MIGRATION STATISTICS HARMONISATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
COMPARING THE CASES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE NETHERLANDS

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Deborah Werner
Department of Politics and International Relations
University of Leicester
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Deborah Werner

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Abstract
This study addresses how European Union (EU) level and domestic level actors strive to harmonise migration statistics. Comparable migration statistics are essential for EU policy-makers and academics for informed policy formulation and policy evaluation. Yet the components of these statistics vary between the EU member states and hamper their comparison. While the statistical possibilities to enhance the comparability of migration statistics are well-covered in the literature, few studies look into the statistics producers themselves, or ask which factors further the harmonisation of migration statistics. With migration policy rising on the EU’s agenda, also related statistics gain in importance. Statistics producers inform governments as well as supranational institutions, and are therefore essential for democratic and transparent policy-making. It is vital, therefore, to analyse those who collect the data, how they produce statistics, and how they harmonise them across countries.

This study employs a most different case research design and focuses on two distinct national statistical systems in their cooperation with EU stakeholders in the case of migration statistics harmonisation. Comparing the United Kingdom with the Netherlands, this thesis finds that there was most domestic adaptation and policy convergence in view of migration statistics definitions, and less adaptation regarding the policy instruments as well as policy goals. This thesis argues that in addition to supranational explanatory factors such as a high obligatory potential, high domestic administrative capacity as well as national non-opposition to and knowledge of rules drive migration statistics harmonisation.
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List of Abbreviations
CBS: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Central Statistical Office, Netherlands
CCS: Centraale Commissie voor de Statistiek, Central Statistical Commission, Netherlands
CEIES: European Advisory Committee on Statistical Information in the Economic and Social Spheres
CIREA: Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on Asylum
CIREFI: Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Borders and Immigration
CSO: Central Statistical Office, former national statistical institute, United Kingdom
DG: Directorate General
DGINS: Directors of the National Statistical Institutes
DGINSC: Directors of the National Statistical Institutes Conference
EASO: European Asylum Support Office
EC: European Community
ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community
EEC: European Economic Community
EMN: European Migration Network
ESAC: European Statistical Advisory Committee
ESGAB: European Statistical Governance Advisory Board
ESS: European Statistical System
ESSC: European Statistical System Committee
EU: European Union
Euratom: European Atomic Energy Community
Eurostat: European Union statistical office
FRONTEX: Frontières extérieures, European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
GBA: Gemeentelijke Basis Administratie, Municipal Basic Administration
GSS: Government Statistical Service
IPS: International Passenger Survey
LFS: Labour Force Survey
LTIM: Long-Term International Migration
MSIP: Migration Statistics Improvement Programme
NISRA: Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency
NSA: National statistical authority
NSI: National statistical institute
NSS: National statistical system
OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD-SD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Statistics Division
OEEC: Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
ONS: Office for National Statistics, current NSI of the United Kingdom
PROMINSTAT: Promoting Comparative Quantitative Research in the Field of Migration and Integration in Europe
SOPEMI: *Système d'observation permanente des migrations*, Continuous Reporting System on Migration
SPC: Statistical Programme Committee
SSB: *Sociaal Statistisch Bestand*, Social Statistical Database
THESIM: Towards Harmonised Statistics on Immigrants in Europe
UK: United Kingdom
UN: United Nations
UNECE: United Nations Commission for Europe
UNECE-SD: United Nations European Commission for Europe Statistics Division
UNSC: United Nations Statistics Commission
UNSD: United Nations Statistics Division
Chapter One - Introduction

“Every organisation or national authority takes a different starting point and uses varying definitions and parameters for the publication of its statistics. Of course, all statistics that are produced have their value and are promoted by those generating them. But they are not neutral, and one unfortunate consequence thereof is that they cannot always be used for the drawing of comparisons” (European Parliament, 2003).

The above-mentioned quote is taken from the European Parliament’s report on the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament to present an Action Plan for the collection and analysis of Community Statistics in the field of migration of 2003 (European Parliament, 2003). This quote highlights three issues. First, the European Parliament had concerns about the level of harmonisation of migration statistics across the European Union (EU) member states. Second, the European Parliament perceived these concerns about the level of harmonisation to hamper the comparability of migration statistics. Third, these concerns particularly gain in importance for the area of migration as migration involves at least two countries, which makes problems of comparability particularly urgent.

In the EU, migration statistics are harmonised within the framework of the European Statistical System (ESS). The ESS consists of Eurostat\textsuperscript{1}, the part of the European Commission heading this System as coordinator, and the individual member states’ national statistical systems (NSSs), which produce their own national statistics before delivering them to Eurostat. The NSSs remain responsible for data collection; they deliver the data to Eurostat, which then produces and disseminates EU-wide statistics. Because it consists of a multiplicity of member states, this set-up of the EU’s statistical sphere highlights the problems of comparability of statistics are of particular importance. This is the puzzle which drives this research and the point at which this project steps in. How are international migration statistics harmonised in the European Union (EU)? This research seeks to address the question of how domestic and EU actors

\footnote{Eurostat was re-named From Statistical Service to Statistical Division, Statistical Office of the European Communities, and finally to Eurostat, as it was known in 2009. For reasons of readability, this thesis refers to Eurostat only.}
in the area of international migration and asylum statistics strive to overcome long-standing problems of comparability of those statistics across the EU member states.

Official statistics aim to be free of any governmental or entrepreneurial interest (Brüngger, 2003, p. 344). Yet the introductory quote from the European Parliament underlines that statistics are not as impartial as one might expect at first glance. Rather, statistics are subject to diverging administrative traditions in national statistics collection. One measure that addresses the issue of non-comparability is the harmonisation of statistics. Harmonisation in statistical terms means that the same definitions, concepts and methods are commonly applied prior to statistics production. Harmonisation can also refer to statistics as finished output that are made comparable by calculation, or put into the same format. In more detail, one can distinguish between input-harmonisation and output-harmonisation. Input-harmonisation refers to applying uniform observation procedures and concepts. Output-harmonisation refers to the standardisation of statistical outputs. Statisticians use the term *ex ante* output-harmonisation to indicate that statistical outputs are harmonised on the basis of predetermined definitions (Ehling, 2003, p. 22; Grais, 1999, pp. 58-59; Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik & Harkness, 2005, p. 7; Körner & Meyer, 2005, p. 150). To accomplish input-harmonisation, statistical institutions make use of the same definitions and methods of data collection. Output-harmonisation is thus easier to achieve, but allows the transfer of the respective national understandings and data gathering methods to the superordinate, i.e. the international or EU level (Schmeets & Huynen, 2010, p. 2).

It is necessary to harmonise statistics in order to make comparisons between statistics which are produced by different statistical institutions. While comparability is also important at a national level, the comparability and reliability of statistics become imperative at international and supranational level, i.e. across countries. If statistics are based on different national concepts, they describe different phenomena, and cannot be meaningfully compared. In an ever-growing EU, the demand for comparable statistics increases. As a consequence, this thesis combines the focus on migration with the focus on statistics harmonisation. It sheds light on how EU and national actors strive for migration statistics harmonisation.

### 1.1 Topic Selection and Contribution to Original Knowledge

This section serves to provide the political background within which this thesis is
placed in order to explain why this thesis addresses migration statistics harmonisation in the EU. Furthermore, it highlights what this thesis contributes to original knowledge. The topical importance of the question - the reason why it is worth posing - is that migration as a phenomenon is not restricted to a country: it crosses borders. It affects most states and regions in the world. Because it is such an encompassing phenomenon, it cannot simply be ignored. Rather, one requires further information, about its scope and duration, in order to learn more about it. Policy-makers and scholars alike rely on information about the phenomenon; the first group needs information on migration for policy-formulation, the latter group requires information for their research. Migration is not restricted to one single country, but minimally entails a country of residence and a country of destination.

However, the understanding of what constitutes a migrant may diverge from country to country. In addition, systems of migration data collection are embedded in a country’s administrative traditions, and often tailored to the respective country’s understanding and definition of a migrant. As a result, problems can arise when migration statistics are compared across borders. One country’s migration statistics may be based on different migration-related definitions than those of another country. The importance of migration statistics harmonisation is highlighted by international statistical institutions as well as the European Commission. It addresses the issue of comparability among statistics in this field in its own statements, and has funded research projects in this area (for instance, Fassmann, 2009, p. 42; Poulain, Perrin & Singleton, 2006; Kraler & Reichel, 2010; European Commission, 2003; European Commission, 2005a).

This following paragraphs give an overview of international statistical institutions involved in migration statistics harmonisation in order to show why migration statistics harmonisation in the EU is unique, and explains why this study focuses on migration statistics harmonisation in the EU. For this purpose, three international statistical institutions active in migration statistics harmonisation are compared to each other. The reasons for this study’s EU focus is firstly that earlier movements towards migration statistics harmonisation at international level were of limited success. Second, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Statistics Division (UNECE-SD), the United Nations Statistics Commission (UNSC), and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Statistics Directorate (OECD-SD) have a low obligatory potential towards their members, and cannot make
use of hard law, which is backed up with possibilities of enforcement.

Eurostat is not the only statistical institution striving to harmonise migration statistics. A number of statistical bodies attached to international institutions were also involved in this task. Internationally, there have been attempts to harmonise migration statistics since 1891 (Kraly & Gnasekaran, 1989, p. 968). The UN recognised the lack of uniformity amongst definitions and concepts, and addressed the problem by issuing Recommendations on how to further congruency across borders in international migration statistics, publishing a coherent set of definitions in 1953, 1976, and most recently, in 1998 (UN, 1980, Preface; UN-SD, 1998, p. 8). In the EU, migration statistics harmonisation entered the agenda of EU policy-makers and civil servants in the 1970s, in the form of the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the compilation of uniform statistics of foreign workers, as examined in Chapter Four (European Commission, 1972, pp. 1-2).

Given that other international statistical institutions were also active in migration statistics harmonisation, it needs to be justified why this thesis focuses on migration statistics harmonisation in the EU. The first reason is that the UNSC’s attempts had limited success, as Table 1.1 shows.
Table 1.1. Central Definitions of UN Recommendations on International Migration Statistics, 1953 to 1998.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Number of countries which implemented the definitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1953 | - Permanent immigrants: non-residents (both nationals and aliens) arriving with the intention to remain for a period exceeding a year.  
      - Permanent emigrants: as residents (nationals and aliens) intending to remain abroad for a period exceeding one year.                                                                       | - Most of the national definitions of an immigrant and emigrant did not comply with the one year criterion.  
      - Less than ten countries included a direct indication of what constituted a resident or a non-resident in their definitions.                                                          |
| 1976 | - Long-term immigrants: persons who have entered a country with the intention of remaining for more than one year and who either must never have been in that country continuously for more than one year or, having been in the country at least once continuously for more than one year, must have been away continuously for more than one year since the last stay of more than one year.  
      - Long-term emigrants: persons who have left the country with the intention of remaining abroad for more than one year and who either must never have been away from the country continuously for more than one year or, having been away from the country at least once continuously for more than one year, must have been in the country continuously for more than one year since the last absence of more than one year. | - No country implemented strictly the definition of long-term immigrant or long-term emigrant.  
      - Nine out of 31 countries Eurostat and UNECE-SD examined regarding the translation of the UN Recommendations into national practice used a year as the period of stay determining migrant status. |
| 1998 | - Long-term migrant: A person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year (12 months), so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence. From the perspective of the country of departure the person will be a long-term emigrant and from that of the country of arrival the person will be a long-term immigrant. | N/A                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |

Sources: UN, 1980, pp. 2-4; 7; UN-SD, 1998, pp. 13-16.
This chapter posits that the attempts at migration statistics harmonisation of the international statistical institutions which ordered harmonisation hardly had repercussions at national level. Since NSSs were responsible for the data collection, this was a serious setback for migration statistics harmonisation. This paragraph elaborates on the limited national adaptation and policy convergence in the case of the UN Recommendations. Thereby it examines international-level incentives for migration statistics harmonisation and their translation into the national statistical context.

In November 1995, the Conference of European Statisticians (CES) sent out a questionnaire to other international statistical institutions, aimed at building an inventory of issue areas covered and working hours spent on these statistical themes throughout the calendar year 1996. The CES of the UNECE-SD received answers from 17 institutions. According to this document, Eurostat dedicated 816 working hours to “[c]onceptual/methodological improvement of statistics” aimed at furthering the cross-national comparability of statistics (UNECE-SD, 1996, pp. 1, 3, 7, 10, 11). The UNECE-SD, UNSC, OECD-SD recorded scores of 55, 40, 84 working hours dedicated to harmonisation attempts respectively. Eurostat is the obvious front-runner regarding the number of hours related to this category. This also indicates why Eurostat’s harmonisation attempts should prove more successful than that of the other three analysed international statistical institutions.

The 1998 set of Recommendations was adopted by the UNSC (UN-SD, 1998, Preface). Yet again, the 1998 UN Recommendations acknowledge it was “unlikely that countries will change the definitions provided by the laws and administrative regulations governing international migration in order to comply with international statistical Recommendations” (UN-SD, 1998, p. 14). Table 1.1 contrasts successive definitions of what constituted a long-term (im)migrant in relation to how many countries have implemented these definitions. This is done firstly in order to show how the definitions changed between 1953 and 1998, and secondly to underline that although the Recommendations may have been jointly created by international statistical institutions and states, this does not mean that states also translate these Recommendations into practice. In fact, the review of Eurostat and the UNECE-SD of their practices revealed that strictly none of the countries complied with the Recommendations (UN-SD, 1998, p. 13). Only the UK International Passenger Survey (IPS) made use of the recommended definitions of long-term immigrants and long-term emigrants (UN-SD, 1998, p. 16). These findings essentially indicate two issues. The
first is that there were concerted efforts in making migration statistics more comparable at international level. Second, they underline that without a mechanism that enables enforcement of regulations, it is unlikely for NSSs to change their domestic practices. This indicates that the 1976 UN Recommendations had limited impact on the national level in view of migration statistics harmonisation (policy goal), and definitions (policy instrument settings), and did not determine which sources should be used to produce migration statistics (policy instruments) (UN, 1980, p. 12). The UK’s IPS constituted an exception in that it was set up along the lines of the Recommendations.

Statisticians publish widely about their work, for instance, in the context of the United Nations (UN) or Eurostat, but political scientists mostly overlook the statistical sphere (for instance, Chang & Monar, 2013; Schmitter, 2000), or give only an overview of Eurostat’s departmental organisation and duties (Sabathil, Joos & Kessler, 2008, pp. 238-240). Michelle Cini (Cini, 2007, pp. 81-108), Antonis Ellinas and Ezra Suleiman (Ellinas & Suleiman, 2012, p. 105) report exclusively on the Eurostat scandal in 2003. Ulf Sverdrup’s paper is the notable exception, in that it reflects on the cooperation of National Statistical Institutes (NSIs) and Eurostat\(^2\), and the harmonisation of statistics. Yet Sverdrup concludes that more research into the topic would need to be executed, since distrust of official statistics can hamper decision-making, particularly at EU level (Sverdrup, 2005, p. 27).

Whereas existing literature on quantitative data standardisation stresses the need for congruency and focuses on statistical possibilities which could possibly alleviate cross-border comparison, it does not look into whether, and if so, how supranational, national, and policy-specific factors impact on migration statistics harmonisation (for instance, Feskens et al., 2006; Kraler, 2005; Kraler et al., 2006; Raymer & Willekens, 2008; de Beer et al., 2010). It is the aim of this study to bridge this gap. While migration statistics harmonisation is not restricted to the EU, the case of the EU is of particular interest for the following key reasons.

First, Regulation 862/2007/EC on the harmonisation of EU migration statistics is central to this project, most importantly, because it introduces uniform definitions to the member states (European Parliament & Council, 2007). Until the Regulation came into force in 2009, migration statistics differed greatly in their availability and in their definitions of basic concepts, such as that of a long-term migrant. For this reason, this

\(^2\) National Statistical Systems (NSSs) consist of National Statistical Institutes (NSIs) and National Statistical Authorities (NSAs), with the latter usually being restricted to the role of data providers.
Regulation proved to be an important step in migration statistics harmonisation, and is discussed later in this thesis in greater detail in the country chapters, Chapter Five and Six. However, even though the Regulation has been in place since 2009, member states were still working on its implementation in 2012 (European Commission, 2012, p. 13). Furthermore, the establishment of a common asylum policy, and thereby the creation of a new collector of asylum data, namely the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), consolidate migration statistics harmonisation into “a rolling exercise”, and “something that requires constant care and attention” (Interview 15). While reliable and comparable data is indispensable for developing EU migration and asylum policy, yet in many member states even stock data on non-national inhabitants were unavailable before the introduction of the Regulation. This constant lack of comparable statistical information was acknowledged in the European Commission’s proposal of a legal base for a common framework on statistics surrounding migration-related issues. Even in cases within which member states registered their data on migration, the numbers originated from a multitude of sources and diverged significantly as regards the mode of data collection; examples include non-existing data, or variations in definitions of basic concepts such as that of migration or immigrants (European Commission, 2005a, p. 2).

Regulation 862/2007/EC asks for a set of common definitions, but does not restrict member states to the use of a common and singular source across the Union.

Second, the Schengen acquis which addresses the alleviation of border controls in the EU, and the freedom of movement for persons create specific impediments regarding the collection of migration-related data. Normally within Schengen countries which employ population registers, either EU citizens are exempt from immediately registering with the authorities of the country to which they are moving, or non-registration is not sanctioned. This means on the one hand that there are two basic categories of immigrants to a country concerning the data gathering, i.e. EU citizens and non-EU citizens, so-called third country nationals. On the other hand, this means that data on EU citizens may not be as readily accessible as those of third country nationals, and have to be obtained by other governmental data sources.

Third, contrary to other statistical institutions, Eurostat can introduce detailed rules on migration statistics harmonisation for all member states, which can be enforced either by the Commission or the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Fourth, and most importantly, the ties between EU member states are closer than those between states that are not related to each other in that way. The beginnings of the EU are to be found in the
coal and steel sectors, and trade between the member states. The scope of policy areas with which the EU is dealing has broadened and deepened. In the policy area of migration, the Treaty of Amsterdam transferred migration policy to the area of communitarised policy, and turned migration policy into a task that is handled by the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council, in cooperation with the member states. They took steps towards common asylum and migration policies, which need to be underpinned by data. This growing demand for statistics, as well as their importance for policy-making in the field of migration and asylum, is best illustrated by the statement of a former Eurostat senior official:

“The European Council created a working group to discuss migration policies. After two meetings of this group, the secretary called me, desperate, and informed me that in these two meetings, delegations had only been fighting each other with conflicting statistics, and no discussion had taken place on policy, could I help?” (Interview 6iv).

A wide range of EU policies necessitate objective, correct, and comparable migration statistics. The freedom of movement for persons is one of the four freedoms of the EU, and makes travelling and relocating easier for EU citizens. Moreover, migration plays a significant role in plans such as Europe2020. In order to combat a “shrinking workforce” due to demographic change, the European Commission highlighted the significance of intra-EU migration (European Commission, 2010, p. 18). Another key value of the EU is to provide a fair asylum system. The EU started to work on a Common European Asylum System in 1999. Core targets of the latter were to “provide for a single, common procedure for reasons of efficiency, speed, quality and fairness of the decisions; establish uniform statuses for asylum and for subsidiary protection, which share most rights and obligations, whilst allowing for justified differences in treatment” (European Commission, 2008, pp. 2, 3). Migration statistics cater to these policy needs for the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of policies (Interviews 8, 9, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20). Furthermore, the net migration rate underlines that migration is just as important a phenomenon for the EU as a whole as it is for its single member states. The net migration rate refers to the “difference between the number of immigrants and the number of emigrants” per 1000 inhabitants of a
member state (Eurostat, 2014a, 3.4). Referring to the total of member states, this rate has increased steadily between 2009 and 2013 as shown in Table 1.1, indicating the rise of immigration to the EU. This table also shows that no member state had a net migration rate of 0, which would indicate the perfect balance of immigration and emigration in this period. There is either an emigration or an immigration surplus in each of the 27 member states during that period. In addition, the rate fluctuates strongly over the analysed period in member states such as Cyprus, Portugal, and Spain, switching from a surplus of immigration to a surplus of emigration, or showing significant immigration increases, as in the case of Italy. This emphasises that migration plays an important role in the EU. Policies aimed at migration and the related field of asylum require robust statistics in order to demarcate and understand trends in migration, and enable policy-making accordingly.

Table 1.2. Net Migration Rate\(^3\) for the EU-27 per Member State from 2009 to 2013\(^4\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU-27 and Member State/Year</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Union (27 countries)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (metropolitan)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^3\) Eurostat defines the net migration rate as “the difference between the number of immigrants and the number of emigrants” per 1000 inhabitants of a member state (2014a, 3.4).

\(^4\) Numbers refer to the years 2009 to 2013, because of common definitions for migration and asylum statistics becoming compulsory in 2009, and 2013 being the latest numbers available at the time of writing.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
<td>-7.6</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>-16.1</td>
<td>-17.0</td>
<td>-9.7</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>-7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>-10.1</td>
<td>-25.2</td>
<td>-12.6</td>
<td>-7.1</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat, 2014b, online table code demo_gind.

As indicated in the discussion of input- and output-harmonisation of statistics in the introduction to this chapter, statistical definitions and concepts are subject to (national) political and institutional factors. Most recently, public attitudes to migration and asylum have informed political mobilisation. An example of this is the political movement *Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (PEGIDA)*, translating as Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident, which attracted about 10000 protesters alone in Dresden, Germany, and the German English-language news broadcaster Deutsche Welle declared “PEGIDA determining political debate in Germany” (Deutsche Welle Online, 2014).

In the UK, organisations such as Migration Watch believe that “migration in the low tens of thousands will stabilise the population in the long term so this should be the longer term objective”, but that the benefits “certain types of migrants” have for the country’s economy cannot justify “net migration of 200,000 a year” (Migration Watch, 2014, Section 21). As a consequence, migration statistics are (currently) being
processed through heavily politicised filters. For example, organisations may question official migration statistics. In 2003, Migration Watch looked into Home Office numbers on asylum seekers and their dependants, and argued that the ‘real’ number of asylum seekers was higher than those published by the Home Office (Migration Watch, 2003). The imminent risk is that political discourse on migration and asylum becomes less amenable to differentiated analysis, but rather prone to selective argumentation. In the face of these developments, harmonised, i.e. comparable, reliable, and available migration statistics become increasingly important to both scholars and practitioners. Harmonised statistics are essential to an informed debate on migration and asylum. In the following, the harmonisation of migration and asylum statistics could hardly be a more political topic.

This study aims to advance the existing knowledge of how EU and domestic actors harmonise migration statistics at three levels, i.e. at the conceptual level, at the empirical level, and at the theoretical level.

At the conceptual level, this thesis focuses on statistical institutions. The project elaborates on the very nature of, and the similarities and differences between, statistical institutions making up statistical systems. This project seeks to contribute to the understanding of statistical institutions by mapping them nationally. This is done to show in which aspects they are different from and similar to each other. In order to answer these questions, the thesis devises a typology of NSIs in the EU in Section 1.4, before Chapter Three has a more detailed look at Eurostat. This typology of the NSSs, Figure 1.1, provides the foundation for the selection of the UK and the Dutch NSSs as distinct statistical systems. These systems are chosen in view of their centralisation and prominent population statistics sources, so as to analyse whether these factors have an impact on migration statistics harmonisation.

The empirical contribution of this thesis is found in Chapters Three to Six. Chapter Three shows by which means Eurostat governs the ESS, in which mode it developed, and elaborates on its role in the ESS. Chapter Four discusses which EU incentives furthered migration statistics harmonisation. Chapters Five and Six examine migration statistics harmonisation the case studies of the UK NSS and the Dutch NSS. These are part of the empirical contribution of this thesis, and concentrate on migration statistics harmonisation in the respective national contexts. At the theoretical level, the thesis combines policy convergence, Europeanisation, and historical institutional literature with organisation studies and register-based theory. This thesis refers to a
register-based NSS, if the population census is ‘virtual’, i.e. executed almost entirely without conducting additional surveys. Section 2.2 elaborates on this definition in greater detail. The thesis adds to the theoretical level by comparing the results of Chapters Five and Six in Chapter Seven. Section 7.3 comparatively discusses which explanatory variables further migration statistics harmonisation across the country case studies on the basis of the theoretical framework set out in Chapter Two.

1.2 Methodology

Based on the main research question (i.e. how do EU and domestic actors harmonise EU international migration statistics?) this section addresses the methodology. As is argued by Donatella della Porta and Michael Keating, it is necessary for all social science research to be exercised in accordance with “certain standards of argumentation” (della Porta & Keating, 2008, p. 20). This includes “some reflection on the foundations of knowledge” which “is necessary as a preliminary to all research” (della Porta & Keating, 2008, p. 20). In order to put this advice into practice, this section discusses the benefits and pitfalls of a small-n design in view of this project, before considering the sources employed.

When it comes to the benefits of the case study method, Robert Yin elaborates that the strength of this approach lies in the fact that new variables and hypotheses can be identified during the process of the research, which had not been established prior to the study. Since there was little previous research on which this thesis could draw, this proved beneficial to the research. Yin argues that this method facilitates the study of a policy’s relation to its context (Yin, 2009, p. 60). The interest in this relation is mirrored by this project’s comparative study of migration statistics harmonisation in two EU member states. As the project explores the sparsely developed field of how EU and national actors strive towards the harmonisation of international migration statistics, making use of process tracing in the context of a case study suits this study best. The study analyses statistical governance in the case of EU migration statistics by comparing the cases of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Broadly speaking, this small-n approach enables one to analyse the cases at a level of detail that would not be possible in the context of a large-n study. This study tests supranational, national, and policy-specific factors in the context of two member states. The comparative design allows one to determine the similarities and differences as to how NSSs harmonise migration
statistics. These advantages fit the present study, firstly because the spatial bounds within which this project operates shut off the option of carrying out the analysis as a large-n study. The number of available cases being restricted to 27 need not be a shortcoming, as one is thereby able to analyse each case in more depth than would be possible in a large-n design, as explained above. In addition, this study follows in essence a most different design: both member states harmonise migration statistics according to EU requirements, while their NSSs diverge in view of centralisation and their main sources of migration statistics.

Second, the research question of this study is a “how” question, which asks for a tracing of developments over time, “rather than mere frequencies” at which “what” and “who” questions are aimed (Yin, 2014, p. 10). Compared to “what” and “who” questions, “how” questions are exploratory rather than explanatory in nature. The former two types of question benefit more from survey research in order to determine the frequency of an incident (Yin, 2014, p. 10). This study, however, is interested in how EU and national level actors strive for the harmonisation of international migration statistics in the EU. While it is necessary to define what constitutes a statistical institution at the various levels, and by this answer basic “what” questions, the above “how” question is the primary question leading through this research project, and case study research suits this project best. In order to establish the target group of the research methods, the following lines elaborate the specific understanding of the unit of analysis employed in this research, i.e. statistical institutions. The unit of analysis is linked to the theoretical framework and research puzzle as follows. Peter Hall refers to institutions as “the formal rules, compliance procedures and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy” (Hall, 1986, p. 19). Statistical institutions constitute such formal rules. By drawing upon Yin’s typology of units of analysis, the one used in this study is that of the “organisational unit” as corporate body (Yin, 2009, p. 33). Concretely, this thesis refers to EU and domestic statistical institutions within the statistical systems.

1.3 Methods and Sources of Information

This section is concerned with the methods and sources of which this thesis makes use. The research question of how EU and domestic actors harmonise migration statistics is answered by a combined approach of documentary study and elite
interviewing. Both methods are presented with their respective drawbacks and benefits in relation to this study. Both methods essentially serve the same purpose in as much as they provide empirical evidence for the examination of migration statistics harmonisation in the UK and the Dutch statistical systems. Documentary research provides the basic identification of involved actors, the mapping of the NSSs, and the identification of empirical evidence for how the domestic statistical systems harmonised migration statistics. Elite interviewing furthers the understanding of policy-making within the ESS, at both supranational and national levels. Documentary analysis is supplemented with interviewing in order to strengthen the validity of the results gained by each method through triangulation. The main sources of empirical evidence emerging from the document study and elite interviewing are summarised in Table 1.3 below, ordered by their main institutional affiliation and case.
### Table 1.3. Research Methods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional Level</th>
<th>Research Method</th>
<th>Sources of Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>- Documentary research</td>
<td>- Meta-data on migration statistics published by Eurostat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- multi-annual statistical programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- statistics legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- (migration) statistics work reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- institutional anniversary yearbooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Dutch annual statistical reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- secondary sources concentrating on the Dutch register-based NSS and the census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- websites of national statistical institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- elite interviewing</td>
<td>- interview transcripts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Centraal Bureau voor de</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statistiek, Home Office,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Office for National</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statistics, academics)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>- Documentary research</td>
<td>- Meta-data on migration statistics by Eurostat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- annual statistical programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- statistics legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- (migration) statistics work reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- institutional anniversary yearbooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Council Conclusions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- websites of Eurostat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- websites of the ESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- elite interviewing</td>
<td>- interview transcripts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Eurostat, DG Employment,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DG Home)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>- Documentary research</td>
<td>Recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- websites of international organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- annual work reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- elite interviewing</td>
<td>- interview transcripts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(academics)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own depiction.
Statistical institutions represent the units of analysis. Thus, the primary target group of the interviews and the documentary study is spread across two levels: on the one hand those which are mainly acting at EU level, and on the other hand, those acting on the domestic level. More precisely, statistical institutions whose work centres on EU migration statistics constitute the focus. The first step of the documentary study strives to identify the stakeholders in data harmonisation at Eurostat and the NSSs, in order to then map the 27 NSSs on the level of a corporate unit. Secondly, elite interviews and further documentary research supply the study with empirical evidence in relation to migration statistics harmonisation, in order to trace the specific steps taken.

In the first place, the benefits and limitations of the documentary study are pointed out. According to Yin, a large number of actors and events can be studied over a long span of time by undertaking a documentary study (Yin, 2009, p. 102). This fits this project’s conceptual frame as it takes the temporal aspect seriously.

The formal structures and processes of the ESS are examined by a documentary study. The documents analysed include multi-annual statistical programmes and (migration) statistics work reports, statistics legislation, memoirs and yearbooks, and official websites of international, EU and domestic statistical institutions. In addition, a stream of projects on the topic highlights the importance of the topic. Some of these received funding from the European Commission under a framework programme. Examples are the “Towards Harmonised Statistics on Immigrants in Europe” (THESIM) Project (Poulain, Perrin & Singleton, 2006) and following up on that the “Promoting Comparative Quantitative Research in the Field of Migration and Integration in Europe” (PROMINSTAT) Project (Kraler & Reichel, 2010). These projects give insight into the manner in which information on migrants in the EU is collected. This study used the information provided by these projects to crosscheck the information on the statistical systems and international statistical institutions derived from their websites, as well as to map and categorise the 27 NSSs.

To broaden the empirical evidence concerning the evolution of the Dutch statistical system and its cooperation with Eurostat within and beyond the ESS, this research also makes use of documents retrieved through archival research, and the internet. I consulted the websites of the Dutch statistical institute, and the website http://statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/ which hosts parliamentary documents from 1814 onwards. Similarly, I accessed parliamentary documents for the UK case study at www.parliament.uk. Primarily, the stakeholders of the migration statistics harmonisation
process were identified with the help of institutional websites, Eurostat migration statistics meta-data documentation, and the aforementioned project reports. These documents furthermore allow the tracing of the evolution of the EU, British and Dutch statistical systems, and their decision-making processes with a focus on the area of EU migration statistics. Yet there are limitations inherent to this method in the context of the study.

I experienced difficulties with the availability of some documents. For instance, I could not gain access to all the multi-annual statistical programmes of Eurostat, and I encountered problems accessing national statistical programmes as well. Ideally, this study would include an analysis of multi-annual statistical programmes starting with the first and ending with the statistical programme covering 2009, the year in which Regulation 862/2007/EC came into force. This proved impossible for two reasons, both of which are related to accessibility problems. The first reason is that there are no multi-annual statistical programmes prior to 1973. The first statistical programme dates back to 1973 (Council, 1984, p. 2). The years from 1952 - Eurostat’s creation - to 1973 are not covered by (official) multi-annual statistical programmes. This means that there are no multi-annual statistical programmes prior to that date which would allow an analysis from 1952 onwards. Second, neither electronic nor hard copies of statistical programmes prior to 1985 are publicly available through Eur-Lex, an openly accessible official online database listing legal acts of European law, or the European Commission central library in Brussels. This means that only the statistical programmes from 1985, the sixth statistical programme, onwards were available for analysis in the context of this thesis. For the programmes prior to that year, bibliographical notices could be accessed through Eur-Lex. These, however, merely state the title and the year of publication of the documents in question.

To overcome this drawback, Chapter Five, which addresses EU migration statistics harmonisation incentives, examines Council Conclusions, Action Plans, and Work Programmes in order to bridge this temporal gap. The knowledge gained through documentary research is also limited in the sense that documents showed no explicit evidence in relation to the decision-making process within the ESS, in the context of translating EU incentives into national practices. Thus, elite interviewing comes into play, to overcome this specific drawback. Interviews with Eurostat officials active at that time provided more insight into decision-making in the ESS. In addition, I posed questions to officials of the national statistical systems on the functioning of their NSS,
and the EMN Council Decision and Regulation 862/2007/EC’s domestic impact (see Appendix 1).

Interviews with stakeholders advance this study as they generate focused information that allows for “causal inferences and explanations” (Yin, 2009, p. 102). Yet the question remained as to who belongs to the elite that can further knowledge of a chosen subject, and how these interviews feed into the research question of this thesis, i.e. how EU and national level actors strive towards migration statistics harmonisation, needs to be clarified. Organisational units of the EU and the domestic level were firstly identified by the documentary study. The results helped to constitute the target group of the elite interviews. In addition to that, the documentary study built the basis for tracing the policy process of the harmonisation of migration statistics. Interviewing stakeholders in the process provided me with detailed first-hand information on the practices at the NSSs and Eurostat.

These interviews were essential, as the document study was limited to official publications which were accessible. As a consequence, elite interviewing was necessary because institutions are often reluctant to disclose such issues as difficulties in the policy-making process resulting from colliding interests in official publications (Leuffen, 2007, p. 148). In order to cross-check the interviewees’ answers, the questions posed to the domestic statisticians followed the same question guide (Bryman, 2005, pp. 472-473; see Appendix 1). Mirroring that, the questions asked during the second round of interviews at EU level, i.e. to the representatives of the policy DGs, Eurostat and academia, were more geared to their cooperation with domestic statisticians, their involvement in the harmonisation process, and setting the framework for this process. In that way, interviewees’ answers could be cross-checked. In the context of this study, the interviewees were current or former officials of Eurostat, two policy Directorate Generals (DGs) of the European Commission, two NSSs, and academia, the latter of which were country correspondents for international statistics institutions. 21 persons were interviewed, and three of them were contacted with follow-up questions, mainly in the first and exploratory phase of the project. This number of interviewees may seem low at first glance, yet reflects the small number of statisticians and academics directly involved in migration statistics harmonisation in the context of the ESS. I conducted face-to-face and telephone-interviews with Eurostat and Dutch NSS officials in the first half of 2011, and April 2013 at Eurostat as well as DG Home Affairs and DG Employment. In April 2012 and July 2014, I interviewed statisticians at the Home
Office, the Office for National Statistics (ONS), and the academia. This interviewing enabled me to gain insight into the practitioners’ understanding of the UK and Dutch institutional structures of official migration statistics production, as well as their practices related to migration statistics harmonisation. Other primary sources, such as government reports, were used to verify the results.

I employed semi-structured question guides to direct the interview towards answering the research question of this thesis. Appendix 1 of this thesis outlines these questions. The questions posed to the national statisticians were almost identical to each other, whereas the questions to the representatives of the policy DGs, operational parts of Eurostat, and academia, were more geared to their cooperation with statisticians, and their involvement in the harmonisation process. The prepared list of questions provided a guide through the interview, but, for instance, the order of the questions was changed according to the answers given by the interviewee and the flow of the interview. All interview partners were contacted beforehand with an email, outlining the project and ensuring anonymity. All interviewees agreed for the interviews to be recorded. In cases where they labelled answers with ‘off the record information’, this information was not used in the research project.

1.4 Member State Statistical Systems Selection, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands

In summary, constraints of time and resources hamper the analysis of all 27 NSSs, and also of four NSSs. Therefore, this study follows a comparative strategy, and examines two distinct NSSs selected on the national and policy-specific variables. It follows a most-different research design. Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1 show the distribution of member state NSSs according to two national criteria, which constitute the basic selection criteria.

The spatial scope conditions for this thesis are represented by the 27 member states that were obliged to introduce Regulation 862/2007/EC on the harmonisation of EU migration statistics to their respective domestic statistical systems in 2009. Because of this, the universe of this study’s cases, grouped by countries, can at maximum reach from the small to medium-scale, i.e. 27. In other words, the number of available cases is limited to 27. The set-up of the ESS is unique in its capacity to impart Regulations that are compulsory for the member states of the EU, which amounted to 27 at the time said
Regulation came into force\textsuperscript{5}.

With regard to the research design, it has to be noted first that the ESS consists of Eurostat at EU level, and the 27 NSSs of the member states. Second, the governance in relation to statistical data collection entails institutional structures and the processes taking place therein. This study explores how the NSIs and Eurostat interact within the EU statistical sphere. At the domestic level, it analyses whether (and if so, how) the UK and the Netherlands have adapted to EU migration statistics harmonisation incentives.

Those two NSSs were selected on the basis of the mapping of the relevant 27 NSSs in the EU (Table 1.3). While both countries exhibit the same scores in regard of the supranational variable, they diverge on the national and policy-specific variables. Both countries feature similarly high levels of administrative capacities and path-dependent NSSs. For both member states, the project focuses on the topic of migration statistics harmonisation. Those two specific countries were chosen because they represent two largely different models. The UK NSS is decentralised and not register-based, while the Dutch NSS is both centralised and register-based. This thesis refers to a register-based NSS, if the population census is ‘virtual’, i.e. executed almost entirely without conducting additional surveys. Section 2.2 elaborates on this definition in greater detail. In addition, the countries differ in their sense of duty. This is, however, where the differences regarding the factors of the independent variables end. Ideally, all but one of these factors would differ between the cases.

The statistical area was firstly chosen as a topical field for its overall low level of cross-border comparability, when this research was in its initial stages. Second, in view of the increasing importance of migration policy among EU responsibilities, this specific topic suggested itself as an important field of examination. Cooperation among statistical institutions, however, is not restricted to these two levels. International organisations such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) provide statistical institutions from and beyond both levels with a framework for discussing new developments exchanging best practices.

\textsuperscript{5} In 2013, Croatia joined the EU and thereby also the ESS, so that there are 28 NSIs involved in the ESS in 2014. However, Croatia does not play a role for this thesis because of the temporal bounds set (see Section 1.5).
The 27 NSSs of the EU member states are hence spread out over the four types as shown in Table 1.3.

Table 1.4. Mapping the National Statistical Systems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centralised and register-based</th>
<th>Decentralised and register-based</th>
<th>Centralised and not register-based</th>
<th>Decentralised and not register-based</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Slovenia</td>
<td>Belgium, Sweden</td>
<td>Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This means that the majority of EU NSSs falls into the decentralised and not register-based category, with only few NSSs qualifying for the centralised and register-based, centralised and not register-based, and the decentralised and register-based categories.

1.5 **Time Period selected, 1952 to 2009**

This thesis addresses migration statistics harmonisation from 1952 to 2009. In terms of the temporal limits of this thesis, it must be considered that the harmonisation of migration statistics is a moving target.

Eurostat was created in 1952. This determines the starting point for the Eurostat chapters, and particularly Chapter Six. The Netherlands is one of the six founding countries of the EU, and was part of the statistical cooperation within the EU from Eurostat’s creation onwards. The case is different for the UK NSS: the UK joined the EU in 1973. Because of this, Chapter Five focuses on the developments from 1973 onwards. However, both NSSs were created earlier than 1952, and the application of historical institutionalism demands that the initial conditions of the NSSs be taken into account, in order to determine the mode of institutional development. For this reason, it is necessary to look at the moment of institutional creation in the Dutch and the British cases, i.e. 1899 and 1941 respectively, as well as the developments from 1952 onwards in the EU and Dutch cases, and 1973 respectively in the British case.

In terms of the end date, Regulation 862/2007/EC enables only partial harmonisation, in so far that it harmonises basic migration-related definitions, but leaves it to the member states to decide which data sources they use to supply Eurostat with their migration numbers. Furthermore, the report on the implementation of the Regulation notes that the translation of the Regulation into national practices is still ongoing (European Commission, 2012, p. 13). In addition, the scope of definitions to be
The harmonisation was widened in 2013 in the course of setting up EASO. The Directorate-General (DG) Home Affairs policy officer in charge of relations with the European Asylum Support Office and practical cooperation activities in the field of asylum, acting as statistical correspondent in the field of asylum, commented that “now as EASO is establishing its own data collection, we are seeing which are the areas that are still missing under the Migration Statistics Regulation that EASO can cover” (Interview 15). Given this, the harmonisation of international migration statistics is not yet completed at the time of writing. This thesis studies a moving target, and the research could continue for an indeterminate period of time. However, the resources backing this project are limited, and it is hence necessary to find a sensible end point for this study from an empirical perspective. This thesis determines this end point as the entry into force of Regulation 862/2007/EC on migration statistics harmonisation in 2009. By then, EU member states had to supply Eurostat with migration statistics based on the compulsory definitions stipulated in the Regulation. Thus, the year of 2009 constitutes the end point of this analysis for the EU level, i.e. Chapters Three and Four, as well as the two country chapters, i.e. Chapters Five and Six. In comparison to this, determining the starting point of the analysis is an easier task.

1.6 Thesis Structure

This thesis is structured as follows: the overall role of Chapter One was to introduce the puzzle which drives this research, and stress its contribution to original knowledge in Section 1.1. Migration statistics play an important role for practitioners in policy-formulation and policy-evaluation, as well as for scholars who employ migration statistics in their research. Despite the increasing importance of migration as a policy-area for both nation states and the EU, the harmonisation of EU member states international migration statistics is an issue of debate in academic and practitioner circles. This thesis seeks to address this puzzle by examining how two distinct domestic statistical systems proceed in harmonising migration statistics in the context of the EU. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 overviewed the methodology and methods employed in this thesis. Section 1.4 justified the selection of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK) as case studies. In addition, Chapter One presented the theoretical framework, methodological orientation, research design, and methods.

Chapter Two addresses the theoretical framework of this thesis. In particular, it
concentrates on how policy convergence, the concept of Europeanisation, organisation studies and register theory, and historical institutionalism are applicable to the examination of migration statistics harmonisation. It conceptualises the supranational, national, and policy-specific variables that the following chapters employ. Chapter Three enquires into Eurostat in the ESS, and its ability to harmonise statistics in more detail. The chapter evaluates how Eurostat fares in view of the institutional supranational factors identified in Chapter Two.

Chapter Four lays the ground for the Dutch and UK case study chapters in that it analyses on the one hand how EU-level migration statistics harmonisation developed. On the other hand, it analyses EU documents regarding how they score in the factors of the supranational variable identified in Chapter Two. The chapter discusses how EU and domestic actors harmonise migration statistics by singling out documents in the preparation of migration statistics harmonisation at EU level, whose transfer to the national level Chapters Five and Six examine.

The fifth and sixth chapters proceed to examine how migration statistics were harmonised according to EU demands in two member states. Chapter Five addresses migration statistics harmonisation in the UK statistical system, whereas Chapter Six repeats this examination for the NSS of the Netherlands. These chapters test how the supranational, national, and policy-specific variables established in Chapter Two relate to migration statistics harmonisation.

The seventh chapter recapitulates the findings of the previous chapters and compares the UK and Dutch NSSs in their harmonisation of migration statistics. Finally, this concluding chapter summarises the results of the previous chapters, particularly the findings of the comparative discussion, and places them into the context of existing literature.
Chapter Two - Theoretical Framework

Having elaborated on the research methods, the selected time period, and member states in Chapter One, in Chapter Two the discussion turns to the theoretical framework of this thesis. This chapter provides insight into the theories that are conducive to analysing migration statistics harmonisation in Sections 2.1 to 2.4. These are historical institutionalism, organisation studies and register-based statistics theory, policy convergence and Europeanisation. In a third step, it summarises the conceptualisation of the dependent and explanatory variables of this thesis in Section 2.6. This chapter finds that migration statistics harmonisation is framed best by Europeanisation and policy convergence on the dependent variable. In addition, it refers to historical institutionalism, organisation studies, register-based statistics theory, and compliance literature for the supranational, national, and policy-specific independent variables.

2.1 Historical Institutionalism

As explained in the introduction of Chapter One, it is the member states’ task to produce migration statistics that tally with EU harmonisation demands. This is why this study strives to examine how these EU requirements are put into practice at the domestic level. The following theories are thought important in examining migration statistics harmonisation. Similar to scholars of liberal intergovernmentalism, supranational governance, and neofunctionalism, historical institutionalists also turned their attention to matters of European integration. Yet unlike the other European integration theories mentioned in the previous sentence, historical institutionalism can be applied to analyse domestic level developments, and thus suits the topic of migration statistics harmonisation better than the first three theories. This is why historical institutionalism is the first theory relevant for this thesis, and supplies an explanatory factor for migration statistics harmonisation. In defining historical institutionalism, Paul Pierson determines the approach to be historical because it recognises that political development must be understood as a process that unfolds over time. It is institutionalist, because it stresses that many of the contemporary implications of these temporal processes are embedded in institutions, whether these be formal rules, policy structures, or social norms (Pierson, 1998, p. 29, cited in Bulmer, 2009, p. 308).

