The policing systems in England & Wales and Turkey have problems in terms of legitimacy, flexibility and accountability, and solutions are currently sought through a range of organisational changes. The policing system, as an institution of social control, is under unique pressure to appear to be legitimate. The effectiveness of a police organisation depends on its legitimacy through either consensus or coercion or both.

This thesis first examines the history and socio-economic and political contexts of the development of policing systems and state-police relations in England & Wales and Turkey through a critical consideration of different organisational theories and their application to police organisation. Second, it compares these policing systems in terms of their levels and forms of legitimacy, in order to identify their bases of legitimate authority and the forms of policing practice. Finally, the thesis compares the existing police organisational structures in England & Wales and Turkey in terms of the trends for change towards centralisation or decentralisation.

The core theme of this thesis is the causal connection between differential forms of legitimacy and policing organisation and practices. The thesis proposes that the respective socio-economic and political contexts have resulted in different policing systems in England & Wales and Turkey, which are in turn within different forms of legitimacy in reality, although appearing to be the same, namely legal-rational. It argues that for England & Wales the real basis of legitimate authority is actually legal-rational, whilst for Turkey it is traditional. These respective bases of legitimacy result in different forms of policing practice in these countries. In England & Wales policing is essentially practised on the basis of value consensus, but employing potential and actual coercion to some extent, whilst in Turkey it is primarily on the basis of coercion. The thesis suggests that the effect of these different policing forms is to give rise to a relatively decentralised police organisation in England & Wales, despite a trend increasingly towards centralisation, and a highly centralised police organisation in Turkey, although there is evidence of decentralisation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is the result of research which has been carried out with the help of many people and institutions. First of all I am indebted to my supervisor, Dr. Mike King for his outstanding guidance and supervision. He has always been ready to offer advice and support at any stage of my study from the proposal to the reading of the final draft of my thesis. I am also greatly indebted to all the members of the Centre for the Study of Public Order, particularly to the Director, Professor John Benyon, and the Administrator, Bernadette Hayes, for their help and friendship, and encouragement about all matters.

I would like to express my appreciation to Barry Loveday of the Institute of Police and Criminological Studies, University of Portsmouth, who gave me a great deal of help by reading the first drafts of some pieces of my work, especially the last chapter, and providing important and useful advice and comments.

The most significant sources of information were obtained from the Bramshill Police Staff College Library, Leicester University Library, London University SOAS Library, the Turkish National Library and the Turkish Police Library, and it is a pleasure to pay tribute to all the staff of these libraries for their kind help and services.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the Home Office Police Research Group, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the public relations officers of all police forces in England & Wales and especially those of the Metropolitan Police, West Midlands Police and Leicestershire Constabulary. My thanks also go to the Security, Personnel, and Finance Departments of the Turkish National Police for providing information for my research, and many Chief Police Officers from police forces in England & Wales and Turkey for responding to my letters and for agreeing to be interviewed.

Finally, I would like to thank to my wife, Nural, who patiently shared my life during my study in England, and my daughter, Esra, who was born in England and became the joy of our family. They constituted a source of inspiration and power for such an exhaustive study.
CONTENTS

Abstract
Acknowledgements
Contents
List of figures and diagrams
Abbreviations

INTRODUCTION 1-14

CHAPTERS:

1. POLICE HISTORY, STATE-POLICE RELATIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 'MODERN' POLICE 15-62
   1.1. History and the socio-economic and political context of police development 16
   1.2. The constitution and models of modern policing 46

2. ORGANISATIONAL THEORIES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO POLICING ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 63-111
   2.2. Exploring and applying other theories: neo-classical, modern, post-modern and critical 80

3. CONSENSUAL AND COERCIVE FORMS OF POLICING IN ENGLAND & WALES AND TURKEY 112-154
   3.1. Theoretical concepts of power, legitimacy, consensus and their application to policing forms 113
   3.2. The relationship between legitimacy, coercion and the role of the military in policing practice 135
4. AN ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF POLICING ORGANISATION AND CHANGE 155-196

4.1. Present policing organisational structure and problems 156
4.2. Comparing and analysing current trends of change and potential changes in the police organisation 169

5. THE PRACTICE OF POLICE DISCRETION AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN RELATION TO FORMS OF ORGANISATION AND LEGITIMACY 197-222

5.1. The necessity, use, abuse and control of police discretion 198
5.2. Forms of police accountability in England & Wales and Turkey 210

CONCLUSION 223-242

APPENDICES: 243-302

I. Letters to and from police forces, representative organisations and the Home Office 244
   A. Circular letter dated 6 December 1993 and replies from Wiltshire, Warwickshire and Humberside Police and ACPO 245
   B. Circular letter dated 4 April 1994 and replies from Avon and Somerset, Cumbria, Norfolk, Dorset, Hertfordshire, Essex, Bedfordshire, Gloucestershire and Gwent Police 256
   C. Letters to and from the Home Office 285
   D. Letters to and from Leicestershire Constabulary 289

II. Map of police force boundaries in England & Wales 293

III. Map of new areas of the Metropolitan Police District and details of divisions and sub-divisions 295

IV. Map of provincial police units in Turkey 299

V. Map indicating possible amalgamations of police forces in England & Wales 301

BIBLIOGRAPHY 303-340
LIST OF FIGURES AND DIAGRAMS

PAGES

Diagram I : Types of grounds on which political institutions can be legitimate 127
Figure I  : Differences between the military and the police 138
Figure II : Decentralised and centralised forms of organisational structure 157
Figure III : Types of police organisational structure 158
Figure IV : Organisational structure of Leicestershire Constabulary 160
Figure V  : Organisation of the Metropolitan Police Service 161
Figure VI : Management structure of policing in Turkey 163
Figure VII : Organisational chart of the Turkish National Police 165
Figure VIII: Organisational chart of the Turkish National Gendarmerie 167
ABBREVIATIONS

ACPO : Association of Chief Police Officers
APK : Arastirma, Planlama ve Koordinasyon [Research, Planning and Co-ordination]
BCU : Basic Command Unit
BEC : Black Sea Economic Co-operation
CID : Criminal Investigation Department
CJPOA : Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994
CSPO : Centre for the Study of Public Order
DEP : Demokrasi Partisi [Democracy Party]
DGM : Devlet Guvenlik Mahkemesi [State Security Court]
DP : Demokrat Parti [Democratic Party]
DYP : Dogru Yol Partisi [True Path Party]
EC : European Community
ETK : Emniyet Teskili Kanunu 1937 [Police Organisation Act 1937]
EU : European Union
FBI : Federal Bureau of Investigation
FMI : Financial Management Initiative
GLC : Greater London Council
MACC : Mutual Aid Co-ordination Centre
MGK : Milli Guvenlik Kurulu [National Security Council]
MIT : Milli Istihbarat Teskili [National Intelligence Organisation]
MP : Member of Parliament
NCIS : National Criminal Intelligence Service
NRC : National Reporting Centre
PACE : Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
PC : Police Constable
PCCs : Police Consultative Committees
POA : Public Order Act 1986
RP : Refah Partisi [Welfare Party]
RUC : Royal Ulster Constabulary
SKP : Standart Kadro Planı [Standard Personnel Plan]
SPG : Special Patrol Group
TL : Türk Lirası [Turkish Lira]
TRT : Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyonu [Turkish Radio and Television]
INTRODUCTION

Police organisational structures in England & Wales and Turkey have grown over the years and become increasingly complex. There also remain considerable problems in terms of policing practice, legitimacy and accountability. In an attempt to remedy some of these there are currently a number of proposals for organisational change. The most recent official attempts in England & Wales have resulted in the Sheehy Report (1993), the White Paper on Police Reform (1993), the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994. In Turkey also, the most recent organisational changes have been made under the Criminal Justice System Act 1992, the Police Organisation Act 1993, and the Anti-terrorism Act 1994. All these changes, both within England & Wales and Turkey are, officially at least, for the primary purpose of making policing more legitimate, flexible and accountable.

Police legitimacy and organisational change in England & Wales and Turkey are the main issues considered by this thesis. The core theme of the thesis, however, is that of legitimacy, related in turn to the concepts of state, consensus and coercion. The state uses its coercive apparatuses such as the police and the military to maintain public order, prevent crime and protect people and property. In this sense, the police are the instruments of the coercive power of the state which is, according to Weber, based on a monopoly of physical coercion legitimised by a belief in the legality of this monopoly. Although it would appear
that all states are the same in terms of the exercise of coercion and legitimate monopoly, it is the argument of this thesis that they do not necessarily take the same form in reality but differ according to their respective claim to legitimate authority, in the same way that in a liberal-democratic state, for example, the basis of legitimate authority is legal-rational whilst in an authoritarian state it may be charismatic or traditional.

In terms of policing functions, all states are similar. As indicated above, they all have a coercive police organisation. However, at this point, we need to clarify the relationship between legitimacy and coercion and their meanings in general and in terms of policing forms in England & Wales and Turkey in particular. A system based on consensus is understood to mean that at least the majority of people consent to the system, whilst one based on coercion means that there are persons who apply specially provided means of physical force. As will be considered in Chapter 3 when referring to Held (1987; 1989) and Beetham (1991), political authority within particular societies cannot be characterised as being simply either coercive or consensual. Coercion and consent are not mutually exclusive categories in this sense, as both being grounds for the legitimacy of political authority are likely to be present in any one historical period and in any one society. In addition to coercion and 'pure' forms of consent, there are other forms of consent, variably grounded in degrees of coercion or 'other' rationalities, one of which (importantly for this thesis) is 'traditional'. In terms of policing systems in England & Wales and Turkey, this thesis refers to Weber's concepts of 'value consensus' and 'overt coercion', and here I would like to consider the meaning of these particular concepts.

Weber is concerned with consensus based upon 'ultimate', 'universal' or 'rational' values such as 'freedom', 'equality' and 'democracy'. Value-rationality suggests that legitimacy based on the consensus of the majority is insufficient and
there must be a collective social belief in the necessity for law and order. Weber calls this type of legitimacy 'the belief in legality' (1968: 37).

In terms of the influential factors of policing forms or practices, it is necessary to distinguish between actual coercion and the potential for coercion. Actual coercion may be either 'overt' or 'covert'. Weber considers 'actual' coercion to be the opposite of 'value consensus' (1968: 313). Actual coercive practices are the products of a relationship between a number of factors such as forces towards the maintenance of social order, the extent of social and political dissent and the degree of consent and legitimation. Actual coercion can be defined as the use of force in general policing operations and control of crime. It is related to the use of unreasonable force and the legitimation of this force in dealing with policing problems. The potential for coercion means the capacity and potentiality for the use of force in terms of police organisational and operational structure (Neiburg 1968: 18). However, the potentiality or threat is itself coercive to a degree.

This thesis argues that the legitimate policing form in England & Wales is mainly exercised on the basis of value consensus but in practice there has been an increase in the use of coercion during the post-war period. When we say that coercion is increasing in contemporary England & Wales, however, we mean that the threat or potentiality for, and the actual exercise of coercion is increasing. Regarding Weber's concept of 'legitimate coercion', we suggest that policing in Turkey is also legitimate but it does not conform with that in England & Wales. The relationship between the concepts of acceptance of coercion is complex. The exercise of (potential) coercion must be within legitimate boundaries varying between 'legal-rational' and 'traditional'. Further, coercion is not automatically legitimate, although it may be imposed upon a society according to the view of a minority rather than majority (Weber 1968: 37). Generally, however, coercion can
only be effective in the short term. Here, we argue, the form of legitimate use of coercion is more within 'traditional' rather than 'legal-rational' authority.

This thesis is essentially a comparative study and it explores and compares public police organisations, excluding special, private and voluntary police organisations and individuals, and their respective forms of legitimacy in England & Wales and Turkey. One reason for this limitation is that special, private and voluntary policing services are not developed and well organised in Turkey compared with England & Wales and this would make comparisons difficult. Also, in England & Wales the study of policing is no longer concerned only with public police but also with other policing organisations (Johnston 1992b: 23), whilst little research has been carried out on the Turkish policing system generally, either in Turkey or elsewhere.

Three primary aims of this research can be identified. First it examines the development of policing systems and state-police relations in England & Wales and Turkey through a critical consideration of different organisational theories and their application to police organisation. Police organisation is seen to be essentially bureaucratic following the principles of classical organisational theory or as constituting a rational formal bureaucracy as suggested by Weber. Secondly, the research will compare the policing systems in England & Wales and Turkey in terms of their levels and forms of legitimacy by referring to their respective bases of legitimate authority, the forms of policing practice and different forms of organisation. The form of legitimacy we suggest may lead to a particular form of policing, resulting in a particular form of organisation. Despite some similarities, however, this causal connection is different in England & Wales and Turkey. Finally, this thesis aims to posit and explain how and why the contemporary policing system in England & Wales is changing increasingly towards a more centralised system from one which is relatively decentralised and consensus
based. In Turkey, on the other hand, policing is changing slowly towards a more decentralised and consensus based system from one which is highly centralised. In both countries there is a trend of 'Europeanisation' which will also be considered.

By comparing England & Wales and Turkey, this thesis posits and attempts to analyse the following hypothesis: Policing systems in England & Wales and Turkey operate within different forms of legitimacy in reality. They both appear to be similar, but for England & Wales the basis of legitimate authority is legal-rational, whilst for Turkey it is traditional. The policing form is essentially exercised on the basis of either contested although 'voluntary' consent or actual coercion. The effect of this is to give rise to differentiation of organisation, being primarily decentralised or centralised.

Research in the subject of policing in general and comparative studies in particular has always been beleaguered with complex methodological problems, making a comparative study problematic. The main problem with studying the police in general is that it is usually difficult to know what the police are supposed to do, and how they are thought to achieve what they do. Are they the protectors of the interests of the state or the servants of community? Do they constitute a force or a service? Are they law enforcers or order maintainers? Police tasks are defined and perceived differently by the police and the public. This is related to police culture and to popular belief. For example, the public view of the police in England & Wales remains entrenched in the 1950s ideal of the 'bobby on the beat'. Many people still believe that simply returning police to street patrol duties will solve society's problems. This is a mistaken belief, of course, because society has changed in the last 40 years, and has different problems. Community policing, however, is constantly being proposed as a 'new' idea, which has relevance to contemporary society. The tasks of the police as perceived by the police, however,
differ widely from the general public view. There is a curious tension between the police role presented by, for example, the television programme 'Crimewatch' and popular television police series such as 'The Bill' and 'Inspector Morse', and police operations in reality.

The laws concerning the police do not usually clearly identify police functions and duties, they simply set out the organisation of the police force, and the details of police functions are left to the various authorities, institutions and individuals in charge of the police. Police work may also involve a range of different duties in different countries, and they are organised or structured according to their types of work. For example, some police tasks in Turkey, such as issuing passports and driving licences, differ from those of the police in England & Wales. This is just one of the problems of carrying out a comparative study.

Also, because of different laws, methods of recording crime statistics, the laws of evidence and the rules which govern police practices, policies and organisation as a whole, there are difficulties in comparing any two countries. Although there are some similarities, which will be indicated later, there are also many differences between the police organisations of England & Wales and Turkey. For example, England & Wales is an industrial or even post-industrial developed country while Turkey is not. The level of political culture in Turkey is lower than in England & Wales, and the levels and forms of legitimacy and accountability are different in England & Wales and Turkey.

Apart from the difficulties in comparing the police in respective socio-economic and political contexts, another point is that there is little existing research concerning the Turkish police, in contrast to that concerning the police in England & Wales. England & Wales has a reputation throughout the world for its
professional police organisation, police efficiency and effectiveness, public consultation and accountability to community, legitimacy and respect for civil and human rights. This reputation is supported with wider research and sources both inside and outside the country including Turkey. However, this reputation can be and is questioned in reality. For example, the extent of police accountability to community is decreasing and the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 is likely to decrease it even further. Also, there have been many civil rights and corruption cases in England & Wales. One recent major corruption case concerned the Stoke Newington Police Station in London. The investigation on this case took about three years and it reported 134 complaints against 45 police officers which covered 22 cases including 64 allegations of planting drugs (The Guardian 4 February 1994).

Turkey, on the other hand, has attracted attention from the outside world, especially during the past three decades because of increasing terrorism, military coups and violations of political, civil and human rights. Therefore all the research regarding Turkey either inside or outside the country including England & Wales has concentrated on these general political problems and on the military in particular but not policing itself. As Bright points out, although not only in respect of policing, '... considering its size and strategic importance, there is remarkably little accessible reference material on Turkey' (1994: 9). The lack of sources available concerning the Turkish police in contrast to those concerning the police in England & Wales makes this study an important contribution in this field.

There has been continuing interest in comparative studies of the police in England & Wales. As internationalisation or globalisation of issues and problems has grown, comparative studies between different countries have continued to increase (Øyen 1990: 1-2). Perhaps the works of Bayley (1979), Brewer et al
McKenzie & Gallagher (1989) and Mawby (1990) are the most systematic attempts to compare the police in different countries including England & Wales. The problem, however, is that comparative studies have usually been concentrated around Western countries. Øyen points out this problem clearly:

So far, most of the cross-national studies have been located in Western Europe and North America. This is also where we find most of the sociologists, the sociological institutions, the data banks, the agencies for finding basic and applied research, and the infrastructure for conducting social investigations (1990: 16).

Accordingly, there is not only a lack of studies on the Turkish policing system itself, as mentioned earlier, but also of comparative studies involving the Turkish police. There is only a small amount of information contained in a few encyclopaedic books about the World's police, such as Kurian (1989) and Ingleton (1979). This thesis is one of the first attempts to compare the Turkish police with that of England & Wales.

All these difficulties and lack of sources do not mean, however, that it was impossible to carry out such a comparative research. We should remember that despite these difficulties and problems, the 'comparative method' is a common method in the social sciences, and countries which have even radically different systems can be compared. For example, the studies of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim were comparisons between different countries, nations and cultures (Mawby 1990: 4). As Teune states, '... comparing highly centralised systems and very decentralised ones gives opportunities to observe what is predicted, making credible claims for having observed a system level relationship' (1990: 49). According to Teune, within almost all countries there are remarkable similarities which help to make comparisons. Today, for example, there is a similar structure of authority such as city, province and state, with an urban and rural sector. The governments have been collecting data on these social and political units and these data constitute opportunities and possibilities for comparing countries by
looking at local or national units or groups (1990: 50). Therefore, it has been possible to compare the policing system in England & Wales which is relatively decentralised and the Turkish policing system which is highly centralised by identifying the similarities between them. As mentioned earlier, the police in all societies have similar missions of preserving law and order, preventing crime, and assuming a role as enforcers of regime norms and rules (Fairchild 1989: 455).

The similarities between England & Wales and Turkey that make it possible to compare the police organisation of these two countries are first of all, that England & Wales and Turkey are moving together in terms of changes in organisational structure and policing style. As indicated earlier, for example, there is an increasing trend towards centralisation from a relatively decentralised system in England & Wales, and there is a trend towards decentralisation from a highly centralised system in Turkey. Also, the Turkish police are highly coercive but are currently trying to establish a more consensus based policing form by decreasing the level of coercion, whereas policing in England & Wales, which is traditionally based on consensus, is becoming increasingly coercive.

'Bureaucracy' is seen as a convenient, useful and logical 'framework' for comparing police organisations. As Heady argues (1984: 65-73), the most useful way to view bureaucracy is as an institution defined in terms of basic structural characteristics such as hierarchy, specialisation and competence. Public bureaucracies can also be compared in terms of issues such as legitimacy, accountability, the socio-economic and political context and policy-making. Therefore, we intend to compare the police in England & Wales and Turkey on this basis.

I have applied Sztompka's (1988) model to compare police organisations and their forms of legitimacy in England & Wales and Turkey. According to this,
the focus of a comparative study may vary in three different dimensions and a proposition may be analysed in terms of these:

First is the scope of applicability: the delimitation of an area or a system (by historical, geographical criteria) within which a proposition is found to hold. This dimension ranges from maximum inclusiveness (e.g. on Earth) to extreme exclusiveness (e.g. only in Burkina Faso). Second is the scope of objects: the delimitation of a class or a category of entities (by typological criteria) to which the proposition refers. The dimension ranges from the widest universality (e.g. human beings) to the narrowest specificity (e.g. workers in the cotton industry). Finally, the third dimension is the scope of predicates: the delimitation of properties and traits attributed by a proposition to certain objects. This covers the scale from the greatest generality (e.g. reward) to full concreteness (e.g. wage) (1988: 214).

The directions of comparative study in these dimensions may also differ. A comparative study may seek uniqueness or uniformity. In combining these two criteria, namely the focus and direction of comparative study, Sztompka provides a six-fold model of comparison: encompassing, universalising, generalising, individualising, specifying and particularising (1988: 211-5). Sztompka points out that the rationale of traditional comparative study was to search for uniformity in differences. But as a result of globalisation of the social world, the opposite of this situation appeared and the preservation of enclaves of uniqueness among uniformity became problematic. In other words, the emphasis of comparative study shifted from uniformity among variety to uniqueness among uniformity (1988: 215).

Using Sztompka's model, the research area of this study is geographically limited to England & Wales and Turkey. The reason for choosing these countries is because they have uniquely different policing systems. Because Scotland and Northern Ireland have some different laws, judicial and policing systems, I limited the research area to England & Wales rather than Britain or the United Kingdom. Although the general subject of this thesis is 'police organisation', it particularly focuses on the forms of police legitimacy with a critical consideration of the
issues of centralisation and decentralisation. The aim is not to simply describe similar or different forms of legitimacy and organisational structure, but to compare and search for similarities among differences, or in Sztompka's words, 'uniformity' among 'uniqueness'. As indicated above, Sztompka refers to such a comparative study as 'traditional', arguing that contemporarily the opposite of this situation, namely searching 'uniqueness' among 'uniformity', appears to be problematic.

So far, I have introduced the aims and propositions of this thesis, discussed some of the methodological difficulties and possibilities of such a comparative study, and indicated the limits of the study. Now, I turn to give a brief outline of this thesis which consists of five chapters and a conclusion.

The first chapter gives an account of police history in England & Wales and Turkey and analyses the state-police relationship, referring to the socio-economic and political context of the development of the 'modern' police. Then it refers to the traditional, alternative and new theoretical perspectives for understanding the formation and development of the police. Finally, it considers the constitution and models of policing. In order to understand contemporary policing forms and the problems of legitimacy and accountability we need to know the context of police development and the constitution of the 'modern' police. Also, a consideration of the historical and contemporary development of the police in England & Wales and Turkey would help to understand why and how traditional structures lost their legitimacy, allowing police organisation to develop a new legal-rational structure in England & Wales and why and how the basis of legitimacy for the Turkish police organisation is still traditional. I argue in this chapter that socio-economic and political change has led to the creation of policing systems in England & Wales and Turkey, which operate within different
forms of legitimacy, and respective operational and organisational forms of policing.

Before studying police organisation in particular, however, one needs to consider the meaning of the concept of 'organisation'. The second chapter initially considers this and related concepts such as bureaucracy and rationalisation, and different organisational theories with their application to police organisation. Although such organisations have a particular set of characteristics or an organisational structure which distinguishes them from industrial, commercial and other types of organisation, it is necessary to examine their general situation in relation to organisational theory. There are a number of theories which are considered to be of relevance for our discussions and this chapter will outline them only briefly. These are classical organisational theory and Weber's theory of bureaucracy, human relations theory, structuralist and radical structuralist organisational theories, post-modern theory and critical theory. This chapter is primarily concerned, however, with classical organisational theory and especially Weber's classical theory of bureaucracy, in an attempt to relate its components to police organisation. This focus, I suggest, reflects the particular relevance of classical organisational theory to police organisation. Policing occurs within an organisational context, and police organisations are generally bureaucratic or formal organisations characterised by bureaucratisation. They are characterised by 'division of labour' and 'hierarchy of authority'.

In the light of the theoretical considerations concerning the development of policing in chapter 1, and of the organisational theory in chapter 2, the third chapter begins to deal with concrete issues. It considers legitimate policing forms in England & Wales and Turkey, namely consensual and coercive forms of policing. This includes an examination of the concepts of legitimacy, power, consensus and coercion and their application to policing and the relationship
between the rise or decline of legitimacy and military involvement in policing. The policing systems in England & Wales and Turkey are respectively located within different forms of legitimacy based on different forms of authority. I argue, in this chapter, that in England & Wales police legitimacy is derived from the legal-rational form of authority. In Turkey, on the other hand, there is a traditional form of police legitimacy although the law is formally based within the legal-rational. Although all police organisations including those of England & Wales are based on force and coercion, I argue that these forms of legitimacy, based on different forms of authority, result in policing practices through primarily consensus in England & Wales and coercion in Turkey. The relevance of the military to this thesis is that military involvement in policing increases the level of policing by coercion and decreases legitimacy, but the military presence is more visible in Turkey. This does not necessarily mean that the military institution is illegitimate. According to Weber, it has a 'specific' form of legitimacy which does not depend on consensus but coercion. The military exist to defend society and the state against external threats, while the police are responsible for maintaining internal order and security. Therefore, military involvement in maintaining internal public order is neither regular nor legitimate.

After analysing the development of policing systems, police legitimacy and different forms of policing practice in England & Wales and Turkey, chapter 4 deals with an analysis and comparison of existing forms of police organisation and change in these countries. This includes an examination of existing police organisational structure and problems, trends for change and potential change in the future. Particular attention is given to the question as to how different forms of legitimacy and policing practice have resulted in differentiation in the forms of police organisation, from decentralisation in England & Wales to centralisation in Turkey. This chapter also considers the trend for change increasingly towards
centralisation in England & Wales, the trend towards decentralisation in Turkey,
and Europeanisation in both. It is argued in this chapter that neither the trend
increasingly towards centralisation nor that towards decentralisation is exclusive.
Both processes are occurring at the same time in England & Wales and Turkey. In
England & Wales, however, the trend of centralisation is dominant, whilst in
Turkey that of decentralisation is dominant.

In terms of legitimate forms of policing practice and organisational
structure, the issues of flexibility or discretion and accountability also need to be
considered. The debate on these in England & Wales and Turkey is considered in
the fifth chapter of this thesis. Like the forms of legitimacy, the levels and forms
of police discretion and accountability in England & Wales and Turkey are also
different. I argue, in this chapter, that the police in England & Wales are
accountable to the community, at least to a greater extent, whilst the Turkish
police are not accountable to the community but only to the law and internal
control procedures with little degree of discretion. However, the Police and
Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 is likely to reduce local accountability in England &
Wales. I argue that despite these problems, the relatively decentralised policing
system helps the police in England & Wales to be more flexible and more
accountable to the community than the Turkish police. In Turkey, on the other
hand, high centralisation causes loss of flexibility, impartiality and accountability
to the community. It is stressed in this chapter that the police should be
accountable to the community and accountability should be through consultation.

The thesis concludes by considering the causal connection between the
policing systems, forms of legitimacy, and differentiation in the forms of policing
practice and organisation between England & Wales and Turkey, which is the
core theme of this thesis.
CHAPTER 1

POLICE HISTORY, STATE-POLICE RELATIONS AND THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE 'MODERN' POLICE

Organisational structures of the police in England & Wales and Turkey have dramatically changed since their inception. Although a certain amount of development and change has continuously taken place, the most rapid change affecting the nature and the context of policing in these countries has been during the post-war period. In order to analyse, compare and understand the contemporary police, existing policing forms, organisational structures and contemporary problems concerning police legitimacy, it is helpful to consider the historical development of the police organisation and the socio-economic and political context of policing change. In terms of police history, specifically in England & Wales and Turkey, the focus of this chapter will be on those aspects that help to analyse the development of different bases of legitimate authority, consensual and coercive forms of policing, centralised and decentralised police organisations which will be considered in the following chapters.

In this chapter, both the historical and contemporary aspects of the police in England & Wales and Turkey will be considered. Apart from giving a descriptive account of police history in these countries, I will consider the socio-economic and political context of the formation and development of police
organisations by referring to the police and state relations and different theoretical perspectives for understanding the development of the police. In order to relate the police response to the needs of the time, it is not enough to know 'what happened' in history, we must also know 'why it happened' (Bunyard 1978:1). Consideration will then be given to the contemporary constitution of the police including the meaning of the concept of police, models of 'modern' policing in general and the models into which policing in England & Wales and Turkey in particular fit. This is essential for understanding the historical development as well as to project what developments may take place in the future.

1.1. Police history and the socio-economic and political context of police development

There is a long police history in both England & Wales and Turkey. Although the origin of the organisational structure of the police in England & Wales is usually related to the creation of the Metropolitan Police in London in 1829 by Robert Peel, and the professional police in Turkey were first established in 1845, the roots of policing in these countries go back about one thousand years. Because the main concentration of this thesis is on the contemporary situation, however, only a brief outline of the policing systems prior to the establishment of professional police organisations will be given. The events which prepared the ground for change towards establishing the professional police in England & Wales and Turkey will, of course, be considered, including the history of policing in these countries from the eighteenth century.

In England & Wales, the 'old' policing system relates to the time of parish constables and watchmen. During the first thousand years of the history of police in England & Wales up to 1729, this system of local policing was in force, and during the next hundred years up to the establishment of the new police in 1829,
local parish officers and watchmen were replaced by a single body of constables embodied into a police force (Critchley 1978: 29). The first effort to establish the professional police force in England & Wales dates from 1785, when a Bill was presented to Parliament proposing the establishment of a strong police force to act through the whole of the Metropolitan area, including the City of London. Existing parish constables and watchmen were to be retained and merged with the new police. However, the Bill failed to proceed (Bunyard 1978: 4-5). Another Bill (Middlesex Justice Bill) was introduced in 1792 which created seven Magistrates' Offices in the Metropolitan area. In the meantime the Bill of 1785 had been adopted by the Dublin Parliament, and resulted in the Dublin Police Act in 1786 which formed the Royal Irish Constabulary.

One of the new Magistrates appointed under the Middlesex Justice Act in 1792, Patrick Colquhoun, campaigned actively for an independent police service. Colquhoun proposed a Central Police Board consisting of five commissioners under the control of the Home Office. A nucleus of professional police was to be established in every parish with a chain of command and controlled by the Central Police Board. In 1800, it was converted into a public concern under the Thames River Police Act. In 1829 (29 September), the Metropolitan police organisation was formed. This date is considered as the beginning of the professional police service, or the birth of the 'regular' police in England & Wales (Devlin 1966: 10).

The Metropolitan police are the forerunners of all other police forces in England & Wales, and it dominated the development and change towards modern policing throughout the country until the present time (Morris 1989: 54-9). As a result of threats of violence and riots in the country, the Special Constables Act was passed in 1831. In 1835 the Municipal Corporation Act authorised the establishment of police forces in towns and the County Police Act 1839 authorised the establishment of police forces in rural areas (Bunyard 1978: 13).
With this legislation, the reform of the police was completed in England & Wales. The basis of the 'new' police idea was the establishment of professional police officers, organised into a bureaucratic hierarchy.

Although legislation was introduced to enable boroughs and counties to establish their police forces, the formation of the police in towns and counties was slow. By the end of 1841 only 24 of 56 counties in England & Wales had introduced a police force. Then, the County and Borough Act was passed in 1856 which made it compulsory for each borough and county to have their own police force. This compulsory creation of local police forces was part of a system of local government from 1856 (Steedman 1984: 1). This Act also created the Inspectors of Constabulary, whose task was to appraise the efficiency of the 237 borough and county police forces (Devlin 1966: 100).

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Home Office began to encourage the amalgamation of smaller forces with larger forces in the interests of economy and efficiency. In 1900 the number of police forces in England & Wales was 197, but at that time there were considerable differences between police forces in terms of their size and personnel. In 1910, for example, the largest county forces were Lancashire with 1,652 officers and the West Riding (1,289), and the smallest were Huntingdonshire (540) and Rutland (15). The largest borough forces were Liverpool with 1,508 officers and Manchester (1,249), and the smallest were Tiverton (11), Congleton (11) and Louth (10). At that time the number of officers in the Metropolitan police was about 17,000 (Bunyan 1977; Critchley 1978).

The reduction of forces continued until the Second World War, and following the war, numbers were reduced rapidly until 1960. As Bradley et al state, "... despite a continuity in basic bureaucratic form, the organisational basis of
policing has dramatically altered during the post-war period. We have fewer forces and larger forces, than ever before' (1986: 12). On the other hand, in terms of internal structures of police organisation, there has not been a fundamental change. According to Gregory, the only significant developments from the introduction of Peel's new police in 1829 to 1964 are the formation of Criminal Investigation Departments (CID), and the Special Branch as a response to threats to the security of the state and political crimes (1985: 37). Despite the reduction in the number of police forces as a result of amalgamations and centralisation, policing in England & Wales has always been relatively decentralised or local, and important discussions about changing the system did not take place until the 1960s.

In 1960, the Royal Commission on the Police (The Willink Commission) was appointed. The commission discussed whether the form of the police should be a centralised system or not. The majority of the commission decided to continue with local police forces but with more central government involvement (Bunyard 1978: 30). Although this was the decision of the majority, some members of the commission were insisting upon the necessity for a 'national' police force, administered regionally. After the 1964 Act which removed most of the old police regulations, the number of police forces in England & Wales was first reduced to 49 (in 1965) and then to 43 (in 1974), police officers were given more powers to act as such through the whole country, and more progress was made towards centralisation of policing matters and organisational structures.

Looking at the history of the Turkish police, the first policing service in Turkish history was formed in the eighth century, but little is known about the police of the times before the foundation of the Ottoman Empire in 1299. Because the Republic of Turkey was only founded in 1923, it is a relatively new state which inherited the Ottoman policing system. Therefore, the history of the
Turkish police means that of the Ottoman police. During the time before the establishment of the 'professional' police in 1845, which is considered as the 'old policing period', policing in the Empire was carried out by different kinds of military commanders, along with their other duties.

The event which made necessary the establishment of professional and civil police in Turkey was the replacement of the independent military organisations, including the Janissaries, with a new professional army by Sultan Mahmut II during the 1830s. The Janissaries, the largest military force which was also responsible for policing, was abolished and the new army had no policing responsibilities. The Empire was declining at the beginning of the nineteenth century and the Janissaries, who had been involved in demonstrations demanding social and economic rights, were blamed by the Sultan for this decline. When the Janissaries were abolished, there was a gap in maintaining public order, and a new civil police force was required to fill it.

Nevertheless, on 10 April 1845, the first police regulation (Polis Nizamnamesi) which was a basic translation of French police regulations (Gulmez 1983: 5), was introduced. With this regulation, the police remained within the framework of the military force but were slowly becoming a non-military force. As the police began to fulfil more policing functions than military functions, the police organisation underwent administrative and structural change (Dundar 1986:120).

In 1848, the police were removed from the jurisdiction of Serasker (Chief of Staff), and placed under the police directorate known as the Zaptiye Musiriyeti (Police Marshalship) which is the first professional police organisation in Turkish history. While the police in the capital, Istanbul, were becoming a non-military force during the latter half of the nineteenth century through the introduction of
the Police Marshalship, the other provincial units, which are considered as the basis of the gendarmerie, retained an army association. Maybe because of this, the organisation was named the Ministry of Gendarmerie in 1879. In 1909 this ministry was also abolished and replaced with the Directorate of Public Security attached to the Ministry of the Interior (Ökcabol 1939: 77). The gendarmerie was then organised separately from the civil police.

The Inspecting Officers who were introduced in 1867 to assist the provincial governors in maintaining law and order are the origins of both the Turkish national police and the gendarmerie of today. But the principal organisations devoted to maintaining law and order today, the police and the gendarmerie, both trace their origins to 1845 when the first police regulation was introduced. However the police regulations were not codified until 1907, when the three branches of the service were introduced: judicial, administrative and executive (Ingleton 1979: 165-6).

When the Ottoman Empire collapsed after the First World War and the Republic of Turkey was founded by the revolutionists led by Kemal Ataturk, the old police commanders disappeared or changed their uniforms and functions so that they were no longer recognisable. New personnel appeared, performing the police functions in different ways but with a similar organisation and approach to their responsibilities. In other words, Turkey inherited the Ottoman professional police organisational system which experienced some further changes later on (Aydin 1991: 10).

Just after the foundation of the new republic in 1923, the name of the national police organisation became the General Directorate of Security, which still exists, and the organisation of the gendarmerie was reorganised again attached to the Ministry of the Interior for their policing functions (The
Gendarmerie are also responsible to the Ministry of Defence for their military functions. A further reorganisation of the gendarmerie took place in 1930, and of the national police in 1932 which divided the police into two branches: uniformed and plain-clothes detectives. The last reform of the police regulations affecting general organisational structures took effect in 1937 with the Police Organisation Act. This Act still controls the Turkish national police force today, despite some small changes which have been made from time to time.

No significant organisational changes were made in the Turkish police from 1937 to the 1960 military coup. From 1960 until now, there have been only two major changes. The first one was the formation of the Riot Police (Toplum Polisi) within the central and provincial police departments in 1965. These changes were either responsive or pre-emptive to public disturbances and political violence following the introduction of the new constitution in 1961. This constitution not only gave more freedom of individual political activity, but also more powers to the police to tackle political disturbances. These police units were replaced by the Rapid Action (Cevik Kuvvet) units in 1982. The second change was the creation of Special Operation Teams (Ozel Harekat Timleri) and the Anti-terror Police Departments within the central and provincial police departments and within the gendarmerie organisation in 1986 (Aydin 1988: 44).

Policing change in both England & Wales and Turkey since the beginning of the 1960s, the existing police organisational structures, the trends of change and potential changes in the near future will be considered in chapter 4. As part of the research on recent and current organisational changes, I sought the views of chief police officers in England & Wales through either interviewing or writing to them by letter (letters to and from police officers are included in Appendix I). Also, I spent several months in Turkey in order to research policing change and

22
directions of change, collecting materials and interviewing some chief police officers.

It is clear from the historical account given here, however, that the police are profoundly an integral part of the social, economic and political development of society. Structural changes in policing are closely related to the socio-economic and political context and there is a close relationship between the state and the police. Modern society is a society of organisation (Etzioni 1964: 110) and there is a strong relationship between social environment and organisations within it, as well as a relationship between organisations themselves in an environment. These relationships are determined in the process of exchange, conflict, co-operation or bargaining, all of which are affected by sociological, cultural and power factors.

As an organisation, the police have to work within a social and political environment which largely determines what they can or cannot do. Policing change is related to social change, but this does not mean that all changes in policing are simply responsive to social and political changes. They can also be pre-emptive. As societies experienced industrialisation, urbanisation and a concentration of power, police organisational structures have faced changes. For example, as I will elaborate below, the establishment of the Metropolitan police in London in 1829 and the creation of the modern Turkish police in 1845 were related to the changes in socio-economic and political contexts. According to Critchley, as social and political influences shift, the police system adjusts itself, with local variations, to meet the pressures and needs of changing economic, political and social conditions (1978: 36). This contradicts, to some extent, Bayley's argument.

In times of relative socio-economic and political tranquillity, police forces generally, although not in all states, act with the consent of the communities, but when major crises and dissent exist, policing strategies change and consensus
turns into conflict. The legislation which makes the police more coercive is usually introduced in these circumstances and it generally remains following a crisis. As Shane points out, '... the development of police and their expansion and reorganisation have often coincided with and been explained by a major "law and order" crisis or social unrest within the society' (1980: 3). There are many examples of this type of police legislation in the history of police in both England & Wales and Turkey. For example, the most important legislation which gave police more power was made in England & Wales during or just after the two World wars and the public disorders of the 1980s. In Turkey also, the wars and the military coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980 which occurred because of social and political disturbances and terrorism, were the times when the toughest police legislation was enacted.

The most recent factors which have led to police organisational change such as specialisation, militarisation and centralisation in England & Wales have again been public order problems, especially those experienced during the 1980s. The causes of these problems were socio-economic problems such as poverty, unemployment and racial conflict. In Turkey, also during the last three decades, mass political movements by students and workers, clashes between left and right wing groups and terrorist actions have resulted in policing change towards militarisation and specialisation.

The ethnic differentiation in both England & Wales and Turkey is another issue in terms of the socio-economic and political contexts of structural change in policing in the post-war period. As ethnic groups grew in England & Wales, new social and political problems occurred and the police had new tasks and used new policing methods to overcome racial problems such as fighting between different ethnic groups and demonstration by ethnic groups. As racism became a national issue, it has been one reason for the police in England & Wales to develop
national standards. Ethnic differentiation in Turkey is also one of the social and political factors which determine structural change in the police organisation.

In terms of changes in the economic context, the development of modern police in the West is usually related to the development of a capitalist system of economy and a capitalist society in which the bourgeoisie and the working classes exist, although the liberal-democratic belief ignores this link. As industrialisation and urbanisation developed, the ruling class tried to protect the state against possible threats and consequently created a new police force. That is why the police have been accused of being the instruments of the state or rulers to '...impose a particular industrial and economic strategy upon the nation' (Abercrombie & Warde 1994: 463). Further, the world wide economic crisis during the 1920s and 1930s resulted in high unemployment and unsatisfactory employment conditions which caused many disturbances and clashes between the police and workers' unions both in England & Wales and Turkey. This situation was one reason for the police to reorganise in terms of administrative structures and operational policies.

Regarding Turkey, the idea that the introduction of the modern police was a result of economic development and more specifically capitalism, or that it was a response to class struggle or changes in the class structure of a society, can be challenged. It is difficult to assert that the introduction of the professional police in Turkish history is related to the development of capitalism. The increase in the rate of crime and criminals and social and political disturbances in Turkey, which required a reorganisation towards a modern professional police, is also the result of not only rapid urbanisation and industrialisation but also changes in social and economic situation (Metin 1984: 59). However, this does not necessarily mean a class conflict produced by a capitalist system of economy. As Inalcik argues, during the time prior to 1845 when the professional Turkish police was
introduced, the Ottoman Empire basically 'failed' to understand modern economic problems and was 'unable to adapt' itself into the capitalist system of economy and industrial change (1973: 51).

Further, Ece argues that the establishment of the modern Turkish police was not a response to class conflict but rather a 'reconstruction' (1991: 1). It was an effort to modernise the police organisation in order to avoid the decline of the Empire by trying to reach the general level of the modernisation of social life and economic and technological change. This change was headed by reformist Sultans, the heads of the Empire, rather than by a dominant class such as the bourgeoisie, to prevent the decline of the Empire because of internal and external pressure of political and socio-economic change, not simply to protect the interests of a social class. Social classes such as the bourgeoisie, the aristocracy or the working class did not exist in the Ottoman Empire, since the Sultan was the only landlord or land owner. Individuals had only a right of possession and even the people belonged to the Sultan. This avoided the existence of a class of land owners. Also, the policy of recruiting and educating young people or children for future high and key positions in the state administration from those who lost their families during the wars and even from the non-Muslims who would become Muslims later on, did not allow the existence of an aristocratic class. This is the basis of the tradition of a highly centralised and even autocratic regime in Turkish history which prevented the emergence of the bourgeoisie in the Ottoman Empire. Although not in these specific categories, however, there were social classes, such as middle and working classes, in the Marxist definition of the concept of 'class'.

In the contemporary Republic of Turkey, however, there are social classes, because the aim of the new regime was '... to establish a Western like society, including its capitalistic mode' (Ece 1991: 63). The Turkish Republic transformed itself into a capitalist system, but more specifically, state capitalism. Until 1950,
partly because of internal problems in establishing the new regime and partly because of World War II, capitalism could not exist in real terms.

After 1946 when the multi-party political system began and especially when the Democratic Party (DP) came to power in 1950, capitalism found a real foothold. Since 1960, a class conflict between the bourgeoisie and the working class has been seen, and the police, as a state apparatus, acted against workers' and students' movements with tougher and more coercive methods. The new constitution introduced in 1961 expanded the political and social rights in society, and consequently, demonstrations and riots by workers and students began to be seen more and more. This situation required an extra need for maintaining public order and so the 'riot police', a strongly armed and equipped body capable of dealing with public dissent, were formed in 1965.

Although the police believe that they are impartial and apolitical, because law and order does not operate in a political vacuum there has always been a strong relationship between the state or the dominant political regime and the police organisation. As Jones argues, it is the traditional status of the police organisation that it is related closely to the state and other political bodies and it is not completely independent from politics (1980: 17).

It is clear, therefore, that the police have a close relationship with the state or the state's policies. In Weber's definition, the modern state has a capability of monopolising the legitimate use of force within a given territory. Force is not the only means of the state, but a means specific to the state. All states are coercive by using physical force or employing coercion for maintaining order or protecting their systems. The modern state, which is a product of a capitalist economic system, establishes coercive apparatuses such as the police and military to enforce the law and maintain public order (Weber 1968: 64). In modern political thought
the idea of the state is linked to the notion of an impersonal and privileged legal or constitutional order with the capability of administering and controlling a given territory.

There are many factors that ensure political compliance with the formidable resources of state power, especially those for the maintenance of law and order, such as the police. The police constitute a source of state power. In contemporary England & Wales, for example, there is a massive reorganisation of the police involving a further concentration and centralisation of state power developing considerable capacities for control of industrial and political dissent. The police have been given legal powers by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1984. Also, some specialised forces such as Special Response Unit and Anti-Terrorist Squads have been introduced. Moreover, there has been an increase in co-operation between the police and the military (as will be considered in chapter 3) to tackle disturbances (Held 1989: 141).

The relationship between the state and the police is supported by the fact that the maintenance of social control and public order is a political question (Bayley 1985: 189). Brewer et al go further by arguing that the police themselves are in politics, or that policing itself is a political activity and that the police organisation is a political institution of the state: '... though in Britain there is a reluctance to admit to a connection between the police and politics - not least among the police themselves - policing is a political activity' (1988: 38). Brewer also states, in terms of the relationship between the state and police, that:

The police are custodians of the state's monopoly of legitimate force and are thus by definition guardians of the state's interests at least ensuring its continuation as a state. However, the extent to which the police serves specific state institutions, principally government, is a separate issue. While the police are the servants of the state in the sense of expressing its monopoly of legitimate force, they are not bound to defend specific state institutions like governments or political parties (1994b: 175).
Due to this nature of policing, politics in general and especially changes in the political context have always effected changes in policing in England & Wales and Turkey. As Bowden argues, in every kind of political regime, '... the police became the active arm of the establishment and the first line of defence of the state', in order to challenge the possible threats to the state's 'power and authority' (1978a: 20). Therefore, policing is affected by the nature of the state and state-society relations.

Although the reason for the creation of the professional police was to establish 'neutrality' between people and the state, one of the most effective factors of their creation in England & Wales and Turkey was political transformation. The political system was changing and it required changes in policing. The neutrality of the Turkish police, however, can be questioned as they are more likely to be an instrument of the state and working in favour of state interests. As Bayley argues, it is reasonable to accept that the 'consolidation' and 'expansion' of governments would be associated with the formation of a police system (1975: 351).

When we look at English and Welsh history, we see that since the end of the seventeenth century the development of the political system has been relatively peaceful. Before then, political instability was a frequent occurrence, emphasised by civil war, new monarchs and changing political regimes. Political instability resulted in more policing work which brought about reorganisation and the introduction of the new police in 1829. The change in the political context continued to affect policing organisational change even after the 'new police'. Stead argues that the main factor for greater changes after the introduction of the new police in England & Wales in 1829 was political change:

During the half century that followed the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829, legislation promoted by the central government brought great changes in the policing of the country at large. Political reform was the prime motive
of the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, a measure designed to give a voice in local government to the urban middle class (1985: 47).

The main thrust of the 1888 Local Government Act which made important changes in the policing system was also political. This Act put county government on the same democratic basis as that of the corporate towns, and raised the question of state control of the police. As indicated earlier, all political crises including those occurring during recent decades, have been the basis of new policing legislation and structural reorganisation in England & Wales.

Regarding the political context of the development of the professional Turkish police, the point to make is that they were established at a time (1845) when the police were mainly influenced by religion as the most important part of politics. The police force served as bodyguards of the Sultan as head of state and of religion as the Khalife of Islam, to protect the ruling family, but no other families or political interests.

It might be argued that the effect of a socio-economic and political environment on an organisation is determined by the nature of the organisation itself and its relations with the state. As Etzioni argues, the same environment may have different effects on different types of organisation (1964:74). Therefore, we can say that historically the socio-economic and political context has influenced the police organisation in England & Wales and Turkey in different degrees. More specifically, this thesis posits that the two countries have legitimate police authorities based on different forms of legitimacy, being legal-rational and traditional, different legitimate policing forms, consensual and coercive, and different types of police organisations such as centralised or decentralised organisations. These issues will be considered more thoroughly in chapters 3 and 4.
In order to understand the formation and development of the police more clearly, it is important to consider different theoretical perspectives and explanations which have been offered during this century. I refer to three different theoretical perspectives: traditional, alternative and new perspectives. The traditional perspective varies from the early pioneering exploration of police history in Britain such as Lee (1901) and Reith (1938, 1943, 1948, 1956) to the more detailed studies such as Radzinowicz (1956, 1968) and Critchley (1978). The alternative perspectives were presented by the analytical studies published during the 1970s such as Storch (1975, 1976), Bunyan (1977), Walker (1977), Bowden (1978a) and Robinson (1979). Concerning new perspectives which are either syntheses or criticisms of the traditional and alternative perspectives, I refer to Brewer et al (1988), Vogler (1991), Reiner (1992b) and Emsley (1983, 1991, 1994).

