TEACHERS' CONCEPTIONS OF MORALITY
AND
MORAL EDUCATION.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY.
1.2 OUTLINE OF THESIS.
1.3 HYPOTHESES.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

This thesis is mainly about teachers and what they think and feel about morality and moral education. The impetus for writing it came from my own long experience of teaching in secondary schools as well as from working with other teachers on moral education courses. As a teacher I came to believe that questions of morality and values were more important than many other issues in education, and yet they appeared to be sidestepped or left to the individual interpretation of teachers. In most schools there seemed to be no coherent discussion of policy with regard to moral education, yet values are always implicit in all relationships and activities within the school system. There was an unspoken understanding that everyone knew and shared an implicit morality, yet teachers behaved differently when faced with the same sort of difficult situations.

Of course teachers have differing personalities and these will influence the way they respond in difficult situations. However, both the stress of conflict between teacher and pupil and the anxiety of teachers about resolving moral dilemmas might be reduced if a consideration of values became an explicit part of school policy. Crucial decisions about right and wrong often have to be made without time to think by teachers under stress and therefore are often based on
instinct, gut feeling or expediency, rather than on previously considered policy. Nearly all schools state a commitment to caring for individual members of their community but the ways in which that caring is understood or demonstrated vary widely.

On courses teachers would often express confusion, ambivalence or a lack of knowledge or competence about the whole field of morality and moral education, not always realising that as moral agents themselves they were already engaging in moral judgments and moral action in their daily lives. Few teachers have degrees in subjects which include some ethics or moral philosophy and therefore have not been stimulated to reflect deeply on the nature of morality. Often also it is considered that a person's morality is, like his or her political or religious beliefs or sexual behaviour, a personal or private matter.

The word morality itself has no easy or slick definition. In fact Whiteley (1970) has argued, paradoxically, that in ordinary language the words moral and morality have both a fairly precise and consistent use and no precise or consistent use. Philosophers have argued about morality for many centuries but have failed to resolve the ambiguities attached to the concept. It may be that morality, like beauty, is simply impossible to define satisfactorily. So the confusion of teachers is understandable. At the same time, however, they appear to have a strong personal
commitment to morality and speak passionately about moral issues, sometimes without recognising that they are making prescriptive statements. The choice of teaching as a career is itself indicative of an underlying moral concern.

Teachers are held responsible for the behaviour of children in school. Without an adequate exploration of the nature of moral education, many think that their contribution to moral education is to discipline, reward and punish their students. Many pressures are brought to bear from outside school, such as the expectations of parents, government policies and educational philosophies. As Pring has pointed out, these pressures lead to paradoxical and conflicting demands upon teachers.

"Firstly, between getting young people to behave in a preordained way and at the same time encouraging them to take responsibility for their own behaviour; secondly, between handing on a specific set of values and enabling them to form an acceptable set of values of their own; thirdly, between permitting within society the sophisticated exploitation of young people as potential sources of profit and yet expecting schools to resist this exploitation; and fourthly, between preparing young people for specific roles in society and yet encouraging an independence of thought and a critical stance towards the adult world they are entering into". (in THACKER, PRING and EVANS, 1987, p. 7)

These tensions are essentially reflecting a conflict between freedom and control. Teachers are expected to perform a balancing act between them in the best interests of everyone concerned. However, teachers frequently come down on the side of control. Although control doesn't work very well, and freedom can be seen or feared as anarchy, the balance or
middle way is hard to achieve within a mainly authoritarian school system.

Teachers' thinking is an important resource in this area, but teachers have not been given much opportunity to say what they think. They are as much moral agents as anyone else, and intelligent and articulate. Therefore, they are a good population to sample to find out what the shared moral life is like. It seemed both interesting and important to explore the extent to which teachers are ambivalent and confused about morality, moral education and moral development.

MacIntyre (1987) has written that teachers are the forlorn hope of the culture of Western modernity, by which he means that the mission with which teachers are entrusted is both essential and impossible. They cannot both shape young people to fill social roles and teach them to think for themselves. So he does not recognise the possibility, which is there, of doing both, or of finding a balance between them. I hope that his pessimism is unfounded in this matter, as also in his claim in After Virtue (1981) that we have lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality.

Another stimulus for this study was meeting Lawrence Kohlberg, and learning more of his approach to moral education. My conversations with him both in England and the U.S.A. were a significant experience and I valued his kindness and encouragement. The work of Kohlberg suggests
that the understanding of morality develops through an invariant sequence of stages. The views which teachers hold may be related to their stage of reasoning in Kohlberg's sense and I therefore decided to include in my study an attempt to measure teachers' stage, something which has not been done on any large scale in this country. Studies in the U.S.A. which will be reported more fully in Chapter 4, have found that 30 - 43% of teachers' reasoning is at the principled level. Studies using Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT), which is a simplified version of Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview (MJI), appear to show that stage is also related to teachers' philosophy of education and their classroom practice. Teachers with lower scores were more likely to emphasise authority and the transmission of knowledge, whereas those with higher scores were more likely to emphasise guidance and children learning for themselves. (JOHNSTON, LUBOMUDROV and PARSONS, 1982) There is a lack of research using the MJI, especially in this country. I therefore decided to use it. According to Kohlberg it is a more reliable measure than the DIT since it allows for a greater depth and detail of response.

1.2 Outline of thesis

In exploring what teachers think about morality, it seemed important to see how their thinking related to that of moral philosophers and moral psychologists. The second and third
Chapters of this thesis are therefore concerned with the background of thinking against which the responses of teachers might be understood and given some framework of meaning. This background involves theories of moral education as well as philosophical and psychological theories of morality and moral development.

In Chapter 2 I will be giving an outline of the main ethical positions which philosophers at different times have taken up. I want to emphasise that I do not propose to argue for any particular ethical position. On the contrary, the assumption I am making is that all ethical theories have some validity to them. I hope to describe the range of theories held and the controversies and tensions within them. Philosophers themselves claim to hold to a particular ethical position, and appear to expect other people to do the same. For example, they expect people to be consistently relativists, or objectivists or emotivists, etc. I do not expect that teachers will give consistent expression to a particular ethical theory in either philosophical or everyday language. Rather I expect them to articulate a variety of ethical positions which may well be incompatible or impossible to integrate, and thus are a symptom of the confusion and ambivalence already mentioned.

Chapter 3 will concentrate on theories of moral development and moral education. These will be loosely related to philosophical theories. Brief descriptions will be given of
how moral awareness and behaviour develop according to certain psychological theories - psychoanalytic, social learning and cognitive-developmental. Again I do not expect these theories to be necessarily exclusive of each other, but they do differ in emphasis. These emphases are related to the tension between control and freedom mentioned earlier; one emphasis is on training and discipline in morality and the other on the child's spontaneous construction of the moral world. Wright (1986) sees the first conception reflected in behaviourist social learning and psychoanalytic theory. Morality is somehow 'put into' the young by adults and society generally, and if this did not happen, children would grow up amoral. The alternative view, reflected in cognitive-developmental theory, is that children construct morality on the basis of their own experience of personal relationships. Theories of moral education may also fall into these two conceptions. Hersh, Miller and Fielding believe that all models of moral education have a place in the curriculum because their differing emphases combine to make a rational whole.

"The complexity of morality and moral development is such that educators must combine the strengths of these models in order to do justice to the challenges of moral education in the schools." (1980, p. viii)

I will focus in Chapter 4 on the research methods considered for a study of this kind, and the methods finally decided upon. These fall into three parts. The first two parts are Kohlberg's MJI followed by his metaethical questions
supplemented by some additional questions of my own. These form an in-depth interview. The MJI will be assessed for global stage score (GSS) and weighted average score (WAS). Kohlberg's non-scoring questions and my supplementary questions, called ethical questions for convenience, will be analysed by content analysis. The third part is an open-ended questionnaire on moral development and moral education, and this will also be subjected to a content analysis. Further statistical analysis will be effected using the Digital Vax Cluster SPSS - x statistical package. (1986)

The results of the analysis of these three parts of the investigation will be reported and discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Chapter 5 will report on teachers' stage scores and the relationship between these scores and other variables. Chapter 6 will describe the analysis of the ethical questions, both Kohlberg's and my own, with my supplementary questions identified by capital letters. Kohlberg has accumulated 20 years of answers to his ethical questions from his longitudinal subjects, but I believe these, unlike the rest of his data, have not yet been analysed by his team. Again the relationship to other variables will be reported where statistically significant. Chapter 7 will present teachers' thinking about moral development and moral education, and whether that thinking relates to their stage score and understanding of morality. In conclusion, Chapter 8 will consider the implications of these results and relate what teachers actually say to the theories outlined in Chapters 2 and 3.
1.3 Hypotheses

I found it difficult to formulate any precise hypotheses. This was because I could find little previous research which related directly to the basic questions I am asking. These main questions are as follows:-

i) What stages of reasoning, in Kohlberg's sense, are expressed by British teachers?

ii) What are the prevalent theories explicit or implicit in their ethical thinking?

iii) What do they think about moral education, its importance, how it occurs at the moment and how it should be done?

In relation to these questions I began with certain general expectations, some derived from previous research in the U.S.A. and others from my own experience. These were:-

i) That the majority of teachers will be reasoning at Stage 4 on Kohlberg's scale, with about 30% showing clear evidence of Stage 5.

ii) That there will be no significant sex differences in stage score.

iii) That teachers' thoughts on morality will reflect all the main ethical and psychological positions, but that there will be a predominance of what might loosely be called relativist and emotivist thinking and an emphasis on social learning ideas.
iv) That their views on moral education will be confused and uncertain, but that the 'putting in' perspective will be likely to predominate, particularly among older teachers.

It only remains now for me to say that throughout this thesis, I hope to maintain a clear and accessible style of writing, with the minimum of technical language. Also, I will use, except in quotations, and where a particular individual is to be identified, gender pronouns at random. Moral philosophers in particular still seem persistently to write as if all people are male, and I consider it a moral obligation, due to my own gender, to redress the balance. Hare, for example, opens his book, 'Freedom and Reason', with the following words.

"I ask the reader to start by supposing that someone (himself perhaps) is faced with a serious moral problem - one that calls forth all the powers of thought, imagination and feeling that a man possesses. He will have to supply his own example; for I cannot say for any of my readers what moral question has troubled him most".

Apart from its sexism, and my surprise that Hare, a formalist who stresses reason, here allows that imagination and feeling are brought to bear on a moral problem, his invitation is a useful one. It provides a good starting point for the thesis that follows.
CHAPTER TWO

MORALITY

2.1 INTRODUCTION.
2.2 "COMMONSENSE" ACCOUNTS OF MORALITY.
2.3 THE ROLE OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
2.4 IS AND OUGHT.
2.5 REASON AND SENTIMENT.
2.6 ENDS AND MEANS.
2.7 INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY VERSUS AUTHORITY AND SOCIETY.
2.8 OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE.
2.9 ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE.
2.10 CONCLUSION.
CHAPTER 2: MORALITY

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is concerned with the concept of morality and the various and many understandings of it. In order to provide a framework of ideas within which to construct ethical questions for my sample of teachers, I decided to look at what might be called commonsense views as well as the more technical and abstract theories of moral philosophers. Both these I hope to express in the everyday language which Midgley (1981) sees as necessary in order to locate the richness and complexity of moral phenomena firmly in practical experience.

The definition of moral terms is no simple task, however, since such terms have many meanings, overlap with each other, and involve a plethora of feelings, assumptions and apparent contradictions. There is much confusion and disagreement both in the commonsense view of morality and in moral philosophy. Some indeed consider that the word morality should be abandoned altogether as it has no meaning. Frankena has neatly described the words moral and morality as ambiguous and "in search of a meaning". (1970, p. 150)

Nagel raises the possibility that confusion is in a sense inevitable due to the limits of human insight.
"It may be that some philosophical problems have no solutions. I suspect this is true of the deepest and oldest of them. They show us the limits of our understanding". (1979, p. xii)

It has been suggested that moral philosophy has not yet really begun and Weinreich-Haste and Locke appear to agree. They consider that we need to know what morality is and how different individuals understand it, but that at present .."we hardly begin to know the answers, which require both philosophical analysis and psychological explanation".. (1983, p.xvii)

Despite the confusions, Midgley is reluctant to abandon the concept of morality.

"The word moral and its derivatives are showing signs of strain. Like a small carpet, designed to fit a room which has been enlarged, they are wrenched this way and that to cover the bare spaces. Perhaps in the end we shall be forced to abandon them as Nietzsche suggested. But this would be wasteful".. (1981, p. 103)

So how do people understand this bewildering concept?

After this very brief introduction the next section of this chapter will discuss the ways in which the commonsense views, arguments and feelings of "ordinary" people are expressed. These are not necessarily separate views, but inform and overlap with each other. However, I hope to give an account of them in the following selective and generalised comments. In doing this, I shall also refer to philosophers in what might be called their commonsense moments, and also to an informal survey of 100 people, mostly teachers, on courses run by the writer and colleagues.
2.2 "Commonsense" accounts of morality

In every century or era since civilisation began, some writers have described that century or era as one of unprecedented moral decline. Our present era is no exception and our moral decline has become almost received wisdom, to judge by the number of people who repeat it in various publications and on radio and television. However, in the informal survey, 41% denied that Britain was in a state of moral decline and only 28% thought it was.

A central claim in MacIntyre's book After Virtue (1981) is that our civilisation has reached a turning point and that the horrors of the moral dark ages are already upon us. "The integral substance of morality has to a large degree been fragmented and then in part destroyed"... (p. 5) Because "there seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture", (p. 6) we fall back on an individualistic emotive doctrine. If, according to MacIntyre, the Aristotelian tradition of moral virtues could be restated, it would restore intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social attitudes and commitments.

I would suggest that MacIntyre's view is unduly pessimistic. However disguised its operation, morality will simply not go away. People have not on the whole lost touch with morality,
though their understandings of it and attitudes towards it are complicated and varied. Enter any public house and you will find in progress a loud conversation about what the government ought or ought not to be doing, the unfairness of this or that, or a general setting to rights of the world. Enter any school staffroom and you will find an animated conversation about the respect pupils ought to be showing towards fellow pupils and their property and the importance of truthfulness in relationships. But when they make such moral judgments and prescriptions, people are not necessarily aware of them as moral. It is somehow assumed, without being spoken, that people share common values.

For some people, morality means an ideal way of behaving or living that human beings forever strive towards either as individuals or a society or both. Or they give up striving and call themselves immoral because the ideal contains a built-in guarantee that it will never be reached. The great religions have specialised in describing the ideal and often use the metaphor of a journey or way. In the Samyutta-nikaya, v.8., the Buddha explains the noble eightfold way.

"What, monks, is the Noble Eightfold Way? It is namely right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration." (in ELIADE, 1979, p. 574)

He goes on to describe each one in detail. For example:-

Right speech, for example, is "refraining from falsehood, from malicious speech, from harsh speech, from frivolous speech."
And right action is "refraining from taking life, from taking what is not given, from sexual intercourse".

Tao writings tend to be allegorical and are concerned with the principle of harmony underlying and governing all existence, which, of course, includes that of human beings. The Tao or Way is one of not striving, of letting be. The Sage in Tao Te Ching Chap. VII

"Puts himself in the background; but is always to the fore. Remains outside; but is always there. Is it not just because he does not strive for any personal end That all his personal ends are fulfilled?".. (in ELIADE, 1979, p. 596)

Islam and Christianity both stress that living their prescribed moral life is the way to Paradise or Heaven or union with God after death. Jesus said "I am the Way". The first principle is often to believe in one God, as in the Christian Ten Commandments, and the Koran. The Hindus have many gods, but the concept of reincarnation means that people are throughout many lives striving towards a higher moral and bodily form, until they progress to Moksa or complete one-ness and freedom from the cycle of rebirth. For many religious people, therefore, morality is intrinsically related to religion either because it is a matter of divine command, or because it is the ideal way they should follow through life.

But some non-religious people also see religion and morality as intrinsically connected, and in rejecting religion reject
aspects of the morality associated with it. However, their rejection of religion is often couched in moral terms. Others reject religion because they do not see it affecting the behaviour of its adherents as they feel it should. Religious people do not appear to them to be "better" human beings than non-religious people.

There are also many who believe that morality is independent of religion. In the informal survey 61% thought religion was not necessary to morality, while only 20% thought it was. Darwin considered that moral instincts came first and needed cultivating by reason and civilisation before the idea of a universal and benevolent God would arise in the minds of men. Dewey also wrote that there was no instance of any large idea about the world being independently generated by religion. (SELDDES, G., 1985)

Religious perspectives ultimately understand morality as obedience to the revealed prescriptions of God, the natural law or ultimate reality. In contrast, there is the way of seeing morality as the pursuit of an ideal of social organisation. Throughout history writers such as Plato and Sir Thomas More have attempted such accounts of the Utopian society. Often the Utopian form was a way of attacking established social values or the corrupt use of power, in a manner that would be generally understood but not render the writer liable to official reprisals. In the early part of this century, socialist writers followed in this Utopian
tradition by describing an ideal socialist state as embodying the virtues of freedom, equality, happiness, courtesy and toleration. More recently there appears to be greater emphasis on Dystopias, future societies which are bleak and depressing, with no freedom or equality, or devastated by nuclear war or other catastrophies.

Another common belief is that people are naturally "moral", and that therefore morality will always emerge, perhaps even most obviously as a backlash when society is corrupt. This belief may depend on whether one has an optimistic or pessimistic view of human nature. A.S. Neill took the optimistic view that children at Summerhill would naturally, of their own accord, adopt moral values and patterns of behaviour. However, he also had a tendency to moralise if they did not. Golding, on the other hand, described in "Lord of the Flies" how morality in children broke down in the absence of adult control. Sociobiologists consider that it is our biology that makes us ethical beings. Our genes give us no choice.

"The core of ethics runs deep in our species and is common to human beings everywhere.... Kin altruism, reciprocal altruism and group altruism are strong features of human life.".. (SINGER, 1981, p. 27)

Psychotherapists spend much time in helping patients to accept and integrate the 'bad' side of themselves which is present and normal in every human being. People are not perfect and cannot behave ideally. Jung called this side of
everyone the shadow, and it is the natural or instinctive person.

"It is all those uncivilised desires and emotions that are incompatible with social standards and our ideal personality, all that we are ashamed of, all that we do not want to know about ourselves." (FORDHAM, 1953, p. 50)

To accept the shadow thus involves considerable moral effort and often the giving up of cherished ideals that were based on an illusion about human nature. The assumption behind psychotherapy is that though all people are in some degree morally "bad", there is also a kind of innate "goodness" in them which therapists seek to support.

Smail (1984) in what he calls his "insanely Utopian" book, has described the illusion that an ideal social world is possible as responsible for much of the misery which therapists try to alleviate. This illusion is reinforced by advertising and in it people are supposed to lead sane, balanced and happy lives. The secret world of despair is in fact the real world, where people feel inadequate because they are unable to live up to mythic self-imposed ideals. Life is never ideal, always much more unpleasant than people are led to expect.

Another perspective would say that morality is not a set of ideals to be striven after, but those mundane and pragmatic conditions which enable people to get on reasonably well with others. In this sense it is not something which matters in itself. It is rather the condition of people fulfilling
their roles in relation to each other such that all get what they want. There are thus explicit and implicit moral duties in particular jobs in society, for example in medicine and teaching. Other people expect that doctors and teachers should behave in certain ways, that lawyers will keep contracts and banks will safeguard money. The professions themselves have their written or unwritten codes of ethics.

The Institute of Business Ethics recently published a booklet in which was stated

"Our conviction is that, essentially, industry and commerce are highly ethical undertakings. The ethical demands on us who are engaged in them, are to run them supremely efficiently, responsibly and with clear moral standards"... (1987, p. 4)

However, they do not specify what these moral standards are.

We are also hearing now about "ethical investments". These seem to be concerned with companies which do not produce or sell armaments.

As Hume (1777) wryly observed

"It is impossible for men so much as to murder each other without statutes, and maxims, and an idea of justice and honour.... Common interest and utility beget infallibly a standard of right and wrong among the parties concerned". (SELBY-BIGGE, ed., 1975, pp. 210-211)

Social morality is a complex term, but generally it is understood to mean the values or standards that children learn, during their upbringing, from parents, teachers and the culture around them. This again is influenced by our religious inheritance. The point of morality here is often
to maintain social stability or the status quo and encourage conformity. To misquote Marx, morality can be seen as the opium of the people. A realisation of this meaning of morality can cause people to rebel or reject morality, but they often do it in moral terms, or talk about it as political instead.

Lukes has identified the paradox in Marxism's view of morality.

"On the one hand it is claimed that morality is a form of ideology ... that there are no objective truths or eternal principles of morality ... that Marxism is opposed to all moralising and rejects as out of date all moral vocabulary. On the other hand, no one can fail to notice that Marx's and Marxist writings abound in moral judgments. (1985, p. 3)

Lukes resolves this paradox by suggesting that Marxism is a form of consequentialism, by which any means justify the ends of a "perfect" socialist state.

It is common, in fact, for people to deny the word moral and use other words in its place to mean the same thing. For example, a teacher in my pilot study said that every action of hers was a political one, for example she felt she ought not to use more than her fair share of the world's resources. So the basis of her 'political' statement was moral, but she did not recognise or accept that it was. Politicians are also often accused of using morality as rhetoric to support their own party view.
Warnock notes, like Hume (loc.cit.) that both individuals and groups "are somewhat prone to consider, quite sincerely, if self-deceivably, as requirements of morality what suits themselves" (1971, p. 156)

Some people base a general indictment of morality on this fact. Anti-social acts such as vandalism and hooliganism are often called immoral, because they are against the interests of society. This appears to be because for some people morality is enshrined in the law, even the same as the law, and therefore breaking the law is immoral.

Another view of morality is expressed as behaving as other people expect. The 'other people' can be parents, God, others in authority or society in general. Failing to do this results in guilt. There are of course also those who take this view of morality but resent being told by others what they should do, and thus reject it as moralising, authoritarian or indoctrinative. Others reject this view by claiming that morality is entirely personal, those principles of action an individual makes up her own mind to follow, regardless of social pressures.

For some people, morality appears to be limited to a few basic rules or issues. Within the private view of morality are people who see only one issue or a few issues as moral ones, and other issues as non-moral. The one most frequently cited is sexual behaviour. Morality is equated with the
traditional Christian precepts of chastity before marriage and fidelity within it. Self-discipline in sexual relationships is thus virtuous. Midgley claims that euphemism is responsible for this use of the term morality, because "people would rather say "moral" than "sexual"; they would rather say "sin" or "immorality" than mention whatever special variety of the unmentionable is on hand at the time". (1981, p. 118) Opposed to this view that morality means sexual morality is the view of those people who exclude sexuality from the moral domain altogether. In economic affairs some see the profit motive as immoral while others do not. Some again see the working of a country's economic or political systems as nothing to do with morality at all. Piaget limits the "moral" to the area of non-substitutable relationships, and refers to other relationships as "juridical" (1945).

Another partial view of morality is one which see morality as belonging to a particular group of people rather than to all individuals or to society. Ethnic groups within one society, for example, often consider that different ethnic groups within that same society will not have the same morality. In whatever sense they use the word, they will claim "their morals are not the same as ours", with the implication that "their morals" are inferior. Some feminists talk about feminist morality and we also hear of middle-class morality, right-wing morality or socialist morality. Each group believes that the morality of other groups is different.
This raises the interesting question of what it means to qualify the word morality in this way.

Against the partial view are those who believe morality is inherent in living and goes on all the time.

"The moral life .... is something that goes on continually, not something that is switched off in between the occurrence of explicit moral choice". (MURDOCH, 1970, p. 37)

In my pilot study, a teacher claimed that every action and every decision concerned morality, even deciding what to eat for breakfast or what to throw in the dustbin.

As already seen with the use of words like political in preference to moral, many people apparently do not recognise a special category of "moral" words. Or, more accurately, "moral" terms seem to have a wide range of subtle meanings. 'Ought' has both instrumental and moral meanings as well as others. "I ought to visit my father" can be followed by the phrase "but I know I won't". This meaning seems far from the prescriptive 'ought' described by philosophers, for it appears to express an excuse or pretence for not acting rather than a command to act. Or "I ought to visit my father" can mean "Perhaps I will and perhaps I won't", thus expressing only a possible action. The word 'should', another "moral" term, is frequently confused with 'would' as if these two words have the same meaning. There are, of course, still many people who consider ought as an imperative and those who rebel against this imperative. Most people are clear, though, that none of us do everything we ought to do,
and most of us do a great deal that we ought not to do.

The last commonsense understanding of morality which I will describe here, (although I may not have covered all possibilities), is the one which sees morality primarily as concern for others. Often this concern is one which excludes concern for the self, and in its extreme is seen in acts of moral courage or heroism such as the suicide of Captain Oates or the action of Slotin the nuclear physicist as reported by Bronowski (1977). In an accident at a nuclear laboratory, Slotin exposed himself to a massive and fatal dose of radioactivity to save his seven companions. Such altruism is rare, but caring, compassion and concern for others, which imply an emotional, instinctive or gut response, are not. Of course, caring is understood and enacted in many ways and sometimes for self-interested reasons. To care for and be accepting towards others is also a precept of many religions and a basic value in many psychologies.

It is interesting to note that most of these commonsense views have been summarily dismissed by two philosophers. Wilson calls them fantasy and prejudice, escapes from the real world and from thinking. He makes a plea for reason, which "does not mean disregarding one's feelings, but trying to assess, guide or direct them in some coherent way". He continues, .."We need .. to try to suppress our basic fantasy .. and turn our minds to a rational consideration of the matter". (1973, p. 12)
Singer (1979) also dismisses many of these commonsense views when he writes that ethics is not a set of prohibitions concerned with sex, not an ideal system which is no good in practice, not intelligible only in terms of religion, and not culturally relative or subjective.

In brief summary, the ways of understanding morality selected for description here are:—it is in decline but still alive; an ideal way of living; related to religion; a social ideal; an innate goodness in human beings; mundane pragmatism; a justification of actions; culturally specific values; social control; existing law; conformity to others' expectations; a limited number of rules; continuous and universal; concern for others.

This account is necessarily rather general and confused. However, what may be seen as confusion in the account accurately reflects the confusion of the reality. Despite the confusion in people's understanding, it still seems to be the case that to be fully a person includes being a moral agent in some sense of the word. There is something to be understood from all concepts and the unverbalised assumptions and intuitions behind them. Despite the surface and verbalised differences, there do seem to be some shared meanings and values concerning human interactions. Some of the commonsense concepts will perhaps recur in the moral philosophy sections of this chapter and other concepts will
surely arise. Later in this study these issues will be explored again when data from the sample of teachers has been analysed.

2.3 The role of moral philosophy

Moral philosophers have specialised in the defining and clarifying of the concept of morality and the moral domain. In discussing and commenting on their positions, I emphasise again that I am not adopting any particular ethical position, nor engaging in moral philosophy myself. My account will not be a comprehensive one of all the moral positions philosophers have maintained, but will be selective. Its purpose, which has already been stated, is to generate additional ethical questions for my sample of teachers as well as to investigate the philosophical background of Kohlberg's ethical questions.

Even the most cursory reading of moral philosophy makes it clear that the discipline itself is in a state of confusion, with little consensus or general agreement. It is also currently under threat of extinction as an academic discipline. Mary Midgley wrote recently that moral philosophers have "withdrawn themselves into a disinfected corner as just one set of academic specialists among others". (The Guardian, 12 August 1987) To most people they appear removed from real-life social and political issues in
practice, and do not join their insights with those of other disciplines in the exploration of the very essence of the human mind.

Moral philosophers make two appeals to the reader. Do my premises ring true to you, and do my arguments convince you? They thus attempt to produce a logically coherent argument, but their premises are rooted in intuitions. It is these intuitions we shall be concerned with here rather than the arguments. Arguments are seldom convincing for the reader unless the intuitions they are based on ring true. And since the ethical positions adopted by philosophers are, like commonsense views, remarkably resistant to extinction, this suggests that their basic intuitions have validity.

Philosophers would probably not agree that their premises are rooted in intuitions, and that these in turn may be based on differing experiences and personality. By intuition I mean a judgment or thought which comes to mind with a feeling of insight. It can be understood as being the result of unconscious cognitive and affective processes which integrate experience and generate meanings. Intuitive thoughts can be about people, a sudden feeling of dislike, for example, and may later be proved incorrect. Sometimes, however, intuitions have what might be called uncanny accuracy. Emphasis by philosophers is usually on conscious and rational processes and the role of intuition is discounted.
The following sections will deal in turn with conflicting issues or dichotomies that have arisen in moral philosophy. These conflicting issues or dichotomies are sometimes understood as continua between polarised positions. A number of these dichotomies arise because many moral philosophers, particularly in the past, have engaged in two activities. They have been concerned to examine what is meant by moral concepts and how they are used on the one hand, and on the other have themselves engaged in explicit or disguised moral prescription.

The separation of these issues is to some extent arbitrary as there is considerable overlap. This is perhaps not surprising since the moral life as it is lived by the individual is likely to have some implicit if not explicit coherence to it. Psychology has taught us that most of an individual's behaviour is not as 'ad hoc' as it might appear on the surface. Separating out the elements of the moral life is thus bound to be an artificial convenience to enable the issues to be discussed.

2.4 Is and ought

As we saw in section 2.1, and as Mackie points out (1977), it is quite common and conventional for people with strong moral convictions to remain outside the "moral language game". Although it has been suggested that they are trespassing into
linguistics, moral philosophers carefully debate the ordinary-seeming words right, good, ought, should, etc. in a serious attempt to define why these words have moral meanings as well as non-moral ones. Cupitt, the theologian, has recently suggested that metaphysics and philosophy are dead and only language remains, because

"our thinking, our selfhood, our very humanity, are constituted within language, in such a way that we have nothing to think ourselves right out of language with". (quoted in The Guardian, 21 September 1987)

So, he argues, all the philosophical arguments over "reality" as opposed to what we see, feel and think have become pointless, .."they have simply dissolved, vanished, melted away..". There are, however, intuitions and ideas that persist below, or without language. And philosophers might argue, that even if philosophy disappeared, there would still be talk and argument about how we should live. Socrates did not recognise a subject called philosophy. As Williams put it, (1985) he just talked with his friends in a plain way.

Midgley is convinced of the necessity for an analysis of moral language. She argues that since these concepts do a lot of work, we must try to define them and look for underlying unities.

The distinction I concentrate on in this section is the one made by philosophers between "is" and "ought", and the related distinctions between "fact" and "value", and between
"description" and "prescription". In his much-quoted passage, Hume describes how writers move from statements joined by "is" and "is not", to statements joined by "ought" and "ought not".

"This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this "ought" or "ought not" expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it"... (in HUDSON, 1970, p.253)

There appear to be two possible interpretations of this passage. The first is that there is a logical gap between a statement of fact and a moral judgment. An example might be this. From the factual statement that "torture causes pain", it cannot follow that "torture is wrong" unless a further premiss is asserted "we ought not to cause other people pain".

Philosophers have tried to show that this logical gap can be closed. Hudson's example is not a very good one. His statements are "x is in the common interest" and "x therefore ought to be done". I am not sure that "x is in the common interest" is, as he claims, a fact; it seems itself to be a moral judgment. One might also suggest that the implication of the necessary intervening sentence is there, if not explicitly expressed. People seldom express all the logical links in their chains of thought, for, as mentioned earlier, logical consistency if any is often far below conscious
expression and shared values are often assumed not to need spelling out.

Hare notes (1963) that there are moral words whose prescriptive meaning is secondary to their descriptive, like industrious, honest and courageous. As well as being descriptions, these words imply a commendation which is prescriptive, that is, they imply that it is good to be industrious, honest and courageous. "Good" is described by Hare as a primary evaluative word.

Most philosophers appear to accept Hume's point and it is generally called the "naturalistic fallacy" in this first interpretation. The second interpretation claims the opposite view, i.e. that Hume saw the logical gap between "is" and "ought" but filled it with the idea that moral judgments were statements of fact (Hunter, 1963) or that the inference made from "is" to "ought" was a reasonable one (MacIntyre, 1959). It seems that Hume himself raised the question about the relationship between "is" and "ought" but does not give a clear answer to it, thus leaving all subsequent moral philosophers free to engage in what one of them has called this "delicious argument".

We may conclude, however, that it is important to clear thinking to be aware of the obvious confusion between statements of fact, statements of value and those which are both. Those which are both are verbal shorthand for an
assumption of shared meaning or values, whether they are "ought" statements or not. For example, when asked why stealing is wrong, people commonly say because it is against the law. They are assuming here a moral judgment, shared by the listener, that it is wrong to disobey the law. So both these "is" statements have implied moral judgments in them.

Kant viewed all "ought" statements as imperatives or commands but he divided them into two kinds which he called respectively hypothetical and categorical according to whether the idea was a prudential or instrumental one, or a moral imperative or duty. Prichard (1950) points out that the grounds of "ought" statements can only be ascertained from the context, so that when told for example that we ought never to drive a hard bargain, we cannot tell whether the imperative is categorical or hypothetical unless we know the reason the speaker has in mind. There are perhaps some of our own "ought" statements which might be both categorical and hypothetical, I would suggest. For example, "I ought to get up early" might be on grounds of maintaining my health as well as my duty to care for a distressed child.

Hare claims that all 'ought' statements are prescriptive. When he first began to work in moral philosophy in the nineteen-forties, emotivism was a dominant theory and it appeared to put morality beyond reason. Hare set himself to provide a theory based on reasoned argument in language with a logical structure. He says there are four necessary
ingredients of moral argument. (1963, pp. 92-97) These are a) a logical framework provided by prescriptivity and universalisability, b) an appeal to the facts of the case, c) an appeal to the inclination and interest of those involved and d) an appeal to the imagination, i.e. putting oneself in someone else's position. It is not appropriate here to go into great detail on Hare's theories and the criticisms of them. However, it is necessary to be clear what he means by a) above, a logical framework provided by prescriptivity and universalisability.

First of all, he considers that both statements of fact and statements of value are universalisable, that is, universalisability is not a feature of moral judgments alone, it is also a feature of descriptive judgments. But statements of fact are not prescriptive because they do not entail imperatives, or evaluative commendations as moral judgments do. In making moral judgments we are prescribing. To say that moral judgments, and indeed all ought judgments, are prescriptive is not to say that they are imperatives, but that they entail imperatives. In saying "Capital punishment ought to be abolished", for example, I commit myself to abolishing it in so far as this possibility is open to me. This judgment has the further feature of universalisability because others who accept it, will commit themselves similarly.
One might wonder here whether Hare's view of the average human being's dispassionate commitment to logic and reason is not rather optimistic. In his desire, perhaps even his passionate desire, to counter the claims of emotivism, Hare appears to forget that humans are creatures of sensibility, feeling and unconscious motives as well as reason. This will be discussed further in the section following on the tension between thinking and feeling in moral philosophy.

The views of Hare are not accepted by MacIntyre, who denies that moral utterances are prescriptive and universalisable. He writes

"we tell the truth and keep promises most of the time because it does not occur to us to do otherwise... maxims do not guide us because we do not need to be guided." (1970, p. 37)

MacIntyre claims that the statement "x ought to do y" can mean many other things, for example it can be an expression of indignation or other emotion, the giving of advice, or the expression of commands, exhortations, persuasion or one's own principles. There are also, I would suggest, psychological possibilities such as projection or other defence mechanisms.

This section has discussed, briefly, the disagreements among philosophers over moral words, in particular the word 'ought'. It is perhaps worth adding the view of Kitwood (1987) that ought originated in the rights and duties of knights and serfs in medieval feudalism, but that this has been forgotten and .."after 200 years or more of discourse ... the moral ought has acquired a virtually transcendent
status". It is unclear whether this is a linguistic point - deriving "ought" from "owe" or a substantive point, thus saying in effect that "ought" originates from contractual relationships e.g. I owe the king allegiance. But this idea of ought as a left-over metaphor appears to be a novel one, and it will be interesting to see it developed further.

There is enough consensus that "ought" is a moral concept in some aspects of its usage to agree in general with Hare's comment .. "So when we 'flex' our moral words, we have regard, not merely to matters of mere convenience in communication, but to substantial questions of morality". (1963, p. 29)

2.5 Reason and sentiment

This section on the tension between reasoning or thinking and feeling in morality begins with a return to Hume, who stated the problem as follows.

"concerning the foundation of Morals; whether they be derived from Reason or from Sentiment; whether we attain Knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense". (in SELBY-BIGGE, L., 1975, p. 170)

The issue is whether moral judgment is entirely or primarily a matter of reason or of feeling, or whether the distinction is irrelevant because there is never one without the other. A major problem in posing such a dichotomy in the first place is the ambiguity attached to both words. Reason can be
understood as tightly organised logical thought, as "having reasons", whether they are good or bad ones, and as just thinking of any kind. Feeling can also be understood in several ways. For example, it can be a passing mood, a more enduring disposition, an intuition, a "gut" reaction or an attitude. In the informal survey, 63% of people disagreed and only 24% agreed that we should rely on our intuitive gut feeling in matters of morality.

Aristotle believed that desire or feeling should follow reason.

"Since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts". (NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI.2.)

Hume wrote that the arguments on each side were so plausible that he was apt to suspect that "reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions". (SELBY-BIGGE, 1975, p. 172) However, he concludes that although reason apprehends all the facts and circumstances,

"the approbation or blame which then ensues cannot be the work of the judgment, but of the heart; and is not a speculative proposition or affirmation, but an active feeling or sentiment". (ibid. p. 290.)

Thus, although Hume agrees with Aristotle that both reason and feeling are involved in moral judgment, he has a different emphasis. Feeling is necessary and more important than reason. Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions.
Hume's claims were denied by a number of subsequent philosophers who were perhaps influenced by the eighteenth century Enlightenment in their support of reason. Foremost among them was Kant, who posited an 'a priori' connection between the moral law and a rational will.

"All moral concepts have their seat and origin in reason completely a priori, and indeed in the most ordinary human reason just as much as in the most highly speculative: they cannot be abstracted from any empirical, and therefore merely contingent, knowledge. In this purity of their origin is to be found their very worthiness to serve as supreme practical principles"... (trans. PATON, 1948, p.75)

For "only reason can recognise as its highest practical function the establishment of a good will"... (ibid., p.62)

This appears to mean that the consequence of being rational is always good. In other words if human beings were constantly and fully rational they could not do anything other than the good. Doing good is being rational. Kant developed this into his concept of the categorical imperative already mentioned.

"The will is absolutely good if it cannot be evil - that is, if its maxim, when made into a universal law, can never be in conflict with itself". (ibid., p. 98)

The emotivist view as expressed in the work of Stevenson (1944) and others appears to threaten the view of morality as rational. Stevenson argued that there is a distinction in a moral judgment between 1) what is said, or assumed to be the facts of the situation under judgment and 2) the positive or negative evaluation which is placed upon those facts. Thus moral judgments are expressions of attitude and their major
use is to create an influence on others, to persuade them to agree. Stevenson's understanding of "attitude" is a disposition to act in certain ways and experience certain feelings. This has been criticised by other philosophers who claim that attitudes are more to do with beliefs than emotions. However, it seems true to say that people often present moral situations to themselves or others in highly emotional language and with much passion. As Peters has pointed out .."Adherence to principles is a passionate business". (1970, p. 55)

Other emotivists such as Ayer have said moral judgments do express emotions but have differentiated the theory from subjectivism, which latter view might claim that "X is good" means "I like X".

"We reject the subjectivist view that to call an action right, or a thing good, is to say that it is generally approved of, because it is not self-contradictory to assert that some actions which are generally approved of are not right, or that some things which are generally approved of are not good". (1946, p. 104)

Emotivism must also be differentiated from the relativist view, which in its most extreme form, asserts that whatever anyone approves of is good. It can also be seen as different from, though connected to, the existentialism of Nietzsche, who saw .."human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves". (in MACINTYRE, 1981, p. 266)
Mary Warnock feels that moral positions cannot be divorced from deep feelings.

"A lot of the positions could be criticised as irrational, but I do believe that morality could not exist at all unless partly based on moral sentiment". (Interview in Sunday Times, 24 June, 1984).

MacIntyre criticises both emotivism and existentialism as ethical theories because they reduce moral judgment to personal preference and are the cause of the individualism he blames for the moral decline in our society.

To return, however, to philosophers who, like Kant, support the claims of reason, for example Rawls (1971) and Hare. Reason is the means by which Rawls' principles of justice are reached, and once reached, he considers every rational and disinterested person would assent to them. Hare, as stated in the previous section, postulates that ethical statements prescribe certain moral principles and thus guide human conduct. There must therefore be reason which is able to universalise a moral principle to all logically possible cases. We will see in Chapter 3 how Kohlberg has followed Rawls and the rationalist tradition in his theory of the ontogenesis of justice reasoning. Gewirth is another influential philosopher who believes that although agents are both rational and purposive, (the purposiveness includes desire) the "ultimate justificans" of morality is reason (1978).
Warnock appears to agree, although he suggests that we are rational beings only in a limited sense, namely

"that one is able to achieve some understanding of the situations in which one may be placed, to envisage alternative courses of action in these situations, to grasp and weigh consideration for or against these alternatives and to act accordingly". (1971, p. 144)

but that in this limited sense it is a necessary condition of the applicability to one's doings of moral principles.

Kant and Hare appear to see reason as a faculty used by each individual to work out or keep to certain rules or principles. Gauthier, while also advocating reason as central to morality, sees it as operating in groups, as a principle of rational agreement

"We shall defend the traditional conception of morality as a rational constraint on the pursuit of individual interest"... (1986, p. 2)

But this morality of rational constraint is a socially agreed one, a bargaining or contractarian theory of morals. This idea, he says, is a new one.

"Morality is thus given a sure grounding in a weak and widely accepted conception of practical rationality. No alternative account of morality accomplishes this"... (ibid., p. 17)

This appears not too far removed from Durkheim's stance. More of Gauthier's social account will be given later in the section on the tension between individual and social morality.

Midgley considers that the dispute is a pointless one.

"British moral philosophy from the eighteenth century on has occupied itself with a dispute about
whether morality is a matter of reason or feeling, ignoring the obvious fact that it is both". (1981, pp. 4-5)

But she goes on to point out that when feeling fails, we cannot act at all .."When it does fail, as in cases of extreme apathy and depression, people stop acting".. (ibid., p. 3) Thus she appears to suggest that feeling plays the major part in moral reasoning and action.

Bambrough returns to Aristotle, with whom we also began this section, and repeats his concepts of rational appetite and appetitive reason. Aristotle, he says, recognised that a human being is an indissoluble compound of reason and desire, and neither one should have preference over the other. He concludes that we are not forced to give an account of moral choice and action either exclusively in terms of 'argument and induction' or wholly in terms of 'feeling and internal sense', and that philosophers agree on this more than one would expect.

"We are rational animals, creatures composite of mind and body, and our thoughts as well as our feelings must be given the scope". (1979, p. 147)

We have followed a rather tortuous route through the debate on reason versus emotion in morality, and have seen that some philosophers support entirely reason and some mainly reason, while others endorse emotion or mainly emotion. Yet another group find them inseparable from each other. None of them look to psychology or physiology for support, although both disciplines have much to offer. Both are clear that
cognition and affect are interrelated. Affect can cause commitment to a moral value; it can also weaken commitment. In the brain the cortical system is inextricably bound up with the autonomic nervous system. In conversation people frequently use 'I feel' to mean 'I think'. Philosophers and the rest of us who conceptually distinguish thinking from feeling therefore appear to be separating what is in practice inseparable.

I give the last word to Nagel. It is one of uncertainty.

..I believe one should trust problems over solutions, intuition over arguments, and pluralistic discord over systematic harmony".. (1979, p. x)

2.6 Ends and means

Another area of contention in moral philosophy is between what has technically been called the teleological understanding of morality and the non-teleological or deontological understanding of morality. This is the broadest division in value theory, around the fundamental issue of means versus ends.

The concern in the teleological understanding of morality is primarily with consequences. There is first a definition of the good and then anything that leads to this good is defined as right. This type of theory can be subdivided according to the ways in which the good is defined. A hedonist claims that pleasure is the only good but may see pleasure as either
spiritual or physical. Pleasure may also be seen as relief from suffering. Both Bentham and Mill were hedonists as well as utilitarians although Bentham stressed the quantity of happiness and Mill the quality of happiness (BOYCE and JENSEN, 1978).

The thesis of the utilitarian is that good should be sought, and it is one's moral obligation to act in ways which always promote the greatest possible amount of good. In order to do this, rule-utilitarians adopt rules, and act-utilitarians are concerned with the utility of particular acts. There are also limited utilitarians who emphasise maximising the good for only one specified group of people. This in fact describes the moral thinking of many people, for example those who confine morality within their own family or their religion. Others who take all people into consideration can thus be called universal utilitarians.

