Support Structures in Crusading Armies,
1095-1241

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by
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This thesis will examine the support structures in crusading armies from the First Crusade, launched in 1095, to the end of the Barons’ Crusade, in 1241. Support structures were the networks through which resources were channelled in order to support crusaders during the expeditions to the Holy Land and the eastern Mediterranean. These structures developed in response to the growing costs and challenges of crusading, with increased efforts by the authorities in the West to raise money to support crusaders.

The study of crusader logistics has only taken off in the last twenty years, and the study of how crusading armies were supported is a relatively unexplored field. Recent scholarship has made headway in the logistics of individual crusades, the efforts to raise funds in the West and support structures in western medieval armies. To date, little work has explored the long-term development of support structures in crusading armies or how developments in the West influenced these structures. This thesis will attempt to bridge this gap by examining how the resources raised in the West and those gathered on Crusade were employed to support crusaders, and how these structures developed throughout this period.

This thesis will attempt to address three main issues. Firstly it will attempt to examine the role of the West in the development of crusading support structures, and the growing expectation that support should be provided by the authorities in the West. Secondly, it will study the distribution of resources through these structures, and how effective they were in providing support. Thirdly it will examine the increased role of money and paid service in crusading armies and the impact upon support structures.
Acknowledgements

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### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td><strong>MGH SS</strong></td>
<td><em>Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores (in folio)</em>, 39 vols (Hannover, 1876-2009).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MGH SRG</strong></td>
<td><em>Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum</em>, 78 vols (Hannover, 1871-2007).</td>
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<td><strong>QBS</strong></td>
<td><em>Quinti Belli sacri scriptores minores</em>, ed. R. Röhricht (Geneva, 1879).</td>
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<td><strong>RS</strong></td>
<td>Rolls Series.</td>
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Chapter One
Introduction

This thesis aims to study the support structures in crusading armies from the First Crusade, launched in 1095, through to the end of the Barons’ Crusade in 1241. Support structures were the networks through which the resources raised in the West were channelled in order to support crusaders during the expeditions to the Holy Land and the eastern Mediterranean. In particular this study will examine the development of support structures throughout the first century and a half of crusading. This period saw increasingly sophisticated means employed to support crusading, but these mechanisms were also deeply influenced by warfare in the medieval West. It will also examine how the resources raised in the West and those gathered on crusade were fed into these structures, and how effective these structures were in supporting crusaders in the field. Finally, it will investigate the increasingly monetised nature of crusading, the development of paid service in crusading armies and their impact upon support structures.

This thesis will focus on the crusades to the eastern Mediterranean that targeted the Holy Land and Egypt. Crusading took place on many other fronts, with expeditions taking place in the Baltic, Iberia and Languedoc. However, the crusades to these regions presented different challenges to those faced by crusades to the East in terms of the distances, climate and political geography of the intended destination. Personnel also varied greatly between crusades, with different groups being attracted to different crusading fronts. Crusading in Iberia tended to be dominated by the Christian inhabitants, whilst crusading to Languedoc was largely undertaken by French crusaders and the Baltic crusaders tended to be drawn from central Europe.¹ Crusading to the Holy Land attracted crusaders from across the Latin world, and also saw the most intensive efforts by the authorities of the West to support crusades to the eastern Mediterranean. Considering the differences between crusading to the East and crusades directed elsewhere, this thesis will focus exclusively on the expeditions to Egypt and the Holy Land. This discussion will also include the Fourth Crusade, because the planning and organisation prior to its departure were intended to support a crusade to

the south-eastern Mediterranean, even though it was ultimately diverted to Constantinople.

Sources
The crusades have attracted considerable attention from contemporary authors and this makes them some of the best documented events of the medieval period. The First Crusade is perhaps the most fortunate of the crusades in this regard with at least four of the accounts being written by participants, with other accounts written by those who witnessed its launch in the West or by receiving second-hand accounts from returning participants. Other crusades receive only brief coverage by medieval writers, or else only certain aspects of the crusade are covered; most notably Odo of Deuil’s otherwise excellent account of Louis VII’s crusade ends abruptly after the defeat in Anatolia in January, 1148.

The next century and a half of crusading receives varying levels of attention from contemporary authors. Some expeditions are well-served by contemporary authors, the Third Crusade for instance has a number of accounts from English, French and German perspectives, making it one of the best-evidenced crusades since the First Crusade. As with all primary accounts the reliability and perspective of these sources varies greatly, in particular the pro-Angevin and pro-French perspectives of the Third Crusade can sometimes be found in direct contradiction of each other. The failure of a crusade often resulted in highly negative comments from authors in the West, who were often liable to blame the failure of the crusade on the sinfulness, factionalism, avarice or

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\[\text{3 Odo of Deuil, } De \text{ proffectione Ludovici VII in orientem, ed. & tr. V. G. Berry (New York, 1948).}
\]

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\[\text{5 The accounts of Ambroise and Roger of Howden differ substantially from those of Rigord and William the Breton.}
\]
pride of the crusaders. There is also a tendency to blame or down-play the role of non-crusaders, most notably the Byzantines or the settlers of the Latin East. This needs to be taken into account when one is considering the motivations of crusaders along with the acquisition of material goods during the expedition. Although care must be exercised when using these sources, this does not necessarily diminish their value when studying the crusades.

The reliability and usefulness of these chronicles needs to be weighed carefully and the motivations of the authors and their own theological or political agendas need to be taken into consideration. Many of these accounts were not written by participants, but by clerics in the West and were often written several years, if not decades, after the events they report. The authors are therefore influenced by their own backgrounds and by their own attempts, conscious or otherwise, to narrate the crusades.

The sources describing the events of the First Crusade are perhaps the best example of how a general narrative for a crusading expedition was created, and then repeated in many accounts in the following centuries. A number of eye-witness accounts survive which offer valuable information on the conduct of the crusade, but the reader must be mindful that each of these texts carries with it the concerns and motives of their authors rather than the accurate documentation of events. Fulcher of Chartres attempts to justify the desertion of his master, Baldwin of Boulogne, and Raymond of Aguilers states that his account was written to correct erroneous accounts in circulation in the West ‘because the misfits of war and cowardly deserters have since tried to spread lies rather than the truth.’

Whilst the intentions of those writing in the aftermath of the First Crusade needs to be appreciated, one cannot write off the crusade narratives as being fully-developed works of political or religious allegory. As Marcus Bull’s work on the narratives of the First Crusade has shown, the consideration of politics on the First Crusade is not always

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7 The *Gesta Francorum* and Guibert of Nogent, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis, vol. 127A (Turnhout, 1986) are two of the most conspicuously anti-Byzantine accounts.
9 See footnote 2.
10 Fulcher of Chartres, pp. 337-338.
11 Raymond of Aguilers, p. 235, ‘maxime ideo quia imbelles et pavidi, recedentes a nobis, falsitatem pro veritate astuere nituntur.’
clear or well-articulated. He observes that the *Gesta Francorum*, Fulcher of Chartres and Raymond of Aguilers all demonstrate unresolved tension in reconciling the agency of crusaders with divine power at work during the First Crusade.\(^\text{12}\)

In some cases authorship is uncertain or debated, a prime example being the authorship of the *Gesta Francorum*, which does not cease to draw scholarly debate over the social standing of its author. Heinrich Hegenmeyer and Rosalind Hill have argued that the author was a literate knight probably in service to Bohemond of Taranto,\(^\text{13}\) and this view has found favour with subsequent historians.\(^\text{14}\) The presence of many religious references in the *Gesta* have been seen as evidence of a clerical education, but as Bernard Hamilton argues, this was unusual but not unprecedented, highlighting the similar career path of Baldwin of Boulogne.\(^\text{15}\) However, the clerical elements within the *Gesta* have led to others, notably Colin Morris, arguing that the text was written by a cleric.\(^\text{16}\) The debate over the authorship is important because it is central to our understanding and handling of the *Gesta* as a text. Were the author a knight, then this would be the only secular chronicle of the First Crusade, and as such would lend weight to the text’s discussion of military matters unlike its clerical counterparts.

The authorship of the *Gesta* is of particular significance as it forms the basis for many other sources, with the works of Guibert of Nogent, Robert the Monk and Baldric Bourgueil being strongly influenced by the *Gesta*.\(^\text{17}\) Other debate has occurred over the relationship between Peter of Tudebode’s *Historia de Hierosolymitano Itinere*, the *Gesta Francorum* and the newly discovered *Peregrinatio Antiochie*.\(^\text{18}\) These three works have strong textual similarities and may have been based upon an earlier unknown narrative of the First Crusade, with debate revolving around the point of divergence between these sources.\(^\text{19}\) The relationship between the *Gesta*, and the works

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\(^{18}\) Ibid., pp. 1-17.

\(^{19}\) J. Flori, ‘De l’Anonyme normand à Tudebode et aux Gesta Francorum: l’impact de la propagande Bohémond sur la critique textuelle des sources de la première croisade’, *Revue d’Histoire Ecclesiastique*,
of Peter Tudebode and Raymond of Aguilers has also received scholarly attention, with John France highlighting similarities between the texts.20

These accounts were then polished, embellished and improved upon during the first decades of the twelfth century, with texts written by clerics in northern France. Guibert, for instance, is highly critical of the style and language used in the Gesta.21 Guibert is likewise scornful of Fulcher’s coarse language and sceptical treatment of the Holy Lance after its discovery at Antioch, though Guibert also confesses that he was only recently made aware of Fulcher’s work just as he was about to close his Gesta Dei per Francos.22 These twelfth-century accounts rely greatly on eyewitness evidence, but these accounts are frequently streamlined, edited and reworked into a new narrative. This polishing, as found in the works of Guibert, Robert the Monk and Albert of Aachen, also involved the placing of the crusades inside the framework of contemporary theology, which in the case of the First Crusade would influence the creation of a common narrative of the crusade.23 Like the accounts of the eyewitnesses, these texts are also greatly influenced by other works such as classical historiography, pilgrimage texts, chansons de geste, the deeds of rulers and saints, and, of course, the Bible, with many intertextual references appearing throughout crusading writings.24

Aside from the influence of works from outside the crusades, there are also problems with the information from the eyewitness accounts being used uncritically by successive writers. Many of the authors chronicling the history of the First Crusade were influenced by Bohemond of Taranto’s anti-Greek propaganda campaign launched after the end of the First Crusade, and this can be seen most prominently in the works of Guibert of Nogent, Robert of Reims and the Gesta Francorum.25 One prominent feature of this campaign is the existence of a letter allegedly written by Alexios to Robert of Flanders appealing for help against the Turks. Some writers, such as Guibert, cast doubt on the idea that the Franks would really be tempted by the offers made by Alexios and

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21 Guibert, p. 119.
22 Guibert of Nogent, p. 329.
seems to question the authenticity of the letter. However, this scepticism is lessened by Guibert’s anti-Greek sentiments and his wish to castigate Alexios for this alleged degeneracy.\textsuperscript{26} This indicates that the source material used in later texts needs to be considered judiciously, in addition to the perspective of the author.

Chroniclers writing after the event were also influenced by the works of each other, Jay Rubenstein’s work on the texts of Guibert of Nogent, Albert of Aachen and Fulcher of Chartres indicates several points of overlap, however, it is not always clear whose work had been referenced by whom. With the possibility of different versions circulating from earlier dates of completion, the relationship between the texts is complex.\textsuperscript{27} However, the survival of manuscripts is also important to our knowledge of historical texts and sadly there are many works that have now been lost. The existence of these sources can only be hypothesised by examining the textual relationship between sources, as has been discussed above regarding early versions of the \textit{Gesta Francorum}. Other texts seems to have enjoyed widespread popularity and have many surviving copies, most notably Robert the Monk’s \textit{Historia Iherosolimitana} has over eighty surviving Latin texts, with many more versions in the vernacular.\textsuperscript{28}

Whilst the discussion above only deals with the texts of the First Crusade, the issues remain the same throughout many other chronicles narrating later crusades. The problems surrounding authorship and the relationship between texts are complicated by the fact that few authors cited their sources. It is largely left to the contemporary authors to identify possible texts that were used in their composition: Emily Babcock and Augustus Krey identified William of Tyre’s use of the \textit{Gesta}, Raymond of Aguilers, Walter the Chancellor, Fulcher of Chartres and Albert of Aachen.\textsuperscript{29} Matthew Paris, writing in the thirteenth century, is thought to have made use of many twelfth-century chroniclers: William of Malmesbury, Henry of Huntingdon, John of Worcester, Ralph Diceto and William of Tyre.\textsuperscript{30} Many of these texts were also written many years after the events they reported. The Capetian sources that discuss the Third Crusade, were

only written in the early thirteenth century, and as such the authors were likely to have been influenced by the later Reign of Phillip II and his conflicts with the English kings.

Establishing the authorship of other texts is also problematic because they have multiple authors, such as the continuations to William of Tyre: *L'Estoire de Eracles Empereur* and the *Rothelin Continuation*. These works are Old French versions of William’s original work and were written in the thirteenth century, decades after the events reported by William of Tyre’s original work. The dating of different elements within these works is a complex business, as are attempts to trace the influences of different authors; this is in addition to the fact the themselves texts were written long after the events reported, and with influences from other sources.  

The opinions and perspectives of the authors are equally as likely to influence their recording of events. Matthew Paris’ attempts at objectivity are sometimes flawed by his own views; after dictating a letter from Pope Alexander IV to Bishop Peter of Hereford from 1255 relating to finances for securing Sicily, Matthew highlights his own hostility to the papacy by declaring, ‘Alas! For shame and grief! These and other detestable things emanated at this time from the sulphurous fountain of the Roman Church.’ Such influences need to be considered when accessing Matthew’s narration of Frederick II’s crusade to the Holy Land, which is broadly supportive of Frederick’s efforts in the Holy Land. In contrast Philippe de Novare highlights Frederick’s unreasonable demands for money and castles when in the Holy Land, and he is supportive of the efforts of his patrons, the Ibelins, in their struggle against Frederick.

Aside from their immediate target audience, which tended to be either the clergy or nobility of the medieval West, it is also clear that many authors were aware of their role as historians and that their work would reach beyond lifetimes. This brought responsibility, Matthew Paris states, that ‘the lot of historians is a hard one, if one speaks truths it offends man, and if they record falsehoods they offend God.’ Ralph of Caen is likewise self-aware that as a historian he is shaping the past for posterity and

that by doing so he has ‘set out a past life as a model for later generations.’ This consciousness therefore makes these sources interesting because we can assess the motivations of these authors when writing for posterity. However, the modern reader also needs to be aware to the fact that they are being informed with a purpose, and that information may have been withheld or ignored by the author to suit this purpose. What has not been written therefore becomes as important as what has been written.

Many of these accounts have now made their way into print, with considerable collections of narratives being preserved in the publications of the Rolls Series, *Receuil des Historiens des Croisades Occidentaux, Receuil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France* and the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica.* There are also more focused collections of source material to be found for specific crusades notably, Reinhold Röhrich’s *Quinti Belli sacri scriptores minor* and Ashgate’s *Crusades Texts in Translation* series.

In addition to the narrative sources, there are also letters sent between participants in the crusades during the expeditions. Frequently these are written by the leaders of the crusades; Stephen of Blois, Louis VII, Conrad III, Richard I, Frederick Barbarossa, Legate Pelagius and Frederick II all wrote back to the West and their description of the crusades provides immediate and first-hand accounts. These can often reveal the immediate concerns and realities of life on crusade, often discussing the availability of coin, food or water. Letters can therefore contrast sharply with works written in the aftermath of crusading expeditions when the events could be looked at with the benefit of hindsight.

Whilst these letters are valuable because they were written from within a crusade and not written looking back on the crusades, care also has to be taken with the assertions of the crusaders. Frequently, crusaders presented the most positive view of events or justified their actions on crusade, most notably the letters of Frederick II were intended to counter his excommunication by Gregory IX, at the same time Gerald, patriarch of Jerusalem, was writing letters condemning Frederick’s actions.

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36 Ralph of Caen, p. 603, ‘posteris longe ante vitam praestruit doctrinam.’
37 RS; *RHC Occ.; RHGF; MGH SS; MGH SRG; MGH SRG n.s.*
38 *QBS; Testimonia minora de quinto bello sacro e chronicis occidentibus,* ed. R. Röhrich (Geneva, 1882).
As with narrative sources, an appropriate level of caution needs to be exercised when handling letters. Most letters from this period do not survive in their original form, but were copied into registers and chronicles by successive authors. Many contemporary authors chose to copy letters into their chronicles to add to the detail and authority of their accounts and to provide their readers with the sense that they were reading the very words of the original authors. However, the lack of surviving original letters means that it is difficult to prove the accuracy of the transcription or the veracity of everything contained in the letters, and there is scope for authors to edit letters to suit their own purposes or to invent them entirely, as with the supposed letter sent from Alexios Komnenos to Robert of Flanders mentioned above.

Medieval authors also had the capacity to be highly selective in their choice of letters, and those included are likely to represent a fraction of the medieval correspondence; the choice of letters therefore needs to be weighed carefully. Matthew Paris makes good use of letters when outlining the crusade of Frederick II in 1227-1229 and Frederick’s dispute with Pope Gregory IX and Patriarch Gerald of Jerusalem. However, Matthew’s habit of tampering with letters throughout his Chronica Majora requires that the reader exercises some caution when handling their contents. The same is true of the narrative offered by Matthew of Frederick’s crusade, particularly given the anti-Papal sentiments mentioned throughout his work.

Many of these letters are preserved in the collections described above and efforts have been made to provide more focused collections of translated letters.

The correspondence between the crusader leaders and the papacy can also be found in the various collections of papal letters. There are sources showing the activity of the papacy during this period, but they vary greatly in their level of coverage. For many popes, letters remain the best sources, of which there are a number of collections containing letters entered into the papal registers. These collections remain a useful tool, however there are issues surrounding the accuracy and completeness of these collections. Christopher Cheney estimates that only a tenth of papal letters were entered

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42 Vaughan, Matthew Paris, pp. 133-134, 141-142.
into the registers, whilst Jane Sayers’ study of Honorius III reckons that perhaps only a quarter of Honorius’ letters were registered.\textsuperscript{44} These letters are also the most important source for the administration and collection of the Church taxes and vow redemption fees in the thirteenth century in the absence of any other accounts or records relating to them. For the pontiffs from Urban II until the death of Innocent III in 1216 the\textit{Patrologia Latina} remains the most comprehensive collection of papal letters.\textsuperscript{45} For the popes from Honorius onwards several collections exist that contain collections of papal correspondence. Petrus Pressutti’s \textit{Regesta Honorii Papae III} provides a good collection of Honorius III’s correspondence, although this collection is not complete, and Lucien Auvrey’s \textit{Les registres de Grégoire IX} does the same for Gregory IX.\textsuperscript{46} These are further supplemented by biographies and narratives following the lives of certain popes. However the level of coverage here is also varied, some popes such as Alexander III and Innocent III are well served by biographies, whereas Urban II, Honorius III and Gregory IX are not the subject of dedicated works.\textsuperscript{47}

There are a small number of records for the period that cast light on the efforts to raise funding to support crusaders. In England the Pipe Rolls and Patent Rolls give some indication of the expenses of the English kings and the support offered to their subjects. The \textit{Catalogus Baronum} provides an indication of knight service owed to the Sicilian kings, and therefore provide a basis for examining the revenues raised by Frederick II for his crusade.\textsuperscript{48} Charters also provide a useful source when investigating the efforts of individual crusaders and their families to raise finance, which were often conducted with local religious houses. These may then be supplemented by treaties and agreements made between crusaders, or with other parties. Such items are often found in narrative sources already mentioned or in diplomatic collections.\textsuperscript{49} As with many

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{45} \textit{PL}.
\end{itemize}
sources from this period, these frequently only provide a glimpse of the efforts to support crusading and these historical records are often only partial or fragmentary in their coverage. However, they do give an indication of the financial and diplomatic efforts used to support crusading.

This thesis consciously omits the use of many Islamic and Greek sources on the crusades. This is not to devalue the usefulness of the various non-Catholic sources, because they offer a valuable perspective on the crusades from an outsider’s viewpoint, and frequently from the outlook of opponents of the crusaders. As such they can be a useful tool to corroborate or dispute the assertions of Latin sources when studying the crusades; they can also provide a useful insight into the attitudes of non-Latins to crusading. Furthermore, the use of these sources can prevent the study of the crusades from being perused in an overly Eurocentric fashion. Modern Arab scholarship also faces difficulties in successfully collating western and Islamic sources, Jonathan Riley-Smith criticises Islamicist scholars for not attaching any significance to the Crusades or the Latin settlement of the Holy Land. Carole Hillenbrand also recognises that this perspective has been influenced by the Arab world’s reactions to ‘colonialism, Arab nationalism, the establishment of the state of Israel, the liberation of Palestine and the rise of ‘Islamic fundamentalism,’ and this has led a number of works being over-taken by the political agenda of their authors.

The medieval Islamic world had a rich history of scholarship, and there are many Muslim sources that cover the two hundred-year period during which the crusades took place in the Holy Land. These comprise a series of annals, biographies and other historical works which comment on the crusades in various levels of detail, but no single work focuses exclusively on the conflicts between the crusaders and Islamic powers. Whereas our understanding of the First Crusade is well-informed by western sources, there are relatively few surviving Islamic accounts written around this time. The account of Hamdan bin ‘Abd al-Rahim, History of the Franks who Invaded the Islamic Lands does not survive, and the Book of Holy War by ‘Ali bin Tahir al-

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52 Hillenbrand, Crusades, p. 4.
Sulami only exists in a few remaining fragments.\(^5^4\) We are therefore forced to rely upon later writers, such as al’Azimi,\(^5^5\) writing in 1160, and Kamāl al-Dīn and Ibn al-‘Athur, both of whom were writing in the thirteenth century.\(^5^6\) By writing many years after the event, there is scope for authors to be influenced by the historical milieu in which they were writing.

Like their western counterparts these sources also have their limitations in terms of the perspective and motivations of their authors. Frequently Islamic sources are written from the theological perspective of religious scholars, and as a result military details are of peripheral importance to the authors. Information such as that referring to support structures and logistics receive little or no attention and the focus of these accounts remains the eventual triumph of Islam over the Franks.\(^5^7\) The crusaders are therefore consigned to the role of an enemy that was to be fought and over-come, this rather one-sided view also gives little indication of the social contacts between crusaders and Muslims.\(^5^8\)

A number of sources focus on the careers of prominent men, most notably the careers of Nur al-Din and Saladin. Frequently these are written by authors close to their subjects, for instance, Saladin features in the works of ‘Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, his private secretary, and of Baha‘ al-Din Ibn Shahhad, the judge of Saladin’s army.\(^5^9\) Nur al-Din’s career features prominently in the work of Ibn al-Athir and Ibn al-Qalansi and his wars against the Franks receive much attention.\(^6^0\) Frequently, the religious interests of the authors are illustrated in the attempts of these authors to present their subjects as idealised rulers and jihad warriors; their careers then are not just narratives of the growing success of these men, but their religious transformation into mujahid. Though it should not be thought that all Muslim sources are uncritical panegyrics, Quadi a-Fadil who is generally supportive of Saladin in his account, is not above criticising him for waging war on fellow Muslims rather than the Franks.\(^6^1\)

\(^{54}\) Hillenbrand, Crusades, pp. 32, 105-108.
\(^{55}\) Al-‘Azimi, Tarikh Halab, ed. I. Za’yrur (Damascus, 1984).
\(^{57}\) Hillenbrand, Crusades, p. 32.
\(^{58}\) Ibid., pp. 9-10.
Islamic sources also have their own political agendas which need to be considered in addition to their religious perspective. The authors writing in the aftermath of Saladin’s death in the late-twelfth and thirteenth centuries were often patronised by Saladin’s Ayyubid successors, who were keen to gratify their patrons and promote the interests of different rival rulers.\(^\text{62}\) Following al-Kamil’s surrender of Jerusalem to Frederick II, Ibn Wasil attempted to justify the surrender of the Holy City on the grounds that the sacred sites remained intact and the city could be taken later.\(^\text{63}\) In contrast, Sibt b. al-Jawzi is highly critical of am-Kamil’s actions and he writes that the Ayyubid ruler of Damascus, al-Malik Da’ud, asked him to preach at the Great Mosque of his distress over the surrender of Jerusalem to Frederick II.\(^\text{64}\)

A greater limitation from the perspective of this thesis is that non-Latin sources are written from outside of the crusade. The authors of these works are less well placed to offer insights into the development of the structures to support crusading in the medieval West or how support was administered whilst on crusade. Ibn al-Athīr describes the looting of Jerusalem in 1199 and the slaughter of 70,000 inhabitants in the Aqsa Mosque.\(^\text{65}\) This rendition of events however, does not shed light on the manner in which spoils were handled amongst the crusader army. Furthermore, the description of the scale of slaughter fits into the historiographical pattern of increasing the scale of slaughter for effect, as seen in both Latin and Islamic chronicles.\(^\text{66}\)

Greek sources also offer a different perspective on the crusading armies, and of particular relevance to this thesis their descriptions of gifts and tribute afforded to the crusaders are of great value. In particular, the Alexiad of Anna Komnene allows an insight into the negotiations between Alexios Komnenos and the princes during the First Crusade.\(^\text{67}\) This source has often been undervalued by historians, but provides a useful Byzantine perspective on the events of the First Crusade.\(^\text{68}\) Similarly, the accounts of Niketas Choniates and John Kinnamos provide a useful balance to the Latin

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\(^\text{62}\) Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, p. 194.


sources in their description of the conquest and sack of the city. However, like the
Islamic sources they were written from the perspective of the Byzantines who were
variably suspicious or hostile to the crusaders, with Anna Komnene’s account being
written some twenty years after the First Crusade. They were also written by authors
from outside of the crusades, and are likely to have a limited knowledge of the
distribution of support within the army once it was received or taken from the
Byzantines.

**Historiography**

Throughout much of the historiography of the crusades the logistics of crusading
warfare has received very little attention. The multi-volume works by Steven Runciman
and Kenneth Setton contain collections of many crusade narratives, in which military
operations are discussed in detail; however little attention is paid to how these armies
were supplied. Although supplies and money did change hands, there is little
consideration of how or whether this was part of a systematic attempt to support
crusading armies in the field. Even scholarship that has looked at the military history
of the crusades in a far more analytical fashion can be found wanting in this regard.

Raymond Smail’s *Crusading Warfare, 1095-1193* did much to revolutionise the
study of warfare during the crusades. In his detailed analysis of the Frankish armies and
battles during this period he illustrated the highly adaptable nature of Frankish forces.
Christopher Marshall’s follow-up work, *Warfare in the Latin East, 1192-1291*, carried
on from where Smail finished and examined the use of castles, the composition of
armies and tactics used by Frankish forces up until the fall of Acre in 1291. However,
both Smail and Marshall pay very little attention to the means by which armies were
supported whilst on crusade. It is taken almost for granted that armies were fed and
paid, with little consideration of how the resources of the crusaders or the Latin East
were harnessed to achieve this.

Since the 1990s the study of the logistics of crusading warfare has begun to
catch up with other aspects of crusading, even though some aspects have been studied

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H. J. Magoulias (Detroit, 1984).


in previous decades. John France’s *Victory in the East: a military history of the First Crusade* outlined the importance of logistics to armies of the First Crusade. Bernard Bachrach’s work on logistics in the medieval West, the siege of Antioch and the Byzantine navy helped to emphasize the need for a greater appreciation of logistics in the study of crusading warfare. John Pryor’s collection of essays, *Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, contains much scholarship which engages with the logistical issues of crusading, and the articles contained therein help fill this gap in crusading historiography. The studies by Bachrach, Charles Glasheen, John Haldon, Alan Murray and Pryor himself serve to illustrate the very great difficulties in keeping a crusading army supplied given the distances, basic road infrastructure and limited transport available to the armies of the First Crusade. Thomas Madden’s work on the Fourth Crusade also illustrates how the basic need for supplies was critical to the decision of the crusaders to divert the crusade to Constantinople, and the vital role that food played in planning a crusade. Many of these also attempt to scrutinise the practicalities of crusading warfare through the use of evidence relating to march rates, load-capacity, costs and the calorific requirements of men and beasts. Armed with these figures it is possible to investigate the real nature of the challenges of crusading warfare and question established scholarly perceptions or the assertions of contemporary authors. Whilst the field of crusader logistics continues to be an active one, many of the studies undertaken thus far are focused on single crusades or specific aspects of them, with the First Crusade receiving the most attention. This subject is therefore ripe for further study, and as yet no attempts have been made to consider crusading logistics over a more substantial period.

Whilst the material concerns of crusaders were vital to their sustenance on crusade, the spiritual aspects of crusading cannot be ignored and these are heavily entwined with issues surrounding the motivation and intention of crusaders. Scholarship in the past thirty years has moved away from notions that crusades were wholly driven by materialistic motives, endemic violence in the West and over-population. 79 Instead, studies have pointed to familial and social pressures and the deep religious anxieties of crusaders in explaining the decision of individuals to take the cross. 80 The concern of contemporary writers for the motivation of crusaders has also been the subject of study, and it is clear that the possible conflict between religious and material motivations was as apparent to medieval authors as to those of the present day. A more balanced view must stress that the spiritual and worldly concerns of crusaders were not mutually exclusive, and a whole host of motivations are likely to have been at the heart of their decision to take the cross. 81 The intention of crusaders is of increased importance when crusaders are paid as part of their service on crusade and when plunder is acquired during the expedition.

The voluntary nature of the crusade vow makes participation significantly different from conventional military campaigns in the medieval West. The impact of crusading vows is significant as they deeply affected the attitudes of the crusaders whilst on crusade, and could even influence the course of expeditions; the desertions witnessed on the Second and Fourth Crusades might indeed be interpreted as objections to diversions from the crusade that were not consistent with their crusading vow. Furthermore, with the evolution of the crusading indulgence by successive popes it became possible by the 13th century to send substitutes or redeem a crusading vow for a cash equivalent. 82 This therefore, raises the familiar historical question of how to define

81 N. Housley, Contesting the Crusades (Oxford, 2006), pp. 77-82.
a crusader. James Brundage’s work on the status of a crusader in canon law has indicated that the Church increasingly wished to formalise and legalise the status of a crusader, along with their commitments and privileges. The importance of the spiritual nature of crusading needs to be kept in mind, the failure to do so would result in a rather anachronistic perception of crusaders being driven solely by their material needs.

The efforts to mobilise money and resources for crusades has received some excellent scholarly attention, and has not witnessed the same neglect as logistics. In any discussion of support structures, the resources that were fed into these structures remain of great importance. As this thesis will argue the resources of crusaders and the structures that administered them were symbiotic, and their development is closely connected. The efforts of individual crusaders to raise money and resources to fund their crusades have been covered in great detail from the First Crusade onwards. Works by Fred Cazel, Giles Constable, Jean Richard and Jonathan Riley-Smith on the finances raised for crusading have illustrated the extent to which individual crusaders and their families went to raise money through the sale and mortgage the lands and rights of their families. The close involvement of kinship and family networks has also been identified as having a central role in both recruitment and the financing of expeditions.

The fund-raising undertaken by the monarchs of the West has also been covered, but often in studies from the perspective of particular crusades or as part of biographical works, but thus far there have not been any broader studies of royal crusading finances throughout the crusades. Recent work has revealed the real limitations placed upon twelfth-century monarchs when attempting to raise money to

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83 J. A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader (Madison, 1969); J. A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law (London, 1995).
fund their crusades due to the lack of adequate fiscal structures and their own limited authority. However, studies by Evelyn Jamison, Graham Loud and James Powell on Frederick II’s measures to raise funds for his crusade of 1227-1229 through his taxation of Sicily have indicated that by the thirteenth century some monarchs were more able to harness the resources of their realms.

The extraordinary taxes raised by crusading monarchs have also been discussed along with conventional finances in the context of specific crusades, kingdoms and monarchs, and have not been the subject of a dedicated study since John Round’s article in 1916. Cazel’s work on the 1185 tax has illustrated the importance of extraordinary revenues in supporting the Holy Land. The Saladin Tithe of 1188 has not been the subject of a dedicated study, but the Tithe in England has been well treated by Christopher Tyerman and Simon Lloyd in their studies of crusading in England.

William Lunt’s coverage of papal finances has also indicated the measures undertaken by various popes to raise money for crusading, so comprehensive is Lunt’s coverage that no efforts have been made to cover this ground again. Efforts by the papacy to raise crusading funds has instead been looked at in the context of individual popes or crusades. James Powell’s excellent coverage of the Fifth Crusade in *Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213-1221*, thoroughly explores the raising of the 1215 twentieth and its collection, along with the role of papal diplomacy and the deployment of legates. Rebecca Kay has likewise studied the Albigensian twentieth of 1221 and Michael Lower extensively covered the complex diplomatic and fiscal issues surrounding the vow redemption fees and the 1238 thirtieth enacted by Gregory IX. Innocent III’s

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91 Powell, *Anatomy*.

initial tax of 1199 has not received such detailed coverage, but is covered by Lunt in his study.

The papacy is important to the development of the crusading indulgence and of the efforts to raise crusading finances. However, the role of the papacy was more expansive, and the developments in papal crusading policy affected the expectations that were placed upon the monarchs and magnates to provide support for other crusaders. Furthermore, the papacy also developed its own role, and that of the Church as a whole, in providing support to crusaders. The broader role of the papacy in the development of crusading has not received dedicated treatment in the period prior to the 1240s; however this is perhaps not surprising given the divergent nature of papal thinking and approaches towards crusading.93 The pontificate of Innocent III has been seen as a watershed in the development of papal crusading policy with radical developments taking place at the start of the thirteenth century. Whilst it is not advisable to exaggerate Innocent’s dynamism at the expense of his antecedents and successors, Innocent was able to greatly enhance the role of the papacy and the Church in crusading. Through the skilled deployment of Bulls, letters and legates, the papacy greatly expanded its reach into Christendom and beyond, and became increasingly involved with the planning, direction and execution of crusading.94

Of great importance to this thesis is the study of warfare in the medieval West. All of the crusades to be discussed originated from the lands of western Europe; the crusaders therefore drew upon the military traditions and practices being used in their homelands. As has already been explored in the works of John France, crusaders could prove very adaptable in modifying their art of war to suit conditions on crusade.95 However, many crusaders continued to rely upon the support mechanisms and logistical structures that existed in the West when planning and undertaking their crusade. Therefore any study of crusading warfare has to be based upon an understanding of the warfare in the medieval West.

93 After the 1240s papal policy is the subject of detailed treatment in: N. Housley, *The Italian Crusades, The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades against Christian Lay-Powers* (Oxford, 1986); M. Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy, 1244–1291. The Chief Instruments of Papal Crusading Policy and Crusade to the Holy Land from the Final Loss of Jerusalem to the Fall of Acre* (Leiden, 1975)
95 J. France, ‘Crusading warfare and its adaptation to eastern conditions in the twelfth century’, *Mediterranean Historical Review*, vol. 15, pp. 49-66.
The military history of the medieval West has always been a popular subject for scholarly work, and the field has continued to be well tilled by academics in recent years. The role of feudalism in medieval armies has perhaps seen the most dramatic change in its historiography and its importance has been greatly challenged in the past decades. The prevalence of feudalism in medieval warfare as advocated by Marc Bloch and François-Louis Ganshof was challenged in the 1970s by Elizabeth Brown, arguing that feudalism did not exist as a single concept and that the construct invented by historians had no basis in reality. The increased obsolescence of feudalism as a means of recruitment in medieval armies has also been discussed by John Prestwich and Stephen Morillo covering feudalism in England and Karl Krieger in Germany. In place of feudalism, scholarly attention has focused increasingly on the role of paid service in the recruitment and support of medieval armies, although the study of military recruitment has focused primarily on the military forces of the English kings.

In particular the collection of essays Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages published by John France casts substantial light on the extensive use of paid service and also the issues surrounding the definition of mercenaries in medieval warfare. The importance of the familia or military household to armies in the eleventh and twelfth centuries has also been highlighted by Marjorie Chibnall and Stephen Morillo.

The past two decades has seen heightened interest in the logistics of crusading, and the studies conducted have illuminated the challenges of crusading and the impact

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100 Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages, ed. J. France (Leiden, 2008)

of logistics on crusading. However, there are still many aspects that have yet to be explored and this field would benefit from further academic enquiry. Studies into the raising of finances in the West and the role of the papacy, and the Church as a whole, have also broadened our understanding of the efforts to support crusading from the West. The structures through which this support was channelled has been also aided by scholarship on similar structures of support in the West, particularly in regards to the use of paid service, but this has yet to be fully explored in crusading warfare.
Chapter Two
Support structures in Medieval Armies

For any discussion of the armies that took part in the crusades during the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries it is vital to look at the conduct of warfare in the West. The armies that departed eastwards during the first hundred and fifty years of the crusades were drawn largely from western Europe, and tended to reflect the military attitudes, customs and practices of their localities at the time. Naturally these perspectives influenced their approach to crusading warfare, often following their established methods of warfare and frequently altering them to suit conditions on crusade.

The crusades pose something of an anomaly in medieval warfare, in part due to their unprecedented scale in terms of men, distances and resources needed to accomplish them. This is often in sharp contrast to campaigns in the West which tended to be far more modest in their scope, with smaller armies, shorter distances, limited objectives and frequently far more modest resources. This chapter will attempt to outline the customs of warfare in the West and support structures used to support armies during this period. It will also attempt to highlight the differences and challenges posed by crusading warfare to crusading armies.

The Familia
The heart of any army from the medieval west was the familia, the military household possessed by monarchs and magnates. The fullest form may be seen in the familia regis, which commonly included the king’s own body of household knights sworn to render him service, but also the myriad of officers who provided the king with the military infrastructure and staff with which to effectively conduct warfare. These included men such as the constable and marshals, castellans and other military lieutenants, who received these offices as a result of their loyal service to their master. The familia regis provided the monarchs of Europe with a permanent standing force with which to protect their person, hold castles and conduct limited military ventures without the need to mobilize additional forces. However, kings were not alone in having their own

102 Morillo, Warfare, p. 43.
familia, the dukes, counts and barons of Europe also commanded their own military households which frequently paralleled the officers and structures of the familia regis, albeit on a smaller scale.103

The household knights of the familia were the core military force available to the powerful men of the medieval West. These men received an annual fee for their service, wages when on active service, grants of food, wine and other amenities and compensation for the loss of any of their equipment.104 The members of Henry I of England’s familia received an annual stipend of 5 pounds and daily rate of 1 shilling per day. By the reign of his grandson Henry II, this had risen to an annual fee around £10.105 William Marshal spent the majority of his career in three military households, that of William de Tancarville, Patrick Earl of Salisbury and Henry II, during which time he received considerable rewards from all of his masters.106 The size of this force would vary considerably depending on the needs of the lord and the resources available to him. This armed force could be rapidly expanded during times of crisis and then scaled down in times of peace. The support given to the men of the familia came in a variety of forms. The Constitutio records the distribution of stipendia et donativa amongst Henry I of England’s familia. Cash payments appear to have been the predominant method of sustaining the familia with bonuses and further gifts being given for loyal service.107

These gifts were not exclusively cash-based, Marjory Chibnall’s work on the household of Henry I observes that many were serving with the expectation of future reward after a period of service to their king, which might come in the form of offices or land grants. Many of William II’s familia also received land grants following their service to their master.108 Walter Map related how William of Tancarville won his way back into Henry II’s favour by citing his leal service and the fact that ‘both my men and myself have always served my lord at our own expense.’109

The familia also contained the members of the household required to organise and maintain an army in the field. The marshals and constables within the familia dealt

103 Morillo, Warfare, p. 52.
104 Chibnall, ‘Mercenaries’, p. 89.
105 Chibnall, ‘Mercenaries’, p. 89; Morillo, Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings, p. 43.
108 Chibnall, ‘Mercenaries’, p. 84.
with the acquisition and distribution of money and kind to the *familia*, they also dealt with the purchase of supplies. The activities of these officers were primarily focused around the needs of the *familia*, however these functionaries could also expand their roles to encompass supplying and paying the wages of an entire army should the need arise.\textsuperscript{110} In his *Dialogue of the Exchequer*, Richard FitzNigel states that the clerk of the constabulary was in charge of knowing the *terminus* of all the king’s stipendiaries.\textsuperscript{111} The Pipe Rolls are not always useful in tracking the employment of mercenaries; however it is clear that the English exchequer was used to channel money to those men serving the Angevins. In 1171 Goldambus of East Anglia was given the sum of 19s 4d for service in Ireland.\textsuperscript{112}

Furthermore, lords were frequently able to impose far greater control over their *familia* than over a larger host. Henry I of England was able to impose discipline to stop his household from ravaging the lands where they were based. The personal bonds of loyalty and comradeship frequently strengthened the control exercised by lords over their *familia*. Members of the *familia* were often entrusted with offices and often received land grants as a reward for their service. However, this was not always the case, the household knights of his brother William II were notorious for their depredations within their master’s own kingdom.\textsuperscript{113} The level of discipline imposed upon the *familia* was largely dependent upon the lord, both for his own charisma and for his ability to provide for his followers.

**Service from land and money fiefs**

The *familia* was insufficient to conduct a large-scale military campaign but could be rapidly expanded in times of war, with additional men being drafted into its ranks. The landed knight has historically been seen as a prominent feature in medieval warfare from 1000 to 1300, however the importance of such men has been under attack in recent decades. In this discussion it must be noted that the terms of service in the use of land tenure differed across the Medieval West, as did its use and operation. It is therefore hard to find a model that encompasses all enfeoffments. However, this section

\textsuperscript{110} Morillo, *Warfare*, p. 60.
\textsuperscript{112} *The Great Roll of the Pipe for the Eighteenth Year of King Henry the Second* (Pipe Roll Society, 18, 1894), p. 31.
\textsuperscript{113} Morillo, *Warfare*, p. 63.
will attempt to illuminate the general concepts and issues regarding land tenure as the basis for military service.

This feudal mechanism for the raising of armies has traditionally been regarded as the basis of medieval armies, however the extent to which it existed or was actually utilised is open to question. In England land fiefs granted in exchange for military service were relatively common, but the instances of such men being called upon to provide service within the bounds of their agreements are relatively few, with perhaps only three or fewer instances of feudal vassals being summoned for service in England. Furthermore, the enfeoffments in Norman England and the Duchy of Normandy commonly allowed for forty days of service per annum during peace time, and up to two months during war, however the terms of service could vary substantially from these. None the less this placed serious limitations on the military operations that could be conducted during this brief window, let alone an expedition to the Holy Land over several years. The increased costs of military service meant that the ability of magnates to summon their full contingents and bring them to serve for the allotted period was difficult, as well as impractical due to limited time constraints.

In Germany all nobles of sufficient rank were bound directly to the King of the Germans along with the senior prelates whose secular authority derived from the Holy Roman Emperor. Beneath this, vassals owed service directly to their own lord. Whilst theoretically this service was unlimited in scope, the de facto nature of service was such that vassals had to be convinced of the necessity of a campaign and given sufficient notice of any military venture to which they may be called. As with many other regions, feudal obligations could also compete with multiple obligations being sustained to and from a vassal to different lords simultaneously, with only the princes being formally bound to the Holy Roman Emperor. As with England, the limitations of service also became increasingly restrictive, with most vassals not having any obligation to serve in Italy, with campaigns over the Alps requiring subsidy by the German Emperors. Similarly whilst German towns had owed military service to the German Emperors, the first record of them being summoned to war is in 1198,

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117 Ibid., p. 157.
indicating that the German rulers had difficulty in enforcing military service from the German towns.\footnote{118}{Ibid., pp. 160, 163-164.}

Fiefs were not limited to grants of lands, money fiefs were also granted as means of providing vassals with the resources to provide military assistance. Money-fiefs were most prevalent in the Low Countries where the booming urban economic centres made these fiefs more lucrative than country estates, although both were in operation. The money fief comprised of money drawn from a specific source such as tolls, rents or customs duties, making them significantly different from grants of cash or pensions. Money fiefs were therefore found where trade or industry tended to be more dominant than agriculture; William Clito, Count of Flanders, repealed tolls from the city of Bruges in 1127, which had previously been granted as money fiefs to the local nobility.\footnote{119}{A. V. Murray, ‘The origin of money-fiefs in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem’, MPM, p. 276-277.} Money-fiefs could also be found in the Crusader states, here money was raised from the tribute exacted from Muslim cities and from the revenues of cities controlled by the Latins in the Holy Land.\footnote{120}{Ibid., pp. 283-284.}

Given the problems with the limitations of enfoeffments, one might well question whether they were still an important part of the medieval war machine, as there are few recorded instances of these agreements ever producing the fighting men they were intended to.\footnote{121}{Morillo, Warfare, pp. 54-55.} Enfoeffments, in fact remained important to the recruitment and financing of warfare. A common practice seems to have been the rendering of a monetary payment \textit{in lieu} of military service. In England, \textit{scutage}, a cash payment often demanded by a lord rather than service, gave a lord the ability to use this money to finance alternative military forces.\footnote{122}{Prestwich, ‘Money and mercenaries, p. 131-133.} In Germany the Roncaglian decrees declared that military service could be fulfilled by a cash payment, however by the reign of Otto IV (1198-1215) this payment had been reduced to a tenth of its original size. The Italian communes under the control of the German Emperors could also discharge their service in exchange for cash.\footnote{123}{Krieger, ‘Obligatory military service’, p. 157, 165.}

Furthermore, as Stephen Morillo has argued, the practice of enfoeffment created a reservoir of equipped soldiers who could be recruited into the \textit{familia} or to augment a more sizeable army.\footnote{124}{Morillo, Warfare, p. 73.} These men could be recruited in addition to their obligations as
enfeoffed vassals, or instead of them. This allowed lords to circumvent the limited obligations that normally impeded more protracted service from their vassals. This also served as being advantageous for some knights whose fiefs alone were not sufficient to support them.\textsuperscript{125}

The structure of lordship was still an important one, as the relationship from lord to enfeoffed vassal was significant in shaping the structure of armies, and the means by which men might be mobilized under a lord’s banner. It was common throughout the period for a lord to call upon his vassals to aid him in times of crisis; this was after all the fundamental role of the vassal, to give military assistance to his lord. In England, the tenants-in-chief of the Norman kings were required to provide a notional number of knights for service, the French magnates were likewise bound by oath to the French crown and the German princes were obliged to support the Holy Roman Emperor.

The ability of a lord to enforce these obligations and compel a vassal to attend him with a force of armed men was a very different matter. Indeed, the extent to which these obligations could be enforced variedly greatly between regions and between individual lords. Often this came down to the relative ability of a lord to enforce service against a vassal’s capacity to avoid it. The Imperial crown of Germany had difficulty in commanding the loyalty of their tenants-in-chief, so there was a constant problem of these magnates failing to serve when required.\textsuperscript{126} The Holy Roman Emperors also faced difficulties in enforcing the obligatory service of the German ministeriales, and over time the authority of the Emperors over these men began to slip away. This decline in the ability of the German kings to enforce the service due to them was greatly hampered by the lack of a centralised administration with which to document and check the obligations of their vassals.\textsuperscript{127}

In France, the great magnates enjoyed an even greater degree of independence from the French crown, so whilst they were notionally subject to the French throne, in practice they could follow their own policies by cooperating with their liege lord or in some instances working against him as necessity decreed.\textsuperscript{128} In contrast the English kings enjoyed far more centralized domains, particularly in England, and as a result were able to compel their subjects to provide either men or frequently money.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., p. 49.
\textsuperscript{126} Krieger, ‘Obligatory military service’, pp. 166-167.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., p. 168.
The importance of lordship and vassalage is also of significance because it provided a structure through which armies could function and be commanded. Kings by nature of their position had a notional authority over their vassals, which as has been discussed could vary greatly in its effectiveness. However, this did provide a mechanism through which medieval commanders could organise their armies and attempt to effectively marshal their forces. These relationships could be of a long-standing sort, as with monarchs to their magnates, with the lord-vassal relationship being passed down as part of the inheritance. Or else they could be far more temporary relationships which might be achieved through the short-term recruitment of new knights into a lord’s *familia*. Whilst the terms of service could vary, the concept of military service in exchange for patronage and support is one which was familiar to the medieval West.

This was in turn aided by institutions within the *familia* which enabled men to join the following of a lord, thereby allowing for the transfer to wages, supplies, equipment, expenses or other forms of support from lord to vassal. Such institutions within a monarch’s *familia* also made it possible for a magnate and his own *familia* to attach himself to the following of a king, from whom the magnate might receive support and succour. The course of the crusades from 1095-1240 would see the utilisation and adaptation of the concept of lordship as means of gelling disparate groups of crusaders into one force. Whilst the leaders of the crusades were not always successful in attempting to translate western practices of lordship to conditions in the East, the mechanism of symbiotic support between lord and vassal remained a central pillar to support structures in the armies of the crusades.

