The

Impact of War on the Administration of the Army, Navy and Ordnance in Britain

1739 ~ 1754

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TO MY PARENTS AND WIFE
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I should like to record my thanks to several people and institutions.

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Abstract

The thesis examines aspects of the work of three departments in Britain responsible for the conduct of war, the ordnance, the army and the navy during the period 1739-54. Similarities are observed in the size and structure of their staffs. An examination of the changes in procedure in the most important areas indicates the extent to which the departments were critical of their own performance. The measures taken touched on fundamental difficulties but were palliatives rather than lasting solutions. A more objective assessment of how effectively the departments coped with the challenge of war is attempted. It appears that, as with many other wars which Britain entered after a long period of peace, the ordnance, army and navy were not adequately prepared for war. They experienced both a crisis of confidence and a real crisis in the first two years. They then took measures to deal with the most pressing problems, and proceeded to adopt expedient measures before rushing into peacetime tranquillity. The analysis of the performance of the armed forces serves as a background to establish what evidence in administrative fact there was for the claim made by the parliamentary opposition after the war that measures taken to strengthen discipline in the army were not justified. There was sufficient evidence of slackness and abuse in the army to induce a stern commander in chief to take corrective action and a dutiful Secretary at War to assist him. Such measures were consistent with trends in the articles of war. Reforms were initiated prior to 1748, before the Duke of Cumberland could be accused of furthering his ambitions to become Regent. Nevertheless measures were pursued to an unprecedented extent and with a zeal not apparent in the period before 1748. A more general assessment on
the working of the various offices would be that although there were examples of incompetence and slackness, there is nothing to suggest that administration was conducted in an unprofessional way by contemporary standards.
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Introduction

The case for a study of administration in the eighteenth century requires no defence. The extent to which works on the army, the navy and the Treasury by Scouller,\(^1\) Ehrman,\(^2\) Baugh,\(^3\) Binney\(^4\) and Middleton\(^5\) have added to an understanding of the politics of the period is self-evident. In this century the distinction between politics and administration was less clearly defined than in the next; the highest administrative officers in the departments responsible for the conduct of war were all political appointments, and to perform those jobs effectively incumbents had to be both politicians and administrators. On the other hand, by virtue of precedent and tradition, various offices were developing that identity which could only arise through time.\(^6\) The workings of departments responsible for the conduct of war are especially relevant since they touched directly on two of the areas which attracted close attention in the eighteenth century, on the one hand defence of the realm and preservation of the monarchy, and on the other the preservation of the landowners wealth and position.\(^7\) Wars

\(^{1}\) R. E. Scouller, The Armies of Queen Anne.

\(^{2}\) J. Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III.

\(^{3}\) D. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole.

\(^{4}\) J. E. D. Binney, British Public Finance and Administration.

\(^{5}\) C. Middleton, The Administration of Pitt and Newcastle, 1754-1760.

\(^{6}\) For a good example, see O. F. G. Hogg, The Royal Arsenal: Its background, origin and subsequent history. In relation to the army many aspects of the administration were similar to those evident in previous centuries, see C. G. Cruikshank, Elizabeth's Army and J. Childs, The Army of Charles II. Note the situation at the end of the century. R. Glover, Peninsular preparation: The Reform of the British Army 1795-1809.

\(^{7}\) A useful indication as to what was considered interesting can be gained from two annual commentaries; J. Chamberlayne, The Present State of Great Britain and G. Miege, The Present State of Great Britain.
were always expensive, especially so if they ended in failure, and the class capable of financing them was small. Nowhere is the interest which these considerations generated better demonstrated than in the period 1739 to 1754.

The period is distinguished in other ways as an important area for study. Britain was plunged into war after twenty-five years of peace. For most of these years Sir Robert Walpole was the foremost minister and his chief apparent virtue was the pursuit of tranquillity at home and abroad. Apart from flurries of activity in 1727 and 1735 the armed services in 1739 had not been called from the relative inactivity into which they lapsed in 1715.

It would have been interesting to see how far the various departments responsible for the conduct of war had atrophied in this period in relation to the demands imposed by any major war. In fact, the scale and scope of the involvement in the wars between 1739 and 1754 were unusually great as a result of inept diplomacy, a chivalrous regard for promises to adhere to the terms of the Pragmatic Sanction broken by other countries less scrupulous, and a healthy interest in preserving trading connections. These commitments involved fighting,

9. See Appendix C, Table 6.
10. Compare for example military expenditure in this war, Appendix C, Table 4, with that in the previous war, Scouller op. cit., Appendix C.
11. The usefulness of preserving Austria as a counter balance to France was not discounted. The notion occurs in several of the debates between 1739 and 1742. See, for example, Pulteney's speech in support of a motion for referring to a select Committee papers relating to the conduct of the war, 21 Jan. 1742, Cobbett, Parliamentary History 1741-3, cc.338-340.
12. See C. E. Fayle, "Economic Pressure in the war of 1739-48," J.R.U.S.I. Vol. 68. 1923. For a shorter synopsis, see an article by the same author "The Deflection of Strategy by Commerce in the Eighteenth Century," ibid. For a particular example of the close links between trade and politics, see p.289 of that article.
not only in Europe, but in the colonies. Britain was fighting for the long-term future abroad whilst endangering the immediate future through the war in Europe. As if these theatres of war were not sufficient drain on resources, the 1745 rebellion gave substance to the earlier fears of Sir Robert Walpole of a French descent on a weakened England.

At the close of hostilities the war departments were faced with the problem of demobilising quickly enough to satisfy Parliament while retaining the basis for future expansion. Although, with hindsight, the period 1748 to 1756 appears as a brief interlude before the Seven Years War, contemporaries were not to know how long the peace would last in Europe. The war in the colonies did not cease in 1748, and continued regardless of the official relationships of the countries involved, merging into the Seven Years War.

The period 1739 to 1754 was marked also by the effect of military affairs on politics in Britain at three stages. It was charged against Walpole that he was not the man to lead Britain in war, in part because of his nature, and in part because of the incompetence of his administration. The expedition against Carthagena and Porto Bello brought no credit on the administration. Military inadequacy was not

13. For the range of activities, see Appendix C.
16. See Bibliography, Pamphlets, item No. 3.
17. See Bibliography, Pamphlets, item No. 1. It is immaterial that other expeditions met the same fate. Lord Keynes, Amphibious Warfare and Combined Operations. For the commonly held view of events, see Lieut. General Sir N. Cantlie, A History of the Army Medical Department, Vol. 1, pp.74-77. See also, JAHR, Vol.2, p.185, Col. C. Field, Cartagena, for a brief critical commentary on events.
sufficient cause for Walpole's downfall;\textsuperscript{18} on the other hand there was no success to save him.

The second stage occurred three years later when politics were thrown into confusion by the rebellion, even London not being considered safe. The continuation of the Hanoverian dynasty in England was thus called into question.\textsuperscript{19} The extent to which Hanoverian interests were responsible for the conduct of the war in Europe against Britain's true interests, especially in the matter of the hiring of foreign mercenaries, was an issue raised in many debates in the House of Commons in the 1740's; this was before William Pitt made the argument legitimate and less disloyal by framing it more politely.\textsuperscript{20}

The final stage began after the end of hostilities. The parliamentary opposition saw in the Mutiny Bills, especially that for 1750, an attempt by the king's second son, the Commander in Chief, the Duke of Cumberland to usurp authority.\textsuperscript{21} Lord Egmont was ostensibly worried by this.\textsuperscript{22} It was suggested that the Duke's intention was to use his position as Captain General and Commander in Chief of the armed forces

\textsuperscript{18} "It was the politicians who were neither fighting sailors nor smuggling traders who forced on the Spanish War." G. K. Stirling Taylor, Robert Walpole and his Age, p.302.

\textsuperscript{19} See Bibliography, Pamphlets, item No. 6.

\textsuperscript{20} See anonymous pamphlet, The Case of the Hanoverian Forces in the pay of Great Britain, BM/E 2206, pp.1,45,73.

\textsuperscript{21} P. Yorke, Life of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, p.44, and H. Walpole, Memoires of the last 10 years of the Reign of George the Second, p.32.

\textsuperscript{22} P. Yorke, op. cit., p.44, and H. Walpole, op. cit., pp.29-32,34.
to personal advantage. There are references to his supremacy within the army and over the Secretary at War, and to the attempts which he was making, not through Parliament, to strengthen that control.

There are suggestions of a similar contemporary attempt regarding naval affairs by Anson.

The thesis has two objects. The primary aim is to examine how effectively the ordnance, the army and the navy reacted to the impact of war. A secondary object is to use this assessment in examining the extent to which accusations made by the parliamentary opposition in the period 1748-1751 are supported by administrative evidence.

In section one an attempt is made to assess how far the departments most closely involved in the conduct of war, the ordnance, the army and the navy were critical of their own performance. One indication of the extent to which the organisation might be stretched would be an increase in the number of staff employed and in the way in which the departments

23. How sensitive a political topic control over the army was, was evident in 1689. J. S. Ormond, Parliament and the Army, 1642-1904, pp.27-30. The fear in 1750 was summed up, Yorke op. cit., Vol. II, p.44. "The Duke, as Captain General, held the supreme military power, which he palpably intended to use in securing the predominating political influence in case of a minority." Lord Waldegrave's Memoirs, 23.

24. For a typical assessment of the Duke of Cumberland, see P. Yorke, op. cit., pp.43-4. See also, H. Walpole, op. cit., p.88.

25. P. Yorke, op. cit., pp.84-85; and see also, H. Walpole, op. cit., p.33. For the introduction of uniforms to the navy, see Maud Wyndham, Chronicles of the Eighteenth Century, Founded on the Correspondence of Sir Thos. Lyttleton and his Family, London, 1924, Vol. II, p.48. For details, see Lt. Brock's "Anson and his importance as a Naval Reformer", p.523-4. He refers to the offering of a reward for the detection of abuses, instituting a strict keeping of accurate accounts, and repeating the official inspection of the dockyards.
were organised. These aspects are examined in chapter one. Against this background the ways in which the departments reacted in areas which most closely affected their work are investigated in chapters two to five. In chapter two the work of the ordnance is examined, principally in relation to its attitude towards the supply of arms. Conclusions formed on the basis of this study are tested in relation to the army in chapter three; the army's principal aim was the constant supply of trained men. The need for the supply of new troops was measured by numerical deficiencies revealed by the mustering system; shortcomings in that system were reflected in the incessant demands for information outside the mustering system. Defects in the system for providing new recruits led to a re-appraisal of the recruiting system and the use of the Irish establishment as a reserve of trained troops. Conclusions on the performance of the ordnance and the army are tested against the experience of the naval administration as described by Professor Baugh. Particular regard is paid to those subjects which bear comparison with areas of the ordnance's and army's activities already considered. These were the three areas most vital to the navy, the supply of vessels, their upkeep, and the payment and victualling of the seamen.

In section two an attempt is made to reach a more objective assessment of the work of the departments. In chapter five the work of the Ordnance is traced through three crises of supply of arms, powder and men in 1739-40, 1745 and 1747; the approach of the Ordnance to the defence of garrisons overseas and at home, especially in the face of the 1745 rebellion, is investigated together with its general attitude as demonstrated by the dispute with the States General; this concerned the artillery train, known as the Joint Battering Train, fitted for
service against the French. In chapter six, consideration is given to areas in which the performance of the war office can most easily be tested, namely how well prepared it was for the war in 1739 and the rebellion in 1745, and the effects of its commitments to supply forces on the continent. Consideration of the navy's performance is limited in view of the extensive attention given to the subject by Professor Baugh. Two areas are examined in chapter seven, however, since they touched most closely on the navy's practical effectiveness, the number of ships available and attempts to improve efficiency after 1748.

The period 1748 to 1751 is especially important because of the attitude of the opposition to the government. Against the background of changes in the army's performance, as indicated in chapters three and six, two other important elements are examined in section three, namely the relationship of the Duke of Cumberland, as Commander in Chief, to Fox, as Secretary at War, and changes in the articles of war by which the army was governed.

The nature of the sources has been a limiting factor in three of the areas studied. The minutes of the Board of Ordnance are not extant before 1749, thus making impossible a detailed study of the work of the Board at this period. For the years 1739 to 1748 therefore reliance has been placed on the most important issues being reported in state papers, the domestic military series. Where possible these developments have been confirmed with other documents which do not serve the whole period, such as the War Office Ordnance Miscellanea and the Treasury papers.

26. For a list of the sources used, see below p. lxxxvii-lxxxviii.
The affairs of the War Office are more difficult to monitor. Changes in routine which in the Ordnance are indicated by references in the minutes of the Board of Ordnance would not, by their nature, find a place in the records of the War Office, which was under the control of one person, not a Board of Principal Officers. On the assumption, therefore, that significant changes affecting the army as a whole would have to be communicated to the agents or the colonels of regiments the best source is the War Office Out-letter series. This has been supplemented by a thorough search of the War Office Miscellany Books, Entry Books of Warrants and Precedents. Unfortunately material is lacking for most of the period on important areas such as numbers of troops recruited, number of desertions and inspection returns.

The study of the Articles of War has been restricted by virtue of the absence of articles for each of the years under review. A complete collection of Articles on a yearly basis was lodged with other papers sent to the House of Lords. The majority of these were destroyed in a fire in 1834.

The absence of such important documents necessitated selective reference to a wide range of abundant departmental records to reveal significant items requiring more detailed treatment. Dates have been changed so that the year runs from Jan. 1st. Documents which, for example, bear the date 1st. Feb. 1747/48 are therefore recorded as 1st. Feb. 1748.
SECTION ONE

STAFFING AND PROCEDURES

Chapter One: p. 11
The staffing of various departments in 1739 and changes during the period 1739-54.

Chapter Two: p. 30
The Ordnance: Procedures and changes, 1739-54.

Chapter Three: p. 88
The Army: Procedures and changes in aspects of army administration, 1739-54.

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The Navy: Procedures and changes in aspects of naval administration, 1739-54.
CHAPTER ONE

THE STAFFING OF VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS

1739-1754
Nature of administration in general; conclusion on period 1739-54.

The Ordnance - distribution of clerks between the Principal Officers - division of clerks at the centre - local organisation - specialist staff - relative importance of Principal Officers - continuity and promotion of clerical staff during the war.

The War Office - background of officers - number and turnover of clerical staff.

The Admiralty - changes in staff during the war - turnover in clerical staff.

The Office of the Treasurer of the Navy - relative importance of the Officers - number and turnover of clerks - distribution of clerks between sections - basis of promotion.
An understanding of the small numbers of men employed and the
tight-knit office structure is essential to an understanding of the
outlook of officials, who were part administrators and part politicians.
It helps to explain the apparent parochialism and attention to minutiae
of office routine. Administration in the eighteenth century was not a
matter for remote desk bound officials. Departments entrusted with
clerical work relating to the conduct of military affairs were run on
a similar basis to that with which a country gentleman might be
familiar in the running of a large estate. On the other hand, despite
the absence of a formal public service, there were similarities in
the organisation of autonomous departments.

This chapter seeks to describe general salient features of
administration in the period. It also seeks to trace what effect the
strain of war had on the organisation, whether an ageing force of
clerks accustomed to peace time administration was replaced by a
vigorous professional team to prosecute a vigorous war, and whether
various departments responded in different fashions. A more detailed
study is prepared for the Ordnance than for other departments partly
because the subject is less well covered in secondary sources, and
partly because the Ordnance's position as an agent of supply meant that
it reflected changing conditions particularly closely.

1. See G. E. Aylmer, The Kings Servants - The Civil Service
of Charles I 1625-1642; L. G. Mitchell, The Purefoy
Letters 1735-53, pp.69-70; note the form of the account
The Ordnance

In 1739 the clerical and executive structure of the Ordnance was the same as it had been for three years previously, and little had changed since 1714. It would remain basically the same for the next sixteen years, the only significant change being in regard to the position of the Master General.

In 1739 there were some 42 clerks under the Master General, Lieutenant General, and the other principal officers of the Ordnance. They were by no means divided equally between the principal officers. The reason for the distribution of personnel is not clear. Neither the numbers employed in one section nor their salaries provide an indication of the importance of that section. It does seem that each principal officer had a minimum of three clerks to assist him. A possible explanation for the amounts by which the staff of certain principal officers exceeded that minimum was that the more important the principal officer the fewer clerical personnel directly responsible to him were needed, greater reliance being placed on more junior administrative officers.

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2. Compare the position in 1739, Appendix A Table 1, with that in 1714, W.O. 54/199, 1st. Aug. 1714.
3. For an accurate and brief explanation of the duties of the Principal Officers, see Miege, op. cit., 1707, pp.356-8.
4. For a description of the duties of the clerks in the various sections, see W.O. 55/1795, f.813. There is no reason to suppose that these regulations recorded on 11 Dec. 1722 did not pertain in 1739. This list is more detailed than that of 30th Jun. 1723, in W.O. 54/199, and the narrative indicates the minor changes made in 1719 and 1720. See W.O. 54/199, f.2.
5. See Appendix A, Table 4.
6. The Victualling Office seems to have been organised on this ratio. Baugh op. cit., pp.54-55.
The permanent clerks fell into two classes, ordinary and extraordinary. There seems to have been little practical reason for this nominal distinction, since the extraordinaries were not so called because they were recruited to deal with an increased amount of business during the war; their numbers remained constant in the period 1739-55. The distinction was not to affect promotion which appears to have been linked to seniority. The most likely explanation is that the distinction justified the payment of a lesser salary.

There seem to have been uniform rates of pay in the central office. The first clerk in ordinary in each section received £150 per annum with two exceptions. The first clerk to the Chief Engineer received £100, and that to the Clerk of the Ordnance received £30 more than the second who himself received £150. These differences in salary probably reflected the size of staff for which the recipient was responsible. There was a uniform minimum rate of pay. All but one of the extraordinary clerks received £40 per annum. It would seem that the standard minimum rate for an ordinary clerk was £50 per year, although there were exceptions. Of the fourteen clerks not in receipt of £150 per year or more, two received £70, eight £60, one £54:10:0, one £50, and two £40. The way in which these were distributed indicates that the wage structure was arranged vertically in sections rather than horizontally in classes.

The local organisation of the Ordnance was basically the same as

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7. Such clerks were termed supernumeraries. See below p.20.
8. Note the similarity with the Navy Office. See Sergison Papers, Appendix IV.
that of the clerks at the centre, but with less variations. Each of
the eight "outports" in Great Britain had a storekeeper. His salary
varied in accordance with the size of the port between £80 and £180
per year. On this also depended whether the station had a Clerk of the
Survey or a Clerk of the Cheque, or both or neither. Portsmouth,
Woolwich, and Chatham had both, Plymouth and Sheerness the Cheque, and
Upnor Castle the Survey. Apart from Portsmouth where the Clerk of the
Survey received £70 per year the uniform rate was £54:15:0. At this
salary also was a clerk special to Woolwich, the clerk of the Foundry.
These clerks would equate to the clerks in ordinary in the central
office. There was a class of extraordinary clerks who were all at the
annual salary of £36:10:0. Their number varied with the size of the
port. Portsmouth and Woolwich had three each, Chatham and Plymouth
two and Sheerness one.

The difference between the less important outports and some of the
more important castles was tenuous. The Duke of Montagu wrote:

In forts [so small that] there was no storekeeper
on the establishment the master gunners are
employed to act as storekeepers, and accountable
for the Stores under their care, so that any
officer taking any, without due authority or
giving receipt for the same, much more if they
be truly represented taking possession of the
whole, without any Survey taken first, may
occasion embezzlement and can be very detrimental
to His Majesty's Service.10

Greenwich and Gravesend and Tilbury only had one Ordnance official, a
storekeeper, as did Berwick, Hull, Chester, Pendennis, Jersey, Guernsey,
Edinburgh, Stirling, Fort William, and Carlisle. At £80 and £60

9. The details are substantially the same as those pertaining
respectively, they were better paid than the inland storekeepers, seven of whom were paid at £40 per year, and Carlisle's merely £30 per year. Perhaps the difference lay in their being sea ports and having naval as well as military stores in stock. In support of this argument, the storekeeper at Hull was paid £50 per year, Hull being of service to both branches. The storekeeper at Edinburgh had a salary of £91:5:0, perhaps because it was the centre of the operations of the Ordnance in Scotland.

In addition to the general staff, the Ordnance had a number of specialists, namely the Astronomer Observator located at Greenwich, two bakers at Windsor, and one at Hampton Court St. James. The rest were at the Tower. Their skills covered the practical side of the work of the Ordnance; for buildings there was a Clerk of the Works, an architect and a draughtsman with a deputy to the draughtsman; for weaponry there was an armourer and a furbisher; and for supplies there was a Purveyor and a Purveyor for Sea. The salaries were what might have been expected for responsible jobs, being more than most clerks received, but less than the rate for first clerks.

The position of the Master General changed over the period. In 1739 the Master General was the most influential of the Ordnance personnel. This was emphasised in 1745 when it was indicated that he ranked with army generals and naval admirals. With regard to the Board of Ordnance his power lay in the manner in which he presented the

recommendations of the Board. On occasions he was able to take independent and decisive action, as over the lodgement of arms in the Tower of London in 1745. In the appointment of an instrument maker in 1746 he was successful in pressing the candidature of a man whom the Board did not want. He had the additional power of recommending persons for the posts of Lieutenant Colonel and Major in the Regiment of Artillery. On the other hand it was shown in the war that the office could function adequately without the presence of the Master General. The only difference which this seems to have made was that the Board of the Ordnance took decisions which more normally it would have referred to the Master General. After the war, Ligonier, appointed Lieutenant General on 17 March 1748, undertook the work of the Master General when no successor was appointed to the Duke of Montagu. Such a substitution was presaged in August 1749 when it was decided that the Lieutenant General's signature would be taken as a sufficient authority for paying wages and allowances in the absence of the Master General.

Before then it had become evident that effective power within the Board of Ordnance lay with the Lieutenant General and the Surveyor General. As was discovered in April 1742 their absence meant that the work of the office was interrupted, principally because no money could

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12. For example, with reference to the demand from Cartaret that arms be provided to Dutch regiments, see S.P. 41/36, 16 Aug. 1744, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu, and ibid., 21 Aug. 1744, Duke of Montagu to Duke of Newcastle.

13. The Master General could make appointments to the posts of Engineer and Chief Engineer, ibid., 8 June 1744, Duke of Montagu to Duke of Newcastle.


be paid out.\textsuperscript{16} The Surveyor General's was an important post.\textsuperscript{17} He was frequently called upon to make recommendations and investigations upon which the whole Board took decisions. On the important matter of supplying powder in Flanders he answered for the whole Board. After 1748, in particular, it does not appear to have made any difference whether the full Board met or whether only two or three were gathered. The Surveyor General was the most frequent attender at meetings in 1749.\textsuperscript{18} The nature of the business dispatched does not appear to have been affected by the number of officers attending the meeting.

There were no major changes affecting the other Principal Officers in the period 1739-48.\textsuperscript{19} The Treasurer and Secretary to the Master General remained in post throughout the period. Two other posts had two changes of incumbent and four changed only once. These changes were spread out over the period, indicating that there were no purges consequent upon administrative failures; of the eight changes, two were promotions and at least one was caused by death.

It does not seem to have been possible for clerks from the Ordnance

\textsuperscript{16} The close liaison was continued in the next war. Whitworth, \textit{op. cit.}, p.214. See also Appendix A, Table 2.

\textsuperscript{17} For the terms of Lascelles' appointment as Surveyor General of the Ordnance, see S.P. 41/36, 30 April 1742. His Majesty's command to the Duke of Montagu. The office had been placed in some difficulty by the illness of Armstrong as Surveyor General and by the death of Sir Charles Willis. The solution had been to appoint Lascelles as acting Surveyor General during Armstrong's life. He acted as temporary Lieutenant General during the vacancy caused by the death of Sir Charles Willis, and his permanent assistant and deputy thereafter.

\textsuperscript{18} See Appendix A, Table 3. Since Minutes of the Board of Ordnance are not available before 1749, it is not possible to compare this summary with earlier practice. It seems to be typical of the period 1749-54.

\textsuperscript{19} See Appendix A, Table 1.
to rise to the status of Principal Officer, these posts being filled by persons from outside the office. This was only possible where procedures and existing staff, especially the first clerks, could be relied upon to function without expert direction. It also reflected the non-specialist nature of administration.20

Within the ranks of the Principal Officers there was a division. The Master General and Lieutenant General were appointed from outside. This was to be expected; the Master General was a political appointment and much of the work was political.21 The Lieutenants General seem to have been appointed for their military ability. General Wade22 was an experienced officer with service in Flanders and Scotland, and General Ligonier served with distinction in Flanders.23 The Clerk of the Ordnance, the Surveyor General, the Storekeeper and the Clerk of the Deliveries were more concerned with routine. The office of the Clerk of the Deliveries was the obvious avenue to promotion, providing for its three incumbents in the period a stepping stone to the Clerk of the Ordnance, Storekeeper, and Surveyor General. The nature of the work of the office was such as to provide a training for the other appointments.

During the war there were significant developments affecting the clerks. Supernumerary clerks were employed in addition to ordinary and extraordinary clerks, but only in small numbers and then only by stages.24

20. That is not to say that certain clerks did not have specialised jobs. Division of functions was surprisingly well developed in both the Ordnance, Appendix A, Table 4, and the Navy office, Baugh op. cit., p.81.
24. Appendix A, Table 4. See also, W.O. 54/210-211.
Otherwise, the establishment did not change, and salaries remained constant. There was, however, some movement of staff which affected various offices in different ways. There was very little change in the staff attached to the Master General. Only after the war did one have to be replaced. There were five changes in the department of the Lieutenant General, two of which were for promotions within the section. The Treasurer's section also enjoyed a large degree of continuity. Apart from one instance the changes of personnel occurred after the war, and three of the five were for promotions within the section. The section of the Surveyor General was untroubled, until after the war, at least as regards the clerks in ordinary. Of the twenty three changes only nine were new appointments from outside the office and of these only three concerned clerks in ordinary. One of these had been in the section already. There was a large degree of continuity in the Storekeeper's section, two of the clerks in ordinary holding office throughout the war, and two others for a period of six years. Of the extra clerks in this section three were incumbent for most of the war. There were only four newcomers, one of whom occupied a new post.

The section under the Clerk of the Ordnance, by contrast, suffered many upheavals. Its clerks in ordinary were largely undisturbed whilst the war lasted. Of the twelve changes affecting the clerks in ordinary, four were merely promotions and three others were promotions from the ranks of the extra clerks. The extra clerks were a real area of change.

25. The changes referred to are movements in the establishment as it stood at selected dates at two to three year intervals during the period, Appendix A, Table 4. The same basis has been used in measuring staff movements in other departments.
The section under the Clerk of the Deliveries was not changed so much. The same pattern obtained, the clerks in ordinary keeping their places during the war, and being replaced with the peace in 1748. Of the extra clerks, there were nine changes out of a possible total of sixteen, three being internal promotions.

The conclusion seems to be that the war did not have special effects upon the personnel of the departments until it was almost finished, that where there were large numbers of changes these concerned extra clerks and the effect was lessened by the number of promotions of men already in the service. Promotion seems to have been organised on the basis of seniority, with minor exceptions. In at least three of the sections the replacement for the first clerk came from within the section. This was consistent with the need to ensure stability either because of a large turnover in junior clerks or alternatively if the section were small.

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The War Office

Whereas by its very nature the Ordnance needed a settled central staff the work of the War Office called for a different organisation, just as stable but much smaller. The regimental agent and the colonel played a large part in the running of the army, being the people best placed to do so. At the same time general control of military forces was not confined to the personnel of the War Office as was the case for the Ordnance. Politicians took an active interest. Nevertheless in view of the large sphere of activities which the War Office controlled the size of the staff was surprisingly small.\textsuperscript{26} There was a Secretary at War, a Deputy Secretary, a Paymaster of the Widow's Pensions, a first clerk and twelve other clerks. The office did not increase in size in preparation for the war nor in response to the initial demands made by the war. It was reduced by two in 1743 and remained at that level for a year before rising by another four by 1748. Thereafter one clerk was reduced by 1752 and one by 1755.

The Secretary at War was a political appointment. His deputy in this period from 1743 was a former chief clerk in the office. The chief clerk could either be from outside, drafted in like Edward Lloyd, or rise from within the structure like Thomas Sherwin. In so far as the lists of clerks can be trusted to portray seniority Thomas Sherwin's rise was exceptional although there were numerous others especially after 1748. New recruits were generally placed at the bottom of the list although John Calcroft entered the service near the top and

\textsuperscript{26} See Appendix A, Table 5.
remained there.

Discounting promotions the continuity in the office was relatively undisturbed; only thirteen clerks left the service between 1739 and 1755 whereas had there been a complete changeover at every year recorded there would have been some 102 vacancies. These thirteen fell into two periods, that around 1742 and the other being 1745-48. Since the second was a period of contraction and the first one of expansion it was to be expected that of the fifteen new recruits the majority joined in the period 1744-48. Yet at no point in this period was the office left with less than eight experienced clerks. The pattern of the office's gradually changing in nature, discharging and taking on men ensured that although in 1755 only one of the clerks had been present in 1738 yet the service was never short of experience. The period 1748-55 was a particularly stable one from the point of view of the changeover of clerks.

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The Admiralty

The numbers and promotion patterns of the administration supporting land based forces are reflected in the situation regarding naval forces. The staff of the Admiralty was comparable in many respects with that of the War Office. It was relatively small; it was less numerous than that of the departments which it controlled; there were seven clerks in 1737. The structure was well defined, each clerk having a different salary; one major difference from other departments was the absence of a collection of lower-paid clerks at the bottom of the structure. In addition, the salary scale started and finished higher. Neither the salary scale nor the basic structure of the office changed during the war.

There was a large degree of continuity among the upper clerical staff. There was no change in the major appointments between 1737 and 1743. For the whole of the war period Corbet was in office as Deputy Secretary and for most of the war Winnington was Solicitor. The same applied to the lower clerks; four of the seven in 1748 had been in office in 1737. The three changes had been spread out, implying that there was little change in the composition of the office at all before 1745. Similarly there was only one change in the clerical staff between 1748 and 1755. Promotion seems to have been organised on the same basis of seniority of service which characterised other departments. New additions to the staff were made at the bottom of the list of employees. In only one case, that of Robt. Osborn, was there definite evidence of

27. See Appendix A, Table 6.
its being possible for a clerk to rise from the strictly clerical to a more executive position.28

The Office of the Treasurer of the Navy

Comparisons with the Office of the Ordnance can be drawn with the Office of the Treasurer of the Navy; the head of each organisation was a lucrative post, a prized political position. There were similarities regarding the position of the senior officers, the number of junior clerks and their organisation. There were three officers in the Treasurer of the Navy's office. Their relative importance was evident from their salaries.29 The Treasurer himself received £2,000 per year, the Paymaster £500, the Cashier and Accountant £400, and the Cashier for Victualling £150. There seems to have been a substantial turnover in the office holders, there being some thirteen changes out

28. Professor Baugh has indicated that such possibilities for advancement, remote before 1748, became more infrequent after 1751, op. cit., p.82.

29. It is not possible to determine what fees were received in addition to salaries at this time.
of a possible thirty-two. Whilst these were distributed evenly before and after 1748, they were also so distributed that one section did not have more continuity than another.

The most significant fact about the office-holders was that it was possible for clerks to rise from the ranks to the position of cashier for Victualling, but not to the higher posts.\(^{30}\) The three incumbents from 1741 to 1755 had all risen in this fashion. John Finch had come from within that section, being the most senior in 1737; Thomas Hubbard and Jacob Barber had each been the most senior clerk in the section of the Cashier and Accountant.

There was no drastic increase in the number of staff in the office of the Treasurer of the Navy. The sole additions to the staff between 1737 and 1755 were two extraordinary clerks under the Cashier and Accountant and another two under the Paymaster. This nominal increase of one fifth on a staff of some eighteen was not as great as at first sight it might appear. The first addition, to the Cashier and Accountant, did not appear until 1743; a second was added in 1745 and removed by 1748. The other two additions were not evident in 1745 but were present by 1748. It would therefore appear that clerks were added as the work increased but not in anticipation of the increase in work. One would have expected the greatest strain to appear at the start of the war, although the financial arrangements in the run-down of the navy would also have caused an increase in work.

There was no great turnover in personnel during the war years. Twenty six clerks left the service in the period, whereas had there

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30. See Appendix A, Table 7.
been a complete changeover in personnel there would have been 127 departures. These departures were spread evenly between the sections, 10 of the 53 leaving from the clerks under the Paymaster, 9 out of 39 from the clerks of the Cashier and Accountant, and 7 out of 28 from the clerks to the Cashier for Victualling.

Continuity in favour of the more important sections was evident in the promotion patterns. The Cashier and Accountant's section "lost" seven further clerks to the Paymaster's section, and one to the Cashier for Victualling's. This in turn "lost" five to the Cashier's section and one to the Paymaster's. By contrast, the Paymaster only "lost" one clerk to a "lower" section. Thus in 1748, of the ten clerks to the Paymaster, five had been in the section since 1737, two of the others had been in service with other sections since 1741, and two of the remaining three were occupying new posts, the incumbents entering between 1743 and 1745. By contrast only two of the six in the Cashier and Accountant's office in 1748 had been present in that office or the Cashier of the Victualling's in 1741. Similarly only one of the clerks in the latter office in 1748 had been in post in 1739. The same conclusion is also true of an analysis of the period 1748-1755.

Promotion was on the eighteenth-century practice of new men occupying dead men's shoes. Only two cases were those of promotion within a section not effected on the basis of seniority. The same applied when men from one section were transferred to a "higher" one. Promotion seems also to have depended on an order of precedence between the sections. Hence it was possible for a very junior clerk in the Paymaster's section to become chief clerk in the Cashier of Victualling's. It did not appear to matter, for the sake of promotion, into which section a clerk came, but that progress was more likely to come to him...
through the Cashier and Accountant's section than through the Cashier of Victualling's section. This applied for the period 1748-55 as well as for that 1737-48. Seniority and position in the section were not overriding factors. It was possible, for example, for a man like John Lynch to rise by ability and overcome lowly position.

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It therefore appears that there are certain common factors relating to the organisation of offices responsible for the conduct of war. Total numbers of staff remained relatively constant. That additional pressure could be absorbed was attributable in part to the division of responsibilities within departments. This was reflected in the low turnover in staff, especially in important areas. Promotion was by seniority. It meant that experience and hopefully ability was brought to bear where it was most needed. It did not extend to mobility between the clerical and executive ranks. A scrutiny of the evidence suggests that these conclusions have equal application to the offices of the Paymaster General and the Navy Board. It was with a small, relatively stable administration that the ordnance, army and naval departments conducted their business between 1739 and 1754. Would existing procedures prove sufficient or, if inadequate, would the extent of the inadequacy be reflected in changes in those procedures?
CHAPTER TWO

THE ORDNANCE:

PROCEDURES AND CHANGES 1739-1754
1739. The supply of arms - procedure - examination - records; the supply of powder; delivery of supplies; fire and candle; the supply of bedding; areas outside scope of Ordnance; Ordnance attitudes - to commitments - to Ordnance personnel - to contractors; finance procedure - general receipts and expenditure - purchase of goods - limitation of Ordnance power - leasing of land and property; control of expenditure overseas - local works - central clerks - travelling expenses.

1739-1748. The supply of arms - change in basis on which replacement arms supplied - attempt to cling to former position - change in practice of arms supplied to marines - cause and nature - receipt of arms from disbanded regiments; transport; deficiencies in normal bedding arrangements; supply of tents.

1748-1754. Extended area of responsibility; general review of office procedures; stricter financial control - cause: fraud at Woolwich - local cash disbursements - passing of accounts - deficiency of existing checks; minor changes in routine; increase in work - clerks in general - Surveyor General; stricter approach - to contractors - to staffing in Drawing Room - to labourers - to house rent - to local officers in general - to storekeepers in particular: issue of stores: passing of bills: bedding: employment of labourers; deficiencies and remedies in supply of coal and candle symptomatic of Ordnance approach.
In peace or at war, the task of the Ordnance was to ensure that supplies of arms, powder, bedding and general goods were provided in the right amounts at the right place and at the correct time.

This chapter seeks to describe the Ordnance's general approach and specific procedures in fulfilling that objective, initially as they existed in 1739, then as affected by the changing demands of war and finally as revealed by the measures taken on the return to peace.

Little changed between 1739 and 1754 with regard to the scope and attitudes of the Ordnance. There were departures from precedent during the fluctuations of the war, but nothing of major importance. What did change were Ordnance procedures to ensure efficient operation. In particular, the period after 1748 was one of reform. More important than actual changes in methods of book-keeping and checks on Ordnance personnel were the attitudes which these revealed. There was an awareness that improvement was possible, and the volume of work delegated to the Surveyor General of the Ordnance indicates that it was intended that reform be effected as well as undertaken. The emphasis was on economy.
The Ordnance's first concern, in relation to the army, was the provision of muskets. It was essential to establish how many arms were to be supplied, before any consideration could be given to the manner of that supply. If the occasion for the demand for arms for a regiment was that the regiment was being raised for the first time, or that the regiment was being augmented, then the matter was simple; the Ordnance was asked to provide the numbers of arms for the extra men as stated in the warrant authorizing the raising or the augmentation. If the object was to replace arms unfit for service, assessment of the numbers involved was necessarily more difficult. In order to prevent fraudulent or exorbitant claims the Ordnance sent its own employees to assess the deficiency in conjunction with the regiment.¹ No such check was possible when the need for the replacement of arms was that they had been lost in action.² The question was not so much the extent of the deficiency but rather where the cost of the replacement of the arms was to be found. The position adopted by the Ordnance was that the cost of equipping new troops was to be met by the Ordnance initially and ultimately by the Treasury, but that the cost of subsequent provision of arms was to be borne by the regiment in general or the colonel in particular. This applied to both the land regiments and the marines.³ The same approach was evident with regard to the repairing and cleaning of arms kept by the marines.⁴

¹. See, for example, S.P. 41/36, 17 Sept. 1740. State of arms of Col. Pulteney's Regiment of Foot. The inspection was by two gunsmiths together with Patterson and Bogdani of the Ordnance Staff.
³. S.P. 41/36, 10 Nov. 1740, Duke of Montagu to Duke of Newcastle: "It has been very usual for regiments ever to be furnished with arms out of His Majesty's Stores more than once".
⁴. Ibid., 12 June 1744, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
The procedure for the supply of arms was simple. The colonel of the regiment either paid for the arms himself,\(^5\) or approached the Ordnance for their supply. The Ordnance either made the arms itself or contracted for their supply with private gunmakers. Most of the arms were provided by the latter method.\(^6\) A study of the pistols supplied in the years 1716-19 indicates that the Ordnance employees in the Tower made what the contractors failed to supply.\(^7\) It is not possible to ascertain how many of the larger calibre guns were normally made by each. It was not until the Woolwich Arsenal grew in size and scope that the making of arms was seen as an essential operation, best performed under the control of the public administration.

When contractors supplied arms there was a need to examine them for faults. After 1739 the checking was performed by sampling. It is not possible to ascertain the numbers checked nor the method used in the period prior to 1739, although as late as 1726 arms were being returned into store which had not been 'proved' by the Ordnance.\(^8\) This is consistent with the previous system; in 1713/14 Lord Stafford provided arms for his regiment in Spain, many of which were of gunmaker's proof only.\(^9\) 1726 may have marked a change in practice. In the next year arms were provided for the

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5. "The pistols made by Barbar we cannot learn how or when the regiment got them, but believe they were made by contract with the then Colonel of the Regiment ...", \textit{ibid.}, 24 Sept. 1740. Report on State of Arms of Sir. R. Rich's Regiment of Dragoons.
6. With reference to muskets for Sir Robert Rich's Regiment of Dragoons "they were made some in the Tower, but most of them by various contractors with the Office of Ordnance", \textit{ibid.}, 24 Sept. 1740.
7. \textit{Ibid.}, the arms supplied most recently being sea muskets in 1738-39 were made in the Tower.
8. \textit{Ibid.}, 3 Oct. 1740, "State of Arms of General Barrel's Regiment of Foot". Cadogan had commanded the regiment in 1726. The arms were only proved on their return into store.
additional companies of General Gore's regiment which were to the same pattern as before, but of the King's proof. Whilst most of the arms supplied were new, a substantial number were really re-issues. Whereas there are examples of this in the period before 1739, it was to be expected that under the conditions of war the practice would be extended.¹⁰

The arms were delivered by the Ordnance on the same basis as other stores. The cost was borne by the Ordnance. This did not apply to the provision of arms for the service of forces in Ireland.¹¹ There was a different establishment and Treasury for Ireland, and the cost of postage and packing was charged to the customer's account. There are references to the Ordnance's delivering arms intended for the Irish establishment to contractors charged with delivery to the place where the arms were required.

The keeping of accurate records was important at two stages in the process. When the guns were proved the Ordnance reserved the right to put back the date of the Principal Storekeeper's receipt, and thereby also the debenture date, to the date of delivery for proving the arms at Woolwich Arsenal. If the gunfounders wanted any relief they had to apply for it to the Board of the Ordnance; the Board might then grant it as a favour.¹² This was one method of ensuring good behaviour on behalf of the gunmakers and also had the advantage of saving money temporarily. It could only be effective in an era when bills were not paid immediately but quarterly, and

¹¹. Ibid., 25 March 1740, Board of Ordnance to Master General. See also, W.O. 55/353, p.182, 10 Sept. 1748, R. Wilmot to J. Cockburn, and ibid., p.79, Earl of Harrington to Duke of Montagu, 4 Sept. 1747.
when the payment of these debentures was so far in arrears as to make the further delay of weeks or months in this fashion a desirable course of action. At Woolwich the system of book keeping relating to the survey of guns was that the Office Day Book of issues of stores contained the weight of guns delivered out. This same total was recorded in the Register, thus ensuring a double check. When arms were returned into store, and then re-issued for scrap, their weight was recorded in the Memorandum Book. This figure had to accord with that in the Office Day Book of issues of stores and was the total used to assess the payment due to the gunmakers who bought the cannon. Another check against corruption was the fact that all the clerks of the office took part in this process of determining the real weight of guns so issued.

Since the work of the Ordnance touched so closely on the supply of arms, it was thereby involved in the provision of powder. New powder was made using saltpetre supplied by the East India Company and refracted by a powdermaker employed through the Surveyor General of the Ordnance. The Ordnance had used in this way a certain Mr. Azire although, or perhaps because, he was not employed in the actual production of powder. He was paid when the refraction was complete. His successor, Mr. Johnson, was also allowed samples free of charge by the Surveyor General. The powder-makers were sometimes paid in money and sometimes in saltpetre. Old powder was reprocessed, when serviceable, and distributed between the powder-makers equally.

13. Ibid., f. 34, O.B.M., 27 June 1749.
14. For previous difficulties concerning the supply of saltpetre, see Scouller op. cit., pp. 197-8.
If the Ordnance could not ensure the supply of its goods its other efforts were vitiated. In the War of the Spanish Succession, and previous wars in Flanders, contractors furnished all the necessaries for the carriage of the Artillery and stores. The Ordnance hoped in 1739 to contract in like manner for horses and waggons at the lowest available price. The contractors provided horses, waggons, harness, drivers, and all other essentials.\(^{17}\) The aim of the Ordnance was to exercise as much control as possible at the least expense; whilst part of the cost was defrayed out of the military chest, the Ordnance insisted, as part of the contract, that one driver be allowed for each gun and spare carriage, tumbril and forge cart.\(^{18}\)

Of the goods which it was the job of the Ordnance to supply, "fire and candle" were to cause difficulties out of proportion to the value of the goods supplied. The regulations on this subject had been in force by 1739 for fifteen years. During the war, the Ordnance was loathe to raise the allotted quotas for the supply of each. This was consistent with the parsimonious attitude reflected in 1739 in the list of places which the Ordnance supplied with fire and candle.\(^{19}\)

It fell within the scope of the Ordnance to supply bedding for troops in barracks. It was no part of their job to supply bedding for other categories of men. In particular the Ordnance claimed that it was outside its orbit to supply any of His Majesty's forces on board the fleet with

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17. S.P. 41/36, 15 May 1742, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
18. S.P. 41/36, 15 May 1742, Board of Ordnance to Master General.
bedding. Land bedding which had been used was unsuitable. The procedure for the legitimate distribution of bedding differed for supplying different areas. In England and Scotland the contractor undertook to repair and renew bedding for a period of 21 years and gave money to be held as security. In return he was to receive a sum equal to 10/- per bed per year. On his contract's expiring, or his own prior decease, the bedding was to be left to the Ordnance in good order. The survey at this point was to be performed by disinterested parties and a representative of the contractors. Bedding more than half worn was to be given back to the contractor who was then responsible for its replacement. Bedding which was half worn was to be taken by the Crown. The defect of the system was plain to the Ordnance. A new contractor would not take into his charge half worn bedding which he would have to replace and this meant that such items had to be replaced by the Crown. The difficulty was inherent in the contract system.

The procedure for Gibraltar was less rigid; there was no settled allowance, but an annual survey was performed by the Ordnance, although paid for by the civil authorities. The procedure for Minorca was not

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21. S.P. 41/38, 1 Nov. 1751, Board of Ordnance to H. Fox.
clear. It seems that the civil authorities were responsible for the inspection of the bedding; at any event the island met the cost of providing items.

Many areas fell outside the scope of the Ordnance. In particular, there was no commitment on the Ordnance to victual the Artillery. They were regarded in this respect as any other regimental body of men.

As regards the garrisons, the Ordnance did not have a direct interest in the supply of stores and provisions, since it relied on contractors. Garrisons other than Minorca received their firings, oil, and other small items from the island concerned through the agency of the local magistrate. At St. Phillips the system was that the Governor or the Commander-in-Chief

23. The Ordnance claimed that it was not their job to supply bedding and bedsteads for the additional men for the five regiments in Minorca. Contracts were to be made privately. C.T.B.6P., 1739-41, p.219, 12 Feb. 1740. The claim was to no avail. The Ordnance provided and transported 500 beds and sent an account to the Treasury, ibid., p.383, 17 June 1740. The bedding was only for the additional men. Capt. Wilson, an agent, sent a memorial to Yonge on behalf of the five regiments in the garrisons of Minorca for 1450 new sets of bedding for the 2900 pre-augmentation establishment. No bedding had been previously supplied for nine or ten years. The memorial maintained that "that it does not belong to them to provide bedding for the said troops and that when upon emergency they have supplied such bedding the charge was instantly repaid out of the royal revenues of the Island by warrants of the Treasury", ibid., 1742-45, p.78, 30 Sept. 1742. Orders were given for the bedding to be supplied, ibid., p.79, 3 Oct. 1742. Re-imbursement was made next year, ibid., p.404, 10 May 1743. There was a similar transaction in 1745, ibid., p.833, 9 Dec. 1745.


25. For the relationship of the Ordnance and the Artillery, see Scouller op. cit., p.43.

supplied the wants of the garrison, appointing someone to issue the same from store. Deliveries were made monthly and the Quarter Master General of each regiment always attended.

The Ordnance resisted attempts to increase the area of its commitments. As was pointed out in 1749 there was no provision for the Ordnance to supply coats and waistcoats. Like other leather goods they were the subject of "off reckonings" and therefore a regimental responsibility. Similarly with regard to arms used on the Continent it resisted a further drain on its resources by stating that it had no "power to dispose of His Majesty's quota of the Train under the care of the Ordnance".

The Board was concerned to ensure that a strict check was kept on those stores which were issued. For instance, Thomas Leslie was accountable to the Board for the stores which he held in his capacity of Barrack master in North Britain; he was unable to issue from those stocks without the approval of the Board. In particular there was a strict control on the issue of cloths. A necessary concomitant was a periodic check of items in store. Officers in the colonies had to submit an annual inventory. At the centre, the "remain" of items in the Tower was a much larger exercise, performed annually. The labourers at the Tower received extra pay whilst it was in progress, there being references to "the usual allowance" and to the taking up of labourers' time as an expensive necessity.

There was a similar control on work performed by contract. The Clerk of the Cheque was to attend when the carpenter was measuring timber. He

29. Ibid., O.B.M., 20 June 1749.
was then to sign the carpenter's certificate or any agreement that was made for the purchase of materials of any kind. This system also applied to other branches of the Ordnance and the Master Artificers were involved if anything was purchased in their sphere. The fact that such checks were necessary indicates that the Ordnance found fault with the contracting system. It was perhaps merely reacting to the symptom and not identifying the cause. The Ordnance was seeking to prevent mistakes made by others outside its direct control. On the other hand, had the Ordnance enjoyed full control of all the tasks performed in its sphere there would still have been need of restraints. Additionally, in favour of the contract system was the fact that contractors were not subject to the same political pressures as a government body.

Money made available to the Ordnance was paid to the Treasurer of the Ordnance. He disbursed it and accounted to the Treasury. His other main task was to prepare the estimates which were laid before Parliament. On the issue of pay, the usual procedure was for the Master General to sign the Quarter Books which certified the wages and allowances due to "the Master General, Lieutenant General, Principal Officers and other attendants civil and military". The Master General then authorized the Clerk of the Ordnance to make out a "duplique" as authority for the Treasurer to make payments.

30. Ibid., O.B.M., 17 Nov. 1749.
31. This was the experience of the Navy Board in relation to certain aspects of work in the dockyards; see below p.191.
32. The powers of the Treasurer were limited. Whilst all Principal Officers were servants of the Board of Ordnance which they comprised the Lieutenant General and Surveyor General exercised an influence which control over finances might have been expected to confer on the Treasurer. See above p.18.
The normal procedure on the purchase of goods was for the Ordnance to issue to the supplier a bill of exchange which could be redeemed later from the Treasurer. If the bill was for a charge which had been foreseen, then the Treasurer merely paid it. If, however, there was no head on the estimates where the cost should be inserted, then the Treasurer paid the bill and inserted the cost in the next estimate to be laid before Parliament. In general it seems to have been recognised that Parliament would reimburse the Ordnance in respect of those items of expenditure which involved civil repairs. In this circumstance, the procedure was that both the Ordnance and the Committee of the Privy Council submitted reports for consideration by the Privy Council.

In some spheres the financial powers of the Ordnance were limited. The payment of troops, whilst abroad, required the Lords of the Treasury's issuing a warrant to buy silver. Warrants to grant the transfer of funds were normally prepared by the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury and signed by the Secretary of State. The Ordnance was dependent therefore upon the Lords Justices for the receipt of that part of the Crown's revenue intended for the payment of bedding for use in Minorca. The Treasury Commissioners told the Lords Justices who in turn informed the Ordnance and gave orders to divert the relevant part of the revenue of Minorca.

The Ordnance held leases on land and buildings integral to its work. This was to be expected, especially in the colonies where bases were not

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36. Ibid., p.35, 3 June 1747.
37. W.O. 55/354, p.87, 10 March 1752.
regarded as permanent. Trouble was caused in Jamaica over leases from private individuals. The Board also leased from the Navy. Leases seem to have been for long periods. The Ordnance was restricted regarding the more permanent acquisition of land. In April 1749 the part played by the Treasurer of the Ordnance in the possible purchase of the castles of Cargaff and Braemar was small in comparison with the Lord Advocate of Scotland and Lieutenant Colonel Watson, the Engineer. The two of them had the power to settle the hire or purchase of the castles and the Lord Advocate alone had the task of perusing the deed draft.

Expenditure in the colonies was more difficult to control than that in Britain. The payment of salaries was controlled by the requirement that the pay slips be signed by both the Storekeeper and the Clerk of the Cheque. On other disbursements the system in 1739 was that the Chief Engineer signed all orders for the payment of moneys. In small places, where there was no chief engineer, it seems likely that the Ordnance relied on the only officer within its sphere, gunners being on occasion responsible for disbursements. The Duke of Montagu, as Master General, said that where there was no storekeeper on the establishment the master gunner was usually employed as such. The Ordnance sought to reinforce this

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38. See below p.263.
40. There were 26 years to run on one at Kimsale in 1749. W.O. 47/34, O.B.M., 3 Oct. 1749.
41. Ibid., O.B.M., 8 April 1749.
42. Ibid., O.B.M., 17 Nov. 1749. See here for irregularities during the war.
43. This did not apply to the Governor.
45. For example, see ibid., O.B.M., 2 May 1749.
46. S.P. 41/37, 24 Dec. 1745, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu, forwarded by him to Duke of Newcastle the next day.
necessarily insecure system by trying to limit expenditure to the estimated amount. The twenty-third article of the instructions issued to the Chief Engineer indicated that no money was to be paid on account of the fortifications or any other service except by order of the Chief Engineer, in writing, over his signature.\textsuperscript{47} In addition, gunners had to submit a quarterly report on the stores, received and expended, and have it signed by the Governor. They also had to take a remain of the stores in stock on December 31st. each year. Furthermore the Ordnance tried to check the estimate. There is evidence that demands for the land service from certain of the Out Ports and Garrisons were measured against a settled allowance.\textsuperscript{48} There were also special firing regulations laid down not only for the gunners\textsuperscript{49} but also for the governors. These enjoined, in effect, that guns could only be fired on special days when the Royal Family passed by and when also the Ordnance commanded it.

There were controls on the expenditure of the Ordnance in Britain. The Board was severe in preventing abuse among its own servants. Of particular interest was the experience of Thomas Lascelles. When he was appointed acting Surveyor General in 1742 provision was made for him to have his own job performed by a deputy; in that event the money which the deputy was to receive was to be paid directly.\textsuperscript{50} This was because the Board was concerned to prevent the abuse of an incumbent's appropriating the salary intended for his deputy. The Ordnance demonstrated its fear of

\textsuperscript{47} W.O. 47/34, O.B.M., 21 Feb. 1749.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., O.B.M., 20 May 1749.
\textsuperscript{49} S.P. 41/37, 5 July 1748, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
\textsuperscript{50} S.P. 41/36, His Majesty's command to Duke of Montagu. The reverse of the document is dated 14th. ... 1742. The location of the document in the folio suggests a date of March 1743. Internal evidence dates it to post 30th. April 1742.
possible abuse in this area in two other episodes. There was evidence of one clerk's still taking the salary given for an extra man when the real need for the deputy had ceased to exist.\textsuperscript{51} Another clerk was required by the Ordnance to pay to his deputy one half of his salary.

It was not the custom to advance money to employees travelling to do their duty at home.\textsuperscript{52} Travelling expenses were allowed. When the journey was for a limited purpose, order by the office, such as the disarming of ships, checks were such as to discourage overspending. Ordnance officers had no authority for buying captured arms unless they were fit for service.\textsuperscript{53} The issue of powder to various bodies could not be allowed on the accounts of gunners on board His Majesty's ships without His Majesty's order.\textsuperscript{54} Although this regulation meant little in practice, its mere existence was a powerful weapon since the gunners' accounts had to be passed before the accounts of the captain and the ship could be cleared.

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\textsuperscript{51} W.O. 47/34, O.B.M., 21 Feb. 1748, relating to Edinburgh.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., O.B.M., 11 April 1749.
\textsuperscript{53} S.P. 41/37, 7 Dec. 1745, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
\textsuperscript{54} The Ordnance often made the point to the Admiralty. For example, see W.O. 41/34, O.B.M., 27 Jan. 1749.
Arms were contracted for and supplied during the war in the same manner as pertained in 1739. The same types were manufactured both in small arms and in cannon. There were two minor changes. In 1746 the Duke of Cumberland used, and the Ordnance experimented with, a new type of cannon, known as the Saxon cannon. There is no evidence of its ever having gone into production and use generally. Small arms imported from Holland during the war were regarded as inferior to the English muskets. Therefore, instead of arms being issued indiscriminately from store as needed English arms were reserved for the Guards and other old regiments.\footnote{S.P. 41/36, 13 Oct. 1743, Board of Ordnance to Master General.}

The major change affecting the use and administration of arms concerned their replacement and accountability for those lost and damaged. This was of the greatest importance, since it tended towards making the British army more of a centralized and efficient unit. Gradually the responsibility for the replacement of arms was transferred from the colonel of the regiment to the Ordnance. In the midst of conflict more emphasis than hitherto was placed on the need to provide an adequately equipped force and less on the means which were to ensure that end. The Ordnance defended strongly the position which it maintained in 1739. The change occurred in the practice rather than the theory. The Ordnance charted the decline as they saw it in 1744:

It was a general rule that they [colonels of regiments who stood in need of replacements] should be accountable to His Majesty for any arms lost, embezzled, or spoiled and at their own charge provide new ones, and supply all defects that should happen in any case whatsoever, except upon actual service.\footnote{The responsibility of the colonel for arms issued to him was set out in the Indenture reproduced in \textit{J.A.H.R.}, Vol. xv, facing p.183.}

That this rule was in some measure broke
through upon its being intimated to His Majesty that it was feared scarce any of his forces had good and serviceable arms fit for the day of occasion. [viz. the general re-equipment of the armed forces in 1740-1.]

That His Majesty has likewise indulged several regiments with new arms, in lieu of those represented to have been lost in the West Indies, and by other accidents, which in strictness they ought to have resupplied at their own charge.

The Board was concerned that care of arms would be neglected. Had the Ordnance commented some years later the decline would have been seen more starkly. In comparison with later demands for the replacement of arms those of the first years of the war were light. This was partly because of the scale of the war and the length of time which it lasted, and partly the result of the massive and general replacement of arms early in the war in 1740-41. Losses at home, in the colonies and in Flanders accounted for the demands which reached a peak in 1746-47. The general re-equipment of the army could not have been charged fairly to the pockets of the relevant colonels, when the order was imposed from above on all regiments, although arising out of complaints from the same colonels. In addition, it was the logical extension of the earlier principle whereby, to meet the threat of war, regiments had been augmented with troops who were equipped with new arms at the expense of the crown. Similarly, on the precedent of 1740-41, it would have been difficult to refute the logic of a claim that regiments ordered on foreign service, and therefore needing new arms, should have these supplied at the expense of the crown.

57. S.P. 41/36, 12 June 1744, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
58. The Board of Ordnance itself used this argument frequently; for example, see S.P. 41/36, 13 Oct. 1743, Board of Ordnance to Master General.
59. See below p.216.
was a fine distinction between the loss of arms abroad through negligence and their loss in action. Also, when the claims for replacement of arms on the grounds that they had been lost in action were as small as those submitted by the Earl of Rothes, it would have been but a small extension of the principle for their replacement to have been allowed.\textsuperscript{61} It was reasonable for arms to be replaced when regiments were to go on foreign service.\textsuperscript{62}

The Ordnance tried to limit departures from precedent by having the reason for replacement stated on the relevant warrant. For instance, the defeat at Laffeldt was cited on four occasions between February 16th. and 22nd. as the justification for the provision of new arms.\textsuperscript{63} In this case the numbers involved were substantial and arguably beyond the ability of regiments to meet from their own funds. In the aftermath of the 1745 rebellion the defeat at Preston Pans was adduced as the reason for equipping some of Lascelles' regiment\textsuperscript{64} of foot and also the defeat at Falkirk for that of St. Clair.\textsuperscript{65} Similarly, after the war a request in March 1751 was accompanied by the explanation that the replacements were needed in respect of others lost in a shipwreck off Caithness.\textsuperscript{66}

There were, however, substantial departures from precedent in that arms were sometimes replaced with only the general cause and justification

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{61} Ibid., p.11, 8 May 1747, Duke of Newcastle to Duke of Montagu.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Ibid., p.5, 24 March 1747, and p.292, 18 April 1749, Duke of Newcastle to Duke of Montagu.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Ibid., p.107, 16 Feb. 1748, pp.110 & 119, 22 Feb. 1748, and p.211, 17 Nov. 1748. In each case the numbers of arms in question were between 40 and 90.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Ibid., p.19, 1 May 1747, Duke of Newcastle to Duke of Montagu.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p.76, 29 Aug. 1747, same to same, and see also W.O. 4/44, 26 Aug. 1747, Fox to Duke of Newcastle.
\item \textsuperscript{66} W.O. 55/354, p.6, 6 March 1751, Duke of Bedford to Board of Ordnance.
\end{itemize}
given; phrases as general as "the Low Countries", "the Brittany expedition", and even "the late campaign" were used. Again, at home replacements were made for "losses against the rebels", "the rebels in Scotland", and "actions against the rebels". Such claims could not possibly be substantiated without further information. The vaguest entry occurred in July 1747. Orders were given for completing the issue to Colonel Trelawney's Regiment of Foot in Jamaica and Rattan for old arms lost or made unserviceable "by parties being frequently ordered into the woods". It was but a short step to replacing arms in Lieutenant General Pulteney's Regiment of Foot for those "lost in service".

Although the principle upheld in 1739 had been broken on many occasions there were indications that the Ordnance fought to preserve its former position. In August 1747 the Ordnance requested a warrant from

68. Ibid., p.105, 30 Jan. 1748, same to same. Occasionally there was a mixture of the two; see ibid., p.53, 31 July 1747, same to same.
69. Ibid., p.112, 13 Feb. 1748. See also S.P. 41/20, 19 Mar. 1752, Fox to Earl of Holdernessse. The arms were, "by many years service worn out and become unserviceable".
70. Ibid., pp.37,38, 31 July 1747, Duke of Newcastle to Duke of Montagu.
71. Ibid., p.98, 24 Dec. 1747, same to same.
72. Ibid., p.52, 28 July 1747, same to same.
73. Ibid., p.114, 7 March 1748, Duke of Bedford to Duke of Montagu. The furthest that the practice strayed from the original procedure was the issuing of new arms at government expense merely on the grounds that the old ones were worn out by time; see ibid., p.120, 16 March 1748, same to same, and W.O. 55/354, p.24, 9 Aug. 1751, Duke of Newcastle to Board of Ordnance.
74. In Queen Anne's war the Ordnance fought with similar lack of success to protect its position. "We must again repeat to your Lordship that this frequent arming of regiments puts Her Majesty to greater expense than was ever formerly ordered .... and if encouragement is given to demands of this nature, it may be expected to arm as often as clothe", W.O. 55/343, 19 Oct. 1703, quoted by Scouller, op. cit., p.192.
the Duke of Newcastle to the effect that Parliament was to pay for exchanging the 500 muskets and bayonets of Loudoun's regiment. This course of action was pursued in preference to absorbing the charge and merely presenting a bill in the form of extraordinary expenses to Parliament, as would have been normal had the expenditure concerned building works.  

After the war arms seem to have been replaced at the expense of the government. The Ordnance made representations in 1750 against one ruling. The Lords Justices ordered a return to the practice under which a regiment was to pay the cost of the replacement of arms being the difference between the cost of the new ones supplied and the value of the old replaced. The Ordnance seems to have tried to benefit from this decision. Each soldier was made accountable for his musket and had to make good any loss out of his own pay; this system of control could only work when the initial provision of arms was more efficient. The concession to change and the lesson of war seems to have been that this rule could be suspended in total war.

Initially after the introduction of the Marines in 1740, arms were taken on board ship by the troops. This led to losses through mere

75. How much was at stake financially could be seen from an account of arms and drums lost at sea or taken by the enemy. C.T.B.& P. 1742-45, p.761, 8 May 1745.
76. For a small number of arms were supplied for the Inniskilling Regiment of Dragoons; W.O. 55/354, p.69, 12 Dec. 1751. Earl of Holderness to Ligonier. For the replacement of arms worn out by the climate, see S.P. 41/21, 3 Aug. 1754, Fox to Robinson. For a change in emphasis, see S.P. 41/20, 19 Mar. 1752, Fox to Holderness. The arms were worn out by many years service.
78. Ibid., pp.22,23, 3 June 1747.
79. Ibid., p.214, 25 Oct. 1748, General Shirley did not withhold pay from soldiers who had lost arms by inevitable misfortune.
accidents, captures and shipwrecks. It also led to confusion since the marine officers had neither funds or allowances to repair old arms still less to buy new arms. In June 1747 the system changed and marines went on board ship with all their equipment except arms. To facilitate the change, on June 13th., the ten regiments of marines were to return all their firelocks into store, as well as their bayonets, keeping some hundred of each per regiment for training purposes. They were to be stored at the Marine regiment's shore headquarters. The rest were to be issued as required. The system set up to this end was that the Master General of the Ordnance was to allow each ship a number of firelocks and bayonets equal to the number of marines established as the complement of a ship of that class; halberts and drums were to be allowed for N.C.O.'s and drummers. The Master Gunner of the ship was to be responsible for their upkeep.

This was more than a means of keeping the arms of the marines in reasonable order: it was a major change in emphasis and represented a move towards the Admiralty's increased control of the Marines.

Since the Admiralty was responsible for reporting on the condition of the firearms it was arguably in practice in charge of the Marines. Therefore it was logical to make the marines more ship-based and less of a band of soldiers who happened to be serving on board ship. The Admiralty regained that control which it had enjoyed in the war of Spanish Succession,

81. This meant 100 muskets and bayonets for ships of 100 and 90 guns, 80 for those of 80, 70 for those of 70, 60 for ships of 60 and 50 guns, 50 for 40 gun ships, 30 for twenties, and 10 for sloops; ibid.
and which had been lost in 1740. Additionally this was a move towards centralisation in that responsibility for caring for the arms was taken away from the marine regiments and made more formal. Although this was the result, there is no evidence that this was the intention. The Master Gunner on board each ship was already responsible to the Ordnance for the powder on ships and their guns. It would have seemed logical to extend his power and responsibilities in this way. The reform seems to have been useful, upsetting no-one.

The Master Gunner on each ship was to issue arms to the Commanding Officer of the marines detachment when desired, taking a receipt. When marines were sent ashore, either to hospital or discharged, the commanding officer was to return to the Master Gunner the arms issued. In this system no extra responsibility was taken by the Ordnance. Colonels were obliged to provide all the accoutrements apart from arms, as had been the usual practice. Each soldier was likewise responsible for his musket whilst in his custody "and if any loss or damage happens to them through his default he was to make it good out of his pay". Steps were taken to ensure that the new arrangements were satisfactory. The proposal was approved that:

in order to keep the arms on board His Majesty's ships in good condition .... two armourer's mates be allowed to all ships from 70 guns upwards, and one armourer's mate to all ships under 70 guns, as far as sloops of 100 men inclusive; and that armourer's mates (as armourers are) be appointed to His Majesty's ships by warrant from the Ordnance Board.

In 1749 the disbanding of regiments and the taking away of their

83. The marines were regarded as an adjunct to the land forces, and therefore fell under the Secretary at War.
arms was performed differently from 1729.85 The only unusual procedure forced on the Ordnance abroad, apart from the confusion at Rattan, was that its storekeepers who collected and kept the arms were on this occasion under the instructions of the Governor or Captain General of Jamaica and the Leeward Islands or, in his absence, the Commander-in-Chief or the President of His Majesty's Council. This was at the instruction of the Lords Justices. Orders would be transmitted to them by the Principal Secretary of State. In Jamaica, at least, the arms of Colonel Trelawney's regiment were to be stored at Kingston until they were required again.86

There seems to have been little change in arrangements for transport during the war. The Board hired horses for service in Flanders as had always been done. The Board seems to have tried to limit the length of the contracts, notwithstanding any resulting bad-feeling among the contractors.87 Contracts were made for three months and "for such longer periods as the King should judge proper". The question of whether contracts should be renewed or terminated had to be referred by the Master General of the Ordnance to either the Duke of Newcastle or the Duke of Cumberland.88 The caution evident in this approach was also evident in

85. See W.O. 55/353, p.198, 31 Oct. 1748, Fox to Col. Lascelles. The aim of taking away swords was partly to prevent any mischief on disbanding and partly to provide soldiers with a surrender bonus.
87. S.P. 41/36, 2 May 1744, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu. The hiring of horses for service with the artillery train was the limit of the Lieutenant General's responsibilities in this area. "For other movement in the field, each commander had to solve his own transport problems". The mutiny acts did provide for the impressment of transport. Scouller, op. cit., pp.203,206.
88. S.P. 41/36, 17 Oct. 1742. Duke of Montagu to ?
the detailed arrangements which the Ordnance tried to make in relation
to the finalising of the contracts.\textsuperscript{89}

We propose to contract, as was done in the late war, for the Horses and Wagons either in Holland or Flanders\textsuperscript{90} as they can be had cheapest, for which purpose we have wrote to Mr. Trevor at the Hague, Mr. Daniel at Bruxelles and Mr. Hatten Vice-Consul at Ostend to desire their assistance in finding out persons of abilities and credit to undertake the same.\textsuperscript{91}

The Ordnance referred later to the attendant difficulties that "some time will be requisite to provide horses abroad and many other things to be prepared in relation to it".

The Ordnance continued to hire ships for the transport of its stores.\textsuperscript{92} There was no change in arrangements for the provision of stores and provisions for garrisons; the arrangements were placed in the hands of contractors.\textsuperscript{93}

The procedure for the supply of bedding to British garrisons remained unchanged. The war did, however, reveal deficiencies in the systems relating to the peculiar circumstances of Minorca and Gibraltar. There is evidence of the discovery of irregularities in the procedure adopted at Gibraltar, and of changes being made to rectify them after 1749. In November 1751 the Ordnance stated that until recently there had been no

\textsuperscript{89} For details, see S.P. 41/36, undated.
\textsuperscript{90} Mention was made of this being the practice "in the former wars in Flanders"; the contractors there furnished horses, wagons, harness, drivers and all necessaries for the carriage of artillery and stores; \textit{ibid.}, 15 May 1742, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
\textsuperscript{91} S.P. 41/36, 15 May 1742, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
\textsuperscript{92} The Ordnance appreciated the relative cost of sea and land transport, see \textit{ibid.}, 4 Feb. 1740, Duke of Argyll to Duke of Newcastle. For the situation in Queen Anne's War, see Scouller, op. cit., p.209.
\textsuperscript{93} For example, see C.I.B.S. P. 1742-5, p.474, 26 Apr. 1744.
fund out of which the charge of the Gibraltar bedding could be defrayed; therefore such an item was placed in the estimate to be laid before Parliament. At this time the Ordnance hoped that the island would be in a better position to pay for the upkeep of its own bedding because of its better financial position.

Some rationalisation of the procedure attaching to the provision of bedding on Minorca was needed. Nothing was done during the war, perhaps because there were more immediate concerns. The British system could not be adopted for several reasons; the bedding would not last as long because of the climate; there was the added charge for freight and insurance; and the contractors charged more for their care and trouble, the same conditions of contract as agents in Britain.

The obvious solution, and the one adopted, was to place Minorca on the same basis as Gibraltar. The proposal in November 1751 was that maintaining and keeping up the bedding there was for the time being to come under the direction of the Ordnance, being paid for in the first instance by the Board. It was to appoint a Bedding Master. This arrangement was in no way to interfere with the existing arrangements for the supply of other items to the garrisons. The island was to be responsible, as before, for providing firings and oil, and was also to keep up the buildings of the barracks in good order. The Ordnance emphasised that the island was to continue to be responsible for the payment of the bedding. The Ordnance was to be re-imbursed for the charge of the bedding, which it had disbursed, out of the civil revenues of the island by an order annually from the Lords of the Treasury.

95. Ibid., p.22, 3 Aug. 1751, Fox to Board of Ordnance.
The only other major change in the supply of other stores concerned tents. The Ordnance refused to supply bell tents for the expedition to the West Indies on the grounds that these lay outside the sphere of the department; and yet it did supply these items. In September 1751 36 tents were supplied for North Britain at the expense of Parliament. The usual procedure on paying for the tents was indicated in a letter from Yonge to Field Marshal Wade in February 1744. Wade was directed to cause the necessary stoppages to be made from the pay of the forces in Winter Quarters "as was practised in the late war for the supplying of tents and other necessaries ...".

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96. "I am informed the Office never used to issue any particular tents for sergeants different from those of the private men .." There was an attempt to combat the tendency for the Ordnance to be called on to supply a greater range of goods. S.P. 41/36, 12 Apr. 1740, Duke of Argyll to Duke of Newcastle.
97. S.P. 41/36, 12 Apr. 1740, and 3 June 1740, Cathcart to ?
The period 1748-54 was one of great activity for the Ordnance. Some measures like the general taking of the remain in the Tower on 1st January 1749\textsuperscript{99} were merely natural consequences of the ending of a war. On the other hand the coming of peace provided the opportunity for the Ordnance to make changes in those areas where deficiencies had become apparent during the hostilities. These reforms were undertaken against a background of an increasing Ordnance commitment. In any future war it would have more responsibilities than hitherto and therefore, if for no other reason, it was necessary to ensure efficiency in its own organisation.

The scope of the Ordnance was extended in the years after the end of the wars. Whilst the Office of Barrack Master was instituted at Minorca,\textsuperscript{100} his model at Gibraltar in 1749 was given responsibility for all established quarters for officers.\textsuperscript{101} More important was the setting up of the colony at Nova Scotia in May 1749. The Ordnance was required to supply Engineers, a Commissary of Stores, and a clerk or conductor. These developments were to be expected since the organisation for the settlement at Nova Scotia would follow naturally the pattern for those at Gibraltar and in America. A further significant development arose in 1752 when an enquiry recommended that the Ordnance Board superintend the building of Fort Annaboa in West Africa. If the West African Company could not be relied upon to act as efficiently and conscientiously as the East India Company, and the Ordnance was called upon to assist in order to complete the task, it was likely that the Ordnance would have

\textsuperscript{99} For details of the full remain of the small arms in the Tower, see S.P. 41/37, 1 Jan. 1749.
\textsuperscript{100} See above p.38.
\textsuperscript{101} W.O. 47/34, O.B.M., 20 Sept. 1749.
to play an ever larger part in such affairs especially in this area.