Historical institutionalism stands in the new institutionalist tradition. Broadly speaking, this opens the door for greatly varying perceptions of what constitutes an
institution (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000, p. 4). Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo highlight that there is at least some common ground in defining institutions on which historical institutionalists can agree. It covers “the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy” (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992, p. 2). Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen stress that “the word institution is sometimes used for a specific category of actors, usually corporate actors or organizations.” (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 12). NSIs are formal institutions that coincide with this definition of institutions, and historical institutionalism fits with the topic at hand in that regard. Further, Thelen and Steinmo elaborate that historical institutionalism concentrates on the “relationship between new policy ideas and the institutional configuration that mediates between such ideas and specific policy outcomes” (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992, p. 22). In the context of this thesis, the EU incentives are the EMN Council Decision and Regulation 862/2007/EC on the harmonisation of migration statistics. NSSs and NSIs constitute the institutional configuration, and migration statistics harmonisation is the outcome.

In order to gain a better overview of the different historical institutionalist approaches, this section refers to Christopher Pollitt’s typology of institutional change, presented in Table 2.1. This typology sets up the structure of this Section on historical institutionalism. In this typology, Pollitt distinguishes between the two axes as “process of change” and “result of change” (Pollitt, 2008, p. 46). Streeck and Thelen highlight that one must take into regard both the process and the result of these changes. The process of change can either be incremental or take the form of a sudden rupture, whereas the result of change can be path-dependent or radical (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, pp. 8-9). By this, one obtains four cells: cell A, standing for the classic incremental type of change; cell B still signifies incrementally changing institutions, but with a result radically different to the initial institution; cell C is described as “radical conservatism”, meaning that there is sudden institutional change, with a quick return to the initial path; and cell D stands for the pattern and result of a critical juncture, i.e. sudden and radical change (Pollitt, 2008, p. 46). Cells A and D stand for well-known, but also highly debated concepts within historical institutionalist writing, while Streeck and Thelen claim the possibility of a cell C type of change, but concentrate on type B.
Thus, an important difference dividing historical institutionalism scholarship is the degree of stickiness ascribed to institutions. By stickiness of institutions this thesis refers to the lasting structural effects of institutions on political struggles (see, for instance, Boettke et al, 2008, p. 332). One could span an imaginative continuum from persisting institutional invariability over time at one end, and a sudden, radical, critical-juncture change at the other. Expanding on this idea, cell A would represent the stickiest institution, institutions of cells B and C would be decreasingly sticky, and institutions of cell D the least sticky ones.

With regard to concepts that are classically related to historical institutionalism, this section introduces the reader firstly to path dependence, associated with cell A of Table 2.1 outlining the types of institutional change. A second important concept in historical institutionalism is that of “critical junctures”. Corresponding to cell D of the above typology in Table 2.1, a critical juncture process of change should be disruptive, and its outcome discontinuous compared to a political outcome’s former status quo. Like the historical institutionalist approach as such, work within a path dependence framework (cell A) draws on a wide array of definitions.

No historical institutionalist positions herself at one of extreme ends, i.e. total institutional invariability (Pollitt, 2008, p. 46). Yet, if sticking to the above picture of the continuum, “path dependence” scholars find themselves rather close to the end of an institutional stickiness continuum signifying a lack of institutional change, arguing for situations of institutional “lock-in” within which change is unfeasible. Douglass North understands path dependence as merely limiting future choices, thereby explicitly
stressing the possibility for alternative paths to be taken (North, 1990, pp. 98-99). According to Mahoney and Villegas, path dependence is “associated with the effort of researchers to understand the repercussions of early events on subsequent and possibly historically distant outcomes” (Mahoney & Villegas, 2009, p. 78). While a number of writers reluctantly refer to path dependence as restricting the choice between future paths. Particularly James Mahoney posits a more rigid understanding of this concept.

Mahoney opposes this seemingly minor relevance of initial conditions by addressing it as one of three factors for “path dependence” (2000, p. 511). Path dependence itself, however, is a major debate within historical institutionalism. Not content with the mere notion of path dependence as “history matters”, he stresses that “path dependence characterizes specifically those historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties” (Mahoney, 2000, pp. 507-511). The elements of path dependence, which are applied in this thesis for matters of operationalisation, are laid out in the following. Firstly, the point in time in the examined sequence at which an event takes place, matters. Later events have less impact than earlier ones, as the possibilities one can select are determined by the prior choices. Secondly, the primary event in a chain of events has to be peculiar in the sense that it cannot be explained by preceding incidents - resembling Ruth Collier and David Collier’s line of argumentation for “critical junctures” (Collier & Collier, 1991, pp. 29-31). Lastly, once a process within a sequence - be it reactive of self-reinforcing - towards an outcome is started, it is rarely stopped or altered. Collier and Collier refer to these first events in a sequence as “critical junctures”, periods of transition or reorientation that shape future outcomes. They weigh eight countries against each other in their developments of labour movements and regime dynamics. Thus, their conception of a critical juncture features a comparative element across states - a significant change comes about in distinct ways in each of the analysed cases - that obviously cannot directly be detected in a study focusing on a singular case, but only when comparing cases.

Equivalent to critical junctures in incremental institutional change are so-called change agents. While Sven Steinmo still observed in 2008 that the modes of incremental institutional change do not give insight into the reasons for this change, subsequent works by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen amended this shortcoming (Steinmo, 2008, p. 121; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, Figure 1.1). So-called change agents constitute an “intervening step through which the character of institutional rules and political
context do their causal work” (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 44). Yet change agents do not function in isolation, they “act in concert with other institutional actors”, i.e. cooperate with supporters or challengers of institutions (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 46). Similarly, in view of a historical institutionalist approach geared towards path dependence, critical junctures, i.e. relatively deep change in a relatively short period of time, embody the reasons for change related to punctuated change followed by path dependence (for instance, Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, pp. 1-37).

Historical institutionalism with its focus on institutions fits well with the topic at hand, which aims to provide insights into migration statistics harmonisation in the EU. Peter Hall formulated a widely accepted definition of institutions, i.e. “[…] the formal rules, compliance procedures and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy” (Hall, 1986, p. 19). There is a multiplicity of international institutions working towards the harmonisation of definitions, concepts and measurement techniques of cross-country statistics. Based on that, this study defined a “statistical institution” as a formal institution in which the “production and analysis of statistics are important parts of the work” (UNECE-SD, 1999, p. 1). Examples of such institutions - other than Eurostat - are: the European Central Bank (ECB), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations (UN). This list of statistical institutions is not comprehensive. A set of statistical institutions works on the data collection and the production and analysis of financial and monetary statistics. In this field, naturally central banks cooperate with, for example, the International Monetary Fund, the OECD, the UN and Eurostat in the roles of data providers and users of statistics. The following comparison of these institutions to Eurostat, however, reflects exclusively on those concerned with migration statistics harmonisation, the policy-focus of this thesis. Volker Rittberger and Bernhard Zangl distinguish between international regimes and international organisations based on the number of issue areas they address (Rittberger & Zangl, 2006, pp. 6-7). Adapting this to the statistical sphere, Rittberger and Zangl’s distinction helps sharpening this project’s focus on international statistical institutions, and thus distinguishing them from international regimes. All listed international statistical institutions focus on one issue-area, i.e. statistics. However, this argument does not render them statistical regimes, because under the umbrella of statistics, they address a multitude of statistical issue-areas. Following this, FRONTEX and UNHCR have been excluded from the analysis because of their focus on one single issue area,
mainly operational data on border crossing and asylum respectively.

Merging the definitions of statistical institutions on the one hand, and international organisations on the other, this thesis defined international statistical institutions as organs addressing the production and analysis of a wide range of statistical issue areas statistics by collective decision-taking of its members. An additional attribute is that the international statistical institutions’ departmental attachment to international organisations. Regarding the institutional structure, the UNSD is part of the United Nations (UN), as well as the statistics division being a sub-unit of the OECD, the UNECE-SD forms part of the UNECE, and Eurostat forming part of the European Commission and thus the EU institutions.

Based on this section, institutions have an impact on migration statistics harmonisation. Statistical institutions within their respective systems are at the very heart of this study. This study adopts a historical institutionalist approach, because historical institutionalism highlights the effects that institutions have on the policy-making under their auspices. For the present thesis, historical institutionalism directs attention to the impact that the mode of institutional development of statistical systems has on migration statistics harmonisation.

This section posits that both the mode of development of both the national and the supranational statistical system are of importance for migration statistics harmonisation, because of the set-up of the ESS. The ESS may be headed by a DG of the European Commission, Eurostat. However, the functioning of this system remains - most importantly - dependent on the NSIs as data collectors, as well as on final decisions being made in the committee of the directors of the national statistical institutions, the DGINS committee. As Chapter Three elaborates, new proposals on statistical policies are first discussed by national experts in task forces and working groups (Interviews 11, 20), and cleared by the heads of the NSS after that, before any opinion is voiced vis-à-vis Eurostat’s superordinate institution, the European Commission. Despite the increasing orientation of domestic policies, polities and politics towards Brussels institutions, decision-makers from the national level retain a high level of control over the ESS alongside the European Commission.

Furthermore, this section argues that the path-dependent development of a statistical system can have different effects on migration statistics harmonisation. This thesis expects the path-dependent development of the ESS to further migration statistics harmonisation, since the ESS is dedicated to harmonised statistics across the EU
member states. This thesis assumes the path-dependent development of an NSS to hamper migration statistics harmonisation. The purpose of the NSSs was originally to provide their respective national Government with official statistics, and not to supply statistics that were comparable to those of other NSSs. Therefore, this section claims that NSSs try to safeguard national practices. As a consequence, this section expects the path-dependent development of NSSs to hamper migration statistics harmonisation.

Given this, historical institutionalism allows for analyses of the stimuli or impediments (namely the mode of institutional development of statistical systems), for change, i.e. migration statistics harmonisation. This is essential for answering the research question of this thesis, which asks how EU and national actors strive to overcome the longstanding problems of comparability of migration statistics across the EU member states.

2.2 Organisation Studies and Register-based Statistics Theory

Section 2.3 established that organisations can be classified as (formal) institutions. Similar to historical institutionalism, organisation studies also aim determine whether organisations have an impact on policy outcomes such as migration statistics harmonisation. Section 2.2 hence supplies another two explanatory factors for migration statistics harmonisation, centralisation, and a register-based statistical system. Thomas Hammond challenges that “strategic behavior by subordinates can completely overcome the impact of the organizational structure” as Herbert Simons suggests (Hammond, 1986, p. 417). In Hammond’s opinion, the final decision is in the hands of the superior. The superior selects the best option of those presented to her by her employees. Morten Egeberg similarly contends that

“formal structural designs are expected to ‘route’ information exchange, co-ordination processes and conflict resolution. Thus, how we draw organizational boundaries are supposed to determine which problems and solutions policy makers become aware of, and at which level in a hierarchy various concerns are considered simultaneously, or are allowed to be sheltered from other interests” (Egeberg, 1999, p. 162).
A general typology of organisations could provide the basis for the country selection, i.e. which NSSs to compare in their harmonisation of migration statistics, and in identifying explanatory factors for migration statistics harmonisation. Organisation studies supply a number of these typologies. Talcott Parsons distinguishes between four types of organisation. He suggests that organisations “may in the first instance be classified in terms of the type of goal or function about which they are organized” (Parsons, 1960, p. 45, italics in original text). To Parsons’ mind, there are firstly those organisations that fulfil the function of economic production, secondly those that are geared towards political goals, thirdly those that “contribute primarily to efficiency, not effectiveness” such as courts, and fourthly those with a primarily cultural, educational and expressive functions such as churches and schools (Parsons, 1960, pp. 45-46).

According to Parsons, organisations can further be distinguished by whether they are “confronted with problems of establishing social relations with the ‘objects’ of their endeavors and of having to motivate them in various ways” (Parsons cited in Blau & Scott, 1963, p. 41). The success of so-called service organisations depends on good relations with their clients, contrary to so-called production organisations. Everett Hughes presents another typology of formal organisations. He distinguishes between formal organisations based on the members of an organisation. There is

“(1) the voluntary association of equals, where members freely join for a specific purpose; examples include sects, clubs, and professional associations; (2) the military model, which emphasizes a fixed hierarchy of authority and status; (3) the philanthropic model, consisting of a governing lay board, an itinerant professional staff, and the clients served, as illustrated by hospitals and universities; (4) the corporation model with its stockholders, board of directors, managers, and staff; and (5) the family business in which a group of people related by kin and marriage carry on some enterprise for profit” (Hughes, 1952, n.p.; quoted in Blau & Scott, 1963, p. 41).

Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott differentiate organisations on the basis of who profits from them (Blau & Scott, 1963, p. 42). Their four types of formal organisations are:
“(1) the members and rank-file participants; (2) the owners or managers of the organization; (3) the clients or, more generally, the ‘public-in-contact’, which means the people who are technically ‘outside’ the organization yet have regular, direct contact with it […]; (4) the public-at-large, that is, the members of the society in which the organization operates” (Blau & Scott, 1963, p. 42).

These typologies are not applicable to the study of migration statistics harmonisation in the EU, because this study is interested in migration statistics harmonisation in different EU member states. NSSs unify the key stakeholders in this task. It is not reasonable to compare an NSS to an organisation that is not involved in the task. The NSSs need to be sensibly comparable. As Giovanni Sartori writes, apples and pears can be compared, but only in certain aspects (Sartori, 1993, pp. 245-246). The aspect of interest of this study is migration statistics harmonisation - an aspect that cannot sensibly be compared between an organisation which is involved in this process, and an organisation which is not involved in it.

In addition, according to the typologies of formal organisations developed by Parsons, Hughes, and Blau and Scott, NSSs qualify for the same categories. The three typologies would not allow any distinction between them. In case of Parsons’s typology, statistical institutions are organisations too similar to each other for the typology providing a basis for case selection: both are production organisations, i.e. not dependent on setting up social relations with their objects. For similar reasons to that explain why Parsons’ typology cannot be applied to this project, the application of Hughes’s typology does not further the case selection of this study. This thesis aims to answer the main research question of how EU and domestic actors strive to overcome impediments to harmonised migration statistics, and NSSs are the key actors dealing with this task. The NSSs of different countries, however, fall into the same category, i.e. possess a fixed hierarchy of authority and status. In the following, NSSs cannot be distinguished according to Hughes’s typology. The application of Blau and Scott’s typology to this thesis again fails, for reasons similar to those of Hughes and Parsons as NSSs fall into the same categories. An additional problem occurs in relation to Blau and Scott’s typology: the NSSs fit three instead of one type. In detail, the ‘managers’ of the NSSs, i.e. the respective governments, profit from them in that they are the main users of the statistics that the NSSs produce. Furthermore, the general public benefits from the
NSSs in that they make use of the statistics produced by the NSSs. These users can also be in regular contact with the NSSs through workshops and user committees.

This also means that the second criterion for distinction of Parsons’ typology does not further this thesis. Statistical institutions receive the majority of their funding from the government, which grants them a certain degree of independence from user satisfaction of users outside the government. Social relations between the NSSs and the general public are thus of limited importance. This is subject to change. All kinds of statistics users are involved in the statistical process through user groups and workshops. In addition, the government as such is a main user of official statistics. In the following, social relations between the statistical institutions and the government are key. This further hampers a distinction, and the determination of explanatory factors for migration statistics harmonisation.

As a consequence, another way for discerning NSSs has to be found. Organisational structure, particularly the level of decentralisation, is such a criterion. In line with Egeberg’s and Hammond’s elaborations, organisational structure as such, and centralisation and decentralisation respectively gained scholarly attention. In particular, the impact of the organisational structures, their impact on policy-making, and the organisational ability to deal with tasks, were of interest. In that way, organisational factors could explain differences and similarities between migration statistics harmonisation in the UK and the Netherlands. The following paragraphs elaborate on the indicators for centralised NSSs and register-based national statistical strategies.

There are several understandings of what constitutes centralisation and decentralisation. In general, Charles Glisson and Patricia Martin explain that “[c]entralization refers to the degree to which the authority and decision making power in the organisation is concentrated versus dispersed”, (Glisson & Martin, 1980, p. 22 citing J. Price, 1972, n.p.). In this understanding, the centralisation of power can take place at any level of the organisation. Richard Butler, however, defines centralisation as “[t]he degree to which the authority to make decisions is located at the top of the management hierarchy” (Butler, 1992, p. 78).

Regarding decentralisation, Fumihiko Saito defines decentralisation as a “process through which central government transfers various forms of authority and functions to subnational governments for timely adaptation to locally specific

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6 Statistics Sweden is an exception in that it mainly relies on its own revenue.
conditions.” (Saito, 2011, p. 491). Saito’s understanding of decentralisation is markedly geared towards a vertical, i.e. national - subnational - division of labour. Yet decentralisation can also take place horizontally, for instance between government departments. In addition, Saito’s elaborations are directed at the decentralisation of a special type of ‘organisations’, i.e. governments. While NSSs are part of governments, Saito links decentralisation to key goals of governments such as economic growth, conflict mitigation, nurturing civic values and social capital, and, in contrast to this study’s focus, migration statistics harmonisation (Saito, 2011, p. 485). This is why this thesis turns to Peter M. Blau and Richard M. Schoenherr, who address horizontal as well as vertical decentralisation. The authors list the four indicators for decentralisation as

“(1) delegation of personnel authority within the headquarters, (2) delegation of budget responsibilities within the headquarters, (3) the influence the heads of divisions at the headquarters exercise over major structural changes in their divisions, and (4) delegation of responsibilities to managers of local offices” (Blau & Schoenherr 1971, p. 113).

Paul ’t Hart, Alexander Kouzmin and Uriel Rosenthal stress that, in times of crisis, organisations tend to follow the path of centralisation, not decentralisation (’t Hart et al., 1993, n.p.). While EU demands in relation to migration statistics harmonisation do not qualify for a crisis in ’t Hart, Kouzmin and Rosenthal’s understanding, i.e. “severe threat, time pressure, and high uncertainty” - this highlights that centralisation is beneficial to efficiency (’t Hart et al., 1993, n.p.). Glisson and Martin relate centralisation to an increase in efficiency and productivity, which also highlights the advantages of centralisation over decentralisation (Glisson & Martin, 1980, p. 23). This understanding of decentralisation is mirrored in the UN definition of the decentralisation of NSSs. Statisticians themselves, as well as international statistical organisations, differentiate between decentralised and centralised NSSs.

This is reflected in Willem de Vries’ statement on the centralisation of NSSs in the context of the UN SD: “Obviously, coordination is easier to achieve in countries with a centralised statistical system […] than in countries where official statistics are
highly decentralised [...] or relatively decentralised” (de Vries, n.d.a.). In a presentation to the UN SD, de Vries elaborates “[p]ure forms of ‘central’ and ‘decentral’ are relatively rare, but it is widely believed that any form of decentralisation implies certain negative efficiency effects.” (de Vries, n.d.b., quotation marks in the original).

Following this, this thesis expects the centralisation of NSSs to benefit migration statistics harmonisation. According to Günter Kopsch, an official of the German federal statistical institute, one could potentially distinguish between functional and regional centralisation. Statistical systems are regarded as centralised if official statistics are the task of a coordinating statistical office. They are considered to be functionally decentralised if statistical services are part of Government departments. As the term suggests, regionally decentralised systems involve statistical offices in their regions (Kopsch, 2002, p. 2).

This is, however, challenged by the United Nations (UN) Handbook of Statistical Organization. According to the latter, statistical systems are regarded as centralised if official statistics are the task of a central statistical office, however “[c]entralization can include out-posting of staff to other departments or the delegation of certain functions to geographically separate units, which, however, remain subordinate to the central authority” (United Nations, 2003, p. 13). This thesis chose the UN definition, because Kopsch’s is made from a markedly federal, perspective, and suffers from the following shortcomings: all the NSSs of the EU have a statistical office. Yet not all of them can be regarded as centralised, as some of them employ statistical units in Government Departments. NSSs cannot simply be classified as centralised or decentralised, but as rather centralised or rather decentralised. Put differently, the centralised and the decentralised NSSs are representing ideal types. Referring to the actual decision-making power of sub-units of statistical systems provides a handy benchmark in order to establish on which end of the centralised-decentralised continuum an NSS is situated. Moreover, the term “regionally decentralised” might be misleading, because there are no regional statistical offices, but federal state or county statistical offices, or offices based in the major cities of a member state. Because of the negative effects of decentralisation suggested in the literature, this thesis expects centralisation to further migration statistics harmonisation.

This thesis furthermore classifies NSSs on the basis of the sources informing their statistics. They therefore range between being register-based systems on the one hand, and survey-based systems on the other. Yet all systems incorporate elements of
both, with one or more elements prevailing. In the mid-1970s, the Danish statistical institute started a move towards “a comprehensive system of personal statistics based on data from administrative registers” (Eurostat & Statistics Denmark, 1995, p. 14 Corrigendum). In the case that it was able to carry out the 1981 population and housing census fully without any additional surveys, the strategy would be regarded a success. This paper follows the Danish example and regards a statistical system as register-based if it has a basic population register, and conducts its decennial census mainly by referring to existing administrative or statistical registers, with no or only limited use of surveys (Eurostat & Statistics Denmark, 1995, p. 14 Corrigendum). This selection criterion is not without problems. The additional requirement of a largely register-based population and housing census leaves countries such as Germany - which possess a basic population register – in one of the cells demarcating a non-register-based system (Table 1.3). Statistics Germany refers to its 2011 census-round as register-based. Yet it does also conduct surveys in this context which leads to its categorisation as a decentralised system, and not a register-based one. Statistics Slovakia itself does not provide any information on whether its 2011 census-round is register-based or not. However, Statistics Slovenia lists only the NSSs of Austria, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Slovenia, Belgium and Sweden as register-based (Statistics Slovenia, 2010). The combination of these criteria leaves us with the typology of NSSs, as presented in Figure 1.1.

A United Nations publication on register-based statistics suggests that more and more countries “are considering the possibility of producing statistics based on administrative registers” (United Nations, 2007, v). A theory directly related to this study’s focus on the statistical sphere is that of statistical registers. Anders and Britt Wallgren suggest the existence of statistical register theory. They argue that this theory became necessary because of the increasing importance of registers that are used for statistical purposes, caused by the need to reduce costs, and in the face of increasing non-response (Wallgren & Wallgren, 2007, p. ix). Statistical registers are particularly an attribute of the Nordic NSSs, but due to the need for cost-reduction being widely spread, other NSSs increasingly refer to register-based statistics as well.

Moreover, Rolf Verhoef and Dirk van de Kaa highlight the advantages of a register-based census, such as the ability to re-use register data for other purposes, and the reduced financial and response-burden (Verhoef & van de Kaa, 1987, p. 639). While Philip Redfern stresses that the advantages of a register-based population census also
depend on the quality of the registers and data availability, he agrees with Wallgren and Wallgren, as well as Verhoef and van de Kaa, that register-based censuses are less cost-intensive and put less response-burden on the public (Redfern, 1986, p. 12). Because of the strengths of register-based statistical system as well as the weaknesses of mainly survey-based statistical systems, this thesis expects register-based NSSs to fare better in migration statistics harmonisation than NSSs that are not register-based.

Based on this section, this thesis hypothesis firstly that decentralisation of the NSS sets impediments for migration statistics harmonisation. This is because of the increased efforts that have to be put into co-operation and communication between the parts of the NSS working towards the same goal, i.e. migration statistics harmonisation. Second, this thesis expects register-based NSSs to fare better in migration statistics harmonisation than those NSSs not based on registers. This is, because register-based statistics theory argues that register-based systems are more cost-effective, and poses less of a response-burden on participants than survey-participants.

### 2.3 Policy Convergence

This section examines the concept of policy convergence concerning its use as dependent variable and the explanatory variables connected with it. Policy convergence literature serves to frame the dependent variable, migration statistics harmonisation, and supplies explanatory factors for it. With regard to existing theory, the question of how EU and national actors strive towards migration statistics harmonisation in the EU is mirrored in policy convergence: policy convergence and migration statistics harmonisation are both aimed at an increase in similarity across geographical entities such as states. Convergence can be defined as “the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and performances” (Kerr, 1983, p. 3 cited in Bennett, 1991, p. 215; see also Drezner, 2001, p. 53). This definition referring to the convergence of societies was later specified by Christoph Knill for the convergence of policies, which suits the focus of this thesis on migration statistics harmonisation better than Clark Kerr’s focus on societies. Knill defined policy convergence as

“any increase in the similarity between one or more characteristics of a certain policy
(e.g. policy objectives, policy instruments, policy settings) across a given set of political jurisdictions (supranational institutions, states, regions, local authorities) over a given period of time. Policy convergence thus describes the end result of a process of policy change over time towards some common point, regardless of the causal processes” (Knill, 2005, p. 768).

There are other differences to be noted between these definitions. On the one hand, Knill is more open about the dimensions of policy convergence and provides only the examples of policy objectives, policy instruments, and policy settings. On the other hand, Knill’s definition is clearer regarding the question of where policy convergence can take place. By referring to policy convergence as happening across a set of political jurisdictions, he stresses that the concept needs to be addressed in the context of at least two entities. In addition to this, Knill highlights the character of the concept as relating to a process that comes about over time. Knill’s definition implies both a temporal and a geographical aspect, and therefore sharpens the concept. Kerr’s definition does not address this clearly. Given that this thesis is aimed at answering the question of how EU and domestic actors overcome problems of comparability in migration statistics, this is another reason why Knill’s definition suits the project at hand better than that of Kerr.

The concept of policy convergence is relevant for this thesis because of the following reasons: both migration statistics harmonisation in the EU and policy convergence relate to a process, and are thus taking place over time. As Chapter Five elaborates, the harmonisation of migration statistics in the EU gained momentum from the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 until the introduction of Regulation 862/2007/EC in 2007. Both, migration statistics harmonisation and policy convergence, occur across political jurisdictions: this project examines migration statistics harmonisation in the EU, particularly in the Netherlands and the UK. Most importantly, however, migration statistics harmonisation and policy convergence both focus on an increase in similarity.

2.3.1 Explanatory Variables for Policy Convergence

Policy convergence supplies explanatory as well as dependent variables. This section elaborates on which explanatory variables for policy convergence this thesis uses. This thesis agrees with Katharina Holzinger and Christoph Knill in the following
aspect. It contends that its focus on policy outcomes instead of policy outputs necessitates the inclusion of other explanatory variables than those normally related to policy convergence in its theoretical framework (Holzinger & Knill, 2005, pp. 779-786; also see Section 2.3.2 on policy convergence as dependent variable regarding this argument). Examples for explanatory variables and mechanisms for policy convergence are: institutional membership, international harmonisation, transnational communication, and regulatory competition (Liefferink & Jordan, 2002, p. 1; Busch & Jörgens, 2005, pp. 863-867; Holzinger & Knill, 2005, pp. 779-786; Knill & Tosun, 2009, pp. 875-878). This thesis concentrates on explanatory variables related to supranational harmonisation, and therefore excludes the convergence mechanisms transnational communication and regulatory competition from its framework. It does so, because this thesis is interested in migration statistics harmonisation in the EU on the basis of EU incentives. Therefore, one can focus on the causal mechanism of supranational harmonisation, and flesh out the theoretical framework with explanatory variables traditionally related to the transfer of legal instruments from EU-level to domestic level, such as compliance theory, as indicated in the following section. This thesis argues, however, that institutional membership, or adapted to an institution, that it presides over members, is part of international harmonisation, especially in the case of the EU. It moreover posits that it is necessary to first evaluate an institution’s capacity to issue hard law and enforce this, as well as to assess whether it is able to introduce these legal instruments for at least the majority of its members. If an institution is able to issue documents of different legal standings, it is necessary to repeat this exercise for the harmonisation incentives themselves. In addition, the documents might target specific addressees and would therefore hardly allow for harmonisation across the EU member states.

As a consequence, this thesis draws on Holzinger and Knill regarding (supranational) causal factors for policy convergence. Holzinger and Knill hypothesise that the obligatory potential of international and EU requirements, and the membership of countries in an international organisation or the EU, are positively related to policy convergence (Holzinger & Knill, 2008, pp. 55-56). Heichel et al. distinguish between supranational law, international hard law, and international soft law (Heichel et al., 2008, pp. 87-89). According to the authors, supranational law has the highest obligatory potential, international hard law a medium one, and international soft law the least obligatory potential. They suggest that the higher the obligatory potential of law, the
more likely policy convergence will be. Heichel et al. name a second indicator for the obligatory potential. They argue the power of institutions to enforce the legal acts has a positive impact on policy convergence. Heichel et al. distinguish between the strictest monitoring by courts, the second strictest monitoring by international institutions, the third strictest monitoring by international regimes, and the fourth strictest monitoring by diplomacy (Heichel et al., 2008, pp. 87-89). If EU requirements are framed by formal legal instruments, they can be enforced firstly by the Commission and secondly by the ECJ, potentially leading to financial sanctions, which the member states are thought to seek to avoid (infringement procedure, Articles 258 to 260 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU).

In addition, they argue that a high level of detail furthers policy convergence, since this leaves member states with less leeway for “selecting appropriate instruments to comply with international policy objectives” (Holzinger & Knill, 2008, p. 52). Michael Kaeding similarly posits that a high degree of detail furthers the legal translation of EU incentives to the domestic level, because this closes off alternative avenues of translation, which in turn makes it easier for domestic actors to “settle an agreement on time” (Kaeding, 2008, pp. 121-122). The level of detail also links to Robert Kagan’s explanatory factors for enforcement styles. He suggests that the legal design and the potential for enforcing a law have an impact on the enforcement style (Kagan, 1989, pp. 96-100). Moreover, if the supranational level sets incentives for harmonisation of migration statistics, compliance with these incentives leads to policy convergence. This is why this thesis refers to explanatory variables set out in compliance literature. In their study on farmers’ compliance in the case of agro-environmental regulation in Denmark, Søren Winter and Peter May argue that normative and social motivations impact on the farmers’ compliance with those regulations (Winter & May, 2001, pp. 688-689). They find that compliance is high if the sense of duty is high, and reckon compliance to be high if the enforcement style is formal (Winter & May, 2001, pp. 678-679). Winter and May further assume that the regulated entities need to feature a high capacity in order to comply, and that these regulated entities need to know the rules in order to comply (Winter & May, 2001, pp. 679-680). This section argues that the nature of the enforcement style is already part of the theoretical framework, by including the obligatory potential of an EU incentive in the framework. The obligatory potential consists of possibilities for enforcement as well as the nature of the incentive. Both of these indicators comprise rankings for the
incentive from formal to informal ones. Yet this thesis firstly takes from Winter and May’s study that a strong sense of duty to comply should further the compliance of the regulated entities - in the thesis the member states - with EU migration statistics harmonisation incentives. Secondly, it expects the NSSs to have high capacity, and thirdly that knowledge of requirements to comply with these incentives is positively related to the NSSs’ compliance.

Gerda Falkner, Oliver Treib and Miriam Hartlapp similarly hypothesise on which factors affect domestic compliance with EU law. They theorise that domestic opposition to EU law, and national inability to comply with it, are linked to non-compliance with EU law (Falkner, Treib & Hartlapp, 2005, p. 13). The former, they explain, may stem from national reservations about a specific EU demand, whereas the latter could originate from political or administrative crises (Falkner, Treib & Hartlapp, 2005, p. 13). Ellen Mastenbroek and Mendeltje van Keulen identify domestic opposition to EU incentives as playing a role for member states’ compliance with two environmentally focused EU directives (Mastenbroek & van Keulen, 2006, pp. 24; 38). Mastenbroek and van Keulen also link domestic opposition to Markus Haverland’s (Haverland, 2000, p. 100) article which posits that institutional veto points may hinder domestic compliance with EU law. They correctly note that Haverland concentrates on the institutional set-up of a member state, rather than the policy content (Haverland, 2006, p. 24). This thesis replicates Haverland’s focus on the institutional set-up of a member state as an explanatory factor for member state compliance in Section 2.5 on centralised and decentralised NSSs.

In addition, Falkner, Treib, and Hartlapp find that issue linkage impacts negatively on domestic compliance with EU law (Falkner, Treib & Hartlapp, 2005, p. 314). Issue linkage denotes the “simultaneous discussion of two or more issues for joint settlement” (Poast, 2012, p. 278) in intergovernmental negotiations or the joint inclusion of two or more policy issues in one legal act. This thesis expects issue linkage to hamper migration statistics harmonisation, because it assumes the former to cause coordination problems or “informational barriers”, which can lead to negotiating parties withdrawing their signature because of uncertainties regarding the commitment of the other parties involved for the actors involved (Weber & Wiesmeth, 1991, p. 255). In addition, the inclusion of several issue areas makes migration statistics harmonisation less likely since states may have different views of which areas to focus on, or because they may get entwined with current domestic reform processes (Berglund, 2009, p. 18).
Falkner, Hartlapp, and Treib thus assume that issue linkage in the EU incentive has a negative effect on domestic adaptation to the incentive (Falkner, Treib & Hartlapp, 2005, p. 314). Translated into the research interest at hand, this means that if an EU incentive covers more than one issue, the expectation is that this hampers migration statistics harmonisation. This is due to problems in coordination or informational barriers, which can potentially lead to a decrease in commitment to translate the EU impulse into the national context or withdrawing their signature to do so entirely. Issue linkage could thus lead to member states withdrawing from their commitment to transfer an EU impulse for migration statistics harmonisation domestically. This could then start a domino-effect with more member states withdrawing, because harmonisation only makes sense if at least the majority of if not all member states follow up what has been agreed supranationally. Harmonisation at EU level cannot be achieved by a single member state only. This thesis takes on all three factors, and expects them to hamper migration statistics harmonisation at the national level. Falkner, Treib, and Hartlapp’s study mirrors Winter and May’s theoretical framework with regard to the capacity to comply. They also assume that regulated entities need to be able to comply, in order to comply (Winter & May, 2001, pp. 679-680).

Moreover, Adriaan Schout, Andrew Jordan, and Michelle Twena assume that administrative incapacity impedes actors’ ability to take on new tasks (Schout et al., 2010, pp. 161-164). In the present case, the new task that NSSs have to take on in response of EU incentives, is migration statistics harmonisation. Schout, Jordan, and Twena evaluate the administrative capacity to cope with new tasks. According to Schout, Jordan, and Twena, administrative capacity comprises the ability to issue hierarchical and horizontal instruments, bureaucratic rules, staff training, and the ability to specify the tasks that need to be incorporated at national level by the administration (Schout et al., 2010, pp. 161-164).

Similar, but closer to the topic of migration statistics harmonisation, is the ESS’s understanding of administrative capacity of NSSs (Eurostat, 2008, pp. 6-23). The peer reviewers of the ESS investigate whether the following aspects are fulfilled within the national constituents of the ESS, the NSSs: their professional independence from political influence, whether they have a clear mandate for data collection, and whether they have adequate resources available in order to produce high quality official statistics. Furthermore, the reviewers evaluate whether the NSS is committed to quality, whether the NSS can provide statistical confidentiality, whether it is impartial and
objective in its statistics production, and whether the statistics it produces are well accessible and clear so that statistics users can easily understand the qualitative information - seven different aspects in total. What is similar about the two conceptualisations of administrative capacity of Schout, Jordan, and Twena and Eurostat is that well-trained staff can be regarded as a resource. Another important similarity is that independence from political influence, and having a clear mandate, constitute hierarchical rules. Yet this thesis refers to the Eurostat’s conceptualisation, because it is tailor-made for its focus on migration statistics harmonisation, which is put into place by statistical systems. In summary, policy convergence supplies administrative capacity, the obligatory potential, the role of an institution in its institutional environment, the level of detail of an EU incentive, the sense of duty, and the level of knowledge as explanatory factors for migration statistics harmonisation.

2.3.2 Policy Convergence as Dependent Variable

Understandings of policy convergence dimensions largely coincide. Whereas David Dolowitz and David Marsh suggest that policy convergence comprises a wealth of dimensions, policy goals, content, instruments, structure and policy concepts, attitudes, ideas, administrative structures and techniques (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, p. 350), more recent literature provides a more succinct understanding of dimensions. Bennett names the policy content, the policy style, the policy goals, the policy outcomes, and the policy instruments as dimensions of policy convergence without giving further thought to measurement (Bennett, 2001, p. 218).

Duncan Liefferink and Andrew Jordan examine the policy content dimension, which they conceptualise as “goals, instruments, settings of those instruments” (Liefferink & Jordan, 2002, pp. 5-7). Similarly, Holzinger and Knill propose to examine policy outputs, i.e. the “policies adopted by a government” rather than policy outcomes, “the actual effects of a policy in terms of goal achievement”, because the latter also underlie other variables (Holzinger & Knill, 2005, p. 776; 2008, p. 31). Contrary to Holzinger and Knill’s argument that policy outputs “are what count[s]”, this thesis argues that policy outcomes constitute the proper point of interest, since policy outputs are merely plans on paper. Therefore, if one is interested in how far policies become increasingly similar to each other, one should concentrate on policy outcomes. This thesis agrees with Knill, however, in view of the dimensions of policy convergence as a
dependent variable. It follows this author and examines whether, and if so how, policy goals, policy instruments, and their settings becoming increasingly similar over time (Knill, 2005, p. 768).

Pierre Lascoumes and Patrick Le Galès define a policy instrument as “a device that is both technical and social, that organizes specific social relations between the state and those it is addressed to, according to the representations and meanings it carries.” (Lacoumes & Le Galès, 2007, p. 4). Migration statistics harmonisation in the European Union encompasses conventional policy instruments such as “tokens of authority” and new ones such as networks (Hood, 1983, p. 54). As such, this thesis draws on Adriaan Schout, Andrew Jordan, and Michelle Twena’s strategy to evaluate old and new instruments together (Schout et al., 2010, pp. 161-165). New modes of governance, i.e. “public-policy-making that includes private actors and/or occurs outside the formal legislative arena” are at play alongside the more old-fashioned mode that takes place through the introduction of Regulation 862/2007/EC in migration statistics harmonisation (Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2011, p. 54).

Going beyond the analysis of policy instruments, Lascoumes and Le Galès reflect on the question what policy instruments can tell us about the mode of governance. The task that is to be integrated in the scope of duties of Eurostat and the NSIs is migration statistics harmonisation. Both - new and old policy instruments - are used in the area of migration statistics harmonisation. The choice of instruments, or as Lascoumes and Le Galès call it, the “public policy instrumentation” of policy-making, feeds into the research question of this thesis by answering how EU and national actors go about migration statistics harmonisation (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2007, p. 4; see also Le Galès, 2011, p. 152). Christoph Knill forms two ideal types of administrative styles, the mediating and the intervening type (Knill, 2001, p. 40). The intervening ideal type is “characterised by deductive, substantive, hierarchical and detailed patterns of regulatory intervention. Administrative interest intermediation reveals legalistic, adversarial, formal and closed interactions, with access to regulatory process being restricted to those societal actors directly affected and addressed by administrative intervention” (Knill, 2001, p. 40).
On the contrary, the “mediating ideal type of intervention, by contrast, is characterised by more inductive, procedural, non-hierarchical and flexible patterns, allowing for a large degree of administrative discretion in defining regulatory requirements - which is done in the light of case-specific peculiarities. Administrative interest intermediation is based on pragmatic, consensual and informal interactions between administrative and regulated societal actors. Le Galès’ typology is finer grained in that it does not look for the superordinate administrative style, but single policy instruments, which can equally be divided in two groups or as pertaining to administrative styles.

Table 2.2. Policy Instruments and related Policy Styles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Instrument</th>
<th>Policy Style</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative &amp; regulatory</td>
<td>Intervening/conventional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic &amp; fiscal</td>
<td>Intervening/conventional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement- &amp; incentive-based</td>
<td>Mediating/new</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information- &amp; communication-based</td>
<td>Mediating/new</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>De facto</em> and <em>de jure</em> standards/best practices</td>
<td>Mediating/new</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Charlotte Halpern examines the policy instrument mix in the area of EU environmental policy (Halpern, 2010, p. 40). In agreement with Kassim and Le Galès, Le Galès, and Schout, Jordan and Twena, Halpern finds that EU policy makers employ a mix of conventional and new policy instruments (Kassim & Le Galès, 2010: 18; Le Galès, 2011, p. 153; Schout, Jordan & Twena, 2010, p. 157; Halpern, 2010, p. 54). She finds that while there is indeed evidence for the use of new policy instruments, they are joined with conventional policy instruments. Halpern further suggests that the inventiveness of EU policy makers regarding the formation of new policy instruments is overstated. Often, new policy instruments are imported from the EU member states or international organisations (Halpern, 2010, p. 40) in the area of EU environmental policy. Similarly, Börzel stipulates that governance in the EU takes place in the shadow of hierarchy, with supranational institutions holding more power than private actors, or
excluding them completely (Börzel, 2010, p. 192). Moreover, Kassim and Le Galès propose that the “there is an essential unpredictability about the form that any instrument eventually assumes” (Kassim & Le Galès, 2010, p. 11). At the first glance, this thesis could also include the ‘politics of migration’. However, the following reasons speak against such a move. The first reason for the exclusion of the political dimension of migration as an independent variable is well illustrated by a Minister’s statement in 2010. In the UK, the then Minister of State for Immigration Damian Green, stated that he would be accused of fiddling with the numbers if a country would change them unilaterally. The possibility to change what a member state counts as a migrant is thus not only in the hands of the respective Government, but also depends on the decisions taken at EU level - as it will be shown throughout this thesis - since the coming into force of Regulation 862/2007/EC on the harmonisation of migration statistics in the EU in 2009. The perception of migration as a positive or a negative factor for the member state - be it by politicians or the opinion of the general public - must thus be excluded as an explanatory factor for migration statistics harmonisation. Similarly, the definition of a migrant utilised in the Regulation is based on the one recommended by the UN, which further widens the scope of addressees. Moreover, political parties from the centre-right as well as centre left political parties were in power for instance in the Netherlands and in the UK when the migration statistics harmonisation measures of the EMN and Regulation 862/2007/EC came into force. Neither of them prevented the harmonisation of migration statistics. One can deduct from this comparative point of view that it is unlikely for the political orientation of the leading party in a member state to impact on migration statistics harmonisation. Another approach to this first reason for the exclusion of the politics of migration from the research design of this thesis which arises at national level is that the harmonisation of migration statistics is not influenced by whether referenda on a supranational Treaty are taking place. On the contrary, in 2005, when the Dutch and the French held such referenda on the European Constitution, these did not prevent migration statistics harmonisation at EU level.

Second, one can exclude the ‘political need’ for migration statistics harmonisation as a reason to cause migration statistics harmonisation systematically and across member states as this need had already occurred prior to the attempts analysed in the course of this thesis. Namely, earlier international attempts to harmonise migration statistics have taken place as elaborated in Chapter One. Yet these attempts were of limited success. In a similar vain, events such as the Yugoslav Wars between 1991 and
2001 which initiated a high influx of refugees to EU member states. According to a
needs-based line of argumentation, this should have brought with it the harmonisation
of migration statistics across the member states. Approaching the argument the other
way round, there have been initiatives to harmonise migration statistics at international
level which were not related to a specifically pinned down need for migration statistics
harmonisation such as by the International Statistical Institute in 1891, and again in
1924 (Kraly & Gnanasekran, 1987, p. 969). On the basis of this, this thesis knowingly
excludes the political dimension, and particularly the politics of migration as an
explanatory factor for migration statistics harmonisation in the EU.

Furthermore, Holzinger and Knill distinguish between the degree of
convergence, i.e. the “similarity of policy outputs” (Holzinger & Knill, 2005, p. 776),
and further the direction of convergence, i.e. “upward or downward shift of the mean
from time t1 to t2” (Holzinger & Knill, 2005, p. 776), and the scope of convergence, i.e.
how many countries are affected (Holzinger & Knill, 2005, p. 778). The dimensions of
policy convergence, along with their measurements, ask for policy outputs that can be
quantified and scaled. This is easy to achieve in, for example, the well-researched area
of environmental policy, which is governed by a multiplicity of standards, such as an
allowed maximum emissions level for cars. These measurements, particularly the
direction and the scope of policy convergence however, do not easily lend themselves to
the harmonisation of migration statistics. As elaborated in the introduction of Chapter
One, input-harmonisation of statistics is conducted through a standardisation of
concepts and their definitions, and in some cases, the methods of data collection.
Output-harmonisation occurs through merging statistics in a standardised format.
Definitions, methods, formats, related to migration statistics harmonisation cannot be
brought into order - there is no simple answer to the question of which of the methods,
concepts, and definitions is better than the others in order to determine the direction of
policy convergence. There is no scale that says that this or that definition or method is
preferable to any other. Rather, methods, concepts, and definitions are nominal
characteristics.

In addition, both the direction of policy convergence and the scope of policy
convergence necessitate the knowledge of all, or at least a large number of, the countries
in the entire case population. In the case at hand, this would be 27 EU member states.
Otherwise, determining the mean of a policy aspect across countries is meaningless.
This, however, exceeds the scope of this thesis, which follows a qualitative research
strategy. Without this knowledge, this benchmark, i.e. the mean, cannot be established.

In the following, an alternative measure concerning the direction of policy convergence has to be found. This alternative is delta-convergence. Stephan Heichel, Jessica Pape and Thomas Sommerer elaborate on the types of policy convergence (Heichel et al., 2005, pp. 831-834). Combinations of the following types are not unusual:

- sigma-convergence denotes the process of domestic policies becoming more similar to each other
- beta-convergence means that a country’s policy is catching up with that of another
- gamma-convergence refers to the stability of country rankings in a specify policy area
- delta-convergence occurs if national policies become increasingly similar to a model prescribed by a superordinate level

While sigma-, beta-, and delta-convergence suit the harmonisation of migration statistics in the EU particularly well, gamma-convergence rests on the assumption that there are country rankings regarding a particular policy field. Regarding the direction of convergence, it would mean that the standards were raised. Should the analysed countries have applied the standards before the harmonisation process set in, and later regressed to not applying them, it would signify that the standards were lowered. That the policy outputs are nominal in nature affects the measurement of the scope of policy convergence in migration statistics harmonisation. An analysis of all the 27 member states, initially targeted by Regulation 862/2007/EC on migration statistics harmonisation in the EU, would go beyond the possibilities of this thesis, because of temporal and financial restrictions.