Until the 1980s policing history was dominated by traditional studies written usually by former civil servants for the police. For example, Lee (1901) was an army officer preparing himself for the post of chief constable, and Critchley (1978) was an Assistant Under-Secretary of the State in the Home Office (Robinson 1979: 35). They ‘... saw history in relatively simple terms of progress and presupposed the emergence of a broad consensus in politics and society’ (Emsley 1991: 3-4). According to the traditional perspective, the motives for creating the new police were the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the old policing system at the close of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. In other words, the problem was the inability of control arrangements to cope. The ‘new police’ were a bureaucratic institution of professionals rationally administered and directed towards a policy of regular patrols to deter crime and maintain order (Reiner 1992b: 18). For traditional historians, the creation of the
new professional police was necessary and inevitable. For example, Reith states, in terms of the 'advantages' brought by the creation of the new police, that:

It is an unquestionable historical fact that the appearance of public orderliness in Britain, and of individual willingness to co-operate in securing and maintaining it, coincides with the successful establishment of the police institution (1943: 3).

This argument was shared also by many other traditional historians such as Lee (1901: xxv-xxvii) and Critchley (1978: xvii). They argue that the major impact of the police was on the welfare of the working class and the poor, and they protected the weak against the strong. Lee, for example, states that the police were '... designated to stand between the powerful and the weak, to prevent oppression, danger and crime' (1901: xxx). The same point is also made by Reith (1956: 203), Critchley (1978: 28) and Radzinowicz (1956: 233).

The themes of these historians are united by the conception that England & Wales is a democratic country and the police organisation, as one of its institutions, is democratic, either identical with or representative of the people. Robinson expresses the rationalisation developed by the traditional historians in four themes:

(1) that the need for police arises out of the division of society into good and bad citizens; (2) that one result of the growth of police power is to protect the weak against the powerful; (3) that the police is dependent for its effectiveness on public support; and (4) that historically the business of policing has been confined to the people themselves (1979: 35).

In order to understand the traditional perspective, we must refer to Reith (1938, 1943, 1948 and 1956) and Critchley (1978) who are both traditional historians but have slightly different views especially in terms of the notion of police function. The traditional interpretation of police development in England & Wales is most forcefully elaborated in the works of Reith, who argues that the establishment of the police is to preserve society from 'uncontrollable crime and mob violence' since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries which were 'the golden age
of gangsterdom in England'. There was an 'increasing menace of disorder'. Democratic civilisation literally depends on the establishment of the police and the police are members of the community who are paid to work for the interests of community welfare and existence. It was the effort of 'gangsterdom' and the success of its propaganda which '... frustrated for nearly a century every attempt to end the menace of crime and disorder by creating police' (Reith 1943: 12). He states elsewhere that:

Charles Rowan laid the foundation for us of a police institution which is unique in the world and in history because the power of our police is almost entirely desired from the co-operation given to them by the public. If this for one reason or another is withdrawn, our police are helpless and must cease to function (Reith 1956: 265).

Further, he argues that complaints and criticisms about the police arise from a confusion of mind caused by an inability to distinguish between the police and police administration. What could be criticised, he suggests, is the failure of police administration, not the police organisation itself. The existing police weaknesses of every kind are almost solely the product of defective police administration. Many institutions, individuals and groups criticise the police. These could be listed as the aristocracy, nearly all the magistrates and most judges, bankers and merchants of good repute, all criminals and all who benefit, directly or indirectly, from crime and finally all political extremists known as the 'ultra-radicals' or 'ultras' (Reith 1956: 153-4). He goes on to say that:

The ultra leaders were well aware of the real cause of the complete discomfiture of their revolutionary plans during the reform crisis.... They realised that to secure a complete victory over the unarmed police in London was an essential preliminary to revolutionary progress and to exposing to the masses the weaknesses in numbers of the troops throughout the country, which were authority's only other means of opposing (1956: 161).

What Reith tries to do is to balance the foregoing threats against the growth of hostility to the idea of forming a professional police. The function of the police is founded in the balanced system of the interplay between the police
and the public in which the police officer is in the role of teacher of non-violent conduct in the school of public affairs. As Robinson points out, in all Reith's works the idea is almost the same: the central task of a civilised nation is to provide a law-enforcement authority, and this is the police (1979: 40).

Critchley whose work is one of the most recent detailed traditional studies of police history, has a slightly different perspective from Reith. He is hostile to 'rigid' or 'dogmatic' historical theories. The difference between the two authors, in terms of police function in society is that Reith argues that public orderliness comes from the police (1943: 3), while Critchley believes that the 'gentility' of the police derives from the historical and traditional roots of the community, but the source of violence in society is the working class (1978: 73). Although Critchley seems to be sympathetic to the working class, he asserts that it is against them that the police must be used. He further argues that the police are used for different purposes from time to time:

In the nineteenth century the main problems were poaching, vagrancy, and petty crime; during the first three decades of the twentieth, public order constituted a major problem; now the challenge is from crime of all kinds, and road traffic (Critchley 1978: 320).

In terms of the reasons for the creation of the new police, Critchley argues, like almost all traditional police historians, that the old policing system collapsed because of the corruption of constables and justices, and the breakdown of law and order. He agrees with Reith when explaining policing in Victorian England & Wales, by saying that crime and public order disturbances were challenges to the police (1978: 163). His argument is that the creation of the new police was an achievement of the nineteenth century:

The achievement of the nineteenth century was the establishment of the prototype Metropolitan Police and the provision of means for creating similar local forces elsewhere; the achievement of the second was to consolidate a police system throughout the century by arming the Home Secretary with coercive powers to raise local standards uniformly (1978:101).
One of Critchley's main arguments is that in a democratic state where the rule of law is well established and Parliament is supreme, a highly respected police force is a condition, not a denial of liberty, but it should be within the restraints of law. This was well understood by Peel and other pioneers of policing in England, but its truth has been obscured, owing to the confusion between two broadly different ideas: the first one is the beneficial purposes of strong policing in a democracy, the other one is despotism, deliberately destructive of freedom, of a so-called police state. Moreover, the development of the police was a progression from anarchy to civilisation. The police system sustains the civilisation of people and also promotes freedom under the rule of law without which civilisation is worthless. The police represent the collective interests of the community, and hold a balance somewhere between 'total freedom' which is anarchy, and 'total order' which is tyranny. The police represent society towards the regulation of civilisation. Regard for the police is regard for law and order. Patrick Colquhoun did not exaggerate, Critchley says, when declaring at the end of the eighteenth century, that '... everything that can heighten in any degree the respectability of the office of constable, adds to the security of the state, and the safety of life and property of every individual' (Critchley 1978: xvii-xviii).

The traditional perspective of police history was challenged in the 1970s as the alternative perspectives of police development became dominant. These studies '... tended to describe the police as an instrument created by and for the capitalist state as a means of imposing and maintaining class hegemony' (Emsley 1991: 1-2). An alternative view from the opposite end of the political spectrum has always been available but it has been elaborated in academic historical studies published during the 1970s. The alternative studies are generally critical towards traditional historians, but only some of them propose different perspectives. For example, Bunyan (1977) suggests a different theoretical perspective from
traditional historians when criticising them, while Robinson who analysed and criticised traditional histories, did not consider police history from a different perspective and even acknowledged that ‘... these critical comments do not in any way reduce their extremely important contribution to police history’ (1979: 46).

The alternative police histories are ‘academic’ or ‘analytical’ studies. This perspective gives a more concrete and precise social basis of political conflict concerning the police and relates policing to a wider context. It embodies equal, but opposite distortions to the traditional perspective. In this perspective the police are seen as a means of maintaining the dominance of a ruling class against the interests and opposition of the various sections of the working class who constitute the majority of the population. It also maintains that the police are best understood as the obvious answer to a problem; but the problem is not the increase in crime and disorder, it is rather the growth of an industrial society and the need of the ruling class to maintain its position and to discipline the new working class in the industrial society (Reiner 1992b: 12; Emsley 1991: 4).

According to this alternative perspective, the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation, which are the fundamental sources of the demand for a ‘new police’, occurred within a specifically capitalist framework. Therefore, the basic cause of increasing disorder was capitalist development and the motive for establishing the new police was the maintenance of order required by the capitalist class, ‘... with control of crime, riot, political dissidence and public morality being separate subsidiary facets of this overall mission’ (Reiner 1992b: 301).

MacKay asserts that the traditional police historians are wrong in arguing that the formation and development of a professional police force was inevitable. What was inevitable was the process of social control in which the police play a considerable role in the policing of the ideological battle of hegemony between
social classes (1987: 89). For the alternative perspective, the beneficiaries of the new police are the bourgeoisie who established them, and the police themselves who had opportunities for social advancement and power. For example, Bunyan argues that the bourgeoisie benefited most from the establishment of the new police since the police protected their property and their social position or status (1977: 63-4). That is why the deepest opposition to the new police came from the working class.

One important point which is common in the alternative police histories is that 'the people' did not control the police, although there is some debate about whether or not the provincial police were controlled by the 'local elite'. Nevertheless, they are united in denying the traditional perspective that '... the new police were subject to popular control' (Reiner 1992b: 37).

In terms of the social control role of the police, Storch (1975 and 1976), Levett (1975) and Emsley (1983) mention a version of the alternative perspective. This is the structuralist perspective which regards the police as an instrument of class power. These historians suggest that the establishment of the police was a response by urban elites to their inability to control the social order as they had done previously, especially in terms of controlling immigrants, migrant workers and the poor in general, all of whom were considered to be 'dangerous classes'. According to this perspective, the police were designed to impose new kinds of social control on the new working class. Emsley, for example, states that:

The police, as an instrument of class power, fits well with what might be conveniently termed as a 'structuralist' view of nineteenth-century society which has pinpointed a common tendency, beginning with the Enlightenment, for an individual's time and space to be totally controlled (1983: 6).

Two important contributors of 'structuralism' are Foucault (1977, 1984), although he rejects the term 'structuralist', and Ignatieff (1978) who criticises
Foucault. According to Foucault, the police in the nineteenth century exercised 'a permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance'. They did not act against the state, because they were identified 'with a society of disciplinary-type' (1977: 214-15). For Ignatieff also, the police in that century were the 'disciplinarians' of the working class (1978: 189). As Emsley states:

This 'structuralist' view of police development provides a timely potent antidote to the Whig view, and both Foucault and Ignatieff provide a multiplicity of valuable insights. The problems are, on the one hand, the determinist nature of this interpretation, and on the other, the fact that, for all its power, the argument that police forces were established and developed to impose discipline cannot be proved by reference to the canon of historical evidence (1983: 7).

The alternative theoretical perspective adopted by Bunyan has attempted to bring out those aspects of police work which the traditional perspective denies, extending to a whole range of attitudes which affects an understanding of the contribution of the past to the present. According to this perspective, the historical development of the police demonstrates class interests explicitly present in their creation and later practices, and it is this perspective that the traditional considerations of the police history fail to account for (Bunyan 1977: 289). Contrary to the perspective of traditional historians such as Reith and Critchley, therefore, far from representing the collective interests of the community, the police act in the interests of a particular class. In other words, the police may act in the interests of individual members of the working class, but they have opposed, historically and contemporarily, the interests of the working class as a whole. In this respect history speaks for itself and denies the foundations of liberal-democracy (Bunyan 1977: 289). He states that:

Conventional histories pose the anarchy of pre-police times against a progression towards a civilised way of life. They argue that this can be explained through the recognition by all the people of the need to respect the rule of law and its enforcers, the police. Underpinning this respect is the independence of the law and the police from sectarian or class interests so that by protecting the rights of all, the liberty of the individual is guaranteed. An alternative history must seek to explain the interests that
the police were formed to protect, and the way in which the system gained general acceptance (1977: 58).

Bunyan agrees with the alternative perspective of police history in the sense that it proposes that the creation of the new police was not because of the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the old police but because of the development of capitalism, arguing that:

The modern police were formed at a time when the old police system of policing which had worked quite effectively for more than five hundred years, broke down with the onset of industrial capitalism. The rank and file of the police were recruited exclusively from the working class and came to provide protection primarily for bourgeois persons and property in the name of an 'independent' agency and through an 'independent' system of law (1977: 73).

What we can understand from this statement is that there is a link between the emergence of the modern police and the development of a capitalist economic system in general. The growth of particular crimes and public order disturbances is related to economic development. When economic development exists, crime against wealth and property can be seen more widely than at times when society is more generally poor and desperate. Therefore, the context in which the Metropolitan police was founded in London was determined by such socio-economic characteristics and the new police had contact with different classes such as rich and poor, employed and unemployed, and law-abiding and criminal.

Bunyan argues that the origins of the police and other institutions practising state power date from the time of ruling-class governments, and historical reality shows these institutions to be the product of the collective efforts not of the people but of the ruling class (1977: 297). During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries crime increased as a result of the movement from the land to towns, the growth in population, and the advent of large numbers of people living in poverty. The ruling class responded to these developments first by seeking to extend the old policing system and then by the establishment of the regular police:
Policing was (and still is) concerned with two areas - public order and crime. The maintenance of public order was essential to frustrate the nation-wide struggles by the new working class. Crime was perceived by the ruling class to be inextricably bound up with poverty, the poverty of the urban poor and the low wage-earning farm workers (Bunyan 1977:61).

According to Bunyan, the coercive power of the state in everyday life has been largely legitimised and the actions of the workers often considered as criminal and unlawful. He further argues that police histories place much emphasis on the violence of the 'mob' before the creation of the new police from the 1830s but historical evidence does not support this position. About twenty major riots and disturbances took place in Britain between 1736 to 1848, the crowds killed a dozen at most, while the courts hanged 118, and 630 were shot dead by security forces. Also, between 1850 and 1920, 8,520 miners were killed by pit disasters but no mine-owner found himself in prison (1977: 300).

Bunyan concludes by arguing that it is clear from the historical practice of the British state that its repressive agencies have been overwhelmingly directed against the movements of the working class. This is true of the past as well as the present, because the police and other state institutions play their role in the reproduction of the prevailing order which entails the elimination of any political activity threatening capitalist domination.

The main difference between the traditional and alternative police histories is that the traditional perspective emphasises policing by consent and concerns the view that the state derives its legitimacy from its representation as the embodiment of agreed values, while the alternative perspective recognises the police only as an instrument of coercion (Brewer et al. 1988: 214). Like the traditional police histories, the alternative perspectives of police history are also being debated. Although there is nothing like a 'counter-revisionist' position yet, recent studies such as Reiner (1992b) and Emsley (1983, 1991, 1994) suggest that both the
traditional and early alternative perspectives embody questionable assumptions. These are new perspectives for understanding police history which are either syntheses of the traditional and alternative perspectives, or criticisms of both of them. For example, Reiner (1992b)\textsuperscript{1} interprets police history with a neo-Reithian perspective which is a synthesis of the traditional and alternative perspectives, while Emsley's (1983, 1991 and 1994) perspective is a critical view of police history. Reiner's and Emsley's explanations also provide a comparison with the two perspectives considered previously.

Reiner proposes his neo-Reithian synthesis of the traditional and alternative theoretical perspectives as a 'new' and 'most appropriate' perspective for understanding police history. He defines the traditional perspective of police history as the 'cop-sided view of police history', and the alternative perspective as 'a lop-sided view of history' (1992b: 12, 25). Reiner criticises the traditional historians because of their '... lack of appreciation of the rational basis of opposition to the police' and the alternative perspectives because they '... over-emphasise the extent of continued working class opposition' (1992b: 55-6). He suggests that a neo-Reithian synthesis would give due weight to the success of the police reformers and the tradition they created, but also accept that policing is in a social order given by structured bases of conflict, not fundamental integration:

\textsuperscript{1} Reiner uses the terms 'orthodox' and 'revisionist' instead of the 'traditional' and 'alternative' perspectives of police history. I use the terms traditional and alternative for consistency of terminology, because these are the terms most commonly used by the studies in the field. Reiner compares the two perspectives by asking and answering ten questions about the 'new' police, which I am not considering here in detail. These questions are: What was the source of the need for a new police? What was wrong with the old policing arrangements? What were the motives for police reform? Who opposed the new police? How long did opposition to the police last? What was new about the new police? What was the social impact of the new police? Who gained from the new police? Who controlled the police? What model of historical explanation underlines orthodox/revisionist police history? (1992b: 13-56).
What is needed is a neo-Reithianism which neither writes of the police as "conning bastards", nor as all sweetness and light (Reiner 1992b: 41).

Reiner argues that in many respects, the alternative perspectives constitute an unequivocal advance in the understanding of the establishment of the new police, but that this view is in many respects an inversion of the traditional perspective:

To the revisionists [alternative historians] conflict between police and the working class in a capitalist society has structural roots, so periods of social integration can only be an artificially constructed, temporary truce. On the other hand, in the traditionalist analysis a liberal democratic industrial society is structurally integrated, so social conflict can only be a superficial phenomenon (1992b: 38-9).

Further, in terms of controlling the police, he states that both the traditional and alternative perspectives assume a 'fit' between the type of police system and the control requirements of a capitalist society. It is this condition which calls into being the actions of people who make their own history by creating a new police force (1992b: 39). The traditional perspective has no foundation for the claim that the 'people' controlled the police. The new police signified a move away from a degree of popular control. In terms of public support or opposition to the police, he compares and criticises both perspectives:

The evidence of sustained anti-police hostility and violence which the revisionists have accumulated is certainly sufficient to dispel the orthodox notion of easy and early acceptance of the new police by the mass of the population. But the revisionists err in the opposite way, neglecting the clear evidence of growing acquiescence and indeed support for the police amongst a broad section of the working class, as well as the middle class (1992b: 48).

Unlike the alternative perspectives, Reiner concludes by arguing that in many places the police came to be accepted by some sections of the working class after their inception.
Emsley, on the other hand, criticises the traditional perspective, but is also equally sceptical of the alternative perspectives. Emsley considers his critical perspective as a 'counter factual' history of the police (1983: 163). The basic differentiation between Reiner's and Emsley's perspectives is that the former simply synthesises the traditional and alternative perspectives while the latter criticises them.

According to Emsley, both the traditional and alternative perspectives of police history describe the development of the police in terms of rational solutions to the problems. In the traditional perspective it is great far-sighted men who recognise the solutions but in the alternative perspective the solutions tend to be class needs. Therefore, police reformers and politicians act as spokesmen for their own classes (1991: 4-5). He goes on to say that:

The problems which brought about the creation of the new police were not clear cut; and neither were the solutions. It often seems a popular assumption that ideas go into the legislative process at one end and come out virtually unchanged, except for being converted into laws, at the other. In fact there were considerable changes between the hopes and plans of the reformers and the legislation which eventually emerged establishing the police force of England & Wales (1991: 5).

As I have already indicated, Emsley is more critical towards the traditional perspective of history than the alternative perspective. According to the traditional perspective, there is one police service in England & Wales which was derived from the model of the establishment of the Metropolitan police. This perspective implies two things: first, the Metropolitan police model demonstrated its efficiency and it was taken up by other counties and boroughs, although some of them failed to adopt the model. The second implication is that the Metropolitan police model, or the English model, was unique for being non-military, unarmed, and non-political. Emsley criticises these two implications by saying that the first has led to a serious distortion of the history of police and policing, and the second ignores the political and social context in which the police were allowed to
develop during their formative period and especially in the second half of the nineteenth century (1991: 229). He states that:

Pains were taken at the time of the creation of the Metropolitan Police to ensure that they did not look military, and the traditional police historians insist that the English police were always 'non-military'. However, policemen were organised in a strict hierarchical institution. During the nineteenth, and for much of the early part of the twentieth century, many of their commanding officers were former soldiers, or men from the colonial gendarmeries. The constables were subjected to a strict discipline, they were given parade-ground drill and sometimes quartered in 'barracks' (1991: 235).

What Emsley argues is that the police have always enforced a dominant ideology, and have military and coercive powers, but they have generally preferred to function by consent. 'Prevention' was the key word for England's new police since many feared that crime and political unrest were increasing, and the new police were formed to prevent them. The principal arguments advanced in Parliament for the creation of the Metropolitan Police in 1829 were that it would be valuable in helping to prevent crime, and crime was rising (1983: 126). However, he criticises the view which considers 'prevention' as the reason for establishing the new police, by saying that it is difficult to estimate success in the prevention of crime, and to prove the extent of crime prevention:

Modern research has produced conflicting evidence on the effectiveness of preventive patrolling in deterring crime during the mid-twentieth century. It seems probably that any one intent on committing a crime will do so, taking good care to ensure that there is no preventive patrol in the vicinity. There is no reason to assume that the nineteenth century was any different either before or after new police forces were established (1983: 129-30).

In his explanation of Victorian policing, however, Emsley argues that the new police originated from fears of crime and disorder, and from a general desire among the rulers to establish and maintain a new level of order within society. The new police were especially good at apprehending those who committed petty street offences but less successful at preventing burglary, which significantly increased in the judicial statistics in the second half of the nineteenth century,
Unlike other forms of property crime. He points out that the police constable was the 'domestic missionary' charged with bringing civilisation. The constable was armed with a battery of legislation to achieve this end. It had been possible to move on street traders and apprehend the disturbers of public order long before the creation of the new police, but the new police brought more efficiency and strictness to this sort of enforcement (1991: 68-70).

What we understand from Emsley's argument is that he does not accept the argument of traditional historians that the establishment of the new police was because of the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the old policing system. He asserts that the creation of the new police was a departure for policing not because the old policing system was inefficient and ineffective, but because it was a new body answerable directly to the Home Secretary. However, this departure from the old style of policing was far more gradual than much traditional police history has allowed and many of the problems attributed to the old system were also to be found with the new police (1991: 59).

Emsley's critics argue that he is somehow against the police. However, he responds by stating that:

While it does seem that the police are not particularly effective in preventing crime or major disorder, it is very difficult to conceive of a modern society functioning without some professional body to which crimes and offences can be reported and which can take charge and organise in cases of accident or disaster - in short a professional police force. Because police forces have tended to take particular forms and to develop in particular ways, this does not mean that these were the only forms or the most efficient ways in which development was possible (1983: 163).

What we can understand from this statement is that Emsley rejects this criticism, and argues that despite ineffectiveness, a professional police force is necessary in modern societies.
1.2. The constitution and models of modern policing

After considering the historical aspects of policing and the historical analysis of the socio-economic and political context of police development, it becomes essential to consider the meaning of the concept of 'police' and models of modern policing in general and in contemporary England & Wales and Turkey in particular.

The English term 'police' originally comes from the Greek terms 'politeia', or its Latin adaptation 'politia' meaning 'policy' and 'polis' meaning 'city' (Manning 1977: 39; Whitaker 1979: 35; Kneymeyer 1980: 172). In Turkish the Greek term 'polis' is used as the equivalent of the term 'police'. The term 'police' has been applied historically, to 'the exercise of collective authority' (Whitaker 1979: 35), or 'a condition of order in the community' (Kneymeyer 1980:172). In the contemporary meaning, the concept of 'police' and its equivalent in Turkish (polis) signifies 'an organised body of constabulary' (Fosdick 1972: 3), having specific functions of crime prevention and order maintenance (Johnston 1992a: 3) and refers both to protection from danger, and to concern with matters of welfare (Kneymeyer 1980: 182).

Policing functions were carried out by the ordinary people in the early ages of the history of policing, and there were no formal policing agencies or individuals (Avery 1981: 10). As a result of the movement towards the bureaucratisation of policing, society has given over these tasks to the professionals. However, questions of who these professionals are, and what sort of role they should fulfil have always been raised.

In police and academic literature, there is no agreement on the general definition of the 'police'. This may be partly because of the disagreement among authors on the role and functions of the police. For example, are they the
protectors of the interests of the state or the servants of community? Do they constitute a force or a service? The concept of 'police' is also defined differently in different socio-economic and political environments or countries. For example, the police in England & Wales are more likely to be considered the servants of community, at least to some extent, while in Turkey the police are more likely to be perceived as an instrument of the state protecting the interests of the state.

According to Mawby, it is difficult to define the police because as academic discussion of 'policing' became more common, a definition of the 'police' tended to be avoided (1990: 2). It is usually argued that the concept of 'police' is relatively modern and 'policing' is an old one (Fosdick 1972: 3; Johnston 1992a: 4).

Another difficulty with defining the police is because everyone defines the police in terms of their different aspects such as organisational structures, functions, or culture, and according to different political and theoretical orientations. According to Klockars, who classifies such definitions as 'norm-derivative', no definition of police will do if it is a reflection of the political and theoretical orientations or sense of humour of its author. He argues that the concept of police cannot be satisfactorily defined in terms of its 'ends', but in terms of its 'means'. A proper definition must be based on the fundamental tool which police use to do their work, rather than on what they use that tool to do, because the police have used the 'means' which defines them to achieve many different 'ends' (1985: 9). Klockars goes on to define 'police' by stating that, '... police are institutions or individuals given the general right to use coercive force by the state within the state's domestic territory' (1985:12).

According to Cain, the police must be defined in terms of their key practice: 'They are appointed with the task of maintaining the order which those
who sustain them define as proper' (1979: 158). Lepine also defines the 'police' as
'... an organised body of officers whose primary duties are the preservation of
order, the security of the person and safety of property' (1905: 4). According to
Bayley, the term 'police' refers to:

... people authorised by a group to regulate interpersonal relations within
the group through the application of physical force. This definition has
three essential parts: physical force, internal usage, and collective

Mawby defines the police in terms of their structures, functions, and culture. The
police is an agency which can be distinguished in three ways: firstly in terms of its
legitimacy, which implies that the police are granted some degree of monopoly by
those occupying power within the society, secondly through its structure, which
implies that the police is a specialised and organised force, and finally by its
function, which implies that the role of the police is concentrated on the
maintenance of law and order (1990: 3).

Accordingly, the police may be seen as an arm of government control, or a
state institution exercising coercive powers in society especially in terms of
maintaining order. In short, the primary role of the police is order maintenance
which in turn is the primary need of all states (Brewer et al 1988: 1; Bowden
1978: 19), although it may be exercised essentially on the basis of coercion or
consensus in different states. All other tasks of the police such as the protection
and preservation of life and property, the prevention and suppression of crime, the
enforcement of laws, the apprehension of offenders and the provision of a wide
range of public and welfare services are subordinate to the primary function of
order maintenance (Bowden 1978: 19).

Considering contemporary policing, however, it is also essential to discuss
the welfare function of police. As a result of the transformation of state objectives
towards a 'welfare state' or 'security state' from the beginning of the eighteenth
century, the welfare aspect of policing functions came into being. Kneymeyer argues that in Germany, for example, the term 'police' (Polizei) was understood to be the institution which relates to the public welfare of the state in general, and its contributors, and those who care for the order, security and welfare of subjects (1980: 181-2). Although by the end of the eighteenth century the welfare notion of police tended to be eliminated as an objective of the state, or be separated from the function of order maintenance, it is still one aspect of contemporary policing especially in developed countries. Brewer et al state that:

In some quarters, the police are now regarded as a substitute for the continuing pursuit of collectivist and welfare-oriented policies, flourishing in an ideological climate that favours a conservative emphasis on political order at the expense of a liberal stress on rights. One casualty of the growth of this perception has been the post-war inter-party consensus about the police and policing (1988: 7).

Brewer et al mean that although the nature of policing in England & Wales is increasingly becoming coercive or even authoritarian especially when dealing with political and industrial disorders, contemporary political governments tend to give police welfare functions so that they can be perceived by the public, as 'liberal democratic'.

Cohen explains this change with 'a particular crisis of authority for the liberal democratic state', 'authoritarian consensus' and even 'friendly fascism'. According to Cohen, there is a shift in the nature of the state from 'liberal welfare state' to 'authoritarian state'. Welfare budgets are cut and welfare services are transferred to the private sector. The hard side of the state becomes even harder with more investment in policing and other criminal justice services (1985: 107-9). Cohen argues that this is a change towards 'punishing' innocent matters and rule-breakers in the name of 'justice' and 'welfare' (1985: 114).

With the exception of the USA, the police in most developed countries, however, spend more time on 'non-crime' work or on 'welfare' work compared
with underdeveloped countries. For example, in England & Wales non-crime work or public welfare services takes up a relatively high proportion of police time (Bayley 1985: 125; Mawby 1990: 195-6), while in Turkey the police place little or no emphasis on welfare work. Some individual officers may do so, but it is not required by the system or regulations.

The concept of the 'modern police' can be understood, in terms of their functions, in two ways: the 'modern police' established in the early nineteenth century, and the police of contemporary time. Walker suggests that modern policing means '... a system of law enforcement involving a permanent agency employing full-time officers who engage in continuous patrol of fixed beats to prevent crime' (1977: 31). Hester & Eglin also point out that '... modern policing is distinctive in so far as it consists of policing by full-time employees of centrally accountable, bureaucratic organisations' (1992: 149). They identify several features of modern policing. The main ones are the organisational and technological aspects of the increased use of force, the development of community policing and the development of a variety of '... illegal police practices in the targeting and control of groups described as "subversive" and "dangerous"' (1992: 153).

According to Bayley, however, the 'modern police' in the world, in terms of legitimacy and functions, tend to be public, specialised and professional (1985: 11-2). Modern policing is dominated by agencies that have become increasingly specialised during the past two centuries. By 'professional' he is referring to explicit preparation to perform the unique police function, involving merit recruitment, formal training structured career advancement, systematic discipline and full-time service. Professionalisation is a characteristic of the modern police more clearly than either publicness, or specialisation. In contemporary times, professionalisation has been accepted as essential to efficient management.
Publicness and specialisation can be found in many societies before the modern time, but professionalisation is rare. The characteristics associated with 'modernity' such as industrialisation, urbanisation, and technology are not necessary to establish public police forces (Bayley 1985: 33). (The notion of 'modernity' will be considered more thoroughly in the next chapter). What is new about the modern police is the combination of these three characteristics, rather than any one of them. Therefore, all the characteristics of the modern police are not necessary to the existence of the police in contemporary times. For example, modern countries do not always have public police forces, or forces which are paid and directed by government, although they may have elaborate legal codes. In other words, 'publicness' is determined after the establishment of states, and the state can authorise an institution for order maintenance without actually directing them, or they can be directed by government but paid privately. Especially in advanced industrial societies in the contemporary world, the number of private police institutions which are less professional is growing considerably. Also, one important consequence of police specialisation was the removal of the military from the function of order maintenance. However, as a result of the problems with political systems, in many contemporary societies, including Turkey, military forces still intervene in public order policing, although Bayley argues that '... the movement from non-specialised to more specialised policing has so far not been reversed' (1985: 44).

What are the models of the modern police? There are different categorisations of the models of modern police in general. For example, Mawby distinguishes between Anglo-Saxon, continental and colonial models of police (1990: 16-33) and Bayley divides the modern police, in terms of operational differences in the approach to problems of social control as; authoritarian, oriental and Anglo-Saxon models (1982: 1). Brewer et al postulate three 'state strategies'
for policing: criminalisation, accommodation and suppression (1988: 231). In terms of categorising the models of contemporary or modern police forces, it is worth focusing on the categorisations of Bayley and on Brewer et al who criticise Bayley.

Bayley's categorisation of models of policing is one of the first attempts to formulate a comparative typology of policing. As Brewer et al argue, when criticising it, what is unusual about this categorisation is that it does not concentrate on a narrow range of homogeneous set of countries (1988: 227). An 'authoritarian police' occurs, Bayley suggests, within systems found in some eastern and central European countries and some countries of Africa and the Middle East where the state assumes authority for social control in whatever way is required to achieve desired ends. The police are usually empowered to enact their own regulations, and they act as an 'omnicompetent administrative institution' doing whatever administrative task the state requires. This means that the police do not exist to help citizens, they exist to serve the state. Authoritarian police stress control through deterrence, not prevention; protection and safety are provided through regulations (Bayley 1982: 1-2).

'Oriental police', on the other hand, for Bayley, are based on a system of community policing, seeking to maintain control through 'persuasion' and community support. The police in the countries that have an oriental system such as Japan, Korea, and Malaysia, encourage people to bring any conceivable problem to them including those pertaining to their social life and welfare. He argues that the Anglo-Saxon police also do these kinds of things, but the oriental police advertise and organise themselves to deal with them. Although the 'oriental' police have the authority of law behind them, they are more than enforcers. They are seen as teachers of morality or welfare workers, not simply as agents of formal control. Bayley argues that in the oriental system, the level of public participation...
into policing is also high, and it makes unclear the distinction between the responsibilities of the police and those of the public, as well as between community sanctioning and legal sanctioning by the police (1982: 3-4).

Bayley's third model is the Anglo-Saxon which typifies the liberal-democratic countries such as the USA, Canada, and Britain where the police '... tend to concentrate more narrowly on tasks associated with law enforcement' (Bayley 1982: 5). This police tradition was initially dependent upon small local groups for law enforcement (Mawby 1990: 18). In the modern time, they are not all-purpose administrative agents of the state or community welfare workers but this is not to say that they carry out only a law enforcement function, they also perform a considerable service function. However, the decision to do so is theirs, rather than being required by the state like in an oriental system (Bayley 1982: 5). The 'Anglo-Saxon police' who are more specialised, have legal authority, but not unrestrained authority to the extent found in an authoritarian system, or moral authority found in an oriental system. They are deployed for emergency response, not for routine, low visibility interaction with the public. They stay in their stations until an incident occurs and are not organised to be part of daily community life. Individual officers or some units may perform this function, but it is not an organisational objective. In the Anglo-Saxon system, the public questions the police and stands up for its rights, but does not want to share responsibility for social control with the police. It is believed that crime is a police matter (Bayley 1982: 5-6).

According to Bayley, Anglo-Saxon police are no less effective than the others and control by the police in an Anglo-Saxon system is light, limited, and more negotiable than in other system. However, he indicates a weakness of this system by stating that:
The failure of Anglo-Saxon police, American especially, to work cooperatively with the public in social control is at the root of our law enforcement dilemma. We do not want to emulate the authoritarian system, though paradoxically there is a tendency to do so when we are hard-pressed to do something about crime. Anglo-Saxon control procedures decay in the direction of authoritarian ones, not oriental ones (1982: 6).

Brewer et al criticise this categorisation of models of policing by saying that a functional breakdown of the tasks of the police in a wide range of different states, shows that all these models of police can co-exist in a national force irrespective of the nature of the state and society. For example, Anglo-Saxon liberal democratic countries have police forces which occasionally discharge 'authoritarian' police functions, or the police forces in authoritarian states sometimes perform 'oriental' policing (1988: 229). In short, all police forces discharge a wide range of duties which encompass all models mentioned by Bayley, and his typology underplays the influence the state has on policing models. Brewer et al go on to say that:

Although Bayley's typology implies that geographically and culturally contiguous states exhibit similar policing styles, this seductive idea is misleading and fails to address explicitly the relationship between policing and the state.... The state plays an important role in conditioning the styles of policing adopted by a force in particular circumstances, at different historical periods and when confronted with specific issues and threats (1988: 230).

According to Brewer et al, any comparative typology of policing needs to incorporate two main features. These are differences in the police-state relationship and the varying mix of models which states typically deploy to accomplish order maintenance. Irrespective of their ideological base or political system, all states need to and must maintain internal order and the emphasis placed on consent and coercion is variable. For example, in liberal-democracies the conduct of the police is formally constrained by law, but it is not unusual for them to act outside the law. Conversely, even the most authoritarian state imposes certain limits on police actions (1988: 215).
Brewer et al identify a range of strategies of policing employed by all states, to either maintain or regain order through police, which are related to their general and primary requirement to maintain public order. These responses or strategies of the state against disorder are: criminalisation, accommodation, and suppression, although they can be combined in varying forms in particular societies (1988: 231). Brewer et al indicate that the advantage of this categorisation is that it sets policing in the context of it relationship to the strategies adopted by the state. 'Criminalisation', for example, involves the police treating public disorder without regard to the political context in which the offences occur. This strategy restricts the police to the limited policy of containment. The justification of this strategy is that it requires the application of the rule of law by the police as universal principle without exception. The strategy of 'accommodation', on the other hand, attempts in some form or other to meet the grievances of the groups from which disorder emanates. The most common forms of this strategy are measures to remove discrimination against a group, affirmative action programmes and steps to tackle deprivation. The third strategy, that of 'suppression', can be realised through suppressive legislation or through harsh police tactics. A hallmark of this strategy is the state's recognition of the political character of the disorder, but through the police, the state confronts rather than accommodates the challenge to its authority. The strategy of suppression tends to be criticised as a violation of human rights, and evidence of the states authoritarianism, which leads to the charge that it constitutes a police state (1988:233).

Brewer et al argue that policing models have changed depending on the changes in the state or state policies and the relationship between the state and the police. They point out that liberal states are becoming more suppressive and authoritarian in their strategies for public order maintenance. Liberal democratic
States operate under the constraint of 'due process' or the norm of legality which restricts their non-legal powers. Other states give the police, as the defender of public order, the autonomy in order to allow them a wider definition of public order than the law allows in practice (1988: 220-1). An authoritarian state, on the other hand, may moderate coercive models of policing for public order maintenance. As Brewer et al point out, '... a liberal-democracy may shift its strategies for order maintenance in a more authoritarian direction in order to demonstrate that it is able to keep public order in a part of its own territory' (1988:237).

Considering Bayley's (1982) and Brewer et al's (1988) categorisations of models of policing, I would now like to define the policing models in contemporary England & Wales and Turkey in particular. The policing model in liberal-democratic England & Wales is primarily 'Anglo-Saxon' (Bayley 1982: 5; Brewer et al 1988: 229), although the police do perform some authoritarian and oriental policing functions. The policing model in England & Wales prior to 1950 can be called as 'liberal', at least to some extent, but has been changed since then. Brewer mentions four characteristics of policing in England & Wales which describe this 'liberal' model. The first characteristic refers to organisational features such as decentralisation and an absence of militarisation. The liberal model also represents the social compositions of the society. The police obtained their mandate from the community and operated on the basis of consensus and legitimacy. Finally, the liberal model refers to apolitical policing (1994b: 176). Contemporarily, the liberal model no longer exist in England & Wales. Brewer et al state that:

No longer do British police tackle major public disorder with dustbin lids and standard truncheons; this slow shift towards a militarised and specialist public order police reflects a reluctance on the part of some liberal-democracies to change the public image of the police as uniformed but unarmed men and women 'in the middle'. In Britain's case this
reluctance hangs incongruously with the argument that there is a shift by the British state toward the right (1988: 226).

Brewer et al argue that the police, on one hand, are repressive and threaten the private lives of people, but on the other hand, they have developed a community policing reminiscent of oriental policing methods to improve police-public relations (1988: 229). Brewer et al state, in terms of the 'authoritarian' aspect of the police in contemporary England & Wales, that:

Change in the nature of public order policing, set against the background of continuing economic decline and the occurrence of bitter industrial disputes and violent street disorders, have encouraged the view that Britain is becoming increasingly authoritarian.... Recent reforms in police methods and organisations including a heavy reliance on mobile patrol, are increasingly considered to be not only ineffective but counter-productive: by dramatising encounters between the police and public, they have damaged the growth of police-community relations (1988: 7).

Accordingly, it would seem that policing in England & Wales is becoming centralised and militarised and that it is related closely to politics or state policies. Brewer identifies several dimensions of state-police relationship. First of all, the police hold political beliefs and allow their conduct to be influenced by these beliefs. They are also, directly or indirectly, engaged in party politics and manipulate the government's priorities in order to obtain a disproportionate share of resources. The police implement government policies and are biased to the legitimate opposition and are also affected by the values and ideology of state institutions. Finally, the conduct of the police affects people's perceptions of the state (1994b: 177-8). This argument can be regarded as a contribution to the 'alternative' perspective of police history expressed by, for example, Emsley (1983) and Bunyan (1977) which have been considered above in this chapter. Also, it has relevance to Bayley's (1982) and Brewer et al's (1988) policing models, and Cohen's (1985) argument on the shift from 'welfare state' to 'authoritarian state'.
This thesis, however, contends that the Turkish police can squarely be placed into the category of 'authoritarian' police. It is the authoritarian characteristic of policing in Turkey which has not yet allowed 'public participation' in policing in the forms of private and voluntary policing. However, to the extent that the Turkish state is not purely an authoritarian state, but a state trying to establish a more democratic system, in the Turkish policing system there are some elements of Anglo-Saxon and oriental models. The government recently encouraged the police to improve police-public relations, and to act as an agent between the state and public, although they are still under the control of a strong centralised administrative system.

Considering Brewer et al's (1988) classification of the state's strategies against disorder, we can say that the police in England & Wales generally follow the strategy of 'accommodation', although they sometimes use the strategies of suppression and criminalisation or a combination of all three, while the Turkish police primarily use the strategy of 'suppression' to maintain order at least in some parts of the country where terrorism and public order incidents are common. In other parts of the country suppression is combined with accommodation and criminalisation.

Especially for the Turkish police we may also use the term 'repressive', a model of policing mentioned by Alderson (1979: 35), rather than the term 'authoritarian'. According to Alderson, policing in those countries which have a strong centralised system is generally repressive, and tends towards alienation of the police from the community. Turkey falls into this definition. In Alderson's words, '... repressive police exist to serve strong or alienated government. Rulers or governments lacking in popular support will rely on repressive police to maintain them in power' (1979: 43).
Although since 1950, 27 years after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, the political system in Turkey has developed towards more democratisation, the policing system has not changed in line with it. As democratisation and politicisation of the society increased, the police organisation has also been politicised, but has worked to tackle political activities against the political power with militarised and coercive methods, rather than democratic methods. In other words, the 'coercive' and 'hard' policing established at the beginning of the foundation of the state to protect the systematically established political regime, still exists in contemporary Turkey. The police in England & Wales, on the other hand, are relatively more involved in 'community policing' and more likely to be the servants of community. They are locally organised on the basis of public consensus, but still there is a trend increasingly towards repressive policing, as a result of increased centralisation and militarisation.

Since there is some difficulty in classifying the policing model in Turkey, I would like to pay more attention to this problem. As we can see, the Turkish police can be called 'authoritarian', 'repressive', or 'coercive', although there are some elements of Anglo-Saxon and oriental policing models. Moreover, we can discuss the question whether or not the Turkish police system is similar to that of 'divided societies' mentioned by Brewer (1991). A divided society is where:

... there is endemic and deep social conflict which adheres around rigid cleavages, such as religion, ethnicity, race or national origin. There is an absence of the social cohesion which is characteristic of more socially integrated and homogeneous societies (Brewer 1991: 179).

Policing is, therefore, more complex because of the nature of conflict, and the police are themselves a part of social conflict rather than neutral arbiters of it, by their partisan methods and lack of autonomy from the political system (Brewer 1991: 187).
There are several internal and external processes in policing which serve to distinguish the police in divided societies from the police in other societies (Brewer 1991: 181-3; Brewer & Magee 1991: 259-61). One general feature is that there is selective enforcement of law in favour of the dominant group, and there is excessive attention to the actions of minorities. There are also discriminatory practices which limit the exercise of the rights of minorities and a penetration by the police into their daily life. Political partisanship in upholding and enforcing the distinction of political power by allowing unequal rights to political protest is another feature of policing in divided societies. Also there is a lack of autonomy from the political system which can be seen in many ways. For example, the police have a direct contribution into political decision-making structures and they are usually allowed to join political institutions.

An effective mechanism of public accountability is absent in divided societies. It is not the case in this sort of society that the police are impervious to external control, but the state tends to rely on its internal mechanism of accountability. The lack of public accountability discourages the police from maintaining autonomy from the political system or the state. The use of force is relatively unrestrained, due to the extensive and broad powers to use force legally, the availability of lethal weaponry, and the absence of public accountability. This arbitrary use of force allows the police to use their discretion in a partial or partisan way.

Another general characteristic of policing in divided societies is that there is a dual role of the police which arises from responsibilities for ordinary crime and internal security. The management of his dual role can be effectively the development of specialist and independent units which are responsible for internal policing matters. The attitudes of the dominant and subordinate groups towards the police and their actions are polarised. The dominant group view the police as
its own guarantor, while the subordinate group view them as agents of oppression. There is also a social composition biased towards the dominant group because of an inability or unwillingness to recruit from among the minority communities. Consequently, there is a chronic and endemic personnel shortage. The police fail to supply new recruits, despite the high demand, because recruitment tends to be restricted to only one section of the divided community. In these societies, the diffusion of policing functions throughout the dominant group as volunteer groups and other compatible institutions are also drawn into a policing role. Finally, there is a close operational links between the police and the military. The shortage of police personnel, under-funding of the police and the deterioration in internal security requires a reliance on military forces.

I would argue that Turkey is not a deeply divided society to the extent that Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Israel have been, but there has always been political instability caused especially by ethnic and religious problems. Accordingly, the Turkish police are similar to the police in divided societies, and have most (arguably seven or eight) of the characteristics of the police in these societies, namely, lack of autonomy from political power, no effective mechanism of public accountability, the police use of force is relatively unrestrained, different social groups have different attitudes towards the police and there is a close relationship between the police and the military. Nevertheless, as Brewer indicates, some of these processes of policing are present even in non-divided societies, especially in those where there is a racial and ethnic tension of a less systematic kind than found in divided societies, such as in the inner city areas in Britain (Brewer 1991: 184-5). Also divided societies are not all divided to the same extent, and the police may perform different roles in different regions of the country:

First a benign mode of policing can coexist in a divided society alongside the paramilitary mode, although they influence each other. Secondly,
'normal policing' is possible in some geographical areas of a divided society, although its introduction can be further advanced by a process of police reform (Brewer & Magee 1991: 264).

In short, we can define the Turkish policing model as 'similar to the police in divided societies' rather than simply 'authoritarian'. But nevertheless, most of the features of the police in divided societies are authoritarian, repressive, suppressive and coercive. In divided societies the main task of the police is to police societal divisions caused by terrorism (Brewer 1994a: 4), and like the RUC in Northern Ireland, one of the main tasks of the Turkish police is also to combat terrorism in general and separatist terrorism in particular. In combating terrorism, the police and the military forces in Turkey usually co-operate together. Since the major terrorist groups are from certain ethnic or religious sections of the society and within fairly definite geographical regions, the attitudes of those in these regions towards the police are not the same as in other areas. The police also see themselves as part of the political government of the day and do not regard themselves as accountable to the community they police.

Apart from a short descriptive account of police history, this chapter considered theoretical issues and some of the academic debates in order to analyse the historical, socio-economic and political context of the formation and development of the police organisation, state-police relations and the constitution of modern policing in general and in contemporary England & Wales and Turkey in particular. The next chapter will consider theoretical issues further and more specifically explore different organisational theories and their application to the police organisation. The theoretical background given in this first and the next chapter will also contribute to our analysis and understanding of the empirical and concrete issues such as police legitimacy, centralisation and decentralisation, discretion and accountability which will be considered in the following chapters.
CHAPTER 2

ORGANISATIONAL THEORIES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO POLICING ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

Although the police have a particular set of characteristics or organisational structure, such as rigid hierarchy of authority, which distinguishes them from industrial, commercial and other types of organisation, it is necessary to examine their general situation in relation to the theory of organisation and bureaucracy. Police are seen to be essentially bureaucratic in character with the design of police organisation following the principle of rational formal bureaucracy. Increased bureaucratisation since World War II resulted in a greater administrative centralisation and rationalisation in police organisation generally. The attitude and behaviour of the members of a police organisation is conditioned and shaped according to the location they occupy within the bureaucracy. In other words, the structures of contemporary police organisation are rational, hierarchical arrangements that can be explained using the classical theory of organisation as suggested by Weber.

This does not mean that other theories of organisation are not applicable to the police organisation at all. However, classical organisational theory would seem to be more relevant and helpful in understanding police organisation. Most aspects of classical organisational theory can be applied to contemporary police organisation and in this chapter neo-classical or human relations theory,
structuralist and radical structuralist theories, post-modern theory and critical theory, will also be considered.

Theories of informal organisation, on the other hand, will not be considered in this chapter because the thesis itself does not consider the organisational sociology of police work, but the formal police organisation. However, this body of theory is important and I would like to introduce it within a few paragraphs. 'Informal organisation' refers to the social relations that develop among the staff above and beyond the formal relations determined by the organisation. Members of an organisation tend to form informal groups or organisations within the formal organisation which exert a definite effect upon the formal structure. An important function of informal groups is to mitigate the harsh routine, discipline and consequent boredom arising from the nature of the work or organisation. The bulk of organisational sociology of police work is driven by the theories of informal organisation as applied in many studies in the field, such as those conducted by Manning (1977; 1979), Holdaway (1979; 1983), Fielding (1984; 1988), Grimshaw & Jefferson (1987) and Ainsworth & Pease (1987).

Informal structures, such as occupational culture and relations between organisation members, constitute significant sources of informal socialisation for personnel who join the police. The main basis of informal organisation within policing is the occupational culture. As Fielding points out, research on police socialisation has highlighted the influence of informal organisations and the very limited effect of formal organisations (1988: 207).

Administrative decisions involve discretion and cannot be based upon an abstract theory of policing, or upon internal rules and regulations of the organisation. Police work at lower levels is mainly discretionary (Manning 1977: 109-10). In the long term, however, policing is carried out according to pre-
determined plans and policies. In this sense, 'policy' refers to rules governing both internal and external relations and is defined as a general plan for the identification of goals, the means of their achievement and aspects of evaluation of the plan. Although there are some external and internal restrictions on policing policies, Manning identifies some problems for which policy is required. These are morale, discretion, accountability, crime fighting focus, rational resource allocation, public confidence and corruption (1977: 342-56). Fielding also points out that the informal reward system, supervisory system and the actor's view of their work and its imperatives affect policies and processes (1988: 15).

