [ibid. 55].

Thus, Woyzeck the murderer became in a sense a victim of social and political movements which he would have been at a loss to understand.

The death sentence
As well as the rights and wrongs of particular convictions and the appropriateness of the death sentence in specific instances, death sentences in general were the subject of discussion in the medical press, with medical opinion for the most part opposing them. The question also, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, engaged non-
medical writers from a wide variety of backgrounds. In
Russia, the death penalty was abolished as early as 1754 for
all but political crimes, and this was followed in the 1780's
by abolition in Austria and Tuscany (though it was later re­
established) [Joyce 72]. Foucault points to a general
moderation in respect of physical punishments throughout
Europe in the later part of the eighteenth century, and in
Prussia from about 1780. This was true especially of public
displays of punishment, such as torture and execution, and
the change was, in some measure, cosmetic: "... on exclut du
châtiment la mise en scène de la souffrance. On entre dans
l'âge de la sobriété punitive" [Foucault 1975 19-20]. England
was almost alone in resisting the trend and in 1819 there
were no fewer than 223 categories of capital crime [ibid. 20]

In Germany, a common theme in relation to criminality was the
thin dividing line between virtue and evil, as in Schiller's
Der Verbrecher aus verlorener Ehre of 1785. Though moral law
and a sense of moral guilt were paramount, man's law, and
particularly the death penalty, were seen as crude and
drastic instruments to apply to issues involving such fine
judgment. A.G. Meißner, a jurist and philosopher wrote in
1790: "Wie sehr würden wir erstaunen, wenn eben das, was uns
glänzende Tugend zu seyn dünkte, der erste Schritt zum Laster
ward, und wie zweifelhaft würden wir oft seyn, wenn wir
dessen entscheiden sollten, ob das, was menschliche Gesetze mit dem
Tode bestrafen, und bestrafen müßten, vor den Augen des Weltrichters Barbarey oder Edelmuth seyn werde." [cited in Schönert 54].

J.C.A. Grohmann, Professor of Philosophy at Wittemberg in the 1820's, (who as we have seen was held to be a leader of those propounding the cause of materialism and determinism) marshalled the arguments against:

"Erstlich die richtige Kenntnis und Schätzung des menschlichen Gemüths fehlt." For instance, the fear of death is a disincentive to crime only as long as "das Glück die Fußtritte des Menschen beflügelt."

"...zweitens, weil der nähere Erfahrungsweise für die psychologische Heilkraft solcher Endurtheile fehlt." No penal theory can cite a single instance where the death penalty has prevented crime. Grohmann makes the perceptive observation that the carrying out of the death sentence with its religious ceremonial and drama might even, for some individuals, act as an incentive to crime, offering a legitimate route from life to death, from guilt to salvation.

"Drittens, für eine Theorie, wo der Nachsatz und Vordersatz ein Zirkel im Beweisen ist und zu dem Bedingten die Bedingung, zu der Bedingung der Grund fehlt." Arguments for the death penalty tend to be circular and the reasons adduced are not capable of scientific proof.
Thanks to the acceptance of new ideas in forensic psychiatry, Grohmann points out that, where there had been eight death sentences before, there were now only two. It becomes unthinkable to execute the remaining two, who should be put to a "Zuchthaus". The diminution in the number of death sentences carried out has not led to a rise in the number of murders, so it is reasonable to suppose that total abolition would not lead to a rise in crime. Injustice is increased rather than decreased by the exercise of the death penalty in cases where it is totally inappropriate, for instance in infanticide. [Grohmann 1823 273-331]

Whereas Grohmann argued from rational, humanistic and empirical grounds, arguments against the death penalty from the Christian viewpoint took the line that in such serious matters God alone has the right to judge [Günther 189-204].

It is indeed remarkable that, at a time when the gallows awaited those in England who committed quite minor offences against property, the sentence of execution was so rarely carried out in Germany, even for murder. Clarus in his introduction to the second Gutachten underlines the gravity of the death sentence on Woyzeck, in that it was "eine Handlung der strafenden Gerechtigkeit, wie sie der größere Theil der gegenwärtigen Generation hier noch nicht erlebt hat", and in a footnote draws attention to the last execution
in Leipzig, which had been carried out as long ago as 1790 [SWB I 488].

It was moreover extremely rare for an accused person, in whose case a second Gutachten had been required by the courts, to be executed. Meckel, writing in 1820, reviewed 42 such cases and found that in only two was Zurechnungsfähigkeit held to apply after the second Gutachten [Henkelmann 95]. The Woyzeck case therefore seems to have been exceptional in a number of ways.

The foregoing review of the medico-legal issues allows the supposition that, with another medical examiner, the outcome in the Woyzeck case might have been very different, and indeed that Büchner's dramatic fragment might never have been begun. It is time to investigate how Clarus came to his view of Woyzeck's condition.
J.C.A. Clarus, to whom was given the task of reporting on the mental state of the murderer Woyzeck, was Professor of Medicine at Leipzig and head of the Jacobsspital. The Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie of 1886 describes him as "in seinen Kreisen hochgeschätzter Arzt und sehr beliebter Lehrer".

Clarus on Zurechnungsfähigkeit

In 1828, Clarus published a pamphlet intended to justify his findings in the Woyzeck case*. He recognises that much contemporaneous medical thinking runs counter to his own, but claims Henke and Heinroth as his authorities. The question is not whether Wahnsinn or Verrückheit or any other psychiatric diagnosis is applicable, but whether a state of Freiheit or Unfreiheit exists. However his wide experience (500 cases over a period of 18 years) convinces him that the purposes of the court can be achieved "ohne Einmischung des Freiheitbegriffs" [Clarus 1828 7]. At the same time, Clarus devotes much space to the definition of freedom: the ability to formulate and carry through a course of action in the awareness of the outcome of that action for himself and others. The law can only be applied to those who are free in that sense. What is needed in court is agreement about what a judge may reasonably ask of a doctor, and what a doctor may reasonably answer. This "vermittelndes Prinzip" is

*Beitrag zur Erkenntnis und Beurtheilung zweifelhafter Seelenzustände Leipzig : Fleischer 1828
to be found in the question of freedom [ibid. 10-11]. But freedom is not a property of mind, and cannot be sought there; the fundamental factor is reason, "Vernunft", which consists of a subjective element, "Verstand", and an objective or outward element, "Willen". "Freiheit sey die Wirkung des durch die Vernunft geleiteten Willens" [ibid. 12-14].

By these criteria, "Vernunft oder vernunftmäßiger Gebrauch des Verstandes und Willens ... ist daher die Eigenschaft, deren Daseyn oder Nichtdaseyn nachgewiesen werden muß, so oft über die Zurechnungsfähigkeit eines Menschen Zweifel entstehen, keineswegs aber das Daseyn oder Nichtdaseyn der Freiheit ... Das Freiheitsprinzip ist aber nicht bloß unzureichend, sondern auch zu den von seinem Vertheidigern aufgestellten Zwecken entbehrlich." [ibid. 15-17]. For liability before the law to be valid, the individual's "Verstand" must be capable of formulating a course of action and anticipating its effects, and his "Willen" capable of making the choice from the number of alternatives that "Verstand" has been able to formulate. "Zurechnungsfähigkeit ist daher der Zustand eines Menschen, in dem es in seiner Macht steht, eine Handlung nach ihren Zweck, Mitteln und Folgen, so wie nach ihrem Verhältniß zum Gesetz zu berechnen und sich selbstständig für die Unternehmung oder Unterlassung derselben zu bestimmen, zurechnungsfähig aber ist derjenige, in dem sich die Bedingungen der Zurechnung vereinigen." [ibid. 17].
Having established his own philosophical position, Clarus attacks the motives of those who take a less strict view of accountability before the law, and by implication asserts his own integrity. Doctors plead in favour of a defendant out of mistaken ideas of humanity, out of ignorance or laziness, or out of fear of being attacked by the defence lawyers. Judges themselves are said not to be immune from such weaknesses [ibid. 26-27].

It is clear that Clarus is defending a view he passionately believed in - whether this coloured his judgement in the matter of Woyzeck is something to be explored in the context of the Gutachten themselves.

The Background
It was a well-established practice in German courts to require a medical Gutachten, or appraisal, to be submitted in cases where the state of mind of the accused was of importance to the question of culpability. Marx points to the influence of the tradition of Roman law in Germany, whereby criminals were judged by their motivation. Detailed comment on their mental state at the time of the crime was therefore more important than in countries where the traditions of the Common Law obtained [Marx 1968 165 footnote]. The procedure which Clarus followed in his second Gutachten on Woyzeck came very close to the form which was to be proposed as ideal by Heinroth in his Grundzüge der Criminalpsychologie oder die
Theorie des Bösen of 1833. How far the motivation for the crime was derived from dolus, evil intent, should be evaluated by investigation of all predisposing factors and the circumstances surrounding the act, and the subsequent actions and comments of the accused concerning the crime should be analyzed. A complete life history of the accused should be obtained and its significance for the nature of the crime assessed. The methods of investigation should include the gathering of information from others, observation of and interrogation of the accused on several occasions [ibid. 171-172]. A model of the thoroughness required to achieve such a standard is found in Ernst Büchner's Gutachten in the case of Gardist Jünger [Ernst Büchner 39-72]. However by Heinroth's criteria, the first Clarus Gutachten may be held to have been less than adequate.

We have seen that Clarus' own criteria for decision on the Zurechnungsfähigkeit of an accused person were based, not on the presence or absence of a recognizable mental illness, not even on the question of whether the accused could be held to be free or unfree, but on whether he was in possession of reason to a degree which allowed him to formulate a course of action in the awareness of what its outcome would be for himself and others [Clarus 1828 10]. We shall now examine whether the conclusions reached by Clarus in his two Gutachten are in accordance with the criteria which he himself laid down.
The first Gutachten - 16. Sept. 1821.

Clarus would later acknowledge that Woyzeck's state of mind was "zweifelhaft", even that it was without parallel in the annals of forensic psychiatry [S.W.B. I 489]. And where doubts arise on the culpability of an individual, then, Clarus asserts in his apologia: "Vernunft oder vernunftmäßiger Gebrauch des Verstandens und Willens... ist daher die Eigenschaft, deren Daseyn oder Nichtdaseyn nachgewiesen werden muß ..." [Clarus 1828 15].

As one might expect, in the first Gutachten little attention is paid to the question of possible diagnosis, and the only psychiatric term used is "fixe Idee", of which Clarus can find no evidence [SWB I 547]. More surprisingly, given the central importance that Clarus attaches to it, neither does "Vernunft", in its applicability to Woyzeck's situation, receive mention, and there is only brief reference to "Verstand": "Der Verstand, dessen Anlagen zwar nicht ausgezeichnet, aber doch mehr als mittelmäßig zu nennen sind ..." [ibid. 547]. This comment seems inadequate to the importance that Clarus would appear to be according to the concept of reason and understanding in relation to culpability. Similarly, there is, in the main part of the Gutachten, no direct reference to Woyzeck's freedom of action.

Only in his conclusions on the accused's culpability does
Glarus give this issue brief mention in that there is: "... kein Merkmal ..., welches auf das Daseyn eines kranken, die freye Selbstbestimmung und die Zurechnungsfähigkeit aufhebenden Seelenzustandes zu schließen berechtige" [ibid. 548]. On the issue of whether Woyzeck might have been subject to overpowering impulses, Clarus writes in a convoluted style which suggests a wish to appear suitably judicious: "Endlich giebt sich auch in den Aeußerungen des Inquisiten und in seinem ganzen Wesen auf keinerlei Art ein hoher Grad von Reizbarkeit des Temperaments, von Ungestüm und körperlichen Aufregung oder von Störrigkeit, Tücke und Bosheit zu erkennen, um daraus mit nur einiger Wahrscheinlichkeit den Schluß ziehen zu können, daß er zu denjenigen gehöre, welche, ohne in ihrem Bewußtseyn, oder in ihren Begriffen gestört zu seyn, dennoch in ihren Handlungen einem unwillkürlichen, blinden und wüthenden Antriebe folgen, welcher alle Selbstbestimmung aufhebt." [ibid. 547].

By contrast, Clarus does not mince his words in expressing his sense of Woyzeck's moral degeneracy. The next sentence reads: "Dagegen finden sich bei ihm desto deutlicher die Kennzeichen von moralischer Verwilderung, von Abstumpfung gegen natürliche Gefühle und von Gleichgültigkeit in Rücksicht der Gegenwart und Zukunft." And he continues: "So fehlt es dem Leben dieses Menschen an innerer und äußerer Haltung, und kalter Mißmut, Verdruß über sich selbst, Scheu vor dem Blick in sein Inneres, Mangel an Kraft und Willen..."
si ch zu erheben ...". He ends the statement of his findings with a comment on the apathy and absence of remorse shown by the accused. [ibid. 547-548].

Clarus' comments on Woyzeck's general appearance seem to have some reference to Lavater's ideas on criminal types, in that supposed signs of criminality are absent: "Seine Miene hat nichts Tückisches, Lauerndes, Abstoßendes oder Zurückschreckendes..." [ibid. 546]. Despite the absence of positive findings in this regard, the overall portrayal emerging from the first Gutachten is of a dull, brutish individual, without conscience, yet who shows no evidence of mental illness. Clarus mentions, without attaching any significance to them, two factors which might have led to some suspicion of disturbance. As a soldier Woyzeck is described as compliant and withdrawn to a degree that might by some have been regarded as pathological: ".. habe er .. sich immer etwas abgesondert gehalten, seinen Dienst pünktlich verrichtet..." [ibid. 542]. Further, the episode: ".. so habe ihm ... jemand, auf den er sich aber nicht besinnen könne, gesagt: 'Du bist verrückt und weißt es nicht.'" [ibid. 545], might well have referred to an overheard remark, but does carry something of the quality of an auditory hallucination.

