THE CONFLICT FOR POWER IN THE IRAQI POLITICAL DISCOURSE ACROSS MAINSTREAM AND SOCIAL MEDIA: (DE)LEGITIMIZATION, RAPPORT, SOCIOPOLITICAL IDENTITIES AND IMPOLITENESS

A thesis submitted to School of English in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Linguistics

May 2016

Thulfiqar Al-Tahmazi
University of Leicester
The Conflict for Power in the Iraqi Political Discourse across Mainstream media and Social Media: (De)legitimization, rapport, sociopolitical identities and impoliteness

Thulfiqar Al-Tahmazi

Abstract

Political discourse is the battlefield for the conflict for power and legitimacy between different actors and ideologies. Analyzing how political discourse can be produced and perceived in different genres presents itself as an indispensable academic endeavor in order to understand the dynamics of such discursive conflicts in both their off and online contexts. This thesis investigates the Iraqi political discourses instantiated in three different genres across mainstream and social media. The thesis first develops an analytical approach that derives from Political Discourse Analysis and impoliteness studies to account for how political discourses can be produced, perceived and evaluated in situ. The analytical gap between the macro-analytical discourse approaches (e.g. CDS-informed Political Discourse Analysis), and micro-analytical approaches (e.g. discursive impoliteness studies) is bridged by examining the relational and interactional aspects of meso-level positioning as derived from Bamberg’s (1997) tripartite adaptation of positioning theory.

The data analyzed in this thesis consists of three, thematically-comparable sets of interaction taken from contrasting genres (TV interviews, Facebook comment threads, online news readers’ responses). The analysis of the data demonstrates that the conflicts between oppositional actors and ideologies can be discursively produced through the use of a limited number of “typical content-related argument schemes” or topoi (Reisigl and Wodak 2001:75), many of which seemed to be characteristic of Iraqi political Discourse, in order to (de)legitimate particular interpretations. In this sense, (de)legitimization is conceptualized as a micro argumentative practice rather than as a macro discursive goal as often argued by political discourse analysts. This conceptualization is innovative in bringing (de)legitimization closer to the study of impoliteness, and in so doing making it possible to pinpoint the attitudinal consequences and moral implications of the discursive conflicts in which oppositional ideologies compete for legitimacy. The analysis can also provide a broad contrastive
perspective as to how the conflict for power instantiated in the Iraqi political discourses could be produced and perceived across mainstream and social media.
Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the support and generosity I received while carrying out this research. Without it this study simply would not have been completed.

First and foremost, I would like to express my profound gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Ruth Page for her invaluable support, advice and guidance throughout the entire process. Her insights and continual encouragement made this thesis more of a stimulating challenge than the demanding burden I often felt it would be. I also would like to thank Dr. Philip Shaw, who kindly took on my supervision and provided me with valuable feedback at key moments in the study.

I would not have been able to carry out this research without the financial support from HCED-Iraq scholarship program. I highly appreciate their support and generosity.

I owe my loving thanks to my wife who overwhelmed me with her loving care, affection, and continue to support and encourage me in ways too numerous to count. I also would like to thank my father who has always been an inexhaustible source of support and inspiration.

Finally, my gratitude and respect also go to everybody at the School of English for they always wished me good luck. Being part of this school was a great experience.
# Table of Contents

List of Tables ........................................................................................................... 9

List of Figures ........................................................................................................... 9

List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................. 10

I. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 11
   1.0 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 11
   1.1 Cultural and political context of Iraq ............................................................... 12
   1.2 Rationales for the thesis .................................................................................. 15
   1.3 Thesis Questions ............................................................................................... 16
   1.4 Structure of the thesis ...................................................................................... 18

II. Discursive Conflicts for Power in Mediatized Political Discourse ................... 21
   2.0 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 21
   2.1 Defining political discourse ............................................................................. 21
   2.2 Analyzing mediatized political discourse ....................................................... 24
   2.3 Power in/of political discourse ........................................................................ 27
   2.4 Functions of political discourse ...................................................................... 28
   2.5 (De)legitimization patterns in mediatized political discourse ....................... 31
   2.6 (De)legitimization topoi in Iraqi political discourse ....................................... 36
   2.7 Summary .......................................................................................................... 42
III. Evaluating the Discursive Conflict for Power: rapport management and impoliteness in mediatized political discourse ............................................................

3.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................

3.1 (De)legitimization as a positioning process ..................................................

3.2 Rapport management in mediatized political discourse ...............................45

3.3 Impoliteness as an affective reaction and a moral evaluation ......................53

3.4 Interplay between (de)legitimization and impoliteness in mediatized political discourse .................................................................................................................

IV. Methodology and Data .....................................................................................63

4.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................

4.1 Methodology .................................................................................................63

4.1.1 Mixed method analysis .............................................................................63

4.1.2 Interdisciplinarity .....................................................................................65

4.2 Data ..................................................................................................................66

4.2.1 Data Selection ..........................................................................................66

4.2.2 Data Categories: generic categorization vs. thematic categorization …69

4.3 Ethical Issues and Anonymization .................................................................71

4.4 Translation and transcription conventions ....................................................73

V. Interplay of (De)legitimization, Rapport and Impoliteness in Political TV
Interviews ..................................................................................................................76

5.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................76

5.1 Communicating sociopolitical stances through (de)legitimization ..........76
5.2 Interactional practices and alignments in political TV interviews ..............92
5.3 Unpacking the construction of sociopolitical identities ..............................103
5.4 Rapport and impoliteness in political TV interviews: attitudinal and moral
implications ........................................................................................................114
5.5 Summary .......................................................................................................126

VI. Interplay of (De)legitimization, Rapport and Impoliteness in Facebook
Discussions ........................................................................................................128
6.0 Introduction ..................................................................................................128
6.1 (Dis)agreeing through (de)legitimization ................................................129
6.2 Establishing alignments and forming political fronts ..................................141
6.3 Indexing sociopolitical identities and constructing online communities ....151
6.4 Rapport perception and variability of impoliteness assessments on Facebook
..........................................................................................................................158
6.5 Summary .....................................................................................................168

VII. Interplay of (De)legitimization, Rapport and Impoliteness in Online Readers’
Response Threads ...............................................................................................170
7.0 Introduction ..................................................................................................170
7.1 Voicing sociopolitical views through (de)legitimization ............................172
7.2 Establishing alignments and forming political fronts .................................187
7.3 Constructing virtual sociopolitical identities and online communities .......194
7.4 Rapport perceptions and variability of impoliteness assessments in online
readers’ response threads ..................................................................................207
7.5 Summary .....................................................................................................218
VIII. Discussion and Conclusions .................................................................221

8.0 Introduction ..........................................................................................223
8.1 General Trends in Iraqi Political Discourse .........................................223
8.2 Cross Thematic Comparison of Iraqi Political Discourse .....................226
8.3 Cross Generic Comparison of Iraqi Political Discourse .......................227
8.4 Limitations and challenges .................................................................231
8.5 Potential for further research .............................................................232

Appendences ..........................................................................................234
Appendix 1 (Consent Templates) .............................................................234
Appendix 2 (Consent Forms) .................................................................238
Appendix 3 (Transcripts of the Data) .....................................................242

Bibliography ...........................................................................................329
List of Tables

Table 2.1 Patterns of (De)legitimization .................................................................35
Table 3.1 Rapport orientations adopted from Spencer-Oatey 2008 .......................51
Table 4.1 Dataset sizes and word counts .................................................................70

List of Figures

Figure 2.1 Action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi ...........................................38
Figure 2.2 Actor-oriented (de)legitimization topoi ..............................................40
Figure 3.1 Positioning analysis and evaluations of impoliteness in political interactions ..............................................................................................................62
Figure 5.1 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in the first interview ...............88
Figure 5.2 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in the second interview ..........89
Figure 5.3 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in the third interview ..........90
Figure 5.4 Percentages of actor-oriented and action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi in the three TV interviews .................................................................92
Figure 5.5 Participation framework in TV interviews .........................................102
Figure 5.6 Percentages of legitimization and delegitimization in the TV interviews ..................................................................................................................113
Figure 5.7 Percentages of impoliteness in the TV interviews ..........................125
Figure 6.1 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in first comment thread ....137
Figure 6.2 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in second comment thread ..138
Figure 6.3 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in third comment thread ....139
Figure 6.4 Percentages of actor-oriented and action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi in comment threads .................................................................141
Figure 6.5 Participation framework in Facebook comment threads .....................150
Figure 6.6 Percentages of legitimization and delegitimization in the Facebook comment threads ...................................................................................................153
Figure 6.7 Percentages of impoliteness in the Facebook comment threads .......167
Figure 7.1 Structure of alarabiya.net comment section in Arabic and English ....171
Figure 7.2 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in first response thread .......183
Figure 7.3 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in second response thread ....184
Figure 7.4 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in third response thread .......185
Figure 7.5 Percentages of actor-oriented and action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi in response threads ........................................................................................................187
Figure 7.6 Participation framework in online response threads .......................193
Figure 7.7 Percentages of legitimization and delegitimization topoi in the response threads ......................................................................................................................199
Figure 7.8 Percentages of impoliteness in the response threads ......................217

List of Abbreviations

CDS Critical Discourse Studies
CMC Computer Mediated Communication
Chapter One
Introduction

1. Introduction
Political discourse, i.e. the language used in or about politics (Fetzer, 2013: 1), in the media, is the key means for people to familiarize themselves with politics and engage in it (Lauerbach and Fetzer, 2007). Investigating political discourse in the media across different communicative genres can elucidate how the conflict for power, whose battlefield is discourse (Carta and Wodak, 2015:6), can be produced and perceived in these genres, and demonstrate how the medium affordances in these genres shape these conflicts for political power. Traditionally, scholars interested in analyzing political discourse, e.g. critical discourse analysts and political discourse analysts, have often concentrated on highly formalized political discourses produced in institutional genres. This thesis, however, will focus on less formal political discourses produced in non-institutional genres in both mainstream and the new forms of media in order to highlight interlocutors’ ideological biases and unpack how they are (re)produced and perceived in interaction. The thesis provides fresh insights in Political Discourse Analysis by conceptualizing (de)legitimization in a way that brings Political Discourse Analysis closer to rapport and impoliteness studies, and in so doing it can pinpoint the attitudinal consequences and moral implications of the discursive conflict for power which involves oppositional sociopolitical viewpoints competing for legitimacy. The thesis also makes an important contribution to the study of impoliteness and that of rapport by providing an ethno-sectarian perspective, which represents a relatively new perspective in these emerging fields of scholarship.

In recent years, technological advancement has created various, new online platforms in which people can discuss public issues and concerns. The advent of different forms of ‘social media’\(^1\) was thought at first to give rise to a freer and more inclusive public sphere (Habermas, 1989), especially in countries that have always suffered from strict censorship over mainstream media (Etling et al., 2009: 7). This view was mainly prompted by the view that social media “can generate political

\(^1\) In line with Leppänen et al. (2015), social media is broadly thought of as digital platforms “that build on the ideological and technological premises and foundations of Web 2.0” and enable the “creation, exchange and circulation of user-generated content” to facilitate interactions between a wide range of interlocutors.
pressure because it is itself intrinsically democratic and can foster populist participation” (Seib, 2007: 5). This view was substantiated to a large extent by the tremendous political transformations that took place in the Arab world in 2010-2011, in which Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and weblogs represented the main tools harnessed by activists to gain momentum for their political struggle against authoritarian regimes (Storck, 2011). Social media, then, can provide more comprehensive and freer platforms for exchange of information and views, constituting an indispensable “online public sphere” (Douai and Nofal, 2012). This online public sphere allows the traditionally marginalized political actors to produce counter-discourses (Dahlberg, 2007: 837) that can counterbalance the disempowering nature of the elitist discourses pervading the traditional mass media (Hall, 2008: 116).

However, social media is sometimes criticized by cultural and critical theorists for being parasitically dependent on mainstream media (e.g. Habermas, 2006: 423, fn. 3) and so reproducing the existing power structures in society (Gerhards and Schafer 2010). Thurlow and Mroczek (2011: xxvi) highlights the ideological nature of social media “in terms of their political economies of access and control”. On the other hand, Blumler and Gurevitch (2010: 3-4) and Weiss (2013: 606) demonstrate how political and social fragmentations can be further exacerbated by the social media, as the interlocutors’ behaviors online often reinforce their pre-established ideological positions (Dahlberg, 2007). In line with this, several studies from different academic perspectives highlight the link between the political discourses circulated online and the polarization of political and social positions (e.g. Sunstein, 2008, Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2010, Conover et al., 2011). In this respect, the thesis sets its problem space within the context of the oppositional positions between the techno-enthusiasts’ aspirations about the democratizing potentials of social media, and the techno-skeptics’ pessimism about the weak or even pathological public engagement in online discourses.

1.1 Cultural and political context of Iraq

Iraq is a Middle Eastern country located at the southwest of Asia in the region anciently known as Mesopotamia, but there are some suggestions that link the name ‘Iraq’ to ancient Aramaic or Sumerian languages. Iraq is a multi ethnic country, in

---

which Arabs, both Shiites and Sunnis, and Kurds represent the largest ethnic groups. Other ethnic groups include Turkmen, Shabakis, Assyrians, Armenians and Mandeans. This ethnic diversity is also crosscut by sectarian and religious divisions. Shia and Sunni Muslims form the predominant majority of the 33 millions Iraqis, while the religious minorities include Christians, Yezidis and Sabian Mandeans.

Article One in the constitution of Iraq, which was formed in 2005, stipulates that “the system of government is republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic” (the constitution of the republic of Iraq, 2005). Due to the diverse nature of Iraqi society, the de facto political system in the country is consociational. Consociationalism, according to Ghanim, (2011: 136), refers to

a power-sharing system, between various confessional blocs. It is a model
for conflict resolution in ethnically divided societies, which is grounded on
quotas in government and bureaucracy, reciprocal veto rights, regional
autonomy, and proportional representation.

Although there is no constitutional article about the ethno-sectarian allocation of the supreme governmental offices, the Iraqi consociational system customarily allocates the presidency to a Kurdish person, the premiership to a Shiite person, and the Speakership to a Sunni person. In this consociational system, almost every political party aims to represent a certain ethno-sectarian group because most political parties are, by tradition, ethno-sectarianly closed, that is, their members belong to a single ethnic or sectarian group. This consociational political system is fundamentally parliamentary in nature, as the parliament is the place where all the ethnic and sectarian groups are represented.

The political process involves two levels of power struggle among the main political actors. Firstly, there are intra-communal conflicts for power in which several political parties aim to claim representation of their ethno-sectarian group in order to be able to nominate the incumbents of the governmental offices allocated to their ethno-sectarian group. Secondly, political conflicts for power can also be inter-communal, in which political parties from different ethno-sectarian backgrounds compete for more power for their respective communities. Inter-communal (political) conflicts for power often take place when the political parties that represent the same
ethno-sectarian group develop a parliamentary coalition that represents their group to negotiate with other ethno-sectarian coalitions over governmental positions or to defend their ethno-sectarian group against possible infringement on their rights. Although inter-communal, i.e. ethno-sectarian, conflicts for power are a distinctive feature of the Iraqi political system, cross-ethnic and cross-sectarian conflicts for political power are possible, but they are often motivated by minor or short-term political interests.

The thesis considers the pursuit of domination and legitimacy played out in a particular period of recent Iraqi political history. In order to make sense of these power conflicts (and hence the data which are explored in later chapters), I begin here by introducing the key political entities who were competing for power during and after the 2012 Iraqi election. Ghanim (2011: 121-122) presents those political entities and summarizes the 2012 election results as follows:

The second legislative election was held on March 7, 2010... The cross-sectarian coalition .... of Iraqiya, headed by the former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, won the highest number of seats, 91. This result gave Allawi a plurality but not outright majority. The second runner was the [bloc] of the then Prime Minister Maliki, the State of Law, which won 89 seats. The difference between these two [blocs] was only 54,000 in popular votes. The other Shiite [bloc] of Iraqi National Alliance came third with 70 seats. Within this Shiite coalition, the Sadrists faction, Ahrar, captured most of the votes, 39 seats, followed by the ISCI with 18 seats and the Fadhila Party with 8 seats. The total seats that went to the Kurdish parties were 57. Most of these seats went to the Kurdistani Alliance, 43, while the other parties won 14 seats: 8 for Gorran, 4 for Islamic Union of Kurdistan, and 2 for al-Jama’a al-Islamiyyia. The Sunni [bloc], Tawafuq, won only 6 seats, while the list of the interior minister Bolani, Unity of Iraq, won 4 seats.

---

3 Since there was no legislation until August 2015 regulating the creation and performance of the political parties in Iraq, there were no political parities per se, but rather, very versatile and flexible political entities. These political entities can be political parties, political coalitions, political fronts, or even parliamentary blocs.
After the election, the predominantly Shiite Al-Maliki’s State of Law bloc united with the other Shiite blocs, the Iraqi National Alliance and the Unity of Iraq bloc, to form the Shiite majority (163 seats). This emergent Shiite bloc nominated a Prime Minister Designate (Al-Maliki), who was later sworn in before the parliament. After failing to form the majority bloc in the parliament, the bloc of Iraqiya, an initially cross-sectarian coalition, became the major representative of Sunnis as most of its Shiite members resigned, which led to its unification with the Sunni bloc of Tawafuq. The different Kurdish blocs united after the election forming the third biggest bloc in the parliament. It is important to note that for the period in question, cross-sectarian fronts were occasionally formed to achieve certain short-term political goals within cross-sectarian confrontations in the national sphere. The most important cross-sectarian confrontation was the one whose aim was to vote out the Prime Minister in the parliament in 2013, which divided the country cross-sectarianly into pro-Al-Maliki and con-Al-Maliki factions.

1.2 Rationales for the thesis
The choice of the thesis topic was specifically motivated by three different rationales. Firstly, in the wake of the dramatic political uprisings in the Arab world and the ensuing political transformations in some countries, there is a need to explore the accompanying shift in political discourses within the Arab(ic) context. These political transformations might have never been possible without the use of social media. Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and weblogs represented the main tools harnessed by prodemocracy activists and Islamists alike to gain momentum for their political causes (cf. Storck, 2011). Although the political context in Iraq may differ from that in the other Arab countries, because the regime that ruled Iraq for decades had been overthrown by foreign forces, this did not deter Iraqi civil and political activists, and minority rights defenders from making use of social media to engage in political debates and to express their political views. Therefore, it seems necessary to scrutinize the different aspects of Iraqi political discourse and to examine how it might be differently produced and perceived in different communicative genres across mainstream and social media.

Secondly, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 gave rise to tremendous political transformations in the country. The political system has change from an
authoritarian regime to a consociationally democratic system, in which various ethnic
and sectarian groups have to be represented. It is often argued by many political
analysts and sociologists that the consociational democracy often inhibits nationalistic
ethos and gives rise to a multiple array of ethno-sectarian identities in political
discourse (Chanim, 2011; Younis, 2011). Notwithstanding, the fragmentation of the
Iraqi national identity actually started before the consociational system was endorsed.
It began during the last decade of Saddam Hussein’s era when the state policies
started to become more evidently ethno-sectarianly exclusionary. Amidst these ethnic,
sectarian and social divisions, media platforms, and especially social media, have
consequently become one of the most extensively (mis)used platforms for cross-
sectarian interactions, and even more regretfully the key means for the post-US led
invasion generations to familiarize self and communicate with the different other.
Hence, investigating the production and evaluation of the conflict for power in Iraqi
political Discourse, with a capital D, (Gee, 2005), presents itself as an indispensable
academic endeavor for Iraqi researchers in order to understand the dynamics of these
conflicts in both their off and online contexts.

Thirdly, the reason for employing rapport and impoliteness studies in the
thesis is not only because it satisfies an analytical need, i.e. they can pinpoint the
attitudinal and the moral implications of the political discourses instantiated in the
social media (see further Chapter 3), but also because assessments of impoliteness and
rudeness in online contexts have become a public and legal issue in Iraq. Ever since
the Baghdad-Rusafa Appeal Court ruled that libels and slanders in social media are
liable to prosecutions just as in mainstream media,⁴ norm disruptive or offensive
practices in social media have come under the spotlight. Therefore, the present thesis
also aims to make an academic contribution to this public and legal debate.

1.3 Thesis Questions

The thesis focuses on the conflicts for power that take place in mainstream and social
media, the discursive patterns of these conflicts, and their interactional, moral and
sociopolitical implications. Ultimately at a broader level, this thesis aims to shed some
light on how the ethno-sectarian and social divisions in Iraq are reflected in
mainstream and social media, and how these divisions are perpetuated by means of

⁴ Ruling 989/penalty/201429/12 http://www.iraqja.ig/view.2713/ (accessed 23/01/2015)
the very same discourses instantiated in these types of media. In order to investigate this topic systematically and in an empirically grounded fashion, I articulate an overarching research question that guides the analytical focus of this thesis. This primary question is operationalized by three sets of subordinate methodological, empirical and theoretical questions (see Sunderland, 2010:15). The methodological question deals with the potential operationalization of the empirical objectives of this thesis by exploring possible methods to bridge the gap between the context of production and reception in the political discourses instantiated in both the mainstream and social media. The empirical questions posited in this thesis are to some extent comparatively oriented, focusing on the different characteristics of the political discourses produced in different thematic and generic contexts representing mainstream and social media. Finally, the theoretical question tests the theoretical assumptions of each of the analytical practices and approaches employed in the thesis, i.e. Critical Discourse Studies and rapport and impoliteness studies, against the as yet relatively under-investigated context of Iraqi mediatized political discourses in order to provide ethno-sectarian perspective. To that effect, new theoretical concepts will be introduced in this thesis in order to account for the various ways in which the argumentative and evaluative aspects of political discourse may be interrelated in ethno-sectarianly polarized contexts. These new theoretical concepts will be of relevance to current advances in Critical Discourse Studies and impoliteness studies.

Primary Question:
What are the interactional, sociopolitical, affective and moral implications of the conflict for power taking place in the Iraqi political discourses instantiated in three different genres representing mainstream and social media?

Methodological questions:
How can the production and evaluation of the conflict for power in mediatized Iraqi political discourses be accounted for systematically?
Empirical questions:

1. How do interlocutors communicate their political viewpoints, and what are the argumentation patterns that they tend to use across different generic and thematic contexts?
2. In what ways do medium affordances affect the dynamics of argumentation and interactivity across different generic contexts?
3. What types of identities are played out in the political discourses produced in these generic and thematic contexts, and how are they functionally employed by the interlocutors?
4. How can impoliteness assessments trigger and be triggered by (de)legitimization in the Iraqi political discourses circulated in different thematic contexts in the genres under scrutiny?

Theoretical questions:

To what extent can the analysis of the mediatized Iraqi political discourses in terms of production and perception attest the general assumptions of Critical Discourse Studies and impoliteness studies and theoretically contribute to these fields of scholarship based on empirical evidence from a relatively under-investigated context?

1.4 Structure of the thesis

The thesis comprises eight chapters. The present chapter, i.e. the Introduction, provides background information about the political and social contexts of the research project (section 1.1). It also sets out the rationale and motivation for conducting this research project (section 1.2). Furthermore in this chapter, the research questions have been discussed and categorized according to their theoretical, empirical and theoretical relevance (section 1.3).

Chapters two and three constitute the literature review that surveys the different approaches employed in the analysis. These two chapters aim to develop the theoretical framework that will inform the analysis in the later analytical chapters. Focusing on the analysis of the conflict for power in political Discourse, Chapter two outlines the theoretical background for analyzing mediatized political discourses (section 2.1 and 2.2) and unravels how power relations are played out therein (section
The chapter provides an overview on how the quest for domination and power is constructed and manifested by means of (de)legitimization and its functions (sections 2.4). Finally in this chapter, I introduce a typology of the (de)legitimizing argumentative structures that can be used in ethno-sectarianly based political Discourse (section 2.5).

Chapter three explores the relational and affective aspects of political discourse. The chapter conceptualizes (de)legitimization as a multi-tiered positioning process in which the argumentative and evaluative aspects of political discourse are intrinsically intertwined (sections 3.1 and 3.2). The chapter also reviews the state-of-the-art in rapport and (im)politeness studies as impoliteness assessments will be used to highlight the attitudinal consequences and moral implications of mediatized political discourses (sections 3.3 and 3.4). The chapter concludes by introducing the approach specially developed to account for the production and reception of the conflict for power that takes place in the political discourses circulated in mainstream and social media (section 3.5).

Chapter Four provides an account of methodology and data collection. It outlines the methodological decisions made in the research design for this project and explains their theoretical bases (section 4.1). The chapter also sets out the data collection process, and clarifies its selection criteria and categories (section 4.2). The data preparatory processes that include ethical issue, anonymization, translation, and presentation of the transcription, are detailed in sections 4.3 and 4.4.

Chapters Five, Six and Seven represent the analytical part of the thesis, in which the political discourse produced in three contrasting thematic contexts in three respective genres are analyzed. These genres includes TV interviews, representing dialogic mainstream media (Chapter Five), Facebook comment threads, representing social media (Chapter Six), and online news readers’ responses, representing an online mass media platform (Chapter Seven). Each chapter explores how the conflict for legitimacy and power is produced and perceived in three thematic contexts in a specific genre. Each chapter consists of four sections. The first section in each chapter investigates how the conflict for power is produced by means of various (de)legitimization patterns. The second section in each chapter examines the participation framework afforded by each of the genres to demonstrate how the interlocutors position themselves in relation to each other, and to identify the different
roles available in each of these genres. The third section in each chapter unpacks the constructions of the functionally versatile sociopolitical identities constructed by the interlocutors and highlights their social implications in each of the different genres under scrutiny. The fourth section in each chapter deals with how rapport can be perceived and how the interlocutors evaluate each other’s political and interactional practices in terms of impoliteness in order to highlight the moral implications of the political conflict for power in these three genres.

Finally, in the discussion and conclusions, Chapter Eight, I discuss and summarize the thesis findings and show how these findings address the project’s research questions. I discuss the thesis’ methodological and theoretical implications, and suggest potential directions for further research. I also set out the originality of this research work and underscore its contributions to the fields of Political Discourse Analysis, impoliteness studies, and intergroup communication.
Chapter Two

Discursive Conflicts for Power in Mediatized Political Discourse

2. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to lay out the theoretical framework used in analyzing the production of the conflict for power in mediatized political texts. In order to understand the dynamics of power relations in political discourse, it is important to explore the ontology of political discourse to clearly define the field of study. Therefore, the first two sections present the current state of research on political discourse in the public field. Section 2.1 interrogates the concept of political discourse and how it might be defined in accordance with the aims of the present thesis. Section 2.2 foregrounds how power may be exercised in political discourse in order to maintain the interlocutor’s interactional goals and advance their political objectives. Section 2.3 explores the strategic functions of political discourse that serve the political actors’ pursuit of legitimacy and power in ways that naturalize their ideological biases. Section 2.4 provides an overview on how the conflict for power is constructed and manifested by means of (de)legitimization, exploring the concept of (de)legitimization and its possible patterns. Finally, section 2.5 introduces the various topoi of (de)legitimization that are characteristic of Iraqi political Discourse.

2.1 Defining political discourse

Language is the main tool to perform political actions and advance political agenda, because, as stated by Chilton and Schaffner (2003: 3), “the doing of politics is predominantly constituted in language”. Political actors use language to communicate their political thoughts and perform political actions to bring about political changes. Historically, the interface of language, rhetoric, and politics was a major topic of study for Aristotle, Machiavelli and many other great thinkers throughout history. More recently, the analysis of political discourse, i.e. the language used in or about politics (Fetzer, 2013: 1), has attracted considerable academic attention across a range of different disciplines; inter alia, Political Science, Critical Discourse Studies, Pragmatics, Communication studies, and Cultural studies. This interest in political discourse seems to have different motivations, the most important of which, especially from a critical discourse analytical perspective, is to delve into how political discourse can form and be formed by the underlying power relations and
hegemony in society (Foucault, 1981). Dunmire (2012) maintains that the interrelation between language and politics cannot be overlooked in academia, asserting that the “political turn in linguistics ran parallel to and was informed by a linguistic turn in political science” (ibid: 736).

However, political discourse cannot be properly defined without appealing to the notion of politics itself and how it might be related to that of discourse. Apparently, most, if not all, types of mediated communication can be considered political from poststructural and postmodern perspectives, because discursive practices are constructed by and constructive of social and political realities (Fetzer, 2007: 164). Dahlberg (2011: 41) points out that all types of discourse are essentially political, because “[d]iscourse theory is, at its core, a theory of politics: of the hegemonic formation of social relations - of discourses - that necessarily involve hierarchies of power and relations of inclusion and exclusion”. This conceptualization of discourse yields a rather blurry picture of what may constitute political discourse, because it conflates the distinction between the politics of language and the language of politics (Okulska and Cap, 2011: 6-7). To avoid any possible conceptual confusion, when doing Political Discourse Analysis it is necessary to analyze “politics as a discursive, [rather] than the discursive as political” (Hay, 2013:323), because analyzing political discourse is, to use van Dijk’s (2002:203) words, “theoretically and empirically relevant only when discourse structures can be related to properties of political structures and process”. Taking the narrow view of political discourse as the language of politics necessitates an examination of how ‘politics’ may be defined.

Traditionally, politics has been broadly defined in two different ways (Hay (2007: 61-2; Fetzer, 2013: 9). It is either defined in terms of deliberation among different political actors to make decisions and identify feasible choices for actions (Hague et al., 1998:3–4; Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012:17), or as a “quest for power” (Wodak, 2011: 5; Bourdieu, 2005:39). In this sense, politics can be envisaged as “a struggle for power, between those who seek to assert and maintain their power and those who seek to resist it” or as a cooperation to “resolve clashes of interests” (Chilton, 2008:3). Apparently, these definitions of politics contradict each other, because one definition entails cooperation whereas the other implies conflict.

The contradiction between the two definitions of politics may be reconciled by appealing to Edelman’s (1976, cited in Lauerbach and Fetzer, 2007:5) distinction
between “an instrumental and an expressive dimension of politics”, or, in Sarcinelli’s (1987, cited in Lauerbach and Fetzer, 2007:5) term, “the production and the presentation of politics”. The production of politics, i.e. the instrumental dimension thereof, which refers to the decision making process in politics, presupposes the need for cooperation to resolve conflicts and make decisions. Alternatively, the representation of politics, i.e. the expressive dimension thereof, which refers to the representation of politics in the media, often triggers conflict and antagonism. This is because media represents a frontstage, where the representation and justification of actions is more important to the political actors than the political deals made in the backstage (Wodak, 2011:24). It is important to note here that disagreement and conflict can be used interchangeably in practice, because “conflict is a disagreement between two or more parties who perceive incompatible goals or means of achieving those goals” (Jones 2001: 91). Dynel (2015: 340) states that “both conflict and disagreement may also be studied in the context of broader communicative phenomena, such as arguments (Schiffrin 1985), disputes (Brenneis 1988), and quarrels (Antaki 1994)”.

Alluding to the domain of politics, van Dijk (1997) provides a well articulated characterization of what may constitute political discourse. He (ibid: 15) contends that political discourse can be contextually defined in respect of its “aim, goal or function”, and how these are related to the wider scope of politics. Implicitly acknowledging the fuzziness of political discourse, he (ibid: 16-18) points out that political discourse is the language of the different political domains, that include political systems, structure, process, actors and values. In this sense, van Dijk’s definition falls under the category of the language of politics rather than the politics of language. In terms of the actors involved in political discourse, van Dijk (1997: 13) states that all types of actors, whether the politicians or citizens, “as well as their organizations and institutions, may take part in the political process, and many of them are actively involved in political discourse”. Chilton (2004: 3) distinguishes between the practice of politics at the macro level, which involves political institutions, and micro levels, which involves individuals and social groups. Fetzer (2013: 13) refers to practice of politics at the micro level as doing politics from below, in which all political actors, politicians and grass roots, and social groups are involved in mediatized political practices in typically non-institutionalized settings (ibid.; 13).
The inclusion of the discourses produced by the general public about politics in political discourse is based in the democratic ideal that the power of politics is mandated to the professional practitioners of politics, i.e. politicians, by the public themselves. Therefore, it is hardly contentious to regard the discourse in which the general public is engaged in discussing political topics as a political discourse. Political discourse, then, is the function of politics and the arena where it is practised, debated and represented.

Political discourse in the media is notably different from other types of discourse. It is firstly characterized by the struggle for dominance and power, which consequently triggers antagonism and conflict. On the other hand, Finlayson and Martin (2008, 449) state that political speech represents “a snapshot of ideology in actions”. This can be extended to almost all types of mediatized political discourse, especially the ones in which political and ethno-sectarian biases are intrinsically intertwined as in the interactions under scrutiny in this thesis. As such employing fallacious arguments and manipulation of emotion can be another typical characteristic of political discourse (Keinpointer, 2008: 250). In this sense, political discourse is seldom informative and value-free; it is rather value-laden, tendentious and manipulative. Therefore, presenting a person’s self positively and authoritatively, and justifying their actions are typical discursive practices in political discourse. Finally, political discourse is a public discourse that is becoming more mediatized and digitalized (Fetzer, 2013: 3). It is communicated through different types of media that are multilayered in terms of “production, reception, transmission and discourse distribution in traditional and new media” (ibid, 1), which makes the analysis of its micro interactional dynamics and medium affordances very relevant to Political Discourse Analysis.

2.2 Analyzing mediatized political discourse
Mediatized political discourse represents the field in which ideology is put into action; to investigate this kind of discourse a critical perspective is required. A critical analysis of political texts does not only entail focusing on their production and rhetorical techniques used in them and their linguistic realizations, but also on interrogating their ideological underpinnings and highlighting their social and political implications. To that effect, several methodologies have been developed
within Critical Discourse Studies to explore the interrelation between politics, discourse and society (Baxter, 2010: 126). Out of these efforts, the new sub-discipline of Political Discourse Analysis has emerged.

Van Dijk (1997:11) conceives of Political Discourse Analysis as a critical enterprise that deals with political discourse stating that this enterprise could have the best of both Critical Discourse Analysis and the linguistic analysis of political discourse. Preferring the term ‘Analysis of Political Discourse’, Okulska and Cap (2010: 4) conceptualize this enterprise as involving the socially oriented analysis of “polity and/or policies, located at the intersection of political/public discourse and political/social institutions”. Van Dijk (1997, 12-14) asserts that it is important for Political Discourse Analysis to “answer genuine and relevant political questions and deal with issues that are discussed in political science”. In this sense, Political Discourse Analysis can have two objectives; first, it can account for the dynamics of the “discursive political practices”, and second, it can demystify the hidden aspects of the political context and uncover the ideological biases therein (ibid: 41).

Fairclough & Fairclough (2012) identify two major traditions in Political Discourse Analysis. The first tradition focuses on the representation of political reality including the representations of actions, actors, values and institutions (ibid, 2012:20), while the second tradition emphasizes the role of deliberation and argumentation in decision making in politics. The first tradition is represented by two influential approaches in the field; first Chilton’s (2004) cognitively anchored approach to Political Discourse Analysis, and secondly Wodak and Reisigl’s (2001) and Wodak’s (2011) Discourse-Historical Approach. In the approaches that fall in the first tradition according to the Faircloughs’ classification, politics is viewed as a struggle to impose particular ideologically motivated representations of reality. Fairclough & Fairclough (2012: 25-26) argue that such approaches fail to envisage politics as a domain of action, where political choices are made to bring about political transformation. The second tradition in Political Discourse Analysis is represented by Fairclough & Fairclough (2012) themselves, who conceptualize politics as deliberative acts that require practical reasoning and argumentation. They (ibid: 23) emphatically assert that no adequate critical Political Discourse Analysis is possible without argument reconstruction.
Four counter arguments can be presented in response to the Faircloughs’ conceptualization of Political Discourse Analysis. Firstly, as convincingly argued by Hay (2013:325), reducing politics to deliberation and argumentation excludes a wide range of political discourses, because although “all situations of deliberation are political, not all political situations are deliberative”. Secondly, in all the discourses in postmodern societies in general, and the increasingly mediatized and digitized political discourse in particular, it is representation, rather than argumentation, that plays a vital role in constructing our worldviews including the political (cf. the concept of hyperreality developed in Baudrillard, 1994). Thirdly, the argumentation process in the political discourses instantiated in the media, whether in the mainstream or the social, represents a means to gain power and legitimacy for the oppositional parties involved in these discourses, each which aims to promote particular representations of political reality. Fourthly, from a rhetorical perspective, Finlayson (2013: 318) argues, “political disputes take place not at the level of conclusions but at that of premises - conceptions of situations, of circumstances, of the social world”. The significance of premises does not lie in their conceptual content only but also “in their capacity to induce chains of quasi-logical reasoning” (Finlayson, 2012: 762). This means that representation become far more fundamental than argumentation in Political Discourse Analysis, because representation forms the “constitutive presuppositions” that make political decisions and actions possible (Finlayson, 2013: 318).

Political Discourse Analysis can then be defined as any procedures, methods and techniques used to analyze the language of politics “that entails implementing/executing power for and gaining/manifesting superiority through furthering interactants’ communicative goals” (Okulska and Cap, 2011: 399). This view is compatible with the shift in Political Discourse Analysis from “macro-politics, and politics as a product, to the more recent focus on the dynamics of politics and political process as it manifests in e.g., the microanalysis of politics” (Fetzer, 2013:2), which is entrenched in the Foucauldian tradition that the dynamics of power can be best felt and analyzed at the micro-level of analysis and practices (Thomas and Davies, 2005: 684; and Oberhuber, 2008: 277-8). This can be linguistically operationalized by tracing the interlocutors’ negotiations of power in interaction at different levels of linguistics analysis, and identifying the argumentation patterns they
employ to naturalize their ideological biases in order to maintain their political interests.

2.3 Power in/of political discourse
Researchers interested in Political Discourse Analysis principally investigate the teleological and strategic functions of political discourse. This is because they tend to envisage political discourse as the domain in which political actors attempt to exercise power over others in order to attain their interactional goal at the micro level as part of their pursuance of their sociopolitical objective at the macro-level. To that end, the investigation of the strategic functions of political discourse necessitates unpacking the interrelation between power and discourse in general and political discourse in particular. The interrelation between discourse and power and how it shapes our conceptualization of the world around us has long been a subject of heated debate in different disciplines, including social theory (Foucault, 1981), Philosophy of Language (Searle, 1995), Critical Discourse Studies (Fairclough, 2003; Martín Rojo & van Dijk, 1997; van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999; van Leeuwen, 2007) and Political Discourse Analysis (van Dijk, 1997; Chilton, 2004; Wodak, 2011; Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012).

The conceptualization of power has developed dramatically over time. Power is traditionally defined in terms of control and influence exercised over others to urge them take a particular course of action (Dahl, 1957: 202-3). In response to the weakness of this one-dimensional and purely behavioristic conceptualization, Bachrach and Baratz (1970: 24) developed their two-dimensional view of power by extending the concept of power to include the ability to restrict the environment of action as well as exercising control over action. Fairclough & Fairclough (2012: 113) argue that the “two-dimensional view of power is an advance over the one-dimensional view in that it sees power (over) as not only a capacity in decision-making, but also a capacity to limit the scope of decision making”. However, power is not necessarily the observable control of action and its environment; it can be exercised covertly to safeguard the interests of the powerful. Therefore, evoking the Foucauldian concept of knowledge/power and the Gramscian concept of hegemony, Luke (1974) develops his three-dimensional view of power, in which he defines power in terms of interests, where actors can act contrary to their real interest
unknowingly (1974:34). Power can then be conceptualized as a covert operationalization of biases in discourse. These biases are often “socially structured and culturally patterned” (ibid: 26). Therefore, as aptly illustrated by Diamond (1996:13), “power is not just the ability to coerce someone or to get them to do something against their will, but rather, it is the ability to interpret events and reality, and have this interpretation accepted by others”.

Consequently, the linguistic manifestations of power and its pursuit, with the aim of imposing visions or beliefs (Bourdieu, 2005:39), can be traced in political discourse to uncover how the interlocutors secure their interests and naturalize their biases. The link between the interlocutors’ discursive behavior at the micro-level, i.e. the linguistic text, and attainment of their political goal at the macro-level, i.e. the political agenda, is mediated by several rhetorical and argumentative strategies. These rhetorical and argumentative strategies are used to empower the interlocutors’ positions and justify their political actions and agenda.

2.4 Functions of political discourse
Several scholars have proposed different theoretical perspectives and analytical toolkits to interrogate the ideological underpinnings of political discourse and scrutinize how power can be constructed, exercised, and legitimized in it. These theoretical perspectives and analytical toolkits have either been developed within the tradition of Political Discourse Analysis, e.g. Chilton & Schaffner (1997); Chilton (2004); Cap (2008), or within that of Critical Discourse Studies, e.g. Martín Rojo & van Dijk; (1997); Reisigl & Wodak (2001); Hart (2010).

Political discourse analysts tend to concentrate on the general strategic functions of political discourse. Chilton & Schaffner (1997) and Chilton (2004) argue that to carry out Political Discourse Analysis it is more feasible to start with a top-down categorization of the strategic functions that the language of politics may be employed for, rather than making claims about “the strategic potential of certain linguistic expressions in general” (Chilton, 2004: 45). This can be done, Chilton & Schaffner (1997: 212) argue, by linking “political situations and the processes of discourse types and levels of discourse organization”. In their earlier work, Chilton & Schaffner (ibid: 212–13) proposed four different strategic functions in political discourse namely: ‘coercion’, ‘(de)legitimization’, ‘dissimulation’ and ‘resistance,
opposition and protest’. Developing the original work of Chilton & Schaffner (1997), Chilton (2004: 45-7) identifies three strategic functions of political discourse; viz. coercion, (de)legitimization and (mis)representation, which is the outcome of merging the two functions of “dissimulation” and “resistance, opposition and protest”.

Coercion is the strategic function of political discourse that is covertly associated with power. It is the intentional use of power in order to influence the way others act to maintain one’s interests and goals (Chilton, 2004: 47; Hart, 2010: 63). Wartenberg (1990: 96) defines coercion as the use of power that necessarily involves a restriction of others’ environment of action as well as making threats in case of non-compliance. Chilton asserts that coercion is not entirely discursive but rather dependent on the interlocutor’s “resource and power” (Chilton, 2004: 45) or in Fairclough’s (1989: 43) terms, “power behind discourse”. Yet, coercion can be discursively exercised via directive and declarative speech acts that are entitled by powerful roles and identities (Hart, 2010:64). Additionally, coercive use of power “can also be exercised through controlling others’ use of language - that is, through various kinds and degrees of censorship and access control” (Chilton, 2004: 45).

Coercive power with the intention to maintain interests cannot be effectively exercised without a justification of some sort. This justification is linked to the actors’ legitimization of self to maintain “the right to be obeyed” (Chilton, ibid: 46). Legitimization may be achieved by “arguments about voters’ wants, general ideological principles, charismatic leadership projection, boasting about performance and positive self-presentation” (ibid). Delegitimization is the “essential counterpart” of legitimization by means of which the opponent is “presented negatively, and [its] techniques include the use of ideas of difference and boundaries, and speech acts of blaming, accusing, insulting, etc” (ibid). Emphasizing its relation to concepts of role and social identity, Cap (2008: 22) envisages legitimization as “linguistic enactment of the speaker’s right to be obeyed” by appealing to the sources of power associated with a particular social role and a political position. Linking (de)legitimization with self and other presentation, van Dijk (1997:32) argues that in the argumentative activities in political or racial discourses, interlocutors employ two major strategies: viz. “positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation”. Legitimization is broadly defined as a justification strategy to naturalize power abuse and ideological biases. Martín Rojo & van Dijk (1997: 530) argue that all “justificatory discourses”
have legitimizing function, yet legitimization is at work only if power, authority or institutional settings are involved. Along the same line, Fairclough & Fairclough (2012:109) maintain that legitimization is a particular type of justification that is enacted in connection with the pursuit of power and characterized by “publicly shared and publically justifiable, and sometimes even highly formalized, codified, institutional system of beliefs, values and norms”.

Representation (as well as its counterpart, misrepresentation), on the other hand, refers to the political actors’ tendentious construction of reality. Chilton (2004:46) asserts that representation and misrepresentation are related to the “control of information, which is by definition a matter of discourse control”. He identifies two types of information control; quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative control of information refers to the amount of information (usually an inadequate amount), whereas “qualitative misrepresentation is simply lying, in its most extreme manifestation, but includes various kinds of omissions, verbal evasion and denial” (ibid). In this sense, (mis)representation, according to Chilton, can be achieved outside or inside the immediate discourse practices of the interlocutors. On the one hand, (mis)representation is a matter of power behind discourse (Fairclough, 1989), which involves the struggle for the access to public discourse and the control over it. On the other hand, however, (mis)representation is a matter of power in discourse (ibid), which is concerned about the quality of the interlocutors’ discursive practices in interaction.

In practice, coercion, (de)legitimization and (mis)representation are intrinsically interconnected. Both Chilton (2004: 47) and Hart (2010: 10) point out that representation creates a worldview that aims to secure the control of the action, i.e. coercion, but coercion cannot be successfully brought into action unless the represented worldview is justified by legitimization. The relation among the three main discursive strategies seems to be largely mediated by the interlocutor’s role or identity in the interaction. Coercion cannot be exercised unless the political actor enacts a certain role or identity, therefore a particular representation of the actor image who exercises coercion, i.e. his/her identity, needs to be legitimimized. Furthermore, (de)legitimizing a representation of reality often aims to maximize the positive attributes of self and the negative attributes of others, and alternatively minimize the negative attributes of self and positive attributes of others.
Although the relation among the three strategies is not envisaged in hierarchical terms by Chilton (2004), Hart (2010:7) explicitly contends that coercion is the macro-level strategy to which both (de)legitimization and (mis)representation contribute. Since coercion is “not purely linguistic” (Chilton, 2004:45), it is (de)legitimization that seems to operationalize both coercion and (mis)representation. This is because (de)legitimization justifies/undermines the preferable representations of reality, whose aim is to maintain one’s access to power and to secure one’s capability to control others’ actions, i.e. Coercion. It is, then, (de)legitimization, rather than coercion, that should be conceived of as a macro discursive goal. Chovanec (2010:62) rightly argues that legitimization and delegitimization are the overarching goals of political discourse at “the macro-level, which are achieved through the use of several broad discursive strategies, realized by particular textual forms and structures as manifestations of the micro-level of discourse”.

2.5 (De)legitimization patterns in mediatized political discourse

The justificatory function of (de)legitimization often focuses on different aspects of the political context; it can either be actor-oriented, e.g. election campaigns, or action-oriented, e.g. declarations of war and announcements of strategic plans. In fact, both actor and action-oriented (de)legitimization are used simultaneously but they may differ in terms of their hierarchical importance, which is based on the genre expectations and the (de)legitimizers’ political goals. Implicitly alluding to the two possible orientations of (de)legitimization, Hart (2014: 7) argues that legitimization should be envisaged as a macro-function through which interlocutors “seek social approval of the Self”, self here is conceptualized either as the individual interlocutor or a social group or an institution the interlocutors are identified with, or “accreditation for social actions”.

The justificatory function of (de)legitimization has often been conceptualized as a macro discursive goal and explored in highly formalized textual formats of political discourse, mostly written texts and speeches, which are produced in monologic genres (e.g. Martín Rojo & van Dijk, 1997; Cap, 2010; Reyes, 2011; Sowin´ska & Dubrovskaya, 2012). However, in multi-party and dynamic political interactions, especially the ones produced in the social media, justifications of political actions or access to power and authority, and making claims about the public
images of self and others are typical micro interactional practices, whose aim is to voice political opinions or to express (dis)agreements in these debate-like interactions. In these multi-party and dynamic political interactions, it is, then, feasible to conceive of (de)legitimization as a micro argumentative practice that aims to promote/undermine certain interpretations of reality by justifying the public claims about self image, the capacity in which a course of action performed, or the course of action taken.

In the conflictive multi-party debate-like interactions, including the ones under scrutiny in this thesis, the interlocutors tend to recontextualize certain political actions and actors and present them in accordance with their political goals and ideological biases as part of their competition to legitimate their political convictions and delegitimize those of their opponents. Recontextualization, as it is used here, refers to the process of transforming meaning from its original context to acquire different meaning in a new one (Linell, 1998:144). Recontextualization makes the elements of the social practices recontextualized i.e. the roles and identities of the actors concerned, the performance styles of the actions involved, timings and settings (van Leeuwen, 2008: vii), “pass through the filter of the practices in which they are inserted” (ibid: 12). In practice, the transformed meaning may involve “actual wordings, explicitly expressed meanings, or something only implicit or implied in the original text or genre” (Linell, 1998: 148).

Investigating (de)legitimization in terms of the action and actors recontextualized is compatible with KhosraviNik’s (2010: 63) heuristic for analyzing what actors, actions and arguments are actually found in the text and how they are represented when investigating discourses on social and cultural categorization. This means that the working definition of legitimization in this thesis will be: the argumentative practice by means of which the interlocutors’ oppositional interpretations of political contexts are justified and through which their pursuit of power and domination in the mediatized political discourse is acted out. The justification function of the (de)legitimization process can be achieved by recontextualizing particular political actions to characterize them as legitimate and justified in accordance with the interlocutors’ political goals, and/or by recontextualizing particular political actors to characterize them as legitimate
claimants of power in accordance with the interlocutors’ ideological preferences. Delegitimization is the counterpart of legitimization.

(De)legitimization is not associated with specific linguistic acts; it is rather a sociopolitical act that may take different realizations (Martín Rojo & van Dijk, 1997:527-8). The discursive realizations of legitimization involve different levels of linguistic description (Mackay, 2015:328). Therefore, it seems more viable to focus on the “typical content-related argument schemes” or topoi (Reisigl and Wodak 2001:75), and how they may be realized linguistically in different contexts rather than concentrating on the linguistic realizations of (de)legitimization and their descriptions in general. Drawing on several argumentation theoretical traditions, Reisigl (2014:77) argues that in discourse analysis, topoi reveal more about the specific features of the discourses in which they are used (subject positions, ideological biases, justification strategies, and controversial claims, etc.) than their purely formal characters. Topoi are very important in political discourse because they facilitate the transition from the arguments to preferred conclusions (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 74–75). Although these topoi are not necessarily fallacious, they are frequently used fallaciously in political discourse. Wodak and Reisigl (ibid: 75) explicitly warn of this ambivalent nature indicating that it is not possible to make a clear-cut distinction “between more or less plausible argumentation and fallacies”, especially where tendentious predications are made as parts of these topoi. This is because these tendentious predications often restrict the pragmatic context making particular preferred presupposition more cognitively relevant to the recipients (Maillat & Oswald, 2011: 74-5), and, thus, more likely to evade their logico-rhetorical modules (Sperber, 2000).

Broadly speaking, there seem to be two general academic trends as to how to explore the discursive (de)legitimization patterns, i.e. topoi. The first trend focuses on the social categorization of the actors involved, i.e. the representation of self or in-group, on the one hand, vs. the representation of other or out-group, on the other (e.g. Martín Rojo & van Dijk, 1997; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Chovanec, 2010; Sowin´ska & Dubrovskaya, 2012). The second trend, however, is more action-oriented viewing (de)legitimization as an argumentative process that is based on the rationalization and justification of political actions (e.g. van Leeuwen, 2007; Reyes, 2011). It is important to note here that the distinction between these two trends is not stated explicitly, but is
rather implied by the (de)legitimization patterns and strategies described in the framework proposed by each researcher.

Concentrating on actor representation, Martín Rojo & van Dijk (1997: 534-41) identify multiple linguistic evidences at different levels of analysis, i.e. semantic, pragmatic and rhetorical, to demonstrate how the social categorization of actors, in terms of positive self presentation and negative other presentation, may have a justificatory function. Along the same line, Chovanec (2010), and Sowin’ska & Dubrovskaya (2012) interrogate the discursive inclusion and exclusion of actors in political discourses to highlight their (de)legitimizing nature. Both Chovanec (2010:62) and Sowin’ska & Dubrovskaya (2012: 450) assert that social categorization is cognitively associated with the positive qualities of in-group and the negative qualities of out-group. It is this cognitive association, which is quintessentially ideological, that creates the justificatory function of (de)legitimization (van Dijk, 1998:255).

Alternatively, viewing legitimization as an action-oriented process, van Leeuwen (2007:92) develops a well articulated typology for various legitimization patterns arguing that legitimization include four different categories: authorization, moral evaluation, rationalization and mythopoesis. He conceives of authorization as a legitimizing process achieved by invoking the concept of power and authority, whether traditional, social, institutional or legal. Moral evaluation is defined as legitimizing assessment of actions “by reference to a value system” (ibid). Rationalization, on the other hand, refers to the justification of claims, actions and goals by highlighting their cognitive validity or expediency. Finally, mythopoesis can be defined as a legitimization process that is communicated through “narratives whose outcomes reward legitimate actions and punish non-legitimate actions” (ibid).

Employing insights from both actor and action-oriented perspectives, Reyes (2011) develops a typology to account for (de)legitimization in US presidents’ speeches. He (2011: 781) states that (de)legitimization can be discursively achieved through (1) appeal to emotions (particularly fear), (2) presenting a hypothetical future, (3) rationalization, (4) voices of expertise and (5) altruism. He (ibid: 785) argues that (de)legitimization by appealing to emotion aims to skew the interlocutors’ opinion regarding the topic in question. This can be achieved by representing out-group members negatively. He (ibid: 786) maintains that (de)legitimization by hypothetical
future is justifying the interlocutor’s (mis)use of his authority to take an action that protects his/her group from expected detrimental force or action. This can be discursively presented in various ways including proximization, which is defined by Cap (2010: 119) as a “strategy that relies upon the speaker’s ability to present events on the discourse stage as directly affecting the addressee, usually in a negative or a threatening way”. Reyes’s second legitimization strategy, i.e. presenting a hypothetical future, is included in van Leeuwen’s (2007: 104) theoretical rationalization that takes the form of prediction. Similar to Reyes’s hypothetical future, prediction according to van Leeuwen (ibid), requires an actor with a particular social position to take protective measures. Moreover, Reyes’s conceptualization of rationalization is similar to that of instrumental rationalization proposed by van Leeuwen (2007), because it only includes instrumentality, which needs to be conceptualized as a modus operandi (Reyes, 2011: 786). The fourth (de)legitimization strategy identified by Reyes, i.e. voices of expertise, is similar to van Leeuwen’s (2007) authorization in terms of expertise. The last strategy identified by Reyes is altruism, which he defines in terms of the positive representation of self (2011: 787).

Taking the typologies developed by van Leeuwen (2007) and Reyes (2011) as points of departure, the major (de)legitimation topoi can be summarized in Table 2.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Legitimization</th>
<th>Delegitimization</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rationalization</td>
<td>Irrationalization</td>
<td>Action-oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Positive evaluation of action</td>
<td>Negative evaluation of action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Authorization</td>
<td>Deauthorization</td>
<td>Actor-oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Positive representation of self</td>
<td>Negative representation of other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1 Patterns of (De)legitimization

In polarized political situations, (de)legitimization always comes in binary opposition, because legitimizing a political action or actor implicitly entails the delegitimizing the opposing ones, and vice versa. Interlocutors involved in political
interactions would be expected to legitimize their own or their in-group members’ images as authorized, trustworthy, amiable, popular and the like, and/or their own or their in-group members’ actions as legitimate, justified, legal, rational, expedient, beneficial and the like. Conversely, they would delegitimize their opponents’ image as unauthorized, not trustworthy, and unpopular, or their actions as illegitimate, unjustified, illegal, outrageous and so on. Interlocutors often use action-oriented (de)legitimization to justify specific political actions; therefore action-oriented topoi tend to be short-ranged in nature focusing on the specific context in which the actions (de)legitimized take place. Alternatively, Interlocutors often use actor-oriented (de)legitimization to support the ideological biases about self and others, hence actor-oriented topoi tend to have a “panoramic” sociopolitical focus (cf. micro and macro legitimation in KhosraviNik, 2015). It is necessary to note that both action and actor-oriented (de)legitimization can be employed simultaneously in order to reinforce rhetorical effect.

2.6 (De)legitimization topoi in Iraqi political discourse
In this thesis, (de)legitimization will be examined in the relatively under-investigated Iraqi political discourse in multi-party political interactions produced in mainstream and social media in order to capture the dynamics of power and interlocutors’ uptakes of each other’s discursive behaviors at the micro-level of analysis and practices (see 4.2.1 below). Based on an in-depth survey of the data and the empirical evidence from my qualitative analysis (also see Al-Tahmazi, 2015), the major topoi summarized in table 2.1 above can be further explicated and correlated with further sub-argumentative structures and discursive means of realizations. The empirical evidence indicates that the (de)legitimization topoi found in any political Discourse can be motivated by the context of culture, to use Malinowski’s (1966 [1923]) term, more than any other contextual factors as will be shown below. In this sense, expanding on the (de)legitimization topoi identified by other researchers, predominantly in western discourses, will situate the (de)legitimization topoi found in my data in their social and cultural contexts, i.e. Iraqi political Discourse, and highlight the cultural diversity of human discourses and the ways these discourses can be approached and analyzed from culturally sensitive, but globally minded, perspectives (Shi-Xu, 2015).
To start with, (ir)rationalization is an action-oriented (de)legitimization topos; it can be realized in two different ways: explanation and highlighting effectiveness. On the one hand, (ir)rationalization by means of explanation is related to the cognitive validity of the actions targeted by the process of (de)legitimization (van Leeuwen, 2007:92). In (ir)rationalization, the reasons that are ostensibly provided in support of a action intended to be (ir)rationalized are not necessarily the same reasons that support the action from the viewpoint of the (de)legitimiser (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012: 96). This explains how (ir)rationalization can function as a manipulative technique. Rationalization by means of explanation takes the form of providing supporting evidence to present the political action as valid and reasonable. Conversely, Irrationalization by means of explanation highlights the (perceived) inconsistencies in a particular political action to present it as cognitively invalid and incompatible with the interlocutors’ needs. (Ir)rationalization by means of explanation is subsumed under van Leeuwen’s theoretical (ir)rationalization, which he defines as presenting the action’s (in)compatibility with truth (2007:103).

On the other hand, (ir)rationalization by means of effectiveness focuses on the outcome, usefulness and expediency of the political actions targeted by the process of (de)legitimization. It is, as such, epistemologically pragmatic in nature. This sub-type of (ir)rationalization is subsumed under van Leeuwen’s (2007) instrumental (ir)rationalization, which defines the validity of the action in terms of efficiency, purposefulness and effectiveness (Reyes, 2011: 799). Rationalization by means of effectiveness is related to how expedient the political action targeted by rationalization is or how beneficial its consequences are for the general public in order to reinforce its validity. Alternatively, Irrationalization on by means of effectiveness is used to warn the intended addressee(s) of the inexpediency of the political action and its detrimental consequences, i.e. topoi of danger (Hart. 2010: 82). This can be discursively achieved by means of proximization to present the intended action as directly affecting the addressees in a negative way (Cap, 2010: 119).

Secondly, political actions can be (de)legitimized by means of legal or moral evaluation (van Leeuwen, 2007:97). This is done by appealing to the legal sets of values or the moral order. (De)legitimization that takes the form of evaluation may refer implicitly or explicitly to other actions to hold a comparison that aims to present the intended action as more/less legitimate than others. (De)legitimization by moral
evaluation presents the political action as (im)moral or good/bad. Moreover, (de)legitimization by legal evaluations presents the political action as (il)legal or (un)constitutional. In certain cases, the borderline between what is legal and moral may become very blurred in certain political situations. For instance a human rights-related issue seems to be both a moral and a legal issue.

The key difference between the two main action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi, i.e. (ir)rationalization and positive/negative action evaluation, can be better envisaged by using Chilton’s (2004:117) distinction between epistemic and deontic (de)legitimization. (Ir)rationalization falls within epistemic (de)legitimization, which refers to the claim to have better understanding, recognition or knowledge of the real facts. Positive/negative action evaluation, however, falls within deontic (de)legitimization, which is concerned with the interlocutor’s claims to be right in a moral sense. Figure 2.1 shown below lists the action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi.

![Figure 2.1 Action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi](image)

The third (de)legitimization topos is (de)authorization. (De)authorization is predominantly actor-oriented; it can be operationalized by reference to authority and powerful positions. (De)authorization explicitly aims to strengthen/weaken the power of the political actors targeted by presenting them as (un)fit to hold the power
positions they claim for themselves. Both van Leeuwen (2007) and Reyes (2011) identify the topos of authorization through the voices of expertise as an important legitimization technique in political discourse. In political discourse, claims of popularity and reference to (electoral) representativeness can also be an empowering technique (see example 1 in 6.1 below). Characteristically in the ethno-sectarian discourses, claims of majority and minority can function as ethno-sectarian (de)authorization. Claims of majority are used to present in-group as a legitimate claimant of authority or powerful positions (see example 16 in 7.3 below). In contrast, claims of minority are used to present out-group as an illegitimate claimant of authority or powerful positions (see example 21 in 7.4 below). Ethno-sectarian (de)authorization can be considered a defining feature of the Iraqi political discourses that are produced in the mainstream and social media. Therefore, the power sources based on which political actors can be (de)authorized include: expertise, popularity, and representativeness and claims of majority/minority.

The last (de)legitimization topos is positive/negative actor representation. Political actors can be legitimized by presenting them positively, and delegitimized by presenting them negatively. Political actors can be presented as individuals or as groups; as one might expect self or in-group members are evaluated positively, whereas others and out-group members will be represented negatively (Reyes, 2011: 785). Van Dijk (1998:267) uses the term “ideological square” to refer to the cognitive tendency in political discourses to maximize positive attributes of self and minimize negative attributes of self, and to minimize positive attributes of other and maximize negative attributes of other. The ideological square highlights the interlocutors’ egocentric and exclusionary nature in political discourse. Positive representation of political actors can be done in different ways. Political actors can be presented as altruistic or attentive to public needs, and by means of inclusion (Reyes, 2011: 787). Political actors can also be legitimized by presenting them positively through comparisons with a negative role model, positive difference (Reisigl, 2014: 88), to highlight the contrast between the positive aspects of the legitimized actor and the negative aspects of the negative role model. Victimization is another way to achieve legitimization; it highlights in-group (perceived) grievances representing in-group as victimized by out-group and, as such, as entitled to more power (See example 4 in 5.1, example 5 in 6.1 and example 3 in 7.1 below). Conversely, negative
representation of political actors can be done in different ways. They can be presented as egocentric or selfish and careless about the public needs, or by means of exclusion. Political actors can also be presented negatively by making comparisons with a positive role model to highlight negative difference. Criminalization is another topos of delegitimization; it is used to represent out-groups as violating or impinging on in-groups’ rights (see example 3 in 6.1 and example 4 in 7.1 below). The use of victimization and criminalization in political discourses that are primarily ethno-sectarian in nature seems to be mainly motivated by the sentiments of disenfranchisement and victimhood that permeate all Iraqi ethno-sectarian communities. Figure 2.2 shown below lists the actor-oriented (de)legitimization topoi.

Figure 2.2 Actor-oriented (de)legitimization topoi
As shown above, the (de)legitimization topoi can be classified into two broad categories, namely: collective and individualistic topoi based on the multitude of targets of the (de)legitimization process. The former (de)legitimize groups and communities in their entirety, whereas the latter (de)legitimize individuals, typically politicians. Collective (de)legitimization topoi include victimization, criminalization and claims of majority or minority. Individualistic (de)legitimization topoi involve the remaining actor-oriented topoi and all the action-oriented ones. Individualistic (de)legitimization topoi are always political in essence; they target specific political actors based on their political performance. In theory at least, they aim to persuade most of the Iraqi people about certain political claims regardless of their ethno-sectarian affiliations. Nevertheless, collective (de)legitimization is always ethno-sectarian in nature; they are frequently addressed to an intended audience, i.e. the in-group members, for out-group members do not tend to accept the arguments that are based on delegitimizing their ethno-sectarian community.

To capture how these topoi actually function, it is necessary to analyze how the (de)legitimized actors and actions are discursively represented in a linguistically grounded way. Within the critical discourse analytical tradition, van Leeuwen (2008 [1996]) developed a socio-semantic set of discourse-analytical concepts to describe how social actors and social actions might be represented in discourse. These analytical concepts are motivated by sociological rather than linguistic categories, although van Leeuwen (ibid: 33) indicates that there is a degree of overlap between the two. In a similar vein, Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 44) identify discursive representational strategies; these include different referential and nomination choices to refer to the (de)legitimized political actions and actors, and different predicative construction to assign quality to them or to characterize and evaluate them. Admittedly, there is not a straightforward relation between these representational choices, on the one hand, and their social meaning at the macro-level, on the other. The relation between the two is mediated by indexicality, which refers to the implicit correlation between linguistic choices and their conventionalized context of use (Ochs, 1996:411). Therefore, (de)legitimization will be analyzed in terms of the topoi identified above, the linguistic representations of the actors and actions involved (van Leeuwen, 2008 [1996]), and how they are predicated and characterized in the discourse (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001).
2.7 Summary

The aim of this chapter was to lay out the theoretical framework to be used in analyzing the production of the conflict for power in mediatized political discourse. Focusing on how political discourse could be conceptualized in accordance with the aims of the thesis, the chapter explore the interrelation between power and discourse, foregrounding the strategic functions of political discourse that serve the political actors’ pursuit of legitimacy and power in ways that naturalize ideological biases. The chapter examined how the conflict for power can be constructed and manifested by means of (de)legitimization, exploring the concept of (de)legitimization and its possible patterns. Finally, it distinguished the various topoi of (de)legitimization some of them seem to be characteristic of Iraqi political Discourse. These (de)legitimization topoi could be categorized in two different respects: argumentative orientation and multitude of targets. In terms of the argumentative orientation, the (de)legitimization topoi were either actor-oriented or action-oriented. Actor-oriented (de)legitimization topoi tend to support the long-rooted ideological biases about self and others and, therefore, have a panoramic focus on the sociopolitical conflicts in Iraq. Alternatively, action-oriented (de)legitimization tend to be short-ranged in nature focusing on the specific contexts in which the political actions (de)legitimized took place. In terms of multitude of targets, the (de)legitimization topoi were either individualistic or collective in nature, where individualistic topoi typically target individual politicians, while collective topoi (de)legitimize communities in their entirety.
Chapter Three
Evaluating the Discursive Conflict for Power: rapport management and impoliteness in mediatized political discourse

3. Introduction
This chapter explores the possibility of employing insights from rapport and impoliteness studies to examine how interlocutors affectively perceive and morally evaluate the use of different (de)legitimization topoi in the political discourse produced in the media. In doing so, the chapter ultimately aims to develop an approach that helps pinpoint the interactional, social and moral implications of the conflict for power in the Iraqi mediatized political discourse. Section 3.1 demonstrates how (de)legitimization can function as a multi-layered positioning process that is intimately interrelated to the relational aspects of communication and the indexing of sociopolitical identities in mediatized political discourse. Section 3.2 investigates the concept of rapport and how the affective and attitudinal aspects of communication can be accounted for by means of positioning analysis. Section 3.3 presents the state-of-the-art in (im)politeness studies and explores the interplay between (de)legitimization and (im)politeness in order to highlight how the interlocutors’ discursive practices in political discourse affect and effect the moral and social orders. Finally, in section 4.4 I introduce my conceptualization to account for how the conflict for power in the mediatized political discourse can be affectively perceived and morally evaluated in terms of impoliteness.

3.1 (De)legitimization as a positioning process
Critical discourse analysts assert that the use of language is never politically neutral. (De)legitimating, as the use of language to represent particular political actions or actors in a tendentious way, is an inevitably positioning process (Davies & Harré, 1990), through which the (de)legitimizer aligns him/herself with a particular interpretation of reality. In the multi-participant interactions investigated in this thesis, however, the use of (de)legitimization topoi also positions the interlocutors’ in relation to each other based on the sociopolitical stances they attempt to communicate. The distinction between these two types of positioning is based on the
contrast between two spatiotemporal levels in the interaction; namely the there-and-then moment in which the (de)legitimized actions took place and from which they were recontextualized, and the now-and-here moment in which the interlocutors are interacting with each other.

Davies & Harré (1990: 48) define positioning as a “discursive process whereby selves are located in conversations as observably and subjectively coherent participants in jointly produced story lines” (Davies & Harré, 1990: 48). Bamberg (1997) develops Davies & Harré’s theory proposing a framework to account for positioning as a multi-tiered interactional process. Bamberg’s framework (1997) can account meticulously for the two levels of positioning in (de)legitimization, but more importantly it attends to a third level of positioning that focuses on the interlocutors’ indexing of their sociopolitical identities and elucidates how these identities can be linked to the broader macro-level social order (De Fina, 2013: 40). Bamberg (1997: 337-8) conceives of positioning as a discursive process that takes place at three different levels of analysis.

1. Positioning level 1 is concerned with the ways characters, their actions and evaluations are positioned in relation to each other in the reported event.
2. Positioning level 2 deals with the ways interlocutors position themselves to each other.
3. Positioning level 3 is related to the ways interlocutors “position themselves to themselves”. That is, how they want to be understood beyond the dominant discourses that frame the interaction.

Drawing on Bamberg’s positioning analysis, (de)legitimization can be analyzed at three levels, each of which has different analytical focus. At the first level of positioning, the analysis concentrates on how the (de)legitimized actions and actors are recontextualized from the there-and-then moment of the reported event and (re)characterized in the here-and-now moment of the interaction (see also De Fina and Georgakopoulou, 2012: 163, De Fina 2013:53), with a special emphasis on the lexicogrammatical representations of these actors and actions. At the second level of positioning, the analysis is concerned with the interlocutors’ alignments with each other when (de)legitimating particular worldviews; this means that the analytical foci of this level are the different relational facets of interaction. Finally, at the third level
of positioning, the analysis deals with how the interlocutors act out their sociopolitical identities and how these identities are indexed. In fact, the last level of positioning analysis cannot be perceived as an utterly separate level of analysis; it rather represents a summation of the first two levels, with special focus on the interlocutors’ practices that are indexical of their sociopolitical identities.

Analyzing (de)legitimization as a multi-layered positioning process brings closer the macro analytical techniques that focus on sociopolitical aspects of discourse and the micro analytical techniques that deal with interactional and attitudinal aspects of communication. This is because positioning analysis as Bamberg et al. (2011:182) argue, can account for the connection between “the in situ and in vivo interactive practices and wider cultural sense-making strategies”. Bridging such a methodological gap facilitates the cross fertilization between two disciplines, often perceived as unrelated, viz Political Discourse Analysis and rapport and impoliteness studies. This cross fertilization makes it analytically possible to trace the affective and moral implications of the different (de)legitimization topoi used in the multi-participant, debate-like, political interactions instantiated in the mainstream and social media.

