A PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENTARY ON
THE CONCEPT OF SCHOOL SOCIALIZATION

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INTRODUCTION

1. SCHOOLS AS AGENTS OF SOCIALIZATION: A GENUINE SUBJECT FOR STUDY

It is an historical fact\(^1\) that schools have been thought properly to function, to use current terminology, as "agents of socialization", and though today we are accustomed to drawing a distinction between education conceived as the development of mind, and socialization as a process whereby a person is led to become an acceptable member of society, most people would, I think, still be ready to acknowledge that, whatever may be desired concerning the relationship between schooling and education, schools do in fact accomplish more than a measure of proficiency in the discrete subjects which fill the educational timetable. It is one thing, however, to entertain a vague conviction that the many years of compulsory school attendance contribute to the process by which a child learns to become an acceptable member of society, it is quite another to be able to say precisely just how it is that schools achieve this effect.\(^2\)

Such difficulty may occasion doubt: perhaps schools do not after all have any lasting influence however potent their sway may be during the impressionable years of school attendance. It is certainly true that many teachers would reject any suggestion that they were engaged in a process which had as its goal an adult whose behaviour showed a willing, non-rational conformity to societal norms. The assertion, then,


2. There do, of course, exist theories which might be seen to offer an elucidation of the part played by schools in this process. None at present command a wide acceptance, and it will aid the clarity of the exposition of this thesis if a detailed examination of those theories is delayed until certain other issues have been considered.
that schools do in fact accomplish a socializing function with respect to that large group which is our present society may be seen as questionable.

It is possible to state more precisely the debatable claim regarding the contribution of schools to such a socialization process if a distinction is drawn between what may be called "school role" socialization, by which may be meant the process by which children become acceptable members of the school community, and the socialization for later citizenship, which is often desired by administrators that schools should accomplish, and which I shall call simply, "school socialization".

A person advancing such a claim might begin by pointing out that there are good grounds for supposing that school role socialization is a process which cannot reasonably be doubted to be undertaken, however unwittingly, by all schools. The grounds are at least twofold.  

Firstly, it is difficult to see how schools could even function at all if this were not so. It is as surely true that schools socialize pupils in this sense as it is that long-term members of groups everywhere are led to accept the standards of behaviour which are thought necessary by the group's controllers. At certain times role distancing is possible, and over certain matters cynicism may be a way of life, but, by and large, clerks, convicts, waiters and pupils entertain similar views concerning appropriate and justifiable behaviour in their organisations, and their beliefs are roughly congruent with those encouraged by the people in authority over them.

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2. See Goffman, E., Encounters, 1972, 73-134.
Secondly, it is difficult to see how children could find school at all bearable if they failed to acquire what may vaguely be called, "the schoolchild mentality". If we raise the question as to why children, and indeed adults, should begin to think of themselves and their obligations in ways prescribed for them, we find ourselves driven to talk of basic human needs - the needs to be liked, to overcome the anxiety which we feel when we find ourselves in a minority, and so forth. In so far as individuals are free of these needs, they will remain independent of the pressures to become, in any consequential sense, members of a group. Few adults are of this nature, and fewer children, and so there is reason to think that children are led by readily comprehensible psychological mechanisms into the assimilation of the schoolchild mentality.

If, then, school role socialization is a process which cannot reasonably be doubted to occur, an advocate of the view that school experience is part of the process of socialization into acceptable adult membership of our society might be taken to be advancing at least one of two views. Firstly, he might be suggesting that the process by which schools lead children to become acceptable pupils instils in children or leads them to acquire certain values, knowledge or skills which are required of the successfully socialized adult, or that school role socialization at least provides an introduction to, or a necessary stage towards, the later acquisition of such values, knowledge or skills. Secondly, he might be suggesting that school role socialization, though it undoubtedly occurs, is not really important. What matters is that schools do, in fact, instil values and transmit knowledge which, whether useful or not to the school as an organisation, are required by society to be possessed by its members.
It would seem that both these claims are open to investigation, though it is not yet clear quite what precise data a research worker might seek to locate, and what methods he might best employ. At this point a choice presents itself to the uncommitted enquirer. Within limits it is possible to interpret in a variety of ways what may be meant by "socialization", and it will be upon the interpretation chosen that the success of the enquiry in terms of positive empirical findings will depend. It is necessary, then, to preface any investigation of school or school role socialization by attempting a clear delineation of the concept of socialization so that the theoretical alternatives may be clearly understood.

It is, in fact, one of the aims of this thesis to set forth the philosophic considerations on which a reasoned decision might be made regarding the most fruitful way to conceive the socialization process, so that any contribution made by schools to the process by which children are led to become acceptable members of society may be made plain.

The opacity of these remarks may be partly dispelled if I set forth a brief anticipatory outline of the central argument set forth in the main body of the thesis, indicating the philosophic position which provides the justification for proceeding along the particular paths I have chosen.

2. Philosophic Contributions to the Study of Socialization

2(a) Conceptual Analysis

In any study of socialization processes conceptual problems may be seen to arise the moment one ceases to accept that what is meant by "socialization" is unproblematic. One is, in fact, led rather speedily to this viewpoint by even a cursory reading of relevant educational literature, for mutual charges of confusion have been levelled by philosophers and sociologists concerning the concepts...
of socialization, social education and education itself. Whilst, as I shall argue, the upshot of this controversy is that it is reasonable to draw a distinction between social education and socialization, a totally uncontentious yet informative explication of the latter term has not, to my knowledge, yet appeared in educational writings.

This absence of accord does not appear to be confined within the pages of educational journals. In the literature of several disciplines - social anthropology, psychology, social psychology, sociology - one encounters diverse definitions, though some of these do betoken similar assumptions. But there is none, as far as I am aware, which is informatively precise and capable both of commanding general assent, and of revealing the particular theoretical standpoint from which the definition issues. This recurring discord prompts one to doubt whether a rapid dissolution of the problem of the "correct" meaning of "socialization" may even in principle properly be sought by recourse to short definitions found in diverse fields of intellectual enquiry. It might in fact be suggested that the practitioners in these disciplines are offering a scientific refinement of a commonsense notion, and that it is to ordinary usage that we must look to clarify the meaning of the term. This, on investigation, does not appear to be a very persuasive argument, for although the term was in use prior to its employment by social scientists, it has only subsequently at the hands of those scientists gained what precision it now has in everyday discourse.

In such circumstances, one is led to consider whether an explication of "socialization" may not call for the kind of conceptual analysis which is usually regarded as an expertise practised mainly by "pure" philosophers. However, the limitations of conceptual analysis when applied to this particular problem are soon evident.
The concept of socialization upon which this analysis is to be employed will of necessity be a concept drawn from one of the disciplines of the social sciences, and which has already been defined in terms relevant to the solution of particular problems. As such, any conclusions reached may only incidentally yield relevant insights if we wish to employ a nominally similar concept to describe the processes of school or school role socialization. By way of illustration, the task of conceptually analysing the notion of socialization as it appears in two very different theories is undertaken during the course of the thesis, and the results considered.

Thus, in seeking guidance on how best we are to proceed with the investigation of school or school role socialization it now begins to appear not only that a precise and relevant definition of the concept of socialization is not to be reached by conceptual analysis alone, and hence one cannot move straight from the analysis of the concept to the gathering of empirical data, but that a substantial part, if not the whole, of a theoretical approach may have either to be accepted or rejected. Accordingly, the main philosophic contribution to the study of school or school role socialization may be found to lie not in the conceptual analysis of "socialization", but in a kind of meta-theoretical investigation into the most appropriate theoretical approach to be adopted.

2(b) Theories and Research Approaches

In assessing the merits of theoretical approaches the issues may be clarified if we invoke a distinction drawn by Laudan within the class of what are usually called "scientific theories" between two sorts of propositional networks. Laudan\(^1\) illustrates the distinction

by noting first that we often use the term "theory" to denote a very specific set of doctrines, hypotheses, axioms or principles which can be used for making specific experimental predictions and for giving detailed explanations of natural phenomena. Examples of this type of theory would include Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism and Einstein's theory of the photoelectric effect. By contrast, the term "theory" is also often used to refer to much more general, far less easily testable sets of doctrines or assumptions. For instance, we speak of "atomic theory" or the "theory of evolution". In each of these cases, we are referring not to a single theory, but to a whole spectrum of individual theories. The term "evolutionary theory", for instance, does not refer to any single theory, but to an entire family of doctrines, all of which work from the assumption that organic species have common lines of descent.

We are accustomed, then, to referring not only to specific theories but to collections of theories based on common conceptual features, fundamental analogies and so forth. There are, in fact, various criteria by which groupings of theories may be composed. Kuhn, for example, relates theories by recourse to his notion of a paradigm, whilst Lakatos employs his concept of "negative heuristic" to compose "scientific research programmes", and Laudan writes of "metaphysical and methodological commitments" which individuate "research traditions". In this thesis these criteria are examined

3. Laudan, L., op. cit., 78.
and it is suggested that the means by which theories may be collected together should have reference to the problem one wishes to solve. For our particular purposes it is suggested that theories may be assigned to separate "research approaches" and, as a first step towards determining which is likely to be the most fruitful way of investigating school or school role socialization, I distinguish two research approaches to the investigation of socialization processes.

The first research approach may, following Dawe, be called the "social systems research approach". I argue that, amongst others, the socialization theories of Durkheim and Parsons are in accord with this research approach, since both these theorists appear to accept its characteristic perspective. For example, they deal with socialization primarily in the context of the question of how social stability is to be maintained in a society, and they assume it is maintained principally by citizens being led to hold certain values. It is, in fact, a fundamental assumption of this research approach that societies are held together by affective bonds, whether these take the form of moral solidarity or loyalty, as favoured by Durkheim, or the acceptance that the turmoil of Freudian desires should only be permitted expression in certain forms, as Parsons seems to suggest. According to this research approach, once these affective bonds have been forged, then, given a continuing objective situation in which the values held by a society's members are conducive to social stability,

public order and the smooth functioning of society will cease to be a problem.

A further clarificatory point is necessary in this introductory preview. This concerns the aim of socialization processes as it is conceived by social systems theorists. According to these theorists the aim of a socialization process is to inculcate or foster a range of values. These values are distinguishable in that they are, or are thought to be, conducive to the stability and preservation of the smooth functioning of the group. The ultimate justification for the operation of socialization processes, for social systems theorists, then, will have reference to the maintenance of what may be called the group's "way of life".

Actually, when focussing on the group called "society", social systems theorists write variously of the justification of socialization processes as being "the maintenance of social stability", "the avoidance of civil unrest" and "the preservation of the smooth running of society". There is no common or agreed form of words. The connotations are roughly similar, however, and lead one to recognise that another assumption is here being made. This is that society, and indeed any other group which operates socialization processes, has a function to perform. In the case of the group called "society" the function may perhaps be described, as I have indicated, as the preservation of a certain way of life. This "way of life" includes such things as the organisation of institutions and religious worship, the distribution of property and the enforcement of certain ways of behaving. When the topic under discussion is not society, but the group which is comprised of members of a school, the justification for the operation of socialization processes may be supposed to be the education of pupils. The
socialization processes which operate with respect to pupils in schools, or to members of a society, then, have as their aim, according to social systems theorists, the inculcation of values which are conducive to the group's functions being fulfilled. Nominal members of these organisations who fail to acquire these values are thought to be deviants or unsuccessfully socialised persons, or even unsocialised persons, and are subject to various kinds of sanctions or even expulsion.

Supported by these assumptions, a theorist working within the social systems research approach might in his attempt to investigate school or school role socialisation try first perhaps to specify the values which schools foster in children. In the investigation of school socialization the values may or may not be those thought necessary by schools to preserve order within their walls. The revealed values must, however, be related to those by which it is supposed that social order is maintained within society. To the extent that this is achieved, positive findings regarding school socialization will have been located.

Under the second research approach considered in this thesis, which I shall call the "ethogenic" approach to socialization, a very different perspective is advocated. In considering socialization, the starting point is not immediately a view concerning the maintenance of civil order in the sense of avoiding large scale civil unrest, though the justification of socialization processes remains the maintenance of a group's or society's "way of life" and the discharging of its functions. It is, in fact, tacitly assumed that social order is not under any imminent threat from any violent faction. This being the case, other factors which affect the smooth running of social

life may be more readily investigated. Ethogenists think of the collective social life which comprises a society as being composed of myriad social interactions which are seen as having to be constructed on a moment-to-moment basis by the application of, and adherence to, certain rules. For the maintenance of social order, then, a society's citizens need to be knowledgeable about, and adapt in the adherence to, the rules which govern social intercourse. Operating with this perspective, socialization would be viewed as the process by which children, and indeed all new members of groups, learn the rules by which social intercourse is properly conducted within those groups. 

In the application of this research approach to school socialization, the suggestion would be made that the ability to handle countless adult social interactions requires as a forerunner the actual experience of interacting with people in a more formal, rule-governed fashion than is often found within the family, and that since the most frequent and sustained "formal" contact which children have outside the family is at school, it is therefore promising to look at the child's experience of interacting with teachers and other pupils to learn something of the development of the knowledge of interaction rules. One central feature of the investigation of school socialization would then simply be the attempt to discover the rules governing pupils' social intercourse in schools. This would in part constitute an investigation of school role socialization. It would then be followed by an attempt to determine the relations between the rules for conducting encounters in schools and those in adult society.

In this thesis, then, I propose to set forth two research approaches. I shall try to argue that the social systems research approach as it

1. The responsibility for this interpretation of socialization is my own. To my knowledge, no ethogenic theorist has written at length explicitly on the topic of socialization, and certainly not on school or school role socialization.
has been or may be applied to school or school role socialization is so beset with difficulties that consideration must be given to the possibility of adopting an alternative. That alternative, I shall suggest, may be that which I call the ethogenic research approach, and I shall attempt not only to explicate its identifying characteristics, but to outline the features of possible theories of school and school role socialization based upon it which are free from serious conceptual difficulty and susceptible to detailed empirical development.

In attempting to accomplish these matters it is clear that my arguments will rest on the criteria employed in the appraisal of theories and research approaches, and I shall in the next section indicate the kind of criteria which would be involved in this appraisal.

2 (c) The Appraisal of Theories and Research Approaches

Concerning individual theories, the first question which might be raised concerns the plenitude or dearth of positive empirical findings to which a theory has led. In comparing the merits of two theories in this respect this criterion is similar to that advocated by Lakatos in his "sophisticated falsificationist doctrine". Lakatos has suggested that the crucial consideration in deciding whether one theory is properly to be preferred to another is whether it offers any novel excess information compared with its predecessors, and whether some of the novel information is corroborated. Recourse merely to this criterion may be useful only if one theory reveals a great deal of information and the others almost nothing at all. Otherwise we would find ourselves having to locate a measure by which empirical information gathered from one theory may be weighed against that from another. 1

1. See Lakatos, I., op. cit., 91-196.

2. It has been argued that the attempt to specify content measures of scientific theories is extremely problematical, if not literally impossible. See Crumbaum, A., 'Can A Theory Answer More Questions Than One Of Its Rivals?' in British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, vol. 27, 1976, 1-14.
Certainly, a mere numerical count of facts would be a difficult if not impossible task.

In addition to this difficulty which attaches to the attempt to employ the single Lakatosian criterion, there are others. Firstly, it would appear that two different theories, even if they originate from the same research approach, may not lead to the gathering of quite the same facts. Various writers have suggested that "the world" does not present problems to the theoretician in "unambiguous pieces of veridical data". Empirical problems arise within a certain context of enquiry and are partly defined by that context. Our theoretical presuppositions about the natural order tell us what to expect and thus what seems peculiar or problematic or questionable. Situations which pose problems within one enquiry context will not necessarily do so within others. Thus, whether something is regarded as an empirical problem will depend in part on the theoretical commitments we have made, and consequently two theories which are to any degree successful will reveal different, but not competing, facts about the world, for they will be addressed in some degree to different problems. We cannot, then, simply invoke numerical positive findings as the single criterion by which to decide whether one theory is to be preferred to another.

Neither, it may be argued, can we proceed simply in the opposite direction and discard one theory in favour of another if research guided by one theory produces negative findings or anomalies. The reasons for this are, firstly, to abandon a theory because it is incompatible with the data assumes that our knowledge of the data is beyond question. Once we realise that the data themselves are conceivably questionable, the occurrence of negative findings or anomalies does not require the abandonment of a theory, for we may choose to direct our doubts towards the

1. For amplification of these points, see Duhem, P., The Aim and Structure Of Physical Theory, Princeton, 1954, and Quine, W.V.O., From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1953.
data. Secondly, it must be acknowledged that there may always be eliminable ambiguities in the testing situation. In the empirical examination of a theory it is an entire network of concepts which are being put to the test, and should a prediction turn out to be erroneous, rather than abandon the theory we might seek to locate and rectify internal misconceptions.

This last point conveniently leads us away from the appraisal of theories by reference to empirical findings towards a consideration of their conceptual strengths and weaknesses. An examination of the conceptual features of a theory may merge into a consideration of the merits of its related research approach, though it is possible to limit one's questions in the first instance to features of the particular theory. Difficulties of a conceptual nature which afflict individual theories and not related research approaches are often methodological, that is, related to the gathering of data which would support or weaken the theory, and it is with regard to this point that individual theories are examined in this thesis.

I turn now to the appraisal of research approaches. In discussing the social systems and ethogenic research approaches I distinguish several conceptual features of the kind Kuhn calls "metaphysical paradigms" which help to constitute these research approaches. I suggest that the questions we must raise in the appraisal of these metaphysical paradigms are two-fold. Firstly, we must determine the extent to which the analogies which comprise the metaphysical paradigms are beset with difficulties irrespective of their application to problems of school or school role socialization; and, secondly, we must enquire if the analogies are being stretched too far when they are so applied. This latter question reflects my acceptance of Kuhn's view that the most decisive reason for ceasing to employ particular metaphysical paradigms is

1. See Kuhn, T., op. cit.
2. Ibid., 52-91.
likely to arise from the analogies failing to cast light upon the states of affairs to which they have been extended. In addition to the appraisal of metaphysical paradigms, critical attention is also directed towards the ontological commitments and methodological principles by which research approaches are also in part constituted. Finally, it will be argued that it is pertinent to enquire whether the interpretation of the notion of socialization and its allied concepts associated with a particular research approach are consonant with those which may actually be seen to be employed both in schools and in our society.

3. A Position in Philosophy of Science

It is apparent that in attempting to appraise theories and research approaches in the way I have outlined I am adopting a certain position in philosophy of science. The full development of this viewpoint requires too lengthy an exposition to be attempted here, and my commitment to it will perforce not here receive complete justificatory argument. It is incumbent upon me, nevertheless, to indicate briefly what this position is, so that the degree of dogmatism which underpins this thesis is made to some degree more acceptable by the provisional nature of the adopted stance being declared.

The position which informs this thesis may in part be characterised by the concern I expressed about the conceptual difficulties which attend theories and research approaches. Expressly to make the absence of conceptual difficulties a mark of their acceptability is to move away from the notion of empirical truth as the decisive criterion, and, as Laudan has pointed out:

"... few scholars who study the nature of science have found any room in their models for the role of conceptual problems in the rational appraisal of scientific theories."

1. Laudan, R., op. cit., 47.
Empiricist philosophies of science
(including those of Popper¹, Carnap² and Reichenbach³) and even less strident empiricist methodologies (including those of Lakatos⁴, Collingwood⁵ and Feyerabend⁶) — all of whom imagine that theory choice in science should be governed exclusively by empirical considerations — simply fail to come to terms with the role of conceptual problems in science.

Moving away from individual writers and towards schools of thought, Laudan also points out that, on the subject of theory choice, inductivists might offer the general advice "choose the theory with the highest degree of confirmation", and falsificationists might say "choose the theory with the highest degree of falsifiability". Both pieces of advice would appear still to refer only to empirical considerations.

Laudan's remarks are made in the context of explaining or reconstructing the actual historical course of science, his contention being that scientists have always been as much concerned with conceptual problems as with empirical confirmation. The concerns of the present thesis are rather different, being principally to determine which of two research approaches is likely to be more profitably embraced if a particular problem is to be solved. However, with respect to the


criteria by which one research approach is to be judged more favourably than another, I adopt what I think would be the position taken by Laudan. His view, I believe, would be that one research approach has been, and I hold should be, preferred to another, in proportion as it has led, or is likely to lead, to the gathering of more positive empirical findings while generating fewer conceptual problems of an apparently intractable nature.

To reach a decision on these grounds would not imply that the research approach adopted was "correct", nor that its fundamental assumptions were true. Consequently, to work within the confines of one research approach rather than another would be merely to make a tentative pragmatic decision.

A pragmatic position with respect to research approach or theory preference differs, as we have seen, from the view taken by other writers. To point the contrast, reference may be made to the distinctions drawn by Lakatos between the three main schools of thought concerning the normative appraisal of research approaches.

The first school of thought he considered is that which he calls "cultural relativism" or "scepticism". Adherents of scepticism regard research approaches as just families of beliefs which rank equally, epistemologically speaking. One belief system is no more "right" than any other belief system, although some have more adherents than others. There may be changes in belief systems but no progress. Here Lakatos

1. Laudan would recognise the earlier mentioned difficulty concerning the computation of positive empirical findings, and it would thus only be in cases where one research approach or theory had over a period of time led to few positive findings whilst another an abundance, that this criterion could be invoked.


3. Lakatos writes of "theories" in this paper, but his views are applicable to what I term "research approaches".

mentions both Kuhn's views and Feyerabend's "epistemological anarchism", according to which any belief system is free to grow and influence any other, but none has epistemological superiority. The sceptic would thus deny the possibility of producing criteria by which one research approach could be judged epistemologically superior to another.

By contrast each of the other two schools Lakatos considers asserts the possibility of producing such criteria. "Demarcationists", among whose number Lakatos considers himself, are preoccupied with trying to produce an impersonal, timeless criterion of appraisal which will help us to identify scientific progress. "Elitists" deny the possibility of constructing such a criterion of scientific progress which would yield judgements with respect to individual research approaches, but believe that reasoned decisions can be reached concerning the research approach it is preferable to adopt at any particular time.

The term "demarcationism" is usually associated with the problem of demarcating the scientific from the non- or pseudo-scientific, but Lakatos uses it in a rather different sense. A demarcation criterion, for Lakatos, is one used to distinguish scientific progress from degeneration, and a demarcationist is one who believes, firstly, that scientists can discover truths about the world, that is to say, can formulate propositions whose validity is independent of the opinions of men. Demarcationists believe, secondly, that criteria can be produced by which it may be recognised which theories have not led, and cannot lead, to the gathering of such knowledge. Such criteria also enjoy the status of impersonal knowledge, though its articulation may, like other timeless factual knowledge, be a matter of dispute and

increasing refinement. ¹

Lakatos writes that demarcationists proceed by reconstructing the criteria which great scientists have applied sub- or semi-consciously in appraising particular theories or research approaches. When it is found that theories, both past and present, do not meet these criteria, demarcationists attempt to overrule or explain the failure of the research approaches and theories.

Lakatos acknowledges that demarcationist historiography recognises that all histories of science are inevitably methodology-laden and that one cannot avoid "rational reconstructions". Each different kind of demarcationism—inductivism, falsificationism and Lakatos' own methodology of scientific research programmes—leads to a different "internal reconstruction", with correspondingly different anomalies and different "external" problems. These rational reconstructions, however, can be compared according to well-defined standards, and the history of demarcationism itself constitutes a progressive research programme.

The school of thought that Lakatos identifies as "elitism" is based on the negative claim that there cannot be a universal criterion of scientific progress. Elitists would hold that research approaches can only be appraised by scientists themselves or even by an elite of scientists, and the appraisal is of a pragmatic kind. Lakatos characterises pragmatism as the belief which is based on the denial of the existence of Popper's third world: ²

"Pragmatists do not deny that knowledge exists, but knowledge for them is a state


of mind, or even a 'slice of life'. One theory is better than another for a person or community $P$ at a time $t$ if it is ...
more 'satisfactory' for $P$ at $t$ ...
A theory is better than another if it works better".

If now I try to locate the view adopted in this thesis in relation to the positions outlined by Lakatos, it can be seen that I occupy a position which might be described as mid-way between elitism and demarcationism. I cannot fairly be described as a sceptic in so far as I believe it is possible to make a rational choice between available research approaches and theories. Neither is my position simply a version of demarcationism, since I do not seek to locate and deploy criteria which permit other than a pragmatic decision to be reached. I do believe, however, that pragmatists may employ general criteria justifying the adoption of one research approach and theory rather than another at a particular time, and concerning Popper's third world I remain an agnostic. I am, then, not wholly an elitist in Lakatos' sense.

My rejection of outright demarcationism is based fundamentally on the conviction that the quest for general criteria demarcating scientific progress and degeneration is utopian. The necessity for pragmatic decisions by scientists appears to me, that is, to be inescapable. I believe this since there seems to be no way of knowing whether the collection of apparently positive findings can indubitably confirm a theory as true. Recognising this, some philosophers (notably Pierce, Reichenbach and Popper) have suggested that although our present theories are neither true nor probable,

they are closer approximations to the truth than their predecessors.¹

Such an approach offers few consolations, however, since, as Laudan has pointed out, no one has been able even to say what it would mean to be "closer to the truth", let alone offer criteria for determining how we could assess such proximity. This is, of course, not to deny that, for all we know, some scientific theories are indeed true; equally it does not preclude the possibility that scientific theories through time have not moved closer and closer to the truth.

I hold the view, then, that since we must embrace agnosticism over the question of truth, scientists can only make pragmatic decisions concerning the preferability of research approaches and theories, the decisions being based both on the plenitude or likely plenitude of apparently positive findings, and the seeming freedom from conceptual difficulties attaching to the research approach and individual theory.

Such, then, will be the position adopted in this thesis. It is beyond the confines of the ensuing discussion to defend it further by detailed argument. It may be that this position will at some future date be shown to be untenable as a general position in philosophy of science. On that I cannot pronounce. I am more confident, however, that as applied to the field of enquiry which is the subject of this thesis, it will hold. I believe, that is, that the arguments in the thesis are sufficiently strong to establish that at the present time there are strong reasons for believing that the approach to school and school role socialization I shall advocate is preferable to the social systems research approach.

In this introduction I have attempted to outline my major concerns in this thesis. In the first chapter, however, my attention will be confined to the problems which arise in attempting to analyse the concept of socialization.
It is apparent that the description of the part played by school experience in the socialization process by which children are led to become acceptable members of our society cannot be properly undertaken until the concept of socialization itself has been satisfactorily elucidated. The clarification of the concept may be attempted in several ways, and I propose in this section to explore the possibilities of various approaches before indicating the avenue by which a relevant interpretation may be reached. I shall begin, principally in the interest of completeness, by remarking on the term's usage in everyday discourse.

1. "Socialization" and Ordinary Language

It must, I think, be admitted at once that an investigation of the use of the term in ordinary discourse is unlikely to prove particularly informative, since the connotations the concept today possesses appear to have been acquired from its uses at the hands of practitioners in several disparate scientific disciplines. It is, I believe, fairly clear that on the rare occasions in which the term "socialization" is used in everyday conversation its meaning is heavily theory-laden, and that if we seek elaboration of the speaker's meaning, it is to the term's use within the implied theoretical discipline that we must enquire.

This is not to say that the verb "to socialize" or its cognate, "socialization", were not current in the language well before they were in specialized use by twentieth century philosophers, sociologists and other behavioural scientists. Accordingly, we find the term present in the Oxford dictionary where "to socialize" is said to mean, "to render social, to make fit for living in society". Here, we seem to have the idea of preparing the individual for social life in general, rather
than for citizenship of a particular country. In the dictionary we may also find an illustration of the use of the term "socialization", drawn from a work published in 1899, which indicates that the process of socialization is "designed to produce the moral participant in society". Here we have illustrated a usage which implies a concern which is often seen as central to the socialization process: the inculcation of values thought necessary for the smooth running of society.

It would not appear, however, that either of these two illustrations have sufficient precision to be useful as a characterisation of the central concept of our investigation. This being the case, and the analysis of conversational usage not a viable recourse, it might next be thought profitable to examine the disputes which have appeared in specifically Educational writings concerning the supposed relationships and differences between the concepts of socialization and social education, for here perhaps we may find attention focussed directly on our key concept in the context with which we are concerned.

2. Socialization and Social Education

The insistence upon the importance of the logical differences between these two concepts has come, in the main, from philosophers of education brandishing the results of their analyses of the concept of education. Philosophers\(^1\) have concluded that education is concerned with the development of mind in accordance with the various forms of knowledge. Thus Hirst writes\(^2\):

"... to have a mind basically involves coming to have experience articulated by means of various


2. ibid., 124-5.
conceptual schema. It is only because man has over millenia objectified and progressively developed these that he has achieved the forms of human knowledge, and the possibility of the development of mind as we know it is open to us today.

A liberal education is, then, one that, determined in scope and content by knowledge itself, is thereby concerned with the development of mind".

This conclusion has been taken as an essential evaluatory criterion governing curricular projects which profess social education as their aim. Curricula contaminated with the baser metal of aims which are non-educational in this sense have been deplored as "socialization", a less than wholly rational process designed to secure conformity to prevailing social norms. Clarification of this distinction may be made by examining the philosophical case upon which it rests.

The argument may begin with evidence that the concept of education has in fact often been thought to be concerned with preparing children for "citizenship". Here we might find cited the much quoted view of Durkheim:

"Education is the influence exerted by adult generations on those who are not yet ready for social life. Its object is to arouse and develop in the child a certain number of physical, intellectual and moral states which are demanded of him both by the political society as a whole and the special milieu for which he is specifically destined". ¹

More recent evidence, culled from various government reports and "social education" projects can also easily be assembled. The Plowden Report\(^1\), for example, sees one obvious purpose of Primary education as fitting children for the society into which they will grow up, and the Crowther Report\(^2\) advocates further education to help students grow into "profitable citizens". Again, it is suggested in the Newsom Report\(^3\) that for the children under consideration the content of courses should be relevant to their likely concerns in adult life. Reference could also be made to a series of Schools Council Working Papers inspired by the Newsom Report. The most well-known of these publications, Working Paper No. II, "Society and the Young School Leaver"\(^4\), gave examples of courses believed to have been successful. These included topics such as "Work Experience", "Familiarity with the Adult World", "Public Utilities" and "The 97 Bus Route".

The philosophic objection to this conflation of education and preparation for citizenship is made on the grounds that the latter is not primarily concerned with the development of the pupil's mind in accordance with the forms of knowledge relevant in this area, but rather with fostering an outlook which is acceptable to society. Pring, for example, identifying preparation for citizenship with socialization, writes that,

"Socialization is a suspect word to many because it seems to imply not only a knowledge

and understanding of society but also an acceptance of the values and norms of that society. Thus the Newsom Report and the various Working Papers seem as much concerned with the attitudes and values of the pupils as with the knowledge they acquire. To train for citizenship seems to mean that one should inculcate certain values - respect for property, due deference to authority, the duty to vote, obedience to the law, loyalty to one's country. These would be the sort of features that distinguish the good citizen. Therefore, these would be the qualities that we must teach our pupils if they are to be properly socialized. They must learn the proper rules of behaviour.¹

This suggested difference between socialization and social education has recently been criticized on the grounds that it contains an assumption to the effect that the forms of knowledge are not ultimately a reflection of societal interests. This is important since once the forms are acknowledged to be so, it would follow that even if a teacher's aim was the development of the pupil's mind in accordance with the forms of knowledge, he would simply be deluding himself in thinking he was pursuing educational ends. He would, in fact, be engaged in socializing his pupils, since the forms of knowledge would simply be his society's way of interpreting the world, though "society" here would have to be construed widely indeed.

To clarify the contentious aspect of the philosopher's claim it is necessary to understand that the forms of knowledge are taken by Hirst to be,

"... the basic articulation whereby the whole of experience has become intelligible to man, they are the fundamental achievements of mind."

Peters has written of his agreement with this view:

"The structuring of knowledge into differentiated forms of thought and awareness is not an accidental or arbitrary matter, for there is no other way in which knowledge in depth can be developed."

Commenting on Hirst's forms of knowledge, several sociologists, including Young, Adelstein and Jencks have noted that they appear to be based on some kind of absolutist conception of a distinct set of categories. Jencks has pointed out that whilst Hirst acknowledges that his forms of knowledge are "historically and descriptively socially constructed", nevertheless they take on an ahistorical and absolutist form in his theorising which is quite unjustified.

6. ibid., 33.
It would appear that the crucial issue in determining whether or not Hirst's forms of knowledge are society specific turns upon the possibility of there being alternative conceptual schemes which permit coherent organisations of experience. Whether there may be such schemes is a very difficult question to answer, and certainly cannot be entered into here. Fortunately, for our purposes we may adopt a pragmatic stance to the issue. Neither Jencks nor any other writer has to my knowledge produced persuasive evidence that a society exists, which cannot be taken to be simply at a primitive and confused level of thought, whose members do not order their experience in accordance with the categories Hirst suggests. Literally, for all the world Hirst would appear to be correct, and on these grounds alone it would seem unobjectionable to base the distinction between social education and socialization on the conception of education as the development of mind in accordance with the forms of knowledge.

It might also be added that even if we were to accept that the forms of knowledge were peculiar to our society, so that education and socialization were ultimately indistinguishable, it would surely not follow that we would have no use for a distinction between the process of training for citizenship extolled by the government reports and the fostering of thinking in accordance with the forms of knowledge, whatever their status is taken to be. The distinction, then, must surely be allowed to stand, and it enables us at least to declare that our interests in this thesis are not to be in social education.

To distinguish social education from socialization in the sense of preparation for citizenship does not, however, assist us greatly.

1. Jencks mentions Casteneda, C., The Teaching of Don Juan - a Yaqui Way of Knowledge, 1970, but concedes that the "evidence" here is "strange".
in determining how we, who seek to provide answers to questions concerning the nature of school and school role socialization, are best to understand the concept of socialization. To achieve this aim, it might be thought more profitable to eschew for the present the scattered remarks to be found in Educational literature, and to consider what insights may be gained by a conceptual analysis of "socialization", and it is to this task that I now turn.

3. Conceptual Analysis and the Concept of Socialization

In availing myself of this recourse I proceed with certain reservations. Clarification of a concept employed within a particular theory may only incidentally yield relevant insights if we wish to deploy a nominally similar concept to explain quite different phenomena. The reason for this, and it is one which is now quite widely accepted among philosophers of science, is that concepts take their meanings from the theories in which they occur, from what Feigl\(^1\) calls their "locus in the nomological net". I believe this view to be quite incontrovertible, though it is still sometimes the case that philosophers who operate mainly outside the philosophy of science attempt the analysis of concepts which nominally are similar to those employed by behavioural scientists, believing thereby that they can shed some light on the concepts as they appear within theories. Not surprisingly, such philosophers often find that they have subsequently to condemn the conceptual deployment of particular theorists. Langford,\(^2\) for example, has criticised the manner in which the concept of learning has been deployed by certain psychologists, and Hamlyn\(^3\) has attacked Piaget's notion of development. (It is, of course,

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possible that when theorists are employing concepts which are nominally similar to those which have a usage within ordinary discourse, they may covertly and invalidly draw on the richness of implications found in everyday language. When this occurs "ordinary language philosophers" may, of course, correctly criticise).

The impetus behind this kind of conceptual criticism often springs, I think, from a conviction which involves what Popper\(^1\) has called "the fallacy of essentialism". The "fallacy" is the belief in the over-riding importance of definitions and their implications. Popper is not, of course, suggesting that an improvement in the precision of a formulation may not sometimes be highly profitable. His point is that an increase in exactness has only a pragmatic value. If greater precision is needed, it is because the problem to be solved demands it, and not merely because it is possible to clarify or refine a concept further, something which he argues could always be the case. Mackenzie\(^2\) has further argued that a searching examination of the concepts employed in a theory is most profitably undertaken only when there are strong grounds for believing a previously accepted theory is unable to account for current knowledge.

If it is the case that concepts take their meaning from the part they play within a theory and call for no greater precision than is required by the theory, then, in so far as we wish to solve a fresh problem, the analysis of concepts within particular theories intended to resolve quite different problems, may only incidentally prove illuminating.

It is, then, only for the insights which may incidentally be afforded that I shall examine two contrasting interpretations of the concept of socialization. Before doing so, however, certain distinctions between different approaches to conceptual analysis must be made.

The first distinction is one which often finds its counterpart among philosophers themselves. Although most philosophers would probably agree that the making of conceptual remarks was central to their calling, by no means all would accept that this was a worthwhile end in itself. If a broad division can be made between concepts which find their characteristic employment in what with some looseness may be called "scientific" theories, and those in ordinary discourse, then it is probably the case that those philosophers who engage in the analysis of the latter, devoting their attention, for example, to concepts such as "teaching", "education", and so forth, think of conceptual analysis as valuable simply for the clarity it brings. When, on the other hand, philosophers of science direct their analytic gaze at particular concepts, their concerns are frequently wider than clarification for its own sake. For example, whilst the former kind of philosopher may be concerned to elucidate the logically necessary conditions for the proper use of a term, philosophers of science may be concerned with "explication" in Hempel's sense:

"An explication of a given set of terms ... combines essential aspects of meaning analysis and of empirical analysis. Taking its departure from the customary meanings of the terms, explication aims at reducing the limitations, ambiguities and inconsistencies of their ordinary usage by producing a re-interpretation intended to enhance the clarity and precision of their meanings as well as their ability to function in hypotheses and theories with explanatory and predictive force. Thus understood, an explication cannot be qualified simply as true or false; but it may be adjudged..."

more or less adequate according to the extent to which it attains its objective.

It would appear that the kind of analysis described by Hempel is not relevant here, for its purpose is to overcome a perceived difficulty within a particular sphere of investigation. Equally, the other kinds of analysis undertaken by philosophers of science — clarifications of, for example, concepts such as that of an "intervening variable", and remarks concerning the proper interpretation of "theoretical constructs" — seem also not to be germane in that they are made with the intention of removing procedural difficulties.¹

In addition to both these approaches one might mean by "conceptual analysis" simply an examination of the way in which concepts are used and related within a theory. One might, for example, in considering a theory of socialization, examine how socialization is understood by considering how deviance is accounted for, and what explanatory resources are available to deal with cases of unsuccessful socialization.

This latter type of investigation would appear to be the most relevant for our purposes, but in order that we may draw from the considered theories all that is of interest, I shall begin by posing a question which a conceptual analyst of the ordinary language approach might well raise. The question is whether socialization is a process which logically can ever be considered complete. In posing this question, we may thus proceed with both approaches to conceptual analysis in mind, looking for the answer to our question as it is suggested by the theory, and also noting the way in which notions which attend upon that of socialization are treated.

The question we are to pose, moreover, is clearly of some importance in itself, for if socialization is a process which can at some point

¹. It is easy to exaggerate the differences between philosophers of science and ordinary language philosophers. It is, of course, true that much of the work done by the former — on, for example, the concept of explanation — is undertaken both in the manner and the spirit of the latter.
be considered complete, its end-product may perhaps be called "a socialized man", and, if so, we may need to know the distinguishing features of such a person. If, on the other hand, the nature of the socialization process is such that it can never finally be said to be complete, then we shall have to consider what criteria may be applied to determine the success or failure of the process.

3 (a) The Theories to be Considered

From among the various socialization theories which have been propounded, I shall at this point concentrate on just two: that which may be called the "behaviourist" theory, and, by contrast, that advanced by Berger and Luckmann. There is no reason for choosing these particular theories other than their relative completeness and continuing influence - the former on psychological and social psychological research projects, and the latter on the thinking of sociologists who are united in their anti-positivism.

The theories are relatively complete in that it is a fairly straightforward matter to determine not only how the concept of socialization itself is to be understood, and what constitutes success and failure in the socialization process, but also to discover how the related concepts of "deviancy", "the unsuccessfully socialized person", and "the unsocialized person", are to be interpreted.

It is upon these features of the theories that I shall focus attention. For then, and only then, will it be possible properly to decide whether, in the terms of the theory considered, socialization is an unending process.

1. The work of various writers could be cited here, and to some extent the theory outlined will be a composite one. For an overview of the literature see Zigler, E.F., and Child, I.L. (eds.) Socialization and Personality Development, Massachusetts, 1973, 1-26.


3. The comparison referred to here is with theories which deal only with particular aspects of socialization, such as that of Bernstein. See Bernstein, B., Class, Codes and Control, vols. I-III, 1971-75.
(i) The Behaviourist Theory of Socialization

The term "behaviourist" has a certain looseness of application. As I shall use the term, it will refer to those theorists who thought, and those who still think, that a certain set of "decision procedures" for the design and evaluation of research is the principal requirement for an intellectual enquiry to be properly termed "scientific".

These decision procedures have their immediate origin in the work of the logical positivists and scientific methodologists whose view of the structure of scientific theories was, in its original purity, that such theories should be hypothetico-deductive systems. General laws or hypotheses should be asserted as postulates, and the consequences of these ("theorems") should be deduced by strict logical and mathematical rules, the theorems then being tested by experiment. Scientific theories, they believed, differ from logical and mathematical systems only in that their basic terms are given empirical reference by operational definitions which state the observational conditions under which the terms may be applied.

It is from such a view of scientific theories that "classical" behaviourism sprang. However, as has been pointed out, the logical tools for refining concepts and testing theories associated with classical behaviourism were used by later behaviourists in virtual independence of the hypothetico-deductive model of theorising, which was found too difficult and cumbersome for conducting many worthwhile investigations. The logical and methodological tools actually used, Mackenzie has noted, included:

"... operational definitions, meaning criteria such as the verifiability criterion, related criteria for assessing the validity of hypotheses (whether formally deduced from a

1. See Mackenzie, B.D., op. cit, 23.
theory or not), and others.¹

All these techniques, or "decision procedures", were taken to provide a sufficient guide, even without strict adherence to the hypothetico-deductive model, to show not only how to evaluate scientific theories and statements, but also how to put ideas into a form suitable for such evaluation.

In a behaviourist theory of socialization, then, an adherence to such procedures is to be the distinguishing mark. No grand hypothetico-deductive theoretical system is to be found, but the use of allied procedures can be noticed in the very definition of "socialization" offered by theorists of behaviourist inclination. Consider, for example, the following definition:

"By socialization is meant the whole process by which an individual born with behavioural potentialities of enormously wide range, is led to develop actual behaviour which is confined within a much narrower range - the range of what is customary and acceptable for him according to the standards of his group."²

There is in such definitions a stress on overt behaviour at the expense of mental characteristics, and it is a short step from here to the limiting of enquiries to that which is easily amenable to measurement³. Such definitions may be contrasted with those of opponents of behaviourism, such as Raffky, whose interest in socialization is not coloured by any commitment to the decision procedures accepted by behaviourist researchers:


3. Such measurement has, of course, to include the assessment of particular attitudes or traits, but behaviourists find little difficulty in producing operational definitions of these.
"Socialization is the process whereby the objective, i.e., external and coercive world of social objects, norms, values, institutions, and legitimations, becomes subjectively real to the individual. His consciousness is structured in accordance with the world view of his contemporaries and thus the symbolic universe acquires for the individual what William James calls the 'accents of reality'. The goal of the socialization process is an individual who identifies with other people and situations".¹

It is notable that in the approach to socialization implicit in behaviourist definitions there is no reference to a distinction often drawn by other kinds of theorist, that between "primary" and "secondary" socialization. These terms are employed by diverse writers, though they do not always mark the same distinction.

Thus, in the Gittins Report², primary socialization occurs during the period between fifteen months to three years, when significant relationships within and outside the family are formed. For Havighurst and Neugarten³, on the other hand, the process of primary socialization is concerned not so much with fundamental relationships as with the patterns of feeding, sleeping, toilet training, control of aggression, and so forth, which need to be established for the child. Equally, by "secondary socialization" may be meant either occupational role socialization⁴ or the process of induction into any group outside the family.⁵


4. There are a number of works employing this concept. See, for example, Becker, H.S., Geer, E. and Hughes, E., Boys in White, Chicago, 1961.

5. See, for example, Lacey, C., The Socialization of Teachers, 1977, 20.
I believe that one of the reasons for the neglect of this distinction by behaviourists is that according to their view of acceptable scientific procedure, the outcome of the socialization of an individual is understood as the product of his "reinforcement history" in particular situations. This being the case, little of consequence seems to lie in the distinction between primary and secondary socialization, for the outcomes of both processes are to be understood, they believe, in similar ways.

Although behaviourists have no use for a broad distinction between primary and secondary socialization, they do have recourse to the idea that people may, in accordance with their age, be said to be "at a satisfactory level of socialization". A person may be so described when he has learnt to behave in the ways that someone of his age, sex and group ought, in the eyes of society, to behave, provided it is within his power to do so.