Mill also stresses the importance of reasoning;

"Whether happiness be or be not the end to which morality should be referred - that it should be referred to an end of some sort, and not left in the dominion of vague feeling or inexplicable internal conviction, that it be made a matter of reason and calculation, and not merely of sentiment, is essential to the very idea of moral philosophy". (quoted in FLEW, 1971, p.116)

Spiritual pleasure, however that might be defined, is the goal or purpose of morality in many religions. Thus, within a religious context morality tends to be understood in a teleological way. There is, however, a deontological aspect to the religious perspective on morality since the actions
said to lead to spiritual pleasure are also said to be intrinsically good or right.

A non-hedonist values something other than pleasure as the only good. Aristotle, for example, valued happiness, remarking that only "men of the most vulgar type identify the good or happiness, with pleasure". (NICOMACHEAN ETHICS I:5) His definition of happiness is "an activity of soul in accordance with perfect virtue". and by virtue he means "not that of the body but of the soul". (ibid., 1:13) Virtue of the soul can be divided into intellectual virtues and moral virtues. The practice of these virtues is justified because it leads to happiness.

Another category of teleological reasoning is egoism. The ethical egoist is one who determines the moral rightness of an act in terms, not of the act, but of its consequences for himself or herself. The end which is sought is one's own goods, and this may mean ignoring the good of others. However, to do things in one's own interests is not necessarily to be selfish and unkind. It can be in one's own interests and lead to one's own good to do things for others. Rand (1964) however, suggests that in any case, it is right to put ourselves first.

Teleological reasoning can therefore be summarised as end-oriented reasoning, the end being either qualitative hedonism, quantitative hedonism or non-hedonism. Egoism is
the view that one ought to seek one of these ends exclusively for oneself. Act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism are distinguished by which of these three ends or purposes is valued.

Deontological reasoning is a denial that only the consequences of acts are important. The nature of the act itself is more important in determining rightness. In pure deontology, morality is a function solely of the nature of the act itself and consequences are irrelevant, and in mixed deontology a consideration of consequences is combined with a consideration of the act. Deontologists can also, like utilitarians, be divided between act and rule orientations. For Kant, for example, the consequences of an act were irrelevant. As a pure rule-deontologist, he had one central moral rule by which to judge an act, the categorical imperative.

"There is therefore only a single categorical imperative and it is this: 'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law'. (trans. PATON, 1948, p. 84)

He also gives an example of this in action, or rather what happens when it is not in action.

"For the universality of a law that everyone believing himself to be in need can make any promise he pleases with the intention not to keep it would make promising, and the very purpose of promising, itself impossible, since no one would believe he was being promised anything, but would laugh at utterances of this kind as empty shams". (ibid., p.85)

A mixed-rule deontologist emphasises rules over particular acts, but also gives some consideration to consequences.
Ross, for example, gives seven rules or duties which ought to be followed, other things being equal. These are fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement and not harming others. (1930) None of these obligations are so firm as never to be outweighed by one of the other obligations or by consequences. The crucial problem in making moral choice is to balance maximising the good against these several obligations.

Sartre is a pure act-deontologist because he adopts the attitude that the rightness of each act must be judged without recourse to its possible consequences or its conformity to any moral rules. Sartre says that

"Kant believes that the formal and universal are enough to constitute an ethic. We, on the other hand, think that principles which are too abstract run aground in trying to decide action... The content is always concrete and therefore unforeseeable; there is always the element of invention".  (1947, pp. 55-56)

On this view people must invent their own values. They cannot simply discover those that "exist", for they do not exist.

To summarise, deontological reasoning is concerned with the nature of an act in considering its rightness, and only secondarily might consider the consequences of an act. A deontologist may also have an act or rule orientation. Those deontologists who are mixed in that they consider consequences as well as acts, can, like the teleologists, who only consider consequences, be hedonist or non-hedonist.
This section has described very briefly the two main theories of normative ethics. Mackie (1977) questions whether there is in fact much difference between these two theories, for he expresses difficulty in distinguishing and separating them. There are also some goods which Mill, for example, had difficulty in squeezing into the utilitarian scheme either as higher pleasures or an indirect means to happiness, but which should be included. Mackie cites as also important, liberty of thought and discussion, understanding of all sorts of things, a self-reliant, enterprising and experimental spirit and way of life, artistic creation and craftsmanship, the enjoyment and appreciation of beauty, and general participatory self-government in large and small institutions.

It is interesting to note that the majority (70%) of teachers in the informal survey referred to earlier agreed there were certain things people ought never to do whatever the consequences, with a minority (13%) disagreeing and 17% uncertain. Thus a deontological view was predominant. Whether this will be the case with the current sample under study remains to be seen.

2.7 Individual autonomy versus authority and society

The focus of this section is on the contrast between a
concept of morality as derived from society and socially based, and a concept of morality as a function of the individual person. Moral philosophers appear rarely to have addressed this distinction as a focus of argument and hence "the deep conflicts between them are concealed instead of being brought into the open". (COOPER, 1970, p.72) All individuals are also members of a community or society. In contrasting the social and individual origins of morality we are perhaps therefore drawing attention once again to a difference of emphasis rather than a discrete dichotomy.

Most philosophers appear to concentrate their analysis upon the individual as a source of moral reasoning and judgment. Moral maturity consists in autonomy rather than conformity to any authority, and the mark of a mature moral agent is the ability to decide for oneself and act on one's own judgment. Thus the individual conscience is seen as more important than society's mores or laws. There are philosophers who are exceptions to this tradition, however, and their views will be described. Also, the views on morality of a psychologist, Piaget, and an empirical sociologist, Durkheim, which bear on this question, will be contrasted. Piaget supports individual autonomy and Durkheim like the philosopher Hobbes, submission to the authority of society.

MacIntyre (1981) sees only emotive philosophies as individualistic, but the formalist tradition of Kant and Hare also stresses individual rationality and adherence to the
principles or rules which reason dictates. Thus they firmly shifted moral authority from religion and placed it with the individual. Nagel considers that deontological requirements are agent-centred because they instruct people to determine the rightness or wrongness of their acts solely from the point of view of their position in the world and their direct relation to others. (1979, p. 204) Murdoch also takes the agent-centred perspective when she disputes Hampshire's view that all internalisation comes from outside, and people's actions are determined by public life. The authority she claims is that of reality as discerned by the "refined and honest perception", the "just and loving gaze" of each individual. If people attend properly to this reality, they will know what must be done and have no choice but to be obedient. (1970, pp. 38-40)

A philosopher who particularly stresses the individual agent and her rights is Gewirth, although along with individual rights all individuals are also obligated towards preserving the rights of other individuals. The supreme principle of morality he calls the Principle of Generic Consistency, and he states it thus.

"The general principle of these obligations and rights may be expressed as the following precept addressed to every agent: Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself". (1978, p. 135)

Every human being is an agent and because of that must hold that his freedom and well-being are necessary goods.
"On the basis of his engaging in purposive action every agent is logically committed to accept this value judgment about necessary goods". (ibid., p.57)

This in turn requires him to accept logically that he has rights to these generic features. This right-claim also entails, in a secondary way, that under certain conditions other persons ought to assist him to have freedom and well-being, and at the very least ought to refrain from interfering with his freedom.

Thus morality originates from the autonomous individual person, but there are social consequences that follow from Gewirth's definition of human rights, for example that everyone has the right to be rescued from serious deprivation or starvation or has the right to commit suicide if they so choose.

MacIntyre disputes Gewirth's logical move from wanting 'necessary goods' to having a right to them.

"It is quite clear that the claim that I have a right to do or have something is a quite different type of claim from the claim that I need or want or will be benefitted by something". (1981, p. 64)

According to MacIntyre, the predicament in modern moral philosophy remains, that is, a predicament in which the price paid for liberation from what appeared to be the external authority of traditional morality has been the loss of any authoritative content from the would-be moral utterances of the newly autonomous agent.
"Each moral agent now spoke unconstrained by the externalities of divine law, natural teleology or hierarchical authority; but why should anyone else now listen to him"? (ibid., p.66)

The question of individual freedom is a difficult one in moral philosophy. For some it is understood as egoism, and much moral philosophy, like religion, has aimed to defeat the "fat relentless ego" (MURDOCH, 1970, p.52), the enemy of the truly moral life. Murdoch herself connects morality with attention to individuals, not in a logical way like Gewirth, but in a more imaginative way like Dante. Murdoch writes of a freedom which is not strictly the exercise of the will, but rather the experience of accurate vision which occasions action. Such accurate vision needs not only attention but love, and the action that follows is then known and necessary.

"Attention is a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality. I believe this to be the characteristic and proper mark of the active moral agent". (ibid., p.34)

Dante, who is not strictly speaking a philosopher, expressed the idea of virtue as "the light of the intellect charged with love". (1971, p. 433)

Hampshire sees only comparative freedom as possible for the individual. There is what he calls a swaying balance between consciousness of oneself as an agent and as a patient, as active or passive. Other philosophers have seen this tension as one between free will and determinism. However, for our current purposes, we will stay in the more general terms of
the tension between autonomy and authority, and turn to the contrasting theories of Piaget and Durkheim.

Piaget has identified two types of social relations: constraint and co-operation.

"The first implies an element of unilateral respect, of authority and prestige; the second is simply the intercourse between two individuals on an equal footing". (1932, p. 53)

Relations involving co-operation or mutual respect he considers necessary for the development of intellectual and moral autonomy, and therefore, an understanding of morality based upon the idea of the moral equality of individuals. Relationships of unilateral respect, on the other hand, imply moral inequality, since one party to the relationship exercises power and authority over the other, whose duty is to obey. Insofar as an understanding of morality can be inferred from such unilateral relationships it is that morality consists in obedience to authority.

In Piaget's scheme, whether or not such heteronomous relationship is the first step in the child's experience of relating to others, it should give way to subsequent relationships of mutual respect and the realisation of moral autonomy.

"The adult who is under the dominion of unilateral respect for the 'Elders' and for tradition is really behaving like a child". (ibid., p.340)

The relevant point here is that, as Piaget implies, morality can be understood in two ways, as originating autonomously in the individual in relation to others who are moral equals, or
as an acceptance of, and sense of obligation to conform to, the prescriptions and rules of authority.

In opposition to Piaget's views are those of Durkheim. In classifying people's objectives into personal and impersonal, and stating that personal ends do not have moral value, Durkheim denies that the individual is an autonomous moral agent or an originator of morality. His view could be considered as heteronomous, for it is based on authority, the moral authority of the group or society.

"There are no genuinely moral ends except collective ones. There is no truly moral force save that involved in attachment to a group". (1961, p. 82)

And unlike Piaget, who sees unilateral respect as immature, Durkheim considers that through submitting to the rules of the group people develop selflessness and realise their own true potential. We defer to society, which exists separately and beyond individuals, with a feeling of religious respect.

"Society is the benevolent and protecting power, the nourishing mother from which we gain the whole of our moral and intellectual substance and toward whom our wills turn in a spirit of love and gratitude". (ibid., p.92)

Sprigge also appears to be a philosopher outside the individualistic tradition, for he sees morality as a system of prescriptions, conformity to which is encouraged in society by public opinion. He considers that people should properly conform. It is necessary and proper for society to limit the individual's pursuit of his own ideals. We should
conform to morality but seek our satisfactions elsewhere.

(1970, p. 144)

Since most individuals live in a social system, it is unlikely that any individual could act as a completely autonomous being, in the sense of a wholly separate moral agent. Gauthier attempts a synthesis.

"A just society is neither a Utopia nor a society of economic men. It provides a framework for community but is not communal. The socialisation that it affords its members promotes the realisation of their autonomy". (1986, p. 339)

Strawson (1961) writes that there are many possible systems of moral demands, but certain human interests must be recognised in any community. These will include the abstract virtue of justice, some form of obligation to mutual aid and mutual abstention from injury, and, in some form and some degree, the virtue of honesty. Frankena (1970) also would like to believe that morality is a social enterprise as well as a rational one. Cooper (1970) believes there is a distinction between individual and social morality because unless there were such a thing as human society there would be no morality. We employ the individual concept whenever we stand back from the social one and try to decide whether to accept or reject some part of it. He concludes that our actual social and moral life is a product of the union of, and the tensions between, two diverse but related concepts of morality.
It is clear that this tension between individual and social morality is an important one, and also that it is related to the tension which will be addressed in the following section, that between subjective and objective conceptions of morality.

2.8 Subjective and objective

This section will look briefly at what philosophers have traditionally called subjectivism and objectivism. They appear to hold a number of positions with regard to these concepts. One is that these concepts are separate, opposed and incompatible. Another is that they differ by degree along a continuum. A third position is that both are involved in moral thinking and so in a sense the distinction is a false one. It is also claimed that one derives from the other. However, since many philosophers concentrate on criticising or denying other positions rather than clarifying their own, even the above positions must be considered as tentative.

Hare says he does not understand what is meant by the objectivity of values. But Mackie points out that this is not a good reason for saying that it is not a real issue. He believes it is an important issue and that it would make a real difference to our metaphysics if we had to find room for objective values, perhaps something like Plato's forms,
somewhere in our picture of the world. (1977, p. 24) Another philosopher, Ayer, considers that it is not a real issue, and that the 'familiar' objective-subjective antithesis is out of place in moral philosophy. (in HUDSON, 1970, p.136)

A definition of these terms is thus very difficult, but Boyce and Jensen (1978) offer a working definition which we shall follow here. Subjectivism is used to signify that a given ethical theory basically rests on attitudes. That is, a given attitude is the sole criterion of morality or moral truth. Thus, a subjectivist theory is one in which all ethical assertions are merely statements of attitudes which one holds, or which someone else holds. An objectivist theory is one in which this is not the case. Ethical assertions are held to reflect an "objective", transcendent moral truth that is independent of anyone's feelings.

The objective point of view is related to, but not the same as, the absolutist point of view, and is perhaps also connected with our religious tradition and the moral authority of God or other authority figures. The two terms 'objective' and 'absolute' are frequently confused and this will be discussed in the next section. Certainly I expect teachers to confuse them, particularly when considering the question of whether moral reasoning is different from scientific reasoning.
Those philosophers like Kant who are prescriptive and universalise moral principles can therefore be considered loosely as objectivist, although they claim that every rational person would agree. This is a difficult point though, because Mackie would argue that subjective agreement is not objectivity. Traditionally, the values that are being agreed to are considered as objective. From Plato and Aristotle, the dominant objectivist tradition has assumed or claimed that there can be knowledge of what is the good for human beings. The idea of objective values makes a strong emotional or psychological appeal to human beings, for such values appear to offer security or certainty to life. Without them, life can appear to have no purpose, no meaning and no coherence, and human beings themselves of no value at all. MacIntyre interprets this in another way. Instead of seeing objective moral principles as a psychological defence against despair, he sees them as a mask for expressions of personal preference in moral argument. (1981, p.18)

The moral authority of the Church in the western world provided the objective values of divine revelation. In the classical age, reason became the cornerstone of the belief in the possibility of obtaining absolute, objective or certain knowledge. Early scientific knowledge corroborated this. However, modern science rejects it. Popper (1972) said that science did not provide infallible or certain knowledge. Like a historian, the scientist marshals arguments for and against a conjectural analysis, and then submits them to
rational criticism. Objectivity only comes in as part of this rational criticism. Russell (1935) argued that values are a matter of taste. Science can be objective, but morality cannot. This is a subjectivist view and puts morality outside the realm of truth and falsehood. What science cannot discover, humankind cannot know. However, there is still a strong objectivist tradition today, both in science and in philosophy. Kohlberg is careful to call his position non-relativistic, but nevertheless he has frequently stated his debt to Socrates, Kant and Rawls in asserting that the first or only virtue of a person, school or society is justice, and it is always the same ideal form regardless of climate or culture.

Bambrough is convinced that there is objective moral knowledge, although he recognises that

"in morality as in psychology we are concerned with the subjective reactions of individuals and at the same time with a subject matter that calls for and permits .. moral objectivity". (1979, p. 66)

He uses as proof of moral knowledge which everyone would know and agree to be true the following moral proposition: we know that this child, who is about to undergo what would otherwise be painful surgery, should be given an anaesthetic before the operation. He appears to be saying that we ought not to cause unnecessary suffering to a child. Even so, it is a large claim to make that everyone would agree with his example. On a factual basis, if the anaesthetic was more dangerous than the operation, it might cause less suffering in the long term not to use it. Those specialists who are
currently conducting research to discover whether newborn infants are able to feel pain, also would not agree. However, these are perhaps quibbles as Bambrough is defending a commonsense view of moral knowledge as objective.

"The commonsense view is that we know that stealing is wrong, that promise-keeping is right, that unselfishness is good, that cruelty is bad".. (ibid., p. 16)

MacIntyre has written in similar vein that it does not occur to us to do otherwise than tell the truth and keep promises most of the time. (loc.cit.)

So are we back to defining morality as commonsense? I suspect there may be some truth in this.

Mackie makes the bold statement that there are no objective values, (1977, p.15) but also asserts that subjectivism has more than one meaning. The denial that there are objective values does not necessarily commit him to the view that they are subjective reports or commendations, but commits him to moral scepticism. Subjectivism is commonly understood to be analogous to emotivism, but emotivists like Ayer have denied this. (Ayer, loc.cit.) Hume is considered to be a subjectivist, and also Locke. The intuitionist view of Ross, out of which the emotivist view developed is that we use our subjective intuition on the facts of the situation, which may lead to objective values. The nature of intuition, however, remains a mystery.

"The objective aspect .. consists of certain morally relevant facts about the persons or things involved, and the subjective aspect .. consists of
certain morally relevant thoughts of the agent’s about the persons or things involved". (in HUDSON, 1970, p.92)

Most philosophers dispute Ross's view because intuition as a mystery defies the analysis and logic they consider a necessary part of moral philosophy. In section 2.3 I argued, however, that much philosophical analysis is in fact based on the intuitions of philosophers. And I will argue later that philosophers might take more notice of intuition and other psychological processes.

Existentialism also asserts the important reality of self. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. Thus the first effect of existentialism is that it puts all persons in possession of themselves as they are, and places the entire responsibility for their existence squarely on their own shoulders. They have to confront their own anguish in the absence of external moral truths, which are, as Plato said, "laid up in heaven". But even Sartre argues, according to Bambrough, like most people, as if there were moral truth, some prior knowledge on which to base moral choice.

The distinction between objective and subjective thus appears to be relative and a matter of dispute. Hare considers that relativism, subjectivism, emotivism, and other such doctrines (none of which he holds) have become so inextricably confused with one another in philosophical writings as to make the term 'objectivism' - which is used indiscriminately to contrast with all these views - totally useless as a tool of
serious enquiry. It becomes even more confusing when people suppose that anybody who is not a 'descriptivist' cannot be an 'objectivist' and must therefore be a 'relativist', a 'subjectivist', an 'emotivist', or even all three in some sense. (1963, p.50) The problem appears to be that the same individual is the occupant of both viewpoints. As Nagel puts it

"The task of accepting the polarity without allowing either of its terms to swallow the other should be a creative one. It is the aim of eventual unification that I think is misplaced, both in our thought about how to live and in our conception of what is. The co-existence of conflicting points of view, varying in detachment from the contingent self, is not just a practically necessary illusion but an irreducible fact of life". (1979, p. 213)

However, despite the difficulties of definition, empirical studies have been made of the objective-subjective dimension in people's moral thinking (Trainer 1982, Fishkin, 1984) and these will be described in Chapter 4.

2.9 Absolute and relative

These concepts are closely related to, and sometimes confused with, those of the previous section. The tendency is for an absolutist to be objective, and a relativist to be subjective. However, someone who believes that ethical values are objective can say that the courses of conduct which these values determine must vary partly according to the particular occasions; and hence be relative to them. A simplified view of absolutism might be as a belief that two
conflicting ethical opinions cannot be equally valid, and of relativism that two conflicting ethical opinions may be equally valid. Within each concept, however, there are further distinctions to be made, as well as confusions to be noted.

Absolutism can, for example, be opposed to consequentialism, because an absolutist is somebody who thinks that there are certain types of action which should never be done whatever the consequences. Hare, however, disagrees with this. In most senses of the word he is an absolutist in his formalist view of the prescriptivity and universalisability of moral principles. But he suggests that a person who thinks one absolutely ought not to bring about pain in somebody else by torture is seeking to avoid certain consequences, and therefore a consequentialist as well as an absolutist. (in VESEY, G. (ed.), 1974, pp. 50-51)

Absolutism as moral truth is also connected with religion and its moral authority. The adherents of a particular religion are required to have certain beliefs, to hold certain moral rules and to practise them in their daily lives. In the Christian religion, the words of Jesus are often prescriptive. Garnett, quoted by Frankena, describes the principles of universality and impartiality as built into the injunction to love; the former by interpreting neighbour to include enemies, and the latter by specifying that one is to love each neighbour as oneself. However, Frankena considers
that the ethics of Jesus are compatible with a variety of metaethical theories as shown in the history of Judeo-Christian thought. (GOODPASTER, K. (ed.), 1976, pp. 91-92)

This may be because the ethics are sometimes expressed in metaphors or parables which do not lend themselves easily to logical or linguistic analysis. As we also know, the revelation of what is right and wrong, and commands on moral standards differ in various religions. It could also be thought that some religions, Zen Buddhism, for example, are not morally prescriptive.

There is also a sense in which absolute can mean universal. Morality has something about it, some central core or content which applies to all human beings and without which the word has no meaning. Plato's remarkable Theory of Forms presents absolutes like temperance, courage, piety and virtue, which cannot be defined, but yet exist as "certain incorporeal Forms which are objects of the mind." As Flew puts it, if there are such entities as an abstract Form of the Just, and of the Beautiful and of the Good, and of all things of this sort, then values and ideals are "as objective, as absolute, as unchangingly eternal as any heart could desire". (1971, p.78) Midgley lists some ideas without which there could be no morality - responsibility, freedom, rationality, respect for persons and treating others as ends in themselves. (1981, p.17) Morality is a serious matter which affects everyone deeply, and is naturally important for a human being. The word moral is simply the superlative of serious. The
implication here seems to be that morality is the same for all human beings, whether explicitly defined or implicitly assumed.

One can be absolutist about some things and not about others. For example, a pacifist would never take human life for any reason whatsoever, but she might think that some lies were all right. Most people think, however, that there are exceptions to all moral standards or absolutes on occasions or when they conflict with each other in practice. Relativism denies that there are any moral standards or absolutes. The word relativism, however, also has several different meanings.

Cultural or sociological relativism holds that different groups have different moral standards. This has been confused with a consideration that each society's moral standards are thus "right". Williams calls this .."the anthropologist's heresy, possibly the most absurd view to have been advanced even in moral philosophy". (1972, p. 34) He further makes the point that the central confusion of relativism is to try to conjure out of the fact that societies have differing attitudes and values an a priori non-relative principle to determine the attitude of one society to another; this is impossible. So this fact does not mean that these different moralities are all equally correct or valid, which is ethical relativism. Locke (1986, p. 25) writes that the fact that a particular culture's
morality permits a certain practice, female circumcision for example, does not mean it is morally correct, even within that culture, but simply that it is thought to be morally correct within that culture. He goes on to say that morality is something in terms of which different social moralities can, and sometimes should, be criticised. This infers some overall standard of right. Midgley's view appears to be similar, but does not distinguish between cultural and ethical relativism.

"Relativism is (approximately) the somewhat puzzling view that duties bind only in particular cultures, and that their bindingness is actually just some sort of bargain – an entrance fee exacted for belonging to a particular group, and meaning less outside it". (1981, p. 12)

Another name for ethical relativism has been found by Carter – epistemological relativism, from which position people inevitably fall back on choosing cultural values or their own personal values (1986, p. 10). Ethical relativism has been much criticised from Plato's time to ours. For example, Kohlberg has defined ethical relativism as "a philosophic doctrine (which holds that) there is no way for thoughtful persons to resolve their difference in moral values and judgments". (1984, p. 3)

Ethical relativism has also led to another confusion, with moral toleration. The fact that everyone has a right to their own opinion on moral values does not necessarily mean that everyone's opinion is right. In that case, we are perhaps back to accepting an external authority as right, or moral universals, or the nihilism or scepticism of avoiding
views on moral issues altogether because nobody can ever say what things are good and bad, right and wrong. However, haphazard or certain, there are moral decisions to be made somehow.

There may be room again for a mixture of absolutism and relativism in the view that every society expresses some, if not all, of the core universal content of morality. Beyond this core, there may be differences. This core content of morality has been identified by Wright as respect for persons, fairness and justice, truthfulness and keeping promises and contracts. (1986, p.48) These overlap with the core ideas listed by Midgley, (loc.cit) and suggested by Nowell-Smith.

"the more we study moral codes the more we find that they do not differ on major points of principle". (1954, p. 18)

Hospers notes a similar confusion. A certain practice might make for the happiness of one society but not of another, and then it would be right in the one society and not in the other. Thus only the application of the moral principle of maximising happiness differs, not the principle itself. He concludes that

.."probably most people who call themselves relativists are not so at all, for they believe in one moral standard which applies in different ways to different societies because of the various conditions in which they live". (1961, p. 36)

So, as in many of the sections in this chapter, we return full circle to the idea that despite all the arguments, there may in fact be little real difference between the protagonists of the various views.
2.10 Conclusion

This brief survey is intended to show how the questions asked of teachers in the interview echo important and controversial issues in moral philosophy. Some of the ethical questions in the interview were derived from Kohlberg, and others were suggested by my own reading of the issues as discussed in this chapter. The difficulty both of framing questions and of analysing answers is that there are no clear-cut questions and no easily categorised answers.

Williams writes that the resources of most modern moral philosophy are not well adjusted to the modern world. Various versions of rationality

"share a false image of how reflection is related to practice, an image of theories in terms of which they uselessly elaborate their differences from one another". (1985, p. 198)

Philosophers have a commitment to argument, and it may be that this tends to obscure their agreement over the nature of the moral life, however much they may differ over the analysis and meaning of moral language and concepts.

Williams nevertheless remains optimistic that philosophy can help people live meaningful individual lives within a society, concerned with reflection and self-understanding. It seems to me that in order to do this, moral philosophers might use the insights of other disciplines which also study the individual's life and how it is, or should be lived. Academic specialisation makes this difficult, but the study
of the way complex human beings live and relate to each other needs a more integrated approach. Popper's (1972) image of the tree of knowledge is a useful one here. The pure tree of knowledge has integrative growth, the opposite to that of living organisms. The many different roots grow into a unified trunk.

One thing is clear, which is that morality affects both the individual and the individual in relation to other persons, both close and distant. Those people who claim that morality is entirely an individual or personal affair nevertheless judge others in moral terms. To each other we are often forced to justify our moral views, and we are not very good at it. We are also not very good at living up to them, for, though the ways in which we deceive ourselves are many, we are all bound to be moral failures. The idea of moral failure appears to be one that philosophers do not spend much time on.

I end this chapter with a quotation from Warnock on the need for further progress in moral philosophy. Unlike, say, Spinoza, he does not see the world of mind and language neatly tied up in logically necessary truths.

"From recent and contemporary moral philosophers there is much to be learned and much profit to be derived. Nevertheless, this is a subject in which there is still almost everything to be done". (1967, p. 77)
CHAPTER THREE

MORAL DEVELOPMENT

3.1 INTRODUCTION.
3.2 PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY.
3.3 SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY.
3.4 COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY: KOHLBERG.
3.5 COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY: PIAGET.
3.6 MORAL EDUCATION: THEORY and PRACTICE.
3.7 CONCLUSION.
3.1 Introduction

It was suggested in the last chapter that moral philosophers have tended to ignore theories of moral development yet at the same time their ethical positions carry psychological implications. In this chapter several broad theoretical perspectives on moral development will be summarised. Because psychologists, like philosophers, root their theories ultimately in their own experience of the moral life, it is to be expected that their theories will reflect, however loosely, the ethical positions of philosophers. The teachers in the main study were asked questions about moral development and the responses which reflect their thinking and experience may be closer to one theory than another. The final section will outline various approaches to moral education and these, too, will involve, implicitly if not explicitly, theories of moral development.

The theories selected for review here are Freud's psychoanalytic theory, social learning theory, and the cognitive-developmental theories of Kohlberg and Piaget. Psychoanalytic theory was chosen because Freud's concept of the superego is closely related to commonsense notions of conscience. Social learning theory relates to commonsense also through its emphasis upon behaviour. Kohlberg was chosen partly because of his great influence upon research into moral development and moral education, partly because his Moral Judgment Interview is used in the main study and
partly because, unlike the two theories already mentioned, he stresses thinking and reasoning. These three theoretical perspectives therefore place the emphasis in moral development upon affect, behaviour and cognition respectively. Piaget's theory will be discussed because certain aspects of it appear to have been neglected. Kohlberg has based his stage theory more on Piaget's scheme of intellectual development than his scheme of moral development, and the latter merits more attention.

There is not space here to deal with these theories in great detail, nor the various recent developments from them. As Rest (1984) has observed, none of the major theoretical approaches offers an adequately comprehensive view of the psychology of morality, although each points to some aspects of it. His own theoretical speculations have led to a model in which these aspects interact along with others, particularly situational factors, in the process of moral behaviour. However, his emphasis is still mainly individual and cognitive. Lifton (1986) also considers that no single model of morality can provide all the answers and that there is too much reliance at present on the cognitive-developmental model both in psychology and in education. The importance of practical morality is stressed by Haan (1985) and others, while Gilligan (1982) and Kitwood (in press) have emphasised aspects of relationships as a key element in moral decision-making and development.
Thus, research is moving towards a more comprehensive account despite the complexities involved. The last fifty years of scientific research have given us undoubted insights into aspects of moral development but there is still much to be done. In this empirical study, I anticipate that the teachers studied will stress a perspective more like that of the psychoanalytic theory of parental identification or the conditioning theory of social learning than cognitive-developmental stage theory in their view of moral development.

3.2 Psychoanalytic theory

It has frequently been said that Freud did not recognise any innate goodness or inclination towards being moral within individuals. This could perhaps be debated. He certainly wrote that infants were born amoral since they had no internal inhibitions against their pleasure-seeking impulses, and he disagreed with Kant who claimed that God had implanted a moral conscience within us. (FREUD, S., 1932, p.84). The many revisions of his theory by Freud and his followers make a clear exposition of it difficult, but it cannot be ignored, since it was the first comprehensive attempt to explain human personality. Within this context, he offered an explanation of moral development in his concepts of superego, ego-ideal, conscience, Oedipal conflict and guilt. This section will briefly describe these concepts and whether Freud appears to have an implicit philosophical position.
According to Freud's theory, there is constant dynamic interaction between the three structures of personality, the id, the ego and the superego, in organising the release of psychic energy and its conversion into muscular energy. The amount of energy available to the personality from the primary reservoir of energy in the id has limits, however, so that if the id, as it were, uses too much energy in satisfying its impulses, there is less available for the ego and the superego. With the superego in control of energy, conduct is moralistic, with the ego in control, realistic, and with the id in control, impulsive. The work of harmonising the personality is done by the ego in response to anxiety in the face of threats from the external world as well as threats from the aggressive and sexual impulses of the id and the moral demands of the superego. A person may not necessarily be aware of the source of her anxiety, for it may be a blend of two or three types and may also be repressed into the unconscious.

Thus the superego is the moral or judicial branch of the personality, developed from the ego. It has two primary functions. The conscience functions to suppress, neutralise or sublimate those instincts of the id, which, if acted upon, would violate the moral rules of society. The function of the ego-ideal is to show the ego positive ideals of behaviour as judged by society. At first the role of the superego is played by an external power, the parents. The external restrictions of the parents are then introjected, so that the
superego takes the place of the parental function and this occurs by about the age of five. Later writers e.g. Klein and Winnicott have suggested that the formation of the superego takes place in infancy and is related to the quality of the infant-mother relationship. (MITCHELL, 1986, MONEY-KYRLE, 1951) Morality is demonstrated by a relationship which embodies empathy, concern and reliable provision.

The two functions of the superego are, according to Freud, acquired through the process of identification. In the case of the conscience it is identification with the aggressor. When a child is frustrated or punished by a parent her own aggression is aroused, but if she expresses it, she is punished even more severely. So the only way of coping is to turn the aggression in on herself and adopt the same punitive attitude towards herself as the parent had towards her. After about the Oedipal conflict age of five, the conscience is firmly established as a separate channel through which aggression which cannot be expressed outwardly is turned inwards. If the aggressive energies of the superego are not strong enough to prevent the forbidden impulses becoming conscious, they act to prevent them being acted upon. If the impulse does result in action then the full aggression of the superego turns upon the ego in the form of guilt and remorse. The conscience could thus be seen in philosophical terms as a kind of self-protective egoism which results in categorical imperatives or rules of unacceptable behaviour. However, it must be noted that Freud considered the
conscience to be irrational and mostly unconscious. So, in commonsense terms, people can often not say why some action or thought is wrong, only that they have an instinct or 'gut feeling' that it is wrong.

The other function of the superego, the ego-ideal, is formed by a process Freud calls anaclitic identification, based on libidinal attachment or love. Since libido is limited in quantity, the more love a child has for her parents, the less she has for herself. It is painful when the loved person is absent, and the child then re-establishes equilibrium by incorporating into herself the cathected image of the loved person, thinking, feeling and acting as if she were that person. Object-love is thus turned into narcissistic love. As the ego matures in its sense of differentiation from others, the other becomes internalised as an ideal. (WRIGHT, 1971) Conscience is thus the agency which "watches the actual ego and measures it by the ideal" (FREUD, S., 1914, p.89) The conscience can treat the ego cruelly and apply to it the most severe moral standards.

What seems to follow from Freud's theory is that conscience is individual. It is formed within the family and will vary according to the strength of parental identification involved. Parents bring up children by following their own superegos, so the superego of the child is built on that of the parents, and it is also in some sense the vehicle of tradition and cultural norms. Although formed by the age of
five, the superego can later be influenced a little by other authority figures. In some cases this can lead to moral masochism, which Freud describes as excessive inhibition with an unconscious feeling of guilt and need for punishment. In order to provoke punishment by Fate, the parent-substitute, "the masochist must do something inexpedient, act against his own interests, ruin the prospects which the real world offers him, and possibly destroy his own existence in the world of reality" (FREUD, S., 1924, p.266-7)

Thus depression and suicide can be understood as self-aggression caused by an over-severe superego. Paranoid diseases also can result from feelings of being watched or criticised by the superego.

As well as being turned against the ego, the superego can also be turned outwards against other people. This serves the double function of diverting the superego's aggression from the ego as well as satisfying its demands by punishing someone else. This is most likely to occur when someone else is plainly guilty of actions which the individual wants to do, but is inhibited from doing. Thus Freud accounts for the cruelty of moral indignation, as expressed for example by the Inquisition, the burnings of 'heretics', and genocide. This aspect of the superego is fraught with danger for teachers as well as parents.

Although Freud describes moral guilt and shame as the expressions of the tension between the ego and the superego, he does not appear to differentiate between them or analyse
them. Gilligan (1976) claims that shame is the precursor of guilt. Shame involves inferiority feelings, embarrassment, inadequacy and weakness, rejection, or other "narcissistic wounds". Guilt is the feeling of culpability, of having committed a sin, and needing expiation and punishment. Morality therefore motivates behaviour towards avoiding these moral emotions - avoiding shame by egoism, avoiding guilt by altruism - and is a negative and immature stage, as well as narcissistic or egoistic. People need to be cured of morality so that it can be replaced by active love of self and others, in relationships where the conflict between egoism and altruism has been transcended. Buber writes that the psychotherapist has nothing to do with a person's "existential" guilt and cannot heal it. Existential guilt is not repressed or imaginary, but fully conscious and does not concern parental or social reprimand. It is real, and occurs "when someone injures an order of the human world whose foundations he knows and recognises as those of his own existence and of all common human existence". (in SMITH, R.W., 1971, p.92)

Only the person who injures can heal his or her own guilt, though a therapist can help by recognising it as real personal guilt, different from all the "anxiety-induced bugbears that are generated in the cavern of the unconscious". (ibid., p.97)

Freud himself seems to have considered the conscience as pathological, a force causing neurosis and psychosis, illness and death. In particular he criticised the society of his own time for its attitude to sexuality, suggesting that the
group superego required too big a sacrifice of libidinal impulses.

The object of psychoanalysis is to reduce the power of the superego by making it less compulsive and categorical. The unconscious elements within it can be made more conscious so that the ego is strengthened, and the individual becomes more realistic, rational and autonomous. Choices can be made which liberate a person from guilt and from introjected parental and societal values as well as from unreal ideals. Freud would therefore seem to consider the formalistic tradition of philosophy which embodies categorical imperatives, or the objectivistic tradition which includes divine authority as the psychopathology of the moral life rather than the true moral life, which is based on rational understanding. "The categorical imperative of Kant is a direct inheritance from the Oedipus-complex". (FREUD, S., 1924, p.264)

Most other therapies derive to a greater or lesser extent from Freud's work, and most stress the process of therapy as developing individual decision-making and autonomy, and reducing the power of internalised "oughts". Neo-Freudians like Fairbairn (1952) have called the superego "the internal saboteur" and "the persecutory object". Jung considers it important for us to accept what he called the shadow, the repressed instincts and emotions that are incompatible with social standards and our ideal personality. "The shadow is a
moral problem which challenges the whole ego personality". (in FORDHAM, 1953, p.51)

Psychoanalysis and other humanistic therapies are often criticised on the grounds that they legitimise selfishness. Freud's concept of conscience could be considered as based in narcissism, but this narcissism did include love for others, although satisfying one's own needs is the primary motivation. It seems more similar to Gewirth's view of generic rights (see Chapter 2, section 2.7), by which every individual has the right to her own freedom and well-being and the obligation to recognise the same rights for others, rather than the view of an ethical egoist, who only seeks the end of his own good. Most therapies also stress the integrity of others and view persons as ends in themselves. Wallach and Wallach (1983) claim that focussing on one's own needs and development cannot help but lead away from other-directed concern. Such concern, along with ethical principles and ideals, has been emphasised in traditional wisdom as reflected in many religions and the sages of many cultures. They further claim that psychologists have contributed to ethical doubt and scepticism by assuming that ethical judgments have no validity as such. These are very provocative statements. Most psychologists and therapists would, I think, see self-knowledge (which includes clarification of values) as a necessary preliminary to greater understanding of others and more concern for them. Both reason and feeling are important for this task, which
might be considered by psychoanalysts as real moral education as opposed to the unconscious and authoritarian indoctrination which takes place in the family in the formation of the superego.

3.3 Social learning theory

Research in this field is characterised by an emphasis on the empirical study of moral behaviour, rather than on constructing a hypothetical model of personality as in the psychoanalytic approach. However, both theories consider that the moral codes of conduct approved by society are acquired by children through a process of internalisation which mainly takes place in the family. They differ though in that social learning theory does not consider these values necessarily learned for life. By conditioning they can be unlearned or changed. This theory contrasts therefore with the philosophical positions of innate moral knowledge and rational acceptance of principles. It emphasises morality as moral behaviour.

Parents shape their children's behaviour by punishment, by reward and by the example they set. Technically, these are called negative and positive reinforcement and modelling. Negative reinforcements include smacks, withholding affection, isolation and verbal rebukes and sarcasm. These punishments create pain and anxiety which subsequently come
to have an inhibitory effect on behaviour. Positive reinforcement by praise, smiles, hugs and attention gives pleasure to the child and increases the probability of repetition of the rewarded behaviour.

Anxiety is very easily conditioned in this way by punishment. Experiments have shown that swift and early punishment is effective in training resistance to temptation. (ARONFREED, 1976). It is not only parents, therefore, who effect moral training, but others such as teachers, peers and experimenters. Behaviour therapists also use methods of desensitisation to cure patients of phobias and obsessions.

Eysenck addressed the problem of why conditioning worked with some children and not others, even when their circumstances were similar. He came to the conclusion that other factors were involved, such as heredity and personality, which influenced an individual's degree of conditionability. His studies on twins supported the view that personality was largely determined by heredity, but he does not rule out other environmental factors. (EYSENCK, 1964, p.101) His series of personality tests were used to derive a measure of extraversion - introversion (E) and neuroticism - stability (N). Studies found that criminals and others whose conduct is "immoral" were found in the high E - high N category, that is they were extravert and emotionally labile. This has a biological basis in that extraverts have low degrees of cortical arousal, and therefore need stronger stimuli.
Applied to conditioning, this would mean that extraverts are harder to condition, because they need more powerful unconditioned stimuli and reinforcement. He concludes also

"Thus extraverts have a greater built-in susceptibility to temptation, because of their low level of cortical arousal. Their needs are greater than those of introverts; and the pursuit of these needs is likely to bring extraverts into conflict with society". (EYSENCK, 1976, p. 114)

Eysenck's view in summary, then, is that moral behaviour is mediated through an individual's "conscience", which is acquired through a process of conditioning. Conditioning in turn is dependent upon the level of cortical arousal.

Some of the other environmental influences on moral behaviour mentioned by Eysenck may include conformity to the norms of a particular group and imitation of the behaviour of peers and media "stars". Rest (1983) points out that non-conformist behaviour can be highly moral, as in the case of Gandhi or Martin Luther King whose behaviour corresponded closely with their principles or reasoning. But this does not alter the fact that conditioning can affect behaviour in both moral and immoral ways.

Recently, social learning research is extending into the area of cognition, which it has so far neglected and it may be that cognitive change will be a critical determinant of how a child construes and receives her social experience. At present the social learning approach seems to emphasise the passivity of a child, as the recipient of training in values, and too much underplays the child's own positive construing. Thus it
attaches to the philosophical concept of society's authority rather than that of individual autonomy. It underplays both reason and feeling, and since the norms internalised are social, social learning theory would appear to see values as culturally relative and not absolute or universal.

3.4 Cognitive-developmental theory: Kohlberg

Cognitive developmental theory differs from the previous two approaches. They assume that children learn the morality of their society through identification with socialisers or by direct conditioning and example by socialisers, whereas the cognitive-developmental approach stresses the child's own construal of the moral domain. Adherents of the cognitive-developmental approach claim that moral development proceeds through a series of stages which represent underlying cognitive structures or ways of perceiving the sociomoral world. Although affect is involved, moral development is fundamentally a cognitive or rational process and the moral force in personality is primarily cognitive, not affective or behavioural. Since Kohlberg's work forms a major part of this study, his current theory will be discussed in detail through a series of propositions. The philosophical basis of this theory will be specified but only brief reference will be made to the large number of studies including both cross-cultural and longitudinal, now estimated at some two thousand, which on the whole support Kohlberg's
main claims. Many of these have been extensively reviewed elsewhere (e.g. WALKER, 1982, SAPP, (ed.), 1986, MODGIL and MODGIL, (eds.), 1986).

Some of the basic propositions of Kohlberg's theory are as follows.

I) THE REASONINGS PEOPLE OFFER TO JUSTIFY THEIR MORAL PRESCRIPTIONS TEND TO FORM INTERNALLY CONSISTENT SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT, HERE CALLED STAGES, WHICH ARE CENTRED UPON CERTAIN SALIENT CONSIDERATIONS.

These systems of thought form logical or structured wholes. Reasoning based on them is not a specific response to a particular task, but a general way of responding to tasks which are not manifestly similar. Each system of thought is qualitatively different according to its own inner logic. In stressing reasoning as essential to moral judgment, Kohlberg is denying the emotivist position but, unlike Kant, he does not entirely rule out affect as a component of moral judgment or justice reasoning. However, at heart, he views morality as a set of rational principles.

The inner logic is discovered in the salient considerations of each stage. The following brief summary of these considerations is extracted from a pre-publication draft of the current Standard Issue Scoring Manual (1984). A fuller description of the stages will be found in Appendix A.
Stage 1: assumes that doing things intrinsically labelled as wrong is followed by punishment determined by external authority. Punishability thus defines an act as wrong, and anticipation of reward defines an act as right.

Stage 2: focusses upon instrumental interests, needs and exchanges, considered from the perspective of the isolated individual, or of those with whom the interested individual can immediately identify.

Stage 3: considers pro-social (or anti-social) motives and norms, and the expectations of relationships and roles valued for their own sake.

Stage 4: appeals to generalised practices, responsibilities and rights which are required or should be upheld by society, and embodied in necessary institutions like the family and the law.

Stage 5: pre-supposes fundamental socio-legal values. A hierarchy of rights and values is seen as a valid principle for any society and a judgment which rational individuals would make based on logic, or would agree upon through appeal to a process of social contract.