3.2 Rapport management in mediatized political discourse

The relational aspects of communication have long been described as an essential part of any communication process. Brown and Yule (1983) argue that the use of language has a fundamental interactional function. More recently, there has been an unprecedented interest in investigating the relational aspects of communication across various sub-disciplines of linguistics including sociolinguistics, Pragmatics and (im)politeness studies (see Spencer-Oatey, 2011; and Haugh et al., 2013). This interest is motivated by the fact that “human relationships are a primary locus of social organization” (Enfield, 2009: 60). Exploring the relational aspects of communication makes the connection between the interlocutors’ discursive practices at the micro-level of the interaction and their social meaning at the macro-level clearer and more meaningful. This is because these discursive practices display how the interlocutors situate themselves within a network of subject positions (Davies & Harré, 1999: 35). More importantly, the emotive and evaluative dimensions of relations are of special significance in explaining how discourses are shaped by the social and moral orders.
In (im)politeness studies, different terms are used to refer to the relational aspects of interactions, including ‘relational work’ (Locher & Watts, 2005, 2008), ‘relating’ (Arundale, 2010), ‘relational practice’ (Holmes & Marra, 2004; and Holmes & Schnurr, 2005) and ‘rapport management’ (Spencer-Oatey, 2000, 2005). Broadly speaking, these different terms seem to overlap with each other but slightly differ in foregrounding different aspects of relationality (Spencer-Oatey, 2011: 3565-6). Highlighting interlocutors’ discursive efforts in negotiating their relations with others, Locher and Watts (2008:96) define relational work as “all aspects of the work invested by individuals in the construction, maintenance, reproduction and transformation of interpersonal relationships among those engaged in social practice”. Alternatively, Arundale’s ‘relating’ underscores the dynamic and conjoint construction of relations; he (2010: 138) conceives of relating as “the establishing and maintaining connection between two otherwise separate individuals, …. index(ing) phenomena that arise in linguistic and extralinguistic interaction between at least two individuals, the minimum unit of analysis being the dyad, rather than the individual person”. Anchored in the analysis of workplace contexts, ‘relational practice’ is envisaged as a means to lubricate the social wheels through supportive and/or deference oriented discursive practices in order to “advance the primary objectives of the workplace” (Holmes & Schnurr, 2005:125). Foregrounding the affective and evaluative dimensions of relations, Spencer-Oatey and Franklin (2009a: 102) define rapport as “people’s subjective perceptions of (dis)harmony, smoothness-turbulence and warmth-antagonism in interpersonal relations”.

The term ‘rapport’ seems to be more suitable for the purpose of this study, firstly because it helps link the interlocutors’ discursive practices with their perceptions of and attitudes towards the negotiation of power and the construction of social relations that take place in interaction. Secondly, rapport, as argued by Spencer-Oatey (2005:96), is based on three factors; interactional wants, behavioral expectations, and face sensitivities, which makes rapport management theory able to account for both relational work and identity work, i.e. the second and the third levels of positioning analysis respectively. Drawing insights from rapport management theory, it is, then, possible to develop an analytical framework to investigate how the discursive construction of power in political discourse can be attitudinally reacted to and morally or normatively evaluated in interaction. This analytical framework can
ultimately interrogate the social and moral underpinnings of the Iraqi mediatized political discourse.

Spencer-Oatey and Franklin (2009:112) indicate that interactional wants, encompass interlocutors’ goals in the interaction, which can be transactional, relational or both. Behavioral expectations, on the other hand, are developed, Spencer-Oatey (2008: 15) argues, in relation to the interlocutors’ “perceived sociality rights and obligations”; when these are not satisfied, rapport may be affected. Behavioral expectations can be motivated by social norms, conventions, principles and agreements that are associated with the situation in question (Spencer-Oatey and Franklin, 2009:111). Finally, face sensitivity refers to the aspects of self that have significant emotional value to interlocutors (Spencer-Oatey, 2005:104). Spencer-Oatey (2009: 141) views face as an inherently relational entity that is related to the positive attributes of self that an interlocutor claims for her- or himself and expects others to ratify, and the negative attributes of self s/he neither claims nor expects others to ascribe to him/her in particular context. The relationality of face presupposes that both self face and others’ faces are involved and should be attended to in interaction (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 66). Face comprises personal, relational and collective attributes of self that are associated with self-esteem, reputation, prestige, dignity, honor, and competence (Spencer-Oatey, 2008: 14; Culpeper, 2011: 24).

Spencer-Oatey’s (2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b) rapport management theory brings the concepts of face and identity closer than ever before. In fact, the relation between face and identity is originally alluded to in Goffman’s (1967:5) definition of face, which he defines as “the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself [sic] by the lines others assume he [sic] has taken during a particular contact”. In the same vein, Brown and Levinson (1987: 61) defines face as an “emotionally invested” public self image interlocutors claim for themselves in interaction; this public image “can be lost, maintained, or enhanced and must be constantly attended to in interaction”. More recently, face and identity have been increasingly viewed as intimately associated concepts by several scholars (Locher, 2008; Ruhi, 2009, 2010; Culpeper, 2011; Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2013; Joseph 2013). Locher (2008: 533) envisages relational work as an inclusive term that comprises rapport management, identity work and facework, arguing that relational work refers to the process of negotiating relations, whose product is face or identity. Culpeper (2011:25), on the
other hand, underscores the connectedness between face and identity asserting that face includes “all that the self identifies with”. He (ibid: 26) conceptualizes “the self as a schema consisting of layers of components varying in emotional importance with the most highly charged closest to the centre, and this is thus where potentially the most face-sensitive components lie”.

However, other scholars (including Arundale, 2009, 2010, Haugh 2009, 2012, O’Driscoll, 2012) argue against conceptualizing face in terms of self concept or identity. Rejecting Goffman’s original conceptualization of face, Arundale (2010) envisages face as an essentially social phenomenon while “identity is a phenomenon conceptualized in terms of an individual system” (ibid: 2091). Along the same lines, O’Driscoll (2011:21) conceives of face as a necessarily interactional phenomenon, while identity is not because it is, he adds, the more enduring image one holds about him/herself. Haugh (2012: 58) contends that conceptualizing face in terms of a “socially attributed aspect of self” conflates the concept of face with that of identity. This, consequently, results in, he (ibid) argues, “relationships themselves being neglected as an object of study in their own right in the analysis of interpersonal interactions”.

As convincingly argued by Garces-Conejos Blitvich (2013:5), characterizing face as being utterly different from identity contradicts the social constructivism which underlies most current approaches to identity. The main problem with the views that do not think of face and identity as intimately interrelated, Garces-Conejos Blitvich (ibid) argues, is that they still conceive of identity as predetermined construct, as originally theorized by essentialist approaches to identity, but identity is now commonly viewed by most identity scholars as a social phenomenon constructed interactionally (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006: 4). Furthermore, identity, as often argued by identity theorists, is not individualistic but rather socially negotiated and jointly constructed (Simon, 2004: 25), and as such is the responsibility of the interpreter as much as the responsibility of the constructor (Joseph, 2004:81), because it requires to be verified by others in situ (Burke & Stets, 2009: 68). Consequently, this makes the study of identity construction in discourse indispensable when investigating the attitudinal and moral aspect of relating, more specifically when dealing with face and (im)politeness.
However, identity itself is a contested concept; it is conceptualized differently by different scholars. Some theorists think of identity as a fundamentally social phenomenon (cf. Stryker’s Identity Theory, 1987; Labov, 1972), whereas others contend that it is best conceived of as a cognitive entity (cf. Markus’s social cognition perspective, 1977; Tajfel and Turner’s Social Identity Theory, 1986; and Turner et al.’s Self-Categorization Theory, 1987). Alluding to this controversy, Simon (2004) argues that the social and the cognitive aspects of identity are two sides of the same coin. He asserts that the discussion over how to conceptualize identity is “in fact only possible, on the basis of a shared appreciation of identity as a crucial social-cognitive mediator that enables people to comprehend and act in their social worlds as self-conscious and motivated agents” (ibid: 42). Identity theorists have also contested the bases out of which identity can be constructed, relating identity to role, group or unique attributes of self. Bruke & Stets (2009:113) state that the concept of role is taken to be the fundamental basis of identity in sociologically informed identity theories, because it is envisaged as the main regulatory unit in any interaction. In cognitively informed identity theories, nevertheless, the group membership is perceived as the defining aspect of identity, because it revolves around the ways interlocutors perceive themselves as members in particular social groups (ibid: 118). From a cognitive point of view, a further distinction can be made between an interlocutor’s perception of his/herself as social agent belonging to a particular social group and as unique member in it. This distinction is instantiated by the difference between collective identity and personal identity. Personal identity is then defined in terms of how unique an individual is and how distinct s/he is from others (Simon, 2004: 37; Bruke & Stets, 2009: 124).

It is not sufficient to emphasize the close relation between face and identity; it is even more important to elucidate the intricacies of this relation in a way that highlights the analytical difference and theoretical significance of each of these concepts when dealing with rapport in mediatized political discourse. Miller (2013:76) argues that “the processes by which face is managed and through which identities are constructed happen concurrently and are co-constitutive”, which makes the separation between face work and identity work difficult (Joseph, 2013: 51). Face and identity seem to differ in two respects. First, identity can be a private phenomenon, as a person can reflect about self and who s/he really is. In contrast, face
is always a public phenomenon relevant only in interaction. Secondly, unlike identity, face is always characterized by emotional attachment; it comprises the aspects of self that have emotional significance to interlocutors. Goffman (1967:6) asserts that “a person tends to experience an immediate emotional response to the face which a contact with others allows him; he cathects his face; his [sic] "feelings" become attached to it”. Similarly, Spencer-Oatey (2007: 644) argues that from a cognitive point of view, face and identity are both related to the multiple attributes of self, but face is exclusively related to the attributes that are “affectively sensitive to the claimant”.

Drawing on insights from social and cognitive perspectives in identity theory, Spencer-Oatey (2008:14) argues that face can be associated with personal identity, relational identity and collective identity. By the same token, Garces-Conejos Blitvich (2013) explores how face and identity may be interrelated and how face can be related to the multiple identities interlocutors may have in interaction. She argues (2013: 17) that “each of the multiplicity of agent/identity that coverage in an individual will have specific authenticity/self-worth/self-efficacy attributes associated with them, i.e., faces”. Interestingly, Spencer-Oatey and Garces-Conejos Blitvich’s conceptualizations of face are compatible with the emic understanding of face within Iraqi culture, which emphasizes the positive image associated with the presentation of self. For instance, using the expressions *May Allah whiten your face* to praise someone or *May Allah blacken your face* to condemn him/her underscores the association between face on the one hand, and pride, honor and good reputation on the other (cf. Ruhi and Işık-Guler, 2007). Face can then be defined as the sentimentally sensitive aspects of self that are related to an interlocutor’s honor, reputation, dignity and self worth (Spencer-Oatey, 2008: 14; Culpeper, 2011: 24; Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2013: 17). These aspects of self can be associated with an interlocutor’s personal, interactional or collective identities in interaction.

In this sense, face simultaneously functions as a regulative and constitutive force in interaction. Face regulates how the interlocutors desire to be positioned

---

5 I prefer to use the term *interactional* face rather than *relational* face because all types of face can have relational effect, and can, as such, affect how rapport is perceived. It seems more plausible to think of it as an interactional aspect associated with role relations in a given genre.
within networks of relations in a given interaction in a way that best serves interactional goals. Alluding to the regulative force of face in interaction, Goffman (1967:12) points out that the “maintenance of face is a condition of interaction, not its objective. To study face-saving is to study the traffic rules of social interaction”. In effect, interactional face, the sum of rights and obligations an interlocutor is entitled to by virtue of the role s/he enacts in a given genre, regulates his/her potential interactional moves. Moreover, face is also constitutive of rapport in interaction as it underlies interlocutors’ choices to manage a multiplicity of identities (De Fina et al., 2006: 9) and therefore how interlocutors perceive their relation with each other in terms of “(dis)harmony, smoothness-turbulence and warmth-antagonism” (Spencer-Oatey, 2009a:102).

Since face is associated with an identity projected, which is the agent’s possession rather than the individual’s (Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2013: 10, 17), rapport, therefore, is a flexible interactional construct that may change momentarily in the interaction. In practice, interlocutors constantly re-evaluate their relations with each other as the interaction unfolds according to the emerging interactional needs. Attending to this fact, Spencer-Oatey (2008: 32) identifies four different rapport orientations that underlie interlocutors’ perception of rapport, which are shown in Table 3.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Rapport Orientation</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rapport-Enhancement</td>
<td>Interlocutors positioning themselves in relation to others in a way that enhances harmony in the interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Rapport-Maintenance</td>
<td>Interlocutors positioning themselves in relation to others in a way that maintains harmony in the interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rapport-Neglect</td>
<td>Interlocutors positioning themselves in relation to others in a way that is indifferent to harmony in the interaction (the interlocutor’s attention is focused on tasks, or s/he is more concerned about their own self-image)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Rapport-Challenge</td>
<td>Interlocutors positioning themselves in relation to others in a way that impairs harmony in the interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1 Rapport orientations adopted from Spencer-Oatey 2008
However, investigating rapport in multi-participant and mediatized genres, like the ones in which political discourse is produced, necessitates a sophisticated analytical toolkit to allow for investigating the possibility of multiple rapport orientations triggered by a single discursive practice. Discursive practices may be perceived differently by different interlocutors. In intergroup interactions, for instance, a particular discursive practice can be interpreted as rapport enhancing by in-group members and as rapport challenge by out-group members. Broadly speaking, a rapport enhancing practice tends to be perceived positively and therefore polite. Conversely, a rapport challenging practice tends to be perceived negatively and therefore impolite. It seems that Fetzer’s (2007: 1343) distinction between the first-frame and second-frame participation is very useful when theorizing how rapport sensitive practices are evaluated in terms of (im)politeness in multi-participant and mediatized genres. The concept of first-frame participation refers to the interaction between the participants actively involved in the interaction, whereas the concept of second-frame participation refers to the passive role of the observing audience. Therefore, it is essential to take into consideration all the potential recipients at all participation footings in the given genre (Haugh, 2013) when investigating how rapport is perceived and how it may trigger evaluations of (im)politeness in mediatized political discourse.

### 3.3 Impoliteness as an affective reaction and a moral evaluation

Linguistic (im)politeness has been investigated in many different settings, including workplace contexts, intercultural encounters, interpersonal interactions and many others. The literature on these settings is rather abundant, encompassing dozens of journal articles, several special editions and edited volumes. Nevertheless, there is scant literature on the study of (im)politeness in political discourse; this noticeably includes Harris (2001) and Fracchiolla (2011). Other than relative lack of research conducted on (im)politeness in political discourse, there are several reasons that make the study of (im)politeness in mediatized political discourses a worthwhile endeavor. First of all, impoliteness analysis can account for how the conflict for power and legitimacy is received and evaluated in political interactions in order to cope with the shortcoming in Political Discourse Analysis that it often focuses on the production,
rather than the reception, of political texts. Furthermore, the study of (im)politeness unpacks the normative and moral underpinnings of the political discourses under investigation by examining how the interlocutors evaluate each other’s political and discursive practices in terms of (im)politeness. In practice, when interlocutors evaluate particular discursive or political practices as polite, impolite, rude and so on, they implicitly indicate that “their evaluations are not idiosyncratic”, but are rather based on normative and moral sets of values (Fukushima & Haugh, 2014: 165-166).

Traditionally, politeness is characterized as a set of rules followed to ensure good communication (Lakoff, 1973), a set of strategies for acting in a socially acceptable way (Brown and Levinson, 1987), or a regulative principle that maintains social equilibrium (Leech, 1983). More recently, and especially after Eelen’s (2001:35) revolutionizing call to attend to the “evaluative moment” in real interactions when analyzing politeness and impoliteness, a notable shift has taken place. Scholars started to concentrate on how discursive practice may be evaluated in terms of (im)politeness; so (im)politeness was conceptualized as an evaluation (Watts, 2003: 8), a perlocutionary effect (Terkourafi, 2008:56) or valenced attitudinal response towards a specific behavior (Culpeper, 2011: 23). This shift triggered a major change in (im)politeness scholarship, especially in discursive approaches to (im)politeness, which is characterized by prioritizing the participants’ understandings of what may constitute (im)polite behavior, i.e. politeness1, rather than the technical conceptualization of the term within a proposed theoretical framework, i.e. politeness2 (Eelen, 2001:30 ff.). In fact, the study of (im)politeness has evolved out of the study of indirectness in pragmatics to develop a wide range focus that includes rapport, identity, and affective and relational aspects of communication.

This thesis takes an epistemologically pragmatic approach to (im)politeness, in which (im)politeness is conceptualized as a means to an end not as an end in itself, concentrating on the interlocutors’ own understandings of what may constitute an (im)polite discursive practice and the basis on which such a practice is morally and normatively evaluated (Kádár and Haugh, 2013:181-205; Fukushima & Haugh, 2014: 166). This conjures up the heated debate about the distinction between politeness1 and politeness2. Building on the original distinction drawn by Watts et al. (1992) between first-order politeness and second-order politeness, Eelen (2001: 35) defines politeness1 in terms of “action-centredness”, which is fundamentally based on the
participants’ understanding and evaluation in interaction. On the other hand, politeness2 represents “the scientific conceptualization of the social phenomenon of politeness in the form of a theory of politeness1” (ibid: 43). In her study of (im)politeness across time, Terkourafi (2011:161) finds that (im)politeness1 and (im)politeness2 had come from different conceptual origins and that each serves different social and epistemological purposes. However, Haugh (2012:122) refuses to equate the relation between (im)politeness1, and (im)politeness2 with that between emic and etic perspectives. He (ibid: 122-128) identifies several epistemological and ontological limitations in this equation arguing that it is rather too simplistic. Attending to all participation footings, he (ibid: 126) asserts that side participants, bystanders and the like “constitute another important first-order locus of analysis”. Kádár & Haugh (2013: 84) refer to this category of interlocutors as “metaparticipants”.

(Im)politeness1 perspective can be made use of to explore the theoretical reach and empirical pertinence of employing interlocutors’ evaluations of each other’s discursive practices in terms of (im)politeness in analyzing the reception of the discursive conflict for power in political discourse. In the context of this thesis, the evaluations of (im)politeness are thought of as social and moral indicators to measure the extent to which the use of particular (de)legitimization topoi is deemed permissible, sanctioned, or tolerable. Since my data represent mediatized political interactions available to audiences, my own (emic) awareness of the rapport sensitive and (im)politeness relevant instances can inform the (im)politeness1 perspective employed in the thesis. This is because I represent a metaparticipant, to use Kádár & Haugh’s (ibid) term, in these political interactions. More importantly, my emic knowledge of some of the culture specific convention and the conventionalized uses associated with the genres under investigation can also be of great use to this (im)politeness1 approach (see Long, 2016; Culpeper, 2016).

Evaluating a particular behavior as polite, impolite or otherwise is not done in a vacuum, but it is rather evaluated against a normative frame of reference (Kádár and Haugh, 2013:64), which sets the socially expected, allowable, prescribed and proscribed practices in a given context. In the same vein, Culpeper (2008: 30) introduces the idea of personal, cultural, situational and co-textual norms that frame interaction. Kádár and Haugh (2013: 94-95), on the other hand, argue that the
normative frame of reference encompasses three layers of norms: firstly the localized expectancies that involve spatiotemporal and interactional norms; secondly the conventionalized or semi-institutionalized norms that are related to community of practice or other group-based conventions; and thirdly the sociocultural norms related to societal conventions. These norms shape the moral order that underlies all evaluations of (im)politeness.

In this respect, the normative frame of reference and morality are strongly linked (Kádár and Marquez-Reitfer, 2015: 244). Culpeper (2011: 37) argues that the link between the normative frame of reference and morality is established by the obligations associated with the social norms, whose violations may be deemed immoral and as such impolite, because, as argued by Anderson (2000: 170), a social norm is “a standard of behavior shared by a social group” and perceived as “impersonally authoritative rules that everyone ought to obey” (ibid: 183). However, at a more individual level, morality can also be linked to a person’s behavioral dispositions that are reinforced by ideologies (Culpeper, 2011: 76). In everyday life, particular actions, behaviors or practices are often morally evaluated as right or wrong, good or bad, completely based on ideological biases not on social norms. Van Dijk (1998:8) argues that ideology influences our conception of morality by enabling us to establish a multitude of social beliefs about what is good or bad, right or wrong about particular action. Therefore the normative frame of reference can be thought of as a complex, culturally inculcated and socially reinforced, behavioral expectations with normative values guiding our practices.

In the different (im)politeness approaches, the normative frame of reference is grounded in different theoretical models developed in different disciplines, e.g. anthropology, i.e. culture, (Brown and Levinson, 1978), human cognition, i.e. frames (Terkourafi, 2008), sociology, i.e. Habitus, and community of practice, (Mills, 2003, 2011), or linguistics, i.e. genre, (Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2013). Eelen (2001: 196) strongly criticizes the traditional theories of politeness (e.g. Lakoff, 1973; Brown and Levinson, 1978[1987]; Leech 1983) for anchoring their analysis in theoretically vague concepts like culture to account for variability and sharedness in politeness. He (ibid: 221) conceptualizes (im)politeness as an evaluation of a social practice that can be more plausibly grounded in Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. Yet, Garces-Conejos Blitvich (2013: 21) rebuts the reliance of the discursive approaches to (im)politeness
on the concept of habitus emphasizing that it is too abstract to account for linguistic analysis. In an attempt to make her approach to (im)politeness more linguistically grounded, she (ibid: 24) links it to genre arguing that “[it] is at the socially shared level of genre practices, then, where we find the bundles of norms that guide our assessments of im/politeness”.

Anchoring the normative frame of reference in the concept of genre seems to be a fruitful theoretical move because, as argued by Cap and Akulska (2013: 4), “genres activate certain situational contexts and are realized in these contexts”; these social contexts give rise to a set of role relations that defines interlocutors’ rights and obligations and the behavioral expectations to which they give rise. Additionally, genre does not only subsume the interlocutors’ social rights and obligations in genre, but also their interactional wants, which represent important factors that affect rapport (Spencer-Oatey, 2005:96). This is because genre is broadly perceived to involve goal-oriented social practices (Gruber, 2013: 38). Therefore, genre, as “a way of acting and relating” (Fairclough, 2003: 29) predominantly defines the normative frame of reference in any interaction by virtue of the role relations and interactional wants permissible in that genre, against which discursive behaviors can be evaluated as polite, non-polite, impolite and otherwise.

It is also essential to take into account the variability, argumentativity and recursivity of the evaluations of impoliteness. The evaluations of (im)politeness can vary across individuals, or “even within the same individual over time” (Haugh, 2013: 56). This is mainly related to these individuals’ different conceptions about the normative frame of reference; norms and conventions are not necessarily shared but rather assumed to be shared (Bicchieri, 2006:2; Terkourafi, 2011:162). Bicchieri (2006:2) points out that interlocutors’ discursive practices “further confirm the existence of the norm in the eyes of its followers”. Drawing on insights from discursive psychology, Haugh (2013: 56) argues that variability in evaluating (im)politeness “is to be expected and should be theorized as such”. This variability makes the evaluation of (im)politeness debatable and open to negotiation in interaction. Evaluations of (im)politeness are also recursive; that is, they are not only communicated in social practices but rather represent social practices in and by themselves (Haugh, 2013: 54). This means that a particular evaluation of (im)politeness can itself trigger another evaluation, because “evaluating someone as
impolite can occasion a complaint or negative assessment” (ibid: 59). In this sense, variability, argumentativeness and recursivity may be attributed to the different assumptions held by the interlocutors about the sharedness of a normative frame of reference in which the evaluations of (im)politeness are grounded.

In theory, an evaluation of (im)politeness can give rise to subsequent evaluations of (im)politeness in a recursive pattern. In this respect, Eelen’s (2001) distinction between expressive (im)politeness and classificatory (im)politeness seems very relevant here. Expressive (im)politeness refers to a negatively or positively valenced attitude encoded in a discursive practice, whereas classificatory (im)politeness is the normative judgment of this negatively or positively valenced attitude (Eelen, 2001: 35). Expressive impoliteness can be “first-positioned (i.e. initiating)” or “next-positioned (i.e. responsive)” (Haugh, 2015: 224). When first-positioned, expressive impoliteness involves an offensive practice, but when next-positioned it registers an offense via an affective stance (ibid: 280). On the other hand, classificatory impoliteness is always next-positioned, encompassing a moral stance made by invoking the moral order (ibid). Yet, in my data, indeed in all multi-party interactions, some discursive practices can involve both expressive and classificatory impoliteness. This takes place when an interlocutor communicates his/her evaluation of a particular discursive practice as impolite in an impolite manner (see example 22 in 7.4 below). In practice, the rapport sensitive instances that involve classificatory (im)politeness can be identified based on the interlocutors’ metapragmatic comments (Culpeper, 2011: 74) and other contextualization cues available (Gumperz, 1982: 131), which may include a word, a phrase, a paralinguistic feature or interactional practices. On the other hand, the rapport sensitive instances that involve expressive impoliteness can be analytically identified by making use of my own emic awareness of the norms conventionally associated with the settings under investigation to make specific genre-sanctioned and culture- specific interpretations of impoliteness (see Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2013: 24; Long, 2016: 22).

Since I investigate mediatized political interactions, which typically include conflictive and antagonistic interactions, the analysis will be more attentive to impoliteness. Garces-Conejos Blitvich (2010:545) argues that impoliteness should not be envisaged “just as disruptive, but as constitutive of communal life”. Indeed, the evaluations of impoliteness can play a privileged role in unpacking the interactional,
social and moral underpinnings of the interactions in which they are made. In this thesis, Culpeper’s (2011) definition of impoliteness will be adopted, because it takes into consideration three important aspects. Firstly, it highlights the connection between impoliteness and the social and the moral orders in which the interactions in question are anchored. Secondly, it is characteristically attentive to the role of emotions in evaluations of impoliteness. This seems to be very relevant in antagonistic interactions, especially because impoliteness is often perceived to be more intimately associated with true emotion (Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2010: 69). Thirdly, and maybe more importantly, Culpeper’s (2011) definition links impoliteness with causing offense, which lies at the heart of the Arabic understanding of impoliteness. Culpeper (ibid: 23) defines impoliteness as:

a negative attitude towards specific behaviours occurring in specific contexts. It is sustained by expectations, desires and/or beliefs about social organisation, including, in particular, how one person’s or a group’s identities are mediated by others in interaction. Situated behaviours are viewed negatively - considered ‘impolite’ – when they conflict with how one expects them to be, how one wants them to be and/or how one thinks they ought to be. Such behaviours always have or are presumed to have emotional consequences for at least one participant, that is, they cause or are presumed to cause offence. Various factors can exacerbate how offensive an impolite behaviour is taken to be, including for example whether one understands a behaviour to be strongly intentional or not.

It is important to mention upfront that in the context of this thesis, impoliteness is perceived in its broadest sense to refer to the process of “inferring interpersonal meanings in context” (Culpeper et al., 2014: 67). Thus, the conceptual distinction between impoliteness and rudeness made by some scholars (Terkourafi, 2008; Culpeper, 2005) is overlooked in the analysis. Firstly because this distinction is not lexically maintained in some languages (Terkourafi, 2008: 61), which makes it difficult to follow in the actual analysis, at least in certain languages. In fact, there is no Arabic equivalence to the English impoliteness itself; the expression lack of
politeness is often used to refer to impoliteness in Arabic; secondly, the distinction is actually based on the notion of the speaker’s intention, which is admittedly impervious to analytical investigation, and as such runs the risk of indulging in purely cognitive analysis that is difficult to capture linguistically. Thirdly, as indicated by Culpeper in a later work (2008: 32), the distinction between impoliteness and rudeness is made “in the spirit of defining impoliteness2”, and as such has little relevance to the impoliteness1 perspective used in this thesis.

Evaluations of impoliteness can be instantiated by different triggers. Breaching of social entitlements and violating of behavioral expectations can give rise to negative evaluations and, as such, impoliteness may ensue (Spencer-Oatey, 2008; Culpeper, 2011). Impoliteness may arise in such cases because interlocutors are held accountable for their discursive practices that are evaluated negatively by others; this accountability is “underpinned, in part, by the presumed agency” of the interlocutors (Mitchell & Haugh, 2015: 207). However, particular discursive practices can still be assessed as impolite even though they do not violate the normative frame of reference. Spencer-Oatey (2005: 108) shows how particular practices can still be face-threatening without violating any expectations or breaching appropriateness. This is because, in theory, interlocutors’ faces are expected to be maintained; unintended or implicit face attacks often give rise to negative emotions that are traditionally linked to impoliteness. Moreover, an evaluation of impoliteness can also arise when a self claimed identity is disauthenticated in an attempt to exclude an interlocutor from a social group because such a behavior orients rapport towards challenge and impairs harmonious communication (Garces-Conejos Blitvich et al., 2013).

In conflictive interactions, disauthenticating interlocutors’ projected identities or attacking the faces associated with these identities seems to be in line with the behavioral expectations associated with the context, which may make such practices more tolerable and a bit less impolite (Culpeper, 2011: 206). Yet, in my data the discursive practices that are perceived by the interlocutors as involving disauthentication of their projected identities or potential damage to their faces, especially their collective aspects of self, are evaluated negatively and envisaged as extremely offensive (see 6.4 and 7.4 below). This is firstly because in these public interactions these aspects of self become more emotionally sensitive and publicly
exposed (Culpeper, 2011: 219), and secondly the extent to which these interactions are polarized reinforces intolerance.

Therefore, drawing on Spencer-Oatey (2005: 108) and Garces-Conejos Blitvich (2013: 18), evaluations of impoliteness can be argued to emerge if:

- the normative frame of reference is violated,
- the self projected identity is not verified or disauthenticated , and
- the self-worth and self-efficacy attributes, i.e., face, associated with the self-projected identity are attacked

The difference between identity/face related impoliteness and that related to the violation of the normative frame of reference can be explicited clearly in multi-participant and multi-layered interactions like the ones investigated in this thesis. The discursive practices that raise social entitlement violation issues can be evaluated as impolite by all participants, ratified and non-ratified (Goffman, 1981). On the other hand, the discursive practices that raise identity/face related issues can only be evaluated as impolite or offensive by the addressees to whom these discursive practices are intended. This is because these practices attack the addressees’ faces exclusively and, as a result, make them more vulnerable in interaction. The first type of impoliteness, the negative evaluations associated with violation of the normative frame of reference, can be captured at the second level of positioning analysis, as it deals with the interactional roles that define the interlocutors’ rights and obligations.

Nevertheless, the second type of impoliteness, i.e. the negative evaluations associated with identity/face attacks, can be captured at the third level of positioning analysis, because it concentrates on the discursive construction of identities, and by extension the faces associated with these identities (Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2013).

Interestingly, as shown in (2.6) above, one of the delegitimization topoi is operationalized by invoking the moral order to evaluate negatively particular political actions. Evaluating political actions negatively based on moral grounds may amount to evaluations of impoliteness. This can be attributed to two reasons: firstly these evaluations are made in response to actions that triggered negative attitudes (Culpeper, 2011:23), secondly impoliteness cannot be dissociated from the process of evaluative characterizations of actors and actions (Georgakopoulou, 2013:68), which seems the essence of this type of delegitimization. However, these evaluations differ from typical evaluations of impoliteness in two respects. First, they are employed
argumentatively as part of the interlocutors’ efforts to delegitimize the political actions performed by unfavorable political actors, whom the interlocutors typically perceived as out-group members. Second, the actions evaluated in terms of impoliteness do not take place within the same spatiotemporal level of the interaction in which the evaluations are made. The actions evaluated take place in the there-and-then moment of the reported events, but they are recontextualized in the here-and-now moment of the interaction. This means that actions are exogenous to the interaction in which they are evaluated negatively and, thus, considered impolite. Therefore, the term exogenous evaluations of impoliteness will be used to refer to delegitimization cases that are based on moral evaluations to differentiate them from typical evaluations of impoliteness which will be termed endogenous. Analytically, exogenous impoliteness assessments can be identified at positioning level 1, which focuses on the political actions that are recontextualized in the interaction and how they are morally evaluated and consequently delegitimized.

3.4 Interplay between (de)legitimization and impoliteness in mediatized political discourse
To sum up, this thesis traces how the conflict for power is produced, perceived and evaluated in debate-like multi-participant political interactions. To do so, the analysis needs to focus on both the discursive production of power and the (de)legitimization of particular interpretations of reality and their social meaning at the macro-level, and the interactional, attitudinal and moral implications of these practices at the micro-level. I argue that Bamberg’s (1997) multi-tiered positioning analysis can account for these different analytical levels and how they may be interrelated in interaction. Bamberg’s positioning analysis highlights how the use of (de)legitimization indexes sociopolitical stances, and simultaneously positions the interlocutors in relation to each other as well as to themselves.

This multi-tiered analysis can also account for how the various sets of impoliteness assessments may be triggered and functionally employed in political interactions taking into consideration the different spatiotemporal levels of the participation framework. In this sense, it explains how the evaluations of impoliteness in the interactions under scrutiny may have a delegitimizing function and, thus, may be employed argumentatively. This takes place when delegitimization is put into
action by morally evaluating the political action intended to be delegitimized. On the other hand, this multi-tiered analysis shows how (de)legitimization can trigger evaluations of impoliteness when interlocutors evaluate particular interactional practices that have delegitimizing functions as violating the genre-based interactional norms, failing to verify or rejecting the sociopolitical identities they claim, or else damaging the aspects of face associated with these identities. Unpacking the interrelation between (de)legitimization and impoliteness elucidates how the conflict for power in mediatized political interactions can be attitudinally confronted, and normatively and morally evaluated in interaction. This also highlights the intertextuality and multifunctionality of impoliteness in ethno-sectarian and political discourses. Figure 3.1 illustrates how each level of positioning analysis can capture a different type of evaluation of impoliteness.

![Figure 3.1 Positioning analysis and evaluations of impoliteness in political interactions](image-url)
Chapter Four
Methodology and Data

4. Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to explain the methodological basis of the analysis and to outline the data collection as well as the data preparatory processes, which include obtaining ethical approvals, anonymization, transcription, and translation. Section 4.1 outlines the methodological decisions made in the research design for this project and explains their theoretical bases. Section 4.2 sets out the data collection process, clarifying its selection criteria and its categories. The ethical issues and the anonymization process are detailed in section 4.3. The last section in the chapter, i.e. 4.4, is dedicated to the discussion of the translation method and presentation of the transcription conventions.

4.1 Methodology

This section sets out the methods and approaches applied in this thesis and their theoretical underpinnings. It also tackles the coding decisions made to quantify the textual data.

4.1.1 Mixed method analysis

In the field of linguistics, the relation between the quantitative and qualitative research paradigms is not always one of contrasting poles but rather of continuum (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Using a mixed methods design that integrates qualitative and quantitative analyses has been increasingly described as a beneficial strategy to answer a wide range of research questions (Angouri, 2010: 30; Page et al.; 2014: 53; Ivankova and Greer, 2015: 65). More specifically, Teddlie & Tashakkori (2009: 7) present mixed methods research as an alternative pragmatist paradigm that employs both textual and numerical analyses based on the researcher’s needs. According to Tashakkori & Creswell (2007: 4), a mixed methods paradigm combines or integrates qualitative and quantitative elements in several ways, but the most relevant to this thesis include the use of

- two types of research questions (with qualitative and quantitative approaches), and
two types of data analysis (statistical and thematic).

The analysis in this thesis has a predominantly qualitative element that deals with how conflict for power and legitimacy is produced, perceived and evaluated in mediatized political discourses. As indicated by Herring (2004: 369), “complex, interacting, ambiguous or scalar phenomena” can be more comprehensively analyzed and described by qualitative and interpretative approaches than quantitative approaches. Yet, using quantitative analysis is also important to analyze how various phenomena and discursive patterns are used differently in the different generic contexts. Sandelowski et al. (2009: 210) assert that quantifying patterns in qualitative analysis “allow[s] analysts to discern and to show regularities or peculiarities in qualitative data they might not otherwise see or be able simply to communicate, or to determine that a pattern or idiosyncrasy they thought was there is not”. To that effect, the outcomes of the qualitative analysis were codified and analyzed quantitatively in order to provide comparative insights about the linguistic description of texts produced in contrasting genres and thematic contexts. Therefore, using mixed methods was not only beneficial but rather imperative in the present thesis, because research design of the thesis was substantially based on both qualitative and quantitative research questions.

The use of mixed methods, in which the outcomes of qualitative analysis are codified and analyzed quantitatively, was also inspired by other similar studies in the different fields with which my thesis deals, i.e. Political Discourse Analysis, communication of emotions and attitudes, and Linguistic Impoliteness. Bull (2003:18-19) highlighted the importance of using coding systems to analyze textual data quantitatively in political communication. Boyd (2014) employed both quantitative and qualitative analysis to identify and analyze patterns of participatory positions in YouTube comments on US political speeches. Langlotz and Locher (2012) analyzed the ways in which emotional stances could be communicated in online disagreements by firstly identifying the linguistic and graphic patterns that indexed emotional display and then coding their corpus based on these linguistic and graphic patterns to analyze their corpus quantitatively. As for impoliteness studies, Garces-Conejos Blitvich (2010) quantified certain realizations of impoliteness to explore the interrelation between impoliteness and polarization in political discussions on
Youtube. In a similar fashion, Kleinke and Bös (2015) also used mixed methods to investigate how rudeness is functionally used in intergroup discussions in online fora. Exploring cross-cultural variation, Culpeper (2011, section 1.5) and Culpeper et al. (2014) employed mixed methods in their analysis of impoliteness in different cultural contexts in order to provide insights as to how impoliteness could be triggered and evaluated in different cultures.

Notwithstanding, coding the outcomes of qualitative analysis in order to analyze them quantitatively may sometimes be criticized for being unjustifiably subjective. However, subjectivity in mixed methods research can be mitigated by making adequate and transparent analytical decisions. In this thesis, three analytical decisions were made to minimize subjectivity and avoid biased interpretation of the data. First, the coding decisions were based on the interlocutors’ perspectives, that is, the coding was in line with an emic perspective, in order to avoid as far as possible the potential imposition of the analyst’s perspective. The interlocutors’ perspective could be ascertained via the explicit metapragmatic comments (Culpeper, 2011: 74) and contextualization cues (Gumperz, 1982: 131) in the data, which might include a word, a phrase, paralinguistic feature or interactional behavior. As noted by Fielding (2009: 131), the quantification of textual patterns could be done based on categories or codes that emerge in the data. Second, the data were triangulated in terms of the political topics discussed and the genres from which they were extracted (see 4.2.2), to ensure that the results can be transferable to similar contexts (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009: 26). Data triangulation aims to converge and corroborate different datasets in order to ensure validity and increase the credibility of the analysis (Fielding, 2009:131; Angouri, 2010: 34). Third, the interpretation of the findings emphasized clear points of contrast as indicated through polarized quantitative results. Inevitably, this means that nuanced differences in particular instances were neglected in order to reduce likelihood of drawing unsubstantiated conclusions.

4.1.2 Interdisciplinarity
This thesis aims to answer a broad question related to how the conflict for power is produced, received and evaluated in the political discourses in some mainstream and social media in order to shed light on the ways ethno-sectarian divisions in Iraq form and are formed by the political discourses produced in mainstream and social media.
However, this question is too broad to be dealt with from a single academic perspective, and as such requires an interdisciplinary analytical approach that is specifically tailored to answer it. As Klein (1990:196) convincingly argues, interdisciplinarity “is a means of solving problems and answering questions that cannot be satisfactorily addressed using single methods or approaches”. The mixed methods in this thesis are thus developed from an eclectic interdisciplinary analytical approach, which also opens up the thesis’ relevance to a wider spectrum of audience and provides critical perspective to the research (see Page et al., 2014: 49).

The present thesis draws on Political Discourse Analysis to analyze how the conflict for legitimacy and power is produced and discursively realized in Iraqi political Discourse. However, the majority of the political discourse analytical techniques focuses predominantly on the contexts of discourse production and pays very little attention to the reception of texts (cf. Fairclough, 2003: 12, Breeze, 2011:520). To attend to the reception of text, I employ the study of rapport and that of impoliteness to account for how the conflict for domination and power is perceived and evaluated, as these frameworks attend to the contexts of reception as they are made evident in the different interactional contexts. However, there is an analytical gap between macro discourse analytical approaches, e.g. the CDS-informed Political Discourse Analysis, and micro analytical approaches, e.g. discursive analyses of rapport management and (im)politeness. Methodologically, positioning analysis can bridge this micro-macro gap by appealing to the multi-tiered positioning theory, originally developed in narrative analysis (Bamberg, 1997), by investigating the relational and interactional aspects of communicative encounters at the meso-level.

4.2 Data
Data analyzed in any research raises numerous questions concerning the collection process, selection criteria, data categories and sample size. The purpose of this section is to address these questions.

4.2.1 Data Selection
The data collected in this thesis include nine contrasting political interactions discussing three different political topics in three different generic contexts representing mainstream and social media, in order to observe data triangulation.
Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007: 106) point out that the sampling scheme is one of the crucial factors “in situations where the purpose of the qualitative study is to generalize the findings”. Therefore, the data selection was based on a purposively predefined set of criteria in order to ensure that the data were representative of the types of media under scrutiny, namely mainstream and social media, and that the political discourses in these types of media were thematically comparable, i.e. the data collected from the different types of genres tackled the same political topics. Teddlie & Yu (2007: 80) maintain that purposive sampling can have two goals:

● to find instances that are representative or typical of a particular type of case on a dimension of interest, and
● to achieve comparability across different types of cases on a dimension of interest.

Therefore the general data selection criteria were:

1. The datasets that represented both mainstream media and social media had to be interactional, so that interlocutors’ uptakes of each other’s discursive behaviors could be observed in order to be able to analyze how the conflict for power in political discourse is perceived and evaluated (cf. Terkourafi, 2015: 95).

2. All the datasets had to include interactions that dealt with strictly political issues related to the political regime and process in Iraq rather than other general issues.

3. Data triangulation had to be taken into consideration; each of the datasets should include interactions that took place in three different thematic contexts, i.e. political topics.

4. All the datasets had to take place within the time span decided, i.e. from June 2013 to May 2014.

These general data selection criteria were not enough to facilitate the data selection and collection processes. First, it was relatively difficult to decide what best represented the political discourses instantiated in mainstream and social media in Iraq. Second, the lack of standardized procedures for collecting data from the internet including social media (Hewson, 2008), made it even more difficult to collect the data that fit the purpose of this thesis. Prior to the data selection process, I surveyed the
Iraqi TV channels, different social media and several online platforms, and also consulted some activists with good experience in offline and online activism within the Iraqi context in order to identify the most commonly used and watched political platforms. Based on the personal survey and consultation, it was decided to exclude some of the social media sites and platforms, such as Twitter and YouTube, because they were not commonly used by Iraqis to discuss political views. The survey and consultation processes also resulted in more detailed selection criteria that were specifically relevant to the genre chosen. The criteria based on which the selection of the TV interviews was made are listed below:

1. The selected interviews had to be taken from ostensibly cross-sectarian and non-partisan TV channels in order to ensure political inclusiveness in the policies of the TV channels selected.
2. The key political rivals or parties related to the discussed political topics in each of the selected interviews had to be all represented to guarantee the exchange of diverse viewpoints.
3. The selected TV interviews should not represent in any way a form of “confrontainment” (see for instance Garces-Conejos Blitvich et al., 2013).

Facebook was chosen as a social media context for interaction, as it represented the most commonly used social media site in Iraq (Iraq Insights and Trends, 2011: 4). The criteria based on which the Facebook comment threads were selected included:

1. The Facebook page had to be owned and administrated by key political commentators, journalists or civil activists. Facebook pages which were suspected to be administrated by others were ruled out.
2. The Facebook page owner had to have relatively high number of followers (50000 followers and/or friends on average).
3. The Facebook page owner had to interact actively with and respond to the commenters who engaged in the political discussions generated on their pages.
4. The posts made by the authors had to attract relatively high numbers of comments (minimally 100 comments) generating relatively long comment threads.
The online news readers’ response threads were selected as a point of contrast with both the mainstream news and Facebook interactions, for in this case both forms of mass media and social media were intertwined. The online news reports were professionally generated journalistic content posted on an online mass media outlet, whereas the online news readers’ response threads represent user-generated content posted on interactive platforms, typically categorized as a social media outlet (see Walther and Jang, 2012). The criteria based on which the online news website was selected included:

1. The selected online news website represents an online website of a leading and widely spread Arab news agency.
2. The comment section of the selected news website generated relatively long comment threads in comparison to other websites (70 comments on average in comparison to 10 comments on average for other popular online news websites).

4.2.2 Data Categories: generic categorization vs. thematic categorization

Although these multiple criteria made the data collection a highly difficult and complicated process, these parameters aimed to ensure that the datasets analyzed in the thesis were representative of the political discourses produced in some genres of mainstream and social media and ultimately comparable. The data analyzed in this thesis can be categorized in terms of the genres in which they were produced and in terms of their thematic contexts, i.e. the main topics discussed. From a generic perspective, the data collected first included a set consisting of three TV interviews representing mainstream media. These TV interviews were taken from three popular TV shows taken from two cross-sectarian and ostensibly non-partisan TV channels: Alrasheed www.alrasheedmedia.com, and Alsumaria www.alsumaria.tv. The second dataset consisted of three Facebook comment threads taken from three different Facebook pages. The first comment thread was taken from a Facebook page owned by the renowned journalist, author and activist Muhammad Al-Akhras. The second comment thread was taken from a Facebook page owned by the famous political talk show host, author and activist, Saadoun Muhsin Dhamad. The third comment thread
was taken from a Facebook page owned by well known political commentator Ibraheem Alsumydaie. The third dataset consisted of three online news readers’ response threads taken from the pan-Arab online news website www.alarabiya.net.

From a thematic perspective, the data collected can also be categorized into three different sets based on the main topics discussed by the interlocutors. The thematic categorization crosscut the generic categorization. The political themes discussed in the first TV interview, first Facebook comment thread and first online news readers’ response thread were related to the 2012 political deadlock in the country, which was related to the opposition’s demand to vote out the former Prime Minister, Al-Maliki, or push him to tender his resignation. In contrast, the second TV interview, second Facebook comment thread and second online news readers’ response thread predominantly focused on a highly sensitive and potentially conflictive topic, namely the sectarian-based power-sharing process in post US-led invasion Iraq along with the concomitant Sunni claims of marginalization and victimhood. Lastly, the political themes tackled in the third TV interview, third Facebook comment thread and third online news readers’ response thread were mainly associated with the results of the 2014 parliamentary election and the follow up negotiations to form a coalition government. The political interactions, from which all the dataset were collected, took place in the period from June 2013 to May 2014. Table 4.1 provides more information on the three datasets collected in this thesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TV interviews</th>
<th>FB comment thread</th>
<th>Online news readers’ response threads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Topic 1</td>
<td>Topic 2</td>
<td>Topic 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of turns</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3912</td>
<td>4280</td>
<td>6175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words count</td>
<td>14367</td>
<td>8603</td>
<td>11294</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 Dataset sizes and word counts

As indicated in the table above, there is variation in terms of the sizes of the datasets. This was expected because of the different modularity in each dataset. It was decided
to keep all the responses and comments (not to take a sample of comparable size) in order to ensure that the full discussions in each set are included. When doing quantitative analysis, I will normalize the results in relation to the total analytical tokens identified in each of the datasets. I will make sure to explain the normalization process I made in detail for each case within the analytical chapters.

4.3 Ethical Issues and Anonymization

The ethics of data collection from online outlets has been, and is still, a topic of heated debate within humanities and social sciences (e.g. Sharf, 1999; Eysenbach & Till, 2001; Bassett & O’Riordan, 2002; Flicker et al.; 2004; De Costa, 2015). The center of this debate is generally related to the extent to which the data collected are considered public, and consequently whether or not the interlocutors’ consent is needed (Page et al., 2014:64, Bassett & O’Riordan, 2002; Eysenbach & Till, 2001). The TV interviews were considered public materials because they were broadcast by mass media and were made available online for public use, and as such required no consent to observe and transcribe. The online news readers’ response threads were also considered public discourses for several reasons, firstly because they represented discussions about public policies rather than friendships and private interests (Sellers, 2004: 15). Secondly, they were made publically available to anyone with an internet connection at a website that requires no subscription; alarabiya.net. Finally, the offline identities of commenters on alarabiya.net were not observable in this context and thus were at no risk of being revealed (cf. Markham, & the AoIR ethics working committee, 2012).

As a potentially semi-public, semi-private or even private context, Facebook is a rather more complex context from which to collect data. Here the question of who owns the interactions, their status as public or private, and the right to access the materials in the first place raise many questions. Facebook’s terms and conditions explicitly state that “[w]hen you publish content or information using the Public setting, it means that you are allowing everyone, including people off of Facebook, to access and use that information, and to associate it with you (i.e., your name and profile picture)”.

More importantly, in contrast to many discourse-analytic studies of

---

6 Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, section Two: Sharing Your Content and Information
Facebook interaction that focused on data extracted from private wall pages (e.g. Page 2012, Maiz-Arevalo, 2015; Bolander and Locher, 2015; Theodoropoulou, 2015), here the Facebook pages were publically available. Therefore, the comments posted on public Facebook pages to debate public issues and made available to everybody, were considered public and, as such, ethically acceptable to use as part of the data for my analysis (cf. Markham, & the AoIR ethics working committee, 2012). However, the status updates made by the Facebook page owner needed informed consent from the owners, because they might have thought of their Facebook pages as an online private space (see Page et al., 2014:64-65; Markham, & the AoIR). To conform to the University of Leicester ethics regulations, I applied for ethical approval to collect online data for my research. A consent form was developed in order to obtain the permission of the Facebook page owners from which the data were collected. The consent form was originally developed in English and then translated into Arabic, because the people whose consents I sought were Arabic speaking (see Appendix I). In accordance with Data Protection Act 1998, the Facebook page owners received accurate, explicit, and detailed information about the purpose of the data collection, and they were also able to contact the researcher in case of questions or concerns. They all signed the consent forms and sent me electronic versions of these consent forms (see Appendix II).

The data collection for the thesis had to be anonymized. Tilley & Woodthorpe (2011: 198) and Walford (2005: 85) define anonymization as the removal or obscuring of the interlocutors’ names and any identifying details in order to ensure that interlocutors would not be identified. In qualitative research, anonymization is a desirable standard which primarily aims to minimize the risk of potential harm to interlocutors (Tilley & Woodthorpe, 2011: 199). Therefore, all information about the online commenters’ names and locations were anonymized. Throughout the thesis, all interlocutors were referred to by their interactional roles, e.g. post-author, commenter 1, and commenter 2. Only when there was a need to refer to specific commenters, initials system was developed to designate them. This system employed every two successive alphabetical letters as initial for the designated commenter (see examples 7 and 5 in 6.2 below). Yet, the names of the interviewees in the TV interviews analyzed in this thesis were retained, because they were considered public figures discussing their political views publically on mass media.
4.4 Translation and transcription conventions

All the data were originally produced in Arabic, both high and low varieties. Arabic is a diglossic language that includes a high variety, modern standard Arabic, and a low variety, local Iraqi (colloquial) Arabic in the case of this thesis (Ferguson, 1959). However, some sociolinguistic studies seem to conceptualize standard and colloquial Arabic as “two extremes poles on a continuum” rather than completely distinct varieties with different functional and contextual usages (Albirini, 2016: 42). The data were mostly produced in the modern standard Arabic because of the settings and medium of the genre in question, but bidialectal code switching (ibid: 228) has occurred frequently. The data produced in local Iraqi (colloquial) Arabic were printed in red wherever analytically relevant. A semi-literal translation was used to present them in English in the thesis. The semi-literal translation aimed to exhibit, as accurately as possible, how the political topics, actions and actors were originally realized by the interlocutors. The English translation was on occasion slightly modified in case the original punctuation used by the interlocutors potentially gave rise to confusion as shown in the example below, which is a response posted by a reader of the online news website:

كله كتب حتى اهل الجنوب مو كتبه تنتخب الهالكي ليش هو شنو اللي سواه بالجنوب اشو كلما مر الوكل
يرجعون للورا ملتهف بالتعليم والفقر والمرض والكهرباء والماء والبطالة هاي مال 40 بالمئة كلها كتب يكتب

These are all lies. Not all the people of the south voted for the doomed one [a play with words to refer to Al-Maliki]. What has he accomplished in the south? It is getting worse as the time went by. [There are] deteriorating education ((system)), poverty, diseases, ((lack of)) electricity and ((running)) water and unemployment. The 40 percent is all lies.

The reader did not use any punctuation marks in his/her original response. Therefore, I had to use the proper punctuation marks to make the comment comprehensible to the English reader.
As for the data extracted from spoken interactions, viz, the TV interviews, I personally transcribed them using a simplified version of the ‘Jefferson system’ (cited in Hutchby and Wooffitt, 2002: vi-vii), which is shown below.

(0.5)   Number in brackets indicates a time gap in tenths of a second.
(.)     A dot enclosed in brackets indicates a pause in the talk of less than two-tenths of a second.
=       ‘Equals’ sign indicates ‘latching’ between utterances.
[ ]    Square brackets between adjacent lines of concurrent speech indicate the onset and end of a spate of overlapping talk.
(( )))  A description enclosed in a double bracket indicates a non-verbal activity.
-       A dash indicates the sharp cut-off of the prior sound or word.
:       Colons indicate that the speaker has stretched the preceding sound or letter.
(inaudible) Indicates speech that is difficult to make out. Details may also be given with regards to the nature of this speech (eg. shouting).
.       A full stop indicates a stopping fall in tone. It does not necessarily indicate the end of a sentence.
?       A question mark indicates a rising inflection. It does not necessarily indicate a question.
↑↓     Pointed arrows indicate a marked falling or rising intonational shift. They are placed immediately before the onset of the shift.
Under Underlined fragments indicate speaker emphasis.
CAPITALS Words in capitals mark a section of speech noticeably louder than that surrounding it.
° °   Degree signs are used to indicate that the talk they encompass is spoken noticeably quieter than the surrounding talk.
'Less than' and 'More than' signs indicate that the talk they encompass was produced noticeably slower than the surrounding talk.

[...] Lines omitted for the purpose of brevity
Chapter Five
Interplay of (De)legitimization, Rapport and Impoliteness in Political TV Interviews

5. Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to examine the conflict for power in three TV interviews representing political discourses in mainstream media in terms of production and reception. To that end, I investigate how the production, reception and evaluations of the conflicts for power instantiated in the three TV interviews across thematically different contexts. Focusing on the first levels of positioning analysis, section 5.1 examines how the interviewees pursued legitimacy and power when communicating their sociopolitical views through the use of different (de)legitimization topoi. Section 5.2 concentrates on the second level of positioning analysis to unpack how the participants in these interviews could establish alignments and position themselves vis-à-vis each other. This section also explores the medium affordances that shaped the participation framework and determined the role-relations in the genre of the TV interview. With a focus on the third level of positioning analysis, section 5.3 demonstrates how the interviewees discursively constructed their sociopolitical identities to elucidate the functions and social implications of these identities. Section 5.4 deals with the how rapport was perceived and how particular political and interactional practices were attitudinally confronted and morally evaluated in terms of impoliteness in order to pinpoint the social and moral implications of the conflict for power that took place in these interviews. Finally, section 5.5 sums up the main argument in this chapter and sets out the findings of the analysis.

5.1 Communicating sociopolitical stances through (de)legitimization

In multi-participant political interviews, like the one analyzed in this chapter, the interviewees tend to compete for the legitimization of particular interpretations of the political scene in the eyes of their audience in order to serve their political interests. To that end, the interviewees recontextualize and (re)characterize particular political action and actors to communicate their sociopolitical stances over the issues discussed in the interviews. To analyze the interviewees’ communication of their sociopolitical stances, the three TV interviews comprising the dataset of this chapter were
transcribed and subjected to an in-depth qualitative analysis to identify the utterances that have (de)legitimizing functions. At the first level of positioning analysis, lexicogrammatical representations of the political actions and actors involved in these utterances were analyzed. Instances of actor-oriented (de)legitimization were analyzed by identifying who the (de)legitimized political actors were and how they were discursively represented in each of the interviews. In action-oriented (de)legitimization, however, there had to be an action involved; this action could involve a material, mental or verbal process (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004) for which the (de)legitimized actor was proven responsible and held accountable. Instances of action-oriented (de)legitimization were analyzed based on what political actions and actors were actually found in the text and how they were discursively represented. Examples 1 and 2 elucidate how instances of actor and action-oriented (de)legitimization could be analytically distinguished.

Example 1:

As for Citizen Coalition (it) won (0.2) because (it) made successes in comparison to the past as it made a progress that might be a double in comparison to its previous results (.) <NO it is rather more than double.

(Interview 3: interviewee 1)

In example 1, the interviewee attempted to legitimize a particular interpretation of the political scene in the aftermath of the election in order to serve the interests of his political coalition. He employed the topos of authorization to empower his political coalition, i.e. Citizen Coalition, by referring to its increased popularity, which was proven by the result of the 2014 parliamentary election. Although he knew that his political coalition was the third or even the fourth in the number of parliamentary seats, he used authorization by virtue of popularity and representativeness to present his political coalition as making advances in comparison to the results in the previous election that took place in 2010, i.e. it made a progress that might be a double in comparison to its previous results (.). In this example, the political actor being
legitimized was discursively represented by virtue of collectivization (van Leeuwen, 2008: 37-8), using a noun denoting a political group, i.e. Citizen Coalition.

Example 2:

Franckly, I will tell you frankly () that Mr. Prime Minister’s initiative IS THAT the parliament dissolves itself in order to hold an early election ((coughs)) = this is not a realistic idea either.

(Interview 1: interviewee 1)

Contrary to example 1 above, the interviewee in example 2 attempted to delegitimize the opponent’s political interpretation of reality in order to advance the political agenda of his party. He irrationalized his opponent’s action, i.e. Mr. Prime Minister’s initiative, by appealing to effectiveness, arguing that this initiative was not practically viable, i.e. this is not a realistic idea either. In this example, the irrationalized political action was discursively represented by objectivation, which refers to, as argued by van Leeuwen (2008: 63-4), the substitution of the product, i.e. the initiative, for the action itself. The Prime Minister’s responsibility for the action was communicated by possessivation using genitive phrase in Arabic that was functionally equivalent to possessive s in English.

In certain cases the interviewees combined actor-oriented with action-oriented topoi in order to reinforce the affect of the (de)legitimization as shown in the example below.

Example 3:

Interviewee:

Uhhh actually before I answer () I would like to comment on what he has mentioned. Colleague ((used honorifically)) Jawa::d said that this is the desire of Marjaiya ((religious leaders)) and the people and so no. I think this is an inaccurate talk. No
Marjaiya (religious leader) has announced, I mean save one due to certain circumstances(.) and someday I may talk about them. No MARJAIYA has spoken about a person in specific(.) uhhh this is firstly. And when the people elect a bloc as majority this means-((gets interrupted by the interviewer))

(Interview 3: interviewee 2)

In example 3 above, interviewee 2 aimed to delegitimize his opponent’s argument as to why his political party refused a third term for the former Prime Minister Al-Maliki. The reason for the refusal, as mentioned by interviewee 1 at some point during the interview, was that it was the desires of the Marjaiyas (Shiite religious leadership) and that of the people. Therefore, interviewee 2 in this example attempted to highlight the inconsistency in interviewee 1’s argument in order to irrationalize it, i.e. this talk is not accurate. ..... No MARJAIYA has spoken about a person in specific. The irrationalized action was discursively represented by abstraction, (van Leeuwen, 2008: 68). In order to strengthen his counterargument, interviewee 2 also used an actor-oriented legitimization topos, which was authorization via electoral representation, depicting his political party, which was impersonalized (van Leeuwen: 46) as the majority in the parliament, and as such a legitimate claimant of premiership.

Broadly speaking, in each of the three TV interviews analyzed in this chapter, the interviewers and the interviewees were concerned about recontextualizing a limited number of political actors and actions in order to (de)legitimize particular interpretations of reality in a way that better served their political agenda and ideological preferences. Indeed, it was the interviewers, or the program managers, who were responsible for determining the topic of discussion in each interview, as they have privileged access to public discourse (cf. van Dijk, 2008: 67ff). The first discussed topic was the 2012 political crisis related to the opposition’s demand to vote out the former Prime Minister in Iraq, i.e. Nouri Al-Maliki, or push him to tender his resignation. As was to be expected, the main actors who were delegitimized included the former Prime Minister and the opposition parties, while the main political actions (de)legitimized included the former Prime Minister’s policies, behaviors towards his opponents, i.e. the opposition parties, and the opposition parties’ political agendas and their behaviors towards the former Prime Minister and his cabinet (see examples 2
and 6). Since the interviewees represented the two sides of the crisis, i.e. the ruling coalition and the opposition, they were more concerned about representing their political parties and their political agendas more positively and representing their opponents and their own political actions negatively.

In the second TV interview, the main political actors and actions that were targeted by the process of (de)legitimization were related to the sectarian-based power-sharing process in the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The political actors who were (de)legitimized included Saddam Hussein’s ousted regime, stereotypically described as Sunni-favoring, and the new regime, stereotypically described as Shiite-favoring (see examples 7 and 8 below). Moreover, Sunnis and Shias were also (de)legitimized in this interview, because they were perceived as represented by the key actors in the political process. This was due to the consociational political system in the country. The interviewees, who were members of the main two communities, i.e. Sunnis and Shiites, frequently legitimized the communities they belonged to and delegitimized the other communities in pursuit of political support from their in-group members and domination over the out-group community. Alternatively, the political actions (de)legitimized were associated with the practices of the old and the new regimes and the practices of the ruling coalition and of the opposition parties. This interview dealt with the most sensitive aspect of Iraqi politics, which was related to the ethnic identities of the participants. This was evidently demonstrated by the frequent use of in-group victimization as a collective legitimization. The example below illustrates how the use of ethno-political terms and the victimization topos could be used for legitimization.

Example 4:

سُّنَّٰٖ لِيِجِئِّ الْسَّنَّةَ إِلَىْ تَشْكِيْلِ اِقْلَالِمِ اَلْأَهِ لِلْحِفْظِ وَحَدَّةِ الْعَرَاقِ، لِلْحِفْظِ اَلْأَهِ (.) ي́عْنِي حُكْمُ الْذَّاتِ اَنْ يَحْكُمُوا اَنْقِسَمُ بَيْنَهُمْ. لَانِ حَقِيقَةَ هَكَيْكَ اِقْصَاءَ وْتُحْيَيسِ وْظِمَّ مَوْجُودَ الْتَّوْمَامُ عَلَىٰ مَكوْنِ بَعْضِهِ دَونَ أَخْرِ.

Sunnis may resort to forming (federal) regions uhhh that maintain the unity of Iraq, to maintain uhhh the (. ) I mean self-ruling, to rule themselves by themselves. Because in

---

7 Saddam Hussein was the longest serving president of Iraq who was deposed from power by the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.
fact there are exclusion, marginalization and injustice today imposed on a particular (ethnic) component rather than the other.

(Interview 2: interviewee 2)

In example 4, the interviewee legitimized the formation of a federal region wherein Sunnis could enjoy semi-autonomous rule. He rationalized this demand, which was actually part of his political party agenda to maintain, uh, the self-ruling, to rule themselves by themselves. The political action rationalized in this example was represented by means of objectivation using the process noun forming (see van Leeuwen, 2008: 63). Moreover, the interviewee simultaneously legitimized his own ethno-political group, which was first referred to by collectivization i.e. Sunnis, and then by backgrounding (van Leeuwen, 2008: 29). He resorted to the collective legitimization topos of victimization to present them as marginalized and victimized by others, i.e., there are exclusion, marginalization and injustice today imposed on a particular (ethnic) component rather than the other. Due to the nature of the general topic discussed, the collective topos of victimization was used frequently as a legitimization technique in the second TV interview.

The third TV interview tackled the results of the 2014 parliamentary election and the political negotiations that followed to form a ruling majority coalition. In this interview, the interviewees seemed to be more interested in strengthening their positions as legitimate representatives of the people and delegitimizing the previous political actions of their opponents (see examples 1 and 3 above). However, as the parliamentary elections failed to produce a decisive outcome for either party, the interviewees unanimously legitimize the recreation of the Iraqi National Alliance and its role in forming a unity government. Interestingly, the topoi of authorization and deauthorization were employed frequently in this interview (see also figure 3 below).

This warrants the assumption that the interviewees in political interviews tend to be more concerned about the power potentials associated with the claims of being the legitimate representatives of the general public, and the comparative lack of their opponents’ legitimacy around election time. Example 5 illustrates this tendency.

Example 5:

Interviewee:
The Prime Minister has not come (to power) by a coup d’état in order to say it is a dictatorship(,) he has come (to power) by the votes of the people.

(Interview 3: Interviewee 2)

In the above example, the interviewee was attempting to establish the well deserved right of the former Prime Minister’s, who was the interviewee’s party leader, to premiership. He invoked the concept of the power of the people that can be invested in a representative elected through a democratic election. Thus, the interviewee used the topoi of authorization to empower the leader of his political party by means of the votes his party garnered in the election in order to depict him as a legitimate incumbent of the premiership, i.e. he has come (to power) by the votes of the people. The political actor authorized in this example, i.e. Al-Maliki, was functionalized (van Leeuwen, 2008: 42) by reference to his position as a Prime Minister.

Interestingly, in all three TV interviews analyzed in this chapter the decisions made by the interviewees regarding employing actor-oriented or action-oriented (de)legitimization tended to be motivated to a great extent by the interviewer’s interactional moves. It seems that the argumentation process in TV interview was necessarily organized around the gate-keeper’s, i.e. interviewer’s, interactional moves that aimed to unravel the interviewees’ stances on certain political issues. The interviewer’s discursive practices could involve different speech acts. The most frequent of these speech acts included ‘directive’ in the form of questions and ‘expressive’ in the form of provocative statements (Searle, 1975). This could be intuitively attributed to the power over discourse (Fairclough, 1989) that the interviewers possess in such a genre. This indicates that the argumentation process in the TV interviews tends to be hierarchically, rather than rhizomatically, structured (cf. 6.2 and 7.2). Consider the extract below which represented the first question raised by the interviewer that guided the direction of the interview and the way the interviewee’s answer unfolded.

Example 6:

Interviewer:
Nowadays all the initiatives are directed towards removing Al-Maliki or changing the government. The question then is (0.3) is it the desire to get rid of the SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM whom some consider is the Prime Minister? Or is it the desire to remove a politician with popularity who was proven popular still and was the first in the last election? And these components or blocs fear that he maintains and keeps this popularity and power for a second turn?

Interviewee:
I do not want to deny the Prime Minister’s popularity (0.4) I mean is he popular or not? He is popular and this was proven in the last parliamentary election when he garnered the highest number of votes in Baghdad and in the provincial election held few days ago. I do not want to underestimate what the State of Law coalition has garnered in the provincial election (0.3) Yet I do not want to close my eye about (the fact that) it has declined noticeably. Uhh in most of the provinces even in the provinces which were considered its ((Al-Maliki’s coalition)) strongholds (0.1) it retreated in favor of other competitors of Al-Maliki’s (0.3) Citizen Coalition and -

Example 6 illustrates how the interviewer’s power over discourse could influence the interviewee’s choice of the (de)legitimization topos used in the response. The interviewer’s utterance gave emphasis to the characterization of a political actor, viz.
Al-Maliki, rather than his political actions describing him once as the source of the problem and once as a politician with popularity without any reference to a specific action. This motivated the interviewee to focus on delegitimizing Al-Maliki’s public image, rather than his actions and policies, using the actor-oriented delegitimization topoi of deauthorization. The interviewee attempted to deauthorize Al-Maliki by referring to the results of the provincial election that took place a few days before the interview took place, i.e. i.e. *Uhh in most of the provinces even in the provinces which were considered its ((Al-Maliki’s coalition)) strongholds (0.1) it retreated in favor of other competitors of Al-Maliki’s*. The results, as argued by the interviewee, represented a decline in Al-Maliki’s popularity, and as such his authority and legitimacy. The interviewee deauthorized Al-Maliki in his capacities as a statesman and as a political leader as well. This was adroitly achieved by firstly referring to Al-Maliki’s position as the Prime Minister by means of functionalization (van Leeuwen, 2008: 42), and secondly by referring to his political coalition by means of collectivization using a noun denoting a political group, i.e. *State of Law Coalition*. Depicting Al-Maliki losing in the election highlighted his insufficiency as Prime Minister and his failure as a political leader of his political Coalition.

Example 7 below showed how the action-oriented legitimization in the interviewee’s answer was motivated by the interviewer’s question.

Example 7:

Interviewer:

* استاذ سامي( ) الا يتحدث الشيعة بان مثلا انه منصب رئاسة الوزراء هو حكرو على الشيعة حتى وان لم ينص على ذلك في الدستور؟*

*Mr. Sami (.) do not Shiites for instance say that the premiership is the monopoly of the Shiites even though it is not stated in the constitution?*

Interviewee:

* لا(0.5) لأنه منصب رئاسة الوزراء تقرره الكتلة الاكبر حسب الدستور، سواء كان او شيعيا ( ) كرديا او عربيا . من خلال الدورات السابقة، الجمعية الوطنية ثم الدورتين القادمتين، لن الشيعة اکثرية كانوا يشكلون الكتلة الاكبر في داخل [البرلمان].*

*No(0.5) because the premiership is decided by the biggest bloc according to the constitution, whether for a Sunni or Shiite ( ) Kurdish or Arab. In the previous*
(parliamentary) terms, the National Assembly and the following two terms, the Shias were the majority in the parliament.

Interviewer:

ودستوريا من حقهم ان يرشحوا من يشاؤون.

Interviewee:

Constitutionally they have the right to nominate whoever they want.

(The interviewee represented the action differently in his response in order to neutralize the negative valence of monopoly. In the response, it was discursively represented as agentialized action (van Leeuwen, 2008: 66), that is, the right to nominate, to emphasize agency which, in turn, established the Shiite politicians’ right to nominate the Prime Minister.)
Furthermore, example 8 highlights the interviewer’s powerful role that entitled him to reorient the argumentation process towards serving his interactional goal through resisting the interviewee’s deviation from answering his question directly. The interviewer’s question was about the ruling coalition’s failure to build functioning state institutions in the aftermath of the US-led invasion, which was action-oriented question, but the interviewee attempted to eschew the question focusing instead on blaming the ousted regime.