This has important consequences for the kind of criteria behaviourist theorists employ to determine whether or not the socialization of an individual has been successful. For this view, combined with the insistence that data be quantifiable, has led to the construction of evaluatory procedures which typically take the form either of inventories or scales designed to measure individual attitudes or traits, possession of which in combination could be said to constitute the successfully socialized person, or of multi-dimensional personality tests, sections of which are relevant to "social adjustment". An example of the former, which is, I believe, widely used in America, is the Stodgill "Behaviour Record Sheet", which is designed to measure attitudes of children to determine the extent to which they are deviant on such matters as sex, friendships and honesty. Each child interviewed is accounted deviant on, for example, sexual matters.

to the extent that his completed questionnaire reveals his difference from
the normal, that is, the average child. This kind of questionnaire
criterion of normalcy is also widely employed in this country. For
example, the "Bristol Social Adjustment Guides"\(^1\) are used by many
Education Authorities. These Guides take the form of questionnaires
which are designed to measure such things as "peer-maladaptiveness",
"hostility" and "unforthcomingness".

Among multi-dimensional personality tests are several which are
entirely or in part concerned with the evaluation of socialization. There
is, for example, Bell's "Adjustment Inventory"\(^2\) which assesses five
areas of "personal adjustment": home, health, social, emotional and
"total" adjustment. There is both an adolescent and an adult form of
the test, the latter including an assessment of "occupational adjustment".
Another multi-dimensional test is the "Scales for the Study of Behavioural
Problems and Problem Tendencies in Children".\(^3\) This includes a rating
scale designed for use by teachers to "survey a maladjusted pupil or to
ascertain the characteristics of a class". In studying behaviour problems,
it lists observable activities. Each activity is rated on frequency of
occurrence. The listed behavioural problems include: defiance of
discipline, temper outbursts, obscene talk, sex offences and so forth.\(^4\)

It is, then, by the use of standardized "socialization scales" that
the behaviourist seeks to reach a decision as to whether a person is deviant
or, within the terms covered by the questionnaire, whether we have reason
to believe that an individual has not been successfully socialized.

Social Adjustment Guides, 1958.
3. Haggerty, M.E., Olson, W.C., and Wickman, E.K., Scales for the Study
of Behavioural Problems and Problem Tendencies in Children Manual,
New York, 1930.
4. Other multi-dimensional tests could of course be mentioned. The most
widely used probably is, Hathaway, S.R. and McKinley, J.C., The
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, New York, 1943. See
Behaviourists are not limited by their approach merely to the identification of those who have not been successfully socialized. It is quite compatible with their principles to conduct investigations into the failure of socialization processes. To understand the theoretical basis of these explanations, however, it is to behaviourist learning theory that reference must be made. The literature here is extensive and there are divergencies among behaviourist theorists which it would not be profitable, with our present concerns, to pursue. Instead, I shall simply cite the work of the social psychologist, Homans, who has formulated some of the general laws or propositions derivable from Skinner's work in a way intended to give them general application. These formulations include the following three propositions:

1) If in the past the occurrence of a particular stimulus-situation has been the occasion on which man's activity has been rewarded, then the more similar the present stimulus-situation is to the previous one, the more likely he is to engage in the activity or some similar activity now.

2) The more often within a given period of time a man's activity is rewarded, the more often he will engage in that activity again.

3) The more valuable to a man is a reward he has received for some activity, the more often he will engage in the activity.

I would suggest that the explanations of unsuccessful socialization given by behaviourists rest upon at least an implicit acceptance of these propositions.

Such explanations might not, of course, make reference only to such principles. An explanatory account might also allude to the fact that in a pluralist society such as our own, it is to be expected that individuals would be members of groups whose behavioural requirements of members were incompatible. The disharmony, for example, between the

1. See, for example, Hill, W.F., Learning, 1964.

values fostered in certain working class homes and those extolled by some schools could reasonably be expected to weaken the effectiveness of all the socialization processes operative there.¹

The explanatory resources to which I have referred could lead to the drawing of a distinction by behaviourists between unsuccessfully socialized persons and deviants. Unsuccessfully socialized persons would be those whose behaviour showed only a limited and intermittent commitment to the values and ways of behaving expected of a group's members. The term "deviant", on the other hand, could be used by behaviourists to refer to people whose behaviour deviates from the group's norm in such a manner that it has to be understood as a consequence of successful socialization by socialization agents who are themselves deviant. The children of criminals, for example, may be raised in such a fashion that the family traditions are maintained. Neurotic parents also may rear rigidly conforming children who later are unable to adjust to changes in societal values, and thus come to behave in ways which are deviant in the eyes of contemporary society.

Behaviourists, then, may distinguish between the unsuccessfully socialized and the deviant. These terms are, moreover, not the only ones which they may contrast with the "successfully socialized." They may also recognize another category of individual, that of the "unsocialized person." By the term "unsocialized person" they may include not merely the infant who has not yet been led to conform to "proper" standards of behaviour, but also two other classes of people who have not been effectively exposed to a socialization process.

The first of these does not contain many members. From time to time one reads accounts of children who have not been reared in human

society, and so simply have not been exposed to any human socialization process. Some of the feral children discovered in the past enter this category, and other children who have been confined in virtual isolation may also properly be accounted as unsocialized.

Secondly, in a large, complex society such as our own, it seems inevitable that no individual person will be exposed to the full range of group norms to be found in the entire society. Once, in fact, division of labour occurs, it is likely that there will be people who are not fully aware of how one ought to behave as a worker in an occupation different from their own. Further, not only is occupational role socialization relevant here, but religious socialization in any pluralistic society also has similar implications. In a society such as ours, then, we are all in some respects, "unsocialized people".

We come now, finally, to the question of whether, in the terms of behaviourist theory, socialization is necessarily (from a logical point of view) an unending process. It will, I think, be fairly clear both that a distinction will have to be drawn between successful and complete socialization, and that the possibility of complete socialization will be related to the type of society and socialization under consideration.

For the behaviourist, successful socialization is evidenced by a certain score on a socialization scale of one type or another. But while a behaviourist would acknowledge that a person so tested might, at that time and in respect of the areas assessed by the questionnaire, be said to have been successfully socialized, there would be no basis for the further assertion that his socialization was complete. In all but the most static societies norms are constantly being created, strengthened or weakened, and the transmission at any one time of the current norms would not then amount to a complete socialization programme. In modern industrial societies a fairly constant effort
is thought necessary to lead citizens to adopt a "proper" outlook on the changing important affairs, and thus without unending efforts at socialization the probability of widescale deviance or indifference is increased. Equally, even if the socialization under consideration is of a more limited kind - occupational role socialization, for example - there are, for similar reasons, no grounds for supposing that socialization efforts may ever be no longer necessary.

For the behaviourist, then, socialization should not be conceived in such a fashion that it appears a process which has a logical termination in more than a purely formal sense. The end of the socialization process may logically be "a socialized man", but such a being is not uncontingently a person with a fixed set of attitudes. It is possible only to speak of a person as socialized in the context of a particular society at a certain time, and thus if we wish to know how we are to recognise a socialized pupil we gain little by purely conceptual argument.

There is much still to be discussed in connection with the behaviourist approach to socialization, but whilst our enquiries are limited to examining the profitability of a conceptual analysis of the term as it appears in different theories, we may postpone further comment to a later section of the thesis. We turn now to a quite different theoretical approach, that of Berger and Luckmann.

(ii) The Berger and Luckmann Theory of Socialization

The approach to socialization of Berger and Luckmann in The Social Construction of Reality owes much to the writings of George Herbert Mead. Though Mead considered himself a "social behaviourist", he differed from other behaviourists on reductionist issues which were crucial in their methodological implications. He considered Watson's behaviourism

2. See Mead, G.H., Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, 1934.
a grave oversimplification of the nature of human behaviour, and believed
that if a scientist was to work with an adequate conception of human
behaviour he had to operate with mental concepts such as intentions
and purposes. Mead was a behaviourist only in the sense that he
accepted a Darwinian emergent view of mind which sought to explain
distinctively human behaviour in terms of its genesis in infantile
responses. In Mead's work, therefore, we do not find anything like the
same concern with reproducible experiment, operational definition or
other techniques of the later behaviourists. We find instead a large
amount of speculative writing, which is often persuasive, but depends for
its cogency upon an appeal to our own intuitive understanding of the
origins of human behaviour. Berger and Luckmann would appear not only
to accept something very like this general theoretical stance, but,
as we shall see, even make use of terminology employed by Mead.

The central problem which these writers seek to resolve concerns
what is involved in becoming a member of society. Their interest lies
not in the membership of particular societies, but of societies in
general, or groups within them. Their answer, in brief, is that it is to
come to possess a sense of identity as a member of a group. In order,
however, fully to understand what is involved here it will be necessary to
comprehend the positions taken by Berger and Luckmann with respect to
the cluster of distinctions which it was found necessary to make
in clarifying the behaviourist approach to socialization.

Accordingly, we may begin by citing their definition of socialization.
For these writers, the process involves,
"... the comprehensive and consistent
induction of an individual into the
objective world of a society or a sector of it".2

Stated in this isolated fashion, however, there is a suggestion of an accommodation by an autonomous individual to the social order, and this is a distortion of their actual position. It is clear in fact from their writings that the notion of an autonomous man, in the sense of one whose views are not shaped by society, has no part to play in their theoretical perspective. For Berger and Luckmann, socialization primarily involves children in the assimilation of ways of thinking to such a degree that to think otherwise seems playful or preposterous. Adopting Meadian terminology, they suggest that,

"Primary socialization ends when the concept of the generalised other (and all that goes with it) has been established in the consciousness of the individual. At this point he is an effective member of society and in subjective possession of a self and a world".

To understand what is being suggested here, it will be necessary to follow their reasoning in some detail.

Berger and Luckmann begin by pointing out that every child is brought up by parents or guardians who belong to a certain class and to other kinds of social groupings, at least in a society such as our own. These parents or guardians will have a distinctive outlook on the myriad social gradations and on the correctness and importance of the ways in which a person should conduct himself. They perforce impose their viewpoint upon their children to a varying but often considerable extent, for children from the earliest months of life form emotional attachments to their parents, and initially take their viewpoint as beyond the

possibility of challenge. Children thereby come to adopt a biased and to some extent even an idiosyncratic perspective on what is "proper" conduct and "correct" beliefs. Further, children not only acquire perspectives on the world in this way, they are also led to accept views of themselves from this source. To a considerable extent children become to themselves what their parents take them to be.

Berger and Luckmann suggest that there is a progression by which children come to embrace their parents' viewpoint and accept it as an objectively correct characterisation of themselves and of the social world. There is a progression, presumably both temporal and logical, in the minds of children which moves, for example, from "Father is angry with me now" to "Father is angry whenever I spill soup" to "Everybody is against soup spilling" to "One does not spill soup" - the "one" being himself as a member of a group which may include all of society.

Berger and Luckmann suggest that it is only by virtue of this identification with a group that a child's sense of his own identity attains stability. The child now has not only an identity vis-a-vis a parent or guardian but an identity vis-a-vis all those he encounters. For Berger and Luckmann, the importance of this can scarcely be over-estimated:

"The formulation within consciousness of the generalised other marks a decisive phase in socialization. It implies the internalization of society as such and of the objective reality established therein, and, at the same time, the subjective establishment of a coherent and continuous identity. Society, identity and reality are subjectively crystallised in the same process of internalization".¹

Primary socialization, they believe, is followed in most cases by a secondary socialization, which is indeed only possible after the former has been effected. At one point they define secondary socialization widely as,

"... any subsequent process that inducts an already socialized individual into the new sectors of the objective world of his society".¹

Later, however, in discussing what occurs during secondary socialization, they narrow their consideration to the individual’s identification with institutions of one kind or another. Secondary socialization then involves, "the internalization of institution or institution-based sub-worlds".²

They illustrate the range of factors involved here by discussing the socialization of a cavalryman. They point out that a man becomes a cavalryman not only by acquiring the requisite skills, but by becoming capable of using their argot, or sharing tacit understandings, and, crucially, by identifying with the role and accepting the norms to which the members of his profession subscribe.

Unlike behaviourists, Berger and Luckmann, as we shall see, attach considerable importance to the distinction between primary and secondary socialization. They do point out, however, that it is possible to conceive of a society in which no further socialization takes place after the primary one. Such a society would be one with a very simple stock of knowledge, all of which would be generally available. Since, however, there is no known society which does not have some division of labour and, consequently, some knowledge available only to those who follow certain occupations, secondary socialization is universally a practical necessity.

We turn now to the question of the criteria adopted by Berger and Luckmann to determine whether or not the socialization of the individual

2. ibid., 150.
has been successful. In dealing with both primary and secondary socialization, they assert that a person has been successfully socialized if and when he fully identifies with the group of which he has become a member. Although these writers make this their principle criterion, and indeed their discussion of socialization centres upon it, they would certainly not deny that in order to become an acceptable member of a group a person must fulfil other conditions. These other requirements would no doubt include acquiring the knowledge and skills which competent members must possess. This point is worth emphasising since in the concern which Berger and Luckmann have with the individual member's viewpoint, the demands of other group members do not receive a great deal of attention.

Although Berger and Luckmann give prominence to the same success criterion when dealing with both primary and secondary socialization, it is clear that the psychological impact upon the individual is likely to be greater in the case of a failure in the primary socialization process, for a failure in this process will result in the child not properly forming the kind of attachment which writers like Bowlby have suggested as important in the psychological development of children.

It is, nevertheless, on the topic of failures in secondary socialization processes that Berger and Luckmann write at length. Their discussion is conducted not at the level of individual case history, but rather takes the form of an examination of the ways in which groups of varying complexity may by the very nature of their organisation make complete identification by all members at least highly unlikely.

Berger and Luckmann begin their examination of failures in the secondary socialization process by discussing a type of society more

simple than our own. They claim that the kind of society in which one is likely to find a very high degree of successful socialization is one in which there is a very simple division of labour and minimal distribution of knowledge. In such a society everybody knows the occupation and status of everyone else and that no changes are likely. In consequence it is difficult to aspire in a meaningful way to fulfil anything other than one's prescribed social destiny. A knight is a knight, and a peasant is a peasant, to himself as well as to others. "Problems of identity" are not likely to be experienced by many members, for the question, "Who am I?" is unlikely to rise into consciousness, since the socially pre-defined answer is "massively real subjectively and confirmed consistently in all significant social interaction". 1

Under such circumstances a failure in the secondary socialization process typically occurs when individuals from the outset fail to meet society's requirements of its members. Such failures are beyond the individual's control, and might be termed "biographical accidents", which might be either biological or social. For example, in a certain type of society it may just not be possible to arrange matters so that a certain sort of individual readily accepts society's view of himself, since in that society a stigma attaches to the kind of person he is. The cripple and the bastard have been two such types of individual in certain societies. Such people have been deemed to be in some degree unacceptable, and the dawning consciousness of this inhibits feelings of unreserved identification with the group. In the terms of Berger and Luckmann, any such person is unlikely to be successfully socialised for, "... there will be a high degree of asymmetry between the socially defined reality in which

he is de facto caught, as in an alien world, and his own subjective reality, which reflects the world only poorly.¹

Berger and Luckmann then change the model of society and consider one in which certain people are separated from the rest of the citizenry but form an organised group of their own. By way of illustration they write of a society in which lepers are stigmatised and forced to live together on the outskirts of a village. Whereas in the society previously considered the people who were not successfully socialized remained isolated individuals and were given no psychological support from any organised group sharing a similar affliction, in the society at present under consideration this is not the case. Berger and Luckmann suppose that inside the leper colony it is understood that to be a leper is to bear the mark of divine election. In these circumstances it is to be expected that a failure in the socialization processes which operate in the main society will be accompanied by a certain degree of success in that of the leper colony. Individual lepers, under these conditions, may to some degree achieve some genuine identification with the group comprised by their fellow lepers. However, in so far as a leper wishes to be free of his disease, he will wish to be normal and thus will think it better to belong to the group which lives within the village. It is, in fact, likely to be the case that socialization processes operated within the leper colony will be only partially successful.

Berger and Luckmann have up to this point considered only societies whose socialization processes operate in such a fashion that certain people are led, against their wishes, to think of themselves as different from other members of society. Having glimpsed the possibility of a sub-group within a society operating its own socialization processes, Berger and Luckmann now begin to examine societies in which a "heterogeneity in the socializing personnel" afford an opportunity for the

¹ Berger, P.L. and Luckmann, T., op. cit., 185.
individual himself to choose to identify with a sub-group. We see this happening in Kipling's novel, *Kim*, where the white boy is brought up for a time as an Indian native. Kim's identification with white society is fractured, and for a time, he prefers to think of himself as a native Indian rather than a white boy.

Berger and Luckmann point out that such a possibility of choice or "individualism" is directly linked to the possibility of unsuccessful socialization of a kind we have not so far discussed. Up to this point we have considered only failures in socialization processes which could be said to be intentional. Once, however, we begin to consider societies in which individuals may choose to identify with a sub-group, then cases of unsuccessful socialization reveal weaknesses in the operation of the dominant group's socialization processes.

In societies where this is possible it is not only a few isolated individuals like the boy in Kipling's novel who may raise the question concerning with which group they wish to identify. Berger and Luckmann suggest that the question "Who am I?" will arise also in the minds even of the successfully socialized by virtue of their reflections concerning the unsuccessfully socialized. Once one person has exercised choice, others must grasp, at least intellectually, that choice is possible.

Finally, Berger and Luckmann consider societies such as our own in which not only might "a heterogeneity of socializing personnel" make "individualism" a possibility which may be widely entertained, but a more fluid social structure also may lead to many individuals identifying with something other than their "proper place" in society. Berger and Luckmann point out that in such a society, the exercise of choice at the secondary socialization stage may lead to the repudiation
of the group with which the individual identified during primary socialization. A man may wish, that is, to recreate his past. We see this in the case of the person of working class origins who wins the Oxford scholarship and gains the kind of intellectual freedom which permits him to see the mental straitjacket foisted upon him in his early years. He is now the middle class scholar and cannot think of himself as the labourer's son.

More importantly, the possibility of exercising choice on the question as to which group one is to belong in a pluralist society creates the possibility that one may simply pretend to others to identify with a particular sub-group for ulterior reasons. A man may, for example, adopt the manner and dress, and espouse the ideas of "hippie" culture, simply to exploit the increased sexual opportunities. As Berger and Luckmann point out, if this phenomenon becomes widespread, "the institutional order as a whole begins to take on the character of a network of reciprocal manipulations". They further point out that:

"There will be an increased general consciousness of the relativity of all worlds, including one's own, which is now subjectively apprehended as 'a world', rather than 'the world.' It follows that one's own institutionalised conduct may be apprehended as 'a role' from which one may detach oneself in one's consciousness, and which one may 'act out' with manipulative control. For example, the aristocrat no longer is an aristocrat, but plays at being an aristocrat, and so forth .... This situation is increasingly typical of contemporary industrial society".

Berger and Luckmann do not dwell on the implications of the situation they describe, but it would appear that if the effectiveness of socialization processes is to be judged in terms of the identification of members with their groups, then clearly a society such as ours can tolerate a considerable failure rate without large-scale civil disorder. This is, of course, not to suggest that the various skills, knowledge and abilities to share tacit understandings, and so forth, mentioned by Berger and Luckmann in their discussion of the many things involved in learning to be a member of a group, are not absolutely necessary if groups are to function smoothly. It would not appear, though, from their writings, that Berger and Luckmann believe that an inward commitment is strictly required of all members of our present society.

Having elucidated the terms in which Berger and Luckmann explain failures in socialization processes, it remains to be considered whether, within their theory, the concepts of the deviant and the unsocialized person have any application, and if so, what importance they possess.

On the topic of deviance we may begin by noting that one of the fundamental differences between the theory of Berger and Luckmann and that of the behaviourists is the former's phenomenological concern with the person who has been exposed to socializing experiences, rather than with an objective examination of the degree of his conformity with attitudes and behaviour patterns esteemed by the group. This being the case, Berger and Luckmann have no pressing taxonomic need for the deviance label. It is true that a person with an identity problem may think of himself as "deviant", but for Berger and Luckmann the terminology is of no special significance. Their concern is merely to explain how a person comes to have an identity problem, that is, fails to be properly socialized. Similarly, the notion of an unsocialized person in the
sense of one who, perhaps for the reasons adduced during my discussion of
the behaviourist theory of socialization, simply has not been exposed to
a socialization process, could readily be employed by Berger and Luckmann.
The introduction of this term would not, however, appear to add greatly
to the ideas incorporated in their theory. These writers have, as
I have indicated, declared that the primary socialization process is
necessary if a child is to attain a "sense of his own identity". It is
not entirely clear what Berger and Luckmann might mean by this phrase,
but nothing in their writings would appear to be contradicted by the
attitudes and behaviour of those few feral children about whom we have
reliable evidence. Indeed, some terms like "a sense of one's own identity"
and "a sense of belonging to a group", are in fact illumined by the
reports we have of these children who have been denied a normal human
upbringing.

It remains now only to answer the conceptual analyst's question as
to whether socialization is for these writers logically an unending
process or not. Once again it is pertinent to draw a distinction
between successful socialization and the possibility that socialization
processes may no longer be required. On the question of success in
the socialization process, it would appear that this can be said to
have been achieved, at any particular point in time, if a person has
no "identity problems". Children aside, it seems reasonable to suppose that,
in our society at least, few people can be said not to entertain some
reservations about the groups to which they belong, and realism obliges
us therefore to acknowledge that completely successful socialization at
the secondary stage is difficult to achieve in a society such as our own.
Concerning the possibility that socialization processes could ever
be completed, Berger and Luckmann stress that even in the case of
primary socialization the processes are, as a matter of contingent fact, never completed:

"It should ... be stressed that the symmetry between objective and subjective reality cannot be complete. The two realities correspond to each other, but they are not coextensive. There is always more objective reality 'available' than is actually internalised in any individual consciousness, simply because the contents of socialization are determined by the social distribution of knowledge. No individual internalises the totality of what is objectivated as reality in his society, not even if the society and its world are relatively simple ones".¹

The process of socialization for Berger and Luckmann, then, must in effect be accounted unending and the notion of a "socialized man" as the terminus of the socialization is a purely formal one.

In this chapter my announced intention was to indicate the path by which a relevant interpretation of the concept of socialization might be reached. In proposing to examine two contrasting socialization theories, however, I did acknowledge that any insights afforded would be incidental. I propose now to review these insights, and to draw certain conclusions concerning the way in which a promising, operable interpretation of this concept might be reached.

From an examination of these two theories it would seem that there are two points which it is instructive to note. We may begin to develop the first point by remarking again that theories are designed to solve problems, and that if we are to assess the relevance of any particular theory to our present enquiry it is essential to be clear just what

question has been posed to which the theory provides the answer. A further complication may now be observed. Underpinning the question posed and its theoretical solution are assumptions and commitments of various kinds which may render the incorporation of any feature of the theory into the solution of some quite different problem extremely difficult, if indeed, it is possible at all.

This point may be readily observed in connection with the behaviourist theory. The central question which theorists who conduct their investigations in accordance with behaviourist techniques are concerned would, from a content analysis of their questionnaires, appear to be the following: given that people are acceptable as members of a group insofar as they hold certain values, how can it be determined which people hold those values, and which are deviant or unsuccessfully socialized to some degree? Their answer, as we have seen, involves the construction of carefully contrived questionnaires. It is, however, not only the rectitude of scientific procedure with which such questionnaires are produced which should lead us to adopt a behaviourist theory of school socialization. Other factors need to be considered. A common assumption of behaviourist theorists is that the purpose of socialization processes is to instil certain values, for it is the adoption of these values which makes people acceptable as group members and social life stable. Such a perspective on socialization processes may not be a fruitful one to embrace when one's interest is in school socialization, for it may simply be the case that the part played by schools in the

1. I shall confine my illustrative remarks to the behaviourist theory since the assumptions which underlie the theory of Berger and Luckmann admit of no short, coherent elucidation.

2. There is nothing in the behaviourist credo (which is, in fact, a body of beliefs concerning the correct way to conduct scientific investigations) which would prevent behaviourists from construing the socialization process in a way such that values were not at the centre of the picture. It is simply a matter of contingent fact that most socialization scales do focus on values.
socialization of children lies not at all in the inculcation of values conducive to the preservation and smooth functioning of society.

In addition to this assumption there are others which in due course I shall discuss. For the present it is sufficient for my purpose to remark that embodied in all theories are perspectives and commitments, an examination of which is necessary if any attempted application of the theory to fresh problems is to be founded properly on reason.

The second point which emerges from the examination we have made of the socialization theories of the behaviourists and Berger and Luckmann concerns the clear distinction which is drawn between features of the socialization process under consideration, and the consequences which follow for those for whom the process has not been successful. For Berger and Luckmann, the clearest representatives of such failures are cripples, bastards and lepers. Such people are, in the societies considered, almost outcasts. They retain nominal membership of the group but are treated quite differently from other members and often harshly. 'Similarly, the use to which socialization scales most commonly are put is to determine whether a member of an organisation, such as a school, should be treated in a way in which other members are not. In the case of a school pupil his score on a socialization scale may in certain circumstances lead to his being sent away from his present school to a special kind of educational establishment. He remains a schoolboy, but is treated differently from the majority of schoolboys, and the treatment he receives is in no sense part of the normal socialization process.

This point seems to me to be an important one for there is an increasing tendency in educational writings ¹ to apply the term "deviant" either to pupils who regularly commit minor breaches of school regulations

¹. See, for example, Hargreaves, D., Hester, S., and Mellor, F., Deviance in Classrooms, 1975, and Barton, L. and Heighan, R., Schools, Pupils and Deviance, 1979.
and receive routine punishments, or even to pupils who are not doing well academically and are taught in special groups within their own school. To use the term in this way makes it very difficult to distinguish the process of school role socialization from the arrangements schools make to deal with its failures. It is undeniable that school authorities seek to bring children to behave in ways which are conducive to what they see as the proper running of the school, and that, with some children, they fail so completely that they are compelled to arrange the removal of the children, by one means or another, from the school.

It would assist analytic clarity in any discussion of school role socialization if the terms "deviant" or "unsuccessfully socialized" were reserved for these children. Certainly I propose to do so in this thesis.

Before we may proceed with the elucidation of the terms of any direct empirical investigations either of school or school role socialization, we must take up the point that it is necessary not merely to have a knowledge of socialization theories which might be applied to this area of study, but to make a detailed examination of the assumptions which underpin the theories. It is to the problems involved in this enterprise that I now turn, for it is clear that a relevant interpretation of the concept of socialization can only be reached following such an examination.
CHAPTER TWO

THE SOCIAL SYSTEMS APPROACH TO SOCIALIZATION

1. The Conceptual Foundations Of Theories

In this chapter I propose to identify certain commitments and assumptions which are shared by three socialization theories which possess the promising feature that they may all, with varying ease, be construed as theories of school socialization. These theories are those of Durkheim, Parsons and certain behaviourists. I shall not in this chapter undertake any assessment of these theories, though their common conceptual features, upon which a later critical examination will focus, will be elucidated. I shall preface my attempt to specify these theoretical features with some general remarks concerning the conceptual foundations of theories, since if it is the case that any properly reasoned attempt to apply a theory to the solution of a fresh problem must be based upon a prior assessment of the theory's underlying assumptions and commitments, then it would seem that an initial step would be to form a clear idea of such conceptual foundations of theories. It is to this problem that I now turn.

There are in the literature concerned with the problems of scientific change three conceptualizations of the kind of foundational features of theories in which we are interested. These include the notions of a research programme, a paradigm and a research tradition. I shall consider each of these in turn, seeking to determine their relevance to the particular problem which is our concern, beginning with Lakatos' conception of a research programme.
1(a) The Research Programme

This notion, like those of a paradigm and a research tradition, rests on a prior distinction being made between individual theories and the more general conceptions on which they, in various senses, may be said to rest. It differs from a paradigm and a research tradition in that a threefold distinction is made. Lakatos states that research programmes have three elements: a "negative heuristic" or hard core of fundamental assumptions, the rejection of any of which would involve the abandonment of the entire research programme; the "positive heuristic", which contains a "partially articulated set of suggestions or hints on how to change ... modify, sophisticate" our specific theories when we wish to improve them; and a series of theories where each subsequent theory results from adding auxiliary clauses to the previous theory, such theories being the specific instantiations of the general research programme.

Clearly, of these elements of the research programme it is only the hard core of fundamental assumptions in which we are at present interested. If, however, we are to make use of this notion we need some means, some clue, as to how we may recognize assumptions which are so fundamental that to abandon them amounts to ceasing to work within the confines of the programme. Lakatos provides no means of such identification and consequently we are left merely with the suggestion that theories are not created *ex nihilo*, but are the working out of a prior conception of "the world" or a "slice" of it. Although to write of "an examination of the hard core of assumptions upon which a theory rests", is clearly a way of expressing the enterprise we seek

to elucidate, it is to other writers that we must look if we are to gain some insight into the kind of data which is to be analysed. We next turn, then, to Kuhn, and his conception, or rather conceptions, of a paradigm.¹

(b) The Paradigm

A difficulty one encounters in considering Kuhn's conception arises from the different senses in which he writes of a paradigm. According to Masterman², Kuhn uses "paradigm" in at least twenty-one different ways, though these, for our purposes, may be reduced to two which Masterman identifies as the main senses of the term. These senses are termed by Masterman, the "sociological" and the "metaphysical", and I shall discuss the relevance to our concerns of both these senses, beginning with the sociological.

In noting Kuhn's use of the concept of a paradigm "in a sociological sense", Masterman believes she has discerned Kuhn's intention that the concept be used as a tool for sociological analysis, rather than the rational reconstruction of the growth of a particular scientific school. In this enterprise Kuhn's notion of "normal science"³ is germane. Normal science, he writes, is research based on one or more past scientific achievements that some community for a time recognises, properly or improperly, as supplying the foundation for its further practice. These achievements are described by Kuhn as being sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity, and sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for them to solve. Kuhn's only explicit definition of

a paradigm is in fact in terms of an achievement which shares these two characteristics.

We have, then, the idea that individual theories rest on assumptions drawn from a prior scientific achievement in the form of a theory which has the characteristics Kuhn describes. We must enquire whether such a characterisation of the fundamental assumptions of theories is useful for our purposes.

On reflection it would appear that Kuhn's notion of a paradigm as a scientific achievement whose procedure and commitments are adopted by individual scientists who thus become a recognisable group, is both difficult to employ, and ultimately irrelevant. To make use of this conception we should have to locate the scientific achievement upon which the theories of socialization we are to consider were modelled. This, in practice, is by no means easy, if indeed it is possible at all. This may be seen if we consider briefly the three theories to which I have alluded.

In the case of Durkheim, it is not easy to think of his Lectures On Moral Education as normal science of the kind Kuhn has in mind, even if we translate them from the normative to the empirical mode. Indeed, few if any of the concepts employed are defined in such a way as to be immediately useful in any testing of Durkheim's contentions which by normal standards would even be regarded as scientific. Though Durkheim's views can certainly be located within a particular tradition, there is, as far as I am aware, no reason to link his lectures with any prior specific scientific achievement.

Concerning the Parsonian approach, the difficulty of locating the originating scientific achievement lies not in that one cannot be found, but that there are two areas in which one may look and possibly find such achievements. Firstly, there is in Parsons' work some obvious
connections with Freud's theories, though whether there is any one Freudian analysis which would be widely agreed to enjoy the status of "scientific achievement" in Kuhn's sense is unlikely. Secondly, there is the functionalist element in Parsons' thought. Whilst one can readily find prior examples of functionalist theory in the history of sociological thought, whether any specific example could be found which is in Kuhn's sense a scientific achievement and which is the direct ancestor of Parsons' work is again unlikely.

Concerning the behaviourist approach, a similar position is again to be found. It might also be suggested that behaviourism is a school of scientific thinking which may be more comprehensible when seen as springing from a philosophy of science derived from the work of certain logicians than from any particular model scientific achievement.

Whatever may be the case concerning the ancestry of these three theories, it is surely an indirect way to proceed if one wishes to examine the conceptual foundations of a theory to try to trace an originating scientific achievement, and then to scrutinise that, rather than the present theory. If a theory does have weaknesses in its basic assumptions then, in general, there seems no reason to believe they cannot be located without recourse to an analysis of any prior scientific achievement upon which it was modelled, and from which it inherited difficulties. I conclude from this that the notion of a paradigm as a scientific achievement from which a theory is derived is not a particularly useful concept to employ for our present purpose.

I turn now to what Masterman calls the "metaphysical" sense of "paradigm". Masterman believes that this interpretation of the concept may be discerned when Kuhn equates "paradigm" with a set of beliefs¹, with a myth², with a new way of seeing³, with an organising principle

2. ibid., 2.
3. ibid., 117-21.
governing perception itself\(^1\), with a map\(^2\), and with something that determines a whole area of reality\(^3\). If we now ask what precisely is a paradigm, the clearest answer we can reach, according to Masterman, is that it is a picture, a model, or something which is intended to be used analogically to render a confused state of affairs ordered and comprehensible. The explicit metaphysics, the fuller mathematicising innovation, the more developed experimental procedures - all those things which, taken together, are part of an established scientific achievement - appear later than the attempts to employ the paradigm, where the concept is understood in its "metaphysical" sense.

A paradigm now is a picture or model of one thing which is used to represent another - for example, a geometrical model made of wire and beads, though it is primarily a glorification of a child's toy, is used to represent a protein molecule\(^4\). It is, of course, true that science abounds with pictures or models used analogically, and not all are to be termed, "paradigms". What, then, is further required for the correct use of the appellation? It would seem that the picture or model must be capable of becoming a "research vehicle", of being applied to new material to bring order and understanding to confused states of affairs. As Masterman puts it:

"Kuhn repeatedly compares the switch from one scientific paradigm to another to the operation of 're-seeing' an ambiguous gestalt figure. What, however, he must be feeling his way to, in talking about an artefact which is also 'a way of seeing', is an assertion, not about

1. Kuhn, T.S., op. cit., 120.
2. ibid., 108.
3. ibid., 128.
4. This example is drawn from Masterman, M., op. cit., 77.
the nature of an artefact, but about its use ... It is, in fact, actual artefacts used analogically which Kuhn is after, as have been many other philosophers of science from Norman Campbell¹ to Hesse². But Kuhn's artefact, unlike Hesse's, cannot be a four-point analogy or a material analogy, because it has got to be an organised puzzle-solving gestalt which is itself a 'picture' of something, A, if it is then to be applied, non-obviously, to provide a new 'way of seeing' something else, B.

Kuhn's paradigm's 'way of seeing' is a concrete 'picture' of something, A, which is used analogically to describe a concrete something else, B. That is, ... a known construct, an artefact, becomes a 'research vehicle', and at the same moment, if successful, becomes a paradigm by being used to apply to new material in a non-obvious way.³

I have found this conception of a paradigm to be a very useful analytical tool, though in considering any particular theory it is apparent that not one but several of Kuhn's metaphysical paradigms may be in employment, and it may be the case that the claim that a particular paradigm is being employed within a theory is contentious, and not something that can be unequivocally established by a straightforward examination of a theory. It may also be the case that one's purpose

³. Masterman, M., op. cit., 77-78.
in seeking to specify the paradigms operative within a theory may influence one's findings. In this connection it is pertinent to note that Kuhn's investigation, in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* is quite different from the present enquiry. Kuhn wished, among other things, to explain the historical course of science. To that end one may suppose that he examined a number of theories in order to locate common metaphysical paradigms, and, having done so, he could then declare that certain pieces of research were, in his sense, "normal science". The present enquiry, on the other hand, is not at all concerned with "normal science", and when certain theories are collected together it will be on the basis merely of one or two common paradigms, the theories being otherwise quite disparate, and not such that Kuhn, with his particular interest, would group together. Kuhn's notion of a metaphysical paradigm, nonetheless, is one which I hope to demonstrate may usefully be employed for our present purposes.

Although Kuhn's conception may, I believe, be usefully adopted, it does not clarify every aspect of the conceptual foundations of theories that needs to be assessed. To confine enquiries to metaphysical paradigms may leave the methodological and ontological commitments of theories unexamined. Kuhn's conception is, in fact, too narrow to capture adequately the entire conceptual area from which the strengths and weaknesses which we wish to examine may be seen to emerge. It is with this thought that I turn now to Laudan's conception of a "research tradition".

1 (c) The Research Tradition

A research tradition is in part composed of a set of guidelines which over a period of time have come to be accepted, consciously or otherwise, as canonical for the formulation of individual theories. Such

1. If we may relate this notion to Lakatos' "negative heuristic", it is clear that metaphysical paradigms are likely to form part of what Lakatos wished to collect under his concept. Kuhn's notion may thus to some extent be seen to clarify the concept introduced by Lakatos.

2. Laudan, L., op. cit., 78ff.
guidelines are not usually written down and in order to perceive just what they are, it is usually necessary to examine several theories which seem to share a similar approach to a certain range of empirical problems. These theories also are part of what Laudan calls a research tradition, though Laudan wishes to draw an internal distinction between the individual theories and the conceptual features they share. The examples of research traditions which Laudan provides are drawn from diverse fields of intellectual enquiry and are not all illuminating. Those which he draws from psychology, which include Freudianism and "classical" behaviourism, do, however, seem to be consonant with the characteristics he subsequently attributes to research traditions.

These characteristics include ontological and methodological commitments which, as an ensemble, distinguish one research tradition from another. The ontological commitments will specify the type of fundamental entities which may be supposed to exist in a certain field of intellectual enquiry. If the research tradition is classical behaviourism, for example, the legitimate entities which behaviourist theories may postulate are limited perhaps to what is directly observable. Any theorist who wishes to introduce entities such as unconscious desires into his theory places himself beyond the behaviourist pale. Concerning methodological proceedings, Laudan writes that as part of the research tradition certain modes of empirical investigation will be prescribed, and these only will constitute the proper methods of enquiry. These methodological principles may be of only the most general kind, or they may be quite detailed and cover both experimental techniques and modes of evaluation in the manner, for example, of the "operational" methodological principles of behaviourism. A research tradition, then, most importantly, is a set of ontological and methodological prescriptions. Accordingly,
Laudan's "working definition" is that:

"... a research tradition is a set of general assumptions about the entities and processes in a domain of study, and about the appropriate methods to be used for investigating the problem." ¹

It is to be observed from this definition that, except at the level of specifying what the world is made of, and how it should be studied, research traditions do not provide detailed answers to specific empirical questions. They provide merely the tools needed both for solving empirical problems, and, in part, for clarifying what those problems are. Research traditions accomplish this latter function by indicating that it is appropriate to discuss only certain types of empirical problem and not others, which either are thought to be more properly tackled by researchers working under a different research tradition, or to be "pseudo-problems" which can properly be ignored. Either the ontology or the methodology alone of a research tradition can influence what is to count as a solvable problem for its constituent theories. Since the methodology of the research tradition specifies certain techniques which alone are the legitimate investigational modes, it is clear that only phenomena which can be explored by those means can, in principle, pose legitimate empirical problems for theories within that tradition. In a similar fashion, the ontology of a research tradition may exclude certain problems, or include them within the scope of its constituent theories, according to whether the problems involve reference to recognised entities.

One final point Laudan makes concerning the function of research traditions must be noted. This concerns the justificatory role they

¹. Laudan, L., op. cit., 81.
play with respect to their constituent theories. Specific theories make many assumptions about "the world," the justification for which seldom appear in the presentation of theories. Indeed, it is normally the case that theorists do not recognise any obligation to justify all their ontological and methodological assumptions, for they work within the confines of a research tradition which has to some degree established, via the apparent success of its constituent theories, that their assumptions are justified.

The pragmatic appeal to the apparent success of a research tradition as a whole should not, of course, silence all criticism of its ontological and methodological assumptions. Criticism on purely conceptual grounds may lead to doubt being cast upon seemingly positive findings. It may also lead to a clarification of the limits of the useful employment of these assumptions. It is this latter function of conceptual criticism which is more relevant to the task of deciding which of two quite diverse sets of methodological and ontological assumptions it is likely to prove more profitable to accept in seeking to elucidate school or school role socialization.

Recalling now the shortcoming, for our purposes, of Kuhn's idea of a metaphysical paradigm, we may now enquire how Laudan's concept may be employed to fill the lacuna. The addition we may make to Kuhn's notion is to include the idea that since explanatory scientific theories have at least implicit ontologies and clearly operate in accordance with specifiable methodological principles, we may, in addition to attempting to discern the metaphysical paradigms which underpin the theories we are to consider, also try to elucidate their ontological assumptions and methodological limitations.
1 (a) The Research Approach

It might seem that in accepting these ideas from Laudan I am, in effect, intending to employ his concept of a research tradition without reservation. This is not quite so. The use which I shall make of the suggestion that theories are underpinned by ontological and methodological commitments is in at least one important respect quite different from that made by Laudan. Laudan is concerned to explain the rationale of changes in scientific outlook, and to that end the research traditions he identifies are confined to those which are time-honoured. Thus, he treats behaviouralism and Freudianism as separate research traditions. However, the distinction drawn between behaviouralism and Freudianism is by no means an absolute one, and a case may be made that, examined from a certain perspective, these "research traditions" rest on precisely the same ontological commitments and methodological principles. I hope, in fact, to demonstrate that the behaviouralist theory of socialization and that of Parsons, which incorporates several Freudian assumptions, may be seen to share several ontological and methodological limitations.

I further hope to show that both these theories, and that of Durkheim, also share similar metaphysical paradigms and, since they do, I shall write of these theorists sharing the same "research approach". This enables me to restate the task I have asserted to be required if a properly reasoned assessment is to be made of the likely success of applying a particular theory to the solution of a fresh problem. Instead of writing of the importance of considering a theory's underlying assumptions and commitments, we may more informatively write instead of the necessity of examining a theory's metaphysical paradigms, ontology and methodology.
Further, since it is the case that individual theories share similar metaphysical paradigms, ontologies and methodologies, we may write of their belonging to the same research approach, and once particular research approaches have been described, they may then be critically examined in isolation from the work of theorist whose work is in accordance with them. It is at the point where alternative research approaches have been identified that we may also restate the task required for the profitable elucidation of the concept of socialization. We may now say that in order to understand the processes into which we must enquire when examining school or school role socialization we must first describe the research approach to socialization from which the description of these processes is to issue.

In the remainder of this chapter I shall elaborate that which I shall call the "social systems research approach to socialization". It is to this research approach that the socialization theories of Durkheim, Parsons and the behaviourists would appear to belong.

2. The Social Systems Research Approach to Socialization

The particular conceptions which constitute this research approach may perhaps be seen to have been formulated in response to a certain social problem. That problem is concerned with the means by which social order is to be maintained in large, complex societies such as our own. According to Dawe, the particular solution to this problem which is of interest here was shaped by the nineteenth century conservative reaction both to the French and the Industrial Revolutions. In opposition to what was seen as the glorification of the individual in the former, and the destructive egoism of the latter, the conservative reaction sought the maintenance of stability by the promulgation of the idea that the state must have precedence over the individual.

1. In the initial formulation of this research approach I was influenced by an article by Dawe, who writes of "the social systems approach to socialization", and in recognition of this I have adopted his terminology. See Dawe, A., op. cit.

2. ibid., 207.
The need for such a move arose through the acceptance of the Hobbesian belief that the pursuit of private interests leads inevitably to social disintegration. In consequence, it was held that social order may only be maintained if the state obliges the private citizen to accept certain forms of constraint.

Dawe contends that there is a direct line of thought linking the origins of the social systems perspective in the thought of Hobbes and certain theories still extant today. He traces the development of views stressing the importance of constraint, noting how scientific attention moved from the idea of the "external" coercion of the individual to that of "internalization". He suggests that in Weber's typification of bureaucratic order, in Durkheim's abiding concern with moral solidarity and, latterly, in the conceptual web woven by Parsons, the basic continuity is clear.

Dawe associates the introduction of the concept of internalization with successive attempts to account for the subjective dimension of action. He points out that this change has not altered the underlying perspective taken on social order. All that has been achieved is a description of how constraint is achieved; the source of constraint is still located in society. As Dawe observes, this move has not been without its difficulties since once it is posited that people unreflectively internalize values, we are easily led into what has been called the "oversocialized conception of man".

1. Dawe, A., op. cit, 207.

2. The introduction of the concept of internalization may even, Dawe claims, be seen as behaviourist; the corollary of viewing feelings and convictions as rooted in the external conditions of the agent's situation. See also Scott, J.F., 'The Changing Foundations of the Parsonian Action Scheme' in American Sociological Review, vol. 26, 1961, 184-193.