In calling Stages 1 and 2 pre-conventional and Stages 3 and 4 conventional, Kohlberg does not mean to imply that they are related to social convention or custom. Turiel (1983) has distinguished the moral domain from the conventional domain as ordinarily understood, and his work suggests that children
as young as six are able to discriminate between conventional rules and rules of morality and justice. However, the boundaries of the moral domain, if any, in human affairs, are as yet a matter of dispute. Kohlberg appears to set them rather narrowly, that is around the concept of justice. It appears, however, that in response to criticisms, particularly by Gilligan (1982), Kohlberg now concedes that his emphasis on justice does not reflect fully all that is recognised as being part of the moral domain. There is an ethic of care, often represented by Christian ethical teaching. He does not believe however, that this is a separate ethic as Gilligan claims, but that

"special obligations of care presuppose but go beyond the general duties of justice, which are necessary but not sufficient for them". (KOHLBERG, L., LEVINE, C. and HEWER, A., 1983, p.21)

This broadening of the psychological domain of morality may have to involve a re-assessment of Kohlberg's acceptance of the Platonic view that the good is one, and that its name is justice. At present, the central salient assumption of each stage is how people respond to the question - what is the right (or just) thing to do? The systems of thought of each stage with their salient considerations are thus focussed on the question of justice.

II) EARLIER STAGES ARE NOT LEFT BEHIND IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT BUT ARE TAKEN UP AND REINTEGRATED AT THE NEXT STAGE.
What this means is that the salient considerations at one stage remain in the next stage, but are now reorganised around new central and salient considerations. In other words, earlier stages are not so much left behind but taken up and transformed in the next stage.

III) A STAGE OF MORAL REASONING REPRESENTS THE OVERT EXPRESSION OF AN UNDERLYING AND RELATIVELY ENDURING COGNITIVE STRUCTURE.

Kohlberg now calls his stages stages of justice reasoning rather than stages of moral reasoning, because he recognises that morality is not necessarily totally synonymous with justice, but he has nevertheless maintained the Platonic position. When referring to his earlier work I will use the term moral reasoning. The cognitive structure he describes is not a neural structure of the brain that functions in a certain way but the structure of the functioning of the rules for processing information. There are other cognitive domains with a similar structure which are related to the moral, including logical-mathematical, social perspective taking and social-conventional. Kohlberg claims that these domains develop in parallel and are interdependent. The moral domain can be recognised as separate and to consist of prescriptive value judgments of what is right and good. These judgments are not reducible to, nor directly expressive of, emotive statements. However, Kegan (1982) and Loevinger (1982) take a more holistic view. Kegan's developmental view
of the self, for example, includes what he calls the "participative" side of development, that is "the way that activity is experienced by a dynamically maintained self" (KEGAN, 1982, p.12).

Kohlberg has taken over the concept of structural stage from Piaget's theory of logic-mathematical development. But since the structures themselves can never be observed the stages that represent them are constructions of ideal types or exemplars rather than abstracted forms or expressions of the structures themselves (KOHLBERG, 1984, P.242). Thus, Kohlberg's idea of structure is similar to that implied by the psychoanalytic theory of personality structure. (Tomlinson, 1986, p.109) writes that Kohlberg defines cognitive development with Piaget, as progress through these mental structures, then defines morality, again with Piaget, as deontological justice. He claims that Kohlberg's structuralism is now "a rather old paradigm", since human psychological resources are more flexible than structuralism allows. Sullivan (1977) argued earlier that Kohlberg's structuralist 'bias' underplayed the role of other factors like imagination and sensitivity in moral judgment.

IV) A STAGE IS HELD TO REPRESENT AN UNDERLYING COGNITIVE STRUCTURE WHICH IS IN A RELATIVELY ENDURING STATE OF EQUILIBRIUM. THE HIGHER THE STAGE THE GREATER THE STABILITY OF THE EQUILIBRIUM SINCE IT REPRESENTS A CAPACITY TO RESOLVE MORE COMPLEX MORAL PROBLEMS.
Equilibrium is defined by Kohlberg as a balance of reciprocity between the action of the organism upon the (perceived) object (or situation) and the action of the (perceived) object upon the organism. This balance in interaction is reflected in the underlying stability or conservation of a cognitive act. The direction during development is towards greater equilibrium between the self's actions and those of others towards the self.

"In its generalised form this equilibrium is the end point or definer of morality, conceived as principles of justice, that is of reciprocity or equality. In its individualised form it defines relationships of 'love', i.e. of mutuality and reciprocal intimacy". (KOHLBERG, 1984, p.9)

V) MOVEMENT FROM ONE STAGE TO THE NEXT IS THUS A FUNCTION OF DISEQUILIBRIUM INDUCED BY PROBLEMS OF INTERACTION THAT CANNOT BE RESOLVED AT THAT STAGE.

At the highest stage, the ultimate criterion of morality is reversibility. This is implied in what Kohlberg calls "moral musical chairs", a conception which requires each person systematically to take the position of everyone else in the situation until a fairly balanced solution emerges. In practice this is an extremely difficult and unlikely procedure and thus it must be considered an ideal. It requires what Piaget calls a commitment to the 'spirit of the game', which is justice, a constitutive rule without which cooperation cannot take place. (1932, p. 93) In fact Kohlberg no longer claims the existence of this highest stage (6) in empirical studies so it remains a speculation, but the
search continues, and it is still the theoretical ideal endpoint for his "rational reconstruction of ontogenetic stages of justice".

Movement through the stages to this ideal endpoint is thus a movement towards greater reversibility or equilibrium, via stage-change stimulated by disequilibrium. The concept of disequilibrium is a difficult one. As long as the salient considerations of the stage structure appear to provide good reasons for an individual to think through moral conflicts, there is equilibrium. Where reasons do not appear to be good enough to an individual, there is cognitive disequilibrium and a search for better reasons. This involves a reorganisation or change of cognitive structure. However, this can take some time, as Kohlberg's theory accommodates transitional stages between the main stages of development, in which individuals appear to have a mixture of cognitive structures. Disequilibrium can be caused by exposure to higher stage reasoning, as happens in Kohlberg's moral education programmes.

VI) A PERSON'S MORAL REASONING IS SELDOM WHOLLY WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF A SINGLE STAGE AND USUALLY EXHIBITS FEATURES OF ADJACENT STAGES. HOWEVER, THE LONGER A PERSON'S REASONING REMAINS IN A GIVEN STAGE, THE MORE IT BECOMES CONFINED WITHIN IT.
It is possible to speculate here on the effect of a traumatic life event on moral development. Such an event can highlight past experience as wrong or damaging and force an individual to re-assess her whole modus operandi. In terms of Kohlberg's theory, a tragedy or a religious revelation in a person's life could cause massive cognitive disequilibrium and be followed by sudden cognitive stage progression.

VII) AN INDIVIDUAL'S STAGE OF MORAL REASONING REPRESENTS THE BEST REASONING OF WHICH THAT PERSON IS CAPABLE, WHERE THE CRITERIA FOR "GOODNESS" OF REASONING ARE THOSE WHICH APPLY TO REASONING IN ANY CONTEXT.

A person's actual reasoning of course may not be as good as that person's best reasoning. But defining a stage as the best reasoning a person is capable of carries with it the assumption that regression to earlier stages cannot occur, except perhaps with brain damage. The problem of regression has been a significant issue for Kohlberg. In some of his early studies, college students appeared to regress from Stage 4 to Stage 2, before moving on to Stage 5. Becoming aware of different social standards, some students had no reason to support their own particular standards and thus tended to return to more personal and subjective decisions. But Kohlberg decided their thinking was not the same naive hedonism as Stage 2, where subjects did not yet have a social conscience. The origin of transitional stages was here, in Stage 4/5, where morality seems arbitrary and relative and
ways of making a principled choice have not yet been discovered.

Another implication of this proposition (vii) is that if a person has any Stage 5 reasoning at all in her answers, then she should be considered as Stage 5 because that would be her best reasoning. However, this does not appear to be reflected in the scoring procedure, since this involves averaging all scorable material, and thus lower stage reasoning would pull down the overall score. Also, reasoning at any stage is only counted in the final score if it is 25% or more of the total scorable material.

VIII) THERE ARE 5/6 STAGES OF MORAL REASONING AND THESE FORM A UNIVERSAL AND INVARIANT DEVELOPMENTAL SEQUENCE.

Stages 5/6 have now been amalgamated because no evidence of discrete Stage 6 reasoning has been found in cross-cultural studies. Evidence has, however, regularly been found in both 'simple' and 'advanced' cultures of Stages 1-4, thus supporting Kohlberg's claims that these stages are universal. Kohlberg adopts the universalist position from the philosophy of Kant and Hare, that is, making a moral judgment assumes a universalising intent and also that universalisability of such judgments is logically necessary. Despite the variability in certain moral behaviours or customs in various societies, beneath this there seem to be universal kinds of judging or valuing. Kohlberg gives the example of monogamy
and polygamy, both of which are compatible with the culturally-universal underlying moral norms of personal dignity, trust and commitment in sexual relationships. (KOHLBERG, L., LEVINE, C. and HEWER, A., 1983, p.72)

Criticisms of Kohlberg's universalist claims have been made by Carter (1986) and Locke (1986) who both claim that he is in fact a cultural relativist. Carter writes that this is because Kohlberg makes an epistemological choice in his prior assumptions and this choice itself is relative because it cannot be proved. So although the stages may appear universal, the philosophical assumptions behind them are relative. Locke says that Kohlberg is not entitled to move from the claim that moral principles have to be universal in the sense of applying indifferently to everyone who falls under them to the claim that there are universal principles to which everyone can or will agree. Neither does he believe that Kohlberg has shown that there are moral universals common to all cultures. This appears to be a pertinent criticism, since only principled (5/6) reasoning is truly universal, according to Kohlberg himself, and Stage 5 has not been found across all cultures. Simpson (1974) also claimed that Kohlberg has not studied a sufficient number of cultures to substantiate his claims of cultural universality of the stages, and has agreed with Sullivan (1977) that his higher stages are ethnocentric.
Stage 5 has only been found in people of Western or 'advanced' cultures and this has led to criticism of Kohlberg (e.g. SULLIVAN, 1977) for bias towards Western liberal ideology. Broughton (1986) has recently gone further in suggesting that a liberal ideology which he considers as consonant with state power, authority, and social control, is given a rational basis by Kohlberg's theory. This seems strange, as Stage 5 principles of justice are stated by Kohlberg to be those by which entrenched authority is to be criticised rather than supported. It appears to be a hazard for moral educators to be criticised for being subversive by those holding right-wing political ideologies, and for being reactionary by those holding left-wing political ideologies. Kohlberg maintains his claim of cultural universality, saying that the failure to find higher stages in 'simple' cultures is due to their lack of social-structural complexity and lack of formal systems of education.

IX) THOUGH THE END STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT FOR PARTICULAR INDIVIDUALS WILL VARY, NO STAGE IN THE SEQUENCE CAN BE OMITTED.

Several studies have been made to test Kohlberg's claim that the sequence of stages is invariant and stepwise. Those by Holstein (1976) and Kuhn (1976) are early studies which found some regression and stage-skipping, but more recent studies using the new scoring system are supportive of the sequence (e.g. WALKER, 1982). Kohlberg's own longitudinal data has
recently been analysed and published and he claims that over 20 years the thinking of subjects developed in a regular sequence with no stage-skipping or regression. (COLBY, A. and KOHLBERG, L., 1984).

Critics, however, still claim that it is adjustments to the scoring procedure as well as the structure of the MJI itself as a measure that have eliminated regression (e.g. KURTINES and GRIEF, 1974) and that other factors affect performance in the interview.

If moral development occurs in a sequence of stages over time one would also expect that older subjects would show more advanced stages of moral reasoning than younger subjects. Cross-sectional studies show that moral development seems to develop as long as people continue their education, then tends to level off. (REST, 1980). It does seem obvious that development will occur in thinking as with other aspects of growth along with increasing maturity and socio-moral experience at least from early childhood to young adulthood.

X) THE SEQUENCE OF STAGES FORMS A LOGICAL HIERARCHY IN THE SENSE THAT A GIVEN STAGE IS A LOGICALLY NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT CONDITION OF THE NEXT STAGE.

This is a central tenet of cognitive-developmental theory derived from Piaget. Moral judgment is a role-taking process that has a new logical structure at each stage paralleling
Piaget's logical stages. As each stage forms a new and more integrated form of reasoning, the stages also form a logical and cumulative hierarchy.

There is some dispute over the later stages being hierarchical. Gibbs (1979) suggests there are standard stages for childhood and adolescence, but that these are followed by existential stages for adulthood. The latter are not necessarily sequential, upward or cross-culturally universal but can be alternatives to each other. The 'principled' stages may be understood as detached reflections upon one's theories in action. Kohlberg has modified his theory in this respect, and now says that Stages 1-4 are 'hard' structural stages, in that they meet Piagetian stage criteria, and Stage 5/6 is a 'soft' stage on the grounds that it is based on philosophical reflection rather than on actual problems directly encountered.

Hogan (1984) considered that Stages 5 and 6 could be alternatives to Stage 4 depending on an individual's personality and vocational choice. Lifton (1986) finds the cognitive-developmental assertion that few people achieve the higher stages of moral development disconcerting, because it defines 95% of the U.S. population as morally immature. He suggests that there is a wide variety of moral styles, and that any or all of these may be considered morally mature, because they do enable people to handle moral situations effectively.
Although Aronfreed (1976) believes that higher stages reflect only a commitment to a particular philosophical position, Lickona considers that a moral hierarchy cannot be avoided. "A morality that respects the rights of others is superior to a morality that does not, and ... development of such a higher morality is a necessary condition for the kind of society whose members each have a fair chance at the pursuit of happiness or fulfillment" (1976, pp. 6-7)

He appears to assume here, however, that reasoning at lower stages does not respect the rights of others. I would argue that the rights of others are respected at Stages 2 and 3, albeit limited to the others a person actually interacts with.

XI) LATER STAGES OF REASONING ARE BETTER THAN EARLIER ONES, NOT IN THE SENSE THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WHO EXHIBITS A HIGHER STAGE OF REASONING IS BETTER IN A MORAL SENSE, BUT THAT THE INDIVIDUAL'S REASONING IS BETTER.

A hierarchy assumes superior and inferior positions. As well as being logically better, higher stages show better equilibrium and solve problems better. Kohlberg also claims that people at higher stages are more liable to follow their better judgment with moral action. It is difficult, therefore to escape the implication that subjects at higher stages are more moral persons. Kohlberg cites as examples of such ideal moral persons Socrates, Martin Luther King and Gandhi. If Kohlberg would not define these three as more moral persons, one wonders whether he could define a moral person at all. He also wrote
"our psychological theory is grounded on the moral philosophical theory which specifies that the later stage is morally better or more adequate than the earlier". (1973, p. 632)

As evidence of higher stages involving better reasoning, Kohlberg claims that people reject the reasoning of the stage below their own as inferior. In other words, if offered a choice, they prefer the reasoning of the highest stage they can comprehend. This is consistent with Kohlberg's theoretical claim that earlier stages have not been left behind but transformed in subsequent stages because they were found to be inadequate. It is to be expected therefore that people will reject as inadequate earlier stages of reasoning in their untransformed state.

Although Kohlberg appears to acknowledge that psychological evidence alone is not sufficient justification for the moral adequacy of higher stages, he continues to justify them in terms of a relationship between such psychological evidence and normative theories.

"to explain these findings psychologically is to engage in a normative-theoretical-rational reconstruction of stages or of theories to which they are related". (1982, p. 525)

Seigel finds this confusing, and insists that the facts of development (is) cannot provide any justification of moral adequacy (ought). (1986, p. 74) Boyd however considers that Kohlberg is right when he suggests that there is a relationship between 'is' and 'ought' here, because conceptions of justification are themselves stage-bound or psychologically dependent.
II) IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE REASONING USED TO DEFEND A MORAL JUDGMENT, BECAUSE IT REFLECTS AN UNDERLYING COGNITIVE STRUCTURE, IS ALSO AN INDICATION OF THE COGNITIVE PROCESSES WHICH GENERATED THE MORAL JUDGMENT IN THE FIRST PLACE.

In his research procedure intended to locate a subject's stage of reasoning, Kohlberg first presents a moral dilemma and asks for an immediate judgment on whether the chief protagonist should or should not act in a certain way. Once the judgment is made, the subject is asked for his or her reasoned justification for the judgment. Kohlberg's stages are based upon the nature of the reasoned justification and he is not concerned, in identifying the stages, with the actual judgments made. However, he then makes a significant assumption, although it is not explicitly stated, that the underlying cognitive structure reflected in the reasoned justification also generated the judgment in the first place. He has also claimed that the judgment thus generated has an influence on behaviour and therefore appears to see the reasoning or stage as an essential part of the process towards moral action.

This assumption, that the same cognitive structure underlies both judgment and reasoning, can be questioned. The judgment tends to be made fairly quickly and intuitively, and could be arrived at through unconscious processes which bear little relationship to the reasoned justification. The justifi-
cation could be seen as a subsequent rationalisation of the judgment and an effort to defend it to others. Because it has to be both conscious and verbal, it might reflect a person's political or social views, what is considered acceptable to the interviewer asking 'Why?' or be a defensive reaction. It is normally easier to make a judgment than to justify or defend it. This remains then a fundamental and unanswered question in Kohlberg's theory.


As mentioned earlier, Kohlberg's stage sequence, like any developmental sequence has a certain obvious commonsense to it. Of course a 24 year old will have a broader social perspective than a 4 year old, and a 14 year old something in between. Similarly with the ability to role-take another's position. Both these create a surface validity to Kohlberg's stage scheme.

However, the idea of the logically necessary distinction between factual and descriptive statements, and morally prescriptive ones, is more controversial and philosophically
questionable. It reflects Kohlberg's assumption of formalistic moral philosophy, and a 'rule-theory' interpretation of cognitive moral maturity. For a non-formalist philosopher the end-point of moral development would not resemble Kohlberg's Stage 5/6. Kohlberg adopts a formalist position but does not justify it. His adoption of prescriptivism means an assumption that the domain of "ought" statements is different from the domain of "is" statements. This point has been already discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.4 and will be further discussed later in this chapter.

The criteria of differentiation and integration are also said by Kohlberg to map into the formal criteria which formalist philosophers have held to characterise genuine or adequate moral judgments. These latter criteria are those of prescriptivity and universality. However, Kohlberg does not analyse differentiation and integration to show how they happen in the stages, so they remain an assumption rather than a proved claim.

"These combined criteria, differentiation and integration, are considered by developmental theory to entail a better equilibrium of the structure in question". (1981, p. 135)

Higher stages, because they are more equilibrated, are more able to resolve moral conflicts and thus are more adequate psychologically than lower stages of moral reasoning. Locke (1986, pp. 28-9) is a critic of this assumption. He considers that the Stage 2 'instrumentalist' who solves his problems by appealing to what is most in his personal interest, may well find moral problems easier to solve than
someone agonising over individual rights and social utilities at Stage 5.

XIV) THE STAGE SEQUENCE IS SAID TO BE FUNCTIONALLY RELATED TO PIAGET'S STAGES OF INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT AND OTHER STAGE SEQUENCES.

Piagetian stages are now called 'hard' stages by Kohlberg because they have all the formal properties which Piaget attributed to a structural stage - qualitatively different structure, invariant sequence, structured wholeness and hierarchical integration. Kohlberg believes his own stages 1-4 meet these requirements. They are also related to Piaget's own stages of intellectual development in that a given stage of intellectual development is said to be a necessary but not sufficient condition of a given stage of moral reasoning. For example, all principled subjects are formal operational but many formal operational subjects are not principled. The moral and logical stages are structurally parallel but different, as indicated in the following table.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 3(i) LOGICAL AND MORAL STAGES</th>
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<tr>
<td>LOGICAL : PIAGET</td>
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<tr>
<td>Symbolic, intuitive thought.</td>
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<td>Concrete operations,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Substage 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Categorical Classification.</td>
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<td>Concrete operations,</td>
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Substage 2
Reversible concrete thought.

Stage 2: Instrumental
hedonism and
crude
concrete
reciprocity.

Formal operations,
Substage 1
Relations involving the
inverse of the reciprocal.

Stage 3: Orientation to
interpersonal
relations of
mutuality.

Formal operations,
Substage 2

Stage 4: Maintenance of
social order, fixed
rules and authority.

Formal operations,
Substage 3

Stage 5/6: social contract
and universal
ethical principle
orientation.

(Adapted from KOHLBERG, 1973b)

Kohlberg also relates his Stages to Selman's (1980)
role-taking or interpersonal stages. Attainment of Piaget's
stage of formal operations is said to be a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the attainment of Selman's 4th stage
of interpersonal conceptions. Selman's 4th stage must be
achieved for Kohlberg's 4th moral stage to be achieved.
'Soft' or functional stages have been described by Kohlberg as those which do not have the necessary formal properties already mentioned. He places the stages of Erikson (1963), Loevinger (1976) and Fowler (1981) in this category. Kohlberg has related his stages to Fowler's religious stages, and said that a stage of moral judgment is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a stage of religion. These 'soft' stages continue into adulthood, whereas Kohlberg claims that beyond early adulthood there is no new 'hard' moral stage. Kegan has attempted a synthesis of several stage schemes which show their interrelatedness, particularly in the critical move from personal to interpersonal orientation, as in Kohlberg's Stage 2 to Stage 3. (1982, pp. 164-5)

All these stages are within the ego domain, and Kegan has suggested that Kohlberg has made "the single most original and potentiating contribution to the understanding of the ego since Sigmund Freud". (1986, p. 163)

 XV) STAGE OF MORAL REASONING IS HELD TO BE A NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT CONDITION OF MORAL ACTION. THE MOTIVATION FOR MORAL ACTION IS DEFINED AS COGNITIVE.

As noted by Blasi (1980) cognitive-development theory offers only the vaguest guidelines for approaching the relations of cognition and action, simply hypothesising a positive correlation between them. Studies so far have shown a small positive correlation or none. If, however, moral stage does represent deep structural aspects of cognition, one would
expect that structure to operate in other areas of a person's life. If not, either moral stage is not representative of cognitive structure and thus moral judgment is not related to moral action or some other variable (or variables) intervenes between moral judgment and moral action.

In the next section it will be seen how Piaget distinguished between theoretical and practical morality. However, Kohlberg has not. His idea of moral action involves moral cognition and he has maintained his position with little modification. In other words, he claims that the higher the stage reasoning, the more likely action will be consistent with the moral choice made on a dilemma. There are said to be three steps which result in moral action. The first is the making of a deontic judgment of rightness or justice in the situation, the second that the self is responsible for carrying out this judgment, and the third step is carrying it out. Although the judgments for stage score are made on hypothetical dilemmas, Kohlberg claims that studies show real life dilemmas are also more likely to be followed by moral action. (1984, p. 258)

Gilligan and Belenky (1980), in their study of women deciding whether or not to have an abortion, concluded that the decision the subjects made as well as the action they took, was influenced by other factors than justice reasoning, such as consequences, responsibility and environmental influences. Thus operating on the principle of justice alone was not
enough; justice had to be combined with responsibility. This responsibility seems to be of a different genre to the responsibility of the separate self for carrying out the ideal action described by Kohlberg. Gilligan describes it not in individual or ideal terms, but as responsible action after consideration of the realities of the situation for all concerned. Kohlberg has now allowed that there are other components in moral action, ego controls such as attention, intelligence and delay of gratification, but that

"moral actions cannot be understood as such without reference to an internal moral cognition or moral judgment component which must be directly assessed as part of the definition of an action as moral" (1984, p. 263)

In addition to moral judgment, responsibility to others, ego controls and situational factors, there are other variables, at present ignored, which may be considered relevant to moral action, but on which more research is needed. These include personality, cultural or religious influence and feelings. Studies have been made into the relationship between ego-strength and cheating by Loevinger (1976), which showed that children higher in ego-strength were less likely to cheat.

Sloan and Hogan (1986) argue for a synthesis of cognitive and psychoanalytic approaches towards moral choice and action in everyday life. In this they follow Habermas (1979) who considers that the processes of self-understanding and self-deception (through defensive manoeuvres) are central determinants of moral conduct.
Thus most researchers, including Kohlberg, now appear to agree that a multiple of variables in the social situation or in the individual's personality, have an influence on moral behaviour.

This summary sequence of propositions by no means exhausts what can be said about Kohlberg's theory. However, it is intended to draw attention to the main features of his theory. The following points are also worthy of note as new features of the theory, or particularly controversial ones, namely: a) Stage 7, b) Moral Types, and c) sex difference.

a) Stage 7 is a religious orientation required by universal moral principles. The term is a metaphor which is used because it presupposes the conflicts and questions that arise at the principled Stage 5/6. It integrates universal principles with life's ultimate meaning. According to Kohlberg, it has similarities to Fowler's sixth stage of faith and to Erikson's ultimate stage in the life cycle, of integrity versus despair. He considers it to be a 'soft' reflective stage rather than a 'hard' structural one, and also it is not a strictly moral one. Ultimate moral maturity requires a mature solution to the question of the meaning of life, but this cannot be found on purely logical or rational grounds. For Kohlberg it requires in essence a religious or ontological solution. However, Kohlberg does suggest that the question 'Why be moral?' can be answered at lower stages with both religious and non-religious reasoning by "the
realities of the human social order". (KOHLBERG, 1981, p.344). It is difficult to see what Kohlberg really means when he says that the universal ethical principles of Stage 5/6 "cannot be immediately justified by the realities of the human social order". It may be that such realities are to be considered descriptive of what 'is' rather than prescriptive of what 'ought' to be, and these two concepts have, according to Kohlberg been differentiated by Stage 5/6. However, this logical problem also arises at Stage 7.

Fowler does not agree with Kohlberg that moral and religious reasoning are separate but parallel developments. His faith stages are, he believes, more comprehensive constructs than Kohlberg's stages, because they represent modes of knowing, commitment and action, in which thought and emotion, rationality and passionality, are held together. He quotes Power's view that faith "provides the very condition for the possibility of making any moral judgment" (1977, untitled and unpublished paper) and concludes that each moral judgment stage implies and requires anchorage in a more extensive framework of belief and value. (FOWLER, 1980)

In considering the relation of agape or responsible love to principles of justice, Kohlberg suggests that agape presupposes justice principles but may go beyond them when an actor freely gives up claims he or she may in justice demand. Also, principles of justice could be agreed on by rational agents who hold different conceptions of the good life and the good person.
Altogether, the concept or metaphor of Stage 7 is a confusing one. By the logic of Kohlberg's own theory it can in any case only be reached or understood by those of us reasoning at Stage 5/6, of whom there appear to be very few in the world. Part of the confusion appears to be the result of the different meanings noted in the question 'Why be moral?' by those who attempt to answer it. It was made clear in Chapter 2 that the word 'moral' can be understood in many different ways.

b) In his new theory of Moral Types, Kohlberg makes a belated return to Piagetian moral theory which will be discussed in the next section. He also considers that this new analysis better distinguishes structure from content in moral judgments. The current manual no longer provides criteria for scoring A and B substages within each stage of justice reasoning, substages which were concerned with content. Moral Type B is now considered as an orientation throughout the stages to Piaget's notion of autonomy, mutual respect, and reversibility, in contrast to Type A which is an orientation to his notion of heteronomy. There will be further description and discussion of Moral Types in Chapter 4.

c) Kohlberg's original choice of an all-male sample to test his stage hypothesis, and choice of all male protagonists for the dilemmas, has perhaps proved unfortunate in its generation of a sex bias controversy. It was the case,
however, in the early studies, that subjects with a concern for norms of caring and affiliation tended to be scored Stage 3, and those with a concern for norms of law tended to be scored Stage 4. It was also the case that the former were more often female and the latter were more often male, which suggested that females were inferior in moral reasoning. Kohlberg's explanation for this was sociological, i.e. that women who did not experience participation in society's complex secondary institutions through education and work responsibility, were not likely to acquire those societal role-taking abilities necessary for the development of Stage 4 and 5 justice reasoning. (1984, p. 340)

Kohlberg is in partial agreement with one criticism, (GILLIGAN, 1982) which is that influential theories of personality development for the most part have been created by males, (e.g. Freud, Piaget) and reflect greater insight into male personality development than into female personality development. It is clear that some of Freud's theories about female development are now commonly regarded as incorrect. However, Kohlberg does not agree with Gilligan's further claim that morality includes two moral orientations, an ethic of justice and an ethic of care and response, or her claim that his current scoring procedure does not adequately elicit the ethic of care and response. Lyons (1983) offered evidence for these two ethics, used by both sexes, but care predominantly by females and justice predominantly by males, and also evidence that they
represented two different modes of describing the self in relation to others - a separate/objective mode and a connected one. She quotes Piaget's insight that apart from our relations to other people, there can be no moral necessity. But moral philosophy and moral psychology have both been dominated by the image of a person capable of detached objectivity in moral choice, and this she considers to be demonstrated in Kohlberg's theory. It is interesting to note here a connection with some psychoanalytic studies which reveal that academics are liable to schizoid or separatist personality traits, which are reflected in their images of moral maturity. (Hogan and Busch, 1984)

Siegel (1986) notes that even if women do develop conceptions of self and morality as Gilligan describes, this does not justify the rightness of such a morality, any more than the fact that men may develop as Kohlberg describes justifies the rightness of that morality.

Kohlberg quotes at length from a review by Walker (1982) of 78 studies in contradicting Gilligan's claim that his standard scoring system has a built-in sex bias and downgrades female responses. The majority of these studies found no sex difference, but a few of them (13) found significant differences, all favouring men. Kohlberg considers that in these studies sex differences in adults (4 of 19 studies) were confounded with differences in level of education and occupation, and that further studies which controlled for
these variables (e.g. SNAREY, 1982) showed no mean
differences in justice reasoning stage. The sequence of
stages in both sexes has been corroborated, but this does not
of course mean that any sex bias has thus been eliminated.
Also he does not believe that there are two ethics, one of
justice and one of care, because care can be subsumed under
justice, and because Gilligan has not proved 'hard'
structural stage properties for the care ethic. As Kohlberg
writes, "morally valid forms of caring and community
presuppose prior conditions and judgments of justice".

This debate is ongoing and the results of the current study
will thus be interesting. According to Kohlberg, a sample of
educated people in the same profession, teaching, should show
no sex difference in their level of justice reasoning.

Although Kohlberg's writing is complex and sometimes appears
contradictory, and his psychological theory and method have
developed over the years, he is almost unique among
psychologists in stressing the necessity for a philosophical
base for his psychological theory. His attachment to this
base, and expression of it, have remained firm. He has
attempted to integrate the 'ought' of moral philosophy with
the 'is' of empirical psychology. He gives two reasons for
entering the philosophic arena. One is to justify his moral
education programmes in schools, and the other that a
psychological theory of ethics has philosophic implications.
which must be articulated. (KOHLBERG, 1981, p.104) In his famous paper, From Is to Ought, (1971) he spells out clearly his reasons for a non-relativist, rationalist, universalist impartial and objective stand, in the formalist tradition of Kant, Rawls and Hare. He has also claimed many times that justice is the sole virtue. His claim was, following the Socratic view, that virtue is ultimately one, not many, and it is always the same ideal form regardless of climate or culture, and the name of this ideal form is justice. He believed that his empirical studies supported this Socratic view.

However, he has more recently softened this claim, in saying that his view is also close to Aristotle who identifies morality with a number of virtues. Also, he writes

"At this point, our stage findings do not allow us to claim evidence for certain normative ethical conclusions which nevertheless remain Kohlberg's own philosophic preference"...

.."We cannot claim either that there is a single principle which we have found used at the current empirically highest stage, nor that that principle is the principle of justice or respect for persons. There may be other principles". (KOHLBERG, L., LEVINE, C. and HEWER, A., 1983, p.63)

Thus there still seems to be some necessity for clarification of these contradictory claims.
3.5 Cognitive-developmental theory: Piaget

Kohlberg has frequently acknowledged his debt to Piaget. However, as already mentioned, his developmental stages of justice reasoning are more closely related to Piaget's intellectual stages than to Piaget's stages of moral development. Since Kohlberg's theory has dominated the scene for twenty years now, some aspects of Piaget's theory of moral development have been neglected by subsequent theorists. One notion of Piaget's which does appear in Kohlberg's stages is the distinction between heteronomous and autonomous moral types, discussed in the last section.

Piaget's primary purpose is not the study of moral reasoning so much as to reach an understanding of the origins of moral obligation within the total process of judgment and action in real situations. His theory is therefore more one of practical morality than theoretical morality, and in contrast to Kohlberg's which emphasises judgment, his understanding of "the moral" emphasises action. For Kohlberg an individual's action in itself is not moral unless it is preceded by a moral judgment; for Piaget thinking and experiencing coexist within social relationships. We can thus see that whereas Kohlberg stresses the individual moral reasoner, Piaget stresses the importance of relationships and social context in moral thinking and action. Because moral obligation is generated within relationships between people, Piaget's theoretical speculations, interspersed with his empirical
report, are social psychological and do not appear to form a cognitive-developmental stage sequence with formal properties. Any development in the two coexisting kinds of morality he describes consists of a shift in emphasis from one to the other rather than a structural change within a stage sequence. His theory could in fact be called sociodynamic because unlike Kohlberg he takes account of both social interaction and personality difference.

Piaget's empirical study consisted firstly of observing the attitudes and behaviour of children from 3 to 14 years old playing games, in order to analyse their practice of the rules of the game and their consciousness of them.

"All morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules". (PIAGET, 1932, p.1)

We may disagree with this statement about morality, particularly as Piaget himself later appears to contradict it when he talks about respect between individuals, both unilateral and mutual, rather than respect by one individual for objective rules. However, in his study, he found that for young children the rules were external and derived from adult authority, but that older children had made the rules their own and understood that they could be changed by agreement as long as they remained fair rules. These two moralities, of heteronomy and autonomy, can also apply to adults.

"The adult who is under the dominion of unilateral respect for the 'Elders' and for tradition is really behaving like a child." (PIAGET, loc.cit.)
Piaget also questioned children about stories in which there was lying or stealing, and asked them to assess how wrong the action was and to explain why it was wrong. He found that younger children took more account of the result of the action than the intention behind it. For example, it was more wrong to break several cups accidentally than to break one cup deliberately. Older children took more account of the intention than the consequences. As far as punishment was concerned, younger children on the whole accepted any kind of punishment as necessary to expiate wrongdoing and also tended to see misfortune as punishment for some wrongdoing. This idea, which Piaget calls immanent justice can also be observed in those adults who consider that the poor or the sick must have done something wrong. Older children were more concerned that punishment should fit the crime in order to reform or deter the offender. Thus it would seem right to a class of young children if a teacher punished the whole class when a wrongdoer did not own up, but wrong and unfair to a class of older children.

For his two moralities Piaget postulates two kinds of social relations, constraint and cooperation.

"The first implies an element of unilateral respect, of authority and prestige; the second is simply the intercourse between two individuals on an equal footing." (PIAGET, loc.cit.)

The beginning of cooperation is assisted by the need for reciprocal affection which Piaget calls "the primary condition of the moral life". (ibid., p.173) Also the child
experiences that, for example, truthfulness, is necessary to the relations of sympathy and mutual respect. This emphasis on experiencing before learning is reminiscent of Aristotle's view that virtues are acquired by practising them until they become a habit. However, it would seem that for Aristotle the experiencing was a conscious rehearsing action, whereas for Piaget the experiencing comes first and the consciousness of it later. It is not only a change in social relationships which encourages the shift from egocentric to operational thinking in the development of the child's intelligence. If either unilateral relationships remain the predominant form of social relations, or intellectual development is slow, reciprocal morality will be delayed. Piaget's explanation of the shift in emphasis from heteronomy to autonomy within the context of social relationships is complicated and controversial, but it is nevertheless central to his theory. The process is, for him, a slow one, a gradual conscious realisation (theoretical morality) of the moral principles upon which a person actually functions (practical morality). Thus theoretical and practical morality appear to become united in moral autonomy.

"The child's verbal thinking consists of a progressive coming into consciousness, or conscious realisation of schemes that have been built up by action". (ibid., p. 173)

Wright (1983) discusses further the concept of conscious realisation which Piaget later (1976) called cognizance. It involves observation by the self of the success or failure of actions, the co-ordination of such observations, and reflection that goes beyond it. I would suggest that various
social relations would provide contradictory input and therefore it would be difficult for theoretical morality to be clearly and coherently brought into conscious realisation. Complete equilibrium even in a close relationship between two people who relate in mutual respect would also seem idealistic.

Lickona (1976) points out the difficulties of research studies on Piaget's speculations, particularly of the change from heteronomous to autonomous morality. Some research has shown that maturity is slower than Piaget thought. The existence of unilateral morality as Kohlberg's Stage 1 and mutual respect morality as Kohlberg's Stage 3 he suggests has been proved by Kohlberg's empirical studies.

Weinreich-Haste (1982) suggests that Piaget's implicit definition of morality is to be found in the questions he asked his subjects about fairness and justice, rather than how this morality is transmitted within social relations. However, as well as stressing rules of justice as necessary to morality, Piaget clearly stresses the point that relationships are prior to rules, the breeding ground, as it were, of moral rules.

It is difficult, therefore, to abstract Piaget's philosophical position. He seems to take both the individual and the social view, include both reason and feeling, and take for granted 'ought' or moral obligation. He does not
make claims about a particular objective ideal, nor universal principles nor absolute truth. But on the other hand, it is difficult to say that he is a relativist or subjectivist. His perspective on moral maturity as autonomy, however, does tend towards subjectivism as well as individualism.

"The morality of the autonomous conscience does not tend to subject each personality to rules that have a common content: it simply obliges individuals to place themselves in reciprocal relationships with each other without letting the laws of perspective resultant upon this reciprocity destroy their individual points of view". (ibid., p. 404)

3.6 Moral education: theory and practice

This section will focus on the commonsense view of moral education as well as on professional approaches. To a certain extent these two overlap. Many teachers either hold the commonsense view or are not particularly concerned about moral education at all because they work in schools where there is no real professional approach to it. It is significant that moral education does not appear in more than a few initial teacher training courses. The professional approaches that do exist will be related as far as possible to the concepts of morality discussed in Chapter 2 and those of moral development discussed in previous sections of this Chapter. I will suggest that the commonsense view of moral education is one that stresses authoritative moral training and the 'putting in' of moral values, and that this is practised in many schools. Some professional theories however stress moral education as a process of 'drawing out'
moral competence by facilitative and experiential methods. Between these two extremes there are some theorists who see a place both for didactic teaching and self-directed learning. I will also suggest that more attention might be paid to Piaget's distinction between the individual, the interindividual and the social aspects of morality.

It has to be borne in mind that moral education does not only happen in schools, and it is even questionable whether schools can ever be as effective a moral influence as other agencies such as the family, the peer group, other social groups, and, in particular, television. Durkheim (1961) said that often the family is defective as a morally educative context, however, so the school was an important learning environment intermediate between the family and an impersonal society. There are some who believe that it is not the role of the school to provide moral education, and this group includes some teachers. However, whether personally interested or not, the majority of teachers, parents and students do consider it an important aspect of education in secondary schools. (May, 1971, McPhail, 1972) In any case, for good or ill, it does go on, both formally in the curriculum and informally in the 'hidden curriculum' and school structure.

"Moral education is an inevitable role of the schools. For the educator, it comes with the territory". (PURPEL, D. and RYAN, K. (eds.) 1976)

"There is no morality free school, no valueless teaching". (SIZER, N.F. and SIZER, T.R. (eds.) 1970)
In a democratic society, moral education is properly an issue for everyone. It is not one to be reserved only for the expertise of psychologists, philosophers and educators.

Government documents, while stressing the importance of moral education, appear to see it as a form of training, and thus reflect the commonsense view. Pring quotes two D.E.S. papers which say that schools should aim "to instil respect for religious and moral values, and tolerance of other races, religions and ways of life" (1987, p. 4) (my underlining).

As well as the assumption here that everyone knows what religious and moral values actually are, the use of the word 'instil' is interesting, as its dictionary definition implies the use of authority; "teaching ideas gradually but powerfully", and "to pour in, drop by drop". (e.g. GARMONSWAY, 1965) The new Education Bill, currently under discussion, appears to relegate values to the periphery of curriculum practice, suggesting that although important in theory, in practice moral education is left to chance.

This view of moral education as the 'putting in' of socially acceptable religious and moral values has a long tradition in this country. Teachers as the agents of society transmit to future citizens standards of behaviour which are backed by the authority of the Church or the State. In school this tradition is represented in two ways. Firstly, in religious education lessons and Assemblies, it is still strong,
particularly in independent schools, despite new ideas in the teaching of religious education. Secondly, it is reflected in discipline systems, where offences such as fighting, stealing, rudeness and disobedience are punished. Anti-social behaviour is to be prevented both inside and outside the school. When the authority of the school and the teacher over the child is emphasised, moral education becomes a form of social control.

Those who react against moral education in school are sometimes reacting against such moral training, because it is seen as moralising and indoctrinative. However, those who react against it in this way tend also to lack knowledge about alternative approaches to which they might be attracted. Young people themselves often react against being told by teachers what is right and what they should do. Moral instruction by adults is only likely to have an effect if it echoes what young people already intuitively feel as moral agents themselves. If it does not echo what they think it breeds resentment and can even be morally corrupting, if adults promote actions which children think are wrong. Adolescents in particular are keen to assert their growing sense of identity and moral agency. Balancing the responsibilities of teaching accumulated knowledge with those of encouraging individual autonomy can seem an impossible task for the teacher and it is all too easy to fall back on the exercise of authority. It is also all too easy for students, and many adults, to accept passively the dictates
of authority. Carter asks us to consider the frequency with which people speak of the 'they' of authority and suggests that this formula is one to be avoided since it is regularly "a smokescreen for authority resting outside yourself or for intellectual senility". (1984, p.43)

The commonsense view that moral values are 'put in' to children is reflected in both social learning and psychoanalytic theories. Psychoanalytic theory is consistent with the 'putting in' approach, yet Freud himself tends to deplore such training though he does not suggest an alternative except in general terms. According to Freud, children should be more psychologically prepared to understand their own sexuality and the aggressiveness of which they are destined to become the objects. They should also not be led to believe that everyone else is virtuous. It would be better if education were to say

"This is how men ought to be, in order to be happy; but you have to reckon on their not being like that". (1969, p. 71)

One of the aims of psychoanalytic therapy is to moderate the effects of a strong conscience, which is the result of training towards impossible ideals and followed by the guilt of failure to live up to them. Social learning theory sees conditioning with rewards and punishment as an effective training for social conscience, and promotes behaviour modification or reconditioning to reform disruptive behaviour in school. These theories have been discussed in previous sections. I simplify them here only to make the connection
with moral education. Durkheim (1961), writing more directly of moral education, saw discipline as important, and the teacher as interpreter of the great moral ideas of his time and country. Nevertheless, the teacher is as much obligated to morality as the student, a morality which originates from, and has the authority of, society. Thus Durkheim too, underplays individual moral agency and belongs with qualification to our 'putting in' category.

Socrates in 'The Republic' compares himself to a midwife. A philosopher/teacher assists the student in giving birth to those ideas and insights which are there, within the student's mind, awaiting expression. This is not necessarily entirely 'drawing out' or facilitative, as it appears, however, for what is to be drawn out, in Plato's view, and as we will see, in Kohlberg's, is the idea of virtue as a rational and universal commitment to justice. So although not entirely indoctrinative, there is a certain expectation involved. However, Socrates was certainly against the passive acceptance of values and conformity to them simply on the authority of the State and would probably have been in favour of what Freire (1974) many centuries later, called "critical consciousness".

We turn now to more worked out schemes of moral education and their practice in schools where more than lip-service is paid to moral education, although there is only space to refer to them briefly. I suggested earlier that none of these take
primarily the 'putting in' approach, although some of them appear to combine some didactic teaching within their major concern of 'drawing out' the moral awareness and competence of young people. Most practices are more common in the U.S.A. than in this country, and these too have a long history, although they are derived more from philosophy than from psychology. The question also should be briefly mentioned about whether moral education should have a regular slot on the school timetable, whether moral issues should be dealt with as they arise in any subject, or whether it should be a whole school concern. Or, of course, it could be all three. Moral issues arise in all aspects of the curriculum and the general life of the school, but if they are dealt with as they arise, some important issues may not be covered. Educators vary in their answers to this question.