For that reason, this thesis examines the degree and the direction of policy convergence, but not its scope. Concerning the direction and scope of policy convergence, migration statistics harmonisation is similar to higher education policy regarding the nominal nature of policy characteristics. Torben Heinze and Christoph Knill devise a blueprint for researching policy convergence in higher education policy, following a qualitative research strategy given the “mostly qualitative data” of that
policy field (Heinze & Knill, 2008, p. 506). Delta-convergence can be examined if one reinterprets the direction of policy convergence, and does not use the mean as benchmark, but rather a policy model introduced by a superordinate level. In conclusion, in addition to these types, policy convergence is the first concept to frame migration statistics harmonisation as in policy goals, policy instruments, and policy instrument settings becoming more similar over time, for the reasons outlined in Section 2.5.

### 2.4 Europeanisation

The second concept relevant for this thesis on the dependent variable is that of Europeanisation. The main research question guiding this thesis, that is how domestic and EU actors harmonise migration statistics, implies that there are two levels of actors involved in EU statistics harmonisation: the domestic and EU levels. The very nature of the ESS - with Eurostat at the helm and the NSSs at national level - implies that there are two levels of importance for this study. The Europeanisation concept fits the research question well in this regard: it encompasses both the EU and the national level. In addition, the Europeanisation concept, defined as domestic adaptation to European regional integration, suits this project well as the impetus for harmonisation in the EU came from the EU level, and was implemented at the national level by the NSSs.

Europeanisation defined as the impact of the supranational level on the national level is, however, not the only understanding of the concept. There are three major interpretations of, or as Claudio Radaelli frames them, “approaches” to, Europeanisation (Radaelli, 2004, Figure 1). Table 2.3 summarises these. Sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.3 provide more detail on the approaches, and elaborate on why this thesis choses for bottom-up-down Europeanisation.
Table 2.3. The Three Approaches to Europeanisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Direction of Research</th>
<th>Involved Levels</th>
<th>Vocabulary</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vertical; EU to domestic (first wave)</td>
<td>EU &amp; domestic</td>
<td>“Top-down”; “downloading”</td>
<td>Primarily politics, policies, and polities, but also “ways of doing things”, beliefs, norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical; domestic to EU to domestic (second wave)</td>
<td>EU &amp; domestic (contested)</td>
<td>“bottom-up-down”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal; domestic to domestic (with the EU providing an arena for the interplay)</td>
<td>EU &amp; domestic (contested)</td>
<td>“cross-loading”</td>
<td>Ideas, norms, “ways of doing things”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical; domestic to EU</td>
<td>EU &amp; domestic</td>
<td>“bottom-up”; “uploading”</td>
<td>Primarily supranational politics, supranational policies, and supranational polities, but also “ways of doing things”, beliefs, norms at supranational level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Börzel & Risse, 2000; Figure 1; Howell, 2004, p. 5; Radaelli, 2004, Box 1; p. 4; Major & Pomorska, 2005, pp. 1-2; Vink & Graziano, 2008, pp. 9-10.

Peter Mair stated in 2004 that “Europeanisation is a fashionable and often-employed concept within the field of European Studies” (Mair, 2004, p. 337). Similarly, Johan Olsen examines the different faces of Europeanisation - and finds a wealth of them. Given this multitude of understandings of Europeanisation, Olsen argues that the differences in approaching Europeanisation do not necessarily turn out to be problematic, as long as the respective author is explicit about how Europeanisation is conceptualised (Olsen, 2002, p. 922). Following Olsen’s implicit advice to look closer at the multitude of conceptualisations of Europeanisation, this section gives an overview of the three predominant research agendas. Therefore, it does not do justice to the concept to solely look at one of the three approaches. Rather a threefold examination of the concept is necessary, in order to determine whether it is suited to feed into an answer to the research question of this thesis, and if so, in the form of which approach. This thesis the bottom-up-down approach, since it captures EU and domestic level developments as is necessary for the examination of migration statistics harmonisation.
Indeed, following for instance Kerry Howell’s elaborations on different conceptualisations of Europeanisation, Europeanisation can be approached in three distinctive ways. From this perspective, the debate among scholars related to this concept centres on the question whether Europeanisation is i) mainly directed from the EU to the domestic level, ii) from member state to another member state, iii) from national to EU level. The respective vocabulary of the three approaches to the concept refers to i) a “bottom-up-down” Europeanisation or a “downloading” process, ii) a “horizontal” or “cross-loading” process, or iii) a “bottom-up” or “uploading” process (Howell, 2004, p. 5). The top-down approach designates the translation of policies or politics originating at EU level to the domestic level. The second, horizontal, approach refers to an interaction between member states of the European Union either under its auspices, or alternatively without its involvement. Lastly, the third, bottom-up, approach relates to member state policies or politics being transferred to the EU level.

2.4.1 The First Approach to Europeanisation - A Bottom-Up-Down Process

According to Claudio Radaelli, the first wave of Europeanisation studies concentrated on a purely top-down direction of research (2004, p. 4). It was theorised that pressure from the EU level, mediated through intervening variables, led to reactions at member state level. This understanding of Europeanisation is unable to grasp actions of member states and their impacts, for example during policy formulation. The second generation of Europeanisation studies mainly seeks to explain the impact of the EU on the national level, but includes actions of member states and their impacts at EU level. It thus follows a ‘bottom-up-down’ examination of events (Radaelli, 2004, p. 4; Dyson & Goetz, 2003, n.p. cited in Bache & Marshall, 2004, pp. 4-5; Vink & Graziano, 2008, p. 10; for a different perception of the ‘waves’ of Europeanisation studies, see Michelle Egan, 2012, xi-xiii). Departing from this perspective, Radaelli defines Europeanisation as follows:
“Europeanisation consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli, 2004, Box 1).

Ian Bache and Adam Marshall similarly argue that Europeanisation should be seen as downloading, i.e. “Europeanisation as the impact of the EU on its Member States”, is the primary road of research taken by the majority of Europeanisation scholars (Bache & Marshall, 2004, p. 13).

Second wave Europeanisation studies refer to what Maarten Vink and Paolo Graziano frame as the “domestic adaptation to European regional integration” (2008, p. 7). European regional integration designates the “formation of closer economic and/or political linkages among countries that are geographically near each other” (Vink & Graziano, 2008, pp. 6-7). In agreement with Radaelli, Vink and Graziano stress that “there is nothing necessarily ‘top-down’” about focusing on national adaptation to European integration (Vink & Graziano, 2008, pp. 9-10). Analysis of that kind is geared towards repercussions of something European on the national level. This means that one needs to take stock of the situation at national level prior to EU involvement. In the following, the actions taken by the EU are examined (see Chapter Four of this thesis). Lastly, the situation after those EU actions take effect at national level is compared to the domestic situation before EU involvement. Also Georg Menz suggests that analysis must go beyond a static and point-in-time view of the situation since the EU incentives came into force (Menz, 2010, p. 3). He is similarly discontent with the predominant route of Europeanisation research, with its focus on national adaptation to EU-level demands. His solution is to disregard the usual sequence, focusing exclusively on the EU requirement, followed by a domestic answer. Menz suggests that “Europeanization needs to be (re)considered as an often heavily embattled two-way process, spawning several institutional arenas” (Menz, 2010, p. 3). This thesis takes this criticism on board by following the bottom-up-down approach to Europeanisation.
2.4.2 The Second Approach to Europeanisation - A Horizontal Process

The second approach to Europeanisation refers to the adaptation of member states in view of cooperating with each other. Authors taking on this approach refer to “horizontal” Europeanisation, policy transfer or “cross-loading” (Howell, 2004, p. 5; Major & Pomorska, 2005, pp. 1-2; Mannin, 2010, p. 6). By cross-loading, Claudia Major and Karolina Pomorska mean “the exchange of ideas, norms and ‘ways of doing’ things between countries or other entities for which the EU sets the scene; thus change is not only ‘due’ to but takes place ‘within’ Europe” (Major & Pomorska, 2005, pp. 1-2). Kerry Howell contends that while “[h]orizontal policy transfer incorporates learning from, and assimilating other member state policies without EU involvement”, this comes close to over-stretching the concept of Europeanisation. Necessarily, he elaborates, Europeanisation requires involvement of the EU in one way or the other. Otherwise, the object of analysis does not fit with Europeanisation, but would rather be a mere policy-transfer between two states (Howell, 2004, p. 5). Seemingly disagreeing with Howell, Michael Mannin claims that horizontal Europeanisation is possible. He defines this kind of Europeanisation as interactions “between political actors across member states” (Mannin, 2010, p. 6). Yet, also he finds that this horizontal Europeanisation in the interactions amongst member states relies on an EU impetus, and thereby mirrors Howell’s assessment that the label Europeanisation necessarily involves the second, i.e. supranational level. Whereas the top-down and bottom-up processes clearly focus on developments that comprise two levels, i.e. the EU level and the domestic level, the level of EU involvement in this second approach to Europeanisation is less clear at the first glance.

Although authors use terms differently, in the end, one finds them on common ground. This section concludes that horizontal Europeanisation, i.e. Europeanisation of the member states’ interactions with each other, is possible, yet cannot be called Europeanisation if there is no involvement of the EU. This second approach to Europeanisation holds true for the case at hand. It feeds into the answer to the research question how EU and domestic actors harmonise migration statistics. An example of this would be if NSSs were to cooperate in harmonising their migration statistics under the auspices of Eurostat.

However, if one insists EU involvement to be necessary for cross-loading, it is questionable whether this second approach to Europeanisation merits the label of an approach at all, and suggests that it should be subsumed under the first approach. An
EU incentive causes change at domestic level in the form of member state cooperation. As a consequence, this thesis includes any EU member state cooperation in harmonising migration statistics under the remit of Eurostat, under the first approach. Hence it does not distinguish between the first and second approach to Europeanisation.

2.4.3 The Third Approach to Europeanisation - A Bottom-Up Process

The third approach to Europeanisation refers to the effect of something national on the supranational, i.e. EU level, and turns the purely ‘top-down’ approach on its head. Put differently, this means that something which has previously been the exclusive or predominantly been the responsibility of member states, moves to the EU level agenda. Studies following an exclusively bottom-up design, i.e. studies of adaptation at EU level to member states’ practices or structures, are scarce. Beyers and Trondal’s study of Belgian and Swedish polity structures and their impact on officials’ role perceptions in a supranational environment is a notable exception (Beyers & Trondal, 2003, p. 2). While Beyers and Trondal’s study represents a rare example of pure “bottom-up” Europeanisation, it does not relate to this research. This thesis is interested in how EU and domestic actors strive to overcome impediments to migration statistics comparability by harmonisation. Similar to Beyers and Trondal’s article, Albert Kraler contends that the “increased attention given to the improvement of statistical data-collection is directly linked to the Europeanization of migration policy” (Kraler, 2005, p. 4). In accordance with Kraler’s argument, which this Chapter interprets as an increase in importance of migration policy at EU level, Chapter Four initially focused on developments from the late 1980s onwards, and particularly on the years following the signature of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. Within this Treaty, developments towards a common EU migration policy gained in momentum as the policy area moved from the inter-governmentally governed third pillar, to the first, “Community” pillar that introduced a more supranational decision-making. The Treaty of Amsterdam also marks the incorporation of the Schengen *acquis* into the primary legislation framework. It became apparent, though, that concentrating on this period would be ignorant of migrant data requirements that initially served a different purpose.

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7 Since Kraler is interested in policy outcomes at EU level, this thesis argues that his use of the term Europeanisation is misplaced, since he refers to the effect of something national at EU level.
Migration statistics are just as well necessary for other policy areas, for instance, for security and policing policy, and for economic policy. An intuitive example for this is that of labour migration, which fuses both policy areas.

At first glance, Thomas Risse, James Caporaso and Maria Green Cowles also adopt a bottom-up perspective to Europeanisation. They define Europeanisation as “the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance”, which suggests the focus of analysis to be at EU level (Risse, et al., 2001, p. 3). Yet overall they are interested in the impact of integration “on the member states who created it” (Caporaso, 2008, p. 28). Therefore, this study contends that Risse, Caporaso and Green Cowles’ work follows an analysis in the tradition of the first approach to Europeanisation, i.e. it follows a top-down design. They suggest three steps of Europeanisation, which repeat themselves time and again (Caporaso, 2008, pp. 27-32, drawing Risse, et al., 2001). The first step is, similar to Vink and Graziano’s point of view, European integration. However, contrary to Vink and Graziano, to Risse, Caporaso and Green Cowles, European integration designates law-making by the Council of Ministers, European Parliament and the European Commission as well as implementation by the European Commission and judgments by the European Court of Justice (Vink & Graziano, 2008, pp. 7-8; Caporaso, 2008, p. 28). Thereby the latter ascribe the initial impulse to the EU level, and this thesis contends that they essentially belong to what the previous section termed the first generation of Europeanisation studies, in Table 2.3 above.

In addition, the foreclosure of influences from beyond the EU is artificial, and represents another reason why this thesis is disregarding Risse, Caporaso and Green Cowles’ approach to Europeanisation. This particular shortcoming becomes explicit in Chapter Three, which addresses international statistical institutions charged with migration statistics harmonisation as well as in the UK case study: international developments cannot be totally excluded from the analysis. Eurostat and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) cooperated in advancing common definitions, and the United Nations issued Recommendations on the harmonisation of migration statistics that also formed migration statistics harmonisation in the EU. Therefore this project argues that this model of Europeanisation is overcome, and Europeanisation research should follow Vink and Graziano’s perception of Europeanisation as being bottom-up-down.
Nevertheless, Risse, Caporaso and Green Cowles have inspired Europeanisation research to date (for instance, Börzel & Soyaltin, 2012). The contested goodness of fit presents the second step in Risse, Caporaso and Green Cowles’ understanding of Europeanisation. Section 2.4.4 looks into the goodness of fit in more detail. The third step to Europeanisation in this model is that of “mediating factors”, that can be “nearly every domestic structural condition that affects the impact of European integration”, which the authors claim to be of particular importance in the case of high adaptational pressure, i.e. in case of a grave misfit between the domestic and EU level (Caporaso, 2008, p. 30).

Europeanisation is the second concept to frame migration statistics harmonisation, since both address a process that takes place over time. Moreover, migration statistics harmonisation in the EU necessitates domestic adaptation because of the nature of the ESS which is spread across the supranational and the domestic level.

2.4.4 Explanatory Factors and Conditions for Europeanisation

This section focuses on the explanatory factors and conditions which are related to Europeanisation. The first condition for Europeanisation to be discussed is the ‘goodness of fit’. The goodness of fit emerged in relation to a study on legal implementation in the EU. In the following, it made its way into Europeanisation literature in general. Francesco Duina coined the goodness of fit in his article on legal implementation in the EU (Duina, 1997, p. 157). Different types of secondary law - i.e. mainly Directives, Regulations, Decisions, Opinions, and Recommendations - necessitate different measures of the member states in order to download these legislative acts into national policies, polities and politics. EU Directives are, as such, not directly applicable to the national level and require the formulation of national legislative acts in order to enter the domestic sphere (Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, 2012, Article 288). Francesco Duina anticipated on the one hand that if a Directive greatly challenges domestic institutions, its implementation is complicated. On the other hand, Duina believed that in case a Directive matches or strengthens the existing institutional arrangements, its implementation was successful (Duina, 1997, p. 157). In the language of Europeanisation scholars, a ‘good fit’ between domestic policies, polities or politics and EU demands, meant that the transposition of an EU Directive would take place smoothly. A ‘bad fit’ was hypothesised to lead to high pressures on the
domestic level to adapt to EU demands. In the following, the translation of EU into national law would be problem-ridden (for instance, Börzel, 1999, p. 575; Risse, Cowles & Caporaso, 2001, pp. 6-12; Caporaso, 2008, p. 27).

However, the goodness of fit has been proven to constitute neither a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for the transposition and/or implementation of Directives. The implementation of Directives can be smooth even if there is a high level of misfit between the EU and the national level, just as implementation can be burdensome in case of a good fit between EU demands and domestic realities (for instance arguing against the goodness of fit: Versluis, 2004, p. 9; Mastenbroek & Kaeding, 2006, p. 331; Knill & Lehmkuhl 1999, p. 11; Börzel & Soyaltin, 2012, p. 8 stick to using the goodness of fit as does Sabine Saurugger, 2014, p. 186). As such, this thesis argues that it is not sensible to make use of the goodness of fit exclusively to describe whether there is domestic adaptation. It can however be used as a preliminary test predict whether domestic adaptation is to be expected. It might well be that the assumption holds true in empirical studies. It proved useful in highlighting that there may well be domestic adaptation to EU demands despite a good fit between the levels. It also directs attention to a situation in which the national situation already tallies with EU requirements. In that case, it may be that no domestic adaptation takes place, but it is a situation of inertia if there is no retrenchment of the domestic level from its current situation due to EU incentives. This means that the goodness of fit should be included and tested in the context of this thesis as an indicator for whether one expects Europeanisation to take place. With regard to the operationalisation of the goodness of fit, this thesis follows Michael Kaeding and Ellen Mastenbroek as the fit between the national and the EU level, and the absence or existence of delays in translating the EU incentive into the national context (2006, pp. 333-334). In the event of a good fit, the presence of a delay means that the hypothesis did not hold true. Similarly, this thesis measures the score of its independent variables, depending on the number of factors showing positive results. If the majority of factors are positive, the score of the variable is high. If less than the majority are positive, the score of the variable is low.

Not all policy convergence and Europeanisation scholars refer to independent variables. Simon Bulmer and Burch go as far as arguing that “[i]t is difficult to try to conceive of the relationship in conventional, positivist social science terms i.e. with independent and dependent variables and simple causality, if analysis is to capture incrementalism and continuity” (Bulmer & Burch 2001, p. 78, cited in Howell, 2004, p.
5). Also Robert Ladrech contends that explanatory factors still lack proper theorisation in the area of party politics. He explains that the “dependent variable may have been given some thought, but the independent variable – the EU and/or its influence – was never really adequately theorized” (Ladrech, 2012, p. 2). Yet Theofanis Exadaktylos and Claudio Radaelli (2012), Mastenbroek and Kaeding (2006), and Christine Trampusch (2009) propose explanatory factors for Europeanisation. For the overarching Europeanisation literature, Theofanis Exadaktylos and Claudio Radaelli enlist common explanatory factors related to Europeanisation (Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2012, p. 27). Out of their sample of 200 Europeanisation studies, this thesis takes over veto points and bureaucracy as explanatory factors. Kaeding and Mastenbroek, along with Christine Trampusch, draw on new institutionalist literature in order to explain Europeanisation. Kaeding and Mastenbroek argue to “bring domestic preferences and beliefs to center stage” (Kaeding & Mastenbroek, 2006, p. 348). Trampusch posits that factors endogenous to an institution may explain how the national level responds to EU incentives and thereby follows an historical institutionalist line of argumentation in the form of incremental institutional change (Trampusch, 2009, p. 375). This thesis follows these authors’ advice by including the mode of institutional development as an explanatory factor for migration statistics harmonisation in its theoretical framework as argued in Section 2.1.

2.4.5 Europeanisation as Dependent Variable

This section elaborates on how Europeanisation is portrayed as dependent variable in Europeanisation theory and literature. The answer to the question of the domains of Europeanisation, i.e. what is Europeanised, is diverse. As indicated in Table 2.3, there is essentially no restriction to what can be downloaded. Scholars of Europeanisation have looked at policies and politics, whilst other authors widen the scope of national recipients of Europeanisation. Whilst Radaelli names “domestic [...] discourse, political structures and public policies” as possible domestic objects of Europeanisation, Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse list polities, politics, and polities (for instance, Börzel & Risse, 2000, Figure 1; Radaelli, 2004, Box 1). This thesis is interested in how EU and domestic actors harmonise migration statistics as a policy. This fits neatly with the literature on policy convergence on which Section 2.3.2 on policy convergence as dependent variable elaborates. This thesis draws on Paolo Graziano in operationalising
Europeanisation: domestic adaptation can hence be determined if the three dimensions of the dependent variable, i.e. policy goals, policy instruments, and policy instrument settings, change between time T2 (after the coming into force of the EU impulse) and time T1 (before the coming into force of the EU incentive) (2011, p. 585). In terms of operationalising the degree of Europeanisation, this thesis determines that the intensity of domestic change “varies according to the dimension involved - that is, more dimensions involved, greater change.” (Graziano, 2011, p. 585). This thesis draws on firstly on Börzel and Risse’s approach (2000, p. 10).

Gerda Falkner, on the one hand, discerns three degrees of change resulting from Europeanisation that initially seem to be sufficient to describe the impact on the national level. These are namely “small-scale change” referring to change in strategies, “medium-scale” meaning relevant but not revolutionary change, and “large-scale” change that points to change in national regimes (Falkner, 2003, p. 11). On the other hand, Börzel and Risse stick to Falkner’s differentiation in degree. They term the three degrees, in order of increasing intensity of change, “absorption”, “accommodation”, and “transformation” (Börzel & Risse, 2000, p. 10). These results at national level, however, are all ’positive’ in the sense of an actual impact of Europeanisation, and hence do not grasp the possibility of either lack of change, or the outcome of a situation that is less European than the initial state of affairs. In contrast, Radaelli’s list of possible outcomes caters to these possibilities. He utilises two types of positive effects and thereby largely adheres to Börzel and Risse’s differences in degree named above, but additionally introduces a ’neutral’ a ’negative’ outcome of Europeanisation, namely “inertia“ and “retrenchment” (Radaelli, 2000, pp. 14-15). Ian Bache and Andrew Jordan present the most comprehensive framework. Their framework comprises three degrees of positive change - i.e. absorption, accommodation, transformation - as well as inertia, and a type of negative change, i.e. retrenchment (Bache & Jordan, 2006, p. 28). If three or four as “transformation“ and heavy domestic change, two as “accommodation“ and medium domestic change, one as “absorption“ and little domestic change, and none as inertia, i.e. the lack of domestic change.

2.5 Research Questions

This project is geared towards examining how EU and national actors harmonise
migration statistics in two EU member states. On the basis of the theoretical framework and the hypotheses, this caveat leads to the following, more specific, research questions:

1) Are migration statistics harmonised across the selected member states, nationally, or in both cases?

It is the main goal of this thesis to examine similarities and differences in migration statistics harmonisation in two EU member states. The study draws on policy convergence literature in order to achieve this goal, and examines whether member state migration statistics converge with one another and with the supranational incentive or not. Based on the concept of policy convergence, the three dimensions to be analysed are the policy instruments (do migration statistics harmonisation policies converge across member states?), the setting of those instruments (how are the policy instruments orientated, what is their frequency, are they becoming more similar over time?) and the policy goals (do the policies actually aim to achieve increased comparability of migration statistics?).

2) Have migration statistics domestically adapted to the EU impulses?

This second question concerns the question what domestic impact EU harmonisation incentives had. Have the member states have adapted domestically to EU requirements?

3) How can one explain differences and similarities in migration statistics harmonisation?

This thesis examines how migration statistics are harmonised in the UK and the Dutch statistical system. Following that, the study draws on policy convergence, Europeanisation, historical institutionalism, and organisation and register studies, to analyse the explanatory power of supranational, national, and policy-specific factors. Which factors cause the potential similarities and differences in migration statistics harmonisation?
4) What are statistical institutions and do they harmonise migration statistics?

While the key focus of this project centres on migration statistics harmonisation, this study also aims to further understanding of statistical institutions as such, and their approaches to migration statistics harmonisation. Do statistical institutions harmonise migration statistics differently across the international, supranational, and domestic levels? Are there differences between statistical institutions active at the same level?

These questions will be answered to show how EU and domestic actors strove towards migration statistics harmonisation.

2.6 Conclusion and Summary of Dependent and Independent Variables

Sections 2.1 to 2.4 and their respective subsections gave an overview of the theories relevant for this thesis. This section summarises first the conceptualisation of the dependent, and second the conceptualisation of the independent factors. It follows Stephan Heichel, Jessica Pape, and Thomas Sommerer in grouping these factors as supranational, national, and policy-specific variables (Heichel et al., 2005, p. 824).

2.6.1 Dependent Variable - Migration Statistics Harmonisation

Policy convergence and Europeanisation dimensions examined in this thesis as increasing similarity and national change over time from T1 (prior to EU impulse) to T2 (after EU incentive) in the following three dimensions:

- policy goals: more comparable migration statistics across member states in general, as well as the aims of the respective EU impulse;
- policy instruments: peer reviews, conferences/workshops, national legislation, national (best) practices, migration statistics sources;
- settings of those instruments: output-harmonisation, input-harmonisation, ex ante output-harmonisation; frequency and/or duration of those instruments; mediating or intervening; policy style
For each of the dimensions of migration statistics harmonisation, the question is whether and if so, how much domestic adaptation is found in the two member states analysed between T1 and T2. Moreover, this thesis examines whether, and if so, how much policy convergence there is between the EU and domestic level as well as between the two member states. With regard to the degree of Europeanisation, this thesis regards change in one dimension as absorption, in two dimensions as accommodation, and in three dimensions as transformation. The second goal of this thesis is to determine the type, the degree and the direction of policy convergence as elaborated in Section 2.3.2.

2.6.2 Independent Variables - Supranational, National, and Policy-specific Variables

The following paragraphs outline the argumentation underlying the independent factors for migration statistics harmonisation on the basis of Sections 2.1 to 2.4 and the hypotheses related to them. It begins with the supranational factors, then elaborates on the national factors, before it finally lays out the policy-specific factors. This thesis groups the following factors as supranational variables, and expects them to be conducive to migration statistics harmonisation. The path-dependent development of Eurostat is a supranational institutional factor, whereas the other factors are supranational document-related explanatory factors.

The path-dependence of Eurostat could potentially be linked to a high degree of obligation as a path-dependent Eurostat does not suffer from major disruptive challenges, and can accumulate a high degree of obligation. Similarly, the high degree of obligation could be related to the EU incentive including a harmonisation incentive in order to enforce the harmonisation incentive. In turn, these could be related to the lack of issue linkage, and a high level of detail re-enforcing each other. The national independent factors of centralisation and the nature of the NSS, however, should clearly not be related, as demonstrated by the NSSs following no particular pattern in view of how they are spread out over the four types of NSSs depicted in Figure 1.1. Also the high administrative capacity should not be related to either of them - otherwise the NSSs should all mimic the most effective combination. Yet this thesis found EU NSSs to be dispersed over all four types. The national factors of sense of duty could further be related to the document-focused supranational factors as well as high domestic administrative capacity. They could all help to translate an EU impulse into the national
context, enabling smooth adaptation. Following a similar line of argument, the policy-specific factors of knowledge of the rules and non-opposition could be related to these as they should all further domestic adaptation. Section 7.3 addresses the outcomes of these reflections in light of the results of the comparative discussion.

A path-dependent mode of institutional development of Eurostat should further migration statistics harmonisation, because this institution is set up to co-ordinate the statistical cooperation of the EU, and further the harmonisation of the EU’s common statistics. A rupture in the institutional development of Eurostat would have meant that the EU loses its key player in statistics harmonisation, which would have hampered migration statistics harmonisation. Just as well, the an incremental development of Eurostat - which ends in the installation of a fundamentally different institution - would have impacted negatively on migration statistics harmonisation in the EU as this new institution would have had to live up to Eurostat’s significance and needed time to establish itself as the primary actor in EU migration statistics harmonisation. These considerations lead to Expectation 1 below. In terms of operationalisation, and based on the above elaborations on path dependence, this thesis determines path-dependence of a statistical system if firstly, earlier events in the examined process should have more impact than those later in the process. This also means secondly that these starting points should resemble critical junctures. Thirdly, the process once started, should not stop or undergo heavy change. If these criteria are not fulfilled, this thesis regards the statistical system as not path-dependent.

> Expectation 1: A path-dependent mode of institutional development of Eurostat is positively related to migration statistics harmonisation.

What underlies all the following document-specific factors is that the EU incentive should ask for harmonisation. This, on the one hand further highlights and ensures the topical focus of the EU incentive is migration statistics harmonisation. On the other hand, a specific harmonisation stimulus is expected to be beneficial for migration statistics harmonisation, because it shows there is an issue which needs to be tackled. This leads to Expectation 2. In terms of measurement, this thesis attests a harmonisation incentive if the respective EU impulse explicitly mentions its aim being harmonisation, and if it applies to at the least the majority of member states at the time. If this does not apply, the EU impulse is not expected to improve migration statistics harmonisation.
Expectation 2: An EU incentive which clearly addresses migration statistics harmonisation furthers migration statistics harmonisation.

A high degree of obligation is expected to be conducive to migration statistics harmonisation, because hard law can be enforced by Courts or international institutions. Not following the rules set out in the legal act can lead to sanctions through this enforcement. A high degree of obligation, which firstly depends on the sort of law, and decreases from supranational to international hard law to international soft law, and secondly whether the law is sanctioned. This thesis hence measures the degree of obligatory potential as follows: if a legal act is of supranational character, and the possibilities of enforcement are high, the obligatory potential is high. If these criteria are not fulfilled, the thesis regards this as low degree of obligation.

Expectation 3: A high degree of obligation is positively related to migration statistics harmonisation.

Issue linkage is expected to represent an impediment to migration statistics harmonisation, because it creates informational barriers between the NSSs involved, and because it is more likely that EU incentives stipulating migration statistics harmonisation collide with other domestic reform processes. The thesis attests issue-linkage if the EU impulse relates migration statistics harmonisation to other political aims. Issue-linkage exists if the EU impulse mentions political aims in addition to that of migration statistics harmonisation.

Expectation 4: The lack of issue-linkage furthers migration statistics harmonisation.

Furthermore, this thesis expects a high level of detail of the EU stimulus to impact positively on migration statistics harmonisation. While a highly detailed EU incentive may be more difficult for the member states to include in their own domestic environment, it will lead to migration statistics harmonisation in the end. The reason for that is that a detailed EU incentive cuts off alternative domestic interpretations. While the level of detail of a legal act is also indicated by the number of articles/sections and subsections, the legal act needs to show that it aims at more than providing further instructions if it names instructions that go beyond pinning down the goals of the action. This is because also an aim can be broken down in several steps without actually providing any details beyond this which determine how these goals should be put into
practice. If these criteria are not fulfilled, the thesis views this as a low level of detail.

- Expectation 5: A high level of detail of the EU incentive is positively related to migration statistics harmonisation.

The following lines delineate why this thesis expects the following national factors to further migration statistics harmonisation. This thesis hypothesises that a centralised NSS features better in migration statistics harmonisation. Mirroring the veto-player argument, this is because less actors are involved in migration statistics harmonisation at domestic level. That said, less communication problems can arise, and there is a smaller number of stakeholders who can block the process. Drawing on the above, this thesis regards an NSS as centralised if official statistics are the task of a central statistical office, which may also include subnational statistical offices if these are subordinate to the central statistical office, rather than Ministries or other public authorities producing the majority of official statistics.

- Expectation 6: A centralised NSS is positively related to migration statistics harmonisation.

The thesis expects a register-based NSS to have an advantage in view of migration statistics harmonisation. The reasons for this are that register-based NSSs are thought to be less costly, as well as holding a wider range of data that can be utilised for the purpose of migration statistics harmonisation than in those NSSs which rather rely on surveys than on registers. This leads to Expectation 7 below. This thesis attests an NSS to be register-based if the population and housing census is almost exclusively based on registers, and as not register-based if this is not the case.

- Expectation 7: The register-based nature of an NSS furthers migration statistics harmonisation.

A high sense of duty of the member state is thought to be positively related to migration statistics harmonisation. The argument for this is that member states which show a higher commitment to translate EU incentives into their own domestic context in general, should also do this in the case of migration statistics harmonisation. The strength of a country’s sense of duty is indicated by the number of formal opinions it receives from the European Commission in an examined period of time. This is then compared to the average number of formal opinions of all member states of this period.
If a member state receives more than the average number of formal opinions, the member state has a low sense of duty. If a member state receives fewer formal opinions than this average, it has a high sense of duty. If it receives more, it has a low sense of duty. The formal opinion stage is the first stage of an infringement procedure against a member state. This thesis focuses on the formal opinions rather than a later stage of the infringement procedure, the latter of which would be aimed at the actual compliance rather than the sense of duty of a country. If a country changes its approach to a legal act upon the receipt of a formal opinion, this says more about its sense of duty than being forced by formal means to do so.

**Expectation 8:** A high domestic sense of duty to translate EU incentives into the national context is positively related to migration statistics harmonisation.

This thesis assumes that a member state which has an administratively highly capable NSS finds it easier to harmonise migration statistics. The logic behind that is that the high administrative capacity of the NSS of a member state should further migration statistics harmonisation, because these NSSs have a higher capability to implement EU stimuli at national level. This thesis takes an NSS complying with four of the seven criteria of administrative capacity as a benchmark, and attests the NSS to have a high administrative capacity if it fulfils more than four criteria, and a low administrative capacity if it fulfils less than four criteria.

**Expectation 9:** A NSS with a high administrative capacity furthers migration statistics harmonisation.

An NSS which follows a path-dependent mode of institutional change is expected to run into problems with regard to migration statistics harmonisation. The argument for this is that the NSS’s purpose and its institutional structure were intended to collect data for the member state according to its own practices, rather than statistics which which are harmonised with an EU-wide scope. A newly founded NSS, for instance, on the other hand may have more leeway to mould its institutional structure, because the existing structure is still subject to changes or not yet fix. Like for the path-dependence of Eurostat, this thesis attests path-dependence of an NSS if firstly, earlier events in the examined sequence should have more impact than those later in the sequence. This also means secondly that these starting points should resemble critical junctures. Thirdly, the sequence once started, should not stop or undergo heavy change.
→ Expectation 10: A non-path-dependent mode of institutional development of an NSS is positively related to migration statistics harmonisation.

Having elaborated on the supranational and national independent variables, and the related hypotheses respectively, the following paragraphs outline the policy-specific explanatory factors and expectations. Domestic non-opposition to the EU stimulus for migration statistics harmonisation in the member state is expected to be beneficial to migration statistics harmonisation, because the stimulus does not need to overcome national resistance to it. Resistance to the EU incentive on the other hand would slow down and hinder its implementation at national level. Domestic opposition to EU law is shown in official documents or indicate this in interviews at the formulation, adoption, and evaluation phase of the policy cycle. If opposition to a legal act is clearly voiced in these, this thesis attests a high level of opposition. If it does not do so, the thesis sees this as a low level of opposition.

→ Expectation 11: Non-opposition in the member state towards the EU stimulus furthers migration statistics harmonisation.

Moreover, a high level of knowledge of the rules stipulated in the EU incentive is expected to further migration statistics harmonisation as the NSS does not need to learn about the rules prior to executing them at domestic level. In addition, it is less likely that NSSs interpret the EU incentive wrongly, or translate it wrongly at national level, if they have a high level of knowledge of the rules. Both of which would impede migration statistics harmonisation. In terms of operationalisation, this thesis takes member states’ NSIs providing feedback on single articles/sections, and/or subsections of an EU impulse that goes beyond a statement on whether it was for or against it in interviews or official documents on the topic, as an indicator for a high level of knowledge of the rules.

→ Expectation 12: A high level of domestic knowledge of the rules is positively related to migration statistics harmonisation.

These explanatory factors, grouped into a supranational, a national, and a policy-specific variable, are tested in the following chapters in terms of whether they are positively related to migration statistics harmonisation.

This chapter evaluates how Eurostat fares regarding the institutional factors of the supranational variable, which are its role in the ESS, its obligatory potential, and the mode of its institutional development. It does so in order to demonstrate which possibilities to influence EU member states Eurostat had. Eurostat stands at the centre of this chapter, because of the unique role the EU statistical office plays in the European polity. Eurostat is the main provider of cross-country and cross-sectoral official statistics of the EU. This chapter examines how the supranational factors identified in Chapter Two play out for Eurostat in the context of the ESS. It is necessary to follow this course of action in order to garner knowledge about Eurostat that does justice to its centrality and significance in the coordination of migration statistics harmonisation in the EU.

The first of two key reasons why this thesis focuses on migration statistics harmonisation in the EU is that international level attempts at migration statistics harmonisation have largely been unsuccessful. The second is that Eurostat has a higher obligatory potential towards the members of the ESS than do the other international statistical institutions active in migration statistics harmonisation as elaborated in Chapter One. Chapter Two identified an institution’s obligatory potential, and its mode of institutional development as supranational institutional factors to affect migration statistics harmonisation. As a consequence, this chapter examines how Eurostat fares in view of these supranational institutional factors. The chapter proceeds by supranational institutional explanatory factor as discussed in Section 2.6.2. The chapter first gives an overview of Eurostat’s role towards the NSSs (Section 3.1). It then argues that Eurostat has a high obligatory potential (Section 3.2), and that Eurostat’s institutional mode of development is path-dependent (Section 3.3). This chapter fills a gap in the literature in that it reflects on the cooperation of National Statistical Institutes (NSIs) and Eurostat as set out in Section 1.1.
3.1 Eurostat’s Role in the European Statistical System

This section examines how Eurostat fared in view of the first supranational institutional explanatory factors, by examining whether it presides over member states. It finds that although the ESS - consisting of coordinator Eurostat and the NSSs as data suppliers - formally came into existence only in 1997 through Council Regulation 322/1997/EC on Community statistics, Eurostat declared close cooperation with the NSIs as decisive, from its creation onwards (Council, 1997; de Michelis & Chantraine, 2003, pp. 15-16). Data collection, and production of member states’ official national statistics, were still in the hands of the NSIs in 2009. As such, the NSIs represented the basic elements of EU statistics production. Between 1951 and 2009, the number of countries under the auspices of Eurostat increased from six to 27 countries through EU enlargements. Table 3.1 gives an overview of EU enlargements between 1951 and 2009, in order to delineate which NSSs were under Eurostat’s remit at what time.

Table 3.1. Chronology of European Union Enlargements by Country and Year from 1951 to 2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Founding countries: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands</td>
<td>1951 (Signature of the Treaty of Paris)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain, Portugal</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria, Romania</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Europa.eu, n.d..
With regard to EU enlargements, a Eurostat official explained that Eurostat’s responsibilities grew with the enlargements. When only six countries supplied Eurostat, mainly with economic data, each statistician was responsible for one country. Eurostat staff were aware of the collection methods and definitions, and discussed them with each other. With 27 member states in 2009, and additional preparatory work with accession countries, this was rendered impossible (Interview 1). In general, Eurostat took the initiative to establish contacts with accession countries as soon as the Council decided to start negotiations concerning the accession of a country (Interview 1).

Another former Eurostat official gave a more detailed account of the matter of enlargement and its implications for Eurostat’s work. Contrary to Eurostat taking the initiative to establish contacts with accession countries, the first enlargement of the Community of the UK, Ireland and Denmark was made without any veritable input from the statistical office. Similarly, in the accession process of Greece there were almost no prior contacts made. Contrary to that, in the case of the accession of Spain and Portugal, the strategy of the Council and the Commission was to negotiate with the countries about their capability to adopt the acquis communautaire (Interview 4i).

Eurostat’s role therein was threefold: Firstly, it had to verify the capability of the candidate countries to join, and, before the accession was settled, to integrate the national statisticians of the candidate countries as observers in the working groups and statistical committees so that they could immediately start to operate at the moment of the accession (Interview 4i). Secondly, it Eurostat had to provide the countries with a training programme and technical assistance, to facilitate the integration of the respective NSS into the ESS (Interview 4i). Thirdly, it is important to mention that, from the beginning of the 1990s onwards, Eurostat systematically invited statisticians beyond the EU to its working groups and committees as observers. Candidate countries took part as associates, via training sessions (Interview 5). This means that Eurostat was not only presiding over the NSSs of the EU member states, but was also responsible for setting up first contacts with the NSSs of accession countries.

3.2 Obligatory Potential of Eurostat

This section examines the obligatory potential of Eurostat. It does so because this thesis expects a high obligatory potential to be positively related to migration statistics harmonisation as discussed in Chapter Two. The obligatory potential of Eurostat’s
cooperation with the NSIs differed markedly between the stages Eurostat took in order to introduce new legal instruments. Task forces and working groups stood at the early stage of drafting a new legal statistical instrument. Under the remit of Eurostat, statistical task forces provided the context to discuss ideas such as survey modules, and how to measure concepts. For instance, with regard to an action plan for the collection and analysis of Community statistics in the field of migration, the European Commission initiated task forces, for example, “to discuss proposals for statistical legislation on migration and asylum”, and another on “ways of improving administrative co-operation between Ministries and National Statistical Offices on asylum and migration statistics” (European Commission, 2003, p. 18). Following the ideas-testing phase of task forces, the conclusions gained in task forces were fed into working groups. Working groups “have a mandate already to decide on the Regulations, on the design. Working groups are, in that sense, more important in decision-making” (Interviews 11, 12, 20).

Yet task forces were also held for the purpose of exchanging information on topics about which Eurostat would like to gain more information. In this case, taking decisions played less of a role. Delegates from the NSIs presented their ideas before Eurostat summarised the event, and sent this summary and a conclusion to the delegates in preparation for the next meeting. In general, it was the richer member states who were active participants in statistical task forces, as they possessed the financial means to send delegates to the task forces (Interview 12). A Dutch statistical researcher explained that these task forces provided a “really a good opportunity to have some influence” by expressing points of view on propositions made by Eurostat and other NSIs (Interview 11). Task forces also provided an opportunity to gain the support of other NSIs for ideas (Interview 11). To complete the task force phase took two years on average, but could also take up to five years (Interviews 11, 12). The reason for this rather extended time-frame was that there was a multitude of task forces being held at the same time. In addition, the progress of those task forces was slowed because they tackled different statistical surveys, which partially overlapped thematically (Interview 11).

The working group on migration statistics comprised experts of the 27 member states, as well as EFTA and candidate countries. It was created in 2005 and tasked “[t]o advise the Commission on issues relating to the concerned area/to establish close cooperation between the statistical institutions of the Member States and the
Commission/to facilitate the exchange of information, experiences and good practices.” (European Commission, 2011a, p. 1). The working group is functioning in an informal manner, and convenes usually once a year (Interview 15). The committees outlined in this chapter also constitute a focal point in view of Eurostat’s obligatory potential towards the constituents of the ESS, the NSSs of the EU member states. In 2006, there were eight committees in the field of statistics that had the right to exert comitology powers (Eurostat, 2006a, p. 3). This means that these committees had the right to implement an EU legal act. One of these committees was the SPC. As early as 1971, plans existed to create the SPC, but were not put into practice for eighteen years. The DGINS agreed on the principle of harmonisation, but only if their own respective methods formed the benchmark (de Michelis & Chantraine, 2003, p. 64). When the SPC finally took up its work in 1989, its task was to develop the Code of Practice, and “to submit a final report on the implementation of the Statistical Programme” to the Council and to the European Parliament (Council, 1989a, Article 5).

The introduction of the European statistics Code of Practice marked an important step in the development of the ESS. The code had the intention of achieving two basic goals. The first catered to a point of view exogenous to the producers of statistics. The goal was to increase the level of trust of statistics users in the quantitative information disseminated. The second aim was to introduce a quality framework applicable to all producers of statistics that should serve to underpin the quality of statistics in general, above the level of minimum standards (European Commission, 2005b, 2.1). As such, the code first entered the EU statistical agenda in 2004. The code was a self-regulatory instrument, enforced by peer reviews (European Commission, 2005b, 2.4). The fifteen principles laid down in the code provided the framework conditions for statistical authorities to fulfil this task. The first five principles were focused on the institutional environment that should be conducive to a statistical policy independent from political interference, by making a legal basis for the functioning of the statistical institute, as well as its data collection and statistics production and dissemination, a requirement that protected the data providers’ confidentiality.

This independence should be ensured by quality controls within the NSIs and Eurostat, but also by reaching out to experts outside the institutions that constitute the ESS (National & Community Statistical Authorities, 2005, Principles 1-5). Principles

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8 The current version of the Code of Practice dates back to 2011 (Eurostat, 2011a).
six to fifteen then flesh out the nature of this statistical policy, i.e. the characteristics that rendered a statistical policy cost-effective, transparent, impartial, and based on sound methodology. Moreover, the code put an emphasis on comparability within and across member states’ statistical systems. Just as well, the code asked for regular cooperation of the NSIs within the framework of the ESS (National & Community Statistical Authorities, 2005, Principles 6-15).

The Code of Practice was introduced as a measure to support NSIs in their self-assessment of the quality of their governance. Peer reviews were conducted for the first time from 2006 to 2008 (Eurostat, n.d.e). In view of Eurostat’s obligatory potential towards the NSIs, the right of initiative was of great importance. As DG of the European Commission, it was able to propose EU law to the European Parliament and Council. Under what was called the co-decision procedure pre-Lisbon (now the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’) new initiatives that arose within Eurostat were firstly discussed in a Eurostat working group or sectoral committee, within which statisticians representing their member state were able to express their views. Secondly, the actual document was prepared and passed on to the DGINS, to reach an agreement within this committee. This was not compulsory, but common practice within Eurostat. After the document was declared to fit the opinion of other concerned DGs, and approved by the Commission, it was sent to the Council and the Parliament. As this procedure was costly in terms of time - on average it takes about three years - Eurostat usually chaired only one or two working groups per year (Interviews 1, 2).