The whole procedure of the office was not called into review until 1749, but when it was undertaken the scope was as wide as possible. The task of increasing efficiency and recommending changes in regulations which either custom or practice had indicated as deficient was given to the Principal Clerks; they had the power to call on the help of other clerks. It is not clear who was responsible for instigating the review. The Master General's letter of 25th. May 1749 mentioned that because of:

\[
\text{the multiplicity of business and great number of different services required from the Office during the late war, the said Rules and Instructions [given by Charles] may not have been so exactly observed as they ought to have been.}
\]

The brief which he gave to the Board was to consider:

\[
\text{if any alterations or reformation may be proper to be made ... in any matters relating to the Office, which may tend to His Majesty's service, and the good economy of the office, and be a means of preventing its getting into debt for the future, and for keeping the state of the office in so distinct and clear a method, as that they may at all times be able to account for the appropriation of the money ... granted by Parliament to the Office.}
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He referred, in the preamble, to reform in the context of:

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102. Before then there was emphasis on tidying up anomalies which had occurred during the war. Deficiencies in accounts were rectified. W.O. 46/8, pp.1,2,3, 22 Sept. 1748, 18 Apr. 1749, 12 May 1749 et al.
104. Ibid., O.B.M., 13 June 1749. They were to meet 3 days per week for at least 3 hours.
105. W.O. 47/34, O.B.M., 2 June 1749. It is also possible that the Master General was influenced by rumours of the fraud at Woolwich which came officially to the notice of the Board of Ordnance at the end of June. See below p.61.
Peace being now happily restored, and an Act of Parliament very late[ly] passed, by which the debts of the Office will be entirely discharged.

It seems likely that the intention was to avoid the need of returning to Parliament for approval of overspending. It is not clear if this was merely the Master General's being cautious, or whether the action was forced upon him. Dispute on the bill to which he referred is not recorded in reported debates.

The response to the order to institute the enquiry was immediate; the letter arrived on 29th May 1749, and the first part of the enquiry was considered by the Board on 2nd June 1749. The enquiry, far reaching in terms of reference and importance, yielded relatively little outside the financial sphere. There was a tightening of procedure on the transporting of stores. For the future it was ordered that the name of the person to whom the goods were consigned was to be contained on the bill of lading; the same information was to be included in the instructions to Masters of Store-ships. This reform was consistent with other measures tending towards greater control over local personnel.

There were also changes in the procedure relating to the justification and payment for stores other than arms. There were two instances of the Ordnance's complying with requests first and then later seeking justification; but there was nothing to indicate that these were anything more than expedients adopted in time of war. In response to a storekeeper's demand for powder the Ordnance pointed out that any change in

106. Ibid., O.B.M., 28 July 1749.
108. See below p.77, et seq.
supply had to be preceded by an application to His Majesty for a change in the proportion of the established quota. That represented no change. The Ordnance felt that it had to reassert the principle, although in practice it did supply on account the powder requested.\textsuperscript{110}

The last general change in this sphere occurred in 1749. The Ordnance Board said that for the future any sums received by the Barrack Master at Gibraltar for bedding and utensils should be paid immediately to the Storekeeper without waiting for the Board's order; the Ordnance officers were to charge such sums to the Storekeeper's account and this sum was to be inserted in the state of cash which was transmitted to the Board annually.\textsuperscript{111}

The principal object of the Master General's enquiry seems to have been the saving of money and the prevention of abuses. There were a number of important financial reforms in the period 1748-1755. These may have been occasioned by the enquiry directly; they may equally have been the product of the vigilance of the Surveyor General, since measures to control spending were being effected as late as 1754, long after the initial impetus of the enquiry would have been lost.

Investigations after 1748 revealed two significant areas in which previous regulations had proved defective in practice. The custom of granting warrants to approve of stores delivered or works performed years before was responsible for an instance of one man's being paid twice for the same service. The remedy adopted was to order that after 1 July 1753 no warrants would be granted:

unless a certificate is produced under the hands

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., O.B.M., 21 Feb. 1749.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 1 Sept. 1749.
of the officers or others who ordered stores to be provided or works to be done within three months after the service is performed and that the said officers be acquainted that whenever the nature of the service presses so much as to require immediate dispatch without waiting for orders or warrants from the Board, they must report the same as soon as possible that timely provision may be made for defraying the expense thereof, and if they neglect so doing longer than three months it will be deemed a breach of duty and punished accordingly.\textsuperscript{112}

The major abuse which came to light after 1748 was the fraud involved in the delivery of old iron gun metal to a Mr. Remnant, civilian contractor, for the making of shells.\textsuperscript{113} The extent of the fraud was considerable.\textsuperscript{114}

The Surveyor General's investigations indicated that Mr. Remnant had received £10,370:15:7 more than was due to him.\textsuperscript{115} It was alleged by John Leslie, a clerk in the Surveyor General's office, that this in the opinion of the Surveyor General, represented only one-fifth of the real defalcation, a view which he himself supported.\textsuperscript{116} He claimed to know of other frauds,\textsuperscript{117} although the Surveyor General said that in preparing his original report he had obtained all the knowledge which Leslie had.\textsuperscript{118}

When pressed, Leslie said that he did not know of other frauds and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{112} W.O. 47/41, p.226, O.B.M., 8 March 1753.
\item \textsuperscript{113} The suspicion of fraud in this area was not new. In Queen Anne's war the Ordnance investigated the erasing of certain words from a debenture by Richard Jones, a maker of shot and shell who had offered to re-process old metal. Scouller \textit{op. cit.}, p.197.
\item \textsuperscript{114} It was equivalent to building expenditure in 1739 on fortifications at Sheerness, Gillingham, Fort Agustus and Portsmouth. See Appendix C, Table 5.
\item \textsuperscript{115} W.O. 47/41, p.68, O.B.M., 12 Jan. 1753.
\item \textsuperscript{116} W.O. 47/42, p.135, O.B.M., 4 Sept. 1753.
\item \textsuperscript{117} He had advertised his intended publication of the facts, W.O. 47/42, p.120, O.B.M., 31 Aug. 1753.
\item \textsuperscript{118} W.O. 47/42, p.289, O.B.M., 21 Nov. 1753. On the other hand, malpractice was not confined to the Ordnance; see below p.186. The frauds were a reflection of the slackness in administration generally.
\end{itemize}
"acknowledged that he was prompted, advised and urged by his friends and creditors, men of very little or very bad characters to write and print what he had done". Nevertheless the amount of money involved was considerable. The Board was able to obtain repayment from the executors of the culprit, Remnant. The most significant feature was the way in which the fraud was perpetrated and in which it was discovered.

The matter had come to the attention of the Board of Ordnance in a letter from John Leslie, at that time a clerk at Woolwich. The full facts were revealed by the investigation ordered by the Board of Ordnance. It was evident that efforts had been made by the Storekeeper and Clerk of the Cheque at Woolwich to prevent the information's reaching the Board. The Storekeeper was dead before he could be suspended by the Board; the Clerk of the Cheque was reprimanded. Leslie's own part in the proceedings is questionable. The Storekeeper said that Leslie had weighed and delivered gun metal in the same manner as he had. The Board apparently accepted this view, reference being made to "the part which he Leslie acted as a Principal for several years in the practice of the very frauds which he hath detected". It is not inconceivable, although not supported by evidence, that he might have made public the fraud because he was not profiting from it. The Board considered that he wrote to the Board not because it was his duty to do so but when "it became in his interest so to discover the fraud, to prevent others doing the same and he being punished for his share therein". It said that all the frauds were not detected by him.

119. W.O. 47/41, p.12, O.B.M., 2 Jan. 1753. See also Appendix C, Table 1.
The fraud had been a simple one. Remnant was charged with a lesser weight of metal than in fact he took away. The practice rested upon inaccurate recording of the weight of guns delivered and inadequate checking against the book recording the original weight of each gun. Similar frauds in the future could not be prevented merely by the passing of regulations. The incident showed that rules were only as effective as the personnel which implemented them and that when two persons who were supposed, in theory, to act as a check on each other were in collusion the possibility of fraud existed.

Nevertheless the Ordnance was obliged to take all possible care in the framing of instructions even though these might not be followed to the letter.

At a local level there was an attempt to make more effective the procedure relating to the authorisation and payment of works undertaken locally. At Placentia the intention was to prevent private work being done under the guise that it was official. The commanding officer had, in future, to approve such work; His Majesty's tools were not to be issued out; private people were to pay for any work performed; in the meantime the Ordnance was to re-possess timber appropriated for fences together with wheelbarrows.

As regards payment at local level for official local repairs there was, in 1749, a decisive end to an indecisive situation which arose during the war. The official procedure was for the Chief Engineer or Instructor to pay no money except by order signed by himself. This procedure had been disregarded. It was decided after the war that the Chief Engineer

122. W.O. 47/34, f.34, 27 June 1749.
123. Ibid., O.B.M., 17 Nov. 1749.
again be ordered to sign all orders for the payment of money both for incidental expenses and for fortifications. The procedure was that the Barrack Master listed the repairs to be done in a note to the Chief Engineer. He then ordered their performance and demanded a receipt from the Quarter Master of the regiment billeted there that the work had in fact been performed. In the meantime the Barrack Master paid over the money which he had received to the Storekeeper and Paymaster and these two were charged with this money from time to time. In order that checks could be kept at the centre as well as locally, notice of payments to the Storekeeper and Paymaster was to be transmitted to London.

Consistent with the increased control being exercised in this sphere was the reprimand of the Paymaster of the works at Inverness over the payment of a bill. William Bogdani, Clerk of the Ordnance, attempted to introduce some elementary accounting. At the same time he drew attention to the fact that some accounts should have been drawn up quarterly or half-yearly. In an attempt to draw order out of chaos Bogdani wanted to know the balance in order that he might compare it with the books in his office. He took a close interest in the affairs of the forts at Braemar and Cargaff Castle. There was a close and stringent interest in closing the accounts of ships. He also kept a strict check on the storekeeper at Jamaica. The irregularities in

124. This is based on repairs done at Gibraltar; ibid., O.B.M., 20 Sept. 1749.
125. W.O. 46/8, p.7, 7 Sept. 1749, Bogdani to George Fern, paymaster of works at Inverness.
126. Ibid., p.9, 7 Sept. 1749, Bogdani to Francis Gatton.
127. Ibid., p.13, 3 Jan. 1750, Bogdani to George Fern.
128. For example, see ibid., p.14, 10 Feb. 1750, Bogdani to Capt. Matthew of the Argyll.
129. Ibid., p.20, 17 Sept. 1750, same to J. Rogers, storekeeper at Jamaica.
accounts extended back to 1747. He wished to know the states of cash and where the cash had gone. The emphasis in all his attempts was on seeing that matters were correct at the time of the investigation.

The Surveyor General sought to introduce more checks into the system as it operated at the centre. This is not to say that effective checks did not exist before. For instance, in 1746 the auditors of the imprests instituted enquiries on an unauthorised exceeding on the Engineer's branch books of £300-£400. \(^{130}\) It was felt however, that existing checks were not sufficient guard against fraud and malpractice. In 1750 the Surveyor General informed the Board that several officers of the Ordnance both at home and abroad had bills of disbursement of some years standing in his office. \(^{131}\) He feared that he might have to raise objections to some of them when laying the claims before the Board. He suggested, and the Board agreed, that when the Board received an application for imprests, it should first enquire of the Surveyor General whether the claimant fell into the category about which he was concerned. He came to this conclusion since at its previous meeting the Board had made out imprests of £70-£1,815 to four Ordnance officers in this category. \(^{132}\) It is also possible that he was prompted to this recommendation by the practice whereby storekeepers "as well .... abroad as at home" had made payments "from time to time ... (without ever quoting by what order) to clerks, artificers, labourers and others". He discovered this by accident in examining storekeepers' accounts. He prevailed upon the Board of Ordnance to send circular letters:

\(^{130}\) S.P. 41/37, 26 March 1746, Charles Bush to Daniel Prevereau.  
\(^{132}\) He claimed that he had too much work to undertake this task any earlier than as examples arose.
to all storekeepers and other persons at home concerned in the payment of money from this office to forbid their ever contracting with artificers before such artificer's proposals are agreed by the Board or ever paying or allowing the least trifle to clerks, artificers, labourers or others whatsoever without their absolute order and enjoinder in every Payment.

The first check on this was to be the compulsory quotation of the Board's order. The second more lasting, was making a standing rule for the Surveyor General to disallow all such articles found thereafter with that particular omission. To prevent the system being too rigid the Board agreed to allow the expenditure of up to 20/- on necessary and immediate repairs.133

A continual concern in administration in the eighteenth century was the problem of keeping account of the money held in the office.134 Two attempts at an improved system were made in the period 1749-55. Mr. Hayter submitted a scheme in June 1749 "for keeping the accounts of the money granted to this office by Parliament".135 The basis was that:

in order that the Board may know the true state of the office at the end of every quarter, it will be necessary .... to have a book, wherein an account should be kept of the particular services for which money is granted by Parliament, noting on the debtor side the sums allowed, and on the credit side the sums paid on each respective service.

The scheme had the advantage of completeness. When any debentures were made and signed, the information was to be entered on the credit side of the account to which they belonged, specifying the date of the debenture, the name of the person to whom the bill was payable and the service

135. For full details, see W.O. 47/34, O.B.M., 2 June 1749.
in question, or the species of stores delivered; the same was to apply to imprests for the advance of money, and when the imprests or any part thereof were cleared that information was to be entered on the debtor's side of the same account. It would make possible quarterly accounts of the state of the office, deficient only in the bills which had not yet come to the office; debentures for these could be entered under the head of exceedings. Mr. Hayter hoped that this scheme would provide a check on the real against the anticipated expense and the distribution of the ordinary income of the office. On the matter's being reported to Mr. Bogdani, he reported:

there appeared no difference between the said scheme and what has been for years hitherto practised, except in the addition of a number of heads.

In support of this statement he prepared a list of the existing heads of expenditure, those of Mr. Hayter's addition being marked with a cross.\footnote{Ibid., O.B.M., 28 July 1749.} Bogdani was probably being too hard in his criticism of the scheme; the number of additions proposed by Hayter testifies to the relatively ill-defined nature of the scheme before then. Mr. Hayter's scheme was not put into practice.

The second, successful, attempt at reform in this area came in 1752.\footnote{W.O. 47/40, p.97, O.B.M., 5 Aug. 1752.} The scheme put forward at that time was concerned with checking the amount of money granted in warrants against the sum paid in cash. The Surveyor General had considered a scheme advocated by Mr. Bogdani for forming at any time a state of the debt of the Ordnance.\footnote{W.O. 47/39, p.59, 17 Jan. 1752.} It involved the Clerk of the Ordnance's office being apprised of all contracts, orders and

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item 136. Ibid., O.B.M., 28 July 1749.
\end{itemize}}

-67-
agreements. The keeping of a running total made it necessary that the person responsible "be an exact accomptant" and one that "can be depended upon in regard to his attendance and integrity". He was to be an additional clerk under the Clerk of the Ordnance. The Surveyor General thought the change so necessary that he affirmed that "whatsoever money the Board shall allow him the clerk will be money well disposed to the advantage of the office". In the event, the Ordnance appointed a man slightly above the average rates for clerks.\textsuperscript{139}

Bogdani had explained that the ability to calculate the finances at a glance would be of great importance. It was a primary object in the Master General's instituting the review of procedures.\textsuperscript{140} Several attempts had been made and failed. The problem previously had been the lack of material on which to base such estimates. Bills allowed could be brought into the clerk of the Ordnance's office several months late and in some cases the delay was a matter of years. Under the new scheme calculations based on warrants from the Board or quarterly allowances from the office would give a degree of precision, but would not take account of the number of articles not arising from this source, of which the first notice was the demand itself. The Board of Ordnance, however, was prepared to tolerate this imprecision on the grounds that the new method "comes nearer the truth than any method hitherto practised". The new system utilised the warrant book of the Clerk of the Ordnance, and

\textsuperscript{139}. W.O. 47/40, p.104, O.B.M., 7 Aug. 1752. The man was to be paid at the rate of 4/- per day. See also,p.15 above for the normal rates.

\textsuperscript{140}. See above p.58. In preparing the debt of the Ordnance as ordered trouble had been found in valuing the as yet unpresented warrants. W.O. 47/35, p.336, O.B.M., 5 May 1750.
warrants were to be entered there. As a check a similar warrant book was to be kept by a new clerk. A second check was built into the system; the additional warrant book was to contain the rate, price and total value of each warrant. When a warrant was monied, allowed by the Surveyor General and brought into the Clerk of the Ordnance's office, the total was to be posted opposite the original entry. Presumably this was intended to ensure strict adherence to the terms of the warrant; it would also show the value of warrants granted or outstanding. A deficiency was that this figure could reflect either warrants not completed or else those not brought into the Clerk of the Ordnance's office. The new system was largely an extension of previous practice. The Clerk of the Ordnance had for some years kept a kind of ledger of warrants for stores delivered from the Tower; this scheme lacked the valuation of the items, but could easily be extended as under the new plan.

There were several minor changes in routine, involved in returning an office whose concern was the conduct of war to a peace footing. In 1750 the procedure of clerks going to prove guns was reviewed. In 1741 it had been decided that the first clerk in each branch in the office could go to prove guns and powder accompanied by one clerk from each branch in rotation. Since then the practice had grown up, without the Board's order, of an assistant's being in constant attendance on the minuting clerk. He had received allowances on the same basis as the other clerks. The Board ordered that the allowances be continued. Mr. Bush sought to make the minute more explicit; he made a case for the employment of an extra clerk in view of the volume of letters to be written at

the proving of guns. He asked whether a clerk or two in the office should travel if the first clerk were absent. The Board concurred, ordering that there might be two clerks of each branch sent. The Surveyor General did not think the minute sufficiently explicit. Ten months later the Board at his request explained the minute relating to the number of clerks allowed to go from the minuting branch to the proofs; the minuting clerk and the assistant minuting clerk were to attend the Board when they met at Greenwich and Woolwich, together with one other clerk from that branch; in the absence of the minuting clerk, his assistant and two other clerks should attend so that there might always be persons to write such letters as might be directed.

In the same year, the clerks and others in the Ordnance applied for, and obtained, a gratuity in respect of the burden placed on them by the war. The case for such a gratuity was partly their "extraordinary attendance and care" and partly that on former declarations of peace, in 1698 and 1713, gratuities were allowed to clerks "in consideration of their great services during former wars". Four employees applied for, and were allowed the same gratuity on the grounds of inconvenience; the Master Furbisher, however, was only given the sum of £10. The Board was not prepared to allow everyone to benefit from the precedent.

The office messenger on claiming a similar allowance, was informed 'that

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143. For the rôle of the Surveyor General as an arbitrator and decision maker in this period, see above p.19; see also, W.O. 47/34-44 passim. It was an area which was likely to grow in importance.
144. W.O. 47/37, p.157, O.B.M., 12 Feb. 1751. The amount of the gratuity claimed reinforced the distinction between clerks in ordinary, £20, and clerks extraordinary, £10 each.
146. Ibid., p.204, O.B.M., 22 Feb. 1751.
the list is closed and there is no precedent for it'. The salary of Mr. Job Staunton Charlton\textsuperscript{147} was raised by an allowance of £100 in view of:

the business of that place requiring great assiduity, care and attendance, and as the said Clerk of the Deliveries upon the establishment of that office is less than the salary of any of the other principal officers of the same.\textsuperscript{148}

The Surveyor General seems to have been called upon to deal with an increased amount of business. Many matters were referred to him and it seems likely that he was used as a check on expenditure and malpractice,\textsuperscript{149} being supported by the Board.\textsuperscript{150} He reported on the new proportions of ships and yachts in the Royal Navy.\textsuperscript{151} There was evidence of economy in making contracts on which he reported and there was consequently close scrutiny of tenders;\textsuperscript{152} on one occasion a contractor, clinging too rigidly to a high price, was deprived of the contract, a valuable one for seven years, which was given to rivals.\textsuperscript{153} In relation to the gunfounders, the Surveyor General referred to a combination against the Ordnance; their object was to keep up the price. The Surveyor General sought to reward one contractor who voluntarily lowered

\begin{itemize}
\item[147.] For his appointment, see \textit{ibid.}, p.350, O.B.M., 29 Mar. 1751, and p.423, O.B.M., 19 Apr. 1751.
\item[149.] W.O. 55/1816 passim and also W.O. 55/1 passim.
\item[150.] W.O. 55/1, p.18, 28 March and 3 April 1753. He also investigated the insufficiency of shirts for certain companies sent abroad. One would have been expected the Board of General Officers to do so. \textit{Ibid.}, p.53, 10 Aug. 1753.
\item[151.] W.O. 55/1816, f.141, 31 July 1752.
\item[152.] \textit{Ibid.}, ff.87, 24 Sept. 1751, and 138, 13 July 1752. For action concerning flintknappers, see W.O. 55/1, p.35, 18 May 1753. See also, \textit{ibid.}, p.19, 28 Mar. 1753, and \textit{ibid.}, p.21, 11 Apr. 1753.
\item[153.] W.O. 55/1816, f.153, 6 Oct. 1752.
\end{itemize}
his price.\textsuperscript{154} It was part of his policy to treat all contractors alike in terms of orders placed. A contractor disadvantaged in one year could have the deficiency remedied in another.\textsuperscript{155} It was within this same spirit of the need to advance the work of the office as speedily as possible that he organised the setting up of an experiment to test an alternative method of extracting saltpetre.\textsuperscript{156}

The Surveyor General was responsible for introducing several specific regulations which required definition in the extraordinary items of expenditure claimed on accounts submitted to the office.\textsuperscript{157} The issue which revealed the loopholes in the existing arrangement was that of the accounts of the Paymaster to the Train in North Britain. The amounts for coals and candles, stationery for the Commanding Officer and Paymaster, and travelling charges and lodgings were all very high; they were the cause of the Surveyor General's being "dissatisfied with the officers both civil and military in Scotland for the expenses they have put this office to in 1748". The problem was not administrative failure, for there were vouchers for every item; the Paymaster or Storekeeper "perhaps ... was not the person that was to blame".\textsuperscript{158} It was the duty of the Surveyor General to disallow all such articles as appeared unreasonable. In this case the custom of the office was against him.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., f.138, 13 July 1752. The system of 'proving' arms at the Tower was extended. This diminished the control of the private Gunmakers Company. See below p.81.

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., f.144, 7 Aug. 1752. For his close involvement in proposals for a Land Service Musket, see W.O. 55/1, p.146, 10 Apr. 1755.


\textsuperscript{158} Their only crime was paying the money.
Officers could charge what they liked for postage, lodging and travelling, the Ordnance paymaster and storekeeper being obliged to supply demands.\textsuperscript{159} The most that could be done was to prevent a similar situation arising again. The Ordnance redefined the regulations. A proportion of coals and candles was to be established. No person should ever supply themselves with stationery without acquainting the Board; if they found that items could be supplied cheaper upon the spot than at the Tower they could have an order for the purchase thereof; the matter would be referred to the Surveyor General who would allow what was necessary. Thirdly officers on duty with detachments in Great Britain should be allowed sums for postage, lodgings and travel in order to avoid a lack of definition.

The Surveyor General represented to the Board in 1752,

\begin{center}
\begin{quote}
the great multiplicity of business and the necessity he is under to have extracts or copies of letters, minutes or other papers from time to time to enable him to answer the number of papers continually referred to him which his first clerk is not able to go through.\textsuperscript{160}
\end{quote}
\end{center}

He therefore desired he might be allowed a clerk to be an assistant to his first clerk and that,

\begin{center}
\begin{quote}
such clerk may have an allowance of 4/6d. per day to be paid by bill and debenture to commence the first of October next.\textsuperscript{161}
\end{quote}
\end{center}

A major change in the establishment was effected in the Drawing Room.\textsuperscript{162} The Surveyor General's main criticism was that "as the number of persons paid in this service was unlimited, it had given rise to many

\begin{footnotes}
\item[159.] Where the Paymaster wished to travel, the officer certified for him.
\item[161.] The same was ordered accordingly, \textit{ibid}.
\item[162.] \textit{Ibid}., p.96, O.B.M., 5 Aug. 1752.
\end{footnotes}
disagreeable solicitations", the solution was to settle the number and "as vacancies happen the most deserving promoted to a higher pay and a new one nominated to fill up the vacancy in the lowest class". A necessary step towards "the constant attendance he hoped to see established in the Drawing Room", was the removal of the anomalous position of two of the fourteen present incumbents: four were absent on service by order of the Board and two had different employments in the office. The solution was for the Board to treat all in the same manner. Besides fostering stability, the Surveyor General was concerned to create a spirit of emulation in the employees. The means to this end was the division of employees into different classes of pay. The Surveyor General felt that this justified the increased annual cost to the service of £73.

In the years 1748-55 the Ordnance sought to exercise a greater check on the people it employed, both directly as labourers in the Tower and indirectly as artificers. In 1750 Bogdani instructed the Deputy Treasurer not to pay the labourers' annual pensions and wages in view of their unjustified absence from musters until a report had been made to

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163. For details, see W.O. 47/34, 2 May 1749. The Board acceded to a request from Mr. Haines, a conductor returning home from Flanders, that the allowance given to him for attending the Drawing Room might be restored to him. The sum involved was 2/6d. per day.

164. This was the normal pattern for promotion. See p.22 above.

165. These were additional to the four absent on services by order of the Ordnance.

166. See above p.15.

167. For the close scrutiny of clerks under the Master Armourer found guilty of improper practice and discharged in May 1750. See Hogg op. cit., p.394.
the Board. On another occasion, the labourers in Ordinary claimed that they were unable to take in the 1700 bags of saltpetre which were brought in the Tower "several of the labourers being old and past their labour and some doing no duty at all". The labourers had to pay porters to do the work, and then petition the Ordnance for reimbursement of this sum.

The Board not only decided that the absent labourers pay the fees incurred and paid to the porters, but in addition tried to avoid a recurrence of the situation for the future; they ordered that no man was to be warranted as a labourer in ordinary or entertained as an extra labourer who was under 20 or above 35 years of age. Thirteen months later there was another curb on the labourers. In the future no labourers were to be sent on messages except by the first clerks in each branch or in their absence by the next clerk; all were to produce vouchers from the clerks by whom they were sent. This arose out of the Surveyor General's investigation of a letter from Mr. Miles. He had compared accounts of payments for messages with vouchers and found that £11:1:9 was paid in messages without notes or certificates. Also, it was ordered that no labourer be paid more than one shilling for any message. This arose out of the practice of some messengers charging 1/6d. per message. The Board tried to prevent such abuses by requiring

See also, W.O. 47/34, f.29, Board of Ordnance Minute, 2 June 1749 "whereas the labourers are become very negligent and remiss in their duty ...". For an analysis of their shortcomings, see ibid., 24 June 1749.
171. This is evidence for the existence of at least latent checks in the system.
to see monthly accounts of the letters, messages, and work hire. Presumably these would have been passed to the Surveyor General. Nearly two years later there was a minor amendment to the system. It was decided that 1/6d. would be allowed for messages taken after 6 in the evening provided that the clerk who sent the labourer authorised the payment. This arose out of a case where the Board ruled that a person sent in lieu of the messenger should be paid by the messenger. In November 1750 the office labourers were enjoined not to presume without a written order from one of the Principal officers of the Ordnance (which implicitly they had been doing) to assist any persons in the loading of any goods, stores or any materials whatsoever on the Tower wharf that did not immediately belong to His Majesty or the office.

The treatment of the question of house rent was evidence of increasing standardisation of office procedures. There were several instances of grants for house rent having to be confirmed on the arrival of a new incumbent. Mr. Bogdani asked whether the new men were to enjoy the same terms as other officers. The clerks employed at the centre petitioned:

that they have neither houses, lodgings or any allowance in lieu thereof for House Rent and as all the clerks on the establishment at Woolwich and in the other out ports have either houses, lodgings, or an allowance for House Rent over and above their established salaries.

they therefore prayed the Board would take their case into consideration .... to put them upon an equality with them by granting each of them such an allowance for House Rent as they shall think meet;

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there was added a memo that house rent or lodgings near the Tower were very expensive. The Board refused to be drawn into the setting of a precedent. It gave a sum of £10 each during the pleasure of the Board, "their business being greater than at the out ports". 175

In similar vein was the Board's decision to allow an extra £10 per year by bill and debenture to Messrs. Gamball and Ayres "they being the only clerks in ordinary whose salary is as small as £40 a year". 176

The Board sought to exercise a strict or stricter control on its officers at local level. Master Gunners were to notify the death of any of their gunners to Sir John Ligonier or the Board. 177 The demands for stationery submitted by the Engineer for Plymouth and the Cinque Ports division and those employed on the roads in North Britain were referred to the Surveyor General. 178 The conclusion was the allowance of 10/- per day to each officer in command in lieu of stationery ware and postage of letters in South Britain and 12/- per day in North Britain. 179 In November 1752 the Board tried to guard against damage to His Majesty's cranes and Tower wharf. No timber or stores were to be landed on Tower wharf with His Majesty's cranes without the Principal officer's order in writing unless it were for His Majesty's service; in that case the Clerk of the Works or his deputy was to certify to the Surveyor General the nature and quantity of such stores as had been landed. 180

In that same month was demonstrated an example of the Board's consum-

175. Ibid., 28 June 1751.
176. W.O. 47/38, p.41, O.B.M., 9/10 July 1751; see also p.15 above.
178. Ibid., p.336, 5 May 1750; see also, W.O. 47/36, p.397, 11 Dec. 1750.
ing interest in economy. The Board agreed to the request of "Mr. Campbell and some other storekeepers who live not far off" for 10/- per day in the quarterly disbursements for the risk they ran in making cash disbursements.

There was stricter control over the storekeepers in general. In particular, the Surveyor General made an alteration to the duties of the Storekeeper and Clerk of the Survey and Cheque at Woolwich with the orders relative to the Master Smith. A letter was referred to the Surveyor General concerning the irregularities perpetrated by the Storekeeper and Master Gunners at many of the garrisons in issuing and expending of stores. The sequel to this and other letters similarly referred was a report in March 1751. The Surveyor General said that the matter was so intricate that he needed the active help of a specialist to resolve the issue and to frame preventative measures. For instance, one of the chief abuses concerned the non-production for payment of bills for the quarter in which they were incurred. In any case care was essential in drawing up an account of what stores were necessary to be sent for completing the 'proportion' of the garrisons for the succeeding session. There seems to have been an intensive and retrospective

181. Ibid., p.347, O.B.M., 27 Nov. 1750. This may have been the product of the Master General's instruction as above p.58
182. The letter was sent to the respective officers at Woolwich, the Storekeeper and Clerk of the Cheque at Gravesend, the Storekeeper at Gravesend and Tilbury, and the Storekeeper at Upnor Castle.
186. W.O. 47/37, p.556, O.B.M., 7 June 1751. For an example, see ibid., p.509, O.B.M., 17 May 1751, where the accounts of the Storekeeper at Fort William for stores issued and needed were referred to the ledgerkeepers to report how far his accounts were passed and then to Mr. Armstrong to report whether any supply was sent in the previous year.
investigation on this account in March of 1751, the ledgerkeepers had adverse comments about the accounts of the storekeepers at Rattan, St. Johns, Ferryland, Edinburgh, Trinity Harbour, Carbiniere, and Placentia and Annapolis. In each instance the Board ordered that the storekeeper in question send in his accounts forthwith, in two cases threatening to put his bond in suit against him. The Board ordered further enquiries in some of the other cases. The ledgerkeepers made their case the stronger by quoting what had been the practice. It was evident that the practice in wartime had been different. The ledgerkeepers set out the ruling for the normal behaviour of the storekeepers:

It had sometimes been an article in the Board's instructions to storekeepers not only to be careful in having proper receipts for stores issued, but also to sign duplicates of all stores received, one of which (was) to be attested by the person who delivers them and transmitted to the office with the ledgers and vouchers, the other to be delivered to the person from whom the stores are received.

Thus there was a check on one half of the system. Similarly for the other half:

From the out-ports as vouchers for the storekeepers having justly charged themselves on their ledgers they transmitted yearly with their accounts either the bills of lading or certificates particularising the number, nature, quantity, and quality of stores received, signed by the Clerks of the Survey and Cheque; and from Greenwich, Edinburgh, other places, usually, is transmitted either a duplicate of the Storekeepers receipt or a bill of particulars attested by the person who delivered them into store whereby it may appear that the Storekeeper had just charged themselves therewith.

188. Ibid., p.406, O.B.M., 4 Apr. 1751.
There were also vouchers for stores issued. The Board ordered that the ledgerkeepers examine the accounts and report.

Another step towards greater centralisation and control was the definition of the Storekeepers' procedure with regard to bedding.\textsuperscript{189} Mr. Turner, the storekeeper at Upnor Castle, had never had any particular order from the Board to use the unserviceable bedding to repair the bedding in store; his practice had been to repair new bedding in this fashion, sending an annual account of the unserviceable stores. The Board ordered that "he must never break up any bedding" for the future before he had transmitted its state and condition and received the Board's orders. The Board, however, paid him for the bedding already broken up according to his account.

The Board sought to exercise a greater control over the Storekeepers in the matter of the labourers whom they employed.\textsuperscript{190} On an investigation begun some two years earlier, the Surveyor General enquired into the return from the several out-ports of the labourers employed. The practical result was that the Board ordered that letters be written to:

\begin{quote}
all the storekeepers belonging to this office to acquaint them that upon the death or removal of any one labourer they are to immediately apprise the Board therewith and on no account whatsoever to fill up such vacancy until they first know the Board's pleasure.
\end{quote}

At the same time as imposing a stricter regulation on its storekeepers, the Ordnance was determined to make certain that order was maintained by insisting that it had control over their appointment. The question arose in 1751.\textsuperscript{191} McPherson, naval Storekeeper in the East

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{189} W.O. 47/39, p.465, O.B.M., 5 June 1752.
\item \textsuperscript{190} W.O. 47/41, p.142, O.B.M., 13 Feb. 1753.
\item \textsuperscript{191} W.O. 47/38, p.478, O.B.M., 19 Dec. 1751.
\end{itemize}
Indies had received a warrant from Commodore Lisle for officiating as Ordnance storekeeper there. The Surveyor General produced the Ordnance's precedents against this practice, and the Board subsequently wrote to the Secretary of the Lords of the Admiralty.

The strict control of the Ordnance was not confined to the storekeepers. At the centre, it was accompanied by a greater definition of procedure in the gun office. It is possible that this constituted a return to the pre-war system. The system of proving arms at the Tower was altered. It involved Ordnance personnel in more work but did ensure greater control over the quality of arms provided.

The strict attitude affected other officers locally. The Board agreed with the Surveyor General's conclusions on the request for a Furbisher by the Respective Officers at Portsmouth. He said that all vacancies of furbishers' assistants and persons employed in the cleaning of arms at the Out-ports should be filled up from the Day Men in the small gun office: their abilities had been proven and honestly tried, and therefore they were preferable to "persons whose character is not known but by the recommendation of others". He further observed that the Portsmouth officers had strayed from the normal practice; they had called one man one of the assistants when there should only have been one of that rank, the rest being Day Men. Also, although the Board had ruled that the Furbisher at Portsmouth should only have one servant

195. The passage implies that he was referring to the nominee of the Portsmouth officers; he put forward his own nominee and said that John Frywell could come and have a test in the Small Gun Office.
and only then when necessary, the Portsmouth officers had allowed an apprentice to the Armourer when he should have been dismissed.\textsuperscript{197} This was followed by a wider investigation. The question concerned what general rules could be made for the guidance of officers at out-ports in investigating and rejecting guns.\textsuperscript{198}

There was a stricter check introduced on the respective officers at the out-ports in relation to stores delivered to gunners of His Majesty's ships and the stores returned by them.\textsuperscript{199} When the Board considered the problem, in July 1751, the situation was that the respective officers were directed to sign only the "remains" and not the receipts for the stores returned; they were not obliged to witness the indents for stores issued. Although the officers had followed these instructions, Mr. Bush chief clerk to the Clerk of the Ordnance felt that the vouchers were not sufficiently authorized when auditing their accounts. In particular, he felt that witnessing the indents was "essentially necessary to be done whether the indents are for money or for stores". The consequent order was as comprehensive as possible. For all stores returned by gunners, whether before or after the remains were to be taken, the receipts as well as the "remains" should be signed by all the respective officers jointly. All indents were to be witnessed by one or both of the Clerks of the Survey and Cheque.\textsuperscript{200}

For all the increased control over the officers of the Ordnance, there was no significant reform of the regulations governing their rela-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{197} This was analogous with ship practice; W.O. 47/43, p.269, 7 May 1754.
\item \textsuperscript{198} W.O. 55/1, p.143, O.B.M., 21 Mar. 1755. Report to Principal Officers of the Ordnance.
\item \textsuperscript{199} W.O. 47/39, p.462, O.B.M., 5 June 1752.
\item \textsuperscript{200} These were previously witnessed by Storekeepers.
\end{itemize}
tion to the central administration. Perhaps the reason was that it was felt that the regulations were sufficiently adequate provided they were enforced. There is some evidence to support this view. It was ordered\textsuperscript{201} that all demands for the supply of the several out-ports, forts, castles, and garrisons for 1755 be referred to the proper clerk. He was to compare them with the allotted proportion and report what were necessary and wanting to complete them. He was also to note such particulars as were usually bought on the spot. The reports were then to be laid before the Surveyor General, and when approved by him, they were to be estimated by the proper clerk before presentation to the Board with their value.

Typical of the problems which the Ordnance faced both at the centre and locally, and indicative of the Board's emphasis on economy to the possible exclusion of other more important reforms, was the disproportionate amount of time and trouble spent on the question of coals and candles for the offices of the Ordnance.\textsuperscript{202} The justification, in the opinion of the Surveyor General, was that these were as expensive as many other stores and were as regularly received and issued. His concern was that they be bought most cheaply.\textsuperscript{203} The problem was that it would be difficult to form any regulations which would effectively prevent future abuses. The secondary problem was that the Surveyor General could not judge what business might arise, and therefore it was impossible to say what proportions might be requisite. From the figures presented by the Surveyor General it would be difficult to refute his conclusion that

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{201} W.O. 47/44, p.303, O.B.M., 26 Nov. 1754.
\textsuperscript{202} W.O. 47/36, p.365, O.B.M., 30 Nov. 1750. For the earlier attempts to tighten the system, see W.O. 47/37, pp.12-14, O.B.M., 2 Jan. 1751.
\textsuperscript{203} W.O. 55/1, p.1, 15 Jan. 1753.
\end{flushleft}
there had been abuse, for the consumption of candles rose steadily year by year, increasing more than fifty per cent between 1745 when the office was at its busiest and 1749 when peace came. Similarly the consumption of coals was greater in 1748 than it had been in earlier years in the war.

The new scheme adopted was that each person should demand a fair proportion of coals and candles, signing a receipt to the housekeeper on delivery. Where, as in several rooms, fires could not be attributed to particular clerks, they were to be made the responsibility of the doorkeeper or such other person as the Board approved. There were two safeguards in the new system. The housekeeper was to report any misapplication of coals and candles and was to signify to the Board when any new supply was required.\textsuperscript{204} This involved the passing of proper instructions for the housekeeper since she had none previously. Secondly, the Treasurer's office keeper was to keep an exact account of coals and candles supplied in the same manner as the housekeeper, showing what each fire used each day. The clerks in that office were to certify the account. A demand for a fresh supply was to be accompanied by an account of the disposition of the former supply. There were similar regulations for the drawing room, the book binding room, and the chief engineer's and other offices.\textsuperscript{205}

The regulations were to be enforced under threat of dismissal from the employment of the Ordnance for those found embezzling goods for private use or assisting such a proceeding.

In practice, the regulations were strengthened by the part played

\textsuperscript{204} For example, see W.O. 47/38, p.474, O.B.M., 19 Dec. 1751.
\textsuperscript{205} W.O. 47/37, pp.12-14, O.B.M., 2 Jan. 1751.
by the Surveyor General. In one case the Board approved part of a demand, insisting that if more were required application had to be made to the Surveyor General. It would seem that the Ordnance was mainly concerned to bring the problem under control and to assert its authority. When the Surveyor General was charged to consider and settle the amounts given to Bush, Humphrey, Chapman and Ryley, the quantities which he recommended were double the previous allocation, and almost double the quantities to which he had objected in the first instance. Once having asserted its authority the Ordnance could allow custom to play a larger part once again.

The Board did not show the same desire to save money in regard to structural expenditure. In 1753, amongst other items the Surveyor General directed Mr. Stephenson to report the number of grates usually furnished to each house belonging to the office. Since he had been Clerk of the Works there had been no regulations made in relation to the number of stone grates furnished to each house. Bogdani said that it was the usual practice to allow three. An anomalous position had grown up through new ones being supplied on application, as old ones became worn and out of fashion, without the old ones being taken into store. The Surveyor General wanted a ruling from the Board for the number to be put in a particular house, which had caused the enquiry. He asked the

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210. W.O. 47/43, p.163, O.B.M., 7 Mar. 1754. The "usual allowance" of coals and candles was made for a specified group.
212. For a list of such houses in 1739, see W.O. 54/208. Only 19 of the 43 clerks had houses.
Board to make, in addition, a more general ruling. The Board complied. In future, all principal clerks were to be furnished with four grates of stone. The Board went further in an attempt to regularize the position. At the Surveyor General's suggestion, it ordered that "no clerk on his removal or promotion presume to take with him any of the King's grates or other furniture whatsoever belonging to the King". Crown property was to be marked with a broad arrow and a mark to distinguish which house it belonged to. The machinery to put this into practice was that each clerk sign his own inventory in the relevant book and the Clerk of Works sign a duplicate to be left in the possession of the appropriate clerk.

What conclusions arise from the way in which the procedures of the Ordnance changed? The structure of the Ordnance was the same in 1739 as it had been for at least half a century. It did not change fundamentally before 1748. In the absence of Board of Ordnance minutes before 1748 it is not possible to detect changes in the day to day running of the office, although it is evident from measures after the war that there had been changes during the course of the war. The two most important developments during the period related to the supply of arms and the effects of the lack of funds. The Ordnance fought unsuccessfully to restrain the free replacement of arms. Financial stringency was the basis of the dispute concerning responsibility for, and division of, the Joint Battering Train. It was also the basis of
the Ordnance's practice that two officers be involved in each operation where possible to prevent fraud. It was evident from the episode involving Remnant that the opportunities for fraud existed and that these were exploited despite the safeguards taken. After the war an attempt was made to redress deficiencies in procedures and to exert a strict control on the day to day running of the office. These did not represent a fundamental change in approach. The real problems of the Ordnance were more fundamental, and could not be solved merely by tightening in practice what was, theoretically, already a sound set of regulations. It will be seen that this was also the difficulty which the army administration had to face.
CHAPTER THREE

THE ARMY:

PROCEDURES AND CHANGES 1739-1754
Problems of War Office administration.

Returns - nature and frequency; causes - inadequacy of mustering system; limitations - not a substitute for musters - reliance on regimental agents.

Musters; adequate in theory; causes of inadequacy in practice - lax civil and military liaison - frequency - mustering complete - failure of internal checks - commissaries' negligence - tradition - lax central organisation - failure of external checks; similarity of previous practice with that of 1739-54.

Recruitment; desertion; changed basis of providing recruits - cause - machinery - results; situation unchanged after 1746.

Use of Irish establishment; transfer to British establishment - replacement of troops - reduction; recruiting - financial arrangements - mustering complete; inactivity 1748-54 - rationalisation - continued use as reserve.
Whereas the task of the Ordnance was to provide correct supplies in correct quantities at required times and places, the principal task of the War Office was to place at the disposal of field commanders adequate quantities of troops of the right calibre. In order to assess the needs of the army it was essential to have accurate information. Such information could usually be provided by proper use of the mustering procedure. In war, certain types of information could not be acquired in this way, and some increase in special enquiries would be expected if the mustering procedure proved inadequate. The nature of these increased demands and the causes of the breakdown in mustering reveal the strains imposed on the organisation by the war.

There was a shortage of adequately trained men throughout the war. The extent of the shortage can not be determined in the absence of inspection and muster returns before 1750; the mere issue of orders to recruit can not be used as an indication of the extent of the problem, as these were issued throughout the war, apparently as a matter of routine. The shortage, however, was reflected in the hiring of foreign mercenaries and in an attempt to improve the method of obtaining British recruits. The ability to draw on Ireland as a source of trained soldiers lessened the demands placed on the inadequate recruiting system in England.

This chapter, therefore, seeks to investigate the nature of the procedure relating to these areas and the changes which occurred, in order to see if the conclusions formed from a study of the Ordnance are capable of more general application. Certain similarities are observed, namely that there was a lack of precision in procedures, that bold attempts were made to obtain greater definition, but that basic problems remained untouched at the end of the period.
The army's principal problem was the same as that of the Ordnance; as under-manned central administration was required by circumstances which it could not control to assume responsibility without authority. Whereas the Ordnance was inferior to other government departments, the War Office suffered from the independence of army commanders. That weakness was reinforced by the very reliance on the honesty and reliability of local commanders in the matter of returns which was itself the product of weakness; there was no independent efficient channel of communication. At the end of the war, the mustering procedure was still disregarded and there was no reason to suppose that affairs would change. Little had been done with regard to recruiting, except to demonstrate more effectively than formerly that little could be done without conscription. The Irish establishment remained useful, and arguably essential, in the context of the prevailing military structure, but nevertheless a poor substitute for a proper standing army which was unacceptable in England.

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1. It was this weakness which was investigated by the Special Committee of the House of Commons on the Land Forces and Marines which was reported in 1746. References below to this document are shortened to "Report". The page number in these references is followed by the letters 'a' or 'b' denoting the left and right hand columns of the printed page respectively.

2. For example, see Mr. Pulteney's speech in the Debate in the House of Commons on the number of Land Forces, 28 Nov. 1739, Cobbett Parliamentary History, cc.247-9. See also, Yonge's speech in the Debate on continuing British Troops in Flanders, 6 Dec. 1742, ibid., 1741-3, c.912.
It was evident from the outset of the war that accurate information relating to the condition and number of troops and officers would be required by the War Office. It soon became apparent that the normal mustering procedure could not be relied upon to fulfil this requirement. Increasingly colonels and agents of regiments were called upon to send reports to the Secretary at War.

In March of the first year of the war, 1740, Arnold was preparing a book on the succession of colonels to the several regiments of Horse,Dragoons, and Foot. He asked the colonels of regiments to distinguish the colour of the facings and trimmings, since the King wanted a list of these items and other distinctions of all his troops and regiments.

When the six Marine regiments were raised to serve on board ships subject to the same articles of war as applied to the land forces, reference was made to the twenty-fourth article of war. All commissions were to be entered in the books of the Secretary at War and of the Commissary General of the Land Forces. They were not otherwise to be allowed at the musters:

To the end every officer upon having recourse to the Muster Rolls may know how they take rank of each other by the seniority and date of their Commission.

A warrant of October 1739 constituted and appointed a Commissary General for the Marines, then raising and thereafter to be raised.

These two episodes had two factors in common; the enquiry was not directly caused by the fighting of the war; they also constituted a pattern which was used increasingly during the war, asking what was the situation at the place and of the people closest to the point at which the information became available. The subjects were varied. For example, as early as June 1739, the Secretary at War asked several colonels to

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4. The King was interested in such military matters.
send a computation of the savings arising by "grass money" for their regiments from May 1739 to September 1739. On the other hand such returns were by no means the only source of information at the disposal of the Secretary at war. In the first year of hostilities Yonge wrote to make arrangements for the review of ten regiments by Generals Honeywood, Churchill, and Barrell. These reviews took place and had some effect since, in January, orders were issued that the Ordnance officers were to be helped to examine the arms of regiments reported to be out of order on the late review.

It was in the frequency and accuracy of returns made by colonels, over and above the musters, that the value of many requests for information lay. In 1740 the Secretary at War ordered monthly returns to be made to him on the state and condition of the troops in England, and the places where each regiment was disposed; any alterations were to be notified to him. Similarly, nine months later he wrote to several regiments ordering them to submit an account of men already raised, with fortnightly returns signifying the number raised, and the number in quarters.

The same strictness applied to the Marines. In January 1740 Yonge signified to the marine colonels that within the week they were to submit a weekly return of the numbers in the regiment and the number of recruits raised. He also ordered that he was to receive a return showing the number of men on shore and on board ship; they were to distinguish the

6. W.O. 4/35, p.79, 11 June 1739. For the introduction and administration of this particular stoppage from pay see Scouller op. cit. pp. 248-252. For a description of other terms involved in the administration of army pay see ibid. p.126 et. seq., notably pp.132-137.
7. Ibid., p.162, 14 Sept. 1739. Yonge to the three reviewing officers.
number of each rank on board ship. Similar returns were to be sent each month.\textsuperscript{11} In July 1740, Arnold, a member of his staff, had written indicating the need to submit a return on detachments of marines distinguishing the number of effectives and also the number of desertions.\textsuperscript{12}

The order was altered with respect to several detachments, enjoining the making of returns fortnightly instead of monthly;\textsuperscript{13} this was extended, a month later, to apply to four regiments.\textsuperscript{14} It was not intended that this should remain an empty injunction in view of the measures taken to enforce the monthly submission of accounts:

As you have not complied with the repeated directions sent you to make monthly returns to me of the strength of the said detachment, I take this occasion to acquaint you that if you neglect doing it for the future I shall be obliged to lay the matter before His Majesty when you must expect to be suspended.\textsuperscript{15}

In this order also there was a provision which would explain the increased frequency of the returns; the colonels were to distinguish those who were in a condition to embark on board the fleet from those who were not.\textsuperscript{16}

Monthly returns on honour were also instituted for the Governors, Lieutenant Governors, and officers commanding in chief the several garrisons to report the effective number of Invalids in Britain, in accordance with an order in 1741.\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} W.O. 4/36, p.442, 4 June 1741. Yonge to officers commanding the additional companies of marines.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p.41, 5 July 1740.
\item \textsuperscript{13} W.O. 4/37, p.35, 26 Sept. 1741. Baker to commanding officers.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p.61, 24 Oct. 1741. Baker to Major General Cornwallis, Colonels Pawlett and Jeffreys and Lieutenant Colonel Cunningham.
\item \textsuperscript{15} W.O. 4/36, p.386, 23 April 1741. Yonge to commanding officers of several detachments.
\item \textsuperscript{16} W.O. 4/37, p.61, 24 Oct. 1741. A particular instance of the need to have information on troops ready to be embarked was Yonge's order to Col. Cavendish and the O.C. in C. the remainder of Col. Fleming's regiment; W.O. 4/36, p.347, 20 Mar. 1741; see also Ibid., p.386, 23 April 1741.
\item \textsuperscript{17} W.O. 4/37, p.46, 8 Oct. 1741. Yonge to commanding officers.
\end{itemize}
The War Office was determined to keep an effective hold on the situation. There was a call for a return on honour of the strength of regiments in South Britain.\textsuperscript{18} In the second year of the war the regiments of foot were required to make another return giving the number of effective men, according to the establishment "without any deduction on account of recruiting or any pretence whatsoever".\textsuperscript{19} A review by a General Officer was another independent check even though it was not all-important since recruiting officers were not always recalled for the review.\textsuperscript{20}

These first years of the war indicated a determination to keep an effective check on numbers; they also revealed that central administration had to rely on the honour of the colonels for important information. This was inevitable when the normal mustering procedure either did not operate or was not effective. Both conditions were encountered when forces operated overseas. It was pointed out that:

\begin{quote}
Though it is the intent and meaning of the Act of Parliament for punishing Mutiny and Desertion, False Musters etc. that all our forces should be mustered by the Commissary General or his Deputy there is no Commissary in Jamaica to muster and make out rolls ... and such as have been transmitted here from there are very irregular and improper and liable to many objections.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

As early as 1739 the problem had occurred in Britain. Several regiments were told to submit "an honorary return of the state of the strength" of the regiments together with such accounts as you may have received from officers then recruiting of the respective numbers enlisted by them which shall not have joined the regiment.\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{18} W.O. 4/36, p.428, 28 May 1741. Yonge to several agents.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} W.O. 4/37, p.197, 19 Mar. 1742. Yonge to several colonels.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} W.O. 4/36, p.458, 18 June 1741. Yonge to several colonels.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} W.O. 26/19, p.234, 16 Feb. 1740, Warrant.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} W.O. 4/35, p.121, 10 Aug. 1739. Yonge to extensive list of colonels.
\end{itemize}
Time was to show that these were no short term expedients but rather an indication of the scope of the problem.

The limitations of the mustering procedure were to be measured by the practice of mustering as complete up to the nominal establishment regiments which, in reality, did not comprise that number of effective men. That practice undermined the entire mustering procedure. Nevertheless it was a useful expedient, especially for regiments serving in the colonies. In the example quoted above, notwithstanding the deficiencies, debentures were made out complete for the period in question. Similarly debentures were made out complete for the Independent Company at Bermuda since there was no commissary there, and therefore no regular musters. One had already been granted for Providence.

When there was a need for an immediate revenue this practice was extended. For instance, the Commissary General was to muster 'complete' from June to December 1739, a total of three musters, in order to help with the raising of troops. Just two months later, in February 1740, two complete musters were allowed to the Marine regiments. This was to be expected in cases where the troops involved had returned recently from

23. A debenture, in general, was a voucher given in connection with the supply of goods or services to the Royal Household or a government office, entitling the recipient to payment. In this context the debentures related to the pay of the regiment and were issued by the Paymaster General of the Forces, see W.O. 4/44, p.18, 25 Aug. 1747, Fox to J. Scrope secretary to the Lords of the Treasury. Debentures were said to be made out "complete" when they authorised payment on the basis that the regiment had been mustered as complete.


25. W.O. 4/35, p.98, 29 June 1739. Yonge to colonels of regiments in Gibraltar and Minorca. The practice was not confined to the period 1739-48. In 1739 when considering a memorial of the Paymaster of the Forces for funds, the Lords of the Treasury deferred judgement in order to consider an account of the retrospect time allowed on the muster rolls in 1715 or thereabouts for defraying expenses of augmentation of the like kind which were then made. Cal. Treas. Books and Papers 1739-41, p.57, Oct. 4 1739.

overseas and stood in need of immediate augmentation to the numbers allowed on the establishment.27 This was the justification for the Commissary General's being ordered to muster, complete for six months, regiments returned from the West Indies.28 Debentures were made out complete for companies in Jamaica and the Bermudas in February 1743 where there had been no regular musters since Christmas 1741.29 An extension of the same principle was allowing the four independent companies at New York to present nine fictitious names on the muster rolls towards the raising of a fund to make good the loss of arms and accoutrements.30 At home speed of events could render the mustering system ineffective. It was for this reason that three battalions of foot guards which had marched suddenly to embark for Flanders had not been mustered; it was decided that debentures be made out to muster them complete.31

Muster rolls could not possibly provide the kind of accurate information which was requested in time of war. On the one hand, only serving officers who knew their men could give a judgement on the number of effective men, when that term was open to so much misinterpretation and when in war it could be meaningless. On the other hand, much useful information was by its nature extraordinary. For instance, in February 1742 the agents for the marine regiments were each asked to send a list of the officers of the marine regiments, with the dates of their first commissions in the army in order that the information might be laid before the House of Commons.32

The problem of control became more acute in time of continental war

27. W.O. 4/38, 7 April 1743. Yonge to Pelham
31. W.O. 26/20, p.18, Warrant, 8 April 1743.
and hostilities overseas. 33 For the forces in America the War Office had to rely on reports from its commanders on the spot. 34 In 1743 Oglethorpe reported on the state of His Majesty's forces on the frontiers of North America. Regiments of foot raised there and serving in the West Indies had to be mustered complete because of the scattered disposition of the troops. 35 The lack of a suitable commissary was the justification in many cases. 36 For instance the independent companies of invalids sent with Lord Anson could not have their accounts cleared, since the companies were dispersed. Working figures were provided from the information sent from the expedition whilst it was in progress. The accounts were settled as they stood. 37

Mustering the marines often proved difficult. The problem seems to have occurred when officers on board ships failed to send lists of men under their command or when, because of sickness or expediency, small detachments were taken to serve on board ships where there were no marine officers to control them; in addition marines could be put ashore only to disappear with no record of their movement being kept. There would have been no difficulty if the naval captains had kept an accurate list of the number and rank of the marines on board their ship. The Secretary at War was instrumental in the issue of orders to the Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean that splitting detachments between ships be stopped and accurate lists maintained which the Commissary General of Marines could

33. For instance in the subsequent war Middleton says in relation to Braddock's Muster Master, "He revealed a remarkable knowledge concerning the distances and condition of travel in that part of the world." Lack of zeal was a common accusation; allegations of false musters were rare. Op. cit., p. 217.
34. See, for example, S.P. 41/15, f. 237, 1 Sept. 1743.
inspect. This was done in March 1744. The situation had not improved significantly by 1746. The Committee on the Land Forces and Marines was told that although more care was taken than formerly there were only five or six ships where the ships books adequately gave details of the marines on board. One example serves to confirm this evidence given to the Committee. Four regiments of marines dispersed throughout the world could not have their regular musters. Extra expenses, desertions and deaths had been heavy; the expenses were chiefly caused by the repair of arms on board ship or of men in sick quarters. The figure gained from the Muster Books of the ships of war and musters taken at quarters was short of that required on the establishment. If the non-effectives were respited, the expenses would fall on the personal pay of the officers. The solution in this case was that the musters were regarded as having been completed satisfactorily for the non commissioned officers and privates. This was in accordance with the practice during the war of Queen Anne when some three men per company were allowed "as a fund for arms".

Regiments were mustered as complete when it was expedient. The lack of muster rolls at Ostend was advanced as a reason for the payment in full of the regiment.

Four regiments of foot were completed to strength on their return from the West Indies and employed immediately on the recruiting service. They were too dispersed to muster. The solution was that the regiment was paid as though complete. There existed a similar problem in relation to

39. A respite was a withholding of pay. For example, see Scouller op. cit., p.142.
Georgia; this also applied to the independent companies of invalids in the Islands of the Bermudas. At Annapolis Royal the dispersed nature of the positions of Lt. General Phillips regiment was taken as good reason for their being mustered complete.

There was a particular need to exercise control over the forces operating in Europe. The agents employed by the regiments to be raised to serve in Flanders were instructed to send a return of the recruits raised, the number of horses wanted and the tonnage for the new clothing of the regiments. All recruits were to be sent by their corps to Flanders by way of Ostend. Other commanding officers were instructed to submit details of recruits raised and the number of men ready for embarkation. In May 1743 Yonge was writing to the colonels:

In the returns which you are to make to me every month take care that the same be exact as to the real effectives in your regiment. I am likewise to desire you will specify in the said return what recruits you raise from time to time as well as what alterations happen by discharges, deaths or desertions.

Where the returns were not forthcoming the agents were required to send a state of the effective men in the regiment. There was a similar re-iteration of the requirement to submit on the first day of each month an honorary return of the strength of the several independent companies of invalids in the garrisons of Great Britain. This injunction was obviously not carried out satisfactorily, since in 1744 Lloyd, of the War

43. Ibid., p.218, 15 Feb. 1745. For Jamaica and Rattan, and the Isle of Providence, see ibid., pp.219-220, 31 Jan. 1745.
44. Ibid., p.349, 28 Feb. 1746. The preamble reads, "whereas it has been further humbly represented unto us, that men have been from time to time sent over thither at a great expence to recruit the said company".
45. Ibid., p.350, 6 Mar. 1746.
47. Ibid., p.128, 11 May 1743; for another set of regiments, see ibid., p.132, 12 May 1743.
48. Ibid., p.160, 28 May 1743. Yonge to several governors.
Office, wrote to the governors of Guernsey, Jersey, Scilly, Landguard Fort and Portsmouth asking for a return on honour of the number of effectives doing duty at their respective garrisons. 49

Eighteen months later the War Office again felt that it was necessary to have a check on the state of all the regiments, independent of any musters. 50 The information was designed to give the number of effectives in each regiment, the different numbers of different ranks and the services upon which they were employed. 51 The same order, coupled with one to complete the regiment without loss of time, was sent to various regiments. 52 Five months later, orders were sent to recruit regiments both in North and South Britain. The returns of progress made were to be sent weekly to the Earl of Stair in South Britain and to Sir. J. Cope for the forces in the North; they were to send the returns to the King. The additional companies to the several regiments remaining in Flanders were to be completed, and the return made to the Earl of Stair. 53 The War Office at this time was also concerned to learn what progress had been made in recruiting the two additional companies to the regiments of foot. Returns upon honour were required also for the number of recruits raised for the part of the regiments then in Flanders. More significantly, they showed that copies of the monthly returns laid before the Secretary at War were also to be sent to Marshal Wade. The coverage was as extensive as possible; not only the colonels of the regiments concerned, but also the commanding officers of each regiment residing in Britain were to be acquainted with the orders. 54

50. Ibid., p.63, 20 Aug. 1744.
52. Ibid., p.187, 18 Dec. 1744.
In the face of the rebellion, the War Office relied upon extraordinary returns. Yonge tried to check the augmentation of the four battalions of foot guards at home, desiring the names and companies to which newly enlisted men were appointed. The office asked the same agents for an account of the officers with an exact list of any vacancies. Two months later the office returned to the problem of the augmentation of the foot guards; agents were asked for a return of the real effective numbers in each company. This time the return seems to have been merely for financial purposes:

To enable me [Yonge] to settle the commencement of the establishment and the necessary allowances for the augmentation of the said regiment. 56

The new regiments caused some confusion. Lloyd wrote to many agents for them to return an exact list of the names and quality of the officers in the regiments to which they belonged. One of the objects was to distinguish such of the officers who were in the army at the raising of the regiments, the names of the regiments from which they were "broken" and their rank before their promotion. Four days later, the office showed itself concerned with the problem of officering the marines. Several agents were ordered to provide a list of the vacant companies in their regiment and the succession of officers recommended by the colonels on account of these vacancies. The real effective strength of the regiments, however, in terms of private soldiers was of more immediate concern. The officers commanding regiments of the regular army were instructed to send, until further order, weekly returns to the office of the real effective strength of their regiment. 59

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57. Ibid., p.92, 19 Nov. 1745. Yonge to various agents.
58. Ibid., p.104, 23 Nov. 1745; and ibid., p.1, 9 Oct. 1745.
the agents of the 15 newly raised regiments were ordered to send the strength of those regiments in to the office. They were also to provide details of the ordnance of the regiments.60

It is significant that this information was requested, at least in part, in preparation for a motion in the House of Commons. In pursuance of an address from the House, the colonels of regiments serving outside Britain other than those in the Mediterranean were to send a return of the strength of their regiments in order to enable the Secretary at War to compile a list.61 It is possible that the office had in mind the need to satisfy the House of Commons when asking the agents of the newly raised regiments whether the regiments had been regularly mustered from the commencement of the establishment; the agents were also asked what musters had been taken and likewise the period to which the troops were last mustered. On the other hand it is possible, although not likely, that the office was concerned to ensure that the mustering procedure, although by-passed in many ways, was not made redundant.

Deficiencies in the mustering procedure were still evident after the special committee of the House of Commons had reported. The War Office issued orders for compliance with an alteration made in the Act of Parliament for punishing Mutiny and Desertion in 1747:

Certificates are to be signed by an officer or officers upon the back of the muster roll ... of each troop or company certifying the reasons of any man or men being absent from the musters, whether by sickness or being employed in recruiting, on party or furlough or by a signed leave from the colonel or field officer or officer commanding the regiment, troop or company, and likewise the cause of any horse or horses not being present at the musters.62

60. Ibid., p.217, 29 Jan. 1746. See also, ibid., p.383, 16 May 1746. Lloyd to various agents.
61. Ibid., p.226, 6 Jan. 1746, Lloyd to agents. Similar arrangements were made in respect of certain regiments of horse, ibid., p.227. 7 Feb. 1746.
62. W.O. 4/43, p.188, 6 April 1747. Fox to commanding officers.
The Secretary at War pointed out "that the certificates so signed upon the back of the muster rolls are to be upon Honour made to His Majesty". There was no higher requirement.

This, however, was no more than the re-iteration of theory; it continued to be evident that practice could be quite different. On the one hand the office ordered the issue to the regiments on foreign service of the clearings due to them to June 24th, 1745, provided that muster rolls for them had been transmitted to the pay office to that date. At the same time, it made generous provision should the roll be missing. The executor to the late Paymaster General was to:

Issue such a sum as you shall think will be equal to the clearings of the regiment for the above-mentioned time upon account to enable the officers to furnish themselves with necessaries they may stand in need of upon this occasion.

An estimate was to suffice if no muster rolls had been presented.

The mustering procedure continued to be supplemented by more frequent returns; monthly returns were required of the colonels of several regiments of foot in 1746. There was to be an exact account of the state of regiments upon honour, listing the vacancies and stating whether these had arisen by promotion, death, or otherwise. It was to encompass eight old regiments and fifteen new ones. Agents to Marine regiments were to retain in their hands:

The vacant pay of all such officers late or now belonging to the regiments of Marines ... who may have died or may have been promoted or removed since these regiments were last cleared and ... do not issue the same to the respective colonels or to any other person till the clearings of these

63. The term "clearings" was applied to regimental pay to be issued when the accounts had been cleared or passed for payment.
64. W.O. 4/42, p.43, 12 June 1746. Fox to John Ingram, executor to the late Paymaster General, Thomas Winnington.
65. Ibid., p.1, 28 May 1746.
corps are settled and paid and you are to transmit to me an account of the said vacant pay of each officer now remaining in your hands and what has been paid to you by the colonels of each respective regiment since the last clearings of the said regiment were issued specifying the names of such officers and the times such vacancies remained either by deaths, removals or promotion.66

There was issued the form of a return of the strength of the regiment of Dragoons "which His Majesty expects you shall exactly follow in all future returns to be made ... and every return is to be made on the last day of each month".67 At the same time the same version of the return form and the date of submission was promulgated for the foot guards.68 Similarly, it was to the officers commanding the additional companies69 of several regiments in Britain that the Secretary at War turned to transmit to him on the last day of every month a return upon honour of the strength of those companies.70

It had been the practice to include fictitious men on the muster rolls as authorised by royal warrant.71 This custom was not discontinued following the report of the House of Commons Special Committee, although there is evidence of a reduction in the number of such men. The Commissary General was caused some difficulties by the limited nature of the reduction. The Secretary at War arranged for the provision of a warrant to direct the Paymaster General to allow the full pay of such fictitious men as remained on the establishment.72

66. Ibid., p.62, 20 June 1746. Fox to various agents.
68. Ibid., p.64, 15 Jan. 1747. Fox to various colonels.
71. The act for Mutiny and Desertion only recognised one reason for fictitious men appearing on the muster roll which did not require a warrant, namely that for providing for widows of officers. Report p.112.
72. W.O. 4/44, p.18, 25 Aug. 1747. Fox to J. Scrope, Secretary to the Lords of the Treasury. See also, W.O. 24/259, p.38. The Commissary General's difficulties were caused by amendments to the Mutiny Act; see below p.350.
Musterings regiments as complete continued, despite the disadvantages of that practice. For example, Fox ordered the Commissary General to give directions:

Notwithstanding former orders to the contrary ... to the deputy commissaries ... within whose circuits five regiments of foot lately returned from Flanders lie to muster them from the 25th. November, 1747, to 25th. December inclusive.

This would merely guarantee the fact of a muster, but it could give no certainty of the accuracy of the result. 73

There was additional evidence of the former weaknesses remaining unchanged. Fox was obliged to repeat orders enjoining Governors, Lieutenant Governors or officers commanding the garrisons of Great Britain to make monthly returns upon honour of the strength of the independent companies of those garrisons. The information required was merely what a muster could and should have provided: how may officers were present, the reasons for those absent being absent, how many privates and N.C.O.'s were effective, and how many were incapable of garrison duty by reason of long service, age or infirmities. There was a stringent check on returns submitted from various garrisons. There had been no return of the independent companies in the garrison for periods:

Notwithstanding the repeated orders you have received signifying the King's pleasure that the same should be done monthly. 74

The procedure for mustering the marines had been found inadequate at an early stage. Strains were still evident after 1746. 75 Fox wrote that:

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74. W.O. 4/42, p.162, 29 July 1746. Fox to commanding officers at various forts.
75. Dr. Middleton described the rôle of the agent, op. cit., p.215, "the War Office found that although it was responsible for the regiments and their welfare, it could never effectually control these men".
Great difficulties (have) arisen in the methods hitherto taken for clearing the four youngest regiments of marines as the real numbers of effectives in those corps cannot be properly ascertained.

Significantly, both the steps taken and the tools used to repair the damage were not associated with the standard mustering procedure. One of the regimental agents was to attend the War Office with the regimental book kept incorporating details since the first raising of the regiment. In that book was recorded the number of effectives the regiment had at various times together with the account of the recruits raised from the 24th. June 1741 to 24th. June 1742.\textsuperscript{76}

In the matter of the vacant pay the example of the marines shows how the mustering procedure had broken down. It was evident that the agent was called upon to provide the information which should have been available already to the Commissary General, the Paymaster General and the War Office itself had the correct systems been followed. Agents for four of the marine regiments were to send an account of the vacant pay of the commissioned officers of those regiments between April 25th. 1742 and December 24th. 1742. They were to distinguish the names and qualities of the officers who died or were promoted or removed within that period, the time their respective commissions were vacant, with the names of their successors whereby the amount of the vacant pay arose.\textsuperscript{77}

Some of the concern to rectify the mistakes of the marines might have sprung from the decision to put:

> All Marines now raised or hereafter to be raised under the immediate and entire command of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{76.} W.O. 4/43, p.132, 28 Feb. 1747.
\textsuperscript{77.} W.O. 4/44, p.258, 25 Jan. 1748. The eleventh section of the Mutiny Act called for the attendance at any muster by the civil magistrate with adequate notice being given to him.
\textsuperscript{78.} W.O. 4/43, p.142, 3 Mar. 1747. Fox to colonels.
The Admiralty took seriously their responsibilities and had drawn
up a report on the state of the Marines:

... the arms of the Ten Regiments of Marines are in
general extremely bad - many extremely unfit for use,
and the whole number very short of the establishment
by reason of captures, shipwrecks and other accidental
losses at sea, the marine officers having no allowance
to buy new arms, or keep the old in repair.

Ships with marines on board were therefore at a disadvantage compared with
the fire power of the French and Spanish ships. 79

Although grave weaknesses remained apparent, nevertheless the War
Office did not give up the mustering procedure entirely. In connection
with forces in the Plantations, there was a re-affirmation of the
mustering system, its emphasis on written records, the need to itemize
the dates, the public service to which sums saved by non-effective men
had been put and the whereabouts of that record. 80 This arose out of an
address by the House of Commons dated April 8th, 1745 that warrants to
muster complete in respect of islands and colonies in America should not
be granted without the above procedure's being followed. The order was
made that all forces in America on or after December 24th, 1745 were to
transmit to the agent:

Or person employed to transact the business of the
said regiment, troop or company or other forces
from time to time at the same time and in like manner
as muster rolls are made and taken, true lists.

The commanding officer and three other officers of the regiment were to
endorse the lists, in the same way as muster rolls were written, and
attested before a Justice of the Peace or Chief Magistrate. The lists
were also to show the nature, extent, and application of the savings from
the non-effective men. The procedure was then that the agent present the

79. Ibid., p.386, 13 June 1747. Fox to Lieutenant General Cornwall.
80. W.O. 26/20, p.292, 17 Sept. 1745. Warrant for regulation of
forces in the Plantations.
lists and certificates to be vetted by the Comptrollers of the Army accounts who, when satisfied, were to take a certificate to the Secretary at War of the proofs given to them. They were to authorize him to prepare warrants for His Majesty's signature for mustering when proper muster rolls were wanting.

Again, the Commissary General for the Marines was ordered to instruct his deputy to repeat former orders about musters to the officers of the regiment. The emphasis was on giving to the civilian magistrates adequate notice, ample help and:

All possible satisfaction with regard to men that may be certified for on the back of the muster rolls in any future (muster).

This arose out of the deposition made by Edward Wood, High Constable of Chatham, about a muster there which he found unsatisfactory with regard to the numbers on party, furlough or sick. As late in the war as 1747, and despite the action of the Committee of the House of Commons, a muster could be disregarded locally and at the centre.\(^81\) Whilst condemning the lack of discipline the War Office was doing nothing more than re-iterate orders issued formerly; and, moreover, this was done at the instance of a person outside its organisation and not part of the formal army.

The agent was the man to whom the War Office usually turned when it tried to make up for deficiencies in its normal procedure.\(^82\) The agent derived his power to act from the colonel of the regiment.\(^83\) He was the source of much useful information on many topics, particularly after the 1745 rebellion. Agents were called on to return a certified list, with

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82. For a critical review of the rôle of the agent at the beginning of the century, see Scouller, op. cit., pp.135-137.
their former ranks, of all officers of the new regiments which were taken from other regiments or from half pay. On financial matters, Fox wrote for information about the number of non-effective men as at midsummer 1749 and the balance of the non-effective money up to December 24th, 1748 in connection with a warrant for making debentures complete for their regiments then in the Pay Office. The agent was used as the natural channel of information regarding prisoners of war. The regiments for which they were responsible were to transmit to them an account of arrears due to or debts due by the prisoners in France that were exchanged or ransomed. This order was retrospective, being concerned with the period before they joined their regiments or were permitted on the pension of the Hospital. The agents were also to form a general account for each regiment to be laid before the Secretary at War in which the prisoners were to be charged with the disbursements made by Colonel Denscombe for necessaries provided for them, over and above their weekly pay. The agent was expected to provide accurate information about recruiting. For example, in November 1747 agents for various regiments were ordered to transmit a weekly return giving the names of recruiting officers, where they were working, and the number of men raised. Identities and destinations of invalids were also required. It would be difficult to see how the war administration could have functioned as well as it did without the active co-operation of the agent, despite his failings; at the least, he reduced the work which would otherwise have been generated by the War Office's communicating with individual commanders singly, as opposed to communicating through agents each responsible for

84. W.O. 4/42, p.327, 14 Nov. 1746. Lloyd to various agents.
several regiments. It is probable that this factor also tended towards greater uniformity in the application of an order.