It is not altogether surprising, given its intended readership, that the first Gutachten is for the most part written
in measured, legalistic style with statements carefully qualified: "Den Umgang mit dem weiblichen Geschlecht habe er zwar nicht sehr gesucht, aber auch die Gelegenheiten dazu nicht verschmäht, sich jedoch immer mehr zu einer Person gehalten, obwohl es ihm dabei ziemlich gleichgültig gewesen sey, ob diese es mit mehrern zu thun gehabt, oder nicht."

[ibid. 543]. Even allowing for the conventionality of language which Clarus no doubt regarded as appropriate to the situation, it is difficult to believe that he saw Woyzeck as much more than a "case", and perhaps not even a very interesting case. Besides, the statement on the accused's relationships with women is not accurate. The much more detailed history given in the second Gutachten shows that Woyzeck's mental disturbance became most marked at those times when he suspected his various partners of unfaithfulness.

The second Gutachten
It is clear that the second Gutachten was intended more as a justification for Clarus' initial recommendations and as a contribution to the public debate engendered by the Woyzeck case, than as a scientific contribution to the literature on Zurechnungsfähigkeit. Henke, in his editorial introduction to its publication in the Zeitschrift für die Staatsarzneikunde, writes that it is "ohne Zweifel aber auch für das grössere Publikum geeignet" [ibid. 487]. Clarus pays tribute to "dem würdigen Vertheidiger dieses Deliquenten ... obgleich
er in dieser Sache mein Gegner gewesen ist ..." [ibid. 489].

The choice of words here suggests that Clarus did not simply see himself as an expert witness serving the court, but as a participant in an adversarial contest.

That he was writing for the public, and not for the judiciary, is also apparent in a change of style: "...sieben Wunden..., an denen sie nach wenigen Minuten ihren Geist aufgaben, und unter denen eine penetrierende Brustwunde, welche die Zwischenrippenschlagader zerschnitten..." [ibid. 490]. Contrast this with the laconic "... und so sey die That geschehen...", which is all the account given in the first Gutachten [ibid. 544]. The later account is nearer the language of the Schauerroman, than of the medico-legal document, although it must be acknowledged that such horror-evoking devices are found often enough in the medical journals of the time, especially where the writer's aims are polemical.

Certainly there is evidence of the strong feelings surrounding the case, and of high drama, with the almost last-minute intervention of a "Privatmann" and a stay of execution and order for re-examination issued at 4 a.m. on 10 November 1822, three days before the execution was due to take place. The defence had asked for the re-examination to be carried out by another doctor, and suggested J.C.A. Heinroth. Clarus indicated his willingness for this to be done, but the court
rejected the defence application and ordered Clarus to undertake the task [ibid. 492-493]. Heinroth would have been likely to have adopted a similar moral stance to Clarus, and indeed Clarus claims him as one of the authorities on whom he based his approach. It might therefore seem at first surprising that the defence suggested his name. However we have noted that Heinroth argued the case for *Unzurechnungsfähigkeit* to be held to be applicable over a wide range of disorders. The defence may therefore have expected a more favourable opinion from him, than from Clarus. A comment by Heinroth on the Woyzeck case indicates that this expectation may not have been entirely without basis, in that he acknowledges the complexities of the issues involved, and that "solche Zustände" (sc. evidence of mental disturbance) may have existed: "... allein es ist ein Gegenstand der Untersuchung, und zwar nicht selten ein sehr schweriger, wenn und wie lange solche Zustände statt gefunden haben; und man kann sagen, daß gerade diese Art von Untersuchung die mühevolleste Aufgabe der gerichtlichen Arztes ausmacht. Wie wir noch unlängst in Sachsen ein Beispiel dieser Art an der ärztlich-gerichtlichen Untersuchung des Mörders Woyzeck aufzuweisen haben." [Heinroth 1825 122-123]. To have suggested a doctor who held mental disturbance to be organically determined and who might therefore be expected to take a deterministic view of Woyzeck's culpability would almost certainly have met with the refusal of the court.
Before submitting his new report, Clarus saw the accused on five occasions between 12 January and 21 February, 1823. He refers to "neuerdings aktenkundig gewordene Umstände, die mir, aus ärztlich-psychologischem Gesichtspunkte betrachtet, noch eine genauere Erörterung zu erfordern". It is not clear why the documents referred to were not available to Clarus earlier, but they did contain material indicating considerable psychological disturbance in the accused.

Significantly they show that that disturbance manifested itself at times of difficulties in relationships with women, especially where Woyzeck suspected his sexual partner of having dealings with other men. Settled in Leipzig in his mid-twenties, after six years of Wanderschaft, he formed an association with a young woman who lived in the same house. When, however, she later moved away into service and wished to end their relationship, he became threatening, and eventually struck her, splitting her head open [SWB I 494-495]. In 1810, during the period of his military service, he fathered a child by "einer ledigen Weibsperson, der Wienbergin". When he learned that she was consorting with others, his behaviour changed, he became withdrawn, irritable and suspicious. He began to have frightening dreams about the freemasons, and in his waking state feared that, since in these dreams he had learned the freemasons' secrets, he was in great danger. About the same time he experienced what may have been visual and auditory hallucinations: "Auch habe er ... einmal des
Abends am Schloßberge eine Erscheinung gehabt und Glockenläute gehört..." [ibid. 496]. The delusion of persecution by freemasons persisted after his discharge from the army and his return to Leipzig in December 1818.

During the two and a half years from then until the murder of Frau Woost in June of 1821, Woyzeck was for the most part unemployed, dependent for money on his mistress, drank heavily, and spent much time alone in his room engaged in "Pappenarbeit". In the summer of 1820 ("bis einige Wochen vor Michaelis"), he was hearing voices. He had the delusion that his heart was being pierced by a needle. He attributed this to the devil, and when he tried to pray, heard the devil's voice call: "Da hast du den lieben Gott." [ibid. 498].

About a month before the murder he bought a dagger with a broken handle, later telling Clarus that he had heard a voice calling: "Stich die Frau Woost in tot!" - wobei er gedacht: "Das tust du nicht", die Stimme aber erwidert habe: "Du tust es doch." [ibid. 501]. (In psychodynamic terms, this may be said to represent a verbalised internal conflict. Clarus does not record where Woyzeck thought the voices were coming from. In Woyzeck, Franz locates the voices outside his head, underground.)

As in the first Gutachten, Clarus adopts a moralistic tone, and sees the law of the courts as fundamentally a moral law.
He expresses his conviction ".. daß die Gerechtigkeit, die
das Schwert nicht umsonst trägt, Gottes Dienerin ist."

Woyzeck's condition is ultimately the result of moral
failings, and his fate before the law should be a warning to
the young against sinful behaviour: "Möge die heranwachsende
Jugend bei dem Anblicke des blutenden Verbrechers, oder bei
dem Gedanken an ihn, sich tief die Wahrheit einprägen, daß
Arbeitsscheu, Spiel, Trunkenheit, ungesetzähige Befriedigung
der Geschlechtslust, und schlechte Gesellschaft, ungeahnt
und allmählich zu Verbrechen und zum Blutgerüste führen
können" [ibid. 490]. There is an echo here of Oberlin's view
of the sources of Lenz's sickness, though the sadness and
compassion expressed by Oberlin is absent in Clarus.

Clarus is not above distorting the facts to fit his convict-
ions. Although often, after his discharge from the army, un-
employed, Woyzeck does not seem to have been idle by nature.
Gambling is not one of the failings listed elsewhere in the
Gutachten and, far from seeking out bad company, Woyzeck was,
on all the evidence, a withdrawn and solitary man.

By the time of his re-examination of the prisoner in January
and February of 1823, Woyzeck had, according to Clarus,
Improved considerably in his moral and mental state. This the
examiner attributed to a well-regulated life in prison,
 humane attention from, among others, the prison chaplain,
 reading of the Bible and not least to the experience of
having been face to face with death [ibid. 505]. Such an interpretation accords with Clarus' view of the moral basis of Woyzeck's disorder and can be seen to refer back to the views of those who in the latter part of the preceding century had practised and claimed success for the moral treatment of the insane.

It is clear that Woyzeck was much improved, and that his paranoid feelings were much less powerful. When asked why he had not at the time of his first examination told Clarus of his history and his feelings, Woyzeck explained this by his earlier sense of desperation, and his distrust of everyone, suspecting that all were persecuting him: "Er habe gedacht: wozu solle das viele Schreiben." He seemed now, according to Clarus, to feel the need to communicate and to have developed a capacity for introspection, neither perhaps surprising after a long incarceration [ibid. 505-506]. And it may be that he had taken at face value Clarus' suggestion that he should trust him, and not regard himself as on trial [ibid. 503].

Clarus' criteria for diminished responsibility were that:

1. At or around the time of the offence, the accused should be suffering from mental disturbance to a degree that affects perception or judgment, or

2. At or around the time of the offence, the accused should be acting under a blind instinctual impulse [ibid. 524].
In other words, and as Clarus would later assert in his apologia, the nature of the mental disturbance was unimportant. What mattered was whether and to what degree understanding and judgment were impaired, and whether the freedom of action was precluded by overwhelming impulse.

**Freedom of action**

Although Clarus makes no definite reference to Unfreiheit, there is now a clear indication that Woyzeck felt himself in the grip of powerful and compelling forces: "... bei stärkern Anreizungen aber sei ihm der Zorn in den Kopf und vor die Stirne gefahren, und habe ihn dergestalt überwältigt, daß er seiner nicht mehr mächtig gewesen. Namentlich habe er diese Abstufungen des Zornes bei seinen Zankereien mit der Woostin wahrgenommen, und sich bei der Verübung der Mordthat in einem solchen Zustande von Ueberwältigung befunden, daß er darauf losgestochen habe, ohne zu wissen, was er thue." [ibid. 508-509]. And again: "Diese Worte hätten ihn geärgert, und da habe ihn der Gedanke an das Messer und an seinen Vorsatz plötzlich wieder mit aller Macht ergriffen, und ihn mit einem Male dergestalt überwältigt, daß er darauf zugestoßen habe, ohne zu wissen was er thue."[ibid. 516]. Here we are given Woyzeck’s reported account of his feelings and, if this is taken at face value, it would go a long way to meeting Clarus' second criterion. We must assume therefore that Clarus did not accept it as true. Yet, if it were a
fabrication, this would imply a sophistication (and deviousness) on Woyzeck's part, of which there is no other evidence in the Gutachten.

Reference is made [ibid. 529] to the feeling Woyzeck had experienced "als müsse er die Leute auf der Gasse mit den Köpfen an einander stoßen." Clarus quotes Hoffbauer as describing this as a common type of experience among "Hypochondristen", but differentiates between involuntary thoughts, and action under irresistible impulse. Again, however from Woyzeck's own account, it seemed the impulses verged on the uncontrollable: "... er habe einen Gedanken, den er einmal gefaßt, und besonders unangenehme Vorstellungen, nicht leicht wieder los werden können, es seyen ihm, wenn er lange über etwas nachgedacht, zuletzt ganz die Gedanken vergangen; er sey dabei manchmal sehr ärgerlich gewesen und nach und nach menschenscheu, mißtrauisch und bitter geworden ... er sey dabei sehr leicht von Zorn ... überwältigt worden u. es sey ihm dabei gewesen, als ob er eine Kraft habe alles zu zerreißen..." [ibid. 518]. It is significant here that Clarus links these episodes to circulatory disturbance, which leads to some inconsistency in the matter of Woyzeck's freedom of action. If, as Clarus asserts: "Daß auch Woyzecks Benommenheit und seine finstere menschenscheue und reizbare Gemüthsstimmung von der körperlichen Anlage abhängig gewesen sey, kann nicht bezweifelt
werden." [ibid. 518], then Woyzeck's moods were organically determined and it could be argued that his freedom to act other than under the influence of the powerful impulses which resulted was correspondingly impaired.

In the end, it is Woyzeck's recall of events, the clearness of his intentions and the absence of any apparent disturbance in the days leading up to the murder, which are adduced by Clarus to support his opinion that Woyzeck was not under the influence of an overwhelming impulse and was thus fully accountable. He will go no further than to say that there was "Uebergewicht der Leidenschaft über die Vernunft" [ibid. 533].

_Vernunft/Verstand_

Clarus deals much more fully in the second Gutachten, than in the first, with the question of how much Woyzeck's understanding and his capacity to reason might have been affected. He acknowledges at the outset that this might be open to some doubt, and at the same time that it is the critical point at issue: 

"... als es zweifelhaft geworden war, ob er seines Verstandes mächtig, und mithin zurechnungsfähig sey, oder nicht..." [ibid. 488]. Clarus devotes a long paragraph to an assessment of Woyzeck's capacity to understand, and shows him to have been able to follow a consistent train of thought, and to recount in detail circumstances which they had previously talked about.
at the time of the first set of interviews eighteen months before. Such mistaken ideas as he expressed, are put down to his lack of education [ibid. 504-505]. It is the case, argues Clarus, that Woyzeck is subject to delusions and misconceptions, but these are not uncommon, especially where disorders of the sense organs are involved, and do not necessarily impair "dem freien Vernunftgebrauch" [ibid. 524]. "So wie ich nun glaube, mit psychologischen Gründe dargethan zu haben, daß Woyzecks Einbildungen blos als Sinnestäuschungen, Irrthümer und Vorurtheile, keineswegs aber Symptome eines kranken, den freien Vernunftgebrauch störenden Seelenzustandes betrachtet werden müssen ..." [ibid. 525].