The main reason why I feel that this body of important theory in its own right should not be elaborated in this thesis is because, as mentioned earlier, I am concerned with formal police organisation. Another reason is concerned with Turkey where discretion is severely limited. Discretion is part of the informal police organisation and there are radical differences in the use of discretion between England & Wales and Turkey. However, issues of discretion and accountability will be considered in the final chapter.

2.1. Organisation, bureaucracy and rationalisation: classical organisational theory and Weber's theory of bureaucracy

Most classical organisational studies developed from observations of the main features of industrial and political organisations of the late nineteenth century (Silverman 1972: 73). In sociology, this period is known especially for those studies on organisational structures and their relationships with society. Weber is one of these. In terms of 'organisation', three different classical theories need to be mentioned. The first is Weber's theory of bureaucracy which deals with rationality and its role in the bureaucratic structure. The second is the contribution of Taylor known as 'scientific management theory' which is devoted to
maximising efficiency by making management a 'science'. The last one is theory of 'principles' which suggests four main principles applicable to all organisations.

'Organisation' can basically be defined as a system consisting of different parts to serve specific aims and goals. It signifies an ordering of social relationships hierarchically structured to pursue specific goals under social circumstances (Etzioni 1964: 4; Albrov 1971: 38). Classical organisational studies define 'organisation' usually by the characteristics of 'bureaucracy'. The concept of 'bureaucracy' is used in political science and sociology in a number of applications. The notable ones are: state administration, groups of officials, administrative autocracy, rational organisation, organisational inefficiency, modern organisations and modern society (Abrahamson 1993: 4-6; Page 1992:507).

Weber's definition of bureaucracy is the most widely accepted. He defines bureaucracy as an administrative body of appointed officials and considers bureaucratisation as the most obvious characteristic of organisation and an element of any organisational structure. Weber identifies a number of characteristics which define a 'bureaucracy': a continuous organisation with a specified function or functions, its operation bound by rules. The organisation of personnel is on the basis of hierarchy, the staff are appointed not elected on the basis of impersonal qualifications and are promoted on the basis of merit. The staff are separated from ownership of the means of administration or production and, finally, staff are paid fixed salaries and have fixed terms of employment (1947: 329-41).

Weber summarises these defining characteristics of bureaucracy as 'division of labour' and 'hierarchy of authority' and sees an organisation to be fundamentally characterised by a division of tasks which are broken down into
small units. Division of tasks is done as much as possible in order to achieve the organisational goals. This is basically specialisation which makes it possible to recruit experienced or more suited workers or officials to divided tasks or jobs. However, all units are co-ordinated by a set of rules and orders, and this uniformity does not allow individual performance in terms of quality and quantity to be achieved (Etzioni 1964: 53-4). The characteristics of 'division of labour' and 'hierarchy of authority' are respectively the advantage and disadvantage of specialisation.

It is apparent from these definitions that the concepts of 'organisation' and 'bureaucracy' are connected and cannot be considered separately because organisation is usually explained by the characteristics of bureaucracy or because bureaucracy is really a form of organisation. But although bureaucracy is a form of organisation, all organisations are not necessarily bureaucratic. The example for this given by Etzioni is hospitals which, unlike bureaucracies, have no single centre of decision making (1964: 3).

Police organisations are characterised by bureaucracy. There is really a division of labour and a strong hierarchy of authority in police forces generally. In particular, as will be considered in chapter 4, the policing system in England & Wales, for example, by accepting some principles which serve a trend towards centralisation and specialisation, has implemented the classical view on a strict division of labour. Some parts of policing are even fundamentally specialised in order to achieve more effectiveness, although it may cause problems in terms of civil liberty and human rights. Over-use of technology such as the use of widespread computer data bases, for example, threatens the 'private life' of people.

In terms of division of labour and specialisation, we should consider another point here. According to Weber's analysis it would seem that
bureaucracies engage professionals or specialists with technical qualifications which serve to legitimize their power and autonomy as well as their status. This point is particularly relevant to the police who have increasingly sought administrative autonomy from the general political and administrative system. After World War II more bureaucratisation and specialisation have been seen in policing matters generally and this development served the police to gain more independence. When the job needs specialisation, government tends to give the police power and authority to act more independently.

As indicated above, according to Weber, bureaucracy is also characterised by a hierarchy of authority. This is a structure in which each member in the organisation is held accountable to their subordinates. Gerth & Mills state, when explaining Weber's view of hierarchy, that:

The principle of hierarchical office authority is found in all bureaucratic structures: in state and ecclesiastical structures as well as in large party organisations and private enterprises. It does not matter for the character of bureaucracy whether its authority is called 'private' or 'public' (1976: 197).

What we understand from this statement is that hierarchy exists in all kinds of organisations which are characterised by bureaucratic structures, whether it is a private or public organisation. As a principle of hierarchy, workers or officers are expected to conduct their tasks in a formal rather than in a personal way. There is always a distance between them which is identified according to rank structure or conditions of work. Apart from military forces, the most obvious hierarchical structure is seen in police organisation. Officers and rank and file are divided in terms of hierarchy of ranks.

In hierarchical organisations the disciplinary system works by exerting a strong control through a system of rewards and punishment. Control is effected according to written regulations which protect the rights of workers and protect them from the personal attitudes of the higher ranks. The regulations are drawn up
by the higher ranks in these organisations. Weber's classical theory identifies this as a control system legitimated by 'superordinates' which usually involves 'coercion' in practice (Gerth & Mills 1976: 198). 'Coercion' is seen in most organisations, to varying extents. If control is by coercion this may lead to unhappiness and disagreements between 'superordinates' and 'subordinates' who may wish to escape from the organisation as a result (Etzioni 1964: 53-4). It might be suggested that the issue of strong control and coercion is particularly relevant to police organisation, because policing itself, at least to some extent, is use of force and it is a disciplined profession.

In terms of hierarchy and control, the flexibility of an organisation or bureaucracy is an important point to be discussed. 'Inflexibility' is a negative aspect of bureaucracy. A bureaucracy, which is a rigidly designed organisation, may find it difficult to adapt to rapid changes in its environment or respond appropriately to environmental pressure. An organisation should be flexible enough to react to change. It must also be guided by competent personnel who can see the overall picture of organisation and have sufficient access to decision making channels to initiate changes at the micro level of the organisation which is the most critical and important level. Without this flexibility, an organisation becomes unable to prevent the emergence of a strong hierarchical authority and other negative bureaucratic aspects. Relating this point to police organisation, it can be argued that although modern police organisational structures have become more flexible than strong hierarchical structures, police bureaucracy is still associated with the problem of inflexibility in terms of decision making and control and command systems.

Flexibility or inflexibility can be seen to different degrees in centralised or decentralised organisations. A centralised organisation is more likely to be able to provide facilities that independent units or decentralised organisations could not,
such as standard and national services, but as Etzioni argues, centralised organisations allow for less 'local experimentation' and grant less 'unit flexibility'. This, as Etzioni adds, does not mean that decentralised organisations always allow more flexibility (1964: 29). This depends on the environment where the organisation is based and the population which the organisation serves. This is true of both centrally or locally organised bureaucracies, but it would still be true to say that in most cases, centralised organisations do not allow enough flexibility. Decision making channels are usually open to only top managers who are more likely to be appointed and influenced by central government, rather than being elected by and accountable to the people they serve.

This distinction can be seen especially in police organisation. Decentralised police organisations are more flexible than the centralised ones. For example they may allow the involvement of most members of the organisation or even the community in policing policy making or decision making procedures. They are more likely to allow for sufficient devolution of responsibility to divisions and provincial forces to permit operational commanders at these levels to respond flexibly and effectively to local needs and priorities. Such a flexible police service is also related to greater community consultation and participation and is set in the context of the need for greater police accountability. We can propose, despite some exceptions and problems, that the decentralised policing system in England & Wales is an example of a more flexible organisation, and the centralised Turkish police organisation is an example of an inflexible police organisation.

'Rationality' of bureaucracy is another aspect of classical organisational theory which also needs to be discussed here, in order to analyse the general characteristics of contemporary police organisations. Bureaucracy or bureaucratic authority in general, and police bureaucracy in particular, is rational. Rationality
forms the basis of legitimacy. Contemporary policing organisational change in England & Wales and Turkey is also the result of a process of rationalisation.

Rationalisation generally refers to ways of acting and thinking which are not found only in an organisational context but in all aspects of social life. Weber's use of the term 'rationalisation' destroys the notion of myth and replaces it with a scientific approach. It is difficult to sum up Weber's rationalisation thesis and to define what rationalisation really is because it is a process rather than a term related to a certain period of time. Albrow argues that the laws of nature and principles of action are at the heart of the Weberian idea of rationality. These factors permit logical relations and actions. Therefore, according to Weber, rationality is natural, scientific and related to logical actions and relations within a society. Albrow goes on to define rationality by saying that '... to be rational the act must be regulated by values, clearly conceived purposes, oriented to knowledge. Rationality is conferred on the act by its location within the symbolic system' (1987: 170).

Studies of Weber's work attempt to analyse the rationalisation process by dividing it into different periods of time or different stages such as societal, cultural, and personality processes. The societal process of rationalisation involves the development of a capitalist society (Weber 1968: 71 and 436), whereas the cultural level of rationalisation concerns the growth of science, art, law and morality. As the rationality of the organisation of economy and authority increases, irrational forms of process are eliminated and the law as a whole is rationalised (Weber 1968: 809). At the personality level, the Protestant life-style became dominant. At this level, Protestantism interpreted success in business as the fruit of a rational mode of life. Weber's term 'rationalisation' invariably involves 'depersonalisation' (1968: 588).
Rationalisation would appear, then, to develop over time, having social, cultural and personality dimensions, and extending its influence into all spheres of social life. Albrow proposes five processes which make up Weber's view of rationalisation, namely rational technique, technical progress, rational choice of ends, life-guiding principles, and rational-methodological lifestyle (1987: 166).

As to the 'societal' level of rationalisation, Spitzer also argues, in his consideration of rationalisation in terms of crime control and public order, that rationalisation is associated with the development of capitalism (1985: 312). The regulation of social life under capitalism requires the use of force to secure public order as well as to protect profits and all concrete forms of capital itself. It is this feature of crime control mentioned by Spitzer with its emphasis on the overt and repressive control of labour by capital which has received the attention of the 'new criminologists'.

According to Spitzer, under capitalism, legally based coercion emerged as part of an historical process which can be termed 'rationalisation of social relations', and this shaped and provided the framework of changes in the organisation of crime control. This form of coercion represents the basis of rationalisation of social life in a capitalist society. The rationalisation of police organisation can be seen as a part of the relationship between specific forms of social regulation and the transformation of capitalist society. The emergence of public policing or bureaucratic police organisation was part of a more 'preventive', 'calculable' and 'professional' approach to social regulation and surveillance (Spitzer 1985: 321-5). Spitzer goes on to say that:

One of the most important aspects of the rationalisation of social life associated with the triumph of the capitalist mode of production has been the intensification of regulatory controls. Proceeding on both the economic and the political levels, this intensification has brought about a revolution in the management of domestic population (1985: 315).
What is argued here is that rationalisation is associated with the development of capitalism, and capitalism was able to transform relations of production in such a way that control could become more intensive rather than extensive, whereas under the feudal form of domination it was only possible to control at a distance. Capitalism has made possible the development of a new range of strategies to use labour power or the working classes for more productivity. This unique way of treating the working classes has become more possible with the expansion of public authority and law, with the greater centralisation and hierarchy of the political order. As capitalism continued to dissolve the traditional organisations of social life, bureaucratic organisations became more important in a mechanism which co-ordinated a rationalisation process or rationalised system of administration in order to overcome the apparent irrationalities of the pre-capitalist system. This mechanism is the modern capitalist state. The bureaucratisation of state administration resulted in a system of centralised, rational, and objective organisational structures rather than a personal rule or command system. Therefore, we can say that 'centralisation' is a characteristic of 'rationalisation'. This is an example of what Weber means by the 'depersonalisation' which rationalisation brings.

Finally, it can be demonstrated that there is a trend towards increasing rationalisation and that rationalisation is a continuous process. As Albrow argues, it is possible to develop and improve Weber's idea of rationality, by considering the intensification of rationality in modern conditions such as the computerisation of almost all institutions, including police organisations. Continuing rationalisation also creates a conflict between rationality and individual freedoms (1987: 181-2). Similar to this general approach, as Spitzer argues, the rationalisation of the organisation of policing and crime control is also a continuing process which may lead some contradictions and conflicts associated
with the relations of political power and the continued legitimation of an increasingly hierarchical social order (1985: 327).

In terms of organisation and bureaucracy, the issues of rationality and efficiency are also related. Weber considers rational bureaucracy as a major element in the rationalisation of the modern world, and particularly in the social process. Bureaucratic organisations are rational and more efficient social units, keeping organisation together. Therefore, any organisation which is bureaucratic and rational is more likely to be efficient (Etzioni 1964: 4; Albro 1970: 89).

If we consider the relevance of Weber's theory to the police organisation, it can be argued that although the police organisation is bureaucratic and close to Weber's model of organisation based on rationality in general, they are not necessarily efficient. For example, in a police state or even in a country like Turkey where democracy does not exist in all aspects, policing is carried out through centralisation and militarisation and is not efficient enough. In democratic countries such as England & Wales where policing is decentralised, on the other hand, policing is more likely to be efficient, due to better police-community relations and community involvement, although still the concept of 'efficiency' is not usually well defined.

Weber sees bureaucracy as the system of efficient production, but also as a system of domination of one group by another. This domination is usually legitimised by laws and regulations or the 'legal system'. This causes problems and even conflict between legal and bureaucratic procedures. Bureaucracy operates by rules and regulations, building a wall of organisational rules which usually prevents the members of a bureaucracy from responding to the rule of law. This is especially true of 'external' laws which are the reason for organisational
inefficiency or a threat to the hierarchical structure and flexibility, especially in police organisation.

The fact that rules of succession do not apply for the top leaders is another negative aspect of bureaucratic rationality. While there are rational criteria for the bureaucratic organisation as a whole, these rules do not exist for top leadership positions. Also, rational bureaucracy allows a decision making process in a rational and efficient manner, but decisions can be made secret by the top leadership of the hierarchy which are not debatable by the majority below. Secrecy denies accountability and the legal and rational processes of removal from office. The issue of organisational efficiency can be further considered by exploring the other classical organisational theories: scientific management theory and principles theory, which are more concerned with this issue.

Scientific management theory which emerged at the same time as the classical theory of bureaucracy, is a 'functionalist' theory of organisation. The main contributors of this theory are Taylor and Fayol. Taylor's contribution addresses itself to improving the efficiency of the organisation by establishing a scientific methodology of management. Taylor, in contradistinction to the classical theory of bureaucracy, is not interested in the organisational problems of power-structures in the society but rather the practical problems of organisational efficiency. He states, when defining the concept of 'scientific management' that:

Scientific management does not necessarily involve any great invention, nor the discovery of new or starting facts. It does, however, involve a certain combination of elements which have not existed in the past, namely old knowledge so collected, analysed, grouped, and classified into laws and rules that it constitutes a science; accompanied by a complete change in the mental attitude of the working men as well as of those on the side of the management, toward each other, and toward their respective duties and responsibilities (1923: 139-40).

Before Taylor's study, there were no standard sets of working. What Taylor tries to do is to improve the efficiency of work, considering the
management of initiative and incentive as the best management of time. According to Taylor, this method and its techniques can only be achieved by a scientific study and an analysis of all the methods and techniques in use, together with accurate time and motion studies (1923: 25). Mouzelis explains the basic aim of Taylor’s theory by stating that it:

... is the increase of organisational productivity, especially on the workshop level. In order to realise this goal, Taylor advocated the empirical and experimental approach to the problems of workshop management. He believed that for every process, every task in industry, there is one best way of performance; in order to discover this unique way, one has to examine this part of organisational reality in a scientific way (1975: 81).

For Taylor, then, improvement in efficiency would be achieved if management develops a scientific method for each element of work, scientifically selects, trains and teaches the personnel working in the organisation, establishes co-operation between management and workers and finally accepts an equal division of work and responsibility between management and personnel (1923: 36-7).

Mouzelis considers co-operation between management and workers as the fundamental principle for the implementation of Taylorism (1975: 83). According to scientific management theory, if co-operation between management and personnel working in the organisation is not achieved, all other methods and techniques are useless. Scientific management has as its goal not only the increase of productivity, but it also attempts to provide a solution to the continual conflict between managers and workers. One of the essential points to consider, in order to establish such co-operation, is to solve problems especially in terms of wages and rewards. Taylor began to establish his scientific management methods on the premise that workers deliberately planned to do as little possible rather than what they were able to do. What workers want most from their employers, Taylor says, is a high wage. Wages are the most important element for the motivation of workers, and the adoption of scientific management would remove or reduce
disputes between employer and workers over wages. The focus of scientific management theory is that if rewards are closely related to work effort, workers will respond with the maximum performance of which they are physically capable. Another element of Taylor's contribution is the concept of 'functional supervision'. In a system of functional supervision where the supervisors are specialised in particular areas of working structure and workers are responsible to only one relevant supervisor, efficiency would increase.

Fayol (1949), another contributor to the scientific management theory, is concerned with the 'upper management' of an organisation. According to Fayol, there is a universal science of management applicable to all organisations. His concern is to provide a system by which management would be more efficient and more successful. The main principles of Fayol's contribution to this theory are a programme of action prepared by means of annual and ten-year forecasts, and an organisation chart to guarantee order and assure each worker a definite place together with careful recruiting and personnel training in order to find the right person for each task. Also, observation of necessary principles in the execution of command or direction and meetings of the departmental heads of every division chaired by the director of organisation to ensure co-ordination in the organisation can be mentioned. The universal control based on clear accounting data rapidly made available is the final principle. According to Fayol, these principles are necessarily valid because they are 'neutral' (Hoskings 1991: 181).

Scientific management theory would, therefore, seem to be employer-centred, not worker-centred, since its principal aim is to increase efficiency by deriving the maximum benefit from workers, and the only motivation for workers is a wage or material rewards. This principle of Taylorism can be criticised. Since Taylor blames the trade unions for encouraging restrictive practices against the workers' interests, trade unions see a threat to their interests and those of their
members. Contemporaries of Taylor criticise scientific management method on humanitarian grounds in that it was bad for the health and well-being of workers, and that it contributes to alienation of the worker from society (Sofer 1972: 37). Hoskins also criticises Taylor by indicating three general points: Taylor's lack of attention to organisation as a political process, his concept of the person which is narrow and individualistic, and finally, related to the other two, that he has little regard for social processes as a whole for the construction and performance of organisation. According to Hoskins, Taylor oversimplifies the distinction between 'management' and 'worker', and distorts what it is to be 'human'. Taylorism threatens both management and workers as 'internally homogeneous in values and interests' and '... the interest of workers could be handed over to management for their protection and promotion' (1991: 183).

Taylor and most of his followers are also criticised for their mechanistic view of organisation and their concentration on the instrumental aspects of human behaviour. As Mouzelis states:

Indeed the organisation member was conceived as an instrument of production which can be handled as easily as any other tool (provided that one knows the laws of scientific management). In such a conception, there is no consideration of the feelings, attitudes, and private goals of the individual; neither is there any realisation that the worker is a social being influenced in his behaviour and attitudes by his colleagues by the social structure and culture of the groups within which he finds himself (1975:85).

What the critics of scientific management theory argue is that Taylorist theory neglects the psychological and sociological aspects of organisational behaviour. However it is not meant by this statement that Taylor is unaware that workers have feelings, and private goals, but he, as an engineer, assumes that these aspects of behaviour are irrelevant to the issue of efficiency.

According to the 'principles' theory, on the other hand, there are certain rules which are universal and applicable to all organisations. Although many
concepts behind this theory come from Weber and Taylor, it takes on new dimensions based on the studies of some classical writers such as Gulick, Urwick, Mooney, and Reiley. These theorists attempt to define seven activities comprising administration, namely planning, organising, staffing, directing, co-ordinating, reporting, and budgeting. This theory is also known as 'classical administration theory'.

These theorists collectively propose four principles that organisations should follow. The first is the 'co-ordinative principle' which provides unity of action in common purpose. The second is the 'scalar principle' which refers to hierarchical aspect of organisation. The 'functional principle' is the concept of specialisation. The final principle is 'staff and line' which represents authority and staff advice and ideas (Pfiffner & Sherwood 1960: 60; Sofer 1972: 137-8). This theory emphasises the structure rather than individuals or human elements in the structure.

The 'principles' theory makes the division of labour its central tenet. According to this theory if a particular job can be broken down into its simplest parts the worker doing this job will become more specialised and skilled and this will lead more efficiency. But this division of labour needs to be balanced by a control system with a line of supervisors from the bottom to the top of the administrative body. This theory also accepts four principles by which the organisation can achieve the optimal division of labour and authority. First of all, specialisation should be by purpose of the task, and all work based on a particular process should be grouped together. Specialisation according to type of clientele is yet another basis for division. Finally, jobs performed in the same geographical area should be placed together (Etzioni 1964: 23).
The 'principles' theory also has its critics. It has been argued, for example, that these principles are prescriptive rather than descriptive, and that they state how work should be divided rather than how work actually is divided. Etzioni (1964) argues that the principles are difficult to apply to a specific organisation since they often overlap, and they fail to provide a satisfying guide to division of labour in the organisation. According to Etzioni, the actual planning of the division of work in an organisation is affected by some considerations which are not covered by these principles. For example, the type of specialisation may be determined by the culture in which the organisation is situated, by the environment of the organisation, by the availability and type of personnel, and by political factors (1964: 24). Etzioni goes on to criticise this theory by saying that the four traditional principles for division of labour in the organisation '... neither allow for a realistic analysis of existing organisations, nor do they in fact provide workable plans for improvement' (1964: 24).

In terms of the relevance of classical organisational theory, I would like to emphasise that the police are essentially bureaucratic following rational formal bureaucracy and specialisation. Further, it must be stressed that police administrators generally follow classical principles of management, which utilise authoritarian attitudes.

2.2. Exploring and applying other theories: neo-classical, modern, postmodern and critical

The image of organisation as a bureaucracy was being challenged by social scientists after the second World War. Features of bureaucracy were recognised as often '... petty, obsessive, and self serving, alienating people from the organisation's purpose and sometimes from themselves' (Fineman 1991: 234). Human relations theory which is the most common theory identified with neo-
classical theory, was the first reaction to the classical organisational theory (Scott 1963: 15). Then the modern, post-modern and critical theories followed.

The human relations theory acknowledges the human elements of the organisation which are of little concern to the classical theorists. It evolves from the discovery that the personnel working in organisations tend to form informal groups or organisations within the formal organisation which exert a definite effect upon the formal structure. The human relations philosophy, which originated from the studies of Mayo and his associates, questions the assumptions of classical theory in general and of scientific management in particular.

According to human relations theory, if management wants to improve the efficiency of the organisation, it should motivate its workers by fulfilling their physiological, safety, and other needs mentioned in Maslow's theory of motivation, or the organisation would be ineffective. Mouzelis states, concerning the studies of human relations, that:

They not only revolutionised the classical theory of management by breaking through its formalistic approach and opening up the whole problem area of human behaviour in the firm; they also filled a great gap in the study of bureaucracy, in being the first to show by what precise mechanisms social phenomena on the societal and organisational level are linked with concrete behaviour on the group and the individual level (1975: 119).

Human relations theory argues that the amount of work carried out by a worker is not determined by physical capacity but by social capacity. Also, non-economic rewards play a major role in determining the motivation of worker. According to this theory, the highest specialisation is not the most efficient form of division of labour, and workers do not react to management and its norms and rewards as individuals, but as members of groups. In short, the studies of human relations are concerned with social rewards more than material rewards. They also
emphasise the role of communication, participation and leadership (Scott 1963: 16-8; Etzioni 1964: 32).

The same points indicated above were found also by the Hawthorn studies, the first studies of human relations, conducted between 1927 to 1932 at the Western Electric Company's Hawthorn works in Chicago, a collaboration between the company and Harvard University (Etzioni 1964: 32; Sofer 1972: 64). These studies were undertaken under the direction of Mayo, and are considered to be the main source of inspiration for all studies in the human relations field. The primary aim of these studies is to analyse organisations as living social structures to examine working conditions in relation to output, and generally to classify the numerous problems arising in the working conditions (Mouzelis 1975: 98; Ham & Hill 1993: 120). Stressing the positive relationship in their studies between worker satisfaction and efficiency, the Hawthorn studies sought techniques to improve the morale of individuals working in the organisation (Scott 1981: 88-9).

The methods and findings of human relations theory in general and the Hawthorn studies in particular have also been widely criticised. Hoskings, for example, argues that the findings of this theory were taken to imply that the prevailing concept of person had to be revised to accommodate what otherwise could not be explained. Hoskings goes on to say that:

A particularly important observation was the emergence amongst production, workers, of a social organisation which was not planned, formalised, or legitimised by management, but rather created and controlled by the workers themselves. These processes have come to be referred to as 'informal organisation' occurring 'within' formal organisation (1991: 187).

Mouzelis makes a limited criticism of this theory by arguing that the critics of the methods and findings of the human relations theory and the Hawthorn studies have confused rather than clarified matters. This is because many critics, neglecting the diversity and changing character of the school, attack
It as a whole, when their criticisms are only valid for a certain sub-school or a
certain phase in its development (1975: 112). Mouzelis states:

I think the only weakness which seems fundamental and common to the
school as a whole, is that human relations theory has tried to solve the
major organisational problems in drawing attention to the individual and
group level, and not paying much attention to the organisation as a whole.
Indeed even when human relations studies take into consideration
organisational variables, the main focus of analysis remains the group or
the individual (1975: 112-3).

Silverman also argues that when human relations organisational methods
were tested experimentally, it became clear that they by no means always had the
desired effect on productivity and work satisfaction. This was followed by the
suggestion that factors like communication might not be independent variables
but dependent on more basic aspects of the organisational structure (1972: 76).
Critics of human relations theory also made great deal of its lack of concern with
extra-organisational factors. Structuralist studies such as Simon (1965),
Subramanian (1966) and Sandler & Mintz (1974) constituted the first body of
reaction to and criticism of the human relations theory.

Although its major dialogue has been with the human relations theory,
Etzioni (1961, 1964, 1965) proposes structuralist theory as a synthesis of classical
and human relations theories. Structuralist theory concerns both formal and
informal elements of organisation with equal attention. It, as a synthesis, also
includes both work and non-work organisations, the scope of informal groups and
their relations inside and outside the organisation, lower and higher ranks, social
and material rewards and their effects on each other, and the interaction between
the organisation and its environment. Structuralists see the organisation as a large,
complex social unit in which many social groups interact. According to this
theory, the interests of management and the workers within the organisation
frequently come into conflict (Etzioni 1964: 41-50). Scott states, when exploring
structuralist theory, that:
The structuralist model suggests that the rational (classical), and the natural (Human relations) system perspectives are complementary. Each view represents a partial truth. If the perspectives seem at time to conflict, this is because the organisational elements to which they point sometimes conflict. The recognition of such conflicts is an important part of the 'whole' truth about organisations, their structural features, and their functioning (1981: 124).

Structuralist organisational theory which accepts system analysis, shifts the conceptual level of organisation study above the classical and neo-classical (Human relations) theories. As Scott points out, this theory of organisation asks four major questions, namely, what are the strategic parts of the system, what is the nature of their mutual dependency, what are the main processes in the system which links the parts together, and finally, what are the goals sought by systems? (1963: 19). Scott goes on to say that:

Modern organisational theory represents a frontier of research which has great significance for management. The potential is great, because it offers the opportunity for uniting what is valuable in classical theory with the social and integrated conception of human organisation (1963: 26).

As a synthesis, or analysis of the classical and human relations theories, the structuralist theory criticises both of these theories. It suggests that classical theory emphasises an organisation without people, and human relations theory advocates people without organisation. The majority of criticism stems from the inconsistencies and lack of sophistication of the formulations of classical theorists and the pro-management bias of their theory. It is argued that the chain of command as hierarchy tends to make individuals in the organisation dependent upon, passive toward, and subordinate to the leaders or higher managers. Also the span of control is criticised because it increases the administrative distance between individuals (Simon 1965: 20; Subramanian 1966: 437). As an example of a criticism of the classical organisational theory, Sandler & Mintz argue that within the police organisation '... a paramilitary structure tends to create a sense of demoralisation and powerlessness at the lower ranks' (1974: 458). However,
Etzioni pointed out, even over 30 years ago, that despite some reaction and criticisms, the application of the classical approach with its concern for formal organisational structure has not died out (1964: 25).

Simon (1965) attacks the classical principles and advocates an integration between the personnel and the organisation in a formal structure. For this integration, money is still a prime motivator for employees. Structuralists believe in a formal structure in the organisation with superiors at key points, rather than close supervision. They believe that general supervision rather than close supervision, increases efficiency. The major emphasis of this theory is that tasks are controlled by the management rather than by people.

Structuralists suggest that the human relations theory does not provide a full view of the organisation, and that its partial view favours management and misleads the workers. They also argue that human relations studies pay too much attention to the informal groups and their influence on the organisation. Human relations theory indicates some ways in which the resulting frustration might be reduced, but the structuralists insist that there are sharp limits on the degree to which this can be achieved (Etzioni 1964: 42).

Radical or radical structuralist theory, on the other hand, has developed out of the critique of functionalist theories of organisation represented by Taylor, Fayol and Mayo. What is described as 'Radical Organisation Theory', especially in terms of organisational policy process, is the central concern of a body of literature in organisational theory, consisting of writers such as Clegg (1975 and 1990), Benson (1983), Salaman (1981), and Burrel & Morgan (1979). These studies emphasise the importance of organisational power and suggest ways in which organisations are shaped and influenced by the societies in which they operate. They are concerned not only with individuals within organisation, but
with the organisation itself, its internal structures and members, internal relationships and the relationship between the organisation and society. In short, radical organisational theory is concerned with organisational policies, and organisational members as a group rather than individuals.

Benson, a radical organisational theorist, emphasises the importance of linking levels of administrative structure, interest structure, and the rule of structure formation (1983: 4-6). He also criticises those who concentrated on the issues of securing co-ordination of public services neglecting the wider influences that effect co-ordination, arguing that a complete analysis of inter-organisational relationships needs to explore these three levels especially in the structure of policy sectors. Benson states that:

For each policy sector, then, it would be necessary to explore the impact of deep rules of structure formation. These would not determine the structure of the sector in every detail. It is reasonable to assume some measure of autonomy for the other levels - administrative organisation and structural interests. In broad terms, however, the events at these levels are to be explained at the level of rules of structure formation. The rules limit and enable action at other levels. Social science accounts which do not consider these deeper rules are to varying degrees incomplete (1983: 31).

Ham & Hill (1993) criticise Benson's explanation, questioning his analysis of the relationship between levels. They argue that although the primary thrust of Benson's discussion is that action at the surface level cannot be understood without reference to the interest structure and rules of structure formation, he does not suggest that the relationship between levels is simply deterministic. In his argument, there are echoes of Weberian analysis of bureaucracies and the growth of corporatism, with the suggestion that state agencies in capitalist societies may be able to shake themselves free of class control and act in their own interests. What is not clear from Benson's explanation is '... how far and in what circumstances bureaucratic action is determined by deep structures or is independent of these structures' (Ham & Hill 1993: 178).
The approach found in the works of Clegg (1975 and 1990) and Clegg & Dunkerley (1980), namely 'the structure of domination' is slightly different from Benson's approach. Clegg argues that studies focusing on the surface level of power are incomplete, and proposes that students of power should seek to identify the structure of domination in which power is exercised, and should analyse the rules linking power and domination (1975: 77). Clegg & Dunkerley also state that:

The individual is essentially a social being, who, as a bearer of social relations, is ruled and dominated in the last instance by economic power. This economic power is embedded and displayed within the framework of a 'structure of domination' which is articulated through different types of 'rule' (1980: 456).

Clegg & Dunkerley point out, in terms of legitimation, that state organisations may be relatively free of the structure of domination which guides other organisations, but nevertheless, the state in the capitalist society is subject to the same structure of domination as private corporations (1980: 550).

Salaman (1981) who also considers some ideas expressed by Clegg & Dunkerley, argues for a Marxist approach to the study of organisation to be combined with elements from Weberian theory. Salaman whose approach pays attention to the significant influence which the profit motive exercises over the structure of organisations, states, in terms of class and corporation, that:

To argue for the continuing relationship between capitalism as a form of economic system based on class conflict and class interest and organisation structure and design of work is not to assert that this relationship will be automatically achieved (1981: 249).

The difference between Clegg & Dunkerley (1980) and Salaman (1981) is that Clegg & Dunkerley argue that individuals are 'bearers' of social relations that have little autonomy while Salaman, pointing to the influence of economic factors on individual and organisational action, argues that individuals have some scope for interpreting these influences. The difference between Clegg & Dunkerley,
Salaman and Benson is partly explained by their respective dependence on Marxist and Weberian approaches (Ham & Hill 1993: 183).

The influence of the approaches of these three studies and their attack on functionalist theories of organisation has been considered by Burrel & Morgan (1979) whose work is a contribution to radical organisational theory. Burrel & Morgan indicate that the main characteristic of Weberian approach is that it examines the role of bureaucracy, the increased role of the state, and is linked to ideas about corporatism. The distinctive characteristic of Marxian approach, on the other hand, is its focus on the economic structure of society and the use of the method of political economy to analyse organisations (1979: 385-8).

According to Burrel & Morgan, radical organisational theory has developed from the critique of functionalism. They indicate the unifying themes which join together radical structuralists as a totality is a way of looking at the organisation as a whole. The unifying themes are, structure which is an emphasis on organisations as structures within wider structures, contradiction which means that organisations are the stage where conflicts are visible, and crisis which refers to macro-social change resulting from crisis which develops out of contradiction (1979: 358-9).

After considering structuralist and radical structuralist organisational theories, we need to continue to explore theories by referring to post-modern theory and critical theory which is the main body of criticism against post-modern theory. Although modern theorists were challenged by anti-modernist ideas from the late 1960s, the concepts of 'post-modern theory', 'post-modern', and 'postmodernism' have appeared more frequently in social science in general and in organisational studies in particular since the end of the 1980s.
I will consider here the meaning of these concepts, the distinction between them and their application to organisational studies in general and policing organisations in particular, but in order to understand post-modern theory, it is first essential to explore the concepts of modernism, post-modernism and relevant concepts, such as Fordism and post-Fordism. The issues of Fordism and post-Fordism are essential to consider especially in terms of the debate about Taylor's classical theory of scientific management. Post-Fordism is a particular trend under the heading of 'postmodernism'.

Before explaining the meaning of the concept of 'modernism', however, it is also necessary to differentiate between the concepts of 'modernisation', 'modernity' and modernism. Harvey explains and relates all these three concepts in one sentence: '... modernism is a troubled and fluctuating aesthetic response to condition of modernity produced by a particular process of modernisation' (1989: 99). However, there are different views in terms of the differentiation and relation between the concepts of modernism, modernity, and modernisation. According to Hebdige (1989), modernisation refers to the socio-economic and technological innovations associated with the growth of capitalism, while the concept of modern describes the radically transformed character of life under capitalism most clearly visible in the European and American cities of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The notion of modernism is linked to the wave of experimental movements in the arts as well as to the capitalist metropolitan centres. Hebdige (1989) argues that all these innovations set out to articulate the experience of modernity, while many argue that today the concepts of modernism and modernity are different, although they are relative, and that modern should be understood not as modernity, but as modernism, since the concept of modernism includes contemporay social and cultural practices (Lash 1987: 355 and 1990: 123; Giddens 1990: 1).
According to Giddens, modernity refers to modes of social life or organisation which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less world-wide in their influence, while modernism is usually taken as a paradigmatic change in the arts which began at the end of the nineteenth century (1990: 1). Smart who argues that modernisation is a broader concept to analyse a series of changes and developments (1992: 151), states that:

Modernism was initially employed in the eighteenth century by defenders of the classical tradition antagonised by the claims advanced by 'moderns' during the course of the infamous querelle. The term began to be used in a positive sense to describe an aesthetic or cultural movement towards the close of the century... Modernism is conceptualised as 'the search for modernists' and, given the specificity of difference of the latter is constituted through its opposition to, or break with, the traditional, modernism effectively becomes an 'anti traditional tradition' (1992:150-1).

The post-War period in Europe and America from 1945 to the early 1970s which is known as the 'high modernism' period, can be seen, in economic and political terms, as the 'Fordist' era in nature (Social Studies Review 1990: 20). Although the symbolic initiation date of 'Fordism' is 1914 when the car manufacturer Ford introduced the automated car-assembly line in Michigan in the USA, it describes an industrial era from the second world war to the early 1970s, characterised by mass production systems and semi-automatic assembly lines, pioneered, but not invented by Ford. However, the concept of 'Fordism' was used during the 1950s and 1960s to mean the Keynesian and state monopoly capitalism '... making a shift in the focus of functionalist analysis from the labour process to macroeconomics and political relations' (Clarke 1992: 13).

When Fordism was symbolically initiated at the beginning of this century, Taylor's study of 'scientific management' had already been published in 1911, and the separation in terms of hierarchical social relations and de-skilling within the labour process was already under way in industrial organisations. Therefore, Ford
did little more than rationalise old technologies and the pre-existing division of labour. By flowing the work to a stationary worker, however, he achieved considerable gains in productivity. Clarke who criticises Fordism, argues that the process used by Ford in producing motor vehicles was one pre-existent in the United States, and there was nothing original in either the detail or the general principles such as the composition of tasks, or the specialisation of tools. The originality of the Fordist project is that it applies these principles to a new branch of production (1992: 167). As Harvey states:

What was special about Ford (and what ultimately separates Fordism from Taylorism) was his vision, his explicit recognition that mass production meant mass consumption, a new system of the reproduction of labour power, a new politics of labour control and management, a new aesthetics and psychology, in short, a new kind of rationalised, modernist, and populist democratic society... Ford believed that the new kind of society could be built simply through the proper application of corporate power (1989: 125-6).

Fordism is a system of mass production which solves some problems with the relationship between the management and workers in Taylor's scientific method of management mentioned earlier in this chapter in which workers were treated as an ordinary factor of production, scientifically selected to suit the task, and closely supervised in the purpose of productivity. Clegg argues that Fordism is a system based on the increase in labour productivity and on wage relations which Taylorism made possible (1990: 178). Aglietta (1979) also considers two aspects of the Fordist work process: a highly and increasing organic composition of capital, and the potential for rapid increases in productivity achieved not simply through new process technology but through intensification of labour. Crook et al state, when comparing Taylorism and Fordism, that:

The key weakness in Taylorism is the need for close supervision in the context of a capacity for informal resistance on the part of workers. This problem was solved by the car manufacturer Henry Ford, who used the technology of the moving assembly line to replace the supervisor (1992:171).
Mass production of automobiles was dependent on some basic principles such as the standardisation of the product, the use of special-purpose equipment, the elimination of skilled labour in direct production and the mechanisation of similar tasks, although those tasks remained subject to Taylor's scientific management (Murray 1989: 38-9; Tolliday & Zeitlin 1992: 1-2). Crook et al summarise the major characteristics of the Fordist assembly line system of production as: standardisation, continuity, constraint, and task simplicity (1992: 171-2). Fordism and post-Fordism can be related to the police organisation in terms of producing a 'service'. If we accept that the police also produce 'services' such as 'policing' or 'public order', it can be explained by Fordism or post-Fordism.

Post-modern theory involves the claim that some or all of the characteristics of modern society and of Fordist economy and manufacturing such as mass production, mass consumption, corporate capital and organised labour, an interventionist state, full employment, and demand management have disappeared, and that especially after the Second World War a new kind of society began to emerge. Depending on the way it is analysed, this change or new society has been labelled with various terms such as consumer society, media society, society of spectacle and post-industrial society. However, the most commonly used term is 'postmodernist society', although those who are against the idea of postmodernism argue that '... we are living in a period of high modernity' (Giddens 1990: 163). Therefore, today in the late twentieth century, we stand at the opening of a new era, to which the social sciences must respond and which is taking us beyond modernity itself. This new era is named by different concepts such as post-industrial or post-Fordism, postmodernity and postmodernism (Giddens 1990: 1-2).
First, I would like to consider the distinction or relation between the concepts of postmodernity and postmodernism, and then the concept of post-Fordism. Similar to the concepts of 'modernity' and 'modernism', postmodernity and postmodernism are also distinct but related. (Smart 1992: 169). The concept of 'postmodernity' has been used for what is seen as a qualitative break in the development of contemporary society or qualitative transformation from one kind of social order to another. Giddens who distinguishes between the notions of postmodernity and postmodernism, argues that postmodernity is usually used as if it means the same as postmodernism, but the concept of postmodernism concerns aspects of 'aesthetic reflection' upon the nature of modernity (1990: 45).

In short, the emergence of a fundamental set of new styles in terms of 'aesthetics' and 'art criticism' are labelled as 'postmodernism'. It basically represents some kind of reaction to 'modernism'. In the social sciences, postmodernism describes the critique of the modernist project to ground and unify the social sciences. In its critique of modernist social science, postmodernism considers the relationships between scientific knowledge, power, and society as well as the relation between science, critique and narrative (Seidman & Wagner 1992: 2). As Lash argues, postmodernism is not a condition, nor a type of society in the sense that people speak of an industrial society, a capitalist society, or a modern society, but instead it is 'confined to the realm of culture' (1990: 3-4).

As a conclusion in terms of modernism and postmodernism, it would be true to say that the two concepts are both close and far apart. As Lyotard points out, the nuance which distinguishes these two concepts is that '... they often coexist in the same piece... and yet they testify to a difference (un différend) on which the fate of thought depends' (1984: 80). Boyne & Rattansi argue that the importance of treating 'modernism' differently from 'modernity', is the fact that despite its inevitable links with modernity, modernism constituted a 'critique' of
modernity. Partly because of this critical distancing, there are lines of continuity between modernism and postmodernism, and therefore, postmodernism also constitutes a critique of modernity, and in some senses it may be said to extend and deepen the critique already begun by modernism (1990: 8).

Harvey argues that the categorisation of both modernism and postmodernism into a complex of oppositions expressive of the cultural contradiction of capitalism can be dissolved, and that the sharp categorical distinction between modernism and postmodernism disappears:

We then get to see the categories of both modernism and postmodernism as static reification imposed upon the fluid interpretation of dynamic oppositions. Within this matrix of internal relations, there is never one fixed configuration, but a swaying back and forth between centralisation and decentralisation, between authority and deconstruction, between hierarchy and anarchy, between permanence and flexibility, between the detail and the social division of labour (1989: 39).

There are contradictory implications that post-modern theory emerged as a complementary idea, or as reaction to the modern (Best & Kellner 1991: 38). Those who do not accept the existence of postmodernity as a new theory argue that it is best understood as a continuation of the processes of modernisation where those processes operate with increasing scope and intensity to erode what appears in retrospect as the regional stability of modernity (Crook et al 1992: 220). According to those who accept postmodernity as a new theory, on the other hand, it questions the main characteristics of modernity, and it is a rejection and criticism of the world's present conditions and problems. Therefore, if the argument of postmodernity involves the wholesale rejection of modernity, this means that the period dominated by the idea of modernism is being left behind and that we are entering a distinct post-modern era (Uysal-Sezer 1993: 33-5). However, basically, the idea of 'post-modern' is different from, but it is not something that comes necessarily after the 'modern'. It is either an 'anti-modern' approach or an 'alternative' to modernity.
I would agree with Karatepe who argues that modernity was something produced to maintain the socio-economic and cultural dependency of non-Western societies upon the West. Therefore postmodernity, by questioning modernity, would help non-Western countries such as Turkey to develop independent socio-economic and political systems. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, Turkey followed the 'modernist' model of change in terms of economy, politics and culture, and as a result, failed to develop its own identity (1994: 2). If we consider anything different from 'modern' as 'post-modern', for example 'Islamic' thought or approaches can be considered as 'post-modern' because Islam does not accept many modernist theories in terms of its meaning of 'Western', although Islam is, in fact, a 'pre-modern' system. This can be raised as a question of how useful and important post-modern theory is outside Western societies.

Although the use of the term 'post-modern' is new, it is not certain when the post modern era began. It can be argued that the 'modern' age ranged from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries, and that the last 150 years have been the 'post-modern' period, but most of studies in the field argue that 'postmodernity' originated in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Rosenau 1992: 5). Whenever the post-modern era began, however, and whether it is a new theory or not, as Best & Kellner point out, within social theory, postmodernists claim that there are fundamental changes in society and history which cannot be illuminated by modern theories, but require new theories and conceptions (1991: 30). According to theorists such as Foucault (1984) and Lyotard (1984), the modernist project in social theory, in all its Marxist and sociological aspects, is both historically and conceptually exhausted. These theorists, in focusing on developing an alternative model of knowledge and discourse, reject Marxist models of radical theory and practice, claiming that a new kind of radical theory is required. Their claim
'... draws on a diffused but potent belief that massive historical shifts and dislocations are underway in culture and society' (Crook 1990: 46).

Unlike modern and classical sociologists who transcend the relativity of social situations and attempted to establish some rational standpoint from which 'reality' could be described, the post-modern theorists argue that there is no 'objective reality' behind social meanings (Social Studies Review 1990: 20-1). However, there are different groups of postmodernists. Although it can be argued that there are as many forms of postmodernism as there are postmodernists (Featherstone 1988: 207), in terms of social science, two broad schools can be identified, namely sceptical postmodernists who are cynical, pessimistic, and extreme in their rejection of modern theory, and affirmative postmodernists who are optimistic and do not reject all aspects of modernism (Rosenau 1992: 15).

The sceptical postmodernists reject modern theory and recognise a situation where more than one theory exists, none claiming superiority over any other. Such questioning of theory is only one dimension of the post-modern challenge to modern social science. Those postmodernists who offer a pessimistic and negative assessment of modern theory, argue that '... the post-modern age is one of fragmentation, disintegration, malaise, meaninglessness, a vagueness or even absence of moral parameters and societal chaos' (Rosenau 1992: 15). Rosenau considers this view as the 'dark side of postmodernism' or 'the postmodernism of despair', because the postmodernists of this orientation who adopt a 'blasé' attitude believe that nothing really new is possible (1992: 15). He goes on to criticise the sceptical postmodernists by stating that:

Rigid truth claims are unfashionable in the social science today, but the need for theory is central. Social scientists of every orientation find it extremely difficult to give up theory as the sceptics require. A world without theory means an absolute equality of all discourse, an end to foundational claims. The entire intellectual climate of the social science would be transformed (1992: 89).
The affirmative postmodernists, on the other hand, have a more hopeful, and optimistic view of the post-modern time, although they agree with the sceptical critique of modernity. As Rosenau states:

Post-modern theory, for the affirmatives, is unsystematic, heterological, de-centred, ever-changing, and local. Non-representational, it is personal in character and community-specific in focus. Their decentered theory is said to be valuable for its own sake and never to claim special authority for itself. It does not require the object-subject distinction of modern social science (1992: 83).

Rosenau argues that no specific illustration of both sceptical and affirmative post-modern approaches can be considered as completely adequate. Each proposes to set itself up outside the modern paradigm not to judge modernity by its own criteria, but rather to contemplate and deconstruct it (1992:5).

In the economic sphere 'postmodernism' is described as 'post-Fordism'. Since Ford's day, the automobile industry has occupied a central position in debates concerning management, and it has served as a model of economic expansion and technological progress based on mass production, the key element in Fordist philosophy (Crook et al 1992: 172). The Fordist system, continuing for over a half century, depended on myriad individual, corporate, institutional, and state decisions, many of them unwitting political responses to the crisis tendencies of capitalism, especially in the great depression of the 1930s, and during wartime. Many studies in the field tell of the dispersal of the concentrated and centralised structure of economic organisation which reached a high level in the corporist state regulation of the post-war period up to 1970s. Moreover, as Harvey argues, post-war Fordism has to be seen as a total way of life, not only a system of mass production. Mass production meant standardisation of product as well as mass consumption and it becomes an international affair (1989: 135). During the mid-1960s, however, there were signs of serious problems within Fordism. In
other words, despite the fact that it solved some problems presented by Taylorism, Fordism itself brought some problems. As Tolliday & Zeitlin state:

Ford's rapid growth and dramatic innovations in production brought with them unprecedented problems of labour management. Skilled workers progressively moved into new 'indirect' services such as toolmaking and maintenance, joining the growing army of supervisors, inspectors, progress chasers, clerks and engineers needed to administer mass production (1992: 2).

Partly because of the problems brought by Fordism, and partly because of the sharp economic recession in the 1970s born out of a confrontation with the accumulated rigidities of government policies built up during the Fordist period, the transition in the regime of 'flexible accumulation', or 'post-Fordism' began. This breakdown of the Fordist practices of the post-war world was also a result of the challenge to the 'modern' idea by anti-modernists or postmodernists during the 1970s. That is why, economically, the term postmodernity is usually described as post-Fordism, a rejection of mass production line technology in favour of flexible work patterns and a flexible labour force. However, the concept of post-Fordism is a more concrete concept than 'postmodernism'. The 1970s is marked by the crisis of Fordism, and the 1980s marks the transition to 'not-Fordism' or 'post-Fordism' (Clarke 1992: 13).