**Paid Service**

In recent decades the rate at which medieval armies became monetized has been much debated. In the context of English armies, Herbert Hewitt attributed this change to the Hundred Years War, whilst John Morris has argued that the change came even earlier with the armies of Edward I during the Welsh Wars. Holt asserts that this change occurred towards the first quarter of the thirteenth century during the reign of King John of England, whilst John Prestwich argues that this development took place during the
eleventh century. Whilst these are only the proponents of the English aspect of this question, as developments varied across Europe, this does illustrate the level of scholarly disagreement over monetization of warfare.

The use of paid troops offered an alternative means of recruitment, which could supplement the forces available to a medieval commander. These stipendiarii are common in the armies of A.D. 1000 onwards, and it may be that this was a more common form of service in the armies of the medieval West. The employment was a common means of expanding the royal, ducal, comital or baronial familia rapidly and had distinct advantages over relying upon the service enjoyed through enfoeffments. The terms of service for such men was not restricted, and as such these soldiers could be employed for as long as was necessary. This was restricted by the availability of cash to hire such men and keep them in service for a protracted period. Whereas enfoeffments tend to be in relation to knights, although there were some sergeants that were enfoeffed to the King of France, the hiring of mercenaries allowed for the recruitment of knights, mounted and foot sergeants, archers, crossbowmen and engineers. During his campaigns in the North of England, William I employed a large number of stipendiary infantrymen where the English fyrd were not available or else if their loyalty could not be counted upon. Flemish knights were hired en masse by Henry I of England, with the Flemish treaties of 1101 and 1110 providing 1,500 milites. Breton forces were also hired by the Norman kings in 1106, 1117 and 1123. Furthermore, on his deathbed Henry I requested that the 60,000 marks in the Falaise treasury be paid out to his familia et stipendiari.

The use of paid fighting men continued to be utilized into the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Richard FitzNigel in his Dialogue on the Exchequer stated that Henry II of England ‘prefers to expose stipendiaries, rather than natives to the fortunes of war.’ That Henry preferred to utilize paid troops in contrast to the enfoeffed

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130 Morillo, Warfare, pp. 52-54.
132 Morillo, Warfare, p. 50.
133 Ibid., p. 57.
134 Ibid., p. 92.
knights of himself and his barons is borne out by his recruitment practices throughout his reign. Henry II of England made extensive use of Brabanters at Chaumont in 1167, Dol in 1173 and Rouen in 1174 in his campaigns against the French, Bretons and his own sons.\textsuperscript{136} This practice was then continued by his sons, Richard and John, in their continuation of these wars with Philip II of France.\textsuperscript{137} Henry II also made use of Welsh troops drawn from his lands in the Welsh marches. As early as 1167, Henry used Welsh troops in the Vexin and again at Rouen in 1174. John similarly brought 4,000 Welsh troops into England in 1191 in his bid to claim the regency of England. John would then go on to employ them throughout his reign, with Welsh troops being recruited in nearly every year until his death.\textsuperscript{138} It is understandable that John increasingly had to resort to paid troops due to the difficulties he was encountering with his own baronage.

The German Emperors were also in the practice of hiring fighting men if they could not raise a sufficient force from their vassals. Frederick Barbarossa employed 1,500 Brabanters for his Italian campaign of 1166, many of whom are unlikely to have been his direct vassals. During the civil wars between Philip of Swabia and Otto of Brunswick mercenaries were hired by both sides. Frederick II seems to have an even greater diversity of fighting men with Flemish, England and Egyptian troops being present at the Siege of Brescia in 1238.\textsuperscript{139} The problems of demanding military service from the Imperial tenants-in-chief made the recruitment of hired soldiers increasingly appealing.

It is clear from the examples given above that the recruitment of such mercenaries was rarely ever a problem, so where did these fighting men come from? As has already been stated the enfeoffed vassals provided a ready source of paid fighting men who could fight for pay in addition to any obligations they may already have had. However, the recruitment habits of the Norman kings indicate that mercenaries could be garnered from further afield, with men being brought in from Flanders and Brittany. Flanders and Brabant appear to have been highly militarized areas, as the endemic violence there created a large reservoir of armed men who were willing to seek employment elsewhere.\textsuperscript{140} The south of France became a region renowned for mercenaries, a natural product of the long wars between France, England, Aragon and

\textsuperscript{136} Hosler, ‘Revisiting mercenaries’, pp. 36-38.
\textsuperscript{137} Prestwich, ‘Money and mercenaries’, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{139} Krieger, ‘Obligatory military service’, pp. 164-165.
Toulouse. The rivalries between the Italian cities likewise created the conditions whereby a market for hired fighting men could exist, though the minority of these men were recruited from outside Italy.\textsuperscript{141}

During the early thirteenth century the knights, sergeants and crossbowmen that were serving in Philip II’s castles in Normandy all received cash, with a pay scale recorded by Philip’s treasurers; knights receiving 72d \textit{parisis}, mounted sergeants 36d, mounted crossbowmen 48 or 52d, crossbowmen on foot 12d or 18d, and foot sergeants 8d. It is also recorded that during the Normandy campaigns fought against Philip in 1202-1204, John of England was paying his troops 30\% less than the king of France. The pressure on John’s finances can be seen by the recruitment of Welsh troops, which seem to have come in at a far cheaper rate of 2d for foot sergeants and mounted sergeants making 12d per day, with some 240 Welsh foot-soldiers being employed for £100 for a 50 day period.\textsuperscript{142} The evolution of pay scales makes it clear that paid service was becoming increasingly common, although from these registers it is unclear whether other forms of reward were still being utilized.

The status of paid fighting men was one which greatly concerned contemporaries as there were deep anxieties about the trust-worthiness of such men. Medieval warfare necessitated attacks on non-combatants, and the blame for attacks on civilians and the other manifold horrors of war were frequently attached to the medieval mercenary.\textsuperscript{143} The Third Lateran Council of 1179 went as far as condemning all Brabancons and their employers.\textsuperscript{144} The mercenary captains, Mercadier, Cadoc and Girdard serving Richard I of England, Philip II of France and John of England respectively, all receive damning judgements from contemporary chroniclers.\textsuperscript{145} Even their accomplishments are often ignored, for instance, in the \textit{Life of William Marshal} Mercadier’s capture of Milly-sur-Thérain and the Bishop of Beauvais in 1197 is written as a victory for Richard, despite the fact that Richard was at Rouen at the time. In the same way the mercenary captain Lupescar was blamed for the loss of Normandy to the French in 1203, even though William Marshal could equally be held responsible.\textsuperscript{146} David Crouch’s work on William Marshal and the mercenary captains has identified their separation from the established structures of loyalties and lordships that made

\begin{footnotes}
\item[142] Rowlands, ‘”Warriors”’, p. 221.
\item[144] Hosler, ‘Revisiting mercenaries’, p. 35.
\item[145] Prestwich, ‘Money and mercenaries’, p. 140-143.
\end{footnotes}
them vulnerable to accusations of avarice and treachery. At the same time they might be accused of lacking the knightly ethic that had been in its evolution since the Peace of God movements in the eleventh century. This was in turn reinforced by the increased social separation of knights as a distinct social class and is mirrored by increased distinctions between knights and mounted sergeants.\footnote{Crouch, ‘William Marshal’, pp. 23-25.}

Michael Mallett’s \textit{Mercenaries and their Masters} similarly identifies that the foreignness of mercenaries is what primarily differentiates the mercenary from the paid soldier. This work focuses upon warfare in Renaissance Italy, and attributes this evolution to developments in the thirteenth century.\footnote{M. Mallett, \textit{Mercenaries and their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy} (London, 1974), p. 23-26.} Kelly DeVries, however, argues that this perception predates this attitude to at least the twelfth century; although he concedes that the notion of foreignness is also a difficult term to define given the problems of discerning national identity during the medieval period.\footnote{K. DeVries, ‘Medieval mercenaries: methodology, definitions and problems’, \textit{MPM}, p. 45.} Stephen Morillo takes this problem further by attempting to identify to what extent the medieval \textit{stipendiarii} may be termed a mercenary, in context of their integration within society and their motivation to fight. He reveals that according to his model, the medieval paid soldier does not conform to the characteristics of a ‘true mercenary’ being relatively embedded into the society in which they served.

However, the stereotype of the fickle mercenary seems to have had little basis. At the siege of Bridgenorth in 1102, the force of paid knights serving Robert of Bellême refused to surrender when Robert’s other vassals betrayed the castle to the king. Significantly they were greatly concerned that their reputation would suffer if it appeared that they had betrayed their master.\footnote{Morillo, \textit{Warfare}, p. 52.} The evidence therefore does not support the caricature of the unprincipled mercenary, though great venom was directed at the discharged soldiers who struck out for themselves as in 1180, when a force of unemployed mercenaries took control of Limousin and the Auvergne.\footnote{J. France, \textit{Western Warfare}, p. 72.}

Coupled with the differing views of medieval mercenaries, is the issue of how to identify men fighting for pay as opposed to other types of reward. The term \textit{mercenarii} is hardly ever used in contemporary sources, many chroniclers favouring the use of the term \textit{stipendiarii} or \textit{solidarii}.\footnote{France, ‘Introduction’, p. 7.} This tends to be used in an attempt to distinguish paid troops from those serving for some other type of obligation, although troops of the
familia and those raised from enfoeффed vassals were frequently paid in cash for their services or else rewarded in some other form. However, these terms are seldom used with any consistency by contemporary writers indicating that there was little differentiation between the two terms. Some contemporaries went even further by vilifying the stipendiaries. Rigord in his Gestsa Philippi Augusti describes Richard’s mercenary captain Mercadier and his men as Cotarellorum, suggesting that they are not merely paid soldiers, but brigands. This can also be seen in William the Breton’s Philippidos where Mercadier and Philip’s own captain, Cadoc, are described using the terms rupta and ruptis, to emphasise the destructive nature of these characters.

Throughout the Albigensian Crusade, Count Raymond of Toulouse and the Count Raymond-Roger of Foix are repeatedly described as having ruptiarii or routiers in their armies, and Raymond-Roger of Foix is himself described as Rogerius comes Fuxensis Ruptarius. However, these terms are likely used in order to discredit Raymond of Toulouse and his followers. There is also a habit of using regional terminology as a catch-all term for those fighting for pay such as Brabanters, Basques, Welshmen and Flemings. However, it is unlikely that these terms described every paid soldier recruited and are likely to be little more than a euphemism, rather than an accurate regional profile. Distinctions between the soldiarii and the Walenses were made when Henry disbanded his army in 1188, but Rowlands views this as an administrative attempt to distinguish Welsh vassals recruited by Henry and John, from their other paid troops.

**Other means of support and reward**

Whilst this discussion has focused primarily upon the role of the familia, enfoeффment and paid service, it should not be thought that these were the only means of securing military service. In addition to cash payment, we also see alternative forms of reward being used throughout this period. The forgiveness of debts was another means of securing military service; John pardoned the debts of 150 knights so that they might serve him. Chibnall’s work on the familia of Henry I reveals that many were serving

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153 Rigord, p. 132.
157 Rowlands, ‘‘Warriors’’, p. 214.
either at their own expense or with the hope of being rewarded in the future.\textsuperscript{158} It is probable that many amongst the army of William in 1066, had similar ambitions regarding the prospect of having land granted in the event of William’s victory.\textsuperscript{159} Richard I of England’s mercenary captain Mercadier received regular wages from Richard, until he was eventually granted the barony of Perigord as a reward for his years of service to his master.\textsuperscript{160}

Another motivation to serve was the lure of booty, which also served to provide either a bonus to a soldier or perhaps the mainstay of his reward.\textsuperscript{161} The cost of campaigning led to the need for fighting men to increase their income in order to meet the costs of their activities. This could be addressed through pay or expenses, but could be supplemented by the taking of booty whilst on campaign. Throughout warfare in the West and Latin East there is an emphasis on plunder, which borders on an obsession. By the eleventh century it was common practice that warfare would involve the ravaging of an enemy’s lands in order to deprive them of the means to make war. This then facilitated the supply and rewarding of the soldiers, in addition to their pay.\textsuperscript{162} However, it was generally accepted that looting should not be a free-for-all, but that loot should be collected under the supervision of a commander and then apportioned to his men. This was the case with Robert Guiscard’s forces in Calabria when he divided the spoils between himself and his men. William I of England was also known for giving generous spoils to his followers.\textsuperscript{163}

Moreover a leader was also judged by his ability to provide his followers with the opportunity to gain plunder. One of the reasons for William Rufus’s popularity with his mercenary troops was that he allowed them to pillage lands in England in order to gather booty.\textsuperscript{164} On the other hand depriving ones followers of booty was proved to be an unpopular and potentially dangerous move, as plunder provided a vital influx of wealth into armies benefitting both morale and its ability to survive.

\textsuperscript{158} Chibnall, ‘Mercenaries’, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{161} Prestwich, ‘Money and mercenaries’, p. 148.
\textsuperscript{164} Prestwich, ‘Military household’, p. 121.
The role of paid service encouraged the demand for money with which to wage war. The rising cost of the military equipment needed to provide military service resulted in the wages of fighting men rising throughout the period covered by this thesis. The cost of equipping a knight for war rose steadily, a knight during the twelfth century might equip himself for £5, but Denholm-Young suggests that this rose to as much as £50 during the thirteenth century.\textsuperscript{165} The daily wage for a knight in the household of Henry I stood at between 8d and 1s, under the reign of Henry II this had risen to 2s.\textsuperscript{166}

The number of knights had also begun to fall in medieval armies; Michael Prestwich’s work has revealed that the number of knights began to fall throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. With around a third of William’s invasion army in 1066 consisting of heavily armoured cavalry, but by the early thirteenth century the number of knights and mounted sergeants was about equal. By 1267, however, the force taken by William of Leyburn to Nottingham reveals that of a force of thirty eight, only eight were knights the remainder being mounted sergeants.\textsuperscript{167}

Throughout this period warfare also appears to be increasingly monetised. As has been discussed, the recruitment of knights serving as part of an enfeoffment was only partially used at best, with a preference given by some commanders to paid soldiers. Increasingly payment was becoming the norm regardless of social or military stature, with commanders having to increasingly foot the bill for all of their followers. The enfeoffed nobility from Liège and Looz were compelled to serve without remuneration, however by the time of the fourteenth century the Bishop of Liège had to pay for the cost of feeding his vassals, and in the event of a foreign campaign pay, for the cost of replacing horses and equipment.\textsuperscript{168}

The discussion above has covered the mainstay of medieval warfare, which is typically modest in its execution, with warfare being conducted within limited means for limited goals. How then can the campaigns of the crusades be reconciled with the form of warfare in the West which was decidedly more modest in form? It is perhaps

\textsuperscript{166} Prestwich, ‘Money and mercenaries’, p. 144.
\textsuperscript{168} C. Gaier, ‘Analysis of military forces in the principality of Liège and the county of Looz from the twelfth to the fifteenth Century’, \textit{Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History}, vol. 2 (1965), pp. 5-6.
worthwhile to examine the more extraordinary campaigns in the West; the best known is perhaps the Norman invasion of England in 1066.

**Case Study: The Invasion of England in 1066**

The 1066 campaign mounted by William of Normandy is one of the greatest undertakings during the medieval period, and certainly contemporaries were unlikely to have seen warfare on such a scale. William of Normandy was faced with a distinct problem in his mission to pursue his claim on the English throne by force of arms. The Kingdom of England was many times the size of Normandy and as such had far superior resources of treasure and men with which to oppose him. William therefore had to bolster the duchy’s forces in order to successfully invade England. The forces available to William were his own ducal *familia*, and the households of his barons in Normandy, he was also able to hire additional men in the manner described above.\(^{169}\) The native resources of Normandy during this period are uncertain, but given that the forces of Robert of Normandy at Tinchebrai in 1107 are thought to have been no greater than 6,000, we might assume that this might be the upper limit of William’s military potential.\(^ {170}\) This certainly compared poorly with the tens of thousands that Harold Godwinson might have been able to call upon. However, the field army assembled by William for the Battle of Hastings is commonly regarded to have been in the region of 7,000-12,000 men, with perhaps a total invasion force of 14,000.\(^ {171}\) This suggests that William was able to recruit a further 8,000 men, with the possibility of additional forces being recruited in the succeeding years as he attempted to gain control of England from 1066 onwards.

As has been discussed William had several means at his disposal to supplement the army normally available to him. The ducal *familia* would have provided William with the basis of his army, which could then have been supplemented by William’s vassals in Normandy and by the hiring of additional troops from throughout northwestern Christendom. John of Worcester, Orderic Vitalis and William of Poitiers all indicate that a large part of William’s army which fought for him at Hastings was

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composed of men serving for pay. Furthermore, the penance given to the Norman army after Hastings was greater for those serving for pay as opposed to those serving from their duty to William. William’s use of stipendiary knights continued after 1066 with many of the castles in northern England being garrisoned by these *stipendiarii*. In 1069-1070 William was troubled by his hired knights from Anjou, Maine and Brittany complaining that they wished to be discharged from his service, so when he paid and disbanded his army at Salisbury he kept the malcontents in service for a further 40 days as a punishment. As with the *familia* of Henry I, it may be possible that some men served William at their own expense with the hope of gaining reward after loyal service. But given William’s mass hiring of fighting men and presumably lavish expenditure on men, it seems likely that some form of support would have been sought from William by the majority of his army.

William’s invasion naturally required the assembling of a fleet with which to transport the men, horses and supplies necessary for the invasion. Both chroniclers and historians have disagreed over how many ships were mustered by William, from several hundred to Gaimar’s report of 11,000 in the fleet. Gillmor sees 700 ships being a more likely figure, and consistent with the size of army William needed to transport, though this is only an estimate given the unknown capacity of the ships used. The organisation of naval forces under the Norman dukes is unclear, and it is uncertain which naval forces were already available to William or how the Normans would mobilize naval forces in a more conventional conflict. It seems likely that naval logistics tended to be a far more *ad hoc* system than the organisation of land forces, with ships being built, commandeered or hired as needed.

It is unclear how William raised his fleet or what role his subjects played in providing ships. Wace and the list of quotas demanded from William’s barons are in

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177 Morillo, *Warfare*, p. 60.
disagreement over the number of ships that William required from his vassals. Wace records that Odo of Bayeux contributed 40 ships whilst his listed quota is for 120 ships; similarly Wace attributed 30 ships to the Bishop of Le Mans, who does not appear on the list at all. It seems likely that William was in a position to demand ships from his followers in addition to his own construction efforts. It is also probable that William sought aid from the Count of Flanders, although only Simon of St. Bertin writing a century later directly refers to ships being sent from Flanders to join the fleet. The treaties with the counts of Flanders may also have provided William with ships from outside his duchy in exchange for a money-fief paid by William to Baldwin of Flanders.

William may also have sought aid from his neighbours through the recruitment of knights en masse to his cause. The 1101 treaty with the Count of Flanders required the provision of Flemish knights in exchange for a 500 mark annuity from Henry I. However, this could have been a descendent of a far earlier agreement made by William I. William granted money fiefs of 300 marks to Baldwin V of Flanders, then to Baldwin VI thereafter. Eljas Oksanen argues that this may be evidence of a similar number of knights being promised by the counts of Flanders. William is thought to have had no more than 3,000 knights at Hastings, therefore a force of 1,000 men would have been a great addition to William’s forces in his subsequent campaigns in England. This codified agreement parallels the settlement of some Flemings in England, Albert of Beverley lists Flemings as one of the six gens of Britain and this reflects the continued cross-channel connections between Flanders and the Flemings rewarded with English lands by William.

The example of the Flemish settlement in England reveals that financial reward was an important lure to motivate men to join William’s army from both within his duchy and beyond. However, the prospect of reward after the completion of a successful campaign is also likely to have been a significant factor in the decision to join William’s invasion. William of Poitiers records a speech by William that is revealing about the attitude of the men who fought for him; William states that he possesses the advantage over Harold by having more land with which to reward his

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180 Ibid., pp. 126-127.
182 Ibid., p. 266.
followers because ‘Victory will go to the man who is prepared to be generous not only with his own property but also with that of his enemy.’ This sentiment reveals much about William I’s role not only as a commander, but also as a source of patronage and largesse for the men following him.

There were many forms of reward that motivated men to fight for William: men serving as part of his *familia*, as a result of their existing obligations to William or for the receipt of wages. However, men from all of these backgrounds may have expected or at least hoped for a share of the conquered land once William had gained the English throne. Even those serving as short-term mercenaries may have hoped for their slice of England’s bounty, those men whom William kept in service for a further 40 days in 1070 would surely have quit his service sooner, were it not for the prospect of foregoing any rewards of land. The massive redistribution of land following the conquest supports the fact that William intended to make good his obligations to his followers by granting them estates in England at the expense of the subjugated English landowners.

William’s ability to bolster his ducal forces with the surplus men needed to make a successful invasion possible depended on his capacity to reward those who came to serve him. William’s position as Duke of Normandy and titular King of England gave him the authority to command his subjects and this was reinforced by the ties of lordship which bound William’s followers to him. These relationships came in varying forms, William’s established vassals in Normandy were already bound to serve him, however the extraordinary nature of the operation and the great misgivings held by many barons about the wisdom of the invasion necessitated generous rewards for William’s Norman nobles. The relationship differed somewhat for those swords-for-hire who were brought in to fill the ranks of William’s ducal forces, receiving wages but with the hope of more substantial reward after their service. But whilst the scale of service and reward might differ, the central pillar of the symbiosis between lord and vassals and the two-way exchange of support and assistance remains the same. In this respect the scale of the challenge was far more daunting and the rewards never more bountiful, but the mechanisms that bound William to his followers remained similar to other medieval armies and their commanders.

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183 William of Poitiers, p. 176.  
The Demands and Differences of Crusading Warfare

Crusading warfare imposed immense challenges to men whose experience of warfare was limited to relatively modest campaigns involving fewer men, shorter distances and a more familiar climate. For many crusaders the expeditions were a great challenge from a logistical perspective: with the central question of how to move an army thousands of miles from the West to the Holy Land, have it arrive in a fit state to fight and win a campaign. This challenge was also complicated by the spiritual nature of crusading, which to an extent limited the use of the conventional structures of support and lordship present in the armies of the medieval West. It is therefore important to consider the demands of crusading warfare and how this differed to warfare in the West.

Crusading to the Holy Land dwarfed the scale of many conventional military campaigns in the West, and even exceptionally large-scale campaigns such as the Norman invasion of England were eclipsed by some crusades. William’s journey from Dives-sur-Mer in September, 1066 to his arrival in London in December, 1066 covered a distance of around 350 miles. In the punitive campaign of 1070, the harrying of the North, William’s army travelled over 450 miles.\textsuperscript{185} The journey from Clermont to the Jerusalem by contrast is 2,000 miles, with many crusaders from England or northern France having to travel even further.\textsuperscript{186} The great distance from their homelands was further exacerbated by the radically different climates of Anatolia and the Levant compared to those of northern and central Europe. The author of the \textit{Gesta Francorum} describes the hardships suffered as the First Crusade travelled south from Nicaea in summer, 1097. ‘We therefore pursued them (the Turks) through a land which was deserted, waterless and uninhabitable, from which we barely emerged or escaped alive, for we suffered greatly from hunger and thirst.’\textsuperscript{187} The lack of experience in operating in these environments, often in the face of hostile forces, proved difficult and great pressure was placed upon the resources and support structures of the crusader armies.

The huge distances involved in crusading made it inevitable that the crusaders would have to pass through lands controlled by non-crusaders and it was from these lands that the crusaders were forced to find supply and replenishment. This could be

\textsuperscript{185} Distances calculated from maps in M. Bennett, \textit{Campaigns of the Norman Conquest} (Abingdon & New York, 2001), pp. 47, 55.
\textsuperscript{187} \textit{Gesta Francorum}, p. 23, ‘Nos itaque persequebamur eos per deserta et inaquosam et inhabitabilem terram, ex qua uix uiiu euasimus uel exiuimus. Fames uero et sitis undique coartabant nos.’
incredibly hazardous and raised the problem of how sustain a military force in potentially hostile lands. The First, Second and Third Crusades all saw heavy fighting as the crusaders passed through the Muslim-controlled lands in Anatolia. In some cases the crusaders proved to be victorious, securing valuable treasure and supplies through the taking of booty, tribute or trading concessions. Whilst booty and tribute can be found throughout medieval warfare, in many cases it only acted as a supplement to the resources already available. In contrast the armies of crusades depended on the resources that could be seized when passing through hostile lands. This was by no means guaranteed and travelling through hostile Muslims lands could prove disastrous, with both the German and French on the Second Crusade forces suffering defeats, heavy casualties and supply shortages before they even set foot in the Holy Land.

Aside from the hostile Muslims powers they encountered; the crusaders also had to treat with the Byzantines during the landward journeys to the Holy Land during the first century of crusading. The relationship between crusaders and the Byzantines throughout this period proved to be unstable and highly volatile, and on many occasions descended into open conflict. These relations were affected not only wider religious differences between the Latin Church and Greek Orthodox Church, but also by the political rivalries and suspicions harboured between individual crusaders and the Byzantine emperors. Bohemond of Taranto had waged war on Alexios prior to the First Crusade, and this rivalry influenced their dealings on the First Crusade, and this rivalry influenced their dealings on the First Crusade. The sack of Constantinople by crusaders in 1204 makes it easy to dismiss crusader-Byzantine relations as being inevitably hostile and bound to end in violence. This perspective is also influenced by a number of anti-Byzantine accounts of the crusades, which cast the Byzantines in a poor light.

As will be argued, this picture is not entirely accurate, despite the ambivalent nature of the relationship between Byzantines and crusaders it became necessary to form a working relationship and to cooperate to their mutual benefit. Deprived of their sources of supply the crusaders were forced to come to an accommodation with the Byzantines and other local rulers in order secure the supplies they required. The Byzantines equally were eager to assure the safety of Constantinople, and were

189 France, Victory, pp. 110-121.
190 Housley, Fighting for the Cross: Crusading to the Holy Land (London & New Haven, 2008), pp. 248-249
prepared to negotiate with the passing crusaders in order to achieve this. The need for diplomacy of this kind differentiates the crusades from warfare in the West. Certainly cordial relations were desirable with local lords, but logistical problems of distance intensified the need to secure access to the supplies controlled by the Byzantines. This resulted in the Byzantine rulers becoming a part of the support structures of crusading armies through the dispensation of gifts, alms and the provision of markets.

As an alternative to landward travel, it was possible for crusaders to travel by sea to the Holy Land. For some crusaders the amphibious nature of the operation would have been unfamiliar, and far removed from the smaller scale of warfare to which they were used. But to other crusaders, notably those from the maritime republics of Italy or the trading cities of the Low Countries, this aspect of warfare would have been more familiar. Nonetheless, the decision to travel by sea would necessitate the gathering of large amounts of shipping in order provide passage for a force of crusaders. In order to achieve this there were two possibilities: the first was to build sufficient ships to transport the army. This was seen during William of Normandy’s invasion of England, but this required a huge financial outlay to construct the ships, and then to provision and man them. It also necessitated an adequate number of dockyards and the time to construct them. The alternative was to hire shipping to transport crusaders to the Holy Land and this was often done in a piecemeal fashion by individual crusaders or contingents. But on a few occasions large contracts were made with the maritime republics to provide shipping en masse, as was seen in the Third Crusade between Philip II of France and Republic of Genoa and during the Fourth Crusade with a huge contract made between Venice and the crusaders.\footnote{Geoffrey of Villehardouin, \textit{La Conquête de Constantinople}, ed. E. Faral, vol. I (Paris, 1973), pp. 22-30.} Both of these fleets required formidable financial resources to hire and as such passage was beyond the means of many crusaders relying on their own finances. This therefore required the support structures of crusading armies to accommodate the expense of transporting thousands of crusaders to the Holy Land.

Crusading was, above all, a religious undertaking that motivated people from all scions of society to take the cross and depart for the Holy Land and, by the twelfth century, other crusading fronts too. Much has been written on what motivated people to take the cross, and scholarship in the past decades has emphasised the importance of
religious concerns in shaping the decision of individuals to participate. The fundamentally spiritual nature of crusading remained throughout this period, and from the outset the crusading vow was a voluntary commitment. This placed limitations on the recruitment and support mechanisms available in the West, which relied heavily on notions of lordship and fealty. Departing kings and magnates could not order their vassals to accompany them on crusade, nor were they able to exert the same level of influence as they might in the West.

The first hundred and fifty years of crusading demonstrated the uniqueness of crusading warfare, and how crusading vows influenced the attitudes of crusaders during the expeditions. A heightened religiosity can be found in crusading armies, which one might have expected from those engaged in penitential warfare. Many crusades display outward signs of this zeal with processions, fasts, masses and the enforced purification of the crusader host by the expulsion of prostitutes, or in some cases all women. Some leaders also attempted to regulate the moral conduct of their followers, one the best examples of this can be found in the ordinances agreed by Henry II and Philip II at Gisors in January, 1188:

'It was also enacted that no one should swear profanely, and that no one should play at games of chance or at dice; and no one was after the ensuing Easter to wear beaver, or gris, or sable, or scarlet; and all were to be content with two dishes. No one was to take any woman with him on the pilgrimage, unless, perhaps, some laundress to accompany him on foot, about whom no suspicion could be entertained.'

However, it is clear that these regulations certainly did not stop gambling or other licentious behaviour; in fact debt problems forced Richard and Philip to impose

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192 Housley, Contesting, p. 84.
limits on the sums that could be wagered. But, this does not mean that crusaders were unaware of their own spiritual commitments and that their conduct on crusade should reflect this. In particular it was of great importance that crusaders were motivated by the desire for the salvation of their souls, rather than for desire for earthly gain. As one contemporary put it: ‘The sin is not in waging war, but in waging war for the sake of plunder.’ This was of particular concern, as the desired victory on the battlefield would inevitably result in the accumulation of booty. As will be discussed, this booty served an important function, but it is important to note that there was a genuine concern for the motivation of crusaders. So whilst crusaders were not unmindful of the practicalities of crusading, it is important to note that the campaign they had embarked upon was like no other in the west. Not only success of the crusade, but also the souls of the participants, hung in the balance and that deeply influenced the approach of many crusaders to crusading warfare.

Crusading vows and the spiritual concerns of crusaders did not nullify the existing bonds and obligations that existed in the West. Work by Riley-Smith and France has shown that a lord taking the cross had a huge impact on their vassals and placed great pressure on them to do likewise, and this is reflected in the strong regional participation that can be seen when powerful lord or king took the cross. The ability of Henry, Richard and Philip to impose the ordinances mentioned above further indicates the influence of kings during a crusade. The decision of other family members to take the cross also influenced the motivation of individuals to take the cross and frequently multiple family members would go on crusade together or else be in close contact during an expedition. These kinship networks often shaped the form of support structures between these related crusaders. This said, for many crusaders their crusading vow remained the primary motivation for taking the cross, and during the course of expeditions the crusading vow remained paramount over material or political concerns.

The crusading warfare was also radically different to warfare in the West due to the personnel that were found in crusading armies. As has been discussed, armies in the West relied upon fiefs, cash payments or the bonds of lordship specifically to recruit fighting men. The crusades were a departure from this because they were open to all members of Christian society. Although, attempts were made to specifically target the

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military classes; throughout this period crusading remained open to all, regardless of age, gender or military capability. In many cases this resulted in with large numbers of people taking the cross who had little or no military value. Whilst many armies in the West probably contained some non-combatant elements, such as servants and camp-followers, the support structures found in the West were aimed solely at supporting fighting men.

The number of non-combatants involved in crusading is hard to gauge, as they seldom attract detailed comment from contemporaries. Fulcher of Chartres’ description of the First Crusade relates that the army numbered ‘six hundred thousand men fit for war, of whom one hundred thousand were armed with armour and helmets, not counting the unarmed, that is, clerics, monks, women and children.’\(^\text{198}\) Whilst this is likely to be an exaggeration of the numbers involved, Fulcher of Chartres’s comments indicate that a large part of the army was comprised of non-combatants. Scholars continue to be divided over the number participants, but this thesis favour’s John France’s estimate of around 7,000 knights and 35,000 infantry, along with anywhere between 20,000 to 60,000 non-combatants.\(^\text{199}\) The number non-combatants on crusade is likely to have varied between crusades, there were efforts by some leaders to restrict the participation of non-combats and their participation could also be limited by practical considerations, such as the need to secure transport by ship. But it is striking that even by the Barons’ Crusade in the mid-thirteenth century there were still considerable numbers of participants on crusade who were not fighting men.\(^\text{200}\)

Many of these non-combatants had only limited resources with which to support themselves, and these resources were swiftly consumed during the crusades. The struggle to provide this support is witnessed by the famines and diseases that decimated many of the poor amongst the armies of the crusades.\(^\text{201}\) This therefore placed great pressure on the support structures used in medieval armies during this period. This thesis will explore the efforts of the crusaders to solve this problem through direct subsidy, the creation of communal alms funds and eventually the attempts to encourage unsuitable crusaders to commute their vows for cash.

\(^{198}\) Fulcher of Chartres, p. 333, ‘sexies centum millia ad bellum valentium aestimabant, quorum centum millia loricis et galeis muniti erant: exceptis inermibus, videlicet clericis, monachis, mulieribus et parvulis.’


\(^{200}\) Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora, vol. 4, p. 71; ‘The Rothelin Continuation of William of Tyre’, p. 44.

\(^{201}\) Housley, Fighting, pp. 150-158.
Of all the support structures discussed perhaps the *familia* was most suited to a crusading environment, many of the military households accompanied their lords on crusade. Their relatively small size and their use of cash as a means of reward made it easy for the *familia* to adapt to conditions on crusade. In contrast, the vast distances involved in crusading made it difficult to use land and money fiefs to provide support; furthermore the duration of a crusade was likely to be far longer than a campaign in the West. Once departed, crusaders were largely unable to have fresh resources raised and dispatched to them *en route*. This therefore forced many fief-holders to find other means of raising funds to take with them on crusade. Riley-Smith has estimated that the cost of crusading for a knight was perhaps four to five years of his annual income, and this compelled many crusaders seek alternative means to raise cash quickly.

However, it has been noted that many medieval commanders were increasingly using paid troops, rather than relying upon the military service owed to them from land fiefs. Paid service was used extensively during the Norman invasion of 1066, when a large army had to be supported operating away from its base of support. Paid service proved to be a high versatile form of support, that was suited to crusading warfare, and this will be discussed more fully in a later chapter.

It is also important to consider the wide geographical areas that crusaders were drawn from, with the appeal of crusading extending to all Christendom. Some expeditions, such as the Venetian Crusade of 1122 and Frederick II’s crusade in 1227 are dominated by the followers of a particular ruler or from a given region, but these are in the minority. The majority of crusades attracted crusaders from across Europe. This no doubt caused cultural and linguistic difficulties between the various crusader groups, but it also meant that the support structures remained focused around the powerful regional lords as can be seen in the First, Fourth and Barons’ Crusade.²⁰² The *familia* of these magnates formed the nucleus for these support structures, around which larger bodies of crusaders could be supported. However, this hindered attempts to create any unified support structures and meant that multiple support structures often existed focused around different magnates or princes, sometimes working in competition with each other for the resources available. Though, as well discussed, some success can be seen in the establishment of common funds, alms funds and confraternities, these cannot be found on all crusades.

²⁰² Riley-Smith, Crusades, pp. 32-33.
This issue was partially related to the problems of leadership during the crusade, and throughout the crusades it proved difficult to establish one unified command structure that all would accept. The absence of this overall control resulted in factional and political in-fighting between the various leaders on crusade. The participation of emperors and kings during the Second, Third and Fifth Crusades had the potential offer leadership and core around which support structures could be established. However, political rivalries in the West still undermined any attempt to establish a collective support structure, as can be seen by the constant wrangling between Richard and Philip during the Third Crusade.

Political in-fighting was certainly not uncommon in the armies of the medieval West, but crucially many crusades lacked the leadership of a commander strong enough to overrule these differences. So whilst support structures on crusade could be very effective, they rarely encompassed all crusaders on an expedition, and left support structures fragmented and focused around regional leaders.

In summary, crusading warfare was very different to warfare in the West. The huge distances involved presented the crusaders with difficulties in adjusting their art of war to accommodate the demands of crusading. The distance from home would also mean that the armies would have to adapt to an itinerant lifestyle purchasing, foraging or plundering supplies as they moved. This necessitated interactions with non-crusaders, most notably the Byzantines, and as such these outside parties became important in feeding the support structures of the crusades. The armies that set out to the Holy Land were also different to the armies of the West; with many thousands of non-combatants taking the cross alongside the military classes. The logistical problems of supporting armies on this journey imposed great costs on those making the journey. With the limited resources available this placed a strain on the support structures available, which would have had to expand as the crusades continued in order the meet the growing costs of crusading warfare. The penitential nature of their vocation also marked the crusades as being different from conflicts in the West, their attitudes being influenced by their spiritual concerns as well as by their material ones.

203 France, Western Warfare, pp. 209-211.
204 Riley-Smith, Crusades, pp. 117-118.
Chapter Three

The Range of Support: Popes, Emperors, Kings, Princes, Lords and Families

This chapter will discuss the various sources of support available to crusaders, and the ability of these structures to provide that support. The changes in crusading policy, the establishment of crusading privileges and the raising of finances greatly enhanced the role of the papacy and the Church in providing support to crusaders. The monarchs of Christendom also had a great capacity to support crusading warfare through their access to the financial resources of their own kingdoms; however the primitive nature of fiscal mechanisms in some kingdoms greatly limited their ability to provide support to their followers. This was accompanied by support delivered through the lords when on crusade and through kinship networks, with money often being raised through the sale or mortgage of family lands and rights. Finally, common funds, alms funds and confraternities were also used on some expeditions to ensure that money could be distributed to the needy or to support important crusading projects. The importance of these sources varied throughout this period, and as crusading costs grew, the ordinary sources of support became increasingly insufficient. This helped to foster a growing reliance upon the authorities of the West and a growing expectation that they would provide support.

This chapter will explore the expectation that the papacy, Church, monarchs and magnates of the West would provide support to crusaders. The developments in crusading warfare in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries saw an increased role being taken by the authorities of the West in supporting crusading. The expectation that the leaders of the West would provide support was driven by the urgings of the papacy and by their positions as overlords, so that by the mid-thirteenth century this expectation of support seems to have been established.

Popes

Urban II and his successors played a vital role in the instigation of preaching and the formulation of bulls that would shape the course of the crusades. However, the role of the Papacy in the execution of the crusades seems to have been given little thought or what, if any, support the Holy See would offer to those who took the cross. This offered little in the way of precedent for successive popes to follow, however this gave them the freedom to pursue their own crusading policies.
When Urban II launched the First Crusade following his sermon at Clermont in November 1095 there is little evidence that he had a clear idea of the role that the papacy would play within the Crusade, except as its spiritual head; or of the role that was to be had by the Papal Legates. The four accounts of the sermon at Clermont are abundant with the motivation and justification for the crusade; they also highlight the spiritual concerns of those participating.\textsuperscript{205} However, all versions lack level of detail in regards to how the crusade would operate and how the papacy would function in relation to the expedition launched.

Urban’s letter, written in late 1095 to the Flemings announcing the appointment of Adhemar as legate instructed them to attach themselves to Adhemar’s following.\textsuperscript{206} Unfortunately Urban’s other letters fail to provide further details on the role of the papacy or legates. His other letters to the people of Bologna and Vallombrosa forbid the participation of monks or priests without permission of their abbots or bishops, or of husbands without leave from their wives.\textsuperscript{207} The nobles of Catalonia are similarly informed that they should not take part in the crusade for Jerusalem, but that they should remain in Iberia to continue the fight against the enemies of Christendom close at hand.\textsuperscript{208} Other than this, Urban’s role in the expedition seems to have been very minor, after the targeting of Jerusalem and the phenomenal success of his preaching campaign, he seems to have taken a back seat during the expedition and allowed the princes and his legate to manage the affairs of the crusade.

This attitude was mimicked by many of the twelfth-century popes who attempted to engage in crusading, however there were important steps taken to facilitate the support of crusaders departing for the East. Eugenius III and Gregory VIII both began the preaching that launched the Second and Third Crusade; however in both cases command was left to the monarchs who took the cross to provide support and finance to these expeditions. Whilst the papacy did not directly provide any support, successive popes developed the structures and mechanisms by which crusaders might be supported. *Quantum Praedecessores*, issued by Eugenius III in 1146, clarified the terms of the crusading indulgence, particularly in relation to the protection offered to

\textsuperscript{205} Fulcher of Chartres, pp. 727-728; *Gesta Francorum*, pp. 1-2; Robert the Monk, pp. 727-730; Guibert of Nogent, pp. 111-117.

\textsuperscript{206} *Kræzzugsbriefe*, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 136-137.


crusaders and the suspension of interest on debts.\textsuperscript{209} Gregory VIII’s bull of 1187, \textit{Audita tremendi}, followed similar lines.\textsuperscript{210} However, other sources for the period, most clearly demonstrated in the account of Gerald of Wales, makes it clear that partial indulgences were offered to those unfit or unable to take the cross.\textsuperscript{211} This therefore opened the possibility of crusaders being supported by money raised from non-combatants in the West who would also receive spiritual rewards from their donations.

Innocent III revisited the notion of contributions in his preparation for the Fourth Crusade. Innocent enabled all those deemed unfit or unsuitable to take part in the expeditions to redeem their vows in exchange for a cash sum. Furthermore, prospective crusaders could alternatively sponsor others to go on crusade in their stead, under this scheme both the sponsor and the surrogate received the full crusading indulgence.\textsuperscript{212} Innocent also began the practice of placing chests in all churches, encouraging donations for the cause in exchange for penances.\textsuperscript{213} Innocent’s expansion of the possibilities for fund raising to non-crusaders therefore enabled the non-militarized elements of society to lend their resources to the crusade and also to share in the spiritual rewards. It is unclear to what extent Innocent’s initiatives gathered popular support, as there are no references to any of the sums raised through the commutation of indulgences or through sums gathered in churches. Whilst these sums may have been distributed to local crusaders as was intended, the efforts taken by many crusaders to raise their own finances would suggest that the support raised through Innocent’s schemes was at best modest.

In addition to his efforts to mobilize the resources of the laity, he also went on to harness the resources of the clergy. Innocent III was the first pope to initiate clerical taxation as a means of supporting crusaders. In 1199 Innocent conceded a tenth tax on papal revenues to the crusade, he also demanded a fortieth tax on all clerical revenues to support local crusaders.\textsuperscript{214} Admittedly, similar levies had been attempted by Louis VII on the French clergy prior to the Second Crusade, and Philip II of France and Henry II of England had attempted to impose the Saladin Tithe upon their own subjects in 1188.
but Innocent’s decree is the first admission by the papacy that it was to have a role in financing and supporting expeditions to the East, in addition to the Church as a whole.

However, the ability of Innocent to ensure that men were supported in the field was in fact limited. He had the means available to command the gathering of funds by the bishops, but here effective control over these sums ended. Aside from Innocent’s command that these sums be raised there is little record of their distribution or to whom they were given.\(^{215}\) Despite Innocent’s regular letters during the Fourth Crusade to his legate Peter Capuano and to the princes at the head of the crusade, Innocent was not in a position whereby he was providing active support to the crusaders, lacking both the funds needed or the means of efficiently channelling money to the crusader host.

*Quia Maior*, issued in 1213, confirmed many of the crusading privileges that had been established by previous pontiffs, offering protection for the property and families of crusaders and freedom from usury.\(^{216}\) Furthermore, Innocent also continued his previous policy of permitting the vows taken by unsuitable persons to be commuted in exchange for cash. This policy was then reiterated and crystalized in 1215 with the issue of *Ad Liberandam*, which authorized the commutation of vows in exchange for cash sums, whilst the indulgence was still received.\(^{217}\) Although this had the potential to provide a greatly increased pool of funding, the effectiveness of this initiative is not known, and is largely overshadowed by the twentieth taxation which was to dominate the funding for the Fifth Crusade.

The Fourth Lateran Council, held in 1215, greatly expanded the commitment of the Church to financially support crusading. The decrees from the council as formulated in *Ad Liberandam* declared a tenth tax on papal and cardinal revenues and a twentieth tax on all clerical revenues, all over a period of three years. In addition to this, Innocent pledged a further 30,000 pounds of silver for the support of Roman crusaders.\(^{218}\) This more ambitious plan was perhaps a reaction to the Fourth Crusade, which saw the crusade veer wildly away from its intended destination of Egypt and eventually resulted in the taking of Constantinople. This unexpected turn of events was partly the result of the dearth of funds to pay for the Venetian fleet that had been contracted to transport the crusader host to the Holy Land.

\(^{216}\) *PL*, vol. 216, col. 818-819.
\(^{217}\) *Constitutiones concilii quarti Lateranensis una cum commentaris glossatorum*, ed. A. García y García (Vatican City, 1981), pp. 7-8.
\(^{218}\) Ibid., pp. 7-8.
Thereafter clerical taxation would remain a staple tool of the papacy in providing financial support. Honorius imposed a further triennial twentieth upon French bishops to support crusading efforts in Languedoc in 1218.\textsuperscript{219} Gregory IX decided to levy a tax of a thirtyth on all clerical incomes in England and France for a period of up to three years.\textsuperscript{220} Louis IX’s Crusade of 1265 would rely heavily upon funds raised from the French clergy, with perhaps as much as two-thirds of his war chest being raised through these means.\textsuperscript{221}

Honorius’ successor, Gregory IX, further enhanced the ability of the Church to act as a source of support. The 17\textsuperscript{th} November, 1234 saw the launch of the bull \textit{Rachel Suum Videns}; it offered crusaders ‘an indulgence and promise(d) an increase in eternal salvation as the righteous’ reward to all who truly undertake this labour with contrite heart and oral confession.’ The prospect of achieving an indulgence was also open to ‘those who will have gone to the Holy Land not in their own person, but simply through their expenses’ and were granted an indulgence according to ‘the quantity of their aid and their state of devotion, also to all who will have suitably given from their possessions in aid of the same land.’\textsuperscript{222} Previous bulls had focused primarily upon encouraging the military classes to take the cross, and sometimes had references to those who would be able to give alms, such as in \textit{Quia Maior}. \textit{Rachel Suum Videns} instead made a clear exhortation to those able to make a non-violent contribution to the crusade: “For many, desiring to behold the lands where the Lord stood, have reached the goal without the labour of a race, the crown without the ordeal of the sword, through him who rewards his faithful soldier, and looks only for good will in his service.”\textsuperscript{223} Now those who remained in the West had the opportunity to win spiritual reward without direct participation.

The extension of the crusading indulgence from being exclusively for participants, to a far broader audience indicates that the papacy was increasingly aware

\textsuperscript{220} \textit{Registres}, no. 4605-4607, ‘ut liberaliter et benigne assentiant quod ecclesie et clerici suarum diocesum in tricesima reddituum suorum usque ad triennium predictis Terre Sancte et imperio provideant.’
\textsuperscript{221} W. C. Jordan, \textit{Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade: A Study in Rulership} (Princeton, 1979), pp. 65-104.
\textsuperscript{222} Matthew Paris, vol. 3, p. 283, ‘veniam indulgemus, et in retributione justorum salutis aeternae pollicemur augmentum. Eis autem qui non personis propriis illuc accesserint, sed in suis duntaxat expensis juxta facultatem et quantitatem suam viros idoneos destinaverint, et illis similiter, qui licet in alienis expensis in propriis tamen personis accesserint, plenam suorum concedimus veniam peccatorum. Hujus quoque remissionis volumus et concedimus esse participes, juxta quantitatem subsidii et devotionis affectum, omnes qui ad subventionem ipsius terrae de bonis suis congrue ministrabunt.’
of the problems regarding the financing of crusades and the need to support military activity in the Holy Land. *Rachel Suum Videns* represents the progression of thought that stretches back through the previous half century, which allowed anyone to take the cross regardless of age, gender or disposition. The funds raised could then be used to finance the nobles and knights of Christendom, who would be able to depart to the Holy Land and redeem their vows personally. Due to the fact that the military aristocracy was needed to carry out the Crusade in person, it therefore fell to the non-military classes at the poorer end of society to take the cross and then redeem their vows.\(^{224}\)

A further indication of Gregory’s plans to support the Holy Land can be seen in his decision to call for a universal tax across Christendom. Gregory’s letter of 28\(^{\text{th}}\) June, 1235 to the archbishop of Reims, details that the tax was to be levied on every man and woman, at the rate of a penny a week for ten years, with only crusaders being exempted. Every month the money raised would be declared by a local committee and distributed to local crusaders.\(^{225}\) But aside from this letter there are no further references to this tax, which suggests that the proposal was abandoned. The penny a week was more than many could afford and with inadequate methods of enforcement, the tax being voluntary, it seems likely that there was no participation in this initiative.\(^{226}\)

The role of the papacy in its support of crusading warfare was one that gradually developed over time and only by 1199 was material support being offered by the papacy. From 1095 until the pontificate of Innocent III the secular leaders had shouldered much of the responsibility for financing crusading warfare. The rapid expansion of papal efforts to finance crusading in the thirteenth century indicates that it was becoming increasingly the business of the Church to provide this support. The papal remit also grew to include not only the mobilisation of papal and Church finances, but the coordination of financial initiatives across Christendom.