After the war there was a stricter attitude towards returns. In one instance this was accompanied by the non-payment of off-reckonings in cases of dispute or uncertainty. Mishandling was revealed in Durore's regiment; he had requested a sum of money to carry on the recruiting service in view of the depletion of the recruiting fund under Dalzell, the previous commander, and the insolvency of the agent Captain Wilson. The money was to be taken from that which would accrue to the regiment for 1747. Proceedings were in train against Dalzell to recover almost £3,000 for the use of the regiment.

To take another example, in April 1750, Fox wrote to the officer commanding troops and governors of Jamaica, Antigua, S. Carolina, the Bahamas, Bermuda and New York. The fourth article of war of the fifth section had not been obeyed. It required that exact returns of the state of the regiments garrisons and independent companies in America should be remitted to the Secretary at War by the respective governors or commanders there by all convenient opportunities. Future obedience of the article was enjoined.

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88. For a description of the "off reckonings" system, see Scouller, op. cit., p.132 et seq.
There was no formal change in the regulations regarding the musters by 1746. The Commissary General and his deputies still derived their duties from the Acts of Parliament on mutiny and desertion, the twenty-second article of war and the instructions given to commissaries. These duties remained unchanged. In fact, the underlying principle was reinforced at an early stage. In 1740 when the rules and instructions for the better government of the marine forces were produced it was stated that:

Muster rolls together with the receipts or acquittances of the respective colonels or their assigns shall in all respects be deemed and allowed of, as sufficient vouchers for the charges in the said accounts, and for making out warrants and debentures for clearings.

The report of the Special Committee of the House of Commons on the Land Forces and Marines revealed the extent to which practice differed considerably from theory. This was not the original object of the enquiry, which was to investigate increases in army expenditure. In the course of ascertaining the number of effective men provided by that expenditure it was found that the Committee had relatively little information on regimental strength, since reports had not been made to them as directed. The committee naturally turned to the muster rolls to provide this information, but found that they were:

In general, as will appear hereafter, ... of no use at all in this respect.

In theory the instructions for mustering were so comprehensive as to be

92. This was the date of the Report to the House of Commons; see above p.91 and below p.348.
93. Ibid., p.112b. See here et. seq., for details of their numbers and duties.
95. Report p.109. The Committee found that "in the muster rolls referred to them, the Forces were almost constantly certified to be complete to the number on the establishment, notwithstanding it had been proved that they never were so". The Committee sought an explanation. Ibid., p.114.
almost foolproof.\textsuperscript{96} To make the scope of the muster as complete as possible no certificate was to excuse the absence of a soldier except for recruiting service or sickness.\textsuperscript{97} The mustering of horses was as important as that of mustering human bodies, and bore the same penalties for abuse of the instructions.\textsuperscript{98} At the least, penalties were stiff; courts martial could order the Paymaster to pay a forfeit to the informer out of the arrears of pay due to the offending officers.\textsuperscript{99} At worst, those breaking the rules could be barred from civil and military office anywhere in His Majesty's service. Every incentive was given to making the link between crime and punishment as sure as possible. In general terms, close co-operation between civil and military personnel was called for.\textsuperscript{100} Informants were encouraged by the payment in horse or cash for information relating to abuses on horse musters.\textsuperscript{101}

Administrative arrangements were designed to diminish the chances of fraud; the surgeon or his mate had to see in person all those they certified as sick within ten miles of London and Westminster. Special precautions were taken concerning mustering within the City of Westminster and the Borough of Southwark. A strict time limit was laid down for the return of the muster rolls to the three bodies who received them, the

\textsuperscript{96} For a brief explanation of duties of the various interested officers, see Chamberlayne for 1723, op. cit., pp.130-1.
\textsuperscript{97} Report p.112b. The Articles of War modified this slightly; soldiers were allowed absent from musters on party or furlough or by a signed leave from the Colonel or Field Officer.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., p.113a.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., p.113b. If there were no arrears these goods were to be seized and sold. If the offending officer had no goods then he was to be sent to jail for 6 months.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., p.113a. Penalties for muster masters not co-operating to the full were heavy being a fine of £50. False musters called for £100 forfeit. See also Scouller op. cit., pp.135, 143.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., p.113a and 113b. For a similar position in the previous war see Scouller op. cit., p.143.
Paymaster General, the local paymaster, and the Comptroller of the Accounts of the Army.

In practice, the Committee found that although the scope and principle of the muster and the penalties were adequate, the measures to implement the former and lend weight to the latter were not sufficient. Checks in the system were not adequately regarded in general, and, in particular, co-operation between civil and military was too lax. One witness suggested, and no-one contradicted his claim, that Justices of the Peace very rarely attended musters, and that when they did not attend there was no application to Justices other than those summoned to attend to sign the muster rolls after the musters had been made. 102 He was supported by the evidence of another witness who said that far from being the check, which they were supposed to constitute, the civil magistrates often refused to attend the musters and never refused to sign the rolls when they did. In one case a certain mayor did sign, but that was long after the event and he did not pause to examine what he was signing. 103 One witness reported one Commissary's not having a certificate for the sick and absent; he relied solely on the word of the officers. 104 Newton, in a better position to speak with authority, went one stage further and said that the practice of marking sick and absent soldiers as such had been disused for some three or four years. This could well have been an exaggeration designed to cover his own lack of initiative, but it was made possible by the lack of the relevant certificates from the surgeons or the officers. He thought that the blame was attributable to the Commissary General's office:

102. Ibid., pp.114a and 114b.
103. Ibid., p.117a.
104. Ibid., p.116b.
Though it is as easy to have the certificates now as it was formerly ... yet that matter has not been so much attended to of late at the Commissary General's office.

The implication of his evidence was that surgeons had not been reprimanded for failing to present certificates.\(^{105}\)

The timetable relating to the return of muster rolls rendered the system inefficient. Several witnesses pointed out that musters were only taken about half as frequently as they should have been. One said that two musters were generally made out at, or near, the same time. He gave as the reason the impossibility of doing otherwise when commissaries missed the troops as they passed through the commissaries' circuit.\(^{106}\)

This might also explain why Cholwick made out musters singly, rather than in pairs, after December 1745; if the thirteen or fourteen regiments which he mustered could be expected to move, and not stay in the same place, then there would be a need for them to be mustered more frequently in general and particularly before and after a change of quarters. Newton mustered troops in his circuit three times in the period November 1744 to November 1745, whereas "till within these few years" he generally did so six times a year. Similarly, in 1744 Culliford mustered St. George's dragoons for four months, all retrospectively, whereas he said his normal practice had been to do so once every two months.\(^{107}\) There was evidence that this was the normal period.\(^{108}\) In this case the ostensible reason for departing from normal practice was that the regiment of dragoons came from Ireland and had been stationed in his area for six months before he was

105. Ibid., p.117a.
106. Ibid., p.117a. There were six circuits in England, p.115a. The witness said that the troops changed quarters frequently in the previous year.
informed of their presence. Either of the explanations advanced was 
evidence of the war's affecting the administrative practice of the army.\(^{109}\)
The way to such a slackening of standards had been indicated in the former 
practice of making two musters at a time when it was understood that the 
troops were fixed in those particular quarters.\(^{110}\) In order not to give 
a false impression of slackness it should be remembered that musters 
did not become very infrequent. The above examples indicate that the 
departures in practice were in respect of details, not principles. In 
addition, it was stressed by several witnesses, albeit to save themselves, 
that the greatest number of musters ever taken together was three.\(^{111}\)

To some extent the institution of the muster roll was by-passed 
and rendered ineffective by administrative action only remotely connected 
with the commissary. One example was the practice of granting warrants 
to muster complete for a certain period,\(^{112}\) when a regiment was newly 
raised or when it was augmented or when the men were drafted from one 
regiment to another corps.\(^{113}\) Although the practice had been used earlier 
in the war\(^{114}\) at the time of the report of the Committee of the House of 
Commons there were warrants to muster complete regiments and additional 
companies in the West Indies.\(^{115}\) The existence of the practice could 
have made more acceptable abuses in mustering procedure.\(^{116}\) Before 1746,

\(^{109}\) Report p.117b. He maintained that he did not muster in advance 
and that he thereafter mustered regularly at two month intervals.

\(^{110}\) Report, p.118b; by implication this was before Christmas 1745.

\(^{111}\) Ibid., p.117a, p.118a.

\(^{112}\) See Ibid., p.191, appendix XXV to the Report for an abstract of a 
warrant for mustering complete.

\(^{113}\) See Ibid., p.115a and also Report, p.118b. The rules for 
musterling a new-raised regiment were strict; Williams felt 
obliged to go in person, instead of sending Bromley, who occasion­
ally acted for him, to muster Lord Harcourt's regiment which had 
been raised in 1745 (W.O. 4/47, p.49).

\(^{114}\) See above p.96.

\(^{115}\) Ibid., p.115b.

\(^{116}\) For a representative sample, see Ibid., p.116b.
it is uncertain how widespread the practice was. A major of Blakeney's regiment, and the officers of foot in general said that they had an order from the Board of General officers that regiments of foot were to be mustered complete at 65 privates per company, besides sergeants, corporals and drummers. The commissary concerned, Culliford, denied having heard of such an order, nor did he believe that there was an order to muster dragoons complete at 57 privates per company. Nevertheless, he still acted on the officers information; he did not respite any men of St. George's regiment of Dragoons.¹¹⁷ He had never mustered a troop of horse and dragoons at more than two persons less than the number on the establishment, and a company of foot at more than five less.¹¹⁸ The practice is also plausible on the grounds of financial distress, "the officers thinking themselves as complete as they can afford when their companies consist of that number."¹¹⁹

In practice the actual form of the muster roll was open to abuse. The article of war instructed that no officer was allowed to stand on the muster rolls when his commission was not entered; witnesses said that this was not so in reality.¹²⁰ Being on duty was regarded, in practice, as being a permissible excuse for being absent from the muster; and officers were frequently absent recruiting, a procedure allowed when the rolls were returned complete.¹²¹ He added that working men and servants of officers were put on parade, which additions the commissaries

¹¹⁷. Ibid., p.117b; the establishment was 70 privates per company.
¹¹⁸. Ibid., p.118a.
¹¹⁹. Ibid., p.117b.
¹²⁰. Ibid., p.115b. Povey was clerk to the Commissary General and therefore in a position to know the facts.
¹²¹. Ibid., p.116a.
failed to notice.\textsuperscript{122} It was not usual to respite privates in England on the grounds of their absence, since if they were away from the regiment the officers always certified the fact and the cause. Even if the muster was correct, therefore, there was no check that the contents were accurate; even if they were, there was no check usually that the rolls were signed at all and that where the rolls were signed there was no check that the signature at the foot was that of the commissary.\textsuperscript{123}

The areas in which the commissaries had to operate also made proper mustering very difficult. The commissaries abroad were under the control of the Commissary General, but the clerk to the Commissary General did not remember the Commissary General's sending any orders to them. The commissary for Minorca lived in England where he also held the post of Deputy Commissary General. It is true that his counterpart for Gibraltar did reside there for many years.\textsuperscript{124} The one for Jersey and Guernsey was in the difficult position of only being able to be in one place at one time. Typical of the situation was the fact that the clerk to the Commissary General could not remember whether or not\textsuperscript{125} the commissary for the Scilly Isles resided there or not. Unless the number of officers increased, there was no alternative to there being absenteees in certain areas, and it would have been a worse abuse of the system to have had no officer of the crown appointed; such thinking would explain

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\textsuperscript{122} If the commissary did not notice them, the Commissary General's office could not do so. Povey said that he had never heard of the practice of officers' men or servants mustered in the ranks, "nor (if there are any) are they distinguishable from other men", \textit{Ibid.}, 115b.
\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Ibid.}, p.115a. If it was evident that the rolls were not signed, the Commissary General's office would return them for signature.
\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Ibid.}, p.115a.
\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Ibid.}, p.114b and p.115a.
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the appointment shortly before 1746 of commissaries at Cape Breton and Carso. That the Committee was fully aware of the deficiencies of the system was revealed in their learning, in response to their question, that most of the commissaries in Britain resided in or near London. 126

Commissaries in Flanders were hindered by their situation. One witness said that he began there by using the English practice of calling men over by their names, dealing in this way with the Danish and Hessian troops in British pay in 1741. 127 The following year he was not allowed to follow the same procedure, partly because "it would subject ... to inconveniences" the general officers, and partly because his method had not been practised in the last war. Rather, he was to pass the rolls as they were sent to him from one muster to another, signed by two officers of each troop or company, which had been the practice in the late war. The witness's own impression was that it was "reckoned sufficient if the troops in foreign service be complete once a year", the Commander in Chief in Flanders giving the justification for the warrants. 128 On one occasion Wade is alleged to have told the witness that he need not trouble himself since the troops were complete.

If thus restricted in the use of his theoretical power by the soldiers in the field, the deputy commissary was fulfilling no useful function. 129 This limitation of the scope of the deputy commissary was of importance in indicating the extent of the inefficiency of the admin-

126. For other evidence on the same question, see Report p. 118b, 119a, in relation to the West Indies expedition, Leeward Islands, Scotland and Placentia.
127. Ibid., p. 115b, 116a.
128. At different times this was Lord Stair, General Wade and the Duke of Cumberland. The Duke of Cumberland and General Wade directed the witness to pass the muster rolls, p. 115b.
129. According to the witness, the intention of appointing a commissary was to make the musters as complete as possible.
strative machine in the war. It is significant that the deputy commissary attempted to use the English system. If the explanation were that there was no other specified machinery for mustering during the course of the campaign, then the administration had very short memories; for the field officers soon remembered the precedent of the respective officers delivering the rolls and the commissary's passing them. If on the other hand this was an attempt to depart from precedent, on the grounds of improving efficiency, it is evidence of the weakness of the administration that when faced with opposition, it did not stand up to the military opposition. If the intention was to establish one practice quietly in the stead of another then that approach was as naive as it was vain.

The whole operation of sending a commissary to Flanders seems to have been mismanaged. The removal to Flanders of Watson who was qualified, led to the appointment of a deputy commissary in his stead in Britain. The episode was also unusual in that when Watson returned, his deputy continued in post. Since Watson was a Member of Parliament before he went, it is possible that these duties engaged him on his return; in either case it would seem to indicate the deleterious effect of politics upon administration.

Apart from the normal difficulties experienced by commissaries they were themselves responsible for many of the faults in the system through negligence, both simple and criminal. In the spirit of officers and gentlemen trusting gentlemen it was easy for a commissary to take the word of the officers about the musters rather than make his own investiga-

130. Commissaries were not allowed to appoint deputies to act for them, ibid., pp.115a, 117b.
131. Ibid., 115a.
One witness cited the example of a former commissary general's taking the word of officers from the foot guards for such privates as were on furlough or absent, whilst requiring that those of the horse guards be certified on the reverse of the rolls. Another said that a commissary, which implies that he was generalising, relied on the word of the officers when mustering complete; the same witness cited a case where this was done for the sick as well as for normal absentees. Cholwick admitted that for all musters except that preceding the 1746 enquiry he did not insist upon certificates on the reverse of the rolls, being told that it was not the practice. He hinted that it was not altogether usual to see the men which a commissary mustered. He said that most commonly the certificate of an officer was accepted for the sick although at times he had seen them himself. It was with more justification, although still contrary to instruction, that even after his return from Italy he signed rolls brought by Bromley, his deputy whilst in Italy, allowing him also to sign rolls left with the officers.

The difference between trust through laziness and corruption through criminal negligence must have been slight. It seems likely that the Committee suspected some corruption — to judge from the line of enquiry; one witness was at considerable pains to stress the financial moderation of the commissaries; the pay was small, the money paid on muster being to defray travelling charges and even this was withheld when the troops could not afford it; they had only one dinner from the officers as a

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132. For an extreme example of this, see the position in Flanders. Ref. 118a. This was consistent with the evidence presented to the Committee in relation to the mustering of the Marines, ibid., p.156b.
133. Ibid., p.116b. Culliford took the word of the Dragoons officers on the order for mustering complete, ibid., p.117b.
134. Ibid., p.118b.
gratuity and any gratuity was on the basis of custom and not of right. Certainly the witness was correct in saying that the incentive for corruption was present. The salary was small.\textsuperscript{135} The commissary could sell his place, prices ranging from £2,000 to £6,000 which sum he would naturally wish to make up; even the modest sale price of £1,250 paid in 1722 would take several years to recoup.\textsuperscript{136}

The opportunity for corruption was also present. The Commissary General gave orders to all deputy commissaries general; he could suspend them but he did not have the power to remove them.\textsuperscript{137} There was likely to be scope for differences of opinion as to the standards used in assessing men's fitness.\textsuperscript{138} Most important, there had grown up a tradition "as long ago as the late war which had continued ever since" that the commissary receive a gratuity.\textsuperscript{139} There was no lawful claim to gratuities. Opinion varied on the actual extent of the practice. It was generally held that the deputy commissary took money for mustering the marching regiments,\textsuperscript{140} although according to one witness the horse and foot guards did not pay.\textsuperscript{141} Another witness gave figures which indicated that far from this being so they paid twice as much at home as abroad.\textsuperscript{139} The testimony of several witnesses indicated that it was

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., pp.117a, 116a and 112b.
\textsuperscript{136} The consent of the Commissary General was not necessary for the purchasing of a place, \textit{ibid.}, p.116a.
\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Ibid.}, p.115a.
\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Ibid.}, p.116a. One M.P. said that his remarks had not been well received.
\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Ibid.}, p.116a.
\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Ibid.}, p.114b.
\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Ibid.}, p.116a. One witness felt aggrieved at not being suitably rewarded, having said that on one occasion he did not have a warrant to muster complete. See also \textit{ibid.}, p.118b. Cholwick said that he did not respite men on the muster rolls of a regiment, and yet was denied the usual compliment, which implied that he expected some considera-

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normal for the commissary not to receive a gratuity if the body which he
was mustering was complete.\textsuperscript{142} This could be either because he had less
work to do or, as was more likely, because it could be seen as a reward
for mustering complete when such a muster was not justified. Apart
from the list of charges which the Committee was investigating, there was
little evidence given about the number of musters which were conducted
normally;\textsuperscript{143} one witness did record three changes introduced during the
war.\textsuperscript{144} When two or three musters were made at a time the same compliment
was given to the commissary as if the musters had been taken separately.\textsuperscript{145}
It had been a former practice for some regiments not to give a gratuity
for musters, and for others not to give above half a guinea; since 1741
none of the regiments in the area of the competence of the witness had
given him as little as that sum.

The war also revealed deficiencies in the organisation at the centre.
Failure was most evident in lack of control overseas.\textsuperscript{146} The many muster
rolls coming from America after the expedition to the West Indies under
Lord Cathcart were never investigated. This was possibly because the
musters were not made in the usual manner, the rolls did not come in any
regular order, and no warrants came into the office for clearing these
regiments, or else the rolls were cleared without a warrant. In the
Leeward Islands the muster rolls were drawn up and signed by officers,
and yet the witness could remember no muster of men ever taking place
during his time in service there. There were cases where the lack of
muster rolls was attributable to the lack of a commissary, such as at

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{142} Ibid., pp.117a, 117b, 116a.
\item \textsuperscript{143} Ibid., p.116b.
\item \textsuperscript{144} Ibid., p.117a.
\item \textsuperscript{145} See also ibid., p.118b; for details of financial rewards
enjoyed by a deputy.
\item \textsuperscript{146} Ibid., p.118b and p.119a.
\end{itemize}
Placentia; the commissary at Annapolis Royal also served as Judge Advocate. Nearer home, in Scotland, although the rolls were sent to Edinburgh, and the same compliment allowed as in England, Johnson said that he never saw a muster master in his time there.

The centre was out of touch with the deputy commissaries. For instance, Newton did not acquaint his superior with the repulses which he had received from officers with regard to enquiries into the clothing and accoutrements of the men. Culliford had not received orders in 1745 for mustering the dragoons of St. George from the time that they came onto the British establishment nor for the numerical definition of mustering complete.\textsuperscript{147} The worst case of the lack of control and communication concerned a deputy commissary called Williams. Having paid some 2,000 guineas three years earlier to his predecessor, Manning, he had only mustered one set of troops in person, relying instead on the commissary of a neighbouring circuit and a Mr. Bromley who had a warrant to officiate from Cholwick, a deputy commissary who was in Italy. His reason for so employing Bromley was that he himself was unacquainted with the business and that his predecessor had told him that he could proceed entirely by deputy. He had had no orders to the contrary on this head, nor on the legality of a commissary's changing his district without leave from the Commissary General.\textsuperscript{148} The confusion in which Williams found himself seems genuine; it was consistent with his always countersigning Bromley's rolls.\textsuperscript{149} The central office seems to have turned

\textsuperscript{147.} Ibid., p.117b.  
\textsuperscript{148.} Ibid., p.118a and b. Until the orders for mustering Lord Harcourt's regiment he had only lists of quarters and general instructions.  
\textsuperscript{149.} He did not countersign the roll left with the Commanding Officer. This was signed by Bromley. The commanding officers should have realised that Bromley did not have the authority to act. He did not have an authority to act for the witness, \textit{ibid.}, 118a.
a blind eye to the proceedings, retaining the fiction of Williams' being responsible. Lists of quarters were still passed to Williams who passed them on; and Williams feared action from above if Bromley also signed the rolls. His therefore was the sole signature.\textsuperscript{150} The scale of the department's failure, however, was not drastic; the total of the troops in Williams' circuit since he took office would not be more than a regiment; nevertheless it would be slightly disturbing that in Bromley's returns there were no respites made nor any certificate of the cause of absence.

The conclusion reached by the Committee was reasonable on the evidence that it had heard.\textsuperscript{151} The method of mustering did not appear effective enough to answer the intention of the legislature; in particular it made possible frauds on the public and impositions on the officers. The Committee found that the war had revealed deficiencies in procedure; the original terms were adequate, but the whole system foundered on their application.\textsuperscript{152}

If the internal checks in the mustering system failed, so did checks attached externally to the system for that purpose. The Comptrollers of the Accounts of the Army were instituted in 1703 with a secretary whose position disappeared in 1708 and re-appeared in 1714. Their original instructions\textsuperscript{153} were that they, or their agents, should inspect all muster

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\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., p.118a.
\textsuperscript{151} This conclusion related specifically to the Land Forces. It had equal application to the Marines, being consistent with the evidence presented to the Committee. The Committee's questions to witnesses on matters relating to marines seem to have been based on the premise that the conclusion was of general application.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., p.119a.
\textsuperscript{153} For the text of which this is a paraphrase, see ibid., p.119b. For the instructions, see ibid., p.198, appendix XXX to the Report.
\end{flushright}
rolls, and investigate the computation of pay, in order to prevent frauds and abuses concerning musters. They were also to certify on each muster any respites and their causes and report to the general, or Commander in Chief, of the British forces, and the High Treasurer or the Commissioners of the Treasury.

Practice differed substantially from the theory of their constituting an effective check. The Comptrollers did not inspect the computation for the pay nor certify the amount of and causes of the respites. No application was made to the Comptrollers office when respites were to be taken off, and no notice was given of their being taken off. None of the accounts mentioned in the instructions was sent to the office of the Comptrollers and the office itself was in 1746 entirely under the direction of the Treasury, acting only in such matters as were referred to it from there. The only part of the duties enjoined by the Instructions, and actually performed, was the inspection of the muster rolls and taking the respites; and in these areas in Nelson's time there was never any attempt to settle methods for preventing frauds in musters; and he could not remember the book of respites ever being called in or used.

By 1746 the work of the Comptrollers was more general, and they did not delve too deeply into any one subject. They dealt with victualling problems, constantly attended the Board of Chelsea Hospital, and examined the accounts of Barrack Masters in Scotland. In March 1742 persons supplying the several companies of invalids in Flanders were to be paid by the Paymaster General subject to their producing a certificate from

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154. He had been in the office for 26 years. He was Secretary to the Controllers.
the Comptrollers of the Accounts of the Army. This was to record that the number and type of clothing had actually been delivered and that its quality and condition conformed to the approved pattern. They could be used as an agency of enquiry into all matters on reference from the Treasury or the Crown.

It seems that the Comptrollers were not performing most of the functions for which they had been instituted, and that the residue which was being performed was not pursued with the original spirit of efficiency. There is no evidence to suppose that the war of 1739-48 was an important factor in this process, the change in the nature of the office probably occurring before 1739. Nelson in 1746 said that "the nature of the office has been many years quite changed". His reference to there being no efficient action on the respite book and muster frauds since 1720 implies that the date of the change came quite early. The fact that he, as Secretary to the Comptrollers, could find no instructions in the office subsequent to those supposed, from internal evidence, to belong to the 19th. May 1708, suggests a still earlier date. Such a suggestion is also consistent with the history of the rôle of Secretary. In 1708 he was omitted and replaced by a Secretary to the Board of General Officers. The process was reversed in 1714, but the links still continued. Nelson's predecessor who resigned in 1720 having been paid for performing the same duty.

The Committee found that the office of Comptroller was severely limited in its new rôle in the field of victualling, an area where, especially during the time of war, an efficient body could have benefited the service. On the entering of contracts for the provisions for forces abroad, it was

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157. Ibid., p.119a.
to concern itself neither with the quality of the provisions, which was certified by the Commanding Officer overseas, nor with the price, which was settled by the Treasury. Similarly, on insurance, its task was to compute the figure on the price fixed by the Treasury. Investigating demands of arrears due to contractors for supplying the army in Flanders with forage could have been of considerable importance through exhaustive investigation of accounts and witnesses; the office was hampered in that examinations were not on oath and the scope of the enquiry was limited to whether forage was delivered, and whether the accounts were made up by the proper vouchers. The same applied to computing victualling lists which were sent from the garrisons to the Treasury and thence to the Comptroller's office. The practice during the war, and there is no evidence that this did not apply also before the war, was that although the Comptrollers could alter the report they did not examine the accounts and other materials used in compiling that report; nor did they give any directions as to how it should be drawn up.158

Regarding the usefulness of the Comptroller's office, an indication both of its latent power and of the need to exercise that power, is that it was ordered at the request of the House of Commons that certificates on oath of the number of effective men and officers of regiments in America be produced to the Comptroller's office before any regiment be mustered complete. It was an indication of the weakness of the office and of the administration in general that not only did the suggestion have to originate from outside, but also that nothing had been done to implement the order by the time of the sitting of the Committee of the

158. Ibid., p.119b, 120a.
Both the deficiencies of the system and continuing attempts to make it effective were evident at the end of the war; certain regiments could not be cleared to Christmas 1746 with the other forces since muster rolls were lacking for their regiments. Fox wrote to the Commissary and Deputy Commissary General for them to hold an enquiry to find out if the neglect lay with the deputies or if the returns had been lost, and if so, by whose fault. Fox wrote to the Commissary General on three occasions in February 1749 specifying that regiments mentioned were to be mustered before their reduction. Some worth was still felt to reside in the system. Fox wrote to authorise passing on the muster roll as a special case Lieutenant Dunbar. This followed an order that no commission officer to any of the twenty-five independent companies of invalids should be absent from duty without his leave.

To place the deficiencies of the mustering system in perspective, it is a reflection of the relatively stable nature of army administration in the eighteenth century that similar conclusions could be drawn from a study of Queen Anne's war. Many of the factors were present far earlier. In the time of Elizabeth I muster masters were seldom good at their jobs.

159. Ibid., p.120a.
161. Ibid., pp.10 and 12, 7 Feb. 1749, and p.21, 8 Feb. 1749.
162. Ibid., p.96, 11 Mar. 1749, Fox to Commissary General.
and were often dishonest. There was thus little fear of detection to deter the wrongdoer. The inducement was powerful:

the price which captains could afford to pay for false certificates which would enable them to claim more pay, more clothing, and more food than was justified by the number of men actually in their company was too tempting.

Cruickshank argued that the neglect was deliberate

The regulations governing the muster office could not have been better drafted. Had no more than one of the links in the chain of responsibilities .... been dishonest it would have been glaringly revealed .... But when the whole of the chain was corrupt .... it was quite impossible to run the machine efficiently.

A more charitable explanation for similar abuses advanced by Childs for the army in the time of Charles II was that false musters were as much perquisites as the fees taken by government officials. He also makes the telling point that the problem was far from being a British monopoly, being a symptom, if not a function, of every standing army with an inadequate system.

There was no reason to suppose that there should have been any improvement in the system between 1715 and 1739. The inadequacies of a system which was adequate in theory but inadequate in practice would only be demonstrated under the strain of a war. In the absence of more detailed relevant records it is difficult to assess the extent of the inadequacy, although it is an important question to resolve in view of later attempts

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165. Ibid., p.136.
166. Childs, op. cit. He explains but does not minimise the problem.
167. Little action was taken against abuse of the fee system until the 1780's.
168. This is because inspection returns are only extant from 1750. Evidence relating to muster rolls, both as to their content and the procedure, before that date is fragmentary. It does not appear to contradict the impression given to the Special Committee of the House of Commons. See, for example, W.O. 7/123, p.35.
to enforce stricter discipline in the army.\textsuperscript{169} The weakness of the system could not have been more exposed, and more publicly than before the House of Commons Special Committee. Opportunity was afforded to anyone wishing to find fault in the army.

On the other hand the problems were not unknown to members of the House of Commons, many of whom had held army posts. The situation which none could deny was that weaknesses existed, and unscrupulous agents and colonels took advantage of these because weaknesses were tolerated.\textsuperscript{170} Slackness was condoned for several reasons apart from personal dishonesty and administrative inefficiency. Due regard for procedure could only be pressed to the disadvantage of those whom slackness benefited. Anyone wishing to press reforms would have to risk the vociferous opposition which arose after the war. A more major reason was that mustering was a means to an end, success in war, and provided that this was achieved by other means procedural deficiencies were of less relevance.

On a financial level, though the effects of financial malpractice were large in relation to individuals they were small in relation to other expenditure on the war. In terms of efficiency, it was evident that other expedients could be employed. Further, by the use of the practice of mustering complete it was revealed that the army authorities were prepared to sacrifice a punctilious regard for form in favour of simplicity.\textsuperscript{171} The largest factor tending towards the continuation of the inadequate mustering system was the consequence of having sub-standard forces, as this would be

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{169} See below p.345 \textit{et seq.}
  \item \textsuperscript{170} Clothing the regiment was profitable for the colonel. Major R. E. Scouller, \textit{J.A.H.R.} Vol. 47, 1969, p.211.
  \item \textsuperscript{171} For a specific example relating to the circumstances of the transfer of two regiments to the English establishment, see W.O. 26/20, p.360, 22 Mar. 1746.
\end{itemize}
reflected by defeat in battle. Commanding officers could be relied upon to complain about the condition and number of men if these would affect their performance and reputation. By comparison other issues were subordinate. If the War Office personnel were to worry about relevant procedures in need of reform, recruitment was a more fruitful subject for attention.

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The army in the field depended upon the provision of adequate supplies of suitable men, notably infantry. The measures which it took to assess the demand through the mustering procedure and special returns have been described. There is insufficient evidence on which to base a judgement on how seriously the War Office sought to minimise its problems over recruitment by action against desertion. There is evidence that it was realised to be an important factor. On the other hand the subject was adequately covered in the articles of war and procedure could do little to prevent what the penalties in the articles of war could not discourage. Army officers did not need to be reminded that desertion was to be prevented. What could be done was to minimise its bad effects.

One way was to offer rewards for the picking up of deserters. Another was to condone it when that was expedient. Thus at the start of the war pressure for recruits led the War Office to the expedient of authorising colonels of regiments not to deliver up any deserters claimed by other
regiments provided that they continued in their current regiment; in
which case they were to have the King's pardon.\textsuperscript{172} Such an order was
particularly understandable when it referred to regiments where battalions
were held in readiness to go abroad on service.\textsuperscript{173}

It was also desirable to prevent desertion by ensuring that potential
deserters were not recruited. More opportunity for desertion existed in
the army than the navy and the navy knew how readily unwilling recruits
absconded. It was perhaps this reason which lay behind an injunction at
the outset of the war to discharge Irishmen then currently in regiments
and to take particular care that others were not recruited in future. This
order arose from the King's hearing that great numbers of Irish had come to
North Britain to enlist in His Majesty's forces there and affected both
foot and dragoons.\textsuperscript{174} This measure, first affecting the British regiments,
was extended to Gibraltar and Minorca.\textsuperscript{175} At a time when it was difficult
to find recruits such an order seemed strange. One reason might be that
the War Office needed to rely on being able to recruit in Ireland. Again
it is possible merely that the War Office wanted to be able to rely on
recruits and could not feel happy with those who were Irish. This was
consistent with the treatment of members of Highland regiments later in the
war.\textsuperscript{176}

The main factor in the provision of adequate supplies of men was the
recruitment of new men. During the war the demand for additions to the

\textsuperscript{172} W.O. 4/37, p.235, 16 April 1742, Yonge to various commanding
officers.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., p.245, 23 April 1742.
\textsuperscript{174} W.O. 4/35, p.139, 29 Aug. 1739, and p.144, 31 Aug. 1739. See
\textsuperscript{175} W.O. 4/35, p.198, 9 Oct. 1739, Arnold to various colonels.
\textsuperscript{176} For a description of a mutiny and its sequel in 1743 in a
regiment of Highlanders scheduled to be sent to Flanders,
armed forces fluctuated. There was a great demand at the start of the war and again in 1745 to meet the demands of the rebellion. Although the problem was not as great for the army as the navy, attempts were made to improve the efficiency of the system. Two initiatives were attempted. Additional companies stationed in Britain were set up with the intention of supplying recruits to the main regiment sent to Flanders. A wider scheme of reform was attempted in the same year. The intention was to place recruitment on a more organised basis. This was not the first attempt in the eighteenth century to find a better method of recruiting. In Queen Anne's war the shortage of recruits led to an abortive reorganisation. The system which was to be replaced then, and which was in operation in the first years of the war under review, involved each regiment's sending some of its own officers to recruit on behalf of the regiment where it was thought that recruits were available; there was no set pattern.

It is not possible to assess the inadequacy of the system which the reformed system was to replace. Inspection returns do not exist before 1749. Orders to regiments to recruit are not indicative of the need to recruit since they appear to have been issued indiscriminately. There is no means of knowing whether it was a large or a small recruitment which was required. Nevertheless there were several significant features about of the new system.

It was authorised by an Act for the speedy recruiting of His Majesty's Land Forces. It was important that the civil powers be involved directly. Had the new system been implemented strictly it would have prevented com-

plaints such as occurred after the war when, in response to representations, the Secretary at War, Fox, said that he would endeavour to prevent for the future the recruitment of apprentices.\(^{179}\) The Secretary at War sent printed copies of the Act to Clerks of the Peace for distributing to Justices of the Peace in each division of the county "that no time might be lost in putting the said act in execution".\(^{180}\) In the interests of speed also he sent orders to the Postmasters of the areas requiring them to take care to deliver them.\(^{181}\)

The regiments of marines, and the regiments of foot serving at home in Great Britain, in Minorca, Gibraltar and the Plantations were each allotted different counties for recruiting. The corps serving in Jamaica, Rattan, New York, the Bermudas, and the Bahamas were excepted, being recruited in North America. Colonels of the regiments were ordered to send:

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a \text{a sufficient number of commission and non-commission officers to repair without loss of time to the counties and places allocated to your regiment to receive such able bodied men as offered as voluntiers and pressed men as shall be delivered over to them by the Commissioners appointed by the Act.}
\]

The regiments were to be completed to the numbers borne on the establishment. The allocation of different counties to different regiments was done after consultation.\(^{182}\) There had been an order to all agents to make a return of the counties to which their regiments would desire to send representatives to receive recruits.\(^{183}\) This had been followed by a meeting of agents. The

\(^{180}\) For a list of the counties see W.O. 4/39, p.71, 27 Mar. 1744.
\(^{181}\) Ibid., p.72, 27 Mar. 1744.
\(^{182}\) Ibid., p.95, 11 April 1744, Yonge to various colonels.
\(^{183}\) Ibid., p.75, 26 Mar. 1744, Lloyd to several agents.
allocation had not, therefore, been haphazard.  

To facilitate the putting into practice of the Act, the Commissioners were equipped with copies of the literature relating to the army: the then current act for punishing mutiny and desertion, the then current act for the speedy and effectual recruiting of His Majesty's land forces and the "rules and articles then in force for the better government of His Majesty's Horse and Foot Guards and all other forces in Great Britain, Ireland and dominions beyond". Shortly afterwards the War Office gave to the original procedure the practical measures for its enforcement which it had at first lacked; the officers appointed for that service were to attend the meetings of the relevant commissioners from time to time as the meetings were appointed.

Although this was the standard method of proceeding, it was possible for the War Office to receive information from a set of commissioners and ask them to submit a list of suitable men; in this case the Secretary at War would order officers to go to receive the enlisted men. This method would seem to have been of most use when meetings were least frequent or productive, such as those outside London. Such a rationalisation could arise from a situation where it was "impossible that such a number of officers can be employed upon the recruiting service so as to attend the commissioners in all the several counties and places of their meetings".

The important feature was that the commissioners were to send lists of

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184. Ibid., p.91, 7 April 1744, Sherwin to various agents.
185. Ibid., p.151, 8 May 1744, Yonge to J. Scrope in relation to the royal printer. See also, W.O. 4/40, p.266, 28 Mar. 1745. Officers of the army received copies of the literature as well.
187. Ibid., p.134, 28 April 1744.
volunteers or impressed men of 5 feet 5 inches or under, if fit in all other respects, with an account of height and age, and the Secretary at War was to take action thereon.\textsuperscript{188}

The basis on which the counties seem to have been grouped was that London and its environs were reserved for regiments serving in Minorca, Gibraltar, and the Plantations, with the other counties largely arranged in units of three; one county might exceptionally be included in two groups. It seems to have been intended that one county only provide troops to one regiment. This was in direct contrast to the previous haphazard system.\textsuperscript{189}

One result of the Act, and an indication of the shortage of men at the beginning of the war against France which had been a major cause in the introduction of the Act, was an order given in March 1744.

\begin{quote}
Notwithstanding former orders to the contrary a sufficient number of commission and non-commission officers of regiments in Flanders ... who are now recruiting in England do remain here to take care of such recruits as shall be raised subject to the pressing act.\textsuperscript{190}
\end{quote}

Officers in North Britain recruiting were to stay there despite orders three days earlier to return to their posts and march on London.\textsuperscript{191}

Curiously the regiments do not seem to have made great efforts to take advantage of the opportunity to enlist new men. As early as five days

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\textsuperscript{188} For the widespread nature of the complaints, see W.O. 4/39, pp.143 and 148, 3 and 5 May 1744.
\textsuperscript{189} For a precise analysis of the regiments to which individual counties provided recruits, see W.O. 25/3196 and W.O. 25/3198. For the same information re-arranged to indicate which counties provided recruits for individual regiments, see W.O. 25/3197 and W.O. 25/3199. There is a short list under W.O. 4/39, p.95, 11 April 1744.
\textsuperscript{190} W.O. 4/39, p.54, 9 Mar. 1744, Yonge to several agents.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., p.41, 28 Feb. 1744.
\end{flushright}
later, and on many subsequent occasions, the Secretary at War received complaints from the commissioners that no officers of the regiments specified had attended the meetings for raising volunteers. The Secretary at War communicated the King's displeasure and enjoined obedience of attendance in the future.\textsuperscript{192}

Orders were given for men raised in Devon to be handed over to regiments for service abroad and Marine officers at Plymouth were ordered to attend the meetings in Devon and Cornwall. The same general points made in relation to this area were made to commissaries in all parts of the country. Orders had been given for marching regiments' officers to attend the recruiting meetings, "though I fear", said the Secretary at War:

> there are not a sufficient number to be present at all the sub-divisions in England, but as lists from time to time shall be sent to this office, pursuant to the advertisements in the Gazette and other papers, the neighbouring officers shall be directed to receive them. There are likewise several recruiting officers expected from Ireland, which will in some measure supply this deficit.

> As to the men under the standard of five feet five inches which you mention as proper for the Marines, I am to acquaint you in answer that almost all the Marines officers are on board the Fleet, and such of them as are on shore are already employed in the Cities of London and Westminster and the several counties allotted them to recruit: it will therefore be some time before it is possible to send them to the great number of places from which the like applications hath been received but as soon as possible they shall be sent.\textsuperscript{193}

The position of the War Office was that:

> all imaginable care has been taken to send officers to attend their meetings in the several counties and

\textsuperscript{192. Ibid., p.103, 14 April 1744, Lloyd to several colonels.  
193. Ibid., pp.122,3, 24 April 1744.}
places from which he (the Secretary at War) hopes will soon remove the complaints for the want of officers to receive the volunteers and impressed men.194

Another change occurring as an incidental result of the act and an indication of the scale of the recruiting problem was the order given for a recruitment meeting at the Guildhall some five days later;

provided [that] the said recruits shall be able bodied men, and in the officers judgement proper for His Majesty's service they may be entertained notwithstanding they may be somewhat under the (height) standard.195

That this was more of a general policy rather than a mere expedient in a particular case can be seen from similar orders sent to all colonels of marines.196 The Secretary at War indicated to what extent the standards could be relaxed; "something under five feet five inches is sufficient for marines if they are fit in other respects".197 This proviso contained in letters from Yonge to the Lord Mayor of London and the Chairman of the Commissioners for Middlesex and Westminster was not a mere form of words;

I am likewise to desire the Commissioners will take care to enlist none but able bodied men, no papist, nor Irishmen, nor any that are unfit for duty, from weakness of body or from any infirmities and distempers, and the officers will be ordered to refuse any such the service having lately greatly suffered by things of this kind.

When the men newly recruited were received they were handed over by their recruiting officers to their regiments in the normal way. There

194. Ibid., p.143, 3 May 1744, Lloyd to Clerk of the Commissioners for Newcastle. See also, ibid., p.134, 28 April 1744.
195. This was five feet five inches, W.O. 4/40, 24 Aug. 1744.
197. Ibid., p.130, 25 April 1744, Lloyd to Clerk of the Commissioners for Uxbridge.
seems to have been two refinements of this procedure shortly after the passing of the act. Yonge wrote direct to colonels or commanding officers of the marines in London to appoint an

officer to attend at Lord Stair's house each morning for receiving orders from Lord Stair relating to volunteers or impressed men which shall be turned over to recruit those regiments.

This followed a period when the practice was for the War Office to write to colonels directly without using any clearing system. The officer appointed was to pass on the information on the same day. Similar orders were sent to Dalzell and Fuller, responsible for the regiments of foot in the West Indies and the Mediterranean respectively. Also, directions were issued to the officers employed for receiving the impressed men from the Commissioners to accept not only men for the regiments which they represented

but also such others as were or might be allotted to other regiments of foot or marines in Great Britain, Ireland, Minorca, Gibraltar and the Plantations.

They were to subsist these men until handing them over to the recipient regiment. Money for this subsistence was to come in the first place from those agents of the regiments to which the officers belonged. Those agents were to be re-imbursed in turn from the agents of the regiments which finally received the men. If the agents had insufficient balances in hand they could apply to the Paymaster of His Majesty's Land Forces and Marines.

As regards the extent of the work of the Commissioners, as opposed to their scope and the intensity of the activity, they seem to have continued

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198. For example, see ibid., p.110, 20 April 1744. Lloyd to General Dalzell and Colonel Oglethorpe.
199. Ibid., p.131, 27 April 1744, Yonge to General Cornwall.
200. Ibid., p.168, 10 May 1744, Yonge to several agents.
to operate even under the stress of the 1745 rebellion. In 1745 Yonge referred to recruits' being delivered to the Foot guards by "the several counties and parishes". The Act enjoyed some successes; in 1744 the Commissioners in the City of London and those for Westminster and in Middlesex had been requested to bring their activities to a close since Phillips had all he needed for Newfoundland.\textsuperscript{201} There was a considerable amount of trouble taken to ascertain how well the Act was working. Information was recorded under the names of the men impressed, their last abode, the time and place of delivery, the names of the recruiting officers, where the men served and the sums for which the warrants were issued.\textsuperscript{202} Many men were discharged for one reason or another.\textsuperscript{203} Recruiting was intensive fairly soon after the passing of the Act.\textsuperscript{204} It is not possible to tell at what stage the scheme was abandoned and still less to ascertain at what time it had ceased to be effective.

After this innovation in the recruiting scheme, apart from the extraordinary raising of the county regiments to meet the danger and threat of the rebels in 1745,\textsuperscript{205} the only changes were minor ones. There is little else that in reality the War Office might have done. Of course there were more efficient means of raising men which later came into use and which might have been advocated. In practice, opinion was against any attempt towards a more permanent army organisation. Efficiency in recruitment would have been seen as sinister rather than as advantageous. At the same time, normal recruitment was not of prime importance. The relative ease

\textsuperscript{201} W.O. 4/40, p.118, 27 Sept. 1744.
\textsuperscript{202} T 64/17, pp.1-3, 19 April 1744.
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid., pp.4-7.
\textsuperscript{204} See T 64/18 for the period April to June 1744.
\textsuperscript{205} See below p.314.
with which additional troops were raised in 1745 indicates not only that inducement could be as relevant as coercion but also that for service of a limited time in England, as opposed to less salutary conditions abroad, there was no shortage of men. This was a reassuring situation in the event of setbacks.\textsuperscript{206}

The War Office sought to supplement its efforts by paying for others to raise troops abroad. Debate in Parliament centred around these efforts on the continent.\textsuperscript{207} Though these were of undoubted importance, of equal significance and of more immediate use was the reliance placed on a source of troops nearer home, in Ireland.

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\textsuperscript{206} The Secretary at War placed advertisements in the press for young men to take arms in defence of the kings sacred person, W.O. 26/20, p.270, 12 Sept. 1745.

\textsuperscript{207} See below p.343.
At several times of crisis in the period 1739-48 when the War Office was confronted with the problem of supplying unexpected and large numbers of men at short notice, the Irish Establishment was drawn upon, as on other occasions in the Eighteenth century, to provide the necessary trained troops.\textsuperscript{208}

The first instance in the period 1739-48 preceded the war with France.\textsuperscript{209} In 1739 Yonge wrote to five colonels ordering them to raise troops to replace men drafted, in October 1738, from the regiments into that of the Earl of Rothes. These were to replace his troops which had been sent both to Gibraltar and also to Georgia for incorporation into the regiment of Colonel Oglethorpe. There was to be generous levy money, and musters were to be complete for two months.

In June 1739 ten regiments were transferred to the British establishment.\textsuperscript{210} In May 1742 there followed a further seven, being four of foot, two of dragoons and one of horse.\textsuperscript{211} Similarly, in November 1744, three more regiments were withdrawn from the establishment rather hastily although still continuing to be paid on that establishment. It was implied that this transfer was temporary, and the arrangements made in

\textsuperscript{208} See C. T. Atkinson,"The army under the early Hanoverians," pp.139-40. See also, by the same author, "Jenkins Ear, Austrian Succession War and the'Forty-five", p.283. The Irish establishment was theoretically independent, but there were close connections in practice; see Middleton, op. cit., p.37, "Ireland was a recruiting ground for the whole of the British Isles". For a good background to the problem, and a discussion of an earlier analogous situation, see I. F. Burton, "The English Government and the Irish Military Establishment, 1691-1712".

\textsuperscript{209} W.O. 4/35, p.120, 10 Aug. 1739.

\textsuperscript{210} Ibid., p.91, 19 June 1739, Yonge to Pelham, Paymaster General. See also, W.O. 8/3, 22 June 1739.

\textsuperscript{211} W.O. 4/37, p.225, 10 April 1742, Yonge to commanding officers. See also, W.O. 8/3, p.77a, 19 May 1742.
response thereto, merely expedients. In the crisis of 1745 two battalions more were withdrawn to England. Again, in October 1747, some 660 men were described as having been recently drafted from the three regiments of foot commanded by Bruce, Irwin, and Otway.

Troops were also sent abroad from Ireland directly, without passing through the British establishment; in May 1743 the major part of St. Clair's First Battalion of the Royal Regiment of Foot and the Earl of Rothes' Foot were sent straight to Ostend.

Various measures were adopted to replace or at least mollify the effect of these withdrawals. Otherwise Ireland would have been rendered even more vulnerable at certain critical periods; also it would have been impossible to continue to use Ireland as a reserve, which would have been a more serious military disadvantage. One method was to draft additional regiments as replacements. In December 1746, Ligonier's horse and Hamilton's dragoons were transferred to the Irish establishment on their landing at Dublin. This apparently paradoxical situation was partly to be explained in terms of Ireland's being used as a repository of potential recruits for completing the regiments depleted to serve elsewhere. Similarly, after the war, in November 1749,

212. W.O. 8/3, p.91, 22 Nov. 1744, Pelham, Gibson, Middlesex and Fox to Duke of Devonshire. Reference was made to the regiments being cleared according to regular musters only on their return and the cessation of the practice of mustering complete.

213. In the crisis of 1745 two battalions more were withdrawn from Ireland to England. Add. Mss. 15869, f.84, Speech of Earl of Chesterfield, Lord Lieutenant General and General Governor of Ireland to both Houses of Parliament at Dublin, 8 Oct. 1745. See also, W.O. 26/20, p.291, 28 Sept. 1745.


Hopson's regiment of foot was placed on the Irish establishment, having lately arrived from Cape Breton. More important in this respect was the scheme suggested in May 1743, and implemented in the June of that year: one battalion of the regiment of foot returned from the West Indies and the regiment of foot commanded by Sir J. Bruce were sent to Ireland. An order was made that there be incorporated into these regiments the commission and non-commission officers and privates left behind when the battalion of the Royal regiment of foot commanded by the Earl of Rothes were sent to Ostend. It seems that the object, at least in this instance, was to leave behind a caucus of men on which to build later, whilst ensuring that sufficient numbers were sent abroad.

The most significant expansion of forces in Ireland to meet deficiencies, however, was by the simple expedient of augmenting the establishment. In June 1739, as later in 1755, such an increase was ordered. The augmentation was to be "raised and paid from the savings by the removal of the ten regiments to this our kingdom", which removal was probably the cause of the augmentation. This was quite a substantial addition amounting, over the 11 regiments then on the establishment, to nearly 4,000 men. The horse and dragoons received a similar augmentation in March 1739/40, although of smaller proportions, five men being added to each company. A year later there was ordered a similar increase in the same amount. Orders were issued alike to the horse, dragoons and foot

218. This was the standard expedient. S.P. 41/21, 2 Sept. 1755.
219. The question of the changes attendant on a transfer to the Irish Establishment was ever present. Yonge wrote to Col. Wentworth to confirm the appointment of the Quarter-Master. He "must not expect to be put upon half pay in Great Britain in case the regiment should be ordered back to Ireland". W.O. 4/35, p.103, 9 July 1739.
220. T.P. Board Papers ccc II 42.
whereby the Duke of Devonshire was authorized to pay out "such sums as you think fit to be issued for raising and paying the additional men". There was added the proviso that "the same do not exceed the sums ascertained to be paid for the like number of men by our letter dated 2nd. April last".

In May 1742 it was ordered that the six battalions of foot should be augmented by the addition of 35 men to each.221 Again the increase in dragoons followed shortly, in the September of that year, there being added 23 men to each troop.222 The crisis of 1745 caused another increase, four companies being added to four regiments223 on the Establishment in November.224 This addition made each regiment some 1400 strong and thereby occasioned their being divided into two battalions each of seven companies.225

Conversely it was to be expected that when there were no further demands on resources, the Irish Establishment would be one of the first areas to show signs of a reduction in the number of forces.226 The first indication came in February 1746 when four regiments of foot, one of

221. W.O. 8/3, p.77a, 19 May 1742.
222. Ibid., p.85a, 29 Sept. 1742.
223. Ibid., p.100, 7 Nov. 1745.
224. This followed a speech from the Earl of Chesterfield in October, "I have nothing to ask, but the usual and necessary supplies for the support of the Establishment, ... the supplemental increase of regular forces for your defence here shall be made in the least expensive manner by additional companies only; after which augmentation the number of troops will still be within the usual military establishment". Add. Mss. 15869, f.84. For similar arguments in relation to the British establishment, see Cobbett, Parliamentary History, 1739-41, cc.927-91.
226. There was a similar occurrence in 1713. C. T. Atkinson "The army under the Early Hanoverians", p.138.
dragoons and one of horse were ordered to be reduced.\textsuperscript{227} Between November 1748 and February 1749,\textsuperscript{228} four regiments lost an adjutant, two more\textsuperscript{229} lost half their senior officers and two others\textsuperscript{230} were completely disbanded. In the ranks there was a similar reduction. Each regiment of horse lost 108 privates with their horses; and each regiment of dragoons lost the additional men granted in 1742, together with an additional eight privates from each troop. The foot regiments, however, were not treated uniformly. Frampton's and Richbell's escaped more lightly than even Irwin's or Otway's. The reason why the reductions were so severe was:

\begin{quote}
\indent in order to make room for placing on the establishment of Ireland, from the 25th. day of December last inclusive, so many other corps as together with those which would be left on that establishment would compose an army of 11,964 men, agreeable to a plan which had been approved by us.
\end{quote}

This represented a return to the pre-war officer establishment as was recognised at the time; the reductions were undertaken:

\begin{quote}
\indent leaving nevertheless in each of our said regiments of horse, dragoons, and foot commission and non-commission officers in number and quality the same as are allowed on our establishment or list containing all the payments to be made to our Army Ordnance and other officers therein mentioned for our Kingdom of Ireland, commencing from the 28th. day of October 1728, leaving also 21 private effective men in each troop of horse and dragoons and 29 private effective men in each company of Foot.\textsuperscript{231}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{227} The regiments of Irwin and Otway lost four privates per company; those of Bruce and Folliot lost five. The amount for Ligonier's horse and Hamilton's dragoons is not stated. W.O. 8/3, p.110b, 7 Nov. 1745.

\textsuperscript{228} The regiments of Lord Molesworth, General Degrangues, Mordaunt, and Hamilton: \textit{ibid.}, p.118b.

\textsuperscript{229} The regiments of Generals Irwin and Otway.

\textsuperscript{230} The regiments of Sir J. Bruce and Colonel Folliot.

\textsuperscript{231} W.O. 8/3, p.119, 18 July 1749.
In part this scheme arose out of the existing situation. The regiment of dragoons which was transferred to the Irish establishment was reduced to carry the same number of officers, non-commission officers and men as each of the four regiments of dragoons already there. The twenty regiments of foot sent were similarly reduced to the proportions of the four regiments already there. The question of changes attendant upon a transfer to the Irish Establishment was ever present. Yonge wrote to confirm the appointment of the Quarter Master. [He]

must not expect to be put upon the half pay in Great Britain in case the regiment should ever be ordered back to Ireland.

The fact that the War Office returned to an easily understood pre-war establishment, that the pattern was a uniform one with few exceptions, and that the transfers were all to take place from the British establishment at the same date imply some measure of efficiency. Two features point to another conclusion. The original orders for the disbanding of one group and the transfer of another were given in the October and November of 1748. By the July of 1749 the regiment of dragoons and 12 of the 20 regiments of foot had still not arrived in Ireland being by contrary winds and other accidents prevented from landing.

Hence before July 1749

it became necessary for our service and the peace and safety of our said kingdom, to keep intact there a part of the forces which would otherwise have been disbanded before the said 24th. day of December last.

232. There were 21 battalions since St. Clair's regiment had two.
233. For details of the regiments, see W.O. 8/3, p.150, 18 July 1749. The one exception was that Hargraves regiment was to have 20 lieutenants instead of 11 lieutenants and 9 ensigns.
234. 25th. December 1748.
In addition, the other 8 regiments of foot were ordered to Ireland with all expedition; and "yet" in 1749 "they are now in the Mediterranean". This caused the adoption of the financial expedient whereby they were paid out of the Irish establishment, even though they were out of the kingdom.\textsuperscript{235} Also three months later, there was further evidence of inefficiency.\textsuperscript{236} When Hopson's regiment of foot arrived from Cape Breton to be put on the establishment no provision was made for them to be linked with the 21 battalions of foot directed to be paid on that establishment; hence Pelham, Campbell, and Grenville had to order Harrington to do so from the date of landing.

Recruiting the forces in Ireland before 1740 followed a slightly different procedure from that in England. In that year non effective men on muster rolls were disallowed. Thereafter the same mustering procedure was to be adopted as pertained in Great Britain.\textsuperscript{237} Levy money for raising additional companies was given to regiments.\textsuperscript{238} The system was different also in specifying that they were to be not only volunteers but also

\begin{quote}
Protestants in the several counties of the Province of Ulster .... with [the] proper certificates of the names and age of such men and when and where enlisted;\textsuperscript{239}
\end{quote}

How much importance was attached to this was seen in November 1739 when

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{235} W.O. 8/3, p.152, August 1749.
\item \textsuperscript{236} Ibid., p.174, 12 Oct. 1749.
\item \textsuperscript{237} Ibid., p.56b, 2 April 1740. Agents and colonels were each allowed the pay of a warrant man in lieu of their customary allowances. The balance of any pay left over was to be applied to paying for clothing lost by desertion.
\item \textsuperscript{238} Ibid., p.100, 7 Nov. 1745. Levy money was not to exceed 40/- per man. The regiments were those of Irwin, Otway, Bruce, and Folliot.
\item \textsuperscript{239} Ibid., p.97, 3 Oct. 1745, Liddell to Muster Master General of Ireland. See also, ibid., p.112b, 28 Oct. 1747 for a re-iteration of the same requirement.
\end{itemize}
orders were given to raise Protestants in the Province of Ulster for the four additional companies to be added to the four regiments of foot. It was to be pointed out to the regiments that enlisted men would be dismissed if they were enlisted without a certificate from a Justice of the Peace and a minister of the parish, or from a Justice of the Peace and a non-conformist minister of the neighbourhood where the men were enlisted; they were to take the oath voluntarily and "to be Protestants and of Protestant families".\textsuperscript{240} As in England, the civil authorities were to give all possible help in the recruiting service, so in Ireland similarly there was an example of the civil officers being instructed to provide convenient quarters and carriages for the recruiting officers until they arrived in Dublin.\textsuperscript{241}

The standard procedure for financing the recruiting had been for the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland to be authorized and commanded to instruct the receivers general and the Paymasters to issue and pay forthwith out of our revenues there to the said colonels or agents of our said regiments respectively such sums of money by way of advance on account ... as will be sufficient to pay the levy money for the men to be raised.\textsuperscript{242}

There were changes in the origins, rate, and conditions attaching to the payment of the levy money. In 1739 the money was provided by way of advance on account of savings effected by the removal of the ten regiments to England.\textsuperscript{243} In April 1740 there was some difficulty about paying for

\textsuperscript{240} \textit{Ibid.}, p.98, 15 Nov. 1745; see also, \textit{ibid.}, p.113, 28 Oct. 1747. Recruiting in or near Dublin was prohibited.
\textsuperscript{241} \textit{Ibid.}, p.113, 28 Oct. 1747.
\textsuperscript{242} \textit{Ibid.}, p.33, 22 June 1739.
\textsuperscript{243} \textit{Ibid.}, p.33b, 22 June 1739. The regiments of Onslow, Blakeney, Descury, Wentworth and Handasyd were allowed vacancies to assist in the purchase of arms. It was the accruals to this fund to June 24th. which were used, \textit{ibid.}, p.35b, 9 July 1739. June 24th. was the date on which the ten regiments were transferred from the Irish to the English establishment.
the additional men to the horse and dragoons. Whilst the Treasury provided the greater part of each money, there was also effected a saving by tinkering with the muster rolls. The additional men were to be placed on the establishment from March 25th. 1740, which was in order, with five to be mustered complete to June 30th. of that year and the other four similarly to December 31st. of that year.\footnote{Ibid., p.57b, 2 April 1740. The normal practice was to have the men paid only from the date of their enlistment. For example, see ibid., p.97, 3 Oct. 1745.}

The rate paid for recruits changed during the war. In 1739 it was put at £5/8/4d per man when recruits for the additional infantry companies and their augmentation were being sought.\footnote{Ibid., p.33, 22 June 1739.} By October 1747 levy money was advanced to the sum of £3/3/4d for each foot soldier.\footnote{Ibid., p.112b, 28 Oct. 1747.}

Once on the establishment, the pressing problem was the payment of the new troops. The standard practice was that if they came from outside Ireland they were to be paid

from the day of their landing respectively (the pay) to be issued by the ... Receivers General and Paymasters to the Colonels or Agents in the same manner as the present pay of the regiments is issued.\footnote{Ibid.}

This did not change during the war. An entry in 1742 records that of the regiments to be raised and sent to Ireland

every commission, non-commission and staff officer should be paid according to his rank from the date of his commission, warrant or appointment and every private man who shall be approved by the General Officer appointed to review him from the day of his landing in that our kingdom.\footnote{Ibid.}

The same principle applied to troops raised in Ireland. As stated in 1745,

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Ibid., p.57b, 2 April 1740. The normal practice was to have the men paid only from the date of their enlistment. For example, see ibid., p.97, 3 Oct. 1745.}
\footnote{Ibid., p.33, 22 June 1739.}
\footnote{Ibid., p.112b, 28 Oct. 1747.}
\footnote{Ibid., p.33, 22 June 1739.}
\footnote{Ibid., p.77a, 19 May 1742.}
\end{footnotes}
it was ordered that four additional companies should be placed on the establishment from June 24th., "but with the proviso nevertheless" that the commission officers should be paid from the dates of their commissions, the non-commission officers from the dates of their appointments, and the privates "only from the day of their enlisting properly certified to the Muster Master General". The same system applied to recruits raised to complete regiments to their required numbers which seemed to prevail was expressed in 1745:

as soon as they [the recruits] shall be reviewed and approved by the Reviewing General Officer they are to be carried as also their certificates ... before you [the Muster Master General] that they may be allowed upon the Muster Rolls and enter into pay from the days of their enlisting.

Mustering regiments as complete, when men were neither present nor even alive, was a favourite device on the Irish Establishment. It was used at critical times during the period under review. Before 1739 some regiments had vacancies allowed for buying new arms. This system was extended in August 1739. The number of men was substantial, five men per company in each of five regiments being so mustered complete from the time of drafts being sent to Minorca to the end of March 1739 to pay for new arms. There was a similar arrangement to replace the 100 men per regiment drafted from the regiments of St. George and Colonel Blakeney into that of the Earl of Rothes by allowing the same number on the muster for the six months prior to 1st. March 1739. As the regiment of foot

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249. Ibid., p.100, 7 Nov. 1745.
250. Ibid., p.97, 3 Oct. 1745.
251. Ibid., pp.35a and b, 10 Aug. 1739, and 9 July 1739; arrangements were to be made for paying the colonels this money. The colonels concerned were Onslow, Blakeney, Descury, Wentworth and Handasyd.
commanded by the Earl of Rothes likewise wanted new arms and accoutrements, that regiment was to be mustered complete until it received the additions of October 1st. and from then to March 3rd. following. 252 Mustering complete was used as a means of providing the financial support for recruiting. 253

One effect of the war, and the more significant in that it was not an expedient brought about by crisis, was the attempted redistribution of the proceeds from the four non-effective men. They had been:

usually allowed upon the muster rolls of each troop of horse and dragoons and each company of foot in the several regiments on the military establishment ... of Ireland,

to make good deaths and desertions. 254 Under the Irish system checks or respites were placed on all men who did not personally appear at musters. These could be removed on application to the governing body of Ireland. 255

The non-effective men were now to

be discontinued and their full pay deducted from each regiment and placed in distinct and separate articles upon the said establishment to be disposed of in the manner and proportion following:

the subsistence of one man a troop or company to the colonel of the respective regiment in lieu of all the customary allowances: the subsistence of one man ... to the agents of the regiments in lieu of their customary allowances.

Any remainder of the full pay was to be issued as off-reckonings upon assignments made by the respective colonels towards enabling them to supply the loss of clothing by deserters. This system was seen as a mere substitute under another name for the old system continued; in October 1746 there was

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253. See above p.96.
255. W.O. 26/20, p.360, 22 Mar. 1746, warrant. This was the theory in England also.
granted an addition of four non-effective men to each of the four additional companies of the four regiments of infantry, requested by the colonels and officers from the time of raising them "that they might be on an equal footing with the other companies of the said regiments".

This scheme was basically the same as that previously in operation. The importance of the reorganisation was partly that it demanded a more exact approach with a greater degree of accuracy and control, and partly in that it constituted a possible check on the amounts obtained by the colonels and agents at the expense of the fund for recruiting and clothing. In fact this danger was merely a potential one since the War Office financed recruiting by extraordinary methods when necessary. Thus at the same time that this measure was passed, so was an order that

> to render the schemes for the augmentation of the Horse and Dragoons effectual it will be necessary that the nine men which are to be added be placed on the establishment from the 25th. March last past inclusive and that five of the said men should be allowed on the muster rolls as complete from that time to 30th. June next inclusive.

The other four were to be allowed complete from 25th. March to December 31st. inclusive. This differed from the former practice in that the Duke of Devonshire was to issue such sums as he thought fit for raising and paying the additional men with the rider that the resulting sum was not to exceed the previous expenditure on a similar issue in 1740.

How effective in practice the check was could be seen from an episode

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256. The colonels of the regiments were Irwin, Otway, Bruce and Folliot.
257. A similar theory underlay the investigation by the House of Commons Special Committee. See above p.121.
258. This was written on April 2 1740.
259. W.O. 8/3, p.57b, 2 April 1740.
260. Ibid., p.64b, 24 March 1740.
In November 1745 it was decided that the four additional companies be paid from June 26th. 1745. In January 1746 it was decided that the two additional men for the colonel and the agent were to be paid from the time the additional companies were placed on the establishment to March 31st. 1746; it was further decided that the other two non-effectives, to make good deaths and desertions, were also to be paid to March 31st. but only from the time that each company had raised 200 men.

This was obviously an intentional measure since the original scheme was crossed out in draft and the subsequent one written in, indicating that Irwin's regiment at least was to be paid from the dates of the commissions of the additional captains. Also it is probable that the introduction of this scheme meant that there was less money available for recruiting. For despite the orders which were sent out after 1740 there was no extraordinary allotment of effective men to cover them; on the other hand the same absence of evidence could be used to support the argument that the scheme was working well in its new form.

There was one other occasion during the war when the troops were mustered complete. In November 1744 the regiments of St. George, Frampton and Richbell were withdrawn from Ireland and did in fact depart, but they were continued on that establishment because "it is become necessary" they were to be mustered complete. Their pay was to be set aside as if they were in Ireland, and then sent to the Paymaster in England. However two points indicate that a greater degree of control was exercised in London. It was made clear that mustering complete was only to be undertaken as a

261. Ibid., p.107b, 1 Oct. 1746.
temporary measure, and that when the regiments returned they were to be cleared according to regular musters only. Also, in the orders of the crown to the Duke of Devonshire concerning the sending of money to England, there was an injunction for him not to apply it to any other purposes. 263

There were few changes in the military position and practice in Ireland in the period 1748-54. Ireland seems to have remained largely forgotten. 264 There were some attempts at economy and rationalisation. In 1751 whilst it was decided that the Lieutenant-General remain on the establishment, it was decreed that there were to be no Brigadiers General. 265 This did not constitute a real decrease in numbers, the total of Majors General remaining only one less than the former combined total of Brigadiers and Majors General. At least it was a necessary preliminary to such a real decrease. Provision was made for a further reduction; unless the service should particularly require it

any vacancies which may happen by promotion, removal, or death of any one of the ten majors General which shall be first placed on the said establishment .... shall not be filled up until the number of Majors General be reduced to less than seven.

The allowance for the three Majors General was to cease. Salaries as well as numbers changed; whilst that for the Lieutenant General rose slightly that for the new Majors General was less than half of the rate paid to the

263. Ibid., p.91, 22 Nov. 1744.
264. This was consistent with Ireland's main rôle as a reserve, of particular importance during actual war.
265. W.O. 8/4, p.12a, 3 Sept. 1751.
old Majors General and less than one fifth of that of the former Brigadiers General.\textsuperscript{266}

This did not mean that economy was an overriding factor. In 1752 the Lords Justices wrote to Dorset approving of his recommendations to the Commissioners of the Treasury.\textsuperscript{267} These were pay increases to the lower ranking officers and men of the dragoons in Ireland in view of the "dearness of provisions and forage". They also approved Dorset's suggestion for appointing as "useful and necessary" an adjutant to each regiment of horse and dragoons on that establishment at an allowance of four shillings per day. The £730 per year which this would cost was, however, only a fraction of that saved in the former reduction. There was a similar increase for the foot regiments in 1754;\textsuperscript{268} captains of foot were to receive an additional 6d. per day clear of all deductions, 2d. to each subaltern officer, and 1d. to each private. On that occasion pay was to be back-dated by three months. There was also one minor administrative change; the Judge Advocate General and Judge Martial of Ireland was given an extra 3/4d. per day\textsuperscript{269} in consideration of his being obliged by a late Act of Parliament to keep an office for preserving the original proceedings and sentence of all General Courts Martial which was not incumbent upon him before that Act was passed.

The recruiting procedure was simplified. For the future, it was ordered in 1752 that recruits for the regiments could be sent directly to their respective regiments without being obliged to go through Dublin in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{266} Ibid., p.13b, 9 Sept. 1751.
\item \textsuperscript{267} Ibid., p.19b, 12 Mar. 1752.
\item \textsuperscript{268} Ibid., p.30, 1 Mar. 1754.
\item \textsuperscript{269} Ibid., p.24, 6 April 1753.
\end{itemize}
order to be examined, "the reviewing generals having now an order to
inspect all the new recruits that are enrolled within one year of their
review". These two measures are evidence of a stricter, more formal
and efficient approach to old problems. There was also evidence of the
old spirit's continuing. Thomas Eyre was empowered to appoint a deputy
or deputies in his office of engineer, overseer, surveyor and Director
General of all the fortifications, passages, and plantations in Ireland.
Yet, even in this case, safeguards were introduced; the deputy or
deputies had to be approved by the Chief Governor or Governor of Ireland,
and he or they had to obey the orders both of the Board of Ordnance of
Ireland and the Chief Governor or Governor of Ireland.271

During this period the procedure attaching to the mustering seems to
have been fairly strict, to judge from the orders, rules, and instructions
to be observed by the Muster Master General and Clerk of the Cheque.272
The Muster Master General was to conduct the muster in person, or by
deputy, of His Majesty's army and the Battle Axe Guards within the Kingdom
"four times a year at least or as often as we or the government of the time
shall think fit".273 As a check on the deputy commissaries who were to be
sent out constantly, the Muster Master General and the deputies were to
make out returns to the government bearing the date of the first muster
taken in each circuit, and also the date when the rolls were returned to
the muster office. Presumably to prevent corruption, no deputy commissary
was to go on the same circuit twice in succession. They were not to pass
through quarters and garrisons without mustering the forces there. The

270. Ibid., p.21, 28 July 1752.
273. These dates were at three month intervals from January 1st.

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Governors or officers commanding the garrisons or quarters were to present their men under arms at the deputy commissary's convenience; the commanding officer of each regiment or company was to have the muster rolls ready, fairly and alphabetically written. The regulation about the Irish soldiers being rejected for enlistment, except by order of the government, augmentations or on draughts was repeated.

In these years Ireland was still used as a reserve. The best example occurred in 1750. Representation had been made to the King concerning the necessity of supporting the settlements in Nova Scotia by sending an additional military force there. The Duke of Bedford then wrote to the regiments involved that they could cast lots for the service. Lascelles regiment was the one to go; the significant feature was that it was to remain on the Irish establishment, being cleared "from time to time according to the establishment notwithstanding the want of muster rolls" until their return or the receipt of further orders. An attempt was made to guard against corruption in that subsistence and pay for the regiment was to be sent to the Paymaster General for the time being

free and clear of all deductions for exchange and remittance, and of all other deductions whatsoever except the normal deductions for Poundage, Hospital and Pells fees;

it was not to be issued or applied to any other use whatsoever. When it did return "especial orders and directions" were to be given that it be thenceforth "paid and cleared according to regular musters only"; the War Office was concerned "that His Majesty's service may not suffer by irregularity in the payment of the said regiment".274

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What conclusions are to be drawn from changes in the routine of the war office? The authorities responsible for army affairs realised at an early stage, as had the Ordnance, that deficiencies existed in the system. That was the reason for continual attempts to obtain more accurate information on the state of the army. It was evident that these fears were well founded in the breakdown of the mustering system as indicated by the evidence presented to the Special Committee of the House of Commons on the Land Forces and Marines. Similarly, in relation to the problem of the supply of trained forces, that deficiencies existed in the system was evident from the skilful use of the forces on the Irish Establishment, and that it was realised was apparent from the revised method of obtaining recruits. In total these reforms were mere palliatives. Problems over recruiting and the suggestion of corruption were inherent in a system on which so much depended on men who stood to gain relatively large sums by the dishonest conduct of their duty at muster. So long as these conditions existed and there was no adequate standing army nor militia the Irish establishment would be essential as a reserve of men both to meet emergencies and also to make up for deficiencies in recruiting.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE NAVY:

PROCEDURES AND CHANGES 1739-1754
Comparison with the administration of the army and the
Ordnance - manpower - control over personnel - mustering -
victualling - submission of accounts - emphasis on economy;
payment of wages - deficiencies of routine - attempts to
tighten system.
Control over personnel - dockyards - extra work - wartime
discontent - change in practice - ironwork, timber, sails
- disposal of old goods.
The tasks of the navy were many. Professor Baugh has described the general approach and specific procedures adopted in fulfilling these objectives. There is nothing of significance to be gained by re-working the same subject. It is, however, useful to place the naval reaction in the context of the response of the other war departments, the Ordnance and the War Office. Points of similarity are observed at both a general level and in particulars.