The only existing model of moral education which is totally 'drawing out' is that of Values Clarification (e.g. SIMON, S., et.al., 1972). Students are encouraged to express whatever values they hold, and there is little discrimination between moral and non-moral values. The method is a good starting point for articulating and sharing values. In an effort to avoid indoctrination, however, this approach has become diffuse and appears to assume that young people have already the capacity to "arrive at values by an intelligent process of choosing, prizing and behaving". (RATHS, et.al., 1978).
Weinreich-Haste (1987) suggests that the most common emphasis in moral education in this country is on the acquisition of social skills. McPhail's Lifeline (1972) project is based on learning to understand other people. This goal is also close to that of the pastoral care system and of recent approaches to religious education. Personal and social education courses as well as tutorial schemes also stress consideration for others, (e.g. Button, 1971, 1974, Hopson and Scally, 1980) and the importance of interpersonal relations, although not necessarily with any comprehensive account of the moral aspects of them. Most of these schemes use the experiential learning method as most likely to stimulate effective learning. The teacher is seen as facilitator of the student's own learning, rather than as the expert instructing the novice. There are still many teachers, however, who see their role as that of expert instructor, and fear loss of authority and discipline if they become facilitators. While stressing the development of empathy, McPhail also emphasises modelling and conditioning by adults to achieve this, so notions of freedom and determinism appear to be confused. He distrusts rationalism because it can lead to a "packaged approach to truth", so his model concentrates on the development of affective responses. "An emotional response is needed for valid moral and social learning". (McPHAIL, 1972).

Wilson (1973) sees a role for many teaching methods in moral education which he believes should be taught as a separate
subject. In order to perform better in the moral area, certain capabilities need to be developed. These are, briefly, treating others as equals, awareness of one's own emotions as well as those of others, awareness of the facts relevant to moral decisions, and bringing all these to bear in particular situations, so as to decide and act in accordance with them. Where McPhail emphasises feeling, Wilson emphasises clear reasoning and consideration of the evidence. He believes that it is important for students to relinquish fantasies about morality and face reality, because such fantasies, emotions and prejudices prevent us from seeing and pursuing rationality in moral education. On the whole, he appears to fit into both our categories. For although he sees the teacher as playing a supportive role as sufficiently concerned, insightful and sane people, he also says that direct methods of teaching will be a focus or anchor for other methods.

Despite the thoroughness of his approach to moral education in the curriculum, Wilson's scheme has apparently not been much used. His fully worked out process of evaluation of moral learning in particular merits further attention, as evaluation is seldom mentioned in other theories.

The most comprehensive approach to moral education in the classroom and the wider school community is that of Kohlberg. He views both the stimulation of cognitive moral development and the practice of moral action as necessary for moral
education. So that although his stage theory is concerned with moral judgment, his work in schools is concerned with both moral judgment and moral action. He belongs mostly in our 'drawing out' category because he does recognise that young people are already moral agents. It has been shown by Turiel's research (1983) that from an early age children can distinguish moral rules as more important than conventional rules. However, Kohlberg follows Piaget in considering that young children initially see moral authority as outside themselves and only gradually does their morality become self-directed or autonomous.

Kohlberg's involvement in schools began when a research study by Blatt (1970) showed that moral dilemma discussion classes which stimulated cognitive conflict and exposed students to reasoning one stage above their own effectively raised moral stage, though only by an average 1/3 stage. Originally, Kohlberg believed that such discussions, in social studies and civics lessons, could raise moral stage to 5 or 6, the principled level of reasoning expressed in the American constitution as procedural justice, equal opportunity and respect for human personality. However, since few subjects in his studies appeared to reach Stage 5 or the current Stage 5/6, his goal has been redefined. He had previously claimed that teaching to Stage 4 was indoctrinative as it taught respect for law and order, authority and the free enterprise system. More recently he has retrenched to Stage 4 goals as the ends of civic education, i.e. a commitment to being a
good member of a community or a good citizen. (KOHLMAN, 1980a) But this educational approach, he claims, is not indoctrinative. The teacher is not imposing any value content on the students but preparing them to comprehend better and then appropriate the principle of justice on which the moral philosophy of the Constitution is based. This is effected by Socratic discussion in lessons, and participatory democracy in the school as a whole.

The moral dilemma discussion method begun by Kohlberg has been described by many commentators. (e.g. HERSH, R., MILLER, J. and FIELDING, G., 1980, FENTON, E. and KOHLBERG, L., 1977). Suffice it to say here that teachers can make better use of it if they are familiar with Kohlberg's theory and have had some training in moral education themselves. This is not often the case for teachers in this country. Dilemmas can also be used in the form of role-play or drama, or as written exercises.

Kohlberg's 'just community' programmes have been called the leading edge of his theory. Direct experience by students of a democratic school community helps to develop Stage 4 attitudes in a safe, small and personal society, and this can be followed by experience in the wider community to generalise such attitudes. Kohlberg agrees with Dewey's vision of schools making more just and democratic citizens, who would then make schools and society more just in a progressive spiral. It is a great deal to ask, however, of
teachers and principals to lose the security of their unquestioned authority and open themselves to the vicissitudes of democratic decision-making. In this country patterns of authoritarian governance are perhaps even more ingrained than in the U.S.A.

This way of learning democracy by doing it is worth the risks, Kohlberg would argue. It respects the moral agency of students, encourages their own thinking and in dealing with real-life problems within the school such as stealing, may more effectively promote moral development than hypothetical moral dilemma discussion. Democracy can close the gap between adult and peer group cultures if responsibility is shared, and thus reduce student alienation. Students who have had a say in making the rules are also more likely to follow them. Further, it is claimed that "the unit of effectiveness of education is not the individual but the group." (Kohlberg, 1971, p.82)

In community meetings in small alternative schools, for example the Cambridge Cluster School, final agreements were made on the rules and policies of the schools. As issues arose in school, ways of dealing with them were discussed and perhaps delegated to a smaller committee to effect. However, democracy is not easy. It is time-consuming and sometimes frustrating, boring or chaotic. In a large school participatory democracy could take more time than is available. Kohlberg's small-scale experiments show, however,
that democracy in action has practical and developmental benefits. (Lickona, 1976, Reimer, J. and Power, C., 1980) It has solved problems in American schools by providing an alternative mainly for alienated or disruptive young people.

From this brief survey, it can be seen that although Kohlberg's programme is promising and in the sense of power-sharing, revolutionary, it has practical problems in its application. It needs considerable courage, intelligence and patience from both staff and students as well as a commitment of time and energy. Teachers need lengthy and extensive training in developmental theory and the practical methods and a commitment to the process of democracy. It is also necessary for teachers to be at higher stages of reasoning than their students and this is not necessarily the case. In this country the practice of it would need whole-sale reform of school structure in ways which are clearly not agreeable to the government, or to those teachers who perceive moral education more from an inculcative than a developmental perspective. Although all great educators from Plato onwards have recognised that "just communities" provide the necessary social context for the development of morality, there appear to be many pressures that inhibit their implementation.
3.7 Conclusion

Moral philosophers, moral psychologists and educators all begin with their own commonsense understanding of morality and then progressively specialise in creating their own particular theories, which are often apparently in conflict. The general position taken in this thesis is that each of these specialised philosophical, psychological and educational theories has something to contribute to our understanding of the nature of the moral life and the process of moral education. However, it is clear that at present no one has achieved an adequate synthesis of these differing points of view. It seems that the effort to achieve a synthesis means going back to and exploring in detail the moral life as experienced by ordinary people. The main study is intended as a small contribution to that task.

Specifically in relation to moral education, Peters (1970) has written that it is no good talking about moral education until we have a more determinate conception of what is involved in being "moral". A synthesis is needed of what he calls the authoritarian and the romantic approaches, and a more adequate view of morality should reveal the proper place for both authority and self-directed learning in moral education.

This, however, is easier said than done, for the dichotomies between autonomy and authority, reason and feeling,
individuality and socialisation etc. are very pervasive, and controversy rather than consensus is the norm. The fact that they are pervasive points to inherent tensions in the moral life, which may well be a reflection of our human condition.
CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH METHODS

4.1 INTRODUCTION.
4.2 MEASURING COGNITIVE STRUCTURE: THE MORAL JUDGMENT INTERVIEW.
4.3 THE INTERVIEWER'S ROLE.
4.4 SCORING THE MJI.
4.5 ETHICAL QUESTIONS.
4.6 MORAL EDUCATION QUESTIONNAIRE.
4.7 REACTIONS TO THE INTERVIEW.
4.1 Introduction

The study to be reported is an exploration of the relationship between Kohlberg's stages of justice reasoning, and the ethical ideas and opinions on moral development and moral education of a sample of teachers, predominantly from secondary, comprehensive schools. Supplementary questions will concern differences related to sex, type of school, age, years of teaching experience and subjects taught. The basic hypotheses were listed in Chapter 1, section 1.3.

Following an initial pilot phase, 90 teachers were included in the main study. (Partial data were obtained from a further 30 teachers but not included in the analysis). They taught in a total of 57 different schools of 11 different types in the Midlands. Consideration was given to the possibility of interviewing all the teachers from, say, two schools, or a large number from, say, four schools, but it was very difficult in practice to arrange this. Interviewing teachers from a large number of schools would, however, give a wider range of teacher opinion. The 90 teachers between them taught 42 different subjects. All of them taught at least 2 of these subjects and some of them taught as many as 6. Their years of experience ranged from 1 to 30. Of the 90 teachers, 55 were male and 35 were female. (Full details of the sample of teachers are given in Appendix C).
All subjects underwent an in-depth interview varying in length from one to two hours and completed a questionnaire. It was originally intended to interview all teachers in their schools. Because the study was carried out at a time of stress for teachers, when political action was taking place and several new curriculum initiatives were being introduced, this proved impossible. In the event, 48 teachers were selected at random from those seconded to Leicester University for one year's study for higher degrees and diplomas and were interviewed at the University, while 42 teachers were interviewed during the school day at school.

The interview and questionnaire can be divided into 3 kinds of questions. The first, here called moral reasoning questions, are those from Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview schedule that directly relate to his stage scoring. The second group of questions is more general dealing with the concept of morality. This section includes some of Kohlberg's questions not used for stage scoring together with some supplementary questions. For convenience this second group of questions will be labelled ethical throughout this study. These two groups form the interview schedule. The questionnaire is made up of the third group of questions, those on moral development and moral education. Subsequent treatment of the data will therefore be divided into 3 sections or chapters. The complete interview and the questionnaire can be found in Appendix B. The supplementary questions which I added are identified by capital letters. All interviews were
tape-recorded and subsequently transcribed. In order to check on whether the experience of the interview affected the subsequent completion of the questionnaire, the sequence was, as far as possible, systematically varied, 51 teachers having the interview first and 39 the questionnaire.

4.2 Measuring cognitive structure: the moral judgment interview

The aim of the content analysis of the interview and questionnaire is to infer underlying coherence or structure beneath surface speech. This is, of course, made explicit in Kohlberg's scoring procedure. But it was also hoped that in a similar way it would be possible to infer a subject's underlying ethical position and implicit conception of moral development and moral education.

It is well known now that there are methodological problems involved in research which uses data in the form of participants' own accounts of their views and attitudes. (POTTER, 1983) There is variability in what a single person says or writes on different occasions or even on one occasion during the course of a lengthy interview. The reasons for this are technically extremely difficult to discover since they lie within the individual's own experience, personality, use of and understanding of language and unconscious as well as conscious motives. I hoped to avoid
the difficulties which might be added to these if several
interviewers were used by doing all the interviewing myself
and taking as much care as possible to stick rigidly to the
set questions except where further probes were needed to
clarify answers. Kitwood (in preparation, 1987) writes that
conscious answers are often rationalisations, and that the
roots of consistency lie largely below conscious awareness
and can only be identified after "delicate therapeutic
work". Therapeutic work, however, is a long-term process and
clearly not within the scope of this study.

Though the present study is concerned with adults, it is
perhaps worth referring briefly to Piaget, who, in his study
of children's conceptions of the world (1929) found serious
difficulties in distinguishing what he called spontaneous
and liberated convictions from those due to adult
suggestions. He said that the psychologist must make up for
the uncertainties in the method of interrogation by
sharpening the subtleties of his interpretation.

Piaget identified five criteria which would show whether a
particular conviction had been borrowed by the child from
adults by passive imitation or whether it was in part the
product of the child's own mental structure. The most
important of these criteria are that, regardless of
variations of circumstances, children of the same age arrive
at the same conception of a phenomenon, that this will
evolve into a new conception and that a particular conception
will occur many times and resist suggestion.
Kohlberg appears now to be admitting that the scoring method of the MJI is, in a similar way to Piaget's, interpretative or hermeneutic but that it can still be considered scientific, or as scientific as it is possible to be. He considers his current measuring instrument "allows us to have our psychometric cake and hermeneutically interpret it too." (KOHLBERG, LEVINE and HEWER 1983)

There is debate about whether basic conceptual structures do go on emerging and evolving in adult life, but it certainly appears probable. Although not structural, Erikson's seven stages are lifelong and do not end until death resolves the tension of the final stage of integrity versus despair. But certainly adults are likely to present strong convictions many times during the course of a lengthy interview, as Piaget showed to be the case with children. One might also hypothesise that in the case of statements about moral questions these convictions may be in apparent conflict.

My decision to use the Moral Judgment Interview was taken because it appeared to be, although still with problems, some unavoidable, the best instrument available at present for measuring moral judgment. The possible alternatives were the written version of the MJI, Gibbs' (1982) Social Reflection Measure (SRM) and Rest's (1986) Defining Issues Test (DIT). As these involve written responses they avoid possible interviewer variability as well as being easier to administer to groups and to score. The latter two measures,
however, were both derived from the MJJ and designed as simplified versions of it. Their relationship to the MJJ is uncertain. Kohlberg has noted that the SRM correlates .50 with the MJJ when age is screened out as a variable and global agreement is 48%. Studies have also shown that the DIT correlates .35 and .17 with the MJJ with age screened out. Kohlberg also claims that the MJJ fits better a Piagetian stage model (personal communication). Neither the SRM nor the DIT have the reliability and validity of the original Kohlberg measure, now refined after twenty years work into its current form.

I decided to use the MJJ in tape-recorded interview rather than the written form for several reasons. Firstly, Kohlberg himself said it was the 'ideal' method because it allows both for probing of ambiguous responses and for a full record of the subject's reasoning. (Kohlberg, L. and Colby, A., 1984). Secondly, the interview is administered to one subject at a time rather than to a group and this is likely to increase the seriousness with which it is approached and the quality of the answers. Thus, although it takes much longer to administer and assess, the tape-recorded interview should provide more stage-scorable material and a more accurate stage-specific score at the end. I used Form A of the MJJ containing the 3 hypothetical dilemmas which can be summarized as follows.
Should Heinz steal the overpriced drug to save his dying wife or not?
Should the judge sentence Heinz for stealing or not?
Should 14 year old Joe refuse his father's request for the money that Joe has earned to go to camp?

Until such time as empirical methods in psychological research are more effective it is necessary to work within the parameters we have available at present, controversial though they are and limited as they may be by the complex nature of human personality. Research in moral judgment is broadening now to focus not only on characterising the organisational forms of moral reasoning but also to study the role of moral judgment in decision-making and the regulation of behaviour, and the influence of personality and environmental factors. Kohlberg is aware of this and discusses in a recent study Stage 3 and Stage 4 subjects who have intuitions and tacit unverbalised awareness of Stage 5 ways of thinking.

"It is these unarticulated tacit understandings that govern actual decision-making and behaviour, not that which is verbalised and codable according to the new scoring system". (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 218)

Yet he still claims that higher stage scores are more likely to lead a person to moral action.

I would speculate that these unarticulated intuitions as well as affecting decision-making and behaviour may also affect the verbalising of moral reasoning or judgment, particularly
in hypothetical dilemmas and thus make Kohlberg's stages less definitive than he has claimed.

Little comparable work has been done on the study of people's underlying ethical structures and conceptions of moral development and education. There have been a few attempts to index ethical positions empirically and these are described in section 4.5 of this chapter. But it must be emphasised that the attempts in this study are exploratory and tentative for there is little previous work to build on.

4.3 The interviewer's role

The role of the interviewer is crucial in eliciting from subjects the best thinking of which they are capable in order to discover their underlying cognitive structures, the function for which the interview was designed. One of the limitations of the MJI as a standardised interview procedure is that interviewers can vary in their style and use of probe questions.

Kohlberg has written that

"'structural' interviewing, considered somewhat whimsically, is the art of asking a subject 'why' enough times to find out how he gets profound, but not enough times to find out how he gets angry". (1977 scoring manual).

This remark, however, does not appear in the current manual. There can be much variation of style ranging from a curt and quite threatening interrogation by the researcher to a very
gentle attentive listening style as often used in counselling. I would suggest that a counselling style is much more effective in enabling subjects to talk freely about their thinking especially in a field which is often unfamiliar to them. No training in interviewing style is given at the Harvard Moral Education Center workshops. They concentrate almost entirely on the scoring of protocols. There is a section on technique, however, in the manual but this appears to refer to the questions asked and how to probe for scorable answers while avoiding suggestion. There is in fact, an implied rejection of the counselling mode.

"Interviewers with training in non-directive counselling seem to have an almost irresistible tendency to 'reflect' the subject's responses back to him..........You may inadvertently bias an interview by suggesting rewordings of the response to the subject." (COLBY, A and KOHLBERG, L. 1984, Chap. 7., p. 8)

Reflecting back does not necessarily involve rewording, although paraphrasing might do, and paraphrasing of questions, if not answers, is recommended in the manual. Reflecting back is usually considered to be a repeating back to the subject of what he or she has just said. In the present writer's view, interviewing style as opposed to questioning technique is very important and some training in basic counselling skills should be part of the training workshop procedure. Kohlberg himself had the most gentle of styles and appears to have developed affectionate friendships with many of his longitudinal subjects over the years. Some interviewers of course, do not attend the workshops, since it involves travelling to Harvard, and
therefore learn about interviewing and scoring entirely from the manual. The manuals themselves are often difficult to obtain and full of alterations.

There is a sense in which the questionnaire method is more standardised across subjects since the questions and answers are then written and unaffected by different interviewer styles. However, since I interviewed all my subjects myself and maintained the same style and questions, although there was obviously some difference in the further probes given to individual subjects, there should be little interviewer variation. I adopted a counselling style which was facilitated by the fact that I am a trained counsellor. In fact I found this style necessary as well as effective since a number of subjects began the interview with some anxiety and/or hostility. The anxiety often concerned the confidentiality and anonymity of the interview and what they might say about their school in the questionnaire, as well as concern about the unfamiliarity of the topic. It also seemed that many teachers (like their pupils) were anxious to give me the 'right' answer. Hostility appeared from those who had negative feelings about morality, often in its supposed connection with religion, sex or politics, or negative feelings about 'interfering university academics'. On the latter point I was able to say that I was a teacher myself.

I particularly wanted to interview some teachers who were hostile to the idea of moral education so that my sample
would be more representative of teachers in general as well as providing the possibility of discovering the grounds of their hostility. None of them were still hostile by the end of the interview and this lends support to the view of the MJI as a heuristic device, which has been noted by many commentators.

4.4 Scoring the MJI

I personally administered all the interviews and transcribed the tape recordings of them. In the summer of 1985 I also attended the scoring workshop at Harvard University in order to become proficient in the scoring procedure and to enable me to use the latest (1984) version of Kohlberg's scoring manuals in their pre-publication form. I assessed the Global Stage Score (GSS) and the more discriminated Weighted Average Score (WAS). A brief description of how these scores are arrived at seems appropriate at this point.

The GSS is computed from the stage scores assigned to each of the 6 issues by matching a subject's interview judgements with criterion judgements in the manual. Scores for the chosen issue are given 3 points, those for the non-chosen issue 2 points and guess scores 1 point. Only stages which represent 25% or more of the issue totals count towards the final GSS. The WAS has the same system of weights for chosen, non-chosen and guess scores, but does take into
account all the stages represented. It is expressed as a decimal and then multiplied by 100. Thus, for example, 326 is a WAS score that is nearer to Stage 3 than Stage 4. The same GSS score would be 3/4. In the event, perhaps because the teachers were a fairly homogeneous group, there was considerable bunching of GSS scores around stages 3 and 4 so in the analysis of results I made more use of WAS scores. A Canadian scorer, also trained at Harvard, was able to check a sample of my scoring for interrater reliability, and a high measure of agreement was reached. It is interesting to note an apparent contradiction between Kohlberg's theory and the scoring process. The structure of the stages, according to Kohlberg, provide a stepwise and not a continuous development. The WAS scoring procedure, however, seems to imply a continuous development.

Kohlberg has been much criticised for the fact that his original stage scheme was based on information from an all-male sample and that the protagonists in the dilemmas are all male. (see Chapter 3) Some studies have found that the gender of the protagonists does influence the measurement of moral reasoning. Bussey and Maughan (1982) found that males scored significantly higher when the protagonists were male but that females did not score significantly higher when the protagonists were female although their scores did increase. In order to test this with my sample of 55 males and 35 females, I changed the sex of the protagonists on every alternate interview so that 45
teachers answered questions about Heinz and Joe and 45 answered questions about Helen and Joan. Of the 45 answering questions about Heinz and Joe 29 were male and 16 were female. Of the 45 answering questions about Helen and Joan 26 were male and 19 were female. I also changed the policeman Mr. Brown to the policewoman Mrs Brown for the female interview and changed Joe to Joan, but the sex of the judge remained unspecified in both the male and female interviews.

I considered the possibility of scoring teachers also by Kohlberg's new procedure into Moral Type A or Moral Type B. These types have replaced the substages A and B in both the theory and scoring. Returning to the theory of Piaget (1932) and his distinction between a first stage of justice involving heteronomous orientation to rules and authority and a second stage of autonomous orientation to fairness, equality and reciprocity, Kohlberg now considers that heteronomous reasoning does not disappear with development but remains as an orientation throughout the stages. This finding emerged from the 'bootstrapping' technique or circular revision, by which stage definitions are revised in the light of empirical data analyses and vice versa.

"By 'bootstrapping' we mean the notion of an evolving research program in which data feed back into theory and method to improve the account of development we offer. This process is not unique to our efforts. In fact, it could be argued that it is the model used in all scientific endeavors". (COLBY, A. and KOHLBERG, L., 1984, p. 66)
In one of these revisions study was made of content which had been mistakenly identified as higher stage structure. In this content ideal types could be seen which appeared to be ranged on a continuum from heteronomous to autonomous.

In earlier versions of his scoring procedure, Kohlberg had defined substages, called A and B, within his main stages. However, it now seemed that the substage orientation needed reassessment.

"Our longitudinal data scored for substage seem to indicate that where there is change from one substage to another it is from A to B. However, some subjects attaining substage B often retain their substage status even when they advance to the next stage, and some subjects remain substage A throughout structural progression through the stages". (KOHLBERG, L., 1984, p. 255)

This finding was instrumental in the decision to drop substages from the scoring method and to score Moral Type separately. This is done by looking in any of the protocol answers for criteria of autonomous thinking. Derived from Kant and Piaget the critical criteria are those of choice (choosing the more just course of action in the dilemma), hierarchy (treating persons as ends, not just means), intrinsicalness (respect for persons), prescriptivity (a categorical moral 'ought'), universality (actions must apply to any and all human beings), freedom (judgments made without reference to external authorities), mutual respect (of actors as rational and autonomous moral agents), reversibility (viewing the problem from the perspectives of all actors in a situation), and constructivism (understanding that all society is derived from communication and co-operation between and among persons).
The presence of these indicators means a subject can be scored as Type B and their absence will be indicators of Type A. The first study of this scoring showed high reliability and no sex differences. Kohlberg also claims that where relations are more equal, for example in a Kibbutz or in a democratic school, people would be more autonomous. Type B's would also be more likely to take moral action than Type A's. Early studies in alternative high schools have shown a tendency for pupils to move from Type A to Type B because of the democratic system and a developed sense of community. I decided, however, not to use Moral Types as a measure because research is still ongoing and the measure has yet to be validated. The Types are also designed as additional information about subjects within Kohlberg's moral stages and not as a wholly separate measure. However, they do seem more promising than A and B substages so far.

But the debate about separating structure from content in scoring, something Kohlberg has worked on for many years, continues with the claim (EVANS, 1986) that even in the latest manuals the structure of answers is still not sufficiently differentiated from content for scoring purposes. Also the attempt is made to ascertain underlying cognitive structures from verbalisation only which favours therefore the more articulate subjects with a wider vocabulary. I would add that the interview is a stressful one for subjects who are not used to talking about moral dilemmas in particular and are constrained to make choices and answer very direct structured questions.
Kohlberg's latest manual, *The Measurement of Moral Judgement* (1984) contains a chapter describing the reliability of the Standard Issue MJI and Scoring System. It is asserted that the instrument is "highly reliable" in several ways. I summarise the data as follows. Firstly, test-retest reliability is shown to be in the high nineties correlation on tests taken a month apart using Form A and Form B. All subjects receive scores within one-third stage of each other. Then the same interviews were used to assess interrater reliability. Percent agreement on Form A ranged from 88% to 100% for agreement within a third of a stage. Raters who scored the interviews varied in degree of experience in using the manual. Thirdly, alternate form reliability was assessed and percent agreement between Forms A and B was comparable to test-retest and interrater reliability. A Cronbach alpha test was also made for internal consistency and the results indicated that the measure meets the psychometric criterion of internal consistency of a test, that is, they provided strong evidence that the MJI is measuring a single construct.

As far as validity is concerned Kohlberg has argued that construct validity is the appropriate validity concept for a developmental measure, not prediction to an external criterion, and here criteria of construct validity correspond to the two most central constructions of stage theory, that is, invariance of stage sequence and structural "wholeness". As far as a response to hypothetical dilemmas is
able to predict scored response in real-life dilemmas. Kohlberg believes that it does. The correlation in Gilligan and Belenky's (1980) study on the relation between scores on the abortion dilemma subjects were actually facing and on the standard dilemmas at time 1 and time 2 were .83 and .92 respectively. Taken together, this data is believed by Kohlberg to address the central methodological concerns raised by such critics as Kurtines and Greif (1974), but he also says that there is a need for further research on discriminant and construct validity. Rest is impressed with these results,

"If one is not favourably impressed with these findings it is difficult to know what would be impressive in all of social development literature." (1986, p. 466)

The aforementioned paper by Kurtines and Greif criticised Kohlberg's measure on several technical points. The authors claimed there was no evidence that each stage by itself had discriminant validity although there was some discrimination in general between unsophisticated and sophisticated reasoning and they concluded that the empirical validity of the model had yet to be demonstrated. However, Broughton (1978), in a reply to Kurtines and Greif criticised their criteria and their criticisms, both on the stage-like consistency of individual moral reasoning and on the sequential ordering of the stages, as well as saying that despite difficulties in measurement Kohlberg's theory could still be correct. In a more recent critique, Cortese (1984) points to the fact that Kohlberg's scoring system has been
substantially reformulated since his original study in 1958 and concludes that although there are still some problems, the current scoring procedures successfully meet the major problems of reliability as introduced by Kurtines and Greif. But there does not seem to be strong evidence for the discriminant validity or the predictive validity of standard issue scoring. Further investigation may provide the data which will undoubtedly lead to further revision of theory and method and a better insight into moral development.

It seems at present then that Kohlberg's measure still has some validity problems but it remains the most effective measure available. It is possible however that in claiming that standard issue scoring is both scientific and interpretive, Kohlberg will attract more criticism.

The actual scoring of protocols also still has problems and Kohlberg's team are aware of many of them. It is clear that unless the scoring method is valid, the validity of all studies based on it will remain questionable. Kohlberg's 'bootstrapping' method, defined earlier, has led to many alterations in the manuals but also left him open to criticism of trying to fit his empirical work into his stage theory, that is, to generate scores that show stage-like upward movement and minimal regression as well as internal consistency and high reliability. The theory itself is developing over time, particularly as results from the longitudinal study become available, although in view of
Kohlberg's recent death, it may be that his work will now have to be deemed complete and its future promise not be fulfilled.

One of the main difficulties in scoring has been identified by Cortese (1984) who claims that the scoring is not really standard because there are no matching Criterion Judgements in the scoring manual for all the possible combinations of 9 dilemmas x 18 issues x 9 norms x 17 elements a subject might express in his or her Interview Judgment. Thus original or idiosyncratic responses from a subject either cannot be scored at all or must be scored as a guess by the rater. This difficulty can be exacerbated if the dilemmas have been translated into another language with its own nuances and understanding. Certainly both these difficulties were apparent in my experience of scoring, although the language change was merely from American to English.

Another problem is the status of transitional stages. In the Piagetian model of structural stages, where stages represent a) structured wholes that b) develop in an invariant sequence and c) form hierarchical integrations, there cannot be 'transitional' stages, only 'whole' stages. However the scoring manual appears to treat transitional stages in exactly the same way as whole stages by giving them critical indicators and criterion judgments. Kohlberg maintains that his stages are 'hard' structural stages with discrete operations of reasoning, but has not yet solved the
difficulty involved in the status of transitional stages. 53 of the 90 teachers I scored were in the transitional stage 3/4, another 2 in 2/3 and 8 in 4/5. This left the minority of teachers in whole stages, i.e. 8 in stage 3 and 19 in stage 4. (see Table 5(1) in Chapter 5)

Very little of the interview is actually needed to assign a stage score. The three dilemmas of Form A each contain two issues so the stage score could quite reasonably be assessed on only six sentences spoken by a subject during the course of an interview lasting at least an hour. The minimum needed is two issue scores so a subject's best reasoning may in fact be based on only two sentences. Much more material is thereby omitted than is included for scoring purposes. Moreover, four of the six issues, Law, Morality and Conscience, Punishment and Authority, appear to me to be very closely connected in having similar if not identical Criterion Judgements and thus the interview is overloaded with legal matters. Another point is the rigidity of the choice between 2 issues. For example, those who choose not to steal the drug in the first dilemma are scored as choosing the Law issue whereas in fact they may have decided not to steal for other reasons such as personal integrity and be against obeying the law. Such a response is unscorable because all the Law issue Criterion Judgements assume Law as more important than Life. I observed in fact that subjects with some experience of counselling or therapy were likely to be scored at Stage 2 because they expressed
themselves in individualistic terms of 'personal space' and 'privacy rights' rather than in the more general terms of 'respect for persons' and 'equal rights' which would have matched the philosophical language of Stage 5 criterion judgments.

One of Kohlberg's theoretical assumptions is of prescriptivism. The scoring is said to measure a subject's explicit or implicit moral prescription.

"An interview judgment, to be used for match scoring must involve some element of "should" or "ought", that is, it must be prescriptive". (COLBY, A. and KOHLBERG, L., 1981, p.28)

There appears to be a lot of room for possible errors here. It is sometimes very difficult to judge whether the material is implicitly if not explicitly prescriptive, particularly as the "should" requirement is normally in the question asked by the interviewer rather than in the answer given by the subject. The manual suggests caution when applying the criterion of prescriptivity to Stage 1 and Stage 2 protocols because individuals reasoning at these stages do not distinguish clearly between "should" and "would". In my experience this confusion is present in all stages. It is also the case that some subjects do not consider "should" or "ought" to be prescriptive or moral words at all, and their particular understanding of it is not necessarily communicated to the interviewer.

Some subjects also resent the idea that they should tell Heinz what to do. It is up to him to make his own moral
decisions. Those who attempt to put themselves in Heinz's shoes in an empathic manner are hindered by the fact that they have to guess at Heinz's feelings and in any case he is a hypothetical person. The response "If I were in Heinz's shoes, I should ... etc." is possible, but "If I were in Heinz's shoes I would ... etc." is a more natural way of speaking but may not in that case be prescriptive. Even with an interview transcribed from a tape, this issue of prescriptivity is a problem.

Having reviewed all these problems, including many that arose in the process of my own scoring, it needs to be stressed that I followed Kohlberg's written instructions and my own training at Harvard as closely as possible.

4.5 Ethical questions

Studies have found that measuring the structure or content or both of people's ethical or metaethical positions is fraught with difficulties. Kohlberg himself has amassed 20 years of answers to the ethical questions in his interview but as far as I know these still await analysis, although in fact they form the major part of the MJI. I used these questions of Kohlberg's and added some of my own in an attempt to discover categories of ethical thinking into which teachers could be placed. I considered it necessary to use supplementary questions since Kohlberg's questions did not tap some of the
major philosophical dimensions. For example he does not include questions on religion and morality, on whether morality is individual, social or universal, on means versus ends and on subjects' own attachment to particular values. Full details of my additional questions will be found in Appendix B.

Boyce and Jensen (1978) say that once a person's underlying moral base of normative ethics is understood, most of his particular judgments can theoretically be predicted. For their research study of the teleological-deontological dimension of moral thinking they designed a test of moral content and scored the various answers to dilemmas that different kinds of teleological and deontological reasoners would use. However, it is difficult to tell whether their subjects' reasoning fell into one "moral base", i.e. either teleological or deontological, because the answers are ranked in importance and thus all categories receive points. A global picture is therefore obtained by which a person's reasoning is, for example, more deontological than teleological. It seems therefore that a person's underlying moral base can contain several categories which philosophers would deem incompatible. Philosophers themselves appear to put their own thinking into exclusive categories.

The absolutistic-relativistic dimension was studied in U.S. College students by Perry. After looking at U.S. college students from a developmental point of view he concluded that
from adolescence to adulthood there are three essential steps in a person's maturation. First, a person modifies an absolutistic right-wrong outlook "to make room, in some minimal way, for that simple pluralism we have called Multiplicity". In the second step "a person accords the diversity of human outlook its full problematic stature and transmutes the simple pluralism of Multiplicity into contextual Relativism and then comes to foresee the necessity of personal Commitment in a relativistic world". (1974, p. 42) The third step traces the development of Commitments in the person's actual experience. Each of these three steps is subdivided into three positions, giving nine in all. Almost as in a game, deflections from the main line of development can occur which Perry calls temporizing, which is delaying in a position, escape, which is a kind of detachment or alienation, and retreat, when entrenchment in early positions of dualistic absolutist structures has taken place.

The details of this scheme, however appear extremely complicated, and the first and last positions were extrapolated rather than present in the data. This study however, with its idea of deflections from the main line of development, does throw interesting new light on the phenomenon of apparent "regression" to relativism among college students which has proved a problem for Kohlberg's model.
Trainer's Australian study (1982) is more substantial. He expresses dissatisfaction with concepts which are currently employed for discussion and identification of the nature and variety of moral thought and seeks to offer clear useful descriptive categories of the main factors. He singles out Kohlberg and Wilson as thwarting progress by confusing empirical analysis with their own philosophical ideals and assumptions, and by emphasising structure at the expense of content. He writes that there is a need for studies which are free ranging explorations of varied instances of moral thinking, which look out for many different concepts and categories in order to determine which ones seem most valuable for representing what goes on when people think about morality and for identifying the differences between people. These studies should be free from preconceptions about the most useful variables.

The major dimensions were extracted by what Trainer calls "open-minded and exploratory data-gathering". University students were used as subjects and later he used adults and children as well. Open-minded is obviously not the same as objective, for he writes that any observer's cognitive apparatus is inescapably subjective, and subsequently his concepts cannot be proved true any more than Kohlberg's. Certainly much criticism has been directed at Kohlberg because of his claims that his model has been shown empirically to be valid. The two main factors which Trainer considers to be of prime importance are those he calls
internalisation and the objective-subjective continuum. Internalisations are the intrinsic values held when the chain of asking 'Why?' questions comes to an end in the answer 'It just is'. These intrinsic values are more felt than known and make up the individual's conscience. There is only one type of conscience but its strength varies in different individuals.

The objective-subjective dimension is connected to conscience in that the more objective an individual, the stronger his or her internalisations are likely to be. This does appear to be somewhat of a paradox. Trainer also claims that the more objective subjects were also more authoritarian, less self-actualising, more likely to universalize moral principles, the law and God and less likely to consider human rights and happiness.

His other dimensions are the structure of moral reasoning which he claims is more to do with feeling than rationality, moral sensitivity, moral knowledge and ideas. He suggests that a tendency to take moral principles very seriously is in general associated with immature, rigid, primitive and questionable moral ideas. One could suspect here that Trainer's own preconceptions are creeping in. His study is nevertheless very wide-ranging and thorough.

The work of Fishkin (1984) is mostly within the objective-subjective continuum. He distinguishes seven
theoretical positions, ranging from Absolutism at one extreme to Amoralism at the other and ends up supporting a position called Minimal Objectivism which performs a kind of balancing act between the extremes. Locke (1985), in a review of Fishkin's book, relates this again to Kohlberg's 'regression' problem and says that this position, which might as well be called Minimal Subjectivism, is both more consistent and more defensible than Kohlberg allows. It is a compromise between "the objectivist claims of traditional morality and the subjectivist tendency of contemporary moral scepticism". Fishkin does make a useful distinction, in my opinion, between various possible degrees of holding objective and subjective beliefs at the same time. But his work also demonstrates the difficulties in store for the researcher who attempts any similar task.

Brown (1984) made a study of Fishkin's methodology in the form of a Q sort. The items used were the responses made by Fishkin's subjects. The subsequent factor analysis produced 4 factors which Brown says are neither as unambiguous nor as numerous as Fishkin's categories, and that although it is possible that the twelve persons examined do not embody all of the meta-ethical positions in existence, it is also possible that Fishkin's seven categories owe their clarity and status more to his logic than to anything inherent in the way people actually think when engaged in moral discourse. He therefore recommends to Fishkin that he should substantiate the operational foundation on which he seeks to
erect his theoretical structure. Unless some check is available on the perceptions of the classifier, sceptics will challenge the conclusions reached.

In view of these difficulties, it was with some trepidation that I approached the analysis of answers to the ethical questions of my own interview. I had originally hoped that teachers would distribute neatly into categories which I could label by the main philosophical theories such as objective, subjective, emotive or intuitive beliefs. Preliminary work on the data proved what reading such studies as those described above had already suggested, that in this area people do not fit easily into categories. Despite the philosophers' abstractions and beliefs that people are rational and consistent and that such categories exist and people do fit into them, in practice this proves to be a long way from reality. I therefore decided to proceed the other way round as recommended by Trainer and see if any distinct categories would then emerge, bearing in mind from Brown's study that my analysis should be as logical as possible in order to represent teachers' accounts as accurately as possible.

It must be pointed out, however, that any analysis of content has to be relative to the researcher. Doubtless other researchers would have analysed it differently. For practical reasons it was quite impossible to find others to judge the data and to seek for inter-judge reliability in
any systematic way. However, there was a good deal of informal discussion with others during the course of the analysis.

Most writers now agree that total objectivity in social science research using participants' accounts is not possible. In verbal communication there are intersubjective difficulties. For instance, people tend to assume in a conversation that there are shared meanings attached to the words used and this is not necessarily the case. Each person understands a question in her own particular way, so that the same question will not have precisely the same meaning for all subjects. Most of the questions in this section were complicated. This was hard to avoid in view of the topic under research. But different understandings of the questions and different wording of the answers made the search for common themes across subjects a difficult one. In trying to get at what people mean, the interviewer has to be aware also that tone of voice, gestures and stress on certain words are all important. Sometimes people mean more than they say and sometimes less. And there is always the possibility of what further things they might say if questioned more, or what different things they might say if questioned on another occasion.

The personality of subjects can also make a difference to how they approach the interview situation and what they say in it. As Smail writes,
"There is (only) an extremely small minority of people who manage to conduct themselves sensitively and spontaneously in the world without recourse to fake objectified selves...who are able to relate warmly and openly to others without feeling threatened...(by)...the Other's objectifying gaze". (1984, p. 50)

The question of personality difference is one not yet addressed by philosophers. The responses thus had to be read and reread many times before the content analysis could begin, and any underlying structure which has been ascertained must remain tentative. There has, however, been a strong desire throughout to do justice to the teachers who provided so much rich and thoughtful material with great good humour, and to the complexity as well as the coherence of their ideas.

It is worth noting here that I had a particular reason for including one of my additional questions which relates to Kohlberg's theory. Kohlberg's theory on adult development now posits 'soft' stages which are levels of existential or reflective awareness, above the 'hard' structural stages 1 to 5. As they have not appeared in the empirical data they are also now considered hypothetical. Stage 7 in fact has always been hypothetical - Kohlberg's dream, perhaps - but Stage 6 was part of his original stage scheme, although it is now amalgamated with stage 5. Kohlberg states,

"To answer the questions 'Why be moral?' and 'Why be just in a universe filled with injustice, suffering and death?' requires one to move beyond the domain of justice and derive replies from the meaning found in metaethical, metaphysical and religious epistemologies" (KOHLBERG, LEVINE and HEWER, 1983, p.41)
These questions, however, are not asked in Kohlberg's interview. I used the first of them as one of my additional questions and found my subjects able to answer it at stage 2 and through to stage 4/5. I would suggest therefore that it can be reasonably answered at any stage and not only by those with principled cosmic perspectives.

It could be that justice reasoning does not end at stage 5 but can be continued to include a cosmic perspective. Or that these answers are not exclusive to post stage 5 reasoning as Kohlberg suggests. In the analysis of results I will relate subjects' answers to the question "Why be moral?" to their stage score, and discuss the implications of this.

All the ethical questions from the interview were analysed by a preliminary content classification and then subjected to a computer factor analysis as well as the usual cross-tabulations and other statistical tests.

4.6 The moral education questionnaire

The open-ended questionnaire concerned the moral development and moral education questions in my study. I considered this type of questionnaire to be preferable because it would not offer teachers any suggestions about children's development and moral education and thereby make it more likely that
their own individual view would be stated. In my pilot study I used a Likert type scale with statements about moral education but I rejected it for the main study as proving too restrictive as well as offering suggestions. Other studies such as those by McPhail (1972) and May (1971) used structured questions with answers to tick or cross. This type of questionnaire offers information about the subject under study to participants as well as constraining their replies within strict limits.

I asked four questions which were set out on a whole page each to encourage full answers. The first question was about moral development so that I could see whether teachers views accorded with theories of moral development as well as with their views of how moral development could be encouraged in school. The other three questions were about the nature and purpose of moral education and how its purpose, if any, could be achieved in school. Full details of these questions will be found in Appendix B and an analysis of the answers will be found in Chapter 7.

The analysis of these questions had difficulties that were not quite the same as those of the ethical questions already described. The responses were written so that there was no opportunity to ask subjects to clarify their meanings. Some wrote short and sketchy notes for answers and others wrote long essays complete with references to books. Some answers were very confused and some writers had almost illegible
handwriting. Subjects mentioned a number of themes, often in the same sentence, which did not always seem to be logically coherent. A theme could also be mentioned positively or negatively or both. In fact it would have been better to have worded the questions in a more straightforward way. However, since subjects were free to write what they liked, and as much as they liked, there was much more material than would have been available from a structured questionnaire. In relation to each question I sought to clarify whether a subject gave expression to a particular idea and whether this was in a positive or negative way.

All the data were analysed using the Digital Vax Computer Cluster SPSS-x statistical package (1986)

4.7 Reactions to the interview

Kurtines and Greif(1974) state that all theoretical systems must ultimately be evaluated empirically and therefore Kohlberg's model must be so evaluated "despite its demonstrated heuristic value". I am not sure whether it is in fact possible to evaluate empirically all theoretical models, particularly in the social science field, but I consider from my own experience that Kohlberg's interview has a heuristic value for subjects. In order to see whether my subjects would agree I decided, at the end of the depth interview to ask the teachers for their comments on it. Many
of my subjects found the interview stressful and difficult and frequently said so, but they also found it interesting and rewarding. During the course of the interview the few subjects who had been anxious or hostile at the beginning changed their minds and began to enjoy the experience.

For his work in schools Kohlberg uses moral dilemmas as a teaching programme. It seems to me that it is just as useful for teachers as for their pupils in giving them the opportunity to clarify and express an understanding of morality they did not always know they had. It seems they have not had much opportunity to do this before. It also helps them to understand better the difficulties their pupils have in clarifying and expressing opinions and values. As I mentioned earlier many people hold implicit values, and live them in their lives, without knowing what they are or why they are held. Piaget(1932) was convinced that practical, lived morality came before the theoretical realisation of it in the development of children and I would suggest that this is also the case for adults. This was actually expressed by some of the teachers I interviewed in their comments, as in the first of the examples given below. The examples are a representative selection of the comments teachers made.

"We don't realise that we face these decisions every day. We just cope with them"

"I've found it very interesting. It's thrown a few more channels open. Whether they stay open long enough to think about them is slightly different"
"Actually I quite enjoyed that, to my surprise. Expressing things you don't usually talk about you become aware of things you haven't considered for a while"

"It's difficult to word your feelings about it, to justify it"

"It's been very interesting, fascinating, but off the cuff you feel very nervous"

"I feel quite well researched. I didn't expect to be searched myself quite so much"

"It is without doubt one of the most difficult areas to show logic"

"I feel a bit drained. These questions are hard to consider and to articulate"

"They are awkward problems that you would not normally come across so we find out how we go about sorting out our own rationale"

"You know more about me now than anyone else does"

"I don't think I've ever been faced with any moral dilemmas"

"I've been involved in these things before and I've always been angry that you don't really know where they are leading or you are dissatisfied with the questions asked or the inflexibility of the people asking the questions. That is certainly not the case with this".