Gregory IX’s penny-a-week plan further indicates the direction of papal thinking in regards to the need for long-term support for the Holy Land. Innocent’s tax of 1199 only lasted for year,\(^{227}\) this rose to a three-year period for the gathering of the twentieth in 1215,\(^{228}\) and also for the triennial Albigensian twentieth levied in France

\(^{224}\) *Lower, Barons’ Crusade*, p. 17.


\(^{226}\) *Lower, Barons’ Crusade*, p. 33.

\(^{227}\) *PL*, col. 829-830.

under Honorius. Gregory’s fund raising schemes for the Barons’ Crusade involved a similar three-year thirtieth tax upon the clergy of England and France, in addition to the ten-year voluntary tax proposed in 1235. Gregory himself seems to have appreciated the need for more sustained funding, stating in his letter to the archbishop of Rheims, that those fighting in the Holy Land should ‘be provided expenses for at least ten years. From the continues support of the alms of the faithful.’ The gradual increase in the length of the taxation period also allowed for greater sums to be levied overall. This measure also indicates the papacy’s recognition that brief flurries of crusading activity, as witnessed during the first century of crusading, were no longer adequate to secure the Christian position in the Holy Land. Instead, crusading warfare now called for sustained campaigns and an even greater dispatch of support to the Holy Land.

This increased need for funds is mirrored in the appeal made to crusaders regarding the length of time that should be spent in the Holy Land. Innocent’s Post miserabile commanded that ‘each of the earls and barons should, by their own means, send a number of warriors to the defence of the land of the nativity of our Lord, to be supported by predetermined sums of money, and there to remain for two years at least’. Innocent then raised this period to three years in Quia Maior and Ad Liberandem in his call for the Fifth Crusade. Honorius likewise demanded that Frederick II crusade for two years in the Holy Land. Only Gregory’s crusading appeals in 1234 and 1235 failed to specify a suitable time span for crusading activity, however clerics were allowed to pledge their benefices for a period of three years. Given the three-year period suggested for lay crusaders on previous expeditions, it may

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230 Registres, nos. 4605-4607, ‘ut liberaliter et benigne assentiant quod ecclesie et clerici suarum diocesum in tricesima reddituum suorum usque ad triennium predictis Terre Sancte et imperio provideant.’
231 Epistolae selectae saeculi, vol. 1, no. 646. ‘de fratrum nostrorum consilio militiam Christianam in partibus transmarinis, que iugiter contra hostes fidei prelium Domini prelietur, ad minus usque ad decem annos providimus instruendam , de fidelium elemosinis subsidium continuum habiturum.’
232 PL, vol. 214, col. 310, ‘comites et barones juxta facultates proprias ad defensionem terrae nativitatis Dominicae certum in expensis suis dirigant numerum bellatorum, illic saltem per biennium moraturum.’
233 PL, vol. 216, col. 819, ‘competentem numerum bellatorum cum expensis ad triennium necessariis secundum proprias facultates;’ Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta, p. 244, ‘competentem conferant numerum bellatorum cum expensis ad triennium necessariis.’
be the case that a similar period may have been imitated by crusaders throughout the Barons’ Crusade.

By mid-thirteenth century the role of papacy in the support of crusading greatly expanded, to the point where it became the dominant institution in providing support. Innocent, Honorius and Gregory all in their own ways attempted to address the problem of supporting crusading warfare, and this burden was increasingly taken by the Church as a whole. It was during this half-century that the expectation of papal support seemed to have been fostered. Indeed their ability to withhold or deny funding could lead to criticism as can be seen in Thibaut of Champagne’s poems written around the time of his departure in 1239. During this time Thibaut had intended to set out for the Holy Land, but Gregory instead wished him to crusade to the Latin Empire and denied him access to the vow redemptions raised in Champagne. Thibaut’s work demonstrates his growing frustration with Gregory’s crusading policies, not least because Gregory had denied him funding, going so far as to berate Gregory for his hypocrisy. ‘They slay the simple, God’s children, / The \textit{papelards} make the world tremble.’ The \textit{papelard} is a clear anthropomorphism of the Papacy and throughout the song \textit{Dex est ensi comme li pellicanz}, the \textit{papelard} seeks to prevent Christians from aiding the Holy Land and then chastises them for doing so. This episode indicates both the power of the papacy to command the resources it raised and also the expectation that it would use these resources to support crusading.

\textbf{Legates}

As crusading armies were never accompanied by any of the popes it therefore fell to others to deliver the resources raised by the papacy to the \textit{crucesignatii} for whom it was intended. In this capacity the legates became important figures in the support structures of crusading armies through their proxy control of funds raised by the papacy and from other sources. Throughout this period two legates were prominent in acting as

\footnotesize{236} Four of Thibaut’s songs are thought to have been written around the time of the Barons’ Crusade, Lower, \textit{Barons’ Crusade}, pp. 112-113.
\footnotesize{238} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 238-241.
supporting agents during crusading expeditions, Adhemar of Le Puy on the First Crusade and Pelagius of Albano on the Fifth Crusade.

There were other legates appointed to the other crusades during this period but their role does not seem to have included the support of other crusaders. During the Second Crusade, Theodwin of S. Rufina was appointed Legate to Conrad III’s expedition, whilst Guy of S. Grisogono made Legate to Louis VII’s force. In addition the French Bishops, Godfrey of Langres, Arnfulh of Lisieux and Alvisus of Arras were all endowed with legatine powers.\textsuperscript{240} Legates Theodwin and Guy are recorded as being present at the council at Acre, but do not seem to have been involved in any of the major decisions, with the kings taking the leading role in both expeditions.\textsuperscript{241} The French Bishops were much-criticised following the defeat of the Crusade for their meddling in the politics of the expeditions, most notably Godfrey of Langres for his staunchly anti-Byzantine stance.\textsuperscript{242} Henry of Albano was appointed as legate to the Germans by Gregory VIII as part of his preparations for the Third Crusade. However, despite his efforts to aid negotiations between the German, French and English kings who would take part in the Third Crusade he died in July 1189, before the crusade could depart.\textsuperscript{243} Baldwin of Forde, papal legate and archbishop of Canterbury was sent by Richard at the head of his advance party to aid in the defence of the Holy Land and arrived at Acre in September 1190.\textsuperscript{244} However, his role in the Holy Land seems to have been primarily as Richard’s lieutenant rather than as papal legate.\textsuperscript{245} Peter of Capua was appointed as legate by Innocent to the Fourth Crusade; however, he was facing grave difficulties from the start. The Venetians refused to accept him as Legate and would permit him to come as a preacher only. Neither Peter nor Innocent were willing accept the relegation of papal legate to this minor role, and so Peter did not re-join the crusade until after the conquest of Constantinople in 1204.\textsuperscript{246}

\begin{itemize}
\item Hiestand, ‘Papacy’, p. 38.
\item Philips,
\item Odo of Deuil, pp. 26, 68, 78.
\item Ralph of Diceto, vol. 2, pp. 60-62.
\end{itemize}
No legates were appointed to the crusades of Frederick II in 1227 or on the Barons’ Crusade in 1239.

Legates were also active on other crusading fronts. Eugenius III appointed Anselm of Havelburg as legate for the Wendish Crusade in the bull *Divina Dispensatione II*. Anselm’s role, like that of Adhemar Le Puy, made him notionally the leader of the expedition; however the Crusade was also led by Albert the Bear, Conrad of Meissen and other secular nobles with whom Anselm had to cooperate. There are no records relating to the mechanisms of support by which these armies were maintained, and it is likely that the crusaders relied upon their personal finances. Certainly Anselm does not appear to have taken any special role in the support of crusading efforts beyond that of the papal plenipotentiary on the expedition.

Contemporary to Pelagius is Arnaud Almaric, who played a significant role in the Albigensian Crusade that was being waged prior to and throughout the Fifth Crusade. Arnaud Almaric was important during the preaching of the Albigensian Crusade and was appointed to lead the expedition as the Papal Legate, eventually becoming Archbishop of Narbonne in 1212. However, contemporary accounts do not place a huge emphasis on the role of Arnaud Almaric during the Albigensian Crusade in a way comparable to Pelagius, nor was Arnaud entrusted with the Albigensian twentieth taxes raised in 1218.

The two legates most actively engaged in the support of crusading efforts remain Adhemar of Le Puy and Pelagius of Albano. This discussion will therefore focus upon the efforts of these two legates to provide support to the crusades of which they were a part. As with many aspects of the First Crusade, there is little evidence that Urban II had a clear idea of the role of the papal legates on crusade. The only surviving evidence regarding Adhemar’s appointment is the letter written by Urban in late 1095 to the Flemings, which appoints Adhemar as ‘leader of this expedition and undertaking in our stead, so that those who, perchance, may wish to undertake this journey should comply with his commands, as if they were our own, and submit fully to his loosings or bindings, as far as shall seem to belong to such an office.’

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247 *PL*, vol. 180, col. 1203.
250 *Kreuzzugsbriefe*, pp. 136-137, ‘carissimum filium Ademarum Podiensem episcopum, huius itineris ac laboris ducem, uice nostra constitutimus, ut quibus hanc uiam forte suscipere placuerit, eius iussionibus tamquam nostris parent atque eius solutionibus seu ligationibus, quantum ad hoc negotium pertinere
This would seem to provide Adhemar with the full plenipotentiary powers available to a papal legate, but with more specific instructions that the Flemish crusaders should attach themselves to his *comiatui*. With the lack of any funding, it is unlikely that Adhemar would be able to support any of the Flemish crusaders who followed him. This suggests that the *comiatui*, or following, referred to by Urban in fact implied a more distant form of authority, which enabled Adhemar to command but without the obligation to support his fellow crusaders.

If this was the case in December, 1095, the situation changed during the course of the Crusade. Firstly the notion of Adhemar wielding full control of the expedition, as dictated in his letter to the Flemings, needed to be reconciled with the political realities of the First Crusade. The expedition had attracted many powerful lords to its cause, notably Godfrey of Bouillon, Bohemond of Taranto, Raymond of St. Gilles, Robert of Normandy and Robert of Flanders. These men brought with them not only sizeable followings of their own, but the military expertise with which to conduct the expedition. Adhemar’s role in the First Crusade has come under scrutiny by historians, with differing views as to his importance within the crusade.

Adhemar’s role on the First Crusade increased as the Crusade progressed. Adhemar took charge of caring for the needs of the poor during the long siege of Antioch, in which there were a number of famines within the army causing much death and suffering. The call of Urban II had resulted in as many as 20,000 of the poor taking the cross, few of whom were of any military value, but they still had to be fed and supplied. It may have been Adhemar le Puy who instigated the practice of urging the wealthy to give a tenth of their funds to provide the *multi pauperos erant in exercitu, et multi infirmi*, though this is only recorded in detail after his death. The practice of giving a tenth clearly comes out of the practices of the Church in the West, where a tenth was paid to the Church. Adhemar therefore seems to have asserted the role of the Church on Crusade as it existed in the medieval West; the principal source of charity...
and succour for the poor. On one occasion Tancred returned victorious from one foray outside Antioch, taking the heads of seven hundred Turks, in jest he then gave a tithe of seventy heads to Adhemar, and in return he was granted funds by Adhemar to replenish his coffers.\textsuperscript{255} Guibert of Nogent reports of Adhemar, ‘he showed great care for the souls of the poor, always teaching the rich to love the needy, to help them in their need, insisting that they were the guardians of the poor.’\textsuperscript{256}

There is no indication from any surviving letters from Urban that Adhemar was directed to fulfil this role, so it is likely that Adhemar acted in response to the situation he faced during the siege of Antioch. It is likely that his own efforts to aid other crusaders were driven by his own interpretation of the vague mandate provided by Urban and by his own industry and desire to aid his fellow crusaders.

The role of the Papal Legate on the Fifth Crusade has also drawn a considerable amount of scholarly attention. Pelagius’ supposed feud with John of Brienne is often viewed as a contributing factor to the failure of the Fifth Crusade.\textsuperscript{257} However, as Powell and others have argued in their coverage of the Fifth Crusade, there were relatively few instances where their personalities or policies conflicted. Pelagius from the start of the crusade had no military command, and sole military command was held by John of Brienne for most of the expedition.\textsuperscript{258} So whilst Pelagius’ role as a military leader remains in grave doubt, his role in supporting crusading efforts in Egypt was perhaps his most significant contribution, and one which continued to grow throughout the crusade.

Pelagius’ letter of appointment given by Honorius on 12\textsuperscript{th} June, 1218 awarded him comparable proxy powers to act in the stead of the pontiff with the full range of plenipotentiary powers that this entailed.\textsuperscript{259} Although Honorius gave these powers with the instruction that Pelagius \textit{et sic modeste procedas in omnibus et discrete}. Equipped with these powers, Pelagius operated as Honorius’ agent in the Holy Land, and it is

\textsuperscript{255} Ralph of Caen, p. 644, ‘caesis circiter septingentis, caesorum capita Tancredus lxx Appodiensi transmittit episcopo, decimam de triumpho: quibus oblatis, episcopus gemino percellitur gaudio.’

\textsuperscript{256} Guibert of Nogent, p. 246, ‘gesserat tanta sollicitudine curam, ut divitibus id prae omnibus in dies duceret inculcandum, quatinus egenos diligerent, eorumque misericordiis insisterent, ipsos asserens suae ipsorum vita custodiam.’


\textsuperscript{258} Powell, \textit{Anatomy}, pp. 115, 161.

\textsuperscript{259} Pressutti, 1433, ‘Ut autem nihil tibi desit ex illis que ad plenitudinem legationis pertinent exequende, plenarium tibi auctoritate presentium concedimus facultatem, ut cum necesse fuerit vice nostra illa etiam exequaris que nostro sunt speciali privilegio reservata, firmiter inhibentes nequis processum tuum provocationis obiectu audeat impedire.’
clear from the letters exchanged between the two men that they enjoyed a good working relationship. For instance, Pelagius carried out Honorius’ request from the letter of 2nd January 1221 that negotiations be attempted with the Muslims. Both men were likewise in agreement that the terms were unacceptable. And Honorius’ letters continued to bolster Pelagius’ resolve and lend him the spiritual and moral authority to resolve disputes and keep the peace between the crusaders.260

In his role supporting crusaders in the Holy Land, Pelagius seems to have emulated a role similar to that of Adhemar, by using the resources dispatched to him as a form of common fund through which crusading efforts might be supported. Pelagius was able to fund several enterprises during the campaign such as the construction of the assault boats by the Venetian, Genoese and Pisan crusaders in 1219.261 The majority of the letters sent to Pelagius by Honorius allowed the legate great latitude for the dispensation of funding to the crusading army. There were instances where Honorius directed funds to be allocated to specific parties, such as the grant of funding to the Templars and Hospitallers in January, 1219.262 It is clear that these funds were not held in common, but were under the immediate authority of Pelagius, the funds being referred to as the vicesima. Thus, whilst the control of money seems to have been firmly in Pelagius’ hands, the funds at his disposal may be used in way similar to the alms collected by Adhemar. With a large portion of the twentieth tax of 1215 being sent to Pelagius this would have greatly increased his capacity to provide support to crusaders in Egypt.263

While papal policy insisted that the crusade should be conducted for a period of three years, James Powell suggests that most nobles only stayed in Egypt for around eighteen months, with many having departed by the Summer of 1220.264 The departure of these nobles would normally have resulted in their following departing with them;

260 Pressutti, 2338, ‘Ne autem occasione terre vobis iam date a Domino vel sicut speramus in posterum dande aliquq quod abis inter vos possit dissensio suboriri, tam super iam acquisitis, quam decetero dante Domino acquirendis plenam ipsi legato, tam in temporalibus, quam in spiritualibus, commisisimus potestatem, ita ut per se aut per alios libere illam exerceat prout res videbitur postulare.’
262 Pressutti 1824, ‘quinque milia marcarum, duobus milibus quingentis uni, et totidem alteri, assignatis in predicte Terre subsidium destinamus, sive in galeis, sive in machinis alis, seu in alio apparatum secundum .. providentiam utilitier expendenda’
263 Powell, Anatomy, pp. 97-100.
264 Powell, Anatomy, pp. 116-117.
however it may be that Pelagius was able to sustain those who could not afford to remain in the Holy Land due to their lack of funds.

The extent of Pelagius’ patronage during the Fifth Crusade may be observed in the gradual increase in his influence during the crusade. Following the fall of Damietta in July 1220 Oliver of Paderborn describes Pelagius’ frustration at the stagnation of the crusade: Deinde principes ac duces multitudinis convocavit et in sermone publico populum torpem ac otio deditum excitavit ad laborem.265 However, following the arrival of Louis of Bavaria in May 1221, Pelagius was able to goad the army into action.266 The lack of opposition to this plan may indicate the dominance of Pelagius, as by this point in the crusade many of the magnates had already departed Egypt. It possible that after so many years at Damietta the personal finances of many crusaders had run out and that they were now dependent upon the financial support provided by Honorius via his legate. Pelagius role as a distributor of support for many, may have been a significant factor in enabling him to push the crusader host into battle.

The role and significance of Adhemar of Le Puy and Pelagius of Albano in the support of crusading warfare differs greatly, though both were important to the expeditions in which they participated. Both legates enjoyed similar legatine powers, and had considerable freedom of action in pursuing the wishes of their masters in the curia, and both men saw it as their duty to provide support for their fellow crusaders. The availability of resources was central to the role that legates took on the crusade. The lack of funds meant that Adhemar had to raise money from the wealthy crusaders in order to provide for the poor on the First Crusade. In contrast Pelagius’ control over the funds raised by Honorius greatly expanded his role in supporting his fellow crusaders, demonstrating the potential influence that could be held by legates on crusade.

Control of resources is not the only factor in determining the scope of legatine influence. Many legates accompanied the crusades of this period, but only Adhemar and Pelagius acted as providers on crusade. It required motivation and energy to attempt to create support structures to provide for other crusaders and, where necessary, to raise resources. Many of the legates that took part in crusading did not play an active role in supporting crusaders. This is partly a reflection of the predominance of other support provided by monarchs, lords or families. However, Adhemar’s industry in creating his

265 Oliver of Paderborn, p. 249.
266 Powell, Anatomy, p. 107
support networks is an indication of the combined need for a proactive attitude and the resources with which to work.

**Emperors and Kings**

Many popes actively sought the involvement of the monarchs of the medieval West and some were specifically targeted by papal preaching and diplomatic efforts to encourage them to take the cross. The emperors and kings commanded large resources and their participation was likely to result in many of their subjects taking the cross also. However, it is often hard to discern what monarchs were meant to contribute to the crusade and it would appear the expectations placed upon monarchs changed over time. This expectation seems to have grown with the changing nature of crusading warfare and also with the papal assertions as to the crusading obligations of rulers. The rulers of Europe also varied in their ability to meet these expectations. Richard I and Frederick II were able to harness centralised institutions within their realms to support their followers on crusade. Other leaders lacked sufficient resources with which to provide support, neither did they have sufficient authority as monarchs to fully fulfil their role as a crusading king.

During the preaching of the First Crusade, the very personal nature of Urban’s appeal does not outline the role he intended for any monarchs who took the cross. This may be due to the fact that royal recruitment was unlikely at the time of the First Crusade due to Urban II’s recent dispute with Philip I of France over Philip’s bigamous marriage and his conflict with Henry VI of Germany regarding the investiture controversy. The first papal move towards royal involvement came with Eugenius III’s bull, *Quantum Praedecessores*, which was addressed very directly to Louis VII of France. However aside from Louis’s expected participation in the Second Crusade, Eugenius did not explicitly outline the role that Louis was expected to play in the support of the crusaders from France, or from anywhere else. Jonathan Phillips suggests that the primary target of Eugenius’ effort was in fact Conrad III of Germany. Conrad’s involvement, encouraged by Eugenius and Bernard of Clairvaux, would have added Conrad’s military resources to the expedition. However, there is still

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267 Riley-Smith, *First Crusaders*, pp. 88-89; Asbridge, *First Crusade*, p. 56.
268 PL, col. 1064.
no mention of the extent to which Conrad was expected to aid his German subjects on crusade.

During the fallow period between the failure of the Second Crusade and the fall of Jerusalem, there were attempts to encourage Henry II of England and Louis VII to take the cross to combat the worsening situation in the East. Money was sent to the Holy Land in 1166 and 1185 and commitments were made to go on crusade, but papal appeals failed to secure a crusade to the Holy Land until after the fall of Jerusalem in October, 1187. The reaction to the fall of Jerusalem compelled Richard I of England, Philip II of France and Emperor Frederick Barbarossa to take the cross. However, Gregory VIII’s *Audita tremendi* neglected to define a clear role for the monarchs in preparation for the Third Crusade, although Gregory does list the ‘quarrels between kings and princes’ amongst the sins of the Christian people that brought about the fall of Jerusalem.\(^{270}\) Whilst all three monarchs went to considerable lengths to support their subjects, but it is unclear to what extent this support was expected by Gregory VIII or by their subjects.

In Innocent III’s crusading bull of 1198, *Post miserabile*, the participation of kings is specifically referred to, but this bull failed to secure royal participation in the Fourth Crusade. However, *Post miserabile* is significant in that it reflects Innocent’s plans for how future crusades should be organised. Richard I of England and Philip of France are addressed directly, and are commanded to effect ‘a reconciliation between them(selves), or at least obtaining a truce for at least five years and exhorting the people to the service of the cross.’\(^{271}\) Peace between the English and French kings would thereby enable their subjects to take an active part in the crusade. The peace insisted upon by *Post miserabile* would become a staple of papal crusading policy, and would feature in future crusading appeals. But, the role of kings on crusade still remains unclear in Innocent’s appeal, whereas the other leaders are actively encouraged to participate: ‘Earls and barons, according to their means, send a number of warriors to the defence of the land of the nativity of our Lord.’ It is uncertain whether the expectations outlined in *Post miserabile* were intended to include emperors and kings,

\(^{270}\) ‘Historia de expedition’, p. 8.

\(^{271}\) *PL*, vol. 214, col. 310-311, ‘ad charissimorum in Christo filiorum nostrorum Philippi Francorum et Richardi Anglorum regum illustrium destinamus ad reformandam pacem vel treugas saltem usque ad quinquennium ordinandas et exhortandos populos ad obsequium crucifixi.’
as this appeal was not made to them directly.\(^{272}\) It may be that political disagreements between the English and French kings during the Third Crusade led to Innocent focusing his appeal of 1098 to the earls and barons, rather than the monarchs of the West.

The expectations placed upon the kings and princes of the West are more tangibly defined in *Quia Maior* issued in April 1213 in preparation for the Fifth Crusade. They were directed, like the clergy, to provide ‘an adequate number of fighting men with expenses for three years . . . according to their own means.’\(^{273}\) This appeal was then repeated in *Ad Liberandam* issued in November 1215, asking that ‘those who cannot go in person contribute an adequate number of soldiers with their necessary expenses for three years, according to their means and for the remission of their sins.’\(^{274}\) Innocent now attempted to impose crusading obligations on the monarchs of Europe with the hope that they would then lend their manpower and money towards the crusade, even if they did not attend in person.

From the monarchs of the medieval West, only Frederick II responded to the call to crusade, however securing Frederick’s participation in line with papal expectations would prove a difficult affair. There is no extant record of the original appeal made to Frederick by Honorius, however Frederick’s letter of 12\(^{th}\) January 1219 suggests that it is in reply to a previous letter received from Honorius. Honorius’ original letter sent to the archbishops of England and France related an appeal by the crusaders in Egypt for men and money now that their resources had been exhausted.\(^{275}\) However, Honorius’ surviving letters are regrettably less clear about the demands expected from Frederick. A letter dated 7\(^{th}\) October, 1219 to Frederick complaining of his failure to depart refers to Frederick’s commitment *ad Terre Sancte subsidium* or later in the text, *ad Terre Sancte succursum.*\(^{276}\) Further letters from Honorius are no

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\(^{272}\) *PL*, vol. 214, col. 310, ‘comites et barones juxta facultates proprias ad defensionem terrae nativitatis Dominicae certum in expensis suis dirigant numerum bellatorum.’

\(^{273}\) *PL*, vol. 216, col. 818-819, ‘competentem numerum bellatorum cum expensis ad triennium necessariis secundum proprias facultates. . . . Postulantes hoc ipsum a regibus et principibus, comitibus et baronibus, alisque magnatibus, qui forsitans per seipsos personaliter non accesserint ad obsequium Crucifixi.’

\(^{274}\) *Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta*, p. 244.

\(^{275}\) Presutti, 1716, ‘ut cum expense [sic] quas fecerunt et faciunt in machinis et galeis ac alii bellici sumptus eos pecunia sic exhauserint, ut viris bello strenuis qui pro defectu rerum remeare coguntur, necessaria ministrame non possint, et sic exercitus paulatim cotidie dilabatur, eis post Deum in cismarinorum auxilio totam spem suam habentibus, tam bellorum quam pecunie succursum mittere festinemus.’

\(^{276}\) Presutti, 2207.
more explicit in detailing Frederick’s general commitments to offer support or aid to the Holy Land.

Although German and Sicilian forces were committed to the Fifth Crusade, Frederick’s own crusading vow remained unfulfilled. Honorius therefore intended to codify Frederick’s crusading obligations following his failure to aid the crusade in Egypt personally. These commitments were outlined in the agreement between the emperor and Honorius reached at the council at San Germano July, 1225. The agreement called for Frederick to depart for the Holy Land along with at least 1,000 knights and stay in the Holy Land for at least two years, retaining the knights at his own expense. For every knight in that thousand that he could not provide he was to give 50 marks a year in lieu of the absent knight to be given to Teutonic Knights for the defence of the Holy Land. Frederick also agreed to provide passage for a further 2,000 knights, along with their households and three horses per knight in subsequent passages to the Holy Land. Frederick was also required to pay a surety of 100,000 ounces of gold to Patriarch John of Jerusalem and Herman of Salza, the master of the Teutonic Knights. This could then be reclaimed when Frederick arrived in the Holy Land.

The San Germano agreement gives a detailed account of Frederick’s crusading obligations and makes it clear that he was to be responsible for the recruitment and support of his forces in the Holy Land. This document might be regarded as exceptional owing to Frederick’s poor record as a crusader, which was awash with postponements and delays. Honorius by 1225 seems to have been unwilling to accept vague promises to provide support to Holy Land, instead requiring detailed commitments from Frederick.

The pressure placed upon Frederick is in contrast to *Rachel Suum Videns* issued in 1234, which only asks that any kings or princes not going in person should ‘send an appropriate number of fighters with all necessary expenses, according to their own

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277 *Constitutiones*, p. 129, ‘*Per presens scriptum notum facimus universis, quod nos transibimus in subsidium Terre Sancte ab instanti Augusto presentis XIII. indictionis ad duos annos et per biennium tenebimus ibi mille milites ad minus a; ita quod si aliquos de ipso numero statuto tempore deesse contigerit, in quinquaginta marchis argenti per annum defectum militis redimemus.*’

278 *Ibid.*, p. 129, ‘*Passagium dabimus, si venerint in primo passagio vel in duobus subsequentibus passagiis, duobus milibus militum et familias eorum et per militum tribus equis.*’

279 *Ibid.*, p. 129, ‘*Quando autem nos in fine biennii ad passagium assignatum transsiremus, rex et patriarcha et magister domus Teotonicorum predicti ad laudem et consilium magistrorum Hospitalis et Templi ac aliorum proborum hominum de terra expendent eandem pecuniam bona fide, sicut melius viderint expedire utilitati Terre Sancte, in servitio Iesu Christi et terre pro salute anime nostre et antecessorum nostrorum.*’
means, in support of the Holy Land."\textsuperscript{280} A further appeal was made to Louis IX of France urging him to make peace with Henry III of England, or else to renew their truce.\textsuperscript{281} No formal peace was reached as result of Gregory’s urgings, but the situation was peaceful enough for preaching and recruitment to take place in England and France. There does not appear to have been any real pressure placed upon either Louis IX or Henry III to take the cross following Gregory’s initial appeal, but it is significant that both kings utilised their resources to endow gifts upon departing subjects.

\textbf{The Mobilisation of Royal Finances}

The ability of monarchs to support crusading rested upon their ability to harness the resources of their realms and effectively deploy them on crusade. This continued to be a feature of crusading finance for emperors and kings from the crusades of Louis VII and Conrad III in the Second Crusade through to the funding provided by Louis VIII and Henry III during the Barons’ Crusade in the 1240s. More ambitious schemes were later developed by various monarchs to raise funds in support of crusading expeditions in the form of extraordinary taxes as will be explored in the next chapter; however, many monarchs continued to rely upon their established financial mechanisms to support crusading.

To finance his part in the Second Crusade, Louis VII of France had to rely heavily on the French royal domains around Paris, as he lacked the authority to raise the money from across his kingdom, and even in his own lands his fiscal institutions were at best rudimentary. Louis relied heavily upon the French Church to provide him with the necessary funds with which to go on Crusade, Robert of Torigny writing in the 1150s described Louis VII raising funds through the ‘plunder of the poor and despoiling of churches.’\textsuperscript{282} While Louis is unlikely to have been as ruthless as this impression demonstrates, charters prior to his departure demonstrate that he was making demands on the French Church. Giles Constable’s discussion of the charters from Fleury reveals that Louis found it challenging to extract these funds, with Louis’ initial demand for 1,000 marks being reduced by negotiation to 300 marks and 500 gold bezants (around


\textsuperscript{281} Registres, no. 2180, ‘Christianissime principum, instanter exposcimus ut, pacem in regno tuo conservans, cum carissimo in Christo filio nostro . . . illustri rege Anglie pacis federa studeas reformare, vel saltem, ut interim de pace tractetur cum eo.’

\textsuperscript{282} Robert of Torigny, ‘Chronicon’, MGH, vol. 6, p. 497.
Louis also made demands from the French towns; charters from August, 1146 and February, 1147 from the church at Le Puy reveal Louis’s request for aid from Stephan, bishop of Le Puy ‘out of the money of the city.’ The nature of Louis’ demands has been interpreted differently, Robert of Torigny and Ralph of Diceto, writing in 1190, described Louis’ actions as a ‘national census’. However, a more cautious interpretation would view Louis’ actions as an ad hoc series of demands to raise funds for his expedition. His lack of authority is demonstrated in his dealings with Fleury and the absence of further demands suggests a piecemeal accumulation of crusading funds.

Forty years later when Louis’ son Philip II came to take the cross, the French monarchy had begun to expand its hold on the French kingdom, and as such was in a stronger financial position in terms of its ability to raise resources. Philip attempted to implement the Saladin Tithe in France, but his efforts were blocked by opposition from the French clergy. Lacking the authority of the English kings to raise the Tithe, Philip instead resorted to his existing fiscal structures. The prévôtes, or royal centres, into which the Capetian lands were divided, helped to funnel the regular revenues of the French kings, drawn from land, rents, tolls, mills and many other sources. The majority of these sums were very small and a substantial part of it was paid in produce, but some tolls could raise as much as 1,400 livres annually. Philip also gradually increased the size of his lands, and the revenues they generated grew throughout his reign. The gîte was the right of the French king to demand hospitality for himself and his entourage, Philip sought to commute the gîte in exchange for an annual fixed sum. In 1189, Philip commuted the three night’s hospitality owned from the town of Laon for an annual fee of 200 livres. However, from these revenues the proportion that found their way into the funding of Philip’s expedition is unknown. Philips’ war chest was greatly increased by a payment of 24,000 marks from Richard of England as a relief to secure his father’s French possessions, though it is questionable as to how much of this sum Philip actually received or was able to use to fund his crusade.

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283 Constable, ‘Financing’, pp. 64-65
286 Baldwin, Government of Philip, p. 53; Bradbury, Philip Augustus, p. 78.
288 Tyerman, England, p. 79.
For much of his reign, Philip’s conflict with Richard I and John of England prevented him from either taking the cross or lending the full weight of French royal support to departing French crusaders.\(^\text{289}\) However, by the 1230s the situation had changed somewhat, and though Louis IX was reluctant to take the cross personally, French nobles were able to receive royal backing for their expeditions. In 1239, Amalric of Montfort, constable of France, received the French royal arms and 32,000 *livres parisis* to support his crusade to the Holy Land.\(^\text{290}\) Louis was also able to provide support to those from outside his kingdom. Baldwin of Courtenay was granted a loan of 50,000 *livres parisis* when Baldwin pawned his newly acquired possession of Namur.\(^\text{291}\) In May 1239, Louis IX also gave the followers of Baldwin of Courtenay small sums of thirty or forty *sous*.\(^\text{292}\)

The French kings also raised considerable funds from the Jews within their realms. The French kings seem largely to have regarded the French Jewry as their personal possession, and as such were ideal targets for economic exploitation. The Jews of the Rhineland had seen similar exploitation during the First Crusade, and during preparations for the Second Crusade, Peter the Venerable, abbot of Cluny, highlighted the role that Jews might play in funding the crusade.\(^\text{293}\) However, due to a lack of records regarding Louis’ preparations, it is unclear what exactions were made from the Jews to support his expedition.

At the start of Philip II’s reign, Ralph of Diceto reported that Philip managed to raise 15,000 marks from the French Jews through a mixture of ransoms, expropriation of debts and confiscation of property.\(^\text{294}\) This was to become a feature of French royal finance for the first decade of his reign, with smaller sums being raised from the Jews in the years after 1179.\(^\text{295}\) It is therefore likely that Philip continued to exploit the Jews in France in preparation for his participation during the Third Crusade.

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\(^{292}\) *RHFG*, vol. 22, pp. 593–594, ‘Itinera, dona et hernesia anno domini M. CC. XXIX, inter ascensionem et omnes sanctos.’


Royal exploitation of the Jews continued on a more modest scale in support of the Barons’ Crusade. In a letter of 10th December, 1238, Gregory encouraged Louis to contribute the proceeds of Jewish usury to Baldwin of Courtenay’s crusade. Due to the lack of direct royal participation the Jews in the royal domains received less attention than the Jews of Brittany and Champagne.

In contrast to the French crusading finances, the finances of English kings are far better documented, largely due to the institutions that administered English royal finances and the survival of these records. Henry II was greatly aided in this by the higher degree of centralisation in England and Normandy, however his subsequent defeat and death brought to an end his crusading plans and we will never know the extent to which Henry would have harnessed his conventional royal incomes to supplement the funds raised by the Saladin Tithe.

The English crusading expedition was taken over by Richard I, who proceeded to raise large sums of money following his succession to the throne in July, 1089. These measures attest to Richard’s drive to amass resources for the crusade and also the extensive cash-generating options available to an Angevin monarch. There was no shortage of ambitious men with the funds to purchase offices from their new king, and Richard was also able to arrest and impose fines upon former officers. This is illustrated in the case of the sheriffdom of Worcestershire, where the incumbent sheriff, Robert Marmion, was removed from his post as sheriff and fined £1000. William Beauchamp then paid 100 marks to secure the office of sheriff. In all Richard removed twenty-two of the twenty-seven sheriffs in England, indicating the scale of profits that could be made from arriving and departing sheriffs.

Many of these officials, such as Robert Marmion and Rannulf of Glanville, had been prominent under Henry II and enabled Richard to have his own men in office, whilst enabling him to raise fines from those he arrested. Many other offices and titles were also sold to those rich men who had the means to buy them; Hugh de Puiset was able to secure the earldom of Northumberland for £10,000 and Godfrey de Luci managed to obtain the sheriffdom of Hampshire along with the custody of castles at

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296 Registres, no. 4641.
298 Gillingham, Richard, p. 115
Winchester and Portchester for £3,000. Richard secured a payment of 10,000 marks from William of Scotland in exchange for the castles of Berwick and Roxburgh. It is hard to fully assess the total sums that Richard was able to raise for his expedition, because the only two estimates of English finances made at this time by Gervase of Canterbury and Roger of Howden also encompassed the funds raised by Henry II.

Whilst the money amassed by Richard was certainly considerable and contemporaries remarked on his eagerness to raise these sums, the means by which he did so are consistent with the normal means of raising finances by his predecessors. What is remarkable is the short space of time in which these funds were amassed, illustrating Richard’s haste to raise money for his expedition. It may also be the case that Henry’s funds raised through the Saladin Tithe were spent in his struggle against Richard and Philip II. After Henry’s death and Richard’s succession, with his father’s funds drained Richard may have been forced to rely on more conventional sources of English royal funds.

Support from the English kings greatly increased in response to Gregory IX’s requests for aid, and Henry III directed substantial royal sums towards the English crusaders destined for the Holy Land. The chief beneficiary of this largesse was his brother Richard, earl of Cornwall, who received generous grants to help pay for his crusade. Henry authorized the tax on Jews, which granted 3,000 marks to Richard and later gave much of Gregory’s thirtieth tax to Richard, with 6,000 marks of the tax being transferred to the Paris Temple as part of Richard’s war chest in May, 1238. Henry III was also able to dispense other sums to other subjects, Amaury of St. Amand received 50 marks, Roland of Bray received 20 marks and Reynold of Bernevall 10 marks. Henry granted Thiery of Nussa, prior of the English Hospitallers, a £1,000 loan towards his crusading costs. Bertram le Gros sold land to the king for 40 marks and William of Mastac pledged all the land he held to Henry for the sum of £180.

Henry III also gave pay in advance which added to the crusading resources of some crusignati. The English knight William of Trubleville, after the death of his brother Henry, received an advance on his knight’s fee of 20l in order that he might fulfil his brother’s vow, received in February, 1240.\textsuperscript{309} Robert of Sabiol received 400 marks for himself and his followers to campaign in the Holy Land for a year.\textsuperscript{310} Even sergeants in royal service also received their wages in arrears to help fund their crusade, Peter of Lungevill, Adam of Beretin and Peter of Bareny each received fifty-eight shillings from Henry towards their expenses.\textsuperscript{311}

In England, the Jews provided the English crown with a valuable source of revenue with which to raise crusading finances. In 1188 Henry II raised a tallage of 10,000 marks against the Jews of England, this was then followed by an additional 2,000 marks imposed by Richard in 1190.\textsuperscript{312} In 1237, Henry III ordered a levy of 3,000 marks in support of the crusade of his brother, Richard of Cornwall.\textsuperscript{313} However, these sums are relatively modest and would only have amounted to a small proportion of the royal revenues for the crusade.

In the Holy Roman Empire, little is known about Conrad III’s efforts to finance his expedition. No letters or contemporary authors comment on any special efforts to raise crusading funds, with no records made of demands on the German Church, the Jews or the towns. So we must therefore assume that Conrad instead relied on the considerable resources already available to the German monarchs.\textsuperscript{314} Traditionally the German monarchs relied on incomes from their own estates, silver mines and tribute from the Slavs, this was then supplemented by servitia owed from churches.\textsuperscript{315}

Frederick Barbarossa, who took the cross in March, 1188, also seems to have relied heavily upon his own resources with which to amass his crusading war chest. Contemporary authors make it clear that Frederick assembled a considerable sum for the crusade, the author of the \textit{Historia de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris} remarked

\begin{footnotes}
\item[309] \textit{Ibid.}, vol. 1, p. 464. This was later raised to 60l.
\item[310] \textit{Ibid.}, vol. 1, p. 378.
\item[311] \textit{Ibid.}, vol. 2, p. 378.
\end{footnotes}
that Frederick spared no expense in his preparations for the crusade.\textsuperscript{316} Otto of St. Blasien also relates that upon Frederick’s death, a large amount of treasure was distributed by his son Frederick of Swabia. Alan Murray has calculated the cost of the German expedition at 81,000-90,000 marks, though the extent to which these costs were born by Frederick is unclear.\textsuperscript{317} Despite the considerable resources raised by Barbarossa, he still relied upon crusaders to raise their own finances:

‘The emperor . . . issued a decree that forbade anyone on foot, or who lacked the capacity in the use of arms, also anyone who could not finance themselves for the journey for at least two years, from undertaking the way of pilgrimage with him, since a weak and unwarlike crowd was customarily more of a hindrance than help to such a difficult situation.’\textsuperscript{318}

This would indicate that Frederick was aware of the huge cost the crusade, and was unwilling to subsidise useless mouths. In previous expeditions of the emperor to Italy, German knights with an income of over five marks per annum were to receive 10 marks and 40 ells of cloth for their travel as far as the Alps, after this they would receive one mark for every month on the Italian side of the Alps.\textsuperscript{319} Frederick’s insistence that German crusaders should have sufficient funds for two years would indicate that he was not prepared to provide a similar subsidy on crusade. However, comparable directives had been given in previous crusades with little success, so it is unclear to what extent this was adhered to.

The resources available to the Holy Roman Emperors greatly increased when the Kingdom of Sicily came under their sway and provided an important source of income for the crusade of Frederick II in 1227-1229. Roger II of Sicily’s reorganisation of the fiefs owing military service to the king was recorded in the \textit{Catalogus Barorum}. This therefore provides a rough gauge of the potential military force and financial sums

\textsuperscript{316} ‘Historia de expedition Friderici imperatoris’, p. 67, ‘nec postea dabantur eidem expensae, ut primitus de domo Regis.’
\textsuperscript{318} ‘Historia Peregrinorum’, ed. A. Chroust, \textit{MGH STRG n.s.}, vol. 5, p. 126, ‘Imperator itaque videns et gaudens milicium Christi sic leto affluere incremento, edicto prohibuit, ut nemo pedes, nemo usibus armorum minus idoneus, nullus etiam qui ad minus in biennium summptus itineris a habere non posset, peregrinationis viam secum arriperet, quoniam ad tam laboriosam expeditionem magis impedire quam expedire vulgus inbelle et debile consuevit.’
\textsuperscript{319} Arnold, \textit{German Knighthood}, p. 24.
that could be mustered by the kings of Sicily.\footnote{Loud, ‘Church, warfare and military’, pp. 31-45.} James Powell has suggested that this method of direct royal recruitment was used by William II when he raised his fleet in 1187, and when Frederick raised his fleet in 1221 to aid the Fifth Crusade at Damietta.\footnote{Powell, ‘Crusading’, p. 143.} Frederick’s crusade of 1227-1229 also extensively utilised the \textit{Catalogus Baronum} as a means of raising funds to meet his crusading obligations made at San Germano in 1225. Frederick II continued this practice in 1231 when he wrote to Samson, justicar of Basilicata, instructing him to raise one knight from each ten fiefs for service in the Holy Land. Frederick also ordered that they be equipped with two horses and should be provided with fifty ounces of gold to cover their expenses for one year.\footnote{Acta Imperii Inedita Seculi XIII Et XIV. Urkunden Und Briefe Zur Geschichte Des Kaiserreichs Und Des Konigreichs Sicilien in Den Jahren 1198-1400, ed. E. Winkelmann (Innsbruck, 1880), p. 607-608.}

The authority of the German emperors was expanding during this period, and German rulers were increasingly able to raise finances from their German lands. However, the kingdom of Sicily enjoyed a far more centralised system of royal control than Germany, and the methods of fund-raising offered by the \textit{Catalogus Baronum} presented Frederick with a far more reliable mechanism for raising the crusading finances that he required. The lack of comparable fiscal institutions in the Holy Roman Empire therefore made Sicily a preferable source of support for Frederick.

The demands of crusading forced many monarchs in the West to turn to already established means of funding that they could readily count on. However, even from the Second Crusade it became apparent that these resources were insufficient to execute a successful campaign in the Holy Land. After the departure of Louis VII from France in 1147, it was only a matter of weeks before he wrote to his regent Suger, abbot of St. Denis, with an appeal for him to send \textit{pecunia scilicet perquirenda} to him immediately, indicating Louis’ shortage of funds.\footnote{RHFG, vol. 15, p. 487, ‘De caetero, rerum status ipse nos admonet, immo et urget et arguit, ut admonitionis vestrae memores simus, de pecunia scilicet perquirenda, quae post vestigia nostra in usu impensarum nostrarum deferatur.’} Richard I of England’s rapid raising of funds prior to his crusade demonstrates the rigorous exploitation of the conventional resources of the English crown, but Richard’s claiming of his sister’s entire dowry from Tancred of 20,000 marks and the subsequent sale of Cyprus to the Templars highlight his need to further replenish his coffers. Although emperors and kings were able to finance their own limited participation, and to aid their subjects’ expeditions, these funds were wholly insufficient for a large-scale sustained campaign in the Holy Land. With
growing expectations placed upon the rulers to support crusaders the need for extraordinary measures seems to have been recognised by the late twelfth century, as can be seen in the Anglo-French attempts to raise the Saladin Tithe. However, the capacity of kingdoms to raise these funds varied greatly, with England and Sicily benefiting from central fiscal mechanisms, whilst other kingdoms were forced to rely on more traditional resources. This stimulated the need for assistance from the Church or else relying upon their own subjects to sustain themselves.

Lords and Families
Despite the efforts of the papacy and the monarchs of the West to support crusading, a large amount of financial preparation was conducted at a far lower level. The lords and nobles of the West took an active part in crusading and were determined to mobilise their own resources to support themselves and their followers. However, like the lay and clerical leaders, lords too found that their role in the crusades began to change, as the expectations of support from them began to increase. Families were also important in raising funds and could exploit family resources to enable their members to take the cross. As can be seen in warfare in the West, these kinship networks played a significant role in recruitment and in the support structures that were formed during the expeditions.

Many of the crusades lacked the participation of any of the European monarchs; deprived of this royal leadership, many crusades became centred around powerful regional magnates. The First Crusade saw the emergence of several powerful lords, Godfrey of Bouillon, Bohemond of Taranto, Raymond of St. Gilles, Robert of Normandy and Robert of Flanders. These men would go on to dominate the First Crusade, and with legate Adhemar of Le Puy, effectively became the governing council for the crusade. This was then mirrored in the follow-up crusade of 1101, where the forces led by Raymond of St. Gilles, Count Stephen of Blois, Duke Stephen of Burgundy, Bishop Anselm of Milan, Albert of Biandrate, Hugo of Montbeel and Conrad, constable to Emperor Henry III, also seem to have led regional contingents described by Albert of Aachen as Longobardorum, Provinciales and Theutonicos. The Fourth Crusade, like the First Crusade, produced a sizeable number of crusading magnates. Innocent’s preaching efforts bore fruit with the recruitment of Thibaut of France, ‘Patronage’, pp. 14-17
325 Albert of Aachen, pp. 586, 592-594, 606.
Champagne, Louis of Blois, Baldwin of Flanders, Hugh of St. Pol and later Boniface of Montferrat. There was also a substantial presence from the clergy with six bishops present among the crusading host along with many other nobles from France and Germany.\textsuperscript{326}

The Fifth Crusade was joined by John of Brienne, however in practice the crusade was dominated by nobles who arrived in Egypt throughout the course of the expedition. These included Leopold of Austria,\textsuperscript{327} Robert Courzon, Henry of Bar, Hugh of La Marche, Hervé of Nevers, Matthew of Apulia, Henry of Schwerin, Louis of Bavaria and Oliver, son of John of England.\textsuperscript{328} They were joined by legate Pelagius of Albano who arrived in the Spring of 1219 to add his voice to the crusading council. The Barons’ Crusade focused around Richard of Cornwall, Peter of Brittany, Thibaut of Champagne, Hugh of Burgundy, Amalric of Montfort, and Henry of Bar.\textsuperscript{329}

The expectations placed upon these lords to support their followers were in many ways similar to those of the emperors and kings. Many of the initial crusading appeals, such as the First and Second Crusade, offered the spiritual reward, but largely failed to specify the role of the lords of the West. This did not stop many lords from taking the cross and crusading eastwards at the head of their followers. Nor were these lords restricted to supporting their own vassals, frequently the circumstances of crusading led to them supporting many other crusaders as part of their mouvance. Amongst Godfrey of Bouillon’s contingent when he set out in 1096 were other German lords who were not his vassals, and against whom he had fought in the Investiture Crisis some years before.\textsuperscript{330}

The First Crusade offers perhaps the best demonstration of the role of lords in the support of crusading armies due to the wealth of narratives documenting the crusade. During the siege of Antioch in June, 1098 Godfrey of Bouillon provided the impoverished Hartmann with bread, meat and fish and named Henry of Esch as his ‘guest and table companion’,\textsuperscript{331} this would seem to indicate that these men had become

\textsuperscript{326} Villehardouin, vol. 1, pp. 10-14; Queller & Madden, Fourth Crusade, pp. 5-6, 21-39.
\textsuperscript{328} Oliver of Paderborn, p. 186, 253; ‘De Itinere Frisonum’ in Quinti Belli Sacri, Ed. R. Röhricht (1879), p. 77.
\textsuperscript{329} Lower, Barons’ Crusade, pp. 162-16; Philip Mouskes, Chronique rimée de Philippe Mouskes, ed. F. Reiffenberg, vol. 2 (1838), p. 661; Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, p. 946.
\textsuperscript{331} Albert of Aachen, pp. 332-334, ‘Quousque Godefridus dux gloriosus illorum misertus panem unum cum portione carnis uel piscis ex suo propriosumptu Hartmanno constituit. Henricum quoniam miles et homo suus multis sibi seruiuit in annis et bellorum periculis, conuiuam et mense sue socium adituauit.’
incorporated into Godfrey’s *familia* and were supported in this *ad hoc* measure. Another account from Ralph of Caen records the aftermath of a skirmish during the siege of Antioch in late 1097: ‘Tancred owed a great deal of money to his fellow soldiers and had nothing in his coffers. Therefore, this money, received with great joy and exultation, soon freed the leader from his debt. The distribution of the money also relieved the needs of these soldiers.’