Notwithstanding this danger, the social systems approach to socialization is still widespread amongst neo-Freudian and behaviouristically inclined sociologists and social psychologists, as well as a whole range of recent role theorists. Though the evidence for this assertion can be gathered only by a more wide-ranging examination of the literature than is possible here, I would claim that even a cursory examination of the literature reveals that the thought which most typically underlies research papers on socialization is some variation on the following:

"In order that any society may function well, its members must acquire the kind of character which makes them want to act in the way they have to act as members of the society or of a special class within it. They have to desire what objectively is necessary for them to do. Outer force is replaced by inner compulsion, and the particular kind of human energy which is channelled into character traits".

The social systems approach to socialization, then, has a lengthy history, and still today attracts many researchers. As a research approach its characteristics may be considered under the headings of metaphysical paradigms, methodology and ontology.

2 (a) Metaphysical Paradigms

There are two metaphysical paradigms which individuate this research approach and which will later receive critical attention. The first amounts to a way of looking at groups with regard to how social harmony is to


be maintained and the group's function or purpose efficiently fulfilled. The comparison invoked here involves reference to some kind of adhesive substance, the presence of which is necessary if the diverse parts of a certain contrivance are not to fall apart and the function of the article rendered inefficient if not inoperative. The analogy suggests that just as certain things have to be held together by some form of adhesive in order to fulfil their purpose, so groups of people, including a society, need, if they are not to split asunder and cease properly to perform their function, to be held together by a kind of social glue which is constituted by the shared values of the members of the society or group under consideration. I shall refer to this metaphysical paradigm as "the affective bonds assumption".

Guided by such an analogy the theorist interested in describing socialisation processes would focus his attention on the means by which values thought to be necessary for the stability and efficiency of a group are transmitted. Such a theorist may never question or even realise that his research is guided by this particular analogy. Instead, for him, it may just be taken for granted that socialization is concerned with the implanting of values, and he may even believe that his only problems are empirical.

The other metaphysical paradigm integral to this research approach complements the one just mentioned. It amounts to a way of looking at people, or, more precisely, at the acquisition of their convictions. The analogy being employed here is, at least partly, concerned with plastics, and indeed, Hollis has written of a model of man he calls "plastic man". In explicating this conception he quotes Durkheim's view that "individual natures are merely the indeterminate material which the social factor moulds and transforms". According to this conception, inner convictions have their origin in constraining social facts which are

external to each individual. For any inward state that explains the actions of a person there is always an external and constraining fact to explain the origin of the inner state. The constraints are mostly internalised and indeed, society could not function were they not. But internalization is not an act of assent by the inner man, it is, rather, more like a process of being moulded.

We are, then, to think of people as beings whose convictions are, like the particular shapes of pieces of plastic material, the result of a process of moulding. At this point, the metaphor usually becomes a mixed one, though consistency can, I think, be maintained. The necessity for the complication of the comparison arises because some account is required of the relationship between held convictions and actual behaviour. A dispositional account is usually offered. By this is meant that to acquire values is to acquire a tendency to behave in a certain way whenever certain circumstances obtain. We may preserve the analogy with plastics and not, for example, introduce comparisons with the brittleness of glass, by construing the moulding of people to be like a moulding into forms which have a tendency, for example, to topple sideways in certain situations.

We have, then, two metaphysical paradigms for our consideration which are fundamental to this research approach. In due course they will receive critical attention, but I wish now to address myself to the methodological stance associated with this research approach.

2 (b) Methodology

In considering the methodological position associated with this research approach it is apparent that we must recognise that questions of research method can, from a logical point of view, only arise after the metaphysical paradigms have been conceived. Having determined to construe reality in a certain way, the options open for its empirical
investigation are correspondingly curtailed. It is fundamental to the social systems research approach - part of what Lakatos would have called its "negative heuristic" - that socialization be understood as having as its goal the stability and efficiency of the group, and that this is achieved by the inculcation of certain values. Empirical investigations may neither confirm nor cast doubt upon these propositions. The empirical problems which are to be investigated are concerned with discovering the means by which the socialization process is accomplished in the group under consideration, the success criteria which are operated, and the arrangements which groups make to deal with those who fail to acquire the desired values.

In seeking to determine the means by which the socialization process is effected, the methodology employed might be termed "environmentalist" in that enquiries are conducted to determine the impact of a range of a group's organisational features upon the convictions of individuals who are learning to become acceptable group members. It is no part of the investigation of socialization processes to enquire into the basis on which people decide for themselves that the values of the group of which they have become members ought to be upheld. It is assumed that values are "internalized" rather than embraced after due deliberation, and thus the range of factors to which individuals are subject within a group's "environment" will exceed those which are concerned with any reasoned persuasion with which new members may be met.

In order to conduct investigations in accordance with this environmentalist principle, the research worker must seek to determine which values it is believed are conducive to the stability and efficiency of the group, and he must relate its organisational features to the assimilation of these values by group members.
In this, as in attempting to answer the other empirical questions which are accepted as falling within the province of the social systems research approach to socialization, a theorist receives no further detailed advice concerning the methods he should adopt in conducting his investigations. It is this absence of precise directive that, in part, permits theorists as diverse as Freudians and behaviourists to work within the social systems perspective.

2 (c) Ontology

The various commitments of this research approach which I have so far discussed might seem to suggest that its ontology must include a reified group with a "central value system", but I am not convinced the reification is necessary. It is true that this approach had its origin in a question which may be phrased as, "How is society to maintain its stability?" but this question might I think be properly interpreted as "How are the ruling classes to maintain existing societal arrangements?"

There is no necessity for a disembodied society or a group to be accorded a shadowy existential status, and correspondingly no need for intellectual alarm over the need for such an entity to possess the attribute of a central value system.

It is in connection with values, however, that a genuine, though quite different, ontological commitment would appear to be made. Once again, according to this research approach, socialization is a process arranged so that the stability and efficiency of the group may be maintained, and it involves the inculcation of certain values. But those who work within the confines of this research approach cannot rest with the idea that socialization processes lead merely to the acquisition of private convictions. It is the behaviour of members which is of first importance. Accordingly, one finds that a dispositional
account of what it is to accept values is an integral part of this research approach. By this is meant that to accept certain values is, at least, to be disposed to behave in particular ways whenever certain circumstances obtain. It is important to realize that by "being disposed to behave" is not meant that group members calculate the advantages of behaving in a particular way when they find themselves in these circumstances. Rather, for socialization processes to be useful to groups, successfully socialized members must have a persisting tendency to behave in certain ways irrespective of personal disadvantage. The dispositions which have been inculcated must, then, in some sense, exist, for if they did not, socialization, according to this conception of the process, could not work.

Such, then, are the distinguishing features of the social systems research approach to socialization. I believe that the elaboration of these features in this chapter has provided greater clarification of a perspective on socialization then could be obtained by a short definition of this term. It is, moreover, quite an easy matter to supplement the elucidation of this research approach with a definition of the kind so often produced in research articles. Thus, we may say that according to the social systems research approach, socialization is a process by which individuals are led to become acceptable members of a group by the inculcation of values necessary for the preservation and efficiency of the group. Following this, it may also be agreed that unsuccessfully socialized individuals will be nominal members of a group who, for some reason, are not, in the eyes of other group members, properly committed to these beliefs. Unsocialized persons will be nominal group members or outsiders who, for whatever reason, have not been exposed to the group's socialization processes. Finally, deviants may be said to be nominal group members who have embraced values inimical
to the beliefs deemed necessary for the preservation and efficient functioning of the group.

This completes the outline I wish to make of the conceptual features of the social systems research approach to socialization, and, having done so, we may raise the question as to whether the interpretation of the concept of socialization we have explicated is the most profitable one with which to examine school or school role socialization. Before doing so, I wish in the next chapter to consider the work of those theorists mentioned earlier which, I believe, belongs to this research approach. I shall try to show that it is fair to describe these writers as social systems theorists, and I shall also attempt a critical examination of those aspects of their theories which cannot be assessed in a later critique of the research approach itself. In the case of Durkheim and Parsons, whose theories I have not so far discussed, I shall proceed by setting forth their theories, relating them to the social systems research approach.
1. The Theory of Emile Durkheim

(a) Exposition

Durkheim's views on the part played in the process I have called "school socialization" may be inferred from a series of lectures published under the title of *Moral Education*. Before considering his views two points should be noted. The first is that Durkheim wrote in normative vein and not in an attempt to make valid empirical observations of the socializing effects of existing school arrangements. His views, however, are neither utopian nor in part even at variance with what was then occurring. Frequently his writings simply provide, from the standpoint of the theorist of socialization, a rationale of the organizational arrangements effected by schools, and they then amount to no more than opinions on how existing practices ought to be interpreted.

The second point is that Durkheim drew no distinction between socialization conceived as a process by which, via the inculcation of values, individuals are led to become acceptable members of society or of a group within it, and what he called "moral education". Though today many writers would be unwilling to employ the term "moral education" as a synonym for "socialization", it is clear that for Durkheim the significance of these terms at least overlap to a considerable extent. This is apparent since Durkheim insists that to act morally is to act in the interests of the group:

"To act morally is to act in terms of the collective interest ... the domain of the moral

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begins where the domain of the social begins". ¹

It is also the case that by "education" Durkheim means a developmental process which, as we shall see, does not exclude non-rational persuasion, and thus, combining these two ideas, we find Durkheim writing that moral education has as its goal "the development of fundamental dispositions at the root of moral life". A not inaccurate, though incomplete, paraphrase of this would appear to be that the goal of moral education is the development of dispositions to behave in the interests of the group. Such a goal would appear at least to include the aim of the socialization process according to the social systems research approach. It is, then, by examining Durkheim's views on moral education that we may learn his opinions concerning the relationship between the organisational arrangements effected by schools and school socialization.

In examining Durkheim's views we may begin with his belief that for a person to behave in a moral fashion, or to behave in a manner conducive to the interests of the group, it is necessary that he be consistent in his behaviour and that he be "sensitive to authority", in the sense of acknowledging that there are rules of conduct, account of which must be taken in all circumstances. These two features of morality - regularity of conduct and acknowledgement of authority - are, for Durkheim, aspects of what he called "discipline", and he believed that one important part of moral education involved the fostering of the two character traits associated with "discipline".

The first of these traits is described variously by Durkheim as, "the desire for regularity", ² "the preference for an ordered life", ³ and "a disposition for a regular existence". ⁴ According to Durkheim, schools foster this trait by insisting on regular school attendance, with clearly

2. ibid., 131.
3. ibid., 144.
4. ibid., 148.
defined lesson periods, break times and general orderliness of behaviour. Schools are largely successful in this undertaking, he believes, and one of the reasons for their success lies in the child's psychology. A persisting desire for regularity can be encouraged in this way because the child has an innate disposition to enjoy repeated actions. It is by recognising this that teachers can assist in developing in the child a capacity and a liking for regular conduct during school hours. Having achieved this, Durkheim believes that the child will more readily acquire acceptable behaviour patterns when he leaves school and joins other groups.

The readiness to acknowledge the overriding importance of moral rules, which, for Durkheim, would be rules which were made in the interests of the group, is a trait whose development is made possible by the child's innate openness to imperative suggestions from authority figures:

"The amazing credulity, docility, goodwill, obedience ... manifested in a host of traits among young children recall the phenomenon observed in a hypnotised adult ... It is easy to persuade children, even at the age of three or four, that the pain following a blow, for example, has gone; they they no longer are thirsty; that they are no longer tired - on the condition that the assertion countering their complaints is altogether pre-emptory."^1

Durkheim believes that schools have a crucial part to play in the development of this trait, for he believes that the family setting does not provide the kind of environment within which it may properly be fostered. He writes that the readiness to acknowledge the supreme importance of moral rules is difficult to encourage within the family circle since the family is composed of a very small number of persons, who know each other intimately, and who are constantly in contact with one another.

1. Durkheim, E, op. cit., 141-2.
In consequence of this, familial relationships are not usually subject to formal, impersonal, immutable regulation. Familial obligations are not normally fixed once for all through precise rules that are always applicable in the same manner; rather they are likely to accommodate themselves to differences in personality and circumstances. The abstract idea of duty is less important here than sympathy. All the members of this small group are emotionally involved with each other, and, as a result they have too much feeling for each other's needs for it to be necessary, or even useful, to seek to guarantee cooperation through regulation.

As part of his moral development, however, the child must learn to respect certain impersonal rules and learn also to do his duty because it is his duty. He has to be brought to feel obliged to do so, even though the task may not seem an easy one. Such an understanding, which can only be inadequately attempted by parents, must devolve upon the school. At school there is a whole system of rules that govern the child's conduct, and these are brought to the child's attention by people who are authority figures. Given the child's openness to imperative suggestion, it should be possible for schools to bring him to accept the importance of behaving in accordance with the rules of the group of which he has become a member. It is, then, in Durkheim's view, through adherence to school regulations that this trait may be developed in the child.

I have remarked that Durkheim claimed that for a person to behave in a moral fashion it is necessary both that he be consistent in his behaviour and that he acknowledge that there are rules of conduct account of which must be taken in all circumstances. It was also Durkheim's view that to behave morally it is necessary to behave in a way which is not crudely self-seeking. But if behaviour properly deemed moral is not oriented towards oneself, he asked, what object is its proper focus? Since others cannot legitimately demand gratification which, if directed
towards ourselves, would be amoral, the object of moral behaviour must be something beyond the person, or beyond any number of individuals qua individuals. What is left, then, as the object of moral behaviour are the groups, including society, of which the individual is a member.

In order, then, for a person to act morally, he must act in the interests of the group of which he is a member. In order that he should want to do so, he must feel attached to or identify with the group. In Moral Education we accordingly find Durkheim's views on the part schools must play in encouraging the desire to be attached to a group.

He begins, characteristically, by locating the psychological predisposition that makes the fostering of this desire possible. The predisposition is said to be the child's "faculty of empathy", which is "... another way of saying that the source of this aspect of moral life resides in the sum of those tendencies that we call altruistic and disinterested."¹

According to Durkheim, every child is born with a rudimentary ability to reproduce and therefore to share other people's sentiments, an aptitude for sympathising with others which is the first form of genuine altruism.

By building upon innate altruistic sentiments as well as upon the spontaneous growth of the capacity for sympathy, the moral educator can foster the desire to be attached to a group. The development of this propensity is especially favourable when the teacher gives the child a clear idea of the social groups to which he belongs. However, in order to bring the child to feel attached to these groups, it is not sufficient merely to give him an intellectual interpretation of them. In addition, it is important that the child vividly experience, by actively participating in the joys of collective life, the pleasures

1. Durkheim, E., op. cit., 207.
of belonging to a group:

"To appreciate social life to the point where one cannot do without it one must have developed the habit of acting and thinking in common. We must learn to cherish these social bonds that for the unsocial being are heavy chains. We must learn through experience how cold and pale the pleasures of solitary life are in comparison. The development of such a temperament, such a mental outlook, can only be formed through repeated practice, through perpetual conditioning."¹

In this the teacher and school life have an important part to play. This can be seen by observing the transformation that takes place in a child who, after a solitary upbringing in his family, enters a lively and well-ordered class for the first time:

"He comes out of it entirely changed. He is alert, his face is expressive, he talks with animation; for the first time the child has had a tonic experience ... He is no longer supported by his own energy alone: to his own strength that of others is added. He participates in the collective life, and his whole being is enhanced."²

To achieve this tonic effect in the child, the class must really share in a collective life. The teacher accordingly has a duty to contrive the appropriate conditions. Such phrases as "the spirit of the class", and "the honour of the class", Durkheim feels, must become something more than abstract expressions in the student's mind. The

2. ibid., 241.
opportunities to achieve this goal Durkheim believes to be abundantly present if the teacher looks for them:

"It may be a common emotion that grips the class upon reading a touching piece. It may be a judgment passed on some historical figure or event after general discussion of its moral value and social bearing. It may be a common impulse to esteem or blame, which any of a thousand events in everyday life may suggest ..."¹

Durkheim advocates as another means by which feelings of solidarity could be awakened in the child the "very discreet and deliberate use of collective punishments and rewards."² In addition he suggests that displays of the best work completed by students in past years would be one of the ways in which each class could be led to identify with past pupils, and thus given some sense of continuity. In the fostering of this identification, Durkheim suggests that it would be helpful to record and collect all the unusual awards, all the exceptional actions, all the special celebrations, that have taken place in the past.³

In addition to these means by which children may be led to acquire lasting desires to belong to groups, Durkheim believes that the content of lessons may serve a similar purpose.

Beginning with the sciences, Durkheim contends that there is a "turn of mind" which is a serious obstacle to the formation of a feeling of solidarity, and that scientific teaching is particularly adapted to combatting it. He calls the turn of mind "oversimplified rationalism". It is characterised by a tendency to consider as real only that which is perfectly simple. He considers Descartes to be the most distinguished

2. ibid., 245.
3. ibid., 247.
exponent of this attitude in modern times since for Descartes "there is nothing real except mathematical extension, and bodies are made up only of parts of extension". Durkheim contends that although this conception has been useful in certain theoretical speculations, it has had regrettable repercussions when incorporated into deliberations concerning moral behaviour:

"Society is indeed an enormously complex whole. If we apply to it the principle of oversimplified rationalism, we must say that this complexity is nothing in itself, that it has no reality, that the only thing real in society is that which is simple, clear, and easily grasped. Now, the only thing that satisfies all these conditions is the individual. The individual would then be the only real thing in society. ... According to this kind of reasoning, our moral behaviour finds itself stripped of any kind of objective. In order to cherish society, to devote oneself to it, and to take it as the objective of conduct, it must be something more than a word, an abstract term. A living reality is needed, animated by a special existence distinct from the individuals who compose it. Only such a reality can draw us out of ourselves and so perform the function of providing a moral goal. We can see how this dangerous view of reality can influence behaviour, and why, therefore, it is important to correct it."

2. ibid., 251.
The way in which the teaching of science can help in overcoming an oversimplified rationalism is at first limited to bringing to the child a feeling for the complexity of things in those matters bearing on the physical world; for this perception to be extended to the social realm, it must first be elaborated and gain ground and force with respect to the other realms of nature. Durkheim regards this as an essential phase of preliminary education, and suggests that precisely this is the function of the sciences in moral education. By way of illustration he asserts that the biological sciences are especially useful in making the child understand the complexity of things and the vital importance of that complexity. Any organism is made up of cells. The cell, then, would seem to be something perfectly simple. But the cell is a perfect demonstration of the fact that this simplicity is only apparent. Nothing is more complicated than the cell. All of life is resumed in it. Indeed, the cell works, reacts to external stimuli, it feeds, grows and reproduces, just like the most highly developed organisms. Here is one thing that will make the child understand that in one sense a whole is not identical with the sum of its parts. This can lead him along the road to an understanding that society is not simply the sum of individuals who compose it.  

In addition to the teaching of science, Durkheim also considers "aesthetic education", under which he includes both beaux arts and literature, in relation to moral education. He writes that when we awaken a taste for the beautiful, we open the avenues of the mind to disinterestedness and sacrifice. Anything that prompts man to lose sight of himself, to look beyond and around himself, not to consider himself as the centre of the world, cannot but develop in him those habits and tendencies found at the root of morality. We have here, in both cases, the same needs and capacity for getting away from self-centredness, for opening oneself

fully to the outside. Thus, in one sense aesthetic education "shapes
the will to moral ends and can therefore prepare the student for his
moral education". 1

Finally, Durkheim considers the relationship between the teaching
of history and moral education. His view is that by making the history
of their country come alive for the children, we can at the same time
make them live "in close intimacy with the collective consciousness". 2
The "collective consciousness" to which he refers is that of the French
people, and the fundamental aim of teaching history, for the moral
erator at least, is to produce in the children feelings of attachment
to that large group to which they all belong - the French nation.

1 (b) Durkheim as a Social Systems Theorist

Such then, in outline, is Durkheim's position. That his lectures
are in accord with the social systems research approach can readily be
demonstrated. Firstly, it is fairly clear that Durkheim is employing
the metaphysical paradigm which I have called the "affective bonds
assumption". According to this assumption, groups, including society,
are held together and function smoothly if members share a commitment to
certain values. There is throughout the lectures in Moral Education a
constant concern that children should acquire values which when considered
together would certainly appear to be such as would be included in any
list which might be considered necessary for the preservation and efficient
functioning of society. Consider the particular values which Durkheim believes
schools should foster: the desire for regularity, preference for an ordered
life, respect for rules, the desire to be attached to a group, the desire
to act in the interests of the group, the desire to uphold the honour and
act in the spirit of the group, and pride in one's nationality. Durkheim
is here surely working with the affective bonds assumption, and, it may
be added, accepting by implication that the goal of socialization processes
is, in one form of words, the preservation and smooth functioning of
1. Durkheim, E., op. cit., 269.
2. ibid., 278.
Concerning the second metaphysical paradigm I mentioned, that which suggests that we view the acquisition of values on analogy with the moulding of plastic material, Durkheim appears again to be adopting a fairly unequivocal position. An implication of this analogy is that people are to be conceived as beings who are led to acquire a whole range of convictions in the acceptance of which autonomous, rational decision-making is not the focus of investigation. Durkheim seems to accept this conception and, indeed, his suggested scheme of moral education relies, as we have seen, on the development of innate dispositions by obliging children to participate in the school regimen, and on fostering emotional attachments to school groups of which they are members by means other than rational persuasion. It is true that Durkheim does make reference to "self-determination"¹ or the voluntary acceptance of values, but he does not appear to have believed that the fostering of values may be accomplished merely by the teacher's explanations of the reasons why the rules prescribing certain forms of behaviour are desirable. Such explanations may be hoped only to bring to pupils an "enlightened" assent.²

Concerning the environmentalist methodology of the social systems research approach, little by way of argument would appear to be needed to establish that Durkheim's lectures belong to this research approach. Had Durkheim recast his thoughts in a form suitable for empirical investigations to be conducted, it is clear that the factors which he would have sought to relate would have included, on the one hand, organisational features such as those comprised by school rules and the contents of lessons, and, on the other, the "moral" convictions of the pupils.

2. ibid., 120.
Finally, there is in the social systems research approach an ontological commitment to some form of existence for dispositions. Durkheim seems plainly to accept such a view. Indeed, not only does he appear to think that dispositions may be fostered, he believes that children have "innate" dispositions to behave in certain ways, and it is upon these dispositions that the moral educator must seek to base his programme.

1 (c) Appraisal

In his lectures on Moral Education, then, Durkheim may be seen to be working within the limits of the social systems research approach. Before attempting an assessment of those aspects of his views which may not more profitably be examined in a critical consideration of the social systems research approach itself, I should like to question the extent to which his writings may be said to approach a complete description of school socialization.

In this connection it must first be recalled that my earlier consideration of the meaning of "socialization" led me to conclude that within certain limits, the term could be defined in accordance with the writer's wishes. The limitations upon any proffered definition were, I suggested, connected with the need to be able to offer characterizations of terms allied to that of "socialization", as well as to illuminate the normal process of successful socialization. Concerning the Durkheimian interpretation of the term "socialization" or "moral education", little difficulty is apparent. There does not seem to be any good reason why Durkheim should reject the social systems characterization of the term as a process by which individuals are led to become acceptable members of a group by the inculcation of values necessary for the preservation and effective functioning of the group. It would surely be unreasonable to expect Durkheim to specify every one of the values involved here, and he has given a fair indication of the kind of values he believes them
to be. It is on the question of the interpretation of allied concepts that we may find less than satisfactory guidance in Durkheim's lectures.

The absence of direct comment upon these concepts need not in every case be accounted an important omission. In dealing with school socialization, that is, with the part played by schools in the process by which children are led to become acceptable members of a society, the concept of the unsocialized person, namely, a person who has not been exposed to any socialization process, is a notion which has no place in the scheme of things to be considered.

On the topic of unsuccessful socialization the problem is more pressing. To illuminate the notion of unsuccessful socialization, which, in this context, involves a failure to mould pupils' attitudes to the required degree, one needs, first and foremost, some criteria by which it may be decided whether a particular pupil has been unsuccessfully socialized. A clue to Durkheim's answer to this question may be afforded if we were first to suppose that he was writing about school role socialization. One might easily speculate on the criteria of which he might then avail himself. The values Durkheim wishes to see fostered include, among others, the desire for regularity, respect for rules, the desire to be attached to a group and the desire to act in the interests of the group. Accordingly, we may say that a person who disliked school, did not join school societies or take part in extra-curricular activities, was unpunctual and disruptive in class, was less than successfully socialized, for his behaviour does not manifest an acceptable degree of commitment to the values which, by the means Durkheim outlines, it was sought to instil in him.

Concerning later adult membership of society, matters are not so straightforward. It would be a simple matter for Durkheim to identify members of society who were apparently also insufficiently committed to these values—some criminals, apathetic non-voters and other similar people
appear to belong to this class - but it is less easy to establish that their lack of commitment derives from a failure of the socialization processes operated by schools. Since Durkheim wrote in normative vein, we can form no clear conception of how he would have dealt with this problem.

If we turn now to the concept of deviancy, we again encounter a difficulty of a similar nature. If Durkheim would accept that a deviant person is one who embraces values inimical to the preservation and effective functioning of the group, rather than one who merely remains less than fully committed, then, once again considering school role socialization first, it does appear that Durkheim would find little difficulty in identifying pupils who may be described as deviant. If we reflect on the particular range of values with which Durkheim concerns himself and their relation to moral solidarity and loyalty to the group, and we connect these with his fears that Cartesian studies may lead to the apotheosis of the individual, then we may infer that Durkheim would regard as deviant those children, however well they observe the school rules, who actually enjoy being on their own and positively dislike joining in group activities. In addition, Durkheim might properly regard as deviant those pupils who are members of that group of "troublemakers" found in every Secondary school, who have their own "delinquent sub-culture or value system" which clashes with that of the school. When applied to the adult membership of society, Durkheim's theory appears to gather within its net not only the kind of individual we should intuitively expect to find, but others whose inclusion under the label of "deviant" is more surprising. Firstly, Durkheim would appear to wish to label as deviant all nominal members of a society who, ideologically, are committed to working against its interests. Here he may include traitors, revolutionaries, and so forth. But, secondly, it would equally seem that he would include any individual who, for example, is preoccupied with his own interests to the point where he is not noticeably concerned with the interests

of the group in a consequential sense. The chess grandmaster and the artist might be two such kinds of person, and would, by Durkheim, presumably be accounted deviants.

In remarking upon the apparent departure from an intuitive conception of deviancy I do not, on that account, mean to imply any criticism of Durkheim's views. The basis on which the inferred interpretation of Durkheim's interpretation of both this concept and that of the unsuccessfully socialized person may properly be criticised requires special argument, and this it is convenient to postpone to a later chapter.¹

It is apparent from the foregoing remarks that Durkheim's lectures in Moral Education are less than completely satisfying if we are seeking an account of school socialization which is complete in the sense of offering an interpretation of these concepts which are so closely allied to that of socialization. Despite these omissions, and even taking into account the fact that Durkheim wrote in normative vein, it is still possible, I believe, to attempt to begin to answer the question which may properly be raised concerning the degree of confirmation which might be forthcoming should Durkheim's lectures have been cast in a form suitable for their empirical assessment, and his objective the elucidation of school socialization.²

Concerning this matter there would appear to be two directions in which speculation may proceed. The first might involve an attempt to determine the importance of the experience of school life in the acquisition of the dispositions to enjoy attachment to groups and to like or at least tolerate a highly organised, regular way of life, with an abiding respect for rules and regulations, by attempting to compare the prevalence of these dispositions in societies where no formal schooling is arranged with societies such as our own. Alternatively, one might locate within our society a number of persons who, for one reason or another, had not attended schools, but had been educated at home, and

1. See below, 216-217.
2. It must be acknowledged, however, that not every feature of Durkheim's proposals are at present in operation.
compare their attitudes to group membership and a highly organised, regular, rule-governed life, with those who did attend school.

To my knowledge neither of these two modes of assessment have been undertaken, and considerable care would be required if the school variable were to be properly isolated, for there are certainly many factors within family life and within the myriad arrangements by which any society functions which might lead children to want to belong to organised groups and to acquire a liking for or a tolerance of the degree of regulation of behaviour which is the norm in our society. Without intending to criticise Durkheim on this account, I think it is important in connection with the overall assessment of the profitability of embracing the social systems research approach as the basis on which to investigate school or school role socialization, that the fact is registered that no positive findings confirming Durkheim's theory can be adduced.

The second way in which speculation concerning the empirical confirmation of Durkheim's theory may proceed makes reference to research findings on the topics of self-control and "moral development", and I shall deal with each in turn. An examination of the research findings on self-control may be considered relevant if it is accepted that Durkheim wanted to foster, in addition to loyalty, a desire for regular conduct and a proper respect for authority based on a commitment to group stability and efficiency. Since such values will inevitably run counter to individual group member's self-interest, Durkheim may be said to have wanted to foster children's self-control in these matters. It scarcely needs detailed argument to establish that Durkheim would have to accept this reformulation of his aims since it is difficult to imagine effective socialization in any form being accomplished without people being led to exercise self-control over certain desires and to accept various forms of restraint and abstinence. The only difficulty to be overcome concerns the precise formulation of the question upon which empirical findings might lend support or cast doubt.
In this connection it may be emphasised that Durkheim envisaged various features of school life - the regularity of lessons, collective punishments and rewards, History lessons and so forth - rather than rational persuasion, accomplishing his socialization aims. The determination to exercise self-control thus engendered in children would surely, then, not be manifested in highly discriminative choices. We are being asked to believe that over the broad areas of interest which affect group stability and efficiency - regularity of conduct, respect for authority and loyalty to the group being especially emphasised - children are led to exercise self-restraint, the restraint being later manifested in adult society, and its origin being traceable to experiences during children's school careers.

In order now to perceive the precise question which may be raised in order properly to assess the inferred Durkheimian empirical claim, another feature of the logic of empirical investigations of theories of school socialisation must be made explicit. In proceeding to examine any such theory one cannot validly list values to which one merely supposes the adult members of society subscribe, and which are believed to be necessary to its stability and efficiency. A properly reasoned case must be made showing that the values one wishes to relate to school experience really are held in a behaviourally consequential way by the adult citizens. Accordingly, it may be possible to locate evidence that the values and behaviour which Durkheim wished to see fostered are not in fact displayed by members of our society. The ways in which this might be established may take the form of showing that they entertain quite contrary values, or that in our society people simply are not moved by the considerations in question.

It is in fact in the latter way that the available empirical evidence permits us to proceed, if only to a certain degree. In connection with the Durkheimian theory it may be asked whether there is evidence that people do,
in our kind of society, actually manifest self-restraint over issues as broad as his lectures imply, or whether the courses of action they customarily undertake seem more likely to be fully explicable only if reference is made to considerations other than the dispositions he wished to see fostered.

In considering this problem, the question concerning the source from which empirical findings could relevantly be cited has to be decided. This is an important question since, as I have remarked earlier, no empirical findings are entirely free from the influence of the theoretical assumptions which underpin the research method by which the findings were gathered. Empirical research originating from a theoretical background which was quite incompatible with Durkheim's own would not seem to provide the kind of information which could fairly be used in assessing Durkheim's work. On investigation it transpired that there was only one source of relevant information - that provided by behaviouristically inclined theorists. Happily, I think that an acquaintance with Durkheim's writings leads one to suppose that he would not be entirely dismissive of empirical findings produced by such writers, and so I shall proceed to examine his views in the light of these research findings.

I shall begin by noting that there is evidence that a person's willingness to defer gratification depends on the outcome he expects from his choice.¹ The factor which would appear of particular importance is the individual's expectation that delayed future rewards, for which he would have to work and wait, are almost certain to materialise. Thus we have one variable here which involves reference to a factor other than a disposition to defer gratification in the interests of the group, namely, the agent's calculations about possible rewards, to which we may expect to have to refer in explaining the behaviour of people in our society at the present time.

It has also been suggested that the restraints which people may choose to exercise depend upon the "subjective value" of the offered rewards for behaving in a certain fashion\(^1\). For example, given that all children expect that approval by teachers depends on practising self-discipline in the classroom, there will be differences in the frequency with which such control is exercised due to differences among children in the value they place upon obtaining their teacher's approval. Similarly, while for one individual approval from peers in a particular situation may be more important than parental approval, the reverse may be true for a second person.\(^2\)

Further, it has been pointed out\(^3\) that people judge and evaluate their own behaviour, and reward and punish themselves. They congratulate or berate themselves for their own characteristics; they praise or belittle their own behaviour. Research has even shown the importance of a person's present emotional state for the kind and extent of the self-evaluation he exercises. Whether one feels happy or sad, for example, influences such things as generosity and charitability both to other people and to oneself.\(^4\)


There is no reason, then, to suppose that in a society such as our own that people may not at any time question their commitment to the groups to which they belong, and may not review and even censure their tendencies to behave in accordance with group norms. Once again, then, we are led to suppose that the courses of action which people undertake which affect the stability and efficiency of the groups of which they are members may not be satisfactorily explained simply by reference to the absence or presence of an indiscriminate tendency to behave in certain ways in circumstances which affect the interests of the group.

It would seem from the foregoing observations and research findings that it is at least questionable that the adult population of a society such as our own could be said to be disposed to display the kind of unquestioning loyalty to the state, and unreflecting deference to authority and ready compliance with regulations and routines, which schools it is suggested might foster.

I should like now to turn to the research findings on moral development. I believe that the information gathered by these studies has a certain relevance in that it reveals a tendency in our kind of society at the present time for children and adolescents to be, firstly, inconsistent in their judgements of what is right and wrong, secondly, to

1. In a summary, Mischel writes that in order to predict an individual's voluntary delay of gratification accurately one would need to know his age, sex, the "reward" for which he is waiting, the consequence of not waiting, the models to whom he had recently been exposed, his immediate prior experiences, his mood at the time of the decision and a host of other variables. See Mischel, W., Personality and Assessment, New York, 1968, 288-301.  

2. It might be suggested that Durkheim did not wish to inspire such indiscriminate behavioural tendencies, and that, in fact, his remarks on "autonomy" reveal a contrary intent. It is clear, however, that the fostering of dispositions is to be accomplished by non-rational means and, in consequence, it is difficult to see how Durkheim could have hoped that from such origins fine discrimination could issue. As I have remarked earlier, the role of rational persuasion in the school-child's moral education is conceived by Durkheim to be confined to turning prior assent into "enlightened assent".

be able to resist doing what they believe to be wrong largely to the extent that they think punishment may be incurred, and thirdly, to be idiosyncratic over matters about which they feel remorse or guilt.

Further, it has been suggested that for the individual these three aspects of moral behaviour are either completely independent or are at best only minimally inter-related.

If these findings are accepted then the notion we may entertain of the schoolchild in our kind of society is not such that we may readily suppose that under the present, partially Durkheimian system, schools are leading children to commit themselves in a consistent and behaviourally consequential way to the interests of the school groups to which they belong. On the contrary, in any direct empirical enquiry we should expect to find that children were very mixed in their views concerning the school's rules and regulations, and about authority and the extent to


which the interests of the group should take precedence over other interests. Neither should we expect great consistency in resistance to temptation or the expression of regret following self-indulgence.

If, following the proper empirical assessment, such expectations should be fulfilled, then an empirical theory along partially Durkheimian lines would have failed to produce positive findings.

In conclusion, we may say of these approaches to the empirical investigation of the Durkheimian theory that on balance it appears that the view that the stability and efficiency of our society depends on its members acquiring dispositions of the inclusive kind Durkheim apparently champions is questionable in so far as the available evidence suggests that the adult members of society do not display self-restraint on the basis simply of any one consideration, such as a concern for the interests of any group to which they belong. It would also appear unlikely that children in our schools are acquiring the dispositions Durkheim wished to see fostered. Thus, there is room for doubt that an empirical theory along Durkheimian lines would accurately depict the features of school life which contribute to the socialization process by which children are led to become acceptable members of our society at the present time.

The reference to "our society at the present time" is, I think, an important qualification, for one frequently reads accounts of life in countries such as China at the time of the "Cultural Revolution" where the citizens do indeed seem to be committed to the interests of their society in a way which leads one to suppose that their behaviour may indeed be satisfactorily explained by reference merely to certain dispositions. The school experience of children in such societies also seems, if accounts are to be believed, to be of a nature such that the growth of these dispositions may be recognised to have occurred as a result of the socialization programmes operated by schools. But such societies seem very different from our own, and considering the reviewed evidence, we must rest with the conclusion that the Durkheimian theory of school socialization may
be the subject of reasoned scepticism in so far as it is intended to apply to a society such as our own.

In fairness to Durkheim I should like to emphasise a point acknowledged earlier. It is true only up to a point that the proposals he made were or are existing practices universally operated in schools in our kind of society. It is unlikely, for example, that all teachers make use of collective punishments and rewards, or stress the ethos of the school. It seems even more unlikely that science teachers relate the subject matter of their lessons to the aims of "moral education". This being the case, it does not seem to be entirely fair to produce research findings which give support to the view that it is questionable whether the adult population of a society such as our own could be said to be disposed to display the kind of loyalty to the state and deference to authority which Durkheim suggests schools might foster. Until Durkheim's proposals have been fully implemented their success cannot properly be ascertained.

This line of argument seems to me to be unanswerable as a defence of Durkheim's detailed position. It has, however, the unfortunate consequence that we have at the present time, and indeed in the foreseeable future, no valid means of an assessment of that position. In these circumstances it does not seem to me to have been an entirely unprofitable exercise to have attempted to consider whether existing school arrangements are contributing to the formation of the kind of attitudes Durkheim was concerned to champion. Durkheim's precise position may be unaffected by the empirical evidence I have adduced; the kind of partially Durkheimian system at present operated seems less immune.

1. See above, 94.
In his article, *The School Class as a Social System: Some of its Functions in American Society*, Talcott Parsons sets out to do two things:

"Our main interest is in the dual problem: first of how the school class functions to internalize in its pupils both the commitments and capacities for successful performance of their future adult roles, and second of how it functions to allocate these human resources within the structure of the adult society."

The second of Parsons' interests, the leading of pupils towards different kinds of occupation in accordance with their assessed abilities and aptitudes, is often, as indeed it is for Parsons, considered a study which falls under the rubric of socialization. Since, however, the individual is not glimpsed in such studies, the focus being on the mechanisms of selection by which pupils are chosen for courses leading to higher qualifications, it will not be of concern to our investigations here. Our interests, then, are in Parsons' views on the school classroom as an agency through which individuals are, in his words, "trained to be motivationally ... adequate to the performance of adult roles."

In common with Durkheim, Parsons appears to accept, by implication at least, that the central purpose of socialization processes is to inculcate certain values which are thought to be necessary for the stability and efficiency of society. Since, however, his thought draws heavily

1. Parsons, T., *op. cit.*

upon Freudian ideas his views are markedly different from those of Durkheim, though there is common ground not only concerning the formal goals of socialization processes, but also concerning the importance of school experience as the means whereby in our society the inadequacy of "family socialization" may be overcome. It is, in fact, upon this point concerning the inability of parents to foster values in their children which are required by society that we may conveniently commence an examination of Parsons' theory.

Parsons appears to suggest that one important defect in the young child's experience within the family is that he forms strong emotional attachments only with his parents and principally his mother. This means that he is inclined to accept values and to perform tasks to please only his parents. Parsons points out that by the time the child reaches adulthood the objects of his affections and regard need to have undergone a fundamental change if the values required by society are to be internalized. The school, then, is the means in our society whereby the child is led away from the "pre-oedipal objects of attachments", and towards others which will more effectively dispose him to perform tasks which are necessary for society's stability and efficiency.

The psychological process which Parsons suggests is involved in the transformation is described in the following terms. The very young child has a strong emotional attachment to his mother and, as part of a family, has ascribed for him a certain status. Following the stage of oedipal conflict he is sent to school where he finds that status has to be "earned" by performances on tasks set by the teacher. Just as the child formerly identified with his mother in the pre-oedipal stage and acquired a certain "achievement-motivation" - he wanted to do things well to please his mother - so his achievement-motivation is furthered by his identification with his teacher, and his wanting to do well in school to please his teacher. The school thus
recapitulates an experience which the child first had in the family.

The process of identification with the teacher which Parsons postulates is furthered, he thinks, by the fact that in the elementary grades the child typically has one teacher, just as in the pre-oedipal stage he had one parent, the mother, who was the focus of his "object-relations". The continuity between the two phases is also favoured by the fact that the teacher, like the mother, is a woman. But if she acted only like a mother, there would be no genuine reorganisation of the pupil's "personality system".

This reorganisation is furthered by the many features of the teacher's role which differentiate it from the maternal. It is also pertinent that while a child has one main teacher in each grade, he will usually have a new teacher when he progresses to the next higher grade. He thus comes to grasp that his teacher, unlike his mother, is interchangeable.

The school year is long enough to form an important relationship to a particular teacher, but not long enough for a highly individual attachment to crystallize. Most importantly, more than in the family, the child in school must internalize his relation to the teacher's role rather than her particular personality. The accomplishment of this is a major step in the internalization of "universalistic patterns":

"For the individual, the old familial identification is broken up and a new identification is gradually built up, providing the first-order structure of the child's identity apart from his originally ascribed identity as son or daughter of the 'Jones'. He both transcends his familial identification in favour of a more independent one and comes to occupy a differentiated status within the new system". ¹

Apart from his relationship with the teacher there is another feature connected with school attendance which Parsons believes to be

¹ Parsons, T., op. cit., 307.
of immense importance in the process by which the child is led to form new attachments and, concomitantly, to acquire different motives. The school-age child continues to live in the parental household and to be highly dependent on his parents, but he is now spending several hours a day away from home, subject to a discipline and reward system which are essentially unrelated to that administered by the parents. Moreover, the range of this independence gradually increases. The child has, for example, his own pocket money, travels further afield, and has the opportunity for association with age-peers without detailed adult supervision.

Parsons believes, in fact, that membership of peer-groups is extremely important in the socialization process by which children are led to become acceptable members of our society. In his view,

"The motivational foundations of character are inevitably first laid down through identification with parents who are generation-superiors, and the generation difference is a type example of a hierarchical status difference. But an immense part of the individual's adult role performance will have to be in association with status-equals or near-equals. In this situation it is important to have a reorganisation of the motivational structure so that the original dominance of the hierarchical axis is modified to strengthen the egalitarian components. The peer group plays a prominent part in this process".¹

One final indication of Parsons's reliance on Freudian thought for guidance in understanding the socializing function of schooling is revealed in the interpretation he offers of the role of "sex-typed activities" in school. Sex-segregation of latency period peer groups, he suggests, may be regarded as a means of reinforcing sex-role identification. Through

¹ Parsons, op. cit., 308.
intensive association with sex-peers and involvement in sex-typed activities, they strongly reinforce belongingness with other members of the same sex and contrast with the opposite sex. Even more Freudian in character is his suggestion that sex-typed activities function to help pupils to cope with the psychological difficulty of overcoming the earlier incestuous attachments, and hence to prepare the child to form in later years an attachment to someone his own age and of the opposite sex.

2 (b) Parsons as a Social Systems Theorist

It is with these remarks that we conclude the insights Parsons offers concerning the part played by schools in the process by which children are led to become acceptable members of our society. His views can, I think, be readily shown to fall within the province of the social systems research approach. It is, firstly, fairly clear that Parsons is employing the metaphysical paradigm I have called the "affective bonds assumption" for he insists on the importance of children being led away from solely familial attachments towards a concern for the regard of peers in order that the kind of strong achievement motivation, which he apparently believes is necessary if society is to function properly, may be formed.

Parsons seems equally committed to the second metaphysical paradigm I have mentioned, that which suggests that we view the acquisition of values on analogy with the moulding of plastic materials. This is apparent in that he believes that children can be inclined by the contrivance of certain features of compulsory school attendance to embrace values to which they have given no rational consideration. Indeed, Parsons supposes that children can be led even against their initial wishes to replace the objects of their deepest feelings, their unconditionally loving parents, with friends and teachers whose esteem has to be earned. Here, surely, is a reliance on the "plastic man" analogy.

Concerning Parsons' particular use of the environmentalist methodology associated with the social systems research approach I shall have more to
say presently. It is sufficient at this point to establish that he does in fact adopt this methodological stance by noting that the factors which he desires to relate include, on the one hand, school organisational features such as the presence of female teachers during the early years, the conditional nature of the teacher's regard, the compulsory separation from the parents for several hours each day, the enforced propinquity of other children and the participation in sex-typed activities, and, on the other, the development of desires to be esteemed by a particular range of people and the consequent growth of an achievement motivation which is thought essential for the stability and efficiency of society.

Finally, we turn to the ontological commitment to some form of existence for dispositions which I have suggested is a distinguishing feature of the social systems research approach. Although Parsons does not write of dispositions, the Freudian basis of his theory suggests that the kind of achievement motivation he believed schools foster would have something of the character of an unconscious wish. The successfully socialized adolescent's behaviour would, that is, be more like a moth veering towards a light than a helmsman steering a ship to port. The need for the approval of teachers and peers would draw him towards behaving in ways which would gain this end. This being the case, there does not seem to be a significant difference in writing of the fostering of dispositions in the sense of tendencies to behave in a certain way whenever certain circumstances obtain, and the inspiring of achievement motivation. We may, then, I believe, conclude that Parsons can be said to be accepting this ontological commitment of the social systems research approach.