Professor Baugh's conclusion was that it was:

almost impossible for any ministry to allow a program of administrative reform to take precedence over the requirements of political management. Until the disasters of the war for American independence, few Englishmen saw the need, and fewer still felt the inclination, to reform a navy which, for all its faults, was the acknowledged mistress of the seas.

That was why Anson could not:

lift the dead weight of tradition from the dockyards nor could he introduce, unassisted, a more efficient and equitable method of manning the fleet.

This broad conclusion is consistent with the absence of fundamental reforms noted in relation to the Ordnance and the War Office. It has been seen that there was an awareness within the Ordnance that reform was possible within the existing constraints of tradition and economy. Reform of procedures was no more than that, an attempt towards efficiency with better methods to achieve the same ends rather than a re-definition of aims. Reforms relating to army administration similarly concentrated on expediency.

2. Ibid., p.505.
3. Ibid., p.504.
With regard to particular instances the most important aspects of naval administration were the provision, victualling and payment of seamen, and the smooth running of the dockyards. The naval problem of the supply of manpower had no parallel in the Ordnance's sphere, but bore similarities to the army's problem. The situations were not identical. Soldiers were easier to train and could be drawn from a wider population than the coastal towns; there were less vested interests to resist impressment. In addition, the navy's problem had to be solved internally, whereas indifferent recruitment of soldiers could be compensated by use of the Irish establishment and the hiring of mercenaries. The equivalent to the impassioned debates on naval impressment were the acrimonious debates on the payment of Hanoverians and Hessians. The army was fortunate that the strength of Britain's allies lay on land. Britain's navy was left to fight the war against a formidable combination of opponents alone.

However, in the areas which can be compared, the army's performance closely reflected that of the navy. It has been seen that the attempts to increase recruitment in the army were not fundamental changes, but rather steps towards greater efficiency on the same pattern. Similarly Professor Baugh concluded that "methods for recruiting the fleet remained basically unchanged. However, new conditions shifted the emphasis". A register of seamen and coercion to make it work were as unwelcome as the keeping of a standing army, or the use of militia, themselves the

5. Ibid., pp.160-1.
8. Ibid., p.235.
eighteenth century substitute for conscription. The greater efficiency evident from the re-organisation of counties for army recruitment was reflected in the improvement in the efficiency of naval impressment.

One of the main aspects of the Ordnance's reaction to the demands of war was a tightening of control on its personnel, especially after the war, both by admonitions to observe existing procedures and changes in the system. This occasioned the criticism that the Ordnance was more often concerned to have responsible officials checking on each other rather than seeing to the progress of affairs. This tendency was consistent with the War Office's emphasis on returns and the close scrutiny of agents and colonels by the House of Commons special committee. Orders sent to senior dockyard officials make the same point.

There was some attempt to define the duties of the Clerk of the Cheque on musters. In 1739 it was directed that his weekly account of the state and condition of the ships in commission contain the musters

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11. See above p. 74 et seq.
12. Lack of control was one factor against the building of ships by contract. "We do not say that ships built in the out ports are frequently visited and surveyed, but the practice is to visit from time to time ships building by the contractors whose yards are near the King's ... If we should receive information of any bad practice we could prevent it." Adm. 106/2182, p. 275, 10 Oct. 1746. Officers of the yard were to meet together and have all the standing orders read to them at least once every six months. Ind. 10665, p. 322, 13 Mar. 1749.
13. For a description of the work of the Clerk of the Cheque, see Baugh p. 297. Although he was accountable to the Comptroller of the Navy, in regard to mustering he was more accurately the instrument of the Treasurer of the Navy, ibid., p. 293.
of those ships.\textsuperscript{14} He was to note the officers absent and on what occasions these absences occurred. Two years later, it was ordered that the mustering was to be done frequently and strictly. The Clerk of the Cheque was particularly to mark if the ships were weakly or ill-manned, or bearing an over proportion of boys, distinguishing the quality of the men and boys on the best method possible. The whole was to be reported to the Navy Board in order that when a deficiency was noticed, the ships might be discharged or mustered as appropriate.\textsuperscript{15}

This practice was extended in 1746 to include:

all tenders, storeships, transports and other hired vessels that are obliged to have a certain complement on board on account of the owners.\textsuperscript{16}

There is some evidence from the instructions that the Navy tried to make its preparations for the war as efficient as possible. The Clerk of the Cheque was not simply to function as an officer who called the roll; the order of 1739 directed that his account of the ship, besides mentioning the state and condition of ships and musters, was also intended to indicate where the ships lay, the arrival of ships and transports with naval stores, when they would be ready to deliver them and how long they would take to unload the goods. It was also to mention

\textsuperscript{14} Adm. 49/54, p.239, 5 Apr. 1739.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p.243, 27 Apr. 1741.
\textsuperscript{16} Adm. 49/54, p.243, 29 Dec. 1746.
when loaded or unloaded, if ready to sail, the time of sailing and the reasons for any delay.\textsuperscript{17} The insistence on procedure was not always to the disadvantage of the Clerk of the Cheque. The Navy Board defended their following procedure in the matter of the employment of boatswains, gunners and carpenters against a complaint from the dockyard commissioners.\textsuperscript{18} In the same fashion the Navy Board defended itself from the Admiralty and its dockyard officers from the criticisms of an aggrieved sea captain in 1746. He wanted work performed which the dockyard officers thought unnecessary. The Board said that it could not:

\begin{quote}
be answerable for the behaviour of our officers nor the civil economy of the navy while services may be directed the purposes of which we may be totally ignorant of.\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

More important than changes in detail in the job of the Clerk of the Cheque was the check imposed on him. In 1740 it was required that he submit to both the Admiralty and Navy Boards separately the number of men borne and mustered at Spithead, the Nore, and in other ports and in harbour. This was to be in addition to an account of the officers absent on leave. It was emphasised that the accounts were to be dependable.\textsuperscript{20}

The only change in the duties of the second most important dockyard officer, the Clerk of the Survey,\textsuperscript{21} came in 1746. Previously, he

\begin{footnotes}
\item[17.] Ibid., p.239, 5 Apr. 1739.
\item[18.] Adm. 106/2180, p.88, 4 Jan. 1744.
\item[19.] Adm. 106/2182, p.142 \emph{et seq.}, 24 May 1746. In relation to defence against similar interference at Sheerness, see ibid., p.196, 30 July 1746; see also, ibid., p.275, 10 Oct. 1746.
\item[20.] Ibid., p.244, 12 Apr. 1740, Adm. 49/54. Emphasis was placed on the accuracy of reports. Baugh \emph{op. cit.}, p.339. This was consistent with the practice in the army; see above pp.90-111.
\item[21.] Baugh, \emph{op. cit.}, p.300.
\end{footnotes}
had merely been under orders:

with the approbation of the Master Attendant to draw out and with him to sign all warrants to the Storekeeper for issuing to the Boats­wain and all others in the Master Attendant's departmental stores both for the harbour and sea service, and to enter all warrants in books prepared for that service.

In 1746 it was ordered that they were to do the same with Master Shipwright's warrants for such stores as related to the Comptroller of His Majesty's ships. It was also instructed that warrants were to be expressed in words and at length and none were to be signed which were not also expressed in figures.22

There was a tightening of the procedure for mustering. The existing instruction to the Clerk of the Cheque was that he muster ordinary storekeepers at unspecified times once or twice a week.23 To this was added, in 1749, the rider that this was to be done at any time of day or night.24 Two years later, to make the system more secure, the chief officer on board was directed to attend the muster and keep an exact run and check along with the Clerk of the Cheque on all persons absent.25 This was a sensible extension of the existing procedure, where the officer commanding on duty had to lay before the Clerk of the Cheque, at muster, the book kept on board a king's ship or hired vessel in which every man's name absent on duty or leave was inserted.26

22. Ibid., p.246, 29 Apr. 1746. Adm. 49/54.
23. Ibid., p.236, 29 June 1685; and 21 Feb. 1695.
24. Ibid., p.236, 8 Dec. 1749. See also, Ind. 10665, p.61, 19 Oct. 1749.
   This was consistent with the captains of ships being ordered to accommodate clerks of the cheque. Ind. 10665, p.61, 22 Mar. 1750.
26. Adm. 49/54, p.240, 3 June 1691; and 5 Nov. 1691.
The only other change affecting the Clerk of the Cheque seems to have been designed to cope with the advent of peace. It was not a drastic change in procedure. In 1748 it was ordered that, in addition to the other accounts sent separately to the Admiralty and Navy Boards each week, an account of the proceedings of His Majesty's ships in harbour should also be sent. This seems to have called for much the same information, and for a similar purpose, as required in the instruction to the Clerk of the Cheque at the start of the war.\textsuperscript{27}

There was a continued emphasis on attendance at musters.\textsuperscript{28} The Clerk of the Cheque could not do his job properly unless he saw every man, and some might be absent.\textsuperscript{29} The solution proposed by the Navy Board was similar to that adopted by the army authorities, placing emphasis on the commanding officers report on absent men.\textsuperscript{30}

In the same way as the Navy passed these regulations for the Clerk of the Cheque, extending and re-inforcing his position without basically altering his job, so it sought merely to remind the Storekeeper of his duty.\textsuperscript{31} In 1749 he was reminded to send up his accounts and abstracts regularly, quarterly on the day appointed.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p.244, 12 Apr. 1748; and 16 June 1748.
\textsuperscript{28} Adm. 106/2185, p.416, 12 Feb. 1750. It did not prevent the suspicion of false mustering, see ibid., p.465, 13 May 1751.
\textsuperscript{29} The Clerks of the Cheque had been frustrated by not being supplied with proper muster books by the captains. Adm. 106/2186, p.19, 6 Nov. 1751.
\textsuperscript{30} One of the abuses continued, concerning the sending of muster books to the navy office through third parties, not direct. Adm. 106/2187, p.63, 1 Feb. 1754. For the abuses which could be covered up by slackness, see ibid., p.111, 29 Apr. 1754, p.138, 18 June 1754.
\textsuperscript{31} Adm. 49/54, p.245, 13 Mar. 1749.
\textsuperscript{32} The strict control over dockyard officers was mirrored in the dissatisfaction felt with the captains not obeying orders; Adm. 106/2186, p.19, 6 Nov. 1751.
Such activity as there was in relation to the victualling officers was confined to admonitions to conform to existing procedures. In 1745 the first new additional instruction was given to the Master Cooper for 13 years. Most of the changes incorporated in additional instructions to the original ones of 1706 had been issued in the period 1716-21. The new regulations were designed to check abuses in the disposal of goods held in his care. 33

The instructions of the Clerk of His Majesty's mills at Rotherhithe were partly concerned with the implementation of previous orders and partly with extending the scope of his authority. 34 In July 1742 the Board ordered a copy of the minute dated 26th. March 1702 to be affixed in each office, to prevent the officers and clerks pleading ignorance of the standing orders against taking perquisites. 35 Two months earlier, the Board had noted that their minutes of 28th. March 1715, 7th. March 1717 and 17th. November 1727 in relation to the account of orders and references not implemented had not been duly observed. 36 The respective officers were "strictly enjoined to comply punctually therewith". It seems that this order too was disregarded since eighteen months later the issue arose again. The Board again enjoined compliance with their minute. It gave a fuller synopsis of the minute in question. 37

At the start of the war the Board set down the procedure to be followed on the entry and discharge of men. 38 The officers must have disregarded the first element of this instruction since it was ordered

34. Adm. 49/59, pp.368-376.
35. Ibid., 23 July 1742.
36. Ibid., 19 May 1742.
37. Ibid., 5 Nov. 1743.
38. Ibid., 2 Apr. 1740.
in 1745:

that the several storekeepers and officers, before they employ any person in the respective branches on extra service, do first apply to the Board for the doing thereof.

At the same time, the Board sought to extend its area of control over the officers by introducing yet another check into the system, concerning the issue of provisions and stores. 39

After the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle there was no significant reform of the instructions relating to the work of the Victualling office. This suggested what the nature of the earlier changes in wartime had indicated, that those changes were seen as mere expediencies to meet certain situations, not as worthwhile reforms in themselves. It does seem that, as with the Ordnance and the Navy Boards, 40 there was a suspicion that contractors were deriving too great an advantage. The Master Butcher at the Port of London was always to attend to the taking of suet out of oxen to see that it was properly pared and trimmed and lodged in the suet loft. "That there be no abuse committed on the part of the contractors" the Clerk of the Cuttinghouse was to see that it was kept under two locks until it was weighed off, keeping the key to one lock for himself, the contractors having the other. 41

Whilst on the one hand there were some changes, in the basic arrangements for victualling as evidenced in the regulations issued, there were also more frequent orders sent to make more immediately effective the day to day routine of the office.

40. See above p.71, and, with reference to shipbuilding, Baugh op. cit.,
41. Ibid., Adm. 49/59, 13 Jan. 1752.
Several of the orders sent to the victualling office during the war merely related to the submission of accounts. The Board administered a severe rebuke in 1739 for not sending up accounts.\(^{42}\) Similarly at the end of the war it was felt important to stress efficiency, the Board issuing an order requiring the submission of accounts by the time limit.\(^{43}\) Six months later, the request was made more specific relating to the account of sales of provisions.\(^{44}\) In forbidding the officers and clerks to take any fees or reward for the bills made out, the Board was again tightening existing procedure rather than making new financial arrangements.\(^{45}\) Such innovations as were made were on a minor scale and in some cases were confined to the price to be paid for certain goods.\(^{46}\) The only measure of real financial importance was the decision that tradesmen's bills carry four per cent interest after six months.\(^{47}\)

There was little attempt to change the financial machinery at the end of the war. The three measures taken were biased in the interests of economy, although each could be said to make the service more efficient. In 1749 it was decided that the bakers receive a weekly wage which was to include their beer and bread;\(^{48}\) it also meant that they had to work as labourers on the wharf. A year later an agent and store-keeper had to pay for items which they had thrown away when these might have been sold for the advantage of the crown.\(^{49}\) In 1753 an order was

\(^{42}\) Adm. 114/35, 5 Jan. 1739. See also, ibid., 17 Jan. 1739.
\(^{43}\) Ibid., 6 Jan. 1748.
\(^{44}\) Ibid., 8 July 1748.
\(^{45}\) Ibid., 13 Nov. 1747.
\(^{46}\) Ibid., 6 June 1746.
\(^{47}\) Ibid., 22 Mar. 1749. See Baugh op. cit., p.471, concerning an attempt to nullify the effects of long payment of bills.
\(^{48}\) Adm. 114/35, 50 June 1749.
\(^{49}\) Ibid., 12 Sept. 1750.
dispatched that the tradesmen had to make out their bills before.50

The Navy Board's major interest was in controlling the administra-
tive officers. During the war they were subject to the same order as
workmen about attending the roll call.51 There were attempts to chivy
them into greater efficiency.52 The main concern was that they be
honest. Officers and clerks were forbidden to take fees for bills made
out. After the war the Board had the same interests at heart. Hence
the emphasis on the immediate submission of accounts,53 the attendance
on the parcelling of stores and the concern to follow regulations on
the sale of provisions.54

It was in relation to the payment of naval wages that the attitude
of the navy most closely resembled that of the Ordnance. Deficiencies
in the procedure during the war led to abuses which occasioned an
enquiry and reforms after the war. These were not fundamental but were
real attempts to make the best of an inadequate system. The background
to the changes was the complaint that naval service was unattractive in
part because of the delays in the payment of wages.55 Walpole claimed
that there were conscientious attempts to meet the demands of statutes.
Professor Baugh demonstrated that pay tickets were discounted heavily
and that the only solution, being more frequent payments, was administra-
tively impossible. Such real measures as were possible were not taken
until 1758. The question was neglected between 1739 and 1748 because

50. Ibid., 13 June 1753.
52. Ibid., Adm. 114/35, 5 Jan. 1739.
53. Ibid., 8 July 1748. See note 73 below.
54. Adm. 114/35, 12 Sept. 1750; See also, ibid.,
16 Feb. 1756.
the navy was more concerned about desertion than morale.\textsuperscript{56}

There were several changes in the administrative machinery of the pay office during the years when Britain was at war. Unlike the changes in the post-war period they were isolated and did not form any coherent scheme of reform, being expedients to circumvent difficulties and not taken to their logical conclusion.

The payment of wages was an area in which complaints would come to light most easily, and at an early stage if the machinery were deficient.\textsuperscript{57} Two years after the start of the war the Board tried to meet complaints about exorbitant fees "for writing and certifying petitions, and likewise of the men that were run on ships books, who had been relieved".\textsuperscript{58} The remedy adopted was the imposition of a maximum fee of one shilling on pain of dismissal if this were exceeded. The notice of the Board's ruling was to be displayed in the most public place in the Petition Office and the Ticket Office.\textsuperscript{59}

A year later the Board was trying to improve efficiency at the other end of the pay procedure, the dispatch of the Treasurer's accounts. The new procedure followed exactly the practice of the Treasury. Whilst the Navy Board was prepared to change the details of its practice its priorities remained the same: the new work was to be allowed "provided it be no interruption to the carrying on the payments and casting the

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p.481.
\textsuperscript{57} "The paying of seamen's wages by our officers abroad or at home is a practice ... liable to many objections, particularly double payments and a difficulty of bringing the money to account by the Treasurer. Adm. 106/2180, pp.393-5, 11 Sept. 1744.
\textsuperscript{58} For the description of men 'run' on ships books, see Baugh, \textit{op. cit.}, p.195.
\textsuperscript{59} Adm. 14/178, No. 250, 16 Nov. 1741.
debt which are always to be preferred to other business".\textsuperscript{60}

The Board was concerned with the same problem in 1747. The Treasurer was anxious that his and the preceding Treasurer's accounts be made up with greater speed; he requested, and the Board granted, another set of clerks for this purpose. In addition it ordered that one clerk be spared from the Comptroller's office for the purpose, "in regard to the business there is near equal to that in the Treasurer's".\textsuperscript{61} Similarly two months earlier, there had been measures taken for casting the debt of wages "due on the books of His Majesty's ships paid since the first of January last to the instant".\textsuperscript{62} Clerks at the out-ports attending the payments there had to give their assistance in the casting of the debt "and they [should] do the same on like occasions for the future".\textsuperscript{63}

If efficiency of payment was one concern the need to prevent any "clamour on account of undue preference" was equally important. The need to institute some respected order of preference arose out of an observation from the Comptroller of the Treasurer's accounts that the £10,000 received for paying the wages of the captains and officers belonging to His Majesty's ships not yet under payment would fall greatly short of payments already ordered; he requested advice. This was that the new procedure should be:

\begin{center}
that captains and officers should be paid according to the dates of the orders from the Admiralty except such as are ordered
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{60. Ibid., No. 255, 3 Nov. 1742.}
\textsuperscript{61. Adm. 14/179, No. 393, 6 Nov. 1747.}
\textsuperscript{62. In relation to paying arrears of wages on the books of ships paid off, see Baugh, op. cit., pp.470,492-3.}
\textsuperscript{63. Ibid., Adm. 14/179, No. 383, 30 Sept. 1747.}
on immediate service or out of pay and widows
who are to have the preference in payment. 64

Apart from these routine and daily administrative difficulties
which were bound to appear, the greatest upset to the routine of the
office came with the change in the incumbent in the post of Treasurer
of the Navy. The problem concerned the abstracting of the ships books
paid in the period of office of the initial incumbent. In order to
determine former practice, the Deputy Treasurer and a representative of
the Paymaster of the Navy were both consulted. Reliance was however
placed on the chief clerks to the Comptroller and in the Ticket office.
The procedure to be followed for abstracting the books was that set
down in 1720. 65

After the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, the Navy was concerned to put
some of its financial affairs in order, which it had not been able to
do systematically before. 66

Seamen's wages 67 had been delayed in payment throughout the war. 68

64. Ibid., No. 368, 4 Apr. 1747.
66. For the issue of orders during the war, see Baugh op. cit.,
67. Delay in the payment of wages mainly affected the ordinary
seamen. A measure of relief was granted in June 1747 to
commission and warrant officers, the Admiralty taking into
account "the large arrears generally owing to them from
the government". Provided that the accounts of the ships
were passed by the accounting officers who were to produce
certificates to that effect the Admiralty was prepared to
authorise payment of the officers personal pay with that
of their servants without waiting for the payment of the
ships. The restriction was that at least one year's pay
had to be due. Adm. 7/678, No. 10, Order in Council, 3
June 1747.
68. The extent of the problem was indicated by the fact that
it was unusual for men returned from the Mediterranean and
the West Indies to have three months pay advanced as an
incentive, "the present circumstances of affairs requiring
that as many of His Majesty's ships as possible should be
manned and got ready to send to the downs or wherever else
they may be wanted". The men required could only be obtained
by drawing them from ships intended for paying off after
service overseas, Adm. 106/2181, f.262, 4 July 1745.
and therefore were subject to many abuses. The Navy Board appreciated the causes of the problem:

We observe ... that the many inconveniencies, and hardships, the seamen have laboured under, during the last war, have been occasioned chiefly from the practice of turning over, and discharging by ticket, which practice, if for the future it could be corrected that great discount would be taken off seamens tickets, which arises from the distress they suffer from remote and uncertain payments.

Payment of wages was delayed at the end of the war. The cause was lack of money available to the Navy Board which had been directed:

if possible to save money, in order to pay off at least a part of the ships expected from India for which no provision has yet been made by Parliament ... We [the Navy Board] think it not possible to carry on the recalls of ships already paid off without further aid [from] Parliament.

A contributory cause was the irregular records submitted:

Much the greater part of the [pursers] accounts delivered in are so imperfect that it creates inconceivable trouble and time to put them in proper order for passing ... muster books from the captains are the principal grounds [for] checking and settling such accounts, yet many of them are delivered in so defective and others never recorded at all, that it is impossible to pass some pursers accounts without dispensing orders from the Admiralty.

69. For the cause of withholding wages, see Baugh op. cit., p.478. See also, J. Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III, p.133.
70. For a good example in face of the threat of the 1745 rebellion, see Adm. 106/2181, p.262, 4 July 1745 and p.472, 14 Dec. 1745. See also, Adm. 106/2183, p.559. For a previous example, see Adm. 106/2180; the Princess Louisa sailed before men from the Kent transferred could be paid.
71. Adm. 106/2185, p.466, 13 May 1751.
73. Ibid., p.11, 16 Oct. 1749.
The attitude of the Navy Board was clear:

It is far from our inclination to detain poor seamen unnecessarily on account of their wages, but when the public treasure is concerned we think it our indispensable duty to use the utmost precautions we can that neither His Majesty nor the claimants may be injured. 75

In February 1749 the Board tried to act against the practice of issuing substitute tickets when the originals were said to be lost; subsequently these were "found" after the substitute ticket had been granted and payment made. 76 The new procedure was to delay the tickets until the ship for which they were required had been recalled and the books made up. 77 Obviously this was no solution to the problem. For nine months later, the Board resolved that "a stop be put to the payments of such bond tickets as have been already granted and are not yet paid, till other affidavits are made". The issue arose out of a case relating to the validity of the form of affidavits, and the Board took into consideration the previous practice in taking them; the new ones were to be made according to a new form which had been agreed on by the Board. 79 There must have been some confusion about which of the bond tickets should be paid and which not, since the Board re-iterated its

74. The Navy Board defended the attention to duty of its employees, "daily attendance both morning and afternoon is given by the clerks of the Tickett Office to give the Pursers and all others who have business there the utmost dispatch". Adm. 106/2185, p.11, 16 Oct. 1749.
76. The practice was that the latest ticket took precedence. Adm. 106/2185, p.108, 5 Jan. 1749.
77. Adm. 14/179, No. 518, 26 Feb. 1749. The period was six months. Adm. 106/2184, p.211, 24 Oct. 1748. See also, ibid., p.256, 1 Dec. 1748.
78. Some attempt was made to implement it which did have effect. Adm. 106/2185, p.212, 7 May 1750.
79. Adm. 14/179, No. 542, 28 Nov. 1750.
position. This rested on the two previous decisions, that such tickets be paid on application provided the ships books on which they were granted were made up, and that the parties had made another affidavit to prove the loss of the original ticket before one of the members of the Board. At that meeting the Board catered for the bond tickets already granted. Two days later it made the same resolution for future practice, introducing, however, a proviso that the person making the affidavit had also to give security. Although this had not been mentioned before it was couched in terms which implied that such a proviso was neither unusual nor unexpected.

There was no immediate change in the system, but the situation must have continued to be confused; for in December 1753 the Board revoked the six minutes on the subject made since the war and redefined its position. In the main this involved no more than a re-iteration of the minutes in question, although some innovations were introduced.

Unofficial abuses in the payment of wages required reform. The Board began its investigations in January 1750. The Admiralty wanted an account of the money paid during the preceding year on officers and seamen's tickets that had been paid by endorsements, assignments, or letters of attorney. They wanted likewise a record of all wages, although no tickets had been made out that had been paid by virtue of

80. Ibid., No. 606, 20 Sept. 1752.
81. Ibid., No. 607, 22 Sept. 1752.
82. Ibid., No. 651, 5 Dec. 1753.
Letter of Attorney or assignment. How seriously the Board viewed the situation could be judged from the suspension of work on other business in the offices of the Treasurer of the Navy, the Comptrollers and the Ticket Office so that the clerks could be spared for the preparation of the account. The work was completed before the end of April.

The minute of the Board after the investigation referred to:

frequent abuses that have been lately discovered in forging seamen's wills, powers of attorney, and other authorities for negotiating business in this and the Pay Office.

The areas in which these abuses were practised were the "receipt of seamen's wages, or the bounty allowed the widows or relations of such as are slain in action against the enemy". The Board frowned on "such pernicious practices [as] tending so greatly to the prejudice of the seamen, their wives, widows and relations who have any claims due to them from His Majesty's Navy". Two remedies were proposed. On the one hand, the clerks of the offices in question were to take more care in the conduct of their business. In the event of a claim the claimant was to present "proper authorities relating thereto". The clerk was to make some private mark for identification on the document. If he

84. Adm. 14/179, No. 545, 1 Jan. 1750.
85. Ibid., No. 551, 1 May 1751.
86. The difficulty in framing regulations was recognised by the Navy Board, in relation to the fraud involving the impersonation of seamen. Adm. 106/2185, p.108, 5 Jan. 1749.
suspected nothing then he was:

to give the parties concerned therein all the satisfaction with regard to the business as the case will permit, either the next day or as soon after that as they possibly can, to prevent any just reason for complaint of delay herein.

If he suspected or detected a forgery or a fraud he was "to bring them to the Board and receive their instructions". The Board was thence concerned to place immediate responsibility on the people most intimately connected in the work, whilst ensuring that there was an easy method of enabling a higher body to take the more important decisions, besides instituting some means of cross checking. The Board was also concerned that its administrative efficiency should not interfere with its public relations. The order for the immediate dispatch of justifiable claims seems either ironic or a refreshing change after the wartime experience of delayed payments.  

At the same time as effecting an answer to the specific problem of forgeries, the Board in the same minute tried to improve the efficiency of the Ticket Office in general.

The Navy Board reported that one of its commissioners, Falkingham had:

met with great insults from seamen attending the Pay Office ... and his life threatened ... of late it has become hazardous to carry on that service and the Treasurer at the Pay Office is likewise in danger from the mutinous behaviour of the seamen.

Only one or two people attending their claim were to be admitted at any one time instead of "the great concourse of people who daily

87. See Baugh, op. cit., pp.474-5.
resort there" on the grounds that this concourse gave "much interrup-
tion ... to the branch of business respecting the Ticket Office". The
chief clerk was made responsible for seeing that the doorkeeper complied
with the instruction. A further check was introduced into the system
by having the chief clerk in the Ticket Office, who had the charge of
the tickets, initial his acceptance of all authorities produced.88

Not only was the system within the office improved, but also there
was a review of the procedure adopted in the case of investigations
instituted from outside. In January 1752 the Board came to the conclu-
sion that when any future application was made to them to stop the
payment of wages due on ships books, the petitioning parties should
produce such powers and assign satisfactory reasons to the Board for
that purpose before a stop was granted.89

Apart from the general problem of payment of tickets, and the pay-
ment of bounties the main immediate concern in the period 1748-54 was
with paying off men reduced from His Majesty's ships. In January 1750
the Board sent for and interviewed the Cashier to the Treasurer of the
Navy.90 The problem was the great expense which could attend the payment
of such reduced men "by sending to the out-ports small sums of money and
clerks from time to time as the said men may arrive in order to be
paid". The solution was that:

> when the lists of such reduced men [are] sent
to this office in order to be examined and
cast, the same should afterwards be sent to
the Clerk of the Cheque at the port where such

88. Adm. 106/2184, p.532, 11 Sept. 1749; see also,
ibid., p.550, 23 Sept. 1749.
men shall arrive with directions to him to pay
the said men under the Comptroller or the
Commissioner residing there.

This would ensure speedier payment being made, affecting the men on the
spot, and would save further expense and confusion both at the out-ports
and in the central office by not having to dispatch clerks with the
money. The obvious danger was that with greater control vested further
from the centre, the danger of inefficiency and fraud was increased.

The Board tried to prevent this by instituting a system of signing
and counter checking; the payment of the displaced men "is to be
reduced by such commissioners signing the lists on which such men were
to be payed". The Clerk of the Cheque was to see to it; in the same
way as he had served as the intermediary in distributing the list, so
he was to receive it from the Commissioner and pass it to the London
office. This scheme had the advantage that it ensured that communi-
cations were only with one person at one port and the involvement of the
Clerk of the Cheque meant greater reliability. On the return of the
list to the London office it was to be signed by "two members of the
Board, as a voucher to the Treasurer of the Navy". This voucher was
essential for the final financial transaction. The Clerk of the Cheque,
having initially been directed to pay the bill, was to "draw a bill on
the Treasurer of the Navy for the amount thereof expressing therein the
service for which the same is drawn".

In addition to the changes brought upon the staff of the naval
administration by the changes effected after 1748 in financial procedure,
there were other measures involving a stricter surveillance of the
clerks; the need for reform had become evident during the war\textsuperscript{91} and

\begin{footnote}
91. Note in particular the wording of the preambles.
\end{footnote}
only became possible to execute with the advent of peace.

For it was as early as March 1749 that the Board passed a severe minute.92 It "took notice of the clerks in the several offices not attending their duty as early as is necessary for the dispatching of the business of each commissioners branch". The new regulations were to the effect that the clerks had to attend by 9 o'clock every morning; the procedure to ensure that the minute was observed was that clerks disregarding it were to be reported to the relevant commissioner by the chief clerk of each office. The penalty was that he "is determined to dismiss them for their contempt thereof". The transaction of private affairs was permitted but so that it might not form the basis of a plea for the non-performance of office duties the clerks were "allowed to leave the office at 2 o'clock returning again to their respective duty at 5 o'clock in the afternoon".

An investigation into an anonymous letter alleging that officers and clerks in general and those at Woolwich in particular were guilty of great irregularities and negligence revealed that there had been slackness at Woolwich in the matter of the conduct of the call of the labourers, for which the Clerk of the Cheque was responsible.93 An examination of the Clerk of the Ropeyard with reference to the balancing of his accounts indicated a discrepancy amounting to negligence despite warnings from the Navy Board.94

If speed was seen as one facet of administrative efficiency so was

financial integrity. The Board seems to have thought that these were not necessarily mutually exclusive; in a minute of June 1750\textsuperscript{95} it implied that the "great delays [which] are made in the dispatch of business in the Petition Office and Ticket Office" were caused by clerks refusing to write "and certify Petitions" and make out "orders for taking off R's [men who were run on ships books] who have been relieved" until they had received a perquisite for doing so. The minute forbade in general the demanding of money "on ... any other account as well", and introduced a stiff penalty of immediate dismissal.\textsuperscript{96} The regulation and penalty were to be given prominent display in the offices. It is difficult to see what else the Board could have done; it had been driven to these extreme measures because of "the ill tendency of such practices" and their persistence despite "several orders on that behalf".\textsuperscript{97}

Six months later the Board again took up the matter of perquisites, this time being concerned not merely with specific instances but with the entire question of fees.\textsuperscript{98} It was a thorough enquiry, the Board specifying as many areas as it could think of. "It is ordered that the chief clerks of the respective offices do prepare and lay before

\textsuperscript{95} Adm. 14/179, No. 533, 29 June 1750.
\textsuperscript{96} The riot in September 1749 was attributed to the scandalous behaviour of Mr. Falkingham's coachman in taking money from the seamen under the pretence of procuring the speedy payment of their wages, on the first notice of which Mr. Falkingham turned him out of his service. Adm. 106/2184, p.552, 29 Sept. 1749; see also p.181 above.
\textsuperscript{97} The consequences of this practice were recognised by the Navy Board. It caused confusion in ships accounts. Cases could not be resolved without interviewing pursers, as the only equitable course; this meant that the straightforward accounts received prompt attention. Adm. 14/179, No. 533, 29 June 1750.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., No. 541, 7 Dec. 1750.
the Board an account of all the perquisites that have been usually
taken".

Whether this enquiry was sufficient to prevent abuses in the taking of fees or not is uncertain; it did not prevent the fraud which was reported in May 1751. The Admiralty considered that their standing rule from 1694 against officers of the navy and clerks of the navy and Pay offices receiving seamen's wages adequately covered the problem. The Navy Board thought the results of the order might have caused what it was designed to prevent:

as it has thrown them [sailors due pay] without resource, into the hands of [those] who having acquired an exclusive monopoly of the receipt of wages and taken advantage of the necessities of some, and of the weakness, and heedlessness of others, impose on them without money, by demanding great premiums for receiving their money, by raising up false claimants for the same, after they have received it, by purchasing their tickets at a shameful, and exorbitant discount.

The Navy Board felt that there were five advantages in allowing public servants to receive fees at a premium of 3d. in the £. The officers were "generally very well recommended" and trustworthy by virtue of their long service. They were under constant scrutiny and threat of dismissal and other exemplary punishment. Their salaries would serve as security for any moderate fraud and they would not risk their future career. Most important, "either the receivers will be obliged to lower their unreasonable demands or the seamen will take their papers ... to those who will do their business on easier terms". The proposal was not adopted.99

The Board felt obliged at the beginning of the next war to restate the position:\textsuperscript{100} tickets made out for men discharged unfit for service and signed by a Flag officer or Comptroller of the out-ports, or in the Thames by the Comptroller of the Navy or the Regulating Captains "shall upon their being brought to the Ticket Office be immediately assigned for payment without any fee or reward whatsoever to be paid for the same". The emphasis was on taking action immediately. This conclusion is supported by the wording of the preamble to this measure:

hardships attending such persons as are discharged by ticket from His Majesty's ships for want of their being forthwith paid .... and also to prevent such parties being put to great expence by waiting from their places of abode a month before such tickets are paid as hath been customary.

The other important measure to control the clerks in the years between 1748 and 1754 concerned the use of messengers. It was consistent with other measures imposing greater control on the keeping of office hours.\textsuperscript{101}

The close control exercised on its lower employees by the Ordnance was reflected in certain reforms in the naval sphere. In the dockyards the only change of a general nature during the war came in 1743. The officers [were] not to suffer any Roman Catholics to be employed in the Yards or ordinary, but on discovery to discharge them unless they will take the oaths that are in that case provided.

This was explicable in view of the current foreign invasion scare.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., No. 750, 4 Aug. 1757. Adm. 14/179.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., No. 652, 19 Dec. 1753.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., Adm. 49/54, p.234, 1 Mar. 1743. See below pp.305-6. After the war dockyard officers were reminded that they were responsible for the behaviour of their clerks. Ind. 10665, p.61, 12 Oct. 1753.
The pressure of events caused some change in the regulations pertaining to workers in the dockyards. In 1742 provision was made to allow shipwrights and caulkers to work in their meal-times. Three years later it was enjoined that they return to work within the common time allowed for dinner. At the same time it was decided that they be allowed the same extra time as the artificers; but a condition was imposed, that only a sufficient number be employed as was absolutely necessary for keeping pace with the artificers.

It was evident that much extra work was being done often out of necessity to meet specific objectives. The Navy Board defended the extra work generally:

It greatly contributes towards forwarding the work of the yards in general and is the best means we can think of for keeping the several artificers in His Majesty's service, who otherwise would quit the same on account of the great encouragement and punctual payment they would meet with in the merchant yards and this sort of augmenting their pay in time of war may easily be reduced in time.

104. Ibid., pp.262,263, 20 Aug. 1745.
105. For example, with reference to the provision of more sloops, see Adm. 106/2181, p.137, 2 Apr. 1745. It gave rise to the problem of remuneration; see Baugh, op. cit., p.328.
Working extra was allowed only in exceptional cases. Adm. 106/2180, p.116, 27 Feb. 1744.
Economy in the matter of dockyard wages was evident early in the war. When labourers were employed to work on Sundays they were to be allowed common day wages only, not an extra allowance. Ind. 10664, 1 Feb. 1739.
They were to be allowed extra, however, when working on board ships at Spithead.
It was a continuing problem. Extra work had to be approved by the Navy Board in 1744. Ind. 10665, p.116, 19 Feb. 1744. There was an enquiry as to the amount of the extra work, ibid., 8 Apr. 1747. All extra work was discontinued.
of peace.\textsuperscript{106}

There were several measures intended to ensure greater effort from the workmen.\textsuperscript{107} This was consistent with the attempts to employ more men in the dockyards to meet changing requirements;\textsuperscript{108} the same applied to the ropeyards.\textsuperscript{109}

It was also consistent with the reason advanced for the strike of the smiths at Deptford Yard in August 1744, it being reported that:

\begin{quote}
the smiths ... had left their work on account that some of them were mulcted for neglect of their duty.\textsuperscript{110}
\end{quote}

Professor Baugh has listed the underlying causes of discontent. In particular non payment of wages seems to have been a contributory factor in trouble at Chatham.\textsuperscript{111} Supporting evidence on the importance of pay was furnished early in 1747:

\begin{quote}
We have already felt and shall every day be more and more sensible of the effects of this heavy debt ... we apprehend it will be impossible for us to go on another year without a very considerable sum of money to discharge [inter alia] ... the great debt due to the Kings Yards, the artificers of which are now grown so subject to clamour for want of pay, that it is with the greatest difficulty we can keep them to their work.\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

The Navy Board's reaction to the strikes illustrated the attitude

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{106} Adm. 106/2182, p.417, 2 Feb. 1747.
\item This was consistent with attempts to procure as many shipments as possible at the start of the war. Ind. 10665, p.419, 9 Oct. 1741, 29 Apr. and 10 Nov. 1752.
\item \textsuperscript{107} Baugh, op. cit., pp.311,313,314,334,339.
\item \textsuperscript{108} Ibid., pp.224,322.
\item \textsuperscript{109} Ibid., p.287.
\item \textsuperscript{110} Adm. 106/2180, p.384, 31 Aug. 1744.
\item \textsuperscript{111} "The money voted for the service of this year being already near expended", Adm. 106/2181, p.383, 10 Oct. 1745.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Adm. 106/2182, p.417, 2 Feb. 1747.
\end{itemize}
which the workmen encountered. It was hoped that orders would be given to garrison commanders near the yards to help ships take the smiths in order to their serving on the ships. Measures would be taken to have ironwork supplied from contractors. This was consistent with the reaction to the ropemakers strike in 1745, which broke the determination of the strikers. It was also mirrored in the reaction to the Chatham shipwrights and apprentices strike of the same year; such as appeared foremost in the disturbances were to be marked "that when proper opportunity offers we may punish them as they deserve". The same desire for economy caused the curtailment of work in the yards in 1747, and the run down of the work force.

There was little change in the practical work of the yards. It was decided that apprentices should be taken on six weeks trial before their indentures were made out, in order that their behaviour might be assessed. Arrangements were made to have artificers working in task

113. In relation to the strike at Portsmouth in 1742, the Admiralty received a report from the Commissioner there, Hughes, of the workmen who were very active in the riot. The Admiralty ordered that these be discharged and not re-engaged "in any of His Majesty's yards on any pretence". Adm. 95/91, p.368, 22 Jan. 1743.
118. Adm. 49/54, p.258, 13 Mar. 1749. Officers of the yards were ordered to discharge servants and not to bear any thereafter. Adm. 106/2185, p.352, 21 Dec. 1750. There was a restriction on the type of labourers to be employed in the yards. No person over 40 nor less than 20 was to be taken on. Ind. 10665, p.245, 31 Oct. 1751. For a continued example, see Ind. 10665, p.389, 16 Feb. 1753. Those who died were not to be replaced.
The Navy was concerned about metalwork, timber and sails, the three items vital for the efficient working of the dockyards. In 1751 the Board decreed\textsuperscript{120} that a particular and distinct account should be kept of all iron materials and necessaries issued or supplied, for carrying on the work at the Forge; the account was to specify all work done and its value. It was to be regularly submitted and charged to the Storekeeper; the object was to enable the Navy Board to compare the costs with work done by contractors for the same work on similar projects.

Professor Baugh commented upon the increase in ironwork prepared in the dockyards.\textsuperscript{121} One of the anticipated advantages had been the saving that would be made. This proved illusory, the Navy Board having for some time past received frequent accounts of embezzlement of great quantities of new iron, which the care of all the officers has not been able to prevent.

A computation of the actual costs between 1 Jan. 1747 and 31 Dec. 1750 compared with the costs which would have been incurred by contract for the same period indicated that work by contract would have been cheaper by some £17,000. The proposal therefore was made that a return be made to work by contract.\textsuperscript{122} When it came to implementing the proposal the

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., p.264, 23 Mar. 1755. Adm. 49/54. See also Baugh, \textit{op. cit.}, p.331. After the war the number of joiners was reduced as much as possible; it was not recommended that working by task be adopted. Adm. 106/2186, p.127.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., p.279, 20 May 1751. Adm. 49/54.

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Op. cit.}, pp.284-5. This was reflected in the favourable conditions relating to wages afforded to the blacksmiths during the year. Ind. 10665, p.39, orders dated 23 July 1740, 4 Nov. 1741, 10 May 1748.

\textsuperscript{122} Adm. 106/2185, p.452, 24 Apr. 1751.
Navy Board found that it had underestimated the cost of contract work. The Navy Board dropped the proposal and determined to "put the same under such a regulation for the future as may prevent the abuse and embezzlements so frequently complained of".\(^{123}\) In the following year, orders were given to the Purveyor that, when qualifying timber which was fit for ships, he was to insert the rates for which certain pieces were suitable. For particulars on all clauses the last contract was to be consulted. In these other clauses it was directed that the Purveyor was to exercise his judgement.\(^{124}\)

It had been ordered in 1715 that work on sails be of the best kind and to the satisfaction of the inspecting officers.\(^{125}\) The regulation of 1753 sought to make that inspection more stringent, and the penalties for abuse more severe.\(^{126}\) The Master Attendant and the Clerk of the Survey were to open up the sail loft frequently or "as often as their duties will permit". They were to look out for "irregular bad sewing, stitching or insufficient workmanship or use of sharp nuckles". The penalties were to be an adequate reduction of the offender's wages:

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\(^{123}\) Ibid., p.491, 26 June 1751.

\(^{124}\) Ibid., p.285, 11 March 1752. Adm. 49/54. This was consistent with increased care for timber during the war. Ind. 10665, p.341, 23 July 1744, 1 Aug. 1746. Caution was evident when the timber was delivered. No defective timber was to be received except by the consent of all officers concerned. Ind. 10665, 13 May 1751.

\(^{125}\) Ibid., p.277, 25 Aug. 1715. For orders relating to the sails to be made and fitted for ships during the war, see Ind. 10664, orders from the Navy Board, 23 June 1740, 12 Sept. 1740, 5 & 13 March 1741.

\(^{126}\) Ibid., p.277, 19 Sept. 1753. Other regulations did not change. See also, Adm. 106/2186, p.127. The Navy Board found that working by task had unfortunate consequences when the sails were made by contract.
"anyone incorrigible ... through negligence or incapacity" was to be discharged from the service. The stated reason for these regulations was "that the men may be kept duly employed".

A similar picture emerged in relation to victualling. Most of the additional instructions to the Clerk of the Bakehouse at the Port of London had been issued during that same period, 1716-21.\textsuperscript{127} Several difficulties arose, however, during the course of the war of 1739-48 which required further action. At the very start of the war, the Clerk complained of the lack of able workers to be employed as mates at the ovens. The Board agreed to his suggestion that the mates be paid more, as an incentive to recruitment, and ordered that this come into immediate effect. At the same time it demanded greater efficiency in the running of the Bakehouse.\textsuperscript{128}

The Board was also concerned to prevent the wastage of goods.\textsuperscript{129} There were attempts to keep up the quality of raw materials. In 1742 the Clerk of the Bakehouse was suspended for accepting peas of inferior quality.\textsuperscript{130} In the dockyards there was concern about the use of inferior quality tar.\textsuperscript{131}

Of the orders relating to goods, the greatest part referred to the problem attaching to the disposal of old goods. There was an unsuccess-

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Ibid.}, Adm. 49/59, p.241, et. seq.
\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Ibid.}, 11 Apr. 1739; and see Adm. 49/56 for 11 Apr. 1739.
\textsuperscript{129} Adm. 49/59, 18 Aug. 1742, and see also, Adm. 49/56 for 18 Aug. 1742. See also, Adm. 49/59, 24 Nov. 1742; and Adm. 49/56 for the same date. \textit{Ibid.}, Adm. 49/59, 24 Nov. 1742.
\textsuperscript{130} Baugh, \textit{op. cit.}, p.425.
\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Ibid.}, p.280.
\end{footnotes}
ful attempt to embezzle old goods at Deptford. There was a reference to frauds at Portsmouth concerning the sale and delivery of old stores. Commissioner Hughes made enquiry. His report indicated that there was no need to introduce new regulations:

If the officers attend the delivery of the old stores agreeable to the orders which we constantly send them and if the Commissioners of the Out Ports will see the same complied with, it would effectually take away the occasion of any future complaint.

As might have been expected these were more numerous after the peace than before it. In 1746 the Navy Board gave orders that sea beer be issued since it would not keep in store. The Navy Board was in part concerned with the revenue to be gained from the sale of goods. Hence it set a price on old meat which the agent was directed to sell. An order was issued requiring the early submission of accounts of the sale of provisions. Again, and indicative of the attention to detail

132. Adm. 106/2185, p.61, 21 Nov. 1749. The possibility of fraud was ever present and steps were taken to prevent the possibility; for example, it was ordered that particular care be taken that no erasements in words or figures appear in bills. Ind. 10665, p.109, 31 May 1742.

133. Fraud was difficult to determine: purchases of old stores, especially old guns of iron, were given an allowance over and above their just weight. In the Ordnance Remnant was prosecuted for taking such an allowance unofficially; see above p.62. Ind. 10665, p.322, 22 Apr. 1752.

134. Ibid., p.155, 3 Mar. 1749. See also, ibid., p.175, 20 Mar. 1749.

135. To encourage persons to discover embezzlement of stores a reward equal to one third of the value of the stores discovered was to be given to the person giving that information. Ind. 10665, p.101, 17 Oct. 1752.


137. Ibid., 1 Aug. 1748.

138. Ibid., 5 July 1748.
which was required by the Board, in 1751 agents and storekeepers were ordered to be present at the dispatch of provisions to London.139

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Changes in the navy have been shown to follow a similar pattern to that evident in relation to the Ordnance and the army, namely that apparent deficiencies were identified and corrected, but that basic problems remained undisturbed. Strictures to observe existing orders more closely and improvements in the working of the dockyards were attempts to make the existing system operate more effectively rather than strike out new ground. As Professor Baugh pointed out the problem of recruiting was incapable of solution within the existing political climate; problems of dockyard efficiency were really beyond the technical facilities and administrative standards of the eighteenth century. It would have been unreasonable to expect more far reaching measures than were actually taken.

139. Ibid., 6 May 1751.
SECTION TWO

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ORDNANCE, ARMY AND NAVY

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Chapter Six: The Army p.276
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CHAPTER FIVE

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ADMINISTRATION

OF THE ORDNANCE 1739-1754
Difficulties: - scope of commitments - England - Ireland - Flanders - colonies - allies; Nature; internal difficulties - financial control - no monopoly over supply - shortage of money; suppliers; multiple demands.

First crisis: - supply of arms in 1739 - cause of shortage - shortage in 1740-41; quality of arms unsatisfactory; insufficient men; expenditure on garrisons overseas.


Third crisis: - shortage of men in 1747 - shortage of powder; Joint Battering Train - agreement - difficulties - neglect of overseas garrisons.

Effect of peace: - reduction in commitments - difficulties over Joint Battering Train; reform of Ordnance - control over records - emphasis on economy - extent of work on fortifications.
The performance of the Ordnance in the years 1739 to 1754 was not an unmitigated failure:¹ points in favour of the Ordnance can readily be found, even in those areas where the Ordnance could be justly criticised. Neither uniformly efficient nor inefficient, its rather haphazard methods meant that on some occasions it saw and remedied the causes of problems and on other occasions it did neither.

Many factors outside the Ordnance could be adduced, if not to explain away its failures then at least to put its performance in perspective. It experienced the difficulties which troubled the administrations of the army and the navy, and in addition had the peculiar problem of being in an inferior position because it was giving a service. The Duke of Montagu had a clear idea of his function:

His Majesty having honoured me with the office of Master of Ordnance it is my ... duty to use my utmost endeavours that nothing may be wanting for his Service that can be required from the nature of my office.²

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¹ Dr. Middleton placed the rôle and effectiveness of the Ordnance in perspective for a later period, op.cit. p.303.

² Compared with the military and naval department, the Ordnance Board appears to have discharged its main responsibilities with a minimum of fuss or inconvenience. There were few serious failures in supply, even in America. Perhaps it was fortunate that few of its fortifications were seriously put to the test. Indeed, the preparations made in 1756 and 1759 appear to modern eyes to have been casual in the extreme. The Board was slow to assess the danger and even slower to act. However, it must be remembered that the great criterion of eighteenth-century administration was not speed or efficiency, but integrity. Although concern for procedure often dominated the Board's thinking, it did not prevent it from executing its responsibilities in a manner that compares favourably with the other departments of state.

The inferior position of the Ordnance was reflected in the lack of regard paid to its military personnel. It was felt necessary for a warrant to be issued indicating that the impression that "the commission officers of our artillery bear no rank in our army, and have no right to be treated or considered as officers of the same" was wrong and to be remedied. There appears to have been little change in the position. In April 1750 it was felt necessary to issue a warrant directing that officers of the regiment of artillery should take rank in the army according to the dates of their commission. The Board of Ordnance wrote to remind the Duke of Newcastle about the continuing problem eight months later in view of the "frequent complaints of the difference made betwixt the artillery people and the rest of the army, particularly in the West Indies".

The effect of the civil branch of the Ordnance's not performing its job was immediate and its worth was judged by the effect of its mistakes. Formal procedures and the difficult conditions were not of as much importance as efficiency. The war presented a special challenge to the Ordnance at three phases; the initial equipment of the armed forces; the shock of the 1745 rebellion at home when the Ordnance could have reasonably expected by then to have survived the impact of the war; and the years of continuing war prior to the peace when the length of the conflict would test the strength of the department's organisation. The task of dealing with the aftermath of the war was a larger one than confronted the other two services; and yet if the Ordnance was to perform efficiently in the next conflict, it should have used the period of peace prior to the Seven Years War in preparation.

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3. S.P. 41/36, undated except for the year 1744, King to Generals, Commanders in Chief, Master General of the Ordnance, and Secretary of War. The location in the bundle suggests a date of May 1744. It was also felt necessary to draw attention to the honours to be paid to the Master General. W.O. 26/20 p.366, 5 Oct. 1745.

It is argued in this chapter that the Ordnance's performance should be assessed in the light of the difficult conditions, that it performed well in the first phase of crisis, that it can be criticised for inaction during the second and third phases, but that however much better it might have done, yet it did not let down the war effort seriously; it muddled through.

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The offices responsible for the conduct of war in the eighteenth century in general were in the unfortunate position of being faced with the problems of scope and complexity of war more common in later centuries, without the benefits of later technical advances. The solution for the army and the navy was the expedient of giving effective control to local commanders; the central organisation could act afterwards in the event of failure or abuse. Such a solution, possible for military problems, did not lend itself readily to the problems of supply.

Demands of war and geography were factors outside human control.\(^5\) They added to faults within the Ordnance itself and in the bodies with which it had to deal.

Throughout the war the Ordnance was called upon to supply in large quantities arms and other stores to many theatres. The range of materials ordered, for instance, for Cathcart's expedition, gives some indication of

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5. For an indication of the difficulties facing the army in general and the problem of command in particular, see C. G. Cruickshank *op. cit.*, pp.45, 61.
the scope of the work of the branch. The equipment of forces in Britain was customary. From 1739, whenever there was an augmentation to, or an introduction of, a regiment the Ordnance was to supply new arms. In the course of 1740 and 1741 all regiments were issued with new arms. In the eight months between the July of 1739 and February 1740 some 28,000 muskets were issued, not counting over 2,000 issued to garrisons and marching companies. After this initial outlay the Ordnance was called on to equip new companies like the twelve new independent companies of foot in June 1747. The 1745 rebellion posed a larger demand still. In four months in 1745 there were issued out of store 47,000 muskets and bayonets. These were for the use of towns like Newcastle, Carlisle and Berwick, and for the county-raised troops. This supply of arms to people outside should not obscure the real increase in the strength of the garrisons at the time in response to the rebellion. Even with the end of the rebellion the demands on the Ordnance at home did not cease. Arms were lost and regiments had to be supplied by the central government.

6. W.O. 55/424 Duke of Newcastle to Master General 14 March 1739. The impact of Cathcart's expedition was reflected in its cost in relation to other items of expenditure of the Ordnance. See Appendix C. For details of the demands imposed by the fitting of an artillery train for service in the Netherlands, see W.O. 55/424, f.80, 29 May 1742. For other specialist activities, see W.O. 55/508, pp.16,55,61 and 103.

7. It was ordered on 27 Jan. 1740, W.O. 4/35, p.401, that marine regiments were to provide themselves with tents and other camp equipment. The Ordnance had other responsibilities concerning trains for the defence of Britain. For the details see S.P. 41/36, 18 Mar. 1741, Duke of Montagu to Duke of Newcastle. This also records the change in the structure of the home establishment. For a proposal for the school for instructing artillery people, see S.P. 41/36, 19 Mar. 1741. Same to same.

8. See Appendix C, Table 2.

9. S.P. 41/36, 2 July 1741, Yonge to Stone.

10. For an analysis, see S.P. 41/36, 28 Mar. 1740, Master General to Duke of Newcastle.


12. This was against the spirit of the regulations, see above p.49, see also W.O. 47/36, p.152, 14 Sept. 1750, warrant and order in council.
If no Scotsmen fled the country with quantities of arms it is interesting to speculate where the missing items went. Herein might lie an explanation not only for Cumberland's attitude to the Highlanders and the Government's fears of the Scots which lingered for the next three or four years, but also the material precautions which were taken.¹³

England was not the only drain on resources of the Ordnance at home. Authorities in Ireland requested the supply of many arms during the war. The importance of this demand lay not in the size but in the timing. There were two significant demands in the critical months of 1745, the Lord Lieutenant wanting 20,000 muskets and 10,000 broad swords for the Irish militia. Presumably this was a direct effect of the rebellion. Also there were requests in the November of that year for 1,200 muskets for the replacements for men drafted to Flanders.¹⁴ The first demand could be dismissed as not being vitally important. The other was more difficult to refuse since it had a direct relevance to England's military capability.

England had, in Flanders, an endless drain on its resources.¹⁵ Typical of the ad hoc arrangements which the Ordnance had to meet was the order to "entertain in our service a battalion of Swiss to be commanded

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¹³ This is a view which would have found favour with Mr. James Oswald, an opponent of the government. According to him the French knew that if arms and ammunition were supplied to the north of Scotland "the inhabitants themselves might probably make them masters of a great part of the island, and give our government here such an interruption as would for one campaign at least, prevent our being able to give any great assistance to our friends upon the continent". Cobbett, Parliamentary History 1743-47, c.1365, Debate in the Commons on the Causes of the Progress of the rebellion, 28 October, 1745, cc.1363-1382.

¹⁴ S.P. 41/37, 23 Nov. 1745, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu. How deeply the Master General felt the problem was indicated by a note which he wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, ibid., 26 Nov. 1745.

¹⁵ For details of what was sent to the Austrian Netherlands, see S.P. 41/36, 15 May 1742, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu. See also Appendix C, Tables 1 & 2.
by Colonel Lewis Dejean". The Ordnance had to face the problem of the
defence of Ostend; they considered a report by Ligonier on a proposal
from the States General. More generally, there were large demands by
British forces fighting there in addition to the demands of the artillery
train. Regiments needed to be re-equipped after battles. This commit­
ment did not take account of the Joint Battering Train supplied jointly
by the British and the Dutch. As with Ireland the point about the
commitment in Flanders was its effect as part of the whole. For instance,
in August 1745 at the very time that England needed its own arms to
defend itself 5,000 muskets, with bayonets and cartouch boxes, were
required in Flanders. In March 1747 a quantity of firearms, gunpowder,
musket balls, tent poles, mallets and pins were sent over to the Low
Countries.

The effect of these demands was greater because of the requirements
of forces in the West Indies. At the very time that the Ordnance was
trying to re-equip the British regiments in 1741 it was having to supply
Cathcart's expedition with arms; this was rapidly followed by Blakeney's
expedition. When an expedition was equipped the range of goods to be
supplied was vast. Given that Cathcart's was the first expedition of the
war it was small wonder that some items were neglected. In addition,

18. Ibid., 2 April 1745. Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
19. For an example see W.O. 55/353, pp.109,110, 20 Feb. 1748, Duke
of Bedford to Duke of Montagu, and 22 Feb. 1748, Duke of Newcastle
to Duke of Montagu.
20. For details about the establishment and subsequent history of
this Joint Battering Train see below pp.257-9, 26h-7.
21. These were cartridge boxes; see Scouller, op. cit., pp.150-1.
22. S.P. 41/37, 20 Aug. 1745, Board of Ordnance to A. Stone, Secretary
to the Lords Justices.
Montagu.
Also see Appendix C, Tables 1 & 2.
reinforcements were made to the West Indies island fortifications especially in Jamaica.\textsuperscript{25} The Ordnance supplied and equipped forces raised in America to serve in the West Indies.\textsuperscript{26} When several items described as camp necessaries were wanted for St. Clair's regiment, which had been ordered to the West Indies, the point was made that all other regiments in that service had been allowed the same;\textsuperscript{27} the demand was as insistent as it was constant.

Other colonies were not neglected, and the Ordnance could not disregard them in calculating its commitment. South Carolina and Georgia received goods; one episode indicated the difficulties involved.\textsuperscript{28} The Ordnance could be called upon at any time. In 1746 the Ordnance had to consider a proposal for an expedition against the French settlements in North America and the immediate sending of a body of troops for that purpose.\textsuperscript{29}

Nor did this help for the colonies cease with the advent of peace. In April 1749 the Ordnance was asked for stores and an engineer for the new colony in Nova Scotia together with a sufficient number of mattress.\textsuperscript{30} In the next month there was an additional draft of men and, later, it was represented that the colony needed both small arms and powder for self

\begin{itemize}
\item \begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 23 Oct. 1740, Order being part of a synopsis in S.P. 41/36 of Account of Stores in War directed to be sent to the Plantations by Orders of His Majesty in Council between March 1738 and August 1741.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Ibid., Warrant dated 1 July 1740. 500 muskets were sent for the use of the Independent Companies at Jamaica, 10 July 1740, and 1,000 were ordered for Lord Cathcart on October 9th.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 5 Sept. 1741, Mr. Wilson to Board of Ordnance; copy to Secretary at War, 8 Sept. 1741.
\item \textsuperscript{28} S.P. 41/36, 26 Jan. 1740, Duke of Argyll to ? See also Appendix C, Table 2.
\item \textsuperscript{29} S.P. 41/37, 28 Mar. 1746, Duke of Bedford to Duke of Montagu.
\item \textsuperscript{30} W.O. 55/353, p.291, 15 April 1749, Comm. Plantationsto Duke of Bedford. See also W.O. 55/353, p.299, 3 May 1749, Board of Ordnance to Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations.
\end{enumerate}
\end{itemize}
defence against the Indians. Wherever there was any fighting, or likelihood of fighting, the Ordnance was involved. It was for that same reason that in 1755 the Board was again under pressure, all departments having requirements to be satisfied at the same time.

Not only did the Ordnance have to supply Britain's own expeditions. A proportionately small, but important part of its resources was spent in assisting allies. The Austrians in Flanders asked for and were given a supply of powder at a stage when the Ordnance was worried about the availability of powder for its own use. Hanoverians and Hessians were supplied with ammunition. Even such insignificant persons as the Alcaide of Tetuan received powder. The largest drain on resources from this source seems to have been the King of Sardinia who received supplies in each year between 1745 and 1748.

Next to the size and frequency of demands, nature was the largest obstacle facing the Ordnance. In the arms supply crisis of 1740, the Board pointed out:

> What an interruption all sorts of business met with from the severity of the late frost, how long it continued, and what damage was done to mill work and engines of all kinds, which required time to repair and make good the same. The severity and long continuance of the frost last winter ... prevented for several months the working of the water mills employed in forging of muskets and making gun powder has prevented the magazines from being supplied with small arms and powders fully as ...... they should be.

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31. For the expense caused by the new settlement see W.O. 47/37, f.177, 18 Feb. 1750. See also W.O. 55/353, p.298, 22 April 1749, Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations to Principal Officers of the Ordnance.
32. S.P. 41/37, 24 June 1746, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu. The practice of issuing stores to foreign troops was consistent with practice in Queen Anne's war. Orders were given that powder be drawn from the Joint Battering Train.
33. In the Seven Years War the problem still existed of contractors sending arms overseas, Middleton op. cit., p.285.
34. S.P. 41/36, 28 May 1740, Board of Ordnance to Master General.
35. Ibid., 26 Nov. 1740.
The contractors for peat had to lay in a year's supply at once. In the winter of 1744, and again in 1748, severe frosts caused the powder mills to cease production for six to eight weeks. The Ordnance was so short of powder that it had to be purchased from abroad.

Abroad, weather was an important factor. Fortifications in the West Indies were easily ruined through long exposure to the elements, and gun carriages were affected; several items of the accoutrements for Colonel Duroyre's regiment of foot in the Leeward Islands were affected by the heat and the sea water. The climate killed as many men as the enemy, if not more, during the whole of the century in the West Indies. In the relatively short period of Cathcart's expedition the damage caused by the enemy was minimal but the climate accounted for 60 artillery men and artificers.

In the Mediterranean the climate caused the rapid deterioration of bedding, and inadequate means of communication and transport caused

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37. See Appendix C, Tables 1 & 2.
39. See also W.O. 4/44, 3 Sept. 1747, Fox to Robinson, with reference to the Walcheren expedition; see also ibid., p.33, 1 Sept. 1747, Lloyd to Churchill, and p.36, 1 Sept. 1747.
40. In these conditions men were reluctant to serve overseas. There is mention of the possibility of a mutiny on board the ship carrying 150 recruits to General Cornwallis' regiment in Nova Scotia; S.P. 41/20, 2 May 1750, Lloyd to Aldsworth.
41. S.P. 41/38, 1 Nov. 1751, Board of Ordnance to Fox.
additional problems. The dispersed nature of the garrisons at Minorca meant that a different system of supplying bedding had to be devised.\(^{42}\) A similar difficulty, concerning the collection of materials, applied in the Bahamas.\(^{43}\) There was the same problem in North Britain over the inspection of arms.\(^{44}\) Communications with the centre were hampered. Ledgers from Minorca completed in December 1741 had still not arrived in London six to eight weeks later.\(^{45}\) Correspondence and transfer of goods across the Atlantic could take considerably longer than this. In practical terms, it meant that unless expeditions were properly equipped in the first instance, and supplies were delivered at the first attempt, any corrective measures could be so long delayed as to reveal serious gaps in the administration at local level. This was a serious situation for both the army and the navy, where in tight circumstances the local representative could act;\(^{46}\) it was in the nature of the Ordnance's rôle as central supplier that there was little that could be done locally. Hence the complaints about bad organisation in Wentworth's expedition when there was a shortage of engineers and tent equipment.\(^{47}\)

The Ordnance also had to face problems common to suppliers in all ages: the need to plan ahead, as with the storehouses in Jamaica,\(^{48}\) con-

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42. For details of the system, see S.P. 41/38, 1 Nov. 1751, Board of Ordnance to Secretary at War, and ibid., 13 Dec. 1751, same to Earl of Holdernesse. Previously no-one was responsible, S.P. 41/38, 3 Aug. 1751, Secretary at War to Board of Ordnance.
43. S.P. 41/36, 18 Oct. 1743, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
45. Ibid., 16 Feb. 1742, Board of Ordnance to Master General.
46. For instance Churchill ordered storekeepers to issue stores. W.O. 55/354, p.31, 10 Sept. 1751, Holdernesse to Board of Ordnance.
47. For an example of how the Ordnance coped, see S.P. 41/36, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu, 5 Sept. 1741; for the supply of tents to the expedition, see ibid., 12 June 1740, Secretary to Lords Justices to Duke of Montagu.
48. S.P. 41/36, 10 July 1742.
sideration of natural processes like the seasoning of timber, fluctuations of demand, fluctuations in prices which affected the purchasing power of the Ordnance when Parliament was reluctant to increase the vote, and unseen costs more real than apparent. The Ordnance pointed out, when submitting one estimate, that the mortar and workmanship cost more than the timber and bricks. Typical of the problems was that referred to in a letter of 1743:

...there are no contractors for supplying materials but the same are collected from all parts of the Islands [the Bahamas], at different prices, nor any undertakers for performing great works, but the whole is executed by day work.

Again there was the economic difficulty, as opposed to procedural considerations, caused by dealing with such a large area. It was cheaper to make gun carriages individually in the Bahamas than to make them in England and transport them. If the task were to be performed as cheaply as possible the amount of trouble caused could well be greater than merely by following precedent.

One stage depended upon another and the whole was only as good as the weakest of the constituent parts. This led the Board of the Ordnance to defend its position by saying that delivery dates could not be guaranteed.

49. For example see ibid., 28 May 1740, Board of Ordnance to Master General.
50. When the Ordnance was at a disadvantage it had to offer to pay contractors ready money. See S.P. 41/36, 28 May 1740, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu. When the Board was not so hard pressed it could afford to adopt a more ruthless approach to contracts. See above p.71.
51. S.P. 41/36, 8 Mar. 1743, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
52. The Bahamas were referred to; Ibid., 18 Oct. 1743, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
53. W.O. 55/354, p.82. Undated memorial of John Tusher, to the King in Council, referring to expenditure which he had undertaken. For the ordinary position, see ibid., p.84, 27 Mar. 1744, Board of Ordnance to J. Tinker.
54. S.P. 41/36, 28 May 1740, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu. For the purchase of guns for the defence of Cork see W.O. 55/353, p.27, 16 June 1747, Lord Harrington to Duke of Montagu.
Subject to the occurrence of the unexpected in a crisis the Ordnance was dependent for information on its local engineer and for authority to act on the King or the Lords Justices.

The Ordnance, therefore, would necessarily have experienced difficulties in its operation. Each of the problems was expressed by the officials of the Ordnance during the war. In addition, the particular nature of the Ordnance's procedure in these years also created difficulties which were not so well understood. There were three main areas. Before 1749 the financial procedure made it impossible for the department to account immediately for the Parliamentary grant. This was one of the reasons advanced for tightening up the financial procedure after the war. The supply system was deficient in that the Ordnance did not have a monopoly and yet was expected to supply arms and goods as though it did. Commanding officers, individuals, the Irish garrison and even foreign countries could buy British arms and powder, until after the war when there was a ban imposed. There was one case where the spirit of private enterprise was so dominant over national interest that arms were sold at Penzance to private individuals subject to the approval of the Duke of Newcastle; when the Ordnance decided that it should have first claim on them the purchasers

55. For instance, the Board realised the relationship between demands made by them and by individual customers. "In case Mons. Bentinck or the States Agent have already purchased or even agreed for any quantity of powder with the powderrakers employed by His Majesty it would then be imprudent to make any issue from His Majesty's Magazines as there will be an impossibility of replacing it for some considerable time". S.P. 41/37, 28 Aug. 1747, Board of Ordnance to Earl of Chesterfield.

56. See above pp.58-74.

57. The Ordnance itself suggested this. S.P. 41/36, 25 Mar. 1740.

58. S.P. 41/38, 15 Oct. 1755, Board of Ordnance to Earl of Holdernesse. For laws passed relating to gunpowder from James I to the end of George II's reign, see B.M. 1480, b.b. 13, Abstract of Laws relating to the Ordnance, pp.67-87.
tried to make a profit on the re-sale. This example, not important in itself, demonstrates the point of potential danger. It was this free access to supplies which allowed potentially hostile Scottish towns like Aberdeen and Montrose to buy arms in the name of self defence before the 1745 rebellion. Even if the government was loath to monopolise the supply of arms, there was a case for the institution of a scale of priorities. Thirdly, the system of supply was undermined by a fundamental defect in the system for payment. Suppliers favoured being paid in cash rather than delayed payment by government bill. In November 1745 the Master General said that the supplying of the great demand of all parts of the country for this reason was the cause of supplies to the Ordnance being held up. There was no move towards a system of state supply nor an attempt at speedier cash payments.

If there were basic faults in the system not attributable directly to the Ordnance, there were similarly faults in the operation of the system not attributable to them. There was little that the Ordnance could do to ensure that the terms of a contract to supply arms were fulfilled if the contractor proved unworthy of the trust placed in him. Some mistakes therefore were inevitable. In September 1739 there was a contract to supply 1,000 arms per month for twelve months. In the eight months to May 1740 there had been received the grand total of 592. The problem did not diminish. As late as 1755 the Ordnance still found one contractor


60. W.O. 55/353, p.15, 8 May 1747, Duke of Newcastle to Duke of Montagu and iMibid., p.16, 13 April 1747, Petition from Aberdeen to Duke of Newcastle.

61. S.P. 41/37, 23 Nov. 1745, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.

62. S.P. 41/36, 28 May 1740, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
providing bad bedding.  

The attitude of the bodies which the Ordnance had to serve was a factor which exacerbated the difficulties. This was demonstrated early in the war. In 1739 the Master General of the Ordnance informed the Duke of Newcastle of:

> The several steps that were taken relating to her, by which it will appear the Office of Ordnance have not been to blame.

He was referring to a ship loaded with stores for Carolina detained at Portsmouth for the want of a convoy. 

There were many instances of multiple demands of stores. The first example was in connection with Cathcart's expedition. In the original demand no muskets were mentioned at all; when they were ordered it was in two batches, 1500 in July 1740 and a further 1000 in October 1740. There was a similar occurrence with materials supplied for the Flanders campaigns in 1742 and 1744. The Ordnance used its initiative in making good

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63. S.P. 41/38, 11 Aug. 1755, Board of Ordnance to Amyand (Secretary to Lords Justices).
64. The situation pertained at the end of the century: "Thus the administration of the British Army was organised (if that word is not too flattering) on a principle of multiple fission", "cumbrous machinery, and ... lavish scope for interdepartmental frictions". Richard Glover op. cit., p.15.
65. For example in Boscawen's expedition, see S.P. 41/37, 25 Oct. 1747, Duke of Montagu to Andrew Stone.
67. W.O. 55/424, 1 July 1740, Andrew Stone to the Master General of the Ordnance. See also ibid., 2 Sept. 1740 and 9 Oct. 1740, same to same. See also S.P. 41/36, passim for July and October 1740. For a more general demand by warrant see S.P. 41/36, undated although positioned in the unbound bundle of documents after 8 Aug. 1740 and before 11 Sept. 1740, A. Stone to Duke of Montagu.
68. W.O. 55/424, f.80, Lord Carteret to Duke of Montagu. See also ibid., 9 Sept. 1740, and ibid., f.81, 13 Feb. 1744. This recalled a previous series of orders.
deficiencies in arms in the order for Blakeney's expedition.\textsuperscript{69}

The warrants for the provision of bedding for Phillips' regiment came in three stages in eight months between September 1744 and May 1745.\textsuperscript{70} Again, in 1746 in supplying powder to Holland not only was the supplementary demand more than double the initial one in quantity, but it came fifteen days after the first and eleven days after the first had been met.\textsuperscript{71}

Boscawen's expedition required almost daily alterations to the list of stores to be supplied.\textsuperscript{72} There were many examples from North America.\textsuperscript{73}

The Ordnance could also expect some last minute and more unusual demands. Such arose when additions and alterations were made to the establishment of guns and gunners stores for the Royal Navy as in 1745\textsuperscript{74} and when the Marines misused or lost their arms. There was a re-equipment in 1747.\textsuperscript{75} It could expect that, on occasions, essential stores and men would be held up because of the lack of convoys. It could not expect to put up with continual and gross negligence. The Ordnance realised its position. In November 1754\textsuperscript{76} it said that there was scarcely an instance of the Board's not having to use its last minute power of alteration of

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\item \textsuperscript{69} S.P. 41/36, June 1740, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
\item \textsuperscript{70} S.P. 41/37, 15 Feb. 1745, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
\item \textsuperscript{71} S.P. 41/37, 28 Aug. 1747, Board of Ordnance to Earl of Chesterfield.
\item \textsuperscript{72} S.P. 41/37, 25 Oct. 1747, Duke of Montagu to Andrew Stone.
\item \textsuperscript{73} The Ordnance general attitude was summed up in a letter from Montagu to "My Lord", "I must ... beg of your Grace that if it should at any time be resolved that we are to have a train of artillery this year in Flanders you would be so good to give me timely information of it as some time will be requisite to provide horses abroad and many other things to be prepared in relation to it. S.P. 41/37, 24 Feb. 1746.
\item \textsuperscript{74} W.O. 55/353, p.164, 4 Aug. 1748, W. Sharpe memorial to Admiralty; see also W.O. 47/36, p.406.
\item \textsuperscript{75} For details of the extensive re-equipment see W.O. 55/353, p.22, 3 June 1747.
\item \textsuperscript{76} S.P. 41/38, 25 Nov. 1754, Charles Frederick, for the Board of Ordnance, to Claudius Amyand, secretary to the Lords Justices.
\end{itemize}
The Navy was not the only body adding to the Board's inconvenience. On the one hand, it had to fight local prejudices like those of the Governor of Gibraltar. In 1739 he wanted more defences than the Ordnance judged necessary.\textsuperscript{78} Governor Trelawney of Jamaica pressed his claims strongly.\textsuperscript{79} On the other hand, the Ordnance fought restrictions from above. There were many instances of confusion of command above the Ordnance and evidence of lack of knowledge of how the department worked. The main hindrance was the cheeseparing attitude of Parliament.\textsuperscript{80} That ultimately was why the Ordnance could not meet the demands of the Governors of Gibraltar and Jamaica. The ability of the Ordnance to limit its own expenditure was not trusted and there was no inclination to give the department the power which it needed to ensure that trust. Both items were symptomatic of the attitude of Parliament.