As many others such as Murray (1989), Hebdige (1989), Hirst (1989), and Smart (1992) indicate, this is a transition from an organised to a disorganised capitalist economy. Contemporary capitalism is witnessing the erosion of Fordism, and there is a shift from the dominant forms of twentieth century centralised mass production associated with Fordism, to a new form of flexible accumulation, or post-Fordism. Post-Fordism is consumption not production-led. Policing postmodern society will be considered later in this chapter, but here we can indicate that policing in post-modern era also takes post-Fordist forms of organisations such as 'flexibility'. Post-Fordism involves the desegregation of the
market into specialised sectors which is made possible by the development of information technology to co-ordinate specialist markets and labour processes. As Hirst states:

The switch from Fordism to post-Fordism is seen as market-led, capitalist entrepreneurs of the classic type responding with new strategies to changed market conditions. In this account, Fordism is the more coherent concept, whereas post-Fordism is less an idea of a coherent manufacturing system than a way of registering a bundle of reactive social and economic changes. Fordism is supposed to have prevailed throughout the industrial world - the USA serving as a model for others. Post-Fordism is likewise a phenomenon of the whole industrial world (1989: 322).

Like modernism, being something maintaining social and cultural dependency of non-Western societies upon the West, Fordism is also something produced to maintain economic dependency of non-developed or developing countries, such as Turkey, upon developed, industrial Western countries. Post-Fordism, therefore, would help such countries to develop their economic independence.

This transition from Fordism to Post-Fordism happened at the time when the success of Fordist rationalisation meant the relative displacement of more and more workers from manufacturing. Harvey points out that the period from 1965 to 1973 was one in which the inability of Fordism and Keynesianism to contain the inherent contradictions of capitalism become more and more apparent, and that there were problems of rigidities in labour markets and contracts. It was also the time when the inflationary wave began that was eventually to sink the post-war boom (1989: 141-2).

In contrast to the features of Fordism such as mass production, mass public provision and modernist forms, post-Fordism is characterised, in terms of a homology between 'flexible' production techniques, by differentiated consumption patterns, a restructured welfare state and postmodernist forms (Gilbert et al 1992: 3; Hirst 1989: 321). As Gilbert et al argue, at the heart of the shift from Fordism
to post-Fordism lies 'flexibility'. In other words, the breakdown of Fordism and the emergence of post-Fordism is characterised primarily in terms of a search for greater level of 'economic flexibility' (1992: 3). Reed defines the concept of post-Fordism as:

... a view of contemporary socio-economic developments and their longer-term implications which suggests that the core components of 'Fordist' production regimes - mass production systems for mass markets coordinated through bureaucratic control mechanisms - are in the process of breaking down under the accumulated weight of economic, political, and social crisis (1992: 292-3).

Since the post-Fordist era is marked by direct confrontation with the rigidities of Fordism, the term 'flexible accumulation' is also used instead of post-Fordism. As Smart points out, flexible accumulation has been identified as an articulated response to the crisis of corporate state capitalism and the social and political problems associated with the dissolution of the post-war 'Fordist-Keynesian' configuration (1992: 52). At the heart of the new era of post-Fordism there are some new forms of the capital-labour relations. As Gough states:

These forms are able to overcome the problems for capital which have arisen within the Fordist labour process. Since they are said to be the basis for a qualitatively new era of accumulation, they are relatively stable and productive forms. They are able to suppress, or at least accommodate conflict between capital and labour, and they enable relatively rapid increases in productivity and the incorporation of technological innovation in processes and products (1992: 33).

Parallel to postmodern theory, post-Fordism has also been considerably criticised. For example, Murray considers the way post-Fordism is widening the split between core and periphery in the labour market and welfare systems, as the most pressing danger from it (1989: 49). Hirst also argues that it is an inadequate means of actually analysing changes in manufacturing, and what is wrong with post-Fordism is that it invokes a traditional Marxist explanatory prejudice since the features of the production system can be used to characterise the wider society or the whole industrial world (1989: 322).
Clarke (1992) and Gough (1992) whose work is concerned with the historical and theoretical critiques of Fordism and post-Fordism, consider a critical examination of the two concepts in a Marxist perspective. Clarke particularly criticises regulation theory which is considered to be the basis of post-Fordism, saying that it has to be judged incoherent. Post-Fordism lacks both theoretical and empirical coherence since it has proved impossible to find any pure case of Fordism and post-Fordism (1992: 15). Gough also argues that the existence of a new 'post-Fordist regime of accumulation' is unproven, and some important contemporary phenomena such as the relation of wages to productivity and structures of credit which are usually regarded as aspects of post-Fordism, can be more logically theorised as aspects of a particular period of crisis. Therefore, the notion of post-Fordism is irrelevant to an understanding of these issues (1992: 43-4).

I would argue that it is too early to criticise postmodernism in general and post-Fordism in particular in terms of their achievements or propositions. It is true that these are new theories which is still to be proven but it will be so in the near future. It will have some positive implications especially for developing non-Western societies which failed to develop their socio-economic and political independence by following the modernist model.

As the concepts of postmodernism and post-Fordism appeared in the literature during the 1980s, there has also been growing perception that the organisational forms which have dominated modern societies since the second half of the nineteenth century are no longer appropriate to the socio-economic and technological conditions. The notable studies concerning the issue of 'post-modern organisations' or 'post-modern organisational theory' are Clegg (1990), Clegg & Dunkerley (1980), and Reed (1992). Post-modern organisational studies
challenge modern, rational bureaucratic organisations and question their authority of hierarchical and bureaucratic organisational structures. As Reed states:

Rational bureaucracy, with its emphasis on rigid hierarchical discipline and control, and a highly specialised division of labour is increasingly seen as an outmoded and obsolete organisational forms for dealing with the pressures and problems that present themselves in late twentieth century societies. Instead the latter are deemed to require organisational forms that break with the logic of bureaucratisation and its in-built drive towards centralised control and highly differentiated work processes (1992: 226-7).

Clegg argues that as a result of changes during the post-war period in the state sphere, internationalisation, and the de-industrialisation of areas and enterprises which had been strongholds of Fordism, organisational responses became evident in the 1980s, and in order to explain these changes, the concept of 'post-modern organisation' has been invented. What the components of a postmodernist organisation might be, emerge best in contrast to some familiar characteristics of modern organisations. Postmodernism points to a 'more organic', 'less differentiated' form of organisation than those dominated by the rational bureaucratic forms of modernism (1990: 180-1). Clegg, whose definition of 'post-modern organisation' provides a useful summary of the changes in terms of the notable characteristics of post-modern societies and organisation, states that:

Where modernist consumption was premised on mass forms, postmodernist consumption is premised on niches. Where modernist organisation was premised on technological determinism, post-modern organisation is premised to technological choices made possible through 'de-dedicated' microelectronics equipment (1990: 181).

Post-modern organisations are generally flexible, while rational modern organisations are rigid. For example, in the Japanese enterprises in the post-war period, flexibility emerged out of the modes of rationality. Clegg argues that distinctive modes of rationality, which is postmodernist in its opposition to the principles of the Weberian/Fordist organisation pattern, may have emerged in some aspects of post-war Japan (1990: 205). At the centre of this emergent mode
of rationality was the negotiation of long-term employment policy in the years following the war. This minimised many of the employment rigidities which were endemic to modernist bureaucratic and Fordist organisations. The flexibility in terms of employment or workers extends to the technological process of work itself. In Clegg's words, "... production lines in Japanese enterprises are organised to be more flexible than the simple linear track of a Fordist factory" (1990: 196).

In contemporary literature, the foundations of post-modern organisations are sometimes referred to as post-Fordist organisations. The interrelated economic, technological and political developments occurring in the 1970s and 1980s brought about this shift to post-modern forms of organisation. As Reed argues, the bureaucratic organisational forms that directed the process of industrial modernisation in the West for more than a century are seen to be dissolving into diverse structures which signify the imminent demise of Fordism and the emergence of a post-Fordist world (1992: 233).

Current debate on post-Fordism is centred on technical organisational questions that dominate discussion of the labour process, the organisation of the firm, inter-firm relations and the relation between production and consumption. Attention is focused on the question how to organise production in the most 'efficient' way. As Gough states:

More grandly, it is supposed that the problems of the economy as a whole can be resolved by technical-organisational change. The stagnation of the world capitalist economy in the last twenty years is understood as a crisis of an old form of social organisation, Fordism and the emergence of a new form, post-Fordism. In current discourse, these forms of organisation, sometimes termed 'regimes of accumulation', are seen as socio-economic and political structures connected to particular basic technologies which enable sustained economic growth (1992: 31).

Considering these general characteristics of post-modern organisations, it is argued that there is a process of change in the police organisation from modern to post-modern. Modern police organisation is a professional organisation for
handling the policing function of surveillance with the state monopoly of legitimate force. As Reiner suggests, the deeper social changes of postmodernism are transforming the role of the police organisation within the whole policing process:

The changes in social structure and culture which have been labelled postmodernisation render this conception of policing increasingly anachronistic. There can be no effective symbol of a unitary order in a pluralistic and fragmented culture. In short, policing now reflects the processes of pluralism, desegregation, and fragmentation which have been seem as the hallmark of the post-modern (Reiner 1992a: 779-80).

According to Reiner, there are three characteristics or strategies of 'postmodern policing' which must be adopted if the police are to achieve what legitimacy is available in the post-modern time. The first one is to recognise the replacement of the 'ideal type' by a more pragmatic conception of acceptability which means that the police are providers of an ordinary public service, not sacred people of national pride. Secondly, police personnel must reflect the more diverse and plural demographics of post-modern societies which requires adequate and equal representation of different social groups, such as ethnic minorities, and women. Finally, local policing must be adjusted to the plural priorities and cultures of a much more diverse social world (1992a: 781).

The current changes and potential changes in the internal organisation of police forces in the future in England & Wales towards a more clear or transparent and flexible structure, can be seen as to bring policing in line with the characteristics of the post-modern society. Reiner gives the possibility of introducing sector policing and a local elected authority in London as examples of trends for change from modern bureaucratic organisation to post-modern organisation.

Studies of post-modern or post-Fordist organisation have been considerably criticised. For example, Gough, who questions the post-Fordist
forms of organisations, argues that there are some contradictions and instabilities in the post-Fordist model associated with value relations. Instabilities of the model are due to the fact that the post-Fordist forms of the capital-labour relations are not based on technological and organisation rationality, but represent forms of class struggle in a particular conjuncture (1992: 34). Rosenau, as mentioned earlier, argues that the pessimistic feature of modernism in general, and the anti-bureaucracy feature of post-modern organisation in terms of opposition to hierarchy, state power, and administrative regimes, go along with specific conservative social policies such as de-regulation, privatisation, and the reduction of social welfare (1992: 158).

The main body of criticism against post-modern theory, however, is 'critical theory'. The theorists associated with critical theory of the Frankfurt School, such as Habermas, emerged during the late 1970s and 1980s as the key critics of post-modern theory, although the first generation of the Frankfurt School emphasised the negative aspects of modernity. In contrast to most post-modern theorists, most critical theorists conceptualise modernity in terms of the trajectory of capitalism as a product of the capitalist economic system and technology. Critical theorists reject the alleged break between modernity and postmodernity proposed by many postmodernists. As Best & Kellner indicate, post-modern theorists want to go much further than critical theorists in overthrowing traditional philosophy and social theory (1991: 216). The critical theorists employ Marxian categories such as commodification, exchange, and reification to analyse a wide range of social phenomena and to describe the totalising tendencies of contemporary capitalism and its new forms of domination. As Best & Kellner state:

Most of the focus by those in the tradition of critical theory on the post-modern debate has concerned the attacks by post-modern theory on modernity, reason, Enlightenment, universality, and other concepts which critical theory has utilised, albeit not always traditional. The critical theory
optic on post-modern theory has for the most part focused on post-modern forms of knowledge and their allegedly irrationalist proclivities - rather than on the theories of post-modern society, the media, simulation, and so on (1991: 246).

The most notable criticism of postmodernism is contained in the works of Habermas (1981 and 1987), where he criticises post-modern theory by employing standard Marxian methods of ideology, and defending modernity as an 'unfinished project'. Habermas is a strong advocate of modernity and a defender of progressive elements but he criticises its oppressive aspects. Habermas defends a type of modern and critical theory against positivistic and conservative theory. As Best & Kellner state:

In contrast to post-modern theory, Habermas wants to valorise early modernity and to realise its unfulfilled potential. His first book, then, provides important clues as to what aspects of modernity he wishes to preserve and to serve explain why he would oppose later post-modern theories which totally reject modernity (1991: 236).

What Habermas defends is the modern differentiation of cultural spheres and the development of autonomous criteria of value in the fields of law and justice, knowledge, morality, and art (1981: 8). This advocate of modernity is against negative attacks and believes that instead of giving up modernity and its projects as a lost cause, we should learn from the mistakes of those extravagant programs which have tried to negate modernity. However, he acknowledges much of the post-modern critique of modern philosophy, although he undertakes to reconstruct not to reject reason. Habermas fears that the rejection of reason has dangerous theoretical and political consequences. He states:

I fear that the ideas of anti-modernity together with an additional touch of postmodernity are becoming popular in the circles of alternative culture. When one observes the transformations of consciousness within political parties in Germany a new ideological shift (Tendenzwende) becomes visible. And this is the alliance of postmodernists with premodernists (1981: 14).
The debate between post-modernists and their critics is part of the debate about the contemporary meaning and social role of science. Best & Kellner argue, for example, that post-modern theory tends to obscure some fundamental aspects of our everyday life and social experience. For example, bureaucratisation and administration continue to be major trends of contemporary society, but post-modern theory diminishes their role. In short, '... post-modern social analysis is highly one-sided, articulating tendencies toward fragmentation (Lyotard) or implosion (Baudrillard)' (Best & Kellner 1991: 223). Seidman & Wagner also state that:

As a consequence, the critics claim that postmodernism too readily dismisses the possibility of scientific theorising in sociology. Most sociological critics of postmodernism argue that some sort of general (or generalising) theory is both possible to attain and desirable to pursue (1992: 8-9).

Critics of postmodernism argue that it erases the differences between truth and error, or between theory and nonsense, and that this means 'nihilism'. Scholes states that '... since there is no truth, there is no error either, and all beliefs are equal' (1989: 56). Even some sceptical postmodernists acknowledge this complaint, but most of them argue that the absence of truth is positive. Rosenau who considers both sceptical and affirmative post-modern approaches as inadequate, argues that the post-modern view of 'nihilism' is itself contradiction. By expressing this view, postmodernists assume a position of privilege. They assert as true their own view that 'there is no truth'. By doing this, they affirm the possibility of truth itself, although a few of them escape this dilemma. However, they warn their readers that the views they express are only their own. Therefore, '... there is simply no logical escape from this contradiction except to remain silent' (Rosenau 1992: 90).

Best & Kellner criticise the attacks on postmodernism by the critical theorists, but this does not mean that they defend post-modern theory. They
criticise some aspects of both critical and post-modern theories. They argue that in terms of strengths and weaknesses, the two theories share significant similarities; both theories agree in their critiques of traditional philosophy and social theory, and both carry out sharp critiques of modernity and its forms of social domination and rationalisation. On the other hand, there are many differences between critical theory and post-modern theory. Critical theory generally wants to draw and defend some boundaries and some categorical distinctions which many post modernists reject. For example, postmodernists reject categories of radical social theory that critical theorists retain, such as those of political economy, and class (1991: 215-6). As Best & Kellner state:

It is unfortunate that critical theory and post-modern theory have not engaged themselves more productively in a dialogue with each other, for in a sense they complement their respective strengths and weaknesses (1991: 252).

What can be understood from this debate is that neither critical theory in any of its versions, nor post-modern theory provide an adequate model for a contemporary theory. Both theories are one-sided and require important corrections and compensations, and Habermas and Lyotard, as representatives of them, for example, also share certain deficiencies in terms of constructing critical theory and politics. In short, critical theorists reject the alleged break between modernity and postmodernity proposed by most postmodernists. But this does not mean that the critical theorists defend modernity. Nevertheless, as indicated above, there are many similarities as well as differences between the post-modern and critical theories.²

² There are also globalisation and orientation debates (Robertson 1992), and even newer organisational theories or approaches than post-modern theory which are called 'ecological' or 'contemporary' approaches. The notable ecological approaches are: population ecology (Clegg & Dunkerley 1980; Young 1988), institutionalist (Donaldson 1985; Scott, 1987; Fliedstein 1985), and power perspective (Mintzberg 1983) which are considered as useful in structuring of organisations and explaining divisionisation in organisations. Ecological explanations of organisation attempt to explain the conditions which can sustain and inhibit particular forms of organisational life (Clegg 1990; Reed 1992). Because of their weak relevance to my thesis, I do not consider them here in detail.
As a conclusion, we can say that all theories considered in this chapter are critical of each other or emerged as a reaction to another. But they suggest different conceptions of people, society and organisation in general and police organisation in particular. For example classical theory assumes that what is good for management is good for the workers. Hard and efficient labour will increase the effectiveness of the organisation and it will lead higher profits for both management and workers. Human relations theory, on the other hand, suggests that workers have many needs other than economic needs, and the classical approach benefits neither management nor workers. In short, non-economic, social and cultural needs increase worker satisfaction and productivity (Etzioni 1964: 20-1). The contribution of structuralist theory provides a useful comparison of the classical theory, especially the scientific management, and human relations theories which are in many ways opposed.

As Etzioni points out, even when writing over 30 years ago, the factors and variables one theory views as crucial may hardly be considered by an other (1964: 39). According to scientific management theory, the most efficient organisation would also be the most satisfying one, since it would maximise both productivity and the workers' pay. Human relations theory, on the other hand, assumes that the most satisfying organisation would be the most efficient by suggesting that workers would not be happy in the cold, formal, 'rational' organisation that satisfy only their economic needs. However, both theories consider a balance between the organisation's goals and the worker, but only differ in the degree (or type) of balance they depict. Therefore, it remains for the structuralists to argue that conflict is inevitable, and to emphasise that social science is not a vehicle to secure the needs of either worker or organisation.

In terms of their consideration of organisation, we can say that basically classical organisational theory considers organisations as 'rational' systems, and
human relations theory sees organisations as 'natural' systems, while modern theory combines these two viewpoints. Post-modern theory, on the other hand, basically criticises the implementation of modernism for organisation. Finally, critical theory rejects post-modern theory.

Classical theory which contains both a theory of motivation and organisation, pays attention to formal structures and to rational considerations. The search for greater effectiveness and efficiency in organisations gave rise to the classical theory of administration, especially the scientific management or classical motivational theory. According to this theory, workers are seen as motivated by economic rewards, and the organisation is characterised by division of labour with a highly specialised personnel and hierarchy of authority. The characterisation of the 'formal organisation' comes out of this tradition. Human relations theory, as a reaction to scientific management, emphasised the emotional and planned, non-rational elements in organisational behaviour. From this tradition, the concept of 'informal organisation' was developed. Structuralist theory relates the two concepts of the formal and informal organisation with equal attention. This can be identified as a convergence of organisational theory, which was made more sophisticated through comparative analysis. The scope of this theory was much broader to begin with, both in terms of the kinds of organisations covered and the kinds of cultural background taken into account. Contrary to 'rigid' rational modern organisations, post-modern theory suggests more 'flexible' organisations. Postmodernism sees highly specialised division of labour as 'outmoded' organisational forms (Reed 1992: 226).

In terms of the relevance of the organisational theories to police organisation, it would seem that classical organisational theory is more relevant and useful for understanding police organisation than other theories and most aspects of this theory can be applied to police organisation. Police organisations
are bureaucracies characterised by 'division of labour' and 'hierarchy of authority'.
Despite the fact that classical organisational theory seems to be the predominant
model of administration in policing, a few police organisations in the world may
be said to be utilising structuralism. One area where the structuralists have had
influence is information systems, and since police organisations are establishing
massive data-processing systems, they may utilise the structuralist model.
Although human relations theory has had little formal effect on the police
organisation, since the police work to fulfil people's social and non-economic
needs, it still can be utilised by the police organisation (Gaines 1975: 36 and 51).
Post-modernism has also influenced changes in the police organisation. The
police organisation in the post-modern era tries to transform itself into a more
flexible and transparent organisation, and to transfer some auxiliary services to
other organisations.

In the light of the theoretical background given in this and the first
chapter, the following two chapters will further consider the relevance or
applicability of organisational theories to the legitimate forms of policing practice
and police organisations in England & Wales and Turkey in particular. The next
chapter will analyse the legitimacy of policing systems, the bases of legitimacy
and legitimate forms of policing practice by referring to the concepts of consensus
and coercion.
CHAPTER 3

CONSENSUAL AND COERCIVE FORMS OF POLICING IN ENGLAND & WALES AND TURKEY

In this chapter the concepts of power, legitimacy and consensus are applied to the policing forms in England & Wales and Turkey. The relationship between these concepts is complicated one but we can simply say, for policing, that if legitimacy of the police is widely recognised, consensus for policing is likely to be enhanced. Similarly, police-public co-operation either usually results in or is an indication of policing by consensus. On the other hand, however, little police-public co-operation would generally indicate more coercive policing whereby consent is based on force rather than 'free will'. This chapter will assert that the policing form in England & Wales is primarily exercised on the basis of value consensus and in Turkey on coercion. The first section of this chapter also considers these different forms of policing.

The second section considers the relationship between legitimacy, coercion and military involvement in policing. The relevance of the military to this chapter is that like the police, the military are also the instruments of the state, based on a monopoly of physical coercion. Also, military involvement in policing increases the level of policing by coercion and decreases legitimacy, but this is more visible in Turkey compared with England & Wales.
3.1. The concepts of power, legitimacy and consensus and their application to policing forms

Although in practice it is difficult to separate the concepts of power, legitimacy and consensus, it is necessary to make a distinction between them in order to move towards an understanding of their inter-connection. Accordingly, in this first section of this chapter, the meaning of these concepts and their relationship with each other are analysed together with their application to policing.

Power is one of the major components of most, if not all, types of organisation including police organisation. Power is needed in the very formation of an organisation and without a formal power structure, organisations face a situation of 'chaos'. In Weber's study of power relations and authority in political organisations and public bureaucracies, power is defined as the possibility, probability or chance of imposing one's will upon the behaviour of others (Weber 1947: 152; Gerth & Mills 1976: 180; Reed 1993: 58). Other studies in the field also define power as the ability of variously an actor or individual or quality to produce effects upon other people or the environment (Beetham 1991: 43; Etzioni 1961: 4; Jaques 1976: 39). Jaques' definition of power is probably the most common usage in contemporary sociology:

Power is the rate of the induction of behaviour in others. It is the quality of an individual (or a group) which enables him to influence other individuals either singly or collectively by channeling and directing their behaviour in such a way as to help him to fulfil his aims. It is that quality which gets others to act, to work, to do things on one's behalf. The power of individuals or groups may derive from any sources, physical strength, psychological ability, social prestige, collective action, economic wealth (1976: 39).

This definition seems to be comprehensive, but not complete. Especially in terms of power relations in organisation, the interpretation of, for example, Etzioni (1961, 1964, 1965) must be considered. Those who have power in any
organisation may gain that power because of their ability to give or take away rewards which are important to members of the organisation. The role of a power holder within an organisation differs according to the sources of their power. These may be derived either from a person's position in the organisation or personal characteristics, or even a combination of both. According to Etzioni, if power is derived from organisational positions the power holder is usually called an 'officer' and if it is derived from the person's personal characteristics, they would be known as a 'leader' (1961: 90; 1964: 61).

Because organisations are identified according to the types of power applied, we should examine the classification of power. In existing studies of power, several kinds of power are mentioned. Broadly, we can distinguish between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' power, but we should look at classifications of power generally. Etzioni classifies power into three types: coercive, utilitarian and normative. These three types differ respectively according to the 'physical', 'material' and 'symbolic' means employed by organisations to make the groups or individuals who are subject to that power, comply (1961: 5-7; 1964: 59). Coercive power rests on the application or the threat of application of physical sanctions. It derives from the ability to force someone else, by using physical sanctions, to carry out instructions. Utilitarian power is based on control over material resources and rewards through the allocation of salaries and wages. Finally, normative power rests on the allocation and manipulation of symbolic rewards and deprivations.

Regarding the types of people who have power and their power sources indicated above in Etzioni's classification, we can say that personal power is always normative, but positional power may be normative, coercive or utilitarian. Most organisations usually employ all three types of power, but the extent to
which they rely on each of them may be different. Indicating the different classes of means of power, Etzioni states that:

All other things being equal, at least in most cultures the use of coercive power is more alienating to those subject to it than is the use of utilitarian power, and the use of utilitarian power is more alienating than the use of normative power. Or to put it the other way around, normative power tends to generate more commitment than utilitarian and utilitarian more than coercive. In other words, the application of symbolic means of control tends to convince people, that of material means tends to build up their self-oriented interests in conforming, and the use of physical means tends to force them to comply (1964: 60).

Considering this statement from Etzioni, it can be said that according to the type of power applied, camps and prisons are examples of coercive organisations, and that religious and educational organisations and public bureaucracies are typical of normative organisations. 'Blue-collar' organisations such as factories and 'white-collar' organisations such as banks are utilitarian organisations. According to Etzioni's classification, the police organisation, as a public bureaucracy, is considered as a normative organisation. I would argue that it is not possible to generalise in this way. All police organisations are ultimately coercive and the police organisations of some political systems, for example totalitarian regimes, are totally coercive. In Turkey, although the police are not supposed to exercise coercive power under the law, they exercise coercion in practice. To this extent, the police organisation does not apply normative power and cannot be considered as a normative organisation.

In terms of organisation, 'legitimate power' is important. Therefore, before proceeding to consider the concept of 'legitimacy', I would like to examine the meaning of this. 'Legitimate power' is considered in the literature as 'authority'. To clarify this, we should consider the definition of the notion of 'authority' itself. Authority can be defined as the 'right', while power, as mentioned above, is the 'ability' of an individual or group and quality to produce effects upon other people. One may have power without legitimacy, but not authority. In an organisation,
authority gives an individual the right to issue instructions to others and to see that they are carried out. As Jaques continues:

Authority is an attribute of a role which gives the incumbent the right to exercise power within socially established limits, and to apply to others positive or negative sanctions (rewards or punishment) depending upon the quality of their behaviour. It is thus the exercise of power in a manner which others have said is allowable and are prepared to support. Authority is, therefore, the institutional transformation of power channelled and limited within a social system (1976: 39).

The group towards whom the power is being used authorises that power and this process of authorisation means the legitimation of power. The legitimation process, as will be explored below, should be completed through certain channels such as consensus. Legitimate power or authority is related to the centres or grounds of power. In Weber's analysis of organisation and bureaucracy, for example, there are three types of legitimate authority: charismatic, traditional and legal-rational (1947: 328-9; 1968: 212) and I will consider each in turn.

According to Weber, charismatic power is accepted through the force of the superior's personality and leadership qualities and is legitimated by the belief the people have in the exceptional qualities of the leader. Power centred on 'tradition', however, assumes that the members of an organisation accept the orders of superiors on the basis that this is the way which things have always been done. Therefore, the legitimation of traditional authority stems from a belief in the unchanging nature of everyday routine and an unchanging past. An authority is seen as 'traditional' if legitimacy is claimed for it and believed in by virtue of the sanctity of age-old rules and powers. The power holder is there according to traditional rules and is obeyed because of their traditional status. Traditional rule is based on personal loyalty and this loyalty determines the relations of the administrative staff to the person exercising authority (Weber 1968: 226-7).
The third type of legitimate power, expressed in 'legal-rational' terms, depends on the members of organisation accepting that the orders are founded on rationally derived structures and central processes in the organisation. In this sense, the legitimisation of legal authority is a belief in the law, not in a charismatic or traditional leader. People obey laws under legal authority, because the laws are issued through proper procedures. According to Weber, legal-rational authority rests on the acceptance of the validity of a number of mutually inter-dependent ideas. Any given legal norm may be established by agreement or by imposition on grounds of value-rationality, within a claim to obedience at least on the part of the members of the organisation. Each body of law consists of a system of abstract rules which have usually been established intentionally. Persons in authority, the 'superiors', are themselves subject to an impersonal order by orienting their actions to it through their own disposition and commands. What the person obeys is only the law (1968: 217). In Weber's theory, traditional and charismatic power bases are lacking in stability and are related more to political interests rather than the administrative efficiency of an organisation, while legal-rational or bureaucratic power has most potential to be accepted as legitimate authority and stabilises working relationships.

Considering the bases of legitimate authority mentioned by Weber, we can suggest that in England & Wales, the basis of legitimate authority is legal-rational. In Turkey, on the other hand, the basis of legitimate authority is traditional, although the law is formally based within the legal-rational, due to a democratic regime structured on Western laws. I will elaborate these different bases of legitimate authority in England & Wales and Turkey later in this chapter.

Although 'authority' is considered as legitimate power, it may still not be sufficient for legitimacy, because the power system dictates what is legitimate. The concept of 'legitimacy', which is related to the process of bureaucratisation
and rationalisation, generally means the quality of being seen as lawful and right (Beetham 1991: 3). It is derived from the Latin word *legitimus* which means 'according to law' (Edmonds 1988: 95). Weber uses legitimation to refer to the acceptance of the exercise of power, because it is in line with values held by those towards whom power is exercised. This can be defined as legitimacy through value consensus. Weber’s study of legitimation is especially relevant to this thesis and I will continue to elaborate this.

For Weber, in a state there are legal institutions such as the police and the military, which work and act on behalf of the state, as identified in the law. This is the major factor which legitimates the state. It is even more important for the police, as they usually stand directly between citizen and the state. The legitimacy of the authority of the police is directly linked to the legitimacy of the authority of the law. The authority or power which the police have is not their power, but the community’s power given by the law. If people consent to the functions of the state or its institutions, then the state or the power system is legitimate. If any organisation is to survive in the long term, the exercise of power in the organisation must be accepted and believed in by those who are being ruled, and they must see the exercise and legitimation of power publicly.

Like power and authority, types of legitimacy are also classified as traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational depending on the source or ground from which power is derived. This means that what makes power legitimate in one society may be different from that which legitimates power in another society. As indicated earlier, the basis of legitimate authority in England & Wales for example, is legal-rational whereas in Turkey it is traditional.

The question which we should ask at this point is, whatever type of legitimacy we are referring to, what makes a power system legitimate, or how
does legitimacy exist? As mentioned above, if people accept the way power is exercised, this is what we mean by legitimacy. But what are the indicators of this acceptance? Beetham indicates some elements of legitimacy such as legal validity, justifiability of rules, belief in legitimacy and consent to power (1991: 4-6). Generally, he suggests, our understanding of legitimacy rests on differential theoretical perspectives.

According to legal experts, for example, legitimacy is equivalent to legal validity. This means that power is acquired and exercised according to established rules, or in other words, the power a person has is legally exercised within the law. This is the first condition of legitimacy. The situation where the rules of power are not legally valid is called 'illegitimacy'. In other words, illegitimacy means that the first condition of legitimacy, namely 'legal validity', is absent. According to moral and political philosophers, on the other hand, power is legitimate where the rules governing it are justifiable according to rationally defensible normative principles. Therefore, legitimacy entails the moral justifiability of power relations. Almost all power systems require justification to meet the interests of the subordinate, as well as the dominant. If the system fails to do this, its power is not legitimate. To be morally justified, power has to be derived from a valid source of authority. Therefore, if the justifiability of rules and supporting beliefs do not match, a non-legitimate situation, namely a 'legitimacy deficit', or weakness exists. In contrast, again, social scientists in the twentieth century mostly follow Weber when defining legitimacy. According to Weber, legitimacy must be valid, but if legitimacy is to have validity, it must also be believed. Legitimacy is validated once the followers accept and believe in the claim for legitimacy. Power is legitimate where the people involved in it believe that it is legitimate. Simply, followers believe in the legitimacy of a regime and that makes it legitimate (Weber 1968: 213; Albrow 1970: 40-3).
Beetham criticises this view by arguing that a Weberian definition of legitimacy misrepresents the relationship between belief and legitimacy, and takes no account of the aspects of legitimacy that have little to do with beliefs. Belief in legitimacy is a result of 'influence' to which people are exposed. People have faith because the powerful have been successful in a propaganda and public relations campaign, and '... they have managed to convince people that they are legitimate because their legitimations have been accepted' (1991: 9-11). According to Beetham, 'consent' is one element in legitimacy which has nothing to do with belief. Actions such as joining in 'acclamation' and voting in an election confer legitimacy or contribute to making power legitimate. There are three general factors or dimensions which make power legitimate. These are, the legal validity of the exercise of power, the justifiability of the rules governing a power relationship in terms of the belief and values current in the given society, and the evidence of consent derived from actions. This means that where power is exercised according to justifiable rules and with evidence of consent to the power holder, it is valid and legitimate (1991: 12). If we consider the impact of this argument for this thesis, we can say that if policing is exercised through justifiable rules and with evidence of consensus, it is valid and legitimate. Legitimacy of policing might, however, take different forms according to differential bases of legitimate authority.

If the power system or its law and order institutions such as the police use coercion rather than consensual means to deal with disorders, conflicts or any other threats to the system, this must not only impact on the legitimacy of the power system as a whole or that of the particular institution, but disorder or conflict itself may indicate that the system itself is weak or inadequate. The system or the state and the police should, then, employ Brewer et al's (1988) 'accommodation' strategy against disorder or conflict. This is a strategy which
meets the grievances of the groups from which disorder emanates (Brewer et al 1988: 233). The police should fight against problems such as discrimination and unemployment which result in disorders. This strategy, instead of using coercive methods when disorders occur, will make the policing system more legitimate. As Beetham states:

One of the prime causes of disorder within any society lies in the absence of agreement about some aspects of its power rules (the rules of property, division of labour, political office, citizenship, or whatever), and in the social conflict to which such disagreement gives rise. Disorder and insecurity are as much the product of inadequate legitimacy as they are its cause. To the extent that this is so, any attempt to suppress discontent or disagreement by force, rather than resolve it by political means, may only weaken a state's legitimacy rather than enhance it (1991: 139).

The behaviour and actions of the police against people and public incidents are important sources of their legitimacy. If they conduct themselves properly, that is according to accepted rules and principles, their legitimacy is likely to be reinforced. If police performance is adjudged to be right according to prevailing values and expectations of the public, its legitimacy will be strengthened. Legitimacy is the extent to which policing is accepted by the public as valid in its mission and its methods and depends upon the extent to which they are judged as behaving properly, in according with basic rules and values (Reiner 1986: 258; Benyon 1986: 15; Benyon & Solomos 1987: 190). Bayley states, concerning police legitimacy, that:

Police exist whenever the application of physical constraints can be shown to be regarded as legitimate by the community... Particular problems occur, therefore, when a police force loses legitimacy and is no longer accepted by members of the community... In such cases it is not a contradiction to say that a particular community has an unacceptable, illegitimate, unauthorised, even illegal police (1985: 9-10).

In short, policing may be adequately legitimate or not, and it may take different forms in different societies, but if it is not accepted by the members of society, it will cause more problems rather than end them. In other words, successful
policing can be achieved by the 'free' consent of the public, not by simply employing extreme coercive methods.

As I have already mentioned, 'consensus' is another concept to consider in this chapter. It is the most important element or basis of legitimacy, but not the only one. Legitimacy may be based on 'coercion' which will also be considered here. Although the term 'consent' is the verb or action and consensus is the name of the condition, I will use both of them where appropriate. More specifically, in this thesis I am concerned with Weber's concept of 'value consensus'. This means consensus based upon universal values such as freedom and democracy. Value consensus is the pure opposite of 'force' and 'coercion', in that an individual or group may be forced to consent. The legitimation of power and therefore, the long term survival of any organisation, depends mainly on the strength of consensus among its members, both administrators and subordinates and it must be 'active' rather than 'ideal' (Gramsci 1971: 208). Consensus is usually defined as the majority view, expressed in voting or any other method, but for value consensus the majority view only is not sufficient, and the attitude of the total population must be taken into account. Therefore, as Jaques argues, there must be a 'willingness' of the minority to accept the majority view, unless some sort of coercive power is exercised. He further states that although some may be opposed at any given time, consensus means '... sanctioning and acceptance of policies which allows the members of an institution to agree to remain together and to support its constitution' (1976: 214). Consensus, of course, exists when people towards whom power is exercised consent to the power holder. Beetham defines the term consent as a factor which confers legitimacy:

What counts as consent, therefore, and from it is required to confer legitimacy on the powerful, is itself a culturally specific matter determined by the convention of a given society, rather than definable absolutely. What is common to legitimate power everywhere, however, is the need to 'bind in' at least the most significant members among the subordinate through actions or ceremonies publicly expressive of consent so as to
establish or reinforce their obligation to a superior authority and to
demonstrate to a wider audience the legitimacy of the powerful (1991: 19).

Beetham also comments on the position or ability of the people who consent by
saying that in order to be able to give consent a person has to be free or at least
capable of freedom: 'In the case of political power, consent is related to
membership of the political community, which can be a more restricted category
than that of the free' (1991: 60). From these definitions, it would seem that those
actions which are performed on the basis of pure consent or which are considered
to be in accordance with consensus, should be free, public and independent from
the system of power, otherwise they cannot have a legitimating role. 'Privacy' has
no legitimating role. In terms of consent to policing, the view of the minority is
especially important. The 'majority' of people are not usually the objects of
criminological investigation. Criminal investigation mainly depends on the flow of
information to the police from the community as either victims, witnesses, or
other studies, that consent to policing is not just a series of individual instances,
but an issue which needs to be seen in a broader historical perspective. They state
that:

The history of policing in Britain has largely been about the negotiation
and maintenance of relations between the police and the working class
which, for short, is usually referred to as 'policing by consent'. The irony is
that the police institution largely legitimated itself by claiming
subordination to (a formalistic interpretation of) the rule of law, while
everyday street policing was legitimated by the use of discretion (1990:
358-9).
This means that if people were to withdraw their consent, and refuse to abide by the rules of conduct, all the police available would be insufficient to maintain order.

Although 'consent to power' usually means 'obedience' to requirements of the powerful, obeying the requirements or keeping the law is not enough. Consensus is maintained in order to uphold rational values or standards but in practice a collective belief in the necessity of law and order does not always exist. Sometimes a form of 'forced consent' may exist. The idea that people consent to power if they do not openly protest is inadequate. For value consensus, there should be an agreement between the power holder and subordinates on actions to be taken and they should not be coerced to act in a certain way. In this context, there is a relationship between 'force' and 'consent'. This relationship, and the concept of 'forced consensus' is a problem tackled by Gramsci (1971). According to him, consent should be 'active' not 'ideal'. Therefore legitimacy should be based on active consensus. Gramsci argues that the state itself is a coercive entity with its legislation and coercive apparatuses (1971: 208). For the retention and stability of consensus, '... the attempt is always made to ensure that force will appear to be based on the consent of the majority' (Gramsci 1971: 80).

As already mentioned, according to Weber's theory of legitimacy, the validity of legitimacy is based on consent or voluntary obedience, but since legitimacy may exist to support a system of domination, coercion may also be used to maintain order. Legitimacy does not have to be consensual or even universal and subjects of a system do not have to believe in the ideas that justify it. Legitimacy can be imposed upon a society according to the view of a minority rather than majority, with acceptance emerging only after coercive domination. Muir who describes coercion as the 'instrument of equality' and the 'enemy of liberty', states that:
Coercion is a means of controlling the conduct of others through threats to harm. Coercive relationships exist everywhere in every society: in family, in the marketplace, and, characteristically, in political institutions. Civilisation tolerates, even makes possible, many uses of coercion. Most notably, it delegates to its public officials the licence to threaten drastic harm to others (1977: 37).

Policing is itself coercive, and the police organisation is a state's coercive instrument. Police organisation reflects an inherent contradiction within a system of democracy, having the capacity to undermine democratic rights and privileges through the use of non-negotiable coercive force. Apart from consensus, therefore, coercion is another basis of legitimate policing. In England & Wales the policing form is primarily exercised on the basis of value consensus and in Turkey it is mainly exercised on the basis of coercion. These two forms of policing are opposites. Lea & Young (1984) identify three major differences between these contrasting forms of policing in terms of the support of the public, the flow of information and the role of stereotypes. In consensus policing, there is a high level of community support for the police, a reasonably high flow of information and use of stereotypes to some degree, while in coercive policing, the actions are without consent, there is no flow of information and there is maximum use of stereotypes (1984: 173).

The differences between these respective policing forms also indicate the differences between forms of police legitimacy. In order to elaborate this differentiation between 'policing by consent' and 'policing by coercion', I would like to consider these two forms of policing in further detail. Policing by consent requires an ongoing relationship between the police and public and requires mechanisms by which the police can be held accountable for their actions. As Uglow argues, the acceptability and legitimacy of policing by consent depends not only on their adherence to the law, but on the general principles of fairness and restraint (1988: 2). Since consent refers to policing policy, rather than daily...
decision making (Morgan 1989: 218), consent to policing does not necessarily imply support for what police institution actually does. This means that the public may be involved in creating policing policies or long term plans but not daily policing practice. Day-to-day policing is more discretionary, although it has to be according to policies previously outlined. In other words, support for the ascribed goal of police work, crime prevention, is not necessarily the same support for particular styles or objects of police work (Brogden 1982: 204). Brogden continues:

In inner city, residents wanted police activities to be more crime-related and less directed towards public order. The police's most visible concern with public-house brawls, with maintaining their authority on the street, was seen as a side-track for 'real' police work - the maintenance of personal and household security (1982: 204).

One point to be considered is that since policing itself entails the use of coercion or force, complete policing by consent cannot exist. Morgan (1991) argues that there never can be complete policing by consent in two fundamental senses. First, action by the police cannot depend on the wishes of offenders and victims. Second, although the opinion of victims, either individuals or groups, are important, they cannot be allowed to determine police decisions (1991: 7). When policing by consensus is not complete, then there is exercise of coercion. In England & Wales for example where policing is by consent to a great extent, there is an increasing use of coercion by the police. This is a change in the form of policing. Especially in inner city areas in England & Wales, practices have moved away from consensus policing towards coercive policing. Increases in public order policing, and the widespread training of a large proportion of the police in many forms of riot control are evidence of a drift towards coercive policing as a result of a decline in consensus (Lea & Young 1984: 183; Hillyard & Smith 1988: 241-9; Morgan 1989: 4; Jefferson 1990: 35-6). Despite policing by consent, therefore, there is evidence of a decline of consent and use of coercion in England.
Held (1987; 1989) argues that the middle-classes tend to exhibit greater consistency of beliefs and agreement over values than the working-classes. The working classes, on the other hand, hold common values and they tend to be hostile to the system rather than supportive. There is more 'dissensus' between classes than there is consensus. In terms of people's influence over government, the middle-classes also tend to assert greater confidence than the working class. However, as Held states:

> While legitimacy is not extensively conferred most people do not have a clear-cut conception of what alternative institutions they desire. Hence, there is reason to suspect that the distance, remoteness or even alienation people experience in connection with dominant political and economic institutions might be the basis of further political uncertainty and volatility in the future (1989: 128).

According to Held and similarly Beetham (1991), political authority within particular societies cannot be characterised as being simply either coercive or consensual. Coercion and consent are not mutually exclusive categories in this sense, as both being grounds for the legitimacy of political authority are likely to be present in any one historical period and in any one society. In addition to coercion and 'pure' forms of consent, there are other forms of consent, variably grounded in degrees of coercion or 'other' rationalities, one of which (importantly for this thesis) is 'traditional':

**Diagram I: Types of grounds on which political institutions can be accepted**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coercion, or following orders</th>
<th>Apathy</th>
<th>Instrumental acceptance</th>
<th>Ideal normative agreement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>Pragmatic acquiescence</td>
<td>Normative agreement</td>
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(Source: Held 1987: 238)
The diagram illustrates seven possible reasons for why political orders, rules and
care complied with: (1) there is no effective choice in the matter (coercion); (2)
these rules have always been accepted (tradition); (3) there is a lack of interest in
the exercise of these rules (apathy); (4) there is a lack of perceived alternatives
(pragmatic acquiescence); (5) there is perceived opportunities for personal
advantage (instrumental acceptance); (6) given available information the rules
should be accepted (normative agreement); and (7) in ideal circumstances these
rules should be accepted (ideal normative agreement) (Held 1987: 182, 238).
Held, following Weber, only regards these latter two as unambiguous grounds for
regarding a political order as legitimate. In any specific society, however, all these
grounds for complying with the political authority of that society are liable to be
present, although in specific moments, one may be dominant.

How do the police exercise coercion in practice? The authority for the use
of coercion by the police lies in the recognition that uncontrolled exercise of
power by individuals increases the insecurity and decreases the liberty of the other
members of public. Therefore, the police are justified in exercising coercion in
pursuit of that legitimate goal to maintain order. As Christian argues, allowing the
police to use 'reasonable force if necessary' to carry out routine policing functions,
signifies a departure from the notion of 'policing by consent' which underpinned
the legal theory of police powers (1984: 154), because it is not always clear what
is meant by the terms 'reasonable' and 'necessary'. The use of reasonable force
may cause problems and may allow the police to exercise further powers. For
example, the legitimation of the use of reasonable force in stop and search
operations by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 would also allow police
to carry out strip searches (Christian 1984: 157-8).
The use of coercion by the police may minimise rioting, but as Benyon points out, it may cause further frustration leading to more social and political outbreaks of violent disorders and disintegration. Disorders and political violence may reinforce particular group identities, thereby leading to further conflict (1985: 38, 45). Benyon & Solomos also argue that the use of coercion may suppress urban unrest temporarily, but these sorts of measures usually result in even greater feelings of injustice which lead to further disorders (1987: 189-90). The primary reason for the Brixton Disorders, for example, was that the police did not succeed in achieving 'public approval' for their functions and duties (Scarman 1981: paragraph 4.70).

Nevertheless, since the disorders in the early 1980s and the Scarman Report of 1981, up to the present time, the police leadership and those who determine policing policies in England & Wales have been engaging in efforts to regain legitimacy for the force. One impact of the Scarman Report has been that many senior police officers elaborated a new corporate strategy consisting of 'upgrading the professional standards of individual officers', 'decentralisation of decision making structure', and 'community co-operation' (Reiner 1986: 271-2). Many chief constables and commissioners have sought to re-establish legitimacy by strengthening public involvement in policing through more consultative committees, and a more flexible and multi-agency approach, which can be explained as a 're-legitimation through policing style' (Uglow 1988: 15). Foot patrols, Neighbourhood Watch schemes, consultative committees and community policing which advocate a community based approach to law enforcement are all attempts to decrease the extent of coercive policing and to improve the image of policing by consent in England & Wales.

In Turkey, on the other hand, the basis of legitimate policing is different from that in England & Wales. As indicated above, policing in Turkey can be
described as policing by coercion. Policing by coercion is policing without consent and with the hostility of the community. Coercive policing usually exists to serve a totalitarian state, or at least a state or government which lacks public support. Turkey cannot be formally considered to be a totalitarian state because it is established as a parliamentary democratic state based on Western laws, but since democracy does not exist in real terms and democratic institutions enjoy only a limited legitimacy, we cannot say that policing is exercised on the basis of value consensus. Instead, there would seem to be a situation of 'forced consensus'. The Turkish police, like the police in England & Wales, operate within a legal framework which is the basis of the state. The law connects the police with the state, and the Turkish state presents itself as governed by law. The police cannot be distinguished from the state from which it derives its authority. Whilst the state is governed by law, the laws about policing are too broad, and permit police to practice coercive powers that a liberal-democratic state would not allow. For example, because the laws and regulations are not clear, officers may treat a child or a teenager like an adult by using force, or may torture suspects and criminals, although these are not legal actions.

The 'authoritarian' characteristic of the Turkish state and coercive policing are the main reasons for lack of consent to the political and administrative system of the state as a whole, and to policing in particular. In this situation, policing in Turkey is guaranteed by coercive powers and law and order is maintained by coercion, because the police organisation is an apparatus of the coercive power. Gorgulu is right to say that it would be an exaggeration to argue that widespread terrorism and political disorders in Turkey constitute a situation that the police cannot overcome, because the police forces would be powerful enough to maintain public and political order if they could get public support and consent (1980: 45).
As in any country, the police remain as the instrument of the state in contemporary Turkey, but the legitimate function of the state is to maintain public order and to enforce the law. The important point to make here, is that the new state established in 1923, formed a coercive and authoritarian police organisation to protect the systematically established political regime and the economic system of state capitalism. As Ece argues, after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the police and the gendarmerie, like all other state institutions, were given the duty to act in the 'interests of official state ideology' (1991: 48). The declared aim was to protect the new regime against the activities of radical political movements such as communist, fascist and fundamentalist Islamic, but the police have even been used against those engaging in basic democratic activities.

Because the new political system was a one-party authoritarian system, during the early two or three decades of the new republic there were no radical political problems. Especially after 1946, the time when the multi-party political system began, Turkey witnessed a rapid development in terms of social and political change. As Harris states:

One of the small number of non-western societies struggling to evolve a workable parliamentary democracy, it long seemed to offer lessons and insights into an important political process. At times, some have even regarded it as a model for other developing countries (1985: 1).