After the fall of Antioch in June 1098 and the famine that followed, the magnates withdrew to towns they had already conquered in the surrounding region, declaring that ‘if any needy person without gold or silver wished to remain with them, he would be gladly maintained by them, upon making an agreement’. Many crusaders, also driven by the dearth of supplies, went to Edessa ‘to earn rewards for military service from Baldwin.’ At around the same time, many ‘vassals, knights and foot-soldiers’ joined Raymond Pilet, one of Raymond of St. Giles’ knights, who proceeded to attack the towns of Talamania and Marra. This indicates that in times of crisis, that the allegiances of crusaders could change and they could move into the *mouvance* of another lord. The support offered could also take unusual forms, during the siege of Jerusalem, the leaders of the crusade ‘announced that if anyone would bring three stones to cast into the pit he should have a penny.’

The support offered by the crusading kings and nobles was not necessarily in the form of cash payments. Frequently support was often provided in the form of horses, arms or supplies. During the First Crusade, when Tancred set out, he endowed his followers with ‘military arms, horses, mules and other goods of this type.’ Later in the crusade, during the march from Antioch to Jerusalem in 1099, the crusaders were offered tribute from the cities they passed. Raymond of Aguilliers records that ‘the king of Tripoli proposed to our princes that we would give them fifteen thousand gold pieces, horses, mules, clothing, provisions and an open market’, the lord of Gibellum

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333 *Gesta Francorum*, pp. 72-73.
335 *Gesta Francorum*, p. 73, ‘Erat autem ibi quidam miles de exercitu comitis Sancti Egidii, cui nomen Raimundus Piletus. Hic plurimos retinuit homines, milites ac pedites.’
336 *Gesta Francorum*, p. 91, ‘ut si aliquis in illam focaeam portasset tres petras unum haberet denarium.’
337 Ralph of Caen, p. 606, ‘arma tamen militaria, caballos, mulos, et alia hujusmodi pro commilitonum suorum numero, sufficienter aptavit.’
also offered similar gifts and ‘an abundant supply of wine.’ It is likely that these supplies would have been given not only to those within the household of the princes, but also distributed to those beneath them.

As has been stated above, the expectations placed upon lords began to become more concise during the thirteenth century. *Post miserable* issued in 1198 states that lords were expected either to participate or else to send a contingent of men in their stead at their own expense. This expectation was then reinforced by crusading bulls issued in the next forty years. The evidence suggests that many lords were able to provide for their followers on crusade. Baldwin of Flanders gave Villain of Nully ‘500 livres of his own money so that he might join him on the expedition.’ Conrad, bishop of Halberstadt also lacked the funds with which to complete the journey and so was provided with 500 marks by the Dean of Magdeburg. During the embarkation at Venice during 1202, Robert of Clari records that ‘the cost of each man’s passage was now levied throughout the host; and there were people enough who said they could not pay for their passage, and the barons took from them such moneys as they had. So each man paid what he could.’ It is also important to note that many magnates taking part in the Fifth and Barons’ Crusade were the recipients of crusading funds raised by the papacy from clerical taxation and vow redemptions, and this will be discussed below.

However, it is apparent that the expectation of support was not always met during crusades. A song from the Rothelin Continuation sheds some light on this question and the views of some in the crusader camp towards the barons.

‘The great lords show no kindness, give
no sort of help or aid
to such when all their money’s gone.
These don’t deserve to die.
If ever they come home again,
Who’ll blame them? None but fools,

339 Villehardouin, vol. 1, p. 32.
341 Villehardouin, vol. 1, p. 34.
Imprisoned lords, all over France
Her people pray for you!\textsuperscript{342}

This was written during the long delay at Acre in 1240, after the defeat at Gaza, during which Henry of Bar was killed and many other lords captured. This text would indicate that lords were expected to show generosity and largesse towards their followers, and here they are being berated for their failure to do so. We may contrast this behaviour with Peter of Brittany who after his raid distributed the plunder he had gained. The Rothelin Continuation reports: ‘Poor people were helped for a time, as the count and his companions gave them plenty of meat, which had been in very short supply.’\textsuperscript{343} Richard of Cornwall seems to have been willing to distribute his finances to those who needed it, ‘And on the third day after he landed, the proclamations made in Acre shouted that no Christian pilgrim would withdraw for lack of money, but with his stipends to support those who fight actively for Christ.’\textsuperscript{344} The delivery of support by the time of Barons’ Crusade, and reactions to the failure to provide this support, are indications that the expectation of support from magnates on crusade was established by the mid-thirteenth century.

In addition to support from the ecclesiastical and lay leaders, support was also provided at a lower level within families and through kinship networks. From the beginning of the crusades, individual crusaders relied heavily upon their families for support, with lands frequently being sold or mortgaged in order to provide funding for family members to take the cross. As will be discussed below, kinship became important in establishing support networks within crusading contingents, as kinfolk had a tendency to gather together whilst on crusade, frequently supporting each other during crusading expeditions.

Jonathan Riley-Smith’s work on family recruitment during the First Crusade reveals that it was by no means uncommon for family members to crusade together with

\textsuperscript{342} ‘Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, de 1229 à 1261, dite de manuscript de Rothelin’, \textit{RHC Occ.}, vol. 2, p. 551, ‘Ne n’ont bonte ni aie / Ne confort des grans seignours, / Quant lor monnoie est faillie. / Ill u’il ont mort deservie. / S’il s’en reviennent le cours, / D’eulz blamer seroit folie. / Li puesples de France prie, / Seigneur prisoner, pour vous.’

\textsuperscript{343} ‘Continuation’, p. 535.

\textsuperscript{344} Matthew Paris, vol. 4, p. 71, ‘Et tertia die postquam applicuerat, vocem praeconia fecit in Acon acclamari ut nullus Christianus peregrinus recederet pro defectu pecuniae, sed stipendiis ejus sustentandi morarentur Christo strenue militaturi.’
over forty families having at least two members who took the cross during the First Crusade.\textsuperscript{345} With the gradual development of a crusading tradition in some families the importance of kinship to support networks remained an important part of crusade funding. This was further fuelled by the focus on the role of kinship in crusade preaching, with Eugenius III’s bull \textit{Quantum Praedecessores} highlighting the efforts made by previous generations of crusaders: ‘It will be seen as a great token of nobility and uprightness if those things acquired by the efforts of the fathers are vigorously defended by you, their good sons.’\textsuperscript{346} It is significant that these ties of kinship remained important, even when other forms of support were being mobilised.

Families remained important even after the departure of the crusade for the Holy Land. Work done on the armies of Godfrey of Bouillon, Robert of Normandy and Bohemond of Taranto have demonstrated that extensive networks of kinship bound many in the army to its leader, and then to other members of their contingent.\textsuperscript{347} In his account of the Fourth Crusade, Villehardouin lists the crusaders by region, listing the following of Louis of Blois, Thibaut of Champagne, Nivelon, bishop of Soissons, Baldwin of Flanders and Hugh of St. Pol, many of whom went on crusade with at least one other family member.\textsuperscript{348} In total Villehardouin lists sixteen different crusaders who were immediate relatives of other crusaders who were generally, but not exclusively, within the same contingent.

The pattern of recruitment suggests that kinship groups would actively take the cross together, which would make the sharing of the family’s resources easier. In this respect the lords on crusade, and sometimes monarchs when kinship was shared, acted as means of support for their kinfolk, and this was an important factor in drawing crusaders into the \textit{mouvance} of their relatives. Nor was support limited to kinfolk in the families of lords and knights. Emperor Frederick Barbarossa was accompanied on crusade by his son Frederick of Swabia.\textsuperscript{349} On the Third Crusade, Richard endowed his nephew Henry of Champagne with large quantities of silver and supplies.\textsuperscript{350} This

\bibitem{riley-smith-93-94} Riley-Smith, \textit{First Crusaders}, pp. 93-94.
\bibitem{pl-1064} \textit{PL}, vol. 180, col. 1064.
\bibitem{villehardouin-5-7} Villehardouin, pp. 5-7.
\bibitem{itinerarium-60} \textit{Itinerarium}, p. 60.
demonstrates that even at a royal level kinship remained important in the shaping of support networks.

**The Finances of Lords and Families**

The resources available to the lords of the West were inevitably far more modest than those that could be harnessed by the kings and emperors. Lords frequently lacked the sophisticated fiscal apparatus with which they might be able to mobilize the large sums required to crusade to the Holy Land along with their followers. The methods utilised by the magnates to raise cash for crusading therefore frequently resemble the efforts undertaken by less affluent crusaders and their families.

The sale of lands and rights remained a central part of funding throughout the entire period covered by this thesis, from the launch of the First Crusade in 1095 to the Barons’ Crusade in the late 1230s. Whilst on crusade, a crusader could expect to spend at least four times his annual income, and even the wealthy found it difficult to raise sufficient sums. These sales were mostly lands, vineyards, mills, rents and serfs, and could vary greatly in size and scope. In 1096, Godfrey of Bouillon sold or mortgaged most of his lands and rights to Othert, bishop of Liége, in order to raise the funds necessary to crusade to the Holy Land, the bishop apparently stripping his cathedral and nearby churches to raise 1,300 marks for Godfrey. Riley-Smith has identified at least thirty-eight sales of land in support of crusaders departing in 1095, with other sales taking place in the years following to support further crusading activity.351

Many of these sales reflect the involvement of families in the raising of these funds. Ida of Boulogne endowed a local monastery ‘for the safety of her sons, Godfrey and Baldwin, who have gone to Jerusalem,’ in order to raise funds for them.352 At a more modest level, the wife, son and brothers of Robert of Vicar confirmed the sale of his lands to St. Vincent of Le Mans, in exchange for a counter gift financing Robert’s expedition to the Holy Land.353 Departing crusaders could also renounce their rights to lands in exchange for a cash sum. One Stephen of Neublans, who took part in the First

Crusade, renounced his rights contested with St- Hilaire-le-Grand de Poitiers for the sum of fifty *solidi* and two mules.354

The sale of lands continued to remain important to lords and families in successive crusades. In 1147, Bertrand of Jean sold his lands to the cathedral of Auch for the sum of 30 *solidi* to finance his participation during the Second Crusade.355 In England similar transactions also took place to finance crusading in 1238. Simon of Montfort sold his woods around Leicester for £1,000 to the Hospital at Leicester, and sold pasture rights to the burgesses of Leicester in order to raise funds for his part in the Barons’ Crusade.356 Ralph of Ringstone sold his estate at Clapton, Northamptonshire to his brother for 100 marks.357 Geoffrey Hacard gave lands to Carisbrooke Priory on the Isle of Wight in return for four marks towards his journey.358

Land could also be pledged in order to raise funds. A charter from September 1196 records that William Le Vast pledged his lands to the abbey of Fécamp in exchange for three marks of silver.359 At least thirty other land pledges can be identified during the First Crusade, where the lenders would occupy the land taking any profits, and these would later be returned to the borrower, a practice which theoretically did not encompass usury. Often these transactions involved multiple family members, such as Gerard Le Duc, with his brother and sons, who surrendered claims on land belonging to the monks of St. Vincent of Le Mans in exchange for five *solidi*. The entire sum went to Gerard’s eldest son, Guy, who took part in the First Crusade.360 These pledges of land could also involve very large transactions; Robert of Normandy pledged his duchy to his brother William II of England in exchange for 10,000 silver marks.361 In 1238, William of Cley pledged his lands in Gateley, Norfolk for three years in return for funds.362

The exploitation of family resources provided many departing crusaders with funds throughout this period. Similarly, many lords also resorted to similar measures in

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360 *Saint-Vincent du Mans*, vol. 1, p. 384.
raising cash for their journey to the Holy Land. The continued need to raise funds would indicate that by the time of the Barons’ Crusade, many crusaders still felt the need to rely on their own funds and those of their families. This would indicate that despite expecting papal and royal support by the thirteenth century, crusaders could not expect to rely exclusively upon it.

**Towns and Cities**

In the communes of northern Italy, an alternative form of support was offered to crusaders. Due to the absence of regional magnates the cities undertook to support their citizens whilst on crusade. Caffaro of Genoa’s account of the Genoese attacks on Almeria and Tortosa, reports that at the outset of these expeditions ‘the consuls ordered all the men of the contado of Genoa, under oath, speedily to provide for themselves everything that was necessary for the expedition.’\(^{363}\) This suggests that initially the Genoese crusaders relied upon their own finances, in a way similar to that of other crusaders across the West.

Evidence suggests that at least some towns and cities had begun to finance their own crusaders by thirteenth century. During the Fourth Crusade the Republic of Venice was paid 85,000 marks for the transport of the crusading army. As part of this agreement Venice provided the crews to man the transport vessels and fifty war galleys. Robert of Clari attests to the large amount of Venetians who took part stating that the Venetians sent ‘half of those able to bear arms from all of Venice.’\(^{364}\) It would seem likely that this payment not only covered the costs of shipping, but also supported the Venetian crusaders who accompanied the fleet.

Cities and towns also financed their citizens during the Fifth Crusade. *Quia Maior* specifically targeted the *civitatibus, villis et oppidis*, and requested that they, like the prelates and magnates, send men to the Holy Land.\(^{365}\) Following the failure of the Italian communes to keep the peace during the run up to the Fifth Crusade, Cardinal Hugolinus was able to extract tax grants from many cities in the Romagna and Lombardy for the support of crusading. Siena promised to raise 6 shillings per citizen for the cause of the Crusade to be distributed either to Honorius or their own Siennese

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\(^{364}\) Robert of Clari, p. 9.

\(^{365}\) *PL*, vol. 216, col. 819.
crusaders. Florence in turn promised to grant expenses of twenty Pisan shillings for a knight and ten for a footman. Milan offered to send twenty knights with expenses for one year, Brescia gave the same for ten knights and Lodi for four knights. Verona promised to give every knight 160 pounds and every infantryman 20 pounds. Padua provided ten knights *bene paratos omnibus expensis ipsius communis per annum unum in subsidium Terre Sancte*. On this same basis, Treviso, Mantua, Regium and Modena provided for five knights from their communes, Novara three knights, Vercelli six knights and Bologna ten knights. Later, in the peace agreement made with Frederick II, the Italian communes in opposition to Frederick promised to send four hundred knights to the Holy Land, with expenses for two years. However, there is no record that these terms were ever fulfilled when Frederick departed for the Holy Land in 1227.

The example of the Italian republics would indicate that support was increasingly shifting from individual crusaders and their families, to becoming the obligation of communes. However, from the evidence available it is unclear whether families or individuals were still required to raise their own finances, in addition to funds supplied by their city.

**Common Funds, Alms Funds and Confraternities**

During the course of the crusades, a number of communal funds were established to provide for crusaders. These funds provided an additional avenue of support, which was created by the conditions of crusading and a response to the need to support poorer crusaders and to engage in communal projects. Common funds can be found during the First Crusade at the siege of Nicaea, where a Lombard siege engineer was paid the sum of 15 *libras carnotensis* for the construction of a siege tower, with materials and tools being provided ‘from the common expense and assistance fund’. During the siege of Antioch, Tancred was given charge of the defences outside the St. George gate, for which the *Gesta Francorum* reports that ‘the council offered him four hundred marks of

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368 *Ibid.*, nos. 18, 19
372 *Registres*, nos. 125, 132
373 Albert of Aachen, p. 122, ‘tantum, necessararia arti mee ex communi sumptu et iuuamine amministrentur.’
This money would appear to have been raised communally. Albert of Aachen reports that the decision was taken after the victory at Dorylaeum that ‘all necessary supplies should be pooled, and everything should be held in common.’\footnote{\textit{Gesta Francorum}, p. 43.} Raymond of Aguilers reports that Raymond of St. Giles paid ‘one hundred marks of silver, and other princes paid according to their means.’\footnote{Albert of Aachen, p. 136, ‘qui ab illo die commixtis cibariis cunctisque rebus necessariis, omnia communia habere deceuerunt.’} It would therefore appear that many of the lords on the crusade were donating their own funds with which to fund projects that were advantageous to the collective good.

During the Third Crusade an agreement made between Richard I and Philip at Messina in 1190 stated that upon the death of a crusader, part of their wealth might be given to their relations or followers. The remainder was to be held by a council of lords and prelates ‘who were to employ the said money towards the relief of the land of Jerusalem, as they should think necessary.’\footnote{\textit{Itinerarium}, p. 219, ‘multum conquirens monetam ad eam jugiter restaurandam, et ad conducendum qui lapides congregarent jaculandos.’} At the siege of Acre, the great siege engine, ‘God’s Stonethrower’, was constructed at general expense, then maintained by a priest who ‘stood next to it preaching and collecting money for its continual repair and for hiring people to gather the stones for its ammunition.’\footnote{Oliver of Paderborn, p. 181; ‘Gesta Crucigerorum Rhenanorum’ \textit{QBS}, p. 40; ‘Gesta Obsidionis Damiate’ \textit{QBS}, p. 82.} No further mention is made of this fund or any other communal funds, however with Richard taking centre stage in providing support during the later stages of the crusade this may have made communal funds less relevant.

The Fifth Crusade also demonstrates examples of the pooling of resources. Oliver of Paderborn’s siege engine was constructed by the Germans and Frisians as a result of generous funds given by many crusaders. The \textit{Quinti Belli Sacre} and the \textit{Gesta Obsidionis Damiate} both report that the engine cost 1,600 marks to build.\footnote{‘Gesta Crucigerorum Rhenanorum’ \textit{QBS}, p. 40} Much of this would appear to have been raised through the contributions of individual crusaders, Henry of Hernoth is said to have given 500 gold marks and 10 silver marks for its construction.\footnote{‘Gesta Crucigerorum Rhenanorum’ \textit{QBS}, p. 40} Charity was also provided to the poor, with the Templars feeding 4,000
bellatorum a day at Acre, apart from those who could afford their own expenses. Pelagius also gave copious funds to the Pisans, Genoese and Venetians to pay for the construction of ladders for their attack from the river in 1219. This was also subsidised by John of Brienne and other nobles supplying ropes and anchors.

In addition to common funds to support military projects, alms funds were also created in order to support the poor on crusade. The first overt reference to an alms fund comes in 1099 at Arqa to provide *multi paupers erant in exercitu, et multi infirmi*. However, other accounts suggest that alms were given prior to 1099, the earliest example is of the alms provided by Emperor Alexius during the passage of the People’s Crusade in 1097. Alms were also distributed following the death of knights at Nicæa, and after the death of an anonymous knight in Robert of Normandy’s service.

Stephen of Blois records that ‘Every man of our Franks, indeed, would have met a temporal death from starvation, if the clemency of God and our money had not succoured them.’ It is unclear whether this alms-giving was *ad hoc* or as part of an established alms fund to support crusaders.

Legate Adhemar is recorded as being active in seeking to provide for the poor prior to his death in August, 1098. The alms fund was later given to the management of Peter the Hermit following the death of the legate and in order to support ‘poor and infirm, the public was urged to give a tenth of all spoils of war.’ These sums were then divided with one quarter going to the priests, another quarter to the bishop (presumably meaning Peter of Narbonne, the newly appointed bishop of Albarra), and half going to Peter the Hermit. There are no further references to this alms fund, but there is little reason to suppose that it stopped functioning and it may have remained in existence until the eventual departure of the crusaders for the West in 1099.

The suffering of the crusaders during the siege of Acre in 1189 is likely to have encouraged Hubert Walter, bishop of Salisbury, to order that a ‘collection was made for distribution to the poor.’ The author of the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis*

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381 Oliver of Paderborn, pp. 254-255.
382 Oliver of Paderborn, pp. 211-212.
383 Raymond of Aguilers, p. 278, ‘Praedictam est vero eo tempore ut daret populus decimas de omnibus quae cepisset, quoniam multi pauperes erant in exercitu, et multi infirmi.’
384 Albert of Aachen, pp. 31, 113, 121.
385 Kreuzzugsbriefe, p. 150.
386 Raymond of Aguilers, p. 278.
387 *Itinerarium*, p. 135 ‘facta est collecta distribuenda inpauperes.’
Ricardi does not state the sums given, only that ‘everyone contributed according to their means towards a distribution ‘to all according to their needs.’\textsuperscript{388}

However, the importance of some kind of common fund seems to have been apparent before the arrival in Acre. Henry II’s 1188 ordinances for the crusade state that:

‘It was also enacted that whoever should die on the pilgrimage, should leave his money which he must have taken with him on the pilgrimage, to be divided for the maintenance of his servants, for the assistance of the land of Jerusalem, and for the sustenance of the poor, according to the judgment of certain discreet men, who were to be appointed for the performance of that duty.’\textsuperscript{389}

Whilst Henry’s ordinance does not expressly order the creation of an alms fund, it is consistent with the notion of supporting the poor whilst on crusade. Furthermore, Henry’s plan also called for the appointment of men to act as judges over this to ensure the efficient enforcement of this decree. Henry’s ordinances are similar to those issued by Richard and Philip in 1190, but it appears that the function of this fund changed to resemble that of a common fund, though it should be noted that common funds and alms were not mutually exclusive. The establishment of common funds by the English and French kings during the Third Crusade also indicates they considered the provision of aid for poor as part of their responsibilities as monarchs. This would also indicate that the growing expectation of support from kings may also have extended to the poor and to non-combatants. In contrast to Frederick Barbarossa who attempted to limit his army to only fighting men. Frederick’s decree states that the German crusaders had to be well-funded and that ‘a weak and unwarlike crowd was customarily more of a hindrance than help.’ This makes good strategic sense, but these measures would also

\textsuperscript{388} Itinerarium, p. 136, ‘quisque secundum proprium virtutem conferebat in unum, ut distribueretur unicuique prout cuique opus erat.’

\textsuperscript{389} Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 2, p. 337, ‘Dispositum est etiam, quod quicunque in peregrinatione decesserit, pecuniam suam, quam secum in peregrinatione attulerit, ad sustentationem servientium suorum, et ad auxilium terrae Jerosolimitaneae, et ad sustentationem pauperum dividet, juxta consilium discretorum virorum qui ad hoc constituentur.’
have limited his own financial outlay, and suggests that Frederick would have struggled
to provide this support.\(^{390}\)

Confraternities between crusaders also appear during the crusade, these were the
pooling of resources of smaller numbers of the crusaders who would aim to pool their
resources for their mutual benefit. Raymond of St. Giles established a fund with
Adhemar and other Provençal crusaders, ‘Raymond distributed five hundred marks to
the group on the terms that, if anyone of the knights lost his horse, it would be replaced
from the five hundred marks and other funds which had been granted to the
brotherhood.’\(^{391}\) This demonstrates that communal funds could often be found at a
lower level, although as this was founded by Raymond with his counts, this suggests the
prevalence of his own patronage and his own established support and kinship networks.

The role of the common fund seems to have been most important in the early
years of the crusades, especially on the First Crusade, where the lack of any centralised
leadership or financing made the common fund a necessary expedient to support the
many poor on crusade. The need for the common fund was greatly reduced by the
introduction of crusade funding provided by the Church or secular leaders, this was then
coupled with the expectation that the poor should be supported by the lords or kings on
crusade. The organisation of crusades was changing, so that by the thirteenth century,
crusading funds were being collected for most expeditions which could be used to
support the poor or engage in communal projects, the leaders of expeditions also appear
to have been aware of the expectation that they provide this support. With its functions
superseded, the common fund seems to have fallen out of use in crusading warfare.

**The Range and Expectation of Support**

The support provided by popes, legates, kings, lords or families varied greatly
throughout the first hundred and fifty years of crusading, and even within single
crusades. The availability of funds set obvious limits to the support that could be
provided, in many of the expeditions the papacy was able to create a means by which
funds could be raised, but in practice had relatively little control over their collection or
distribution, despite the attempts of popes such as Honorius III and Gregory IX to

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\(^{390}\) *Historia Peregrinorum*, p. 126, ‘Imperator itaque videns et gaudens milicaim Christi sic leto affluere
incremento, edicto prohibuit, ut nemo pedes, nemo usibus armorum minus idoneus, nullus etiam qui ad
minus in biennium sumptus itineris a habere non posset, peregrinationis viam secum arriperet, quoniam
ad tam laboriosam expeditionem magis impedire quam expedire vulgus inbelle et debile consuevit.’

\(^{391}\) Raymond of Aguilers, p. 245, ‘atque habito consilio, quingentas marchas argenti illis largiter, ea
nimirum conditione, ut si quis militium suorum equum dependeret, de illis quingentis marchis illi
restauraretur, ac de allis quae fraternitati concessa sunt.’
allocate funds to departing crusaders. Furthermore, once these funds were distributed, the papacy effectively ceased being the source of support and it was left to the lay leaders of the crusades to use these funds to support their fellow crusaders. The only means by which the papacy could retain some measure of control was by the employment of legates to stand as proxy for the distribution of funds raised by the papacy either through clerical taxation or vow redemption.

In the case of the laity on the crusade, this was less of an issue as many of the monarchs and nobles took their own funds on crusade and therefore retained direct control of them. Here too the ability of these leaders to support their followers was limited by the funds available to them, many were limited to providing support to extended networks of vassals and kinfolk, others such as Richard I and Frederick II could afford to fund more ambitious enterprises with larger armies supported by larger war chests. However, the resources available to emperors, kings, and lords often failed to withstand the enormous financial pressures of crusading, with crusaders frequently having to return home or else attach themselves to the *mouvance* of a leader who had the resources to support them.

With successive crusading bulls the responsibility for providing support began to be gradually defined. Popes increasingly looked towards monarchs, lords and cities to provide support for crusaders. In order to meet these expectations ever greater resources had to be harnessed. By the end of the twelfth century it was becoming apparent that conventional sources of income were insufficient to meet the rising costs of crusading and that new financial initiatives would need to be undertaken in order to sustain armies in the Holy Land. This challenge was to be met first by the English and French kings with the Saladin Tithe, and then by the papacy with clerical taxation and vow redemptions. Many crusaders in thirteenth century still continued to raise funds in a manner similar to their predecessors in the eleventh century and communal funds continued to be created on crusade. However, the demands of crusading increasingly meant that the resources of families, lords and even kings were insufficient to meet the needs of crusading armies.
Chapter Four
The Raising and Management of Funds

Because of the limitations of conventional royal finances, restricted papal finances, and the modesty of personal or family resources, it fell to the monarchs and popes of the era to attempt to supplement and support crusading warfare. Authorities of the period, both ecclesiastical and secular, sought to increase the resources available to crusaders and innovated new ways of amassing these resources. This was done through the increased exploitation of existing sources of finance, but increasingly novel measures were introduced to raise these funds; taxation was implemented throughout the twelfth century by the monarchs on England and France. The popes also aimed to support crusaders by levying taxes upon the clergy and raising money through vow redemption fees. This chapter will aim to explore the variety of fund-raising mechanisms, the development of these mechanisms and the impact the changing nature of crusading warfare had on fund-raising mechanisms.

Royal Taxation & the Saladin Tithe
The funding supplied by emperors and kings remained important through the first hundred and fifty years of crusading, however the ability of monarchs to meet the growing costs of crusading was gravely in doubt. As discussed in the previous chapter, the shortage of cash suffered by Louis VII during the Second Crusade is illustrated by his letters to his regent appealing for yet more funds to support his crusade. As early as the mid-twelfth century it became apparent that additional financial measures were needed. These measures chiefly took the form of extraordinary taxes levied on the kingdoms of those raising them: the taxes of 1166, 1185 and the Saladin Tithe. The first two were intended to supply financial assistance to the beleaguered Crusader States and the Saladin Tithe was intended to finance the large expeditions of the Third Crusade. The taxes were imposed at differing rates, with different methods of collection and with differing levels of success.

The first of the royal attempts to raise crusading finances originated from the joint initiative of Henry II of England and Louis VII of France to provide assistance to the Holy Land in response to the appeal of Alexander III in his letter to the Christian
faithful, *Inter Omnia*, of 29th July, 1165.\(^{392}\) This was then followed by a similar tax in 1185, which was again in response to the worsening situation in the Holy Land communicated to the kings by Heraclius, the Patriarch of Jerusalem.\(^{393}\) Henry had strong ties to the ruling dynasty of the kingdom of Jerusalem, his own maternal grandfather, Fulk of Anjou, was king from 1131 to 1143 and Fulk’s successors were cousins to the Angevin dynasty in England.\(^{394}\) Louis VII also had familial ties to the Latin settlers in the Holy Land, providing a dynastic incentive to aid the Holy Land in addition to a spiritual one.\(^{395}\)

The terms of the taxes varied substantially. The 1166 tax was levied at a rate of a 120th tax on all revenues, moveable goods and property for a year, and a 240th in four subsequent years. This tax was to be levied upon the whole kingdom, and only those who had taken the cross were exempt.\(^{396}\) The 1185 tax instead levied a 100th for one year, and 240th for three subsequent years.\(^{397}\) The amount of cash raised, through these taxes is unknown due to the limited references to their collection in contemporary documents. Even royal records in England for the period give little evidence of the collection of the 1166 tax, and none at all for the 1185 tax as it was collected directly by the military orders.\(^{398}\) It has been suggested by Cazel, that these two experiments in taxation gave Henry the experience necessary to later implement the Saladin Tithe. He estimates the English contribution to the 1185 tax is likely to have been around 30,000 marks, Henry could therefore have predicted the yield he might have received and how best to collect it.\(^{399}\)

The Saladin Tithe of 1188 greatly increased the tax burden of the previous taxes, it imposed a tenth on all ‘revenues and moveables for the present year, and of all their chattels, both in gold and silver, and of all other things.’\(^{400}\) Gervase of Canterbury estimates that this yielded £70,000 (105,000 marks),\(^{401}\) while Roger of Howden states that Henry II’s treasure upon his death was 100,000 marks.\(^{402}\) A tax of a thirteenth

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\(^{392}\) *PL*, vol. 200, col. 559-600  
^{396} Gervase of Canterbury, vol. 1, p. 199.  
^{401} Gervase of Canterbury, vol. 1, p. 422.  
raised in 1207 in England is recorded to have raised £57,000 (85,000 marks), this means that a tenth for this year would have produced £74,100 (111,150 marks), suggesting that neither Roger of Howden nor Gervase of Canterbury’s figures are implausible.\footnote{W. L. Warren, \textit{King John} (London, 1961) p. 167.} However, the lack of detailed records necessitates caution in dealing with these figures. Gervase’s figure of £70,000 might be questioned given his estimation of £60,000 being raised from a \textit{tallage} on England’s Jews, a figure likely to have been an exaggeration.\footnote{Gervase of Canterbury, vol. 1, p. 422.} Furthermore, Roger of Howden’s figure of 100,000 marks is likely to contain the proceeds of ordinary exchequer receipts and other sums not raised by the Saladin Tithe.

Henry had also made efforts to amass treasure in the Holy Land in preparation for his Crusade, the 30,000 marks sent by Henry to the Holy Land mentioned by the author of the \textit{Itinerarium regis Ricardi} is likely to have been the money amassed by the tax of 1166 and 1185.\footnote{‘Itinerarium’, p. 26.} The \textit{L’Estoire de Eracles Empereur} also commented on Henry’s massing of treasure in the years prior to his departure, but gives no indication of the amount.\footnote{‘L’Estoire de Eracles Empereur,’ \textit{RHC Occ.}, vol. 2 (Paris, 1859), pp. 46-47, 90-95.} Chroniclers for the period record piecemeal amounts sent to the Holy Land, Roger of Howden reports the dispatch of a thousand marks to the Holy Land in 1177, and the chronicler of Laon the transfer of three thousand marks to the Patriarch of Jerusalem and the Templars in 1186.\footnote{Roger of Howden, \textit{Chronica}, vol. 1, p. 159; ‘Ex Chronic Anonymi Laudunensis Canonici’, \textit{RHGF}, vol. 18 (Paris, 1878), p. 705.} This suggests that Henry gave serious thought to the support of his army once it had arrived in the Holy Land and was aware of his need for a large supply of funds upon his arrival.

Philip II of France also attempted to raise the Saladin Tithe in the kingdom of France, but found that he encountered great difficulties in doing so. Philip may have anticipated opposition from the Church to the Tithe, which may account for the exemptions allowed by Philip, unlike Henry who allowed no exemptions. Rigord records the exemption of the Cistercians, Carthusians, the abbey of Fontevraud and lepers; however these exemptions are not recorded by Roger of Howden or Gervase of Canterbury.\footnote{Rigord, p. 88, ‘exceptis ills qui sunt Cisterciensis, ordinis, et ordinis Carthusiensis, et ordinis Fontis-Ebrardi, et exceptis leprosis, quantum ad suum pertinet proprium.’} Despite Philip’s precautions he was forced to yield to pressure from the French prelates, in a letter to the William of Blois, archbishop of Reims, he revoked the
Saladin Tithe on all his realms.\textsuperscript{409} Due to Philip’s failure to enforce the Saladin Tithe we have no surviving record of the sum that could have been massed, and the lack of information on the taxes of 1166 and 1185 in France further prohibits us from making a projection on this basis.

The means of collecting the Saladin Tithe had also been experimented with in the taxes of 1166 and 1185. The 1166 tax called for ‘the priest and trustworthy men of the parish’, who would then convey the money collected to a collection point in the diocese on the feast of All Saints, where it would be witnessed by others from the diocese.\textsuperscript{410} The 1185 tax used a wider committee involving, a priest, two respectable parishioners and also ‘two brothers, one of the Temple and one of the Hospital.’\textsuperscript{411} Local collection committees seem to have been effective as they were again utilised in the collection of the Saladin Tithe, although Henry decided to add representatives from his household, his chancery, from the bishop and from the local nobility. ‘In each parish this money is to be brought into the presence of the parish priest and the rural dean and one Templar and one Hospitaller and a servant of the lord king and a clerk of the king and a servant of the baron and his clerk and a clerk of the bishop.’\textsuperscript{412}

In contrast to Henry’s decision to create new structures for collecting the Tithe, Philip chose to collect the Tithe through the existing structures of French royal control, the prévôtes. The evidence suggests that Philip’s agents were able to collect this tax, but Philip subsequently had to agree to its return following hostility from the French clergy. It is likely that Henry was greatly aided in his ability to raise the Tithe by the reforms that he had imposed upon England throughout his reign. The consolidation of the English royal demesne, the expansion of the English legal and fiscal systems, as illustrated in the Assizes of Clarendon, the increased role of the Exchequer and the assessment of land holdings in the Cartae Baronum all serve to highlight the growth of

\textsuperscript{410} Gervase of Canterbury, vol. 1, p. 199, ‘quarum unam custodiet presbyter, duae fideliores viri parochia.’
\textsuperscript{411} Lunt, ‘Text of the ordinance’, p. 242, ‘Ad hanc elemosinam colligendam instituentur in singulis episcopatibus duo fatres, unus de templo et alter de hospitali, et singulis parochianis illi duo fratres et dominus presbiter ville et duo de legalioribus parochianis elemosinam constitutam fideliter colligent et conservabunt.’
English royal finances and increased revenue potential of England. The heightened degree of Henry’s fiscal control over England may have enabled him to implement the Tithe, despite equally intense opposition as witnessed in France.

Despite the large amount of money that was raised through the Saladin Tithe, this thesis suggests that it would still have been insufficient to cover Henry’s crusading costs. He would still have required the extensive utilisation of conventional royal incomes, additional windfalls through booty and gifts and individual crusaders to have in part used their own incomes. We do not know how large Henry’s crusading expedition would have been or how much it would have cost. However, the costs of Richard’s crusade to Holy Land are known to us and are likely to have been very similar in terms of the cost of shipping and wages. However, it is important to remain cautious about these estimates given the great inflationary effects of crusading warfare, and the considerable inflation in the West around the year 1200.

Roger of Howden estimates that Richard’s fleet totalled one hundred and six ships, whilst Richard of Devizes estimates the size of the fleet at one hundred ships and fourteen busses, each buss carrying a double crew complement. Based upon the accounts for the fleet surviving in the Pipe Rolls, Tyerman estimates that the ships cost on average £50 each, with a total outlay of £5,700 for one hundred and fourteen ships, with the crew complement for this fleet costing £8,700, which presumes an average crew of 45 men per ship as born out in the Pipe Rolls. This is likely to be only an average, as some ships, such as one carrying Ivo of Vieuxpont, that only carried ten men and three sailors, Richard of Devizes estimated that each ship would hold 40 sergeants with double this on the larger ships, meaning that this fleet would have been able to transport 5,120 sergeants and an equal number of horses. This does not count the transport of the knights themselves, supplies and additional land or naval forces which no doubt accounted for an even greater expense.

We also have information about how much Richard spent in support of his forces in the Holy Land. Upon Philip II’s departure from the Holy Land in 1191:

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416 *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*, p. 104.
417 Richard of Devizes, p. 15.
he (Philip) also gave to Raymond, prince of Antioch, one hundred knights and five hundred sergeants for the defence of his lands against the pagans. In the same way the King of England also gave the prince one hundred knights and five hundred sergeants for the defence of his lands, and gave to each of the knights forty marks of silver for his pay from the feast of Saint Michael until Easter; and Robert of Quincy was appointed as their custodian and leader.¹⁴¹⁸

This period of six months, from the 29th September, 1191 to the 5th April, 1192, makes no mention of the pay afforded to the sergeants by Richard. It is possible given the need for knights to have support personnel in the form of servants and grooms that the 40 marks per knight also paid for the wages of 5 sergeants. However, Roger’s use of the *servientes* elsewhere in his *Chronica* suggests that he was referring to sergeants, who commonly fought as infantry and light cavalry in medieval armies.¹⁴¹⁹

The sum of 40 marks per knight is broadly consistent with the wages of knights and sergeants in the medieval West. The registers of Philip’s treasurers from 1202-1204 reveal that knights were being paid 72d *parisis* per day, and foot sergeants at 8d *parisis*. In sterling this equates to roughly 26d per day for a knight and 3d for a foot sergeant, and over a six month period that would equate to £19 14s 10d for a knight and £2 5s for sergeant.¹⁴²¹ These figures from the early thirteenth century indicate that the six-month wages for a knight and five sergeants would come to £30 19s 10d. Assuming that Roger of Howden was referring to sterling marks in his account of Richard and Philip’s dispatch of knights and sergeants to Acre in 1191, the 40 marks would equate to £26 13s 8d paid for each knight and five sergeants for six months. This comes close to the sum he would have paid in the 1200s for similar service in Normandy. The increase in price may reflect inflated costs caused by the crusade and by the general inflationary effects upon the currency in the intervening decade.

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¹⁴¹⁸ Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, vol. 3, p. 125, ‘Et ante recessum suum tradidit ipse Raimundo principi Antiochiae centum milites et quingentos servientes, ad defensionem terrae suae contra paganos. Similiter rex Angliae tradidit eidem principi centum milites et quingentos servientes, ad defensionem terrae suae contra paganos; et dedit unicuique militi quadraginta marcas argenti de praemio a festo Sancti Michaelis usque ad Pascha; et constituit Robertum de Quinci custodem illorum et ducem.’


¹⁴²¹ Baldwin, *Government*, p. xv. The rate given in Baldwin’s introduction can be worked out at 1d Paris = 0.3675 d sterling.
According to Gervase and Roger, the Saladin Tithe may have raised as much as 100,000 marks including other royal incomes. Using the figure of 40 marks for a knight and five sergeants for six months, Henry could have supported a force of 1,000 knights and 5,000 sergeants for a whole year at a cost of 80,000 marks. In order to transport these men he had the option of assembling a fleet similar to the one his son recruited in 1190. Based on Richard of Devizes estimates, Richard’s fleet of 114 ships had a total carrying capacity of 5,120 sergeants, in addition to the crew, arms, and 5,000 horses. It was common for a knight to have multiple horses, so the presence of such a large number of horses is not inconceivable. How the knights might have travelled is unclear from Richard’s expedition and they may have had to pay their own travel expenses. The fleet assembled by Richard I that departed from England cost 21,600 marks (£14,400) according to Tyerman’s calculations. Henry’s crusading funds deposited in the Holy Land, reckoned to have been in the region of 30,000 marks, could therefore have supported this force of 1,000 knights and 5,000 sergeants for a further six months with cash to spare. However, the maintenance of this force for eighteen months would have effectively depleted the 100,000 marks that might have been raised from the Saladin Tithe and the 30,000 marks that were dispatched to the Holy Land from the 1166 and 1185 taxes. This would also fail to consider the funds needed to pay for arms, supplies, the construction of fortifications and to meet other additional expenses whilst on crusade.

With the 130,000 marks raised from the Saladin Tithe, other taxes and his own revenues Henry would have been able to support 1,000 knights, 5,000 sergeants for eighteen months, and provide shipping to transport them to the Holy Land. It is possible that he planned for a far more modest crusade than the extravagant expedition launched by Richard, which supported 17,000 men for two years. This would suggest that even taxes imposed in the Saladin Tithe would have been insufficient to satisfy the needs of a larger crusading army.

It is also likely that Henry would have followed similar measures undertaken by Richard to secure funding; such as the sale of lands and offices, and the claiming of his daughter’s dowry from his son-in-law Tancred of Sicily whilst en route to the Holy Land. Richard also raised large sums from the sale of Cyprus to the Templars, and then

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to Guy of Lusignan. It may be that without these large sums Richard’s crusade would have come to an end far sooner than it otherwise did. However, such windfalls were rare and could not be planned or counted upon.

Frederick’s crusade to the Holy Land as outlined in the San Germano Agreement was by contrast a far more streamlined expedition. According to the terms of the agreement struck in 1225, Frederick was required to support 1,000 knights in the Holy Land for a period of two years and provide passage and transport to a further 2,000 knights in the following years. In order to raise the money to finance his crusade Frederick turned to the established fiscal systems in Sicily, the Catalogus Baronum. Richard of San Germano records Frederick’s command that ‘Individual feudatories should provide eight ounces of gold for each fief and one knight from each eight fiefs for the coming month of May, which he had fixed for crossing to the Holy Land.’ It is unclear whether this figure from the Catalogus Baronum refers to the feudum proprium or the feudum augmentum, which offered a far large host. Jamison and Cahen both view the former as being the agreed number of knights demanded as service upon enfoeffment, whilst the latter refers to the total number of knights that may be provided from the fief. This is complicated by the fact that some land holdings give only one figure listed as pro magnae expeditionis, which is presumably a figure similar to the augmentum.

A further complication when attempting to gauge the men and gold that could have been raised by Frederick is the fact that sometimes only fractions of fiefs are held. James Hill’s article on this subject has suggested that the relatively small number of knights that would have been provided by the feudum proprium may mean that this is primarily a financial figure, and that only the feudum augmentum refers to military service. The calculations done by Hill on this subject gives a total of 3,283.786 knight’s fiefs recorded in the Catalogus Baronum which are from the feudum proprium, the

426 Constitutiones, p. 129.
figure from the *feudum augmentum* gives a total of 7,371 knight’s fiefs. Assuming that Richard of San Germano’s figure of eight ounces of gold from every fief only refers to knight’s fiefs this gives a sum of 26,270 ounces of gold from the *feudum proprium* and 58,968 from the *feudum augmentum*. The *feudum augmentum* includes knights available *pro magne expeditionis* and it is likely that Frederick’s Crusade would easily fulfil any criteria for a great expedition. The *feudum augmentum* figure of 58,968 fiefs is likely to have been the number if knight’s fiefs called upon by Frederick. However, this only may only represent a fraction of the gold which may have been raised from Sicily due to the diaspora of the recorded fiefs in the *Catalogus Baronum*. Hill estimates that the *Catalogus* covers only 60 per cent of the land in the kingdom, so assuming a comparable number knights fiefs were available from the remainder of the land this gives a total of 98,280 ounces of gold, or 12,285 silver marks, from a total of 12,285 knights’ fiefs.

Frederick did not stop here in his efforts to raise crusading funds for the crusade. Frederick was also able to raise funds from the Sicilian Church. Richard of San Germano records that Frederick imposed a special *collecta* of 1,300 ounces gold upon the abbey of Sab Germano in August, 1225. In June or July 1227, the monastery was instructed to provide a further 450 ounces of gold for Frederick’s expedition. Frederick then demanded that the churches and clerics of Sicily pay further sums to him, the monastery of San Germano supplied Frederick their additional 1,200 of the gold in April of 1228, presumably the deadline for this supplementary payment. Such extraordinary demands were not unknown even outside the context of a Crusade; Frederick had previously demanded money to pay the wages of knights and sergeants fighting Saracen rebels in Sicily, of which the abbey of Monte Cassino had to pay 300 ounces of gold. San Germano was one of the major abbeys of the kingdom of Sicily and Richard’s detailed information was confined to the demands made from his own

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431 Richard of San Germano, p. 57.
432 Richard of San Germano, p. 63.
433 Richard of San Germano, p. 67.
434 Richard of San Germano, pp. 53-54, ‘Item pro stipendiis militum et servientium, quos ad debellandos sibi rebelles Sarracenos Sicilie statuerat, certam pecunie summam per totum regnum mandat colligi imperator. et tunc per quendam iudicem Urbanum de Teano colecte fuerunt de terra Sancti Benedicti unce auri 300.’
monastery. However, he states that the repeated demands were reflective of a broader pattern of taxation that was being executed across the realm by Frederick.

For every knight in the thousand that he failed to supply, he was to give 50 marks a year in lieu of each absent knight, to be given to Teutonic Knights for the defence of the Holy Land.\(^{435}\) This likely to have been the cost of supporting a knight in the Holy Land for year, on this basis Frederick’s crusade would have cost him 100,000 to support a thousand knights in the Holy Land for two years. The 12,285 marks raised from the *Catalogus Baronum* were only sufficient to fund around a tenth of Frederick’s force. As will be discussed this force is likely to have been larger than a thousand knights, and there are likely to have been additional costs in shipping and supplies. It is therefore understandable that Frederick made three separate demands on the abbey of San Germano for total of 2,950 marks, which would have supported nearly 30 knights.

It is unclear how much would have been raised by Frederick’s levies on the Church of Sicily, but the huge costs of Frederick’s expedition makes it likely that would have he had to rely upon other sources of income from Sicily and from the Holy Roman Empire. In Frederick’s encyclical of 6\(^{th}\) December 1227 he confirms that Louis of Thuringia was in receipt of 20,000 marks and further 5,000 marks from Frederick’s own chamber, indicating that funds were also raised in the Empire.\(^{436}\) It would appear that, like Henry, Frederick could not expect to have all of his crusading costs paid for novel crusading taxes, and that more traditional forms of revenue also had to be exploited.