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\textsuperscript{77} A 'proportion' in this context was synonymous with the quantity of stores demanded.

\textsuperscript{78} S.P. 41/36, 4 Jan. 1740, Board of Ordnance to ? See also \textit{ibid.}, 4 Oct. 1739, Governor of Gibraltar to Yonge. See also S.P. 41/11, 14 and 25 Sept. 1739. For a change relating to Minorca, see S.P. 41/36, 10 and 12 June 1740, Board of Ordnance to Master General.

\textsuperscript{79} S.P. 41/36, 27 Dec. 1739. For the way in which the Council at Antigua bargained, see S.P. 41/36, Account of Stores of War ordered for the Plantations between March 1738 and August 1741.

\textsuperscript{80} For a good example, see the Debate in the House of Commons on augmenting the army by new regiments, 10 Dec. 1740, Cobbett, \textit{Parliamentary History}, 1739-41, cc.927-91 especially c.976.
Of the three crises which the Ordnance experienced in the years 1739-48 the first, and arguably the most important, concerned the supply of arms at the start of hostilities. The demands for additional arms were many. How far had the Ordnance prepared for the war?

Regarding the number of arms, there is evidence that the Ordnance had prepared a sufficient supply. Sea pattern muskets were made in large quantities in 1738, with production continuing to the declaration of hostilities. In the fifteen months preceding March 1740 it had issued some 28,000 muskets and had been left with half that number in stock. It could well be represented that the Ordnance might reasonably expect the seven month supply to be sufficient and to replace issues with new stocks. Some supplies of goods necessary for making land and sea muskets had been replenished since September 1739 although the numbers were still deficient. The Ordnance hoped that fresh stocks would cover issues. The Board defended its position on the grounds that orders for sufficient work had been lodged. The Board also agreed to pay ready money to contractors as an incentive to speedy service. There was a reference to "other measures which Your Grace [the Master General] knows we have taken ... We have [employed] the hands judged to be the properest on all accounts, both in town and country to forward the same".

At no point after 1740 could the Ordnance feel or be said to be in control of the situation. In May the Board wrote to the Master General:

82. Ibid., 28 May 1740, list attached thereto; Board of Ordnance to Master General.
83. Ibid., 26 Nov. 1740, Montagu to ?
84. Ibid., 28 May 1740, Board of Ordnance to Master General.
Where many persons are employed in such a manner that sickness, or any other accident happening to one might retard and hinder the other, we do not pretend to determine what quantity may be depended on, or at what times, lest it should turn out contrary to expectation, but we cannot suppose that less than 3,000 will be completed by Michaelmas next, unless the want of water should obstruct the same.

This was a very realistic estimate of the position. The Duke of Montagu struck the same note in a letter to the Duke of Newcastle in November of that year:

The very great demand there has been for military stores both for sea and land service has considerably reduced the stock in His Majesty's Magazines, and tho' all proper care was taken for the speedy replenishing of them, the severity and long continuance of the frost last winter which prevented for several months the working of the water mills employed in forging of muskets and making gun powder has prevented the magazines from being supplied with small arms and powder so fully as I wish they should be.

Perhaps a just conclusion would be that the Ordnance took measures to prepare for the war, that these were largely sufficient for the first year or two, but that increasingly the Ordnance realised the shortcomings of supply against demand and fell back on expedients, finding reasons for the failure to provide in advance.

The crisis of supply of arms in December 1739 was precipitated, if not caused, by the large demands. The Board had been asked to supply many categories of soldiers with new English muskets. The existing regiments of foot received additional men who needed to be armed. Several regiments of foot and independent companies were raised. There were six newly raised regiments of marines to arm with new issues in December
1739. Issues totalled 22,500 arms in five months. The pressure of the demands in November and December was indicated by the fact that 3,400 arms were issued in the other three months. These issues reduced the stock of arms to a level which caused the Ordnance concern. The level of anticipated demands made the situation worse. The whole army was to be re-armed, and it was probable that new levies would be made and armed as the scale of the war grew. The Ordnance felt obliged in these circumstances to import ten thousand arms from Holland, the King having authorized the purchase of sufficient to answer all emergencies.

In the March of 1740 the Master General of the Ordnance was afraid that the forecast anticipated demands from some of the regiments in Gibraltar and from the foot guards in Great Britain would very much reduce the state of the arms. The whole tenor of the letter to the Duke of Newcastle was sombre, especially in the face of the demand for stores from Ireland which had caused the enquiry to which the Ordnance was replying:

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88. For details see S.P. 41/36, 13 Dec. 1743, Board of Ordnance to Master General.
89. For details of the Ordnance's eloquent defence of its position, see Ibid., the arms supplied to Guards and other old regiments were English. Newer regiments had the Dutch arms.
91. Arms were issued on augmentation, S.P. 41/36, 15 July 1740, Duke of Montagu to ?
92. See S.P. 41/36, 25 Mar. 1740, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Argyll. The Board piously declared "We are using all possible expedition to replenish his Majesty's Arsenal with new arms". The Board's protestations with reference to arms for Ireland were without effect. 4070 muskets and bayonets and 165 chests were ordered to be delivered out of Ordnance stores. The original request had been for more than that number, ibid., p.214, 3 Jan. 1740. The expense was £6,696. Cal.Treas. Books & Papers, 1739-41, p.52. The Ordnance felt obliged to satisfy part of this demand, being some 2,000 muskets direct from abroad, ibid., p.340; the arms were delivered in May 1741, ibid., pp.462-3, 12 May 1741. Some 5,000 were supplied in 1742, CTR&P, 1742-5, p.188, 26 July 1742.
In obedience to His Majesty's commands signified in Your Grace's letter of the 12th. inst. I send your Grace enclosed a report of the Principal Officers of the Ordnance with an account of what arms have been delivered by the office this last year, and a state of what now remains in store. I believe the calculation they have made of what may still be wanting for the several regiments of Dragoons and Foot in Great Britain is the lowest that can be supposed. I rather apprehend there will be more required .... I am not able to determine how far it would or would not be proper to spare any number at present for Ireland.93

At that time there were supplies in store for seven months based on a calculation of the previous demands.94 Reverses in war could easily and very rapidly drain the resources.95 The fears of the Ordnance could be appreciated.96 It was perhaps at this time that contracts for 6,000 arms mentioned in October 1740 were made.97 This is consistent with a letter from the Secretary to the Lords Justices to the Master General, indicating the Lords Justices order that the Master General98

... should, with the utmost secrecy, immediately send a proper person to Holland, with a pattern of arms, and fully instructed upon the several parts mentioned in Mr. Trevor's letter.

93. S.P. 41/36, 28 March 1740, Duke of Argyll to Duke of Newcastle. His supposition was consistent with the evidence available. The Board of Ordnance estimated for an average of 50 arms being needed for each of the 10 regiments of foot. On the evidence of supplies a year previously a figure of 200-300 could have been defended.
94. Land Muskets in stock on 1 Jan. 1739 numbered 42,121. Between then and 18 Mar. 1740, 28,153 were issued, S.P. 41/36, 18 Mar. 1740.
95. A contract for the delivery of 1,000 arms per month had not been met, ibid., 28 May 1740.
96. In November 1740 Montagu wrote "Considering the great demand there may still be for these two species of stores [guns and powder] so very necessary for the service ...". S.P. 41/36, 28 Nov. 1740, Duke of Montagu to ?
97. See below p.219.
98. S.P. 41/36, 12 June 1740, extract from letter from Mr. Trevor, His Majesty's envoy extraordinary at the Hague, to the Duke of Newcastle, forwarded to the Master General by the Lords Justices.
He had written to the Duke of Newcastle "relating to the number of Fire Arms, that may be purchased in some of the towns of Flanders". Trevor would help in the execution of any purchase. The Master General was to give the necessary orders for action.

In October and November 1740 the Ordnance again felt exposed. In October the Master General wrote that it was pressing for Trevor at the Hague to procure another 10,000 muskets and bayonets. Speed was of the essence. Montagu did not want to leave anything to chance for lack of authority:

Pursuant to the resolution of the Lords Justices yesterday that I should send to Mr. Trevor to contract for 10,000 musquets and bayonets over and above the 6,000 already contracted for, in order to lose no time I have wrote to him about it by this day's past, but as I am in doubt whether he will think himself sufficiently authorized to contract on my [authority] only, and that I think he did require some sort of order or power from the Lords Justices for his entering into the contract for the 6,000 arms ... I wish you would write to him ... by tonight's post that no time may be lost in forwarding the affair.

In the following month, again revealing the extent to which the Ordnance was placed in some degree of difficulty, he advocated the import of ten thousand barrels of powder from Holland:

As gun powder is a store without which all other military provisions are useless and of no effect and consequently a store of which we can't have to[o]

99. Recourse was had to Holland in the Seven Years War. Arms were delivered from Holland on several occasions in 1741, CTB & P. 1739-41, pp.518,524,532,538,543,463.

100. S.P. 41/36, 3 Oct. 1740. Many of the arms were delivered in May 1741, CTB & P, 1739-41, p.463, 12 May 1741.

101. S.P. 41/36, 26 Nov. 1740, Montagu to ? See also, CTB & P. 1739-41, p.344, 9 Dec. 1740.

102. In the next war the supply of gunpowder was less satisfactory, Middleton, op. cit., p.283.
great a quantity beforehand, and that the service may not suffer by any disappointment which may happen as last year by severe and long frosts or by any other unforeseen accidents.

He hoped that this would prove a "sufficient quantity ... with that we have of them making at home to supply all services that can possibly be required". He was at pains to point out how much the plaything of fortune was the Ordnance in this respect. "All proper care was taken for the speedy replenishing of ... [the stocks diminished by] ... the very great demand there has been for military stores both for the sea and land service".

At the same stage in the next year the crisis reappeared. In July 1741 Yonge submitted to the Secretary to the Lords Justices a letter covering Wade's assessment of the types of arms required for the several corps of horse, foot and dragoons which were represented to him as unfit for foreign service. The totals of arms required, if these regiments were sent on foreign service, were substantial. More arms and salt-petre had to be bought from Holland. The request was for 10,000 muskets and bayonets to be bought in Holland. Montagu presumed that the last

103. Although no complaint seems to have been received about the quality of this powder from Holland the Ordnance itself does not appear to have been satisfied. Commenting on the powder which the States General owed to Britain as part of its contribution to the Joint Battering Train the Board advised "The States ought to pay the full price of the best and strongest powder made use of by them in public service, and that it will be disadvantageous to His Majesty to receive it in Nature, as we know by experience it is of a worse fabric and inferior strength". S.P. 41/38, 21 Nov. 1751, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Newcastle.

104. S.P. 41/36, 26 Nov. 1740, Duke of Montagu to Duke of Newcastle.

105. Ibid., 2 July 1741, Yonge to Andrew Stone.

106. Warrants dated October 1741, ibid.

warrant for the same number would serve as a model for the one desired.\textsuperscript{108}

The crises in 1740 and 1741 had several causes. During these years all the regiments were issued with new arms, although initially only to the additional men in each regiment. Additional arms were sent to Gibraltar in 1739 to cater for the first and second augmentations.\textsuperscript{109}

The problem re-occurred in the following year. Yonge wrote to several regiments that they were to be supplied with a new set of arms on surrendering their old.\textsuperscript{110} The need to supply the West Indies made the effect of these demands greater; at the very time that the Ordnance was trying to re-equip the British regiments in 1740-1 it was having to supply Cathcart's and Blakeney's expeditions with arms;\textsuperscript{111} of the charges levelled against the organisation of Cathcart's expedition, not being equipped with sufficient arms was not one. Troops were raised by the governors of the West Indian islands\textsuperscript{112} and had to be supplied with arms.

Small arms were supplied to America.\textsuperscript{113} The reasons advanced for the 1741 demand were indicative of the plight of the Ordnance in each of the first three years of the war. "By the last letter from Oglethorpe I suppose there may be orders soon to send a supply of muskets to Georgia". The four regiments that were to be reduced in America were to leave arms there and would not need re-supplying on their return. It was possible

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\textsuperscript{108} The Ordnance submitted on 14 Aug. 1741 a memorial for permission to land 10,000 muskets bought in Holland to be landed and stored in the Tower, CTB & P, 1739-41, p.551, 30 Sept. 1741.
\textsuperscript{109} S.P. 41/36, 15 July 1740. See here for details of arms in store in Gibraltar. Master General to ?
\textsuperscript{110} W.O. 4/38, p.45, 8 Mar. 1743, Yonge to various regiments. For Blakeney's see S.P. 41/36, 5 Jan. 1740.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 10 July 1740; see here also for July and October passim.
\textsuperscript{112} S.P. 41/36, 5 Jan. 1740. Orders to Governors in the West Indies.
\textsuperscript{113} The financial strain on the Ordnance increased; see, for example, CTB & P, 1739-41, p.503, 6 Nov. 1741.
\end{flushleft}
that some new forces might be raised by the following summer.

The daily demands for arms for sea service is very great and probably by next year new supplies will be wanted for America for other Foreign services, so that the call for Musquets that are, or may be daily expected are so very many that it is hardly possible to get them made at home fast enough to supply all the demands and therefore for fear of accidents it would be extremely necessary to have more arms from Holland than what are already ordered to be made there.\textsuperscript{114}

The demand was great and not entirely foreseeable. The Ordnance advanced its own ignorance as a reason for not being totally in command of the situation.

As the arms of the six regiments of dragoons and the ten of foot are still to be surveyed and it is uncertain in what condition they may be found, we cannot fix the determinate number which may be wanting or their use ... What further demands may be made upon this office for more arms we do not know.\textsuperscript{115}

In addition an analysis of the timing and scale of the demands for arms in the period January 1738 to March 1740 indicates that the demand was constant and cumulative. The Board could have argued that it did not experience the salutary shock of an early shortage to spur them into action, and that the crisis unfolded slowly and inexorably. In this connection, the concern of the Ordnance Board about the inevitability of future commitments which could not be assessed in advance was merely a reflection of similar views expressed in Parliament.\textsuperscript{116} Speaking in a debate in the House of Commons on transferring seven regiments to the British Establishment Winninton is reported as having said that no-one

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\item \textsuperscript{114} S.P. 41/36, 17 Oct. 1741, Duke of Montagu to ?
\item \textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 25 Mar. 1740, Board of Ordnance to Master General.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Cobbett, \textit{Parliamentary History}, 1741-43, c.618, 28 April 1742, and c.912, 6 Dec. 1742.
\end{itemize}
could imagine that Britain had too many troops and that if war continued more troops would need to be raised. The Secretary at War, Yonge, echoed the same sentiments eight months later. In presenting a resolution on continuing British troops in Flanders he said that there was a demand for troops at home in case more troops were sent abroad. New troops would have to be equipped. On the other hand the Board of Ordnance could not derive satisfaction whatever the uncertainties from being forced to re-stock so drastically and so soon after the start of the war.

One assessment would be that the Ordnance had failed to allow sufficient for contingencies and that to guard against unexpected demands it had to buy abroad arms which, with more foresight, it could have provided by more normal means. With the benefit of hindsight it appears, paradoxically, how fortunate was the Ordnance; its plight and that of Britain would have indeed been desperate if the continental war had involved England any earlier.\textsuperscript{117}

Another and attendant criticism against the Ordnance concerned the quality of the arms which it provided. There is evidence that the arms with which the army entered the way in 1739 were not up to standard. The general survey of the army's weapons, with the reports returned to the Ordnance in the September and October of 1740, contain reports similar to that of Handasyde's regiment.\textsuperscript{118} The arms were very old, the date of supply being mainly 1722, although one batch dated back to 1715-19 from

\textsuperscript{117} In the next war, at the start the Board of Ordnance tried to have 50,000 muskets and other weapons constantly in store for immediate use; Middleton, p.282, \textit{op. cit.}, "Deliveries appear to have sufficed".

the Tower; some were even made before 1709. The barrels were never 'clean bored' and the bayonets needed to be refurbished and equipped with new scabbards. New cocks and locks were in most common need of repair.

The report was prepared by two gunsmiths with one of the Principal officers of the Ordnance at some time before January 1739/40.  

When the arms of the regiments were reviewed generally it was reported that:

but very few of the old arms of these regiments are either serviceable or repairable, so that (although it has been unusual for regiments furnished with arms out of His Majesty's stores more than once) I am humbly of opinion it may be for His Majesty's service at this juncture that they be furnished out of His Majesty's magazines with new arms to complete the old establishments, General Barrel's regiment excepted which having had no new arms given them on the last augmentation (their old ones being in store) will require the new arms for their present complement.

Montagu was realistic;

There is very little reason to believe that the old arms complained of belonging to the other six regiments which were ordered to be surveyed are in any better condition.

Speed was of the essence;

As these regiments are now in North Britain, and lie very much dispersed as it would occasion a great expence to send proper persons to survey them, and require a great deal of time, I am humbly of opinion it would be for His Majesty's service that they should be furnished out of His Majesty's stores with new arms to the number of those said to be defective in each regiment ... and all the regiments to return their old arms into store.

The bad state of the arms revealed in the complaints was an indication of the laxity of the Ordnance at the time of initial supply. It would seem

119. For similar details, see the report on General Honeywood's regiment, ibid., dated by internal evidence to pre 26 Jan. 1740.
strange, however, that these conditions could have been tolerated and not investigated for the two years in which a state of war was either imminent or real. This was the more striking in that the arms had "been several times returned into store and delivered to the regiment again" in the period between 1723 and 1739.120

The service provided after that was not without fault. Drafts from Ireland on three occasions meant that arms of three different calibres were used in the same regiment.121 In 1748, when a regiment was being equipped with arms, it obviously expected that the Ordnance might supply old arms of dubious description since it asked that the arms supplied be all of the same type. The lax attitude to the question was demonstrated by the manner of the enquiry in 1741; the Board surveyed only seven regiments and then proceeded to make assumptions on that basis for the other six.122 There is no record of the correct information's being sought, even afterwards, as a confirmation of the need for the action taken.

The Ordnance, therefore, was not as concerned about the state of arms as it should have been. Yet it could have been argued that it was the duty of the regiments to look after their own arms and to complain about the quality of those which they had or which were delivered if any complaint were needed. In fact the enquiry into the condition of the arms of the Marine regiments in 1743 arose in this way.123 The Ordnance could also

121. W.O. 55/354, p.123, 11 May 1752, Amyand to Board of Ordnance. See also the reply by the Board of Ordnance to the Lords Justices, ibid., p.134, 5 Aug. 1752.
122. S.P. 41/36, 10 Nov. 1740, Duke of Montagu to Duke of Newcastle. The reason was the dispersed nature of the regiments throughout North Britain.
123. Ibid., 13 Oct. 1743, Board of Ordnance to Master General.
reply to the charge of neglecting the standard of the arms that in examining the guns it did employ specialists who should not pass, as fit, items which needed replacement.\textsuperscript{124} Evidence of that was in the amount of detail in the reports on the condition of the arms. The Ordnance did try to maintain standards. They claimed to let at least five or six months elapse for the stocks to harden and season before they went forward in the making of the muskets.\textsuperscript{125} They were always ready to experiment in order to maintain and improve designs and standards of weapons.\textsuperscript{126} In addition, when arms had to be supplied from Holland they were made to the English pattern; they were not as well finished, but in performance they were allegedly equal to the English and superior to most purely foreign muskets. "It was universally agreed that they would answer the purpose as well as those [the English muskets] which make a finer appearance".\textsuperscript{127} This assessment proved too optimistic. By October 1743 the arms originally supplied to the ten regiments of marines were represented to be in a very bad condition.\textsuperscript{128} The reply of the Board of Ordnance was that the first six\textsuperscript{129} had received English muskets, but that the other four\textsuperscript{130} supplied with Dutch muskets "had no cause to complain of not being supplied with good and reasonable arms though they did not appear so good to the eye".

\textsuperscript{124} The reports were by gunsmiths and were consistently critical of the quality of the arms. For a list of the instructions to Major Pattison, one of the men who performed the survey, and for details of the organisation, see W.O. 55/1811, pp.1,3,6,7 and 8. \\
\textsuperscript{125} S.P. 41/36, 28 May 1740. \\
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 27 Sept. 1742, Board of Ordnance to Master General. \\
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 13 Oct. 1743. \\
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 13 Oct. 1743, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu. \\
\textsuperscript{129} The regiments were those of Wolfe, Frazer, Lowther, Long, Cockran, and Cotterell. \\
\textsuperscript{130} The regiments were those of Cornwall, Duncomb, Pawlett, and Jeffreys.
The Ordnance suggested that the need for new arms arose from neglect, and argued in support of this idea that no complaint had been made by the seven regiments of foot which had been supplied with foreign arms at the same time as the marines. The Ordnance's argument was badly founded. One of the seven regiments did complain. The result was a general order relating to the seven regiments authorising the replacement of Dutch muskets with English ones as and when necessary.

The four regiments of marines immediately sent a memorial to the Earl of Stair asking for at least 100 new arms for each regiment. The Board of Ordnance charted the decline as they saw it from the former position and advised that greater care be urged on the marines. The Board was reluctant to issue the arms and required a warrant.

This episode would seem to suggest that the foreign arms were not up to standard. On the other hand since the arms of the marines, even British ones, had to be replaced within a further three years it is also possible that the cause of the rapid wear was not the quality of the arms but the treatment which they received. This argument would not apply if the replacement ordered in 1746 were the result of a desire to profit by

131. The regiments were those of Fowke, Long, Houghton, Price, Mordaunt, Cholmondeley, and de Grangues.
132. The Ordnance was supported by the Lords Justices; the Secretary at War wrote that the regiments should pay for the new arms required and for repairing and changing arms grown unserviceable; W.O. 4/38, p.325, 22 Oct. 1743, Baker to the respective colonels of the ten regiments.
133. S.P. 41/36, 5 May 1744, Lord Harry Beauclerk was commanding the regiment formerly commanded by Col. Cholmondeley.
134. Ibid., 5 May 1744, being a draft warrant.
135. Ibid., 12 June 1744, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
136. W.O. 55/353, p.22, 5 June 1747. See also, W.O. 4/43, p.386, 13 June 1747 for the background and the sequel to this episode. Steps were taken to keep the arms in a better state by the appointment of armourers to ships.
the example of free replacement in 1744, rather than a true reflection of
the state of the arms.

There were three occasions during the first years of the war when the
Ordnance was criticised for not supplying sufficient men. In 1740 in
reply to a criticism about the lack of gunners and bombardiers, the
Ordnance pointed out that the garrisons of Minorca and Gibraltar had been
augmented on 1st. April 1740 at the request of the governors, and that
these numbers had been thought sufficient. The Board had prepared the
necessary men and had "taken up a ship to transport them to both places".

Cathcart's expedition was dispatched with allegedly insufficient
engineers. The expedition was short of trained gunners, which was the
Ordnance's fault. On the other hand the Board did send out replacements
for the Artillery people who died on the expedition. In March 1743
there were only 300 qualified personnel to man the Trains of Artillery.
At that time, it was expected that the raising of two new companies would
take over a year. That was by the normal method. Extraordinary action
was needed in view of the need for the raising of two additional companies
"without which it is impossible the service of the Train proposed for the
service at home can be performed". The Master General proposed, with the
consent of the Duke of Newcastle, that he would choose, and not be allocated

137. "The strength of the Ordnance Board's labour force was also
criticised, since like so many other departments, the Ordnance
viewed the war as a merely temporary occurrence." Middleton,
op. cit., p.280.
138. S.P. 41/36, 10 June 1740, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
139. Ibid., 14 July 1741, same to same. See also Ibid., 31 July 1741,
same to same.
200 of the Irish drafts of which there would be over 1500 within 15 miles of London. He wanted speedy sanction:

> for as they will be all together at their rendezvous on Tuesday, I take for granted they will immediately be disposed of, to the several regiments they are to be sent to, and I would have the power of choosing them before that is done, for I know I shall meet with difficulties in doing it afterwards.\textsuperscript{140}

In the defence of the Ordnance it did feel that by October 1741 it had sufficient gunners and engineers skilled in the theory. By the most charitable view, the Ordnance was overtaken by the scale of the war, having had insufficient foresight to make adequate contingency plans. When it did run into difficulties, over numbers, it did try to make the greatest use of people at its disposal. In this context could be seen the immediate transfer of the Artillery people from St. Clair's expedition to the Flanders expedition.\textsuperscript{141}

The Ordnance was criticised over its supplies for Lord Cathcart's expedition. It was said to be responsible for the shortage of various items, notably tents. In defence of the department it must not be forgotten that this was the first large expedition abroad for many years. The necessary equipment for the siege of Havana was approved at a meeting attended by General Wade, Major General Armstrong and Lord Cathcart, in addition to members of the Board of Ordnance.\textsuperscript{142} There were other responsibilities incumbent upon the Ordnance at the same time. There seem to have been no similar complaints about the Flanders expedition. Either the proximity of the conflict made it possible to correct errors easily, or else

\begin{footnotes}
\item[140.] Ibid., 4 March 1744, Duke of Montagu to ?
\item[141.] S.P. 41/37, 1 Apr. 1747, Duke of Montagu to "My Lord".
\item[142.] S.P. 41/36, 16 May 1740, delivered to the Duke of Newcastle on 19 May 1740.
\end{footnotes}
the Ordnance had learned from its mistakes.

The question of how effectively the Ordnance had prepared the garrisons at home and abroad for war had not arisen at this stage.\textsuperscript{143} The Ordnance's attitude seems to have been one of complacency that anything which needed to be done was being done.\textsuperscript{144} The Chief Engineer said in May 1743 that in preparing for the possibility of war with more than one power the Ordnance had filled every magazine in England. He was referring to powder for general service.\textsuperscript{145} In support of his claim it was evident that special provision was being made for the storing of powder at Plymouth,\textsuperscript{146} and that in general other garrisons had powder up to the correct "proportion" in 1738.\textsuperscript{147}

More was being done abroad, although nothing on a major scale compared with the cost of new arms and the commitment in Europe. An analysis of expenditure\textsuperscript{148} indicates that in the early years of the war relatively

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{143} Repairs to forts were under the sole direction of the Ordnance, W.O. 55/425, p.167. The lesson was not learned for the next war. Middleton writes: "The programme of construction during the war, considering the almost constant threat of invasion from France, was surprisingly modest". Op. cit., p.275. The "Board confessed that in spite of attempts to collect data, it had only the scantiest knowledge of the coasts and maritime counties of England". Ibid., p.276.
\item \textsuperscript{144} There was no significant expenditure on garrisons in the first years of the war. See Appendix C. There was a similar attitude in the next war. The invasion threat of 1759 was met by a slow response; Middleton op. cit., p.277.
\item \textsuperscript{145} S.P. 41/36, 10 May 1743, Board of Ordnance to the Admiralty, with supporting papers from Horneck to the Lieutenant General of the Ordnance.
\item \textsuperscript{146} See the petition referred to under S.P. 41/36, 23 June 1743, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu; see also ibid., 28 June 1743, Duke of Montagu to A. Stone, Secretary to the Lords Justices.
\item \textsuperscript{147} See W.O. 49/122, f.158.
\item \textsuperscript{148} For a list of stores sent to the Plantation between 1738 and Aug. 1741 in relation to the total sent since the accession of George II, see S.P. 41/36, 14 July 1741, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu. See also Appendix C, Tables 1 & 2.
\end{itemize}
large sums were spent on Gibraltar and Minorca, that by contrast the West Indian garrisons were rather neglected and that small quantities of goods were assigned to American colonies.\textsuperscript{149} The Ordnance was happy that Minorca was adequately supplied.\textsuperscript{150} In June 1740 the artillery had been augmented and the defences strengthened.\textsuperscript{151} In the following February the Governor of Minorca requested additional supplies of powder. The Ordnance considered the normal supply sufficient.\textsuperscript{152} Nevertheless, additional powder was sent to the island\textsuperscript{153} and additional defences proposed in case of attack.\textsuperscript{154} In the next year, in August 1743, a general order was issued by the Lords Justices requiring Governors, of whom that at Minorca was one, to place the garrisons in a proper state of defence. The Board claimed that it had been exercised by the use made of that order.\textsuperscript{155} It was evident that the Governor was unhappy with the state of affairs as

\textsuperscript{149} In January 1740 supplies were sent to Georgia and South Carolina. No stores had been sent to Virginia, North Carolina, New Jersey, nor New Hampshire. Further information is available under CTB & P, 1742-5, p.522, with respect to Placentia.

\textsuperscript{150} The Lieutenant Governor represented to His Majesty the necessity of supplying Minorca with sufficient quantity of powder and all other Ordnance stores "in case of any attempt upon the said island". The heads of the enquiry ordered by the Duke of Newcastle were full. The Ordnance claimed that great additions had been made to the works and the number of forces had been augmented since the last proportion of Ordnance and stores were settled for Minorca. They therefore proposed a new one taking account of all contingencies which could be put into effect in 9 or 10 weeks. S.P. 41/36, 16 Feb. 1742, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu. No reply had been received by 26 June 1742, \textit{ibid.}, for that date.

\textsuperscript{151} S.P. 41/36, 10 June 1740, Board of Ordnance to Master General.

\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Ibid.}, 17 Feb. 1741, same to same.

\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Ibid.}, 24 Nov. 1741, same to same.

\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Ibid.}, 16 Feb. 1742, same to same. For the Algerian menace to Minorca, see W.O. 1/294, p.393. For the consideration given to a siege of Minorca in 1741, see W.O. 4/37, p.141. There were several occasions during the century when it was thought that the Spaniards had designs on Minorca, W.O. 1/294, pp.671,687,849, W.O. 1/296, pp.187,275,319, W.O. 1/299, p.665.

\textsuperscript{155} W.O. 55/353, p.349, 11 April 1750, Charles Bush to Andrew Stone.
Arguments with the Governor of Gibraltar were founded on the same confidence. The attitude of the Ordnance would seem to have been that it did not claim to have supplied all requests for arms, but did claim to have done all that it felt was required. In part also it was concerned to reduce its commitment as much as possible and exercised natural caution.

In the West Indies an order in council of February 1740 provided for an engineer to go to the Bahamas to perform the necessary works. The Ordnance realised, at least in name, the importance of the islands; "they are judged to be of the utmost importance to His Majesty's service". The Board asked for guidance as to whether they could ask Parliament for the expected expenditure. The answer received from the Lords Justices indicated the dilemma of the Board. The sum was to be kept as small as reasonably possible.

In 1741 the Governor of Jamaica complained that the fortifications there were generally bad, and that the base lacked a hospital and barracks. The Lords Justices asked the Ordnance to consider the second two heads,

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157. For the state of the defences at Gibraltar, see S.P. 41/11, 25 Sept. 1739. Orders were given for the building of a hospital at Gibraltar, CTB & P, 1739-41, p.228, 13 Mar. 1740.
158. For details of those works considered necessary and the information supplied on the allegedly parlous state of the defences in the Bahamas, see ibid., p.72, 27 Dec. 1739. See also, S.P. 41/36, 18 Oct. 1743, Board of Ordnance to Master General.
159. For the weakness of the defences in the Bahamas in 1741, see S.P. 41/13, pp.2,3. It was not unusual in the eighteenth century for the works there to be reported in a defenceless state. For example, in relation to 1799 see W.O. 1/620, p.37; for the West Indies generally, see W.O. 1/599, pp.520,539. Nor was it unusual for the troops to be reported as being in a bad condition: for instance with reference to Antigua in 1766, see C.O. 5/168, pp.619-38.
especially in view of the large number of men in the West Indies. The
Ordnance's defence\(^{160}\) was predictable:

As to their fortifications ... we beg leave to observe ... that the government of Jamaica, as
well as those of the other Plantations have usually been at the expense themselves, and
rarely asked for more than the assistance of an Engineer sometimes to direct them how to proceed.

There are twelve engineers appointed to attend the Expedition, when they can be spared from that
service, one of them may be employed to assist them, and when the expedition is at an end ... (you) may
please to direct an engineer to continue there if the same shall be judged necessary.

We are so great strangers to this and the other plantations ... the same being no part of the
establishment of this office, that we can be of other service herein than by offering our opinion.

The Ordnance's attitude to the need for barracks and a hospital was that these should be provided:

but from the experience we have had since the breaking out of the war of the excessive price paid for labour,
and every thing that is done or purchased there, we can by no means recommend the building either barracks
or hospital with stone or brick, being certain it would be attended with too great an expense, it would require
a constant fund to sustain and support them, and as we conceive would be of no public benefit after the
forces are withdrawn, for we must conclude that the Island has already provided such accommodation for
their settled forces the six Independent Companies.

We do not apprehend ... that the troops continue long in the island at one time.

Some person on the spot should be authorized to build and enabled to defray the charge of them, this
office having no fund for services of this nature.\(^{161}\)

The result was that the suggestions of the Ordnance were accepted in part.

\(^{160}\) S.P. 41/36, 11 Sept. 1741, Board of Ordnance to Master General.
\(^{161}\) Warrant of 9 Sept. 1741, quoted in S.P. 41/36, 19 Oct. 1741,
Board of Ordnance to Master General. The Board approved the
continuation of the engineer there, S.P. 41/36, 1 Mar. 1743,
same to same. Construction was to be under the care of the
Ordnance and the expense treated as an extraordinary item in the estimate presented to Parliament, CTB & P, 1739-41, p.503,
6 Nov. 1741.
A hospital or infirmary and huts were to be built in Jamaica under the direction of one of the engineers employed on the expedition in the West Indies. The Ordnance later complained that it had received no directions for continuing or sending an engineer to Jamaica; although the inhabitants had applied for an engineer "they don't seem inclinable to employ him".  

The sequel showed how well founded were the suspicions voiced originally by the Board of Ordnance.

... by the General's order they have built a storehouse for fresh provisions, with an apartment for the storekeeper, and a dispensary or place to keep the medicines with apartments for the surgeons, a storehouse for salt provisions with an apartment for the storekeeper, that as the transports come in the General proposes to have more huts made, that the General also expects him to pay the rent of the ground on which the huts are erected which is £10 Jamaica currency per month beginning from 10th. December last; that the General and Governor propose to have huts built at Port Morant near the east end of the Island for 500 men, and more huts in other places in order to canton the troops of that Island; that if this scheme goes on the charge may be double or treble what was first imagined.

The Ordnance had to consider not only the demands of the island's representatives. Jamaica caused difficulties in another context. The issues and the attitudes revealed were basically the same. Vernon was of the opinion that Jamaica "lies commodious to fitt out expeditions from", that if stores were there an offensive or defensive operation was always possible, and that in any event Jamaica was of great importance and ought to be provided against an enemy. He proposed the buying of a storehouse and the

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162. Ibid., 1 Mar. 1743, Board of Ordnance to Master General.
163. Ibid., 19 Oct. 1742, same to same.
creation of a magazine. Speed and economy favoured the former. The fact that the Navy Board held land for purchase instigated the adoption of the latter. The Ordnance submission, apart from the detail, was that:

We apprehend ... that the reason which prevails with the Admiral to solicit the making these extraordinary provisions is grounded chiefly upon a supposition of our going into a French war, but even in that case ... we beg leave to represent ... that this office never had any property in Jamaica, that we had neither storehouse, magazine storekeeper or other officers there except during the time of war, and then a storekeeper, etc., was appointed and accommodations hired, not purchased, for use of the fleet occasionally, and for that time only.

The Board outlined other changes occasioned by the war:

We are now ... at a very considerable expense on account of His Majesty's fleet in those parts, we have a storekeeper to receive and take care of the stores sent from hence, and to issue them as the Commander in Chief shall direct, we have sent an armourer to clean the small arms and a cooper to trim the powder and repair the barrels.

Storehouses were rented and the Ordnance's local officer was placed in a position where it was advisable to buy land which occasioned the erection of other storehouses and a temporary magazine. Precedent was important.

We do not know there either is or can be a greater necessity now than during the late wars for this office having any perpetuity in Land or Houses, or any settled establishment of officers in that island.165

If any conclusion were to be formed in the first years of the war, it is that this philosophy underlay the preparations of the Ordnance on arms, men, stores and garrisons. In all cases its preparations proved sufficient for the first year of the war. When the first signs of inadequate preparation subsequently became apparent, the Ordnance looked

165. Ibid., 8 Mar. 1743, Board of Ordnance to Master General. He passed comment on it on 15 Mar. 1743.
to the rapid acquisition of powder and muskets as precautionary measures. Increasingly the Ordnance realised the inadequacy of supply against demand, and fell back on expediency measures and finding reasons for its failure to provide in advance against the demand.

The second crisis centred around the rebellion of 1745. How prepared was the Ordnance in 1745?

The Ordnance found itself once again short of arms; it had sufficient to meet the challenge, but as in 1740/1 had little in reserve. In the September of 1744 Montagu was worried about the low state of the arms. With reference to the number of arms to be distributed to the Counties, Wade told Montagu that a thousand arms were needed to take with him. The Duke of Newcastle subsequently ordered a sufficient quantity of arms to be sent. Montagu asked for specific instructions in a warrant, as his authority for delivering the same.

> I think more are already to be sent than people will be found to take them (I mean for the King's service in these Northern Counties) and the fear of sending too few might make one send more than the King's stores can well spare at this time considering how low they grow.\(^ {166} \)

The Ordnance had been forced to order another 10,000 arms from Holland which were daily expected in November 1745.\(^ {167} \) For in that month, there were less than 500 swords and 20,000 muskets in store, a figure which seems ample until it is remembered that 47,000 had been demanded in a very short space of time to meet the demand of the rebellion.\(^ {168} \) The Ordnance said that the stocks of arms were very greatly diminished by issue of arms

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166. S.P. 41/37, 28 Sept. 1744, Duke of Montagu to ?
167. Ibid., 23 Nov. 1745, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
168. After the 47,000 were issued, 21,413 remained in store. In addition, "We have not 500 Broad Swords in Store, nor ever kept any at all for Service, till very lately". Ibid.
particularly to the associated troops in the several counties;\textsuperscript{169} the result was that the Ordnance did "not think it adviseable to deliver any more on these occasions than are absolutely necessary". The issue was whether the Lord Lieutenant of Norfolk should be supplied with 1,000 or 2,000 arms, on a sale or return basis, to enable the towns of Norwich, Lynn and Yarmouth to arm themselves. The Ordnance's attitude was that it was prepared to try to supply the Norfolk demands once they said how many men they had raised, if any arms could be spared.\textsuperscript{170}

It might also have added the demands which continued to be imposed from abroad. Ireland had already requested at least 23,000 muskets during the war.\textsuperscript{171} As with Cathcart's expedition, the importance of the demand in 1745 lay not in the number but in the timing. In the critical months of 1745 there were three large demands. In August it was\textsuperscript{172} represented to the Board of General Officers that the arms were bad and that the best method of providing the Irish foot regiments with arms was from London. In replying to the Lords Chief Justices, through the Master General, the Board said that after considering the state of small arms in the Tower, the second battalion of the regiment of foot under St. Clair could be

\textsuperscript{169}. The demand had been presaged in the previous year by the arming of Dejean's battalion of Swiss, S.P. 41/36, 14 Mar. 1744, Duke of Newcastle to Duke of Montagu, and the proposed arming of Northamptonshire volunteers, ibid., 6 April 1744, Duke of Montagu to Duke of Newcastle.

\textsuperscript{170}. S.P. 41/37, 24 Dec. 1745, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.

\textsuperscript{171}. An order for 20,000 firelocks and bayonets for the militia of Ireland was met by the issue of a warrant, CTB & P, p.81, 6 Oct. 1742. 5,000 had been issued earlier in the year, ibid., p.188, 26 July 1742.

\textsuperscript{172}. A petition to the Lords Justices represented that many of the arms of the Irish troops were unserviceable; the request was for the free replacement of arms, S.P. 41/37, 29 Aug. 1745, Captain Alexander Wilson's memorial to the Lords Justices.
furnished with a new set of muskets and bayonets according to the Irish establishment; other regiments, however, should have an increase of 400. The arms were to be paid for as usual before they were issued out of stores. In November faced with a demand for 20,000 muskets and 10,000 broad swords from the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, the Board of Ordnance commented in typical fashion:  

> Considering the present state of affairs and the possibility there may be a further demand of muskets for the use of His Majesty's forces in Great Britain, we cannot supply the said demand for Ireland, or any part thereof, lest a proper supply should be wanting for their use.  
> Although a considerable number of arms are in hand for His Majesty's service yet the great demand there is for arms in all parts of the kingdom at this juncture, for which the workmen are paid on the delivery of them in ready money, retards the supplies for this office, so that no certain time can be depended on.

The Board, ironically, was prepared to tolerate a future reduction of arms. It suggested that the 10,000 arms lately bought from Holland, and then daily expected, might be sent to Ireland for the service of the Militia. Montagu added that the Lord Lieutenant might order a quantity of arms from Birmingham to the same specifications as they furnished for His Majesty's service to be proved and examined by the Ordnance; the Ordnance was to be paid for that service.

This followed a specific request for arms to re-equip replacements

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173. Ibid., 13 Aug. 1745, Board of Ordnance to Master General.
174. Ibid., 23 Nov. 1745, same to same. They were paid for out of the revenue of Ireland, CTB & P, Volume 5, 1742-45, 27 Aug. 1745, p.822, being arms for five regiments.
175. See above pp.236-7.
176. S.P. 41/37, 26 Nov. 1745, Duke of Montagu to Duke of Newcastle.
for men drafted from Irish regiments. The Board agreed to meet the demand, in part, provided that it obtained a warrant for laying the expense before Parliament. In an addendum when Montagu forwarded the Board's recommendation to the Duke of Newcastle he indicated the preoccupation of the Ordnance with the multiplicity of demands: he had heard that Col. Percival intended to apply for an order for the Ordnance to furnish him with arms for some men he has raised in Ireland.

I beg for God's sake you won't grant it him, for if you do, it will be a precedent, for Lord Kildare and every man in Ireland that raised men in any way to ask for arms from here, which will be impossible to be supplied.

Similarly, in August, when England needed its own men and arms for its defence, 5,000 muskets and cartouch boxes were needed for service in Flanders. The original order had been instigated by the Duke of Cumberland, and the Lords Justices had been approached for a ruling; the charge was to be inserted in the next estimate to be laid before Parliament. As soon as the rebellion was over, the regiments were recalled from England to Flanders. Demands from both spheres were difficult to refuse since England could not afford to suffer setbacks in either.

The Ordnance again found itself short of men. It had been short of men in the previous year but had successfully fitted out a train of

177. The regiments were those of Irwin, Otway, Bruce, Folliot, Battereau, and St. Clair. The men replaced had been drafted to Flanders. This probably explained the difference in the Ordnance's reaction to the two demands. Ibid., 23 Nov. 1745, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.

178. Ibid., 26 Nov. 1745, Duke of Montagu to Duke of Newcastle.

179. Ibid., 20 Aug. 1745, Board of Ordnance to A. Stone, Secretary to Lords Justices.

180. The importance of the battle for the Low Countries was debated in December 1742. Yonge's view was that whilst Britain might rely on its naval strength as security against invasion, if France had this area she "might in a very few years be able to fit out a most formidable squadron", Cobbett, Parliamentary History, 1741-3, cc.909-10.
artillery. This had been discharged three months later.181 In December 1745 the Board complained that there were not enough men to supply the normal services required. Special preparations for the rebellion strained the resources; in particular, Wade had asked for one complete company of artillery to be sent from London to the army under his command. Montagu, Master General, felt "considering the French invasion and the numbers of artillery people we have ... I dare not take upon me to send any more".182 It is evident that a representation had been made that Clifford's fort, at the mouth of the Tyne, be supplied with guns and ammunition together with a number of experienced gunners. The Board, in a reply to the Master General, said that the number of gunners at Clifford's fort was up to the establishment, that an augmentation beyond the number on the establishment was necessary in almost every garrison in England "more especially at this juncture", but that such an augmentation did not lie within their powers.183

In mid-September Montagu referred to the shortage of men:184

fit to attend a Train of Artillery if there should be occasion ... I believe it would be for His Majesty's service if some of the Artillery people in Flanders were to come over with the regiments that are to come from thence ... Wade ... thinks they may as well pass their winter quarters in England as in Flanders, and be sent back to Flanders before the campaign opens there.

181. S.P. 41/36, 2 May 1744, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu. See also, ibid., 15 Aug. 1744, Duke of Montagu to Duke of Newcastle.
182. S.P. 41/37, 10 Mar. 1745; the Duke of Montagu had gone into the country for a period of convalescence.
183. Ibid., 13 Dec. 1745, Board of Ordnance to Master General, forwarded by him to the Duke of Newcastle 28 Dec. 1745. See here for a list providing a detailed assessment of the state of the artillery companies in Great Britain on that date, and the establishment of garrison gunners.
184. Ibid., 15 Sept. 1745, Duke of Montagu to ?
At that time of the 752 men in eight companies on the British establishment for the service of the Train by land and bomb vessels at sea, 400 were in Flanders, 62, sent as reliefs to Ostend, 16 at Edinburgh, 40 on board bomb vessels, 88 at Annapolis and Cape Breton, leaving only 146 in Britain; of these 60 were wounded and sick. Two weeks later the situation remained largely unchanged; there were only some 20 fit men at Woolwich; no improvement could be expected until the company coming from Flanders arrived. Montagu proposed that: 185

As most of the British foot are now ordered home and as there are still complete companies of artillery of one hundred men each in Flanders ... one more of those companies should be ordered to come over with the troops, that are to come up the river for the service of the artillery here.

In December it was noted that all the remaining part of the Field Train in Flanders was ordered to be sent over. 186 The report was prepared on 13th. December 1745. Montagu sent an additional letter to the Duke of Newcastle, a fortnight later, proposing an addition of 15 mattresses to each of the eight marching companies since:

there are not a sufficient number of artillery people to supply the several services that may be required. 187

The Board had written to Montagu:

As two trains are now actually attending His Majesty's forces, and a third is held in readiness, and as we must keep a corps in reserve for any further service than just what is on the carpet, we do not think the regiment of artillery can supply a sufficient number of experienced gunners for Clifford's fort or any other garrison. 188

The Board of the Ordnance advanced in favour of the augmentation:

185. S.P. 41/37, 1 Oct. 1745, Duke of Montagu to ?
186. Ibid., 2 Dec. 1745, same to same.
187. Ibid., 28 Dec. 1745, same to same.
188. Ibid., 13 Dec. 1745, Board of Ordnance to Master General.
By this ... there might always be an officer and a proper number of artillery people in Garrisons in the several towns where there are field trains of artillery in store an account of which your grace received inclosed with the representation who would be ready to attend those trains if on any sudden increase they should be taken into the field, and would also be ready to serve the guns of the several garrisons in case of any attack.

There was a plea for a speedy decision. The necessary command was given on 17th. January 1746. By June the augmentation had been made. At that stage, the Master General required a warrant for putting the increase in pay on the normal establishment.

The shortage of men was to be expected, not only on the grounds of the stretching of resources, but because three months previously it had been foreseen that the drafts for Cape Breton would be a long time before they were ready and fit for service.

The Board could offer little defence against the charge that it neglected garrison defences at home and abroad. By 1745, some of the defences were in a parlous condition. Handasyde complained of the state of Berwick. Montagu added that, apart from Portsmouth, none were much better. The East range of Tilbury fort had been allowed to fall into a

190. *Ibid.*, He also enclosed a list showing the establishment of gunners at the several garrisons.
191. S.P. 41/37, 25 June 1746, Montagu to "My Lord".
192. *Ibid.*, 15 Sept. 1745, same to same. See here for details of the expedition to Cape Breton and the manpower resources at that time. Montagu argued that one of the artillery companies in Flanders and men sent to the relief of Ostend should return with the regiments from Flanders in order to winter in England.
193. For changes in the establishment of garrisons, compare entries for different dates in the eighteenth century. The changes were relatively minor and present no pattern. At least there was no increase in the years before 1745; see W.O. 25/3206.
194. S.P. 41/37, 27 Oct. 1745, Duke of Montagu to ?
bad condition. Milford Haven had some defences which had fallen into
disrepair by the June of 1747. Timmouth Fort had been demolished as being
of no further use; a fort which defended Burlington Bay was demolished
and Scarborough Castle allowed to fall almost into ruin. Hull's citadel
lacked one pallisade until Montagu had personally intervened.

The defence offered by Montagu for the lax state of affairs was that
there had been neglect before he came into office:

I have used my utmost endeavours to see him [His
Majesty] served in every branch of the office in
the best manner possible, if I have not succeeded
it has not been for want of my good intentions:
when I came into the office and endeavoured to make
myself master of the business belonging to it I
found it had been a kind of principal [sic] in the
office, ever since the Union with Scotland, to
neglect all the Northern Garrisons, as if they
would never be of any further use, and since the
Peace of Utrecht the same notion I found has in a
great measure prevailed in relation to most of the
fortified places except Portsmouth ... All these
neglects have been occasioned through a false
notion in the office that doing proper repairs
would occasion too great an expense and that places
of strength in England could never be wanted.

The neglect of the northern garrisons in general and the ones in Scotland
in particular was all the more inexcusable since as early as 1739 the
governor of Fort William had indicated how exposed he felt in a hostile
country. Montagu blamed his predecessors; suggesting that the improve-
ments at Portsmouth were associated with the previous Master General, the
Duke of Argyll and Greenwich, having been governor there. He drew
particular attention to the rôle of Sir Charles Wills:

195. S.P. 41/36, 6 Feb. 1740; the Duke of Argyll quotes a letter to
the Board of Ordnance from the storekeeper at Fort William,
dated 7 Jan. 1740.
I am assured that Sir Charles Wills when he was Lieutenant General of the Ordnance was more responsible than any of the Board for preventing the repairs out of a notion of saving money.

Montagu tried to suggest that improvements coincided with his own appointment. At that time he had written to the Duke of Newcastle "I am extremely desirous not to lose any time in getting everything under my care put into the best method I am capable of for His Majesty's Service".196 In particular he claimed to have been instrumental in pressing improvements in two instances. He stated that improvements at Hull had been started in 1745 on his instigation. He was concerned to show that the neglect of Berwick ended with his own action. In 1744 he ordered the townspeople to remove a weakness in the town defences. This was necessary because there was no engineer in the town. Montagu argued that the Ordnance officer resident there, was capable, but agreed to send another. With reference to gunners Montagu pointed out that there was a Master gunner and six gunners on the establishment:

There I believe are some of them voters of the corporation, others of them old soldiers, for it is a great misfortune that ... no sooner does a gunners place fall, but the Member of Parliament for that place insists upon having it for one of his voters, this I have complied with as seldom as possible. I always make the garrison gunners out of old soldiers and people of service, but I can not recollect that I have appointed one gunner at Berwick since I have been in the office ... but of my own accord I ordered seventeen gunners returned from Flanders that were not able to do field duty to be sent to Berwick by sea, and think it is about three weeks since they were sent ... The only thing I ever saw relating to it (the run-down state of the defences) was a letter from Sir John Cope to Mr. William Yonge in which he mentioned the want of gunners and without receiving any orders, or having

196. Ibid., 19 Mar. 1741, Duke of Montagu to ?
any application made to me, I sent the gunners I mentioned before.\footnote{197}

It is difficult to accept Montagu's view of the causes of the situation since it took a long time after rebellion to re-fortify Scotland;\footnote{198} his interpretation on the situation before then is open to dispute. The call of war could have delayed such Scottish fortifications for several years if there had been no danger in Scotland. On the other hand, the commitment to other theatres of war was less after 1746 than before the rebellion, and the continuation of a company of artillery in the Highlands in 1747, when they were needed elsewhere, indicated that the situation in Scotland was not that peaceful.\footnote{199} It was that same spirit of complacency which had caused the refusal to believe in the danger from the rebels until the danger was no longer potential but real.\footnote{200} It marked a return to the pre-rebellion thinking typified by an episode in April 1744. A few weeks before an invasion scare Montagu was reporting that all was quiet and that danger from an invasion was quite over.\footnote{201}

The general neglect of preparations for an invasion, or rebellion, stands in telling contrast to the excellent way in which the Ordnance responded to the danger when it became apparent. It coped with the massive

\footnote{197}{S.P. 41/37, 27 Oct. 1745, same to same.}
\footnote{198}{See Appendix C, Tables 1 & 2, for details of expenditure.}
\footnote{199}{Fox wrote to the Duke of Newcastle after Blakeney's complaint about inability to enforce the disarming act. W.O. 4/44, p.29, 31 Aug. 1749.}
\footnote{200}{This was surprising. Scotland had always been a danger area. In 1740 there had been some debate about the mode of transfer of barrels of powder in view of a near accident concerning a paymaster's party. S.P. 41/36, 6 Feb. 1740. Report to Board of Ordnance to Mr. Muir, Storekeeper of the Ordnance at Fort William, written 7 Jan. 1740, quoted in a letter from Duke of Argyll to Duke of Newcastle.}
\footnote{201}{S.P. 41/36, 6 April 1744, Duke of Montagu to Duke of Newcastle, "everything is now quiet and the danger of an invasion quite over". Ibid., 2 May 1744.}
demand for stores. Between September 24th. and 28th. 1745 there were orders placed for 7,500 muskets and bayonets, 7,700 cartouch boxes, 550 pistols, 360 carbines and 560 swords. The average time between demand and supply in the form of dispatch of the arms was some seven days, a testimony to the department's efficiency. The Ordnance represented that to transport them by land would be difficult and dangerous. The Master General requested the Admiralty that they be sent by sea.  

This supply of arms to bodies outside the garrisons should not obscure the large increase in the strength of the garrisons between August and October 1745. The number of swords supplied nearly doubled; a storeship of arms was sent to Berwick and an amount sent to Marshal Wade to dispose of as he wished. There was a late but massive supply of arms for Newcastle were ready in October. The Ordnance represented that to transport them by land would be difficult and dangerous. The Master General requested the Admiralty that they be sent by sea.  

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203. Ibid., 23 Nov. 1745, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.  
204. Ibid., 16 Oct. 1745; like the arms for Lord Herbert's regiment of foot these had not been sent, although authorized on 15 Oct. 1745, since the warrants did not come to hand until late.  
205. Ibid., 5 Oct. 1745, Cockburn to ?  
206. For the numbers supplied, see an account produced by the Board of Ordnance, ibid., 16 Oct. 1745. Newcastle had 1500 and Carlisle 300.  
207. For an account of small arms delivered in September and October 1745, see S.P. 41/37, 16 Oct. 1745. To compare this position with that on Jan. 1st. 1745, see ibid., 6 Aug. 1745.  
208. This was as promised in the Duke of Montagu's letter, ibid., 27 Oct. 1745. Duke of Montagu to Duke of Newcastle.
swords sent to Edinburgh, although there was already a large store there.\(^{209}\) Arms were removed into Berwick for safe keeping. It is probable that this strengthening of the garrison was deliberate, not haphazard; for in the summer of that year the Ordnance had called for an assessment of the state of the arms.\(^{210}\)

The Ordnance had other problems besides supply. The town of Aberdeen felt compelled, at the start of the war with France in 1744, to equip itself with artillery for self defence.\(^{211}\) Montrose similarly bought large artillery and small arms.\(^{212}\) These purchases not only reduced the stock available to the Ordnance, but their existence created an additional problem when the rebels landed. To prevent their being taken by the enemy Sir John Cope and the Duke of Cumberland had the guns of Aberdeen and Montrose moved to Edinburgh.\(^{213}\) The Ordnance had to consider other problems than the Scottish garrisons. It had to equip a train of artillery for service in North Britain.\(^{214}\) For defence further south, field pieces

\(^{209}\) Ibid., 17 Oct. 1745, account produced by the Board of Ordnance.

\(^{210}\) Ibid., 6 Aug. 1745, report by J. Robinson and C. Smith. The Duke of Montagu called attention to the fact that the proportion of stores for each garrison was approved by an order in council, ibid., 27 Oct. 1745, Duke of Montagu to ?

\(^{211}\) W.O. 55/353, p.15, 8 May 1747, Duke of Newcastle to Duke of Montagu, see also ibid., p.16, 13 April 1747, Aberdeen's petition to the Duke of Newcastle.

\(^{212}\) S.P. 41/38, 17 June 1754, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Newcastle. See also ibid., 26 Mar. 1752, C. Bush to D. Scott, Member of Parliament for Montrose. See also ibid., Memorial from D. Scott undated but prior to 23 Nov. 1753 when the Duke of Newcastle forwarded it to Ligonier.

\(^{213}\) Similarly the Earl of Marchmont lodged arms at Berwick to prevent their capture by the rebels. When the rebels were at Edinburgh the freemen of Berwick used these arms with the consent of Marchmont's agent since they could not procure other arms, W.O. 55/353, p.134, 13 Feb. 1748.

\(^{214}\) For details of the artillery trains required, see S.P. 41/37, undated although pinned to a document dated 24th. Feb. 1746. The order was to discharge the train horses.
bound for Georgia where they were much needed were diverted to defend Hull. The Master General made suggestions for the defence of London, pointing out several flaws in the existing arrangements, whilst wishing to remain anonymous. His suggestions were based on common sense and the example of the 1715 rebellion. The Ordnance itself undertook the removal of ammunition into the Tower. The sequel was that Montagu was asked to examine entrances to the cities of London and Westminster, considering methods of stopping them up.

The real, as opposed to the potential, danger presented by the rebels posed many problems for the Ordnance. On the question of material considerations Inverness was so knocked about that it required a new fort, and Edinburgh needed repairs to its powder magazine and its fortifications

215. For details of the financial wrangling over the price of Hull's buying the guns, see S.P. 41/37, 17 April 1746 to Thos. Ramsden and the ruling ibid., 29 April 1746, same to same. For a similar problem on powder provided for Hull, see ibid., 13 Aug. 1746, W. Thomson to Duke of Newcastle.
216. S.P. 41/36, 28 Mar. 1748, Thos. Percels to ?
217. For details of the plans which the Duke of Montagu pointed out and the expedients suggested, see S.P. 41/37, undated letter from Duke of Montagu to Duke of Newcastle? The document is located in the bundle between ones dated 22 Oct. 1745 and 27 Dec. 1745.
218. Ibid., 27 Sept. 1745, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu. See also ibid., 1 Aug. 1747, same to same, with regard to bullets.
219. Ibid., 27 Dec. 1745. The order was dated 13 Dec. 1745. The bullets belonged to private citizens and were not paid for at the time of their requisition. Later, after much delay, they were declared worthless; S.P. 41/37, 1 Aug. 1747, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu in response to an enquiry from the Duke of Newcastle to the Duke of Montagu, ibid., 27 Sept. 1747.
220. Ibid., 9 May 1747, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu. See also Appendix C, Tables 1 & 2.
Less tangible was the confusion caused to the distribution of arms by the skirmishes with the rebels. Regiments lost both firearms and swords only to acquire others either from the rebels or the stores.\(^{222}\)

The extent of the immediate effect of the rebellion on the Ordnance could be seen in the crisis measures forced on the Ordnance and on the local commanders. It seems a feature of the campaign that, in the heat of the moment, control moved away from the centre to local individuals.

This also applied after the war. General Churchill sent orders to the officers commanding at every barrack to acquire one pair of blankets for each man in the parties sent on patrol in the Highlands. Leslie, Barrack Master General of Scotland, had complied with the demand and asked the Ordnance Board how to react if other demands were received. The answer was that:

> the Board can by no means recommend it to him to refuse complying with the orders of the Commander in Chief upon a sudden emergency, and for the good of His Majesty's Service.

Leslie was advised that the storekeeper:

> take a receipt for their being replaced by others of equal goodness, and on failure thereof, signify the same to the Board, that they may take proper measures for the recovery of them or their value.\(^{223}\)

In 1745 it was Cope commanding the forces in North Britain who ordered the removal of guns from Montrose and their storage by the Ordnance officer at Edinburgh. The Duke of Cumberland ordered the re-equipment of certain

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\(^{221}\) S.P. 41/37, 12 May 1747, Duke of Montagu to ?

\(^{222}\) For instance, in relation to Colonel Thos. Murray, see W.O. 55/353, p.19, 1 May 1747, Duke of Newcastle to Master General, and also ibid., p.5, 24 Mar. 1747, same to same, and ibid., p.20, 1 May 1747.

\(^{223}\) W.O. 47/34, O.B.M., 26 July 1749.
regiments directly out of store. Thus swords of the militia came to be used by other forces.\textsuperscript{224} It was therefore not a simple task which faced the Ordnance after the rebellion. The most significant feature of its aftermath was the Board's attempting to restore order out of chaos. It did not attempt to restore the situation prevailing before the rebellion, but merely to produce a working solution.

The most immediate task was the re-equipment of certain regiments with the arms which they lacked in case they were to be employed elsewhere at once. In the orders there was sometimes reference to where the arms in question were lost, but the main emphasis was on the number actually missing, and the Ordnance adopted the practical approach of taking from where there were surpluses.\textsuperscript{225} Similarly, the Ordnance saw to the repair of damaged fortifications. A necessary corollary was reversal of most of the emergency measures taken. The troops moved out of York, and Hull lost the guns which it had acquired.\textsuperscript{226} The Ordnance eventually turned to the task of sorting the arms returned to the Tower.\textsuperscript{227} The company of artillery was continued in Scotland in the absence of some more permanent form of defence to render their presence unnecessary.\textsuperscript{228}

\textsuperscript{224} He also requested an engineer to be sent to undertake works at Fort Augustus and Inverness. S.P. 41/37, undated but prior to 12 May 1746, Duke of Montagu to ?

\textsuperscript{225} For example see W.O. 55/353, p.5, 24 March 1747, Duke of Newcastle to Duke of Montagu. See also, \textit{ibid.}, p.20, Duke of Newcastle to Duke of Montagu in relation to Lascelles regiment of foot.

\textsuperscript{226} See above p.248.

\textsuperscript{227} See S.P. 41/37, state of small arms in the Tower, 13th. December 1746 and 1st. January 1749. A survey of bullets taken into the Tower during the rebellion was performed, \textit{ibid.}, 27 Sept. 1747, Duke of Newcastle to Duke of Montagu.

\textsuperscript{228} This commitment added to the stretching of resources of men. S.P. 41/37, 29 July 1747, Montagu to 'My Lord'. See also p.253 below.
That was the most enduring aspect of the rebellion's effect on the Ordnance. The Board seemed to have realised how inadequate its previous measures had been. Evidence in support of this view was the construction of the military road from Newcastle to Carlisle, surveying for which began in 1750. Also, there was constructed a new fort at Arderseer Point early in the 1750's although it was most inaccessible;\textsuperscript{229} and there were fortifications undertaken at Cargaff Castle and Castle Town. They had been repaired and converted into barracks. They were supplied with arms and stores. The same applied to Fort Augustus, previously demolished and emptied of guns, ammunition and stores by the rebels in 1745. Works were put in hand at Castle Tarbott and Castle Turren following a representation to the Duke of Newcastle.\textsuperscript{230}

The stimulus of the rebellion was restricted in that changes were introduced slowly. It was surprising that rebuilding did not begin until 1747 and even ten years after the rebellion there were still some fortifications not completed. Similarly the confusion over arms held by regiments was still evident in 1752;\textsuperscript{231} some regiments had had the state of their

\textsuperscript{229} The cost of transporting bread during the construction caused the suggestion that kilns be erected on the spot; W.O. 4/47, p.118, 13 Mar. 1750, Fox to Principal Officers of the Ordnance. See also W.O. 47/36, O.B.M. p.300, 13 Mar. 1750.

\textsuperscript{230} W.O. 55/353, p.356, 5 May 1750, Board of Ordnance to the Lords Justices. The Ordnance sent the draft of the warrant authorising them to act on the four castles, their repairs and fitting as early as 11 July 1748, S.P. 41/37, 11 July 1748, Chas. Bush to the secretary of the Ordnance. For the warrant see S.P. 41/37, 11 July 1748. For expenditure on Fort Augustus and Fort William in 1747-8, see Appendix C, Tables 1 & 2.

\textsuperscript{231} In the request for replacing worn out arms of the Kings own regiment of Dragoons commanded by Lieutenant General Bland, it was asked that the regiment should have a complete set of new and uniform arms, W.O. 55/354, p.123, 11 May 1752. How regiments assorted arms were amassed was described, \textit{ibid.}, p.129, 5 June 1752, Bogdani to Claudius Amyand.
arms investigated and solved earlier than this date merely because they had to be re-equipped to fight in Flanders. 232

This indicated in miniature the effect of the rebellion and the war on the Ordnance. The organisation was stretched, but it proved capable of being stretched without breaking. When the tension was removed, the Ordnance set about ensuring that it would not be so stretched in future; but the measures, apart from being too late, were too little to prevent the organisation being stretched again. The Ordnance was merely doing in less obvious form what it did before and during the rebellion; it was filling the gaps on the basis of past experience and practical necessity rather than thinking and building ahead.

The third crisis was one of men and not of arms. The straining of resources was indicated in April 1747 when the artillery company returning from St. Clair's expedition was put straight on board ships going to Flanders. 233 Three months later there was only one fifth of a company at Woolwich in reserve. 234 These had to work in the laboratory guard and serve at Woolwich and Greenwich as well as answer any sudden call. Not enough men were left to do the common duties required; that was why a party of foot guards were doing duty at the magazine at Greenwich. The reason for the crisis was that there were 79 men in Flanders, 40 in England at Carlisle and Berwick on the orders of the Duke of Cumberland, 22 on bomb vessels, and 24 sick, one being on leave. This was typical of

232. See W.O. 55/353, p.7, Duke of Newcastle to Duke of Montagu regarding the supply of arms to a regiment ordered on foreign service.
233. S.P. 41/37, 1 April 1747, Duke of Montagu to 'My Lord'. The Ordnance pressed that the returned stores would not be sent to Flanders. They were still waiting for a reply 3½ weeks later, ibid., 27 April 1747.
234. There were 40 effectives at Woolwich, when a company numbered 210, S.P. 41/37, 29 July 1747, Duke of Montagu to Duke of Newcastle.
the stretching of resources caused by commitments. The theoretical position of the Ordnance was set out by Montagu. He felt that

as long as the war continues we ought always to have a hundred men at least in readiness to attend any little Field Train that might be called for upon any sudden alarm.

In practice the Board was left to clutch at straws. There might just be sufficient men if those in Flanders could be spared in time to come home. Several engineers had been sent to Bergen-op-Zoom. Montagu was informed that many had been killed or wounded. The figure of 40 effectives would continue, therefore, to be a realistic one.

This scandalous state of affairs was to be tolerated only eighteen months after the Ordnance had received the severe shock of the rebellion. The Ordnance was having to make do in England with less than one company when it was estimated that two were needed to guard stores and magazines, man bomb vessels and meet emergencies. Such an eventuality presented itself quickly, for in the next month there were renewed demands for Boscawen to have a company of artillery.235 There was need for haste to make them ready for the expedition. The Duke of Newcastle, at Boscawen's request, ordered that a company be sent to Boscawen. Montagu replied that this was impossible unless another company were raised and added to the regiment of Artillery. He intended that serjeants and corporals from an old company would form the nucleus of the new company. He did not foresee difficulties in raising recruits. At that time, of the eight companies of artillery five were in Flanders with the Duke of Cumberland, one in Scotland with the camps and the train of artillery there, and two depleted by the loss of their best men to the companies going to Flanders. They numbered only

the equivalent of one company. The shortage of men for Boscawen's expedition was solved by sending a small company of 50.

Towards the end of the war, in August 1747, it is not surprising, in view of previous occurrences, that the Ordnance was worried about its supply of powder.\textsuperscript{236} There was a fear that the supply might dry up for some time to come. There had been no real problem in the previous year. The Ordnance calculated that, in addition to the 540 barrels then being shipped with the Train, only 200 would be needed for the campaign; the Joint Battering Train had over 6,000 barrels. The Ordnance felt that supplies should be met from the stock of the Joint Battering Train.\textsuperscript{237} This was consistent with the situation pertaining in March. In the course of a reply to an enquiry from the Duke of Newcastle whether it was worth purchasing powder from Russia, the Ordnance advanced, as one of the reasons for not doing so, that "His Majesty is in no want of gunpowder either for small arms or powder". The price was higher and transport both more dangerous and expensive.\textsuperscript{238} Charles Frederick agreed that 800 or 1,000 barrels might be spared to be sent to Bergen-op-Zoom. He said that the Ordnance would prefer to be paid in cash and not in kind.\textsuperscript{239} Orders were issued next day for the delivery of 1,000 barrels. The Ordnance had acted in three days and a ship had been hired.

At the end of the month, a demand for a further 2,000 barrels was made through Chesterfield for the service of the States General. The Ordnance replied that the amount could be spared "if the circumstances are

\textsuperscript{236} For the expenditure see Appendix C, Table 2.
\textsuperscript{237} S.P. 41/37, 24 June 1746, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
\textsuperscript{238} Ibid., 12 Mar. 1748, same to same.
\textsuperscript{239} Ibid., 10 Aug. 1747, Charles Frederick, Surveyor General, to Earl of Chesterfield.
very pressing" provided that neither Bentinck nor the agent for the States had purchased nor agreed for any quantity of powder with the powdermakers employed by His Majesty. If they had, writing with reference to the re-supplying of powder in His Majesty's magazine, "there will be an impossibility of replacing it for some considerable time". Had there been adequate supplies, there would have been no cause for alarm. The solution to the problem shows that the Ordnance was aware of the dangers in its position over the manner of supply. The analysis would have been equally true of the supply of arms.

The Ordnance could also be criticised over the provision of supplies other than arms. It was cautious in the matter of the supply of coals and candles to home garrisons on the grounds of economy. In September 1748 Bland's regiment of dragoons was a full year's powder and ball in arrears. The captain had bought these privately. The main criticism, however, concerned the supply of bedding. At some time before 1746, it was reported that Phillips' regiment at Placentia had had no bedding, clothing, nor provisions for three years; the Captain had supplied them from his own pocket. Later, the bedding which did arrive for the regiment was so bad that it did not last the journey past Newfoundland; in any case it was only sufficient for the effectives there. There was a complaint from Nova Scotia that the three regiments there suffered greatly by the want and scarcity of bedding.

There was another complaint in June 1748. The Board of Ordnance

240. Ibid., 28 Aug. 1747, Board of Ordnance to Earl of Chesterfield.
243. Ibid., p.14, 9 Oct. 1746, Gledhill (Company commander) to Board of Trade; ibid., p.12, 26 Feb. 1746, W. Sharpe to Duke of Newcastle.
pointed out that the whole regiment received new bedding in 1744 and 1745 and that if it had been afforded due care it would not be worn out, none of it being in use for more than three and a half years.\textsuperscript{244}

In November 1751, when four regiments arrived in Minorca, the bedding for the garrisons there was entirely unfit for service; the supply of the replacement bedding was so slow that the temporary bedding had itself become unfit for use.\textsuperscript{245} The situation did not improve with the passage of time.\textsuperscript{246}

The importance of the laxity in the provision of arms and other stores was that although the Ordnance did nothing wrong in supplying the deficiencies of the garrisons yet it did not actively seek out deficiencies. It was not concerned to give itself more work even in the interests of future benefits.

There were two general continuing commitments of the Ordnance which caused problems in the period 1744 to 1748. It would have been expected that the war with France would have caused problems for the Ordnance both in Europe and abroad. The Board found no difficulty in supplying armaments to Europe. The problem was one of procedures and did not become serious until after peace came. Abroad, the Board's problems after 1744 would be

\textsuperscript{244} Ibid., pp.140,141, 24 & 28 June 1748, H. Fox to Chas. Bush and reply Bush to Fox.
\textsuperscript{245} W.O. 55/354, p.62, 27 Nov. 1751, Fox to Holderness. See also, ibid., p.22, 3 Aug. 1751, Fox to Board of Ordnance.
\textsuperscript{246} For inadequacies in the supply of bedding to Nova Scotia at the beginning of the next war, see S.P. 41/38, 11 Aug. 1755, Board of Ordnance to Amyand.
to keep up defences to prevent and combat any attack.

The Ordnance had two commitments to maintain in the Low Countries. It had to supply an artillery train for the service of the British troops there in the same way as one was required for the troops serving in Britain. In May 1745 an agreement was reached with the Dutch government to set up and maintain a Joint Battering Train. Britain's contribution was met initially from the heavy artillery which it had in the Low Countries already; The residue of the British quota was bought from the States General in the same way as, in 1742, additional ordnance, carriages and stores had been bought to make up the Train which the British had for its own forces. Control of the Joint Battery Train was placed in the hands of the Dutch. Purchases and advances were paid for by the British through the Board of Ordnance, which applied annually to Parliament for re-imbursement of the expenditure. The agreement was to cause many problems both during and especially after the war. It seems to have been badly drafted and lack of trust on both sides marred its implementation.