Contrary to this general development, policing has not been democratised. As the politicisation and democratisation of society increased, the police organisation has also been politicised, but has worked to tackle activities against political power with coercive methods rather than with democratic and rational powers and methods. Coercive policing in Turkey is currently increasing in the form of establishing heavily-armed police forces or units and increasing the number of weapons and armoured vehicles available to the police. During the past few years several 'military-style' anti-terrorist police departments have been
established. In 1993 the Government formed the Internal Security Co-ordination Board attached to the Vice-Prime Minister, and the Special Operational Unit attached to the Anti-Terrorism Department has been reorganised and extended as an independent department. This department has provincial sub-units. The personnel work in the Anti-Terrorism and Special Operation Departments and their sub-units are fully armed and equipped with military equipment and their primary duty is to fight against terrorism. The Government also decided to transform two Police Schools to Special Operation Schools from the 1993-4 academic year. The graduates of these schools will be employed within the Anti-Terrorism and Special Operation Departments indicated above and their sub-units.

The number of public order police forces, namely the Rapid Action Police, are also increasing. Currently, there is a Rapid Action Unit in 63 cities and 38 towns. The total number of police officers employed in these units by the end of 1994 was about 15,000. The authorities of other cities which do not have a Rapid Action Unit may call for help from these units when necessary.

The number of police personnel in Turkey is increasing and this requires more weapons, armoured vehicles and equipment. Every year thousands of personnel are employed and most of them are given at least a pistol and a personal radio. Also, the old pistols are replaced with new and more powerful ones and the anti-terrorism, special operational and rapid action teams are given additional weapons and armoured vehicles. It seems that increasing the number of weapons available to the police, which increases the extent of coercive policing, is still accepted as a normal trend in Turkey, although there remains a commitment to the notion of a more democratic, modern and civilised police force.

In terms of public consensus and the use of coercion in Turkey, it is essential to mention the gendarmerie force. The gendarmerie is a military and
highly disciplined police force and gendarmes are military personnel. New career junior officials are obtained by quota from graduating classes of the military schools and their training is conducted in the gendarmerie school under General Staff supervision. Gendarmes live in barracks as a reactive force separated from the community like other military forces. Although the national police are also armed and remote from the community, at least they are aware of the importance of public-police relations in attaining public consent, whilst community initiatives involving co-operation with public are unknown by the gendarmerie force. They do not represent the local community whatsoever.

Although Turkey differs from England & Wales considerably in terms of heavily arming all police officers, and having many 'military-style' police units or departments, it is similar to some Western European countries such as Italy, Germany and France. These countries also have similar police forces, but the difference between Turkey and the 'continental model' is the comparatively heavy use of antidemocratic policing strategies and the lack of respect for political, civil and human rights by these particular units of the Turkish police. Also, the constitution and position of the gendarmerie is different from the military police forces in, for example, Italy and France. Their military police forces are professional forces responsible only for policing, while the Turkish gendarmerie is not a professional force but consists of those persons who are on their temporary compulsory military service. They are under the control of the Ministries of Defence and the Interior, having both military and policing functions. Their military role, however, is more important than the policing role. The most important difference between Turkey and the European context, however, is that the actual military is involved in maintaining internal public order. Although normally the police are responsible for maintaining internal order and the military are responsible for defending the state and society against
external threats, the Turkish military intervene in policing and maintaining internal public order not only during emergency cases, but whenever they find it 'necessary'. The position of the gendarmerie also encourages the military to intervene in policing. The involvement of the gendarmerie and of the actual military in policing is a major factor for coercive policing and lack of public consent in policing.

It was argued, in a report by a group of British police officers to the Turkish government in 1980, that 'hard policing policy' would not work against terrorism and political disturbances, and therefore, Turkey should avoid coercive policing (Emniyet Genel Mudurlugu 1980: 2). The same report, however, suggested that military force may be used when internal security and order is in danger, although the military should not employ all its weapons, should be under the control of the police and consider their role as secondary (1980: 6). The report advocated the use of military forces as a short term measure under the control and command of the police and civilian authorities, but this did not happen in Turkey. Once the Turkish military are involved in policing, they do not accept the control of any other body and they use all the available weapons and militaristic tactics.

Military involvement in policing is not something that can be condoned. The coercive policing form supported by military force results in a further distancing of the community from the police and produces an alienation between the community and the police. This is undesirable and may only weaken legitimacy rather than enhance it. Therefore, it is an unusual way of ensuring legitimacy. It is this insufficient and unusual basis of legitimacy which generates the debate concerning the level of the legitimacy of the Turkish police. The relationship between legitimacy, coercion and military involvement in policing practice is considered in the next section.
3.2. The relationship between legitimacy, coercion and the role of the military in policing practice

Both the police and the military are state coercive apparatuses for maintaining order and 'protecting' society. In this sense, like the police, the military are also the instrument of the coercive power of the state based on a monopoly of physical coercion (Weber 1968: 37). According to Weber, both the police and the military are state legal institutions which work on behalf of the state. The police practice state power to maintain internal order, while the military are responsible for defending the state and society against external threats. Weber describes state policing function as 'the protection of personal safety and public order', and the military functions as 'the organised armed protection against outside attack' (1968: 905). As mentioned earlier, however, in Turkey the military are also involved in internal policing and public order whilst in England & Wales military officers normally do not police civilians (Johnston 1992b: 29).

Military involvement in politics in general and in internal law and order or policing in particular increases problems of police legitimacy, reducing the level of legitimacy and increasing coercion. This does not mean that the military do not have legitimacy. They have a 'specific' form of legitimacy which does not usually depend on consensus, but coercion (Weber 1968: 905; Jenkins 1976: 55; Jenkins & Doorn 1976: 3; Edmonds 1988: 110). According to Weber, if the 'specific legitimacy' of coercion is connected with any particular type of 'consensual action', this connection is 'weak' in military actions against an external enemy (1968: 905). Weber continues:

It becomes more clearly perceptible where a territorial association is attacked by an external enemy in its traditional domain, and arms are taken up by the members in the manner of a home guard. Increasingly rational precautions against such eventualities may engender a political organisation regarded as enjoying a particular legitimacy (1968: 905).
This statement means that the military institution is not illegal, but has a particular form of legitimacy. However, the level and form of the legitimacy of the military may be different in different societies depending on the level of political culture. According to Finer, in countries where there is a low political culture the need for legitimacy is not important for the military, while in the countries with advanced political culture it is important (1962: 22). As Edmonds states:

> The legitimacy of armed services is founded on their being first and foremost an institution of the state. Their existence in other words is laid down in constitutional law, which normally details their powers and responsibilities and their relationships with and to other legally established state institutions. But purely legal prescriptions do not in themselves confer legitimacy; it is equally possible that the constitution itself might not enjoy popular support (1988: 96)

Edmonds' argument in this statement is that the military is a legitimate institution since it is a legal and constitutional state institution. However, its legitimacy might not be based upon public consensus.

In order to understand the relationship between police legitimacy, coercion and military involvement in policing, this section considers three main issues. First is the historical and contemporary relations between the military and the police. The question to ask here is why both the police and the military exist? Then, it will discuss the role of the military in policing. This will include a consideration of the role of military involvement in an increasingly coercive policing practice. Finally, military intervention in general and legitimacy of 'military coups' in Turkey will be discussed.

The modern police were established to replace military forces such as local militias, part-time constables and other military personnel employed by the justice system. Although there were police institutions and individuals before the establishment of the modern police, the military were also responsible for protecting life and property (Radzinowicz 1956: 115; Bramal 1985: 68; Rowe
1985: 197). When the military forces were used for order maintenance, they were called 'the police'. The army's policing task continued until the beginning of the nineteenth century, despite continued hostility against this intervention (Emsley 1983: 45). The police took over the policing role from the military, but military intervention into policing has continued until the present day. Therefore, there is a close relationship between the two institutions which is important to examine (Bayley 1985: 8). Despite this close relationship, military and police forces and their roles are usually studied separately, and there are few studies considering the relationship between the military and the police. A notable one is Enloe (1980), who says that in any modern political system, the military and the police should be explicitly studied, they '... have to be considered in a common framework' (1980: 8), and it should not '... take rumblings in the barracks to stir political scientists to consider the role of the military' (1980: 93).

Why do both the military and the police exist? Almost all states have both police and military forces. As Mark points out, military as well as police forces are necessary even in the most democratic states (1985: 87). The army exists in almost all states as a symbol of independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity (Edmonds 1988: 29). There are few exceptional states where the army does not co-exist with a police force. For example, Costa Rica abolished its armed forces in 1948, but left an armed police force which carries out military functions (Kennedy 1974: 1). The barracks became a museum in Costa Rica, but since there is a body, namely the police, performing military functions, the existence of the military is open to debate.

The main reason why both the police and the military exist is that there are fundamental differences between the two in terms of their roles or functions, although they are both intended to maintain state authority. As already mentioned in reference to Weber, broadly, the military is responsible for defending the state
against external threats and attacks, and the police are responsible for internal security and so the reason for the existence of both forces is the duality of the state’s function. The differences between the military and the police make them both ‘distinct’ and ‘related’. Although the army exists to fight other armies, not internal crowds, it intervenes in policing especially when the security of the state is threatened. The involvement of the police into military matters, on the other hand, is unusual. Enloe (1980) lists the differences between the police and military forces as follows:

Figure I: Differences between the military and the police

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police Forces</th>
<th>Military Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Do not perform extra national functions</td>
<td>11. Principal raison d’être is defence of nation-state from external threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Have personnel posted throughout the national territory</td>
<td>12. Personnel may not be concentrated in just one or two bases, but they are</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Operate in relatively small units</td>
<td>13. Operational units are relatively large, numbering in hundreds, not dozens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Are under authority of civilian officials - either local governments or ministries of the interior</td>
<td>14. Face adversaries who are likely to operate in large units as well and often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Have principal adversaries who are of same nationality as policemen</td>
<td>15. Internally, are subject to organisational differentiation according to mission and technical orientation, with the major boundaries being those between army, navy and air force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Leave transgressions to be defined by extra-police authorities, typically legislative bodies</td>
<td>16. Have uniformed officials who, even when not themselves members of executive cabinets, are likely to be represented in policy-making circles nationally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Are uniformed in a way that makes them visually distinguishable from civil servants and soldiers</td>
<td>17. Have a standing force that can be supplemented by special mobilisation of reserves or conscripted civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Assign individual officers authority to arrest civilians</td>
<td>18. Include regular military personnel who usually live in spatially separated compounds and have access to services of their own</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Are on continual and routine call rather than subject to periodic mobilisations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Rarely draw manpower from national conscription</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Allow individual members to live civilian community existence when off duty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Enloe 1980: 131-2)
As we can see from this, there are several organisational and functional differences between the military and the police forces. Enloe lists only the differences not the similarities between the two institutions, but it is not clear why for the police eleven and for the military only eight characteristics are mentioned. It indicates, for example, that the police are under the authority of civilian authorities such as local governments or ministries of the interior, but does not say that the military are usually under the authority of ministries of defence.

Despite these differences, there are similarities and common operational strategies between the military and the police. Historically, both the police and military forces, especially in the context of most political or industrial disorders, acted in parallel or in direct collaboration. This shows the close relationship between the army and police, but does not mean that they had the same role and responsibility. Legally, military officials are servants of the state and are subject to a chain of governmental orders and command. In terms of public order, the police have the primary responsibility and they are not necessarily servants of government in all states. Police officials are not supposed to be subject to governmental order regarding the operational use of police (Whelan 1985a: 125). Currently, in almost all states including Turkey and England & Wales, at least to some extent, the police also act as servants of government, and take orders from governmental individuals or organisations.

Because of this close relationship, the usual distinction between military forces and the police is not clear-cut and it is not easy to totally separate the military from the police. The point is that the military forces tend to be more externally oriented and police forces are more concerned with internal matters. However, increasing coercive policing practice has led the police to adopt certain attributes of the military shown above in Figure 1, either accompanied by the sacrifice of traditional police characteristics, or by the addition of attributes to the
existing police structure so that the result is a police institution that is more complex and fragmented.

The creation of the police ended the role of the military as the primary order maintainer. According to Enloe, the police '... owe their creation to civilian officials' desire to be less dependent on the military maintaining order' (1980: 109). Answers to the question why the police were created while the military existed may vary depending on different theories of police history and their role as considered in chapter 1. The studies which constitute the 'alternative' perspective of police history and which criticise the 'traditional' perspective, argue that the police organisation was created by the propertied capitalist, industrialist and ruling classes to protect their property or interests. They tried to create their own protectors because, the army were occupied elsewhere and it was not suitable nor one hundred per cent ready to work in the interests of capitalists. Bunyan (1977) for example, states that:

To enforce public order the police, rather than the army, were used increasingly to break up political meetings in London and to spy on working-class movements. One such movement was the National Political Union of the Working Class. In May 1833 they held a demonstration at Cold Bath Fields, which the police broke up with baton charges (1977: 63)

Enloe explains the creation of police forces with the 'brutality' of the army in dealing with internal disturbances. London's Gordon riots in 1780 and the Peterloo riots in 1819 were working-class political and economic protests and the traditional police were not capable of dealing with them. In both riots the military forces had to be called in to maintain order. But the brutality of the military shocked the emergent middle-classes and with the creation of the new police the middle-classes was assured that this new police would protect its property without adopting the arbitrary methods of the military (1980: 110).
Miller (1987) also emphasises the 'brutal' actions of the military, but argues that the police, in terms of maintaining public order, have been no better than the military. Peel thought that the new police could do the same job without people getting killed, or having their lives at risk. He even denied that the police would be an instrument of coercive power. Miller goes on to say that:

It was not a far-fetched thing to say. Policemen were not put into red coats. But they wore uniform, paraded, and saluted. They were usually commanded by ex-army officers, with a mania for discipline.... The important point, however, was if the so-called 'civil police' was any better than the army at controlling disorder. People still got killed. Others were cut or beaten up. Perhaps that was their fault. The opposition thought not (1987: 47).

What we understand from this argument is that the police were created as another instrument of the state to exercise coercive power in the interests of the ruling classes, either by replacing the military or collaborating with it. Weber argues that after the development of bureaucratic military organisations, the military became a political instrument of a capitalist state rather than of capitalist or propertied individuals. Initially armies were equipped and provisioned by the 'lord' (1968:981).

Usually, in the case of an emergency when disturbances go beyond the control of the police, military forces intervene in carrying out policing functions. As Edmonds asserts, military forces are seen as a symbol of state sovereignty and independence, and the saviours of their country in times of emergency (1988: 97). However, the questions of when disturbances go beyond the control of the police, and what constitutes an emergency are not easy to answer. The Turkish military are frequently involved in maintaining public order, and find many reasons to legitimise their actions, while in England & Wales the military do not police society, although there has been military involvement from time to time, usually in the form of giving aid to the police in the cases of emergency. The British Army had a continuing role in policing in Northern Ireland, although currently
there is a process of cease-fire, but since my study is limited to England & Wales and Turkey, I am not considering this special case here.

In England & Wales there has always been a distinction between police and military functions, except for a short time after the civil war of 1641 when Cromwell's Army carried out both policing and public order functions. In Turkey, on the other hand, the distinction is not so clear, since the gendarmerie, as a military policing force, is in fact under military command but carry out normal policing functions. As Edmonds indicates, military forces are principally a tool to assist the economic, political and social development of Third World states, while in the advanced industrial states the internal security role of the military has to take second place (1988: 194). Edmonds goes on to say that:

Internal security is a necessary task of armed services in Third World states and is executed in conjunction with police and other security organisations. Their role, however, has less to do with the maintenance of law and order, and also to do with monitoring, and indeed containing, the political ambitions and power struggles that were inherent at first in the immediate post-colonial situations, and later when regional ethnic or class antagonisms began to break down the first optimistic perceptions of national unity and homogeneity (1988: 200).

Although Turkey is no longer a 'Third World' country, but rather a 'developing country', I would argue that in terms of contemporary military-policing relations, Turkey still falls into this definition. In other words, policing is a primary role of the military in Turkey while in England & Wales, which falls into Edmonds' definition of an 'advanced industrial state', the public order function of the military is perceived to be minimal.

The formal definition of military's role in internal security and public order is to provide aid for the civil authorities. Police-military relations in peace-time in England & Wales are codified in two major regulations. One is the Queen's Regulations for the Army 1975. Particularly Chapter 11, entitled 'Military Aid to the Civil Authorities' gives military the 'policing role'. The other one is the
Manual of Military Law 1968. Section V of Part II is entitled 'Employment of Troops in Aid of the Civil Power'. According to these regulations there are three 'recipients' of military aid in peace-time emergencies, namely, the civil community, civil ministries and the civil power (Whelan 1985a: 114).

Some writers such as Downes (1988: 154) argue, in terms of police-military relations, that from the seventeenth century onward, military involvement in maintaining public order in England & Wales has been a temporary duty, but the common view is that the military has always been, and remains involved in internal security matters. Although the role of the military in England & Wales in policing tended to disappear during the late nineteenth century as the police increasingly assumed this function, the military have always remained available as the ultimate force whenever a threat to the security of the state arises.

As indicated above, especially by the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, there was a close relationship between the army and the police to deal with disorders in England & Wales. The Select Committee set up in 1909 on the 'Employment of the Military in Cases of Disturbances' reported that during the thirty years from 1878 to 1908 military forces had been called on to assist the police on twenty-four occasions (Bunyan 1977: 69). In the following years until the second world war, troops were called out on fewer occasions such as the Police Strike in 1919, the Miners' Strike in 1921 and the 1926 General Strike. During the post war period, troops have been used on many occasions under the term of 'military aid to civil ministries' for the purpose of 'essential services' during industrial disputes and in cases of emergency. Apart from these occasions, police-military co-operation has been seen in the course of incidents involving terrorists and in the planning and implementation of security arrangements for major ceremonies and other potential
targets (Brewer et al 1988: 25). During the last decade, the military have been more visible in England & Wales than before. For example, Downes states that:

Despite the desire for privacy, the armed forces, deprived of their role as colonial police and returned to home waters and continental locations, remain sensitive to the accusation that they fulfil no productive function. As a result of this sensitivity, the services have engaged in efforts to make society more aware of them (1988: 163).

As can be understood from what has been said so far, the military in England & Wales usually assists the civil authorities in terms of 'emergency assistance' in cases of accident or national disaster such as the storm in 1987, but there are two other types of possible help. One is routine assistance on special projects, such as construction and demolition that possibly require using explosives. The other is the full time attachment of volunteers to social service organisations for specific periods (Ministry of Defence 1989: 1-2).

The Ministry of Defence considers 'emergency assistance' as legal if it follows a natural disaster or major accident when the civil authority is unable to cope. The assistance should also be given by invitation and consent and with the written agreement of the civil authorities. Application for military assistance in an emergency case should be made to the nearest army unit, or through the nearest police station. Therefore, in the case of emergency there is an army-police cooperation, or military involvement into policing in assisting civil power, but it is not always obvious and easy to know what constitutes an 'emergency situation'. That is why military involvement, even in terms of aid or assistance, is a moot point.

Full use of military force on any occasion to maintain public order in England & Wales is not usual, but there are some writers such as Jeffrey (1985: 51), Bramal (1985: 69-71) and Clutterbuck (1978: 277), who accept military involvement in policing at least partially or as 'last resort'. They argue that the
responsibility of the army is not domestic, but domestic security is an inescapable responsibility for any army, and the defence of the state must include the capability to assist in the maintenance of public order. Although the army would not be needed in the field of public order, because the proper people to keep law and order are the police, they assert that the military can largely give aid to the civil authorities in a number of ways in certain circumstances when the police have difficulties to deal with.

These studies welcome military involvement in maintaining internal order, and even find it necessary by considering it a 'last resort'. It might be argued, however, that the functions of the military and police are different, and maintaining public order as well as dealing with terrorism is not supposed to be the duty of the military. Therefore, it should not be considered even as a 'last option' because when military involvement is allowed even as a last resort, it is likely to go further than police action. As Bunyan argues, resorting to the use of armed forces has always been the last option, but if a major confrontation occurs, '... the state will be prepared to use all the means available in defence of the capitalist system' (1977: 288).

In Turkey, on the other hand, military forces have occupied a special position and enter into politics and policing on a range of matters far beyond military interests. Harris is right to consider the military establishment in Turkey as 'a key actor in Turkey's political order', and a 'special form of pressure group on the Turkish scene', since military forces have played a prominent and sometimes a determinant role even when not actually running the government (1985:4). As Ahmad states:

Anyone reading about the political situation of Turkey in the early 1990s, or indeed during the past quarter century, is likely to be struck by the role played by the armed forces... The emphasis on the army's role in Turkish history and politics, from Ottoman times to the present, suggests a continuity which seems plausible. It assumes that the army was an
institution which never changed its world view, that it stood above society and acted independently (1993: 1-3).

Ahmad is correct in this historical account but the military remains the same today. Whether Turkey is a 'Third World' country, or a 'developing' country, as Tasgetiren (1992) argues, military forces are involved in the social life of Turkey more than any other country in the world, while the maintenance of the public order function of the military is otherwise universally decreasing (Ozturk 1993: 30). The responsibility for internal security in Turkey is given to the military forces by law, such as the Responsibility for Armed Defence Against the Internal Enemies Act (Memleket Ici Dusmana Karsi Silahlı Müdafaaya Mukellefiyeti Kanunu, No: 4654) and articles 117-122 of the Constitution. Therefore, military involvement in policing in Turkey is 'lawful' and 'constitutional'. These laws do not refer to 'military aid' to the police, but empower the military with a 'policing role'. This is an essential difference between England & Wales and Turkey in terms of military involvement in policing.

Article 1 of the current Turkish Police Organisation Act 1937 also gives the Minister of the Interior the power to call out military forces in maintaining public order in cases when the police cannot effectively operate. In Provinces, the governor-generals exercise this power. When they are asked to be involved, the military have to act immediately. Especially since the intensive political disturbances of the 1960s, the military have been involved in policing on many occasions. The last major military involvement in maintaining public order was during the Istanbul disorders in March 1995. At that time, one of the religious leader of Alawıats, a religious group, was shot dead in an attack on a coffee shop, and it triggered off riots and urban unrest. The police were found ineffective in overcoming the disorders and the troops were called in. It is questionable whether the police were ineffective or not, and many writers such as Birand (1995), Barlas
(1995) and Dogru (1995a, 1995b), put forward strong arguments that this military involvement was a 'preparation' for a military coup.

As Guran argues, the Turkish military not only gives aid to the police for certain services, but act like the police with full powers for public order and law enforcement (1970: 92). Once they are involved, they are given a certain task, maybe in a certain area, and usually exercise powers independently from the police command structure. Also, since the police are responsible for policing, when the armed forces perform policing functions, the issue of accountability becomes questionable. Therefore, if the military is called out, the civil authorities should have full charge of the use of troops, as they do for the police. Guran justifies the involvement of the Turkish military in policing in cases when the police fail to be effective and the civil authorities ask for help (1970: 76-7), ignoring the fact that policing is not the duty of the army and should not be involved whatsoever. Nevertheless, Guran is right to say that the military '... may play an important role in maintaining law and order, but the use of the military will not prevent the repetition of the incidents in which they are involved' (1970:104).

In terms of military involvement in policing, I would like also to refer to military intervention in general, and the case of 'military coups' in Turkey in particular. Military intervention, or a 'military coup' means involvement in politics and seizure of power in general. Historically, the police have played the greatest role, even greater than the military, in exercising coercion, and in accomplishing the legitimate seizure of power, becoming the dominant apparatus in totalitarian states. However, as Bowden (1978) points out, such police-sponsored seizure of power has been more covert than military intervention and political history fails to record adequately the role of the political police:
While the military machine may well be more suited than the police to the process of accomplishing the seizure of the state, the military have no preemptive place in the establishment of despotism. Instead, the para-military police, 'the police of the prince', or, as they are designated here, the personalised police, have a long if largely unrecorded history of political intervention (1978: 41).

In modern times military forces have been used more than the police for intervention in politics and for the seizure of power as a whole. The reason for military intervention in politics and society and the way it happens is related to the level of development of societies and the level of political culture (Finer 1962: 20-1; Doom 1976: 27-8; Ozturk 1993: 31). For example, military intervention in politics is more the exception than the rule in developed countries and those countries where there is a high level of political culture. If the level of political culture is low, the replacement of civil government by the military government is more likely. This is the answer to the question why military coups are more likely to take place in Turkey than in England & Wales. Finer also argues that military intervention takes different forms such as violent or non-violent, and varies from society to society according to the level of political culture (1962: 20-1). Finer, who considers the 1960 military coup in Turkey in detail, uses it for explaining the military intervention-political culture relations, by stating that:

Yet...Turkey's level of political culture was and still is immature.... It is doubtful how far Ataturk's novel conception of a Turkish nationality has superseded the traditional concept of the Turks as being essentially a peculiar part of Islam. Traditionalism still fights a successful battle against the laic, almost commits philosophy of the urban elites, and one of the reasons for the 1960 coup was the growing extent to which the Democratic governing party had lent itself to the resistant clericalism of the countryside. Since the declaration of the Republic, indeed since the Young Turk revolution of 1908, there has been no consensus on the procedures for transferring power (1962: 112-13).

We need to add that now, more than thirty years after Finer's statement, the situation in Turkey remains almost the same. Another possible reason for a military coup is public opinion. A military coup is most likely in countries where public opinion is sharply polarised on racial, religious, tribal, class or ideological
lines, while it is unlikely to be attempted or to succeed in countries where there is a body of middle opinion. The idea of a relationship between military coups and polarisation of public opinion applies to many developing countries, Turkey included. Polarised public opinion towards the political system as a whole and towards policing in particular is a characteristic of Brewer's (1991) notion of 'divided societies', considered in chapter 1.

In terms of military coups, Turkey is in a unique situation. The Turkish military traditionally pride themselves as being a national institution drawn from all sectors of society, and an institution above all social organisations and political parties (Yalman 1968: 130). They are trained for a long time, to act or to intervene whenever they find it 'necessary'. They define their mission as 'defending the state' which means to exercise oversight on civilian politics (Abadan-Unat 1989: 18). Military intervention in politics is encouraged by the Armed Forces Act. Article 35 of this Act states that it is a 'duty' of the military 'to protect and safeguard' the country. It does not indicate whether this protection is against external aggression or internal threats. That is why they feel justified to intervene even if the problem is an internal disorder. As Kedourie states:

The armed forces consider themselves, indeed, the protectors and guarantors of the constitutional order. It must remain on the cards that should conditions once more call for intervention, they will feel justified intervening (1992: 151).

Because military officials do not trust politicians and act almost independently, it is difficult for politicians and civilian governments to deal with public disturbances and political violence within the limits of the law. The Turkish military do not believe in political solutions, control the destiny of the country from behind the scenes and consider it their 'duty' to intervene when there is political instability and disorder, or a threat to state security. That is why the views of politicians and military officials about combating public disorders are
different. For example, just before the 12 September 1980 coup, Ecevit, the then Prime Minister, stated that those who threaten internal security '... will receive their lesson within the limits of rules of the democratic state of law' (Twelfth September in Turkey 1982: 59) while General Evren, the then Chief of General Staff, who headed the coup and became the President of the State, expressed a different view about internal political disturbances. He stated that the military will not allow the '... disintegration of our country by a handful of furious people' and warned that '... nobody will have enough power to destroy the republic which is entrusted to us by Ataturk' (Twelfth September in Turkey 1982: 56).

During the 72-year history of the Republic of Turkey, the military has always intervened in politics. Harris argues that when the military forces have united for intervention they have been successful (1985: 153) and their actions in the coups, for example, has been accepted as 'justified' and 'legitimate' by the public, or even acclaimed as necessary, to serve the nation (1985:160). It is true that the military forces have been successful in intervening in politics whenever they wished to, but we cannot argue that the public see military intervention at any time as necessary and justified.

Janowitz argues that Ataturk, the founder of the Republic, was successful in taking the army out of domestic politics (1971: 324). He rejects Frey's (1965) view that the background factors of the military coup in 1960 were the decline in the access of the Turkish military to politics, the loss of power in controlling civil authorities and the decline in the number of retired military officers as parliamentary candidates. I would not agree with Janowitz. It cannot be said that Ataturk removed the military forces from internal politics because Ataturk's regime was a one-party regime dominated by a certain political ideology, and controlled by military officers in key positions of the ruling party, the Republican People's Party (CHP).
As Brown points out, Ataturk appointed former military officers to important administrative posts. They were heavily represented in Parliament, accounting for about 20 per cent of all members, but holding 30 per cent of the important posts and many cabinet posts for long time (1989: 387). As soon as the country turned to a multi-party system in 1946, a more civilian party, the DP which did not rely on the military as a source of recruitment for parliament and cabinet members took over power in 1950 and the prestige and importance of former army officers declined steadily (Frey 1965: 183). The DP government did not consider the army to be 'above' the political authority. Consequently, the army began to seek opportunities to intervene in politics directly, which resulted in the military coup on 27 May 1960. In order to legitimise their action, the Generals accused the DP government of failing to cope with the economic and political crisis, but the real reason was that the military was hurt by the politicians. A member of the coup, Erkanli, openly said that:

The pride of the Turkish Armed Forces which are the only organised force in this country was hurt on every occasion, the uniform which is the real legacy of our history brought shame to those who wore it (Cumhuriyet, 20 July 1960).

The background factors for the military coup on 12 September 1980 were also the loss of the military's overall support in the decline of its representation in government posts, although internal political violence and terrorism have been put forward as the reasons. Brown argues that the Turkish military 'had to intervene' in 1980, 'because the Turkish state was on the verge of falling apart', and the 'warning by the military had gone unheeded' (1989: 390). Brown tries to legitimise a military regime and military coup in Turkey. To intervene in political and administrative system is not one of the duties of the army, they are supposed to do what the government decides, not to 'warn' the government, or to decide upon intervention against the government.
Janowitz, who analyses and compares Middle Eastern military institutions, argues that in the majority of Middle Eastern states, including Turkey, military interventions in internal political regimes come after a crisis or breakdown in efforts to create parliamentary systems (1971: 306, 319). This may be so for those Middle Eastern countries where there is no democratic parliamentary system, but not for Turkey. Turkey is a democratic parliamentary system, although it is not satisfactory, and whenever the Generals take over power they simply replace the parliamentary system with a military regime, rather than ironing out its faults.

The generals who headed the 1980 coup changed the constitution and major laws, legitimising the coup, protecting those who headed the coup against any trials or criticisms, strengthening the position of the army by giving them more powers, legalised the appointment of many retired generals to the key positions and made it difficult for civilians to ignore the views of the military by creating unusual institutions. The most important unusual institution created by the constitution made by military rule is the National Security Council (MGK) which provides the Prime Minister and the cabinet with a vehicle by which the military can express their views on national security affairs. The President of the State is the Chairman and the Chief of the General Staff and the commanders of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie are the members of this council, together with the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Defence, the Interior and Foreign Affairs. The MGK was established to help government as an advisory body in terms of making policies concerning national security but in practice it works as a 'second government'. It deals with almost all kinds of issues not only military or security concerns and what it decides is carried out by the government without any comment (Erdogan 1990: 328; Ozturk 1993: 149).

Due to this situation established by the military governments, especially through the MGK, the military continue to control politics either publicly or from
behind the scenes. Kedourie (1992: 130) and Hale (1990: 77) are right to say that the existence of such a council gives a constitutional legitimacy to military intervention in the future. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect a military coup in the future, as long as the Turkish army perceives itself as the guardian of the state (Ahmad 1993: 213). Even when military forces are not actually ruling the state, they have the role of an influential pressure group, and civilians usually follow the advice of the generals closely. Therefore, to avoid accusations of violations of democracy and civil rights, the military may not be too involved in politics in the future but will continue to control the government through the MGK.

Regarding military involvement in policing, it can be said that the military may have an effective role when they do become involved, but this is neither legitimate nor sufficient. As Doorn argues, the concepts of 'legitimacy' and 'consensus' are '... intended to convey the fact that the military establishment plays a dominating role without sufficient public support and political trust', and military involvement in politics, or the militarisation of politics causes a crisis of legitimacy (1976: 19, 27). Alderson also asserts that the police have a duty to avoid involving the military in the policing function if at all possible: 'The army stands the greatest risk of being sucked into a dominant and protracted policing role which is inimical to the wider military interest' (1979:81). As indicated at the end of the first section of this chapter, the Turkish military usually do not accept the command and control of any civilian authority when involved in policing. When this involvement does exist for any reason, however, the military should always remain under the strict control of the government. The military should not even come to the aid of civil power without the permission of the government (1979: 78). However, placing the military under the control of the political
government or under the command of the police in Turkey is unlikely in any circumstances at the present time.

Also, it would be possible to assert that a military regime, a regime with full involvement of the military or a regime established after a military coup in any country would never require legitimacy, and in both origin and purpose, is a non-legitimated authority, since its rules cannot be justified in terms of a recognisably valid source of authority. Neither is it subject to any public legitimisation in terms of expressed consensus. As Beetham states, the military 'resolve the problems of democratic politics by abolishing politics' and 'immunise the state from the problems of society by elevating the state above society' (1991:232).

In this chapter I considered the legitimate forms of policing in England & Wales and Turkey exercised on the basis of either consensus or coercion, and military involvement in policing practice as a problematic issue in terms of police legitimacy which reduces the level of legitimacy and increases coercion. The next chapter will attempt to apply theoretical issues concerning consensual and coercive policing forms considered in this chapter, and organisational theory explored in the previous chapter, to the existing police organisation and structural change in contemporary England & Wales and Turkey. It will consider different forms of police organisation such as centralisation and decentralisation, the current trends of change and potential changes in the near future.
CHAPTER 4

AN ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF POLICING ORGANISATION AND CHANGE

As suggested in chapter 1, it is possible to define the police as a state institution exercising coercive powers to maintain order. This is a universal definition. However, the forms of police organisation may vary, partly because of the different roles and functions of the police in different societies and partly because of their respective bases of legitimate authority. It may be a centralised, decentralised, military or civil police organisation or a combination of these. As mentioned earlier, for example, England & Wales has a relatively decentralised police organisation and Turkey has a highly centralised one. Turkey also has 'military' police forces such as the gendarmerie and the coastal security guard while in England & Wales there is no equivalent of these. Therefore, when considering the public policing organisations in Turkey I will also refer to these.

In this chapter, firstly the present organisational structure of the public police in England & Wales and Turkey will be introduced and compared, indicating the problems concerning command and control structures. Then, changes in the policing systems in these countries will be discussed. This will include a consideration of the trends towards centralisation in England & Wales,
decentralisation in Turkey, and Europeanisation generally by referring to potential changes in the future.

4.1. Present police organisational structure and problems

Policing in England & Wales is organised locally under the close supervision of central government. Apart from a short period under Oliver Cromwell there has never been a centralised policing system (Whitaker 1979: 173), but there is currently a trend towards centralisation. The Turkish police on the other hand, have always been highly centralised, although there is currently some evidence of a slow trend towards decentralisation. In this section, the current policing systems in England & Wales and Turkey will be introduced. First of all, however, it would be useful to examine the meaning of the concepts of centralisation and decentralisation and relate them to the concept of bureaucracy considered in chapter 2.

Bureaucracy is, as we have suggested, an administrative body or a form of organisation characterised by 'division of labour' and 'hierarchy of authority'. Centralisation or decentralisation of a bureaucratic organisation is related to these characteristics. Butler defines centralisation as '... the tendency of organisations to keep decision-making power near to top of the hierarchy' and decentralisation as '... the tendency of organisations to allow decisions to be taken at lower levels in the hierarchy' (1986: 326). According to Bayley's definition, a country can be said to have a centralised police structure when command is given routinely to sub-units from a single centre of control. Conversely, decentralisation indicates the independence of command in sub-units (1985: 54; 1992: 522-3). MacKenzie (1978) illustrates these two main types of organisational structure as in Figure II. In MacKenzie's model, the example of decentralised structure or 'wheel structure' indicates the independence of command structure in sub-units which are
nevertheless equally linked to each other. In a centralised structure or 'all-channel structure' on the other hand, individual units are not linked to each other, but under the control of a central organisation.

Figure II: Decentralised and centralised forms of organisational structure

a) Decentralised structure  
(Wheel structure)  

b) Centralised structure  
(All-channel structure)  

(Source: MacKenzie 1978: 196)

As Bayley suggests, however, in order to adequately describe the structure of policing systems, two dimensions of analysis must be distinguished. The first one is the command structure and the other one is the number of police forces. In a decentralised policing system there is always more than one force whilst a centralised system may have one or more than one. In Bayley's words, '...decentralisation creates multiple forces, but multiple forces are not always decentralised' (1985: 53). If we compare England & Wales and Turkey in terms of policing organisational structure using Bayley's typology, they have both similarities and differences in their respective systems. Both countries have more than one police force but those in England & Wales are local forces of the same
kind whilst Turkey has more than one national force of different kinds, namely the police, the gendarmerie and the coastal security guard. The relationship between the command structure and the number of forces can be shown as follows.

**Figure III: Types of police organisational structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Centralised</th>
<th>Decentralised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Singular</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>England &amp; Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Bayley 1985: 54, 59, Tables 3.1, 3.2)

This table shows that England & Wales and Turkey are on the same line but in different columns. This means that although they both have more than one police force, in England & Wales the policing system is decentralised, despite increasing central control, whilst in Turkey it is centralised.

The police in England & Wales are governed by three institutions. These are the Home Office, the local Police Authority, and the Chief Constables. The role of the Home Office in policing is exercised by the Police Department within the Home Office. The purpose of this department can be explained as follows:

The Police Department supports the Home Secretary in seeking to ensure the delivery of effective and efficient policing in England & Wales. It supports the Home Secretary in his specific responsibilities for providing the appropriate level and mix of resources and allocating them to best effect; appropriate police powers and guidance; and those scientific training, research and other support needs which may best be met centrally (Home Office 1992: 1).

158
The Home Office Police Department has an important role in carrying out policing although the policing system remains relatively decentralised in England & Wales. This Department mainly provides training and technical services to all forces through some institutions organised nationally, such as the Bramshill Police Staff College for higher training, District Police Training centres which provide basic training for all recruits from local police forces, Forensic Laboratories, Wireless Depots, the Police National Computer Centre and the Research and Planning Branch.

Since 1974, there have been 43 police forces in England & Wales. 27 counties have their own forces, whilst 8 are combined forces, 7 are metropolitan forces and 1 is a city force. (A map of the present boundaries of police forces in England & Wales is given in Appendix II). Each force is responsible for policing and public order law in its own area, but there is constant co-operation between them. Currently there are proposals to reduce the number of police forces by further amalgamations of some small forces. This issue will be discussed later in this chapter.

41 forces (excluding the Metropolitan Police Service and the City of London Police) are headed by Chief Constables who report, according to the Police Act 1964, to the local Police Authority. The Metropolitan Police Commissioner, because of his 'wider powers for security' (Barclay 1993: 11), reports to the Home Secretary, and the City of London Police Commissioner reports to the Common Council of the City of London. The provincial police are also responsible to the Home Secretary through the HM Inspectorate of Constabulary who receives yearly reports from the police forces on behalf of the Home Secretary, and undertakes tours of inspection.
The provincial police forces are referred to as 'constabularies', and each constabulary is organised 'fairly uniformly' throughout the country (Bunyan 1977: 75). As an example, the organisational structure of Leicestershire Constabulary is illustrated as follows:

**Figure IV: Organisational structure of Leicestershire Constabulary**

![Organisational Structure Diagram]

(Source: Leicestershire Constabulary 1995)

This structure typifies most of county police forces in England & Wales. Each force has a regional headquarters where the main offices are based. Below the level of headquarters, the constabulary region is divided into 'divisions', each division is sub-divided into areas, and within each area there are police stations.
There are similar uniformed and specialised departments such as CID and traffic in almost all forces.

London's Metropolitan Police Service, with its headquarters at New Scotland Yard, is responsible for an area within a radius of 15 miles from the centre, excluding the City of London which has a separate force. It has no local community based authority and the Home Secretary is in charge of all policing matters in the Metropolitan area. For historical reasons, the structure of the Metropolitan Police Service and its accountability is unique. Its organisational structure was revised in August 1994 and the new structure came into force on 1 April 1995. The main reason given by officials for this structural reorganisation was to meet local needs. The organisation is now divided into five areas and within each area there are several divisions and sub-divisions. The new organisation can be shown as follows:

Figure V: Organisation of the Metropolitan Police Service

![Organisation of the Metropolitan Police Service](image)

(Source: Metropolitan Police Service 1995)

Each area is headed by an Assistant Commissioner who has the powers of a Chief Constable. The heads of areas are given special tasks under a matrix formula. For
example, the head of the central area is given the task of public order. They not only lead policing policies concerning their specialities for their specific area but generally within the Metropolitan region. (A map of new areas of the Metropolitan Police District and details of divisions and sub-divisions is given in Appendix III).

Although the police forces in England & Wales originated and developed independently, currently there is a tendency towards uniformity in terms of organisational structure, and there is already a high degree of uniformity amongst police forces. This tendency is largely the result of the influence of the Home Office, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and ACPO. The tendency towards centralisation and its importance in the context of this thesis will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.

As explained earlier, public policing in Turkey has traditionally been centralised and carried out by three separate national forces namely, the civil police, the gendarmerie and the coastal security guard. Indeed, centralisation has been a traditional feature of the political and administrative system in Turkish history generally. Turkey's long tradition of civil disorders is one of the factors which has produced a public order police force through a highly centralised system. Especially by the end of the nineteenth century when the collapse of the Ottoman Empire began, and by the beginning of this century when the Republic of Turkey was founded, a high priority was given to public order policing functions. The state remains anxious to secure the regime, systematically established by Ataturk. The three national organisations in charge of policing are constitutionally a part of the executive.

Britain has played a major role in the history of the world's policing, and the tradition of localised policing has spread out from Britain to many parts of the
world (Stead 1985: 167), but not to Turkey. Turkey's centralised and coercive style of policing derives from the centralised, soldierly policing tradition of France, and still resembles it in respect of tasks, national structure, the nature of control and internal organisational structure. Not only are police regulations identical throughout Turkey but the Ministry of the Interior has the authority to control and fund the police. In practice, operational control is not usually exercised by the Ministry of the Interior, but is delegated to the heads of three forces mentioned earlier, namely the Director-General of the Police, the Commander-General of the Gendarmerie and the Commander of the Coastal Security Guard. These in turn, delegate some of their authority to the directors and commanders of provincial organisations. This management structure of policing in Turkey may be illustrated as follows:

Figure VI: Management structure of policing in Turkey

(Source: Aydin 1991: 24)

Another body involved in the management structure of policing in Turkey is the High Security Commission. This is an advisory body which has the role of co-

163
ordinating the three police forces and other institutions involved in policing. It makes the highest decisions in terms of internal security, peace and order of the country, meeting at certain times during the year and being called into emergency session when necessary. The chairman is the Minister of the Interior. The permanent members are a representative from the General Staff and the heads of the police, the gendarmerie and the coastal security forces. The commanders of some special forces such as the customs and forest guard are usually represented at this commission. The Minister of the Interior may also call a number of police inspectors, governors and representatives from any other relevant organisations for each meeting.

All the functions performed by these three forces are the same but normally the police are responsible for policing within the municipal boundaries of cities and towns, whereas the gendarmerie work in rural areas, villages and small towns, and the coastal security guard are responsible for not only, as their name would imply, the coastal areas but also territorial waters. The three forces have separate arrangements for finance, central headquarters in Ankara, provincial units, training schools, and communication systems. The highest officials of the organisations are attached to the Ministry of the Interior with regards to their policing functions. The local units are under the highest civil authority with respect to their administrative functions and under the Public Prosecutor with respect to their judicial functions.

The territorial organisation of the Turkish National Police corresponds to the administrative subdivisions. The whole organisational structure including central and departments may be illustrated as in Figure VII. There are three kinds of department within the central organisation or headquarters, the principal, assistant and advisory departments. The principal departments are those which are responsible for the main policing tasks such as crime prevention and public order.
Examples of these are the departments of security, anti-terrorism and traffic. Assistant departments, such as personnel affairs, health and training, carry out tasks which support and help the principal departments for a more effective policing service. Finally, advisory departments, such as the Police Inspection Board and the Legal Advice, work directly under the command of the Director-General concerning their specialities to advise or inform the Director-General or other interested departments.

Figure VII: Organisational chart of the Turkish National Police

(Directorate-General of Police)

- General Secretary
- Intelligence
- Public Relations
- Legal Advice
- Archives and Documentation

Assistant Gen. Dir.

- Public Order
- Anti-terrorism Protection
- External Affairs
- Passport

- Security
- Smuggling
- Criminal Lab.
- Interpol

- Traffic
- Communication
- Data-Processing
- Aviation

- Financial
- Logistic
- Construction
- Factories

- Personnel Affairs
- Training
- Social Services
- Health

City Police Directorates (76)

Town Police Directorates (255)

Town Police Commanderates (372)

Police Stations (1255)

(Source: Polis 1993: 10-12)
Under the large central organisation, there are police units in 76 cities. (A map of city police organisations in Turkey is given in Appendix IV). Each city police organisation also has sub-divisions in districts or small towns. The smallest units of the national police are local police stations, attached to the district police commanders. Despite this wide territorial distribution, as Kurian indicates, a vast majority of police personnel are clustered in the larger cities, such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir (1989: 385).

The Turkish National Gendarmerie organisation, which was reorganised in 1930, is a part of the military with responsibility for policing tasks. The gendarmerie are in charge of public order maintenance in rural areas which is not the responsibility of the police, and also supervise the enforcement of law, conduct criminal investigations within their areas of responsibility and control traffic in those places where traffic police do not operate. Further, a company of gendarmes is attached to each military division as 'military police'. The Ministry of Defence directs the gendarmerie with regard to their military tasks, whereas police tasks are carried out under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. Gendarmerie personnel have a military status. In other words, their military role is greater than their policing role, since it is a part of the defence structure and under the command of the military. That is why we can explain their role as 'military policing'.

The Turkish National Gendarmerie organisation has a similar structure to the national police organisation. At the headquarters in Ankara headed by a General, there are several principal policing departments such as security and anti-terrorism, and administrative or assistant departments such as personnel affairs, training, and financial departments. The organisational structure of the gendarmerie may be illustrated as follows:
Apart from the central organisation, the national gendarmerie organisation is composed of 13 regional divisions. These divisions are responsible to the Commander-General. Below these regional divisions, there are provincial regiments each commanded by a Colonel who advises the Governor-General of the Province on matters concerning maintenance of public order. The provincial commander also has direct charge of the country gendarmerie commanders. The 76 battalions stationed in the cities are directly responsible to the commanders of provincial regiments. Below these are district squadrons in administrative
districts. The gendarmes based in the city and town units do not police the areas in
the municipal boundaries which are the responsibility of the police. In the rural
areas and villages gendarmerie stations are headed by a sergeant, each of whom
controls fixed posts usually located at intervals of 15-20 kms., with 6-12
gendarmes. As Ece points out, the commanders of territorial gendarmerie units
generally have no power to make decisions or to take individual action. Their
powers are restricted to orders from above and laws or regulations issued by the
government (1991: 46-7). The organisation of the Coastal Security Guard is very
similar to the gendarmerie in terms of administrative and command structures,
tasks, responsibilities and dual status. Its personnel also have a military status
with the responsibility for policing the coastal areas and territorial waters.

This section has attempted to introduce the present policing organisational
structure in England & Wales and Turkey. Although these countries have
different forms of policing organisations in terms of their administrative and
operational structures, since they are both organised bureaucratically it cannot be
said that they are totally different from each other. As discussed in chapter 2, the
police in the two countries are characterised with the bureaucratic organisational
structure. There is a division of labour and hierarchy of authority in all police
forces in terms of specialists and non-specialists. However, the police bureaucracy
in Turkey is characterised by centralised and coercive structures, which do not
usually allow flexibility and accountability to the community, whilst in England
& Wales it is relatively decentralised, allowing more flexibility and accountability
to the community. In both England & Wales and Turkey, however, there are
trends of change in policing organisational structure, and the next section
considers an analysis and comparison of these current trends of change and of
potential changes in the future.
4.2. Comparing and analysing current trends of change and potential changes in the police organisation

The organisational size and structure of the policing service in England & Wales has changed rapidly in the post-war period. There have been reorganisations to create fewer, larger and more centralised forces. The most important changes, the bases of today's police organisational structure, took place during the 1960s. The Desborough Report 1962 recommended centralisation through amalgamation and standardisation of police forces in the following statement:

It is, however, obvious from the evidence that the administration of all local police authorities is not equally good and that under the present system lack of uniformity has developed to an undesirable degree. Whilst we consider that the present system of control is sound in general principle, and best suited to the circumstances of this country we are of the opinion that the police administration would be more economical and efficient if a greater measure of centralisation and standardisation of conditions of service could be introduced (Paragraph 17-18).

This Report led to the Police Act 1964 which reorganised the size and number of police forces in England & Wales to create today's policing system which is local but under strong central control. Since then, the Home Office and ACPO have regularly circulated advisory material to encourage standardisation of policing strategies and to reduce any variation in policing practices between forces. The most notable evidence of central control over the police during the past few decades has been the establishment of regional crime squads, a central police computer service, a national police college, the National Reporting Centre (NRC) which has now become the Mutual Aid Co-ordination Centre (MACC), and the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS).

The establishment of NCIS is one of the most recent major organisational changes towards centralisation of policing in England & Wales, and I would like to consider it here in more detail. The main initiative for the establishment of
NCIS was largely due to a lack of information exchange from the different regional crime squads. Following a report by ACPO, the establishment of NCIS was announced by the Home Secretary and began to operate on 1 April 1992. After it was established, the National Drug Intelligence Unit, the National Football Intelligence Unit and some special units of the Metropolitan Police became sub-units of NCIS. It also houses the UK Central Bureau of Interpol. By the end of 1994, the organisational structure of NCIS was reshaped and the new organisation came into force on 1 April 1995.