Woyzeck's state of mind as revealed in the Gutachten
There is considerable evidence of what would now be regarded as serious psychopathology in the second Gutachten, symptoms which might now be held to be examples of paranoid delusions, ideas of reference, auditory hallucinations and thought disorder.

Clarus records in some detail the content of Woyzeck's delusion that he is in danger from the freemasons, and describes the convoluted reasoning which underpins it. The three streaks which he has seen in the sky correspond to the three parts of the Trinity and thus to the secret sign involving three fingers which he attributes to the freemasons. It is the possession of this knowledge that
places him in peril [ibid. 510]. The symptom is explained in terms of "theils Mangel an Kenntniß und Erziehung, theils Leichtgläubigkeit" [ibid. 518], not so much explaining, one might say, as explaining away. (Present-day psychiatry would seem to offer some support to Clarus' view, in that it defines delusions as "false beliefs, which are unaffected by a reasonable demonstration of their untruth or impossibility and are out of keeping with the cultural and educational background of the subject."* It cannot be argued, however that a belief that one's life was under threat from the Freemasons because of knowledge of their secrets was a belief shared by those of Woyzeck's social class and upbringing, in the sense that many might through lack of education still have believed that the earth was flat.)

There are a number of examples of what are now termed "ideas of reference", that is to say the belief, without reasonable foundation, that others are talking about one, especially in a hostile or critical way. Woyzeck hears an officer, who he believes might be a freemason say to his sergeant-major that if the soldier were to spit blood it should be immediately reported, "und es sey ihm gewesen, als ob er ihn dabei angesehen habe" [ibid. 511]. The hearing of voices ("sie erzählen sich einander etwas") was sometimes associated with the thought that people were calling him a fool [ibid. 513-514].

The hearing of voices seems to have taken many forms, sometimes female, sometimes male, sometimes soft, sometimes shrill ("es habe um ihn geschrieen"), and were often perceived as frightening, even although their message seemed to contain no particular threat, for example: "o komm doch". Significant for Büchner's later use of his source in the play, were the voices "Immer drauf", when Woyzeck was imagining his mistress dancing with another man, and the voices telling him to commit suicide: "Spring ins Wasser" [ibid. 513-516]. The voices, and the attendant anxiety, became much less of a problem when Woyzeck reduced his drinking, and Clarus emphasises that no voices were heard in the week before the murder [ibid. 515].

One symptom common to a number of psychotic conditions is the inability to sustain thinking on a particular object and there is passing reference to this: "Verminderung der gewohnten Kraft einen Gegenstand des Nachdenkens lange zu verfolgen" [ibid. 523]. It is noteworthy that Büchner shows that when Franz is under stress his capacity for sustained thought all but disintegrates. Another possible form of thought disorder may be represented in Clarus' reference to "momentane Unfähigkeit zum Nachdenken überhaupt" [ibid. 523]. He cites Woyzeck's own account of this experience: "Uebrigens habe er einen Gedanken, den er einmal gefaßt habe, nicht leicht wieder los werden können, besonders unangenehmene
Vorstellungen, und dabei öfters lange hinter einander immer auf einen einzigen Gegenstand hingedacht, bis ihm zuletzt ganz die Gedanken vergangen seyen und er gar nicht mehr habe denken können" [ibid. 509]. This shows two features commonly occurring in schizophrenic illness. The compulsion to go on ruminating on one topic has been called "Klebedenken" or perseveration [Bleuler 27]. By contrast, "nicht mehr ... denken können" may describe either an extreme degree of the impoverishment of thought which can follow upon perseveration or might indicate the phenomenon known as thought blocking: "At times the patient is able to speak easily and readily, move quite freely, and then again thinking or movements will halt freeze, coagulate. However, on closer scrutiny one finds that the basis of the blocking generally lies in the significance the blocked chain of thought has for the patient." [ibid. 35]. Bleuler's comment on the inhibitory process involved could apply to the Gutachten's "besonders unangenehme Vorstellungen". 

Most of the indications in the second Gutachten are that any disturbance Woyzeck may have suffered from lay in the past, but allusions to continued brooding, which resulted in him still being in a state of self-deception over the significance of dreams and apparitions ("Geistererscheinungen u.s.w.")) suggest that all was not well, and that he may still have been suffering from delusions [SWB I 506].
The absence of any signs of mental illness is asserted unequivocally. "Wahnsinn, Tollheit, Melancholie" are specifically excluded [ibid. 505]. Even the idea that Woyzeck might be suffering from a partial insanity is not entertained. The very factor that leads the Doctor in the play to diagnose an aberratio mentalis partialis: ".. Er thut alles wie sonst, rasiert sein Hauptmann?" [ibid. 418], confirms Clarus in his view of Woyzeck's normality: "So wie übrigens die tägliche Erfahrung lehrt, daß Personen, welche sich in dieser Anlage befinden," (this follows a list of Woyzeck's symptoms) "im Stande sind, allen ihren bürgerlichen und moralischen Pflichten zu genügen, so sagt auch Woyzeck, daß ihn alles dieses nicht gehindert habe, seine Geschäfte ordentlich zu besorgen, und mehrere Äußerungen von ihm ... geben zu erkennen daß bei ihm die Freiheit des Willens in diesem Zustande keineswegs aufgehoben gewesen sey." [ibid. 518].

Again, although he does not refer to the concept of partial insanity, Clarus seems to be arguing against its applicability to the present case: "Sinnestäuschungen und namentlich die Einbildung ohne objektive Veranlassung Töne und Stimmen zu vernehmen, wenn sie sich zu irgend einer Seelenkrankheit ... gesellten, niemals isolirt erscheinen." One of the additional symptoms whose presence is necessary to confirm the possibility of madness is "Vernachlässigung ... der gewohnten Beschäftigungen." [ibid. 526-527]. Indeed, it is difficult to envisage what evidence pointing towards a
diagnosis of any sort of madness Clarus would have been prepared to accept, since Woyzeck's statements about his mental state were to be disregarded unless they were confirmed by witnesses [ibid. 507], a state of affairs which makes any inquiry into thoughts and feelings a dubious procedure.

It is clear from the foregoing that Clarus does describe a multiplicity of symptoms in Woyzeck. However he denies all of them psychological significance. He mentions, for instance, attacks of anxiety and palpitation, attributing these to painful constrictions around the heart and cramping in the limbs, an inverse of present-day ideas on psychosomatic causation. Whatever the origin of these symptoms, it appeared that Woyzeck could overcome them by psychological means, namely "durch Richtung seiner Gedanken auf einen andern Gegenstand" [ibid. 507-508].

In only one instance does Clarus acknowledge the occurrence of symptoms arising from difficulties in the accused's interactions with others [ibid. 508-509]. While still in military service, Woyzeck had felt insulted by his superiors, and had many difficulties put in the way of his intended marriage. As a result, "... sey ihm der Zorn in den Kopf und vor die Stirne gefahren, und habe ihn dergestalt überwältigt, daß er seiner nicht mehr mächtig gewesen." It is significant that here Clarus describes a state of mind in which Woyzeck
might be held to be deprived of freedom ("seiner nicht mehr mächtig"), and that he links it with the accused's state of mind on the day of the murder. The connection with the issue of Unfreiheit, however, is not made.

Clarus is ready with explanations of Woyzeck's disturbed thoughts and feelings, based on physical, mainly circulatory, disturbances in the body, or based on common-sense psychology. Thus the voices: "Stich die Frau Woostin todt", are put down to Woyzeck's habit of talking to himself. They represent a conversation in his head between Woyzeck and his conscience (a psychodynamic concept!), but Clarus does not hold that this is of any serious significance. An alternative explanation of the hearing of voices in terms of organic disturbance is also given. The accused suffered from a tinnitus in his right ear and it was in the right ear that he heard the voices.* This proved according to Clarus that the hearing of voices resulted from congestion in the circulation compounded by Woyzeck's misinterpretation of the sounds in his head [ibid.522]. His "irrige, phantastische und abergläubische Einbildungen von verborgenen und übersinnlichen Dingen" are ascribed to his want of knowledge and education, and his credulousness, linked to a tendency to introspection and an in general hypochondriacal nature. His

*Bleuler in his classic monograph on the group of schizophrenias noted that hallucinatory voices are frequently referred to one ear or the other, although in his cases pleasant voices usually came from the right ear, harsh ones from the left [Bleuler 387-388].
belief that he was in danger from the freemasons, and his ungrounded belief that others were talking about him, what might respectively be now termed paranoid delusions and ideas of reference, both now held to be suggestive of serious disturbance, are rationally explained in similar terms: "...dieses alles hängt mit den Einbildungen und der Furchtsamkeit dieses Menschen, mit seinen damaligen Verhältnissen und seiner körperlichen Anlage so natürlich zusammen, daß es sich daraus vollständig und ungezwungen erklären läßt." [ibid. 518-519].

For the most part however, symptoms are ascribed to physical causes, such as "Unordnung des Blutumlaufes" [ibid. 534]. Woyzeck's dark moods, his withdrawnness, his disordered thinking, his delusions are ascribed to irregularities of the circulation, and consequent congestion of the blood vessels of the head [ibid. 523].* The problem now for Clarus, although he does not state it as such, is that, if the circulatory disorders described are not under Woyzeck's control, if they have led to the psychological disturbances described, and if these disturbances were in any way responsible for the murder, then the freedom of action necessary for the condition of Zurechnungsfähigkeit cannot be inferred. Clarus deals with this partly by not allowing a

* Clarus here exemplifies the confusion in the Psychiker/Somatiker issue. He claims Heinroth as an authority, but relies on an explanation of Woyzeck's condition based on organic causation.
connection between the mental disturbance and the murder. However he cannot altogether ignore the potentially serious significance of some of the symptoms that he has described. Indeed, he acknowledges that the hearing of voices and imaginary conversations can be a sign of madness [ibid. 523].

If Woyzeck is ill or mad, how can he be held to be accountable? The conclusion reached by Clarus is that he is neither ill nor mad; he has a predisposition ("Anlage") to illness, but not any actual illness. He has a tendency to "Hypochondrie" which accounts for all the symptoms of mental disturbance: "... eine finstere und zugleich reizbare Ge- müthsstimmung, Menschenscheu, Liebe zur Einsamkeit, Benommenheit des Kopfes, Verminderung der gewohnten Kraft einen Gegenstand des Nachdenkens lange zu verfolgen, Zerstreuung und momentane Unfähigkeit zum nachdenken überhaupt, oder auch Beschäftigung mit unwillkürlich sich aufdringenden Bildern, einer trüben Einbildungskraft, deren man mit aller Kraft des Willens nicht erwehren kann.". This impressive list amounts to "bloß Symptome der Hypochondrie... welche... den freien Gebrauch des Verstandes nicht im mindesten beschränken, oder gar aufheben." [ibid. 523].

If the accused shows no evidence of madness, there is still the issue of amentia occulta ("stille Wuth") to be considered, and Clarus does not fail to do so. He acknowledges that there are many circumstances attached to
the crime that might be held to support such a diagnosis, the occasional, overwhelming surges of aggression, the hearing of voices, the lack of remorse and the criminal's poor recall of events on the day of the murder. But he questions the whole validity of the concept, and holds that, if it does have any applicability, it is in very narrowly defined conditions, none of which apply to the present case [ibid. 527-528]. (These conditions, as set out by Clarus, are repeated almost word for word in the review by Hitzig of the Clarus Gutachten and of Marc's critique [see above]. We have seen how the reviewer accepted totally Clarus' interpretation of Woyzeck's state of mind.)

In the end, the determination of Woyzeck's accountability before the law is made by Clarus to depend on the Kantian concept of freedom of will, a concept to which the Doctor in the play will be made to give comically distorted utterance: "... habe ich nit nachgewiese, daß der musculus constrictor vesicae dem Willen unterworfen ist? Woyzeck der Mensch ist frei, im Menschen verklärt sich die Individualität zur Freiheit" [H.2.6]. Glück has argued that Clarus also, in common with the political establishment of a Metternich-dominated central Europe, distorted Kantian idealism in the interests of the status quo: "Er (sc. Idealismus) geht – in Worten – über die bestehenden Herrschafts- und Knechtschaftsverhältnisse 'hinaus'. Tatsächlich bleiben diese unberührt,
mehr als das, sie werden stabilisiert." [Glück 98]. The concept of free will was the premise underlying the whole of the Clarus Gutachten and was decisive for Woyzeck's conviction and execution. In all this, "Clarus war beherrscht, nicht von Kant, sondern, auf diesen Unterschied kommt es an, von dem in der Restaurationsperiode reaktionär umfunktionierten kantischen Idealismus" [ibid. 100].

Clarus' Woyzeck, Büchner's Franz

We have seen how, in Lenz, Büchner took over whole sentences and paragraphs from his source, the Oberlin account, and have shown how significant were the departures from that source in illustrating his very different view as to the sources of Lenz's madness. None the less, a very similar picture of the poet as a person arises from the two accounts.

The situation as regards Büchner and his source in Woyzeck is somewhat different. On the face of things, the portrayal of Woyzeck in the first Gutachten is hardly in any respects similar to the character we come to know and understand in the play. Clarus describes a coarse individual, a moral degenerate who drinks too much [SWB I 547-548] and whose relationships with women are repeatedly characterized by violence [ibid. 494-495]. By contrast, Franz is the most sensitive and morally aware person in the play. He has a capacity for loving and caring, and puts his health and well-
being at risk so that his wife and child may have some extra sustenance. He is capable of murder, but only in desperation when Marie has finally destroyed his hold on life.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Clarus wanted his readers to see Woyzeck as morally reprehensible in order to justify the conclusion on culpability that he had already reached.* None the less, in the fuller account prepared by Clarus in his second submission, traits emerge that suggest that the historical Woyzeck may have been a more complex individual than Clarus was previously prepared to allow, and that Büchner may have derived from the Clarus version more than the externals of the story, the persecutory delusions regarding the freemasons and the voices urging murder.

