The Anglo-American Special Relationship and the Decolonisation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1957-1963

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to use the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to examine the way in which the Anglo-American special relationship functioned away from a crisis and on an issue over which the British were, uniquely the controlling power. Africa became a Cold War battleground in the sense that both the Americans and the Soviets wanted saw this vast area as a potential gain. For Britain the issue was how to appease both the white settler and African native populations, under the scrutiny of both new African nations and the UN while pushing forward with their decolonisation policy. This pressure, coupled with the desire to establish a new world role through helped to create a unique situation for Anglo-American relations as it gave the two nations an issue they could work together to solve, without a crisis to guide or influence them.
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Abbreviations

Within the Text

Within The Footnotes
DO - Dominion Office, The National Archive.
FO - Foreign Office, The National Archive.
PREM - Prime Minister's Office, The National Archive.
CPA COB - Conservative Party Archive, Bodleian Library, Oxford University.
MS Macmillan - Papers of Harold Macmillan Department of Special Collections and Western Manuscripts, Weston Library, Oxford University.
MS Mac - Macmillan Diaries, Department of Special Collections and Western Manuscripts, Weston Library, Oxford University.
MSS Welensky - Papers of Sir Roy Welensky, Rhodes House, Oxford University.
HMSO - Her Majesty's Stationary Office.
RG 59 - Records of the Department of State, National Archives II, College Park.
DDE - Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.
JFKL - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
OH - Oral History Project Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
FRUS - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Africa Volume XIV.
Introduction

The Anglo-American special relationship is a contentious issue amongst historians, politicians, and political commentators. The relationship has been used by politicians to either justify or deride interaction with their transatlantic partners and the very existence of it has been questioned by historians and journalists. Its highest and lowest points have been mapped in a quest to explain its existence and its relevance; to show it at its best and at its worst. The main conclusions reached principally fall into three categories, the first being that while the relationship exists, it is unequal and not as special as some politicians, particularly the British, would have the public believe.¹ The second category is that the relationship is special and exists due to the unique and close bonds forged by a close personal relations and most importantly, mutually shared aims.² The final category is that the special relationship was simply an illusion perpetuated by the British in an attempt to disguise their declining world status.³ This thesis will argue that the special relationship did exist and is in fact a hybrid of all three conclusions, and that while personal relations are essential for the relationship to work, it is mutual aims and benefits that truly define it.

Strong personal relationships between an American President and a British Prime Minister can be seen numerous times during the twentieth century and beyond; Roosevelt and Churchill, Reagan and Thatcher and Bush and Blair are prime examples of when this personal relations and the special relationship were at their highest

points. In 2012, during a visit by Prime Minister David Cameron, Barack Obama stated that the two met 'to reaffirm one of the greatest alliances the world has ever known.'

In 2013, journalist Nile Gardiner, in response to an apparent split between Barack Obama and David Cameron over issues in Syria noted that 'whatever the pro-French rhetoric coming from the White House and State Department, the fact remains that Britain is, and will still remain, America’s closest friend and ally. The defense, intelligence, cultural, educational and economic ties between Great Britain and the United States are so deeply rooted that the special relationship will survive regardless of the split over Syria.' The relationship between Cameron and Obama has not enjoyed the same highpoints that Macmillan enjoyed with either Eisenhower or Kennedy. Indeed, in early 2016 comments made by Obama about the failures of operations in Libya were interpreted in the British Media as an attack on both Cameron and the special relationship.

However, in spite of this, support and belief in the special relationship still seems to exist. This perhaps speaks to the idea that Britain is still suffering under the illusion that it is still a world power, or perhaps it speaks to the belief and the knowledge that, based on the fact that Britain and America all too often find themselves with mutually agreeable aims, the special relationship will exist again the future. This sentiment is expressed in a note to Eisenhower regarding the Bermuda meeting in March 1957:

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8 Gardner, The Special Relationship will long outlive Obama’s Anti-British, Pro-French Presidency.
'The US needs the alliance for much the same reason as does Britain. We rely on British help...material and psychological, to implement our policies towards the Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, South Asia and some areas of the Far East. We recognise the two acting in concert, with the aid of the Commonwealth, form a more persuasive combination that the US acting alone. In addition, we rely heavily on Britain in the military field. Their contribution next to our own...forms the largest national component in NATO and UK territory afford essential bases for US forces in the British Isle, Caribbean and other areas.'

What was remarkable was that Macmillan managed to forge such close bonds with not one but two different American Presidents. Despite not only change of administration but also political party on the American side, Macmillan was able to establish a strong personal relationship with Kennedy after enjoyed similar with Eisenhower. This was due in part to Macmillan's political abilities but also because, despite alterations within American politics, foreign aims were still aligned. While nothing changed in terms of the way in which the two nations could work together, the evolution of independence across Africa, as well as Cold War interpretations, forced the hand of both the British and the Americans. Thus, what was perceived as policy transformation was in fact policy progression.

Geelhoed and Edmonds contend that Macmillan and Eisenhower achieved a great amount as political leaders, citing the fact that they helped to strengthen NATO.

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and that they moved away from an era of confrontation towards one of negotiation. However, what is more interesting is their assertion that ‘they did not succeed in bringing any peaceful resolution to the issues that divided the East and West nor did they abandon their predecessors’ policy of containment vis-à-vis the communist world. Nevertheless, neither Eisenhower nor Macmillan was satisfied with pursuing a foreign policy characterized only by endless recrimination, mistrust, and hostility toward their adversaries.’

Christopher Sandford states that Kennedy and Macmillan, ‘were almost comically mismatched, and yet no other Atlantic partnership since the days of Roosevelt and Churchill have given each other more practical co-operation on matters of mutual interest....One major sign of the success of the Kennedy-Macmillan axis is the number of times they met, or spoke, and the relative speed with which they made their relative decisions.’ While crisis management seemed to bring the two leaders, and therefore the two nations, closer together, the way in which they tackled the problems of African nationalism and decolonisation without the impetuous of crisis, allows study of the relationship to take on a completely new dimension. If the relationship was able to bring constructive and thoughtful progress on a difficult and potentially critical issue, it would infer that the relationship ran much deeper and was far more important than had been previously believed.

Eisenhower himself often spoke extremely favourably and warmly of his association with both Britain and Macmillan. Although the personal relationships are important, another aspect is how the two Presidents felt towards Britain as a nation. Eisenhower often spoke highly of the country itself, possibly stemming from his close relations with British personnel during his time as Allied Supreme Commander during the Second World War. Similarly, Kennedy felt some affinity with the British due to his experience of the nation during his stay in Britain during his father’s appointment as Ambassador to the United Kingdom. However, the fact that Kennedy wrote the critical book 'While England Slept' about the beginnings of the war and his Irish ancestry gave Macmillan cause for concern when he became President.

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However, Dominic Sandbrook asserts that 'contrary to myth, Kennedy and Macmillan had an uneasy relationship.'\(^{15}\) He goes on to claim in his notes that archival material supports this assertion but fails to specify exact examples. However, after following the trail from the citation Sandbrook does use it seems that there is no archival evidence in fact offered by the original source.\(^{16}\) Although, past biographers and historians may have exaggerated the closeness of Macmillan and Kennedy, and while there were moments in which they did not agree, close examination of the archival evidence does not seem to suggest that the relationship between the two men was in any way a myth. What it does suggest is that, despite moments where the two men disagreed there was a friendly communication between them and a sense of friendship.

The connection between Macmillan and both Presidents is the cornerstone of the Anglo-American special relationship during this period. However this is only part of a much bigger picture; while close and amicable relations between the leaders was a solid starting point the real basis of the relationship was the basic fact the Britain and America were trying to achieve similar if not identical political aims. This simple idea is the true root of the special relationship and can be clearly seen not only in the way the British government communicated the problems they faced and the wider political issues that could affect the handling Central African Federation to the Americans, but in the way that the Americans themselves were able to understand and empathise. This thesis will illustrate that the Americans clearly understood the British point of view, right up until the end of Federation and the Americans had their own ideas of what they would like to see accomplished in the Federation they were keenly aware of the problems Britain faced, acknowledging the fact that there were no easy answers. This thesis therefore, examines the relationship at work, not its rescue from a crisis.


Anglo-American Relations and Decolonisation

The aim of this thesis is to draw on these analyses and use the decolonisation process to explore the nature of Anglo-American relations and the concept of the special relationship. Decolonisation became a hot topic for politicians in the late 1950s and into the 1960s. The world was in the midst of a new and frightening era as the Cold War began to have flashes of heat across the globe and the race for supremacy expanded beyond weaponry and into space. While it is perhaps unfair to judge or analyse Africa within Cold War framework, it is impossible not to when considering Africa from the Anglo-American perspective; the ideological war between the Soviet Union and America made every nation important more for its possible future allegiance rather than its physical future. Nations were, looked at for how they would fare against a possible push for communist expansion in the area. While this analysis questioned their economic and political viability it was not to protect the people of Africa, it was to protect the West; at least from an American perspective. With these concerns in mind, it is easy to understand why the economic and political association offered by Federation seemed so attractive to the Americans, and why they held on to the hope that it would survive.

The British too, were actively concerned about the threat of communism as well as the need to have strong free African nations that would become self-sufficient. The Federation was developed as the answer to all these concerns as dealing with the issue of white settlers. The outcome was therefore, that the British and the Americans were aligned in their desire for a free and stable Africa, if for slightly different reasons. This created a strong basis for close cooperation, sharing of information and a platform on which to build future policy to meet these aims. The problem, as this thesis will demonstrate, is that mutual aims for what should be achieved do not necessarily translate into a plan for how to achieve them. America and Britain were able to work together, share ideas and create an understanding of the problems and the wider political issues but they could not produce a clear answer that would achieve this and satisfy all parties. The focus is then not on how the problem was solved - the unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia in 1965 is a clear indication that the problem was not solved - but how the relationship worked not only to avoid crisis but to create understandings.
Lawrence Butler's article on Britain, the United States, and the Federation focuses on the role America had in the Federation during the period 1959-1963 and offers a foundation on which to build a more detailed and in depth analysis of both America's function and relationship with Britain.\textsuperscript{17} However, Butler’s paper, while insightful, merely scratches the surface of a complex and multilayered issue; while the main ideas and themes are touched upon, it does not draw on any archival evidence from the Presidential Libraries or the National Archives in the United States, although he does cite evidence from the Foreign Relations of the United States series. By examining American archival evidence, a new and clearer picture of the way in which Britain, Africa and decolonisation are perceived in relation to America’s general foreign policy, their Cold War stance, and their wider political needs. It is through examination of the not just the information presented to each president and administration but how this information was absorbed and interpreted against the background of a bigger political background that the true intentions of the Americans can be clearly assessed.

The comparison between Eisenhower and Kennedy on the subject of Africa has often been reduced to a simplistic idea that while Eisenhower ignored the area, Kennedy, uniquely and perhaps bravely, saw something that Eisenhower did not.\textsuperscript{18} However, if instead, Africa policy is seen to a progression of ideas and that fact that Eisenhower had more of an impact on the way in which Africa policy was formed is considered, Kennedy's impact is lessened. The fact that Butler's work starts from 1959 shifts the focus away from the Eisenhower era and the reestablishment of the Anglo-American relationship after Suez, allowing the Eisenhower's input to be diminished and the contrast between him and Kennedy to be less effective. Understanding the development of the relationship through the Eisenhower and Macmillan era is vital to the analysis of how the relationship worked on issues in Africa and how it continued under Kennedy. Macmillan's time as Prime Minister, during two Presidential periods makes a cohesive and clear picture of the way in which the relationship worked very difficult. To establish if the focus on Africa changed or the way the two nations


developed their understandings of the domestic and foreign policy implications of colonial policy changed there needs to be a clear comparative analysis of both the Eisenhower and Kennedy periods.

The need and desire on both sides of the Atlantic to rebuild the relationship after the damage of the Suez crisis indicates that the relationship was valued. The development of policies and the way in which the relationship worked to create understandings, manipulate situations, or create a sense of empathy about Africa, as part of this re-establishment and onto its maintenance is where the real story lies. To take one presidency in isolation therefore does not allow for comparative discussion or truly reveal the nature of the special relationship but instead gives a limited and, in some ways, false view of the way in which Britain and America worked on the issue of Africa, particularly the Federation. Historian Simon Smith notes that 'It would be dangerous, however, to regard Suez as a watershed separating a period of British regional supremacy from one of impotence...while British power had been undermined in the years before 1956, it by no means collapsed after that date.' Suez was a milestone, a symbol of greater issues at play; Suez was a manifestation of issues that Britain and America faced in the new post-war era. While Britain's decline is part of a well-documented historical debate, what is often overlooked is the effect Suez had on American foreign policy, or at least how it affected the development of colonial policy.

Between 1957 and 1963 African nationalism was gaining momentum, Independence had begun in Ghana and all the problems within Federation were beginning to become undeniable. While 1959 was the year that these cracks became fatal wounds for the Federation, the focus of this thesis is the Anglo-American relationship and the way the two nations reacted to the growing tension within the Federation while taking into account other political issues. It is therefore important to look at the situation British and the Americans at this time too. This period, following on as it does from the Suez crisis also allows for a full examination of how the relationship progressed.

This thesis will expand on the work of Butler by opening up the time frame to cover the entirety of Macmillan's term, going up to the end of Federation to create a more comprehensive view of the relationships he forged with both Eisenhower and Kennedy and how this interplayed with the changing situation in Central Africa. The use of archival evidence gathered from the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and National Archives will illuminate on the attitudes towards Britain and Africa within the governments and the State Department, particularly after the creation of the Bureau of African Affairs in 1958. This expansion will also illustrate the idea that Africa was of interest to the Americans to a much greater extent and from an earlier stage and that a development of a coherent and workable Africa policy was an important element of not only American foreign policy but also their relationship with Britain.

Daniel Voleman's thesis on United States foreign policy and Central Africa, in contrast, uses only American archival materials and deals with how the Americans dealt with the nations that made up the Federation over a much longer period, from 1945-1965. The result is an analysis of American policy rather than of a co-ordinated approach and as such offers little insight into the Anglo-American relationship. Throughout Voleman's thesis, there is an emphasis on the Kennedy and Johnson years, in which the crisis in Southern Rhodesia reached its climax after the end of the Federation. This means that the Eisenhower period is somewhat overlooked and no archival evidence from the Eisenhower library is used within the thesis. He in fact claims that there is no material within the Eisenhower archives relevant to the decolonisation of Central Africa, reflecting the Eisenhower’s over all lack of interest in Africa.

However, this thesis will illustrate the fact that there is in fact a great deal of material within the Eisenhower library and the State Department files at College Park Washington relevant to the study of the Federation and Eisenhower’s stance on African policy. Although some of the archival evidence is more general in its scope or focuses more on Africa through relations with Macmillan and the British, it is nonetheless enlightening for the study of Federation in this period. It is one of the aims

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22 Ibid, p.196.
of this thesis to redress this balance, and add more to the wider study of both Eisenhower as a President, and how Eisenhower and Macmillan worked together.\(^{23}\)

The lack of British archival evidence in Voleman's work seems extraordinary given the political situation in Central Africa at that time. The British were actively involved in the government of all three nations within the Federation, through the Commonwealth or Colonial offices, a high commissioner, the personal interactions between the Macmillan and his successors and the various Governors and Prime Ministers of the Central African Federation. Britain was so heavily involved in the area as its colonial power it seems incredible that no investigations were undertaken in the many libraries and archives that house material pertaining to Central Africa within Britain. It is even more incredible when the true extent to which America conducted its interaction with African politics through its European allies in their role as colonial powers. Until the process of independence was fully underway and probable, if not certain new leaders of African nations became known, the Americans had little choice but to communicate with European governments in order to deal with African problems. This is particularly true in terms of the decolonisation process, as the Americans could not discuss a swift but careful exit from Africa with anyone else; especially not the unelected and powerless African nationalist movements that had yet to start on the road to independence and political power.

This thesis will draw on British archival evidence not only to show the relationship that the British government was able to foster with the Americans but also to convey the necessity of considering the British viewpoint on an issue that was, at least before the movement towards self-rule began in the Central African Federation, mainly a British issue. This does not remove Africans from the issue of Africa but instead acknowledges the nature of the politics of the time. While morally the future of Africa lay in the hands of the Africans that called it their home, realistically the power was in the hands of Macmillan until independence. To ignore the British archives in studies of Central Africa at this time, limits the analysis dramatically and does not allow for a full appreciation of the success of American policy, nor does it allow for the limitations policymakers may have felt dealing with a foreign policy issue over which they had little control.

\(^{23}\) Ibid, pp.xi-xii.
Overall, the evidence located in the National Archives not only provides the basic detail of the way in which the issue of the Federation was handled but also the way in which the members of the British Government perceived and dealt with Sir Roy Welensky. The breakdown of relations between Welensky and Macmillan after the publication of the Monckton report, for example, is clearly recounted in both official correspondence held at the National Archive and in the personal diaries held by Oxford University. Through the comparative analysis of the published memoirs of Harold Macmillan against both his private memoirs and his official correspondence and memorandums as Prime Minister, it is possible not only to create a more detailed view of what took place but of the Macmillan as a man. Similarly, there is often a marked difference between the cabinet conclusions and the notebook versions giving an insight into what was actually said during cabinet meetings rather than the sanitised version the official record offers. In regard to the relationship Macmillan had with both Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy, the personal correspondence between Macmillan and the two men gives a clear insight into the kind of personal relations they were able to achieve, in particular documents relating to the television broadcast made by Macmillan and Eisenhower during the latter's visit to England in 1959.

Andrew Cohen's work on the Federation makes more use of American and British archival material. In his study however, the focus is on a much wider economic issue although a chapter does look at the American involvement in the Federation. However, he fails to make use of any archival material located at the Presidential libraries of either Eisenhower or Kennedy. This can be explained by the fact that Cohen's thesis does not focus on the American side, however, it does mean that the portrayal of the American stance on Africa or their interactions with Britain over the issue is not as accurate and the analysis is therefore limited.

25 CAB 195/18, CC (60) 9th Conclusions, 16 February 1960, Prime Ministers Africa Tour; CAB 128/34, CC (60) 9th Conclusions, 16th February 1960, Prime Ministers Africa Tour.
26 MS Macmillan, c.353 The Radio and Television Broadcast by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan at 10 Downing Street, 31 August 1959.
While the economic issues within and outside of the Federation had an impact on the way in which both the British and the Americans approached the problems of the Federation, the main focus of both governments were the political implications and issues. In terms of this thesis, Cohen’s work beyond this one chapter is not pertinent and runs transcendentally to the focus on the special relationship. However, it does offer, within that chapter, a focused view of the relationship between Macmillan and the Americans that considers a wide range of archival evidence from both sides of the Atlantic. While this analysis and the others mentioned add to the discussion of the decolonisation of Central Africa and the roles of the British and Americans, all three have limitations that prevent a clear and accurate picture of how Britain and America faced the issue of decolonisation in the Federation. This thesis will provide a bridge, linking the basic understanding already developed whilst also interlinking wider issues and themes to create a multilayered investigation into the special relationship and its role in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

This thesis argues that what made the relationship special in terms of the decolonisation of Africa was the wider context of the Cold War, which, coupled with the individual domestic considerations of both nations, created the perfect scenario for increasing and developing the interplay between the two nations. The growing awareness and sympathy for independence movements juxtaposed with the problems they presented for both the counties created a unique connection between Britain and America, while strong communication allowed a deep understanding of the problems and limitations felt by both sides. This need to encourage control of a worsening situation while simultaneously understanding why control was hard to achieve, allowed progression to occur that was mutually beneficial.
The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed in 1953 against a backdrop of changing colonial policy and attitudes towards imperialism as the British Empire steadily became the British Commonwealth. What separated the territories that made up the Federation from other African nations moving towards independence during this time was the issue of their white settler populations. This was a particular issue for Southern Rhodesia, which had the added problem of being a self-governing colony and therefore under limited British control. The Federation's aim was to bring these difficult nations together under a multiracial system, aimed at increasing the contribution black Africans could make. However, by 1957 the cracks had begun to show in this delicate and ambitious experiment.

The Federation brought together three very different territories, each with varying British involvement, economic viability, levels of European settler population and types of African Nationalist movement and leadership. The key unifying element was the fact that the three territories had a significant white European settler population, which led to the Federation's development and, to some extent, its eventual downfall. The varying levels of white settlers seem, roughly, to correlate with the level of difficulty of Independence. This, coupled with the fact that that Africans were never enthusiastic about accepting of the idea of Federation, seems to suggest that it was doomed to failure and is reflective of the mistrust of the African majority towards the white minority.

However, it can also be argued that Federation itself was not the problem; it was the way in which the idea was developed and the perception, at the very least, that the main benefactors would be the white population that were the real issues. Federal models have, and continue to be an option for, African countries facing what Eghosa Osaghae identifies as 'the second decolonisation.' This line of historical analysis rests on the principle that African independence was not completed as the remnants of colonial rule, in the shape of the political, and in some cases, social structures left by the former colonial powers remain. In other words, new

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'independent' leaders merely replaced the colonial rule rather than making changes to create a new and truly independent state, far removed from the issues of colonial rule. Federation, in its purest form, has been advocated by many champions of this model as a way of increasing democracy and the involvement of the people in the political development of their own nations, helping to create a truly independent state. 29

However, it must be noted that, despite the significant changes made in Colonial policy during this period, there was no mandate for change that came from the people. As David McIntyre notes: 'Not one General election after 1918 featured the Empire as a major campaign issue...no party spilt on colonial issues either.'30 This contrasts sharply with the development of American colonial attitudes; the 1960 Presidential Election campaigns of both serving Vice President Richard Nixon and Kennedy placed significant emphasis on Africa and America's future role in the continent.31 This supports John Darwin's assertion that British people 'were always indifferent to the future of the British Empire.' 32 High defence spending and national service were both linked with colonial responsibilities and were both unpopular with the British public, especially in times of austerity.33 A growing awareness of racial inequality, the growing Communist threat, and a deep affinity with the ideals of freedom and liberty, help explain the support decolonisation found in America. 34

This is not to say that Imperialism was finished in Britain in the 1950s, for many it was not a lack of power but the lack of desire to rule that was the real issue. This was certainly the view of Sir Roy Welensky, the Prime Minister of the Federation, especially after the demise of the Federation in 1963.35 This was according to David Goldsworthy, a refusal 'to accept that Britain no longer commanded the power to mould modern Commonwealth in its own image; all that was lacking was the will.'36 This viewpoint seems to ignore the rise of nationalism and the financial difficulties associated with

29 Ibid.
33 McIntyre, British Decolonization, p.81.
34 Meriwether, "Worth a Lot of Negro Votes", p.739.
35 MSS Welensky, 590/3 Welensky to Bennett, 31st December 1962.
holding on to colonies, especially those that violently opposed outside rule. However, this was a position held by a number of influential politicians and commentators during the life of the Federation and beyond. Although, as McIntyre states, there was no party spilt over colonial issues\(^{37}\) there was constant danger of rebellion and dissent from among the ranks of the conservative backbenches; there were, in fact, a number of occurrences in which a spilt was indeed threatened.\(^{38}\)

Goldsworthy reasons that a major change was the result of previous ministers failure to address the issues of settlers vs. natives, arguing that:

'It was left to their successors to choose between the conflicting priorities of settler control and majority rule...But so long as the problem was not confronted, the effect was to preserve a situation in which the European community's appeared to have the upper hand in local politics and the very fact that the Government chose not to attempt any basic change in the balance of power prior to 1959 may be attributed in some degree to the inhibiting presence of the party's settler lobby.'\(^{39}\)

In the context of the Cold War, the Commonwealth was portrayed as 'unique to the West as a whole, offering a “unique bridge” between the West and the newly-emerging countries.'\(^{40}\) Britain was therefore faced with a great difficulty; there was pressure to grant independence to colonial interests speedily and welcome them into the Commonwealth and equally under pressure to make sure that these nations were not left vulnerable to communist subversion. Some nations made this transition relatively easily while some, for reasons of history and a need for autonomy. New nations also felt this pressure from America to essentially 'pick a side' and align themselves with either East or, preferably West. This created a very difficult situation in which Britain's colonial policy could be seen to be dictated by American desires, as well as creating more pressure on the British to have to consider possible American reactions to any decision made about the future of colonial nations. The constant need

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\(^{37}\) McIntyre, *British Decolonization*, p.81.


\(^{39}\) Ibid, pp.309-310.

to ensure that the American’s were 'on side' was perhaps a direct result of the lessons learnt after the Suez crisis; however it could also be seen as direct evidence of Britain’s weakened political position.

Although Roger Louis states that 'the pace of events in this region owed little to direct pressure from the superpowers', he also notes that 'Washington pressed the colonial powers to consult and coordinate their African policies with the Americans in NATO' due to fears there could be another incident like the Suez crisis. Goldsworthy also argues that there was an increased anti-American sentiment over the issue 'The United States was identified as a major enemy of British Imperial interests, possibly even more dangerous than the Soviet Union because it was nominally a friend and ally'. The special relationship was, therefore, under a great deal of strain from many different elements. The fear that America was 'meddling' in the British politics had to be weighed against the belief that Britain’s future strength relied heavily upon its relationship with America, while America had to pursue its policy in Africa and encourage Britain to follow a similar line without creating issues for the British Government at home or upsetting their allies. Duignan and Gann, however, argue that 'The Americans responded to the African challenge in a slow and ambivalent fashion. They stood committed to decolonisation; yet they had no wish to alienate their NATO allies by hurrying the pace.'

It is important to consider the effects of wider issues within Africa had on the Federation both domestically and internationally. While decolonisation within Africa had a great impact on the African nationalist movements in each of the three territories, the problems faced in areas such as the Congo, Katanga, Kenya and French and Portuguese colonies in Africa also had consequences for the decolonisation process as well as shaping the attitudes of the British and Americans when dealing with the Federation. The problems faced by the Portuguese, French and Belgians in Africa had a knock on effect on the political landscape as well as on the African nationalist movement. The horrors of the Hola Massacre both helped to downplay the

Nyasaland Emergency to the British public but also highlighted the dangers mishandling the delicate situation in Africa would bring.\textsuperscript{44}

The four African nations with the biggest impact on the Federation during this time were Ghana, The Congo, and South Africa albeit for very different reasons. Ghanaian independence in 1957 was the starting point for African decolonisation; it gave hope to African nationalists across the continent and set Britain on its path to dismantling its African Empire. South Africa cast a permanent shadow across Southern Rhodesia; an allegiance between the two nations created a constant threat that helped Federation to continue long after doubts over its future began to surface. The communist threat faced in the Congo helped the Federation to continue; no direct communist influence had been found within the Federation itself, the troubled Congolese state of Katanga, bordering Northern Rhodesia, posed a threat without the economic stability of Federation.

This thesis will examine not only the factors that contributed to the end of Federation but also the factors that kept it going for so long, even after the reality of its failure had begun to show. The Federation acts as a microcosm of the realities of African decolonisation containing as it did three vastly different areas with varying difficulties. The roads they each took towards independence also reveal much about the ways in which African nations in general worked towards independence. There was no 'one-size-fits-all' solution that could be used across all of Africa, any more than there was in the Federation. It is only when both the Federation itself and its place within the wider context of Africa generally is understood can a real analysis of how the British and the Americans faced the problems of Federation but explain not only their actions but the motives behind them take place.

America and Decolonisation

By 1956, great strides had been made in decolonisation of European empires. Many nations were either moving steadily towards independence in the future or had achieved it. While the move towards decolonisation for European nations was based predominantly on economics, America’s policies were very much political. The Cold War between America and Russia had resulted in both an arms and a space race and the third world would soon become the third race. Newly independent states were vulnerable to infiltration and America needed to balance its anti-colonial thinking with its fear of communism. While colonial powers were urged to persevere with decolonisation, the American Government also needed these countries to be secure. According to Stephen Ambrose, 'Suez made Eisenhower almost painfully aware of the importance of the third world to the United States.'

American policy towards the colonial world during the period 1957-1963 developed steadily, with a growing knowledge that deeper understandings of the countries striving for independence, as well as the limitations and pressures felt by their colonial powers, were vital to development of their own policy, particularly in Africa. This is demonstrated by the creation of the Bureau of African Affairs and the role of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in 1958. However, Thomas Noer notes that the department was the 'least prominent of all geographical divisions in the State Department.' This can, of course, be explained by the fact that it was a newly created division and does not necessarily result in the assertion that the aims of the department were any less significant to the American Government, more likely that they yet had much to say or act upon. Noer notes that 'the act was as much symbolic as substantive. The Bureau of African Affairs was separate but not equal. The State Department favored the European section for promotion and prestige. Most senior officials in the Bureau of African Affairs were European specialists who opposed American support of decolonisation.'

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45 Borstelmann, Cold War and the Color Line, p.85.
As discussed previously Duignan and Gann, argued that 'The Americans responded to the African challenge in a slow and ambivalent fashion.'\textsuperscript{49} This is a view shared by Hemming who observes that the 1950s were a 'time of particular ambivalence in American attitudes towards decolonisation prompted mainly by the growing realisation of the need to accommodate nationalism in the developing world, but also by the desire to maintain good relations with European powers.'\textsuperscript{50} However, Duignan and Gann go on to comment that, 'the Americans began to promote academic study of African cultures in the long 1950s; they channelled loans and grants to Africa; and above all they changed their political line. Anti-colonialism came to be interpreted as a policy that was moral in itself, as a device for expanding American trade, and as a means of strengthening the American position where newly independent states were endowed with voting strength in the United Nations, quite out of keeping with their military or economic power.'\textsuperscript{51}

The major factor in American interests in Africa, particularly in the Eisenhower period was the threat of communism. The danger was, as Stephen Ambrose notes that most of the new nations 'have not been prepared by their rulers for independence. Many had raw materials unavailable elsewhere...all of the new nations appeared to more or less in danger of falling to the communists.'\textsuperscript{52} For the Americans, in the midst of the war against communist infiltration and the missile race, Africa's strategic importance and its significance as a propaganda tool was fully appreciated. America needed to make sure that new nations felt America and the capitalist model was the right choice for economic growth and political prosperity. Arguably, therefore, the American's sought to replace the withdrawing Colonial Powers and guide these nations to the benefit of US political, economic, and perhaps even military, aims.

Howard Temperley argues that despite America's distaste for Empire, 'in more ways than they perhaps realised, the Americans found themselves behaving much like the British before them' arguing that the resident US ambassador in each nation

\textsuperscript{49} Duignan and Gann, \textit{The United States and Africa}, p.286.
\textsuperscript{51} Duignan and Gann, \textit{The United States and Africa}, p.288.
\textsuperscript{52} Ambrose, \textit{Eisenhower}, p.376.
replaced the British as 'the effective power behind the titular ruler' by performing a similar role.\textsuperscript{53} Bernard Porter supports this view, stating that:

"Imperialism" has never been one of the things that have differentiated Britain from America. During the twentieth century the myth arose that this was one of the essential contrasts between them...throughout the nineteenth century and for some way into the twentieth, Britain and America pursued almost identical imperial paths, or, at any rate, paths that can be regarded as 'Imperial' in some lights.\textsuperscript{54}

Ali Manzrui expands on this idea even further claiming that America entered a new that: 'America, the incarnation of liberal decentralization of power at the domestic level, became the incarnation of the most concentrated international power in history. The United States embodied power greater by far than the strength of Rome at its most glorious, greater than the leverage of England at its most imperial. The American founding Fathers must have turned in their graves as they witnessed their child grow into a dangerous, mighty adult.'\textsuperscript{55}

It was not until the early 1960s that neutralism was truly acceptable to US government as non-alignment and not, communism under another name.\textsuperscript{56} It was, in many cases, more practical for a country to remain neutral as it allowed for investment and funding to come from both USSR and USA, or at least pushed both sides to make offers of investment and aid in order to sway them to their side. The danger was that by pushing nations to choose a side, they were pushing Africa into the arms of the communists. As Mazrui comments, 'because of the link between Western enterprise and Western colonization, a link between nationalism and socialism has evolved in the Third World.'\textsuperscript{57}

Racial injustice was another issue that had a big impact not only on the way in which the US constructed its African policy but also how Africans across the continent

\textsuperscript{53} Temperley, Howard, \textit{Britain and America since Independence} (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p.190.