The support offered through the taxation implemented by the monarchs of England, France and the Holy Roman Empire is unlikely to have been sufficient to pay for the full costs of crusading. This does not deny the achievements of royal taxation; the creation of *ad hoc* institutions for the collection of taxes and the willingness to harness the resources of their kingdoms demonstrates that rulers were actively engaged with the need to support crusading. However, some of the difficulties encountered by some kingdoms demonstrates that this was not always possible. The huge cost of supporting troops in the Holy Land would still have required these monarchs to rely upon their conventional incomes to supplement the proceeds of taxation and also the ability of crusaders to finance themselves privately. The crusading taxes therefore demonstrate an attempt to answer the problem of how to support crusading warfare, and

\(^{435}\) ’Constitutiones, p. 129, ‘in quinquaginta marchis argenti per annum defectum militis redimemus.’

\(^{436}\) *HDFS*, p. 42, ‘qui eamdem marchiam ex jure imperii simili modo tenere possemus valentem ultra xx millia marcarum argenti per annum, et addidimus etiam de camera nostra quinque milia marcarum, eligentes potius utilitati nostre deesse quam servicio crucifixi.’
while only partially successful, taxation proved a valuable means of raising support. It also demonstrates the willingness of the western monarchs to provide this support.

**Clerical Taxation**

In common with the monarchs and lords of the West, the Church too was increasingly expected to meet the challenge of supporting crusading warfare. Like the rulers of the West the papacy saw taxation as a means to fulfil this goal, with taxes being levied upon the clergy in 1199, 1215 and 1238 to support crusades to the Holy Land. Taxes were also imposed in 1218 to support crusades against the Albigensian heretics and taxes upon the French Church were central to supporting the crusade of Louis IX. As has been discussed in the previous chapter the Church was increasingly expected to offer support to crusaders and successive popes would use taxation as a means to achieve this. Popes from Innocent III onwards developed the weight of taxation and the means of distribution in order to fully bring the resources of Church to the assistance of crusaders.

Innocent III was the first pope to instate clerical taxation as a means of supporting crusaders. In his bull *Graves orientalis terrae*, issued 31st December, 1199, Innocent announced a tax of ‘a tenth all our revenues in money and in kind . . . for the aid of the eastern province.’ Innocent also ordered a tax of a fortieth on all ecclesiastical revenues to aid the Holy Land for the duration of one year. In response to the mixed results of the Fourth Crusade in 1202-1204, Innocent sought to greatly expand the role of the Church in providing support for crusaders. The Fourth Lateran Council held in 1215 enabled Innocent to implement his new crusading initiative in preparation for the Fifth Crusade:

> ‘We therefore decree, with the general approval of the council, that all clerics, both those under authority and prelates, shall give a twentieth of their ecclesiastical revenues for three years to the aid of the Holy Land, by means of the persons appointed by the apostolic see for this purpose; the only exceptions being certain religious who have rightly earned release from this said tax, and similarly those persons who have taken or will take the cross and so will go in person. We and our brothers, cardinals of the

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437 *PL*, vol. 214, col. 829, ‘decimam partem omnium reddituum et proventuum nostrorum curavimus subventioni orientalis provinciae deputare.’
Holy Roman Church, shall pay a full tenth.\textsuperscript{438}

In addition to taxation Innocent also decreed that he would provide further monetary grants to Roman crusaders.\textsuperscript{439}

Pope Gregory IX also instituted clerical taxes as part of his efforts to raise finances for the Barons’ Crusade. Though vow redemptions were the focus of Gregory’s funding initiatives, he also instituted a tax of a thirtieth on all clerical incomes in England and France for a period of up to three years.\textsuperscript{440} The proceeds of this tax were then allocated along with the vow redemptions and other crusading revenues to the crusaders. Gregory also suggested a more radical scheme to support the Holy Land, and proposed that a universal tax be imposed across Christendom. Gregory’s letter of 28\textsuperscript{th} June, 1235 to the Henry, archbishop of Rheims, detailed the tax was to be levied on every man and woman, at a rate of a penny a week for ten years, with only crusaders being exempted.\textsuperscript{441} Following this letter there are no further references to this tax so we may assume that these proposals were abandoned. The penny a week was more than many could afford and with inadequate methods of enforcement this initiative seems to have come to nothing.\textsuperscript{442}

Innocent’s decision to impose crusading taxes upon the clergy is significant because it greatly increased the role of the Church in crusading. The late twelfth century then saw the increased role of royal support being provided by the kings of England and France. However, the crusades during the first half of the thirteenth century lacked widespread involvement from the monarchs of the West. Only during Frederick II’s expedition of 1227-1229 was significant support offered to crusaders, so in the absence of royal finances it increasingly fell to the Church to fulfil this role. The Church’s role in supporting crusading conformed to Innocent’s vision of the role of the Church in Christendom as a whole. Successive popes continued to fulfil their role as Vicarius Christi, and continue to provide support to crusaders through the harness of the Church’s resources.

\textsuperscript{438} Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta, pp. 244-245.
\textsuperscript{439} Ibid., p. 245.
\textsuperscript{440} Registres, nos. 4605-4607, ‘ut liberaliter et benigne assentiant quod ecclesie et clerici suarum diocesum in tricesima redditium suorum usque ad triennium predictis Terre Sancte et imperio provideant.’
\textsuperscript{441} Epistolae selectae saeculi, vol. 1, no. 1, 646.
\textsuperscript{442} Lower, Barons’ Crusade, p. 33.
This support gradually grew in scope, with the scale of taxation being greatly increased from the one-year fortieth tax in 1199, to the three-year twentieth in 1215 and the three-year thirtieth in 1238. Innocent’s planning for the Fifth Crusade in 1210s shows a keen awareness of the challenges of crusading and a desire to address where the Fourth Crusade had gone awry. During the Fourth Crusade the crusaders could not afford to pay for the hire of the Venetian fleet as agreed in the Venice Treaty of 1201. In order to satisfy their debt to the Venetians, the crusaders agreed to retake Zara, a former Venetian subject. With the debt still not satisfied the crusaders agreed to sail to Constantinople to install a deposed Byzantine Emperor in the hope of reward. Innocent forbade both these actions, and was forced to witness his instructions to crusaders being ignored when the crusaders attacked Zara and Constantinople against his expressed wishes.\footnote{Queller & Madden, \textit{Fourth Crusade}, 48.}

The failure to provide adequate finance and its consequences are likely to have been apparent to Innocent, and a problem he would attempt to solve in his preparations for the Fifth Crusade. Unfortunately no records survive for collection of the 1199 fortieth, and the only comparable sum raised during this period was the twentieth tax raised sixteen years later in 1215. James Powell has managed to record 775,692 marks being raised through this tax over three years, with this sum only representing a portion of the revenues yielded by the tax.\footnote{Powell, \textit{Anatomy}, p. 99} From this figure a year’s worth of revenue would be roughly 260,000 marks levied at a twentieth, a fortieth would therefore yield a potential 130,000 marks from single year. This admittedly is a crude estimate; this only takes into account the extant records from the collection of the twentieth and also does not take into account inflationary effects between 1199 and 1215.

However, this figure of 130,000 marks is considerably more than the cost of the Venetian fleet during the Fourth Crusade, which totalled a sum of 85,000 marks for the transport and provision of 33,500 men for one year.\footnote{T. F. Madden, \textit{Enrico Dandolo and the Rise of Venice} (Baltimore, 2007), pp. 124-125.} Even with the devaluation of currency by a third, this would still indicate that funds raised by Innocent in 1199 may have been sufficient to pay for the cost the Venetian fleet, at least in theory. This would therefore confirm that there were problems in collecting the tax of 1199, or that once the money was raised it was difficult to ensure that the money was used with the greatest efficacy.
Innocent’s decision to increase the tax to a triennial twentieth in 1215, therefore suggests a keen awareness of how much crusading cost, although whether he was in a position to forecast income is unclear. The kings of England and France may have been able to forecast the yield of the Saladin Tithe based upon previous taxes on moveables in 1166 and 1185. But the lack of extant Church records makes it unclear whether Innocent was aware of the sums that had been raised by the 1199 tax or whether he had any indication of the potential revenue from the twentieth in 1215.

The effectiveness of the triennial twentieth in raising money during the Fifth Crusade may be seen in the continued use of clerical taxation to support crusading. Whilst the Fifth Crusade was still underway Honorius imposed a new tax upon the French clergy in order to support the faltering crusade against the Albigensian heretics in Languedoc. This tax was also set at a twentieth, levied on all French dioceses for a period of three years. The income tax was also utilised in 1228, when Gregory IX imposed a tax of a tenth on both the laity and clergy in order to finance a war against Emperor II. This last tax caused considerable resentment because Gregory and Frederick made peace soon afterwards. Gregory then chose not refund the money from the tenth, and instead retained the money for his own use.

Taxation was again introduced to meet the demands of crusading to the Holy Land in preparation for the Baron’s Crusade in 1238. Following his difficulties in redirecting crusading manpower and resources to the Latin Empire, Gregory decided to impose a tax of a thirtieth on all clerical incomes in England and France for a period of up to three years. Lower argues that it is unlikely that the French thirtieth was ever collected, as there are no further letters referring to the tax after Gregory’s initial appeal to Louis IX in November, 1238. The lack of comment on the tax by contemporaries would further indicate that the French clergy were disinclined to pay this tax. In England opposition to the tax was also apparent, Matthew Paris’ criticism of the 1238 tax also reflects his resentment at Gregory’s refusal to refund the tenth of 1228. However, it does appear that at least some of the tax was levied in England.

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446 Kay, ‘Albigensian Twentieth’, vol. 6, pp. 308-309.
448 Lower, Barons’ Crusade, p. 132.
449 Registres, nos. 4605-4607, ‘ecclesie et clericis suarum dioecesum in tricesima reddituum suorum usque ad triennium predictis Terre Sancte et imperio provideant.’
450 Lower, Barons’ Crusade, p. 154.
Gregory restored all the English crusading funds to Richard in November, 1239, Gregory specifically refers to ‘the twentieth or thirtieth or vow redemptions held in the kingdom of England.’ However, the proceeds of this tax were allocated along with the vow redemptions and other crusading revenues to the crusaders, making it hard to establish how much was raised through the thirtieth. Henry III granted 500 pounds from the thirtieth to Baldwin of Courtenay in May, 1238. However, it is likely that this reference to ‘500£ of the thirtieth as a gift’ to Baldwin refers to the thirtieth raised by Henry upon his own lands in 1237, rather than the tax ordered by Gregory IX.

The thirtieth tax is first mentioned in February, 1237, but the call for its collection in November, 1238 comes four years after the issue of Rachel suum videns, the bull which declared the crusade and the institution of vow redemptions in 1234. The bull refers to the use of vow redemptions to fund the crusade, but there is no mention of the imposition of taxation. The decision to implement the thirtieth tax was as a result of his decision to shift the focus of crusading away from the Holy Land, as he had outlined in Rachel suum videns n 1234. Gregory instead favoured a crusade to aid the faltering Latin Empire of Constantinople. In order to support military action in Latin Greece, Gregory sought to greatly increase the funding available to him by ordering the collection of the thirtieth. Gregory’s decision to implement the thirtieth is an indication that clerical taxation was becoming an important part of the papal finances by this period, and was a financial measure that could be called upon in a crisis. Gregory would go on to impose a tax of a fifth upon the clergy in 1240 to fund another war with Frederick II, however this was also met with opposition by the clergy who had to pay the tax.

The effectiveness of clerical taxation could vary greatly along with the sums that might be raised by it. A large sum appears to have been raised for the Fifth Crusade and is likely to have contributed greatly to the large sums of money raised by Honorius to support crusading in Egypt. By the end of the century clerical taxation would become a staple of crusade funding; an illustration of its potential can be seen during Louis IX’s crusade of 1249 when the taxation of the French clergy supported two-thirds of his

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452 Registres, no. 4965, ‘aut que de vicesima seu tricesima, vel pro redemptione votorum in regno Anglie haberi poterunt.’
454 Registres, no. 5392.
455 Brundage, Medieval Canon Law, pp. 133-136; Purcell, Papal Crusading Policy, pp. 105-114.
costs and raised 950,000 *livres tournois*. The effectiveness of the taxation in the first half of the century is far more variable, local opposition from the clergy could limit the funding potential of clerical taxation as can be witnessed in Gregory’s thirtieth of 1238. If carefully prepared, such as through Innocent’s decision to get the approval of the Fourth Lateran Council for the 1215 twentieth, taxes upon the Church could produce large sums of money to support crusading.

The means of distributing the money gathered through clerical taxation could prove equally as important as the means by which the tax was raised. The means of distribution varied as popes sought to alter the systems of the funding in order meet the needs of crusading. The 1199 tax effectively left the distribution of the fortieth tax in the hands of a local committee of two respectable knights, a Hospitaller and a Templar appointed from each diocese. This committee was then instructed ‘to administer appropriate grants of money to those that cannot afford to go at their own expense, after sufficient assurance has been given that they will stay in defence of the Holy Land for a year or more, according to the quantity of the grant.’ Unfortunately we have little evidence of how this money was then distributed to departing crusaders or in what quantities.

*Ad Liberandam* only hints at Innocent’s plans for the distribution of the twentieth, with the text of the bull only directing the money raised to be given *per manus eorum qui ad hoc apostolica fuerint providentia ordinati*. The use of papal agents as collectors was nothing new, but the death of Innocent in July, 1216 prohibits us from knowing the full extent of Innocent’s plans for the collection and distribution of the twentieth. The relative novelty of clerical income taxes restricted Innocent’s ability to reform the 1199 taxation model and the role of the Church in providing crusading finances could only be expanded incrementally. Innocent took steps to allay opposition to his innovative 1199 tax; he exempted the Cistercians, Premonstratensians, Grandmontines and Carthusians from the fortieth tax. As a final sweetener Innocent announced that this would be a one-off tax and would not set a precedent. Such

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457 Jordan, *Louis IX*, p. 82.
458 *PL*, vol. 214, col. 381, ‘si in suis non poterunt sumptibus transfretare, congrua de eadem summa stipendia ministretis, sufficienti ad eis cautione recepta quod in defensione terrae Orientalis per annum vel amplius juxta quantitatem subsidii commorentur.’
459 *Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta*, pp. 245.
460 *PL*, vol. 214, col. 829, ‘Nec aliquo modo credatis quod per hoc in dispendium vestrum legem vobis imponere intendamus, ut a vobis inposterum quadragesima quasi debita vel consuetudinaria exigatur.’
concessions illustrate the real difficulties faced by Innocent in transferring his spiritual authority as *Vicarius Christi* into earthly power.

Innocent was aware of this issue and sought to use the Fourth Lateran Council held in 1215 to reinforce his own authority in raising the twentieth tax. Innocent’s crusading bull *Ad Liberandum* is included at the end of the decrees of the council and confirms that the tax was ratified by the council, rather than on the sole authority of the papacy. As Powell has illustrated this became a useful tool in extracting the twentieth from reluctant clerics, and the phrase *in concilio generali* appears in many of Honorius’ letters requesting the gathering of the twentieth or when cajoling reluctant clerics. Innocent’s decision to double the tax rate and extend it to three years greatly increased the burden on the clergy and the approval of the council is likely to have been central to Innocent’s ability to increase the rate of taxation by this extent.461

During the Fifth Crusade it fell to Innocent’s successor, Honorius III, to manage the collection and distribution of the twentieth. Honorius’ role has been under scrutiny in recent years, with some arguing that he was a sort of under-study drafted into the post to complete the work of his illustrious predecessor.462 However, recent scholarship credits Honorius with considerable influence in the development of papal crusading policy.463 His management of the twentieth would support this, as Honorius frequently manipulated his distribution strategy to support crusaders and further his crusading goals.

Honorius’ letter of 28th February 1217 outlines his plan for the distribution of the crusading funds. In this letter he states that had considered carefully how to distribute the crusading funds and ‘heard different advice on how to dispense the twentieth.’464 In order to avoid accusations of the funds being misused, Honorius decided to entrust revenues gathered from each diocese to four or five laymen or clerics who had taken the cross, each of whom would be appointed by the local bishop and the collectors. It would then fall to this small group to distribute funds to ‘needy crusaders and useful to the business of the Holy Land, especially of that diocese where the

twentieth collected had been raised.’ Their accounts of this distribution would then be rendered to the legate and the masters of the Hospital and Temple. They would then provide a testimonial letter to the distributors to confirm that the twentieth had been distributed in diligent fashion.\textsuperscript{465} In this respect Honorius’ structure for the distribution of support to crusaders strongly resembles the methods utilised in the 1199 tax, but with added refinements to ensure that the funds were distributed to those in need of it.

However, Honorius would substantially alter the methods of collecting and distributing the twentieth throughout the Fifth Crusade. These changes do not point to a clear shift in policy, with local distribution frequently being conducted alongside centralised collection. Furthermore, these changes demonstrate Honorius’ response to appeals from across Christendom and from Pelagius, which he dealt with in a very \textit{ad hoc} manner, rather than adhering to any firm policy regarding the dispensation of support to crusaders.

Sometimes Honorius intervened directly, by-passing the authority of local distribution agents and allocating these funds directly. In a letter of 2\textsuperscript{nd} December, 1216 Honorius authorised Albert of Salzburg and Frederick of Berchtesgaden to collect the twentieth from their localities.\textsuperscript{466} Hervé, count of Nevers, was granted the twentieth from his lands in a later dated 5\textsuperscript{th} July, 1218.\textsuperscript{467} Milo of Beauvais was given permission in a series of letters from Honorius, dated from November and December 1218, to divide the twentieth gathered prior to his departure amongst his barons, counts and others. In addition to the twentieth from the diocese of Beauvais he was also granted the twentieth from the archdiocese of Rheims.\textsuperscript{468} The Abbot of Pruvino was likewise instructed to give the twentieth from his monastery’s lands to Stephen of Pruvino.\textsuperscript{469} The Bishops of Durham and Verdun were also instructed to give their twentieth to men whom they could send to fight in their stead.\textsuperscript{470}

Many of these changes to Innocent’s original collection model came from petitions made by the departing crusaders. Savaric de Mauleon was awarded the

\textsuperscript{465} Ibid, 381, ‘per manus ipsorum de conscientia tamen cardinalis qui fuerit ibi legatus distribuatur fidelier et discrete, crucesignatis egentibus et utilibus negotio Terre Sancte ac presertim de illa dioesi ubi vicesima illa collecta fuerit oriundis, idemque distributores, ipsi legato et magistris Hospitalis et Templi reddant diligentissime rationem, per quam redactam inscriptis appareat evidenter pecuniam quam ut premium est sub testimonialibus litteris secum attulerint esse crucesignatis fidelier et utiliz distributam.’
\textsuperscript{466} Presutti, no. 137.
\textsuperscript{467} Presutti, no. 1498.
\textsuperscript{468} Presutti, nos. 1675, 1745, 1770.
\textsuperscript{469} Presutti, no. 3559.
\textsuperscript{470} Presutti, nos. 1889, 2256.
twentieth from Poitiers in response to his petition answered on 6th July 1219, stating he
needed money having incurred a debt of 1,200 silver marks to Sienese merchants in
preparing for his crusade.\footnote{471} Honorius’ decision to award Hervé of Nevers the twentieth
of Nevers stems from a petition made to Honorius whilst he and other crusaders were
waiting at Genoa.\footnote{472} These petitions from relatively high-ranking crusaders indicate that
they felt that they could directly request assistance from the Holy See. Though there are
only a few petitions that survive in record, we might assume that the local committees
were otherwise actively engaged in supplying funds to local crusaders as per Honorius’
original plan.

Honorius also ordered the centralised collection of the twentieth in his attempts
to send support to crusaders. Throughout the Fifth Crusade Honorius ordered the
gathering of the twentieth in depots throughout the West so that it could be dispatched
directly to the papal legate in Egypt. These efforts ran alongside the local distribution of
the twentieth and allocation of the twentieth via petitions to Honorius. The military
orders played a significant part in assisting Honorius in the transportation of the
twentieth to crusader army in Egypt. Honorius’ decision to collect some of the twentieth
centrally predates his general instruction for local distribution in February, 1217.\footnote{473} A
letter dated 12th November, 1216 instructed Giraud, abbot of Cluny to send all of the
twentieth collected from his abbey to the Paris Temple.\footnote{474} This illustrates the
overlapping nature of Honorius’ attempts to collect and distribute the twentieth which
shows a complex mixture of localised and centralised collection.

The Paris Temple became one of the key repositories for the twentieth in the
West. Honorius’ letter to the Bishops of Noyen and Meaux instructed them to send
their collections for the past two years to the Paris Temple.\footnote{475} The Convent of St. Victor
of Paris was instructed to send its twentieth to Paris and the twentieth collected from the
diocese of Beauvais was also bound for the Paris Temple.\footnote{476} Similar arrangements were
also made in other parts of Christendom utilising the Templars and Hospitallers as

\footnote{471}{Presutti, no. 2133.} \footnote{472}{Presutti, nos. 1498, 1499.} \footnote{473}{Presutti, no. 381.} \footnote{474}{Presutti, no. 101.} \footnote{475}{Presutti, no. 1998, ‘Intellecto ex litteris vestris quod diligenter mandatum apostolicum exequentes duorum preteritorum annorum vicesimam et pecuniam truncorum ac pro redemptione votorum exhibitam per metropolitanos in provinciis suis et eorum suffraganeos ad mandatum vestrum collectas ad domum militie Templi Parisius deferrit fecistis, et assignata mediate ipsarum karissimo in Christo filio nostro Philippo regi Francorum illustri iuxta mandati nostri tenorem, reliquam pro Terre Sancte subsidio reservatam in domo reposuiistis predicta.’} \footnote{476}{Presutti, nos. 2658, 2815.}
agents for the twentieth. In response to appeals for money and reinforcements from the crusaders at Damietta in August 1218, Honorius began the process of amassing the twentieth from throughout Christendom. In a letter of 2\(\text{nd}\) January 1219 Honorius highlighted the state of papal finances, and made it clear that the resources of the twentieth now needed to be brought to bear: *Cum autem pro navigio Romanorum in quo ultra viginti milia marcharum argenti expendimus camera nostra pene penitus sit ex hope.* This letter to the Archbishop of Bremen and the Bishop of Riga also ordered the transfer of the twentieth to the Templar *cubicarius* Martin, and to the Hospitaller Marshal John.\(^{477}\) The clerics of Germany were also ordered to give their collected funds to the Templars.\(^{478}\) In another letter from January 1219, the clerics of Hungary were instructed to aid the papal chaplain Accontius with the collection of the twentieth from this region.\(^{479}\)

Once funds had been gathered at the Paris Temple under the watchful eye of Brother Aymard of the Templars, the funds could then be dispatched *in subsidium Terre Sancte transmittas venerabili fratri nostro Albanensi episco po apostolice sedis legato.*\(^{480}\) Much of the twentieth gathered centrally was dispatched to legate Pelagius who arrived in Egypt in the autumn of 1218.\(^{481}\) Pandulf Masca, the papal legate to England and bishop of Norwich, was advised by Honorius to send all money collected to either the Paris Hospital or Paris Temple. The Paris Temple and Paris Hospital were in turn instructed to send the five or six thousand marks of silver, sent by Pandulf, to Pelagius. Honorius in turn wrote to Pelagius informing him that this sum was with the Paris Temple and was being sent forthwith.\(^{482}\)

The Paris Hospital was also used as a staging point for the twentieth, with instructions sent in July 1220 to dispatch either four, five or six thousand marks from the English twentieth to Pelagius.\(^{483}\) The evidence available points to the preferred use of the Paris Temple for the dispatch of funds, as opposed to the Paris Hospital; although whether this is a picture created by availability of the surviving evidence is unclear.

\(^{477}\) Pressutti, no. 1634.
\(^{478}\) Pressutti, no. 1783.
\(^{479}\) Pressutti, no. 1808.
\(^{480}\) Pressutti, no. 2114.
\(^{482}\) Pressutti, nos. 2513, 2519, 2620.
\(^{483}\) Pressutti, no. 2519, ‘per apostolica tibi scripta mandantes quatinus sex milia, vel quinque milia, aut id minus quatuor milia marcharum de vicesima quam dilectus filius Pandulphus Norwicensi electus camerarius noster apostolice sedis legatus penes vos deponi mandavit’.
Though it should be noted that the Paris Temple already had a long-standing relationship with the Papacy regarding the administration of its finances, transactions which Lunt traced back to the mid-twelfth century.\textsuperscript{484} The Paris Temple also had a history of aiding the kings of France with their finances, and a centre for the collection of French royal tax collection.\textsuperscript{485}

Once the twentieth had arrived in Egypt, it fell to Pelagius to use the funds to support the crusader host. Pelagius’ letter of appointment gave him plenipotentiary powers required to distribute the twentieth at his own discretion, with the instruction to act \textit{sic modoeste procedas in omnibus et discrete}.\textsuperscript{486}

In one letter Honorius instructed Aymard to send to Pelagius the 13,000 marks thus far collected and to send other parts of the twentieth as they came in.\textsuperscript{487} Pelagius was able fund several enterprises during the campaign such as the construction of the assault boats by the Venetian, Genoese and Pisan crusaders in 1219.\textsuperscript{488} Pelagius may also have been responsible for recruiting other crusaders as stipendiarii during the course of the expedition.\textsuperscript{489}

The balance of the letters sent to Pelagius allowed him great latitude for the dispensation of funding to the crusading army. But, Honorius sometimes sought to retain control of the resources raised by the Church and wished to determine when it was dispatched and for whom it was intended. In his letter of 23\textsuperscript{rd} January 1219 to Pelagius and the masters of the Temple and Hospital, he gave clear instructions as to the use of the 5,000 marks sent. The sum was to be split equally between the two military orders \textit{sive in galeis, sive in machinis aliis}.\textsuperscript{490} In a letter sent in July 1220 Honorius berated Brother Aymard in the Paris Temple for dispatching 13,000 marks to Pelagius

\textsuperscript{484} Lunt, \textit{Papal Revenues}, vol. 1, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{486} Pressutti, no. 1433, ‘Ut autem nichil tibi desit ex illis que ad plenitudinem legationis pertinent exequende, pleniam tibi auctoritate presentium concedimus facultatem, ut cum necesse fuerit vice nostra illa etiam exequaris que nostro sunt speciali privilegio reservata, firmiter inhibentes ne quis processum tuum provocationis objectu audeat impedire.’
\textsuperscript{487} Pressutti, nos. 2214, 2600, ‘Ceterum quorum subventione presertim pecunie indiget Terra Sancta, volumus et per apostolica tibi scripta mandamus quatinus venerabili fratri nostro Pelagio Albanensi episcopo apostolice sedis legato sex milia marcarum argentii de Anglie vicesima que si ad hoc non sufficit, de alia que ad nos pertinet pecunia per eos per quos dirigitur tue domus subsidium sine mora transmittas.’
\textsuperscript{488} Oliverus Scholasticus, pp. 211-212.
\textsuperscript{489} Oliverus Scholasticus, pp. 249-250.
\textsuperscript{490} Pressutti, no. 1824, ‘quinque milia marcarum, duobus milibus quingentis uni, et totidem alteri, assignatis in predicte Terre subsidium destinamus, sive in galeis, sive in machinis aliis, seu in alio apparatum secundum ... providentiam utiliter expendenda’
without direct instructions from the Holy See, and instructing him to wait for Honorius’
go-ahead before sending further sums to Pelagius.\textsuperscript{491} Honorius’ also instructed Pelagius
to repay Louis of Bavaria 2,000 marks in expenses in a letter dated 30\textsuperscript{th} November
1220. \textsuperscript{492} The surviving letters concerning Pelagius’ distribution of the twentieth seems
to indicate that Honorius was largely content to allow Pelagius to exercise his own
judgement, with the decision to fund the projects mentioned above coming from
Pelagius in Egypt, rather than Honorius in the \textit{curia}.

Whilst significant sums were dispatched to the Holy Land, the funds distributed
were not always used in an efficacious manner. Oliver of Paderborn alleged that funds
‘that were conferred for the support of the Holy Land’ were diverted and that ‘betrayers
retained the stipends of Christian soldiers and gave their souls to transitory things.’\textsuperscript{493}
Oliver remained with the army until the defeat in 1222, and so could not have witnessed
instances of \textit{crucesignati} remaining at home, but may have encountered this upon his
return to the West in 1223. The allocation of funding to crusaders prior to their
departure led to the difficulties of these sums being either lost or alienated from the
crusade. In a letter to Pelagius dated 24\textsuperscript{th} July 1220 Honorius stated that there were
problems due to crusading funds being tied up with leaders until they chose to depart;
given that crusaders, such as Duke Louis of Bavaria, Herman of Baden and Guy of
Brienne, were still arriving even in 1221 it may be that these men or their followers
retained the expenses from the first year of the tax in 1217.\textsuperscript{494}

James Powell’s work on Honorius’ report sent to Pelagius in July, 1220
estimates that of the 775,461 marks that can be recorded as being raised by the tax, only
a small proportion was allocated to local crusaders; with only 49,010 marks (less than
six per cent) being given in expenses to regional contingents of crusaders or to
individuals.\textsuperscript{495} Given the lack of correspondence relating to the distribution of funds to
local crusaders it may be that a large part of the support provided at local level fails to
appear in the surviving documentation. Unfortunately there is little direct evidence for

\textsuperscript{491} Pressutti, no. 2600, ‘Ceterum discretioni tue per apostolica scripta firmiter precipiendo
mandamus quatinus nichil transmittas decetero de vicesima, vel de alis ad nos spectantibus,
qui quicumd super talibus tibi haec tenues mandaverimus, nisi de novo a nobis super hoc mandatum
reciperes speciale.’

\textsuperscript{492} Pressutti, no. 2800.

\textsuperscript{493} Oliverus Scholasticus, p. 247, ‘Defraudatores autem elemosinarum, que collate fuerunt in Terre sancte
sacramente, qui meriti Spiritus sancto culpas suas texerunt, cum Anania et Saphira portionem habituri
peribunt et cum Juda, fure pessimo et Domini sui prodii, puniuntur gehennaliter, qui proditores
Christianitarum stipendia militantium sibi retinuerunt dantes animas pro rebus transitoriis.’

\textsuperscript{494} Oliverus Scholasticus, pp. 256-257.

\textsuperscript{495} Powell, \textit{Anatomy of a Crusade}, pp. 97-100.
Pelagius granting money from the twentieth to his fellow crusaders in Egypt. Pelagius granted funding to the Templars and Hospitalers in January, 1219, which seems to have been in a response to a letter, probably written in mid-1219 but now absent, from the crusaders to Honorius requesting aid for the building of machinis et galeis, tum in alio bellico apparatus. Pelagius funded the Italian assault crafts in 1219. Oliver of Paderborn also refers to Pelagius’ employment of stipendiarii Gallici et Teutonici, although there are no further references to how many were employed or when they came into Pelagius’ employ.

These expenses can hardly account for the nearly 800,000 marks sent to Pelagius by Honorius, as calculated by Powell. As has been discussed, only a small proportion of perhaps 50,000 marks had already been allocated for the use of the Romans, Louis of Bavaria and the military orders amongst others. We are therefore left at a loss to trace the use of this vast sum, but assume that Pelagius used these funds to support the crusading venture in Egypt by the payment of wages and expenses.

The size of the army at Damietta was perhaps in excess of 10,000 at its height; containing 1,200 knights, including turcopoles and other horsemen, and ‘armed footmen, the certain number unable to investigate due to their great abundance, whom the Saracens compared to locusts, because of the great extent of country occupied by them’. The Fifth Crusade also witnessed frequent arrival and departures, as many nobles left for home when their funds had become exhausted. These regional magnates are likely to have played an important role in supporting crusaders within their own contingents. It may be that when these lords departed for the West, crusaders were forced to rely upon the support of Pelagius and the funds from the twentieth given by Honorius.

The distribution of the thirtieth tax imposed to support the Barons’ Crusade in 1238 is harder to trace still. Gregory’s letters sent to the kings of England and France ordering the collection of the tax do not specify the method through which the tax was to be collected. But, the rights to the tax were given to crusaders along with the

496 Pressutti, no. 1824.
497 Oliverus Scholasticus, pp. 211-212.
498 Oliverus Scholasticus, p. 250.
499 Powell, Anatomy, pp. 97-100.
500 Powell, Anatomy, p. 99.
501 Oliverus Scholasticus, ‘Estimatores vero militie mille ducentos numerabant militariter armatos cum equitaturis ad tale negotium peragendum necessariis exceptis Turcopolis et aliis equitibus numerosis. Peditum armatorum certum numerum investigare nequivimus propter eorum copiam, quos Sarraceni locustis comparabant, quia magnum terre spatium occupaverunt.’
twentieth and vow redemptions. This would suggest that the agents appointed to collect vow redemptions fees were also expected to collect the thirtieth.

Gregory also appointed a number of agents to oversee the collection of the vow redemptions and other monies. In England, Brother Thomas of the Templars was responsible for the collection of the redemption fees, the structures of the Temple were also used in England as central pooling locations for redemption fees. In Brittany and the dioceses of Poitiers and Angers, William of Oléron was directed to oversee the collection by Gregory’s letters in January, 1238. The Bishop of Le Mans was instructed in April 1238 to collect from his own diocese and from the province of Rouen. William of Cordelle was given the power to redeem vows in the province of Rheims, except from the lands of Thibaut of Champagne in May, 1237.

The Barons’ Crusade presented the same problems as the Fifth Crusade in ensuring that money raised for the purposes of crusading was spent in the manner intended. The vow redemptions instituted by Gregory IX created large sums of money which were granted to the magnates who took the cross, most notably Peter of Brittany, Thibaut of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall, with the intention that this money would support both themselves and their followers on crusade.

However, the distribution of funds was greatly complicated by the sudden changes in Gregory’s crusading policies notably his decision in 1235 to divert the crusade to Latin Greece. Gregory decided to allocate much of the funding to Baldwin of Courtenay, the heir to the Byzantine Empire, who was recruiting in the West for an expedition to Greece. The structures required to collect the crusading revenues relied heavily upon local clerics collecting the money in a diligent fashion. This potentially may have brought the clergy into conflict with powerful nobles in their locality who wished to crusade to the Holy Land; it is therefore questionable whether they would wish to alienate such men as Peter of Brittany, Richard of Cornwall or Thibaut of Champagne. Local loyalties and politics are likely to have diminished any serious attempt to secure funds for Baldwin and Gregory’s crusade to the Latin Empire.

502 Registres, nos. 3528, 4265, 4965, ‘aut que de vicesima seu tricesima.’
503 Registres, nos. 2960, 4268-72.
504 Registres, nos. 4025, 4026.
505 Registres, nos. 3903, 4625.
506 Registres, no. 3945.
507 Lower, Barons’, pp. 50-54; Tyerman, England and the Crusades, p. 104.
508 Registres, nos. 4672, 4673.
Clerical taxation enabled the resources of the Church to be harnessed to support crusading and the value of this method of raising crusading funds was recognised by successive popes. If the tax was organised effectively, as during the Fifth Crusade, then large amounts of money could be raised to support crusaders. However, this also required effective structures for the distribution of the funding. Both centralised and localised methods of funding were tried during the reign of Honorius, and through his efforts to concentrate funds with Pelagius it is likely that effective support was supplied to the crusaders in Egypt. Localised distribution was also attempted from 1199 onwards, but limited records make it hard to establish the level of success enjoyed through distribution to local crusaders. The opposition to clerical taxation that developed during the 1220s and 1230s also illustrates the limited powers of the papacy in enforcing the collection of taxes. The historical record indicates that clerical taxation was a useful mechanism of taxation and could generate large revenues, and would continue to be used to support future crusades.

**Vow Redemptions**

In addition to clerical taxation the papacy also experimented with raising money through vow redemption fees. Under this practice a crusader could redeem their vow in exchange for a cash payment which would vary according the wealth of the crusader.

The practice of allowing partial indulgences to those who sent aid to the Holy Land had been long established since the pontificate of Alexander III, and saw implementation during the preparations of the Third Crusade. Gerald of Wales’ preaching tour reveals that half-indulgences were being offered for those donating money to the crusade. In addition, the practice of cross-takers sponsoring surrogate crusaders had been encouraged by Innocent III in his letters to the bishop of Narbonne and archbishop of York during the Fourth Crusade. This had also been witnessed during the Fifth Crusade, and is provided for in Innocent’s bull *Ad Liberandam*, which called for any kings, lords or towns to send men to the Holy Land at their expense. The developments instituted in *Ad Liberandam* marked surrogate funding as an official element in the crusading policy of the papacy in matters recruitment and funding.

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510 Gerald of Wales, p. 73-74.
511 *PL*, vol. 214, col. 308-312, 830-831.
The adoption of vow redemptions as a financial strategy represented a radical change in papal policy, which for many years had been aimed at restricting the participation of non-combatants within the crusade. The practice of taking a crusading vow, and then redeeming the vow by paying a cash sum had been around for some years. Gerald of Wales’ preaching tour reveals that it was possible to pay a cash sum to receive a partial indulgence, though one anecdote reveals that one shrewd individual was able to pay twice and thereby receive the full indulgence, but there is no evidence that the redeeming of vows was common practice and vows were expected to be completed in person.513 The Third Crusade also saw the absolution of vows by Richard I of England’s key lieutenants Geoffrey FitzPeter, William Brewer and Hugh Bardolf in exchange for a cash sum.514 Rannulf Glanvill also managed to purchase absolution from his vows, but in the event took part and led the English vanguard to Acre in 1190.515 However, these instances would appear to be exceptions made for a few prominent individuals, and any crusade vows taken were expected to be fulfilled.

Innocent III greatly expanded the possibilities of vow redemption in *Quia Maior* issued in April, 1213. This bull was a reaction to a problem that commonly beset crusading armies, that of having many non-military personnel amongst its ranks who served as a drain on resources and required the protection of the fighting men. *Ad Liberandam*, issued two years later, enabled those crusaders deemed unsuitable for making the journey East to redeem their vows through a monetary payment, this would thereby lessen the presence of useless mouths on the crusade and raise much needed cash to pay the costs of a crusade.516 However, it is unclear to what extent this was adopted during the Fifth Crusade, and Innocent does not seem to have fully exploited the possibilities for raising cash, with the funding for the Fifth Crusade chiefly orientated around twentieth tax levied upon the clergy in 1215.

Gregory IX however, went further still, *Rachel Suum Videns* allowed for anyone to take the cross regardless of their status. However, this was done on the condition that ‘if pressing need or manifest usefulness should demand it, their vows may be commuted

513 Gerald of Wales, p. 73-74.
514 Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, vol. 3, p. 17; Richard of Devizes, pp. 6-7.
516 Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta, p. 244, ‘Eis autem, qui non in personis propriis illuc assesserint, sed in suis dumtaxat expensis iuxta facultatem et qualitatem suam viros idoneos destinarint, et illis similiter, qui licet in alienis expensis, in propriis tamen personis assesserint, plenam suorum concedimus veniam peccatorum.’
or redeemed or deferred by papal command. Gregory’s efforts to organise what would become the Baron’s Crusade took the concept of vow redemptions to a new and far more extensive level. *Rachel suum videns* demonstrates a shift away from the use of clerical taxation that had been the focus of previous attempts to fund crusades. The bull allowed anyone to take the cross regardless of age, gender or disposition; they would then be able to redeem their vows through a payment.

The funds raised could then be used to finance the nobles and knights of Christendom who would be able to depart to the Holy Land and redeem their vows personally. Due to the fact that the military aristocracy was needed to carry out the Crusade in person, it fell to the non-military classes at the poorer end of society to take and redeem their vows. Previous bulls had focused on the military classes, and sometimes had references to those who would be able to give alms, such as in *Quia Maior*. *Rachel Suum Videns* instead makes a clear exhortation to those able to make a non-violent contribution to the crusade: “For many, desiring to behold the lands where the Lord stood, have reached the goal without the labour of a race, the crown without the ordeal of the sword, through him who rewards his faithful soldier, and looks only for good will in his service.” Now those who remained in the West had the opportunity to win spiritual reward without direct participation.

With the net cast over the whole of Christendom the potential income from Gregory’s scheme was potentially huge. However, here the record fails us and there are few references to how much money might have been gathered solely through the use of vow redemptions. During previous crusades only prominent individuals are recorded as having their vows commuted and so it is hard to establish how common this practice was. The difficulty in estimating these revues is further compounded by grouping of all crusading funds together. Honorius letters during the Fifth Crusade saw little distinction made between money drawn from the twentieth, alms, legacies or vow redemption fees, with all of the crusading funds being referred to collectively as the *vicesima*. It is therefore hard to determine what Gregory’s funding targets were when he was planning to use vow redemptions as the central pillar of his crusade preparations.

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517 *Registres*, no. 2200.
519 Matthew Paris, vol. 3, pp. 280-287; *Registres*, no. 2200, ‘Multi etiam, invenire locum ubi steterunt pedes Domini cupientes, prius ad bravium sine cursu , vel post ad coronam sine gladio, pervenerunt, Illo suum remunerante militem, qui solam considerat in oblatione voluntatem.’
520 This range of letters gives an indication of the consistant pattern of grouping all funds with in the term *vicesima* throughout its collection: Pressutti, nos. 381, 993, 1120, 1244, 1317, 1921, 2608, 3042, 3658.
Some indication of the expectations of Gregory can be seen in his response to the crusading plans of Peter of Brittany. Peter wrote to Gregory outlining his plans in conjunction with John of Mecon and John of Soissons, to recruit an army of ‘2,000 knights and 10,000 armed infantry for the support of the Empire of Constantinople.’

Gregory’s reply sent on 12th January, 1238 initially rejected the plan stating that a smaller force of ‘1,500 knights and 6,000 foot soldiers’ would be sufficient. However, the reason for this down-sizing was Gregory’s belief that ‘a great multitude of the mercenaries itself existed there.’ This plan would have called for a large amount of funding in order to support an army of this size and then have sufficient funds to recruit the *stipendiarii*, who were supposedly milling around Greece.

It is therefore revealing that Gregory envisaged raising sufficient funds to pay for the force proposed by Peter of Brittany. Strayer calculates the yearly earnings of a knight to be 160 to 200 *livres tournois* and a sergeant’s as 90 *lt*. On this basis the cost for Peter of Brittany’s force would have been between 240,000 *lt* and 300,000 *lt* for the 1,500 knights and 54,000 *lt*, for 6,000 sergeants. Gregory therefore hoped to raise at least 300,000 *lt* to cover the costs of Peter’s expedition, not counting cost of transport or of hiring additional personnel in the Latin Empire. To put this in perspective, ten years later a tenth levied on the whole of the French clergy yielded 950,000 *lt*. Whilst these figures may only be used with caution, it does reflect that Gregory saw vow redemptions as being equally as significant in their yield as clerical taxation.

As already discussed, Gregory had great difficulties in ensuring that the vow redemptions gathered were distributed into the hands of those he intended support on crusade. Gregory commanded that half of all the redemption fees be given to Baldwin from the kingdoms of England and France. However, the evidence suggests that he received very little of this money, and his dearth of funds can be observed when he was forced to mortgage his rights to his lands in Namur to Louis IX of France. This problem was compounded by the fact that the rights to redemption fees were frequently granted to multiple recipients. This can be seen in the case of Gregory’s letter of the 23rd February, 1238 to William of Oléron which confirms that Godfrey of Argentan had

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521 *Registres*, no. 4027, ‘te in subsidium imperii Constantinopolitani cum duobus milibus equitum et decem milibus peditum accinxisti.’

522 *Registres*, no. 4027, ‘mille et quingentis equitibus et ses milibus peditum duntaxat accingens.’ ‘magna ibidem stipendiariorum multitudo consistat’


524 *Registres*, nos. 4672–4287.

525 Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, p. 947.
vowed to lead twenty knights to the Holy Land and was granted a portion of the revenues from the diocese of Poitiers.\textsuperscript{526} However, these sums had already been promised to Peter of Brittany in Gregory’s previous letters.\textsuperscript{527} Whilst Gregory had used hand-picked agents to collect and distributed the vow redemptions, the agents he employed were drawn from the regional clergy and so brought with them their own loyalties and interests, which were not always oriented around Gregory’s crusading policies.

Vow redemptions provided yet another means of raising support for crusading warfare. In contrast to clerical taxation it offered a far broader resource pool from which to draw, with every soul in Christendom potentially able to contribute and in doing so gain the crusading indulgence. Whilst this avoided the opposition encountered by obligatory clerical taxation, Gregory’s extension of the vow redemption policy still encountered criticism from those like Matthew Paris who saw it as an abuse of the crusading vow.\textsuperscript{528} So whilst the taking of a crusading vow was voluntary and its income uncertain, Gregory felt confident in making vow redemptions the focus for his funding preparations for the Barons’ Crusade. The lack of detailed records makes it hard to determine the effectiveness of vow redemptions as a means of raising finances. However, the volume of letters from Gregory relating to the vow redemptions would indicate that the funds raised were substantial and many of the departing crusaders were eager to secure their rights to a portion of the fees.\textsuperscript{529} Gregory’s crusading plans with Peter of Brittany would further indicate that the pope foresaw large sums being raised in order to support crusaders in the East. On the other hand, Gregory’s greatest difficulties lay in ensuring that the distribution of support was directed towards the crusaders to whom he had allocated funds. Most of the crusading revenues appear to have been claimed by the regional magnates intending to crusade to the Holy Land, whilst relatively little of these funds appears to been secured to support crusading in Latin Greece.

\textsuperscript{526} Registres, no. 4107, ‘in subsidium Terre Sancte voverit quod illuc duceret viginti milites more regni Francie preparatos . . . pars congrua dicto nobili in suarum expensarum subsidium preberetur.’

\textsuperscript{527} Registres, no. 4265.

\textsuperscript{528} Matthew Paris, Chronica, vol. 3, p. 287.

\textsuperscript{529} Of the approximately 3,800 letters in Gregory’s registers written between the announcement of Rachel Suum Videns on 17\textsuperscript{th} November 1234, and the last letter concerning vow redemptions, written to Bishop Lorenzo of Ourense on 30\textsuperscript{th} April 1241, vows redemption fees appear in over 50 of them. The majority of these are concentrated in the 2500 letters written between 1237 and 1241, when preparations were being made for departure. Registres, nos. 2200-3002.
Conclusion

The soaring costs of crusading and the limits of crusaders’ own finances created a gap in funding that monarchs and popes sought to fill through the raising of extraordinary revenues. Their level of success in providing the funds to support other crusaders varies greatly throughout the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Large sums of money were raised through the Saladin Tithe and through the 1215 twentieth and could provide succour to crusaders whose finances could not support the pressures of crusading. However, Philip’s failure to raise the Saladin Tithe and Gregory’s limited success in the 1238 thirtieth both indicate that these extraordinary taxes could not always provide the necessary funds, and that careful preparation was required when levying these taxes. However, faced with the growing costs of crusading to East and with the expectation of royal or ecclesiastical support there was no choice but to look to such measures. Vow redemptions fees, explored most fully as a funding source by Gregory IX, enabled the burden of crusading finances to be levied upon the whole of Christendom. However, the effectiveness of vow redemptions, along with the taxes of 1199 and 1238, is unclear due to lack of records and also of the lack of real pontifical control over funds once they had been raised.

It is significant that individual crusaders and their families continue to raise their own resources for the crusading, which indicates that whilst some support was offered by kings and popes, it was not always sufficient to cover the costs of crusading. Support was provided, and sometimes very substantial support, but the mechanisms of channelling the resources of monarchs or the church had yet to be refined to the point where they could provide comprehensive support to crusaders.
Crusading placed increasingly heavy burdens upon the private resources of many crusaders. As has been discussed in the last chapter, this burden was increasingly being borne by the Church and lay authorities in the West. However, these resources in combination with crusaders’ personal finances were frequently insufficient to meet the colossal demands of crusading. Any form of resupply from the West was frequently difficult, and there were great logistical problems delivering food or money to a crusading army in situ, let alone when it was on the march or at sea. Many crusaders therefore had to find additional means to support themselves en route, in order to fill the gap between private finances and those provided by the authorities. Booty was taken after victory in battle or the fall of a city, or goods could be taken by force from the local inhabitants. Resources could also be received as gifts from local rulers or could be bought in markets, both of which were provided by the Byzantines and by other potentates. The resources received through diplomatic means could also take the form of tribute, dowries and alms, and could be taken from both Christian and Muslim rulers alike. This chapter will explore the types resources raised on crusade, the methods of distributing these resources, and importance of these resources to the support of crusaders.