Despite the fact that Clarus attributes to the accused an almost total lack of remorse in relation to the killing (he is said to manifest no "Bewußtseyn der Schuld ... aber auch ohne sonderliche Reue" [SWB I 548]), the second Gutachten does show clear evidence of conscience on Woyzeck’s part. Especially, he felt remorse at not having married his earlier mistress, Weinberg. That it was not a transient pang is shown by a continuing sense of his own unworthiness: "Er habe sich daher auch geürgert, wenn die Leute von ihm gesagt hätten,

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*Kubik maintains [Kubik 166] that it is only in his foreword to the Gutachten, written for later publication, that Clarus makes moral points concerning the case, but the first passage referred to above is in the main text of the first Gutachten.
daß er ein guter Mensch sey, weil er gefühlt habe, daß er es nicht sey." [ibid. 509]. Compare this with the Captain's "... Woyzeck, Er ist ein guter Mensch ... aber Woyzeck, Er hat kein Moral...Er hat ein Kind ohne Segen der Kirche". Franz is able to respond to this with dignity and to counter the re­proach with reference to a more humane morality [ibid. 172].

Another deficiency that Clarus found in Woyzeck was an unwillingness to look at his feelings ("Scheu vor dem Blick in sein Inneres" [ibid. 548]). Yet he writes of the latter's "Träume, die er sehr gern erzählt, und auf seine Weise deutet" [ibid. 516], indicating that Woyzeck was indeed ready to explore his inner world, and was trying to understand it. The one dream the content of which is described reveals a touching awareness on the part of the dreamer of the pit in which he finds himself and his hope that there may yet be someone to save him [ibid. 516]. The "Scheu vor dem Blick in sein Inneres" belongs to Clarus, rather than to Woyzeck. To engage in the exploration of inner worlds might have robbed the doctor of his certainties.

Woyzeck shares with Franz, his fictional counterpart, a wish to understand the world around him, even when it is most mystifying. Clarus writes in the second Gutachten: "Da ihm nun verschiedene Male in seinem Leben Dinge begegnet seyen, die er sich aus dem gewöhnlichen Laufe der Natur nicht erklären können, so sey er auf den Gedanken gekommen, daß..."
Gott sich auch ihm auf diese Weise habe offenbaren wollen..." [ibid. 510]. It is his very attempt to comprehend that leads him into delusional thinking, like Franz with his phantasies concerning the fungi in the grass. The Woyzeck of the Gutachten, too, struggled with "die doppelte Natur".

Thus the portrait of Woyzeck that Clarus conveys in the first Gutachten of a coarse, immoral individual, devoid of remorse and self-awareness, is contradicted in the second by a number of traits that are mentioned almost in passing, certainly without any inquiry into their importance. Even where Clarus refers to Woyzeck's thought disorder, where blocking occurred under the influence of "unangenehme Vorstellungen" [ibid. 509], he does not inquire into the content of his thoughts, nor give any indication of what the unpleasant ideas might be. Clarus, like the Doctor in the play, is concerned with the external manifestations of disturbance, and with measurable physiological parameters. Büchner wishes us to explore the feelings and frustrations, the need for some kind of certainty both in relationships and in ideas that underlie the appearances of madness.
"I am aware that the man who is said to be deluded may be in his delusion telling me the truth, and this in no equivocal or metaphorical sense ..." [R.D. Laing The Divided Self]

"Tatsache ist indessen, daß er [Lenz], Lucile und Woyzeck nur wenige Züge haben, die man eindeutig krankhaft nennen muß. Ja, im Verhältnis zum historischen Woyzeck der Clarus-Gutachten treten sie bei der Büchnerschen Figur auffallend zurück und in den Hintergrund der Handlung." [Wittkowski 279]. The facts of the matter could be held to be quite contrary to those asserted by Wittkowski. It is true that Franz is not just mad, whereas the focus in the Gutachten is solely on the question of whether or not Woyzeck can be held to be mad to the extent of being unzurechnungsfähig. But far from moderating the portrayal of madness and removing it from centre screen, Büchner both deepens and widens it, taking from Clarus the two themes of the heard voices and the delusion concerning the freemasons, and in addition allowing insight into Franz's thought, thought that shows clearly pathological features. It is a measure of Büchner's unique achievement, that he both shows understanding of the processes of psychotic breakdown, and can relate these processes, and the way they find expression, to the life situation of his protagonist. Far from madness being pushed to the background, as
Wittkowski suggests, it is integral to the nature of Franz's interactions with Marie, with the Captain and the Doctor, and to his desperate attempts to find meaning in his existence. This section will examine how Büchner portrays in Franz features now clearly held to be pathological, and their significance in his existential situation.

The First Draft

The unfolding of the dramatic action in the first draft [H1] of the play concerns simply the theme of Margreth's (Marie's) unfaithfulness, Louis' (Franz's) jealousy, and his subsequent murder of his mistress. There are, in the opening fairground scene, overtones of, in Wetzel's phrase, "die Absurdität der Schöpfung", and this sense is reinforced in the Grandmother's story in H1,14 [Wetzel 377]. Reuchlein suggests that the playing down of references to the historical Woyzeck in this earliest draft indicated that Büchner's initial interest in the purely dramatic possibilities of the story, whereas later drafts focus more on polemical issues [Reuchlein 1985 47-49]. Although it is true that the satirizing of social and scientific attitudes is an important feature of the later drafts, it would be mistaken to hold that the polemical takes precedence over the dramatic and psychological or, as Kubik seems to suggest, that the play was written with a polemical intention [Kubik 167].

The exploitation of Louis by those who have power over him is
only briefly and indirectly alluded to:

MARGRETH. Der andre hat ihm befohlen und er hat gehen müssen. Ha! Ein Mann vor einem Andern. [H1,3]

Louis' mood is of desperate restlessness: ".. ich hab kei Ruh ... Ich muß fort, muß sehn! ... Ich muß fort." Andres attributes this to Margreth's whoring: "Du Unfried, wegen des Menschs." [H1,4]. We see here Louis' need to know, "muß sehn", which will become in a later draft Franz's need to understand: "Ich bin viel auf der Spur! Sehr viel." [H2,2]. And: "Ich will darüber nachdenke." [H2,7].

The part played in the genesis of Franz's madness by the medical experiment of which he was the object will become an important issue in the play. In H1 the theme is adumbrated, not in relation to Louis, but to the character of the Barber, who disappears from later drafts: "Ich bin die Wissenschaft. Ich bekomm für mein Wissenschaft alle Woche ein halbe Gulden ... ich hab ein lateinischen Rücken. Ich bin ein lebendiges Skelett. Die ganze Menschheit studiert an mir" [H1,10]. Despite his being reduced to a living skeleton, science has not made him mad. Instead, he shares with the later figure of the Captain a tendency to sentimentality and neurosis.

The final scene of the first draft contains what may be interpreted as a satirical reference to Clarus in the person of the Gerichtsdienier: "Ein guter Mord, ein echter Mord, ein schöner Mord, ... wir haben schon lange so kein gehabt."
Clarsum was also a servant of the court, for whom the Woost murder was "eine Handlung der strafenden Gerechtigkeit, wie sie der größere Theil der gegenwärtigen Generation hier noch nicht erlebt hat..." [SWB I 488]. The case provided Clarus with the opportunity to demonstrate his medical-forensic skills and to enjoy a degree of public recognition. It was, doubtless, for him "ein guter Mord".

Louis experiences visual and auditory hallucinations, but not all have a truly psychotic quality. Before his eyes he sees the knife with which he will kill Margreth, and the shop in the dark lane where he will purchase it. He hears the music to which Margreth dances with her lover [H1, 6 and 7]. These images represent vividly anticipated or relived experience, rather than psychotic hallucination. The voices however, located outside his head and under the ground: "Stich! Stich! Stich die Woyzecke tot! ... Immer Woyzecke! das zischt und rumort und donnert" [H1, 6] indicate a psychotic splitting.

The hallucinatory voices are of course derived from the second Clarus Gutachten, but their location underground is Büchner's invention, and anticipates the concept of the earth's hollowness, later developed in H2,1 and H4,1.

There are thus in place in H1 a sketchy outline of the form taken by Louis/Franz's madness, and some indication of its existential setting. Louis' significant interactions are confined to his lover and to Andreas, with little in these to
indicate the sources of madness.

Voices and delusions
The later drafts deepen both the portrayal of Franz's state of mind and our understanding of how it has arisen. In the first scene in the field outside the city, Franz is confronted with a world that is both mysterious and threatening. Strange omens occur, presaging death. The earth trembles under his feet. Franz seeks and finds an explanation: "Das waren die Freimaurer, ich hab' es aus." [H2,1]. Grandin has shown that many of Franz's utterances derive from the Book of Revelation in Luther's translation. In H2, his delusion has an apocalyptic dimension, "das fürchterliche Getöse am Himmel" but this sense is immeasurably heightened in H4, where Franz perceives a whole world under threat: "Ein Feuer fährt um den Himmel und ein Getöse herunter wie Posaunen", to be followed by a terrible stillness: "Alles still, als wäre die Welt tot." [H4,1]. The biblical allusion is strengthened by Franz's instruction to Andrés not to look back. The city is the place where Marie will betray Franz with the Tambour-Major, and has become like the cities of the plain on which Lot was commanded not to turn his eyes [Grandin 175].

Although the language is heavy with religious symbolism, the depiction accurately matches psychotic phantasy. Jung describes the inner world of the schizophrenic on the verge
of breakdown: "... the latent schizophrenic must always reckon with the possibility that his very foundations will give way somewhere, that an irretrievable disintegration will set in, that his ideas and concepts will lose their cohesion and their connection with other spheres of association and with the environment. He stands on treacherous ground and, and very often he knows it. The dangerousness of his situation often shows itself in terrifying dreams of cosmic catastrophes, of the end of the world and such things. Or the ground he stands on starts to heave, the walls bend and bulge, the solid earth turns to water, all his relatives are dead, etc." [Jung 1958 259]. Büchner's imagery, not only of apocalyptic doom in the heavens, but of the hollow earth under Franz's feet, and the desolation of the abandoned child in the Grandmother's tale, all stand in anticipation of Jung's brief description, derived from clinical experience.

The content of Franz's delusion, the threat from the free-masons, originates in Clarus, who explains the symptom in terms of "theils Mangel an Kenntniss und Erziehung, theils Leichtgläubigkeit" [SWB I 518]. Glück has suggested that in attributing his terror to such threats, Woyzeck/Franz was showing himself to be the victim of the reactionary propaganda which held freemasonry to be an underground conspiracy threatening the overthrow of the state: "Nicht zufällig sucht Woyzeck diese Freimaurer unter dem Erdboden!"
[Glück 61-62]. It is unlikely that Woyzeck/Franz could have been directly aware of this kind of propaganda, but its content could have filtered down to become common currency. This interpretation of the symptom focuses on the oppression which undoubtedly contributes to the form that Franz's madness takes.

Büchner, however, shows us deeper sources of the threat from underground. Franz's world is hollow under his feet, is in danger of giving way.* Although he is deluded as to the source of what threatens him, the threat is real enough, no less than the disintegration of his self and of a world that gave that self meaning. He needs to make some kind of sense, and can only seize on the idea that the forces which are destroying him are hidden in a cloak of secrecy: "Ich hab's, die Freimaurer ..." [H4,1]. Büchner goes on to demonstrate the real sources of terror and disintegration: a society which reifies its most oppressed members and which provides the reifiers (the Captain and Doctor) with no gratification other than the exercise of power; the loss by Franz of the only person who had given his life some purpose; and the ultimately terrifying possibility, a world without meaning and without God, portrayed in burlesque in the fairground.

*The theme of the earth's fragility is found also in Dantons Tod, where in II,2, in response to his companion's confident assertions about the inevitability of progress, the Second Gentleman expresses his fear of its surface crumbling: "Ja, die Erde ist eine dünne Kruste, ich meine immer ich könnte durchfallen, wo ein Loch ist" [SWB I 36, Baumann 149].
scene (with man equated with a performing animal) \[H1,2, H2,3\], and in desolate earnest in the Grandmother's tale \[H1,14\].

In the case both of Franz's hearing of voices and his delusions concerning the freemasons, we have seen Büchner portraying in his protagonist realistic and clinically plausible symptoms of a paranoid psychosis. This is not perhaps surprising when we know that these symptoms were simply copied from a well-publicised medical source. What is remarkable is that he endowed them with meaning significant to the life situation and inner world of that protagonist. It must be acknowledged that not all psychiatrists were content, as was Clarus, simply to depict the observable manifestations of madness. We have seen [Chapter Four] how, in the year before Büchner was engaged in writing *Woyzeck*, K.W. Ideler gave some account of the inner processes of paranoia, with terror and superstition distorting the meaning attached to natural events \[Ideler 1835 415\]. But Büchner went beyond such generalized speculation, to reveal the specific dreads that robbed Franz of his sanity.

We shall see how, in a deepening examination of his subject's inner world, he portrayed other symptoms, certainly not appearing in Clarus, and for which there is no obvious antecedent, symptoms again clinically authentic, and at the same time capable of being interpreted in relation to the sources
of Franz's madness, and his attempts to make sense of them.