\textsuperscript{57} Mazrui, 'Superpower Ethics', p.146.
perceived America. The civil rights troubles facing black Americans made headlines in Africa and severely undermined the image of justice and tolerance that was being perpetuated by the American government. American support of the right to freedom for Africans and their outrage at Apartheid seemed to be hypocritical when African Americans were not able to partake in some of the most basic elements of American life.\(^{58}\) This issue became more than just a domestic issue as more African nations became independent and sent diplomats to the United Nations in New York and government representatives to Washington. This was extremely damaging to the prestige of America at a time where it had become crucial to gain, if not full allegiance from African nations then at least neutrality in the Cold War. The Soviets were also quick to use this issue to discredit the Americans in Africa and further their own campaign.\(^{59}\)

The Anglo-American focus of this thesis grants a new insight into the way in which America and Britain worked together to discuss the issues of decolonisation. However, it also allows for a deeper analysis of both the American position on decolonisation and how they worked on the issue within their own administration to understand the complexities and strive for solutions. It is within this that a new perspective on the role of Eisenhower during his time as President can better analysed and better understood to truly reflect the way in which Americas perspective on Africa changed between 1957-63 without relying on the simplistic idea that the election of Kennedy was the key factor. While Kennedy made Americas interest in Africa public, he was, in part, building on an Africa policy that had already had its foundations built. He was also able to take advantage of the fact that his presidency coincided with an unprecedented movement within African towards independence. While it is inaccurate to suggest that Kennedy rode the coattails of either Eisenhower or the African independence movement, he was able to enjoy a great deal of credit despite not being President when the development of the intelligence and policy planning actually took place. This thesis will illustrate that rather than Kennedy creating America's African policy aims after his election, he instead built on the basis developed under

\(^{58}\) Borstelmann, *Cold War and the Color Line*, p. 166.

Eisenhower. Kennedy’s ability to create personal relations with African leaders and build stronger ties with African nations was certainly a personal success, however, he could only achieve this because the groundwork in terms of intelligence and strong relations and communication between Britain and America on this issue had been established and nurtured.

This thesis will pull all of these issues together to create a full and detailed picture of the way in which the Anglo-American relationship helped Britain and America to build a strategic and cooperative African policy, through close contact and mutual understanding. It will weigh up the aims and the needs of each side to see if the relationship truly helped to achieve not just decolonisation but also create a stable Africa with close ties to the West and will investigate the way in which the relationship built a solid Africa policy that ultimately made Anglo-American relations in the area almost redundant. It will also explore the question what made the relationship special and its ability to join the two nations together when the need was at its highest and the aims of the two nations came together so well despite the fact that a successful conclusion would render it obsolete.
Chapter One:

Suez and Decolonisation

The general effect Suez had on Britain's political status, and on the Special Relationship, has been widely discussed by numerous historians and commentators.\(^1\) For Jonathan Coker, 'The Suez war convinced the British establishment that Britain could no longer exercise world power without the support of the United States. The crisis, in fact, reminded the political establishment that the relationship was not between equals. The British recognised that they should never again engage in military operation without America's open or tacit encouragement and, better still, day to day support.'\(^2\) This wound to Britain's prestige greatly affected a number of British policies and the repair and maintenance of a relationship with America seems to be at the very centre of these changes. However, the focus here is on the effect Suez had on African decolonisation.

Suez

For Lord Beloff asserts, one of the consequences of Suez for the British was:

'The general acceptance in the Conservative party of the fact that the dominance of the United States in world affairs could not be challenged and that the path of safety was at almost any cost to align British policy with that of the United States. Macmillan himself was the conscious agent of this revolution. He blamed himself for failing to grasp the degree to assured Eden that the Americans would not oppose it. This feeling gave added weight to his determination to use his premiership to put things right.'\(^3\)

It is this idea that is perhaps the most significant; Suez may not have started the decline but it forced if not acceptance, then at least acknowledgement of the issue.

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If Suez had an effect upon Britain's political self-worth, then the Empire was where it was dealt the biggest blow.\textsuperscript{4} The effect was not immediate, due to the fact that, as Young remarks, first Macmillan 'had to concentrate on winning the 1959 election, a task which would not be helped by further evidence of national retreat.'\textsuperscript{5} The connection between national decline and the end of Empire is well established and it is often seen that Suez and Empire were inextricably linked.\textsuperscript{6} However, for Macmillan, decolonisation was a matter of morals, noting 'It is a vulgar but false jibe that the British people by a series of gestures unique in history abandoned their Empire in a fit of frivolity or impatience. They had not lost the will or even the power to rule. But they did not conceive of themselves as having the right to govern in perpetuity.'\textsuperscript{7}

This assessment, while not without merit, fails to acknowledge the political situation of the time and the impact this had on the perception of colonialism and the economic situation facing Britain. While the progression of thought and debate about colonialism had begun to raise questions about the morality of owning foreign lands, this was not the driving force for the rapid decolonisation during the late fifties and early sixties. The expense of running an Empire as vast as Britain's had become a burden that they could no longer handle and it was for this reason that Macmillan ordered a profit and lost analysis of the colonies soon after becoming Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{8} The truth was that the Empire had tipped the financial scale and was no longer cost effective.\textsuperscript{9} This coupled with the turning tide of international feeling about colonialism were the collective reasons behind changes in political thinking about Empire.

According to Lord Beloff, there was a second consequence of Suez; 'The abandonment by the Conservatives of their role as the imperial party...Free of the bonds of “Commonwealth d’abord” Britain and British conservatives in particular, could now adopt the ideal of European Unity, hitherto of interest only to a minority. In this rather negative or roundabout way, Suez can be seen as a proximate cause of

\textsuperscript{5} Young, \textit{Britain and the World}, pp.180-181.
\textsuperscript{6} Holland, \textit{Pursuit of Greatness}, p.216.
\textsuperscript{8} Holland, \textit{Pursuit of Greatness}, p.296.
\textsuperscript{9} McIntyre, \textit{British Decolonization}, p.45.
British application to join the Common Market.\textsuperscript{10} This is perhaps a more subtle yet significant consequence; while the focus on the effect on Britain’s psyche has been established, the effect it had on the Conservative party itself is often overlooked.\textsuperscript{11} Though decolonisation was a process that had begun before Suez and under a Conservative government, it is perhaps surprising how rapid and widespread decolonisation was during the Macmillan era. This shift was keenly felt across Africa, particularly in the Federation where this acceleration was perceived as abandonment of whites in Africa.\textsuperscript{12}

While Darwin suggests that, 'It is too facile to see the accelerated colonial withdraw after 1960 as a direct consequence of the humiliation of 1956. Nor is it clear that Suez extinguished the great power aspiration of British leaders or their readiness to defend far-flung interests by military action.'\textsuperscript{13} Young asserts that 'surprisingly, the Suez crisis, with all its supposed lessons, does not seem to have quickened the pace of withdrawal or ended the belief that Britain must keep order in the World for the sake of its commercial and financial wealth.'\textsuperscript{14} The difficulties and the criticism that both Macmillan and his post-1959 Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod faced within Parliament and the Conservative party itself clearly indicated that was no unity in regards to of the end of Empire. However, Macmillan was keenly aware that the Empire had become a barrier to repairing the Anglo-American relationship.

Hemming argues 'Suez revealed the depth of anti-colonial feeling in the international arena.'\textsuperscript{15} This broader consideration is probably one of the most influential consequences of Suez crisis especially when coupled with the idea that British prestige was waning. While it cannot be claimed that Suez created anti-colonial feeling, it gave credence to rising feeling and forced the issue to be more closely inspected by not only politicians but also the public of Britain and beyond. As Hemming states, 'despite the scathing accusations of gunboat neo-colonialism

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid; Holland, \textit{Pursuit of Greatness}, p.301.
\textsuperscript{12} MSS Welensky 683/5, Welensky to Don Wilese, 28 September 1960; MSS Welensky, 590/3, Welensky to O.B. Bennett, 31 December 1962.
\textsuperscript{13} Darwin, \textit{Britain and Decolonisation}, p.223.
\textsuperscript{14} Young, \textit{Britain and the World}, p.180.
\textsuperscript{15} Hemming, \textit{Macmillan and the End of Empire}, p.100.
following Suez, direct international pressure for decolonisation was not acute.16 However, for the Federation’s Prime Minister, Roy Welensky, with the added benefit of hindsight, ‘Suez was, or ought to have been, a blazing danger signal to those of us in Africa who still depended on Britain. For the last time probably in this century Britain tried, along with France, to defend her overseas rights, responsibilities and interests.’17

Kenneth Kyle suggests that ‘the final stages of decolonisation went rapidly ahead under a Conservative government, not without moments of great political tension but with the outcome conditioned by the demonstration affect at Suez of the harsh limits of British power.’18 While it is true that decolonisation, particularly across Africa, began to hit a steady stride from 1957 onwards, it is perhaps more accurate to say that the loss of Empire was both more keenly felt by Britain and gained negative connotations in the aftermath of Suez.19 Within this framing it is easy to see why the Anglo-American relationship began to become more important to British politicians; it was a way to show the world that Britain was still regarded as relevant. While Suez showed weaknesses in the relationship, it also highlighted its strengths. As Kyle notes ‘in Britain after Suez it became a general assumption that, regardless of the provocation, that there would be no more solo flights’,20 however this also meant that Britain could become part of, if only transiently, a bigger and stronger unit.

Simon Smith observes that, ‘It would be dangerous, however, to regard Suez as a watershed separating a period of British regional supremacy from one of impotence...while British power had been undermined in the years before 1956, it by no means collapsed after that date.’21 Conversely, Darwin suggests that Suez ‘serves as a convenient watershed to separate the years in which Britain’s survival as an independent power seemed possible (and desirable) from the subsequent era which saw the rapid liquidation of the colonial empire and the scaling down of Britain’s global commitments.’22

16 Ibid.
19 Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, p.222.
20 Kyle, Suez, p.561.
21 Smith, British Imperialism, p.106.
22 Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, p.223.
Rebuilding Anglo-American Relations After Suez

One of the Macmillan’s priorities when he became Prime Minister was to find a way to make the relationship with America Special once more. While past Presidents and Prime Ministers had enjoyed varying levels of friendship with each other, Macmillan’s challenge was to achieve this in vastly different circumstances. Churchill and Roosevelt, and Atlee and Truman had been able to forge their relationships in the midst of the euphoria that came with victory in the Second World War; Macmillan had to re-establish a relationship with Eisenhower in much harsher conditions. Not only was there a strain politically but there was also a growing resentment of America amongst the British public. As Britain’s Ambassador to the United States, Harold Caccia explained to U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: 'I told him that I did not think he realises how deep and widespread anti-American sentiment in Britain had become, America’s best friends in Britain had become sadly disillusioned. We had often modified our policies, (for example in the Far East) in the interests of solidarity with the United States and we had expected similar support from them over the Suez Canal, which was vital to us. We all felt badly let down, and I would require a big effort by the Americans to restore British confidence in them.' However, Caccia also goes on to say that he 'ended this part of the conversation by saying that, whatever might have happened, our attitude towards the Anglo-American alliance remained unchanged. We on our side would do all we could to restore the previous intimate relations, but that it would have to be a two way effort.'

This emphasis on the desire to restore the Anglo-American relationship after Suez highlights the perceived importance the relationship still had. However, it also gives an insight into the type of relationship that the two had previously shared and wanted to continue into the future. The fact that Caccia felt that he was able to express to Dulles the dissatisfaction felt in Britain, seems to indicate that the

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23 Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations, pp.120-21.
25 MS Macmillan, C.919, 338 Fols., For the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary from Minister of Defence, Talk between Dulles and Caccia, 28 January 1957.
26 Ibid.
27 Richard Barnet, Allies: America, Europe and Japan Since the War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1984), p.188; Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations, p.127; Dickie, Special No More, p.97; Dobson, Anglo-American Relations, pp.119-120.
28 MS Macmillan, C.919, 338 Fols., For the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary from Minister of Defence, Talk between Dulles and Caccia, 28 January 1957.
relationship was one that encouraged honest discourse. It also seems to indicate that there was at least a moderate interest in restoring the relationship on the part of the Americans. This is supported by Piers Brendon's assessment that, at the Bermuda meeting with Macmillan, Eisenhower 'effaced, even diminished, himself. He subtly and successfully insinuated his own ideas. He restored confidence by means of beaming cordiality and transcendent charm. He bound up the wounds as only a master of coalition diplomacy could.'

While the personal and political relationship between Macmillan and Eisenhower will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two, the meeting between the two in Bermuda was a significant moment in the re-establishment of close personal relations between the two leaders. As Kyle asserts, 'they established a pattern for future contacts, in which a happy glow almost succeeded in obliterating the considerable divergences that continued between them without obscuring the realities of power.' The Bermuda meeting was also the site of discussions over closer cooperation between Britain and America in the field of nuclear weapons. The technological partnership between the US and Britain is often noted as a high point in the Anglo-American relationship and the foundations were built in Bermuda. This shared nuclear relationship and Macmillan's advocacy of interdependence seems to support Darwin's assertion that 'implicit in the revived special relationship after 1957 was the understanding that Britain would never again embark upon a major operation as Suez without America knowledge and tacit approval.' However, this was just one element of the Anglo-American relationship. While nuclear proliferation offered a tangible result, issues such as decolonisation and the communist threat on the other had were harder to quantify.

Despite Caccia's negative predictions, Eisenhower was still extremely popular with the British people. When he visited the UK for the first time since Suez, he found himself overwhelmed by the reception he received especially, as Ambrose suggests, 'he had been warned to expect a cool reception, as the British had by no means

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29 Ibid.
31 Kyle, Suez, p.542.
32 Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, p.225.
33 Ibid, p.223.
34 Ambrose, Eisenhower, p.540.
forgiven him for Suez...In addition Macmillan had given the trip minimum publicity...But as the motorcade drove from the airport to the city, through a gathering dusk, the people of Britain turned out to honor the man who had such a personal place in their hearts.\textsuperscript{35} Much like the relationship with Macmillan was made easier and stronger given their experiences during the Second World War; Eisenhower was able to connect with the British public due in part to his war record, particularly his involvement in the Normandy beach landings.\textsuperscript{36} Ambrose goes on to comment that in the 'Mac and Ike show', a television broadcast made by Macmillan and Eisenhower during his visit, 'Eisenhower, discussing the need for greater cultural exchange, showed again that the British always brought out the best in him.'\textsuperscript{37}

\textbf{Anglo-American Relations}

Harold Macmillan often used the term 'interdependence' to describe the new kind of relationship that he saw for the Anglo-American alliance.\textsuperscript{38} It is under these terms that nuclear relations were created, but it can be argued that interdependence went far further than that; it affected the way in which the partnership operated on all levels and accurately describes the nature of the special relationship; a partnership working together to achieve mutually beneficial aims. This does not mean to say that there was not compromise nor inequality with the relationship; interdependence did not imply a partnership of equals.\textsuperscript{39} Britain could be a junior partner in this relationship yet still gain from it tremendously while Americans could gain much needed support, resources, influence, and knowledge from Britain. It was this understanding that there was mutual gain that cemented the relationship between Britain and America.

However, this new interdependence between America and Britain and the development of the special relationship did stir some misgivings within the British Government. As Ovendale remarks 'Lord Home, was anxious lest this new Anglo-

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Brendon, \textit{Ike}, p.1.
\textsuperscript{37} Ambrose, \textit{Eisenhower}, p.541.
\textsuperscript{39} David Nunnerley, \textit{President Kennedy and Britain} (London: Bodley Head, 1972 pp.185-189.)
American interdependence endanger the nature of the Commonwealth with its neutral members. Home, in a letter to Selwyn Lloyd noted that the Commonwealth 'works in such a way that emerging countries of Asia and Africa feel they can enjoy close relationship with us under the umbrella of the Commonwealth without necessarily being obliged to adopt a policy of alignment in the Cold War.' Similarly, Ambrose notes that, during Eisenhower's visit to France that preceded his trip Britain, de Gaulle did not 'hesitate to voice his suspicion that the Americans along with their British friends, wanted to run NATO and indeed the world.' Indeed, de Gaulle's suspicion of the Anglo-American relationship would later affect Britain's application to join the European Economic Community, resulting in a resounding 'Non' in 1963.

Jonathan Coker states that:

'There were those who argued that the special relationship was becoming more symbolic than real with every year that it encouraged Britain’s preoccupation with its past and made it uncertain about its future, that it was, at best, the sole consolation of a nation which found itself increasingly on the margins of history....The British establishment, however, also believed that it derived much from being what the Americans themselves called their "closest" ally.'

However, Andrew Marr's assessment is far harsher: 'The truth was that Britain was a bystander in the new superpower world. We had little leverage left with the Americans; the Empire was hurriedly being dismantled, so where could Britain stand in the new World?' Similarly, Corelli Barnett claims that 'the failure of Macmillan and his colleagues to awaken from the 'world power' hallucination led to wider consequences still.' While there is much debate over the legitimacy of the relationship, results such as the nuclear agreements that seem to suggest that a close relationship did exist between Britain and America; as well as less tangible results such as close cooperation on issues such as African decolonisation.

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41 PREM 11/2689, Home to Lloyd, 21 May 1958, cited in Ibid.
45 Andrew Marr’s *A History of Modern Britain* [Television Programme], BBC 2, 29 June 2009.
Lawrence James asserts that 'Under Macmillan’s adroit guidance, Britain shed burdens but stayed a great power, theoretically capable of resisting nuclear intimidation by Soviet Union, so long as America delivered the appropriate gadgetry. On the surface at least, imperial decline had not gone hand in hand with a complete loss of standing in the world.\textsuperscript{47} This again seems to indicate that the relationship at least created illusion if it was not an illusion itself. The fruits of the special relationship were a projection of power created by the Americans; Skybolt was purchased to be Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent but it could only be launched with American acquiescence thus the illusion of power was created. In terms of decolonisation, the illusion is not so easily identified as the British and Americans shared views and opinions with no apparent catch. America was not silently dictating policy and directing the British towards favourable decisions. Similarly, Britain was not able to use the situation to achieve a greater power status; in fact, for some, the retreat from power was completely the opposite. What did occur, however, was a sharing of information and a development of ideas.\textsuperscript{48}

The policies of the British and the Americans followed similar paths and although there was pressure placed upon Britain to decolonise Africa and to so quickly and safely, these were not aims that Britain did not already hold for themselves.\textsuperscript{49} What the Anglo-American alliance did offer however was a way for America to gain intelligence on and an understanding of Africa nations ahead of their independence, and gave Britain support, and perhaps someone to share the blame. The outrage aimed at America by white settlers at their perceived interference in Africa did, to some extent remove some of the responsibility from Macmillan and his government.\textsuperscript{50}

Ultimately, it is not clear how productive it was to perpetuate the idea of British importance through the Anglo-American alliance. Britain’s history, influence, and legacy perhaps had a greater impact on their image abroad then their relationship with the Americans. It seems, as Brendon asserts, Britain were aware of ‘their

\textsuperscript{47} Lawrence James, \textit{The Rise and Fall of the British Empire} (London: Little Brown, 1994), p. 594.
\textsuperscript{48} Cohen, \textit{Settler Power}, p.240.
\textsuperscript{50} MSS Welensky 683/5, Welensky to Wilese, 6 May 1963.
Country’s satellite status and were quite happy to use this position to try and influence the Americans. Conversely, Barnett is far more pessimistic in his assessment, "friendship with the United States"? "Powerful and equal partner"? In reality Britain was to remain for the rest of the century and into the next what she had been ever since the latter years of the second World War - a satellite posturing as an equal.\textsuperscript{52}

A major issue for the special relationship was communication between the two nations. This can be seen during the Skybolt crisis, where although members of each Administration spoke to one another they did not communicate their needs, fears, and wider considerations clearly.\textsuperscript{53} In terms of the decolonisation of Africa, the communication between the two nations was far more precise and detailed. This can be explained by the fact that Africa was a much bigger issue with clearer political consequences and as such, there was a greater interest in the area as a whole and in relation to European nations. The fact that discussions took place between the Prime Minister and the President made conveyance of wider considerations and points of view fair easier. While a summit meeting between Macmillan and Kennedy ended the Skybolt crisis, Africa never became a crisis, in part because discussion of the problems only really took place at that level.

However, the division of responsibility for colonial nations between the Colonial and Commonwealth offices made the handling of issues within the Federation extremely complicated as Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were both under the Colonial Office while Southern Rhodesia came under the Office of Commonwealth Relations. This caused a great deal of difficulty when the constitutional reviews were convened (to be discussed in more depth in chapter six) when arguments arose between the Secretary of State for Colonies and the Commonwealth Secretary.\textsuperscript{54} The number of different men that occupied these various roles during Macmillan’s time as Prime Minister also adds the confusion; the position of colonial secretary was changed four times while the Commonwealth secretary was changed twice. The last reshuffle saw the two roles taken by Duncan Sandys, although the two Offices did not

\textsuperscript{51} Brendon, \textit{Decline and Fall}, p. 499.
\textsuperscript{52} Barnett, \textit{Verdict of Peace}, pp.514-5.
\textsuperscript{54} Macmillan, \textit{At the End of the Day}, p.313.
themselves merge until 1966. This would have made direct communication between the British and the Bureau of African Affairs extremely difficult as it was unclear which office to contact regarding which African nation. However, as the remit of the American bureau was contained to developing the role America had in Africa and the British offices to the British exit from the area, there were few reasons for the two departments to interact with each other at all. Although American reactions to policies and incidents in Africa would be considered, they were not the primary focus of these offices; that would be left to Macmillan and the foreign office.\textsuperscript{55}

Within the American government, attention to the situations arising within Africa was assigned to the Bureau of African Affairs and its Assistant Secretary of State. This was one of a number of State Department offices that was tasked with investigating and understanding problems in specific areas of the world. These findings were then used as a basis of either foreign policy or for developing strategies for discussion in meetings. The establishment of the Bureau indicated to Africa and beyond that, America was taking an interest in the area. However, it was created in the latter years of Eisenhower's term it was not utilised as well as it came to be under Kennedy. Kennedy's appointment of G. Mennen Williams to Assistant Secretary brought a level of enthusiasm, purpose, and drive that was unprecedented to such a minor role within American politics.\textsuperscript{56} The reality, however, was that the Bureau of African Affairs did not hold much significance within the State Department and was much less important than other regional departments.\textsuperscript{57} This can be easily explained by the fact that relations with other nations such as Britain were not only more politically and economically significant relations with these countries had already been established. While Africa had the potential to be significant in terms of a larger cold war context, it was still only peripherally important. The fact that African was still in a transitional period towards full independence and the fact they had no historical relations with the US also affected Bureau's significance.

The Bureau of African Affairs and the Department of State were able to create, through thorough investigation, a clear understanding of all the issues in Africa and the

\textsuperscript{55} Prem 11/2587, 'Africa the Next Ten Years', for the Prime Minister, author unknown, 28 June 1959. (Not the report itself)
\textsuperscript{57} Noer, \textit{Cold War in Southern Africa}, p.49.
effects they would have on the British domestic politics. The British too were able to internally evaluate the position of the Americans and anticipate their likely reaction to specific issues. The handling of the Federation as a whole and then Southern Rhodesia as a single territory is a prime example of this.\textsuperscript{58} This is often interpreted, particularly in the Eisenhower period, as American favouring their relations with the United Kingdom over their future relations with the Africans.\textsuperscript{59} However, this fails to appreciate the complicated political landscape that had to be navigated; the British were in control of these areas until independence and were the key to a stable future on the continent. The swift disengagement of African colonies by Britain, while maintaining stability in the face of communist subversion was of paramount importance to the Americans; only then, would there be Africans with which to engage.

**African Decolonisation**

The story of decolonisation across Africa is one of contrasting highs and lows; a complex issue that cannot be narrowed down to one simple narrative. However, the way in which Federation worked over its lifetime can only be fully appreciated when it is taken in the context of Africa as a whole. For David Dickson, 'American foreign policy towards Southern and Central Africa could be described as a series of blunders by successive administrations.'\textsuperscript{60} One example of this is the Portuguese colonies and the way in which the Eisenhower government approached them and for Philip Muehlenbeck, the fact that 'Portugal, unlike Great Britain or France, was only a marginally important ally for Washington, relations with Lisbon are particularly revealing of Eisenhower's position on decolonization.'\textsuperscript{61} Muehlenbeck goes on to suggest that during a visit to Lisbon in 1960 Eisenhower ignored 'his advisers briefing to condemn Lisbon's colonial policies' in a speech to the Portuguese people.\textsuperscript{62} However it is important to note that at this point was in the last few months of his Presidency and that his actual statement that 'there are no great problems between the United

\textsuperscript{58} RG59, General Records of the Bureau of African Affairs, Records relating to Rhodesia and Nyasaland Box 1, Briefing Papers for Your Conversation with Ambassador Whitney, Memoranda, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, (Tab A), 4 August 1959.

\textsuperscript{59} Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans*, p.4.


\textsuperscript{61} Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans*, p.8.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
States and Portugal. And our two nations, despite obstacles set in our paths by others will continue the march towards peace and freedom' does not endorse Portugal's colonial record either.  

Muehlenbeck offers this statement as an indictment of Eisenhower's stance on decolonisation and his pro-European bias however this is a rather simplistic take on a complicated political situation. While there was no strong political connection with Portugal the issue of decolonisation in Africa was an issue for the Americans on a much wider scale. The argument that American could have dealt with Portuguese colonies differently than the colonial responsibilities of their closer allies does not stand up to scrutiny; any deviation of policy would have made the Americans appear hypocritical, indecisive and weak and placed pressure on colonial nations to exit Africa without ensuring the stability needed to prevent communist subversion.

Problems in the neighbouring areas of Katanga and the Congo also affected the perception of Federation and influenced its future, particularly because of the threat of communist infiltration. Alan James states that ‘British concern for restoration and maintenance of law and order in the Congo certainly reflected her immediate interests. But there was also a second and at least an equally compelling local imperative which pointed Britain in the same direction. It was the Congo's geographical position.’ Welensky expressed his support for the leader of Katanga Moise Tshombe and worked with the British against the threat of communist infiltration within the African nationalist movements of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. As Lowry asserts, 'if the impact of Communism on African nationalists was limited by the end of the 1950s belief in a communist threat had certainly become a permanent feature of white Rhodesian political discourse, heightened by the beaming of subversive Soviet broadcasts into the Federation by the end of the decade.'

Kenya provided an example of the impact white settlers could have on African independence. Much like the Federation, the white settler population in Kenya had to be persuaded to accept the need for advancement for Africans and black majority rule.

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64 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
The fact that the events of the Nyasaland Emergency and the Hola massacre, in which eleven detainees in a Kenyan detention camp were killed and many others injured by colonial forces, happened simultaneously further tied these two areas together and created a particularly difficult situation for the British Government. The difference between Kenya and Southern Rhodesia in particular was that Southern Rhodesian whites were in a stronger political position given its status as a self-governing colony. While Southern Rhodesia and the rest of the Federation suffered racial tensions of varying degrees and incidents that embarrassed the British both domestically and internationally, the Federation did not have a horrifying incident like Hola in which the British were so intimately involved.67

Like Kenya, South Africa was an example of the unique problems that decolonisation of white settled African nations presented to the British Government. However, while Kenya presented a work in progress, South African was a stark reminder of how things could progress, particularly in an area with limited British control and influence. South Africa, much like Southern Rhodesia, was an area in which racial tensions ran high and a greater autonomy was exercised. As a self-governing colony, Southern Rhodesia was able to make decisions without British assent or control. As Richard Hall suggests, ‘threats of a 'Boston Tea Party' had to be brought out whenever there were serious political quarrels.68 South Africa's decision to become a Republic and leave the Commonwealth in 1961 made this threat real and the added fear that Southern Rhodesia would join forces with it to expand the ideas of apartheid as a reaction to the growing African nationalist movement. While there were doubts about the practicality of this due to Southern Rhodesia's high African population, moderate racial policies - in comparison to the apartheid regime in South Africa - and white Rhodesians affinity to Britain, there was an anxiety that Southern Rhodesia would see South Africa as inspiration.

America and Africa

America’s interest in Africa was, in the main, a reaction to growing Cold War tensions. The threat of communist subversion across the world was creating fear for the Americans both within its government and in the general populace. Africa was a unique danger; nearly a whole continent of new independent and unaligned nations coming into being in a short period. Economic and political naivety and instability made them potential breeding grounds for communism and their collective significance in the United Nations would make them valuable assets as well as potentially difficult adversaries.69 These concerns meant that even the most basic American principle of freedom and political representation was not as clearly or strongly argued by America as would be expected. The fear that these African nations, lacking in economic and political stability would be left vulnerable to communist infiltration seemed to supersede the cause of Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness all Americans held so dear, possibly due to the inherent risk it posed the for these values for Americans themselves. However, it is also important to consider that while America had a moral obligation to denounce colonialism and fight for political freedoms within Africa, there was also a moral obligation to ensure that this freedom did not come at a high price. It was not unreasonable therefore for America to work with the British to try and ensure that while political freedoms were being achieved this would not create volatile nations that would not only fail to prosper but would become humanitarian disasters.

While there was no immediate threat within Africa that would suggest the Soviets aims to replace colonial powers with their communist influence there was an opportunity to work with the departing powers to ensure that there was no power vacuum for the Soviets to fill. This was an area where prevention rather than reaction was the key and as such, it is much harder to determine the success of the American efforts. There was also an awareness of how American domestic issues, such as civil rights, affected the developing countries.70 In a letter to the President from the Committee on International Policy of the National Planning Association fear is

70 Classified Williams Box 3, The Vice President’s Report to the President on Trip to Africa, February 28–March 21 1957, 7 April 1957.
expressed that 'it is not only in the Middle East that we have been losing ground. As much can be said, though less dramatically, of other parts of Asia and Africa...It requires little imagination to grasp the effectiveness throughout much of Africa of the propaganda material provided our adversaries by the behaviour of Southern extremists.\textsuperscript{71} This fear of communist infiltration in Africa and the damage it could do is echoed by Vice President Richard Nixon in his report on his trip to Africa; 'the communist threat underlines the wisdom and necessity of our assisting the countries of Africa to maintain their independence and to alleviate the conditions of want and instability on which communism breeds.'\textsuperscript{72}

Criticism of the way in which America chose to work with the exiting colonial nations rather than engage with African nationalist leaders was a direct result of this approach.\textsuperscript{73} Had the Americans instead worked alongside the nationalist leaders to push for faster removal of colonial ties this would have solidified their image as crusaders for liberty and freedom but would have damaged their relations with important European allies without guaranteeing the support or alignment of the African nations they offered support. Instead, by using these relations with the Europeans, the Americans were able to help ensure that efforts were made to ensure stability on the continent as well as gain an insight into African politics; this was especially true of the special relationship with Britain.\textsuperscript{74}

In terms of the Colonies and the Commonwealth, British influence and knowledge of the area were required to assist the Americans in preventing communist infiltration.\textsuperscript{75} However, despite Eisenhower's belief that the Third World would be important for America's future, as Ambrose observes, 'Convincing the American people was the trick. Over the next four years, Eisenhower would try every form of persuasion at his command to demonstrate to his countrymen the importance of the Third World

\textsuperscript{71} Dulles, John Foster, Papers, White House Correspondence Series, Box 5, To President from Committee on International Policy of the National Planning Association, 8 October 1957.
\textsuperscript{72} Classified Williams Box 3, The Vice President's Report to the President on Trip to Africa, February 28–March 21 1957, 7 April 1957.
\textsuperscript{73} Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans, p.4.
\textsuperscript{74} Papers of Clarence B. Randall: Journals, 1953-61, Box 7, Memo to Council on Foreign Economic Policy, Subject US Foreign Economic Policy for Africa South of the Sahara (no date).
\textsuperscript{75} FRUS General US Policy Toward Africa, Memorandum from Secretary of State Special Assistant (Holmes) to Secretary of State (Dulles), Report on Africa, 6 February 1958.
to the United States. It was one of the most frustrating experiences of his life.  
  
  More importantly, it was also difficult for Eisenhower to convince his own government. Ambrose notes that Secretary of the Treasury 'Humphrey protested that the United States should not encourage the emerging nations, that it should instead support the French in Algeria, the British in Rhodesia, and so on because the Europeans ran the colonies more effectively and this would improve living conditions faster. Eisenhower replied that 'it is my personal conviction that almost any of the newborn states of the world would rather embrace communism or any other form of dictatorship then to acknowledge the political domination of another government even though that brought to each citizen a far higher standard of living.' This highlights the difficulties the Americans faced in formulating a colonial policy that struck a balance between the desire to assist colonial peoples and maintaining vital relations with European allies.  

While there may have been a split in the Administration as to how to handle the issues of decolonisation, there was a strong belief that Africa should move towards independence. As Dulles noted in a letter to Edgar Hoover in 1955, 'I have over the recent months, and indeed years, taken the occasion to press the British to take a certain leadership in developing the policy of independence for the colonial peoples which would enable us to take the initiative away from the Soviets and the Communists on this matter. President Eisenhower has been pressing the British very hard...However, nothing adequate has yet been done.'  

Nixon also reiterated Eisenhower's belief that Africa was more valuable than the American public yet acknowledged or understood.  