Example 8:

Interviewer:

What delayed this building (of the state)?

Interviewee:

To understand the problems caused by the former regime and the problems that corrupt the Iraqi State (0.3) On April the 9th it is not only the regime that was changed (.) and the dictator was overthrown (.) but it is the entire state (which was) established in the twenties (of the last century) that has collapsed.

Interviewer:

hmmm

Interviewee:

نكر تدرك المشاكل التي خلفها النظام السابق وما المشكلات التي نخرت الدولة العراقية(3) يوم 9 نيسان 2003 لم يتغير النظام فقط (.) ووو لم يطح بالدكتاتور فقط (.) انما انهارت دولة بكمالها امست في عشرينيات القرن الماضي.

To understand the problems caused by the former regime and the problems that corrupt the Iraqi State (0.3) On April the 9th it is not only the regime that was changed (.) and the dictator was overthrown (.) but it is the entire state (which was) established in the twenties (of the last century) that has collapsed.

Interviewer:

ummum
A state uhh that was rejected (.) and uhhh by the majority of the Iraqi people, but it was imposed on this people. A state built on racist basis, sectarianist basis (.) Under which the majority of the Iraqi people had suffered (.) and it reached its worst conditions at the hand of Saddam Hussein.

Interviewer:

What delayed this issue?

(Interview 2: interviewee 1, interviewer)

At the beginning of the extract in example 8, the interviewer raised a question, namely What delayed this building (of the state)?. This question was action-oriented in nature because it concentrated on material process, which was the process of a state building. In a bid to eschew the question, the interviewee delegitimized the former regime using an actor-oriented technique. The interviewee described the former regime as being racist and sectarianist and illegitimately imposed on the people, i.e. it was imposed on this people. A state built on racist basis, sectarianist basis. When the interviewer realized that the interviewee was deviating, he urged the interviewee to commit to the line of the argument in his original question by raising the same question again at the end of the extract, i.e. What delayed this issue?.

To hold a cross thematic comparison between the three TV interviews analyzed in this chapter, the utterances identified as having (de)legitimizing functions were analyzed quantitatively. The quantitative analysis makes it possible to draw a general conclusion as to how the different (de)legitimization topoi were utilized strategically in the different thematic contexts. The numbers of (de)legitimization instances identified were 83, 76 and 102 in the first, second and third interviews respectively. These 261 instances were coded for the eight (de)legitimization topoi listed in table 2.1. As mentioned in examples 3, 4 and 6, some of the utterances with (de)legitimizing functions involved more than a single topois. These utterances were accommodated in the analysis by quantifying each single occurrence of the different

8 A distinction is made here between the terms ‘sectarianist’ and ‘sectarian’. The term sectarianist is used to refer to the political practices that have sectarian-based exclusionary effect; the use of the adjective ‘sectarian’ does not necessarily involve such an exclusionary implication.
topoi in the utterance; this means that the utterances that included two (de)legitimization topoi were coded twice. The results were then normalized in relation to the total number of (de)legitimization topoi occurrences in each interview. Coding decisions regarding ambiguous cases of (de)legitimization were made by using the interactional responses that followed as evidence of the emic interpretation of the participants. The quantitative analysis shows that the (de)legitimization patterns varied in accordance with the main topic discussed in each of the TV interviews. This suggests that the thematic context had the greatest impact on how the (de)legitimization patterns emerged.

Figure 5.1 (below) shows the percentages of the different (de)legitimization topoi used in the first interview.

![Figure 5.1 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in the first interview](image-url)
The most striking observation in Figure 5.1 was that the negative representation of others was the most commonly used topos (N=17) followed by the positive representation of self (N=15) with a narrow margin difference between the two. Authorization (N=3) and deauthorization (N=7) were the least used of all topoi. In terms of the action-oriented (de)legitimization, the figure indicates that the frequencies of the action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi were obviously less polarized, which means that all the action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi were used almost evenly. The topos of negative evaluation of actions (N=11) and positive evaluation of actions (N=11) were the most commonly used action-oriented topoi.

Figure 5.2 below shows the percentages of the different (de)legitimization topoi used in the second interview.

As for the second TV interview, figure 5.2 above exhibits that the legitimization topos of the positive representation of self was by far the most commonly used (N= 20).
This is due to the interviewees’ frequent use of victimization to present in-group members positively (see example 4 above), which seems to be related to the sectarianly sensitive nature of the topic discussed. The common use of victimization could be attributed to the fact it was the most tolerable collective topos. Due to institutional settings of the TV interviews the use of explicitly inflammatory discourse, typically associated with the collective topos of criminalization and sectarianist exclusion (cf. figures 6.2 and 7.3 below), were neither tolerated nor beneficial to the interviewees in this public context. Therefore, use of victimization instead of criminalization may be also deemed a manifestation of political correctness in the political discourses produced in the mainstream media. The second most commonly used topos was the negative evaluation of actions (N= 15). The results highlight how polarized the use of the different (de)legitimization topos was. The least used topos were authorization (N= 3).

Figure 5.3 below demonstrates the percentages of the different (de)legitimization topos used in the third interview.
Unlike the results in the other interviews, the frequent use of authorization (N= 21) and deauthorization (N= 14) seems very salient in the third TV interview as shown by Figure 5.3. In light of the topic of the interview and with reference to examples 3 and 5, this seems be to be motivated by interviewees’ interests in the power potentials associated with the claims of being the legitimate representatives of the general public, and the lack of their opponents’ legitimacy around election time. The second commonly used actor-oriented topoi was the positive representation of self (N=16). In regards to the action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi, the positive evaluation of actions represented the most commonly used topoi (N=14) followed by the topoi of irrationality (N= 13).

Interestingly, the interviewees in the three TV interviews persistently served their predefined goals in ways that were commensurate with their political institutions’ agendas. They tended to legitimize the political views institutionally endorsed by their political parties and to delegitimize the ones institutionally endorsed by the opponent parties. This was evident in the interviewees’ frequent indexing their institutional affiliations (also see example 17 below) when using (de)legitimization. Even in ethno-sectarianly polarized interactions, e.g. the second TV interview, in which they might be expected to advance the goals of the ethno-sectarian community they belonged to, the interviewees tended to employ ethno-sectarian topoi to covertly legitimize their political institutions’ agendas in securing bigger shares in the government, which was in fact based on ethno-sectarian quotas (see examples 4, 14 and 21). This highlights how manipulative the interviewees’ practices could be and ultimately suggests that these practices were motivated by instrumental (or goal-oriented) rationality (Mueller, 1989).

When presenting the quantitative results in term of the dichotomy of actor-oriented vs. action-oriented (de)legitimization in each interview, as shown in figure 5.4 (below), it becomes clear that that actor-oriented (de)legitimization topoi were slightly more commonly used than action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi in all the interviews.
Figure 5.4 can be a bit misleading because in many cases in the TV interviews analyzed here both action and actor-oriented topoi were used in a single utterance to reinforce the effect of the (de)legitimation process. The utterances in which both action and actor-oriented topoi were used represented 15% of the total utterances with (de)legitimizing functions in the first interview, 28% of the total in the second interview and 14% of the total in the third interview. Indeed, this makes the utterances with (de)legitimizing functions that concentrated on (de)legitimizing actions more common than the ones that concentrated on (de)legitimizing actors exclusively. Focusing on (de)legitimizing political actions rather than political actors in the TV interviews could be attributed to the political actors’ persistence to justify the political practices of their political parties and to promote their agenda.

5.2 Interactional practices and alignments in political TV interviews

Analyzing participants’ interactional practices at the second level of positioning analysis has two advantages: it firstly unpacks how the interviewees flesh out their generalized interactional identities, i.e. genre-sectioned roles along with their entitlements, and turn them into particularized interactional identities (Sluss & Ashforth, 2007) based on the politically defined alignments made by the participants. In the genre of TV interview, the genre-specific roles in the interview, e.g. interviewer vis-à-vis interviewee, are known by virtue of the generic structure of the interaction and made recurrently salient during the interview according to the participants’
emerging needs. These genre-sanctioned roles can evolve into political roles of supporters or antagonists in regards to the topic in question. These political roles form the participants’ enriched particularized interactional identities. Secondly, the second level of positioning analysis can also elucidate how the politically defined alignments concurrently effect and affect the participants’ perception of rapport in the interview. Example 9 below shows how the participants could attend to their genre-sanctioned roles as the need emerged.

Example 9:

Interviewer:

(Formal term of address) Jawad, let me interrupt you to save time.

Interviewee:

Yes

Interviewer:

جاودي علي سؤالي (.50) تتابوكم (.) شلون تتنويهاً؟ ووني متحبني يعني؟ شنو هى خططكم ؟ ولاي اهداف رايدين توصلون؟

Answer my question (0.5) your results (.) how do you expect them? I mean, where are you heading? What are your plans? What the goals you seek to achieve?

(Interview 3: Interviewer, Interviewee 3)

In example 9 above, the interviewer’s interactional move highlighted his genre-specific role positioning the other participant in the role of the interviewee. The interviewer comfortably interrupted the interviewee to steer the interview in the direction that best served his interactional wants, which revolve around eliciting as much information as possible from the interviewees. This interruption did not violate the behavioral expectations in this genre, because the deontic power associated with the interviewer’s genre-sanctioned role entitled him to interrupt the interviewee without repercussions.
In the three interviews analyzed here, after a few interactional moves the participants’ genre-sanctioned roles evolved into politically defined alignments that positioned them vis-à-vis each other by virtue of the stances they took towards the topic in question. The politically defined alignments could be established by virtue of (de)legitimizing particular political actors and actions. Due to the antagonistic debate-like nature of the interviews analyzed in this chapter, the interviewees’ politically defined alignments were often in direct contrast to each other. Example 10 demonstrates how two interviewees in the third interview communicated their opposing political stances over forming a majority government in the aftermath of the parliamentary election in 2014, which consequently positioned them in contrast to each other.

Example 10:

Interviewee 2:

I say I do not care about these words (0.4) the essence is that we do not go back to the previous experience. The essence (.) even the essence of political majority is that we do not fall back. In other words, if the national unity or the partnership government had succeeded we would not have raised the slogan of political majority.

Interviewee 1:

When we talked (about this), and said that a half +1 cannot rule Iraq, because Iraqi is composed of different colors (ethnicities) that should be represented.

(Interview 3: Interviewee 1, Interviewee 2)

In example 10, interviewee 2 asserted his support for a majority government, which would challenge the consociational system in the country. He rationalized the formation of a national unity government highlighting its ineffectiveness, and rationalized the formation of a majority government highlighting its ability to
overcome the difficulties encountered by the former government, which was a national unity government. On the other hand, interviewee 1, in his later response to interviewee 2, communicated a completely opposite stance. He irrationalized the majority government representing it as inapplicable in an ethnically diverse country like Iraq, where each ethnic group would want to be represented in the government. Communicating such oppositional stances positioned the interviewees as rivals and opponents over the topic in question, which in certain cases could orient rapport towards challenge between them.

Unlike the interviewees, the interviewers’ political stances could oscillate between two opposite poles. By virtue of the social entitlements associated with their roles, the interviewers might change their alignments over the issue under discussion as the interviews would unfold based on their interactional need without violating any behavioral expectations. An interviewer could take an opposite alignment against the interviewee to whom the question was directed in what seems to be an attempt to provoke the interviewee to provide a desired answer or more information. The interviewers as the animators and authors, but rarely the principals (Gofman, 1981), were often perceived by the interviewees as less committed to the opinions expressed in their utterances, and as such less accountable and morally responsible for them. Example 11 explains how the interviewer in the third TV interview changed his alignments as the interview unfolded when discussing the results of the parliamentary elections. The interviewer first aligned with the interviewee from the State of Law coalition when directing a question to the interviewee representing the oppositional side, which was Citizen Coalition, and then he shifted his stance to align with the interviewee from Citizen Coalition when directing a question to the interviewee from the State of Law Coalition.

Example 11:
Interviewer:
First question

\[
\text{شَرِيح مِكتَابٍ شَلون انِتَلافٌ المواَطن هو المنَتصر أو هو المنَتصر في اَغلب المحافَظات، كما اَعلن عن ذلك السَّيد الحكيم؟... النتائج الَّتي نسمعها تشير إلى تقدِم دولةٍ القائِم.}
\]

\footnote{In the context of Iraqi politics, the term National Unity Government indicates that all the political parties in the parliament are represented in the government with no parliamentary opposition what soever.}
Sheikh ((religious term of address used honorifically here)) can you tell me how Citizen Coalition is winning in most the provinces, as declared by (term of address) Hakeem ((who was the head of the coalition))? ..... The results we have been hearing indicate that the State of Law ((coalition)) is in advance.

Second question

But before all that, although the State of Law (coalition) is at the top (.) but it seems that Citizen Coalition is confident of his competence as well as his odds regarding the formation of the coming government.

(Interview 3: Interviewer)

In the first stance, when addressing the representative of the Citizen Coalition, the interviewer deauthorized the coalition which the addressed interviewee was representing and authorized its traditional rival State of Law coalition by invoking the result of the election. By so doing, the interviewer in the first question positioned himself in an opposite alignment with the addressed interviewee. Yet, when addressing the representative of the State of Law Coalition in the second question, the interviewer aligned himself with the traditional rival of the State of Law, i.e. Citizen Coalition, presenting it as more able to form the new government using authorization in terms of expertise and competence. Communicating such oppositional stances did not orient rapport towards challenge between the interviewer and either of the interviewees, because his interactional practices fell within the behavioral expectations associated with his genre-sanctioned role.

In particular cases, the politically defined alignments that evolved as the interaction unfolded could orient rapport between the interviewees toward challenge and in extreme case towards confrontation. Example 12 below is an extract taken from the second interview in which the interviewees established oppositional alignments when voicing their opinions over the issue discussed; these alignments interactionally positioned them in direct contrast to each other. Interviewee 1 attempted to refute a previous argument provided by interviewee 2 about the policies of the former regime, ousted by the US-led coalition in 2003. To that effect,
Interviewee 1 irrationalized the argument, highlighting its inconsistencies. Interviewee 2 challenged this counterargument establishing an antithetical alignment that consequently resulted in impairing the harmony of the interview.

Example 12:

Interviewee 1:

ال أهـيـه الامر الاخر (0.5) التوصيف بـان النظام السابق ماكان يميز على اساس أـهـيـه شيعي وانما على اساس حزبي (0.5) انظر الى مجلس قيادة الثورة (.) كم فيه من الشيعة ؟ ولا واحد (بدم مقاطعته من قبل الضيف الثاني)

Uhhh, the other issue is (0.5) the description that the former regime was not discriminating based on uhhh was (not discriminatory against) Shiite but on partisan bases (0.5) Look at the Revolutionary Command Council (.). How many Shiite members were there? None- ((get interrupted by the other interviewee))

Interviewee 2:

كيفة؟!

<How>!

Interviewee 1:

انظر (.) عددلي

Look (. ) list [them] for me.

Interviewee 2:

عددليهم، اي.

List (them) for me, yes.

Interviewee 1:

لا انت عدد

No, you list (them)

Interviewee 2:

Saadoon Hamadi

سعدون حمادي
Interviewee 1: 
He was not in the Revolutionary Command Council.

Interviewee 2: 
Muhammad Hamza Az-Zubaidi

Interviewee 1: 
ما مكان ب[(...)]
He was not [in (...)]

Interviewee 2: 
[كلهم] هؤلاء كانون شيعة.

[All of them] were Shiite.

Interviewee 1: 
و يوم سقط النظام، يوم سقط النظام يوم 9 نيسان(0.5) سوردي كم شيعي بمجلس قيادة الثورة، ولا واحد(0.5) انظر إلى الجيش، شيعي أهدى قيادات الفيلق ولا واحد شيعي (0.5) سوري قادة الفرق، ولا واحد شيعي. صحيح
الشيعة موجودين في حزب البعث، صحيح يسمح لهم دخول المؤسسات العسكرية، لكن هناك مستويات من
القيادة مستويات من الوظائف لا يصلها شيعي حتى لو كان يعتنٌ.

On the day the regime was overthrown (.) on the day the regime was overthrown on April the 9th (.) tell me how many Shiite in the Revolutionary Command Council, no one (.) Look at the army, look at uhhh the divisions’ commanders, none was Shiite (0.5) look at uhhh the brigade commanders, none was Shiite. (It is) correct (that) there was Shiite (members) in Ba’ath Party, (it is) correct (that) they were allowed to join the military establishments, but there were levels of command, levels of positions that no Shiite could occupy even if he was Ba’athist.

Interviewer: 
نعم، اعطي مثال على هذا.
Yes, give me an example for that.

(Interview 2: Interviewee 1, Interviewee 2, Interviewer)

At the beginning of the extract in the example, the interviewee 1 refuted the argument presented by the interviewee 2 in earlier turns; this refutation was considered a challenge because it was endorsed by the interviewee’s role as representative of his political party (Weizman, 2008: 36). This challenge was represented by the first interviewee’s attempt to irrationalize the argument by invoking its inconsistency, i.e. the description that the former regime was not discriminating based on uhhh was (not discriminatory against) Shiite but on partisan bases (0.5) Look at the Revolutionary Command Council, how many Shiite members are there? None. This delegitimization process triggered a series of challenges made by the two interviewees to fault each other’s argument. These series of challenges triggered intense emotive response, which made this interaction rapport sensitive. The intense emotive responses were indexed by certain contextualization cues (Gumperz, 1982), such as intonation, directive speech acts including a question, i.e. how, and an order, i.e. No, you list (them), successive overlapping and interruptions. At the end of the extract, however, the interviewer employed his gate-keeping rights to moderate the standoff between the two interviewees. He took over by raising a question to interviewee 1 to end the standoff.

Conversely, the interviewees might also position each other in more rapport enhancing ways referring to them as colleagues or brothers.10 Such interactional moves aimed to disaffiliate the rival interviewees from the practices of their political parties in order to mitigate the potential face attacks associated with delegitimizing these political practices. Such rapport enhancing interactional moves were used to maintain the harmony of the interview. Example 13 taken from the first interview illustrates a rapport enhancing move made by one of the interviewees from United Coalition to take a supportive position with the other interviewee, who was from the State of Law Coalition to mitigate the delegitimizing of the State of Law political rhetoric.

---

10 The use of ‘brother’ as a rapport enhancing term of address is very common in the Arab and Muslim worlds.
The State of Law in the last provincial election, and I believe my brother Izat agrees with me, used war-styled rhetoric.

(Interview 1: interviewee 1)

In example 13, the interviewee was negatively representing the rival coalition, i.e. State of Law, accusing it of using a provocative rhetoric, i.e. war-styled rhetoric, against its opponents. However, he positioned the other interviewee who was a member in the State of Law Coalition as a brother, i.e. my brother Izat. In this example, the interviewer’s interactional move seems to have two advantages. He firstly wanted to mitigate his attack on the other interviewee’s political coalition by implying that he did not target the other interviewee in person, and in so doing he saved the personal aspects associated with his face. Secondly, disaffiliating the other interviewee from the political practices of his own political coalition rendered him a witness to this practice, which in turn made this delegitimization attempt more credible.

The interviewees in each of the interviews analyzed did not only position themselves in relation to the other interviewees, whom was purportedly viewed as an opponent, and the interviewer, but also in relation to the audience, who were metaparticipants (Kádár & Haugh, 2013: 84) at the second-frame (Fetzer, 2007: 1343). Interviewees could attend to the audience by referring to their interests within the argumentation process. Example 14 demonstrates how an interviewee legitimized his political party by depicting himself and his party as very attentive to their people’s needs.

Example 14:

If we feel there is anything against our interests, our existence, our provinces, our people and our demands (.) we will take a stand.

(Interview 1: Interviewee 1)

In this example, the interviewee attempted to characterize his political party positively by presenting it as the defender of the interests of the ethnic constituency his party
aimed to politically represent in order to enhance the legitimacy of this political party. This type of interactional practice highlights how the interviewees could attend to the second-frame of participation. Involving the audience in the interaction often aimed to win the audience’s sympathy and consequently guarantee greater rhetorical effect.

Alternatively, interviewees sometimes attempted to justify particular political actions by depicting them as being demanded by the people themselves, as shown in example 15.

Example 15:

No our objection is actually derived from a methodological and scientific issue and an issue related to a public demand and Marjai’ayas’ ((the religious leaders)) demand (.) (which) emphasizes on a peaceful handover of power and not to establish a culture of monopoly or uh or a culture of monopoly, or dictatorship so to speak. This means uhhh (.) it does not fit the National Alliance taste and that of the constituency of the national alliance....

(Interview 3: Interviewee 3)

Attempting to substantiate his objection to nominating the former Prime Minister for a third term, the interviewee rationalized his political stance by providing different reasons for this objection, of which the religious leaders’ and the people’s desire was the most important, i.e. issue related to a public demand and Marjai’ayas’ ((the religious leaders)) demand.

In the TV interviews analyzed, there was no audience present; thus the audience included the metaparticipants at the second-frame who could be addressed indirectly as in examples 14 and 15. At the first-frame participation, the situation was more complicated, because it involved different “interactional orders” (Langlotz and Locher, 2012). The interactional order refers to the participation framework in interaction; it indicates to whom an interactional move could be addressed, and as such clarifies the dynamics of the argumentation process in the interaction. Employing the insights of Langlotz and Locher (2012), figure 5.5 (below) sets outs the interactional orders and the dynamics of argumentation in the genre of multi-
participant TV interview. The interviewer could address the interviewees (A) or refer to a world reported in his utterances (B), which motivates how the argumentation process unfolds (see examples 8 and 9). The interviewees could address each other (C) (this often takes place if a rapport sensitive issue emerges (examples 24, 25, and 26), and they could refer to the world reported in the interviewer’s utterances (D) or the world in general (E). The utterances that might have a (de)legitimizing function could only be generated when they referred to at least to one of the worlds indicated in the figure (see the line in bold), because (de)legitimization presupposes a worldview that needs to be supported or refuted.

Figure 5.5 Participation frameworks in TV interview
5.3 Unpacking the construction of sociopolitical identities

A participant’s sociopolitical identity may include different social attributes related to his/her personal and collective aspects of self. This is mainly due to the fact that identity is not unitary but rather a versatile and multifaceted entity comprising different beliefs about ones’ own attributes and characteristics (Campbell et al., 2000: 67). Mole (2007:15) argues that sociopolitical identities derive “from the establishment of rules and the fixing of meanings which condition and constrain political action by legitimizing certain agents and policies and delegitimizing certain others”. In the context of this chapter, participants’ indexing of their enregistered, i.e. stereotyped, and emergent sociopolitical identities (Agha, 2009; De Fina, 2015) were examined by focusing on the third level of positioning analysis, as it could clarify the link between the participants’ use of (de)legitimization topoi with their construction of sociopolitical vis-à-vis the contesting dominant discourses that framed the interview in its “temporal and spatial locality” (Moissinac, 2007: 236).

Example 16 below elucidates how an interviewee constructed a sociopolitical identity that did not only index his political affiliation but also his personal attributes that emphatically established his ostensible uniqueness as a man of principle, not one that sought power.

Example 16:

Interviewer:

Do you want to convince Dr. Dhafer (.) and the audience that Mr. Al-Maliki, ((who)) spent almost a year talking about the majority government, is willing in the next term to! uhhh it is hard [to accomplish anything if he is not in the]....

Interviewee 1:

[He, he (.)] does he accept a majority ((government)) without him being its Prime [Minister?]...
This (.) this (.) This is my question.

Interviewee 2:

Now I am not talking on his behalf on this issue. He is man of a character (.) of an ambition(.) of a belief. I do not care how he thinks. Does he think that a majority without him is a majority or not? I do not care. I think that there must be uhhh 0.4 Enough with this comedy(0.3) partnership ((government)) and unity ((government)) and whatever. We must opt for a majority and minority. Let it be (that) we are the minority. Didn’t I tell you hard luck for us even if we lost? It is not important.

Interviewee 2:

أهه خلي...

Uhh let...

Interviewer

But numerous calls (for a majority government) seem to be out of confidence?

Interviewee 2:

من حقه لو مو من حقه؟ إذا هو هو يكدرب اذا اني....

That’s his right, isn’t it? If he, he can, if .....
No no. Isn’t he one of the key figures in the ((political)) arena?

Interviewee 1:

نعم لا شك (.) لايل هو الرقم هموالان الان الأول في بغداد.

Yes no doubt (. ) He is even the main figure in Baghdad now.

Interviewee 2:

من حقه هو بطرح مشروع وتطبيق من حقه. يتوقع ما يتوقع مو هواي مهم عندي. المهم عندي مشروعه صح.

It is his right to propose a project and adopt it. It is his right. ((Whether)) he succeeds or not does not significantly matter to me. What matters to me is that his project is correct.

(Interview 1: Interviewer, Interviewee 1, Interviewee 2)

At the opening of the example the interviewer and interviewee 1 attempted to delegitimize the calls for majority government often made by the leader of State of Law Coalition, i.e. Al-Maliki, by irrationalizing the majority government, highlighting its detrimental consequences as it would concentrate power in the hands of Al-Maliki, whose coalition had the majority seats in the parliament. In response to this delegitimization attempt, the addressed interviewee (interviewee 2), who represented the State of Law Coalition in the interview, provided a counterargument that aimed to legitimize the majority government. The legitimization of the majority government was achieved by highlighting its beneficial outcomes depicting it as the possible reform to the dysfunctional ethno-sectarianly based power sharing government, i.e. Enough with this comedy (0.3) partnership ((government)) and unity ((government)) and whatever.

As part of his counterargument to the original delegitimization bids made by the interviewer and interviewee 1 at the beginning of the extract in example 16 above, interviewee 2 made sure to convey an implication that he was a man of a vision who aimed to improve the political system, not a merely blind follower of his political party leader, e.g. We must opt for a majority and minority. Let it be (that) we are the minority. ((Whether)) he succeeds or not does not significantly matter to me. Legitimizing the majority government did not only construct interviewee 2’s political
alignments in regards to the issue in questions here, but it also constructed his personal identity as a political reformist and a non-conformist State of Law member. His sociopolitical identity as reformist was discursively indexed by a positive stance he took towards the political action of calling for majority government. Furthermore, his personal identity as a non-conformist State of Law member was indexed by taking an ostensibly indifferent stance to his political party’s eagerness for power, e.g. *I do not care.*

In the interviews analyzed here, the interviewees’ sociopolitical identities did not only include personal attributes but also collective ones. Collective attributes indicated the interviewees’ membership in certain political institutions or ethno-sectarian communities. The institutional identities were strongly associated with the political institutions active in the Iraqi political arena. From a sociological viewpoint, an institution is a “complex of positions and roles” that has the social function of modeling human behaviors according to sets of rules, norms and values (Turner, 1997: 6). Renkema (2004: 253) points out that an institution can be viewed as an intermediary level between the individual and society. Due to the nature of the interviews, the interviewees frequently indexed their institutional identities to reaffirm their roles as representatives of their political parties and coalition in the interviews. Yet, this was slightly less evident in the second TV interview because the interviewee were more concerned about their image as representative of their ethno-sectarian communities due to the ethno-sectarianly nature of the topic discussed. Example 17 below demonstrates how the interviewees could index their institutional political identities.

Example 17:

*This is what we think as State of Law ((members))

(Interview 1: Interviewee 2)

**oliest العراقية التي سحب الترشيح.... اذا العراقية قدمت مرشحين اخرين.**

*It was not Iraqia ((coalition)) that withdrew the nomination..... that means Iraqia ((coalition)) has ((in fact)) nominated others.*

(Interview 2: Interviewee 2)
Citizen Coalition (it) won (0.2) because (it) achieved successes in comparison to the past...... we are still in fact at the top in most of the provinces.

(Interview 3: interviewee 1)

Example 17 shows how the institutional political identities can be indexed by the interviewees in the three interviews. In the first interview the interviewee explicitly indexed his representation of the State of Law Coalition using the expression This is what we think as State of Law ((members)). In the second interview, the interviewee indexed his membership in his political institutions, i.e. Iraqia coalition, by virtue of a political stance, which was an attempt to defend the political policies of that political institution. The interviewee in the third interview, explicitly referred to his political institution, i.e. Citizen Coalition, and then indexed his membership in it by using the collective pronoun ‘we’.

In a fragile, consociational democracy like Iraq, it was typical for the interviewees’ to interweave their political affiliations with their ethno-sectarian attributes that defined their memberships in certain ethnic or sectarian groups to foreground particular sub-national identities. In the interviews that discussed less ethno-sectarianly sensitive topics, i.e. the first and third interviews, the interviewees tended to construct their ethno-sectarian based political identities in a way that enhances nationalistic ethos or inter-communal rapprochement in order to present themselves as nationalistic, non-sectarianist or tolerant with other communities. Consider examples 18 and 19 taken from interview 1, in which the constructed sociopolitical identities comprised both political and ethnic concepts of self. In example 18, the interviewee’s sociopolitical identity was constructed by means of legitimizing a political action, whereas in example 19, the interviewee constructed his sociopolitical identity though legitimizing a political actor.

Example 18:
Interviewee 2:

Example 19:
Interviewee 2:
Our alliance with the Kurdish brothers should be maintained, but never at the expense of ((losing)) the other ((ethnic)) component (0.3) impossible.

(Interview 1: Interviewee 2)

The interviewee in example 18 legitimized the political action of making an alliance with the Kurds by indicating that this political alliance was not at the expense of other communities’ fundamental interests, i.e. the Sunnis. By so doing, the interviewee indexed his political affiliation with the State of Law Coalition, which was back-grounded in the extract (van Leeuwen, 2008), and simultaneously indexed his membership in a sectarian group, i.e. Shia, through differentiation (van Leeuwen, ibid: 40), where his ethno-sectarian community was explicitly distinguished from the other communities, i.e. the Kurdish brothers, the other ((ethnic)) component, i.e. the Sunnis, to index difference between in-group and out-groups. In the example above, the interviewee constructed his ethno-sectarian based sociopolitical identity in a way that resisted the political stereotype associated with his enregistered identity (Agha, 2009; De Fina, 2015) and enhanced inter-communal rapprochement in order to disperse any possible Sunni suspicion about the Shiite-Kurdish political alliance. This inter-communal rapprochement was meant to be interpreted as a rapport enhancing move, especially by the metaparticipants at the second-frame, i.e. the audience.

In the same vein, the interviewee in example 19 below attempted to ease any tension engendered by the rival interviewee’s accusation for his political coalition to ignite animosity with the Kurds in order to win the votes of the sectarianist Sunni in election, e.g. his problems with the Kurds were the same issues Usama Al-Nujaifi made use of to win the election.

Example 19:

Interviewee 1:

ولأ أحد في الموصل ولا في كركوك ولا في ديالى يدلي بعفاء بين اخواته في هذه المحافظات والأخوة الكرد.

No one in Mosul or Kirkuk or Diyala wishes for animosity between his brothers in these provinces and the Kurdish brothers.

(Interview 1: Interviewee 1)

In response to this accusation, the interviewee in example 19 legitimized his sectarian community, i.e. Sunnis, using positive in-group representation topos by showing positive intentions towards the Kurds. Communicating this political stance indexed
the interviewee’s sectarian identity as a Sunni, and concurrently indexed his sociopolitical identity. The sectarian affiliation of his political party was discursively indexed in terms of spatialization, “in which social actors are represented by means of reference to a place with which they are, in the given context, closely associated” (van Leeuwen, 2008: 46). The spatialization in this example was established by referring to the Sunnis via the cities in which they form the majority, i.e. Mosul or Kirkuk or Diyala. Similar to example 18, the interviewee in example 19 attempted to use this collective legitimation to depict himself, his political party and ethnic community as tolerant actors who were looking for peaceful coexistence with the Kurds, which could be perceived as a rapport enhancing attempt targeting part of the audience, i.e. the Kurds in this case.

As in interview 1, indexing sectarian affiliation in the third interview often aimed to disperse any possible inter-communal tension triggered by political actions as demonstrated in example 20 below.

Example 20:
Interviewee 1:

First of all the insistence on the National Alliance (.) as Mr. Al-Sa’idi and I mentioned, represents a necessity (.) a national necessity. And this alliance has played a fundamental and actual role in preserving the unity of the country and maintaining its independence. This does not mean that there are some remarks on the performance of this alliance (.) this is firstly. The insistence on the alliance does not mean at all keeping the sectarian and racial alignments. We are in fact surprised by the continuation of this issue on some media channels. I do not know why this
The homeland gathers all these colors, and there is no contradiction when there are blocs that represent human groups that belong to a sect (.) or denomination (.) or a race.

(Interview 3: Interviewee 1)

In the above example, the interviewee sought to legitimize his political party’s insistence on recreating the broad Shiite political alliance in the parliament, i.e. the National Alliance, and simultaneously to refute the political and media debate about how the recreation of such an alliance would sustain the sectarian and ethnic alignments in the new government, which indeed hampered reforms and negatively affected the performance of the previous government. The legitimization process in this example was achieved by rationalizing the recreation of the National Alliance through highlighting its beneficial outcomes on the political arena in the country, e.g., this alliance has played a fundamental and actual role in preserving the unity of the country and maintaining its independence. By rationalizing the Shiite alliance, the interviewee positioned himself as a Shiite consociationalist ready to share power with other ethno-sectarian communities. Such a sociopolitical identity was indexed by virtue of the stance he took towards the recreation of the alliance. The interviewee concurrently asserted that this alliance was not sectarianist and did not target any other ethnic or sectarian group. Communicating such a stance was meant to disperse the threat that the recreation of the Shiite alliance might pose to the other communities which were often described as minorities. Taking this stance aimed to function as rapport enhancing and inter-communal rapprochement towards these minority groups.

Unlike the tendencies in the first and the third interviews, the interviewees in the second interview were prone to identify themselves with particular ethno-sectarian communities in order to highlight difference and provoke tensions between the communities to which they belong. The interviewees in the third interview aimed to attain their political goals as representatives of ethno-sectarian communities looking
for more administrative positions in the power sharing government. This was mainly due to the nature of the topic discussed, which was characteristically sensitive from an ethno-sectarian point of view. Examples 21 and 22 below show how the interviewees underscored their different sociopolitical identities as part of their pursuit of ethno-sectarian power.

Example 21:
Interviewee 1:

It is not possible that (.) not possible that you expect that Sunnis (.) that the number of Sunni representatives in the parliament is a majority. Because the parliament is a reflection of the reality on the ground as it is, not as we desire or as some plans. Therefore the dilemma of marginalization has no value. Where is the marginalization?! [Is there anyone] ...

Interviewer:

[Even though] the Sunnis are a majority?! Mr. Al-Nujaifi said Sunnis are a majority (.) he said it clearly.

Interviewee 1:

Where is the majority?! Where (.) why not obvious?! Haven’t we held an election? >Three parliamentary terms?!
majority? Where (.) why not obvious?! Haven’t we held an election? >Three parliamentary terms?! In doing so, the interviewee positioned the opponent in a role of minority representative, which seemed to be interpreted as a rapport challenging act by the opponent (see example 21 below). This positioning process was discursively represented by means of collectivization (van Leeuwen, 2008: 37-8) using a noun denoting a sectarian community to refer to the political actor, i.e. Sunnis. By taking such a stance, the interviewee oriented rapport towards challenge and also implicitly constructed his sociopolitical identity as a politician representing the majority, i.e. Shiites. Indexing such a sociopolitical identity reinforced his enregistered identity as a Shiite hardliner State of Law member.

In example 22, the interviewee challenged the other interviewee’s bid to position him and the sect he politically represented as a minority.

Example 22:

Today there is a force that tries to present this ((sectarian)) component as a minority. And this force functions in all circumstances, in the election and after the election. Brother Abu Yasir has talked about the uhhh there is a parliament and it forms the government(.) and they are participating in the uhhh(.) No brother (.) we aren’t participating and the evidence is the security issue. The security departments are almost empty ((of Sunni participation)), and the participation rate is almost less than 8% for the Sunni component. This is an issue in which marginalization and exclusiveness are obvious.

(Interview 2: Interviewee 2)

The interviewee, in the example above, positioned himself as representative of Sunnis through collectivization using a collective pronoun, i.e. we. He also positioned the sect he represented, i.e. Sunnis, as marginalized by an unnamed force, which by implication referred to the government predominantly controlled by the Shiite political parties. Such a positioning process had two rhetorical advantages; it firstly legitimized the interviewee’s political party, which was assumed to represent Sunnis,
by characterizing it positively as a victimized political actor. Secondly, it
delegitimized the government (discriminatory) policies, and by so doing the
interviewee constructed his identity as a Sunni politician defending his community’s
rights.

An in-depth look at how the participants employed (de)legitimization to
position themselves in relation to each other and to themselves revealed that there
were two discursive patterns the participants employed to identify themselves as
members in certain sociopolitical groups. These patterns resonate with the
identification practices observed by Bucholtz (1999) in a community of female
‘nerds’ at a US high school. Bucholtz (ibid: 211-12) maintains that identities are
constructed and projected by two identification practices, these are:

NEGATIVE IDENTITY PRACTICES are those that individuals
employ to distance themselves from a rejected identity, while
POSITIVE IDENTITY PRACTICES are those in which
individuals engage in order actively to construct a chosen identity.
In other words, negative identity practices define what their users
are NOT, and hence emphasize identity as an intergroup
phenomenon; positive identity practices define what their users
ARE, and thus emphasize the intragroup aspects of social identity.

Calculating the frequencies of legitimization versus delegitimization in each
interview highlights the different discursive patterns the participants used to index
their sociopolitical identities as shown in figure 5.6 (below).

![Figure 5.6 Percentages of legitimization and delegitimization in the TV interviews](image-url)
Paying special attention to identity construction, figure 5.6 exhibits how differently the interviewees’ sociopolitical identities were constructed in the different thematic contexts. Unlike the participants in the third interview, the participants in the first two interviews tended to construct their sociopolitical identities via negative identification; that is, defining self by negatively recontextualizing particular political actions and negatively characterizing particular political actors, i.e. through delegitimization which dissociated them from these disproved political actions and disfavorable political actors. Nevertheless, in the third interview, which dealt with 2014 election results, the participants tended to construct their sociopolitical identities via positive identification; that is, defining self through promoting self image and justifying self actions. Due to the lack of a decisive winner in the election, the interviewees tended to use the legitimization topoi of authorization and positive representation of self more frequently (see figure 5.2) to emphasize the electoral representativeness of their respective parties and their positive traits.

Negative identification practices seem to be motivated by two different reasons. On the one hand, negative identification can be triggered by a general cognitive tendency identified by several researchers including Messick & Mackie (1989, 55–9) who argue that people tend to perceive out-groups to be more homogenous than in-groups. On the other hand, and from a rhetorical viewpoint, employing negative identification in the first two interviews was less committal and more equivocal. The use of negative identification practices was a good diversionary technique, because it made it easy for the interviewees to avoid discussing their own political performance, agenda and plans, which might require them to commit to a certain course of action, and offered them the chance to indulge in the effortless attacks of opponents.

5.4 Rapport and impoliteness in political TV interviews: attitudinal and moral implications

As argued in 3.4 above, analyzing the impoliteness assessments and how they could be triggered in the TV interviews under scrutiny is advantageous in two respects. First, it can pinpoint the attitudinal and affective consequences, and moral implications of the interviewees’ practices. Secondly, it accounts for how the evaluations of impoliteness can be functionally employed in these interviews, that is,
how the evaluations of impoliteness in these TV interviews might have delegitimizing functions and, thus, be employed argumentatively. Ultimately, these two analytical advantages unpack the interactional, social and normative underpinnings of the TV interviews in which these evaluations of impoliteness were made and account for how the interviewees’ discursive conflict for power and legitimacy was perceived and evaluated in situ. In the context of this thesis, the outcomes of multilayered positioning analysis could elucidate how rapport was perceived by the interlocutors and how the evaluations of impoliteness were made in interaction.

There are three important aspects that seem very relevant to the analysis of the impoliteness assessments in mediatized political interactions like the TV interviews analyzed in this chapter; these aspects include the source, type and directionality of impoliteness. Firstly, the source of impoliteness refers to the spatiotemporal context in which the action perceived as impolite took place, whether endogenous or exogenous to the interview in which the impoliteness evaluations were made. Secondly, types of impoliteness are related to the connection between impoliteness and the interviewee’s sociopolitical identity and the aspects of face associated with it (cf. Bull et al., 1996). In this sense, instances of personal, institutional or communal impoliteness, identified in the dataset analyzed in this chapter, could show how the moral and the social implications of the conflict for power are linked to macro social categories such as ideologies, political institutions, or ethno-sectarian communities. Thirdly, the directionality of impoliteness refers to the multitude of targets at which the practices perceived as offensive and impolite can be directed. Impoliteness can be directed at single or multiple participants at different levels of participations (Kaul de Marlangeon, 2008); personal impoliteness, for instance, is often unidirectional in nature as it only targets the participant whose practices or character is described in terms of impoliteness. Alternatively, institutional and collective assessments of impoliteness are multi-directional, targeting numerous participants at different levels of participation.

The relation between (de)legitimization and the evaluations of impoliteness seems to be intricately versatile and complex in mediatized political interactions. This is mainly due to the fact that (de)legitimization can be both morally based and attitudinally implicative. Nevertheless, this complexity and versatility can be accounted for by the various levels of positioning analysis, for each of these
positioning levels has a different analytical focus that can deal with a different aspect of impoliteness. In the TV interviews analyzed here, impoliteness could arise because certain practices performed within the interaction were perceived as emotionally offensive. Yet, the interviewees might also appeal to the moral order to evaluate some political actions that were performed outside the interaction. The aim of these morally based assessments was to delegitimize others’ or out-groups’ political actions (see figure 3.1). Evaluating political actions negatively based on moral grounds might amount to evaluations of impoliteness, because these evaluations were made in response to actions that triggered negative attitudes. However, these evaluations differed from typical evaluations of impoliteness in two respects. First, they were employed argumentatively as part of the interviewees’ efforts to delegitimize the political actions performed by their rivals. Second, the actions evaluated in terms of impoliteness did not take place within the same spatiotemporal level of the interaction in which the evaluations were made. The actions evaluated occurred in the there-and-then moment of the reported events, but they were recontextualized in the here-and-now moment of the interview, highlighting the intertextual link between the two moments. This means that actions were exogenous to the interaction in which they were evaluated negatively and, thus, considered impolite. Instances of exogenous impoliteness were analytically captured by the first levels of positioning analysis, whereas instances of endogenous impoliteness were analytically captured at the second and third levels of positioning levels. Consider the examples 23 and 24 (below), which highlight the difference between these two evaluations of impoliteness.

Example 23:
Interviewee 1

It is not in the Prime Minister’s interest, ((one)) who wants to run a functional government ( .) even if he desires to continue ((for a new term)), to antagonize his
partners. On the contrary (. ) logic, even out of interest not that of integrity...uhhh. Let’s say the man is desires to continue in this position, ((he is)) supposed to satisfy those partners(.) but if those partners on one hand ((behave as)) partners and ((behave as)) enemies on the other. This thing did not make the ((political)) atmosphere continue as healthy. I mean, they are with him in the cabinet in Baghdad and conspire against him in Erbil to take the motion of no confidence for instance. How is this acceptable?! (This is) not acceptable.

(Interview 1: interviewee 1)

In example 23, the interviewee delegitimized how the United Coalition behaved politically, i.e. they are with him in the cabinet in Baghdad and conspire against him in Erbil to take the motion of no confidence for instance, using the topos of negative evaluation of an out-group action. In this example, the delegitimized political practice of United Coalition was discursively represented as a conspiracy. At the end of the example, the interviewee invoked the moral order to evaluate this kind of political practice in terms of moral acceptability wondering how such a political practice can be considered acceptable, i.e. How is this acceptable?! In this example, the interviewee evaluated the political practice of the United Coalition in terms of impoliteness, implying it violated the moral expectations. This evaluation conveyed an emotionally charged negative attitude, i.e. (This is) not acceptable, towards what was considered an offensive action. This impoliteness assessment was communicated by Iraqi colloquial variety of Arabic rather than the modern standard Arabic used at the beginning of the extract to express intense emotive response. Indeed, conspiring is often considered as an outright immoral action in Arab culture. In fact, one of definitions of the verb ‘to conspire’ is to break a pledge11, which is considered a very serious immoral practice in Arab culture, as it reveres keeping pledges and promises. The evaluated practice did not take place in the interview, but it was rather performed prior to the interaction; the interviewee recontextualized the action in the interview as part of his delegitimization of the rival political coalition. As this type of evaluation was embedded within the delegitimization of the political practices of United Coalition, it could be captured at the first level of positioning analysis, in which the political actors and action are positioned relative to each other in the reported event.

11 Alma’ani online dictionary
Therefore, this example can be argued to involve an instance of exogenous impoliteness.

In certain cases, exogenous impoliteness assessments could give rise to endogenous impoliteness. This was because exogenous evaluations of impoliteness were not communicated in a vacuum but rather embedded in social practices, which were themselves liable to impoliteness assessments (Haugh, 2013; Kádár and Haugh, 2013). For instance, in example 24 below an exogenous impoliteness assessment made by interviewee 1 was embedded in an action-oriented delegitimization; this exogenous impoliteness assessment triggered an endogenous impoliteness assessment as interviewee 2 perceived this interactional practice as an unguarded attack on the leader of his political coalition.

Example 24:

Interviewee 2:

His problems with the Kurds were the same problems Usama Al-Nujaifi made use of to win the election. When Al-Maliki stood up as a man of steel against his old colleagues and allies, oh you ((vocative article)) Usama betrayed him and turned a Kurd ((Kurd’s supporter)). This is shameful. Do you want us to uncover everything?

Interviewer:

Please do.

Interviewee 2:

((This is)) difficult(,) frankly difficult.

Interviewee 1:
No, let him ....

Interviewee 2:

…it is difficult.

Interviewee 1:

And this is the description ((sounds like))... Uhhh people will be convinced by your argument without the ((required)) details. Can you... I mean, I mean you sound like accusing the others without evidence.

(Interview 1: interviewee 1, interviewer, interviewee 2)

At the beginning of the extract in example 24, interviewee 2 delegitimized the leader of United Coalition for changing his political stance over the Kurds’ demand from the federal government. Hinting at his (perceived) opportunistische nature, interviewee 2 implicitly depicted him as a double-faced man with no principle. In doing so, interviewee 2 communicated an exogenous impoliteness assessment embedded in a delegitimization act by which the opportunistic practice of the targeted political character was evaluated based on moral grounds, i.e. This is shameful. This exogenous impoliteness was evaluated as a case of violation of the normative frame of reference for not being in line with the appropriate behavior of a decent politician.

In his response, interviewee 1 evaluated this exogenous impoliteness as an impolite interactional practice itself, because it was perceived as violating both the norm of proper argument that would require real evidence, and the behavioral expectations that would entail avoiding outright face attack. The interviewee used the clause you spared nothing, which is often used in informal Iraqi Arabic to suggest that a social norm was flagrantly violated, to register a moral stance (Haugh, 2015). Interviewee 1 perceived this attack as a threat that damaged the face associated with his institutional identity as member in United Coalition, whose leader was explicitly
attacked in the example. This type of endogenous impoliteness assessment was captured at the second level of positioning analysis, which concentrated on the violations of behavioral expectation associated with the interactional roles in this genre, and the third level of positioning analysis, which focused on how identities were constructed vis-à-vis the competing discourses that framed the interview.

Turning to the type of impoliteness in the TV interviews, three types of impoliteness were identified: personal impoliteness, institutional impoliteness and communal impoliteness. If an interviewee, or an action he performed in his capacity as distinctive or unique person, was evaluated in terms of impoliteness, this could be considered an instance of personal impoliteness. The exogenous impoliteness assessment referred to in example 24 above could be classified as a typical case of personal impoliteness, in which a specific political actor in his capacity as a distinctive agent was morally evaluated. An important aspect of any personal impoliteness assessment is its unidirectionality as the behavior perceived as impolite was directed at a single participant. The personal impoliteness in the example above involved the evaluation of Al-Nujaifi’s practice as a metaparticipant.

Institutional impoliteness by definition relates to the institutional identity of the interviewees. Therefore, institutional impoliteness may arise when an agent acting out an institutional role violates a social norm or threatens another agent’s face. Kaul de Marlangeon (2008: 738) defines institutional impoliteness as “a bounded phenomenon of public nature, performed by individuals that act on behalf of the group sharing the same system of values”. Example 25 below introduces an example of institutional impoliteness embedded in an attempt to delegitimize the State of Law Coalition. This institutional impoliteness was perceived by the interviewee representing the State of Law as an offense triggered by the opponent interviewee to target his entire political coalition rather than his personal face only. This instance of offense making was interpreted as a typical case of institutional impoliteness, because both the delegitimizer and the delegitimized are the representatives of their political coalitions.
Example 25
Interviewee 3:
No our objection is actually derived from a methodological and scientific issue and an issue related to a public demand and Marjai’aya’s ((the religious leaders)) demand (.) (which) emphasizes on a peaceful handover of power and not to establish a culture of monopoly or uh or a culture of monopoly, or dictatorship so to speak. This means uhhh (.) it does not fit the National Alliance taste and that of the constituency of the national alliance not even uhhh (.) the political method of peaceful transition of power in democratic regimes.

Interviewer:

Interviewee 2:

Mr. Kamal, you chances to form the next government look weak (0.4) First of all the trust (.) trust of other parties in you are weak. And uhhh some blocs reject a third term for Mr. Al-Maliki ((in office))(. ) and you have no other nominee.

Interviewer:

Interviewee 2:

Uhhh actually before I answer (.) I would like to comment on what he has mentioned. Colleague [used honorifically] Jawa::d said that this is the desire of Marjaiya ((religious leaders)) and the people and so no. I think this is an inaccurate talk. No Marjaiya ((religious leader)) has announced, I mean save one due to certain circumstances(,) and someday I may talk about them. No MARJAIYA has spoken about a person in specific(,) uhhh this is firstly. And when the people elect a bloc as majority this means-(((gets interrupted by the interviewer))

(Interview 3: interviewee 2, interviewee 3)

At the beginning of the extract in the example above, interviewee 3 attempted to legitimize his political coalition's rejection of support for the former Prime Minster
for a new term in office by providing two justifications. The first justification was the need for political change to prevent power monopoly, and the second was the desire of the religious leaders, whose opinions are very important in a country where politics and religion are strongly connected. Interviewee 2 interpreted the second justification provided by interviewee 3 as a serious threat to his coalition as this might undermine the popularity of his political coalition. This is due to the fact in certain cases the Iraqi religious leaders’ opinions can have a notable impact on the political process in the country. In the extract, interviewee 2 was reluctant to answer the interviewer’s question before he replied to the challenge that was directed to him in his capacity as member in a political institution, i.e. the ruling coalition, which might damage the self-worth and self-efficacy attributes, i.e. face, associated with his institutional political identity in the eyes of the audience. Therefore, he rushed to refute his opponent’s argument by denying its validity, i.e. I think this is an inaccurate talk, and then continued to authorize his political party by appealing to its previous result in the election, i.e. when the people elect a bloc as majority this means. The answer of interviewee 2 in the example 25 above involved an institutional impoliteness that was indexed by certain contextualization cues, such as intonation, his insistence to refute interviewee 3’s argument before answering the question raised by the interviewer, and the emotionally aggressive counterclaim (Langlotz and Locher, 2012: 1594), i.e. No MARJAIYA has spoken about a person in specific.

Alternatively, evaluations of communal impoliteness are inherently related to the ethno-sectarian identities of the interviewees. Such evaluations were made when the self-worth and self-efficacy attributes associated with the interlocutors’ ethno-sectarian identities were attacked. The second interview, which dealt with the more sensitive aspect of politics related to the ethnic identities of the interviewees, was the typical context for communal impoliteness to emerge. Consider example 26 below.

Example 26:

Interviewee 1:
لا يمكن أن (.) لا يمكن أن تتوقع أن السنة (.) أن عدد النواب السنة يكونون في داخل البرلمان هو الاكثـرة . لأن البرلمان هو انبعاس عن واقع الشارع كما هو، مو كما نشتهي وكما يخطط البعض . لذلك معضلة التهميش مالها معنٌ مالها قيمة . التهميش وبي؟! [اكو واحد] ...

It is not possible that (.) not possible that you expect that Sunnis (.) that the number of Sunni representatives in the parliament is a majority. Because the parliament is a
reflection of the reality on the ground as it is, not as we desire or as some plans. Therefore the dilemma of marginalization has no value. Where is the marginalization?! [Is there anyone]...

Interviewer:

[حتى وان كان] السنة اغلبية؟! السيد النجيفي قال السنة اغلبية؟! قالها بوضوح.

[Even though] the Sunnis are a majority?! Mr. Al-Nujaifi said Sunnis are a majority (. ) he said it clearly.

Interviewee 1:

وين الا غلبية ؟ وين (. ) مابانت ؟! مو سوينا انتخابات ؟! ثلاث [دورات برلمانية ؟!]

Where is the majority?! Where (. ) why not obvious?! Haven’t we held an election? >Three parliamentary terms?!

Interviewee 2:

[ممكن] اجابه؟ (مقاطعه الضييف الأول ومخالب المقدم)

[Can I] respond? ((interrupting interviewee 1 and addressing the interviewer))

Interviewer:

طبعا (. ) لك حرية الاجابة.

Of course (. ) you have the right to respond.

[Interviewee 1 keeps the floor]

(Interview 3: interviewee 1, interviewer, interviewee 2)

Interviewee 1 in the example above deauthorized the Sunni community, presenting it as a minority. This deauthorization attempt was perceived as face sensitive by the opponent, interviewee 2, interpreting it as an offensive attack against his entire sect not only an attack against him as a person or his political coalition, and as such impolite. This communal impoliteness was captured by the third level of positioning analysis where interviewees’ indexing of their ethno-sectarian identity was scrutinized. The communal impoliteness was indexed by interviewee 2 by certain
contextualization cues that included overlapping and interruptions, i.e. [Can I respond? (interrupting interviewee 1 and addressing the interviewer)], and metapragmatic comments (Culpeper, 2011: 74), i.e. his challenging counterclaim in his response (see example 22 reused below).

Example 22:
Interviewee 2:

Today there is a force that tries to present this (sectarian) component as a minority. And this force functions in all circumstances, in the election and after the election. Brother Abu Yasir has talked about the uhhh there is a parliament and it forms the government(.) and they are participating in the uhhh(.) No brother (.) we aren’t participating and the evidence is the security issue. The security departments are almost empty ((of Sunni participation)), and the participation rate is almost less than 8% for the Sunni component. This is an issue in which marginalization and exclusiveness are obvious.

(Interview 3: interviewee 2)

The interviewee, in the above example, positioned the Sunnis as marginalized by the government, which was predominantly controlled by the Shiite political parties. By so doing, he legitimized his sect by representing it positively as victimized, and simultaneously delegitimized the government’s exclusionary policies. This challenging interactional move and the pointed complaint (Culpeper, 2011: 256), i.e. No brother (.) we aren’t participating and the evidence is the security issue, communicated that interviewee 2 has taken offense when interviewee 1 deauthorized Sunnis as a minority in the previous example. Therefore, the actor-oriented legitimization of Sunnis and the action-oriented delegitimization of government exclusive policies involve an embedded evaluation of communal impoliteness. In terms of directionality, this inter-communal impoliteness evaluation indicates that
Interviewee 2 interpreted the collective authorization attempt in the previous example as an offensive, and as a result face threatening, act to him and to the entire ethnosectarian community he sought to represent in this interview. By so doing, interviewee 2 directed the expressive communal impoliteness embedded in interviewee 1’s deauthorization towards multiple participants at different levels of participation, i.e. the Sunni community at the second-frame.

Impoliteness instances identified in the dataset exhibit thematically related differences across the three TV interviews analyzed in this chapter as shown in figure 5.7 (below).

![Figure 5.6 Percentages of impoliteness in the TV interviews](image)

In the figure, impoliteness was codified in terms of expressive impoliteness and classificatory impoliteness (Eelen, 2001). As argued in 3.3 above, the identification of the classificatory impoliteness instances in the dataset was based on the interviewees’ metapragmatic comments (Culpeper, 2011: 74) and contextualization cues (Gumperz, 1982: 131). The identification of the expressive impoliteness instances, on the other hand, was based on my own emic knowledge of the norms conventionally associated with the settings under investigations to make specific genre-sanctioned interpretations of impoliteness (see Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2013: 24). The numbers of impoliteness assessments identified in the utterances that have a (de)legitimizing function were as follows; 5 instances of expressive impoliteness and 3 instances of classificatory impoliteness in the first TV interview, 9 instances of expressive impoliteness and 5 instances of classificatory impoliteness in the second TV interview, and 3 instances of expressive impoliteness and 1 instance of classificatory impoliteness in the third TV interview. Since some instances of (de)legitimization involve both action-oriented and actor-oriented topoi, the quantitative analysis of the
Impoliteness in each interview is normalized by the number of utterances identified as having a (de)legitimating function, which might include more than a single topos. Figure 5.7 demonstrates that impoliteness was more salient in the interview that was more sectarianly sensitive because of the sensitivity of the topic. However, it was less salient in the third interview in which the interviewees concentrated on justifying their actions and improving their image rather than attacking others (cf. figure 5.3 and 5.6).

5.5 Summary
The aim of this chapter was to examine how the conflict for power could be discursively produced, perceived and evaluated across thematically different contexts in the genre of multi-participant political TV interviews. Focusing on how the conflict for power was discursively realized, the interviewees tended to recontextualize particular political actions and actors and (re)characterize them in order to (de)legitimize particular interpretations of reality. At the first level of positioning analysis, the analysis shows that the interviewees employed a wide range of topoi to (de)legitimize particular political interpretations of political reality. Although, the balance between the action and actor-oriented topoi was maintained, the use of the different (de)legitimization topoi seemed to vary in thematically motivated patterns.

In the first interview the positive representation of self image and the negative representation of others were the most commonly used topoi. The collective legitimization topoi of victimization was characteristically employed in the second TV interview due to the ethno-sectarianly sensitive nature of the topic. Interestingly, in the third interview, which discussed the results of the 2014 parliamentary election and the possibility of forming a ruling coalition, the topoi of authorization and deauthorization were the most commonly used topoi.

At the second level of positioning analysis, I interrogated the interlocutors’ genre-sanctioned roles in the TV interview and examined how they evolved into political alignments as part of their attempt to establish their alignments towards the topic in question and/or towards each other. The analysis indicates that these political alignments affected and effected how rapport was perceived in the interviews. At the third level of positioning analysis where the sociopolitical identities were scrutinized, different types of sociopolitical identities were indexed. These identities combined political orientations with personal traits or institutional or ethno-sectarian affiliations.
It seems that the interviewees tended to construct their identities via negative identification patterns due to cognitive and rhetorical reasons. It is the interrelation between the here-and-now, i.e. in the locality of interviews analyzed in this chapter, and the there-and-then, i.e. the (de)legitimizing process, that determined how the interlocutors defended their political interests and constructed their sociopolitical identities.

Focusing on how conflict for power was perceived and evaluated in terms of impoliteness, the last section investigated the interrelation between (de)legitimization and impoliteness in order to highlight the social and moral underpinnings of the political discourse produced in TV interviews. The multi-tiered positioning analysis was used to identify various instances of exogenous and endogenous impoliteness each of which triggered at different spatiotemporal levels of the context. Exogenous evaluations of impoliteness were embedded in the (de)legitimization acts, and hence were captured at the first level of positioning analysis. The findings suggest that exogenous impoliteness assessments functioned as moral gauges for negatively perceived political practices. Endogenous evaluations of impoliteness, on the other hand, were the focus of the second and third levels of positioning analysis as they were triggered by (perceived) violation of the normative frame of reference and identity and face related offenses. Thus, endogenous impoliteness assessments could normatively gauge for the interviewees’ interactional practices in situ. As for the types of impoliteness, the impoliteness assessments identified mostly include institutional impoliteness in the first two interviews, but communal impoliteness in the second interview, which seems to be motivated by the thematic context. The analysis of impoliteness indicates that impoliteness was more salient in the interview that was more sectarianly sensitive because of the sensitivity of the topic. However, it was less salient in the third interview in which the interviewees concentrated on justifying their actions and improving their image rather than attacking others.
Chapter Six
Interplay of (De)legitimization, Rapport and Impoliteness in Facebook Discussions

6. Introduction
This chapter aims to scrutinize the discursive conflict for power in three Facebook comment threads, to explore the participation framework and dynamics of argumentation in these online interactions and finally to examine the social and moral implications of this conflict for power. Section 6.1 investigates how the conflict for power, by means of (de)legitimization, could be produced and reacted to on Facebook at the first level of positioning analysis. Section 6.2 explores the interactional orders afforded by the medium in the Facebook comment threads to demonstrate how the interlocutors positioned themselves in relation to each other in the wake of the collapsed context in this genre (Marwick and Boyd, 2011). Section 6.3 unpacks the social ramifications of the conflict for power in this genre by highlighting how the sociopolitical identities were constructed and how they consequently led to the creation of online sociopolitical communities. Investigating how rapport was perceived in situ elucidates how certain political and interactional practices could be evaluated in terms of impoliteness (section 6.4), which ultimately pinpoints the moral implications of the political confrontations taking place on Facebook.

Research on (de)legitimization, as a discursive power source, has often overlooked computer mediatized communication. However, the use of different social media platforms in political debates makes the investigation of the conflict for power in the political discourses produced in social media a worthwhile and valuable research project, especially because the continuity and similarity between the virtual and the real can be “fruitfully used to diagnose cultural change and societal conditions” (Bou-Franch & Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2014: 22). This is especially relevant in the context of this chapter, as Facebook users are urged by particular affordances of the medium to make the connection between their off and on-line self more visible (Cirucci, 2015). From a political perspective, social media represent communication platforms technologically equipped to function as an indispensable

---

“online public sphere” (Douai and Nofal, 2012) in the globalized world where marginalized people can voice their political opinions and produce counter-discourses that offset hegemonic discourses (Dahlberg, 2007: 837). In this respect, the popularity of social media as means of activism and political engagement has increased considerably since the political events of 2011-2012 in the Arab world (Arab Media Outlook Report, 2012: 224).

In Iraq, Facebook is the most commonly used social media site. Facebook characteristically generates and circulates huge political discourses in which a wide spectrum of interlocutors can participate making use of different affordances, one of which is the public commenting tool on public pages. The most relevant medium factors (Herring, 2007) of Facebook are its collapsed context (Marwick and Boyd, 2011), which gives it its participatory nature, which theoretically allows everybody with internet connection to engage in these interactions. Asynchronicity is another important medium factor because it offers users plenty of time to send precise and planned messages (Tanskanen, 2007: 98). The comment liking tool is also important as it may indicate the commenters’ endorsement of some political opinions, which can ultimately index their memberships in some online communities forged within the comment threads (see examples 17, 18 and 19)

6.1 (Dis)agreeing through (de)legitimization

Unlike the political discourses produced in mainstream media, the use of (de)legitimization in the political discourses instantiated on Facebook comment threads does not quintessentially aim to promote specific political agendas. The commenters’ principal goal when engaging in a political discussion on Facebook comment threads is to communicate their (dis)agreement with the arguments made by the post-author (i.e. page owner) or the other commenters and have their voices heard, especially because their ability to access mainstream media is rather restricted. This was evident by the commenters’ frequent use of debate related expressions, such as ‘agree’, ‘disagree’, ‘don’t think’, ‘this opinion’, ‘this argument’.

Broadly speaking, in these debate-like interactions the commenters recontextualize particular political actions and actors and then (re)characterize them in order to (de)legitimize particular interpretations of the political scene. The commenters in the comment threads analyzed in this chapter legitimized the political
actors they liked, along with their political actions and (de)legitimized the political actors they disliked, along with their actions. In doing so, they voiced their political opinions in a manner that was in line with their ideological preferences. As discussed in the previous chapters, the lexico-grammatical realizations of (de)legitimization can be analyzed at the first level of positioning analysis to demystify their ideological packages. Similar to the analysis in Chapter Five, both action and actor-oriented (de)legitimization could be found. Unlike the interlocutors in the interactions analyzed in Chapter Five, however, the commenters in the Facebook interactions employed these types of (de)legitimization to communicate their utter or partial (dis)agreement with others rather than promoting specific political agendas. Consider examples 1 and 2 below.

Example 1:
المواطن مع الأحرار مع منفرقه و يصيرون النصف + يتشجعون رئيس وزراء وباي بأي نوري ..... ان شاء الله
Citizen ((coalition)) and the Free ((bloc)) along with the small blocs become a half+1 and ((they)) nominate a Prime Minister Designate and bye bye Noori..... Allah’s willing.

(Comment thread 3)

In order to express his disagreement with the political prediction made by another commenter, the commenter in the example above authorized two political actors whilst deauthorizing another one in order to legitimize his own prediction about how the political scene would evolve in the aftermath of the 2014 parliamentary election in the country. He first authorized the traditional Shiite rival of the ruling party, i.e. Citizen ((coalition)) and the Free ((bloc)), by invoking their popularity and representativeness as indicated by the election results and their ability to form the new government. The commenter discursively represented these political actors by means of association, which refers to “groups formed by social actors and/or groups of social actors (either generically or specifically referred to) which are never labeled in the text (although the actors or groups who make up the association may of course themselves be named and/or categorized)” (van Leeuwen, 2008:38). The then-ruling party, the State of Law, was individualized and nominated (see van Leeuwen, 2008: 52) by using the first name of its leader, i.e. Noori. Although it was the first winner in
the parliamentary election, the commenter deauthorized the State of Law by highlighting its inability to form a majority coalition that could form the government, i.e. bye bye Noori..... Allah’s willing.

Example 2:

Oh father of XXX ((traditional term of address)) you are man of insight. Al-Maliki's enemies had raised his popularity to the utmost after they managed by means of their convulsive sectarian discourse to depict him as the greater danger to a particular sect. And this made the people from the other sect more attached to Al-Maliki as he (represented) their defender and the defender of their sect.. My regards.

(Comment thread 1)

In example 2, the commenter was communicating his agreement with the political interpretation made by the post-author in his original post. He thus delegitimized the opposition parties’ practices using negative evaluations of an action. The commenter discursively represented the opposition in terms of possessivation (van Leeuwen, 2008:34) in relation to the former Prime Minister who was nominated (ibid: 40), i.e. Al-Maliki's enemies. The delegitimized actions were first agentialized (ibid: 66) to highlight the opposition’s responsibility for them, i.e. Al-Maliki's enemies had raised; they managed to, and then by an objectivated action (ibid: 63-4), which was negatively presented through predication, i.e. by means of their convulsive sectarian discourse.

In certain cases both actor-oriented and action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi can be used in order to make the disagreement more grounded and justifiable, as shown in example 3 below.

Example 3:

Do you hold dialogue with the one who wishes to slay you?

(Comment thread 2)

In example 3 the commenter attempted to rebut the post-author’s call on the government to embark on national dialogue. To that end, the commenter criminalized
the Sunni opposition, with whom the post-author urged the government to hold dialogue, discursively representing them by genericization (van Leeuwen, 2008: 35), i.e. *the one who wishes to slaughter you.* Criminalizing the Sunni opposition as such represented them as fit for prosecution rather than political dialogue. By so doing, the commenter attempted to irrationalize the political action (i.e. holding a dialogue with the opposition), by highlighting its inconsistency, because the Sunni opposition was perceived by the commenter as unfit to hold dialogue with. This political action was discursively represented in terms of objectivation by the commenter, substituting the product, i.e. dialogue, for the action, i.e. to hold dialogue or to negotiate.

As was to be expected, in the first comment thread, which discussed the 2012 political standoff between multiple opposition parties and the ruling party as well as the concomitant propagandas, the main actors (de)legitimized included the former Prime Minister and the opposition parties (see example 4 below), while the main political actions (de)legitimized included the former Prime Minister’s policies, behaviors towards his opponents, i.e. the opposition, and the opposition parties’ political agenda and their behaviors towards the former Prime Minister and his cabinet as shown in example 2 above. Example 4 introduces the post-author’s argument in the first comment thread and a response posted by one of the commenters, in which he used delegitimization to communicate his agreement with the post-author’s argument.

Example 4:
Post-author: I have said it more than one time; Al-Maliki’s enemies benefitted him more than his friends ((did)), they allied against him so they turned him into a hero in the eyes of many groups and the ((election)) results are proving this theory. Even though I am not specialized in political analysis, I personally expect that next year would witness a
tactical change in his opponent’s campaign. They would have to deal with him because he became the most important figure in the political equation. I even expect that the regional powers would reassess the (political) scene after election results. If I were in the opponents’ places ((shoes)) I would make peace with Al-Maliki and do the exact opposite of what I (they) did in order not to increase his popularity and not to let him win a third term. If things go the other way around and the battle of defaming continues, be assured that his votes would increase and would embarrass them all.

Here I am and there you are. (((Time will prove my expectation right)).

Commenter:

الرئاسة الماليكي كانت اصالة انتخابات طائفيا حثنا فهو و كان و و سيكون رئيس وزراء لطائفة واحدة.

Al-Maliki's (victory in the) election was originally sectarianly motivated. He has been, and always will be, a prime minister for one sect only.

(Comment thread 1)

In example 4, the post-author irrationalized the opposition parties’ practices against Al-Maliki, (the former Prime Minister), specifically their defaming campaign, highlighting its detrimental consequences on the opposition parties themselves, e.g. they allied against him so they turned him into a hero in the eyes of many groups and the ((election)) results are proving this theory. The irrationalized actions were represented by means of agentialization (van Leeuwen, 2008: 66), i.e. they allied; they turned, and objectivation, (ibid: 63-4), i.e. the battle of defaming. The responsibility of the opposition parties for these actions was linguistically established by presenting them as the doers of these actions, i.e. agents.

In the same example, the commenter used the negative representation of an out-group actor to delegitimize the former Prime Minister, i.e. Al-Maliki, in order to voice his opinion regarding the issue discussed by the post-author, and which generated the entire interaction, i.e. the comment thread. The commenter characterized Al-Maliki as a Prime Minister for his own sect only not for all Iraqis, i.e. he has been, and always will be, a prime minister for one sect only, to cast doubt on his legitimacy. In doing so, the commenter indirectly communicated his disagreement with the author. The characterized, i.e. the former Prime Minister, was
discursively represented by means of nomination (van Leeuwen, 2008: 41) referred to by his last name.