Furthermore, the infringement procedure allowed the European Commission to first try to settle the matter through formal opinion within a period set by the Commission. While Eurostat has seldom made use of formal measures against member states (Interviews 18, 19), Eurostat found that allowing NSIs to start infringement procedures helped in securing resources at national level, in order to adhere to statistical EU law (Interviews 6i, 21). If that remained unsuccessful, the Commission was allowed to forward the matter to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This means that the obligatory potential of Eurostat towards the members of the ESS was high. Secondary EU law could not only be issued in statistical matters, but also enforced by a supranational institution, and the ECJ.
3.3 The Development of the European Statistical Sphere from 1952 to 2009

This section analyses Eurostat’s institutional development. It does so, because according to historical institutionalism, it expects that an institution’s mode of development affects the policies it puts out, as laid out in Section 2.1. As a consequence, the Eurostat’s mode of development is expected to affect migration statistics harmonisation. In order to establish whether Eurostat followed the mode of path-dependent institutional development, this section draws on documents which elaborate on Eurostat’s creation. This section argues that Eurostat’s mode of institutional development is that of path-dependence.

Robert Schumann, the then Foreign Minister of France, suggested that “Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe” (Schuman, 1950). This led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) through the Treaty of Paris in 1951. The Treaty of Paris also marked the creation of what was to become Eurostat, the EU statistical institution. What began as an enterprise of seven statisticians who provided the ECSC with data of the beginnings of a common market, e.g. of price statistics and gross domestic product tables, in the 1950s is nowadays a full DG of the European Commission (Interview 4i). To date, Eurostat’s directorates are concerned with methodology, national and European accounts, sectoral and regional statistics, social statistics, Government finance statistics and quality, and global business statistics (Eurostat, 2011c). At its main branch in Luxembourg, it had around 800 staff in 2011 (Interview 1). Also the development of the number of Eurostat’s staff points to a path-dependent mode of institutional development since there is no sudden decrease or increase in the number (Figure 3.1).
Before this section examines Eurostat’s mode of institutional development, it evaluates two potential organisational designs of the EU statistical office which Eurostat’s creators discussed. These elaborations naturally precede any examination of the incremental institutional mode that Eurostat followed in order to analyse whether it has changed its original set-up. The two possibilities discussed were to either create a powerful institution from scratch to finally take over the tasks of the NSIs, or to insert Eurostat in the existing European statistical environment amongst the NSIs as its coordinator.

The Treaty establishing the ECSC of 1951 left the High Authority, the executive body of the three Communities and predecessor of the European Commission, with much leeway to design Eurostat. Eurostat was originally referred to as ‘service’ of the High Authority. Sections of the Treaty describing the tasks of the Community’s institutions did not explicitly mention a supranational statistical institution. Because of this, Eurostat initially lacked an explicit legal basis within the Treaty, and the High Authority was able to execute “all appropriate measures of an internal nature to assure the functioning of its services” (ECSC, 1951, Article 16). Under the heading of general provisions for the functioning of the ECSC, Article 46 (1) allowed the High Authority to consult experts, and asked it to draw up studies of market and price trends. Finally, Article 47 permitted the High Authority to gather any information it needed in order to fulfil its tasks. With Article 213 of the European Economic Community Treaty of 1957, however, Eurostat’s data collection and checks were put under the scrutiny of the Council, and in successive Treaties increasingly under that of the European Parliament.
Taken together, these Articles represent the initial insertion of Eurostat into the *acquis communautaire* as coordinator of the EU statistical sphere as well as the driver of harmonisation of its statistics.

Eurostat’s first head of service, Rolf Wagenführ, explained that a new institution coordinating the EU statistical sphere had to be created in the context of the ECSC. Referring to Eurostat’s ‘zero hour’, Wagenführ mentioned that there were essentially two considerations circulated on how to design and equip Eurostat. The first possibility was to create Eurostat as a strong supranational statistical institution, with far-reaching competences that would finally take over the NSIs’ task to produce official statistics (Wagenführ, 1963, p. 380). The alternative was to create a supranational statistical institution whose task was to co-ordinate the member states’ data collection. This had the advantage of preserving the expert knowledge and statistical cultures of the NSIs. This thesis adds, however, that installing a new statistical institution at supranational level, which would have taken over all activities related to statistics production, would have furthered statistics harmonisation. It would have initiated statistics harmonisation right after its creation. Wagenführ argued that the decision for the latter option was taken because of the immense costs and the loss of domestic experience in statistics production that would have been involved if a truly strong EU statistical office was created. Eventually, Eurostat was set up as coordinator of the EU statistical sphere, instead of taking over the tasks of the NSIs, at the moment of its creation (Wagenführ, 1963, p. 380).

Once this initial decision was taken, Eurostat set up its statistics collection and cooperation with other international statistical institutions. Eurostat started to cooperate with other international statistical institutions early. An example for Eurostat’s early collaboration with international statistical institutions was the predecessor of the OECD. Together, they worked on elaborating common guidelines for statistics in order to be able to trade lucratively with non-member states. But how was this cooperation with other international statistical institutions framed in practice? A senior statistician at Eurostat described the work of Eurostat’s statisticians as follows: “When they first started, they were very proud of inventing their own methods, for Europe, that was a period of great enthusiasm.” (Interview 1). For instance, Eurostat’s first system of national accounts differed markedly from the UN system which had already been in place at that time. This, of course, led to a series of problems for the users who were suddenly confronted with two data sets: the one from Eurostat, and that of other
organisations, each telling a different story. Because of this potential source of confusion, Eurostat aligned its methods early with the OECD, the UN, and depending on the subject, also the Food and Agricultural Organisation.

After the initial decision to set up Eurostat as coordinator of the member state statistical systems, the High Authority created 12 divisions and services with the implementation of the ECSC Treaty in 1952. Amongst them, the ‘statistical service’ was set up as an early version of Eurostat. Tendencies of High Authority departments collecting statistics themselves during the 1950s and 1960s never really put Eurostat’s existence at risk (Interview 3). One the one hand, this is because the statistics produced by Eurostat were considered as ‘official statistics’ of scientific quality for the preparation and monitoring of Community policies. On the other hand, these statistical cells of the directorate generals (DGs) would not have been able to collect the figures published by the NSSs or any other public or private statistical source. To date, there are statistical units in DG Home Affairs, DG Justice, and DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion. These statistical units, however, do not produce their own statistics, but make use of both Eurostat and national statistics (Interviews 15, 16, 17, 20).

Coinciding with the ECSC Treaty’s provisions, Eurostat’s core responsibilities have remained the same since its creation. These were and are the harmonisation of collection methods and definitions, the coordination of member states’ statistics collection, the liaison with external statistics collecting bodies and the dissemination of statistics since in 1952 (de Michelis & Chantraine, 2003, pp. 15-16).

Since the idea of an EU statistical institution that collected statistics itself as well as setting up decentralised statistical units in the DGs failed, the harmonisation of the statistical definitions and collection methods in the member states was Eurostat’s first and foremost concern. In Eurostat’s early days, these domestic statistics were deemed not to be comparable at all. In order to draw up a working programme for the advancement of the Communities, however, exactly those numbers were required of the six founding countries. To give an example of how basic the harmonisation attempts were in those early days: Eurostat’s statisticians questioned the domestic definitions of seemingly clear-cut things like salt: did the member states’ data they received refer to cooking salt, road salt or salt used during chemical processes (Interview 1)? Still, harmonisation remains the main item on Eurostat’s agenda. To date, the way forward is seen in metadata, i.e. descriptions of the collection method, data source or definitions (Interview 4).
Eurostat itself consisted of three departments until 1957. Those were coal statistics, steel statistics, and general statistics (de Michelis & Chantraine, 2003, p. 17). It would, however, not be correct to conclude an exclusive focus on statistics needed for trade in Eurostat’s initial stage. The social statistics it collected were rather socio-economic by nature, e.g. household budgets which gave insight into the situation of workers’ families in the coal and steel sector (Interview 2). In the late 1950s and the 1960s it was intended to incorporate Eurostat’s units in the different DGs of the Commission. This idea was quickly abandoned by Albert Coppé, the Vice President of the Commission of that time, who was an advocate of independent statistics and in favour of a single European statistical reference organisation. With the signature of the Treaties of Rome in 1957, two further European Communities, namely the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom, each with its own executive body, came into existence, as a sign of intensified co-operation between the ECSC countries. Due to the highly technical nature of the atomic energy statistics, Euratom initially employed a distinct statistical service which would be incorporated into Eurostat’s organisational structure in 1958. By contrast, Eurostat’s responsibilities included the provision of the EEC’s numerical information from the outset (de Michelis & Chantraine, pp. 24-29). Between 1959 and the merger of the three Communities in 1967, a common statistical service was established. It was managed by a committee consisting of a member each from the High Authority, the EEC Commission and the Euratom Commission, deciding by rule of unanimity upon staff, budget and organisational matters.

The 1970s marked a difficult period for Eurostat. The relations between the EU statistical office and the European Commission, and the NSIs, were afflicted with the “increasingly marginal role” of Eurostat in the context of the European Commission (de Michelis & Chantraine, 2003, p. 73). Rather than appreciating the wider potential of Eurostat’s numbers, the policy DGs simply asked for quantitative information which would allow them to do their work (de Michelis & Chantraine, 2003, p. 79). This led to “the image of [Eurostat’s] powerlessness” prevailing amongst the NSIs (de Michelis & Chantraine, 2003, p. 77). In the following, NSIs turned towards other international organisations with a “sounder image” than Eurostat, such as the statistical cells of the OECD or the UN (de Michelis & Chantraine, 2003, p. 77).

In line with Eurostat’s difficulties during the 1970s, also during the 1980s, mirroring the situation of the Community as a whole, Eurostat found itself in a deep crisis: the statistics it produced did not meet the Commission’s expectations regarding
timely and relevant statistics (Interview 5), because of inadequate resources to execute and coordinate Eurostat’s workload as well as disagreements among Eurostat staff at the high echelons as reasons for Eurostat’s problems (de Michelis & Chantraine, 2003, p. 77). Its position within the European Commission was weakened. However, the European Parliament strengthened Eurostat’s position by opposing Commission proposals to dissolve Eurostat and to integrate its tasks within its respective policy-related DGs. Instead, it argued for a Eurostat that was open for all European institutions under the same conditions. Perhaps its most important request was to apply the co-decision procedure to decision-making on future statistical programmes. As anticipated by the then Commission President Jacques Delors, statistics played a key role in the European integration process from the late 1980s onwards (Interview 5). The single market, the European Monetary Union, enlargement, and finally the increasing attention that was paid to environmental protection, all required a solid basis of comparable statistical indicators to formulate policies, and to monitor their implementation. In order to keep up with these developments, Eurostat strengthened its original role as a service provider, made its services accessible to the general public, and introduced a common training programme for its own member states’ statisticians. Furthermore, Eurostat introduced weekly management, monthly middle-management and quarterly Statistical Programme committees, along with periodical programming committees with the major stakeholders among ESS-members, candidate countries, central banks, the European Parliament and the Commission DGs (Interview 5).

As the NSIs requested a higher level of independence of Eurostat from the Commission, and also because Eurostat wanted to ensure more guarantees to the NSIs on data protection, the so-called ‘Eurostat law’ of 1997 determined Eurostat as the responsible authority for EU statistics and technical independence, instead of the European Commission as a whole (European Commission, 1997, Article 2; de Michelis, 2002, p. 32). Following the Eurostat law, some member states wished for a Eurostat entirely independent of the European Commission. The member states suspected the European Commission of pushing the publication of certain sensitive figures in a certain direction, but were not successful (Interview 1).

Committees and the Director Generals of the National Statistical Institutes Conference (DGINS) constituted an important part of Eurostat’s cooperation with the member states in the ESS. Therefore, this section outlines the main committees attached to Eurostat until 2009. Migration statistics harmonisation was introduced before that
time and hence still fell under the old mode of the pre-Lisbon comitology rules. Table 3.2 below enlists previous and current committees attached to Eurostat and the ESS in 2009. Drawing on information given on the ESS website and the respective legislation for each committee, this chapter contends that the functions of committees related to the ESS stayed the same, and the institutional environment remained stable, which underlines this section’s argument that Eurostat followed the path-dependent mode of institutional development. ESS Committees and their functions remained the same from the late 1980s, early 90s till 2008 and 2009 respectively in the cases of the committee coordinating EU and domestic statistical matters (SPC - ESSC), the committee advising the other main EU institutions on statistical policy (CEIES - EASC), and the Director Generals of the National Statistical Institutes Conference (DGINS) which exists since the creation of Eurostat and formulated, and later gave an opinion on the statistical programme.
Table 3.2. Overview of Committees attached to the European Statistical System.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Previous Committee Name, Year of Establishment</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Current Committee Name, Year of Establishment</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Statistical Programme Committee (SPC), 1989  |   - Formulate statistical programme, development of Code of Practice in 2004   
   - coordinate EU and domestic statistical matters | European Statistical System Committee (ESSC), 2009 |   - Develop statistical programme, Code of Practice, methodology   
   - prepare issues of international relevance and represent ESS at international level |
| European Advisory Committee on Statistical Information in the Economic and Social Spheres (CEIES), 1991 |   - Advise Council and Commission on statistical policy, taking the information users’ demands into account   
   - give opinion on Statistical Programme, particularly on costs borne by information providers | European Statistical Advisory Committee, (ESAC), 2008 |   - Advise Council, European Parliament, and Commission on statistical policy, taking information users’ demands into account   
   - give opinion on Statistical Programme, particularly on costs borne by information providers |
| Director Generals of the National Statistical Institutes Conference (DGINS), 1953 |   - Formulate European statistical programme   
   - coordinate EU and domestic statistical matters | Director Generals of the National Statistical Institutes Conference (DGINS), 1953 |   - Give an opinion on statistical programme;   
   - coordinate EU and domestic statistical programmes   
   - originally preceding the SPC |
| N/A                                           | N/A  | ESGAB, 2008                                   |   - Supervise adherence to Code of Practice |


The DGINS consisted, as its rather telling name suggests, of the heads of the 27
member state NSIs. The participants of the DGINS conference, which had been set up in 1953, had to have two hats ready when they attend Eurostat committee meetings: the national and the European hat. Although the cooperation between Eurostat and the NSIs were intense - proven by a multitude of working groups and discussions at DGINS conferences - the differentiation between their two roles proved not always easy (de Michelis & Chantraine, 2003, p. 93). An example of this dilemma is the discussion that arose in connection with the question whether to set up a Statistical Programme Committee (SPC). Although also the SPC was intended to be staffed by the heads of the NSIs and chaired by Eurostat, its creation signified a transfer of authority from domestic to EU level, and was therefore contentious. Based on Council Decision 89/382/EEC, the SPC was created to assist the Commission in its task to establish a common methodology and standards and the multi-annual statistical programme. Further reasons to establish the SPC were to provide the discussions of the DGINS meetings with a legal base, and to set up a structure within which it was possible to exert comitology, and to delegate powers to implement EU legislation to Eurostat.

When the SPC was finally created in 1989, it comprised the directors general of the NSIs. It was governed by qualified majority, with a total of 321 votes, 232 votes were necessary for a qualified majority (Eurostat, 2006, p. 8). The SPC evolved into the European Statistical System Committee (ESSC), but only few new responsibilities were acquired by the ESSC. Comprising representatives of Eurostat and the NSS, the ESSC was responsible for deciding on “measures which the Commission intends to take for the development, production and dissemination of European statistics.” (European Parliament & Council, 2009). As within the SPC, each member state was usually represented by only one person in the ESSC. With the chairman’s permission, however, additional experts were allowed to be present at the expense of the member state (SPC, 2001, Article 6; ESSC, 2012, Article 11). Providing cooperation between NSIs and Eurostat with a “more formal character”, the SPC was set up. Building on Article Five of the Council Decision of 19 June 1989 establishing the SPC, the committee was introduced to support the Commission in the implementation of the current Programme, the preparation of subsequent Programmes, and with such other tasks as were attributed to it by acts of the Council in the field of statistics (Council, 1989b, Introduction). If the matter passed on to the committee for examination fell under Article Four of the aforementioned Council Decision, the committee could exert implementing powers. Another goal was to increase international cooperation in the field of statistics within
the context of international organisations, so as to be able to compare community statistics to those of “its main economic partners”.

The academic community and private actors had a stake in the statistical decision-making process as users of EU statistics in form of the ESAC (Eurostat, 2009c) and the ESGAB (Eurostat, 2011b). The Commission was assisted in its task to supervise the implementation of the Statistical Programme by the CEIES, before the CEIES was replaced by the ESAC. ESAC has replaced CEIES in involving the public “in the co-ordination of the objectives of the Community's statistical information policy” (Eurostat, 2009b). Whereas the ESAC’s role was of a planning nature, in relation to the formulation of working programmes, the ESGAB functioned as the ex post supervisor of the ESS’s work. As regards the institutional structure in the form of committees of the ESS, the findings suggest that the evolution of the CEIES into the ESAC, as well as the SPC turning into the ESSC, were largely changes in name. In addition, the composition of the DGINS conference hardly changed. Yet the results indicate that it changed in purpose. The DGINS still existed in 2009, but had transferred its responsibilities in relation to the Statistical Programme to the SPC, which was set up particularly for this task. The creation of the ESGAB represents an instance of change in the committee structure of the ESS. The ESGAB was newly established at the end of the period that this thesis analyses, and constitues a new quality control mechanism, in that the ESGAB is charged with the supervision of the implementation of the ESS’s Code of Practice. This means that change has taken place, in the form of setting up new committees such as the SPC and the ESGAB.

Based on the above, this section argues that Eurostat evolved in a path-dependent mode of institutional development. Eurostat was created directly after the introduction of the Treaty of Paris in 1951, and therefore after the creation of the ECSC, the predecessor of the EU. The Treaty of Paris constitutes a critical juncture for the development of the EU as well as that of Eurostat. Firstly, it marks the beginning of the sequence of supranational cooperation of countries comprised in the ECSC, EEC, European Atomic Energy Community, and EU. Eurostat was part of, and continuously provided its services to, all of those. Second, because the time between Schumann’s declaration of 1950 and the signature of the Treaty of Paris in 1951, which set up Eurostat, was only one year. If one compares the duration of this critical juncture of one year to the duration of the sequence whose beginning it marks, one finds that this qualifies as ‘quick’ change as suggested by historical institutionalism: the sequence
starting in 1951 lasted till 2009.

This section posits that the early design choice to set-up Eurostat as coordinator of the EU statistical sphere prevailed over later changes to the ESS’s set-up. None of the committee creations dissolved the basic design of the ESS, consisting of the NSIs as statistics suppliers to Eurostat. This indicates that the creation of Eurostat had more impact than events that took place later in the sequence. Though the successive rounds of enlargement placed an increasing number of NSSs under the remit of Eurostat, and supranational statistical cooperation intensified, such as in the committees related to the ESS, the set-up of the ESS remained the same. The NSSs delivered statistics to Eurostat which coordinated the cooperation in the ESS. Eurostat’s approach to cooperate with accession countries was not subject to change between the enlargements. Moreover, attempts of European Commission policy DGs to produce their own statistics were not successful. Eurostat remained the sole producer of EU official statistics. Furthermore, despite demands of the NSSs to split Eurostat from the European Commission, Eurostat stayed part of the latter in the form of a DG. As a consequence, this section contends that Eurostat followed a path-dependent mode of institutional development.

3.4 Summary of the Findings and Conclusion

This section recapitulates the findings of Sections 3.1 to 3.3. It draws on one explanatory factor after the other, which Chapter Two identified as supranational institutional explanatory factors. In doing so, it lays the ground for the country analyses, Chapters Five and Six, which test whether the theoretical expectations hold true. Based on the findings of Section 3.1, this section concludes that Eurostat was set up as coordinator of the ESS rather than as an authority meant to take over the responsibilities of the NSIs. Over the course of successive EU enlargement rounds, Eurostat had an increasing number of NSSs under its auspices.

Eurostat fared well with regard to its obligatory potential. Eurostat could initiate statistical legislation which qualified as EU secondary legislation, and could be enforced firstly by Eurostat itself. If this initial stage of enforcement did not settle the matter, then Eurostat could pass the matter on to the ECJ. One would thus expect domestic migration statistics harmonisation to be achieved. This, however, only refers to the obligatory potential of Eurostat. Individual legal instruments need to be examined in view of their obligatory potential in order to identify the ones that are expected to bring
about migration statistics harmonisation. Chapter Four does so. Yet it was necessary to evaluate Eurostat’s obligatory potential towards the member states in this chapter, in order to examine what potential it had to affect the NSSs.

Section 3.3 found Eurostat’s mode of institutional development to be of a path-dependent nature. The section argued for the existence of a critical juncture from 1950 to 1951, which started the sequence of Eurostat’s path-dependent institutional development. Attempts of policy DGs of the European Commission to produce their own official statistics were of limited success, and Eurostat could assert its position as sole producer of EU-wide official statistics. The introduction of the Eurostat law in 1997 signalled an increase in Eurostat’s independence from the European Commission. Yet it did not initiate Eurostat’s split from the European Commission. This indicates that the basic features of the ESS remained the same, but with a strengthened role for Eurostat within the European Commission. The power of the member states in supranational statistical matters which had already been present at the moment of Eurostat’s creation was still a potential cause for obstacles to a higher degree of statistics harmonisation in two regards: first, in view of the creation of a powerful, and in a final move, single, statistical office in the EU eradicating the NSIs, and secondly, concerning a higher level of harmonisation of EU statistics. Based on these restrictions, Eurostat was created and remained the coordinating statistical body of the ESS. This basic aspect of its original role in the ESS has changed little to date. As a consequence, this chapter argues that Eurostat and the ESS developed in a path-dependent manner. The theoretical expectation set out in Chapter Two, regarding a path-dependent institutional development of Eurostat in the ESS, is that this has a positive impact on migration statistics harmonisation in the member states, since it aimed at statistics harmonisation from the start⁹.

⁹ In addition to harmonisation being the outspoken aim of the ESS, there could also be additional factors impacting on migration statistics harmonisation.
Chapter Four - Tracing the Development of Migration Statistics Harmonisation at European Union Level and Identifying Migration Statistics Harmonisation Incentives

Chapter Four serves to identify important steps that have been taken, at EU level, towards migration statistics harmonisation for the following country analyses, Chapters Five and Six. To that end, this Chapter refers to the factors that constitute the supranational variable as laid out in the theoretical framework, and examines how legal instruments, Action Plans, Programmes, and Council Conclusions fare in view of the indicators constituting the supranational variable. The chapter contends that the EMN Council Decision and Regulation 862/2007/EC fulfil all six of the indicators that are assumed to be conducive to migration statistics harmonisation as set out in Section 2.6.2.

In the following, Chapters Five and Six both examine the EMN Council Decision and Regulation 862/2007/EC as EU incentives for migration statistics harmonisation. The other documents examined in this Chapter do not fulfil the entity of factors, and are excluded from examination in the two following chapters. Albert Kraler, Michael Jandl, and Martin Hoffmann review how EU migration policy has developed over time, and contend that migration moving upwards on the EU’s agenda brought an increased interest in migration statistics with it (Kraler, Jandl & Hoffmann, 2006, pp. 35-76; see also Kraler, 2005). They do, however, not systematically evaluate how the harmonisation incentives they enlist relate to migration statistics harmonisation, which represents the aim of this chapter.

4.1 Examining Policy Incentives at European Union Level

Chapter Four advances Chapter Three, which focused on the institutional supranational explanatory factors. Chapter Four examines how these factors play out for singular documents. This is necessary because the actual document may be aimed at only certain member states, and because Chapter Three found that Eurostat could govern the EU statistical sphere in both a non-legally binding, and a legally binding, manner. Chapter Four furthermore lays the ground for Chapters Five and Six. It examines EU incentives for migration statistics harmonisation between 1976, when the Council Regulation on the compilation of uniform statistics on foreign workers came into force, and 2009 when the Regulation 862/2007/EC on the harmonisation of
migration statistics came into force. First, the purpose of this section is to recapitulate the indicators for the supranational variable by which the documents are assessed. In order to be conducive to migration statistics harmonisation, the Section 2.6.2 conceptualised the supranational variable as follows:

- Eurostat’s mode of institutional development is that of path-dependence
- the EU incentive should ask for migration statistics harmonisation
- the degree of obligation of the EU incentive must be high: the EU incentive must be supranational primary or secondary law, enforceable by courts or supranational institutions
- issue linkage of the EU incentive must be inexistant
- the degree of detail of the EU incentive must be high

It is the EU’s journey toward a common migration policy that led to Regulation 862/2007/EC on the harmonisation of EU migration statistics (Interview 16). This section outlines which documents are analysed in this chapter, and justifies their use. The chapter evaluates EU law between 1976, when the proposal for the Council Regulation on the compilation of uniform statistics on foreign workers was issued, and the EMN Council Decision in 2008. This is divided into three periods which coincide with the periods prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam, post Amsterdam, and post Treaty of Nice. The chapter also studies EU multi-annual Statistical Programmes. The chapter moreover studies Council Conclusions as well as it looks into Programmes and Action Plans focusing on migration. It is important to include all the document types named above in this analysis for the following reasons. The multi-annual Statistical Programmes provide insight into the priorities in the statistical sphere for their respective validity period, whereas the Council Conclusions outline priorities for the EU in general. Action Plans and EU secondary law then elaborate on how these priorities are executed in practice. Instead of analysing the documents in these groups, the chapter examines them chronologically. This allows not only for identifying which documents fare well in view of the supranational variable, but also for tracing the process of migration statistics harmonisation at EU level. This serves the additional purpose of
determining in which of the three periods, roughly demarcating the Treaties, (Sections 4.1.1, 4.1.3, 4.1.5) migration statistics harmonisation entered the EU’s agenda.

4.1.1 Analysing Documents from 1976 to 1992 regarding the Supranational Variable

This section studies how the documents from the Council Regulation on the compilation of statistics on foreign workers (1972) to the end of the Statistical Programme 1989-1992 fared in view of the indicators of the supranational variable outlined in Section 4.1. Given that, these documents were all issued prior to the signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. This Treaty functions as a watershed for migration policy at EU level since it transferred the formerly intergovernmentally governed pillar to the first pillar, which enabled the EU institutions to have more impact on matters of migration. This section proceeds by examining the indicators per document, before the following Section 4.1.2 summarises the results. It contends that none of the documents examined in this section fulfil all the criteria of the independent variables, and hence are not a harmonisation incentive, show a high degree of obligation, do not feature issue linkage, or are highly detailed. This is why these documents are disregarded in view of answering the research question. As established in Chapter Three, Eurostat’s mode of institutional development was that of path-dependence for the years from 1976 to 1992.

The proposal for a Council Regulation on the compilation of uniform statistics of foreign workers from the Commission to the Council marked a step towards the ensuing Regulation. The proposal explained in its explanatory memorandum that in 1967, the requirement to obtain a permit to work in a member state other than one’s own was dropped. As a result, some member states solely collected foreign worker statistics on third country nationals. Because of this, it became important to find other sources of the data necessary to form statistics on the entity of foreign workers in a member state (European Commission, 1972, p. 2). The representatives of the member states voiced their discontent about the lack of comparability of existing domestic statistics on foreign workers (European Commission, 1972, p. 1). The Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, and the European Economic and Social Committee argued it was necessary to collect data on foreign workers since these were an important part of the EEC’s labour market. In order to gain knowledge about foreign workers, they asked that in addition to data on the employment status itself, statistics which were
sufficiently comparable on nationality, sex, age, branch of activity or occupational group and region should also be compiled. The memorandum also mentioned that in 1972 no such sufficiently comparable statistics existed (European Commission, 1972, pp. 1-2).

It would only be in 1976 that the Council issued the initial Council Regulation on the collection of those numbers. Specifically, Council Regulation 311/1976/EEC centred on “the compilation of statistics on foreign workers” (Council, 1976, Article 1(2)). This 1976 Regulation gave no details about common definitions of key concepts or data sources, and merely stated that member states should “compile statistics once a year from the various sources normally available to them, in particular social security data, censuses, statistics supplied by employers or residence or work permits” (Council, 1976, Article 1(2)). This list of potential data sources supports the title of the Regulation in that the purpose of gathering migration statistics was primarily related to matters of the labour market. The question of those numbers’ harmonisation would only be legally addressed and formalised by Regulation 862/2007/EC in 2007.

Another step in this analysis of the development of migration statistics harmonisation at EU level is the Statistical Programme for the years 1985 to 1987. Under this Statistical Programme, the harmonisation of statistics as such, and in particular external trade statistics, was a key topic. In relation to the field of external trade which was described as “most onerous and successful”, the Statistical Programme admitted that “standards of comparability” were “less rigorous” in the face of two rounds of enlargement in other areas (European Commission, 1984, pp. 8-9). Yet at the same time the lowest level of harmonisation across the member states with regard to “urgent policy purposes” was also “lower than previously considered to be necessary” (European Commission, 1984, pp. 8-9). Moreover, bringing supranational, i.e. Community nomenclatures and definitions, in line with “general international standards” is portrayed as a priority for Eurostat in these years. The Statistical Programme addressed the area of “employment, social affairs and education” as one of ten statistical tasks that had been added to Eurostat’s remit in the years prior to this Programme, with a focus on statistics on migrant workers, yet it did not include a harmonisation incentive for these (European Commission, 1984, Appendix II). The analysis of the priorities shows that, while migration statistics were a topic of this Statistical Programme, their significance was low compared to statistics in other areas such as external trade.
The second Statistical Programme which this chapter analyses is the one covering the years from 1989 to 1992. According to the European Council, the Statistical Programme for the period 1989 to 1992 served an important purpose in relation to the creation of the internal market strived for therein (Council, 1989a, p. 1). Naturally, it did so by setting the basis for collecting statistical evidence, in particular to formulate and assess policies, but it also set out overarching goals of increased availability and comparability of statistics across the member states of the community. The creation of the internal market constituted the main concern of this Statistical Programme. The Programme mentions it as the first area of statistics that was to be tackled (Council, 1989a, pp. 4-5) and the “development of the statistical infrastructure” was considered as “necessary for the proper operation of the internal market” (Council, 1989a, p. 3). Only after that were statistics for the decision-making in the area of the Common Agricultural Policy, and the structural funds, named as priorities.

While the final report of the SPC on the Statistical Programme for the years from 1989 to 1992 talked about completed comprehensive harmonisation of statistics in the sectors of agriculture, iron, steel, and external trade on EU level, the Statistical Programme did not directly address migration statistics, let alone their harmonisation (Council, 1989a, p. 5). It concentrated on the internal market, economic and social policy, agriculture, industry, and the functioning of the EU institutions, and issued sectoral programmes for areas such as social and regional statistics, which includes migration statistics (Council, 1989a, p. 5). In its report, the SPC mentioned that Eurostat’s coverage of migration-related statistics extended to “migratory flows” and the “structure of foreign populations”. The report claimed the availability of these data for the years 1990 and 1991, but questioned their quality. It further denoted the necessity to harmonise “certain” definitions, and “to develop information sources in some Member States [...] and to improve data coherence” (European Commission, 1993, p. 27).

4.1.2 Analysing Documents from 1976 to 1992 regarding the Supranational Variable - Conclusion

This section sets out how the three documents mentioned in Section 4.1.1 fared in view of the supranational variable, proceeding by supranational explanatory factor. It does so in order to identify which of the documents showed positive results and should
thus be examined in view of their impact on the domestic level in Chapters Five and Six. Table 4.1 summarises the findings for the documents analysed in Section 4.1.1, before this section proceeds to give a more detailed examination per document.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harmonisation incentive</th>
<th>High degree of obligation</th>
<th>non-existent issue linkage</th>
<th>High degree of detail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: Author’s own depiction.

This Council Regulation 311/1976/EEC was addressed to all member states of the time. It did not constitute a supranational incentive for the harmonisation of migration statistics in the form of goals, instruments, or instrument settings. The goal of this Council Regulation was merely the compilation of statistics on foreign workers. This meant that only the migrants in employment were of interest, as opposed to the entirety of migrants. There was no demand for using uniform instruments: the member states could make use of “the various sources normally available to them” (Council, 1976, Article 1(2)). It neither demanded the harmonisation of instrument settings such as definitions nor statistics submission dates to Eurostat. While it asked to receive the same breakdowns from all member states, these breakdowns were not defined, so occupational groups or age groups were allowed to differ across the member states (Council, 1976, Article, 1(1)). Its form of secondary law signified that the Council Regulation could be enforced by the Commission and the Court. The Council
Regulation asked for the compilation of statistics of an intrinsically interlinked issue - foreign workers. Another argument speaks for the existence of issue linkage in the case of the Council Regulation: the member states were allowed to use social security data to produce their statistics on foreign workers. The Council Regulation also featured a low degree of detail: it not only consists of only four articles, but also failed to provide more guidance on statistical breakdowns.

The Statistical Programme for the years 1985 to 1987 was valid for all the member states at the time. While it contained a harmonisation incentive for statistics in general, Eurostat was only starting to look into statistics of the area of employment, social affairs and education. In the following, this section contends that the Programme lacked a harmonisation incentive for migration statistics. The degree of obligation of early Statistical Programmes was different to those to date. Whereas the latter ones take the form of a Decision or a Regulation, the sixth Statistical Programme marked the increasing degree of obligation of Statistical Programmes. The explanatory note of the Statistical Programme mentioned that the European Commission instituted a procedure which should allow “the Council to examine and approve such programmes” (European Commission, 1984, Explanatory Note). The European Commission forwarded the Programme to the Council “with an indication that it is ready to have consultation with the Council”, and the Council sent it to the European Parliament and to the Economic and Social Committee for information (European Commission, 1984, Explanatory Note). This means that the sixth Statistical Programme did not yet qualify as secondary law. Its degree of obligation is thus low.

The Statistical Programme covered a wide range of statistical themes, such as the processing and dissemination of statistical information, general economic statistics, external trade, transport statistics, energy, and demographic and social statistics (European Commission, 1984, p. 3). This section hence argues that the Statistical Programme featured a high degree of issue linkage. As is the nature of Statistical Programmes, the degree of detail of the sixth Statistical Programme was low: the Statistical Programme mentioned priorities, named aspects of harmonisation and how statistics could be linked, and in the long term, could converge. It set out perspectives for “difficult sectors”, and statistics dissemination and marketing, and stressed the importance of research into new technologies to provide the “optimal amount of information relevant to policy purposes” (European Commission, 1984, p. 12). For instance, regarding the harmonisation of statistics, the Statistical Programme stated that
it was important to understand the differences between NSSs, but did not elaborate on how this should be accomplished.

The Statistical Programme for the years 1989 to 1992 had relevance for all member states of the time. Based on the above, it did not contain a harmonisation incentive for migration statistics. Rather, it questioned the quality of the data available, which means that the comparability of these data was also questionable. While the Council issued a Resolution on the implementation of a Statistical Programme for the first time, the Statistical Programme for 1989 to 1992, Resolutions are non-binding (Council, 1989, Annex). The Statistical Programme hence had a low degree of obligation. Typical for a multi-annual Statistical Programme, this Statistical Programme also covered a high number of issues rather than dwelling on details. Since the Statistical Programme did not contain a harmonisation incentive, the issue could not have been linked to others.

This means all the three documents examined in Section 4.1.1 did not address the topic of migration statistics harmonisation. All documents are issued during Eurostat’s path-dependent mode of institutional development as shown in Chapter Three. The degree of obligation varies between the documents, however: the two Statistical Programmes had a low degree of obligation, whereas that of the other documents was high. Issue linkage was non-existent in these documents, since they all did not ask for migration statistics harmonisation. Moreover, the degree of detail was low for all the documents which Section 4.1.1 analysed. This means that the degree of obligation and the absence of issue linkage should be conducive to migration statistics harmonisation. Crucially, however, the documents lack a harmonisation incentive. In addition, they do not show a degree of detail. These latter two indicators are expected to hinder migration statistics harmonisation. This is the reason why none of the documents examined in this section forms part of Chapters Five and Six.
4.1.3 Analysing Documents from 1998 to 1999 regarding the Supranational Variable

This section shows how the documents, from the 1998 Action Plan on migration statistics to the Tampere Conclusions, fared concerning the indicators of the supranational variable which Section 4.1 set out. It argues that none of the documents examined in this section covers all the explanatory factors positively. Therefore, the documents are excluded from the further analysis of this thesis. Section 4.1.4 summarises the results.

In 1998, the Commission published an Action Plan aimed at extending the collection of migration and asylum statistics (European Commission, 1998). The Action Plan elaborated that it was necessary to widen the collection of these statistics, as well as to ensure that these were comparable across the member states. This was deemed important after an examination of the working methods of the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on Asylum (CIREA) and the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Borders and Immigration (CIREFI). The Action Plan mentioned that data collection at that point exhibited many gaps, and the data was often outdated. The Commission was now looking into how Eurostat could take up this task. It enlisted the goals of collecting asylum data on asylum requests and decisions, non-accompanied minors, and the demands for asylum refoulements. Other types of data could be collected in the final phase of the Action Plan. The Action Plan asked for proceedings to take place in two phases. First the member states were to deliver the complete data needed at EU level for the first semester of 1998. A database should be established, experts from the NSIs heard, and a data transfer system created. Moreover, the Action Plan scheduled an evaluation of the activities for December 1998 (European Commission, 1998, A). The second phase of the Action Plan foresaw the extension of the data collection of the old member states to the ten new member states and candidate countries, as well as new types of data on issues such as trafficking and forged documents. The Action Plan specifically aimed at a monthly or trimestral data delivery of the member states. However, the Action Plan explicitly lacked a list of methodological definitions. This was presented as a final step in the harmonisation of migration statistics after the database had been established.

This section now focuses the Statistical Programme for the years 1998 to 2002. The Statistical Programme declared the analysis of available data and the harmonisation of migration statistics concepts as primary task for Eurostat for its period of validity. The Programme acknowledged that the member states differed in the sources feeding
into supranational migration statistics (Council, 1999, Title III). It also portrayed migration statistics as essential under Title VIII on social policy, education, vocational training and youth statistics. The Programme recognised, however, that the data of this area were collected for the “analysis of long-term unemployment and studies of transition processes”, not for purely migration-related reasons.

The 1998 Action Plan on the implementation of the Treaty of Amsterdam - the so-called Vienna Action Plan - focused on the area of asylum, external borders and immigration, as well as the statistics required for it, as follows. The Vienna Action Plan aimed at drawing up an “overall migration strategy”. In order to achieve this, the Action Plan declared the exchange of information and statistics on immigration and asylum a priority, and asked to extend the availability of “information on the status of third country nationals and national legislation and policy on the basis of the Commission’s Action Plan” (Council & European Commission, 1999, Section 34).

The Tampere Conclusions in general aimed at the “creation of an area of freedom, security and justice in the European Union” (European Council, 1999, Introduction). To that end, the Conclusions were of importance with regard to the development of a common EU asylum and migration policy. Yet the Conclusions also declared developing “a genuine European area of justice”, the “Union-wide fight against crime”, and “stronger external action” as milestones (European Council, 1999, Sections A-D). With regard to the development of a common EU asylum and migration policy, the Tampere Conclusions addressed issues related to third country nationals (European Council, 1999, Section A I-IV). For that purpose, the general “approximation of legislations on the conditions for admission and residence of third country nationals” between member states should have been supported by “a shared assessment of the economic and demographic developments within the Union, as well as the situation in the countries of origin” (European Council, 1999, Section A III). This assessment needed to be based on evidence, which could have been provided by the relevant harmonised migration and asylum statistics. However, the Tampere Council Conclusions did not mention the harmonisation of migration statistics as a goal.
4.1.4 Analysing Documents from 1998 to 1999 regarding the Supranational Variable - Conclusion

The section at hand summarises the findings for the documents explored in view of migration statistics harmonisation in the previous Section 4.1.3. It does so in order to determine their results regarding the indicators for the supranational variable. This section conducts this recapitulation by document in chronological order. By doing that, the section identifies which of the documents asks for examination concerning its impact on the national level in Chapters Five and Six. Table 4.2 summarises the findings for the documents analysed in Section 4.1.2, before this section proceeds to give a more detailed examination per document.

Table 4.2. Supranational Results of the Examined Documents from the 1998 Migration Statistics Action Plan to the Tampere Conclusions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harmonisation incentive</th>
<th>Degree of obligation</th>
<th>Low or non-existent issue linkage</th>
<th>High degree of detail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: Author’s own depiction.

The 1998 Migration Statistics Action Plan was applicable to all member states. In its second phase it also extended to the candidate countries. It clearly included an incentive in view of the common goal of better available and comparable migration
statistics. However, it specifically did not include a harmonisation incentive regarding the sources, i.e. the policy instruments, and instrument settings, namely the definitions. The Action Plan did not constitute primary or secondary law, and thus featured a low degree of obligation. The Action Plan focused on the collection and harmonisation of migration statistics, and hence did not link issues. The degree of detail is low as the Plan set goals, but did not provide the member states with guidelines on how to furnish and transmit these data to Eurostat. The Action Plan showed three indicators conducive to migration statistics harmonisation, yet a low degree of obligation, and little detail.

Like the Statistical Programme for the years 1985 to 1987, the one for the years 1998 to 2002 was relevant for all member states of the time. Contrary to the previous one, this Programme contained a clear harmonisation incentive for migration statistics. Issued as Council Decision on the Community Statistical Programme 1998 to 2002, the Statistical Programme had the status of secondary law, and was thus enforceable by the European Commission and the Court. This Statistical Programme asked for migration statistics harmonisation, and had a high degree of issue linkage in that it was aimed at economic, social, and migration data collection. The Statistical Programme linked economic, social, and migration data collection (Council, 1999, Title VIII). The multi-annual nature of the Statistical Programme brought with it a low level of detail. This document had three indicators furthering migration statistics harmonisation. However, it did not fulfil the criteria of low issue linkage and contained little detail, which is thought to hinder migration statistics harmonisation.

The Vienna Action Plan did not directly exclude Ireland and the UK from its applicability. However, it mentioned that in “the context of the Treaty requirements, account should also be taken of the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland under the Protocols to the Amsterdam Treaty” which restricts its relevance for those two member states (Council & Commission, 1999, Section 27). While the Vienna Action Plan asked to ameliorate the availability of migration and asylum statistics, it did not address the issue of harmonisation, but only improved exchange of information. This means that the Action Plan did not demand harmonisation in that regard. As an Action Plan it was neither primary nor secondary law, and showed a low degree of obligation. As mentioned above, the Vienna Action Plan linked the issues of migration statistics with an overall migration strategy. The Action Plan had a low degree of detail, and solely named the areas for which data were required. Most indicators exhibited a negative result in the case of the Vienna Action Plan. Only its relevance for the majority
of member states and the lack of issue linkage could have been conducive to migration statistics harmonisation. The latter, however, stemmed from the Action Plan’s silence regarding a harmonisation incentive, so the negative result is rendered meaningless.

The Tampere Conclusions applied to all member states of the time. The Conclusions lacked a harmonisation incentive for migration statistics. Their degree of obligation was also low, since the Conclusions were not legally binding. They were neither primary nor secondary law, and could thus not be enforced by the Commission or the ECJ. The Conclusions had several focal points. The Conclusions encompassed the fight against crime, strengthening external action, and developing a common migration and asylum policy. This section argues, however, that since the Conclusions did not include a harmonisation incentive for migration statistics, there was no issue linkage. The Tampere Conclusions also set out milestones rather than providing detailed guidance in how to accomplish these. In the following, this section posits that the Tampere Conclusions had a low degree of detail. Only as regards one indicator, the applicability to all member states, is thought to be conducive to migration statistics harmonisation at national level. The non-existence of issue linkage was due to the lack of a harmonisation incentive in the Tampere Conclusions, and should not be seen as furthering their impact on the national level, in the following.

Overall, only two of the four documents analysed examined in Section 4.1.3 included a harmonisation incentive for migration statistics. All documents examined in this section apart from the 1998 Migration Statistics Action Plan and the Statistical Programme for 1998 to 2002 are excluded from the analyses in Chapters Five and Six. Furthermore, also none of these two documents showed positive results for the factors thought to be conducive to migration for all indicators. This is also why the 1998 Migration Statistics Action Plan and the Statistical Programme for 1998 to 2002 are not part of the country analyses.

4.1.5 Analysing Documents from 2001 to 2007 regarding the Supranational Variable

This section examines how documents from 2001 to Regulation 862//2007/EC fared in view of the indicators for the supranational variable. This serves to identify those documents which show positive results for the factors of the independent variable, and are thus likely to influence migration statistics harmonisation nationally. The section finds that the EMN Council Decision and Regulation 862/2007/EC did so in all
explanatory factors. As a consequence, they form part of Chapters Five and Six. The section proceeds by exploring the further factors of the supranational variable, factor by factor, for each of the analysed documents. Following the 2350th Council meeting on Justice, Home Affairs, and Civil Protection, in May 2001, the press statement declared that “[i]n the field of asylum and migration statistics, transparency should therefore henceforth become the main principle” only subject to the requirement to safeguard people’s identity (European Commission, 2001a, Section Asylum and Migration - Conclusions regarding common analysis and statistics). Prior to that, the secrecy of information was guarded by the Council secretariat, the “K.4” or coordinating committee, and the “clearinghouses” CIREA and CIREFI (European Commission, 2001a, Section Asylum and Migration - Conclusions regarding common analysis and statistics). This secrecy around the data, documents and decisions of the Council led the European Parliament to ask to be “regularly updated on the work being done in this area and for due account to be taken of [the] Parliament’s views” (European Parliament, 1996, 2.). Further, the cooperation between the relevant national authorities and Eurostat, and also the use of international organisations as venues for discussion to further the availability of migration and asylum statistics, should be enhanced. This can be seen as the hour of birth of Regulation 862/2007/EC, as the “Commission [was] invited to consider at an appropriate time the preparation of Community legislation to set out the needs of the Community for statistics in this field and how these needs can be met” (European Commission, 2001a, Asylum and Migration - Conclusions regarding common analysis and statistics).