"I think these situations are very good starters for discussion about what you would do in the same situation so that if a time comes when you have to make a similar decision you can be a bit more enlightened about it".

"I was expecting to be asked 'What is right?' and 'What is wrong?' Some interesting questions and now I need some time to think about them and perhaps I'll come back to you"

"I feel awkward using the word moral because I don't think I've worked out exactly what I understand by it"

"Sometimes I was quite irritated by it, but then it got interesting trying to work out what I was feeling about it. It's certainly not an easy thing to do. You keep going round in circles"
"That was very hard work! It really was because I'm so used to doing instant reactions in teaching. So having to think things through and justify them is really hard work"

"It's been quite fun in a perverted sort of way"

"I really enjoyed that. Can I come back next week?"

These comments left me with a number of strong impressions. The experience of the interview did seem to be a significant one for most of the teachers. There was evidence that they were consciously realising thoughts and feelings, to some extent for the first time. It was clearly not a purely "intellectual" experience since it drew on powerful feelings. The interview itself was thus a morally educative event for them. It appeared to have started a process which could go on much further. In fact, some subjects returned for subsequent explorations of the issues. This seemed to me to confirm my belief in the value of counselling skills in the interview process and in moral education. It seemed to suggest that teachers need to pursue this process much further before they can effectively cope with an experiential approach to moral education with their students. These points will be taken up again in the final chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION I - KOHLBERG'S STAGES

5.1 STAGE SCORES: GSS and WAS.
5.2 TESTS ON ORGANISMIC VARIABLES.
5.3 CURRICULUM SUBJECTS RELATED TO WAS.
5.4 SEX DIFFERENCE ON WAS.
5.5 WAS RELATED TO ETHICAL QUESTIONS.
5.6 WAS RELATED TO QUESTIONNAIRE.
5.7 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS.
CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION - KOLBERG'S STAGES IN RELATION TO OTHER VARIABLES.

5.1 Stage scores: GSS and WAS

All subjects were given the full Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview. As already indicated in Chapter 4, two scores can be derived from the interview, Global Stage Score (GSS) and Weighted Average Score (WAS). The former allows a classification of subjects into 9 groupings from Stage 1 to Stage 5, i.e. Stages 1, 1/2, 2, 2/3, 3, 3/4, 4, 4/5, and 5. The latter allows a score from 100 to 500.

Table 5 (1)
Distribution of Global Stage Scores

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<th>STAGE</th>
<th>FREQ.</th>
<th>%</th>
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<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
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</table>

The striking feature of this table is that although subjects range from Stage 2/3 to Stage 4/5, 80% of them fall into Stages 3/4 and 4 and none fall clearly into Stage 5.
This result is not surprising in one sense since it has been repeatedly found that few people in Western societies are unambiguously at Stage 5 in their moral reasoning. However, in a recent study movement to Stages 4 and 5 after high school was found to be systematically related to higher education and to job satisfaction and responsibility (Kohlberg, 1984). So one might wonder who does achieve higher stages of moral reasoning in our society if not a responsible professional body of graduate teachers.

In the U.S.A., studies have been made of the stage reasoning of teachers. Those studies reported by Leming (1986) indicate that more teachers use principled reasoning than in my sample. 43% of a sample of Michigan teachers were reasoning at the principled level. (Giffore and Lewis, 1978). 42% of 2,500 college graduates studied by Rest (1976) also showed principled reasoning. Wilkins (1980) had similar results with a sample of Australian pre-service students. Bloom (1976) however, in a study of practising teachers, found only 30% of them reasoning at the principled level.

It is difficult to see how these researchers arrived at their percentages, so it is hard to interpret their findings in relation to my own results. Leming observes that the majority of teachers reason at the conventional level and so many may fall below the level of their high school students. Only 9% of my sample showed clear evidence of principled
reasoning. It does not make sense, on the face of it, for teachers in Britain to be so far behind teachers in the U.S.A. in stage reasoning. There may, however, be some reasons for the apparent difference.

If these studies used the D.I.T. as a measure rather than the M.J.I., which I used, it is likely that the stage scores would be higher. Certainly Rest used the D.I.T. with his 2,500 college graduates. The D.I.T. is a multiple choice questionnaire with suggested responses for each stage, and subjects choose from these suggested responses. It is easier to choose a Stage 5 response than to construct one, as is necessary with the M.J.I. Also, by Kohlberg's theory, subjects actually prefer a stage response one above their own when it is offered to them. This is another reason why scores on the D.I.T. are higher than on the M.J.I.

It is also the case that Stage 5 responses represent the principles embodied in the U.S. Constitution, with which all Americans become familiar during their own education. In Britain we have no written Constitution, nor are such principles stressed in schools. For the Americans responding to the D.I.T. therefore, it might be a case of recognising the suggested Stage 5 response as the principles to which they owe allegiance. This point will be discussed further in the concluding chapter.
The bunching of subjects apparent from Table 5(1) means that the Global Stage Score is not the best measure to use in testing relationships to other variables in this instance. Instead, the Weighted Average Score has been used in all statistical tests. The distribution of WAS is given in Table 5(2) following.

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Total: 90  X = 363.4111  SD = 38.2737
5.2 Tests on organismic variables

Preliminary tests, including analyses of variance and correlations, were conducted to see if there was any significant relationship between WAS and the following:

a) subjects who took the interview first and those who completed the questionnaire first.
b) subjects who were seconded to Leicester University and those who were in school.
c) subjects given the Heinz dilemma and those given the Helen dilemma.
d) age of subjects.
e) number of years of experience in teaching.
f) the type of school subjects taught in.

In none of the above tests did the results approach anywhere near significance. Though the results were not significant, it is perhaps worth reporting certain slight trends found in the data. Thus, subjects given the Heinz dilemma scored on average slightly higher ($X = 367.1333$) than subjects given the Helen dilemma. ($X = 359.6889$) In previous studies it has been found that the gender of the protagonists does influence the measurement of moral reasoning (e.g. Bussey and Maughan, 1982). This will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.4 in the report of male and female differences on the two interviews. In relation to type of school subjects taught in, those teaching younger children scored on average slightly higher ($X = 380.5714$) than those teaching older
children (X = 366.3571), and teachers from Roman Catholic comprehensive schools had the lowest average score (X = 310.6667).

The fact that no correlation was found between WAS and the ages of subjects is consistent with the claim made by Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) that stage progression tends to slow up greatly after the age of about 25 and subjects tend to remain in the stage they have then reached. The implication from this study is that experience of teaching does not stimulate further development in Kohlberg's stages. Nevertheless, Kohlberg's current theory posits the development of reflective thinking or "soft stages" in adulthood, if not "hard structural stages". He writes, ..."Soft stage models present a new way of doing research in the subject area of adult development, a way that has emerged from the Piagetian paradigm". (KOHLBERG, LEVINE and HEWER, 1983, p. 41)

5.3 Curriculum subjects related to WAS

Tests were conducted to see whether WAS was related to curriculum subjects taught in school. This proved difficult since each teacher named up to 6 curriculum subjects out of the 42 different ones named. There was thus considerable overlap of teachers into more than one subject category. In order to reduce this overlap to a minimum, it was decided to
group the curriculum subjects into 11 groups. It was still the case that a few teachers overlapped. By overlap I mean that teachers placed in one group might also teach a little in one of the other groups. The determination of the 11 groups was somewhat arbitrary, but based upon the observation that, for example, a teacher was more likely to teach French and German than French and Chemistry. The 11 groups were as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subjects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENGLISH</td>
<td>English, Drama, Communication, English as a Second Language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANGUAGES</td>
<td>Spanish, French, German.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCIENCE</td>
<td>Physics, Chemistry, Biology, General Science.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEOGRAPHY</td>
<td>Geography, Geology, Environmental Studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL EDUCATION</td>
<td>Social education, Careers, Personal and Social, Health, Lifeskills, Community Care.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESIGN</td>
<td>Design, Art and Craft, Technology, Rural Studies, Home Economics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMANITIES (inc. Primary)</td>
<td>Humanities, Social Studies, General subjects, Integrated studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HISTORY</td>
<td>History, Politics, Sociology, Commerce, Psychology, Economics, Business Studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.E.</td>
<td>Religious Education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAMES</td>
<td>Physical Education, Games.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 11 42
The WAS for teachers who taught in each grouping was compared with the WAS of those who did not teach in that grouping, and the results were as follows.

Table 5 (3)
Analysis of Variance of WAS of 11 groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT GP.</th>
<th>DO TEACH</th>
<th>DON'T TEACH</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>SIG.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>X WAS</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>X WAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENGLISH</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>374.7222</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>360.5833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHEMATICS</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>348.3333</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>365.7308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANGUAGES</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>373.0000</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>362.4756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCIENCE</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>347.5238</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>368.2464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEOGRAPHY</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>374.7000</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>362.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL ED.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>359.7895</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>364.3803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESIGN</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>348.4286</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>364.6747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMANITIES</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>372.4800</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>359.9231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HISTORY</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>379.6000</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>360.1733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.E.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>379.8000</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>361.3625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAMES</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>358.5000</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>364.0250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>FOR ENTIRE SAMPLE</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>363.4111</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from the above table, the WAS of teachers who taught history approached significance (.0705) in an upward direction and the WAS of those who taught science was significantly lower (.0278) than those who did not.

Since there was still some overlap of teachers, three large groups were formed out of the smaller groups, with Games omitted, as all Games teachers appeared in other groups.
These three groups were as follows.

**SCIENCE**  Mathematics, Science, Design.
**LANGUAGES**  English, Languages.
**HUMANITIES**  Geography, Social Education, History, Humanities, Religious Education.

Cross-tabulations showed that there was still some overlap, except between Science and Languages where there was none. Eleven teachers taught in both Languages and Humanities and these were mainly English teachers who also taught a humanities subject. Twelve teachers taught in both Science and Humanities and these were mainly Science teachers who also taught Personal and Social Education or Careers.

An analysis of variance test of WAS versus these three large groups was made, as before, by differentiating between those who did teach within a particular large group and those who did not. The results were as follows. They show that two of the tests were highly significant, whereas the third was not significant.
Table 5 (4)
Analysis of Variance of WAS of 3 groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT GP.</th>
<th>DO TEACH</th>
<th>DON'T TEACH</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>X WAS</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>X WAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCIENCE</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>348.4412</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>372.5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMANITIES</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>371.6226</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>351.6486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANGUAGES</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>372.8800</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>359.7692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOR ENTIRE SAMPLE</td>
<td>TOTAL 90</td>
<td>X WAS 363.4111</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results showed that those teachers who taught Science had an average WAS score significantly lower (.0031) than those who did not teach Science. Those teachers who taught Humanities scored significantly higher (.0133) than those who did not teach Humanities. The non-significant trend for teachers of Languages was for the average WAS score of those who did teach in that group of subjects to be higher than the average WAS score of those who did not. Although the conclusions must be considered tentative, these results clearly suggest that teachers falling into the Science grouping score lower than all other teachers. As the results reported in Section 5.2 show, none of the factors listed in that section can account for this difference. It could be the case, however, that sex difference among teachers who
fall into these groups could account for the difference. When this was tested, it was discovered that sex was not significantly related to subject taught. Hence the difference reported here cannot be attributed to the preponderance of one or other sex within the Science group. Other possibilities are that factors influencing people who choose to study Science, or the effect on them of studying it, may lead to a way of thinking which discounts moral reasoning because it is "unscientific". It was feasible to check this latter possibility by using a question asked later in the interview, and relating the answers to it to the 3 large subject groups. The question (number 15) was "Most people believe that thinking and reasoning in science can lead to a correct answer. Is the same thing true in moral decisions or are they different?"

None of the relationships proved significant.

The conclusion has to be made, therefore, that the lower WAS scores of science teachers cannot as yet be explained. There is always the possibility of some kind of bias in the measuring instrument, but to study this would call for another research project.

5.4 Sex difference on WAS

As was explained in Chapter 3, section 3.4, a major focus of contention over recent years has been the issue of sex
difference on Kohlberg's stages. Evidence of systematic sex
difference has been found in a minority of studies only,
mostly as over-representation of females in Stage 3 and
their under-representation in Stage 4. Since the present
sample of subjects fall overwhelmingly in the Stage 3 to 4
range, if sex differences exist they should show up.

Table 5 (5)
Analysis of Variance of Sex differences on WAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WAS X</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>SIG.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>346.1714</td>
<td>36.2771</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>374.3818</td>
<td>35.1650</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For entire sample</td>
<td>363.4111</td>
<td>38.0038</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>.0004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This result is quite unequivocal. Males in this sample score
very significantly higher than females. Males are more
likely to fall into Stage 4 and females into Stage 3. A
scattergram of WAS scores of males and females also showed
that 4 females and 1 male scored 300 or below, and 11 males
and 3 females scored 397 or above, that is, more females than
males scored lower than Stage 3 and more males than females
scored higher than Stage 4. It has sometimes been thought
that this sex difference might be caused by the fact that the
protagonists in the dilemmas are all male. In this study, I
changed the sex of the protagonists on each alternate
interview, so that 45 teachers were asked about Heinz and 45 were asked about Helen. A 3-way analysis of variance was made to compare sex of subject with the sex of the interview and WAS and the results were as follows.

Table 5 (6)
Analysis of Variance: Sex of subject x WAS x sex of interview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex of interview</td>
<td>348.69</td>
<td>377.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>344.05</td>
<td>371.12</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For entire sample X WAS = 363.4111

These results indicate that there was no significant interaction between sex of subjects and sex of protagonists in the dilemma and they appeared merely to reflect the higher general average of males. However, there was a trend for both sexes to score slightly higher on the Heinz interview. Thus, in the present study, the sex difference cannot be accounted for by the fact that the chief protagonists in Kohlberg's dilemmas are all male. Further evidence on sex difference in thinking about morality will be presented in the next chapter.
It is also worth referring again to Kohlberg's claim that if samples for studies are controlled for education and occupational status, no mean differences in justice reasoning stage should be found. (1984) He quotes studies by Colby and Kohlberg (1984), Snarey (1982) and Weisbroth (1970) in which sex differences were found. He concludes,

"Studies comparing the sexes in justice reasoning stage either report no sex differences or report sex differences attributable to higher education and role-taking opportunity differences related to work"... (KOHLBERG, 1984, p. 348).

It is difficult to understand how role-taking opportunities could be indexed in relation to work.

This study is significant, therefore, in reporting a sex difference among a sample of teachers, all the product of higher education and all in the same profession.

5.5 WAS related to ethical questions

In addition to the Kohlberg stage scoring questions, a number of other questions were asked in the interview, questions which for convenience I have labelled ethical. Responses to these questions will be dealt with in detail in the next chapter. What is relevant here is that the relationship between WAS and responses to these questions was tested.
It was decided to relate WAS to these questions because, by Kohlberg's theory, some relationship was to be expected. Although his stages are derived from the defences or justifications subjects give after they have made a moral judgment in a hypothetical dilemma, Kohlberg's theory claims that what is being measured is underlying cognitive structure. This cognitive structure is said to underlie all real life moral judgments and actions and hence represents a relatively stable perspective on moral issues. Therefore it is to be expected that this perspective will show itself in response to other questions related to morality as well as to those directly involved in stage scoring.

In Appendix B the whole interview is given. Those questions used for scoring purposes are not numbered. The ethical questions are numbered from 1 to 15 with my questions additional to Kohlberg's identified by capital letters.

In most cases the relationship between these questions and WAS was far from significant and only the few significant results will be reported here.

a) Question 12: How do you know when you've come up with a good moral decision? Is there a method of reaching one?

Those subjects whose responses stressed going by their own experience, or relying on their training or own values,
scored significantly lower than the rest. ($X = 336.8571, \text{ No.} = 7, \text{ vs. } X = 365.6506, \text{ No.} = 83, \text{ Sig. < .05})$. On the other hand, those subjects whose responses stressed comparing their decision with some external moral authority like society or the Bible scored significantly higher than the rest. ($X = 395.7500, \text{ No.} = 8, \text{ vs. } X = 360.2561, \text{ No.} = 82, \text{ Sig. < .01})$.

Though the numbers who differ from the majority in these comparisons are small, they may be claimed to be consistent with Kohlberg's stage theory, since we might tentatively expect Stage 4 subjects to stress external, social authority and Stage 3 subjects to stress personal and socialisation experience. Though it is of course going well beyond the evidence, there is perhaps a hint of objectivity in the former view, and a hint of subjectivity in the latter.

b) Question 13: WHAT WOULD YOU SAY IS YOUR MAIN CODE OF VALUES OR PRINCIPLES?

Subjects who in their responses to this question stressed mainly the family, and the need for fairness, truthfulness and fidelity within the family scored significantly lower than the rest. ($X = 341.0526, \text{ No.} = 19, \text{ vs. } X = 369.3944, \text{ No.} = 71, \text{ Sig. < .003})$. Again, though the minority is small, this emphasis upon the maintenance of family stability is entirely consistent with Kohlberg's conception of Stage 3.
c) Question 5: WHY SHOULD ONE BE MORAL, ANYHOW?

As was pointed out in Chapters 3 and 4 this basic question, according to Kohlberg, is the existential problem which leads subjects to Stage 7. It was argued earlier that it is nevertheless a question subjects can reasonably be asked at any stage.

Although Kohlberg has not written a lot on his conception of Stage 7, his position on it appears to be as follows. For subjects thinking in Stages 1 to 4, the answer to the question "Why be moral?" is already implicit in the stage structure itself, i.e. "Why is it right to do this?" is answered at Stage 1, "Because if not you will be punished", or at Stage 4, "Because society would break down", and these answers already include a reason to be moral. However, at the principled Stage 5/6, where the answer is in terms of a moral principle, not a fact, so that subjects have now differentiated fact and value, and value is generalised into a universal principle, the question "Why be moral?" has a new significance. It becomes "Why commit yourself to a universal moral principle?", and hence the answer must be in terms of a cosmic perspective on the nature of the world, that is, some kind of universal "religious" philosophy.

The result of relating WAS to this question is summarised in the following table.
Table 5 (7)

Analysis of variance of WAS vs. Question 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WAS X</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>SIG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To live with yourself</td>
<td>351.778</td>
<td>36.2614</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To live with self and others</td>
<td>355.4211</td>
<td>39.4537</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious reasons</td>
<td>364.0000</td>
<td>38.7040</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To live with others</td>
<td>365.1795</td>
<td>32.0295</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humans are innately moral</td>
<td>399.3333</td>
<td>47.6839</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For entire sample 363.7865 38.0509 89 .0274

Responses to this question will be dealt with more fully in the next chapter. For the moment our concern is the relationship to stage score. On the face of it the relationship is perplexing. It cannot be explained by sex difference because there is no significant sex difference on any of the ethical questions although there is a significant sex difference on WAS.

Responses stressing personal happiness in the first category might be seen as expressions of Stage 3 thinking, but if we understand this in terms of personal integrity then in Kohlberg's terms we might expect it to be expressive of Stage 5 or 6 reasoning. Stressing the importance of smooth co-existence with others might seem a typical Stage 3 response, though the subjects endorsing it here are closer to
Stage 4 than Stage 3. Religious reasons, because they draw upon the authority of God's law, seem consistent with Stage 4. The 9 responses which stress the fact that human beings just are moral beings do not seem obviously related to any of the stages, though if interpreted as affirming the universal and equal moral agency of all human beings, then they would seem clearly expressive of Stage 5/6. It is also possible that these subjects were aware that this question is illogical below at least principled thinking, if not Stage 7 as Kohlberg believes. All of them except 1 had scored some Stage 5 in their assessment.

These comments are necessarily highly speculative and uncertain. Perhaps the only firm conclusion is that the results of this study suggest that Kohlberg's account of the relationship between responses to the question "Why be moral?" and his stage development is more complicated than he thought. The results also suggest that further and more detailed exploration of the relationship might prove very interesting and lead to a somewhat revised conception of the stages.

5.6 WAS related to the questionnaire

In addition to the interview, subjects also completed a questionnaire in which they gave their views on moral development and moral education. Responses to the four
questions which are given in Appendix B will be analysed in detail in Chapter 7. For the present our concern is the extent to which the responses may throw light on stage reasoning.

a) Question 1: Could you suggest reasons why some children become adults who try to keep to certain moral standards while others do not?

Responses to this question were classified into 23 groups, only 3 of which were significantly related to WAS.

(i) Responses which emphasised affect, in particular empathy, sensitivity to others and desire for approval, were associated with higher WAS scores than those which did not. ($X = 395.3333, No. = 6, vs. X = 361.1310, No. = 84, \text{Sig. } < .03$). The association of these responses with, in effect, Stage 4 reasoning, rather than Stage 3 reasoning, is hard to interpret, though they might be held to be consistent with a view which stresses the intrinsic nature of moral agency, or the reciprocity and mutual respect of Stage 5/6.

(ii) The responses of a few subjects emphasised strongly the negative moral influence on young people of the media. These responses were significantly associated with low WAS. ($X = 319.8333, No. = 6, vs. X = 366.5238, No. = 84, \text{Sig. } < .003$). The tendency to attach a great deal of importance to general social influences in moral development may be judged not inconsistent with a Stage 3 perspective.
(iii) Interestingly, those subjects who made a special point of saying that schools have a negative moral influence on pupils scored significantly higher on WAS than those who did not. \( (X = 381.0714, \text{ No.} = 14, \text{ vs. } X = 360.1579, \text{ No.} = 76, \text{ Sig.} < .05) \). The result is only just significant, and the number of subjects small, nevertheless it is of interest that the Stage 4 perspective which is associated with maintaining the stability of society's institutions, should be critical of the moral influence of one of society's major institutions. However, it appears to be the case that in some schools, subjects do not see what they believe to be a good moral influence actually put into practice effectively.

b) Question 2: Please describe, as it is at present in your school, what contributes, both positively and negatively to the moral education of pupils.

Responses to this question were predictably varied. Only one finding out of 24 groups is worth reporting as significantly related to WAS. Four subjects stressed that their own schools positively influenced moral development in so far as they were child-centred, respected the independence of the child, and the child's right to fair treatment. The WAS of these subjects was significantly higher than the rest. \( (X = 400.5000, \text{ No.} = 4, \text{ vs. } X = 361.6860, \text{ No.} = 86, \text{ Sig.} < .04) \). It is noteworthy too, that one of these four subjects was the only one in the sample who also emphasised the negative
effect on the moral education of pupils when the school was not closely related to the local community.

c) Question 3: What do you think is the purpose of moral education?

Two of the tests relating to responses to this question and WAS reached significance. Nearly half the subjects mentioned as an important purpose of moral education the development of the pupil's reasoning, analytic capabilities, decision-making abilities, and moral autonomy. They were significantly higher on WAS than those who did not mention this purpose. ($X = 371.4419$, $N_o. = 43$, vs. $X = 356.0638$, $N_o. = 47$, Sig. $< .05$). Conversely, those relatively few subjects who mentioned as a major purpose of moral education the direct teaching of what is right and wrong, and training pupils to resist temptation were significantly lower on WAS than those who did not mention this. ($X = 338.8889$, $N_o. = 9$, vs. $X = 366.1358$, $N_o. = 81$, Sig. $< .04$).

It might be thought that a conception of moral education as the specific teaching of what is right and what is wrong by people in authority would be associated with a Stage (1) or Stage 4 perspective though a Stage 4 perspective here seems more associated with the encouragement of moral autonomy. Such an influence, however, probably indicates only a superficial understanding of Stage 4 for the Stage 4 focus upon maintaining the stability of society's institutions, so
that change is brought about by constitutional methods, when that society is a constitutional democracy, would seem to lead to a recognition of the importance of developed moral autonomy and self-direction among its (future) citizens. It is also worth noting that the X WAS of 371.4419 indicated that this group included teachers scoring 4/5 on Kohlberg's stages, who were therefore demonstrating the Stage 5 perspective of respect for individual right and autonomy in their view of the purpose of moral education.

5.7 Summary of main findings

The main findings in this chapter can be summarised as follows.

1. GSS scores showed 59% of teachers in Stage 3/4, with 21% in Stage 4, and 9% in Stage 4/5 above, and 9% in Stage 3, 2% in Stage 2/3 below.
2. The distribution of WAS scores was from 258 to 470, with a X of 363.4111.
3. There was no significant relationship between WAS and the following variables - interview or questionnaire first, Heinz or Helen dilemma, age, years of teaching experience, type of school.
4. Teachers of science subjects had a significantly lower WAS than others (< .0031).
5. There was a significant sex difference on WAS. Males scored higher and females lower. (< .0004).

6. There was no significant interrelation between WAS, sex of subject and the Heinz or Helen interview.

It cannot be said that the relatively few significant relationships found between WAS and the ethical and moral education questions have done much to enlarge our understanding of stage perspectives. Nevertheless, there are connections which later and more detailed research might follow up. These can be summarised as follows.

There was a tendency for higher scorers on WAS to endorse the following views.

a) A moral decision can be recognised as good if it compares with some external authority such as society or God's law.

b) The quality of life for everyone is higher if humans show concern and respect towards others.

c) If you are a thinking being at all you are a moral being. It is an inevitable part of being human.

d) Moral development in children is encouraged by their empathy, sensitivity to others and desire for approval.

e) Schools which do not practise what they preach, have double standards for staff and pupils, and unfair structures, have a negative influence on moral education.
f) Schools which are child-centred, respect the child's independence and right to fair treatment, promote moral education.

g) Pupils' moral development is encouraged by a school which is related to the local community.

h) The purpose of moral education is the development of reasoning, decision making and moral autonomy among pupils.

There was a tendency for lower scorers on WAS to endorse the following views.

a) I go by my own experience or values in deciding whether I have made a good moral decision.

b) It is an important principle to maintain fairness, honesty and fidelity in family relationships.

c) The reason for being moral is to live up to your own standards, or be happy with your life.

d) It is in your own and society's interests for you to be a moral person.

e) The media has a negative moral influence on young people.

f) The purpose of moral education is to teach children the difference between right and wrong.
CHAPTER SIX

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION II - CONCEPTS OF MORALITY

6.1 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS OF ETHICAL QUESTIONS.
6.2 OBJECTIVE-SUBJECTIVE CORRELATION TEST.
6.3 OBJECTIVE-SUBJECTIVE FACTOR ANALYSIS.
6.4 INDIVIDUAL-SOCIAL FACTOR ANALYSIS
6.5 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FACTOR ANALYSES.
6.6 CONCLUSION.
CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION II - CONCEPTS OF MORALITY

6.1 Frequency analysis of ethical questions

In this chapter, the ethical questions will be described and discussed in the order in which they were given in the interview. Subsequently their relationship to each other will be reported. Their relationship to other variables such as sex, age and length of subjects' teaching experience proved in every instance to be non-significant. However, question 9 was significantly related to the type of school subjects taught in, and this will be mentioned in the context of question 9. Also question 8 was significantly related to curriculum subjects taught, and this too will be mentioned in context.

The first section will give the frequencies of answers to the fifteen questions with brief comments on them and examples of answers from each of the numbered sub-groups. As already noted in the previous chapter, the questions are numbered, and the supplementary ones I added are identified by capital letters. A discussion of the philosophical concepts underlying these questions is to be found in Chapter 2.
a) Question 1: What does the word conscience mean to you?

Table 6 (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDIVIDUAL</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Conscience is a personal feeling</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Conscience is an inner voice or instinct</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Conscience is a personal set of beliefs</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Conscience is the spirit of God</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIAL</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. Conscience is learned from upbringing/socialisation</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOTH</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. Conscience is both individual and social</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Conscience is not a viable idea</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total | 90 | 100 |

The majority (68%) of subjects understood the concept of conscience in individualistic terms. However, within this individualistic meaning, there are differences. The first sub-group (17%) expresses conscience as a negative feeling of shame or guilt, or a gut reaction towards what is right.

1. A gut reaction of knowing what's right in a particular situation

   A nagging feeling of guilt that one has done something wrong

Both these examples seem to indicate a somewhat unconscious or irrational feeling as do the comments from the second sub-group. This group sees conscience as an inner voice or instinct, but appears to identify this inner voice as a thinking one.
2. Whatever it is within me that makes me think it's right to act in a certain way. It's what you've worked out for yourself is the right way to act which is not necessarily what other people tell you or what is generally accepted.

The 2% who consider conscience to be the spirit of God within them are, like the other two sub-groups, expressing a concept of conscience which cannot be challenged and perhaps therefore they are avoiding full responsibility for their actions. However, the fourth sub-group see conscience as a worked out, rational and conscious set of beliefs or individual philosophy, which can, therefore, be challenged, and for which they are taking responsibility.

3. It's my own personal set of rules that I impose on myself. It means making moral decisions about issues and once the moral decision has been made that obligates you to follow that course of action.

It is not, of course, clear whether this individualistic concept has arisen from within the individual, or has been impressed upon him or her from outside. 16% of subjects do view conscience as imposed from outside, by parents through upbringing, or more generally through the norms and values of society.

4. If you look at it like a computer, it's society programming us. It's our control. It's our boundary. Hereditary, or at least told to you by your parents and grandparents as a set of values.

Another group (14%) clearly view the concept as a combination of individual and social ways of understanding right and wrong.

5. Something to do with the interplay between the values and ethics that society has socialised into you and your conscious interpretation of that. You end up with an amalgam of both.
This division between an individual and a social conscience thus has underlying it different views of the origin of conscience. It is also related to the philosophers' discussion on the rights of the individual against the rights or good of the community and the search for a balance between them. However, like the subjects in the present study, some philosophers tend to support the individualistic view, some the social view, and others both views.

Unlike philosophers, the writers of dictionaries are forced to define succinctly the words in their columns. The origin of conscience is not defined, but its nature is, and in most dictionaries, it appears to be defined in individualistic terms. Conscience is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as follows:-

"Conscience: the organ of the mind responsible for
a) inhibition of wrong behaviour
b) guilt or self-blaming after transgression
c) impulse to pursue virtue in an altruistic way
d) capacity to discriminate right from wrong."

The Penguin English dictionary (3rd ed. 1977) defines it as "an individual's system of accepted moral principles; the subjective sense of right and wrong, especially as applied to a particular act."

Eysenck (1961) defines conscience as a conditioned avoidance reaction to certain classes of acts or situations, and thus clearly implies that it is inhibitory or controlling and a
consequence of training by others. Most sociologists would probably agree with him.

In the Dictionary of Religious Education Pring interestingly says that a reference to an "inner voice" is "of course only a metaphor", but does not say what it is a metaphor of. He also takes the individualistic view.

"It is essentially a personal conviction, where right and wrong are not a matter of publicly agreed knowledge in the way that mathematics and science are." (1984, p. 98)

Some would argue with the second half of this statement and say that right and wrong may not be overtly agreed in public, but privately and in common everyone knows what they are. I shall return to this point in the concluding chapter of this study.

b) Question 2: Should a moral decision be based on one's feelings or on one's thinking and reasoning about right and wrong?

Table 6(2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Entirely on thinking</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mainly on thinking</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Entirely on feeling</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mainly on feeling</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Both. They are the same or cannot be separated.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Don't know</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To some extent, this question takes up in more detail the distinction between feeling and rational thinking seen in sub-groups 1 and 2 and sub-group 3 in the previous question.

It is apparent here that the majority of subjects (56%) who answered that a moral decision should be based on both thinking and feeling were not confused by the either/or format of the question. There was however, some confusion among subjects between "should" in the question and "is" so I categorised them together. This confusion was discussed in Chapter 2 and has permeated the whole study.

Examples

5. It's got to be a combination. You must temper one with the other.

I don't think in the end you can separate them. People aren't creatures of pure reason or pure emotion.

I don't think feelings can be divorced from your intellectual ideas of right and wrong. The two are very intricately tied together.

28% considered a moral decision should be based entirely or mainly on thinking.

1. It should be based on thinking. I wouldn't consider it a moral decision if it was made by someone on the emotion of the circumstances.

14% considered it should be based entirely or mainly on feeling.

3. Feelings ought to take sway if it's a difficult choice. You're a long time dead, aren't you?

So the majority of subjects say that thinking and feeling are both involved in a moral decision. One could perhaps tentatively suggest, therefore, that they endorse "objective subjectivity", as one of them expressed it, rather than objectivity on the one hand or subjectivity on the other.
It could also be asked whether the 14% who emphasised only or mainly feeling are thus emotivists in MacIntyre's sense. Certainly they are not emotivist in its narrow sense of giving expression to feelings of desire or approval, for they are describing a feeling of some kind of inner compulsion. MacIntyre (1981) sees emotivism as embodied in our culture in a "variety of philosophical guises". It encourages us to think of ourselves in individualistic moral terms, rather than as related to the social structure. Even objectivity he sees as a disguise for personal preference. "In moral argument the apparent assertion of principles functions as a mask for expressions of personal preference". (MACINTYRE, 1981, p.18) It is difficult, however, to see this disguise in operation in these subjects.

He considers that this personal preference or an individualistic will to power stands in the way of the intellectual and moral life which can only be sustained by the construction of local forms of community with a "shared vision of and understanding of goods". Thus he supports the Aristotelian tradition. It is difficult to see why he considers the individual will cannot be directed towards the social good, in that individuals do tend to agree on core moral ideas, and to understand the tension between individual and social morality. At least the majority of subjects under study here do, as can be seen by many of the answers to these ethical questions.
c) Question 3: In general, what makes something a moral problem?

Table 6(3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Personal values conflict</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Interpersonal or social problem</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No answer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The subjects here divide into two fairly equal groups, 50% in the first and 47% in the second. The first group takes a more individualistic view, considering that a moral problem is concerned with an individual's own moral choices or an internal conflict of values.

1. Any decision based on values which somebody has to have sorted out for themselves rather than a straight factual choice like which holiday to go on.

Any time a person has to make a judgment about a situation where there are conflicts in your attitude.

Something that I felt internally was wrong, yet felt a great desire to do, like commit adultery with my next door neighbour.

It's a moral problem if there's a feeling that there are things that I ought or ought not to do.

The second group emphasises that moral problems are those which affect relationships with others, where a balance of the rights of others or the community with one's own rights is difficult to maintain.
2. A moral problem is to do with our relationships with other people, and honesty and fairness in that and in ourselves as well.

It's a conflict with established law or norms, where what you think is right is in conflict with other people or the law.

When you've got to balance out whether or not your actions are going to have an effect on anybody else besides yourself, and consider their feelings as well as yours.

Just whether it's socially acceptable or not.

These two groups are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Further questions to each of them would probably have elicited agreement. However, the emphasis of each group is distinctly different.

d) Question 4: What does the word morality mean to you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. An individual code for living</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Code for a society or group</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Individual and social</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. No answer/no meaning</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These answers demonstrate again one of the main tensions or themes in this study, that between the individual's personal values and the values of the group or society. As a moral agent, each person originates moral judgments, but so does each other person. And people interact not just in pairs, but in various groups and in society as a whole, so that their moral judgments impinge on or are about all these relationships.
The subjects divide into what can be called a psychological or personal point of view (41%) and a sociological or group point of view (37%), with a smaller number endorsing both views (18%). The first view emphasises the content of an individual's conscience.

1. I think probably the same as conscience - your own decisions as to what is right and wrong, your own code.

It's to do with the way people act within their own moral code or standards. If you judge them you should judge them by their moral standards and not yours.

I suppose to me, personally, it means not sleeping around.

The second view emphasises the taught or accepted ways of behaviour of a community.

2. It is the collective morality of society. In a lot of cases I think there are fairly absolute rights and wrongs that most people would agree on.

A recognised or accepted code of behaviour which will vary according to the society and the age which you live in.

Morality is fitting into your particular social group and not doing anything that's unacceptable in the eyes of your peers or your family.

The third group see morality as both an individual and a social concern.

3. It is probably a code of conduct that society demands of me plus a code of conduct that I demand of myself.

I think it means people doing what they should be doing for the best of all concerned, themselves and others.

4% of respondents claimed that the concept of morality had no meaning for them, or a negative meaning, or they resisted answering the question.
4. It's not a word I use. It's an abstract noun, often used as a substitute for not thinking about what you are saying. Like beauty. I could tell you whether I thought something was beautiful, but I couldn't tell you what beauty is.

That's a hard question. It's only Monday morning, you know.

The word doesn't happen in my vocabulary. It means R.E. and Assemblies and I'd try not to be there.

It is interesting to note how many subjects use the word "code" in their answers, and one could speculate that this comes from the Christian "code" or Commandments which are still a strong part of our inheritance in the western world.

Philosophers do not seem to emphasise these views, as was discussed in Chapter 2 and neither do dictionaries give definitions similar to these subjects' statements.

E) QUESTION 5: WHY SHOULD ONE BE MORAL, ANYHOW?

Table 6(5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To live with yourself.</td>
<td>18  20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To live with yourself and others.</td>
<td>19  22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Religious reasons.</td>
<td>4   4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. To live with others.</td>
<td>39  43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Humans are innately moral.</td>
<td>1   1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. No answer.</td>
<td>9   10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total | 90 100 |

This question in one form or another has been asked throughout history. Why should one do that which is right or
good? is another version of it, although slightly different in meaning.

The majority of subjects here (43%) take the view that the reason for being moral is to demonstrate respect and concern for others in society and to enable the smooth running of that society. When added to group 2, one can say that 65% of subjects disprove MacIntyre's view that everyone now is an individualist rather than, in the Aristotelian tradition, a committed social being.

4. Because it leads to a code of conduct within groups which leads to the welfare of everybody within that group.

Life if possible should be happy and contented so we try never to hurt others, or affect their lives adversely.

Being moral elevates us to a higher level than common animals. We should not upset, offend or hurt others.

I would suggest therefore that implicitly included in this view is the idea that the self benefits as well as society, the view which is specifically endorsed by another 22% of subjects.

2. Initially for your own good. And doing things that don't harm others. And to have a society we can all live and operate in because we can assume others have the same values.

Without it you are failing to take into account the needs of others and not living up to the potential of being a human.

The more thoughtfully you act towards others and the more thoughtfully they act towards each other, then the more pleasant it makes life for all and sundry.

The 18% who say that they are moral because they want to be happy appear at first sight to be egocentrically motivated,
but the emphasis in fact appears to be more connected with personal integrity and following conscience.

1. I want to be happy with the way I live. I want to feel whatever I've done has got integrity, and to be an influence for good.

There's that nagging little feeling that has been bred into you that hedonists get it in the end.

Because I have a conscience and it would trouble me if I wasn't.

The 4% who give the reason for being moral as keeping God's law appear similar to group 1, except that God is their authority rather than their individual integrity or conscience.

3. I look at the reason for being moral as living up to the standard I believe God wants from me and which is also ultimately in the best common good.

The most interesting group are the 9% who take a completely different line by saying that the question does not make sense because human beings cannot help being moral. It is in the nature of human beings, perhaps in an evolutionary sense, or in the sense of all of us having innate moral knowledge.

5. That's an unaskable question, because morality means what you're obligated to be. If you're a thinking being at all you are a moral being. You may be immoral but not amoral.

In practice we don't have a choice because we are all trying in our own way to be moral.

F) QUESTION 6: IS IT NECESSARY TO HAVE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS TO JUSTIFY BEING MORAL?

Table 6(6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. No</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No answer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>90</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
94% of subjects said it was not necessary to be religious to be moral, at least where 'religious' means to have a specific belief in God or to belong to a particular denomination. In another sense of being religious, many said morality was nevertheless connected with being humane and behaving in a "Christian" way.

1. It's not necessary. The value of human life is the same for the religious person and the humanist.

I feel quite strongly about that actually, the sort of spiritual side of it. I don't see why believing in Jesus Christ has to be necessary to make you into a better person.

It's not necessary, but I don't know to what extent my own reasons for acting in a particular way are some sort of hang-over from a fairly Christian upbringing.

Only 4% said religious beliefs and practices were necessary, for them personally, to justify morality.

2. For me it is right what the Church says.

Yes. I'm not a devout Christian but I do believe in life after death.

The connection between religion and morality is an interesting one and much has been written about it. As the subjects in this study infer, it depends on what you mean by religion. It is also the case that in many intellectual disciplines there is a tension between an objectivist orientation, that is a belief in the possibility of obtaining "absolute" or "certain" knowledge, and a relativistic orientation, that is a belief that moral and perhaps all knowledge is dependent on its historical, cultural, situational or individual context. It is clear that there was a long period in our history when religion, or divine revelation, gave to moral standards the status of objective or absolute truth. Faith in the authority of God was accepted almost universally in the western world.
Fewer people now accept this, and the subjects of this study probably reflect the thinking of the modern world. They deny that morality is dependent on religion, but they have not yet denied that morality is in some sense objective nevertheless. There is a further discussion of this point in Chapter 2. I would suggest that people psychologically need the security of objective truth, and even though consciously now most people seem relativistic, underneath there is a longing for absolutism, for the authoritative certainty and safety which religion offers. Primary schools still have a religious teaching, most of them having assemblies with prayers and plays at Christmas and other religious festivals like the Hindu Diwali. However, these celebrations are not so common in secondary schools. So I would suggest, tentatively, that the longing for certainty also comes from the religious upbringing that most of the subjects had, even though many have come to reject religion as adults. This suggestion was behind the next question asked.

G) QUESTION 7: WOULD YOU SAY YOU ARE RELIGIOUS?

Table 6 (7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sort of</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a child, but not now</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The subjects who answer this question divide fairly equally into two main groups. 38% claim to be religious or "sort of religious", and 40% deny that they are religious, although 19% of them were when they were younger. One respondent expressed it thus.

4. I had a Christian background as a youngster and it was appropriate at that time. It helped me along the road to a humanist position.

The one teacher I interviewed who was from a different ethnic group to all the others (West Indian) was a Roman Catholic. She said

1. My religious beliefs are more important than anything else.

Others in this group were religious to varying degrees.

1. I'm pretty sure there is some Divine Being even if it's a comforting habit.

Those who were not religious were more definite about it.

2. No. I was dragged through choir and church groups, not Sunday School, fortunately. The attitude of church people - not liking children in church, wearing best clothes etc. - disenchanted me, and I saw religion as a kind of social climbing.

I'm not interested in group religions and I'm not impressed by their claims that what they say is true because it comes from a higher source.

In view of the claim by many people today that we live in a secular society and that attendance at religious services is declining, it seems surprising that nearly 50% of subjects were religious now or had been when they were younger. I would suggest that this reinforces my speculation in discussing the previous question. It is also worth noting that all those who claimed to be religious were Christian. The teaching profession still appears to have a minority of
teachers who belong to other faiths. Morality, however, can be seen as multi-cultural as well as multi-faith in its basic form. This point will be discussed in the concluding Chapter of this study.

h) Question 8: Is there some correct solution to moral problems, or when people disagree is everybody's opinion equally right?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. There is a correct solution</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Everyone can be right in his/her situation. There is no correct solution.</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Can be both 1 and 2.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The majority is right.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total | 90 | 100 |

Behind this question is the argument over whether moral knowledge or rightness is absolute/objective or whether it is relative/subjective. These dimensions were discussed in Chapter 2.

10% of subjects consider that it can be either, depending on the situation. They consider it impossible to make general statements.
3. I think there could probably be a right answer, but also two people could be right if they were both defending a different principle.

Only 14% take the view that there is some absolute or objective right answer to moral problems.

1. I don't think all the different ways of looking at it are equally right. There is one true answer at the end.

There are often factors which cloud the issue but I think there is a right outside what people think.

God is the absolute truth for everything else to be relative to.

The largest group of subjects (59%) believe that everyone can be equally right or that people must agree to differ but in any case there is no absolute right answer.

2. Well, life is too complicated for there to be any set routine, solution or formula to cope with all the circumstances that come up. I feel it's important for people to make their decisions for themselves.

From your viewpoint your rationalised judgment has got to be right, and everybody has a right to consider themselves right.

There's no one solution. We are all equally right and equally wrong.

An inbetween view is taken by the 17% who argue that right lies with majority opinion.

4. I would appeal to groups. If sufficient people believe it is right, then it becomes right.

Everyone is entitled to their own opinion and you have to find the majority view.

As reported in Chapter 4, Fishkin (1984) spread his subjects along a continuum between Absolutist and Amoralist, i.e. extreme objectivism and extreme subjectivism. I would suggest quite strongly that this can perhaps be done with subjects' answers to one question, but that across a number
of questions, this would be extremely difficult, because their answers would be inconsistent. One of the striking features of this research has been the inconsistency of answers. Subjects tend only slightly to express any particular moral stance consistently, and frequently express stances that are in direct contradiction to one another. This will be discussed in more detail in connection with the objective/subjective factor analysis in section 6.3 of this Chapter.