2 (c) Appraisal

It would appear, then, that Parsons' theory is one which may be classified as within the scope of the social systems research approach,

1. This comparison is drawn from Peters. See Peters, R.S., The Concept of Motivation, 1958, 70.
and, as such, will be vulnerable to any valid criticism of the features of this research approach considered in isolation from any theories to which it has given rise. Before embarking upon the assessment of the research approach itself, or even an examination of the special features of this particular theory, I should like to raise the question of the extent to which his article may be said to approach a complete description of school socialization.

We may begin by conceding that it is unreasonable to expect a theorist to specify within the compass of a single work the entire range of organizational features of school life which may foster the growth of achievement motivation. The adequacy of Parsons's theory in the sense at present under consideration turns rather on the extent to which the interpretations we may infer he would make of the concepts of the unsuccessfully socialized person and the deviant are acceptable.

On the topic of unsuccessful socialization which, in this context, would appear to involve a failure effectively to lead the child away from a stultifyingly exclusive relationship with his parents, one looks for a criterion by which it may be decided whether a particular child has not been successfully socialized. The criterion might, in lay language, be couched in terms of the unsuccessfully socialized child being "immature" in his relations with his teachers, whom he might, perhaps, continue to treat as parent-substitutes. The distinguishing feature of his behaviour by which he may be deemed immature in this respect would not, Parsons would concede, be immediately observable, for it would involve the presence of a certain persisting underlying motive. It is at this point that a difficulty which attaches to socialization theories based on psychoanalytic thought becomes apparent. This concerns the contentious nature of imputations of "Freudian" motivations. Psychoanalysts place great importance on the difficulty of ever knowing the "true" motives which lead a person to act in the way he does. An extremely wide range of observable behaviour,
including, no doubt, that which is seemingly indistinguishable from behaviour which is prompted by the desire for achievement in order to merit the respect of the world beyond the family circle, may in the considered opinion of the analyst be attributable to "pre-oedipal" attachments, or an immature need for parental approval. This being the case, it seems reasonable to enquire into the validity of analysts' diagnostic judgements. Extensive empirical investigations have been made of the reliability of analysts' attempts to infer persisting motivational dispositions from observable behaviour. It is now fairly widely recognised that the accumulated findings give little support for the supposed validity of analysts' judgements, even when the judgements are made in clinical contexts. Reviews of relevant research show that clinicians guided by concepts about underlying genotypic dispositions have not been able to predict behaviour better than the person himself (who, supposedly, was unaware he possessed such inclinations) or any lay person using simple indices of directly relevant past behaviour, or even demographic variables. In the light of these findings, the criteria by which Parsons might seek to effect the identification of unsuccessfully socialized persons must, I think, be acknowledged to be less than entirely satisfactory.

A weakness of the nature I have indicated would not, of course, hinder the identification of unsuccessfully socialized children who were grossly immature in their relations with, for example, their teachers. Universal agreement might readily be reached concerning whether a particular boy was, in clinical terms, "mother-fixated". It may well be, however, that in many cases clarity would be served if such children were regarded as "deviants" in so far as this term is applied by social systems theorists to people who are, like such children, strongly committed to values inimical to people who are, like such children, strongly committed to values inimical

to the preservation and efficiency of the groups to which they belong.

If Parsons were to apply the deviancy label to people who were not "achievement-motivated" in the sense of wishing to pursue worldly success for reasons other than to please parents, it begins to appear as if the class of deviants is likely to be composed of those regarded by society at large as neurotics. For in a society where one is expected to form achievement-inspiring emotional attachments to peer group members, the individual who does not change the objects of his earliest attachments will probably be thought to be dominated by his parents, or to be "fixated". If this is so, the question we may now raise is whether there is anything unacceptable in construing deviancy in this way.

The first thought which may strike one is that the class of people who by their commitment to particular values are a force disruptive of the stability and efficiency of society is surely not to be confined to neurotics of the kind at present under discussion. This, however, need not unduly disturb Parsons, for his theory, construed as a theory of school socialization, need only seek to identify those people whose deviancy may be traced to failure in school socialization processes. His claim, then, appears to be that in our kind of society the class of deviants, in respect of whom schools can be seen to have failed to lead to form aspirations useful to society, is confined to those he identifies.

Such an interpretation of the concept of deviancy may, I think, be most profitably assessed in the context of an examination of the social systems research approach itself. It does not seem to me that we can attempt, for example, to determine whether this inferred Parsonian interpretation of deviancy can be deemed "correct" by, for example, comparing it with the interpretation we derived from the writings of Durkheim. It may be that the Parsonian account needs to be supplemented with the Durkheimian, or it may be that the values Durkheim champions would be claimed by Parsons to be, at bottom, based on the sources of achievement motivation in which he
is interested. There simply is not in Parsons' article sufficient 
information profitably to pursue this question.

It is apparent from the foregoing comments that Parsons' article 
is less than completely satisfying if we are seeking an account of school 
socialization which is complete in the sense of offering an interpretation 
of those concepts which are so closely linked to that of "socialization". 
Despite this, it is still possible, I think, to make some pertinent remarks 
on the difficulties to which the empirical assessment of Parsons' theory 
is subject.

The first point which may be made is that there has not, to my 
knowledge, even been any attempt to seek empirical confirmation of Parsons' 
theory. Further, it is not only the case that no such investigation has 
ever been made, it is not clear whether the terms of such an enquiry could 
be given an adequate operational definition, for Parsons' theory draws 
heavily on the Freudian theory of personality. Freudians make a special 
distinction between observable behaviour and the motive it serves; and the 
consequence of their distinction is that in order to characterise behaviour 
properly a certain amount of interpretation of a special kind is required. 
To date there is, however, as I have remarked,¹ no reliable means of 
relating observable behaviour to the underlying categories of motives which 
belong to Freudian theory. In consequence of this, it may not prove possible 
to gather any reliable body of evidence which would either lend support to 
or disconfirm the Parsonian theory. It might also be added in this connection 
that various aspects of the Freudian theory of personality itself have been 
the subject of several controlled empirical assessments with largely 
negative findings.²

This last point may lead one to raise the question whether the 
Freudian theory of personality is one which may profitably be embraced

1. See above, 110.

2. See Eysenck, H.J., and Wilson, G.D. (eds.) The Experimental Study of 
in attempting to describe the part played by schools in the process by which children are led to become acceptable members of society. Not only does its adoption make the gathering of empirical evidence difficult, and not only does it lead to the theorist being selective in the behaviour he chooses to consider, it would also appear to be methodologically unsound. Any proper treatment of school socialization must surely not limit the range of behaviour upon which attention is to be focussed by the adoption at the outset of a theory of personality conceived to solve quite different problems. In opposition to this readiness to construct theories in this manner Turner has insisted that the relevance of personality to the functioning of society or any organisation is a perplexing matter. It remains so partly because there has been no adequate conceptualisation of the relations between group or societal variables and personality, even conceived along Freudian lines. More fundamental, however, is the lack of a conception of personality which has been formulated specifically to account for the behaviour which has been inspired by a particular kind of society or group. The problem has been defined as one of discovering a relationship between societal and group variables and a pre-established conception of personality. This, certainly, would not appear to be sound procedure.

In conclusion, it may be said of Parsons' theory that, like the theory of Emile Durkheim, there is room for reasoned doubt that positive empirical findings may be forthcoming. This is not to suggest that the

1. This may, in part, account for the divergencies between the accounts given of school socialization I have drawn from the writings of Durkheim and Parsons.


3. This is, of course, not universally true. See, for example, Riesman, D., The Lonely Crowd, New York, 1950, 17-38.
difficulties to which I have drawn attention are insuperable. It is important to note, however, that, at present, little support for the social systems research approach to socialization as a fruitful research approach can be gained by citing the work of Talcott Parsons as a theory whose basic conceptions are within its guidelines.

3. A Behaviourist Theory of Socialization

3 (a) Exposition

I have already outlined in an earlier chapter the behaviourist theory of socialization I wish to consider. I shall, therefore, do no more here than briefly mention a fairly recent attempt to extend the theory I have sketched to include more of the concepts – particularly "role" and "social positions" – which Dawe mentioned in his historical survey of the social systems approach to socialization. This particular variant of the behaviourist theory may also be considered an exemplification of the "role learning" approach to socialization which has at present a considerable number of adherents. An influential exposition of this theory has been made by Orville Brim.²

Brim defines socialization as the process of learning by which an individual is prepared to meet the requirements that society has set for his behaviour. These requirements always attach to the positions he holds in either the larger society or some smaller group within it, and the required behaviour is considered to be constitutive of the roles he has to play. Brim acknowledges that a person's knowledge of the requirements of a role and his ability to discharge the obligations are undeniably of some importance in the socialization process. For Brim, however, the most important factor distinguishing successful socialization is motivation. The socialization process is successful, and social stability and efficiency will be maintained, above all to the extent that people can be induced to want

1. See above, 35-43.

to meet the expectations constitutive of the roles in which they find themselves cast.

It is apparent that there is within the behaviourist approach to scientific research nothing which raises difficulties for a behaviourist in his adoption of the concepts of "role" and "social position". The notion of a "role" can be elaborated in terms of "required values and behaviour" and both the values and behaviour in question given operational definition.

The stress on values in Brim's theory is, as I have remarked earlier, also evident in the scales and questionnaires which are the standard means by which theorists of behaviourist persuasion seek to determine the success or otherwise of socialization processes. It is this emphasis, and its implications, which leads one to consider the behaviourist theory as an exemplification of the social systems research approach. There would not seem, that is, to be strong reasons why a behaviourist accustomed to employing "socialization scales" should object to the suggestion that he is construing socialization as a process by which individuals are led to hold certain values which are believed to be supportive of the stability and efficiency of the group to which he belongs. Equally, such a theorist would appear to hold the view that an unsuccess fully socialized person is one who, according to test results, appears not to be committed to these values to the required degree, and that a deviant person is one who has embraced contrary values. The behaviourist theory of socialization may, then, properly be deemed to belong to the social systems research approach to socialization.

3 (b) Appraisal

This conceded we may turn to the question concerning the empirical support which research findings may provide for the behaviourist theory of school socialization. It is right at the outset to report an important inadequacy of which practitioners in the field are fully cognisant.

1. See above, 38-39, and 56.
Morrison and McIntyre, following their survey of research findings, have concluded that behaviourist investigations of the long term influences of lessons and school organisational arrangements on attitudes and traits are in at least one fundamental respect unsatisfactory. They acknowledge that no general acceptance of a "unified" theory concerning the lasting influences of school experience guides research projects. Instead one finds a host of quite unrelated investigations of the possible long-term effects of particular lessons or aspects of organisational features. Further, each investigation by the precision of its operational definitions precludes or makes difficult the legitimate assimilation of its findings into a more general, systematic account of the lasting influence of school experience.

Both these features of behaviourist research procedure may readily be illustrated by reference to the investigations which have been undertaken to determine the influence of features of school life on that aspect of people's outlook which might be expected to affect directly the stability of our society, namely, that concerned with political matters. Studies of the relations between political attitudes and school experience which are commonly found in reviews of the literature usually accord a prominent place to Adorno's study of the authoritarian personality. Both in his original investigation and in later work he sought and found correlations between authoritarianism and length of education. Authoritarianism, as measured by Adorno's "F Scale", correlates negatively with years of education. Another commonly mentioned study is that conducted by Hess and Torey. These writers proceeded on the basis that if education

is playing a distinctive part in moulding attitudes then one would expect to find, for example, that, as they grew older, children's attitudes would become more like those of their teachers. In their study, Hess and Torney did in fact find a narrowing of the gap, based on correlations between such matters as teachers' practices in displaying the American flag and children's attitudes towards the flag as a symbol. Finally, mention is also often made of the investigations conducted by Newcomb, who investigated political attitudes among the student body of Bennington College, Vermont, at that time a small and intensely political college with a liberal faculty much concerned with the events of the period and with acquainting its students with the nature of the contemporary social and political scene. Newcomb reported that most students went through marked changes of attitude as they progressed through the college, moving from freshman conservatism to senior non-conservatism.

An acquaintance with studies such as these reveals clearly the absence of a guiding general theory which specifies in a comprehensive way both the values which it is believed educational organisations foster which it can be argued preserve the stability and efficiency of society, and the features of school life by which this is accomplished. The piecemeal and detailed nature of the investigations, with their inherently limiting features of being examinations of particular institutions during a certain period using unique measuring scales (Adorno's "F Scale"), all tend to preclude their legitimate incorporation in any subsequent attempt to formulate the kind of theory which ought properly to precede any satisfactory investigation of school socialization.

In addition to these deficiencies in behaviourist research studies there is another which is related to the absence of any precisely formulated


2. The survey of research projects in Morrison, A. and McIntyre, D., op. cit., provides many more examples.
theory of school socialization. There is often to be found in such investigations not only a limiting precision of terms of reference, there is also, in another sense, an absence of required detail. The point at issue here may be illumined if reference is made first to research which has been conducted into the impact of sex and religious education, two features of school life which traditionally have been thought to be of some consequence in the development of a "sense of responsibility" and to assist the "personal adjustment" of the individual to "the demands of society".

We may begin by referring to research designed to establish the effects of sex education on sexual behaviour. At the present time in this country, the research conducted by Schofield is often cited in reviews of the literature. In his survey he found largely negative correlations between various aspects of sex education provision and the sexual activity of young people, though a large difference in patterns of heterosexual behaviour did correlate with the type of school (grammar or secondary modern) pupils had attended. Boys and girls from the former are at the age of fifteen less experienced sexually. In another survey Dale compared the views of former pupils from single-sex and co-educational schools, his subjects being asked to report on their feelings about their experience of school and their attitudes to members of the opposite sex. They were asked, for example, "Did your school life help or hinder you in your relations with the opposite sex?". Forty per cent of men from boys' schools compared with less than six per cent from mixed schools thought their schooling had been a hindrance, and similarly distinctive results were obtained from women. Both sexes from the co-educational schools said they found it easier to work with members of the opposite sex, and co-educated men found it easier to work under the direction of a woman.

On the topic of religious education, mention may be made of the work of Alves, who has attempted to relate the intentions of teachers of religious education to the enduring effects of their lessons. Over half of the teachers in his survey indicated that they aimed to promote "personal Christian dedication" among the pupils. One of his general findings was that this aim seemed not to have been lastingly fulfilled since even sixth form pupils in his survey tended to be less positive in their attitudes to Christianity than pupils in the fourth and fifth forms.

It is not, however, on the negative nature of the many correlations in religious and sex education studies that I wish to focus attention, but rather on the absence of information or even conjecture which would render such findings interesting to the student of school socialization or even the theorist inquisitive concerning the long term effects of school experience in any of its aspects. In Schofield's study we are left to surmise for ourselves just what might be those aspects of school life at a secondary modern which are not operative at a grammar school which contribute to the earlier sex experience of its pupils. A similar absence of necessary detail is observable in the work of both Dale and Alves where the unanalysed nature of the school variable leaves unclarified the relationship we should like to see illumined.

It may be doubted that the limitation of these studies to the search for such correlations is merely fortuitous, for in proceeding in this way these researchers are following the standard behaviourist approach to scientific procedure and resting content with its approach to scientific explanation. It is perhaps in the tacit acceptance of this approach to explanation that we may find a continuing underlying reason why empirical behaviourist studies leave any detailed question of the nature of school socialization largely unanswered, and for that reason the logic of this approach to explanation is worthy of our attention.

We may begin by noting that in seeking correlations, behaviourists are in effect confining their investigations to the task of providing the kind of information which may be used to answer a particular kind of question. In the case of the research conducted by Dale, the question might be phrased as follows: Why is it that certain people find it difficult to work with members of the opposite sex? The answer which his study provides is that it may be that these people went to single sex schools and such people usually do find it difficult to work with members of the opposite sex. In more schematic terms Von Wright has written of this, the "inductive-probabilistic" model of explanation, as follows: ¹

"The object of an inductive-probabilistic explanation ... is an individual event E. The basis is a set of other elements or states \( E_1 \ldots E_n \). The covering law, the 'bridge' or 'tie' connecting the basis with the object of explanation, is a probability hypothesis to the effect that on an occasion when \( E_1 \ldots E_n \) are instantiated, it is highly probable that E will occur."

Von Wright has pointed out that it is part and parcel of an inductive-probabilistic explanation that it admits the possibility that E may have failed to occur. It therefore leaves room for an additional quest for explanation: why did E on this occasion actually occur and why did it not fail to occur? Inductive-probabilistic explanations explain why things which happened were to be expected (or not to be expected). Only in a secondary sense do they explain why things happened, viz., "because" they were highly probable. Von Wright suggests that it is better to say not that inductive-probabilistic explanations explain what happened, but to say only that they justify certain expectations and predictions. Some writers are more forthright than this. Philips, for example, writes:

"Imagine that we have valid measures of our independent and dependent variables and that, furthermore, we have established an extremely high statistical relationship between them. This relationship does not in itself constitute an explanation. Rather a correlation is also a description - a fact to be explained. This fact itself does not serve as an explanation of anything at all". 

Behaviourist research, then, though it may prove useful for certain predictive purposes, and in some measure, to explain certain states of affairs, may not be expected, in the absence of a guiding theory, to provide the basis for a satisfactory explanation of the part played by schools in the process by which children are led to become acceptable members of society. In asserting this, I do not mean to suggest that having formulated a promising theory of school socialization, the search for correlations suggested by the theory would be irrelevant. On the contrary, it could be an essential method of testing the theory. I mean to assert here merely that behaviourist studies of the kind I have mentioned seem unlikely to provide the kind of insight from which a detailed theory of school socialization could be formulated.

In reflecting upon empirical findings gathered by behaviourists interested in the effects of schooling I have perforce ignored the theoretical contribution which a behaviourist might make to the study of school role socialization. On this topic behaviourist theorists of socialization might be thought to be able to speak with an unique authority, for it is not only the case that they have devised scales and other measuring devices whereby the "social adjustment" of children may be measured, they have even persuaded schools to adopt their use in cases where it is thought appropriate to reach a decision as to whether a particular child is to be deemed unacceptable as a pupil at that school, or even at any such type of school, and should rather be sent to a "Special" educational establishment.

If, in accordance with the social systems research approach, it is accepted that by school role socialization is to be meant the process by which values conducive to the stability and efficiency of the school are inculcated, and that unsuccessfully socialized persons and deviants are pupils who fail to acquire these values, then it might seem that the behaviourist's task in describing school role socialization may not be difficult. Such theorists know the values which their questionnaires measure, and since these are actually used by schools they may claim to know the values which schools deem to be so important that pupils who fail properly to embrace them are literally unacceptable in the school. Further, proceeding in this way it might then be possible to relate such values to the preservation and efficiency of society, and then to argue that the contribution of schools to the socialization process by which people become acceptable members of society lies in the inculcation of such values. Such a procedure has not, to my knowledge, ever been undertaken and it does rest on an assumption which is questionable.

This assumption is that schools do in fact regard pupils to be unacceptable school members on the basis of the values to which they subscribe. It may well be that even though use is made of "social adjustment" scales in which pupils' values are assessed it nevertheless is the case that the decision to declare a pupil to be unacceptable as a member of the school's community is not principally or even at all based on the question of values. This is a topic which it is more convenient to raise as part of a later discussion of the ethogenic approach to school role socialization. I wish merely at this point to emphasise both that the issue as to whether behaviourists may claim on the basis of the acceptance by schools of their social adjustment scales to know the values which schools require of pupils, and that the claim that the success of school role socialization is as a matter of fact decided by schools by reference to these values, should not be regarded as beyond dispute.
Conclusion

It is apparent from the foregoing consideration of these three theories which were conceived within the confines of the social systems research approach that there does not as yet exist an impressive body of positive research findings such that one could feel fully confident that it would be profitable to continue investigations of school or school role socialization employing this research approach. This is, of course, not to say that the research approach itself is incapable of more effective adoption by other theorists, and as yet we have made no attempt at its evaluation. It is appropriate now to do so, and we turn from empirical to conceptual considerations in an examination of the metaphysical paradigms, methodology and ontology of this research approach.
CHAPTER FOUR

A CRITIQUE OF THE SOCIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH
APPROACH TO SOCIALIZATION

1. The Appraisal of Research Approaches: Some General Considerations

The occasion upon which a need may be perceived to undertake a critical appraisal of the various ideas which combine to form a research approach is likely to arise when its constituent theories are failing to lead to a satisfying accumulation of knowledge. It is, of course, possible at such a juncture that attention may be directed merely at the theories, and negative findings attributed either to methodological difficulties or to a failure to pose precisely the right questions. Thus a social systems theorist might at the present time choose not to question the research approach itself and may believe rather that either Durkheim's or Parsons' theory is substantially correct but must be recast so that a proper operational definition of terms may be effected. However, the contingency of a dearth of positive findings properly should not absolve a theorist from the need to be clear concerning just what are the assumptions and commitments he is accepting in his attempts to understand the world. It may be that the conceptual difficulties which will become apparent following his investigations of the research approach he has been inclined to accept will undermine the validity of even seemingly positive findings. The critical appraisal of research approaches, then, is a task with which no theorist may with equanimity dispense.

In conducting his examination a theorist may, for analytic clarity, consider separately the topics of metaphysical paradigms, methodology and ontology. In his appraisal of metaphysical paradigms some thoughts of Kuhn concerning the ways in which such paradigms may fail to prove acceptable as "ways of looking at the world" may prove helpful,
To begin, it has been emphasised by Kuhn that a paradigm, as an analogy, will in a straightforward sense be incommensurable. This has the consequence that the most decisive reason for ceasing to employ a particular paradigm will arise from the analogy, which will in the nature of things not be usefully applicable to all phenomena, failing to cast light, or any further light, upon a state of affairs. It is not only the case that the extended use of a paradigm produces diminishing returns. A paradigm can, in certain circumstances, be seen to be, in the words of Hesse, a negative analogy, that is, a set of statements developed from within the analogy itself which should have been true had the analogy held that far, but which, since the analogy cannot properly be so extended, turn out not to be so. Kuhn himself writes of anomalies, of insoluble problems, of germane but unwelcome results which are produced by a paradigm being pushed too far.

Kuhn suggests that, typically, in this situation attempts will be made to adjust the analogy. Anomaly deepens into crisis when these attempts fail and negative findings continue to be prevalent, thus throwing into question the very fundamentals of the paradigm. If, at this point, some other theorists working within the confines of a quite different research approach, but addressing what is nominally the same question, begin to amass positive findings, then the old paradigm, together with all its assumptions and commitments, begins to look inappropriate. Kuhn, in fact, holds that,

2. Kuhn, op. cit., 2, 5, 65, 78.
3. It is apparent that empirical questions may be framed which by their wording do not reveal a commitment to any particular research approach. One such question would be: What is the nature of school socialization?
"... one of the things a scientific community acquires with a paradigm is a criterion for choosing problems that, while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to have solutions. To a great extent these are the only problems that the community will admit as scientific or encourage its members to undertake. Other problems, including many that have previously been standard, are rejected as metaphysical, as the concern of another discipline, or as just too problematic to be worth the time."¹

It is apparent from these observations that the important questions we may raise in our appraisal of the metaphysical paradigms of the social systems research approach as it may be applied to the study of school or school role socialization are threefold. We may question whether the analogies involved are being pushed too far in being applied to these problems; more radically, we may ask if the analogies are acceptable at all; and, finally, we may enquire whether these problems may be rendered more comprehensible and investigated more successfully using the assumptions and perspective of a quite different research approach.

Turning from metaphysical paradigms to a consideration of the enquiries which may be raised in the appraisal of the ontology and methodology of research approaches, it is apparent that on these topics the most important question to be raised concerns the fundamental acceptability of the positions adopted with respect to the special problems of school and school role socialization. The possibility of another research approach avoiding any difficulties attending the research approach under investigation

¹ From an historical point of view Kuhn's account of the careers of paradigms has been criticised by Shapere, but this issue is not germane to our present concerns. See Shapere, D., 'Meaning and Scientific Change' in Colodny, R., (ed.) Mind and Cosmos, Pittsburgh, 1966, 41-85, and 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' in Philosophical Review, vol. 73, 1964, 395-94.
must also be considered. Concerning fundamental acceptability, the questions to be posed are whether the methodology is adequate to the investigation of the diverse range of factors which may be present in socialization processes, and whether there are sufficient grounds for the acceptance of the ontological commitment to the kind of dispositions which are posited by the social systems research approach.

With these general considerations before us, we may turn to the critical appraisal of this research approach, considering first its metaphysical paradigms.

2. A Critical Examination of the Metaphysical Paradigms of the Social Systems Research Approach

2 (a) The Perspective on Group Stability and Efficiency

Earlier in this thesis in setting forth the social systems research approach I suggested that one metaphysical paradigm by which this research approach is constituted amounts to a way of looking at groups with regard to how stability and efficiency are maintained. The comparison invoked here involves reference to some kind of adhesive substance the presence of which is necessary if the diverse sections of a certain contrivance are not to fall apart and the function of the article rendered inoperative or its efficiency reduced. The analogy suggests that just as certain things have to be held together by some form of adhesive in order effectively to fulfil their purpose, so groups of people, including a society, need, if they are not to split into factions and cease to perform their function properly, to be held together by a kind of social glue which is constituted by the shared values of the members of the group or society which is under consideration. I referred to this metaphysical paradigm as "the affective bonds assumption".

We have now to determine whether or not to give unqualified acceptance to this comparison. At least one theorist, Harré, who works within a quite different research approach, would appear to want to reject the analogy.

outright. The burden of Harre's complaint is that, in explaining the
stability enjoyed by certain societies and groups within them, theorists
have paid insufficient attention to the pervasive ceremonial character of adult
social life, preferring instead to concentrate on the origin and development
of the capacity to form lasting emotional bonds:

"This suggests that ... the adult social world
is a product of such bonds. Nothing could be further
from the truth. The astonishing thing about the
adult social world as revealed by ethogenic analysis,
is that it forms and transforms itself with little
reference to emotional bonds, lasting or ephemeral.
Social glue is an altogether different stuff. It
is a common assumption to suppose that emotional
bonds cause social cohesion. A more accurate response
is to stand back in astonishment in the face of the
maintenance of social cohesion in the actual situation
of emotional flux".¹

Contrary to the view taken by Harre here, I believe that this particular
metaphysical paradigm does not call for total rejection, though its usefulness
as a way of looking at the stability and efficiency of groups is subject to
certain contingencies. The question of whether the social stability of a
society may be maintained in the complete absence of shared values is one which
is not readily testable on practical grounds even assuming it could be assigned
a precise meaning. If we enter the realm of speculation, I would say that
it seems likely that at least some minimum agreement on moral matters is necessary
if cohesion is to be maintained. More precisely, I incline to the view
that the importance of members of a society adhering to a "central value
system" may vary both from society to society at any one time, and within
a single society over a period of time. It would appear that the most
striking manifestation of a breakdown of social stability, civil war;

¹ Harre, R., op. cit., 247.
may fairly be construed as issuing from an absence of shared values by the society's members. In such a situation, it is important to note, there is not likely to be controversy concerning which values need to be embraced for stability to be restored. There are times, then, when this assumption of the social systems research approach seems not only to be reasonable, but of such consequence that Harre's claims for the importance of the ceremonial aspects of social behaviour, in accounting for the prevailing level of group or societal stability, would appear inflated. In less turbulent periods, however, the minimum agreement over values which it may be granted is required for the stability and efficiency to be maintained, may not be about values which are easy to specify, still less to relate to school experiences. During such times the usefulness of this metaphysical paradigm will depend on the perspicacity of the theorist, and it may be that no individual will, as a matter of fact, produce an hypothesis which will lead to positive findings. At a time when few positive empirical findings have been located, and no promising hypothesis has been formulated which attempts to specify the values by which society is held together, the uncommitted enquirer would not appear to have a strong basis on which he might base a decision to adopt this particular metaphysical paradigm rather than that of the kind suggested, perhaps, by Harre's work.

It is, then, a qualified acceptance that I give to the use of this particular metaphysical paradigm as a basis on which to begin investigations of socialization processes in any context. We have now to consider whether the analogy is likely to be profitably employed when our concern is to examine the part played by schools in the process by which children are led to become acceptable members of our society at the present time. The first point we may note concerns the present level of stability in our society. It may be observed that strikes are prevalent, and that there is a high degree of violence in parts of our society, and it does not seem unlikely that certain people might want to claim that civil order is in imminent danger of collapse, and, if they did, would attribute it ultimately
to a failure of sections of the community to embrace certain specified values. Such people might also wish to claim, especially perhaps with respect to Northern Ireland, that these values are not properly inculcated in schools at the present time. In so far as a person believes these things, then it may seem appropriate in investigating school socialization to seek to determine the values inculcated by schools and to relate them to the maintenance of social cohesion. The adoption of this particular metaphysical paradigm would, that is, seem to offer good prospects for the acquisition of knowledge concerning school socialization.

All these claims, however, seem to me to be open to doubt. One may reasonably doubt, that is, that civil order is indeed in danger of imminent collapse, or that it is clear which values the absence of agreement over which is affecting the stability of our complete society, and not just a geographical section of it. It may, moreover, for the kinds of reasons which emerged during the examination of the theories of Durkheim, Parsons and the behaviourists, even be doubted whether schools are likely ever to be shown to be responsible either for the inculcation of those convictions which allegedly hold society together, or for a failure properly to transmit such values. For the uncommitted enquirer assailed by such doubts, it may seem that in a world where a scarcity of resources obliges a choice between conducting investigations in accordance with this, rather than another quite different metaphysical paradigm, a properly reasoned decision may only be made following an examination of the conceptual difficulties and degree of research success of any theories based on an alternative research approach.

A similar conclusion must, I believe, be reached over the question concerning the likely profitability in terms of positive research findings of adopting the affective bonds assumption as a basis on which to investigate school role socialization. Here also it would appear that the usefulness of this metaphysical paradigm is contingent upon the acumen of the theorist, and in the absence of a substantial body of positive research findings;
the uncommitted investigator would not appear to have any sound reason
to suppose that it is likely to be more rewarding to examine school role
socialization from this perspective rather than another, prior to an
examination of the alternative.

The possibility of an alternative research approach to socialization,
then, makes the doubts we may feel concerning this particular metaphysical
paradigm of more consequence. This alternative research approach, which
I shall discuss later in greater detail, takes as the goal of socialization
processes, not the inculcation of values, but, rather, the acquisition
of competence in the countless social exchanges which make up social life
in our society. It would certainly seem to be the case that in a society
such as our own, at the level of routine daily encounters, people could
not continue to work and play together without possessing certain knowledge
and skills which are quite independent of shared commitments for their
successful operation. Indeed, such commitments may for certain kinds of
encounter be quite dispensable. In this approach to socialization, then,
we are concerned not, for example, with the problems of specifying values
by which societal cohesion is maintained and tracing their acceptance
to school experiences. Nor are we concerned with the identification of
the values which it is supposed schools inculcate in order to maintain
stability and efficiency in school matters. We are concerned rather with the
necessity of introducing individuals to the various kinds of symbolic
interaction by which social life is conducted in a particular society or
group.

Such an approach thus avoids the need to adopt the metaphysical
paradigm by which stability is made dependent upon the members of groups
sharing certain values. It does not question the validity of the affective
bonds assumption; the issue simply is not raised. The treatment of group
or societal stability and efficiency, issues which must be tackled by
any adequate theory of socialization, is not made to revolve around the
question of values. There is, then, an alternative, admittedly as yet unexamined, to which a theorist sceptical of the affective bonds assumption might turn.

2 (b) The Perspective on Persons

The second metaphysical paradigm I mentioned in connection with this research approach amounted to a way of looking at people, or more precisely, at their acquisition and expression of moral convictions. Under the analogy employed here, people are viewed as creatures who in their behaviour with respect to the acquisition and expression of moral values are similar to plastic materials. Just as plastics are moulded into certain forms so that they behave in predictable ways in certain circumstances, so people may be moulded or influenced by non-rational means so that they act in set ways when they are in certain situations. I referred to this metaphysical paradigm as the "plastic man" analogy.

In the appraisal of this metaphysical paradigm, I shall seek not merely to question its acceptability in the special cases of school and school role socialization, but to raise doubts concerning its fundamental acceptability in any studies of socialization processes. In this undertaking I shall have occasion to refer to research findings relevant to the study of the notions of an attitude and a trait, for it is by the employment of these concepts that expression very commonly is given by social systems theorists to the dispositions which they believe socialization processes instil. My critical examination of this paradigm will, in fact, centre on the manner in which the concepts of an attitude and a trait are typically treated by social systems theorists.

(i) Attitudes

The concept of an attitude has a central place in sociology and social psychology, and has been employed in many studies involving the effects

of schooling upon children. But despite the lengthy and widespread acceptance of the concept of an attitude as a genuine variable in the explanation of behaviour, there has fairly recently been a series of studies which cast considerable doubt upon the role which attitudes typically have been assumed to play in the genesis of action.

The terms in which this role has been described have, of course, varied in accordance with the way in which the notion of an attitude has been characterised. Historically, definitions of "attitude" have covered a great deal of conceptual territory, ranging from Allport's mentalistic

"... states of readiness ... exerting a dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations to which he is related,"

to behaviouristic definitions from both psychologists and sociologists in terms simply of the probability of the occurrence of specified behaviour in a particular situation; to say that someone has a certain attitude towards some issue is to say that whenever matters pertaining to this issue arise, he is likely to respond in a particular manner. Nevertheless, the central view of social scientists would appear to be that the concept


of an attitude may be used in causal explanations of behaviour: people feel a certain way about some issue, and this determines how they behave on occasions when this issue arises.

Centrally, this is the role assumed to be played by attitudes, and the analogy we are at present considering may be restated in the following way: just as being moulded into a particular shape makes it likely that when certain other conditions obtain, an object will behave in a way which may be forecast, so people can be moulded, that is, can be led to acquire certain attitudes, so that, given specifiable conditions, they are likely to behave in a predictable way.

I would like now to mention briefly some studies which cast serious doubt on the supposed straightforwardness of this connection between attitudes and behaviour.

Firstly, there have been several studies in which it has been found that people will actually behave in ways which oblige us to acknowledge that on certain kinds of occasions the things which people believe, the moral convictions they hold, are of little account in themselves in explaining what they actually do. For example, in the widely discussed study by Milgram, a majority of liberal-minded subjects delivered what they believed to be very dangerous shocks to vulnerable testees on the bland instructions of the experimenter. The subjects delivering the shocks actually deprecated the kind of behaviour in which they themselves indulged. Mention may also be made of recent studies of "bystander effects" by Latane and Darley, where subjects were found with great frequency to be unable to bring themselves to help those they believed to be victims of various kinds of accident, despite strong internal feelings that they ought to render some sort of assistance.

1. A more complete review of relevant studies is to be found in Abelson, R.P., 'Are Attitudes Necessary?' in King, B.T. and McGuiness, E., (eds.) Attitudes, Conflict and Social Change, New York, 1972, 19-32.


assistance. It has even been found by Asch\textsuperscript{1} that often an individual would agree with other members of a group over matters of straightforward empirical fact even though his own senses told him that their views were quite wrong.

In addition to these kinds of study it also seems relevant to remark upon those investigations which have sought to determine whether a change in behaviour follows a change of attitude. Here there are a number of disconcerting studies. For example, investigations have been conducted by Janis and Feshback\textsuperscript{2}, and by Leventhal and Niles\textsuperscript{3}, and by many others into the effects of "fear appeals" concerning dental hygiene, smoking and other topics related to health. It has generally been found that the pattern of results concerning changes of attitude towards the health danger were different from those for changes in actual behaviour. Many people are apparently led to adopt different attitudes, but do nothing about it except perhaps to express their new opinions orally.

In view of these findings the most common conception of the relationship between attitudes and behaviour - that attitudes "make ready" certain behaviour, so that the appropriate situation simply "calls it forth" - would appear simplistic. It must at least be agreed with Abelson\textsuperscript{4}, I think, that the connection is often more tenuous, and that situations must, so to speak, strongly encourage the connection for the appropriate course of


If this conclusion is accepted as the one to which these findings lead, then we may raise the question concerning the applicability of the analogy under consideration. The available evidence suggests, I think, that if the concept of an attitude is to be a useful one, descriptions of attitudes may need to be far more precise than is usually the case. It may be to little purpose, for example, to think in such general terms as the need to foster "an attitude of respect for the regulations of the group" if, in fact, people by and large simply do not behaviourally manifest such general attitudes. It may be the case that people can be relied upon to reveal by their behaviour a concern for such regulations only in certain complex circumstances which positively encourage behaviour which is consonant with their convictions. In order, then, for the notion of an attitude to be a useful one, the description of each attitude may need to include a reference to the circumstances under which we really may expect to see the appropriate behaviour manifested.

The reviewed evidence does not, then, suggest that the comparison between the behaviour of plastic materials which have been moulded into certain shapes and the behaviour of people who have been led to adopt certain

1. Abelson has suggested that there is a large number of "encouragement clues", and experimental work on them has already commenced. The experiments include those on "social modelling" such as that of Rosenbaum, and Bryan and Test. (See Rosenbaum, M.E., 'The Effects of Stimulus and Background Factors on the Volunteering Response' in Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, vol. 53, 1956, 118-121, and Bryan, J.H. and Test, H.A., 'Models and Helping: Naturalistic Studies in Behaviour' in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 6, 1967, 400-407.) It has also been found that a person can be led to express his attitudes in behaviour by planting the idea that he is the sort of person who acts on what he believes, leaving enough doubt about it so that he is motivated to prove to you that he really is this sort of person. See HoArthur, L.A., Keisler, C.A. and Cook, P., 'Acting on an Attitude as a Function of self-concept and inequity', in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 12, 1969, 295-302.
attitudes is simply invalid. It may, however, seem to create a certain difficulty for social systems theorists who may need to think in terms of groups being able to foster attitudes supportive of group stability and efficiency without those groups having prior knowledge of the kind of "encouragement cues" required for reliable behavioural manifestations of the possession of an attitude. Further, if social stability really is attributable to the inculcation of attitudes it would seem that before social systems theorists may seek to specify the organisational features which promote their adoption, they may need to know a great deal more than at present concerning the complicated relations between attitudes and their behavioural manifestations. If and when they acquire such knowledge, they may feel the need either to increase greatly the sophistication of the plastic man analogy, or even to change the comparison completely.

(ii) Traits

If we turn now from the concept of an attitude to that of a trait we shall find that in important respects a similar situation confronts us. The concept of a trait has been conceived by many psychologists, including those working within the social systems research approach, to play a role in the origins of behaviour similar to the role traditionally assigned to attitudes.\(^1\) The suggestion has been as follows. People regularly behave in set ways in similar circumstances. When an individual is recognised as behaving in such a manner, he is described as possessing a certain trait, and the implication is that the possession of this trait in some way leads to the behaviour, and will on future occasions continue to bring the person to behave in similar fashion.

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Once again, however, the balance of empirical evidence suggests that there is an unfulfilled need to establish that the kind of regularity in behaviour necessary for the concept of a trait to be applicable in the way social systems theorists require is actually to be found.

There have been several reviews\(^1\) of findings relevant to the claim, or rather, assumption, that individuals to whom a particular trait has been imputed tend to behave in much the same way when in similar circumstances. In commenting on these, Mischel is prepared to assert:

"Response patterns even in highly similar situations often fail to be strongly related. Individuals show far less cross-situational consistency in their behaviour than has been assumed by trait-state theorists."\(^2\)

Mischel is, of course, not suggesting that all behaviour is "situation specific". People do not have to relearn everything in each new situation they encounter; they have memories, and their past experience influences their present behaviour in important and complex ways. Mischel is, however, prepared to assert that the circumstances in which we may expect to find a person behaving in ways we have previously observed need to be considered far more carefully than has been the case in the past, and that supremely general traits like "honesty" and "loyalty" need to be qualified by detailed references to particular circumstances in which we might expect these traits actually to be manifested.

We are led, then, to a conclusion concerning the applicability of the concept of a trait similar to that reached in considering the findings on attitudes. The research does not show that the "plastic man" analogy is

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invalid, but a certain difficulty for social systems theorists has been made apparent. Such theorists may have to accept that they can no longer think that socialization is a process by which groups contrive to inculcate values which may be conceptualised in terms of general character traits unqualified by reference to the circumstances in which they are likely to lead to behavioural manifestations. Before they can formulate these more detailed trait appellations, moreover, further research into the relationships between traits and their overt expression in differing circumstances would appear to be required.

Finally, empirical findings aside, a further question we may raise in connection with this particular analogy is whether Kuhn's contention that paradigms break down because the paradigm has been stretched too far, or applied to areas which result in a negative analogy, might be true in the case we are considering. This interrogative is of more than incidental interest in that it provides a perspective from which to approach the more directly apposite question concerning the acceptability of the ontological status assigned to attitudes and traits. If it can be shown that there is a sense in which the concepts of an attitude and a trait may be employed which do not have ontological implications, it may appear that the social systems theorist's use of these concepts involves an invalid extension of their application. We turn, then, to the ontological commitment of this research approach.

3. An Examination of the Ontological Commitments of the Social Systems Research Approach

In seeking to determine whether it is acceptable to assign some kind of ontological status to the concepts of an attitude and a trait, it must be conceded that neither the findings we have just considered, nor those cited in connection with the impact of educational organisations upon the acquisition of attitudes and traits, demonstrate that such concepts either

1. See above, 116-119.
require or cannot validly possess ontological entailments. The
evidence simply points to the conclusion that we are likely to need to qualify
references to general attitudes and traits with remarks which have the
effect of curtailing the range of situations in which behaviour consonant with
the possession of the trait or attitude may be expected. Such evidence, then,
has no bearing on the present question.

In order to pose the problem concerning the necessity for the existence
of attitudes and traits in a way which may enable its solution to be more
readily attempted, a certain distinction must be drawn and further clarification
made. The distinction concerns the status of the existence we may wish to
accord to attitudes and traits. The writings of Quine have enabled us
to write of a strong and a weak sense of "existence". In the weak sense,
we may write of the ontology of a theory, meaning by this the kind of items
over which it allows quantifiers to range. An ontological thesis in the
strong sense, I hold, is a claim about what must be accorded existential
status in any theory dealing with the questions in a particular problem
area. In connection with the problem of the nature of school socialization,
a strong ontological thesis would involve reference to schools, groups
and people behaving in ways supportive of group stability and efficiency.
It is problematic whether reference must also be made to attitudes and traits
which cause people to behave in certain ways.

Having drawn this distinction, I wish to restate the ontological problem
in a way that will allow me to write of "dispositions" rather than "attitudes"
and "traits". This not only has the virtue of brevity, it affords the
opportunity of considering the problem in the context of a current dispute -
the question of the existence of dispositions is one which has been the subject
of recent philosophic enquiry. There does not seem in the present context
to be any matter of great importance such that the term "disposition" should
not be substituted for those of an "attitude" or "trait". By the attribution

1. Quine, W.V., 'Ontological Relativity' in Quine, W.V., Ontological Relativity
 and Other Essays, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1968, 26-68.
of any one of these terms we suggest that a person behaves in a particular way when certain circumstances obtain. The question we are to consider, then, is whether in either a strong or a weak sense dispositions exist.

Before proceeding further, certain complications which I do not believe are ultimately important in the present context may be acknowledged. These concern the variety of predicates which may be deemed to be dispositions, and among which it is possible to draw distinctions. To begin, it may be possible in the present state of knowledge to draw a distinction between dispositions in which certain behaviour will be manifested whenever the appropriate conditions are present, and those in which it is merely probable that manifestations will occur. Further, as Mackie has pointed out,

"Many ordinary dispositional terms are indeterminate between alternatives: is something explosive only if in certain circumstances it will explode, or is it enough that it may explode or has some chance of exploding? Similarly, if a man is to count as irascible, how inevitable must it be that he will get angry if provoked?"^2

Another distinction which may be drawn is that between dispositions which have a single manifestation, such as fragility, and those, like sociability, which may be displayed in a variety of ways. Finally, it might be thought to be of some consequence to attempt to distinguish between active and passive


dispositions: fragility is a passive disposition, a thing's tendency
to break, whilst to say that something is a solvent is to say that it
has the active power of dissolving certain other substances under certain
conditions. (Mackie thinks that this distinction is fairly arbitrary since
the same facts can be uncovered by saying, for example, that sugar has
the active power of permeating water, while water has the passive power
of being permeated by sugar). It is possible, then, since dispositions
are sufficiently diverse, to draw several distinctions within the class.
It would not appear, however, that this fact has any bearing on the issue
of their supposed existence.