In the second comment thread analyzed in this chapter, the main political actions that were targeted by (de)legitimization were related to the government’s refusal to hold dialogue with the Sunni opposition, which was perceived as sectarianly tendentious. The post-author in his original post blamed the government for refusing to hold dialogue with Sunni opposition highlighting the similarity of this refusal to hold dialogue with the Sunni opposition with the refusal of Saddam’s regime, which is often described as autocratic, to hold dialogue, due sectarian biases, with the former opposition parties, who are now in power. Therefore, the political actors who were (de)legitimized in the comment thread were the government (and the former opposition), which was stereotypically described as Shiite-dominated, and the Sunni opposition (sometimes assimilated with Saddam’s ousted regime), which was stereotypically described as Sunni-dominated. Moreover, Shiites and Sunnis were also (de)legitimized in this comment thread, because they were perceived as actors in the political process in Iraq. Alternatively, the political actions that were delegitimized were associated with the practices of the government and of the Sunni opposition. This comment thread tackled the more sensitive aspect of politics, related to the ethno-sectarian affiliations of the commenters; this was demonstrated by the frequent use of collective (de)legitimization topoi such as out-group criminalization (see example 3 above), and in-group victimization as (see example 5 below), which both were based on differentiation and exclusion.

Example 5:
Post-author:

It had been told to Saddam previously to hold a dialogue with the Leaders of the Shiite opposition; he said how would I hold a dialogue with traitors who had hold up arms with the Iranian Army to kill their own people. Today sit in Saddam’s place those who refuse dialogue under the same pretext, this means that the cycle of violence will continue to devour us in this entrapment(-like) country.
An unjust analogy between (a group of ) people we were asking for living and a freedom of speech and an unrepealable dictator like Saddam (who) gathered them in mass graves.. And (another group of) people who have representatives in the government and the parliament and so many other things but a group of killers made them lose their sight.. This is not an admiration for Al-Maliki but it is the stupidity of his opposition that made him the exceptional man of his time.

(Comment thread 2)

In the above example, the post-author established his political stance using the action-oriented topos of irrationalization to delegitimze the government’s refusal to hold talks with the Sunni opposition highlighting this refusal’s devastating consequences, i.e. this means that the cycle of violence will continue to devour us in this entrapment(-like) country. In the example above, the political action delegitimized was discursively represented as an agentialized action, i.e. those who refuse dialogue. Agentialized actions, to use van Leeuwen’s (2008: 66) words, are the actions “represented as brought about by human agency” in order to associate the actions with their performers, and consequently highlighting their responsibility for these actions. Therefore, right from the outset of the interaction symbolized by the main post, the post-author communicated a sociopolitical stance that was antithetical to the government and its policies.

In order to communicate his disagreement with the post-author, the commenter in example 5 (above) attempted to rebut the analogy between the former Shiite opposition (i.e. politically represented by the current ruling party) and by extension the Shiite people, discursively represented in terms of genericization (van Leeuwen, 2008:36) and differentiation (ibid, 40), i.e. (a group of) people, (another group of) people, and the Sunni opposition. The rebuttal of this analogy was operationalized by the legitimization topos of positive representation of in-group actors by virtue of
victimization. The commenter characterized the Shiites as victimized people who had been killed and buried in mass graves by a dictator merely for asking for decent living and freedom of speech, i.e. \textit{(a group of ) people were asked for living and a freedom of speech and an unrepeatable dictator like Saddam (who) gathered them in mass graves.}

The third comment thread discussed the results of the 2014 parliamentary election. The commenters highlighted the strengths of political parties they supported and justified their political actions, and pinpointed the weaknesses of their rivals and condemned their political actions. Interestingly, the topos of authorization was employed frequently in this comment thread (see also figure 6.3 below). Most of the authorization attempts made by the commenters were achieved by appealing to the political parties’ capability to form a ruling coalition, because the parliamentary elections failed to produce a decisive winner who could form a ruling majority in the parliament. Consider example 6 below.

\textbf{Example 6:}

\textit{I think Al-Maliki will garner 95 seats. With Al-Fadhila, Tayarul-Islah, Al-Sadiqoon and the small blocs they will form the government.} (Comment thread 3)

In the above example, the commenter attempted to authorize the political actor he supported, i.e. Al-maliki, in two ways. He first appealed to the popularity of this political actor expecting that he would garner 95 of the parliamentary seats. Such a number was considered remarkably high within the politically dispersed Iraqi context, in which no party was expected to acquire more than 80 seats. Secondly, the commenter authorized this political actor in terms of expertise, highlighting his ability to convince the small parliamentary bloc to join his ruling coalition. The political party targeted by process of authorization was discursively represented by individualization (van Leeuwen, 2008: 37) referring to it by virtue of its leader, i.e. Al-Maliki.

A quantitative comparison of the (de)legitimization in the three comment threads can be illuminating. The numbers of (de)legitimization instances identified were 67, 114 and 105 in the first, second and third comment threads respectively.
These 286 instances were coded for the eight (de)legitimization topoi listed in table 2.1. As shown in example 3 above, some comments that had (de)legitimating functions included multiple (de)legitimizing topoi; in such cases the occurrence of multiple topoi was accommodated in the analysis by quantifying each single occurrence of the different topoi. The results were then normalized by the total numbers of (de)legitimization instances identified in each in each comment thread. Coding decisions regarding ambiguous cases of (de)legitimization were made by using the interactional responses as evidence that a comment was interpreted by the participants as serving either a legitimizing or delegitimizing function.

Figure 6.1 (below) shows the percentages of the different (de)legitimization topoi used in the first comment thread.

Figure 6.1 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in first comment thread

Figure 6.1 the negative representation of others was the most commonly used (N= 26) followed by authorization (N= 11) and deauthorization (N= 10) respectively. In terms of the action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi, the topos of negative evaluation of actions (N= 8) was the more commonly used followed by the delegitimization topos
The legitimization topoi of rationalization (N= 1) and positive evaluation of actions (N= 1) were the topoi least used in this comment thread.

Figure 6.2 below shows the percentages of the (de)legitimization topoi in the second comment thread.

As for the second comment thread, as shown in Figure 6.2 above, the deauthoritization topos of negative representation of others was by far the most commonly used (N= 66) followed by the legitimization topos of positive representation of self (N= 20). This was due to the commenters’ persistent use of communal criminalization, in order to present others or out-group members negatively, and communal victimization, in order to present in-group members positively, which seems to be related to the sensitive nature of the topic discussed, i.e. the government policies that were perceived as sectarianly biased by some Sunni opposition. Deauthorization (N= 1) was the least used of all topoi. In terms of the action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi,
it was the negative evaluation of actions that was the more commonly used (N= 11) whereas the other action-oriented topoi were approximately used evenly.

Figure 6.3 below shows the percentages of the (de)legitimization topoi in the third comment thread.

![Figure 6.3 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in third comment thread](image)

As shown in figure 6.3 above, the topos of authorization was the more commonly used (N= 32) followed by the topos of negative representation of others (N= 30) in the third comment thread. Most importantly, authorization and deauthorization were used very commonly (N= 49), representing 47% of all topoi. In the light of the topic of the comment thread, which was concerned with the results of the 2014 election, and with reference to the individual examples (e.g. example 1), the high percentages of authorization and deauthorization seem to be due to the commenters’ interest in making claims about the ability of the political actors they support/oppose to represent the general public and to form a ruling coalition. This suggests that the topic
discussed in this comment thread and the temporal context of the interaction (i.e. its proximity to the events debated in the comment thread) affect the commenters’ choices of (de)legitimization topoi. In terms of action-oriented (de)legitimization, irrationalization (N= 7) and the negative evaluation of action (N= 8) were the most commonly used topoi.

Generally speaking, the use of the different (de)legitimization topoi in the three Facebook comment threads was demonstrably more polarized than in the thematically corresponding TV interviews analyzed in Chapter Five. However, the results in the three comment threads exhibit thematically prompted patterns of use that were more or less similar to those found in Chapter Five. In the first Facebook comment thread and its thematically corresponding first TV interview, the actor-oriented topos of negative representation of others was the most commonly used topois. The collective topoi, especially criminalization and victimization, were the most frequent in both the second Facebook comment thread and the second TV interview. In the third Facebook comment thread and its thematically corresponding third TV interview the use of authorization and deauthorization were prominently salient.

The quantitative analysis shows that actor-oriented (de)legitimization topoi were much more commonly used than action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi in the three comment threads. Despite the thematically motivated individual differences between the three comment threads, the percentages of the (de)legitimization orientations within each thread stayed relatively the same, i.e. roughly 1 to 4. This suggests that the political debates in the context of Facebook were more personalized and less agenda-oriented than in the corresponding TV interviews, because in such online debates the commenters tend to focus on the political actors and their images rather than their actions and agendas regardless of the topic being debated. This ultimately indicates that the comments were more interested in supporting their ideological biases about the political actors in the political arena.
6.2 Establishing alignments and forming political fronts

As shown in Chapter Five, the advantage of the second level of positioning analysis in mediatized political interactions is twofold: showing how the genre-sanctioned roles can evolve into political roles of supporters or antagonists with regard to the topic in question; and secondly, unpacking how these interactional roles concurrently effect and affect participants’ perception of rapport in the interaction. Yet, in multi-participant and asynchronous interactions such as the Facebook comment threads analyzed in this chapter, the second level of the positioning analysis has a further advantage. It can elucidate the “interactional orders” afforded by the medium in this genre (Langlotz and Locher, 2012). Due to the collapsed context in the Facebook comment threads (Marwick and Boyd, 2011), it is possible for any metaparticipant to address the post-author, another commenter or maybe both, which makes the participation framework in this genre more complicated than in the interactional genres in the mainstream media, e.g. TV interviews.

Tracing how the genre-sanctioned roles could be fleshed out in the interaction, examples 7 and 8 demonstrate how a commenter established a politically defined alignment that allowed him to join one of the political fronts constructed in the interaction.

Example 7:
AB:
This (what you have said in the main post) is a fact that we the non-politicians are aware of how about (those) who call themselves politicians?????!!

(Comment thread 1)

The commenter (AB) in example 7 voiced his agreement with the original argument made by the post-author about the opposition parties’ practices towards the Prime Minister. This agreement was indicated by the commenter’s claim that [t]his is a fact that we the non-politicians are aware of. Such a comment automatically established his genre-sanctioned role as commenter in a comment thread on Facebook, which bestowed on him certain rights and obligations associate with this role. Yet, his agreement with the post-author’s argument did not unequivocally signal his political alignments towards the political fronts constructed in the interaction, e.g. pro-Prime Minster, con-Prime Minister, pro-opposition, con-opposition, because he ambiguously voiced agreement with the main post without (de)legitimizing any of the parties involved.

However, in a later comment made by the same commenter, his genre-sanctioned role evolved into a particularized interactional role (Sluss & Ashforth, 2007) i.e. a politically defined alignment, which established his membership in one of the political fronts formed in the interaction, as shown in example 8 below.

Example 8:

CD:
الدكتور ناجح... بالرغم من انني لم ارغب به استطاع تمويل دعاية انتخابيه من خصومه من خلال المظاهرة و حتى أصبح مختارا لزمانه.

Al-Maliki is a successful politician... Even though I do not like him he managed to fund (make effective) his electoral campaign from his opponents via the demonstrations he even became the chosen one of this time.

AB:

أي تقصد دكتاتور ناجح ومتغطرس.

You mean a successful and arrogant dictator.

(Comment thread 1)

Paying attention to the second level of positioning analysis could elucidate how commenter AB aligned himself in relation to other commenters by identifying the
interactional order in his comment in example 8 above, i.e. for whom his comment was intended. The interactional order in the example above was commenter-to-commenter, in which AB’s comment was intended as a response to a specific recipient, i.e. commenter CD. The responsiveness was signaled by means of “format tying” (Bolander, 2012:1616), which was made by recycling a lexical item and syntactic structure, i.e. a successful politician, in the first comment and a successful dictator in the other. By so doing, commenter AB established his antithetical alignment to the other commenter and constructed his membership in the political front of the opponents of the former Prime Minister, and, as such, a likely support for the opposition parties.

Due to the nature of the Facebook comment threads, the post authors’ politically defined alignments were established upfront in their original posts. This indirectly positioned them in relation to their audience (potential commenters and lurkers). Unlike the interactional moves made by the interviewers in the TV interviews analyzed in Chapter Five, the post-authors established relatively fixed alignments to the topics of discussion avoiding oscillation between different political stances across the interaction, because they were perceived by the commenters as the “principal” (Goffman, 1981) responsible for and committed to what their posts said and, thus, “active in some particular social identity and role” (ibid: 145). In the data analyzed in this chapter, the post-authors continued defending their political alignments as needed in the comment threads. Consider the example 9, in which the post-author in the second comment thread was responding to a commenter to defend his politically defined alignment which he established in the original post that generated the comment thread as shown in example 4 above.

Example 7:
Commenter:
Let the blood be shed but (with) no submission to the terrorists. Weren’t those in Saddam’s republican guards slaughtering the sons of the uprising?13

---

13 Uprising here refers to the 1991 uprising against Saddam Hussein’s regime
Post-author

No one is asking the government to hold a dialogue with Daesh (ISIS) or Al-Qaeda, but with the politicians you considered traitors, Baathists and proxies, which was what Saddam said about the leaders of the opposition.

(Comment thread 2)

At the beginning of example 7, the commenter positioned himself in direct contrast to the Sunni opposition supporters and less directly to the post-author, rejecting his opinion of the talks between the government and the Sunni opposition. In his response, the post-author clarified his stance in relation to the topic in question defending his original politically defined alignment. By so doing, the antithetical positioning between him and the commenter was explicitly maintained.

Due to the collapsed context in the Facebook comment thread, rapport could be enhanced or threatened by any metaparticipant, as s/he can join the interaction. The politically defined alignments that evolved as the interaction unfolded had considerable impact on the way rapport was perceived and managed by the participants at the different interactional orders available in the participation framework of this genre. Example 10 below shows how rapport was oriented and perceived in an interaction between a commenter and the post-author in the second comment thread, wherein the commenter positioned himself relative to the post-author.

Example 10:

(First Name) do not be the terrorists’ advocate.

(Comment thread 2)

In the example above, the commenter indirectly communicated his disagreement with the post-author’s call upon the government to hold talks with the Sunni opposition. The commenter signaled responsiveness by naming the addressee (the post-author) (Bolander, 2012:1615). Using the negative representation of out-group actors, the
commenter attempted to criminalize the Sunni opposition characterizing them as terrorists in order to delegitimize the Sunni opposition, with whom the post-author requested a dialogue. By communicating such an emotionally loaded disagreement, the commenter aligned himself and the post-author in two opposing fronts in the interaction, which oriented the rapport towards challenge between them.

In some cases, establishing political alignments in intensively antithetical manners rendered communication impossible between some commenters. Example 1 below is an extract taken from the first comment thread in which two commenters, voicing their opinions over the issue in question, established strongly expressed antithetical alignments. In doing so, the commenters oriented rapport towards challenge, rendering the interaction between them quite conflictive. Realizing that communication was no longer possible, one of the commenters positioned the post-author as a gatekeeper, inviting the post-author to wield the deontic power associated with his role to retain the harmony of the interaction.

Example 1:
42. Commenter:

تريدني ارد XXX بنفس اسلوبه لو تصرف انت؟

Father of XXX do you want me to respond to XXXX in the same manner or you will take care of it?

43. Post-author:

لا أني راح أتصرف بدون زعل أخوان ، صحتني ليست مكانا للشتائم وساحذ الآن كل التعليقات المسية.

No I will take care of it. Do not blame me brothers; my page is not a place for insults and I will delete all the offensive comments.

48. Commenter:

اسف صديقي أبو الطيب ... ولكن الصفحة التي يقل فيها ضيوفك الأدب علي لا تلزمني.

Sorry my friend Father of XXX... but I do not want the page ((place)) where your guests becomes less polite with me is of no use to me.
51. Post-author:

 أحمد الحضيري ، جذلت التعليقات السيئة.

 XXXX, I deleted the insulting comments.

54. Commenter:

 شكرا أبو الطيب.

 Thanks father of XXX.

(Comment thread 1)

In the example above, the commenter appealed to one of the post-author’s genre-sanctioned roles; that is the role of a gatekeeper. Within the affordances of Facebook, the gatekeeper role was bestowed on the post-author because he was the page owner. The commenter in comment 42 positioned the post-author as a gatekeeper by performing a directive speech act, i.e. an indirect request. In doing so, the commenter invoked the post-author’s mediating role in the interaction, which was expected to soothe the tension and to put an end to the perceivably norm disruptive behavior of another commenter. The commenter in the example above, then, explicitly indicated in comment 48 that he would not continue the discussion if the insulting comments from the other commenter continued. In comment 43, the post-author responded to the commenter of comment 42; he acted in his capacity as a gatekeeper, warning all commenters that he would delete all the insulting comments. Later in the thread, in comment no. 51, the post-author informed the offended commenter, using naming as a responsive signal, that he had indeed deleted the offensive comments, which implicitly invited the commenter to continue his political argument if he still so desired.

As mentioned above, the second levels of positioning analysis can identify the interactional orders of the interactions. In the comment threads analyzed in this chapter, the comments could be directed to a single interlocutor as shown in example 12 below, in which the comment was addressed to the post-author.

Example 12:

 مشتكيه سيدينا

 (You are) misguided our Saed ((traditional term of address used honorifically)).

 (Comment thread 3)
The interactional order in the example, which represents an introductory part of a comment, was commenter-to-post-author, in which the commenter was only interested in communicating his disagreement with the post-author’s argument. The commenter signaled responsiveness to the post-author by means of a special type of naming (Bolander, 2012:1615) expressed by the traditional term of address our Saed, which was used honorifically in the example.

Alternatively, some comments could involve more than one interactional order. Consider example 13 below in which the comment was directed to both the post-author and other commenters.

Example 13:

What a victory are the brothers talking about? Can you enlighten me Father of XXX ((traditional term of address)) because my head is spinning?!

(Comment thread 1)

In example 13, the commenter responded to both the post-author and some of the commenters. The commenter used the traditional term of address Father of XXX to index responsiveness to the post-author, whereas the responsiveness to the other commenters was indexed by the use of noun phrase the brothers, which was used honorifically. The commenter established an antithetical alignment to commenters who agreed with the post-author’s argument about the former Prime Minister’s victory. However, he attempted to mitigate the threat to the post-author’s face possibly made by this disagreement. Therefore, he directed the disagreement to the commenters, and involved the post-author as a verified witness in the discussion.

Interestingly, some comments, predominantly those which were extreme or controversial, tended to attract the attention of several commenters, motivating them to respond to the commenters rather than the post-author, creating multiple embedded debates within each comment thread. These embedded debates decentralized the interaction, making it less unidirectionally responding to the main post that expressed the post-author’s political opinion, which was supposed to be the main topic of the debate. Using Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988) metaphor of the rhizome when discussing the structure of knowledge, it can then be argued that the interactional orders on Facebook comment threads analyzed in this chapter were manipulated to
make the argumentation process rhizomatically proliferated rather than hierarchically structured. Consider example 14 below.

Example 14:
87. Commenter AB:

اعتقد المالكي سيحصل ٩٥ مقعدٍ. مع الفضيلة وتيار الإصلاح والصادقون والقوائم الصغيرة سيشكلون الحكومة.

I think Al-Maliki will garner 95 seats. With the Virtue, Reform Current, the Truthful and the small blocs they will form the government.

138. Commenter CD:

المواطن والاحرار انتهى المالكي.

Citizen ((Coalition)) and the Free ((bloc)) and Al-Maliki is finished.

155. Commenter EF:

المواطن مع الأحرار مع متفرقه و يصبرون النصف + 1 ويشجعون رئيس وزراء ونابي بادي نوري ... ان شاء الله

Citizen ((coalition)) and the Free ((bloc)) along with the small blocs become a half+1 and ((they)) nominate a Prime Minister Designate and bye bye Noori..... Allah's willing.

156. Commenter GH:

المواطن والاحرار ما يصلون ٧٠ مقعد. شتحجي انت بابا؟!

Citizen ((Coalition)) and the Free ((bloc)) will not get 70 seats. What do you say son (used patronizingly)??

158. Commenter EF:

 بصبرون ٧٩ معهم متفرقه كوك ٣٠ إذا ما حصلت مفاجأة من متحدون.

They will be 79 ((seats)) and with them will be the small blocs, say, 30 ((seats)), if no surprise takes place with the United ((Coalition)).

(Comment thread 3)
In the examples above, each commenter attempted to legitimize his political view by virtue of authorizing the political actors they liked and deauthorizing the ones they did not like, appealing to those political actors’ popularity and representativeness as indicated by the election results and their ability to form the new government. The commenters signaled responsiveness to each other by means of “format tying” (Bolander, 2012:1616), recycling some lexical items and syntactic structures, e.g. *Citizen* ((coalition)) and *The Free* ((bloc)), in comments 138, 155 and 156; and the pronoun *they* in comment 158. The commenters in the above example challenged the hierarchy of interaction which was supposed to revolve around the page-owner-commenters relationship, which was afforded by the Facebook context. Being less interested in voicing their (dis)agreements with the page-owner’s main post, the commenters indulged in debating the post-election scenarios and the formation of the ruling coalition, creating a decentralized discussion embedded within the interaction of the third comment thread. This interactional pattern gave rise to a micro debate that was rhizomatically, rather than hierarchically, connected to the argumentation process in the comment thread in question. Each of these decentralized debates discussed different aspects of the political topics originally raised by the post authors. The commenters engaged in these decentralized debates according to their interactional interests.

Analyzing the different interactional orders in the Facebook comment threads highlights the distinctive nature of the Facebook participation framework and its difference from the participation framework set out by Langlotz and Locher (2012) for the commenting tools in online platforms. When analyzing data from the commentary section of *Mail Online*, Langlotz and Locher (ibid: 1598) identified four interactional orders available to the interlocutors. These are commenter-to-world in the article, commenter-to-author, commenter-to-world in general, and finally commenter-to-commenter. Although the participation framework abstracted by Langlotz and Locher (ibid) is very useful, it cannot be applied wholesale to explain interactional orders in Facebook comment threads analyzed in this chapter. This can be attributed to the fact that the participation framework in the Facebook comment thread includes an additional state of affairs beyond the two worlds abstracted by Langlotz and Locher (ibid: 1598) i.e. the world in the article/post and the world in general. The participation framework in the Facebook comment thread also includes
the hypothetical online world as perceived by some of the commenters (see examples 17, 18, and 19). Figure 6.5 (below) explains the interactional orders available to the interlocutors using Facebook’s public commenting tool. The commenters can either address the post-author (A) or another commenter (B). Additionally, the commenter can refer to the world reported in the main post (C), the actual world (D) or the virtual world constructed online (E). It is important to note that the commenters can engage in more than one interactional order simultaneously, e.g. addressing the post-author and referring to the world reported in his post. The comments that have (de)legitimating functions can only be generated when referring to at least one of the worlds indicated in the figure (see the line in bold), because (de)legitimization presupposes a worldview that needs to be supported or refuted.

Figure 6.5 Participation Framework in Facebook comment threads
6.3 Indexing sociopolitical identities and constructing online communities

The significance of the third level of positioning analysis lies in its potential to explore the social implications of the conflict of power, instantiated by the use of (de)legitimization, through highlighting the discursive construction of sociopolitical identities. It shows how commenters’ politically defined alignments are transformed into sociopolitical identities that comprise personal and collective attributes, and as such, link to macro level social categories. Consider the example 15 below.

Example 15:

انتخاب المالكي كان اصلا انتخابا طائفيا نحنا فهمه و كان و سيكون رئيس وزراء طائفه واحدة.

Al-Maliki’s (victory in the) election was originally sectarianly motivated. He has been, and always will be, a prime minister for one sect only.

(Comment thread 1)

Example 15 above shows how the commenter indexed more transportable attributes of his identity when taking into account the ideological underpinnings that framed the discussion. The commenter established a politically defined alignment as an opponent of Al-Maliki through negatively representing him as a discriminatory Prime Minister to cast doubt on his legitimacy. Communicating this political stance against a political actor in such a way, the commenter did not only index his politically defined alignment, but also his sociopolitical identity as a non-sectarianist and nationalist through his evaluative stance towards the political actor and topic under discussion (cf. Bucholtz and Hall, 2010: 21).

Similar to the TV interviews analyzed in Chapter Five, in the three comment threads analyzed in this chapter the political affiliations of the commenters were sometimes interwoven with the collective attributes that defined their membership of certain ethnic or sectarian groups in order to foreground their sub-national identities. Example 16 below illustrates how a commenter constructed his sociopolitical identity in a way that indexed his membership in a sectarian community.

Example 16:

هذه ليست معادلة عادلة ، لا المالكي بكل فساده وقلته يشبه صدام ، ولا " الشيعة " واعتذر لانني اسمي الاشياء

Bismikhalika marwa wa 'nafsi al-anf al-musulmoni..
This is not a just comparison, neither does Al-Maliki with all his corruption look like Saddam, nor did “the Shiites”, and I apologize for calling things by their names, exercise the same violence exercised by Sunnis.

(Comment thread 2)

In order to convey his disagreement with the post-author’s argument, the commenter attempted to delegitimize his call to hold dialogue with the Sunni opposition. He also delegitimized the Sunnis as exercising excessive violence in comparison to the violence exercised by Shiites, hinting at the claim that the Shiites’ exercise of violence could be proportionately tolerated. In doing so, the commenter took an antithetical alignment to the post-author, but more importantly he indexed his sectarian identity as a Shiite, opposite to Sunnis, by virtue of differentiation (van Leeuwen, ibid: 40).

When the commenters discussed a characteristically sensitive topic from an ethno-sectarian point of view as in example 16 above, they tended to index their ethno-sectarian identities almost always in order to highlight difference and divergence from other commenters and communities. Across the three comment threads analyzed in this chapter, constructing ethno-sectarian identities was often perceived as an attempt to reinforce inter-communal tension or an impingement on the other communities’ political rights (cf. Spencer-Oatey’s (2008) rights and obligations). Despite the negative effect, commenters still indexed their ethno-sectarian identities either as an attempt to substantiate fallacious and tendentious arguments, or as a form of emotional discharge in response to the perceived grievances against their ethno-sectarian community (as shown example 16 above).

An in-depth look at how commenters employed (de)legitimization to position themselves in relation to each other and to themselves indicate that commenters tended to identify commenters as members in certain communities through two different patterns. Calculating the frequencies of legitimization versus delegitimization in each comment thread clarifies the commenters’ identification practices that indexed their sociopolitical identities as shown in figure 6.6 (below).
The figure shows that commenters in the three comment threads tended to use delegitimization more frequently than legitimization. Nevertheless, in the third comment thread, which was about the 2014 election, the result was less polarized, because the commenters used the legitimization topos of authorization more frequently to emphasize electoral representativeness. These results suggest that the commenters tended to construct their sociopolitical identities via negative identification, which was notably based on differentiation and exclusion (see example 16 above). The prominence of the negative identification practices in the Facebook comment threads, in comparison to the TV interviews, indicates how ambivalent the commenters felt about their sociopolitical identities, at least in the online context, and also suggests that the Iraqi public, at least as represented by the commenters, did not trust the key political actors and the political institutions they belong to.

Upon constructing their sociopolitical identities, commenters emphasized difference from and deepened divisions with the commenters perceived as out-group members. As such, commenters, consciously or unconsciously, sometimes pigeonholed each other into discursively formed communities. These communities were oppositional to each other due to the binary nature of the (de)legitimization process that indexed the commenters’ sociopolitical identities. Constructing online communities is motivated by deindividuation, which is very common in highly polarized contexts (Garces-Conejo Blitvich: 542). Deindividuation refers to the tendency of conforming to the behavioral standards associated with a social group when confronting individuals perceived as out-group member(s) (Reicher et al., 1995:191).
The discursively constructed communities ranged from completely imagined communities to an online recreation of ethno-sectarian communities that existed in the offline world. These imagined communities did not necessarily include all commenters; they were formed in small rhizomatic groupings. Like any other functional social grouping, these formed communities presupposed the existence of a set of norms and ideologies that define how these communities function (van Dijk, 1998: 142). The commenters often appealed to a set of emergent norms assumed to be shared by the members of the imagined communities to guide their behavior in the interaction (cf. Turner and Killian, 1987: 9-11). Conversely, creating an online version of the actual communities seemed to be operationalized by the same norms and ideologies that underlay the original communities in the offline world. Example 17 (below) shows how commenters could construct an utterly imagined community.

Example 17:
Post-author:

XXX accuses me of being from Fakhri Kareem’s group.
Hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha

Commenter:

Obviously, XXX is not Magrood ((dispossessed)), therefore he has not read the book and he does not know the publishing house.

(Comment thread 1)

In the example above, the post-author attempted to ridicule an accusation made against him in an earlier comment. In this earlier comment, the post-author was accused of criticizing the former Prime Minister in order to flatter the owner of Al-Mada Publishing House, who was one of the former Prime Minister’s opponents. The accusing commenter indicated that the perceived flattery by the post-author of the publishing house owner was a payback for publishing one of his books. The response to the commenter’s accusation motivated the creation of an imagined community: that of the author’s (imagined) online fans and friends on Facebook. The commenter in
line 39 assigned the accuser an emergent identity (Agha, 2009: 236) positioning him in the role of an outsider who did not belong to the community of the author’s fans and friends, and by so doing the commenter implied that he was a member in this imagined online community. He nicely evoked that online community by using the title of the one of the author’s books, i.e. *The Dispossessed*, excluding the accuser from this community stating that obviously, *Al-Shimari is not Magrood* (*dispossessed*). The existence of this imagined community and other commenters’ membership in it were also indexed similarly in several later comments.

Commenters could also form partially imagined communities, which were motivated by actual but fuzzy or indefinite political groupings in the offline world. Consider example 18 below.

Example 18:

Mr. XXX let go with this subject, 69!!--Mr. XXX Al-Maliki ((garnered)) at least 100 ((seats)) do not be part of the league of Al-Maliki’s enemies. I want you to say the truth that Al-Maliki’s rivals had lost the election, which is the truth. It is better for you to keep being independent.

(Comment thread 3)

In example 20, the commenter voiced his disagreement with the post-author’s speculations about the parliamentary seats won by the former Prime Minister’s coalition. Rejecting the number of seats expected by the post-author (69), he authorized the Prime Minister’s coalition by appealing to the expected number of the seats they would win. He also deauthorized all the other blocs describing them as the *league of Al-Maliki’s enemies*, asking the post-author not to join this league. By so doing, the commenter formed an imagined league that included all the rivals of the Prime Minister, who were quite many in number but ineffectively disunited. Conversely, the commenter indirectly constructed his sociopolitical identity as pro-Al-Maliki, and as such, as a member in the league of Al-Maliki’s supporters (see Upaghyay, 2010: 121). Interestingly, the league of Al-Maliki’s enemies was not
totally imagined, because it was inspired by the implicit agreement among most political parties, who chose not to support Al-Maliki (the former Prime Minister) for another term in office.

Alternatively, commenters could discursively construct an online version of actual ethno-sectarian communities that also existed in offline. Typically, when interactional tension was exacerbated due to controversial or extreme comments that gave rise to rhizomatically embedded debates, more commenters subscribed to these online recreated communities and discursively behaved in line with the ideological biases of these communities. Example 19 (below) shows how commenters could discursively construct an online version of ethno-sectarian communities.

Example 19:
73. Commenter AB:

We rule and you blow up. May Allah help the sons of the ill-fated ((victims)).

74. Commenter CD:

Are you delighted that you rule?... and are you convinced that the other sect is blowing up?... when you lose a beloved one you will see who you blame the government.

76. Commenter AB:

No I won’t blame it and I am convinced that all the blowing up and explosions are from you. Do you think we are stupid?

(Comment thread 3)

In comment 73 in the example above, commenter AB authorized his own sect, with the statement, we rule, and simultaneously criminalized the opposing sect, you blow up. He implicitly indexed his sociopolitical identity as a Shiite by using the collectivized first person plural to refer to the majority sectarian community that rules the country, in which he was a member. By contrast, he indexed the identity of the
opposing minority, i.e. Sunnis, whom he accused of the violent attacks against simple people referred to by the idiomatic expression *the sons of the ill-fated*. Understanding the implied sectarianly biased accusation in 73, commenter CD responded to commenter AB in 74 in a bid to defend his social group by rejecting the accusation, i.e. *are you convinced that the other sect is blowing up?*, and blaming the government for these actions. In comment 76, commenter AB delegitimized the Sunnis again by reiterating the accusation of being responsible for the explosions and the violence in the country.

This extract demonstrates how two actual communities, i.e. Shiites and Sunnis, were discursively recreated as the homogenously and monolithically Sunni-hating Shiite community, and homogenously and monolithically Shiite-hating Sunni community. These mediated, ethno-sectarian communities characteristically attracted the attention of several commenters, and as such triggered inter-communal discursive conflict motivated by the ideological biases of offline communities. Therefore, this took the political discussion from mutual accusations by two commenters to a different level of inter-communal conflict in which few other commenters participated.

Other than the explicit responsiveness signal, the commenters’ subscription to the different constructed communities was also identified by two other analytical techniques; firstly, by analyzing the liking patterns: when engaged in a debate embedded within the comment thread, commenters tended to use the liking tool afforded by Facebook to show their endorsement of the comments that supported their ethno-sectarian biases or to subscribe to one of the online communities. This was evident by the numbers of likes received by the comments that invoked the creation of these online communities. Secondly, by identifying the different normative frames of reference based on which the commenters managed and perceived rapport when interacting with each other, it was noticed that the commenters who directly or indirectly indexed their membership in one of the communities would orient rapport towards maintenance or even enhancement when interacting with commenters perceived to be from the same constructed community, whereas they would orient rapport towards challenge when interacting with commenters perceived to be from the rival community (as will be shown later in example 20 below).
6.4 Rapport perception and variability of impoliteness assessments on Facebook

As the comment threads analyzed in this chapter represented multi-participant interactions, it was expected that the commenters’ conceptions of the normative frame of reference underlying their perception of rapport and evaluations of impoliteness would vary. Exploring how the commenters differently conceived of the normative frame of reference in these comment threads necessitated analyzing the commenters’ evaluations of particular political and interactional practices in terms of impoliteness. This could also serve the ultimate aim of this chapter; that is, to pinpoint the moral implications of the conflict for power in the political discourses instantiated in these Facebook comment threads. Methodologically, in multi-participant interactions it is sufficient for an utterance to be considered as impolite, in its broadest sense, if it is at least evaluated by a single participant (Kleinke and Bös, 2015: 51).

In this respect, the discursive construction of online communities in the political interactions on Facebook and the evaluation of impoliteness in these interactions seem to be dialectically related. On the one hand, each discursively constructed online community presupposed the existence of a normative frame of reference against which the members of that community evaluated their own and other’s behaviors in terms of impoliteness. Yet on the other hand, this normative frame of reference defined this online community and unified how its members conceived of it as a distinct community differentiated from other communities. Example 20, taken from the most sectarianly sensitive comment thread, shows how differently commenters evaluated the main post that originated the comment thread in respect of impoliteness, and by so doing identified themselves with different online communities.

Example 20:
Post-author:

It had been told to Saddam previously to hold a dialogue with the Leaders of the Shiite opposition; he said how would I hold a dialogue with traitors who had hold up
arms with the Iranian Army to kill their own people. Today sit in Saddam’s place those who refuse dialogue under the same pretext, this means that the cycle of violence will continue to devour us in this entrapment country.

34. Commenter AB:

وهل قائل المعتصمون جبهم تحت راية دولة اجنبية كما فعل حزب الدعوة؟ كل منصفًا.

Had the sit-in-ers ((the people who do the sit-in)) fought their army under the banner of a foreign state as did Da’awa party? be fair.

46. Commenter CD:

مقارنة غير منصفة ولا موضوعية... المعارضة السابقة لم تفجر في الشوارع ولم تعرق الشوارع في الدماء وكانت لها مطالب واضحة تتعلق بالديمقراطية والمشاركة السياسية... المعارضة الحالية إرهاب أعظم يشتعل لأجناد دولية متعددة الأطراف ولا يمتلك أي رادع أخلاقي وقد رفضوا كل المحاولات الحوار ولا يقبلون إلا أن يعود كليب حيًا. ولن يعود!!

((It is)) an unfair and non-objective comparison... the previous opposition had not blown up the streets nor had drowned the streets with blood, and it had obvious demands related to democracy and political participation... The current opposition is a blind terror serving multiple international agendas with no moral deterrent, and they refused all the attempts for dialogue and they do not accept but to have the tike ((a play with word to refer to Saddam Hussein)) back alive. And he will not!!

(Comment thread 2)

Commenter AB disagreed with the post-author for equating the ousted regime’s refusal to hold dialogue with the former opposition, which was stereotypically described as Shiite-dominated, and the current government’s refusal to hold dialogue with the Sunni opposition, which was sometimes assimilated with the former ousted regime. In his attempt to refute the analogy between the two cases, Commenter AB used the topos of positive in-group representation to legitimize the Sunni opposition depicting them as peaceful sit-in-ners (( the people who do the sit-in)), and the exclusive topos of negative out-group representation to delegitimize the previous opposition, which is now the ruling party, for serving foreign agendas. Demanding the post-author be fair, commenter AB implicitly expressed his disappointment with his argument indicating how offensive and face-threatening such an analogy could be to
him, other Sunni commenters and Sunni lurkers. This indicated that commenter AB appealed to the normative frame of reference that was congruent with the dominantly Sunni ideological and ethnic biases in order to make such a morally based evaluation of the post-author’s argument.

Like Commenter AB, Commenter CD also expressed his disappointment with the post-author’s analogy by describing it as unfair and non-objective, yet for a different reason. His negative evaluation of the post-author’s argument was based on his refusal to equate the previous opposition, which was tacitly depicted as pacifist and democratic, with the immorally driven and terror loving Sunni opposition, as described by the commenter. In doing so, the post-author’s argument was evaluated as inconsiderate, face threatening, and as such impolite towards commenter CD, other Shiite commenters and Shiite lurkers. The normative frame of reference based on which commenter CD made this evaluation was congruent with the dominantly Shiite ideological and ethnic biases. Example 20 above thus indicates how the commenters’ evaluations of the post-author’s interactional behaviour and political views varied according to the normative frames of reference they drew on to make evaluations of impoliteness, which indicates the possible rift in the Iraqi political context. As indicated in 6.3, appealing to a frame of reference associated with a particular ethnic community when making a moral evaluation eventually indexed the commenters’ subscription to one of the imagined communities constructed in online interaction.

As discussed in Chapter Five, the sources of impoliteness (i.e. exogenous vs. endogenous), types of impoliteness (i.e. personal, institutional and communal) and directionality of impoliteness represent the three important aspects of impoliteness analysis necessary to unpack how the commenters perceived, reacted to and morally evaluated the (de)legitimization of certain interpretations of political reality as part of their conflict for power in the political interaction under scrutiny. In the three comment threads, several instances of exogenous impoliteness were identified by virtue of which the commenters communicated emotionally charged negative attitudes towards particular political practices. These impoliteness assessments were used argumentatively as part of the ongoing discussion in the comment thread to delegitimize the political actions performed by unfavorable political actors, whom the commenters often perceived as out-group members. See example 21 below.

Example 21:
Al-Maliki’s speech is completely compatible with Ammar Al-Hakeem’s yesterday speech. They both have one voice; they spoke of restoring the sectarian Shiite coalition. They have been spitted in their mouths (they have come under the leverage of) by Iran ... They are truly not going to give it (the power) up even if blood reaches up to the knees. As for the change, they have all been washed out in the election, yet there is no grain of shame on their foreheads ((they do not even feel ashamed)); they could have resigned (used conditionally)).

(Comment thread 3)

In the example above, the commenter attempted to delegitimize two political actors, i.e. Al-Maliki and Ammar Al-Hakeem, and their attempt to retain power. Although in their own election campaign each of these political actors implied that they would not restore the sectarian based ruling coalition, they had to break their campaign promises in order to stay in power as they both failed to ensure a ruling majority. The commenter used the negative evaluation of out-group action to delegitimize those political actors’ refusal to lose power at any cost. Most importantly, the commenter explicitly alluded to the moral order to highlight the immorality of such an action in an emotionally vehement fashion, evaluating it as shameworthy, i.e. yet there is no grain of shame on their foreheads ((they do not even feel ashamed)), by making use of the intertextual connection between the political practice evaluated and the interaction itself. This exogenous evaluation of impoliteness was communicated by local Iraqi Arabic rather than modern standard Arabic used at the beginning of the extract to express intense emotive response. Since this type of moral evaluation, i.e. exogenous impoliteness, was embedded in the delegitimization of the political practice, it was thus analytically captured by positioning analysis level 1, where the political actions and actors were contextualized and characterized at the then-and-there moment of the reported event.

In certain cases, exogenous impoliteness assessments gave rise to endogenous impoliteness assessments. These endogenous impoliteness assessments arose because certain practices performed within the interaction were perceived, by at least one
commenter, as rapport sensitive because they were emotionally offensive, morally unacceptable or violating a normative frame of reference. Consider example 22.

Example 22:
Post-author:

**Guys let’s discuss quietly and without slandering and defaming others.**

(Comment thread 1)

In the above example, implicitly evaluating some of the previous comments as impolite for violating the norms of responsible and fruitful debate, the post-author urged the commenters to avoid personal, emotionally negative attitudes. Furthermore, in a later comment, one of the commenters requested the intervention of the post-author to act in his capacity as a gatekeeper to put an end to an offensive comment that targeted him (see example 11 above).

However, many of the endogenous impoliteness instances identified in the comment threads analyzed in this chapter did not involve explicit moral evaluations of others’ practices inside the interaction, but rather encompassed offensive retaliation that can be considered typical cases of expressive impoliteness (Eelen, 2001: 35), as shown in example 23.

Example 23:

**To be direct.. By your argument you make yourself/ either ignorant or stupid.. Or malicious and vile.**

(Comment thread 2)

Example 23 shows how a commenter conveyed his strongly worded and offensive disagreement with the post-author’s argument, which was about the importance of dialogue between the government and the Sunni opposition. The commenter was not concerned about providing a counterargument or, at least, refuting it, but he was rather more interested in attacking the post-author and threatening his face. This comment was not directly evaluative in nature, i.e. classificatory impoliteness (Eelen, 2001:35); it rather involved a tacit evaluation communicated indirectly by virtue of an offensive remark, which made it a typical case of expressive impoliteness. In the example above, the expressive impoliteness was communicated by means of a
conventional formula of impoliteness that involved personalized negative assertions (Culpeper, 2011: 135). This endogenous impoliteness could be analytically captured by positioning analysis level 2, where the commenter positioned himself in relation to the post-author, taking a strongly antithetical alignment that violated the behavioral expectation in that genre.

With regard to the types of impoliteness, no institutional impoliteness was identified. This might be attributed firstly to the non-institutionalized and informal nature of such Facebook comment threads, and secondly the commenters’ reluctance to associate themselves with political institutions (see negative identification in 6.3 above). Yet, perhaps more surprisingly, few instances of personal impoliteness were identified in the dataset analyzed in this chapter. Personal impoliteness arises when an agent, or an action s/he performs in his capacity as a distinctive or unique person, is evaluated in terms of impoliteness, as shown in the example below.

Example 24:

Brother XXX, I think that you are flattering XXX, the owner of XXX ((publishing house)) by your talk against Al-Amaliki because XXX Foundation published your book (Al-Magareed) ((The Dispossessed)), isn’t that right sir?????

(Comment thread 1)

In the example 24, the commenter attacked the post-author accusing him of being partial in order to refute his argument about the political crisis, i.e. I think that you are flattering XXX, the owner of XXX ((publishing house)) by your talk against Al-Amaliki. The commenter indexed responsiveness by means of naming (Bolander, 2012:1615), using the term of address brother XXX. This comment was an instance of personal impoliteness, because it involved an offensive attack against the post-author’s self-worth, i.e. face, that was associated with his personal identity rather than his collective identity. This kind of impoliteness was implicationally context-driven (Culpeper, 2011: 180). Like all instances of personal impoliteness, the evaluation of impoliteness in the example above was unidirectional, because it was directed at a single interlocutor, i.e. the post-author.

Communal impoliteness was the most common type of impoliteness identified in Facebook comment threads analyzed in this chapter. Communal impoliteness
assessments were inherently related to the ethno-sectarian identities of the commenters; they emerged when the self-worth and self-efficacy attributes associated with these identities were threatened. Damaging the self-worth and attributes of these ethno-sectarian identities were often interpreted as a flagrant attack against the entire ethno-sectarian community and its values. This could be attributed to the ethnically politicized Iraqi culture and the genre motivated deindividuation. The second comment thread, which dealt with the more sensitive aspect of politics related to the ethno-sectarian identities of the data analyzed in this chapter, was the typical context for communal impoliteness to emerge. Consider example 25 below.

Example 25

It was an Arab nation ((referring to Baath party motto)) in Saddam’s days and then became an Islamist Wahabbist nation ((referring to Islamic fundamentalism)), they are fallen ((rogues)).

(Comment thread 2)

In the above example, the commenter indirectly voiced his disagreement with the post-author over the dialogue between the government and the Sunni opposition by using the actor-oriented delegitimization topos of negative out-group representation. The delegitimized political actor was discursively represented in two different ways: firstly by means collectivization (van Leeuwen, 2008: 37-8) using the collective noun nation; and secondly by means of backgrounding (ibid: 29) using the pronoun they. The commenter delegitimized the Sunni opposition by implying their opportunism for shifting ideologies from Baathist nationalism to Islamic fundamentalism, and then by describing them as fallen ((rogues)). This comment involved an expressive impoliteness communicated by a conventional impoliteness formula, which Culpeper (2011: 135) termed “personalized negative references”, i.e. they are fallen ((rogues)). In terms of directionality, the expressive communal impoliteness embedded in this delegitimization attempt was directed towards multiple participants at different levels of participation, i.e. Sunni commenters and lurkers.

Generally, an overview of impoliteness analysis across the three comment threads demonstrates that impoliteness was more likely to emerge in commenter-to-commenter interactional order, especially when multiple commenters became
engaged in an embedded interaction rhizomatically related to the comment thread (see example 26 below). This was because some controversial comments often attracted the attention of other commenters motivating them to aggressively respond to the commenters who produced those controversial comments, and subsequently generating more expressive and classificatory impoliteness. This could give rise to “flaming”, which refers to often gratuitous use of abusive or offensive language to target other participants in computer mediated communication (Lange, 2014: 54).

Consider example 26.

Example 26:

80. Commenter AB:

The Premiership should be for one those:
Ali Daway
Al-Bulani
Adil Abdulmahdi
Ayad Alawi
And the best is Alawi
But unfortunately the sectarianists made it a mere wish for the decent and patriotic ones to assume this post.
And unfortunately democracy has the fatal flaw that we are forced to consider the votes of the ignorant, the bad and the sectarianists to get Hanan Al-Fatlawi, Mahmoud Al-Hasan and Misha’an Al-Jubouri and their ilk to the parliament.

81. Commenter CD:
You apparently seem to understand very well ((very smart))! Be careful I envy you for your understanding. You apparently understand very well ((very smart)) because of ((your)) Al-Bulani ((choice)).

82. Commenter EF:
Shut up

83. Commenter GH:
I think Ayad Alawi is the best one of them if he takes the people with him to London and rule them ((there)).

The example above shows how commenter AB’s attempt to legitimize certain political actors and delegitimize others perceived as controversial by the other commenters, which motivated them to respond to him rather than the post-author. All the following comments in example 28 above, whose responsiveness was indexed by “format tying” (Bolander, 2012:1616), involved some type of offensive reply. These offensive replies seemingly threatened commenter AB’s self-worth and self-efficacy either through a conventionally blatant silencer (Culpeper, 2011: 136), i.e. shut up, or sarcasm, which represents convention-driven impolitical impoliteness (Ibid: 165), i.e. You apparently seem to understand very well ((very smart))! These responses can be considered as typical cases of expressive impoliteness for damaging explicitly and seriously the commenter’s face. In the three abusive comments in the example above, Iraqi Arabic rather than modern standard Arabic was used to express intense emotivity.

An overview of the impoliteness instances identified in the three comment threads demonstrates that there was a correlation between local Iraqi (colloquial) Arabic and the linguistic realization of impoliteness; in many impoliteness assessments the commenters registered impoliteness, especially classificatory and next-positioned impoliteness, by using local colloquial Arabic (also see examples 21, 22 and 26). Additionally, across the three comment threads analyzed here, the actor-oriented delegitimization attempts seemed to be more socially reprehensible than the action-oriented ones, and as such more likely to be evaluated as impolite, because
they involved explicit aggression against specific political actors rather than criticism of their political practices.

As in the previous chapter, the impoliteness instances identified in the dataset exhibit thematically motivated variation across the three comment threads analyzed in this chapter as shown in figure 6.7 (below) which represents a quantitative analysis of the impoliteness. The impoliteness instances identified were codified in terms of expressive impoliteness and classificatory impoliteness, and then normalized by the number of comments identified as having a (de)legitimizing function.

![Figure 6.7 Percentages of impoliteness in the Facebook comment threads](image.png)

Similar to the impoliteness analysis in the previous chapter, figure 6.7 demonstrates that impoliteness was more salient in the comment threads that were more sectarianly sensitive, i.e. the second Facebook comment thread, wherein 36 instances of expressive impoliteness and 18 instances of classificatory impoliteness were identified. Yet, the numbers of impoliteness instances identified in the comments that had (de)legitimizing functions were proportionately the same in the first and the second comment threads; 13 instances of expressive impoliteness and 6 instances of classificatory impoliteness were identified in the first comment thread and 19 instances of expressive impoliteness and 8 instances of classificatory impoliteness were identified in the second comment thread. Different from the results of the quantitative analysis of impoliteness in the TV interviews, the first comment thread did not score a higher level of impoliteness in comparison to the third one. This difference could be attributed to the evident moderation attempts made by the post-author of the first comment thread in his capacity as a gatekeeper. Also, unlike the TV interviews analyzed in the previous chapter, proportionately fewer instances of
classificatory impoliteness were identified in the three comment threads. In this research work, the major analytical importance of classificatory impoliteness consists in its ability to unpack more clearly the normative foundations that underlie the evaluation of impoliteness. This suggests that within these Facebook threads, the commenters were more interested in the retaliatory tit for tat rather than sanctioning offences or violations of the behavioral expectations by invoking the normative foundations of their impoliteness evaluations.

6.5 Summary
Like Chapter Five, the aim of this chapter was threefold: firstly, to examine the commenters’ use of different topoi to (de)legitimize particular interpretations of political reality as part of their conflict for power in these Facebook comment threads, secondly to examine the participation framework and the dynamics of argumentation, and thirdly to analyze the social and the moral ramifications of this conflict for power in different thematic contexts. The analysis shows that commenters used (de)legitimization to voice their (dis)agreement with the political views presented in interaction. At the first level of positioning analysis, the findings suggest that there was a thematically prompted variation, proportionately similar to that identified in chapter Five, in terms of the (de)legitimization topoi used in the three Facebook comment threads. In the first Facebook comment thread and the thematically corresponding first TV interview, the actor-oriented topos of negative representation of the other was the most commonly used. The collective topoi, especially criminalization and victimization, were the most frequent in both the second Facebook comment thread and the second TV interview. In the third Facebook comment thread and its thematically corresponding third TV interview the use of authorization and deauthorization were prominently salient. The analysis shows that the political debates in the context of Facebook were more personalized and less agenda-oriented than in their corresponding TV interviews.

The second level of positioning analysis elucidated how the commenters’ genre-sanctioned roles in the comment threads evolve into political alignments as part of their attempt to establish their alignments towards the topic in question and ultimately towards each other. This level of analysis also interrogated how these political alignments affected and effected rapport between the commenters in these
interactions. Due to the affordances of Facebook, it was found that the set of the interactional orders available in the comment threads complicated the dynamics of argumentation process making it rhizomatically versatile rather than hierarchically structured, which allowed the commenters to tackle different aspects of the political topics originally raised by the post authors. This necessitated a modification to Langlotz and Locher’s (2012) model of participation framework for online interaction in order to better account for the dynamics of argumentation process in the Facebook comment threads.

Most commenters’ sociopolitical identities were interwoven with their ethno-sectarian affiliation; this was analyzed at the third level of positioning analysis. It seemed that the participants in social media, like those in mainstream media, constructed their sociopolitical identities via negative identification patterns motivated by cognitive, cultural and political reasons. Most importantly, the findings also indicate that constructing sociopolitical identities had social implications, the most important of which was constructing different imagined communities. The commenters in Facebook comment threads tended to invoke online communities, which ranged from completely imagined communities to recreated versions of offline communities.

Furthermore, the commenters’ attempts to (de)legitimize certain versions of political reality had moral implications. The commenters’ conceptions of what might constitute impolite behavior seemed to vary, because their conception of the normative frame of reference varied based on the commenters’ membership in the community invoked online. The multi-tiered positioning analysis was used to identify various instances of exogenous and endogenous impoliteness each of which triggered at a different spatiotemporal level of the interaction. In respect of the source of impoliteness, both exogenous and endogenous impoliteness assessments were identified. Impoliteness assessments were found to be either personal or communal in nature. The analysis of impoliteness indicated that impoliteness was more salient in the comment thread that discussed the most sectarianly sensitive topic. The impoliteness analysis also suggested that the commenters were more interested in the retaliatory tit for tat rather than the explicit moral evaluations of others’ behavior.
Chapter Seven
Interplay of (De)legitimization, Rapport and Impoliteness in Online Readers’ Response threads

7. Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to examine conflict for power in three threads of readers’ responses on a news website, whose affordances could produce a distinctive type of mediatized political discourse. To that end, I investigate how this conflict was discursively produced, perceived and evaluated across thematically different contexts. Section 7.1 investigates how the conflict for power, by means of (de)legitimization, could be produced and reacted to in threads of readers’ responses in online news platform employing the first level of positioning analysis. Section 7.2 examines the participation framework afforded by the medium to demonstrate how the responding readers positioned themselves in relation to each other, and to identify the different roles available in the threads of online readers’ responses. Section 7.3 unpacks the constructions of the functionally versatile sociopolitical identities and highlights their social implications in this type of genre. It also investigates how the respondents’ interweaving of their political affiliations with their ethno-sectarian attributes could lead to the construction of online versions of their offline communities. Section 7.4 deals with how rapport could be perceived and how the respondents evaluated each other’s political and interactional practices in respect of impoliteness in order to highlight the normative underpinnings and moral implications of the political conflict for power in the genre of online news readers’ responses.

The data analyzed in this chapter represented a functionally distinct type of media discourse, in which both forms of mass media and social media were intertwined. The online news reports that attracted the readers’ responses were professionally generated journalistic contents posted on an online mass media outlet, whereas the threads of the readers’ responses represented user-generated contents posted on an interactive platform, typically categorized as a social media platform (see Walther and Jang, 2012). Technologically speaking, the online news website

---

14 A version of this chapter was accepted for publication in Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. The paper will appear under the title of ‘Fuelling ethno-sectarian conflicts: (De)legitimization and impoliteness in readers’ responses in an Arab online media’. 170
from which the data were extracted, alarabiya.net, represents a participatory and interactive web 2.0 website (Herring, 2013), because it has a comment section that allows the respondents to express their opinions over the reported news freely,\textsuperscript{15} see figure 7.1 below.

\textsuperscript{15} The website has no netiquette for commenting, and no indication of editing could be found.
For the purpose of this chapter, the most relevant medium characteristics (Herring, 2007) in the online news comment section were its maximum 600 symbol textual content, asynchronicity, potential anonymity or pseudonymity, response title designation and (dis)liking options. This was because the content limit could affect message intensity, asynchronicity could increase message precision (Tanskanen, 2007: 98, Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2010:542), anonymity or pseudonymity could increase confrontation (Kleinke and Bös, 2015:48; see also example 3 below), response title designation could index the interactional order (see example 11 below) and finally (dis)liking patterns could indicate polarization (see example 18 below).

To ensure comparability with the datasets in Chapters Five and Six, the three response threads selected in this chapter were similar in terms of the topics they tackled to the data analyzed in the previous chapters. These topics included firstly a political topic, which dealt with the political crisis in the country in 2012, secondly an ethno-political topic, which mainly dealt with the power sharing process in the country in light of the Sunnis’ claims of political marginalization, and thirdly the preliminary results of the 2014 parliamentary election and the main expected winners.

7.1 Voicing sociopolitical views through (de)legitimization

In the online readers’ response threads, the different (de)legitimization topoi were intrinsically employed to express the readers’ political viewpoints in response to news items posted online. The respondents’ use of (de)legitimization in this context was typically achieved by recontextualizing particular political actors, actions and events reported in the news section and characterizing them in ways congruent with their ideological preferences. In this sense, investigating the use of the different (de)legitimization topoi could give a glimpse of the reproduction of ideology and perpetuation of sociopolitical conflicts in this online context. As discussed in the previous chapters, the lexico-grammatical realizations of the (de)legitimization process in discourse can be analytically captured at the first level of positioning analysis. Nevertheless, the actual analysis of the lexico-grammatical representation of actors and action (de)legitimized and the argumentative patterns in the three threads of responses analyzed in this chapter revealed distinctive patterns of (de)legitimization, which seem to be affected by the medium and social factors.
(Herring, 2007) of the genre under investigation as will be shown below in this section.

The first online news report to which the readers were responding was titled *Al-Esawi for Alarabiya: No solution for Iraq’s Crisis save Al-Maliki’s resignation.* It dealt with the political crisis in the country in 2012. Later on, this crisis was exacerbated in the aftermath of a violent incident in the small town of Hawija where many protestors and a few policemen were killed and injured in a confrontation between them. Having been incapable of voting the former Prime Minister out in the parliament, Al-Esawi and the opposition parties requested that the former Prime Minister step down, especially after government’s violent reaction to the protestors in Hawija in northern Iraq. The report tackled the opposition parties’ political reaction, and set out the government’s and opposition’s narratives of what happened in that incident. The journalistic content of this report motivated the readers to express their opinions over the political situation and the political actors and actions reported using the comment section in the website.

Hence, in the response thread generated by this online news report, it might conceivably be expected that the main actors (de)legitimized by the respondents would include the former Prime Minister and the opposition parties, whereas the main political actions (de)legitimized by the respondents would include the former Prime Minister’s policies, his behaviors towards the opposition parties, and the opposition parties’ political agenda and their behaviors towards the former Prime Minister. See examples 1 and 2.

Example 1:

Enter ((2nd person plural)) the net ((search the internet)) and you will know the truth about this Baathist drummer ((Baath regime supporter))....

(Response thread 1)

The example above represents actor-oriented delegitimization by a reader to rebut the opposition’s argument stated by Al-Esawi and reported in the news section. The opposition argued for the former Prime Minister to tender his resignation in order to put an end to the political crisis and stabilize the political situation in the country. Using the topos of negative representation of out-group actor, the respondent
characterized Al-Esawi as a supporter of the societally and legally denounced Baath Regime, which was perceived responsible for the crimes committed under its reign. Linguistically, in this response Al-Esawi was represented by means of appraisement (van Leeuwen, 2008: 45) referring to him by means of a connotatively negative noun phrase, i.e. *Baathist drummer* (*Baath regime supporter*).

Like the data analyzed in the previous chapters, the respondents could also combine action and actor-oriented strategies in order to (de)legitimize their argument about the political actors, action and events reported in the news section. See example 2, in which a respondent used both authorization and irrationalization to substantiate his political view.

Example 2:

*The majority of the people of Iraq are with Al-Maliki’s elected and parliamentary majority-owning government... Iraqis can choose the government only by the democratic election boxes (ballot) not by waging violence, power and terror, whom he calls for them (violence, power and terror) will be burned by their fire and will gain nothing as happened before (referring to the previous years of sectarian violence)... The previous Baathist way will not be of use but will be a scourge on its people.*

*(Response thread 1)*

In an attempt to voice his opinion of the reported political actors, the reader in the example above first authorized the former Prime Minister by characterizing his government as fairly elected and representative of the majority of the Iraqi people, i.e. *The majority of the people of Iraq are with Al-Maliki’s elected and parliamentary majority-owning government.* The authorized political actor was discursively represented by means of possessivized objectivation (see van Leeuwen, 2008: 46), referring to him metonymically by means of the political entity (the government) he was closely associated with, i.e. *Al-Maliki’s elected and parliamentary majority-owning government.* The respondent then used the action-oriented topos of
irrationalization in order to delegitimize the call for revenge for the killed protesters by hinting at the detrimental consequences of such a call, i.e. *whom he calls for them ((violence, power and terror)) will be burned by their fire and will gain nothing as happened before ((referring to the previous years of sectarian violence))... The previous Baathist way will not be of use but will be a scourge on its people. The irrationalized action was discursively represented by means of objectivation where the action of calling for revenge was replaced by its products (see van Leeuwen, 2008: 63-4), i.e. *waging violence, power and terror*; and the previous Baathist way, to refer to the call for revenge for the killed protesters.

Distinctively, however, many of the responses identified as having (de)legitimization functions in the first thread of readers’ responses included political actors and actions that were not reported in the first online news report. Motivated by expressive rationality (Svensson, 2011), the respondents frequently voiced their ideologically biased political views about the broad political situation in the country in general without limiting themselves to the political actors, actions and issues discussed in the online news report. The most salient actors who were not reported but still (de)legitimized in the response thread included the key ethno-sectarian communities in the country, i.e. Sunnis and Shiites. The most salient political actions which were not reported but still (de)legitimized in the response thread included the actions perceived as infringements by one of these ethno-sectarian communities of the others’ political rights. Therefore, the (de)legitimization attempts that were based on the ethno-sectarian grounds in general, and in-group victimization and out-group criminalization in particular, were common in this response thread regardless of the content of the online news report (see examples 3 and 4). This seems to be related to the anonymity and pseudonymity available on the online news response thread, which allowed the discussion to develop into an inter-group conflict without any serious consequences incurred by the conflict instigators (cf. Haines et al., 2012). This makes the first response thread stands out when compared to the first TV interview analyzed in Chapter Five, and the first Facebook comment thread analyzed in Chapter Six, although they all discussed more or less similar political topics.

Consider the example below which shows how in-group victimization transformed a political topic into an explicitly ethno-sectarian discussion.

Example 3:
The problem is not with Al-Maliki…. But it is in the constitution which makes a new Al-Maliki out of each Prime Minister... (It is) a constitution (that) gives the Shiites everything... and takes away all the rights of Sunnis.. Enough with all the lies and the deceptions.

(Response thread 1)

In example 3, the respondent was concerned about the solution proposed by the opposition parties to end the political crisis in the country at the time. Implying that the opposition’s call for the former Prime Minister to step down was an ineffective solution, the respondent argued that the problem was due to the constitution rather than the individual who assumed the Premiership. This argument was based on the premise that the power sharing formula in the country was unfair and ethno-sectarianly imbalanced. In a bid to substantiate this premise, the respondent used the topos of victimization depicting the Sunnis as disenfranchised, i.e. takes away all the rights of Sunnis, by the Shiites who were implicitly represented as power extorting. Both of the political actors targeted by the (de)legitimization process were discursively represented by means of collectivization (van Leeuwen, 2008: 37-8) using the collective nouns Sunnis and Shiites.

The criminalization that was motivated by the ethno-sectarian biases and ideologies was also very common in the first response thread. Example 4 introduces an out-group criminalization legitimizing a sociopolitical view. Example 4:

The position of the Prime Minister is a monopoly for Shiites and (it is) they who decide who deserves it. The time of thuggery, bullying and getting things done by force has come to an end when your rule demised and your leader hid in the hole ((referring to Saddam Hussein)).

(Response thread 1)
In example 4, the respondent used negative representation of out-group members to express his opinion about the Sunnis and Saddam Hussein. He criminalized and so delegitimized the Sunnis, characterizing them as thugs and bullies who ruled the country by force during Saddam Hussein’s era. Linguistically, the actors targeted by this criminalization attempt were represented by differentiation (see van Leeuwen, 2008:40). In the example above, the Sunnis, who were associated with Saddam Hussein’s bullying and intimidating rule, i.e. your rule, your leader, were differentiated from and compared to the Shiites, who were explicitly nominated in the response to create the difference between the respondent’s “self” and the “other”. By so doing, the respondent represented the political conflict between the government and the opposition (which was reported in the news section) as a more ethno-sectarianly centered conflict between Sunni and Shiite groups (in the comment section).

The second online news report, which was titled Alawi for Alarabiya: Al-Maliki’s policy will drag the country to a catastrophe, mainly dealt with the power sharing process in the country, especially in light of the Sunnis’ claims of being politically marginalized. Alawi urged the former Prime Minister to respond to the demands of the Sunni tribes in Anbar province, warning that violence and terror would flourish if the sectarianly exclusionary policies continued. The report also highlighted the need to reform the political system, and to make it more inclusive. In the second readers’ response thread, the main political actors (de)legitimized were the former Prime Minister and the opposition parties in general, and the Sunni opposition in particular, whereas the main political actions (de)legitimized included the former Prime Minister’s policies towards Sunnis, which were perceived as exclusionary, and the opposition parties’ political agenda. Unsurprisingly then, the respondents’ arguments were predominantly based on differentiation and exclusion of the delegitimized actors, and in-group victimization of the legitimized actors (see example 5) and the delegitimization of policies perceived as sectarianly exclusionary (see example 6). However, what made the second response thread distinctive in comparison to the second TV interview analyzed in Chapter 5 and the second Facebook comment thread analyzed in Chapter Six, was the use of historically-inspired ethnic and racial stereotypes and ethno-sectarian biases to highlight
sociopolitical divergence and the ideological employment of history to delegitimize political practices (see examples 5 and 6).

Example 5:

Al-Maliki and the State of Law Coalition’s connections with agenda of the terroristic Safavid Iranian intelligence have been revealed, and the (gallows) rope has become tightened on their necks... Therefore they decided to fight the people of Sunna ((Sunnis)) in the revolting provinces and our Iraqi Shiite decent nationalist brothers..

(Response thread 2)

In an attempt to delegitimize the former Prime Minister and his ruling coalition, the respondent in example 5 negatively represented them by means of differentiation and exclusion, which was based on the assumption that Al-Maliki’s Shiite dominated coalition were backed by Sunni-hating Iran. This delegitimization was based on the racial and ethno-sectarian stereotype that the Shiite political parties were inspired by an Iranian-backed agenda to control the Sunni areas in the Iraq, dating back to the reign of the sixteenth century Safavid dynasty. Characterizing the former Prime Minister and his ruling coalition as Iranian Safavid proxies was a bid to differentiate them from Iraqi Shiite decent nationalists and eventually exclude them as non-Iraqis based on an ethno-sectarian stereotype that had a racial hint to it. The respondent also attempted to legitimize the people of Sunna ((Sunnis)) in the revolting provinces positively representing them as victimized by the former Prime Minister who decided to target them for ethno-sectarian reasons. In the response above, the political actors targeted by the delegitimization were discursively represented by nomination, i.e. Al-Maliki, and collectivization, i.e. the State of Law coalition (see van Leeuwen, 2008: 52), while the political actors targeted by legitimization were discursively represented by means of possessivization (ibid:34), i.e. the people of Sunna, and then by spatialization, which van Leeuwen (ibid:46) defined as “a form of objectivation in

---

16 A descriptor used to refer to the Safavid dynasty that ruled Iran in the sixteenth century, whose kingdom was represented as the Shiite rival of the Sunni-inspired Ottoman Empire. Nowadays, it is sometimes used to refer to the Shiite Arabs in an exclusionary and derogatory manner to link them with Iran.
which social actors are represented by means of reference to a place”, i.e. *in the revolting provinces*, which were four Sunni provinces at the time.

Example 6 demonstrates how some policies, perceived as sectarianly exclusionary could be delegitimized by action-oriented topoi that made use of ideologically loaded interpretations of history.

Example 6:

«استمرار للمواجهة بين أنصار الحسين وأنصار يزيد». هل هذا رأس وزراء ام طيال ؟ حاقد اعمى
مسخم 1345 سنة ومازالت تصدق ان السنع من قتل ال البيت الأطهار.

How would Sunnis and Shiites coexist in Iraq after the Noori Al-Maliki the Prime Minister stated that the current conflict is “a continuation of the conflict between the Supporter of Al-Hussein and the Supporter of Yazeed”. Is this a Prime Minister or drummer? A spiteful blind black-faced (it has been) 1345 years and you still think Sunnis killed the virtuous Ahlu Al-Bait (([Family of Prophet Muhammad])).

(Response thread 2)

In the example above, the respondent delegitimizd the former Prime Minister for allegedly using a sectarianly loaded historical battle that culturally represented a battle between good, i.e. *the Supporter of Al-Hussein*, and evil, i.e. *the Supporter of Yazeed*, to describe the political confrontation between the government and opposition. The respondent irrationalized the former Prime Minister’s action by highlighting its detrimental consequences on peaceful coexistence in the country, i.e. *How would Sunnis and Shiites coexist in Iraq*. The action targeted by the delegitimiziation was agentialized (van Leeuwen, 2008: 66) to highlight the former Prime Minister’s responsibility, i.e. *Prime Minister stated that*. To reinforce the impact of the delegitimization process, the respondent then negatively represented the statement maker, i.e. the former Prime Minister, characterizing him as a *spiteful blind black-faced*.

The third online news report was titled *Preliminary Results: Al-Maliki garners 40% ((of the votes)) in the Southern Provinces*. It reported the preliminary results of the 2014 parliamentary election and the key (expected) winners. The report also demonstrated the main competing electoral coalitions, which included partisans and
independent candidates, and gave a brief account of the Iraqi electoral law and the ballot counting process. Prompted by the content of the report, the main political actors (de)legitimized in the third response thread were the competing politicians and their electoral coalitions. Unlike the third TV interview analyzed in Chapter Five and the third Facebook comment thread analyzed in chapter Six, which tackled the same topic, (de)authorization was not the most commonly used (de)legitimization topoi (see figure 7.4 below). In this response thread, (de)authorization was mostly combined with negative out-group representation, which was by far the most commonly used actor-oriented topoi (see example 7). As for the action-oriented (de)legitimization instances identified in the third response thread, they mainly targeted the election process (see example 8), and the federalization process, which represented one of the most debated issue in the politicians’ election campaigns (see example 9).

Example 7:

These are all lies. Not all the people of the south voted for the doomed one ((a play with words to refer to Al-Maliki)). What has he accomplished in the south? It is getting worst as the time went by. (There are) deteriorating education ((system)), poverty, diseases, (lack of) electricity and (running) water and unemployment. The 40 percent is all lies.