According to the Laeken Council Conclusions of December 2001, the Union’s goal of a “true common asylum and immigration policy” was “slower and less substantial” than it had assumed it to be (European Council, 2001, Section 38). The Conclusions centred on common asylum and immigration measures such as family unification and effective external border control. Information backing this policy area increased in importance. For instance, a measure envisioned to support the development of a common asylum and immigration policy was “the development of a European system for exchanging information on asylum, migration and countries of origin”, and an agreement on a common definition on the term “refugee” (European Council, 2001, Sections 40, 41).

The European Council reiterated the need “to develop a European Union common policy on [...] asylum and immigration” in its Seville Conclusions (European
Council, 2002, Section 26). In order to achieve this, it was “determined to speed up the implementation of all aspects of the Programme adopted in Tampere for the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice in the European Union” (European Council, 2002, Section 26). The Conclusions spoke about a multitude of actions that it envisioned for the years following the Seville Conclusions. While on the one hand, the Conclusions focused on measures that were aimed at the Union internally, other measures were drawn up for the Union’s external persona. Examples from the Conclusions are that, after the European Council had asked to agree on a common definition of a refugee under the Laeken Conclusions, now the European Council urged the Council to adopt minimum standards for “qualification for refugee status and the content of refugee status and the provisions on family reunification and the status of long-term permanent residents”, or the integration of the lawfully immigrated (European Council, 2002, Sections 29, 37).

The Statistical Programme covering the period from 2003 to 2007 enlisted migration statistics as one of four priorities, in particular for the “statistical implications of the major Community policy areas” (European Parliament & Council, 2002, 3. Priorities). Under its title “[v]isas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons”, this Statistical Programme mentioned the need for more comprehensive migration and asylum statistics, as well as the need for them to be more comparable between member states (European Parliament & Council, 2002, Title IV). Under this Statistical Programme, the interplay between economic and migration statistics was not as distinct as in earlier versions. Migration statistics were rather of importance for their own right, and the need to improve them concerning comprehensiveness and comparability is clearly voiced in this Statistical Programme. Yet this Statistical Programme enlisted the forthcoming enlargement of the Union and “the development of cooperation with the countries of the Mediterranean Basin” as reinforcing factors for data requirements in the area of asylum and migration (European Parliament & Council, 2002, Title IV).

In 2003, the Thessaloniki Conclusions repeated the European Council’s call for speeding up the development towards a common approach to matters of asylum and migration, that had been initiated in Tampere. The Conclusions stressed the political importance of its migration and asylum policy within its overall scope of responsibilities (European Council, 2003, Sections 8, 9). The Council urged the member states to complete the adoption of legislation in the policy field of asylum. The
Conclusions also emphasised the importance of integrating legally resident citizens of third countries in the EU member states (European Council, 2003, Sections 14, 24). These integration measures were to provide these third country nationals similar conditions to EU citizens, most prominently with regard to working conditions, education and health services. This section hence argues that integration was paired with economic and demographic aspects. Moreover, the Thessaloniki Conclusions mentioned that an “Annual Report on Migration and Integration in Europe” should be issued. This report from the Commission to the Council should prominently feature data on migration and asylum. It was intended to present an overview of the state of play concerning policy measures and practices employed by the member states. The Conclusions stressed the data’s significance for an “effective management of migration in Europe” (European Council, 2003, Section 33). The Thessaloniki Conclusions also mentioned the creation of the European Migration Network (EMN) (European Council, 2003, Section 34).

According to the Hague Programme, the policy area of freedom, security and justice was high on the political agenda. The Treaties from Maastricht onwards set up a “common legal framework [...] and the integration of this policy area with other policy areas of the Union” (Council, 2005, Section I). The document also raised illegal immigration and trafficking of human beings as threats to the Union citizens’ security. While the Hague Programme also addressed the rights of migrants and refugees, such as their access to courts, the document repeated the need for restrictive measures such as better external border control, and the need to fight illegal immigration (Council, 2005, Section I). Economic aspects played less of a role in relation to migration and asylum policy in the Programme, and were only briefly mentioned as a means to achieve “the knowledge-based economy in Europe” (Council, 2005, Section III 1.4). While it did not elaborate on the quality or comparability of the data, the section on asylum, migration and border policy is of importance to this thesis as it stressed the requirement for common analysis of aspects of migration. According to the Hague Programme, the journey towards a common migration and asylum policy needed to take root in the common analysis of the relevant data. To achieve a common analysis of migratory movements, the European Council reiterated that “the collection, provision, exchange and efficient use of up-to-date information and data on all relevant migratory developments [was] of key importance” (Council, 2005, Section III 1.2).
The development of the EMN is of importance for migration statistics harmonisation, because the 1996 feasibility study on the creation of an EMN\textsuperscript{10} referred to the Network as potential “catalyst for data harmonisation” in the area of migration statistics (University College London et al, 1996, 169). Apart from the goal of the Network playing a supportive role in statistics harmonisation, the Network was meant to fill the gaps such as that of inadequate “access to and comprehensive and up-to-date source on national policy and legislation relating to migration” (University College London et al, 1996, x). In addition, the 2007 European Commission staff working document, included in the Proposal for a Council Decision establishing a European Migration Network, reflects on the Network’s role in executing research and analysing the data provided by Eurostat, as well as its ability to “add value by bringing together other official and non-statistical data which are not covered by the Regulation and to support the experimentation with new practices and methods” (European Commission, 2007, 3.d).

From 2003 to 2006, the EMN existed as a pilot project, while the Network only gained a legal basis in 2008, with the Council Decision 381/2008/EC of 14 May 2008 establishing a European Migration Network (EMN Council Decision) (Council, 2008, (6)). The EMN Council Decision itself, as issued in 2008, was aimed at the provision of “up-to-date, objective, reliable and comparable information on migration and asylum” (Council, 2008, Article 1(2)). It formulated the key tasks of the EMN as the collection and analysis of information, developing indicators which would further the consistency of information, and providing the relevant EU institutions with it (Council, 2008, Articles 2, 8). It also determined the composition of the EMN (Council, 2008, Articles 3, 5), and that of its steering board (Council, 2008, Article 4). The EMN’s work was coordinated by the Commission so that it reflected the “political priorities of the Community in the area of migration and asylum” (Council, 2008, Article 6). It also elaborated on the frequency and purpose of the EMN meetings (Council, 2008, Article 7), its reports and studies (Council, 2008, 9), how the internet-based information system should take form (Council, 2008, Article 8) and its cooperation with EU institutions (Council, 2008, Article 10). The EMN Council Decision lastly laid out the budgetary resources and the implementation of this budget (Council, 2008, Articles 11, 12). This indicates a high degree of detail.

\textsuperscript{10} The EMN was referred to as “European Migration Observatory” in this feasibility study.
Regulation 862/2007/EC was aimed at more comparable migration statistics in general, and the harmonisation of the underlying definitions of migration and asylum statistics, i.e. the policy instrument settings, in particular. However, the Regulation did not ask for the harmonisation of the sources - the policy instruments - on the basis of which these statistics were produced (European Parliament & Council, 2007, Article 9(1)). Indeed, a Eurostat official who was involved in drawing up Regulation 862/2007/EC, that bound the NSIs to common definitions, explained that it was at no time foreseen to draw migration statistics from a common type of data source across the member states (Interview 19). The Regulation determined a vast range of definitions essential for the production of migration statistics, such as usual residence, immigration, emigration, and citizenship (European Parliament & Council, 2007, Article 2(1)(a)-(d)) as well as their respective breakdowns and submission date (for instance, European Parliament & Council, 2007, Article 3(1), Article 3(2)). In addition, the Regulation required the member states to supply Eurostat with information about the data sources they used, as well as the quality of those (European Parliament & Council, Articles 9(2), 9(3)). Lastly, the Regulation determined how the member states should supply the data to Eurostat, and asked for regular reporting on the implementation of the Regulation in the national contexts (European Parliament & Council, 2007, Articles 10(1), 12)). This means that the EMN Council Decision and the Regulation showed positive results for all the explanatory factors, and are hence included in the country chapters.

4.1.6 Analysing the Results of Documents from 2001 to 2007 regarding the Supranational Variable - Conclusion

This section recapitulates the findings for the documents analysed in Section 4.1.5 and determines which of them is or which of them are likely to impact on domestic migration statistics harmonisation. Those documents which focus on migration statistics harmonisation in the UK and the Netherlands respectively are forming the basis for Chapters Five and Six. Table 4.3 outlines the results of this section, before the section goes on to present the results of each indicator per document.
Table 4.3. Supranational Results of the Examined Documents from 2001 to 2007.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harmonisation incentive</th>
<th>High degree of obligation</th>
<th>Low or non-existent issue linkage</th>
<th>High degree of detail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, the</td>
<td>Yes, the</td>
<td>Yes, the</td>
<td>Yes, the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Statistical Programme</td>
<td>- Regulation 862/2007/EC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>covering the period</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from 2003 to 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Laeken Conclusion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Seville Conclusions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- EMN Council Decision</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Regulation 862/2007/EC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own depiction.

The first of the documents under study in this section are the Conclusions regarding common analysis and statistics of the 2350th Council meeting on Justice, Home Affairs, and Civil Protection. While the Justice and Home Affairs Council concluded that migration and asylum statistics exchange should be ameliorated, it only implicitly addressed the harmonisation of these statistics by ameliorating their comparability. They asked to “avoid duplication and increase efficiency and comparability of statistics, co-ordination and co-operation among these authorities, the Commission and other relevant actors, […] should be further developed, inter alia through a network of statistical experts” (European Commission, 2001a, Section Asylum and Migration - Conclusions regarding common analysis and statistics; italics in original text).
Conclusions made at this meeting qualified neither for primary nor secondary law, and their degree of obligation was thus low.

Apart from asking for better exchange of statistics in the area of migration and asylum, the meeting also tackled a wide range of other issues, such as drugs, and the European Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters (European Commission, 2001a, Section Justice and Home Affairs I). Yet it did not link the issue of migration statistics harmonisation to others; the network of statistical experts is merely a means by which better co-operation should be accomplished (European Commission, 2001a, Section Asylum and Migration - Conclusions regarding common analysis and statistics). The degree of detail of these Conclusions was low as they set out only general principles, objectives, and working methods for the amelioration of migration and asylum statistics exchange (European Commission, 2001a, Section Asylum and Migration - Conclusions regarding common analysis and statistics). This means that the Conclusions fared well in three indicators, the migration statistics harmonisation incentive, the general applicability of the Conclusions, and the lack of issue linkage. Nevertheless, this document did not further domestic migration statistics harmonisation. It fared low for the other two factors.

The Statistical Programme for the years 2003 to 2007 was of relevance to all EU member states of the time. It also contained a harmonisation incentive for migration statistics: the comparability of these should be enhanced (European Parliament & Council, 2002, Title IV). The degree of obligation of the Statistical Programme was high, given that it had the form of a Decision issued by the European Parliament and the Council. This meant that it constituted secondary law, which made it enforceable by the European Commission and the ECJ. The Statistical Programme further linked the harmonisation and the more comprehensive collection and exchange of migration statistics to enlargement and external relations as elaborated above. As is typical for a Statistical Programme, it showed a low degree of detail, and rather stated goals which the NSIs and Eurostat should achieve. This rendered the Statistical Programme achieving positive results for applicability, harmonisation incentive, and degree of obligation, but left it with issue linkage and a low degree of detail, which are both expected to hinder migration statistics harmonisation as set out in Chapter Two.

The Laeken Council Conclusions applied to all member states. They also included a harmonisation incentive as far as the term “refugee” was concerned. They did not ask, however, for the harmonisation of other asylum and migration statistics. As
elaborated for previous Council Conclusions, the degree of obligation of the Laeken Council Conclusions was also low, since they were not legally binding. The Conclusions linked the issue of a better system of information exchange in the field of migration and asylum policy to the issues of the combatting racism and discrimination, as well as “the integration of the policy on migratory flows into the European Union’s foreign policy” (European Commission, 2001b, Section 40). The degree of detail of the Laeken Council Conclusions was low: they named policy goals, but did not elaborate on the details of how to set these into action. The Laeken Council Conclusions hence had positive results in view of applicability, and partly the harmonisation incentive. However, the results of all other indicators are not thought to be conducive to migration statistics harmonisation at national level. The Conclusions are thus excluded from examination in the country analyses.

The Seville Council Conclusions did not address the issue of migration statistics harmonisation. The Conclusions had a low degree of obligation, since they could not be legally enforced. Since the Council Conclusions did not mention the need for migration statistics harmonisation, the issue could not be linked to others. The Conclusions covered a broad range of topics such as enlargement, the reform of the European Council, and European Security and Defence Policy (European Council, 2002, Sections I & II). As for the previous Council Conclusions, the degree of detail was low for the Seville Round. The Conclusions rather determined widely-phrased goals. Since the Seville Council Conclusions solely showed a high result regarding their relevance for all member states, the document does not form part of the analysis in Chapters Five and Six.

The Thessaloniki Conclusions solely mentioned the set-up of the EMN which was intended to assist in migration statistics harmonisation. The Conclusions lacked an incentive for migration statistics harmonisation. As for the previous Council Conclusions which this section analysed, the Thessaloniki Conclusions had neither the status of primary nor secondary law, and could not be enforced legally in the following. As such, their degree of obligation was low. Lacking a harmonisation incentive, the Thessaloniki Conclusions did not link the issue of migration statistics harmonisation to others. Apart from requesting an annual report comprising migration statistics, the Conclusions did not give any more detail. This section hence contends that the Conclusions had a low degree of detail. This makes the general applicability the only indicator in favour of national migration statistics harmonisation in addition to
Eurostat’s path-dependent development. This means that the Thessaloniki Council Conclusions are excluded from Chapters Five and Six.

As mentioned above, the Hague Programme did not contain a harmonisation incentive for migration statistics. It merely asked to reinforce “the collection, provision, exchange and efficient use of up-to-date information and data on all relevant migratory developments is of key importance” (Council, 2005, Section III 1.2). In turn, migration policy was linked to the development of “enhancing the knowledge-based economy in Europe” in Section III 1.4 of the Hague Programme (Council, 2005). The Programme hence contained issue linkage. Since the Programme had neither the status of primary or secondary law, this section argues that the degree of obligation was low. The Programme did not comprise more detail on migration statistics collection than presented here. For that reason, the section argues that the Hague Programme showed a low level of detail. Only the overall applicability of the Programme speaks for migration statistics harmonisation at national level. The Programme does not form part of the analyses of Chapters Five and Six.

Drawing on the above, the EMN Council Decision contained a harmonisation incentive for migration statistics, in that it was the EMN’s purpose to provide comparable information on migration and asylum (Council, 2008, Article 1(2)). In addition, the EMN Council Decision’s introduction mentioned that Regulation 862/2007/EC on the harmonisation of Community statistics on migration and international protection represented an important framework for the EMN (Council, 2008, Introduction (7)). The EMN Council Decision was applicable to all member states apart from Ireland and Denmark. The UK had chosen to participate in the EMN as well as the application of the Decision (Council, 2008, Introduction (16)). This is why this section argues that the Decision was applicable to the vast majority of the member states, so that harmonisation was possible. Since the legal instrument had the status of secondary law, the degree of obligation was high. The EMN Decision had the sole purpose of ensuring the provision of comparable information to EU institutions, member states, and the general public. As such, this section posits that there was no issue linkage. As pointed out above, the degree of detail of the EMN Decision was high. While it only encompassed 15 Articles, the Decision covered all aspects of the Network ranging from the composition of the EMN to its financial allocations. This is particularly remarkable since the EMN had already been established when the Council Decision was issued. One would assume that detailed matters had been settled, and that
the Council Decision would outline the basic tasks of the EMN. Instead, a highly
detailed Council Decision was issued. This means that the EMN Council Decision is the
first document exhibiting positive results for all indicators of the supranational variable.
It is the EMN Council Decision that is examined in the country analyses.

Regulation 862/2007/EC applied to all EU member states. As explained above, the legal instrument named the goal of comparable migration statistics, and achieving the harmonisation of both definitions and the frequency with which the member states should supply Eurostat with the respective statistics. The Regulation thus contained a clear harmonisation incentive. As a Regulation, the legal instrument had a high degree of obligation, since Regulations have the status of secondary law and can be enforced by the Commission and the ECJ. In view of issue linkage, Regulation 862/2007/EC focused exclusively on the matter of migration statistics harmonisation, and featured no issue linkage. The degree of detail of this legal instrument was high. As elaborated above, the Regulation named definitions, breakdowns, submission dates for the statistics, and the respective implementation reports. This means that the Regulation is the second document to show positive results in all indicators of the supranational variable, and Chapters Five and Six hence examine the Regulation.

The majority of the eight documents analysed in Section 4.1.5 contained a harmonisation incentive for migration statistics. Only the Thessaloniki Conclusions and the Hague Programme kept silent regarding this issue. All documents applied to the majority of member states, so they show positive results regarding this indicator. Only three documents had a high degree of obligation, i.e. the Statistical Programme for the years 2003 to 2007, the EMN Council Decision, and the Regulation. Regarding the indicator of issue linkage, the JHA Council Conclusions, the EMN Council Decisions, and Regulation 862/2007/EC showed positive results, since they did not link migration statistics harmonisation to others. The Laeken Conclusions and the Statistical Programme, however, featured issue linkage. Only the EMN Council Decision and the Regulation showed high degrees of detail. This means that, of the documents analysed in this section, only those two documents are examined in Chapters Five and Six regarding their impact on domestic migration statistics harmonisation.
4.2 Explanatory Analysis and Conclusion

This section provides an overall conclusion comprising the findings of Sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.6. It presents the findings for the results of the indicators for each of the three spans of time per document. In addition to that, the conclusion reflects on the development of migration statistics harmonisation at supranational level. Section 4.1.2 concluded that none of the analysed documents featured positive results in all the indicators of the supranational variable. Section 4.1.4 similarly recapitulated that none of the documents exhibited positive results for every indicator. Because of this, Chapters Five and Six examine none of the documents from Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.3. Section 4.1.5, however, found that Regulation 862/2007/EC and the EMN Council Decision showed positive results for all indicators for the supranational variable. In the following, one expects them to impact on domestic migration statistics harmonisation, and the country analyses hence focus on these legal instruments.

This chapter also found that early demand for evidence in the form of statistics did not immediately further the harmonisation of migration statistics. In other words, while these early data requirements indeed existed, they neither triggered nor enhanced harmonisation of migration statistics at EU level shortly after being issued. The chapter showed that migration statistics harmonisation is by no means a topic which entered the EU agenda only recently, but has repeatedly been a concern of EU and national policymakers from 1957 onwards. However, only in 2007 and 2008 all indicators of the supranational variable should feature positivs results, and let one expect migration statistics harmonisation at the national level. The two documents featuring positive results for all indicators were issued late in the third analysed period. In that point, the chapter agrees with Kraler, who stated that the further migration policy moved up in the EU’s agenda, the more urgent became the need for migration statistics (Kraler, 2005, p. 4). As this chapter determined that these supranational factors did not vary per case study, the country chapters, i.e. Chapter Five and Six do not repeat these elaborations in detail.
Chapter Five - Migration Statistics Harmonisation in the United Kingdom

This chapter addresses migration statistics harmonisation in the UK. The UK is a constitutional monarchy, with its parliamentary system being bicameral. The first legislative House is the upper House, the House of Lords, and its second legislative House is the Lower House, which is also referred to as the House of Commons. The House of Commons consists of the Members of Parliament who are elected by the British people, and charged with making laws in cooperation with the House of Lords. It is the task of the House of Lords to “mak[e] and shap[e] laws and check[…] and challeng[e] the work of the government” (United Kingdom, Parliament Online, n.d.).

With regard to immigration and emigration in the case of the UK, and despite the UK’s legacy as colonial power, D. A. Coleman describes the country as a classic emigration country rather than one of immigration until the late 19th, early 20th century. The author supports this statement by commenting on the migration statistics collected as mainly centred on emigration flows, derived from ship passenger lists imposed to protect travellers on their journeys (Coleman, 1987, pp. 11411-1142). François Gemenne argues that Britain - contrary to countries such as Germany and the Netherlands - “is not, and never was, a country actively recruiting immigrants” (Gemenne, 2009, p. 90).

However, when looking at net migration from the 1980s onwards, one finds that between 1983 and 1987, 1989 and 1991, and from 1993 on, there was more immigration than emigration (OECD, 1997, p. 170; OECD, 2000, p. 266). This means that the UK could no longer be perceived as an emigration country. This trend continued in the years after 2000, supported by a strong economy as well as a flexible labour market until 2003 (OECD, 2004, pp. 283-284). Contrary to other large EU member states such as Germany, the UK opened its labour market to citizens of the new member states in 2004\(^\text{11}\), which contributed to an already high net migration. In addition, labour migration from non-EU member states remained at a high level (OECD, 2007, p. 290). Also during and after the economic crisis, net migration continued to be positive (OECD, 2011, p. 330). In view of more recent immigration trends, the UK featured a net migration rate that is higher than the average rate of the EU-27 for the years 2009 to 2012. However, in 2013, the UK’s net migration rate was marginally lower than that of the EU-27 average rate (see Table 1.2).

\(^{11}\) The 2004 EU enlargement turned Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia into the ‘new EU member states’.
The chapter proceeds as follows: the chapter firstly examines how the dependent variable plays out in the UK. This is to evaluate how the UK has reacted to EU incentives for migration statistics harmonisation, and to what extent one can speak of policy convergence of the UK with EU requirements. Second, this chapter focuses on the analysis of the explanatory variables, identified in the theoretical framework in Chapter Two, and how they play out in the UK. Following that, this chapter adds an explanatory examination, bringing together Section 5.1, Section 5.2 and their subsections concerning the dependent and explanatory variables in a third step in Section 5.3. This is done in order to evaluate which independent variables can explain migration statistics harmonisation in the UK. The chapter finds that the supranational and policy-specific variables explain migration statistics harmonisation best for the UK.

5.1 Analysis of the Dependent Variable

This section provides an analysis of the dependent variable of this thesis, and how it takes form in the case of migration statistics harmonisation in the UK. Harmonised migration statistics were identified as the dependent variable in the second chapter. This section examines migration statistics harmonisation in a theoretical framework of Europeanisation and policy convergence. To recapitulate, Europeanisation refers to domestic adaptation to European regional integration in policy. Policy convergence, briefly explained, means an increasing similarity of policy goals, policy instruments, and the settings of these instruments. The section focuses on two key steps towards migration statistics harmonisation, identified in Chapter Four on the EU level development of migration statistics harmonisation, in the UK. These two steps are namely the EMN and Regulation 862/2007/EC. Table 5.1 summarises the findings of the analysis of the dependent variable of migration statistics harmonisation, in the context of the EMN and Regulation 862/2007/EC.
Table 5.1. Summary of the Dependent Variable in the United Kingdom for the European Migration Network and Regulation 862/2007/EC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source/Regulation</th>
<th>Conceptualisation</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Instrument setting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EMN Council Decision UK</td>
<td>Becomes more similar to EU incentive</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMN Council Decision UK</td>
<td>Domestic adaptation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation 862/2007/EC in the UK</td>
<td>Becomes more similar to EU incentive</td>
<td>ONS: No; Home Office: Yes</td>
<td>Hardly, provision of proxies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation 862/2007/EC in the UK</td>
<td>Domestic adaptation</td>
<td>ONS: No; Home Office: Yes</td>
<td>Hardly, but independent, domestic development</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own depiction.

In the case of the EMN Council Decision, the domestic level adapts to EU demands in view of policy goals, policy instruments, and in policy instrument settings. The UK becomes more similar to the EU incentive in policy goals, policy instruments, and policy instrument settings. In the case of the migration statistics harmonisation Regulation, there is domestic adaptation in the Home Office’s policy goal, but hardly any in that of the Office for National Statistics (ONS), since the International Passenger Survey (IPS) was already aimed at providing internationally comparable migration statistics. The same split is carried on to policy instrument convergence with the EU incentive. Similarly, the sources, i.e. policy instruments, are hardly changed domestically, nor have they become more similar to EU demands. Contrary to that, there is national adaptation and increased similarity to EU demands in view of policy instrument settings. Policy instrument settings have changed most for both steps towards migration statistics harmonisation. The following Sections 5.1.1 to 5.1.7 provide more detail on the convergence and Europeanisation of policy goals,
instruments, and instrument settings for the EMN and Regulation 862/2007/EC and how they took place in the UK.

5.1.1 Convergence and Europeanisation of Policy Goals - European Migration Network

Section 5.1.1 focuses on the policy goals of the UK in relation to the EMN. The policy goal of the EMN for the UK was the provision of “up-to-date, objective, reliable and comparable information on migration and asylum” for policy-makers in the EU, as well as for the general public (Council, 2008, Article 1 (2), (3)). In more detail, the EMN Council Decision asked for information collection and provision, research and analysis of these data, and the publication of reports on the situation of migration in the member states, raising awareness of the EMN (Council, 2008, Article 2). The member states which formed part of the EMN produced joint policy reports until 2009. The UK contributed to the statistics reports for the years from 2004 on to 2009, with the European Commission DG of Justice and Home Affairs publishing joint statistics reports from 2001 on (EMN, 2008a, p. 1; UK EMN NCP, 2004, p. 4; UK EMN NCP, 2009a, p. 3). The UK provided country-specific reports outlining migration- and asylum-related policy developments, forming part of a synthesis report from the reference year 2006 onwards, and as country report in its own right from the reference year 2008 onwards (EMN, 2007, p. 1; UK EMN NCP, 2009b, p. 2). These reports were publicly accessible. The EMN moved away from contributing to joint policy reports to publishing individual reports for each EMN member state. The transparent character of the reports was carried on to other forms of information provision such as the ad hoc queries (EMN, 2009, p. 1).

While the UK had before supplied information on its migration and asylum policy and statistics to EU level institutions, such as to the “K.4” committee and the ‘clearing houses’ CIREA and CIREFI, the provision of information in the context of the EMN differs from that in that the circle of addressees was much more encompassing than in the afore-mentioned instances (European Commission, 2003, p. 4). Furthermore, and prior to the introduction of the EU incentive, the Home Office and the UK statistics office had published mainly numbers on migration and asylum on their websites. An example for these are the Home Office’s “Control of Immigration” statistics reports which date back to 1998 (Jackson & Bennett, 1998, p. 1; ONS, 2014, Table 1). The decidedly public character of the EMN is demonstrated by events. The UK EMN NCP
branch held public events, and published a newsletter for its members. The \textit{ad hoc} information published by the UK EMN NCP branch was accessible by the general public unless an EMN branch asked for restricted access to its replies to \textit{ad hoc} queries. This indicates that the UK adapted domestically in the policy style between the point in time T2 (after the EU impulse) and the point in time T1 by to providing policy-related information to the wider public and EU-level institutions. In addition, there is no evidence for problems or delays in national adaptation so that one can speak of the Europeanisation of EMN policy goals in the UK.

The goodness of fit is hypothesised to predict the ease of domestic policy adaptation to an EU impulse. If little national adaptation to the EU incentive is required, the goodness of fit hypothesis suggests that its translation into the national context will be smooth. A bad fit between the levels would lead to problems in national adaptation. Following this logic, one would expect domestic adaptation to be of a medium level for the policy goal dimension: the goal as such, i.e. to provide information on migration and asylum, had existed before nationally, which according to the goodness of fit hypothesis suggests an effortless translation of the EU incentive into the domestic context. Yet in addition to the general goal of information provision, the EU incentive asked specifically for the information to be of a public nature.

By means of the EU impulse, the goal had thus been widened in view of public participation, compared to the existing domestic policy goal. This slightly raises the level of adaptation pressure between the EU and national levels, but not to an extent which would lead one to expect problematic domestic adaptation. Overall, the situation is one of a good fit. The UK EMN NCP broadened information provision which is available to the public in the form of migration-related reports and public events. As the UK has been part of the EMN prior to its formalisation, and also published reports before it had to do so, this thesis contends that there were no problems with accommodating the national policy goal to the EU-induced one. From that point of view, there were no delays in translating the EU incentive into the UK context, nor is there evidence of debates that would indicate problems in terms of putting these changes between T2 and T1 into practice. The goodness of fit hypothesis has thus proven to be correct with regard to the policy goal.

In view of uploading the policy goal from the UK to the EU level, it should be stressed that the UK favoured other options to exchange migration-related information to the EMN, and the setting-up of a new network for these matters (UK, House of
These have however not been put into place. This is why this section concludes that there was no uploading of information exchange and hence the policy goal from the UK domestic environment on this occasion.

5.1.2 Convergence and Europeanisation of Policy Instruments - European Migration Network

This section shows that the UK has adapted domestically to the EMN Council Decision and converged with it over time. In order to ensure the information provision from the member states to the EU level and the wider public, member states set up a National Contact Point (NCP) and a national network of experts and organisations active in the field of migration and asylum, alongside the EMN structure at EU level. The NCPs should provide the reports mentioned in Section 5.1.1 on the domestic situation, containing statistics and information on policy development (Council, 2008, Article 9), and establish a migration network in the member state, including organisations and individuals with expertise relevant for the area of migration (Council, 2008, Article 5).

In 2004, the UK Government announced that it was, in general, supportive of the envisaged EU level action to improve migration statistics to further policy formulation (UK, House of Commons, 2004, 14). Yet it mentioned that it did not think the EMN was the best actor to take over this role, because of its small size and limited resources. Furthermore, the Government suggested that other sources of international migration statistics should be evaluated first, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication.

The motion towards an EMN meant the creation of NCPs, and related national networks of organisations and experts in the field of migration and asylum. By introducing the EMN preparatory action in 2002\(^{12}\), the European Commission and the member states made use of existing expertise and policy instruments in the member states (European Commission, 2005c, 4.1). The NCPs that made up the operational branch of the Network consisted of domestic research institutes or the Ministries in charge of migration and asylum policy.

The majority of member states, the UK being one of them, chose to situate their respective NCP within or attached to Ministries. This on the one hand offered the NCPs

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\(^{12}\) The first joint report of nine member states on migration and asylum policies and statistics was published in 2001.
more direct access to Government information, yet placed the control over the information that is put out in form of the EMN reports in the hands of the Government on the other hand. In the UK, the EU demand for information about the general national migration and asylum situation and related policies, and its exchange among member states, translated into designating the Home Office Research and Statistics Service, and later the Migration and Border Analysis Unit as part of the Home Office Science Group, as framework for the country’s NCP (UK, House of Commons, 2007, 7.2; EMN, 2014c). This Unit was in general responsible for devising studies on migration- and asylum-related topics in the national context. EU demands were hence formulated openly enough so that they could suit the respective situation in the member state, and rely on already existing policy instruments.

Thus, migration statistics harmonisation took place by inserting a policy instrument into the already existing national structure, that cross-loaded and uploaded research and statistics which were not covered by Regulation 862/2007/EC. There is hence a change between T2 and T1 in this element. Moreover, there is no indication for problems or delays in adapting domestically in terms of EMN policy instruments, which points to the Europeanisation of this aspect. This also means that convergence of the national and EU policy instruments took place over time.

In terms of the goodness of fit and its predictive power for domestic adaptation, the thesis finds that it applies in the case of the UK EMN policy instruments. One would expect an easy conversion of the EU demands into the UK domestic context since the UK Government had a network of migration experts in place. Indeed, the EU impulse mimicked the situation already in place domestically, i.e. a network of experts responsible for the analysis and the provision of information on the phenomenon of migration in the form of the UK Home Office Science Unit. The degree of adaptation pressures was hence low. Domestic adaptation took place at the level of absorption of the EU impulse nationally - the EMN NCP was inserted into the existing UK Home Office Science Unit - and was uncomplicated. There is no evidence of difficulties, no delay in establishing the EMN NCP, nor infringement procedures reported in the UK which would point to problems in the translation process. The goodness of fit hypothesis hence holds true.

With regard to bottom-up adaptation, there is no evidence for it in view of the policy instruments for the UK case. Rather, the UK Government sought to initiate the search for alternative policy instruments first, before setting up the EMN, which it
thought to be of too small a scale and of severely limited resources (UK, House of Commons, 2004, 14). These were not put into practice. On these grounds, this thesis takes establishes that there was no uploading of policy instruments from the UK national to the EU level.

5.1.3 Convergence and Europeanisation of the Policy Instrument Settings - European Migration Network

This section shows that the national policy instrument settings of the EMN converged with those which the supranational incentive asked for and that there was adaptation at national level. Article 9 of the EMN Council Decision requested for the EMN NCPs to submit a report on policy developments once a year (Council, 2008). The EMN produced joint policy reports until 2009, to which the UK contributed. It moved away from publishing joint Annual Policy Reports to publishing individual reports per EMN member state. The UK provided annual country-specific reports outlining migration- and asylum-related statistics and policy developments from the reference year 2004 onwards (UK EMN NCP, 2004, p. 1; UK EMN NCP, 2009b, p. 2). This means that the reports were issued with an annual frequency as asked for in the EU impulse. The setting of the EMN resembles that of output-harmonisation: the member states need to achieve the same goal, provision of information and research in the field of migration and asylum with similar means, with NCPs organising conferences and establishing national migration networks, based on their respective national situation.

Regarding the policy style, this section argues that there has been national adaptation to the demands of the EU incentive, and both levels converged with each other over time: since the UK EMN NCP was created specifically for the purpose of the EMN, this section argues that this engendered a national adaptation of policy style. In view of the policy style requested by the EU incentive, it is hard to assign the EU incentive itself to one of the ideal types outlined in Chapter Two. Rather, one finds aspects of both types: intervening and mediating. Since 2008, the existence of the EMN Steering Board, with formal voting and membership rules, points to the intervening type (Council, 2008, Article 4(1), (3)). Moreover, the EMN was able to restrict access to confidential information for non-EMN members (Council, 2008, Article 8(2)). However, there are also aspects of the EMN which speak for the application of the mediating type. For example, the EMN Council Decision asked the EMN NCPs to set
up national networks comprising a wide range of actors (Council, 2008, Article 5(5)(d)). EMN NCPs should contribute by means of information exchange, and the drawing-up of reports and studies (Council, 2008, 5(5)(d)). Yet taking into regard the ultimate purpose of the EMN, this section posits that the intervening style prevails. This is because the Steering Board’s responsibilities included the appropriation of the NCPs’ budget, and also because the European Commission organised the Network’s duties and was meant to “ensure that it appropriately reflect[ed] the political priorities of the Community in the area of migration and asylum” (Council, 2008, 6(1)).

In order to adhere to the requirements set out by the EMN Council Decision, the domestic institutional context of the NCP showed involvement of non-governmental actors. In the UK, the national branch of the EMN connected over 400 migration researchers and organisations which spanned across the governmental/non-governmental divide. The UK NCP organised conferences that were aimed at bringing together Government, NGOs, and academics (UK EMN, 2013). In view of information exchange, the EMN NCPs also commented on each others’ work programmes. A Home Office official commented:

“We’ve looked at [the Germans’] work programme in the EMN and suggested things, and we discussed with the Irish quite naturally and suggested things, and they accepted more than half of our suggestions. That is great. You don’t expect to get more than half of what you [suggest] and they chose [suggestions] that we want to do. If that’s influencing the work programme, that’s quite a good result” (Interview 8).

For the intervening style to prevail suggests that the decision-making was in the hands of EMN staff, excluding non-governmental actors. It was the EMN Steering Board members who decided on the agenda: the Steering Board’s responsibilities included the appropriation of the NCPs’ budget, whereas the European Commission’s task was to organise the Network’s duties, and to make certain that the Network was providing back-up information on the EU’s migration and asylum policies. This means that the focus of the EMN was on providing information to the national Governments and EU level institutions.

Furthermore, the possibilities for non-governmental actors to participate in the
UK EMN were geared towards information provision if, ultimately, the UK NCP decided to grant them access. This section hence argues for the intervening type of policy styles to dominate in relation to the EMN, although the Network as such is - since the coming into force of the Council Decision - an information-based instrument. However, the EMN still brought about change in the policy style of the national statistical sphere. This was not only because it added an information-based instrument to it, but also since information provision – and information access - was largely restricted to governmental actors in the context of CIREA and CIREFI. Only in 2001 did DG Justice and Home Affairs take over some of the data collected for CIREFI and make it publicly available (Herm, 2006, p. 96).

In light of the above, firstly, the UK’s information provision settings largely converged with EU requirements, and the member state adhered to the demands issued by the EU incentive. Secondly, this demonstrates that EU incentives prompted national adaptation in that the UK supplied annual reports to EU institutions that are publicly accessible. There is thus a difference in the same element between T2 and T1. The UK EMN NCP constituted a new part of an existing governmental institution, the Home Office.

In terms of the goodness of fit, i.e. the hypothesis denoting the ease of domestic adaptation, this chapter finds that the hypothesis overall holds true in the case at hand. In view of some elements of the policy instrument settings, there were few occurrences of misfit. This is the case, because firstly, this thesis found only a minor misfit between some elements of the policy style such as in terms of the public availability of migration statistics. Secondly, there was an initial misfit between the language requirement of at least two languages and English as the only language in which EMN reports were published by the UK EMN NCP. This leads one to expect delays for these matters, which actually did not come about. Yet in view of the overall fit between the kind of organisation to constitute the NCP in the UK, one denotes good fit, because the EU impulse leaves a high level of leeway to the member states to put the the EMN in place to fit their national requirements. The UK determined the Home Office, a governmental institution, to host the UK NCP. One were hence to expect no delays in the domestic adaptation, which was the case.

Moreover, there is evidence for partial bottom-up Europeanisation. The UK only partly achieved its aim to place the selection of a service provider for the EMN in the hands of the member states. A compromise was found between EU demands and
national preferences (UK, House of Lords, 2008). The language requirement was an aspect in which the UK was more successful in its negotiations than in the above selection and power over the service-provider. The member state argued that English - the sole language used for the publications of the UK EMN NCP - was the main language employed in the working environment of the EMN and in its publications. In addition, it claimed that other foreign languages were spoken by UK EMN NCP staff so that it did not need to translate its contributions in the form of EMN reports into another language (UK House of Lords, 2008). Indeed, Article 5(2)(e) to Preamble 2 was dropped. The final version of the EMN Council Decision solely mentions that each EMN NCP “should also collectively have adequate expertise in […] collaborating in a multilingual environment at European level” (Council 2008, Preamble 9). This means that in addition to migration statistics harmonisation and convergence in view of the policy instruments settings of the EMN at national level in the UK, one could also find the uploading of UK preferences in view of the settings - language-requirements and decisions relating to the service-provider - of the EMN at the stage of policy- formulation.

5.1.4 Convergence and Europeanisation of Policy Goals - Regulation 862/2007/EC

Section 5.1.4 demonstrates that the policy goals of Regulation 862/2007/EC did prompt partial domestic adaptation, and a part of the UK’s policy goals became increasingly similar to those of the EU incentive over time. Regulation 862/2007/EC asks for comparability between its member states’ migration statistics. It contains common rules for the collection of statistics on “immigration to and emigration from the Member State territories”, “the citizenship and country of birth of persons usually resident in the territory of the Member States”, and “administrative and judicial procedures and processes in the Member States relating to immigration” (European Parliament & Council, 2007, Article 1(a)-(c)).

The comparability of the UK’s migration statistics with those of others had been a goal for the UK since the introduction of the UN Recommendation on migration statistics since 1953. The UK hence used the 12-months criterion to determine long-term migrants which Regulation 862/2007/EC also stipulates. This indicates that there was no domestic adaptation in view of policy goals to EU incentives. In the following, this means one finds inertia at national level in this regard and in the case of the ONS.
The above points to the ONS’s policy goals not converging with those of Regulation 862/2007/EC over time, since the goal of statistics comparability had already existed before. As Chapter One showed regarding international-level migration statistics harmonisation attempts, the ONS migration statistics system was built along the lines of the UN definition so as to allow comparability with migration statistics of other states (Interview 7). However, the statistics produced by the Home Office are, largely speaking, a by-product of immigration control (Interview 9). The purpose of these data is not primarily to be comparable to other states’ statistics, but rather to function as a source of information for the UK government. This indicates that the goal of comparability with other EU member states’ statistics converged with EU demands. This means that whilst there is no convergence in the case of the ONS’ statistics - there was domestic adaptation regarding the goal of Home Office statistics only. In this aspect, there is a difference between T2 and T1 for the Home Office, but not for the ONS. In addition to this, this domestic adaptation process of the Home Office with regard to policy goals did not exhibit delays or problems which could point to a lack of Europeanisation.

In terms of the goodness of fit, which is hypothesised to indicate the ease of domestic adaptation to EU demands, one finds that the goodness of fit did not predict the ease of national adaptation correctly for both the single parts of the UK NSS. First, for the Home Office, one would expect delays or problematic domestic adaptation. Adaptational pressures should be high as the purpose and goal of the UK Home Office’s statistics differed from that of the EU incentive. Their migration statistics are not specifically intended for cross-national comparison, as it is the aim of Regulation 862/2007/EC. Drawing on the goodness of fit hypothesis, one would thus expect delays and/or a problematic pattern of transferring the EU impulse into the UK’s domestic environment. However, there is no evidence for such hold-up or problematic transferral of the EU incentive’s policy goal into the Home Office’s context. The goodness of fit does hence not predict the ease of domestic adaptation correctly for this dimension. Second, matters are different when it comes to the ONS. As laid out above, the policy goal of ONS migration statistics had been that of EU and international comparison prior to the introduction of Regulation 862/2007/EC. According to the goodness of fit, one would hence assume an easy domestic adaptation to the policy goal outlined in the EU impulse. Indeed, there is no evidence for delays or difficulties in view of the UK’s incorporation of the policy goal. There is hence a split regarding the applicability of the
goodness of fit with regard to the policy goal of Regulation 862/2007/EC in the case of the UK. From this point of view, one would hence follow that the goodness of fit hypothesis holds true only for the ONS’s policy goals, but not for those of the Home Office.

There is no evidence for the uploading of UK domestic policy goals such as data-comparability with other countries to the EU level in the framework of Regulation 862/2007/EC. Rather, these were firstly long-standing aims for the international statistical community such as the UNECE and the UN presented in the 1998 set of Recommendations, and secondly a wish for regulation by the then new member states (Interview 16).

5.1.5 Convergence and Europeanisation of Policy Instruments - Regulation 862/2007/EC

This section shows that UK policy instruments hardly adapted to or converged with Regulation 862/2007/EC over time. Migration statistics sources are the member states’ policy instruments, by which they can achieve the policy goal of harmonised migration statistics. The International Passenger Survey (IPS) and, largely speaking, immigration control statistics, are the core of UK migration statistics collection, with the Home Office and the ONS being the primary collectors and producers in the policy area of migration. There is no source of migration statistics that provides the data in their entirety. This implies that migration-related figures on the foreign and national population have to be recorded by other means. In addition, the data collection process in this area of statistics is spread over multiple producers, reflecting the tripartite structure of the UK NSS, developed over the recent decades, as demonstrated in Figure 5.1.

Key sources of international migration statistics for the cooperation with Eurostat are the IPS, the Labour Force Survey, and Home Office visa data. Nationally, the ONS uses results of the decennial population census to cross-check these data, as well as a great many of administrative sources apart from those of the Home Office. Whereas the General Register Office records births, marriages and deaths, there is no central or local population register in the UK that could be used to track migratory movements. For the IPS, 250,000 persons - equalling 0.2 per cent of all travellers entering or leaving the UK - are interviewed per year. By face-to-face interviewing these flow data are collected on
a voluntary basis at all main UK airports, sea ports, and at the Eurotunnel connecting the UK to the European mainland. The estimation of the inflows and outflows of migrants is, however, more a by-product of the Survey, which is principally intended to measure economic issues such as the travel expenditure of the travellers, and international tourism.

Jointly, the IPS, Home Office data on asylum-seekers and their dependants, the Labour Force Survey (LFS), and international migration data from the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA), constitute the sources of the Long-Term International Migration (LTIM) estimates (UK ONS, 2010, p. 5). In the UK, the LFS has existed since 1973, and aims to attain “information on the UK labour market which can then be used to develop, manage, evaluate and report on labour market policies” (UK ONS, 2007, p. 1). In addition, it contains a section that asks for the nationality and country of birth of the respondents.

Until 2007, data concerning flows to and from Northern Ireland originated from NISRA, based on family doctor registrations instead of data from the IPS. Changes in the way in which international migration data were gathered started in 2008, when the ONS switched from IPS to registration data because of “concerns about the reliability of these estimates” (UK ONS, Southampton Statistical Sciences Research Institute & School of Geography at the University of Leeds, 2012, p. 48). Just as well, until 2008, data flows to and from the Republic of Ireland were taken from the Irish NSI, with the data source being the IPS after that point of time (UK ONS, 2010a, p. 17).

The use of other data sources, however, remained stable until 2012: Home Office data constituted the basis for ONS statistics on border control and asylum. Due to the “broad assumptions […] made by ONS about the proportion of asylum seeker applicants that actually correspond to the ONS definition” of a long-term migrant, to date, the “distribution of immigrants to local authorities, asylum seekers and refugees are directly based on the Home Office data”, and are no longer used to supplement IPS, or the LTIM estimates (UK ONS, Southampton Statistical Sciences Research Institute & School of Geography at the University of Leeds, 2012, pp. 48-49).

Migration statistics were also under review in the context of the International Migration Quality Review and the Building Trust in Statistics programme (UK Economic Secretary to the Treasury, 1999, p. 21). An Inter-Departmental Task Force on migration statistics headed by the ONS was set up in 2006. ONS initially asked the Home Office, the Department of Health, the Department for Work and Pensions, and
the Department for Education and Skills for support “to identify timely improvements that could be made to estimates of migration and migration populations in the United Kingdom” (UK National Statistics, 2006, p. 3).