The agreement was ratified in May 1745. As early as September

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249. S.P. 41/37, 5 May 1745, NS. in a letter from Lord Dunmore to Sir Everard Fawkener, 3 Feb. 1746. The agreement was reached after conferences at which the British plenipotentiaries were the Earl of Chesterfield and Trevor, envoy extraordinary at the Hague. The use of the common chest was set out in the instructions to the Dutch Commissary, similar to those supplied to the Generals:
"[la Caisse Commune] qui sera formée par la Grande Bretagne et la Republique pour satisfaire aux frais de l'Artillerie et autres qui arrivent à un Siege, comme aussi pour satisfaire à tous les autres frais casuels de la Guerre qui ne regardent point un siege."
failings became apparent: the Board of Ordnance replied to the Master General:

The pay of the officers etc. of the Joint Battering Train was to be defrayed out of the Common Chest, but we don't find that the same is yet formed, and we don't know whether it was understood or intended their pay should commence from the very date of the convention, or not till such time as the Joint Battering Train was completed: or whether the officers etc. have ever been mustered, any General Officers appointed to have the management of the cash, or whether any other of the Articles required by the Convention have been complied with so as to entitle the officers etc. to the pay demanded.  

The sequel was that Harrington instructed the Ordnance to consider again the reimbursement of the advanced pay of the officers and companies belonging to the Joint Battering Train. The position of the States General was that the inexécution of the Artillery Convention had not proceeded from the States .... if the Train had not been actually employed, nor all the people belonging to it not called out to actual service, it was not the fault of the Republic, nor of the officers, but the latter had been obliged to prepare all their equipages .... and the States had been obliged to make them issue the same consideration for it as if they had served at never so many sieges.

The Board of Ordnance continued to plead ignorance:  

We are entirely uninformed how far the Convention is carried into execution, but if His Majesty is satisfied that the States have performed their part, it is but reasonable in our opinion that the same should be done by us.  

250. S.P. 41/37, 3 Sept. 1745, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu. The enquiry had been caused by a letter to the Lords Justices from Trevor.
252. Ibid., 29 Oct. 1745, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
The same issue arose in the following year. The Board of the Ordnance replied that it was not sufficiently instructed to form a proper judgement of the equity of the States General's demands regarding the Battering Train. They were prepared to take Mr. Trevor's word on the sum claimed in view of his previous care, accuracy and circumspection whilst pointing out that there was a maximum sum for the account of the Battering Train laid down in a warrant and that this had already been exceeded.\textsuperscript{253} There was still delay in the settlement of accounts. In June 1746 part of the accounts of the previous year remained unsettled.\textsuperscript{254} Perhaps the delay in Britain's re-imbursing the States General was the reason for their change in procedure.\textsuperscript{255} The States informed Trevor that they were unable to advance the whole money for current expenses, as they had in the previous year, and proposed the formation of a common chest of 90,000 florins for that purpose.

In order to expedite the passing of accounts Thomas Jones, Controller of the Artillery, was sent to Holland to take care of the accounts of the Battering Train since he was familiar with them from his work in London.\textsuperscript{256} The arrangement seems to have worked. Jones examined the Joint Artillery Accounts for 1747 and found them just.\textsuperscript{257}

As regards fortifications overseas, for which the Ordnance was responsible, no general attention seems to have been given to their improvement in the years 1744-48. Sums spent on the upkeep of existing garrisons did

\textsuperscript{253} Ibid., 13 May 1746, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu, sent on by him to Harrington the next day.
\textsuperscript{254} Ibid., 23 June 1746, OS, Thos. Jones to Board of Ordnance, forwarded to Harrington 2 Aug. 1746.
\textsuperscript{255} Ibid., 25 July 1746, Trevor to Harrington.
\textsuperscript{256} S.P. 41/38, 15 June 1751, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Newcastle.
\textsuperscript{257} W.O. 47/34, O.B.M. 4 Apr. 1749.
not increase until 1747, when extra work was performed at Annapolis and Placentia. New commitments\(^{258}\) at St. Johns, Ferryland, Carboniere, Trinity Harbour, Rattan and Louisbourg did occasion additional expenditure in the period 1746-1748.\(^{259}\) The cost of maintaining ordnance officials in those places increased correspondingly.\(^{260}\)

It is difficult to judge whether the works undertaken were sufficient or whether more vigorous efforts might have been made. On the one hand it appeared to take an inordinate time to meet complaints. There was dissatisfaction about the lack of barracks at Antigua before action was taken in 1747\(^{261}\) and about the lack of both barracks and storehouses at Placentia.\(^{262}\) Yet the Ordnance was not always responsible for the delays. When there was a complaint about the lack of barracks and storehouses at Nova Scotia the Board of Ordnance replied that the delay was caused by the death of the engineer appointed to see to their erection, and his assistant's having had to wait for six weeks for passage.\(^{263}\) Guns, carriages and stores for Jamaica were sent in accordance with an order of 27 March 1746, but

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\(^{258}\) S.P. 41/37, 7 Mar. 1746, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Newcastle; 11 Apr. 1746, same to same; 28 Mar. 1746, Duke of Montagu to Board of Ordnance; 7 Mar. 1746, Board of Ordnance to Master General.

\(^{259}\) Newfoundland was put into a state of defence at the instruction of the Lords Justices and at the expense initially of the commanding officer on the spot, Capt. Smith, CTRJP, p.329, 1742-5, 9/11/1743. Later it was indicated that the bills be passed through the Board of Ordnance; ibid., p.452, 16/2/1744, p.526, 22/10/1744.

\(^{260}\) See Appendix C, Table 1.

\(^{261}\) W.O. 55/353, p.95, 21 Nov. 1747, Duke of Newcastle to Duke of Montagu.

\(^{262}\) It may have been forgiven for believing the situation to be in hand; see W.O. 55/354, pp.82,84, 27 Mar. 1744, regarding petition of John Tinker, Engineer to His Majesty and Board of Ordnance to Lords Justices.

\(^{263}\) W.O. 55/353, p.59, 12 Aug. 1747, Board of Ordnance to Secretary at war.
these were captured by the French; another supply was therefore ordered in the following year.²⁶⁴

Further, some complaints appear never to have been met, to judge from the reported condition of defences in various places at the end of the war. In 1750 the governor of the Bahamas arrived in post to find the defences in a parlous condition, more ruinous than the Ordnance had led him to expect.²⁶⁵ Perhaps the deception was not deliberate; the Ordnance might not have fully appreciated the situation. In 1748 Trelawney, the governor of Jamaica, informed the Ordnance how bad the fortifications were;²⁶⁶ at the start of 1749 the engineer submitted a similar report. He continued to press the point.²⁶⁷

On the other hand it was in the interest of the governor to make the best case possible, and the task of the Ordnance to decide on priorities for the distribution of limited expenditure. This constant regard for economy was the reason why the Ordnance appeared to prefer to wait on events rather than anticipate difficulties. In this period events justified inaction. The enemy did not take fortifications despite their apparent deficiencies. Whilst much human suffering would be caused by the lack of proper storehouses and barracks, the war effort was not directly impaired in a way which would cause a parliamentary outcry followed by prompt remedial action. Loss of men meant less than loss of possessions.

²⁶⁴. Ibid., p.65, 3 June 1747, Sharpe to Duke of Montagu. The governor's other complaint was lack of men.
²⁶⁵. W.O. 55/354, p.319, Governor of Bahamas to Board of Trade.
The coming of peace affected the Ordnance in four ways. It had to cater for the reduction in the army. It had to reduce its own staff. On the constructive side there were changes in organisation, and the peace provided an opportunity for preparations for the next conflict.

There was a significant reduction in the marines, foot, dragoons and the independent regiments.\textsuperscript{268} The Ordnance was affected in that whether the regiments were disbanded or reduced, the arms of the disbanded men had to be collected and surveyed. There was liaison between the Ordnance and the Secretary at War, since the Ordnance needed to know in advance where to send its employees to receive the arms. It is difficult to judge how efficiently the task was executed. On occasions, the exercise floundered because of lack of communication such as when the Secretary at War made arrangements for the reduction of Dalzell's regiment in the Leeward Islands without first realising that there was no Ordnance official to receive the arms.\textsuperscript{269} In addition, there appears to have been little rationalisation of where regiments were to be disbanded. There was no concentration on a few depots. On the other hand, certain places were cited in orders on more than one occasion, implying that disbanding was not haphazard.\textsuperscript{270}

The problem faced by the Ordnance was one of geography and one of scale. The difficulties with regiments overseas was self-evident. At home, there were eighteen regiments disbanded, ten of which were marines, a further sixteen reduced to numbers on the Irish establishment, and some

\textsuperscript{268} For the proposed reduced forces in Ireland, see Holland House, 51378, f.85a, and for Britain see \textit{ibid.}, f.85b.

\textsuperscript{269} S.P. 41/37, 6 Dec. 1748, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Bedford.

\textsuperscript{270} See, for example, W.O. 55/353, p.202, 8 Nov. 1748, Fox to Duke of Montagu. Compare with pp.194,196.
forty two reduced by an arbitrary figure; some lost half their numbers
and others merely lost the additions which had been made during the war.
Much of the disbanding seems to have been ordered during November 1749
with another high point in February 1750. The arms taken on these
occasions explain the differences between the remains of stores taken in
January 1749 and February 1752.

The coming of peace meant that for the immediate future pressure was
taken from the foreign garrisons. The Board of Ordnance lost no time in
reducing its commitment in Jamaica in 1748. It based its argument on
the precedent of action taken to reduce the garrison in 1713 on the advent
of the last previous peace. Orders were given for the removal of the
last engineer at Jamaica, New York, South Carolina and Georgia; the cost
of their remaining in post was put at £1 per day, an expense which the
Ordnance did not think justified in view of the changed military situation.

In the following November orders were given for the disbanding and recall of
the garrison at Rattan. The Ordnance suggested that the Train be recalled
as well. Ferryland, Carboniere and Trinity Harbour were left with a skeleton
staff. The Ordnance resisted a deeper commitment in Antigua; and the

271. S.P. 41/37, 14 Feb. 1748, 24 Feb. 1748, 4 Mar. 1748. The
Admiralty said that it would be employing 4 or 5 smaller rated
ships but declined to comment on how the Ordnance should organise
its affairs at Jamaica, ibid., 24 Feb. 1748, Admiralty to Board
of Ordnance.

272. W.O. 55/353, p.366, 29 May 1750, Board of Ordnance to Lords
Justices being copy of a letter by Board of Ordnance to the
commissioners of the Admiralty, 14 Feb. 1748.

273. S.P. 41/37, 3 Jan. 1749, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu;
and 11 Jan. 1749, Montagu to Duke of Bedford. See also, W.O.

274. W.O. 55/353, p.210, 6 Dec. 1748, Board of Ordnance to Duke of
Bedford.


276. W.O. 55/354, p.59, 26 Nov. 1751, W. Sharpe agreeing with
recommendation of the Ordnance.

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Bahamas were left in an allegedly bad condition. The haste with which the Ordnance reduced its commitment in the West Indies is emphasised by the measures which were undertaken within two or three years for the defence of those places following representations from the Governors.

The Ordnance was keen to reduce its commitment in the Netherlands, as was demonstrated in the arguments relating to the dissolution of the Joint Battering Train.

The problem concerned the division of the Train. Jones was sent to bring home the Battering Train on 20 Dec. 1749. The facts of the case were adequately represented to the Duke of Newcastle by the Board of Ordnance in May 1751:

Mr. Jones by the kind assistance of the Earl of Holdernesse obtained the restitution of the Train and stores which were of English fabric and they were accordingly sent home in November and January last.

But the States, my Lord, being unwilling to part with His Majesty's quota of the said Train which is of Dutch fabric and for which they received from this office £45,143/10/2 in 1742 and 1745, and having proposed to repurchase the same, yet declining the actual payment of the sum arising from such sale, until the accounts (sic.), under the title of Les Fraix Casuels de la Guerre are mutually settled and adjusted; affairs have remained in the same situation to this day.

The Dutch case as set out by their representative, Hop, in a letter to the Duke of Newcastle was that the Dutch expenditure in the common cause was such as to lead him to expect that there would be a balance owing to the

277. Ibid., p.81, 8 Feb. 1752, W. Sharpe to Board of Ordnance; also ibid p.319.
278. See below p.271.
279. See above p.257.
280. He was experienced in the matter.
281. S.P. 41/38, 24 May 1751.
States General,\textsuperscript{283} that sale of the items to the Dutch would therefore be an easy way of helping to meet that balance, that it would save Britain the cost of shipment of stores to England and that the arms in any case were not of the right calibre for English use. He added an argument which was representative of the Dutch attitude toward the extent to which they had borne the burden of the war:

\begin{quote}
La République a perdu durant les derniers troubles une partie très considérable de son artillerie dans les villes prises et dans les batailles gagnées par les Francais et cela pour la cause commune.

Elle n'a donc a present que très peu d'artillerie dans les places, et il s'écoulera beaucoup de temps, avant que ces parties puissent être reparées par des nouvelles Fontes.
\end{quote}

The Board of Ordnance had three concerns, all associated with the cost of the involvement. It claimed that it had no allowance for paying Jones' services as commissary at the Hague between 12 June 1746 and 31 December 1748. The Board had paid him at £2 per day from his appointment to bring home the Battering Train.\textsuperscript{284} It was likewise concerned that it was incurring expense in maintaining officers and artificers with the Train as long as the Dutch refused to release the goods.\textsuperscript{285} With regard to the major problem of those goods, the Ordnance's case was set out in a letter to the Duke of Newcastle in January 1750.\textsuperscript{286} By the terms of the eleventh article of the convention at the end of the war the Train was to be divided in the proportion of two thirds to England and one third to the States General; this was to be done in such a way as to ensure that each

\begin{flushright}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
284. & \textit{Ibid.}, 17 June 1751, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Newcastle.
\end{tabular}
\end{flushright}
side should receive a proportionate share of each species of arms, and carry off as near as possible the individual stores which it had furnished. Therefore, Britain had a right to bring home the remainder of the Train without waiting for the liquidation of the cash accounts.

The Ordnance was concerned about the commitment of its goods:

part of the stores being of a perishable nature, warehouse room expensive in that country, and our quota of the said train not to be valued at less than £80,000. 287

The problem of the expense of maintaining Ordnance officers with the Train was solved by the recall of all who were not absolutely necessary for settling the accounts. 288 The Board of Ordnance had to press the point by reminding the Duke of Newcastle. 289 The Board was also given instructions to pass on to Jones; he was 290 to settle and ascertain forthwith with the person or persons appointed and authorised by the States General for that purpose the value of the said quota of His Majesty's Battering Train which is of Dutch fabric, and to take in the best form proper instruments by which the States make themselves [liable] for the immediate payment of the sum agreed upon whenever His Majesty shall be pleased to demand it.

If the States were to refuse to give such instruments the Board of Ordnance was to cause the quota to be shipped to England without delay.

In his report Jones indicated that the major problem about the extent of the Dutch liability 291 was:

289. W.O. 55/354, p.20, 10 July 1751, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Newcastle.
290. Ibid., p.20, 8 Aug. 1751, Order to Board of Ordnance.
their having employed the officers and companies  
of artillery destined to the service of the  
Battering Train with their own Field Pieces  
during the several campaigns.

It was thought that the Dutch would argue that their other forces could  
act without the elements of the Battering Train and that this would be  
difficult to refute since the Battering Train was never used nor the  
companies named for its service ever mustered. The Dutch could be forgiven  
for this attitude since the entire management of the Train had been given  
to them. Additionally Jones considered, after a thorough investigation,  
that the Dutch had not misused their authority by taking full advantage  
of it.

The Duke of Newcastle ordered the Ordnance to tell Jones to finish  
the liquidation of the accounts on the lines he laid down, provided that  
it was finished within three years. The agreement was signed on 28 Feb.  
1752 by which Britain was to receive £516,500/2/3d. It had not been  
received within the three years.

At home, as well as abroad, the effects of the peace were soon  
evident. In May 1749 an increase in the fortifications at Berwick led  
Parliament to order the reduction of the establishment by an engineer.  
The amount spent on fortifications in Britain and the Channel Islands  
generally was reduced, although important works in Scotland were continued  
at the same level. One of the largest savings was effected by the disbanding  
of the artillery train formerly serving in Scotland. The reduction of the  

292. Ibid., p.78, 24 Jan. 1752, Duke of Newcastle to Board of  
Ordnance.
293. S.P. 41/38, 13 Mar. 1752, Board of Ordnance to Duke of  
Newcastle.
294. Ibid., 11 Mar. 1755, Board of Ordnance to Earl of Holdernesse.
Ordnance's commitments both overseas and at home were reflected in the reduction of expenditure, that in 1749 being just over a third of that in 1748. There was a further reduction in expenditure between 1749 and 1750 but this was relatively insignificant compared with the change between 1748 and 1749.

Although the expenditure of the Ordnance was reduced after the ending of formal hostilities, the Ordnance did not lapse into inactivity. There was a general remain of stores taken in July 1749 to assess their state. The implication was that stores would be acquired where deficiencies were revealed. The scale of the task and the urgency with which it had to be completed could be judged from the employment of additional labourers. There appears to have been an attempt to assess the extra demand made by the war in terms of materials supplied. In August 1749 the Clerk of the Deliveries asked that the Board's orders relating to shot, shells and old iron guns made and sent to Woolwich from January 1st. 1720 to Midsummer 1749 be sent to him. There was a tightening up on contracts. In December 1749 Ravell was told that his initial proposals would not do and that he would have to re-submit quotations. There was also a more general review of contracts. The Master General instituted an enquiry

296. This followed a remain of the small arms, S.P. 41/37, 1 Jan. 1749.
298. Ibid., 12 Dec. 1749.
299. For an example involving the contract for the transport of guns in the Warren in 1750, see Hogg op. cit., p.394. The cheapest powder maker was taken, W.O. 47/37, p.47, O.B.M., 12 Jan. 1750.
into the office procedure, where the regulations had broken down in practice and where they could be amended.\textsuperscript{300}

The Ordnance took two sets of measures in regard to its staff at Woolwich arising out of defects revealed during the war. In regard to the Laboratory it was found that an order passed in 1747 had not been put into effect in full. The deficiency concerned the employment of officers in the laboratory as part of their tour of duty, the intention being to improve their work by subjecting them to the scrutiny of the Lieutenant General.\textsuperscript{301} It was also found that several of the cadets had neglected their duty, particularly since the decease of the Master General. It was deemed best for the service that Ligonier take charge of the company of cadets.\textsuperscript{302}

It was found that there had been considerable delays in the submission of record books and supporting vouchers from storekeepers overseas from as early in the war as 1743. Even when the necessary paperwork was present it was sometimes difficult to reach any conclusions.\textsuperscript{303} The Surveyor General found discrepancies in practice between the officers of different out-ports travelling in the course of their duty. The practice was standardised.\textsuperscript{304}

\textsuperscript{300} See above p. 58. Routine submission of returns during the war had not been followed, W.O. 47/37, p.347, O.B.M., 26 Mar. 1751. A gunners account in 1743 was not brought to the Ordnance until 1749, W.O. 47/35, p.231, O.B.M., 27 Mar. 1750. One of the abuses to be remedied was that the storekeeper at Edinburgh had employed an extra clerk because of the extra business of 1745 and had continued him until Dec. 1748, W.O. 47/34, O.B.M., 21 Feb. 1749.

\textsuperscript{301} W.O. 47/34, O.B.M., 6 Oct. 1749.

\textsuperscript{302} Ibid., O.B.M., 22 Dec. 1749.


\textsuperscript{304} W.O. 47/40, O.B.M., p.248, 24 Nov. 1752.
There seems to have been a greater degree of precision exercised more regularly after 1748 over the whole range of the Ordnance's activities, from the work on Scottish castles at Brae Mar, Cargaff Castle\(^{305}\) and Inverness,\(^{306}\) to the clearing of ships accounts\(^{307}\) and the review of the accounts of the Storekeeper at Jamaica.\(^{308}\) There was a general process of tidying up anomalies which had occurred; deficiencies in accounts were rectified.\(^{309}\) Speed was the only area in which the reforms were open to criticism; by the standards of the eighteenth century the efforts at self-improvement made by the Ordnance were neither slow nor limited in scope.

The Ordnance was also active in areas outside its immediate organisation after the war. Improvement of weapons continued. Iron ramrods were issued to four regiments of foot in the February of 1748, and in February 1752 some 3,400 more were issued.\(^{310}\) The coming of peace brought a time for changes without the interference of practical day to day routine. A new method of paying the garrison at Gibraltar was introduced in 1750. There was discussion about a new scheme for the defence of Gibraltar.\(^{311}\)

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306. Ibid., p.7, 7 Sept. 1749. Bogdani was concerned to reconcile the Paymaster's accounts to those kept in the office.
308. Ibid., p.20, 17 Sept. 1750. The emphasis was on seeing that matters were correct at that moment, and the correction of past mistakes a secondary concern. There was similar close scrutiny of the accounts of the paymaster to Boscawen's expedition and those of the East India Company, see W.O. 46/8, pp.27-29, 23 Oct. 1750. For the sequel, see ibid., pp.30,32, 5 & 9 Nov. 1750.
311. S.P. 41/40, 1 Nov. 1751, Board of Ordnance to Fox.
There were also several complaints about the bad state of bedding at Minorca; a new scheme to ensure the maintenance of bedding in a better state was introduced.

In terms, however, of preparing for a future war by practical improvements in fortifications as opposed to changes in procedure it cannot be said that the Ordnance seized the opportunity of peace to undertake much needed works which only the pressure of war had prevented previously. Rather the concern, as before, seems to have been that as little as possible be done as cheaply as possible. Total expenditure remained steady, at a level higher than before 1739, between 1751 and 1754, increasing in 1755. The difference was attributable chiefly to the single item of pay for the regiment of artillery which did service at home and overseas; sums expended under the head of fortifications, repairs and the supply of stores to garrisons overseas were about one quarter of the sums expended during the war. It is not possible to judge whether this policy was correct. At least as regards Minorca, where expenditure was reduced considerably, events in the next war would indicate that the policy was misguided.

313. Ibid., p.87, 10 Mar. 1752, Pelham to Board of Ordnance. See also, W.O. 47/34, O.B.M., 21 Feb. 1749.
314. For the pattern of expenditure, see Appendix C, Tables 1 & 2.
315. See Appendix B, Table 1, and J.H.C., Vols. xxii-xxvii.
316. See Appendix C, Table 1.
318. The Board of Ordnance thought that Gibraltar had the supplies of powder to withstand a siege of 8 to 9 months but realised that the supplies of Minorca were less secure, S.P. 41/37, 18 Mar. 1747, Board of Ordnance to Duke of Montagu.
What is certain is that several governors considered that existing measures were insufficient, and that the Ordnance disagreed, its first thought being economy. Three instances demonstrate the point.

The Ordnance found itself in difficulty over the settlement in Nova Scotia. On the one hand the Governor there had given orders for the building of two magazines for the protection of the powder. He considered that the Ordnance should pay for the works. The Treasury ruled that in this case it was in order for the Ordnance to pay up to £2,000 but that in future the Governor should pass the request to the Ordnance and thence laid before the King. On the other hand the Ordnance had fixed no establishment for Nova Scotia, nor had it received any commands to take care of the works, fortifications, barracks and magazines as in all other garrisons abroad.

There was a similar problem over English Harbour in Antigua. The situation was:

that English Harbour .... has been fortified at a considerable expense out of naval money, .... and as that Harbour is of the greatest importance in time of war and much resorted to by His Majesty's ships in time of peace, the Lords of the Admiralty think it for His Majesty's service to keep up the naval storehouses and conveniencies of careening .... the fortifications would soon fall into ruin if not duly supported, and the expense of keeping them up not being the proper business of the Navy, the Lords of the Admiralty propose that .... the Navy might be wholly discharged from an expense and trouble which has no relation to it.

321. The Admiralty wanted the appointment of a permanent official to maintain the fortifications and the building of a powder magazine, W.O. 47/34, O.B.M., 18 July 1749.
The Ordnance replied that the island was not on the establishment of the office and that no money had been provided by Parliament. The Board indicated that it had "no plan of the fortifications, but are certain [that] if they are of consequence they will be very expensive in that country". It suggested that one of its engineers survey the state and condition of the fortifications with a view to forming an estimate of the cost of their annual upkeep and their deficiencies.\(^{322}\)

Trelawney at Jamaica began to agitate for defence preparations only one month after the departure of his engineer, saying that he did not want to waste the peace by not preparing for war.\(^{323}\) Just over a year later there was an enquiry into the state of the defences there.\(^{324}\) The only material outcome seems to have been the proposal to buy land for the purchase of a fort at Mosquito Point.\(^{325}\)

At home several minor works were undertaken at Whitby,\(^{326}\) Milford Haven, and at Portsmouth.\(^{327}\) The main effort of the Ordnance was concentrated in Scotland. A petition from nobles and gentry resulted in the survey of a military road south of Hadrian's Wall, the existence of which in 1745 would have made Wade's task against the rebels much easier. Faith

\(^{322}\) W.O. 47/34, O.B.M., 7 Apr. 1749.

\(^{323}\) W.O. 55/353, p.373, 5 July 1750. See also, W.O. 47/36, p.297, 7 Nov. 1750, referring to a report from the Governor, 4 Apr. 1750, saying that there was a need for an additional plan of defence at Port Royal which he made, 14 Nov. 1748.

\(^{324}\) W.O. 55/354, p.1, 2 Apr. 1751, Board of Ordnance to Bedford, Principal Secretary of State. The Board intended to act.


\(^{326}\) W.O. 55/353, p.25, 14 May 1747, Request by Whitby for cannon.

\(^{327}\) Most of the forts under Ordnance control were located on the South Coast. Spending reflected this (Appendix C). The level of spending returned to what had been normal to 1744.
seems to have been placed in the building of conventional castles to keep Scotland secure in preference to the patrolling of the country by soldiers who could be out-manoeuvred by rebels with better knowledge of the terrain, and who could be potential rebels themselves. Thus Cargaff Castle, Castletown, Castle Tarbott, and Castle Turren were taken on the establishment and money spent on substantial repairs and supplies. The building of a fort at Arderseer was continued. These defences were strengthened at a level of expenditure undiminished from that in the war years. This demonstrated concern with Scotland; the fact that the works were undertaken over such a long period suggests a lack of urgency. It also reflects the difficulty of making large changes, such as the building of a fort, which could not be completed with the speed made possible by later technical advances. Perhaps the Ordnance was reluctant to undertake large capital projects because it knew that these would probably not be finished before the danger which had caused the work had long passed. In that event a large proportion of its limited resources would be committed for many years in the future.

In practical terms, whatever the governors of colonies might represent, Britain was to enter the next conflict with fortifications in no worse condition than in 1739; and in many cases improvements in the period 1739-1754 had considerably strengthened defences. By the standards of the eighteenth century the Ordnance could not be expected to have done more. That is not to say that enough had been done.

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328. The £10,000 per year spent on Arderseer was the main difference from the pre 1746 expenditure Appendix C, Tables 1 & 2.
It is possible to reach a favourable conclusion of the Ordnance's work. Preparations for war relating to the supply of arms and gunpowder proved sufficient for eighteen months. Despite subsequent crises and the need to buy both types of goods from Holland supplies seem to have sufficed. Expenditure on garrison at home was limited until after the 1745 rebellion. This was not to affect the issue which was decided on the battlefield. After the rebellion, expenditure was directed to where it would be most effective, in Scotland and on the south coast. The lesson of the dangers of a two pronged attack had been learned. A similar pattern emerged in relation to the upkeep of garrisons overseas. Expenditure was limited, but despite the protests of various governors who considered their defences inadequate the French and Spaniards did not capitalise on the weaknesses, real or exaggerated.
CHAPTER SIX

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE ARMY 1739-1754
General: fluctuation of forces' numbers and expenditure - importance of mercenaries.


1741-48: meeting commitments; overseas; Europe - augmentation and additional companies - withdrawal in face of 1745 rebellion - factors influencing recommitment; England - invasion scares before 1745 - reaction to 1745 rebellion - recall of troops - use of county regiments - other civilian response to the war - position in Ireland.
It is difficult to decide what criteria should be adopted to judge the effectiveness of the war administration's reaction to the challenge of war. It would be wrong to ascribe to "administration" credit or criticism for the success or failure of policy decisions on the provision or deployment of troops. The part played in the making of policy by the Secretary at War, the head of such central administration as existed, was at best uncertain;\(^1\) he was the executive force. At the same time, it would be incorrect to pass over major topics to concentrate on the minutiae of office routine merely because in the eighteenth century administration was not seen as a function separate from politics. By its nature the work of the Ordnance lent itself to a development less directly affected by politics; by contrast, questions of concern to the army, both at the centre and locally, meant the involvement of men of influence. The substance was too important to be left solely to clerks.

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The first and major consideration of the war department was the adequate supply of men. The size of the army with which the wars of Jenkin's Ear and the Austrian Succession had to be fought fluctuated in

\(^1\) See below p.360 \textit{et seq.} For a critical appraisal of the position of the Secretary at War, see J. Hayes, \textit{Bull. John Rylands Library}, Vol. 40, 1957/8, p.334 and note.
the period 1739-54. At the height of the war, in 1746, twice as much was being spent in total on the pay of troops as had been spent in the last years of peace. The figure for expenditure between 1743 and 1748 remained reasonably constant when it might have been expected that the commitment in Flanders would have been reflected in continuing growth in expenditure. It is a testimony both to the efficiency of the War Office, and to the low final figures for involvement, that the force in Flanders could be increased by a third immediately and by a similar amount in the next year. Although one criticism is that the increase could have been achieved more quickly, yet it is also possible to argue that, since the maximum effort in Flanders was not called for until after 1743, the actual rate of increase was an indication of the needs of the situation and not of capacity for growth.

The amount spent at home did not diminish drastically during the war. At its lowest, in 1745, just before the rebellion, the amount spent at home was still three quarters of that which had been spent in the years before 1739. Most of the increase in total expenditure could be attributed to the commitment of forces on the continent. The strength of the lobby for economy on army affairs could be seen from the total expenditure after 1748. The annual figure was reduced to a level slightly lower than that which had become accepted during the 20 years prior to 1739. That figure was to remain reasonably constant to 1755.

Just as there was a rapid increase in the number of troops at the

2. See Appendix D. Much of this section is based on an analysis of this Appendix. For an able although short analysis of the difficulties experienced by the army under the early Hanoverians, see an article of that title by C. T. Atkinson.
start of the war in 1739 there was a rapid decrease at the end in 1749. This was consistent with the increase in expenditure associated with occasions in the period before 1739 when peace had been threatened. In 1728, and again in 1735, the army was increased only to be reduced upon the subsidence of the trouble.\(^4\) The increase in 1740 was slightly greater than that on either of these occasions. From the three instances it would seem that upon the first sign of trouble the War Office increased its expenditure by about a quarter whilst remaining ready to cater for a greater increase if the challenge proved more substantial. Such a conclusion could also be drawn from expenditure in the first years of the Seven Years War.

The increase in 1740 was also different from those in 1728 and 1735 in that whereas previously only the foot had been augmented now the three wings of the army were increased. Both the proportional and the nominal increase was greatest for the foot. This was consistent with expenditure during the rest of the war; the maximum number of troops and the maximum expenditure on horse and dragoons in Flanders was reached as early as 1743, whereas the numbers of foot fluctuated after that.

It is not possible to discover if there was any policy on the number of troops and expenditure at home as opposed to other theatres of war. There is evidence of a prudent approach to the defence of Britain. Although the number of horse on the home garrison was halved when the war in Flanders began, their number was not further reduced. In the period of the greatest effort on the continent the infantry in Britain was not

\(^4\) See Appendix C, Table 6.
reduced much below the level which was maintained either after or before the war. In 1747, although a sizeable force was returned to Flanders, the importance of defending Britain itself was reflected in the expenditure of a sum greater than in the crises of 1728, and 1735. This sum was over half as large again as that spent in 1745 before the withdrawal of troops from Flanders.

After 1748, apart from the general reduction in forces the only significant change related to the relative expenditure on Horse and Dragoons. The establishment for dragoons was some twenty per cent higher than that before 1739, a result of the saving made on the Horse where expenditure was halved. This was partially to be explained by the re-classification of 3 regiments of Horse as Dragoons.5

One important factor discussed whenever politicians talked of the value of foreign troops employed by Britain was the alleged expense of mercenaries, particularly the Hanoverians.6 It is fruitless to attempt more than a rough comparison since it would be necessary to take into account levy money, forage and subsidies to foreign princes for a detailed study; such a comparison would be frustrated by the difficulty of quantifying skill, valour, loyalty and availability of supply.

It is possible, however, to reach certain negative conclusions. Calculating all possible costs of the Danish and Hessian troops against a similar body of British for a similar two month period it was cheaper to hire mercenaries.7 Hesse Cassel and Denmark did not raise the charges for hiring out their forces during the rest of the war. The real import-

5. See Appendix D, Tables 1 & 2.
6. For a comparison of the situations in 1711 and 1743, see B.M. Lansdowne Mss. 10/81.
ance of the mercenaries was their availability as fully trained soldiers, not their cost. They were a significant proportion of Britain's contribution to the war effort by any standard and were especially important at the beginning of the war, in 1746, and at the end of the war when the rest of the British involvement was small or non-existent.\(^8\)

It is important to decide how well prepared were the armed forces in 1739. It is often assumed that in the absence of major conflicts between 1713 and 1739 the War Office and the army must have grown slack. Whilst the conclusion might stand, the premise does not.\(^9\) There was a scare in 1728/9 over Gibraltar.\(^10\) The scare in 1734/5 was sufficient to cause the withdrawal from the Irish to the British establishments of eight regiments of foot. The regiments were not returned for over a year,\(^11\) when some regiments were also reduced.\(^12\)

In 1739 the state and fitness of the army are difficult to determine.\(^13\) There is no direct evidence on the subject. On the other hand, the War Office felt that there was merit in a scheme for rehearsing, if not furthering, instruction in military discipline. In May 1740 it was thought:

> necessary that our Land Forces which are now dispersed in several quarters throughout this Kingdom should be drawn together and be encamped in several bodies in order to be more useful and more speedily united in case of necessity, and for the better instruction

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8. See Appendix D, Tables 1-3.
9. This is consistent with Professor Baugh's judgement on the navy, op. cit., p.495. See also, Appendix C, Table 6.
10. See Appendix C, Table 6.
13. It was not possible to ascertain the worth of the commanding officers. The majority had not been in post long when the war started.
of them in military discipline.\textsuperscript{14}

One camp was to be situated in the neighbourhood of Hounslow under Sir Charles Wills, one near Newbury under General Wade, and a third under Lieutenant General Honeywood near Windsor.\textsuperscript{15} The commanding officers were given as much freedom as possible to march, quarter, and camp where they liked, subject only to the orders of a superior officer or of the War Office.

The organisation was not to be faulted.\textsuperscript{16} The civil officers were ordered to render assistance. Following the report of the three generals, the Quarter Master General was directed to go to the places and examine the ground so that the camps were provided with water and food for the horses and foot, and situated not far from a market town where the soldiers might obtain provisions. Commissioners were appointed to provide the three encampments with the number of rations which would be required, with straw for the soldiers tents and a three week supply of hay.\textsuperscript{17} Proper houses were to be hired to serve as hospitals for the accommodation of the sick and a chest of medicines was to be prepared for the surgeons of each corps. Tents and working tools were to be supplied by the Ordnance. It is difficult to see what else might reasonably have been done to ensure the success of the venture. In the event "rains and tempestuous weather" caused the undertaking to be less than a total success. When camp broke on 30 September Wade's conclusion

\begin{enumerate}
\item W.O. 26/19, pp.245-7, and May 1740, Yonge to Sir Charles Wills, General Wade, and Lieutenant General Honeywood.
\item The groups were of roughly equal size
\item For details, see W.O. 26/19, pp.260,261,273, 10-17 June 1740. The army officers were to pay for the carriages, impressed by the magistrates, at the usual rates.
\item The supply of bread was put to contract, \textit{ibid.}, p.273, 17 June 1740.
\end{enumerate}
was that the troops had learned "the several parts of camp duty to which they were strangers", and that to keep them longer under canvas was merely filling the hospitals.\textsuperscript{18}

A year later Wade was appointed to command a group of regiments with a similar intention of combining training with the setting up of a reserve.\textsuperscript{19}

\begin{quote}
It may be necessary .... for His Majesty's service .... that the several regiments .... should encamp together or in separate bodies to be in readiness for any service which His Majesty may please to order and direct.
\end{quote}

The terms of reference were much the same as in the previous occasion.\textsuperscript{20}

In these early years of the war, there was also an attempt to keep the regiments up to scratch by a general review. One such was held in 1739, and related to the forces, barracks and garrisons in North Britain.\textsuperscript{21} Almost two years later there was a similar order in virtually the same terms for Lieutenant General Churchill to review several regiments.\textsuperscript{22}

It is difficult to tell how effective these measures were. The army was not called into action for another two years. When it did fight, it seems to have compared favourably with the forces of other nations, although this may have been a testimony not to the preparations but to the innate qualities of the common soldier.\textsuperscript{23} At the least the war

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} S.P. 41/12, quoted by C.T. Atkinson, "Jenkins Ear, Austrian Succession War," p.287.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Half were drawn from his group of the previous year and half from Honeywood's.
\item \textsuperscript{20} W.O. 26/19, p.353, 28 May 1741, Yonge to General Wade.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p.198, 3 Sept. 1739, warrant, and p.201, 7 Sept. 1739, orders to General Wade, and Lieutenant Generals Honeywood, Barrett, and Churchill.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p.357, 17 July 1741.
\item \textsuperscript{23} For an assessment of the worth of the common soldier earlier, see, Scouller, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.285-7.
\end{itemize}
administration might claim that it had provided the conditions under which training might be conducted. There is less doubt, although some dispute, about the numbers of men which the army planned to have at its disposal. Atkinson argues that "little was done in the opening months of the war to add to our available land resources"; no substantial increase of the Army was at first attempted. Whilst existing regiments were 'augmented' and their establishments increased, the only other addition to the forces was that of six regiments of marines raised in the winter of 1739-40. There is additional evidence of the War Office's strengthening its forces. Between the outbreak of war and the invasion of Silesia by Frederick the Great, which Atkinson rightly views as opening a new period in the war effort, there was added to the establishment a new regiment of foot. Of the regiment some four companies were to be formed out of the six independent companies of foot in the Highlands of North Britain; the remaining men were "to be raised with all possible expedition".

Augmentation to existing regiments was carried out on a comprehensive basis. The three regiments of foot guards were augmented by the end of the prescribed period 25 June 1739 to 24 August 1739. To prevent

24. For a synopsis of the number of the forces in 1739, see Appendix D, Tables 1-3.
25. C. T. Atkinson, "Jenkins Ear, the Austrian Succession and the 'Forty-five."
28. W.O. 26/19, p.218, 7 Nov. 1739, Yonge to Earl of Crawford.
29. T.P. Board Papers, cccii 42, See Appendix D, Table 3.
30. This was in addition to the order for a regiment of four battalions ordered to be raised in America, the full establishment to begin on 24th. April 1740, T.P. Board Papers, cccii No. 67.
31. Many regiments were augmented in June. See W.O. 26/19, p.175, 26 June 1739, Yonge to various colonels.
the negation of exercise, Yonge instructed the High Constable of several London districts to billet men belonging to those companies then quartered in that division "as the officers have already raised some men and are daily enlisting more .... to prevent their deserting for want of quarters".  

Several regiments of Horse Guards were ordered to be augmented in August. In the same month warrants were issued for several colonels of foot to make arrangements for the assignment of the off reckonings for their additional men from June 1739 to June 1740. Similar warrants relating to dragoon regiments were made in September 1739, the period of assignment being until June 1741. The clothing inspection officers were also notified. One week later an augmentation of ten men to sixty men per company was ordered in Gibraltar and Minorca. The augmentation was to be complete by 24th. December 1739. A second augmentation to 70 effective men was ordered in September for those regiments. Three musters were recorded as complete. Yonge pressed for a reply on the augmentations at Gibraltar and Minorca in order that the Duke of Newcastle could give orders to the Ordnance "that they may be [provided] with ....

33. Ibid., p.88, 22 June 1739, Yonge to several High Constables.
35. Ibid., pp.185,186, 1 Aug. 1739; for details of the augmentation to foot regiments, see ibid., pp.168-172, 12 June 1739.
36. Some dragoons, horse and horse guards were augmented as early as August; ibid., pp.193-5, warrants dated 27 Aug. 1739.
37. For a definition of the scope and the composition of the Board of General Officers, see ibid., p.209, 22 Oct. 1739.
38. W.O. 4/35, p.98, 29 June 1739, Yonge to relevant colonels. See also, W.O. 26/19, p.212, warrant to colonels in Minorca and Gibraltar.
necessary arms as usual out of His Majesty's stores with all possible expedition".\(^{40}\) In August 1739 regimental colonels there were given power to make arrangements for the additional men in their respective regiments from 25th. June 1739 to 24th. April 1740.\(^{41}\) At the same period to help with recruiting, orders were given for making out debentures complete for the two old independent companies in Jamaica for the period December 1737 to December 1738 and the six new independent companies from June 1738 to December 1738.\(^{42}\) In December 1740 the regiment under Dalzell at the Leeward Islands were augmented.\(^{43}\)

The main concern of the War Office at that time was with being as practical as possible.\(^{44}\) It recognised the status quo in pardoning soldiers deserting from the ten regiments due in England from Ireland.\(^{45}\) Two months later the War Office wrote to all half pay officers of His Majesty's Land Forces and Marines on the British Establishment ordering them to send in an account of their ages and present places of abode. No further payments would be made until the order was obeyed.\(^{46}\) In the next month a warrant was issued for reviewing the Forces, Barracks and Garrisons in North Britain. The officers responsible were to be General Wade, Lieutenant General Honeywood, Lieutenant General Barrell, and Lieutenant General Churchill.\(^{47}\)

\(^{40}\) W.O. 4/35, p.100, 30 June 1739, Yonge to Duke of Newcastle.
\(^{41}\) W.O. 26/19, p.188, warrants dated 1 Aug. 1739; see also, \textit{ibid.}, p.212, 1 Oct. 1739.
\(^{42}\) \textit{Ibid.}, pp.173-4, warrants, 15 June 1739.
\(^{43}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p.222, warrant, 12 Dec. 1739.
\(^{44}\) For a typical example, see the commonsense Rules and Instructions for the better Government of the Marine Forces, W.O. 26/19, pp.250-3, 7 May 1740.
\(^{45}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p.176, 29 June 1739.
\(^{47}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p.198, 3 Sept. 1739.
Short of raising many new regiments it is difficult to see what else the War Office could reasonably have done and augmentation was a substitute for raising such new regiments. A similar expedient was the forming of four new independent companies of invalids by a draft of ten private men out of the companies of Fielding's regiment of Invalids.\textsuperscript{48} That the army liked, where possible, to build on a firm nucleus of experienced troops was evident from Ireland, and also in the way in which the marine regiments were formed. Criticism was levelled against the regiments raised in 1745 without such a nucleus.\textsuperscript{49}

The raising of the nucleus for the marine regiments was undertaken as efficiently as possible. Each regiment was to consist of ten companies of three sergeants, three corporals, two drummers and seventy private effective men.\textsuperscript{50} They were to receive 120 corporals and private men from each of the three regiments of Foot Guards suitable for promotion to marine sergeant.\textsuperscript{51} Similar orders were issued for the draft of 100 privates considered as suitable to be made corporals and four drummers qualified to be Drum Major. The onus for delivery was on the regiment supplying the troops.\textsuperscript{52} No regiment was called upon to supply more than one set of men. Orders were quickly given for recruiting one of the donor regiments.\textsuperscript{53} The groups forming the basis of each regiment seem

\textsuperscript{48} W.O. 26/19, p.216, 7 Nov. 1739.
\textsuperscript{49} See above pp.144-5,313.
\textsuperscript{50} Such a process of "robbing Peter to pay Paul" was not unusual. Before the war Rothes' had been reduced to a skeleton to provide a nucleus for Oglethorpe's regiment. C. T. Atkinson "The Army under the Early Hanoverians", p.140. For the details of the making up of that nucleus, see W.O. 26/19, p.229, 31 Dec. 1739.
\textsuperscript{51} The procedure was not peculiar to the Marines; see W.O. 26/19, p.230, 12 Jan. 1740 with reference to Dalzell's regiment.
\textsuperscript{52} W.O. 26/19, p.225, 21 Dec. 1739.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., p.226, 21 Dec. 1739.
\textsuperscript{54} W.O. 26/19, p.242, 22 Mar. 1740.
to have been chosen to give a varied composition. The headquarters of the new regiments were spaced throughout the country, Portsmouth, Newcastle upon Tyne, Aylesbury, Leeds and Taunton. This made access easier, which was of importance when the essentials were speed and the concentration of the maximum number of men in one place in that difficult first year of hostilities.

Financial expedients were used when raising the six marine regiments. Their pay was to be with effect from 25th. October 1739, for 700 men with £2 each levy money; the two subsequent musters were to be complete "the better to enable the officers to raise good and able men fit for service". In order to defray the cost of equipping the regiments, on the request of the colonels, the assignments of the off-reckonings were carried on by warrant from 25th. October 1739, the date of their establishment, to 24th. June 1741. The possibility of the exercise's being undertaken later was retained by the arrangement adopted when the Marine regiments were sent to the West Indies. Three hundred and ten of each of the first raised regiments were left in England.

The War Office was pressed for time in 1740. Six marine regiments and additionally the regiments of Wentworth and Blakeney received orders that they were to acquire accoutrements for a foreign expedition and to

54. For details, see W.O. 26/19, p.227, 21 Dec. 1739.
be ready by mid March 1740. There was to be no excuse for absence. Two months later an order was issued for the rapid supply of camp necessities to Cathcart's expedition. Yonge kept up the pressure on the regiments, inviting them in the next month, April, to discuss the best method for embarking the additional marines.

The Marine regiments, soon after their formation in December 1739, were each augmented, in February 1740, by ten sergeants, ten corporals, ten drummers and three hundred privates. To provide for their equipment an allocation of their off-reckonings from 25th. November 1739 was made. The terminal date of this assignment was arranged to accord with that granted for the rest of the regiment.

In February 1740 officers of the Gibraltar garrison were ordered to return there immediately. Two months later Yonge followed up the order. He wanted an immediate list of officers and recruits who had gone to Gibraltar on the last convoy, and a list of officers absent from their duty.

59. The rules under which the marine forces were to operate were such as would be readily and easily understood. Areas in which the normal practice relating to the land forces or sea forces were to be followed were identified and exceptions noted. For details, see W.O. 26/19, pp.250-3, 7 May 1740, "Rules and Instructions for the better Government of our Marine Forces". When Marines were raised in 1755 they were made subject to Admiralty control rather than being treated as a special corps under military discipline. Middleton op. cit., p.85.

62. Ibid., p.512, 12 Apr. 1740, Yonge to six colonels of marines.
63. Ibid., W.O. 26/19, p.233, 7 Feb. 1740; see also, W.O. 26/19, p.238 for same details.
64. W.O. 26/19, p.237, 29 Feb. 1740.
66. Ibid., p.514, 13 Apr. 1740, Yonge to colonels of regiments at Gibraltar and Minorca.
The next crisis which occasioned additional measures was the extension of the war made likely by the Prussian invasion of Silesia. Between then and the actual sending of troops to Flanders there were two main problems.

The war with Spain caused an increasing drain on resources in the form of troops for expeditions and garrison duty. Keeping control of Gibraltar and Minorca also constituted a drain on manpower, there being a total increase in the garrisons between 1739 and 1740 of some 1,000 men. A year later a return from Gibraltar showed that garrison to be much under establishment owing to losses by sickness. This prompted steps to complete the regiments to be taken at once. Yonge wanted an account of numbers already raised to make good the deficiency. The deficiencies were substantial, ranging from 107 to 124 per regiment. It is likely that the same applied to Minorca.

The imminent extension of the war also constituted a potential drain on resources. Yonge had to submit to the Privy Council a report on the forces which had been resident in Guernsey and Jersey in case of conflict with France. The forces there in 1739 were less than those there in King William's war, or in the early years of Queen Anne's reign and the early years of George I. Drafts had to be made to the regiments

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67. This was reflected in the augmentation to marine regiments in August 1741, W.O. 26/19, p.369, 27 Aug. 1744. Fighting was restricted to the colonies.
70. Ibid. The numbers involved were Kirke's 124, Hargraves 102, Columbines 130, Clayton's 142, Fuller's 129.
71. W.O. 26/19, p.221, 26 Nov. 1739.
which had returned to Britain from the West Indies. Several regiments of marines were ordered to recruit to make up the West Indies' deficiencies, and they were given six months mustering complete in order to enable them to do so. Some attempt was made to offset this drain on troops by local recruitment; but this was perhaps more of a token than a real contribution.

Troops were scarce. One indication was the issue of orders that regiments should not give up suspected deserters to the original regiment for which they enlisted since they would be pardoned by virtue of having enlisted in another regiment. This was in preparation for embarkation. Another indication was the injunction to the Duke of Cumberland, the Duke of Marlborough, and Lord Dunmore to make up 10, 9 and 9 companies respectively to go on foreign service if necessary at the expense of their other companies.

At the same time that it was protecting its more long lasting commitments the government was preparing for more immediate problems already increasing. The War Office had the foresight to find out how ready several regiments were, from the point of view of equipment, to be sent on foreign service. In January orders were given for the raising of

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72. W.O. 26/19, p.461, 27 May 1742. The marine regiments in question were those of Wymyrd and Cotterrell.
74. See Appendix D for the raising of American troops. The contribution was necessarily small in view of the number of troops employed overseas.
75. W.O. 4/37, p.235, Yonge to various colonels. See also, ibid., p.245, 23 April 1742, for a list of regiments ordered to do the same.
76. Ibid., p.241, 21 April 1742, Yonge to those colonels.
77. S.P. 41/36, 2 July 1741, Yonge to Andrew Stone.
seven new infantry regiments. This was accompanied by the usual requests to the Ordnance for the supply of arms and aids to recruitment such as levy money and drafts from regiments in Great Britain.

Marine regiments were an obvious object of expansion since they could be used on board ship and on land, ideal for expeditions. Four more regiments were added at this time in addition to the six already raised. The War Office could justify this balance of foot and marines on the ground that, whilst it provided for the eventuality of the forces being used on the continent, it also provided the flexibility needed in case there was occasion for greater emphasis on expeditions.

The main criticism of the War Office at this juncture was not in relation to the general approach to the problems presented by the war but rather in the lack of attention to detail. Clothing for example had to be prepared in a rush for troops serving in Flanders. Whilst recognising the need for, and trying to institute, effective expeditions and full numbers in the West Indies the office seemed resigned to having deficiencies in these areas. A critic in 1742 might have been excused for thinking that the same might apply to the continental war effort, that it was of little use setting up new regiments with good intentions unless more were done to ensure that they were up to strength. This

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78. For details, see W.O. 4/36, pp.254,258, 16 Jan. 1741. For the estimate of the cost, see B. M. Lansdowne Mss. 1215, ff.155/166.
79. For the arms with which they were supplied, see above pp.47,202,216-7.
81. Ibid., 16 Jan. 1741, p.254, Yonge to relevant colonels.
82. W.O. 4/38, p.15, 16 Feb. 1743, letter to various agents. This is useful as showing some of the regiments for which individual agents were responsible.
criticism could only be proved or the fear shown to be without foundation in the course of the actual war. On face value, and in the short term, the War Office had done well. It was able to send over to Flanders at one time an expeditionary force of some 10,595 men whilst at the same time placing under orders for Flanders considerable additional forces.\textsuperscript{83}

The War Office had met successfully the more general crisis of increasing the area of its responsibility without any major reverse. It could be argued that the West Indies expedition could have been better planned.\textsuperscript{84} The difficulty in which the War Office found itself was illustrated in a letter from Yonge to Pelham in May 1740. In view of the lack of any other prescription the arrangements for the hospital relating to Lord Cathcart’s expedition were based on numbers involved in the siege of Gibraltar in 1727. More generally there was the difficulty of central control and foreseeing difficulties. Yonge questioned “whether it may not be proper to invest the Commander in Chief with a discretionary power to provide for these and other emergencies of the service as may arise”.\textsuperscript{85} In the event, the war effort did not fail in the West Indies nor the Mediterranean. Any reverse in these areas would have had serious consequences during the rest of the war.

The argument that there was neglect rests on flimsy foundations, based more on the accusations of Walpole’s political opponents than on administrative fact.

It is true that in this period Ireland was left short of troops and

\textsuperscript{83} W.O. 4/37, pp.241-3, 21 Apr. 1742.
\textsuperscript{84} For an account of the repulse at Cartagena, see Britain’s Sea Soldiers Colonel C. Field, Chapter VI.
A truncated account appears in an article by the same author, JAHR, Vol. ii.
\textsuperscript{85} W.O. 26/19, p.254, 16 May 1740.
to a lesser extent Great Britain also. Atkinson emphasised the denuded state of the Irish defences in 1745 when the situation was worse. The invasion scares of 1744 and 1745 emphasised the poor state of England's defences. Yet the counter argument in both cases is, and was, that Britain was fighting a defensive war by offense; the success of this policy was evident in the failures of the attacks on Britain. Had the forces remained at home, that would have been no guarantee against an invasion; it might have been the possible cause of the attack's being made earlier if the French were thereby successful on the continent against reduced forces. The other consideration was that of money. It would have been impossible, in the prevailing climate of opinion in Britain, to raise a sufficient number of troops for the force at home as well as abroad, even had that been desirable. Had there been more troops available it would have been possible to argue that they should be employed on actual service as well and not kept in reserve. It would seem that on balance the best distribution of the resources at its disposal of the War Office was made.

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86. C. T. Atkinson, "Jenkins Ear, The Austrian Succession and the 'Forty-five."
87. This was Pitt's argument.
88. For example, note the invasions of 1688 and 1715.
There were three main considerations throughout the war after the initial period of mobilisation. It had to keep its overseas forces effective, to keep its forces in Europe in the field, and to protect England itself.

Gibraltar and Minorca do not seem to have posed much of a problem. In January 1742, at a relatively late stage, officers absent without leave from Minorca were ordered there without delay. The matter was pursued. The War Office wrote to the agents responsible to submit immediately lists of such officers of regiments at Minorca who were absent distinguishing the number of officers on recruiting service and those on leave of absence together with the number of recruits sent for each of those corps of troops since the previous Christmas. The sending of recruits and clothing was synchronised with the order of officers to return to Minorca and Gibraltar. The Duke of Cumberland expected obedience of these orders on pain of his displeasure. The problem continued. A report in 1748 listed the deficiencies of the Gibraltar garrison of up to one hundred and fifty three per regiment; it was ordered that the deficiency be made good by immediate recruiting.

A list of the officers absent, and on what service, was required of the agents with reference to regiments in Gibraltar, Minorca and Cape Breton. It would seem that the Mediterranean was under strength, but that strenuous efforts were not made to avoid this as long as there were

90. W.O. 4/38, p.185, 10 June 1743. Lloyd to various agents.
93. Ibid., p.338, 18 Mar. 1748; see also, ibid., p.376, 16 Apr. 1748. Officer absenteeism at Gibraltar was not new, W.O. 4/34, 21 May 1735.
more important theatres of war.\textsuperscript{94}

There was evidence in this period why the West Indies were regarded in the Eighteenth Century as a place to be avoided for military service. Deficiencies revealed in May 1740 in the regiments recently returned from the West Indies were almost six times as heavy as those in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{95} The numbers of troops sent there confirm the same impression. The War Office turned the rebellion in England to good account, using the opportunity to send to each of two regiments at Cape Breton and regiments at Jamaica and in the Leeward Islands a further 200 recruits who were prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{96} There was some attempt to solve the problem of manpower by local recruitment and rationalisation.

Early in 1744 orders were given that six independent companies at Jamaica and the four at Rattan were to be formed into one regiment. The troops at Rattan were part of the regiment of foot formerly raised in North America.\textsuperscript{97}

There was some activity more generally in North America. In August 1743 several agents, whose regiments were in Georgia, Bermuda, New York, and Jamaica were ordered to submit a return of the strength of the relevant regiment of foot or independent company.\textsuperscript{98} Changes made in 1744 were significant. As a measure of standardisation Phillips' regi-

\begin{footnotes}
\item[94] Regiments in the Mediterranean were traditionally short of the establishment, W.O. 4/33, 25 May 1734. See also, W.O. 4/32, 26 Oct. 1730.
\item[95] W.O. 8/3, f.87b, 26 May 1743. Regiments were to be placed on the Irish establishment and to absorb the details of St. Clair's regiment left behind when the rest of the company went to Flanders.
\item[96] W.O. 4/42, 31 July 1746. Fox to Duke of Newcastle.
\item[97] W.O. 26/20, p.134, 1 June 1744. Yonge to Governor of Jamaica.
\end{footnotes}
ment and that in Nova Scotia were augmented to the numbers on the home establishment. Four months later three independent companies of foot were raised in South Carolina. The setting up of a garrison at Rattan was an important innovation. Troops were ordered to be raised for service in Georgia. An order was issued for raising a regiment of foot under Pepperell and Shirley for the service and defence of Cape Breton.

Nevertheless local recruitment could not remove the necessity for extraordinary expeditions. A force of five battalions was ordered under General St. Clair. Drafts were to be made from existing regiments to make them complete together with ones to complete three regiments at Cape Breton. Drafts were to be made from the five battalions of such men as had been enlisted on account of the rebellion or of such others as were judged unfit for sea journey. Arrangements were made for a hospital for this expedition financed by weekly or monthly deductions.

The attitude of the War Office in these areas was understandable. There were no defeats in this sphere. If any more troops had been drafted, a more important area might have been left denuded. The most distressing feature for the future was that the War Office had made little progress towards solving the problems of health, recruiting, and command over great distances.

100. For details, see W.O. 4/40, p.380, 20 July 1745.
101. Baker was appointed agent to the garrison "newly established", W.O. 26/20, p.234, 23 Mar. 1745.
102. Ibid., p.275, 9 Sept. 1745. Yonge to relevant colonels.
103. Ibid., p.369, 30 Apr. 1746. Yonge to Lieutenant General St. Clair.
104. For details, see ibid., pp.371,372, and 375, 6 May 1746, and pp.379,380, 7 May 1746.
The commitment of British forces in Europe fell into three phases after the initial dispatch of forces to Flanders. This commitment had to be consolidated; there was a reduction of the involvement commensurate with, and caused by, the effect of the fear of the success of the 1745 rebellion in England; thereafter the War Office had to arrange for the re-commitment of the forces to the European theatre.

The pattern of the troop supply to Europe was easy to determine. There was an initially large force sent in 1742. This was three quarters of the maximum involvement later.\(^{105}\) A constant watch was kept on recruiting for this service. In 1742 efforts were made to bring Wynyard's and Cotterell's regiments of marines up to strength. Drafts were to be made of three drummers out of Bragg's foot.\(^{106}\) Thereafter there were attempts to provide a constant supply of men. There were several augmentations of the forces whilst in Flanders. The six regiments of dragoons were augmented by drafts of two cornets and 96 private dragoons.\(^{107}\) The regiments of foot were also augmented. Agents Captains Levett, Adair, Baker, Wiseman, and Mr. Wilson had to draw lots for the names of the regiments from which the drafts were to be taken.\(^{108}\)

Additional companies were ordered to be raised. The agents sought aid for the equipping of these additional companies. The official position was that these expenses be provided out of the off-reckonings of the companies for the period 24 June 1744 to 25 June 1745. This was supposed sufficient to tide them over until another complete clothing

\(^{105}\) See Appendix D, Tables 1-3.
\(^{106}\) W.O. 26/19, p.461, 27 May 1742.
\(^{107}\) W.O. 4/39, p.217, 8 June 1744.
was required. At the time of the more general return the regiments had to submit a return on honour of the strength of the regiment's two additional companies.

Recruiting for the additional companies was not proceeding well. In December 1744 Yonge warned, in relation to the sailing date of 1st. March 1745, that:

> care be taken that a sufficient number of recruits be ready to embark at the same time to complete the said regiment under pain of His Majesty's displeasure.

The colonels were reminded that "orders were given for the same so long ago as the 27th. of June last". Negligent recruiting officers were to be reported to Yonge. Any immediate and subsequent returns on honour of recruits raised for that part of the regiment in Flanders and for the additional companies were to be made to Marshall Wade and to Yonge. The orders were sent to the regimental agent, its colonel and the officer commanding in England.

Part of the concern over the raising of the additional companies was explicable in view of their being seen as reserves for making good deficiencies in the recruiting returns. These attempts to provide soldiers were consistent with earlier efforts. Orders were given to recruit to full capacity several regiments in November 1743, both foot and dragoons. There was another series of orders two months

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109. Ibid., p.83, 1 Sept. 1744.
110. Ibid., p.146, 22 Oct. 1744.
111. Ibid., p.190, 18 Dec. 1744. For similar orders to regiments of foot, see ibid., p.189, 18 Dec. 1744.
112. Ibid., p.219, 8 Feb. 1745.
113. Ibid., pp.74-77, 30 Nov. 1743, 5 Dec. 1743. Yonge to various colonels.
Drafts to foot regiments serving in Flanders were ordered at the time that Wade was made commander in chief in Flanders. Such was the need for recruits of any kind for the forces in Flanders that an attempt was made in March 1743 to preserve the status quo. An advertisement was placed indicating a pardon for deserters who had enlisted elsewhere, from Irish and British regiments sent to Flanders. Deserters who surrendered within a month would be pardoned. A year later, orders were given for raising a regiment of foot under the command of the Earl of Loudoun. He was allowed to make an assignment of the off-reckonings for a period of fifteen months.

In May 1743 several regiments were reminded by Yonge:

I am likewise ordered ... to take notice that it is a long time since you have had your beating orders and that they are surprized that no greater progress has been made in your recruiting.

The problem was a continuing one. In January 1745 there was an order to recruit generally among the horse, foot and dragoons in Great Britain. Recruitment was to be completed by March 1st. It would appear that in order to facilitate recruitment the state of returns on recruits were to be made to the Earl of Stair in South Britain and Sir John Cope for the forces in North Britain.

Active concern was expressed about other areas vital to the army's
performance. Detailed arrangements were made for ensuring that the clothing intended for these forces in Flanders was delivered safely, the agents of the regiments being the instrument of the army in this matter.\(^{121}\)

The sequel was an order to colonels of horse dragoons and foot that they were to ensure that the clothing actually sent was in use by their men before March 1st. or before they took the field.\(^{122}\) The same concern about the clothing was demonstrated before the 1747 campaign.\(^{123}\)

There was a similar concern shown about horses intended as remounts.\(^{124}\) Similar orders regarding both men and horses were sent a year later at the same time of the year.\(^{125}\)

It was to be expected that the War Office would be as concerned about the supply of officers as about the men and horses which they were to command.\(^{126}\) Before the start of the 1744 campaigning season orders were sent to all officers to return to their posts except for those employed on the recruiting service.\(^{127}\) There were also injunctions to

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121. W.O. 4/38, p.136, 13 May 1743, Baker to several agents.
122. Ibid., p.390, 22 Dec. 1743, Yonge to Duke of Cumberland. See here for details of the regiments involved.
123. W.O. 4/43, p.43, 14 Jan. 1747. Fox wrote to all the agents of the foot regiments. See here for details.
125. W.O. 4/39, p.127, 25 Apr. 1744, Yonge to several agents. For details of the men recruited and drafted, see ibid., pp.128 and 129. Yonge & Lloyd to several agents.
127. Ibid., pp.447 and 448, 4 Feb. 1744, Yonge to several colonels, and p.469, 12 Dec. 1744, same to same. Officers in North Britain recruiting were to stay there; W.O. 4/39, p.41, 28 Feb. 1744. This was contrary to orders three days earlier to repair to their posts and march to London; ibid., p.34. See also similar orders, ibid., p.48, 1 Mar. 1744, p.52, 7 Mar. 1744. Officers in the regiments for which Guering was responsible also had to stay there since they were recruiting, in order that they could collect men raised by the pressing act, ibid., p.54, 9 Mar. 1744.
commanding colonels to return to their posts. The date by which officers had to be in Flanders for the 1745 campaign was later being March of that year. There was a general investigation of where officers were.

The threat and fact of the rebellion of 1745 in England marked a change in the way in which the Netherlands theatre of the war was treated. Forces were withdrawn rapidly. After the rebellion the War Office replenished forces withdrawn from the continent, but later the build up was gradual and limited in extent. The first action was to augment the forces left on the continent during the crisis. The main batch of four regiments was sent four months later, in June. This force was almost doubled by the January of 1747, although one regiment was recalled at that time. Three months later the last of the additions to the Flanders force was sent out, one battalion and a regiment of Highlanders.

Four factors influenced the speed and scale of this recommitment of forces. Britain did not want a full scale involvement in the first instance, forces being initially a show of political solidarity as much as of military value. The situation in Flanders was not desperate. Although some of the losses of arms at Fontenoy had been heavy, the withdrawal of British troops had not had the deleterious effects which

130. See below pp.308-10.
131. See Appendix D, Tables 1-3. See also, W.O. 4/43, p.37, 13 Jan. 1747.
133. W.O. 4/42, 7 June 1746, p.17. Fox to various colonels.
had been predicted. The numbers of arms lost in 1747, in the campaign in Flanders in general, and at Laffeldt in particular, show that fighting was on a smaller scale than at the start of the war. In any event it would have been foolish to denude England of troops immediately, with the Pretender still uncaptured. That the War Office held this view was supported by the measures which were taken to keep Scotland peaceful.

136. The Earl of Chesterfield shared their fears, P.R.O., 30/29/1/11, f.12, 11 Nov. 1745.
137. The 1747 campaign had looked promising, Fortescue op. cit., Vol. 11, pp. 156-63.
It was necessary to defend England, and also other parts of Great Britain, whilst the fight was being taken to the enemy on the continent and in the colonies. Indeed many argued that this should be the primary function of the army. The rebellion of 1715 was within recent memory and those able to take the relevant decisions were those who had most to lose by a change in the monarchy which would follow a successful invasion. It might be expected, therefore, that the operation of the army would be conducted with an invasion in mind. If any additional stimulus were needed it was provided by invasion scares in 1743 and 1744.

The earlier episode was important in two respects. There was a reference to 100 deserters from Lord Sempill's Highland Regiment's being picked up at the Berwick Garrison; other deserters had been drafted previously from the Highland Regiments. After the scare in 1743, Yonge wrote to the officers in charge of several regiments:

139. Horace Walpole wrote from the Cockpit to Trevor. "A set of gentlemen in Parliament besides the Tories of some eloquence and weight but of great ignorance in foreign affairs having shown by a debate yesterday, that they will have us abandon the Continent...." The importance of the invasion scares as part of the more general war commitment was pointed out by Fox in 1753. He "reminded the House of the danger in 1745, and observed, that if there had been 3000 men more in Scotland, the number [of men] disputed, [in 1753] there would have been no rebellion: that if the troops which we were obliged to recall home had remained in Flanders, France might have received a stroke from which she would never have recovered: and if they had been delayed by contrary winds, no man in this kingdom would at this time, have dared to dispute what number of troops the new government should keep up or how they should be paid. Debates and Procs. Volume 5 p.124. See Lord Strange's speech, Cobbett, Parliamentary History, 1743-7, cc.494-503.

Since I wrote the above I am ordered that you do take particular care on this occasion for preserving the peace of the Highlands and make the proper disposition for that purpose as occasion shall require and keep a constant correspondence with those parts.141

The loyalty of the Highland regiments and Scotland was obviously in question. In the south the Earl of Stair made a comprehensive study of invasion sites, and the routes which an enemy would take once landed, together with possibilities for defence.142 Therefore two of the major weaknesses in England's defence were identified at an early stage; a plan which exploited these defects by a synchronised pincer attack from north and south was as dangerous as it was difficult to prevent. Once successfully initiated such an invasion would have been able to exploit what was considered to be England's most major weakness, the enemy within, a Catholic minority anxious to restore the old faith and to overturn the 'new' monarchy.

Response to the threat of invasion in 1744 made it evident that the danger of such a three-fold attack was realised. Particular preparations were undertaken in the county of Cambridge. The Lords of the Privy Council signified His Majesty's Pleasure that "the laws against papists and other persons dangerous to the government be put in execution with the utmost diligence". This was to be followed by a meeting of the Justices of the Peace to give them instructions. There was also reference made to the declaration which had to be adhered to, consequent on an Act of Charles the Second's reign.143 More military preparations

141. Ibid., p.159, 24 May 1743, Secretary at War to officers commanding in Carlisle, Preston, and Newcastle.
142. Add. Mss. 35,893, f.82, 1743.
143. Add. Mss. 5808, ff.88b,89b.
were undertaken. 6,000 Dutch troops were brought over in February and stayed till the end of June, before returning to Flanders.\textsuperscript{144} An artillery train was ordered for service in Great Britain.\textsuperscript{145} The Ordnance contracted for 550 horses being part of the 900 necessary for that train. By the May of 1744 some of the horses had been kept in readiness since February. The question of the renewal of their contract caused concern. The Board wished to know also how many guns were to be kept in the train for the future;\textsuperscript{146} there was the question of what was to be done with the civil officers dependent upon the train;\textsuperscript{147} they were discharged on the authority of the Master General.\textsuperscript{148}

Despite these previous alarms it seems that the War Office did not anticipate the 1745 rebellion as being a great threat,\textsuperscript{149} although it could be argued that the contingency plans developed for those occasions were preparation and foresight enough.\textsuperscript{150} The speed with which it reacted when the danger was imminent made it likely that it had under-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{144} W.O. 4/39, 22 June 1744.
  \item \textsuperscript{145} For the use of the artillery train, see Scouller \textit{op. cit.}, p.92.
  \item \textsuperscript{146} For details, see S.P. 41/36, 2 May 1744, Board of Ordnance to Master General.
  \item \textsuperscript{147} \textit{Ibid.}, 12 June 1744, same to same.
  \item \textsuperscript{148} \textit{Ibid.}, 15 Aug. 1744, Duke of Montagu to ?
  \item \textsuperscript{149} A similar state of unpreparedness was evident in 1756, Middleton, \textit{op. cit.}, p.4. On that occasion too Hanoverian and Hessian mercenaries were brought over to defend England.
  \item \textsuperscript{150} Another defence for the army was that the possibility of invasion bore a relationship to the state of preparation of the navy: "[the French] are fitting out a great fleet there [Dunkirk] and when that fleet will be dispatched .... will in my opinion depend on the strength and command of ours at home". Pelham to Fox, July 22 1745, Add. Mss. 51379.
\end{itemize}
estimated the danger.\textsuperscript{151} It is also possible that the danger had been recognised but that the demands of the Dutch for help, supported by the Duke of Cumberland, were considered more pressing. As late as June 1745 it was sending a further two regiments and drafts from a third to Flanders in keeping with its growing commitment there.\textsuperscript{152} At that stage there were more troops in Flanders than in England.\textsuperscript{153} A large part of the former 7,200 were recalled on September 20th.\textsuperscript{154} A week later a further eight regiments were ordered to embark for England and the rest of the army was to be held in readiness to follow. Four days later Ligonier's horse,\textsuperscript{155} Hawley's dragoons, and Bland's together with

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Fox admitted as much later, see note 139 above. For a similar sequence of events, see Debates and Procs. Vol. 5 pp. 186-189 May 23rd. 1755. For the feeling in England, especially in London, witness the comments of Pelham: "I heartily wish the troops were arrived both Dutch and English, for though I look upon these Highland rebels as a sort of rabble, yet if there is no force to oppose 'em they may come in time to be considerable. We have scarce any regular troops in the country, and between you and I, I don't find that zeal to venture purses and lives that I formerly remember. I don't care to look out for reasons". Pelham to Robert Trevor, Buckinghamshire Mss. Sept. 10 1745, p.131.
"You know from Lord Harrington and the rest of your friends here the situation of this country; we are plagued every day with new and different reports as to the progress of the rebels" same to same, ibid., p.133, Nov. 8th. 1745.
\item T.P. Letter Book, xx, p.102, 16 June 1745; the regiments of Price and Mordaunt and drafts for the guards which had arrived at Ostend.
\item The Duke of Newcastle wrote to the Duke of Cumberland in August 1745, "the troops from Ostend ... should [be] sent directly hither considering the very small number of regular forces at present here". S.P. 87/18, f.111, 20 Aug. 1745.
\item For details, see S.P. 87/18, 20 Sept. 1745, and ibid., 25 Sept. 1745, Earl of Harrington to Duke of Cumberland.
\item Ibid., 27 Sept. 1745, same to same.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
a remnant of Rich's dragoons were preparing to embark. In other words arrangements were made in just under a month for almost all the forces in Flanders to return home.