Booty in Medieval Warfare
The taking of booty is relatively well-documented throughout the crusades. The goods taken could include money, precious objects, clothing, food stuffs and livestock. The importance of booty to crusaders reflects attitudes to the taking of plunder in the West and the conditions encountered on crusade further encouraged the taking of spoils. As has been discussed, booty has always played an important role in warfare, and the medieval West was no exception to this tradition. Timothy Reuter’s study of plunder in the Carolingian Empire demonstrates that the need for booty remained at the heart of the Frankish military machine and was an important form of reward that the Frankish kings could dispense to their followers.\textsuperscript{530} This truth remained throughout the medieval period, and the taking of booty was commonly seen as a prize of victory eagerly sought

by all combatants, and furthermore this plunder might be the sole reward for some. There was therefore an expectation that booty and ransoms might be acquired through victory in battle. By the fourteenth century when payment for military service was common, booty still remained important and systems had long been established for the division of booty. However, medieval commanders were also aware of the potential disruption that could be caused by soldiers’ preoccupation with plunder. The taking of spoils was even known to start during the battle, such as during the First Crusade when many impoverished crusaders started collecting booty whilst the battles continued, thus imperilling the prospects of victory.

This discussion will focus on the money, goods and animals taken as booty on the battlefield and items looted or foraged from the lands they passed through. In terms of the language used in medieval texts, there are distinctions between booty (spolia, preda or rapina) and supplies (necessaria or victualia). However, in the practices of medieval warfare the distinction between looting and foraging is unclear and difficult to distinguish. For the purposes of this discussion the items obtained by force, as opposed to being paid for, will be dealt with together. Once these goods arrive within the crusader armies the methods of distribution were usually the same, be it through the pooling of loot, royal control over booty or through free seizure.

**Money and Treasure**

Crusading was a very costly venture, and the finances of crusaders and their leaders were rapidly sapped by the rigours of crusading. This was greatly increased by the rampant inflation witnessed during many crusades. At Antioch in early 1098 an ass’s load of grain was sold for ‘eight hyperperoi, which is a hundred and twenty shillings in our money. Many of our people died there, having not the means to buy at so dear a rate.’ Albert of Aachen relates that during the siege of Antioch ‘a single little loaf which previously could be purchased for a penny of Lucan money was now sold to the poor for two shillings.’ Raymond of Aguilers states that during the siege a hen cost

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533 _Gesta Francorum_, p. 33, ‘etuendebant onus unius asini octo purpuratis, que appreciabantur centum uiginti solidis denariorum. Ibi quidem sunt mortui multi ex nostris, non habentes pretium unde tam carum emere potuisse.’
534 Albert of Aachen, pp. 220-221.
‘eight or nine solidi.’\(^{535}\) Shortages of cash did not only affect the poor, Guibert of Nogent reported that even the magnates were ‘hard pressed to pay such price, what could he do who, for all his previous wealth, was now all but a pauper?’\(^{536}\) Price rises like this meant cash reserves would be depleted far more rapidly, Louis VII encountered this only a few months after departing when he wrote to his regent, Suger, abbot of St Denis, requesting the dispatched of more funds urgently. However, on many expeditions this was not possible and new resources of cash had to be found.

Money and precious objects provided the most direct means for crusaders to refill their coffers and the taking of this plunder is often eagerly recorded by contemporaries. After the victory at Dorylaeum in July 1197, Albert of Aachen records ‘precious gold and endless quantities of silver.’\(^{537}\) The quantity of booty taken is also described in detail by Fulcher of Chartres, the author of the *Gesta Francorum*, Guibert of Nogent, Ralph of Caen and Robert the Monk.\(^{538}\) Similarly large hauls of plunder are recorded at Tarsus,\(^{539}\) the battle at the Iron Bridge,\(^{540}\) Antioch,\(^{541}\) Al Barra,\(^{542}\) Ma’arrat-an-Nu’man,\(^{543}\) and Tripoli,\(^{544}\) though these probably only reflect the major engagements where booty was taken, with smaller quantities being taken throughout the crusade. Ralph of Caen also recalls that from the booty taken after the victory at Antioch in July 1098, ‘the people became rich after their poverty.’\(^{545}\) The fall of Jerusalem also presented the crusaders with an abundance of wealth which was seized by the victorious crusaders.\(^{546}\)

In 1204 the Fourth Crusade witnessed the fall of Constantinople to an army of crusaders from the West, Geoffrey of Villehardouin recorded that ‘so much booty had never been gained in any city since the creation of the world.’\(^{547}\) The *Gesta Obsidionis Damiate*, James of Vitry and Oliver of Paderborn all comment on the great spoils that

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\(^{535}\) Raymond of Aguilers, p. 258.

\(^{536}\) Guibert of Nogent, p. 176, ‘Et ubi principes coangustare iam ceperat pecuniae difficulatas, quid ageret ille, quem, monibus pridem opulentis, iam extrema premebat egestas.’

\(^{537}\) Albert of Aachen, p. 137.

\(^{538}\) Fulcher of Chartres, p. 336; *Gesta Francorum*, p. 20; Ralph of Caen, p. 629; Robert the Monk, p. 764.

\(^{539}\) Guibert of Nogent, p. 162-163; Robert the Monk, pp. 767-768.

\(^{540}\) Albert of Aachen, p. 219; Anelm of Ribemont, ‘Anselm of Ribemont to Manasses II, archbishop of Rheims (Antioch, February 10, 1098)’, p. 286; Ralph of Caen, p. 670; Robert the Monk, p. 771.

\(^{541}\) Albert of Aachen, p. 285; Fulcher of Chartres, pp. 343, 349, 353; Robert the Monk, p. 836.

\(^{542}\) Fulcher of Chartres, p. 352

\(^{543}\) Albert of Aachen, p. 376-377; *Gesta Francorum*, p. 70. Fulcher of Chartres, p. 352. Robert the Monk, p. 849

\(^{544}\) Robert the Monk, p. 853.

\(^{545}\) Ralph of Caen, p. 670, ‘Populus de paupere jam fit opimus.’

\(^{546}\) Albert of Aachen, pp. 430-433; Fulcher of Chartres, p. 359; Robert the Monk, pp. 868, 873

\(^{547}\) Villehardouin, p. 52.
were reaped after the capture Damietta, however the authors disagree at the level of
looting that took place when the crusaders took the city.\textsuperscript{548}

Of all the plunder taken, it was money and treasure that were perhaps the most
versatile form of booty; they did not spoil or need feeding. The evidence suggests that
captured coinage was used extensively in crusader armies, and seems to have been
incorporated into the already diverse myriad of western coinages used. Byzantine
coinage was used during the siege of Antioch in 1098, the \textit{Gesta Francorum} states that
an gain was paid for in Byzantine \textit{hyperperoi}.\textsuperscript{549} Murray’s work on the logistics of
Frederick’s expeditions using the Barbarossa hoard stresses the importance of non-
Western currency, with Byzantine coinage most probably being paid out swiftly in
order to buy food \textit{en route}.\textsuperscript{550} In addition to using captured treasure to purchase goods,
local currencies were also used to support fighting men, at the siege of Acre Richard I
and Philip II were paying their knights in \textit{bezants}.\textsuperscript{551} However, the role of these
currencies will be explored in the next chapter.

The use of local coinage by crusaders is further supported by the agreements
made for the exchange of coinage made with local rulers, chiefly the Byzantines.
During the Second Crusade, Emperor Manuel I Komnenos offered the armies of Conrad
III and Louis VII, ‘suitable exchange’ as part of their passage through the Byzantine
territory.\textsuperscript{552} The Third Crusade also saw exchanges agreed between Isaac Angelos and
Frederick Barbarossa.

Booty therefore became important in sustaining crusading forces on the march,
and the failure to take plunder could have disastrous consequences. After their defeat at
Mount Cadmus, Louis’s army limped towards the city of Adalia. Odo describes
shortages and inflation similar to that of the First Crusade. Upon reaching the city, the
French were forced to pay exorbitant prices by the Greek inhabitants, and Odo states
that the only reason that the French did not attack Adalia was due to the lack of food,
the attacks of the Turks and the lack of siege equipment.\textsuperscript{553} Odo was also aware of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{548} ‘Gesta Obsidionis Damiate’, p. 114, James of Vitry, \textit{Lettres de Jacques de Vitry}, Ed. R. B. C. Huygens
\item \textsuperscript{549} \textit{Gesta Francorum}, p. 33, ‘etuendebant onus unius asini octo purpuratis, que appreciabantur centum
ugginti solidis denariorum. Ibi quidem sunt mortui multi ex nostris, non habentes pretium unde tam carum
emere potuissent.’
\item \textsuperscript{550} Murray, ‘Finance’, pp. 365-367.
\item \textsuperscript{551} \textit{Itinerarium}, p.213-214, 239, Roger of Howden, \textit{Chroonica} 3, p. 113.
\item \textsuperscript{552} Odo of Deuil, p. 28, ‘et ipsi forum idoneum, concambium competens, et alia quae nostris utilia visa
sunt pro suo imperatore sacramento simili firmaverunt.
\item \textsuperscript{553} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 134-135.
\end{itemize}
huge differences between the success of the First Crusade through Anatolia and the failures encountered during the Second Crusade; he remarks that during the First Crusade: 'that the crusaders kept themselves rich by capturing cities and fortresses.'

Odo laments the failures of the Second Crusade:

‘Instead of the Turks, however, we met with the wily Greeks, whom we spared, to our bad luck, as if they were Christian; and, sluggish with idleness and ailing from weariness and annoyances, we have spent nearly all our wealth. Out of a foolish sense of security or from bitter poverty, some have sold their arms or abandoned them after their horses died.’

This passage of *de Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem* indicates that Odo was quite clearly aware of the problems suffered by Louis and Conrad’s expeditions. More important he was able to make comparisons between the success of the First Crusade, and the failure of the Second Crusade. In doing so he seems convinced that the lack of opportunity to take booty through battle or through the sack of cities undermined the ability of the crusaders to support themselves. Although, he also highlights the importance of the support provided by Louis and a grudging recognition of Byzantine support, it is clear he still views the failure to take booty as central to the failure of the crusade in Anatolia.

Odo’s description of the failures of the French expedition highlights the value of plunder and the role it played in the survival of crusading armies, but it would be naïve to assume that all plunder was taken out of desperation or design. In some instances the avarice or opportunism of crusaders seems to be the driving factor. Odo also reports that many of Louis’s followers ‘gained plenty for themselves, either from the market, whenever that was possible, or from plunder, because they had the power to do that.’ Bohemond’s crusade of 1107-1108 was also alleged to have been made to secure plunder, Bohemond ‘urged all who bore arms to attack the Emperor with him, and promised his chosen followers wealthy towns and castles.’ The intention of crusaders

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557 Orderic Vitalis, vol. 6, p. 70
when seizing plunder was one that troubled clerics during this period, and there was concern the wealth amassed on crusade would corrupt crusaders. It is hard to judge to what extent these motivations pervaded amongst the crusading armies, but it is important to note that the drive to seek plunder was not always the product of materialistic motives. The need to replenish finances was common to both rich and poor crusaders, however this did not just encompass short-term efforts to find additional income.

**Strategic use of cash and treasure**

It is clear that even when crusader armies were well supplied and free from privations, booty was still sought after, as can be witnessed during the First Crusade. The plunder taken following the victory at Dorylaeum is recorded as being abounding, but there is little indication that this plunder was essential to the support of the crusader host. Similarly, contemporaries also identified avarice motivating some crusaders to pillage the lands they passed through. Albert of Aachen describes Peter the Hermit’s followers pillaging the Byzantine lands despite the distribution of alms and the provision of markets by Alexius. He describes the Germans witnessing the plunder taken by the French and Roman crusaders, encouraging ‘the Germans to be fired with greed for pillage.’ Even during times of relatively plenty during the march through Palestine to Jerusalem in 1099, crusaders continued to search for supplies far away from the main body. Near the city of Sidon the Muslim garrison rode out ‘killing pilgrims who were looking for supplies and provisions in the region of this city.’

This may have been partly due to the role of booty in western warfare, where victory in battle ordinarily involved the taking of booty. However, it is also likely that the taking of booty fulfilled a wider strategic function by enabling crusaders to raise sufficient funds to finance the next leg of their journey. Possible instances of this can be found in the naval expeditions that departed from Europe to the Holy Land. Sigurd of Norway’s expedition in 1108 travelled via Iberia, winning several victories over the Muslims and sacking the towns of Sintra and Alkasse, amassing booty as he travelled to

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559 Albert of Aachen, pp. 32-33, ‘Videntes autem Theutonici quia Romanis Francigensis res prospere successit, et sine impedimento cum preda sua tociens reuersi sunt, accensi et ipsi rapinarum auaricia ad.’
the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{561} This was repeated during the Second Crusade, the force of Normans and Flemings who also travelled via Iberia justified their involvement in the Lisbon campaign by their need to take plunder so that it could be used in the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{562} In a similar fashion the Castilian and Genoese forces were also able to amass considerable amounts of plunder after the fall of Almeria in 1147, some of which was used to repay ‘the debt that the commune owed, namely seventeen thousand pounds. They had the rest of the money divided up among the galleys and other ships.’\textsuperscript{563} On the Third Crusade a German naval force aided Sancho of Portugal in the capture of Silves on the agreement that the crusaders would have a share of the spoils.\textsuperscript{564}

Murray’s work on the logistics of Frederick’s expeditions has highlighted the importance of booty in the sustenance of his army, and evidence of the plunder taken can be found in the Barbarossa hoard.\textsuperscript{565} However, during the looting that took place during the passage of Frederick’s army through Byzantine lands during late 1189 it becomes clear that the booty taken was increasingly unrelated to the need to gather essential victuals. By January, 1189 booty was abundant among the crusaders and being taken ‘under the excuse of bringing back supplies, almost universal indiscipline prevailed and far more than was needed was dishonestly brought back as plunder.’\textsuperscript{566}

Prior to the truce with the Byzantines in February 1190 the ‘whole army was, however, overflowing with booty taken from these Greek enemies, and since luxuries were available in abundance this served to encourage bad behaviour among them.’\textsuperscript{567}

Following the fall of Iconium in May, 1190 the \textit{Historia de Expeditione} and Magnus of Reichersberg recount that the ‘booty gained in this city, in gold, silver, jewels and purple cloths, came to a value of more than a hundred thousand marks.’\textsuperscript{568} Upon Frederick’s death a large hoard of treasure is recorded as being taken by his son.\textsuperscript{569}

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\item \textsuperscript{563} Caffaro of Genoa, p. 84, ‘et soluerunt debitum quod communis erat, scilicet ualens librarum miliaria . xvii . aliam uero pecuniam per galeas et alias naues diuidere fecerunt.’
\item \textsuperscript{564} ‘Narratio Itineris Navalis ad Terram Sanctam’, ed. A. Chroust, \textit{MGH SRG n.s. vol. 5}, p. 190.
\item \textsuperscript{565} Murray, ‘Finance’, pp. 365-367.
\item \textsuperscript{566} ‘Historia de Expeditione’, p. 59.
\item \textsuperscript{567} ‘Historia de Expeditione’, p. 59, ‘de preda ipsorum hostium Grecorum habundabat omnis exercitus proindeque deliciae afflucentes et continua otia vitiorum fomitem plerisque ministrabant.’
\item \textsuperscript{568} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 86; Magnus of Reichersberg, \textit{Magni Presbieri Chronicon}, ed. W. Wattenbach, \textit{MGH SS}, vol. 17 p. 515, ‘quod rapina in ipsa civitate facta in auro et argento, gemmis et purpura, erat ad aestimationem ultra centum milia marcarum.’
\item \textsuperscript{569} Otto of St. Blasien, p. 52, ‘Igitur Fridericus Suevorum dux filius eius, patris nobilis heres thesauris paternis exercitui liberaliter erogatis, milicie Christiane decus et spes unica, exercitum merore conferendum consolatus recreavit eductoque de hoc fatali loco et inviso milite Antiochiam pervenit.’
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
gathering of this quantity of booty suggests that Frederick Barbarossa was already planning the next stages of his campaign. In view of the shortages already suffered by his army, it is likely that he foresaw the need to gather as much booty as possible for the remainder of his crusade to the Holy Land.

On a much larger scale, Richard I of England was able to seize plunder en route to the Holy Land from the sack of Messina in 1190,\textsuperscript{570} however a far greater prize was his conquest of Cyprus in early 1191.\textsuperscript{571} Having taken control of the castles on the island, Ambroise records that ‘he (Richard) found that the towers were stocked with treasures and riches, with pots and pans of silver, great vats, cups and bowls of gold’\textsuperscript{572} amongst many other treasures. Robert of Howden also reports that Richard ‘received from all the inhabitants of the island a moiety of all their goods.’\textsuperscript{573} Richard’s stated in his letter to Longchamp written in August 1191 states that his actions were a response to Isaac’s aggression.\textsuperscript{574} However, his decision to pursue the conquest of Cyprus represented a substantial diversion from Richard’s planned crusade. It is therefore possible that Richard had considered an attack on Cyprus from the outset.\textsuperscript{575} Ambroise reports the positive impact of Richard conquest:

\begin{quote}
‘The king, by taking Cyprus, had
Made all the army to be glad
For therefrom would they food derive
To keep the might host alive.’\textsuperscript{576}
\end{quote}

Whether Richard set out to conquer Cyprus from the outset is debatable, however once hostilities with Isaac had broken out Richard seems to have been quick to capitalise on the financial benefits that might be gained from the island. Initially Richard agreed a peace settlement with Isaac in exchange for 20,000 pounds of gold

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{570}{Ambroise, 808-815.}
\footnotetext{571}{Roger of Howden, \textit{Chronica}, vol. 3, p. 57.}
\footnotetext{572}{Ambroise, 2066-2070, ‘Les tors trova totes guarnies, De tresors e de mananties, De poz d'argent e de chalderes, E de cuves granz e plenieres, De copes d'or e d'escüeles.’}
\footnotetext{573}{Roger of Howden, \textit{Gesta}, vol. 2, pp. 111-112, ‘interim rex angliae accepit ab universus hominibus insulae medietatem omnium suorum.’}
\footnotetext{574}{‘Epistolae Cantuariensis’, vol. 2, p. 347.}
\footnotetext{575}{Gillingham, \textit{Richard} p. 153-154.}
\footnotetext{576}{Ambroise, 2363-2366, ‘Car ç'avoit l’ost en joie mise, Que li reis aveit Cypre prise, Do’t tant vitaille lor venoit, Que tote l’ost s’en sustenoit.'}
\end{footnotes}
and Cypriot assistance in the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{577} It was only after Isaac breached these terms, that Richard pursued Isaac and took over control of the whole island. Though Cyprus was a distraction from events in the Holy Land, it seems to have been a diversion that Richard was willing to indulge. Given the exorbitant cost of Richard’s crusade it is likely that he was eager to recoup his resources anywhere he could. The outbreak of hostilities with the Cypriots coupled with Richard’s military superiority provided an opportunity to secure additional finances for his crusade. Furthermore, Richard’s possession of the island enabled him to gain yet more funds by selling Cyprus to the Templars, and then to Guy of Lusignan.\textsuperscript{578}

Following the fall of Acre in July, 1191, Richard and Philip chose to keep all of the booty and prisoners taken from the city: ‘both the pagans as well as the gold and silver, and all other articles of property.’\textsuperscript{579} \textit{Itinerarium} states that the defenders promised the sum of 200,000 \textit{talentorum Saracenicorum} in exchange for their lives.\textsuperscript{580}

Even, after the execution of many prisoners, Richard and Hugh of Burgundy still retained exclusive control over certain high-value captives.\textsuperscript{581} The French and English nobles protested, and requested that they be allowed their share of the spoils citing their own poverty, but the kings retained their control over all property, booty and prisoners from the city.\textsuperscript{582} Their decision to retain these spoils and ransoms rather than allowing their followers to take a share is likely to be due to the huge financial pressures suffered by them. Ambroise states that Philip and Conrad of Montferrat expected to receive 100,000 bezants from the captives taken at Acre, ‘with which they hoped to support and retain their people until Easter.’\textsuperscript{583}

The state of Richard’s finances are revealed in his letter of the 1\textsuperscript{st} October, 1191, to Garnier, abbot of Clairvaux, which states how he and his followers had ‘exhausted all our money, and not only our money, but our strength and body as well; we do notify unto your brotherhood that we are not able to remain in the country of Syria beyond the

\textsuperscript{578} ‘L’estoire de eracles empereur’, p. 189-191.
\textsuperscript{579} Roger of Howden, \textit{Chronica}, vol. 3, p. 121, ‘et omnia quae in ea errant, tam paganos, quam aurum et argentum et caetera omnia.’
\textsuperscript{580} Ambroise, 5208-5213; \textit{Itinerarium}, p. 232.
\textsuperscript{581} Roger of Howden, \textit{Chronica}, vol. 3, p. 128.
\textsuperscript{582} Roger of Howden, \textit{Chronica}, vol. 3, p. 123.
\textsuperscript{583} Ambroise, 5330-5333, ‘Dont li rois quidoit bien aver, Cent mil besanz de lor avoir, Dont il quidot ses genz tenir, Desqu’a la Pasche e retenir.’
festival of Easter. Richard also writes that the French crusaders under Hugh of Burgundy had also expended their resources, and would be forced to return home unless ‘timely provision shall be made for them, in men . . . and in money.’ Richard’s assessment of the French force is supported by the account of the Itinerarium which reports that the French crusaders received nothing from their king, causing Hugh of Burgundy to borrow 5,000 marks from Richard. However, William the Breton reports that Philip in fact left Hugh of Burgundy 500 knights, with sufficient funding for three years. Rigord also describes Philip endowing Hugh of Burgundy ‘with a great sum of gold and silver, and an infinite supply of victuals.’

Nor were Richard and Philip the only crusaders eager to replenish their resources. In March, 1192 a group of crusaders set out from Jaffa to Mirabel seizing a large amount of booty. Half of this was given to Henry of Champagne, who was defending Jaffa at this time, the foragers keeping the remaining half. Ambroise records that the sergeants’ share of this plunder was sold for the sum of 1,400 bezants, but the booty amassed by the knights during this raid is unknown. Another sortie was mounted a week later from Ascalon, with yet more livestock and captives taken. There is little indication that either of these expeditions were organised by the leaders of the crusade, as Richard and Hugh of Burgundy were in Acre at this point. Following the expenses of the building work undertaken at Ascalon in January and February, 1192 it is likely that many crusaders wished to replenish their finances.

The diversions witnessed during the course of the Fourth Crusade were also attempts to secure funds to support the eventual journey to the Holy Land. However, in the unique case of the Fourth Crusade these diversions to secure loot and territory were attempts to secure funds in order satisfy the debts the crusaders had already incurred. The fleet hired by the French and Italian crusaders and provided by the Venetians cost 85,000 marks, this money was to be paid in a series of instalments with the final

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584 Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, p. 132, ‘totamque pecuniam nostrum, et non solum pecuniam, sed et vires et corpus, jam exhaustus.’
585 Ibid., p. 132, ‘nisi per vestrae praedictionis sollertiam eis, in populo, unde terra possit populari et muniri, et in pecunia quam in servitio Dei uberius expendant, circumspecte provideatur.’
586 Ambroise, 5344-5350; Itinerarium, p. 239.
587 William the Breton, ‘Gesta Philippi Augusti’, p. 193, ‘et aliis quos ad hoc sufficere presumebat quingentis militibus cum sufficienti trium annorum sumptu de fisco eius ministrato ad defensionem terre Sancte dimissis.’
589 Ambroise, 8253-8268; Itinerarium, pp. 324-325.
590 Ambroise, 8287-8304; Itinerarium, p. 325.
591 Ambroise, 8058-8061; Itinerarium, pp. 317.
payment delivered by the date of departure in October, 1202. Only a fraction of this cost had been paid by late 1202, therefore the leaders of the crusade agreed to attack the former Venetian city of Zara in order that the booty taken could be used to satisfy the debt to the Venetians. Following the conquest of Zara a further diversion was planned to Constantinople, which would place the deposed Byzantine heir Alexios IV Angelos on the Byzantine throne. In return for the assistance of the crusaders, Alexios IV promised to satisfy the entire debt of the crusaders to the Venetians, pay the crusader host with an additional 200,000 marks and aid the crusaders logistically and militarily in the Holy Land.

During the Fifth Crusade, plunder was taken by the crusaders in their campaigns in Syria during the summer of 1217. However, it appears that much of this booty was claimed by Andrew of Hungary when he departed for the West in January, 1218. The details of Andrew’s crusade finances are unknown, but given the high costs of crusading, it is understandable that he sought to recoup his expenses through the taking of plunder. Oliver of Paderborn, James of Vitry and the Gesta Obsidionis Damiate, confirm the abundance of treasure in Damietta. Given the extraordinary length of the siege it is likely that many crusaders wished to replenish their treasuries. Many crusaders had already returned home due to their lack of funds, so the need for spoils amongst those that remained would have been great. The violence following Pelagius’ initial distribution of spoils indicates that many crusaders expected either a share of the city or larger shares of booty than they had received. It also indicates that this feeling was strong enough to cause considerable disorder in the newly won city, until a more equitable division of plunder was organised.

Emperor Frederick II’s expedition of 1227-1229 displays a high degree of central organisation and centralised funding. However, the letter of Patriarch Gerald written in mid-1229 to Pope Gregory IX related that Frederick came with only ‘two hundred and forty knights and no money, with the intention that spoils from the

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594 Oliver of Paderborn, p. 168, ‘Rex Ungarie brevi commoratus tempore cum magno dampno Terre sancte recessit, peregrinos etiam et Galeas, dextrarios et iumenta cum armis secum traxit.’
inhabitants of Syria would sustain them.’

Though in the face of the considerable evidence relating to Frederick’s raising of funds through the fiscal institutions of Sicily, principally those afforded by the *Catalogus Baronum*, it seems unlikely that Frederick relied solely upon the acquisition of plunder in order to sustain himself in the Holy Land. Patriarch Gerald’s comments are likely to be based upon his own opposition to Frederick and his desire to seek support from Pope Gregory who was also at war with Frederick; the reliability of Gerald’s testimony can therefore be questioned.

However, it is significant that he accuses Frederick of relying entirely upon the *spoliis habitatorum Syriae* to sustain him. This betrays a number of issues regarding Frederick’s crusade. Firstly, Frederick had committed in the treaty of San Germano in July, 1225 to providing not only 1,000 knights for his crusade, he also committed to providing 50 marks per annum in lieu of every knight in that thousand who he failed to bring to the Holy Land. Gerald alleged that Frederick had not honoured the treaty, by failing to provide the required number of knights or pay the cash supplement. Furthermore, Gerald implies that Frederick’s intention to support his army through the taking of spoils was inadequate and constitutes a violation of the treaty.

This therefore suggests that the taking of spoils, at least in Gerald’s view, was not an acceptable alternative to the centralised funding that was expected of and promised by Frederick in the Treaty of San Germano. Even though spoils might be acquired by Frederick and then routed through his own treasury to support his knights this would not be adhering to the treaty. Whilst one must remain aware of Gerald’s hostility to Frederick and possible attempts to discredit the Emperor, this may suggest a broader view that by the late 1220s the reliance upon the taking of booty to support crusading activity was no longer an acceptable financial strategy.

The ability to take and transport booty for future use on crusades was also dependent upon the method transport used by crusaders. The landward crusaders relied upon the transport that could be offered by carts and pack animals to carry any booty.

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599 *Constitutiones*, vol. 2, p. 129, ‘Per presens scriptum notum facimus universis, quod nos transibimus in subsidium Terre Sancte ab instanti Augusto presentis XIII. indictionis ad duos annos et per biennium tenebimus ibi mille milites ad minus a; ita quod si aliquos de ipso numero statuto tempore deesse conigerit, in quinquaginta marchis argenti per annum defectum militis redimemus.’
taken. The limitations of medieval transport therefore placed restrictions on the amount of booty seized. To illustrate this point, a medieval cart commonly in use could transport around half a tonne of goods, it would also require horses, which in turn needed to be fed and watered. A mule by contrast could transport around 85 kg of goods, again requiring food. Medieval ships varied greatly in size, but the larger *navis* commonly used in the thirteenth century displaced an average of 800 metric tonnes. Whilst these ships would have had to transport men and other supplies, the difference is still striking; it would have taken 1,600 carts to transport the equivalent load of one *navis*, or 9412 mules.

In the context of the Fourth Crusade, the total haul booty is estimated by Geoffrey of Villehardouin to be 800,000 marks, or 128 million pennies. Whilst it is likely that the total sum included different forms currency and precious objects, the volume of substance is likely to have been similar. It is unknown what type of mark is being used, but the average weight of medieval penny is 1.25g, the plunder taken would therefore have weighed 160 tonnes. This would have taken a fifth of the hold space of a *navis*, but would have otherwise required 320 carts or 1,183 mules. This demonstrates that there were clear advantages to travelling by sea, and that the ability to transport booty also is likely to have influenced the crusaders in the planning their expedition and when on the crusade.

The strategic use of plunder also encompassed a number of diversions from crusading as witnessed during the Second, Third and Fourth Crusades. The *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi* clearly states that the justification of this diversion was to seek plunder and the Franks on the Fourth Crusade concluded a formal treaty with the Venetians promising to return Zara to Venetian control, and then in another agreement to repay their debts after the fall of Constantinople. Richard’s diversion on the other hand, seems to have been presented to him by opportunity, and there is no evidence that he planned to attack Cyprus. Later in his disputes with Philip, Richard argued that he was not in fact acting as a crusader during the conquest of Cyprus, instead he was

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600 Bachrach, ‘Nicea to Dorylaion’, p. 55.
601 Haldon, ‘Roads’, p. 146
602 Madden, *Food*, p. 214.
605 *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 100-101.
taking retaliatory actions as sovereign, and therefore was not bound by their agreement. However, it is apparent the funds raised served to fund Richard’s crusade.\textsuperscript{606}

This raises the question of whether crusaders who diverted to take booty were doing so as crusaders, or whether they temporarily put their vows aside in order to do so. Innocent’s rebuke to the crusaders in 1202, instructed the crusaders to return to their vows and there was also disagreement within the force that attacked Lisbon about the righteousness of their diversion.\textsuperscript{607} Despite these misgivings crusaders were still willing to deviate from their path to secure plunder, arguing that their diversions were temporary and that they still intended to fulfil their vows in the Holy Land.

From the First Crusade onwards both rich and poor crusaders sought to replenish their finances through the seizing of booty or the raising of ransoms. The most spectacular examples of the spoils used in this way can be found in the Third and Fourth Crusades where large quantities of plunder were used to either satisfy the debts of crusaders or to replenish their coffers for the next stages of the crusade. The crusade of Frederick in 1227-1229 may suggest a shift in attitudes towards relying upon plunder to finance crusading and is heavily criticised for his alleged failure to provide adequate finances and to rely on spoils. This may indicate that whilst booty was a useful bonus for both rich and poor crusaders, the taking of spoils was no longer necessary in order to finance an expedition in transit. With the development of finances raised by authorities in the West, the importance of booty diminished and was less vital to the sustenance of crusading armies in the thirteenth century.

\textbf{Consumables}

The basic food-preserving techniques in the medieval period meant that any food bought might only last a few weeks before spoiling; this created a permanent demand for food amongst crusading armies. The hardships endured by the crusaders frequently took the form of food shortages and famines are well-recorded throughout the crusades. During the siege of Antioch the dearth of supplies resulted in a famine that killed many amongst the crusader host;\textsuperscript{608} this was then followed by another famine when the crusaders finally took the starved city in June, 1098.\textsuperscript{609} When Antioch finally fell, some of Bohemond’s followers are reported to have been unwilling to ‘come up to the citadel

\textsuperscript{607} \textit{PL}, vol. 214, col. 1178-1179.
\textsuperscript{608} Albert of Aachen, pp. 260-263.
\textsuperscript{609} \textit{Gesta Francorum}, p. 62.
to fight, for they stayed in the houses cowering, some for hunger and some for fear of the Turks. Later in December, 1098 a further famine followed after the fall of Ma’arrat-an-Nu’man, during which Albert of Aachen, Fulcher of Chartres, the Gesta Francorum and Ralph of Caen report that some of the crusaders resorted to cannibalism in order to sustain themselves.

Several famines were seen at the siege of Acre during the Third Crusade. By May, 1191 food shortages were reported during the German passage through Anatolia along with heavily inflated prices. The inflation reported during the Fifth Crusade is an indication that food was in short supply; a small loaf was sold in Acre for twelve denarii. Patriarch Raoul’s decision to send the poor crusaders home from the Damietta in 1218 may have been due to this impact of these food shortages.

Due to the great distances from their base of supply in the West, the crusaders frequently had to secure supplies of food locally, often by force. In some expeditions, such as the First Crusade, the magnates leading the army took an active role in leading foraging expeditions to provide supplies to the army. Faced with the worsening famine during the siege of Antioch, Bohemond, Tancred and Robert of Flanders attempted ‘to seize plunder and supplies by which hunger could be assuaged and the people relieved from want.’ Several months later another foray led by Tancred ‘seized a great amount of grain, wine, oil, and other no less necessary supplies.’ Following the failure of this expedition to return with sufficient supplies, another was mounted by Robert of Flanders, but the loot from this expedition was consumed within a few days. After the capture of Antioch in June 1098, many of the poor crusaders suffered greatly as a result of the famine which compelled Godfrey of Bouillon and Raymond of St. Giles to ‘pillage the countryside for the poor.’ During the Barons’ Crusade an expedition led

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610 Ibid., p. 61, ‘Videns autem uir uenerabilis Boamundus quia nullatenus posset conducere gentes sursum in castellum ad bellum – nam qui errant inclusi in domibus timebant alii fame alii timore Turcorum.’
611 Albert of Aachen, p. 375; Fulcher of Chartres, Gesta Francorum, p. 80; Ralph of Caen, p. 675.
613 ‘Historia de Expeditione’, p. 81.
615 Albert of Aachen, pp. 216-217, ‘ad contrahendas predas et necessaria, quibus fames extingui et populus ab inopia possit releuari.’
616 Guibert of Nogent, p. 195, ‘et apprehensis multam frumenti, hordei, vini atque olei aliorumque non minus necessariorum diripuit copiam.’
617 Ibid., pp. 220-221.
618 Raymond of Aguilers, p. 264, ‘et milites et pedites suos omnes pro causa pauperum, ut in Hispaniam depraedatum eos deduceret.’
by Peter of Brittany captured large quantities of ‘oats, peas and beans, chicken, barley, wine, (and) geese.’  

However, the search for food was not always led by the nobility and frequently smaller informal parties would head off in search of food. In 1101 a party of several hundred Provençal crusaders were annihilated by the Turks as they ranged ahead of their army in attempt to find food. During the siege of Acre, 1189-1191, many proborum juvenum attacked the Muslims forces without permission, and the ‘young men entered the tents of the pagans, and ate and drank of what they found therein; after which they carried away with them whatever they could find of value.’ They were then defeated when Saladin counter attacked causing them to leave their booty behind. This incident also described by the Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi states that this attack was itself motivated by the desire to find plunder.

Foraging for booty outside of the army was also a dangerous undertaking, and there are many instances of unwary foragers falling prey to ambushes. During the Barons’ Crusade a raid to seize plunder by magnates Amalric of Montfort, Henry of Bar, Hugh of Burgundy led to their defeat by a large Muslim force. Raymond of Aguilers recalls an instance during the First Crusade where some knights refused to continue protecting unarmed foragers. This demonstrates that non-combatant crusaders also found themselves disadvantaged in seeking food, as they relied heavily upon the protection of the knights and other armed crusaders. Entire armies could also find themselves ravaging an area in order to secure subsistence. In 1189, following the refusal of the Byzantines to allow Barbarossa’s army passage, the Germans ‘freely plundered the property of the Greeks, and destroyed what they did not plunder.’ As a result of attack, the Germans were denied access to Byzantine markets, a fact which Frederick blamed on the perfidy of Emperor Isaac in a letter to his son Henry, sent in early November 1190. This further compelled Frederick’s force to seize food from the surrounding lands. During their stay at

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620 Albert of Aachen, pp. 600-601.
621 Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, p. 70.
622 Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi, p. 89.
623 Ibid., pp. 46-47.
624 Raymond of Aguilers, p. 245.
625 ‘Historia de Expeditione’, p.39, ‘Quamobrem omnis infiremuit exercitus et bona Grecorum extune libre diripiebant, reliqua pessumbabant.’
626 Ibid., p. 41.
Philippopolis, the Germans occupied the town for a period of twelve weeks and harvested the crops in the surrounding region. An attack was also made upon the city of Herrhoë, with large quantities of food and livestock being seized, the collecting of booty continuing for four days until the crusaders ‘were almost tired of doing so.’

This substantial diversion to secure food supplies coupled with the Byzantine withdrawal of markets, suggests that the Germans were suffering from a shortage of food during the summer of 1190. These shortages were only relieved after the wintering of the army at Philippopolis, and the harnessing of the local resources in order to sustain the army.

It is clear from the anecdotal accounts of inflation, that food was not necessarily eaten upon receipt, but that it was frequently bought and sold. In this market economy the limited supply of food would raise the demand for food, and drive prices higher, therefore making the poor particularly vulnerable. As has been discussed, inflation can be seen on many expeditions and served to place added pressure on the finances of crusaders. During the passage of the 1101 crusade through Anatolia, ‘There was sustenance only for the wealthy and splendid men who had brought flour, bread, dried meat or flitches of bacon on carts from the port of Civitot and from the town of Nicomedia.’

During the Third Crusade, Frederick Barbarossa’s army began to suffer food shortages and starvation amongst the poorer crusaders who had eaten their share of food, this is despite his instructions that only those with sufficient funds should participate. Such was the demand for food in many cases that sometimes grossly substandard food products entered the market: Raymond of Aguilers records that a ‘head of a horse sold for two or three solidi, a goat’s intestines five solidi.’ Albert of Aachen also comments that Duke Godfrey paid ‘fifteen marks of silver for the flesh of a miserable camel.’

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628 Albert of Aachen, pp. 600-601, ‘Tantum diuitibus et magnificis uiris qui uechiclus a portu Ciuitoth et a civitate Nicemedia farinam, panes, carnes siccas uel beconnes attulerant, sustentatio uite erat.’

629 ‘Historia de Expeditione’, p. 28, ‘tum viarum mira difficultas, tum peditum etiam et quorumque pauperum cibos quoslibet inconsulte sumentium assidua mortalitas;’ ‘Historia Peregrinorum’, MGH SRG n.s. vol. 5, p. 126, ‘nullus etiam qui ad minus in biennium sumptus itineris habere non posset, peregrinationis viam secum arriperet.’

630 Raymond of Aguilers, p. 258.

631 Albert of Aachen, pp. 300-301, ‘quindecim marcas argenti pro carne cameli uilissimi expendit, pro capra procul dubio dapifer eius Baldricus tres marcas uenditori dedisse perhibetur.’
The looting of food served to fulfil the short-term needs of crusading armies, and could range in scale from minor acts of looting to foraging expeditions led by magnates aimed at securing sustenance for their followers.

**Livestock**

An early indication of the role of plundered livestock in the support of crusading armies can be seen in the passage of the crusaders through the Christian lands of the Balkans during 1096 and early 1097. Bohemond and Godfrey appear to have given orders for their troops not to pillage these lands, but to buy any supplies needed.\(^\text{632}\) However, the inhabitants refused to provide supplies to the crusaders, so with supplies now denied to them 'their restraint now turned to fury, and they seized horses, cows, asses, and whatever else was useful.'\(^\text{633}\) This seizure of livestock during the First Crusade illustrates the need for crusaders to adequately furnish themselves with the animals they required, if these animals could not be bought, they would be taken.

The military elite of the crusading armies were the knights, these heavily armoured cavalrymen fought primarily on horseback and horses were vital to ensuring their combat effectiveness. It was common for knights to have multiple horses, ranging from chargers to pack animals. The loss of these animals could seriously affect the combat effectiveness of crusading armies, as can be seen on the First Crusade where the number of horses fell from around a thousand in late June 1097 to less than two hundred at by June 1098.\(^\text{634}\) During the battle outside Antioch Godfrey of Bouillon had to beg a horse off Raymond of St. Giles, and many wealthy men went into battle riding donkeys and pack animals into battle.\(^\text{635}\) Great mortalities of horses through exposure, fatigue or battle can also found during the Second and Third Crusade during the German march through Anatolia, throughout the siege of Acre from 1189-1191 and siege of Damietta during the Fifth Crusade.\(^\text{636}\) The crusaders also required horses, donkeys, oxen and camels to transport their supplies and equipment overland, and while

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\(^{632}\) Ibid., pp. 68-69; Guibert of Nogent, p. 138.

\(^{633}\) Guibert of Nogent, p. 139, ‘At illi, modestia quam habuerant in furorem versa, diripiebant equos, boves, asinos ac quaelibet sibi utilia,’

\(^{634}\) Riley-Smith, *First Crusade*, p. 70.

\(^{635}\) Albert of Aachen, pp. 332-335.

their numbers are not recorded we might assume that they suffered similarly high mortality rates, and in extremes were devoured by ravenous crusaders.

The importance of animals to the crusaders can be seen in the many references to their capture. After the victory at Dorylaeum the *Gesta Francorum* describes the taking of many ‘horses, asses, camels, oxen, sheep and many other things about which we know not.’ During one battle outside in Antioch in March, 1098 the *Gesta Francorum*, relates that after the battle the crusaders ‘recouped ourselves very well, with many things which we were badly in needed, as well as horses.’ The year before, when the crusaders arrived at Antioch November, 1097 the vanguard won a victory over a Turkish force after which: ‘great quantities of grain and wine fell into our hands, and the foot-soldiers acquired the valuable horses, camels, mules, and asses that remained.’ After the victory on the 28th June, 1098 over the Muslim relief force at Antioch, the author the *Gesta Francorum* again describes the taking of valuables, ‘as well as sheep, oxen, horses, mules, camels.’ In March, 1192 a sortie was mounted a week later from Ascalon during which large numbers of livestock were taken. Peter of Brittany was celebrated for a raid that brought a large amount of livestock back to the crusader army.

It should also be noted that herds of cattle, sheep and goats were also captured by the crusaders. These animals could either be butchered for meat or traded with the locals. The huge losses in livestock meant that crusaders were always eager to replenish them at any opportunity. It is also revealing that the horses were also demanded in tribute, and were often made as gifts to crusaders. The communal funds establish to provide remounts is also an indication of the high importance given to supplying the knights with remounts. The western focus on the mounted knight necessitated the provision of horses in order to maintain their effectiveness on the battle field, and therefore became prized booty in many expeditions.

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637 *Gesta Francorum*, p. 20.
638 *Gesta Francorum*, p. 41; Guibert of Nogent, p. 189.
639 Guibert of Nogent, p. 170, ‘multa nostris resederunt spoila innumera frumenti vinique; reliquuntur impendia; equorum, camelorum, mulorum asinorumque pedestribus cessere subsidia.’
640 *Gesta Francorum*, p. 70, ‘oues quoque et boues, equos et mulos, camelos et asinos, frumentum et unum, farina et alia multa quae nobis errant necessaria.’
641 Ambroise. 8277-8283; *Itinerarium*, p. 325.
642 ‘Continuation Rothelin’, p. 535.
Distribution of Plunder
The means of distributing booty could vary greatly whilst on crusade. In the medieval West it had long been the practice for all booty to be gathered in a collective pile and then distributed by the leaders to their followers.\(^{643}\) However, the expeditions that set out for the Holy Land demonstrated different ways of handling and distributing booty whilst on crusade. Given the importance of booty to the resupply of crusading armies, it was essential that the booty taken should be effectively distributed. This could vary from the central pooling of booty to direct royal control over booty, both of which were common in the West. However, there are instances of free seizure being in operation and occasionally free-for-alls. The arrangements made for the distribution of booty differed in their level of effectiveness, with accusations of withholding booty or thefts from collective piles being commonplace.

Division of Booty
In many expeditions agreements reached at the outset or made during them could ensure the equitable division of spoils amongst the crusader host. Usually all plunder would be gathered in a central pool and divided between the crusaders. Norman and Flemish crusaders who took part in the capture of Lisbon in 1148 pledged to pile their plunder outside of the city so that the booty could then be divided.\(^{644}\) A treaty made by Alfonso with the Genoese in 1146 specifies that the Genoese would receive a third of any lands or goods taken during their crusades to Iberia.\(^{645}\) Following the conquest of Almeria in October, 1147 the city was divided between the Genoese and the other besiegers, Alfonso of VII of Castile and Ramon Berenguer of Barcelona.\(^{646}\) At the siege of Tortosa the following year, the city was again divided following its capture, with a third of the city going to the Genoese and two-thirds to Ramon Berenguer.\(^{647}\) After the surrender of Silves in September, 1189, the crusaders made an agreement with the defenders that all moveables should be surrendered, this booty was then to be divided between the attackers and a share was also given to Sancho of Portugal.\(^{648}\)

During the Fourth Crusade the division of plunder was dominated by a series of agreements made with the Venetians from 1201 to 1204. Thomas Madden has

\(^{644}\) De expugnatione Lyxbonensi, pp. 174-15.
\(^{645}\) Codice, pp. 204-9, nos. 146-7.
\(^{646}\) Caffaro of Genoa, p. 84.
\(^{647}\) Ibid., p. 88, ‘hoc toto completo, Ianuenses terciam et comes duas.’
\(^{648}\) Narratio’, p. 190.
highlighted the importance of vows and contracts made between the Franks and the Venetians in shaping the course of the Fourth Crusade. The first agreement made in February, 1201 when the Venetian fleet was originally hired, specified: ‘that so long as our association lasts we shall have one half, and you the other half, of everything we win by land or sea.’

In Spring 1202, following the failure of the crusader to pay for the cost of the fleet, a second agreement was reached whereby the crusaders agreed to aid the Venetians in retaking Zara, but that the Venetians would take full control of city, presumably with plunder being divided as per the original 1201 treaty.

The March Pact made outside Constantinople in March, 1204 further detailed agreements for the division of plunder following the fall of the city, and illustrates that these agreements could be complex. It stated that ‘all treasure found within the city by whoever ought to be brought and placed in the appointed common location.’ This pile would then be divided, with three quarters of the first 200,000 marks going to the Venetians and the remainder to the Franks. As Donald Queller discussed in his work on the Fourth Crusade, this division reflects that debts were still owed to the Venetians from the 1201 agreement, and the subsequent lease of their fleet for a further year.

Thereafter, any remaining booty would then be split evenly between the Venetians and the Franks. This is the only crusade where the shares allotted to individual crusaders are recorded; the Devastatio reports that ‘they began to divide the common booty and to give, almost like certain down-payments, twenty marks to each and every knight, ten marks to each cleric and mounted sergeant, and five marks to each foot soldier’.

Prior to the capture of Damietta in November 1219 during the Fifth Crusade, ordinances were created governing the conduct of the army and the arrangements for the division of spoils once the city fell. These ordinances called for all gold and silver to be brought together and any who kept their plunder would lose a hand and their share of booty.

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650 Villehardouin, vol. 1, p. 36; Robert of Clari, pp. 11-12.

651 Urkunden zur älteren Handels, vol. 1, p. 445, ‘Totum quidem hauere, quod in ciuitate inuentum fuerit, a quolibet duci debet et poni in commune eo loco, quo fuerit ordinatum.’

652 Queller & Madden, Fourth Crusade, pp. 175-176, n. 22, 199-200.


654 ‘Gesta Obsidionis Damiatæ’, p. 11, ‘Item qui introit civitatem et inventit aurum et argentum et omnia alia, que invenerit, adunet in tribus vel sex domibus et assignet ea stabilitis; si quis vult derobare, perdat manum et suam partem.’
The division of booty was an attempt to ensure the fair dispensation of loot to all crusaders; however the effectiveness of this can be questioned. There are many allegations that booty was stolen or diverted from the common pile. After the fall of Silves some crusaders went into the city to extort money out of the Muslim inhabitants and some crusaders took grain from the city before the plunder had been divided.\textsuperscript{655} This then sparked a panicked spate of looting ‘in the commotion men carried off the plunder before the division between the Portuguese and ourselves was made, acting without the permission of our leaders and against the terms of the agreement.’\textsuperscript{656} This ultimately resulted in the crusaders forfeiting their share of booty when Sancho of Portugal denied them further claim to spoils.