'For many years, Africa in the minds of many Americans has been regarded as a remote and mysterious continent which was the special province of big-game hunters, explorers, and motion picture makers. For such an attitude to exist among the public at large could greatly prejudice the maintenance of our own independence and freedom because the  

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76 Ambrose, Eisenhower, p.377.  
77 Ibid.  
79 John Foster Dulles Papers, 1951-59, Subject Series, Box 7, Memo for Hoover, 23 November 1955.
emergence of a free and independent Africa is as important to us in the long run as it is to the people of that continent.\textsuperscript{80}

While Nixon supported the establishment of the Bureau of African Affairs, he also noted that 'this in itself will not be enough. There must be corresponding realization throughout the Executive branches of the Government, throughout Congress and throughout the nation, of the growing importance of Africa to the United States and the free World and the necessity of assigning higher priority to our relations with that area.'\textsuperscript{81}

Noer argues that 'While many in the United States did not foresee that decolonisation would occur as rapidly as it did, it was clear that colonialism in Africa was dying. Faced with the prospect of a sizable number of new nations in the immediate future, Washington accepted the inevitable.'\textsuperscript{82} While it is true that rapid decolonisation was not entirely foreseen, it was encouraged by the Americans.\textsuperscript{83}

Arguably, the rate at which African nations began to emerge in the early 1960s created more problems than the Americans had expected in both the UN and elsewhere causing some anxiety within the Administration.\textsuperscript{84} There seems to be a sense that both the British and the Americans did not know how fast they wanted decolonisation to progress; speed was best in terms of preventing internal disorder within African nations, however measured and steady progress was best for preventing a possible vacuum for the communists to fill.\textsuperscript{85}

The essence of the situation is that it was unprecedented, covered a great area of land and vastly different nations with vastly different needs.\textsuperscript{86} The biggest advance in African policy during this time was perhaps the realisation that Africa could not be dealt with on a grand scale, that African policy could not be a broad and sweeping and that each nation, or at least groups of nations with similar problems and outlooks, needed to be treated separately. African policy had to be a collection of policies and

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[80]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[81]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[82]{Noer, \textit{Cold War in Southern Africa}, p.49.}
\footnotetext[83]{Ibid; FRUS Telegram for the Mission at the UN to Department of State, Development in Africa, 17 March 1959.}
\footnotetext[84]{Zinn, \textit{A Peoples History}, p.429.}
\footnotetext[85]{FRUS, National Security Council Report, The Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on US Policy toward Africa South of the Sahara prior to Calendar Year 1960, 26 August 1958.}
\footnotetext[86]{FRUS General US Policy toward Africa, Memorandum from Secretary of State Special Assistant (Holmes) to Secretary of State (Dulles), Report on Africa, 6 February 1958.}
\end{footnotes}
this created a tremendous problem: how to create a coherent and clear African policy that could be understood by the American people as well as the African nations.87

Areas such as the Federation created unique problems due in part to their significant white population but also due to their political make-up and the promises that had been made.88 The Federation needed to be, unlike most other African territories, dealt with as both a whole and as three separate parts. While Southern Rhodesia's affairs were the responsibility of the Commonwealth Office, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as British protectorates, were under the Colonial Office. While other African nations were moving towards self-rule, the Federation was on course for a very different kind of system for independence in the form of Dominion status as a group of nations under the current federal system.89

After Suez the Americans faced a reality in which their strength as a superpower was at its most effective when it was supported by allies, as Thompson asserts Eisenhower 'had learned too well the importance of co-operation among the Allies in World War Two to ignore its necessity in the Cold War'.90 For Ambrose 'Suez made Eisenhower almost painfully aware of the importance of the third World to the United States, which was why he made it not only the theme of his second inaugural speech but of much of his second term.'91 The difficulty was that the United States had very little direct influence over Africa; this is where the relationship with Britain became useful. Close co-operation with the British allowed the Americans to if not influence, then at the very least be aware of both the problems facing Britain in Africa and their proposed solutions.92 In this sense, the British for once were the ones with

87 Ambrose, Eisenhower, p.377
91 Ambrose, Eisenhower, p.376.
92 RG 59 Records of the Department of State, Records Relating to Rhodesia and Nyasaland Box 1, C. Vaughan Ferguson Jr, Frederick Picard, Approach to UK Government Concerning Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 3 August 1960.
the power and influence; it was their knowledge, understanding, and their relations with Africa that were needed.93

Macmillan and Eisenhower had an opportunity therefore to re-establish the special relationship and move it forward. This would rely heavily on the personal relations that they had founded during the war, which, coupled with a set of aims that would be best served together, set the scene for a new high in the story of the special relationship.

93 FRUS General US Policy Toward Africa, Memorandum from Secretary of State Special Assistant (Holmes) to Secretary of State (Dulles), Report on Africa, 6 February 1958.
Chapter Two:

Ike and Mac: Anglo-American relations and Decolonisation.

Macmillan and Eisenhower were in a unique position in 1957: while Anglo-American relations of the past had been borne out of the need to co-operate during war or maintain close relations in its aftermath, the Macmillan-Eisenhower era started after a period of crisis in relations.¹ Rebuilding was the key to the early part of this era and as such, the very nature of the relationship changed, as did public opinion regarding both its effectiveness and its need.² There was a simultaneous awareness of both the limits and the necessity of the special relationship during this period. Suez had shown that the special relationship could only exist if both sides had the same aims and the breakdown of the relationship had shown both sides the value of the alliance.³

Africa and decolonisation were fast becoming big issues for the Eisenhower government and the Suez crisis had brought into focus not only the relationship with the United Kingdom but the significance of emerging nations in the third world. The danger of communist subversion in such a vast area, coupled with the dangers of losing influence in an area with pockets significant resources, such as the Northern Rhodesian copper belt grabbed the attention of American policy makers. The way in which the Americans were perceived by these countries also became more and more important as they became independent. The link between African independence and American civil rights started to become apparent in this period and so Africa began to have a much wider influence on American political thinking.

² Coker, Foreign and Defence Policy, p.9.
³ Dickie, Special No More, p.96.
Eisenhower and Britain

Although the nature of the relationship, the role Britain had to play in it and the importance placed on it by the Americans can be debated, it is clear from archival evidence that both Eisenhower and Macmillan valued the Anglo-American alliance and strove to repair any damage caused by Suez. Eisenhower was aware of the value of Anglo-American relations and the need to encourage closer and stronger ties. During a meeting with Macmillan in Washington in October 1957, Eisenhower recognised the need for a deeper union between the UK and the US, stating that 'we should develop ourselves as better partners, almost to the point of operating together under one general policy.' However he was also keen to point out that although 'our two nations, having so much in common and bearing much the same responsibilities, have got to stay together...this does not mean...that we will not be full partners of other countries as well.' In fact, in a Legislative Leadership meeting in 1959, Eisenhower suggested the idea of the US, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand could form 'one great government.' While this idea seems impractical, it does illustrate that relations with Britain and its stronger Commonwealth nations was an attractive proposition to the Americans. It also seems to add credence to the idea that commonality of language was a vital factor in close relations with the US, explaining why Britain was able to foster such close ties.

However, the status of Britain had significantly changed after the Second World War and the Americans were acutely aware of this. The damage of war, the rise of the superpowers and the beginning of the long process of dismantling its once grand and vast empire cast Britain in a smaller role than it had historically been accustomed. The rise of the European Economic Community (EEC) without British involvement had

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5 DDE, Papers as President, US Papers, Ann Whitman Files, Box 23, Macmillan talks, Washington 23-25 October 1957, Memorandum of Conversation, 24 October 1957, Subject: Free World co-operation; Meeting Presided over by the President and Prime Minister Macmillan.
6 Ibid.
7 DDE, Papers as President 1953-61, Legislative Meetings Series, Box 3, Notes on Legislative leadership meeting, 24 March 1959.
8 DDE, Papers as President, 1953-61 (AWF) Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 11, Staff Notes No. 280, 16 January 1958; Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, p.225; Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, p.203; Brendon, Decline and Fall, p.498.
also led to renewed questions over Britain’s world power status. While the EEC had not yet climbed to a position of competitor to the United Kingdom in the fight to be America’s closest ally the organisation was making great strides. However, the EEC also opened up an opportunity for the British to strengthen its alliance with the US by becoming a member and using its position to become an intermediary between Europe and the US. The Europeans were not blind to the Trojan horse threat Britain posed, particularly French President Charles de Gaulle. The 1950s and 1960s were fast becoming the era in which Britain’s importance lay not with the decisions it made for itself but the influence it could have on the decisions of others.  

Historian Roger Louis notes that ‘relations between Britain and the United States largely offset British decline in the international system.’ However John Darwin suggests that the 1959-64 ‘marked the onset of Britain’s final transformation from global power with an overseas Empire and considerable capacity of independent action, into a regional power whose remaining overseas possessions were more of an embarrassment than a source of strength.’ Ritchie Ovendale, states that ‘Eisenhower demoted Britain when he came to power’ and that while ‘Washington thought that London would be useful with its experience and strategic important military bases, but many Americans leaders considered that the Anglo-American alliance was more importance to Britain’s than it was to the United States.’ This view point is further supported by Howard Temperley’s analysis that ‘the United States still needed allies, and British support was valued…but to harp on, as the British did, about a ‘special relationship’, as in the expectation of being granted favours, came to be regarded by Americans as something of a joke.’

When Harold Macmillan assumed the role of British Prime Minister, he made it a point of urgency to repair any damage to Anglo-American relations that had occurred after Suez, but more importantly he sought to develop a new relationship with both the American President and the American nation as a whole. Macmillan’s aim was that

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10 Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p.500.
11 Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, p.222.
12 Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations, p.103.
14 Temperley, Britain and America, p.190.
Britain move forward from the difficulties over Suez to create a new era in the relationship. Macmillan himself noted that, 'in our lifetime we have been pretty close together, our countries. Of course we have had differences; there is no good in denying them. There have been serious differences after the war...but the greatest thing about it is we never look backwards, we look forward.'\(^{15}\)

Harold Macmillan was an extremely complex political personality, receiving admiration and loathing in equal measure by both his contemporaries and historians. Sir Roy Welensky was, by the end of his time as Federal Prime Minister, a fierce critic, particularly of his political duplicity; although in his early days, Macmillan had impressed Welensky with his 'outstanding qualities of leadership.'\(^{16}\) However, this impression deteriorated during the lifetime of the Federation, resulting in Welensky to later to comment that 'I always hoped against hope that it wouldn’t happen, that this great Empire would flounder. Little did I think that I would see it flounder before my eyes under the inept handling of a man like Macmillan.'\(^{17}\) Historian Correlli Barnett describes Macmillan as 'Eden's scheming successor'\(^{18}\) and 'a snaggle-toothed, staggy-moustached, droopy-eyed...phoney Edwardian English gent...equipped with small 'l' liberal prejudice, slippery political cunning and remorseless ambition.'\(^{19}\)

As historian, Nigel Ashton, notes he projected a 'veneer of detachment and languor, which he cultivated to conceal his ambition.'\(^{20}\) Similarly, the American Department of State biographic intelligence report on Macmillan states that 'underneath his Edwardian appearance and calm and relaxed manner, Macmillan hides a determined and confident personality.'\(^{21}\) There is a sense that Macmillan played a political game, creating the persona of a political grandfather to hide both his ambitious nature and his political abilities. Long before the spin-doctors in the 1990s British political scene Macmillan was cultivating an image that hid his ruthlessness and his intentions in order to manipulate situations to his benefit.

\(^{15}\) MS Macmillan, c.353 The Radio and Television Broadcast by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan at 10 Downing Street, 31 August 1959.
\(^{16}\) MSS Welensky 683/5 Sir Roy Welensky to Don Wilese, 22 July 1957.
\(^{17}\) Ibid, 590/3, Sir Roy Welensky to O.B. Bennett, 31 December 1962.
\(^{18}\) Barnett, Verdict of Peace, p.510.
\(^{19}\) Ibid, p.125.
\(^{20}\) Ashton, "Golden Days", p.700.
\(^{21}\) DDE, Papers as President, White House Central Files (Confidential Files), 1953-61, Subject Series, Box 78, Department of State, Division of Biographic Intelligence, Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, United Kingdom, March 1959.
All this alludes to a darker aspect of Macmillan's character, an aspect that would see him accused of foul play and Machiavellian tendencies by politicians that felt betrayed by his actions. Appearances were definitely deceiving when it came to Macmillan, as were, it could be argued, his true intentions. It is very difficult to garner a clear idea of who Macmillan really was or what his aims were as a politician. Details contained in his memoirs often conflict with the memories of others, as well as official documents and even his own diary entries. However, during his time in office he was often called 'Supermac' by commentators and news reporters, after an ironic portrayal in a cartoon published in the London Evening Standard that became an integral part of his long-term image. Historian D.R. Thorpe notes, 'Macmillan with his drooping moustache, off duty plus fours and speeches full of learned literary allusions, was never the glass of fashion or the mould of form, yet he had not been widely characterised as an out of touch old fogey.'

While it is certainly true that the two leaders enjoyed a close personal friendship and connection, it is perhaps unfair to merely categorised the relationship as positive, cosy, and nice and ignore the deeper complexities that existed. In the story of the special relationship Eisenhower and Macmillan rarely warrant much more than a footnote to the perceived highlight of the Kennedy and Macmillan relationship that followed. While there is certainly evidence of a more unlikely and possibly more politically productive relationship that existed between Macmillan and Kennedy, the Macmillan and Eisenhower relationship has suffered from under appreciation as well as underdeveloped study. As Geelhoed and Edmonds assert 'a more realistic assessment of the effectiveness of the Eisenhower Macmillan partnership lies in an analysis of how each leader managed to use the partnership to achieve his own objectives.'

The relationship between Macmillan and Eisenhower was built upon a shared history and past personal relations. As Eisenhower notes in a farewell letter to Macmillan, there was a deep satisfaction brought to him by 'the close relationship which has existed between us from the dramatic days of World War Two up to the

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Correspondence between them certainly paints a picture of two men that mutually respect and feel genuine affection towards each other personally. Letters between the two began with the informal 'dear friend' and usually included some reference to personal appreciation, admiration, or gratitude. In a letter Macmillan sent to Eisenhower the occasion of his birthday in 1957, Macmillan states that 'as one gets older birthdays become less a matter of congratulations, but I still feel they are an occasion for sending messages of friendship. I need not tell you how much I have valued the friendship between us.'

The relationship can also be seen in the 'Mac and Ike Show' broadcast on the BBC in 1959 in which the two leaders discussed political matters and the strength of Anglo-American relations together on national television. These heavily scripted 'informal chats' gave the public a chance to see Macmillan and Eisenhower discuss the perils they faced and the close relationship that Macmillan and the Americans, shared. In this show, Eisenhower stated that 'ever since 1941 I have been engaged in activities where one of my principal concerns has been the state and the strength of relations between your country and ours. And I can say through that long experience that those relations have never been stronger and better than they are now.'

However, Macmillan does not escape criticism from Eisenhower or other members of the American administration. Both Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and the President were disappointed that fellow conservative Richard Butler had not become Prime Minister instead of Macmillan. Eisenhower felt that 'Butler would have been easier to work with--that Macmillan and Eden were somewhat alike in the fact that they both could not bear to see the dying of Britain as a Colonial Power.' Dulles also expressed disappointment at Macmillan's appointment, also preferring Butler. In a discussion with James Reston, a reporter for the New York Times, Macmillan is described by the journalist as, 'the most relaxed Prime Minister since Asquith...he

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26 MS Macmillan, c.353 The Radio and Television Broadcast by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan at 10 Downing Street, 31 August 1959.
27 DDE, Papers as President 1953-61, Ann Whitman Files, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 8, Diary entry, 10 January 1957.
28 John Foster Dulles, Telephone Conversation Series, Box 6, Call to Secretary Humphrey, 10 January, 1957.
loved life, literature and the publishing business, and was above all the political battle most of his life, never having dreamed of being Prime Minister until perhaps four months before he took office. His approach is easy and philosophical but he has no political sex appeal."\(^{29}\)

While it can be argued that America's focus on Africa had been formed and influenced by their relations with the colonial powers, particularly Britain. Instead of forming polices on what was best of Africa, the interests of the colonial powers were also considered. This should not be unexpected as the disentanglement of Europe from Africa had been the main issue and the established relationships between America and European powers had been the key to America's ability to influence policy in Africa during this period. Politically, it would be sensible and reasonable for America to rely on colonial intelligence to help judge the readiness of African nations and push for independence.\(^{30}\) Although some communication could be held between the US and prospective African leaders, there were no actual African governments in which to engage with on a meaningful level until independence had at least been tabled and date set. Colonial powers were still in charge and as such, dialogue had to be between Europeans and the US at least in terms of the progression of the decolonisation process. It was also vital that the US kept in close communication with the colonial powers to anticipate any possible problems, encourage the decolonisation process, and create a clear understanding of the individual nations and the wider issues at play.

\(^{29}\) Christian Herter, Secretary of State Papers, Chronological File, February 1960 (1), Box 9, Memo of Conversation, Christian Herter and James Reston, Subject, Interviews with Khrushchev, Adenauer and Macmillan, 24 October 1957.

Eisenhower and Africa

Eisenhower was, like Macmillan, a figure representing the establishment and the old guard.\(^3\) By 1957 he was in his second and final term in office and as such could be regarded as a lame duck politically; with only three years left of his administration his reaction to new problems, such as the decolonisation of Africa, would be far more measured and lacking in firm Presidential guidance. While new developments in thinking were beginning to take shape in the various government departments, they did not necessarily filter through to the top level during the late 1950s.\(^3\) A major factor was the fact that many of the major developments that placed Africa centrally in world affairs did not happen until Eisenhower’s last year of office, which created the illusion that he was behind in his political thinking. Ghanaian independence in 1957 followed by Guinean independence in 1958 opened the doors for decolonisation of Africa but it was not until 1960, when seventeen new nations came into being, that African independence became a truly important issue.

The Eisenhower Administration was, however, in place during those years of preparation for African independence and the creation of the Bureau of African Affairs in 1958 signalled the significance Africa was gaining within the State Department.\(^3\) Nixon also took trips to Africa\(^4\) and gave significant attention to the area in his election campaign, although arguably, this could be seen to be a reaction to the Kennedy side, which placed Africa in the centre of its campaign.\(^5\) The Eisenhower Administration therefore, should not be so easily dismissed as unaware or indifferent to Africa. While the development of African independence led it to become primarily an issue of the 1960s, the late 1950s were a time of great investigation and preparation.

However, Nixon was not the only member of the administration to visit and report on Africa during this period. Clarence Randall, the chair of the Council on

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\(^3\) DDE, Papers as President, Ann Whitman Files, DDE series, Box 37, Special Staff Notes, Director Smith Trip to Africa (Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Tunisia), 22 December 1958; Director Smith’s Observations on his Trip to Africa, November 2-22, 1958.
\(^4\) RG 59, Classified Williams, Box 3, Vice President Nixon, Report to President on Trips to Africa 28 February - 21 March 1957, 7 April 1957.
Foreign Economic Policy, also visited many areas in Africa, bringing back his assessment of both the political and economic situations in each country and his appraisal of the way in which America should handle the changing situation in Africa, including the relations with the various metropoles. Randall did make a visit to the Federation and was able to write to the joint East and Central Africa Board in March 1958 of his confidence in the Federation. However, Muehlenbeck criticises Randall's visit as 'he met exclusively with European colonial governors' which therefore massively influenced his view of the situation in Africa.

It would be incorrect to state that the Eisenhower administration did not recognised Africa as a vital issue for the future, or ignored it completely. There were two key reasons for Africa to become a significant area of interest for America during the 1950s. The first was the fact that Africa was to become a large mass of new, non-aligned nations open to communist subversion and the second was the continuity of trade and business with these new nations where business had been established as well as creating new economic ties with countries with vast natural resources. In many ways, the two issues were not separate but part of the larger Cold War issue as trade opportunities with the United States could result in these nations moving away from communist countries. However, in many ways, it also meant that these same nations were more valuable to the US than the US was to them and as such a fear of losing them and their resources to the communists.

The Eisenhower government’s stance on Cold War is vital to the understanding of its policy towards Africa at this time. The policy of massive retaliation and the Eisenhower Doctrine in relation to the Middle East were both indicative of the Administration's robust, no compromise stance on the threat of communism. The massive retaliation policy referred to the idea that nuclear arsenals had to be upgraded and maintained to create fear and dissuade an enemy attack of any form, as it would be met by a complete and deadly nuclear response by the Americans.

37 Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans, p.7.
38 Ambrose, Eisenhower, p.376; MS Macmillan, c.353 The Radio and Television Broadcast by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan at 10 Downing Street, 31 August 1959.
39 Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, p.225; Brendon, Decline and Fall, pp. 497-98; Brendon, Ike, p.337.
40 Ibid.
Similarly, the Eisenhower Doctrine offered Aid and assistance to any Middle East nation that was threatened by another nation. This created an atmosphere of fear and suspicion, especially of nations unwilling or unable to choose an allegiance to either Superpower. Muehlenbeck notes that 'Eisenhower’s perception of African nationalism was greatly influenced by the principal architect of his foreign policy, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Dulles believed that Third World nationalism was a tool of Moscow’s creation rather than a natural outgrowth of the colonial experience. The idea of neutral states was not popular with the American Government, for obvious reasons; aid and assistance given to a country that did not openly reject communism could result in the misuse of American funds and expertise on a nation that would eventually align themselves with the Soviet Union.

In a meeting of the National Security Council in 1960, Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon stated that 'in several areas of Africa, the Soviets were trying to break in. To cooperate with them would only cause them the get in earlier and easier. We had to compete, although not on every program, country, or thing. We should pick out those things that we could do best and concentrate on them, getting together with other free world nations on those things.' Dillon further recognised that the Americans could not hope to win all across Africa, noting that 'we should prevent the Soviets from graining a major position in Africa, although we will have to adjust to some Soviet presence.' However, what the Americans did, fail to recognise were the sensitivities and difficulties newly independent countries who wanted to break ties with their old colonial powers and truly go it alone faced. Although many nations remained on friendly terms with their former rulers, the creation of the Commonwealth was a major example of this, the need for independence to appear as clear as possible was vital.

By aligning themselves with the West the old colonial ties could not be severed as completely as these nations wanted and needed them to be. There was also

41 Ibid.
42 Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans, pp.3-4.
43 Ibid, p.4; DDE, Papers as President 1953-61, (AW File), International Series, Box 25(a), Briefing Paper for Talks with Prime Minister Macmillan, September 27 1960; Dulles, John Foster, Papers, 1951-59, General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, Box 2, C.D. Jackson to Dulles, 9 February 1959.
44 FRUS, Memorandum of Discussion at the 436th Meeting of the National Security Council, 18 August 1960.
something to be gained by neutrality; with each side vying to support the African independence, the African nations could use this as a bargaining tool to get more assistance. Under Secretary Dillon gave a brief acknowledgement of this issue noting 'the more these countries could play the USSR off against the West, the higher would be the cost to us.'\textsuperscript{45} However, this failed to see the potential benefits for the African nations, only the potential difficulties it posed the American government. This was a major downfall of the Americans at this time as the failure to consider African needs meant that they were often regarded as being either uninformed or ignorant of, the situation in the area.\textsuperscript{46} While this was not the case, the Americans were not yet in the position to have developed coherent and comprehensive African policy for independent Africa. The mistakes made by Eisenhower in the first few years of African independence could be rectified by the time Kennedy came to office as Eisenhower was in charge during an era of trial and error while Kennedy was able to exploit the lessons learnt. This created the illusion that Eisenhower did nothing and Kennedy did everything for Africa and Africans.

The Cold War was never far from the minds of American political figures when developing policies and even government departments to deal with the Africa issue. In a statement before the Foreign Affairs Committee discussing the creation of the post of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dulles remarked that, 'With 21 new nations, and others at the threshold of independence, we endeavour to help them retain genuine independence and overcome the difficulties and dangers inherent in the early stages of independence when, according to communist doctrine, such states are susceptible to being 'amalgamated' into the communist bloc with the total loss of their independence.'\textsuperscript{47} Africa became important in terms of the Cold War as decolonisation in the area was in danger of creating vacuum of power that could be exploited by the communists. The Cold War turned all non-aligned nations into prizes to be won for both sides and so a battle for the hearts and minds of Africa commenced as soon as the decolonisation process began, if not earlier.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{46} MSS Welensky, 636/12, Lewanika to Welensky, 10 October 1959.
\textsuperscript{47} DDE, Papers as President 1953-1961, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 11, Statement by the Honorable John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 28 January 1959.
The issue of Africa was firmly on the agenda of the Eisenhower Administration and there was a deep understanding of both the problems facing the colonial powers and the African nations during the decolonisation process. There was also a keen sense of what areas and issues would become problem areas in the future, despite the fact there was often a lack of understanding of the psychological meaning of independence for Africans, as illustrated earlier. Eisenhower was quick to congratulate Macmillan personally on his Winds of Change speech, and encouraged his trip to Africa ‘in view of the important role Africa is likely to play during the coming decade.’\textsuperscript{48} However, his advocacy of African independence was always measured in terms of the effect on the Cold War balance of power, thus a paradox was created within the Administration wherein African independence was simultaneously supported and feared.

The problem America created with their stance against neutralism and their acquiescence to European colonial powers was that it allowed African nations to believe that America was not on their side. The damage done to American prestige in the area was not fully appreciated, particularly when the Americans chose not to engage with newly independent African nations or those close to it in the same way that the Soviets did.\textsuperscript{49} These failures can be explained by Eisenhower’s limitations as a President with only months left in office and his desire to protect ties with old European allies over the establishment of new relations with new African nations and were acknowledged by the Kennedy campaign.\textsuperscript{50} However, by not fostering any kind of rapport with leaders of new African nations the Americans allowed the Soviets to gain the upper hand and make inroads on the continent without any American effort to counter it.\textsuperscript{51} For the Eisenhower administration the focus was place upon the colonial powers ensuring that the African nations they moved towards independence were strong enough economically and politically to not be tempted by communism. The Americans wanted to allow the Europeans enough time and space to decolonise Africa

\textsuperscript{49} Muehlenbeck, \textit{Betting on the Africans}, p.33
\textsuperscript{50} Papers of President Kennedy, Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files, Legislation, Legislation Files 1953-60, 1960 Foreign Policy: Central (cont.) - Foreign Policy: Atlantic Unity, Box 736, Laura Hahn to Senator Kennedy, 31 January 1960.
\textsuperscript{51} Christian Herter, Secretary of State Papers, Chorological File, February 1960 (1), Box 9, Memorandum for The President, Proposed Personal Message to the First African Regional Conference of the International Labor Organisation, attached to Memorandum for A.J. Goodpaster, 8 December 1960.
without adding pressure through the UN, NATO, or public support for African nationalism. While Africa was on the Eisenhower administration's radar it was very much in terms of the Cold War, European relations and wider political ideas; Africans seem to be strangely absent from the picture. However, while this shows a lack of foresight on behalf of the administration it is perhaps the natural result of policy development that while trying to fulfil immediate objectives that others are created or overlooked. In terms of Africa, the focus was on ensuring that African nations became independent when they were ready and were strong enough to survive the communist threat, what was ignored was the idea that by bypassing Africans the Soviets were allowed a foothold that could have undermined all this.

In the main, the focus of Eisenhower's African policy was within the wider context of both the Cold War generally and the threat of communist subversion of new African nations. The correlation between African independence and the independence battles America fought against Colonialism in the 1700s was not lost on the Administration and was used as a symbol of empathy. However, Dulles also drew another comparison between early America and early Africa, stating that there was an understanding of American limitations during the beginnings of their journey towards independence that Africa did not yet possess. Dulles states that: 'the founders of our own nations, who were possessed of great political wisdom, realized that popular intuitions, where the people directly picked those who would govern, were highly dangerous in the absence of an electorate which was not only literate, but broadly educated and which accepted the basic principles of moral law. Although the population of our colonies went far to meet these tests, those who framed our constitution felt it unwise to admit of direct popular vote except to a limited extent.'

This illustrates that the US were also guilty of occasionally subscribing to the antiquated thinking that Africans were less civilised and educated, much like British and Federal Ministers at the time. However, it also shows that the Administration was

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52 Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans, pp.7-8.
53 FRUS, Memorandum of Discussion at the 436th Meeting of the National Security Council, 18 August 1960.
54 DDE, Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman Files) Dulles -Herter Series, Box 11, Statement by the Honorable John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 14 January 1959.
aware of the risks on the African continent in the future when decolonisation was realise.

The biggest difficulty in the anti-colonial movement was to balance colonial disengagement with ensuring that the nations were truly ready for the responsibility. Unstable nations would not be conducive to a productive and harmonious world and could create humanitarian as well as political problems for future generations. This was a particular point of interest for the American government who would not only concerned with possible communist subversion, but would also be called upon by these nations for aid and assistance in the years that followed their independence. For Dulles, the danger was that 'this sudden leap from being governed to direct popular government is fraught with great peril. It means that in fact their will, in most cases, still be a dictatorship; namely, the dictatorship of that group which is able to arouse mass emotions and sweep the people into one course or another without reflection or sober choice.' In these early days of the process, the moral and ethical issues of decolonisation were still debatable. Although the US stood for independence and freedom, it had to acknowledge the dangers that this independence could pose if the population was not ready. However, it was also unethical for the US to decide unilaterally, if these nations were ready. This created a situation of uncertainty and caution within the Administration.

The Americans did have to juggle, much like the colonial powers in charge of these African nations, the need to support the anti-colonialism movement and the need to ensure the independence did not destabilise the vulnerable new nations. C. Vaughan Ferguson Jr., director of the Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs suggests that the US and the UK 'on the subject of colonialism and nationalism...we are in general agreement.' However he also states that 'I am not sure that in our previous discussions we paid sufficient attention to the great danger to all of Africa

59 Ibid.
that could arise from premature or disorderly independence on the part of an area that is neither politically, socially nor economically ready for such a changed situation.\textsuperscript{60} Randall, therefore, urged caution in American foreign policy stating that, 'it seems to me that while emphasizing United States support for the legitimate aspirations of all African peoples to conduct their own affairs, we must not support such movements blindly or without consideration of the consequences that could arise from premature breaking of the present ties a given area has with a European metropole.'\textsuperscript{61}

This of course grated with the anti-colonial posture of the Eisenhower Administration and the United States in general, and their stance on independence, liberty, and freedom for all. This perhaps shows the complexity of the issue as a whole, as well as the difficulty of creating policy that satisfies the various needs and opinions. It does show the inconsistency of policy and thought toward Africa at the time due to the infancy of the issue. It seems that because Eisenhower was preparing for a future issue, the American stance was often a victim of current affairs and the internal debate happening within the State department itself over what exactly American Africa policy should be.\textsuperscript{62} There was no previous example of that could be used to guide policy development; it was being created as problems arose and as successes were achieved. In this sense inaction within the State Department and the Administration as a whole can be more easily explained and justified without being dismissed as merely disinterest.

Muehlenbeck claims that 'Africa was of such minor importance for the Administration that the State Department made no distinction between the peoples of the continent either in objectives or policy guidance. Instead, Africa was treated as a single political unit.'\textsuperscript{63} However, archival evidence seems to suggest that there was a clear awareness within the Administration of the difficulties and complexities of that Africa posed as a continent and in terms of individual nations. In a memorandum to the Commission of Foreign Economic Policy by its Chairman Clarence Randall, he noted that Africa was, 'characterized by an infinite variety of languages, religions, racial

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{62} Duignan and Gann, The United States and Africa, p.286.
\textsuperscript{63} Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans, p.5.
differences, and relations with their metropole countries’, and as such 'cannot be thought of as an entity. There can be no common denominator of policy which runs through the continent as a whole. Each of the major areas must be evaluated separately.' This is the crux of the matter; Africa was a continent not a country and as such, policy could not be created in a 'one size fits all' manner. The British territories, as opposed to other European colonies, had one vital and advantage in that English was spoken by all the governments involved and by the nationalist leaders, making communication easier for the Americans.

**Eisenhower and Federation**

There was a clear understanding of the issues in Southern Rhodesia in 1960 in State and intelligence material reported to the President. A summary states that:

'African nationalists rioting at Bulawayo has continued despite strenuous effort by 2,000 police and troops. The Africans, aroused by developments in the Congo, are protesting the arrest last week of several nationalist leaders. The white settler government apparently continues to miscalculate the intensity of African aspiration. The government may be pursuing a tough policy to convince the European electorate, - in advance of possible parliamentary elections this fall - that the present regime will defend white interests as strongly as would the right wing opposition party.'

The problem of white settlers and the lack of understanding they had towards the black majority's needs and wants is clearly illustrated and understood by the Americans. This understanding helped the US to appreciate the difficulties that the

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64 Papers of Clarence B. Randall: Journals, 1953-61, Box 7, Memo to Council on Foreign Economic Policy, Subject US Foreign Economic Policy for Africa South of the Sahara (no date).
65 DDE, Papers as President 1953-1961, Ann Whitman File, Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary Series, Box 51, Synopsis of State and Intelligence Material to be reported to the President, 27 July 1960.
British faced in the area. This in turn affected the way in which the US tried to influence the British; while they offered no solutions themselves their sympathy was underpinned by the emphasis that a solution needed to be found as soon as possible to secure African independence without compromising the area in terms of the Cold War.\(^67\)

Although there had been trouble in Southern Rhodesia in that period during which, 'confidence in the good sense of the country, or at any rate, some of its leaders, was sorely tested. Good sense, however, reasserted itself in the end.'\(^68\) Randall was able to claim that his visit in 1958 however, had left him 'with the definite feeling that the personal relations between Europeans and Africans are improving steadily.' He also claimed that 'if mischief-makers at home would only leave the subject alone the improvement might be even more rapid.'\(^69\) This perfectly illustrates the idea that while the US had an opinion on what was needed to be achieved they had no clear answers to the question of how they could achieve them. It also touches upon the idea that, much like Britain, there were elements of the US that supported the white settlers and were making an already complicated issue all the more complex.