The main function of NCIS is to co-ordinate intelligence on national criminal matters working through the restructured regional crime squads. Although having no powers to direct either individual forces or regional crime squads, it has operational capabilities. While it does not operate directly, it passes on information and intelligence about serious crime (excluding terrorism) and criminals of regional, national, and international interest to individual forces or squads and other appropriate law enforcement and public order agencies which then take action. Regional crime squads continue to carry out the operational role in detection and prevention. The stated objective of NCIS is to help them with relevant and co-ordinated intelligence (NCIS, 1994). The efficiency and effectiveness of NCIS has been questioned and there is speculation that NCIS may be put under the control of MI5.

Another recent attempt to increase the level of centralisation was the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 which extends the role of the Home Secretary in policing by reorganising the status of police authorities in the existing tri-partite structure. The Police Act 1964 sets out the inter-relationship between Chief Constables, Police Authorities and the Home Secretary, and defines their roles. However, the balance within the tri-partite relationship is weighted heavily in favour of the Chief Constables and the Home Secretary, both having
responsibility and power, whilst the Police Authority has responsibility without power. The new Police Act 1994 has not balanced this partnership, but rather decreased the role of the local police authority even more. It changes the number of members to create one type of Police Authority for all forces irrespective of their size and reduces the number of elected members. Although it introduces extensive amendments to the Police Act 1964, the basic structure of the tri-partite relationship is unaltered and the Police Authority remains responsible for securing the maintenance of an efficient police force. With the exception of the Metropolitan and the City of London areas, all Police Authorities are similar in nature.

The original intention of the Bill was that all new Police Authorities would consist of 16 members irrespective of the size of the police force area. 8 members were to be elected councillors, and 5 were to be nominated by the Government or the Home Secretary. This, along with 3 magistrates would constitute half of all members. Also the chairperson was to be appointed directly by the Home Secretary in order to put the police under the full control of central government. After long discussions in Parliament, the Home Secretary announced, in early February 1994, his acceptance of amendments to the Bill. The number of elected members was to be increased from 8 to 9 to increase the total number of members from 16 to 17, and the chairperson was to be appointed directly by him. Elected members were also empowered to draw up a short-list of nominees to be forwarded to the Home Secretary. Along with an elected and an appointed member, the Home Secretary also encourages 'independent' nominees to join local Police Authorities. As Loveday (1994b: 225) points out, the aim in this is to appoint the 'independent' members as chairpersons who are expected to implement government reforms. The Home secretary has already appointed a chairperson for all authorities in October 1994, mostly from the independent
nominees. The Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 also gives the Secretary the power to remove the chairperson in the interests of efficiency.

Finally, the Act stipulates that 41 Police Authorities outside London, which previously ranged in size from 18 to 45 members, should be reorganised with a standard number of 17 members, only one member in favour of local elected members. However, since the Home Secretary appoints the chairperson from a short-list of nominees including an independent who is known to him, and also has power to remove the chairperson in the interests of efficiency, 'local majority' can be and is questionable. The police seem to be under the control of the Home Office to a great extent. The proposal for reducing the number of forces, national standardisation in terms of training, rank and command structures, and the establishment of some new national organisations indicated above, are all evidence of increasing central control over the police or the trend towards centralisation. Also, there is an increase in the national functions of the Metropolitan Police Service. Indeed, a good deal of large-scale departmental and operational work of the Metropolitan police has always had a national characteristic (McKenzie & Gallagher 1989: 59). Especially after World War II, the Metropolitan police began to act as a national force since the government gave it powers to work nationally for certain types of crime, and the duty of coordination amongst other forces. This characteristic of the Metropolitan Police Service has become more visible after the last reorganisation in 1994.

As indicated in the previous chapters, this change in policing organisation in England & Wales is related to changes in the socio-economic and political context and the shift in the form of policing practice from consensual to coercive policing. Changes in political or governmental policies result in changes in policing policies. When the political system is threatened by political disturbances, the state tends to change its policy by increasing the control over its
'coercive apparatuses' to maintain order. For example, the conservative policies in England & Wales during last decade have encouraged a coercive policing practice against the disorders in the 1980s and 1990s through central policies and national organisations. Governmental control over the police is usually exercised not only through administrative and operational policies, but also financial policies. At the present time provincial police forces in England & Wales are obliged to cooperate with the Home Office in order to have more money, information, intelligence and support. The Home Secretary also controls the police through the Inspectorate of Constabulary.

The debate over changing policing organisational structure in England & Wales will continue. There are alternative views on policing improvements such as making policing centralised or regionalised or keeping the present system, although the official view is to make policing more centralised. Cozens (1989) suggests another way to improve policing organisational structure, when considering the proposals for forming the police to face new challenges in the future. He accepts that improvements should certainly be made, but a structural change towards centralisation or regionalisation may not improve the quality of service, and there are heavy penalties to be paid if the police become more remote from the community. According to Cozens, for historical and constitutional reasons, the central direction and authority lines of the police have not been clear and with the establishment of a 'new' body, working between the Home Office and the service within the existing system, would make the service more effective. This is because, '... the Home Office does not have the operational experience and ACPO does not have the statutory authority or resources' (1989:1371). Cozens goes on to say that:

Finding new arrangements will be difficult as it has to balance the need for public confidence, the national responsibilities of the Home Secretary, the legitimate interests of the police authorities, and the operational independence of the chief constables. This can best be achieved through a
new body established for the specific purpose. Such an approach would be consistent with the current practice of setting up ‘agencies’ to carry out the executive functions of government within a policy and resources framework set, in this case, by the Home Office (1989: 1371).

I would agree with Cozens that seeking another way to make the present system more efficient and effective, by considering new arrangements for cross-force, national, or even international crime and policing issues, is preferable to making the policing system in England & Wales regionalised or centralised. There are already problems concerning police-public relations and public consent to policing. More centralisation would alienate the police from the community and increase the problems concerning consensus and legitimacy.

As explained earlier, the Turkish police organisation has been highly centralised since its foundation. Because the general administration system in Turkey is highly centralised, the police cannot easily be separated from it, but currently there is a trend towards decentralisation of the administration as well as the policing system. Partly because of socio-economic and political development, and partly because it is becoming difficult to tackle some local problems from the centre, there is a tendency towards localisation or regionalisation of policing in Turkey, contrary to the situation to England & Wales. Although the slow trend towards decentralisation of the Turkish police is a development of the past decade, the most serious attempts to change the system have been seen during the 1990s. In the move towards decentralisation, some police departments or services have been regionalised or localised and the special municipal police forces and the provincial departments of the police organisation have been given more powers and responsibilities.

It seems that the authorities are beginning to believe that the problems Turkey faces today cannot be solved with the ‘limited rules’ put into operation years ago when Turkey’s population was between 12-18 million.
9.7.1993). At the moment, the population is about 65 million, and this makes it necessary to try to solve the problems locally rather than from the centre. As Saribay states:

The control from the centre to the very small local unit may show the degree of State's power, but it also makes the State tired and clumsy. Excessive control may also cause a loss of confidence of public to the State. This may resist the necessary co-operation between the public and the State for a stable democracy, and may cause problems (Gunaydin 13.7.1993).

Agar was the first Director-General of the Turkish Police to use the term 'decentralised management' in discussions of police reform, in a statement just after being appointed on 9 July 1993. He said that policing will be managed locally by giving more powers to the provincial police forces and by sending the top police managers to the sub-units, or even to the local police stations in order to free them from the need to look to the centre in Ankara for every operational decision (Milliyet 14.7.1993). The former Minister of the Interior, Sezgin, also stated that changes to the Police Powers and Duties Act would empower the provincial police units (Ic Hizmet Bulteni, Nisan-Mayis-Haziran 1993: 37-8).

In order to decentralise the policing system in Turkey, however, first of all the general political system and the administrative structure of government should be decentralised. During the past few years, the Parliamentary Commission on Internal Affairs had been working towards extending the powers of Governor-Generals (the heads of provinces, appointed by the Government), concerning the management and control of the provincial police and gendarmerie organisations. It also considered the establishment of regional organisations, each including more than one province. However, following the Commission's recommendations in May 1993, the Government prepared a Bill which only suggested changes in the Governor-Generals' powers over the police in their provinces (Meydan 21.5.1993). Although there is still no official suggestion of establishing regions,
except in Istanbul which will be discussed below, shifting power from the centre to the head of the province might be seen as an indicator of the development towards decentralisation of all public services, including policing.

Another argument in terms of decentralisation in Turkey concerns the question of electing the Governor-Generals. Gonul (1992) argues that if the heads of provinces were elected by local people, rather than appointed by central government, it would help to speed up the trend towards decentralisation in general and ultimately in policing. Most other writers including Coker, however, criticise this suggestion by arguing that this will mean a ‘ politicisation’ of the Governor-Generals, which is in turn likely to pose a threat to the ‘centralised system’ which has been in place for centuries (1993: 9). I would agree with Gonul (1992) because the Governor-General who is appointed by government, is the head of the local Province Special Administration Board. This Board consists of locally elected members, but is chaired by the appointed Governor-General. If the local community elects the Governor, and the Governor appoints the top local police officers, then the police would be localised and accountable to the community they serve.

Towards the end of 1993, a project was prepared to place some services, including the police, under the control of local governments or municipalities. Cekirge (1993) and Mengi (1993) argue that the aim of this proposal was to increase decentralisation, thereby making bureaucracy more manageable, and to increase local community control. The South-Eastern region of the country was to be the pilot area for decentralising the police service alongside health, traffic and education.

This change was suggested by the Social-Democrat Populist Party (SHP) in the coalition Government, the party which then also controlled the majority of
local governments. However, since the Welfare Party (RP), an Islamic party, took over the control of local government in most cities in the South-Eastern region after the 27 March 1994 local government elections, this change is unlikely to take place in the near future. Also the conservative partner of the coalition government, the True Path Party (DYP), would not accept this proposal. There seem to be a fear that giving more powers to local bodies would result in changes towards autonomy or independence in this part of the country where the Kurdish people live. Even when this project was suggested in 1993, Mengi warned that the government should be careful about terrorists, separatists, and anti-secularists if the police in particular were decentralised (1993:3).

I would argue, however, that decentralisation of public services in this or any other part of the country, poses little threat to central authority. All municipalities have a special police force which is local and accountable to local communities. Nobody has raised a problem about them so far. It can be said that they do not have as much power as the general police, but they do perform some police powers and carry firearms routinely. I would argue that transferring all police functions to the municipal police forces would be more successful in terms of policing the local areas and people than the general police.

Nevertheless, perhaps because the government realised that the police and the gendarmerie cannot be effective through central control in some areas, the village constables are appointed under the control of local authorities especially in the South-Eastern region, to protect their own villages against separatist terrorism. They are appointed from the local people, and paid and directed by the local bodies of general administration. This is, of course, a sort of localised policing. Although the village constables are supposed to be 'temporary', they are unlikely to be removed. The existence of both village constables and the municipal police
shows that policing can be effectively decentralised or even needs to be
de decentralised.

Another development towards decentralising or regionalising the police in
Turkey has been the establishment of regional police units. Especially after 1980,
it has been recognised by police officials that there are difficulties in fulfilling
some services from the centre. It was taking long time, in terms of communication
and transportation, for example, to investigate or analyse criminal evidence for
provincial organisations. As a solution, for certain activities, regional units were
formed in the main seven geographical regions in the country. At the present time,
there are main regional units covering police criminal laboratories, police
hospitals or polyclinics, maintenance and reparation workshops for vehicles and
other equipment, telecommunications, police air forces, and anti-terrorism teams.
These regional organisations may make independent policing policies concerning
their duties in their regions. Ultimately, however, power still rests centrally. Also,
because of the situation regarding terrorism in 12 South-Eastern provinces of
Turkey, a 'region of emergency' was established with its own extraordinarily
powerful police and gendarmerie organisations. Although this does not constitute
regionalisation, but a regional solution controlled centrally, it indicates that local
problems may better be solved locally.

These changes, then, as I have suggested, are the indicators of a tendency
towards decentralisation of policing in Turkey. Although movement towards
regionalisation is evidence of centralisation for a decentralised system like that of
England & Wales, it is the opposite for a highly centralised system like that of
Turkey.

In terms of comparing England & Wales and Turkey, it might be argued
that the historical tradition of policing systems in both countries are changing
dramatically, and there is a line of convergence between the two in terms of policing strategies and organisational structures. In England & Wales, where policing is relatively decentralised, there is a trend towards centralisation and in Turkey, where policing is highly centralised, there is a trend slowly towards decentralisation. In other words, in both England & Wales and Turkey there are currently efforts to find alternative ways to tackle the problems of their present systems. As a result, in England & Wales more functions and greater powers concerning policing are given to central government, whilst in Turkey the provincial organisations of the national police are given more powers and responsibilities. This might be seen as a line convergence. It may result in similar, but not exactly the same systems in these countries, because different cultural and political traditions do not allow the same or parallel policing strategies or organisational structures. Because of these differences the nature of problems such as terrorism varies between England & Wales and Turkey, although the problems are similar in practice and the solutions to the problems require similar strategies. Also, despite the present level of standardisation and nationalisation in England & Wales, it is difficult to envisage that such policing would ever become entirely centralised or nationalised. There has always been a 'British suspicion' of a national police and as Whitaker points out, this suspicion has been '...reinforced by the twentieth century experiences of Germany and Russia' (1979: 174). If we were to assume that the policing system in England & Wales will continue to resist centralisation, developing a more centralised organisation only gradually and maintaining the community policing strategies currently employed, then it would exemplify a strategy that Turkey may follow.

I would argue that the tendency towards decentralisation in Turkey is a positive trend in that the existing highly centralised system for such a geographically vast country is not practical and a decentralised system would
enable the police to meet the needs of the community. In both England & Wales and Turkey the police should rely on a low level of centralisation. Therefore the governments of these countries need to review their policing systems to make them more flexible and less hierarchical, balancing the needs for decentralisation of the police, and devolution of resources to combat local crime, against the needs for greater centralisation to combat the crimes and disorders which have national or international bases, such as terrorism, currency offences and drug trafficking. As discussed in chapter 2, decentralisation and flexibility are characteristics identifiable with the post-modern age into which we are, arguably, entering. The police, therefore, should move towards a post-modern organisational structure in order to meet the needs of the time, although the traditional Turkish policing system needs to be 'modern' before being transferred into a 'post-modern' system.

Europeanisation is another direction of change in policing in both England & Wales and Turkey. Since England & Wales is a member of the European Union (EU), however, the police in this country have a stronger relationship with Europe than the Turkish police. Therefore, the Europeanisation process in policing is a major trend in England & Wales. King applies the concept of Europeanisation to the trend for European policing system change (1993a; 1993c) as well as to changing policies, alliances and other structures (1993b). Apart from establishing co-operation with other countries, Turkey is also trying to join the EU, and is therefore attempting to bring its policing system in line with European standards.

The policing service in England & Wales is increasingly involving itself in Europe as the EU itself develops and integrates more aspects of its member countries. Consequently, many national or local police units dealing with European issues have been established. For example, the Metropolitan police amongst others, has an international unit, and Kent police have acquired the
responsibility for policing the Channel Tunnel creating a frontier control unit.
Most importantly, many national units have been set up to meet national as well
as international needs. As indicated earlier in this chapter, the National Criminal
Intelligence Service (NCIS) was established to provide better co-ordination
between the police forces in England & Wales and the European Counterparts
against international crime (Police Review 4 September 1992: 1625) and a
National Fraud Squad was set up to deal with national and international fraud
(Hilliard 1992: 2009). Also a National Anti-terrorist force is proposed to combat
national and international terrorism (although present indications are that this may
be staffed by MI5).

The setting up of NCIS may be considered as the starting-point for the
move towards Europeanisation. NCIS, which also houses the UK Central Bureau
of Interpol, is linked and co-ordinated with the police in other European countries.
As Klerks indicates, NCIS is the UK contact point for policing matters for other
EU police forces (1993: 60). Walker states, concerning the role of NCIS, that it:

... provides an unprecedented focal point for the development of
international working relations in crime matters more generally, although
its particular strength still lies with its drug division which has succeeded
the National Drugs Intelligence Unit (1993: 125).

The creation of NCIS was seen as preparing the police to challenge the crimes
related with Europe (Hadfield 1992: 9). According to King, NCIS could be
utilised as a model for Europol (1993a: 73).

The Turkish police authorities are beginning to recognise the advantages
of co-operation with European countries in terms of information and technology
exchange, training facilities and working tactics and techniques which would
help to develop more democratic, lawful, as well as effective policing. Apart from
cooperation in terms of educational facilities and information exchange, at the
moment there are many agreements or protocols between Turkey and other
countries, encouraging co-operation to combat internal and international terrorism, drug smuggling and organised crime. Turkey has been a member of Interpol since 1930, and the Turkish police have a limited relationship with Europol. Currently there are attempts in Turkey to bring the policing system in line with European standards, in order to be accepted by EU for full membership. To do this, it needs to reorganise and reshape its own police organisation, making it less coercive with more democratic powers and introducing Western-style police strategies, but there is still a long way to go. As King points out, Turkey is ‘... the longest standing Associate Member (since 1963) and one with little chance of full membership’ (1994a: 78). Turkey’s human rights record has stood in the way of its application for membership (Bright 1994: 11).

Despite increasing political problems and coercive policing practice, in order to align with the Western European countries, there are ongoing discussions on the need for democratisation of policing in Turkey and some changes in terms of law and human rights have already been initiated. From the beginning of 1992, almost all police laws and regulations have been reviewed. Some of them have been renewed with additional articles, and new laws have been introduced. For example, many changes have been made in the major police laws such as the Police Organisation Act 1937 and the Police Powers and Duties Act 1934. The reason for these amendments was that despite intermittent changes, the Police Organisation Act 1937 was no longer adequate to meet contemporary needs and required either fundamental alteration or to be replaced altogether. The Act was fully amended in 1992 to provide a Western-style, more democratic and less coercive policing system.

The most profound move towards democratisation of the police in Turkey was in the changes made to the Criminal Justice System Act (CMUK) in 1992. These changes were the result of an intensive campaign for democratisation of
policing and the criminal justice system by lawyers. It had been the subject of long discussion between both sides of the existing coalition government.

With this change, about 30 articles of the Act were renewed, modernised, and democratised. As Safak indicates, the original Criminal Justice System Act was similar to the German Criminal Justice System Act, but for these recent changes, the legislators benefited from the British Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (1993a: 1). The most important changes brought by articles 14-24 of this Act are: better conditions of interrogation, a shorter period of time for detention and the right for suspects to have a solicitor throughout the enquiry from the preliminary interview to any subsequent prosecution. If a suspect does not have a solicitor, they have to be provided with a legal representative (Resmi Gazete 12.12.1992). According to the old Act, one could have a solicitor only in the court, not in the police station.

Also according to the new Act, at the very beginning of the questioning at the police station, information concerning the detention should be laid before the public prosecutor, regardless of the severity of the crime. Safak criticises this point by saying that it would make the public prosecutor unnecessarily busy and cause a lack of confidence in the police (1993a: 4). The aim of this Act is to make policing and the criminal justice system more democratic and 'transparent', a word used widely in Turkey to explain that what the police do, should be seen and understood clearly by the public. But the introduction of article 31/1 undermines these aims. This article indicates that the Act cannot be applied to those crimes dealt with by the State Security Courts (DGM), and for these crimes, the old Act is applied.

It is argued that another negative aspect of this Act is that it gives more rights to criminals than victims. The Director of Antalya provincial police, Erturk,
argues that the police are having difficulties in applying the new Act and that it needs to be reviewed since it requires a solicitor for the suspect during every level of investigation and prosecution, but that there is no continuing representation for the victims (Meydan 17.5.1993). The former Minister of the Interior, Gazioglu, also argues that the new Act cannot be applied in a country like Turkey, it is a 'too large dress' for the Turkish policing system (Milliyet 27.5.1993). This means that suspects should not have this level of rights and that police powers should not be restricted in Turkey. I would not agree with this view. If it does not suit the police, it does not necessarily mean that it is wrong. Maybe the policing system itself needs adjustment. As Ucanlar points out, what this Act brings is a 'reform', but a 'delayed reform'. Perhaps it is not complete, and ignores the rights of victims, but the civil and human rights that it offers, especially for detainees, cannot be argued against (1993: 2).

Currently the Turkish police are seen to be successful in their fight against terrorism, but one important issue which is discussed after every operation is that the police fail to act lawfully against suspects and kill many of them without prosecution or judgement, being accused of operating a 'shoot first and ask questions later' policy. The Turkish media criticises this sort of police action as 'execution without judgement' (Yargıdsız infaz) which, of course, is contrary to human rights (Cumhuriyet 27.3.1993). The treatment of political and separatist offenders and suspects by the security forces has been the subject of many Amnesty International reports, which usually suggest that the police are involved in killings and tortures. Also the EU froze its relationship with Turkey concerning its application for membership, and although its application for Customs Union membership was accepted in March 1995, for the final decision on full EU membership Turkey was urged to improve its human rights records.
After considering the trends of change in policing in England & Wales and Turkey, I would like to consider the potential changes in the future. It would be true to say that both England & Wales and Turkey need significant changes and it is likely that further restructuring in the police service will continue to take place. During last few years there has been a stronger debate concerning further changes in England & Wales than in Turkey.

Currently, a major issue on the agenda in England & Wales concerning reorganisation of provincial policing is the further amalgamations of some smaller forces, reducing the existing number of police forces. This is of course another step towards centralisation. Apart from this, there are plans for reorganisation of the Metropolitan police. The proposals for amalgamations came in the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994. This Act is considered as a '... vehicle by which the Government proposes to introduce its organisational reforms of policing' (Newing 1994: 2).

The possibility of the amalgamations of smaller forces or the establishment of larger and regional forces or even a national police force has been expressed by Home Secretaries, police chief officers and researchers during the last five decades. The questions are whether certain aspects of policing strategy and administration display an increasing trend towards centralisation, and whether there is a real need for this structural change.

There have been proposals for further amalgamations through the Home Secretary's Statement on the Police to the House of Commons (1993), the subsequent White Paper on Police Reform (1993) and the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994. It is almost certain that there will be fewer and larger police forces in England & Wales in the near future. The Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police, O'Dowd, predicted that amalgamations would occur
within three or five years (Police Review 23 October 1992). Gwent and South Wales forces, for example, have already been asked to consider three options for amalgamation: a full merger, Gwent to cede territory for South Wales, or South Wales to cede territory to Gwent (Mason 1993: 15).

In his statement indicated above, Kenneth Clarke, the then Home Secretary, officially announced proposals for amalgamations together with other police reforms:

As a result we may no longer need 43 separate headquarters maintaining 43 parallel organisations. I have no fixed views about what the right number of forces should be and I have no plans to use the powers in the 1964 Act to amalgamate forces. But I propose that the statutory procedures, which are unduly cumbersome, should be simplified to allow for amalgamations when the time is right (1993: 6-7).

Although this clearly proposes amalgamations, and Mr Clarke repeated three times in his statement that there were too many forces in England & Wales and that amalgamations would come eventually, he drew back from naming the forces which would disappear under a planned programme.

Mr Clarke's proposal was presented in the White Paper on Police Reforms (1993). It was expected that the White Paper would state clearly which of the 43 forces would disappear, but this did not happen. The proposals were probably shelved because they were widely criticised by many chief officers or because there were already many changes under way. The White Paper also proposes that the procedures for amalgamation should be simplified before any amalgamations take place (Paragraph 10.11). It considers the issue of amalgamations in Chapter 10, entitled 'The Pattern of the Police Force' and begins with an explanation of the present pattern of police forces:

A large number of separate forces inevitably means that they duplicate facilities and headquarters structures. Every police force has a chief officer and a supporting command structure. Every independent force also needs its own means of recruiting and training officers, providing them
with buildings, equipment and uniforms, and other facilities precisely because it is an autonomous organisation (Paragraph 10.4).

Then, it goes on to propose future amalgamations by saying that:

The Government considers that for all these reasons it may be desirable in the long term to reduce the number of police forces.... (Paragraph 10.8).

It will be very important to ensure that any police force amalgamations preserve the links with local communities and the local loyalties which are so important to effective policing.... (Paragraph 10.9).

The Government will encourage and support any authorities that wish to propose amalgamations in their areas.... (Paragraph 10.10).

In the same section, the White Paper states that there is no governmental decision about an optimum number of forces, that the Government does not propose to launch an immediate programme for amalgamations and that these should only take place after the procedure for the current changes is completed. The Police Federation responded to the White Paper by arguing that it welcomed the decision not to propose amalgamations until current changes have been absorbed and that the future pattern of police forces should be one of the issue to be considered by a Royal Commission (Police October 1993).

Finally, the White Paper (1993) indicates the new statutory procedures:

In future the boundaries of police forces will be determined by Order made by the Secretary of State.... (Paragraph 10.12).

Where in the future police force amalgamations become desirable, the Secretary of State will be able to prescribe new police force areas.... (Paragraph 10.13).

The same proposals for amalgamations without any indication of when and which forces would amalgamate have been put into the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994. The Act gives the Home Secretary the power to make orders for amalgamations when it is necessary or desirable:

(1) The Secretary of State may by order make alterations in police areas in England and Wales other than the City of London police area....
According to this Act (Section 21(2)) the intention to give the Home Secretary the powers to 'alter' police force boundaries is not only to 'reduce' the number of police forces by amalgamations. It also gives power to 'increase' the number of forces, except the abolition of the Metropolitan Police. However, it is obvious that the aim of these proposals is to reduce the existing number of forces in England & Wales.

Despite the uncertainty of a plan for amalgamations in the Act, as indicated earlier, there has been speculation that the number of police forces would be cut from the existing 43 to 30 (Police Review 15.1.1993), or to 25 (Arnold-Foster 1993: 10), or even to 20 (The Guardian 24.3.1993). The Police Review also speculates that, "... potential amalgamations will be based on establishment rather than land mass, so it may be assumed that every force of less than 3,000 is in danger of a forced marriage with one or more neighbours" (15.1.1993). (A map of possible amalgamations of police forces in England & Wales is included in Appendix V).

There are, of course, arguments for and against amalgamations and the debates are centred on the level of police efficiency and public consent and accountability in the smaller and larger forces, or the relationship between the size of the police force, police efficiency, public support and public accountability.
Officials have always defended or justified amalgamations of smaller forces in England & Wales by way of increasing efficiency and public consent (Brewer et al 1988: 8; Loveday 1994: 14), and further amalgamations in the future are likely to be justified in the same way. In practice, however, they seem to be based on an increase of central government’s control over the police (Young 1993: 5). Most commonly accepted view is that the smaller police forces are able to produce a quality of service with less cost than the larger forces.

As part of the research concerning the possibility of amalgamations in England & Wales, I sought the views and comments of a number of officials from various police forces, their representative organisations and the Home Office. I wrote them by letter and most of them replied (Letters to and from police forces, ACPO and the Home Office are included in Appendix I). Those who did not reply or replied by arguing for amalgamations or remaining neutral were mostly from those forces which are unlikely to face amalgamation. Those from smaller forces, on the other hand, replied with useful comments and mostly argued against amalgamations.

The arguments for amalgamations expressed by the respondents (for example, Humberside Police, pp.244-5; ACPO, pp.246-7; and Avon and Somerset Constabulary, pp.252-3) may be summarised as, economies of scale due to bulk purchasing and standardisation, reduction of management overheads, greater investment in technology, research, organisational methods and management, and improved efficiency in the use of resources generally, for example in responding to major incidents. The arguments against amalgamations (for example, Wiltshire Constabulary, pp.241-2; Warwickshire Constabulary, p.243; Cumbria Constabulary, pp.254-5; Dorset Police, pp.258-65; and Gwent Constabulary, pp.276-8) may also be summarised as, lack of local control, dilution of local accountability which is a fundamental check on the power of the state to interfere
unnecessarily in police policy and operations, increased bureaucracy, increased centralisation of control, diminished responsiveness, and reduction in the morale of personnel.

The arguments in favour of amalgamations are primarily economic. They focus on savings to be made from fewer and larger forces, in staffing and equipment. Those who take the view for amalgamations and even nationalisation, argue that amalgamations would go some way towards standardising police practice and procedures, and the fact that equipment would be purchased in greater quantities would eventually result in cost savings. They argue that this would be a step towards a 'national police force' which would result in even greater standardisation of procedures, and would bring about greater savings as a result of bulk purchasing.

In terms of accountability to the community and the role of public support in achieving greater efficiency, the majority of smaller police forces and police officers from those forces seem to be against amalgamations on the grounds of a perceived necessity to retain local control and a belief that police should be locally accountable to the community they serve. Any extension of the current boundaries would undermine the levels of service provided and would not be in the interests of the police or of the public served. Most of those officers who replied to my letters argue that public support is a critical factor in determining the operational success of any police force.

Another argument concerning amalgamations is whether the government intends to create a 'national' police force with this proposal, as many police officers and researchers would argue. Bayley, for example, suggests that '...although public opinion remains dead set against the creation of a national police force, Britain may be moving in that direction' (1992: 533). Eastwood
Alderson (1991) and Alderson (1994) also argue that nationalisation will 'inevitably' exist. Alderson argues that although the proposals brought by the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 are not 'direct' and do not include terms like 'national police force' or 'Ministry of Police', this is the intended effect and that the Act is a 'wolf in sheep's clothing' (1994: 2).

Alderson argues that the intention of this Act is to create a national police force but I would argue that there is not a clear proposal in this direction. What is intended is to take another step towards the centralisation of policing in the future along with many other developments towards centralisation. This step will almost certainly be taken, but does not provide the fundamental changes required for a national police force. As Reiner & Spencer indicate, the establishment of national police units cannot necessarily be seen as evidence of a national police force '...since there are some policing activities and operations which do not need to be organised at a national level' (1993: 185). Nevertheless, the White Paper (1993) says that '...the police service will continue to be made up of a number of independent local police forces' (Paragraph 10.1). Moreover, apart from a short period during the time of Cromwell in the seventeenth century, policing in England & Wales has always been decentralised, and there has been a traditional antipathy towards centralisation.

Despite the above, the Metropolitan police have undergone significant reorganisation. When Sir Paul Condon, the Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police, took office he immediately announced that changes already started by Sir Peter Imbert, the former Commissioner, would be completed, then new reorganisation plans would be developed and introduced. These entailed the force being split into five large semi-independent police areas. As indicated in the first section of this chapter, this change has already taken place. 'Sector policing' was also introduced in London in 1992. The aim of this was to make the most
effective of available resources, and to work in close co-operation with the local community, by dividing a day work into about 8 shifts (Dixon & Stanko 1993: 1-2). However, this plan failed to work for the Metropolitan police in general because it was rejected by most of sub-divisions and officials. Some divisions have decided to retain sector policing and some not.

In Turkey also, the changes in a variety of Acts concerning policing, as indicated earlier, are likely to lead to organisational changes in terms of improving central and provincial organisational structure. The primary aim of these changes is to moderate and limit police powers and to bring the policing system in line with the provisions of the new Criminal Justice System Act (CMUK). These changes also aim to allow the reorganisation of policing work on the street and in local police stations, the establishment of another police force called the 'judicial police', and the abolition of the dual policing system, namely the Police and the Gendarmerie. Concerning this latter, there are arguments for changing the status of the Gendarmerie, and forming a 'village police' service which would in the long term replace the Gendarmerie. I will now consider these possible changes.

As mentioned, there are proposals to change policing at the level of the local police stations. According to statistics issued at the beginning of 1993, the total number of local police stations in Turkey was 1185 (Polis 1993: 25). It is generally argued that this number of local police stations is more than enough and the number of police stations, especially in the major cities, is therefore being decreased. For example, in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir a number of stations have been closed down within past few years and mobile teams have been formed to replace them in areas of incidents or crimes. It is planned to use the ex-police station buildings for different purposes, such as police-public relations bureaux in order to improve the policing profile (Tercuman 10.2.1993).
The discussion concerning the judicial police force began in early 1992. The most important argument for the establishment of the judicial police force is that it will concentrate on investigation and the gathering of criminal evidence, and will provide an area of specialisation. The Ministry of Justice prepared a Bill which was submitted to the Government in May 1992 and then passed to Parliament, although it has not yet been discussed there. This is because there is no agreement between the police organisation or the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice, or between the police and the lawyers, whether the establishment of such a police force is necessary. The main point of disagreement between the police and lawyers is that this judicial force would be attached to the Ministry of the Interior, but will be commanded by the Ministry of Justice when operating.

The former Minister of Justice, Oktay, who hopes to see the realisation of the judicial police, argues that it would assist in the creation of a democratic and just policing and criminal justice system with a better relationship between the police, the public prosecution and justice systems. The Public Prosecutor for the State Security Court (DGM), Ozliyen, shares the same view (Cumhuriyet 3.4.1993). Celenk, a lawyer, also argues that the judicial police would help combat anti-democratic and unlawful dealings with suspects or criminals (1993:2). Most chief police officers, on the other hand, are against forming a different police force under the control of the Ministry of Justice. For example, the Director of Istanbul Provincial Police, Menzir, argues, that it will divide and diminish the powers and the authority of the police. Menzir states that '... it would be wrong to put the police under the control of both the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice' (Cumhuriyet 3.4.1993). In general, the lawyers and the authorities of the judicial system would like to form the judicial police force, but the police are against such a development. There is already a judicial police
bureau in almost every police unit or department doing precisely the work which the new Bill suggests for the 'new' force. As Safak (1993b) points out, an additional police force may fail to solve the problems caused by the police in terms of democracy and human rights which are the main reasons for the negative image of the police, but it may result in a positive change in terms of organisational structures, and police effectiveness.

The other important proposal, which, as mentioned above, has been put forward for organisational change in policing in Turkey, concerns the abolition of the dual policing system. The geographical working areas of the police, gendarmerie and the military are becoming inextricably intertwined as Turkey becomes increasingly urbanised. Cities and towns are growing larger and take inside their boundaries many villages and rural areas where the gendarmerie normally perform policing functions. In addition to the effects of urban growth, terrorist activities in the gendarmerie areas are policed by the military forces, again blurring the demarcation lines between the two arms of the police.

A proposal for solving the problem with this dual policing system is to redefine the role of the gendarmerie and clarify its position as either part of the military, or as part of the police under the civil authorities. Many argue that policing forces should be unified (Genc 1993: 45; Turinay 1994: 2). Another plan which will help to end the role of the Gendarmerie in policing is the establishment of the village police. Sabah (30.8.1993) reported that the Ministry of the Interior was preparing a Bill to establish such a force, specifically to work in villages. The Bill has not yet been passed to Parliament, but if it is enacted, it will limit or perhaps even end the role of the gendarmerie in policing the rural areas.

There are different plans to reorganise policing in Istanbul in particular. It, being the largest city and metropolitan area in the country with a population of
over 10m, has more problems in terms of socio-economic and political issues as well as terrorism, smuggling and organised crime. In July 1993, it was announced that a special model of administration in general and for policing in particular had been proposed for Istanbul. According to this proposal, there would be a Ministry of State responsible for Istanbul, and the City would be divided into two parts with two Governor-Generals and two Police Directors. In other words, the Istanbul Provincial Police will be divided into two forces. The Turkish Government is currently considering this proposal. Apart from this proposal, there are further proposals for establishing a regional administration system around Istanbul, including some other cities. *Meydan* (28.4.1993) reported that the authorities were preparing a Bill to establish an autonomous region in the area with Istanbul as the centre. According to this Bill, several neighbouring provinces, such as Edirne, Kırklareli, Tekirdag, Kocaeli, and Sakarya will become part of this region. In this general administrative region, policing will be reorganised to undertake main policing duties, leaving secondary duties such as issuing passports to the civil authorities. According to the Bill, the rural areas in this region which are now the responsibility of the Gendarmerie, as in all other parts of Turkey, will be left to the Police and also an Environment Police Force will be established to fight crimes against the environment. This is another sign of the potential removal of the policing functions of the Gendarmerie force. It is still uncertain if this Bill will become an Act in the near future, but it might be argued that it is inevitable sooner or later. This proposal will start a procedure to end the role of the militarised Gendarmerie force, a move which has received no criticism. This change will also speed the trend towards decentralisation of policing in Turkey.

In this chapter the present police organisational systems of England & Wales and Turkey, the current trends of change and potential changes have comparatively been considered. In the first section, the organisational structures of
the police in these countries are introduced by putting the relevant organisational charts. The police organisations are compared in terms of problems they face, referring to the concepts of centralisation and decentralisation which are also explained. I argued that the policing system in England & Wales is relatively decentralised and it allows more flexible and democratic policing practice, whilst in Turkey it is centralised and has more problems in terms of democratic policing practice which have been considered in the previous chapter. These different forms of organisation are related to the bases of their respective legitimate authorities and the consensus or coercive policing practices, which have been considered in the previous chapter. In the second section of this chapter I argue, however, that in England & Wales there is a trend of change towards centralisation and in Turkey a trend towards decentralisation. These are also parallel to the shift in the forms of policing practices in these countries. The point is that both countries should rely on a low level of centralisation and should balance the need for decentralised and centralised policing for local and national needs. Finally in this chapter, potential police organisational changes are considered. Particularly, possible amalgamations of smaller police forces in England & Wales are argued against. The main proposals for change in Turkey which this chapter considers are the reorganisation of policing at local level, the establishment of a 'judicial police' force and the abolishment of the gendarmerie or the unification of policing. I consider all these plans as positive attempts in that they would help to establish a more democratic and consensus policing system, and a more flexible and accountable form of police organisation in Turkey. The form of organisation as well as form of legitimacy are related closely to the issues of discretion and accountability to the community which I turn to consider in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5

THE PRACTICE OF POLICE DISCRETION AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN RELATION TO FORMS OF ORGANISATION AND LEGITIMACY

In chapter 3 consensual and coercive forms of policing in England & Wales and Turkey were considered, followed by a comparison of decentralised and centralised forms of police organisational structure in these countries in chapter 4. These different forms of legitimacy and organisation are related to different forms of accountability and discretion. In order to explain the effectiveness of police organisation and the quality of forms of police legitimacy, in this chapter, I will initially consider the practice of police discretion and accountability in these countries.

We need to bear in mind, however, when comparing England & Wales and Turkey, that since the policing systems in these countries are within different forms of legitimacy and policing forms and organisational structures are therefore different, the forms and levels of police discretion and accountability are also different. In line with legal-rational legitimacy in England & Wales or traditional legitimacy in Turkey, the police may be accountable to the community or to the state. Similarly, the practice of discretion may be wider and unstructured or controlled and structured. The questions of where, when and how the police enforce the law or use their discretion, and to whom they are accountable when
fulfilling their functions identified by the law or using discretion are the main concern of this chapter.

There is a relationship between police discretion and accountability, especially accountability to the community. Demand for this form of accountability may affect operational decisions and the practice of discretion. The position of the police in democratic societies poses key questions for those who believe that officials who are appointed or elected to positions should be accountable for their activities. Police organisations, in this respect, are particularly problematic because of the nature of the discretionary powers they have been given. Because of the importance of discretion and accountability in policing practice it is essential to consider these two concepts together in this chapter. Apart from considering the concepts of discretion and accountability, this chapter discusses the actual practice of police discretion in sense of its necessity, use, abuse and control. The actual forms of police accountability will also be discussed with regard to the community and through consultation in England & Wales and Turkey.

5.1. The necessity, use, abuse and control of police discretion

Discretion lies at the heart of any system of justice and the police probably have more discretion than any other agency in the system (Ericson 1974: 84). In terms of policing practice, 'discretion' is seen to be important, necessary, inevitable, desirable and unavoidable (Reiner 1992b: 211; Johnston 1987: 48; Kinsey et al 1986: 66). The practice of discretion is important as the police core mandate implies a balance between law enforcement and the recognition of local custom. According to Scarman, '... discretion is the art of suiting action to particular circumstances. It is the policeman's daily task' (1981: Paragraph: 4.58). In carrying out their day-to-day duties the police enjoy a considerable degree of
discretion, due to the reality of daily police work. Individual officers work long hours without any direct or close supervision, and need to respond immediately to specific situations in their day-to-day work (Scraton 1985: 49).

Discretion is not only used in daily work on the street, but also in the station when receiving calls, reports or messages and in categorising events. When calls and messages are received at the station, officers decide priority and when or how to act (Manning 1979: 53). Where the police witness an offence or receive a report from the public, they have to decide whether it is a policing matter or not. When the incident is registered, an officer will decide if a crime has been committed or not. The police of course first analyse the offence according to the law. Analysis of the actions of any police officer will show that they are constantly required to practice discretion to varying degrees, every day of their working lives.

The concept of 'discretion' involves an informal process of decision-making influenced by social imperatives. This may include both the traditional and occupational culture of policing. In other words, the police may use discretion according to the tradition of the society in which they live, or according to the usual way it has been exercised in the police. The legal concept of discretion implies a power to make a choice or decision between alternative courses of action (Davis 1969: 4; Pattenden 1982: 3), or room for decisional manoeuvre possessed by a decision maker (Jowell 1973: 179). Galligan also defines 'discretion' as any power given to an official which leaves the decision-maker with some significant scope for setting the reasons and standards according to which the power is to be exercised, and for applying them in the making of specific decisions (1986: 23). Templeton defines discretion as:

... a function of arbitrary social control reflecting the imperative of law in actions as opposed to law in books. It expresses the moral rather than the legal authority of police power, and for the most part to use it the police
must approximate and be guided by community definitions and expectations rather than any sanction of the law. Essentially it is a political mechanism which may be exercised whenever effective limits on police powers allow variability in decision making (1985: 152).

Discretion is a custom or tradition versus rules in police decisions, especially day-to-day decision-making. Where rules are not clear, discretion begins as a way the police interpret the legal rules, regulations and laws. As Jefferson argues, the exercise of discretion is not only according to law or legal rules but also social (police work) rules, even though the relationship between legal, democratic and work structures is determined or dominated by law (1990: 51).

Davis (1969) suggests a 'dichotomy' between rules and discretion. However, Jowell does not accept such a simple dichotomy, arguing that discretion is '... a matter of degree, and ranges along a continuum between high and low' (1973: 179). Rules may nevertheless appear to abolish such discretion. According to Jowell, rules are purposively devised and language is not clear in its application to situations that cannot be foreseen. The applier of a rule will therefore frequently be possessed of some level of discretion to explain its scope (1973: 201). As Scratchon argues:

Police discretion, then, is developed at different levels, from the operational policies laid down by chief constables to the daily practices of officers on the beat. The police use discretion in their interpretation of the law and its application. They use discretion to determine the application of police force rules and their responses to the priorities of their senior command (1985: 47).

Discretion is necessary for a successful policing service. Ericson points out that organisations need to allow discretion and it can be viewed as an inevitable consequence of organisational activity. This facilitates system needs and mechanisms such as organisational security in relation to social forces in its environment, stability of lines of authority and communication, stability of informal relations, community of policy and sources of its determination and
homogeneity of outlook with respect to the meaning and role of the organisation (1974: 84-5). Reiner also states, when explaining the 'inevitable' of discretion, that:

The police inevitably have discretion in the enforcement of laws, for at least two reasons. One is that they do not, and never could, have adequate resources for full enforcement of every law. There is thus an inescapable necessity for choice about priorities. Second, even the most precisely worded rule of law requires interpretation in concrete situations. The logically open texture of rules in application makes an element of at least implicit discretion inevitable (1992: 210-1).

Kinsey et al propose three essential reasons for the necessity of discretion. First, the nature of rules and ambiguity of language requires the interpretation of general rules to fit particular situations. The practice of discretion and the enforcement of law are matters of political rather than legal definition. Second, the practice of discretion is inevitable given the limited resources available in any society. Finally, discretion is desirable because both justice and effective policing demand it (1986: 166-7).

Nevertheless, there are some who oppose discretion in favour of legal rules. Pattenden, for example, is not confident that individuals can practice intelligent and honest personal discretion and welcomes rules, because they are assumed to eliminate subjectivity, to ensure stability, predictability, and quality of treatment, and to promote order (1990: 12). Szikinger also states that the reasoning for discretion cannot be accepted, because 'the circumstances are not suitable for regulation' and theoretically, 'any aspect of police activity can be regulated' (1992: 37). What Szikinger is arguing here is that all policing activities could not only be regulated but controlled by those regulations, and further that everything concerning policing and police powers could be defined on paper or in law, rendering police discretion unnecessary. But as Pattenden argues, although it is true that rules encourage certainty, all rules are not free of subjective standards,
because rules are 'purposive devices' and the language in which rules are written is not certain (1990: 12-3).

Although the concept of discretionary power simply means the power to use discretion, in practice discretion is a way of exercising power, and police discretion represents one of the most critical and difficult of these (Fisk 1974: 64). Stop and search powers, for example, are difficult to govern by rules, but are discretionary, depending largely on the views and behaviour of individual police officers. Therefore, the police use of stop and search powers needs to be exercised with great care and discretion. In terms of 'care' in discretion, the Code of Practice for the Exercise by Police of Statutory Powers of Stop and Search says that:

An officer who has carried out a search must make a written record unless it is not practicable to do so, on account of the number to be searched or for some other operational reason... The record must be completed as soon as practicable (1986: Paragraphs 4.1, 4.2).

Jefferson argues that the situation which enables the norms and practices of operational officers in the field to effectively dominate discretionary decision-making in the case of public order policing in England & Wales is worsening. For example, the Public Order Act 1986 weakened the legal procedures and granted the police greater discretion by suggesting the offence of disorderly conduct which represents the most significant extension of discretion (1990: 58). The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 also did not make major changes in terms of discretion in public order policing, although it emphasises the importance of police-public relations.

We can formulate a similar argument about police powers contained in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984. This Act extends police powers in the case of search seizure and detection in ways which increase police discretion, although these have been balanced by supervisory procedures and compulsory community consultation. The power of arrest with, or without warrant
has also been extended, creating a power to detain arrested persons for questioning without charge for up to 96 hours. Under the Act, the powers of the police are related to the seriousness of offences. For example, if an offence is arrestable, the police can always arrest without a warrant, and have certain search powers. Police powers are more restricted for offences which are not arrestable. As Templeton (1985) argues, if the offence is classified as serious, the police are given greater powers including setting up road blocks, searching the homes of innocent people and detaining suspects for extended periods. PACE defines and classifies the offences, but in the cases when the offence does not fit the definition of PACE, it is the police who use discretion about when an offence is serious or not.

The issue of police powers in Turkey is more complex. Historically, the major threat to public order and the security of the state in Turkey has been derived from mass popular movements, rather than occasional riots. This is perhaps why especially the stop and search powers of the police are too extensive, or even unlimited and not well defined. This might be one reason for the abuse of discretion, in the sense that the police do not know what their powers are, how to use them or when discretion is to be exercised.

Since the military intervention of 1980, the Turkish police have been given increased powers to combat terrorist movements. Announcing the new policy against terrorism, the first Prime Minister of the military rule, Bulent Ulusu, told the first meeting of his cabinet that, '... the government would take all judicial and administrative measures to remove inefficiency in the Turkish administration. Our main duty will be to eradicate all seeds of terrorism' (Law Enforcement News 13 October 1980). This statement was expected to start a purge in the government of all Turkish political extremists, including rightists, leftists, Kurdish separatists and Islamic fundamentalists. The new edict apparently
extended the authority and powers of the police and the military forces still further to deal with political militants. Since 1990, further laws have been introduced giving the police tougher and more extended powers.

Stop and search and identity checks by the police in Turkey are very common. As indicated earlier in the previous chapters, human rights and civil liberty organisations both in and outside Turkey often stress that these powers are too extensive and misused. One important point is that although these powers are given under the law only to the uniformed police, such actions are also taken by plain-clothes police officers (Tokgoz 1990: 28).

According to the Turkish Police Duties and Powers Act (PVSK), police discretionary powers should only be exercised for the purpose of fulfilling certain functions identified by the law (Yenisey 1987: 174). However, the special and intelligence branches of the police particularly use their discretionary powers more arbitrarily and especially so in the political arena. They go much further than England & Wales or any other Western European country would allow. The security of the state is given as the rationale for this action.

Street level discretion for the Turkish police is not individual but collective and occurs according to the decision of the officer in charge of the team. Article 1 of the Turkish Police Duties and Powers Act stipulates that in situations that are not clearly identified by laws or regulations, the officer on duty has to ask for a decision from the commander in charge and act according to the order given. Although the officers on the street are in better position to see and understand the situation or problem, and may be able to make a better decision by using their discretion, it is compulsory by law and in practice to ask for the decision of a higher ranking officer. One reason for this may be to avoid corruption, through officers on the street abusing their power.
In terms of abuse of discretion, as indicated earlier, another important issue is 'impartiality'. Since the use of discretion may mean either justice or injustice (Davis 1969: 3; Kinsey et al 1986: 19), it is important that the police make decisions and use their discretionary powers impartially. The possibility for impartiality of the police is questioned, however, on the basis that they determine what offenders or offences will be given priority. The police are expected not only to enforce the law, but to know which values to endorse and which to ignore.

As mentioned above, in England & Wales, the provisions of PACE add greatly to the area of police discretion and thus to a greater reliance on internal discipline. For example, many of the most controversial powers, such as the establishment of road blocks, detention beyond 24 hours, delay in access to legal advice, and the power to take intimate body samples, may be put into effect only in the case of a serious arrestable offence. Although some guidance is given, there is considerable scope for subjective judgement by individual police officers. Discretion on this scale is at odds with impartially applying the law and makes external accountability something of a problem.