The reason for this Task Force was that “[t]here is now a broad recognition that available estimates of migrant numbers are inadequate for managing the economy, policies and services” (UK National Statistics, 2006, p. 3). The Migration Statistics Improvement Programme (MSIP)¹³ was set up in 2008, and revisits the 2006 Inter-Departmental Task Force on Migration Statistics (UK ONS, 2009, p. 1). While the Programme officially ended in 2011, the Beyond 2011 Programme takes up MSIP and strives to better understand population change based on improvements in Government data sources. Final recommendations were scheduled for 2014 (UK ONS, 2012, p. 1).

As mentioned above, the following methodology changes, that involve Government bodies other than the Home Office and the ONS, happened in the period of the introduction of the Regulation. From 2008 onwards the LTIM methodology changed from using IPS data to “[d]ata supplied by NISRA using family doctor registrations”, and where data from the Irish statistical institute had been used, LTIM now refers to IPS data (UK ONS, 2014b, p. 17). Because of their timing, these changes could have been induced by the Regulation. However, the ONS document on the changes made regarding the estimates of international migration in Northern Ireland, and between the UK and Republic of Ireland, suggests that these alterations have been inspired nationally, and therefore do not qualify as changes due to EU requirements (UK ONS, 2008, p. 1; UK ONS, 2014b, p. 17).

Another change in statistics sources is adding questions to large social surveys. A Home Office official elaborates:

“Now we started [adding migration-related questions], we actually paid ONS to put reasons for migration onto the Labour Force Survey, which they never had before. And the census this time isn’t just about ‘are you a migrant?’ but also ‘which year did you come or migrate’. Those are things where we spend our money, if we’ve got money” (Interview 8).

The ONS cooperated with the Irish statistical institute to incorporate the latter’s

¹³ The MSIP was initially referred to as Improvements to International Migration Statistics (IMPS) programme.
numbers in the LTIM estimates. This collaboration with the Irish statistical institute ceased to exist in 2007. Prior to 2008, the ONS used data of the Irish statistical institute, but now covers the route between the Republic of Ireland and the UK through the IPS. The ONS document on LTIM methodology changes for both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, suggests that the reasons for change stem from the national level, i.e. the IPS became available as a better source over the years and was used. Following this, changes took place, but these alterations did not come about because of the Regulation. In addition, purely domestic change does not qualify for Europeanisation.

Horizontally, that is between national and subnational Government bodies, the cooperation between the ONS and NISRA was reorganised because of domestic reliability concerns. NISRA was not part of the Government Statistical Service (GSS), but co-operated closely with it. The migratory movements to and from Northern Ireland had been covered through the IPS until 2007. Yet NISRA raised reliability concerns regarding those estimates, “primarily because no ports in Northern Ireland were surveyed by the IPS. NISRA use health card data to identify international immigrants and emigrants for their population estimates. ONS has incorporated these NISRA estimates into its estimates of long-term international migration for 2008 onwards” (UK ONS, 2008, p. 1).

The cooperation of the ONS with NISRA represents vertical policy instruments structures in as much as the latter is part of a Devolved Administration and thus a subnational body. Similar to the examination of the horizontal structures and their alterations, however, these changes in the vertical cooperation have been nationally inspired by NISRA instead of coming from the EU level. This means that this vertical change in cooperation does not fall under the remit of Europeanisation. This is because the concept captures the changes initiated by EU incentives at domestic level. The above indicates that the EU has not played a role in this case. In addition, even in case these changes would stem from the introduction of the Regulation, there is no decrease in the inclusion of subnational actors. Initially, no NISRA figures were used, but they have been from 2008 onwards. NISRA hence gained in competence, and was added to the vertical structures that sustain the production of LTIM estimates. Both horizontal
and vertical structures have not been Europeanised, but rather further developed nationally.

As a Home Office official refers to the cooperation with Eurostat and further differences between the data that are available through UK domestic sources:

“As far as we’re aware, they’re basically happy. I mean there are still bits of data that they ask for that we don’t do. This coming year [2013] there’s some data that they are starting to collect on Blue Cards which doesn’t apply, because we’re not part of Schengen, so there’s lots of little tweaks where the UK is slightly different. […] we don’t have a system for capturing the data on [residence permits], so we come up with the best proxy, but they still want it to be the same. We say we don’t have anything, and as we’re all statisticians that are there, they keep on saying ‘can’t you come up with something?’, so we have to go on and think about it” (Interview 8).

Further differences of the UK sources to EU incentives were caused by the immigration law:

“Eurostat wanted to have data on residence permits – most European, most of the EU member states, have residence permits, the UK doesn’t. So we’ve had to come up with an alternative based on “leave to remain”. We couldn’t, because of the nature of how migration is managed in this country, we couldn’t produce exactly what they asked for. That sort of queries we need to discuss with Eurostat, and explain to them, why not everything is always quite the same in all countries. Because if we don’t have residence permits, that’s just a fact” (Interview 9).

According to a Home Office official, there was no drastic domestic change in UK policy instruments due to EU requirements. Interestingly, the interviewee referred to a good fit between the EU incentive and the national definitions, in order to explain why there were no drastic changes:

“Well, we haven’t changed any of our UK stats as result of the [Regulation]. […] Some
of the data can be slightly different, basic trends are the same, we have not fundamentally changed our definitions, our national definitions, to match anything with Eurostat want. Because we had a well-developed system here. When [Regulation 862/2007/EC] first came out, I was in the negotiations with them and looked at it and thought ‘we’re already doing 95% of this’ and you’d ask the question about how exactly do you want these figures ‘shall we include dependants or not’, they’d say ‘just do what you do nationally’. Over the time they probably had discussions with us, maybe asking ‘could you do it that way’ and so on, but most of it, we already had” (Interview 8).

The above indicates that the UK policy instruments did not become more similar to EU incentives. The policy instruments that were necessary to adhere to the requirements existed already nationally. There is hardly any domestic adaptation to EU requirements. Rather, one can find domestic development of policy instruments, data sources, than change due to EU incentives. There is thus a change between T2 and T1, but it is domestically induced.

In view of the goodness of fit, the above indicates a good fit between the EU level policy instruments impulse and the national level policy instruments in place at the time of the introduction of Regulation 862/2007/EC from Home Office statistics. Based on the statement taken from Interview 8, the majority of Regulation 862/2007/EC policy instruments, i.e. means to record migration control-related statistics had already been in place. One would hence assume that the Regulation did not have a problematic translation into the UK’s national context. As there is no evidence for delays and/or problems in relation to this, it is possible to deduce that the goodness of fit hypothesis holds true. The situation is comparable with regard to the policy instruments of the ONS: Regulation 862/2007/EC specifically made it possible to utilise surveys for the respective data collection. This means that there should have been a good fit between the policy instruments in place, most importantly the IPS and the EU level impulse, i.e. the Regulation. On the basis of the goodness of fit hypothesis, one would hence expect a delay and trouble-free transfer of the Regulation into the domestic UK environment.

Similar to the situation of the Home Office, there is no evidence for either in view of the ONS’ policy instruments as such.

In terms of the uploading of policy instruments to form part of the Regulation, there is no evidence for this. That the Regulation allows for a wide range of data
collection systems across the spectrum of register-based and survey-based ones, the open formulation/phrasing is not an element that was exclusively included for the British. The introductory chapter gives an overview of the nature of the NSSs of the EU, and apart from the UK, there are Sweden and Malta which mainly base their migration-related statistics on surveys. There is also no evidence for the UK specifically pushing this aspect to be part of the Regulation. However, the outputs of the UK EMN NCP could be described as a manner of uploading information prior to the introduction of the Regulation. As Interviewee 8 elaborated “I think, Eurostat, [when they introduced the Regulation] recognised, that they really didn’t have any competence in migration stats. […] They didn’t have any knowledge of it. Which is partly why they set up the European Migration Network” (Interview 8). So in that sense, the EMN could be regarded as policy instrument for uploading information to the EU level. However, this only occurred after the EU level gave the impulse to set up the EMN, and moreover had overcome the UK’s initial scepticism towards setting up this new structure. In addition, national networks of migration experts are by no means a phenomenon restricted to the UK, which would allow us to trace the roots of the EMN back to a UK origin. Furthermore, the policy instrument of the EMN was induced by the EU level as shown in Section 6.1.2 above. This is why this thesis argues that there is no bottom-up Europeanisation in the matter of Regulation 862/2007/EC policy instruments.

5.1.6 Convergence and Europeanisation of Policy Instrument Settings - Regulation 862/2007/EC

This section concentrates on demonstrating that the policy instrument settings of Regulation 862/2007/EC have domestically adapted to and converged with EU requirements. The setting Regulation 862/2007/EC requested in view of the policy instruments, the migration data sources, was that of ex ante output-harmonisation, which means that it left leeway for the member states to produce migration statistics based on data sources of their choice and availability. Also in the UK, the setting of the policy instruments was mainly that of an ex ante output harmonisation, because migration statistics were produced on the basis of different sources and data collection methods, administrative sources and the IPS. The above evidence indicates that the settings converged with EU demands. There is evidence that the settings of data sources were adjusted to the EU incentive.
The Regulation provided common definitions of concepts related to migration and asylum. Some of these reflected the diversity of data collection in this policy area in the EU. For instance, “usual residence” was defined either as the location at which the person was registered to reside or as the place where a person normally spent their daily period of rest (European Parliament & Council, 2007, Article 2(1)(a)). Immigration meant the “the action by which a person establishes his or her usual residence in the territory of a Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months” (European Parliament & Council, 2007, Article 2(1)(b), italics added). “[C]itizenship” was defined as “the particular legal bond between an individual and his or her State, acquired by birth or naturalisation, whether by declaration, choice, marriage or other means according to national legislation” (European Parliament & Council, 2007, Article 2(d)). “Country of birth” meant the country of residence (in its current borders, if the information is available) of the mother at the time of the birth or, in default, the country (in its current borders, if the information is available) in which the birth took place” (European Parliament & Council, 2007, Article 2(1)(c)). It also allowed for the use of proxies, by stating that if a member state was not bound by a legal text stated in Paragraph 1, the member state should supply comparable statistics on the basis of existing procedures (European Parliament & Council, 2007, Article 2(4)). Article 9 of the Regulation determined that data could be collected through administrative and judicial records, administrative registers, population registers, censuses, sample surveys, and “other appropriate sources” (European Parliament & Council, 2007, Article 9).

The UK adhered to the EU requirements concerning migration statistics harmonisation, mainly on the basis of the IPS and Home Office data, which translated into its interpretation of the above-mentioned definitions: the usual residence was defined as the location at which the person usually spends their daily period of rest rather than per registration. For the reference years 2008 and 2009, the last year before the Regulation came into force and the first year when it was in force, the UK provided Eurostat with statistics on international immigration as asked for by the Regulation, Article 3(1)(a) (European Parliament & Council, 2007, Article 3(1)(a); Eurostat, n.d.a, p. 109; Eurostat, n.d.b, p. 97), and international emigration for the reference year 2008 with complete breakdowns for all data asked for (Eurostat, n.d.c, p. 103), and for the reference year 2009 with incomplete breakdown for “[i]nternational emigrants by citizenship, sex and age group”, and “[i]nternational emigrants by next usual residence,”
sex and age group”, and complete breakdown for “[i]nternational emigrants by single year of age” (Eurostat, n.d.d, p. 89).

For both immigration and emigration and both reference years 2008 and 2009, the definition the UK used for citizenship differs from how it is determined in the Regulation. While the Regulation asks for the “particular legal bond between an individual and his or her State” that she or he acquired by naturalisation or declaration, the UK refers to it as the one given in the passport the individual is travelling on (Eurostat, n.d.a, p. 109; Eurostat, n.d.c, p. 103; Eurostat, n.d.b, p. 98; Eurostat, n.d.d, p. 89). This could coincide with an individual’s citizenship, but could diverge in cases such as fraud, or may have been unclear in cases of dual citizenship. Moreover, the UK defined the “age” of a migrant as the age the migrant had reached upon migration, instead of the recommended “age reached during the reference year based on the year of birth” (Eurostat, n.d.d, p. 90; Eurostat, n.d.b, p. 98). The “usual residence” was defined as the “place of the daily period of rest”, due to the IPS being the main source of the UK’s migration statistics instead of a population register (Eurostat, n.d.d, p. 90). Yet the definitions used by the UK met EU demands, and the UK’s policy goals coincided with those of the EU level (Eurostat, n.d.d, p. 90; Eurostat, n.d.b, p. 98). That there was no change from 2008 to 2009, the first year in which Regulation 862/2007/EC was in force, indicates that there was hardly any domestic adaptation to EU demands. An ONS official replied to the question whether there were any definitions that the ONS had to change due to the Regulation, she replied: “No, not really, we’ve always used the UN definition of a migrant; some other countries have problems with that (Interview 7)”.

The Home Office produced statistics which reflected the UK’s immigration legislation. The figures of the latter hence required a higher degree of adjustments before they are sent to Eurostat. An example of this is that Eurostat used other country groupings in citizenship acquisition data (UK Home Office, 2014, p. 57). A Home Office official commented: “At the moment for Eurostat, we do a slightly different grouping on, for instance, citizenship data we send to them, compared to what we publish [nationally]. We just got programmes set up to run it with their groups, we push the button and put it into their spreadsheet. It’s a bit of pain, but... For instance, you have different definitions of what Europe is, as you might guess” (Interview 8).

Furthermore, domestic “fresh [asylum] applications include[d] those who have made a fresh claim in the same reference month, while figures provided to Eurostat exclude these applicants” (UK Home Office, 2014, p. 71), and multiple removals are
excluded in the figures the Home Office sends to Eurostat, but included in the data published nationally (UK Home Office, 2014, p. 85). Another policy instrument setting that led to national adjustment was the requirement of monthly data on asylum:

“The main way in which Eurostat have influenced our work is through the monthly data on asylum which is a requirement, for the reports through the European Migration Network” (Interview 9).

He elaborated that contrary to the requirements of the Regulation, the Home Office were retrenching from providing monthly data, because they found by conducting a trend analysis that it was often going against trends (Interview 9). “We didn’t see a lot of point, but we did it. We changed our publication process so that we could supply them with the data” (Interview 8).

In view of the policy style, and whether it has changed through the adoption of Regulation 862/2007/EC, the findings point to the following. Similar to the findings in the previous section on the policy style of the EMN Council Decision, Regulation 862/2007/EC showed signs of both ideal types. Overall, the Regulation does lean more towards the intervening type. Its form is clearly legalistic and hierarchical in that the European Commission can enforce the Regulation in all member states. The Regulation lays down a deadline by which the member states have to submit their statistics (European Parliament & Council, 2008, Article 4).

The Regulation broadly refers to the member states as data providers. Yet it does not foresee the inclusion of other actors in the production and delivery of migration and asylum statistics. The Regulation does not contain a specific reference to the ONS and the Home Office, nor does it mention civil society actors. In addition, the producers of official statistics are public authorities. This means that in view of the migration and asylum statistics production for Eurostat’s purposes, actors apart from state authorities do not have direct access to the process. The ways in which users have been part of migration statistics harmonisation in the UK included the consultations in the preparatory phase of the Regulation in the UK (UK House of Commons, 2003, 14.8). This indicates that elements of the mediating style also related to the Regulation. Before the Regulation came into force in 2009, the respective statistics were sent to Eurostat,
on the basis of gentlemen’s agreements. From that perspective, one finds a shift in the mode of migration statistics harmonisation towards the intervening type (UK House of Commons, 2003, 14.8).

Summing up, the style of Regulation 862/2007/EC is closer to that of the intervening ideal type than that of the mediating type. The evidence above indicates that the sources’ settings have converged with EU demands over time by increasing the frequency of data supply and in providing different country groupings, for EU level use. However, the country groupings still persisted nationally, and in that sense there was no convergence. While the definition of a migrant did not have to be adapted domestically to EU incentives, and there was hence also no increase in similarity over time between the national and the EU definition, the UK has hence adapted domestically to EU requirements, in view of changing country groupings for EU use as well as the frequency of publications. In the following, there is a change between T2 and T1 in these elements. These factors point to domestic change as well as to convergence between national and EU policy instrument settings over time. It should be noted, however, that although the UK changed its country groupings in order to fit with the EU requirements, it kept its own country groupings stable for national use.

In view of the goodness of fit, which predicts the ease of national adaptation to the EU impulse, the hypothesis does not hold true. For the UK, one would expect slight delays or problems, given that the Home Office had different frequencies of data-publication and provision to the ones required by Regulation 862/2007/EC. Moreover, the frequency of national data-provision to Eurostat was lower than the one the Regulation asked for. Furthermore, the country groupings in citizenship acquisition data of the Home Office differed from those used by Eurostat. In addition, domestic fresh asylum applications (UK Home Office, 2014, p. 71) and removal numbers (UK Home Office, 2014, p. 85) differ from those sent to Eurostat. In the following, one would envisage the transfer of Regulation 862/2007/EC to be problem-ridden. However, even despite questioning the usefulness of the more frequent data-provision, the Home Office transferred the Regulation into its national environment without delay (Interview 8). This means that the goodness of fit hypothesis does not hold true in the case of policy instrument settings.

Regarding the uploading of national UK policy instrument settings, there is evidence for some aspects which have been transferred from the UK’s comments on the draft Regulation in 2003, whereas other aspects have not been uploaded despite being
suggested by the UK Home Office and the ONS. Examples for successfully uploaded proposed amendments are the inclusion of the term ‘humanitarian protection’ (previous Article 1), removal of ‘aspects of operation of’ (previous Article 3), the agreement of a longer time frame for the coming into force of the Regulation (previous Article 3), and the exclusion of statistics on the industry and level of education and training from the Regulation (previous Article 9) (Eurostat & European Directors of Social Statistics, 2003, Annex).

Other suggestions made by one UK negotiator regarding the frequency of data-provision did not find their way into the Regulation (Interview 8). Moreover, the UK continued to refer to their own understanding of domestic asylum applications, country groupings, and removal numbers in their nationally published data even after the coming-into-force of Regulation 862/2007/EC. These settings did not make their way into the Regulation. Further on this, there is no evidence for the UK to change its point of view in this regard, which could potentially have explained the lack of the settings in the Regulation. Rather, the member state presently still applies these settings nationally. This points to partial bottom-up Europeanisation in the case of policy instrument settings from the UK domestic level concerning the above-mentioned aspects.

5.1.7 Analysis of the Dependent Variable - Conclusion

This section recapitulates the findings for the dependent variable for the policy goals, instruments, and instrument settings for both EU migration statistics harmonisation incentives. In the case of the EMN, the domestic level adapted to EU demands in policy goals, policy instruments, and in policy instrument settings. The UK became more similar to the EU incentive in all three dimensions of the dependent variable, i.e. policy goals, policy instruments, and policy instrument settings. This thesis thus attests a transformation at national level in the context of an EMN. In the case of the migration statistics harmonisation Regulation, there was domestic adaptation in the Home Office’s policy goal, but hardly any in that of the ONS. The same split was carried on to policy instrument convergence with the EU incentive. Similarly, the sources, i.e. policy instruments, were hardly changed domestically, or became more similar to EU demands, because there was no need to do so. Contrary to that, there was national adaptation and increased similarity to EU demands in view of policy instrument settings, and only in the context of the Home Office in the case of policy goals.
As only one dimension experienced change entirely, this chapter attests an overall absorption at national level. This means that the EMN Council Decision and Regulation 862/2007/EC had different effects on the UK, and policy instrument settings have changed most. In view of the goodness of fit, this chapter found that for the EMN, that there was no significant misfit in either of the three policy dimensions. This makes one expect a smooth adaptation to the EU impulse nationally, which was the case, and matches the transformation at domestic level. The goodness of fit hence predicted the ease of national change due to EU-inducements correctly. However, in the case of Regulation 862/2007/EC, this thesis established a medium misfit. It came to this conclusion, because two dimensions showed misfit between the levels. In the following, one would expect delays and/or problems in the national adaptation to the Regulation. Yet these did not come about. This means that the goodness of fit does not predict the ease of adaptation correctly for the Regulation in the UK.

Concerning bottom-up Europeanisation, this chapter found in the context of the EMN, that the UK uploaded policy instrument settings to the EU level, which found their way into the Council Decision. This chapter found that there was no domestic uploading of EMN-related policy goals, policy instruments. Moreover, it established that no Regulation 862/2007/EC-related policy goals or policy instruments were uploaded. This is primarily explained by the fact that the Regulation as such was created and put into place on the impulse of the new member states which joined the EU in the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. The respective NSIs firstly wished to have rules in writing they could follow. Secondly, the Regulation enabled the NSIs to justify their demands domestically for the resources necessary to put the EU demands into place (Interview 16). The UK as an ‘old member state’ which had joined in 1973 is not part of either of these two rounds of enlargement, and is thus not part of the member states which asked for rules in writing. This is further highlighted by the UK Home Office’s initial stance towards the Regulation in 2003-2004. While it was not opposed to rules governing the compilation and processing of migration statistics at EU level, it preferred for them to be non-compulsory but on a voluntary basis (UK House of Commons, 2003, 14.8). Yet once the draft Regulation was formulated, the UK tried to amend several policy instrument setting-related aspects. In view of Regulation 862/2007/EC, the chapter found that some suggestions regarding policy instrument settings of the UK made their way into the final Regulation.
5.2 Analysis of the Explanatory Variables

This section addresses the explanatory factors for migration statistics harmonisation. The variables mentioned above are grouped in the following categories of explanatory variables for migration statistics harmonisation in the UK, as set out in the theoretical framework:

- supranational
- national
- policy-specific

The following subsections follow these groups and show which form they take in the UK. As the supranational factors are covered in Chapter Three and Four, the Chapter at hand will solely provide Table 5.2 summing up the findings of these previous chapters for reasons of the overall readability of this thesis. Following this, this chapter examines the results of the factors which form the national and policy-specific variables.

5.2.1 Supranational Explanatory Variable for Migration Statistics Harmonisation

Chapters Three and Four determined the following positive results of all factors of the supranational independent variable.
Table 5.2. Supranational Explanatory Variable for Migration Statistics Harmonisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EMN Council Decision</th>
<th>Eurostat path-dependent</th>
<th>Harmonisation Incentive</th>
<th>Degree of Obligation</th>
<th>Issue Linkage</th>
<th>Degree of Detail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Regulation 862/2007/EC | Yes | Yes, apart from policy instruments | High | No | High |

Source: Author’s own depiction.

Recapitulating the findings of Table 5.2, all supranational explanatory factors are expected to be conducive to migration statistics harmonisation.

5.2.2 National Explanatory Variable for Migration Statistics Harmonisation in the United Kingdom

This section addresses the national explanatory factors for migration statistics harmonisation in the UK. Section 2.6.2 identified

- a centralised NSS
- the register-based nature of the NSS
- a high sense of duty
- a high administrative capacity
- non-path-dependent development of the NSS

as national independent variables, and expects them to be positively related to migration statistics harmonisation. Table 5.3 outlines the UK’s results for these factors.
Table 5.3. National Explanatory Variable for Migration Statistics Harmonisation in the United Kingdom.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Centralisation</th>
<th>Nature of NSS</th>
<th>Sense of Duty</th>
<th>Administrative Capacity</th>
<th>Non-path-dependent development of the NSS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EMN</td>
<td>Mainly decentralised</td>
<td>Non-register-based</td>
<td>Below average</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration statistics harmonisation</td>
<td>Mainly decentralised</td>
<td>Non-register-based</td>
<td>Below average</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own depiction.

After a brief description of how the UK Statistics Authority is organised to date, this section reviews the development of the main stakeholders of the UK statistical system. With regard to its location and the level of its centralisation, the GSS is currently not only dispersed across 30 Government Departments, agencies, as well as the ONS, but also across the Devolved Administrations in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (UK Statistics Authority, n.d.b). The number of professional statisticians in the GSS amounted to about 1400 statisticians (UK Statistics Authority, n.d.a). While the dispersion of the GSS across Government Departments has an impact on the manner in which migration statistics are collected in the UK, devolution also plays a role that this chapter tackles below. The UK statistical system to date functions under the auspices of the UK Statistics Authority, with the latter heading the GSS. This service itself consists of three parts: The ONS, Government Department statistical units, and statistical units of Devolved Administrations, as shown below in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1. The Structure of the United Kingdom Statistics Authority.

With the introduction of the 2007 Statistics and Registration Service Act, there is a Statistics Board. This Board consists of executive - the National Statistician and the Head of Assessment, both of whom are civil servants - and non-executive members. The Board is responsible for monitoring the quality of official statistics production and dissemination (United Kingdom, 2007, Sections 7, 8). Its reports may be forwarded to the Minister or the Devolved Administration, and may be published (United Kingdom, 2007, Section 8 (2), (3)). Furthermore, the Board is required to assess official statistics against the Code of Practice, with the assessments being published (United Kingdom, 2007, Section 12). The National Statistician heads this system and the UK Statistics Authority, as well as being the Authority's chief executive (United Kingdom, 2007, Section 31).

The National Statistician advises the Board as regards the comprehensiveness, quality and good practice of official statistics (United Kingdom, 2007, Section 30(1)). The good practice of official statistics refers to a good accessibility of official statistics (United Kingdom, 2007, Section 7(4)). Should the Board not follow the National Statistician’s advice, it must publish its decision, and lay it before Parliament (United Kingdom, 2007, Section 30(3), (4)). The Board must also “develop and maintain definitions, methodologies, classifications and standards for official statistics in line with EU and international practice (United Kingdom, 2007, Section 9). The ONS is the UK Statistics Authority’s executive agency, and, in its role as NSI, functions as primary
contact with Eurostat (Statistics Authority, n.d.c). The Authority’s primary tasks are to oversee ONS, and to scrutinise all official statistics produced and disseminated in the UK. Moreover, the service includes statistical units in the Devolved Administrations of Scotland and Wales as shown below. Government statisticians work not only in the ONS and in the Devolved Administrations, but also in Departmental statistical units. These units are led by a head of the profession accountable to the National Statistician. International migration statistics are chiefly produced by the Home Office and ONS. To a lesser extent, the Department for Work and Pensions provides data on the basis of national insurance numbers. This means that while the UK Statistics Authority and its predecessors constitute an element of centralisation in the UK NSS, the UK NSS is still mainly decentralised since the GSS is spread out about the Devolved Administrations as well as the Government Departments. While the UK has a central statistical office, Government Departments supply a large share of the member state’s official statistics. The UK NSS thus qualifies as a decentralised statistical system. This means that the organisation of the member state’s statistical sphere stands in contradiction to the centralised British polity as such as described by Simon Bulmer and Martin Burch (2005, p. 862).

While this chapter focuses on developments from the UK’s accession to the European Union, it is necessary to look back to 1921 and 1941 respectively, discover the origins of the UK statistical system, and how it has existed up 2009. This is done in order to establish which mode of institutional development the UK NSS followed. Centralisation as explained above, in the form of creating an NSI, happened well before the UK’s accession to the Community - with the establishment of the Central Statistical Office (CSO) in 1941. 1941 brought that central element to the UK NSS that Henry Rew wished for in his presidential address to the Royal Statistical Society (RSS), “on the lines of those established” by other European states such as Norway and the Netherlands (Rew, 1921, p. 10). The RSS acts as a commenting body to the UK Statistics Authority. According to Rew, it was not the “present defects of official statistics or the delinquencies of official statisticians” that caused a problem, but rather the organisation of the statistical system itself and the lack of adequate resources of the system in place (Rew, 1921, p. 10). These thoughts were shared by the then Prime Minister Winston Churchill who established the CSO so as to
“consolidate and make sure that agreed figures only are used. The utmost confusion is caused when people argue on different statistical data… The various Departmental statistical branches will, of course, continue as at present, but agreement must be reached between them and the Central Statistical Office” (Churchill cited in McLennan, 1995, p. 469).

The former UK National Statistician, Karen Dunnell, summarises this period of the UK Statistics Authority as follows: prior to 1941, major Government Departments controlled their own statistical unit each, lacking any sort of coordinating body. So it was only natural that the CSO formed part of the Cabinet Office to advance the coherence of the UK statistics collection and production (Dunnell, 2007, p. 3). In view of the mode of institutional development of the UK NSS, this section argues that the beginning of the Second World War marks the critical juncture that marks the start of the UK NSS’s path-dependent development. Later events in the sequence from 1941 to 2009 such as the Rayner Review have not eroded these early design choices, and the UK NSS still exists in its mainly decentralised form.

In 1979, a period of downsizing and merger began. The then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher asked Derek Rayner to install the so-called “Efficiency Unit”, with the help of which she intended to reform the civil service by “improving efficiency and eliminating waste in Government” (UK House of Lords, 1998, Part 3(62)-(64)). One of the Unit’s investigations was aimed at the CSO and the Government Department statistical units, and led to cuts in staff numbers and statistical activities (Hoinville & Smith, 1982, p. 195). According to Martin Weale in his role as Chairman of the National Accounts Users’ Group, the reductions in funding brought with them deficiencies in the quality of statistics produced, in addition to disregarding Parliament’s, the Opposition’s, and the public’s statistical demands. In the end, Ministers who previously supported the cuts in costs and staff also criticised statistical quality (UK House of Commons, 1998, Appendix 3(1)). According to Bill McLennan, former Director of the CSO and Head of the GSS, the Treasury and Civil Service Committee had serious concerns about the reliability of economic statistics. This gave rise to a comprehensive review of the “Inter-Departmental arrangements for the production of Government economic statistics” led by the Treasury and Civil Service Committee in 1989 (McLennan, 1995, p. 471).
The third phase of the UK statistical system’s development, i.e. that of increased independence, is marked by the establishment of the CSO “as a distinct Government Department accountable to the Treasury in 1991” (Laux, Alldritt & Young, 2008, p. 2). Contrary to this, the Government under Thatcher regarded the CSO first as a service Department. It gained executive agency status in 1996, and thereby was able to determine its circle of users, and better address the public’s doubts about the statistics it produced (McLennan, 1995, pp. 471-472; UK House of Commons, 1998, Appendix 3(1)). The transfer of responsibility for statistical themes to the CSO from other Government Departments during the 1990s, and the merger of the CSO and OPCS finally led to the creation of the ONS in 1996 (Laux, Alldritt & Young, 2008, p. 2).

During the 1990s, the National Statistical Service had gained the attention of the Labour opposition. The 1997 election manifesto of the Labour party called for an independent National Statistical Service (Labour Party, 1997, n.p.). In 2000, the then Labour Government took up this call and introduced the framework for national statistics, introducing chiefly one new element. This was the inception of an advisory body to Ministers, the Statistics Commission, intended to be independent of Ministers and statistics producers in terms of having its own budget, and being able to determine its own activities. Yet the Statistics Commission chairman as well as the Commission’s other members were appointed by a Cabinet member, namely the Chancellor of the Exchequer (UK National Statistics, 2000, p. 8).

Another decentralisation aspect is that of the UK statistical system’s devolution. Following the establishment of Devolved Administrations in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland in 1997 the statistical cooperation between these three administrations and UK Government was regulated by the Concordat on Statistics in 2001. However, this only bound the administrations by a gentlemen’s agreement and was not legally enforceable (UK Statistics Authority, 2002, p. 1).

Furthermore in 2001, the Treasury stressed that there was still a need for more rights for the National Statistician in terms of deciding which statistics should qualify as ‘national statistics’, and therefore underlie additional quality standards. The Treasury specifically expressed concerns “about the role of Ministerial discretion in determining the scope of National Statistics” (UK House of Commons, 2001). Greg Phillpotts, as a member of the Royal Statistical Society, reports on review meetings on the draft National Statistics Code of Practice in 2002. According to Phillpotts, the Labour party and the Royal Statistical Society called for an independent UK statistical institution.
The Royal Statistical Society was concerned about the operation of the UK statistical system, and highlighted areas of insufficient protection of official statistics from ministerial interference, including prior ministerial and official access to statistics before publication, weaknesses in the National Statistician’s independence, and an overemphasis on Ministers’ needs rather than those of all other users (Phillpotts, 2002, p. 402). In response to this and following up on the 2006 Statistics and Registration Service Bill, and the Recommendations of a Treasury sub-committee report also dating back to 2006, the 2007 Statistics and Registration Service Act laid the foundations of the UK Statistics Authority in 2008 as non-ministerial Department.

The UK NSS develops path-dependently, since the Second World War acts as a critical juncture in the beginning of the analysed sequence, and the seed of partial centralisation sown in the course of it, has taken form in the UK Statistics Authority. In line with Bulmer and Burch’s article on the development of Whitehall, the UK statistical sphere thus also developed in a incremental manner (1998, p. 625). Contrary to their results regarding the development of Whitehall, however, this thesis showed that for the UK statistical sphere, there is indeed a critical juncture, namely Churchill’s creation of the CSO as a central element in the UK’s otherwise decentralised NSS which at the time of writing still exists in the form of the UK Statistics Authority. Yet this critical juncture did not occur because of the UK becoming a member state of the EU, which is also unlike the “critical moments” that brought about changes in Whitehall such as the creation of a central oversight mechanism for EU policy which Bulmer and Burch find to have existed only on a non-permanent basis (1998, p. 626; italics in original text). The inception of the CSO is identified for a critical juncture - amongst the others reasons on which this section elaborated - because this element of centralisation still exists. Yet, these findings of this thesis do not coincide with Bulmer and Burch’s later argumentation in their book on the Europeanisation of Whitehall, namely, that eventually, UK Government experienced transformative change following gradual change (2009, p. 191). It should be noted, however, that the authors have not covered the country’s statistical sphere in their book.

This thesis establishes the sense of duty of a member state on the basis of the number of so-called formal opinions, the first of three stages of infringement procedures. In the case of the UK, 188 formal opinion procedures were opened in the years 2007 to 2009 (European Commission, 2011b, Table 2.1). This is above the EU-27 average for these years, which amounts to 156 formal opinion procedures per member
state between 2007 and 2009. This indicates that the UK’s sense of duty to comply with EU law, and by that to harmonise migration statistics in the UK for these years, is below the EU average. The member state shows a low sense of duty.

The literature portrays the administrative capacity of the regulated entity as another national indicator that determines compliance. This thesis refers to Eurostat peer reviews in order to establish a NSS’s administrative capacity. In the first round of ESS peer reviews, the UK NSS meets the seven targets that were tested in all EU-27 member states as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, either fully or largely. This points to the UK NSS having high administrative capacity. Table 5.4 summarises the findings.

**Table 5.4. Administrative Capacity of the United Kingdom Statistical System.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional independence</td>
<td>Largely met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandate for data collection</td>
<td>Largely met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequacy of resources</td>
<td>Largely met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality commitment</td>
<td>Fully met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistical confidentiality</td>
<td>Fully met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impartiality and objectivity</td>
<td>Largely met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessibility and clarity</td>
<td>Largely met</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own depiction, adapted from Eurostat, 2008, pp. 6-23.

In summary, the UK NSS remained a highly decentralised statistical system. The Second World War qualifies as a critical juncture that marks the start of the path-dependent development of the UK NSS: the predecessor of the UK Statistics Authority, the CSO was established in 1941, and added an element of centralisation to the branches of the UK NSS which until then had been independently working. The UK NSS as a decentralised statistical system with elements of centralisation has existed since 1941. The trend towards centralisation has continued, and taken form in the UK Statistics Authority. The UK NSS also exhibits a high administrative capacity. However, based
on the number of formal opinions of the years 2007 to 2010, the UK as an EU member state has a lower sense of duty than the EU average for these years when it comes to translating supranational incentives into its national context. This means that, apart from sense of duty, the national explanatory factors all feature high levels. Since these are national factors, they are applicable to both the EMN Council Decision as well as Regulation 862/2007/EC.

5.2.3 Policy-specific Explanatory Variable for Migration Statistics Harmonisation in the United Kingdom

This section demonstrates that the UK scored highly with regard to the policy-specific variable. In terms of policy-specific independent variables for migration statistics harmonisation, the theoretical framework enlisted

- non-opposition to the EU incentive
- knowledge of rules

This section sets out how these policy-specific explanatory factors exist in the UK as summarised in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5. Policy-specific Explanatory Variables for Migration Statistics Harmonisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Opposition</th>
<th>Knowledge of Rules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EMN Council Decision</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation 862/2007/EC</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own depiction.

Concerning the EMN Council Decision, in 2004 the UK Government announced
that it was in general supportive of the envisaged EU-level action regarding improving the “statistical base to underpin migration policy development” (UK House of Commons, 2004, 14). Yet it mentioned that it did not think the EMN was the best actor to take over this role, because of its small size and limited resources. Furthermore, the Government suggested that other sources of international migration statistics should be evaluated first in order to avoid unnecessary duplication. In the debates on the future of the EMN in 2007, joined by the Select Committee on European Scrutiny, the UK Government was “generally supportive” of the draft Decision on the EMN. It pointed out that the responsibilities of the Commission and the EMN Steering Board - consisting of the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the member states would each have one representative - should be in the ‘right balance’. The UK Government argued for a greater scope of responsibilities for the member states, examples of this being the selection of a service provider, and the weakening of the requirement for an EMN NCP language apart from English for the UK EMN NCP (UK House of Commons, 2007, 7.17, 7.19).

The UK negotiated for the language requirement to be re-formulated and thus to adjust it to its specific national preferences and the languages spoken at the UK EMN NCP. “[The UK Government] will seek an exemption for the UK EMN NCP from the requirement that NCPs should be able to work and write in another EC official language.” (UK House of Commons, 2007, 7.17). It succeeded in weakening the requirement:

“Our position was […] strengthened by the repositioning of the ‘non-English language requirement’ clause from Article 5(2)(e) to the Preamble (8) and the loosening of the wording to "Each National Contact Point should also collectively have adequate expertise in … collaborating in a multilingual environment at European level” (UK House of Lords, 2008).

It only partly achieved its other aim to put the selection of a service provider for the EMN in the hands of the member states: “We obtained assurances from the Commission that Member States, through the National Contact Point, will have an informal role in the selection of a future Service Provider (a formal role being outside what is feasible
under Commission procurement procedures)” (UK House of Lords, 2008). This thesis takes that for an indication of the UK’s high degree of knowledge of rules comprised in the EMN Council Decision.

In the case of Regulation 862/2007/EC, the UK NSS partly opposed the motion as such. In relation to the European Commission’s proposal for a Regulation in 2003, the UK Government preferred to keep this rather informal mode of operation:

“The UK will be seeking to work with other Member States to identify the most effective means of achieving comparable and timely statistics without the recourse to legislation. Measuring asylum and migration is challenging and the aim should be to identify a set of principles that all Member States aim to work towards on a voluntary and collaborative basis” (UK House of Commons, 2003, 14.8).

This section draws from that statement that the UK Government did not oppose the content of the Regulation, but its form as EU secondary law. A letter from the Home Office Statistics Unit to Eurostat shows, however, that the Unit proposed a number of amendments to the 2003 draft of Regulation 862/2007/EC, and did not oppose the Regulation as such (UK Home Office, 2003, p. 1). Most importantly, the UK NSS wished to amend the requirement to send more data, and also more frequent data (UK Home Office, 2003, p. 1). The UK NSS raised the issue that although “Eurostat and the Commission suggested that the proposed Framework’s coverage would essentially fit into the confines of the Member State’s existing data collections, to provide these with a proper legal basis”, the proposed Regulation “would require the introduction of new data collections in the future, both in the UK and in other Member States” (UK Home Office, 2003, p. 1). In addition, the Home Office had moved away from the monthly provision of data (Interview 8). Only singular aspects of the Regulation are questioned by the UK, and explicitly states that it does not oppose the move as such. This is why the thesis argues that the UK does not show opposition towards the Regulation.

This section argues that this detailed feedback on the draft Regulation - the Home Office provided suggestions for ten of the 14 Articles of the draft Regulation - indicates the high degree of knowledge of rules (UK Home Office, 2003, pp. 2-3). This in turn indicates that there was no opposition towards the Regulation as such, and that the UK’s
knowledge of rules was high. The evidence presented in this paragraph also points to
the same being true for the EMN Council Decision, i.e. no opposition, and a high degree
of knowledge.

5.2.4 Analysis of the Explanatory Variables - Conclusion

Section 5.2.4 recapitulated the results of how the UK scored in view of the
explanatory variables. It proceeds by variable. Sections 5.2.1 to 5.2.3 focused on how
the explanatory factors played out in the UK. Having analysed this question, this thesis
finds that the supranational explanatory factors feature similar findings for both the
EMN Council Decision and Regulation 862/2007/EC, apart from a lack of a
harmonisation incentive in the latter regarding policy instruments. Chapters Three and
Four determined positive results regarding supranational explanatory factors. Eurostat
followed a path-dependent mode of institutional development from the time when the
EMN Council Decision and Regulation 962/2007/EC were issued until 2009. In both
cases, the UK had to adhere to supranational law since it was a member state of the EU
at that time, and decided to opt in to the EMN. The degree of obligation and the degree
of detail is high for both steps of migration statistics harmonisation. In addition, the
country showed negative outcomes for issue linkage for both steps. The indicators such
as EU membership, high degree of obligation, and the lack of issue linkage, and the
high degree of detail are all thought to further migration statistics harmonisation.

The UK overall shows negative results regarding most national factors. The
chapter found the member state to be decentralised, not register-based, to have a low
sense of duty and a path-dependent NSS, but with a high administrative capacity. All
are thought to be detrimental to migration statistics harmonisation apart from the high
administrative capacity. The UK scores high in view of the policy-specific variable:
knowledge of rules features a positive result for both EU incentives, and the member
state only showed some minor opposition to parts of the Regulation. Summing up, the
supranational and the policy-specific variables should further migration statistics
harmonisation most, based on the above.
5.3 Explanatory Analysis

This section brings together the findings for the dependent variable and the explanatory variables so as to show whether the theoretical expectations held true. Section 5.1 and its subsections focused on the dependent variable. They showed in how far the UK has taken measures towards the harmonisation of migration statistics. To recapitulate, the UK’s goals became more similar to the EU impulse for both EU incentives examined in this chapter. In view of policy instruments, there was only convergence and domestic adaptation in the context of the EMN. Contrary to that, the policy instrument settings became more similar and adapted nationally to both EU impulses. This means that one finds transformation in the case of the EMN nationally, and absorption in the context of the Regulation. In terms of uploading, this thesis found UK to EU transfer in view of EMN and Regulation 862/2007/EC policy instrument settings. Section 5.2 and its subsections examined the explanatory variables for migration statistics harmonisation in the case of the UK. They found that supranational and policy-specific factors should further migration statistics harmonisation. Largely speaking, the UK’s results for national factors should rather prohibit the harmonisation of migration statistics. Only the country’s high administrative capacity furthers it.

Bringing together dependent and explanatory variables in this explanatory analysis feeds into replying to the research question of how migration statistics were harmonised. The following subsections of Section 5.3, which are ordered by explanatory variable, examine whether the theoretical expectations formulated in the theoretical framework in Chapter Two hold true.

5.3.1 Findings for the Supranational Explanatory Variable

The theoretical expectation for the supranational explanatory factors leading to migration statistics harmonisation was that the positive results of supranational explanatory factors furthers migration statistics harmonisation. Chapters Three and Four showed that there is a high score for the supranational variable, and one would hence expect the UK to succeed in bringing its goals, instruments, and instrument settings in line with both EU incentives. Section 5.1 and its subsections showed that EMN goals, instruments and instrument settings were reciprocated by the UK, and led to domestic adaptation. It also demonstrated that, in the case of the second step to migration statistics harmonisation, Regulation 862/2007/EC, the Home Office’s goals and
instrument settings were brought in line with EU requirements. The goals and instruments of the ONS had already been in line with the EU incentive, and neither needed to be adapted to them, nor led to other domestic change. The expectation thus holds largely true.

5.3.2 Findings for the National Explanatory Variable

On the basis of the theoretical framework, the expectation was that a high score of the national explanatory variable would further migration statistics harmonisation. The analysis of the national explanatory variable in Section 5.2 and its subsections revealed that the UK fared badly in that regard, apart from a high administrative capacity. All other factors, i.e. the path-dependent development of the UK NSS, its decentralised nature as well as the UK’s low sense of duty, would let one assume to constitute hindrances for migration statistics harmonisation being successful.

One would hence expect that the goals, instruments, and instrument settings of both migration statistics harmonisation steps were not mirrored in the UK. Section 6.1 and its subsections analysed the dependent variable. They showed that EMN goals, instruments and instrument settings were reciprocated by the UK, and led to domestic adaptation. It also demonstrated that Regulation 862/2007/EC goals did not harmonise the ONS’s policy goals and had little impact on its instruments, since the ONS’s goals and instruments had already been in line with EU incentives. The situation was different for policy goals and instruments of the Home Office, and policy instrument settings in general, for which there was domestic change as well as uploading to the EU level from the national level. The expectation is thus not fulfilled.

5.3.3 Findings for the Policy-specific Explanatory Variable

It is expected that a high score in the policy-specific variable has a positive impact on migration statistics harmonisation. Section 5.2.3 showed that the policy-specific explanatory variable scored highly in the UK. While the UK had some criticisms regarding both policy items, it was in general supportive of both. Similar to the supranational factors, the policy-specific factors fit well with the analysis of the dependent variable in Section 5.1 and its subsections. The outcome that was expected on the basis of the theoretical framework, that a high score in policy-specific variable
furthers migration statistics harmonisation, is largely supported by the findings of Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 and their respective subsections.

5.4 Explanatory Analysis - Conclusion

In conclusion, the explanatory analysis covering the previous sections shows that none of the theoretical expectations hold true in total. The supranational and the policy-specific factors explain large parts of the results of Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 and their subsections, whereas the results of the national factors need to be checked against the results of the next chapter focusing on migration statistics harmonisation in the Netherlands. This will show whether the results can be upheld in comparison.