(Response thread 3)

In the example above, the respondent attempted to deauthorize Al-Maliki, who was being reported as a prospective winner in the online news report, by falsifying what was reported about the election, e.g. These are all lies. She then negatively represented Al-Maliki, characterizing him as too bad to vote for, especially because the services in the southern part of the country, which represented his stronghold, had deteriorated drastically during his term, i.e. what has he accomplished in the south it is getting worst as the time went by. This negative representation of Al-Maliki was then combined with the deauthorizing argument that he could not be the winner, which was repeated at the end of the comment, i.e. the 40 percent is all lies. The actor targeted by the delegitimation was discursively represented by pejorative nomination, i.e. doomed one. This pejorative nomination represents a play with words
to refer to Al-Maliki making use of the rhyming in the two words: the Al-Maliki and Al-Haliki, which means the doomed one.

Example 8:
عن أي تغيير تتحدثون؟ العراق لن يصلح حاله ماتول هو محتج من قبل إيران ومافيات إيران!! هذه الانتخابات ضحى على الذوقون لا أكثر ولا أقل.

What (political) change are you talking about? Iraq will not be saved as long as it is occupied by ((under the hegemony of)) Iran and the mafia of Iran!! This election is a farce no more or less.

(Response thread 3)

In the example above, the respondent, whose pseudonym suggested that she was a woman, delegitimized the election process itself. The respondent hinted that it was rigged by the Shiite political parties, which were stereotypically accused of being backed by Iran. She evaluated the action, i.e. the election process, negatively describing it as a farce no more or less. The delegitimized action was discursively represented by means of objectivation (van Leeuwen, 2008: 63-4) substituting the actions, i.e. the ballot casting, vote counting and the election process in general, by the products, i.e. the change, the election.

Example 9:
إذا كان من الصعب على العراقيين أن يتفقوا على قائمة عامة يمكنها يتخذهوا بدل التصويت الطفيف فالأفضل لهم ان يتم تشكيل قدرات في الجنوب واحدة والمناطق الغربية واحدة وبغداد يكون وضعها مستقل لأنها العاصمة. هذا الحل السلمي أفضل من الحرب الأهلية والتفشي وبحق على العراق ككل واحد ويترك الامر لاجيال القادمة لتصحيح أخطاء اجدادهم الذين هم الجيل الحالي.

If it was too difficult for Iraqis to agree on a secular ((non-sectarianist)) (electoral) list ((coalition)) to vote for instead of the sectarian-based voting it is then better for them to form federal regions one in the south and another in the west, and Baghdad should have it independent status because it is a capital. This peaceful solution is better than the civil war and fragmentation and it will keep Iraq as one country and leave it to the next generation to straighten the mistakes of their grandparents who are the current generation.

(Response thread 3)
In a bid to legitimize his view about the best political solution for the county, the respondent rationalized federalization, highlighting its effectiveness and beneficial results to the country, i.e. *This peaceful solution is better than the civil war and fragmentation and it will keep Iraq as one country*. Linguistically, the action targeted by the legitimization process was first represented as deagentialized action that is not “brought about human agency” (van Leeuwen, 2008: 66), i.e. *to form federal regions*. Subsequently, and in order to emphasize its benefits, the respondent represented the action by distillation, which refers to the process of abstracting or highlighting some of the aspects of the action for the sake of legitimization by establishing a reference to action (ibid: 69-70), i.e. *This peaceful solution*.

Quantitative analysis made it possible to compare the three response threads in terms of the (de)legitimization patterns used across three thematic contexts. The numbers of (de)legitimization instances identified were 77 in the first response thread, 51 in the second response thread and 95 in the third response thread. As in 5.1 and 6.1 above, these 222 instances were coded for the eight different strategies of (de)legitimization. As mentioned in examples 2, 4 and 6, some of the responses that had (de)legitimizing functions included multiple (de)legitimizering topoi. In these cases, the occurrence of multiple topoi was accommodated in the analysis by quantifying each single occurrence of the different topoi; this means that the responses that included more than two (de)legitimization topoi were coded twice. The results were then normalized in relation to the total instances of (de)legitimization identified in each response thread. Coding decisions regarding ambiguous cases of (de)legitimization were made by using the interactional responses as evidence that the topoi was interpreted by the participants as serving either a legitimizing or delegitimizing function.

Figure 7.2 (below) shows the percentages of the different (de)legitimization strategies used in the first response thread.
Figure 7.2 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in first response thread

Figure 7.2 clearly shows that the negative representation of out-group members was the most commonly used topos (N=46) followed by positive representation of in-group members (N=7), and authorization (N=7). This seemed to be related to the fact that the discussion was, to a large extent, based on ethno-sectarian grounds in general, and out-group criminalization in particular (see examples 3 and 4 above). In terms of the action-oriented (de)legitimization topos, the topos of negative evaluation of actions (N=7) was the more commonly used, followed by the topos of irrationalization (N=4), which also seemed to be related to the ethno-sectarian nature of the discussion.

Figure 7.3 below shows the percentages of the (de)legitimization topos in the second response thread.
Like the first response thread, negative representation of out-group members (N= 33) was also the most commonly used topos in the second response thread although with a marginally higher percentage, as shown in figure 7.3 above. The second most commonly used topos was the positive representation of in-group members (N=6). In a similar fashion to the TV interview and Facebook comment thread that discussed similar ethno-sectarianly sensitive topics, the results in the second response thread, as shown in figure 7.3, were due to the respondents’ frequent use of out-group criminalization to present out-group members negatively, and in-group victimization to present in-group members positively, which seems to be related to the sensitive nature of the topic discussed, i.e. the power sharing process in the country, and the Sunnis’ claims of political marginalization. In terms of the action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi, the negative evaluation of actions, which often targeted
ethno-sectarian practices of out-group members (see example 6 above), was found to be the more commonly used (N=4).

Figure 7.4 shows the percentages of the (de)legitimization topoi in the third response thread.

![Figure 7.4 Percentages of (de)legitimization topoi in third response thread](image)

Unlike the TV interview and Facebook comment thread that discussed similar topics, i.e. the results of the 2014 parliamentary election, figure 7.3 shows that both authorization and deauthorization represented only 22% of all the topoi used, which made them the second most commonly used topoi (N=10 each) rather than the first. It was found that the negative representation of out-group members was the most commonly used topos (N=49). This was mainly due to the respondents’ tendency to
combine (de)authorization with the negative representation of out-group members (see example 7 above), and sometimes with positive representation of in-group actors, which represented the third commonly used topos (N=9). Irrationalization and negative evaluation of actions were the most commonly used action-oriented topoi (N=6 for both), which suggests that that the respondents were interested in delegitimizing the practices related to the election process.

The quantitative analysis shows that the delegitimization topos of the negative representation of out-group members was by far the most commonly used topos across the three online response threads analyzed in this chapter. This suggests that the medium, rather than the topic, had the greatest impact on how the (de)legitimization patterns emerged in the discourses produced in this genre, which made the response threads characteristically different from the data analyzed in the previous chapters (cf. technological determinism in Arendholz, 2013: 18-19). More importantly, however, the quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that in the unmoderated genre of the response threads the respondents’ expressions of opinions were not necessarily based on politically substantiated ground, but rather motivated by ethno-sectarian and racial biases. This explains the comparatively increased use of actor-oriented (de)legitimization in general, and collective (de)legitimization in particular regardless of the topics discussed.

The quantitative analysis also indicates that actor-oriented (de)legitimization topoi were much more commonly used than action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi in the three response threads, with a margin slightly different from that identified in the Facebook data. Despite the thematically different contexts in the three response threads, the percentages of action-oriented (de)legitimization to the percentages of actor-oriented (de)legitimization within each thread were almost the same, i.e. roughly 1 to 5. Similar to Facebook comment threads analyzed in Chapter Six and different from the TV interviews analyzed in Chapter Five, the political interactions in the context of online news were characteristically personalized and infrequently agenda-oriented, because the respondents tended to (de)legitimize the political actors and their images rather than their actions and agendas, regardless of the topic reported in the news section.
Figure 7.5 Percentages of actor-oriented and action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi in response threads

7.2 Establishing alignments and forming political fronts

In the readers’ response threads, the second level of positioning analysis could reveal how the respondents constructed their politically defined alignments to establish their roles as supporters or antagonists with regard to the political actors reported in the news section, and how these roles concurrently affected and effected rapport in the interactions under investigation. Additionally, and as explained in Chapter Six, positioning analysis at this level could also capture the interactional order(s) in responses and, as such, unpack the dynamics of argumentation and the participation framework in the multi-participant and asynchronous interactions that were analyzed.

The collapsed context in the response threads made it theoretically possible for the respondents to establish their politically defined alignments, and, as such, position themselves in relation to other participants either by directly addressing those participants, i.e. the authors of the news reports, other respondents, and lurking readers (metaparticipants), or indirectly by merely expressing opinions concerning the topics in question. In practice, and in contrast to the commenters in the Facebook comment threads, the respondents in the online response threads never addressed the author of the news reports. This might be attributable (in part, at least) to the fact that the news reports posted on the website were written by a team of news editors rather than individual authors.

In the response threads, the respondents could position themselves in relation to each other either indirectly by expressing their opinions of one of the political
actors mentioned in the news report, or directly by signaling responsiveness to intended participants in the response title. Example 10 demonstrates how two respondents established their politically defined alignments and indirectly positioned themselves in relation to each other only by expressing their opinions of one of the political actors mentioned in the news report.

Example 10:

Respondent 1:

أٓ٨ٚٓٞ ٝ١ ٝ ٟي حُـ٣ٖ حُؼَحه٢

Eyad Alawi is the only hope of salvation for Iraq.

Respondent 2:

ٝ٢ ٝ ٟي حُـ٣ٖ حُؼَحه٢

Alawi is an American agent ((proxy)) and is ((conspiring)) against the Iraqi Army.

(Response thread 2)

In example 10 above, respondent 1 expressed his opinion about the main political figure mentioned in the online news report, i.e. Eyad Alawi. Attempting to legitimize Alawi, respondent 1 positively characterized him as the only hope of salvation. Taking this stance towards this political figure established respondent 1’s politically defined alignment and also indicated his membership of the group of Alawi’s supporters. In a bid to respond to respondent 1, respondent 2 delegitimized Alawi by implicitly excluding him from the body of patriotic Iraqis, which makes the interactional order principally respondent-to-respondent. The responsiveness was signaled by means of “format tying” (Bolander, 2012:1616), using the name of the targeted political figure, i.e. Alawi. By responding in this way, respondent 2 indirectly established an antithetical alignment to respondent 1 and also indexed his membership in the political group of Alawi’s opponents.

Alternatively, example 11 shows how a respondent explicitly positioned himself in relation to another in an antithetical manner by using the response title in order to signal responsiveness right from the outset.

Example 11:

Respondent 1:
Why are Shiites voting for Al-Maliki?? What has he delivered for them?? No security, daily explosions, paralyzed economy, the oil is being stolen everyday going to Iran, poverty, and very bad infrastructure. What has been left to vote for him?

Respondent 2:
Response title: a response to one who claims to be a girl

Why are you opening your sectarianist eyes on the Shiites only ((you are biased against the Shiite))?? And you close them on the Sunnis?? Iraq has been ruled by the Sunnis for 80 years and they have eventually left it a destructed occupied and underdeveloped country suffering from wars, embargo, terror, destruction dictatorship, and sectarianism etc. ??? Look at the other Arab countries which are ((filled with)) chaos, terror, explosions, killing, destruction, underdevelopment, civil wars and countless problems, etc. They are all Sunni countries and ruled by Sunnis? No Shiite in it?? Be a nice girl and move away from sectarianism? If you were really a girl? But I do not think so but (you are one) of the sectarianists who write with multiple names???

(Answer thread 3)

In the example above, responsiveness was explicitly signaled in the comment title as respondent 2 directly referred to the pseudonym chosen by respondent 1, i.e. a response to one who claims being a girl. Respondent 1 delegitimized Al-Maliki and
blamed the Shiites for voting for him, and by so doing she established her political alignment over Al-Maliki’s electoral victory in the southern provinces and the people who voted for him. Interpreting her response as offensive to all Shiite people, respondent 2 attempted to respond by delegitimizing the Sunni characterizing them as unfit for ruling. Respondent 2, thus, oriented rapport towards challenge when interacting with respondent 1, especially in his last few sentences, i.e. Be a nice girl and move away from sectarianism? If you were really a girl? But I do not think so but (you are one) of the sectarianists who write with multiple names???. Interactionally, the example shows how the lack of any moderation or gate-keeping roles jeopardized the harmony of communication and made it more confrontational. In this respect, the response threads were different from the moderated contexts of the TV interviews and the Facebook comment threads analyzed in the previous chapters.

Similar to the Facebook comment threads analyzed in chapter Six, every response thread was organized as a series of decentralized debates rhizomatically connected to each other. Employing Bolander’s (2012) responsiveness analysis indicates that approximately 70% of the responses in each response thread analyzed in this chapter were addressed to other respondents. The rhizomatically structured argumentations in the online response threads were influenced by the respondents’ tendency to reply to the respondents who made extreme or controversial responses. Such a tendency was clearer in the online response threads in comparison to the data analyzed in the previous chapter due to the nature of the medium (see examples 3 and 11 above). This tendency, however, was not the only reason behind the rhizomatic structure of the interactions on the response threads. The affordances of the response threads made the argumentation process inherently rhizomatic in nature. Unlike the Facebook comment threads, the lack of hierarchically powerful roles, e.g. report author or gatekeeper, around which hierarchical interactions could be organized, made the response threads inherently divided into numerous, embedded debates which, although decentralized, were rhizomatically linked to the topics under discussion. Consider example 12.

Example 12:
84. Respondent 1:
It seems that some people have not understood the meaning of democracy. They accept its results if they fit their desires and if they were different they will start accusing and slandering democracy and the winners by it ((the winner of power through democratic means)) etc.!!! Normally the wise accept the results of democracy whatever its results were and this is the difference between the wise and the stupiiiiiid ((the penultimate letter was orthographically repeated in the original response to indicate prolonged pronunciation and emphasis of the last syllable))

85. Respondent 2:

الديمقراطية تدعو الى الافضل، يا ساذج هههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههhe

86. Respondent 1:

وعشو هو مقياس الأفضل بنظرتك، يا فطحل زمانك !!!!!!!

And what is the indicator of the best in your opinion, you the genius of your time !!!!!!!

87. Respondent 2:

باغيي الأفضل من يبني ويزدهر وخدم شعبه بافضل الخدمات. هذا لا ينطبق على المجرم نوري المالكي سرق اموال العراق والعراقيين .... افهم انها الغبي هههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههههhe

You stupid, the best (is the one) who builds and serves (and provides) his people with the best services. This does not apply to Al-Maliki the criminal (who) stole the money of Iraq and of the Iraqis... Understand you idiot hahahahahahahaha.

88. Respondent 1:

من يحدد المجرم عن عدمه هو خيارات الشعب العراقي التي اتخذها حسب ما يعرف به عن الأخبار الإعلامية المسيرة ... العراقيين هم الذين سيختارون خيارهم أما كعالما... شوقي عقل.

The one who decided (who is) the criminal is the Iraqi people who will surely elect whom they see by their eyes not through the politicized media ((partisan media)).....
The Iraqis are the most ware (of the facts), are you going to respect their choices or as usual will.... (Get) some brain.

89. Respondent 3:

يا سيد بي فاه كثير ، لا وجود للديمقراطية أصلا فالديم قرطبة هي كلمة استخدمت للضحك على الناس و تنغي

علمي العشوية ويجب التحكم بها و نسمي العشوية المؤهلة . و الإنتخابات في الدول العربية تكون 99.8% و

علمية هذه أرقام كانت غير منطقية لذلك بدأ السبب و التشكيك لأن المتحكم بها هم الأجهزة الأمنية و توجه

الديمقراطية نحو ما تريد هذه الأجهزة.

Dear Mr. very perceptive, there is no democracy at all, democracy is a word used to fool people and (it) scientifically means randomness that needs to be under control or oriented randomness. The (results of the) elections in the Arab countries are (always) 99.8% and scientifically these figures are unreal and irrational because the ones who control them are the security apparatuses and democracy is oriented according to what they want.

90. Respondent 4:

الديمقراطية هي إعطاء الشعب القدرة لاختيار قيادته السياسية .... هو صحيح في تلاعب بالديمقراطية لكن ده لا

يمتدعى أن تنتقد الديمقراطية بل يجب انتقاد الأساليب المنطقية إذا كان يشوه الغضب والخداع .... في العراق، وحسب

معلوماتي، يوجد مرافعين دوليين بالإضافة لمرافعين من مختلف المرشحين في كل مركز انتخاب لذا يصعب

التلاعب بالنتائج.

Democracy is to give the people the ability to choose their political leadership... it is correct there is manipulation in democracy, but this does not necessitate criticizing democracy but criticizing the followed style which infested with cheating and deception... In Iraq, according to my information, there are international monitors as well as monitors (representing) the different candidates in each polling center and therefore it is difficult to rig the results.

(Response thread 3)

In the examples above, each respondent attempted to legitimate his political view and delegitimize the others’. The respondents signaled responsiveness to each other by means of “format tying” (Bolander, 2012:1616) which was made by using specific lexical items and syntactic structures. The reference to democracy was the ubiquitous connection that permeated this embedded interaction; every respondent referred to it in their responses, and they also used the noun phrase the best to refer to the outcome
of the election, which represents a prerequisite for democracy and as such was linked to the discussion. This interactional patter, in which the respondents were engaging in a decentralized debate rhizomatically linked to the response thread, was very common across the three response threads analyzed in this chapter.

Unlike Facebook, the lack of hierarchically powerful roles highlights the distinctive nature of its participation framework. Figure 7.6 (below) explains the interactional orders available to the participants in the online news responses. The respondents could only address another respondent (A) creating response threads. However, they could refer to three different worlds; the world reported in the news section (B), the actual world (C) or the virtual world constructed online (D). Analogous to the participation framework within Facebook, the responses that have (de)legitimizing functions could only be generated when referring to at least one of the worlds indicated in the figure (see the line in bold), because (de)legitimization presupposes a worldview meant to be supported or refuted.

Figure 7.6 Participation framework in online response threads
7.3 Constructing virtual sociopolitical identities and online communities

In the online news response threads analyzed in this chapter, the respondents’ discursive practices were the main resources through which their sociopolitical identities could be analyzed by employing the third level of positioning analysis. Due to the medium affordances in the response threads, the respondents’ sociopolitical identities were not only indexed in the contents of these responses, but also by the pseudonyms they chose for themselves. Unlike the Facebook usernames (which under the terms and conditions of the site reflected the participant’s names also used by them in offline interactions), the respondents in the response threads could choose their usernames specifically for the political interaction in which they were involved. Examples 13 and 14 show how different aspects of the respondents’ identities could be indexed by the information conveyed in the different parts of the response.

Example 13:

The Sunnis will bring an elected president and he too will hide in the hole one more time, get lost people of holes.

(Response thread 1)

In Example 13, the respondent’s sociopolitical identity was indexed by content of the response itself, in particular by the negative stance he took towards the Sunnis and Saddam Hussein, who were tacitly represented as inseparably interrelated through using the expression people of holes. This innuendo was based on the shared knowledge that Saddam Hussein was found hiding in an underground bunker after having been overthrown by US troops in 2003. Due to the binary oppositional nature of delegitimization and the ethno-sectarianly polarized political context, the respondent’s delegitimization of the Sunni community and the former Iraqi president signaled his transportable attributes as a Shiite (Zimmerman, 1989:90), and his political affiliation as an opponent of Saddam Hussein’ regime.

However, in example 14, some of the attributes comprising the respondents’ sociopolitical identities were indexed upfront by the pseudonyms they chose for themselves as examples of “visible indicators” (Zimmerman, 1989:91) which unequivocally referred to particular transportable attributes of their identities.

Example 14:
Pseudonym 1:
Umar Ibn Al-Khattab

Pseudonym 2:
Sunni Iraqi ((with feminine grammatical gender value))

Pseudonym 3:
Classy non-sectarianist Iraqi ((spelling error in the original was corrected))

The first pseudonym indexed the ethno-sectarian identity of the respondent through the association with a sectarianly loaded name of a historical figure, i.e. the second Caliph of Rashidun Caliphate Umar Ibn Al-Khattab, who is highly revered by Sunnis but disrespected by some Shiites. This username historicized the Sunni-Shiite political conflict in Iraq and signaled enmity to Shiite respondents. The second username directly revealed the collective identity of the respondent, who chose to identify herself as a Sunni Iraqi woman. The third username, however, indexed the respondent’s cultural orientation that is more related to personality, rather than the collective attributes of his sociopolitical identity, because he explicitly identified himself as a non-sectarianist Iraqi.

In the previous chapters, the analysis showed that political affiliations could be interwoven with the communal attributes that defined the respondents’ memberships in ethno-sectarian communities only if the political topic discussed was ethno-sectarianly sensitive. By contrast, in the three response threads analyzed in this chapter the respondents almost always constructed their sociopolitical identities by interweaving political affiliations with ethno-sectarian attributes regardless of the topic discussed. This was predominantly due to the nature of (de)legitimizations which often ethnicized the political topics discussed. Example 15 unpacks how a
respondent constructed his sociopolitical identity in a way that indexed both his political ideology and membership in an ethno-sectarian community.

Example 15:

Respondent 1:

In fact (it is) the Shiite cities that should demonstrate and demand the Sunni cities to cease supporting terrorists in their areas... because we have millions of victims... and to stop taking (financial) support from Qatar and the world’s Sunnis ((referring to non-Iraqi Sunnis)) and to stop brainwashing the men and women terrorists in order to send them to Shiites’ gatherings.

(Response thread 1)

In the example above, the respondent represented the Shiite community positively by means of victimization and represented the Sunni community negatively by means of criminalization. Interestingly, however, the respondent did not only criminalize Iraqi Sunnis but also all the Sunnis in the world, i.e. the world’s Sunnis ((referring to non-Iraqi Sunnis)). Taking these stances towards this ethno-sectarian community, the respondent indexed his sociopolitical identity as a victimized Shiite, explicitly differentiated from the terror-supporting Sunnis across the world. By so doing, the respondent combined his political ideology as non-radical and terror-hating person with his ethno-sectarian affiliation in a single sociopolitical identity.

Most importantly, in the data analyzed in this chapter, and in contrast to the data analyzed in the previous chapters, the respondents’ sociopolitical identities which comprised ethno-sectarian attributes along with their political affiliations frequently functioned as supranational, rather than sub-national, identities. This seems to be motivated by the demographics of the respondents in the response threads. Since the data analyzed in this chapter was taken from the comment section of a pan-Arab, non-exclusively Iraqi, website, several non-Iraqi respondents, as indicated by their pseudonyms, participated in interaction, which put the discussions about the Iraqi politics in these response threads in a broader geopolitical context that spanned the entire Middle East region. Example 16 shows how the collective attributes of being
Sunni or Shiite could be used to construct supranational, rather than sub-national, sociopolitical identities.

Example 16:

It is imperative to form the greater Sunni State in all parts of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine and Ahvaz in order for the Sunni Nation to prevail on its lands and to reward its righteous martyrs who have come out of their mosques and shed their pure and immaculate blood to serve their Sunni Nation in order to eradicate the malicious and crime-committing Alawite and Nusairi killing machine that are proxy of the malevolent Safavidism and to eradicate the minority alliance.

(Response thread 2)

In example 16 above, the respondent referred to the so-called Sunni nation as if it was a real geopolitical entity, legitimizing the demand to form the greater Sunni State that spans across most of Mesopotamia and the Levant regions. The respondent also delegitimized the Shiite community, referring to it as the minority alliance in order to represent the Sunni Nation as a majority in the Muslim world. He represented the minority alliance or the Shiite community in the Muslim world as including the Alawite minority in Syria and the Shiite communities in Iraqi and Iran, referring to them as Safavids. Representing the Sunni community all over the Middle East as a nation that should have its own state indicated that the respondent was envisaging his Sunni identity as a sociopolitical identity in a supranational entity, i.e. Sunni nation/state, rather than an indication of membership in a sub-national group, the Sunni community in Iraq. This exemplifies how ethno-sectarian attributes could be precariously unstable and thus liable to politicization in the late modern Arab culture in general and Iraqi culture in particular.

In a similar fashion, the respondent in example 17 recontextualized the sociopolitical struggle between two ethno-sectarian communities at the sub-national level into a broader supranational conflict. Distinctively, however, the respondent used this ethno-sectarian identity to excommunicate others with opposing ethno-sectarian identities from their national group.
Example 17:

The decent Iraqis’ time of salvation from Al-Maliki and his Safavid gang and bloody militias has come very near by the willing of Allah his Almighty and (that of ) the ferment and heroic Iraqis.. Whoever supports Al-Maliki, the (collaborating) agent ((used negatively as a proxy for a foreign country)), is an Iranian Safavid and we (all) know the Iranians’ malicious eager to kill the Iraqi people.. And whoever stands up to his Safavid ideas ((referring to Al-Maliki’s)) is a decent patriotic Iraqi desiring peace and safety for this country..

(Response thread 2)

The respondent in the example above attempted to delegitimize Al-Maliki’s supporters, who were often Shiite Iraqis, by virtue of differentiation and then exclusion from the national space, representing them as Iranian Safavid, i.e. *Whoever supports Al-Maliki, the (collaborating) agent ((used negatively as a proxy for a foreign country)), is an Iranian Safavid*. By linking Shiism to the Iranian Safavid dynasty, the respondent wielded the ethno-sectarian affiliation of some Iraqis, i.e. Shiite Iraqis, as an exclusionary tool in order to deprive them of their national identity as Iraqi citizens, representing them as non-genuine Iraqis, or even Iranian.

It was, therefore, found that the collective attributes that defined the respondents’ memberships in the ethno-sectarian communities were discursively represented differently: these representations included Sunnis vs. Shiites (see examples 15 and 16 above), Arabs (or Iraqis) vs. Persians (Iranians or Safavids) (see example 17 above), and Muslims vs. non-Muslims (see example 18). This indicates that the transportable attributes of the sociopolitical identities in the Iraqi political context were not fixed but rather fluid in nature depending on the context in which they were used. It is important to emphasize that the different representations of these collective attributes were motivated by ethnic stereotypes and sectarian biases in order to highlight difference and deepen divergence from respondents perceived as out-group members.
Similar to the Facebook comment threads, an in-depth look at how the respondents employed (de)legitimization to position themselves in relation to each other revealed that there were two patterns of identifying respondents as members in certain communities. Calculating the frequency of legitimation topoi versus delegitimization topoi used in each response thread, highlighted the different identification practices employed by the respondents to index their sociopolitical identities as shown in figure 7.7.

![Figure 7.7 Percentages of legitimation and delegitimation topoi in the response threads](image_url)

Figure 7.7 shows that respondents in the three response threads tended to use delegitimization more commonly than legitimation. Nevertheless, in the third response thread, which was about the 2014 election, the result was slightly less polarized, because the respondents used the topoi of authorization and positive representation of in-group members more frequently to emphasize the electoral representativeness and positive attributes of the political actors perceived as in-group members. These results suggest that the respondents tended to construct their sociopolitical identities via negative identification, which was based on differentiation and exclusion (see examples 17, 18, 19 above). As in the Facebook comment threads analyzed in Chapter Six above, this indicates how ambivalent the respondents felt about their sociopolitical identities, at least in the online context, and also supports the locus communis about the Iraqi public’s lack of trust in the main political actors and the political institutions they belong to. These results along with similar ones found in the previous chapter (see 6.3) substantiate the argument made by many political analysts (e.g. Radwan, 2012) and civil activists (e.g. Dawood, 2014) about the crisis of democracy and the lack of public confidence in the political system in Iraq.
Due to the anonymity and pseudonymity afforded by medium of the online readers’ response interactions, deindividuation and the polarization, the interactions almost always developed into an inter-communal conflict, which consciously or unconsciously motivated the respondents to classify each other into in-group or out-group members. Unlike the online communities constructed in the Facebook comment threads analyzed in the previous chapter, the online communities constructed in the online response threads were solely online versions of the actual ethno-sectarian communities, operationalized by the same norms and ideologies underlying the original communities in the offline world. Example 18 shows how the respondents could discursively construct an online version of actual ethno-sectarian communities.

Example 18:

4. Respondent 1:
The position of the Prime Minister is a monopoly for Shiites and (it is) they who decide who deserves it. The time of thuggery, bullying and getting things done by force has come to an end when your rule demised and your leader hid in the hole ((referring to Saddam Hussein)).

5. Respondent 2:

The Muslim ((referring to Saddam Hussein)) is the crown on your head ((degrading idiomatic expression)) and (you) are not worthy of the soil he walked on, alas now you slaves has grown tongues, but we will chop your necks off, (you are) a clique of barbarians feeling happy because of a rule of 10 years.

7. Respondent 3:

The grandsons of Saddam, the leader of the hole, want to return to the rule ((power)), and I say to you (it is) the Lucifer’s hope in Paradise ((idiomatic expression used to refer to very unlikely scenario)) hahahahaha.

9. Respondent 4:

I am not a grandson of Saddam you scoundrel. Sa`ddam was your uncle ((leader)) hahahaha or you have forgotten (now)...... We will overthrow Al-Maliki and you will be watching. Laugh and feel happy (now) because in a while you will be whining over the ruins of the doomed one ((a play with words to refer to Al-Maliki)) and his Magi-Shiite government. Iraqi will return to us you Arabanized ((pretending to be an Arab)) Shrooqi ((degrading expression referring to Shiites from southern Iraq)).
10. Respondent 5:

It is you and your ilk that are scoundrels, (you are) Baathists from Saadi Alhili’s group ((expression used to refer to homosexuals)). Aren’t you from Saadi’s group.....

11. Respondent 6:

I think (it is) you that are from Saadi Alhili’s group along with Al-Hakeem and Al-Sistani ((names of religious Shiite clerics))...

12. Respondent 7:

You, who say Arabized Shrouqi, do you know that does Shrouqi means? I am sure you are a D.....((shorthand for ‘donkey’)) and you do not know,...., this name had been used for the King Sargon of Akkad ((ancient king of Mesopotamia)) and it means the veracious or good king, which means that Shrouqis ((referring to the Shiites people in southern Iraq)) are the origin(al people) of Iraq, you ignorant.

14. Respondent 6:

The leader of the hole is better than the leader of the beads ((referring to Al-Maliki))....

17. Respondent 8:

(your) problem is (with) the Shiite ruler, any Shiite ruler you have you would talk (badly) about him. You want to rule yourselves (even though) you are a minority of
the Iraqi people (representing) 7%. One must know one’s value and size.... Al-Maliki is a mercy of Allah to you because he fears Allah, if you have another ruler with no fears of Allah you will long to the days of Al-Maliki.

18. Respondent 9:

Oh I am afraid 5%.....what a schmuck... well how had you accepted that the 7% ruled you for 30 years ((referring to the Saddam Hussein’s rule))?! May death take you all.

(Response thread 1)

The respondents in example 18 were engaging in a confrontation embedded within the first response thread. They signaled responsiveness to each other by means of “format tying” but more importantly by the “order and participant roles”, which Bolander (2012:1617) conceptualizes as a “strongly content related” type of responsiveness. This type of responsiveness requires in-depth examination of content of the successive comments to determine whether the respondents were engaging in this rhizomatically embedded debate or merely expressing their political opinion without reactively responding to others. All the responses were confrontational, demonstrating typical flaming behaviors and consequently polarizing the interaction even further. This was indicated by the relatively high numbers of the (dis)likes they garnered. Although each response in this thread had 7.8 likes and dislikes on average, response 4 had 8 likes and 17 dislikes, comment 7 had 12 likes and 15 dislikes, and comment 17 had 10 likes and 16 dislikes. This highly polarized context motivated more respondents to categorize others into in-group and out-group members based on their politicized ethno-sectarian affiliations, giving rise to vicious and ultra extreme online versions of their offline communities: a homogenously Shiite-hating Sunni community and a homogenously Sunnis-hating Shiite community. This made the political discussions in this unmoderated genre irrationally polemical rather than reasonably topic-focused or deliberative (see Figure 7.8)

The respondents referred to these communities differently using a wide range of ideologically loaded names in order to historicize or racialize the political conflict between these two communities. These names firstly included ideologically loaded
collective expressions to refer to these communities; the expressions *grandsons of Saddam* was used to refer to Sunni community in responses 7 and 9, and the expressions *Magi-Shiite, or Arabized Shrouqis* were used to refer to Shiite community in responses 9 and 12 in the example above. Secondly, some of these stereotypes were based on the associations between specific political or religious figures and the communities they belong to. Therefore, *Saddam Hussein* (see comments 4, 5, 7, 9 and 14 in the example above) made implicit reference to the Sunni community by means of association, and Al-Maliki, Al-Sistani and Al-Hakeem (see comments 4, 5, 7, 9 and 17 in the example above) made implicit reference to the Shiite community by means of association.

Comparatively, the online communities constructed in the three online response threads analyzed were bigger than the ones constructed in the Facebook comment threads analyzed in the previous chapter, as a higher number of participants interactionally subscribed to these online communities. Perhaps due to the highly ethno-sectarianly polarized nature of the interactions, more online news readers seemed emotionally motivated to highlight their ethno-sectarian affiliations in the interaction in order to defend their ethno-sectarian community against the offenses caused by the respondents perceived as out-group members. In the data analyzed in this chapter, these highly xenophobic online versions of the offline communities were recreated through the respondents’ appeal to the ultra extreme ideological biases associated with their enregistered identities (Agha, 2009; De Fina, 2015). Politically speaking, the xenophobic and ultra extreme online versions of the offline communities might further deepen inter-communal rifts and weaken national unity in the country, because, for most of the post-US led invasion generations, social media represent the only way to familiarize self and communicate with the different other and out-group members.

The respondents’ subscriptions to the constructed communities in each response thread were identified mainly by analyzing the content of the response or the pseudonyms chosen by the respondents. Additionally, tracing the respondents’ rapport management between each other was a useful means to identify the respondents’ memberships in the communities constructed online. It appeared that the respondents who indexed their memberships in one of the online communities would act in a rapport enhancing manner when interacting with respondents perceived to be from the
same online community, whereas they would act aggressively or even offensively when interacting with respondents perceived to be from the rival community. This aggressiveness towards the respondents perceived as out-group members has an important interactional function in creating a sense of in-group bonding among respondents who shared the same ideological biases (also see Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2010: 543; Perelmutter, 2014: 87; Bou Franch & Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2014: 21). This type of aggressiveness, which often gave rise to impoliteness, emerged because each discursively constructed community presupposed the existence of a different frame of reference against which the members of that community evaluated their own and other’s behaviors normatively. Alluding to the unifying force of the moral and normative orders, Chilton (2204: 199) argues that “sharing of a common view regarding these concepts [i.e. justice and injustice, good and evil] is an intrinsic part of constituting a social or political group”. Yet at the same time, establishing a shared frame of reference also positions those who do not share that group as a separate, distinctive community of others. Example 19 shows how respondents’ different evaluations of a particular response made by one of the readers of the news section and their different rapport-sensitive reaction to the respondent who posted it could indicate their memberships in different online communities.

Example 19:

22. Respondent 1:

أبيا المالكي الشجاع يا قائد الصولة الظافرة على الإرهابية والعروبة والمطلوبين ..... نقول لك نحن وكل الخيرين والمدنيين والاحرار من ابناء شعب العراق معك و جنودا رهن اشرتك ..... 

Oh you Al-Maliki the courageous, the leader of the victorious charge on the terrorists, the mobs and the wanted.... We say to you we are along with all the good, patriotic and free people of Iraq are with you as soldiers at your service.

24. Respondent 2:

اخر تصرير لعلاوي بأنه لن يرشح للانتخابات القادمة خوفا من ذكاء الأزرقي و حكمته السياسية و تح ليله للواقع العراقي و العالمي ...

The last statement for Alawi was that he would not run in the next election because he was afraid of the punctured one’s ((a play with words to refer to the respondent Al-Azraqi offensively)) intelligence, political experience and realistic analysis for the Iraqi and the global situations…
26. Respondent 3:

Greetings to the Iraqi Al-Azraqi as he is resisting by his words the crowds of the malicious (who are) against the dignified Iraqi people.

27. Respondent 1:

Thank my dear brother Ahmed for the salutation and the words of compliment and for your true patriotism towards your country Iraq and for cherishing the honest sons of Iraq who are defend the homeland each from their position whether by arms or by the pen to expose those evil terrorists who target the great Iraq and its decent people!!

28. Respondent 4:

Bless you the Iraqi Al-Azraqi. You are from your position supporting Iraq, its army and the tribesmen who are fighting the forces of darkness and whoever supporting them, the ignorant and sectarianists.

(Response thread 2)

In example 19, respondent 1 used legitimization topoi to express his support to the former Prime Minister. In a bid to communicate his political view, respondent 2 ridiculed respondent 1’s legitimization of the former Prime Minister, orienting rapport towards challenging respondent 1 and the group he belonged to. The normative frame of reference based on which respondent 2 made his negative evaluation of respondent 1’s legitimization of Al-Maliki was congruent with the dominantly Sunni ideological biases. Therefore, by making this normatively motivated attitudinal reaction, respondent 2 indexed his subscription to the online version of the Sunni community constructed in interaction. Conversely, both respondents 3 and 4 agreed with respondent 1’s political stance over Al-Maliki, who was stereotypically described as a
Shiite leader, orienting rapport towards enhancement with respondent 1 by means of the compliments they paid to him, as well as their encouragement to him to continue what he was doing. The normative frame of reference based on which respondents 3 and 4 made their positive evaluations of respondent 1’s legitimization of Al-Maliki was congruent with the dominantly Shiite ideological biases. Therefore, by making these normatively motivated attitudinal reactions, the respondents indexed their subscription to the online version of the Shiite community constructed in interaction.

7.4 Rapport perceptions and variability of impoliteness assessments in online readers’ response threads

As shown in the previous chapters, in order to pinpoint the affective repercussions and moral implications of the discursive conflict for power, it was important to analyze different aspects of impoliteness. The multi-tiered positioning analysis could capture meticulously how various sets of impoliteness assessment were triggered and functionally employed in the response threads taking into consideration the different spatiotemporal levels of the interaction. In the conflictive online interactions analyzed in this chapter, impoliteness could function as a social categorization tool in order to classify the respondents as in and out-group members. This could be achieved by two types of impoliteness: on the one hand exogenous impoliteness assessments, which clarified the respondents’ moral stance in regards to certain political practices and the actors responsible for them; on the other hand endogenous impoliteness, which often involved affective expressions of attitudes used to reinforce certain identities and oppose others (Culpeper, 2011: 252; cf. Svensson, 2011), and by so doing enhance rapport between the like minded respondents and simultaneously underscore divergence with and difference from others (Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2010: 543; Perelmutter, 2014: 87; Bou Franch & Garces-Conejos Blitvich, 2014: 21).

In the three response threads, several instances of exogenous impoliteness were identified by means of which the respondents communicated moral stances and emotionally fraught negative attitudes towards particular political practices as part of the respondents’ delegitimization of out-group members. Consider example 20.

Example 20:
Regretfully, some of the people of Anbar have yielded to the orders of Al-Qaeda and DAESH (ISIL)’s terrorism by not participating in the election, they have not participated for being fearful of punishment… what a pity for the men who lost their Iraqi identity and marginalized themselves by themselves for obeying a clique of foreign terrorists’ orders.

(Response thread 3)

In the example above, the respondent used the negative evaluation of an out-group action to delegitimize the people of Anbar who boycotted the 2014 parliamentary election and represented this boycott as an act of obeying the terrorists’ orders. In doing so, the respondent explicitly appealed to the moral order to highlight the negative nature of this political stance in a vehement fashion. The respondent evaluated this political stance negatively, describing it as a regretful and pitiful practice, i.e. regretfully,… what a pity for the men who lost their Iraqi identity.

Invoking the moral order to evaluate this stance negatively amounts to impoliteness assessment of a public practice (see Culpeper, 2011: 65; Culpeper et al., 2014 for the relation between impoliteness and the emotions of regret and pity). Part of the impoliteness metapragmatic comment (Culpeper: 2011: 74) was expressed in Iraqi colloquial, rather than, modern standard Arabic to express intense emotive response.

Evaluating the boycott of the election in this way was a typical case of exogenous impoliteness, because the action evaluated took place outside the context of the interaction. As this type of moral evaluation was embedded in the delegitimization of the political action, it was thus analytically captured at the first level of positioning analysis.

At the second level of positioning analysis, it was possible to capture some instances of endogenous impoliteness, especially the ones that included violations of the social rights and obligations the respondents expected to be associated with their roles. Example 21 shows how a respondent denounced another respondent’s deauthorization of the former Prime Minister for being motivated merely by ethno-sectarian biases, which was perceived as unfair.

Example 21:
Respondent 1:

Who voted for doomed one ((a play with words to refer to Al-Maliki)), the beads seller ((degrading expression referring to his alleged humble origin))?? They were all ((ballot)) boxes coming from the Safavid Iran..

Respondent 2:

Al-Maliki is loved by his people and the evidence is his landslide victory in the previous election. I want to let the Sunni people know that Al-Maliki in the election before the last (his) State of Law (coalition) has garnered more votes than Sunni candidates in Mousil and Anbar. So, you want him to leave the rule ((to step down)) by force because of some Shiite-hating ones?? The rule will not go to the Sunni minority and you must know your size, and be ashamed (of yourselves). As a French proverb says, everyone has the right to dream (but) not everyone can attain it ((make it come true)) because it may be a pipe dream hahahahahahaha.

(Response thread 1)

In example 21 above, respondent 1 attempted to deauthorize the former Prime Minister Al-Maliki, implying that he, with support from Iran, managed to rig the election. Respondent 2 negatively evaluated respondent 1 and the other Al-Maliki-opposing respondents’ attempts to delegitimize Al-Maliki as being motivated by ethno-sectarian biases, interpreting these attempts as unjustifiably aggressive and consequently impolite. Respondent 2’s moral evaluation was made by implicitly appealing to the concept of fairness within a consociational political system, i.e. you must know your size, (cf. Spencer-Oatey, 2008:13, and Culpeper, 2011: 37) and the general moral order, i.e. be ashamed, in order to highlight respondent 1 and the other Al-Maliki-opposing respondents’ violations of the normative frame of reference. Respondent 2’s contribution involved an impolite evaluation of the previous response; it was interpreted as a face attack targeted indiscriminately at all Sunni respondents,
and, thus, as impolite itself (see example 25 below). This means that respondent 2’s contribution included both classificatory impoliteness, as it involved an explicit moral judgment of Sunni respondents’ practices, and expressive impoliteness, as it encompassed an affective reaction that was deemed offensive by the Sunni respondents later on in the thread. The classificatory impoliteness in the second response in the example was analytically captured at the second level of positioning analysis, because the appeal to the violation of fairness was associated with the respondents’ interactional roles that defined their rights and obligations.

Like the Facebook comment threads, most of the endogenous impoliteness instances identified in the online news response threads analyzed in this chapter did not involve explicit moral evaluations of the respondents’ practices inside the interaction, i.e. classificatory impoliteness, but rather involved offensive affective reactions encoded within the responses, which were considered typical cases of expressive impoliteness, as shown in example 22.

Example 22:

وَاللَّهُ كِلَّكُمۡ...وَحَافِدُون وَأبِو إِسْرَائِيْلۡ صَادِقُ قَصْصِينَ مَعْنِيِّكُمۡ.

*I swear to Allah you are all .... and spiteful. And the father of Isra‘a ((honorific referring to Al-Maliki)) is at the top ((winning)) whether you want it or not.*

(Response thread 3)

Example 22 shows how a respondent expressed a negative attitude towards other respondents who delegitimized the former Prime minister, establishing a strongly antithetical alignment to them. The respondent was not concerned about providing a counterargument or, at least, refuting the opposing responses, but he was rather more interested in attacking the respondents who delegitimized the political actor he supported, i.e. Al-Maliki. In the first sentence in the example above, the respondent avoided communicating what seemed to be a taboo word directly on record leaving it to the readers to fill in the blank, i.e. *I swear to Allah you are all .... and spiteful.* Additionally, the expression *whether you want it or not* in this context was considered highly offensive, because in the Arabic culture it implies that other’s opinions are not respected. This impoliteness assessment was communicated by means of a conventional formula of impoliteness that involved personalized negative reference (Culpeper, 2011: 135). The response was also emotionally intensive as it was
expressed in Iraqi Arabic rather than modern standard Arabic. As such, the response above was interpreted by respondents who opposed Al-Maliki as impolite for being offensively inappropriate and face-damaging. The response in the example above was not directly evaluative in nature, i.e. classificatory impoliteness; it rather involved an offensive reaction, which made it a typical case of expressive impoliteness.

At the third level of positioning analysis wherein the respondents’ constructions of their sociopolitical identities were under scrutiny, it was theoretically possible to identify three types of impoliteness related to the types of identities and the aspects of face associated with each of them; viz. institutional, communal and personal impoliteness. However, in three response threads, no institutional impoliteness was identified. Like the Facebook comment threads, this may be attributed to firstly, the non-institutionalized and informal nature of the response threads, and secondly the respondents’ reluctance to associate themselves with political institutions (see negative identification in 7.7 above). As was to be expected, many cases of communal impoliteness assessments were identified in the response threads analyzed in this chapter. Unlike the interactions analyzed in the previous chapters, all the three response threads analyzed in this chapter were thriving contexts for communal impoliteness to arise regardless of the topics discussed. This was because the respondents constantly ethnicized and racialized the discussions in these response threads.

Interestingly, the communal impoliteness identified in the data analyzed in this chapter could be classified into two categories: face-related impoliteness and identity-related impoliteness (see 3.3 above). The communal impoliteness assessments were mostly due to attacking the aspects of face associated with the respondents’ ethno-sectarian identities, i.e. face-related impoliteness. Damaging the self-worth, self-efficacy, dignity or honor, i.e. aspects of face, associated with these ethno-sectarian identities was interpreted as a flagrant attack against the entire ethno-sectarian community and its values. Therefore, and unlike Culpeper’s finding about the main triggers of impoliteness and interactional aggression in interpersonal settings (2011:47), this made the collective face, rather than the personal or Quality face, “overwhelmingly the most important type of face relating to impoliteness” (2011:47), in an ethnically politicized culture and in the genres that encouraged deindividuation, such as the online news readers’ responses. Consider example 23.
Example 23:

The people of the Centre and the West decided to announce their region (in a way) similar to the Kurdish brothers ((referring to the Kurdish semi-autonomous region)) because we can no longer take the people of the South and their Latimiyas ((a distinctive Shiite religious rite)). And all your attempts to humiliate us will lead to (the establishment of) a region wherein your legs will be broken and you won’t be allowed to enter.

(Response thread 3)

In example 23, the respondent negatively represented the Shiites and criminalized them, characterizing them as people who cannot be lived with, and who attempted to humiliate the Sunni people. The Shiites and the Sunnis were discursively represented by means of spatialization, which van Leeuwen (ibid: 46) defined as “a form of objectivation in which social actors are represented by means of reference to a place”. In the example the people of the South referred to the Shiites, and the people of the Centre and the West referred to the Sunnis. In doing so, the respondent delegitimized the Shiite community and communicated a strongly negative attitude against them in a way that was interpreted as aggressively face damaging and offensively impolite by the Shiite respondents. This impoliteness assessment was triggered by a conventionalized threat (Culpeper, 2011: 136), i.e. wherein your legs will be broken and you won’t be allowed to enter. In terms of the number of targets, the expressive inter-communal impoliteness embedded in this attempt at criminalization was directed towards multiple participants at different levels of participation, i.e. Shiite respondents and readers (metaparticipants), due to the context collapse, which were publically available and viewable by a potentially huge and unknowable audience. This type of impoliteness assessment was analytically captured at the third level of positioning analysis, because it involved an attack on the aspects of face that were associated with the participants’ ethno-sectarian identities.

In contrast to the examples analyzed in the previous chapters, some impoliteness assessments identified in the data analyzed in this chapter were not due to face attacks targeting particular respondents, but rather motivated by dis authenticating their sociopolitical identities, i.e. identity-related impoliteness.
Example 24 demonstrates how disauthenticating some respondents’ ethnic and national identities resulted in impoliteness.

Example 24:

Respondent 1:

العراقيين الآن بحاجة إلى قائد غير طائفي وتنظيم كيف يدير البلاد حكمة ... العراقيين عانوا الكثير وتعبوا ... نحتاج إلى رجل يفعل ويطرد العراق إلى حال أفضل كي تكون دول العالم ... لا إلى خراب العراق ، كـمثـل مهزلة . قتل ودداء ........................ وأهم شيء يبقى العراق للعراقيين فقط ( ولا مكان )

Iraqis are now in need for a non-sectarianist and clean(handed) leader who knows how to run the country wisely..... Iraqis have suffered a lot and have grown tired..... We need a man who acts and develops Iraq to (become) better like the rest of the world.... NO for the destruction of Iraq, enough, with the nonsense, killings and bloodshed........... The most important thing is (that) Iraq remains for Iraqis only and no place for the Persian Magi in it.

Respondent 2:

لاست انت يا امامة من يحدد من يحكم العراق.

It is not (for) you, you flunky, to decide who rules Iraq.

(Response thread 2)

In the example above, Respondent 1 made use of the relation between the Shiites in Iraq and Iran, which is stereotypically characterized as one of subordination, to represent the Shiite Iraqis as Persian Magi. Respondent 1 attempted to use this relation as an exclusionary tool in order to deprive the Shiite Iraqis of their national identity as Iraqi citizens and ethnic identity as Arabs. In doing so, he presented his, tacitly indexed, Sunni identity as a normative standard for Iraqi identity, i.e. The most important thing is (that) Iraq remains for Iraqis. This kind of impoliteness was implicationally driven by the confrontational atmosphere of the interaction (see Culpeper, 2011: 180). As indicated by his reply, respondent 2 interpreted respondent 1’s remark as seriously offensive and impolite, which motivated him to respond in an offensively retaliatory manner, i.e. [i]t is not (for) you, you flunky, to decide who rules Iraq. Respondent 2’s interpretation of respondent 1’ remark as offensive and impolite was not only because his face was attacked and damaged, but because his national and ethnic identities, as an Iraqi and as an Arab, were disauthenticating.
Few instances of personal impoliteness were also found in the online news readers’ responses. However, personal impoliteness was always combined with communal impoliteness, which made these impoliteness assessments more offensive, because it was directed to the respondents in their capacities as specific individuals and in their capacities as members in particular ethno-sectarian communities, as shown in example 25.

Example 25:

Respondent 1:

المشكلة الحاكم الشيعي لو أي حاكم شيعي يجيكم راح تتحاوز عليه تريدون الحكم بيدكم والتتم أقلية 7% من شعب العراق انتتم. المفروض الإنسان يعرف حجمه وقوته ... اصلا المالكي رحمه لانه يخاف الله لانه يجي غيره عليك مايخاف الله فسوف تنرحموا على ايام المالكي.

(Your) problem is (with) the Shiite ruler, any Shiite ruler you have you would talk (badly) about. You want to rule for yourselves (even though) you are a minority of the Iraqi people (representing) 7%. One must know one’s value and size.... Al-Maliki is a mercy of Allah to you because he fears Allah, if you have another ruler with no fears of Allah you will long to the days of Al-Maliki.

Respondent 2:

يمعود اخف 5% ... شوف شلون دماغي سز ... زين شلون ترضون 7% تحكمكم لعده 30 سنة!! من موت يكركم.

Oh I am afraid 5%.....what a schmuck... well how had you accepted that the 7% ruled you for 30 years ((referring to the Saddam Hussein’s rule))?! May death take you all.

(Response thread 1)

In example 25 above, respondent 1 attempted to deauthorize the Sunnis, characterizing the Sunni community as a minority, which represents only 7% of the population. In his response to respondent 1, respondent 2 insulted both respondent 1 and the ethno-sectarian community he belonged to, i.e. Shiite people. This response engendered multi-directional expressive impoliteness, in which respondent 2 attacked respondent 1’s face that was associated with his personal identity as a unique individual, i.e. what a schmuck, and the face associated with his collective identity as a member in the Shiite community, i.e. May death take you all. In this sense, the second response in the example involved a personal impoliteness, communicated by conventional formulae of “third-person negative reference” (Culpeper, 2011: 135),
and communal impoliteness communicated implicationally by virtue of the ethno-sectarianly confrontational context (ibid: 180). To index intense anger, respondent 2 used the low variety of Arabic to communicate his response (see Culpeper, 2011: 65; for the relation between face-related impoliteness and anger).

It was theoretically expected, and analytically demonstrated in the previous chapters (see 6.4 and 7.4), that delegitimization, rather than legitimization, would give rise to impoliteness, because delegitimization entails attacking others’ face or disauthenticating their identities, (also see examples 22, 23, 24 and 25 above). This was predominantly attributed to the fact that damaging out-group members’ face was a means to enhance one’s own and in-group members’ face in ethno-sectarianly polarized interactions like the ones analyzed in this chapter. Surprisingly, however, in the data analyzed in this chapter, impoliteness was sometimes motivated by legitimization. The current approaches in impoliteness studies may fail to account for how legitimization can trigger impoliteness, but by extending Spencer-Oatey’s (2008: 16) and Culpeper’s (2011:39) insights, it can be argued that impoliteness that arose from legitimization were motivated by the perceived violation of association and equity rights reflecting the respondents’ concerns over fairness and consideration of in-group’s rights. In highly ethno-sectarianly polarized contexts, (undue) in-group legitimization attempts were often perceived by out-group respondents as provocative impingements on their ethno-sectarian communities’ sociopolitical rights. Consider example 26 in which an authorization attempt gave rise to impoliteness.

Example 26:
Respondent 1:

He ((referring to the politician mentioned in the online news report)) is demanding Al-Maliki’s resignation whose bloc won in most of the Southern provinces as well as Baghdad!!.. This means a resignation of more than ten million capita (who) voted for him...

Respondent 2:

هو منو انتخب الهاككي أبو السيج؟؟كلها صناديق جتى من ايران الصفوية..
Who voted for doomed one ((a play with words to refer to Al-Maliki)), the beads seller ((degrading expression referring to his alleged humble origin))?? They were all (ballot) boxes coming from the Safavid Iran.

(Response thread 1)

In the example above, respondent 1 attempted to authorize the former Prime Minister by appealing to the votes he gleaned in the previous provincial election in order to express his rejection of a demand made by an opposition leader in the reported world (see figure 7.6 above). Although the first response in the example only expressed respondent 1’s political opinion over the topic in question through legitimizing one of the political actors mentioned in the news section, without being directed to other respondents, it was perceived as an irritatively provocative and inflammatory remark, and most likely impolite, and consequently triggered an intensively offensive reply in the second response (see Culpeper, 2011: 64 for the link between impoliteness related to behavioral expectations and moral emotions such as anger and irritation). Respondent 2’s response suggests that he interpreted respondent 1’s attempt to authorize Al-Maliki as a provocative impingement on the sociopolitical rights of his Sunni community. Therefore, he reacted by deauthorizing Al-Maliki and accused him of being assisted by Iran, for ethno-sectarian reasons, to rig the election results in order to retain power. The use of an ethno-sectarian stereotype that had a racial hint to it, i.e. Safavid, signaled the ethno-sectarian ground of respondent 2’s remark, which was meant to counterbalance the violation of his expectations regarding the political entitlements of his ethno-sectarian community. Although Culpeper (2011: 206) indicates that “counter-aggression may be taken as a matter of fair defence”, the respondent’s remark was still interpreted as ethno-sectarianly offensive and impolite by Shiite respondents and readers (metaparticipants), because it involved an ethno-sectarianly offensive stereotype, i.e. Safavid.

Contrary to the impoliteness analysis in chapters Five and Six, the instances of expressive and classificatory impoliteness analyzed in this chapter did not exhibit relevant thematically related differences across the online readers’ response threads analyzed in this chapter as shown in figure 7.8 (below). This can be attributed to three different reasons: firstly the respondents always ethnicized the political topics
discussed, and as such made these more sensitive (see 7.1 above). In a culture where
ethno-sectarian identities are often politicized and inter-communal tension is high,
damaging the self-worth associated with these communal identities is often interpreted as an attack against the entire community and its values. In the dataset
analyzed in this chapter, the use of collective delegitimization topoi, which was fairly common, was often perceived as a blatant act of aggression by out-group respondents, which consequently triggered various impoliteness assessments. The second factor that seems to make impoliteness equally salient across the three response threads was the lack of a moderating role in this type of genre that could ease expected tensions between the respondents. Finally, the potential anonymity or pseudonymity made the respondents less socially accountable before the eyes of others (cf. Mitchel and Haugh, 2015), which gave rise to gratuitous aggressive practices and, in many cases, flaming (Lange, 2014: 54). Apparently, the lack of moderation and anonymity are specifically related to the affordances of the medium.

The numbers of impoliteness assessments identified in the responses that have (de)legitimating functions were as follows: 29 instances of expressive impoliteness and 5 instances of classificatory impoliteness in the first response thread, 19 instances of expressive impoliteness and 3 instances of classificatory impoliteness in the second response thread, and 38 instances of expressive impoliteness and 11 instances of classificatory impoliteness in the third response thread. The impoliteness assessments in each response thread were normalized by the number of responses identified as having (de)legitimating functions. Figure 7.8 also shows that classificatory
impoliteness instances identified in the three online news response threads were much fewer than the instances of expressive impoliteness. This suggests that the respondents had a tendency to register their negative attitudes towards others’ interactional practices in a retaliatory fashion rather than sanctioning moral and normative judgments about others’ violations of appropriateness or their aggressive behaviors, i.e. classificatory impoliteness. Additionally, collating the results in figure 7.8 with those in 7.5 and the in-depth look at the individual impoliteness assessments identified shows that actor-oriented delegitimization seemed to be more socially reprehensible than the action-oriented types of delegitimization, and as such, was more likely to be evaluated as impolite.

7.5 Summary

The aim of this chapter was to examine how the conflict for power could be discursively produced, perceived and evaluated across thematically different contexts in three online readers’ response threads. Focusing on how conflict for power was argumentatively structured and linguistically realized, the first level of positioning analysis demonstrated that the respondents employed various topoi of (de)legitimization in order to express their political views. Collective topoi in general and out-group criminalization and ethno-sectarian differentiation and exclusions in particular were by far the most commonly used topoi in the three response threads regardless of the topics discussed, which, when compared to the results in the previous chapters, suggests that it was the medium, rather than the topic, that had the greatest impact on how the (de)legitimization patterns emerged in the interactions analyzed in this genre. Distinctively, the respondents employed history-inspired racial stereotypes and ethno-sectarian biases in their (de)legitimization to highlight sociopolitical divergence. More importantly, the quantitative and qualitative analyses suggested that in the unmoderated genre of the online response threads, the respondents’ expressions of opinions were not necessarily based on politically substantiated ground, but rather motivated by ethno-sectarian biases.

At the second level of positioning analysis, and due to the affordances of the response thread, it was possible for the respondents to index responsiveness explicitly using the response title or implicitly by expressing their opinion about the topics in question, and in doing so establish alignments to the intended recipients.
Interactionally, the online respondents’ interactions lacked the presence of a moderator or gate-keeper, which made the response threads highly confrontational, and as such different from the data analyzed in the previous chapters. It was also found that the set of the interactional orders available in the online respondents’ interactions divided the argumentation into multiple, embedded debates that were rhizomatically attached to each other with no substantive hierarchical connection.

The third level of positioning analysis showed that the respondents’ sociopolitical identities were almost always the result of interweaving political stances with ethno-sectarian identities. Distinctively, however, these ethno-sectarian identities frequently functioned as supranational, rather than sub-national, identities. Like the data analyzed in the previous chapters, although with higher margins, the respondents constructed their sociopolitical identities via negative identification, which supported the argument made by many political analysts and civil activists about the crisis of democracy and the lack of public confidence in the political system in Iraq. Most importantly, the findings also indicated that most respondents in the online response threads tended to organize themselves in online communities that represented highly xenophobic and ultra extreme online versions of their offline communities. This explains why the unmoderated online response threads functioned as a platform that facilitated the expression and exchange of extreme ideological views giving rise to polemical discourses that lacked rational political deliberation.

Focusing on how the discursive conflict for power was perceived and evaluated, the last section investigated the normative and moral aspects of the respondents’ use of (de)legitimization to express their political views. The multi-tiered positioning analysis was used to identify various instances of exogenous and endogenous impoliteness assessments, each of which triggered in different spatiotemporal levels of the interactions. The impoliteness assessments identified were always communal in nature. Although occasionally combined with personal impoliteness, these instances of communal impoliteness were often utilized as a social categorization strategy. Surprisingly, in the data analyzed in this chapter, impoliteness assessments were sometimes triggered by legitimization. This was because (undue) in-group legitimizations in highly ethno-sectarianly polarized contexts were often perceived by out-group commentators as provocative impingements on their ethno-sectarian communities’ sociopolitical rights. Quantitative analysis of impoliteness
indicated that the respondents in the online response threads were a mainly interested in the retaliatory tit for tat rather than the explicit moral evaluations of others’ behaviors. Unlike the data analyzed in the previous chapters, the quantitative analysis of impoliteness assessments did not demonstrate thematic variation across the three response threads analyzed in this chapter, because, due to the medium, they were all ethno-sectarianly sensitive.
Chapter Eight
Discussion and Conclusions

8. Introduction

The main objective of this study was to advance the understanding on the discursive conflict for power within Iraqi political Discourse. Ultimately, at a broader level, this was meant to shed light on how the ethno-sectarian and social divisions in Iraq are reflected in mainstream and new media, and how these divisions are perpetuated by means of the very same discourses instantiated in these two types of media. To that effect, the thesis attempted to answer the following primary research question:

what are the interactional, sociopolitical, affective and moral implications of the conflict for power taking place in the Iraqi political discourses instantiated in three different genres representing mainstream and social media?

This primary question was operationalized by three sets of subordinate methodological, empirical and theoretical questions.

The methodological question dealt with the potential operationalization of the empirical objectives of this thesis by exploring the possible methods to bridge the gap between the context of production and reception in the political discourses circulated in both the mainstream and the social media. Methodologically, the present thesis drew on Political Discourse Analysis to analyze how the conflict for legitimacy and power was argumentatively structured and linguistically realized in the data. To attend to the reception of text, I employed the study of rapport and that of impoliteness to account for how the conflict for domination and power was perceived and evaluated, as these frameworks attend to the contexts of reception as they were made evident in the different interactional contexts in the data. The analytical gap between macro discourse analytical approaches, e.g. the CDS-informed Political Discourse Analysis, and micro analytical approaches, e.g. discursive analyses of rapport management and (im)politeness was innovatively bridged by employing Bamberg’s (1997) multi-tiered positioning analysis. This facilitated the cross fertilization between two often perceived as unrelated approaches, viz political discourse analysis and rapport and impoliteness studies. This cross fertilization made it analytically possible to trace the attitudinal and affective repercussions, and the moral implications of the different
(de)legitimization topoi used in the multi-participant, debate-like, political interactions instantiated in mainstream and social media.

From a theoretical perspective, the thesis provided fresh insights into Political Discourse Analysis in two ways. Firstly, it identified new sets of “content-related argumentation schemes” (Reisigl, 2014:77), i.e. topoi, used by the interlocutors to legitimize their political viewpoints and to delegitimize those of their opponents. These sets of topoi included in-group victimization vs. out-group criminalization, and in-group authorization (claims of majority) vs. out-group deauthorization (claims of minority). These sets of topoi are entrenched within the sentiments of victimhood and disenfranchisement that permeate all Iraqi ethno-sectarian communities, and underlie many of the political actors’ attempts to pursue increased political power. These topoi seem to be characteristic of Iraqi political Discourse, and seem to define its distinctive sociopolitical nature. This also suggests that (de)legitimization topoi are conditioned by the context of culture, in Malinowski’s (1966 [1923]) term, more than any other contextual factors. In this sense, identifying these culture specific (de)legitimization topoi expanded on the topoi identified by other researchers, predominantly in western discourses, and highlighted the cultural diversity of human discourses and the ways these discourses could be approached and analyzed from culturally sensitive, but globally minded, perspectives (Shi-xu, 2015). Secondly, (de)legitimization in this thesis was conceptualized as a micro argumentative practice that could be attitudinally and affectively confronted and morally assessed in interaction, rather than as a macro discursive goal of highly formalized political texts and speeches as often conceptualized in Political Discourse Analysis. The conceptualization was innovative in bringing (de)legitimization closer to the study of rapport and impoliteness analysis, and, in so doing, it could pinpoint the affective and attitudinal consequences and moral implications of the conflicts for power in Iraqi political discourses across mainstream and social media in which oppositional sociopolitical viewpoints were competing for legitimacy.

The thesis also made an important contribution to the study of impoliteness and that of rapport by providing an ethno-sectarian perspective, which represents a relatively fresh perspective in these emerging fields of scholarship. The thesis made an important distinction between exogenous and endogenous evaluations of impoliteness taking place at different spatiotemporal levels of the interaction.
distinction elucidated how the evaluations of impoliteness could trigger and be triggered by (de)legitimization, thus highlighting the multifunctionality and intertextuality of impoliteness assessments in ethno-sectarian and political discourses. The other contribution to the study of impoliteness that the thesis made was to propose a necessary expansion of Spencer-Oatey’s (2008: 16) association and equity rights in order to account for the evaluations of impoliteness that could be triggered by legitimizations. In typical interactional contexts, it might not be expected that legitimization could give rise to an impoliteness assessment, because legitimization does not involve explicit norm disruptive behavior or face attack. However, in ethno-sectarianly polarized contexts it was found that legitimization could indeed trigger impoliteness assessment. Although the current approaches in impoliteness studies may not adequately account for how legitimization triggers impoliteness assessment, extending Spencer-Oatey’s (2008: 16) and Culpeper’s (2011:39) insights on association and equity rights, which reflect the interlocutors’ concerns over fairness and consideration of in-group’s rights, can explain this atypical case of impoliteness. Based on the evidence from the data in this thesis, I argued that (undue) in-group legitimization was often perceived by out-group interlocutors as a provocative impingement on their ethno-sectarian communities’ sociopolitical rights.

8.1 General Trends in Iraqi Political Discourse

Despite the thematically and generically prompted variations in the data, several common discursive patterns could be found in the various forms of political discourses analyzed in this thesis. From an empirical perspective, the thesis attempted to answer four empirical questions. Each of these empirical questions was related to a different level of the analysis, viz. the three levels of positioning analysis and the overarching analysis of rapport and impoliteness. The four levels of analysis accounted for different aspects of the conflict for power in three different genres representing mainstream and social media, and measured its cross-thematic and cross-generic variations, as clarified below:

1. analyzing the (de)legitimization patterns in each genre across three different thematic contexts,
2. identifying the roles and participation frameworks afforded by the media in these genres,
3. unpacking the sociopolitical identities, their functions and social implications, and finally
4. examining the functions, sources, types and directionality of impoliteness assessments across different thematic and generic contexts.

At the first level of positioning analysis, the findings showed that interlocutors employ a limited number of (de)legitimization topoi to (dis)agree with others or express sociopolitical views. These (de)legitimization topoi could be categorized in two different respects: argumentative orientation and multitude of targets. In terms of the argumentative orientation, the (de)legitimization topoi were either actor-oriented or action-oriented. The analysis indicated that actor-oriented (de)legitimization supported the long-rooted ideological biases about self and others and, therefore, tended to have a panoramic focus on the sociopolitical conflicts in Iraq. Alternatively, action-oriented (de)legitimization tended to be short-ranged in nature focusing on the specific contexts in which the political actions (de)legitimized took place. In terms of multitude of targets, the (de)legitimization topoi were either individualistic or collective in nature. The former (de)legitimize individuals, typically politicians, whereas the latter (de)legitimize groups and communities in their entirety. Individualistic (de)legitimization topoi were political in essence; they targeted specific political actors based on their political performance. They aimed to persuade most of the Iraqi people about certain political claims regardless of their ethno-sectarian affiliations. In contrast, collective (de)legitimization was always ethno-sectarian in nature; they were frequently addressed to an intended audience, i.e. the in-group members, for out-group members would not tend to accept the arguments that were based on delegitimizing their ethno-sectarian communities.

The quantitative analysis of the (de)legitimization patterns demonstrated that actor-oriented (de)legitimization topoi were more commonly used than action-oriented (de)legitimization topoi in all the interactions analyzed in this thesis; this was characteristically salient in the political discourses produced in online contexts. These results suggested that the argumentation structures in all the political debates analyzed in the thesis were personalized and infrequently agenda-oriented, as the interlocutors tended to (de)legitimize the political actors and their images rather than their actions and agendas regardless of the topic being debated and the medium affordances.
The quantitative analysis showed that the argumentation structures, and, as such, the interlocutors’ self identification practices, in the Iraqi political Discourse tended to be based on delegitimization rather than legitimization regardless of the topics debated or their generic contexts. This seemed to be prompted by two different reasons. On the one hand, and from a rhetorical perspective, employing delegitimization in argumentation was less committal and more equivocal. Delegitimization made it easy for the interlocutor to avoid discussing their own political ideological convictions and political thoughts, which might require them to commit to certain premises or courses of actions, and offered them the chance to indulge in apparently effortless attacks of opponents’ political convictions. On the other hand, and from a political perspective, the interlocutors seemed not to trust the key political actors and the political institutions to which they belonged. This substantiated the argument made by many political analysts (e.g. Radwan, 2012) and civil activists (e.g. Dawood, 2014), about the crisis of democracy and the lack of public confidence in the political system in Iraq.

In terms of the sociopolitical identities constructed in the interactions taking place in the different genres across mainstream and social media, the ethno-sectarian identities were always at play due to cultural and political reasons. However, these ethno-sectarian identities seemed to be unstable, versatile and multifunctional. They could be played out as sub-national or supranational identities based on the contexts or even the interlocutors’ interactional needs. In terms of the functions, the ethno-sectarian identities were employed as a means to reinforce inter-communal solidarity and to counterbalance the negative stereotypes associated with these enregistered ethno-sectarian identities, or to voice dissent and express ethno-sectarian antagonism.