It is perhaps noteworthy that those who taught in the large Humanities curriculum group were significantly more likely to take a relativist stance by saying that everybody's opinion is equally right. (Sig .012)

I) QUESTION 9: IS THE RIGHT ACTION ALWAYS THE ONE WHICH HAS DESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES, OR ARE THERE SOME THINGS WE OUGHT TO DO REGARDLESS OF THE CONSEQUENCES TO OURSELVES OR OTHERS?

Table 6(9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Right action has desirable consequences.</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. There are some &quot;oughts&quot; regardless.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Both. It depends on the situation.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. No answer.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 90 100
The distinction expressed by Kant between whether an action should be performed because it is good in itself (categorical imperative) or whether it should be performed because it leads to good consequences (hypothetical imperative) has been much debated among philosophers (see Chapter 2). 41% of subjects here stress the instrumental view that the consequences of actions are what makes them good or not. This view can also loosely be called utilitarian.

1. We always have to consider the consequences of every action we take and then make a decision as to whether something is right or wrong based on that.

At my stage because of all the constraints I have to think of the consequences first or be an outcast in the institution, but if my circumstances change I might pluck up courage to do something about my convictions like the Greenham women.

A slightly smaller group of subjects (36%) endorse the view that there are some things we ought to do regardless of the consequences.

2. I am sure there are things that we ought to do regardless of the consequences. Whether we are prepared to do them or not is another matter.

Yes, there are some things we ought to do even though the consequences are going to be unpleasant or even harmful to other people. Right and moral decisions don't necessarily have the best outcome or even the one you predict but that doesn't prevent them being right and moral decisions.

As with most of these ethical questions, there is again a group of subjects (20%) who say it can be either or both, depending on the situation.

3. Sometimes you have to do things regardless of the consequences. But it is right to think of those consequences and to try and hurt as few people as possible.
I don't really want to answer that. I do feel the end is as important as the means but I don't want to sound very definite on that. I would go back and look at the situation.

This type of answer can be construed, like the similar ones to other questions, in two ways, firstly as a genuine belief that only when faced with a particular decision in a particular situation can a person decide, or secondly as one of what Wilson (1973) calls "escapes" from thinking about morality, i.e. a defensive way of avoiding an answer to a question, which is after all a very difficult one. The phrasing of it also could have been better. Some subjects again showed the implicit longing for objectivism and "truth" which I suggested earlier, for example,

2. I think there must be things we ought to do regardless. It's just a gut reaction that there ought to be.

Those subjects who taught younger children were the least likely and those who taught older children the most likely to say that the right action is the one which has desirable consequences. (Sig .045)

J) QUESTION 10: ARE THERE MORAL RULES THAT EVERYONE EVERYWHERE SHOULD TRY TO KEEP, OR IS IT UP TO EACH INDIVIDUAL?

Table 6(10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. There are universal moral rules.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. It is up to the individual.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Some universal, some up to individual.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. There are agreed rules for a society or majority.  
   22 25
5. No answer.  
   3 3

Total 90 100

The largest group here (30%) take the absolutist or objectivist view, i.e. there are moral rules that everyone, everywhere should try to keep.

1. There are certain moral rules which everybody accepts like not killing, not stealing and so on.

   Yes, I think there are moral rules we should try to keep but we're not going to manage it all the time.

   I think there are universal rules. They are passed on by example and by word of mouth from one generation to another.

20% consider that there are no universal moral rules in that sense, and that each individual should decide on his or her own moral rules.

2. Basically it is up to each individual. Nobody should try and impose that amount of power.

   We do need a good standard of general moral behaviour but at the end of the day it comes down to your own personal feelings.

   You can't possibly think of every situation and define what ought to be done. What ostensibly might be the same circumstances if you actually looked at it probably wouldn't be because of the different people involved so therefore you can't possibly even define a set of rules. I don't think they even exist.

These answers are a contrast to the answers to Question 8, in which a similar concept is implicit and, where the largest group endorsed the view that the individual is right, and that there is no absolute right answer to moral problems.
It could be that the idea of moral rules can more easily be seen as objective than the idea of the rightness of a particular decision. 25% consider that rules are agreed by a society, rather than that they are either universal or individual.

The word 'absolute' does appear itself to have different meanings. (see Chapter 2) It may mean that something is the necessary condition of a satisfactory life. Or absolute may mean some God-given or natural law. Or perhaps these are the same. It is not clear what meaning the present subjects ascribe to the word. They do not comment here on the origin of universal moral rules, only upon their existence or not.

22% of subjects say that there are some basic moral rules for everyone, but that beyond those it is up to the individual.

3. That's a very difficult question. Yes, there are, but I don't think it's right for an individual to impose his views on others. Some moral rules are acceptable in a universal way, but it must be left to the individual as to which rules he operates.

On a lower level it's up to the individual, but when you are talking in terms of areas like genocide, it's general.

And again a percentage (25%) say rules are neither universal nor individual, but decided by a society or group or the majority in that society or group.

4. In a community you have got to decide on a set of rules and everybody sees the validity for that so everybody should follow them. If everyone didn't agree you might have to take a majority decision.
I think it's up to societies rather than individuals. There isn't a universal set of rules.

K) QUESTION 11: WHERE DOES THE QUESTION OF SELF-INTEREST FIT INTO BEING MORAL?

Table 6(11)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. It does not/should not fit in.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. It is self-interest to be moral.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Self-interest has to be balanced with others' interests.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Miscellaneous answers.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. No answer.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first group here (24%) seem to understand self-interest as meaning selfishness, self-indulgence or "looking after Number One" and therefore see it as conflicting with altruism, or considering others first, which is equated with morality. Human beings are basically greedy and morality prevents too much indulgence of that greed or self-interest.

1. We're all of us out for what we can get in some way, and I'm sure our moral code linked to laws keeps us fairly on the straight and narrow, keeps us from indulging too much.

If you were a truly moral person you would always make the right decision regardless of what it's going to do to you.

30% consider that it is in a person's self-interest to be moral. Their reasons differ, however, from avoiding prison or guilt, to being accepted by others and serving God.
Another reason is that if you behave well towards others, they are more likely to behave well towards you.

2. Because you are protecting the society in which you live, in a sense it's self-interest to abide by the moral status of the day. And to score points in Heaven, if you want to be flippant. So I don't follow the argument that it's in your interest to pinch and grab what you want.

You and others benefit from a moral code. Others will reciprocate, you hope.

It's in my self-interest to limit my self-interest. Stress is laid by 28% on the importance of balancing your own self-interest with that of others. This group appears to be understanding self-interest in terms of the needs or rights of all individuals, which each individual should take into account.

3. Balancing interests is a dilemma. Take the teachers' action. There's your pay interest against the interest of 'O' level classes, and a long-term interest in better education for all.

Self-interest is good because you have certain needs and achievements to meet, but you have to look for situations where you can meet your needs and help meet the needs of others without any contradiction.

The 10% of miscellaneous answers were mainly non-committal, such as "It depends on the situation" or "It depends on your motives" or that the question was too complicated to answer.

1) Question 12: How do you know when you've come up with a good moral decision? Is there a method of reaching one?

Each subject mentioned several of these ways of knowing, so these answers are not exclusive of each other.
Table 6(12)

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. of mentions</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. It feels right.</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. By experience.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. If has good consequences.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. By careful consideration or reason.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. By discussion with others.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Too complex. It depends on situation.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Compare to external moral authority.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. You don't know.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
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</table>

By far the commonest response mentioned, by 57%, was a feeling or "gut reaction" variously described as comfortable, calm, a glow, satisfaction, smug, content, instinct, peace of mind or absence of guilt.

1. Often when you've made a decision you know in yourself whether you've done the right thing. You don't feel uncomfortable about it or worry about what others might think.

You feel .... I was going to say smug .... but more .... content, mentally content. There's no afterthought, no conscience. Within yourself you feel content.

37% mentioned that a good decision was known by its good consequences.

3. Time tells really. If someone seems to do well after the advice you have given them.

If you see that other people would benefit from it.

The use of reason to weigh up carefully the pros and cons before making a decision was stressed by 30% of subjects.
4. It's very difficult to know, and personally I'm very bad at making decisions. I suppose if you've really really thought round it and all the ideas then that's about the best you can do.

If you consider all the options a decision ought to be apparent.

The process of making a decision was seen as so complex by 21% that there were no easy answers. The decision might depend on the factors of the particular situation.

6. There are so many factors to be considered and each situation is different, so you can't say something will work again just because it worked last time.

A small number (8%) mentioned using their own past experience or training in values, and 12% said discussion with others would help towards a good decision. 9% would compare the possibilities with some moral authority outside themselves like society or the Bible, while 6% were convinced that you can never know whether a decision is a good one or not.

M) QUESTION 13: WHAT WOULD YOU SAY IS YOUR MAIN CODE OF VALUES OR PRINCIPLES?

In answering this question subjects also mentioned several items.

Table 6(13)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Total %</th>
<th>No. of Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mentions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Regard for oneself.</td>
<td>18 90 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Behaviour towards family.</td>
<td>19 90 21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Behaviour towards other people. 77 90 86
4. As a member of society. 28 90 31
5. Behaviour towards the environment. 11 90 12
6. The 10 Commandments. 21 90 23
7. Depends on situation. 2 90 2

Although most subjects gave several of these answers what first came to mind for the largest percentage of subjects (86%) was that they should behave considerately towards other people. Respect and concern would be shown by helping, being fair and truthful, protecting, being loyal and supportive, unselfish and co-operative. One should not hurt, kill, rape, upset or envy others.

3. I would not hurt people physically or verbally or by making them feel small. I would respect others and their possessions.

It is a framework based on trying to be non-intrusive on others. I generally keep promises and do not steal. I hope to do things that affect others positively. To do nothing is not to be neutral. Suffering is because people remain neutral. Putting it into practice is the problem!

I would not intentionally hurt or kill anybody, or do emotional harm, or harm their property. I mean, I've pinched the odd pen and a few bits of paper now and then, but what I'd feel would be a major theft, I would not do.

31% were concerned with their behaviour as members of society in particular, and often equated their values with those upheld by law. They spoke of equality of opportunity, not discriminating between people on any grounds, redressing injustice and respecting the country's history.
4. I think our society is very unfair and unjust and I think I ought to do what I can to try and change that. But I can't do much.

generally following the law would have to be the main one.

It seems that a question about principles or a moral code inevitably brings to mind for a number of people the Ten Commandments, which 23% mentioned, although not everyone would go along with all ten and some subjects would update them.

6. The principles by which a Christian should live his life, basically doing to other people the things you would not mind being done to you by them.

The Ten Commandments are an approximate guideline for everybody.

21% were concerned that family relationships should be honest faithful and fair.

2. I know what I ought to do but very often I don't, e.g. chastity before marriage and fidelity within it. I haven't kept either of those.

Respect for oneself is important for 20%, that is being honest to yourself, standing by your beliefs, not abusing yourself, and developing your own potential.

1. I value my own freedom, because otherwise I'm not in a position to make any moral decisions.

Thou shalt make the most of oneself, strive to make the best of your life, short though it may be. Thou shalt not waste time.

The environment was mentioned by 12% and includes kindness to animals.

5. Nuclear weapons and the threat of using them are the most outrageous blasphemy and I would oppose that.
N) QUESTION 14: SHOULDMORALITY BE THE SAME FOR EVERYBODY?

Table 6(14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mostly</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I can't say/no answer</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This question followed closely on the one before and referred to it. It was also designed to check on Question 10 about whether or not there is a universal moral code. However, this question appears to have been understood differently, perhaps because it does not contain the somewhat authoritarian word "rules" that is in Question 10. As in some previous questions, there was confusion between "should" and "is" so I categorised them together. The implication I would read into the fact that a larger percentage here (47%) (or, added to the group who say that mostly morality should be the same for everybody, 60%) compared to the 30% in answers to question 10, is that those subjects believe their stated values to be the "right" ones and that they should be shared by others. Some of them, indeed, expressed it in this way.

1. I suppose I must think that or I wouldn't have that view myself.

My morality would make a better world.
Universalisability is not necessary the same as objectivity. Also, as Mackie (1977) puts it, subjective agreement would give intersubjective values rather than objective values. Hare, however, considers that moral judgments are essentially and necessarily universalisable. So that whenever people say, "I, you or he ought to do something", it follows that they are saying that everyone ought to do it in the same situation. This commitment is attached to the meaning of the word "ought". It is not clear whether intersubjective values could be the same as universal values.

1. I think those moral characteristics should be the same for everybody. They have got to form the basis of relationships between people.

   Everybody has the same moral code, like a backbone.

The 13% who say that most, or the basic, moral values should be shared by everyone are thus expressing a very similar view to the first group.

3. I suppose if I'm honest I believe other people should keep most of these things.

   There is a basic set of principles that any group of people would sit down and thrash out as a code. But people should still have as much freedom as possible.

22% of subjects clearly say that morality should not be the same for everybody. Some of these, I would suggest, endorse this view in order to protect people's freedom, and especially their freedom from any imposed morality, or to protect themselves from imposing it on others.

2. No, because that would involve imposing my views on others. People who have other points of view have another piece of the truth and I might learn from them.
I would not suggest that my moral code is by any means the correct one for everybody.

Your moral code changes with your experience, so if I said everybody's should be the same there would be no chance for this development.

o) Question 15: Most people believe that thinking and reasoning in science can lead to a correct answer. Is the same thing true in moral decisions or are they different?

Table 6(15)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Right answer in morality, not in science.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Right answer in science, not in morality.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No right answer in either.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Right answer in both.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Miscellaneous.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis of the responses to this question of Kohlberg's was much confused by the first part of it and indeed the complicated phrasing of the whole question. Most teachers did not agree that most people believed that science had correct answers, and I received several short lectures on physics and Popper. Some understood the question to mean that scientists should be concerned about the ethics of their work and this again complicated the analysis.
If you think science has produced the surrogate mother thing, it's got to start thinking about what it's doing, hasn't it? I don't believe this rolling technology is a good thing.

Morality deals with the way science is used.

However, it appears that only groups 1 and 4 consider that morality provides correct answers. This is only 7% of subjects. In question 8 13% think there is a correct answer to moral problems, and another 9% partly think so.

The majority of subjects here (56%) believe that science does have right answers, but morality does not.

2. In science you are dealing with positives and negatives, yeses and nos. You seem to be dealing with absolutes and in morals you aren't.

Science is a wonderful world where there are facts you can prove. In human experience subjectivity comes into it and it's difficult to prove things.

Subjects in the second largest group (34%) do not see correct solutions being reached in either science or morality.

3. I don't believe either can give you a correct answer, because scientists make value judgments.

Science is just part of knowledge and I don't think it makes any difference as far as moral decisions are concerned which particular aspect of knowledge you're looking at. No one has answers.

6.2 Objective-subjective correlation test

In an attempt to discover whether teachers could be classified into groups loosely labelled objective/absolutist and subjective/relativist, I identified six questions on which teachers should give consistent answers if this was the case. These questions are numbers 2, 8, 9, 10, 14 and 15. A
Pearson Correlation test showed that there was no consistent association across all six questions in the direction anticipated. Some individual correlations were significant, however, and these will now be reported.

a) Teachers who say there are universal moral rules that everyone should try to keep also tend to say that moral decisions are made by thinking and reasoning. Conversely, those who say there are no universal moral rules and it is up to the individual to decide, tend to endorse the view that moral decisions are based on feeling. (Sig. .001, Corr. .317)

b) Those who claim that there is no right answer to moral problems also tend to say that there are some things people ought to do regardless of the consequences. And those who claim that there is a right answer tend to say that the right action is the one which has desirable consequences for oneself or others. (Sig. .047, Corr. -.178)

This correlation is in the opposite direction to what might be expected.

c) Subjects who say there is a correct answer to moral problems also tend to say that answers are "more right" in moral matters than in scientific matters, or that both morality and science have right answers. On the other hand, subjects who say there is no correct answer to moral problems say that neither science nor morality can produce such
answers, or that science can but morality cannot. (Sig. .025, Corr. .206)

d) Teachers who take the objective view of science and morality, i.e. that both produce right answers, tend to state that everyone should keep to the same moral code, while teachers who take the subjective view consider that a moral code cannot and should not be the same for everyone. (Sig. .031, Corr. .198)

Thus, although there were some signs of consistency across these six questions, the correlations were weak, and it would therefore appear that teachers cannot be consistently classified as objective or subjective, but that their ideas are a mixture of both. This is not to say, however, that if an objective-subjective continuum could be extracted, some subjects would not be towards the objective end and some towards the subjective end. However, it also appears possible that some subjects might appear at both ends of this continuum, i.e. highly objective in one answer and highly subjective in another. Those in a middle position might perhaps be labelled culturally but not universally objectivist, in that they tend to say that basic moral rules are decided by the society, the group, or the majority. Beyond these basic rules, which might differ from society to society or group to group, there is room for individuals to decide for themselves.
6.3 **Objective-subjective factor analysis**

Because there were some signs of consistency in objectivity or subjectivity across the six questions as described above, it was decided to test further by factor analysis, and to add also the answers to question 7, - Would you say you are religious? The loadings on the extracted factors were not very high, so the descriptions derived can only be considered tentative. Positive loadings above .3 and negative loadings below -.3 were counted. The computer extracted 11 factors but after consideration 7 were omitted because they did not have enough reasonable loadings and thus would not provide a coherent description. Four factors remained which did appear to provide coherent accounts, although there was some overlap between factors.

**FACTOR 1**

**Positive loadings**

.74 There is no right answer to scientific or moral questions.

.46 I am sort of religious.

.44 I am not religious.

.35 Moral rules are agreed by the majority or a society or group.

**Negative loadings**

-.76 Science has right answers but morality does not.
- 236 -

-.43 There are universal moral rules.
-.35 I am religious.
-.34 There are some things we ought to do regardless of the consequences to ourselves or others.

Any description of the meaning of a factor must necessarily be tentative. At the positive end of Factor 1 moral rules are not seen as universal but decided within a group or a society perhaps by the majority. Religion plays no significant part in providing moral guidelines and there can be no objective right answers to moral questions. Neither can there be any categorical moral injunctions that are independent of their consequences. The negative pole contains the rejection of these ideas. At this pole there are universal moral rules often provided by religion. Morality does not provide answers that can be proved as in science. We know that there are things we ought to do regardless of the consequences.

**FACTOR 2**

Positive loadings

.59 Moral decisions should be based on thinking and reasoning.

.43 There is a basic set of moral rules for everyone, but beyond that it is up to the individual.

.35 There is no absolute right, everyone can be equally right, or each in his or her own situation.
Negative loadings

- .67 Both thinking and feeling are involved in a moral decision.
- .46 Moral rules are up to the individual.
- .40 Morality should be the same for everyone.
- .34 The right action is one which has desirable consequences.
- .32 There is a correct solution to moral problems.

At the positive end of the factor, the important thing about moral decisions is that they should be based on thinking, not feeling. There can be no absolute right answer to moral problems. To a considerable extent there should be common moral rules, but beyond this basic set of rules, the individual in his/her own situation is right. Rightness cannot always be determined by the desirable consequences of actions. At the negative end the belief is that both thinking and feeling are involved in moral decision making, and that consequences are very important in deciding what to do. Although it is up to the individual to decide, morality should be the same for everybody because there can be one correct solution to moral problems.

Positive loadings

.43 There are some basic moral rules, the rest are up to the individual.
.42 The majority decides on the right solution to moral problems.

.38 The right action is the one which has desirable consequences.

Negative loadings

-.61 There is no absolute right, everyone can be equally right.
-.60 There are some things we ought to do regardless of the consequences to ourselves or others.
-.44 There are agreed moral rules in society.
-.42 Both thinking and feeling are involved in a moral decision.

There are clear affinities between this factor and the previous one. Positive loadings stress the importance of democratic or majority decision-making, rather than individual or universal rules. Nevertheless there are some basic moral rules which everyone should try to keep; the rest are up to each person. A right action is one which has desirable consequences for the person or persons concerned. The negative pole also says that there are agreed moral rules and that everyone can be equally right. But there are some things we ought to do regardless of the consequences. When making a moral decision, both thinking and feeling are involved.
FACTOR 4

Positive loadings

.51 There is a correct answer to moral problems.
.47 I am religious.
.45 Moral decisions should be made by thinking and reasoning.
.36 There are universal moral rules.
.33 Morality should be the same for everyone.

Negative loadings

-.51 Moral rules are up to the individual.
-.45 Morality should not be the same for everyone.
-.39 Everyone is equally right. There is no one correct answer to moral problems.
-.30 I was religious as a child, but am not religious now.

The positive pole of this factor takes the most absolute stance of the four factors. There is one correct answer to moral problems and God may be the source of right rather than the individual. Reasoning and thinking, not feeling, will produce a good moral decision. There are universal moral rules and morality should be the same for everyone. The other end of this factor is clearly relativist or subjective. The individual should decide on his or her own morality and each individual can be right, because there is not one correct answer. Religion has been rejected, and the source of right is with the individual and his or her feelings.
It should be stressed again that these factors should be regarded as speculative, that there is overlap of ideas between them, and that they are not altogether coherent. These 4 factors were related to certain other variables. On Factor 1 men were significantly more positive and women more negative (Sig. .004). The men, therefore, were more likely to view moral rules as decided within a group or society, to discount religion and to consider the consequences of actions. Women, on the other hand, were more likely to view moral rules as universal, to say they were religious and that what was right should be done regardless of the consequences. In summary, on this factor, men supported consensus and women were more absolutist or objective.

Those teachers who taught science, who we have already found to have significantly lower scores on WAS, were significantly negative on Factor 3 (Sig. .019). That is, they endorsed agreed moral rules but said that everyone could be equally right. Surprisingly, they also said that feeling was as important as thinking in making a moral decision. But there are some things we ought to do regardless of the consequences. Thus, they tend to be in a middle position between objectivism and relativism as well as between individual and social morality.

As far as WAS scores are concerned, teachers positive on Factor 4 scored significantly higher. (Sig. .035). The
description of Factor 4 at its positive pole shows it to be the most absolute or objective of the four factors. This fits in with Kohlberg's theory for Stage 4. The individual is less important than society's or God's law. There are universal moral rules which apply to everyone and moral decisions should be based on reasoning and thinking, rather than feeling.

6.4 Individual-social factor analysis

The responses to a number of the ethical questions were such as to express or imply a contrast between an underlying individualistic perspective on the one hand, and on the other a societal emphasis in the way morality was understood. Many teachers, of course, struggled to express a synthesis of these two perspectives. The questions which seemed to elicit most clearly these underlying perspectives were numbered 1, 3, 4, 5 and 13. In order to check whether there were consistent perspectives across these questions, the responses to them were intercorrelated, and the resulting matrix factor was analysed.

Two significant factors emerged. There was no significant sex difference on either of these factors, nor were they significantly related to the organismic variables. There was also no correlation with subjects taught or with WAS. Factor 1 had high positive loadings on individualistic responses across the five questions, as follows:-
FACTOR 1

Positive loadings

.74 Morality is a personal code for living.
.60 My own moral code stresses being honest with myself and standing by what I believe.
.53 We should be moral for our own integrity or happiness.
.47 Conscience is an individual feeling, inner voice or personal philosophy.
.41 A moral problem is a conflict or decision to be made which is based on an individual's own values or conscience.

This factor thus unequivocally stresses the individual as moral judge and moral agent, and this perspective is consistently expressed over these five questions.

Factor 2 emerged as bipolar. There were positive loadings on individualistic responses to two questions, which were also positive on Factor 1. There were negative loadings on responses to the remaining three questions.

FACTOR 2

Positive loadings

.76 A moral problem is a conflict or decision to be made which is based on an individual's own values or conscience.
We should be moral for our own integrity and happiness.

**Negative loadings**

-.48 My moral code stresses family loyalty, obeying the law and generally caring for others.
-.34 Conscience is learned from my upbringing and what is acceptable to society.

This factor is harder to interpret. It clearly implies that there is no consistent societal perspective across the questions. The predominant perspective across these questions is thus individualistic. It is not, however, the individualistic perspective equated by MacIntyre (1981) with self-interest and greed and which he claims is responsible for the breakdown of morality in our society. The perspective of teachers represented in Factor 1, is an individualism of personal integrity, honesty and a clear conscience.

The tension between individual and social approaches to morality, both in theory and in practice, is complicated because each appears to contain elements of the other. The individualistic approach of Kohlberg, for instance, although it emphasises the development of individual cognition and judgment, needs social interaction and experience for this development of moral autonomy to occur. And the social approach which stresses the influence of social norms and
acceptability, has to include a decision by the individual that social values and social relations are important. The different emphases could also be related to personality type. To put it somewhat simplistically, some people are more sociable than others.

Weinreich-Haste has attempted to synthesise the two extreme views which see morality as either a totally individual matter or a totally social phenomenon.

"As individuals we comment prescriptively on the actions of ourselves and others ..... As members of society, we reflect the cultural norms, values and assumptions of the society in which we grow up and affirm and perpetuate them. We are thus engaging in both an individual and a social process." (1984, p. 326)

I would speculate that although cultural norms do impinge on us all, we do not necessarily "affirm and perpetuate" them. Some people may not recognise their influence at all, but others will recognise and then reject cultural norms. There are examples of both these implications within Factor 1. In fact, further questioning of many subjects would probably have elicited a more integrated view of an individual and a social perspective in moral development. It is probably correct to say that one cannot exist without the other, but not that morality has to be either one or the other. It is a complex mixture of both, with a stronger emphasis on the individual in some theories and in the responses of my sample, and a stronger emphasis on social morality in others. Extreme forms of each view would therefore appear to be misguided. Individual structuralism, which focusses
completely on the individual, and social structuralism, which sees individual meaning "solely as a functional reflection of public language, cultural determinants, or the requirements of public self-presentation" (ibid. p. 345) are but two sides of the same coin.

The loadings on the individual-social dimension indicate that this tension is more important in teachers' thinking about morality than the tension between objective and subjective conceptions. This is perhaps not surprising. The latter conceptions are more philosophical and abstract ones, whereas the former are real and everyday concerns for teachers in school. Many teachers express a commitment to the academic and personal development of individual children, but at the same time are working within a school community. There are many occasions when the good of a particular pupil will appear to conflict with the good of the school as a whole. This will be corroborated by data from the moral education questionnaire, to be presented in the next chapter.

6.5 Correlations between the two factor analyses

This section will be brief because there were few significant relationships between the objective/subjective and the individual/social factor analyses. Those relationships that were significant were all negative correlations.
Individual/social Factor 1 correlated negatively with objective/subjective Factor 3 (Sig. .04). This seems to be because both poles of the latter stressed agreed moral rules and therefore took an interpersonal, if not a social view, whereas the former factor stressed the judgment of the individual and individual moral integrity.

Individual/social Factor 1 also correlated negatively with objective/subjective Factor 4 (Sig. .03). Factor 4 gave the strongest objective/absolute versus subjective/relative dimension, with the latter at the negative pole, and stressing individual choice in morality. It therefore makes sense for it to be correlated negatively with individual/social Factor 1, which also stresses individual choice. This appears to show that emphasis on the individual in one set of answers is likely to suggest emphasis on the individual in another set of answers.

6.6 Conclusion

As section 6.1 demonstrates, subjects have given a wide spread of responses to the ethical questions. These responses have provided a total universe of ideas. The factor analyses in the later sections of this chapter have been intended to discover whether there are discernible dimensions to the universe of ideas expressed by the subjects. They were also intended to discover whether these
dimensions related to the philosophical ideas and dimensions discussed in Chapter 2. The outcome does suggest, over the whole group of subjects, a slight tendency for certain philosophical positions to be present, though in a loose and imprecise form. The consistency hoped for in my original hypothesis is not apparent, though a few individual persons exhibited some consistency in one or other of the contrasting perspectives.

Overall, the individual/social dimension of morality appeared to be somewhat dominant, although very loosely defined. As noted in Chapter 2, this tension has been, on the whole, neglected by philosophers. Most philosophers consider the individual to be the source of moral reasoning and judgment. The subjects in this study appear to see more clearly the tension between the individual and the group or society although the factor analysis shows that many of them do emphasise individual moral autonomy. Morality is understood as mainly rooted in the autonomous decisions of individuals, but social agreement is also important. As already noted, this may be of particular relevance for teachers professionally concerned with individual children's development within the social institution of the school.

The objective/subjective dimension is even more loosely defined as there is a certain degree of correlation and overlap of ideas between the factors in the analysis. The main impression is of confusion and contradiction in
individuals' responses to the interview. Where there was consistency, it was not necessarily caused by moral understanding, but perhaps by attachment to other beliefs in which a moral attitude can be embedded, such as political or religious views. Nevertheless, most philosophical positions appear to have roots in the intuitions of most subjects.

There are, in addition, certain incidental findings which are worth summarising here.

1. There was no significant relationship between the ethical questions and the sex, age or length of teaching experience of subjects. Relationships to scores on WAS have been reported in the previous chapter.

2. On Question 8, those who taught in the large Humanities group were more likely to take a relativist stance by saying that everybody's opinion is equally right (Sig. .012).

3. On Question 9, teachers of younger children were least likely and teachers of older children were most likely to say that the right action is the one which has desirable consequences (Sig. .045).

4. Men were significantly more positive on Objective/Subjective Factor 1 and women significantly more negative (Sig. .004).

5. Science teachers were significantly negative on Objective/Subjective Factor 3 (Sig. .019).

6. Teachers who were positive on Objective/Subjective Factor 4 had significantly higher scores on WAS (Sig. .035).
7. The Individual/Social Factors 1 and 2 were not significantly related to the organismic variables.
8. Individual/Social Factor 1 correlated negatively with Objective/Subjective Factor 3 (Sig. .04).
9. Individual/Social Factor 1 also correlated negatively with Objective/Subjective Factor 4 (Sig. .03).
CHAPTER SEVEN

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION III - IDEAS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION

7.1 QUESTION 1: MORAL DEVELOPMENT.
7.2 QUESTION 2: THE NATURE OF MORAL EDUCATION.
7.3 FACTOR ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONS 1 AND 2.
7.4 QUESTION 3: THE PURPOSE OF MORAL EDUCATION.
7.5 QUESTION 4: ACHIEVING THE PURPOSE.
7.6 FACTOR ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONS 3 AND 4.
7.7 CORRELATION OF ALL FACTOR ANALYSES IN THE STUDY.
7.1 Question 1: Moral Development

The answers to be reported in this chapter are those to the four open questions asked in the questionnaire. As discussed in Chapter 4 the questions themselves were frequently understood differently by subjects, and the responses varied from brief notes to long and thorough essays. The analysis was complicated by the fact that subjects could not be asked to explain further what they meant by certain phrases. There were again implicit assumptions about the nature of morality and a further assumption that these assumptions were common or shared. There was also criticism by some subjects of assumptions they considered to be implicit in the questions and which they rejected. This was particularly the case with the first question, and, with hindsight, I think it might have been phrased more carefully, and divided into two questions clearly specifying firstly the positive, and secondly the negative, influences on moral development. For this question, and the next one, it was often difficult to decide whether a response was positive or negative unless specified in a list by the respondent. On such occasions, I counted the response as both positive and negative. For example, a teacher might write "Family influence important", and this would be classified as implicitly both positive and negative. Teachers were significantly more likely to rate social factors (Sig. .004) and Habit (Sig. .014) as both positive and negative than other categories.
It was possible, nevertheless, to make a content analysis of the answers to this question, and details are given in the following table. Each subject mentioned several items. It is noteworthy that the categories were more often seen in a positive than a negative light.

**Question 1** Could you suggest reasons why some children become adults who try to keep to certain moral standards, while others do not?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of sample</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of negative mentions</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of sample</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this table it is clear that the family was considered by teachers to be the strongest influence on moral development.
from both a positive and a negative point of view. They did not consider what is in part their own influence, in school, to be as important. Durkheim (1961) in contrast, undervalued the role of the family and stressed the critical importance of schooling. It is interesting to note the low position accorded to the influence of the media, both positive and negative. There has been much publicity given to the supposed negative influence on children of the media, but teachers consider that the family, the school, the peer-group, the individual and other general social factors all have a more negative influence on moral development than the media. Religion is the only influence considered to be entirely positive.

1. The family

According to the teachers, a family which has a beneficial moral influence on children is one where parents set a good example, treat children with fairness and kindness, discuss moral issues and rules with them, and give them love, security and trust. Only a few respondents mentioned strictness and fair punishment.

Home backgrounds which encourage children to think about why they have taken certain attitudes/behaviours will encourage the moral development of children. This does not only include explicit discussions or instructions but also implicit behaviours and attitudes on the part of members of the family towards each other.

A child exposed to the ideals of honesty, sharing, truthfulness, fair play and respect for other individuals will more likely become an adult who will uphold these values.
Influence of parents, particularly of mother in early years, family cohesion and relationship with siblings - leads child to become aware of family and society's moral values.

Caring, responsive parents are more likely to develop 'moral standards' that are permanent. They need to 'teach' by example and have 'reasoned' with their youngsters rather than laying down the law, being too puritanical or indifferent.

If parents consistently impose standards on offspring and praise the child when he/she does as expected, then that child is more likely to internalise these morals than the child whose parents are inconsistent in their own behaviour and expectations.

Many of these comments seem to represent an ideal family, and particularly ideal parents. Although most of us fail to reach ideals, it is probably the case, as one respondent notes, that most families do their best to teach children the difference between right and wrong. Mothers watching children at play, even before the children can talk, frequently correct their behaviour with each other. This, I would suggest, happens regardless of the mother's own moral example or behaviour. And some mothers, for example, in an infant conflict, will support hitting back, while others will not.

This sort of paradox is evident among teachers, for the very behaviours rated positive by some, were rated negative by others, strictness for example.

Families could exert so much pressure upon children to conform that they react against the pressure in an effort to assert their independence.
If moral standards are extremely rigid and led to confrontations, maybe this could lead to uncertainty and rejection of certain moral standards in adulthood.

Thus the moral standards imposed by parents could be rejected or rebelled against. Many teachers stressed that disrupted or violent homes as well as a 'bad' or inconsistent parental example or lack of training would adversely affect the moral development of children.

Violence, deprivation or other upheavals at home mean "conscience" does not develop as it does in others.

Major, easily recognisable reason is lack of training in moral standards by parents.

If early influences are bad, perhaps parents showing little respect for themselves, others and the rights of property of others, then I think that children exposed to this fairly negative code will adopt similar values. Really it is a lack of values.

Where a family is unemployed or in bad housing, children may experience resistance to authority, hassles with police, etc. which do not equate with the messages they get from school.

Only one teacher thought that "broken homes" did not necessarily mean lower standards, as is assumed also by many public figures. (I note that politicians were not mentioned as a moral influence!)

One parent families often have closer relationships and their increase in numbers does not necessarily reflect itself in lower standards.

The high count for family influence is partly explained by the view of many teachers that such influence is both positive and negative.

Children learn both positive and negative moral standards from their parents and the example, both good and bad, of their parents' behaviour.
I wonder whether it might also suggest some buck-passing by teachers to parents. One teacher commented that it was surprising how many children did grow up to observe moral standards given their poor role models in home and school. Those who state what moral standards actually are mention honesty, fairness, truthfulness, caring and respect for others, all of which I would suggest make up the common or shared or assumed core of morality. Or at least the ideal or theory of morality, for our practice of it is frequently far from these ideals. As one teacher put it:

To keep to a moral standard means one is a hypocrite.

2. School

The influence of the school was rated the second most important positive influence, but also a relatively high negative influence on moral development, though markedly less negative than the family.

Like parents in the family, and perhaps thinking of teachers in their 'in loco parentis' role, the teacher as a role model or moral example was considered important, as were caring relationships and fairness. Some respondents stressed discipline and punishment more heavily than others, who were reluctant to use it. However, many teachers were dubious whether they could affect negative standards already formed at home.

In school, particularly primary and infant (4-11), the influence of the teacher and developing relationships within the class results in certain rules and conformity.
Only likely to modify an existing code and induce a more open and questioning attitude rather than form the basis of a pupil's own moral standards.

Schools and parents need to work together as a team so that the student does not receive conflicting messages.

Children are quick to spot insincerity and often 'actions speak louder than words' is true. Mutual respect between teachers and pupils is important for a healthy atmosphere.

Conformity to rules and school regulations, seen as positive by some teachers, was seen as negative by others.

It is morally inhibiting to encourage conformity because this inhibits individuality and the potential for moral autonomy.

Teachers were particularly critical of schools where there was one standard for teachers and another for pupils, where teachers did not practice what they preached, or where they did not consider that the school was a particularly moral structure or institution.

Are schools moral institutions? One could be very tempted to say no! which is rather unfortunate as some youngsters would benefit from a strong moral input (whatever that may be) during their schooling.

Childrens' experience of school may create confusion by proclaiming a set of moral standards (sometimes in a religious context) which are then not put into practice within the structures of the school or the relationships between staff and staff or pupils and staff.

Since the topic of the moral influence of the school is more fully covered in answers to the next question on moral education, it will not be further dealt with here. In sum, the answers in this category represent the teachers' view that their influence on children is much less than that of the family.
3. Peer-group

Table 7 (1) shows that the peer-group is considered by teachers to be less influential, both positively and negatively, on children's moral development, than the family or the school. However, frequently all three were mentioned together, along with the next category of other social factors, as making up the general sum of childhood influences which were difficult to assess separately. Again contrary to public opinion, teachers considered the moral influence of the peer-group to be more positive than negative.

Some may be set an example, i.e. through home background or peer-group which sees acceptance of moral standards as desirable.

The peer-group can work in both directions, raising the moral standards of some pupils who get in with a 'good' group and the reverse can also happen.

Children look at the end results of the morals kept by their contemporaries and find this more attractive.

Teachers were particularly aware that for this category the influence could be either way, perhaps depending on other environmental factors.

A weak family unit may lead to a strong identification with a particular peer-group. In such a case the influence of the dominant member will shape the moral behaviour of the whole group.

The negative statements about the peer-group were thus often alongside positive ones.

Sometimes pupils who come from 'good' homes but whose academic ability does not match that of their parents and the pupil is unable to achieve the success the parents anticipated get in with an 'unsuitable' peer-group and the pressure to reject the moral code is much greater.
The friendship group of a child will influence moral development either by challenging beliefs and behaviours or by reinforcing them. The individual with different beliefs may either compromise them for the sake of the friendship or retain the beliefs and leave the friendship group.

4. Social factors

As already mentioned, the social experience of a child was often considered in general terms.

There is diversity of standards because of the unique interplay between the various socialising agencies/forces and the set of circumstances/events that each individual experiences and reacts to.

There were however, also some factors in this category which were not covered by others. For example, the influence of culture, social class, gender and profession. Also society itself was mentioned, people's investment in it and the opportunities it did or did not afford them.

Middle class values show great concern for private property (because they own most of it and see this as morally correct) whereas working class values may show little concern for, or even consider immoral, the ownership of private property which excludes them.

People who find themselves in positions of responsibility may feel bound to uphold high levels of morality.

They may believe that in keeping moral standards they are contributing to the well-being of society at large. They may do this because of, or in spite of, other pressures.

By attempting to live by these standards they can reap positive rewards in terms of job, family, social prestige, etc. particularly if the standards are those that 'society' puts forward.

Dissatisfaction with society and/or rebellion against it were the most common reasons given for a negative moral influence in this category.
Some children adopt values which they know and feel will give them the disapproval of society in general.

Some cultures encourage children that certain standards are there to be broken.

It may be that in their limited social experience the keeping of any moral standard was not commonplace.

Sheer rebellion - freeing themselves from society's enforced rules which they find doesn't allow them 'free expression'.

The environment may provide opportunities for temptation.

5. Religion

About a quarter of teachers in this study saw religion as a beneficial moral influence on children. None of them considered that its influence was negative.

A balanced Christian upbringing does not 'push' the moral standard element but by example as a way of life teaches that moral standards produce a better society, a socially balanced and happy life.

Those with a strict religious upbringing and a highly developed conscience are more likely to keep moral standards.

Affiliation to a church or youth organisation attached to it.

Religion can reinforce moral standards.

6. The self

Although this is an interesting category, there is a sense in which it overlaps with other categories following especially genetic and affective factors. This is because moral standards are seen to reside in an individual response to other influences, rather than in the earlier and more highly
rated categories, as imposed from outside. However, this distinction is not clear enough to be considered significant here.

Moral standards are adopted for self-interest, self-preservation, or self-enhancement or development, or for their practical use. These were rated either positive or negative by the teachers who mentioned them.

Some people seem to learn to develop their own moral standards, having accepted or rejected those on offer from parents, school and society; these would appear to be likely to be adhered to.

Moral growth will only be evident when a child decides not only that a particular moral belief is RIGHT but also that that belief is a practical possibility to hold and operate.

Some children adapt themselves to situations as they occur and develop a code of behaviour which has self-preservation at its heart. These children are afraid of the rough, chaotic nature of life around them.

The ability to keep moral standards may reflect personal qualities such as self-discipline.

Self-interest in particular, as we saw in Chapter 6, Question 11, is seen both as necessary to morality and operating against it.

Kids go off the rails due to the selfishness and materialism before their eyes.

Maybe some have never thought about 'moral' standards as such, couldn't attempt to define them and therefore the idea is meaningless.

Lack of character development - unable to take responsibility for one's own behaviour, and totally unaware of effect on others.

Immoral practice may have proved to be more rewarding. Stealing, lying, violent behaviour, sexual immorality, destructive comments about other people, gossiping, throwing tantrums, etc. all have rewards.
7. Habit

The inference in this category of responses is that moral training or socialisation will lead to the habitual practice of moral standards. This category is closest to the social learning or conditioning theory.

- Training, pre-conditioning in childhood.
- Learned/acquired/taught during childhood.
- Morality rests in a series of generalised attitudes and habits.

I believe that "moral standards" are learned responses from many sources.

8. Genetic factors

14.4% of teachers considered that heredity was a positive influence on moral development and 5.6% considered it could be a negative influence.

As discussed in Chapter 3, sociobiologists seem not to have addressed the latter possibility as they view positive morality like caring for kin and altruism to be inherited in our genes. Eysenck, however, does consider there is a genetic basis to crime in certain people's personality and conditionability. It is, of course, a matter for debate whether personality is at all inherited, but I have nevertheless included mentions of personality traits in this category.

- There is an inherent tendency to accept or reject society's tenets. I am not here advocating the 'original sin' thesis - it is merely my opinion
that some children/people will develop into the 'conscienceless' minority whatever their upbringing.

Each child has his/her own inbuilt nature.

Morality reflects insufficient development of potential in evolutionary terms.

Certain biological predispositions and disabilities affect the moral standards and relationships of some children.

There may well be many physiological reasons why some people are difficult/delinquent, e.g. criminality has been related to chromosomal abnormalities. What was seen in the past as moral failing may well be beyond the control of the victim.

And, against this view.

It is widely believed that children inherit their predisposition to be moral from their forbears. This point of view suits those who benefit from inherited wealth and power. I don't believe it to be valid.

Some people are instinctively amoral.

9. The media

As already mentioned, attacks on the media, particularly television, for its negative moral influence, have been widespread. It is therefore surprising that teachers, in a good position due to their close contact with children, to assess the influence of television on moral development, are more likely to consider it a good influence (10%) than a bad influence (6.7%), although many considered it as both.

Heroic characters may be used as role models of acceptable behaviour, as kids tend to believe what is shown or told on television.

T.V. glamourises decadence and immorality.

Parents and teachers counterbalance the destructive elements of media pressures.
Influence of T.V. suggests to kids that the 'bad
guy' is a hero - violence is commonplace and
normal; everyone is only out to get what they can.

10. Affective factors

Comments were allocated to this category when feelings were
mentioned, both children's own feelings and other people's.
Only a few teachers emphasised feelings as important in
positive (6.7%) or negative (5.6%) moral development.
Feelings were often related also to other categories like the
family, the self and genetic factors.

They may come to keep certain moral standards
because they are afraid of punishment or fear
disapproval from others.

If they do something wrong, they 'feel for' the
wronged person. This makes them unhappy and so by
being moral, they avoid personal unhappiness.

If an individual's potential for sensitivity to
others is developed, they are more likely to have
moral awareness and moral behaviour.

If keeping the norms of society has not brought
affection, people may try to capture it by
rejecting them.

The need for excitement. By doing 'shockable'
things a feeling of excitement is produced.

11. Miscellaneous

This category contained comments on the question, usually
critical, and not answers to it. It is interesting to note
that all those taking issue with the question had completed
the questionnaire before the interview, and were hostile
already to the concept of morality. As already reported,
this hostility had largely disappeared by the end of the
interview. Anger is particularly evident in the first emphatic comment.

This is too vague to answer! What particular "moral standards" are we referring to here? Whose "moral standards"? Surely the problem is not that some children/adults have no moral standards but rather than they have moral standards rather different from those holding power in our society? Is it reasonable to consider "moral standards" in this absolutist sense?