However, he went on to give an example of incident in which an African man was spoken to rudely by shop assistant in a Salisbury store, describing it as, 'very sad that the efforts of the vast majority of a country should be upset by a small number of ill-bred men or women who in fact, just don’t know how to talk to people of a lower social class.'\(^70\) This statement does seem to undermine the issue of racism, especially when it is taken into account that the African involved is described as 'well dressed and well spoken', which seems to infer that he was above the perceived usual African standard.\(^71\) The overall impression that racism, or at least the treatment of Africans, did have a negative impact as 'no houses, schools, hospitals, or votes can ever

\(^{67}\) Dulles, John Foster Papers, 1951-59, General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, Box 2, C.D. Jackson to Dulles, 9 February 1959.


\(^{69}\) Ibid.

\(^{70}\) Ibid.

\(^{71}\) Ibid.
compensate for the bitterness engendered by this sort of behaviour’ does help balance the viewpoint slightly. 72

The key issue for the Eisenhower Administration was timing; the development of the issues in Africa and the progress of government intelligence on these concerns ran concurrently to such an extent that when the issue exploded and much of the action was taken Eisenhower had left office. This creates the false impression that Eisenhower did very little, if anything regarding Africa, when in reality he had little to do during his time except develop the intelligence in order to address the problems as they arose. 73 However, Noer claims Nixon in fact led the push for a more active African policy. 74 However had the Eisenhower Administration been truly stagnant there would have been little development of African policy. The creation of the Bureau of African Affairs and the post of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs clearly demonstrate that African was being taken seriously as an issue and that moves were being made to create and develop policy and intelligence.

One of the main concerns identified by the Eisenhower Administration was the effect of race relations and civil rights issues on their image abroad, particularly in Africa, as well as how African independence influenced the movement in America. 75 This knock on effect was immensely important and the new African nations caused great diplomatic issues for America, not only as the host nation of the United Nations, but also in establishing friendly diplomatic relations with these new nations. Segregation, racial abuse, and attacks were reported in African news and were being experienced by African politicians, diplomats, and students visiting the United States. More importantly perhaps, these issues were being exploited by the Soviet Union as a propaganda tool. 76

Visiting African representatives in the United States created a number of issues during this period. Racism had a real effect on the day-to-day experiences of African diplomats and political figures, which affected their ability to exist in America in the

72 Ibid.
73 Duignan and Gann, The United States and Africa, p.288.
74 Noer, Cold War in Southern Africa, p.49.
76 Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, p.121; Noer, Cold War in Southern Africa, p.52.
simplest of ways. As early as 1957, the Ghanaian Finance Minister was refused permission to drink orange juice and coffee he had ordered from a restaurant in Delaware. As a result of this incident, he was later invited to breakfast with the President and Vice President in an attempt to mend fences. This sort of incident, though seemingly trivial on the one hand, was a humiliating experience for both the Minister and the American government as a whole. The United States, which hoped to lead new nations and claimed itself to be the land of the free was unable to ensure that a visiting dignitary was afforded the freedom experienced by all people, because they were unable to guarantee this for the millions of African American either. This issue ran through the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations and linked civil rights with African independence in an unbreakable bond.

One of the main civil rights problems in the late 1950s was the desegregation of public schools in America and the battle to both enforce and prevent it. The Little Rock school incident in 1957 became a symbol of this fight and reporting of the incident made it an international matter. The deployment of troops to secure the safety of nine students in a school in Arkansas created many international public relations issues for the American Government and affected the prestige of the Administration both positively and negatively.

The fact that segregation existed, and was defended by such large portions of American society, was unsettling for many African nations. The implementation of the findings of the Brown versus the Board of Education ruling of 1954, that segregation in schools was wrong and the use of all Federal resources to ensure that the nine students were able to go to school was seen as a positive move by the Eisenhower Administration. However, this kind of reaction was then expected on every case and when Federal government did not get involved in issues of segregation or civil rights in

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77 Ibid.
78 DDE, Papers as President 1953-61, Ann Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 8, October 1957 Diary, Entry on 10 October 1957.
79 Ibid; Christian Herter, Secretary of State, Papers, Chronological File, February 1960 (1), Box 9, Reply to Mr McLaughlin. 28 October 1960.
general, it reflected badly on the Administration.\textsuperscript{81} A lack of understanding outside of America, of the way in which the American system and constitution worked, compounded this. Federal troops could not be called into every case, nor indeed did the President himself have the ability to intervene at all in issues of state law.\textsuperscript{82} This created a two-tier system where some states were more compliant to the general civil rights stance of the Government than others were. However, for those that did understand these nuances, the idea that the American President, the so-called leader of the free world, could not stop the Southern States of his own country from denying black American citizens equal rights, was rather frightening.\textsuperscript{83}

It was difficult for the Eisenhower Administration to preach the gospel of Western democracy and capitalism when they were the living embodiment of the limits of liberty. Cries of hypocrisy came from Africa, and more significantly for the US, from Russia. The Committee on International Policy of the National Planning Association informed Eisenhower that 'it requires little imagination to grasp the effectiveness throughout much of Africa of the propaganda material provided our adversaries by the behaviour of Southern extremists.'\textsuperscript{84} Eisenhower himself states that 'it would be difficult to exaggerate the harm that is being done to the prestige and influence, and indeed to the safety, of our nation in the world. Our enemies are gloating over this incident and using it everywhere to misrepresent our nation.'\textsuperscript{85}

However, Muehlenbeck asserts that:

'Early in his presidency Eisenhower and his advisors seemed unaware of the fact that racial discrimination at home hurt the image of the United States in the Third World...When the administration eventually did become aware...Eisenhower still neglected to provide strong presidential leadership during the time that \textit{Brown v. Board of Education} was being argued or when the Emmet Till murder occurred, and he only reluctantly and half-

\begin{footnotesize}
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    \item \textsuperscript{81} DDE, Papers as President, 1953-61, (Ann Whitman Files), Cabinet Series, Box 13, Minutes of Cabinet Meeting 27 February 1959; Notes of Dr John Hannah, Chairman Committee on Civil Rights, for Cabinet Presentation 27 February 1959.
    \item \textsuperscript{82} DDE, Papers as President, 1953-61, (Ann Whitman Files) Cabinet Series, Box 15, Cabinet Meeting, December 18 1959.
    \item \textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
    \item \textsuperscript{84} Papers of John Foster Dulles, White House Memoranda Series, Box 5, The Committee on International Policy of the National Planning Association to the President (no date).
    \item \textsuperscript{85} John Foster Dulles: Papers, Telephone Conversations Series, Box 12, Draft number 2, Arkansas Incident, 24 September 1957.
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heartedly got involved during the school integration crisis that took place in Little Rock, Arkansas.\textsuperscript{86}

Civil rights issues also had an effect on America's image in Europe, an area with a number of colonial nations who had also felt the hypocrisy of the anti-colonial stance America had taken in regards to Africa. While the findings of an Information Agency study of Post Little Rock opinion on the treatment of African Americans suggested that Little Rock itself had little effect on European opinion, it did find that, 'Current Western European opinion race relations in the US are highly unfavorable' and explained that the lack of effect could be due to the fact 'America's standing in the area of race relations was already in a very depressed state...and hence not readily susceptible to further decrease.'\textsuperscript{87} However, despite this negative view, the study also found that predominately favourable opinion 'that, on balance, negro status in the US has been improving over the past decade.' and that this 'underscores the value of making every effort to place the recent racial developments in a broader perspective in the projection of America abroad.'\textsuperscript{88}

All of this indicates that although on the surface Civil Rights is a completely separate domestic issue, it had wide reaching effects for American governments efforts to foster close relations with African nations as well as affecting the way in which America was viewed by the colonial nations it judged.\textsuperscript{89} The support of America for a multiracial Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, free of racism on any side and with no segregation seems completely absurd when it is compared to the state of civil rights matters in the US itself. It is, therefore, perhaps unsurprising that no strong condemnation of Southern Rhodesian segregation issue came from Eisenhower, nor did they concern themselves too much over issues within this area. The parallels between Southern Rhodesia and Southern States in America were glaringly obvious to even the most uninformed observer.\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{86} Muehlenbeck, \textit{Betting on the Africans}, p.196.
\textsuperscript{87} DDE, Records as President, White House Central Files, (Confidential File), 1953-61, Subject Series, Box 99, Post Little Rock Opinion on the Treatment of Negroes in the US, Office of Research and Intelligence, January 1958.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{89} Krenn, \textit{Black Diplomacy}, pp.114-5; RG 59, Classified Williams, Box 3, Vice President Nixon, Report to President on Trips to Africa 28 February -21 March 1957, 7 April 1957.
\textsuperscript{90} US Council on Foreign and Economic Policy, Office of the Chairman, Records, 1954-61, Randall Series, Trips Subseries, Box 3, Africa South of the Sahara - Americas New Frontier for Trade and Investment by
The fragility of the Federation itself may also have had a part to play in this. The lack of support from black Africans for the Federal system was well known; however, no other solution seemed to present itself. The three nations had significant white settler populations as well as varying natural resources key to Western investment in the area. The white population was vital to the economic future of the area but were a massive hindrance to its political future. Independence under a black majority rule was unacceptable to the white settler population and independence under white rule was not only distasteful to black Africans in the Federal areas but throughout Africa as a whole.

The Eisenhower government was critical of the Federation and its lack of progress but perhaps not as publicly or aggressively as it had been on other international issues. However, the future of the Federation was an issue that was taken very seriously with the Bureau of African Affairs. In a department paper replying to the question, 'what can the US do to help make the Federation a success?' American understanding of the situation and its point of view was clearly laid out.

The first matter addressed was the question itself, adding that it should also mean 'What can the US do to convince the Africans that the success of the Federation is in their own interests?'. The negativity of the American answer is perhaps a little surprising considering their public stance on the future of the Federation. The stated response, 'very little...because I don’t think the Federation as seen now is working altogether in the African’s best interests. Certainly not as the articulate African gauges his best interest', does sum up the problems of Federation quite succinctly.

Clifford W. Shields, Vice President Farrell Lines Inc. Address at The Third General Session of the 44th National Trade Convention at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel NYC, 19 November 1957.


95 Ibid.

96 Ibid.
The difference between the concept of partnership, and what it actually meant in practice was the main problem for Federation. As the paper states, 'the policy of partnership, which was part of the price paid to the Colonial Office for the Federation, does not in reality mean what the Colonial Office, the US, or the Africans would like it to mean. It means, to most whites, that only a very small share of control will be given the African. I don’t think anything more was intended in 1953 and possibly less is intended today.'

The issue of segregation and the belief of the inferiority of black Africans were seen to be central to the problems of Federal partnership. America itself had battled this predicament for many years with no clear and easy solution. The key problem was the widespread belief that white Rhodesians would suffer under black leadership, whether by intentional acts or by the perceived ineptitude of Africans to run the country for themselves. This concern meant that the black Africans of Rhodesia were in a situation where 'the Whites believe firmly in segregation, the African wants partnership to mean equal political rights and privileges. He won't be persuaded that the Federation is in his best interest unless it does, no matter what the US may do --or the Rhodesian whites --in the way of better housing and social services.'

The most interesting suggestion made in the paper was that rather than the focus being on convincing black Rhodesians that Federation will work for them, the emphasis should be on convincing the white population first as this would make Federation a viable, active tool in the push towards true non-racial partnership. As the paper states:

'In order to persuade African's that Federation is in their best interests, the whites must first be persuaded that the Federation, with a general partnership policy, is in their best interests. The whites have all the effective power and nothing very much can be done to improve inter-racial relations until the whites begin to change their attitudes, policies and practices and agree to relinquish some of their power. I don't think the

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97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
whites in Rhodesia --nor in the Union -- will change their segregationist, supremacist concepts in time to avert trouble.'

This was the real problem as 'the real meaning of partnership, as conceived by the whites, becomes increasingly apparent to the Africans, so will their separatist or nationalist feelings grow.' The bleakness of the situation is made clear when the author of the paper stated that 'I don't know any good, easy tack for the US to take...I think the future of the Federation is 'blacker' (pun intended) than that of the Union.'

This contrasts with Clarence Randall's observations of his trip to Salisbury, in which he commented that 'a sound relationship with the Africans is developing.'

This also shows that the US had no new, imaginative, or helpful solutions for the British government and as such could not act in the role of leader or the broker for peace on this issue. As such Britain had to take the lead, create policy and use its influence and role in the area to create a better situation with only the friendly acknowledgement of the difficulties it faced by the US government and, more importantly, its criticism when it failed to solve what the US itself found practically unsolvable.

However, the observations of the Governor General of the Federation, Lord Dalhouise, by Randall during his visit paint a picture of a man not equipped to carry out his job. Randall notes that 'he was dreadful. Cordial enough, and all that old chap, but not an idea per day. Doesn’t matter, old thing, for he is a relative of the Royal family. His aide, Lord Somebody, of 20 years, was a second edition, only more vapid.' This kind of judgement, of royal links meaning more than competency, and the mocking of the 'Englishness' of the man, seems to allude to a lack of confidence in the leadership of the Federation at best, but also, at worst, a lack of confidence of the British as a whole to handle such a situation. However, the general tone of the entry, and

99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Papers of Clarence B. Randall, Journals, 1953-61, Box 7, Memo to Council on Foreign Economic Policy, Subject US Foreign Economic Policy for Africa South of the Sahara (no date).
103 FO 371/137972, Memorandum of Conversation, Morning Session, Talks on Africa, 24 November 1959.
105 Papers of Clarence B. Randall, Journals, 1953-61, Box 7, Memo to Council on Foreign Economic Policy, Subject US Foreign Economic Policy for Africa South of the Sahara (no date).
Randall’s comment that Salisbury has ‘200,000 inhabitants, of whom 75,000 are white, and 64,000 automobile registrations. They have a mere eight golf courses’, 106 perhaps indicates that these comments were more personal and humorous in nature than serious political commentary. By 1960, the view of British actions in the Federation and the future of the Federation had developed even more, as seen in a letter from a member of the Bureau of African Affairs and the Bureau of Public Affairs to the Head of the Office of Policy and Plans in the US Information Agency. The view that white settler domination was the main issue in the future of the Federation had not changed, emphasising the difference between what the Federation supposedly stood for, and what it had achieved. The letter states that ‘although Federation officially supports a policy of ‘partnership’, the majority of white settlers in Southern Rhodesia have so far strongly opposed any acceleration on the political and economic advancement of the Africans.’ 107

However, a letter from Edward Mulcahy, the American Consulate General in Salisbury, to the Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, dated October 1960 in response to an international edition of Newsweek, indicates that there was still a lack of clear understanding of the issues in Central Africa. The article is described as, ‘the type...which tends to justify to the White Settlers --and to his Government-- the locally held belief that the foreign press is engaged in a conspiracy against him.’ 108 He also notes that while there was no reaction in the local press yet, 'there is ample material in it to provide the makings of some real fine anti-American brickbats by local editorialists and letter-to-the-editor writers.’ 109

The issue that Mulcahy had with the Newsweek article is the improper reporting of a racial incident in Salisbury that unfairly condemned white settlers and black nationalists alike. Mulcahy argues that the article misrepresented facts including a reference to black mobs 'tearing through the streets of Salisbury' despite the fact

106 Ibid.
108 RG59, General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Records relating to Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1956-61, Box 1, Edward Mulcahy to Olcott Deming, 28 October 1960.
109 Ibid.
that the trouble was confined to the African township and 'white police' firing on Africans despite the police force being multiracial.\textsuperscript{110} He also disputes 'the insidious implication' in the article that the riots were in some way connected to the Monckton report (to be discussed in the following chapter). He argues that the riots were 'entirely apolitical in origin, spontaneous and unorganised. The trouble began...out of the death of an African caused by a European woman motorist.\textsuperscript{111}

He also went on to explain that in terms of Northern Rhodesia, the view of the consulate varied greatly from Newsweek's estimation as, 'it is our impression that, except for some blow-hard die-hards among the white settlers, most of the Europeans there have seen the handwriting promising black government on the wall and have begun to adjust themselves manfully to the prospect.'\textsuperscript{112} This clearly illustrates the differences between the situations in the territories of the Federation in terms of African advancement and the attitudes of the white settlers. During the latter years of the Federation, these differences became more apparent and as such the viability of the project diminished greatly.

One of the biggest criticisms of the Eisenhower Administration is that very few leaders of new African nations and no African nationalist leaders in areas such as the Federation were invited to visit the White House. Heads of UN delegations from sixteen African countries were received at the White House on October 14th 1960; however, no African nationalist leaders were officially invited to the White House.\textsuperscript{113} This matter is addressed by Joseph Palmer, Second American Consul General to Major Cruciana the Assistant Attaché at the American Embassy South Africa in March 1960. Palmer acknowledges:

'The fact remains that the Consul General has never knowingly sent to the United States any African Nationalist Party leader. We are not proud of this fact as we wish that circumstances were such that we could. A number of them are responsible people who do not happen to agree with the present policies in effect here. Many of them are potential leaders of country, and we

\textsuperscript{110} ibid.
\textsuperscript{111} ibid.
\textsuperscript{112} ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} DDE, White House Central Files (Confidential File) 1953-61, Subject Series Box 81, The White House, Remarks by the President to the African Leaders in his Office, 14 October 1960.
cannot ignore them. But the fact remains that we know, as well as anyone else, that in the Federations present phase of political development it would be unwise for us to give them official United States Government grants.\textsuperscript{114}

This offers some explanation as to why African nationalists were not officially invited into the US and it is important to recognise the fact that the Federation was in a vulnerable position. With fears growing of its collapse and the impact this would have on the communist threat, and on the risk of Southern Rhodesia joining the South African Union's sphere, it is not surprising that Eisenhower's Administration erred on the side of caution. The Kennedy Administration, in contrast, was more welcoming to African leaders; however, this came after the mass independence of Africa in 1960 and in the time when Federation was in its last stages of existence. As such, Kennedy did not face the issues that Eisenhower which allowed him to interact on a greater scale with African nationalist leaders.

However, Muehlenbeck's assessment is that the administration’s reluctance to engage with African nationalist leaders was an effort to avoid upsetting or embarrassing the British. When Nkomo and Kaunda visited the United States in 1959 with Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika, they were, according to Muehlenbeck, 'unable to get an audience with high-ranking State Department officials' because 'Joseph Satterthwaite...made it clear to his subordinates that out of deference to the British he would not meet personally with the three African nationalists.'\textsuperscript{115} Instead, Olcott Deming met with the three leaders and was so impressed by the men that he concluded that 'If these men are 'dangerous revolutionaries', they are the kind we should stick close to because I found them reasonable, intelligent and, most understanding of their situation, ours, and Great Britain's.'\textsuperscript{116}

However, Muehlenbeck's assessment fails to acknowledge or explain the reasons behind the administrations decisions. Deming himself clarifies this in his account of the matter in which he states that, 'this was a time when the British were concerned about, responsibly bringing the countries under their jurisdiction as

\textsuperscript{114} RG59, General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Records relating to Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1956-61, Box 1, Joseph Palmer to Major Cruciana, 8 March 1960.

\textsuperscript{115} Muehlenbeck, \textit{Betting on the Africans}, p.9.

colonies or protectorates towards independence. But they didn't wish to move to fast. And they let our government know that it would not be helpful if we were urging early independence to countries such as Rhodesia, Uganda, Kenya and so forth. Britain had its own timetable.\textsuperscript{117}

The constant threat of Southern Rhodesia either making a unilateral declaration of independence, or joining with the Union of South Africa was a very real concern for both the British and the Americans throughout this entire period.\textsuperscript{118}

Although an alliance with South Africa was unlikely as the number of black Africans and relatively improved standards of racial tolerance in Southern Rhodesia in comparison with the Union, the threat was ever-present and was exploited by Federal politicians.\textsuperscript{119}

The speed in which the Federal Government moved on the two big issues of race relations and economic development were also criticised, however arguably to a lesser extent than the previous analysis. The letter states that, 'on both these issues the Federal Government has attempted to pursue a moderate course - to advance the African, gradually as they prove themselves able to participate increasingly in the country's economic, political, and social life under the policy of "partnership".\textsuperscript{120} This is then compared to the situation for the Africans, 'who at no time have conspicuously supported the Federation of the three territories, continue to press for greater and more rapid participation in the governing process, for the removal of racial barriers, and for economic advances such as higher wages and entry into skilled positions.\textsuperscript{121}

However, there does seem to be an acceptance of that Federation had perhaps run out of time to keep the moderate, gradual change policy going if the Federation was to survive. The feasibility of the Federation had become a real question in the light of a number of events in Southern Rhodesia noted in the letter, including the arrest of

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{119} DDE, Records as President, White House Central Files (Confidential File), 1953 - 61, Subject Series, Box 78, State Department Briefing Book, Macmillan Visit -Africa, Macmillan Talks, Washington, March 19-23, 1959, Development in Nyasaland (Background Paper), no date.
\textsuperscript{120} RG59, General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Records relating to Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1956-61, Box 2. Letter, Mr. P. O'Sheel, Bureau of African Affairs and Bureau of Public Affairs, 'Situation in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland ' to Mr Halsema, Office of Policy and Plans, US Information Agency from, 17 November 1960.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
nationalist political leaders and the resulting riots. This led to the Bureau of African Affairs to conclude that Southern Rhodesians would become more demanding and less likely to follow moderate leadership, which could result in more violence. 122

One of the major turning points was the Monckton Report on the issues of the Federation, which reported its findings in October 1960 after almost a year of study. The report was extremely unpopular within the Federal Government and the decision to have a commission study the issue was contentious. The resulting findings only cemented the idea that the Federation in its present form was widely despised and mistrusted by Africans and could not properly deliver its aims of multiracialism and partnership without major changes. This was in line with State Department position that Federation could not survive though it did 'regard sympathetically with the United Kingdom and those elements in the Federation which seek an easement of present tensions through moderation and accommodation. In particular we hope for further progress in racial co-operation.' 123

The result of all this was an American view that while white Europeans in Rhodesia should recognise the need to accommodate African advancement if only to avoid further violence, they did believe that Africans should show restraint and in turn recognise the contribution of white settlers to the economic stability of the country. Then ejection of the white settlers would not be in Rhodesia's best interest and some kind of partnership would have to happen if Rhodesia was to continue to have a bright economic future. 124

All of this seems to indicate that while the Eisenhower Administration cannot be labelled as completely ignorant of the issues and complexities of Africa in general and the Federation as a single entity as knowledge and understanding are two very different concepts. While aware of the issues, the Eisenhower government seems to lack the understanding of the fight black Africans were experiencing to have the fundamental right to a political voice in a nation in which they are majority. Although it is clear that the issue is not as simple as allowing the black majority to take control regardless of their competency, the idea that they should acknowledge the need for

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122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
the white minority for their economic future, seems to belie the point. Although it is undeniable that while the white settlers were instrumental to Rhodesia's future they were also instrumental to the Federation's downfall as they would not move quickly enough to grant black Africans the ability to even exist in Southern Rhodesia without racial segregation and limits, let alone even the smallest semblance of a political voice.

While the Eisenhower Administration was aware of the Federation, it is possible faults, and its noble aims, it did not require much investment from the Americans. The British, Federal, and territorial governments seemed to be handling the situation in the area and progress was being made, if at a pace that displeased both the Africans and the Americans. However, the events of the Nyasaland riots and the declaration of a State of Emergency catapulted the area into a new era of discord and started a chain of events that would ultimately destroy the Federation and its multiracial plan.
Chapter Three
State of Emergency: Nyasaland Riots and the Devlin Report

A number of events during 1959 changed the attitudes of both British and American politicians and put the issues of Federation under uncomfortable public scrutiny. These events set in motion two important investigations into the Federation: the Devlin Report and the Monckton Commission.¹ These reports allowed African objections to Federation to not only be acknowledged but also openly heard for the first time. The private reservations of the British and Americans were also given greater credence and a public voice. The Federation had previously been an area that had not warranted a great deal of American involvement or intervention as it had not been as problematic as other areas. However, the Nyasaland riots elevated its significance and forced both the British and the Americans to face the misgivings they both had about the future of the Federation.² While the Federation had been peaceful it had been a low priority despite uncertainties about its success. There was no impetus for Britain or America to act and possibly create problems despite their lack of confidence in the Federation especially as both wanted and needed the multiracial model to succeed.

The two reports were received and handled very differently, with Devlin's Report being widely criticised (with a rebuttal report subsequently produced in Britain's defence) and Monckton was accepted by all except whites in the Federation. However, the core belief that the Federation was simply not working in its current form as effectively as it had been hoped was expressed and accepted in both. As the Devlin Report dealt with the investigation over the handling of the Nyasaland riots and the declaration of a State of Emergency, it was a more damaging and personal report for the British, especially as it came in a British election year. It is therefore important to analyse both what the British Government rejected within the report and why. The fact that it was an election year adds a new dimension, allowing questions to be asked as to the real purpose of the objections to the Devlin Report. It is also important to see

¹ Welensky, 4000 days, pp.130-1, p.139.
² Sanger, Central African Emergency, p.163.
how the Emergency and the Report came to both create and shape the Monckton Commission, a document that fatally damaged the Federation. As Welensky stated:

'The two most critical years in the short and stormy life of the Federation were in 1959 and 1960. During this period pressures, external and internal built up against us which we were willing and able to resist and which, had we been absolutely free and independent, we should have resisted successfully. But I say it in all seriousness and without bitterness; the Government of the United Kingdom, which exercised ultimate but by no means remote control over our concerns, lacked the will, though it still had the capacity, to back us up in our fight for survival. In these years the seeds of the Federations destruction were sown.'

The Nyasaland Riots and the Murder Plot

The Devlin Report was commissioned to answer questions raised over the handling of violent disturbances in Nyasaland that led to the declaration of a State of Emergency in Nyasaland on 3 March 1959. During this time, a number of African political leaders and others, thought to have connection with African Nationalist parties, were detained and political parties and meetings banned as an attempt to curtail alleged plots to kill Europeans. The volatile nature of Nyasaland prompted historian Clyde Sanger to conclude that, 'trouble in Nyasaland was a long time coming. If anything was predictable in a generally unpredictable continent in 1959 it was that there would be disturbances in Nyasaland.' However, Welensky's assessment of the disturbances, just the day before the Emergency was declared downplayed the seriousness of the incidents. In a letter to Australian senator Don Willese, Welensky states that 'we are faced with a little bit of a rebellion - the kind of thing that the Colonial Office type of Government seems to encourage wherever it is. However, I believe that I shall be able to deal with it. If not, it won't be for lack of trying.'

The Nyasaland disturbances were the result of widespread dissatisfaction with Federation and the belief that Nyasaland 'had in 1953 been spatchcocked into the

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5 MSS Welensky 638/5, From Roy Welensky to Dom Willese, 2 March 1959.
Central African Federation with the two Rhodesias. Nyasaland was often viewed as an unnecessary and unwanted element within the Federation by many, including Welensky himself, due to its economic instability, lack of resources and smaller white population. This meant that Nyasaland became seen as a drain on resources that gave very little in return and there was therefore much more trouble than it was worth. However, as it was now part of the Federation, if it was allowed to disengage and become independent, pressure for similar action in Northern Rhodesia would increase causing irreparable damage to the Federation. Therefore, despite its unpopularity, it was essential for the future of Federation for Nyasaland to remain.

Despite the fact, as Welensky’s biographer Gary Allighan claims, ‘Nyasaland, in fact, has been the chief comparative beneficiary of Federation advantages in most respects’ African nationalists in the area still resented Federation. The reality was that while Nyasaland did receive a great deal of financial support within the Federal system, the key issue was that there was a widespread distrust of Federation as a tool of white suppression. The rise of African Nationalism was based on a total belief in self-determination under the system of one man, one vote. It was feared, perhaps correctly, that this could not be achieved within the Federal system, at least not quickly; the fear of a black majority was strong within the white settler mindset as was the fear of white oppression within the minds of the black natives. However, Sanger claims that regardless of the advantages that Nyasaland gained, the real beneficiaries from Federation were white Southern Rhodesians.

Obvious parallels can be drawn between the white settlers in the Federation, particularly in Southern Rhodesia and the American South in this period. The fear of allowing those that had previously been subjugated to have a political voice, especially when their numbers either exceed or offer a significant challenge cannot be underestimated. As Sanger comments, ‘Like the American Southerner, the white

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8 RG 59 Classified Williams, Box 3, Vice President Report to President on Trip to Africa, February 28-March 21 1957, 7 April 1957; Welensky, *4000 Days*, p.141.
11 Verrier, *Road to Zimbabwe*, p.75
12 Sanger, *Central African Emergency*, p.79.
Rhodesian mixes generous open-handedness with narrowness of mind - a lot of ideas have never come his way. Like a Texan, he enjoys talking about - identifying himself - with extravagant, larger-than-life figures. It makes him feel more on terms with the vastness of Rhodesia itself, and to have seven million black men kept smaller in a psychological stature than himself increases that feeling.\textsuperscript{13} The area became a powder keg of fear and mistrust that inevitably blew. The parallels and similarities between the racial situation in the United States and the Federation made it all the more difficult for the Americans to get involved. The hypocrisy of the Americans offering advice and guidance on racial issues was one element to this, as was the fact that they had no advice or guidance to offer.\textsuperscript{14}

One of the key arguments put forward against African involvement in federal or territorial politics was that the average African had no real interest in, or understanding of, politics. African nationalists were accused of pretending to be the voice of the African majority when in fact they were just using them to push forward their own agenda. For Welensky, widening the franchise to Africans needed to be a gradual process, as he felt the majority of Africans were unqualified and thus opening the system meant lowering standards.\textsuperscript{15} In a letter to his cousin, Welensky states 'I keep on saying to friends of mine among the Europeans, who talk about fear for the future, that I don't fear the black man one scrap. I employ five in my house and have never in my life struck a people who care less about the future and were less reliable than these people.'\textsuperscript{16} However, as Sanger argues, although European settlers were considered to be more politically aware, this was not always the case as, 'only in the last few years has racial tension intruded sufficiently to make politics a more common subject than gardening, and it has still not intruded enough to make more than a few people do any fundamental thinking about their position in this quickly changing continent.'\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, p.52.
\textsuperscript{15} MSS Welensky 683/5, Welensky to Don Wilese, 28 September 1960.
\textsuperscript{16} MSS Welensky, 684/5; Welensky to Sam Willinsky, 26 August 1963.
\textsuperscript{17} Sanger, \textit{Central African Emergency}, p.60.
One of the most controversial elements of the declaration of a state of Emergency in Nyasaland was the allegation that there was a murder plot against white settlers.\textsuperscript{18} Although there were claims that a plot had been uncovered, it is unclear if this was truly an integral part of the decision to declare an Emergency. While claims were made in British Parliament of a murder plot, the Governor of Nyasaland, Sir Robert Armitage stated that

’When I read that Lennox-Boyd had said in the House of Commons that a massacre was being planned and that was the main reason for the declaration of the state of Emergency I was staggered. In my broadcast earlier that morning I had made no reference to any massacre or murder plan or anything of that sort. I had been governed in my action all through the escalating violence throughout the country...The people I was concerned with were Africans in government service who were being molested, their houses burnt, their places of work destroyed. They were the people who really concerned me when I decided to declare a state of Emergency.’\textsuperscript{19}

One explanation for the confusion was that ’Lennox-Boyd himself was away from London for much of February and thus in a poor position to judge the seriousness of the situation’\textsuperscript{20} and that ’in seeking to justify the declaration of another state Emergency, Amery, Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd’s deputy, emphasised the more alarming aspects of the Nyasaland government’s intelligence reports. He claimed that the recent disturbances had been part of ’an organised threat to European Community.’\textsuperscript{21} However, it could also be argued that the British, particularly Lennox-Boyd, blindly followed the leadership within the Federation and its territories in order to keep the status quo. The handling of the situation was clearly flawed no matter which explanation is given most credence, causing much embarrassment to the British at an extremely delicate time. The elections of 1959 were even more important for Macmillan as they marked the first time he faced the public vote as a candidate for

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{18} Franklin, \textit{Unholy Wedlock}, p.145.
\bibitem{21} CAB 128/33, CC (59) 13th Cabinet Conclusions, 27 February 1959.
\end{thebibliography}
Prime Minister, having previously inherited the role from Antony Eden after his resignation in 1957.

The timing of the incident raised other problems that affected the way it was handled by both the British and the Americans. While the French were beginning to turn the corner on their problems in Algeria, the British were under pressure after a massacre at Hola detention camp in Kenya, which led to the death of eleven detainees. The issue was compounded by the fact that both the Hola Massacre and the declaration of a State of Emergency occurred on the same day, allowing the public, the media and historians to draw parallels between the two incidents, especially their effect on Macmillan’s African policy. As Ovendale notes, 'it was the forthcoming general election of 1959 and a concern for the 'middle voters' sensitivity about Africa at a time of the Hola Camp massacre in Kenya and the Devlin 'police state' report on Nyasaland, that focussed Macmillan's attention on Africa.' In the US too, the issue of Africa had begun to play an ever-increasing role in the development of foreign policy, especially as the fear of communism spreading across a vulnerable, expansive, and strategically significant area such as Africa.