No more troops could have been taken when the danger was merely a potential one. The Dutch were thought to be complaining bitterly as it was that the only forces remaining were meagre ones in comparison to the needs of the situation. The Dutch commitment to the continental war was both greater and closer than the British. Any reduction in foreign help was not welcomed by the Dutch. Britain's representative to the Dutch government summed up the feeling in the country in a letter to Pelham:

The Empress's destitution of the Low Countries is indeed looked upon as little better than malicious; but then ours does not stand quite clear here of the imputation of being disproportionate to the danger that dictates it .... The Republic is willing to struggle hard, provided she has any rational prospect of

156. Ibid., 1 Oct. 1745, same to same.
157. Ibid., 20 Sept. 1745, Duke of Cumberland to Earl of Harrington. Protestations were made such as "His Majesty is far from any intention of abandoning the interests of the confederacy but will continue to exert himself". S.P. 87/18, f.121, 4 Sept. 1745, Earl of Harrington to Duke of Cumberland.
158. In the middle of November Cumberland pointed out that when the additional second detachment of infantry left he would only have thirteen broken battalions and twenty squadrons; S.P. 87/18, 13 Oct. 1745, Duke of Cumberland to Earl of Harrington.
159. For example, see Add. Mss., 15869, f.91, for a list of troops raised by the States since May 1743.
struggling to any purpose.\textsuperscript{160}

Most of the troops remaining were recalled in the following months to meet the strain caused by the rebellion. All that remained were three regiments of dragoons, consisting of 1614 men.\textsuperscript{161} What made the situation worse, from the Dutch point of view, was that it was not only the British forces which were withdrawn. At the same time as the first ten battalions of troops had been ordered to return ten Dutch battalions were also brought over.\textsuperscript{162} They numbered more than the British troops left committed at Christmas 1745. Possibly this was a strategic and political move to preserve the British presence on the continent. Alternatively the discrepancy may have arisen over the ability of the British to spare horsemen which it would not need against the rebels in exchange for infantry which would be of less use than horsemen against

\textsuperscript{160.} Buckinghamshire Mss. p.136, Dec. 10 1745. He elaborated the same point when writing to Pelham two months later, referring to "the national outcry and fermentation, which the fall of Brussels, and the approach of the French, by verifying all the fears and predictions of the States upon the retreat of our troops raises ... People are indeed sensible that this catastrophe is in great part to be attributed to the ... Court of Vienna; but ... the chief load of odium falls to the share of our administration which is taxed here with the want of will rather than of power to have prevented ... these evils ... Our measures for crushing the rebellion are taxed here with having been disproportionate and ill placed; our dread of a French invasion to have been by some even affected, but by all to have been over hasty". 
It is small wonder that there was dispute later over the share of the costs to be borne by the respective countries towards the upkeep of the Joint Battering Train, see above pp.257-9.

\textsuperscript{161.} Add. Mss. 38038, f.234.

\textsuperscript{162.} How badly they were needed was evident from a letter written by Weston at Whitehall on 25 Oct. 1745. "Here is a strong party for abandoning the continent entirely and dying if we must die, \textit{se defendendo} ... I doubt it must be little less than a miracle to save us". BM Buckinghamshire Mss. p.132.
the French army.

Further evidence of the desire to keep the Dutch satisfied was given by the use of eight squadrons and six battalions of Hessians in Britain. They were reported to be coming from Flanders on Christmas Eve 1745. They were to land at Newcastle and relieve the Dutch. It also seems likely either than the War Office simply underestimated the number of troops which would eventually be needed or, and this is more likely, that fear of the enemy grew as the danger neared London.

Apart from the numbers of troops recalled, the order in which they were brought back was sensible. Although dragoons would have been more mobile what was needed to face similar Scottish dispositions was loyal battle hardened infantry. Of the original ten Dutch battalions nine were initially landed in London "which not only ensured the least hazardous and speedy crossing but also ensured the protection of the capital". The tenth was sent straight to Newcastle. When it became obvious that the Pretender was making for the eastern route the War Office directed the second batch of eight regiments to Newcastle. It seems that the third assignment of battalions was directed to the South which was the logical place for any re-inforcements when the most immediate needs had been met.

This consideration undercuts and explains a criticism contained in a memorandum attached to a list for December 1745. This was that

163. For an explanation and description of the movements of the Hessians, see, "Hessian troops in Scotland 1746", A. W. Haarman. *JAHR* Vol. 40, 1968, p.188.
166. S.P. 87/18, f.182, 27 Sept. 1745, Earl of Harrington to Duke of Cumberland.
168. S.P. 41/16, ff.348-9, undated, "Dispositions of forces...."
since the first and then present priority was to strengthen Wade's force it was a pity that more re-inforcements had not already been sent to him. It was more sensible to do too little marching and redeployment rather than too much, provided that defeat was avoided. The further advantage of the reserve made possible the recommendation in the memorandum that an advanced corps be formed of at least 2,000 infantry and two dragoons regiments; the emphasis was to be on experience, the infantry being "old" as opposed to new regiments, and one of the dragoons having to come from Flanders. It was to move towards Stafford and Lichfield in case the rebels gave Wade the slip and to secure the line of the Weaver if the rebels were to make for North Wales "which seems the thing most to be feared".

A return showing the distribution of forces at the end of that same month shows the balanced nature of the disposition of the defensive forces. With Wade, guarding the East were four squadrons and eighteen battalions, ten of which were Dutch. On the West coast were six squadrons and two battalions. There were held in reserve far larger forces than these, with a further six battalions marching north. The change from the earlier plan was that some of the more experienced troops were in the group held in reserve, four of the six regiments marching north being "young regiments". The same list for January 1746 shows the same emphasis on troops held in reserve around London.

It was to the credit of the War Office that the initial moves were made quickly and that the later batches did not take longer than four

169. Ibid., 24 Dec. 1745, f.340
170. For details, see S.P. 41/17, 5 Jan. 1746, ff.18-19, Dispositions proposed for the Forces in Great Britain.
weeks to recall. Some delay could be attributed to bad weather and chance. The War Office on the other hand could be expected to allow for that and it does seem surprising that with advance warning of over a month since the start of the withdrawal, it did not take place with greater speed. The probable explanation would be a desire not to desert the Dutch with unseemly haste. In addition the dangers were not then so acute as to call for the implementation of panic measures in panic fashion. It seems that the Duke of Cumberland had been reluctant and slow to release the forces. The Earl of Harrington had written to remind him that:

the King can no longer defer to strengthen his hands at home by a detachment from the army under Your Royal Highness' command.\(^{171}\)

The War Office also made sensible use of the extra forces in the form of the county regiments. The usefulness of the county regiments was placed in perspective by General Wade writing from Newcastle in November 1745 to the Mayor of Lancaster:

All the advice I can give is, if you have any force, as most of the counties have, to make use of them by dividing [them] into small parties, who may fire from every hedge to keep the rebels from separating from their main body to pillage and plunder, which I think will embarrass them more than any other method than can be expected from the county regiments.\(^{172}\)

This was consistent with the self help which had been fostered in previous years.\(^{173}\) In 1744 the Duke of Newcastle wrote to De Jean appoint-

171. S.P. 87/18, f.118-122, 4 Sept. 1745. See also, ibid., f.164, 15 Sept. 1745.
172. Fitzherbert Mss. p.162, 10 Nov. 1745.
173. The French model was similar. In a paper on "The Land Forces of France" it was recorded that "the government give commissions to Gentlemen who are willing to raise the companies and troops they want to complete their regiments, at their own expense and who at the end of the war are broke and generally ruined, Add. Mss.35893 f.44,\(\text{anon},\) June 1758.
ing him as commandant of the military body of Protestant Swiss resident
in England. They had sought approval for the establishment of their
company in the common defence. They had offered:

to cloath themselves in an uniform habit at
their own proper cost and charge, and to be
at all times ready for service upon being
subsisted during the time only they shall be
employed, and humbly desiring our leave to
elect their own officers under our Royal
Approbation and the command of such officers
as we shall appoint to command them in chief.  

Regiments to be raised and commanded by noblemen on a voluntary
basis were to be of the same numbers as normal regiments of horse and
foot. They were to enter into royal pay and be borne on the establish­
ment from the day when each colonel certified that half of the privates
which he was empowered to raise were enlisted. They were to be paid only
for effective men and horses. Steps were taken to provide regiments
with the necessary accoutrements. Yonge wrote to tell the Paymaster
General to pay for baggage money and horses for the regiments under
orders to take the field, before Yonge had procured the warrants. On
the same day he wrote to a series of agents to provide camp necessaries:

warrants to defray the expense would be placed before the king in due
course.

The regiments had been raised in sufficient time to meet the real

battalion suisse. 10 May 1744.
175. S.P. 41/15, f.133, 12 Apr. 1744. Duke of Newcastle to
Colonel Dejean.
See also, ibid., p.383, Lloyd to agents of the regiments.
177. Ibid., p.59, 9 Nov. 1745, Yonge to agents of the
regiments.
danger from the Pretender, all but one of the fifteen\textsuperscript{178} being at least half complete by the 1st. December 1745, and six being so as early as November 1st.\textsuperscript{179} Some attempt was made to stiffen them with more regular troops. Yonge made preliminary arrangements for out-pensioners at Chelsea Hospital to be approached to serve as sergeants and corporals in the regiments or companies of volunteers. He sent lists to commanders and hinted that they should approach the pensioners themselves directly.\textsuperscript{180}

Once raised, the regiments were issued with camp necessaries\textsuperscript{181} and arrangements were made for subsisting them on a normal basis. Yonge wrote to the Paymaster General that the king had ordered two regiments of horse and thirteen of foot to be raised and that their pay should commence from the times when the nobles in charge certified that the regiments were half raised. Details were supplied. All the commission officers and half the n.c.o.'s and privates were to be subsisted from that date.\textsuperscript{182}

Their position was made as regular as possible, each being equipped with a normal regimental number. Most of these regiments were used on

\textsuperscript{178} For a list and the numbers in each, see Lansdowne Mss. 1215, ff.182-195. Two were horse regiments, each of 273, and thirteen of foot, each of 814 men. The horse regiments were initially of the same numbers as the normal regiments of Evans and Wade, more than six others, and less than three. The costs were comparable. The foot regiments carried one less in number than the normal regiments of foot on the home establishment. The cost was comparable. See, ibid., and Appendix D.

\textsuperscript{179} For a list, see W.O. 4/41, p.49, 7 Nov. 1745. Yonge to Paymaster General.


\textsuperscript{181} Ibid., W.O. 4/41, p.59, 9 Nov. 1745. Yonge to various agents.

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., p.49, 7 Nov. 1745, Yonge to Winnington.
less important duties. In December 1745 a memorandum advocated that Harrison's, Mordaunt's and Houghton's would suffice to guard the West with new regiments doing duty at Bristol, Exeter, Portsmouth and other places on the coast.\textsuperscript{183} By the next month this had largely taken effect, although Mordaunt's was still listed as being in the environs of London.\textsuperscript{184} The War Office made use of the new raised regiments to guard the entry to North Wales. Cholmondeley's company at Chester was re-inforced by five companies of Blakeney's; Colonel Graham, commanding the regiment of volunteers raised at Liverpool, was ordered to take the post in the line of the Mersey by Warrington and fall back on Chester if necessary.\textsuperscript{185}

Most of the regiments, nine of the fifteen, were on garrison duty, usually in the places where they had been raised.\textsuperscript{186} The others were placed in the company of experienced horse and dragoon regiments under the command of Ligonier and the Duke of Cumberland. This meant that Wade and Hawley, who were most likely to meet the enemy had no untrained troops, the six battalions of Dutch troops being a sufficient problem on their own, whilst the new men had time to be trained. At the same time it would have been foolish to include in the forces near London the two regiments of horse with the two horse regiments already there since these only numbered two regiments and two troops; not only were they the last line of defence but also they were the nucleus of a potential rallying force in the event of defeat.

\textsuperscript{183} S.P. 41/16, ff.348-9, undated, "Dispositions of forces....."
\textsuperscript{184} S.P. 41/17, 5 Jan. 1746, ff.18-19.
\textsuperscript{185} W.O. 5/37, 19 Nov. 1745. See also, S.P. 41/16, ff.348-9.
\textsuperscript{186} S.P. 41/17, Memorandum, ff.18-19, Dispositions proposed for the Forces in Great Britain.
These county regiments did not represent the whole of the civilian response to the war. Some twenty independent companies were to be raised in North Britain. An agent and paymaster was to be appointed.\textsuperscript{187} There was also the raising of other independent companies of volunteers.\textsuperscript{188} Cambridge, like other places, instituted a fund for the purpose of raising and paying volunteers to defend themselves.\textsuperscript{189} Bristol was in the process of raising 1,000 men, and in the middle of December Tower Hamlets was raising a similar number of ten companies to form its own regiment.\textsuperscript{190}

Another group of forces at the disposal of the War Office at this time was the additional companies to the foot regiments and the marine regiments. The additional regiments were divided into three almost equal groups at Newcastle, Portsmouth and Plymouth; the former group was to be of aid to the depleted forces of Wade, and the latter was to bolster the south coast defences manned by the new regiments. This was a sensible arrangement ensuring that the experienced troops were central in the two areas and the less experienced troops in the individual garrisons. The same consideration possibly underlay the disposition of the marine regiments in headquarters along the south coast, one battalion to each headquarters at Canterbury, Chatham, Chichester, Maidstone, and

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., p.353, undated although the pagination suggests that these fall in the period 6 March 1746 to 14 March 1746.
\textsuperscript{189} For a local petition setting forward the particular concern of the population, see Add. Mss. 5808, f.87. This is also important in respect of its statement of the background of the Catholics, and of the increase of the French fleet in the English Channel. Reference is also made to the invasion scare of 1744.
\textsuperscript{190} For the establishment of an "associated regiment" at Spittle Fields, see W.O. 26/20, p.337, 7 Jan. 1745.
Portsmouth, with two at Plymouth and Southampton.\textsuperscript{191}

In addition to these larger considerations and initial preparations the War Office had to make minor adjustments caused by events, particularly in the aftermath of the rebellion. Yonge wrote, for example, to several commanders to hold their regiments in readiness to embark immediately for Scotland with the necessary equipment.\textsuperscript{192} The Duke of Cumberland reported that the troops under his command were in great want of clothing. The Secretary at War called for an account of what was available for sending in order that he could submit the information to the Duke of Newcastle for transmission to the Duke of Cumberland.\textsuperscript{193} The matter was pursued in the next month, several agents being instructed to put the clothing for North Britain on board transports with the utmost expedition; they were to indicate the dates if already shipped, or, if not, the likely date of completion.\textsuperscript{194} Emphasis was placed on the account's being accurate.\textsuperscript{195} In the next month Lloyd wrote to several agents to list the accoutrements of their regiments and instructing them to obey the orders of His Royal Highness by completing the accounts forthwith.\textsuperscript{196} Clothing was organised to send to the 23 regiments in Scotland.\textsuperscript{197}

As Atkinson correctly said, by 1745 the force in Ireland had been reduced to very modest proportions.\textsuperscript{198} The forces were increased in November 1745 by the raising of additional companies and then expanded

\textsuperscript{191} S.P. 41/17, 5 Jan. 1746, ff. 18-19.
\textsuperscript{192} W.O. 4/41, p.296, 22 Mar. 1746. Yonge to Skelton, Houghton, Mordaunt, Handasyd.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., p.239, Feb. 1746. Lloyd to various agents.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., p.314, 27 Mar. 1746.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., p.320, 2 Apr. 1746.
\textsuperscript{196} W.O. 4/42, p.5, 29 May 1746. Lloyd to various agents.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., p.7, 29 May 1746. Same to same.
\textsuperscript{198} C. T. Atkinson, "Jenkins Ear, Austrian Succession War, and the 'Forty-Five," p.283.
into two battalions apiece. Chesterfield pointed out that the increase in forces was being undertaken in the least expensive manner by the use of additional companies only. Even after that, the number of troops would be within the usual military establishment. Political pressure was applied in favour of as low a commitment in Ireland as possible. The Earl of Chesterfield, Lord Lieutenant General and General Governor of Ireland pointed out to both houses of the Irish Parliament how the Pretender's success "would consequently destroy your liberty, property and your religion". He then asked for the usual and necessary supplies for the support of the establishment. 

It was a tiny force to hold down the country. On the other hand, there were two points in favour of the thinking of the War Office. There was no trouble in Ireland. There was the mixture of old and new regiments which was evident in England whilst preparing for the rebellion. The timing of the augmentations shows that either there was recognition of the dangerous position in Ireland or else it was building up forces there in case of a disaster in England. Both would indicate foresight.

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199. Add. Mss. 15869, f.84.
200. Ibid., Speech of Earl of Chesterfield, Lord Lieutenant General and General Governor of Ireland to both Houses of Parliament in Dublin.
The army's administration performed adequately in this period. Sufficient forces appear to have been made available in the period 1739-1741 to meet the drain on manpower caused by involvement in the war on the continent, and to meet the emergency of the 1745 rebellion. These commitments were not met without difficulty. At home the army had to resort to expedients such as adding to regiments by building on an experienced nucleus, robbing one regiment to form another, and, in face of the rebellion, reliance on such additional forces as could be raised on a voluntary basis. Abroad, shortage of men and the extent of the commitments resulted in the hiring of mercenary forces as a source of ready trained troops even at the expense of the unpopularity of such expenditure. Even so the Dutch were able to argue with some justification by virtue of their being neglected in 1746 that the British commitment was too small and too easily withdrawn.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ADMINISTRATION

OF THE NAVY 1739-1754
The number of ships on the establishment - in 1739 - comparison with earlier occasions - changes to 1754; ships in commission; numbers refitted, rebuilt and replaced.

1739-54:- Liaison Navy Board and Admiralty - number and condition of fleet - dispute over condition of dockyards - number of workmen - method of working.
Both the Ordnance and the army administration experienced difficulties in expanding activities to meet the increased commitment of the war. The period to 1741 was one of crisis in both areas.\textsuperscript{1} Professor Baugh has shown how, in this same period, the navy first came to grips with the problems of manning the fleet and the dockyards.\textsuperscript{2} The numbers of serviceable ships had a direct bearing on the dockyards, victualling and impressment. In particular it is useful to see if the navy reacted as quickly as the army to the need to increase the fighting force available.

There are three aspects to the supply of ships; it is possible to look firstly at the establishment, being the theoretical maximum number of ships which might be brought to use at one time, secondly at the number of ships which were actually employed, and thirdly at the number which were in a position to be employed and the steps taken to remedy the residual deficiency. This deficiency would be the difference between the establishment and the total of those fit or in a position to be made fit for service.

The number of ships on the establishment did not drastically diminish between 1714 and 1739; reductions which did occur were largely in the categories below 60 guns. The first three rates had remained remarkably steady for some fifty years and the fourth for forty.\textsuperscript{3} The sixth rate was marginally stronger than in 1714. It was the fifth rate which showed a reduction in strength between 1714 and 1739, numbers

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} See above pp.282-287.
\item \textsuperscript{2} Baugh \textit{op. cit.}, pp.163-206.
\item \textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.245-6, Table 14 and see also Appendix E, Table 1.
\end{itemize}
falling from 42 to 19. A vital class of ships was thus neglected. In explanation, although not justification, the neglect of the small ships was mitigated by the tendency to concentrate ships in the upper portions of each class. The reduction in the fifth class arose mainly because of the entire disappearance of the 30 gun class. The reduction in the number of 50 gun ships between 1714 and 1739 is partly explicable in terms of the increase in the number of ships of 60 guns. There was a reduction in the number of ships of 70 guns in contrast to those of 80 guns which remained constant.

If the situation in 1739 were compared, not with that in 1714, at the end of a war, but with that at the beginning of the previous real conflict, at the death of King William, additional defence against the charge of neglect becomes possible. The fifth rate was virtually of the same size, and the sixth twice as strong. If comparison were made with the end of the previous period of peace the establishment in 1739 was significantly greater with regard to the fourth, fifth, and sixth rates than it had been in 1688.

The establishment of the navy in 1744 and the development after 1739 throw light on the preparations in 1739. A comparison of the situation in 1739 and 1744 provides further evidence that the first four rates had been kept up to strength before 1739. In the five years

4. See Appendix E, Table 2.
5. The effect of this neglect was evident in the nature of the ships used as cruisers from the Lizard to Cape Finistere. See Appendix E, Table 12.
6. For the relation of gun complements to the rates of ships, see Appendix E, Table 2.
7. These developments were consistent with the increase in the dimensions and tonnage of each class in response to shipbuilding trends in France and Spain. See Baugh op. cit., p.248.
8. See Appendix E, Table 1.
the nominal establishment rose by only one in these four rates. The compilation of an abstract of ships would suggest that precedents were being sought in 1744 on the state of the navy during the course of the war as well as at the start. The first three rates were not significantly different from the numbers at the deaths of King William and Queen Anne. The fourth rate contained almost as many ships as 1714 and more than at the death of King William. The fifth was almost as strong as at the death of King William and the sixth twice as strong.

Taking the war period as a whole it is a measure of the early lack of preparations and the speed with which corrective measures were taken that whilst the establishments for the first two rates remained unchanged, those for the third to sixth rates increased; most of the change was effected before 1745. At the end of the war there was a reduction from the level in 1745, but numbers were not slashed, and remained higher than in 1739, especially in the lower rates.  

The navy could not, and in certain areas would not wish to, put on active service all of the ships on the establishment. The pattern of ships in commission during the war is different from that indicated by fluctuations in the establishment. Ships of the first class were not required, being cast in the rôle of "ultimate weapons". The second rate was increased to almost its maximum number during the war by April 1741. The fourth rate was hardly increased at all between 1739 and 1745. The fifth doubled, although the increase was gradual; half had been added by 1741. The sixth, too, doubled, but most of the increase had taken place by October 1740. Merely on the evidence of

9. This situation obtained in 1751. Appendix E, Table 1.
ships in commission three conclusions are possible. The first rate of ships was felt to be adequately prepared. Although deficiencies were felt particularly in the fifth and sixth rates, corrective action was easiest for the smallest ships. The immediate object of placing more ships in sea pay had been met for all classes by 1741. Both in this particular and in general, with the exception of the second rate, the development followed a similar pattern to that which emerged in the previous war.

It is legitimate to ask how far the increased preparations constituted a more efficient use of resources, and how far they merely reflected changes in the establishment. The first rate did not change; the second did not have a nominal increase in the establishment. In the other rates the number of ships in commission rose as a percentage of the number on the establishment. On the other hand there remained, in 1745, the same discrepancy between the two as had existed in 1739. Therefore changes in the establishment seem to have been reflected in the number of ships in commission; but there was no progress towards ensuring that all on the establishment were in sea pay.

Two explanations are possible. On one view it would be desirable for a cautious navy to retain a number of ships not in commission but fit ready for an emergency, and to keep this reserve constant as the establishment expanded. On the contrary view the establishment contained ships which were not able to be made ready for sea.

The evidence suggests the second explanation. Professor Baugh listed, in total, ships which were suitable for fitting out, which he

11. See Appendix E, Table 3.
defined as ships put in commission without major repair.\textsuperscript{12} The implication is that the residue were not serviceable. A contemporary list supports this estimate of the number of ships capable for fitting out.\textsuperscript{13} The implication relating to unserviceable ships is supported by a later document which indicated the number in question as being ships, not in commission, in need of great repair.\textsuperscript{14}

In practical terms it meant that when the ships in commission are compared not with the numbers on the establishment but with those which might have been put in commission it emerges that at the declaration of war, as Baugh writes, virtually every ship capable of being made fit for sea was already in sea pay.\textsuperscript{15} In September 1739, three months after mobilisation, the only ships actually in reserve were three of 50 to 70 guns, and nine frigates. This evidence points both ways. It is evidence of bad planning. Yet it is also a sign that in the lower rates of ships all the ships in the existing fleet which were to be used in the next five years were being used from the outset. In this respect the situation had not changed by 1743. The higher the rate of ship the smaller proportion of ships in sea pay. The navy could no more afford in 1743 to allow ships in the lower classes to remain unfit

\textsuperscript{12} Baugh \textit{op. cit.}, p.246.
\textsuperscript{13} Adm. 106/2178, p.114, 19 Sept. 1739, and S.P. 42/116, f.70, 19 Sept. 1739. See also Appendix E, Table 5.
\textsuperscript{14} Adm. 106/2179, p.260, 6 Jan. 1742. This is consistent with the urgency of orders to report on and complete with "the utmost despatch" such ships of the line of battle then out of commission which could be made ready at short notice. Adm. 95/91, p.322, 25 March 1742. See also, \textit{ibid.}, p.328, 20 April 1742 and p.339, 26 July 1742.
\textsuperscript{15} Baugh \textit{op. cit.}, p.248.
or unreplaced than it could in 1739 or 1741.\textsuperscript{16}

There were three ways in which the navy could increase its state of preparedness. It was possible to refit the repairable,\textsuperscript{17} rebuild the irreparable, and replace those too decrepit for such renovation.

As regards the refitting of ships this was a matter of short term expedients rather than a reflection of long term planning. To the ships on the establishment in 1739 which were fitted out between 1739 and 1745 must be added the new ships which would be fitted out. An analysis of when ships were fitting, although possible, would only indicate the same conclusion as that reflected in the number in sea pay.

An analysis of the ships being rebuilt yields the expected conclusion that most of the largest ships which were to be rebuilt before 1745 were in fact rebuilt before 1741.\textsuperscript{18} Rebuilding was concentrated in the years 1739-41, and occurred mainly in the range of 50 to 70 gunned ships. Rebuilding was performed at royal yards which had the capacity, releasing merchant yards to build smaller ships. After 1745 the emphasis changed, being more on the construction of new ships in the royal yards than on the repair of ships. Royal yards built the larger rates. There is evidence to suggest that a greater number of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} The navy realised its deficiencies. In January 1742 the Admiralty ordered that all ships of the smaller rates fitting out for cruising should be put in hand in preference to the great ships. Adm. 95/91, p.315, 30 Jan. 1742.
\item \textsuperscript{17} In this war repairs were performed mainly at the royal dockyards, Baugh \textit{op. cit.}, p.261. This was consistent with the practice on rebuilding ships; see Appendix E, Tables 8 & 9. The Navy Board was reluctant to allow ships to be repaired at merchant yards in the next war. Adm. 106/2187, p.356, 3 March 1755.
\item \textsuperscript{18} See Appendix E, Table 7.
\end{itemize}
ships could have been repaired or built if there had been a greater throughput of vessels. At the least it does suggest that given an initial lack of preparation sensible efforts were made to retrieve the situation by first the repair and then the supplementation of the middle rates.

Ships were built for two reasons. They were to some extent a substitute for repairing the smaller rates as well as being the only way by which the establishment could be increased. No ships were launched in the years 1737, 38, and 39, a testimony to the navy's lack of foresight. Thereafter the lower rates of ships were produced earlier, and in greater numbers, than the higher rates. Most of the lower rates were produced in the years 1740 and 1741. There was a slowing down in 1742 with a burst of activity in 1745. The increase in larger ships was less concentrated. Most significant was the fact that the new additions were towards the bottom of the fourth rate, possibly to compensate for the relative shortage of fifth rate ships.

The navy conducted a survey in 1741 to assess the areas from which new ships ordered between July 1739 and January 1741 were provided. As anticipated, although only eighteen of the ninety-five built came from other than merchant yards these were the larger vessels for which merchant builders lacked facilities. This supposition is supported by the lack of ships of 40 guns and under being built in the King's yards.

The building and rebuilding programme represents a considerable increase in the war effort judged in the terms of the numbers of ships in each class in sea pay and suitable for fitting out in 1739. It is

19. See Appendix E, Table 6.
20. See Appendix E, Tables 6 & 11.
evident that the administration undertook, although belatedly, a substan
tial building programme. By 1745 the number of new ships exceeded
the number of ships which had been unserviceable in 1739.\textsuperscript{21} The
contrast is made more starkly if the number unfit in 1739 is compared
with the total number of ships built during the whole war. Whereas
the number of new third rates did not even make up the deficiency in
1739, even with the rash of building in 1745, those for the fourth
rates were double the number deficient in that category in 1739. The
discrepancy between nominal establishment and actual fact in 1739 was
almost made good by 1744. Understandably, that for the fifth and
sixth rates was made up by 1740. This serves to confirm that the
navy's priority was to remedy the deficiency in the lower rates as
quickly as possible.

It would be a mistake to place too much emphasis on mere numbers
since the true state of the fleet depended on the ability to get ships
in sea pay fitted out and repaired when necessary.\textsuperscript{22} Professor Baugh
has discussed the problems which the navy faced in that task and the
success with which it was able to tackle them. Yet whilst the perform-
ance of the dockyards could have been improved in many respects it
remains true that the situation would have been intolerable without the
extensive building and repair programme which was instituted.\textsuperscript{23}

An objective assessment of the performance of the navy in peace
between 1748 and 1754 is difficult to make, since like the Ordnance and
the War Office it was to be judged by the effectiveness with which it

\textsuperscript{21} Compare Appendix E, Table 6, with Baugh \textit{op. cit.}, Table
15, p.246.
\textsuperscript{22} Middleton \textit{op. cit.}, p.71.
\textsuperscript{23} See Appendix E, Table 5, and Baugh \textit{op. cit.}, p.254.
prosecuted war. Problems of victualling and impressment were only revealed in time of war when additional demands were placed on the system. The number of ships and the dockyard facilities to maintain those ships were of continuing concern.

Efforts were made to ensure that information was made available to the Navy Board and the Admiralty in three ways. Compliance with normal instruction by dockyard officers would provide that information needed for the exercise of control and decision making. Orders were passed to keep the officers to these instructions:

Although there are many standing orders .... that direct upon the arrival of ships at the respective ports, to be laid up or refitted, they be forthwith clear'd for the dock surveys .... and estimates made .... of the charge and time to repair and refit .... yet the said orders are too often neglected and the ships a considerable time in port before they are released of their .... stores and ballast, and proper surveys too long neglected often after ships are cleared.  

More directly the first visitation of the dockyards since 1686 provided first hand confirmation of what was wrong. On a more day to day basis the close liaison between the Admiralty and Navy Boards

25. For the visitation of the dockyards in 1749 set in the context of later visitation, see Haas, J.A., "The Royal Dockyards: Reform, 1749-1778". The records for the visitation are limited, ibid., p.194; see also, Adm. 3/61, 26 June - 12 Aug. 1749, passim. Middleton considered that at the start of the peace no reorganisation seemed necessary, op. cit., p.153. He points out that the 1751 visitation concentrated on rooting out corrupt practices rather than on the development of new facilities, ibid., p.133. His general view is that there was not much progress in the dockyards, ibid., pp.140-3. On the other hand, he considers that the fleet was in a better state of readiness at the start of the Seven Years War than on previous occasions, ibid., p.70.
evident in the period 1739 to 1748 was continued on important issues.\textsuperscript{26} As usual the Admiralty had the Navy Board report on the accounts of the storekeepers of His Majesty's several yards and the debt of the navy, with reasons, to be laid before the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{27} The Admiralty ordered the preparation of an exact account of the state of the navy, with the date of establishment, dimension, burdens carried in tons, men, guns, when built, rebuilt, where building and rebuilding and by whom and to what draught.\textsuperscript{28} In the next month the Navy Board sent to the Admiralty Board, for their perusal, a list of the Royal Navy; it was intended for the Board distinguishing where the ships were, in what condition and which were in commission and which in ordinary, with the ports where they were laid up.\textsuperscript{29} It would have been difficult for the Admiralty to have made more efforts to be better informed on the fleet; to ascertain its exact condition would have required detailed reports from the dockyards. The Admiralty had to rely on the judgement of its officers. It could use the material with this proviso to assess the work remaining to be done, having surveys to hand of similar type at previous dates for comparison.

The Admiralty was also concerned about tenders. At the start of February it ordered an account of all vessels available in the ports for this purpose with an account of those broken up.\textsuperscript{30} At the end of

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\textsuperscript{26} Adm. 95/91, p.310, 21 Jan. 1742. See also, \textit{ibid.}, p.324, 7 April 1742. Emphasis was placed on the provision of information in the weekly progress returns, see \textit{ibid.}, and Ind. 10664, 16 June 1740 and 9 Oct. 1741.
\textsuperscript{27} Adm. 106/2187, p.315, 31 Dec. 1754.
\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Ibid.}, p.323, 18 Feb. 1755.
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Ibid.}, p.372, 17 Mar. 1755. See also, \textit{ibid.}, p.526, 6 Aug. 1755.
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid.}, p.304, 4 Feb. 1755.
\end{flushleft}
the month the Navy Board submitted a wider and more detailed account; tenders taken up at the outports as well as in the river were listed with their tunnage, their complements and how they were disposed of.\(^{31}\) This procedure was made regular by the Admiralty order that lists of tenders, with the masters names, number of men and guns, and the terms on which they were hired be submitted by the Navy Board on the first day of each month.\(^ {32}\)

With regard to the number of ships, not only on the establishment but in a state to be put into commission, it was evident that the navy was not neglected after 1748.\(^ {33}\) In 1753 it was anticipated that it would be possible to make fit for 1754/5 sufficient ships to bring the numbers in sea pay up to the level which was reached in 1743;\(^ {34}\) this was considerably stronger than the force available in 1739 or even in 1740.\(^ {35}\) It would seem that the state of the British navy compared with the French was no worse in 1753 than 1743, although the French had apparently increased their navy between 1750 and 1753.\(^ {36}\) There was no rapid building programme before the Seven Years War.\(^ {37}\)

During the war to 1748 it had been evident that deficiencies existed within the dockyards. The visitation of the yards in 1749 confirmed that weaknesses existed. Remedial measures were taken in areas

\(^{31}\) Ibid., p.351, 25 Feb. 1755.
\(^{32}\) Ibid., p.391, 1 Apr. 1755. The Board submitted the first return on 14 March 1755.
\(^{33}\) For a contemporary assessment of the comparative strength of the navy in 1748 and 1753, see Adm. 106/2186, p.347, 22 Jan. 1753.
\(^{34}\) Compare ibid., p.429, 23 May 1753 and Adm. 106/2187, p.526, 6 Aug. 1755.
\(^{35}\) Compare Appendix E, Tables 3 & 13.
\(^{36}\) See Appendix E, Table 13.
\(^{37}\) Middleton op. cit., p.58.
where performance had been unsatisfactory in the period 1739-48.\textsuperscript{38} An attempt was made to ensure that standing orders were changed when necessary, and enforced in practice. In practical terms the Navy Board was concerned that it should keep the fleet in good repair:

Lest upon any future rupture we should be under the same necessity as we were at the breaking out of the late war, by the ill state .... the navy was then in, of building ships by contract in the merchants yards, and those ships being built by timber not sufficiently seasoned, and being much wanted, were hastily put together, by which means many of them became in want either of middling or great repair or rebuilding.\textsuperscript{39}

Keeping the fleet in good repair involved three issues which were linked, the supply of funds, the number of artificers and the manner of their working. The supply of funds was crucial.\textsuperscript{40}

With regard to the general situation the Navy Board's position was clear:

On comparing the number and tonnage of the fleet, at the demise of Q. Anne, with what it now is, we

\textsuperscript{38}. The spirit behind reforms was ably summed up by Dr. Middleton: "The Navy Board insisted that all increases in the establishment should be judged not on the present need but on what had sufficed in previous wars .... This seemingly unreasoning point of view was in reality the product of another attitude current in the eighteenth century, namely, that it was the man rather than the system which was likely to be at fault. Deficiencies were usually blamed on mismanagement or corruption in the dockyards, and remedies were to be found on greater attention to business, working hours, and the dismissal of offending employees." \textit{op. cit.}, p.139.


\textsuperscript{40}. Economy was evident in the instructions that estimates be drawn up with care and not exceeded. Ind. 10665, p.110, 2 April 1750. There was an attempt to assess liabilities earlier. All bills for stores received were to be at the Navy Office before the end of the year in which they were made out. Ind. 10665, p.27, 8 June 1750.
find there is an increase of 42 ships, (and
a greater tunnage) which consequently requires
more workmen (especially shipwrights) as well as
a larger proportion of materials to keep his
majesty's ships and stores in good condition ....
it will unavoidably follow, either that a debt
must be incurred or that the ships cannot be
kept in such good repair, nor the magazines so
well supplied ....41

There was continual friction between the Navy Board and the
Admiralty on the number of artificers to be employed. In 1750 the
Navy Board represented in the autumn that the run down of the yards
had gone too far42 and that the discharge of shipwrights and caulkers
together with vacancies arising by deaths had reduced numbers to a
total insufficient to carry on the repair of ships and the building of
others ordered to be started. The Board proposed an established number
for all the yards. The Admiralty disagreed and set the Navy Board
impossible criteria; it recommended them (the Navy Board) "to keep
such a number of workmen in the yards as they judge necessary for
carrying on the works in hand, and can be maintained within the grants
of the year".43

Again in 1753 it was evident that the argument was well drawn.
The Admiralty maintained that there were more workmen than in the first
years of Queen Anne's war. The Navy Board argued that the number of
men in the dockyards had been reduced from 9140 in 1749 to 5748 in

42. The reduction referred to in 1750 was proposed in 1749.
Adm. 106/2185, p.102, 27 Dec. 1749.
For an indication of the reduction of men working in the
dockyards between April 1748 and June 1749, see Adm. 106/
2185, p.845. This contains a very useful table; about
a third of the workforce was shed, the reduction being
distributed over all the yards.
43. Adm. 3/62, 6 Nov. 1750.
The question of the number of artificers was linked directly to the manner of working, by task or by day pay. The Navy Board said that shipwrights working by task would do one-third more work. There were disadvantages. The obvious ones were the expense of the double pay and the need to keep a sufficient number handy in case of emergency. More important, the Board recognised that working by task would answer the end of providing ships quickly but that if built by day pay "the Royal Navy will be better and more substantially built and repaired, the ships last longer, and the figure of their bodies be more accurately preserved". It would be cheaper in the long run. In support of the argument was adduced the fact that ships "built in Merchants Yards, in a very few years, have proved weak and in want of much greater repairs". The merchants had been required to perform work by day pay. The ill effects of contract work were not new, an instance being quoted from 1694. It was also argued that flexibility of work required in a dockyard lent itself more to day work than task work.\footnote{45}

What was the result of this continued interest in the dockyards? The supply of money was controlled. The number of artificers therefore had to fluctuate in response to it;\footnote{46} the Navy Board did try to keep within the grant for the year.\footnote{47} Economy was a prime consideration in

\begin{footnotes}
\item[45] \textit{Ibid.}, p.127, \textit{et seq.}
\item[46] For an increase, see Adm. 106/2187, p.52, 18 Jan. 1754.
\item[47] In this instance numbers of workmen were to be discharged in view of the increase in the debt over the previous year. Adm. 106/2186, p.360, 31 Jan. 1753. For the Navy Board's idea of the numbers required in Oct. 1750, see Adm. 106/2185, p.320, 22 Oct. 1750.
\end{footnotes}
retaining work by contract. The theory was that workmen could be provided when necessary at the start of the next war.\textsuperscript{48} This seems to have been justified in 1755. The Navy Board revised its January list of figures relating to the numbers of workmen needed in the dockyards. At the start of February\textsuperscript{49} it represented to the Admiralty that notwithstanding the additional numbers of shipwrights and other artificers lately enlisted in His Majesty's dockyards

\begin{quote}
we find they are not sufficient to answer the present occasion in equipping the ships under orders to be fitted for sea, tho' the whole strength of the yards where they are fitting is employed on them whilst the works on the great ships building or repairing are wholly at a stand.\textsuperscript{50}
\end{quote}

The Admiralty seems to have enjoyed the success which its efforts were intended to achieve. In the first six months of 1755 the total dockyard force increased by one-third although this increase was not spread evenly throughout the dockyards. The Admiralty was obviously at this time searching for the most efficient way of using its resources. At the end of February\textsuperscript{51} it requested the Navy Board to enquire into the possibility of repairing three ships in those merchant yards nearest to the King's yards. This scheme would have had the advantage that the

\textsuperscript{48} This could be achieved by different methods. In the demand for sailmakers at the start of the war it was ordered that if the sailmakers were found fully qualified to discharge their duty they could dispense with producing their indentures. Ind. 10664, p.409, 22 May 1740.

For the taking on of servants at the start of the next war, see Adm. 106/2187, p.297, 28 Jan. 1755.

\textsuperscript{49} Adm. 106/2187, p.302, 3 Feb. 1755.

\textsuperscript{50} This tends to confirm Baugh's judgement about the reason for the reliance on the Merchant Yards, op. cit., p.261.

\textsuperscript{51} Adm. 106/2187, 24 Feb. 1755.
relevant Master Shipwright of the King's Yard would be able to carry out inspections.\textsuperscript{52} The Navy Board in reply gave a classic argument against the use of merchant builders:\textsuperscript{53}

If upon opening the bottoms of the said ships after they are taken in hand by the merchant yards their defects should prove greater than are expected it will not be possible to ascertain a time for completing their repairs unless the contractors will oblige themselves to employ as many workmen as may be judged sufficient for that purpose, which, we apprehend they will not submit to.\textsuperscript{54}

The supply of stores was crucial. In 1753 the Navy Board was not satisfied that it had sufficient timber and stores in stock, wanting a supply for two and a half years when it had sufficient only for eighteen months.\textsuperscript{55} There is evidence that the situation was unsatisfactory in 1755. The Admiralty noticed from the weekly progresses of Plymouth that the rigging, cables and sails of the 'Ipswich', 'Warwick', 'Weymouth' and 'York' which were reported to be in good condition for service were not completed, a "notorious neglect" as the Admiralty noted.\textsuperscript{56} A strict enquiry was ordered, the Admiralty wanting to know "whether the officers of the yard made timely representations of the want of stores and which of the officers was culpable". The surmise was correct. The Navy Board found that the Master Attendant and the Clerk of the Stores were most to blame since they were responsible for keeping sufficient stores to keep pace with the work of the Master

\textsuperscript{52} This course of action had been urged in Apr. 1745 and Mar. 1746 but was unsuccessful, see Baugh \textit{op. cit.}, p.260.
\textsuperscript{53} Adm. 106/2187, p.356, 3 March 1755.
\textsuperscript{54} This was hardly to be expected. The merchant builders were reluctant to relinquish control over their labour force. See above p.188.
\textsuperscript{55} Adm. 106/2186, p.347, 22 Jan. 1753.
\textsuperscript{56} Adm. 106/2187, p.377, 19 Mar. 1755.
Shipwright. What was more, the enquiry showed that the same charge had been levelled and proved against them a year earlier.57

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What conclusions arise from a study of the naval administration in the period 1739-1754. In relation to the number of ships the navy started the war with insufficient in the lower rates; but then this deficiency was remedied easily, before the 1745 rebellion and only just after the alliance of France and Spain linked the two most powerful naval powers to oppose Britain at sea. Once under weigh the building programme had to be restrained on the grounds of economy. As regards the general condition of the navy and the dockyards, although there were grounds for disquiet, services sufficed. After the end of the war the major problem concerned the state of the dockyards. Man-power was reduced as far as was consistent with economy and safety. The initial reduction was followed by a continuing dispute between the Admiralty and Navy Boards as to the actual number required. The impression from these episodes was that when occasion arose steps would be taken to meet any emergency. This seems to have been the case,

57. Ibid., 13 May 1755.
in the event. There were attempts to make sure that the Admiralty and Navy Boards were kept informed of the state of affairs in order that they might recognise such an occasion. The manner of the artificers working was so structured as to ensure that their efforts were directed to the best and cheapest effect. This was at the bottom of the discussion on the relative merits of day and contract work.
SECTION THREE

MILITARY DISCIPLINE AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN POLITICS
Nature of discussion of administrative matters - measures causing opposition 1748-51.

Articles of war; changes 1718-37; changes 1737-48 - mustering and returns - administration of justice; changes 1748-51 - nature and origin.

Relationship of Secretary at War and the Commander in Chief - Yonge's position - Fox's position - change after 1748 - influence of Duke of Cumberland.
The period 1749-51 was distinguished by a change in the nature and intensity of the discussion of military affairs in Parliament. In the period 1739-48 such discussions as there were had been marked by their inadequacy. The subject matter of the debates were a curious mixture of military minutiae and quarrels on the supply of money, framed in the context of patriotic fervour.¹

Politicians equated government and administration, which opened the way for a detailed assessment of the work of the various offices. Yet the politicians limited themselves in scope and depth. They were concerned with the army and the navy; the Ordnance was rarely mentioned as such in the reported debates, and the subsidiary boards of the Admiralty not at all. Within that framework, concern was with policy decisions rather than with detailed discussion of the working of government departments.²

The government's aim in debates whether financial and routine or on specific issues raised by the opposition seems to have been to keep discussion to a minimum.³ The tenor of the debates, as reported, seems to indicate that, for the government, parliamentary approval was a necess-

1. See, for example, Cobbett, Parliamentary History, 1739-41, cc.894-927. Debate in the Commons on the state of the army.
2. Such an approach was frustrated by the government speakers' argument that certain items relating to foreign affairs be kept secret. Ibid., 1741-3, cc.332-73, notably c.351 and cc367-70.
3. Note, for example, the way that government speakers tried to fog the issue in discussing in November 1739 the question of raising seamen. Pelham emphasised the issue of the distribution of bounty money, previous decisions, the crown's prerogative on the distribution of money and the advantage of pragmatism over a fixed law. Howe and Walpole concentrated on the constitutional issue. Not one government speaker answered the opposition's case that the situation was desperate and the proposal the sole viable means of remediing the problem. Cobbett Parliamentary History, 1739-41, cc.97-149, Debate in the Commons on the bill for the encouragement of seamen, especially columns 99-101, 103, 118, 119, 122-3, 126 and 130. Contrast this debate with the Debate in the Commons on the Seamen's Bill in February 1740, ibid., Vol. XII, 1741-3, columns 26-143, especially Mr. Philip Gybson's speech, cc. 27-29, and Sir Robert Walpole's, c.100.
ary evil and that for those opposing the government issues were opportunities for taking a dissenting opinion. The issue is complicated by the confused state of politics for the greater part of the period; Walpole was losing his stature at the beginning of the war and had lost it by the time the war had been in progress sufficiently long to make some dissatisfied with the apparent lack of success. Thereafter no-one dominated the political scene sufficiently to crush opposition. Fear of the Duke of Cumberland's influence meant a period of recrimination at the end of the war when one would have expected exhaustion if not elation to have ensured relative calm.

Debates in the period 1749-51 were conducted inside Parliament with greater acrimony than before. There were two distinct series of measures which caused opposition. Proposals to reduce into one and explain the navy acts were the occasion for debates in February and April, and April and May 1749. The two issues common to each of the three debates were the exercise of authority by the Admiralty over officers in general and over proposals to extend control over half pay officers in particular.

The same issues were the cause of debates on matters affecting the army. The questions of half pay officers and control over the conduct and revision of courts martial sentences were raised in February and March 1749 at different stages of the Mutiny Bill for 1749, and again

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in February 1750 on the Mutiny Bill for that year. Similar opposition was created by the bill to limit the length of service in Feb. 1750 and again in February 1750 by the bill to limit the discharge of non-commission officers.

It is an important issue whether opposition to proposals was merely factious or whether it was loyal in the best interests of king and country. It concerns the motives of the opposition. Since part of the opposition's case was that the motives of those proposing the measures could not be trusted, it is therefore necessary to establish how justified were the allegation of abuses which the measures were designed to prevent. Since in relation to the affairs of the army part of the opposition's attack was directed at the person of the Duke of Cumberland it is also necessary to establish his relationship to the Secretary at War, the chief officer of the army administration. Since the changes affecting the army were associated with proposals to change the articles of war it is also necessary to trace the development of these articles. If changes in army regulations were normal, violent opposition to a particular phase would be that much the less justified.

8. Debate in the Commons on the Mutiny Bill. Ibid., cc.621-641.
9. Debate in the Commons on a bill for limiting the Time for Soldiers to serve in the Army. Ibid., cc.723-760.
The articles of war had changed very little between 1718 and 1737. The changes were more administrative than fundamental. The general nature of the changes was towards the strengthening of discipline.

The article relating to obeying superior officers was extended. In 1718 it had read "If any officer, or soldier, shall refuse to obey the military orders of his superior officer, he shall suffer death, or such other punishment as shall be inflicted by a Court Martial". By 1737 the scope had been widened "If any officer or soldier shall strike or use any violence against his superior officer, being in the execution of his office, or shall refuse to obey the lawful command of his superior officer, all and every person and persons so offending shall suffer death, or such other punishment, as by a court martial shall be inflicted".

The tenth article in 1717 was re-worded, and the punishment altered. In 1737 the penalty for threatening a superior with a weapon was cashiering for an officer, and "if a non-commission officer or soldier he shall receive such capital punishment as a general court martial shall inflict".

By the addition to the seventeenth article the power to appoint courts martial in the nature of regimental ones was vested in the officer commanding in any of the castles, forts, or barracks or those

13. Art. 1717, Article 9th., Art. 1718, Article viii.
14. Art. 1737, Article viii. This became Article ix in 1718.
15. Art. 1737, Article ix.
who commanded independent companies in detachments, though composed of different troops.\textsuperscript{16}

One addition to the twentieth article\textsuperscript{17} indicated that "when the said courts martial are composed of the officers of one corps they shall then take their rank only according to the dates of the commissions they are mustered by in the said corps". With reference to the oath an additional instruction was introduced: "The military officer is likewise to take a certificate from the justice or magistrate, that the man inlisted did take the said oath, and that the seventh and tenth articles were read to him, as by the Act of Parliament was directed".\textsuperscript{18}

There was an addition to the thirty-eighth article,\textsuperscript{19} "and to the end that offenders may in such manner be brought to justice, we do hereby direct, that when any officer or soldier shall commit any offence, for which punishment may be lawfully inflicted by a court martial, the person so offending may by order of the then commanding officer upon the place, either in writing, or otherwise, be put under arrest and confined, until he shall be tried by a court martial for the same or otherwise lawfully discharged".

\begin{itemize}
\item[16.] \textit{Ibid.}, Article xvii. This article describes the way in which the court martial was to operate. The sentence was not to be executed until the commanding officer of the regiment or the garrison had given his approval. He was not to be a member of the court martial. The article was new in 1718, Art. 1718, Article xvii approximating to Art. 1717, Article 21st.
\item[17.] Art. 1717, Article 22nd., Art. 1737, Article xx. Art. 1718, Article xx.
\item[18.] The seventh article referred to penalties for mutiny, and the tenth related to desertion.
\item[19.] Art. 1717, Article 40th., Art. 1718, Article xxxviii, Art. 1737, Article xxxviii.
\end{itemize}
There were several important changes in the articles of war between 1737 and 1748. It is not possible to date these changes precisely. A complete set of the annual articles of war was formerly lodged with the papers of the House of Lords but there were destroyed in the fire of 1834. The changes did not occur before 1742 since the articles of war of that year were the same as those for 1737. Since the parliamentary enquiry of 1746 dealt with areas in which there were changes in the articles, discipline in general, clothing and mustering, it seems possible to attribute at least the more important of the changes to the period 1747-8.

The format of the articles also changed between 1742 and 1748. Previously arranged in merely numerical order, although in a logical progression, they were re-arranged into definite classes. The change was not introduced earlier than 1747, references in the report of the parliamentary enquiry of 1746 being to the old style articles. The opportunity was taken to introduce minor textual alterations. The most interesting feature was the extension of the scope of certain articles. In total the 1749 version was almost half as long again as that of 1742. Certain of the additions could be expected to reflect what was

20. See Appendix F for the articles of war which do survive elsewhere.
21. Compare Art. 1737 above with those for 1742 to be found in the war office library located in a bound volume of articles covering the period 1742-1760.
23. The 1717 version used Arabic numerals, those of 1718 and 1737 Roman numerals.
24. See above p. 91.
25. See the Rules and Articles for 1749 located in the House of Lords library, consulted by permission of the Clerk of the Records. There is another copy filed in a loose leaf binder in the War Office library.
found lacking during the war. Some alterations made existing articles more explicit, whilst others were completely new.

Many of the articles under the new section 14 relating to duties in quarters, in garrisons, or in the field were new, replacing more restricted injunctions. In dealings with the enemy, the previous injunction against disclosure of the password was repeated. In addition, there were introduced penalties for forcing a safeguard, relieving the enemy with money, victuals or ammunition, and correspondence with the enemy.

There had been a general article relating to leave of absence and conduct on the march; absence from the post had to be certified by the commanding officer. Under the new articles this was re-defined as a specific injunction against quitting the platoon.

There were two other minor amendments under the same section. There was introduced a particular instruction against violence towards sutlers, and the previously unspecified injunction against being out of camp was made specific, one mile being defined as the limit.

Previously there had been no instructions for regulating precedence in camp between different corps; four sections of the new articles

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27. Art. 1749, Section 14, Article 15.
28. Ibid., Article 17.
29. Ibid., Article 18.
30. Ibid., Article 19.
32. Ibid., Article 28.
33. Art. 1749, Section 14, Article 10; see also, ibid., Article 16.
34. Ibid., Article 11.
35. Art. 1737, Article 33.
36. Art. 1749, Section 14, Article 1; see also, ibid., Articles 2, 3, 4.
dealt with the problems of the horse, the foot and the engineers.\footnote{Ibid., Articles 24,25,26,27.}

There had been no specific instruction against the casting away of arms. One was introduced.\footnote{Ibid., Article 14.}

When injunctions against the negligent misapplication of arms, ammunition, accoutrements and clothing were repeated,\footnote{Art. 1737, Articles 40,41.} there was an added provision whereby the captain of each troop or company was charged with the responsibility of their good preservation, being accountable to the colonel.\footnote{Art. 1749, Section 13, Articles 1,2,3.}

Another minor area of re-definition was the section relating to sutling. The emphasis was changed. Previous injunctions against serving soldiers undertaking commercial business\footnote{Ibid., Article 4.} was replaced by an injunction on the commanding officer to ensure that the sutlers were sufficient and that they derived no advantage from sutling. Officers were able to bring in provisions.\footnote{Art. 1737, Article 26.}

Changes in the articles relating to mustering and returns were of a more substantial nature. The regulations for correct mustering were stiffened in two respects.\footnote{Art. 1749, Section 8, Articles 2,3 & 4. It was ordered that the officer commanding was to derive no advantage from sutting.} A penalty for corrupt commissaries was introduced;\footnote{Compare Art. 1737, Articles 22 & 23 and Art. 1749, Section 4. See also, above pp.112 and 348.} officers absent without leave were to be deemed deserters.\footnote{Art. 1749, Section 4, Article 6.} Chaplains were to be subject to the same discipline as soldiers on the
matters of mustering and drunkenness.\textsuperscript{47} The penalty for false musters was retained as cashiering. In similar vein, the section relating to returns in general was strict; it was completely new.\textsuperscript{48} Officers commanding in South Britain were required to submit a return of their forces at the beginning of each month. Details about the absence of officers were specifically required. A similar state of the Irish forces was to be made to the Governor there, and likewise in relation to the forces in North Britain to the commanding officer there. These were from time to time to be sent to the War Office. The state of the garrisons at Gibraltar, Port Mahon, and garrisons and independent forces in America were to be sent to the Secretary at War "by all convenient opportunities".

There were other significant innovations. The provisions were new which extended to the Artillery the duty to obey rules for the army and the ability to conduct its own courts martial.\textsuperscript{49} There was introduced a general order against disorders or neglects to the prejudice of good order and military discipline.\textsuperscript{50} The section which related to half pay officers was completely new,\textsuperscript{51} incorporating the provisions that their rank be static and that they be subject to discipline as ordinary officers.

The most important changes came under the heading of the administration of justice.\textsuperscript{52} Some changes were minor. The treatment of prisoners

\textsuperscript{47} Art. 1749, Section 1, Articles 5 & 6.  
\textsuperscript{48} Art. 1749, Section 5.  
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., Section 19.  
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., Section 20, Article 3.  
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., Section 17.  
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., Section 15.
was unaffected. The terminal time for the holding of a court martial was moved from 1 p.m. to 3 p.m.\(^53\) Important clauses were added in relation to courts martial held across the seas\(^54\) and those involving officers of different branches of the service.\(^55\) The limitation of general courts martial to thirteen commission officers and the president to be under the rank of field officer or officer commanding the garrison where such courts martial were to be held was not confined "except as to General Courts Martial held in places beyond the seas where there is no Civil Judicature". These "may consist of a less number than thirteen commission officers (where all that can be conveniently assembled do not amount to that number) but such general courts martial shall not consist of less than three commission officers, and the president of the court martial shall not be under the degree of a Captain, and the judgement, given by such general courts martial, shall be by the Plurality of Voices".\(^56\) In that case the judgement by the plurality of voices replaced the normal majority of at least nine of the thirteen present on matters of life and death.\(^57\)

By the addition of a new article relating to the decision of disputes between different corps courts martial were to be equally composed of officers belonging to the corps in which the parties in question then served. The presidents were to be taken in turn.\(^58\) There were introduced injunctions against disrupting courts martial\(^59\) and a limit

\(^{53}\) Ibid., Section 15, Article 19. Compare with Art. 1737, Article xx.
\(^{54}\) Ibid., Article 2.
\(^{55}\) Ibid., Article 3.
\(^{56}\) Ibid., Articles 1 and 2.
\(^{57}\) Art. 1737, Article xx.
\(^{58}\) Art. 1749, Section 15, Article 12.
\(^{59}\) Ibid., Article 17.
was placed on the duration of imprisonment for officers and soldiers awaiting trial.\textsuperscript{60}

The major changes in the articles of war for 1749 were the insertion or substitution of certain phrases.\textsuperscript{61}

Death or other suitable punishment was the existing penalty for drawing a weapon against a superior officer. It was to be extended to threatening a superior with violence while he was on duty. It was the existing penalty for disrespecting orders. The reference to obeying "orders" was omitted and a looser "any lawful Command of his Superior Officer" inserted in its stead.\textsuperscript{62}

Previous times for the conduct of a trial were between eight o'clock in the morning and three in the afternoon. These were retained as the norm but exception was provided "in cases which require an immediate example".\textsuperscript{63}

For areas there was a military presence and there was no civil judicature the existing powers of the generals, governors or commanders were extended. The courts martial which they could appoint under existing articles were empowered to "try all persons guilty of wilful murder, theft, robbery, rapes, coining, or clipping the coin of Great Britain, or of any foreign coin current in the country or garrison and all other capital crimes or other offences and punish offenders according to the known laws of the land or as the nature of their crimes shall deserve".\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., Article 19.
\textsuperscript{61} The main debate was less on the content of the changes than on the extent of their application, Cobbett, \textit{Parl. History}, 1747-53, cc. 395-8.
\textsuperscript{62} Art. 1749, Section 2, Article 5.
\textsuperscript{63} Art. 1749, Section 15, Article 10.
\textsuperscript{64} Art. 1749, Section xx, Article 2.
General Courts Martial could also take cognisance of and punish at their discretion all such crimes, disorders or neglects which officers and soldiers might be guilty of to the prejudice of good order and military discipline though not mentioned in the above articles of war. This power was slightly restricted in 1749 in that crimes were defined as non capital ones. 65

There were several changes in the articles of war for 1750. The punishment for mutiny and sedition was altered. It had previously been death upon conviction before a court martial. It was altered to death or "such other punishment as by a court martial shall be inflicted". 66 The same change of penalty was introduced for "all officers and soldiers, who, having received pay, or having duly enlisted in our service, shall be convicted of having deserted the same". 67

Previously the punishment for not reporting or otherwise not using utmost endeavours to suppress mutiny or sedition was that the offender "ought to be reputed accessory to the mutiny, and to be punished by a court martial with death, or otherwise according to the nature of the offence". The words between "ought" and "be punished" were replaced by the direct "shall". 68

The penalty for forcing a safeguard, assisting the enemy with money, victuals, ammunition or protection, corresponding with the enemy, and leaving post to forage for plunder was death; for disclosure of the watchword it was death or such other punishment as shall be inflicted by a General Court Martial. In 1750 this alternative to death was intro-

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65. Ibid., Article 3.
66. Articles for 1750, hereafter Art. 1750, Section 2, Article 3.
67. Art. 1750, Section 6, Article 1.
68. Art. 1750, Section 2, Article 4.
duced for the other offences.  

Under the new article five in section fifteen the previous articles six and seven were rolled into one. Article six indicated that the Judge Advocate General or his deputy should prosecute in His Majesty's name and under the oath set out in article seven. The 1750 edition included a new clause at the end of the sentence "Neither will I, upon any account, at any time whatsoever, disclose, or discover the vote or opinion of any particular member of the Court Martial". The addition was "unless required to give evidence thereof as a witness by a Court of Justice in a due course of law".

This same addition to the oath was made to a new article setting out the oath to be taken by the Judge Advocate or the person officiating as such.

Both articles of section 17 relating to half pay were omitted. The first decreed that no half pay officer should be entitled to promotion or higher rank. The second required that all half pay officers be equally subject to discipline and required to attend as if they were actually on full pay.

Several of the articles altered in the 1751 edition concerned the maintenance of discipline. Most changes were textual. The manner of reaching decisions in general courts martial was altered. The article indicating that decisions could be reached by a majority of votes in cases where there was no civil judicature was replaced by an instruc-

69. Ibid., Section 14, Articles 9,14,15,18,21,22.
70. Ibid., Section 15, Article 6.
71. Art. 1749, Section 15, Articles 2 and 9.
tion that the majority was to number at least nine. 72 This removed
the exception from the rule.

The previous article laid down that "after a non-commissioned
officer or soldier shall have been duly enlisted and sworn no discharge
granted be allowed of as sufficient which is not signed by a field
officer of the regiment which he entered, or the commanding officer
where no field officer of the regiment was in Great Britain". An
elaboration was inserted in 1751 before the phrase relating to no
discharge "he shall not be dismissed His Majesty's service without a
discharge in writing". 73

A previous article had allowed officers, soldiers and sutlers to
bring into fort or garrison provisions, eatable or drinkable. This
was restricted in 1751 "except where any contract or contracts are or
shall be entered into by us, or by our order, for furnishing such
provisions, and with respect only to the species of provisions so con­
tracted for". 74 The article against quartering women or children in
houses assigned for troops was made more explicit. 75

A textual change was introduced on the exclusion of the commanding
officer requirements for a president of a general court martial. The
same provision was incorporated in the article relating to General
Courts Martial held in Gibraltar, Minorca, and other places overseas.
This article was re-written to incorporate the provision of another
1749 article "unless where a field officer cannot be had, in which case

72. Art. 1750, Section 15, Article 9.
73. Articles of war for 1753, B.M. BS 24e 138(i). Art. 1753,
   Section 5, Article 3.
74. Ibid., Section 8, Article 2.
75. Ibid., Section 9, Article 1.
the officer next in seniority to the commander, not being under the degree of captain shall preside at such court martials".76

There was an addition concerning the oath to be given to persons giving evidence before a general court martial "nor shall any sentence of death be given against any offender by any general court martial, unless nine officers present shall concur therein, and if there be more than thirteen, then the judgement shall pass by the concurrence of two-thirds of the officers present".77

It is difficult to trace the origins of these changes. Some would seem to follow from particular difficulties in the war; such would be those changes relating to returns, musters, preservation of arms and leave of absence.78 Conduct in quarters, sutling arrangements, and the relation of the artillery to the rest of the army have not formed part of this study; it is therefore not possible to tell whether the changed articles of war accurately reflected problems.

The subjecting of half pay officers to discipline as though they were full time could not possibly have been caused by the direct events of the war. It might have been an indirect result of an assessment of the low state of morale of the army.

The changes in arrangements for courts martial were mainly procedural. They would imply that miscarriages of justice had been made possible by the previous system. The testing of that thesis would require a re-examination of courts martial during the war at home and overseas; this lies outside the scope of the present work; the records

76. Ibid., Section 15, Article 2.
77. Ibid., Section 15, Article 8.
78. See above pp.48-50, 112-132 and 296.
for such a study are not available, and even if they were it would be
dubious whether any more justifiable conclusion could be reached by an
analysis now than was reached then.

By contrast with the changes in the previous years, those in 1749
were of a more general nature, reflecting principle rather than
specific abuse to be remedied by a re-wording or patching up of previous
articles. The main feature was an emphasis on a general and strict
obedience in principle to the commands of a superior, and the provision
for military courts martial to be held when there was no civil judicature
to enforce law. Whilst some changes in 1750 were textual, a common
change was the vesting in the court martial the power of passing an
alternative sentence to death. The other major items were also points
of principle, non disclosure of votes at courts martial, and the
restriction of the death penalty to courts martial where nine or more
officers concurred in the sentence. The contentious articles relating
to half pay officers were omitted.

Changes proposed in 1751 were shorter. Some were pragmatic and
specific. The points of most general significance were the re-affirmation
of the need for nine by number or two-thirds majority verdicts in cases
involving sentences of death, and the change in the composition of the
court martial to exclude the Commander in Chief or Governor of the
Garrison from being President.

It is therefore possible to place opposition to certain measures
in the period 1749-51 in the context of changes in the Articles of War.
It seems that the articles of war were susceptible to change reflecting
acknowledged deficiencies, that, as was to be expected, the majority
occurred towards the end of the war, that in addition there was an
attempt in 1749/50 especially to establish a greater control on the
method of discipline in the army, and that in 1750/51 there was an attempt to ensure that courts martial were not subject to undue influence. This analysis of internal evidence in the articles of war accords closely with conclusions formed from other sources and indicates that the parliamentary opposition's analysis of the nature of those trends was defensible. It does not indicate whether the opposition's inference was correct that the changes were attributable to Cumberland and prejudicial to the true interests of the army.

It is therefore essential to seek the origin of the changes. Part of the answer lies in the relationship of the Duke of Cumberland to the Secretary at War.

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The chief officer of the military administration was the Secretary at War. There has been some debate as to the extent to which the position and importance of the office changed in the period under review. That position has a direct relevance to the question of the motives behind the introduction of the Mutiny Bills.

The office had a chequered history in the Eighteenth Century. Under Pulteney in the period 1714-17 the Secretary of State for the Southern Department was called on to sign documents which were purely administrative in character. The office, as exercised by William Yonge the incumbent in 1739, had a more positive and independent role. Details of vacancies were forwarded to the Secretary of State together with recommendations for their being filled. In a letter marked private in 1743 Yonge apologised to Lord Carteret for troubling him after his other letter enclosing the lists of vacancies.

79. For a brief but largely accurate description of the structure of British Military Administration in the Eighteenth Century, see an article of that title by Major G. C. Merrick, JRUSI, vol. 57, pp. 1644-8. A good survey of the general background is given in Scouller, The Armies of Queen Anne, pp. 14-22, 30 et seq. The anomalous position of the various officers concerned with the conduct of war was summed up by I. F. Burton "Communications", H.J. lv (1961), pp. 78-103. He made reference to the demise of the specialist committee of the war office, "There was administrative work of considerable importance for such a committee to do in the army, and its failure left the government of the army for very nearly the rest of the century full of anomalies and divided uncertainty between monarch, secretary at war, secretary of state, and commander in chief"; (p. 84). A contemporary description of the military offices is to be found in Chamberlayne, op. cit., 1723, pp. 150-1, 573, 590.

80. For a critical appraisal of the position and limitations of the Secretary at War, see J. Hayes, Bull. John Rylands Library, Vol. 40, 1957/8, p. 328 et seq., especially the footnote to p. 334.

81. S.P. 41/15, f. 258, 9 Sept. 1743, Yonge to Carteret.
Though I have always had an inclination to favour the Colonels with regard to their recommendations of ensigns and second lieutenants, yet I beg leave to observe on this occasion that the great number of vacancies have occasioned strong sollicitations from Noblemen and Gentlemen of weight and interest in their several counties, and by the long time they have been undisposed of, they are become very importunate and uneasy. I should therefore hope His Majesty would at this time have a more particular regard to recommendations of this nature.

Powerful as the medium for recommendations, Yonge realised that he was in a position to influence decisions. Even on this occasion he tried to influence the decision.

I have taken the Liberty to mark those who appear to the Kings Servants here, to be the most urgent, as very material to His Majesty's Service, and among these John Fletcher recommended by Sir Jas. Lowther I must name particularly.

The influence exercised by the different groups can be seen in the lists which Yonge was asked to provide. In September 1743 he provided four:

The first contains the list of the several vacancies with the recommendations of the colonels. The second a list of the vacancies in each regiment. The third a list of such second lieutenants and ensigns as are recommended by noblemen and gentlemen of consequence to be promoted to the rank of Lieutenants. And .... fourth of such young gentlemen as are recommended in like manner to serve in the army as ensigns or second lieutenants.82

Yonge showed a complete command of the statutes involved in the filling of vacancies, and demonstrated that he knew his place, and did not encroach on areas forbidden to his influence:

82. S.P. 41/15, f.272, 9 Sept. 1743. Yonge to Carteret. See also, ibid., f.276, 28 Aug. 1743, Admiral Stewart to Yonge. For a critical view of Yonge's conduct from an out of favour former Master General of the Ordnance, the Duke of Argyle, see Cobbett, Parliamentary History, 1739-41,cc.894-910. Debate in the Commons on the state of the army. especially cc.904-5.
By the death of Lord Stapleton there is a vacancy to the Third Regiment of Foot Guards, but as His Majesty knows all the affairs of those Corps so well, I have not presumed to annex any recommendation .... as Lord Dunmore is now with His Majesty I beg leave to refer to him.

It seems that the nature of the office changed under Yonge's successor, Fox. Ilchester argues that after 1748 as part of a more thoroughgoing reform of the army Cumberland set himself the task of reducing the office of the Secretary at War to its original status. This change could be said to have begun earlier. In December 1746 Fox complained that the Duke of Cumberland had left him in the midst of the work of disbanding two troops of life guards and the reduction of three regiments of horse to dragoons in order to save £60,000 per annum.

I think I have disbanded Oglethorpe's Rangers too, and if so that is my doing. The other you may believe I was only the willing instrument in His Majesty's and His Royal Highness's hands.

Ilchester argues that paradoxically this closer relationship between the Commander in Chief and the Secretary at War meant that in the years 1745 to 1747 when the Duke of Cumberland was out of the country the Secretary at War had more responsibility, being in direct communication with the King and the Secretaries of State on matters which would normally have been dealt with by the Commander in Chief. It is in this context that he places significance on the facts that Fox did not make speeches in the House of Commons and of his reputed severe illness. This conclusion is supported also by Horace Walpole's saying in 1748:

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85. Ilchester, op. cit., p.143.
to the great detriment of the Ministry Fox has turned one of the sinecures under the government into one of the most laborious employments, at the same time imagining that the ease with which he executes it will prevent the discovery of his innovation. 86

Politically as well as administratively this was a time of change for the Secretary at War. He took an active part in politics. The King and Cumberland pressed Fox not to leave the position of Secretary at War even when he wished to press claims for the Treasurership of the Navy. The reason was that Fox was needed to pilot the controversial Mutiny Bill through the House of Commons. 87

Ilchester argues for the period after 1748 that there were strenuous efforts made to evolve order out of the chaos into which War Office routine had fallen. It is difficult to define specific areas. The major reforms were not made in office routine so far as can be established from the office records available. A thorough search has revealed one area in which such a change was recorded. Reference was made to "the new method of making up the company's accounts". The Secretary at War expected some reply from the regiments. This "new" method seems to have been a re-iteration of rules already in force. In the sense that they had obviously been disregarded Ilchester's argument is supported. 88 Lloyd wrote to regimental agents:

86. Quoted in Ilchester, op. cit., p.148.
87. Even after that there is evidence of Fox's close involvement with the Duke of Cumberland. On Dec. 10th. 1754, Fox wrote to him after carefully drafting two proof copies: "I must begin with humbly asking pardon for having mistaken your Majesty. I now understand that your Majesty does not intend to have any leader in the House of Commons". B.M. Add. Mss. 51375, at beginning of volume, not foliod.
I have it in command (in the absence of the Secretary at War) to acquaint you that HRH the Duke, to prevent any mistakes or disputes in stating the recruiting accounts of the regiments of foot, hath thought proper to repeat H.M. order of 24th. Aug. 1743 for settling the recruiting accounts of the Infantry.

Lloyd quoted the text of the original order and went on to make arrangements for the execution of the order in the context of 1748. It is noteworthy that had the instructions been carried into effect, one area investigated by the House of Commons Special Committee on the Land Forces, as an area of possible abuse, might have been removed from their enquiry. 

There was little wrong with the instructions which made an attempt to link the accounting for 'non effective money' to the recruiting for the regiment; the basis for both was the number of fit men on the establishment. It attempted to define a starting position, and made provision for an annual review with the accounts being balanced with the intention of providing a permanent fund "to pay all contingent expenses, and for ... recruiting and compleating the regiments". The parliamentary enquiry revealed the lack of uniformity in practice, evidence that the order of 1743, had not been followed to the letter although it was ostensibly only seeking to regulate what had been customary. Although the impetus for the Duke of Cumberland's initiative was his signing warrants to settle accounts for the army to 28 Dec. 1748 and a desire to prevent future mistakes or disputes, it is possible to see this reform as the first practical attempt to put right what the parliamentary enquiry had revealed was wrong.

89. For the causes of the increase, see Report pp.76-81.
90. Ibid., pp.129b, 130a and b.
There is evidence that the idea was the Duke of Cumberland's, reference being made to the Secretary at War's commenting upon a letter which touched on the new method of making up company accounts this comment being "what he (the Secretary at War) takes to be His Royal Highness the Duke's intentions upon that Head".\(^91\) There is ample evidence that the Duke of Cumberland exercised a practical day to day control through the Secretary at War over a variety of subjects. Many instances relate to the affairs in Scotland.\(^92\) Other subjects ranged as wide as transport,\(^93\) preferment,\(^94\) discipline\(^95\) and an investigation of the degree of stability within regiments between 1748 and 1752.\(^96\)

On the basis of the general work of the office, and regardless of specific question about the changes in the articles of war it would be possible to argue that there existed a situation in which Cumberland and the Secretary at War worked closely and that the nature of the Secretary at War's office was changing.

It is also clear that Cumberland's was the dominant part.\(^97\) He kept a controlling hand upon the disbanding of the forces. To take but one example, Fox wrote to several agents:

I have it in command from His Royal Highness the Duke to acquaint you, that he had ordered

\(^{93}\) See for example, W.O. 4/46, p.11, 6 Feb. 1749, Fox to Capt. Scott.
\(^{94}\) Ibid., p.88, 14 Mar. 1749, Fox to Earl of Marchmont.
\(^{95}\) Ibid., p.311, 17 Aug. 1749, Fox to Churchill.
\(^{96}\) W.O. 4/49, p.11. Fox to commanders of dragoon and foot regiments.
\(^{97}\) For Middleton's reasoned traditional view of Cumberland's rôle, see op. cit., p.204.
such of the youngest officers in Flanders who are to be reduced with the additional companies to Lord Beauclerk's, Huske's, Johnson's Regiments of Foot to which you are agent to repair to England; and it is His Royal Highness further order that the officers who have been with the additional companies but are not reduced do join their respective companies on landing ....