The ideal of impartially upholding the law is unattainable. The policing function inevitably involves policy decision, assessment of priorities and the utilisation of limited resources. The police, despite the image that they like to project, do not simply enforce the law. They make policy about which laws to enforce, how much to enforce it, when to enforce it and against whom to enforce it. According to Lambert, the issue of the control of discretionary powers lies at the centre of the debate (1986: 2, 64). In other words, to avoid partiality and abuse, police discretion should be controlled or structured. But is this possible?

Discretion is one of the most valuable assets for any police officer, but must be used with great care, and needs control or structuring to avoid its abuse or
partial practice. Police discretion should be restricted to its minimum level in order to avoid the possibility of abuse. Griffiths argues that policy directives within the police service should be limited to the maintenance of the rule of the law by the most effective means available (1984: 127). But it is not easy to control, supervise, or monitor discretion since it cannot be measured or recorded. Lundman, for example, points out that the work of the patrol officer is unsupervised and, to a lesser extent, unsupervisable (1979: 145). Referring to America, Reiss also states that:

Most decisions... are unsupervised so that the exercise of discretion not to invoke the law cannot be monitored and reviewed. What is more important, discretionary decisions can be reviewed only when they are directly supervised or a matter of record. Because the police bureaucracy does not require that many discretionary decisions be made a matter of record, those choices cannot be subject to internal review (1992: 74).

This means that police officers are relatively free to act on the basis of individual attitudes or prejudices. The absence of close supervision makes this even more important.

The pervasive practice of discretion by individual police officers operates in such a manner that it contradicts the basis of organisational rationality in which the structured patterns of vertical decision-making are considered paramount. Templeton (1985), who explains these circumstances as 'organisational rationality versus personal discretion', argues that there are linkages between individual decision-making and organisational variables such as control through departmental rules, control through changes in officer decision making capacity and control through community pressure. Control through departmental rules is understood as the 'buffer' between the ambiguity of legislation and unrestricted discretion, and is the most widely advocated perspective of management. The perspective of control through changes in officer decision-making capacity is offered as a general panacea and is a radically difficult and unacceptable approach.
to police organisation. The idea of control through community pressure on the practice of police discretion consists either of direct power relations with community groups, or on the indirect transactions between the individual police officers and people (Templeton 1985: 173). In terms of control of discretion by community, Griffiths argues that when making decisions, senior officers need consultation with local representatives within the community:

Yet such judgement, whether made by a constable exercising his discretion or by a chief officer making a major policy decision, must inevitably be influenced by public expectations. It would be a foolish Chief Constable who failed to explain fully his policies to his police committee, and divisional level councillors should always have access to divisional commanders (1984: 127).

Sanders proposes five areas in which police discretion in street-level actions is controlled. First, arrest can be only for 'suspicion' of a specific offence, and then stop and arrest should be based on 'reasonable suspicion'. The areas of stop and search are restricted by the Home Office guidance and the Code of Practice for the Exercise by Police Officers of Statutory Powers of Stop and Search (1986). Also, stop and search must be recorded, and finally there should be a supervision of these records (Sanders 1993: 84-5). There are similar control mechanisms in the police station when dealing with suspects and for prosecution decisions. However, Sanders argues that how the police practice discretion, and whom they practice it upon, is poorly controlled (1993: 86). This Code of Practice states, when explaining 'suspicion' and 'reasonable' suspicion for stop and arrest, that:

Whether reasonable grounds for suspicion exists will depend on the circumstances in each case, but there must be some objective basis for it.... Reasonable suspicion may exist, for example, where information has been received such as a description of an article being carried or of a suspected offender; a person is seen acting covertly or warily or attempting to hide something; or a person is carrying a certain type of article at an unusual time or in a place where a number of burglaries or theft are known to have taken place recently (1986: Paragraph 1.6).
It also suggests that reasonable suspicion cannot be supported on the basis of personal factors. For example, the colour, age or hair style of someone, or the fact that a person is known to have a previous conviction for possession of an unlawful article cannot be used as the basis for stop and search (1986: Paragraph 1.7).

The control of discretion is necessary wherever the law fails to offer clear guidance on action, and those situations where there is no complainant. In practice, on the question of public order, this means attending both to the Chief Constable's discretion to introduce various paramilitary options and to decide how they will be used, and to the discretion of constables executing their public order powers. For Reiner, the problem of how the inescapable and justifiable discretion enjoyed by the police can be controlled exists at two levels:

The level of policy-making for the force as a whole-the assessment of priorities in resource allocation and broad overall strategy and style- and the street-level actions of rank-and-file officers. In addition there is the task of providing channels of complaint about abuse and dissatisfaction (1992: 211).

According to Jefferson, recognising the practice of police discretion implies two principal needs. One is 'confining discretion' or the elimination of necessary discretionary powers which means fixing the boundaries and keeping discretion within them. The other one is better control of necessary discretionary powers which entails 'structuring and checking' (1990: 141). For structuring discretion, open plans, open policy statements, open rules, open findings, open reasons, open precedents, and fair informal procedures are needed since 'openness', as Davis indicates, is the natural enemy of arbitrariness and a natural ally in the fight against injustice (1969: 98). In Turkey for example, since there is no policy of 'openness' in terms of the use of discretion, it is impossible to prove whether or not discretion is abused.
MacKenzie lists six types or categories which exemplify the practice of police discretion in England & Wales in terms of structuring or controlling discretion. First of all, police are increasingly seeking to redefine the 'objectives' of their organisation in order to provide the most effective and efficient service to the public. Discretion is in the granting of certain permits and licences which must be obtained through the police. The way in which each police organisation produces 'manuals of instruction' which appear to place limits on the police practice of discretion has frequently led to the misconception amongst officers that they work in a highly defined and structured job. Finally, the police choose alternative methods of investigation, intervention, and disposition available to the active officer on the operational areas of the police station (1990: 428-33). These categories show that police discretion in England & Wales is structured and organised through some specific areas of police work.

In a system of unstructured or uncontrolled discretion, dangerous situations may occur since it can lead to violations of due process and open up the possibility of greater arbitrariness and partiality. As has been seen especially in Turkey, these measures may also lead to police corruption and misconduct. Attempts to control police discretion through rigorous rule-making assume that a large proportion of decisions can be programmed, but law framed in broad and ambiguous terms militate against such a possibility. Conversely, narrowly drawn regulations devalue opportunities for flexibility and are unresponsive to individual public needs. Therefore, rules do not necessarily replace discretion, and attempts to control and structure discretion by increasing the number of rules may result in public claims of police repression and harassment. In Turkey for example, because the police are organised in strong, hierarchical and centralised structures, police discretion is more likely to be superimposed, programmed and structured to reflect organisational priorities than in England & Wales. Accountability is a
democratic form of control of police discretion, and I turn to consider it in the next section.

5.2. The forms of police accountability in England & Wales and Turkey

Discretion is a matter of policing policy in general, while accountability concerns individual police officers being answerable for their actions and use of powers. Accountability implies a public form of explanation and justification of police actions and discretionary powers (Uglow 1988:114). The issue of accountability is, according to Reiner, the question of how to keep police practice, in particular the operation of discretion, in line with 'communal values' (1992b: 233). Jefferson & Grimshaw in defining accountability suggest that it '... concerns the institutional arrangements designed to ensure the obligations of the police are upheld' (1984: 10). As policing has become a controversial area, the issue of police accountability has also become a matter of strong debate. As Reiner indicates, '... all debates about policing issues eventually end up with the question of accountability or control of police force. The bottom line of any controversy about policing is who governs?' (1991b: 249). The crucial questions in terms of police accountability are for what, how much and to whom are, or should the be police accountable for the use of those powers? (Jefferson 1988; Reiner 1993). The concept of accountability requires that the police be accountable to the law, to an effective machinery for the investigation of complaints, to an effective and accessible local government structure, and by means of all three, to the community.

The police forces in England & Wales, with the exception of the Metropolitan Police and the City of London, are formally accountable to their respective Police Authorities whose duty it is to maintain an adequate and efficient police force (Stephens 1988: 169), but they are accountable to both a
local and a national authority. The ultimate national authority is the Home Secretary, a member of Parliament having cabinet rank in the government. Statute law provides the Home Secretary with certain powers over all the police forces in England & Wales. As mentioned earlier, the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 even increased the Home Secretary's powers over the police in general and Police Authorities in particular. The Metropolitan Police in particular are accountable to the Home Secretary, who is their only authority, and who in turn, is supposed to be answerable to Parliament.

Accountability is at the heart of the general policies followed by any police force in England & Wales. The police consistently argue that the limits of their powers and their procedures are defined by legal rules. They see themselves accountable to the courts for their actions, but their decisions are characterised as much by discretion as by rules. They can be examined and influenced through court actions, but there are also other methods. They are indirectly influenced through the operation of the exclusionary rule of evidence and by a direct challenge to a particular policy by judicial review. Also, they are examined by a new form of accountability through the legal process which has arisen with the creation of the Crown Prosecution Service in 1986 (Uglow 1988: 118-9).

The myth that the police in England & Wales are simply objective agents of the law has also been exposed by the movement of the police into the political arena. A number of former Commissioners and Chief Constables have expressed opinions on the conditions of the times and the function of the governmental process. As Maister points out, they have lobbied for greater police powers, while at the same time, denying the need for greater accountability (1986: 1). For example, in March 1982, on the same day as the Police Federation advertised in the national press calling for the restoration of hanging, James Anderton, the then Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, warned of a conspiracy to hamstring the
Police Authorities (Baldwin & Kinsey 1982). The success of this lobby can be judged by reference to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which substantially increases police powers.

The widespread public and political debate about policing which has taken place during recent years in England & Wales has focused, to a large extent, on police accountability. Kinsey et al. argue that there is a growing crisis in police accountability by stating that:

In the wake of the inner-city riots of 1981, many commentators including ourselves pointed to the absence of any element of accountability to local government in police policy making in London. Then, with the Miners' Strike of 1984-5, the debate on accountability shifted outside London to the provincial forces where, under the 1964 Police Act, County Councils and Metropolitan counties do have some concern with the administration of policing (1986: 13).

This debate generally expresses two extremes. On one hand, some Chief Constables and the Home Office argue that the police in England & Wales are fully accountable for their actions through the internal disciplinary procedures, Police Authorities and Parliament and that any further accountability could only be achieved by a weakening of the independence, authority and efficiency of the police. On the other hand, some institutions and individuals, such as the National Council for Civil Liberties, some Police Authorities and Scarman (1981), take the view that the institutions by which accountability is said to be achieved are incapable of providing it. They argue that the police have retreated into their specialised and increasingly technological world of law enforcement, becoming remote from the communities they serve and putting forward policing policies and styles which suit only their own purposes (Lambert 1986: 18).

Although a credible system of accountability requires that the police be accountable to the law and local government structures, accountability to the community is the most essential issue. The police should represent communities
not governments, and be more open to the community they serve. This can be achieved by increased liaison with social services and other agencies, increased accountability to the community and above all, greater involvement with the community. A successful police service has its roots in the community, is responsive to the needs of the area in which it works, is accountable to the public, and its composition reflects the community it serves. But as Boateng argues, these conditions do not usually exist (1984: 152).

There are proposals concerning 'desegregation' of police functions, the introduction of Basic (Local) Command Units (BCU), and local police forces or municipal police forces, and the aim for these is to improve accountability to the community (Loveday 1993a: 69; 1994a: 18). But there are also attempts to increase central control of policing by the introduction of the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994, which diminishes the level of accountability to community.

The extent of police accountability to the community in England & Wales is arguable. In a survey undertaken in 1991 amongst chief police officers, it was asked how accountable the police are to the communities they serve. As a result, 15 out of 27 indicated that the police were effectively accountable to the community, and 10 disagreed (Aydin 1991: 64). Some of those who thought positively made comments to support their views. For example, one argued that the police in England & Wales are accountable to the community, and '... the police in Great Britain are more accountable to the public than any force in the world' (Aydin 1991: 65). Those who argue in favour of greater police accountability, seek the introduction of mechanisms by which prior control over policing decisions and actions can be achieved, either by extending the power of central authorities to determine police actions or by expanding the ability of local communities to determine such decisions.
Accountability of the Turkish police, on the other hand, is not a well researched issue. Because of the complexity of policing laws it is not well defined who or which part of the police has which powers and responsibilities, or who is accountable to whom for their actions and use of discretionary powers. What is certain is that they are answerable only to the Minister of the Interior and other higher ranking officers through internal disciplinary procedures. We can only talk to some extent, about financial accountability of the Turkish police to the Police Trust, since the police are financed to a large extent by the Trust. Further, the Trust has the right and power to control and supervise how the police spend this money.

The national police force is fully responsible to the Minister of the Interior for all police activities including judicial (criminal) and political (state security) branches as well as the general or administrative police. The national organisation is also responsible to the Minister for their policing functions. The Minister of the Interior is formally accountable through the doctrine of ministerial responsibility to Parliament and through Parliament to the electorate. The Turkish police are not accountable to the community they serve. Nor is there any accountability to any democratically elected body such as a local police authority or to local government. Discussions concerning public and political accountability of the Turkish police remain outside the public domain. The Turkish police organisation itself formally controls police accountability. The internal command staff potentially have considerable powers of internal accountability. As a quasi-military organisation, its disciplinary procedure contains many formal sections of a highly centralised military organisation. Despite this disciplinary procedure, there is arbitrary use of police discretionary powers, and the legal and organisational rules fail to control police accountability.
The Turkish police believe that to allow police accountability to the community through an elected body or in any other form would make the police the tool of any extremist political party or group which might take over the control of policing. A survey of the heads of provincial police units in Turkey conducted in 1991 asked whether it is possible to talk meaningfully about police accountability to the community in any sense in Turkey. 11 respondents out of 19 indicated that this is not possible whilst the rest of the participants either did not respond or responded positively but with reservations (Aydin 1991: 66).

In order to achieve greater community involvement in policing, police-community relations, and public accountability or accountability to community which is essential for effective policing, a new policing approach is being introduced in the USA of 'problem-oriented' or 'problem-solving' policing. The objective in problem-oriented policing is to explore how an organisation as a whole could analyse a given city-wide problem and its response to it. It seeks to tie together all the elements involved in policing and to redefine relationships between the police and the community. It is a way of making more effective use of community and the police in receiving the policing service. By making community and the police 'closer', it reduces the likelihood of police malpractice and pushes the police to consider themselves accountable to the community (Hoare et al 1984; Eck & Spelman 1987; Goldstein 1990). This approach may be adopted in the USA, and it has been successful in the city of Newport. However, as Goldstein points out, because of the rigidity of the police organisational structure, it would be difficult to adopt this type of policy in England & Wales (1990: 53). Also, because of the same reason it cannot be adopted in Turkey.

Problem-oriented policing was introduced in Newport in 1983 within the entire police department. The objective was to make problem-solving and integral part of daily operations. A four-step process that police officers were trained to
use was created: identifying the problem, analysing the problem, searching for alternatives, and assessment (Eck & Spelman 1987: 103-33). Sir Kenneth Newman tried to introduce this type of policing in London between 1982-7 when he was Commissioner. Four problems were selected in four major areas: Asian gangs, shopper victims in Oxford Street, prostitutes in Bedford Hill, and motor vehicle crime. But the 'hierarchy' and 'rigidity' of the organisational structures made the adoption of the problem-oriented approach difficult (Goldstein 1990: 53-4; Hoare et al 1984: section 10.3).

There is no 'problem-oriented policing' in England & Wales, but the police in this country consider community consultation and community involvement in order to develop accountability to community to be a prime concern, while in Turkey these issues are not being considered seriously. Community consultation and accountability through consultation is one relatively recent policy for crime control and police effectiveness. According to the existing legal systems in both England & Wales and Turkey, the primary role of the police is to maintain order. The difference between these two countries is that the police in England & Wales carry out their duties relatively in consultation and co-operation with the communities they police, while a real police community consultation and co-operation do not exist in Turkey. The police in England & Wales are commonly known as the servants of public, at least to some extent, whilst the Turkish police are really the servants of government. The Turkish police are not able to receive any help from the community for better policing, while the police in England & Wales generally receive a considerable amount of help from people.

The first official recognition of community consultation in England & Wales was Home Office circular 54/1982 (Home Office 1982). This was based on the Scarman report (1981) which recommended that the police should establish community consultation machinery. PACE 1984 then made this compulsory.
Proposals on community consultation at a local level have been put forward by John Alderson, the former Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall. In that part of the country, there existed police authorities as elsewhere, but in addition, there were community policing consultative groups. Police officers also attended and observed debates at council meetings. When Alderson gave evidence to Scarman (1981), he argued that this form of informal consultative arrangements had to be put on a statutory footing. After the Brixton disorders, Scarman was concerned that a key stage in the riots had been the breakdown of the voluntary consultative relationship between the police and community representatives. His report showed that intensive Special Patrol Group (SPG) operations had been conducted without disclosing the fact either to community leaders or to the relevant home beat officers. As to the use of public liaison branches, Scarman acknowledged that many forces already possessed these, but:

A number of those who have seen evidence to the inquiry, see these branches as a mere public relations exercise. They instance the reluctance amounting in many cases to outright refusal or senior police officers to discuss operational questions with leaders of the local community (1981:5.55).

Scarman recommended that police authorities should have a duty to establish appropriate machinery for police consultation not by changing the formal powers of the authorities, but by making them more active in decision making procedure.

The governmental response to these proposals was rapid. In June 1982, the Home Office issued a circular to police authorities and Chief Constables asking for the establishment of formal community liaison procedures. These guidelines say the machinery to be set up should enable Police Authorities and Chief Constables to take local views into account. Membership should be wide ranging and include local councillors, MPs and representatives from probation, education, social services, housing and voluntary groups. The police would be members as of right. Matters which could usefully be taken up, as Zander (1985) indicated,
included the discussion of the incidence of crime and police response to both crime generally and specific types of offence and the operation of police procedures and policy in relation to law enforcement.

By the end of 1982, just one year after Scarman's recommendations, 10 of the 41 provincial police forces had set up Police Consultative Committees (PCCs) in their areas, usually by subdivision. Section 106 of PACE 1984 whilst being a significant and contentious policy initiative, lying at the heart of the current debate concerning police accountability (Morgan 1986: 83), does enact some of Scarman's recommendations. It does not, however, make the establishment of PCCs a statutory requirement. Rather it states that:

Arrangements shall be made in each police area for obtaining the views of people in that area about matters concerning the policing of the area and for obtaining their co-operation with the police in preventing crime in the area (PACE 1984: Section 106).

Although PACE did not make the establishment of PCCs compulsory, the development of PCCs was rapid. By the summer of 1984 only six authorities had no formal committees and that number declined to three until 1986, two of which have enhanced their network of crime prevention panels to the point that there is little to distinguish them from consultation groups (Morgan 1986: 86). Formal consultation arrangements in police forces outside London have taken a variety of forms. A standard form was not identified by the section above. This means that Police Authorities have discretion as to what they see as the appropriate method for obtaining 'the views of the people'. Expectations of these arrangements vary and sometimes conflict. Central and local government, Chief Constables and sections of the public do not necessarily have a common purpose or interest in such matters. Despite this rapid development in terms of establishing PCCs, they have always been subject to criticism. The most important debate about this issue is their significance and role. The primary aims of the PCCs are to educate
members of the public about what police can or cannot do, and to obtain people's views of policing in their area. But, it is usually argued that the PCCs are unsuccessful, and are proving to have limited practical value.

Morgan argues that within the existing constitutional framework a partnership is unlikely to develop unless we are aware of the following points. First is the fact that many police authorities and members seem not to take their duties seriously. Another point is the paucity of hard organisational and operational data provided to police authorities by Chief Constables and the confusion and ignorance of consultative committee members (1987a: 41). Morgan goes on to say, about committee members, that:

First, they do not represent a community, however that term is defined: sub-divisions seldom coincide with self-identifying physical neighbourhoods or communities; they cut across them or span many. Second, with their limited memberships, the committees do not normally pretend to represent either the many 'interest communities' or neighbourhoods... Third, committees seldom stress, even symbolically, political accountability: not only are they based on police administrative rather than local government areas, but their members are not directly elected (1987a: 42).

What Morgan argues is that the members of PCCs become an unsuccessful and passive audience in discussions concerning policing policies. The majority of members have no basis from which to challenge the police, and experienced PCC members tend to become more pro-police, more sympathetic to the problems of the police, and more supportive of police claims for more resources. We must add that since Morgan's argument in 1987, there has not been a notable change in the position of PCCs.

Strata (1990), who observed meetings of two particular consultation committees, also concludes that there is a lack of consultation and a need for a radical change in power relations between the police and the community they consult. According to Strata, there is '... an uncritical acceptance in the main of the
police viewpoint that was reasserted if a particular member appeared to criticise' (1990: 529). Further, Strata states that:

Lay member contributions showed that their experience as consumers of policing was limited and dependent on the accounts of senior police officers on the committee. This inevitably affected their independence and their ability to evaluate objectively (1990: 545).

Loveday argues that ensuring effective local accountability of the police cannot be provided by continued reliance on local consultative arrangements. He suggests alternatives to the PCCs that could provide more effective platforms for local opinion than PCCs. One alternative might be the creation of elected Community Safety Committees at District Council level which should have a remit to consult police in the provision of local crime prevention programmes. Another one could be the utilisation of existing parish councils (1994a: 20).

Despite all these criticisms it could be argued that PCCs are necessary and have a considerable role and duty to fulfil. Generally, community consultation has been improved in England & Wales, especially compared with Turkey, but still there are demands for greater consultation and accountability through consultation. The Sheehy Report (1993: 4) recommended increasing consultation with local people, but it is still not clear whether or not all police forces in England & Wales are going to follow these recommendations. Some police officials argue that public consultation in their areas is well enough, and therefore, the Sheehy Report has no significance in this sense. As MacKenzie argues, the Sheehy Inquiry had the opportunity to take the service forward with a modern management structure, accountable at basic command level (1992: 18), but since its Report in 1993, there has been no agreement on following its recommendations.

In comparison, the Turkish police are not encouraged and are not subject to any law which requires them to establish a system of community consultation,
and there are no legal consultative bodies. There is a little encouragement from internal regulations, but this is only for improving community relations. According to a circular of the General Directorate, dated 17.6.1985, all police stations are requested to meet, at least once a month, those members of the community who wish to come to the station, to discuss policing matters in their areas, to hear complaints against the police and to listen to community ideas on policing issues. These meetings which are a type of community consultation meeting, are called 'peace' (Huzur) meetings. A former Director-General of the Turkish Police, Beduk, explained in 1985 when the meetings were first initiated, that the aim of these meetings was to establish co-ordination between the police and the public. Also, it was aimed to establish a channel for people to express their ideas about general policing issues in order to help the police. As a result of this effort, most local police stations began to arrange public meetings, but it would be true to say that it is still not enough and does not work efficiently. The police either do not listen to people properly or they do not care about what they say. However, such an effort can be a channel towards a real police community consultation procedure.

In conclusion, for accountability to the community and accountability through consultation, the police and public need to be close to each other. If police-public co-operation is essential, it would be right to suggest that further amalgamation of police forces, and reduction in the number of elected members of Police Authorities in England & Wales proposed in the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 are likely to prove to be counter-productive reforms as they reduce the extent of public involvement in policing. The police should not be alienated from public if they are to be accountable to the community. The police should be accountable to the community and use their discretionary power impartially, although it is not always possible. Many problems in terms of police
legitimacy, discretion and accountability in both England & Wales and Turkey are related to the lack of co-operation between the police and public.

Police legitimacy through consensus is also related to community involvement in organisational and operational policy and decision making structures. Bradley et al argue that without community involvement 'policy legitimation' and police effectiveness become a problem (1986: 85). When social groups and classes find ground for involvement in policing through expressing their views, this means that there is a consensus between the police and public. This provides a legitimation of the police role and practices, which means that policing is carried out by consent. In England & Wales there is, at least to some extent, police-public involvement and public consensus which results in legitimate policing, whilst in Turkey people have no share in police duties, or any involvement with the police.

The issue of legitimacy based on consensus is a fundamental concern, particularly for police accountability and accountability through consultation. Many police practices and actions need a high degree of public support to be successful. If there is no support from the community, police practices are not accepted as legitimate and they are most likely to be coercive actions. Policing in free societies can only be properly undertaken by consent and in consultation with that society in all its agencies. This means that the police service relies on public co-operation. Policing without public support denies policing by consent and in the long-term renders policing an impossible task. One of the very keystones of legitimate and accountable policing will be put at risk, if the police lose the support of the public. The causal connection between the policing system and different forms of legitimacy, policing practice and organisation will be considered further in the conclusion.
CONCLUSION

Legitimacy has been an important issue in the study of organisation in general and is no less essential when considering police organisation. Organisations usually seek to legitimise their own existence and functioning, and to ratify their own power structure. Legitimation must be based upon the consensus of superior or subordinate members of an organisation. The policing system, as an institution of social control, is under unique pressure to appear to be legitimate, and the strength of a police organisation depends on its legitimacy through consensus. Police power requires both internal and external legitimation, and this is usually referred to as 'policing by consent'. However, consensus is not necessarily the only basis of legitimacy in any state. In authoritarian states, or a state in which a limited democracy exists, for example, legitimacy is not based on consensus, but rather on coercion or forced consensus, although effective policing requires a certain level of consensus in any system.

It must be noted that the concepts of legitimacy and the legality of state authority are not the same. The structural aspects of social order generally bear the broadest value consensus. Legality is an attribute of sovereignty and confers no state authority upon the actions of those who conduct the offices of the state, state authority and the law. Legitimacy, on the other hand, reflects the existence of
consensus which gives the state authority and power, not by virtue of legality, but through the respect which people pay to social and political institutions such as the police. Legitimacy is earned by the ability of those who conduct the authority of the state to represent and reflect a broad value consensus and it cannot be claimed or granted by mere technicalities of law. Legitimacy must be granted by the success of state institutions in meeting expectations and demands, in mediating interests and aiding the process by which the values of individuals and groups of people are allocated in, for example, law and order. In short, legitimacy refers to consensus and the practice in reality, while legality refers to the technical consistency of the law and prescribed practice. Therefore, even if the law loses legitimacy, it can still retain legality.

This thesis proposes that policing systems in England & Wales and Turkey operate within different forms of legitimacy in reality, while appearing to be the same. It argues that for England & Wales the basis of legitimate authority is legal-rational and for Turkey it is traditional, and the form of policing practice in England & Wales is essentially on the basis of value consensus whilst in Turkey it is on the basis of coercion. The effect of these different forms of legitimacy and policing forms give rise to a relatively decentralised police organisation in England & Wales, despite the increasing trend towards centralisation, and a highly centralised one in Turkey, although there is evidence of a trend towards decentralisation. This conclusion considers this causal connection between the legitimacy of policing systems, the forms of policing practice and differentiation in the forms of organisation between England & Wales and Turkey.

Initially, this thesis has suggested that the formation and development of policing is related closely to the socio-economic and political context. The development of the 'modern' police, for example, was a response to changes in the socio-economic and political context as a whole and to social crises in particular.
The motive for establishing the 'modern' police was the development of capitalism and the maintenance of order required by the capitalist or the ruling classes of the capitalist state in order to secure their positions and property from the opposing classes or 'underclass', although the traditional police historians would argue that the reason was primarily the inefficiency of the 'old' police in fighting crime. In other words, the police were established as the instrument of the ruling classes and thereby, the state. In this sense too policing is affected by the nature of state and state-society relations. If policing is governed by the political and economic structure of the state it is also influenced by its inherent weaknesses and limitations.

Socio-economic and political change effects historical and contemporary police organisational change. Public disorders and political problems usually lead to changes in police organisation towards more specialisation, coercion and centralisation. It is one of the suggestions of this thesis that socio-economic and political contexts lead to different processes of change, creating a tendency towards a relatively decentralised and consensual policing system in England & Wales, and a highly centralised and coercive system in Turkey.

According to Bayley's (1982) categorisation of policing models, that in liberal-democratic England & Wales is Anglo-Saxon, although the police here sometimes perform both authoritarian and oriental policing functions. On one hand, they are repressive and threaten the private lives of people, but on the other hand, they have developed a community policing similar to the oriental policing methods to improve police-public relations. The Turkish police, on the other hand, can be put into the category of authoritarian police. But Turkey is a developing country attempting to establish a more democratic regime and therefore also contains some elements of the Anglo-Saxon and oriental policing models. Brewer et al (1988), however, severely criticise Bayley by arguing that
none of his models can alone be applied to any system. They suggest, alternatively, that one should rather focus on state strategies for policing, which may be taken as accommodation, suppression and criminalisation. As to their classification of state strategies against disorder, it might be argued that the police in England & Wales generally follow the strategy of accommodation, although sometimes using those of suppression and criminalisation or a combination of all three. 'Accommodation' is a strategy which meets the grievances of those groups from which disorder emanates (Brewer et al 1988: 233). The Turkish police, however, primarily use the strategy of suppression to maintain order at least in some parts of the country where terrorism and public order incidents are common. In other parts of the country suppression is combined with accommodation and criminalisation.

It would probably be better to consider the Turkish policing system as being 'repressive', a model of policing mentioned by Alderson (1979), or as 'coercive' or even 'authoritarian', since it is highly centralised and alienated from the community. Although the political system in Turkey has developed towards more democratisation during the post-War period, the policing system has not changed in line with it. As democratisation and politicisation of the society has increased, the police organisation has also been politicised, but has worked to tackle political activities against the established political power with coercive methods, rather than democratic methods. In other words, the 'coercive' and 'authoritarian' policing established to protect the systematically established regime when the state was founded in 1923, still exists in contemporary Turkey.

Further, this thesis questions whether or not the policing system in Turkey can be considered as one 'policing in a divided society', a distinct form of policing mentioned by Brewer (1991). Divided societies are '... those where there is endemic and deep social conflict which adheres around rigid cleavages, such as
religion, ethnicity, race or national origins' (Brewer 1991: 179). The whole of Turkey does not consist of a deeply divided society to the extent of Northern Ireland or the former apartheid South Africa, but because there has always been a political instability caused by ethnic and religious problems, the Turkish police display most of the characteristics of such societies. For example, there is no accountability to the community, but a polarisation of attitudes towards the police, and the police are highly co-operative with the military forces especially in the struggle against terrorism and separatism. These features of the Turkish policing system also characterise the form of their legitimacy, namely legitimacy through coercion.

This thesis considers consensus and coercion as two extremes of legitimate policing forms in England & Wales and Turkey. However, as indicated in Chapter 3 when referring to Held (1987; 1989) and Beetham (1991), political authority within particular societies cannot be characterised as being simply either coercive or consensual. Coercion and consent are not mutually exclusive categories in this sense, as both being grounds for the legitimacy of political authority are likely to be present in any one historical period and in any one society. In addition to coercion and 'pure' forms of consent, there are other forms of consent, variably grounded in degrees of coercion or 'other' rationalities, one of which (importantly for this thesis) is 'traditional'. According to Weber's theory of legitimacy, the validity of legitimacy is based on consent or voluntary obedience, but since legitimacy may exist to support a system of domination, coercion may also be used to maintain order in the short term or even legitimated after the event. Legitimacy does not have to be consensual or even universal and subjects of a system do not have to believe in the ideas that justify it. Legitimacy can be imposed upon a society according to the view of a minority rather than majority, with acceptance emerging only after coercive domination (Weber 1968: 37).
Policing is itself coercive, and the police organisation is a coercive instrument of the state. Police organisation reflects an inherent contradiction within a system of democracy, having the capacity to undermine democratic rights and privileges through the use of non-negotiable coercive force.

The debate over the concept of legitimacy is complex because legal experts, political philosophers and social scientists all perceive legitimacy from different viewpoints. As a result of this, there are a number of elements or measures of legitimacy such as legal validity, justifiability of rules, belief in legitimacy and consent to power. This also means that the understanding of legitimacy rests upon differential theoretical perspectives. Beetham considers this as '... a separation that has been progressively reinforced through the twentieth century by the demands of the academic division of labour' (1991: 243).

The complex debate is particularly concerned with the relationship between the concepts of acceptance of coercion, whether that exercise of (potential) coercion is legitimate and also its intricate connection with consensus. In Weber's theory, consent to a political order contains an element of the voluntary however great the coercion exercised. Weber states that '... even the most drastic means of coercion and punishment are bound to fail when the subjects remain recalcitrant' (1968: 334).

In elaborating an understanding of the dimensions of consensus in coercion, Held (1987) introduces the notion of acceptance variably grounded in degrees of coercion or other rationalities within liberal democratic states such as coercion, or following orders, and tradition, apathy, pragmatic acquiescence, instrumental acceptance, normative agreement and ideal normative agreement. These are all different grounds on which political institutions can be accepted in liberal democratic states. All of these may exist in any society, depending on the
type of political authority, but one may be dominant. As Al Brow argues, the belief in legitimacy is a major factor in enhancing the stability of an order, but individuals may also be oriented towards it in terms of expediency either from fear for the consequences if they do not accept it, or from the advantages they perceive if they conform. He states that '... for much of the time people adhered to an order simply because they were accustomed to do so and could see no good reason for doing anything else' (1990: 163).

In short, it is important to clarify for an understanding of this thesis that the exercise of (potential) coercion must be within legitimate boundaries, those boundaries varying between 'legal-rational' and 'traditional'. Further, coercion is not automatically legitimate, although it may be legitimated 'after the event' or even, as indicated by Weber and mentioned earlier, be imposed upon a society according to the view of a minority rather than majority (Weber 1968: 37). Generally, however, coercion, even if suggested by processes of propaganda, can only be effective in the short term.

As already mentioned, like almost all liberal democratic societies, in England & Wales there is, at least to a greater extent, the practice of 'policing by consent' whilst the Turkish policing style is primarily 'policing by coercion' within traditional authority. By policing by 'coercion' I mean policing without 'voluntary' consent or in Weber's terms, as suggested in Chapter 3 of this thesis, 'value consensus', and with the hostility of the community or even policing based on extreme forced consensus. Coercive policing usually exists to serve a totalitarian state, or at least a state or government which lacks public support. Turkey cannot be considered to be simply a totalitarian state because it is established as a parliamentary liberal-democratic state based on Western laws, but since liberal-democracy does not exist in real terms and democratic institutions enjoy only a limited legitimacy, we cannot say that policing is exercised on the basis of value
consensus. The Turkish police, like the police in England & Wales, operate within a legal framework which is the basis of the state. The law connects the police with the state, and the Turkish state presents itself as governed by law. The police cannot be distinguished from the state from which it derives its authority. Whilst the state is governed by law, the laws about policing are too broad, and permit police to exercise coercive powers that a liberal-democratic state would not allow. This 'authoritarian' characteristic of the Turkish state and coercive policing are the main reasons for lack of consent to the political and administrative system of the state as a whole, and to policing in particular. In this situation, policing in Turkey is guaranteed by coercive powers and law and order is maintained by coercion.

A fully legitimate policing system is one that enjoys the value consensus of the public, but even a highly legitimate system does not necessarily have value consensus and it may sometimes practice coercion. The potential for coercion or force is always present in all states. Even a community police officer is part of a repressive and coercive system. Therefore, despite a relatively high level of policing by consensus, in England & Wales there is also use of coercion by the police. Coercive policing practices are perhaps even increasing through changes in the organisation and form of policing practice along with the use of technology and specialisation. Although there is, of course, exercise of 'actual' coercion, the increase in coercion would seem to be especially on the level of the 'potential for coercion'. The ultimate coercive form of policing is contemporarily encompassed with the form of 'paramilitary policing' which means '... the application of quasi-military training, equipment, philosophy and organisation to questions of policing' (Jefferson 1990: 16). Whilst the Turkish police have always employed 'paramilitary' policing tactics, in England & Wales investment and training in the use of the technology of paramilitary policing has grown during the past three decades. Therefore, 'paramilitarism' is becoming a characteristic of the police
organisation in contemporary England & Wales, reducing police legitimacy, consent and public consultation.

We are suggesting by this thesis that policing in both England & Wales and Turkey is legitimate, but the bases for their legitimate authorities differ from legal-rational to traditional, and this differentiation results in different forms of policing practice, namely primarily consensual and coercive. In England & Wales the policing form is essentially practised through law and order, local government accountability and, although at the same time being contested, consensus to a large extent, whilst the legitimacy of the Turkish police is based on a traditional form of legitimate authority in reality. The manifestation of police legitimacy in Turkey is the consent of people with the fear of sanction for non-consent, in other words, it is equal to an extreme 'forced consensus', but reinforced through 'traditional authority'.

The military involvement in politics in general and in policing in particular has been raised here as a problematic issue in terms of police legitimacy. Historically, the police and military forces, especially in the context of most political or industrial disorders, acted in parallel or in direct collaboration. This shows the close relationship between the military and the police, but does not mean that they had the same role and responsibility. Even after the establishment of professional police in England & Wales, for example, both the police and the military were under the authority of the Magistracy. The magistrates had the authority to call upon the military for putting down disorders, and had personal command of the military when they were actually involved in maintaining order. Until 1855 the sanction of a central state official was required for any internal military movement. Vogler explains this as '... a severe inhibition upon the use of the military as a conduit of state power' (1991: 84). After that time, requisition became mainly a local issue between the magistrates and the local military office.
However, by the time of the first World War, the military in England & Wales became a central state agency free from local control, developing a centralised organisational structure and having significant responsibility for national public order which visibly continued especially during the first half of this century.

Legally, military officials are servants of the state and are subject to a chain of governmental orders and command. In terms of public order, the police have the primary responsibility and they are not necessarily servants of government in all states. Police officials, in England & Wales, for example, are not supposed to be subject to governmental order regarding the operational use of the police (Whelan 1985a: 125). Currently, in almost all states including Turkey and England & Wales, at least to some extent, the police do act as servants of government, and take orders from governmental individuals or organisations. As Vogler states, '... it is demonstrably true that both the police and the military have now broken free from any remaining control by the local state and magistrates', but we need to be '... wary of overemphasising the power of the military at expense of the police' (1991: 92).

The 'modern' police were established to replace the military as the force responsible for internal security. The reason why both the military and the police exist in contemporary times, however, is that there are fundamental functional and organisational differences between the two. Broadly, the military is responsible for defending the state against external threats whilst the police are responsible for internal security and the maintenance of order. But because both are intended to maintain state authority, they are both 'distinct' and 'related', although the military is usually the dominant force. Despite many differences, especially in terms of internal structure and the way they function, the police and the military are similar. As Bittner points out, '... both institutions are instruments of force and for both institutions the occasions for using force are unpredictably distributed' (1975:
Perhaps because of this close relationship between the two, the military in England & Wales and Turkey become involved in policing matters in times of emergency, although what constitutes an emergency is not easily defined. The involvement of the police in military matters, on the other hand, is unusual.

In terms of legitimacy and coercion, however, the role of the military in policing in Turkey is unique. The main problem concerning the legitimacy of policing in Turkey is that the military not only intervene in policing to aid police in emergency cases, but also frequently take over the control of political power by military coup. The main reason for such a limited democracy or military-style policing practice and the subsequent poor human rights record in Turkey is that the military is too deeply involved in politics, Turkish social life, as well as policing. One part of the police, namely the gendarmerie, is actually a part of the military responsible for policing the rural areas.

It is argued here that the effect of different policing systems being based on different forms of legitimacy, and different forms of policing practices, gives rise to a differentiation in police organisational structure, namely from primarily decentralised in England & Wales to primarily centralised in Turkey. Unlike the dissimilarity in the use of coercion, however, these two countries are becoming similar in terms of organisational structure. There is a tendency towards centralisation from a relatively decentralised system in England & Wales as the role and powers of central government over the police increases, whilst in Turkey there is evidence of a trend towards decentralisation from a highly centralised system, as the central government transfers more powers and responsibilities to the provincial organisations of the national police force, and establishes some regional organisations. If we are assume that the policing system in England & Wales will continue to resist centralisation, developing a more centralised
organisation only gradually and maintaining the community policing strategies currently employed, then it would exemplify a strategy that Turkey may follow.

The Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994, for example, increased the level of centralisation in England & Wales by changing the status of Police Authorities in the existing tri-partite structure of the provincial police management. It fixed the number of the members of Police Authorities to create one type of Police Authority for all forces, consisting of 17 members, irrespective of their size, and reduced the number of elected members. This Act, therefore, decreased the role of local Police Authorities even more than the Police Act 1964 which set out the inter-relationship between Chief Constables, Police Authorities and the Home Secretary and defined their roles. After the new Act, the balance within the tri-partite relationship is still weighted heavily in favour of the Chief Constable and the Home Secretary. They both have responsibility and power, whilst the Police Authority has responsibility without power. This Act brings a clear shift of power over policing from local to central government, and this change was initially, it seems, entirely the product of government or the Home Office without consulting any other organisation. Strong opposition following the first proposals, has however served to 'water this down' slightly (Loveday, 1995).

The establishment of national organisations and co-ordination agencies such as the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) and the Mutual Aid Co-ordination Centre (MACC) are also clear evidence of change towards centralisation in England & Wales (King & Brearly, 1995). Further centralisation of policing in England & Wales is likely through amalgamations of police forces in the near future. Although there are no fixed plans, there have been some proposals for further amalgamations through the Home Secretary's Statement to Parliament (1993), the White Paper on the Police Reform (1993) and the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994. The result is probable that there will be fewer
and larger police forces in England & Wales in the near future. As argued earlier, further amalgamations proposed by this Act are likely to take place, but what would seem to be intended by this and other changes is not the creation of a completely national police force, but only to take another step towards centralisation.

Centralisation in England & Wales is usually defended on the grounds of police efficiency and effectiveness, although this is questioned here. There is a public, professional and academic antagonism against the trend towards centralisation that has its roots in British democratic history. This rejection is even stronger against nationalisation.

The concepts of centralisation and decentralisation are misleading and the debate over the change towards centralisation and decentralisation of policing in England & Wales is even more complex. We could, and indeed do, argue that neither the trend increasingly towards centralisation nor that towards decentralisation is exclusive. Both processes are occurring at the same time in England & Wales and Turkey. In England & Wales, however, I suggest that the trend of centralisation is dominant, whilst in Turkey that of decentralisation is dominant. For example, in England & Wales we have witnessed the introduction of county or city council-run municipal police forces, the establishment of Basic (Local) Command Units (BCU), and the 'desegregation' of police functions (Loveday 1993a; 1994a; Johnston 1993; 1994b; 1994c). However, it is questionable whether this constitutes decentralisation in reality because of the extent of control still exercised by the centre.

As a new initiative, 'municipal-style' forces are being introduced and even operational in some towns. In terms of efficiency and effectiveness, management of police personnel and resources, public accountability and public protection,
there are considerable reasons for the establishment of these forces. The Guardian, for example, reported that councils see that the police are 'overworked and understaffed, and are prepared to fund and operate their own forces' (16 April 1994). As the first council-run police force in England & Wales, Sedgefield District Council in Durham introduced a force called 'Community Force' and the London Borough of Wandsworth quickly followed suit. Brian Stephens, the Labour leader of Sedgefield Council, argued that crime and the apparent inability of the police to curb lawlessness was an over-riding concern of local people and therefore, the council had decided to act towards establishing such a council-funded police force. John Reed, the head of the Community Force, argued when indicating the principles of the force that they were accountable to local people through the Council and that they were not in this for profit, like a private firm. He states: 'We are somewhere between a security service and the police. We are a crime-prevention force. The police investigate crime .... But if we come across criminal behaviour we report it' (The Guardian 16 April 1994).

It would seem from this statement, that the council-run police forces being introduced in towns and cities of England & Wales are not for profit, but funded and directed by councils, and therefore they are not general or private but 'special public' or 'hybrid' police. According to Loveday the diversion of some police functions to the municipal police or any other alternative special forces would make policing more effective and efficient and the increasingly fragmented provision of protective service might be better delivered by municipal police services at local authority level. He states that '... municipally-led and publicly accountable police services might also be an attractive alternative to unregulated and unaccountable private sector provision encouraged by central government' (1994a: 19).
Also, the value of decentralised or local policing has been recognised by the Government in England & Wales in its commitment to the Basic (Local) Command Units (BCU) in most forces. The size of the BCUs depends on whether the function of the unit is public order oriented or concerned with community style policing. Police effectiveness is expected to increase with the introduction of the BCUs. However, the introduction of the BCUs has a weakness. As Loveday states '... the boundaries of these Units are not planned to be coterminous with those of local authorities. This is a major weakness of the current BCU strategy because the most effective crime preventative measures involve inter-agency links' (1994c: 30). The BCU is also seen as a means of substantially reducing the number of existing police forces in England & Wales. In other words, amalgamations or centralisation through amalgamations are seen as part of BCU reform.

The issue of 'task review' or the 'desegregation' of police functions is, as mentioned, another factor in the decentralisation of policing in England & Wales. This amounts, in Johnston's (1993; 1994b; 1994c) words, to 'sectoral' restructuring of policing service. In order to make the police in England & Wales more efficient in terms of personnel allocation and police functions, there was a proposal in 1993 to replace some regular police officers with other individuals and agencies, and to review police core and ancillary functions. Before this proposal, many argued that general and routine police work had to be categorised within core services to provide a framework within which standards of services can be defined (Butler 1992: 34). Core services may be considered as those which enable the police to deliver their main aims and objectives and which need to be discharged by the police. They include three categories: responding to calls for assistance and advice, the investigation of crime, and public services such as handling lost and found property (Butler 1992: 34; Loveday 1994d: 38-9).
Consequently, the Audit Commission (1993) recommended that a classification and review of police roles and priorities was needed, whilst the White Paper (1993) stated that only 40 per cent of police time is spent on main policing duties and therefore, a review of police functions is required. Following these reports, the Home Secretary decided to review police core and ancillary tasks and to examine the services provided by the police. For this purpose the Home Office set up a team to carry out the review.

Following the review, the Home Office proposed a transfer of some ancillary tasks from the police to other agencies such as civilian or private police agencies, and the Special Constabulary, because these tasks were taking valuable time that might be better used to combat crime and release more officers for main duties. The review was also supposed to work with the service to identify the important core functions of the police and how those functions could be carried out more effectively. The proposal for review aimed to relieve the police service of peripheral tasks that do not require either their powers or their skills so that they can concentrate their energy on the vital tasks of policing that really matter to the public. The Report on Core and Ancillary Tasks identified eight tasks that could be transferred to outsiders, namely missing persons, community and safety education, stray dogs, found property, noise pollution, response to automatic alarms, policing public events, and administration of licensing for explosives, gaming, betting and liquor (Police November 1994; Johnston 1994c: 3). As Johnston points out, the response of the public police to this change has been 'defensive' (1994c: 6). He goes on to state that '... one fear is that commercial, municipal and popular provision of street-level "social service" function will reduce the police to a reactive public order force, thereby undermining their legitimacy' (1994c: 6). The Police Federation, for example, opposed such a review of police functions. According to the Federation, the review of core functions
means 'stealing' from the police service and it would not improve either the efficiency or the effectiveness of the police (Police April 1994: 8). In response to the Home Office proposal for a review of core and ancillary police tasks, the Police Federation expressed the view that other agencies such as civilians, private police or volunteer specials cannot replace the regular public police (Police April 1994; The Guardian 19 April 1994).

These changes clearly show that in England & Wales the processes of centralisation and decentralisation are concurrent. However, I would argue, as already stressed, that the dominant trend of change in policing in England & Wales is centralisation. The changes outlined above may not only evidence processes of centralisation and decentralisation, but could also constitute a more complex 'fragmentation' within 'post-modern' society. Apart from decentralised and flexible policing, depoliticisation of the police, the creation of different agencies involving in policing, arrangements for police management and transferral of some policing tasks to market forces, may all be characteristics of policing in 'post-modern' societies or 'late modern' societies (Reiner 1992a; 1994b; Johnston 1994c).

Conversely, in Turkey, although there is evidence of decentralisation, it is likely to take a long time to see a completely decentralised policing system in the near future. The two major national organisations in charge of policing, namely the police and the gendarmerie, are constitutionally part of the executive, with a centralised and coercive image. The official policy in Turkey is based on the fear that decentralising the police would result in demands for autonomy or separatism in some regions of the country. It is the suggestion here that decentralising policing, as well as many other public services in any parts of the country, does not present a serious threat to the central authority but on the contrary, would help to increase police consensual legitimacy and accountability to the community.
A fully decentralised policing system in Turkey would take a long time in any event owing to almost all other public services being centralised. There are, as mentioned earlier, proposals to change the local policing procedures by reducing the number of local police stations, establishing a new police force, namely the judicial police, and to either abolish the gendarmerie organisation or replace it with another civil police force such as the 'village police'. As already mentioned, however, the processes of decentralisation and centralisation are occurring at the same time in Turkey. Although the trend of decentralisation is dominant, policing is also being even more centralised in terms of control over the police.

Another trend for change in policing in England & Wales and Turkey is that of Europeanisation. The police in both England & Wales and Turkey are increasingly involved with other police forces, however, the former are in closer co-operation with Europe and 'Europol' than the latter due to Britain's membership of the EU. Turkey, on the other hand, wishes to join the EU. For this purpose, the government tries to transform the police into a system which is more democratic, based on value consensus and respectful to human and civil rights. But the distance between the two systems must be acknowledged and Turkey still has a long way to go before it comes in line with Western European countries.