Addressing this question more directly now, it may be agreed at once,
I believe, that as far as social systems theorists are concerned, dispositions
have at least an existence in the weak sense, that is, such theorists, in
speaking of the fostering of dispositions: supportive of group stability
and efficiency, do intend that entitative status be given to dispositions.
This point is worth making since not all philosophers would agree that to
impute a disposition to someone is to make an ontological assertion.
Ryle, for example, writes that,

"To possess a dispositional quality is not
to be in a particular state ... it is to be
bound or liable to be in a particular state, or
to undergo a particular change, when a particular
condition is realised."¹

Thus, for example, to say that sugar is soluble is to say merely that if sugar
is placed in water it will dissolve. Armstrong² calls this the "phenomenalist"
account of dispositions, and, if it were adopted by social systems theorists,
it would mean that the successfully socialized person would not be one who
in any real sense "possessed" certain dispositions, but one who would merely

1. Ryle, G., _The Concept of Mind_, 1949, 43. See also Price, H.H., _Thinking And
Experience_, 1953, 322.

behave with some regularity in ways which were supportive of group stability and efficiency when the occasion demanded.

I do not believe, however, that such a move is open to social systems theorists, for the phenomenalist account itself would appear not to be acceptable as an interpretation of the connotations of the ascription of dispositions. The phenomenalist position has been challenged by both Armstrong and Mackie, who would substitute a "realist" account. Armstrong writes that according to the realist view,

"... to speak of an object's having a dispositional property entails that the object is in some non-dispositional state or that it has some property (there exists a 'categorical basis') which is responsible for the object manifesting certain behaviour in certain circumstances, manifestations whose nature makes the dispositional property the particular dispositional property it is. It is true that we may not know anything of the nature of the non-dispositional state. But, the realist view asserts, in asserting that a particular piece of glass is brittle, for instance, we are ipso facto asserting that it is in a certain non-dispositional state which disposes it to shatter and fly apart in a wide variety of circumstances. Ignorance of the nature of the state does not affect the issue. The realist view gains some support from ordinary language, where we often seem to identify a disposition and its 'categorical basis'. (It has been found that brittleness is a certain sort of molecular pattern in the material!).

Armstrong believes that a phenomenalist account of dispositions must be rejected because without assuming that there is some "categorical basis" of dispositions, some thing inherent in that to which the disposition is attributed, there would be no warrant for any predictive statement concerning the future behaviour of the object which possesses the disposition. From the fact, that is, that an object has frequently behaved in certain ways in particular circumstances in the past, one cannot reasonably suppose it will so behave in the future unless it is assumed that there is something inherent in the object which will lead to it behaving in that way again.

Social systems theorists are, then, by necessity as well as choice, realists concerning dispositions. They believe, in the weak sense at least, that they exist. The further question must now be raised as to whether behavioural dispositions, or more precisely their categorical bases, must be accorded existential status in any acceptable theory explaining the origins of behaviour patterns supportive of group stability and efficiency.

In seeking to answer this question, no unequivocal position may be reached. One may only adduce certain considerations which, I believe, up to a point, do have a certain force which tends to show that there may be no unavoidable necessity to posit the existence of the categorical bases of dispositions.

The argument to this effect has as its starting point the role of dispositions in the explanation of the behaviour of both people and things. This role has been illustrated by Mackie in the following way:

1. I am ignoring the "problem of induction" here, for I believe this is a quite separate problem.

2. If this argument is accepted no social systems theorist can be a strict behaviourist, for at the present time, he would have to accept that unknown, but not unknowable, entities within the agent are not beyond the scope of the theory he has adopted.
"When we have found that opium puts people to sleep, it is quite legitimate to make the further claim that it has a dormitive virtue. On the realist view this means only that opium has (some constituent which has) some as yet unknown but not essentially unknowable property which, interacting with normal human bodies, causally produces sleep. The unknown property is introduced in dispositional style, as the ground (or 'categorical basis') of the disposition. This does not yet explain why opium puts people to sleep: it merely provides a place holder for the genuine explanation which would be given if the unknown property and the causal process or mechanism by which it produces sleep were more explicitly described."¹

If this account is accepted, then we may say that in so far as the fact that members behave from time to time in ways conducive to group stability and efficiency calls for some explanation (and it may seem to do if they behave in ways which are not in their own interest or which are in some other respect unusual), then it may be necessary at a time when an adequate causal explanation of a person's behaviour cannot be offered, to attribute to him a disposition to behave in certain ways whenever certain circumstances obtain. The role of this disposition in the explanation of the behaviour will, in Mackie's terms, be as "a place holder". It seems likely that if and when the ground or categorical basis of the disposition is discovered, reference to a disposition will cease, and a quite different kind of theoretical discourse will take its place. The attribution of dispositions, then, should be seen as a useful device rather than as a categorical statement about what exists in the world. It is useful in so far as it connects specific behaviour with certain circumstances, and thus defines a problem to be explained at some future date.

¹. Mackie, J.L., op. cit., 105-6.
It is, however, concerning the necessity for recourse to the attribution of dispositions in explaining the range of behaviour in which social systems theorists are interested that is at issue here. If it can be shown that there may be no such need because there is available an alternative explanatory resource which does not rely on the use of dispositional concepts, then we shall not of necessity be driven to posit the existence of the categorical bases of dispositions. The question to be raised, then, is whether such an alternative exists.

I shall argue that there is indeed a way of regarding at least a certain range of people's behaviour which is supportive of the stability and efficiency of groups to which they belong which would appear to be free from a dependence on dispositional concepts. Before indicating the central concepts of this alternative approach to the explanation of the behavioural patterns in which social systems theorists are interested, I should like to clarify the position adopted by such theorists with respect to the motivation of behaviour, since it is on this topic that the alternative explanatory approach may most starkly be contrasted.

The clearest account of the approach to motivation adopted by social systems theorists is that espoused by behaviourists who take as their starting point in the explanation of behaviour the view that the way people behave is limited to their "response repertoire", by which is meant the ways in which they customarily respond to previously experienced situations. The "mechanism of selection" by which one course of action rather than another is undertaken has reference to various "stimulus-response" bonds, each of which consists of a disposition to behave in a certain way in a particular kind of situation. As Alston writes,

"The stimuli presented to the organism at a given moment, 'activate' all its dispositions that involve stimulus categories to which any of the current stimuli belong. As a result of this activation instances of the response
categories of each of these dispositions will be produced, except where (as is normally the case) two or more categories are incompatible; in the latter case the response from the strongest competing tendencies will be emitted.¹

In contrast to this conception of the sources of human behaviour is the theory of motivation which Alston calls the "Purposive-cognitive Theory", and which he outlines in the following way.

"According to this way of thinking, which in its gross outlines is familiar to all of us from early childhood, intentional action is undertaken in order to reach certain goals, the particular means employed being a function of the agent's beliefs as to what, in the current situation, is likely to attain that goal ... In stark outline this model features three basic types of inner psychological determinants, desires, which so to speak, mark out certain states as 'to be striven for', beliefs, which provide bases for

¹Footnote - It should perhaps be pointed out that it may be possible to attempt a dispositional account of what it is to "possess a belief". However, this is an issue which is not relevant here, for the statement of a belief does not play the role of a "place-holder" in an explanation of a person's behaviour in the way it has been observed of the statement of a disposition. Consider the alternative explanations of why a man is inevitably deferential to one of his employers:

1. He believes that it is a requirement for the efficiency of the organisation whose aims he wishes to promote.

2. It is part of his character. Whenever he meets any of his superiors his manner becomes deferential.

In the first explanation a complete (though perhaps incorrect) explanation is being offered, whilst in the second, no explanation is really being offered at all. Instead, deferential behaviour is being located in a wider context of behaviour which stands in need of explanation. The imputed disposition plays the role of a "place-holder" in the explanation; the belief statement does not.
selecting lines of action as the most promising ways of reaching these goals, and abilities, which delineate the response repertoire from which the desire-belief combinations make their selection". ¹

Alston proceeds to develop this conception of motivation in order to account for more complex behaviour. It is not necessary, however, for our purposes, to attempt a full exposition of either of these two alternative accounts of the origins of behaviour. The question which is of concern is whether the Purposive-cognitive account may be used to explain satisfactorily behavioural patterns supportive of the stability and efficiency of groups.

It would not appear that this question may be resolved in advance of detailed descriptions of the behaviour to be explained. In the absence of any wide agreement concerning the range of behaviour which is supportive of, for example, social stability in our society at the present time, we may proceed some little way by referring to the behaviour discussed by Durkheim and Parsons. It would in fact appear that certain elements of the behaviour mentioned by these writers may plausibly be seen as "automatic" in the ways reference to the activation of stimulus-response bonds suggest. In particular, behaviour which shows a preference for an "ordered existence", and the acceptance of everyday rules of social intercourse, would appear to be of this nature. Equally, the preference noticeable in many twelve year old boys for the company of other boys and for male sex-typed activities has all the appearance of automatic prompting.

It might, however, be suggested that explanations of such behaviour in terms of the activations of stimulus-response bonds, although plausible, are no more than that. It might be argued that the reason why people prefer an "ordered existence" is that it is incomparably more convenient in our society than disordered existence. If people seldom deliberate as to whether or not to do those things compatible with ordered existence, that is because,

¹ Alston, W.P., op. cit., 70-71.
as things stand, they have no difficulty whatsoever in reaching a decision. Nevertheless, a conscious decision having been made or not, behaviour on any one occasion reveals a preference which can be seen to be a rational one based on abilities, and desires and beliefs which have reference to the immediate circumstances in which the action is undertaken. Similarly, it may be argued that twelve year old boys behave in the manner in which they do, because on each occasion it is reasonable to do so in the circumstances.

If we enquire as to which of these two alternative explanatory schemes is the "correct" one, or even the one to be preferred, we find that no unequivocal answer can be given. Theorists who have recourse to a Purposive-cognitive account of the origins of behaviour may seem obliged to account for consistency in behaviour by reference merely to persisting circumstances external to a rational agent.¹ This, in itself, does not seem objectionable, and there does not seem to be any way in which one may properly dismiss one explanatory approach in preference to another. For what it may be worth, I believe that most people are inclined to believe that they engage in a whole range of activities which are supportive of group stability and efficiency "out of blind habit", and thus would accept the explanation offered by social systems theorists in preference to that couched in Purposive-cognitive terms, so far as these activities are concerned.

Having conceded this, it would, I think, be acknowledged by many people that there are other activities which are not so plausibly construed in terms of the automatic elicitation of stimulus-response bonds. The decisions of members to act in the interests of the group in financial matters, such as, for example, "buying British", when purchasing a car, may perhaps often more plausibly be explained with notions drawn from the Purposive-cognitive scheme. People buy the car they do because, at the time, they want that type

¹ This may not necessarily be the case. Recourse may be had, for example, to the concept of a "script", or the computer programme metaphor of a "plan". See Berne, E., Transactional Analysis in Psychotherapy, 1966, and What Do You Say After You Say Hello?, 1974, 1, and Miller, A., Galanter, E. and Pribram, K.H., Plans and the Structure of Behaviour, New York, 1960
of car, believe it to be more economical or reliable, because it is, on balance, in the best interests of the country, and so forth. People do not, it may be suggested, just purchase as a result of inner promptings.

If this is the case, then it would seem that in relation at least to certain behaviour which affects the stability and efficiency of groups, the necessity for the existence of the categorical bases of dispositions is not a compelling one, for if a satisfactory explanation of certain behaviour can be formulated in Purposive-cognitive terms, and such terms do not require ontological status for dispositional bases, then there can be no over-riding justification for supposing that the bases of dispositions must, in the strong sense, exist.

Concerning the ontological status of dispositions, then, it may perhaps be concluded that it is not unreasonable to ascribe certain dispositions to people and to suppose thereby that their categorical bases exist. Such bases must be assumed to be physical in nature, rooted in the bodily constitution of people. It may be pointed out that on the present level of knowledge, \(^{1}\) we can offer little illumination about the bases of dispositions, but this in itself does not affect the validity of a claim for their existence. More bothersome is the uncertainty under which social systems theorists must conduct their research. There are few if any behavioural patterns which absolutely demand the ascription of dispositions in order to account for them; at best, it seems merely not unreasonable to posit their existence.

We turn now to the question raised earlier, that of whether Kuhn's account of the breakdown of paradigms, of their being applied to areas which produce negative analogies, is illuminating in the present case.

It might be thought that this question might be approached by considering the circumstances in which people actually cite traits or attitudes in describing people. Such a study might be supposed to reveal the paradigm uses of these concepts, and, presumably, their legitimate uses, any departure from which by social systems theorists would perhaps account on Kuhnian lines.

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for any misuse through the extension involved in the "plastic man" analogy. Some psychologists have in fact investigated the occasions upon which trait and attitude labels are employed, and have suggested that typically they are applied to people when their behaviour is distinctive in some respect, most often on more than one occasion. The politician we bother to describe as "honest" is meant perhaps to be rare, and the man we describe as "irascible" behaves with more than usual irritability over small mishaps. It does not seem to me, however, that such research may show that these attributions are in some sense the "central" or "proper" uses of the term, though there may be an irreducible comparative aspect to the use of these terms.

It would seem more promising simply to try to specify an uncontentious use of trait and attitude appellations, and indicate that the social systems theorist's departure from this would appear to lead to possible difficulties of the kind I have suggested. It would appear that such an uncontentious use of trait and attitude labels is one in which their employment is intended merely as a summary indication of the kind of behaviour in which a person has engaged in a certain kind of situation in the past: "He was inclined to behave in this manner on those occasions". No suggestion would be intended that in the future such behaviour will in like circumstances be "automatically elicited" or even will probably be so. Such a use of these concepts would not be a dispositional one, and would thus avoid the suggestion of the existence of dispositional bases having existential status.

If such a use of trait and attitude ascriptions could be established as the originating one, then it could perhaps be suggested, not that a comparison had been illegitimately extended, but that a mere façon de parler - "He was inclined to do certain things", meaning "He chose to do these things"

on those occasions" - had been interpreted in a way which would make
future predictions possible, that is, by supposing that there was some thing
within the person which caused him to behave in the way he did.

4. An Examination of the Methodology of the Social Systems Research

Approach

Earlier,¹ I remarked that the empirical problems investigated by
theorists working within this research approach are concerned with the impact
of a range of a group's organisational features upon the convictions of
individuals who are learning to become acceptable group members. In this,
the methodology employed, I stated, may be termed "environmentalist". The
methodological principles which might be issued as a guide to the researcher
might include the following: do not try to discover the reasoning by which
people are persuaded to adopt certain values which preserve efficiency and
stability. Seek instead to locate those variables within a member's environment
which can be used to explain how he has come to hold the relevant beliefs
to which he does in fact subscribe.

This methodological dictum does not readily allow us to see how any
part played by the agent himself in the formulation or acceptance of
values could be incorporated within the social systems perspective. Certain
writers who are uncommitted to this aspect of the social systems approach, and
here may be included both theorists who favour an "interactionist" method­
ology and philosophers hostile to the "reductionist" element which
behaviourists bring to this methodological stance, might see in this a
serious weakness.

Interactionists would claim that any acceptable methodological approach
to the study of socialization which is conceived as a process essentially
concerned with the acquisition of values, must be conceived as a

¹. See above, 76.
two-way system in which the behaviour of each participant both affects and is affected by the behaviour of the others. Such theorists see socialization as an "interaction process" which involves the child as an active partner, rather than a process of unilateral manipulation of the child. They suggest that, guided by behaviourist methodology, the child in previous socialization studies was seen as some kind of incomplete organism which develops in different directions in response to different stimuli. A child, they hold, is not simply a tabula rasa which mysteriously responds to the input of stimuli by adults, and adults are not simply stable factors in the child's social environment, but are themselves prone to change under the impact of their offspring's challenge. In short, they champion their own approach to empirical enquiry as the only realistic one:

"... the paradigm that equates the parental role with that of the model and the child's role with that of the follower simply does not fit the facts."


2. For a detailed account of this approach, see Dreitzel, H.P., 'Introduction' in Dreitzel, H.P., (ed.) Childhood and Socialization, 1973, 5-24.

In considering this objection to an exclusively "environmentalist" research method the question which must be raised is not the direct question of whether behaviourists do justice to the complexity of the features of the situations in which people acquire their values, but rather whether they need to do so. It is, I think, germane to point out that the empirical studies which employ an interactionist methodology and are avowedly concerned with the socialization process, reveal no precise interpretation of the concept of socialization. They appear, in fact, to be merely exploratory studies concerned to delineate a realistic interpretation of interactions, usually between a mother and her offspring whilst still in infancy. From the considerations raised in Chapter One of this thesis we can see that it is not wholly illegitimate to refer to such research as "studies of the socialization process", but there is no reason to suppose that such studies necessarily subvert a social systems research approach with a behaviourist bias, and in seeking to understand how society, and groups within it, try to inculcate values which are conducive to the maintenance of social stability, social systems theorists do not in fact appear to be trying to answer questions which are similar to those which prompt theorists advocating an interactionist research perspective.

It would in fact appear that the social systems theorist has little to gain by attending to interactionist critics. The social systems theorist begins, or ought to begin, his researches with some conception of the values in which he is interested. His empirical investigations of the transmission of values are concerned with determining how far these have been successfully imparted and by what means. In the latter task his analysis would not appear to need to be "fine-grained". If, for example, a social systems theorist should find, firstly, that by the age of nine most children in our society showed loyalty only to the group which was comprised of themselves, their mother and father, and secondly, that this was related to various aspects of parental behaviour, there does not seem to be anything gained
by noting the interplay of child-parent interactions. We may suppose that it is unquestionable that, inadvertently or otherwise, parents foster in their child loyalty to the family however much they may accommodate their behaviour to his wishes. This being the case, criticisms by the advocates of an interactionist methodology seem simply to be irrelevant to the work of the social systems theorist.

Conclusion

The conclusions which may be drawn from the critical appraisal I have made of the various features of the social systems research approach do not, I suggest, call for its abandonment as too beset with conceptual difficulties to be worth the intellectual effort of salvage. But the difficulties do appear to be substantial, and this, together with the meagre positive findings from empirical research linking identified features of school life with the acquisition of values which might reasonably be deemed to be conducive to the maintenance of group efficiency and stability, lead one to consider the possibility that school and school role socialization may more profitably be explored by a quite different interpretation of the concept of socialization, with fresh metaphysical paradigms, ontology and methodology.

In the next chapter, I shall set forth a theoretical perspective which I shall call the ethogenic research approach to socialization. This perspective will be derived from the ethogenic research approach to social interaction, which is composed of a body of writings whose purpose is to describe both the structure of social interactions, and the knowledge and abilities required to conduct interactions in an orderly way.
CHAPTER FIVE

A PERSPECTIVE ON SOCIALIZATION BASED ON THE ETHOGENIC
RESEARCH APPROACH TO SOCIAL INTERACTION

In this chapter I shall seek to accomplish three aims. The first of these is to provide an indication of the range of knowledge and abilities required of participants for the orderly management of social encounters in our society. The analysis by which this will be accomplished will not in itself be ethogenic, but will certainly be such as would find support among those theorists who have specifically adopted the ethogenic label. Secondly, I shall set forth those of the conceptual foundations of the ethogenic research approach to social interaction which I believe are of special relevance to one who wishes to construct an approach to socialization based upon it. Finally, I shall outline an interpretation both of the concept of socialization and of its allied concepts based on these conceptual features of the ethogenic research approach and on the earlier analysis of the knowledge and abilities required in social interactions.

The various features which combine to make up the ethogenic research approach, like those of the social systems research approach, have their origin in the context of a certain problem. That problem is concerned, not with how civil unrest is to be avoided in complex societies, but with how it is that the countless social encounters and interactions which make up everyday social life in a particular society are organised and managed by their participants. Couched in this way, this problem has been the subject of much research in the last twenty years, though the question which is of more direct interest to theorists concerned with the socialization process — "How do people come to acquire the knowledge and skills required to conduct these encounters successfully?" — has received very little attention.

1. I shall use the term "social encounter" interchangeably with "social interaction", and mean by these terms simply a meeting between two or more people in which communications are passed.

2. For a discussion of its other conceptual foundations, see Harre, R. and Secord, P.F., op. cit.
It is this question which will underpin the approach I wish to advocate both to socialization processes in general, and to school and school role socialization in particular. Concerning socialization processes in general, it may be enquired how group members acquire the knowledge and skills necessary to conduct social interactions as a group member. On the subject of school socialization, the central question would concern the part played by school experience in the development of the knowledge and skills necessary for the successful negotiation of social encounters as they are conducted in our society. In order to throw light, from the ethogenic standpoint, on school socialization, one would first have to answer the question concerning the nature of the demands of social interactions in schools, for it is only by a knowledge of such interactions that we may be able to judge the relevance to later adult social intercourse of the skills and knowledge attained by pupils. In order, then, to investigate school socialization, one would first have to conduct research into school role socialization. An examination of what is involved in this latter undertaking will occupy a major part of the later sections of this thesis, but for the present it is the illumination merely of the knowledge and abilities required in social interactions in general which must be our concern.

1. Knowledge and Abilities Required in Social Interactions

In order to elucidate the particular knowledge and abilities of interest here which are deployed in the management of everyday social encounters we must begin with an analysis of interactions in which the literal semantic content of the communications passed is not the prime focus of concern. Attention is directed, rather, at a certain kind of structure which is observable. The structure of any particular encounter between two people may hinge on the emotional state of the participants: love or anxiety may be discernible in the twists which the meeting undergoes. But such influences are not, according to Harré, typical. To suppose so would be to attempt an overly

general application of the "attachment" level of functioning. In support of this, one may cite recent studies of social interaction between adults and between children which provide little evidence that emotional forces of the kind Bowlby has in mind are active in social intercourse after infancy.

It is evident that the most simple meetings between two people, even telephone calls on mundane matters, may be seen to be highly artificial, contrived affairs which may at any time break down in ways which leave either or both parties insulted, uncomprehending, embarrassed or the like. Social encounters, it may be argued, have to be created and sustained by their participants, and this involves an almost continuous stream of solutions to the problems which confront those wishing to maintain ordered interactions. These problems may, for analytic purposes, be divided into three classes.

The first cluster of problems arise when strangers meet or acquaintances begin to engage in conversation. The range of difficulties to be negotiated at the commencement of such encounters may be illustrated by imagining the meeting of two strangers on a narrow mountain path. The environmental contingencies oblige the recognition by each party of the close presence of a fellow human being. The immediate problem which each must overcome involves the creation of an orderly procedure by which they may pass one another without danger or loss of face. Harré suggests that the archetype of a social solution created by the appearance of the stranger on the path might run

4. This example is drawn from Harré, R., op. cit. 249.
5. Harré excludes patently non-social solutions to the problem created by the second person on the path. To throw the other over the edge, that is, to exercise "raw physical causality" upon him as an object, seems to be a solution that lies outside any social order. The relation between the two strangers may be contrasted with that of a surgeon and his patient on an operating table, where the surgeon is not required to acknowledge the other as a human being.
as follows: 1

"Each catches the eye of the other, a slight smile and an eyebrow flash is exchanged; each person, acknowledged as a social actor, makes incipient ushering movements, and one of them completes them fulsomely; the other person passes while the usherer squeezes himself back against the wall, and each makes a little acknowledging head movement. At no point have they gone so far as to discover whether they belong to the same linguistic community. 2 The interchange might clearly be said to have a strongly ceremonial character.

Each actor must grasp the meaning of the smile, for should it be a trifle too narrow, it betokens the recognition of the appearance of an opportunity for mischief, exhibited to the innocent other as part of the exquisite preparation for a sadistic shove."

It is apparent from this illustration that the initial problem during the introductory stage of a social encounter concerns the way in which one person is to extend a ritualistic 3 and polite form of greeting.


3. This term is henceforth used in Goffman's sense of a "... conventionalized act through which an individual portrays his respect and regard for some object of ultimate value". See Goffman, E., Relations in Public, 1971, 88. See also, A Discussion of Ritualization of Behaviour in Animals and Men: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, vol. 251, 1966, 247-526.
to the other, for to be polite is to lead the other person into a show of equal civility, from which position orderly social interaction may proceed. The forms which polite greetings may take will vary in accordance with the circumstances and relationship of the persons involved. In Harré’s example, it involves a slight smile. Between a teacher and a pupil it may involve the pupil rising from his chair, removing his hands from his pockets, and waiting to be addressed.

The analysis of social interaction in which we are interested, then, leads to the recognition firstly that an introductory stage which is strongly ritualistic in character may be distinguished, and that the negotiation of this stage may require varied knowledge and abilities. The knowledge required is not limited to the forms of greeting which are widely prevalent in our society, for in certain situations none of such greetings may be appropriate. A distinction may be drawn, then, between those situations for which there already exists an appropriate form of greeting from those for which there is not. Harré, in fact, distinguishes between "standard" and "non-standard" solutions to the problem of deciding the appropriate form of greeting. There is a standard solution if there already exists a ceremonial form proper to the carrying out of the greeting, the use of which is widespread, and there being some tendency to regard it as having exclusive claim to propriety. For example, it may be thought that the proper ceremonial form of greeting a stranger to whom one has been introduced is to utter the words "How do you do?" and shake his hand. If so, this would be a standard solution to the problem of how to greet strangers on being introduced.

Non-standard solutions to problematic situations have precisely the same aim as standard solutions, that is, the creation of the appropriate measure of order, and, for such solutions to work, they must use already existing elements of ceremonial greetings. An example of a non-standard form of greeting
is provided by supposing that one of the strangers on the mountain path might have pretended to recognise the other as his friend. His words of greeting would have accomplished just as much as his actual smile, for he would have established a friendly intent, which could have been developed by the offering of an apology for his "mistake". Such a move would also have blurred the ominous aspect of this encounter by complicating the situation to make it also one in which a misidentification of a friend had occurred.

It is to be noted that propriety does not always require the exchange of greetings on the commencement of interaction. For example, when a teacher during a lesson asks a pupil a question, no formal greeting is required, though certainly it is thought correct for the pupil to indicate to the teacher his realization that they are now involved in personal interaction. As with greetings, there are standard and non-standard ways in which this may be accomplished.

Further knowledge and abilities required of a person who may be relied upon at least to begin social interactions in an orderly way may be observed if we reflect that for a person to apply either a standard or non-standard solution to a particular situation and so resolve it, he must be able to recognise what that situation is, and, if it is not yet clearly differentiated, so act to define it as being of a certain kind. In addition, at the commencement of a social encounter, indeed during its entire course, the various words spoken and actions performed may commonly be undertaken by the participants not in their propria persona, as this or that named individual, but as they represent or take upon themselves the lineaments of types, such as teacher and pupil, or ticket collector and passenger. This, too, the person who can be relied upon to maintain orderly social interaction must also be able to accomplish.

It is to be observed, too, that adherence to the set verbal forms by which interactions may be commenced does not wholly determine propriety. The manner in which words are uttered or gestures made is also of major importance. It would appear that in order to begin social interactions in an orderly way, some expectations must be entertained concerning the likely effect of the manner in which one conducts oneself. A wrong inflexion, and one may appear too cold, presumptuous, indifferent or the like.

An adult, then, at his social best, needs a fairly wide range of abilities and knowledge of social situations if he is even to commence social interactions in an orderly way.

A social encounter having been satisfactorily commenced, there arise problems concerning how it may be continued in an orderly manner. Typically, the even course of social interactions are threatened by challenges to the self-esteem or social standing of one or more of the participants. A study of such threats and the manner of their treatment has been made by Goffman. Broadly speaking, such threats, and indeed violations, are dealt with by a variety of ameliorative rituals or ceremonies which appear to be based on a tacit acknowledgement that a person's "face" is sacred. Thus one way of dealing with any action perceived as a violation is to admit that it is a violation, means what it appears to mean, and then to employ some ritual, such as an apology, to ameliorate the offence. Goffman has offered a detailed analysis of the forms such interaction rituals may take, though, as he points out, there is, in our society at least, a very limited set of ritual enactments available for contrite offenders. The important point, however, lies in the indication of an attitude rather than in the ability to offer proportionate compensation. As Goffman writes:

"Whether one runs over another's sentence, time, dog or body, one is more or less reduced to saying some variant of "I'm sorry". The variation in degree of anguish expressed by the apologizer seems a poor reflection of the variation in loss possible to the offended. In any case, while the original infraction may be quite substantive in its consequence, the remedial work, however voracious, is in these cases still largely expressive. And there is a logic in this. After an offence has occurred, the job of the offender is to show that it was not a fair expression of his attitude, or, when it obviously was, to show that he has changed his attitude. In the latter case, his job is to show that whatever happened before, he now has a right relationship to the rule in question, and this is a matter of indicating a relationship, not compensating a loss".  

The importance of this point is that it reveals that it is in becoming sensitive to the possibilities of causing offence to the other participants in encounters that progress towards adequacy in the management of interactions in a large measure lies.

The possibilities of causing offence during social encounters are not limited merely to the range of things one might say or do which may be expected to disrupt the orderly course of any kind of social intercourse. Each encounter, or at least each kind of encounter, generates its own possibilities for offence and disorderly termination. Goffman, has shown this to be the case in considering two basic conversational forms. The first of these is the interrogative interchange. One person enunciates a

2. ibid.
question, a second provides the answer. If we assume that when the question is asked the questioner exposes himself to the worst possible readings (that he is stupid, that his speaking is uncalled for, that his question is presumptuous), then we can see that any more or less straight answer, however dutiful, however mechanical, however vague, can provide relief to the questioner. For although the questioner will have a variable concern to obtain the information for which he asks, he will have, distinct from that, a constant concern to obtain acceptance of his enquiry. A question is a form of request - a request for information - and as such may be analysed as a ritual move which can be answered satisfactorily by a justified withholding of the information as much as by an exposition of the full facts.

The other conversational form Goffman discusses is that which he calls the declarative interchange. The first speaker propounds an argument, enunciates an opinion, draws a moral, or some such, in the guise of saying something that should have some relevance and even validity for all who can hear. The second speaker, in return, provides an affirming nod, a verbal agreement, a counter argument - any of which confirms the first speaker's claim to being the sort of person who has a right to express opinions and who is worth attending to when he does. To make a declaration, after all, is to commit oneself to obtaining support from hearers - support not so much for what one says as for the propriety of saying it.

Questions and statements, then, can be seen as claims to a kind of status, and replies will be examined for, and ordinarily engineered to provide, affirmation that the claims are not a presumption.

A person competent to sustain social intercourse will, then, be one who is sensitive to the need to be supportive of the other participant's claims to be the sort of person who may ask the kind of questions and make the sort of assertions he does. Conscious of such needs, such a person must also possess the knowledge and ability to make what Goffman calls supportive interchanges and, when necessary, remedial interchanges.
Having indicated something of the problems involved in the commencement and the sustaining of social interaction, there remains only to mention farewells. The successful management of these ritual terminations of encounters may require not only a knowledge of the form appropriate to the occasion ("Good afternoon", "Cheers", "au revoir darling"), since one party may be less inclined than the other to terminate the encounter, thereby obliging the other to start the process by a series of cues that are effective but not blatant. In such circumstances, various supportive interchanges may also be required if the termination of the meeting is to be mutually satisfying.

The analysis of interactions which we have so far considered has merely distinguished greetings or commencements, the central course of the interaction, and farewells. Whilst such an analysis has also revealed something of the range of knowledge and abilities required of those who would be competent in the management of social intercourse, it provides no means whereby one might attempt to elucidate the rules by which the members of a particular group actually conduct their interactions. If we grant that within any group there will be power and status differentials, and that new members will be required to conduct themselves during interactions in ways which take account both of this fact and of the ways of behaving which are regarded as acceptable within the group, then we can see that a means of analysing interactions in a much more fine-grained way is required. I believe the ethogenic approach to interaction provides the means of such an analysis, at least in the case of certain groups, including that composed of teachers and their pupils. A major part of the remainder of this thesis will be devoted to an attempt to establish this.

1. Interactions are often, of course, more brief than this. Greeting may be made "in passing", farewells omitted, and the central course of an interaction consist of only a few words. Nothing of substance appears to hang on this.
I shall begin this task by setting forth the main features of the ethogenic research approach to social interaction - its metaphysical paradigms, methodology and ontology - and later I shall try to establish its applicability to the elucidation of interactions as they are conducted in schools in this country at the present time. During the course of this undertaking I shall formulate what I believe to be a promising alternative to the social systems research approach to school and school role socialization.


2(a) Metaphysical Paradigms

(i) The Manipulation Analogy

There are several metaphysical paradigms at the foundation of this research approach. The first I shall consider may be called the "manipulation analogy". This analogy involves the acceptance of two other claims. The first is that the myriad social activities which combine to make up the social life of a society or a group within it may be analysed into discrete encounters between persons pursuing goals of which they are consciously aware or about which they can be made aware. Once this view is accepted, the second hypothesis may be posed. This is the view that every participant in a social encounter may be seen to be concerned to secure his own interests. The acceptance of these assumptions then leads easily to the view that the participants in any social encounter may be seen to be trying to manipulate each other.

It may be observed that the two supporting claims are not equally comprehensible as I have stated them. There seems no difficulty in acknowledging that social life can be seen to be made up of a series of encounters which are usually marked, if only temporally, by fairly definite beginnings.
and endings. However, the belief that when people meet they may be seen to behave in ways which are based on self-interest calls for further comment, for it is not clear just what the status of this claim is intended to be.

The claim may be intended, firstly, as a straightforward empirical truth - people, as a matter of fact, just do always act in their own self-interest. However, the manner of argument which would have to be employed to deal with the flood of apparent counter-instances would quickly lead one to suspect that the claim must be intended as a necessary truth of some kind - people are incapable of acting other than in their own self-interest. This claim has received much philosophic attention throughout the ages, and raises many controversies. Fortunately, these need not be entered into here, for I think ethogenists need not make such an extreme interpretation of this claim. The position I believe they may adopt is that this view is to be treated merely as a viable way of looking at social encounters. Its justification is to be found in the results which the ethogenic research approach achieves.

We have, then, two claims to accept provisionally before the manipulation analogy may be considered. Let us for the present give such acceptance and try to elucidate the intended comparison. We may begin by reasserting that according to this analogy all social encounters may be investigated as if the participants were seeking to manipulate each other. The analogy which is being suggested here involves a comparison between behaviour in practical situations which is the result of planning and the execution of deliberate techniques for dealing with people, typically people in positions of power and authority, and behaviour which has not been so premeditated. To

1. This is, of course, not the only way in which social life may be considered. The usefulness of this particular way of looking at matters will be related to the special problems one wishes to solve.

2. See, for example, Nagel, T., The Possibility of Altruism, 1970.
illustrate, the comparison might involve the behaviour of the members of a university department who discuss just what tactics should be adopted in negotiating the department budget with the administration. Here it is appropriate to speak quite literally of the chairman's approaching the Dean with a plan governed by ground rules, and all the rest. It is of the essence, by contrast, that most everyday conduct does not, in any literal sense, involve the conscious and deliberate adoption - ad hoc - of behavioural tactics and ground plans. Indeed, the ways in which people deal with one another in the ordinary course of life are philosophically perplexing in so far as they lack the elements of conscious design that so often mark, for example, negotiations with a superior authority. The suggested analogy, then, involves the attempt to see everyday interactions in terms of consciously designed behaviour involving strategic planning and the adherence to rules.

An implication of this analogy would be that, since people are, more often than not, quite polite to one another, we would have to see their smiling faces as masks, and indeed much of their overt behaviour as simulated. It is, in fact, precisely this assumption of simulation which gives the manipulation analogy its point. In order to lay bare the structure of social encounters the ethogenist suggests we imagine that each participant has his own covert aim in behaving as he does. If we assume this, then we become especially sensitive to questions concerning the significance of actions which occur during the course of encounters. One is likely in reflecting upon an observed meeting between two people, to raise such questions as, "What was it that each of these people was trying to achieve?", and "What were the rules they observed, and what were the strategies they employed, in trying to achieve their ends?". It is, then,
the ethogenist's claim that by the use of this analogy the structure of
social encounters may be elucidated.

(ii) The Rule Analogy

Ethogenists rely heavily on the notion of a rule for the description
and explanation of social behaviour. As we have seen, they do not suggest
that the behaviour of people is to be understood as actually being generated
in all instances by the deliberate adherence to explicit rules. Much of
the behaviour in which people regularly engage is, they acknowledge, uncon­
sidered, and some can only be understood as blind habit. The ethogenist's
claim is that social behaviour may be considered as if it were the result
of the deliberate adherence to rules, and that we may describe and explain
people's behaviour by viewing it in this manner.

Before elucidating this analogy further, a prima facie objection
may be considered. It might be suggested that one of the most striking
features of the behaviour of children, particularly adolescents, is that
it often relates to the flouting of rules, simply because they are rules.
Harre would probably classify such behaviour under the heading of "proofs
of autonomy"! Human beings, it has been widely noted, have the propensity
to "assert their individuality" occasionally, even regularly, by flouting
accepted conventions and the rules to which other people apparently expect
them to conform. Such phenomena, however, may not prove beyond the scope
of an attempted description and explanation of people's behaviour in terms
of rule-following, for the ways in which rules are disregarded or broken
may itself be regular. It is, then, in itself not implausible to attempt
to understand behaviour, which includes that which at one level is rule­
breaking behaviour, by seeking to interpret it as of a rule-adhering
nature at a higher level.

1. Harre, R., 'Some Remarks on "Rule" as a Scientific Concept, in
Mischel, T., (éd.), op. cit., 145.
In order now to clarify the analogy further, and to enable me subse­quentlly to show how the ethogenic research approach may be applied to problems which are recognisably problems connected with socialization pro­cesses, I wish to invoke some distinctions, drawn largely from Toulmin¹, between rule-governed and rule conforming behaviour, and behaviour which involves conforming to, applying and following rules.

Rule-governed and Rule-conforming Behaviour

Toulmin notes that during the course of enculturation children learn to behave in ways which have a very clear pattern and structure. The mother says to the child "You must learn to behave yourself", with the implication that the child must come to act in ways governed by the rules "appropriate" to situations of this particular type. This kind of learned regularity, or "rule-governed" behaviour can already be found in the conduct of children who have not yet learned to talk. For example, the games that mothers play, such as pat-a-cake, are composed of a series of distinctive actions performed in sequence, not just "as a rule" or "regularly", but in a "rule-governed" pattern. The distinguishing feature of "rule-governed" as opposed to "rule-conforming" behaviour is that the former is behaviour which falls within an accepted range of requirement, whereas the latter is behaviour which is correct according to a much more strictly defined rule.

Toulmin points out that rules are thus relevant to sequential behaviour in two different kinds of ways, and can accordingly be judged "correct" or "incorrect" in either of two respects. With the possibility of some overlap it may be said that non-verbal behaviour may be deemed normal or eccentric, conformist or unconventional, or open to criticism as a solecism, that is, as falling outside the accepted range of requirement in some significant respect. Verbal behaviour, on the other hand, may be deemed to be either "good English" or ungrammatical, clear or unintelligible, or open to

criticism for failing to conform to the rules of syntax, phonology or logical grammar. By comparison with the rule-governedness of non-linguistic behaviour, which lacks the systematic exactitude of language and is commonly a matter of degree, the conformity or non-conformity of our utterances to linguistic rules typically is an all-or-nothing, right-or-wrong affair. Whilst there are some situations in which non-linguistic behaviour has to be performed with liturgical exactitude, more typically there is room for flexibility, with a substantial range of behaviour being acceptable.

Conforming to, Applying and Following Rules

Toulmin begins the elaboration of this second distinction by pointing out that in practical and intellectual life alike - in carpentry, cooking and chess - we learn procedures whose steps are decided in the light, not of cultural convention, but of their functional efficiency. To blend a mayonnaise, to make a mortice and tenon joint or to play an Indian defence - each of these procedures involves performing certain actions in relation to fixed rules in order to bring about a certain result. Where it is the intention of the agent to attain the end result and when he carefully attends to the rules constitutive of such a procedure, he may be said not just to have "conformed to", but to have "applied" the rules.

This ability to apply rules to achieve a certain end is, no doubt, initially learned, as Toulmin puts it, "in the public domain", by imitation, instructions or example. We begin, that is, by merely conforming to rules as we encounter them, for we have no clear conception of the overall procedure. It is only later that we may in any real sense be said to be able to apply rules.

It may also be noted that many procedures which involve the applying of rules are quickly committed to memory ("internalized"), so that we can go through them "without having to think" or "in our heads". To the extent

1. The distinctions made here involve some variation from those made by Toulmin.
that such procedures do become matters of routine in this way, it
becomes difficult to speak of the "application" of rules. It would
appear more natural to say that the agent is "following" the required proce-
dural rules, and I shall reserve this term for behaviour which is of
this nature.

A further complication which may be noted, for it will be of some
relevance later, is pointed out by Toulmin when he notes that certain problem-
solving procedures are not always learned by first conforming to rules, nor
are they always later followed unthinkingly as matters of routine. In
adhering to the rules to solve a particular problem, the rules may be sub-
jected to a critical evaluation of their effectiveness, and the entire
procedure assessed. In such a situation the rules of the procedure them-
selves have now become the objects of intellectual activity, and not
merely elements in its production. Where rules of procedure are applied
with conscious critical attention they acquire a more complex relevance to
the human conduct in which they figure. Toulmin points out that for Descartes,
as for succeeding philosophers, this self-critical application of intellectual
procedures is the prototype of rationality. Ethogenists would also, perhaps,
claim that the ability to engage in this type of activity is also of great
importance in the successful negotiation of social interactions.

Having drawn these distinctions, we may say that the rule analogy
suggests that the behaviour of people during social encounters may be seen
to resemble the competent behaviour of people who are applying rules to
attain a certain end. In certain cases, of course, such as that in which
the chairman negotiates with the Dean about the departmental budget, it
will actually be true that the chairman's behaviour can be described in terms
of applying rules. In all other cases, however, the rule analogy has the
status of a suggested comparison whose justification will be made in terms
of the revelations of the structures of interactions its use may afford.
It may be the case that a great deal of interactive behaviour may truly be described as either rule-governed, or as behaviour which involves conformity to, or the following of, rules. This, however, is not what is intended by the ethogenist's use of the rule analogy. It is, rather, as I have indicated, that interactive behaviour may profitably be seen as involving the application of rules.

(iii) The Role Analogy

The concept of a "role" is integral to several quite different theoretical perspectives, and is, indeed, employed by theorists working within both the social systems research approach and the ethogenic, though the concept is not to be understood in quite the same way. In the interests of clarity I shall, therefore, begin by setting forth what I think may fairly be described as a central sociological conception of "role", and then indicate the emphases and departures which are made by the two research approaches under consideration in this thesis.

This central conception will be drawn from the work of Dahrendorf,

who has pointed out that the idea of a social role, though a scientific construct, is a conception that at many times and places has suggested itself.


to writers seeking to understand man in society. What, he asks, could be more plausible than an analogy between prescribed patterns of behaviour for actors in given parts of a drama and behavioural norms for persons in given social positions? The resemblance is striking at several points, though only the following implications of the use of the notion of a theatrical role appear to be relevant to the analogy intended by Dahrendorf.

To begin, we use the term to refer to prescribed ways of behaving which are given to a person to learn for a particular series of occasions. It is relevant, too, that there is nothing in the notion of a theatrical role which inhibits an actor from playing a multitude of roles, and indeed, during the course of his career an actor will be expected to do so. It is also pertinent that in principle any person may play the role and each will be expected to behave in the same prescribed way. It is true that actors are sometimes instructed to improvise, but such dramatic licence plays no part in the intended analogy. Indeed, to be useful to sociologists, Dahrendorf would insist that the notion of a theatrical role under consideration must be such that it is obligatory that the actor not depart from the written text in which the behaviour is prescribed. It may be noted that these ways of behaving may be learned perfectly or otherwise, and the action involved may be executed with skill or be unconvincing to the audience. Finally, the notion of a theatrical role is employed in the context of a drama which, as far as Dahrendorf is concerned, mimics reality with considerable fidelity. Names are given to roles, thus an actor might play the role of "Hamlet, Prince of Denmark". By so naming the role in this way a link is established between the portrayal of social positions within and outside of the theatre. Every role in Dahrendorf's theatre includes the portrayal of some aspects of behaviour associated with a social position.

1. Dahrendorf, R., op. cit. 25.
This last point is of some interest, since it is by way of the concept of a social position that certain role theorists introduce the analogy they intend. For every social position a person can occupy in real life, whether it is described in terms of family, occupation, class membership or whatever, there are conventional and sometimes legally prescribed ways of behaving. To take up a social position, therefore, is in effect to undertake to behave in certain ways, rather, so role theorists say, in the manner in which an actor, having accepted a casting in a drama, undertakes to behave in conformity with the script. We cannot, of course, tell how any person occupying a particular social position will actually behave, for he may "play the role badly", but we can know what is expected of one who occupies it. Further, social roles, like theatrical roles, are conceived without reference to particular persons. The behaviour and attributes expected from the teacher, the father or the politician, can be described without mentioning any one person by name.