Disordered thinking

Although we shall show how Franz's thought became more and more disjointed in the course of the play, it must be stressed that, despite his menial status and lack of education, he is the only character who shows any real capacity for thinking: "Selbstdenken, aus eigenen, wenn auch bescheidenen Mitteln" [Glück 107]. The Captain thinks in moralistic clichés: "Moral das ist wenn man moralisch ist, versteht er. Es ist ein gutes Wort." [H4,5]. The Doctor's reflex responses are derived on the one hand from unthinking pseudo-science: ".. das sind so Uebergänge zum Esel, häufig auch in Folge weiblicher Erziehung .." [H3,1]; and on the other from pseudo-Kantian gobbledegook (derived from Büchner's teacher, Wilbrand [Guthrie 1988 37]): "Woyzeck, der Mensch ist frei, in dem Menschen verklärt sich die Individualität zur Freiheit." [H4,8]. Marie is capable of reflection and introspection, but only in terms of her own narrow world. Andres is an apathetic survivor, while the limits of the Tambour-Major's narcissistic view of life are defined by brandy and sex.

In contrast, Woyzeck is continuously engaged in an attempt to understand the threatening world in which he finds himself, and his own relationship with that world: "Ich bin viel auf der Spur! sehr viel ... Sieh um dich! Alles starr, fest,
finster, was regt sich dahinter. Geht still, was uns von Sinnen bringt, aber ich hab's aus." [H2,3]. If the hidden mysteries are beyond his comprehension, this does not discourage him from going on with his search. And he can grasp, as his betters cannot grasp, the limitations imposed on his moral and physical situation, by economic constraints on the one hand: "Sehn Sie, wir gemeine Leut, das hat kein Tugend" [H4,5], and physiological constraints on the other: "Aber Herr Doctor, wenn einem die Natur kommt" [H4,8]. If Franz's thoughts are disordered, it is in the first place because he does have thoughts of his own to become disordered, and because he is disempowered by his history and circumstances from using his intelligence, his thinking, to gain some kind of control over his life. For Franz, lack of power constricts the capacity for knowledge. "Weil ihm die realen Ursachen undurchschaubar bleiben ... verirrt er sich in irrationale 'Erklärungen' seines Elends... Die Ursache seiner Spekulation ist seine begriffliche Ohnmacht, und die Ursache seiner begrifflichen Ohnmacht ist seine reale Ohnmacht" [Glück 110].

Among the fundamental symptoms of the schizophrenias, Bleuler lists disturbances of association and affectivity. Of these, "we know of two disturbances peculiar to schizophrenia - pressure of thoughts, that is a pathologically increased flow of ideas, and the particularly characteristic 'blocking'"
We have seen that Clarus described how Woyzeck, in certain disturbed states of mind, ceased to think altogether, probably a reference to thought blocking. On the other hand, it would be difficult to find in either of the Gutachten any indication that the accused suffered from pressure of ideas. (Clarus' description of Woyzeck's thinking suggests perseveration rather than tangentiality.) By contrast, Büchner shows Franz's restlessness and desperation as expressing itself in a flood of ideas, often dislocated. Both Marie and the Captain prepare us for its wilder manifestations:

MARIE - "Der Mann! So vergeistert ... Er schnappt noch über mit den Gedanken." [H4,2]

HAUPTMANN - "Woyzeck er sieht immer so verhetzt aus ... Du bist ein guter Mensch, ein guter Mensch. Aber du denkst zu viel, das zehrt." [H4,5]

At length, Franz's thought begins to disintegrate: "Es ist viel möglich. Der Mensch! es ist viel möglich. Wir habe schön Wetter Herr Hauptmann. Sehn sie so ein schö, festen groben Himmel, man könnte Lust bekommen, ein Kloben hineinzuschlagen und sich daran zu hänge, nur wege des Gedankenstrichels Ja, und wieder ja - und nein, Herr, Herr Hauptmann ja und nein? Ist das Nein am Ja oder das Ja am Nein schuld?" [H2,7]. The disjunction here is sufficient to be thought of in terms of the kind of thought disorder that occurs in schizophrenia,

*Pressure of thoughts is now recognized to be more a feature of manic and hypomanic states than of schizophrenia, where nonetheless a flow of inconsequentially linked ideas, tangentiality, certainly does occur.
and which has variously been termed knight's move thinking, tangentiality and slippage [Andreasen et al. 101]. Kraepelin used the term *paralogia* for the process whereby the idea that is next in a chain of thought is suppressed and replaced by another which is related to it [Kraepelin 21-22]. Sullivan has suggested that the failure of schizophrenics to communicate comprehensibly arises from a failure of "consensual validation", i.e. the process whereby a speaker shares assumptions with his assumed audience that make him adhere to a certain grammatical form and logic [Sullivan 1964 13-14]. Franz's thoughts have raced ahead of his capacity to reflect on whether he will be understood or not.

None the less, the sequence of thoughts is by no means random, and Büchner has been able to identify meaning in Franz's madness, just as surely as did Shakespeare in Ophelia's. The speech referred to occurs towards the end of a scene in which the Doctor and Captain have been making sly allusions to Marie's unfaithfulness, and Franz's agitation throughout is clearly related to this:

"Es ist viel möglich. Der Mensch!" - reiterating the Doctor's "Der Mensch ist frei" - but also taking up the Captain's "weil er ein guter Mensch ist Woyzeck". The possibilities for "Mensch" (humanity) are narrowed down for the individual "Mensch" (Franz). But (das) "Mensch" (whore) is also the
term by which both Franz and Andres have spoken of Marie, and Franz has again been confronted by the possibility of her unfaithfulness.

"Wir habe schon Wetter, Herr Hauptmann" - Franz makes reference to his conversation with the Captain in the shaving scene (belonging to a different draft [H4,5], but clearly intended for the earlier part of the play). This recalls an incident in which Franz was yet again humiliated: "O Er ist dumm, ganz abscheulich dumm".

"man könnte Lust bekommen, ein Kloben hineinzuschlagen und sich daran zu hängen" - the thought of repeated humiliation leads Franz to suicidal thoughts, a dark contrast to the light of heaven, which is at the same time "schön", "fest" and "grob". The Captain and the Doctor have had their fun ("Lust") at Franz's expense. The only fun left to him is to hang himself.

"nur wege des Cedankenstrichels zwischen Ja, und wieder ja - und nein" - here Franz's thought appears to be at its most disjointed. It is as if he has been stretched to the end of his capacity to understand his world. The word "Gedankenstrichel" itself suggests a line of thought that has been broken and can no longer be sustained. Does yea mean the
possibility of life, and may its negation? Hinderer sees the passage as referring to Matthew 5, 37: "Eure Rede aber sei: Ja, ja, nein, nein" [Hinderer 252]. Also plausible is Wittkowski's suggestion that "ja" and "nein" are the two possible answers to Marie's question: "Bin ich ein Mensch?" [H4,4]. The answer for Franz is crucial to the wholeness of his world, and for his sanity [Wittkowski 305]. But the "Gedankenstrichel" surely refers to the gap between Franz's present situation and what his life might yet have been had Marie said "no" instead of "yes" to the Tambour-Major.

Guthrie here suggests that "the metaphor is not entirely consistent with Woyzeck's character", implying that in a later draft Büchner would have re-written this passage [Guthrie, J. 1988 40]. Certainly the term "Gedankenstrichel" is unlikely to have been in Franz's vocabulary, but for the rest his struggle with language reflects his desperate wish to know, "ich will darüber nachdenke", and the limits of his capacity to understand. The need to know is a recurrent theme.

*Psychoanalytic theory sees the need as an important component of the unconscious. Freudians hold it to be derived from infantile sexual curiosity [Anzieu 26]. More relevant to Franz's situation is Klein's postulate of an "epistemophilic impulse", the need to know as a source of mastery over the environment [Klein 86-87]. His striving to establish some kind of control over his world is doomed to failure. The only
Büchner's achievement in H2,7 is to have captured the tortuosity of schizophrenic thought, and at the same time to endow it with meaning. The Captain's reaction, "Mir wird ganz schwindlig..." is that commonly experienced by the non-psychotic when confronted by schizophrenic logic, namely to doubt one's own grasp on sanity. To protect himself, he has recourse to moralistic platitudes. The Doctor, however, is protected from such a reaction by his pseudo-scientific zeal, and can think only in terms of the significance of these symptoms for his experiment: "Phänomen, Woyzeck, Zulage". Goldstein has identified as one of the main disorders of schizophrenic thinking a tendency to concrete thought: "... there is an abnormal boundness to outer-world stimuli so far as they belong to the realm of reality that the patient experiences... The demarcation between the outer world and his ego is more or less suspended or modified in comparison with the normal. ... The objects which impress the patient are not the same as those which would impress the normal person in the given situation ... He does not consider the object as part of an ordered outside world separated from himself, as the normal person does." [Goldstein, K. 23]. In the second Gutachten, Clarus notes "... wie sehr er [sc. object he can, in the end, control is Marie, and he can control her only by extreme means, by murder."
In H4,8, Franz is confronted by a "doppelte Natur" which shatters his sense of order: "Sehn Sie Herr Doktor, manchmal hat einer so n'en Charakter, so n'e Struktur. - Aber mit der Natur ist's was anders, sehn Sie mit der Natur er kracht mit den Fingern das ist so was, wie soll ich doch sagen, zum Beispiel ...". The nature of his world, a double nature where things can both be and not be at the same time, is beyond his understanding and he has recourse to the kind of thinking that Goldstein described: "Die Schwämme Herr Doktor. Da, da steckts. Haben Sie schon gesehn in was für Figuren die Schwämme auf dem Boden wachsen? Wer das lesen könnt." He cannot see the fungi as having a separate existence to himself, as part of a separate, ordered world. They are incorporated into his scheme of things, even though their meaning within that scheme of things is not clear. This kind of thinking is very close to magical or animistic thinking, an archaic (archetypal) mode held by Jung to be predominant in schizophrenia [Arieti 27-32]. Hinck sees Franz as standing in some kind of elemental, rather than archaic, relationship to nature, so that the voices and the visions are not his but nature's: "Woyzeck ist als Mensch ganz
zurückgeworfen auf die Natur - in einem Maße, das die elementare Beziehung zur außermenschlichen Natur erlaubt: er lauscht ihre Stimmen und sieht ihre Visionen ab..." [Hinck 216]. Wittkowski relates the "Schwämme" to Pascal's "spongia soli" which give up their secrets when pressed (though this could only be Büchner's metaphor, not Franz's) [Wittkowski 317]. It is a measure of the richness of Büchner's conception that it yields such a multiplicity of interpretations, by no means incompatible with one another. Franz's focussing on the patterns shown by the fungi might be held to exemplify the symptom described by Kraepelin in his early account of dementia praecox, namely the apparently irresistible attraction to casual external impressions [Kraepelin 6-7]. The implication here is that this attraction is meaningless, whereas Büchner endows this and Franz's other symptoms with existential significance.

Franz's sense of self
It is appropriate at this point to reflect on the schizophrenic symptoms not shown in Büchner's portrayal of Franz. We have seen in relation to Lenz how fragile was the poet's sense of identity, which merged so easily into the identity of those around him. Heald has demonstrated that Franz often, and especially when he is most agitated, reflects the vocabulary of those around him, as if he could not find his own words, or even his own thoughts [Heald 180]. We have seen in the passage demonstrating pressure of
thought, how the direction of his thinking is determined by chance words of the Captain. This could be held to represent some weakening of his ego boundaries. At the same time, Franz shows, to a degree of which Lenz was not capable, a sense of his own selfhood (albeit a selfhood under threat), of his position in society, and of some of the political forces which have put him there. And he is capable of asserting that selfhood in the face even of authority: "Wir arme Leut. Sehn Sie, Herr Hauptmann, Geld, Geld. Wer kein Geld hat" [H4,5]. This relative strength of identity conforms to the clinical picture of paranoid schizophrenia (as distinct from the non-paranoid schizophrenias) as it was later (1911) to be delineated by Bleuler [Bleuler 317].

Franz and Fixer Wahn

DOKTOR Woyzeck Er hat die schönste aberratio mentalis partialis, die zweite Spezies, sehr schön ausgeprägt. Woyzeck Er kriegt Zulage. Zweite Spezies, fixe Idee, mit allgemein vernünftigen Zustand, Er tut noch Alles wie sonst...?

The doctor here has recourse to the concept of partial madness to label Franz's mental state. We have seen that Clarus in his Gutachten did not discuss diagnosis, and indeed hardly used psychiatric terminology, so this is one issue that Büchner did not derive from his historical source. He is here clearly satirising the notion that a human being's suffering can be neatly categorised within a system of species and subspecies. The contemporary psychiatrist who most exemplified this systematised approach to mental illness
was J.C.A. Heinroth in his *Lehrbuch der Seelenstörungen* of 1818. His system was based on an almost mathematical permutation of disturbances - hypersthenia, asthenia and a combination of the two, hyperasthenia - applied to each of the main mental functions - "Geist", "Gemüth", and "Wille", separately and in combination. Together with a number of sub-classifications, these amounted in all to nearly forty disorders [Marx 1990 373]. Heinroth's "zweyte Form des Wahnsinns" was "Wahnsinn mit Verrücktheit (*ecstasis paranoica*)" [Heinroth 1818 271]. It is important here not to confuse *paranoica* with paranoia in the sense of delusions of persecution. It means rather what is implied in the derivation from the Greek, a state of being beside oneself. The picture of the illness in Heinroth's description much more resembles a simple schizophrenia than Franz's paranoid state, but the likely outcome according to Heinroth is "fixe Idee". It would seem possible therefore that the Doctor is being seen as basing his classification on Heinroth, and that the former's "die zweite Spezies" is based on the latter's "zweyte Form des Wahnsinns".