I would argue that everyone necessarily has a moral standard which may not be consistent but is there in every human being as a notion of good/bad, right/wrong.

'Standards' are often set by the 'haves' to control the 'have nots' and preserve their own position.

Kids know right from wrong from a very early age.

Also in this category are influences mentioned only once or twice, such as the influence of sportsmen, youth leaders, grandparents and neighbours. There were also some interesting, but unclassifiable comments, for example, the two following.

I wonder why it is that girls are more law-abiding than boys?

There are no atheists in a fox-hole, there are plenty of puritans who are sexually perverted, many uncharitable charity workers, and anti-social social workers.

The relationship to moral development theories of these responses is complicated. It would seem, however, that the predominant theories represented, implicitly if not explicitly, are those of social learning and psychoanalysis, described in Chapter 3. There is also evidence of sociobiological theory, and Durkheim's theory of the influence of the group. A religious view of morality is also mentioned. The least mentioned theory of those described in
Chapter 3 is the cognitive-developmental stage theory of moral development. Only two teachers suggested that morality develops through a sequence of stages. Most teachers have, during their training, met the Piagetian stages of intellectual development, but not, it seems, Piagetian or Kohlbergian stages of moral development. This suggests that the view of teachers on moral development is probably not very different from that of the general population in this country. It also suggests that there is much scope for teachers to develop their own potential for moral discussion and development.

The categories in this question which were associated with higher scores on WAS were reported in Chapter 5, section 5.6. It is perhaps worth repeating them here. Those higher on WAS stressed the positive effects of affective factors and the negative moral influence of schools. Lower WAS scores were gained by those teachers emphasising the negative effect of the media. There was no significant relationship between answers to this question and the sex of subjects, their age, years of teaching experience, or subjects taught.

7.2 Question 2: the nature of moral education

Teachers were asked by this question to think about their own school, and consider what happened in it that they would identify as moral education. A distinction was again made
between the positive and negative aspects of moral education, that is, what promotes moral education and what hinders it. In no school was there a separate subject called moral education, nor a whole school commitment to the concept. However, it was considered to go on, both overtly and covertly, in a number of areas. It was interesting to note that, as with the previous question, the same things could be seen as positive by some teachers and negative by others, overt by some, and covert by others. As one teacher wrote

I would not like to differentiate between positive and negative contributions. To my mind one person's moral education is another person's ideological control/manipulation.

A few teachers claimed that moral education did not occur or that they did not know what it was. Others claimed that it went on all the time and was a dimension of the whole curriculum. As with the previous question, teachers mentioned several items. They were significantly more likely to mention the peer-group as both positive and negative than other categories. (Sig. .014)

Question 2 Please describe, as it is at present in your school, what contributes, both positively and negatively, to the moral education of pupils.
Table 7 (2) Nature of moral education

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<tr>
<th>Nature of Moral Education</th>
<th>No. of Positive Mentions</th>
<th>% of Sample</th>
<th>No. of Negative Mentions</th>
<th>% of Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Personal and social education, careers, etc.</td>
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<td>61.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Hidden curriculum.</td>
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<td>43.3</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>3. Religious education.</td>
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<td>35.6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
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<td>4. Teacher example.</td>
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<td>28.9</td>
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<td>5. Other subjects.</td>
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<td>6. Teacher control.</td>
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<td>23.3</td>
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<td>7. All aspects of school.</td>
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<td>8. Assemblies.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Clubs, sports, trips, School Council.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
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<td>10. Community links.</td>
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<td>11. Peer-group.</td>
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<td>5.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Child-centredness.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. School structure.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. No moral education.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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</table>

61.1% of teachers mentioned these aspects of the curriculum as providing good moral education and only 3.3% thought they did not provide as good or positive moral education as they could. This category covered a wide number of subjects, all of them concerned with personal or social education. Humanities, social studies, social education, community
education, careers and health education were included, as well as tutorial schemes like Active Tutorial Work. Counselling by tutors and the school counsellor was also mentioned as well as the pastoral system in general. The whole spectrum of these subjects could loosely be described as concerned with personal development as opposed to academic development, although curriculum subjects like social studies and Humanities are concerned with both. Most of the mentions, however, were for personal development subjects, and less for courses with examinations like Humanities.

Community education enables them to show an example out of school, for example, to young children at playschool.

Tutorial lessons once a week. A lot of these deal with topics such as stealing, lying, bullying, being a good/bad friend, etc.

An overt aspect of moral education is exhibited in such subjects as social/personal tutorial work, Careers and Humanities.

Social education covers all topics which are deemed moral and controversial, i.e. sex, drugs, abortion, law, smoking, love, war, "right and wrong".

Within Humanities teaching about Ourselves, the Family, Third World issues, Law and Power in Society for example. These clearly raise moral issues which are then tackled by the staff.

Where teachers saw such courses as negative (3.3%) it was more to do with attitudes to them than the courses themselves. They did not have enough impact because they were undermined by other staff, or not considered important by pupils if they did not lead to an examination, or the moral component was not properly thought out.

Good developments in p.s.e. are somewhat hampered at intervals by a number of totally disinterested and negative staff.
There is inconsistency in the pastoral system and in what staff consider important.

Social education is unfortunately not seen as worthwhile by many parents and consequently a 'doss' by many students.

Although morality and the concepts of right and wrong are touched upon in Personal Development periods it is usually only very shallow.

2. Hidden curriculum

The 43.3% of teachers who saw the hidden curriculum as effective moral education, seemed to understand it in terms of good relationships, particularly between staff and students, and the 'ethos' of the school. In this sense moral education is seen as 'caught' rather than 'taught', covert rather than overt, as values are unthinkingly or unconsciously transmitted.

Moral education takes place through interaction with staff when via the hidden curriculum various attitudes or approaches to life are unwittingly assimilated.

Teachers don't even need to know they are doing it for moral education to occur. (Indeed some teachers would be horrified to discover they were doing it) - but it goes on via the hidden curriculum.

Many teachers are open, honest and caring and take effort to understand and explain to students how they should behave and why, and why we behave as we do.

Subject teachers impose their own moral standards on students through classroom relationships, the 'work ethic', encouraging competitiveness/co-operation, gender role differentiation, responses to authority, etc. Much of this is not recognised as 'moral education'.

There is not much information here about what kind of values are part of this process. Again there is an assumption that
everyone knows what socially acceptable values are. Those teachers (6.7%) who saw the hidden curriculum as negative were, however, more specific.

The hidden curriculum contributes in a negative way in my view, as the ethos of the school encourages competition at the expense of co-operation.

Negative - the hypocrisy of an institution divided into them and us. (e.g. we smoke in the staffroom, you shouldn't.) Staff are always right, students guilty 'till proved innocent. Violence and bullying are condemned but some staff bully students.

3. Religious education

Once the main vehicle of moral education as it was understood in the last century, religious education is still seen as, on the whole, a positive influence on moral education in schools. 35.6% of teachers mentioned it.

The major contributory factor is the teaching of the Catholic doctrine in this school.

RE gives pupils the chance to reason out their views on key issues which enhances their moral reasoning, but the value of the opportunity depends entirely on the member of staff teaching the subject.

Religious education throughout the whole school must give pupils an inkling of how to be moral upright people within the community.

Morals, ethics and values are taught in R.E. lessons but have a relatively minor impact compared to the hidden curriculum.

I presume that R.E. lessons include an element of moral education, though the philosophic implications may be blurred by the intrusion of various isms and doxies.

Several teachers mentioned, like the second quotation above, that the moral value of religious education depended on the teacher, and many of the other quotations appear muted. This
suggests that methods of R.E. teaching vary widely and are perhaps regarded with some suspicion by teachers of other subjects. This suspicion of R.E. staff, perhaps the same kind of suspicion afforded to moral education researchers, is evident also in the negative comments given by 7.8% of teachers.

Traditional approach to moral education - supposed to take place in R.E. lessons - but is no real moral education.

In R.E. no moral issues need be discussed as such. It is along lines of life of Christ and comparative religions.

The R.C. approach in our school often made people feel that they could "sin", ask for forgiveness, then everything was again O.K. Some disruptive characters thus ended up with lower moral standards than children of non-religious schools.

4. Teacher example

There was some overlap between this category and the hidden curriculum category. However, where there was a response particularly identifying teacher example or modelling, I classified it separately. 28.9% of teachers considered they set, or should set, a good moral example to their pupils. Of course, some teachers were aware that they also failed to set a good example.

Teachers attempt to treat others in a fair way, giving a model of a moral person. They also fail in this, thereby breeding resentment.

A lot of the hidden curriculum in the school rests on the example given by staff, so it's important to have as moral a staff as possible. Don't ask me how you decide that.

The most influential factor in moral education, is, without doubt, the example of teachers. This, however, is far from consistent and must lead to some confusion among pupils.
14.4% of teachers, the second highest negative category, (discipline mentioned by 15.6%) were sure that teachers on the whole set a bad moral example.

Poor example from staff in loss of temper, indolence, neglect of immoral behaviour of children and asserting arbitrary rules.

A negative aspect of morality could be the double standards exhibited by some staff. 'Do as I say, not do as I do'.

5. Other subjects

Specific curriculum subjects not already included in other categories are included here, along with more general comments which suggested that moral education went on across most or all curriculum subjects. 24.4% of responses were positive against only 1.1% negative.

Students learn awareness of moral principles, the possibilities of life actions, and the possible responses of others to these actions, chiefly through English Literature.

Morality enters into most subjects - the morality of decisions taken in the past as well as the morality of technological decisions now made for people by those in power - nuclear power, use of resources, etc.

Even in Maths. there is an element of moral education.

History, science, environmental studies and games scrutinise the work, contributions and values of other people.

Moral education crosses all subject boundaries. In PE especially you have to be moral or games couldn't take place.

The one person giving a negative rating was a history teacher to his own subject.

History is negative insofar as it teaches relativity of moral values.
6. Teacher control

Although this category was about mid-way in the positive ratings in Table 7 (2), mentioned by 23.3% of the sample, it was the highest of the negative ratings, mentioned by 15.6% of the sample. This indicates that the issue of rules, discipline, rewards and punishment is a contentious one. It perhaps represents one of the main dilemmas in schools, that of individual freedom versus authority and the school society. This dilemma is of course inherent in our mainly authoritarian school structure. One would expect that those teachers who considered strict discipline a necessary exercise of authority would see it as positive moral education, while those who would prefer a more democratic system would see discipline as negative.

The disciplinary system operates on the basis that it is teaching the pupils the 'right' rules of conduct for life.

Punishment is administered justly and by mutual agreement with the offender.

Pupils should not be allowed to get away with disruptive behaviour. When they know that little will be done to them, their disruptive behaviour will continue.

Those emphasising discipline as negative moral education claim it is often arbitrary, unfair and irrational.

Negative behaviour in school usually gets a lot of teacher time and this is unfair to the well-behaved, hard-working pupils. You're brought up to be rewarded for good behaviour, but in school good behaviour is taken for granted and ignored.

The asserting of arbitrary rules like uniform rankle and are difficult to justify.
The system of discipline is too irrational and not sufficiently 'owned' by the pupils, with whom it is not discussed.

Why should pupils show consideration to teachers who do not show it to them? Many pupils see their role in the school's moral code is to be scorned and manipulated.

7. All aspects of school

This category is perhaps of a different nature to the others, but it was explicitly mentioned by enough teachers (16.7%) to make it worthy of a separate classification. Those teachers who said here that moral education was in everything that happened in school, mostly went on to give examples of this. Other teachers, who might have been added to this group, gave such comprehensive lists of where moral education occurred that it was difficult to think of areas of school life they had omitted. This category, by its nature could not be divided into positive and negative, as such judgments were given in the particular examples chosen.

I have never been able to grasp the concept of a moral education lesson. Surely it is in everything that we do and offer in school.

I think it goes on all the time, even in the dinner queue.

No teacher can avoid moral issues, for they intrude into everything we do. Personally, I don't pretend to understand, in connection with my own life, what is right and what is wrong. I find honest bewilderment on these issues the only professionally acceptable approach.

8. Assemblies

Traditional school morning Assemblies do not take place as often as they once did, but nevertheless are still rated as
morally educative by 15.6% of the current sample of teachers. In fact they are seen as more 'moral' than 'religious'.

Assemblies are almost never religious, but often use moral examples.

Assemblies are positive when the content is interesting and relevant to illustrate a simple point made. A principle is that a moral idea should be delivered by example (literature, history, etc.) and not by precept.

The 5.6% who rated Assemblies as negative described them as moralising at students, talking over their heads, and an occasion from which students automatically 'switched off'.

Moralistic assemblies largely go over their heads. (Water off a duck's back, they've heard it all before!)

Totally negative since children 'talked at' - 90% switched off.

9. Clubs, sports, trips

This category emphasised extra-curricular activities of a social nature. As well as the above, visits and charity appeals were mentioned as encouraging moral education. This was only a small category, rated positively by 7.8% of teachers.

Extra-curricular experience offered to pupils - residential, etc. - and all opportunities to socialise in various situations with adults and children.

Camps, field courses, inter-tutor group activities all encouraged and reinforce good moral standards.

Lack of such extra-curricular opportunities was rated as negative by 3.3%, rather than the opportunities themselves.

Lack of clubs and societies leads to missing an important part of education.
10. Community links

Again a small category, mentioned positively by 6.7% and lack of involvement in the local community rated as negative by 1.1% of teachers.

4th, 5th and 6th formers go out and help in the local community.

Community work is valuable. (e.g. old people's lunches).

The school is far too inward looking and does not serve the community yet in any major way.

11. Peer-group

It is perhaps curious that the peer-group was mentioned much more in answers to the previous question. However, this may indicate that the influence of the peer-group is considered stronger in out-of-school hours. For this question it is rated equally positive and negative (5.6%).

By living with each other, pupils learn to juxtapose their feelings against those of others in deciding how to act.

Children will often say to each other - we don't do it that way in our school.

Peer-group pressure - the school is a violent and frightening place in which the strong survive, stealing is O.K. - BUT the opposite message is also transmitted. Students pick up whichever suits them/they are suited to.

12. Child-centredness

This very small all-positive category (4.4%) is one which did not seem to fit into any of the others, though I did consider adding it to that of teacher example. However, it does seem
of special interest in its particular stress on individual pupil development.

Moral education represents all that is good in schools. Isolate purposeful activity, child-centred involvement and you will see moral education. Pupils learn to solve problems, create models, co-operate, discriminate, and see inequality.

Students' achievements should be recognised and celebrated, by teachers and by themselves. Independence and strength of character should be encouraged.

However, these aims would seem to many teachers as idealistic or romantic. One sounds a note of warning. Although in his school, he says, the aim of moral education is to avoid indoctrination and help pupils make free, independent decisions.

If we as teachers stress free choice and individual autonomy as the only moral objective, we may well be encouraging autonomous anarchists, autonomous racists and autonomous muggers.

Here again, therefore, we appear to have the tension between freedom and responsibility, and an obvious need for more discussion of the meanings of moral words and concepts among teachers.

13. School structure

This is the only category where negative ratings outweighed the positive, although both ratings were only a relatively small percentage of the sample. Perhaps there are things in our school system which we take for granted, but should in fact be subjected to scrutiny on moral grounds, particularly size and decision-making processes. 8.9% were critical.
Through the various practices we have developed to manage some of our schools (streaming, banding and particularly, options at 14+) we have created a world where we preach one thing e.g. equality of opportunity but are unable to live up to our promises.

Staff themselves because of organisational practices are not always able to develop as truly moral individuals. There has never been any open discussion of what moral standards we should be aspiring to attain.

Trying to change schools into establishments functioning according to a sound moral code could be something of a tall order! Nevertheless it is essential.

Decision-making tends to be autocratic rather than democratic, leading to a feeling of resentment, unfairness and impotence.

These views might be supplemented by those which have been classified in other categories such as teacher example or the hidden curriculum and include remarks about hypocrisy, double standards, forcing pupils into situations where they have to be untruthful, belittling and ridiculing and hiding behind institutional rules.

Schools are meant to be for the benefit of pupils.

The two positive comments about school structure were about democracy.

There is a School Council and devolution of responsibilities of common room duties, etc. to pupils.

We have a 6th Form Committee with some limited democracy.

14. No moral education

Only one person claimed that formal moral education was actually deliberately ignored in her school. However, she later described ways in which it did go on informally.
Our school contains Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims and Christians. So that no offence is given to any one cultural group it has been the custom to ignore religious studies, which for most staff are inextricably linked to moral education.

Since the analysis of the answers to this question has been complicated, some summary of the responses will now be attempted. First of all, there is a clear understanding that moral education does happen in schools, both formally and informally. It is not a separate subject and neither is there usually an explicit commitment to it. Even where it is considered formal, therefore, it goes on haphazardly and without thought or discussion on a professional level by teachers. Certain subjects include moral education more than others, although all may contribute. The majority of teachers specify these as subjects concerned with personal development, as well as arts subjects like Humanities, History, English and Religious Education. The informal effect of moral education is through the hidden curriculum of relationships and the example of teachers. The poor example of teachers could also have the highest negative effect, as well as arbitrary or unfair disciplinary procedures. There was no support for a separate subject called moral education, but criticism that there was little discussion by schools or agreed policies on moral education. Thus the whole effect was confusing and contradictory, with teachers coping in practice as best they could at a fairly instinctive level.

It could be that the need for clarity goes back further than teachers to the institutions themselves, and behind them to
the society which sets up the institutions. One teacher asked

I wonder, just how should we bring up our young
people?

With ambivalent and contradictory messages teachers are
confused, but nevertheless concerned.

We do desire that every student, as an individual, should be respected, and should grow up to make his/her own choices. We believe we are giving them freedom and breathing space to mature and develop. In practice things do not happen like this. Students are faced with either accepting (for good or bad) the system being imposed on them, or rejecting that system. Personal freedom to make choices does not easily go hand in hand with the necessary objective of keeping 1,200+ students under some kind of control.

The gap between theory and practice appears large. But can the system change? Or should it? These questions will be addressed in the final chapter. Since the next two questions are also concerned with moral education, a consideration of the relationship of teachers' views to theories of moral education will be discussed later in this chapter. Already, though, it is clear that teachers are unfamiliar with both the theories and the moral education materials already available.

For this particular question, responses were not significantly related to sex of subject or the other organismic variables. Relationships to WAS where significant have been reported in Chapter 5.
7.3 **Factor Analysis of Questions 1 and 2**

Categories of the responses to these two questions were correlated with each other on the basis of whether or not a subject endorsed a category. The resulting matrix yielded few significant correlations but nevertheless a factor analysis was run to see if there were any meaningful trends in the responses. Ten factors emerged but it was decided to use only four of these, as they had the highest loadings and were therefore likely to show the most coherent or consistent accounts.

These four factors proved very difficult to interpret. However, an attempt will be made to give some overall picture of each one. Loadings of more than +3 or -3 were included.

### Factor 1

**Positive loadings**

- .59 A good family background has a positive influence on moral development.
- .58 School has a positive influence also.
- .53 Discipline in school promotes moral education.
- .47 Teachers who give a good example further the moral education of children.
- .42 Religious ties in childhood encourage moral standards.
- .39 Moral values may be inherited.
- .38 School assemblies have a positive influence.
The peer group can support moral standards.

The pastoral curriculum promotes moral education.

The media can give children good examples.

The peer-group can also have a negative influence.

**Negative loadings**

- .38 The hidden curriculum is an important influence in moral education.
- .36 Keeping moral standards is a matter of habit and training.
- .30 Self-interest is a negative influence on the development of moral standards.

The positive loadings on this factor all emphasise positive ways in which the moral development and moral education of children can be influenced by agencies outside the individual or by the environment. A good example by both parents and teachers is important as well as strict discipline. School assemblies and subjects within the pastoral curriculum as well as the media can all give children good models to follow. The peer-group, however, is likely to have a bad influence as well as a good one. Two of the items at the negative pole rate influences within the child and within relationships in school as important. There is a sense, however, in which the idea of training or habit might be expected to appear on the positive end of this factor, and it is difficult to relate it to the other negative items here.
Factor 2

Positive loadings

.61 A disrupted or inconsistent family will have a negative effect on children's moral development.
.55 Other social or environmental influences can also have a negative influence.
.38 Schools which do not practise what they preach have a negative influence.
.30 Peer-group pressure is often to do wrong.

Negative loadings

-.43 The media has a positive influence on moral development.
-.39 Religious education is positive moral education.
-.38 The peer-group can support moral values.
-.34 Personality or genetic factors have a good effect.
-.31 Individual qualities like self-discipline are important.
-.31 Many academic school subjects promote moral education.

All the positive loadings on this factor are responses to the first question on moral development, and they all stress negative influences. Moral development is hindered or goes wrong when there is a disrupted, unfair or inconsistent family background and other bad influences in society, the school and the peer-group.
At the negative end of this factor, therefore, are the good influences of the media, the peer-group and personality factors within the individual whether inherited or not, on the development of moral standards. In school, a wide variety of subjects across the curriculum from religious education to science, promote moral education.

**Factor 3**

**Positive loadings**

-.53 The pastoral subjects in school promote moral education.

-.44 Other subjects like English also promote it.

-.40 In general the school has a positive influence on moral development.

**Negative loadings**

-.43 Teachers who give a good example are influential.

-.41 Strict or fair discipline is important for moral education.

-.34 Discipline can also be a negative influence.

-.34 The individual herself is important in moral growth.

The positive end of this factor stresses the importance of the school as a good influence on moral development and education. In pastoral courses as well as other academic subjects, moral issues are discussed. The family is not mentioned. The negative pole also stresses the importance of school but not the curriculum. It stresses more the
necessity for teachers to give a good example and keep control. However, discipline can sometimes have a negative effect, and self-discipline by the individual is also needed.

Factor 4

Positive loadings

.46 School has a negative effect on moral development.
.46 Moral education is given positively through the hidden curriculum.
.42 Religious education is also positive moral education.
.37 Discipline can often have a negative effect.
.36 The individual's personality is important.
.36 But self-centredness may hinder moral development.
.34 Assemblies in school promote moral education.

There were no significant negative loadings on this factor. It is the hardest one in which to see coherence as it contains seemingly contradictory responses. Although school has a mainly negative influence on moral development, there are areas in school where beneficial moral education may occur. This would be through the hidden curriculum, religious education and school assemblies. Discipline has a negative effect, but the individual child's self-interest or self-discipline can have either a positive or negative influence.

These factors can only be considered tentative, but each one does appear to have a slightly different emphasis. There is
a strong difference between Factor 1 which stresses family and social influences, and the other three factors which all emphasise the influence of the school and teachers. There was no significant sex difference on these factors nor any significant relationship to any of the other variables. Any relationship to WAS was reported in Chapter 5.

7.4 Question 3: the purpose of moral education

This question was much more straightforward than questions 1 and 2 of the questionnaire, and thus the answers were easier to classify. Some teachers found it hard to write about the purpose of a subject when they did not really know what the subject was, but the majority were quite visionary in their aims both for moral education and education as a whole. Sometimes, in fact, these became synonymous. It does seem apparent in the answers to this question that the purpose of moral education, understood as what ought to be the case, is closer to the theories, than what is the case in schools in practice, as identified by answers to the previous question. This is shown also in the quotation from a teacher on page 281. The following table lists in decreasing order of size the categories which emerged. Teachers mentioned one or two categories each on average.

Question 3 What do you think is the purpose of moral education?
1. Individual development.

It is most interesting to see from this table that half the teachers considered the development of individual children as the main aim of moral education. As part of educating the whole person, children should grapple with moral problems, learn to analyse and solve them, to develop their own moral agency and autonomy. For teachers unaware of theories of moral education, these aims are remarkably close to those of cognitive-developmental theory in particular, and the drawing-out model I described earlier. However, individual autonomy was also allied to respect for others.

The purpose of moral education is to assist students to take a grip on their own destinies, learn to be self-reliant, self-disciplined, objective, independent and honest in their thinking.
Moral education ought to be an enabling process, giving students the tools and powers of analysis so that they may assess themselves, the world around them and their place in it.

To allow the pupils to question their stand on moral issues, investigate their own beliefs and to make their own decisions on their future moral standards.

Most of us hope to bring our students to moral autonomy, but frequently we seem to have induced cynicism and despair instead.

To enable an individual to make up their own mind about what is 'right' and 'wrong' with regard to a universal set of principles, and to stick to this regardless of other influences. (Idealistic!)

2. Conformity to social norms

31.8% mentioned this purpose. The school should teach children to conform to the expectations of the school, society, social values or God. This socialisation view contrasts with the previous view, and also represents the idea that morality is somehow 'put into' children.

It should develop an adult whose views and behaviour conform to those accepted by society as 'moral'. Unfortunately this must to some extent be indoctrination.

Moral education should train children in discipline and morals by obliging them to conform to parent or school expectations, so that they will internalise a moral code and acquire self-discipline.

This last quotation is from a teacher who includes both individual choice and social acceptability in the purpose of moral education. This seems indicative of the predominant stage thinking of my sample, i.e. 3/4.

The purpose should be to produce adults who can consider the question of morals and adopt for themselves a mode of life with values acceptable not only to them but to others in society.
3. Facilitate living with others

At first sight the 31.8% of teachers who endorse this category might have been placed in the previous category. However, there is a difference. The answers in the previous category stress discipline and social rules, whereas in this one the stress is on an individual awareness of others, their rights, needs and feelings.

Moral behaviour comes out of recognising a reasonable balance between the individual's needs, desires and rights and those of others.

To enable students to see the implication of their opinions and actions in terms of the well-being of others.

To create responsible adults who will generally put the need of others before their own personal desires.

4. Tolerance

This category and the remaining ones are endorsed by a much smaller percentage of teachers than the first three categories. 18.2% considered the purpose of moral education to be studying other cultures and points of view in order to develop tolerance of them. In a sense, therefore, this category overlaps with the previous and the first one.

Moral education should encourage tolerance of the beliefs and life-styles of others and respect for other people's liberties.

To get pupils to consider alternative viewpoints on moral issues and hopefully then come to conclusions of their own.
5. **Become happy adults**

Mentioned by 17% of teachers, the criteria for this category were those of happiness, future self-fulfilment and 'good' character. Some mentions overlap with category 1.

- To assist students into adulthood, i.e. into taking a grip on their own destinies, learning to be self-reliant and self-disciplined.
- To enable people to live as happy and rich a life as possible with confident attitude. To explore relationships and ways of life, to discover what they enjoy best.
- To promote goodness (as opposed to badness) of character.
- To produce a community of people who can live happily together in personal fulfilment.

6. **Create better society/world**

The 11.4% of responses in this category wanted to help create a more just, united, caring and harmonious society or world.

- The ideas of fair play, neighbourliness and respect are important if society is ever to be more than the sum of its parts.
- At its highest level to foster a feeling of identity in the wider social group, the world and life as a whole.
- That moral education will help create a fair world, despite governments who want to keep it unequal and unfair.
- Social, racial and emotional harmony.

7. **Teach right and wrong**

In this category were teachers, often in Roman Catholic schools, who were most definite about their role. It was to tell children what was right and what was wrong about their moral behaviour (10.2%).
To tell kids what is right so they can distinguish it from wrong.

To help them overcome temptation and choose to act the right way when there is no immediate reward.

To inculcate what one ought to do in situations.

To give pupils some notion of what may be considered right and wrong.

Although the percentage in this category is small, I would suggest that many more teachers actually carry out this aim in school than they realise as part of their 'controlling' function. However, the majority in these answers consider that, although this happens, it should not.

8. Challenge society

The 8% of responses here took the line that the purpose of moral education was to question and criticise society rather than conform to it, as in category 2.

Moral education ought to be about making students critically aware of the world around them.

I would like to see students being made more aware of what society is about, what they are going to face, and to question carefully and with confidence attitudes that will confront them.

The purpose of moral education is to induce in pupils an open and questioning attitude to the community.

9. No purpose/miscellaneous

This category of 6.8% included those teachers who didn't know what moral education was, or were not interested, or said it should not happen in school.
I've no idea what moral education is and I'm not really interested.

I don't really know what ought to happen in schools. This subject matter would be difficult to teach.

Do teachers have the right to expound values and standards to pupils from various backgrounds?

Can't say because moral education is rather vague to me. I am rather suspicious of people giving a moral lead.

The most interesting conclusion to be drawn from the answers to this question is that the majority of teachers endorse aims which are similar to Kohlberg's principled reasoning. Yet few of them in fact demonstrated principled reasoning on the MJI. And only one of them had ever heard of Kohlberg's theories. Those in category 1, and to some extent in categories 3, 4 and 6, express ideas of moral autonomy, mutual respect, universal principles and commitment to justice. However, those who endorsed category 1 did score significantly higher on WAS (Sig. .05 X = 371.4419), and did include those with some principled reasoning. Those subjects who mentioned the direct teaching of right and wrong scored significantly lower on WAS (Sig. .043 X = 338.8889). These results were discussed in Chapter 5, section 5.6. It seems reasonable therefore to suggest that teachers would respond to the 'justice' model of Kohlberg's theory of moral education, and also to the 'empathy' model of McPhail.

No significant relationships were found between the answers to this question and any of the organismic variables.
7.5 Question 4: Achieving the purpose

This question was a practical one of how the aims of moral education could be achieved, and so to a certain extent teachers fell back on where they already knew it took place, which they described in the answers to question 2, e.g. teacher example and the pastoral system in school. Teachers on average mentioned two categories, although some mentioned up to five. Many teachers were aware of their lack of knowledge.

All these are very vague and idealistic objectives.

Question 4 What ought to happen in schools if they are to achieve this purpose?

Table 7 (5) Achieving the purpose

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of mentions</th>
<th>% of sample</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Teacher behaviour/example/hidden curriculum.</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Cross-curricular concern.</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Whole school commitment.</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Pastoral/tutor system.</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Teacher training.</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. School structure.</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Child-centredness.</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Separate subject.</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>9. Community contact.</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>10. Don't know/miscellaneous.</td>
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<td>11. In Humanities/R.E.</td>
<td>6</td>
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1. **Teacher behaviour/example/hidden curriculum**

The 35.5% who endorsed this category said that teachers should be caring, supportive, fair, truthful, consistent and give reasons for their actions (i.e. be perfect!).

- Staff who lead by example in all their dealings with both children and other staff.
- Staff should uphold precepts of truth, fairness and justice in the way they treat pupils.
- Consistent approach by staff in dealing with everyday problems (e.g. respect for others and their property, tolerance towards those of different sex, age, colour, opinions, telling on those who bully, steal, etc.).

It is mainly achieved through the hidden curriculum.

The employment of teachers having the ability to empathise with students of all backgrounds/opinions.

2. **Cross-curricular concern**

32.2% said that moral issues should be discussed more in all subjects in school, and moral education should not be a separate subject.

- All subjects must include discussion which inevitably includes moral questions. To allow subject teachers to leave it to specialists is not healthy for staff or students.

- It should be across the curriculum and requires careful examination of how each Department might contribute.

- Moral education should take place across the curriculum.
3. Whole school commitment

To some extent this category overlaps with the previous one. However, not only should moral education take place across the curriculum, but in all other school activities as well. 30% of the sample endorsed this view.

Consensus among staff, managers, etc. about what we are hoping to achieve.

The whole staff and the management style of the school should be sympathetic to moral education.

There should be a clearly defined policy in the aims of the school.

Moral education pervades the whole curriculum, ethos and running of the school, and every member of the community must have equal status.

4. Pastoral/tutor system

The responses in this category (24.4%) stress the responsibility of form tutors for moral education. They also suggest that moral education ought to happen within the pastoral system and subjects like personal and social education.

The tutorial system should devote time to discussing moral issues with pupils.

The organised roundabout of social subjects our pupils are asked to consider in the fourth and fifth forms is a good system - where it falls down is that we cannot force them to do what is best or even to think about the issues.

PSD course - 1 period a week for all - resourced, planned to develop range of discussions/perceptions of benefits of moral standards. But should eschew indoctrination.

It could take place in tutor period, basing it on Life Skills/ATW exercises, which every form should do.
5. Teacher training

17.8% considered that teachers needed help in the area of moral education, not only in the form of specialist teachers, in-service courses and curriculum 'packs' but in more time and funding.

It has to be specially timetabled with a qualified moral education teacher, which will not be possible with present-day cut-backs.

A programme of in-service training and the introduction of some teaching pack relying on role-playing, etc.

Appoint and train staff with skills in creating positive human relationships rather than with subject specialisms. Encourage the further professional development of teachers as team members.

Moral education should have a place on the timetable from the beginning of education. It needs staff who have had sufficient education themselves for the task and should not just be assigned to anyone.

6. School structure

The main concern of the 16.7% in this category was that the school structure should be more democratic - that is with more pupil participation in decision-making - and less authoritarian or hierarchical. This is similar to Kohlberg's 'just community' idea.

Involve pupils in development of the school, especially in rules and punishments but also in major curriculum matters.

School organisation needs to become less hierarchical and more open - a place where students exercise choice over their work, and have responsibility.
Schools ought to be based on moral principles, i.e. the organisation of the school from Head down should openly be seen to be working in a fair and just way.

The School Council is important as it provides the children with an opportunity to air their opinions.

7. Child-centredness

Similarly to a category in the previous question, responses here endorse pupil-centred schools, that is, schools where pupils are listened to and treated equally. The 13.3% mentioning this are more than the 4.4% in question 2.

Staff should be willing to give more constructive help and to listen to children and their opinions.

Importance is added to each individual by tailoring the work to suit their needs. Profiling is one way of making children responsible and aware of themselves.

8. Separate subject

12.2% suggested that moral education should be a separate subject.

Time set aside in the timetable for moral issues to be explored.

What ought to happen is for the school day to be structured to include time for Moral Education along the lines of Startline and Lifeline.

Moral education should be developed as a curricular area. User-friendly materials should be at the disposal of teachers.

9. Community contact

This category of 12.2% included various groups, parents, experts, etc. as possible resources for moral education who might visit the school or be visited from school.
Speakers from outside on different religious practices, trips to temples and mosques, dances, community projects, helping the elderly and young.

Back-up from external agencies would be an asset—churches, social services, Samaritans, charities, etc.

Parental involvement is very important.

Schools should not be separate communities. Rather, they should perform a service to the benefit of the whole community—not a false world with false values just for mini-adults.

10. Don't know/miscellaneous

This is a mixed category of items which could not be classified elsewhere, and included those who didn't know what ought to happen in schools. (12.2%)

The school already has its own morality.

Ensure that unacceptable behaviour has an appropriate unpleasant consequence for the child.

'A' level science students miss out on moral discussions. How mature in this respect are our future scientists and doctors?

I do not envy anyone trying to set up such a programme. I wonder how long it would be before the school was visited or telephoned by irate parents.

As soon as any lesson on the timetable is called moral education it's already sunk!
11. In Humanities/R.E.

In the previous question this category was split between two others. Here the indication is that Humanities as a subject is considered less important for moral education than the pastoral curriculum as a whole. R.E. also is only considered by a few teachers to be a good vehicle for achieving the aims of moral education.

If moral education is linked to R.E. it makes more sense. Otherwise its morals are highly questionable.

The role of the humanities teacher should become more important in this area. Study of contemporary issues in society including bias, prejudice, evidence, different viewpoints will contribute hopefully to development of morality.

Overall, the responses to this question express the idea that the school as a whole should have a firm policy for and commitment to moral education, and that this should be demonstrated in the organisation of the school, the overt and the hidden curriculum. Teachers should practice what they preach, but also need development and training themselves in order to deal adequately with moral issues.

There was only one significant relationship with any of the organismic variables. Women were significantly more likely than men (Sig. .006) to endorse the view that moral education should take place in humanities or R.E. lessons. There were no significant relationships to WAS.
7.6 Factor analysis of Questions 3 and 4

As with the previous two questions, a factor analysis was made to see if there were any consistent or coherent trends in the ideas to be found within the responses to questions 3 and 4. Again, the loadings were not very high and only five factors gave reasonable accounts, so any comments must be considered as speculative.

**Factor 1**

**Positive loadings**

.63 Moral education should be a separate subject.
.62 Teachers need training to teach it.
.61 The purpose of moral education is to develop individual moral autonomy.
.43 Society and people's attitudes should be questioned.
.30 The purpose of moral education is to enable students to consider the rights and well-being of others as well as themselves.

**Negative loadings**

-.43 Moral education is too difficult/schools already doing it.
-.41 It should take place in pastoral system/tutor time.
-.30 Moral education has no purpose in school.

An enthusiastic and professional approach to moral education is shown at the positive end of this factor. In order to
help students develop their moral autonomy and consideration for other people's needs and rights, teachers should have training in moral education themselves. Then it could be taught in school as a separate subject equal to other subjects. At the negative pole there is little interest in moral education. It is seen to have no purpose in school or as too difficult to teach. Schools may already be doing it well enough through the tutorial or pastoral system.

Factor 2

Positive loadings

.64 The school structure should be democratic with more pupil responsibility.
.60 Pupils should be respected and their views listened to.
.56 The purpose of moral education is to create a better, fairer society and world.
.38 It should help people to live together in mutual respect.

Negative loadings

-.38 Moral education should be in Humanities or R.E. lessons.
-.32 Moral education has no purpose in school.

The positive pole here stresses the role of the school as a democratic and fair community, where pupils and teachers are equal and all opinions respected. This is seen as
preparation for and therefore likely to lead, as pupils grow up, to a fairer society in which people can more carefully balance their needs against the needs of others. The negative pole denies that this should happen in school and considers moral education should be left to parents and religions. If it has to be in school, it should be discussed in Humanities or R.E. lessons.

Factor 3

Positive loadings
.47 Part of moral education should involve contact with parents, the community, visiting speakers, etc.
.37 Moral education should be a separate subject.
.36 Teachers should have training to teach it.

Negative loadings
-.64 There should be more discussion of moral issues in all curriculum subjects.
-.44 Moral education should also be a policy commitment by the whole school.
-.33 The purpose of moral education is to develop individual moral autonomy.

Like Factor 1, the positive pole of this factor sees moral education as a separate subject with specialist, trained teachers. Contact should also be made with parents and the local community, visits arranged out of school, and visiting speakers invited into school. The negative pole denies that
moral education should be a separate subject. Instead, moral issues should be discussed in all subjects, following a policy agreed by the whole school. The main aim of this policy should be to develop moral autonomy and decision-making skills in individual pupils.

Factor 4

Positive loadings

.61 Teachers should provide a good example of moral behaviour.
.46 The purpose of moral education is to enable pupils to consider others as well as themselves.
.44 Pupils should be taught what is right and wrong.
.33 They should study and learn to tolerate differing points of view.

Negative loadings

-.39 Moral education should take place in tutorial/pastoral system.
-.35 Contact with the local community is important.

This is the first factor to view, at its positive end, the role of the teacher as the most important in moral education. By giving a good moral example in their relationships with pupils, teachers will enable pupils to learn consideration for others. Pupils should also be told what is right, but learn to tolerate the points of view of other people even
though they might be considered wrong. The negative end of this factor contains responses stressing that moral education should take place in the tutorial/pastoral system, with use made of the resources available in the local community.

Factor 5

Positive loadings
.49 Pupils should be taught what is right and wrong.
.46 They should conform to the expectations of school, society or God.
.38 Moral education should take place in tutorial/pastoral system.

Negative loadings
-.56 Moral education has no purpose in schools.
-.37 It is too difficult/schools doing it already.

Positive responses here indicate that pupils should conform to the moral expectations of the school, society or God. These values should be taught as right in the tutorial/pastoral system. Negative responses deny that there is a purpose or a place for moral education in school. The loadings for these responses are higher than the positive ones.

The first two of these factors are the most interesting, as the positive pole of each is strongly in favour of moral
education and the negative pole strongly against moral education. The positive poles differ, however, in their ideas. Factor 1 takes an academic or curriculum view of moral education, whereas Factor 2 stresses democratic practice within the whole school. The latter view is reminiscent of Kohlberg's in many respects, and the former something like Wilson's. The other three factors are more mixed, with Factor 5 taking perhaps the most indoctrinative or 'putting in' view, and Factor 4 stressing the role of the teacher in providing a good model. Factor 3 emphasises the importance of community contact and resources, thus is perhaps the most like social action theory. Three of the negative poles (Factors 1, 2 and 5) are very similar in seeing little purpose in moral education and expressing disinterest. The negative pole of Factor 5, with the highest loadings, expresses the most antipathy.

7.7 Correlation of all factor analyses in the study

The last analysis undertaken for this study was of the relationships between all the factor analyses in Chapters 6 and 7. These are the Objective/Subjective continuum (4 factors), the Individual/Social (2 factors), the Moral Development (4 factors) and the Moral Education (5 factors). A Pearson Correlation Coefficients test was used.
There was a total of 113 correlations of which only nine were significant. This is a very small number, especially as some significant correlations might be expected by chance. The correlations were also not very strong, mostly in the .2 to .3 range. Nevertheless, it may be worth reporting eight of them. One has already been reported in Chapter 6, section 6.5.

Objective/Subjective 1 x Moral Education 5.
(Corr. -.2727, Sig. .009)

There is some tendency for responses to morality which stress a universal objective right, often decided by religion, to go with responses saying that the purpose of moral education is to teach right and wrong, and that pupils should conform to the expectations of the school, society or God. Also, a tendency for emphasis on making moral rules by majority agreement tends to go with little interest in moral education.

Objective/Subjective 2 x Moral Development 3.
(Corr. -.2487, Sig. .018)

Comments denying that there is any right answer, but saying that thinking and reasoning are important and there are some basic moral rules tend to go with comments stressing the importance of the example of teachers and firm discipline in moral education. At the opposite poles, comments confirming
the positive influence of the school in moral development, especially the pastoral curriculum, tend to go with morality being decided by the individual but nevertheless the same for everyone if reason is used and consequences considered.

Objective/Subjective 4 x Moral Development 1.
(Corr. .3085, Sig. .003)

Objective and absolutist statements, for example that there is one correct answer to moral problems, and there are universal moral rules which should be the same for everybody tend to go with statements about the positive influence of the family, the school and religion on moral development, and the importance in school of teacher example, discipline and Assemblies. On the other hand, stress on individual feelings in morality and a rejection of religious authority tends to go with individual development in moral education through relationships as part of the hidden curriculum.

Individual/Social 1 x Moral Development 1.
(Corr. -.2024, Sig. .056)

This correlation is only just significant, but the comments seem to match quite well nevertheless. The positive pole of the former factor stresses the importance of the individual as moral judge and moral agent, and the negative pole of the latter factor stresses the hidden curriculum in moral education and rejects the conscious 'putting in' of moral
values. The other two poles comment on the 'putting in' of moral values by the family, the school and religion, and on pastoral subjects and Assemblies in school.

Individual/Social 1 x Moral Education 5.
(Corr. -.2075, Sig. .050)

The factor above which stresses individual morality rather than social morality is also related to another factor, and to comments about moral education having no purpose in school, being too difficult or already being coped with well enough by schools. The social morality end of the first factor goes with comments in the second factor that pupils should be taught right and wrong and should conform to the school or society's expectations on moral behaviour.

Moral Development 1 x Moral Education 5.
(Corr. .2856, Sig. .006)

As might be expected, the two factors both correlated significantly with Individual/Social Factor 1 are also significantly related to each other. The positive poles of these two factors both stress the putting in to children of society's values by moral education.
Comments stressing socialisation influences on moral development, and teachers' moral example in school as well as the positive influence of religious ties and Assemblies tend to go with comments on the positive influence of the pastoral curriculum as well as other subjects in school. One would actually expect a negative correlation here as it is the negative pole of the second factor which again emphasises the importance of discipline and the example of teachers.

Responses in Moral Education Factor 1 stress a professional approach, with moral education as a separate subject with properly trained teachers. These responses tend to go with negative comments about what currently happens in schools, where only the hidden curriculum and R.E. lessons have a positive moral influence.

A tentative conclusion to be drawn from these relationships might be that although the number of teachers stressing objective or absolutist views and the 'putting in' of moral values is small, the view which they hold is more consistently expressed than the views of the majority of teachers which are more open-minded, both objective and
subjective, and less certain. It seems that by their very nature absolutist views are likely to be more consistently held. This may explain why there are more connections between factors stressing conformist or objectivist views in these correlations, despite their lower loadings. The strong positive loadings on Moral Education Factor 1 has one correlation, and those on Moral Education Factor 2 which stress democracy have no correlations with any other factor.