Role theorists, unlike dramatists, feel it useful to divide the behaviour prescribed for those who occupy social positions into two kinds: demands affecting behaviour ("role behaviour") and demands affecting convictions of at least a quasi-moral kind ("role attributes"). Because a person is a teacher, certain attributes as well as a certain kind of behaviour are required of him, or at least he must appear to subscribe to certain viewpoints.

Role theorists also think it useful to think in terms of social roles being composed of a number of "role segments". The expectations associated with the role of teacher may be sub-divided into expectations with respect to the role segments: teacher-pupils, teacher-parents, teacher-local authority, and so forth.

1. The terms introduced in this section - "role behaviour", "role attributes" and "role segment" may be found not only in Dahrendorf's work, but also in that of Gross, N., Mason, W.S. and McEachern, A.W., Explorations in Role Analysis, New York, 1958. Similar distinctions, in different terms, are to be found in Merton, R.K., Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe, 1957, 279-440.
Dahrendorf develops the point that roles are constituted by expectations associated with a social position by insisting that for the concept of a role to be useful to the sociologist the expectations must be in some sense formally binding on the individual. Social roles are to be viewed as a constraining force on the individual, whether he experiences them as an obstacle to his private wishes or as a support that gives him security. The constraining force of role expectations is due to the availability of sanctions, measures by which society or a group within it can enforce conformity with its prescriptions.

The availability of sanctions is most immediately clear in the case of role expectations supported by the force of law. Many social roles include such expectations which can be ignored or flouted only at the risk of legal prosecution. Such expectations are the "hard core" of any social role. Not only is it possible to formulate them, but they are in fact already formulated or codified.

But laws are by no means the only manifestations of role expectations and sanctions. In fact many organisations today have developed quasi-legal institutions of their own to enforce conformity with their behavioural prescriptions. It is hardly less painful for a man to be excommunicated by his church, expelled by his party, dismissed by his firm, or stricken from the register of his professional organisation, than to be sentenced to prison by a court of law. These are extreme sanctions, but there are also milder formal penalties - from formal reproofs, compulsory transfers, to delays in promotion.

The source of the constraining force of role expectations is, for Dahrendorf, not to be located in the majority opinions of a "reference group",¹ that is, a group to which a person has a relationship by virtue of one of

his social positions. Such a view has in fact been advanced by Gross and his co-authors. As a way of discovering the expectations which constitute a given role Gross suggests asking the members of a given position’s reference groups what expectations they associate with the position’s incumbent. Gross himself applied this suggestion to the position of the American school superintendent. In a series of interviews, he asked superintendents’ superiors, teachers, superintendents themselves, and others, what they expected from a school superintendent. Gross believed that their answers would help him to arrive at a clear definition of role expectations, and at the same time would indicate to what extent the members of a reference group agree with respect to such expectations. Not surprisingly, on many points Gross found no consensus at all, or at best, a weak majority.

According to Dahrendorf, in seeking to relate role expectations to empirical research, Gross abandoned one of the essential elements of an informative application of the concept of a social role. By attributing the force of social norms to the uncertain basis of majority opinion, unacceptable implications cannot be avoided. If six out of ten people think that a school superintendent should not smoke and should be married, these expected attributes are for Gross constitutive of the role of school superintendent. If, furthermore – though Gross does not go this far, but there is nothing in his approach which rules it out – thirty five out of forty pupils think that none of them should get bad marks ever, then this is an expectation associated with the role of schoolteacher.

Dahrendorf believes that role expectations should not be related to behaviour about whose desirability there is a more or less impressive consensus; they should be related to modes of behaviour that are binding for the individual and whose binding character is institutionalised, and thus

recognisable independently of his own or anyone else's opinions. It follows that if we are to connect the categories of role and reference group, it will not be by ascertaining the opinions of reference group members. If theorists wish to preserve the concept of role from the arbitrariness of individual opinion it is better to forget about expectations which are not either legal or quasi-legal. Since adequate methods for identifying role expectations which are not fixed in either of these two ways have not yet been found, theorists should accordingly confine themselves to formulating the accessible elements of social roles in terms of known norms, customs and precedents. Dahrendorf is only willing to qualify this view to the extent of acknowledging that in informal groupings, such as the parents of a given teacher's pupils, norms often only become visible if challenged. A teacher tells his pupils obvious nonsense, which they relay to their parents; the parents decide to do something about it. Such precedents then live on as norms; where they are present, we can properly identify expectations, and accordingly such norms can be recognised as constitutive of roles.

Finally, Dahrendorf acknowledges that the opinions of members of reference groups and the degree of consensus in these groups are not without any significance for role analysis. But their significance is not where Gross presumed to find it. A norm that is not supported or at least tolerated by a majority of group members is on weak ground. If, for example, a teachers' association requires all teachers to arrange weekly parental meetings but most teachers consider it pointless to hold such meetings so frequently, we can predict that in due course the norm will be modified. In a theoretical discussion, then, we must distinguish between the fixed norms of reference groups, which are assigned to the incumbent of a position as role expectations; the opinions of members of reference groups about these norms, which determine their likelihood of change, and the actual behaviour of role players. For the concept of social role, fixed norms only are relevant;
questions about their acceptance and the actual behaviour of the persons to whom they apply presuppose the role concept and are significant only in terms of that concept.

These, then, are the main points of comparison in the analogy which Dahrendorf thinks useful to sociologists. Dahrendorf also acknowledges what he considers to be two important limitations. The first concerns the implicit suggestion that behind all theatrical roles the actor remains a "real person", a man who is not affected by the parts he plays. He is "himself" only when he casts them off. We cannot, however, quite say that during the time the incumbent of any social position yields to society's demands he is no longer "himself", for whilst the unreality of events is assumed in the theatre, it cannot be assumed with respect to society. Despite the theatrical connotations of "role", it would be wrong to see the social role-playing man as an unreal person who has merely to drop his mask to appear as his true self. Indeed, there is a sense in which a man could be said to lead an impoverished life if he does not learn to "play" many social roles, as we see clearly in the case of invalids and others who are restricted to contact with a small number of people. Social roles are more than masks a man can take off, his social life more than a play from which audience and actor alike can return to the "true" reality.

Secondly, it is important to acknowledge that there is more to be known about a person than can be inferred from knowledge of the social positions he occupies. From our knowledge that a person is a teacher we cannot conclude that he is in favour of open-plan classrooms or comprehensive education; nor can we gather that he is a strict disciplinarian or demands neat handwriting. Concerning theatrical roles, on the other hand, there is nothing more to be learned than can be gleaned from the script.

These limitations of the role analogy which Dahrendorf notices do not appear to have (nor does he intend them to have) any unduly confining implications
for the theorist who consciously employs the concept of a social role as an analogical device. Here, then, we have a central conception of the role analogy as it might be used by sociologists conducting research into various aspects of the relations between social organisations and behaviour. What, we may now ask, are the special features of this conception which are adopted, and which discarded, by social systems and ethogenic theorists?

Concerning the former, it is to be noted that the expectations which a group may have in some way made formally binding on members may not refer to behaviour, or to all of the behaviour, which may reasonably be supposed to be conducive the the stability and efficiency of the group. In these circumstances, it is evident that social systems theorists, including those who explicitly adopt role terminology,¹ are unable to follow the line advocated by Dahrendorf. This does not mean, however, that they must fall back on "the uncertain basis of majority opinion", in order to establish that the expectations in which they are interested truly do attach to the social positions occupied by members within their groups. Social systems theorists may use whatever arguments they can conceive which will have the effect of establishing their case.

There is another aspect of the role analogy mentioned by Dahrendorf which leads to a similar conclusion. According to social systems theorists, it is in the inculcation of particular values that socialization processes are seen most importantly to consist. Consequently, in employing the role analogy, these theorists would appear to be as much interested in "role attributes" as in "role behaviour". It is surely the case, however, that few groups have formally codified in some way the character traits or attitudes

which they expect of anyone occupying particular social positions within their groups. This being the case, it is by recourse to argument rather than citation of statute that social systems theorists must proceed.

The manner in which social systems theorists employ the role analogy, then, differs from that advocated by Dahrendorf. Their interest in values, and in behaviour which is supportive of group stability and efficiency, effectively precludes acceptance of what is the most important feature of Dahrendorf's position, the reliance on formally binding expectations.

Turning now to the position taken by ethogenic theorists, it can be seen that the employment they make of the role analogy differs from that of Dahrendorf and the social systems theorists. Although ethogenists have little interest in the attitudes and traits of the members of groups, nevertheless their concern to describe everyday interactions prevents any reliance merely on formalised role expectations, since such expectations are seldom useful in any fine-grained analysis of social encounters. The expectations which comprise a social role like that of a pupil, for example, are entirely too general, too poorly specified in most circumstances, to serve as guides to action to the pupil in actually dealing with the teacher and other pupils.¹

Ethogenists do, nevertheless, make use of a concept of social role. For these theorists, the obligations attaching to particular social positions relate to the ground rules which are treated by participants as binding during social encounters on people holding those particular positions. In meeting parents, for example, teachers are expected to refrain from swearing and making mocking comments on the physical appearance of pupils. If a teacher does speak in such a fashion, then it is recognised that he should apologise and offer a proper remedial explanation of his behaviour. Such ground

¹. This point has been made in another context by McCall and Simmons. See McCall, G.J. and Simmons, J.R., Identity and Interactions, 1966, 66.
rules may be related by direct implication to the formal requirements of a social position, though it is doubtful whether this is by any means always the case.

Recourse to any form of statutory requirement of a social position not being a viable way of elucidating the ground rules by which interactions are conducted, the ethogenist is faced with the procedural problem of how such ground rules may be uncovered. The difficulty is not that one may have to rely on the uncertain basis of majority opinion. This uncertainty is not a difficulty if the expectations in which ethogenists are interested are in fact uncertain. The problem is that we, as participants in social encounters, are not always consciously aware of the expectations we fulfil so adeptly. Ethogenists cannot, then, simply ask the participants in social encounters to specify the rules to which they adhere. Ethogenists require some means by which such rules may be elucidated. This is not, for the ethogenist, an incidental problem. On the contrary, it is for this very problem that the methodology of the ethogenic research approach to social interaction has been devised. Prior, then, to assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the departures such theorists make from the role analogy conception propounded by Dahrendorf,¹ an elucidation of this methodology must be made, and its applicability to at least one field of enquiry examined.

Before attempting an exposition of ethogenic methodology, however, I should like briefly to consider an objection raised by Toulmin² to the fundamental validity of the role analogy as a device by which to understand social interaction.

The objection which Toulmin raises is to the implicit suggestion that human beings respond to, and deal with, one another always in abstract, stereotyped patterns - as instances of general types to which corresponding rules and roles are appropriate - and not, characteristically, as genuine

¹. This assessment is undertaken in the following chapter.

individuals, having their own particular histories, personalities and tastes. Toulmin acknowledges that to some extent social interactions may require the parties concerned to deal with each other in a formal fashion - the work of Harré and Goffman puts that beyond doubt. The characteristic behaviour of a bank manager to his client, of a host to his guests, a judge to the defendant: all such types of conduct respond well to analysis in dramaturgical terms, and, as Goffman saw, this kind of pattern can be carried much further, and applied to familiar, everyday conduct in more detail than had been recognised. Toulmin insists, however, that there is some kind of polar opposition between the idea of dealing with people in accordance with the positions they occupy, and the idea of dealing with them in the normal personal way. During most of a criminal trial, for example, it is proper for a judge to avoid seeing the defendant as a unique human being with a complex history and an individual personality, and to view him instead as, for example, a man charged with fraud. By contrast, we act towards one another as "persons", that is, in a "personal" manner, only at the point where we leave aside or go beyond such generalised "role patterned" modes of conduct, and deal with each other in ways that are sensitive to all the relevant features of the other's background, temperament, past history and present inclinations.

The resulting interactions will be fully personal to the extent, and only to the extent, that the agents involved are conscious, in sufficient detail, of the realities of one another's situations and states of mind; and this kind of awareness can be achieved only to a limited degree if they perceive each other as belonging to generalised types towards whom one can act in accordance with widely established conventions. In short, it is the encounters in which all the parties concerned display the highest degree of conscious sensitivity to the detailed and specific actualities of
one another's positions and feelings - and, by so doing, go beyond all specific "role-playing" - that most fully and characteristically represent interactions between people. Any model, then, of social encounters in which interaction is conceived in terms of transactions between people treated solely as the incumbents of social positions is bound, so Toulmin would argue, to be too narrow to capture the richness and variety of human social intercourse.

It may, I think, be conceded at once that Toulmin's point appears to be valid. The question which remains to be answered is whether the ethogenic research approach is affected by it. The answer would appear to be in the negative, for the aim of this research approach is not at all to be able to describe human social interaction in all its "richness and variety". The ambitions are rather more modest in nature, and are restricted simply to capturing within a theoretical net just those elements which Toulmin regards as not truly "characteristic" of social intercourse. Toulmin's remarks may, I believe, be treated as a reminder of the limits beyond which the ethogenic research approach cannot aspire. Regarded as such, the ethogenist may even treat his observations as welcome.

2 (b) Methodology

For the ethogenist who is not primarily interested in socialization, a central purpose in employing the metaphysical paradigms I have discussed is that they enable him to devise a methodology which may be used to describe the structure of social encounters. The ethogenist sets forth sets of rules which he hopes will be applicable to the participants' behaviour during interactions. It is then for the research worker to determine which, if any, set of rules may be relevant to describe the structure of the particular social encounters in which he is interested. (It may, of course, be necessary to appeal to more than one set of rules). To this end, Harré and Secord
have produced several such sets of rules which may be used to analyse discrete interactional episodes. These sets of rules are drawn from actual social interactions of a kind which these writers call "formal episodes". Such episodes are:

"... sequences of happenings in which reference is made to explicit rules in accounting for the type and order of the component actions".  

An example would be the sequence of actions which several people perform which leads to two people coming to be married. The sequence would constitute a formal episode whose principles of order are in fact explicit rules as to what must be done by the occupant of each role and in what order. The formal episodes described by Harre and Secord may, in other words, be said to be the models by which descriptions of interactional structures may be made.

Harre and Secord actually regard the function of these models as twofold. Firstly, as I have mentioned, by viewing people's behaviour during social encounters in this way a certain structure may be observable. Secondly, the application of the models serves to create a paramorph of the means by which the behaviour is produced by the agents. For example, it may allow us to formulate the strategy and the rules to which we may suppose the participants were adhering. Thus the models have a descriptive and an explanatory function, the former being related to the way in which the episode is described, and the latter to how it is to be accounted for. I give below several examples of the models outlined by Harre and others.

Game Episodes

The first type of formal episode I shall mention is the "game" episode. In characterising games for the purpose of constructing a "games model" in accordance with which interactive behaviour may be seen to be organised,  

a number of writers have emphasised various facets of games. There is such a variety in games, such a variation in their types of rules and outcome, that a certain selectivity in description of what constitutes a game appears to be the only sensible approach if the resultant model is to be a useful analytical tool. For our purpose, the views of just Harré and Secord,¹ Garfinkel,² and Berne,³ need to be consulted.

Harré and Secord list three main features of games which they believe provide important features for any games model which may be used to analyse social encounters. These are:

"1. There are rules and conventions which specify the type of action which is part of the game. These could be called the specification of play.

2. There is a specified form of outcome, in which one or more of the participants is the winner and the others are losers. There may be a third category of people involved, exemplified by linesmen and umpires, in some games.

3. Conditions (1) and (2) ensure that there is an outcome and that the exact form of play is uncertain. This leaves room for skilful play, which includes efficiency in performance of permitted actions and strategies. The third condition requires that the intentions of one or more of the participants should be concealed from the others. Thus a game involves an element of dissimulation or dishonesty as a function of its competitive nature."⁴

¹ Harré, R. and Secord, P.F., op. cit.
³ Berne, E., Games People Play, 1964.
From a consideration of these three conditions it can be seen that in attempting to describe the behaviour of people in the terms of the games model the significant things to look for are strategies and outcomes. As Garfinkel\(^1\) has pointed out, if a social encounter cannot be construed as issuing in some form of victory for one or other of the participants in the episode, then it is not game-like in the sense defined.

Merely to note this, however, is not sufficient for a games analysis to be informative. According to Berne\(^2\), it is important to note that in games there are rules or conventions governing permissible plays, and there are rules defining roles in the game and what counts as winning. If we accept this characterisation of games, then in attempting to describe people's behaviour in games' terms we would, in addition to noting the strategy employed by a person which led to a particular outcome, also attempt to describe what role the other people were playing in the game, that is, what were the rules to which they adhered which resulted in their playing the roles they did. We would also attempt to describe the role played by the "gamester" - that is, once again, to describe the rules to which this person was adhering which resulted in his playing the role in which he had cast himself. (The losers, of course, are not consciously participating in the game\(^3\) - the rules according to which their behaviour may be seen to conform are the "ground rules" which have become established for this kind of interaction. Likewise, the "gamester" may not think in terms of playing a game. Nevertheless, the gamester, unlike the others, is employing manoeuvres with concealed motivations and is thus in a sense in which the others are not, involved in a game).

Routine Episodes

The next type of formal episode I shall mention is that called by

2. Berne, E., op. cit., 44.
Harre and Secord, "routine episodes". The category of routine episodes is distinguished by the fact that, although the actions which occur in such episodes are generated by following specific rules, they cannot be construed as the performance of acts. A routine is performed simply by the faithful carrying out of the required sequence of actions. For instance, servicing a car is a routine - a sequence generated by following a set of rules, and the outcome, better running, say, is causally related to the actions performed according to rule by the mechanic. In this sort of episode, the actions and rules can be justified by reference to empirical knowledge of the effect of the actions performed.

Harre and Secord draw a distinction between authentic and simulated routines. Servicing a car is an authentic routine. But if the same actions are imitated in the course of a play the routine is a simulation. Authentic and simulated routines generally differ in that in simulation routines the actions are not properly performed but only imitated to give the impression that they are genuine, although there are cases in which authentic routines can be distinguished from simulation routines only by our knowledge of the intention of the people involved.

The routine model in terms of which behaviour is to be described will possess the features of formal routine episodes I have mentioned - the behaviour will involve, that is, the carrying out of a sequence of actions which are describable in terms of a sequence of rules, and which have an outcome which is causally related to the carrying out of those rules.

**Entertainment Episodes**

This type of formal episode differs from routines in that it is not performed for the sake of any outcome. Humming a tune is often such an episode. It does nothing, and is producing neither pleasure not pain. But it is a particular tune, so in a sense is a performance under self-monitoring.

2. ibid., 203-4.
and connected to rules.

The sort of behavioural regularity which appears susceptible to such a description will be one in which there is apparently no intended outcome or conventional upshot to the behaviour despite its being possible to discern sequential components of the behaviour. This is not to suggest, of course, that the behaviour is a kind of acte gratuit, for which no psychological explanation could be satisfactorily offered.

Ceremonial Episodes

The next formal episode I wish to mention is that which Harré and Secord call the "ceremonial". They point out that a ceremony may be considered a formal episode in that it is characterised by the existence of a set of rules, in some cases called a liturgy, according to which the actions of each person taking part must conform for the act intended to be successfully performed. Among the distinctions which can be used in the classification of formal episodes there is, as Harré and Secord point out, that between episodes in which a certain sequence of actions are conventionally held to constitute the performance of an act, and those where this is not so. This criterion may be used to distinguish the ceremonial episodes such as that of a marriage, a Mass, a Benediction, a blessing or a Thanksgiving, and the like, from other formal episodes.

The ceremony as a formal episode is the basis for what Harré and Secord call the "liturgical" model for explaining behaviour. The liturgical model is formulated by imagining a liturgy as a paramorph for the unformulated rules the imagined following of which by the participants generates the behaviour in the episode. For the application of this model to be plausible, the behaviour must be related to some entity which has "sanctity" or inviolability. Goffman has shown that certain aspects of interpersonal behaviour may plausibly be

2. ibid., 191.
construed as involving a tacit acceptance that a person's "face" has claims to such inviolability. The identification of such an entity in an episode would give good grounds for expecting the application of the liturgical model to be fruitful as an analytic tool.

Passing Episodes

Certain behavioural episodes do not fit any of the explanatory descriptive models I have so far mentioned. In particular certain behaviour which might at first sight appear susceptible to a game analysis fails, on closer inspection, to satisfy relevant criteria. The kind of behavioural pattern I am concerned with here has been discussed in other contexts by both Goffman and Garfinkel. Garfinkel, especially, has been concerned to examine behaviour, the analysis of which, when the game model has been used to examine it, has been shown to contain structural incongruities. One is concerned here with behaviour in which there is an element of deliberate deception which, however, does not lead to a "win" or a "pay-off". Instead, "success" in managing a situation consists in sustaining a desired image. Some of Garfinkel's most interesting work has been concerned with the intensive study of persons "passing" in roles which they have deliberately chosen to adopt. His much-discussed analysis of the rules relating to the "presentation of self" by adolescent girls derives from his questioning of a person, "Agnes", who, though originally a boy, chose to pass as a girl, and had to learn, as explicit principles, the rules which operate in the lives of girls whose society he wished to join and to follow these rules faithfully. There are, then, rules for the appropriate presentation of self which are related to particular circumstances, and Garfinkel's studies reveal once again that everyday behaviour possesses features which allow us to consider it as if it were the result of explicit rule following.

2. ibid., 116-185.
The methodology of the ethogenic research approach, then, involves the construction and application of various models of the kind I have elaborated. Its success as a methodology will, for our purpose, mainly hinge on the insights it can bring, firstly, into the ground rules of interactions as they occur between teachers and pupils, and secondly, on the insights such information may throw on the process of school and school role socialization. An assessment of both these possibilities may presently be made when I shall attempt to apply the several features of this research approach to the problems of school and school role socialization.

2 (c) Ontology

Concerning the ontology of the ethogenic research approach there is little of a controversial nature to be said. Ethogenists are concerned to study everyday social encounters and with this objective in mind, they are very anxious to avoid reification of abstract entities. People, in all their complexity, exist. In the presence of others they behave in certain ways, and entertain certain expectations concerning the behaviour of others. Such is the data which provide the puzzles which the ethogenist sets out to unravel. As such, no particular ontological problems seem to present themselves.

This concludes the remarks I wish to make concerning the conceptual basis of the ethogenic approach to social interaction. I believe that, in the form in which I have presented it, this research approach is free from serious conceptual difficulty. Accordingly, for our purpose, the crucial question which may be posed of it concerns its applicability as a research vehicle by which interactions, as they are conducted within schools, may be elucidated. This question is crucial since the central concern of this thesis is to produce a theory of socialization which may be applied to the problems of school and school role socialization. Since this is our central purpose, before attempting to demonstrate its applicability I propose to set forth an approach to socialization based upon the ethogenic research approach to social interaction.
3. An Ethogenic Research Approach to Socialization

Before setting forth explicitly the concepts by which this research approach to socialization is to be characterised, I shall indicate the relevance of certain features of the ideas so far considered in this chapter to a conception of socialization.

To begin, the ethogenic approach to social interaction starts from the premise that social interactions have to be constructed and maintained on a moment-to-moment basis. This requires a society's citizens to be knowledgeable about, and adept in, the deployment of certain knowledge and skills. The exercise of these skills requires the ability to stand back and imaginatively construct the likely course of social encounters, including those which are of an extremely formal nature. This in turn requires, indeed it would not be possible in our society without, the actual experience of interacting with adults in a more formal fashion than is commonly found within the family. The most frequent and sustained contact which children have with adults outside the family is at school, and it is therefore promising to look to the child's experience of interacting with teachers to learn something of the development of these social skills.

In charting this development it is perhaps also pertinent to point out that there is evidence that the social worlds constructed by children in their interactions among themselves are created and sustained by processes similar to those by which adults sustain and create their own encounters. These processes involve the use of ceremony and ritual, the presentation of selves, and the capacity for the imaginative rehearsal of social action as a test of propriety. The social world of children, then, may be considered a precursor.

In general terms, the kind of socialization process which I propose to consider will be concerned with the contribution which the experience of socialization makes to the development of these social skills.

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1. See Opie, J. and Opie, P., op. cit.
school life makes to the child's expanding mastery and understanding of the 
forms of symbolic interaction which are necessary for the creation and main-
tenance of interactions in the adult world.

It may be noted that in this matter the development of children's 
progress may be charted by reference to the rule distinctions drawn by 
Toulmin. We may say that typically the young child's first steps in learning 
"how to behave" are made without any realisation that there are any rules 
with which his personal conduct is being compared and brought into line. In 
these respects, he does not in his conduct "apply" rules of procedure to 
attain a certain end, still less employ such rules "critically" or "consciously": 
at most, the child learns to conduct his personal relations in a "rule-governed" 
or "rule-conforming" manner. In the early stages of a child's upbringing, 
it is at most the mentor who has a "rule" in mind, and who corrects the 
child's behaviour in such a way as to consolidate the required patterns in 
his conduct.

This will, of course, also be the case when the child is first a pupil 
and his "mentor" a teacher. A major difference between parents and teachers 
in the parts they play as mentors is that the formality of the relationships 
in which the children engage is much greater at school, and increases in 
formality as the pupils progress through their school careers. Constitutive 
of this increased formality is the impersonality with which children and teachers 
conduct their meetings. A large number of the meetings are conducted on the 
basis, not of individuals encountering one another, but of pupils and 
teachers completing necessary business. Further, the rules by which teachers 
and pupils conduct their encounters increasingly take on the characteristics 
which I have described - the greeting, followed by the ceremonial maintenance of 
order involving supportive and remedial exchanges to deal with threats and 
violations of this order. Children are in fact led during the course of 
their school careers from situations which demand mere rule-conforming 
and rule-governed behaviour to situations which call for the application of
rules to preserve order during encounters, and even for critical reflection upon the accepted ground rules of interaction, and the devising of non-standard solutions. Indeed, it might be claimed that it is by the manifestation by a group member of the ability to maintain social order during degenerating social encounters that the relative success of the socialization processes to which he has been exposed may be judged.

This concludes the general remarks I wish to make, and I turn now to the interpretation of the concepts both of socialization and of those other notions which attend upon it.

From the ethogenic perspective, socialization may be conceived as a process by which members are led to acquire the knowledge and skills necessary to interact with other group members in such a manner that interactions between group members are sufficiently orderly for the affairs of the group to be conducted with reasonable efficiency and the stability of the group not impaired. The unsuccessfully socialized person will be a nominal member of a group who has failed properly to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills. Unsocialized persons will, of course, simply be nominal group members who, for whatever reason, have not been exposed to the group's socialization processes, or through infirmities of some kind are unable to respond to the operation of the socialization processes. Concerning the notion of a deviant person, this approach to socialization would seem neither to require a distinction, nor indeed can one be made, between the unsuccessfully socialized person and the deviant. This is because in focussing on knowledge and skills, rather than values, only one question can be raised of a member of a group: to what extent is he able to conduct interactions in an orderly way? If the answer is that he is not properly able, then it matters little if one says of such a person that he is deviant or unsuccessfully socialized. This being the case, I shall write of such persons as deviants, since this is the more common term.
To recapitulate, I began this chapter by attempting to provide some indication of the range of knowledge and abilities required for the successful management of social interactions. This was followed by an outline of the conceptual foundations of the ethogenic research approach - its metaphysical paradigms, ontology and methodology. Finally, I offered an interpretation of the concept of socialization and its allied concepts based on the foregoing analysis. The interpretation which I have offered of these concepts permits me, I believe, to write of an ethogenic research approach to socialization. Such a research approach would share the conceptual foundations of the ethogenic research approach to social interaction, but would seek not merely to describe the means whereby social encounters are managed but would offer an account of the processes by which the knowledge and skills employed in orderly social interactions within particular groups are acquired. I shall, then, henceforth write of the ethogenic research approach to socialization, and turn to consider the problems of its assessment.
CHAPTER SIX

AN EXAMINATION OF THE ETHOGENIC RESEARCH APPROACH
TO SOCIALIZATION AND ITS RELEVANCE TO SCHOOL ROLE SOCIALIZATION

1. The Appraisal of Research Approaches: Some Further Considerations

Earlier,\(^1\) in considering the social systems research approach, I suggested that the appraisal of research approaches may proceed in several ways. Concerning research approaches considered as composites of metaphysical paradigms, ontologies and methodological principles by which empirical theories are underpinned, I wrote that one might raise questions concerning their acceptability. I suggested that such theories could be assessed in terms of their profitability, and I characterised profitability in terms of positive research findings to which such theories had led or seemed likely to lead. Concerning the elements by which research approaches are composed, I wrote in connection with metaphysical paradigms that one might raise questions about the acceptability of their employment within the context of a certain problem. More fundamentally, one might also enquire as to their acceptability in any problem area. I explained that no straightforward criteria of "acceptability" could be offered since the attempt to investigate phenomena from a particular perspective involves an indefinite range of implications any one of which might be shown to be problematical. In examining a methodology, the question to be raised was whether it was adequate to the investigation of the phenomena in which we were interested. The question of adequacy was to be approached by seeking to determine whether all the required empirical data could be gathered by recourse to the methodological procedures of the research approach. Finally, concerning ontological commitments, the central question to be raised was whether it had to be conceded that it was necessary to posit the existence, in the strong sense of the term, of the entities to which the research approach was committed.

1. See above, 121-127.
In considering the ethogenic research approach to socialization these questions are, of course, again relevant, but there are certain complications of which account must be taken. It is also the case that a further kind of question must be raised of the conceptualizations of "socialization" and its allied notions made in both the ethogenic and the social systems research approaches.

The complications to which I refer have the effect of making it difficult to consider the rule and role analogies separately from each other and from an assessment of what may be called the "applicability" of the methodology. This must be accepted since the manner in which ethogenists use the notion of rules is inseparable from the way in which they employ their conception of roles and the various models which comprise their methodology. The situations they consider are of the type whereby a person in a certain role interacts with others in such a fashion that the behaviour of all parties may be construed in terms of an adherence to sets of rules such as those that constitute, for example, a game, or a liturgy. In attempting to assess the acceptability of the rule and role analogies, therefore, we are led to examine at the same time the ethogenic methodological procedures.

The further kind of question to which I referred which may be raised of research approaches to socialization is one which, in order to avoid duplication, was not raised when an assessment was made of the social systems research approach. The possibility of this mode of evaluation may be seen to arise once it is emphasised that, however such processes may be defined, it is groups who operate socialization processes.

Since it is groups, not theorists of any particular persuasion, who contrive matters so that their members learn to behave in acceptable ways, in the empirical investigations of the socialization processes operated by any particular group it is clearly important that theorists do not conduct their research with theoretical presuppositions which result in their being unable to explain why it is that certain nominal members of any group are regarded as,

1. The connotation of this term will be elucidated in due course.
for example, deviant or unsuccessfully socialized, by the other members of the group. In setting out to conduct research into school role socialization, it is vital, therefore, that the theoretician's interpretation of socialization and its allied concepts be congruent with those who may be said to "manage" schools. One further way of assessing these research approaches, therefore, is to enquire whether their interpretations of these central concepts are congruent with those which may be inferred actually to be operative within schools. This also I shall attempt later in this chapter. For the present, it is to an examination of the acceptability of the remaining metaphysical paradigm, the "manipulation analogy", that I now wish to turn.

2. An Examination of the Metaphysical Paradigms of this Research Approach

2 (a) The Manipulation Analogy

To my knowledge, no theoretician has ever attempted to produce arguments purporting to show that the manipulation analogy - an analogy by which behaviour which is not premeditated and inspired by a deliberately concealed motivation is regarded as if it were so - is unacceptable irrespective of the intentions of the theorist employing it. The fundamental validity of the comparison is, then, not questioned. More contentious might be the claim that all interactive behaviour may be so viewed with insights afforded into the ground rules by which encounters are conducted. It might be suggested that this analogy is unlikely to be illuminating when applied to the interaction between, for example, two signalmen passing short messages of routine information between ships passing each other on the ocean. On the other hand, one may concede the suggestion that this analogy may prove helpful in the analysis of interactions between people in situations in which the function of one person is to persuade the others to follow a vast array of rules whether they are willing or not.

If these suggestions are at all persuasive, then the acceptability of this metaphysical paradigm may be made to appear less than questionable if it can be argued that interactions between pupils and teachers typically occur
under conditions which more resemble the latter than the former. Such a
demonstration would take the form of a phenomenological account of school
life from the pupil's point of view which would in the end rely for its
general plausibility simply on an appeal to those who have experienced school
life as both teacher and pupil that this is not an unduly distorted account of
the way matters rest.

I propose now to offer such an account which is intended to show that
the pupil's position is one in which he is hedged about by rules of various
kinds to which he must learn to adhere.

(i) An Assessment of the Pupil's Position

Before I begin my assessment I should like to emphasise two limitations.
Firstly, in writing about the pupil's position I have in mind what I take to
be the most common classroom arrangement consisting of a number of pupils,
the average being about thirty to a class, and one teacher. Further, I believe
that my interpretation of the pupil's position most accurately fits the Secondary
school, although children in the upper end of the Junior school, in my
experience, often view their situation in ways similar to older pupils, thereby
suggesting that the "logic" of the Primary school classroom, at its upper end
at least, is not significantly different to Secondary schools.

Secondly, even restricting the discussion as I intend to do to pupil
behaviour which is not absent-minded of situational demands, it must be
acknowledged that it is unlikely that anyone will produce an assessment of
the pupil's position, conceived in this very general fashion, such that all
pupil behaviour can be seen to be related to it.

I should like to begin my description of the pupil's position by focussing
on a distinction between two types of rule which the pupil encounters during
his school career. I shall then sketch what I take to be the typical reaction
of pupils towards these rules, hoping thereby to bring into clearer view the
fact that pupils may be seen to view school life as one in which they are faced
by demands for adherence to a vast array of rules. In this way I shall seek to
render more plausible the suggestion that the manipulation analogy may be likely in this context to prove a useful heuristic device in uncovering the ground rules by which pupil-teacher interactions are conducted.

I wish to begin by emphasising two aspects of classroom life. The first is that the acknowledged purpose of the presence of the children in classrooms is that they should acquire competence in the academic subjects which fill the timetable. Progress in these subjects may be seen to involve the acquisition of the ability to adhere to what may be called the "procedural" rules of the various subjects. Secondly, the pupil is not only obliged to work at the academic tasks set by the teacher, he is also supposed to conform both to the teacher's requirements designed to ensure orderliness and efficiency in the classroom, and to the more general school regulations which are meant to enable the functions of the school to be carried out successfully. Such requirements also take the form of, or involve, rules to which the pupil should adhere. Certain of these rules may be called "disciplinary rules". To break a disciplinary rule is, in most circumstances, to misbehave, at least in the eyes of the rule-maker. Such rules may be broken wilfully and may be adhered to reluctantly or prudently. These rules may be distinguished from procedural rules, which find their justification and raison d'être within particular subjects or disciplines. To disregard or break the latter is usually to commit errors or mistakes.

Between these two sorts of rules lie many and various directives which are given to the pupils. Some of these, such as the directive to write clearly, may be viewed by the teacher as at once a disciplinary matter, legibility being an issue which affects efficiency in the school's assessment procedures, and a means to clear thinking in a subject. Many directives, then, are not clearly classifiable simply as disciplinary rules or solely as a means to progress in a subject. Procedural rules, however, at least in principle, should always be distinguishable from rules of other kinds.
The pupil's position as I have so far characterised it, then, is one in which it is demanded of him by teachers that he act in accordance with a vast array of rules whose justification and purpose are of diverse kinds. I want now to suggest that there are certain characteristic ways in which pupils view such a situation, and I shall try to render intelligible this viewpoint by referring to the work of Piaget concerning the child's conception of rules.¹

In his studies of the moral behaviour of children Piaget observed their changing attitudes to the status of rules. In particular he distinguished two stages which are relevant to my purpose. (Piaget writes of "developmental" stages, a notion to which there attaches certain difficulties.² I am here accepting the stages described by Piaget without burdening my argument with the view that each stage must be viewed "developmentally".) Firstly, there is the stage at which children acknowledge the rightness of adult-imposed rules without regard to the point or purpose of the rules or the intentions of the rule-makers, but rather out of awe of authority figures. Consequent upon this are two things: firstly, at this stage children do not distinguish between the different status and types of rules, and secondly, they believe their obligations end at the behaviour proscribed or enjoined by detailed explicit rules. At the other stage which is of relevance here, rules are judged right because they are the means of achieving the common purpose. Thus the point of rules and the intentions of rule-makers are now taken into consideration. At this stage, also, distinctions between different types of rules are possible. Further, with the changing attitude to the status of rules comes an increase in the burden of responsibility the child bears. At the earlier stage even the most capable children are dependent upon directives from adults, and are unable to comprehend other than externally imposed rules. With an increased ability to see the status of rules in this way, an increased measure of self-directed and discerning rule-adherence may be expected of the child.

Younger children, then, according to Piaget, accept rules out of an awe for the authority figure who informs them of the rules, and they do not make discriminations among different types of rules. Some older pupils, I suggest, despite having attained, to some extent, the "operational" stage of thinking, and recognising that procedural rules derive from the subject, make little or no discrimination between the status or purpose of the various kinds of directives by which they are confronted. Rules of procedure and directives of other kinds are often treated as being of the same kind as disciplinary rules. The result is that, for these pupils, and all pupils may be seen to adopt this viewpoint from time to time, school is indeed a place in which they see themselves as being made to adhere to a vast array of constricting rules.

I shall attempt to establish the plausibility of this characterisation of the pupil's position firstly by describing commonly observed pupil behaviour which is supportive of my claim, and secondly, by sketching a typical relationship between pupil and teacher which is rendered readily comprehensible once my characterization is accepted.

To begin, if my characterization contains at least a strong element of truth, it might be expected that pupils would, for example, on occasion treat a directive to learn verb endings or a rule about writing corrections of spelling mistakes as if these injunctions were similar in kind to the rule concerning running in the corridors or the ban on smoking, the latter two rules being regarded simply as irksome restrictions imposed by teachers for reasons into which the pupil does not enquire. Most teachers would, I believe, admit that such behaviour is commonly observable. Pupils sometimes intentionally break even subject procedural rules in an attempt to flout the teacher's authority, thereby forcing him to treat the infringement of procedural rules as if they were disciplinary ones. A realistic fictional illustration of this occurs in Evan Hunter's The Blackboard Jungle:
"The first sentence read: 'Henry hasn't written (no, any) answer to my letter.

Rick (the teacher) read the sentence, and then looked at Miller, 'Well, Miller, what do you say?'

Miller hesitated for just a moment, 'Henry hasn't written no answer to my letter', he said ...

'Antoro, will you take the next one please?' Rick said ...

It was none other than (her, she).

'It was none other than her', said Antoro quickly.

'No!', Rick said. The answer is "she". Take the next one, Levy'.

Levy spoke almost as soon as his name was called.

'George threwed the ball fast', he said.

'Throwed the ball? Rick said, lifting his eyebrows.

'Throwed?' Come now, Levy, Surely you know "threw" is correct? Levy said nothing. He studied Rick with cold eyes. "Belazi", Rick spoke tightly, "Take the next one".

"It was them who spoke", he said.

He knew the game now. He knew the game and was powerless to combat it."

Another type of response which might be expected of pupils who do not enquire into the point of the rules the adherence to which is situationally demanded, would be simply to carry out the teacher's directives in a punctilious but mindless way. This is confirmed by Mackenzie, who writes that difficult children,

"... are still in the minority. The majority we can cope with; or rather, they are nice children and suffer education patiently. They become moderately interested, like a group on a sea-side holiday

who are prepared to put up with charades
until the rain stops". 1

Such docile pupils will dutifully copy from the blackboard, for example, without any attempt to see the point of what they are doing. In fact, as teachers know, they will copy notes from entirely different lessons if these have not been entirely erased from any part of the blackboard. To behave in this manner is to betray not only a lack of concern with the point of directives, but also a blinkered literalness to the precise words of instructions. This is also in accordance with Piaget's findings concerning young people's beliefs that their responsibilities are limited to behaviour which comes within the confines defined by explicit rules.

This literalness in interpretation of instructions further reveals itself in other commonly observed behaviour. Because they regard their responsibilities as limited to the duration of each lesson, some pupils enquire every lesson whether they are to write down the date or rule off. A clearly defined task is what is most satisfying to these pupils, clearly defined, that is, in the sense of it being apparent that at a recognisable point the task is finished and out of the way. Such pupils also often enquire at the start of a task the number of pages or examples they are expected to complete.

Many more illustrations could be given of pupils' behaviour which are supportive of my contention that pupils see their position as one in which they have to adhere to a vast array of rules 2. However, plausibility will hardly be greatly increased by the citation of a few further examples. I have indicated the kind of behaviour which would lend support to my view, and I am confident that those who are knowledgeable concerning school life will on reflection be inclined to accept my characterization. I turn now to describe a typical relationship between pupil and teacher which will also, I believe, lend support to my claim.

In a situation which is characterised by a demand for adherence to a great array of rules originating from one person, it may be predicted that there will be a characteristic relationship between the two parties. Should the pupil feel, for example, bewildered or threatened, bored or constrained or intimidated by any aspect of classroom arrangements, the focus of his feelings is unlikely to be the laws of the country or the examination syllabus, or even the school, but actual people, that is, his teachers. It is the teacher who will appear to the pupil as the personification of the coercive forces, and it is therefore, to be expected that the pupil's response to a situation which requires adherence to multiple rules will be reflected in his relationship with his teachers. At the very general level of this discussion there are at least two possible relationships, both of which I shall outline, though it is that which I shall call the "subservient" relationship which is by far the most prevalent, I believe. I shall begin by pointing out that I have implied that there are two sorts of reaction to the classroom position as I have described it: that which may be called the "disruptive" or "self-assertive" and the "docile". It is clear, however, that no pupil could be tolerated who was disruptive all the time, and many pupils in my experience oscillate between the self-assertive and the docile. What may be common to both sorts of reaction is a heteronomous view of rules. In attempting to understand pupils who respond in these ways to their position in the classroom it may be recalled that Piaget found that with the change of attitude towards the status of rules came an increase in the burden of responsibility the child bears. At the earlier stage children are dependent upon adults and are unable to comprehend other than externally imposed rules. With an increased ability to see that the rules can be changed and that they were instituted for a purpose, a measure of self-help is expected of the child. Since disruptive and docile pupils often do not behave as if the rules they encounter were designed for goals they share with teachers, they do not behave as if they were engaged in a co-operative endeavour with the teacher, and they do not feel that the responsibility
for progress being achieved is in a large measure their own. They appear to think in this way: "It is the teacher's task to see that we progress in our work. Our responsibility is confined to carrying out the limited tasks the teacher supervises when we are in his presence". Such pupils, whether or not they are occasionally disruptive, may be said to see their relationship with their teachers in a "subservient" way. To view their relationship with their teacher in a subservient way is to rely to an unnecessary and counterproductive extent on the teacher for support, direction and assistance; it is to behave as if few, if any, distinctions are to be drawn between the various directives the teacher utters, to show little concern with the point and purpose of such directives, to behave as if one's responsibilities are limited to the carrying out of the directives, and finally, to see the teacher as a coercive force rather than a co-operative partner. (It will be observed that I have described this relationship in behavioural terms. The question, therefore, of whether pupils really see their relationship with their teachers in this way need not be raised. It is sufficient for my purpose if their behaviour can be so interpreted).

The position so far reached is that some pupils not only respond to the diverse rules by which they find themselves confronted in a disruptive or docile manner, but also base their relationship with their teachers on the fact that their behaviour is ordered in so many ways. This is a bleak view and clearly does not capture the way in which many pupils respond to the demands of classroom life. To redress the distortion of this picture, I shall first sketch a different possible relationship between pupil and teacher, and then suggest how it may be that pupils move towards this relationship, rather than towards the subservient one, from the same starting point of a classroom life dominated by a demand for rule adherence.

In contrast to the subservient relationship may be set the one which is the correlate of the view of the status of rules which Piaget has observed to follow the earlier heteronomous view. I shall call this view of the teacher-
pupil relationship the "consultative" view. Such a view is in some respects similar to that which has been approvingly described by Entwistle, who traces this conception of the teacher-pupil relationship to Piagetians such as N. Isaacs. Entwistle notes that Piagetians stress the importance of the child's independent activity "through the notion that he himself must build up his own mental structure from the bricks of his own experience". However, to continue Entwistle's imagery, though the child may be a builder, it is difficult to see him as an architect of his own development. The initiative in this designing and planning function must lie with the teacher. In addition to this function the teacher has the responsibility to assess the progress of the pupil's endeavours. Thus, as with an architect or planner, the teacher functions in an evaluatory capacity. With these qualifications noted, this other possible pupil-teacher relationship can properly be described as a consultative one. To view the relationship in this way is for the pupil to behave as if he saw the teacher as a person who acted as a sort of obligatory consultant in the design and evaluation of learning, it being realised by the pupil that, in the acquisition of skills and knowledge, self-help in the form of a questioning frame of mind and independent efforts to evaluate one's own performance and take appropriate courses of action, are essential. Such a relationship does not preclude the direct teaching of material in so far as this is necessary for the pupil to be brought to a stage of accomplishment in a subject such that a limited independence of the teacher becomes feasible. As Entwistle puts it:

"In learning for themselves pupils require not only such indication of the topology of the field, but also guidance on how to explore it in the most economical and profitable way."  