Macmillan had focused a great deal of attention on Africa prior to the Emergency, one of his first acts when he became Prime Minister was to order a profit and loss analysis of colonial dependences and there had been a concerted effort to push forward with the decolonisation of African after Ghana’s independence. In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, there was recognition of the difficulties that Federation would face in the future and the danger of its failure if it did not begin to adapt. Historian David McIntyre concludes that the Emergency 'convinced Macmillan that Britain must disengage or risk further African emergencies and possible bloodshed' which would suck in British troops, be politically damaging and attract unwelcome attention in the UN.

However, it is perhaps more accurate to state that the State of Emergency confirmed long-standing misgivings about the Federation and caused Macmillan and

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22 Brendon, *Decline and Fall*, p.563.
his government to question its future more intently. The fact that the Federation
carried on for another four years after the Emergency seems to indicate that the
Emergency did not have such a decisive impact on Macmillan's policy toward
Federation. However, it may have influenced his decision to make changes within the
colonial office and speed up in Africa over the next few years. 27

Although failure of the Federal experiment had before been the most likely and
yet the most feared outcome prior to the Emergency, the obvious abhorrence of the
African natives coupled with the immovability of the Federal Government made failure
seem inevitable. It is this shift of thinking that had the biggest impact on African policy;
failure was now not an 'if' but a 'when'. This change spurred on a greater interest in
African policy on both sides of the Atlantic and made Federation and its future a
political issue. 28

In a diary entry just days after a State of Emergency was declared, Macmillan
stated that:

'A most troublesome situation is developing in Northern Rhodesia and
Nyasaland. A sort of reign of terror has been brought about through the
'extremist' native leaders, supported by the Socialist Party and papers like
Manchester Guardian and Observer. There is a most regrettable division of
responsibility between the various Governments concerned. It looks as if the
Federal plan, although economically correct (since Nyasaland is not viable) is
regarded with such great suspicion by 'advanced' native opinion as to be
politically unacceptable.' 29

This statement does seem to indicate that Macmillan had begun to accept the fate of
Federation. As Macmillan's biographer Alistair Horne notes, 'the despised Devlin seems
to have sowed the first strong seeds of doubt in Macmillan's mind as to whether the
Federation had any future at all.' 30

For Lord Malvern, the first Prime Minister of the Federation, there was a
positive outcome, as he stated, 'it is a very good thing the balloon went up in

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28 Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, pp.144-6; Alistair Horne, Macmillan Vol. 2 of the Official Biography 1957-
29 Macmillan Diaries, MS Macmillan dep. C. 20/1-2, 5 March 1959.
Nyasaland...it has caused the Europeans to do some hard thinking. It is not only people overseas who are ignorant; our own people are grossly ignorant about their own affairs.31 While the Governor General of the Federation, Lord Dalhousie, in his opening address resumption of Federal Parliament stated 'The security forces of the Federation has been challenged by evil forces of anarchy and subversion masquerading as nationalism...But the Nyasaland revolt has nevertheless awakened Federal Government to some of the key facts of life.'32 While both men saw the issues differently, the belief that the riots had a bigger effect is surprisingly mutual.

However, while Horne's assessment that 'the Devlin Report was, of course, much more serious than the fracas over Hola. The deaths at Hola were an accident, while the Devlin Report was a direct and authoritative condemnation of government policy.'33 The Hola incident was a particularly nasty example of the treatment of Africans at the hands of British forces, the Emergency was the expression of African dissatisfaction, which was legitimized by a report commissioned by the British Government; the damnation had come from inside the British political system. In this sense, the Devlin Report was politically more serious, however this should not minimise the events of Hola, which was a more serious human incident. Indeed, Macmillan himself disagrees with Horne, stating in his diary that 'actually, the party are more worried about Hola than about Nyasaland.'34 This was due to fact that Hola was an incident that cost lives in a tragic manner, whereas the riots were more a damning indictment of the Federal system. While Africans in Nyasaland could shoulder some of the blame for the riots and the acts of violence that took place, there could be no blame attached to the victims of Hola.

One of the key factors of the declaration of a State of Emergency in Southern Nyasaland was a similar declaration made in Southern Rhodesia in February, which was described by Sanger as coming 'like a thunderclap. As one of the released detainees described it months later "there had not been even a glass broken".35 The move was heavily criticised and led to the resignation of the Federal Chief Justice in

32 Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, p.144.
33 Horne, Macmillan, p.182.
34 MS Mac dep. c. 20/1-2, 24 July 1959.
protest, who condemned measures that, 'drastically curtailed freedom of expression and association', claiming that Edgar Whitehead, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia 'suffered from a "mental myopia".' Meanwhile the Rhodesia Herald newspaper headlines called it 'totalitarian Rhodesia' and an Anglican Archbishop detected in it an 'echo of the Hitler regime.'

While the Nyasaland State of Emergency was in reaction to disorder and violence, the subsequent declaration in Southern Rhodesia seemed to have little or no notable motivation. This illustrates the delicate situation faced in Central Africa, as well as the fact that Southern Rhodesia's racial issues, that became so problematic after Federation ended, were already becoming a barrier to the multiracial harmony that Federation had promised. The volatile situation in Central Africa had thus far simmered under the surface waiting to explode. Politicians in Britain and America foresaw a problem emerging in Central Africa, but allowed the Federation to continue with no real influence or intervention for fear of inciting trouble. The Nyasaland riots and State of Emergency began the fight back against the Federation and the Devlin Report helped to shake the status quo and demand action in Central Africa.

37 Brendon, Decline and Fall, p.582.
The Report

The Devlin Report itself was described by Franklin as 'a devastating document which has since been called "perhaps the best study in modern colonial politics ever written". The report was a detailed analysis of the problems facing the Federation that concluded that the Federation, as it stood, could not continue, particularly as it had little African support. These conclusions angered the British, Federal and Territorial Governments, granted the Labour Party the opportunity to publically attack Macmillan's Government in a crucial election year and, most importantly, it made the secret doubts about the Federations future an uncomfortable reality.

Larry Butler states that the Devlin report was, 'one of the most embarrassing documents to emerge during British decolonisation', while Macmillan himself concluded that the report was 'dynamite' and 'may well blow this Government out of office'. Macmillan was also angered by the language of the report as it, 'was not the language of government White Papers, certainly not that of a gentleman, even if what it said was in practice true.' This statement really gets to the heart of the issue: Devlin angered Macmillan because it was factual and accurate and forced Britain, America and the Federal government to take action and face the reality of the situation in Central Africa.

In his biography of Macmillan, Nigel Fisher, a member of the Macmillan Government, described the report as, 'somewhat overwritten and did less than justice to the difficulties of the Governor and his small staff in trying to cope with a planned uprising, but the description of a British colony as a "police state" was a shock to public opinion.' Allighan was able to find some positives in the Report, claiming that it supported Federation in some instances, while Cabinet Secretary Norman Brook told Macmillan that he had read the report 'quickly but calmly' and concluded that 'it is not as bad as we were led to suppose.'

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41 Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, p.144.
43 Ibid.
46 Thorpe, Supermac, p.438.
49 PREM, 11/2783, Norman Brook to the Prime Minister, Nyasaland, no date.
For Welensky the Report unfairly laid blame at the feet of the Federation and, by default with him.

'We - not the British Government - were held up to hatred and scorn as the fashioners of this police state. The careless glibness of that sentence (and others like it scattered throughout the report) is equalled only its in comprehen sion of African realities and by the harm it did. In all the emotional confusion and heat generated by the Report, one fact stood out: since Britain - Government, Parliament and people - was determined to offload the real responsibilities and obligations of a rulership in Central Africa which she would not hold over us, the Federation was to be her scapegoat.'

The report claimed that 'Nyasaland is - no doubt temporarily - a police state, where it is not safe for anyone to express approval of the policies of the Congress Party, to which the vast majority of the politically-minded Africans belonged, and where it is unwise to express cry the most restrained criticism of government policy.' However, Welensky argued that the Report 'was one of the most publicised and one of the most controversial State Papers of modern times, I disagree with much of it, many of its basic assumptions, many of its conclusions. It was moulded by British prejudices, rooted in ignorance or misunderstanding of African thought, feeling, and customs, and profoundly if guardedly antipathetic to the Federation and all we stood for.'

However, there can be little defence for Welensky's himself apparent lack of interest in Nyasaland. As Federal Prime Minister, he had made just three visits to Nyasaland within two years. As Sanger argues, 'what is worse is that black and white populations who should have been doing business with each other have never met.' In fact, Welensky would only meet the leaders of African Nationalist Parties in later Constitutional reviews, despite being very vocal about his opinions of them.

However as Sanger explains, 'he had two reasons for not meeting them: he felt it would give them added prestige among their followers, and he thought he already

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50 Welensky, 4000 Days, p.131.
51 Murphy, Lennox-Boyd, p217.
52 Welensky, 4,000 Days, p.130-31.
53 Sanger, Central African Emergency, p.56.
knew what they would tell him.\textsuperscript{55} This does seem to indicate a lack of communication and willingness to compromise on the side of the Federal Government. Welensky's views on meeting with black opposition to create a dialogue would again be seen in his distaste at Kennedy's decision to meet with Martin Luther King and others after the March on Washington. In 1963 Welensky questioned 'what kind of government are we going to have when the greatest democracy in the world lets its leader meet what is nothing else but a pressure group and a group that is bringing pressure for the interests of one race.'\textsuperscript{56}

Press reaction to the report was not as bad as expected, perhaps due to the fact, as Horne claims, that the report was 'hidden from the public gaze and minimised by Macmillan, the danger in the Cabinet had been considerable.'\textsuperscript{57} This belief is shared by Richard Hemming who claims that 'the whole issue was trivialised and, denied the light of publicity, quickly faded.'\textsuperscript{58} Macmillan himself stated that:

'The so-called 'serious press' has been excellent. The Times has a good news story and a robust and sensible leading article. Daily Telegraph equally good. Manchester Guardian bad headlines but a very good and very fair leader. Daily Mail, Daily Express good. Daily Chronicle very hostile. Daily Mirror goes to town in a big-hysterical way, the Party seem pretty steady.'\textsuperscript{59}

The Main effect of the Report, beyond the embarrassment it caused to the British and Federal Government was that, as Historian Franklin states, 'To any who may have real or pretended doubts that Congress consisted only of a 'handful of agitators', and that hatred of Federation was by no means universal amongst Nyasaland Africans, it revealed the indisputable truth.'\textsuperscript{60} The result of which was, for Brendon, that 'Devlin summoned up Welensky's fighting spirit but, more important, he inclined Macmillan to appeasement in Africa.'\textsuperscript{61}

The reality of the situation in Nyasaland, and the Federation as a whole, was clearly understood by the British Government, as the Secretary of State for Colonial

\textsuperscript{55}Sanger, Central African Emergency p.56.
\textsuperscript{56} MSS Welensky 684/S, Welensky to Sam Willinsky, 26 August 1963.
\textsuperscript{57} Horne, Macmillan, p.182.
\textsuperscript{58} Hemming, End of British Empire, p.103.
\textsuperscript{59} MS Mac dep C 20/1-2, 24 July 1959.
\textsuperscript{60} Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, p.144.
\textsuperscript{61} Brendon, Decline and Fall, p.583.
Affairs asserts in a correspondence with Lord Perth, ‘if a Commission of Enquiry into the causes of the Nyasaland is appointed, we hope they will find that the direct cause was incitement and deliberate planning by unscrupulous and ambitious men. I imagine, however, that they are bound also to find that they had fertile ground to work on owing to widespread suspicion of Southern Rhodesia and dislike of Federation.

The Nyasaland riots forced the British Government to face realities it had avoided for a number of years. By commissioning the Devlin Report, they were aware that the problems of the Federation would have to be faced and action would have to be taken. The real problem for the British was the timing; an election loomed and this needed to be dealt with quickly so as not to affect Macmillan’s chances.

The decision to contest the Report by compiling a rival Report, known as the Armitage Report after the Governor of Nyasaland was a questionable move by the British Government. Although defence of the Government in the sensitive pre-election period was necessary, the rival report seemed to suggest that it was unwilling to accept the depth of African feeling and indeed, ran contrary to the changes in policy that seemed to come after and the real direction the Government had begun to take. The rebuttal Report seems to have been for purely domestic political reasons with little thought to the interpretation it would have in Africa, for not only the black community, which would be angered but also, the white settlers who would interpret these actions as implicit support of their fight. As Franklin suggests, Macmillan’s Government, ‘most unwisely, decided to challenge various criticisms of the Devlin Report. The Government was admittedly in difficulties over the Report, with the Opposition, and to a considerable extent the British press and public opinion, as well as with important foreign opinion. However, it would have done better to accept the Devlin Report quietly. It did not do so, and thus added insult to injury, particularly among the Africans of the Federation.

Similarly, Murphy notes that, ‘the ‘merciless ridicule’ which ministers had decided to adopt was aimed principally at the distinction the Devlin commission sought to draw between ‘talk of beating and killing Europeans’ and the ‘planning of

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62 PREM 11/2787, Telegram from the Secretary of State for Lord Perth, no date.
63 MS Mac dep. c. 20/1-2, July 16 1950; Ovendale, ‘Winds of Change’, p.457.
64 Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, p.146.
cold blooded assassination or massacre.’ Yet in the face of the Devlin Report’s remarks about the degree of opposition to the Federation among the Nyasa’s, the Government had no credible defence. Indeed, the despatch noted that the Government had ‘always recognised the existence of strong opposition in the Federation in Nyasaland’ and had often brought it to the attention of Lennox-Boyd.65

Another tactic adopted to diffuse the potentially difficult situation that would arise from the release of the report, was to delay it until after the recess and publish the counter report at the same time. Thus, as Murphy notes, ‘rather than merely defending himself against the report when the issue was debated in Parliament, Lennox-Boyd (having, of course being heavily involved in the drafting of the Governments ‘observations’) could give the appearance of dealing ‘in a balanced way’ with the conflicting views of Devlin and Armitage.’66 This does seem to support the idea that the rival report was a political tool rather than an honest reaction to the findings of Devlin. The speed in which it was produced, coupled with the manipulation of timing of the report’s release indicate that it was purely a way of answering or quieting critics in the run up to the election.

The decision to retain Lennox-Boyd as Colonial Secretary in light of the Devlin Report and the Hola Massacre was a way of maintaining at least a semblance of continuity for the British government. In the face of what was feared to be intense criticism before an important General Election, the resignation or dismissal of Lennox-Boyd could have been interpreted as an admission of guilt and could have also set of a series of resignations within the Colonial office and in Nyasaland, causing unnecessary difficulties for Macmillan.67 Macmillan himself highlights his reasoning for not accepting Lennox-Boyd’s offer of resignation in a diary entry that recounts when Lennox-Boyd ‘once more pressed on me his readiness to resign and thought this was the best way out. Rab [Butler] agreed with me that such a decision would be a) wrong. Colonial Administration in the dependent colonies would breakdown if HMG would betray them. b) Impolitic. A rather difficult debate in the House of Commons with perhaps a few Tory abstentions is one thing...But the resignation of the three colonial

65 Murphy, Lennox-Boyd, pp.218-19.
ministers - Lennox Boyd, Perth and Amery, together with the dismissal of the Governor, would be a major event at the most critical time.  

Despite this, Macmillan was well aware, according to Thorpe:

'that after the election, he would, if the Conservatives returned to power, have to appoint a colonial Secretary responsible to progressive opinion in Britain and sympathetic to national opinion in Africa. 'Empire'

backbenchers, with their racist prejudices and 'little Englander' attitudes, were the despair of Macmillan, who knew deep down that the outrage expressed by Devlin and Powell was right.  

Murphy notes the widening gap between Macmillan and Lennox-Boyd by 1959, as 'by the time that Lennox-Boyd made this stout defence of the status quo, Macmillan had already begun to explore alternative approaches.' The Devlin Report could not be the turning point of colonial policy; there was too much at stake domestically to allow Devlin to be accepted. It was not the report that revealed unknown issues, but the report that revealed problems that all involved were already painfully aware of, but had turned a blind eye to. The need for the Federation to succeed created a situation wherein problems and potential problems were ignored as long as they did not become major issues. The Nyasaland riots were the first problems that made this stance impossible to continue.  

The summer of 1959, in the wake of the Devlin Report and during the planning of what would become the Monckton Commission, has been seen by historians as a turning point for Macmillan and the Federation. Lapping states that, 'Macmillan did not announce a sudden change of policy, but in the months after the Devlin report was published the change was startling, carried through like Macmillan's reversal of imperial policy in the Middle East after Suez, without at first admitting anything had changed.' Murphy also states that 'it is clear, nevertheless, that before 1959,

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68 MS Mac dep C. 20/1-2, 20 July 1959.
69 Thorpe, Supermac, p.439.
72 Lapping, End of Empire, p.483.
Macmillan was even less convinced than Lennox-Boyd of the need to offer substantive political concessions to the Federations' African population.\textsuperscript{73}

**Africa the Next Ten Years**

A crucial document during this time was the British assessment of the future of Africa in, 'Africa the Next Ten Years' a document developed for use in bilateral talks with America.\textsuperscript{74} In a review of the paper, an unnamed minister stated that 'the genesis of the paper was the conversation I had with Foster Dulles at Brize Norton in October 1958 when we agreed that we should try to take a joint look at Africa.'\textsuperscript{75} Roger Louis, however, believes that while 'African appeasement was certainly Macmillan’s overriding aim'\textsuperscript{76} the document was 'written as a possible basis for Anglo-American consensus, the document testified to the shared belief that Africa’s future would be shaped by the relationship between Britain and America.'\textsuperscript{77} The development of this paper does indicate that there was clear interest in Africa from the Americans at this time.

Macmillan’s Private Secretary Philip de Zuleta however, questioned the logic of discussing the problems of decolonisation with America when 'the main American interest is to get a share in the exploitation of African mineral resources, and they have no direct experience whatever in colonial administration.'\textsuperscript{78} Murphy also states that 'he implied that the other European colonial powers might have a common interest in seeking to block the spread of American influence in Africa.'\textsuperscript{79} There does seem to be a reasonable question as to why Britain and the United States should discuss Africa. The US was a former colony that had no formal Empire and no direct involvement with or understanding of colonial responsibility. There were other European nations who did share similar burdens which would have been the more natural allies; however, the British did not enjoy such close relations with the French, Portuguese, or Belgians as they did with the Americans. Perhaps more importantly, there was an awareness that

\textsuperscript{73} Murphy, *Lennox-Boyd*, p.185.
\textsuperscript{74} DO 35/8804, *Africa the Next Ten Years: A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs*, 8 July 1959.
\textsuperscript{75} PREM 11/2587, ‘Africa the Next Ten Years’, for the Prime Minister, author unknown, 28 June 1959).
\textsuperscript{76} Louis, *End of British Imperialism*, p.495.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} PREM 11/2587, Patrick de Zulueta to Timothy Bligh, 1 July 1959.
\textsuperscript{79} Murphy, *Lennox-Boyd*, pp.201-202.
America had, and would continue to have, a stake in how Africa developed and Britain used this to create an opportunity to re-establish old ties with the US but create new ones.

The logic of discussing the problems of Africa with the Americans was, however, clear to Macmillan. In the Cold War era, Africa had become increasingly significant to the Americans as a new threat to the balance of power. Soviet infiltration in the newly independent Africa was a danger toward which the Americans were becoming ever more sensitive. In terms of Anglo-American relations, this allowed Macmillan to cast himself in a strong political position: as the leader of a nation with heavy and long-lasting ties within Africa, through both the Empire and the Commonwealth, his knowledge of the area and his involvement with the decolonisation process could allow Macmillan to make himself very important to the Americans. The economic issues tied to decolonisation also meant that any help the Americans could give in a financial sense would not only aid the British to decrease its expenditure but also allow America to offer financial aid in return for either alignment with the West or at least friendly relations and neutrality. It is within this framework therefore that Louis' conclusion that 'Africa the Next Ten Years' was 'written as a possible basis for Anglo-American consensus, the document testified to the shared belief that Africa's future would be shaped by the relationship between Britain and America' can be fully appreciated. However, for Murphy, 'it combined a conventional defence of the policy of gradual constitutional development in East Africa with a more gloomy assessment of the prospects for success in the Central African Federation.'

In his second inaugural speech in 1957, three years before Macmillan's tour of Africa, Eisenhower spoke of the winds of change that blew across the world. In this speech he noted that the, 'Communists were trying to get those winds blowing their way in order to exploit the third world. The great battleground of the Cold War had shifted away from Europe and Korea and Formosa...to Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent, where the situation was in active ferment.' This is a clear indication that Eisenhower had begun to see the post-colonial world as a possible area...
of conflict within the Cold War. However, historian Piers Brendon argues that ‘if Eisenhower's enlightened impulses to aid the Third World were hampered by his neo-colonial mentality, they were quite stultified by his (and even more by Dulles's) compulsion to treat the developing countries as pawns in the Cold War.’

Indeed, there is little reference to Africa outside of its Cold War consideration.

In talks with Macmillan centring on countering Soviet subversion in 1958, Secretary Dulles stated that ‘throughout much of the world we face a grave political problem in that there is a strong trend away from alien rule and local dictatorships and toward direct popular government by people not ready for its responsibilities.’ This seems to indicate that Dulles felt that America and Britain shared the decolonisation problem equally. While it is true that there was an obvious connection in the fact that Britain had a stake as a colonial power reducing its control and that America had a stake in seeing Western influence being maintained in the area, this seems to go slightly further; it seems to remove Africans from their own futures. The focus here is on the Anglo-American relationship and using it to create an understanding that it was their responsibility to save Africa from the communists.

Dulles went on to explain that, 'the international Communist movement with its conspiratorial experience; with its great ability to penetrate class groups and dominate them; with its larges corps of trained 'agitators' and propaganda skills, can readily be the beneficiary of the present trend in Asia, Africa, and the Americas, and bring about its 'dictatorship of the proletariat.' This seems to not only generalise all of Africa but also devalue the prospective leadership of the various African nations. It is important to remember that, as Britain was responsible for a number of these African nations, their abilities to train and prepare Africans for independence is, in some respects, being questioned. However, Macmillan’s reply is simply 'that as a first step we could emphasize to these peoples that, in accepting communism, they face the inevitable prospect of being controlled from Moscow.'

However, perhaps most importantly, Dulles does state that:

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84 Brendon, Ike, p.337.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
'although we respect the desire of the African states to adopt policies of "neutralism" and "non-alignment" and realize that the African states cannot be prevented from establishing normal diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations with the Bloc, we hope they can be persuaded to keep these relations to a minimum and be fully alerted to the dangers of Bloc penetration. We specially hope that the Bloc can be excluded from particularly sensitive fields such as military and police assistance.'

This clearly illustrates the ideology of the Eisenhower Administration; an awareness of neutralism and the reasoning for African leaders choosing this path, but a dislike of it and a desire to persuade against it.

Julius C. Holmes, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for NATO Affairs, stated in a report to the Secretary that 'I see no way to meet this threat except by concerted action with other Western powers, especially those having possession in Africa. This will require an understanding on their part of our objectives and a higher degree of confidence in our motives in Africa then now exists. The genuine danger with which we are still confronted should make this possible, for it is clear that if Africa is lost to the West, Europe will be weakened and outflanked as to make its defense impossible.' However, more importantly, he went on to state that 'one basic question transcends all others in considering what United States policy toward Africa should be, and it is this. We must make up our minds whether we stand with the metropole powers in endeavouring to maintain their centralized control over the economies and political freedoms of the developing areas in Africa, or whether we shall throw our influence on the side of those who seek political and economic autonomy. On the one hand we risk damaging our relationship with some of our NATO partners, but, on the other, we risk for all time losing the friendship of large areas of Africa which inevitably, sooner or later, will be independent.'

This was a key element in the creation of Africa policy; was the focus going to be on the relationships with the Europeans or the potential relationships with the Africans? This decision was made the more difficult by the fact that there were a vast number of new nations, with varying problems, issues and desires who were currently still under the influence of various European nations. The way in which America handled its involvement was affected by, and would have long-term effects on its relations with these European nations. Although the British and the Americans had, or were rebuilding, a close relationship, similar relations could not be guaranteed with other nations, particularly if America had issues with the handling of their decolonisation processes. Problems with the Congo and Algeria, for instance, needed much more careful handling than Ghana and as such, the emphasis on European nations had to remain, if only to create a network of powers that could offer America support during this time. The fact that Ghana and the Republic of Guinea were the only two African nations to gain independence before 1960 also meant that there was little need to make an African policy separate from the Europeans.

However, the decision for Africa to be a component of European policy, allowed for potentially devastating mistakes to be made in Africa. In December 1960, the African Regional Conference opened the Soviets sent an observer to attend, 'and they have demonstrated their interest in the proceedings by having one of their delegates read a personal message from Chairman Khrushchev.'\footnote{Christian Herter, Secretary of State Papers, Chorological File, February 1960 (1), Box 9, Memorandum for The President, Proposed Personal Message to the First African Regional Conference of the International Labor Organisation, attached to Memorandum for A.J. Goodpastor, 8 December 1960.} Earlier that same year, at the All Africa Peoples Conference January, the Soviets sent observers both official and unofficial. America’s contribution was described in a letter to Senator Kennedy as 'Irving Brown, Max Bond; few USIS people who appeared occasionally, a couple of members of the American Committee on Africa, and several crackpots who did us a good deal of harm...should have had some private observers to counter some activities such as Asian-African Solidarity Committee.'\footnote{Papers of President Kennedy, Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files, Legislation, Legislation Files 1953-60, 1960 Foreign Policy: Central (cont.) - Foreign Policy: Atlantic Unity, Box 736, Laura Hahn to Senator Kennedy, 31 January 1960.} The letter goes on to describe

'As is usually the case with any international conference, the communist - neutralist organisations appear well ahead of schedule, and begin making
friends. Again, we did next to nothing. The unfortunate thing about such a wasted opportunity is that a few people could have accomplished a great deal in the way of dispelling anti-American feeling...It would cost us very little to send a few teachers, students, or even businessmen and housewives, to conferences, and would be well worth the effort...The Communists distributed to the Africans, along with peace buttons, all sorts of books and pamphlets describing the wonders of life behind the curtain. Once again, we did absolutely nothing...Must we be sitting ducks at all these conferences, and never even try to fight back?93

Similarly, a later analysis of US policy failures notes that, 'At the parties of the new African nations at the U.N. his year, Mr Khrushchev, the heads of state of the East European countries, the French, Irish, Brazilian, Indian heads of delegation would be present; but only a junior officer of the US foreign service. This happened with Togoland, Guinea and others. Their feeling was summarized in their comment: 'where are the Americans? Mr Khrushchev is here. Aren't we good enough for them?' Only after steady pressure by private American citizens attending the first All-Africa Peoples Conference in December 1958, did our Government (Nixon) send a cable of greeting to the Conference on its final day.94

It is important to note that the timing of both of these Conferences, particularly the African Regional Conference in December 1960. 1960 was the year of Africa and presidential elections in America, and as such, some consideration must be made that the outgoing Eisenhower Administration was not in the strong political position to address or even 'meet and greet' African leaders as it was unclear which members would be there in the future. At the very least, it was difficult to make any judgements or promises about what policies or ideals would be followed months later when the new President was sworn in. However, this does not detract from the obvious problem that the Americans had not been engaging with Africa on a truly meaningful scale prior to these incidents and their failure to do so, impacted on the image of America across Africa.

93 Ibid.
In a conference speech delivered in Quebec, political analyst Stewart Alsop stated that 'we must recognize in Africa...the people who are most experienced at keeping things ticking in tropical Africa are those horrid people, the former colonial powers. The British, the French, and even the unpopular Belgians have forgotten more about Africa than we Americans are ever likely to learn. Moreover, the knowledge of Africa and their continuing influence there among the central assets of the West in the struggle for Africa which has now been joined...We Americans must get over the notion that we necessarily do everything better than everyone else.' It was this line of thinking that the Eisenhower Administration followed: acknowledging that the colonial powers were the ones that knew, and had the most influence over the future of Africa. This created a new dynamic to the Anglo-American special relationship, as Britain for once, was the leading figure on this particular issue, downgrading the Americans to a junior level. However, it would be an overstatement to say that this changed the overall dynamic of the relationship. Communist infiltration was something to avoid but was not necessarily, inevitable. As Clarence Randall states communism was 'not yet significant in Africa South of the Sahara. We must not remain complacent however, for we can be sure that the bloc will soon turn its attention to these countries. While Africa is not now a crisis area, it could very well become one in the near future, and we must act now to keep this great continent and its strategic resources on our side.'

The term Neutralism, in describing the African states that did not wish to align themselves in the Cold War, is perhaps misleading. As Nixon commented in a meeting with Ghana's Prime Minister, the term 'neutralist' was not 'descriptive of the policies of nations in Ghana's position. He thought that 'nationalist' more accurately described the fact that such nations are determined to secure and defend their independence.' Nkrumah responded by stating that Nixon was correct and that Ghana's policy 'will be one of non-involvement and non-alignment in the East - West struggle "but", he said, "Ghana can never be neutral. It will jealously safeguard its independence and resist all

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95 Herter, Christian A Papers, Box 23, 'Will Africa go Communist?' By Stewart Alsop, Bilderberg Meeting Québec, Canada, 21-23 April 1961.
97 DDE, Records as President, White House Central Files (Confidential Files), 1953-1961, Subject series, Box 100, Memorandum of Conversation, Ghana, Visit of Vice President Nixon, 4 March 1957.
effort at domination.” 98 This is perhaps reflective of all African nations of a similar mindset at this time. However, the danger of communist propaganda was expressed to Nixon by the Foreign Minister of Sudan, who 'spoke of the success which communist propaganda is achieving in various areas of the world. He thought that in general it is more effective than American propaganda. The Communists are particularly attacking US aid programs, which he and his colleagues in the Sudanese Government know are without conditions, but which the Communists represent as an effort at political domination by the US.99

During bilateral talks between the United States and Britain, the Americans assured Britain that they 'considered it a remarkably perceptive estimate of the situation and did not wish to dissent from it.'100 However, the state department was critical of Federation, telling the British that, 'while movement in Federation might be generally in the right direction, the pace was altogether too slow', and that they, 'sensed a widening gap between African aspirations and the concessions Europeans were willing to make and, given the intensity of African feeling about racial discrimination, they hoped the British would not surrender its responsibilities in the federation precipitately.'101 The British responded to this by assuring the Americans that 'conditions in the Federation were less grave than the Americans feared, and argued that African political opportunities were growing, together with the prospects for multiracialism.'102 However, neither side referred to Nyasaland's State of Emergency or the Devlin Report, which, as Butler asserts was probably due to the fact that 'in this preliminary exchange, the participants trod cautiously; what was not discussed was as revealing as the formal agenda.'103

For the British the real frustration lay in the fact that 'the Americans, although well intentioned, were pessimistic about Britain's chances of success in the Federation, but offered no suggestion for an alternative policy.'104 Allen Dulles, the US director of

98 Ibid.
99 DDE, Records as President, White House Central Files (Confidential Files), 1953-1961, Subject series, Box 100, Memorandum of Conversation, Sudan, Visit of Vice President Nixon, 13 March 1957.
100 FO 371/137972, Discussions between UK and US on Future on Africa, 21 November 1959, Morning Session.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
Central Intelligence 'supported by President Eisenhower, considered the chances of region achieving orderly economic development, and political progress "just about nil". However, official American support for the Federation and ideal of multiracial democracy 'remained firm'.\textsuperscript{105} The main conclusion the Americans came to was that 'The United States should encourage African leaders to pursue their demands within the framework of Federal law and simultaneously urge the British and Federal Governments to accommodate legitimate African aspirations. Specifically, Britain should promote African interests and economic development in the Northern territories, so as to regain African confidence in British policy and thus secure their consent to the Federal constitution.'\textsuperscript{106}

While historian Andrew Cohen states that the Nyasaland Emergency resulted in world criticism, especially from the US,\textsuperscript{107} there is very little direct archival material to support this. Although it is clear that the Americans had an opinion about the issues surrounding and the probable success of Federation, there is no direct reference to the Devlin Report in the Eisenhower Papers. However, there is reference to the disturbances in Nyasaland, giving a brief outline of the events, the suspected murder plot, and the possible consequences for the Federation as a whole. There is also a reference to the, 'unfavorable impression on American (particularly Negro) public opinion.'\textsuperscript{108}

Nyasaland is also mentioned in a telegram from US representative in the UN Henry Cabot Lodge to Eisenhower when he tell him that 'scarcely a day goes by without my contacts in the UN vividly pressing me with a rapidly evolving revolution in Africa...events seem to be moving faster than was thought likely six months ago. While the British have an evolutionary spirit, events may go too fast even for the British.'\textsuperscript{109} This does seem to suggest that Eisenhower was not as engaged in Africa as Kennedy would later be. However, it is not clear that the Devlin Report was a document that reached beyond the British government. While the American government had an

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid, p.133.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} Cohen, Settler Power, p.238.
\textsuperscript{108} DDE, Records as President, White House Central Files (Conference File), 1953 - 61, Subject Series, Box 78, Macmillan Visit -Africa, Macmillan Talks, Washington, 19-23 March, 1959, Development in Nyasaland (Background Paper), 14 March 1959.
\textsuperscript{109} FRUS, Telegram from the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State, 17 March 1959, Re: Development in Africa.
interest in Africa, it may not have been informed to the extent of being aware of every
government document presented in the UK on Africa, especially at Presidential level.