The terms *fixer Wahn*, *fixe Idee*, *partielle Verrücktheit* and the French term *monomanie*, commonly in use in the earlier part of the nineteenth century, were applied, almost

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* Guthrie points, as a possible source of the Doctor's classification, to E.T.A. Hoffmann's comments on the Schmolling case [Guthrie 1988 38]. But "partielle Wahnsinn" and "fixe Idee" belong to the first category of madness mentioned by Hoffmann, and his second category is "periodische Wahnsinn".
Interchangeably, to a condition of partial insanity, where the individual, while functioning normally in most areas of his life, entertains a delusional idea, or system of ideas, to which he vehemently adheres. J.C. Reil included "fixer Wahn" in his four main categories of mental disturbance, the others being "Wuth" (mania), "Narrheit" (probably what we would now call simple schizophrenia [Harms 183-184]), and "Blösinn" (idiocy in one or other of its forms) [Reil 1805 305]. In Reil's description: "Er ist bloß auf seinen Zweck gerichtet, und stumpf für alles andere. Als Wahnsinniger hat er eine partielle Verrücktheit, die sich auf einem Gegenstand... bezieht. Jeder Zufall ruft die herrschende Idee in ihm hervor." The delusion consists of "eine Ueberlegung unter falschen Voraussetzungen oder zu Gunsten eines thörigten Zwecks." [Reil 1805 380 and 379]. There may, according to Reil, be feelings of hostility and aggression: "Es entspinnt sich Mißtrauen, Haß, Feindschaft, Rachsucht in ihnen, ja, sie gerathen in Wuth, wenn ihnen Gegenstände vorkommen, die sie als Hindernisse in der Erreichung ihrer Zwecke ansehen. Besonders werfen sie diesen Verdacht leicht auf moralische Wesen, und vorzüglich auf ihre Bekannte und Verwandte, weil sie von diesen eher als von fremden Beziehungen auf sich erwarten müssen." [Reil 1805 314]. It is difficult to recognize Franz in this description. Far from being hostile, he appears almost too trusting of others, and his feelings of being persecuted relate to impersonal forces.
rather than to the people around him.

The concept of *fixe Idee* was still prevalent in Büchner's time, although now regarded as a symptom of a number of illnesses, rather than as a disease in itself. Thus, F.L.H. Bird, writing in 1834, described it as arising both in cases of "Wahnsinn" and of "Melancholie", as well as in cases where there was no mental illness, for example in the deaf. Although the symptom could be incurable, especially when associated with "Wahnsinn", Bird holds it on the whole to be benign: "... besser über eine Idee brüllen als mehrere" [Bird 1834 144-185]. This accords with the portrayal of partial madness in, for example, *Spieß*, where it is often shown to protect the sufferer from even worse misery.

As well as questioning the appropriateness of the kind of classification practised by the Doctor, and by Heinroth, it seems likely that Büchner is questioning whether the Doctor has got the diagnosis right [Glück 171-172]. Far from having an *aberratio mentalis parialis* Franz is disintegrating almost totally. Hoffbauer, writing in 1823, divides "Wahnsinn" into "fixer Wahnsinn", corresponding to "fixe Idee", and "herumirrender Wahnsinn" [Hoffbauer 1823 104]. Given the many facets of Franz's madness, the latter diagnosis might have seemed more appropriate. Another of Hoffbauer's categories, "Wahnsinn aus Chimeren", which is characterized by delusions often of a persecutory nature,
might also seem to be more applicable than "fixer Wahn" [Hoffbauer 1802-7 Bd III 98]. But the Doctor's diagnostic methods are not very subtle. He asks: "Er tut noch alles wie sonst, * rasiert sein Hauptmann?" [H4,8], and takes Franz' "Ja, wohl" as indicating that he is functioning normally in all other ways. Büchner however has shown us that, while shaving the Captain, Franz is behaving like an automaton:

**HAUPTMANN** - .... Ich glaub' wir haben so was aus Süd-Nord.

**WOYZECK** - Ja wohl, Herr Hauptmann. [H4,5].

There is health left in Franz, shown in his attempt to retain some shred of human dignity, and his sense of oppression which even leads to a flash of wry humour: "Wir arme Leut ... Man hat auch sein Fleisch und Blut ... Unsereins ist doch einmal unselig in der und der andern Welt. Ich glaub' wenn wir in Himmel kämen so müBten wir donnern helfen" [H4,5]. But that is a part of Franz with which the Doctor is completely out of touch.§

*Henkelmann interprets the Doctor's question: "Er thut noch alles wie sonst...?", as seeking confirmation that his experiments are not interfering with Woyzeck's military duties [Henkelmann 84]. It is difficult to imagine that the Doctor would have the least concern either for the Captain or for society at large. What he is interested in is establishing a diagnosis of fixe Idee.

§ Thought disorder in paranoid patients is often limited to the subject of their delusion, and they can be logical and rational on other topics [Forrest 34]. To this extent the diagnosis of fixe Idee is appropriate. The Doctor is right, but for the wrong reasons.
The sources of madness

For Jancke, Franz/Woyzeck's illness arises "aus der Struktur der menschlichen Beziehungen in dieser Gesellschaft" [Jancke 271]. Such a statement is overinclusive to the point of meaninglessness; if it were true, all Woyzeck's contemporaries, at least those in his social class, would, since they were involved in the same web of social relationships, have shared his madness. One frequently utilized response to this argument is that indeed we are all mad, that society is mad. Büchner's contemporaneity, it is asserted, rests on his ability to show how the structures of society dislocate man from "der schwachen Festung seiner Identität" [ibid. 291]. He might thus be held to be anticipating the views on madness of Foucault and Laing. But ethnological studies of psychiatry suggest that it is social consensus that defines madness [see Devereux passim], so that whole societies cannot, in their own terms, be mad, only those who have placed themselves, or have drifted, or been driven outside the norms of their society. Even if it is acknowledged that the whole of society might be mad, the question still remains as to how Franz could become mad in such a spectacularly different way.

Attempts to identify those features of society which might be most damaging can meet with the same criticism. Jancke, again, locates these for Franz in the process of socialization based on "die Unterwerfung der Sexualität und
die Regierung der Analfunktionen" [ibid. 280]. If this were so, since we all are more or less toilet-trained, and all are subject to some degree of inhibition of our sexual drives, we should all be paranoid murderers. Nor does an appeal to psychoanalytic theory [ibid. 280-281] lead to any clarification. It is true that many psychoanalysts would argue that disturbance of psychological function at the anal level can lead to "surrender of aspects of the self and its capabilities to others" [Rayner 79], leading to the passivity and weakness of boundaries found in schizophrenics. It is equally true that, according to psychoanalytic theory, different disturbances related to anal-urethral function may result in the character trait of miserliness or in a neurotic obsessionality [ibid. 81]. Since we do not have any knowledge about the relevant stage of Franz/Woyzeck's childhood, such speculation is idle. (It is tempting however to see in the character of the Doctor, with his passion for collecting samples of excreted material, his unquestioning self-righteousness and his obsession with classification, a more obvious example of anal fixation.)

Attempts to trace the sources of Franz's madness to what Wittkowski calls "metaphysische Dialektik" [Wittkowski 268] are likely to lead to equally strained explication. Thus, von Wiese can write of Franz being confronted by "die Gottheit in der düstern Leere des Nichts" [v. Wiese 525]. Leaving aside
the problem of whether such an existential crisis would be sufficient explanation for an ensuing madness, it must be questioned whether Franz meets with the divinity in any setting. The metaphysical heart of the play, the Grandmother's tale reflects exactly Franz's spiritual situation and represents the vain search of a lost child for the certainties and the securities of a divine presence, vain precisely because there is no God. When Franz reads from his mother's Bible the words of a Pietist hymn: "Leiden sey all mein Gewinst" [H4,17], he does so with no sense of consolation: "Das thut nix". To hold on to some sense of existence, he turns not to God, but to a scrap of paper that has his name, rank and unit written there.

Not only religion, but also prevailing ethical and philosophical ideas, have been held to contribute to Franz's disintegration, as well as that of his historical model. We have seen how (misapplied) Kantian idealism underpinned Clarus' views on the genesis of mental illness and on the basis of accountability before the law. Glück attempts to show how Franz too is a victim of "herrschende Ideen" [Glück 52-138]. These are said to range from ideas concerning property, through conventional morality, to Enlightenment and Naturphilosophie concepts of the place of science in society. Thus, the loss of Marie to the Tambour-Major is held to be for Franz a violation of his property rights in her, and as
such deserving punishment [ibid. 57]. There is nothing in the text to support this view. Far from regarding Marie as his chattel, Franz sees her and their child as giving him some hold on life, and her giving herself to a new lover as a devastating act of rejection and betrayal. It is this and not an acceptance of conventional sexual morality that underlies the violence of his reaction.

Conventional morality is held to be one of the means by which authority keeps the oppressed in subjugation, and Franz's: "Es muß was Schöns sein um die Tugend" [H4,5] is said by Glück to indicate how far this means has been successful in that Franz has accepted the moral code of his superiors [ibid. 68], but surely the opposite is true. Franz's statement must be ironic, linked as it is to his recognition that morality is indeed class-related: "... aber wenn ich ein Herr wär und hätt ein Hut und eine Uhr und eine anglaise und könnt vornehm reden, ich wollt schon tugendhaft sein." [H4,5]. This echoes the Fichtean view that what constitutes virtue and vice is determined by in terms of power and ascendancy [Wittkowski 275]. Earlier Franz had specifically rejected the conventional moral judgment on the bastardy of his child, asserting a more humane and accepting morality: "Der Herr sprach: Lasset die Kindlein zu mir kommen". It is one of the manifestations of health in Franz that, with his limited powers of thought and articulateness, he is able to resist to some degree the force of the "herrschende Ideen".
These predominant ideas impinge more powerfully on Franz's situation in the views on the nature of man purveyed both by rational Idealism and by Romantic Naturphilosophie. The former is used by the Doctor to subjugate Franz, his experimental animal: "Woyzeck, der Mensch ist frei...", and at the same time exposed as inadequate to explain the totality of man. "Die Frage nach dem Menschen, nach der Menschlichkeit des Menschen wird hier schonungslos gestellt. Das Bild Kants und des deutschen Idealismus vom Menschen als dem freien, seiner selbst mächtigen Ordner dieser Welt hat sich grauenvoll verzerrt." [Martens 379]. The Professor in H3,1 expounds an only slightly distorted version of the Romantic philosophy of science: "Meine Herrn wir sind an der wichtigen Frage über das Verhältnis des Subjekts zum Objekt. Wenn wir nur eins von den Dingen nehmen, worin sich die organische Selbstaffirmation des Göttlichen auf einem so hohen Standpunkte manifestiert und ihr Verhältnis zum Raum, zur Erde, zum Planetarischen untersuchen, meine Herrn..." When the cat is thrown out of the window, the question at issue relates to the interacting forces of gravity and of the cat's own instincts, a similar conflict to that between the requirements of Franz's Natur and of the Doctor's science. The practical outcome of the Professor's high-flown philosophy is an order to Franz, accompanied by threat, to wiggle his ears. So much for planetary significance. The dominant ideas of science and philosophy have succeeded in
subjugating Franz, where the attempts of repressive morality had failed. (Glück argues that both Idealism and Naturphilosophie provided a basis for the crude empiricism that resulted in animal and human experiments, as well as for a repressive psychiatry, exemplified by Heinroth and Clarus, that resisted the liberal, and liberating, ideas of Pinel [Glück 96].)

Examination of the socio-economic roots of madness is open to the kind of criticism that has already been outlined: if Franz, why not everyone in the same social condition? An important difference, however, from psychological and theological speculation is that Büchner has in many passages throughout the play made clear reference to the economic circumstances which govern his characters' lives and which help to determine their relationship with one another. In the apprentice's sermon in the inn [H4,II], the answer to the question "Warum ist der Mensch?" is made in terms of economic interdependency and not theology. Even if money eventually comes to putrefaction, it is nonetheless all there is. The teleology of the argument is not mere parody, but a statement of economic reality [Jancke 272]. The cash nexus is the basis of the, for Franz, destructive relationship between him and the doctor. And economics even comes into the purchase of the murder weapon, for two groats [H4,15]:

JUDE - Er soll nen ökonomischen Tod habe .... Als ob's nichts wär. Und s'is noch Geld.
Franz puts his physical health at risk and suppresses his individuality for the pittance necessary to keep Marie and their child. If it is economic factors that determine his madness, then it is through their effects on human relationships that the sources of that madness must be sought.

Since the schizophrenic group of illnesses was first described by Bleuler in 1911, many psychiatrists have seen them as organically determined and a number of biochemical mechanisms have been postulated as the source of disturbed brain function. On the whole, dietary deficiency has not been favoured as a possible explanation but this has not prevented commentators from attributing Franz's madness to a diet of peas: "Woyzeck is mad, he is hallucinating, most likely due to the fact that he has been a human lab animal for the physician and has been restricted to a diet of peas" [Grandin 176]. Glück is more equivocal. He asserts that it is the experimentation that has brought about Franz's downfall [Glück 181] and that his psychological disturbance did not begin until he became the Doctor's experimental animal [ibid. 149], but leaves the question open as to which element of the experiment is damaging. Kubik, though not going so far as to blame diet for the psychosis sees, it as contributing to the development of a predisposition to madness. She suggests a causal link between the experimentation and the manifestations of Franz's illness and, indeed, that producing
psychosis was the Doctor's specific aim: "... die ärztliche Tätigkeit des Doktors, soweit sie diesen Namen überhaupt verdient, is in H2 klar daraufhin angelegt, Woyzeck gesundheitlich zu schaden und seiner psychischen Destabilisierung Vorschluß zu leisten" [Kubik S.55-66]. The Doctor is certainly pleased that Franz is showing signs of mental disturbance and that he can give that disturbance a name [H4,8], but there is no indication that he set out with that specific aim in mind. His sadism is not in doubt, for he gives notice [H2,6] that he intends to extend the experiment even after the signs of madness are manifest: ".. seh Er mich an, was soll Er tun? Erbschen essen, dann Hammelfleisch essen, sein Gewehr putzen ..". But all this is far from indicating that Büchner attributes Franz's alienation to a diet of peas. His delineation of the Doctor indicates that he is a man of scientific pretensions who usually gets things wrong. He may believe madness may be caused in this way, but this should not be taken to mean that Büchner did - indeed it is unlikely that he made so grotesque a figure the mouthpiece for any of his views. Furthermore, the dramatic force of the play would be considerably reduced if the message it contained was that a diet of only peas is likely to be harmful, or for that matter that one should beware of experimenting doctors. Certainly the fact that Franz was the subject of human experimentation is a central
factor in the genesis of his madness, but it is the
reification that is necessarily part of the process rather
than the specific content of the experiment that is
pathogenic.