2. ibid., 158.
3. ibid., 159.
In depicting two possible relationships I do not mean to suggest that pupils always behave as if they viewed their relationship with teachers in either of these two ways. A truer picture, I think, would be one of all pupils in their infant schools behaving as if they believed that a subservient relationship was demanded of them, but, with success and a gradual increase in confidence and awareness of the status and purpose of rules, a proportion of them moving towards a consultative relationship.

Those who do enjoy a consultative relationship with some teachers do not, of course, experience their rule-dominated situation as one so confining that they feel impelled to behave either in a disruptive or unduly docile manner; disciplinary rules are not experienced as particularly repressive and adherence to procedural rules is a matter of common sense.

Such pupils are, in my experience, decidedly in a minority. The relationship between most pupils and their teachers is, I believe, in large measure a subservient one. If this is the case, then both the typical attitude of pupils towards their teachers and the kind of behaviour in which they commonly indulge in the classroom would appear to indicate that pupils implicitly view their position within the classroom as one in which they are constrained by a great array of rules, adherence to which the teacher is seeking to foster. In such a situation, it would seem not unreasonable to suppose that the manipulation analogy is likely to prove a useful heuristic device by which to seek to uncover the ground rules by which interactions between pupils and teachers are conducted. Indeed, in the circumstances I have described we may expect that at least in some of the encounters between pupils and teachers the way the participants behave would, in actual fact, be manipulative in nature.

I turn now to the rule and role analogies. I have already suggested that the case for an acceptance of these analogies cannot be examined in isolation from the methodological procedure adopted by ethogenists. In these circumstances I propose to move straight to an attempt to demonstrate that the ethogenic methodology may be used to reveal the ground rules by which
interactions between pupils and teachers are conducted. I hope, thereby, not to establish the adequacy of this methodology, which is a topic I propose to postpone until later in this chapter, but merely to show how the ground rules of pupil-teacher interactions can be revealed by recourse to this methodology. I hope to reveal, that is, merely the applicability of the ethogenic methodology, and in so doing to render the metaphysical paradigms of this research approach acceptable in at least one respect.

3. The Applicability and Adequacy of the Ethogenic Methodology

3 (a) Applicability

Earlier,¹ in elaborating ethogenic methodology, I stated that the ethogenist sets forth sets of rules which he hopes will be applicable to participants' behaviour during interactions. These sets of rules constitute models the application of which serves to create a paramorph of the means by which the behaviour is produced by the agents. I wrote that it was by attempting to construe interactional behaviour in terms of these models that we may be led to formulate the ground rules to which we may suppose the participants were adhering. I elaborated the various features of several models and I shall refer to these in attempting to demonstrate their applicability to pupil-teacher interactions.²

(i) The Games Model

In discussing the games model I suggested that in attempting to describe people's behaviour in games' terms we would, in addition to noting the strategy which led to a particular outcome, also attempt to describe the role the other people were playing in the game, that is, to describe the rules to which they adhered which resulted in their playing the roles they did. We would also attempt to describe the role played by the "gamester" - that is,

1. See above, 184-185.

2. For further illustrations and a more detailed presentation of ethogenic analysis being used to illuminate pupil-teacher interaction, though without reference to socialization questions, see Guy, W.R., Explanation of Learning Failure, unpublished M.Ed. thesis, University of Leicester, 1976, 132-171.
once again, to describe the rules to which this person was adhering which resulted in his playing the role in which he had cast himself.

In order now to demonstrate the applicability of games analysis as a means to the elucidation of interactional ground rules, I shall proceed by describing an encounter between a teacher and a pupil and then attempt the descriptions which are so important for the success of such an analysis. For "raw data" I turn to one of the many descriptions of teacher-pupil encounters to be found in John Holt's *How Children Fail*.

"They are very good at this, at getting other people to do their tasks for them. I remember one day not very long ago when Ruth opened my eyes. We had been doing Maths, and I was pleased with myself because, instead of telling her the answers and showing her how to do problems, I was 'making her think', by asking her questions. It was slow work. Question after question met only silence. She said nothing, did nothing, just sat there and looked at me through those glasses, and waited. Each time I had to think of a question easier and more pointed than the last, until I finally found one so easy that she would feel safe in answering it. So we inched our way along until suddenly, looking at her as I waited for an answer to a question, I saw with a start that she was not looking puzzled at all by what I had said to her. In fact, she was not even thinking about it. She was coolly appraising me, weighing my patience, waiting for the next sure-to-be-easier question. I thought, 'I've been had'. The girl had learned how to make all her previous teachers do the same thing. If I wouldn't

Ruth's behaviour as here described by Holt seems clearly to fit the games model. We have an upshot which is a win for one of the participants, and the win is obtained by the use of a manoeuvre showing a concealed motivation. The role for which the teacher may here be said to have been cast by the pupil can be described as "The Rhetorical Questioner". Such a name is appropriate in so far as the rules to which the teacher appears to be adhering are the following:

1. It is permissible to ask the pupil any relevant question but if the pupil indicates that he does not know the answer then a simpler question may be asked.

2. Having begun to ask the pupil questions because she indicated that the initial problem was too difficult, it is "bad form" to ask a pupil a question to which she cannot readily find an answer. It is bad form, that is, to ask the pupil to go away and think about a question supposedly simpler than the initial problem. It is bad form because such a procedure implies either a lack of patience by the teacher to help the pupil who is in difficulties now, or a want of imagination on the part of the teacher in not being able to conceive helpful questions which the pupil can answer and which lead him gently to an understanding of the initial problem.

It is against a background of these ground rules that the pupil's strategy is devised. The object of the game is to get the teacher to simplify his questions so that you do not have to think to answer them, and at the same time, to have him think approvingly of the efforts you are making to grasp the knotty problem. If this is achieved, the pupil wins. The ground rules to which the pupil must conform if his strategy is to be successful are those "rules" which any pupil must follow if he is to present the appearance of one who does not fully understand a difficult question try as he might.
The pupil, that is, must play the part of "perplexed learner". The fact that this is a part which the pupil only acts is what turns the normally unconscious "presentation of self" into a strategic presentation.

It is, then, by the employment of the games model in this way that, most importantly for our concerns, we may seek to uncover the ground rules by which pupil-teacher interactions are conducted. Of course, by no means all such interactions may be construed in games terms, and where it does not seem that a definite "win" occurs, the possibility of employing other models must be considered.

(ii) The Routine Model

Earlier, in explicating the notion of the routine model I wrote that behaviour which may be described in terms of this model will involve the carrying out of a sequence of actions which are describable in terms of a set of rules, and which have an outcome which is causally related to the following of these rules. I drew attention to a distinction between authentic and simulated routine models, the latter being applicable to behaviour in which the series of actions are not properly performed but merely imitated in some respects. For the purpose of specifying the ground rules of pupil-teacher interaction it is the simulated routine model to which recourse may profitably be made, as I shall now try to demonstrate.

In my experience, there are many classroom behavioural episodes which are susceptible to a simulated routine model analysis which reveals interactional ground rules. This model I have found generally to be applicable whenever the teacher encounters repetitious behaviour of an unthinking kind which serves the purpose, so to speak, of getting the pupil "off the hook", of allowing him to claim that he has done whatever has been demanded of him. Consider, for example, the following description of pupil behaviour drawn from Holt:

1. See above, 187-188.
2. Holt, J., op. cit., 44.
"Here are some notes from the other day, when the fourth graders were playing twenty questions. Many of them are very anxious when their turn comes to ask a question. We ask them to play twenty questions in the hope that, wanting to find the hidden thought, they will learn to ask more informative and useful questions.

They see the game quite differently: 'When my turn comes, I have to ask a question'. They are not in the least interested in the object of the game, or whether their question gains useful information. Their problem is simply to ask a question, any old question. The first danger is that you will just be sitting there, unable to ask a question. The next danger is that when you ask a question, other kids will think it silly, laugh at it, say, 'that's no good'.

So the problem becomes not just thinking up a question, but thinking up a question that will sound good. The best way to do this is listen to kids that you know are pretty sharp, and ask questions that sound like theirs. Thus a child who found in one game that 'Is it water?' was a useful question, went on asking it game after game, even when other questions had established that the information sought had nothing to do with water'.

For our purposes, in construing the behaviour described by Holt in the terms of this model, one would first seek to observe the means by which the authentic routine was reduced to a mere simulation. In place of the formulation of a question by genuine intellectual effort, one sees the mere vocalization of an interrogative which is known prior to its utterance to be
irrelevant. In behaving in this manner, however, a pupil is not acting in such a way as to terminate the interaction between the teacher and the class of pupils in a disorderly way. He is in fact adhering with perfect propriety to the ground rules which are operative at the time. These ground rules include not merely that which calls for a proper recognition that the teacher has a right to ask the pupils questions and those which prescribe the manner in which they may reply without causing "loss of face" to the teacher. In volunteering even an irrelevant answer in a game of twenty questions a pupil may show that he grasps that an honest admission that he cannot think of a good question to ask may, from the point of view of sustaining orderly interaction during a game, even a classroom game with educational pretensions, be a faux pas. When embarking on such a game teachers may not recognize that a fair proportion of pupils are not going to make intelligent contributions, or that if every pupil by an honest expression of his puzzlement is going to signal for assistance in formulating a relevant question, then the game cannot in fact be played. What is required of pupils who cannot think of a question is either a facial expression and gestures which convey the idea that a question is on the tip of the tongue but cannot quite be articulated, or an irrelevant or even foolish question which does at least permit the game to be continued. Such are the ground rules which are operative in this context.

The ground rules, then, which govern the behaviour of Holt's pupils permit them to avail themselves of a way of behaving which is only from an educational view improper. Pupils may be consciously manipulating the teacher in behaving as they do, and their behaviour may be educationally self-defeating, but it does reveal a certain adeptness in maintaining a social encounter, and can for that reason be taken as a sign of successful socialization.

It is, then, by the use of the simulated routine model that we may be enabled to see clearly that behaviour which is apparently counter-productive
is in fact perfectly proper once we have uncovered the ground rules which
govern the situation in which it occurs.

(iii) The Entertainment Model

In setting forth the features of the entertainment model,¹ I implied
that behaviour which may be susceptible to clarification by recourse to this
model differed from that which fits the routine model in that it is not
undertaken for the sake of any outcome. I suggested that the comparison
here might be with behaviour such as humming a tune. Such an activity
does nothing, and is producing neither pleasure nor pain. But it is a
particular tune, so in a sense is a performance which reveals an adherence
to rules.

The entertainment model, in my experience, is likely to be usefully
employed in the description of the behaviour of pupils who feel during certain
lessons that, no matter how hard they try, failure is inevitable, and where
this is recognized by the teacher. Accordingly, they do certain things which
patently they would not do if they believed constructive thinking would be
a success. During certain lessons, such as those that occur at the time of
internal school examinations, or during weekly tests of vocabulary, comprehension
or spelling, teachers find themselves, for practical reasons, compelling their
classes to participate in tasks which they know are beyond the capabilities
of certain pupils. In these circumstances, incompetent pupils often (some
regularly) correctly number their answers, set them out in the approved format,
but simply write answers which are either nonsense or idle guesswork. Consider,
for example, the following which is also drawn from Holt:²

"We did some work the other day on multiplication
tables. The results were, to say the least,
astonishing. The paper was marked in a grid of
10 x 10 squares, that is, 100 squares arranged in
ten rows, and to the left of the left hand column,

1. See above, 188-189.
were written in the numbers 1-10, but in irregular order. Thus every one of the hundred squares in the grid was in a numbered column and a numbered row. If a square was in the row numbered 2 and the column numbered 3, the child was to put in the square the product of 2 x 3, or 6. The square in the row numbered 5 and the column numbered 7 would therefore be filled with the number 35. And so on.

From Marjorie's paper, I got: 4 x 6 equals 22, 4 x 4 equals 20, 4 x 7 equals 32. Then 10 x 10 equals 20, and right beside it, 10 x 2 equals 22. Then, side by side, in the square numbered 8, 8 x 8 equals 64, 8 x 6 equals 59, 8 x 4 equals 40, 8 x 7 equals 56, 8 x 9 equals 42. In the 7 row, 7 x 5 equals 35, 7 x 8 equals 56, 7 x 7 equals 49. Then, side by side, in the square numbered 8, 8 x 8 equals 48, 8 x 6 equals 59, 8 x 4 equals 40, 8 x 7 equals 56, 8 x 9 equals 42. In the 7 row, 7 x 5 equals 35, 7 x 8 equals 56, 7 x 7 equals 49. And so on.

It is apparent, I believe, that such behaviour may be construed in terms of the entertainment model. Clearly, the pupil is adhering to some rules - the table square is being completed in the sense that each square is having a number inserted - and the effort expended is not undertaken for the sake of any educational outcome. The question may now be raised concerning the interactional ground rules which the employment of this model reveals.

The first point to be noted is that in behaving in such a fashion it may not necessarily be assumed that the pupil is misbehaving. If the teacher sets an entire class of pupils the same task, then it may be expected, especially if the class is recognised to be one of mixed ability, that some pupils may not be equal to its successful completion. Accordingly, the teacher may not, with justice, punish all pupils who behave in this manner.

This granted, we are led to entertain the possibility that in engaging in this kind of behaviour the pupil is actually adhering to certain pupil-teacher interactional ground rules. The teacher sets his pupils a task which he knows a handful of pupils cannot in fact complete. How are such pupils to respond if orderly interaction with the teacher is to be maintained?
To protest their inability may be to undermine the authority of the teacher as a person who has been given the power to set children assignments on the basis of his knowledge of how academic progress is to be achieved. If it is impractical to exempt these children from certain work (for there is no space to put them, and silence is required) then, realising this, the children may, as part of what Goffman calls a supportive interchange, dutifully write "silly" answers, and their teacher will mark them "sympathetically".

If this explanation of such pupils' behaviour is accepted, then it may be supposed that among the pupil-teacher interactional ground rules there is a special sub-set which refers to encounters between children who play the role of "less able pupils". These ground rules will refer to the ways in which such pupils may respond in the kind of situation we have just considered.

By the attempt to construe certain apparently pointless pupil behaviour in accordance with the entertainment model, then, we are led to view it not as mere time-wasting but as a controlled performance which clearly must fulfil some function. That function would seem to be related to the ground rules by which pupils and teachers conduct their encounters, and seems to reveal that special ground rules may govern interactions between teachers and pupils who are recognised to be "less able". Further support for such a view emerges when situations are examined whose structure would appear to be illumined by the application of the liturgical model.

(iv) The Liturgical Model

In discussing the liturgical model I implied that there are two features of a behavioural episode which suggest that it may be construed in liturgical terms. These are: that the sequence of actions performed constitute in themselves the performance of an act, in the way, for example, a series of actions constitutes a Mass or a Thanksgiving; and that the behaviour can be
related to some entity which has claims to "sanctity" or inviolability, such as a person's "face".

So understood, the liturgical model has, I believe, a quite definite application to classroom behaviour, especially to the behaviour of pupils who have fallen considerably behind their classmates in basic skills, such as reading or those required in the basic operations of arithmetic; in short, in those skills which are socially necessary if periodic embarrassment is to be avoided. The explanation of the low attainment of such pupils is often partly causal in nature, but for reasons concerned with preserving "face", before their peers, that is, to cover up the extent of their lack of accomplishment, they behave in ways which make progress even less likely. Such reluctant learners are not, that is, seeking to avoid work and a commitment to making progress out of an indifference or dislike of the tasks. Fear of public shame is what moves them, as will become apparent when I have given an example, drawn from my own experience, of the sort of behaviour which I believe is susceptible to explanatory description in terms of the liturgical model. This example is of behaviour in a small remedial group, where pupils, of Secondary school age, were taught to read.

In teaching one group of such pupils, I often had occasion to ask Melanie, a fourteen year old with a reading age of seven years, to read aloud to me, the other pupils being engaged in their tasks. Generally she would slap the book down on my desk with a truculent air, and this I came to recognize as a clear signal that she was feeling impelled to protect her self-esteem, and prepared to be aggressive so as to provoke me into dealing with her as a "discipline problem" should demands be made of her which would result in her public humiliation at not being able to read. The other pupils were marginally more capable than her, and like so many adolescents, were not slow to make their scorn apparent. The situation did not usually degenerate so far that I had to treat Melanie as a "delinquent" pupil, however, for I came
to be aware of the origin of her demeanour, even if I was helpless to prevent it.

Our dialogue usually began with a protestation by Melanie:

"This book is too easy".

"Then you'll not be making any mistakes, I take it", I would reply.

Melanie was never able to think of a good rejoinder to this, especially as I remained good humoured. She would then begin to read. After a sentence or two her mouth would begin to dry, and her tongue would keep flicking at the corners of her mouth. Soon she would reach a word which she could neither guess nor slur over, and at this point her attention would swing backwards and forwards between the words on the page, the dryness of her mouth and the tightness of her throat, and the reactions of her classmates at whom she would dart glances through narrowed eyes. After a time I usually broke the growing silence by telling her the word, thereby dissipating the tension over whether Melanie would say something foolish but entertaining to the other pupils who were increasingly aware of their role as audience. Quite soon, of course, some more words would be reached which were perplexing. Here again I would be faced with a difficult problem. If I pressed strategy on Melanie, told her to break down a word, remind her of some exercises on consonantal blending the group had all been through, she would feel I was shaming her publicly - how babyish she would think, I have to say aloud "re-mem-ber-ed". Whenever I tried this, either she stayed silent and waited for me to tell her the word, or she would revert to protestations that the book was babyish or boring. Under these circumstances there was little I could do when a difficult word was reached except to tell her what it was in as unobtrusive a way as possible. This was counter-productive, and I can only justify it to myself by thinking that it was unavoidable, and that some good was being achieved by having Melanie read aloud, even if certain words were omitted, both from the point of view of her progress in reading, and in overcoming her fear of ridicule before her peers. After several promptings and a couple
of pages having, after a fashion, been read, I would make suitably encouraging remarks and Melanie would return to other work.

Such encounters with Melanie would appear to be susceptible to a liturgical model analysis. Given the initial situation of Melanie having to read to me, than what follows could have been forecast much as a liturgy might be used to predict what is about to happen at some kind of formal service. What we invariably had were truculent remarks swayed by good-humoured ones, then several short readings from a book, punctuated by single word utterances by the teacher, finishing with compliments for the pupil. The occasions on which Melanie read to me could in fact be regarded as a kind of contrived demonstration before her peers of her ability to cope in this testing situation without appearing ridiculous. Such episodes could be regarded as a kind of ceremony which could be called a "Preservation of Face", on analogy perhaps with a Benediction. It is evident, then, that certain pupil behaviour may be construed in terms of the liturgical model. The question may now be raised concerning the interactional rules which the employment of this model reveals.

If we act on the supposition that the behaviour of pupils like Melanie is in perfect conformity with some kind of ground rules, for the encounters do at least proceed and terminate in orderly fashion, then we are led to consider two possibilities: either there is a special set of ground rules which are operative whenever interactions occur between the teacher and a type of pupil, who may be called, rather cumbersomely, "the less able pupil who is embarrassed by her inadequacy"; or, alternatively, pupils like Melanie, in the kind of situation I have described, are no longer being treated as children in their role of pupils, but as individuals. The latter interpretation, may, I think, be rejected since instruction is in fact taking place and the pupil's embarrassment is over her inadequacy as a pupil. It has, then, to be accepted that such ground rules from time to time do govern pupil-teacher interactions.
If there is such a role as that of less able pupil who is embarrassed by her inadequacy, then, of course, it would be open to more able pupils, for whatever reasons, to present themselves in such a way as to be included within the category. They would simply observe the kind of "moves" less able pupils make, and the supportive interchanges with which the teacher responds, and adjust their behaviour accordingly. If this is feasible, then it is also possible to view the behaviour of pupils like Melanie as, in a sense, contrived performances. One would start from the view that in order to become recognized as a pupil belonging to a certain category one would have to behave in the appropriate manner. One would then view the actions performed by a pupil like Melanie as signs designed to be interpreted in the way she intends. The manipulation analogy of the ethogenic research approach encourages this kind of "reading" of behaviour, and it would seem that by such a procedure the particular ground rules operative at any one time which belong to this subset are very likely to be made evident.

(v) The Passing Model

In discussing the passing model,¹ I wrote that certain behaviour which might at first sight appear susceptible to a games analysis fails, on closer inspection, to satisfy relevant criteria. Whilst in the behaviour we are to consider there is an element of deliberate deception, it does not lead to a definite "win" or "pay-off". Instead, "success" in managing a situation consists in sustaining by fraudulent means, a desired image.

Garfinkel² calls the occasions on which an imposter has to pass crucial tests, "passing occasions". For our purposes these are occasions in which a pupil's pose as a competent or industrious pupil is under scrutiny. On such occasions the pupil may see his task as one of remaining inconspicuous. Passing occasions, then, for our purposes, will be occasions on which a pupil has to conceal from his teacher, for example, his lack of industry or incompetence. It is important to realise the motivation at work here. We are

1. See above, 190-191.
2. See Garfinkel, H., op. cit., 140.
dealing with pupils whose strategies are designed to secure anonymity, not kudos. These are pupils who may be frightened or ashamed of their inability to cope, or they may simply wish to avoid the additional work which would be demanded of them if their teachers became appraised of their weaknesses.

In order to escape detection during passing occasions, impressions have to be managed. Goffman has introduced the term "management device" to refer to those means by which people control and manipulate the impressions their behaviour conveys. I shall write, however, of "passing devices" and mean by that term, "management devices used by pupils to pass as pupils of average industry or competence."

There occur, I believe, many classroom behavioural episodes which are susceptible to analysis in the terms of the passing model. The prevalence of the use of passing devices will be readily acknowledged once it is realised that among passing devices perhaps the best known is that of cheating. Cheating may, of course, if the manoeuvre leads to kudos for the pupil, and if this is the pupil's intention, amount to a game. In my experience, however, in most cases cheating is most plausibly seen as a passing device. This is so since cheating is usually resorted to when the pupil has failed, for various reasons, to complete set work, and feels impelled to cover his omission and appear to have done what most of the others have done. To attain this end of inconspicuousness (and to avoid discovery) cheating pupils often hand in work which they know not to be completely correct.

Cheating may be seen to be merely one kind of passing device which arises from a recognition by a passing pupil that he is likely to encounter what Garfinkel calls "passing occasions", and that by taking appropriate steps beforehand these may either be successfully negotiated or reduced to less hazardous affairs in the sense that searching questions are unlikely to be asked. Hargreaves has given several examples of the kind of passing device I shall call "normalising appearances", of which cheating is just one.

variety, and which are designed to overcome foreseen dangers of discovery.

The following is such an example:\(^1\)

"In one school I know the pupils would write the date in pencil in their mathematics exercise books. If the teacher did not mark the work in that particular lesson, then on the next occasion the pupil would rub out the old date, substitute the new one and spend the rest of the lesson on matters more important than mathematics, secure in the certainty that if called to account by the teacher he would produce incontrovertible evidence of having worked that day".

Another kind of passing device which is commonly used by pupils involves getting what Garfinkel\(^2\) calls "the environment" to furnish them with the answers to its own questions. Garfinkel calls this practice, "anticipatory following". Sometimes the teacher will be unable to decide whether the pupil is answering his questions, or whether he has guessed from the teacher's questions or from subtle clues both prior to and after these questions what answers are correct or will do.

Although it is by no means uncommon for individual pupils to employ such passing devices, their employment by several pupils simultaneously is also not rare. An example from Holt will illustrate this:\(^3\)

"Second graders who had supposedly been taught phonics by the Gillingham method, were asked by their teacher, 'What letter does Potomac begin with?' There was a chorus of guesses - P,T,V, and many others - with the children all trying to get clues from each other and from the teacher. A few children really knew, and their conviction, as

well as their reputation for usually being right in such matters, won over the others, so that after a while they were all saying P. And the teacher looked pleased and satisfied!

Later, pointing to a map on the wall, she asked, 'Which way would you go if you flew East?' Arms waved in all directions, again settling down as everyone got his cue from the successful students and the teacher's encouraging expressions.

Pupils have recourse to passing devices in order to remain inconspicuous; they wish to appear as one of the majority. Accordingly, the most characteristic passing device may be called "following the leader", and would involve merely a straightforward copying of what the majority of pupils were actually doing. The well-known device of pupils raising their hands when a sufficient number have already raised their hands to make it unlikely that they will be asked is, perhaps, the most common example of this device. The other side of the coin, admitting ignorance when, and only when, a large enough number of pupils have done so is also by no means unknown.

It is, in fact, the very prevalence of the use of passing devices which we may take as a starting point in our enquiries concerning the manner in which the construal of behaviour in terms of the passing model may reveal something of pupil-teacher interactional ground rules. It will, I believe, be readily conceded that teachers are not unaware of the quite widespread use of passing devices by pupils. This granted, the question may be raised as to whether, in general, teachers may be seen to accept or even to connive at it. To speculate on this matter is not necessarily to attribute other than worthy intentions to teachers, for it is certainly the case that under normal classroom conditions no teacher is able at all times to arrange matters so that every aspect of his lessons is pitched at an instructional level appropriate to every pupil. It would seem that the teacher has to accept that he will perforce ask questions and set tasks which not all pupils are able or willing
to answer or complete, though all may, for one reason or another, wish to appear competent and industrious. If this is in fact the case, then, it may be expected that established pupil-teacher interactional ground rules will take account of this fact.

If we enquire just what it is that is being acknowledged, it would appear to be as follows. Classroom interaction is, in its most characteristic form, of the type in which one participant, the teacher, is empowered to ask others to do certain things, including answering questions and undertaking written assignments. In these circumstances, the other participants must, if orderly interaction is to be maintained, make positive moves which show recognition of their teacher's authority as a person who may require them to do certain things. This they may do by making either a response which may be genuine or a pretence. So far as the maintenance of orderly interaction is the issue, either may prove efficacious. Equally, it is to be noted, either may prove ineffective; the pretence may be unmasked or the genuine response be so inadequate that a remedial exchange, in the form of an apology, may be necessary.

We are now in a position to suggest the manner in which the application of the passing model may serve to reveal interactional ground rules. In circumstances where the use of this model appears to account for the behaviour of pupils, whether the behaviour takes the form of the kind of cheating I have described, or anticipatory following, or imitating what the majority of pupils are doing, then it would appear that, in interacting with his class, it is required not only that any one pupil should respond to the teacher's questions and assignments, but that a certain proportion of the class do so. It is not enough for the teacher that one pupil should be able to respond in a manner supportive of orderly interaction, for if only one out of a class of thirty pupils did so, it would suggest that the teacher had not posed a suitable question or set a proper assignment. If, then, we view passing devices not as a means by which individual pupils avoid making honest
endeavours, but as an attempt on the part of the class as a corporate body to provide the kind of response which will be supportive of orderly interaction, we may be led to the revelation of the kind of "corporate" interactional ground rules to which I have referred.

In general, the applicability of the ethogenic models to the problem of discovering pupil-teacher interactional ground rules may be argued in the following way. The "raw data" which the research worker has to analyse are the encounters between teachers and pupils. It is claimed that the structure of these encounters may be revealed by construing what occurs in the terms of the various models. This is the first task to be accomplished. Here it must be conceded that the research worker has no means of knowing that all the encounters he may witness will be susceptible to analysis in terms of the structure of any particular model I have considered. However, it would appear that the most likely structural possibilities are covered. These possibilities include situations in which the following may occur:

(i) the pupil follows the teacher's instructions, which are designed to bring about an improvement in the pupil's knowledge or skills (routine model).

(ii) the pupil merely pretends to be following the teacher's requests (simulation routine model).

(iii) the pupil persuades the teacher to do what the pupil wants despite the teacher's prior requirement that a certain task be completed (games model).

(iv) the pupil makes an apparently quite unacceptable response to the teacher's request, though interaction continues to proceed smoothly (entertainment model).

(v) the pupil engages the teacher in a kind of dialogue which revolves not around the teacher's original request, but around the problem of avoiding an unacceptable loss of "face" by the pupil before the other children (liturgical model).
(vi) at least one pupil responds to the teacher's request in a way which allows the teacher to proceed as if everything were normal (passing model). The possibility of other interactional structures may exist, but they will surely be uncommon, and we may, I think, take it that the encounters a research worker observes are likely analysable in the terms of one or other of the models.

Understood in the literal semantic terms of the messages passed, these encounters may on many occasions seem to reveal subterfuges on the part of the pupils, and, in some cases, collusion by the teachers. These are not matters, however, which are of final interest here. In so far as observed encounters proceed in orderly fashion, it would appear that interactional ground rules are not being transgressed. This being the case, we may view each request or question by the teacher and their responses by the pupils as permissible during encounters between pupils and teachers, and the research worker may enquire wherein the propriety of the behaviour resides. Such an enquiry may require a certain interpretative skill, but in the discovery of interactional ground rules operative within any group there will surely never be devised a means whereby such ground rules may be "read off" in any "automatic" way.

It would appear from the foregoing that it is not implausible to suggest that by the use of the ethogenic methodology some genuine insights may be afforded into the ground rules by which interactions between pupils and teachers are conducted. If so, then not only have we proceeded some way towards demonstrating the applicability of the ethogenic methodology, we have also provided in some degree a validation of the employment of the metaphysical paradigms of this research approach.

3 (b) Adequacy

It is one thing, however, to argue that this methodology is applicable to the empirical investigation of school role socialization; it is quite another to establish that it is adequate for such an investigation. I propose,
in fact, to concede that it is inadequate in the sense that if one seeks to answer the question concerning precisely how one would set about conducting an empirical investigation of school role socialization, then it is clear that one's concerns are not going to be restricted to the elucidation of the interactional ground rules which successfully socialized pupils master. To be an acceptable member of a school community the pupil must learn to act in a variety of ways, that is, he must learn to adhere to a variety of rules, and these rules are not restricted to those concerning pupil-teacher interactions. Earlier, I wrote of subject procedural rules, discipline rules and the various directives whose status is ambiguous, and it will surely be conceded that to be an acceptable member of a school, a pupil must also learn to adhere to these to some degree. It would appear, then, that a first task in the empirical investigation of school role socialization will be to produce a conceptual scheme by which the many rules to which such a pupil must learn to adhere may be specified. This task may be facilitated by the employment of a taxonomy devised by Hargreaves and his associates, which I shall now set forth.

(i) The Specification of School Rules

Hargreaves has noted that any research worker seeking to specify the behavioural rules of a school immediately faces the difficulty that the rules are not, for the most part, written down in a codified form. A few rules, such as "Pupils must not drop litter in the school", are sometimes written down in a formal way, and a list of such rules may be posted on the notice board of each classroom. Some rules may also be affirmed by the head-teacher during assembly times. But these lists of rules are very brief and evidently contain only a minute portion of the rules governing the conduct of pupils. In these circumstances, one might, as a first step, enquire further of the teachers and pupils. Another step one might take is to observe the conduct of teachers and pupils, try to infer the rules which were in operation

and then report these back to the teachers and pupils to confirm whether they were in fact rules governing behaviour in the school. Hargreaves and his associates did in fact adopt both these procedures and embarked on a period of observation in order to uncover the rules in operation in the schools they studied. In this, Hargreaves notes, they were like Schutz's stranger, who, not being a member of the group, had to place in question nearly everything that seemed unquestionable to the members of the group he joined.

Their observations led them to make several classifications among school rules, and these, I suggest, might be used in the empirical investigation of school role socialization as a kind of checklist to which an investigator might have recourse in his attempt to specify the rules to which pupils must learn to adhere.

The first classification is of the "subject" of school rules. Hargreaves sub-divides the subjects of school rules according to their "themes", and he distinguishes five separate themes:

1. the talking theme - this includes the many rules concerning when talking is permitted, and the manner in which conversations may be conducted.
2. the movement theme - the many rules about standing and sitting, entering and leaving a room, and moving about the classroom are included here.
3. the time theme - here are included the rules about arriving on time, about wasting time, and about the time taken by pupils to complete tasks assigned to them.
4. the teacher-pupil relationship theme - here are included the rules about the ways in which pupils are expected to treat teachers. The rules in this, and in the final theme, clearly would include interactional ground rules.

(5) the pupil-pupil relationship theme - here are included the rules governing how pupils are to behave towards one another. Prominent here are those concerned with fighting, name-calling and the various forms of interfering with another pupil and his work.

There are many rules included in each of these themes. To illustrate this, Hargreaves examines the talking theme in some depth. Talking within the classroom may be either between pupils or between teachers and pupils. In dealing with the former he notes the following rules:

(a) all talking by pupils is forbidden: for example, during Assembly, when teacher is addressing the class, and during tests. All these rules can be broken in situations which constitute "emergencies". Talking can be legitimated before its occurrence by seeking the teacher's permission - ("Can I ask him for his rubber?")

(b) some talk is legitimate: for example, during group work. On such occasions, talking by pupils must meet the criteria governing volume and amount, and must be task-related.

(c) almost all talking is legitimate: for example, in the playground. But certain content is proscribed, such as swearing.

In dealing with conversation between pupils and teachers, Hargreaves lists the following rules affecting speech initiated by pupils and directed at the teacher:

(a) Do not talk while the teacher is addressing the class.

(b) Do not talk whilst the teacher is addressing another pupil, or whilst another pupil is talking to the teacher.

(c) Do not talk without permission - raise hand for permission.

Some rules Hargreaves noted affecting pupils' responses after being addressed by the teacher included:

(a) all questions must be answered.

(b) all questions must be treated as serious or as intended. No flippant answers.

(c) answers must be couched in the "right" style.
It is obvious that these rules presuppose many other rules. For instance, the rule about volume in conversations between pupils indicates that teachers have some rule by which talk can be counted as "too loud". In fact, the examination of school rules in terms of the five themes led Hargreaves to several conclusions. Firstly, it became clear that the themes overlapped heavily. Hargreaves came to think that it was impossible to say much about talking rules without mentioning teacher-pupil relationship rules, for instance. Secondly, it made Hargreaves realise the vastness and complexity of the task of explicating classroom rules. One ideal would be to provide some kind of handbook of rules, a knowledge of which would enable a complete stranger to "pass" as a pupil in the classroom. By that criterion, the list Hargreaves provides is very inadequate. Thirdly, it alerted Hargreaves to the fact that the rules changed as the work being undertaken by the pupils changed. It is clear that there are different speech rules in operation when the teacher is addressing the class than when the class is doing a test or carrying out group work.

This feature of the rule-system of schools, that rules change according to context, leads us to another of Hargreaves' classifications. This time the grouping is in terms of the domain of a rule's application. Hargreaves notes that some rules apply to the pupil's conduct in all parts of the school and at all times. Hargreaves calls such rules, "institutional rules". Examples would be the rule which stated that pupils must be punctual and the property rule which states that pupils should treat school property with respect. There are also other "quasi-institutional" rules which apply to most places in school but not quite all. An example would be the rule about clothing and appearance, where special forms of this rule apply in the gymnasium and on the playing field.

In distinction to such rules Hargreaves found that each situation or setting within the school carried its own more specific set of rules.

1. For an example of an attempt to construct such a set of guidelines in a different context, see Scott, M.B., *The Racing Game*, New York, 1968.
These he calls "situational rules". Thus there are rules which are specific to Assembly, to the dining room, to corridors, to the playground, to the classroom. An example would be the corridor rules which proscribe running and prescribe walking on the left.

Having distinguished institutional from situational rules, Hargreaves next finds it useful to combine these two types of rule as rules which do not emanate from any one teacher, "general rules", and to contrast them with "personal rules", which are rules operative only when pupils have dealings with a particular teacher.

Hargreaves notes that both institutional and situational rules may be difficult to specify since different teachers vary in their desire and ability to enforce such rules, and where such force is lacking it is difficult to insist that any rule is really operative. Vacillation and weakness among teachers also blurs the distinction between institutional and situational rules on the one hand, and personal rules on the other, though Hargreaves' work suggests that pupils are sensible of all three types of rule though disagreement about the status of any one rule may be in doubt.

This exhausts the classification of rules Hargreaves offers, but he does indicate some further complexities of the school rule system which are relevant to our present concerns. In particular he has further remarks to make concerning situational rules where the sphere in which the rules operate is the classroom.

Hargreaves begins by noting that there are five principal phases which are common virtually to all lessons. These phases are: the "entry" phase, the "settling down" or preparation phase, the "lesson proper" phase, the "clearing up" phase and the "exit" phase. The first two phases tend to fuse into one another, and Hargreaves' observation suggests great variations

2. ibid., 35.
3. ibid., 67.
between teachers in the rules that govern these phases. There are also variations in the rules which govern the behaviour of pupils in accordance with their age.

Once the pupils are paying attention, the lesson proper can commence. For the most part it is more adequate to conceive of the lesson proper not as a single phase but as a sequence of sub-phases, each of which is concerned with one dominant task. There is considerable variation between lessons in the number of sub-phases as well as the order in which they occur. Hargreaves tries to simplify this complexity by referring to just three types of sub-phase.

The first type of sub-phase is one in which the teacher is highly active, usually in the form of talking, whilst the pupils are relatively passive. He is working out examples on the blackboard; giving a verbal exposition or explanation; demonstrating (especially in science, handicraft and domestic science); reading to the class. In all these sub-phases, the dominant rule in play is the pay attention rule, i.e., the pupils must sit quietly, watching and listening to the teacher. Any pupil activity which conflicts with conformity to the rule is frowned upon, especially talk, movement and auto-involvement.¹

In the second type of sub-phase in the lesson proper, it is the pupils who take the active role and the teacher no longer plays such a dominant verbal part in activities. Typically, pupils are assigned a task which does not involve directing their attention to the teacher. Common examples are: writing an essay, solving written problems, doing practical work, doing project work. The dominant rule in this type of sub-phase is that the pupil should involve himself in the set task and carry it out according to the teacher's instructions. In contrast to the first type of sub-phase a certain amount and kind of talk between pupils is permitted provided it does not involve shouting and is for the most part task-related. On certain occasions movement may also be permitted.

The third type of sub-phase in the lesson proper is a mixture of the other two types. Both teacher and pupils are actively involved in the task. Examples are question and answer sessions, discussions and tests (where the teacher poses the questions orally). Question-and-answer sessions are more common than discussions, but the two have similar rules. The main rules of the question-and-answer sessions are:

1. On the whole it is the teacher who asks the questions and the pupils contribute the answers.
2. Pupils should be willing to volunteer answers.
3. That a pupil is willing to volunteer an answer should normally be signalled to the teacher by hand-raising.
4. Pupils must answer when called upon to do so, and normally should not "shout out" an answer on their own initiative.

Hargreaves suggests that every phase or sub-phase brings into play a distinctive combination of rules. Pupils know which rules are in play because they know which phase they are in - though they would describe a phase in terms of the activity of that phase. Phases - and their rules - are changed by "switch-signals", which are usually verbal statements made by the teacher. All this constitutes part of teachers' and pupils' common-sense knowledge of classrooms, and it is on this basis that members can make sense of rule-breaking imputations which invoke unstated rules which are known to be in play at random points of time during the lesson.

Finally, Hargreaves offers further illumination of teacher-pupil and pupil-pupil relational rules. The notion of relational rules is one which has general application, and indeed both Goffman and Denzin have employed this notion in analysing interactional behaviour in general. Hargreaves, in concentrating on relations in schools, naturally ignores many of

the relational rules discussed by these writers though undoubtedly they
do operate in classrooms as they do elsewhere.

Hargreaves lists several teacher-pupil relational rules, including
the following three:

1. The Rule of Obedience. Pupils are expected to do as the teacher tells
   them, and they are expected to do so without arguing, without "answering
   back", and without undue delay.

2. The Rules of Good Manners. Pupils are expected to display good manners
towards the teachers. This is a comprehensive set of rules, with inevitable
variations between teachers. At the simplest level it is concerned with saying
"please" and "thank you" at appropriate times. It covers modes of address -
especially the use of "sir" and "miss". Of particular interest is the concept
of "cheek" or insolence, which are school forms of the more general social
rule against being "rude".

3. The Rule of Permission-seeking. Pupils are not expected to initiate certain
acts without seeking prior permission from the teacher. This is one of the
most complex of the relational rules, since a pupil has to learn whether
or not an action is within his discretion at a particular time. Leaving
the room almost always requires explicit permission, whereas leaving one's
chair may vary both by teacher, and also by lesson phase. For example, no
permission seeking may be expected during group work phases, but is normally
required during a teacher-demonstration phase.

Among pupil-pupil relational rules Hargreaves lists the following:

1. The Rule Proscribing Aggression. This includes not only physical
   violence, but also threatening behaviour for manipulative purposes, "psychological
   aggression", such as making fun of other pupils, name-calling and so forth.

2. The Rules of Good Manners. The rule prescribes behaving in a "civilized
   manner", and "showing respect for others", and proscribes the use of "rude"
   words, swearing and not acting in a ladylike manner.

3. The Rule Proscribing "Telling Tales". Pupils should not attempt to get
other pupils into trouble with the teacher by reporting their minor mis-
demeanours. From the point of view of teachers, to break this rule is to show disloyalty to fellow pupils.

A final reflection which may be made on the subject of school rules and Hargreaves' classification of them is that it is apparent that not only is there some overlapping between the categories, but that all violations of school rules turn out when discovered to be also violations of teacher-pupil relationship rules, since all pupils are answerable to teachers for what they do. It is a relational rule that pupils should do what teachers require, and among their requirements is that all school rules should be kept.

Such, then, is the conceptual scheme by which a degree of order may be brought to the investigation of the many behavioural rules to which pupils must learn to adhere. In order now to begin to establish the adequacy of the methodology I am advocating - a methodology which not only includes that of the ethogenic research approach by which pupil-teacher interactional rules may be elucidated, and the conceptual scheme by which school rules may be ordered and researched, but also gives recognition to the need to specify subject procedural rules which pupils must to some minimum degree master if they are to be recognised as acceptable members of the school community - I propose now to outline the procedure by which the empirical investigation of school rule socialization may be conducted.

(ii) The Empirical Investigation of School Role Socialization

In the investigation of the socialization processes operated by a particular school one might begin with an attempt to specify the behavioural rules operative within the school, since it is surely the case that without some knowledge and understanding of these rules any attempt to comprehend pupil-teacher interactional rules would surely founder. In the specification of these rules the taxonomy devised by Hargreaves and his associates might be employed, and the means by which the particular rules were uncovered based on those employed by Hargreaves and devised by Schutz. As a kind of appendix to this specification of school rules one would also describe the typical "punishments" or impositions which were likely to follow their infringement, for
in this way an understanding might be gained of the means whereby the importance of learning to adhere to these rules was impressed upon the pupils. Such "punishments" would range from the loss of the teacher's esteem, to the setting of extra work or even corporal punishment and temporary suspension from school.

In this attempt to elucidate the requirements of children who are to be regarded as acceptable members of the school community, special importance should be attached to the elucidation of rules which are, in Hargreaves' terminology, both "relational" and "personal", for it is by the pupil's knowledge of and conformity to these rules that the successful management of interactions may in large measure depend. It is important to realise that such rules are common, and indeed it could be argued that their presence is inevitable, for members of groups not only find themselves playing roles, they also, in accepting these roles, perforce complete the required actions in a manner expressive of their personalities. When performing actions people display a certain style, they qualify their actions by the manner in which they carry them out. For example, it may be a school rule that under certain circumstances the failure to complete homework is excusable, and these circumstances may include the work proving "too difficult". But whether a particular homework is or is not "too difficult" is not always easy for a teacher to determine, and consequently there is room for divergencies of opinion. Some teachers will be more charitable towards pupils on this matter than others, and will acquire the reputation for being this way, or simply be thought to be that kind of teacher. In mastering symbolic interaction with his teacher, therefore, the pupil has to learn to interact not with an abstract symbol of

1. See above, 229.
2. See above, 232.
authority but with an adult, who, by his interactions with pupils, negotiates an identity which is an idiosyncratic version of the role of teacher.