If compared to the findings of Bulmer and Burch, who argue that the EU membership had an impact on UK central government in terms of opportunity structures, its institutional constraints - i.e. devolution (2005, p. 879) -“although not directly prompted by pressures from the EU” (2005, p. 880), and political and organisational cultures (2005, p. 881), the findings of this chapter show a similar outcome for the domestic reaction to the EMN impulse in which case also all three measured dimensions had adapted, but withstands the finding for the effect of the Regulation at UK domestic level. In the latter case, only one dimension had undergone change, which led to the labelling of absorption. Similarly, Bulmer and Burch find domestic adaptation for each of the five institutional dimensions, i.e. system, organisations, processes, regulation as well as the cultural aspects of institutions (2009, pp. 185-189).
Chapter Six: Migration Statistics Harmonisation in the Netherlands

This chapter relates to the main research question of how EU and domestic level actors strive towards harmonisation in the case of migration statistics, by evaluating the case of the Netherlands. The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliamentary system. The States General, the parliament, consists of the Upper House or First Chamber, and the Lower House or Second Chamber. While the members of the Upper House are elected by the members of the councils of the provinces, the Lower House comprises the delegates who are elected by the Dutch people. Within the legislative process, the Lower House plays the more important role and is charged with the day-to-day politics. The Upper House is not formally bound by the Government programme, and is “concerned only with the broad outline of policy” (Netherlands, Upper House, n.d.).

In view of the development of immigration to and emigration from the Netherlands, the net migration rate was mostly negative between 1946 and the early 1960s (Roodenburg, Euwals & ter Rele, 2003, p. 22). This was due to an active emigration policy by the Directorate for Emigration, mostly to Anglophone countries such as Canada, the USA, and Australia (Penninx, Schoorl & van Praag, 1993, p. 7). Rinus Penninx, Jeanette Schoorl, and Carlo van Praag refer to Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS), the Dutch Central Statistical Office, numbers and contend that the net migration rate between 1967 and 1991 has been positive, for reasons such as repatriation from Indonesia, or former military staff from the Netherlands’ former colonies (Penninx, Schoorl & van Praag, 1993, p. 9). Mirroring Germany’s immigration policy in that aspect, the Netherlands recruited so-called guest workers from the mid-1950s onwards so as to address the demand for labour caused by the country’s post-war economic recovery (van Amersfoord & Penninx, 1994, p. 133; Penninx, Schoorl & van Praag, 1993, pp. 9-10).

In the following, many of these guest workers brought their spouses from their respective countries of origin, and the Netherlands experienced family migration between the mid-1950s to mid-1970s. In the mid-1970s, the Dutch Government restricted labour migration severely, until the 1990s, when a new demand for labour arose. Since the 1980s, refugees formed a major part of the immigrant numbers to the Netherlands (Roodenburg, Euwals & ter Rele, 2003, pp. 24-25). Regarding more recent migration trends, the Netherlands nowadays turned into an immigration country (as measured by a positive net migration rate, shown in Table 1.2). However, particularly in
the years 2012 and 2013, the Netherlands’ net migration rate was lower than that of the average of the 27 EU member states, and also considerably lower than the UK’s.

Like the previous chapter on the UK, this chapter starts with examining the dependent variable of migration statistics harmonisation (Section 6.1 and subsections). This first part of the analysis shows how far migration statistics have been harmonised in the Netherlands, and whether this qualifies for migration statistics harmonisation of the member state with EU incentives. In a second step, this chapter concentrates on evaluating how the Netherlands scored in view of the explanatory variables based on the empirical evidence found (Section 6.2 and subsections). Third, this chapter brings together the findings of the first two steps in its explanatory analysis, so as to show which independent variables hold explanatory power for migration statistics harmonisation in the Netherlands (Section 6.3 and subsections). The chapter argues that policy instrument settings have been affected by and coincide most with EU demands due to supranational, national, and policy-specific factors.

6.1 Analysis of the Dependent Variable

Section 6.1 examines the dependent variable - migration statistics harmonisation - in the Netherlands. The first chapter placed migration statistics harmonisation in a conceptual framework of domestic adaptation to European regional integration, as well as increasing similarity of policy goals, instruments, and instrument settings. Mirroring Chapter Six on the UK, this chapter concentrates on the two important steps towards migration statistics harmonisation in the EU - the EMN Council Decision, and Regulation 862/2007/EC identified in Chapter Five - and how the Netherlands translated them into their national context. Table 6.1 presents a condensed overview of the findings for the dependent variable in the Netherlands.
Table 6.1. Summary of the Dependent Variable in the Netherlands for the European Migration Network and Regulation 862/2007/EC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptualisation</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Instrument setting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EMN NL</td>
<td>Becomes more similar to EU incentive</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMN NL</td>
<td>Domestic adaptation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation 862/2007/EC in the NL</td>
<td>Becomes more similar to EU incentive</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation 862/2007/EC in the NL</td>
<td>Domestic adaptation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own depiction.

For the EMN, the findings indicate adaptation and policy convergence in all three aspects, while for Regulation 862/2007/EC, they point to domestic adaptation and convergence with EU requests in view of policy instruments only. This does not mean, however, that the goals and instruments contradict those of Regulation 862/2007/EC. Rather, it means that the goals and instruments tally with what is requested in the Regulation, and they have not triggered any domestic reaction. This situation is described and identified as a shortcoming of both Europeanisation and policy convergence concepts in the theoretical framework, mirroring the discussion surrounding the goodness of fit. In the case at hand, it means that the Regulation was formulated openly enough so that domestic goals and instrument did not need adjustment.

6.1.1 Convergence and Europeanisation of Policy Goals - European Migration Network

This section shows how the national policy goals of the EMN became more similar with the introduction of the EMN Council Decision, and that they have adapted
domestically. The policy goals of the EMN were translated into the national context of the Netherlands as follows: the key policy goal of the preparatory action and the EMN Council Directive was the provision and exchange of migration-related information and research. The domestic branch of the EMN in the Netherlands shared this goal. While it did not provide a statistics report for every reference year from 2004 on, it did deliver country-specific policy reports every year from 2004 on (EMN, 2014a; European Migration Network, 2014b; Netherlands EMN NCP, 2007a, p. 1).

Some ‘delays’ in view of statistics reports can be explained by the nature of migration and asylum statistics. In this area, procedures may be started in one year, but only completed later. It is noticeable though that the report dates back to 2007, instead of 2005, the year in which the first summary of the developments of 2004 could be given. Indeed, the following statistics report also dates to 2007, and highlights the delay in providing a report for the reference year 2004. There is no statistics report for the reference period 2006. The next statistics report after that is for the reference year 2007, published in 2009, with this three year pattern repeated for reference years 2007 to 2009 (European Migration Network, 2014b). In 2010, the second reference year for which the Regulation was in force, there is no statistics report from the Netherlands or any other EU member state. However, the Netherlands supplied various country-specific policy-reports from 2005 onwards for all years to 2010. For the year 2004, only Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Ireland provided country-specific statistics reports (European Migration Network, 2014b). Despite not providing a statistics report for all years from 2004 onwards, this evidence indicates that the Netherlands shared the goal of providing migration- and asylum-related information to the Commission and to the general public.

The findings indicate that the Dutch NCP adapted to the policy goal prescribed in the EMN Regulation as providing to and exchanging information on aspects of migration and asylum nationally with the other NCPs and across levels with the European Commission. The pattern of report publication - complete provision of member state-specific reports, albeit with delays and not providing a separate statistics report for every reference year but rather including this information in their general country reports - shows that the Netherlands shared the policy goal in principle. However, it had a different approach to the manner in which these reports were published prior to the EMN’s formalisation in 2008. That the Netherlands published reports regularly once the EMN is formalised is further enforcing the perception of the Netherlands sharing the policy goal. This indicates a change in the element of
publication frequency between T2 and T1. That the Netherlands shared this policy goal is further highlighted by the Netherlands participating in exchanging information, in the context of \textit{ad hoc} queries between the EMN NCPs. For instance, it launched such a query on the monitoring of student activities in the member states in 2008 (EMN, 2008b, p. 1). This indicates that the Netherlands shared the goal of information provision of the EMN incentive. The findings point to domestic adaptation regarding the policy goal, as well as convergence of the policy goal of the national and the EU level.

With regard to the goodness of fit between the EU level policy goals and the national level goals this section finds that the goodness of fit holds true in the case at hand. This is true because firstly, the Netherlands shared the policy goal of the EU level. One would thus expect a smooth transferral of the EU level goals to the domestic level. Secondly, there is no delay in the country delivering annual reports on migration and asylum in the Netherlands to the EU level. The delay in submitting specific statistics reports does not point to a bad fit, because the member state shares the general goal of information provision to the Commission and the general public by sending yearly reports to the EU level which also cover the topic of statistics, and thus complied with the demands of the EU impulse in this manner. This in turn signifies that the expectations of an easy domestic adaptation held true.

After the EMN motion coming into place, the Netherlands voiced their support of it. Yet in terms of EMN-related policy goals being uploaded to the EU level, there is no evidence for the Netherlands uploading their policy goals to the EU level on this occasion.

\textit{6.1.2 Convergence and Europeanisation of Policy Instruments - European Migration Network}

Section 6.1.2 argues that the EMN Council Decision brought about policy instrument convergence at the national level, and that the domestic level has adapted to these requirements. In 2006, the then \textit{Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie}, Minister for Foreigners’ Affairs and Integration, Rita Verdonk, stressed that the Netherlands supported giving the EMN a more “definitive” form (Netherlands, Lower House, 2006, Reactie). The Dutch Government argued that the cross-loading of information amongst NCPs should be furthered, and in order to prevent the duplication
of work of other relevant players in the field of migration and asylum, there should be regular evaluations of the usefulness of the EMN (Netherlands, Lower House, 2006, 2).

The more definitive form of the EMN was captured in a Council Decision on the future of the EMN. The Dutch Government commented on the draft Council Decision on the EMN in 2007 that it saw the Network as means to further its striving for increased cooperation in the field of asylum and migration at EU level. It argued that exchanging information and conducting research was important so as to achieve this aim (Netherlands, Lower House, 2007, Fiche 4, 4(b), (c)). In 2007, Frans Timmermans, the then staatssecretaris van Buitenlandse Zaken, the State Secretary of Foreign Affairs, evaluated the Council Decision positively in his letter to the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament in 2007 (Netherlands, Lower House, 2007, Fiche 4, 2). He supported giving the EMN a formal character, and said it was necessary to give the EMN a legal basis that enlisted its tasks and structure.

The EMN preparatory action, and the EMN Council Decision, delineated a network of NCPs at the head of national migration networks. These provided the European Commission, the general public, domestic authorities with migration- and asylum-related information. Member states could choose whether or not to attach the NCP to a governmental institution, as long as they created an NCP at the remit of a national expert network of organisations and individuals active in the field of migration and asylum, and provided the EU level with information on national developments every year. The Netherlands opted for a government-attached NCP with an attached expert network. This indicates that the country’s policy instruments converged with those set up in the Council Decision in this aspect. The Netherlands responded to this by creating an NCP, and building a domestic network of experts and organisations in the field of migration and asylum. The Dutch NCP was inserted into the Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst, Informatie- en Analysecentrum (INDIAC), the centre for analysis of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Netherlands EMN NCP, 2014). Both the preparatory action and the Council Decision left it to the participating member states to decide whether they wished to attach the NCP to an existing governmental or non-governmental institution which already carried out research. The Dutch Government opted for a governmental institution which already carried out research. The Netherlands responded to EU demands for providing and exchanging information on migration and asylum policy and statistics by establishing the EMN NCP within the INDIAC, under the roof of the Dutch Ministry for Security and Justice. The Service had
existed since 1995 and produced analyses of immigration policy since that year (Netherlands EMN NCP, 2014).

Throughout the preparatory phase up until Council Decision 381/2008/EC of 14 May 2008 establishing a European Migration Network came into force in 2008, the Dutch NCP produced reports on statistics and annual reports in that period (for instance, Netherlands EMN NCP, 2007b, p. 6; Netherlands EMN NCP, 2006, p. 3). The Netherlands hence assigned an established research department related to a Ministry to accommodate EU demands. Also in the debate on the Council Decision in 2007, the Dutch Government argued for continuity. The INDIAC should remain the framework for the EMN NCP (Netherlands, Lower House, 2007, Fiche 4, 7(a)), and should at least initially remain under the auspices of the European Commission rather than that of an independent agency (Netherlands, Lower House, Fiche 4, 2007, 3).

The preparatory action for the EMN has brought about little change in the cooperation between Dutch Government bodies. An adjustment was that the CBS now functioned as a data provider for the EMN NCP (Interview 13). The INDIAC has been responsible for this task prior to the EU action. However, the EU action demanded horizontal cooperation between the NCPs, which did not yet exist, because the Network was set up only by the EU action. In that aspect, there was domestic adaptation horizontally by cross-loading information and research among the NCPs.

The country thus complied with the EU incentive, and its policy instruments converged with EU demands over time. These findings also indicate that domestic adaptation took place in that the Dutch Government made use of an existing institution, the INDIAC. Had they designated the INDIAC as EMN NCP, the finding would be that inertia came about, neither horizontally between Ministries nor vertically, between the national and the regional or local level. Yet the EMN NCP was inserted into the INDIAC, making use of existing institutions, changing the cooperation both horizontally as well as vertically. This indicates a change in this element between T2 and T1. This is why this section argues for domestic adaptation due to the EMN preparatory action and the EMN Council Decision with regard to policy instruments.

In terms of the goodness of fit, this section determines a good fit between the domestic level and EU demands. This is because the EU impulse met the INDIAC and a structure of experts in questions of migration and asylum as well as the respective statistics at national level, which made it easy for the Netherlands to adapt nationally to it. One would hence expect a smooth adaptation process. This was indeed the case in
practice. There are no reported delays or issues which would point to problems in national adaptation. In the following, the good fit between the levels predicted this correctly, and the hypothesis holds true.

With regard to the question of the Netherlands uploading domestic policy instruments to the EU level, there is no evidence for this concerning EMN-related policy instruments. What is more is that also other countries just as the Netherlands had the basic expert structure in place at the time the proposal for an EMN entered the EU agenda. The Dutch structure was not unique in the EU, and it cannot be traced back to it being a Dutch proposal. This thesis hence finds that there is no uploading of policy instruments to the EU level.

6.1.3 Convergence and Europeanisation of the Policy Instrument Settings - European Migration Network

This section posits that the national policy instrument settings of the EMN converged with what the supranational incentive asked for, and that the country adapted to the incentive. The EMN Council Decision asked for the NCPs to provide annual reports on migration- and asylum-related statistics and national policy developments (Council, 2008, Article 9). As elaborated in Section 6.1.1, while the country did not provide specifically designated statistics reports for every reference year prior to the introduction of the EMN Council Decision, the Netherlands did contribute annual reports on its migration and asylum policies. This indicates that the criterion for annual national reports mostly converged with the EU incentive. Moreover, after the Council Decision came into force, the country delivered a statistics report for the reference year 2009. The fact that these national EMN reports had not been produced before suggests that domestic adaptation had taken place.

Regarding the policy style, publishing reports which were publicly accessible shows that new policy instruments were used, which indicates a mediating style. Yet also in the case of the Netherlands, one finds indicators for both ideal types of administrative intervention in the style of the EMN, both in its pilot phase, and after its formalisation. Interestingly, formalisation did not equal a shift towards the intervening type: the involvement of the general public in the EMN was augmented through its formalisation. As such, the policy style was closer to the mediating type than it had been prior to the Decision. The Dutch Government found that the EMN should be made
better known in public, and its national EMN branches should include all relevant national players in the field of migration and asylum (Netherlands, Lower House, 2006, 2). The Netherlands suggested more involvement of the relevant national actors in the field of migration and asylum in the Network during the consultation on the future of the EMN (Netherlands, Lower House, 2006, 4). Examples of this participation were conferences of the Dutch national EMN, which aim to bring policymakers, researchers and information providers together (NL EMN NCP, 2013). Yet lastly it was the EMN Steering Board that controlled the agenda for labelling the mode of intervention: the member states and the European Commission had seats in the EMN Steering Board (Council, 2008, 6(1)). An official of the CBS commented on the possibility of the NCPs to impact on the agenda: “all the proposals for research and so on, are made on European level:he European Commission. The NCPs have some influence on what will be analysed, but I think their influence is rather small” (Interview 13). In addition, as in the UK, the Dutch NCP was part of a Ministry. This section argues that while there was formalisation, which indicates a more legalistic and thereby intervening policy style, formalisation also brought with it an increase in participation of non-governmental actors, and also in the public accessibility of migration- and asylum-related information. The latter indicates the mediating type. Yet like in the case of the UK, the above points to the exclusion of non-governmental actors in view of agenda control. Because of this, this section posits that the intervening type prevailed.

During the consultations on the future of the EMN, the Dutch Government argued for the EMN to remain connected to the European Commission for the time being, calling to mind the unclear (financial) situation of an independent agency or other independent structure (Netherlands, Lower House, 2006, 4.). It further argued that the NCPs should have objectivity, access to sources of information, continuity, and technical support within the NCP, and be able to set up and keep up a national network as broad as possible. The Dutch Government preferred to have the Netherlands EMN NCP attached to a public authority, because they argued that this guaranteed better access to information, and saw the needs of its NCP better placed in a public body (Netherlands, Lower House, 2006, 4.).

Comparing the Green Paper on the future of the EMN and the Dutch position, it becomes clear that the Dutch Government succeeded in having its suggestion to open up the EMN and its outputs to the general public included in the EMN (European Commission, 2005c, 4.1). Little EMN work had been openly accessible prior to 2004,
whereas increasingly EMN studies have now been published, as foreseen in the Council Decision (Council, 2008, Articles 1(3), 2(1)(f)). In view of the requirement of two EU languages spoken and used in the NCPs, the Netherlands supplied the EMN with national policy and statistics reports in both Dutch and English, on top on various specific policy reports authored in English, until the reference year 2009 (for instance, Netherlands EMN NCP, 2010a; Netherlands EMN NCP, 2010b).

Yet despite the annual domestic network meetings, non-governmental actors were not actively involved in the actual decision-making, and rather functioned as further providers of information. This negates a fully mediating policy style towards all participants in the EMN. Overall however, the introduction of the EMN in the Netherlands points to a slight shift towards more inclusive policy-making, and thereby to domestic adaptation and convergence with EU demands. The country fulfilled the requirement of publishing annual reports too, which also indicates domestic adaptation and convergence with the EU incentive. This means that the not only the policy style changed between T2 and T1, but also the in the member state’s frequency of publishing reports.

Regarding the goodness of fit hypothesis, this section finds that there is a good fit between the levels in terms of their policy style. The intervening style prevailed at both levels, with the EU level featuring only a slightly more mediating policy style by the inclusion of non-governmental actors in policy-making. There was also a good fit between the two levels in view of the status of the Dutch EMN NCP as part of a governmental institution, since the EU impulse left the member states leeway to decide whether to attach the NCPs to a governmental or a non-governmental institution. This means that there was a good fit between the two levels, which makes one expect an easy domestic adaptation to the EU impulse. Indeed, this thesis found no evidence for any delays or problems in transferring the EU level’s EMN demands to the Dutch national level in terms of policy instrument settings. In the following, one can conclude that the goodness of fit hypothesis predicted an easy national adaptation correctly. Concerning any uploading of policy instrument settings from the Dutch domestic level to the EU level, there is no evidence to support this existence of this. This section hence argues that no uploading took place on this occasion.
6.1.4 Convergence and Europeanisation of Policy Goals - Regulation 862/2007/EC

This section shows that Regulation 862/2007/EC did not bring about domestic adaptation to its requirements in view of its goals, and nor has it led to a convergence of the national level with the EU level. The key policy goal of Regulation 862/2007/EC is to bring about a better comparability of migration-related statistics across the EU member states. It would be wrong to state that Dutch migration statistics were produced without consideration for their comparability with those of other countries. The CBS, for instance, tried to comply with the 1998 UN Recommendations on migration statistics, which were introduced in Chapter One. A CBS official commented that they found it difficult to comply with the Recommendations because of the many exclusions and inclusions of different types of immigrants and emigrants that should and should not be counted (Interview 13). This indicates that the Dutch NSS attempted to align with the goal of migration statistics comparability with other countries. This means that the goal of comparability had been present nationally prior to the introduction of the Regulation. In the following, regarding the policy goal, there was no adaptation necessary domestically, and no convergence with the EU impulse over time. As there is no change in this element between T2 and T1, there is no domestic adaptation.

Concerning the goodness of fit between the policy goals of the two levels, this chapter finds that there is a good fit. The reported difficulties in complying with the 1998 UN Recommendations on migration statistics do not relate to its policy goals as such, or those of Regulation 862/2007/EC. An official rather stated that the Dutch NSI found it easier to comply with the Regulation as it contained fewer exclusions than the 1998 UN Recommendations. On the basis of this, one would expect compliance with EU demands to the Dutch domestic level. There were no delays, which would point to problems in complying domestically with the EU impulse. This means that the hypothesis held true in the case of the policy goals of Regulation 862/2007/EC. In terms of the policy goals, there is no evidence for Dutch domestic uploading of these to the EU level.

6.1.5 Convergence and Europeanisation of Policy Instruments - Regulation 862/2007/EC

Section 6.1.5 argues that domestic policy instruments have not adapted to EU demands, and that policy instruments of the two levels did not become increasingly
similar over time. The Netherlands had the following migration statistics sources, i.e. policy instruments, available in order to translate the Regulation into the national context. The Dutch NSS based its statistics on numbers from a wide array of data producers. Data on aliens refused at Schiphol Airport were collected by the Koninklijke Marechaussee, the Royal Military Constabulary. The CBS gathered demographic migration-related data (Netherlands EMN NCP, 2007a, p. 8).

The gemeentelijke basisadministratie (GBA), the municipal basic administrative database, is the backbone for a more comprehensive database, the Sociaal Statistisch Bestand (SSB), the social statistical database. This database holds additional information on residents of the Netherlands, such as the reason for their migration. The next paragraphs hence draw on the SSB. The SSB is a comprehensive database holding information on persons who reside in the Netherlands, and related information on socio-economic aspects of their lives. This means that this database holds information on both Dutch nationals and non-nationals. In addition to that, the CBS receives data from other institutions, which give insight into areas that are not covered by the GBA. These are merged in the SSB. The SSB gives insight into the residents in the Netherlands, and persons that receive their pension from the Netherlands. It comprises more than 30 sources (Netherlands CBS, 2010b). Given the variety of sources it combines, the SSB allows for topically comprehensive information, such as demographic, socio-cultural, socio-economic information. In that regard, it is similar to other register-based systems found in the Nordic countries. The data of the SSB as a whole have been used since 1999, whereas the use of data from the GBA reaches back to 1994. The GBA contains variables such as sex, date of birth, address, civil status, citizenship, country of birth, religious belief. In general, GBA data are available back to 1995. Prior to that, GBA data are available from September 1994, yet denoted immigrants who intended to stay longer than 180 days in the Netherlands. Since October 1994, the GBA registered all migrants who intended to stay longer than four months (Netherlands CBS, 2013a; Netherlands CBS, 2013b; Netherlands CBS, 2013c; Netherlands CBS, 2013f). According to the Dutch Statistics Act, the CBS had access to data of other institutions (Netherlands, 2003, Section X).

The Immigratie en Naturalisatie Dienst (IND), the Dutch Immigration Service, gathered data on the number of procedures. Data on residence permit applications and

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14 This Social Statistical Database additionally holds information on individuals living abroad in receipt of a Dutch pension.
decisions were only available from 2005 onwards. The reason for this was that the IND had taken over the task to produce these numbers from the Aliens Police during 2003 (Netherlands EMN NCP, 2007b, p. 8). With regard to migration statistics, another important source is the Centraal Register Vreemdelingen (CRV), the central foreigners register, of the Immigratie and Naturalisatie Dienst (IND), the Dutch immigration and naturalisation service, which registers, for example, the migratiemotief, the reason for migration (Netherlands CBS, 2013b). The CBS received these data from the IND once a year. These data provided insight into the migration motive of non-Dutch immigrants to the Netherlands. These data, however, exclude immigrants from other EU member states. While these are still required to register with the IND if they intend to stay longer than three months, failing to do so does not have any negative effect for them personally, for instance on their residence permit, as EU immigrants do not need one. Despite this lack of negative consequences for the immigrants themselves, still “about 20 or 30 per cent of the EU citizens do really register themselves at the immigration service” (Interview 13). This makes it hard to find migration motives for this group of immigrants based on IND data. For this reason, the CBS uses “sources from several Ministries or institutes to explore the data on EU citizens” (Interview 13).

In the Netherlands, the CBS was the designated NSI and at the same time responsible for delivering those statistics to Eurostat. Because of the upgrading of the register-based population statistics system mentioned earlier in this section, the CBS received registration data from the municipalities, i.e. vertical structures, on a daily basis from the 1970s onwards. A CBS official elaborated: “We receive data on a daily basis from all municipalities, data about all demographic events, not only migration, but also marriages, birth, death, internal migration” (Interview 13). In addition, once a year, the IND and other Ministries, provided the CBS with data on the migration motive from non-Dutch nationals:

“For that information, for migration motives, which is not registered in the GBA, therefore we use the information from the Immigration Service, we can join these data from the GBA to the data from the IND. From non-Dutch immigrants who enter the Netherlands in a certain year, we know their migration motive in that year” (Interview 13).
Other Ministries provided the CBS with data on migration motives of EU citizens. “For [EU citizens], we use other sources to explore the data, for instance, for students we have another source, we use data on education from people entering the Netherlands” (Interview 13). According to a CBS official, the data collection has not changed because of Regulation 862/2007/EC: while the data collection as such is still the same, the CBS has to explore the data differently since the Regulation, in order to adjust its data and the following statistics to the definition of immigration and emigration stipulated by the Regulation (Interview 13).

These findings indicate that there was no domestic adaptation to the Regulation in view of policy instruments. That the CBS explored data differently because of the Regulation does not constitute a change in the policy instruments, the data sources, themselves between T2 and T1. Rather, this is a change in policy instrument settings, upon which the following Section 6.1.6 concentrates. In addition, domestic developments of data sources, such as the IND taking over residence permit applications and decisions, happened prior to the Regulation coming into force. This means that these changes cannot be accredited to the Regulation itself. In the following, one can also not find signs for increased similarity of the Dutch migration statistics sources to EU demands. Because of the open formulation of Regulation 862/2007/EC, these domestic changes are still within the limits set by the Regulation.

Regarding the goodness of fit - which is thought to predict compliance to the EU impulse – this chapter finds that the hypothesis holds true. The requirements for data sources, i.e. policy instruments, fit Dutch data sources which fulfil these needs. The Regulation asks for surveys, registers, or other data sources which can supply the necessary data. The Netherlands had population registers and other registers available on the basis of which they could send the requested data to Eurostat. Thus, one encounters a good fit, which would let one expect national compliance. As there is no evidence for delays or other problematic matters in relation to the translation of Regulation 862/2007/EC until its coming into force, one can conclude that the hypothesis holds true in the case of policy instruments.

In view of the uploading of Dutch policy instruments to the EU level, there is also no evidence for that. For instance, the register-based nature of the Dutch NSSs is widely-spread across the EU member states. Furthermore, the Regulation allowed for the use of a vast variety of existing national sources, amongst those were registers. Hence, the inclusion of register-based data sources in the Regulation is not a favour to
the country or an expression of their existence in the Netherlands, but rather on their existence in many EU member states albeit in various forms and levels of data availability. This points to the lack of uploading concerning Dutch policy instruments to the EU level.

6.1.6 Convergence and Europeanisation of Policy Instrument Settings - Regulation 862/2007/EC

This section posits that Regulation 862/2007/EC led to domestic adaptation of policy instrument settings. Moreover, it contends that national policy instrument settings converged with EU demands. Regulation 862/2007/EC asked for an ex ante output-harmonisation of migration statistics. This meant that data could be produced with different means, i.e. data sources, as shown in Section 7.1.5. However, they needed to be based on the same definitions in each member state, and be published in a uniform format. A central part of these was the common determination of who counted as a long-term migrant and who did not. The Regulation stipulated the time criterion as 12 months for long-term migration.

A condition for this is that statistics are harmonised at national level. The Dutch NSI, the CBS, took important steps towards this harmonisation in 1999 by introducing uniform concepts in the area of population statistics nationally (Netherlands CBS, 2012, 2). Two concepts are of importance for this chapter. These are allochtonen and autochtonen, which had initially been introduced in order to avoid the term ‘foreigner’. Since the term was thought to bear a negative connotation, alternatives had to be found. In the following, the CBS distinguished between immigrant categories as first-generation allochtonous, individuals of whom at least one parent was born outside the Netherlands, as was the person in question. Second-generation allochtonous were themselves born in the Netherlands with at least one parent born abroad. As a third, separate group, the CBS called individuals born in the Netherlands, and whose parents were both born in the Netherlands autochtonous (OECD, 2001, p. 215, Box III.7).

The nationally used term, however, for the concept of an immigrant, neither coincided with that proposed in the 1998 UN Recommendations, and nor with those made compulsory by Regulation 862/2007/EC, which followed the UN Recommendations. Dutch migration statistics were based on registrations and deregistrations in the GBA. The differences between the definitions were that in the
Netherlands, the “registration criterion is fulfilled if the expected length of stay in the Netherlands in the six months following settlement is at least four months”, and an eight-month criterion for emigration (Netherlands EMN NCP, 2010a, p. 5). The Regulation, however, specified that “the action by which a person establishes his or her usual residence in the territory of a member state for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least twelve months, having previously been usually resident in another member state or a third country” (European Parliament & Council, 2007, Article 2(b)).

With regard to translating the Regulation into the Dutch NSS, the CBS and the Austrian statistical office exchanged their experiences on how to accommodate the Regulation’s requested definitions:

“In order to comply [with] the Regulation, the definition, we cooperated with other statistical offices, like Austria who has almost the same register, and almost the same definition that we have. So we made use of their practices on that” (Interview 13).

Furthermore, from 2004 onwards, “the definitions of the return data in the Netherlands have been adjusted” to be in line with the then draft Regulation (Netherlands EMN NCP, 2007a, p. 24). This meant that only assisted voluntary returns were included in the statistics as well as “[r]eturns to Belgium and Germany according to the so called Mobile Supervision of Aliens” (Netherlands EMN NCP, 2007a, pp. 24, 27). Another adaptation at national level took place in view of figures on “aliens illegally present” in the Netherlands: the Netherlands EMN NCP statistical report published in 2007 mentioned that “of course no official statistics on this are available as illegal aliens are not registered by nature” (Netherlands EMN NCP, 2007a, p. 24).

Its statistical report published in 2010 however, explained that the IND, and later the Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek, the Dutch Repatriation and Departure Service, provided the figures on aliens illegally present, or rather the “number of aliens detained due to illegal residence” (Netherlands EMN NCP, 2010a, p. 5). In addition, the Netherlands EMN NCP report explained that not all data can be delivered. For instance, the Dutch statistical system did not allow for distinction between first instance asylum decisions and definitive decisions (Netherlands EMN NCP, 2010a, p. 5). The introduction of the Regulation signified a break in the data series of the statistical
reports, in that some data were only made available after its introduction (Netherlands EMN NCP, 2010a, p. 5).

Another policy instrument setting was an issue of debate before the Regulation came into force, i.e. that of breakdowns: a CBS official posits that they were able to provide a large number of breakdowns, such as which countries should be included (Interview 13), as well as sex and age. Because of the Regulation coming into force, and to provide domestic statistics users with data produced according to the national definitions, the CBS now produced two migration data sets: “So we do now have two datasets of immigration and emigration data. That cost a lot of work, especially in the first year, to put the system...to change our system in order to comply [with] the Regulation” (Interview 13).

The policy style of Regulation 862/2007/EC was closer to the intervening ideal type in the case of the Netherlands: civil servants from the CBS were involved in the negotiations preceding the Regulation (Interview 13). While the CBS staff was mainly made up of civil servants, their influence was also limited. First, there was the law which stated who counted as migrant in the national practice, decided upon by politicians. They could also ask the CBS to conduct analyses (Interviews 12, 13). A CBS official explained:

“I think we as civil servants of the CBS are not really involved in that kind of decision [how and what to measure]. Maybe some Dutch politicians are, because they... If they need some information they can ask the CBS to investigate or analyse some things, of course. But we as employees of the CBS, we are hardly involved in this kind of decision ourselves” (Interview 13).

Second, the register-based nature of the Dutch population statistical system placed additional restraints on how and what to measure, and who decides on it:

“There’s the register. We have a register, we have a register system, we are... It is stated in the law when somebody is considered to be an immigrant or an emigrant, that’s the clear definition, in our national practice, of course” (Interview 13).
However, until the introduction of the Regulation the Netherlands sent migration and asylum statistics to Eurostat based on gentlemen’s agreements. In that way, the Regulation marked a shift towards the intervening type in the Dutch NSSs cooperation with Eurostat. These findings indicate domestic adaptation and convergence with EU demands concerning the policy style.

Also a range of national definitions and requirements were adjusted to EU demands. Examples are, apart from the basic introduction of the 12-month criterion for both immigration and emigration: the definition on returns, supplying figures on aliens illegally resident in the Netherlands, providing data on citizenship acquisition, and breakdowns by age and sex. However, while the Netherlands adapted to EU demands by delivering different sets of data than their national ones to Eurostat, only the ones sent to Eurostat coincided with EU requirements, and were drawn up according to the specifications of the Regulation. There is hence a change in these elements between T2 and T1. In that way, also, the national level converged in its policy instrument settings with EU demands. Yet there is no full convergence of the two levels since the domestic migration data sets still rely on domestic definitions. The CBS continued to apply these terms nationally, even after the Regulation came into force in 2009 (Interview 13).

In view of the goodness of fit, this thesis finds that the hypothesis holds true. The reason for this is that it predicted domestic compliance with the EU impulse in the Netherlands correctly. There was a good fit in that the CBS was able to draw on an encompassing and detailed database in order to supply the breakdowns and criteria the Regulation asked for (Interview 13). However, the fit cannot entirely be labelled as ‘good’, because of the differences between some of the definitions used nationally prior to the coming into force of the Regulation such as the variation between the Dutch registration criterion of a least four months of stay, an eight-month criterion for emigration, and the EU-level 12 months criterion for both phenomena to be counted. One finds the consequences of this in the Dutch official’s reply, namely that “that [to create two datasets, one for national, one for EU use] cost a lot of work” (Interview 13). In addition, the Dutch Government estimated that this required the creation of 1.0 more full time positions at the CBS at most, and 0.5 full time positions at the IND (Netherlands, Lower House, 2005, Fiche 2). This low level of misfit leads one to expect an increased workload for the CBS, but no severe problems or delays regarding the translation of the Regulation into the Dutch context. Indeed, there is no evidence for either, so that the expectation of a smooth adaptation is fulfilled.
There is no evidence for an uploading of Dutch policy instruments having taken place. The terms *allochtonen* and *autochtonen*, which were and are used nationally at present, are not to be incorporated in the Regulation. Furthermore, the initial response of the country that there were of course no numbers on illegal immigration did not find expression in the Regulation. In addition, the Netherlands kept their own criteria for immigration – a four months anticipated stay at minimum, and eight months for an individual’s emigration also after the coming into force of the Regulation. As elaborated above, these criteria differ from those used in the EU impulse. This result is explained by the statement of the Dutch migration statistics official. The Regulation’s definitions of an immigrant and emigrant suited the existing Dutch system better than the one proposed in the 1998 UN Recommendations. For the Dutch system, the latter held too many exclusions for it to be able to comply with the Recommendations appropriately (Interview 13). Even more, replying to the explicit questions whether the Dutch negotiators had a chance to prevent these adaptation costs or whether they could have directed the negotiations in a manner which would have minimised the adaptation costs, the official replied that this would have been futile as the data supplied under the Regulation were to be compulsory anyways (Interview 13).

The other focal points of the negotiations, namely, whether to refer to the population registered or the population by usual residence, and whether to ask for an exhaustive or a minimal list of breakdowns, for instance, by citizenship are none that would be specific to the Netherlands - other countries such as Sweden or Austria had similar caveats as the Netherlands as they have similar data available, and can not be traced back in the documentation available to the country in question as the other, similar countries’ systems are also the origin for such suggestions for the Regulation. Furthermore, the Netherlands were in a good position regarding the wealth of data it had available, and found it easier to comply with the definition under negotiation for the Regulation rather than the one forming part of the 1998 UN Recommendations, there was no drastic need to push for terms which suited the Dutch system even better.

### 6.1.7 Analysis of the Dependent Variable - Conclusion

This section recapitulates the findings of Section 6.1.1 to Section 6.1.6. By this, it prepares the explanatory analysis of Section 6.3. The finding is that for the EMN, there was both domestic adaptation and increasing similarity between national and EU policy,
policy goals, instruments, and instrument settings. The domestic adaptation to the EU impulse to all three dimensions of the dependent variable, which points to a transformation taking place at national level. The case is different for Regulation 862/2007/EC. The policy goal of harmonised migration statistics across countries was already present in the Netherlands. There was domestic policy instrument (namely, migration statistics sources) development, but this could not be accredited to the Regulation. In addition, the Regulation did not restrict the use of different sources, so that any national development was likely to be a solely domestic one. Concerning migration statistics source settings, there was domestic change because of the Regulation, as well as convergence of both levels. Because only one of the dimensions of the dependent variable has changed in the case of Regulation 862/2007/EC in the Netherlands, this section attests an absorption of the EU impulse at national level in this member state.

With regard to the goodness of fit, the chapter at hand showed that there was a low misfit in all three dimensions of the dependent variable for both the EMN and the Regulation as well as an easy and unproblematic adaptation to the EU impulses. The goodness of fit hypothesis held true in the following. For all three dimensions of the dependent variable for both the EMN and the Regulation, this thesis argues that there is no evidence which would suggest the uploading of domestic policy goals, policy instruments, and/or policy instrument settings. This corresponds with an official’s statement that the Regulation was requested by the then new member states of the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds which wished to have rules in writing to follow, introduce, and apply nationally (Interview 16). The Regulation also helped the NSIs to defend their demands for resources towards their respective national Governments as they could then pinpoint and justify their EU-induced responsibilities (Interview 6i). The Netherlands is one of the founding nations of the EU, and does hence not belong to the afore-mentioned group of new member states. In the following, these coinciding statements further support the findings - the lack of domestic uploading in the case of the Netherlands - of this chapter.

6.2 Analysis of the Explanatory Variables

The following Sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.3 concentrate on the evaluation of the three independent variables, i.e. the
- supranational
- national
- policy-specific

and how they play out for the Netherlands. The sections follow the above-mentioned order, before Section 6.2.4 provides a summary of the findings.

### 6.2.1 Supranational Explanatory Variable for Migration Statistics Harmonisation

Section 6.2.1 sums up the findings for the supranational variable which were made on in Chapters Three and Four. Table 6.2 shows the findings per single factor. The overall expectation is that the supranational variable is positively related to migration statistics harmonisation.

**Table 6.2. The Supranational Explanatory Variable for Migration Statistics Harmonisation.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Eurostat path-dependent</th>
<th>Harmonisation Incentive</th>
<th>Degree of Obligation</th>
<th>Issue Linkage</th>
<th>Degree of Detail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EMN Council Decision</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regulation 862/2007/EC</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, apart from policy instruments</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own depiction.
6.2.2 National Explanatory Variable for Migration Statistics Harmonisation in the Netherlands

This section examines how the Netherlands feature regarding the national variable. It follows the order of the factors that the theoretical framework established as national variable. The following factors were thought to be conducive to migration statistics harmonisation:

- a centralised NSS
- the register-based nature of the NSS
- a high sense of duty
- a high administrative capacity
- non-path-dependent development of the NSS

Table 6.3 presents a condensed form of the findings for the national variable for the Netherlands.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EMN Council Decision</th>
<th>Centralisation of the NSS</th>
<th>Nature of NSS</th>
<th>Sense of Duty</th>
<th>Administrative capacity of the NSS</th>
<th>Non-path-dependent development of the NSS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guideline 862/2007/EC</td>
<td>Mainly centralised</td>
<td>Register-based</td>
<td>Above average</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own depiction.
In more detail, the findings for the national factors are the following. Given that these are national factors, and the Regulation and the EMN Council Decision were introduced in consecutive years, the results should be the same or similar for both policy items. Indeed, for both the EMN Council Decision and the Regulation, the Dutch NSS was highly centralised and register-based. The sense of duty was above average, the administrative capacity of the NSS was high, and the NSS developed path-dependently.

To date, the CBS is split in two branches, which are located in Heerlen and The Hague (Netherlands CBS, 2013e). The Hague is the seat of the Dutch Government and Heerlen is situated in the south of the Netherlands. While being geographically closer to the seat of the Government, there is no hierarchical relationship between the two branches of the CBS. Neither is Heerlen a regional statistical office that is mainly responsible for statistics concerning the southern parts of the Netherlands. Thus, the CBS is not regionally decentralised. To date, there is no thematic division of activities related to statistical areas between the branches, but “very roughly, the surveys are conducted here in Heerlen, but the register information is in The Hague” (Interview 12). The reason for this was that “[...] because, in 1974, here in this location, we had mines, Dutch mines, and then they decided to close them. You had a lot of unemployment here. That was the decision to move one part to Heerlen” (Interview 12). The CBS withstood further plans to relocate the office: “In 1999, there was a decision made by the Government, to move our institute, to have again one location, to move to Tilburg, or The Hague. We had a lot of demonstrations. And we [the CBS branch in Heerlen] survived” (Interview 12). In addition, Ada van Krimpen, responsible for international relations at the CBS in 2009, comments that the CBS produces about 95% of the Dutch official statistics, with the Central Bank being the other main producer (van Krimpen, 2009, p. 1). Thus, the CBS is neither regionally nor functionally decentralised. In addition, the CBS supplies the majority of statistics. In the following, it qualifies as a centralised NSS.

The almost exclusive use of registers to conduct the decennial population census points to the Dutch NSS being a register-based system. In the course of the 1970s, the public concerns about the confidentiality of personal data grew. In the following, the population’s response rates to census questionnaires were particularly low and the costs of sample surveys relatively high (Eurostat, 1988, p. 31). 1971 saw the last Dutch population census to be conducted by making use of questionnaires that were handed out to the population. Ever since then, the CBS has conducted a virtual census, based on
matched information from registers. In order to circumvent the problem of low response rates in the context of the population census, but nevertheless receiving information on the composition of the individuals residing in the Netherlands, the Dutch Government opted to upgrade the GBA in 1984 (Netherlands, Lower House, 1984, 23; Netherlands, Lower House, 1988, 13). The almost exclusive use of registers for the Dutch population census marks the NSS as being register-based.

In view of sense of duty, the Netherlands had a positive result for the factor. This thesis determines the sense of duty of a member state by the average number of formal opinions. These constitute the first stage of three which make up an infringement procedure. For the then 27 EU member states between 2007 and 2009, the EU average number of formal opinions issued against a member state was 156. The average number of formal opinions addressed to the Netherlands between 2007 and 2009 was 105 (European Commission, 2011b, Table 2.1). This is less than the EU-27 average for these years. Given that, the finding is that the Netherlands’ sense of duty is high.

The theoretical framework established the NSS’s administrative capacity as consisting of: professional independence; its mandate for data collection; its adequacy of resources; its commitment to quality; whether it is able to ensure statistical confidentiality, impartiality, and the accessibility of its statistics. This refers to the evaluation criteria of the first round of Eurostat peer reviews. Based on the previously mentioned criteria, the peer review found that the Netherlands’ administrative capacity was high: apart from the quality commitment, all seven criteria were either fully or largely met\textsuperscript{15}. This means that the Dutch NSS features a high level of administrative capacity. Table 6.4 summarises the Netherlands’ results for each individual criterion.

\textsuperscript{15} The peer review team visiting the Dutch NSS criticized that the CBS only conducted in-house quality checks, but did not refer to an independent body to do so. However, this is one of the CCS’s tasks. Therefore, the criticism seems far-fetched.
Table 6.4. The Dutch Statistical System’s Administrative Capacity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional independence</td>
<td>Fully met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandate for data collection</td>
<td>Fully met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequacy of resources</td>
<td>Largely met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality commitment</td>
<td>Partly met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistical confidentiality</td>
<td>Fully met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impartiality and objectivity</td>
<td>Fully met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessibility and clarity</td>
<td>Largely met</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own depiction, based on Eurostat, 2006b, pp. 5-12.

In view of the mode of institutional development, this section finds that the Dutch NSS developed path-dependently. The arguments for this are firstly that the basic institutional interplay of the CBS and the CCS has not essentially changed since 1899. Moreover, the key task still is the data collection and thereafter the production of official statistics. For example, the tasks of both institutions were already formulated in the royal decree as following: “The Central Bureau of Statistics gathers, processes and publishes, as far as the available resources permit, the statistical information which the director general considers useful for practice and science”. Concerning the activities of the CCS, the decree declares that “[t]he Bureau shall not undertake new statistical research or outlays, or terminate existing statistics, without permission from the Central Commission for Statistics” (Royal Decree on the CBS and CCS, dated 9 January 1899, translation by Oomens & den Bakker, 1997, pp. 7-8). This primary mission of the CBS remains mostly unchanged. To date, it is the mission of the CBS to collect, process, and publish official statistics for daily practice, policy and research (Netherlands, 1996, Article 3; Netherlands CBS, 2010a, p. 9).

The 1996 Dutch Statistics Act ensured that the director general of the CBS had the sole competence of determining the methods by which the statistical programme of the CBS was put into practice (Netherlands, 1996a, Section 8; Netherlands, 2003, Section 18). Furthermore, it guaranteed that CBS staff were responsible to the director general instead of the Minister of Economic Affairs. This represented a step towards
more independence of the CBS from political influence. An important difference in ministerial affiliation of the CBS between the 1996 to the 2004 Statistics Act becomes apparent when comparing Section 2 of the 1996 Dutch Statistics Act to Section 2 of the 2003 Dutch Statistics Act. The CBS was no longer a Department of the Ministry for Economic Affairs (Netherlands, 1996, Section 2; Netherlands, 2003, Section 2). Following this change in institutional affiliation, the CBS had the leading role in its own affairs, instead of the Minister of Economic Affairs.