Nearly a fortnight later Fox wrote that he was commanded by His Majesty to order these same colonels to:

transmit to me the names of the youngest officers in the several ranks of captains, lieutenants, and ensigns late of the Regiment of Foot under your command, that came within the break of the two additional companies to your said regiment lately disbanded, as likewise an account of any agreements with your approbation, between any of the said youngest officers and other officers of your corps of similar ranks, not within the break, for the latter retiring in the room of the said youngest officers on half pay.

Orders were issued by Cumberland for adjusting and settling the accounts of the several regiments.

The authority of Cumberland was evident in another incident at this time. Upon the return of troops for disbanding from the Low Countries arrangements were made for the regiments to be made up to the proper numbers by draughts from the disbanded additional companies. Fox wrote to the commanding officer of each regiment 'upon (the) said draught being made without loss of time, transmit to me a list of the

99. Ibid., p.297, 8 Dec. 1748. This could be useful in that it might provide evidence on the identity of officers on half pay, later the subject of interest with regard to the mutiny act.
100. Ibid., p.25, 3 June 1748, Fox to several agents. See also above p.364.
men so draughted for His Royal Highness the Duke's information'.

This order was countermanded by Cumberland's directions. The regiments which were to come to England had been completed by draughts from the Regiments which were ordered to Ireland. If the draughts had been taken they were to be disbanded.

The pattern was repeated after the war. Additional evidence of the elevated position of Cumberland and the implication that he was the driving force in the relationship with the Secretary at War was provided during Fox's absence in 1750. On returning to work after a two month absence he wrote to Newcastle that there were very few vacancies. Harrington had submitted a long list two months earlier. The procedure followed had been the same, the list going to the Duke of Newcastle to be laid before the King after it had received initial approval from Cumberland.

102. How the Secretary at War and the Duke of Cumberland worked closely together was evident from a letter from Joseph Yorke to Fox from the Hague, March 1/12 1748: "I lost no time in laying em (your letters) (together with the enclosed list of promotions) before H.R.H., who approves entirely of what you have done in the different sollicitations" ... "H.R.H. has no objection to General Bland's recommendation of ensign Stuart to the Lieutenancy in Blakeney's."

In a post-script, Yorke wrote with reference to a petition from Middleton, late Director of the Hospitals "H.R.H. says that he thinks he has the best pretensions to that place and that besides it will be a saving of half pay which he would otherwise have had a right to as Director". Add. Mss. 51375, not foliod. There are other examples under the same reference, dated 15 Mar. 1748, N.S. A letter dated 11/22 Mar. 1748, same to same, contains the significant sentence "I have nothing very material to send you this post, in command from His Royal Highness."

104. Ibid., 25 May 1750, Earl of Harrington to Duke of Newcastle.
More explicit reference to the position of Cumberland was made in the letter from Harrington saying that he had given a list of possible promotions to the Duke asking that "His Royal Highness would be pleased to strike out such as he did not approve, which His Royal Highness has done". He was therefore including a list of "such exchanges as the Duke has no objection to". \(^{105}\) There is reason to believe that Cumberland did not exercise his power in this respect in a capricious manner. Fox wrote to the Duke of Newcastle that Herbert had declined the Irish Regiment of Dragoons and that "as the Duke thinks there is want of Horse Officers among the Irish cavalry: His Royal Highness commands me to mention Colonel Dejean who served long in the Horse". \(^{106}\)

The same conclusion is supported by contemporary attitudes. As part of a memorial to Fox from General Dalzell for an allowance for the subalterns and soldiers either from the government or from Antigua itself there was a significant passage: General Dalzell therefore desires you will please to lay before His Royal Highness the said papers together with his humble request, that His Royal Highness may be pleased to move His Majesty to take the same into his royal consideration. \(^{107}\)

There is no instance recorded of the recommendation's not being accepted. In fact Fox was able on at least two occasions, with reference to a list approved by the Duke of Cumberland, to "presume to think His Majesty will have no objection as they are all things almost

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106. Ibid., 30 Sept. 1752, Fox to Duke of Newcastle.
107. Ibid., 25 June 1749.
of course".  

Cumberland's active rôle makes it likely that he would be the dominant partner in putting forward major reforms, and Fox the instrument.

The important reforms which were undertaken concerned matters of wider and more immediate application. In February 1747/8 Fox wrote to the Attorney and Solicitor General. He asked them to consider as soon as convenient whether there was contained anything repugnant to the laws of the kingdom in the proposed articles of war to be substituted in place of the rules and articles "for the better government of His Majesty's Forces". At the same time he wrote to the printer to His Majesty asking for the delivery to the House of Commons of all the articles of war published by authority since the Restoration in consequence of an address of the House of Commons to His Majesty.  

108. Ibid., 20 July 1752, Fox to Duke of Newcastle; 15 Aug. 1752, same to same.
The power of the Duke of Cumberland, although great was limited. In a letter to Fox on 8 Oct. 1749 from Windsor Lodge the Duke referred to the power of the Duke of Newcastle. "I desire you would acquaint the Duke of Newcastle with the King's order to you ... that he may know of poor Yorke's disappointment, which I am sure he would prevent if he could."
In the same letter there was evidence of the king's exercising the power of appointment, not being a mere puppet. "I hoped that the King would have put them off till there had been another vacancy." Add. Mss. 51375.
The relative positions of the King, the Duke of Cumberland, and Fox seem to be indicated by a letter from Cumberland to Fox on Oct. 24 1749:
'Mr. Fox I received yours last night with the news of Bowles death ... I should be glad to know what fresh candidates offer themselves I imagine the King won't be in such haste to dispose of the present vacancies as to make my coming to town necessary before Saturday. I shall wish for some account before I go to town in case the King should express his immediate intention of giving them away". Add. Mss. 51375.

To the Attorney and Solicitor General Fox wrote:

I am likewise to desire you will prepare proper clauses to be inserted in the Bill for punishing Mutiny and desertion and to extend the penalty in Section the 13th. Article the 5th. rendering the commissary who shall be convicted of taking money by way of gratification in the mustering any regiment etc., incapable of holding any military or civil employment whatsoever in His Majesty's Service.

In Section the 13th. article the first for extending the penalty upon any commissioned officer storekeeper etc., convicted of embezzling or misapplying any provisions, forage, arms etc., to the forfeiture of £100 to be disposed of as His Majesty shall direct.

In Section 17 Article the second for making half pay officers subject to the Act of Parliament against Mutiny, Desertion etc.

They were to consider also a clause in the same act to authorise General Courts Martial overseas (where there was no civil judiciary) to consist of less than thirteen commissioned officers when thirteen were not available.¹¹⁰

Some changes had been made before that date. In August 1747 Fox wrote to the Treasury that:

some difficulties having occurred to the Commissary General from the Alteration in the present Mutiny Act, in allowing upon the Muster Rolls the 6 fictitious names for each of the two troops of Horse Guards; 29 fictitious names for each of the two Troops of Horse Grenadier Guards; and one fictitious name for each company of Invalids, His Majesty had been pleased to sign a Warrant, which is added to the said establishment, directing the Paymaster General to allow the full Pay of the said fictitious names in the debenture to be by him made out for these corps.¹¹¹

How far the changes made were attributable to Fox and how far to

Cumberland is as debatable as it is important. Ilchester argued in favour of the Duke's being the influential partner in general on the negative grounds that it was impossible to trace any features directly attributable to Fox. He argues further that Fox lacked the opportunity for centralised action of this nature and that he probably lacked the gift in any case, excelling more in the House of Commons and the party organisation than in administration where he was greatest in subordination. He sees Cumberland by contrast as a creative genius with mental superiority unrecognised because of his tarnished military reputation.

It would seem that although he overstates the case it is probable that Ilchester's definition of the respective contributions of Fox and Cumberland is defensible. It is difficult to be more precise since, although it is easy to establish the involvement of Cumberland, it might

112. Atkinson, in "The Army under the early Hanoverians", proceeds by a similar chain of reasoning with regard to the monarch as did Ilchester with regard to the Duke; see, op. cit., p.139. Middleton subscribed to the same theory on the king's position, op. cit., pp.25, 203, 207. "For many years the first two Hanoverian Kings had personally controlled the army and found no need for a commanding officer."

113. Ilchester, op. cit., p.156.
114. Middleton op. cit., p.209, "The fortunes of the office varied with the holder".
115. This is consistent with the view of the Duke of Cumberland recorded by P. Yorke, The Life of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, Vol. II, pp.43-4.
"If his generalship in the Netherlands had not been rewarded with success, it had at least the merit of honest endeavour; and failure had been excused by the insuperable and special difficulties of his command .... But in later years, since the conclusion of the war, there had been a marked and unhappy change in the young Duke's character and public actions."
He became "a backstairs politician, the tool of abler and less scrupulous persons, inspired no longer by great public motives but by petty jealousies, the instigator of cabals and the chief obstructor of the measures of his father's government".
be anticipated that Fox would seek to inflate the Duke's rôle to curry favour or to ensure a greater chance of their being accepted. The evidence relating to the position of the Secretary at War supports the contention that Cumberland was the author of proposed changes. The insoluble difficulty concerns the claim that the Duke's actions were self-interested.

On the one hand it could be said that in military affairs the relationship of Fox and the Duke was one of aide and Commander in Chief, that therefore both were acting perfectly properly, and that minor alterations to the Articles of War up to 1748 dealt with the symptom and not the cause of the depressed state of the army, a malaise of spirit. On the other hand the opposition saw in the actions of a Captain General the action of a contender for the throne, and denied similar motives in themselves:

As to the Mutiny Bill, you know whose power that chiefly concerned, which made it a particular object of opposition from Leicester House; for this reason the two points most laboured were the subjecting the half pay officers to the Articles of War and military discipline, and the power of the King or Captain General to cause the proceedings of the Courts Martial to be revised after sentence given.

The correct view probably lies between the extremes, but being a question of motive it can never be ascertained adequately. A letter from the Duke reflects what, from his actions, were his policies and at the

116. Compare the situation in the next war when Barrington had a spirited dispute with Ligonier: "Whatever the powers of a Commander in Chief may be, it certainly does not extend to make a Secretary at War give the King advice which he thinks wrong."

117. Yorke op. cit., p.84. Chancellor Hardwicke to Hon. Joseph Yorke, Sec. to the Embassy at Paris 2.4.1749.
same time gives an indication of the qualities which the opposition feared; with reference to the passing of the Mutiny Act proposed in 1749, he wrote to Fox on 22 Jan. 1750:

I have received your letter concerning the debate of tomorrow. Although you know my opinion founded on much experience of the nature of Courts Martial .... yet as I see the appearance of dislike to it from our friends I shall submit to it and with this comfort that I hope it may soon convince the Army in general that I had no share nor gave my consent to what passed last Friday therefore I shall hope that as we have limited the Revision to once our friends might go along with us, and that they will stick together throughout the rest of the bill ....

CONCLUSION
Conclusions on the individual sections have been set out at the end of the relevant sections. Here they are placed in a more general context.

The principal aim was to establish how the departments responsible for the conduct of war in Britain reacted to the impact of war between 1739 and 1754. As with many other wars which Britain faced after a lengthy period of peace, it seems that the army, navy, and ordnance were not prepared for war. They experienced both a real crisis and a crisis of confidence in the first two years, then took measures to deal with the most pressing problems, and proceeded to adopt expedient measures before rushing into peace-time tranquillity. Within that framework it was evident that the departments dealt with the symptoms without defining or solving the basic problems. On the other hand these problems were evident and not remedied at other periods in the eighteenth century. Some were by their nature insoluble.

In Section 1 an attempt was made to assess how critical the departments were of their own performance, as evidenced by the changes which were made in routine and practice. There are certain common features between the ordnance, the army and the navy.

In no department were changes fundamental. Such attempts as there were at reform emphasised the need for officers to observe existing orders. The intention was two-fold; negatively, by performance of their duty officers would ensure that fraud and slackness among their subordinates would be impossible; positively, it was expected that efficiency would improve. The need for reform was realised and some palliative efforts were made, but the system remained fundamentally unaltered. There were two reasons. A practical consideration was that existing orders were in fact sufficient if they were properly followed.
This was particularly evident in the navy in relation to the pay of seamen, and the performance of the duties of dockyard officers, and for the army in relation to the mustering procedure. There would have been no need for the visitation of the dockyards nor the enquiry of the House of Commons special committee on Land Forces and Marines if everyone had done their duty both to the letter and in the spirit of the regulations; this was shown by the recommendations which arose from these enquiries. This was also consistent with the more limited enquiry into office procedure and practice instituted by the Ordnance. The second reason was linked to the relatively stable nature of the staffs of the various departments. With very little change in the staff who performed essential jobs at the centre, promotion going by seniority to those with experience in the section, there was a continuity which did not depend on the framing of regulations.

So long as departments looked at problems in a traditional manner a stricter emphasis on existing regulations was to be expected. This was the second feature common to each of the departments in their approach to deficiencies. Precedent was all important to the Ordnance in the matters which exercised it most, the supply of firearms and the upkeep of fortifications. Traditional solutions to the problems of recruitment and the acquisition of information were attempted by the army, even though these were by more efficient methods. The terms of reference by which the performance of the dockyards and the supply of ships were judged were the same as had been applied during the time of Queen Anne.

A third common feature in the approach to self-reform was the emphasis on economy and the preservation of scarce resources. This was most evident in four areas of the Ordnance's operations. There was an
attempt to make colonels pay for the replacement of arms. Determined
efforts were made to reclaim as much as possible of the Joint Battering
Train from the Netherlands. Internally there were moves to adopt a
method for paying the debts of the office so as to prevent double
payment of bills, and to prevent such frauds as had been perpetrated
by Samuel Remnant, a dealer in old gun metal. It was desire for economy
which caused the enquiry of the House of Commons into the Land Forces
and Marines. There was the implication that illegal profit was to be
made, for example from illegal musters, by the agent, the colonel, and
the commissary. The attempts to find more efficient means of recruit­
ment were caused by the desire to save money. Without those attempts
in England and without the skilful use of the Irish establishment more
money would have been spent in acquiring foreign mercenaries, when it
was thought by many in Parliament that too much was being spent already.
The navy was beset by problems of finance. Dockyard reforms could be
seen as a means of obtaining the maximum return on a large capital
investment. Reforms in the office responsible for the payment of sea­
mens' wages arose specifically from the desire not to squander any of
the small sums earmarked to satisfy the vociferous complaints of
disgruntled unpaid seamen.

In section 2 an attempt was made to reach a more objective assess­
ment of the efficiency of the three departments.

The most important factor, regardless of the many faults and the
ways in which the purpose could have been achieved more easily, was
that Britain was not defeated; the end justified the means. The
Ordnance, though forced to buy muskets and powder in Holland, managed
to supply exceptionally large demands. Garrisons at home and abroad
remained intact. Artillery trains were provided for each of the various
theatres of war, even though there was an occasional shortage of men. The army fulfilled, by various expedients, its main obligation to supply adequate quantities of men to deal with European commitments and the rebellion at home. In the event the navy was not called upon to defend Britain although this had appeared likely in 1744 and 1745. The serious defeat at the battle of Toulon was not directly attributable to the organisation of the naval authorities. Despite difficulties on manning and in the dockyards, the fleet does not appear to have been restricted in its operation.

A second feature which applied to the three departments was the good fortune which attended their performance. The Ordnance was fortunate that the danger in 1745 came from a rebellion where the object was a swift march on the capital, rather than a formal invasion by the French which might have overcome garrisons which were only properly reinforced after the rebellion. By the same token, it was probably fortunate that the feared assaults on Minorca, Gibraltar, and Jamaica did not materialise in this war.

The War Office's effort in Britain in 1745 was only achieved at the cost of the European commitment, as the Dutch were quick to point out. It was fortunate in its opponents. The French failed to press their advantage on the continent and failed to support the Young Pretender by landing on the south coast of England which might well have affected the result of the rebellion. By itself the Young Pretender's march struck fear into the hearts of even seasoned politicians in London. A French landing would have had a most serious effect on morale. Abroad, without the availability of foreign mercenaries such as Hessians, Hanoverians, and Swedes, who constituted a trained body of men available to make up for deficiencies in the supply of men.
at home, the complaints of the Dutch would have been both louder and more soundly based. The war could not have been fought on the same scale without those forces.

The navy was fortunate in that the alliance of the French and Spanish fleets did not form until 1744 when France entered the war. Such an alliance properly used could have effectively exposed the lack of lower rates in the Royal Navy at the start of the war.

A third factor common to the three departments was the pattern of their involvement. Preparations before the war were sufficient for the first two years of the war, during which time reserves were stretched, and thereafter measures were taken to circumvent difficulties as they presented themselves. Towards the end of the war, as soon as conveniently possible, there was a reduction in expenditure over the three departments. For the Ordnance it meant an immediate recall of overseas officers who were no longer required. For the army it meant the reduction of some regiments in terms of numbers, the transfer of others to the Irish establishment and, for some, complete disbandment. For the navy the financial stringency was reflected in the early trimming of the shipbuilding programme and the reduction of the work-force of the various yards. The only area in which expenditure continued at the level determined before the peace was in the Ordnance's measures to defend Scotland, namely the construction of the military road north of Newcastle following the line of Hadrian's Wall, and the erection and repair of Scottish forts. This was an indication both of the extent of the fear which the rebellion of 1745 had generated and also of the long lasting commitment to future expenditure which such major capital decisions involved. During the period 1748-1754 it is evident that although expenditure was at a lower level than at any time during the
war it remained higher than before 1739. Both by reference to the Ordnance works and the affairs of the dockyards it was evident that steps were taken to make some preparations for any future emergency.

How far is the objective assessment of the departments consistent with the subjective assessment and how does this differ from accepted knowledge?

The Ordnance appears as a department occupying a relatively low position as a body providing a service. Tradition and attention to detail were of prime importance. The war showed that its resources were stretched and barely proved adequate to answer the demands, but that this was not always the fault of the Ordnance. Where slackness was attributable to the Ordnance, attempts seem to have been made within the department to put matters right; these measures seem to have been what was to be expected at that period.

This situation is consistent with that described by Scouller at the start of the eighteenth century and by Middleton at the start of the Seven Years War. By the nature of its task, and by virtue of the slow pace of technical advance, the Ordnance had remained relatively unchanged since the days of Elizabeth I. Changes in the Ordnance would only be forced when communications improved and the manufacture of arms became too important to be left to outside contractors, and treated as any other normal purchase. The process which had begun at this time in the development of the arsenal at Woolwich was an area which would continue to grow in importance.

The War Office's experience is more difficult to place. On the one hand, measures taken in the interests of expediency during the war were consistent with those taken in earlier periods. The abuses of the mustering and recruiting systems were not new. They stretched back to
the Elizabethan army and sprang from a system which placed too much emphasis on the agent and colonel of the regiment. The situation would only change when affairs became more formal, when, for instance, hospitals became more common and accepted sick men as a matter of course, when recruiting was not performed by officers of the regiment to which the recruits were to be sent. Under those circumstances there would be no area of doubt, as there was at this time, whether men and officers allegedly absent as ill and "on the recruiting service" were really absent. Difficulties over recruiting were the cause of the need to use the Irish establishment to the best advantage; this use was consistent with the practice at the start of the century. They gave rise also to the changed manner of recruiting, and the use of extra forces as they became available. These difficulties in recruiting were a reflection of the lack of a suitable alternative, such as a militia or a form of recruitment which relied on voluntary enlistment or conscription; this was the more likely course since it was only slightly more probable that men would enter the service of the army voluntarily than they would enlist in the fleet.

Reform in the navy was consistent with the assessment of its own performance since it revealed the emphasis on adherence to existing orders. Nothing has been found to conflict with the picture of the navy presented by Professor Baugh. Additional evidence relating to the payment of wages, dockyard reform and the size of the fleet gives weight to his conclusions and indicates that his analysis of the state of administration of the navy in the first half of the eighteenth century has features which are common to other departments responsible for the conduct of war.

A subsidiary aim of the thesis was to see what evidence in admini-
strative fact there was for the parliamentary opposition's claim after the war that measures to strengthen discipline in the army were not justified. There can be no conclusive answer to this question from administrative records as it turns on the personal motives of the Duke of Cumberland. It is possible, however, to say that there was sufficient evidence of slackness and abuse in the army to induce a stern commander in chief to take corrective action, and a dutiful Secretary at War to assist him. It is also true that reforms were initiated prior to 1748, before the Duke of Cumberland could be accused of furthering his ambitions to become Regent; extensive reforms would necessarily not be implemented during hostilities. Nevertheless, measures to reform the army were pursued to an unprecedented extent after 1748 and with a zeal not previously apparent.

To a modern eye, the business of administration was slack, slow and haphazard, performed with relatively few staff and with a premium on expediency rather than planning. Conversely, there is nothing to suggest that administration was conducted in the period 1739-54 on other than a professional level by contemporary standards. Perhaps this was why the debates and pamphlets published during the war concentrated on issues, and why the acrimonious debates of 1749-51 dealt in personalities rather than in details of events. Administration was still sufficiently small for the job to be equated with the man performing it; this was to be expected when war was not yet solely a matter of nation versus nation, but partly still a pursuit for gentlemen and the sport of monarchies. Such an attitude was fostered by the apparent military security afforded by Britain's geographical isolation. Affairs seem to have been conducted with greater urgency and caution when England was invaded than when England was fighting to preserve Maria Theresa's position or the boundaries of the Low Countries.
APPENDICES

Appendix A  Staff of various departments.
B  Military expenditure.
C  Analyses of military expenditure.
D  Analyses of army expenditure.
E  Analyses of ships, on the establishment, in commission, built and rebuilt.
F  Articles of War.
Appendix A

Staff of Various Departments

Table 1  Master General and Principal Officers of the Ordnance, 1739-54.

2  Relative Importance of Principal Officers of the Ordnance.

3  Attendance of Principal Officers at meetings of the Board of Ordnance in 1749.

4  Clerical staff under individual Principal Officers of the Ordnance.

5  Clerical staff of the War Office.

6  Clerical staff of the Admiralty.

7  Clerical staff of the Treasurer of the Navy.
# Appendix A

## Table 1

**Master General and Principal Officers of the Ordnance, 1739-1752**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>M.G.</th>
<th>I.G.</th>
<th>S.G.</th>
<th>C.O.</th>
<th>C.D.</th>
<th>St.</th>
<th>Treasurer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1750</td>
<td>Duke of Montagu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>W.R. Earle</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>A. Wilkinson</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>C. Wade</td>
<td>T. Lascelles</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>C. Frederick</td>
<td>A. Wilkinson</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>J. Ligonier</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752</td>
<td>Note 2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>C. Frederick</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>J.S. Charlton</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Key
- No change in incumbent
- M.G.: Master General
- L.G.: Lieutenant General
- S.G.: Surveyor General
- C.O.: Clerk of the Ordnance
- C.D.: Clerk of the Deliveries
- St.: Storekeeper of the Ordnance

### Notes
1. The Duke of Montagu retained the post until his death in 1749, apart from the period 20th Feb. to 18th March 1742 when the Duke of Argyll and Greenwich resumed his position.
2. On the death of the Duke of Montagu in 1749 the post remained vacant, resulting in a saving of salary; other clerical posts were left vacant at the same time. Charles, Duke of Marlborough was the next Master General of the Ordnance, appointed on 27th June 1755.

### Source
Compiled from a selective analysis of W.O. 54/204 - 211, tested for the early years against audit office records, A.O. 1/1873-5 and, in relation to the position of the Master General, by reference to W.O. 55/1795, 6.133. and S.P. 44/134 nos. 35, 35, 249. See also *crollen op cit.* pp. 47, 78, 92.
Appendix A Table 2

Relative importance of the Principal Officers of the Ordnance as reflected in their salaries and the number of staff under their control.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>Clerks Status</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£</td>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>Extraordinary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.O.</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.G.</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.G.</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.O.</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St.</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from V.O. 54/204. The list relates to the period prior to 1739. Changes after that date are recorded below, Table 4. The list excludes the one clerk who assisted the Chief Engineer. It includes, as a clerk to the Master General, his secretary, although this was a more prestigious post than a strictly clerical one.
Appendix A Table 3

Attendance of Principal Officers at meetings of the Board of Ordnance in 1749:

**Table 3a.**

Number of meetings in 1749 attended by Principal Officers of the Ordnance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>M.G.</th>
<th>L.G.</th>
<th>S.G.</th>
<th>C.O.</th>
<th>C.D.</th>
<th>St.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>330</td>
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</table>

**Table 3b.**

Analysis of attendance at meetings in Table 3a showing the relative importance of certain members.

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<th>Officers</th>
<th>M.G.</th>
<th>L.G.</th>
<th>S.G.</th>
<th>C.O.</th>
<th>C.D.</th>
<th>St.</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>330</td>
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Table 3c.

Analysis of attendance at meetings in Table 3a showing that the conclusions from Table 3b are representative of the whole period, January - December 1749.

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<th>Quarter to:</th>
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<th>June 30</th>
<th>Sept. 30</th>
<th>Dec. 31</th>
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<tr>
<td>Number of Board present</td>
<td>17 1 4 4 6</td>
<td>16 3 8 12 3</td>
<td>6 3 6 5</td>
<td>16 - 8 6 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total number of Board present</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of meetings</td>
<td>55 7 26 27 15</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiply by number of Board present</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Board member appearances</td>
<td>55 14 78 108 75</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key
- M.G. Master General
- L.G. Lieutenant General
- S.G. Surveyor General
- C.O. Clerk of the Ordnance
- C.D. Clerk of the deliveries
- St. Storekeeper of the Ordnance

Source
The tables are based on an analysis of documents in W.O. 47/34, being Minutes of the Board of Ordnance. There is no proof that the loose documents, not folioed, in this bundle are a complete record of proceedings of the board.

Scrutiny of subsequent minutes of the Board to be found under W.O. 47/35 - 42 suggests that this analysis is representative of the period 1750 - 1754.
### Appendix A Table 4

Clerical staff under individual Principal Officers of the Ordnance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1739</th>
<th>1740</th>
<th>1741</th>
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<th>1743</th>
<th>1744</th>
<th>1745</th>
<th>1746</th>
<th>1747</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>C. Bush</td>
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<td>W. Bogdani</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>W. Bogdani</td>
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<td>W. Dawson</td>
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<td>D. Kemp</td>
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<td>W. Smelt</td>
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<td>J. Robinson</td>
<td>J. Robinson</td>
<td>J. Boddington</td>
<td>H. Basset</td>
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<table>
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<th><strong>Extraordinary</strong></th>
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<td>-</td>
<td>R. Blount</td>
<td>D. Kemp</td>
<td>J. Humphrey</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>H. Basset</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>J. Humphreys</td>
<td>D. Kemp</td>
<td>H. Basset</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>W. Adams</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>J. Humphrey</td>
<td>W. Arnold</td>
<td>H. Basset</td>
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<td>W. Adams</td>
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<td>J. Jesser</td>
<td>R. Blount</td>
<td>W. Arnold</td>
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<td>J. Chapman</td>
<td>T. Bradshaw</td>
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<td>E. Mason</td>
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<td>J. Boddington</td>
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<td>W. Adams</td>
<td>J. Sparrow</td>
<td>R. Blount</td>
<td>A. Forman</td>
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</table>

**Key** In this and subsequent tables in this Appendix the symbol - indicates that there was no change in incumbent.

**Source** See Table 1 above.

**Note** For a record of supernumerary clerks employed in the sections of various Principal Officers between 1739 and 1752 see S.O. 54/210-211.
### ii. Lieutenant General.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>1743</th>
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<td>J. Cross</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>J. Robinson</td>
<td>J. Camball</td>
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### iii. Treasurer.

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### iv. Master General.

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Clerical staff under individual Principal Officers of the Ordnance, continued.

v. Clerk of the Deliveries.

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vi. Surveyor General.

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Clerical staff under individual Principal Officers of the Ordnance, continued.

### VII. Storekeeper

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T. Day
### Appendix A Table 5

**Clerical staff of the War Office.**

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<th>1750</th>
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<td>J. Calcroft</td>
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<td>W. Bowles</td>
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**Source**
Details from:
- Court & Country Register 1750 p. 183, 1752 p. 162.

**Note**
For details of the office staff in 1720 see W.O. 26/16, p.77, 30 Sept., 1720, and for such details in 1759 see W.O. 4/59, p.30, 27 Sept., 1759.
Appendix A Table 6
Clerical staff of the Admiralty.

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Sources
The scope of the sources consulted has been restricted in view of the work done by Professor Beagh, *op cit* pp. 61-2.
Details from:
- Mieg, *op cit* 1738 p. 79.
- Court & Country Register 1750 p. 134.

This list includes only clerks on the establishment. It does not include extraordinary clerks.
Appendix A Table 7

Clerical staff of the Treasurer of the Navy.

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<td>J. Wallace</td>
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Clerks

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<td>J. Hubhald</td>
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Section of Office of Cashier & Accountant

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<td>R. Bruciffe</td>
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Sources

Chronological Ordnance:
Court & Country Register 1752.

Traced against AOV/125/2/87, AOV/126/2/193, AOV/155/2/VA. 
Appendix B

Military Expenditure

Table 1  Total expenditure.
2  Ordnance expenditure.
3  Land Forces expenditure.
4  Marines expenditure.
5  Levy Money and Subsidies.
Appendix B Table 1

Total Expenditure.

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<th>Year</th>
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<td>1742</td>
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<tr>
<td>1745</td>
<td>£ 2,756,830</td>
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<tr>
<td>1746</td>
<td>£ 2,351,280</td>
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<tr>
<td>1752</td>
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<td>£ 784,207</td>
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<tr>
<td>1754</td>
<td>£ 584,300</td>
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1 For analysis see Appendix B Table 2
2 Or: 3
3 Or: 4
4 Or: 5
5 Expenditure on Georgia, Africa and Nova Scotia.
6 This includes interest and all costs including bonuses to cashiers at the Bank of England involved in raising capital together with the cost of repaying loans.
7 Includes £ 70,000 compensation to those who suffered losses by distemper among horned cattle.

Source:
The table is based on accounts of expenditure presented to Parliament of the 5th, 6th, and 7th sesssion of the 25th year of H.R. II., vol. xiv - xxvi.
### Appendix B Table 2

**Ordinance Expenditure.**

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<th>Extraordinary Expenses</th>
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**Total** 1,122,557 2,411,232 1,225,113 12,102 4,721,005

**Notes**

1. For analysis see Appendix C Table 1
2. For analysis see Appendix C Table 2
3. Totals transferred to Appendix B Table 1
5. Voted £109,259 but reduced by £3,037 because salaries saved on vacant posts, Master General, his Secretary, under Secretary, Clerk and Chief Engineer.
6. Voted sum reduced by £2,426
### Appendix B Table 3

#### Land Forces Expenditure

<table>
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<th>1740</th>
<th>1741</th>
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<td>£</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Flaniers.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>617,550</td>
<td>660,151</td>
<td>869,189</td>
<td>1,004,947</td>
<td>647,862</td>
<td>561,794</td>
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<td>1,299,101</td>
<td>856,067</td>
<td>1,267,377</td>
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<td>3. Plantations, Minorca and Gibraltar.</td>
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<td>226,062</td>
<td>266,203</td>
<td>266,513</td>
<td>266,616</td>
<td>274,831</td>
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<td>41,436</td>
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<td>26,776</td>
<td>24,701</td>
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<td>4,163</td>
<td>3,918</td>
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<tr>
<td>General and staff officers.</td>
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<td>Cæsars.</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Hanover.</td>
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<td>1740 rebellion, late regiment. extra expenses.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duke of Wolfenbuttle.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extraordinary expenses, Planters, America.</td>
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<td>Notes:</td>
<td>1. For analysis see Appendix C Table 3.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. For analysis see Appendix C Table 4.</td>
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<td>3. For analysis see Appendix C Table 5.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. 1741 &amp; 1742 expenses.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. 1743 &amp; 1744 expenses whilst in England.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. 1745 expenses.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total.</td>
<td>961,787</td>
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<td>1,808,144</td>
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<td>2,673,676</td>
<td>1,989,363</td>
<td>2,591,716</td>
<td>2,398,333</td>
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<td>Totals transferred to Appendix B Table 1.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<td>1752</td>
<td>1753</td>
<td>1754</td>
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<tr>
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<td>617,315</td>
<td>611,101</td>
<td>628,315</td>
<td>628,315</td>
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<td>Plantations, Minorca &amp; Gibraltar.</td>
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<td>236,421</td>
<td>226,044</td>
<td>236,421</td>
<td>236,421</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extraordinary expenses.</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half pay officers.</td>
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<td>64,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
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<td>55,000</td>
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<td>57,358</td>
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<tr>
<td>General and staff officers.</td>
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<td>16,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Penins.</td>
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<tr>
<td>American troops.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expedition.</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Irregular forces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>States General.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1749 rebellion house regiments.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extra expenses.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flanders.</td>
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<td>Extraordinary expenses Flanders.</td>
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<td>47,985</td>
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<td>31,901</td>
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<td>Extraordinary expenses America.</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elector of Bavaria.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24,372</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elector of Palatine.</td>
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<td>8,620</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elector of Saxony.</td>
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<td>32,000</td>
<td></td>
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<td>4,748</td>
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<td>4,287</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Totals**

| 1,516,486 | 1,239,704 | 1,077,146 | 1,041,555 | 1,057,071 | 1,066,196 |

**Notes**

1. This sum includes payments relating to Guernsey and Jersey.

2. This sum includes payments relating to Nova Scotia and the Isle of Wight transferred to appendix A Table 1 Providence.
### Appendix B Table 1

**Marines Expenditure.**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Contingencies</th>
<th>Clothing</th>
<th>Levy Money</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740</td>
<td>4,890</td>
<td>106,814</td>
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<td>9,770</td>
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<td>206,254</td>
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<tr>
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<td>11,550</td>
<td>201,754</td>
<td>4,500</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>11,550</td>
<td>201,754</td>
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<td>206,254</td>
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<tr>
<td>1746</td>
<td>11,550</td>
<td>201,754</td>
<td>4,500</td>
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<td>1747</td>
<td>11,550</td>
<td>201,754</td>
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<td>16,732</td>
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**Notes**

1. Totals taken to Appendix B Table 1.
2. £ 94,555 of this total being for 4,890 men for the 14 months Oct. 1739 - Dec. 1740 placed to this year's account.
   £ 33,429 for raising & continuing 2,040 men & officers in addition to these 4,890.
   £127,984
3. For 6,930 Marines employed in 1740.
4. Special allowance to colonels in lieu of clothing.

-xix-
### Appendix B  Table 5

#### Levy, Money and Subsidies.

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<th>1739</th>
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<th>1742</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£</td>
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<td>£</td>
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<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>8,620</td>
<td>8,620</td>
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<tr>
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<td>26,847</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### Totals

<table>
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<th>-</th>
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<th>500,000</th>
<th>500,000</th>
<th>500,000</th>
<th>832,919</th>
<th>732,919</th>
<th>793,099</th>
<th>735,467</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Note**

Totals transferred to Appendix B Table 1.
Appendix C
Analyses of Military Expenditure

Table 1  Ordnance Land Service.
2  Ordnance Extraordinary Expenditure.
3  Flanders.
4  Guards and Garrisons.
5  Plantations, Minorca and Gibraltar.
6  Army expenditure 1724-38.
### Appendix C. Table 1

**Ordinance Land Service.**

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1739</th>
<th>1740</th>
<th>1741</th>
<th>1742</th>
<th>1743</th>
<th>1744</th>
<th>1745</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>£</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ordinary.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary charge.</td>
<td>38,835</td>
<td>38,835</td>
<td>40,625</td>
<td>46,774</td>
<td>47,774</td>
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<td>38,835</td>
<td>38,835</td>
<td>38,835</td>
<td>38,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery and Academy.</td>
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<td>5,873</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19,509</td>
<td>25,702</td>
<td>25,701</td>
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<td>9,562</td>
<td>11,574</td>
<td>11,574</td>
<td>11,574</td>
<td>11,574</td>
<td>11,574</td>
<td>9,768</td>
<td>9,767</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>America and West Indies.</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>6,042</td>
<td>13,204</td>
<td>13,244</td>
<td>14,039</td>
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<tr>
<td>Superannuated and disabled officers.</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>1,218</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expedition.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,303</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub total.</strong></td>
<td>49,588</td>
<td>51,471</td>
<td>64,625</td>
<td>61,402</td>
<td>61,219</td>
<td>71,829</td>
<td>83,421</td>
<td>88,378</td>
<td>91,404</td>
<td>94,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extraordinary.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean.</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>30,487</td>
<td>20,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>America and West Indies.</td>
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<td>2,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>49,000²</td>
<td>49,000²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland.</td>
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<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>22,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England - general.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39,300</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>6,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- South Coast.</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>30,800</td>
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<td>Scilly Islands.</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt Petre.</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>10,600</td>
<td>10,600</td>
<td>10,600</td>
<td>10,600</td>
<td>10,600</td>
<td>10,600</td>
<td>10,600</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expeditions.</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>20,701</td>
<td>11,307</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20,511</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>104,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals.</strong></td>
<td>80,088</td>
<td>94,071</td>
<td>115,325</td>
<td>127,703</td>
<td>146,637</td>
<td>166,429</td>
<td>195,000</td>
<td>175,778</td>
<td>204,004</td>
<td>342,064</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Totals transferred to Appendix B, Table 2.
2. Includes £25,000 expenditure on America.
3. Such expenditure was extraordinary in that it was in addition to what was known for the Ordnance, as for the Navy, as the ordinary charge. It did not represent expenditure in addition to that approved in the estimates presented to Parliament, which was termed 'Exceeding', as analysed below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1748</th>
<th>1750</th>
<th>1751</th>
<th>1752</th>
<th>1753</th>
<th>1754</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ordinary.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery and Academy.</td>
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<td>38,835</td>
<td>38,835</td>
<td>38,835</td>
<td>38,835</td>
<td>38,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers and artificers, Britain and Mediterranean.</td>
<td>33,120</td>
<td>33,120</td>
<td>33,120</td>
<td>32,284</td>
<td>33,120</td>
<td>33,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America and West Indies.</td>
<td>2,897</td>
<td>2,897</td>
<td>2,897</td>
<td>2,818</td>
<td>2,019</td>
<td>2,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superannuated and disabled officers.</td>
<td>5,654</td>
<td>3,821</td>
<td>3,404</td>
<td>3,408</td>
<td>3,408</td>
<td>3,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total.</strong></td>
<td>83,503</td>
<td>81,670</td>
<td>81,038</td>
<td>79,946</td>
<td>81,151</td>
<td>80,643</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                  |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| **Extraordinary.** |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| America and West Indies. | 10,000 | 10,206 | 10,000 | 8,000 | 5,000 | 5,000 |
| Mediterranean. | 6,000 | 6,000 | 10,500 | 10,500 | 8,500 | 5,708 |
| Scotland. | 11,607 | 2,000 | 11,500 | 11,500 | 13,000 | 13,000 |
| England - general. | - | - | - | - | 2,278 | 1,196 |
| - South Coast. | 7,500 | 6,500 | 7,500 | 9,210 | 8,500 | 8,000 |
| Scilly Islands. | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Sulphur. | 4,500 | - | - | - | 4,500 | - |
| Expeditions. | 11,257 | 2,804 | - | - | - | - |
| Netherlands. | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| East India Company - store to them. | - | - | (11,388) | - | - | - |
| Revenue from fraud at Woolwich. | - | - | - | (10,171) | - | - |
| Saving from change in calendar. | - | - | - | (570) | - | - |
| Saving from vacant ordnance posts. | - | (3,037) | (2,426) | (2,426) | (2,426) | (2,426) |
| **Total.**       | 134,357 | 106,222 | 106,724 | 106,730 | 105,262 | 115,921 |

**Note.** For details see W.O. 47/40, p.159, O.B.M. 6 Oct. 1752.
### Appendix C Table 2

**Ordnance Extraordinary Expenditure.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1739</th>
<th>1740</th>
<th>1741</th>
<th>1742</th>
<th>1743</th>
<th>1744</th>
<th>1745</th>
<th>1746</th>
<th>1747</th>
<th>1748</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>15,133</td>
<td>15,630</td>
<td>7,471</td>
<td>8,666</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>5,662</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>America and West Indies.</td>
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<td>6,952</td>
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<td>10,559</td>
<td>11,113</td>
<td>43,164</td>
<td>53,283</td>
<td>24,007</td>
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<td>Artillery.</td>
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<td>500</td>
<td>5,640</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,673</td>
<td>6,102</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,141</td>
<td>1,997</td>
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<tr>
<td>Britain defences - towns.</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>3,895</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>1,521</td>
<td>6,404</td>
<td>2,744</td>
<td>1,074</td>
<td>7,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,249</td>
<td>1,605</td>
<td>4,613</td>
<td>7,45</td>
<td>2,014</td>
<td>6,686</td>
<td>3,837</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,018</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>25,500</td>
<td>6,076</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area - new.</td>
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<td>18,665</td>
<td>37,669</td>
<td>1,630</td>
<td>2,425</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>88,354</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- replacement.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12,058</td>
<td>16,006</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,758</td>
<td>33,539</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saltpetre.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24,752</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44,789</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous.</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>544</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>9,264</td>
<td>10,398</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41,820</td>
<td>47,057</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60,000</td>
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<td>15,870</td>
<td>30,215</td>
<td>51,028</td>
<td>37,775</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,348</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41,644</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other.</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total. 2       | 30,504| 46,363| 76,071| 82,729| 68,049| 73,924| 68,427| 246,542| 193,260| 159,556|

1 Sent to Ireland to replace those sent to Fort William.
2 Totals transferred to Appendix B Table 2.
<table>
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<th>Ordnance Extraordinary Expenditure, continued.</th>
<th>1749</th>
<th>1750</th>
<th>1751</th>
<th>1752</th>
<th>1753</th>
<th>1754</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Exceedings</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>1,654</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,779</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
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<td>46</td>
<td>5,251</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>4,446</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>- forces.</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms - new.</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- replacement.</td>
<td>5,713</td>
<td>1,710</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saltpetre.</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expedition.</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allies.</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>13,408</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,985</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total.</td>
<td>42,761</td>
<td>35,449</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>5,764</td>
<td>8,817</td>
<td>5,218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix C Table 3

#### Flanders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Horse 1 Number</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>Dragoons 2 Number</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>Foot 3 Number</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>Gen. &amp; Staff Officers</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>Hospital</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>Contingencies</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>Additional</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>Total 4</th>
<th>£</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1742</td>
<td>1,634</td>
<td>128,688</td>
<td>2,610</td>
<td>117,785</td>
<td>12,045</td>
<td>239,127</td>
<td>2,914</td>
<td>3,057</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>17,192</td>
<td>16,356</td>
<td>534,783</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1743</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>140,599</td>
<td>3,222</td>
<td>142,484</td>
<td>16,170</td>
<td>316,079</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>21,356</td>
<td>634,345</td>
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<tr>
<td>1745</td>
<td>1,966</td>
<td>140,215</td>
<td>3,228</td>
<td>141,711</td>
<td>22,913</td>
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<td>28,107</td>
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<tr>
<td>1747</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>114,105</td>
<td>12,609</td>
<td>240,757</td>
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<td>15,196</td>
<td>372,780</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>406,502</td>
<td>516,085</td>
<td>1,263,816</td>
<td>47,645</td>
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<td>60,000</td>
<td>52,222</td>
<td>2,360,602</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. For analysis see Appendix D Table 1
2. For analysis see Appendix D Table 2
3. For analysis see Appendix D Table 3
4. Total taken to Appendix D Table 3.
### Appendix C. Table 4

**Guards and Garrisons.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FORSE</th>
<th>DRAGOONS</th>
<th>FOOT</th>
<th>INVALIDS</th>
<th>INDEPENDENT CO'S</th>
<th>GENERAL</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>£</td>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740</td>
<td>2161</td>
<td>176,125</td>
<td>2952</td>
<td>139,308</td>
<td>10221</td>
<td>228,657</td>
<td>1815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741</td>
<td>2161</td>
<td>190,332</td>
<td>3480</td>
<td>157,478</td>
<td>10655</td>
<td>403,347</td>
<td>2141</td>
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<tr>
<td>1742</td>
<td>2161</td>
<td>180,812</td>
<td>3480</td>
<td>157,047</td>
<td>25770</td>
<td>417,444</td>
<td>2322</td>
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<td>1097</td>
<td>84,832</td>
<td>1740</td>
<td>78,524</td>
<td>18651</td>
<td>361,301</td>
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<td>84,832</td>
<td>1740</td>
<td>78,534</td>
<td>11126</td>
<td>224,314</td>
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<td>1746</td>
<td>3053</td>
<td>225,047</td>
<td>4968</td>
<td>220,235</td>
<td>35933</td>
<td>753,463</td>
<td>1815</td>
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<tr>
<td>1747</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>90,727</td>
<td>3802</td>
<td>174,371</td>
<td>26063</td>
<td>501,540</td>
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<tr>
<td>1748</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>91,707</td>
<td>6489</td>
<td>289,267</td>
<td>40385</td>
<td>773,407</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749</td>
<td>1052</td>
<td>83,199</td>
<td>3276</td>
<td>168,308</td>
<td>12714</td>
<td>271,195</td>
<td>1815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750</td>
<td>1052</td>
<td>83,199</td>
<td>3276</td>
<td>168,308</td>
<td>12714</td>
<td>271,195</td>
<td>1815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751</td>
<td>1052</td>
<td>83,199</td>
<td>3276</td>
<td>168,308</td>
<td>12714</td>
<td>271,195</td>
<td>1815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752</td>
<td>1052</td>
<td>80,910</td>
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<td>263,765</td>
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<td>1052</td>
<td>83,199</td>
<td>3276</td>
<td>168,308</td>
<td>12714</td>
<td>271,195</td>
<td>1815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754</td>
<td>1052</td>
<td>83,199</td>
<td>3276</td>
<td>168,308</td>
<td>12714</td>
<td>271,195</td>
<td>1815</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** | 1,905,146 | 2,535,776 | 6,108,440 | 546,971 | 28,677 | 1,122,470 | 12,247,480 |

1. For analysis see Appendix D Table 1
2. For analysis see Appendix D Table 2
3. For analysis see Appendix D Table 3
4. Totals taken to Appendix B Table 3
### Appendix C Table 6

**Pay of Different Classes of Troops on the British Establishment 1724 - 1738.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Horse</th>
<th>Dragoons</th>
<th>Foot</th>
<th>Invalids</th>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>£ Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1724</td>
<td>177,960</td>
<td>130,028</td>
<td>259,586</td>
<td>32,580</td>
<td>59,495</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>655,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1725</td>
<td>177,463</td>
<td>129,672</td>
<td>258,931</td>
<td>32,191</td>
<td>59,901</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>655,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1726</td>
<td>176,125</td>
<td>128,139</td>
<td>255,261</td>
<td>32,191</td>
<td>57,121</td>
<td>5,721</td>
<td>655,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1727 (1)</td>
<td>176,125</td>
<td>128,139</td>
<td>255,261</td>
<td>32,191</td>
<td>57,121</td>
<td>5,721</td>
<td>655,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1728</td>
<td>175,607</td>
<td>205,790</td>
<td>301,499</td>
<td>32,580</td>
<td>61,358</td>
<td>9,116</td>
<td>786,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1729</td>
<td>175,125</td>
<td>205,227</td>
<td>300,675</td>
<td>32,191</td>
<td>61,350</td>
<td>9,116</td>
<td>786,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1730</td>
<td>175,125</td>
<td>123,510</td>
<td>288,681</td>
<td>32,191</td>
<td>61,532</td>
<td>9,116</td>
<td>651,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1731</td>
<td>175,125</td>
<td>123,510</td>
<td>288,681</td>
<td>32,191</td>
<td>61,532</td>
<td>9,116</td>
<td>651,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1732</td>
<td>176,607</td>
<td>123,878</td>
<td>285,362</td>
<td>32,580</td>
<td>61,643</td>
<td>9,116</td>
<td>653,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1733</td>
<td>176,125</td>
<td>123,510</td>
<td>288,681</td>
<td>32,191</td>
<td>61,532</td>
<td>9,116</td>
<td>651,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1734</td>
<td>176,125</td>
<td>139,308</td>
<td>228,657</td>
<td>32,191</td>
<td>61,732</td>
<td>9,116</td>
<td>617,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1735</td>
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<td>139,308</td>
<td>370,837</td>
<td>32,191</td>
<td>61,852</td>
<td>9,116</td>
<td>794,529</td>
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<td>139,690</td>
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<td>32,580</td>
<td>61,968</td>
<td>9,111</td>
<td>649,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>139,308</td>
<td>228,657</td>
<td>32,191</td>
<td>61,852</td>
<td>9,116</td>
<td>647,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1738</td>
<td>176,125</td>
<td>139,308</td>
<td>228,657</td>
<td>32,51</td>
<td>61,852</td>
<td>9,116</td>
<td>647,549</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source**

Based on estimates in WO 25/3209.

**Notes**

- (1) An additional expense towards maintaining and securing the Highlands.
- (2) Independent companies (6 of Foot in N. Br.).
- (3) Livery money for 2,100 foot at £2 per man.
- (4) Exclusive of charge of augmentations.

For the period 1739 - 1754 see Appendix C Table 4.
Appendix D

Analyses of Army Expenditure

Table 1  Horse regiments.
2  Dragoons regiments.
3  Infantry regiments.
Appendix D - Note on sources.

1. The tables in this appendix have been compiled from several sources, principally:

Estimates presented to the House of Commons,

J.H.C. Vol. xxiii, pp. 223-l, l13, l91, 5h8, 576.
xxiv, pp. 12, 125, 3l3-5, l95, 612, 702-l, 713.

Documents in the Public Record Office,


Documents in the British Museum,

Add. Mss. 28323, 51378.
The Succession of Colonels to all His Majesty's Land Forces from their rise to various dates, chiefly that to 1749
( E.S. 15/152(5) ).
The Succession of Colonels of the British Army, R.H. Leslie.

2. This information has been found to be consistent with records of the movement of forces in other documents:

Public Record Office,

W.O. l/35-l, W.O. l/13-18, W.O. 26/19-21, S.P. lhh/18h,
S.I. 87/18.

Newcastle Mss. (Clumber) ff. 858-9.

3. All figures have been rounded to the nearest £. This accounts for minor discrepancies between the totals and the sum of the individual regiments' estimates.

4. The tables are intended to illustrate the changing size and disposition of the armed forces.
### Appendix D Table 1

**Horse Regiments.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lieutenant Colonel</th>
<th>Estimated Cost</th>
<th>1739</th>
<th>1740</th>
<th>1741</th>
<th>1742</th>
<th>1743</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Troop Horse Guards</td>
<td>Lord Delamer</td>
<td>181 H</td>
<td>16,547</td>
<td>181 H</td>
<td>16,592</td>
<td>181 H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Troop Horse Guards</td>
<td>Earl of Hertford</td>
<td>181 H</td>
<td>16,547</td>
<td>Duke of Marlborough</td>
<td>181 H</td>
<td>16,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Troop Horse Guards</td>
<td>Earl of Albermarle</td>
<td>181 H</td>
<td>16,547</td>
<td>181 H</td>
<td>16,547</td>
<td>181 H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Troop Horse Guards</td>
<td>Viscount Shannon</td>
<td>181 H</td>
<td>16,547</td>
<td>Earl of Effingham</td>
<td>181 H</td>
<td>16,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Oren. Guards</td>
<td>Viscount Cottenham</td>
<td>177 H</td>
<td>10,073</td>
<td>Earl of Crawford</td>
<td>177 H</td>
<td>10,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Oren. Guards</td>
<td>Earl of Effingham</td>
<td>177 H</td>
<td>10,871</td>
<td>Viscount Cottenham</td>
<td>177 H</td>
<td>10,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Royal Dragoons</td>
<td>Duke of Argyll</td>
<td>337 H</td>
<td>26,876</td>
<td>Earl of Hertford</td>
<td>427 H</td>
<td>31,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Royal Dragoons</td>
<td>Earl of Argyll</td>
<td>337 H</td>
<td>26,876</td>
<td>Duke of Argyll</td>
<td>427 H</td>
<td>31,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Royal Dragoons</td>
<td>Earl of Clanrickarde</td>
<td>319 H</td>
<td>26,055</td>
<td>Earl of Hertford</td>
<td>409 H</td>
<td>30,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Royal Dragoons</td>
<td>General W. Evans</td>
<td>214 H</td>
<td>17,696</td>
<td>Duke of Montague</td>
<td>274 H</td>
<td>20,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Royal Dragoons</td>
<td>General G. Wade</td>
<td>214 H</td>
<td>17,696</td>
<td>Duke of Montague</td>
<td>274 H</td>
<td>20,434</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total C** | 2,161 | 176,125 | 2,651 | 190,332 | 2,651 | 189,812 | 2,651 | 189,812 | 1,087 | 85,537 |

**Flanders** | 1,087 | 85,537 |

---

A **Transferred from Irish Establishment.**

B Details agreed to by Maj. Gen. 35896 Hardwicke Papers Vol. 100111 pp. 69 - 69 being situation as at May 1740.

C Totals taken to Appendix D Tables A.

---

In this and other tables in this appendix, this symbol indicates there was no change in commanding officer when it appears in the body of the table, and that there was no expenditure when it appears in the total column.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1743</th>
<th>1744</th>
<th>1745</th>
<th>1746</th>
<th>1747</th>
<th>1748</th>
<th>1749</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieut.</td>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743</td>
<td>1744</td>
<td>1745</td>
<td>1746</td>
<td>1747</td>
<td>1748</td>
<td>1749</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Green</td>
<td>181 H</td>
<td>16,592</td>
<td>181 H</td>
<td>16,547</td>
<td>181 H</td>
<td>16,547</td>
<td>181 H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>181 H</td>
<td>16,592</td>
<td>181 H</td>
<td>16,547</td>
<td>181 H</td>
<td>16,547</td>
<td>181 H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>181 F</td>
<td>16,592</td>
<td>181 F</td>
<td>16,547</td>
<td>181 F</td>
<td>16,547</td>
<td>181 F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>181 F</td>
<td>16,592</td>
<td>181 F</td>
<td>16,547</td>
<td>181 F</td>
<td>16,547</td>
<td>181 F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Gren.</td>
<td>177 H</td>
<td>10,901</td>
<td>177 H</td>
<td>10,871</td>
<td>177 H</td>
<td>10,871</td>
<td>177 H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>176 F</td>
<td>10,773</td>
<td>176 F</td>
<td>10,743</td>
<td>176 F</td>
<td>10,743</td>
<td>176 F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Caval.</td>
<td>535 F</td>
<td>36,118</td>
<td>535 F</td>
<td>36,019</td>
<td>535 H</td>
<td>36,019</td>
<td>535 H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse Guards</td>
<td>274 H</td>
<td>20,490</td>
<td>274 H</td>
<td>20,434</td>
<td>274 H</td>
<td>20,434</td>
<td>274 H</td>
</tr>
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<td>Horse</td>
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<td>85,085</td>
<td>1,087</td>
<td>85,032</td>
<td>3,053</td>
<td>245,047</td>
<td>1,250</td>
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<td>140,990</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>140,215</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>140,215</td>
<td>1,066</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Regiment of Horse reduced and termed Dragoon Guards, from 1747
2 See Appendix C Table A, & Appendix J Table 2.
3 Regiment returned to Irish Establishment, Dec. 1746.

Dis. = Dismounted
### Horse Regiments, continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1750</th>
<th>1751</th>
<th>1752</th>
<th>1753</th>
<th>1754</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Regiment of Horse</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>17,350</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>17,350</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>17,350</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>17,350</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Grenadier Guards</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>10,871</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>10,871</td>
<td>177</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>10,743</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>10,743</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Regiment of Guards</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>26,976</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>26,976</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All on the Horse Establishment</strong></td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>83,189</td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>83,189</td>
<td>1,052</td>
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</table>
### Appendix D Table 2

**Dragoons Regiments.**

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<th>Year</th>
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<th>£</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>£</th>
</tr>
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<td>1739</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1740</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1741</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1742</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th. Rgt. of Dragoons</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th. Rgt. of Dragoons</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>£</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home</td>
<td>2,952</td>
<td>159,308</td>
<td>3,480</td>
<td>157,478</td>
<td>3,480</td>
<td>157,047</td>
<td>3,480</td>
<td>157,047</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**


The 5th, 8th, 9th and 12th regiments of dragoons remained on the Irish establishment throughout.

*Figures of expenditure transferred to Appendix C Tables D A 4.*
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**Notes**

1. Totals transferred to Appendix C Tables 3 & 4.
2. Regiment reduced Dec. 1746.
## Dragoons Regiments, continued.

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| Home          | 3,902 | 174,371 | 6,489 | 266,267 | 3,276 | 168,308 |
| Stables       | 2,587 | 114,105 |       |         |       |         |

1. Formed from the Duke of Kingsteven's Horse, which distinguished themselves at the Battle of Culloden.
2. Regiment reduced to Irish Establishment.

Dis. Disbanded.
Dragons Regiments, continued.

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<th>10th Royal Regiment of Dragoons</th>
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### Appendix D Table 3

#### Infantry regiments.

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<td>Earl of Spermonde</td>
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<td>P. Kirk</td>
<td>Dlg. T. Howard</td>
<td>V. Burwell</td>
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<td>H 2,778</td>
<td>H 2,778</td>
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#### 1st batt. Ind. batts.

| H 2,778 | F 2,378 | 36,276 | H 2,778 | F 2,378 | 36,276 | H 2,778 | F 2,378 | 36,276 |
| H 2,778 | F 2,378 | 36,276 | H 2,778 | F 2,378 | 36,276 | H 2,778 | F 2,378 | 36,276 |

#### 2nd batt. Ind. batts.

| H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 |
| H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 |

#### 3rd batt. Ind. batts.

| H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 |
| H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 |

#### 4th batt. Ind. batts.

| H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 |
| H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 |

#### 5th batt. Ind. batts.

| H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 |
| H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 |

#### 6th batt. Ind. batts.

| H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 |
| H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 |

#### 7th batt. Ind. batts.

| H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 |
| H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 |

#### 8th batt. Ind. batts.

| H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 |
| H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 |

#### 9th batt. Ind. batts.

| H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 |
| H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 |

#### 10th batt. Ind. batts.

<p>| H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 |
| H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 | H 2,113 | 1,136 | 36,276 |</p>
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<td>W. Harrold/ W. Reid</td>
<td>F. Cummins</td>
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**Notes:**
- The table lists regimental information for various regiments, including their names and roll numbers.
- Each regiment is identified by a letter (I, H, etc.) and a number (615, 15,759, etc.).
- The table continues with similar entries for subsequent years.
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**Notes:**
- Changed to 3 Co's of Foot at South Carolina.
- Breaks: 17/11/08, 9/11/08, 2/11/08.
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**Notes:**
1. Numbers and expenditure on the Irish Establishment (2) not summarized.
2. Totals transferred to Appendix B Table 1, and Appendix C Tables 3,4 and 5 above.
Appendix E

Analyses of ships on the establishment, in commission, built and rebuilt.

Table 1  Ships on the establishment, 1666-1751.
2  Ships on the establishment in 1714 and 1739.
3  Ships in commission, 1739-1745 compared with the period 1702-1708.
4  Ships in commission, 1740-1741.
5  List of ships, 1739-1753.
6  Summary of ships built, 1736-1751.
7  Summary of ships rebuilt, 1736-1751.
8  Ships built and rebuilt in Royal shipyards, 1739-1751.
9  Ships built and rebuilt in Merchants shipyards, 1739-1751.
10  Ships built and rebuilt in Royal dockyards in the period 1702-12.
11  Total acquisitions, 1739-1742.
12  Cruisers employed, 1739-1741.
13  Numbers of French ships compared with the British in 1742 and 1753.
14  Age analysis of ships in the French navy, 1753.
Appendix E Table 1

Ships on the establishment, 1666 - 1751

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Source and key
1 Add Psc. 14032 f. 29
2 Add 106/2181 f. 21 Aug. 1745
3 Add 106/2182 p. 421 2 Feb. 1747 This has useful details of ships other than the 6 rates
4 Add Psc. 17279 f. 27
5 Add 106/2183 f. 179 3 July 1747
6 Add 106/2184 p. 756 26 Nov. 1749
7 Add 106/161 12 Sept. 1750
8 Add 106/165 p. 165 6 Jan. 1750 See here for list
9 For an analysis, with ship names, of change between these dates see Add 106/175 p. 164 3 Dec. 1739
### Appendix E Table 2

#### Ships on the establishment in 1714 and 1739.

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**Source**  
Based on Baugh *cit* p. 246
Appendix E Table 3

Ships in commission, 1739 - 1745 compared with the period 1702 - 1708.

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<tr>
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<td>(2) 1740</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1708</td>
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<td>(3) 1753</td>
<td>1 8 40 48 21 32</td>
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<td>(4) 1755</td>
<td>1 8 33 40 12 29</td>
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</table>

Source

Extract from Adm. 106/2181 p. 301 9 Oct. 1745 apart from where indicated:

(1) For a table of the dates when wages became payable see Adm. 106/178 f. 226 16 Mar. 1740
(2) To place names to these figures see Appendix Table 1
items marked i/c based on MFE at 22 Nov. 1739. This list differs from the above in only having 10 5th rates and 18 6th rates. The difference probably lies in the timing difference of the lists
(3) Adm. 113/116 f. 287 and Agreed to Adm. 106/2186 p. 429 23 May 1753
(4) Add. 173/178 f. 143
### Appendix E Table 1

Ships in commission, 1740 - 1741.

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**Source**

(1) Based on HM Add MSS 14032
(2) For disposal of ships on 1st Sept. 1739 see Add 8/20
(3) For analysis into rates of ships see Add MSS 35898 f. 101
(4) Based on Add MSS 35046
**Appendix E Table 5**

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<td>R l/h U</td>
<td>R l/h 12/17</td>
<td>R l/h 3/30</td>
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| Second Rate |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Harlequin  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Eloise      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Duke       | R l/h U | R l/h 6/38 | R l/h 6/39 | x | R | 6 |    |      |      |
| Prince George |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Saint George |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Hanover     |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Hanover     |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Prince     |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Princess Royal |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Olympias    |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Sandwich   |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Union       |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |

| Third Rate |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Princess Amilla |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Hope       | R l/h U | R l/h 6/38 | R l/h 6/39 | x | 6 |    |      |      |      |
| Princess Caroline |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Cambridge  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Chichester |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Cornwall   | GP 10/1 | GP 10/1 | GP 10/1 | GP 10/1 | GP 10/1 | GP 10/1 | GP 10/1 | GP 10/1 | GP 10/1 |
| Culloden   |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Chichester |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Devonshire |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Dorsetshire |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Invicta    |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Lancaster  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| London     |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Liverpool  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Newcastle  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Norwich    |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Trowbridge |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |

- lvii -
## List of ships, 1739 - 1753, continued.

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</table>

**Notes:**
- B = built
- L = launched
- U = under construction
- H = under repair
- R = ready
- S = sold
- Q = query
- Red = replaced
- Lay = laid up
- FI = fitted
- REB = rebuilt
- LA = launched

---

- Additional entries...
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</table>
Appendix E Table 5

Key A

This Table is based on a variety of sources. The principal ones are ADM 95/12 which is the origin of specific orders given a date such as those in Key B and sundry estimates as presented to Parliament.

- 20 Jan. 1736 for the year 1736
- 7 Feb. 1737 1737
- 16 Jan. 1738 1738
- 13 Jan. 1739 1739
- 13 Feb. 1740 1740
- 8 Feb. 1743 1743
- 20 Mar. 1748 1748
- 27 Nov. 1749 1750
- 24 Jan. 1751 1751
- 20 Nov. 1751 1752
- 10 Dec. 1755 1754

Other sources are as indicated in Key C. The Table is related to Appendix II of Professor Mauch’s book in the matter of the completion of ships built or rebuilt and those in hand in 1742, 1745 and 1751. The Table is not designed to provide a complete record of work on individual ships but rather to give a general picture of the changing condition of classes of ships.
Appendix E Table 5

Key B

Information extracted from Baugh *op. cit.* Appendix II

40R Ship rebuilt in 1740
40B Ship built in 1740
* building or rebuilding in hand in 1742, 1745, or 1751.

Symbols used in relation to the state of ships, principally in estimates to Parliament:

- **B** = Building
- **R** = Rebuilding
- **i/h** = in hand
- **U** = Date of completion uncertain
- **/37** = January 1737

1 When this date follows a description of ship as building or rebuilding it indicates the date on which work was either to start or to finish. For example:

R 6/38 U Rebuilding to be commenced in June 1738, date of completion uncertain.

R i/h 4/39 Rebuilding under way, to be completed in April 1739.

II When the date stands on its own it indicates anticipated date of completion.

III When this date follows a specific instruction it is the date of that order.

Orders issued in relation to ships, chiefly from *Adm. 95/12*.

- **Beb** = Rebuild
- **Rep** = Repair
- **Repl** = Replace
- **Bu** = Build
- **Red** = Reduce (cut down to ship of smaller size)
- **Ex** = Examine
- **H** = Make haste

-1xxii-
### Appendix E Table 5

#### Key C

Symbols used in relation to information from other sources, in chronological order:

- **i/c** = In commission, *Hedge op cit.*, 22 Nov 1739, p. 511.
- **x** = Ships at 19 Sept. 1739 fit for Dec. 1739, *S.P. /2/116*, f.70, 19 Sept. 1739
- **F** = Ships at 11 Jan. 1740 fit for May 1740, *ibid.*, f.84
- **y** = In ordinary and in hand, *ibid.*
- **OR** = Ordered to be rebuilt, 8 Oct. 1740, *Adm. 106/2178* p. 388, where this adds to other sources
- **CC** = In good condition *Adm 106/2179*, 6 Jan 1742
- **SR** = In need of small repair *Adm 106/2185*, 24 Nov 1749
- **MR** = In need of middling repair do do
- **LR** = In need of large repair do do
- **OR** = Ordered to be rebuilt do do

Other lists found useful but not displayed in the table:

- *Adm 106/2183*, p. 179, indicating the condition of ships at 3 July 1747
- *Adm 106/2184* p. 200, 10 Oct. 1748, indicating the dates on which ships had been payed off since the end of hostilities.
- *Adm 106/2184* p. 425, 14 Sept. 1769, indicating the condition of ships.
### Appendix E Table 6

**Summary of ships built, 1736 - 1751.**

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**Total** | 1 13 1 13 23 38 44 133

**Key**
- Based on an analysis of Baugh *op cit* Appendix II. See above Table 5.

1. For an analysis of the projected and actual launching, fitting, and sailing dates see Adm. 106/2178, p.390, 12 Sept. 1740

2. For the dates of launching see Adm. 106/179, p.280, 21 Jan. 1742 and for those built in private yards see *ibid.* p.245, 23 Dec. 1741

- lxxiv-
Appendix E Table 7

Summary of ships rebuilt, 1736 - 1751.

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Total: 1 4 3 12 1 11 10 1 - 43

Key
Based on an analysis of Baugh et al. Appendix II. See above Table 5.
Appendix E Table 8

Ships built and rebuilt in Royal shipyards, 1739 - 1751.

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Source

Based on an analysis of Baugh op cit., appendix II. See above Table 5. This is an analysis of the information in Tables 6 & 7, omitting the years 1736 - 1738.
### Appendix E Table 9

Ships built and rebuilt in Merchants shipyards, 1739 - 1751.

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</table>

**Totals** | 1 24 37 42 104 | - - 2 - 2

**Source**

Based on an analysis of Booth on cit. Appendix II. See above Table 5. This is an analysis of the information in Tables 6 & 7, omitting the years 1736 - 1738.
Appendix E  Table 10

Ships built and rebuilt in Royal dockyards in the period 1702 – 1712.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ships built</th>
<th>Ships rebuilt</th>
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<td>Rate of ship</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1703</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1709</td>
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<td>1710</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1711</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1712</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Totals: 2 6 22 21 18 69 2 2 8 5 3 20

Source:
Based on Adm. 106/2181, p. 331, 4 Sept. 1745.
### Appendix E Table 11

#### Total acquisitions, 1739 - 1742.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Ship</th>
<th>Number of guns</th>
<th>Origin of ships</th>
<th>Royal Yards</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>Merchant Yards</td>
<td>Purchases</td>
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<td>Fireships</td>
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<td>Hospital Ships</td>
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<td>Totals</td>
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<td>54</td>
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**Source**

### Appendix E Table 12

Cruisers employed, 1739 - 1741.

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<th>Month</th>
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<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1740</td>
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<td>Jan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>- 2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>3 5 1 -</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>6 6 1 -</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>3 7 2 -</td>
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<td>June</td>
<td>3 9 - 1 2</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>- 2 - 5 1</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>- 1 - 2 1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>- 2 - 4 1</td>
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<td>Nov.</td>
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<td>Dec.</td>
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**Source**

Based on Add Mss. 33046, f. 128.
**Appendix E Table 13**

Numbers of French ships compared with the British in 1742 and 1753.

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<th>Fr 1753</th>
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**Total** 142

**Source**

(1) Add Mss. 35809, f.123, f.224, & f.226.

(2) See above Table 3 based on Adm. 106/2181 p. 301.

(3) Add Mss. 330A6, f.297, comprising those then fit and capable of being made fit in one year.
Appendix E Table 14

Age analysis of ships in the French navy, 1753.

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<th>24-20</th>
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Totals 38  50  8  15  23  8  142

Source
Add Ms. 75808, f.226. This is an analysis of the list in Table 13.
## Appendix F

### Location of Articles of War

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

( I) General Bibliography
( II) Manuscript Sources
(III) Printed Primary Sources
( IV) Contemporary Secondary Sources
( V) Modern Works (i) Books (ii) Articles
In the following bibliography short titles are used. It is not a list of all the books, articles and pamphlets read nor of sources used. It is a list of those found useful.
GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

Giuseppi M. S. A guide to the manuscripts preserved in the Public Record Office. (London 1923-4).


II Manuscripts Sources

(i) British Museum

Add Mss 14,032  Original letters including list of His Majesty's Ships 1740, 1741.

Add Mss 15,869  Official Diplomatic Correspondence (from the Hague).

Add Mss 17,279  An Estimate of the Charge of the Navy in Harbour, 1743, with list of ships belonging to the Navy.

Add Mss 19,036  State of France and Spain with regard to their military force and revenue.

Add Mss 21,573  The Civil and Military Establishments of Ireland as they stood in 1742.

Add Mss 28,140  Misc. Papers, chiefly connected with the Navy 1707-1746.

Add Mss 28,323  Establishment of the Land Forces, 1739.

Add Mss 32,735-7  Newcastle Papers, Home Correspondence.


Add Mss 33,038  Newcastle Papers, Papers Relating to Taxation and Finance, etc., and other papers connected with the Treasury and other departments being the official papers of the Duke of Newcastle.

Add Mss 33,046  Newcastle Papers, relating to the Army and Navy.

Add Mss 35,893-98  Hardwicke Papers. [Army and Navy Papers, Papers relating to Admiral Byng, British Army list for 1740, Letter Book re Cambridgeshire Volunteers.]

Add Mss 40,829-30  Vernon Papers.

Houghton Mss
Lansdowne Mss 668,1215
Egerton Mss 1684
Stowe Mss 158

(ii) Public Record Office, London (Note 1 below)

a) Departmental

Adm 1/4007-4010  Secretary In Letters - Letters from the Ordnance Office 1723-1757.
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<td>Secretary Miscellanea 1739-49 Return of Expenditure for Sick and Wounded Seamen.</td>
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<td>Accountant General's Draft Copies of Minutes of the Navy Board sent to the Ticket Office 1727-1759.</td>
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Adm 114/35 Admiralty - Victualling Department Miscellanea 1723-1765.

A.O. 1. Declared Accounts in rolls.
1741-1754 Treasurer of the Navy.
1873-1880 Lists and Establishments of the Ordnance.

Ind 5436, 37, 5438 W.O. Commissariat Army Lists 1736-52.

S.P. 41/13-21 State Papers Domestic - Military 1741-1755, Secretary at War.

S.P. 41/36-38 State Papers Domestic - Military 1740-1764 Ordnance.


S.P. 42/62 State Papers Domestic - Naval 1750-56 Admiralty Supplementary.


S.P. 87/8-12 State Papers Foreign Military Expeditions 1742-3.


T 1/321 Treasury In-letters, Content covered by Calendar of Treasury Books & Papers.

T 1/325
T 1/338-9
T 1/372

T 38/805 Treasury Accounts, Departmental 1739-1743 Estimates.

T 44/4 Treasury Registers and Establishments 1742-3.

T 64/17-18 Treasury Miscellanea.


W.O. 4/591 War Office Out Letters - Secretary at War, Deserters, May 1744 - May 1746.


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KEY

1 = Referred to in notes to pages without the prefix P.R.O.
2 = Abbreviations:–
Adm = Admiralty.
A.O. = Audit Office.
Ind = Index.
S.P. = State Papers.
T = Treasury.
W.O. = War Office.

b) Other

Chatham Mss - The papers of Wm. Pitt, 1st. Earl of Chatham.

(iii) National Maritime Museum

Adm A/Sundry - Admiralty to the Navy Board.
Adm B/Sundry - Navy Board to the Admiralty.
(iv) Elsewhere

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Abbreviations Used

B.I.H.R. Bulletin of the Institute for Historical Research,
B.J.R.L. Bulletin of the John Rylands Library,
E.H.R. English Historical Review,
H.J. Historical Journal,
J.A.H.R. Journal for the Society for Army Historical Research,
J.R.A. Journal of the Society of the Royal Artillery,
J.R.U.S.I. Journal of the Royal United Services Institution,
M.M. Mariners Mirror,
S.H.R. Scottish Historical Review,