The importance of personal relational rules is not brought out by Hargreaves who, explicitly at least, is not concerned with the process I have called "school role socialization". The examples he gives of such rules are of such a general nature that they would serve poorly as guidelines to a pupil endeavouring to conduct orderly interactions with his teacher. Nevertheless, I believe Hargreaves would intend that pupil-teacher interactional ground rules be included within the category of personal relational rules. One of the reasons why the illustrations he provides (the rules of "obedience", "good manners", and "permission-seeking") are of such generality is, perhaps, that the methodological procedures he has borrowed from Schutz do not encourage the kind of examination of situations which alone may reveal specific interactional ground rules. This point may be supported, and the need for the ethogenic methodology revealed once more, by elaboration of examples of the following kind.

Consider the case of a pupil who has infringed, for example, the rule which requires that homework be handed in during the lesson following that in which it was set, and wishes to avoid the consequences of his inaction. The first option open to such a pupil is to wait until the teacher asks the class to hand in their work in the hope that a fair number of pupils also have not done their homework - perhaps it was too difficult or the instructions were unclear. In that case the pupil may simply "pass" as one of a number of well-intentioned but perplexed pupils. The pupil has, of course, to decide whether this ploy is workable. The teacher may not be one of the kind who is impressed by the size of the number of pupils who have not done their homework, and he may simply make them all stay behind after the lesson, insisting that the work was not too difficult or whatever.
Let us now suppose that our erring pupil discovers that everyone else has done their homework and he now finds himself being asked why he has not. A possible answer he may give would contrast the procedure adopted by Hargreaves and the methodology of the ethogenist. The pupil might, with apparent simplicity, say: "I'm sorry, sir, I forgot to do it". The ethogenist, working as he does with the metaphysical paradigm I have called the "manipulation assumption" would treat such a remark as a stratagem, which, in this case, it happens to be. We are to suppose, then, that the pupil decides on the bold stratagem of declaring to a teacher who, we may say, is known to be fair-minded, that he simply forgot to do it. He does this with a wide-eyed, honest expression and every indication of consternation and regret. Such a ploy might not enable the pupil to avoid completing the homework the next night, but it might get him out of being set extra work. The reason why this stratagem might work (the pupil would have had to "gauge his man" correctly) is that it invokes a ground rule for the interaction of pupils and teachers which the teacher cannot easily ignore. The teacher, it must be realised, listens to the pupil's explanation in the presence of other pupils, and it is clear that how he reacts will help to forge his identity as a teacher, in the eyes of these pupils at least. If he wishes to seem reasonable, then he must indicate to the pupils that he realises that anyone might forget on one or two occasions, and it would be harsh to set the pupil extra work. It would also encourage dishonesty by the invention of excuses if he were seen to punish an apparently honest admission of a failure to keep to the school rules regarding homework. The pupil's excuse and apology thus bring into a play a ground rule for the smooth interacting of pupils and teachers, viz., the teacher must not abuse his powerful position, but must appear reasonable at all times.

In the specification of this ground rule the employment of the ethogenic methodology is by no means made otiose by the procedures employed by Hargreaves. Using the procedure adopted by the latter one may well have reached the conclusion that during the pupil-teacher interaction under discussion the only
ground rules operative were perhaps those of good manners and obedience, and it might well be that Hargreaves would never progress beyond such generalities no matter what the circumstances were.

In the empirical investigation of school role socialization the procedure I have so far advocated includes an attempt to specify both school behavioural rules and the ground rules by which pupil-teacher interactions are conducted. It is evident that at no point in such an undertaking could one be confident of having exhaustively completed the task. Whether this is of any great importance will, of course, depend on the precise nature of the concerns of the investigator. The concerns of this thesis are primarily with understanding the part played by schools in the process by which children are led to become acceptable members of our society. I shall argue in the final chapter that no attempt at a complete specification of the rules I have mentioned is required, and I shall indicate also the limits beyond which such an investigation need not proceed.

Having conducted research into the school's behavioural rules and the ground rules governing interaction both between pupils and between pupils and teachers, there remains the topic of subject procedural rules. The necessity for the elucidation of such rules arises only, I believe, for research workers whose interests do not embrace school socialization, but are confined rather to school role socialization. It is evident that no ordinary school is obliged to accept all children who by age and address are eligible for membership of the school, and will seek to arrange the removal of any child who because of poor intellectual ability is unable to follow the school's courses. Now, in order to give a complete account of school role socialization it is evident that attention must be paid to all those requirements made by schools the failure to meet which result in a child being regarded as unacceptable as a member of the school community. This being the case, it is evident that in order to give a complete and detailed account of the criteria employed by schools to determine whether or not a pupil is acceptable as a member of the school, an investigation to establish which procedural rules
of which subjects must be mastered if school membership is to continue must be undertaken.

Having acknowledged this, it would appear to be the case that where one's interest is in school socialization the scope of one's investigation of school role socialization need not embrace the investigation of subject procedural rules, for it is evident that should a child fail to meet the cognitive demands imposed by ordinary schools and have to be sent to a Special school, then the contribution of the experience of ordinary schools to the process by which the child is led to become an acceptable member of society is negligible.

On the other hand, in the case of pupils who do meet the cognitive demands made by schools there is little need to enquire into the subject procedural rules to which they successfully adhere in so far as it is unlikely that the mastery of these rules contributes to the mastery of the knowledge and skills required to conduct social intercourse in groups outside of school which the child may join after leaving school.

I conclude, then, that although the expanded ethogenic methodology I am advocating may provide no means of investigating subject procedural rules, this, for the theorist interested in school socialization, is of no great importance.

In advancing this view I do not, of course, wish to deny that the curriculum subject knowledge children acquire at school may not form part of that ill-defined body of knowledge which comprises the "commonsense knowledge" to which participants in any social encounter may allude. However, in so far as social encounters may be conducted in an orderly fashion despite the ignorance of one of its participants concerning any item of information which may reasonably be supposed could only be acquired at school, I do not believe it is necessary for the theorist who adopts an ethogenic approach to school socialization to produce a methodology by which investigations may be conducted into the curriculum subject knowledge imparted to pupils during their school careers.
A similar manner of irrelevance attaches to a body of knowledge acquired by pupils which is quite different from the information which is comprised by the subjects studied in schools. This knowledge is similar in nature to that to which Berger and Luckmann refer in discussing the knowledge possessed by individuals who are acceptable members of a cavalry regiment. Such people not only have a knowledge of what might be termed their "subject" - the arcana of horse warfare, the mechanics of drilling and dress and so forth - they also know the argot of cavalrmen and have the kind of intimate knowledge of their outlook such that tacit understandings may be relied upon, and elliptical utterances comprehended. In becoming a successfully socialized pupil, a child acquires knowledge of this kind, and such knowledge may, in so far as it facilitates and is constitutive of camaraderie, not be frowned upon by school authorities. From the point of view of the maintenance of efficiency and stability, however, which alone gives the school's socialization processes their raison d'etre, knowledge of this kind may be regarded as an irrelevance. If this is the case, then the theorist who adopts the ethogenic approach to socialization need not be unduly concerned if the methodology at his disposal is not designed to elucidate this particular body of knowledge.

In this section I have been concerned to defend the adequacy of the methodology of the ethogenic research approach to socialization as it may be applied to the study of school role socialization. The issue of adequacy is not such that one could ever regard it as a settled one, though I believe that I have in this section raised all but one of the central considerations. The topic which remains to be considered concerns whether the conceptualisations of socialization and its allied concepts advanced in the ethogenic research approach are, in a sense to be clarified, really "appropriate" to the study of school role socialization. It is to this topic that I now turn in the next section.

4. The Relevance of this Research Approach to School Role Socialization

I turn now to the question of whether the interpretations I have made of the notion of socialization and its allied concepts are congruent with those which may be seen to be actually operative within schools. This question may, I believe, be approached most readily by enquiring whether the interpretation of the concept of deviancy I have outlined may be seen to be in essence that which is employed in schools. If it can be shown that this is indeed the case, then, since my characterization of those who are not successfully socialized will have been shown not to be at variance with existing practice in schools, it may be granted that my interpretation of the aim of school role socialization, and of the other allied concepts, must also be congruent with those of the school authorities. I shall, then, in the next sections, seek to establish the applicability of the ability criterion of deviancy which I outlined earlier.

4 (a) Theoretical Criteria of Deviancy

I shall begin by locating my views in the context of current theoretical disputes, for it is in this way that the issue of relevancy may most effectively be clarified.

Currently, the most influential writers on the concept of deviancy are "labelling" theorists. In their theoretical writings, many of these theorists hold that a deviant person is one who commits deviant acts, and deviant acts they describe as acts which break rules. As Becker puts it:

"... social groups create deviancy by making rules whose infraction constitutes deviance".  

1. I shall also consider whether the account of deviancy offered by social systems theorists may not be more congruent than the interpretation which I myself have offered.

However, despite the wide subscription to this interpretation of the concept of deviance, some labelling theorists have conducted investigations into various aspects of the "deviancy" of the physically disabled, such as blind and crippled people, and others have carried out research on alcoholics and homosexuals. Some of these writers have at least acknowledged that it is very difficult to specify the rules which these "deviants" have broken, but are determined to proceed with their enquiries nevertheless. Thus, Schur writes:

"... it is questionable that the notion of rules itself is broad enough to describe deviation. This point is clearest in the instance of physical disability ... There are several good reasons for wanting to define deviance to include reactions to certain personal conditions and disabilities which really involve no rule violation (except the extremely nebulous rule that one should not be disabled.)"  

Other theorists, who similarly wish to retain physical disability within the auspices of labelling theory, find other solutions. Mankoff devises a distinction between what he calls ascribed and achieved rule-breaking:  

"Ascribed rule breaking occurs if the rule-breaker is characterised in terms of a particular physical or visible 'impairment'. He does not necessarily have to act in order to be a rule-breaker; he acquires the status regardless of his behaviour or wishes. Thus the very beautiful and the very ugly can be considered ascriptive rule-breakers."

Such a view seems at bottom to be statistical in nature, and this approach has been rejected by Becker:

"The simplest view of deviance is essentially statistical, defining anything as deviant that varies too widely from the average ... In this view, to be left-handed or red-headed is deviant ... But it is too simple a solution. Hunting with such a definition we return with a mixed bag - people who are excessively fat or thin, murderers, redheads, homosexuals and traffic violators. The mixture contains some ordinarily thought of as deviants and others who have broken no rule at all. The statistical study of deviance, in short, is far too removed from the concern with rule-breaking which prompts scientific study of outsiders."¹

Labelling theorists do not, then, present a united front on the question of the identification of deviants. If we enquire into why this should be so, the answer is, I think, not only that the price of consistency in the application of the "rule-breaker" definition of "deviancy" is an unacceptably sharp narrowing of the field of their enquiries. That some labelling theorists wish to classify the physically disabled, and others such as alcoholics, as deviants, reflects their concern to have their investigations include all those who "everybody knows" are "deviants" and "present problems" for society.² But, as Pollner has pointed out, it is important to distinguish


between a theoretician's conception of deviance and that employed by the members of particular groups. Failure to do so often results in the kind of inconsistency we have just observed. It would seem in fact that any theoretician's attempt to specify the criterion to be used to determine who is deviant will have the result that for him only certain groups will be open to investigation. Where deviancy is defined in terms of rule-breaking, for example, it will only be groups which operate a similar conception with respect to their members which will come within the compass of the theory.

4 (b) School Criteria of Deviancy

In the approach to socialization which I am advocating, I have advanced an ability criterion of deviancy, and if we are to assess the relevance of this view to school role socialization, we shall have to determine whether or not schools also work with such a conception. To resolve this question I propose to turn to the literature concerned with the official, governmental criteria by which ordinary state schools, which are the subject of this thesis, may arrange for a pupil to be transferred to a Special school, or to receive some form of Special education which is radically different from that given to other pupils, for such pupils may rightly be said, I believe, not to be socializable into acceptable members of the ordinary school community. A convenient summary of these criteria appears in the Warnock Report, where there appears the following:

"... we are entirely convinced that Special schools will continue to be needed, particularly for the following groups of children:
(i) those with severe or complex physical, sensory or intellectual disabilities who require special facilities, teaching methods or expertise


2. Ibid., 96.
that it would be impractical to provide in ordinary schools;

(ii) those with severe emotional or behavioural disorders who have great difficulty in forming relationships with others, or whose behaviour is so extreme or unpredictable that it causes severe disruption in an ordinary school or inhibits the educational progress of other children;

and

(iii) those with less severe disabilities, often in combination, who despite special help do not perform well in an ordinary school and are more likely to thrive in the more intimate, communal and educational setting of a Special school."

Concerning the first and third of these criteria little needs to be added to make out the case that ordinary schools operate an ability criterion in order to determine the success or possibility of success of the socialization process they operate. We turn, then, to the more shadowy area of Warnock's second suggestion. If there is a single term which may be used to designate pupils who enter the category Warnock describes as those having emotional or behavioural disorders, that term would surely be "maladjusted". The question, then, that we may now raise is whether ordinary schools view the behaviour which leads to a pupil being designated "maladjusted" as in some sense involuntary so that he may be deemed to be suffering from a disability, or whether schools view maladjusted pupils as children who wilfully reject the standards of behaviour required. I shall argue that the balance of evidence we can obtain from governmental directives points unequivocally to the former.

I shall begin by remarking that a striking feature of the use of the concept of maladjustment in official documents is its medical connotations. Warnock reports that this recourse to a medical conceptualisation of "malad-
justment" was made even before the turn of the century, though it was only in 1927 that the Child Guidance Council was formed with the aim of encouraging "the provision of skilled treatment of children showing behavioural disturbances". It is but one step away from speaking of "treatment of behavioural disturbances" to the setting up of "clinics" officially recognised as part of the school medical service. By 1939, there were twenty-two such clinics so recognised and wholly or partly maintained by the authorities.

The official governmental inclusion of maladjusted pupils among the medically disabled was sealed in the 1944 Education Act. This Act, fulfilled by regulations made the following year, greatly extended the range of children's special needs for which authorities were obliged to make special provision, either in Special schools or in ordinary schools. The Handicapped Pupils and School Health Service Regulations, 1945, included eleven categories of pupils blind, partially sighted, deaf, partly deaf, delicate, diabetic, educationally sub-normal, epileptic, maladjusted, physically handicapped and those with speech defects. The categories have remained largely unchanged since 1944.*

* Footnote

A similar inclusive list was made with respect to the organisation of education in Scotland. In 1947, the Secretary of State remitted to the Advisory Council in Scotland the task of reviewing the provisions made for the education of pupils suffering from disability of mind or body or from maladjustment due to social handicap. The Council produced seven Reports between 1950 and 1952. See The Education of Handicapped Pupils: The Reports of the Advisory Council, 1955. The titles of the Reports were as follows: Pupils who are Defective in Hearing, Pupils who are Defective in Vision, Visual and Aural Aids, Pupils with Physical Disabilities, Pupils with Mental or Educational Disabilities, Pupils Handicapped by Speech Disorders, and Pupils who are Maladjusted because of Social Handicap.
The idea that maladjusted children should be included among the list of kinds of medically certified disabled children is all the more striking in that, as the Warnock Report recognises, whether a child is thought to be maladjusted, and if so to what extent, will depend on a variety of factors, including, for example, the outlook, expertise, resources, accommodation and organisation of the individual school. Warnock complains that the use of the term "maladjusted" tends in itself to suggest a permanent condition and fails to give any indication of the type of special educational provision required. However, although Warnock thinks there is a good case for referring to children as having emotional or behavioural disorders - thereby avoiding the suggestion of a permanent disability - it remains true at the present time that a successful request by an ordinary school for a pupil to be transferred will be based on the argument that the pupil is incapable of learning to conduct himself as normal pupils do - that he is, in fact, disabled in some way.

It would thus appear that the criteria upon which ordinary schools base their evaluation of the success or likely success of the socialization process they operate to bring children to be acceptable members of the school community, are ability criteria.*

*Footnote

An apparent exception occurs when an ordinary school expels a pupil who then has to enrol at another ordinary school. Here it would appear that the pupil is being judged by the first school to be deviant even though he is not disabled, and in such a case it might appear that schools do operate criteria of deviancy which are not based on abilities. I do not think, however, that such an interpretation of the fact of school expulsion has to be accepted. Before mentioning another possible interpretation it is worth noting that such expulsions are rare, and are in fact extremely rare in counties which do not operate a grammar school system, and thus have no chance of sending a pupil to a different type of school. Certainly, we are not here concerned
It is one thing, however, to show that schools operate ability criteria of deviancy, it is quite another to argue that the ability criteria in question are similar to the criteria I have advanced in writing of the ethogenic research approach to socialization. The criteria of the latter are concerned with the ability to engage in symbolic interaction, and in particular with children being able to conduct social encounters with adults as teachers and themselves as pupils. According to my conception, the deviant and the unsuccessfully socialized are nominal members of groups who have not learned to "play their part" as group members. It is not proposed that enquiries be made into whether they want to play their part, and indeed, I am ready to count as successfully socialized those group members who exercise considerable role distancing and only "go through the motions" of being, for example, a trustee prisoner or courteous waitress.

It must be admitted at once that the ability criteria concerned with physical and mental disabilities which are operated by schools have nothing in common with the notions I am concerned to advance, and to that extent, the research approach I advocate may not be used to elucidate all the processes

*Footnote cont.

with anything like the number of pupils who are sent from an ordinary school to a Special school. Where a pupil is sent from, for example, one comprehensive school to another, it would appear that the grounds, stated in general terms, would have to emphasise special features of the expelling school which are inoperative in the receiving one. If this were not the case, it is difficult to imagine how the former school could reasonably expect the latter to receive the pupil. The expelling school would in effect have to admit that its socialization processes had in this case gone awry, and that given exposure to the similar but fresh processes of another school, successful socialization was still possible.
of School Role socialization. Ordinary schools demand of pupils that they be capable of a certain physical independence and have intellectual powers which do not make the curriculum a complete mystery. If at any point in a pupil's school career it becomes apparent that he cannot meet these standards, his membership of the school will need to be terminated. Thus it is only when one considers the more opaque area of the maladjustment criterion that the approach I have outlined may prove illuminating. The immediate question we have to raise, however, is merely whether the ethogenic research approach ability criterion of successful socialization is similar to that operated by ordinary schools in reaching a decision concerning whether a particular pupil is maladjusted or not.

Couched in more precise form, the question will ask whether schools reach their decisions on the matter essentially by judging pupils' competence in conducting symbolic interaction.

I will argue that this is in fact the case, and will begin by pointing out that the range of pupils who are designated "maladjusted" is by no means limited to rowdy, unruly and disruptive pupils. Warnock reports that during the decade 1954-55, which was characterised by a great expansion in the provision for maladjusted pupils, maladjustment was increasingly seen as having manifestations in passive, introverted behaviour as well as anti-social forms of conduct. That a passive and introverted child can in the eyes of a school be considered maladjusted reflects the fact that a schoolchild is expected to learn to accommodate himself to both teachers and other pupils, and thus any insuperable difficulties which a child experiences in accomplishing this may make him appear maladjusted.

It is not in fact easy to taxonomise maladjusted pupils. I have written of rowdy, disruptive pupils, but clearly this is not an exclusive category.

If we follow Caspari,¹ and speak instead of "children with behaviour problems"

then the identifying behaviour of such children might include some or all of the following, and other behaviour as well: aggressive defiance of the teacher, rejection of routine punishments as unfair, use of bad language, spitefulness to other children, bullying, and spoiling and hiding other pupils' work. By contrast, the category of the withdrawn, inattentive pupil is quite a firm category. Such a pupil just sits in his small circle of solitude and makes little attempt to take part in either the work or social life of the school. Another category of maladjusted child is comprised of the school refuser, and yet another by some delinquent children, such as, for example, certain of those who persistently in school steal or commit vandalism.

In suggesting that the pupils who are sent to a Special school because they are maladjusted have as their universal distinguishing mark an inability to cope with symbolic interaction, I am assuredly not claiming that teachers believe that the origins of these various kinds of maladjusted pupils' behaviour lies in their inability to engage in such interaction, or even that teachers unerringly pick out the fact that they cannot manage to do this. Instead, I am claiming that maladjusted pupils, whatever form of deviant behaviour they engage in, are all pupils who, for their various reasons, cannot seem to learn to relate to teachers and other pupils in ways schoolchildren are required, and that even if their rule-breaking behaviour should be inhibited by fear of punishment, lack of dexterity in relating to teachers and pupils would still remain to be mastered, and until such time as it was, these pupils would have to be regarded as deviants.¹

¹. One may speculate about the connection between the various forms of maladjustment and the inability to engage in symbolic interaction. It seems to me to lie in the emotional states maladjusted pupils appear to experience. Agitated emotional states, and equally, great passive self-absorption, may lead pupils to "personalise" interactions in a way which precludes the perception that other children and adults are to be seen as pupils and teachers.
Finally, mention may be made in this connection of the fact that much work on maladjusted children in Special schools concentrates on the fostering of good personal relationships. The form which this "treatment" takes is the replacement of the fairly formal modes of interaction between teacher and pupil by a more relaxed, first-name relationship.¹ This "form of treatment" for maladjusted pupils reveals, I think, a tacit endorsement of the inability which I am claiming ordinary schools perhaps unwittingly attribute to maladjusted pupils. Expertise in symbolic interaction being an accomplishment which is usually seen to be preceded by ease in more informal encounters, schools may rightly think that without greater attention to the fostering of the ability to sustain informal interactions in the more relaxed setting of a Special school, no progress in symbolic interaction will be possible.

If the foregoing analysis is found persuasive, then it may be agreed that there is no significant discrepancy between the approach I advocate and that of schools with respect to criteria to be used to decide how successful a school's socialization process has been with regard to any particular pupil, in so far as the pupil's behaviour raises doubts in the minds of teachers whether the pupil ought, as a maladjusted pupil, to be sent to a special school. This being the case, it would seem to follow that the conceptualization of socialization and its allied concepts which are made in the ethogenic research approach to socialization are in fact not inappropriate for the investigation of school role socialization, and are especially relevant to the theorist interested ultimately in gaining some insight into school socialization.

Conclusion

In this chapter I set out to provide an examination of the ethogenic research approach to socialization. During the course of this examination, I suggested that the rule and role analogies could not be considered in isolation

from the methodological procedures which are part of this research approach, and that it was only by establishing the applicability of the ethogenic explanatory models that a provisional acceptance of these analogies might properly be made. Having, by the method of illustration, attempted to argue for their applicability, I then turned to consider the extensions to the methodology of the ethogenic approach to social interaction which are necessary to create methodological resources adequate for the investigation of school role socialization. This accomplished, I referred to an assertion made earlier in the chapter, that the crucial question which any approach to the interpretation of socialization and its allied concepts has to answer if it is to be used to throw light upon school role socialization is whether the interpretation offered is consonant with that which may be inferred to be operated by those in authority in the normal state school. I then attempted to show that it could be accepted that the interpretation of these concepts offered in the ethogenic research approach to socialization were indeed consonant in so far as they were required to be for the theorist whose ultimate interest lay not in school role but in school socialization. It is by this final argument that a strong claim can be made both for the adequacy of the methodology of the ethogenic research approach to socialization, and the acceptability of its metaphysical paradigms.

Having, at least to some degree, established that the ethogenic research approach may be applied to the elucidation of school role socialization, I should like in the final chapter to seek to determine the way in which the insights which may be gained by adopting this research approach may be used to illumine the process of school socialization.
At the beginning of this thesis I stated that one of my central aims was to set forth the philosophic considerations on which a reasoned decision might be made regarding the most fruitful way to conceptualize the socialization process so that any contribution made by schools to the process by which children are led to become acceptable members of society may be made plain. In the elaboration of these considerations I have been led to develop the notion of a research approach, and to describe and criticize what is probably the most widely accepted interpretation of the concept of socialization, that of the social systems research approach. In this last chapter I propose to develop further the ethogenic conception of school socialization and to set forth some final reflections concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the ethogenic and the social systems research approaches to school socialization.

1. An Ethogenic Conception of School Socialization

Earlier, I suggested that from the ethogenic perspective socialization may in general be characterised as the process by which members are led to acquire the knowledge and skills necessary to interact with other group members in such a manner that encounters between group members are sufficiently orderly for the affairs of the group to be conducted with reasonable efficiency and the stability of the group not impaired. I also wrote that the central question concerning school socialization would concern the part played by school experience in the development of the knowledge and skills necessary for the negotiation of social encounters as they are conducted in our society. Later, I gave support to an analysis of social interaction in terms of interactional rules the adherence to which is necessary if social encounters are to be conducted in an orderly fashion. If this is acceptable,
then the socialization process by which children are led to become acceptable members of our society may at least in part be characterized in terms of the development of the ability to adhere to these rules.

This development may be seen to have its beginnings in the ability of children to engage in "rule-governed"\(^1\) behaviour of the kind demanded in such games as "Pat-a-cake" where adherence within broad limits to certain behaviour is acceptable. At a later stage of the child's development, when he is deemed to be accountable for his linguistic utterances, then "rule-conformity"\(^2\) is demanded of him. However, the orderly management of social encounters requires an ability not merely to engage in rule-conforming behaviour. Encounters between people are rarely of such a nature that any participant has no aim other than to conform to the proprieties of linguistic rules. This being the case, it can be recognized that children gradually learn that in order to communicate effectively and achieve what they want, they must learn deliberately to pay due regard to the relevant interactional rules. They must, in short, learn to "apply"\(^3\) interactional rules. Further, even more than this is demanded of those who would be competent in conducting social encounters since in most circumstances it is expected that people conduct their meetings with others without "having to think" what are the rules. Thus, in the sense elucidated earlier, it is finally expected of people that they learn to "follow" interactional rules with which they have become familiar through experience.\(^4\) Of course, in situations not previously encountered and of an unusual nature, a "creative" solution to the problem of how the encounter is to be managed in an orderly way has to be devised. But this, to be intelligible, would have to be based

1. See above, 170-1.
2. See above, 170-1.
4. See above, 171-2.
on widely known interactional rules operative in situations which in some way resemble the problematic encounter.

In the progression from rule-governed behaviour to that which reveals an ability to conform to, apply and follow rules, I believe the experience of school life with all its formality plays an important part, for it is outside of the family and close personal relationships that a great part of social life is conducted in our society. In order more precisely to indicate the nature of the contribution made by schools to the process by which children are led to acquire the ability to adhere to the rules operative in the interactions they will have to conduct as members of society, we must now clarify a few remaining issues.

The first of these concerns the interpretation we are to make of the concept of the group which is at present under discussion, namely, "society". The question which confronts us is whether or not society is to be conceived as a group entirely separate from the myriad groups which may be found within a society, whether these be groups which are publicly acknowledged to exist, such as trades unions, or be groups which a theorist might compose, such as those whose writings could be said to belong to a particular intellectual tradition. In order to reach a decision on this matter we may recall that for an interpretation of socialization and its allied concepts to be acceptable it must be consonant with that which may be inferred actually to be operative within the group under consideration. Where that group is society, it is essential, if the notion of a group operating socialization processes is to be rendered comprehensible, that society be conceived in some measure as an independent group which seeks to preserve its efficiency and stability by fostering certain types of behaviour. When in the present context we refer to society, then, we must not mean merely the collection of groups to be found within a society, though the stability and efficiency of certain of these groups will certainly affect the stability and efficiency of the group which is called "society".
The existence of such a group cannot surely be doubted. "Society" in the sense at present under consideration refers to that group which has at its disposal prisons, hospitals, asylums and other means of excluding from the main body of members all those who in various ways are regarded as unacceptable as fully participating members of the group. Equally, the group can avail itself of a reward system, such as the formal honours system with its titles and privileges we have at present in this country, by which those who it is deemed have rendered exceptional service to the group may be commended. Membership, which is usually referred to as "citizenship" is most usually a birthright, but has in the past been subject to termination by an act of banishment.

Having declared that it is in this sense that "society" is here to be understood, it must be acknowledged that in the ethogenic account of socialization reference will also inevitably be made to groups found within a society. Myriad activities are undertaken by the members of groups within a society, and it is the performance of at least certain of these activities, and sometimes the nature of the activities themselves, which determine whether a person is regarded as acceptable as a member of society.

The criteria by which members of our society are deemed to be unacceptable (whether termed "deviant" or "unsuccessfully socialized" or whatever) and subject to some form of denial of freedom to associate with acceptable members, are quite varied, and, for the present purposes, an exhaustive catalogue is not required. In the present context it is sufficient to point out that amongst the varied reasons why a person would be regarded as unacceptable would include his inability to conduct social encounters in an orderly manner. Such an inability would, of course, be a matter of degree. At one extreme would be those who are deemed to be of weak intellect or psychologically disturbed – cretins, obsessives, those suffering from paranoia and others.
Although such people may not be confined within a mental institution for the stated reason that they are unable to conduct social encounters in an orderly manner, it is partly such an inability which necessitates their separation from the main body of society.¹

Such individuals may for certain periods of time be quite incapable of conducting everyday social intercourse. Their incapacity, though striking to the observer, may not be totally incomprehensible for we are all prone to manage certain encounters ineptly. Those among the main body of the population who lack the necessary social skills to a certain degree are regarded as gauche or awkward individuals, and if, knowing they cannot "manage" certain encounters easily, such people avoid attending the social occasions at which their difficulties will be apparent, they may be regarded as "unsociable". Such labelling may not be without further implications: success in a wide range of occupations cannot be achieved by those who are regarded as unsociable. Society, then, has at its disposal not only the extreme sanction of enforced separation for those who fail to acquire or lose the ability to engage in symbolic interaction, it also makes use of pressures of varying degrees to lead people to learn and retain this ability.

If this is the case, then it may be accepted that the interpretation of socialization and its allied concepts offered in the ethogenic research approach is consonant with those which may be seen to be operative in "society", in the sense in which we are to understand this term.

It is one thing to argue that the ethogenic research approach is applicable in this sense; it is quite another to answer a question concerning in just what ways the interactional ground rules learned by pupils in schools facilitate social intercourse in adult life. To respond to this question is

¹. It may also be pointed out that there is a growing body of literature devoted to the relations between social behaviour and mental disorder. See, for example, Argyle, M., 'Social Behaviour and Mental Disorder' in Argyle, M., The Psychology of Interpersonal Behaviour, 1967, 133-149.
to make an empirical claim which, at the present time, would be quite unsupported by evidence. It is not my intention in this philosophic thesis to make any such claims, though I do intend to provide some purely speculative indications in the final summary of the ethogenic research approach I intend shortly to make. Before I do so, however, I should like to dispose the reader towards the acceptance of this research approach as the basis from which best to investigate school socialization by providing a resume of the difficulties and weaknesses attaching to the social systems research approach.

2. The Choice Between the Social Systems and the Ethogenic Research Approaches

During the course of this thesis I have set forth several criteria by which research approaches may be assessed. From a comparative point of view, one research approach is to be preferred to another in so far as it is less beset with conceptual difficulties and has led, or seems likely to lead, to the formulation of theories which have produced, or promise to produce, a plenitude of positive empirical findings. In assessing individual research approaches, I suggested that the analogies which constitute the metaphysical paradigms may be examined to determine whether they are being pushed too far in being applied to a particular problem domain. More radically, one may enquire whether the analogies are acceptable at all. Concerning the ontology and methodology of a research approach the important questions to be posed refer to the acceptability of the former, and the adequacy in the problem area under discussion of the latter. Finally, I suggested that for the interpretations of socialization and its allied concepts made under a particular research approach to be applicable, they must be congruent with those which may be seen actually to be operative by the group whose socialization processes one is seeking to elucidate.

In the preceding chapters I have attempted to apply most of these non-comparative criteria to both the social systems and the ethogenic research approaches. In the remaining two sections of this thesis I shall deal with those still outstanding, and will then try to show that, at the present time,
it seems more reasonable to adopt the ethogenic rather than the social systems research approach.

2 (a) The Social Systems Research Approach: A Final Assessment:

The conclusions reached earlier concerning the metaphysical paradigms of this research approach were, in brief, as follows. Firstly, I pointed out that the perspective on group stability - the affective bonds assumption - involves a claim which is difficult either to assess or to employ as a guide to empirical research in investigating school or school role socialization in the absence of any specification of the values which allegedly hold together either schools or our own society at the present time. Concerning the perspective on persons - the plastic man analogy - it was found that before such a comparison could usefully be invoked it was necessary that further research be carried out into the relationships between trait and attitude appellations and their overt expression in differing circumstances. Finally, concerning the particular role analogy constitutive of this research approach it was found that there was no straightforward method by which one might establish precisely what are the role attributes of either the pupil or the member of our current society. The metaphysical paradigms of this research approach are, then, upon any close scrutiny, not immediately acceptable.

Turning now to ontological and methodological considerations, it was found that in connection with the former there was no greatly compelling reason for supposing that, in the strong sense of the term, dispositions must be supposed to exist. Regarding methodological adequacy, it would appear that in the very general terms in which the methodological principles are couched, there is little objectionable. However, the methodological adequacy of a research approach cannot alone vindicate a research approach and, in the final analysis, perhaps the crucial question to be posed concerns
whether the interpretation offered of socialization and its allied concepts
are consonant with those which it may be inferred are actually operative
in the group under investigation. It is to this question that I now turn.

In connection with school role socialization I have already argued
that schools do not seek to exclude pupils whose values are not those which
the establishment seeks to foster. This assertion should not, however,
be taken to imply that schools do not encourage the adoption of certain
values which are conducive to the efficiency and stability of the school, and
discourage others. It is simply the case that in any study of socialization
processes operated by schools account must be taken of the fact that it is a
statutory duty for schools to accept and retain all pupils except those
who are in some state approved way unable to learn to behave in the desired
ways. This being the case, any interpretation of the concept of socialization
cannot, with consistency, involve reference merely to values. This conceded,
social systems theorists might still wish to claim that their interpretations
of socialization and its allied concepts are relevant to the understanding of
school socialization, for they might take as their starting point the values
which schools inculcate in their pupils - values which may be unrelated to
school role socialization - and seek to relate these to socialization processes
operated by the group we term "society".

The question which then has to be raised concerns whether this group
can be seen both to be operating socialization processes which involve
values, and to be employing an interpretation of "deviancy" or "unsuccessfully
socialized" which also makes reference to the acquisition of values. To
answer these questions one must first clarify the connotations of the term
"society". This, I believe, must be done in a way similar to that which
I gave in discussing the ethogenic approach to school socialization. Society
is to be considered as a group to some degree separate from the many groups
within our society, and is to be understood as that group which, among other
things, removes from the main body of the citizenry those it considers to be working against the interests of group members, such as traitors or criminals of certain kinds. The question must be raised as to whether this group operates what may be called a "value criterion" of deviancy. It is certainly the case that certain treasonable behaviour is committed "on principle", that is, in accordance with freely held moral convictions. But it is surely not the case in this country at the present time that we incarcerate individuals merely because they hold and express certain convictions. To this it may be replied that whereas there is no principle in British law concerning the legality of people's opinions, it is on the basis of a man's opinions that a judgement concerning his sanity is made, and it is upon such a judgement that a man may be removed from the main body of society. Such "convictions" are, however, if moral at all, not such as could be related to a failure of value-transmission by schools. The problem which remains for the social systems theorist is this: given that it is necessary that the social systems interpretation of the concept of deviancy be consonant with that operated by the group termed "society", and given that in order clearly to conceptualize deviancy criteria and to free them from the fluctuations of the opinions of group members it is necessary to refer to statutory or some other kind of formal criteria, then it is necessary for the social systems theorist to specify just what are these criteria. I do not claim that this task is an impossible one; but merely that it has not yet been accomplished, and until it has been, it remains questionable whether the particular stance taken by the social systems research approach to the interpretation of socialization and its allied concepts is applicable to the study of school socialization.

The last topic to be considered in this final assessment of this research approach as a basis from which to construct theories of school socialization concerns the empirical findings which such theories have or
I have during the course of this thesis considered the theory which has given rise to the greatest amount of empirical research of any theory derived from this research approach - that of the behaviourists. Even adherents of this theory would, I believe, acknowledge that the positive research findings connecting school experience and adults' values which may be deemed to be supportive of societal stability and efficiency, are few. An impressive body of research findings simply does not exist. Nor, given the conclusions I have reached concerning the metaphysical paradigms, ontology and conceptual interpretations of this research approach, does it seem likely that without a great deal of revisionary work a greater accumulation of positive findings may reasonably be expected to be compiled.

In asserting this I do not mean to suggest that, given an appropriate methodology, one could not specify the values which both schools and our society foster in their members. I believe that both these groups do indeed successfully encourage the adoption by members of certain values. However, it is one thing to concede that these groups inculcate values; it is quite another to hold that such values can be conceptualized in dispositional terms and enjoy the peculiar ontological status I have described. One must also distinguish between the claim that schools foster values, and the claim that such values "live on" in the absence of the circumstances under which they were adopted and, in the dispositional manner, are manifested in vaguely defined situations long after the pupil has left school. My final view is that the whole issue of the manner in which the adoption of values may be conceptualized so that their possession may be the subject of controlled empirical investigation is at the present time extremely problematic.

From the foregoing it may be concluded, I believe, that it would not be unreasonable for the uncommitted enquirer into the nature of school socialization to choose to attempt to construct a theory derived from a research approach less beset with conceptual problems and which held out
the promise of more immediate positive research findings.

2. (b) The Ethogenic Research Approach: Some Final Reflections

In advancing the ethogenic research approach as a viable basis from which to investigate school socialization, I have naturally tried to take account of those conceptual difficulties of which I have become aware. I have, moreover, borne in mind the necessity to provide the kind of detailed conceptualization from which empirical theories could be constructed. It was partly for this reason that I felt the need to supplement existing ethogenic methodology with a schema designed to order and categorize school rules. It must be conceded, however, that in this essentially philosophic thesis I have not produced a detailed first-order theory concerning the "content" of the school role socialization process which might form the basis of a detailed empirical theory of school socialization. Despite this omission, I believe it is possible to suggest some indication of the kind of links one may expect to find between the knowledge of interactional ground rules the pupil acquires and the demands our society makes of those who are to be deemed acceptable in so far as they possess the ability to conduct social encounters in an orderly fashion. I hope in so doing to indicate the limits beyond which investigation of interactional ground rules operative within schools need not proceed.

We may begin by making reference to the analysis made earlier of social interactions in which it became apparent that the structure of encounters may at the most obvious level be distinguished into greetings, the central course of the interaction, and farewells. Children not only learn the ways in which pupils indicate an awareness and knowledge of these interactional stages, they come to realize that in similarly formal situations special forms of words and manner of address may be expected. It is the very formality of interactions between pupils and teachers that makes the experience of school life important in the process by which children become
receptive to the idea that in different situations encounters are conducted in particular ways. There are, moreover, resemblances between the role of pupil and certain others in adult life which it is relevant to note.

We may consider first that ill-defined but quite definite group which I have termed "society". As a member of this group, an individual may be called upon to play a variety of roles, such as those of a juror or a witness of some kind of accident or crime, which require that he conduct himself in a manner which is so far removed from informality as to include strong ritualistic elements. Other roles are, in a straightforward sense, subservient, as when the individual as citizen acknowledges, whether by a bow or some other indication, the presence of royalty. The behavioural extreme of bowing may be considered merely as one end of a continuum along which lies society's expectation that a citizen should be able to express his acknowledgement of the authority of certain other citizens. Such citizens include, for example, at appropriate times, representatives of the police, the medical profession, the military and the elected government.

The ability to play subservient roles is, of course, also required in the myriad groups to be found within our society. It is pertinent to remark upon these in the present context for our society is arranged in such a fashion that its efficiency and stability is dependent upon the efficiency and stability of at least certain of them. Among the most important of these groups are those which comprise the work force in our society. It scarcely needs to be emphasised that most of these are composed of employees and employers and that part of the requirements of the acceptable employee is the ability to play a role which calls for appropriate expressions of deference on certain occasions. This consideration is also applicable to many other groups which are important to the stability and efficiency of our society, and is a factor which provides a clue to the form an ethogenic theory
of school socialization would take. It would attempt to trace the relationship between the interactional ground rules which characterise encounters between pupils and teachers, and those which characterise encounters between citizens in their various roles of employee, juror and so forth.

In attempting to describe this relationship one would first seek to describe the requirements for the orderly management of encounters in schools. In this task the methodology of the ethogenic research approach to socialization would be employed, though it must be conceded that additional conceptual resources may need to be drawn upon in so far as one is interested in school socialization. This need may arise in the following ways.

It is clear that the ground rules by which adult interaction is conducted in our society differ in detail from those which govern pupil-teacher interaction, so that in seeking to describe the relationship between the two it cannot be the intention to find a precise anticipation in school life of the details of adult social intercourse. What I believe may be established is that the awareness of the kind of requirements made of individuals occupying a certain position as a member of an organisation is first gained at school. To establish this it may aid cogency not only to show that encounters both in schools and in society are regulated by ground rules, but also that other notions such as those of a "language register" and a "language style", which can be shown to be applicable to everyday adult social intercourse and are aspects of ground rules, also may be applied to pupil-teacher interaction. It may also aid cogency if it can be shown that all the major functions of language operative in interactions between individuals in their capacity as adult organisational members are employed within schools.

It is over the question of the need to employ these and other concepts,
and the precise interpretations to be given of then1 that will provide
the possibility for the construction of alternative ethogenic theories
of school socialization. It does not appear likely to me that with
the appearance of alternative theories we may witness the spectacle of
one theory leading to few positive findings whilst another leads to a
great deal. On the contrary, I believe that there is little room for
doubt that almost any empirical ethogenic theory will usher in positive
findings, since it is scarcely to be doubted that interactions in schools
and in our society are conducted according to certain, as yet unspecified,
ground rules. I believe, in short, that it may reasonably be supposed
that the ethogenic research approach to socialization will provide the
basis for the construction of empirical theories which will lead to a pleni-
tude of positive findings regarding school and school role socialization,
and that, this being the case, it is reasonable for the uncommitted
enquirer at the present time to choose to work within the confines of this
research approach rather than that of the social systems research approach.

Conclusion

At the beginning of this thesis I pointed out that it is possible
to interpret in differing ways what may be meant by "socialization",
and that it would be upon the interpretation chosen that the success of any
empirical enquiry would depend. I pointed out that it was necessary to
preface any investigation of school or school role socialization with
a coherent delineation of the adopted interpretation and an examination of
its underlying principles and assumptions. It is my intention that this

1. For an indication of the range of possibilities, see Joos, M., The Five
Clocks, 1967, and Halliday, M.A.K., McIntosh, A. and Strevens, P.,
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thesis be understood as such a preface to two possible interpretations, and though I have been concerned to advance and defend one particular approach to the interpretation of school and school role socialization, it is for the uncommitted enquirer to determine which of the two approaches it is more reasonable at the present time to adopt.

In reaching a decision account must be taken of the position I have adopted in philosophy of science with respect to criteria of theory preference. It will be recalled that I wrote that whilst I believe it is possible to make a rational choice between alternative research approaches and theories, I do not adhere to the view that criteria can be produced which permit of other than a pragmatic decision to be reached. Consonant with this view I have drawn only the most guarded conclusions concerning the possibility of overcoming the conceptual difficulties which beset the social systems research approach. Similarly, I must entertain a limited confidence concerning some similar inherent difficulties becoming apparent in the ethogenic research approach, and my optimism concerning the positive findings to which I believe an ethogenic theory would lead must correspondingly be tempered. This acknowledged, it is certainly true that account must be taken of the arguments raised within this thesis, and it remains my conviction that as matters rest at the present time it is more reasonable to seek to investigate school and school role socialization by the employment of a theory based upon the ethogenic research approach.
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ABSTRACT

A PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENTARY ON

THE CONCEPT OF SCHOOL SOCIALIZATION

BY

W.R. GUY

The central concern of this thesis is to formulate an interpretation of the concept of socialization which may provide the basis for a detailed empirical theory which will explain the part played by schools in the process by which children are led to become acceptable members of our society. In Chapter 1 the mode of analysis to be employed is discussed and it is found to lie in a meta-theoretical investigation of the foundations of possible research approaches. In Chapter 2 the conceptual features of research approaches are elucidated and those of the social systems research approach set forth. In Chapter 3 it is shown that the socialization theories advanced by certain writers may be assigned to this research approach and an appraisal of their work is undertaken. In Chapter 4 criteria are formulated by which a critique of the social systems research approach may be made. There then follows an evaluation of the perspective on group stability and efficiency and on the acquisition and expression of moral convictions associated with this research approach. An examination is also made of its ontological commitments and methodology. It is concluded that there are substantial conceptual difficulties inherent in this research approach and in consequence it may be preferable to adopt a quite different research approach. In Chapter 5 an alternative research approach, one based on the ethogenic approach to social interaction, is elaborated. Following an elucidation of the knowledge and abilities required in social interactions, the metaphysical paradigms, ontology and methodology are rendered explicit and interpretations of "socialization" and allied concepts are made. Finally, in Chapters 6 and 7, an attempt is made to provide a detailed vindication of this research approach as it may be applied to the study of both school role and school socialization.