If none of the factors that have been reviewed, social,
economic and psychological oppression, the force of
"herrschende Ideen", the diet of peas, are by themselves
responsible for his madness, it must be acknowledged that in
combination they have profoundly weakened Franz in body and
mind. Yet, with the exception of the experimental diet, Marie
and Andres have been exposed to these same forces and neither
of them is mad. The difference between their condition and
that of Franz lies in their total passivity in the face of
the powers that condemn them to misery.

Marie can understand, as well as Franz, the influences that
govern her subordination: "Unseins hat nur ein Eckchen in der
Welt und ein Stückchen Spiegel und doch hab ich so rothe
Lippen als die großen Madamen mit ihren Spiegeln von oben bis
unten und ihren schönen Herrn, die ihnen die Händ küssen ..."
[H4,4]* but her reaction is resigned acceptance: "Ach! Was
Welt? Geht doch Alles zum Teufel, Mann u. Weib" [H4,4]. This
resignation also characterizes her giving in to the sexual
advances of the Tambour-Major: "Meintwegen. Es ist Alles

* Scene numbers preceded by H refer to Lehmann’s "Synopse"
[SWB I 338-406], which he uses as the basis of his "Lese- und
Bühnenfassung". The numbers 1-4, immediately following the
letter, indicate the draft from which the scene is derived.
Andres' passivity has become a reflex. While Franz is struggling with a threatening world that undermines his whole existence, for Andres the drums serve only as a summons to be obeyed: "Hörst du? Sie trommeln drin. Wir müssen fort" [H4,1]. He refuses to be drawn into anything that will disturb his ordered, albeit miserable, existence: "Ich hör nichts mehr" [H2,1]. Andres expects nothing of human relationships, in extreme contrast to Franz, who will kill when he believes his love for Marie is betrayed. Franz's uneasy images of Marie dancing with her lover are met by his fellow-soldier with a shrug of the shoulders, another "Meinetwege". Andres' song of the compliant serving maid sums up his expectations of women:

"Sie sitzt in ihrem Garten
bis daß das Glocklein zwölfe schlägt
und paßt auf die Solda-aten" [H4,10].

It is clear that he would be content to line up with the other soldiers and take his turn. And his advice to Franz is, in a sense, to do the same: "... laß sie tanze! .... Gott behüt uns, Amen" [H4,13].

Far from being passive in the face of victimization [Lindenberger 85], Franz resists, and it is in that resistance, (defiance would be too strong a word), to the relentless forces which have shaped the world he lives in and which have condemned him to subjection, that the roots of his madness
lie. Physical resistance is impossible—his Captain has threatened him with a pair of bullets in his head [H2,7]—but he resists in his mind. He will not give in, he will understand. And he will want the love of his wife and child for whom he has sacrificed so much.

"die doppelte Natur"

In trying to fulfill these aspirations, Franz is confronted by an ambiguous world, a Nature which promises and denies. The fairground barker, with his "doppelte raison", expounds the double nature of man: "Sehn Sie jetzt die doppelte Räson? Das ist Viehsionomik. Ja das ist kei viehdummes Individuum, das ist eine Person. Ei Mensch, ei tierisch Mensch und doch ei Vieh, ei bête" [H1,2]. Büchner's love of nature is apparent even in his earliest writings, manifesting itself in a sense of essential natural harmony. The requirements of the Doctor's pseudo-Kantian philosophy constrict and confine, shattering this harmony. They demand that Franz overcome his nature and contain his urine. Lenz in the Novelle describes such constraints as "die schmählichste Verachtung der menschlichen Natur" [SWB I 87, Schwedt 170]. In response to the Doctor's heavy-handed taunts: "Die Natur! Hab' ich nicht nachgewiesen, da der musculus constrictor vesicae dem Willen unterworfen ist", Franz struggles to assert his own humanity: "Sehn Sie Herr Doktor, manchmal hat einer so n'en Charakter, so n'e Struktur. — Aber mit der Natur ist's was anders, sehn Sie mit der Natur ...". In his struggle to find
meaning, he is driven deeper and deeper into unreason. Nature is incomprehensible, is seen as showing two faces, on the one hand bringing about events of world-shattering power, on the other concealing its secrets in the pattern of the mushrooms in the grass:

WOYZECK vertraulich. Herr Doktor, haben Sie schon was von der doppelten Natur gesehen? Wenn die Sonn in Mittag steht und es ist als ging die Welt in Feuer auf hat schon eine fürchterliche Stimme zu mir geredt!

In his tunnel-vision the Doctor sees the world as a unity, and man as free within that world. Franz can only see chaos, and himself as devoid of all freedom. For him "die doppelte Natur" signifies the unbridgeable gap between appearances and reality, most painfully in the person of Marie, both "ein einzig Mädel" [H1,8] and a whore. "... begrifflos erfährt Woyzeck die Trennung von Wesen und Erscheinung, sein Leiden ist ihr Ausdruck."[Schwedt 174].

Büchner and Franz

It is in resistance to the prevailing order of things that we find parallels between the situation of Franz and the experience of his creator. Büchner committed himself to resistance against an oppressive political system, while at the same time recognizing that conditions were not right for the revolution which his political philosophy would seem to demand. Two of his closest collaborators were to lose their sanity in prison, his school friend Minnegerode, who was eventually released and his colleague in the publication of
Der Hessische Landbote, F.L. Weidig, who committed suicide. If it is unlikely that he knew anything of the fate of the latter, he was certainly aware of the fate of his school friend [SWB II 445]. It is likely moreover that he saw in others, and observed in himself, the effects of the stress and alienation suffered by those who challenged a powerful and repressive social order.

He knew the frustration and helplessness of feeling at the mercy of historical contingency. In a much-quoted letter in March 1834 he had written: "Ich studierte die Geschichte der Revolution. Ich fühlte mich wie zernichtet unter dem gräßlichen Fatalismus der Geschichte." And in the same letter he referred to the theme that he would take up in Woyzeck, of how power determined the nature of human relationships: "Ich finde ... in den menschlichen Verhältnissen eine unabwendbare Gewalt, Allen und Keinem verliehen." [SWB II 425]. It is impossible to identify with accuracy the sources of Büchner's insights into madness, but it is in this awareness of the inhumanity of relationships dominated by power that they may most profitably be sought.

The role of the Doctor

We have seen how, in Lenz, the depth of the poet's madness varied with the quality of his interactions with Oberlin, the individual in whom he had placed his hopes of recovering wholeness. A number of commentators have seen, in the
relationship between Franz and the Doctor in *Woyzeck*, a potent cause of the hero’s disintegration [Henkelmann 84-86, Glück 165-181, Kubik 62-73].

There are however important differences. Lenz has, in the face of enormous difficulties, gone to seek help from Oberlin, who has, implicitly at least, undertaken to give help. There does, therefore, exist a kind of carer-patient relationship by mutual consent. That it fails to be therapeutic results from a lack of congruence between Lenz’s expectations and those of Oberlin.

Although Henkelmann refers to the failure of the Doctor to establish a therapeutic relationship with his patient [Henkelmann 84], the situation in *Woyzeck* is hardly comparable. It is true that Franz from time to time hopes for some kind of understanding from him: “Herr Doktor, ich hab’s Zittern” [H3,1], but for the most part he has no expectations of help other than the two groats a week he receives for his compliance with the Doctor’s experiments. The Doctor for his part sees no responsibility for treatment, his response to "ich hab’s Zittern" being a delighted “Ei, ei, schon Woyzeck", each new symptom being grist to his scientific mill. There is thus no more question of a doctor-patient relationship in the play, than there is between Clarus and Woyzeck. In both cases, the interactions are dominated by the issues of power and powerlessness. This is not to deny that
these issues arise in a helping relationship between the helper and the one who asks for help, but there the issues are marginal, with Clarus/Woyzeck and Doctor/Franz they are central and of qualitatively different significance.

Doctors in literature

In focussing on the issue of power and exploitation in relation to the Doctor in Woyzeck, Büchner was by no means breaking new ground. Earlier portrayals in German literature tended to show doctors as greedy charlatans and Henkelmann suggests that this reflected feeling about the ineffectiveness of much early medicine [Henkelmann 80]. It was with Goethe (Verazio in Lila and the doctor in Wilhelm Meisters Lehre) that sympathetic portrayals were first found. At the same time, some ambivalence persisted and Lila (1776-1777) fires some heavy broadsides against the profession. "Es kommt alle Tage ein neuer Zahnbrecher, der unsere Hoffnungen und Wünsche mißbraucht" [Lila 862]. "O ja, wenn sie nur was zu sezieren, klistieren, elektresieren haben, sind sie bei der Hand, um nur zu sehen, was für ein Gesicht dazu schneidet, und zu versichern, daß sie es wie im Spiegel vorausgesehen hätten." [ibid. 865]

With the Romantics, a certain degree of idealization began to appear. Novalis, for whom illness was a step on the way to a higher existence, portrayed a physician, Sylvester in Heinrich von Ofterdingen, (published posthumously in 1802) as
the guide to that better life. The good, caring, self-sacrificing doctor, often struggling to overcome the superstitions and prejudices of his patients is represented in Wilhelm Hauff's Novelle Die Sängerin (published posthumously 1828): "...der Arzt hat am manchem Bette mehr zu tun als nur den Puls an der Linken zu fühlen, Wunden zu verbinden und Mixturen zu verschreiben. Glauben Sie mir, wenn man so allein bei einem Kranken sitzt, wenn man den innern Puls der Seele unruhig pochen hört, wenn man Wunden verbindet, die niemand sieht, da wird auf wunderbare Weise der Arzt zum Freunde, und der geheimnisvolle Zusammenhang zwischen Körper und Seele scheint in diesem Verhältnisse auffallend zu Wirken." [quoted in Burger 43]. In this highly idealized portrayal, the doctor becomes the agent of a higher power.

The opposite tendency is represented by Jean Paul's Katzenberger in Dr. Katzenbergers Badereise in which the doctor, with his obsessive "Jagd nach Mißgeburtten" appears as the first literary portrayal, and as prototype, of the eccentric or even mad scientific inquirer [Henkelmann 81]. He values the deformed over normality, even in the case of his own daughter, Theoda, whose "einige Pockengruben" enhanced the charms of her "zart- und glänzend-durchsichtigen Angesicht", charms of which future generations of beauties would be deprived by Dr. Jenner's discovery [Badereise 93]. The
scientific value of the anatomical freaks in his collection lies simply in their rarity, "eine Einzigperle" [ibid. 128]. "Ein Mißgeburt ist mir als Arzt eigentlich für die Wissenschaft das einzige Wesen von Geburt ... ist mir ein Fötus in Spiritus lieber als ein langer Mann voll Spiritus" [ibid. 198]. He declares himself ready to marry a deformed wife, and to hope that such a monster might be born to them. When his daughter's friend, Bona, is confined, he is disappointed that the child is normal in all respects [ibid. 234]. The Doctor in Woyzeck clearly belongs to this tradition. Whereas Katzenberger delights in the rarity of his collection of freaks, the Doctor's reaction to Franz's madness is one of pleasure that Franz is revealed as a specimen, and in his own skill in being able to classify him (even though he gets the diagnosis wrong). There are other parallels. Katzenberger probes the weaknesses of his enemy, the spa physician, Strykius, who stands revealed as an ignoramus, so that he may later use his "science" to destroy him [ibid. 193], rather as the Doctor uses his science to undermine the Captain's fragile peace of mind.

In the case of both doctors, much of what is purveyed is pseudo-science. Katzenberger "does" nothing with his material other than to categorize it, and the same may be said of Büchner's Doctor, whose main delight in the phenomena he believes he has evoked is in naming them.
The polarization in the depiction of doctors, between saint and charlatan, continued well into the nineteenth century. Burger's study of this polarization does not speculate on the reasons why in German literature these two polarities were predominant, nor can he point to a German equivalent to the complex (and realistic) portrayal of a doctor in the person of Lydgate in *Middlemarch*. It surely had something to do with the over-valuing of illness by the German Romantic movement, and therefore of doctors who were held to be in touch with its secret mysteries; as a reaction against this, resentment was felt towards a profession on whom these supposed qualities were projected.

The doctor's tendency to resort to psychiatric jargon when confronted by a suffering Woyzeck is anticipated by Oehlmann, the doctor in charge of the madhouse in *Nachtwachen des Bonaventura* (1804). When one of his patients reveals a complex delusion of grandeur, Oehlmann does not attempt to understand its meaning, but has recourse to theory: "Oehlmann schüttelte den Kopf und machte einige bedeutende Anmerkungen über Gemütskrankheiten überhaupt." [*Nachtwachen* 150].