During the sack of Zara the author of the \textit{Devastatio} states that ‘barons kept the city’s goods for themselves, giving nothing to the poor. The poor laboured mightily in poverty and hunger.’\textsuperscript{657} After the fall of Constantinople, Villehardouin comments on the vast wealth that was at the mercy of the crusaders, and states that ‘apart from what was stolen and the Venetians’ share, they amounted to four hundred thousand marks of silver.’\textsuperscript{658} Robert of Clari blames the reduced wealth on the avarice of the magnates, he describes how the leaders ‘began to rob the treasure, so that nothing was shared with the common people of the host or the poor knights or the sergeants who had helped to win the treasure, save the plain silver.’\textsuperscript{659} Ernoul-Bernard instead accused the Venetians of secretly absconding with much of the treasure onto their ships under the cover of darkness.\textsuperscript{660}

The effectiveness of the pooling of booty at Damietta is hard to discern. The \textit{Gesta Obsidionis Damiae} and Oliver of Paderborn describe the relatively peaceful occupation of the city \textit{sine violenta depredatione cum tumult}, although Oliver states that some crusaders took some from the collective pile, for which they were placed under anathema by Pelagius.\textsuperscript{661} James of Vitry’s account instead describes the outbreak of looting as the crusaders swept through Damietta, although it is possible that James was

\textsuperscript{655} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 192.
\textsuperscript{656} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 192, ‘Et ipsa commotion nostril sine consensus magistratuam et contra pactum efferebant predam ante distributionem inter Portugalenses et nos feciendam.’
\textsuperscript{657} ‘\textit{Devastatio},’ pp. 133, 142, ‘Bona ville barones sibi retinuerunt; pauperibus nichil dederunt. Pauperes egestate et fame maxime laboraverunt.’
\textsuperscript{658} Geoffre of Villehardouin, vol. 2, p. 60.
\textsuperscript{659} Robert of Clari, p. 102
\textsuperscript{661} ‘\textit{Gesta Obsidionis Damiae},’ p. 111; Oliver of Paderborn, pp. 225,238-239, ‘In commune iuravimus omnes, ut asportata de Civitate spolia redderentur inter Victores dividenda; hoc etiam sub anathemate terribili fuit preceptum a legato sedis apostolice.’
referring to the rioting that broke out shortly afterwards following disagreement over
the division of spoils. As can be observed, the division of plunder seems to have
regularly been open to abuse, with many allegations of crusaders holding back plunder
or certain parties within the crusader force stealing much of the accumulated booty.

When it came to the division of booty it is unclear how this done on many
crusades. Only at Constantinople is there a record of the distribution of spoils and this
was done according to rank. At Lisbon, Silves and Damietta shares were apportioned to
all, but there is no record of how large these shares were. The evidence from the fall
of Damietta suggests that shares could vary, and could be overturned if the popular
feeling in the crusading army was strong enough. Johns of Tulbia’s account makes it
clear that Pelagius’ initial division of spoils was unpopular amongst many crusaders,
and following rioting by infuriated crusaders a new division of spoils was announced.
Under this new agreement the city was given over to the control of John of Brienne, and
a new division of spoils gave the humbler crusaders a greater share of the spoils. The
Devastatio’s account of the distribution of spoils also expresses discontent, with many
assuming their initial portion was merely a down-payment. Robert of Clari also records
that ‘Then all the common silver was divided ,as I have told you, but the other
treasures, the gold, the cloth of silk, of which there was so much that it was a fair
marvel, remained undivided.’ It would therefore that in some cases the nobles leading
the crusade retained at least a portion of the wealth.

Robert of Clari also makes another interesting point that at Constantinople booty
was shared out to ‘even the women and the children, to each one something.’ From
this we might infer that it was exceptional to assign women and children booty, and
may have extended to non-combatants as whole. The lack of details regarding the
division of spoils in other crusades prohibits any confirmation of this, but it may have
been the case that the multitude of non-combatants accompanying crusades commonly
received no share in the division of spoils. This would have placed an even greater
strain on their resources, and they would have been forced to rely upon the resources
provided through the leaders or alms funds.

662 James of Vitry, p. 135.
663 De expugnatione Lysbonensi, pp. 176-177; ‘Narratio’, p. 190.
665 Robert of Clari, p. 96, ‘Adont fu partis tous li gros argens, si comme je vous ai dit, et li autres avoirs, li ors, li drap se soie, don’t il avoit tant que ch’estoit une fille mervelle, se remest a partir
666 Ibid., p. 96, ‘as femmes et enfans, a cascun.’
The division of spoils is problematic to address in terms of its overall effectiveness. The evidence suggests that plunder and other resources were divided between crusaders, allowing many to replenish their coffers. However, there are also many accusations of fraud concerning the division of spoils, although the veracity of these accounts cannot be proven. Dividing spoils seems to have been most effective during the Second Crusade, when it appears that the majority of the force felt bound by the Dartmouth Oath to respect the division of spoils, although not without some illicit looting.\textsuperscript{667} In most other cases, apart from Silves, loot was apportioned to ordinary crusaders, but it is hard to establish how dependent rank-and-file crusaders were on the booty taken. There is also the possibility that the non-combatants were frequently excluded from the division. The absence of sufficient quantities of booty it is likely that many crusaders had to rely upon the support structures provided by the leaders and communal funds. The siphoning of booty by the leaders indicates that they needed to rapidly refill their coffers as much the poorer crusaders. However, with the increased expectation that the leaders should provide support to other crusaders, it is likely that crusading sapped their resources swiftly, and required ever greater sums in order to replenish their treasuries.

**Royal Control over booty**

The level of authority wielded by the kings of England and France during the Third Crusade enabled them to assert control over the booty taken throughout the crusade. Prior to the departure of Richard I and Philip II for the Holy Land in 1190 the two kings created a series of ordinances at Vézelay in which they agreed that all plunder taken on crusade would be split evenly between them.\textsuperscript{668} This then went on to shape Anglo-French negotiations throughout the course of the Third Crusade, and was also the cause of a number of disagreements between the two kings. Philip made claims on half the spoils taken from the sack of Messina in October, 1190 and from Richard’s capture of Cyprus in July, 1191. Richard refused him, citing that his actions were not undertaken as a crusader, and therefore did not come under the terms of their agreement. In response, Richard claimed half of the county of Flanders that Philip had received upon the death of the Philip of Flanders whilst on crusade in August, 1191. This seems to

\textsuperscript{667} De expugnatione Lyxbonensi, pp. 57-58.

\textsuperscript{668} Ambroise, 365-370.
have been sufficient to compel Philip to back down.\textsuperscript{669} It is true that these disagreements were resolved peacefully, and resulted in a subsequent redrafting of the agreements regarding the division of booty. However, they placed great strains on Anglo-French cooperation and the mutual mistrust and suspicion only widened the gulf between the two armies.

By retaining control of booty taken during the Crusade, both kings would be able to effectively replenish their resources as discussed above. With the booty concentrated exclusively in their hands, this afforded the kings considerable influence over the course of the expedition. This would have made it hard for other crusaders to operate outside of their \textit{mouvance}. Only Conrad of Montferrat was able to successfully operate independently of Richard and Philip through his control of Tyre, and resources provided by that city.\textsuperscript{670}

The claim of Richard and Philip to all items of booty on crusade was certainly controversial. Roger of Howden reports that the two kings divided the city of Acre between themselves, ‘and everything that was in it, both the pagans as well as the gold and silver, and all other articles of property.’\textsuperscript{671} Given the great privations suffered during the siege, this was much resented by the nobles, who had exhausted their resources throughout the two-year siege. They threatened to withdraw their support unless Richard and Philip agreed to dispense booty to them.\textsuperscript{672} Following the victory at Arsuf in July, 1191 there were further complaints about Richard’s failure to provide support to his followers. Roger of Howden records murmurings of the crusader army: ‘We’re poor people, we’ve got nothing to eat or drink, no clothes to wear or horses to ride on. So how can we follow him? He gives us nothing.’\textsuperscript{673}

In response to both complaints Richard and Philip were able to dispense booty to their fellow crusaders. However, there were also instances where it was freely distributed without complaint from their followers. During Richard’s voyage to Acre, he encountered a Muslim ship which he subsequently captured, killing all the crew, ‘These being thus conquered and slain, the king distributed all their property among his

\begin{footnotes}
\item[669] Roger of Howden, \textit{Chronica}, vol. 3, p. 114.
\item[670] Ibid., pp. 21-22.
\item[671] Ibid., p. 121, ‘Tertiadecima die mensis Julii, rex Franciae et rex Angliae partiti sunt inter eos civitatem Acon, et Omnia quae in ea errant, tam paganos, quam aurum et argentum, et caetera omnia.’
\item[672] \textit{Itinerarium}, p. 233; Roger of Howden, \textit{Gesta}, vol. 2, p. 181.
\end{footnotes}
galley-men.'674 Prior to Richard’s second attempt to assault Jerusalem he captured a Muslim caravan heading for Jerusalem, Richard then divided the spoils from this caravan. Roger of Howden only briefly mentioned the spoils taken, saying that he ‘gave to the knights of the army a portion of the spoils of the slain.’675 However, Ambroise’s account lists the great amount of booty taken in treasure, livestock, food and many other items. He also records how after the taking of the caravan the army went to Betaffa, ‘there they divided up the booty.’676 ‘The king distributed the camels, which were as fine as ever seen, both among the knights protecting the army and those who had gone out. Similarly, he distributed the mules and asses among them generously.’677

Despite Richard and Philip’s authority as monarchs it is clear that they were not fully able to impose control over all booty taken on crusade. As discussed, the nobles on crusade were able to force the release of some items of booty. However, there were also instances where plunder was freely taken. Ambroise’s account of the fall of Messina states that: ‘You may believe in truth that great wealth was lost when the crowd entered, the town was soon pillaged and the galleys, which were neither poor nor mean, were burned.’678 No mention is made of the division of spoils after the sack of the city, which may suggest that plunder was taken freely. Ambroise’s account of the victory over the Cypriot’s describes Richard leaving the battlefield, but the sergeants remained to collect a large amount of booty.679 Again this suggests that there was no formalised division of spoils.

A less ambiguous case can be founding following the crusader victory at Arsuf on the 1st October, 1191, some crusaders scoured the battlefield for booty and ‘returned well-laden, carrying off whatever they wanted.’680 In the aftermath of the battle it is unlikely that neither Richard nor any other leaders were in a position to regulate the taking of spoils. Any such attempts would have been further hampered by the post-battle chaos and by the myriad of different contingents within the crusader host making any regulations regarding booty hard to enforce. The raid conducted in March, 1192

674 Ibid., p. 112, ‘Quibus devictis et interfectis, rex distribuit omnia catalla illorum galiotis suis.’
675 Ibid., p. 182, ‘ex spoliis interfectorum dedit militibus exercitus.’
676 Ambroise, 10511-10564.
677 Ibid., 10553-10558, ‘As chevaliers qui l’ost garderent, Alsi com a eels qui ererent; E muls e mules enelement, Lur departi il richement; E toz les anes as serjanz, Fist il doner, petiz e granz.’
678 Ambroise, 812-817, ‘E bien poez defi savoir, Que il ot perdu grant avoir, Quant la grant presse fud entree; Car tost fud la vile pelfree, Si furent lor galees arses, Qui n’ierent povres ne escharses.’
679 Ibid., 1668-1688.
680 Ibid., 6616-6617; Itinerarium, p. 274, ‘Quisquis avidus lucre praedas hostium voluisset colligere, rediti in locum certaminis, et sufficierent onustus pro voluntate sibi placentia diripuit.’
resulted in booty being divided between Henry of Champagne and other foragers.\footnote{Ambroise, 8253-8268; \textit{Itinerarium}, pp. 324-325.} The plunder taken here did not pass into the hands of Richard, perhaps because he was still in Acre at this point. Free from Richard’s direct command it appears that crusaders could still take plunder for themselves.

The concentration of booty in the hands of Richard and Philip is an attempt by the kings to replenish their finances and to provide sufficient funds to support their armies in the Holy Land. The kings were able to secure a large amount of booty with which they could support their forces, and the maintenance of Richard’s force in the Holy Land for an extended period is an indication of the success of this policy. However, there are also illustrations of the limitations of royal power in achieving this, and Richard and Philip were compelled to distribute plunder to other crusaders on a number of occasions. The control of booty did, however, place both the monarchs in strong position by enabling them to channel the flow of resources to their followers, making them more dependent upon royal patronage and support.

**Free Seizure**

Agreements for the division of spoils are by no means universal across all expeditions. The First Crusade is distinctive for the absence of any system for the pooling of loot. Raymond of Aguilers described the system for the taking of property, ‘it was custom among us that if any one came to a castle or town first and placed his sign upon there with a watch, it was touched by no one else.’\footnote{Raymond, p. 292, ‘Erat enim consuetudo inter nos, ut si aliquis ad castelum vel villam prior venisset, et posuisset signum cum custodia, a nullo alio postea contingebatur.’} Guibert of Nogent is equally clear about the free seizure of booty following the fall of Jerusalem: ‘This was right and proper for the army of God, that the finest things that offered themselves to each man, no matter how poor, became his by right, without doubt or challenge, no matter the social class of the man who first came upon them.’\footnote{Guibert of Nogent, p. 281, ‘Is autem in dominica militia modus et exaequatio fuit, ut cuicumque, etiam pauperrimo, sese quaelibet optima obtulissent, eius proculdubio, absque retractione fierent, cuiuscumque conditionis videretur, cui ad manum primo venissent.’} Guibert gives an interesting justification for this unconventional method of gathering booty, viewing spoils as the just rewards of an army of God. Having won a battle, a sign of God’s favour, the rewards are there for the righteous to enjoy. Furthermore, it is significant that Guibert also views the taking of equal spoils by the rich and poor alike as being justified by the fulfilment of their crusading vows.
This method of taking booty can be found throughout the First Crusade. At Antioch different parts of the city were seized by different lords leading to quarrelling over control of the city. The *Gesta Francorum* records that at Ma’arrat-an-Nu’man the crusaders ‘entered the city, and each seized his own share of whatever goods he found in houses or cellars.’ Albert describes the free seizure of booty in action at fall of Jerusalem on July 15th, 1099: ‘Whoever was first to invade a house or palace occupied it peacefully with all its furniture, corn, barley, wine and oil, money or clothing, or whatever there was, and in this way they became the possessors of the entire city.’ Fulcher of Chartres also records as a result, ‘Thus many poor men became rich.’ Ralph of Caen’s detailed description of the sack similarly related how ‘They rushed everywhere and everything was seized. However, as is commonly said each person has his desire and the cure for this desire takes precedence.’

Early in the First Crusade there seems to have been an initial attempt to pool booty. After the battle of Dorylaeum, Albert of Aachen reports that the crusaders decided ‘from that day, rations and all necessary supplies should be pooled, and everything should be held in common.’ However the pooling of booty is not described by any eye-witnesses to the battle which questions the reliability of this account. The absence of the division of spoils common to the West is largely due the highly fragmented nature of the First Crusade. The lack of a clear leader and the factional nature of the army would have made it hard to impose a universal system for the taking and distribution of booty. Free seizure was perhaps the only workable method of gathering booty, short of an anarchic free-for-all.

The *Gesta Francorum* also describes a curious arrangement where Baldwin of Boulogne made Tancred an offer that whoever could take most booty during the sack of Tarsus could keep the city. This suggests that some form of collection of booty was suggested. The *Gesta Francorum* states that Tancred declined to enter into this offer.

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684 *Gesta Francorum*, pp. 70-71; Fulcher of Chartres, p. 325; Raymond of Aguilers, p. 275.
685 *Gesta Francorum*, pp. 79-80, ‘Intrauerunt uero omnes nostri in ciuitatem, et quicquid boni inuenerunt in domibus et in foueis, hoc unusquisque ad suum continebat proprium.’
686 Albert of Aachen, pp. 432-433, ‘Quicumque uero domum aut palatium prior inuadebat, cum omni supellectili, frumento, ordeo, uino et oleo, pecunia aut ueste, aut qualibet re pacifice obtinebat, et sic possessors totius ciuitatis faci sunt.’
687 Fulcher of Chartres, p. 360.
688 Ralph of Caen, p. 694, ‘cursim omnia et omnia raptim. Ut tamen in vulgo fert fabula, qua cuique est prurigo gravis.’
689 Albert of Aachen, pp. 136-137, ‘cunctisque rebus necessariis, omnia communia habere decreuerunt.’
and therefore, the possibilities for the division of plunder remained unexplored. However, Ralph of Caen describes Tancred wishing to share his plunder with Baldwin prior to the assault on the city, but Baldwin insisted that the captured weapons should be distributed evenly or else entirely given to Baldwin’s men. This arrangement is likely to have been ad hoc and does not fit the general pattern of tribute taking during the First Crusade.

The free seizure of booty inevitably resulted in an uneven distribution of plunder. During the capture of Antioch many of the poorer crusaders began to loot the city, whilst the knights continued to pursue the Turks through the city. Raymond suggests this was common throughout the crusade, during one foray led by Bohemond, ‘Some of his followers had found plunder, but others were coming back empty-handed,’ indicating that plunder was not being evenly distributed. As has been stated, there were also instances where the gathering of booty was dependent upon the protection of armed crusaders. With such an uneven distribution of booty, it is likely that the supply problems encountered by the First Crusade were greatly exacerbated.

Those who could not seize booty to sustain themselves were often faced with starvation, this therefore placed pressure on the support provided through the magnates or communal funds. During the sack of Jerusalem, Ralph of Caen describes widespread looting and the taking of personal spoils, however he also describes Tancred’s decision to distribute plunder to his followers: ‘He armed the unarmoured men, he clothed the naked, and cared for the needy.’ The free seizure of booty also caused discipline problems within the crusader forces. Following the victory over the army of Kerbogah outside Antioch on the 8th June, 1098, many Provencal crusaders ‘eager for booty and Turkish spoils, did not join the pursuit but stayed in that same place where victory was given, and plundered abundant spoils of gold bezants, corn, wine, clothing and tents.’ During the march to Jerusalem there was more unregulated plunder outside the castle of Krak des Chevaliers in early 1099. During the fighting outside the castle Raymond of Aguilers describes

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690 *Gesta Francorum*, p. 25.  
691 Ralph of Caen, p. 633.  
692 Fulcher of Chartres, p. 343.  
693 *Gesta Francorum*, p. 32.  
695 Albert of Aachen, p. 333-335, ‘prede inhians et spoliis Turcorum, in loco eodem quo uictoria data est parum persequens remansit, et grandia spoila auri, bisantiorum frumenti, uini, uestimentorum et papilionum depredata est.’
how the poor broke off from the fray to gather booty, they were then followed by the footmen and then in turn by the knights. This appears to have been so great a problem that before the battle of Ascalon in 1099 Arnulf, patriarch of Jerusalem, decreed that all who stopped to gather booty before the battle was over would be excommunicated.

There were also instances where the need for booty could be an advantage, in Raymond of Aguilera’s account of the siege of Ma’arrat-an-Nu’man he recalls that the knights broke off from the battle once darkness fell, but desperation drove on other crusaders, ‘careless of their lives because starvation had made them contemptuous of life, carried the fight to the besieged in the shades of night.’ Whilst spoils could be a motivating factor, the decree of Patriarch Arnulf and similar decrees on other crusades would suggest that many commanders preferred their troops to be disciplined, rather than lustng for plunder.

The absence of a central or even collective authority during the First Crusade created an environment which encouraged the free seizure of booty. This provided the potential for individual crusaders to become rich overnight, however this also resulted in the uneven distribution of booty. The effectiveness of free seizure as means of support was therefore limited; with crusaders unable to secure spoils having to turn to support structures provided by the magnates or communal funds. Combined with the indiscipline that could result from the free seizures of booty, it unsurprising that this model of distributing plunder was not repeated on future crusades.

The effectiveness of plunder as a means of support could vary greatly depending upon how it was divided between the crusaders. Some crusades managed to ensure a more-or-less orderly division of booty, that enabled both rich and poor to receive a share of plunder to satisfy either their immediate sustenance or else to replenish their funds. However, in some cases the division of plunder excluded many of the common crusaders from any share of spoils, as can be seen after the fall of Acre during the Third Crusade. Or else, the plunder is alleged to have been siphoned away from the collective pool by various elements within the crusader host, with such suspicions being articulated most forcefully during the Fourth Crusade. The division of plunder could be an effective means of supporting crusaders, however this frequently led to kings and

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696 Raymond of Aguilera, p. 274.
697 Gesta Francorum, p. 95.
698 Raymond of Aguilera, p. 270, ‘quibus vita non multum cara fuerat, quos longa jejunia in sui despectum duxerant, per noctis tenebras inferre bella Sarracenis non formidabant.’
magnates benefiting more than their followers. Though, it often fell to these leaders, as with Richard I during the Third Crusade, to support their fellow crusaders in the future. Support might therefore be provided through the treasuries of these monarchs and magnates, which were replenished by the booty taken.

**Byzantine support**

**Gifts and alms**

The wealth of the Byzantine Empire and its geographical position, dominating the landward route East, meant that the Byzantine Emperors were ideally positioned to aid the crusaders passing through their lands. During the First Crusade, Alexios I Komnenos was an important figure in shaping the course of the crusade as it made its way through the Balkans and into Anatolia. Large gifts of cash were made to many leaders of the crusades, Stephen of Blois wrote to his wife Adele that Alexios has ‘loaded me with the most bountiful and precious gifts.’ Godfrey received gifts of corn, barley, wine, oil and game from Alexios during this journey through Hungary, and this continued when he received a further eight days’ worth of provisions for his force at Philippopolis. Albert relates that ‘every four weeks men were sent from the emperor’s palace to the duke, laden with golden bezants, with ten measures of tetartaron coinage, with which the duke’s soldiers could be maintained.’ Albert also records that Bohemond, Raymond of St. Giles, Robert of Normandy and Robert of Flanders and others leaders of the crusade were also generously supplied with funds by the Byzantine Emperor and like Godfrey they all had to swear allegiance to Alexios.

During the Crusade of 1101, Alexios also chose to endow the crusaders with gifts in a bid to stop them from ravaging his lands as they waited for two months to cross the Bosphorus. Alexios was also able to aid the crusaders of 1101 after their defeat at the hands of the Turks. On their return to Constantinople the emperor bestowed many gifts upon Raymond of St. Giles, Stephen of Blois and Conrad, constable to Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV. Alexios also permitted them to stay in Constantinople throughout the Autumn and Winter, providing them with money and

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700 Albert of Aachen, pp. 72-73.
701 Albert of Aachen, p. 86, ‘quatuor uiri aureis bysantiiis onerati cum decem modiis monete tartaron de domo imperatoris duci mittebantur, quibus milites sustenari posset.’
702 Ibid., pp. 88-103.
703 Ibid., pp. 590-591.
supplies. Following the re-establishment of peace between the Germans and Byzantines after their initial conflict, Conrad received both supplies and guides from Emperor Manuel I Komnenos to aid his journey into Anatolia. Manuel also provided ships to transport Conrad and his remaining followers to Acre after their defeat in Anatolia.

The treaty of Adrianople signed in February 1190 clearly defines the support provided to Frederick Barbarossa by Emperor Isaac Angelos. The treaty is chiefly concerned with providing Frederick with the means to support his army in Greece, mainly through the provision of markets and to aid their crossing of the Bosphorus through the provision of 235 ships. The *Historia de Expeditione* also states that Frederick 'had the right to levy wheat, barley and wine without hindrance from any of the Greeks, up to the crossing of the Hellespont,' and if the locals were uncooperative then their goods were placed at the mercy of Frederick and his men. It is therefore clear that Frederick was aware of the great need his army had of supplies, and these terms reflect his need to provide sustenance for his army.

However, the bounty offered by the Byzantine Emperors did not come without conditions. Alexios and Manuel both demanded that all the magnates and kings swear an oath recognising their supremacy. During the First Crusade many of the princes swore allegiance to the Byzantine Emperor, which seems to have been the price for securing food for the crusading army, which Alexios was willing to provide at the price of their submission. Whilst some of the crusaders resisted Alexios’ demands for their homage, most eventually submitted, being faced with the bleak choice of submission or starvation. Godfrey of Bouillon ‘not only gave himself to him (Alexios) as a son, as in the custom of that land, but even as a vassal with hands joined, along with all the nobles who were there then and those who followed afterwards.’

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704 Ibid., pp. 616-617.
705 John Kinnamos, p. 67.
706 Ibid., p. 71.
707 *Historia de Expeditione*, pp. 64-66.
708 Ibid., pp. 65, ‘Christi exercitus absque omnium Grecorum inhibitione tollendi frumentum et hordeum et vinum usque ad transitum Ellesponti.’
709 Ibid., p. 66, ‘Quod si forte ex inverecundia incolarum victualia non potuerit exercitu prebere designatus defensor panse vaston, habebunt licentiam agmina exercitus facere in eos quidquid voluerint, excepto quod non tradant aliqui ethnico terram eorum.’
711 Albert of Aachen., p. 86, ‘non solum se ei in filium, sicut mos est terre, sed etiam in uassalum iunctis manibus reddidit, cum uniuersis primis qui tunc aderant, et postea subsecuti sunt.’
During the Second Crusade the French are recorded as swearing the same oath that the leaders of the First Crusade swore and also to return any Byzantine cities they recaptured to the Emperor's control. After swearing these oaths the flow of gifts and the markets were duly restored.\textsuperscript{712} There is no record in either the Latin or Greek accounts of Conrad swearing an oath to Manuel to restore territories, although given the need for supplies it seems likely that Conrad would have sworn an oath on similar terms to the French. The Byzantine assistance provided to Conrad following the defeat of his army at the hands of the Turks, further suggests that Conrad had reached an accord with the Byzantines by swearing to Manuel.\textsuperscript{713}

The treaty of 1191 also provides us with the codified details of the relationship between Frederick and Isaac, whereas the details of the oaths made between Byzantine emperors and other crusade leaders have not be recorded.\textsuperscript{714} These terms also differ from previous agreements in that they are decidedly one-sided in favour of the German Emperor, and demonstrate that Frederick was in the ascendant over Isaac by February, 1191 when the treaty was agreed. Frederick was to be given hostages by Isaac, but did not have to provide hostages in return, nor did he have to pay compensation for the ravaging done by his followers. In contrast to previous agreements Frederick was not obliged to return any previously Byzantine cities or make an oath of fealty that to the Byzantine emperor.

Whilst Frederick was clearly eager to secure food supplies for his army, the advantageous terms suggest that Isaac’s position to oppose Frederick’s crusade is in fact weaker than his predecessors. Significantly Isaac does not seem to have been in a sufficiently secure position to cut off all supplies to Frederick, a strategy employed by Alexios and Manuel Komnenos during the First and Second Crusades. The ability to provide and deny supplies had therefore produced agreements that largely favoured the Byzantines, Isaac’s relatively submissive posture in early 1191 indicates that he lacked the means to achieve this and was therefore pressured into accepting Frederick’s demands.

During the First Crusade, Emperor Alexius also dispensed his largesse the poor crusaders, as well as the wealthy. In 1096 Peter the Hermit asked Alexius for alms ‘so that he and his men would have something to sustain life’, and Alexios granted Peter


\textsuperscript{713} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 71.

\textsuperscript{714} ‘Historia de Expeditione’, pp. 64-66.
two hundred bezants paid out in the newly introduced *tetartaron*.\textsuperscript{715} Despite the riotous conduct of the crusaders under Peter the Hermit as they made their way through Byzantine lands in 1096, Alexios was still willing to provide them with alms, probably in an attempt to curb the ravaging of his lands by the crusaders.\textsuperscript{716} The decision to use this coin presumably made it easier for Peter to distribute it to his followers, who could then purchase the supplies provided in the markets set up by Alexios. Alms are not mentioned in further crusades, which may indicate that support was instead being provided to the leaders, and then routed through them to their followers.

**Markets and exchanges**

In addition to the gifts and alms offered by Alexios he also granted markets to the crusaders. With many crusaders given orders not to pillage by their leaders, these provided the only other method of acquiring supplies on their journey through Byzantine territory. Peter the Hermit’s force was also granted access to markets on their journey through the Byzantine Empire, but on the condition that he remain no longer than three days in any one town.\textsuperscript{717} Markets were then duly provided to Peter’s force when their reached Constantinople.\textsuperscript{718} The markets were also restored to the magnates on the First Crusade in order that they might continue to sustain themselves around the Byzantine capital.\textsuperscript{719} However, this was only done after they had sworn their oaths to Alexios.

Half a century later during the Second Crusade, Manuel Komnenos was also prepared to offer the armies of Conrad III and Louis VII safe passage and the ‘promise of a sufficient market, suitable exchange, and other privileges which seemed necessary to us.’\textsuperscript{720} However, Odo of Deuil goes on to comment that the supplies provided at the markets were insufficient to sustain the crusaders,\textsuperscript{721} however this may have been a negotiating ploy which might allow Manuel to exacting oaths of homage from Conrad and Louis, as Alexios had done with the leaders of the First Crusade. Markets were also

\textsuperscript{715} Albert of Aachen, pp. 30-31, ‘unde sustentationem uite cum suis habeat.’
\textsuperscript{716} Ibid., pp. 32-33
\textsuperscript{717} Ibid., pp. 28-29.
\textsuperscript{718} Ibid., pp. 30-31.
\textsuperscript{719} Ibid., pp. 86-87.
\textsuperscript{720} Odo of Deuil, p. 28, ‘et ipsi forum idoneum, concambium competens, et alia quae nostris utilia visa sunt pro suo imperatore sacramento similis firmaverunt.’
\textsuperscript{721} Ibid., pp. 40-41.
prominent in the treaty between Frederick and Isaac Angelos, which allowed for the provision of markets along the German line of march.\textsuperscript{722}

Byzantine mercantile assistance was also provided outside of Greece and Anatolia. During the siege of Antioch supply ships seem to have arrived regularly after the securing of the port of St. Symeon. Peter the Hermit was dispatched to Cyprus in order to secure the delivery of food supplies to the crusaders, Raymond of Aguilers also reports that this assistance continued on the march to Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{723} The continued flow of supplies to the crusader army enabled operations in the Levant to continue, and it is unlikely that these supplies would have continued to flow without the approval of the Emperor.

To facilitate harmonious financial dealings with the local merchants the crusaders frequently demanded access to money-changers. Presumably locals were reluctant to accept the coinage of the West, and instead preferred to deal in more familiar local specie. Metcalf suggests that in order facilitate the rapid exchange of coinage, the coins from the West were melted down and recast as Byzantine coins, a service for which the Byzantine moneyers took a commission.\textsuperscript{724} Whilst exchanges are not specifically referred to during the First Crusade, \textit{Gesta Francorum} and Raymond of Aguilers mention the use of Byzantine \textit{hyperpyron}.\textsuperscript{725} During the Second there are more direct references to exchanges, Odo of Deuil records the exchange of \textit{deniers} and silver marks to the \textit{stamenon}.\textsuperscript{726} However, there are also complaints at the harsh exchange rate and allegations that the crusaders were being defrauded by the Byzantines.\textsuperscript{727} However, this may be more indicative of anti-Byzantine feelings in contemporary accounts, rather than actual exchange rates. Exchanges were again provided during the Third Crusade but, with the balance of power in favour of Frederick, he was able to secure more favourable exchange rates. The importance of exchanges to Barbarossa’s army is evidenced in the treaty of Adrianople which explicitly states the exchange rate at five and half \textit{hyperpyron} to the silver mark.\textsuperscript{728} The exchanges remained important because they enabled the crusaders to effectively buy produce from the markets provided as they passed through the Byzantine Empire. Their importance of markets meant that it

\textsuperscript{722} ‘Historia de Expeditione’, pp. 64-66.
\textsuperscript{723} Raymond of Aguilers, p. 274, 290.
\textsuperscript{724} Metcalf, \textit{Coinage of the Crusades}, pp. 3–11.
\textsuperscript{725} \textit{Gesta Francorum}, p. 33; Raymond of Aguilers, p. 278; Murray, ‘Money’, pp. 229-249.
\textsuperscript{726} Odo of Deuil, pp. 66, 75.
\textsuperscript{727} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 66.
\textsuperscript{728} ‘Historia de Expeditione’, p. 66.
became a point of leverage that could be proffered by the Byzantine Emperors in exchange for the fealty of the crusaders.

**Byzantine support**

The crusaders enjoyed a turbulent relationship with the Byzantines, and this relationship varied greatly during the course of the crusades. As the rulers of the Byzantine Empire, they were able to provide the support necessary to sustain the crusaders as they passed through their lands. However, this relationship was frequently overshadowed by Byzantine suspicions about the intentions of the crusader hosts moving through their lands, especially when these forces began ravaging the lands they passed through. Crusader and Byzantine relations were made worse still by cultural and religious differences, and anti-Byzantine prejudices held by some crusaders.

The role of Byzantine support went largely under-appreciated by many contemporary authors, indeed the *Gesta Francorum* and Odo of Deuil remained thoroughly anti-Byzantine in its outlook and is largely a product of the subsequent animosity between Bohemond and the Byzantines. However, some like Albert of Aachen highlight the importance of Byzantine support at Constantinople, Raymond of Aguilers also reports that this support continued with supplies being brought from Cyprus to aid the siege of Antioch and the march to Jerusalem.\(^{729}\) The Byzantines are only prominent in the support of the crusades up until the fall of Constantinople, however, it is significant to note that the existing means of support as afforded by the patronage of kings could be easily supplemented from outside the crusade if the need arose.

**Other support from outside the crusade**

Throughout the course of the crusades additional funds could also be raised through interactions with non-crusaders. Frequently these negotiations could be complicated; frequently diplomacy was mixed with the veiled threat of force from the crusaders in order to extract the resources they desired. The availability of these resources depended greatly upon the route taken by the crusaders and the conditions they encountered, often relying upon chance as much as forward planning.

\(^{729}\) Raymond of Aguilers, p. 274, 290
During Richard’s stay at Messina he was able to raise a considerable 40,000 ounces of gold from Tancred of Sicily. Richard demanded 20,000 ounces of gold to settle his sister’s dowry from her marriage to Tancred’s predecessor, William II and a further 20,000 to secure the marriage of Tancred’s daughter to Arthur of Brittany. Tancred also provided Richard and Philip with supplies and ships during their stay in Sicily and for their journey to the Holy Land. Whilst Tancred and Richard never came into direct conflict, Richard’s army sacked Messina and occupied a fortress outside the city. Richard was therefore in a strong position to ensure that Tancred was cooperative in delivering the support agreed with Richard. It is also likely that Richard’s wintering on Sicily was planned in advance, in order capitalise on the money owed to him by Tancred and provide Richard with both Winter quarters and a resupply depot.

The same cannot be said for Baldwin of Boulogne’s marriage to an Armenian princess in order to enforce his hold upon the city of Edessa. As part of this union he received dowry of 60,000 bezants, although Albert of Aachen records that only 7,000 bezants were actually received by Baldwin. Baldwin was already married at the outset of the crusade, but the death of his wife Godvere of Tosni early in the crusade and his conquest of Edessa presented Baldwin with the opportunity to secure additional funds through his marriage.

Baldwin was also able to ransom the Edessans who were conspiring with the Turks to remove him from power in Edessa. Albert of Aachen reports that he agreed to accept gifts as ransom for the prisoners, and ‘From each man ransomed now fewer than twenty thousand bezants or thirty or sixty were taken into Duke Baldwin’s treasury, in addition to mules and horses, silver vases and many precious ornaments.’ Through his conquest of Edessa and its surrounding towns Baldwin was able to raise finances from these places, which he then used to support his own army, with many escaping the perilous conditions of Antioch to join him. Baldwin was also able to use these funds to support his fellow crusaders and ‘sent very many talents of gold and silver to his

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732 Ambroise, 808-815.
733 Albert of Aachen, pp. 188-189.
734 Ibid., pp. 358-361, ‘Non minus a singulis redemptis quam uiginti milia bisantiorum aut triginta uel sexaginta in erarium ducis Baldwini allata sunt, preter mulos et equos, uasa argentea et plurima ornamenta preciosa.’
735 Ibid., pp. 356-357.
brother Duke Godfrey, Robert of Flanders, Robert count of Normandy, Raymond and the other chief leaders.  

Markets could also be provided to the crusaders by other friendly Christian peoples as they passed eastwards. Bela of Hungary, Stefañ Nemanjić of Serbia and other Balkan rulers were able to provide access to markets for the crusaders, in addition to other gifts that were presented to Frederick Barbarossa and the German magnates. At the First Crusade the Armenian Christians continued to trade with the crusaders on the march through the Taurus Mountains and during the lengthy siege of Antioch. The German crusaders in 1198 were overjoyed to find themselves in a friendly country and were also provided with markets by Armenians. The siege of Damietta also included the participation of John of Ibelin and other Latin settlers, it is therefore likely that supplies were routed to Egypt from the Levant and Cyprus, in addition to those brought from the West during the biannual passages.  

Support could also be extracted from Muslim rulers encountered by the crusaders. Godfrey, Raymond Robert of Flanders and Robert of Normandy accepted tribute from the city of Tripoli in exchange for the preservation of their lands, the town of Jubayl and the fortress of Arqa. An agreement was also reached with the city of Beirut, the ruler offered gifts to the magnates in exchange for the lands of the city being left unspoiled by the passing crusaders. Ralph of Caen comments that ‘they crossed happily to the gates of the cities of Tripoli, Djubail, Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, Acre, Haifa and Caesarea. They boldly demanded great quantities of money and supplies from these places and supplies and money were immediately handed over and paid out.’  

Raymond of Aguilers records that the ruler of Tripoli offered the crusaders ‘fifteen thousand gold pieces of Saracen money plus horses, she mules, many garments, and even more such rewards in succeeding years.’ The lord of Gibellum also sent five
thousand gold dinars to the leaders of the crusade in addition to horses, mules and wine.\textsuperscript{744}

During the passage of the armies through Anatolia in 1101 tribute was also extracted from the Turks, in order escape attack by the crusaders. Albert of Aachen goes further to suggest that these gifts were bribes to compel Raymond and the Byzantines to direct the crusaders to pass through deserts and wildernesses, where they were then attacked by the Turks.\textsuperscript{745} However, it is likely that these gifts then enabled Raymond to support his own followers, in same way that he used tribute during the march to Jerusalem in 1099.

The support received from outside the crusade could be vital to the continuation of crusades. Leaders like Richard and Baldwin were able to add substantial sums to their war chests; however the ability to raise these sums was largely due to their own unique circumstances. Tribute likewise was heavily dependent upon the ability of the crusaders to overawe local Muslim powers into providing tribute, and whilst this could pay substantial sums this form of support was not found on all crusades. Other support from markets could be found more easily, and like those provided by the Byzantines this enabled the crusaders to replenish their food supplies.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The resources raised on crusade were as important as those raised in the West. The money and supplies amassed \textit{en route} and in the Holy Land helped supplement the private resources of crusaders and those provided by the monarchs and popes. The evidence suggests that large quantities of resources were needed by a crusading army, and that all manner of goods were in demand. Contemporaries list money, consumables, livestock and many other goods acquired on crusade and each of these was important to sustainability of a crusading army. These resources could also be important in the long-term, in particular the accumulation of money and treasure by crusaders enabled them to finance the next stages of the crusade as well as to replenish their depleted resources.

The methods of distribution could vary greatly. The division of spoils offered the opportunity for the most even distribution of funds, but as had been seen this was fraught with problems and many common crusaders complained bitterly about being deprived of the plunder owed to them. The free seizure allowed some of the poor to

\textsuperscript{744} Raymond of Aguilers, p. 278.
\textsuperscript{745} Albert of Aachen, p. 597.
become very rich, but the uneven distribution of plunder and effects on discipline meant that it only saw use on the First Crusade. The hardships suffered on this crusade do not seem to have been mitigated by this method of distribution and the support offered by magnates and communal funds continued to remain important. The kings on the Third Crusade were largely successful in ensuring that the large hauls of booty taken on the campaign remained under their control, this meant that they had the power to channel the distribution of plunder. However, this control was not absolute, and they were forced on occasion to dispense it to their followers.

The ability to replenish resources on crusade was of vital importance to crusaders and the failure to do so could prove disastrous. The means of distributing were never entirely even, and the monarchs and magnates on crusade were able to take large shares of these resources. The concentration of resources in the hand of leaders served to deprive many poor crusaders of the means necessary to ensure their long-term prosperity. However, these resources could then be fed by the crusading leaders back to their followers and the poor through their direct patronage, or else through the communal funds sometimes provided. The resources taken on crusade therefore seem to have been fed into the support networks provided by the monarchs, magnates and kinship networks. However, the expansion of support offered by the authorities in the West helped to reduce the need for plunder to sustain expeditions, although local access to food and other supplies remained important.
Chapter Six
Money and the Development of Paid Service

The means of supporting fighting men whilst on crusade could take a wide variety of forms and could be provided through food, clothing, livestock and precious objects, which varied depending upon the availability of resources. Whilst these were all important this chapter will discuss how the role of money in supporting of crusading armies increased gradually from 1095 to 1241. The increase is due in part to the large cash sums that were raised in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries by the authorities in the West to support crusaders, as discussed in previous chapters. The extensive use of paid service in the West further encouraged its use on Crusade, and this therefore required the development of existing support structures to raise and channel these funds. This chapter will explore the development of paid service in crusading armies and the impact of paid service upon support structures.

Paid service and support structures on crusade

Structures of support are important as they provided the means by which the money raised could be channelled to those actively engaged in crusading. It was one thing to raise money to support crusading, but ensuring that it reached those to whom it was intended was an entirely different challenge. Throughout the crusades from 1095-1241 there was a rise in the use of cash payments by leaders to support their followers, although other forms of reward were still being used. This leads us to consider what structures of support were used to provide payment for military service on crusade. Frequently the structures of armies in the West shaped the support structures of crusading armies, as can be seen through the use of the familia and the employment of additional stipendiarii. Gifts and largesse would also distributed by kings and magnates on crusade, these gifts often resemble the cash payments that were exchanged for military service. However, these payments also need to be considered in the context of the political manoeuvring that took place within crusading armies. This discussion will examine the different methods of support: the familia, cash payments, contracts and largesse and developing role of payment in each.

Whilst crusaders were supported by cash payments and other forms of reward, it is important to recognise the fundamentally religious nature of their enterprise. The voluntary nature of the crusading vows taken by participants makes their participation
different from conventional military campaigns in the West. Paid service therefore needs to be considered in the context of this vow and of the spiritual concerns of crusaders, rather than as mercenaries or hirelings. Nor does the increased use of paid service suggest that crusades were becoming less spiritual and more materialistic, rather that the changes that occur in support structures are changes in method rather than motivation.

Contracts for military service begin to be used in the late twelfth century and their use continued into the thirteenth century, where warriors served for a set period in exchange for a fee. The crusading vow was a voluntary undertaking, and spiritual commitment on behalf of the cross-taker, it is therefore necessary to consider how contractual obligations reconciled with contracts on crusade or whether the troops recruited under these contracts had taken crusading vows at all. The legal position of the period was based largely upon the works of Gratian, he argued that providing fighting men were engaged in a just war, there was no moral impairment to them receiving payment. Other contemporaries were similarly concerned about the intention of crusaders, rather than their receipt of reward or booty. There is therefore, no moral reason, as to why crusaders could not be supported through contracts.

The impact of these contracts on their crusading vows is also hard to discern. Richard and Philip each sent troops to Antioch, for these knights and sergeants this meant that their masters were in effect diverting them from their crusade. This could either imply that they were not crusaders, simply hired men recruited for six month period by the two kings, or that they were willing to place their crusading vows on hold in order to take a six month tour of service in Antioch. Similar diversions took place in several crusades to facilitate the taking of booty and fighting against the Muslims in Iberia during the Second and Third Crusades, so this behaviour is not inconsistent with the actions and attitudes of other crusaders.

**The familia**

Many leaders chose to organise their crusading forces in the same way they would have done for a military campaign in the West, and the use of the *familia* on crusade will be

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discussed below. There is little reason to suppose that the members of the *familia* were supported in a different fashion to how they would have been in any military campaign in the West, which was normally through the provision of food, horses, clothing and shelter in addition to cash payments. The use of the military households can be traced from the First Crusade, and the *familia* remained an important institution throughout the first century and a half of crusading. The household knights formed the core of most of the crusading armies, and they also contained important military officers required for marshalling larger armies.\(^{750}\)

Military households can be found on crusade throughout this period. Alan Murray’s work on Godfrey of Bouillon’s contingent demonstrates that Godfrey’s *familia* contained many of his vassals and others who were tied to him by bonds of kinship. This formed the core of Godfrey’s force that departed for the Holy Land in the autumn of 1196.\(^ {751}\) During the Second Crusade, Louis VII is recorded to have departed on the Second Crusade with his *comitatum regale*. Furthermore, Louis and his household were actively engaged in fighting during the march through Anatolia, and the *comitatum regale* was all but wiped out during his crossing of Mount Cadmus in January, 1148.\(^ {752}\) In the thirteenth century the military household was still being used by commanders to support their forces. Frederick II departed on crusade in 1228 with a military household that numbered in excess of a hundred knights, all of whom were transported to the Holy Land at Frederick’s expense.\(^ {753}\)

In addition to the knights and retainers already serving their masters prior to the crusade, the *familia* also allowed for additional personnel to be incorporated. As has been noted Godfrey of Bouillon’s household was able to expand to include many of Godfrey’s vassals and family members prior to his departure on the First Crusade.\(^ {754}\) During the course of the crusade, more individuals were supported within Godfrey’s *familia*. Albert of Aachen records that Godfrey of Bouillon provided the impoverished Hartmann with bread, meat and fish and that he also named Henry of Esch as his ‘guest and table companion’.\(^ {755}\)

\(^{750}\) Morillo, *Warfare*, p. 52.


\(^{752}\) Odo of Deuil, p. 118.

\(^{753}\) *HDFS*, vol. 3, p. 45, ‘quod inter familiam nostram et alios regni milities, qui ad expensas nostras transacto passagio transierunt, fuerunt ultra centum.’


\(^{755}\) Albert of Aachen, pp. 332-335, ‘Quousque Godefridus dux gloriosus illorum misertus panem unum cum portione carnis uel piscis ex suo proprio sumptu Hartmanno constituit. Henricum quoniam miles et homo suus multis sibi seruuit in annis et bellorum periculis, conuiuam et mense sue socium adtitulauit.’
The households of Richard I and Philip II are prominent in many of the diplomatic exchanges during the Third Crusade, and these households also seem to have absorbed their leading vassals. During the Third Crusade, the *familia regis Anglio* of Richard I is recorded as being present at a parley with Tancred of Sicily at Messina in October, 1190. Richard’s *familia* included Walter, archbishop of Rouen, and Gerard, archbishop of Auxerre.\(^{756}\) Richard’s letter in November 1190 to Tancred of Sicily dictating the terms of the peace treaty, greatly expands this list by listing a further twenty-two names described as *de familia nostra*. This included the bishops of Evereux and Bayonne, along with Richard’s constable and chamberlain.\(^{757}\) In April, 1191, Richard’s chancellor Master Roger Malchen perished when two of the *busses perierunt, in quibua multi milites et servientes de familia regis submersi sunt*.\(^{758}\) Roger of Howden also lists Philip II of France’s household at Messina, naming Reginald, bishop of Chartres, Hugh, duke of Burgundy, William of Nevers, William of Juvigny, Geoffrey of Perche, and William of Bar amongst many others.\(^{759}\) Upon his arrival at Acre in 1191, Philip also brought Conrad of Montferrat into his following and *constituit eum principem domus suae, et suum familiarem consiliarium*.\(^{760}\)

It is clear from Roger of Howden’s account that many high-ranking clerics and nobles were absorbed into the households of Richard and Philip during the Third Crusade. There were also ties of kinship between a number of members, in similar manner to Godfrey’s *familia* in the First Crusade. Each of these powerful men would have had their own substantial resources and their own *familia*, so it is unlikely that these men were incorporated into the royal *familia* in order to receive support. However, given Philip’s decision to make Conrad of Montferrat his *principem domus*, this does suggest that Roger may be referring in this instance to Philip’s household.

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\(^{756}\) Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, vol. 3, p. 57.
\(^{757}\) Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, vol. 3, pp. 62-63. ‘*Johannem Ebroicensem et Bernardum Baoniensem episcopos, et per Jordanum de Humez constabularium nostrum, et per Willelum de Curci, et per Ricardum de Camvilla, et per Girardoni Talebot, et per Robertum de Sabilul et per Guidonem de Croum et per Guarnium filium Geroldi, et per Bertramnum de Verdun, et per Willelum Oham berlangum de Tancervile et per Robertum de Novo Burgo, et per Hugonem Bardolf, et per Wigain do Chersburg, et per Gillebertum de Wascuil, et per Hugonem le Bruin, et per Johannem de Pratellis, et per Amauri de Muntfort, et per Andream de Chavenni, et per Willelum de Forz de Ulerun, et per Gaufridum de Bancune, et per Amauri Torel, et per multos alios de familia nostra.’
\(^{758}\) Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, vol. 3, p. 105.
\(^{760}\) Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, vol. 3, p. 114.
It is true that gifts were dispensed by Philip to many of his vassals, including Hugh of Burgundy, Peter of Nevers, Henry of Bar, Guilliame of Mello and Bishop Reginald of Chartres, amongst many others.\textsuperscript{761} Roger of Howden also reports that Richard was able to bestow gifts of treasure to his knights and sergeants whilst at Messina.\textsuperscript{762} However, these gifts differ from the more regular forms of support given to members of the familia and are far larger than the wages a household knight might expect. This suggests that these gifts were intended to help the English and French nobles support their own households whilst on crusade. The reference to Conrad of Montferrat as familiarem consiliarium suggests that his role was also that of counsellor to Philip. The concentration of other leading nobles within the familia of the two kings suggests that on crusade the familia also functioned as a war counsel.