While the Devlin Report was significant in the UK for revealing the problems of
Federation, it actually revealed very little that the Americans did not already know;
these fears and concerns had been expressed between the UK and US already. Devlin
did not have the same political impact in America as it had on the British Government,
as the Americans were not part of the judgement and therefore were not politically
vulnerable to suggestions of mishandling the situation and Devlin did not force the
hand of the Americans as it had the British. At this point American policy relied on
British decision making; while America had an idea of what it wanted to see as the end
result, it was up to Britain to find the pathway to it. The Americans offered no answers,
so it is unsurprising that they did not dwell on Devlin or discuss a plan of action with
the British; they were not in the position to implement any plans nor did they have any
to offer.\footnote{John Foster Dulles Papers, 1951-59, General Memoranda Series, Box 2, From C.D. Jackson to Dulles, 9
February 1959.} There could also have been due to sensitivity towards Macmillan in the run
up to the 1959 election coupled with an awareness of the upcoming US elections in
1960.

The danger that 'the failure of the Federal experiment, in an area inhabited by
approximately 7 million Africans and 280,000 whites, could lead to racial strife and
radical instability in a continent already marked by rapid political change' was
explained to Eisenhower in a briefing paper before Macmillan's visit to Washington in
March 1959.\footnote{DDE, Records as President, White House Central Files (Conference File), 1953 - 61, Subject Series, Box
78, Macmillan Visit -Africa, Macmillan Talks, Washington, 19-23 March, 1959, Development in
Nyasaland (Background Paper), 14 March 1959.} It also warns that 'the probable course set by an independent
Nyasaland is not clear...But in the short term, an embittered and erratic Nyasaland can
only add to the instability of a continent already in great nationalist ferment.'\footnote{Ibid.} This is
placed into the context of American politics as 'the apparent harshness of the
measures used to restore order and prevent further violence will in all probability
create a most unfavorable impression on American (particularly Negro) public opinion.
A deterioration in relations between the Federation and the emergent and independent African countries can be expected.¹¹³

The disturbances were still causing anxiety when Joseph Satterthwaite, the first Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs met the British Ambassador in August 1959. His concern was that the disturbance had set off 'train of events which could lead to the breakup of the Federation.'¹¹⁴ This led C. Vaughan Ferguson, a Foreign Service officer to advise Satterthwaite that 'while the US has been sympathetic to this basic British objective, the Federation is now in serious trouble. We have refrained from public statements which indicated approval of the Federation, primarily because of the inordinate slowness with which the Federal Government has implemented the partnership policy.'¹¹⁵ Ferguson goes on to state that:

'In general, we hope that the UK will find it possible to (1) resist European demands for more power at this stage of the Federations history, when Africans are extremely suspicious and bitter because of the handling of the recent 'emergencies', (2) make soon the difficult, but extremely necessary decision to deal with the detained African Nationalists from Nyasaland, who must be consulted eventually, and (3) advance Africans politically in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia as they have done elsewhere in non-settler Africa when events clearly dictated the necessity of such moves.'¹¹⁶

In general terms the State Department reaction to situation in Federation after the Emergency was that movement was generally in the right direction, however the 'pace was altogether too slow...there was a general feeling that the gap between African aspirations and the concessions the Europeans were willing to make was widening rather than narrowing. It was as this impression that US concern was founded.'¹¹⁷ Cohen asserts that 'the Americans made clear they believed that onus for the current crisis fell on the 'inordinate slowness' of the Federal Government in

¹¹³ Ibid.
¹¹⁴ Records Relating to Rhodesia and Nyasaland Box 1, Joseph Satterthwaite from C. Vaughan Ferguson, Briefing Paper of Your Conversation with Ambassador Whitney Memoranda - Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 4 August 1959.
¹¹⁵ Ibid
¹¹⁶ Ibid.
¹¹⁷ FO 371/137972, Memorandum of Conversation, Morning Session, Talks on Africa, 24 November 1959.
implementing its partnership policy.\textsuperscript{118} This may result in Britain having to give self-govern ment to Nyasaland outside of Federation but within Commonwealth. While this would generate pressure Northern Rhodesia, the Americans judged it 'more in keeping with the long range US (and UK) interests than a Federation in which 'stability' rested on the power of a dominant white minority to impose its will on an overwhelming African majority.\textsuperscript{119}

The Nyasaland riots and the Devlin Report were catalysts to a change within both the British and the American governments. While both sides had expressed doubts and concerns over the future of Federation, both sides were invested in the success of the multiracial model. The riots in Nyasaland made it impossible for the 'wait and see' policy adopted by both countries to continue. While no substantive policy changes took place directly after the Devlin Report was published, there was a subtle shift away from quiet acceptance of Federation and its problems and towards actively seeking a solution. Most importantly, both sides seemed to accept that failure might indeed be inevitable and as such look more deeply into the issues that could be presented by this. The British and the Americans also began to acknowledge that tough decisions needed to be made and that support for white settlers and the Federal structure as it then stood could safeguard Federation as an entity but endanger the area in light of African nationalism. However, the timing of Devlin in terms of both the American and the British domestic policies meant that while there was a shift it was not one that came with public acknowledgement or supporting speeches and action. It was not until the equally damning but more widely accepted Monckton Commission report was published that the change needed and wanted could meaningfully take place.

\textsuperscript{118} Cohen, Settler Power, p.239.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
Chapter Four

1960: The Monckton Report, Banda’s release and African Nationalism

1960 was a significant year for African decolonisation as seventeen African nations were granted independence in this year alone, almost tripling the number of new African nations from nine to twenty-six.\textsuperscript{1} This generated a great deal of attention from around the world, especially in America mainly as part of a wider Cold War context.\textsuperscript{2} Increasingly, the African continent began to become more and more important to the Americans as a possible area of communist subversion but also as a bloc of nations that needed to be wooed in the United Nations.\textsuperscript{3} The growth in African involvement in world politics and diplomacy became linked with the issue of domestic campaign civil rights campaign: a struggle that was causing increasing embarrassment for the Americans, particularly when racial discrimination of American citizens made headlines across the world.\textsuperscript{4} This only intensified when the victims were African diplomats, politicians and students, often on government funded grant schemes.\textsuperscript{5}

While 1960 was a major year for African decolonisation in general, it was also an interesting time for the Federation for two main reasons. The much-anticipated Review Conference, scheduled when Federation was formed, was due to convene, and the Royal Commission on the Federation, known as the Monckton Commission, was due to publish its findings. Although the federal review will be looked at in much greater depth in chapter six, its place in the chronology of the Federation requires it to be mentioned in the context of this chapter. It’s timing, having taken place just two months after the publication of the Monckton Report and in the midst of political flux


\textsuperscript{3} FO 371/137972, Discussions between UK and US on the Future of Africa, 21 November, 23 November; Duignan and Gann, \textit{The US and Africa}, p.288; FRUS, US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960, Memorandum from the Secretary of State Special Assistant (Holmes) to Secretary of State Dulles, 6 February 1958.

\textsuperscript{4} Krenn, \textit{Black Diplomacy}, p.88; Meriwether, "Worth a Lot of Negro Votes", p.739, p.749; Dudziak, \textit{Cold War Civil Rights}, p.8; RG 59, Classified Williams, Box 3, Vice President Nixon, Report to President on Trips to Africa February 28-March 21 1957, 7 April 1957.

in America, illustrates the turbulence of 1960 within Federation and is a clear indicator of its demise during the 1960s. The importance of the Monckton Commission cannot be underestimated; it was a deeply divisive and controversial document, which seemed to legitimise African nationalism or at least African dissatisfaction. While the Devlin Report had uniquely questioned the rule of law and the suppression of Africans, Monckton questioned the very idea of Federation and Britain's support of it as well as acknowledging African dissent and dissatisfaction.

Anglo-American relations were once again embarking upon the unknown. While the 1959 election had secured Macmillan as Prime Minister for the immediate future, the 1960 election resulted in a change of President that could have halted the progress made during Macmillan and Eisenhower period. Although the relationship did not directly suffer during this final year, there was concern over the future of Anglo-American relations. By July 1960 the candidates had been narrowed down to Nixon and John F. Kennedy; both men were very different characters with very different policies and ideas on both Africa and America's future and it was unclear if Macmillan could relate to either man in the way he had with Eisenhower. 6 1960 was therefore, a year of change and transition for the British, Americans, and the Federation.

Getting the Commission Started

The need for a Royal Commission directly stemmed from the Nyasaland State of Emergency, which forced the British to acknowledge the unpopularity of the Federation amongst the Africans of the three territories. 7 Despite the Government’s reaction to the findings of the Devlin Report, there was an awareness that the future of Federation was not safe, nor was it particularly popular in the UK itself. 8 The Emergency had left a bad taste in the mouths of the British public, especially as the Hola Massacre occurred at the same time. 9 This concept was not lost on Welensky who, according to Franklin ‘referred to ‘the wave of emotionalism and hysteria, which had swept the United Kingdom’ during and after the Nyasaland events, for which the

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6 Sanford, Harold and Jack, p.27.
Federal Government was made the scapegoat. The tide of public opinion in the United Kingdom had turned against the Federation, he said, and world opinion seemed to be swinging against it.\textsuperscript{10}

The Commission was extremely distasteful for Welensky; he saw the dangers of allowing an investigation of the Federation, especially the way it was viewed by Africans in the area.\textsuperscript{11} However, with the assurance that the issue of secession would not be part of the terms of reference Welensky reluctantly agreed as he hoped it would remove Federation from UK domestic politics.\textsuperscript{12} This was a major concern for Welensky; he felt that the Federation was being used as a pawn in the larger debate of Africa between the two British political parties. The growing unpopularity of colonialism in Britain, and America, both in and outside politics, was having a negative impact on the Federation, particularly its hopes for Dominion status.\textsuperscript{13}

The decision to keep secession from the terms of reference also led to the Labour party, after quite a long, drawn-out period of discussion, to refuse to take part in the Commission.\textsuperscript{14} However, there was unofficial Labour representation in the Commission, as former Labour Minster Lord Shawcross was enlisted to take part.\textsuperscript{15} African nationalists were also unconvinced about the Commission, as they feared it was merely pretence, intending to distract and placate Africans but a conclusion already conceived to save the Federation.\textsuperscript{16} As nationalist Chirwa states 'we feel the Commission is deliberately set up to perpetuate the Federation. It is not just dominion status we are afraid of - it is Federation itself.'\textsuperscript{17} Sanger makes a similar assessment: 'It would be very remarkable if the Commission, whose members are on balance, anything but biased towards progressive policies and whose witnesses will not be representative of African opinion, was to produce realistic and far sighted recommendations. The 1960 talks have been cursed with an unhappy prelude.'\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{10}Franklin, \textit{Unholy Wedlock}, p.154.
\textsuperscript{12}Franklin, \textit{Unholy Wedlock}, p.154
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17}DO 35/7707, Rhodesia Herald, Macmillan Denies British Fears Sir Roy Welensky, 26 January 1960.
However, in a prologue to his book, added after the release of Banda, Sanger concluded that 'if the Monckton Report is accepted as a balanced judgement and its recommendations alone carry weight, then it may well be a fiasco and do more harm than good. But if Macleod, who unlike the Commissioners had had lengthy talks with the African leaders, is allowed to use some of the Report's recommendations and observations as a basis for more progressive moves, then there is still a faint hope that Central Africa become an example to the World.'\textsuperscript{19}

The significance of the report was never doubted by the Government, as can be seen in communication between Macleod and Macmillan in which Macleod states that:

'The future largely depends on two men. Firstly upon Walter Monckton, whose report will, I think guide the whole of approach to the Federal Review. If his report is both in favour of federation and yet sufficiently progressive, federation can reasonably be expected to win through. The second man is Roy himself. A moment will certainly come when he will have to tell his party leaders in the two northern territories to fall in and follow him. If he can do that, again all will be well. But there is also, as you know that dour and clever man Whitehead. I am afraid that his decisions will be taken mainly on a basis of Southern Rhodesian political calculations: to this extent he is unpredictable.'\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, p.326.
\textsuperscript{20} PREM 11/3240, Progress Report affecting Colonial Matters during the first half of 1960 from Iain Macleod to the Prime Minister, 31May 1960.
Macleod’s Appointment: A Change of Policy?

The decision to appoint Iain Macleod as Colonial Secretary after Lennox-Boyd's post election retirement has been heralded by some as the symbol of a dramatic change of policy towards Africa. Richard Aldous and Sabine Lee assert that Macmillan, 'Kept Lennox-Boyd as a no-risk Colonial Secretary...But when Macmillan felt ready to confront a particular issue, caution as abandoned and 'believers' were installed to carry through his agenda in the face of bureaucratic and political opposition.' Similarly, Fisher states that 'in appointing Macleod as Colonial Secretary, Harold Macmillan was, in effect, issuing a general directive to 'get a move on' in Africa. Theoretically Government policy remained unaltered, the change of timing was so radical that it amounted in practice to a change of policy.'

However Murphy argues that 'the timing of Lennox-Boyd's decision to leave Government and Macmillan's repeated efforts over the course of 1959 to persuade him to stay put, tend to disprove the common assumption that he was eased out of the Colonial Office in order to open the way for the rapid liquidation of Britain's Colonial empire. Nevertheless, there are unmistakable signs that during Lennox-Boyd's final year in office, Macmillan was becoming dissatisfied with the general direction of British policy towards Africa and was eager to play a more active role in its formulation.' Similarly, Thorpe notes that 'as Colonial Secretary, Iain Macleod's attitude towards the pace of decolonisation was to the left of the traditional imperialist Tory back-benchers - even, some suspected, of Macmillan himself. What made matters worse for these backbenchers was the unconcealed delight with which Macleod rejoiced in the discomfort of the white colonial settlers. Macleod was becoming a turbulent minister, a genie that Macmillan himself had let out of the bottle.'

Macleod's appointment did seem to coincide with a greater sense of urgency in the Macmillan government. Shepherd notes that, 'from the moment that Macleod first entered office, he orchestrated the politics of decolonisation, both in Whitehall and in

21 Young, Britain and the World, p.181; Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, p.147.
24 Murphy, Lennox-Boyd, p.200.
25 Thorpe, Supermac, p.481.
Africa with a determined, ruthless skill.26 Even Macleod himself saw that Macmillan believed in a change of direction and speed, though was not as ready for it as he needed to be. He suggests that:

'The difficulty with Harold Macmillan in relation to Africa was that he had all the right instincts, as his "winds of change" speech showed quite clearly. He was more than prepared for a rapid move to independence - as his appointment of myself showed. But from time to time he wanted, and I daresay we all do, the best of both worlds, he didn’t want to fall out with his good friends either at home or in Central or East Africa as the case may be. Whereas, I took the brutal, but I think practical view that this was an omelette, that couldn’t be made without breaking eggs and one couldn’t be friends with everyone however much one wanted to do it, while one was pursuing such a policy.27

It is unclear whether Macleod changed policy or if change was simply inevitable under the circumstances. It is also unclear if Macmillan was in fact explicitly changing his stance on Africa or the Federation by appointing Macleod or if events created a new reality that forced a change in policy. The events of the State of Emergency, coupled with the mounting international and domestic pressure to move away from Empire and forge closer connections to both Europe and America were important factors in pushing Macmillan to be more assertive on Africa.28 The realities of the failures of the Federation were, by 1960, no longer deniable. As a member of the Conservative Commonwealth Council stated 'both the Prime Minister and Mr Macleod have given the party a lead; they have accepted that the aspirations of the Africans must be met, at least in part if we are to avoid disaster.'29

Macmillan’s general election win in 1959 was an important one; not only did he achieve an increased majority he was, at last, the people's choice, and not just that of the conservative party.30 There was also an increasing interest in Africa within the party and, as Goldsworthy argues, 'there seemed, in short, no longer any sufficient

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28 Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, p.221.
29 Conservative Political Archive, COB 120/1-3, Conservative Commonwealth Council, to the Chairman from Mrs Erica Macqueen, 18 April 1960.
30 Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues, p.366.
intra-party reason to postpone changes in policy. Britain was changing, the Conservatives were changing, and all this helped to create a new era for Africa policy.

This change created fear within the white communities of Africa, as historically the Conservatives had been their champions. The recent reaction to the Devlin Report seemed to imply that they were still willing to defend them in the face of criticism. However, the reality was that Federal Government was not achieving what it set out to achieve; the multiracial ideal was breaking under the weight of inaction. No meaningful attempts had been made to engage Africans in a significant way and the white settlers and the Federal Government had to take more responsibility for the stagnation. This was best illustrated by the fact that, despite his open derision of the movement, Welensky did not meet with any African nationalist leader before the Federal review conference in November 1960. A fact that surprised Macmillan and, according to Fisher, 'exemplified much of what was at fault in the way the Federation had been governed.'

This was a major problem for Federation, as it seemed to contradict its multiracial aims, or at least raise serious questions about Welensky’s commitment to the ideal. While Welensky could claim there was a campaign of coercion and intimidation on the side of the African Nationalists, and that they failed to represent the average African in the way they maintained to, his failure to engage with the movements leaders seemed to suggest that multiracialism was just an empty promise. While Welensky did not wish to legitimise African nationalist movements he felt were unhelpful and dangerous, he in fact helped their cause even more.

Perhaps Lord Salisbury’s, assertion that Macleod was 'too clever by half' is the most accurate reflection of the perception of the Colonial Secretary for supporters of white Settlers. Salisbury was a vocal and staunch critic of Macmillan, Macleod and the direction of British African policy, as well as a strong supporter of Federation. He

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32 Brendon, Decline and Fall, p.583; Sanger, Central African Emergency, p.487.
35 Sanger, Central African Emergency, p.56.
36 Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, p.148.
37 Welensky, 4000 Days, P.271; Sanger, Central African Emergency, p.56.
38 The Times, 8 March 1960 in Brendon, Decline and Fall, p.584.
believed that Macleod 'used his skills to outwit his white 'opponents' on behalf of his black "partners". This idea of whites being duped, abandoned, or betrayed became a major theme in the arguments against British policy, the Monckton Report, and the attitudes of the British and American governments in the 1960s.

The idea that there had been a sudden and forceful change in British policy after Macleod became Secretary of State seems to ignore the way in which the situation in the Federation had developed in the years prior. The idea that Britain was abandoning whites made an already sensitive racial issue all-the-more contentious. Instead of recognizing the role they played in denying black African's a voice, taking responsibility, and embracing a new multiracial future, African disillusionment was suppressed. A success for African nationalism was re-imagined to be a traitorous act against whites. The Monckton report would lay these issues out in a very public forum, making uncomfortable reading for both Federal and British Ministers. However, before the Commission could start, the issue of Nyasaland’s African nationalist leader, Hastings Banda’s incarceration and his possible release during the commissions visit to the area needed to be addressed first.

**Banda's release**

The timing and location of the release of Banda, who was still in detention after the State of Emergency, was a major point of contention. While some, including Welensky and Nyasaland’s Governor Robert Armitage, wanted Banda to either be released outside of the Federation, or have his contribution made from prison, others made the argument that Banda should give his evidence to the Commission as a free man. This issue became a mini crisis for the Macmillan Government, with strong opposition to his release from both Welensky and Southern Rhodesia’s Edgar

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39 Brendon, *Decline and Fall*, p.580.
40 MSS Welensky 683/5, Welensky to Wilese, 6 May 1963.
41 Hemming, *End of British Empire*, pp.99-100; DO 35/8804, Africa the Next Ten Years, A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 8 July 1959; PREM 11/321, Colonial Secretary to Prime Minister, Progress Report affecting Colonial Matters during First Half of 1960, 31 May 1960; Young, *Britain and Decolonisation*, p.182.
Whitehead on the one side and Macleod's ardent support for his release on the other.\textsuperscript{45} This escalated to the point where the Colonial Secretary declared that he would be forced to resign if Banda was not released.\textsuperscript{46}

It was feared that Banda's release would reignite the tempers that had flared during the Emergency and thus risk the security of the Federation.\textsuperscript{47} There was also a concern that his presence out of detention would create an atmosphere of anxiety and intimidation, making it harder for more moderate or pro-Federation Africans to speak freely to the visiting Monckton Commission.\textsuperscript{48} Welensky was unhappy at any suggestion of Banda being freed into the Federation, and although he eventually accepted the idea, he was fiercely resistant to his release taking place before the Monckton Commission visited.\textsuperscript{49} According to Fisher, within the Conservative party, 'only Iain Macleod...was insistent on his release.'\textsuperscript{50} This was because Macleod believed that while he was in prison Banda was myth in the minds of Africans across the Federation. Out of prison he was a man, 'and a man would be easier to cope with than the myth. And so it proved.'\textsuperscript{51} The martyring of Banda in detention was, for Macleod far more dangerous than any action he could take, or any mistakes he could possibly make, on the outside. As Macleod himself later reflected, 'whether one liked it or not Banda in jail or out of jail was the unquestioned leader.'\textsuperscript{52}

One other interpretation of Macleod's insistence for Banda's release was that he had been too quick to give reassurances to African nationalists that Banda would be released. Historian Charles Williams asserts that 'the crisis continued to deepen the next day, and it was apparent that Macleod had given some embarrassing half promises to Banda, behind the back of [Alec Douglas] Home and the Cabinet.'\textsuperscript{53} Similarly, Horne comments that 'Macleod had unwisely told some of Banda's friends in Nyasaland that he would be freed almost immediately. That, discovered, Macmillan

\textsuperscript{46} MS Mac dep. c.21/1, 23 February 1960.
\textsuperscript{48} CAB 138/34 CC (60) 11th Conclusions, 22 February 1960; CAB 128/32, CC (60), 13th Conclusions, 25 February 1960; CAB 195/18 cc 14 (60), Notebooks, 1 March 1960.
\textsuperscript{49} Williams, \textit{Macmillan}, pp.357-8.
\textsuperscript{50} Fisher, \textit{Macmillan}, p.233.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, p.234.
\textsuperscript{52} Shepherd, \textit{Macleod}, p.201.
\textsuperscript{53} Horne, \textit{Macmillan}, p.201.
devised the solution. While this claim could be true, the reality was that for the Monckton Commission to appear fully independent and ready to listen to the Africans, it had to be able to hear from its de facto leader outside of a prison cell, particularly when the Commission was investigating the very regime that placed him there. The release would also indicate to Africans that Britain, and to some extent the Federation, was willing to make some concessions. The liberation of Banda was, in many respects, a face-saving exercise aimed at creating an atmosphere in which the Commission’s findings would be better accepted and pre-empting any potential excuse-making in the event it found in favour of Federation continuing.

The relationship between Macleod and Banda was one of mutual respect and understanding. Macleod was able to form a strong bond with Banda, seen in Banda’s statement on his release that ‘I am here because we have a great man at the Colonial Office...It took courage to do what he did - to bring me back to you.’ Macleod was able to use this relationship to persuade Banda to speak to the people on his release to alleviate the tension and try to prevent the violence that Welensky and Whitehouse were waiting to happen. As Fisher states ‘they got on well, and, at Macleod's suggestion, Banda broadcast to the people to tell them he was free, and that the future of Nyasaland could safely be entrusted to the British Government. This worked like a charm. It was as though a boil had been lanced and the tension evaporated overnight.’

Upon Banda’s release Macleod told Macmillan ‘it is a great relief now to have the little man out of gaol because unless he proves himself in the end to be an effective leader, I am sure his authority will diminish rather than increase.’ While this did not happen, neither did the violent outbursts and the security crisis that Whitehead and Welensky had predicted. Macleod had managed to use their arguments as tools to persuade Banda to create a feeling of calm. This, in turn, created a situation in which Welensky and Whitehead became the problem. As Macmillan

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54 Williams, Macmillan, p.361.
57 Ibid, p.234.
59 Ibid.
states in his diary 'the Federation (especially with Welensky and Whitehead on one side and the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland on the other) was the trickiest, for we carry a great - if limited responsibility....[N]ew trouble in developing with Welensky and Whitehead. They are sending intemperate telegrams threatening secession and the break-up of Federation, all because of HMG's wish to release Banda and get on with some constructional advance in Nyasaland. I expected some reaction - but not as bad as this.'

The issue of the release became such that Lord Home, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, questioned if he should just give up and go home. Macmillan concluded that 'it is clear that the Governments (both Welensky's and Whiteheads) are deeply suspicious of London and especially of Colonial Office. His last telegrams reveal a growing sense of something like panic. Unless we are careful, the Europeans will do something rather desperate.' However, this was only part of the problem. While the two leaders had become disillusioned with Britain, the real issue was their perception of Banda himself. As Home concludes:

'The fundamental difficulty is that they look upon Banda as a man who has no redeeming feature and who is dedicated to breaking Federation and nothing else. They do not believe he will be sidetracked by limited talks on Nyasaland from pushing his main aim of breaking Federation. They feel that if he is released before Monckton has reported and guided public opinion he may be using all the publicity instruments at his disposal to succeed in his anti-federation aims while remaining within the law.'

The result was that, as Horne describes 'Macmillan himself came up with a Solomonic Judgement that Banda should be released three days *before* Monckton left Nyasaland instead of three days *after*.' However, the real result of the crisis was that the strain and tension took a toll on Macmillan, forcing him to appreciate the

60 MS Mac dep c.21/1, 7 Feb 1960.
62 MS Mac dep c.21/1, 23 February 1960.
63 PREM 11/3076, To the Prime Minister from the Commonwealth Secretary, 21 February 1960; Welensky, *4,000 Days*, p.271; Sanger, *Central African Emergency*, p.207.
difficulties that the split of responsibility for the Federation across the Colonial and Commonwealth Offices were causing. The Federation suffered from a lack of coherence and cohesion created by the sheer volume of people involved; instead of two sides able to enter into negotiations there were instead a number of sides, each competing, and none cooperating. As Macmillan himself states:

'I confess that the end of this minor crisis was a great relief to me. It is difficult after so many years to realise the nervous strain which can develop over such delicate issues. The situation was aggravated by the anomaly of two secretary of state's being in charge of the same territories in their different aspects, the Commonwealth Secretary acting in respect of the Federation as a whole, and for Southern Rhodesia, while the Colonial Secretary was equally responsible for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.'\(^66\)

Despite the fact that Banda's release did not cause the problems predicted Welensky's sense of betrayal by the British Government and his hatred of Macleod, led him to conclude, 'that Banda's release was accomplished by instructions from Macleod to the Governor or the Acting Governor to placate Dr Banda in every way so as to make sure of his attendance at the July Conference...intimidation of political opposition has become the order of the day.'\(^67\) His refusal to accept Banda as the voice of, if not all Africans in Nyasaland, then at least a sizable proportion, was the real issue. Welensky could not see any benefit to Banda's release, especially after the Monckton Report was published, because he failed to see the African point of view on a number of issues. The racial divide was not taken as seriously by Welensky as it should have been, especially in the light of the multiracial ideal the Federation claimed to have at its heart.

\(^67\) MSS Welensky 665/3, Draft Letter, Prime Minister to Salisbury regarding Macleod, undated.
Racial issues

Perhaps the biggest issue Welensky had with Banda's release was the fear that Banda set the pace for Kaunda in Northern Rhodesia and Joshua Nkomo, the African nationalist leader in Southern Rhodesia. These men were, for Welensky and his followers, the villains that wanted to destroy Federation. As Allighan asserts:

'These three constituted the centres of revolt during the past two years, have converged to culminate in menacing demonstrations and bloodshed. For them, Sir Roy's policy of 'partnership' and African development is neither adequate nor acceptable. Differing lightly in degree as their methods, they have a common objective - complete overthrow of European control or guidance and seizure of the apparatus of Government by the Africans. In pure theory, that ideal is democracy because the natives, when the count of skills is the determinant form a quantitative majority. In practice, Sir Roy says: "The franchise is a privilege to be exercised but those who have attained a standard that makes it possible for them to exercise it intelligently, and those who have it must not deny opportunities and facilities to all to attain that standard."'\(^{68}\)

The idea that franchise was a privilege and not a right was the crux of the problem. To achieve a multiracial society there needed to be equality, but in the Federation, equality too was a privilege to be earned; the problem was that the Africans were not allowed to be in a position to be able to earn it. As Horne comments, 'Welensky's attitude towards African partnership and political advancement was encapsulated in the slogan of 'a vote for every civilised man', the rub of course, lay in the Rhodesian whites' definition of a 'civilised man'. In reality, it meant that Welensky was not prepared to concede parity, or anything like it, in the Federation, nor would he contemplate an African majority in anyone of the territories.'\(^{69}\)

Allighan defends Welensky's stance on the advancement of Africans citing 'Welensky's often announced theorem - 'it's the duty of the white man to provide opportunities for Africans' advancement and opportunities for them to qualify for such

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\(^{68}\) Allighan, *Welensky Story*, p.235.

self-advancement.' It is not enough, in his view, to throw open such avenues without providing the Africans with facilities for the training which alone will qualify them - 'ability, not pigmentation' - to take advance of them. Indeed, Franklin, a critic of Welensky does defend Welensky and his actions in regard to breaking racial barriers. Franklin acknowledges that 'Sir Roy was not and is not a man lacking in human sympathy...Yet he would not give a bold lead, possibly fearing that if he did he might lose the next elections.\(^71\)

Franklin also notes that when contacted about the treatment of Africans by European staff in Post Offices, Welensky would always follow up. However, he also notes that while colour bars were taken away 'almost overnight' in other African countries:

'With almost no repercussions from Europeans' this did not happen in the Federation. The fear of a negative white settler reaction seems only to indicate the absurdity of the idea that white settlers were more qualified for the franchise, and were committed to the ideal of multiracialism in a way that uneducated Africans could not be. Franklin argues that if a fear of white settlers meant that Welensky 'could not take a bold lead for fear of the white electorate then that electorate should not have been entrusted with the Federation.'\(^72\)

Piers Brendon sees Whitehead's attempts at racial changes as an act of lip service aimed at helping his bigger aim for independence for the Federation as a whole, or Southern Rhodesia on its own. For Brendon, Whitehead 'made liberal overtures, such as desegregating post offices and promising land reform, in order to conciliate middle-class Africans and to convince London that Rhodesia was becoming a multiracial state fit for autonomy.'\(^73\) However, social colour bars were a big issue in Southern Rhodesia according to Franklin 'and were on several occasions a source of embarrassment to the Federal Government. Diplomats with skins of various shades visiting the Federation on trade missions or other occasions did not take kindly to

\(^{70}\) Allighan, Welensky Story, p.224.
\(^{71}\) Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, p.134.
\(^{72}\) Ibid.
\(^{73}\) Brendon, Decline and Fall, p.585.
being refused a drink in a bar or a meal or a bed in a hotel.\textsuperscript{74} Similarly, Sanger maintains that 'the machinery of segregation is working to keep black and white apart in the towns. Since three out of every four whites in Southern Rhodesia live in a town, this factor is of supreme importance.'\textsuperscript{75} While Verrier states that, 'white Rhodesians were imperialists stuck in a time warp, living in a world which for Britain had started to come apart on the Somme and had finally disintegrated over Hiroshima.'\textsuperscript{76}

The Americans, facing their own racial problems were extremely aware of not only how their own issues affected their prestige abroad, but also how racial issues had become harmful to their relations with African nations. However interested the American Consulate was in the Federation and its racial issues, there were also great failings on their part. As mentioned previously, there was an awareness that no African leaders had been officially invited to the White House,\textsuperscript{77} and an understanding of how the actions of American run businesses in Africa would affect the image of America in this delicate time. In 1959, an incident the opening of an American picture house in Southern Rhodesia caused a great deal of embarrassment for the American government. As part of the opening, a benefit for the Red Cross charity was held and Africans were excluded. Randall, in a letter to the President of the American motion Picture association, felt the incident 'in my opinion, has greatly damaged the image of which African’s have of our country and the effect is wider than that on the local populace in Southern Rhodesia.'\textsuperscript{78} He also felt that the choice of the Red Cross for the benefit 'could hardly have been a choice of sponsor more calculated to create embarrassment...which is dedicated to the service of mankind without respect to creed or color.'\textsuperscript{79}

Macmillan identified that this issue of racial inequality threatened the very existence of Federation concluding that 'the anomaly, even the dilemma, was now clear. Either Federation must move forward to a genuinely 'multiracial' structure by

\textsuperscript{74} Franklin, \textit{Unholy Wedlock}, p.150.
\textsuperscript{75} Sanger, \textit{Central African Emergency}, p.57.
\textsuperscript{76} Verrier, \textit{Road to Zimbabwe}, p.75.
\textsuperscript{77} RG, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Eastern and Southern Affairs, Records Relating to Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1956-1963, Box 1, Joseph Palmer (Second American Consul General) to Major Cruciana (Assistant Attaché American Embassy South Africa), 8 March 1960.
\textsuperscript{78} US Council on Foreign Economic Policy, Records, 1954-61, Chronological File, Box 1, Randall to Eric Johnston, President, American Motion Picture Association, 19 October 1959.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
which power and responsibility would be shared between the Europeans and the Africans, or it must be dissolved, and the danger was that dissolution would be accompanied by grave turmoil and disaster. This did not at all imply African rule on a 'one man, one vote' basis - it implied some genuine system of partnership with fair representation of the different elements in an agreed system.\textsuperscript{80}

The idea of multiracialism was to remove race as an issue in Africa and allow a partnership between whites and blacks.\textsuperscript{81} The problem was that this ideal inadvertently caused more racial tension in some respects. While African natives saw partnership to mean that race would no longer be a bar to participation in the governance of a country in which they were the majority, white settlers saw this to mean the gradual allowance of participation to those who earned the privilege.\textsuperscript{82} This led to an increased white settler fears that Africans would suddenly become the more powerful race and while Africans increasingly felt Federation was merely another part of a movement toward Dominion status and de facto white domination.\textsuperscript{83} As Franklin argues, 'any hope of non-racialism had disappeared when the Federation was imposed on Africans, impelling them, in order to get out of it, into a racial camp. The number of Europeans who on their side had ever believed at all in non-racialism was negligible.'\textsuperscript{84}

One of the main problems was that whites and blacks in Africa did not mix enough to create understandings or debunk fears. As Sanger argues, 'the dangerous result is that in the cities where there should be most contact, the races are most remote from each other.'\textsuperscript{85} This led to the fear among whites that the black Africans simply wanted to remove them all from Africa and misunderstandings that would not allow any progress to be made. As historian, John Parker argues, 'if the African demands had been excessive, like for example the total elimination of the white man from Rhodesia, the extreme reaction of the European minority would have been more

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\textsuperscript{80} Macmillan, \textit{Pointing the Way}, p.132.