There were no significant relationships with other variables except as reported in previous chapters.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

8.1 INTRODUCTION.
8.2 TEACHERS' STAGES OF JUSTICE REASONING.
8.3 THE ETHICAL POSITIONS OF TEACHERS.
8.4 TEACHERS AND MORAL EDUCATION.
8.5 THE FUTURE.
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction

This study began with general rather than specific questions and was intended to be exploratory. There was little previous research available in this country to use as a starting point, but the exploration had to follow a logical path and use available methods. The survey was to be a wide one, not just of teachers’ attitudes to morality, but also to moral development and moral education. Any one of these alone would have made a substantial research project. However, I was interested in the connections between teachers’ thinking in these three areas, however tenuous they might be. I suspected that it would in any case be difficult for teachers to be explicit about them, and that therefore I would be trying to get at implicit, unconscious and mainly non-verbalised attitudes. Therefore, any assumptions I might make would have to be considered tentative.

It is disappointing that so many of the outcomes have proved to be statistically non-significant. But this itself could be considered, especially in comparisons of data, as evidence of contradictory and inconsistent ideas in this area. The original questions, as stated in Chapter 1, were as follows.

i) What stages of reasoning, in Kohlberg’s sense, are expressed by British teachers?

ii) What are the prevalent theories explicit or implicit in their ethical thinking?
iii) What do they think about moral education, its importance, how it occurs at the moment and how it should be done?

The next three sections of this chapter will attempt to answer these questions, in the light of the results stated in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, but first, some remarks about the research in general and its limitations.

The number of teachers who completed both the interview and the questionnaire was 90, perhaps rather small. However, the amount of data provided was large. A lot can be said in up to two hours of interview, and much written on open questions. Also, I would have preferred a more multi-racial sample. All the teachers except one were of Caucasian race, the one exception being a woman West Indian. But a proportion of one in 90 may well accurately represent the proportion of other races to Caucasian teachers in the profession.

Many teachers stated that their responses to the interview were "off the cuff" and that the next day or the next week their responses would perhaps have been different. A few in fact returned later to ask me to alter things they had said, or to make certain statements more clear in case they were misunderstood. I did not alter any statements but I did agree to clarify them if necessary. It seems that an interview does not give sufficient time to get to really clear thinking, especially on a difficult subject and in the
middle of a busy school day for some subjects. The interview did appear to start a process which could have gone on much longer, a beginning to consider issues recognised as important ones by teachers but which they had often never before had the opportunity to clarify or discuss.

In retrospect I would have rephrased the first two questions in the questionnaire. As it was, their lack of clarity and division into positive and negative, hindered the analysis and led to too many categories. Also I would have joined some categories together in order to increase the likelihood of significant relationships between questions. There is also a sense of artificiality about constructing categories. They tend to overlap with each other because what people write and say is complex. It might also have been better to use a cluster analysis rather than a factor analysis in the statistical tests. It was considered, however, that as I was interested in the connections between ideas, a factor analysis might prove more profitable. There is still scope in the data for case studies to be made, which was another possible way of organising the data. Certainly I have included a large number of quotations from teachers in the results chapters, as I did want the teachers as far as possible to speak for themselves as well as to comment as accurately as I could on what they said.

To comment accurately is no easy task in social science research. Pring also questions the morality of 'scientific' research on people.
"Nor is it morally possible to treat them experimentally, controlling certain elements in their environment whilst changing and examining others... We are not therefore in the province of carefully controlled experiments with objects that can be manipulated". (1984, p.7)

As the subject of research is not an object, neither is the researcher an object. She has her own complexity of values, feelings, personality and experience, but nevertheless has to try to be as objective as possible. Kohlberg's recent adoption of Habermas' 'hermeneutic' view of measuring people has been in response to criticisms of his claims of psychometric validity. But he still claims that his method is scientific as well as interpretative. In contrast with the logical positivist approach to social science research, the hermeneutic approach is not detached. Habermas says that when doing interpretative social science one must enter with an attitude of communication between the observer and the observed, i.e. one must join a conversation. The good interviewer, like a good counsellor, must see the world through the interviewee's eyes. This is what I have tried to do, despite the constraints of the research methods.

I have already claimed that a counselling approach to interviewing is essential, as it is more effective in reaching intuitions and non-verbal responses as well as verbal responses. Also it puts the interviewee more at ease and allays anxiety and hostility. In counselling it is the client's agenda that is important and talked through. In empirical research it is the experimenter's agenda that is paramount. I saw my role as one of finding out what
teachers' agendas on morality were, by using the questions I had, but also giving subjects as much time and attention as they needed to say anything else they wished however much transcribing was involved afterwards. Again, in counselling, the client has a hidden agenda, behind resistance and defences. The counsellor tries to discover this by careful observation of all aspects of the overt agenda presented by a client. Repeated behaviour patterns or reactions as far back as childhood can also reveal some of this hidden agenda. Some of the analysis of my subjects consisted of an attempt to infer their hidden philosophic agenda from their overt agenda.

It is unsatisfactory, in my view, to conduct research into morality using only a questionnaire. Some of the subjects who completed the questionnaire first in the present study, were hostile to the topic, and therefore did not make much effort to complete it intelligently. Their hostility to morality was conditioned by the meaning of authoritarian moralising that they attached to the concept. This hostility had largely dissipated after their subsequent interview, when other meanings had been explored or recognised.

8.2 Teachers' stages of justice reasoning

The results of scoring Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview were perhaps the least ambiguous in this study. But some of
them were hard to explain, as they appeared to contradict Kohlberg's theory and other studies.

Perhaps the most striking fact was that only 9% of the sample showed evidence of principled reasoning. This finding compared unfavourably with studies on teachers in the U.S.A. which used Rest's Defining Issues Test. However, as stated in Chapter 5, Rest's measure, a multiple choice questionnaire, tends in itself to inflate stage score. I have also suggested other reasons why American teachers score more highly. Principled reasoning in Kohlberg's theory is closely connected with the principles of the U.S. Constitution with which all Americans become familiar during their education. In this country we have no written Constitution, and therefore no easily recognisable constitutional principles. I have found no evidence of studies in European countries using the MJ1 to make other comparisons. A figure of 9% at the highest stage does compare however, with the 10% of the general adult population in the U.S. claimed by Kohlberg to reach Stage 5/6. This also suggests that teacher scores in other studies are inflated.

In any event, the majority of teachers in all known studies are conventional reasoners. In many ways this is not surprising. The teaching job is one in which teachers are identified with law and order in school, and with contractual obligations. This is likely to keep teachers at Stage 4.
Only at 'progressive' schools, which are few in number, do teachers find the freedom to be democratic. Most schools do not have a democratic structure and those that do face an uphill struggle against conventional expectations in parents and society in general. My sample did not include teachers from democratic schools (e.g. Countesthorpe, Leics.) who might have been attracted there by their own Stage 5 principles. Gifford and Lewis (1978) suggest that whatever the demands of the school, teachers can create a more open and democratic atmosphere in their own classrooms. This, I would suggest, is very difficult and might cause hostility not only from other teachers but from students who are used to being controlled by most teachers. It would appear contrary to the ethos or atmosphere of the school.

Stage 5 principled thinking was evident, however, in 48.9% of teachers on the third of the moral education questions. In talking about the purpose of moral education for their pupils, they mentioned principles of justice, individual rights and autonomy, and relationships of mutual respect. Teachers endorsing this category were significantly higher on WAS. Only 10% endorsed the view that moral education should give direct training on right and wrong, and this latter group were significantly lower on WAS. This indicates that teachers have the potential for Stage 5 reasoning even though it did not yet appear in their MJIs. Their best reasoning appears in their educational philosophies, which they have thought about and discussed as professionals, rather than in
Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas. I would further suggest that they are inhibited by the 'law and order' system they have to enforce in school from realising this potential. Or one could conjecture that the school system actually depresses their stage of reasoning. I would therefore not agree with the criticism voiced by Bloom (1976) that teachers have a predisposition to be authoritarian and rule-bound thinkers. Some of course, have, but the majority have the potential to be the open, flexible, principled teachers our children need. This is what they say they should be, and what the children in their care should become.

As further evidence of principled potential, I offer my experience in interviewing teachers for this study and in running moral dilemma discussions with them. Their unfamiliarity with moral dilemmas and ambivalence about the concept of morality caused nervousness and fumbling for words, as if, although living their own moral lives, there was some 'freewheeling' or 'slack' in their thinking about morality. When discussion takes place, and this 'slack' is taken up, the impression is that they rapidly move up to the principled level. A study of Kohlberg's theory may also have the effect of raising stage. However, it is difficult to say whether this is genuine, because everyone wants to be 'at' the 'highest' stage.

Although the age of teachers in the study ranged from 23 to 57, and their years of experience ranged from one to 30,
these were not related to stage score. From this it appears likely that the job of teaching either depresses moral stage or inhibits its further development. Kohlberg's view is that little cognitive development is to be expected after early adulthood in the sense of hard or structural stages, but that soft reflective stages may occur. I would consider that Kohlberg underestimates the possibilities for structural growth and change in adulthood, for the restructuring of experience, and learning from experience. His longitudinal subjects are as yet in early adulthood, and few other adult studies have been made with re-testing over time to assess any stage change.

At the lower end of the stage scores were teachers at Stages 2/3 and 3 (11%). This suggests that the moral reasoning of a number of teachers in secondary schools is likely to be at a lower stage than their students. Kohlberg's moral dilemma discussions also require teachers to understand one stage above the highest stage of their students, in order to stimulate student development. Fraenkel (1976) asks how a teacher who reasons at Stage 3 can be expected to present a Stage 5 argument to a Stage 4 student so as to foster moral development if the teacher cannot even comprehend such an argument. Wilkins writes that this highlights a formidable problem in moral education, and that

"If we value moral education because of its obvious implications for democratic citizenship, then teacher education programs ... will have to seek ways of raising the level of moral reasoning in teachers. (1980, p. 549)
But moral education is not just about moral reasoning and teachers' and students' stage of development in Kohlberg's sense. This point will be returned to in a later section of this chapter.

To return now to the significant results on stage scores. One of the hardest to explain is the lower scores of teachers of science subjects compared with teachers of humanities subjects, especially history. As subject specialisation in British schools takes place at either 14 or 16, one could speculate that scientists after that age are less likely to meet moral dilemmas in literature and history. However, there are moral dilemmas in the applications of science and technology. And scientists are as likely to watch films, read books and newspapers, etc. as any other graduates, so they would not escape exposure to moral and controversial issues. But it may be that such exposure is less on the whole than that of graduates in the humanities. It is perhaps worth mentioning that teachers themselves judged the personal, social and humanities subjects as morally educative, but hardly endorsed the sciences as morally educative. If this is true, science teachers would have less exposure to moral issues. Humanities subjects also contain an element of studying and criticising various societies and their institutions. The difference reported had no connection with the sex of teachers of various subjects. Other possibilities already suggested as explanations in Chapter 5 include a particular scientific way of thinking or some kind of bias in the MJI as a measuring instrument.
As reported earlier, this study is unusual in reporting a significant sex difference among the sample on WAS score. The difference was not caused by the sex of the protagonists in the dilemmas. This was changed for every alternate interview, and was found not to be significantly related either to WAS or to the sex of the subject. According to Kohlberg, there should not be such difference when the sample is homogeneous in regard to profession and educational achievement. However, sex difference has been found in some studies. Walker (1982) said a sex bias could occur for two reasons. The first was that the sexes were fundamentally different in their rate of development and the endpoint reached. This appears to stem from Freud's (1927) assertion that women lack moral maturity due to deficiencies in same-sex parental identification. This is now commonly considered to be incorrect. A second reason for sex bias could be because the measurement procedures favour one sex and thus create a false impression that real differences do exist.

This latter criticism is the one Kohlberg has frequently faced, notably from Gilligan (1982). Although Kohlberg's defence is to say that the sequence of stages in both sexes has been proved, it does not follow from this that any sex bias has been eliminated. It may be that Gilligan is right in her view that there are two distinct modes of describing the self in relation to others - separate/objective and connected. The criterion judgments in Kohlberg's scoring rate the 'objective' responses of Stages 4 and 5/6 as better
reasoning than the 'connected' responses of Stage 3. She also believes that there is an orientation towards care which is used by individuals in making moral decisions which again is devalued by Kohlberg's insistence on the superiority of moral decisions based on justice. Other research studies have supported Gilligan's claims. (LYONS, 1983, LANGDALE, 1986). Kohlberg himself has now agreed that his orientation to justice, which may be the cause of the higher MJI scores of males, may be only part of the moral domain and not its entirety. In her study on abortion decision, Gilligan also made the interesting point that adult moral development engaged the dialectic of justice and responsibility through the actual experiences of moral conflict and choice, and that this represented the tension between the ideal (justice) and the real (responsibility and care). She also suggested that in schools justice as an ideal and cognitive morality was fostered by democracy and care was fostered by interpersonal responsibility or affective morality.

There may be particular reasons for the sex difference found in my study which are to do with Britain. There may be a hangover still from female role stereotyping which the feminist movement here has not affected as much as in the U.S.A. And female teachers may have lower status in the school system as a whole in this country. But the question of sex bias, in Kohlberg's measure or of a gender-based orientation towards morality, is far from answered. Sex differences have importance for an improved understanding of
moral theory and practice, and sex as a variable for study should be included in research designs and methodologies as a matter of course.

8.3 The ethical positions of teachers

In Chapter 2 I described some of the "commonsense" understandings of morality, some of the main tensions in moral philosophy and a variety of the ethical positions adopted by philosophers. In particular I concentrated on the meanings of 'moral' words, the roles of thinking and feeling, questions of ends and means, individual and social morality, objective and subjective views of morality, and absolutist and relativistic ways of seeing moral knowledge. From a survey of all these, I framed questions for my teacher sample, in an attempt to elicit similar positions from them.

I also concluded that there was confusion because the arguments of philosophers often obscured the ways in which they agreed. Their commitment to logic appeared to give their theories a rigidity or cut-and-dried nature which was actually far from the case. Convenient though it may be, and comfortable too, to view human beings as fitting into philosophical theories, it is a myth. People are largely motivated by complex unconscious and frequently irrational desires, as well as by the situations in which they find themselves. If there is any order or logic to be found,
therefore, it is likely to be at an instinctive or intuitive level.

Teachers are not professional moral philosophers. Philosophers seek logic, precision of concept definition, and clarity of language. The teachers I interviewed had, on the whole, never before been asked questions about their understanding of morality or attempted to express these understandings. They were nervous and uncertain as they tried to bring their views into words from an instinctive level. The responses to the interview quoted in Chapter 4, section 4.7, indicate just how difficult a task this was for them, and one which involved their feelings as much as their thinking. Comments like

I think I've explored the issue of morals more than I've ever done in my life before.

were not unusual. In the interview itself, therefore, they were attempting what Piaget called conscious realisation. But for Piaget, working with children, this was a gradual process over many years, of uniting practical and theoretical morality, not the work of a one and a half hour interview. I argue here, therefore, that teachers have potential not only for raising their Kohlberg stage of reasoning to the principled level, but for a conscious realisation of the practical moral lives they are already living. The interview was a beginning to both these processes. Teachers are closer to a real moral life than philosophers are in their abstractions and polished definitions. They are being moral agents in school as unconsciously as they are being moral
educators. For teachers, as for most lay persons, moral actions speak louder than moral words. Morality is in operation, though not always recognised, in their everyday lives. Thus teachers' morality could be termed existential. They are experienced in practical morality, but not in theory or reflection on it. As one teacher said

I haven't got a set of procedures. I act a lot on instinct. If you see something wrong on the playground you just go in, not walk by. To talk about this for an hour is much more difficult.

Human experience is the crucible in which our ethical notions are developed. The functional approach to morality, favoured by personality psychologists, may thus prove more useful in closing the gap between practical and theoretical morality. The emphasis on judgment and reflection as used by Kohlberg seems to have widened the gap. An ethnographic research project investigating the moral aspects of what teachers actually say and do in school would be most interesting.

This gap between the ideal and the real, between theoretical verbalised and practical, often intuitive, morality is not recognised by MacIntyre. For he takes evidence that the former is missing in the modern world as evidence that the latter is also missing. To be in operation between people morality does not have to be defined or even verbalised. MacIntyre (1981) claims that in our increasing technical and bureaucratic world, we have largely lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality. He goes on to say that although the language and the appearances of morality persist, the integral substance of morality has to a large degree been fragmented and destroyed.
As far as the teaching profession is concerned, I believe that MacIntyre is unduly pessimistic, and I would reverse his statement as follows. Although the language and appearances of morality have to a certain extent been lost, the integral substance of morality remains intact. There are many reasons why I consider this to be a more reasonable hypothesis. Talking seriously about morality, which is not the same as moralising, has been diminished by decades of decline in the study of philosophy which has led to increasing unfamiliarity with moral language for each new generation. The upsurge of interest in humanistic psychology has shifted the emphasis to the morality of relationships between people from an emphasis on 'out there' imposed 'oughts'. Morality, as well as our understanding of it, is also deeply embedded in our collective past and in our religious traditions.

The teachers I interviewed knew basically what morality was in real life and expressed a commitment to it. They were not able to argue like philosophers about such theories as objectivity and subjectivity although they had some awareness of them, as I shall describe shortly. When asked directly about their own moral values (question 13) 86% of teachers shared the view that morality was respect for others, and that this respect was shown by being fair, truthful, supportive, co-operative, and keeping promises. Respect for others was not shown by killing, lying and stealing. Many teachers were also aware that the ideal person does not exist, and we are all liable to moral failure. Nevertheless,
most of us try to respect others in the above ways most of the time. Interpretation of these principles may sometimes vary, but basically it seems there are certain core moral values. 60% of teachers (question 14) considered that these were or should be the same for everyone.

I would go further and suggest that these basic values underpin all cultures, and that those who see cultural differences in values are in fact seeing differences of interpretation. The position of women, for example, can be seen as unfair and unequal in some cultures, but those upholding such a position see it as supportive and protective of women. Many teachers and schools thus avoid the question of cross-cultural values because they have not yet considered the extent to which the basic principles of morality are common, and take surface differences in interpretation of these principles to mean that the principles themselves differ, or are culture-bound. Since Britain today is a multi-cultural society, this is an issue that needs to be addressed in schools, and the ways in which morality is universal made part of a consistent policy on moral education for all ethnic groups.

To return to teachers' ethical positions, the results in Chapter 6 show that they did, explicitly or implicitly, show most of the philosophical positions described in Chapter 2, but that they did not hold them very consistently. The tension they discussed most frequently, that between
individual autonomy and social conformity, was the one least addressed by philosophers. It might be useful to list, from Tables 6(1) to 6(15) a summary of the positions held.

i) Conscience is more an individual (68%) than a social concept (30%).

ii) Both thinking and feeling are involved in a moral decision, (56%) but there is slightly more emphasis on thinking.

iii) Like conscience, morality is seen as more a code of personal values (41%) than a social code (37%) or both (18%).

iv) Being moral enables people to live together, which is good both for the individual and society.

v) Religion is not necessary to morality, concluded both religious and non-religious teachers (94%).

vi) On the whole, there is no right answer to moral problems (59%). (relativist)

vii) Almost equally, actions are good in themselves (36%) (categorical imperative), or are good if they have good consequences (41%) (hypothetical imperative), or both (20%).

viii) There are universal moral rules (30%) (absolutist), majority rules (25%), rules which are up to the individual (20%) (relative), or a mixture of universal and individual rules (22%).

ix) A good decision feels right (57%), has good consequences (37%).

x) Science has right answers (absolutist) but morality does not, or neither has a right answer (34%).
Different understandings of the meanings of moral words, and confusions between, for example, is and ought and would and should were apparent throughout the interviews. Particular meanings also evoked strong feelings. This was especially the case where morality was understood to mean moralising or telling others what they should do, with the implication of superiority and some authority on the part of the moraliser. This understanding caused much initial resistance and hostility towards the concept and towards the task of deciding what Heinz should do in his hypothetical situation.

It is clearly necessary for words like moral and morality to be more focussed upon and wrestled with, despite people's resistance to them, for as Midgley (1981) suggests and as my interviews demonstrate, resistance does disappear with experience of increased clarification and consideration.

It is not only the meaning of "moral" words that is far from clear. The answer to question 11 about the place of self-interest in morality depended largely on what teachers understood by self-interest. For some it was equated with selfishness, greed, or ignoring the interests of other people; others saw it as a proper concern for one's own well-being and rights, and consistent with concern for others. Such semantic differences in everyday speech can cause interpersonal conflicts and conflicting moral claims. Counsellors and teachers among other professionals need to take this into account.
As far as the factor analyses across a number of ethical questions were concerned, the individual-social factors showed more consistency than the objective-subjective factors. One reason for that might be that the latter ideas are more difficult, abstract and philosophical than the former, which are more related to everyday concerns. For teachers, moral conflicts in school often arise when the rights of an individual child appear incompatible with the rules of the institution.

Teachers have different understandings of objectivity but the most common is the one perhaps adopted from the claims of religion and science, of 'out there' truths. Believing that this denies individual autonomy in moral decisions, many teachers reject it for subjectivity, or a mixture of both. Boyd (1986) writes that we need an understanding of objectivity that accommodates the autonomous subject. He expresses this loosely as a kind of detaching, decentering, or seeking distance on some aspects of our present understanding. Thus it is tied to the subject who is performing the decentering. It could thus be argued that being both objective and subjective at the same time is both possible and reasonable. Most of the teachers in my sample appeared aware of this, with only a few adopting 'out there' objectivity. Thus the lack of strong loadings or consistency on the objective/subjective continuum may represent the fact that the distinction is a false one. It has come from the
efforts of moral philosophers to, in Piaget's sense, consciously realise and reflectively abstract the nature of the moral life, but is not necessarily based on an accurate view of practical morality.

The strong individual/social theme seems in a way connected to the objective/subjective. For the tension is between morality as a matter for individual integrity which is in a sense subjective, and morality as social, which in a sense is objective. A further connection could be suggested between this tension and Kohlberg's stages. The majority (59%) of teachers scored 3/4 on Kohlberg's stage scheme. They were thus between stage 3 which is loosely about being a 'good' person and Stage 4, which is loosely about being a 'good' member of society. Again, although the majority emphasised the individual, a number of teachers looked for some intermediate position or balance between individual and social morality. This bears out the findings of Turiel (1983) that some individuals are both relativists and universalists. They are concerned both with group solidarity and with individual rights.

I want to argue again here for a way through the seeming polarisation of these two concepts, individual morality and social morality. This is the interpersonal or inter-individual area which does not seem to have received in general as much attention as it merits, except from Piaget. There is a suggestion of the idea that morality mostly
happens in this area in Christ's comment that wherever two or three were gathered together, He was there. Piaget (1932) did attend to this interindividual or interpersonal area when he described four kinds of relationship situations. The first is the individual, who makes moral decisions of integrity regardless of what other people think. Then there are relationships of unilateral respect between two people, where one person is in authority over the other. Also between two or a few people are relationships of mutual respect and equality. Relationships between the individual and the group are again unilateral, because there is group pressure on the individual to conform to group norms.

All these types of relationships were mentioned by teachers, but they tended to prescribe interindividual relationships of mutual respect as the ideal. These are also implicit in Kohlberg's Stage 5/6 reasoning, but Kohlberg emphasises reasoning rather than relationship. For Piaget, the concept of relationship is central to morality.

I would like to develop this idea further, into a consideration of moral education as moral therapy when it is based on mutual respect. In therapy and counselling generally, one of the central aims is to promote rational decision making by the client. Another is to provide an atmosphere of acceptance and respect instead of telling a client what she should do. Thus a relationship of unilateral respect may develop through the transference relationship
into one of mutual respect. In such a relationship the individual is valued, and therefore values the relationship. Piaget called the need for reciprocal affection the primary condition of the moral life. And this must apply to adults like teachers as much as it applies to children. But of course, between adults and children in school relationships of mutual respect are much harder to achieve, since there is a strong element of unilateral respect in operation in the classroom group. As Piaget implies, the excessive experience of unilateral respect is detrimental to the child's moral development. This appears to be a double-bind. Unless the teacher can break down the classroom group into smaller units, interindividual relationships of mutual respect are less likely to develop.

The final theme or tension to address in this section is that of thinking and feeling. Again I would suggest that it is the way through the middle that is the most constructive for morality. Instead of philosophical arguments about whether thinking or feeling is a predominant or exclusive component of the moral life, it is necessary to recognise the importance and co-operation of both. This should apply to theory and practice, to philosophy and psychology as well as to moral education. The unnatural separation of cognition from emotion is not congruent with the way a person experiences the world. Further, the emphasis on thinking in moral philosophy and some theories of moral psychology like the cognitive-developmental, has led to an undervaluing of
emotion in morality and exacerbated what Kitwood (in press) has called the schizoid disturbance endemic in our culture. The majority of teachers (56%) interviewed in this study said that a moral decision should be based on both thinking and feeling. There are also other factors involved in one's total experiencing that need to be taken into account in moral decisions, even health, both physical and mental, or diet, as well as personality, role and situational factors. Reality is much more complicated than we currently can discern. People cannot be neatly categorised into the ethical divisions made by philosophers, and the artificial polarisation of ideas in moral philosophy is confusing rather than clarifying for teachers.

8.4 Teachers and Moral Education

In their answers to the question on moral development, over 80% of teachers considered that the family was the most important influence on moral development in children, and only 40% mentioned the school. Yet in answers to the subsequent questions on moral education, teachers did see an important role for the school, and did not suggest that moral education should be entirely a parental function. Of course, many, or even most, teachers are also parents, and to a certain extent the roles and concerns are similar.
Because of this, and also because there is not yet a planned professional approach to moral education in schools, teachers and parents are likely to have similar perspectives on moral development, those expected by my original hypothesis. Teachers did, implicitly or explicitly, express social learning theory, and, to a lesser extent, psychoanalytic theory, as described in Chapter 3. These theories loosely take the view that morality is put into children by parents and society in general as part of the socialisation process. Cognitive-developmental theory, which stresses the role of the child in constructing morality from her own social experience, through a series of stages of development, was notably almost absent from teachers' accounts of moral development.

The confusion and uncertainty shown by teachers towards morality and moral education is partly due to this lack of a planned professional approach. It is also partly due to the negative associations attached to words like moral and morality. Being moralised at by others often causes protest and resentment. However, this sense of protest itself seems to come from morality - you ought not to moralise at others. There is also the question of people's equality as moral agents. If we are all equally moral agents, then no one can claim that his moral judgments are infallible. One result of this can be a belief that overt moral education should be avoided. Because it might be indoctrination and because everyone has a right to their own opinion. Changing the name
of moral education might be a way of avoiding this difficulty.

However, another way is to confront the concepts, for even if overtly avoided, moral education does go on in schools anyway. The majority of teachers were aware of this. Mostly they considered that it occurred in the personal and social curriculum and in the hidden curriculum of relationships and school atmosphere.

It was only in response to the question of the purpose of moral education that the concern of teachers about the gap between what is going on in schools and what ought to go on was expressed. While 31% mentioned conformity to social norms as the main purpose, 50% mentioned the development of individual moral autonomy and mutual respect as aims for moral education. The school structure itself should also accommodate these aims, and not be, as at present, fostering moralising, irrationality, hypocrisy, and unconsidered unilateral respect. Teachers have a strong sense that the system is in conflict with the way it should be.

One therefore must ask whether these aims can be realised in schools, or whether they are too naive or idealistic. Institutions, like individuals, are liable to moral failure, but there may be ways in which some of this failure in schools is unnecessary and could be reduced. In the school as a whole, as for individual teachers, this will not be done
without open reflection and discussion of moral principles and moral practice. Teachers do have a responsibility for maintaining order in their classrooms and schools, and they fear loss of this control both for their students' sake and for their own. But this ultimate responsibility of the teacher is not incompatible with sharing some general responsibility with students. Morality requires that students as well as teachers are respected as persons and allowed to give full expression to their own moral perspective.

The small number of teachers who supported the 'putting in' process of moral education as it happens in most schools at present were significantly lower in their Kohlberg reasoning stage. They were also more consistent in their views of morality as measured by correlation of the factor analyses of the ethical questions. I suggested earlier that this was perhaps due to the nature of those views, which tended to be absolutist and objective, and emphasising society's or God's rules or values.

What happens in schools, and how schools are organised, is, of course, partly the responsibility of society through government policies. MacIntyre has asked what on earth is going on in a society where morality has to be rediscovered. And others have asked what kind of society is it where morality has to be taught to young people who are already living moral lives of their own. (WALZER, 1978) I have
already argued against MacIntyre's view that morality has somehow been lost or destroyed. Our moral life may have been repressed in the way our immoral lives are supposed to be. The moral lives we are already living need bringing out of repression into reflection and recognition. Walzer is right in that young people do not need or want teaching which treats morality as knowledge like geography. This kind of 'putting in' of moral values is doomed to be artificial, superfluous, and resented by the recipients. As Piaget noted, in situations of unilateral respect,

the adult's command, in spite of the nimbus that surrounds it, will always remain external, 'stuck on' as it were, to a mind whose structure is of a different order. (1932, p. 163)

It is no easy task, however, to put into practice in schools the view held by many educationists and politicians that personal, social and moral education should have an important place in the curriculum. Teachers believe that schools should have an explicit policy on values. For although there is a sense in which moral education is going on all the time, there is also a sense in which is has barely begun.

8.5 The future

The main findings of this study and the general conclusions to be made from them have been reported in the earlier sections of this chapter, and in the discussions in the previous three chapters. In this final section I want to focus clearly on the teachers who were the subjects of this
study, and not fall into a discussion of moral education in
general, or the needs of students.

The impression of uncertainty, confusion and ambivalence
among teachers about the nature of morality is strong.
Nevertheless they have a personal commitment to their own
moral values and to morality in action in schools. Their
approach to it is instinctive or existential, in the instant
judgments and interventions they make every day as part of
their professional concern. They have little knowledge of
the theories of moral education or schools as just
communities, although their ideals are close to those of
justice and mutual respect. Few of them have openly
discussed morality or moral education with other teachers, or
come across the teaching materials already available in this
area. Only one school of the 57 represented in the survey
was said to have a whole school commitment to principles of
justice, agreed on after discussion by all staff.

I argued earlier that moral education is not only about
raising levels of moral reasoning among students. It is also
about the acquisition of certain analytic and discussion
skills, and knowledge of moral ideas. I argue further here
that these cannot be developed in students unless teachers
first have the opportunity to develop their own moral
competency. At present in initial teacher training courses
and in-service courses, values are not sufficiently
confronted or discussed. Yet the interest and the potential
for development among teachers is there. Teachers themselves need moral education.

The interview which my subjects took part in was for them an experiential learning process. Those who were initially hostile lost their negative attitude when they got involved in the experience. Their comments in Chapter 4, section 4.7, show that although their unfamiliarity with the topic made the task of reflection difficult, it was a task they found interesting, valuable and important. Few of them had indulged in such conscious reflection before. Their score on Kohlberg's moral reasoning stage scheme was lower than expected, but the ideals they held for their pupils reflected higher stage principles of justice, individual autonomy and mutual respect. Their potential for principled moral reasoning is thus demonstrated. With more reflection and discussion the conscious realisation of the moral lives they were already living, posited by Piaget, would more readily occur.

Part of this realisation, I maintain, would be that as human beings and moral agents, living a shared moral life, we share common basic values which can be made explicit. Even with religious and cultural differences the heart of the moral life is common. This in turn would be the starting point for school-based discussion and consensus on a coherent and explicit policy for moral education and an examination of how far the school itself was a moral institution. Of course this would not be easy.
More in-service courses are needed to introduce teachers who are unfamiliar with them, to various ways of thinking about morality, and various theories and methods of moral education. As with students, it is self-defeating to attempt to indoctrinate teachers. The insights of moral philosophy would seem of limited use, as they tend towards semantic arguments and artificial polarisation of concepts. Like their pupils, teachers need the stimulus and opportunity to make their own search.

Kelly (1967) has claimed that the search for the knowledge of good and evil is a basic and natural one for humankind. He further considers that since the time of the Garden of Eden, strategies of escape from this difficult but important search have been devised. These strategies include believing that good is enshrined in rules of law, in the knowledge of some other authority than yourself, in your own biased and out-of-date conscience or in our rate of progress towards some future Utopian ideal. It is possible to specify some of the conditions which might facilitate this individual search for an understanding of good and evil. Kelly suggests psychotherapy, and certainly its aims and techniques have much in common with moral education, as I argued earlier.

Small groups of teachers, working experientially, in relationships of mutual respect, are one context in which teachers can make this journey. This also extends to the kind of work they do with students. For this to happen,
there needs to be adequate in-service provision and research into the effects of such provision. When teachers seriously engage in this search, they are likely to move beyond the understanding of morality as derived from authority or equated with laws and rules, to seeing morality as a way of life. As Piaget puts it,

One realises most keenly how immoral it can be to believe too much in morality, and how much more precious is a little humanity than all the rules in the world. (1932, p. 189)
### Appendix A: The Six Moral Stages

#### Content of Stage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level and Stage</th>
<th>What Is Right</th>
<th>Reasons for Doing Right</th>
<th>Social Perspective of Stage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LEVEL I - PRECONVENTIONAL</strong>&lt;br&gt;Stage 1 - Heteronomous Morality</td>
<td>To avoid breaking rules backed by punishment, obedience for its own sake, and avoiding physical damage to persons and property.</td>
<td>Avoidance of punishment, and the superior power of authorities.</td>
<td>Egocentric point of view. Doesn't consider the interests of others or recognise that they differ from the actor's; doesn't relate two points of view. Actions are considered physically rather than in terms of psychological interests of others. Confusion of authority's perspective with one's own.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stage 2 - Individualism, Instrumental Purpose, and Exchange</strong></td>
<td>Following rules only when it is to someone's immediate interest: acting to meet one's own interests and needs and letting others do the same. Right is also what's fair, what's an equal exchange, a deal, an agreement.</td>
<td>To serve one's own needs or interests in a world where you have to recognise that other people have their interests, too.</td>
<td>Concrete individualistic perspective. Aware that everybody has his own interest to pursue and these conflict, so that right is relative (in the concrete individualistic sense).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LEVEL II - CONVENTIONAL</strong>&lt;br&gt;Stage 3 - Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships and Interpersonal Conformity</td>
<td>Living up to what is expected by people close to you or what people generally expect of people in your role as son, brother, friend, etc. &quot;Being good&quot; is important and means having good motives, showing concern about others. It also means keeping mutual relationships, such as trust, loyalty, respect and gratitude.</td>
<td>The need to be a good person in your own eyes and those of others. Your caring for others. Belief in the Golden Rule. Desire to maintain rules and authority which support stereotypical good behaviour.</td>
<td>Perspective of the individual in relationships with other individuals. Aware of shared feelings, agreements, and expectations which take primacy over individual interests. Relates points of view through the concrete Golden Rule, putting yourself in the other guy's shoes. Does not yet consider generalised system perspective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stage 4 - Social System and Conscience</strong></td>
<td>Fulfilling the actual duties to which you have agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social duties. Right is also contributing to society, the group or institution.</td>
<td>To keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid the breakdown in the system &quot;if everyone did it&quot;, or the imperative of conscience to meet one's defined obligations (easily confused with Stage 3 belief in rules and authority; see text).</td>
<td>Differentiates societal point of view from interpersonal agreement or motives. Takes the point of view of the system that defines roles and rules. Considers individual relations in terms of place in the system.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LEVEL III - POST-
CONVENTIONAL, or
PRINCIPLED
Stage 5 - Social Contract
or Utility and Individual
Rights

Being aware that people hold
a variety of values and
opinions, that most values and
rules are relative to your
group. These relative rules
should usually be upheld,
however, in the interest of
impartiality and because they
are the social contract. Some
nonrelative values and rights
like life and liberty, however,
must be upheld in any society
and regardless of majority
opinion.

Stage 6 - Universal Ethical
Principles

Following self-chosen ethical
principles. Particular laws or
social agreements are usually
valid because they rest on
such principles. When laws
violate these principles, one
acts in accordance with the
principle. Principles are
universal principles of justice:
the equality of human rights
and respect for the dignity of
human beings as individual
persons.

A sense of obligation to law
because of one's social
contract to make and abide by
laws for the welfare of all
and for the protection of all
people's rights. A feeling
of contractual commitment,
freely entered upon, to
family, friendship, trust,
and work obligations.
Concern that laws and duties
be based on rational calcu-
lation of overall utility,
"the greatest good for the
greatest number."
The belief as a rational
person in the validity of
universal moral principles,
and a sense of personal
commitment to them.

Prior-to-society perspective.
Perspective of a rational individual
aware of values and rights prior
to social attachments and contracts.
Integrates perspectives by formal
mechanisms of agreement, contract,
objective impartiality, and due
process. Considers moral and
legal points of view, recognises
that they sometimes conflict and
finds it difficult to integrate
them.

Perspective of a moral point of
view from which social arrange-
ments derive. Perspective is that
of any rational individual recog-
ising the nature of morality or
the fact that persons are ends in
themselves and must be treated as
such.

From LICKONA, T. (ed.) (1976), Moral Development and Behaviour,
p. 34-5, Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Appendix B (part i)
Moral Judgment Interview with supplementary ethical questions

In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist wanted people to pay ten times what the drug cost him to make.

The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but could only get together about half what the druggist wanted. Heinz told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No. I discovered the drug, and I'm going to make money from it." So the only way Heinz could get the drug would be to break into the druggist's store and steal it.

What should Heinz do?
should steal/should not steal/can't decide

Should Heinz steal the drug?
Why or why not?
If Heinz doesn't love his wife, should he steal the drug for her?
Why or why not?
Suppose the person dying is not his wife but a stranger. Should Heinz steal the drug for the stranger. Why or why not?

(If you favour stealing the drug for a stranger) Suppose it's a pet animal he loves. Should Heinz steal to save the pet animal? Why or why not?

Is it important for people to do everything they can to save another's life? Why or why not?

Is it against the law for Heinz to steal? Does that make it morally wrong? Why or why not?

Should people try to do everything they can to obey the law? Why or why not?

How does this apply to what Heinz should do?

Heinz did break into the store. He stole the drug and gave it to his wife. In the newspapers the next day, there was an account of the robbery. Mr. Brown, a police officer who knew Heinz, read the account. He remembered seeing Heinz running away from the store and realised that it was Heinz who stole the drug. Mr. Brown wonders whether he should report that Heinz was the robber.

Should Officer Brown report Heinz for stealing? Why or why not?
Officer Brown finds and arrests Heinz. Heinz is brought to court and a jury is selected. The jury's job is to find whether a person is innocent or guilty of committing a crime. The jury finds Heinz guilty. It is up to the judge to determine the sentence. Should the judge give Heinz some sentence, or should the sentence be suspended and Heinz set free?

Why?
Thinking in terms of society, should people who break the law be punished?
Why or why not?
How does this apply to how the judge should decide?
Heinz was doing what his conscience told him when he stole the drug. Should a law-breaker be punished if he acted out of conscience?
Why or why not?

1. What does the word "conscience" mean to you anyhow?
2. Should a moral decision be based on one's feelings or on one's thinking and reasoning about right and wrong?
3. In general, what makes something a moral problem?
4. What does the word "morality" mean to you?
5. WHY SHOULD ONE BE MORAL, ANYHOW?
6. IS IT NECESSARY TO HAVE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY BEING MORAL?
7. WOULD YOU SAY YOU ARE RELIGIOUS?
8. Is there some correct solution to moral problems or when people disagree is everybody's opinion equally right?
9. IS THE RIGHT ACTION ALWAYS THE ONE WHICH HAS DESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES, OR ARE THERE SOME THINGS WE OUGHT TO DO REGARDLESS OF THE CONSEQUENCES TO OURSELVES OR OTHERS?
10. ARE THERE MORAL RULES THAT EVERYONE EVERYWHERE SHOULD TRY TO KEEP, OR IS IT UP TO EACH INDIVIDUAL?
11. WHERE DOES THE QUESTION OF SELF-INTEREST FIT IN TO BEING MORAL?
12. How do you know when you've come up with a good moral decision? Is there a method of reaching one?
13. WHAT WOULD YOU SAY IS YOUR MAIN CODE OF VALUES OR PRINCIPLES?
14. SHOULD MORALITY BE THE SAME FOR EVERYBODY?
15. Most people believe that thinking and reasoning in science can lead to a correct answer. Is the same thing true in moral decisions or are they different?

Joe

Joe is a fourteen year old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. His father promised him he could go if he saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper round and saved up the £40 it cost to go to camp and a little more besides. But just before camp was going to start, Joe's father changed his mind. Some of his friends had decided to go on a special fishing trip and he was short of the money it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money he had saved from the paper round. Joe didn't want to give up going
to camp, so he thinks of refusing to give his father the money.

Should Joe refuse to give his father the money?  
Why or why not?  
Is the fact that Joe earned the money himself the most important thing in the situation?  
Why or why not?  
The father promised Joe he could go to camp if he earned the money. Is the fact that the father promised the most important thing in the situation?  
Why or why not?  
Is it important to keep a promise?  
Why or why not?  
Is it important to keep a promise to someone you don't know well and probably won't see again?  
Why or why not?  
What do you think is the most important thing a son should be concerned about in his relationship to his father?  
Why is that the most important thing?  
What do you think is the most important thing a father should be concerned about in his relationship to his son?  
Why is that the most important thing?
Appendix B (part ii)

Questionnaire

CENTRE FOR SOCIAL AND MORAL EDUCATION
MORAL EDUCATION SURVEY

NAME ........................................... SEX .............

SCHOOL ........................................... AGE .............

.............................................

SUBJECT(S) TAUGHT .............................................

NUMBER OF YEARS TEACHING EXPERIENCE .................

1. Could you suggest reasons why some children become adults who try to keep to certain moral standards, while others do not?

2. Please describe, as it is at present in your school, what contributes, both positively and negatively, to the moral education of pupils?

3. What do you think is the purpose of moral education?

4. What ought to happen in schools if they are to achieve this purpose? (You could mention content, staff, resources, school organisation, etc.)
APPENDIX C: Details of Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>90</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Under 30</th>
<th>13</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 50</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
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</table>

Teaching experience

| Under 5 years | 9 |
| 5 - 9 years   | 20 |
| 10-14 years   | 32 |
| 15-19 years   | 18 |
| 20-24 years   | 8  |
| Over 25 years | 3  |
| Total         | 90 |

Seconded to Leicester University 48 In school 42

Interview first 51 Questionnaire first 39

Total 90
Heinz interview 45  
Helen interview 45  
Total 90

Number of different schools 57  
counties 9 (Leics., Notts., Northants., Cambs., Derbys., Lincs., Beds., Warwicks., Herts.)

Number of teachers in each type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of School</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All age comprehensive</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic comprehensive</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School (10-14)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper School (14+)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-16 comprehensive</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Form College</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special School</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Semi-boarding</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maladjusted</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College of Further Education</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>90</strong></td>
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### Subjects taught

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Subject</th>
<th>No. of teachers</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>No. of teachers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Sociology</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Psychology</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Careers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Integrated Studies</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal &amp; Social Education</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Business Studies</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Education</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>General Subjects</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>P.E./Games</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Physics</td>
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<tr>
<td>German</td>
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<td>Biology</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Environmental Studies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Rural Studies</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Geology</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Economics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life &amp; Social Skills</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Computing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Education</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Chemistry</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Statistics</td>
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<td>Technology</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
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<td>Economics</td>
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<td>Commerce</td>
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<td>English as a Second Language</td>
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<tr>
<td>Remedial</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Drama</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art &amp; Craft</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Design</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health Education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Community Care</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
<td></td>
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ABSTRACT

Janet Watson: Teachers' Conceptions of Morality and Moral Education

The central purpose of this study was to explore the ideas about the nature of morality, moral development and moral education of a sample of teachers. In order to interpret these ideas a brief account is given of the main ethical theories held by philosophers and the main psychological theories of moral development. 90 teachers from 57 different schools were given a lengthy interview and completed a questionnaire. The interview consisted of Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview with further ethical questions. The questionnaire consisted of open questions on moral development and moral education.

The MJI was scored according to Kohlberg's current scoring procedure. Other questions were content analysed. Frequencies and interrelationships between variables were calculated using analyses of variance, correlation coefficients and factor analyses. Among the results, 59% of teachers were reasoning at Stage 3/4 on Kohlberg's stage scores. Women and science teachers scored significantly lower than the other teachers, as did teachers who stressed discipline and social training as the essence of moral education. Evidence of distinctive ethical philosophies was sought in the teachers' thinking. Most teachers seemed to give expression to a number of apparently conflicting views. However, there was some tendency for two factors, one labelled objective/subjective and the other labelled individual/social to emerge with some clarity.

These and other findings suggested that teachers had done very little thinking in this area and were considerably confused. However, there was good evidence that the interview itself was an important learning experience indicating their potential for principled reasoning in Kohlberg's sense. A strong impression from the data was the personal moral commitment of teachers, and their recognition of the importance of moral education in school. It is plain, however, that in-service courses are urgently needed if the concern of teachers is to be realised in school life.