Throughout the crusades there are still relatively few references to the military households of the kings and other lay leaders. It may have been assumed that a leader was always accompanied by his household, and therefore the household generally avoids comment. The largest familia recorded on crusade is that of Frederick with one hundred knights, but there is no evidence to suggest that this force, expanded greatly in size or that the methods of supporting its members changed.\textsuperscript{763} The familia provided a convenient method for supporting family members, or for assembling a council as can be seen on the Third Crusade. The familia remained important bodies around which the leaders could assemble their forces, but the majority of crusaders were supported outside the household of the powerful monarchs and nobles on crusade.

**Cash payments**

The growing expectation that the leaders of the West should support other crusaders imposed logistical challenges on the authorities in regards to how this could be achieved. Paid service was used extensively in the West throughout this period, and by the late twelfth century many armies made use of troops fighting primarily for cash rewards. However, it is often unclear how this money employed or to what extent other forms of reward were used.

The use of cash to support fighting men can be found from the First Crusade onwards, Albert of Aachen reports that many went to Edessa ‘to earn rewards for

\textsuperscript{761} Rigord, p. 286.
\textsuperscript{762} Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, pp. 99, 125; Rigord, pp. 286, 304.
\textsuperscript{763} HPFS, vol. 3, p. 45.
military service from Baldwin,764 while the Gesta Francorum states that many ‘vassals, knights and foot-soldiers’ joined Raymond Pilet in attacks on the towns of Talamania and Marra, suggesting that they were now under his command.765 Only in the case of Tancred during the siege of Antioch in late 1097 is money directly referred to: ‘Tancred owed a great deal of money to his fellow soldiers and had nothing in his coffers. Therefore, this money, received with great joy and exultation, soon freed the leader from his debt. The distribution of the money also relieved the needs of these soldiers.’766 At the siege of Jerusalem the leaders announced ‘that if anyone would bring three stones to cast into the pit he should have a penny.’767 This suggests that payments could be small, but were also dependent upon circumstance.

After the defeat of the French at Mount Cadmus in January 1148, Odo of Deuil reports that Louis ‘could not endure the fact that his nobles were impoverished and because his pious heart made him have regard to those below them, he dispelled the wants of both classes as generously as if he had forgotten that he had shared their loss at all.’768 This comes at a low point in the crusade, but from this point onwards Louis demanded that all followed the commands of the officers assigned to them by the Templars.769 However, the largiter provides little indication of the substance of this support, which might have been in the form of cash, or equally through gifts of food, horses or other forms of supply. Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent the French crusaders expected their king to provide support, as there is little reference to Louis’ generosity during earlier phases, or perhaps the dire situation prompted Louis to greatly expand the scope of his patronage.

The scattered examples of cash being used in early crusading armies indicate that money was only one of many methods of supporting crusaders, with other resources being used also. There is little evidence to indicate how these payments were managed and there is only slender evidence to suggest that these payments were wages.

765 Gesta Francorum, p. 73, ‘Erat autem ibi quidam miles de exercitu comitis Sancti Egidii, cui nomen Raimundus Piletus. Hic plurimos retinuit homines, milites ac pedites.’
767 Gesta Francorum, p. 91, ‘ut si aliquis in illam foueam portasset tres petras, unum haberet denarium.’
768 Odo of Deuil, p. 124, ‘Rex vero nobilium paupertatem non ferens et mediocribus pio animo condescendens, tam largiter egestatem exputit utrorumque quasi esset immemor se cum eis aliquid perdidisse.’
The money owed by Tancred to his followers may have been wages, but most examples suggest that the use of payments was *ad hoc* and dependent upon circumstance. It should also be noted that the expectation of support from the leaders of the crusade, had to fully take form and that many crusaders may have sought to use their own resources rather than depending on support to be provided. This can be seen in continued sale of lands and rights by many crusaders.

A notable exception can be found in Bohemond’s crusade of 1107-1108. During his recruitment tour of France in 1106 and 1107, Bohemond was able to attract a large number of French crusaders who subsequently joined his army mustering in Apulia. Orderic Vitalis records that ‘both they and their horses were maintained by Bohemond’s liberality. He supported so many troops for two years that he exhausted his treasury; providing also cheerfully ships for all without any money for passage’. 770 What Bohemond’s *liberalité* encompassed is unclear, as Orderic Vitalis makes no specific references to money. Orderic’s description of Bohemond’s *aerarium* being exhausted strongly suggests that money was being used extensively. It is unclear whether this money was being paid out directly or else being used to purchase supplies and shipping, which in turn were provided to his followers. Bohemond’s expedition is also significant because this was the earliest crusade in which a leader seems to have taken it upon himself to support his followers in this extensive fashion.

It is unclear why Bohemond undertook such expenses, when there seems to have been no expectation that he should do so. It is likely that his experience on the First Crusade had taught the value of having a unified command structure and proper supplies. Orderic also relates he promised his followers lands and castles that he intended to seize from the Byzantines. It is likely therefore that Bohemond wished to ensure that he retain lordship over any lands he captured, not wishing to repeat the wrangling over captured lands in the First Crusade.

During 1188 William of Sicily assembled many men and ships to aid the Holy Land following the fall of Jerusalem. The Old French Continuation to William of Tyre records that: ‘He sent to the land of *Outremer* and all the land nearby and recruited knights and sergeants and gave them pay in accordance with each man’s status. He also

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770 Orderic Vitalis, vol. 6, p. 24, ‘qui omnes cum praefato duce contra Imperatorem dimicare optabant, et illius liberalité, tam sibi quam equis suis, pabulum in illa praestolatione sumebant. Ille nimirum tot phalanges per biennium pavit, aerariumque suum pene totum exhaustit, et naves omnibus sine naulo hilariter exhibuit.’
retained the pilgrims from other lands who were passing through his kingdom. This also suggests those who had taken the cross might be recruited after their departure on crusade.

Paid service was used extensively on the Third Crusade to support both land and naval forces. The Pipe Roll for 1190 records that wages for the crew of Richard’s ships were set at 2d a day for a sailor and 4d for a steersman, and during the course of the year Henry of Cornhill spent £5,023 6s 8d to purchase or hire shipping for the expedition. In total Tyerman estimates that the crew compliment for Richard’s one hundred and fourteen ships would have cost £8,700 for one year, at an average of 45 crewmen per ship, thus indicating the large financial resources employed by Richard.

During the siege of Acre Richard offered 4 bezants a day to any knight that would serve him, in contrast to the three bezants currently being paid by Philip. Roger of Howden also records that Richard and Philip each dispatched a hundred knights and five hundred sergeants to Antioch, with each of the five hundred knights being paid 40 marks for their six month period of service with Raymond of Antioch. This sum, as discussed earlier, is also likely to have included the pay of five sergeants.

Richard made extensive use of wages to support his fighting men throughout his crusade, however it is important to note that support could be as irregular as on previous expeditions. During the siege of Acre in 1191 Richard hired miners to bring down the Accursed Tower, paying two bezants for each stone brought back from the foundations of the towers, which then rose to three and then finally four bezants per stone. In addition to the knights and squires dispatched to Antioch he also ‘on the same day, gave to the prince of Antioch five great ships, laden with horses, arms, and provisions’. It would not be unreasonable to assume that these supplies may have been intended for troops that Richard had dispatched to Antioch, indicating that other forms of support were also offered.

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771 ‘L’Estoire de Eracles Empereur’, p. 112-113, ‘et manda en la terre d’Outre mer, et en toutes les terres, qui pres de lui estoient, chevaliers et sergens, et ill or donreit soz, selon ce que chascuns estoit; et si retint les pelerins, qui d’autre terres estoient venu, et aloient par sa terre por passer.’
774 Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, p. 113.
775 Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, p. 125, “Et ante recessum suum tradidit ipse Raimundo principi Antiochiae centum milites et quingentos servientes, ad defensionem terrae suae contra paganos.”
During the Fifth Crusade Oliver of Paderborn describes the *stipendiarii Gallici et Teutonici* employed by Pelagius during the siege of Damietta.\(^{778}\) It is unclear whether these troops were recruited from amongst the crusaders already at the siege at the time of Pelagius’ arrival in Autumn 1218, or whether they had been recruited prior to his departure from Italy. Their description as *stipendiarii* would suggest that they were being retained for a fixed cash sum or *stipend*, as opposed to other forms of reward or irregular cash payments.

Pelagius’ role in the support structures of the Fifth Crusade was greatly increased by his control over funds raised from the 1215 twentieth. Powell estimates that the majority of the taxes raised by Honorius were dispatched directly to Pelagius in Egypt, with over 700,000 marks being dispatched to him during the course of the Fifth Crusade.\(^{779}\) Unfortunately, very little is known about how Pelagius distributed these funds, the only evidence for payments comes from instructions sent by Honorius allocating sums to individuals or to the construction of siege engines (see chapter four). With such large cash reserves available to him it seems likely that he used this to support crusaders, but whether this was through wages or *ad hoc* payments is unclear.

During the Fourth, Fifth and Baron’s Crusades, considerable sums were also provided to departing crusaders from the revenues of clerical taxes, vow redemptions fees and others funds collected by the Church. Some of these sums were distributed by local committees, whilst others were directly approved by papal authority. An example can be seen in a letter from Honorius dated 6\(^{th}\) July, 1219, enabling Savaric de Mauleon to provide expenses for three years for himself and his followers from the twentieth of Poitiers, this was to repay his 1,200 mark debt incurred with Sienese merchants during his crusade preparations.\(^{780}\) This indicates that cash sums were being distributed to at local level to crusaders departing from that area. During the Baron’s Crusade, very large areas were allocated to regional princes, in the expectation that they would support other crusaders from these areas. In what form this support was distributed is unclear, although the availability of large cash sums makes it likely that much of the support was in the form of cash payments.

By the thirteenth century, paid service was becoming increasingly common in crusading warfare. Whilst paid service could be seen in earlier crusades, the late twelfth

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\(^{778}\) Oliver of Paderborn, p. 250.

\(^{779}\) Powell, *Anatomy*, p. 99

\(^{780}\) Pressutti, nos. 352, 2133.
and early thirteenth centuries demonstrates that these payments become more prominent. However, there are also many references to *ad hoc* payments prompted by conditions on crusade and the booty taken could often take the form goods and livestock as discussed in the previous chapter. This therefore suggests that many types of support continued to be issued.

**Contracts**

Despite the mixed nature of support on crusade, there appears to be a shift towards the use of paid service on crusade, and more specifically towards the use of contracts. In the context of this discussion, a contract would be defined as military service for a set fee for a specified period. The use of contracts can be most clearly documented in the crusade of Prince Edward in 1270, where two surviving contracts clearly outline crusading commitments along with the support they expected to receive.\(^781\) In crusading warfare, the notion of contracted crusaders may initially seem to contradict the very personal and voluntary nature of the crusading vow, and has already been seen that spiritual, or even political considerations, could easily override material concerns. However, the evidence of contracts for military service on crusade indicate that they were common and could often provide the most efficacious means for supporting fighting men on crusade for a sustained period.

The first possible instance of contracted military service can be found as early as 1172, when Henry II of England agreed to maintain 200 knights in the Holy Land for a year in penance for the murder of Thomas Becket, each knight was to be paid three *auri* for their service.\(^782\) Whilst there are no specific references to a contract, Henry would have needed to recruit the specified number of knights, each of whom would have received a set fee per annum. This strongly suggests that a contract was established between Henry and the knights who served him, in order for Henry to fulfil his penitential obligations. Unfortunately there are no records of whether these knights were dispatched from England, or recruited by proxy in the Holy Land. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the knights would have taken a crusading vow, or whether they were acting solely as hired knights.

\(^{782}\) Gerald of Wales, vol. 8, pp. 169-172.
As has been stated above, Richard and Philip were able to dispatch one hundred knights and five hundred sergeants to Antioch, serving a six month period, and being paid 40 marks per knight.\textsuperscript{783} Both kings were also hiring knights at a daily rate of three or four \textit{bezants} during the siege of Acre, and Richard had established daily wages for his sailors prior to his departure from England.\textsuperscript{784} This would indicate that both the Angevin and Capetian crusades were extensively utilising contracts which provided either a lump sum or daily wages.

During the Fifth Crusade, there are a number of references to troops being dispatched to the Holy Land as surrogate crusaders. The appeals made by Innocent III and his successors enabled individuals to take the cross, but send surrogate crusaders in their stead. The number of crusaders required would be proportionate to the wealth and status of the cross-taker, and both they and the surrogates would receive the full benefits of the crusading indulgence.\textsuperscript{785}

The Dauphin of Auvergne was permitted to send 100 knights to the Holy Land with 1,000 marks worth of expenses secured by William of Montferrat.\textsuperscript{786} In a letter dated 26\textsuperscript{th} February 1219 Honorius granted the abbot of Polirone permission to distribute the twentieth tax from his lands between three knights and four footmen, along with horses, and provisions for three years.\textsuperscript{787} The Bishops of Durham and Verdun were also instructed to give their twentieth to men whom they could send to fight in their stead.\textsuperscript{788} Milo of Beauvais was given permission to divide the twentieth gathered prior to his departure amongst his barons, counts and others. In this cause he was also granted the twentieth from the archdiocese of Rheims.\textsuperscript{789} The abbot of Provins was likewise instructed to give his twentieth to Stephen of Provins.\textsuperscript{790} In these cases, where the employer did not accompany his fighting men, contracted service would seem to be the most logical way of establishing the terms of service and an appropriate remuneration. It may also be case that similar contracts were made when crusaders departed from the crusade. When Walter of Avenses departed Egypt in Spring, 1217, leaving 40 knights to campaign for a year it is likely that he left sufficient coin to cover

\textsuperscript{783} Roger of Howden, \textit{Chronica}, vol. 3, p. 125.
\textsuperscript{784} Roger of Howden, \textit{Chronica}, vol. 3, p. 113.
\textsuperscript{785} PL, vol. 214, col. 308-312, 830-831.
\textsuperscript{786} Pressutti, no. 3696, ‘\textit{expensas pro centum militibus}.’
\textsuperscript{787} Pressutti, no. 1894.
\textsuperscript{788} Pressutti, nos. 1889, 2256.
\textsuperscript{789} Pressutti, nos. 1675, 1745.
\textsuperscript{790} Pressutti, no. 3559.
the cost of their service, and therefore must have known the cost of a stipend for each knight for a year.\textsuperscript{791}

The crusading commitments made by the towns of north Italy, frequently commit them to the supporting crusaders for varying periods or else supplying cash subsidies. The commitments vary greatly with some states such as Florence granting expenses of twenty Pisan shillings for a knight and ten for a footman or Verona promised to give every knight 160 pounds and every infantryman 20 pounds.\textsuperscript{792} Other cities provided a number of knights with expenses for a year, with Milan pledging to send twenty knights, whilst Novarra was able to promise only three knights.\textsuperscript{793} Little is known about the administration of these funds, although the limited nature of the support, would have encouraged the use of fixed obligations and contracts between the cities and their crusaders.

In Frederick’s crusade 1227-1229, many of the military personnel supported by Frederick were in receipt of cash payments. The San Germano agreement called for Frederick to depart for the Holy Land along with at least 1,000 knights and maintain them in the Holy Land for at least two years at his own expense. For every knight in the thousand that he failed to supply, he was to give 50 marks a year in lieu of each absent knight.\textsuperscript{794} Frederick also undertook to provide passage for a further 2,000 knights, along with their households and three horses per knight in subsequent passages to the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{795} Many in Frederick’s force were recruited through the Catalogus Baronum, and as such were Frederick’s vassals. However, Frederick’s encyclical of 6\textsuperscript{th} December, 1227 stated that he had fulfilled his commitment to recruit a thousand knights who were ad stipendia nostra pro Dei servitio teneamus.\textsuperscript{796} This suggests that even though they were serving him through their capacity as vassals, they were still in receipt of a stipend. The evidence from the Catalogus (see chapter 4) indicates that Frederick may have recruited as many as 1,535 knights from Sicily who were serving him in this

\textsuperscript{791} Oliver of Paderborn, p. 163.
\textsuperscript{792} Registri dei Cardinali, pp. 7, 12-13
\textsuperscript{793} Ibid., pp. 19-22.
\textsuperscript{794} ‘Constitutiones’, vol. 2, p. 129, ‘Per presens scriptum notum facimus univeris, quod nos transibimus in subsidium Terre Sancte ab instanti Augusto presentis XIII. indictionis ad duos annos et per biennium tenebimus ibi mille milites ad minus a; ita quod si aliquos de ipso numero statuto tempore deesse configerit, in quinquaginta marchis argenti per annum defectum militis redimemus.’
\textsuperscript{795} Ibid., p. 129, ‘Passagium dabimus, si venerint in primo passagio vel in duobus subsequentibus passagiis, duobus milibus militum et familiis eorumdem et pro milite tribus equis.’
\textsuperscript{796} HPFS, vol. 3, p. 45
capacity. However, it also possible that these men had also taken the cross in addition to their service to their liege.

Frederick also recruited two hundred and fifty milites, who had previously been in the employ of the Papacy. He retained a further seven hundred milites transalpine who were employed ad nostra stipenda solidatos, who were to serve at the command of the Master of the Tutonic Order.\(^{797}\) However, it is unclear whether they were to remain under contract to Frederick for the two year period.

The crusading plan of Peter of Brittany for his crusade to aid the Latin Empire also strongly suggests that he intended to use contracts to support his army. His initial plan called for 2,000 knights and 10,000 sergeants,\(^{798}\) but Gregory suggested that this be reduced to 1,500 knights and 6,000 sergeants, on the grounds that ‘a great multitude of stipendiarii’ could be recruited locally.\(^{799}\) The precision of these figures suggests that Peter and Gregory were aware of the potential costs of hiring this number of crusaders, and that it would be logistically easier to hire men locally. The reference to stipendiarii in Greece indicates that Gregory intended to recruit men for set fees, it is therefore likely that those recruited in the West were also supported in the same manner. The plan to recruit this many men in the West suggests that contracts would have been used, as this was the most practical way of recruiting such large numbers, although no period of service is specified in Gregory’s letters of 12\(^{th}\) January 1238.

It is also important to note that paid service could take the form of large contracts. Philip II’s contract with the Republic of Genoa provided for the passage of 650 knights and 1,300 sergeants to the Holy Land, along with a considerable quantity of supplies in return for a sum of 5,560 marks.\(^{800}\) An even larger fleet was contracted for the Fourth Crusade; the Franks agreed to pay the Venetians 85,000 marks for the transport of 4,500 knights, 9,000 squires, 20,000 foot sergeants and 4,500 horses; totalling 33,500 men who were to be supplied for nine months.\(^{801}\) These contracts were exceptional, and it is likely that the majority of crusaders travelling by sea did so in smaller groups. However, these contracts illustrate the highly monetised nature of

\(^{797}\) HPFS, vol. 3, p. 45, ‘videlicet septingentos milites transalpinos per manus magistri domus thetonicorum ad nostra stipenda solidatos, cc et l milites regni quos anno preterito de pecunia ecclesie quietatos sequenti anno ad solidos nostros ibi fecimus retineri.’

\(^{798}\) Registres, no. 4027, ‘te in subsidium imperii Constantinopolitani cum duobus milibus equitum et decem milibus peditum accinxisti.’

\(^{799}\) Registres, no. 4027, ‘mille et quingentis equitibus et ses milibus peditum duntaxat accingens . . . magna ibidem stipendiariorum multitudo consistat’

\(^{800}\) Codice, vol. 2, pp. 366-368.

\(^{801}\) Villehardouin, p. 15; Madden, Enrico Dandolo, pp. 124-125; Madden, ‘Vows’, pp. 441-468.
crusading warfare during this period, and that large resources of shipping, manpower and supplies could be supported if sufficient funds were available.

It is clear that the use of contracts to support crusaders was in its infancy during this period, and the lack of codified documents means that the spiritual status of those contracted to take part in crusading warfare is uncertain. The value of using contracts to support crusaders was recognised in future crusading plans. Louis IX extensively utilised wages in the support of his forces during his crusade of 1248-1250. This trend can also be seen in the recovery treatises written during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. The treatises of Charles II of Anjou and Fulk of Villaret aimed to raise contracted troops to bolster the ranks of crusaders serving at their own expense, although Charles’ plan called for the employment of an extensive naval force. A more radical approach can be seen in the work of Marino Sanudo Torsello, who called for the initial passages to consist exclusively of paid soldiers and sailors, stating that ‘paid troops listen to and obey their captain better than crusaders.’ Whilst not all crusading plans called for contracts to be used, these treatises reflect that contemporaries appreciated the virtues of contracts on crusade.

**Gifts and largesse**

The crusades also saw the extensive use of gifts between crusaders that frequently acted as a form of payment, and were often exchanged between the leaders of crusades. However, these gifts normally came with the implicit understanding that military service would be given in return. These gifts often acted as a means of securing lordship over other crusaders, the relationships between the giver and recipient often reflected the relationship between a lord and a vassal. The concepts of lordship and vassalage were familiar across the medieval West, where financial and logistical support was exchanged for military service, although its operation and extent varied considerably in different regions and at different times. Many of the gifts dispensed on crusade

bear similarities to paid service, and also reflect the relationship between lords and vassals.

Some of these gifts served to reinforce existing relationships that existed in the West and this was most clearly seen in the largesse dispensed by the emperors and kings who took the cross. At Messina, during the winter of 1190, Philip II was able to bestow gifts upon his vassals: Hugh of Burgundy received 1,000 marks, Peter of Nevers 600 marks, Henry of Bar 400 marks, 400 ounces of gold to Guilliame de Mello, 300 ounces to Bishop Reginald of Chartres and Mathieu de Montmorency and 200 to Dreu of Mello and many others.806

During Richard I’s stay at Messina over the same period, Roger of Howden also reports that Richard ‘distributed his treasures with such profuseness among all the knights and sergeants of his whole army.’807 This demonstrates the flow of booty from both these kings to their followers, enabling them to support their own followings and reinforcing their fealty to their king.

During the Second Crusade, much of the German fleet had begun to disperse after it landed at Acre in April, 1148. Conrad was forced to dispense gifts to many of the German crusaders in order to induce them to stay, and only ‘assembled what troops he could by a lavish expenditure of money.’808 Louis VII’s generosity to his battered army in Anatolia is likely to have included large gifts to the French nobles, whom Odo of Deuil also reports as being impoverished by their defeat.809

Gifts continued to be used as a source of support into the thirteenth century Frederick II’s encyclical to all crusaders on the 6th December, 1227 stated that many of the German princes and magnates were ‘induced to take the cross by promises and largesse,’ and many of these nobles were aided in the crusade by subsidy from the emperor.810 It is likely that Frederick refers to the force of crusaders under Louis of Thuringia who departed from Germany. Frederick also writes that passage was provided ‘for princes and all pilgrims’, as well as for seven hundred stipendiariis

806 Rigord, p. 286.
809 Odo of Deuil, p. 124.
810 HPFS, vol. 3, p. 39, ‘Plures vero de principibus et magna mulitudine nobilium et magnatum, exemplo, promissis et largitionibus ad susceptionem crucis induximus, quorum nonnulli nostris adjuti subsidiis ad subsidium terre sancte tunc temporis processerunt.’
Frederick distributed some gifts to the princes and nobles who took the cross, however the extent to which this played a central role in the support of crusading armies is questionable given the number of German troops serving for pay.

These gifts also served to consolidate the bonds of vassalage between the monarchs and their nobles on crusade. It is likely that there was an expectation that Richard, Philip and Frederick II show generosity to their vassals on crusade, and they in turn would support their liege. During the Second Crusade, it is less clear whether this support was expected of Louis or Conrad, but it is significant that following their defeats both monarchs were able exercise greater control over their followers who appear to have become dependent upon royal patronage.

This therefore suggests that the structures of support in this instance did not alter greatly and perpetuated supports structures and networks of patronage that already existed in the West.

However, many gifts were dispensed between parties where there had been no prior relationship in the West. After the fall of Antioch in 1098 and amidst the infighting between Raymond of St. Giles and Bohemond, Raymond made offers of large sums of money to the other princes in an attempt to secure their support. ‘Raymond (of St. Gilles) offered Godfrey and Robert of Normandy ten thousand solidi each, and six thousand to Robert of Flanders, and five thousand to Tancred, and proportionately to other princes.’

During the Third Crusade, Richard I used a substantial proportion of his own resources to sustain not only his own forces, but the other crusaders in the Holy Land. Richard provided extensive loans and gifts to the French crusaders, most particularly Hugh of Burgundy and Henry of Champagne. Itinerarium reports that Richard loaned 5,000 marks to Hugh of Burgundy following the departure of Philip in June, 1191. Richard also made a gift to Henry of Champagne for 4,000 measures of wheat, 4,000 bacons and £4,000 in silver. Frederick of Swabia also made sizeable gifts to his followers on the death of his father Emperor Frederick I, with the money being drawn

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811 HPFS, vol. 3, p. 43. ‘in estivi calore temporis non omisimus versus Brundusium equitare ubi naves et chelandras pro principibus et alis peregrinis necnon pro septingentis nostris stipendiariis militibus.’
812 Odo of Deuil, pp. 40-43.
813 Raymond of Aguilers, p. 271, ‘Volebat tamen comes duci donare decen millia solidos; et Roberto Normanniae totidem, et comiti Flandrensi sex millia, et Tancredo quinque millia; et alis principibus prout erant.’
814 Ambroise, 5344-5361; Itinerarium, vol. 2, p. 239.
815 Richard of Devizes, p. 42.
from his father’s treasury. During the Fifth Crusade, Pelagius is likely to have been able to dispense much of the funds raised through crusading taxes, and it is likely that at least some of these funds may have been dispensed in relatively large amounts to crusaders at the siege of Damietta from 1218 to 1222.

These gifts did however, constitute bidding ties of lordship on crusade and often crusaders moved from the mouvance of one lord to another. After accepting Raymond’s offer of coinage, Tancred then left Raymond a few months later and joined forces with Godfrey, on the grounds that he had not been paid.

Similar changes of allegiance were common during the Third Crusade, throughout the course of late 1191 and 1192, Henry of Champagne, Hugh of Burgundy and the other French crusaders moved in and out of Richard’s sphere of influence. As can be seen above Richard sought to induce the French to follow him through gifts of cash and goods in order secure their support, and this policy was in part successful. Henry of Champagne and the Genoese crusaders were willing to take part in Richard’s proposed attack on Egypt in 1191, and Hugh of Burgundy joined Richard for his refortification of Ascalon. Roger of Howden and the Itinerarium Peregrinorum also relate that Richard made further attempts to offer the French his support throughout the crusade, however they refused to follow his direction when Richard refused to lend them money. Later, Henry of Champagne also left Richard’s following despite Richard’s offer to maintain them eius impensis sufficienter exhibendi.

On crusade, gifts offered a means of support, and were frequently dispensed by wealthy crusaders to those who were struggling financially. However, this was very often accompanied with attempts to secure lordship over the recipient and frequently was part of the factional politics that pervaded crusading armies. The attempts of leaders to incorporate others into their mouvance indicate that support structures could be highly adaptable and that the number of crusaders supported by them could vary depending on the conditions on crusade.

816 Otto of St. Blasien, p. 52, ‘Igitur Fridericus Suevorum dux filius eius, patris nobilis heres, thesauris paternis exercitui liberaliter erogatis, milicie Christiane decus et spes unica, exercitum merore con rectum consolatus recreavit educto que de hoc fatali loco et inviso milite Antiochiam pervenit.’
817 Powell, Anatomy, p. 117. His Table 6.1 gives the details of arrival and departure of leaders and contingents.
818 Albert of Aachen, pp. 284-285; Raymond of Aguiliers, pp. 271, 278.
819 Ambroise, 5351-5356, 7952-7979.
Paid service in crusading warfare

The use of paid service developed in some of the structures used to support crusaders, but was by no means universal. The *familia* remained important, but the methods used to support household members seem to have remained the same throughout this period. Crucially the *familia* seems to have been unsuited to supporting large numbers of crusaders, and alternative methods were sought by crusading leaders. Cash payments were used throughout the crusades as a means of support; however these transactions were frequently *ad hoc* in earlier crusades. The development of crusading taxes and vow redemptions enabled far larger sums to be mobilised, and then distributed to departing crusaders. This is likely to have resulted in the increased use of money to support crusaders. The greater availability of crusading funds further encouraged the use of contracts on crusade. Initially this began on a relatively small scale, but by the thirteenth century large bodies of crusaders were being supported in exchange for cash sums. The gifts and largesse of leading nobles could play a vital role in supporting other crusaders, but required leaders with substantial financial assets and conditions whereby they could exert this influence. The evidence suggests that crusading warfare was becoming increasingly monetised with cash payments becoming more common by the thirteenth century. However, it is important to note that money continued to be used alongside other forms of support.

The impact of paid service on support structures

The use of paid service on crusade required the authorities to possess the financial resources in order to support crusaders. Crusading was always a costly business, with many crusaders having to raise many times their annual income in order to take the cross. There were also many poor crusaders who lacked such lavish resources and were forced to rely upon booty taken or support from their leaders. However, the means of providing this support varied greatly, with only part of this support being delivered in cash. As has been discussed, many different types of resources were accumulated before departure and whilst on crusade and the provision of markets made it possible for leaders to provide support in a wide variety of forms. Evidence from the early crusades equally suggests that money was only one of many forms of support.

The increase of paid service in the West is likely to have deeply influenced the crusade plans of those monarchs and magnates who took the cross. Henry II, Richard I, Philip II and Frederick II all made extensive use of paid service in the support of their
own armies in the West. Their approach to crusading warfare is likely to have mirrored their campaigns in the West, albeit on a larger scale. The financial institutions in the West had also expanded to varying degrees, and a significant factor in this expansion was to support warfare. With growing costs throughout this period and the increase of paid service in medieval armies, this therefore meant that the support structures on crusade had to adapt.

As has been discussed above, contracts provided the most convenient method for assembling forces for a crusade, and enabled men to be supported for a sustained period. In the West and on crusade, the cost of warfare increased steadily during the period covered by this thesis, and continued to rely upon all types of resources being raised. By the thirteenth century, this support was increasingly expected from the Church and lay authorities in the West. In order to meet these expectations the authorities in the West had to radically expand their financial systems, which were largely insufficient to raise the sums necessary to fund the spiralling costs of crusading.

In response to this pressure, the structures of support provided by the monarchies and the Church greatly expanded. Royal taxation was instituted in the form of the Saladin Tithe enacted by Henry II and the levies from Sicilian Catalogus Baronum by Frederick II. Both of these initiatives ensured that the funds raised remained in the hands of Richard and Frederick, and as a result both of their expeditions were firmly under their control, with resources being distributed centrally.

By the thirteenth century the Church also began to provide large financial sums to support crusaders, with clerical taxes in 1199, 1215 and 1238, in addition to the institution of vow redemptions in support of the Barons’ Crusade. However, the methods of distributions varied widely, with local distribution and central collection used to varying extents in an attempt to ensure the efficacious use of crusading funds as discussed in chapter 4.

The costs of crusading warfare necessitated the growth in organisation. The development of mechanisms for raising finances are an indication of the increased sophistication of crusading warfare, however as preparations for crusades became more elaborate, it was increasingly necessary to tabulate the costs of an expedition. In this respect paid service provided an effective means of supporting crusaders.

In the first hundred years of crusading there seems to have been little thought given to the overall cost of crusading, with resources raised and men hired as necessity dictated. By the late twelfth century the crusading obligations of individuals became increasingly specific, even as early as 1172, with Henry II of England’s agreement to maintain 200 knights in the Holy Land for a year in penance for the murder of Thomas Becket. It would therefore have been necessary for Henry to calculate the cost of supporting these knights in the Holy Land, which was set at 3 aurei per knight, thereby costing 600 auri for the year.823

The development of surrogate crusaders in the thirteenth century, discussed above, is likely to have further encouraged the need for the sponsors to know the cost of their patronage. When Walter of Avenches departed Egypt in Spring, 1217, leaving 40 knights to campaign for a year it is likely that he left sufficient coin to cover the cost of their service, and therefore must have worked out the cost of a stipend for each knight for a year.824 Paid service also aided Honorius’ in defining Frederick II’s crusading obligations. The San Germano called for a total of 3,000 knights to be supported in the Holy Land by Frederick over a number of years, with the first thousand knights to be supported there for two years, a sum of 50 marks was to be paid for each knight that failed to be recruited.825 This suggests that this period of military service for a knight had a cash equivalent that could presumably be used to recruit the knights that Frederick failed to provide.

The use of paid service frequently required the raising of ever larger financial resources in order to support crusaders. Crusading funds were raised by the monarchs of the West and the Church, reflecting the growing expectation amongst crusaders that support should be provided by both the secular leaders and the Church. This required the development of mechanisms for the collection and distribution of crusading funds which could then be dispensed on crusade or in the Holy Land. Paid service became increasingly important as it enabled crusaders to effectively calculate their crusading costs, which would then impact upon efforts to raise finances. Overall, paid service encouraged the increased monetisation of crusading warfare and the development of structures to support it.

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824 Oliver of Paderborn, p. 163.
Chapter Seven
Conclusion

The years 1095 to 1241 saw the development of increasingly sophisticated support structures in the armies that crusaded to the Holy Land. These structures were initially ad hoc and relied upon the support networks formed by kinship groups and established loyalties. However, other forms of support began to develop from the First Crusade onwards and these would evolve gradually. Monarchs and magnates played a large part in the support of other crusaders, and the role of these great men in providing support continued to grow until the late-twelfth and thirteenth centuries when Richard I and Frederick II were supporting large armies through their own finances. Common or alms funds can be found in many crusades, which sought to create communal resources to support poor crusaders. Non-crusaders were also incorporated into the crusading support structures; and by the thirteenth century the papacy and Church were increasingly central to mobilising resources to support crusading. Other parties such as the Byzantine emperors, Christian rulers and local Muslim leaders were also important in providing additional resources to the crusaders, and these could prove vital. The relationships formed by support structures could also be highly unstable with crusaders moving in and out of a commander’s mouvance as resources and circumstance allowed. The form that this support took varied depending on the availability of resources, but this could include cash, food, clothing, livestock and many other supplies. The level of support offered could also vary greatly, from small sums paid in cash or kind to individual crusaders, to very large monetary transactions between the leaders of crusading forces. The support structures used in crusading armies saw some important developments, but it would be incorrect to view these developments as universal or as the product of any one design. The developments that did occur were frequently haphazard and often specific to individual circumstances on particular crusades and those individuals those taking part.

As has been discussed in this thesis, the support structures of crusading armies developed as a result of a number of factors. Firstly, the high cost of crusading stimulated the need for support structures in order to sustain crusading to the Holy Land, as both individual and family resources often proved to be inadequate to sustain crusaders. The existing structures that predominantly relied on kinship and local loyalties needed to adapt in order to support the large numbers of crusaders whose
resources had been exhausted on crusade. This adaptation could take varying forms, with the resources of monarchs, magnates, legates, captured booty and communal funds all being deployed through ever-evolving support structures on crusade. However, the costs of crusading did not just result in ad hoc measures to support crusading. By the late twelfth century the costs of crusading were being born by, or at least subsidised by, the authorities in the West. This therefore necessitated the development of mechanisms to ensure that these resources could be effectively used to support crusaders, as can be seen through the collection committees adopted by the papacy and English monarchs and the utilisation of the structures of military orders.

The development of support structures was also driven by the expectation that monarchs and magnates should provide support for other crusaders. Even as early as the First Crusade there are suggestions that the leaders of a crusade had a responsibility to provide support, but for much of the following century the level of support expected from the kings and magnates is unclear. Not until the pontificate of Innocent III did the role of secular leaders become clearly defined in regards to the assistance they were expected to supply to their followers. By the time of the Barons’ Crusade in 1238-1241, the neglect of these obligations was sufficient to attract the censure of contemporary writers. During the thirteenth century, the Church was also expected to provide support for crusaders, and the papacy took an active role in imposing clerical taxation and vow redemption fees in order to achieve this. With the growing expectation of support from both the Church and lay leaders, support structures had to develop in order to allow resources to be channelled to crusaders during an expedition.

A final factor in the development of support structures was the impact of warfare in the medieval West. From the First Crusade onwards, family connections and the familia formed the basis of crusading armies, but by the thirteenth century increased use was being made of paid service and stipendiarii in medieval armies. This necessitated the development of support structures in the West to allow finances to be raised and then channelled to armies in the field. The practice of crusading was substantially different to warfare in the West, due to the spiritual commitments of the participants and the vastly increased logistical challenges imposed by distances, numbers and the climate. But it is likely that the increasingly cash-based nature of medieval warfare, and of medieval society as whole, influenced the development of support structures in crusading armies by requiring that cash be raised to support crusaders in lieu of non-monetary resources otherwise employed.
The evidence suggests that throughout this period departing crusaders continued to rely on the raising of personal and familial resources. However, this was also augmented by the resources raised by the secular and ecclesiastical authorities in the West. In some cases these resources were administered centrally, as with the collection of the Saladin Tithe, Frederick’s tax levies through Catalogus Baronum and a substantial part of the 1215 twentieth tax. However, many of the sums raised by the Church through taxation or vow redemption were also distributed through local or regional committees, with the two systems running in tandem. These were then significantly augmented by the collection of booty on crusade that could often prove critical to sustaining a crusade in the Holy Land. One must also recognise the importance of access to markets, gifts and tribute rendered through diplomacy with the Byzantine emperors and other local rulers en route.

The effectiveness of support structures varied throughout the course of the crusades, and even within the course of a single expedition. The availability of resources was the prime factor in determining the effectiveness of support structures on crusade. Shortages of food and other material were common on crusade, and frequently contributed to the failure of expeditions. However the supply problems faced by crusading armies were generally caused by a lack of resources, rather than a failure of supply structures to administer these resources efficiently. Although, some elements within the crusades, particularly the leaders and the nobility, are criticised for mishandling resources, this does not seem to have been a determining factor in the failure of any crusade.

A dilemma faced by authorities throughout this period was how to ensure that support structures efficiently transferred resources raised to the crusaders in the field, the papacy in particular faced great challenges in administering the clerical taxes and vow redemptions levied across all of Christendom. The papacy lacked the centralised fiscal systems available to the English and Sicilian monarchies, and therefore struggled to ensure the efficacious use of crusading funds. The papacy experimented with both local and centralised methods of administration, but the partial coverage offered by the contemporary sources available prevents us from fully accessing the effectiveness of support structures in channelling these funds. It is clear that these structures were still capable of transferring huge sums from the West to support those on crusade and could support large armies travelling to the Holy Land.
It is frequently difficult to assess the effectiveness of support at a lower level, as the operation of local and kinship support structures goes largely unrecorded. However, the transfer of personnel between different crusading contingents indicates that it was relatively easy for individual crusaders to fall back on the support structures provided by the monarchs and magnates. The existence of alms funds further indicates that structures could be adapted to ensure that the impoverished could be provided for. However, the fragmented nature of many crusading expeditions meant that strategic and logistical concerns did not necessarily outweigh the rivalries and political differences, nor did it overshadow the spiritual commitments of crusaders. Therefore, the flow of supplies and resources could sometimes be disrupted by discord between crusaders, as can be observed during the First and Third Crusades, or conflicts with those outside of the crusade, such as the conflicts with Byzantines during the First and Second Crusades.

The final aim of this thesis was to investigate the increased use of cash in crusading warfare, and the role that paid service played in the development of support structures. Warfare in the medieval West had a great impact on the support structures of crusading armies, and this can be seen in the increased role of money in crusading warfare. The evolution of fiscal institutions in the kingdoms of medieval Europe was partly driven by the need to subsidise warfare, and this therefore is likely to have had an impact on the raising of finances for crusading. The use of paid service in the West also seems to have been more frequent in the latter half of the twelfth century, as can be seen through the increased use of stipendiarii and other paid troops. By the thirteenth century it was commonplace for soldiers to be paid wages, but this continued to operate alongside other forms of reward. Developments in medieval warfare therefore had a strong influence on the armies of the crusades.

From the beginning crusaders raised money as part of their preparations for departure, and this was to continue for the next century and half. This was then supplemented by additional cash sums through the taking of booty, gifts, alms and tribute. Many contemporary references to payments, wages or the price of goods indicate that from the beginning there was a monetary economy operating in crusading armies. However, it is also important to note that many other forms of resource were raised by departing crusaders or were acquired en route. It therefore appears that throughout this period money was just one of many types of resource used to support crusading.
However, there was a clear shift towards an increased use of money in crusading armies starting in the twelfth century, and continuing throughout the thirteenth century. As early as 1166, taxes in England and France raised cash sums to support military forces in the Holy Land. By the time of the Barons’ Crusade, the Church and the rulers in the West were raising huge sums in order finance crusades, indicating the demand for money needed to undertake a crusade. Money never completely replaced other forms of support and crusaders continued to raise their own resources, however the enormous efforts to raise cash in the thirteenth century were an indication of the importance of money as a means of supporting crusading. This is further indicated by the attempts of departing crusaders to secure portions of the crusading revenues raised by the Church in the Fifth Crusade and Barons’ Crusade. However, the relative weakness of Gregory IX’s bargaining position in attempting to secure a crusade to the Latin Empire is clear evidence that despite potent financial backing, spiritual commitments outweighed financial considerations.

The increased importance of money is also reflected in the greater use of paid service as a means of support. With the resources to support crusading increasingly being raised in cash, paid service offered the simplest way of supporting crusaders. This was broadly in keeping with the move towards paid service that can be seen in the West from the late twelfth century onwards, and it has been argued that it offered distinct advantages over other forms of reward and support. Paid service was a feature of many of the better-organised crusades, such as those led by Richard I and Frederick II, and its widespread use in their armies reflects its effectiveness as a means of support. However, the increased mobilisation of cash and the increased use of paid service indicate that by the thirteenth century crusading armies were heavily dependent on cash in order to support themselves.

Recent crusading scholarship has taken a new interest in the logistics and support mechanisms that evolved throughout the first century and a half of crusading. This thesis has attempted to study the development of these structures and the changing nature of support from the First Crusade to the Barons’ Crusade, and why these changes took place. In particular it has attempted to indicate the ever-evolving nature of crusading finances and support structures, that need to appreciated in the context of their development as a whole, rather than through the narrow perspective of a single crusade. Furthermore, the role of money would come to dominate the support structures of crusading armies by the thirteenth century, particularly from centralised taxes raised
by the Church and lay authorities. The study of the crusading in the period following the Baron’s Crusade needs to consider the development of support structures and the resources channeled through them.

By the mid-thirteenth century the provision of adequate finance was a key component of any crusading expedition. The need to provide this finance encouraged the adaptation and innovations mentioned above, so that by the 1240s the support of crusading warfare had changed substantially from the late eleventh century. Furthermore, departing crusaders were also increasingly eager to secure the finances raised by the Church, the wrangling over the vow redemption fees prior to the Barons’ Crusade being a prime example. This trend suggests that the financing mechanisms used to support crusading continued to develop and that crusading activity became increasingly dependent upon securing the money raised through these channels. These funds were raised years prior to the departure of the expeditions, with triennial taxes being frequently employed by the papacy. As has already been mentioned, Church finances were used extensively in the crusades of Louis IX, and by the fourteenth century the Papacy was able to offer considerable sums to leaders who were willing to crusade to the Holy Land. The developments made in the first half of the thirteenth century indicate that the long-term development of crusading warfare moved towards expeditions more heavily based upon centralised finances.

This development conversely suggests a diminished reliance upon the personal resources of individual crusaders. As has been argued above, crusaders were increasingly unable to finance their own participation and a growing expectation was developing that this support should be provided by those leading the expedition or from the Church. In the future, crusaders expected to be supported on crusade without having to finance themselves. This is borne out by evidence in the later thirteenth century. During the crusade of Prince Edward of England in 1270, contracts of service were used to outline the obligations of the crusader and his sponsor. The contract of Adam of Jesmond, dated 20th July 1270, states that: ‘(Prince Edward) has given me, to cover all expenses, six hundred marks in money and transport, that is to say, the hire of a ship and water.’ If we compare this to the anonymous lament from the Baron’s Crusade that berated the barons for failing to provide for their followers at Acre, this suggests a diminished reliance upon the personal resources of individual crusaders.

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that the leaders were expected to support their followers on crusade, and that this developed in the years following the 1240s to become a core component of recruitment and support whilst on crusade.

The costs of warfare also continued to increase throughout the thirteenth century and into the fourteenth century. Even the monarchies of the medieval West had difficulty sustaining large armies in the field and spent many times their annual revenue in a single campaigning season. The costs of warfare therefore, stretched crusading resources even further with the added difficulties of distance and supply for an army travelling from the West to the Holy Land. In future crusades, it is questionable whether even the wealthy monarchs of Europe could afford to mount a large-scale campaign to the Holy Land out of their own coffers. The Church, therefore, appears to be the only institution that could marshal the resources necessary for a campaign to the Holy Land. The papacy was thereby in a position where it could not only declare a crusade, but also significantly influence the prospects of any future expeditions.

With finance becoming so central to crusading warfare, particular in terms of recruitment, it raises the question of whether money was the primary factor in securing the participation of crusaders in an expedition. In which case, this may indicate that the religious enthusiasm and desire for spiritual reward that drove the first crusaders to take the cross, was being gradually superseded by a more commercialised form of warfare where participation was determined by payment and contractual terms. This thesis has shown that the increased use of contracts and expenses by the mid-thirteenth century and the preoccupation with securing funding lends weight to this assumption.

The commercialisation of crusading warfare does not necessarily diminish the spiritual motivations that compelled people to take the cross. The crusading indulgence had been provided to surrogate crusaders since the issue of Post Miserabile in 1199, and the need of successive popes to keep the indulgence as part of the crusading privileges indicates that devotional needs remained the core motivation for people to take the cross. Furthermore, the expansion of the indulgence by Gregory IX to cover anyone who supported the Barons’ Crusade, even if not participating, would indicate that interest in crusading remained alive across Europe. Furthermore, the source of the disagreements over crusading funds raised during the Baron’s Crusade was Gregory IX’s decision to change the destination from the Holy Land to Latin Greece. However,

Constantinople lacked the religious pull of Jerusalem, something that the barons were acutely aware of and judging by the poetry of Thibaut of Champagne, saw the change in destination as a betrayal of their initial crusading vows to go to the aid of the Holy Land. This dispute is revealing because it is clear that, despite the importance of the crusading funds, the devotional interests of the departing crusaders remained equally as important. The changes in finances should therefore be looked upon as adaptations in the methods to support crusading, in line with similar developments in the West, rather than a change in the spiritual nature of crusading.

From 1095 to 1241 the support structures of crusading armies saw a steady development in response to the huge challenge faced by crusaders. The limited financial resources of many crusaders meant that existing support structures were placed under greater stress, and had to develop in order to incorporate additional personnel. Increasingly the burden of supporting crusading fell on the Church and the secular leaders, and throughout the period 1095-1241 there is a growing expectation that they should provide this support. Conventional fiscal structures were often inadequate to raise sufficient finances and crusaders were not always able to raise further resources whilst on crusade. This therefore placed greater pressure on the authorities in the West to impose extraordinary taxes in order to raise the funds necessary to support crusading to the Holy Land. This expansion that began during the twelfth century saw support structures grow in sophistication, which enabled the large revenues raised in the West to be used to support crusaders in the eastern Mediterranean. However, this thesis does not seek to argue that these structures were perfect, and it is evident that real difficulties were faced in trying to ensure that support was provided to crusaders. Furthermore, whilst support structures grew to encompass ever-increasing numbers of crusaders, traditional support networks through family and familia remained important throughout. It is clear that important developments took place in efforts to support crusading, some caused by design and some by circumstance. The structures that evolved offered an ever greater level of support to crusaders, with the wealth of the monarchs, nobles, the Church and Christendom increasingly being mobilised to support crusading to the Holy Land. Despite the increased importance of finances and the commercialisation of crusading warfare, crusading remained a devotional exercise to those who took the cross.
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