\textsuperscript{83} Franklin, \textit{Unholy Wedlock}, p.13.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid, p.189.

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understandable. But even the initial basic need for the Africans for recognition as human beings was rejected out of hand as soon as it manifested itself.\footnote{Parker, \textit{Little White Island}, pp.87-88.} Instead, the prevailing view was that gradual concessions to Africans were enough and belittled the idea of racial tensions and prejudices. This can be seen in Allighan's assertion that:

'Advancement of the African and care for their physical welfare have been and remain basic to the policy of the Federal Prime Minister and his Government, and he denounces the European die-hards in the territories who reject it. "I've lost patience," he publically said that year, "with those people who see in the removal of racial pinpricks the doom of the white man. The truth is that the position is just the reverse, for if we go on treating the African who is educated, and has achieved a standard of culture akin to our own, as an inferior for all time, then we are making a clash on racial issues inevitable." Not only has be blunted the point of many previous criticisms but, in addition, has legislated so that the European tax-payers finance African-native benefits.\footnote{Allighan, \textit{Welensky Story}, pp.224-5.}

Allighan perpetuates this belief further when he states that Welensky 'could rightly claim that against the massive advance in democratic government which he had secured, the British administrations prior to Federation could show nothing whatever of African representation or electoral powers. None realised more clearly than Sir Roy Welensky that it was not the last work in African representation...and none resents more than he the criticism from the British, who did nothing in the seventy years that he has not done enough in seven.'\footnote{Ibid, pp.222-223.} While it could be argued that progress had been made in the years that the Federation was in force, the argument fails to appreciate that the Federation was set up to achieve racial partnership. The small improvements Welensky could claim amounted to very little in real terms. Multiracialism began to look ever more, as Macmillan described as an 'idealistic but perhaps impracticable concept'\footnote{Macmillan, \textit{Pointing the Way}, p.132.}
The Findings

The aims of the Report were clear; to see if Federation was working and if it had a future. As Horne comments 'Monckton was given a brief more cosmetic than dynamic; he was to hear local evidence and clear the air of misunderstandings, then use his great powers of persuasion, combined with his famous charm, to encourage a positive climate of opinion on Federation as a whole. The problem was that the report found that, despite its positives, Federation could only succeed if there were massive changes to its structure as it was, in its current form, found to be 'impeding political advance for African people.'

One of the main issues that the Report emphasised was the intense hatred and mistrust Federation had amongst Africans. As Darwin suggests, 'the report on the commission in October 1960 wasted few words in demonstrating the 'almost pathological' dislike of Federation in the protectorates.' This recognition was a step forward, however the report also, as Franklin suggests, fell for 'for one popular fallacy when it regarded that 'the term federation has in itself become a serious political liability, and the federation association in its new form must start with a new name.' This was a considerable under-estimate of African intelligence.

The main focus of the Report for critics and supporters alike was one small word that was more explosive than any other; secession. The very mention of it provoked a furious reaction from the Federal leaders and brought hope to many African nationalists. As Horne notes, 'once the Report was published, the deadly word 'secession' would be out, and, once the principle had been mooted, it was only a matter of time before it became a reality. The fact that the Report was not met in Britain with the same kind of distaste the Devlin Report received seems to indicate

93 Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, p.273.
94 Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, p.157.
that the conclusions were, if not fully expected, of little surprise to the Macmillan Government. This can be seen in Macmillan’s assessment that ‘the Report would not necessarily have to be accepted or rejected - it was a contribution to the problem and was presented for the consideration of the Review Commission, to which were all committed.’

The reaction of the American Government to the Monckton Commission reveals much about their stance on Federation and how it had evolved by 1960. In a document entitled 'the Dilemma of Colonialism' the Report is described as having reinforced:

‘our belief that the Federation as presently constituted cannot work. The Monckton Report also confirmed our views that (1) no form of federation can succeed which does not secure the consent of the vast African majority, (2) that the use of force by resident Europeans cannot secure long-term stability, or, indeed, continued white control, and (3) that the retention of a federal system, if based on equitable racial partnership, will best conduce to economic growth and political stability.’ However, while the importance of the Report is acknowledged as is their own inability to do much with the findings as 'during the present transitional period, when our ability to influence the course of events is extremely limited, we believe the best course is to urge the United Kingdom to reassert its role as an imperial arbiter between the races until power can be peacefully transferred to responsible Africans.

The resulting stance of the Department was that they regarded 'sympathetically the efforts of the United Kingdom and those elements with the Federation which seek an easement of present tensions through moderation and accommodation. In particular we hope for further progress on racial cooperation.’

They also maintained the view that:

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98 RG General Records of Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, Records relating to Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1956-1964, Box 2, Bilateral Discussions with the UK, African Problems: The Dilemma of Colonialism, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, no date or author.
99 RG General Records of Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, Records relating to Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1956-1964, Box 2, To Mr Halsema, The
'the Europeans must recognize the need to accommodate the Africans and avoid racial violence which will only serve to frustrate efforts for a solution. On the other hand, the Africans must also exercise restraint, and recognize the ejection of European skills and capital is not in their best interests.'

There is also evidence that the Americans had clear understanding of the Commission's recommendations, the minority report and the reactions to the report in UK and Federation.

In talks with the British in November 1960, near the end of Eisenhower's term in office, American support for the Monckton Report was expressed by Mr Deeming of the Department of State, who commented that the 'Department felt that the Monckton Report was an admirable and objective document, though naturally they did not propose to say anything about it in public.' The general situation in Federation at that time was described by the Commonwealth Relations office as, rather surprisingly, having become much steadier over the last year or so both in Parliament and in the United Kingdom generally; the subject no longer aroused such vehement feelings on either side. Meanwhile Satterthwaite acknowledged that Central Africa was 'perhaps the most complex problem in African after the problem of the Congo' and praised British efforts. He also encouraged that secession be discussed at the Review Conference and expressed the view that the United States of America had of course an interest in avoiding a conflict between Africans and the West (though they understood there was no communist problem, as such, in the Federation) and had been concerned about Sir Edgar Whitehead's repressive measures.

The general consensus from historians and those involved has been that the Report marked the beginning of the end for the Federation. Nkomo stated that 'it...
was a damning document, falling only just short of proposing the federation should be broken up. For Parker 'Monckton spelt the death knell of the Federation in unmistakable terms by allowing both discussion of and conclusions on the right of the component territories to secede.' Horne described it as a 'powerful document' that 'amounted to a fair indictment of the way in which the Federation was being run.' While Fisher describes it as 'a wise and forward looking report, which did not in any way cut across Macleod's policies.'

One of the biggest issues that immediately faced the British Government in the aftermath of the Monckton Report was the reaction of Welensky. Having been uneasy about the Commission from the beginning and reassured that the issue of secession would not be included in the terms of reference, in was inevitable that Welensky would take issue to the findings. As Macmillan noted in his memoirs a 'protracted argument now arose with Welensky.' This centred on the issue of the terms of reference and reached such proportions that Welensky threatened to publish the private correspondence of the two Prime Ministers as proof of the bad faith. Though Franklin argues that, 'admittedly Mr Harold Macmillan had made some remarkably vague and equivocal statements on the point from time to time but he had indicated that consideration of this matter could not be ruled out.'

While arguably Welensky could feel hard done by, the reality was that while secession had been left from the terms of reference, it was not marked off limits or barred from consideration. This technicality allowed the issue to be considered and there is no evidence that this was done deliberately by Macmillan or any other member of the British government. However the real issue was that the report’s findings were unanimous except for two signatories who wanted even more; this

107 Nkomo, My Life, p.92.
108 Parker, Little White Island, p.82.
110 Fisher, Macleod, p163.
113 Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p.299.
114 MS Mc dep c. 21/1, 2 November 1960.
115 Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, p.158.
116 Franklin, Ibid, p158; CAB 128/34, CC (60) 57th Conclusions, 8 November 1960; Macmillan, At The End of the Day, pp.300-301.
included the Rhodesians involved. This lead to Macmillan to note in his diary, after meeting Welensky sometime after the report that Welensky was 'rather pessimistic...he still feels very bitter against Ld. Monckton. He cannot answer the question 'Why did all the Euros from Rhodesia sign the report?'.\footnote{MS Mac dep c. 21/1, 26 November 1960.} Regardless of this, Welensky 'maintained that the report was little more than "an essay in the appeasement of African nationalists"'.\footnote{Macmillan, \textit{At the End of the Day}, pp.299-300.}

This sense of betrayal did little to aid the already fraught racial relations in Rhodesia. As Welensky notes 'it is difficult at this hour to get people to keep their heads because there is a strong feeling that the British Government has let us down. In some ways there is a feeling that the white man is being left to carry the can here and that Britain, with her policy of disengagement in the Commonwealth, doesn’t care about her sons and daughters whom she sent out a short while ago to develop the Commonwealth. None of this shocks me because I've always felt that in the end we would have to rely on ourselves and that is how I feel about things now.'\footnote{MSS Welensky 683/5, Welensky to Senator Don Wilese, 28 September 1960.}

Verrier argues that 'unfortunately for Welensky, he quite failed to grasp that Macmillan's foreign policy was based on maintaining the closest possible relations with the United States, although the illusion was also preserved of a Britain well able to make up its own mind and equally well able to coerce lesser powers.'\footnote{Verrier, \textit{Road to Zimbabwe}, p.75.} However, this is quite a simplistic view and fails to take into account the fact that the British Government had other concerns, both domestic and in the Commonwealth that affected their policy toward Africa and the Federation; appealing to, or appeasing, the Americans was not the only consideration.
Macmillan and the Winds of Change

Another historic event of 1960 was Macmillan's visit to Africa, the first visit by any British Prime Minister to 'black Africa' while in office.\(^{121}\) The visit began in Ghana and ended in South Africa, where Macmillan's famous 'Winds of Change' speech was delivered causing much controversy in Africa and at home. While the phrase 'winds of change' had been used in an earlier speech in Ghana, the reaction to it in South Africa was understandably very different and caught the attention of the Press. As Fisher notes, 'many Europeans in Africa and their supporters in Britain were shocked by Macmillan's pronouncement. They reacted as though he had invented nationalism instead of merely pointing out its existence.'\(^{122}\)

However Horne's assertion that Macmillan 'had never said much about his views on Africa, but if anything it was plain that his sympathies were on the side of the African' perhaps overstates the Prime Minister's stance.\(^{123}\) While the speech does indicate that African's could not be ignored and that African independence was inevitable, it does not clearly align Macmillan to the African cause. It is perhaps more accurate to say that Macmillan publicly faced a reality that white settlers, especially in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, were not ready to accept; that African nationalism could no longer be ignored and independence was inevitable.

Williams remarked that:

'At the time, Macmillan's speech caused little sensation outside South Africa...There were those who immediately grasped its significance - Officials in the Colonial and Commonwealth Offices stopped writing policy papers, on the grounds that Macmillan had set out British policy once for all - and there were those, even to the present day who came to recognise, and still do, that it marked one of the turning points in the twentieth Century. A British Prime Minister had scented a breeze - of black African Nationalism - and turned it into a wind. As a result, the British African Empire started finally on the long road to its dissolution.'\(^{124}\)

However, this does not do justice to the way in which decolonisation had already progressed in Africa. Ghana had started the decolonisation process in 1957 and many countries had become or were soon to become independent in by 1960. The winds of change did not signal the end of Empire, it was merely a signpost along the path.

The speech was well received by Eisenhower however, who wrote to Macmillan to tell him 'that I have been enormously impressed with the great skill with which you carried out your tour of Africa. I am certain that in your visits to each of the countries and territories you have made significant contributions toward the resolution of many critical issues...Very frankly, I was especially struck by your masterful address in Cape Town, and your analysis of the forces of nationalism.' This is a clear indication that the Americans and the British, in the most basic of terms, saw decolonisation in the same way. They both saw the growth of nationalism and the need to move towards independence in Africa in a safe and timely manner. While communism and the Cold War were high priorities for the Eisenhower Government, the decolonisation of Africa in general terms was equally important. Cold War considerations needed to be taken into account but were not used to stop the decolonisation process. The warm reception to Macmillan’s speech seems to indicate that Eisenhower welcomed Macmillan’s recognition that African independence was inevitable but that it needed to be handled with care.

Historian Niall Ferguson argues that "the winds of change" blew not from Windhoek or Malawi but from Washington and Moscow. Tragically, they often blew away Colonial rule only to replace it with civil war. In some respects, Eisenhower agreed with this stance, as he saw that 'the Communists were trying to get those winds blowing their way, in order to exploit the third world. The great battleground of the Cold War had shifted away from Europe and Korea and Formosa...to Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent, where the situation was in active ferment." The inherent instability this new era was producing made the dangers of communist subversion a very real possibility for the Americans and thus an interest in

126 Temperley, Britain and America, p.175; Zinn, A Peoples History, p.430.
128 Ambrose, Eisenhower, p.376.
Africa was stirred even more. The influence of East and West did affect Africa but it was not the cause of the winds; they merely attempted to funnel it in their favour.

However, Welensky argued that the communism was an extremely big threat in the Federation. In a speech before the Conservative Commonwealth Commission in December 1960, Welensky claimed that 'we have been pushed back - the Communists have infiltrated' and that 'we have been losing the battle against communism and the way we are going we will lose it finally.' Joseph Palmer had also warned that, within the Federation 'a potentially fertile field for communist penetration exists among the non-European population. Widespread dissatisfaction is evident among non-Europeans, especially Africans, as a result of limitations on economic opportunity and political participation, the situation is exacerbated by white supremacist attitudes displayed by some local Europeans and by growing African nationalism. However, the key point here is that Palmer only saw potential rather than evidence of a real problem. The real issue was that Welensky feared African nationalism and rather than communicating with Nationalist leaders, he dismissed them out of hand. This led to many leaders being courted by communist leaders and linked with other African nationalists that had taken communist aid. This in turn created a new fear of communism and allowed African nationalism to be linked with it turning African nationalism into an even bigger monster.

Although the Americans were well informed of the problems of the Federation, there was the need for Deputy Consul General Edward Mulcahy to contact the State Department to refute press coverage of incidents in the Federation that he felt were misrepresented. According to Mulcahy, Newsweek Internationals October issue made 'several of us here at the Consulate General are downright annoyed with the fairly fulsome article on the Federation.' The main thrust of the correspondence was to

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132 RG59 General Records of Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs Office of Eastern and Southern Affairs, Records Relating to Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1956-1963, Box 1, To Olcott Demming
emphasise that the trouble reported was either exaggerated, imagined or wrongly attributed to reaction to the Monckton Report. However, the real issue is revealed to be that 'it is the type of article which tends to justify to the White Settler -- and to his Government -- the locally held belief that the foreign press is engaged in a conspiracy against him, the subject of a recent Welensky speech to the Salisbury Rotary Club.'

What is unclear, however, is what exactly Macmillan's winds of change meant for the Federation. Macmillan himself describes the difficulties he faced: 'To pass from Ghana and Nigeria with all their hopes and fears, their tribal and personal rivalries, and to reach Salisbury, the capital of the Federation, was to enter a different world. Ghana was African-ruled and had been independent for nearly three years. Nigeria was about to reach independence and was to be ruled by Africans. Here, therefore, we were in an atmosphere of accomplishment and expectation... Salisbury was altogether different. It had still a colonial atmosphere.' After his return from Africa, he concluded to his cabinet that while the trip had been successful, he warned the he 'returned with great anxiety about future of Federation.' In his memoirs, Macmillan was similarly frank about his experiences, stating 'in the nine days which I was able to spend in the Federation I would not help being struck by the sense of uncertainty, whether among Europeans of Africans...The Foundations of the Federation were already being questioned and in both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland there was unrest.'

There had been no sign that Macmillan had, before his tour of Africa, decided that Federation was dead. While there were doubts over how the Federation could fulfil its promise, how it could survive its problems and achieve all its goals in the face of rising African dissatisfaction there was still a belief that Federation should not be abandoned completely; or at least there were no solid plans to end it. That is perhaps the true crux of the issue; there were no plans at all, just a blind hope that it

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133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p.130.
136 CAB 195/18, CC (60) 9th Conclusions, 16 February 1960, Prime Ministers Africa Tour.
137 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p.130.
138 PREM 11/3240, the Colonial Secretary to the Prime Minister - Progress Report Affecting Colonial Matters During the First Half 1960, 31 May 1960.
would all work out in the end. As Horne argues 'there is little doubt...that - as he arrived in Salisbury - Macmillan still wanted to preserve the fabric of the Federation, while knowing that its form would have to be changed to improve the terms of partnership for the Africans. But how? No leader, before or since, black or white, would be able to find the formula for a multiracial black and white society - inside or even outside Africa.'

What is interesting to observe the difference in the two cabinet archives reporting the meeting after Macmillan's return from Africa. The notebook version, written in shorthand note form, differs in content if the general conclusion found in the official cabinet conclusions. In the notebook, Macmillan states that 'we have the responsibility - it is a very difficult task. Must move fast enough to satisfy Africans without getting Euro fears in a panic. S Rhodesia very excitable: might act rashly. We have no power - only influence. Must play for time during '60. Monckton will be more valuable then they think. I have said enough to stress belief in liberal tradition; we can afford to show more consideration for Europeans. Keep them in play until M[onckton] has reported.'

The official version seems to downplay Macmillan's conclusion that there needed to be a balance of speed in Africa that would not upset the European population stating instead that, 'it was now our duty to find a way of constitutional advance which would be sufficient to satisfy the Africans without unduly alarming the Europeans.' There is also no mention of Macmillan's anxiety about the future of Federation, instead choosing to focus on keeping the area stable for the Monckton Commission and the Constitutional review as 'there was at present a real risk that the future of the Federation would be prejudiced before these processes could be completed.'

It is also worthy of note that the major difficulty was not the rise of African nationalism itself but the reaction of the white population. This meant that rather than focusing on what progress could be made increasing African participation, the focus

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140 CAB 195/18, CC (60) 9th Conclusions, 16 February 1960, Prime Ministers Africa Tour.
141 CAB 128/34, CC (60) 9th Conclusions, 16th February 1960, Prime Ministers Africa Tour.
142 Ibid.
was instead how best to sell this to an anxious European population. As the cabinet concludes,

'In the Federation...the United Kingdom Government had a more direct responsibility for finding a means of constitutional progress in a multiracial society. This is a difficult ask, and it had been made even more difficult by the apprehensions aroused among Europeans in the Federation by the rapid growth of national consciousness throughout Africa... The immediate need was to study European opinion in these territories and to keep it stable while the processes on constructional review were being carried out over the next year."

What is clear, however, is that Macmillan's tour and its aftermath proved to be a difficult time for whites in Africa. There was a strong anxiety within the Federation's white population that their future was no longer in their control and that tides were turning against them. Their belief in the British Government to protect them was beginning to waver, if not being eroded completely. The winds of change that blew for them were winds of fear and Macmillan was aware of this. Charles Williams notes that 'Macmillan tried to soothe the spirits by proclaiming his support for the Federation in a speech the next day and claiming that his Lagos remarks had been misrepresented. But he was not entirely successful.'

For Welensky the issue was the reporting of the tour by the British press and the resulting perception in the UK, 'in what I have no hesitation in describing as the general disaster of Mr Macmillan's tour the biased outlook of most of the journalists in and on the fringes of his entourage was a quite important factor."

However, Africa was already proving to be an increasingly important issue for the Eisenhower government as well. In a Security Council document detailing America's Africa policy the maintenance Federal system in Central Africa is encouraged, along with the acceptance of the multiracial democracy. However, the

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143 Horne, Macmillan, p.188; Nkomo, My Life, p.67; Holland, Pursuit of Greatness, p.298.
144 CAB 128/34, CC (60) 9th Conclusions, 16 February 1960, Prime Ministers Africa Tour.
145 Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, p.13; Parker, Little White Island, p.96.
146 Williams, Macmillan, p.357.
147 Welensky, 4000 Days, p.170.
need to 'impress upon the United Kingdom and Federal Governments he urgent need for accommodating the legitimate aspirations of all inhabitants in the Federation within the federal system of government' was also key. There was also an awareness of the of faith Africans had in the Federation, and the need to, 'encourage the United Kingdom to recognize the need to advance Africans and to promote economic development in primarily African areas in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, where the United Kingdom maintains ultimate responsibility, in order to regain African confidence in the United Kingdom and to win African consent of the Federation.  

The Consul General, Lloyd Steere made two public addresses, 'in which he, in effect, criticized the apparent lethargy characterizing the manner in which the Federal Government was implementing its policy of multiracial participation. Although there was recognition that 'strictly speaking, Mr Steere was somewhat out of order in venturing to speak publically on a burning political issue in the Federation' the State Department didn’t take strict position as it 'felt it hadn't been inappropriate.' This could be interpreted as an admission that the Americans agreed with the criticism Steere made, if not willing to endorse it publically. Later controversial statements made by Louisiana Senator Ellender about the situation in the Federation were handled markedly different. This could be due to the change in Administration or the fact they were more supportive of the Federal Government, rather than the nationalist movement.  

1960 was therefore a year of change and of policy and personnel across the British and American Governments and a year in which small cracks began to show in the Federation. Macmillan's Winds of Change speech acknowledged the need for change in Africa, the Monckton Report acknowledged the need for change in the Federation and the need to gain the African support that had been so badly lacking, and Banda’s release acknowledged rising importance of African nationalism across the Federation. America was itself going through a period of great change in 1960, not

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149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 FRUS, Memo from the Officer in charge of Southern Africa Affairs (Dumont) to Terrence Todman of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs, September 1960.
152 Ibid
153 Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 155A, from Salisbury (Geren) to the Secretary of State, 6 December 1962.
least with the election of John F Kennedy in the later part of the year. The presidential campaign placed Africa high on the political agenda and as Noer notes 'during the campaign, he had championed civil rights at home and had promised bold departures from the tired, conservative diplomacy of the 1950s.'\textsuperscript{154} While Britain and America were ready for these changes, white settlers, Welensky and Whitehead were not. They saw these acknowledgements not as an opportunity to build a truly multiracial Federation, but as a personal attack and an abandonment of whites in the area. All these events created a new political atmosphere, however they did not implement any real changes; this would be left to the constitutional reviews that would ultimately see the Federation come to an end.

\textsuperscript{154} Noer, \textit{Cold War in Southern Africa}, p.60.
Chapter Five

Kennedy and Africa: The 1960 election campaign and taking the lead on Africa

When discussing the Kennedy stance on Africa, there are two very distinct periods: the presidential election and his term in office, and such there are two different Kennedys to be examined and judged. Firstly Kennedy as the presidential hopeful, full of promises and ideals yet to be tested, and secondly Kennedy as President and leader, burdened by responsibilities. While Kennedy famously spoke and came to represent the New Frontier for America in the 1960s, Africa was also facing its own New Frontier. 1 1960 was termed 'the year of Africa' as 17 new African nations became independent in that year alone 2 and Macmillan's 'Winds of Change' speech in the February signalled recognition by the British too that the 1960s were a time of change. The 1960s, therefore, were an exciting time and Kennedy firmly tapped into this spirit during both his campaign and his term in Office.

It was on the campaign trail where Kennedy first placed his attention publically and emphatically on the future of the African continent. 3 Africa became a key element of the Kennedy campaign, fitting nicely into the bright, youthful, and brave New Frontier that became part of the Kennedy mythology. 4 Africa was entering an exciting phase; the process started by Ghana in 1957 had become a landslide in 1960 and was a world issue for a number of reasons, not least the role they would play in the increasingly volatile Cold War. 5 Kennedy spoke of Africa often and highlighted the many failures he perceived in the policy adopted by the Eisenhower Administration. How much these proclamations were merely part of campaign grandstanding is unclear; many changes had already taken place that would affect Africa policy regardless of who held office at the end of 1960.

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As previously discussed, the Monckton Report had already had a great impact on the way in which Federation was perceived. The 'support regardless of reservations' stance previously taken had ended; Federation became less about the whole and more about its individual parts. What is interesting about the report from the American point of view is its timing; it came at the very end of Eisenhower's era and just before Kennedy's. This has led to the assumption that any changes of policy were changes made by Kennedy and his position on Africa when, in reality, it was in the main a reaction to the changing situation in the Federation itself. One of the biggest changes was that channels of communication were opened with African leaders in the area, as they were now no longer voices in a crowd but legitimate candidates for control of their respective countries. Race issues in Southern Rhodesia were suddenly more of an issue as the idea of independence, without the moderating framework of Federation was now a real possibility. Federation was no longer blindly supported in the hope that it would achieve something; it was now under fire and threat of ending if it did not fulfil its true aims of partnership or re-invent itself in a way that would.

**The Campaign and Africa**

Africa took a substantial role in the campaign platform of the Kennedy Administration. As Meriwether notes, 'witnessing the powerful draw of Africa and the deep desire to improve lives there, during the campaign Kennedy referred to Africa hundreds of times - far more than he did civil rights.' The reasoning behind this promotion of the African problem was, for Meriwether twofold: 'for Kennedy, Africa was the newest frontier, one where he could burnish his Cold War credentials by enrolling newly independent states on the side of the West while making himself known as a candidate sympathetic to black Americans.' The issue of civil rights in America, though vastly significant at the time was a politically dangerous for a

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6 Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Box 3, Memo for Carl Keyes through McGeorge Bundy, Visit of Kanyana Chiume, 2 March 1963.
7 Papers of President Kennedy, Presidents Office, Special Correspondence, Box 28 Report in Africa Trip, 13 November 1962.
8 Voleman, *United States Foreign Policy*, p.213.
9 Meriwether, "Worth a Lot of Negro Votes", p.739.
10 Ibid.
Presidential candidate and although Kennedy did make some statements and take some action on the issue, placing it in the context of Africa made it far more palatable.

Although Republican candidate, and serving Vice-President, Richard Nixon had visited Africa he had not been able to capture the imagination of the African leaders or the African public in the same manner that Kennedy managed to, without setting foot in on the continent. According to British Economist and writer Barbara Ward Jackson, Nixon was unpopular with African leaders as 'he showed himself...very unaware of a range of issues that would come up in Southern Africa, and like many other people, considerably confused as to how you dealt with them.'\(^{11}\) Kennedy's speeches and involvement in the student exchange program offered a new perspective, while Nixon was seen as part of the old establishment that had failed to achieve. Nixon was a victim of timing in this sense; inaction of the Eisenhower period was because this Administration was nearing its end as well as the fact that Africa had not fully become the issue it would be after 1960, when more African nations were independent.

However, it is important to analyse this period with clear appreciation that the pre-Presidential period was a time of promises being made and past errors being highlighted without the responsibility of having to deliver. Propaganda and spin played a large part in the choices made by both Nixon and Kennedy during this time. Noer suggests that any changes of policy by the Eisenhower Administration during this period were, 'probably designed as much to help Nixon in his 1960 Presidential campaign as to implement a new approach to Africa' and that 'after the election the Administration rapidly abandoned its 'new' Africa policy.' However, Noer also notes Kennedy's own 'dramatic gestures' such as arranging for the Joseph Kennedy Foundation to pay for the transport of African students to the United States when State Department funds were refused and chartering a helicopter to bring Guinea's President Sekai Toure to meet him in Disneyland.\(^{12}\) These were perhaps campaign spectacle more than they were serious expressions of Kennedy's stance on Africa.

\(^{11}\) JFKL, OHT, Barbara Ward Jackson, interviewed by Walter and Elspeth Rostow, 28 June 1964.
Macmillan and Kennedy

The relationship between Kennedy and Macmillan is often noted as a high point of the Anglo-American special relationship. Macmillan was able to rebuild close ties with America after Suez by using his knowledge of, and past relationship with, Eisenhower, the election of Kennedy posed potential problems. Although there was a vague family connection through marriage between members of the Kennedy and Macmillan families, there was no prior friendship on which to build as there had been between Macmillan and Eisenhower. As Macmillan remarked in his farewell note to Kennedy, 'I shall always remember when you took office three years ago, and how soon we seemed to talk and work as old friends, although we had scarcely met before....we could say what we liked to each other, knowing that we were influenced by the same feelings of trust and understanding both for our countries and for the whole world.'

Although the reality of Anglo-American relations is debatable, there is little evidence that connections to the Kennedy family were in any way part of Macmillan's confidence or belief in the special relationship. However, journalist Geoffrey Wheatcroft states that 'his delusion about the Anglo-American relationship had been further encouraged by his connection with the Kennedy family.' The wider Kennedy family was in fact cited by Ormsby-Gore as one of the reasons Macmillan worried that their relationship would not be successful. The possible influence of Joseph Kennedy was a cause for great concern within British ranks as the senior Kennedy had caused friction and controversy during his time as American Ambassador for Britain resulting in 'the general feeling that he had an anti-British sentiments and there was concern as to what extent these affected the thinking of the son.'

Ormsby-Gore also notes that Macmillan 'was of course, very worried about what their relationship was going to be.' However, he goes on to express the belief

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14 Papers of President Kennedy, President’s Office Files, Countries, Reference, United Kingdom, Box 127, Message for McGeorge Bundy For the President, To Kennedy from Macmillan, 22 October 1963.
15 Geoffrey Wheatcroft, 'Not so Special Relationship - Dean Acheson and the myth of Anglo-American unity' In the Spectator, 5 January 2013 http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/8807521/not-so-special-relationship/.
17 Ibid.
that while Eisenhower and Macmillan found common ground in their experiences, in terms of political leanings Macmillan was closer to Kennedy. Ormsby-Gore notes that while they had shared experiences 'I don't know that his political philosophies and President Eisenhower’s political philosophies were very close together - there was no doubt that Macmillan was on the extreme liberal wing of the Conservative Party - he was worried about how he was going to make the jump...in generations.'

In a secret report sent on to the President, the publisher of *Life* magazine, C.D. Jackson, recorded his view of Britain and his interaction with Macmillan. In this Jackson comments that 'Macmillan started on the subject of how much he admired and how well he got on with President Kennedy. He pointed almost affectionately to a special telephone in a corner of the room which he said was the direct line to the White House, and that he and Kennedy sometimes talked two, three and four times a day on the line. Macmillan said that he found that Kennedy understood things much better and much quicker than Eisenhower did.' This both points to a strong and valuable bond between Macmillan and Kennedy and how the special relationship managed to progress as the dynamics changed. Macmillan is noted as saying 'sometimes when I had something important to get Ike to understand or accept, I couldn’t do it except personally--persuade him personally--whereas your present President is surrounded by those brilliant eggheads, who give him the point right away. I will admit it is the British point, which does not necessarily make it a bad point.'