The Doctor as scientist

The power relationship between the Doctor and Franz is also exemplified by the doctor's status as experimenter and that of Franz as experimental animal. For Glück, the experiments carried out by the Doctor are to be seen in the setting of a
scientific establishment that uses science to exploit and to enslave. Its aims in subjecting Franz and his like to a diet of nothing but peas are said to be socio-economic, to find out whether, without leading to social disruption, soldiers may be fed on a cheaper diet than one containing meat [Glück 162]. If this were so, the experiment could be held to be turning out as singularly unsuccessful. Rather than being pleased at each new evidence of pathology in Franz, the experimenter ought to be dismayed that the hopes attached to his enquiry were not being realized.

Henkelmann sees the Doctor's role as scientist in the context of the move from philosophically-based to scientific medicine under the influence of Magendie (who conducted experiments in diet and excretion in 1816) [Henkelmann 3 and 88]. There were certainly important developments led by Magendie, and later Comte, which occurred between 1810 and 1840 (roughly Büchner's lifetime) whereby medicine became based on a physiology and pathology, themselves grounded in chemistry and physics, leaving behind theories based in Vitalism and Naturphilosophie. [Diepgen 88, Lichtenthaeler 486]. The terms in which Lichtenthaeler describes these events are not far removed from the Doctor's own hoped-for claims to immortality: "Diese Revolution ist als eine solche zu betrachten. Sie macht tabula rasa mit der Vergangenheit..." [Lichtenthaeler 499]. Compare the Doctor's: "Es gibt eine Revolution in der
At the same time Büchner cannot be said to be attacking this scientific revolution, since he was himself part of it, his own anatomical studies based on observation and not philosophy. He was rather satirizing a particular kind of science and a particular kind of scientist. Though the Doctor's methods are empirically based: "Den Puls Woyzeck, den Puls, klein, hart, hüpfend, Haltung aufgerichtet, gespannt." [H2,7], it is what Glück has called "empirisches Herumtappen" [Glück 170-171]. There is no suggestion that the Doctor has formed a hypothesis and is testing it. It is simply wanton curiosity, and Franz is its victim. (Magendie, a leader of the drive towards scientific medicine, may have served as a model for this trait in the Doctor: "... this ardent apostle of physiological experiment ... seemed, however, to, substitute experiment for thought, thrusting his knife here and there to see what would come of it, and prodding in all directions in the hope of finding some new truth." [Guthrie, D. 279]).

Kubik has suggested that the Doctor sees himself, or at least wishes to be seen, as the instrument of his "Abgott Wissenschaft" [Kubik 70], but this implies an altruism that is beyond him. His driving force is his need for self-aggrandisement, linked with a sadistic enjoyment of power: "Ja Herr Hauptmann Sie können eine apoplexia cerebralis
The Doctor in <i>Woyzeck</i> may have been in part modelled on the chemist, Julius Liebig, who was teaching, and conducting dietary experiments on soldiers at Gießen, while Büchner was a student there. Any similarities between the two are, however, only superficial. In contrast to the ego-centrism of the Doctor stand the measured tones in which Liebig sets out the aims of his investigations. These are, to modern ears, ecologically sound: "Die Cultur ist die Oekonomie der Kraft: die Wissenschaft lehrt uns die einfachen Mittel erkennen, um mit dem geringsten Aufwand der Kraft den größten Effekt zu erzielen, und mit gegebenen Mitteln ein Minimum von Kraft hervorzubringen. Eine jede unnutzte Kraftäußerung, eine jede Kraftverschwendung in der Agricultur, in der Industrie und der Wissenschaft, so wie im Staate, charakterisiert die Roheit oder den Mangel an Cultur." [Liebig 79]. If, as is often asserted, the character of the Doctor was based on Liebig, then he did not inherit the latter's thoughtfulness. Furthermore, whereas Liebig was dealing with the complex
chemistry, in flesh-eating as compared with grass-eating animals, of fats and starches and sugars [Liebig 85-89], the doctor deals with simpler chemicals like urea and ammonium chloride and still gets it wrong. "Hyperoxydul" (possibly peroxide) is unlikely to be part of any breakdown of body tissues, and in the whole of Liebig's section on the effects of nourishment on body chemistry it receives no mention. [See also Glück 154-155].

Glück maintains that the caricature of the Doctor, and of his science, is not marginal, but central to Franz's disintegration: "wenn ... die tragische Wirklichkeit ist: das Woyzeck infolge dieses 'grotesken' Experiments umkommt." [Glück 181]. Kubik asserts almost as strongly: "dass dem Doktor die Hauptschuld an Woyzecks Scheitern zukommt, da er am stärksten zu seiner physischen und psychischen Destabilisierung beiträgt", the damage being all the greater since the Doctor should, according to Kubik, have been the person to whom Franz might have looked for help [Kubik 72]. Both Kubik and Glück overstate the case. The Doctor is only a part of the world around him that Franz finds so threatening and unfathomable. Both the Doctor and the Captain play their parts in the humiliation experienced by Franz, and certainly it is that humiliation* that in the end unhinges him. However

* "Psychogenic precipitants" (of paranoia) "are also important, and these are most often of the type that provides an assault on the patient's self-esteem." [Slater & Roth 148].
Conclusion

"... when we declare a particular action or set of actions to be unintelligible we mean that we either lack the narrative context in which to place it or, more drastically, that we cannot conceive a narrative context that could account for such an action..." [Barham 88]. This is the gap in comprehension that leads us to designate some forms of thought and behaviour as psychotic. It is Büchner's achievement in Woyzeck that he enables us to bridge that gap.

The psychoanalyst C.W. Winnicott sees individuals as "engaged in the perpetual human task of keeping inner and outer reality separate yet interrelated." [Winnicott 2]. What Büchner has succeeded in doing in Woyzeck is to show us a man, one of the most disadvantaged of humankind, struggling to achieve the task that Winnicott describes: to maintain an identity and some sense of direction, while existing in an external world where he is flooded with perceptions, like "die Schwämme auf dem Boden", which he cannot understand, and in an inner world dominated by a chaos of conflicting feelings of love and hatred, submission and resistance, hope and despair. He fails, and inner and outer reality merge. Natural phenomena become a threatening part of his inner self.
and that self becomes a vengeful agent in the external world. Although both his internal and external worlds remain, in the end, unintelligible to Franz Woyzeck, we are enabled, through Büchner's sympathetic probing, to see that inner world in a fatal process of disintegration.
Chapter Sixteen - Conclusions

The premise which was the starting point of this study, namely that in *Lenz* and in *Woyzeck* Georg Büchner showed, for his time, unique insight into the nature of schizophrenic thought and feeling, has been demonstrated extensively in the preceding analyses of these works [Chapters Eight to Twelve, and Chapter Fifteen]. Indeed, so detailed is Büchner's description, and so integrated are these details with the situation of his characters, that it has been possible to demonstrate [Chapters Twelve and Fifteen] a specificity in the manifestations of their illnesses in relation to their life situation and to their social environment. This, it must be said, is not an approach favoured by most commentators, who prefer to interpret the meaning of Lenz's and Franz Woyzeck's madness in terms of general statements about the human condition.

In the introductory chapter, five hypotheses were stated which might account for that insight, postulating that this may have been derived from Büchner's own experience of illness, from knowledge of the illness in his immediate circle, from his medical studies, or from descriptions of madness in earlier writings, literary or psychiatric. These hypotheses have been examined in the present study, and it must be acknowledged that not one of them, by itself, has yielded sufficient explanation.
In the light of the evidence examined here, it can be justifiably be stated that, in contradiction of frequently made claims to the contrary, Büchner’s own experience of illness by no means explains his understanding of Lenz or of Woyzeck. Another common assertion, namely that Büchner derived special knowledge of psychiatric illness from his time as a medical student, has also been shown here to be without basis.

Similarly, reference to the life experience of those closest to him, his family and his nearest friends, has not revealed any schizophrenia-like illness which might have served as a model. No more can be inferred than that the sense of alienation and persecution which he shared with some of his friends and collaborators allowed him to observe in himself and others the effects of the stresses involved in a situation which in some way mirrored that of his protagonists in the Novelle and in the play.

It has here been shown that Büchner seems to have been little affected by much of the psychiatric discourse of his time. One exception to this is the vigorous debate that took place, in the twenty years or so before the writing of Woyzeck, in the field of forensic medicine. This debate has been examined in some detail in the present study. The central issue which emerges, namely that of freedom/unfreedom in respect of Zurechnungsfähigkeit clearly relates to the situation of
Franz Woyzeck. The contribution to the debate of Büchner's main source for the play, J.C.A. Clarus, is examined and the text of the two Clarus Gutachten analysed. This analysis, it may be claimed, breaks new ground in demonstrating the clinical features of madness described therein, and Clarus' interpretation of these. It highlights, also, aspects of the historical Woyzeck which Büchner developed in his portrayal of Franz.

Two further themes in the psychiatric literature, which may have influenced Büchner in his portrayals of madness, have been identified. The first is the increasing concern, finding expression in the work of Nasse and Ideler in the 1820's and 1830's, with social factors in the genesis of madness, together with a developing awareness, again shown by both authors, of the rôle of internal conflicts and the need for empathy in the understanding of these. Büchner, in focussing both on the inner world and on the social interactions of Lenz and Franz Woyzeck, was reflecting concerns that were beginning to engage at least some in the psychiatric profession.

The other possible influence deriving from the psychiatric literature, which has emerged from the present research, relates to the accounts of schizophrenia-like illness that were beginning to appear from the 1780's on. These often took the form of case histories, and were found in journals,
rather than textbooks. They were often from the pen of anonymous or little-known authors. These reports suggest that schizophrenia was a commonly occurring illness, or at least was becoming common enough to engage the attention of the attention of the medical profession and of others concerned with mental illness. This finding challenges Devereux's view [See Chapter One] that schizophrenia was likely to have been rare in pre-industrial society.

The existence of such descriptions might account in part for Büchner's interest in the illness. They would not of themselves explain his detailed insights. We have seen, however, that some case histories did contain accounts of the sufferer's thoughts and feelings in their own words, and these certainly could have deepened Büchner's understanding.

The remaining hypothesis concerned itself with the possibility that Büchner may have derived insights from literary descriptions of madness.

The work of a number of writers has been examined, from Goethe, writing forty to sixty years before Büchner, to Mörike and Balzac whose novels appeared in the same decade as Lenz and Woyzeck. By far most of the works examined reveal a conventional, non-realistic and sometimes sentimental, attitude to madness, conditioned either by the Enlightenment view of madness as a sleep of reason bringing forth monsters, or by a Romanticism which saw madness as a daemonic state,
sometimes deliberately courted in the pursuit of artistic vision. Of the earlier writers, only Goethe in *Wilhelm Meisters Lehriahre* comes close to a realistic portrayal of madness even to the extent of conveying some sense of psychotic thinking. But here the portrayal is of a depressive rather than a schizophrenic state, and therefore of little direct value as a model for *Lenz* and *Woyzeck*. For a convincing portrayal of schizophrenia, we must wait until the 1830's. Mörike's *Maler Nolten* demonstrates some understanding of schizophrenic thinking, but remains conventional in its account of the genesis of madness. It is however with Balzac's *Louis Lambert*, published three years before Büchner began work on *Lenz*, that we first see a detailed and convincing fictional account of a catatonic breakdown. Both Mörike and Balzac, however, differ from Büchner in showing madness as protection against a psychological threat, in both cases the threat posed by a sexual relationship. The desperateness and torment of psychosis, and the complexity of its sources in human interaction, are conveyed by Büchner alone.

It is in exploration of the two last hypotheses, regarding possible sources in psychiatric literature and in fiction, that we have come nearest to an explanation of Büchner's insights. We have seen in later Romantic literature a move towards a more realistic description of psychosis and, at least in some psychiatric writing of the 1820's and 1830's,
an anticipation of Büchner's reaching into the inner world of his characters. However, nothing in either set of sources prepares us for the wealth of detail in which mad behaviour and thought is explored in Lenz, nor for the empathy which he shows for poor, persecuted, only partly articulate Woyzeck.

If none of the hypotheses by themselves offer more than partial explanation, then taken together they begin to make possible an understanding of the position from which Büchner started out on his exploration. We may then view that position in the light of his historical situation as an outsider who lived through real and life-threatening experience of persecution. And we may finally speculate on the nature of his genius.

Reich sees the genius and the schizophrenic as both open to streams of bio-energy, against which the "normal" have constructed defences that necessarily limit their understanding of the world. The difference is that the genius is able to integrate and channel this energy, whereas the schizophrenic is overwhelmed by it (Reich 399-400 and 432). Navratil postulates that creative activity and mythic-magical thinking represent the same kind of central nervous system arousal (Navratil 117), with the clear implication that the creative act involves some of the psychological processes that can contribute to psychosis, and especially to the schizophrenias.
Perhaps it is Jung who allows us to see where Büchner's inner world might have come closest to that of Lenz and Franz Woyzeck. The disruption of the psyche in schizophrenia releases archaic material expressed in symbolic images of the kind which we have noted in the play and the Novelle. In the non-psychotic, Jung holds that this material can come to awareness in dreams (the so-called "big dream"), and that such dreams are not only more likely to be experienced by the artist, but to occur at certain, transitional, stages of life. He designates the early twenties as one such stage [Jung 1939 242-243], Büchner's age when he was engaged on Lenz and Woyzeck.

Such speculation does not really explain, for it does not answer the question of why the insights available to Büchner were not equally available to others, who at the same point of history concerned themselves with the depiction of madness.

If, in the end, we must be satisfied with explanations that are less than complete, it may reasonably be claimed that the present study has identified factors in the medical, literary and social background of Büchner's time, which helped to determine the content of two remarkable works, witness to their author's richly imaginative genius.
The following abbreviations are made in references in the main text:


SWB I = op. cit. Bd.1      SWB II = op. cit. Bd.2


The Bibliography is in two sections, the first consisting of the works referred to directly in the text, the second consisting of other works consulted. Both are arranged alphabetically by the author’s surname.


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