The analysis demonstrated how the evaluative and argumentative aspects of language are inseparably interrelated in the Iraqi political discourses produced in both mainstream and social media. This was evident in the relationship between instances of (de)legitimization that could trigger and be triggered by evaluations of impoliteness. In some cases, the evaluations of impoliteness were argumentatively employed to delegitimize political actions. This took place when the interlocutors invoked the moral order to evaluate certain political actions as immoral, unfair or unacceptable. The term exogenous impoliteness was used to refer to these evaluations of impoliteness because the political actions evaluated as negative, unfair or immoral
took place outside the interactions in which they were evaluated. Exogenous impoliteness could be captured at the first level of positioning analysis, because its analytical focus was the actions that took place in the there-and-then moment of the reported events, but they were recontextualized in the here-and-now moments of these interactions. Alternatively, (de)legitimization was found to trigger various impoliteness assessments, some of which were prompted by violations of behavioral expectations, while others were due to attacking various aspects of self. These types of impoliteness were called endogenous impoliteness because the practices evaluated as impolite occurred inside the interactions in which they were evaluated. Endogenous impoliteness could be captured by the second and third levels of positioning analysis, which focused on the interlocutors’ interactional roles and their sociopolitical identities respectively. Broadly speaking, and unlike Culpeper’s finding about the main triggers of impoliteness and interactional aggression in interpersonal settings (2011:47), the aspects of face associated with collective identity (rather than those associated with the personal or interactional identities), were found to be the most important aspects of face relating to impoliteness in contexts that are politicized along ethno-sectarian lines.

8.2 Cross Thematic Comparison of Iraqi Political Discourse

The data analyzed in each of the analytical chapters included different political interactions in which three different political themes were discussed. The three themes included: the 2012 political deadlock in the country, the sectarian-based power-sharing process in post US-led invasion Iraq, and finally the results of the 2014 parliamentary election, and thus provided a cross thematic perspective on the conflict for power in Iraqi political Discourse. The results exhibited thematically prompted variations in the political TV interviews and the Facebook comment threads. In cross-sectarian political interactions, i.e. the first theme, the actor-oriented topos of negative representation of other was the most commonly used. The collective topoi, especially criminalization and victimization, were the most frequent when the topics discussed were ethno-sectarianly sensitive, i.e. the second theme, which made interactions about this topic more clearly polarized and inter-communally confrontational. The use of authorization and deauthorization were prominently salient when discussing the topic of the 2014 election.
The cross thematic variations in the (de)legitimization patterns affected how offensively aggressive the political discussions were. As might be expected, the interactions that focused on ethno-sectarian topics tended to be more emotionally sensitive and so interactionally aggressive than any other political topics, because these ethno-sectarian interactions could eventually generate highly exclusionary remarks. However, the interactions that focused on the election-related topics tended to be less emotionally sensitive and aggressive than the interactions that discussed other topics, because the interlocutors in these interactions used relatively fewer delegitimization topoi.

8.3 Cross Generic Comparison of Iraqi Political Discourse

The analysis could also provide a broad contrastive perspective as to how the conflict for power instantiated in the Iraqi political discourses could be produced and perceived across different genres across mainstream and social media. The findings in the three analytical Chapters (Chapters Five, Six and Seven) suggested that there were differences in the (de)legitimization patterns, argumentation structures, dynamics of interaction, identity construction, rapport perception and impoliteness assessments between the television interviews, Facebook interactions and online readers’ response threads. These differences prompted by the genre gave rise to different interactional, sociopolitical and moral implications in the interactions under investigation.

The results demonstrated that the interlocutors’ discursive practices in the TV interviews focused on (de)legitimating specific political actions and actors in manners that were relatively less aggressive. As TV interviews represented a more institutionalized type of media than the other genres analyzed in the thesis, there were established cultural and institutional conventions that prevented explicitly aggressive and offensive behaviors. In this respect, the interviewers, who had powerful interactional roles, often ensured that these cultural and institutional conventions were respected. Therefore, the interviewees were found to employ action-oriented (de)legitimization more frequently than in social media. This made the interactions in this genre more focused on debating specific political issues or actions, which were predominantly raised by the interviewers themselves, rather than on indulging in the long-standing and diachronic aspect of the political conflicts in the country, which could give rise to exclusionary and offensively aggressive remarks. The other
important finding that supported this argument was that the interviewees were found
to use (de)legitimizing topoi that did not involve explicit exclusionary remarks; no
instances of criminalization and sectarian exclusion from the national space were
found even in the ethno-sectarianly polarized debate, i.e. the second TV interview.
Characteristically, explicit indexing of self ethno-political affiliations was perceived
as morally acceptable, because it functioned as a means to reinforce inter-communal
solidarity or to counterbalance the negative stereotypes associated with these
enregistered sectarian identities. However, the interviewees frequently employed in-
group victimization as an indirect strategy to make implicit negative remarks about
the other ethno-sectarian communities, or in extreme cases, employed negative
characterization of particular political actors who were perceived as representing the
rival communities to delegitimize these communities.

In the TV interviews analyzed in this thesis, the medium affordances and the
interactional roles available greatly influenced the dynamic of the argumentation
process and affective and moral aspects of the interactions. Firstly, the interviewers
tended to reorient the interaction towards the reestablished goals of the interviews
every time they felt these goals were not being served. Therefore, they interrupted the
interviewees or rephrased the questions they believed were not being fully answered
by the interviewees. Secondly, the interviewers made use of the power associated with
their interactional roles to moderate the interviews in order to contain any
confrontation between the interviewees. Even in extreme cases, when interviewees
took offence at each other’s practices, they tended to invoke the normative frame of
reference in order to sanction a moral stance (Haugh, 2015: 280), rather than
descending to a tit-for-tat exchange of offenses as was found in the online response
threads, and to a lesser extent in the Facebook comment threads. This was
demonstrated by the percentages of classificatory impoliteness compared to
expressive impoliteness in the TV interviews.

Broadly speaking, in the TV interviews analyzed in this thesis, the
interlocutors persistently served their predefined goals in line with their affiliation to
their respective political institutions. They tended to legitimize the political views
institutionally endorsed by their political parties and to delegitimize the ones
institutionally endorsed by the opposing parties. This was evident in the interlocutors’
frequent attempts to index their institutional identities when performing
(de)legitimization. Even in ethno-sectarianly polarized interactions, e.g. the second TV interview, in which they might be expected to advance the goals of the ethno-sectarian community they belonged to, the interlocutors tended to employ ethno-sectarian ideologies to advance the goals of their political institutions not vice versa. This suggested that these behaviors were motivated by instrumental (or goal-oriented) rationality (Mueller, 1989), which made these TV interviews not only exclusive but also quite manipulative, and as such more detrimental to the public sphere (cf. Habermas, 1989).

In the analysis of online discourses, the affordances of genres in which the political discourses were produced led to varying outcomes. In the interactions that took place in the online news readers’ responses, the respondents’ discursive practices seemed to be motivated by expressive rationality (Svensson, 2008). This was because the respondents tended to use actor-oriented (de)legitimization very frequently to support their ideological biases about self and others, expressing their sociopolitical views in an aggressive and offensive fashion. In the readers’ response threads, the (de)legitimization patterns exhibited an abundance of explicit negative ethno-sectarian stereotypes communicated by means of collective topoi, such as criminalization and sectarian exclusion. Furthermore, recontextualizing historical events and the use of history-inspired stereotypes to express sectarianly exclusionary political views were very salient in this genre.

The medium affordances and the lack of a moderator role in the online news comment threads greatly influenced the interlocutor’s self-positioning, the dynamic of the argumentation and the affective and attitudinal aspects of the interactions. In terms of sociopolitical identities and the ways they were played out in this genre, the respondents’ ethno-sectarianly politicized identities were indexed specifically to voice political dissent and express ethno-sectarian antagonism. In this genre, although the argumentation was rhizomatically structured, the respondents tended to foreground their ethno-sectarian identities to organize themselves in online communities that represented highly xenophobic and ultra extreme versions of their offline communities. Anonymity and pseudonymity afforded by the medium made the respondents feel they were less socially or morally accountable for their discursive practices in the interaction, which resulted in a notably high number of instances of retaliatory (i.e. expressive) impoliteness in this genre. In this highly polarized context,
Impoliteness was sometimes motivated by legitimization. This was because (undue) in-group legitimizations in highly ethno-sectarianly polarized contexts were often perceived by out-group commentators as provocative impingements on their ethno-sectarian communities’ sociopolitical rights. Polarization, use of exclusionary topoi and construction of ethno-sectarian identities to highlight dissent indicated how this unmoderated genre could function as a platform that facilitates the reproduction of extreme ideologies giving rise to polemical discourses that perpetuated the offline ethno-sectarian conflicts.

In the Facebook comment threads, although the interactions reflected some ethno-sectarian biases, especially when debating an ethno-sectarianly sensitive topic, the (de)legitimization patterns were, to a large extent, based on the commenters’ political preferences and interactional needs. This was reflected by the relatively infrequent exclusionary remarks made by the commenters. The analysis shows that commenters used (de)legitimization to voice their (dis)agreement with the political views presented in interaction. In this respect, the (de)legitimization patterns exhibited thematic variation, which indicated that the commenters were more focused on the topic in question.

The medium affordances and the interactional roles available on the Facebook page influenced the dynamic of the argumentation process and evaluative aspects of the interactions. The post authors made use of the power associated with their interactional roles to moderate the interactions that were generated by their posts on their Facebook pages in order to prevent the interactions from developing into aggressive confrontations. They could explicitly invoke a normative frame of reference to remind the commenters about their rules for acceptable political debates in their Facebook pages, or suppress ethno-sectarianly exclusionary and offensively aggressive behaviors. In this genre, the medium affordances divided the argumentation into a series of decentralized debates that were rhizomatically connected to each other. Each of these decentralized debates discussed different aspects of the political topics originally raised by the post authors. The commenters tended to engage in these decentralized debates according to their interactional interests. This allowed the commenters to organize themselves in online imagined communities in these decentralized debates. These online constructed communities ranged from completely imagined communities, which were divided over specific
political issues, to recreated versions of offline communities with all their ethno-sectarian biases.

These minimally regulated Facebook interactions gave rise to an online public sphere that was more inclusive than the one offered in mainstream media and less pathologically polemical than the one offered in the online news readers’ responses, which suggested that the commenters’ practices in the genre of Facebook comment threads were, to a moderate extent, motivated by communicative rationality (Habermas, 1989). However, a caveat must be stated here. Just because the Facebook affordances can facilitate rational dialogue among a wide range of interlocutors, this does not entail that all political debates on Facebook pages will be rationally deliberative, producing well argued counter-discourses that can inform the general public and simultaneously offset hegemonic discourses (Dahlberg, 2007: 837). This is because rational discussions are the outcome of effective moderation and minimal gate-keeping (Mahlouly, 2014: 79), which may not be available all the time.

In terms of the viability of political deliberation that can sustain truly democratic political participation, the results, then, question both the techno-enthusiasts’ argument about the democratization in the online public sphere and highlight its contingency, and the net-sceptics’ pessimism about online public engagement (Virkar, 2014:41). The general conclusion in this regard is that it seems necessary to consider the affordances of the medium as well as the recognized roles and functions in the genre under scrutiny, when examining how political discourses are produced and perceived, because meaning, especially in computer mediated communications, is locally situated and generically conditioned.

8.4 Limitations and challenges
Like all academic research, there are some limitations to this thesis. The nature of the research and its design made it difficult to analyze sizeable datasets that allowed the use of corpus linguistic or social network analytic techniques to produce large scale quantitative results. The thesis had a predominantly micro analytical perspective that drew on qualitative analysis. This was because the thesis aimed to identify the (de)legitimizing topoi and explains their potential functions as means to examine the argumentative structures and linguistic realizations (i.e. production) of the conflicts for power in the Iraqi political Discourse. The thesis also concentrated on pinpointing
the interactional consequences, attitudinal and affective reactions and normative/moral evaluations of using (de)legitimization topoi as a means for unpacking how the discursive conflict for power was perceived and evaluated. On the other hand, the quantitative analysis used in this thesis only aimed to provide a glimpse to cross-generic and cross-thematic perspectives by focusing on the various argumentative and interactional patterns that emerged in different generic and thematic contexts. Since the data encompassed a small number of topics within a limited time frame, it is then necessary to highlight that the findings of the cross-generic analysis might be transferable to similar contexts but not necessarily generalizable (Teddlie & Yu, 2007: 78, 98 fn2).

There were two major challenges in this thesis; on the one hand, it was not possible to make use of inter-rater reliability checks due to the nature of any PhD thesis like this. In this respect, several methodological decisions were made to minimize the inevitable subjectivity involved in the qualitative, micro-analytic types of analysis (see 4.1.1). On the other hand, and due to speed at which the forms of online discourse change, my online datasets inevitably represented a snapshot of particular kinds of interaction that seemed very analytically important and relevant in the current Iraqi social and political contexts. Nonetheless, these datasets have a longitudinal importance as much as they reflect cultural and sociopolitical patterns in Iraqi society that seem to have become increasingly established, especially in the post-US led invasion era.

8.5 Potential for further research
There is much potential for further research that can emerge from this thesis. As the thesis provides a cross-section view of the conflict for power in the Iraqi political discourses produced in the mainstream and social media, one possibility might be conducting a diachronic study that traces the changes in the Iraqi political Discourse over a long period of time. There is also a potential to conduct a comparative study that analyzes the political conflict for power in two different cultures in terms of production or reception or both to identify cross-cultural variations in terms of the argumentative structures, cultural and political underpinnings that shape the discourse in these cultures. Furthermore, the interdisciplinary approach developed in the present thesis sets the stage for further research into rapport management in political
discourse, which can allow for a better understanding of self-positioning in a variety of media discourses that have extensive affective possibilities.
Appendix 1 (Consent Templates)

A. English Version

Dear Respondents,

I am writing a thesis on how power and rapport are employed and represented in modern Iraqi political discourse, and I would like to gather some more examples of the posts and comments on current political issues in Iraq posted on your Facebook accounts.

Any data will be anonymized, so that your name and references to places that might be used to identify you will be removed.

The anonymized examples will only be used in this thesis, and the data will be kept only for the length of this project and then destroyed. If you decide that you no longer want to be part of the project, then please let me know.

If you would like a copy of the final paper, please let me know and I’d be happy to send one on to you.

If you are happy to participate in the project, please sign the attached consent form and send it back to me at the School of English, University of Leicester.

Below is the contact detail of my supervisor at the school of English, Dr Ruth Page. Should you need more information on this consent form, please contact her or me.

Dr Ruth Page
Room 1509, Attenborough Tower
School of English
University of Leicester
Leicester
LE1 7RH, UK
+44 (0)116 223 1286
Rep22@le.ac.uk

Thanks very much in advance for your help,

Thulfiqar Al-Tahmazi
Research Student
School of English
University of Leicester
Leicester
LE1 7RH, UK
+44 (0)7447013780
Thmat1@le.ac.uk
Consent form

I agree that Mr. Thulfiqar Hussein Al-Tahmazi can select and analyse posts and comments that have been posted on my Facebook account. I understand that any information I submit will be anonymized and will be stored separately from this document as part of the research project carried out by him.

I understand that if I want to withdraw my contribution from the project at any stage, I can do so.

I am over 18 years of age.

Name:

Date:
سيدي الكريم/ سيدتي الكريم

افي بحث في مجال لسانيات تحليل الخطاب، أعكف حاليا على كتابة أطروحتي للدكتوراه في جامعة لستر في المملكة المتحدة والتي تتناول "التنافر على الساحة في الخطاب السياسي العراقي في الإعلام التقليدي والحديث: أسلوبات الحجاج والشرعنة، تشكيل الهويات السوسية، وتلقي الآخرين". وليد الرغبة جمع أمثلة عن بعض المشترات والتعليقات التي تخص الشأن السياسي العراقي والتي نشرت في حسابي على فيسبوك لاستعمالها كبيانات لإجراء التحليل.

أود التأكيد أن البيانات التي ستخذ من حسابي على فيسبوك سيتم استعمالها من دون الاتصال إلى الاسم وسيتم مسح هذه البيانات بعد الانتهاء من هذه الدراسة. في حالة قررت الانسحاب من البحث في أي مرحلة منه، إذ بإمكانك إبلاغي بذلك وسأرسلها لكم بامتنان.

في حال رغبت بالحصول على النسخة النهائية من الدراسة، يرجى إبلاغي بذلك وسأرسلها لكم بامتنان.

للحصول على معلومات تفصيلية عن الدراسة يمكنك الاتصال بمشرفتي العلمي السيدة د. روث بيج من قسم اللغة الانجليزية:

د. روث بيج
مكتب رقم 1509 بداية أكتوبر
قسم اللغة الانجليزية
جامعة لستر
المملكة المتحدة

البريد الإلكتروني: rep22@leicester.ac.uk
الهاتف: 1286 223 116
+44

شكرا لمساعدتي ومساهمتي في هذه الدراسة

د. روث بيج
قسم اللغة الإنجليزية
جامعة لستر
المملكة المتحدة
الهاتف: 7447013780
+44

البريد الإلكتروني: Thmat1@le.ac.uk
اعتماد الموافقة

وافق على أن يقوم السيد ذو الفقار حسين الطهمازی باختيار نماذج من المنشورات والتعليقات التي عملتها في حسابي على القيس بوک. علماً أن هذه النماذج سيتم التعامل بها سریًا ومن دون ذكر الاسم وبيانها.

بُلغت أيضاً أن لي الحق بسحب النماذج التي أخذتها من حسابي على القيس بوک من الدراسة في ایة مرحلة منها عند رغبتي بذلك.

علماً بان عمري هو أكثر من 18 سنة.

الاسم:
التاريخ:
التوقيع:
Appendix 2 (Consent Forms)
استمارة الموافقة

وافق على أن يقوم السيد ذو الفقار حسين الطهارزي باختيار نماذج من المنتشرات والتقارير التي عملها في حسابي على النيس بوكم. علمًا أن هذا النماذج سيتم التعامل بها سرًاً ومن دون ذكر الاسم وبأنها ستستخدم جزءًا من بيانات الدراسة التي يقوم بها.

بُثِّثَ أيضًا أن لي الحق في تحديد النماذج التي أختار من حسابي على النيس بوكم من الدراسة في أية مرحلة منها عند رغبتي بذلك.

علمًا بأن عمري هو أكثر من 18 سنة.

الاسم: سعد بن هلال عبد
التاريخ: 17-3-2016
التوقيع: [ลาย]

استمارة الموافقة

وافق على أن يقوم السيد د.ف. حسن الحمادي باختيار نماذج من المنتجات والمساهمات التي عملها في حسابه على القيس بورك. علماً أن تأثّث أن هذه النماذج سيتم التعامل معها سريًا ومن دون ذكر الاسم وبدلاً من بيانات الدراسة التي يقوم بها.

نُقلت أيضاً أن في الحق بسحب النماذج التي أختُبَت من حسابي على القيس بورك من الدراسة في أية مرحلة منها عند رغبتي.

علماً أن من إكمالي هو أكثر من 18 سنة.

الاسم: 
التاريخ: 
التوقيع:
استمارة الموافقة

وافق على أن يقوم السيد د. الفقار حسين الطهاني باختيار نماذج من المنتشرات والتعليقات التي علتها في حسابي على الفيس بوك. علماً أنني بَلَغت أن هذه النماذج سيتم التعامل بها سريًا ومن دون ذكر الحساب وبها ستستخدم جزءًا من بيانات الدراسة التي يقوم بها.

بلغت أيضًا أن لي الحق بسحب النماذج التي أخذتها من حسابي على الفيس بوك من الدراسة في أية مرحلة منها عند رغبتي.

عذراً، كان عمرك هو أكثر من 18 سنة.

الاسم: محمد عامر الأخر
التاريخ: 11/1/2016
التوقيع: [подпись]
Appendix 3 (Transcripts of the Data)

A. First TV Interview

Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ngTZRf6V1xY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Interlocutors</th>
<th>Turns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</td>
<td>المقدم: بعد هذا التقرير نرجو بيك الدكتور طاهر، السيد عزت الشهاب، يمكن جاهزياً ميك خلافًا قديمًا، ينضم الله عزه عماش السؤال الرئيسي إلى محرر حلقات اليوم، يمكن تقليق ويكي وتقنيت ثانيته إلى نهوضًا أن هاي الأعرق سنوات عنوانه الكبير، فهو يحمل حضور بين نسيم الزوايا المالكية، أو ينضم له وخصومه إلى التماسه على درجة اليوم كالميادين جاكي. تجح نحو أقامة المالكية، أو تختير الحكومة. وهو ينضم له هذا الفرصة بالخلاص من المشكلة التي يبحثه هو ريتون الزوايا، أم هو ينضم له صحة بثية الاكتتابات الأخيرة أو مازال عنده شعبية وأخذ المركز الأول؟، وتخلي هذه الهوى أو هذه الكفولة من بقائه واحتفاظه بهذه الشعبيته وفقراته يعشقه والاحتفاظ بالسلطة لدورات ثانية؟</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2   | Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani) | بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم، هنا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لالا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا لا ل
هذا سؤال أطلق عليه الدكتور فيصل وصولاً، وهو نموذج من أسس الدكتور الذي يمكن أن يترك نتائجهها في هذه الحكومة وتشكل حكومة ممتعة بعد قنال شركاء، فإن تمازجناً من هذه الشركاء، فإن تمازجناً من هذه الحكومة فإن تمازجناً من هذه الدولة، فإن تمازجناً من هذه الدولة، فإن تمازجناً من هذه الدولة، فإن تمازجناً من هذه الدولة.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</th>
<th>Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</th>
<th>Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>عظيم؛ يعني، تحياتي. اهبه يعني المالكي مزعج.</td>
<td>التفتيش العراق لأبيه على نحو يعبر عن نقص في الاهتمام.</td>
<td>لا يزال يعني أنه تشكل الشوباء إلى مستويات تدفق، افتحت مع إطارات من القائمة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>بينما يبدأ مع الأشخاص بين الثلاثين.</td>
<td>على مدى السنوات، وتأتي إلى النتائج، إذا تمكنت من النتائج، هناك رأي علمي.</td>
<td>لا يزال يعني أنه تشكل حكومة إسلامية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>مقابلة مع شارك في حديث.</td>
<td>نيابة عن الحكومة، وصوداغ من فضول وكنها، الإطارية</td>
<td>إذا دُكر عاطف بيدو من الحدود أو الصراع بين أشخاصين.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>لا يزال يعني أنه تشكل الشوباء إلى مستويات تدفق، افتحت مع إطارات من القائمة</td>
<td>هناك رأي علمي، وصوداغ من فضول وكنها، الإطارية</td>
<td>لا يزال يعني أنه تشكل حكومة إسلامية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>مقابلة مع شارك في حديث.</td>
<td>نيابة عن الحكومة، وصوداغ من فضول وكنها، الإطارية</td>
<td>إذا دُكر عاطف بيدو من الحدود أو الصراع بين أشخاصين.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>لا يزال يعني أنه تشكل الشوباء إلى مستويات تدفق، افتحت مع إطارات من القائمة</td>
<td>هناك رأي علمي، وصوداغ من فضول وكنها، الإطارية</td>
<td>لا يزال يعني أنه تشكل حكومة إسلامية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>مقابلة مع شارك في حديث.</td>
<td>نيابة عن الحكومة، وصوداغ من فضول وكنها، الإطارية</td>
<td>إذا دُكر عاطف بيدو من الحدود أو الصراع بين أشخاصين.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>لا يزال يعني أنه تشكل الشوباء إلى مستويات تدفق، افتحت مع إطارات من القائمة</td>
<td>هناك رأي علمي، وصوداغ من فضول وكنها، الإطارية</td>
<td>لا يزال يعني أنه تشكل حكومة إسلامية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>مقابلة مع شارك في حديث.</td>
<td>نيابة عن الحكومة، وصوداغ من فضول وكنها، الإطارية</td>
<td>إذا دُكر عاطف بيدو من الحدود أو الصراع بين أشخاصين.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>لا يزال يعني أنه تشكل الشوباء إلى مستويات تدفق، افتحت مع إطارات من القائمة</td>
<td>هناك رأي علمي، وصوداغ من فضول وكنها، الإطارية</td>
<td>لا يزال يعني أنه تشكل حكومة إسلامية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>مقابلة مع شارك في حديث.</td>
<td>نيابة عن الحكومة، وصوداغ من فضول وكنها، الإطارية</td>
<td>إذا دُكر عاطف بيدو من الحدود أو الصراع بين أشخاصين.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>لا يزال يعني أنه تشكل الشوباء إلى مستويات تدفق، افتحت مع إطارات من القائمة</td>
<td>هناك رأي علمي، وصوداغ من فضول وكنها، الإطارية</td>
<td>لا يزال يعني أنه تشكل حكومة إسلامية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>مقابلة مع شارك في حديث.</td>
<td>نيابة عن الحكومة، وصوداغ من فضول وكنها، الإطارية</td>
<td>إذا دُكر عاطف بيدو من الحدود أو الصراع بين أشخاصين.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>لا يزال يعني أنه تشكل الشوباء إلى مستويات تدفق، افتحت مع إطارات من القائمة</td>
<td>هناك رأي علمي، وصوداغ من فضول وكنها، الإطارية</td>
<td>لا يزال يعني أنه تشكل حكومة إسلامية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>مقابلة مع شارك في حديث.</td>
<td>نيابة عن الحكومة، وصوداغ من فضول وكنها، الإطارية</td>
<td>إذا دُكر عاطف بيدو من الحدود أو الصراع بين أشخاصين.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>لا يزال يعني أنه تشكل الشوباء إلى مستويات تدفق، افتحت مع إطارات من القائمة</td>
<td>هناك رأي علمي، وصوداغ من فضول وكنها، الإطارية</td>
<td>لا يزال يعني أنه تشكل حكومة إسلامية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>مقابلة مع شارك في حديث.</td>
<td>نيابة عن الحكومة، وصوداغ من فضول وكنها، الإطارية</td>
<td>إذا دُكر عاطف بيدو من الحدود أو الصراع بين أشخاصين.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>245</td>
<td>Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</td>
<td>لا يمنع من هو الطرف الآخر؟ الطرف الآخر الملكي. هو من ما نتو زاعجوم الملكي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
اما المطالب التي تسمى مروحية مراكز على الرف مكونة، انة اعترف اننا نحن عدناء. شكراً، اعتمد ان لدينا عدناء. على ما يعرف فيها عدناء جزء من ما يعرف وهى عدناء ذات طابع مدني. ولربما ان هناك قد يسمى، اوكونا ون راي تروضح فصاع.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

ماكاعدين سوة، ماكاعدين سوة بنية صافية.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل لكل الاطراف.

لا تمسك، ان هناك تشريح في المعلومات التي تصل بكل الاطراف.
الدكتورة شحادثرد

89.

المحرر 1 (علي العشود)

الدكتورة شحادثرد

90.

لا شلون

91.

المحرر 1 (علي العشود)

92.

يحيى مقالته، يعني مقالة النائب السيد التعليمي حصل على حريته من السجن والإفراج senza موقعة المعهد للكرد

93.

دائم ماوصل إلا بصوت..... غير مسموع

94.

المحرر

95.

المحرر 1 (علي العشود)

96.

كما تخطيط المداخلة عن محافزنا والمواقع التي كانت لديها....

97.

المحرر 1 (علي العشود)

98.

لا إعادة لائدة تاريخ تضايق مع صدام ولا عند تاريخ اجهد العامله ولا

99.

المحرر 1 (علي العشود)

100.

لا

101.

المحرر

102.

ممتاز ممتاز ممتاز الفرق. النبأ أساسية ليس بيد سلطات تنفيذية يعني بدور الكرد

سوى السلام. سوي السلام هي الأشياء ذات الطابع العفوي. ولا يد في الموصل ولا في كركوك ولد في في بنتي يمنع عدد أخوانه في هذه المحافظات والأخوة الكرد. هم في ذلك يذكرون

يتم تطور تفاهمًا الأنشطة الذي غير الهزيمة والأوروبية الكرد. يقمع تنظيمات وول لا يعف من تشتمل جزء من المسؤولية في لنا ووضعنا المالكي مثلا في وضع مضيف أو شيء عن هذا القبيل أو

103.

المحرر 2 (علي العشود)

104.

علي العشود

المحرر

105.

لا يقدم

106.

المحرر 1 (علي العشود)

لا يتعلق بوجود البيشمركة في كركوك وتتعلق بدفع المستحيلات إلى جئي السابقة وكل شيء آخر. أنا

لا أريد أي موقف معاني من حكومة بدور تجارة الأوروبية الكرد. لذلك. لكن أنا لا أقبل أي يكون

هذا اتفاق على حساب طرف آخر. فما بالك إذا كان هذا للطرف هو المحافظات التي أنا انتهي

لهما طبعا لا أقبل. أنا مشروعا وبهناك شيء مصادر ووضود وضع محافظاتنا ضر

هم و널نا ومتناولة. يعني سيكون لنا موقف. أھمة.... القضية، حتى الأحزنة. إذا عندما يحدث

من الآخ اساسا بهذا التوصيف وهذا الشكل، ستكون ذلك مدى يشجع جماعة الموضوع. يعني أن هؤلاء

أن هناك، أن الطابع الشخصي للمشكلة ليس قليلا. ثقية.

107.

المحرر

108.

المحرر

خالد ف. جملة سؤال مهمة وكبيرة
لا كبيرة، كبيرة. ينطغ حجرته، أنا شخصيا، شخصيا اعتقد بأنها حجرةصحبة اللغة ليست مهمة، يعيش ليس هو الحلال، ليس هو الحلال. والماكاك أطلق، فينيس يتبنى أن ينستكك قبل أن يتم الوصول إلى قضية الغريمة. ليس فائدة هذا الموضوع، ولكن لأنه ليس مناحا، لا أكون واقعا، ناوانا. طب

ليللاً بم ر م ر، طب فكد مياكعنا الفاصل، فعلا كتب تحدث بجهة كبيرة. عما اسم قالي في مختلفو ليس مع ديارهم، حسب اللغة، كيف؟

هذا الفكرة التي طرحها السيد رئيس مجلس النواب هو أن تقدم الحكومة استقالاتها وليس أن يجري

سحب اللغة عنها.

هل هي جادة، وهى جادة، هل هي جادة، هل هي جادة اليوم؟ أن مسؤول كل صيدا، صحراج أيضا، هذا هو سبارة السيد رئيس الوزراء، هو أن يقوم البرلمان بحل نفسه لأجراء انتخابات مبكرة، يسعى هذه أيضا ليس

فكرة واقعية، البرلمان لن يحل نفسه أحد من يمكنه حل البرلمان ونورج لجمهوره، وتكاليا بحث حل سلامكا، يرى رئيس الوزراء، والانتحار.

والناتجة النهائية واحد هو المالكي

ويهي جادة، وهى جادة، وهى جادة اليوم؟ أن مسؤول كل صيدا، صحراج أيضا، هذا هو سبارة السيد

رئيس الوزراء، هو أن يقوم البرلممان بحل نفسه لأجراء انتخابات مبكرة، يسعى هذه أيضا ليس

فكرة واقعية، البرلمان لن يحل نفسه أحد من يمكنه حل البرلمان ونورج لجمهوره، وتكاليا بحث حل سلامكا، يرى رئيس الوزراء، والانتحار.

والناتجة النهائية واحد هو المالكي

ويهي جادة، وهى جادة، وهى جادة اليوم؟ أن مسؤول كل صيدا، صحراج أيضا، هذا هو سبارة السيد

رئيس الوزراء، هو أن يقوم البرلممان بحل نفسه، المالكي مراة مستقلة وحكمته تبقى، وملك منجتح نحو انتخابات

برلمانية قائمة، اهبه هو مؤهلهه على تيجها، جزء القانون؟

نعم، اهبه نص شغب ذكر في العزى طفر، لما الكرد، أخوانا الكرد، وأعزائنا، بدأ يضطرون

على المالكي، حتى تاريفا، وعابظا، اين التحالف الشبه الكردي.

هل هو

هذا هو

ما عرفت نندب؟ ما عرف؟

ويهي جادة، وهى جادة، وهى جادة اليوم؟ أن مسؤول كل صيدا، صحراج أيضا، هذا هو سبارة السيد

رئيس الوزراء، هو أن يقوم البرلممان بحل نفسه، المالكي مراة مستقلة وحكمته تبقى، وملك منجتح نحو انتخابات

برلمانية قائمة، اهبه هو مؤهلهه على تيجها، جزء القانون؟

نعم، اهبه نص شغب ذكر في العزى طفر، لما الكرد، أخوانا الكرد، وأعزائنا، بدأ يضطرون

على المالكي، حتى تاريفا، وعابظا، اين التحالف الشبه الكردي.

هل هو

هذا هو

ما عرفت نندب؟ ما عرف؟

ويهي جادة، وهى جادة، وهى جادة اليوم؟ أن مسؤول كل صيدا، صحراج أيضا، هذا هو سبارة السيد

رئيس الوزراء، هو أن يقوم البرلممان بحل نفسه، المالكي مراة مستقلة وحكمته تبقى، وملك منجتح نحو انتخابات

برلمانية قائمة، اهبه هو مؤهلهه على تيجها، جزء القانون؟

نعم، اهبه نص شغب ذكر في العزى طفر، لما الكرد، أخوانا الكرد، وأعزائنا، بدأ يضطرون

على المالكي، حتى تاريفا، وعابظا، اين التحالف الشبه الكردي.

هل هو

هذا هو

ما عرفت نندب؟ ما عرف؟
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>132 Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</th>
<th>133 Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>一个问题</strong></td>
<td><strong>如果没有一个可以接受的伙伴，你会怎么做？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134 Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</td>
<td><strong>这是一个可以进行对话的环境吗？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>问题</strong></td>
<td><strong>如果这样，你会怎么办？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135 Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</td>
<td><strong>你认为这是如何处理的？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>对这个问题的看法</strong></td>
<td><strong>这是如何处理的？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136 Interviewer</td>
<td><strong>这是一个可以进行对话的环境吗？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>问题</strong></td>
<td><strong>这是否意味着你认为这是一个可以进行对话的环境？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137 Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</td>
<td><strong>这是一个可以进行对话的环境吗？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>对这个问题的看法</strong></td>
<td><strong>这是如何处理的？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138 Interviewer</td>
<td><strong>这是一个可以进行对话的环境吗？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>问题</strong></td>
<td><strong>这是否意味着你认为这是一个可以进行对话的环境？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139 Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</td>
<td><strong>这是一个可以进行对话的环境吗？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>对这个问题的看法</strong></td>
<td><strong>这是如何处理的？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140 Interviewer</td>
<td><strong>这是一个可以进行对话的环境吗？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>问题</strong></td>
<td><strong>这是否意味着你认为这是一个可以进行对话的环境？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141 Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</td>
<td><strong>这是一个可以进行对话的环境吗？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>对这个问题的看法</strong></td>
<td><strong>这是如何处理的？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142 Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</td>
<td><strong>这是一个可以进行对话的环境吗？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>问题</strong></td>
<td><strong>这是否意味着你认为这是一个可以进行对话的环境？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143 Interviewer</td>
<td><strong>这是一个可以进行对话的环境吗？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>问题</strong></td>
<td><strong>这是否意味着你认为这是一个可以进行对话的环境？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144 Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</td>
<td><strong>这是一个可以进行对话的环境吗？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>问题</strong></td>
<td><strong>这是否意味着你认为这是一个可以进行对话的环境？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145 Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</td>
<td><strong>这是一个可以进行对话的环境吗？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>问题</strong></td>
<td><strong>这是否意味着你认为这是一个可以进行对话的环境？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146 Interviewer</td>
<td><strong>这是一个可以进行对话的环境吗？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>问题</strong></td>
<td><strong>这是否意味着你认为这是一个可以进行对话的环境？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147 Interviewer</td>
<td><strong>这是一个可以进行对话的环境吗？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>问题</strong></td>
<td><strong>这是否意味着你认为这是一个可以进行对话的环境？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148 Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</td>
<td><strong>这是一个可以进行对话的环境吗？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>问题</strong></td>
<td><strong>这是否意味着你认为这是一个可以进行对话的环境？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>149 Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</td>
<td><strong>这是一个可以进行对话的环境吗？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>问题</strong></td>
<td><strong>这是否意味着你认为这是一个可以进行对话的环境？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150 Interviewer</td>
<td><strong>这是一个可以进行对话的环境吗？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>问题</strong></td>
<td><strong>这是否意味着你认为这是一个可以进行对话的环境？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151 Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</td>
<td><strong>这是一个可以进行对话的环境吗？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>问题</strong></td>
<td><strong>这是否意味着你认为这是一个可以进行对话的环境？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152 Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</td>
<td><strong>这是一个可以进行对话的环境吗？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>问题</strong></td>
<td><strong>这是否意味着你认为这是一个可以进行对话的环境？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153 Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</td>
<td><strong>这是一个可以进行对话的环境吗？</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>没有</strong></td>
<td><strong>是</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>问题</strong></td>
<td><strong>这是否意味着你认为这是一个可以进行对话的环境？</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
لا، بالتحديد حال ناك ناي هاي الصورة. احتله كثرة دولة القانون والاعلام والأطراف التي اشركتها حضرتك في دروس صالح وحركة الجهل وغيرها، ها هي تشكل الحكومة؟

مو الله الجهل، ليس الجهل؟ يجوز متحدون. مندي.

معتذرون؟ مأسينا شي ذاك الطقس وذات الحمام

ليش؟ لا، مندي. عفو لنا تجنب القصة وينتروج المشروع السياسي، يجوز روية متحدون

تسعم مع دولة القانون وليس رؤية جهة الحوار.

لا هو مشاء الله ميكرو. هو مراح يكسر! لان مراح يحمل على عدد مقاعد كافية.

لا بعد بعد

طبب 50 أو 52

لا

لنفترض أننا خسرت هذا العهد، تخيلنا أو على مجلس النواب كمستخر دولة القانون. ولمما خسرت دولة القانون؟ دعني إجيب عن هذا السؤال.

انت ليش نفك، ليس نساي فرارن، ليس

بعدا النتائج مطالعه

ليس نتبي الحقيقة على فرضية

دعني أجيب عن ها السؤال. لا النتائج مطهرت

لا كلما نذا لا تستطيع دولة القانون ان تشكل حكومة إسلامية

انا فملك اننا مكل اننا، هذا المشروع تمتها أو دولة القانون في هذا الانتخابات مجالس المحافظات، وباشر ان أن امي عزت لتقف على، او دولة القانون استخدمت خطابا وطابع حربي. هذا لنا ادك بالخطابات غير المرفوعة لدولة القانون سواء كان في ديني او في ميسان او في
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Number</th>
<th>Interviewer 1 (Al-Ani)</th>
<th>Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>177-178</td>
<td>المجلس الاعلى</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178</td>
<td>جيد، ولكنه لما يعترف هذا الخطأ ستكون النتيجة مؤلمة. لأن يكون باستطاعة أخذونا في بولة القانون لا أن نحبسوا على الأغليبة ولا أن ندفعنا الآخرين بأن يكونوا شركاءنا إذا استمر هذا الخطأ، وإذا استمرت هذه الحسمة وهذا الدعا.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179</td>
<td>انت ليش متلتقل بالقاعة، القاعدة يعني نكون اتحدا مع حكومة اغليبة ولا لا. انا مع حكومة اغليبة.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180-184</td>
<td>يجوز متفقين على الأغليبة</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184</td>
<td>اقتنعت، احتفظ داور</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185-189</td>
<td>لا ليست طائفية</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189</td>
<td>هو هو هو هذا سوال يستمتع</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190-191</td>
<td>انت ليش مالوب عنه في هذه الفئة. هو رجل عدد شختهون عدد طموحو عدد اعتصامه هو. أي مهنيو انه هو شلون يفكر. هن يفكر انت الأغليبة بدوته اغليبة أو لا، هي مهني. وانت انت لا زم، يصير، بعد كفى هذا الضحك على القانون، شركنة وحدة ومديرو شئر. يجب ان نذهب الى حكومة اغليبة واقفة. وخل نكون اتحدا الأقلية. هو كذلك هارد ك حتى لو خسرنا مو مهيم. اهيه حلي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192</td>
<td>بس كثرة الدعوات تبدو من كلام وافق؟</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>193-194</td>
<td>من حقه أو مو من حقه؟ إذا هو هو اذا .... من حقه بسوي بروكودنا ليش لا</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>194-195</td>
<td>لا لا، هو مو رقم من ارقام الساحة؟</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>195-196</td>
<td>نعم لاشك لايل هو الرقم هو اليان اليان الأول في بغداد مع لاشك، لايل هو الرقم هو اليان اليان الأول في بغداد من حقه هو يطرح مشروع ويتبنا، من حقه. يتوق مد ما يتوافق مو هواي مهم عندي. المهم عندي مشروع صح. هيج رجل ازاحة لو اقفاهم وياء احسن؟ لا ازيحه.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

251
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Interviewer</th>
<th>Arabic Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)</td>
<td>ليس؟ مهيه</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)</td>
<td>إذاً الأولك لمادا يعنى ازحة ان لم تعجل سياساته.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202</td>
<td>Interviewer 2 (Al-Shahbandar)</td>
<td>هو خسارة. بعد ليس انت تزوجه انت همه كانت هو راج بخر. خلي يخسر وجده</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)</td>
<td>إذاً الناس اثنى مو بن دولة القانون والسيد رئيس الوزراء للجميع ان يعلن خطاهم ان يتزوج انت انت بنية الشراكة والأخوة. ان يصل أدرك ان فاتني فتحة بن علي الاستاذ عزت، الى السيد رئيس الوزراء ضد التمييز ضد اهل. اذاً لا أريد ان أدرك تلك. ولكن هو ضد التمييز عندما يكون موجودا في السلطة. ولكن هو لا التمييز لديه الفردية، اتخيل ذلك، تمام اخي عزت؟ انه التمييز هو قضية فردية؟ والمناسبة اذا لم مع الفردية. واذاً عندما كره رئيس للجنة الاقليمي في الدورة البرلمانية السابقة استقلت في اليوم الذي قبل ان يقرأ قانون الاقليم. فلت اشترط تقدم استفلف من من اللجنة. ومزايل لدي فناعي.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>خلي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205</td>
<td>Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)</td>
<td>لا ولنروح فاضل</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>موفق، عزيز بوك</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)</td>
<td>دقيقة واحدة دقيقة واحدة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>مهيهية تفضل مهيهية تفضل</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209</td>
<td>Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)</td>
<td>انه عندما تعارض بعض أكاذير المالكي مع ووجه في السلطة هو يضربها عرض الحائط. اذاً سوف أدرك واذاً اخي عزت، انه في الانتخابات البرلمانية السابقة عندما طهرت نتيجة الاقليم، انها كانت أعلى من دولة القانون وكان ان هناك احتفال العراقية تذهب تشكيك حكومة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>تشكيل حكومة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211</td>
<td>Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)</td>
<td>عمل أفضل موجود في محافظات الرسم والجنوب تشكيك أقليم الرسم والجنوب. تشترك هذه ولا لا؟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>واضح</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213</td>
<td>Interviewer 1(Al-Ani)</td>
<td>وكان يدعو الى هذا الاقليم. السيد رئيس الوزراء نعم لديه موقف في ما يتعلق بالسلطة المركزية وما يتعلق باعترافنا الإداري أو المحافظات الأخرى، ولكن عندما تذهب سلطته هو مستعد تقديم يعني اهمه الإثبات أو التنافس، مع احترازي او شيء من هذا القبيل. ماما هو نافي في السلطة طبيع علم تلميذ نوروج تلميذ أлеِّف بوك وكما يكون الالم تلميذ بوك من خلال حواركم وشايبنا من تعليقات.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>214</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### B. Second TV Interview

Link: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_jhNK8_dqhc](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_jhNK8_dqhc)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Interlocutors</th>
<th>Turns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>مشاهديا الكرام إما كنت يجاكم الله. سقط النظام ليس فقط مع حسابات وحسابات، رحل صدام ليسترك وراءه الألف من الأسئلة وترات هالا من العنف والقمع والغدرية، وبعد ان كان العراقيون أسرى العين الواحدة في النظر والملاءة الواحدة في النفس والشهبة الذي لا يتبع عقر أو الزفير الذي... تجربة جديدة هائلة للعصاب، وسوء جاذب بيضاء حلم كي يرى وقت أو بينضات شعب ما يتغير معرفضاً. المهم ما حصل قد حصل وبدأت الموت الجديدة وتغي.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)</td>
<td>اهلا ومرحبا بك.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>مرحبا بكم منازل سامي وأيا منا يقرأنا الفيديو في انتظار متخصص الدكتر، متخصص للمصلوح.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)</td>
<td>اهلا وسهلا</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>مرحبا بك، ونود عضو منازل سامي في البداية. أن تغيرت هذه البلد في تاريخ العراق، هل كنت توقع ان وبعد عشرة أعوام أبا يكون الكلام مشابها لما كان عليه الحال في تلك اللحظة.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)</td>
<td>بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم، شكرا لك ولضيي الكرم ومشاهديا الكرام.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>اسم، سالم الذي منفعت هذه البداية.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)</td>
<td>اسم، اسم.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>اسم، اسم.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)</td>
<td>اسم، اسم.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>اسم، اسم.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)</td>
<td>دولة اسم، كانت مقرضة وورود.... من غالبية الشعب العراقي لكنها مقرضة على هذا الشعب. دولة مبتعة على أساس صريح على أساس طائفة عائلي في حضها عائلية الشعب العراقي. ووصلت إلى ماوصلت فيه في اسوة حالاتها على يد صدام حسين.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>مالذي عطل هذه القضية؟</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

253
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
بعني أولاً بودي أن أقول أن هيه التغيير اهيه الذي حصل حقيقية ليس اهيه بهيمنة حصل
لماضيه اهيه طرف على طرف، إنما النظام السابق لم يكن محسناً على كونه معين واما
كان محصوراً جزئياً حديثاً. يعني الولاء كان للبعض، ليس للناس، ولا لوازيب. يعني
من الذريتين الأولى وله الازدواجية في كل شيء. ومن لم يكن لديه السر، كان سريعاً له
اهيه بني اهيه لم يكن مقرر أو ليس له درجة اهيه من النوايا. إذا كان الولاء على
الحرب، وليس على أساس الطاقة، والقول في ذلك أن اهيه يعني لان الولاء، ومحب
وايزيد، الذي محب حديثاً الزيدي، كل ولاء، هو، كان هناك، وهو يراقب شعبة، إذا كان النظام
التي حصلت في بعد ذلك، والمشاكل التي حدثت في التغيير سبب هيه البناء الداخلي
والخارجي بعد الاختلاس، البناء الداخلي هو الذي أوصيلنا إلى ما، والبناء خاطئ لأنه يبني على
علاقة النوايا، أو إذا أدركنا، أو ما الذي بنجع الحكم دقة على أساس اهيه سامي، اهيه شعبية، وهذا كريد،
إذا من هذه بنيت المشكلة، أنه التغيير الأمراض تسمي طفيلي وعرعي، وهذا لا يمكن موجوداً في
النظام السابق، كان موجوداً، وللعرعي، فقط، لا يمكن موجود في النظام السابق.
الاختلاس، أول مشكلة مشكل الحكمة شكلها سامي اهيه، اهيه حقيقية، إذا كان تسمي، إذا صار تسمي.
بعد ذلك، بدء الدواء الطفيلي تتسم على هذا البناء الخاطئ، يعتبر من كان دولياً لهذا النظام
الذي به وقدم أو أعطي، سيكون كبير، وهو كان يبني لطيف يفقي، واهيه مستقبل، وهو لاحظ
والكلام، ونس، كأن نسمك كأن حكومة شراك وطنية وحكومه

28 Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)

29 Interviewer

30 Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)

31 Interviewer

32 Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)

33 Interviewer

34 Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)

35 Interviewer

36 Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)

37 Interviewer

ولكن هذا لا يمكن موجود إلا واقع الأرض

في الاستفادة في هذه النقطة، دكتور أحمد قبل الاستفادة في هذه النقطة، يعني هل
بنفس هذا الوضع الجديرious مفرحة صاحب، لن يكون مفرحة حزبي
فقط، لم يكن مفرحة، إذا لم يكن مفرحة سابقة. هذه المرة سابق، يمكن أن
صنف، وانقطاعات وانقطاعات، وانقطاعات، وانقطاعات، يمكن أن
العملية، بأنها مفرحة حزبي طفيلي، هل يسبب هذا الوضع هذا التوصيف؟

وهداء ذلك الميد الأسدي للقول بأن هناك احاطا سيء من العملية السياسية في العراق،
وقد لا يعاني سريعاً سبب تغيره بناءة في النظام السابق؟

لا تكن على الالتزام ولكن البناء على تشكيك
ابناء، التي تحدث عدة العراق، لاحظ إلى اهيه يعني، يمكن أن تكون حسب الأفكار
بشتك. لأن القراءة هناك إفساء، وفهم موجود اليويم على موك وعينه دون أخر.

طبيب
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Interviewer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>2 (Al-Msari)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>1 (Al-Askari)</td>
<td>Interviewee 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 (Al-Msari)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>1 (Al-Askari)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 (Al-Msari)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (Al-Askari)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sعدون حمادي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (Al-Askari)</td>
<td>ماكان بمجلس قيادة الثورة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 (Al-Msari)</td>
<td>محمد حمزة إبراهيمي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (Al-Askari)</td>
<td>ما ماكان ب</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 (Al-Msari)</td>
<td>كليهم هوار كاتب شركة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>1 (Al-Askari)</td>
<td>Interviewee 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (Al-Askari)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>1 (Al-Askari)</td>
<td>Interviewee 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 (Al-Msari)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (Al-Askari)</td>
<td>ماكر راسا يحمل على التفاؤل</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 (Al-Msari)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

هناك لجنة فحص اهمية بران مدى التوز舰 قد وضعت هذا التوزيع واعترته وكان واضح جدا.

طيب، يجب دكتور أحمد. إذا استاذ سامي، يعني ما الذي جات به عملية التغيير أو مرحلة التغيير؟ كل ماذا تقلب إلى السنة تهميش لهم أبعادهم عن مناصب سيادية؟ ليس هناك وجد على الخارطة السياسية؟ وان وجد فهو من أجل الصراع فقط والعودة رميا إلى نقاط قديمة. لماذا؟

يعني قبل أن اجيب على سؤالك، يعني فقط المعلومات، أو قضيتين ذكرت، في حكومة عبد الكريم قاسم، وهي أول حكومة جمهورية أو انقلابي إطاح بالملكية. كان عبد الكريم قاسم رئيس وزراء، وكان هناك مجلس سيادة، يعني مجلس محاكم مجلس الرئاسة. هذا مجلس السياسي، أهه مجلس السياسة، كان واحد مشي وواحد سن وواحد كردي. والتي به هذا العونا، هذا مثلا للشيعة وله شملة وهذا مثلت الكرد. إلى أن انحراف نظام عبد الكريم قاسم بعد أربع سنوات، هذا المجلس يسموه مجلس السياسة. والله الأمر الآخر، التوصيف يا يو انظمة النظام السابق ماكان يميز على أساس شيعي والمع أو على أساس حزبي. النظر إلى مجلس قيادة الثورة كمين من الشيعة.

وأيدها

كيف؟!

انظر، عدني

عدلاه، أي

لا انت عدد

سعود حمادي

مجانا مجلس قيادة الثورة

محمد حمزة إبراهيمي

ما ماكان ب

كلهم هوار كاتب شركة

يوم يوم سقط النظام، يوم سقط النظام يوم 9 نيسان شوفي كد شيعي بمجلس قيادة الثورة، ولا واحد. أنظر إلى الشيوعي، شوفيهم نظام الرئاسة، ولا واحد شيعي، شوفيهم نظام الفرق، ولا واحد شيعي. صحيح الشيعة موجودين في حزب البعض، صحيح يوم لهم دخل المؤسسات العسكرية لكن هناك مستوى من الرؤية من الوظائف لا يصلها شيعي حتى أو كان ي שאלה حتى أو عضو في قيادة.

نعم، اعتي مثلا على هذا

استاذ سامي اعتي مثل على ان الشيعة مثل في زمن صدام لا يمكن لهم الوصول إلى موقع معين.

المثال الحج، أي ضابط شيعي، ويعتبرون قادة الحج ويعتبرون حجZhبي السابق، أي ضابط جيش يصل إلى مستوى معين من الرتبة العسكرية لا يمكن أن يكون شيعي فريق، ولا فريق في تاريخ حزب البث شيعي.

بارق، بارق الحج حنظلة مين؟

ماكر راسا يحمل على التفاؤل

بارق الحج حنظلة مين؟
| 58 | Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari) | ماكو ولا واحد من قادة الفقية شيعي، ماكو واحد من قادة الفرق شيعي. وإذا واحدة افترض كل اموك واحد من مجموع كم؟ هل تباعد حجمه أو وجود بحجم الشيعة أي هم إكرامي، لو يعني الشيعة البلعكية الشيعة ماكون فيو أيو كبابا قوق أو مسألة زملائهم البلعكية من السنة؟ إنما ترتد النظام كانت ترتد طائفة. |
| 59 | Interviewer | طيب، هذا في نظام صدام |
| 60 | Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari) | هذا في نظام صدام |
| 61 | Interviewer | رد عليه استاذ سامي اليوم أن (غير مفهم) |
| 62 | Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari) | اليوم اجتهاد، الآن انتخابات أنا الحاكم فيها الناس، الناس تذهب إلى صناديق الاقتراع تختر مجلس نواب، مجلس نواب يأتي مفصل ومباشر طائفية ولا مباشر عرقية، يأتي بمعايير منطقية، معايير محافظات. كل محافظة لديها نواب وبأثرن. شب طبيعي لأن الشيعة أكثرية يأتيون اعتن اللواب شيعة. وبين طبيعي لأن السنة أقلية يكون عدد اللواب بما يساندهم، وهذا الأمر ينطلق على الكر. |
| 63 | Interviewer | طيب هذا الغليظة والافقية استاذ سامي |
| 64 | Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari) | لا يمكن أن نتوقع |
| 65 | Interviewer | يعني فيها خالق |
| 66 | Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari) | لا خيلي اكمل |
| 67 | Interviewer | السيد المجفيف وهو رئيس البرلمان قال السنة اكترية |
| 68 | Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari) | لا يمكن أن، لا يمكن أن نتوقع أن السنة، أن عدد اللواب السنة يكونون في داخل البرلمان هم الاكترية. لأن البرلمان هو الحكا وكان من واقع الشارع كما هو، لا يمكن نشفيه، لا يمكن شكريه. إن ذلك معطلة هي في ماعي ماعيها قيمة. التهيم ومن، أكو واحد |
| 69 | Interviewer | حتى وإن كان السنة اغلبية؟ السيد المجفيف قال السنة اغلبية، فالأمر موضوع. |
| 70 | Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari) | وين الاغلبية وين ماتان؟! هو سبيه انتخابات، ثلاث دورات برلمانية! |
| 71 | Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari) | ممكن اجاب؟ (مطايا المقدم) |
| 72 | Interviewer | طبعا لك حرية الإجابة |
| 73 | Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari) | جمعية وطنية، يكونون السنة كانوا مقاطعين، مو مشكلة. أجنة لمجلس اللواب الأول واجنة لمجلس اللواب الثاني، أجنة لمجلس المحافظات، مناهج الإنتخاباء، بل حتى بعيدة التي حتى بعضهم إذا تحدث أن يعتدي على السنة، أنزاع إلى مجلس المحافظات في كل انتخابات التي جرت هذا، وخاطير، وافقت بالإنتخابات والإنتخابات عنى عرب سنة ووى وأكاد. لا يمكن تغييرها في قضية ألا أنها نشرة عنية، بل عنية علاقتنا وريفيتنا. هذا لا يعني تهيمي، حين يأتي عدد اللواب الشيعة أكثر من عدد اللواب السنة في البرلمان لا يعني أن هناك تهيمهم لهم، لأن القرار في نهاية المطاف |
| 74 | Interviewer | طيب الا يتحدث.... |
| 75 | Interviewee 1 | لأن القرار في نهاية المطاف لهم |
| 76 | Interviewer | استاذ سامي، لا يحدث الشيعة بأن هناك منصب رئاسة الوزراء هو حكر على الشيعة حتى وإن لم ينص على ذلك في الدستور؟ |
| 77 | Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari) | لا، أنه مجلس، أنه منصب رئاسة الوزراء تقترحه الكتلة الأكبر، حسب الدستور. سنا كان أو شيعاً أو كردياً أو عربياً. |
| 78 | Interviewer | ايهه هه |
| 79 | Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari) | من خلال الدورات السابقة، الجمعية الوطنية ثم الدورتين القادتين، لأن الشيعة الأكثرية كانوا يشكلون الكتلة الأكبر في البرلمان. |
| 80 | Interviewer | ايهه ايه، طيب |
| 81 | Interviewee 1 (Al-Askari) | دستورياً من حقين ان يرشحوا من من يردوا من شياون. |
| 82 | Interviewer | طيب استاذ سامي، إذا دعني مع الدكتور أحمد. ذكرنا أحد النقلات مثلا بهذا الشكل، ايه من النظام لاحقة وفقًا لقاعدة الإقليمية والإقليمية، ان يبرر مستوي بعض من العهد يناسب مع الإقليمية والإقليمية. لذا، إن أثر السنة لا إلا الآن، أو يصر عن أن القضية الإقليمية أخذت منهم؟ هي الإقليمية والإقليمية، وهذا ما يتفق بين برئاسة أكبر سلطة تشريعية، وهو السيد الححيفي، وهو الفوز ذلك بشكل واضح ثانياً، لماذا أيضاً يصر كل، كل خطوة نصي الآن في الدولة على أنه تم بنص طاني أو يطب بحاجة؟ |
| 83 | Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari) | طبعتا الإقليمية والإقليمية الآن في البلد لاتتفق بالاه بالاقليمية والإقليمية في البرلمان العراقي. لانكم تعلمون أن نسبة المشاركة في الانتخابات تختلف من منطقة إلى منطقة أخرى، ومن منطقة إلى منطقة أخرى. ندعم أن بعض المحافظات تكون نسبة المشاركة فيها عالية جداً في الانتخابات، بينما مناطق أخرى تكون نسبة المشاركة قليلة. وذلك لأن تكون نسبة المشاركة قليلة، وليس تلك مثل مثلاً سيناء بمثابة نفاد. المناطق التي تكون فيها الإقليمية، الابد على هذه المناطق في يوم الانتخابات، توافق الطريق، كما يوجد تيدي يرتكب ينخدعه نسبي بالمحلية، هذا مطلوب خاف يعقله. في ذلك، كلاً ما يدام هؤلاء الناس، أن يمنحوا من الدهداء إلى الانتخابات، وها ما يوجد اليوم في بغداد، وخاصة في مناطق حزام بغداد. نذكر أن هناك قوة تزود أن تمنح هؤلاء الناس من الدهداء للانتخابات، كلي تكون نتائج الانتخابات، تقول أن، مايقول به الاخوة أن نسبة الشيعة أكثر من نسبة السنة. ولكن هذا الأمر غير صحيح، لأن نسبة المشاركة في المناطق السنة أقل بكثير من نسبة المشاركة في المناطق الشيعية. وفي أمر |
| 84 | Interviewer | ولكن في المفاهيم العديدة؟ |
| 85 | Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari) | وفي أمر مفروض |
| 86 | Interviewer | الدكتور أحمد، يعني سياسي، سياسي |
| 87 | Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari) | حكومياً |
| 88 | Interviewer | الدكتور أحمد، سياسي، يعني |
| 89 | Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari) | نعم |
| 90 | Interviewer | حينما يحدث سياسي معين اقليمية ومنطقة، هو يقصد مكونات. |
| 91 | Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari) | نعم |
| 92 | Interviewer | هو يقصد طانية، يعني من يقول هذه الطائفة الأغلبية هو يقصد من حيث الحد. إذا ابدأ عن قضية المشاركة في الانتخابات.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>93</th>
<th>Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>** dof 根据这一问题，您认为当前的学术水平如何？**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** الهدف هو تحقيق مستوى عالٍ من الشفافية بين الناخبين، ولكن يمكن أن يكون هناك تأثيرات أخرى غير محسنة في بلدٍ آخر.**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>94</th>
<th>Interviewer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>** طلب على مستوى القرار:**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>95</th>
<th>Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>** ذكرت أحدى الفتيات الشبيبة، على مستوى السيادة، تحدث هذه التصورات، لكن هناك شيء سياسية، رأس المستشار العربي، وهو الذي وضعها على وكالة، فإن الوكالة التي تجري في الآبار، وCHAء الفعال بالوكالة هو سيء، وكالة العملية حتى تلك العملية الذي استشهد في الآبار كان ستيا، وقعت العملية بأنفس. هذه النقاط تفاوت تعللها:**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>96</th>
<th>Interviewer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>** هذا النسج في إقامة والتحقيق:**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>97</th>
<th>Interviewee 2 (Al-Msari)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>** يعني اليوم إذا كانت وزارة الدفاع كلاً شوبية وكان وزير الدفاع صعبًا ولم يبين ليه السنة إلى هذا المسجد، لأنه لم يعد اليوم إلى السنة من رشح الآل سيدي المزركشي، وهو الذي وضعها على وكالة وCHAء الفعال بالوكالة هو سيء، وكالة العملية حتى تلك العملية الذي استشهد في الآبار كان ستيا، وقعت العملية بأنفس. هذه النقاط تفاوت تعللها:**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>98</th>
<th>Interviewer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>** طلب دكتور أحمد، ولثم أيضًا حرية الرب دكتور سامي. يعني الدكتور أحمد، بشكل واضح، حتى وتزوج الدفاع بالوكالة سيدي مودول، لم يبت عنة السنة.**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
لا يمكنني قراءة النص العربي بصورة فعالة كلاًً هي مصرية، لكنني أستطيع قراءة النص العربي لبعض الأوقات. إذا كنت بحاجة إلى مساعدة في موضوع آخر، يرجى مزج الفصول والنصوص العربية إلى النص العربي بشكل أفضل.
لا لازم، هذا الرجل خالد العبدي، قد تم هو الأذن، طبعا إلى مسؤول عن كلامي، أنا مسؤول عن كلامي، اتتابع الأمر، هذا الرجل هو الذي سحب ترشيح لأنه لا استطاع أن أعمل بحكاية تراجع. الرجل هو الذي سحب ترشيح، وإذا بالعلاقة اكت rpt من كلامي وهو موجود الآن الأخ خالد العبدي من اهتماني. هو الذي سحب ترشيح وليس العلاقة التي سحب ترشيح. زيتي، إذا الراقي.

العربية، يعني هو الذي سحب ترشيح؟

يعني السيد خالد العبدي سحب بدون من يطلب منه؟

خطاب، طبعا غير، ومها مسؤول عن هذا الكلام، لكن العلاقة قدمت نوايا، نواب ما هو اليوم ذات في البرلمان العراقي. هذا عرض على هيئة المباشة والثعالبة على كل المجالس بالأل التي تسرعة فترة إلى أن يدخل إلى البرلمان، لكنه لم يقبله السيد الراقي. هي عرض له وراء سامج، عرض له شخصي معروف بالفاعة والمهمية. لم يقروا جماهير، للهم، بينهم من جهة متحدة من آل المحكمة السني. يعنى سلم عرض على موضوع قلد سيديدرجة.

أيا ما مثل المكون السني، اليوم من ما مثل المكون السني هي المجموعة المتأقله من قبل المكون السني التي تشكلت عن بالإثار، وهنا حركت عن ابنهم، واذا قابلت عن ابنهم سحب الإثار، لبيمه، والذين اختروهم من شعب الإثار، هم إعضاء مجلس الباب.

عضو مجلس الباب هو من يقررون من بيمثل، لاجي فإن بيمثل. اليوم أكثر إعضاء تلاميذ، طبيب دكتور، السيد مسعود الدينلي أنت من تلاميذ؟

نعم متحور، طبعا لكتبه واحد من 10، واحد من 15 هل هو وجد يقول وقرر ليس منه وما مين الجرف؟ هذا مقبول. كل يوم كار 50 لفائف من الإثار لم يقرروا هذا القرار، أنا كيف يتحور لهه؟ إذا القرار يكون من الناس المحترمين. تعمدا، وعصغرى إلى مايلباً، وقلته أنه أن ت출 عن طريق سيدي، ونكم عن موجودة في كل المجالس المختلفة من موافقة المخاطبة.

عندما تكلمت عن الإثار، لنكلمت عن شعب الإثار، واذا قابلت عن ابنهم سحب الإثار، لبيمه، والذين اختروهم من شعب الإثار، هم إعضاء مجلس الباب.

نعم متحور، طبعا لكتبه واحد من 10، واحد من 15 هل هو وجد يقول وقرر ليس منه وما مين الجرف؟ هذا مقبول. كل يوم كار 50 لفائف من الإثار لم يقرروا هذا القرار، أنا كيف يتحور لهه؟ إذا القرار يكون من الناس المحترمين. تعمدا، وعصغرى إلى مايلباً، وقلته أنه أن تعلو عن طريق سيدي، ونكم عن موجودة في كل المجالس المختلفة من موافقة المخاطبة.

عندما تكلمت عن الإثار، لنكلمت عن شعب الإثار، واذا قابلت عن ابنهم سحب الإثار، لبيمه، والذين اختروهم من شعب الإثار، هم إعضاء مجلس الباب.

نعم، عقد العدد، ورجل عن الإثار، ورجل عن نفس الأمور. وهذا هو كل المكان، أنت الذي يعطي الإمكانية في هذا المكان، لا إعف عن عليه. كفؤ رجل، ينوي اليوم من أنت يوماً، وكأنه لم يدعي الإمكانية.

وبعد اتخاذ، فتوصي الطيب، الوضع الأممي منهار، إذا الإمكاني التين غئيه، بس لا على أسس المهنية. وإنما على أساس الباب. هذا المكون أو لهذا الحزب. ينوي اليوم من أنت يوماً، وكأنه لم يدعي الإمكانية. كفؤ رجل، ينوي اليوم من أنت يوماً، وكأنه لم يدعي الإمكانية.
### C. Third TV Interview

**Link:** [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TLjJ-a-496I](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TLjJ-a-496I)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Interlocutors</th>
<th>Turns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>مساء الخير، انتهت الانتخابات فهل اطلقت التفاهمات بفية الوصول لتحالفات تعمل على تشكيل الحكومة القادمة. فكيف تتألف فرد على تأمين النصف زائد واحد؟ هل دولة القانون؟ كيف والولاية الثالثة لل론الد؟ من بعض الكلمات أم أن بعضاً من المواطنين الأحرار من سيтекمن من تأمين الناشطين؟ هل سيثبط التحالف الوطني مستمر أم أن الكثير اليوم يمكن أن يصبح معه. كيف يتكون التحالف؟ إن انتخابات الديمقراطية؟ هل سيتعامد فرد أخرى مع نسيان لا حوار يجعل.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>تحية طيبة مرة أخرى شاهدينا وتحية طيبة لضيوف الكرم، الشيخ محمد راشد على المتحدة باسم المجلس الأعلى، أيضا السيد كمال الساعدي عن انتفائه دولة القانون، إهل وهسلاً بيك وسيد جدنا بعضكم.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)</td>
<td>اهلاً وسهلاً</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>شيخ البداية ويك. بعدما أعلن السيد الحكم فوز انتفائه المواطنين، أو هل نقول مثل ما هو كان تقدم انتفائه المواطنين. بما انتهت محاكم و أي أهداف توصلوها؟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)</td>
<td>بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم، شكرتا لك ومشاهديكم الكرام وعلمتكم الكريمة. إنهنا للذين أن شرعنا في الحياة الاجتماعية ونحن مقبل ذلك النطق. لتركذ أن انتفائه تعول عليها كثيراً في أسماء المسار، وفقاً لشروط المواجهة. والذين كشفنا أن انتفائه البلد، وما يمكن أن نعملها واتخاذها هي لمائين التفاح من جهة، ورد في عدم وجود رؤية واحدة نشترك لها الجميع.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>هيه</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)</td>
<td>فضلاً بقاء الالتزامات والتدخلات الخارجية. لكن هناءة الأفراد، أزمة القوة وعدد جود الروية المشتركة لدينا شناح ضحايا انتفائه. الانفجار الأول هو البداية عن الفريق الفوري المنظم لم يكن كما أتمناه ان يكون هناك برنامج عمل على شكل رؤية مشتركة قابلة للتطبيق يمكن أن يلتقي هذا الفريق الفوري المنظم</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>يعني بين قوامين تحللون عن شراكة قوية، شراكة الأقوياء؟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)</td>
<td>شراكة الأقوياء مع برنامج رؤية تكون قاعدة فكرية لهذا الفريق المنظم</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>عدكم عدكم عدكم فدائنا هذه الشراكة، ومشرطة نجل، ونفس ابتعاد هذه الشراكة؟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)</td>
<td>ابتعاد هذه الشراكة، وإذا كنا نحن محوراً فنحن أهله</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>هيه</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)</td>
<td>أيضاً انتهت في رؤيتنا أن الوجه يقف بطريقة شراكة مكافحة تحت حكم صصوصيات الأخرين وتحلف الصورية بشكل كامل.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>شيخ مثالين انتفائه المواطن هو المنصر أو هو المقدم في أغلب المحافظات، كما أعلن عن ذلك السيد الحكم.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)</td>
<td>بالتاليه المواطن المنصر، إذا كنا نتحدث عن المواطنين العراقي عموماً حين مشاركته</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>اقصى أقدام انتفائه المواطنين.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

262
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>17</th>
<th>Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)</th>
<th>أما اتخاذ القرار من خلال مساعد قياسياشو على سبيل المثال، حيث حق قراره يكون مساعدا قياسياشو في تنطلق السلة لا يمكن أكثر حتى من الموضوعات</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>السيد الحكم، السيد الحكم معايرة بين الحاضر والسابق، كان متقود دروسا في غلبة المحافظات؟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)</td>
<td>ولازنا فعلا متقود في بعض المحافظات</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>النتائج التي نسعيها تشير إلى تقدم دولة القانون.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)</td>
<td>دولة القانون ككلمة كبرى فعل هي القائمة الأكبر في كل المحافظات، في غلبة، ولم نتمكن نقصته</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>هو هو، استاذ كمال، النتائج حتى الآن لم تصل بشكل رسمي من قبل المفوضية، خططنا جديدا تنبؤ؟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa‘adi)</td>
<td>يسم الله الرحمن الرحيم تهيةكدل CONCAT ومختلف الكرام المعنويات العربية اتهمه تقول أن دولة القانون هي القائمة المقدمة، وهي الآن تعتبر من أكبر القوانين. وهذا مما لا شك فيه، ولكن إن قضية الأراقم حديث هذه اللحظة ليس هناك شرسي. الكيفية تبني بدأ على المعتاد الأولية والفرز الأخرى.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>هو هو</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa‘adi)</td>
<td>التي تشير إلي، هو بعض المحافظات تجريب حسب، مو بشكل رسمي، بين المحافظات ابتدأ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>زيل، خليفة أفاطوك.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa‘adi)</td>
<td>قيم عام، ثم قيم عام، ثم قيم عام، ثم قيم عام.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>يعني إذا ألق من 100 معد هذه ما معنا تراجعا.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa‘adi)</td>
<td>لا، ركزلي على كلمة &quot;بكر&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>بكثير شكا، مو الكثير (يضحك)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>ما عرف، ما عرف (يضحك)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa‘adi)</td>
<td>شلون تزيت تورطنا أنه بالحاجة، غير كثي يشكو. كلمة بكثير يكولون من 70 وفوك، مو</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>مو يوجد هي، مو يوجد هي، مو يوجد هي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>لا، لهم (يضحك)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>لا، لهم (يضحك)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>مو يوجد هي، مو يوجد هي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa‘adi)</td>
<td>لم هذا الشيء مستعد؟</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
لا أنه (يضحك)

ماكو أي خط أحر على أي جهة؟ على أي شخص؟

لا لا، ماكو أي خط أحر. عدته قضية واحدة أخبرت نعمل من أجلها، هل سننجح أو لاتنجح؟ هذه مترابطة لمجموعة من العوامل، القضاية الأساسية التي تعمل لها، ماكو حكومة إسلامية، حتى لاتقبل الأبواب غير واضحة، اقل نعمال ان لنترجو إلى الوراء. ان لا يكون...