Yet by the time of the 2003 amendment, the production of research and production of statistics was still the main task of the CBS, first and foremost for its main user, the Government, and for the production of Community statistics, (Netherlands, 2003, Sections 3, 4). While the CBS became more autonomous from Government interception by gaining its own legal personality, still, the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs held a considerable amount of power over the CBS. For instance, she was in charge of appointing, suspending and dismissing the CBS director general and the members of the CCS (Netherlands, 2003, Sections 22). The CBS’s director general was one of its two management bodies. The second was the CCS, which has been responsible for the approval of the CBS’s working programme since its creation (Netherlands, 2003, Section 6). It was the director general’s duty to draw up and submit an annual and multi-annual working programme to the CCS (Netherlands, 2003, Sections 15, 16). The CCS evaluated and sent these documents on to the Minister of Economic Affairs, who examined these organisationally and financially, and forwarded the documents to the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament for approval (Netherlands, 2003, Section 17).

The annual programme also constituted the basis for further requests for statistics or surveys by the Government. A CBS official explained that while the CBS was free to decline to work on these requests in principle, saying no to comply with a request may be difficult in practice (Interview 11). Another CBS official elaborated:

“For instance, the Social Planning Office, they ask ‘can you do that for us, can you do this survey’, or Ministries ask for the Safety Monitor Survey. Then we look at our programme and we decide whether this is possible. What does it cost? Or for instance, the Parliamentary Elections Survey, we also look at what is possible, can we do two rounds, or one round” (Interview 12).
Yet, the programme director agrees on the statistical researcher’s opinion on the possibility of the CBS to decline amend a survey:

“There’s of course some pressure from Ministries... Saying ‘we need these data’. And the Statistical Office [the CBS] is the only institution that can do these large-scale surveys. And then, on the very top level, there are some negotiations, and then, in the end, we will do it” (Interview 12).

In addition, while the director general drew up an annual report on the CBS’s practices and cooperation with bodies outside the Dutch NSS. This report was sent to the Minister of Economic Affairs, and both chambers of central Government (Netherlands, 2003, Sections 56, 56a). The director general also generated financial statements for each year, which need to be adopted by the CCS and approved by the Minister of Economic Affairs (Netherlands, 2003, Sections 70, 71).

However, regarding determining the methods governing the working programmes, the director general enjoyed a high level of discretion (Netherlands, 2003, Section 18). In this context, one should differentiate between Government requests for surveys and data derived from registers. The existing system restricts options, in that the register-based nature of the Dutch NSS limits the impact of the director general of the CBS. The SSB unites data generated from administrative sources which are based on legal definitions. For surveys, the CBS has discretion on how to conduct these. “We are leading, also in the formulation, how to do it, the design of the survey, how to process the data, sample design. How we produce the data. And deliver the data and disseminate the data to others” (Interview 12). For the latter, the nature of the register limited these choices. The director general’s discretion, and also that of the CCS, with regard to any other decision could be annulled by the Minister of Economic Affairs (Netherlands, 2003, Section 58). Also for the implementation of statistical working programmes, the director general needed to obtain the mandate from the Minister of Economic Affairs.

Secondly, so as to qualify as a path-dependent NSS, in addition to the reasons laid out in the previous paragraphs on the Dutch NSS’s path dependence in this section, the Dutch NSS must exhibit signs that events taking place earlier in its development sequence have more impact than later ones in the sequence from 1899 to 2010. The
following findings concerning the key characteristics of the Dutch NSS (centralisation, and being a largely register-based system), point to this: the Dutch NSS was not always centralised. After a brief period of centralisation in the form of a central commission for statistics, the system fell back to a decentralised, departmental one. In its documentation on the state budget for the year of 1881, the Lower House of the States General voiced the desire to have a central statistical office to cater for greater uniformity of statistics, and professionalism in producing statistics (von Baumhauer & Hendriks, 1863, p. 420; Netherlands, Lower House, 1881, 2.2(56)). No suitable successor for the head of the central commission could be found, and also the Government perceived the commission’s costs as too high (von Baumhauer & Hendricks, 1861, pp. 420-422). In their speech to the Statistics Society in 1861, von Baumhauer and Frederick Hendriks described the system as decentralised, as each of the eleven Dutch provinces had its own statistical office, and it was also planned to install a statistical office on the territory of the Dutch East Indies. The annual reports produced by the provincial statistical offices were not compared between the provinces and were merely forwarded to the provincial councils and published separately (von Baumhauer & Hendricks, 1861, pp. 420-422).

What followed was that the Dutch Government voiced the desire to set up a central statistical office. This proposal aimed to ameliorate the Dutch NSS of the time, being characterised by lacking uniformity of statistics and professionalism in producing statistics (Netherlands, Lower House, 1881, 2.2(56)). Both the CBS, the Dutch central statistical office, and the Centrale Commissie voor de Statistiek (CCS) were created in 1899. The CCS, the Central Commission for Statistics, was installed as the supervisory body of the CBS. Itself, it was an independent administrative body that checked the functioning of the CBS (CBS, 2013d). This means that the events that led to the establishment of the Dutch NSS in 1899, at the very beginning of the sequence, still show their consequences in how the Dutch NSS existed in 2010 in view of centralisation.

While the Dutch NSS has not been a register-based system since 1899 – the Dutch population census has only largely been based on registers since 2001 (UNECE & CBS, 2012, p. 3) - registers played an important role from the first population census in 1829 onwards. The Dutch NSS used its population register to identify the de jure, the population registered, instead of the population in fact living in the Netherlands at the point of census taking (de facto population), for its population censuses since the first
Dutch population census in 1829 (den Dulk & van Maarseveen, 1999, pp. 333-334)\(^{16}\). This means that the further development of the country’s registers, due to the assumedly low response rates to the population census rounds, after 1971 constituted a re-enforcement of the path which the Netherlands already followed.

The GBA had before been mostly restricted to the respective municipalities themselves, and because the database was paper-based the files were not harmonised. This made it difficult for the municipalities to exchange the files amongst each other. The further development of the database was scheduled in three phases (Netherlands, Lower House, 1988, 13). The first phase was to take place from 1987 to 1990. In this initial phase, mainly, the municipalities were to produce a list of persons from their files, and a law on the GBA was to be drafted. In the transition period from 1990 to 1994, the usage of the GBA network was not compulsory, but developed further. In the definitive phase from 1993/1994, the automation of the previously paper-based database was compulsory, as was the use of the GBA network (Netherlands, Lower House, 1988, 13). In relation to migration statistics, the GBA list of personal details contained the place of birth of the individual itself, as well as that of her parents. Moreover, the GBA contained the citizenship of an individual as well as information about the dates of registration and de-registration at the municipality (Netherlands, Lower House, 1986, 1, 2). These measures represented an important step towards registration, as well as the harmonisation of migration statistics in the Netherlands. This register system was enhanced over the next decades. These findings indicate that the Dutch NSS followed a path-dependent development.

In summary, this section finds that in the context of the EMN Council Decision, as well as the Regulation, the Dutch NSS was highly centralised and register-based. The sense of duty was above average, the administrative capacity of the NSS was high, and the NSS developed path-dependently. Apart from the path dependent NSS, all three other national factors are thought to be conducive to migration statistics harmonisation. This section points to the Netherlands scoring highly regarding the national variable. One would hence expect migration statistics harmonisation to be taking place in the Netherlands.

\(^{16}\) According to Kees den Dulk and Jacques van Maarseveen, only the population censuses of 1859 and 1869 employed a combined *de jure* and *de facto* definition of the population (1999, p. 334).
6.2.3 Policy-specific Variable for Migration Statistics Harmonisation in the Netherlands

Section 6.2.3 elaborates on the policy-specific variable, comprising the factors:

- non-opposition to the EU incentive
- knowledge of the rules of the EU incentive

and how they play out in the Netherlands. The section proceeds by analysing each factor in the above order, first for the EMN, and second for Regulation 862/2007/EC. These were identified as the two most important steps in migration statistics harmonisation, which is the dependent variable of this thesis. Table 6.5 shows a condensed version of the policy-specific variable.

Table 6.5. Policy-specific Variable for Migration Statistics Harmonisation in the Netherlands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Opposition</th>
<th>Knowledge of Rules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EMN Council Decision</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation 862/2007/EC</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own depiction.

In more detail, the findings for the policy-specific factors in the Netherlands are the following. In its reaction to the Green Book on the future of the EMN, the Dutch Government commented that it supported the EMN, yet it stressed that it should be given a more definitive form (Netherlands, Lower House, 2006, 1). It suggested that the meaning of the term “information” must be clarified, i.e. whether this information encompassed statistics or not. Also on migration statistics, it raised the question of what
role the EMN would play in the harmonisation of those which were according to the Dutch Government, at that date, incomparable migration statistics (Lower House, 2006, 1). The Netherlands supported the EMN’s role in EU statistical cooperation: it put forward the information exchange of statistics meta-data between Eurostat and the EMN to enhance statistics comparability, and brought together statistics users such as researchers and policy makers with statistics producers (Netherlands, Lower House, 2006, 3). One can hence say that the Dutch Government was not opposed to the EMN. On the contrary, the country wished to put the EMN on a more stable legal base. This should take the form of the EMN Council Decision.

Gauging from the Dutch Government’s reaction to the Green Book on the future of the EMN, the finding is that it also had a high level of knowledge of the rules of the EMN. The Dutch Government suggested that - on top of the EMN’s task to produce objective and comparable information for the EU, the member states, and the general public - the EMN’s focus should be to analyse information and do research. In addition, the Dutch Government found that the EMN should be better promoted to the public, and its national networks should include all relevant national players in the field of migration and asylum (Netherlands, Lower House, 2006, 2).

In view of Regulation 862/2007/EC, the Dutch Government recognised that harmonised migration statistics were of high importance for monitoring and evaluating the common immigration policy, in the context of the negotiations on the Open Method of Coordination on a common immigration policy in 2001 (Netherlands, Lower House, 2001, 1).

Moreover, in 2005, the Dutch Government referred to the draft Regulation on harmonised migration statistics as essential for a better availability of harmonised migration statistics (Netherlands, Lower House, 2005, Fiche 2). Yet, it noticed that it was worried about the degree of detail that the draft Regulation asked for. It elaborated that it was not entirely clear why the draft asked for that many details for EU policy development (Netherlands, Lower House, 2005, Fiche 2). This indicates that there was some opposition to the draft Regulation in 2005. Yet this was different in view of the actual Regulation. The degree of detail was diminished compared to the one in the draft. A CBS official explained: “The definition that is now stated in the Regulation is ... we have to do some work, but it is less hard than should the other definition [that of the 1998 UN Recommendations] have been put into practice” (Interview 13). The definition suggested by the 1998 UN Recommendations made more exceptions of who counted...
and who did not count as immigrant or emigrant as elaborated in Chapter Three. This indicates that there was a low degree of opposition to the draft Regulation, but no opposition to the Regulation in its final form.

Regarding the knowledge of rules induced by the Regulation, this section argues that the Netherlands had a high degree of knowledge, since the CBS was involved in drawing up the Regulation. As a CBS official explains

“Our Department [the Population Statistics Department of the CBS] was very much involved in the decision-making on that Regulation 862. We had several discussions with Eurostat and with other statistical offices, on what is the best definition for immigration and emigration, and international protection. There was very much debate on this issue. […] [The Regulation] means a lot for our statistics, because now we have to provide Eurostat with data on immigration, emigration, and international protection, according to the Regulation” (Interview 13).

In addition, the Dutch Government already provided an estimation of the costs of the transfer of the Regulation into the Dutch context: 107,420 Euros per year for the CBS, and the costs of about 0.5 full-time equivalent posts per year for the IND (Lower House, 2005, 2). This knowledge about the costs indicates that the CBS, the IND and as the Dutch Government knew the rules that were stipulated in the Regulation well. Overall, the findings point to a low degree of opposition in case of the Regulation or the absence of opposition in the context of the EMN, and a high level of knowledge of the rules for both policy items. Given this, the Netherlands score highly regarding the policy-specific variable. The member state did not state its opposition to either of the EU impulses, and it was also make recommendations for the EMN, as well as it was also able to produce a costing for the additional man-power to transfer the Regulation into its national context.

6.2.4 Analysis of the Explanatory Variables in the Netherlands - Conclusion

This section provides a conclusion of the descriptive analysis of the explanatory variables for migration statistics harmonisation in the Netherlands. It proceeds by
summarising the results of the supranational, national, and finally the policy-specific variable respectively in the context of the EMN and Regulation 862/2007/EC on which sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.3 elaborated. Comparing both of the policy items, the variables and most of their factors, the Netherlands show similar results for both items. The country’s initial opposition towards the high level of detail of the draft Regulation is an exception. This initial opposition was overcome in the final draft of the Regulation.

The Netherlands overall scored highly regarding the supranational variable. Eurostat followed a path-dependent mode of institutional development after the duration of critical juncture from 1950 to 1951 until the end of the period which this thesis examines, the year of 2009. Since both the EMN Council Decision and Regulation 862/2007/EC were issued after 1951 and prior to 2009, one can conclude that both policy items fall in Eurostat’s period of a path-dependent mode of institutional development. For both policy items, the Netherlands was an EU member state at the time of formulating and implementing the EU incentive. Both policy items contained a harmonisation incentive. The degree of obligation was high for the EMN Council Decision as well as the Regulation: both were EU secondary law and could be enforced first by the European Commission, and then by the ECJ by the infringement procedure. They focused on only one issue. The policy items also had a high degree of detail. The Netherlands also scored highly in view of the national variable. The NSS was of a centralised nature, and was register-based. The country showed a high sense of duty. The NSS was administratively highly capable. The non-path-dependent development of the NSS was the only factor in which the Netherlands did not feature a positive result: the institutional mode of development of the Dutch NSS was path-dependent. In view of the policy-specific variable, the Netherlands scored highly. Not only was the country supportive of both policy items, but also knew the rules of these EU incentives. In the following, this means that the Netherlands overall scored highly regarding all three variables and for both policy items, with the exception of the path-dependent NSS.

6.3 Explanatory Analysis

This section brings together the summarised findings of Section 6.1 and its subsections, the dependent variable of migration statistics harmonisation, and Section 6.2 and its subsections, the explanatory - supranational, national, and policy-specific - variables. This further replies to the key research question of this thesis, i.e. how EU
and national actors strived towards harmonising migration statistics in the EU, and which factors were conducive to this development. Restating the findings respectively, firstly, the harmonisation went further in the context of the EMN: the goal, instruments, and instrument settings were harmonised with those of the EU incentive. Because all three dimensions changed domestically, this chapter argues that the national level experienced a transformation in the case of the EMN. In the case of Regulation 862/2007/EC, this thesis argues that it was mainly the policy instrument settings that converged with the EU incentive, and domestically adapted to EU demands. The finding that only one dimension changed nationally, points to absorption in the case of the Regulation in the Netherlands.

In view of the explanatory variables, the analysis showed that the Netherlands fares well in all three variables. The majority of supranational factors are thought to further migration statistics harmonisation. Furthermore, the Netherlands showed positive results for most national factors apart from the non-path-dependent development of the NSS. Lastly, the Netherlands neither showed opposition to the EMN Council Decision, nor to the Regulation. The country was also highly knowledgeable concerning the rules set out by the secondary law. This means that the Netherlands scores highly in view of the policy-specific variable. The following paragraphs proceed by explanatory variable. By joining the results of the dependent and independent variables, they elaborate on whether the theoretical expectations laid down in the theoretical framework are confirmed in the case of migration statistics harmonisation in the Netherlands.

6.3.1 Findings for the Supranational Explanatory Variable

The theoretical framework raised the assumption that a high score in the supranational variable would benefit migration statistics harmonisation. Section 6.2.1 argued that there were positive results for all supranational factors, which should be conducive to migration statistics harmonisation. This expectation holds true for policy goals, instruments, and instrument settings for the EMN Council Decision, but only for the instrument settings of Regulation 862/2007/EC. This section hence concludes that the high score in the supranational variable is positively related to instrument settings harmonisation. The findings confirm the theoretical expectation in view of the policy instrument settings across the policy items.
6.3.2 Findings for the National Explanatory Variable

The expectation set up in the theoretical framework was that an EU member state’s high score in the national independent variable furthers migration statistics harmonisation. Section 6.2.2 posited that the Netherlands showed positive results in the majority of the national indicators for the national variable. This exception was the path-dependent development of the NSS that could hence be related to the non-harmonisation of the policy goal and instruments of the Regulation. However, because goals, instruments, and instrument settings were harmonised in the case of the EMN, this assumption must be negated. Yet one can deduce that the other national factors, i.e. the centralised and register-based NSS, the Netherlands’ high sense of duty, and its administratively capable NSS, should be positively related to migration statistics harmonisation. The findings hence corroborate the theoretical expectation concerning the policy instrument settings.

6.3.3 Findings for the Policy-specific Explanatory Variable

For the policy-specific variable, the theoretical framework stipulated that a high score should be positively related to migration statistics harmonisation. Section 6.2.3 argued that the Netherlands were not opposed to either of the policy items, and knew the rules set out in the EMN Council Decision, as well as the Regulation, respectively. In the following, one would expect migration statistics to be harmonised. While goals, instruments, and instrument settings were all harmonised in the case of the EMN, this was not the case for the Regulation. Only the latter were harmonised. These findings point to the policy-specific variable being positively related to the harmonisation of policy instrument settings, but not to the harmonisation of goals and instruments. Because of this, the theoretical expectation only holds true for the harmonisation of policy instrument settings when comparing the EMN Council Decision and the Regulation in the Netherlands.

6.4 Explanatory Analysis - Conclusion

The explanatory analysis of Section 6.3 and its subsections showed that all three variables were positively related to the harmonisation of policy instrument settings. National adaptation hence took place with the intensity of absorption. While for the
EMN, the variables were also positively related to the harmonisation of policy goals and instruments, this was not the case for Regulation 862/2007/EC. In the following, the explanatory variables are not related to the harmonisation of policy goals and instruments. However, a national, i.e. the path-dependent development of the NSS, factor could have been negatively related to the outcome, and the theoretical expectation would hence have been fulfilled; policy goals and instruments were not harmonised in case of the Regulation. Yet this does not hold true, since the same explanatory factor led to different results when comparing the Regulation to the EMN Council Decision. Only the supranational, national, and policy-specific factors that are positively related to the harmonisation of policy instrument settings tally with the theoretical expectation. The findings of this chapter focusing exclusively on the Netherlands are compared and cross-checked with those of Chapter Five concentrating on the UK, in the next and concluding Chapter Seven. Regarding the theoretical framework, this chapter confirmed the foreseen potential difficulties for the case that the national policy goals, instruments, and/or instrument settings were already in line with EU demands. The Netherlands complied with EU demands, yet one can neither find domestic adaptation nor policy convergence. This is because these are defined as processes taking place over time in the theory.
Chapter Seven - Conclusion of this Thesis

This thesis was originally driven by concerns about the lack of harmonisation of international migration statistics across EU member states. Academics and practitioners had voiced their apprehension regarding the low degree of harmonisation of migration statistics, both nationally and across the EU. In the following, this thesis centred on the question of how EU and national actors strove to harmonise migration statistics. It provided insight into migration statistics harmonisation at supranational level. Following that, it focused on two largely distinct NSSs, namely the Netherlands and the UK, and how they conducted migration statistics harmonisation. The following pages delineate the political context of immigration in both the Netherlands and the UK, and summarise the findings of the previous chapters. Following that this chapter provides a comparative discussion of migration statistics harmonisation in the UK and the Netherlands, and give an outlook as to how these findings fit in with the literature. Finally, this chapter elaborates on opportunities for further research along the lines of the results of this thesis.

7.1 The Political Context of this Thesis

The introduction of the first chapter argued that a wide range of EU policies necessitated objective, correct, and comparable migration statistics. In both the UK and the Netherlands, the issue of immigration is a matter of public debate. Two prominent examples are political parties such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP) or the Dutch Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV), the Freedom Party. Both aim to reduce immigration to their respective countries. Furthermore, they both wish to leave the EU in the hope to regain control about the matter of immigration (UKIP, 2014, p. 7; PVV, 2012, pp. 34-36). The standpoints of these parties demonstrate through which filters migration statistics are perceived. Referring to a study by Christian Dustmann and Tomasso Frattini on the fiscal effects of immigrants on the UK, Owen Jones from British newspaper The Guardian claims that “[s]tatistics alone won’t win the immigration debate” (The Guardian Online & Jones, 2014). Rather, he argues, these need to be complemented by positive personal experiences with immigrants. This thesis answers the question of how EU and domestic actors harmonise migration statistics, in order to further the understanding of statistics production and harmonisation. We are indeed “human beings, and emotional creatures at that: not calculating androids”, as Owen
stresses, but also thinking creatures (The Guardian Online & Jones, 2014). Understanding what these numbers describe, and how migration statistics are produced and harmonised by EU and national actors is a necessary part of understanding these statistics.

Another example of the public debate within which migration statistics harmonisation is embedded, is the debate on the UK’s definition of a migrant which arose in 2012. Public attention was drawn to the country’s definition of migrants in the context of the UK’s struggle to reach the government’s targeted cap on yearly net migration, i.e. the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants per year. The UK’s definition of a long-term international migrant used in its long-term immigration (LTIM) estimates, refers to a long-term migrant as “[a] person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year (12 months), so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence” (UK ONS, 2014a, p. 4). This debate emphasises the importance of migration statistics in two ways. Damian Green, Minister of State for Immigration from May 2010 to September 2012, was asked whether it was possible to exclude students from UK migration statistics in order to meet the target in 2012. He stated that “[i]t's always very tempting to try and meet a target by fiddling the figures [...]”. Yet he added “[t]hat's [fiddling with the numbers] what you would accuse me of doing if I just redefined away the problem”. Moreover, Green mentioned that the immigration figures compiled by the ONS were based on an international definition that could not be changed unilaterally (BBC News Online, 30 May 2012). This statement highlights the significance that migration statistics and their harmonisation have nationally, and demonstrates the high level of supranational and international interdependence in the matter of migration statistics.

7.2 Summary of the Findings

This section recapitulates the main findings of this project. This thesis aimed to contribute to the existing literature at the conceptual, the empirical, and the theoretical level. At the conceptual level, this thesis set up a typology of NSSs in the EU in Chapter One, which fed into the explanatory variables of this thesis. This provided the basis for the selection of the Dutch and the UK NSSs as distinct statistical systems in view of their centralisation and prominent statistics sources. Chapter Two delineated the
theoretical framework employed in this thesis.

The project took an empirical step in Chapters Three and Four, which analysed Eurostat and its role in the ESS, and the policy development of migration statistics harmonisation at EU level. These chapters provided the backdrop for the country case studies, Chapters Five and Six, which constituted the second empirical step of this thesis. At theoretical level, this thesis showed which factors were positively related to migration statistics harmonisation by comparing the Netherlands and the UK.

7.2.1 Theories relevant for this Thesis

The two key theoretical concepts for this thesis are Europeanisation and policy convergence. Europeanisation fits the subject of migration statistics harmonisation in the EU, because of the nature of the ESS, which makes Eurostat responsible for the NSSs’ statistics production. It is the member states which need to domestically adapt to a common goal in order to achieve harmonised and more comparable migration statistics. Europeanisation feeds into replying to that question. It is defined as the domestic adaptation to European regional integration. The concept of policy convergence is highly similar to Europeanisation in that it captures change over time. The additional requirement of policy convergence in comparison with Europeanisation is, however, that it addresses the increasing similarity of aspects of policy over time. This resembles statistics harmonisation. Prominent explanatory factors of both concepts were selected, and grouped into supranational, national, and policy-specific variables, in order to test their explanatory value concerning migration statistics harmonisation in two EU member states. The thesis contended that its focus on policy outcomes instead of policy outputs necessitated the inclusion of national and policy-specific independent variables within the theoretical framework in order to explain migration statistics harmonisation.

7.2.2 Eurostat in the European Statistical System

Chapter Three examined how Eurostat scored in view of the institutional supranational explanatory factors. By looking into Eurostat and the ESS in more detail, Chapter Three highlighted the elaborations on the high obligatory potential of Eurostat compared to other, international statistical institutions provided in Chapter One.
concerning statistics harmonisation. In addition, Chapter Three found that Eurostat developed in a path-dependent mode of institutional development. This result coincides with Holzinger and Knill’s hypothesis that the obligatory potential in the EU is particularly high, which favours policy convergence (2008, p. 56).

7.2.3 Migration Statistics Harmonisation at European Union Level

Chapter Four delved into the examination of attempts to harmonise migration statistics at EU level. The chapter showed that migration statistics harmonisation was a recurrent theme in the ESS, from the creation of Eurostat onwards. Yet only since the Treaty of Amsterdam did migration statistics harmonisation become a pressing issue that could no longer be postponed. Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, migration transferred from the third and intergovernmentally governed pillar to the first pillar, which allowed the EU institutions to have more impact on the decision-making. Thus, migration entered the EU agenda. Most importantly, however, the chapter identified the two major steps of the EU towards migration statistics harmonisation, i.e. the EMN Council Decision and Regulation 862/2007/EC. Only these legal instruments scored highly in all supranational factors. The EMN Council Decision and Regulation 862/2007/EC were hence the two EU incentives examined in Chapters Five and Six.

7.2.4 The British Case

The fifth chapter of this thesis concentrated on migration statistics harmonisation in the UK. Through the theoretical framework developed in Chapter Two, this chapter found that the supranational and the policy-specific variable could explain the outcome of migration statistics harmonisation regarding the EMN. For both policy items, the EMN Council Decision and the Regulation, the policy instrument settings have adapted and converged with the respective EU incentive. This means that domestic adaptation took place with the intensity of absorption. While domestic adaptation and convergence with the EU demands came about for the EMN action, the outcome in the context of the Regulation was that hardly any domestic adaptation regarding the goals and instruments took place.

The expectations regarding the supranational and policy-specific variables held true in the case of the EMN. The scores were high and led to migration statistics
harmonisation at the level of transformation. None of the theoretical expectations could completely explain the outcome regarding Regulation 862/2007/EC. For both concepts, the result was that of inertia, i.e. the lack of domestic change and policy convergence over time respectively. The national level’s goals had already been in line with the EU incentive. Keeping these characteristics of the concepts in mind, the supranational and the policy-specific variables largely explain the results of the descriptive analyses of the dependent variable. Only one national factor, administrative capacity, could be related to the dependent variable, since the UK showed positive results for it, and it led to migration statistics harmonisation for the EMN and policy instrument settings in the context of the Regulation. In view of the goodness of fit, the chapter found that the hypothesis overall held true. For both incentives, the member state was able to upload policy instruments settings.

7.2.5 The Dutch Case

Chapter Six concentrated on migration statistics harmonisation in the Netherlands. Regarding the EMN, the Netherlands converged and adapted to EU incentives in policy goals, instruments, and instrument settings. This is different in view of Regulation 862/2007/EC: the goal of comparability with other states had already existed. The instruments that were necessary to deliver migration statistics to Eurostat were also in place. The Dutch NSS, however, had to implement different settings, i.e. the 12-month criterion, in order to adhere to the Regulation. Hence, like in the UK, policy instrument settings have changed most. The intensity of domestic change was hence at the level of absorption. As for the UK, it should be kept in mind that the concept of Europeanisation classes this as inertia, whereas the result for policy convergence is that there is no policy convergence, if the situation if the domestic situation already tallies with the EU incentive before it comes into force. This is the case for Dutch policy goals and instruments. This means that the outcome is a lack of policy convergence, and inertia regarding domestic adaptation in view of the goals and instruments, as the goals, instruments, and instrument settings matched the EU level demands. This is because domestic change took place prior to the introduction of the EU incentive. The analysis of the explanatory variables showed that the Netherlands ranks highly in all three independent variables, which were expected to further migration statistics harmonisation. Only the path-dependent NSS and the mild
opposition towards the Regulation should have hindered migration statistics harmonisation. Keeping the shortcomings of the Europeanisation and policy convergence concepts in mind, recapitulating, the result means that the theoretical expectations were fulfilled for all three explanatory variables in the Netherlands. Moreover, the goodness of fit hypothesis held true in the Netherlands. No uploading was found. This is regarded as reflection of the fact that the Regulation was wished for by the then new member states.

7.3 Comparative Discussion of Migration Statistics Harmonisation in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands per Independent Variable

Having provided insight into migration statistics harmonisation in the UK and the Netherlands separately, this section joins the analyses of the two countries in order to show which explanatory factors for migration statistics harmonisation hold up in comparison. It finds that, in addition to the supranational factors, these are the high administrative capacity, and the member state’s knowledge of and non-opposition to the rules. The section proceeds by elaborating on each explanatory variable across the two countries.

The supranational variable consisted of the harmonisation incentive, the obligatory potential, issue linkage, and the degree of detail of the incentive. The score of the supranational variable was the same for both member states, and one would hence expect a similar development in migration statistics harmonisation in both countries. The high score of the supranational factors was indeed driving the harmonisation of the EMN action’s goals, instruments, and instrument settings. For the Regulation, this was true for policy instrument settings, but not correct for goals and instruments. The negative outcomes concerning convergence and lack of domestic change for both the UK and the Netherlands could, however, be explained by the countries already being in line with the EU incentive. This indicates that the supranational variable furthered the harmonisation of migration statistics. The expectation of a high score furthering migration statistics harmonisation holds true.

The scores of the national variable - the centralisation of the NSS, the nature of the NSS, the sense of duty of the member state, the administrative capacity of the NSS, and the path-dependent development of the NSS, diverged greatly between the two member states. The UK showed negative results for all factors except exhibiting a high
administrative capacity. A low score in the national variable was thought to be detrimental to migration statistics harmonisation, but this expectation was not fulfilled. The UK was still largely in line with EU demands, and adapted its policy instrument settings. The Netherlands, however, scored highly in the national variable with the exception of its path-dependent NSS. This supported the expectation of statistics harmonisation. Because these results in the explanatory variable did not coincide across countries, but largely did so in the dependent variable, the national variable can hence mostly be excluded as an explanatory factor driving migration statistics harmonisation. The only factor of the national explanatory variable that scored highly in both countries and could thus be related to the findings of the dependent variable was the high administrative capacity of both NSSs.

The policy-specific variable diverged slightly between the countries in that the UK was opposed to aspects of both policy items. Whereas the Netherlands only questioned the degree of detail of the Regulation, the UK showed some opposition to the degree of detail of the Regulation and it had some reservations about the EMN motion. These were the balance between member states and EU level institutions, the service provider and the initial requirement of two working languages per NCP. Both countries however stressed their support of the Regulation as such. Both member states also showed knowledge of the rules. This suggested that domestic adaptation to EU demands in both policy items would be similar in both cases, which was the case. The expectation thus was correct in view of the knowledge of rules as well as the non-opposition, since the outcome of migration statistics harmonisation has come about. This shows that, in addition to the supranational variable, a high administrative capacity and a high level of knowledge of rules as well as non-opposition further migration statistics harmonisation in view of policy instrument settings. In order to confirm these findings, one would need to compare these findings to member states which lack administrative capacity and show strong opposition to the rules in question. This thesis argued in Section 2.3.2 that its focus on policy outcomes instead of policy outputs made the inclusion of national and policy-specific factors necessary. Finding the supranational variable as well as a national factor and a policy-specific factor positively related to migration statistics harmonisation highlights this.

Having compared the UK and the Netherlands with regard to their scores in the dependent and explanatory variables (the third research question stated in Section 2.5), the remainder of this section concentrates on replying to the first research question set
out in Section 2.5. Regarding the type of policy convergence, the two countries’
instrument settings became more similar and converged with each other in the context
of Regulation 862/2007/EC. Concerning the goal and the instruments, there is some
convergence for administrative sources, but clearly less than for policy instrument
settings. One can thus refer to sigma-convergence in policy instrument settings, and the
direction of convergence is positive. In the context of the EMN, there is convergence in
view of goals, instruments, and instrument settings. The direction of convergence is
positive, and higher than the convergence relating to Regulation 862/2007/EC. One can
diagnose beta-convergence in policy instrument settings for both countries: the UK was
catching up with the frequency of asylum data provision, and the Netherlands were
catching up with the IPS’s orientation to more comparable definitions of a long-term
migrant. The direction of convergence is positive. Both countries are becoming
increasingly similar to a model prescribed by the supranational level in both policy
items, and this constitutes delta-convergence. While the direction of convergence is
positive, the degree of convergence is high only in view of instrument settings for
Regulation 862/2007/EC. Regarding the EMN action, the direction of convergence was
positive and high in all aspects. These results underline that the factors of all
explanatory variables were positively related to migration statistics harmonisation. A
focus on supranational factors only would not have been sufficient to explain the
findings of this thesis.

In view of the relationships between the independent variables, this section first
looks into what form they take between the variables, before it secondly focuses on their
constituent factors. On the basis of the comparative discussion for all cases examined,
this thesis found that at the level of the independent variables as such, they could be
related. The thesis showed that for both member states and both EU incentives, the
supranational and the policy-specific variables scored highly, and explain domestic
adaptation with regard to the policy instrument settings, i.e. at the intensity of
absorption. However, the national variable did not score highly in the UK. When seen in
conjunction with the UK findings, one can exclude this possibility as the UK scores low
on the policy-specific variable. This is why one is able to exclude a relationship
between the supranational and the policy-specific variables on the one hand, and the
national variable on the other hand. In order to find out whether the supranational and
the policy-specific variable are related, one would need to test these results against
additional case studies. These should feature low scores on the policy-specific variable.
At factor level, one finds that all supranational and all policy-specific factors could be related as they all found positive. In addition, both member states had high administrative capacities. In addition, both member states had NSSs which developed path-dependently. This indicates that these factors could be related. In order to verify or refute this, it would need further cases which show negative results for these factors. Centralisation, the nature of the NSS, and the sense of duty diverged between the cases, and can hence be deemed non-related.

7.4 Placing the Findings of this Thesis into the Context of Existing Literature

Academics and policy-makers alike regarded the topic of migration statistics harmonisation across member states as important, both prior to and after the creation of the EU. When the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force, migration statistics harmonisation gained in importance with migration policy becoming a common responsibility of the member states and EU-level institutions. The importance of migration as such, and that of migration statistics, is highlighted by recent debates about the quality of migration statistics, and the increasing visibility of EU and international linkages in the statistical sphere.

The first chapter found that the overall net migration rate of the 27 member states rose continuously in the years from 2009 to 2013, which indicates that immigration will be playing an important role in the EU’s future. Based on the net migration rate of the UK and the Netherlands, the chapter posited that both countries were immigration countries. While both countries were destinations for immigrants, the Netherlands’ net migration rate from 2009 to 2013 was considerably lower than that of the UK (see Table 1.1), despite the UK Government’s aim to reduce net migration since May 2010 (OECD, 2013, p. 304).

This research has shown that supranational factors set the framework for a successful statistical cooperation towards statistics harmonisation. In view of national and policy-specific factors driving statistics harmonisation, and so heightening the harmonisation of migration statistics, the thesis found that a high administrative capacity, non-opposition to and knowledge of the respective rules are conducive to the expected outcome.

These findings fit as follows in the existing literature: historical institutionalism opens up multiple possibilities in view of institutional development, i.e. path-
dependence, critical junctures, and various forms of incremental change. Because of this, there is also a wide variety of studies and cases making use of historical institutionalist concepts. Sophie Vanhoonacker and Thomas Christiansen posit that the Council Secretariat developed largely path-dependently (2008, p. 766). This thesis suggested that the UK and the Dutch NSSs developed in a path-dependent manner. Yet the path-dependent development of both NSSs could not be identified as entirely prohibiting migration statistics harmonisation. Similarly, the degree of centralisation of the NSSs did not have an impact on the harmonisation of migration statistics.

According to Schout, Jordan and Twena, inspired by the White Paper on Governance adopted by the European Commission in 2001, new policy instruments entered the EU agenda (Schout, Jordan & Twena, 2010, p. 157). Instead of making use of traditional methods of governance such as regulation through legislation, new policy instruments spiked the interest of EU policy makers. This trend was replicated by scholars of EU governance, and a focus on new policy instruments followed (Schout, Jordan & Twena, 2010, p. 157). However, it was soon questioned whether concentrating solely on examining new policy instruments made sense because, non-surprisingly, old policy instruments had not completely vanished from the toolkit of EU policy makers (Halpern, 2010, p. 54; Kassim & Le Galès, 2010: 18; Le Galès, 2011, p. 153; Schout, Jordan & Twena, 2010, p. 157). Schout, Jordan, and Twena’s key argument was that if administrative capabilities of member states are not well-developed, this was detrimental to dealing with EU demands.

Charlotte Halpern examines the policy instrument mix in the area of EU environmental policy (Halpern, 2010, p. 40). Her study confirms Schout, Jordan, and Twena’s outcomes. She finds that while there is indeed evidence for the use of new policy instruments, they are joined with conventional policy instruments. In agreement with these results, this thesis found that the policy instruments used combine elements of mediating and intervening policy styles such as in the EMN, and conventional ones, such as surveys and registers, in the context of Regulation 862/2007/EC. In more detail, the findings indicate a recurring trend of a return to an intervening policy style on the one hand, i.e. the consolidation of hierarchy between the European Commission and the NSSs through the Regulation. On the other hand, the statistical sphere is naturally characterised rather by mediating-style de jure/de facto standards, i.e. generally agreed definitions. Contrary to Le Galès’ typology, however, this policy instrument is not exclusively used “within civil society between economic actors”, but also between
governmental actors (Le Galès, 2011, p. 153). Following that, this thesis finds that Le Galès’ typology of policy instruments and related policy styles, and his division of them into old and new must be adjusted for the statistical sphere in that *de facto/de jure* standards or best practices may be regarded as conventional instruments in the area of statistical policy. The thesis further confirmed a point made by Halpern: she suggests that the inventiveness of EU policy makers regarding the formation of new policy instruments is overstated: often, new policy instruments are imported from the EU member states or international institutions (Halpern, 2010, p. 40). There were several attempts of international statistical institutions to introduce *de facto* standards in the area of migration and asylum statistics prior to attempts in this field by Eurostat. This is not the only commonality between the policy areas of EU environmental and EU statistical policy. Moreover, the findings of this project seem to be in line with regard to the “essential unpredictability about the form that any instrument eventually assumes” claimed by the political sociology approach to policy instruments (Kassim & Le Galès, 2010, p. 11). This is mirrored in the use of both elements of the intervening and the mediating policy style in one instrument, the EMN.

Europeanisation studies find that the administrative structures are only moderately subject to change in the field of environmental policy (for instance, Börzel, 2008, p. 229). It is rather expected that policy content adjusts to EU demands. This study found that there was domestic impact regarding administrative structures: in the case of the EMN, domestic structures adapted to EU action in so far that the data flow between the NSI and the Ministry/Government Department responsible for immigration matters was reversed. Prior to the establishment of the EMN, the IND and the Home Office were data generators that supplied data to the NSI. For the preparation of the EMN reports, the data flow was reversed. In addition a new level, that was geared towards information output for cross- and uploading, was inserted into the national structures already present. This thesis found that because all three dimensions, i.e. policy goals, policy instruments, and policy instrument settings, adapted domestically in both examined member states for the EMN motion. It classed this as transformation at the national level. This was not mirrored for other EU incentive, Regulation 862/2007/EC, for which only one dimension - policy instrument settings - changed, and the thesis labelled this as absorption.

The goodness of fit firstly lost its status as sufficient and then also as a necessary condition for domestic change. This is why this thesis was hence aware that, should it
be used as an explanation for smooth domestic adaptation to EU demands in policy documents or by interviewees, it was just as possible for it not to hold true. Indeed, the term holds explanatory appeal for practitioners concerning changes in the national definitions related to migration and asylum statistics. The requirement of a fit of both levels was brought forward by a UK practitioner, to explain the relatively trouble-free domestic adaptation in case of the UK’s IPS. Furthermore, the thesis found that the goodness of fit hypothesis overall held true.

7.5 Directions for Future Research

This thesis found that supranational factors as well as high domestic administrative capacity, and knowledge of the rules of the EU incentive further migration statistics harmonisation most in view of policy instrument settings. A route for future research would be to test whether the findings of this thesis hold firm when comparing other largely different statistical systems. An example pairing would be to compare Sweden as a decentralised and register-based statistical system to a centralised and not register-based statistical system such as Ireland to each other. Should one follow this road, one should pay particular attention to the question as to whether also the supranational variable as well as the high administrative capacity, non-opposition to and a high degree of knowledge of the rules, are also positively related to the harmonisation of policy instrument settings as this thesis found for the present comparison of the UK and Dutch NSSs.

Testing - most importantly - member states whose NSSs manifest low degrees of administrative capacity, and/or a low degree of knowledge of and/or opposition to the rules could enhance the reliability of the present outcomes. More research is needed to further test these findings. Future research could also focus on the question of whether the supranational variable is a sufficient or only a necessary condition, or whether really the domestic and policy-specific factors do play a role in migration statistics harmonisation. This research has shown that the obligatory potential is crucial for migration statistics harmonisation; further research could test whether this holds true for other statistical policy areas or other statistical systems as that of the United States or CIS Stat (the Interstate Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States). This would allow one to judge whether the explanatory power of the supranational variable and the factors high administrative capacity and the knowledge
of rules holds firm in these cases.

Another possibility for further research would be to explore how these findings for the field of migration statistics compare to other Regulations in the EU statistical sphere, which relate mainly to the area of economic/trade statistics. However, all these possibilities for further research could not have been determined if not for this thesis. This thesis provided a typology of NSSs that can be transferred to other regional statistical systems in order to categorise NSSs, and which can just as well be applied to areas of statistics other than that of migration. Moreover, this thesis found through focusing on the EMN that domestic structures can indeed be altered through EU incentives. Furthermore, it confirmed that also current policy instruments exhibit elements of both the mediating and intervening ideal types. In addition, it stressed the importance of the member states’ high administrative capacity, and their knowledge of the rules, for translating EU incentives into their respective national contexts. By shedding light on Eurostat and domestic statistical systems, and how they strive to harmonise migration statistics, this thesis advanced the knowledge about supranational and domestic institutions, and the factors which are positively related to policy convergence and domestic adaptation. Above all, however, it demonstrated that one needs to pay just as much attention to how statistics are counted as to what they say.
Appendix 1

Mimicking the division by levels shown in Table 1.3, the questionnaires also distinguish between international, supranational, and national actors. Questions aim at both, independent and their factors as well as at dependent variables and their dimensions as summarised in Section 2.6.

Sample Questions for Eurostat Officials on the Development of Eurostat

1. How would you describe the role of the NSIs in their relation to Eurostat? Did it change over the years? If yes, how?
2. How would you describe the Office’s relation to the European Commission/the Council/the Parliament? Did it change over the years? If yes, how?
3. How could it maintain its role as the major statistical body of the EU, although various DGs started to gather data themselves in the 1950s and 1960s?
4. When and why did Eurostat start to collect data on other topics than agriculture and economics, e.g. countries’ foreigner stock?
5. Would you describe the definitions, methods of collection, concepts as comparable? Are there differences between the subject areas? Has the level of comparability increased over time?
6. When does Eurostat start to cooperate with accession/candidate countries (before officially joining EU)?
7. Did you participate in committee meetings of the ESS? If yes, what was your task?
8. What kind of organisations/persons could and did request statistics from Eurostat apart from the EC/European Community for Coal and Steel institutions?
9. Have you participated in the elaboration of harmonised methods/definitions which Eurostat wanted to see implemented on the national level by the national statistical?
10. Is the adoption of the national statistical systems to a harmonised Community methodology in your opinion additionally to the individual statisticians quality also related to the administrative structure (i.e. whether a country is centralised as France or consists of Federal States like Germany or whether a country does carry a central register, e.g. of population)?
Sample Questions for National Statistical Institute Officials

1. Which administrative sources does the NSI use?
2. Could you please describe the role of migration statistics in your country’s policy-making?
3. In which ways are your country’s politicians and civil servants involved in the decision what, when, and how to measure migration?
4. In which migration statistics-related (national and EU) committee(s) or working group(s) are you participating? What is your role?
5. Please describe the co-operation with
   - Other national and EU statistical authorities and policy directorates
     - What is your NSI’s status in this co-operation?
     - What are your possibilities to impact decisions?
     - What is your NSI’s status in this co-operation?
     - What are your possibilities to impact decisions?
6. What was your role/which were your positions in the negotiations regarding Council Regulation 862/2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection?
7. Was there a need to adjust any of your national definitions and/or concepts to Council Regulation 862/2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection?

Sample Questions for Academics involved in Migration Statistics Harmonisation

1. Please describe your role and your tasks in your co-operation with the OECD/Eurostat/Council of Europe/NSIs
2. Which are your possibilities to impact decisions (e.g. which migration-related concepts to measure and which sources to use) within those institutions?
3. Has your involvement changed over the years?
4. What is your opinion on the comparability, availability and reliability of UK migration statistics in relation to those of other EU member states, and the consequences for joint EU policy-making?
Appendix 2 - List of Interviewees.

Interviewees were selected on the basis of their institutional affiliation and their role in migration statistics harmonisation, again mimicking the division across levels presented in Table 1.3. Section 1.3 provides more detail on the interviewee selection.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Institutional Affiliation</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>13 April 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<td>13 April 2011</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>European Commission, Eurostat</td>
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<td>i</td>
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<td>in writing</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 May 2011</td>
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<td>iv</td>
<td>via Skype</td>
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