We referred earlier to the argument that the age of 'modernity' is over and we are now members of a 'post-modern' world, and consequently there is a similar process of change occurring in police organisation. The police organisation, as a professional organisation for handling the policing function of control with the state monopoly of legitimate force, was a paradigm of the 'modern'. It has been suggested, however, that police organisations in a post-modern era would be more flexible and transparent, transferring some auxiliary services to other organisations. As Reiner points out, the deeper social changes of postmodernism are transforming the role of the police organisation within the whole policing
process (1992a: 779). Reiner argues that the downwards desegregation of policy making is already the main aspect of leading reforms such as sector policing introduced in some areas of London. However, in England & Wales, for example, there is still a trend towards more centralisation, and centralisation is not a post-modern form of organisation entailing more flexibility, but rather a 'modern' bureaucratic and hierarchical form of organisation. Decentralised police organisation, on the other hand, encourages more flexibility because it allows the involvement of more members of an organisation and the community in decision and policy-making procedures. Decentralisation is more likely to allow sufficient development of responsibility by divisions and provincial forces to permit operational commanders at these levels to respond flexibly and effectively to local needs and priorities. Such a flexible police service would also be related to greater community consultation and participation, set in the context of the need for greater police accountability. In a less developed or developing country like Turkey, however, the policing system has not even reached the level of 'modern' let alone the stage of being able to go beyond it. By modern police organisation, I mean, in this context, an organisation which is democratic, consensual and respectful to the political, civil and human rights. In other words, if the Turkish police are to be 'post-modern', they should, first of all, be 'modern'.

A democratic and consensual policing practice requires accountability to the community. Despite some weaknesses, the police in England & Wales are more accountable to the community than the Turkish police which are accountable to the law and the internal bureaucratic control structure. However, accountability means more than simply being answerable to the law through the courts and should entail being responsible and responsive to properly elected representatives of the local community.
Policing in democratic societies can only in the long term be by consent and in consultation with other institutions in that society. If policing is not by consent and without the support of the majority of the public, democracy itself is threatened and problems concerning the legitimacy and accountability of the police organisation will become an inherent and perhaps insoluble dilemma.
APPENDIX I

Letters to and from police forces, representative organisations and the Home Office
APPENDIX I/A

Circular letter dated 6 December 1993 and replies from Wiltshire, Warwickshire and Humberside Police and ACPO
Dear Sir / madam,

I am a Turkish police officer, and currently PhD student at the University of Leicester, Centre for the Study of Public Order. My topic for PhD is 'A Comparative Study of Police Organisation and Legitimacy in England & Wales and Turkey: the case for centralisation and decentralisation'.

I would be obliged if you could please provide me with your comments and any relevant material concerning the possibility of future amalgamations of police forces in England & Wales.

Thank you very much for your help.

Yours sincerely,

Ahmet H. AYDIN
PhD Student
University of Leicester
Centre for the Study of Public Order
6, Salisbury Rd.,
Leicester, Le1 7QR
Dear Mr Aydin,

Force Amalgamations

I respond as follows to your letter dated 6th December, 1993, concerning the subject of force amalgamations.

The main argument in favour of larger forces centres on perceived economies of scale, achieved through the need for fewer headquarters, less duplication of support and specialist resources, and savings resulting from the bulk purchase of uniforms and equipment etc. This argument is, however, weakened rather than reinforced by the available evidence. Using figures contained in the CIPFA Police Estimates for 1992/93 it is calculated that of the 31 English non-Metropolitan forces the average net expenditure per police officer is £40,613 for the 12 forces with establishments over 2,000 and £40,409 for the 19 forces with establishments under 2,000 (Wiltshire net expenditure per officer is shown as £38,649).

If we consider policing costs from a different angle - cost per 1,000 population - we get a similar picture. Forces under 2,000 cost £54,000 per 1,000 population. This figure increases with the size of forces to £199,000 for the Metropolitan Police.

The case for the creation of larger forces is also not advanced by reference to performance - indeed there is a strong evidence that smaller forces are producing a quality of service which is at least as good, and often better, than the larger ones. Based on the 31 English non-Metropolitan forces the ‘clear-up’ rate for the smaller forces is 33.7% against 29.2% for the larger forces. The Wiltshire ‘clear-up’ rate for 1991 was 40.4%.

An argument often articulated by those advocating regionalisation or nationalisation of the police in this country concerns the need for the service to respond, not only to local policing problems but also to national and international matters of terrorism and criminality. This problem has long been recognised by the service and effectively addressed by the creation of specialist units and squads which by their constitution supersede county and national boundaries e.g. Regional Crime Squad, National Crime Intelligence Units, Training, the Forensic Science Service and many others.
Wiltshire contributes to and actively supports these units and squads at all levels in terms of finance and personnel. That means in the case of Regional Crime Squads, Wiltshire Detectives working alongside their colleagues from neighbouring forces in dealing with major crime and travelling criminals.

Finally, in the commercial world, the philosophy that 'bigger must be better' no longer seems to be the accepted wisdom. In the early 1980's mergers and takeovers of companies were frequent occurrences. This trend appears, however, to have virtually ceased and in some cases actually been reversed with a move towards de-mergers in groups such as ICI. Similarly the Government trend is to de-nationalise rather than the reverse.

I hope the above observations are of some value.

Yours sincerely,

E C Gurd
Chief Inspector

Mr A H Aydin
University of Leicester
Centre for the Study of Public Order
6 Salisbury Road
LEICESTER
LE1 7QR
Dear Mr Aydin

I write in reply to your letter of 6th December 1993 in which you seek my views on the question of future amalgamation of smaller forces.

I regret that I really don't have time to answer in depth all correspondence that I receive from Under-Graduates and Post-Graduates on policing matters. I do forward however for your information, which might be of use to you in your research, a copy of a paper put together by the Chief Constable of Dyfed-Powys who makes the case for small Forces.

May I say that I concur with both the opinions and sentiments expressed in the paper. I believe most strongly that Police Forces should be locally based and answerable to the public they serve. This is far easier in a Force the size of Warwickshire than it is in one much larger. As you will see from the attached report, on most grounds it is the smaller Forces that are more productive and my experience over the years has been that it is the smaller Forces, perhaps by necessity, that have been responsible for the most productive innovations.

Yours sincerely

[Signature]

Peter D. Joslin
Chief Constable
Dear Ahmet

Thank you for your letter of 6 December 1993. I apologise for not replying more promptly. I am delighted to comment on possible future amalgamations of police forces in England and Wales, though I must stress that the views are my own and not necessarily those of the chief officers of the Humberside Police Force.

There seems little doubt that the current Government will amalgamate smaller forces, probably after they have removed the obligation under the Police Act of 1964 to hold a public enquiry into each amalgamation. For a Government such as the present one public enquiries can cause irritating delays and questioning of rationale.

At first glance it seems difficult to argue against further amalgamations. The Government seek efficiency and effectiveness and the Audit Commission have already stated this is best provided by Basic Command Units of a certain minimal size. Some present forces would struggle to provide such B.C.U’s and are therefore, seen as being inordinately top heavy with officer ranks. A Force of 800/900 officers could be merged into a larger, existing Force of 2/3,000 officers with relative ease and an enormous saving in managerial overheads. More officers would be back on the beat in uniform because C.I.D., Traffic and other specialised units could be rationalised and duplication eradicated.

It is a compelling argument for a Government faced with a large public sector budget deficit. However, it does have a downside because it seems to come as part of a more far reaching package.

If, for example, Cumbria and Lancashire were to be amalgamated then residents of Cumbria may feel they would be losing out if the title of the Force did not mention Cumbria, they may feel aggrieved if the Headquarters of the amalgamated Force remained within Lancashire at Preston. Their arguments and objections would probably be written off as parochial and savings, plus the possibility of greater efficiency and effectiveness would probably justify that stance. Policing would still be delivered locally by basic command units aware of the needs and desires of their local communities.
However, the sinister side of amalgamations comes in when it is considered as part of a package with the change in composition of police authorities. The current plan is to create police authorities, only half of whose members will be elected, headed by a chairperson appointed by the Home Secretary. There is the distinct possibility of Government influence. Indeed, a Government committed to efficiency and effectiveness will no doubt set targets for Forces to achieve and prioritise workload. This is fine, providing Government priorities meet local priorities but it is impossible to believe that this will happen all the time.

The Police Act of 1964 created the Tri-Partitive Structure of Police Control, ie Home Office, Local Authorities and Chief Constables. The Government can now be seen to be cutting out the middleman and, therefore, cutting out local influence. Amalgamations also give communities a sense of loss of influence.

David Pead and Brian Hilliard state:

"... it will also provide the basis for a government-influenced service which could impose the will of a political party. We may not like the comparison, but that is the format used today by South American states ... a format that put Hitler in power and kept him there. It is a plan for a police state."

(Police Review 14 May 1993 p.17)

I hope my comments are of assistance to you.

Yours sincerely

T J SI
CHIEF INSPECTOR

Mr Ahmet H Aydin
University of Leicester
Centre of the Study of Public Order
6 Salisbury Road
LEICESTER
LE1 7QR
17th January 1994

Ahmet H. Aydin
University of Leicester
Centre for the Study of Public Order
6 Salisbury Road
Leicester
LE1 7QR

Dear Mr. Aydin,

I am writing in response to your letter of the 6th December, 1993, asking for some views about the issue of amalgamations.

I enclose a copy of the response of the Association of Chief Police Officers to the White Paper Reforms which I think encapsulates most of the issues on amalgamations and reform.

I think it is quite difficult to consider the issue of amalgamations in isolation to the wider issue of the reform of the Service and in particular that of the issue of local accountability. You will see that the Association of Chief Police Officers is not, in principle, opposed to the idea of amalgamations but would like each amalgamation to be carefully considered on the evidence. However, it is very clear from the Police and Magistrates Courts Bill, which is now before the House of Commons, that the Bill, should it be passed into law as an Act, will create a National Police Force in the United Kingdom. Instead of the current system whereby there are county Police Forces each with their own Police Authorities which are linked to Local Government, there will now be a series of Police Areas which are Areas of a National Police Force which have a small Board, part of which and only part of which, will be drawn from locally elected Councillors. This is a fundamental shift in the structure of the UK Police Force, much more fundamental than any proposed amalgamations which, in comparison to this, seem almost to be irrelevant. For, if you have a national structure divide into areas it really makes very little difference what size the areas are or how they are distributed other than solely in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. The proposed reforms represent a fundamental shift in British policing from locally based framework influenced centrally to a centrally based framework influenced locally.
I trust these points will be of assistance to you.

Yours sincerely

[Signature]

P.W. Neyroud
Superintendent
Staff Officer

Enc.
ASSOCIATION OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS OF ENGLAND, WALES AND NORTHERN IRELAND

AMALGAMATION OF POLICE FORCES

1. We have considered carefully the case for a programme of amalgamations of police forces in England and Wales. We do not set our face against the concept of amalgamations, but we believe it is vital that no proposals for amalgamations - whether in general or specific terms - should be developed without the most careful consideration of a number of factors.

2. We are already on record as saying that a case for amalgamation cannot be made on the single criterion of physical size, or of numbers of police officers. Rather, judgements need to be made, we believe, based on full and proper information relating to:

- Social and cultural factors - which bind communities of people
- Historical factors - which provide communities with a sense of identity
- Geographical factors - which affect ease of communications
- Value for money considerations - to demonstrate whether a higher level of service in terms of quality and efficiency can be provided, compared with what could be delivered with improvements in existing arrangements, including a wider use of collaborative arrangements
- Operational policing factors - which enable local command units easily to draw on necessary resources, whether manpower, training, communications, technical, scientific or specialist, in terms of day-to-day policing, intensive policing projects and major incidents
- Accessibility - of the Chief Constable and senior officers of the force to their officers and to the community they serve

3. Proposals for amalgamation which are examined fully against these factors may in the event be judged to be soundly based. In principle there should then be no argument against such amalgamations taking place. However, we can find little in the way of argument to support such amalgamations taking place now. We can identify many reasons which suggest strongly that any programme of mergers should be postponed for possibly at least five years:

- Cost factors - the very substantial start-up costs which would inevitably be involved would come at a time when public sector finance is already very severely constrained and with little improvement of that position in prospect.
Other Police Service changes already in train - two major inquiries, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice and the Sheehy Inquiry into police roles, responsibilities and rewards, are to report this year. Both are likely to have considerable implications for police management and practice: the Service is simply unlikely to be able to cope on top of that with managing the inevitable upheaval caused by force amalgamation.

Diversion from operational policing - police resources would undoubtedly have to be diverted to some extent away from operational policing and the development of major police initiatives like the quality of service programme - at a time when the Government is emphasising the importance throughout the public sector of delivering a quality service.

Changes in other agencies - changes are already in train in the boundaries of other organisations within the criminal justice system: changes now to police boundaries would aggravate an already confused situation.

Measure of police performance - as part of the improvement of service delivery the Home Secretary has only recently announced his measures to enable police performance to be monitored and measured: there is a strong case for saying that time should be allowed to enable an evaluation to be made of the information gathered, and an assessment of whether that pointed the way to the need for amalgamation in the interests of better efficiency.

Review of local government - the Banham Commission reports on the review of the local authorities in its first tranche this Summer, and the remainder will follow at intervals over the next five years: there can we believe be little sense in reorganising police force boundaries in advance of local government boundaries when the outcome in some areas could well be two changes of 'cap badge' for a police officer, and disruption of his line of communication with the community with which he has become identified.

In the light of these considerations we conclude that the case for embarking now on a programme of police force amalgamations is not made out. But we fully accept that the case for considering the principle of force amalgamations exists and must be addressed. The considerations we have set out at paragraph 2 are we believe essential to that exercise.

March 1993

255
APPENDIX I/B

Circular letter dated 4 April 1994 and replies from Avon and Somerset, Cumbria, Norfolk, Dorset, Hertfordshire, Essex, Bedfordshire, Gloucestershire and Gwent Police
Dear Sir/madam,

I am a Turkish police officer, and currently PhD student at the University of Leicester, Centre for the Study of Public Order. I would be obliged if you could please provide me with your comments and any relevant material concerning the possibility of future amalgamations of police forces in England & Wales?

Thank you very much for your help.

Yours sincerely

Ahmet H. AYDIN
PhD Student
University of Leicester
Centre for the Study of Public Order
6, Salisbury Rd.
Leicester, Le1 7QR
Dear Sir,

Thank you for your letter of the 4th April 1994, regarding your study for your PhD. I will outline below, in brief, a few arguments for and against the proposals for further amalgamations of some of the smaller police forces.

**Arguments for:**

- Home Office Studies on Force efficiency show/indicate correlations to size.
- Increased Force size enhances purchasing power with regards to to I.T. equipment, vehicles, clothing etc. etc.
- Enhanced logistics in moving human resource throughout Force area in deployment to demand, major incidents etc.
- More efficient service to customer, caused by more available resource, enhanced communications etc.

**Arguments Against:**

- Lack of local control.
- Reduction in service to customer caused by lack of local knowledge, ownership etc.
- Cost of amalgamation in terms of corporate identity etc.
- Reduction in morale of staff.

*Working with you - Working for you*

258
Your letter indicates an interest towards the argument for further amalgamations, so I will briefly conclude with some comments specifically in this area. The financial implications on Forces throughout the country at the present time is such that money is extremely tight to meet policing demands. Income generation and sponsorship are in their early days, however developments here may relieve some of the financial burden.

In essence, force amalgamations, albeit a short term expense are considered a long term financial saving and any such avenue will be considered to reduce the costs of policing, particularly if the quality of service to the customer will be improved by such change.

I trust that this will give you some thoughts for your thesis, for which I wish you well.

Inspector C Gould
Dear Mr Aydin

I write with reference to your letter of 4 April 1994 to the Chief Constable, requesting our views on the proposal for amalgamation of some small police forces in England and Wales.

You will be aware that the Home Secretary is currently considering the option of amalgamating certain police forces, although no firm decisions have yet been made. County boundaries are also being reviewed by the Banham Commission, and the findings of that Commission may also have some bearing on future developments. Until such time as any definite decisions are made, it is difficult to speculate on any specific implications for this force.

On a general note, there are obvious advantages to be gained from the amalgamation of police forces, but these are offset by certain disadvantages. Amalgamations would go some way towards standardising police practice and procedures, and the fact that equipment would be purchased in greater quantities would eventually result in cost savings. It could be argued that this would be a step towards a 'national police force' which would result in even greater standardisation of procedures, and would bring about greater savings as a result of bulk purchasing.

Conversely, it could be argued that amalgamations would ultimately result in a reduced service to the rural areas, such as many parts of Cumbria, with resources being deployed to address what may be considered more important issues in urban areas. At the moment, within this county, a number of police officers are still very much part of the local community, and are able to identify with local problems. Should amalgamations result in the re-deployment of these officers to other areas, these very important links with the community would be lost.
I hope that these comments will be of some value to you in relation to your thesis. I have enclosed an article from a recent edition of 'Police Review' magazine which may be of interest.

Yours sincerely

PC Davison
Research Department
Dear Ahmet

Thank you for your letter of 4 April concerning the current debate over Police Force amalgamations. The situation at present is that the Police and Magistrates' Courts Bill contains provisions which would hasten future amalgamations. There has been considerable opposition to many of the proposals in the Bill and fears have been expressed that local views could be ignored in a wish by Central Government to see fewer and larger Forces in England and Wales.

The Bill will shortly be considered in the House of Commons and it may be that the Clause which deals with amalgamations will be amended. Having said that, the Home Office have publicly stated that amalgamations are not on their immediate agenda. The power in the Bill is therefore seen as a reserve power for future use. This statement is not necessarily accepted by some local councillors who continue to suspect that there is a national wish to see Forces reduced to roughly the number you quote in your letter.

The last major round of amalgamations took place in 1968. At that time, for example, the remaining three separate Police Forces in the County of Norfolk were combined into one. I can speak from personal experience of the sensitivity this move caused and of the opposition in local political circles.

This association of Police Forces with local communities is the first powerful argument against larger and fewer Forces. It is not simply a matter of civic pride but a belief that locally based and accountable organisations are more responsible to the needs and views of that community. Larger organisations, based elsewhere, can be seen as remote and unresponsive.
Of fundamental importance, however, is the effect larger Forces might have on the constitutional position of the Police Service in this country. There has traditionally been a clear separation between the legislature, the judiciary and the police as enforcement agency. Parliament thus passes laws. It does not control the police, who enforce the law impartially. This is seen in a country with an unwritten constitution as a crucial safeguard for civil liberties.

There are other provisions in the Police and Magistrates' Courts Bill which have been heavily criticised because they would tend in the future towards closer central political control over policing. I am thinking here of the new arrangements for police authorities, the setting of national objectives and the placing of chief officers on contracts which could erode their operational independence.

Closer central political control over the police could ultimately affect the traditional protection of civil liberties. It might lead to a Ministry of the Interior, with a politician being able to directly influence the enforcement of the law. With larger Forces, such a process would be easier than with a more fragmented system. Amalgamations can thus be persuasively opposed because of concerns over civil liberties.

The arguments in favour of amalgamations are primarily economic. There are savings to be made from fewer Forces, in senior staffing and equipment procurement. Play is sometimes made of what are seen as different policies and practices in neighbouring forces and of the need to ensure standardisation. On the other hand, Forces do have mechanisms for co-operation and ensuring compatibility and I do not find this a compelling argument.

I do hope the above very short summary is of some use to your research. Our tradition is clearly different from other European countries. Having said that, our system clearly has the merit of local support and I have no doubt that any attempt to amalgamate the Norfolk Constabulary with any of its neighbours would meet considerable resistance.

Yours sincerely

Chief Superintendent
Operational Co-ordinator
Dear Mr Aydin

I refer to your letter dated 4 April 1994 seeking comments regarding possible amalgamations of some small Police Forces.

The enclosed document was prepared by my Research and Development Department in April 1993. The detailed statistics may have changed however the argument remains valid.

I hope this information will be of assistance and I wish you well with your thesis.

Yours sincerely

T K Clinch
Chief Inspector

Enc
BRIEFING NOTES ON DORSET POLICE CONCERNS REGARDING PROPOSALS THAT SMALLER FORCES BE AMALGAMATED

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 It is known that the Home Secretary is seriously considering a series of amalgamations and recent "authoritative leaks" suggest that the result might be a reduction from the present 43 Forces in England and Wales to around 20-25.

What is not so clear is the reasoning behind this review process however all the indications are that 'cost effectiveness' and 'value for money' continue to be the major considerations.

1.2 Media speculation suggests that proposals might revolve around a notion that many of the smaller police forces are not viable. It is said that an establishment of around 3000 is considered to be the benchmark.

No evidence has so far been produced to support this argument and indeed an examination of the police-related statistics produced by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) suggests that, against most measurement criteria, the smaller forces often perform rather better than their larger counterparts.

Where there may seem to be potential savings associated with the operation of larger forces these appear to be relatively small against overall costs and are likely to be absorbed many times over by the set up costs involved in amalgamation and integration. That costs would ultimately be reduced and/or efficiency improved within the larger organisations created cannot be guaranteed.

2. COMPARISON OF DATA - A NOTE OF CAUTION

2.1 A problem in examining statistics lies in confirming that one is comparing 'like with like'.

The London Metropolitan and City of London Forces must be viewed in isolation however it is appropriate to comment that their costs are significantly higher and efficiency arguably lower than elsewhere in the country.
2.2 On a 'like with like' basis it is also unreasonable to compare the six 'Metropolitan' areas (excluding London) with the remaining thirty-five 'Non-Metropolitan' or 'Provincial' forces. Nevertheless, given the nature of the review in progress, it should be observed that the costs of those larger organisations, which range in size from 3031 to 7077 police officers, are considerably higher than amongst the smaller forces.

2.3 The major part of the cost for any force is manpower. The 'Metropolitan' areas generally employing a greater number of police officers in relation to population numbers than the 'Non-Metropolitan' areas.

2.4 Even amongst Provincial forces the ratio of population to police officer varies quite dramatically between the best at 365 : 1 and the worst at 544 : 1 making for further difficulties in confirming that 'like' is being compared against like.

2.5 The statistics which follow seek to reduce anomalies so far as is practical by concentrating on the 35 'Non-Metropolitan' forces.

Examination of overall policing costs per head of population in each area appears to provide the most reliable comparison however variations in accounting practices may produce further distortions and ultimately those forces with the lowest costs might argue either that they are the most cost effective/economical or that they are the most starved of funds compared to other forces.

2.6 Dorset is the 3rd highest civilianised 'Non-Metropolitan' force and numbers of civilian employees have significant effects upon the apparent cost per police officer. Those forces employing larger numbers of civilians in relation to the size of the police establishment are disadvantaged by funding anomalies and expenditure per police officer appears higher.
3. DORSET POLICE PERFORMANCE

3.1 Comparisons made below are against other 'Non-Metropolitan' forces. Where any reference is made to 'Metropolitan' figures, the London Metropolitan and City Forces are NOT included.

(a) Compared with other 'Non-Metropolitan' forces in England and Wales, Dorset is relatively under-policed ranking 27th out of 35 forces with a ratio of population to police officers of 514:1 (authorised establishment).

(b) 75.4% of Dorset officers are constables which is consistent with the 'Non-Met' average of 75.7%.

(c) 1.5% of Dorset officers are involved in 'Headquarters Management' functions against a 'Non-Met' average of 1.6%.

(d) The number of crimes committed per 1000 population in Dorset during 1991 was 76 compared with the average for 'Non-Metropolitan' forces of 86.

(e) Dorset officers carried a similar crime caseload per officer at 39.2 crimes in 1991 compared with the 'Non-Metropolitan' average of 41.3 crimes per officer.

(f) 1991 Detection rates show Dorset at 41.3% comparing very favourably with the average for 'Non-Metropolitan' forces at 30.7% and representing 16.2 crimes per officer per annum against a 'Non-Metropolitan' average of 12.7. This should be borne in mind as there is a penalty in such efficiency by way of the greater administrative burden associated with file preparation and production.

(g) Road Traffic Accidents involving injury were slightly less at 1.8 per officer than the 'Non-Metropolitan' average during 1991 which was 1.9.

(h) Traffic Offences per officer on the other hand were higher at 23 than the 'Non-Metropolitan' average of 20.

(i) Dorset officers also issued more Fixed Penalty Notices, 56 per officer, than the 'Non-Metropolitan' average of 39.
In relation to breath tests, Dorset officers were clearly more discriminating in their choice of subjects achieving 24.6% positive results against the 'Non-Met' average of only 15% despite a lower average per officer of 3.5 against 5.3.

3.2 The Dorset Force has consistently achieved high standards of performance against most other forces, many of which are significantly larger in establishment. Such performance appears to be confirmed in the results of surveys undertaken amongst members of the public (Keith Gorton - 66% satisfaction) and by way of 'dip checks' of victims and persons coming into contact with Police where a 94% satisfaction rate has been recorded.

Similar indications of high Quality of Service have been observed amongst the smaller forces generally.

4. DORSET POLICE COSTS / EXPENDITURE

4.1 Dorset Police gross expenditure per 1000 population in 1991 was £85,078 against a 'Non-Metropolitan' average of £85,693 and a Metropolitan average of £110,129.

On a ranking basis, Dorset rates 17th out of the 35 'Non-Metropolitan' Forces.

5. COSTS FOLLOWING AMALGAMATION?

5.1 It is significant to note that in relation to ascending size of force establishments, there is a substantial gap between Nottinghamshire at 2344 and the next larger force, Devon & Cornwall, at 2928.

5.2 Given the 3000 benchmark referred to in the introduction, it is therefore practicable to look at the costs of the 9 'Non-Metropolitan' Forces which already have an establishment of that order or larger (i.e., 2,900+).

Of those 9 forces, only 3 achieve gross costs per 1000 population less than Dorset, despite our high civilian levels and subsequent skewing of financial costings.

5.3 The average cost for these 9 forces is £86,702 per 1000 population. If these 9 are taken as possible models for the future in terms of size of police establishment then expenditure in the Dorset area would INCREASE overall by £1,088,080!
6. ISSUES RAISED AND CONCLUSIONS

6.1

(a) Much comment in relation to funding of the Police Service places emphasis upon the increase in police manpower and expenditure during the lifetime of the Government. The support of the Government is acknowledged but increases in resources must be considered against the demands on police due to increases in crime which has more than doubled since since 1979.

The 'catching-up' process following the Edmund Davies report in 1979 caused a significant short-term increase in costs however taking 1981 as a starting point, the table below illustrates that police expenditure has been increasing at a far slower rate than other justice and law elements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1981 - 1991</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>158 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisons</td>
<td>213 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Aid</td>
<td>372 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probation</td>
<td>157 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>221 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Courts</td>
<td>350 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source - Central Statistical Office)

(b) The smaller police forces, particularly perhaps those with long-standing 'County' identities, are justly proud of their local connections. High levels of motivation and moral are already being affected by uncertainty for the future of officers and families. Recent years have seen a move away from the disruption to family life of regular moves around the force area - amalgamation would undoubtedly raise the potential for such movement, whatever safeguards might be provided for serving officers.

The removal of the experience and wisdom of senior and middle managers from areas which they have come to know so thoroughly may have adverse effects on policing strategies and tactics.

(c) If Police Authority composition and funding is centralised on a larger area there will be a loss of 'local' input and accountability.

(d) The increased demands of workload, legislation, public expectation and media spotlight have already led to much self generated change within the Police Service.
and it is considered that further change will be debilitating in human and financial terms.

These changes have not been allowed to run for any length of time in order to assess their effect and forces which may have been planning change have been discouraged from doing so in the knowledge that more drastic and major proposals are being considered.

(e) Key performance indicators are being hailed nationally as a means of comparing the performance of police forces. We have yet to see how the smaller forces will fare in the 'league tables' which will follow.

The potential for such measurement seems to have been ignored in any considerations towards the rationalisation of the future of the smaller Forces which are expected to rate highly. One area of performance measurement to feature is the number of complaints made - it is already the case that fewer complaints are made against officers from the smaller forces.

(f) Supervision has been condemned in many of the recent well publicised 'miscarriage' cases and the opportunity for chief and senior ranks to know and control their staff on a personal basis will be reduced in bigger forces. It is significant that no major miscarriages of justice cases have occurred in any of the threatened 23 'smaller' Forces (i.e. less than 2000)

(g) Costs of ensuring compatibility of computers, communications, office automation, uniform, transport and stationery are expected to be extremely high and integration will take many years.

(h) The levels of support and systems in amalgamated forces may in practice be reduced to the lowest level as a common denominator e.g. ASU's are not national nor are integrated IT systems. Would these functions mark time until the rest caught up or might they even be reduced to support other areas?

(i) The Banham Commission seems to be taking a far more pragmatic view of the needs for change and it is odd that any changes to Forces should be enforced without consideration of Banham's eventual proposals.

Surely it makes sense for the boundaries in respect of the provision of all services to be coterminous so far as practicable?
(j) The Dorset Police are proud to perform their duties to the people of our county and would not wish to be part of an unrecognisable unaligned Force who are not seen to be providing a high quality service to the public.

(k) The assertion that 'big is beautiful' now is disputed in many areas of business, commerce, and local government. It is paradoxical that the Police Service should now be driven down a doubtful path merely because there is a remote perception of economies of scale.

The facts show this to be a misconception as is even the potential for closure of 'Force Headquarters'. Unless two force headquarters buildings are located geographically close to each other, with one having a great deal of spare capacity, the reality would be that, following amalgamation of the two forces, both headquarters would need to continue even if one were to become a satellite or 'area' headquarters. The alternative of massive capital investment in the present climate seems most unlikely.
Dear Mr Aydin

Amalgamation of Police Forces

I have been passed your letter to the Chief Constable, dated 4th April 1994 concerning the above. I think that the best way to respond to your request is to summarise the arguments for and against the amalgamation of smaller Police Forces, then offer some further considerations and sources which may be of interest.

Arguments for amalgamation

- Economies of scale due to bulk purchasing and standardisation (Information technology, clothing, equipment, vehicles etc.)
- Reduction of management overheads. For example, one headquarters instead of two or three, fewer costs associated with administration, greater scope for cost rationalisation.
- Greater critical mass to invest in technology, research, organisational methods and management.
- Improved efficiency in the use of resources generally; for example in responding to major incidents.

Against amalgamation

- Loss of local community ties and links. Many people identify with and support 'their' Police.
- Dilution of local accountability, which is a fundamental check on the power of the State to interfere unnecessarily in Police policy and operations.
- Increased bureaucracy. It is not necessarily the case that increasing the size of Police areas reduces bureaucracy, sometimes the extra administrative burden requires additional layers of co-ordination and administration.
Increased centralisation of control. Although at present the system of 43 Police Forces may seem cumbersome, the operational independence of Chief Constables provides an effective filter against Political direction.

Diminished responsiveness. If important decisions have to be fed through more layers for ratification, response times will decrease and the vital ability to make timely changes in Policy will be adversely affected.

At the time of writing, the issue of the amalgamation of Police Forces has been temporarily shelved whilst other reforms (in the Police and Magistrates Court Bills) are being debated in Parliament.

If you have not already done so, you may find it interesting to consider the issue of centralisation as a historical one. The current arrangements in the U.K. have evolved since the early 19th Century, and the Police Act of 1964 enshrines the Constitutional position of Chief Constables in Law. I know nothing about Turkish Politics and history, but as a general observation I suspect that Policing structures will be critically dependent on both. The arguments for and against centralisation cannot, I suggest, be considered in isolation. Should you require a source, T.A. Critchley’s "A History of Police in England and Wales" is excellent.

I hope that these few thoughts are of some value, and I wish you every success with your PhD work.

Yours sincerely

Derek Talbot
Superintendent
Corporate Planning
19 April 1994

Dear Mr Aydin

I am responding to your circular letter dated 4 April 1994 in which you ask for a page of argument relating to the proposals for amalgamating some of the current English police forces.

You will be aware that the last major series of amalgamations of English police forces was carried out in the late 1960s as a result of the Police Act of 1964; these amalgamations were largely responsible for the present arrangement of police forces. with several notable exceptions.

I am not going to formulate your argument for you, but I enclose copies of two articles in the 'Police Review' which give a good indication of the police service view about the proposals for further amalgamations. If you are interested in the Essex viewpoint, then the article quoting Mr John Burrow will give this to you; he is the Chief Constable of this force, and was the National President of ACPO in 1993.

You might also find it beneficial to consult the 'Local Government Chronicle' for 18 March 1994 number 6579 in the university library. The Chronicle has some references which set out the views against amalgamating forces. Unfortunately we do not have a copy so I am unable to send it to you.

I hope these references help.

Yours sincerely

Maureen Scollan - Inspector
Museum Archivist

Maureen Scollan - Inspector
Museum Archivist

Mr Ahmet H Aydin
PhD student University of Leicester
CPSO 6 Salisbury Road
Leicester LE1 7QR
Dear Mr Aydin,

Amalgamation of Small Forces

Thank you for your letter of 4th April 1994 to the Chief Constable.

I enclose herewith a copy of a letter dated 9th March 1993 which I trust will be helpful to you. Also, enclosed is a copy of a letter dated 11th March 1993 to the Chief Constable White which you may wish to follow up.

Best wishes for your continued study.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Paul Davis
Assistant Head of Administrative Services
As requested at our meeting last Friday, I am sending you a few comments in support of the paper prepared by Ray White, Chief constable of Dyfed Powys, "Small Police Forces are Beautiful (and Cost Effective) Too!"

1. **ESTABLISHMENT**

   In real terms there are now less police officers available for duty than in 1979. This is for a variety of reasons the main one an increase in training due to new legislation, public order, firearms etc. also increased sickness levels and increases in annual leave.

2. **AUTOMATIC FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION SYSTEM**

   Is currently being introduced in 39 of the 43 Police Forces in England and Wales. The whole of Scotland already has a similar system. This has been achieved by the formation of a consortium and will result in 39 Forces being linked into a common fingerprint data base. It is anticipated that those sitting on the fence will join the consortium. An Automatic Fingerprint Recognition System was under experiment in the Home Office in 1971 but the promises of a national system never materialised. The Home Office now says it will produce a national system by 1995/96 but in my view it is more likely they will sensibly capitalise on the system brought into operation by the consortium.

3. **H.O.L.M.E.S.**

   The software for this major enquiry system is common to all Forces. Unfortunately hardware is not and it takes time and money in linking together different types of hardware.

continued ....
4. ROLE OF H.M.I.'s

In my view, H.M.I.'s should have either regional or functional responsibility and not both, as is the present case. Our H.M.I. for this region is a hard working, energetic man but because of his functional responsibilities can really spend little time visiting Forces other than during his annual inspection.

5. ROLE OF HOME OFFICE

There is little contact between Home Office officials and Chief constables other than through Home Office Circulars which are so often largely a regurgitation of good practice existing in Forces. The personal knowledge and contact with Home Office officials is only gained through A.C.P.O. Service Committees.

On the one hand I find that senior Home Office officials remain in post for too short a period, during which time it must be difficult for them to get a feel of the Police Service, whilst, on the other hand, there are those at the Home Office, particularly in the research organisation, who have been in post for more than 20 years and who are not held in high regard in the Police Service. If anyone wished to look at tenure of office and short term contracts, I think they would here find a fruitful field.

6. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

Lists have been prepared by the Audit Commission, H.M.I.'s and by A.C.P.O. (copy attached). Many of them are purely performance measurements and workload indicators. There is little resistance to the gathering of these; to activity analysis or to the setting of standards but as the Home Secretary recently said, it is difficult to always compare like with like.

A particular indicator which concerns me is that of response times and whilst we should give as prompt a service as possible, it is more important what we do when we arrive and that subsequent enquiries are made.

Indicators can be extremely misleading, for example during 1992 we in Bedfordshire were congratulated by the Home Office by achieving a reduction in crime in two successive quarters. They could and should also have commented on our poor detection rate and asked for an explanation.

What inferences would you make of the following statistics; and which Force would be ahead in any league table?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bedfordshire</th>
<th>Hertfordshire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>540,700</td>
<td>842,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimes</td>
<td>59,562</td>
<td>59,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detections</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hertfordshire is clearly ahead in detections but when
establishments are examined it can be seen Bedfordshire has about 500 fewer officers to deal with this and the many other problems faced by Forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bedfordshire</th>
<th>Hertfordshire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishment</td>
<td>1,178</td>
<td>1,684</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. COMMON POLICE SERVICES

Regional Crime Squads which are currently funded on a per capita basis could quite easily be included within Common Police Services which include Police National Computer, National Identification Bureau, Police Staff College and Recruit training.

8. REGIONAL FUNCTIONS

Thought could be given to extending regional Training, I.T., Management Services and Complaints and Discipline could be undertaken on a regional basis.

9. CAPABILITY OF SMALL FORCES

You are fully aware that I believe in local identity and local accountability which currently exists in small Forces and which are rarely found wanting. As a point of interest, I would add that I have only sought mutual aid from other Forces on two occasions in my 11 years with this Force.

It needs also to be remembered that small Forces are not quite as small as they first appear, for in addition to our Force establishment of 1,178, we also have a civilian establishment of 548 staff. To my mind, anything much bigger than this would become unmanageable.

In the absence of evidence substantiating a need for re-organisation, I hope you can support the retention of the present structure of the Police Service.
Thank you for sending me a copy of your paper highlighting the need to retain small Police Forces which I discussed with four of the five Members of Parliament in this county last Friday.

One of them is Sir Nicholas Lyell, the Attorney General, and he showed particular interest.

Looking forward to seeing you next week at the Spring Seminar.
Dear Mr Aydin,

I am responding to your letter of the 4th April 1994 which arrived whilst I was on annual leave.

It is difficult to anticipate how the current or future Home Secretaries will exercise the new powers they will have in relation to the compulsory amalgamation of the Police Forces, but, there are a number of complex factors which should be taken into account before coming to such a decision. I am uncertain as to how you will be using any material that I supply to you, therefore, I will respond very briefly because, at some future point I may be required to make a detailed response to a Home Office proposal to amalgamate Gloucestershire Constabulary.

If such a proposal was made to amalgamate Gloucestershire Constabulary I believe it would be incumbent upon those making the proposal to make the case for the amalgamation rather than Gloucestershire Constabulary or another Force seeking to justify their continued existence. I make this observation on the basis that on any analysis, Gloucestershire Constabulary is amongst one of the most successful forces in the Country. You will be aware from current publicity that we are engaged in one of the most unique criminal investigations that has ever been undertaken by a Police Force in the United Kingdom and in addition, we have also been responding to a number of other major events such as the National Hunt Festival at Cheltenham which involves visiting Royalty and other major operations which place considerable demands on our resources.
In addition to being technically excellent, Gloucestershire Constabulary enjoys a long tradition of support from the people of the County who identify with us and I am sure I do not need to state the extent to which public support is a critical factor in determining the operational success of any Police Force.

Consequently, in summary this letter should not be construed as a case for containing Gloucestershire Constabulary but as a pointer in preparing your thesis which should perhaps focus on identifying "the problems that will be solved" by the forced amalgamation of Gloucestershire Constabulary with other Police Forces.

I trust you will find these comments helpful and can I take this opportunity of wishing you every success with your Doctorate.

Yours sincerely,

AJP Butler
Chief Constable
Dear Sir

I refer to your letter of the 4th April 1994 and can only apologise for the lateness of this reply.

This county is currently at the centre of debate concerning local government re-organisation, which it is feared could lead to wholesale amalgamation of the Gwent Constabulary (1000 police officers) with the much larger neighbouring South Wales Constabulary (with over 3000 police officers). This Constabulary has initiated public debate on the main issues which you will find are contained in the attached information leaflet.

I hope you find this useful in connection with your studies.

Yours faithfully

Superintendent Davies
SAVE YOUR CONSTABULARY

The Home Office is currently considering the future of the police forces in England and Wales. The intended re-organisation of local government and the possible demise of Gwent, places doubt on its future policing. It can be shown that small police forces are generally more efficient and effective and relate particularly closely to the needs of their communities.

Your police force is in danger of being swallowed up into some large bureaucracy!

Please take a little time to read this leaflet and if you feel you can support the call to save the Gwent Constabulary please complete the tear off section at the rear and forward it to your nearest police station.

If we are allowed to, we will continue in a quiet professional and caring manner, to seek standards of excellence and provide reassurance and support to all our communities and those with whom we come into contact, without fear, favour, malice or ill will.

WHAT YOU CAN DO

The Home Secretary, Michael Howard, will decide early in December what the future will be for policing in Gwent. At this time we do not know how he will view the issues involved.

If you think the Gwent Constabulary should, broadly speaking, remain as it is, please complete the form on the rear of this leaflet. Once you have done so please forward it to your nearest Police Station.

It is our intention to collect all these forms from around Gwent and arrange for them to be delivered to Westminster, hopefully to the Home Secretary, himself.

Please do this today, or as soon as you can! It will only be the expressed views of all of the people of Gwent that will prevent the Constabulary being absorbed into a huge anonymous organisation.

GWENT CONSTABULARY

QUALITY CONTRACT

As a Constabulary we will,

1 Seek and respond to the views of the community.
2 Provide a sensitive and caring service.
3 Ensure a commitment to impartiality and excellence.

Our staff will always,

1 Listen to and be aware of the needs of the people they meet.
2 Put people first
3 Never discriminate against individuals or groups they encounter.
FOR THE ATTENTION OF THE
HOME SECRETARY.

Dear Mr Howard,

I am a resident of Gwent. I am aware that you are considering the
future of smaller police forces such as our local force, Gwent Constabulary;
whilst you are doing so would you please consider the following:

1 I believe the Gwent Constabulary
provide a service second to none in
the country. I do not want to see a
reduction in that service.

2 I believe that the current Gwent
Constabulary should remain as far
as possible intact in its present
form.

3 I believe that the needs of the
locality should determine the
nature of policing, not some
arbitrary general rule.

Yours Sincerely,

NAME:

ADDRESS:

What Gwent Constabulary is

The Government statistics show that the so-called small forces, that is less than 2,000
officers, have certain advantages. They are
cheaper to run, detect more offences and
waste fewer resources on administration
and bureaucracy. It is difficult to understand
therefore how and why those in Whitehall
have decided forces under 3,000
officers.

Gwent Constabulary, in particular, has
achieved the following and maintained
them consistently over the years:

• at least 45% of all crime is detected
• we have helped reduce road accident
  casualties
• we have led the campaign to help victims
  of crime
• we constantly develop links with you,
  the community.

We could not lose these things if we did not
make sure those who govern us know our
views.
APPENDIX I/C

Letters to and from the Home Office
9 May 1994

Dear Sir/madam,

I am a Turkish Police Officer, and currently PhD student at the University of Leicester, Centre for the Study of Public Order. In order to assist in my research, could you please provide me with the sources and information listed below, by either sending a copy or indicating the reference details?

1. Review of Police Core and Ancillary Tasks, Home Office F1 Division, Queen Anne’s Gate, 1994

2. Home Office circular 106/88, and any other information about the police manpower: i.e.
   - How the manpower is allocated to cities, counties or forces?
   - What was the original police establishment?
   - What criteria was used in deciding the number of police officers?
   - What are the reasons for increasing the number of police officers?

Thank you very much for your help.

Yours sincerely

A. H. AYDIN
PhD Student
University of Leicester
CSPO, PhD Student
Salisbury Rd
Leicester LE1 7QR
Dear Mr Aydin,

Thank you for your letter of 9 May requesting information on the police service.

Since 1979 this Government has allocated very substantially increased resources to the police. Approved establishments have been increased by 10,000 and expenditure on the police, estimated at £6.162 million for 1993/94, has increased by 87 per cent in real terms since 1978/79.

At the end of March there were 127,897 police officers and 55,197 civilians in England and Wales. That is an increase in actual strength of 32,440 (16,404 police officers and 16,036 civilians) since May 1979.

There is a pressing need for continuing restraint in all areas of public expenditure, and the Government has not felt able to agree to formal additions to police establishments for 1994/95.

You might be interested in a number of Government initiatives aimed at getting more police officers back on the beat.

The implementation of the recommendations of a recent review of police paperwork following an arrest is expected to halve the bureaucratic demands on the police in that area and to free the equivalent of up to 2,300 officers for front line duties. Consideration is presently underway on implementing the recommendations.

By progressively thinning out middle management posts, Chief Constables will be able to focus their budgets more effectively - for instance by recruiting more constables for front line duties.

Police authorities will continue to be encouraged to release officers from tasks where their powers and training are not required and which can be undertaken by civilian support staff.
In the last 10 years more than 7,300 police officers have been freed for operational duties in that way.

The flexibility available to chief constables will be significantly increased following the passage of the Police and Magistrates' Courts Bill. From 1995 detailed central controls on force strength will be removed and chief constables will have more discretion to decide how many officers they need to police the areas for which they are responsible.

In the interim, additional flexibility will be anticipated by allowing the replacement of some senior officers by larger numbers of more junior ranks, provided that the police authorities concerned can demonstrate that there will be no overall additions to costs.


Finally, the Home Secretary has asked for a review of police core and ancillary tasks to address a concern widely expressed that the extent of responsibilities that the police now face is in need of fresh examination. It aims to relieve the police service of peripheral tasks that do not require either their powers or their skills so that they can concentrate their energy on the vital tasks of policing that really matter to the public. Examples of some of the more peripheral responsibilities might include the legal requirement placed on the police to accept stray dogs and to remove and store abandoned vehicles. These tasks along with an array of licensing, administrative and other duties need to be examined to see if it makes sense for them to continue to be performed by the police. They absorb valuable police time that might be better used to combat crime and release more officers to patrol the streets and make them safer. The review will also work with the service to identify the important core functions of the police and how those functions can be carried out more effectively.

Yours sincerely

H Acharya
F1 Division
APPENDIX I/D

Letters to and from Leicestershire Constabulary
Dear Sir/Madam,

I am a Turkish police officer and currently PhD student at the University of Leicester, Centre for the Study of Public Order. My topic for PhD is 'A Comparative Study of Police Organisation and Legitimacy in England & Wales and Turkey: the case for centralisation and decentralisation'.

In order to assist in my research, could you please provide me with the latest organisational chart of the Leicester Constabulary and any relevant information and material concerning the organisational structure.

Thank you for your help.

Yours sincerely,

Ahmet H. AYDIN
PhD Student
University of Leicester
Centre for the Study of Public Order
6, Salisbury Rd.
LEICESTER-LE1 7QR
Dear Ahmet

Thank you for your enquiry regarding the latest organisational chart of Leicestershire Constabulary.

Please find enclosed a copy of the chart as requested. I hope this is helpful for your thesis.

Yours sincerely

Jackie Woodhouse
Research Unit
Corporate Development Dept

Ahmet Hamdi AYDIN
PhD Student
CSPO
University of Leicester
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LE1 7QR
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APPENDIX II

Map of police force boundaries in England & Wales
(Source: Comben & Strachen 1992: 20)
APPENDIX III

Map of new areas of the Metropolitan Police District and details of divisions and sub-divisions
WITH COMPLIMENTS

Public Relations Branch

Jane Taylor
5.5.1995

METROPOLITAN POLICE

METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE
Directorate of Public Affairs

New Scotland Yard
Broadway
London SW1H 0BD
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Direct line 071-230
THE METROPOLITAN POLICE DISTRICT
(Areas and Divisions)

(Source: Metropolitan Police Service 1995)

297
The Metropolitan Police District –
Areas and divisions

From Monday 1 August, the Metropolitan Police District changed to five areas (See Special Notice 9/94 of 22 July). This stand-alone Notice gives details of divisions and sub-divisions (correct at Monday 1 August) and a map of the new areas.

1 Area (Central)
CX, CD, CV, AB, AG, AP, AW, FH, FS, FF, BD, BC, BH, BS, DD, DS, DR, DM, DT, DA, DP.

2 Area (North West)
SA, SD, ST, SP, SR, SY, SU, SV, SH, SN, SC, SG, SF, QA, QP, QE, QW, QS, QD, QC, QY, QX, QH, QL, XD, XA, XS, XG, XW, XR, YT, YA, YR, YM, YH, YD, NI, NC, ND, NH, NV, NT, NA, EK, ED, EO, ET, EH, EW.

3 Area (North East)

4 Area (South East)
MM, ME, MS, MC, MD, MT, MR, PD, PS, PL, PP, PK, PE, PR, PQ, PB, PW, PN, PC, PH, PM, PY, RG, RM, RK, RA, RV, RT, RH, RY, RB, RE, RS, RL, ZP, ZB, ZT, ZW, ZR, ZL, ZD, ZK, ZN, ZA, ZY.

5 Area (South West)
LD, LX, LC, LS, LG, ZM, ZC, ZE, VK, VN, VS, VH, VC, VE, TW, TT, TR, TN, TH, TD, TF, TC, TB, TG, TY, TP, ID, XH, XY, XU, XV, XG, XR, XE, XN, WA, WL, WW, WR, WP.

(Source: Metropolitan Police Service 1995)
APPENDIX IV

Map of provincial police units in Turkey
APPENDIX V

Map indicating possible amalgamations of police forces in England & Wales
A Cumbria, Durham and Cleveland
B North Yorkshire and Humberside (North)
C Humberside (South) and Lincolnshire
D Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire
E Cheshire and Staffordshire
F North Wales and Dyfed-Powys
G Leicestershire, Northamptonshire and Warwickshire
H Gwent and South Wales
I Dorset and South Wales
J Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire and Hertfordshire
K Norfolk and Suffolk

(Source: Police Review 15 January 1993: 13)
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