نعم

لا يوجد، لن تخرج من التحالف الوطني.

نعم

لا يوجد، لن تخرج من التحالف الوطني.

نعم

لا يوجد، لن تخرج من التحالف الوطني.

نعم

لا يوجد، لن تخرج من التحالف الوطني.

لا يوجد، لن تخرج من التحالف الوطني.

لا يوجد، لن تخرج من التحالف الوطني.

لا يوجد، لن تخرج من التحالف الوطني.

لا يوجد، لن تخرج من التحالف الوطني.

لا يوجد، لن تخرج من التحالف الوطني.

لا يوجد، لن تخرج من التحالف الوطني.
63 Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)

با اعتقادي قادرين، لذا هذا ما وجدنا كفاء، الذي نريد أن ننطلق إلى حكومة جديدة، لاسيما في الأغلبية السياسية، احتجه طبيعياً فينا أغلبية سياسية، وهذا شعار رائع هذا هو تراجع، لا يمكنني التعبير.

64 Interviewer

سأين شكل الشعر?

65 Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)

القضية الأساسية

66 Interviewer

بعض الناس يأتون على أساس هذا الشعر؟

67 Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)

لا لا أقدر متعجع

68 Interviewer

هه هه

69 Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)

أقول أن مهتمي هي الكلمات، الجوهر إنه لا يرجع إلى التمثيل السباقية. جوه، حتى جوه الأغلبية السياسية هي يعني إن لا يرجع إلى الوراء، يعني أخر، لو كانت حكومة الوحدة الوطنية، أو الشركة قد تجت، ماكانا رفعة شعار الأغلبية السياسية.

70 Interviewer

هه هه

71 Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)

عندما أعطيك تؤولي حكومة الشراكة أو كانت ناجحة. تتناول لا أغلبية حكومة سياسية؟ اكتل لا منادي. لكنه لتيج.

72 Interviewer

حوكمل موضوع الأغلبية السياسية. شيخ انلافد دولانت القانون هو المقدم، وحسب السيد المالكي، قادر على أن تأتي النصف رائد واحد. إذا واجب الدعوة لانجح المطالب، وانلافد دولانت القانون أو التحالف مع دولانت القانون من أجل تشكيل الحكومة بسرعة برئاسة السيد المالكي، حفترفون؟

73 Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

يجمل ابتدأنا لاتوجد لدينا خطوط حمر على أي ممارسة من شأنها تدفع باتجاه الاستعراض بتشكيل الحكومة. لذلك لنحن الآن حددنا هدفنا، على الأقل. ما بعد الانتهاء. التحالف الأول أو المتطلب الأول هو ضرورة الاستعراض بالانهاء من العد والفرز، واعلان النتائج بسرع مايمكن.

74 Interviewer

زين

75 Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

والمديد رقم 2 هو ضرورة الاستعراض بعد الانتهاء والتحاليف التي من شأنها أن ينتج وتشكل الحكومة بسرع وقت ممكن. هذا التحالف الإضافيات بالنسبة للناصر. كما فعل الاستقرار الساعدي، تتفق أيضا على أن المقدم الأولي هي التحالف الوطني.

76 Interviewer

هه هه

77 Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

التحاليف الوطني بالإمكان إيجاد تفاهيم أساسية داخل قراء، لكننا فعلا ليس بوعد نترك التمثيل السباقية. عندما نذهب إلى التحالف الوطني، اعتقدنا مان 주장 التحالف دور ناسسي ولم، ومعترف ركيزة للبلد، وهو رصام أمر فلا القادة للمتعجع، لذا يحتاج إلى إعادة اهه.

78 Interviewer

هيئة

79 Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

صياحة

80 Interviewer

هيئة

81 Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

و هيكلة أو هيكلة، وتطوير النظام الداخلية

82 Interviewer

طيب قبل وقبل من خوض تواصل هذا الموضوع، أفتتحنا على المقاطعة. بمرارة، انتقلت المواطن صمحة رئاسة الوزراء؟ يسعى لرئاسة الوزراء؟
83. Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

كتمومًا، بالتأكيد كل الكل السياسي، على الأقل في إطار التحالف الوطني، هي تطمح بهذا المنصب. لما له من أهمية. لكن المواطنين، فعلاً، وتحديداً من بداية حملته الانتخابية لم يكن يركز على هذا المنصب تماماً.

84. Interviewer

85. Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

86. Interviewer

87. Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

بالضبط، بالتأكيد. أما شملت شفقتنا في هذا الأمر. فشقتنا في هذا الأمر، في النظرة البينية لبعضنا أمم مكان أو موقف نشاط رغم في ظل هذه الاستثناءات. هو موقف دعوة لا يختلف عن باقي مواقع الحزام الأخرى. نحو، هو فهم، هو رأس الدولة القائمة في السياسة وإدارة الحزام. فكله لا يضطغ هذا الاهتمام المثير حوله في النظام السياسي، ككله قوة زادة برنامج قوي هي التي تمتلك قدرة أساسية لإبراء الشعب العراقي. ورغم ما من جانبی اعتبار عبرة نبذ هذا الموضوع وعملية تحدته على الواقع الشرقي واسعة كفايات عليه لا تجعله هذا الموضوع حتى بعدولا، اعتبار نوع من أنواع التطورات التي أنجزت السلطات، تجربة دبلوماسية في مثل هذا المكان. موقف العراق هو موقف حل، لكن ما هو أبضاد كتلة كبيرة مهمه صناعةtoLocaleنات القوية، وهي بالتالي تكون بشكل طبيعي بإمكانها أن تنتج هذه المواقف.

88. Interviewer

89. Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

90. Interviewer

91. Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

لا نقلنا أن التحالف الإقليمي هو التحالف الوطني.

92. Interviewer

93. Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

94. Interviewer

95. Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

96. Interviewer

97. Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

98. Interviewer

99. Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

100. Interviewer

101. Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

وكذب فاعلين ككلة حتى على صغر عدته وجمعتها، كانت كتلة فاعلة يشهد لها البرلمان العراقي. كانت دولب في الحركة، ساهمت بناء جناح جملة كبيرة من القوانين، كما أنها عرفت جملة من القضايا التي لم تكن تتعلّ بها.

102. Interviewer

103. Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

104. Interviewer

105. Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

لا يمكن
| 106 | Interviewer | طبيب، خليلي اروح لجواز الجبروي، المتحدث الرسمي لاتحاد الاعتراف، استاذ جواد اهلا وسهلا بك.

107 | Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori) | اهلا وسهلا ومرحبا.

108 | Interviewer | جاك الله. استاذ جواد، اولا حظوظكم شلون شابيفها. وثانيا وين متجهين، وين رايحين.

109 | Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori) | بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم تحية لك وحضرفيك العزيزين، فصيلة الشيخ حمة المعلو والسيد النابض الاستاذ كمال الساعدي ومشاهديك الكبار، ابدعوا امسح لي ان أقدم للهبنتي الى الشعوب العراقي الذي كشف عن شعور عالي بالمسؤولية في فرض الانتخابات، المسؤولية الدينية ومانزهه مع طبيعة من طاعة لترجمات المراجعات الدينية، والمسؤولية السياسية، بما التزمه من اتفاقيات التفاهمات السياسية وعضاها الكثيرة، وكذلك المسؤولية الاجتماعية بأن غبر عن راية اعتبرت هو فعلا مصدر للسلطة. وها قد لقي هذا النداء ونلت ال

110 | Interviewer | طبيب.

111 | Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori) | نقل السلطة من يده الى يد الطبقة السياسية.

112 | Interviewer | ههه.

113 | Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori) | واعترابنا النخب السياسية التي أيضا بيع على عاتقنا الا لاحق مطالب هذا الشعب. رأينا واضح استاذ جواد.

114 | Interviewer | رأينا الانتخابات بهذا الشكل، جرت بشكل او انخ. في جيدة، زير عن ان هناك رغبة على هضور الإدارة السابقة للسلطة.

115 | Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori) | ههه.

116 | Interviewer | واحترام النظام السياسي.

117 | Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori) | استاذ جواد، خليلي اقطعتك حتى تستمر الوقت.

118 | Interviewer | نعم.

119 | Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori) | جاويش على سؤالي، ثانكم شلون تتوقعوا وين متجهين يعني؟ شنو هي خططكم اولاي.

120 | Interviewer | اني.

121 | Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori) | ولاي اهداف رايين توصلون؟

122 | Interviewer | اذا وسواك سمعته، كان تبادر اذهي كان شلون شفت الانتخابات.

123 | Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori) | لا لا.

124 | Interviewer | لهذا جاويش.

125 | Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori) | انتم، انتمتو عن نتائجك المتوقعة واتتمو عن اهدافكم بالمرحلة المستقبلية.

126 | Interviewer | عناء، في ما يتعلق بانجازاتنا وامتحاننا، فلنتلأنا من نتائج عبر عن الارتياح، ونتعامل معها جدا ضمن الخطة الي هي.

127 | Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori) | طبيب.

128 | Interviewer | الى حدناها، ها نمو وهادها نتم، لدينا ماكتبنا انتخابية وتحصي عدد المقايف. لكن لا نود بان نطرح رقم بيلق، بضغوط على الساحة الإعلامية، (غير مفهوم).

129 | Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori) | بعض النظرة، بعض النظرة عن الرقوم، الاخيراء اقرب لمعد تطابع مع انتفاضة الوطن ومع انتفاضات خارج اطار التحالف الوطني؟ لشكيل الحكومة مرتبط بالتحالف الوطني، وانتو متزمنين وراعين باتحاف التحالف الوطني.

130 | Interviewer |
ال[Interviewee 2 (Al-Juboori)]

**131**

جِمَع الاعتماد على التجربة السابقة دائماً مسألة صحية في كل الحكومات وفي كل النظام السياسي، لذا تجربة التحالف الوطني بما فيها وما عليها إذا ينبغي الحفاظ عليها وإن كان التقلص في إمكانية تطوير النهج، في تحقيق ملاحظات على أن التحالف الوطني كان عليه أن يقدم أفضل ما قد، في أن يكون تحالف وثائقي يحدد ذاتاً بحد ذاته. رغم الإتفاقيات التي حصلت، مع شديد الأسف، إلا أنها لا تزالنا موجودين ضمن التحالف الوطني. بالرغم أن نعتدي على تفاهامتنا، وتوفر لنا كل كتلة المواليد، تشكك مما في استراتيجيات التفخيخ في إدارة الدولة وتشير إلى ما في implication على كتلة في داخل التحالف الوطني التي تتكفل بالدارة الدولة داخل الحكومة. لذا لا يوجد قيد على كتلة من كل ما يوجد ملاحظات على ربما شخائر في داخل كتلة في التحالف الوطني أو غير التحالف الوطني.

**132**

هههه

**133**

ههههه

**134**

ههههه

**135**

ههههه

**136**

ههههه

**137**

ههههه

**138**

ههههه

**139**

ههههه

**140**

ههههه

**141**

ههههه

**142**

ههههه

**143**

ههههه

**144**

ههههه

**145**

ههههه

**146**

ههههه

**147**

ههههه

**148**

ههههه

**149**

ههههه

**132 Interviewer**

**133 Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)**

هههه

**134 Interviewer**

هههه

**135 Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)**

هههه

**136 Interviewer**

هههه

**137 Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)**

هههه

**138 Interviewer**

هههه

**139 Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)**

هههه

**140 Interviewer**

هههه

**141 Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)**

هههه

**142 Interviewer**

هههه

**143 Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)**

هههه

**144 Interviewer**

هههه

**145 Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)**

هههه

**146 Interviewer**

هههه

**147 Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)**

هههه

**148 Interviewer**

هههه

**149 Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)**

هههه

**133 Interviewer**

هههه

**134 Interviewer**

هههه

**135 Interviewer**

هههه
الناشرين للحوار، آلية لاختيار المسؤولين، الخ

هذا الذي جان موجود.

لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

أتمت متهمن بعد الالتزام بقرار الانتقادات الوطنية. اضغط على الانتقادات الوطنية.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لابتهم بعد الالتزام بقرار الانتقادات الوطنية. اضغط على الانتقادات الوطنية.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لابتهم بعد الالتزام بقرار الانتقادات الوطنية. اضغط على الانتقادات الوطنية.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لابتهم بعد الالتزام بقرار الانتقادات الوطنية. اضغط على الانتقادات الوطنية.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لابتهم بعد الالتزام بقرار الانتقادات الوطنية. اضغط على الانتقادات الوطنية.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لا مكان موجود.

لا لابتهم بعد الالتزام بقرار الانتقادات الوطنية. اضغط على الانتقادات الوطنية.

لا لا مكان موجود.
| 172 | Interviewer | معناها أن التحالف الوطني مجان يسير بصورة صريحة؟ |
| 173 | Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala) | نعم توجد اتفاقيات فيه، كما توجد فيه ايجابيات. |
| 174 | Interviewer | وعديكم تلقى اتفاقيه التحالف الوطني؟ |
| 175 | Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala) | نعم، نعتقد هناك. وإذا لا نستطيع وبالتالي نحن لنكن بصد متك الاحترام وتجربة خانئة. |
| 176 | Interviewer | شكل المقصد بإدارة هو؟ |
| 177 | Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala) | إعادة الهيكلة: إصلاح قانونية تلزم بها محترف التحالف الوطني هو الفايل الحققي للبلد والمطلوب الأساسي توجيه الحكومة فيه، في حال تشكيكها. حيث يكون رئيس الوزراء، كان من كان من مصلحة المحترف نفسه خان في التحالف، ولا يعتزم نفسه أنه قد تسمح هذا المنصب لكون قادراً وتكون الأمور كهكما. هذا التي نعتقد. نعتقد أن التحالف الوطني ينتج رئيس الوزراء ويتم تكليف هذه الحكومة أو يجري المسامع الأكبر في تأثير تلك الحكومة. |
| 178 | Interviewer | ما هو |
| 179 | Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala) | تكون الظل قرارات التحالف هي السائدة ولايست قرارات الفرد. هذا واضح |
| 180 | Interviewer | واضح |
| 181 | Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala) | هذا التي نعتقد، وتحويله إلى مؤسسة تراكم الخبرة. هذا يؤمن لبناء تصنع الدولة وللتعزيز السلطة. |
| 182 | Interviewer | واضح شيخ |
| 183 | Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala) | قد السلطة تعز في مرحلة |
| 184 | Interviewer | نعم |
| 185 | Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala) | لكن البنادات الأساسية هي بنادات الدولة. |
| 186 | Interviewer | خذ أرجو فاضل قصيرة بعد الفاس والرجو وتكمل حوارنا. مشاهدنا فاضل قصير ابوا معنا. |
| 187 | Interviewer | تحية طيبة مرة أخرى مشاهدنا والجزء الثاني من برامجنا اليوم. استاذ جود الك مرة أخرى، اسف جدًا على الاتهامات. مفقط واضح، موقف الأحجار واضح، وأفضح الولايات الثالثة للسيد الملكي. بالتالي منصف ومكافح على استمرار التحالف الوطني، يعني ذلك ولاية ثلاثة لسلاط الملكي. هل الكثافة الأكبر داخل التحالف الوطني وربما من حقه الحصول على رئاسة الوزراء؟ |
| 188 | Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori) | لا ليس، ليس بالضرورة تماماً هذا الموضوع. أما يعني إعادة توازن قوى داخل التحالف الوطني هو أمر صحي وضرورة أيضاً من ضرورات تكرير أداء السياسي للدولة باعتبار أن التحالف الوطني هو رائد العملية السياسي أو ربما هو التحالف الأكبر، فمن الحق الطبيعي أن تعبي النظر في إحداث عام، إيه توازن قوى التحالف الوطني بما خرج من مخزونات التوتر كبير من الأشكال وجرح التحالف الوطني مشكلة، لأن هو في جميعها لافتات وجلي النظر في إدارة التحالف الوطني. للإجابة حينما تثور ظاهرة خلل لستهدف أحد من منكل التحالف الوطني ونما حرصاً على التحالف لنا نجز منه. |
| 189 | Interviewer | زين |
| 190 | Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori) | وحرصاً على الدولة لناما جزء منها. |
191: مذكرة للصد appropriation؟

192: انقل إلى المرة السبعة؟

193: ما إذا كان يعادل نفس السيناريو?

194: التغيير التدرج، التشكك في كل القوى السياسية، تأكيد على الشابة والشابه من الضغوط الدبلوماسية لرفع الأقرارات من المطلب السياسي وخصائص قانونية معروفة بحل أو تأجيل الشابة وضبطاً على النظرة لأي تأثيرات أخرى على القوى الأخرى المعلقة.

195: اصبر التحالف الوطني لأي دخول إلى الكتلة الأخرى مرشح لرئاسة الوزراء على اعتبار التحالف الإكبر.

196: بينما هذا صحيح.

197: شلون من تتفقون على مرشح رئاسة الوزراء استعدادًا؟

198: علوا.

199: شلون ممكن؟ شني الآلة التي تشغعم على مرشح، مرشح التحالف الوطني لرئاسة الوزراء؟

200: أھب يعني بعض استعداد أو هذا الموضوع هو ساق لواعج بالنظر إلى الحالة الانتخابية. هذا معبر من معايير الاتفاق على هذا المطلب.

201: زين.

202: وقبلية أيضاً أن لابناث المطلب المطلب المهم الذي نذّب به المعنيتان الدبلوماسية وكذلك أن لابناث الدور الأليمي الأول الذي آتله هذا المعبر. على اعتبار أن شخصية رئيس الوزراء يجب أن تكون يجعل جهود أطراف المذكرة يعني أھب سابقاً.

203: هو هو.

204: هو ذلك هذا موضوع غير صحبي يعني ليس يعني لايمض بطلع التحالف الوطني وحكام التحالف الوطني في الإدار.

205: زين.

206: الشخصية، بينما.

207: خليلي أسأل سؤال آخر استعدادًا.

208: علوا.

209: خليلي أسأل سؤال آخر: أھب ضمّ للسيد آل المالكي ولاياة ثانية للسيد المالكي هذا الرفض نهائى أو لم يتم تغريز موضوع؟

210: شكراً له ما رفضنا طبعاً ينكشف من منصة وسيلة منهجية وسيلة علمية وسيلة أرادة عامة وآرادة أعداء مرجعنا الذين في صوره التدال السلمي للعمل وعدم الأنسق شاقة الأبطال أو شقاقأل الاعتقادات أو أن شق التعبير الدبلوماسي، هذا مما يعني الرسالة لا تتماشى مع ماذا التحالف الوطني وعندما بدأت الموافقة التحالف الوطني وغيرها على ولايتي: أھب العينتان هما من النجاح الساقي في التداول السلمي للعمل في النظام الدبلوماسي. وأئداً استعدادًا لشخص السيد المالكي وماذا هذا هو حتى كان مشروع فنون في حدث الاسم السماح لولاية ثانية أو حتى ولاية واحدة تحل الاه..
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Interviewee/Interviewer</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>211</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>واضح، واضح استناد جواب 221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212</td>
<td>Interviewee 3 (Al-Juboori)</td>
<td>تجربة يقين المكلف بهذا المنصب هو مثلما أشار فريق النشيد أنه مرسوم أي طالب للخدمة لا هو مرسوم يقين أي أجنبي.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>واضح استناد جواب 221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>214</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>لتشخيص دون آكل</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>واضح استناد جواب أظهر كجزء لأعضاء وبناء السيد جواد الجبوري المتحدث 221 بسُم أائتلاف الأحرار لأنه شكر على ذلك. أنهه أهرام وكل حفلاتك تشبه الحكومة القائمة يبدو أنها مضيفة. لا سؤال لل العلاقة بالطراف يبكى ضيعي ور وا قص بعض الكتاب لولاية ثالث للسيد المكلن وما أعدد مرض أخرى</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216</td>
<td>Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)</td>
<td>به مما قبل أن أجيء ودبي أن أعلق على ماخرز الزميل جواب يقول أن هاي بي رغبة المرجعية والناشة وكذا أنا أعتقد أن هذا كالم غير حق. لثن أي مرجعية يعني ما أعاد هناك استتبلا إلى نظرية معينة أبى ربما في يوم ما سأحفظ عنه. لتم مرجعية عن شخص معه أهره هدي 221. والشعب عندما ينتخب كلمة أكبر</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>217</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>اسم</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>218</td>
<td>Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)</td>
<td>هذا دعاها</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>السيد يشير الشجاع بالله تعالى شيء النبي جزء من المرجعية؟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220</td>
<td>Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)</td>
<td>فهو هذا أن ليس بديهي أن أفتح هذا الجريدة في 221 في مجموعة من البيانات لا أرى أن أفتح هذا الموضوع. أه بديهي عندما يقول بديهي العلاقة الشعب عندما يقول بديهي هذا معه أن لديه رغبة معينة وابن أن يستجيب لهذه الرغبة. هذا قطع لا أرى أن أغلق. أح 221 أه على هذا ليس أكثر لدينا علاقة بالأخلاقية لل</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>221</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>أنتهى، أنتهى دور الشارع بعد انتهاء الانتهات</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222</td>
<td>Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)</td>
<td>لأنه لأنه رئيس الوزراء لم يأت بأنقلاب حتى يتلها ديكاتورية أجة بأصاصات الشعب.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>زمن أنتهى أنتهى دور الشارع بعد انتهاء الانتهات اليوم الكرة بطبع الانتهات. الانتهات أو بعض الانتهات أولا ما عدها نوقة ثقة ندالة القانون</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>224</td>
<td>Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)</td>
<td>اسم</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>225</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>وثاني يا تريد ولاية ذاتية للسيد المكلن، رافة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>226</td>
<td>Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)</td>
<td>هي القضية (غير مفهم)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>يعني أن كان الاحرار، أو محترن أو عاوني أو حتى لربما الكرد</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>228</td>
<td>Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)</td>
<td>إنها أولا لا الت quem كان كلا مستفي على موافقة الأراضي. القضية لاتتعلق بطولية عدر ما تتعلق بالوافق. يعني بعض القيادات الكردية شهد مشكلتها مع السيد المكلن؟ التف، مشكلتها</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>حتنظيما النقطة حتى تتصور على رئيسة الوزارة؟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230</td>
<td>Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)</td>
<td>لا لا تخليك أهمل اله كنا بسورية المكلف. هذا بعدن. لو كنا منطقيا النقطة مكلن صارته هي المكلن. القضية لاتتعلق بطولية. تعطى مختلف ومحمية. هذا المكلف مسير، هنALS ثورة العراق ماها عاطفة بالنظرة، لهما مادة ٥٥فا</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
232 Interviewee 2
(Al-Sa‘adi)
أي واحد يجي بصير بالحكومة وبالتحالف الوطني ويطلي معارض، هذا لم يتح مقول إبداً.

233 Interviewer
زين تنيني، خليفي إساف هذا النموذج.

234 Interviewee 1
(Al-Muala)
أي واحد يجي بصير بالحكومة وبالتحالف الوطني ويطلي معارض، هذا لم يتح مقول إبداً.

235 Interviewer
طيب

236 Interviewee 2
(Al-Sa‘adi)
ممكن اه تغيرون المالك؟ تجيرون مرح مرح اتROWS رغبات الكلال تحالف الوطنى

ولذا الالتفات؟

237 Interviewer

238 Interviewee 2
(Al-Sa‘adi)
راح هم يواجه نفس الها، إذا اتخى نفس موقع المالك وكل نطق يعد للحكومة

الاندماج، وهذي مشكلة مراد بحل بسهولة. راح أيضاً يوقون ويا نفس موقع المالك،

وكلب مكلب، استنادنا لكونه معين خدمة القلوب. وما حتفنا ويا هذي نطق النطق

حالاً وما يمكن اني نفسي ركوب بعض المواصفات وراها للسلطة والأيضاً، الها علاقة

"النطق رغباتياً أو الالتفاتطاً.

239 Interviewer

240 Interviewee 1
(Al-Muala)
لا، احنا حيننا تتحدث في إن يكون التحالف مفسدة، حيننا سوف لن يبان احترف

بالمصالح الكبرى والعليا، لاننا يتنف النطق، وأفuerdo عن تعلي التحالف. إذا التحالف الوطنى

قال تعلي نطق فينعن نطق، وهمياً يقول لنطق الفقراء، ياواكتكم تكون حكوكم

وهو يبتلك من مصالح البلد العليا، ونابنا حيننا يوقون وافق على شاء دستورية. وهمياً

فرعض، يرفض أيضاً على شاء دستورية. سوف لن يكون هناك مجال لوقادات داخل الطوابع.

كلك يكون حول الطوابع، وسوف لن يكون هناك مجال لوقادات داخل الدستور،

وكلك يكون حول الدستور، وسوف لن يكون هناك مجال لوقادات داخل الدستور،

نفقنا حيننا تيد هذه القضية، ونغرفهم لوقات مع عنا. حيننا نقول إن التحالف

الوطنى مفسدة، حيننا تجرد هذه المصريى تدرك، تدرك بعيوهم وصمعهم رائد الوزارة،

كائن من كان رائد الوزارة.

241 Interviewer
زين، ممكن توافقون على ولاية ثانية للسيد المالك دخل تحالف الوطنى، داخل تفاعلات

بالتخالف الوطنى؟

242 Interviewee 1
(Al-Muala)
نحن اجتازنا بكل واضح في تصويت داخل مجلس النواب، ثم الفا، فانا لنا بإن تكون هناك

ولاية ثانية للرائد الوزارة، ليس للضحاى الخوف، مع كامل النصح والاعتراف بالمالكي.

243 Interviewer
زين

244 Interviewee 1
(Al-Muala)
قلنا وجة نظروا، إن من الالتفات الدستورية والقانونية، فالدستور والقانون لإبتتح ال

رئاسة ان تكون أو لان تكون. تحدث عن كلمة بمثابه ومن حق الكلمة الكبرى أن

هي تترشح

245 Interviewer

246 Interviewee 1
(Al-Muala)
إن ترشح شخصاً حتى ولو سنة مرة.

247 Interviewer
زين

248 Interviewee 1
(Al-Muala)
هذا من جهة، من جهة أخرى كان هناك نوع من التوازن، أن لا تكلفة للرعاية لا يجي،

ويعني بعض المنظور إن هذا الرجل هو الايجادية السيد المالك، إن فالم تفاصيل

أرجل لكثر من مرة، حتى سمعت أن السيد المالك هو نفسه، أيضاً يتحدث وقال، قال: أن

شخصي باوليتونين يكون قد نصح فرصة كافية للتفت، برنامج.

249 Interviewer
اهه هه
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>250</th>
<th>Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>251</td>
<td>ٓٞ٤٥٦١ ٛ٘خى حُظ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>252</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>253</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>254</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>255</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>256</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>257</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>258</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>259</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>262</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>263</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>264</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>265</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>266</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>268</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>269</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>270</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271</td>
<td>ٗو٤ن ُٞ ٓ٘خكْ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**نهاية**

وهو لايستيمح ان يكون مرتين ثالثة

ياما ينحت ياما يقش خلال اللى تمان سنوات

ايمسنت. واعتقد ان هذا ميدى حقيقى صحيح

ذين، بالعقل

ينبغي الالتزام

عدكم مرشح، عدنك مرشح؟ اطفال المواطن حل مند مرشح لرئاسة الوزراء ممكن تخلو؟

على اطفالناナル ولتوال التحالق الوطنى؟

موجودين بال打着 ل، نحن الان لم يكن هذه النقطه هي مورد البحث بالنيابة لى. لكن

لايبعد، ولا لاعبد التحالق الوطنى من ان ينح رجل آخر يكون شفيف للسيد المالكي ويشمل

محله، ولااعبد ولتهان ال…

شهق أو منافس؟

شهق ومنافس. التحالق شرعى هناثه.

زين

التحالق هذا مقبى. اطفال المواطن، ديار شده الحرم، أول يوم دخل الى العراق هو لديه

مرشحين للتنبى هذا المركز وقيادته. لم يكن عاجزاً عن انتاج مثل هذا الرجل أو دفعه الى

الواجهة. كان مرشحه قائم وموجود ولدينا الحمد الله، الرجال اللى القادرين على ان يقودوا

البلد (غير مهفوم) به امام

الاطالاولة ولئنا اهلا بيك.

اهلا وهسلا بيك استاذ على وبالضيوف.

شكره جزيلى. استاذ محمد لين مصرين على رفض الياة الثالثة للسيد المالكي؟

يجعي تعرف ايه كان هناك اطفال هناك اراء متبادله، من اجزاء من التحالق الوطنى واجزاء

من العراقيين وأجزاء من الكنسانى بياذا الخصوص. يجعي مو تكون متحدون فقط كان

بين

ضمن الالاء، يجعي الوجود في هذا الأمر، والدليل عندما كان هناك توسعت على منع

الياة الثالثة 170 داند صوتا بهذا الاستعجار، كانوا يمثلون مختلف اللكل السياسى. وهي كانت

قطع الطريق امام شخص لولاية أكثر من ولايات.

هه هو

هذا الأمر يجعي كان، وسبب عدم وجود نص مستوري بهذا الاستعجار أو عدم استعجار.

كان هناك فقط لرئيس الجمهورية، كفان اللى العالم هو انه الشخص اذا تولى منصب مرتين

رئاسة الوزراء يجب ان

لاتولى ثالثا ونتحن مع هذا اللى ومستمرى

خلصى خلصى اداخل وياه اسنان محمد. السيد النفيسي أيضا اعلناها يعى اللاقح، كان نحن مع

عدم التحالف لولاية ثالثة للسيد المالكي، السيد المالكي يكول ان المتحدون عن عدم التحالق مما

فصولين وثقين اتصالات من كيانات بعض المتحدين يدود استعدادهم للتاحل معا. شلون

تعلق هاه؟

274

لا ينبغي أن نستشهد بالكلام الإلهامي أو الروائي لاستدلاله في الانتقادات والمناقشات. يجب أن تكون هناك حكومة عقلانية تغطي تلك الكلام الذي يتخللهة من الخصائص الاجتماعي – التنمية.
بقاء المالكي أو مهين شخص آخر من ائتلاف دولة القانون أو من بقية قوى التحالف الوطني

بادية بناء قوى التحالف الوطني أو بناء قوى خارجية؟ برئاسة إيران، دور إيران وارادة إيران؟

Interviewer

نموذج إيران هذا الدور وكأنما إيران لن يكون المقصود بالإحتمال الحقيقي هو قد أمر غرب العراق، لا أحد يفكر أن هناك علاقات مع إيران. مثل ما كان آخر علاقات مع دول أخرى، لا أحد يفكر. لا أحد يفكر دور الثائر الأقل في العراق ولا حتى الدور الإيرامي. للنظام الايراني أن يصنعون رؤوس وراء إيران؟ فهل هناك التفاهمات التي أثارت جشع إيران؟ أيضًا أردن أو إيران أو حتى الدول العربية قادرة على أن تتغير مسار التحالفات؟ ماذا تقترح، ماذا تقترح.

Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)

تم يمكن مكون دورهم بعد التحالفات، مثل محاصرة 2010 حسب شركاء الكه داخل التحالف الوطني الذي كانا لولا التوافق العراقي الأمريكي لما كان المالكي في رئاسة الوزراء.

Interviewer

من هذا الكلام؟

Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)

لا، اريد تعطيل تصريح واحد هذا كلام، هو هادي المجالي قبل وقائع القسم الثالث هذا معروف.

Interviewer

وين، شركات كاذبة؟

Interviewee 2 (Al-Sa’adi)

ما دلية؟

Interviewer

لا، اريد تعطيل تصريح واحد هذا كلام، هو هادي المجالي قبل وقائع القسم الثالث هذا معروف.

Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

لا، اريد تعطيل تصريح واحد هذا كلام، هو هادي المجالي قبل وقائع القسم الثالث هذا معروف.

Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

لا، اريد تعطيل تصريح واحد هذا كلام، هو هادي المجالي قبل وقائع القسم الثالث هذا معروف.

Interviewer

هل الموقف هذه العملية تأثيرات أساسية على طبيعة وشكل النظام في داخل العراق. لمن الموقف الداخلي وحافة بعد التغير الابراحي الذي حصل في 2003 تصورngx عالي دور كبير واساسي في تمايز شكل النظام وبدءاته التحالفات، كما ذكر الاستاذ، حينما تتناقش عدد حلفاء حガイド وتحت تدفقها التي لا يمكن للكلات العراقية أن تدخل وترسم الآباء، وكما أنها أقدر تفوق على الأخر.

Interviewer

هل الموقف هذه العملية تأثيرات أساسية على طبيعة وشكل النظام في داخل العراق. لمن الموقف الداخلي وحافة بعد التغير الابراحي الذي حصل في 2003 تصورgx عالي دور كبير واساسي في تمايز شكل النظام وبدءاته التحالفات، كما ذكر الاستاذ، حينما تتناقش عدد حلفاء حガイド وتحت تدفقها التي لا يمكن للكلات العراقية أن تدخل وترسم الآباء، وكما أنها أقدر تفوق على الأخر.

Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

لطفاً تأكدون أن الشان العراقي هو شأن مده من اهمي زمن بعيد. هو هو

Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

هل الموقف هذه العملية تأثيرات أساسية على طبيعة وشكل النظام في داخل العراق. لمن الموقف الداخلي وحافة بعد التغير الابراحي الذي حصل في 2003 تصورgx عالي دور كبير واساسي في تمايز شكل النظام وبدءاته التحالفات، كما ذكر الاستاذ، حينما تتناقش عدد حلفاء حガイド وتحت تدفقها التي لا يمكن للكلات العراقية أن تدخل وترسم الآباء، وكما أنها أقدر تفوق على الأخر.

Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

هل الموقف هذه العملية تأثيرات أساسية على طبيعة وشكل النظام في داخل العراق. لمن الموقف الداخلي وحافة بعد التغير الابراحي الذي حصل في 2003 تصورgx عالي دور كبير واساسي في تمايز شكل النظام وبدءاته التحالفات، كما ذكر الاستاذ، حينما تتناقش عدد حلفاء حガイド وتحت تدفقها التي لا يمكن للكلات العراقية أن تدخل وترسم الآباء، وكما أنها أقدر تفوق على الأخر.

Interviewer

هل الموقف هذه العملية تأثيرات أساسية على طبيعة وشكل النظام في داخل العراق. لمن الموقف الداخلي وحافة بعد التغير الابراحي الذي حصل في 2003 تصورgx عالي دور كبير واساسي في تمايز شكل النظام وبدءاته التحالفات، كما ذكر الاستاذ، حينما تتناقش عدد حلفاء حガイド وتحت تدفقها التي لا يمكن للكلات العراقية أن تدخل وترسم الآباء، وكما أنها أقدر تفوق على الأخر.

Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

هل الموقف هذه العملية تأثيرات أساسية على طبيعة وشكل النظام في داخل العراق. لمن الموقف الداخلي وحافة بعد التغير الابراحي الذي حصل في 2003 تصورgx عالي دور كبير واساسي في تمايز شكل النظام وبدءاته التحالفات، كما ذكر الاستاذ، حينما تتناقش عدد حلفاء حガイド وتحت تدفقها التي لا يمكن للكلات العراقية أن تدخل وترسم الآباء، وكما أنها أقدر تفوق على الأخر.

Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

هل الموقف هذه العملية تأثيرات أساسية على طبيعة وشكل النظام في داخل العراق. لمن الموقف الداخلي وحافة بعد التغير الابراحي الذي حصل في 2003 تصورgx عالي دور كبير واساسي في تمايز شكل النظام وبدءاته التحالفات، كما ذكر الاستاذ، حينما تتناقش عدد حلفاء حガイド وتحت تدفقها التي لا يمكن للكلات العراقية أن تدخل وترسم الآباء، وكما أنها أقدر تفوق على الأخر.

Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

هل الموقف هذه العملية تأثيرات أساسية على طبيعة وشكل النظام في داخل العراق. لمن الموقف الداخلي وحافة بعد التغير الابراحي الذي حصل في 2003 تصورgx عالي دور كبير واساسي في تمايز شكل النظام وبدءاته التحالفات، كما ذكر الاستاذ، حينما تتناقش عدد حلفاء حガイド وتحت تدفقها التي لا يمكن للكلات العراقية أن تدخل وترسم الآباء، وكما أنها أقدر تفوق على الأخر.

Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

هل الموقف هذه العملية تأثيرات أساسية على طبيعة وشكل النظام في داخل العراق. لمن الموقف الداخلي وحافة بعد التغير الابراحي الذي حصل في 2003 تصورgx عالي دور كبير واساسي في تمايز شكل النظام وبدءاته التحالفات، كما ذكر الاستاذ، حينما تتناقش عدد حلفاء حガイド وتحت تدفقها التي لا يمكن للكلات العراقية أن تدخل وترسم الآباء، وكما أنها أقدر تفوق على الأخر.

Interviewee 1 (Al-Muala)

هل الموقف هذه العملية تأثيرات أساسية على طبيعة وشكل النظام في داخل العراق. لمن الموقف الداخلي وحافة بعد التغير الابراحي الذي حصل في 2003 تصورgx عالي دور كبير واساسي في تمايز شكل النظام وبدءاته التحالفات، كما ذكر الاستاذ، حينما تتناقش عدد حلفاء حガイド وتحت تدفقها التي لا يمكن للكلات العراقية أن تدخل وترسم الآباء، وكما أنها أقدر تفوق على الأخر.
الشريك: إذا كان من شراكة فضفاضة قوية ان الجميع يشترك بها، كما اشار الاخوة ان يكون هو من داخل الحكومة من جهة ونصفه في المعارضة.

وهذا الي حصل وادي الى افراحك.

يمكن ان يخرج الى خارج الحكومة ويكلف برامجها ولامارس دوا ايجابيا.

زبن، بالانساق بالرفيع سوف يمكن ان تتفاوت داخل التحالف الوطني صيغة موحدة؟

الشريك: فكر في المحكمة، لكن ما زمان واحد لا يمكن ان يحكم العراق، ان العراق فيه مكونات وفيه تأويل، نحن لا يمكن ان تكون معرفة عن نفسها. استمع هنا لتسيرات لهذه الأغلبية ليست نصف زمان واحد أولا، ثانيا انا لنست أغلبية مقترحة على مكون واحد دون شراكة المكونات الأخرى. قلنا إذا هذا متقول، شراكة قويا من داخل مكونات الشعب العراقي الأساسية تتفاوت على هذا البرنامج فيشكلون باختصا فريك قوي نص وضعية وبرنامج عمله. هذا الي نريد جدا، والذى تعودته مشكلة العراق وليس مشكلة العراق.

واضح.

لا شخص قوي.

واضح.

استد كمال نص ذيقة. مصرى عن حكومة الأغلبية السياسية بين البعض رافضها ويشيعها مو.

انا بالكرسي الي نقده انتبه تقريبا بنعمر هو انتبه أساسا.

لا لاحدلا للتحالف الوطني في اعتقد القوى الكردستانية رافضة حكومة الأغلبية.

هذا شبيه بانه بسهم تحالف مع نص حكمة المانيا. انتيه منشأ ان العراق بروح الى حاوله ان هناك طرف رافض. انتيه جديد حكومة قوية، جديد حكومة قوية الي يشترك بها بعوانه الوطني وحاي يشارى كليه، لايميل الشيعة، بعد بعون ووزير يكون انتي انتي الشيعة أو اسم الكرد، وزير يصخص مثل العراق، حكومة نصحية، مصخص بعد وزير يطلب نائب وزيران والحكومة ويطبع.

ان لا يوجد خطر مع حاوله اذا بس اعمال.

الي خترع عند الوقت، اسف جدا. السيد حاليا، عن انقلل دولة القانون شكرًا جزيلًا. الشريكسن أيضا لنيل الشيخ محمب رشيد معلى المتحدث الرسمي باسم ائتلاف المجال بسبب، شكرنا المكم

شكرًا.

وصلنا مشاهدين الى نهاية الحلقة، لا يعني اننا ينكم على حسن المنابع والاصطاح. الى

الله.
### D. First Facebook Comment-thread


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Interlocutors</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1   | Post-author   | قُلُتَها أَكْرُم مِنْ مَرَةٍ أَعَدَاءُ الرَّمَلُي أَفْدَأَهُ أَكْرُم مِنْ أَسْفَقُهُ أَزَاحُوا بَيْنَهُمْ بِحَيْثُ جُهُوَلَهُ إِلَى بُطُلٍ لِشَرَائِنَ عَدْيَةٍ وَاذِهِ النَّتَائِج تَتَبَتْ هَذَهُ الْنظِرَةٍ وَتَوَقُّعُتْ الشَّخْصِيَةٍ رَمَيَّةَ إِلَى لِسْتَ مَحْتَصُّ بِالْتَحْلِيلِ السَّيِّاسِيَّ، أَنَّ السَّنَةَ المُقْبِلَةَ مُتَشَهِّدَتْ تَغْرَى كَتْبَيْكَاهَا فِي مَعْرَكَةَ حُسْوَمَهَا لِسَبْطِسُونَ لِلْتَعَالِمِ مَعْهُ أَنَّهَا أَصِيبَ الرَّمَقُ الأَصْحَبُ فِي المَعَادِلَةِ السَّيِّاسِيَّةِ لَيْ لْيُبْلَقُ أَنَّهَا حَتَى القُوَّةِ الإِقْلِيْمِيَّةِ مَتَعَرِّضُتْ لِلْفِيَدَةَ لِلْمَشْهُدَ بَعْدَ تَتَائِنَ الْتَحْتَابَاتِ لَوْ كَانَتْ الْخَصْوُمُ أَصِلَحُهَا الرَّمَلُي وَفَعَّلَتْ عَكَسَ ما كَانَ أَفْلَأَهُ كَلْيَا لَتَزَادَ نَشَابُهُ أَكْرُمُ فِي فُوْزُ بَوْلَاةٍ ثَلَاثَةٍ أَلَا لَوْ جِرَى العَكْسُ وَاسْتُمْتَرْتُ السَّمَرَةُ السَّيِّاسِيَّةُ فَقَوْا أَنَّ أَعَدَاءَ المُصْوَّتِيْنَ لَسَيْزَدُ بِبَيْنَهُمْ تَحْرِجُ الْجُمْعَةُ وَأَنَّهْ مَوْجَدُ وَأَنَّهْ مَوْجَدُونَ إِنَّمَا حُقُقُهُ فِي مَرَحَةِ المِلْقَهِ تَحْلِيْلٌ سَلِيمُ فَعْلَهُ هَذِهِ مَسْتَنَاذِهَةَ فِي الْمِلْقَهِ. وَهُوَ يَدِلُّ أَنْ كَانَ حَصْوُمُ الرَّمَلُي بِهِذَا الْحَمْقِ ... أَنَّهُ أَعْمُلُ مِنْهُ جَمِيعاً اَتْمَنَى حُقْقَهُ أَنْ يَعْدَاءُ الرَّمَلُي ثاثِياً رَابِعاً لَيْزَرُ الْجُمْعَةُ حَجْمُ الْفَتْلُ الَّذِي سَيْقُوُدُ أَنْهُ حَسَنُ كَالْمَلْكُ أَسْتَذَّ مَحْمُدُ الْخَارِجُةِ السَّيِّاسِيَّ فِي الْجَزِئِ مَخْلُوَقُ ... الْشَّعْبُ الْعَرَبِيَّ بِطِيْقَ الْمِلْلُ الْخَيْرُ الْعَرَبِيَّ أَحْسَنَ مِنْ الْزَّيْنِ الْمُتَعَرِّضُ ... نُورِيْ شَيْنُ بِنَْنُ عِرْقُهُ النَّكَرَةُ الَّتِي رَأْىٍ تَقِصُّ بِبَخْطَالِ لِلْتَحْتَابَاتِ الْبُحْرِيَّ وَنُبُوْىٍ رَاحُ تَشْتَدُّ الْصُّرَاعَاتِ وَتَنَسْقُبُ بَيْنَ الْكَثَّلِ المَنْتَخُتِ بِالْمَحَافِظَاتِ مَنَ سَيْضَرُ بَعْضُهُمْ لِلْعُسَقُاءِ الرَّمَلُي على اِبْنَاءِ عَوْمُهُمْ سَيْدِيِّ الْفَاطِمَى الْعَلَمُوُرِ لاَ تَحْتَجُّ مَجَوْدُ كَبِيرٍ وَمِجْلِسِ سَيْسَةٍ خِيْرٍ لِلْتُوْصُلَ مِنْهُ مَا تَوَصَّلَتْ أَلْيَا مَا فَعْلَتْ هُوَ نَأَمَلُ أَنْ يَجَدَدُ وَدَرَاسَةُ الرَّفُعُ وَرَدُّ فَعْلَهُ. أَفَى أَنْ لَحَضُصُهُ فِي مَسَارِكِهِ فَمِسْخُ مَصْدَاقِيْهُ وَتَزَادَ مَوْجَدَ هَذَا مَا يَجَدُدُ مِنْ الرَّمَلُي هُمْ مَصْعُوٍ بِبَعْضِهِمْ وَتَعْصِيْهِمْ 278
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>بل أفلاس المالكي. التيار الصدري حقق نتائج جيدة وكتلة الحكم. التيار المدني مع العلم أن المالكي دخل بكل التكتلات الشيعي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>البعض لا يهم سوى إثبات (เบอร์วิ่ง) .. (أتمت حقيقة ..) ما هذه المواقف الغربية؟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>حكومة أزمات وخلافات واعتيادات وفساد وامتلاس وقليل على الهوية .. وووووووو ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>صحيح يا أبو الطيب وقناها بدل المرء الله فقد خذمه خدمه خدمه</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>أبو الطيب أكثر واحد يرفض رأيك هذا هو المتصل، ويتمسك باك مالكي، هيهيههه يغني شيعي مالكي مو غير شي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>إنها موامرة على العراق أجمع</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>انتخاب المالكي كان أصلا انتخابا طائفيا بختا فهو و كان و و سيكون رئيس وزراء لطائفه واحدة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>المالكي سياسي ناجح .. بالرغم من أن ل أرغب به استثمار تسويق دفاعه الانتخابي من خصومه من خلال المضادة بل وحتى أصبح مختارا لرئاسة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>السلام عليكم استاذ محمد عندما تصادق المفوضية على نتائج الانتخابات ربما تقيم مقالك السابقة بغير الكلام الذي تطلع عليه اليوم تفتيدي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>انت تقصد دكتاتور ناجح ومтировس</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>مختارا لطائفه فقط وليس زمانه رئيس وزراء لم يستطع خلال الدورة الأولى ونصف الثانية أن يكسب دعم السنة ولا حتى نفس الشيعة ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>ترا الجماعة داخوا ويبا .. إذا صلاحهم هم راح يحقق نتائج على الأرض وترداد شعبيته</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>اتفق معك بشدة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>هو كاليلا .. بعد منتطها</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>خصوم المالكي حصنوا الدولة عندما أرادوا أن يستطع المالكي اضحاهم لأنهم لم يتكلموا بالواقع أو الحقية وحاولوا الخطأ على حساب ناحية وواقعهم الطافي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>الخضيري انت بعيد عن الواقع أنت نتائج الانتخابات المحلية سيطرت شعبية المالكي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>هيهيهيهيهيهيهيهيهيهيهيهيهيهيهيهيهيهيهيهيهيهيهيهية لا توجد أرقام صعبة في السياسة توجد مصالح فقط والتغيير واحد من روايات الديمقراطية حيث لا تثور ولا تستمر الى ماما نهاية</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
30Commentator
لا شيء ملكي آخذ الثوري ماكسي وباع من المالكين ضمن صورة مبین

الاخ الأخر اعترف انك تناول فخري كريم صاحب المدى بكلاه ضد المالكي لن مؤسة
المدى هي من تكللت بنقاط طبع كتالب الموسوم (الكاردي) ليس كانت بإيديكم؟؟؟

31Commentator

32Commentator
صدقي أساتذة محمد لم يشترد عن الحقيقة أبدا، عن نفس كتب أكثر من مقال حول التنبيه
لحقيقة أن خيار التسليف الإعلامي للمالكي من أسوار الخيارات لمواجهة من قبل غير المتعين
بفكاكته وقدرته على إدارة البلاد، كتب كتب أيضا بعض الزملاء بشكل شخصي والذين بات
ديدنهم كتابه يومية تلوك الشعب والانتقادات المهينة والمستفزة للمالكي، ويناضلون عن سوء
دارة حكومته وتناول مواضيع وتحلي لهم أجزاء غير قليل من المسؤولية ضعف الجهاز التلفزيي
للحكومة، كأنا يوقنون أنهم يستطيعون ويعارون عملية إزاعة متابعة له فيما هو يستلزم
ويعبون شرائح عديدة عادات يوم وانتخبت.. تبادلي

33Commentator
يمعدين خل تناشل بهدوء وبدون جريج ولا تخ

34Commentator

35Commentator

36Commentator
استاذ محمد شكيك تضحكي

37Commentator
استاذ رعد الثوري، أنا أكتب في الصباح وكاباني طبع في دار الزور، خريف الملفوف ومدته
للمدى ورقصه

38Commentator

39Commentator

40Commentator

41Commentator
نعم باصديقي سعد جاسم وربما يصاون ببلطة هاي

42Commentator

43Commentator
لا أني رأى أنصرف بدون زعل آخر، صفتني ليست مكانا للتنامي وساحن الأزت كله
التعليقات المشينة
معادلة قاسية يابو الطيب التي تدومها الآن. المالكى محظوظ ببعضه مترهسة تستمطت في
ان لا تسجيم في الصعود أمام سلطته عقبة المضادة ب نفسها هيئة السطة وقادة،
وينبغي أن لا ينفع ذلك من الصعود بدلاً بجزء صناعية أمامة الرعي واستعداد على كل شيء، فلا
دورات لممارس المصدرين الذين أثروا وحدهم ميولن دون أن يتوقفوا حينها على
تعجيز المنظمات لدنيا بمساعدتها. لا جدال أيضاً للمثل العتابي الذي يبين أن تفكيره اليوم
الانتهاء العقيدة المكونة من خطة تسمح بتاح تجاوز أصفة المالكى، هذه
الخارطة لا شك أنها مجهر تابع للفترة الأقوى وهي فئة الشعوب لدى عمليات التي
يشكل الجزء الشرقي من المعركة العربية، تعود المعادرات لدى تونس ولبنان ومصر على
سبيلاً لم يستطع أن يحدد مراج الثاورة به، فقد التغير في البلدان بعيدة
طفقت أن تعيش دون كرامة، الناجي في بلدان يوفس له لا يدعة مام燃气 نبية لم تنتطع لمدة
الحظة من استغلال شكل "القائد" كي تخضع المواطن نفسه، وليس للجماعة الترابية والمثلثة.

64   Commentator
كلما مكاريد
كلما الكلام الصاغ وأتولى الآخر يل من خلال هذا، قلنا
مشكلة "إعداد" المالكى ليست فقط الشخصية، وإنما سيبرت أن كنت بأخطاء فائقة
كلما مكاريد ريفاً يا مرتضى

65   Commentator
استن سرم، استن ما الخفية والواقع الذي يبره إعداد المالكى
فعله هذا ما يحدث الآن، وما سسعته مستقبل، إذا لا يدع على خصومة أنه يفهمون اللعبة.
كلما ضعيف وكما جحبنا هالحجي
مشكلة إعداد المالكى هو عدم وجود خبرة سياسية كافية لديهم لإسقاط المالكى

66   Commentator
تحملوا ضدهم وحملوها وحدة المسؤولة وهم شركاؤنا في كل شيء في النجاح وفي الفشل
من لا يدع براحه كفاح على حسن نوايا لا يصح أن يكون معارضة معتدلة أو بدا
منسنباً. إذا فوضع قننا مرضي لأن تستمر على حاله مع تغييرات نسبة ربي، يحيتي
إلى محمد

67   Commentator
وهناك جهة دعت أكثر بعض الإعلاميون والملقبين الذين يجرون أي سياسة في العراق ضد
المالكى حسبه الناس أنهم مشكلة شخصية مع المالكى بس إذا، كانوا يتفاجون مع
المخطرين والمفتيين الآخرين، بل كانوا "بترعون" عن الحديث عن الإرهابيين استعداً
لนะคะ على المالكى

68   Commentator
هذا تقرير ممتاز عن النتائج http://alhayat.com/Details/505780

69   Commentator
اعتقد أن هناك عدة عوامل أدت إلى بقاء تحالف المالكى محتملاً على ما بيدا الأول استخدام
الورقة الطائفية لجذب الناخب ثانياً استخدام ورقة التعبئة وخاصة العسكرية وهذا ما حصل
فعلاً في محافظة كربلاء من قبل صهوره اد قام بعض ما بقارب 6000 شخص في ذلك
الشرطة، وتحت أخلاقهم العيوب الموافقين ونهدمهم في هذه الوظيفة في حال لم يتم
التصدي لهم واستشع، ولتم التعبير عن رأيه من أبرز 6 ناخب ثانياً استخدم المالكى في شراء
الناخب رابعاً خصومه الذين أفادوه كثيراً، وهناكد عدة أمر أضطر إذا وجد كله لم يحظ
علي ما بدك مسق حيث فقد الكثير من المقاعد حسب اطلاعي
التمنّى اسعفاد الثاني صباح الساعدي على نجاح دولة القانون في الانتخابات الحالية

شياپ التي في بغداد أحد عشر تضيعت عن توزيع المقاعد ولم تطبع؟

آت جهل جود نيا منا الطيب. فلم قد قام أعداء المالكي برفع شعبيةه إلى أعلى درجاته بعد قام خصومه بإشاعة خطابه الطاغي المتصل بأنظاره الحزن الأكبر على الطاقة السياسية وهذا ما قد تحقا ك": من أبناء الطاقة الأخرى بالمالكي كمداوري عنهم وعن طاقمهم. بمثابة

ربما سيخرج المالكي نسبة مهمة من مقاعد مجالس المحافظات التي يسيطر عليها حالياً لكن ليس بالقدر الذي يعكس شفائه الداعي في الارتفاع فواقعة ترقص ولا الابتعاد الشعبي من جراء تصرفات أعماله وهو ما يعد صرحًا كاملاً بعد ذات ذلك يفضل غباء معارضيه وافترامه للروية والمشروع المبدع.

لم يفز ... ولم تقص بعمل الناس التي أثنتت المفروض 13 مليون ناخب ولم تتخلي ال 3 ملايين وحسب رقابة توزر .................

تعوزتنا الثقة الانتخابية يا اصفاء .. وشيعنا يملك بطريقة جمعة!!

مختار العصر (مسكاة السنة) ونما هذه ثقة القاعدة الجماعية الأكبر حتى إذا لم يرشح (1)

ولاية أخرى الذي ينتبج بعد (هل تعلم من هلي حضء إذا ما يكون ذلك برنام جقبلك عندما

تطلب ابتلك زروبي التي صدرت أضاحها في هذه الانتخابات هذه ليس تشاوراً أنه الواقع إيبا الطيب.

استاذ محمد هيدل الطريقة التي يحسب بها الأصور هي طريقة سانت ليغو وتنتقص بما يلي

أولاً يتم حساب عدد الأصور الصحيحة المذهلة بها لكل قائمة ثم يتم ترتيب القوائم للكيانات

السياسية حسب الأصور الذي حصلت عليها القوائم على الاعداد الفردية

(1-3-5-7-....)

حتى تحصل على نتائج قمة تعادل عدد المقاعد المشخصة للناخدين بعد ترتيب النتائج من

الأعلى إلى الأدنى

توزيع المرشحين لا يعود ترتيب المرشحين داخل القائمة الموجبةستانداً إلى عدد الأصور

التي حصل عليها كل مرشح

بذا تساوي مرشح أو أكثر في القائمة الواحدة بعدد الأصور فيتم تخصيص المقاعد بينهم

وفقاً لتسلسلهم في قائمة الكيان

هذا المطلص لعملية سانت ليغو

وهي ت êح الحزاب الصغيره

بشرفى صحتي وستين صح

انتقد اخطاء الحكم من حقوق المواطن بل من واجباته ولا عبرة لأزدياد شعبته أو

نقضها. مع أن شعبية المالكي أزدادت لعدة أسابيع اهمها وحل العراقيين بالحكم القومي

وانتهاهم بالإعلام الموحد ولا ننسى قيامه باللعب على الأندام الطاغي الذي نجح فيه إلى ابعد

الحدود وسبب آخر قد لا يتبع المجال لها الآن. حكايتي
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Commentator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>لست مع هذا المنطق أبو الطيب الحبيب.. بساطة لأنه ينطبق على صدام مثلًا، والأحد، ومبارك، والقاضي ووووووووووووو. أصرر المالكي هم الذي تعلّطا عليهم لعب شبهة الآخر.. كل حصوم المالكي، بالنسبة له ولجمهوره، هم مجرد نبضات وقتية وأراشيب، هذا لمصور الأمر لجهوه، وجمهوره صوت له بناء على ذلك.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>هيه أبو الطيب والله دوختهم المالكي بعده عداًاتهم تحسب لصالحه يصلي جوائم الأمور لصالحه ويكولون الناس الحمد لله الأمر زينة وبالأخير يبقه احسن من غيره</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>مع الاحترام للأراء العلم من كلام محمد غازى إلا أن الأمر هو ونلاسف هكذا اذكر قالا رأينا لأحمد عبد الحسن وهو الزلج الاخت. قلق فيه أن المالكي محظوظ بهخصومه واسئر عبد الخالق الجميل نقد المالكي اقتلل الموضوع هكذا اغلب الموضوعات التي تنتظر رؤية المشهد من كل زوايا وحتى تصور البعض من المحسوسين بنظرية المؤامرة أنه نقل مفوق الفن. احترامي للجميع</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>لقد أصبتع عين الحقيقه لقد بني حصوم المالكي برجم شعبيته بتاريخه، السيء القاسي حينما ملك سلطة ولجزئية وأخطائهم المتكرر. نسخت.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>اتفق جداً أخي محمد... هذا كلما رأيت من زمن بعيد ومارس</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>انا متفق معكم تماماً لعب السدرينون في القصة الاخرى رقصة موت عل تعديل قانون المساءلة والعادلة لكنها لم تتفق لقد ساعد عزاد المالكي خصوصه كثيرًا وللاسف قول بكل مرارة المالكي أفضل من جميع خصومه الكبار انا الأحزاب الطائفية الأخرى شعبة وسة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>الماليجي لعبه صح</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>صح</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>صفتا با الطيب... خسر كل من كان له نذا</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>المالكي أفضل طمعة في البيئة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>من صفات الحاكم الحقيقى ان يحاول إرضاء كل شعبه.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>محل مضبوط</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
E. Second Facebook Comment-thread


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Interlocutors</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Post-author</td>
<td>قبل لصدام سابقاً حاور قادة المعاركية من الشيعة، فقال كيف احاور خونة يحملون السلاح مع الجيش الإيرانى ويقلعون أبناء بلدهم... اليوم يجلس مكان صدام من يرفضون الحوار مع الآخر تحت نفس الميز، وهذا يعني بأن دوامة العنف سبب تلتهنا داخل هذا البلد الفخ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>يذكر أحدهم أنهم بعثوا مبعوث لصدام وتم طرده من صدام وقالوا له تعال ننسى الماضي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>لا يوجد حل الا حرق هذا البلد الفخ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>استرح يلي تشر</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>صح لناسك</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>بل فخ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>المشكلة ليست طائفية كما وصفت بل هي سلوكية اقتصادية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>عندما نرى الدكتور ونتعلق الدكتورية تستمر المهزلة مما تجرت وجه المهجرين على خنشتها.....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>لااحوار مع من يرفض وجودي كاملة على هيوي بالولاية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>لغة الحوار محدوده ومساعد بين نفس الحس بعينه وفلادا يبتكون نفسهم في دور المعاركية مساعدا متقنها شخصية المعارك رغم رؤى صدام .. فكم تحتاج إلى مثل نبلانون مانديلا وكم تحتاج إلى مثل غاندي .. لايكرون</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>شناب بين المعاركية اولاً وله حوار جهات عدة معقدية ومنهم محافظ الآبار ولم يجدها، لا يريون هنا أو هناك حتى هذه الدعاء لا اعرف فإنهم من هٔ ولا مطالبهم ما هي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>سعدون العزيز .. الله لا يكولوا .. نريد فسحة أمان لي بيجون وردا على الاقل</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>هذا ليس مسألة عادلة، لا بالتمكن بكل فساد وقتله بشب صدام .. ولا &quot;الشيعة&quot; واختار لأنني اسمى لشيء بسميهم مارسوا نفس العنف الذي مارسه السنه ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>صدك بلغ &quot;فاخ&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>لا ادرى ما يراج هذا الشعبي ويشوف حاله كل عمرو حروب وممارك وانتصارات على ابناء جندها واهلنا مع كل الأسرى .. يسلم عزيزي كاتب في قلبي .. حيالى</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>ما اشتبه اليوم بالبارحة.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
للمقارنة غير عادلة بين ناس كانت تريد لقمة عيش وحرية كلمة وديكتاتور لا تدكر مثل صدام جميع في مقابر جماعية. ويناس أنهم محاكرين في الحكومة والبرلمان ونهب الكثير، وكان سوق مدينة من القلق أدناه بسببهم. هذا ليس حساباً ماليياً ولكنها مشاعر جعلة للتقية.

لم بحار صدام الشيعة لأنه يعلم أنهم سولتون خن الأكترية ويريد أن يتضح. ولم بحار من مسجد مكان صدام السنة لأن السنة اليوم يقطر خن الآلاف مكن بلحك، فنان تحكم من البلاط العراق الحاضرة عريزة اسطيركية.

هل تواجه في العراق مشاكل مستعصية وما الحيرة التي تمتع بها فترة قصيرة جداً?

على ما بدأ أن (العف) أم مكرح يحتفظ من فرد آخر!

الجولس مع من يعرف الحوار وليس مع النابيين. شاؤ ويب الإلهيات التي طال تحاور من مجموعة السوق على الطريق! إذا فعل هؤلاء إن اختلاف الشجاعة وإعادة! أي كلام هذا ...

من يملك في هذا البلد ولو شن من الفوه! اسم يجب نفسه من صار فيها كفة الحك.

لك الأرضين هم أصحابه! فك باطل.

اختلاك يتزاح مراسيم الجماعة كل مارش أحد لكون مصع سفن المطالب، وارث من صرح برافعة سقف المحاه CLOSED. هذه الزيات بعده المظاهرات والأحداث، حديثية سببية التاريخ ومع قلة تحريفات لانسانية الإصلاحات الإلهيات التي تدار من المخيمات... مع خاص تقييد الكركي والتي دائما تكاب شمثراك...

خوفي أن يكون كل هذا فلم حي منه جز كل من لينزي وراء طائفته، وفي النهاية ...

وصلك الحياة مثلكها ...

صدام بحار وبقل كما حوار البرزاني وفلته المعارض، كانت ترضي الحوار معه لعلهم بغير هادم أما البرزاني تدعوا الحاور لكن الطرف الآخر بارز رفع بالدوله ورجل مع الآثار والتيده ملي بصور الخدمة ...

لا أعرف الغالية من ابصارك إن حوار المعتدصين إن لبيي لا الإعالي السعدي يدخل طرف مقرض ...

في وقت صدام لم تكن المشرعية الديمقراطية، بل كانت الشريعة للثورة، وبالنسبة لصدام وزبانيته، كنا ابتعادي كنت من أفراد حزب الدعوة من صفدي الجماعة... عملي لإيران التي تزداد أن سقط الثورة العربية الكبرى ...

لم يتعجر شيء. بالتغير سقطت السلطة. وينام النظام. نحن أمام نفس ظاهرة الاستبداد، ويبس ألمات. فقط تغيرت بعض مفاهيم. هناك كان يستخدم مفاهيم وفقاً لسوي. هذا تغيير الجمودي. كيف كان يقوم على عقل. ذلك مازال يجهله. رفعه موعد. كي بقولوا عن موس. وهذا م哈尔ه. الاختيارية متخصصة دائماً تلقين، مع كل نظام. لاندري بعد سقط هذا النظام فلا صدى من تتبعات جيدة ...

انا مع فكرة الطرح التي أردت بها الاستدام إلى نقط الحلق والحوار بدل السلاح ولكن في فترة صدام محک مركزي كاتريثي مفيد ولكن الانتفاضات حكم نفسه بابانيته ضمن الحكم ذاته، وهم مثلهم في البرزاني والمركز، ولكن اللسان العراقي ليس بده يمكن زمحله عدة أطراف خارجة منها كلا سلبيين، والاستثمارات السوق بارزة و mật الطرق، والعلاقات اليوسفية والشتاتية الناجحة مما يعكر بوطنيت نيينا من يقتلون بالانديةه ...

سنتقي رحى الطغينة تعظ باب هذا المنكر أكثر لا يسبح صميت إن كانت رياض طويلة لن يخرج من خزين الطغينة المجوز في وحان هذا الشعب أو تلك الريح الإصطلاحية التي تولدها مراح الطغينة، وتبغها طاقة الأطماع واليفاء خلف ...
لا تفقح مع تحليل واستنتاج مستند
لا تفسير بين معارضي صدام والقاعدة
ليس هناك الأمر السابق
56 نجاح أي حديث في نجاحه هو نجاحاً يومياً

57 لا نعتقد بأن المقارنة منصفة. توجد اختيارات لا يلس من ذكرها وأنزله في طريقة
تصرف الحكومة دون القانون مع المقومات ونظامها العقلي. مع نزيهية واعتراف للأستاذ
سعدون صمم.

58 الاعتصام المركزي والشعب العراقي يحاول أن، للأسف لم ينفض الاختيارات مع
تعمّل الأعداء الخفيف من على مناطق القبالة بطلبت الإطاحة بطلبت الإطاحة
(النظام). وقطع روهم وتفتت أطرهم (ال гарبنور) و(النظام) ... حا. عالم غريب
طيب يعلم في صوت البطل وتعطى للياباني الخبيثة

59 كلما تزامن الحديث هو أن نجاحه بداية للخطر بينهما بين شمس العراق، وهما نحن نخلط
ونفكر ونبحث عن النادر

60 انتظار سعود: أرجح ملك متحدة لان السيد التاجي رئيس البرلمان وبعدها ما متأكد
ستغرق رأيك.

61 هم عملاء ال سعود وهم لا يمكنهم وما بالعراق

62 عززي سعود .. السلطة والحكام ... منطقة من مكونات هذا الشعب ... وو انعم الله
على شعبنا بأن جعل نسبة كبيرة من تمتين بنية الطاقة .... لا تستغرب فعلة
السلاطين والحكام .. من أصل صدام .. و ...
لا حوار...إن قرضاً أطلولاً حوار أن يتميزوا لأن كلاً من الطرفيين غير قادر على بناء دولة قادمة على التسوية. فقوم القانون صادرات الملكة السامية لطيفة فائدة تجيح بشبا من الجراد بالكلم، وقونتياً يومنا.

الاستاذ مصطفى أحمد الوحيدي، والناحية العامة للقوات المسلحة، ونجدة حسب الشاب من الفقرة والمجرين جمعنا فراناً، كتبنا عنه عندما تحدث انفجارات وأرهاق وقتل والطفل لا.

تُنح إلى النائب عبد السويqi بول الصبح، مكل من يعيد على الشعب والجيش

هذة انتظام الأمان تجارها وفق أغاني النزاهة بحق

كافي مزايدات سعودي، وفق الانتفاضة لا تستهدف السنة، لسنة صاعد العثور من

الأعمال المثل، والمثلا والتصوير في التسارع اعتلاها مع الفضاء على الإرهاب وليس مع

النفعية وتاريخي الذين يستقلون السنة، ودون الاهتمام بمساقهم...

كانت مئة عدة أيام صدم لم صارت عامة إسلامية ونهائية، هو سلطان.

تحتاج إلى حكمة قوى من استنسلات داعي، حكمة تعمل وفق استراتيجيات بعيدة

المدى، لوصف الاستراتيجيات مرتبط بالإنجازات

لا أواك الممثلين تختلف تماما.. وهمان كثر غريفة

لا أريد أن اعتقل طلل سعودي لكن هي مقارنة فقط أكل مع الفراق بين صدام وداعش من

جهة والاندماج الحاكمة المتراد الوصول إلى بعض التصور الناجين والإخوان

من كان على صدام الفعال عليه ان لا يأتي مثلاً بها يشتير نفاذة مهمة وهي

الحوار نفتقد للحوار لذا خوياً، لعلها كانت الكفاية ضعيفة لقبضي الحوار لكن عندما تقوم

وتصبح لها جوياً، قوي ترفض الحوار هذه نقطة مهمة علياً التوفيق عنها

استاذ سعودي لانقل ولن أباعون المطلوب من السنام أن يبرزوا النفسهم عن القاعد

ويعبروا لما فعله صدام وإن يفعلوه همه إذا كانوا خايفين من القاعد، والبعينيفن فهمهم

على جهم وذا كانو هو قاعد ومنحنين فيستاهلهم أكثر

أي تهانك الآن، سيكون مصدر العراق أسوة من السعودية

أخ سعودي إستنسلات هذه، قد تتقدم المفاوضات في الاتهام، والاتهام، والاتهام، والاتهام، وقطع

الروس!! هل يوجد أكبر من هذه الاستنسلات؟

أخ سعودي؟؟ ماهماً تم ارسال الفهم الوصول قول كحال للإدارات ونعد

بالبلد الإحالة ولكن الزي كان ضروري

إلى كل الإصدار، الذين يقولون بأن الحكومة تعني من الحوار، أدعوهم إلى مراجعة

الاحتمال، وسعودي يبين الحوار لم يحدث، ذهب الشخص، ووقب جهات لم تبره

ساحات الاستيعاب، وكذلك في(fl) روزي الدفاع، وهذا خاطئ جسيم، إذا أردت ان تعجر

نحتار مع أصحاب الناس حتى لو كنت تحترمهم

متى كان العبارة عن الاحتلال؟ هم غايتهم بعضهم سماوا عبران الأرض وفلسطين

سعود لا يمكن محاربة

مطالب الحوار والعدل لدى الطرفين ضد العراق وسياسة من الخروجية مع الأسد

أيده هل توجد جهة معتز بها من قبل سلالة الاعتصام لكي تفاوض؟
لا يمكنني قراءة النص العربي بشكل طبيعي. يرجى عرض النص باللغة الإنجليزية للمساعدة.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QQbQD3rF0PQ
لا يصح من رفض الحراء سلباً، فنحن نجتمع لجيش الحراء ببراءة أن الحكومة بإذن العباده أما من هو المسلم ومن هو المجرم ومن هو مسيس من قبل تجربة خاصة في أرض إسرائيل.

مرة أخرى، يتم حل الأزمة، إذا كانت هناك اتفاق على أن الأسد غرق في جميع القضايا، بما أن الأسد يصبح ضعفاً إلى أثر كثيرة من الناس، لماذا لم تقدم الحكومة ما يحدث في الحوادي؟

اذن تعرف الآلة بأي القوة والحراء ويساعد في العدل قد ساعد.

لا اعتقد الذي يختلف عليه الناس للاعتصامات هي عادة الأمور إلى أشياء أو اقتصاد السباق، بكل طينية وأجرام الأشياء من الوضع للياباني إلى توضيح تحديadamente مع أحد ذلك لأن هناك وفاق واقتراح تلمذة في بداية الأمر مما كان بالأمر، هذا الذين يلعبون في مركز تقليد النشاطات في فنون الأدبيات، لبضيع وبطالة المتظاهر والقيامي لمعلقة.

السياسة في المكن والمروحة والدعاء، ولكن ياقة يشك من يملك القرار سواء من الحاكم والمعارض لهما في العنان والتربة، ممارسه في القتل والترويع.

السالم علي... من الحاكمين الجدد مثاثة للنظام السابع، ولكن الهال.Pow بطار.

لا يوجد لدوار، ارتبط المخاطر الأمريكية وفق عناية بروسية، لتعرف أن صعود العراق كويتا من ولايات الإمكرية حالياً قد انخفضت إلى بعض النقرات، وفرو بيار، ويعود ذلك إلى بعض.

يا أخ ساعد، تعرض على طريقة الاعتدال ولا تعرض على فشان الذي وجهها. الحلول الذي أطلقته بعض روسي الشعبية ولا تعرض على الاستغلالات المستمرة للشيعه ولا تعرض على الخوف على قتل الجند وال✨.

لا معتقدم الشيعة لا تعرض على الخوف على قتل الجند وال✨. كل هذا وتعود
لا يمكنني قراءة النص العربيี้ من الصورة المقدمة.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>122</th>
<th>Commentator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>الكرسي نفسه وقشور صدام بقية... وقد تركها أو غادت البعث لسكنتها أو غادت اليوم... التاريخ نفسه فن يصف الناس سابقاً تحت مسميات الحياة والعملة... اليوم يجلس مكانه من يردد نفس الأسطوانة مع فارق بسيط فسابقا كانت كتابة القومية واليوم كتابة الطائفة والذي لا يرى الشمس لا يسمع أن يرى أو نوض الحفاظ... لا تهاجم من قال بل هاجمو ما قال إن شئتم... بوركت أخت سعدون ضمد</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>123</th>
<th>Commentator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>لا أظن هناك مقاومة لأن اليوم الحوار موجود لكنه بلا نتيجة بسبب الغباء والفساد وتنوع العمليات السياسية... في زمن صدام... لا حوار مع الشيعة البئرة... لا وجه للمقاومة... محيط لك</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### F. Third Facebook Comment-thread

**Link:** [https://www.facebook.com/alsumydai68/posts/809043769123810](https://www.facebook.com/alsumydai68/posts/809043769123810)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Interlocutors</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1   | Post-author   | من المصدر:
\- الأرقام من مصدر مطلع داخل المفوضية:
  \- القانون 69
  \- المواطنين 46
  \- الإحرام 32
  \- محدود 33
  \- الوطنية 14
  \- العربية 11
  \- البازمن 48
  \- الاتحاد 12
  \- التغيير 10
  \- الاتحاد الإسلامي 5
  \- البلد 5
  \- الجماعة الإسلامية 3
  \- مترفعة 51 |
| 2   | Commentator   | استاذ ابراهيم انت اعلامي معروف ابتداع عن الأرقام إذا كنت غير متاكّد عليك مراجعة حسابك وكتابك لنا متابعين كصرت اسم راحه التدفق في للمح وليس شخصك الترتجل مع الوعد اشتبه بالسراي مع لعبه اسمه السياسة سلمتنتك تتبع جلية لاعلاكن القديمة صدقتي وانته تستمتع ما اصدقت كل واحد من الكلح عقول السابق مساعدتك محد بوصليهم باللائم فاعلنا لك تحظو على اسمك تحياتي ذكر ان تفعلي الذكرى |
| 3   | Commentator   | اذا نشر تسريبات يتم تداولها في الأساليب السياسية ولم أزعم انها ليس |
| 4   | Commentator   | انت رجل تعودنا على صدقاك والرجاء الابتعاد عن التحذيرات ومن المصادر المطلعة والغير مطلعة |
| 5   | Commentator   | المقاعد ناقصة 100 ارجح احسب واجمع |
| 6   | Commentator   | يعني النيار المدي نقصد بالمفرقة؟ يعني وكحلقات مفقودة بالحكياه مالك ... |
| 7   | Commentator   | دكتور .. المصدر يركز على الكبار |
| 8   | Commentator   | ومن هم الكبار
\- تجار الة!!!
\- الكبار بسيرة البلد
\- ام الكبار هوا!!! عمارا
\- الكبار!!! بكر كرومووشهم من اموال الشعب!!
\- ما همهم
\- يعني كيف بالاستحذاع السلطان قصبه عن انوفا وسما!!! ببعوثهم لأنهم لأسف كل
\- الالسنوات مأثروناا صصنعون لانفسهم غير حق وكراهي ودار للبلد |
| 9   | Commentator   | كبار على حساب دم ومنكمات الشعب العراقي ولكن الله فوقهم وواكب من الجميع رغم
\- انوفهم ومعتقاتهم الغنفه |
| 10  | Commentator   | يعني التحالب المداني شكد؟ |
| 11  | Commentator   | بروح ابوك تتمال المالك باخذ الولاية الثالثة مو؟ |
الطبيعة لا

الإرشادة الآتية

الولاية الثالثة حلم الممالك لا يتم تحقيقه نجاة الله ... وعلم أئمة بالجنة

انا شاكدا جذا هذه الأرقام

المدني الديمقراطي لكان له حساب أرقام 11 معد ... بيذخت...حيائي

لاست أرقي

المالك يصف بعد... أكثر من نهر أس

مرور لكل من يقول بلقة الشعب والبرلمان

فصد الممالك كان 55 الموطن والمالة 55 اعترف رح تكير الحجة بالعدد بيس تردة

تعرف تفكك للتحالفات وجلج الجلب مشمول بال القرار ... منمن

بال المناسبة أمس على الجرّاء لأول مرة من سنين أسمك تقول أمنية وليس تحيل

تحليل دقيق جدا

الأيام ستستايتنا من سنين متابة لأول مرة مختلف بتحليكند ننظر قادم الألاین... حيائي

هارو اжить بينها احم الالحيلون بيرو عميب كلي ... وردت الي نفس الوقت الذي وردت تأثرت في الشر

احلم لهذا السبب نا تصورتها من حيائي

تره مصادره بتاريخ العالم. ياتان بايول دولة القانون له جهوره هو الفقي وشيحته

وحبب الوقائع راح تجازر ال 94 معد وبي واحدا مابين حلق من شجمه يعماله

ويكون حرامات يوصلون للبرلمان. اننا حتى تصابح حقائق الناس وإكتشافهم مثلما

انت تكخت الالحيلود جواب 90 غرور الالحيلود. ها نحن طل الخليلود

الممالك العشري الصوت ببطة أرض أو تعيين، لو عنمنا صدك دولة قانون كان المالك

الآن في السجن

نترك المالكة النفت الجهوية ووزع اراضي ومن اشر من فاتند الالحيلود

انت عملت. الوعي والمؤهلات راح انتخب بدون انتخابات مادية. ناس انتخب الرين خو

مو زيلات؟

الله أعلمن الأحجور الاد لا يراه مقطع الفيديو الذي عرض فيه الماضي (محمد حسن)

يوزن سندات الأراضي على القراء ويطلب منهم أن يسلموا بأنهم يسكونوا دولة

(القانون) المالكية والهيئة

الظاهر لازم طالب بغير الشعب قبل منهف الوجه السياسية

استاذ إبراهيم حسب رؤيتي للنظام السياسي في العراق ان هذه الامتناعات لاتضمن

والانتفع من جوع بسبب الاحترام الدينى الطائفي ... العراق لاجبي ودأسته ان خلال

الدولة الدينية العابرة للطائفة وصرح شعار العراق يحتج إلى عبد الله السبي السرالي

طبيباًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًًً®
لاسف

الحالف المدني حصل 11 معد وسبب سلطة عين المراقب للانتخابات

أوّلي على القرار أبتداء الله يعفّي وأنت مختشّة فأعلى ما شأ

عمى ينابض هذا شعب لم يرد العيش مستمرّه ولأمره عادّرة والإكترام المرجعية
وعملاء الدين والمثقفين ينابض ويدمّر دولة القانون 69 معد وهو تأميم موجه
حولت الشعبيّة لأن المستحليّين صبت دولّة القانون

أرفجوا ارتكّب الطائفيّة لأن المكون الأخري ترك كم الجمل ما حلّ وزد السياسيّة
والعملية السياسيّة، فجمهور الفائزات لم تكن للانتخابات وداوله هذه الهيبة التليّة
وأتت عبّى عليها الترشيح بإرضاء جمهوره، وعاتبة قلّته ان تكونو الطائفيّة
وتفاسيرما فيما ينجم على السلمة لأن صورة الاجتماعات بين المكون الآخر سقطت ول
بعد محسّن نفسه أن يكون جورجو لتنزين العملية السياسيّة فتقاليد علم الأقاليم
العقلية وكانت المراكز فعلاً ومن صوتهم القلّة صوتاً لقانونيّات والاحرار
والملاطة وحتى يانداني المجالات الأخرى كافرة، أننتي حرية للطايفية لأن المعلية
مسلم من لون وقطع واحد وأنا وأنا وأنا، هذا فعلاً، لا يريد الحكّم لا يريد أي شئ
ساسلاً شبيلاً واطفالنا ونساناً فقلاً. فاحموا وسرّى كري بتحكّمون تعني كم كل
الموقعية المتّنة

وأوه كلام صحيح لكن سنة كنّناط 8 سنوات كن قلن
الحيل؟؟؟؟؟؟؟؟؟؟

انع أبوبكو أبوزيوري المالكي ولاب كنمن الخلف المالكي والله لا يصبر برازيم
سالم سلام

خطاب المالكي يتفق بالتمام مع خطاب عمر الحكيم البارحة، اناثنئ صوت واحد،
كلما عن عادة الإتحاد للناثلاف الطائفيّة، "كافئة بحلفهم إيران، والإمرعية
وصمّكاً ما يلذين له ألتدع القليلة، أما عن التغيير فقد الشروش جميعهم
بالاحرار، وليس لدكّين دنيا على طراز فصيّهم، "ما استقلال ولو واحد منهم،
um عنى إبراهيم اختير مهتمّاً وأفاً على صوت الفعال إذا كان الاعليّي محصور فزين
الجهولة ووسيّة ناسية الفصي كل الأصول الشريفة

المؤشرات تقول أن دولة القانون تستعمل غ 100 معد.

حلل وأبوبكو البارقيني عليه شعب متّناح ما شايفه مثله يروحون يتنخبون نفس
الوجه الفيّة، تساولاً على يصير بكم

انع عمل مخابراتي يباشر العزر على ناجيّن الاعدا وهو تقتله بفسهم وبعضهم لم
الكون على الفرصة

طيب أبن الحزبيّة

استاذ إبراهيم ترك هذا الموضوع المالكي 69-100 لما فوق
لايتمّ جزء من مبهمية عادة المالكي واردّت مك أن تقول الحق بأن خصم المالكي
خسرت الانتخابات، وهي هي الطبيعة الذي مثقل أسسحك

عبيتين (منظمة أعداء النظام) أذبحك أعداء وعوف ربه العالمين أسفلك

القانون 68-72 فقط، وهو ليس خساراً والمعلومات 46-46، لا يوجد أي تغيير الا في
بحداد فقط، بطيعة

اخ فرس حتّك روح برودية وقلب الخسرة برحابة صدر...

المجموع 319 وبين الباقين والقانون فقط في البصرة وبداد 42 معد

خويه شو متّمون والملاطة ديلون شو هو اكتف مما لننبدو ابتعيني مشتركون

أربع عجاف أخرى ومزيد من الظلم... عساها بختم

على أمة النكاث جبٍ لبل واخذ عونه جرب أنجر

استاذ إبراهيم لازم تزينا صفة أرض على عرفيّين الراعية
لا يمكنني قراءة النص العربي المكتوب بشكل صحيح. يرجى قراءة النص بشكل طبيعي وتصحيحه.
## ملاحظات

1. وفق هذه الملاحظات سبب الأكراد وضع القيان في أي تفاوت! الحراسة مشاعر ما راجع العراق من الأكراد!!
2. الرئاسة المفروض تكون لحَدُّ وفاة
   - علي دوالي
   - البولاني
   - عادل عبد المهدي
   - إبراهيم غالي
   - وآخرين
3. بين للاسف الطائفين خلو وصول الشرفاء والوطنيين للمنصب مجرد إماني.
4. ولاسف الديمقراطية فيها عيب قاتل هو أن الآجرين لا يحمرون غالب الجاهل والמרכزيين
5. الطائفين بنشاط الحسية لوصول مثال حان الفتوة في محمود الحسن و مشاعر الجبري للبرمان
6. ترى أنت مبين لعل تقفهم دير بلاله تسكع على فهمك ميمن تقفهم من البولاني
7. اني أشو أيد علوي ًاحسن واحيد لو باخذ الشعيب وبالد لندن يكهم
8. ألف موريض تجهيز إلى حكومة محاصصة ومنشأة بنية... والسفكيد الأول والأخير
9. البارتي... وكثرة وثبات الله... لا أكو شعب حي جان هسه التنازلات بالمظاهرات في حق وباي قانون وباي شرع يكون العد والفرز لمدة شرنب لم تحصل ولن تحصل حتى في جزء واحد وفي... هييهمه
10. ليس الفرز من يؤخر اعلان النتائج واما القوانين التي سوف تكون في النهايات لا لم تكن
11. بالاقLeod
12. اعتقد المكللي سيتحصل 95 مقد
13. مع الفضيلة في الأصالة والصادقة والقانون الصغير، سيشكل الحكومة وشكا
14. يجي يوم يحكم المكللي من جان يوضع مسام يعلل عندنة
15. من يشب المكللي خلي بيضاوي... هذه الأرضين من أملاء عائلة المكللي والبولاني
16. وزنها من جبو إلى خلوه... تSHOW موازينة السيد الحكيم والسيد محبوزة أراضي مثل
17. المكللي... رحتم كبار يشدا في العراق في عيداء وحمق ولوكية وعبد
18. يعير انا نضحك على النفس لو على العالم الذي يسب عروض عندما تنقض شعبها
19. أما نحن نعبرنا عن ارتفاقه طويل وازنل الشعوب خشبها لا تغير وماصحة
20. قناة الشعب صفر في حسابات الانتخباات هيهيهمه
21. استاذ ابراهيم دولي القانون عدد إعادة والتصويت الخاص 27 و هامودك
22. مع احتراماتي ك acos الله أكول ان الانتخباات كهناه بالهار والله نفس
23. الطالع والجهد حتى كم
24. اعتقد أن هذه الحكومة سوف تبقى في تصريف الأعمال لكثر من سنين لصعوبة الانتقادات
25. والله استاذ ابراهيم حسب المعطيات التي تفضلت بها أو تعطي بها المصدر الخاص بل لا
26. تبشر بخير ان المنقرفة كما سيظهرها تشكل رج مصير وت좋م نفس السيد المكللي
27. ولن يتحق التغيير المنشود
28. مع احتراماتي بس هاي النسب موضحة
29. يعنى يا أبو زيد كاذب ما غريت
30. احترم شكري انت ألير تاقل يقلحك ولواحد وبال حال إذا من الجربية
31. التي سبيت فيها من كل تأييد أي ذات كانت وموافقته البيئة السائدة بحق دماء
32. العراقيين انت تصفها هذا قفوك انت ومس تاق يحل شبان لا يلبب يحلك
33. اعترف عن غريبه اللحي
34. اخي العزيز صحيح جدا أن الأرقام منغيرة كل ست سنوات من عمل المفوضية ولكن هذه
35. الإحصائيات خاطئة
اللهم حنيف نانا خير الأرامل مندا هسه انتخابات عالمية مطلقة النتائج الأوره

楼宇 ليس هل الانتقاد أن الله تعالى لم يفز في النتائج ومن ثم شو تقدير النتائج و هي تحدد المفتي بولاية الثالثة لم

استاذ ابراهيم انتخابات شخصية ممتازة ان شاء الله ان تثبت عن هذه الإحصائيات لتعتبر بعيدا عن الحقيقية وسوف نرى في النهاية وكى لا تكون لغز فرق وتفسى مشكلة مع اقتراح

البدين الوطنيون

استاذ ابراهيم عاشت ابتداء النفس وتطلعها على مفعلا

استاذ الطنية النتيجة النهائية

المجموع 314

كم مسمى المقترحة (41)

همبه...عملها بالتصويت وقلتوا من الكرد لا كان الكتاب مضطجع. فس الحلول المنفردة زادت حتى تصره مبهمة

شكرنا استاذ ابراهيم...ارجو كذلك ذلك موضوعين مع هذه الإرقام كنقطة...الوصول هو نسبة تكيد هذا المصدف بتعتبر 70% أو 80%...والثاني ما ماهي النسبة التي تنويها تلك الاقترام من الزيادة والتفصيل...يعني قصد رائد نافس شكل؟؟؟شكرا استاذ ابراهيم

المجموع هو كامل أيضا وهى الاقترام مو صحيح.

يعني المالكي أحد الراية الثالثة استاذ ابراهيم؟

ضررربج جماعتك يرى هو مثال على الصور من الجامع ينوي تغيلان

هذا عائز نتائج تظهر الله

حل

توقع المالكي يتحالف مع الاكراد للفقاء...مكن كركروك...لكن هذه المرء بطيهم

ضمانات حقيقية

مهبهبهانه النمو ام المندسين انتخابات نزيها كملية توزير الحرمين التي تتحاور مكمون

معين وانتش عالم مدرسة تتحور من المصدف هذه حكومة اصلة منظمة وانتخاباتها

استاذ ابراهيم ممكن دحلي هاي الاقترام شنو اموية تأتي تقرير جديد

نتجها خسر استاذ من شعب يضع بل%mها @لا انت الاقترام الى عنيته شبه اكده

وقربا جدا من العنف الصحيح شكرنا لك استاذ

Ameer Nihad

لارجحة اكرو احصائية عن تيار الاصلح...المجعري

الحياة الكبيرة ستة لكل الأسماك الصغير أو الغطية لم يملك صورة على

استاذ ابراهيم ما رايك بالغموضات التي تجري في الأردن الأخرى التي سوف تجري

مع الاكراد وتصدير نف الشمالي البيت اصول كافية للتحليل؟؟؟

على العراقي
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commentator</th>
<th>ارقام غير صحية والموضوعية لا علم لها بالارقام لما لها لحد الآن لم بد عدن الفرز والتحالف المدني؟؟؟</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>هذا المصدر عاري</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>على ارلي شغله وحسب تسيريات أخرى من الموضوعية فالمقالكي وحدد سيحصل على ثري المقاعد.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>المقررة منعد العدد كبير وقد يعبر كثير من الموازين متحدثون لها في ديالي 6 مقاعد اضافية والعراقية التنان وفي كك وكوك كذلك ولكن مع كل قتال الامكاني تعني صعوبة انشاء انتلاف بقيادة المقالكي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>التحالف المدني الديمقراطي أطول من 12 مقعد</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>المواطن مع الأحرار مع مثقفة و بصبر عون النصف + ويشرون رئيس وزراء وباي باي نوري ... ان شاء الله</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>المواطن والاحرار ما يوصلون 70 مقعد شنجيج انت بابا</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>حلم</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>يصبرون 7 منع مقرفة كول 30 إذا ما حصلت منافقة من متحدثون صدكتي كلهم ما يردون المقالكي عدا الشعب الشعب يردون المقالكي ليس ما يعرف ع العلوم هذا حريه اختيار</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>وبين المدني الديمقراطي استاذ ابراهيم هاي كله شافشي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>على ضوء النتائج هل تتح الحكومة الكتل المصغرة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>جهية الترشيح الخاص إلى حيظو الفارق</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>استاذ ابراهيم وياء نواسه لاصلاح لان عيب ان عودة تيار الاصلاح المركز الخاص</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>هذه النتائج من غير التصوير الخاص إلى حيظو الفارق</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/amar.abosajad/posts/754826334568968">https://www.facebook.com/amar.abosajad/posts/754826334568968</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>يعني هم راح يرجع المالكي شلون براءة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>ابترك رفع صكراكم هله هنا</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>هه ههيه احتة نريد المالكي كلهن قائد الوحيد الذي يحارب الحشي السفولي مع العلم بخسارته الحرب حممية والإعمار وهي ونج في القضاء ودماء لغير</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>كم مقدع تحتاجو الاغلبية الطلابية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>والنظر تغيرات أخرى في حل عدم اعلان نتائج</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>ههيهه ها مديري الموضوعية اسمه اربيك</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>استاذ ابراهيم اذا ممكن الوقع للايبرك كم مقدع؟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>المطلوب كم مقعد في الائذان</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>الفضيلة مهذبين عندك ليش</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
G. First Online Readers’ Responses Threads

Link: [http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/2013/04/26/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%A7-%D9%88%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D9%84-%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A5%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D9%8A-%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A.html](http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/2013/04/26/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%A7-%D9%88%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D9%84-%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A5%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D9%8A-%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A.html)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Interlocutors</th>
<th>Response Titles</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>انا وافق مع العيساوي؟؟</td>
<td>لا يوجد حل غير رجل الملكي النسب لبيبودو بالقوة ؟؟ انا من اشد المعجبين بالمستقبل في العراق لانتماوي الى البرج الملكي او احرزوا البلد ومنطقة الخضراء مثل سوريا ولاしましょう احسن مثك هاي كف ولا توقع فيكم وتقول العراقيين جنبا؟؟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>لنكاكسورين وشجاعتهم</td>
<td>نعم السورين أفضل مما ادرك شجاعة اصلا انا ماعدنا شجاعة وكافي ضحاك عناقلون انا العراقيين كلام ونس ونحن انت بلي كاعدة تلفسف وتحجي انت مو كان ككتب اسمك يا مجهوووووووور</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>دعوة مشبوهة و العيساوي والملكي</td>
<td>ما هذه الدعوة المشوضة ؟؟ هل هو بدل الملكي لحرة ؟؟ العراقيون يتنكون حصة التغير عن طريق حق الاختيار ؟؟ وا اليعيساوي والملكي ومن نف فعليا ما هو الا صوصه صحاكم الشعوب فربما على كل جراهمه ؟ وم انا التغير السلمي .. أي تورة ستنتهي بتفسير العراق وهذا ما يبريء الموجمهييين ون باشاكل</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>منصب رئيس الوزراء حكر للشيعة وهم من يبرر من يستحقه اما زمن اللياقة والضالة وفرض الأمو لفكرة انبي مع وزال حكم وكلام واعتناء زيمكفى القادر الضرور في حفزة ..</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>أنبن العول والصليبوب؟؟؟</td>
<td>المسلم ناج رأسك ولا تسائوى التراب الذي يحتوي فيه. الله أكثر زمن ملك كم ناس يا عبيد بن برص مع أرفاكم،شويه مج فرحانين يحكم 10 سنوات.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>- shame</td>
<td>the worst situation is what ever the iraqi army doing now, the army should point the guns at any majoosy in iraq ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>اخفاد قادت الحفزة</td>
<td>اخفاد قائد الحفزة اخفاد قائد الحفزة لفذ قائد الحفزة يودون العودة للحكم واذا قول لفذ حلب اتيب في الحفزة فيهينيييين</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>تذكر كلمي</td>
<td>التحكم على الشبيحة والنسة ونهب العراق وحجاب يضر طيب رج نسوف مين يلي رج ضحك بالاخر</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Respondent

304

10

Respondent

11

Respondent

12

Respondent

13

Respondent

14

Respondent

15

Respondent

16

Respondent

17

Respondent

18

Respondent

19

Respondent

20

Respondent

21

Respondent

22

Respondent

23

Respondent

24

Respondent

25

Respondent

26

Respondent

27

Respondent

28

Respondent

29

Respondent

30

Respondent

31

Respondent

32

Respondent

33

Respondent

34

Respondent

35

Respondent

36

Respondent

37

Respondent

38

Respondent

39

Respondent
العيساوي تطلب فيها واحد هناك عشرات الفيديوهات التي تمت توزيعها بكل وحدة الخبراء لتضمن طولية خدم الأرهاب

19. Respondent: تحلل

20. Respondent: لا داعي للكتاب

21. Respondent: لا عيساوي ولا مالكي ولا إيراني

22. Respondent: ومن انت تلفر عكس قرار الشرع

23. Respondent: هذا العيساوي كان ندم بكجي بعد البعثة

24. Respondent: عجيب من بطلقة كشككش بكما على المالكي انتش شنكر

25. Respondent: ولم حرارات الاستغلال خلال كلام سفيف لكن لا مفر؟؟هي وثيرة

26. Respondent: إن صاحب الحق لابد أن ينصر يوما في صراعه مع الباطل، وإن طال به الزمان، وحظت عليه الدنيا، فستكون الغلبة لأهل الحق إن شاء الله

27. Respondent: قراره بيد طهران واكم لك احترام العراق فانو ضدوه ويرمر فصوله على كهم وقوقلونة ديفرائية المالكي ونيرไฟلاخ وداخليا ووو و وو وو وماذا عمل للرشح خلال حكمة دولة النفق لا يوجد فيها انو وكهيل وكلهم انت ارسال الأموال الى جيش بشار والعرق بموت الاوامر واسمه من طهران الشعب العراقي الذي نذر كل العراقي ان يعجز المالكي الضعيف ولكن لا كان يعقل وجب وتجه لا ان يعثر الاستفادة ورضي بالمطالع وحافظ على بلغة ليس مثل ذهار الذي شر مهرب وبلد

28. Respondent: احلموا باعبر

305
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>何必</th>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>MOSA1Y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>جنبد بالشدد وجنبد باليمن وجنبد بالعراق</td>
<td>MOSA1Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>موذن لا تحكي عن نطاق الجيش العراقي هل نسبا تاريخ هذا الجيش في زمن الأغلال وحلجه...أن اذ يتش تفحدا يالIraq... موذن</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>مطلوب باستقالة المشاكل التي أثارت كثيرون غلافات بين من يعتبروه أهم هذه الأشياء وكل وأول الموضوع الفرنسي الصوفي في المنطقة العربية والتي تعتبر من مزايا وญาيا الفضاء في عقود تم العبور والفعليين والعلمانيين الذين يتركون بالإسلامين فقط...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>هو من انتخب الهاليكي أبو السبحة كلكلا النصادر جش من إيران</td>
<td>MOSA1Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>لا يمكن لأساد يشعث بالثلث المث يمكن أن يحكموا نبا مثل العراق!!! أظن أن العراق كبر على مثل هؤلاء!!!</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>بعد حرك سوريا تم استخدام إيران لحرق العراق الجدي ولاسيم بل يعترف بعض من يدعون أنه من قبل هذه الأوصت والأل</td>
<td>MOSA1Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>مو كنبو أصبااب</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>ايراني فرسالما توماسو الفرس علا ما يكنكية نضم الملاحي في إيران = جميع المسؤل في الحكومة هو من أوصل تركيب لا إلهة لهما في الفرس - حكومة إيران قالت من الفرس أكثر بكثير مما كانت من العرب وال sala و اشبع 2</td>
<td>MOSA1Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>المالكي يحبع العل ولا الدي فوز في الانتخابات الأخيرة يجوز</td>
<td>MOSA1Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>اصصيح صلاحيات السياسوي وملاحي بلاني لسما تكون لم جرعة ولا لدأ النصعد من الع المجتهد والدبلومي</td>
<td>MOSA1Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>何必</th>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>MOSA1Y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>جنبد بالشدد وجنبد باليمن وجنبد بالعراق</td>
<td>MOSA1Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>موذن لا تحكي عن نطاق الجيش العراقي هل نسبا تاريخ هذا الجيش في زمن الأغلال وحلجه...أن اذ يتش تفحدا يالIraq... موذن</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>مطلوب باستقالة المشاكل التي أثارت كثيرون غلافات بين من يعتبروه أهم هذه الأشياء وكل وأول الموضوع الفرنسي الصوفي في المنطقة العربية والتي تعتبر من مزايا وخدما الفضاء في عقود تم العبور والفعليين والعلمانيين الذين يتركون بالإسلامين فقط...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>هو من انتخب الهاليكي أبو السبحة كلكلا النصادر جش من إيران</td>
<td>MOSA1Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>لا يمكن لأساد يشعث بالثلث المث يمكن أن يحكموا نبا مثل العراق!!! أظن أنعراق كبر على مثل هؤلاء!!!</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>بعد حرك سوريا تم استخدام إيران لحرق العراق الجدي ولاسيم بل يعترف بعض من يدعون أنه من قبل هذه الأوصت والأل</td>
<td>MOSA1Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>مو كنبو أصبااب</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>ايراني فرسالما توماسو الفرس علا ما يكنكية نضم الملاحي في إيران = جميع المسؤل في الحكومة هو من أوصل تركيب لا إلهة لهما في الفرس - حكومة إيران قالت من الفرس أكثر بكثير مما كانت من العرب وال sala و اشبع 2</td>
<td>MOSA1Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>المالكي يحبع العل ولا الدي فوز في الانتخابات الأخيرة يجوز</td>
<td>MOSA1Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>اصصيح صلاحيات السياسوي وملاحي بلاني لسما تكون لم جرعة ولا لدأ النصعد من العمجتهد والدبلومي</td>
<td>MOSA1Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
هل يذكر العيساوي تاريخ الجيش العراقي عندما احتل الكويت وفعّم الانتقاضة الشعبية في العراق عام 1991

39 Respondent

وهل يذكر العيساوي تاريخ الجيش العراقي عندما احتل الكويت وفعّم الانتقاضة الشعبية في العراق عام 1991

40 Respondent

شلون لنا عائشتين وبيكم كل هامه، والله مندي. أجل فعم ساحة اعتراض سليم في الحويجة تلقى عليها ساحة إرهابيين وعائنين، لكن فعم غرباني حرفوا الدور وقلموا الأبرياء وارادوا أن يقلعوا النظام بالتعاون مع أردنيين شاردون بعد احسن من ما جاء الكريم، شو كان المعروف بأدخون الأبوط الشجاع موهيج.

41 Respondent

عجيب امرك تلومهم عن ساحة اعتراض إرهابيين ومساء الوقت تسعي ثورتهم الشعبية غواه... قنسك القواعد؟

42 Respondent

وأزيك بنانا رجعنا من الكويت شبا على الأقدام وتحت الضفة الأمريكية وتحملنا الأزمة وريادة الهزيمة وأذل عنا كانت العلاقات الأمريكية لغينا على نماذجها كلام فاستادنا. وبعده قبل ظل الحماية أصحابنا انتصروا أي انتصار هذا! وربما شعبنا من يومها استنعت ناز في صديقي رفع الافا قي يهم اعدام سلم الذي سحق الجيش العراقي وأهل جيش بطولات حروب فلسطين أصبح جيش يستخدم لأهداف رئيس متهر وجاليل.

43 Respondent

ومن يكون هذا العيساوي حتى يريد مصدراً ارادة الشعب العراقي هل هو الفارض حورة الأبناء المكاني في الانتخابات الأخيرة فاز قيز سهق وما يعني هذا

44 Respondent

وانت من...

45 Respondent

عيساوي

46 Respondent

بغداد – هز انتشار سوي مدناء الصدر في بغداد، موقعاً بحسب ما ذكره مصدر في الشرقية، عدد من القلقين والجريحو ولم ينتم إلى القرارات المعرفة جمع الشبان أو الافراد في الصدر، حديث له اليوم، أن القنصل الذي وقع خبر شبيه أوقع

47 Respondent

هنا هيه بس

48 Respondent

اهلنا وأخواتنا الاكراد السنة استطاعوا نكرير جيش خاص بهم قادر على نحر أي محاولة صفية محبي فائر على ردعها وقلت من تسول له نفسه المساس به هو الخلاج الوحيد الذي يفهم إنشاء وأية السما في العراق، فقلنا أننا العرب لنتشكي جيش قوئ قادر على رفع الخلافات العاملة الحد وافق للعيساوي وأماماه أتمن من أوصلتنا هذه الحال من التل، انتدري لذا لما أنتدري لذا لما ينبي أكثر، الدنيا قد تتของเขา، في اليومين، ولكن الأخزاء أشياء قد تتهم انتدري لذا لما ينبي أكثر، الدنيا قد تت لها، في اليومين، ولكن الأخزاء أشياء قد تتهم انتدري لذا لما ينبي أكثر، الدنيا قد تت لها.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>رقم</th>
<th>مشارك</th>
<th>اللغة</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>مشارك 1</td>
<td>إسبانيا</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>مشارك 1</td>
<td>العراق</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>مشارك 1</td>
<td>كلمات مثل بعض</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>مشارك 1</td>
<td>العيساوي بشر.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>مشارك 1</td>
<td>��נה كذلك</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>مشارك 1</td>
<td>لا تنكر أنا كذلك واقعنا. شكلنا دم حقيق</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>مشارك 1</td>
<td>إذا كانت الحكومة تكتب على بعضه لبعض وتكتب على الشعب</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>مشارك 1</td>
<td>إن هذه الخطابات من حقيبة الرجال</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>مشارك 1</td>
<td>المالكى الرئيس بالصفحة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>مشارك 1</td>
<td>الحل هو اقتراح الاستقلالية بالاعترال</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
العيساوي خل ي denne لا تقوم بناء مصلحه تعاضد مع الحكومة ودعي أوقت في بيئا وأن هذا لم يحدث أبدا وفي الأفلام أن نزه الملالي في إمتنان هذه المنازل لمملكة لنكن تعتبر الملكية معامل مصحم ونحن نريد القوة والقوة أكثر ممهم فج للإبل مراتنا كائنا لله صدام وما نطحها.

المشكلة ليست في المالكي .... أن في الدستور الذي يصنع من كل رئيس وزراء مالي جديد ... تPerPixel بعض الشبيحة كل شيء ...
ويستقل كل حقوق الشهادة .. كفى كتبا وخداعا .. يا عداد المال البارحة كانت تشارك في الحكومة .. وهذا ترضي عندما يرضي سيدي المالكي...

ما يزيد المال بالضغط؟

عليا نقص مناطق المدن العربية فقد الأم كثر من مثلي لا يفهمون مطلوبهم ماعدا الغاء قانون الإرهاب في سويسرا (ألف أقصى العراق) في الواقع المدن الشيعية هي التي ييج أن تظهر ...
وتظاهر من المدن العربية التي تم تخفيف عن الدعم الدين الدولي من قبل لسنة العالم. التوقف عن إخاذ الدعم المالي للمملكة. لذين ما لا يصحب ونتوقف عن إخاذ الدعم المالي للأراضي
والإرهابات ويد عمليات الصبعتي لم أرى نخوة شخصية العراق. فالkeypress في الجنوب مستعد أن نقل الفراعان على بحر ولا يقله اننا هذه المدن الدكتور والذين أعلموا أن لا يقري الإرهابي منعتنا وأن لم يكن هذا ولا ذلك طالب وهمي. المرة هذا مع فائق اعتداد كثير من ابنه هذه المدن ومن يبرأ من هؤلاء

المروش من طبقة السلطنة الملكية أن يكون غير ارهابي وأنك ارهابي بي عيساوي واسترقوا عليك محاكمتك وعليك ان نحصر المسلحه ونعدك طالب بالاستقالة الان تقسيح هذه الملكية تعود على على في العيساوي فور قادمة الملكية مرة ثانية مرتين والعادية الى الإرهابين القلقه
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Interlocutors</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>اريد ايد علاوي رئيس وزراء</td>
<td>كافى ظلم المالكي و سرقه الشعب والفساد والطائفه. نحن العراقيين بـ ١٠١٠ واحد نحن واحد و نريد رفع كرامه و سلام.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>لا مانكر بعد الهزيمة المكررة، والمهنة الفاضحة، والتشريد الطلاب، والذى تحت أقدام المشتغلين.</td>
<td>مو جربناهم كلههم</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>كيف سيتعيش السيسي والشيعي في العراق بعد قتل رئيس الوزراء نوري المالكي إن المواجهة الحالية هي «ثمار الزوراء» المواجهة بين إصصر الحسين وأنصار زيد» هل هذا راس وزراء مطال عسكي ١٣٤٥ سنه وناريت؟ تصدق أن السناس من قتل البيت الأفراح. سبيك السلستى هو حفيد من سلاطين الشمر ودا أحد نابض لأصداء واسئلا ولكن كيف تسألو هو ناصح العربي.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم، بحن الثورة</td>
<td>لا بد من إقامة الدولة الليبية في جميع أنحاء سوريا ولبنان العراق والأردن وفلسطين والأحواز من أجل إقامة الامة السنية على أرضها وقافة لشهدائها الأ Guerras الذين خروا من مساجدهم ويبلغهم ملهم طاهرة الزكاة فداء لأظمهم السنية ومن أجل إقامة الفلكلورية المصرية القديمة المجرمة عملية الشعورية الكبيرة بالشيكاء من أجل استدامة التحالف الكوري الذي بدأ بعبا على أوطأننا لحمايته أجراً كمحسن طروادة لدى جاهذ شعورية سوفية غنية بنغالية غريبة على أوطاننا ومنطقه بالحاج علي أمننا السنية.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>لى عراقي مظومة</td>
<td>الى الذي من أمِّك ١٠٠% لناشئه يخلص العراق من الحرامية والقيلة.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>المرحلة الثانية من المقاومة العراقية!</td>
<td>مايحصل في العراق اليوم بـ ١٠٠% على بدأ المرحلة الثانية من المقاومة العراقية لتحرير العراق من المحتل الأمريكي بعد أن تحرره وناسمه مسرر تام من الاحتلال الأمريكي.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>الأصول الإثنيين</td>
<td>كافى سيئي سيدي سيدي كردي زيدى كثري مظومة مو كافى يا مجرمين نمرتو العراق لله بعمركم.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>لايس هذا نفس الاعلان ؟</td>
<td>الذي أمر في عدة بالهجوم على الفلوجة وشارك فيه القوات� الجويه الأمريكية ومرتزقة البشمركة الذين رقصوا الدبكة حرفياً بتمديد الفلوجة...، ومع هذا ظلت الفلوه نفسه على الأمريكان.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>رقم الرد</td>
<td>مصداق</td>
<td>طبيعة الرد</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>بطل منظمة اللوجست</td>
<td>عمالي. بلغت منظمة اللوجست المطلقة في العراق عام 2004، التي أفرزت القوات الأمريكية، جدلاً حول الطريقة والإجراءات المتبعة لقتل المدنيين. وأبلغت شركة بلوك ووتر الأسبانية وأيضًا كانت الحملة التجميلية ضد القتال الجوي للقوات الأمريكية، وكان ذلك قد طالبة ضرورة تدخل عالمي ضد الممارسات المزعومة في العراق. مازوا القتال مع دعم اليهود، وجعلها غير إسلامية للعراقيين.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>عراقي نموذج</td>
<td>عمالي. عمالي. بطل منظمة اللوجست المطلقة في العراق عام 2004، التي أفرزت القوات الأمريكية، جدلاً حول الطريقة والإجراءات المتبعة لقتل المدنيين. وأبلغت شركة بلوك ووتر الأسبانية وأيضًا كانت الحملة التجميلية ضد القتال الجوي للقوات الأمريكية، وكان ذلك قد طالبة ضرورة تدخل عالمي ضد الممارسات المزعومة في العراق. مازوا القتال مع دعم اليهود، وجعلها غير إسلامية للعراقيين.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>عمالي شبي ينتمي إلى جماعة رياضية</td>
<td>عمالي. بطل منظمة اللوجست المطلقة في العراق عام 2004، التي أفرزت القوات الأمريكية، جدلاً حول الطريقة والإجراءات المتبعة لقتل المدنيين. وأبلغت شركة بلوك ووتر الأسبانية وأيضًا كانت الحملة التجميلية ضد القتال الجوي للقوات الأمريكية، وكان ذلك قد طالبة ضرورة تدخل عالمي ضد الممارسات المزعومة في العراق. مازوا القتال مع دعم اليهود، وجعلها غير إسلامية للعراقيين.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>عمالي من منطقة</td>
<td>عمالي. عمالي. بطل منظمة اللوجست المطلقة في العراق عام 2004، التي أفرزت القوات الأمريكية، جدلاً حول الطريقة والإجراءات المتبعة لقتل المدنيين. وأبلغت شركة بلوك ووتر الأسبانية وأيضًا كانت الحملة التجميلية ضد القتال الجوي للقوات الأمريكية، وكان ذلك قد طالبة ضرورة تدخل عالمي ضد الممارسات المزعومة في العراق. مازوا القتال مع دعم اليهود، وجعلها غير إسلامية للعراقيين.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>قانون عملاء إيران</td>
<td>نحن نملك والاتحاد الأوروبي قد يرفض الاقتراح سلبيًا. مثلاً، فقد كان هناك تدهور في العلاقات بين الاتحاد الأوروبي والاتحاد الأوروبي قبل ذلك، ولكن في السنوات الأخيرة، هناك تحسن في العلاقات بين الجانبين.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 14      | Respondent | الأزراقي | الأزراقيه. حسب مسح رابط بحث 24 ساكع وراء الكومبيوتر، ونجد لغز للعراقيات لا ثورة.
ساعة خلاص العراقيين الشرفاء من المالكية وعصاباتها الصفوية وميليشياتها boolean قرية جدا فضل الله بجانبه وتعدد تم إخلال العراق الغربي والشامي الأبلاط. كل من بيئي المالكي الميل في إيراني صوفي وتحية نعم حكم الاردن لقلل الشعر العراقي. وكل من يفيق ضد أفكاره الصفوية فهو عراقي ولي شرف. رد النزحاء والهادى الله. إن تصفيف النقوس من نواحي الانتصارات الرائعة بتجاوز ماجوري في الإنبار وصراع بين الجيش والرهب لك الحقيقة أن الجيش العراقي تم زجنة بحذف وضد المدنيين وهو أمر لايمكن القبول به أو السكت عليه وعدم الحوار السريع. لحن نداء الإمام ورفع عهادتهم عليهم.

15 Respondent
 المالكية وميليشياتها المجرمة

16 Respondent

17 Respondent

18 Respondent

19 Respondent

20 Respondent

21 Respondent

يا علاوي جربنا أثناء فترة زمنية تراثنا ولاقتنا كفاءة بل فلئت العراقيين بالفؤاد!
هناك ملاحظات من côté de la page antérieure:

22. **المقال الماقلي**

**نقطة الصحة** على الأزمات

واللقاء الكبير للجيب المكلوك في اللغة العربية إلى جانب تحديد النصوص النحوية واللغوية. وتركز على

خفرت الأيدي الآلية في مدارس ومؤسسات تربوية، وتستخدم النصوص النحوية واللغوية في هذه الألفاظ.

23. **المقال الماقلي**

*محوري ثقتكم* من حلقة العقود.

لا يوجد النص الذي يتناسب مع هذه الملاحظة.

24. **المقال الماقلي**

*التفاوت في علاجات*

لا يوجد النص الذي يتناسب مع هذه الملاحظة.

25. **المقال الماقلي**

*تحية إلى الأزمات*

لا يوجد النص الذي يتناسب مع هذه الملاحظة.

26. **المقال الماقلي**

*شكرًا للاجح الشما*

لا يوجد النص الذي يتناسب مع هذه الملاحظة.

27. **المقال الماقلي**

*الاشعاع المتقفل* عن الملاحظة.

لا يوجد النص الذي يتناسب مع هذه الملاحظة.

28. **المقال الماقلي**

*الآزيم يدايق عن العواطف*

لا يوجد النص الذي يتناسب مع هذه الملاحظة.

29. **المقال الماقلي**

*يا علوي*

لا يوجد النص الذي يتناسب مع هذه الملاحظة.
314

هو من هم الفلوجة على النساء والأطفال في 2004 لو كنت صغير

31

لا والله صغير بستب طينيا اتصلح حلا و خليف العراش بس طلعتا كلهب وسنين

32

ليش ما نشتر كتليفي

33

العراق ضاع بين حانا و مانا بين المالكي و حاشيته الايرانية و فواته القيادة و بين داعش و اجرامهم

34

العنف يولد العنف المالكي يوصف الأحياء المدنية بالرمادي والفلوجة يغلفها بأكبر عدد محك من الناس يرجو هنا انه منصر ... طبعاً اهل العباد يطفعون تفتيح روس جنود المالكي التي أسروهم بلياد العدوج لكنهم لم يسنوا و نكمهم وليكدونهم يرجوه بل سلمنا على تاور العشائر و اساندها ففيها توقف الطائرات لفصي الهلي الرماي والفلوجة

35

علاوي انتهى سياسيا بالعراق ... فلا تتعاون وتصبح معه فلا جنود من كلام نشته ولا جندة برلمان واحد و يقيم خارج العراق ويصرح من هنا ومن هناك ...

36

كلا كما نفس طينة الإرهاب وعلى نفس الدبابه الأمريكية أيتهم

37

لم ينزل العراقي بعيش كارثة كبرى منذ أن حال صدام و لم تزل أميركا وايران يعتون به ويعتون فيه فصاي عظيم منذ ذلك الحين. وقد أن الأولان أن تتحرك الشعب العراقي لبيب أعطائه و طوابقه و يبرز بين من هذا العدو معبر يريد كرايته و عزته و كابيتان ز

38

يشار الأساد رمز النفوذ العربي ورمز الكرامة ورمز الشهامة ورمز الرجولة ورمز المقامه ورمز الصمود ورمز التصدوي ورمز التحدي

39

العراقيين الآن أباجحا إلى قناة غير طانسي و يظف معرف كيف يدير البلاد وكمية ...... الرافعين عناوا الكثير ويعتبروا ... لناجي إلى رجل يفى و يبتر العراق إلى حال أفضل كيفية دول العالم ... لا إلى خراب العراق ككيف مشهور وقل وده دما وأهم شيء يبيق العراق للعراقيين فقط (( ولا مكان )) للنفوذ véhicو في ...

40

لاست انت يا امة من يوجد من يحكم العراق

41

أيا عراوي هو أمل العراق الوحيد في الخلاص

42

علاوي عميل امريكي و ضد الجيش العراقي
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Interlocutors</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I. Third Online Readers’ Responses Threads

Link: [http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/iraq-elections/2014/05/01/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BD%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%8D%A8-%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BD%D8%A8-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%BA%D9%8A%D9%8A%D8%B1.htm](http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/iraq-elections/2014/05/01/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BD%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%8D%A8-%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BD%D8%A8-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%BA%D9%8A%D9%8A%D8%B1.htm)
8. يُقال: 

"لا يمكنني إجابة هذا السؤال." 

9. يُقال: 

"لا يمكنني إجابة هذا السؤال." 

10. يُقال: 

"لا يمكنني إجابة هذا السؤال." 

11. يُقال: 

"لا يمكنني إجابة هذا السؤال." 

12. يُقال: 

"لا يمكنني إجابة هذا السؤال."
الشيعة يحكمون بفسد طائفية، ولن يستقر حل العراق إلا ببعيد
الملك دين حكم العراق، الملك في كلمة يحدد حكم
والراح من الجهل، يشتد والملك من القتال، وقيل ازداد لجزء
من مكة كربلاء وغير من الناس، الطائفية، معقول يلي
وزراء عراقي يحكمون بلغ دارياء وفيري بلغ أيها من مختلف
المذاهب العراقية يتمكس ابن الدين الزيدي، والمذاهب
والصيحة والسليم، لكل من جده دياب ولدات مختارة يعيشون
مختلفة ويعيشون الإسلام وهم يهود، ومفعولها حكم
يتكفل بها فصاطية صلى الله صلى الله عليه وسلم
إذا توجد في شاهد والشاهد، كل كله يديل
توقر الرافية والآلام لشاعر، وكان يعد الله على طريقة

13 Respondent

الشيعة لا يصحون

14 Respondent

لماذا ينتهج العراقيين الشيعة الملك؟ إنما لما

15 Respondent

لماذا نفتحنا العراقيين الشيعة العليا؟ ونعملها من

16 Respondent

عراقيا كان مافيا طائفية. وبأننا نحكم وعد

17 Respondent

لولا لتصبح للأرث حكم، ولا ينتهي

18 Respondent

يا في البحر؟ انتبه أيضا بالمنجم، اللحومي و

19 Respondent

يا فيه الديماني بين العالم، يا في فكرة، يا في

ياء 317
من قال إن السماحة ليست بالسماحة ولا الشعيع؟ إياها الكرد
هل تعلم أن الشعيع عبدل عليه أنهم باقون من قبل دورهم المخلص وعيبن عليهم أنهم أعداء لهم من قبل أهل السماحة.
ولتجهم أن المراوح الشعيعين يوم يا باكر دعاوكم من مشاهك لاتقبلن حتى نحن نصيّق السماح أنت تعمل من مشاهك أيضاً، أي نظر إلى الأحزاب الكرد جزء العمل الكرد ماموتو للنظر في الجرح بيار ماذا قل面白ئنا، جلو؟ أياً من المشاكل التي يعاني منها الكرد، وهم أهل إسرائيل، ويتعاملن أن تشيّع أسرائيل دلوهن، أعلم ويدعو أن الشباب الطالبي المجرم الحقيقين، هم أميرك، وإيران وإسرائيل.

20 Respondent

Osman Kurdist Interviewe
r 1 (Al-Interviewer)

Râmi (Ani)

21 Respondent

Osman Kurdist Interviewe
r 1 (Al-Ani)

أنا أختلف معك، مع الحاملي، وكذة التعبيرلينا أو قومية أو من كن يلاحت أن الشعيع متحكمون بفسطنائي، والزلي، والإيران، دائمًا، مهدنون، كسامت الشعيع يزيد ويهدد، وتواصل، وبصر، ...الموضوع لا تفاوت في صينياً، وكوحي تان، مشاكل عدالة، وضع خطاب الفروض، وتعينه في شعب، مترجمة الرفاهية، والغيرة، ...المعملة المذابة، مباشرة في معهم، وبدون تقدير، محبة أو عرفات. أما طرق الطعن، قد لا يكون أحد، أركب بعض الجوانب، بإملاء، وإمام الطيب، ولم ينفي، وعجوبة مانا، عندما، وليكن مافي، عمري، ماسح، من صدا، كلمة طائفة والمذكرة، على كما كان الإقلاع وفي، مصدا، صادق، ومثله، بين الدول.

22 Respondent

لا بالله

23 Respondent

الأمر البياني 67، المع، الكرد 49، عمر، الحكم 42

معقد الصدر 34، عشراء 25، الكتلا عرب 23،

عن مؤلف النجاح 24، المعاينة 10، المجموعة 69، البالغ 34، محق بريثة، نين، نسب تقريب ضع،

فرز على بياديق، يصعب، 8، موعد كونًا، للإيقاعات.

24 Respondent

أيام لينتني ثانية من، والعربيون أو ثابتة

أن كانت هذه التفاصيل، غير بناء، ترقي من الشمال والعمر، والبتراء، لعاني، ولماً بسيط، عن العرب، عادت، أو أن الشعيع، من نمو أن التغييرات التي تضر، أخوة الشعيع، مبدع بلجنة أو تصرف أو غيرها، ليست من الفيروزات التي تحل الأعيان، بشكل، مننة الإمره، فرض، وهو من يقل، ويركبة، قائمة حزب إيران، هم الشعيع العرب، ومن أصول إيرانية، فهيو، أو ألم، كما مع، وإيران، أو أم، هري، أوراسيا، وإيران، ويكي دول العالم، ماجي، اختيار من العريفي الذين حربوا.

إيران وقنا، نايب، في كل صدام، إيران.

25 Respondent

روج زين بمعد مكوك

واشنطن بوست، يتوقع خرافة الملكي في الانتخابات المقبلة، "

26 Respondent

ولا تختار إبلا، بل بلا!

عن أي تشير تحليل؟ العراق أن يصبح حلاً مطلباً هو محل، من قبل إيران وعلاقات إيران، هذه الانتخابات ضعف.

هيهام على الوقود لا أكثر، ولكن الآن فقط تنتظر المصدر، هو العراق إلى عراقه، إن!

27 Respondent

مهما قال سلماً، عراقية مهيبة،

هيهام قال سلماً، عراقية مهيبة

فهذا ماذا قالوا، المشاهد، واجهون، باليد!!!

العمل، غير، ويحل الخصائص، بإلحاح، و藅

28 Respondent

طيب بناء، رد، على

وانت وتنجر، فيها، ملتزمين فسنت، من ضمن، الأسماك، الطائي، يعني، كل مهيئة إسماك، مكتشف

29 Respondent

والله أصبه سرية، عراقية مضخة، ومحزرة في أن

واحد، لا أنا، لن، الشعب يلعب، بـ.
هيهيبهنك الله

31 

الصمك عن عدنا جريحاً ان تخلم في شهور الأخيرة. وتحال انت tên حرب قصر وصادر الياه الآخر. في أهميه الصخري ومن حذامه! فهل تقل انت تخلم.

32 

الحقيقة المرة على أغلبية الشعب العراقي يتخب علاس الطلب، لأن الدين الكاريجية البيانية تركت شعب علمه متفائل سياسياً. الاغراب ابا السيدي الأمالي البطل أبا اراءه يقدد لومل ولد، مع خلوده مرت شؤوب العراق ورسى سيادته على الأمة وان شاء الله متيها البارع والخنسة إلى الآدب لنا، كرسيا آثار العراق الشجاعة والبنوة.

33 

اقرأ الجل عالم العراق وان ضيوعه للك عراقية فمعنا مذا بنسبى العراق فعح الحادقين ويوه المبدين ورس였다 اراءه والهد الله للرسول وللمؤمنين

34 

ابع الجهل الطابعي الحد الجملة اوعف يا ان تتلمي قرارة واصاب بطل! (يا سامع (الصوت صلي على الله اللب محمد وابن علي )) (وامرأ عراق الفرندي-reaching عراق على اليمين ) (كذلك جام) 

35 

الянب البند بحنا الحديث معك

36 

أعلم.....وكلام كلها..ابن النادرية.....استمر يعلم..إعت أيام شيوع وموطنة الرحيقات في مهاران وليس العراق

37 

عندما قال انا جذبه ليد المصعد هو الذي فتح أسما للنهر، يؤدون هذا في السني رحمه نعمة رسل الله ص. واهل بيته وصحب依法 هافنهم سامع عباره ابنة وجبة نجاح يricks أنكر

38 

أحدل يزيد
46 Respondent

لاستفادة من أهل التأييد فحصوا إلى أومر
لاستفادة من أهل التأييد ودعاهم
بعد المشاركية بالانخراط ولم
بشراها خوفا من العقلب. يا حي! على الزمان...
فظنت الهوية العرقية وهموا انفسهم بأنفسهم من أجل
إرضاء ومأواز حرفية أرطبة إجان؟
لا يمكنني قراءة النص العربي بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.

يرجى تقديم النص بشكل طبيعي باللغة العربية أو الإنجليزية للدقة في الترجمة.
62. **العربية**

هل كانت إيران تحلم قبل مнемً مع إسرائيل عامًا بالتوجه نحو جانب حلب، من البلدان العربية؟ وسوريا ولبنان وأرمينيا والمكسيك وتولى أو أين؟!

لقد كان ذلك بحسب الناس المتضررين بخصوص، لكنه أصبح الآن حقيقة تهاجم الحزب، لأن إيران كانت تعمل على بناء مشروع من المدينة الطويل، وهذا لا شك يرجع إلى الحعد. 

العربية، ويجعله يدور على إيران وتصادع أنها في المنطقة. لكن بدل وضع اللوم على إيران وتبني الشعوب العربية، بل قد تكون تأثيرًا لآخر. 

العربية الخاصة تحاول إيه إيران
العرب أصحاب نفس قصيرة جداً، يملون بسرعة ولا يتبعون
إيران الوراثية، ونحن
العرب......

63  Respondent

العرب أصحاب نفس قصيرة جداً، يملون بسرعة ولا يتبعون
إيران الوراثية، ونحن
العرب......

64  Respondent

أردق بسلام

65  Respondent

في حال تلمذ رئيس دولة (الإقبال) لسلطة رابعة يترزم
بالتغير يقصد به هذه المرأة تغيير الشعب و ليس إدارة مجالي
و زراء لأن هو أوكاوا و من أفقيه بقوان أن ضنيت أم
أبش الخطة القائمة ( سيرة ) . هجرة ، هذا الملف
بأسم الله القائم أما التفاعل كالانتي
1 - سمرة . هو الحفاظ على نوايا العراق في بنوك خارجية و
الفقد منه زيادة تروته تحسب استقبال امرأته فيما إذا تهت
ولايتها الأبدية
2 - تهجير . حتى ينفرد هو وجاهته و من لفقيه هو وسياده
في مكان على أن يعترضناه من بقا الكيانات والازاب الأخر
3 - قتل . إن كانوا من أبناء الشيبة أو السنة أو الساسين أو
باق الشدائد غير المولان

66  Respondent

استقرار العراق

نحن العراقيون من نور مصر العراقي ونستحمل جميع مصطلحات
الداخلية بالحوار الوطني الجدلي فقط أنتم إياها الملتزمون النحو
جاتروا وتركوا عن رسائل السياسات الفعلية ودعم الميليشيات
والتغيير الذي نحن المتحف يهدى المخلوق الذي لا يؤمن بالآخر
ما شكلنا هم السياسية لن يسمح لكم في أذكارنا أن تكون عبر
الشيوخ أو نساء بنذكركم حيث يتم إخبارهم بأمورنا واستحم
عصر الفجر عن التي كلمة دينرشي لا تتكون لأن
فقد القدرة لأن تفعيلنا أما بالنسبة للعراق فنحن من تختر من
يعبرن من أو تبرق لنا تنفيذ من خلال صناديق الاقتراع
وسيم العراقي شامخا باهل الشيراء شعية سنة عرب وتركدي
وسيمهم وأدوزين والمورين.

67  Respondent

العراق والحرج الحاقد

فاز المجرم نوري المالكي بالانتخابات العراق في حرب
اتهلة الحز هو اعتقال المجرم نوري المالكي.

68  Respondent

قوع وحد

69  Respondent

هذه الانتخابات تندلع تحت سياسة تغيير الوجهة باتوجه
على سياسة النظام...

70  Respondent

إذا فاز المالكي بلينت أن
الشعب العراقي

71  Respondent

على الأقل نحن نطيع
بافتتننا يا وائل وهب

72  Respondent

باختي العراقي الحز الاتخذ الأفضل لك ماذا جديم من المجرم
نوري المالكي سوا الخراب و الدمار الجوع و سرة ملهم
العراق والعربيين بشعار مشروحة بظل مشروع النحل
بالمبركة نوري المالكي لأشرف شائبة بالإيجابية والاقتصادية على
الشتاتة لأسلمها وهنا يشرف العراق عرق
الترزيح والحضارة والكردية هذا غباء وانحرار

73  Respondent

WAEL SAUDI

FREE
لا يمكنني قراءة النص العربي المتجهز بشكل صحيح. عذرًا على الالتباس.
87 Respondent 
الديمقراطية كثامة حرفاء

89 Respondent 
الديمقراطية هي إعطاء الشعب القوة لاختيار قيادته السياسية هو صحيح في تلاي الديمقراطية لكن لا يمكن أن تنقذ الديمقراطية لا يجد قوتها فيื่ن أو النصر. ...

90 Respondent 
وادي الزفال الإسبانيين في المصادر والمصطلحات الجزائرية والشامي العراقية الوسطية والجمهوريين ليس من الجنس وإلى الدولة. الاشتراكية في العراق إلى وسط في الجنوب يعنى إسقاط ما أدرك زين بس من الدخل الإسلامي المكون...

91 Respondent 
هؤلاء منكم فأنت صاحب الدين والأعمال ... فيقلام في كركوك وذيال وصالح الدين والأعمال ... الم Geschä في حكم المؤسسة وصالح الدين الكردي بريتون

92 Respondent 
لكي تفهم صحراء العراق من حيث وضعها ووضع الجغرافيا وانتمت المملكة. إنها حصانة لكية مصادر تناقش إيا العشري في النواحي. ...

93 Respondent 
حكومته بيني أو شيخية أم كرد مقنع العراق أسوأ وأسوأ من إعرقه

94 Respondent 
على ابن رضي عرب وليع وفأ عيوب الزعيم العراق المتسارع

95 Respondent 
عند الثورة العراقية الكبرى سجل @@@@@@ عند الثورة العراقية الكبرى سجل @@@@@@ عند الثورة العراقية الكبرى سجل @@@@@@ عند الثورة العراقية الكبرى سجل @@@@@@ عند الثورة العراقية الكبرى سجل @@@@@@ عند الثورة العراقية الكبرى سجل @@@@@@ عند الثورة العراقية الكبرى سجل @@@@@@ عند الثورة العراقية الكبرى سجل @@@@@@ عند الثورة العراقية الكبرى سجل @@@@@@ عند الثورة العراقية الكبرى سجل @@@@@@ عند الثورة العراقية الكبرى سجل @@@@@@ عند الثورة العراقية الكبرى
96 Respondent

التي بثت سنة أقرت مخصصة منهم عرب وواحد فارسي. محمد صل الله تعالى عليه وسلما على وفاة الرهان والحصن عليهم أصل المقالة وسليمان المحمدي للفارسي رضي الله تعالى عنه.

الأمر الذي معنى (ع) وهو الأمر الرابع من دري الرسول محمد صل الله تعالى عليه وسلام بن الحسن (المهاجر) على السلام أورد عنها هو الأمام الحسين.

سبيلاً أهلقال على أصل المقالة السلام...

97 Respondent

التشيع عربي لما ونحوه ونحوه ونحوه في الشرع الإسلامي...

98 Respondent

عثر الثورة العراقية الكبرى ساج...

99 Respondent

رجال جيش الطريق التقليدي انتم في قضاء الجيوب 44كم جنوب كركوك واواس سباين صوفي مع كمية الأسلحة...

(الصوفي قد حرث ببناءهم)... تكبير

100 Respondent

الجيش الإسلامي وجنين المجاهدين بطلت فقرات بكر سايم من آخر صدام الدولي وما ادى الى تغييرات تخريج طائراتPersisting في الأبعاد الصناعي لفراغة وفرق الأعداء...

101 Respondent

التطبيع الذي انتخب يهود انواح الخارجي مع باقي الإنجاز الإسلامي وغير الإسلام مصادرًا...

102 Respondent

الي جنوبية...

103 Respondent

المجلس الثوري في بغداد وظائف تدعم الحدث الى الوقوف معها ضد مليشيات إيران المجرمة وyscale ميللى للكي يقولون السلام مقابل الأمان لهم مع تسليمهم دخليات نوع دف...

104 Respondent

عانان الذين يحكمون العراق عصابات قتل وأعمال تشوههم...

105 Respondent

يا والله...رساء الشعب العراقي...

106 Respondent

يا ولد أنت ملائم من الهناء والذباعة إلى زاني على كرامتك بكل تمنٍّ تمكنك وله الانتباه حتى ممكن من أهل بينك. خلي مكان شيء بين من العقل، واتم باذن عليك تخطيطك الكوميدي بمشغة...

107 Respondent

ليست تسلم كل الحكم إلى العراق الأصوليين أي هم المسلمين، وليس كسم المحيطين هم عراقين.. وندفع العراقين بأن العراق يراجع تعمر وصيحة انس من الإمارات على الأقل يلمعشي خيام الدعاء ومناء...

108 Respondent

كلاً كلام ليس ونطبق مثل هذا تماما...
الانتخابات ضحكة على الشعب. المالكي العملي ينصح وليس ينصح. إيران أثارت بوعضة حاكما على الحزب الخلافي لإنار.. ككل، Topic ينصب موضوعه لغوي الشخص المشارك في الانتخابات على ماهه على فض حتف ورفع هميج مللي طهران ناس الدين

تشمل كل أحلامنا ما أن نجح بإليغ الغرفة سبيقي هذا الهالكي جامع على مصير الشروق الذين يامرون بالتغيير لللاب الاستقرار لباشهم

العراق هو يعرف بين بختار

لا تبتكر إبراهيم من جنوب العراق...كانت دعائية القرب هي وسط وجوب العراق...رباع ربيعة وطلي وزياد واست جنوب العراق...القرن السليمجي المعرون أخذنا وهو سنة في شمال وغرب العراق...انت شارب بول كأنك بني امام الإسلام ليس حاكي أو عنصري جمعى انهد السنة أما عم أو ترك وهم على رأس إم وءامك تعرف عن

هذه هي دعوة السلام الذي هو ما تم فضم العراق ثمهمد الوقاف تبرتيا بين التشيمة والمنطقة العراق وله ما ترضى أمريكا

له قديم سلام أكثر

كان كتب حتى الجزء من تلك لانها الهالكي لايمه وشَل اليس لأخ الكبير ودجلو الكلما من الوكل برحمي لللوا تحتف بالطيب وقل الازام وأما وطالله ها مال 40 ونائمة كتاب بل ذكية عنا علاش باللابير وداش هيه مليشيات إيران. و حلا من الفرس بعم دخلوه بين صفح الفاسسية السوية المحبحة منا أتت ذلك بشارك وغبة مع شاير الثابل وهو المشارك يستخدم نفس اسم سواريا لأن داش تابعة لإيران أيه يشل عندهون وكال الفرق ان الإباضه لا يوجد بها داع إضاف عنش ذلك هو الفائز شكا ما تطمع من أشاعات تلك الفائز لأنه مثل ما يكون لثائبة وبينها تاباشة 산

لا نستكتب بعد ها الانتخابات باب علائي راح ينسحب من العمل السياسي (الآن مل من الخمسة) وكولو يوفس كان
| 120 | Respondent | مقيمتهم | عقليته الشغلية. .. ايران وي بشار مو الفاعله .. احن مهنيه مو وي منز.. النزى ناني العراق و خلص. البلدة الأتى. |
| 121 | Respondent | عراقي | اذا فاز الهاكفي فدا معانى ان الشعب احتاره وكهيم أو اعتيهم من الشعه وه واعيشون في اسوس بلد في العالم حسب التقارير الدولية وليس السنين. فأقول ثورى ضعيف المتالك ونساطرون أكثر. ابتان صرخوا مضحكه امام شعور العالم الحره وانا اعتقد هذا كلها من عند الله مبديه وعاليه (وكلما تكونوا بولي علىك) الرحمه الي مهيد الحج الأكبر. |
| 122 | Respondent | العراق | والله كلكم... وحافدون أبوان امراء مصالحة قميس ماعليكم. هيهيه |
| 123 | Respondent | الي ضياء العراقي | في اي عرف كان عربي اعجبي لا تكون الزوجه من اهل بيت الرجل لتخرج زوجات الرجل من اهل بيت الرجل ٣٣٣ ارجو ان لا يكون السبب هو تكييف نساء الرجل (صر) في حكمة المرونة للبيضاء أو المرونة للذهاب مع ابن عمة الرجل وزوج اختها، الزائر بن العمام في ايح ابشره. القطرة كل داع وقطرة انذ الرياح وانطق السنه من داعش الى نصفها والشيوع الذين خصصهم من سبطر العشيقات. |
| 124 | Respondent | اذا الشعب احتار فهذه ارادته | طبعا النتائج قول اب انغلب دولة القانون اكتسب كل مناهجه بال깝 من حمية النسبيه التي مرتست ضد المتالكي واتنالته من قبل الارب شعبيه وال.top على حد سواء لك الشعب اختاره .. هذه حققه اعبان تللمثلب بها الشعب العراقي بطبعه بكره اطراف ولم لا خوف اهل الادمان ومنطق السنه من داعش الى نصفها والشيوع الذين خصصهم من سبطر العشيقات. |
| 125 | Respondent | بغداد | اشا هواية انظمتون ايران والامر محليه بعد ما تنزيحه شروفر غير سالله يا ائدال. |
| 126 | Respondent | العراق | رغم مواجهه دولة القانون من تحديات فاته وдейان الله تعالى سيتصرد القوانين الاشتراوية بكل جدارة وسيتصرد الحق |
| 127 | Respondent | اداية | الاخوة المحترمون ارجوكم معاونين زيت الصورة للامتطاب يعموس اصابتهم في المرونة ومنع الكوارد الطبية من الاعتصامات تلك الوجهة الصادمة واهل الاعظمية الايطال والفرغ في دينالي الايبلن والمحافظات أخرى واختيار مرشحين وقارات موانع مكاتب المفوضية واخذ صناديق الاقتراع وموضوعية الانتخابات غير حيادية لأنها تحت ضغوط النهديه والابيات والضرب وحالة الحرب والا جرح كاكم تضحمون على عقولنا هذا الموضوع لم ولن تكون حيادية ابدا. |
Bibliography


Data Protection Act 1998, available at: 


Fetzer, A. (2007) ‘Well if that had been true that would have been perfectly reasonable: appeals to reasonableness in political interviews’, *Journal of Pragmatics*, (38): 143-153.


Lakoff, R. (1973) ‘The logic of politeness; or minding your p’s and q’s, Chicago Linguistics Society, (8): 292-305.