What is more interesting is the way in which both men cultivated vastly different political images yet were still able to work together. While the Kennedy image was one of youth, vigour and change, Macmillan was the representation of age, wisdom and nostalgia. It could be argued that the two men fully represented their respective countries in exactly the way their countrymen needed and their critics expected them to. While America rejoiced in its youth, critics saw immaturity; while

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19 Papers of President John F. Kennedy, Presidents Files, Countries, Reference, Box 127, United Kingdom, John Steele to the President, Overseas reports from C.D. Jackson, 25 June 1962.
20 Ibid.
Britain celebrated its standing as an elder statesman, critics saw irrelevance.\textsuperscript{22} Indeed Macmillan was 'apprehensive... as to whether the President would think he was a funny old man who belonged to the distant past and couldn't understand the problems of today.'\textsuperscript{23} Interestingly, Ormsby-Gore also suggests his belief that Kennedy shared this concern, stating that, 'the President never told me this but I expect that he wondered how he would get on with this figure who had apparently, apart from anything else, been very close to President Eisenhower and there was a question of whether he would be measured against President Eisenhower and so on.'\textsuperscript{24}

However, both men were able to work together and create an understanding that seemed to thrive on the very differences that seemed to make them incompatible.\textsuperscript{25} Kennedy noted in his reply to Macmillan's farewell telegram that 'in nearly three years of co-operation we have worked together on great and small issues, and we have never had a failure of understanding or of mutual trust.'\textsuperscript{26} It is interesting to note that Ormsby-Gore states that, 'President Eisenhower had been extremely forthright in talking to Kennedy before he came in and had said that if you want good advice you can ask Harold Macmillan - he is somebody who I have always found has got a well balanced mind, who has got a great feeling for history and is somebody whose advice and counsel is something I have always valued.'\textsuperscript{27}

Macmillan's exchanges with Kennedy, like with Eisenhower, were characterised by admiration for the President, extolling the virtues of the special bond between America and Britain and full of historical references. A prime example of this is Macmillan's letter to Kennedy after a meeting in Birch Grove in July 1963 in which he states that, 'I have been especially fortunate in having this kind of friendly intimacy with Presidents of the United States during all my premiership and it has been a great

\textsuperscript{22} Sandford, \textit{Harold and Jack}, p.35; John Snow, interviewed as part of JFK: The First Pop President, BBC Radio 2 (24 May 2010).
\textsuperscript{23} Papers of President John F. Kennedy, Presidents Files, Countries, Reference, Box 127, United Kingdom, John Steele to the President, Overseas reports from C.D. Jackson, 25 June 1962.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{26} Papers of President Kennedy, President’s Office Files, Countries, Reference, United Kingdom, Box 127, Message for McGeorge Bundy For the President, The President to the Prime Minister, October 1963.
\textsuperscript{27} JFKL, OHT, David Ormsby-Gore interviewed by Richard Neustadt 12 March 1965.
pride to me to feel that in this at least we have been in part equal to the Churchill
Roosevelt relationship at the most critical moment in history."28 However, Douglas-
Home asserts that, 'Macmillan and Kennedy were on the same wavelength and this
undoubtedly assisted the formation of Anglo-American policy...it wasn’t close
compared with Churchill and Roosevelt, but it certainly was close, surprising rather
considering the gap in generation.'29

This seems to be indicative of how the Kennedy Administration worked and
why it was very successful in creating links with other countries and leaders. Kennedy
was always well briefed and informed about not only the issue being discussed but
also the country, personality and problems faced by the person he conversed with.30
This was seen in his meetings with African leaders and can be seen in his relations with
the British.31 Although there may have been more developed and personal dimension,
as well as greater political usefulness to the British relationship, in the most basic form
Kennedy was able to create these friendships with multiple nations and multiple
leaders.32

However, this should not detract from the idea that the Anglo-American
relationship was truly unique and special. While strong personal relations were an
important part of the Kennedy administration's approach to all friendly nations, the
way in which the Anglo-American relationship developed during the Kennedy period
reinforces the idea of a special relationship between Britain and the United States.33
While friendly connections were made with other political leaders and representatives,
none had quite the same results or influence as the Anglo-American special
relationship. This is particularly seen in the Polaris missile deal made as part of the
Nassau agreement in 1962 and the Test Ban Treaty in 1963 however, Africa offers a
slightly different insight into the workings of the relationship.34 While the way in which

28 Papers of President Kennedy, President’s Office Files, Countries, Reference, United Kingdom, Box 127, Kennedy to Macmillan, 4 July 1963.
31 Ibid.
the relationship worked at times of crisis has been documented, cooperation between America and Britain over Africa gives an opportunity to see the relationship working without a crisis to push it to the brink.

**Change of Policy**

The belief that Kennedy changed African policy is supported by many members of his administration. Wayne Fredericks, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, asserts that the Kennedy era 'represented a change in top level personal interest in Africa...President Kennedy came to office with many Africans interested in him because of his interest in Africa.'

Edmond Hutchinson, Assistant Administrator for Africa and Europe, however, saw bigger and wider reaching changes that effected African policy, and that was a change of attitude rather than of distinct policy. For, Hutchinson this was clear in a number respects: 'one, it for the first time gave clear and explicit recognition to the fact that changes in Africa were such that Africa was going to be something of a factor in world situations, which had not existed before. Secondly, it explicitly associated the United States with African aspirations in terms of their independence, in social development, which had not existed before....And thirdly, it had the effect of obtaining to a surprising degree the understanding and sympathy of many Africans, even radical Africans, of the racial problems and approach to a solution in the United States.'

The acceptance of Neutralism as a genuine political option and not merely covert communism has often been touted as one of the key elements to the Kennedy Administration and an important advancement from the previous government. William Attwood, U.S. Ambassador to Guinea, states that one key political change under Kennedy was that 'we became less suspicious of genuine non-alignment.' However, the movement within the State Department towards acceptance of this idea was well underway during the Eisenhower period. The fact that most new African

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nations came into being during the Presidential campaign allowed the Kennedy Administration to enjoy the fruits of Eisenhower's labour in this respect.38

In his review of the previous Administration, and appraisal of the Kennedy Administrations first five months, Chester Bowles, during his role as Under-Secretary of State, notes that against the 'background of ferment and challenge we must seek better answers in the next few years to a number of basic questions about our policies in several key areas of the globe.39 In his criticism of America in the Eisenhower era, he notes that 'it was charged...that America's foreign policy posture had become fundamentally negative. The guiding principle appeared to be opposition...Although the world had come to know clear what America was against, there was considerable doubt as to what America was for.'40 As such, Bowles suggests that 'our paramount objective must now be to recapture that mood, to avoid rigid doctrine approaches, and to seize and hold the initiative, not simply in dealing with the Soviet, but in the totality of our world relations.'41 The creation of a more positive attitude was intended to help create a more positive image of America in Africa, one that matched the New Frontierism Kennedy created at home.

The real change in American policy towards Africa may not have been in its content but in its execution and its development. With the creation of more independent African nations, American officials began to analyse the positions of, and deal with, Africans rather than their European colonial rulers.42 Policy could, therefore begin to focus on Africa itself and not the role it played in European politics. Mennen Williams commented that, 'we dealt directly with the Africans, and we couldn't have done anything else but that without being terribly insulting to them.'43 Bowles also notes that the Kennedy presidency was fortunate as it, 'coincided with...this wonderful aura of reform and revolution, and all that, and with the luxury of never having been involved in foreign affairs. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the British had

38FRUS, Memorandum of Discussion at the 436th Meeting of the National Security Council, August 18 1960.
39Papers of President Kennedy, Presidents Office, Special Correspondence, Box 28, A Review, and Appraisal of our first Five Months by Chester Bowles, 5 July 1961.
40Ibid.
41Ibid.
handled our affairs for us in effect." Attwood also claims that 'the main changes were that we began to talk to Africans about Africa as Americans and not as junior partners of France and England.'

However, Bowles notes that 'the real problem was...that the people that Kennedy listened to most on foreign policy had a European orientated view. It was developed in the old days when the British ran Europe, balanced the forces of Europe and here it balanced Europe, and a peaceful Europe, it assured you a peaceful world, because the world was run by Europe.' Similarly, journalist Donald Tyerman wrote in the Washington Daily Star in the last days of Kennedy's presidency, that 'there is, of course, no New Frontier. There are no new, different horizons of policy; there are no new, different modes of politics. The old frontiers of the world environment and of American political process still press upon the rulers of the United States.'

This seems to be a major contradiction that runs through the Kennedy era: greater public emphasis, closer ties, and direct dealings with African nations while simultaneously maintaining a Eurocentric bias on foreign policy. The sheer size and complexity of issues involving Africa, coupled with the fact that there were a number of different European countries involved meant independence across all Africa had not yet been fully realised. Therefore, a balance had to be drawn by the Americans in which they considered general African views, the views of the European metropole and, in many cases, the views of the European settler populations. Although America could deal with a great many African countries on a nation-to-nation basis, areas such as the territories of the Federation were still under the control of the British. As such while Kennedy had to meet, greet and have deep discussions with potential African leaders at the same time he also needed to appreciate the delicate position the British Government were in.

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46 Ibid.
50 Ibid
The African bloc in the United Nations, made larger and stronger by increased independence, also put pressure on both America and Britain, if in slightly different ways. By tabling anti-colonial motions in the UN, African nations put pressure on Britain to move more quickly out of Africa and pressured America to stand by their anti-colonial, pro-independence stance in a meaningful manner. However, the reality was that this increased pressure did little to help the difficult situation in Central Africa, but was in effect a way in which the African nations could flex their newly found political muscles and greatly embarrass both the British and the Americans. America was then, in turn, under pressure from Britain to at least abstain in these votes in order to lessen the strain on them both internationally and domestically.

This created a difficult issue for America, as ostensibly they would have to pick between Africa and Britain. However, as with all political manoeuvres, the issue was far more complicated and issues ranging from the wording of the motion, timings and pressures of other foreign relations issues meant that the choice to support or abstain from a vote was very rarely as simple. An example of this can be seen in the American reaction to a UN resolution calling the UK to abrogate the 1961 constitution for Southern Rhodesia and recommend early independence for both Rhodesias. The State Department stated that they opposed the adoption of this resolution as 'we fear in part that passage of an immoderate text would make the UK task of conciliation more difficult, might make Welensky even more extreme, and might reduce the willingness of the UK to co-operate with the UN.' While there was support for the Committee of seventeen 'both in convincing the UK and Federal Authorities that its later than they think, and in allaying the fears of Africans that their plight is not forgotten' there is an understanding of the wider issues at play and the negative effects such resolutions could have without producing any real benefit.

Although the changes in the general African policy had a big effect on Federation, the way in which the policies regarding Federation as an area changed are far more important. It is essential to note that America, as a nation of influence but not

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52 Ibid.
53 Papers of President Kennedy, Presidents Office, Files, Countries, Reference Box 123 B, Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy by L.D. Battle, Subject: Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 7 May 1962.
54 Ibid.
of direct involvement, had no comprehensive policy regarding Federation, as it had no way of implementing it. America did, however, have an idea of what it would like to see happen, what it wanted to avoid and at least an awareness of the difficulties and problems facing the parties that were involved. What certainly did change was the focus on Federation having to succeed at all costs. This change came about mainly after the release of the Monckton Report in 1960 publically acknowledged that Federation in its current form could not continue in its current form and achieve all that it set out to do.

The choice to place G. Mennen Williams as Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, the first appointment to the Administration, seemed to indicate the importance that Africa in the future presidency of Kennedy. Nicknamed Soapy in reference to the soap and toiletries company his grandfather founded Williams had been Governor of Michigan since 1949 winning six elections, a record in the state. The appointment was extraordinary as it came before the selection of the Secretary of State, who was usually consulted on the matters such as this selection but also because the Bureau of African Affairs had only been in existence for two years. The choice of Mennen Williams for the role also offered much hope to interested parties, as he was a well-respected Governor of great capability.

This is reflected in a newspaper article in which it is stated that 'President elect, Kennedy, took off his own top hat in salute to the new nations when he appointed an Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs even before he named a new Secretary of State. In that single diplomatic gesture, the next President of the United States notified the world of the importance he attaches to emerging democracy in Africa.' It

56 RG General Records of Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, Records relating to Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1956-1964, Box 2, Bilateral Discussions with the UK, African Problems: The Dilemma of Colonialism, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, no date or author.
58 Noer, Soapy, p.224.
59 The Papers of Berl I Berhard, Box 1, New Year Spotlight Beams on Africa by Dorothy McCardle in Unknown newspaper, date unknown.
is interesting therefore that in correspondence between Welensky and his cousin, Sam Willinsky, states that 'he doesn't amount to much in this country.'

Welensky himself seems to have a mixed view of Williams, stating that 'in himself he is not unpleasant'. David Ormsby-Gore's appraisal of Williams for the British Government was that he was 'not used to keeping his mouth shut and although his intentions are good, I can make no promises that he will always say the right thing. Even less so for Mrs Williams.' The reference to Mrs Williams in this is an interesting one. It is known that Mrs Williams accompanied Williams on many of his trips and authored a number of reports for the American Government on issues she felt important, despite the fact she was herself a member of the Administration.

Williams and the US government had been criticised by Harry Jeffreys, the Minister for Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the British Embassy for failing to recognise the difficulties the Federal Government faced. The fact that high American officials and the President himself received African nationalist leaders was deemed 'unhelpful' and the fact that Kaunda and Banda were "treated with honor" at the White House when they were seen as "evil men" was wrong. The basis of Jeffreys' argument was that as 'the African nationalist parties had flourished by physical intimidation, including arson and violence' they should not be legitimized by America. This criticism also stretched to the British government with Jeffreys asserting that it was 'unfortunate that in both the United States and the United Kingdom only the African leaders who 'used the soap box and petrol bomb' received attention.

However, as Williams points out, other more moderate Africans were also received and that these visits were informal and neither Banda nor Kaunda were invited to the White House officially. This kind of unofficial visit was also the circumstance in which Welensky would be able to visit the White House. Although he did not manage to make it the United States until 1963, an earlier suggested visit

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60 MSS Welensky 684/5, Sam Willinsky to Welensky, 17 March 1963.
61 Ibid, Welensky to Willinsky, 18 February 1963.
63 Noer, Soapy, p.234.
64 Records of G. Mennen Williams, Classified Williams, Box 3, Protest of alleged American interference at farewell call by Rhodesian Minister, 4 May 1961.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
presented difficulties to the American government. In a telegram to the American Consul in Salisbury Rusk notes that 'in light of his sharp public criticism of United States Africa policy reported...the question arises as to the usefulness from either United States or Federation point of view of proposed Welensky visit.' Rusk cites the difficult political atmosphere and the fact that United States policy remained unchanged, while the Rhodesian Ambassador notes that from the point of view of the Federation, if the only result would be Americas criticism of Welensky's attitude and shortcomings, the visit would be of 'limited value.' However, it is made very clear that the Department was not "uninviting" Welensky but if he would need another valid reason to visit and 'is merely taking the opportunity while here to make calls in Washington.'

**Kennedy, Africa, and the Federation**

One very large aspect of Kennedy's Africa policy was the move towards personal diplomacy and contact with African leaders. Kennedy was able to use his charm, intelligence, and friendly nature to forge great bonds with Africans who visited the White House. Kenyan political leader Thomas Mboya stated in an interview after Kennedy's assassination that 'what struck one very, very strongly was the relations at personal level. I think there was something in the Kennedy Administration which was so personal that everything became identified with his own personality and his own personal relations with people.' Hastings Banda was one of Kennedy's biggest supporters and told Williams 'in the most glowing terms...how the president stopped everything he was doing, his cabinet meeting, and took Banda around and everything. And he said, 'We have the warmest friend in Washington you could possibly imagine.' Although Williams does acknowledge that this friendship may not have been as warm as Banda hoped as Kennedy 'always was that way' Fredericks notes that; 'President Kennedy was prepared to listen. He was also prepared to receive them as equals. I think he gave them the feeling that they were just as important as any other chief of

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68 Records of G. Mennen Williams, Trips Files, Box 22, Rusk to Consul Salisbury, 25 May 1961.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 JFKL, OHT, Thomas Mboya, interviewed by Gordon P. Hagberg, 10 March 1965.
73 Ibid.
state who came into his office. He was also prepared to talk to them as fellow politicians.\textsuperscript{74}

However, Joseph Satterthwaite, Eisenhower’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs notes that when he offered his services after congress convened in January 1960, 'with the charm which he always had, he said, "well, you know, you're going to see that I'm going to be a little too occupied with other matters this year to devote much time to African Affairs." As far as I know, he didn’t devote any time personally to them. He sent a number of his friends and people formally in high positions to make trips to Africa.\textsuperscript{75} William Attwood seems to agree with this sentiment stating that,

'in general I would say that Kennedy's interest in Africa was marginal --he had many other greater foreign political problems--but that his impulses were right, and that he knew how to make African leaders feel that he cared about them and their problems - if only by breathing life into a few clichés about independence and dignity and memorizing some facts about their countries.\textsuperscript{76}''

The extent to which these personal relations affected African policy decisions in Washington is also debatable. As Fredericks notes, 'it is always difficult to determine precisely what things do affect policy. All I can say is that, on this point, perhaps there wasn’t enough time for President Kennedy’s presidency to determine what the total effect on policy was. But I would say that one of the very important things with the new African countries was to gain their confidence as new leaders and new countries.\textsuperscript{77}''

It is difficult to evaluate fully the effect on the way in which American policy was viewed, or indeed how their policies were formed in Africa. Hutchinson states, 'I doubt that the personal relations affected the internal policies significantly...I doubt very much that it influences their basic position on world issues particularly where they felt that their national interests were greatly involved...I think it did affect their understanding of the American position on world problems and on its domestic

\textsuperscript{74}\textit{JFKL, OHT, Wayne Fredericks, Interviewed by Joseph E O'Connor, 18 April 1966.}
\textsuperscript{75}\textit{JFKL, OHT, Joseph C. Satterthwaite, interviewed by Gordon William W. Moss, 2 March 1971.}
\textsuperscript{76}\textit{JFKL, OHT, William Attwood, Oral History Statement, 8 November 1965.}
\textsuperscript{77}\textit{JFKL, OHT, Wayne Fredericks, Interviewed by Joseph E O'Connor, 18 April 1966.}
problems.\textsuperscript{78} What is certain is that the African nations visited by Williams and the various African dignitaries that met with either Kennedy himself, or high ranking officials within the Administration were made to feel that they were not only being heard, that they were being understood. Although Kennedy used this practice for all nations he dealt with, the very fact that they were being treated equally made them feel unique.\textsuperscript{79}

Although it is clear that there was a general African policy in the Kennedy Administration and an awareness that each nation or area needed a more comprehensive, almost bespoke policy, American policy towards Federation is hard to define and the fact that Britain was still involved in the area complicated matters. America, like Britain had no real answer as to how to make Federation work for all involved. There was instead a list of what they wanted to happen and what they wanted to avoid.\textsuperscript{80} A study mission to Africa in February 1961 notes that two years earlier 'Federation was a relatively tranquil and prosperous area, whose people could still talk hopefully, if not too convincingly, about racial partnership and the multiracial experiment. Now it is one of the most troublesome regions of Africa, and it is becoming clearer that multiracialism is unlikely to have meaning unless a minority group is prepared to accept the proposition that the majority should gain majority political power.'\textsuperscript{81} The study concludes that it is 'really fear of an extension of Southern Rhodesia's influence, rather than the Federation as such, which causes the emotional demands for a break-up of Federal structure.'\textsuperscript{82}

The secession of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia from the Federation was, in the most simplistic view, a straightforward process. The real problem was the way this affected Southern Rhodesia; the reaction of both the British and the Southern Rhodesian Governments to issues such as the racial problems and independence.

Federation was a way in which Southern Rhodesia's racial policy could at the very least

\textsuperscript{78} JFKL, OHT, Edmond C. Hutchinson, interviewed by Joseph E. O'Connor, Oral History Statement, 4 May 1966.
\textsuperscript{79} Papers of John F. Kennedy, National Security Files, Box 3, Memo of Conversation, Kennedy and Banda, Situation in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 2 May 1961.
\textsuperscript{80} Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 3, Rostow to Planning Group Members, Planning Group Meeting 23 April 1963, Attached Paper, Problems of Southern Africa, 25 March 1963.
\textsuperscript{81} Papers of President Kennedy, White House Central Files, Box 38, Study Mission to Africa, February 12 1961.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
be curtailed, with the hope that it would, eventually, be changed. The danger of succession was the fact that Southern Rhodesia would demand independence and that Britain could grant it.

**Kennedy and the Communist Threat in Africa**

Historian David Nunnerley asserts that, 'Kennedy believed that the United States, bound by neither established positions nor traditions, by neither fixed agreements nor vested interests, was in a unique position to create new policies to meet the challenges of the third world, which he saw as a critical battleground between democracy and communism.'\(^{83}\) Similarly, Noer notes that 'Dulles' moralizing and Eisenhower's indifference had created an area of potential Soviet expansion, but also a source of possible triumph for the new Administration.'\(^{84}\) The Kennedy Administration did move away from Eisenhower's stance on Africa, partly due to personal ideals, but also because Kennedy was President at the time when Africa became a big issue rather than merely a potential one.

In his role as Under-Secretary of State Bowles stated that 'in Africa one prophecy, at least can be made with confidence: in the years ahead, the continent will continue to seethe with internal conflicts and revolutionary changes...Our primary objective should be to keep Africa outside the Sino-Soviet bloc. This may best be assured by the neutralization of much of the continent.'\(^{85}\) This seems to indicate that the general stance on Africa remained unchanged when Kennedy came to office and the need to keep the continent out of communist hands was still the main American priority when it came to African policy. What did change however were the methods and the logic behind the policy; neutralism was more readily accepted, personal relationships were fostered with African leaders and Africa began to be separated from European politics. However, this does not mean that Kennedy and his Administration, as Noer notes, advocated 'a passive acceptance of the policies of the Third World' but instead a kind of Neutralism 'that consisted of balanced criticism of

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\(^{83}\) Nunnerley, *Kennedy and Britain*, p.197.

\(^{84}\) Noer, *New Frontiers*, p.256.

\(^{85}\) Papers of President Kennedy, President's Office Files, Special Correspondence, Box 28, Some Requirements of American Foreign Policy, By Chester Bowles, 1 July 1961.
both United States and the Soviet Union, a mixed economy, tolerance of political dissent, and the maintenance of stability and order.\textsuperscript{86}

Bowles was also keen to point out that 'our primary objective in every part of the world should be the emergence of vigorous, independent nation-states. The public commitment of such states to a direct Cold War association with the U.S. is much less important than their commitment to their own development and freedom. Vigorous nationalist independence may serve our objectives as well, rarely does it serve those of the Russians.'\textsuperscript{87} The freedom sought by African nations and their desire for economic stability, did seem to run contrary to communist doctrine. The awareness of the dictatorial nature of communist allegiance, as seen in Russia’s European satellite states would have been understood by African leaders, keen to create truly independent nations. As Bowles suggests:

'in its early castigation of "neutralism", the previous administration had ignored the fact that in many cases an independent and truly neutral nation could act as a more effective block to Soviet efforts than many "client" nations which signed defensive agreements with us largely because they were thereby assured more generous sums of economic assistance... 'Less than 30% of mankind live in the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and Communist China. The remaining 70% live in independent countries whose most ardent wish is to develop their own institution in their own ways through their own independent pursuits.'\textsuperscript{88}

What is clear is that while communism was not an active threat in Africa, it was in such a state of infancy that there would be great risk in allowing the situation to reach a crisis point before intervening. At the Lagos Chiefs of Mission Conference in 1961, a Committee of Ambassadors wrote to Mennen Williams warning him that 'the political situation throughout Africa is fluid. Change is in the air, and it would be a mistake to think of the present division or orientation of Africa as permanent. There is both danger and opportunity...The importance of influencing the emerging leaders of

\textsuperscript{86}Noer, New Frontiers, p.257.
\textsuperscript{87}Papers of President Kennedy, President’s Office Files, Special Correspondence, Box 28, Some Requirements of American Foreign Policy, By Chester Bowles, 1 July 1961.
\textsuperscript{88}Papers of President Kennedy, Presidents Office, Special Correspondence, Box 28, A Review, and Appraisal of our first Five Months by Chester Bowles, 5 July 1961.
Africa cannot be overestimated. This sentiment was shared by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in a letter to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy in which he observes that, 'in Africa the United States is confronted with rapidly changing internal conditions, readjustment of the old colonial relationship toward a new and more rewarding co-operative arrangement, long term Soviet bloc activities and aspirations and the emergence of this continent as a more significant force in the world.'

In his Report on the Mission to Africa, Bowles warns that 'although the mood in most African nations is now favourable to the US, we must expect their leaders on occasion to criticize us in public while praising us in private as a way of demonstrating their independence. Continued good relations will depend in large measure on the sophistication and understanding of our response.' However, he also notes that, 'everywhere the contrast between our approach and that of the previous administration is marked and, regardless of whatever provocative situations may develop, it is essential that we not become frustrated or impatient...[an]example is Guinea, which the Eisenhower Administration was prepared to write off as a 'communist Satellite' and which, because of our patience, now emerges as a vivid demonstration of the ineptness of the USSR and the inapplicability of communist economic and political development techniques to the African continent...In closing, let me emphasize that Africa, with all its uncertainties, is an enormously promising continent, and that by and large the policies of the Kennedy Administration have thus far been brilliantly successful.

In a Pre-Presidential briefing paper prepared by an American academic, Kennedy was advised that 'we are relatively ignorant of the forces and personalities at work in Africa because we have tended to see Africa through Europe. In the eyes of Africans, encouraged by the Russians, we are identified with colonialism and with

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89 Papers of President Kennedy, Presidents Office, Special Correspondence, Box 28, Memorandum for G. Mennen Williams from a Committee of Ambassadors, attached to Memorandum to Bundy, Lagos Conference Papers requested by the President, 4 August 1961.
90 Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 3, Rusk to Bundy, 20 June 1963.
91 Papers of President Kennedy, President’s Office Files, Staff Memos, Ref Box 62, Report of Mission to Africa, 15 October-9 November 1962, 13 November 1962.
92 Ibid.
imperialism. As more African nations were created, American officials began to analyse the positions of, and deal with, Africans political figures rather than their European colonial rulers. Policy could, therefore begin to focus on Africa itself and not the role it played in European politics. Williams commented that 'we dealt directly with the Africans, and we couldn’t have done anything else but that without being terribly insulting to them.' Attwood also claims that 'the main changes were that we began to talk to Africans about Africa as Americans and not as junior partners of France and England.' However, as previously stated, Bowles also noted that 'the real problem was...that the people that Kennedy listened to most on foreign policy had a European orientated view. It was developed in the old days when the British ran Europe, balanced the forces of Europe and here it balanced Europe, and a peaceful Europe, it assured you a peaceful world, because the world was run by Europe.'

In remarks to American Embassy employees in London, Kennedy highlighted the importance of their role in continuing friendship of America and Great Britain. For Kennedy, 'it is not merely sentiment and affection for past associations that makes your assignment so important now. This country, while no longer a far-ranging empire, is a great Commonwealth composed of independent nations who are associated with this country. This country is an island, which in the standards physically of the United States is not large. But nevertheless it has influence; it is persuasive across much of the world.' This indicates the importance Britain offered as an intermediary nation between the US and Commonwealth nations. The loss of Empire had been softened by the creation of the Commonwealth, allowing Britain to keep some of its world influence without the large costs associated with empire. Later in his term, the relationship between America and Britain over Africa became more problematic as the decolonisation process itself hit difficulties. Areas such as Southern Rhodesia posed new problems for the British, who had been able to

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95 JFKL, OHT, William Attwood Oral History Statement, 8 November 1965.
96 Ibid.
disengage from Africa relatively easily before this. White settled areas of Africa created new and unique issues for the British and while the Americans understood and were aware of these problems, this did not mean they did not put pressure on Britain to move more quickly to resolve them. In a paper entitled 'Problems of Southern Africa', the American perspective is clearly outlined; it suggests that, 'at present, the root of our problems in working with the British is that they do not have any over-all Africa policy...the UK has now come up against the tough cases and is basing its action largely on the exigencies of the moment as imposed by different nationalist or private British interest in many different situations in Africa. Accordingly, in discussing Southern Africa with the UK, we should attempt to alert the higher levels of British government to the need we see to bring to bear on Western policy the wider implications of various problems and contingencies presented by the area and to stimulate them to develop their thinking on area-wide strategy.  

However what is perhaps more interesting is the American belief that they were the driving force of African policy across Europe. This is illustrated by the statement that, 'our policy lead has enabled us not only to maintain our moderating influence on African nationalists but to provide a basis for the constructive action of the elements of the British and other Western European and old Commonwealth governments which are trying to bring broader considerations to bear on the African policies of their governments. This seems to suggest that the Anglo-American relationship in regards to Africa was just one of a number America was cultivating and using to create a environment in which Africa policy was developed as a world policy not merely the domestic policy of individual European or wider global governments. However, it could also be argued that there was an implied emphasis on relations with Britain due to the inclusion of the Commonwealth; a vast area they could potentially influence.

In terms of the Federation, Kennedy's decision to meet African leaders such as Banda and Kaunda did affect the way in which the Anglo-American relationship worked. The fact that the Americans had direct contact with the future leaders of

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99 Ibid.
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia not only allowed them to establish their own influence away from the British but they also allowed the African leaders to use the Anglo-American relationship to their own benefits. This is seen in a telegram from Kaunda to Kennedy advising him of the violence in the region in which he asks Kennedy to 'in the name of God and humanity intervene by raising this matter at UN Emergency session and also directly with Macmillan.'

This change of policy, coupled with the change of focus away from the communist threat in Africa during the Kennedy era, meant that Anglo-American talks were less often overtly centred on communism. Instead, the focus shifts onto celebrating the fact that the Americans and British aims were, for the most part, completely in line and warning of the dangers of racial issues in Southern Rhodesia. However, one area that communism still threatened was in the provision of aid to Africa. This was discussed in US-UK talks between Williams and Sir Roger Stevens, the Deputy Under-Secretary of State, in which Williams suggested that 'in order to counter communist activities in the field of economic aid, some free world aid may have to used for political ends rather than strictly for economic purposes.' This indicates that although the communist threat was still considered important, it had become joint aid issue rather than a British political issue. This was an inevitable change as more and more of the African continent became independent, shifting Britain's power status from leader to an influential voice alongside the Americans, although still having a greater input due to the Commonwealth.

One of the key shifts of focus in the Kennedy era was a growing sensitivity to the way in which Civil Rights was perceived by Africans and manipulated by the Soviets as a propaganda tool. This shift made African communist infiltration an extension of American domestic politics and, in this area, removed it from the Anglo-American relationship. In a report on US Race relations, the coverage in Africa was described as 'sensational news aspects of the US racial situation including arrests of children and use of dogs and horses received widespread play throughout Africa, often accompanied by blaring headlines and photographs. Day-to-day developments were

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100 Papers of President Kennedy, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 68, Kaunda to the President, 22 August 1961.
given straight news coverage. In analysis of Soviet Media coverage of the Birmingham crisis, US hypocrisy is cited as an issue that is regularly exploited. Racism is described by the Soviets as being, 'endemic to US ideology and democracy. Birmingham had exposed this and has undermined the prestige of the entire free world and its ideology. American claims to democracy are ridiculous when 20 million Negroes are denied fundamental human rights.\footnote{102}

During his correspondence with Sam Willinsky, Welensky's American cousin, the issue of James Meredith and his struggle to enter the University of Mississippi was raised. In his letters Welensky states that 'when I considered the cost inflicted on the United States taxpayer to get that one Negro, Meredith, into college against the background of our difficulties here, it helped me to get our perspective.'\footnote{104} Welensky also viewed black Americans as suffering a greater sense of poverty and a much lower standard of living then they did in Africa. He remarks that he 'saw poverty and shacks in the States that I think would horrify some of our African brethren here. It's true there is great wealth but there is also great poverty.'\footnote{105} He also foresaw great difficulties in the US stating that he was 'convinced that racial differences are going to mount in the United States and not get less, in spite of Kennedy's efforts. I was rather horrified to sense that the hatreds between the races were much deeper there then they are, I think, even in South Africa, and that's saying something.'\footnote{106}

However, Liberian Ambassador George Padmore expressed his belief to Senator Humphrey, a Senator serving on the Committee of Foreign Relations United State Senate, that

'You chide your country for failing to adopt a positive policy towards Africa. I would venture to further say that it has always surprised me that no attempt has been made by the United States and its European allies to devise a common Western policy for Africa. If a number of nations can unite to face the menace of communism they should also unite for them to prevent the menace of the undermining of their collective influence in the

\footnote{102} Classified Williams, Box 3, Race Relations and American Foreign Policy, Rollie White to Mr Jorden, June 11 1963, attached to Jorden to Williams, 12 June 1963.
\footnote{103} Classified Williams, Box 3, Soviet Media Coverage of the Birmingham Racial Crisis, no date.
\footnote{104} MSS Welensky 684/5, Welensky to Willinksy, 22 April 1963.
\footnote{105} Ibid, 618/6, Welensky to Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, 3 June 1962.
\footnote{106} Ibid, 587/6, Welensky to Anthony Avon, 19 October 1963.
whole continent of Africa... The British, the French, the Belgians, the Portuguese go about their own affairs in Africa and accept advice neither from each other nor from the United States... Here we have a group of people in the same boat who insist on rowing in different directions, although all are pursued by the same storm. And the United States is not allowed to get into the boat at all, despite a vested interest in getting safely to port.\textsuperscript{107}

This lack of cohesive collaboration to fight the communist threat was perhaps less indicative of the Anglo-American relationship, but instead that of American-European relations, coupled with the various problems each individual nation faced in Africa. Britain and America were able to work together to understand the vulnerabilities that would be exposed when Britain withdrew from Africa and minimise the risks of communist subversion. Although Anglo-American relations were able to be harnessed, this was due in large part to their compatibility of aims, as well as the need to keep relations on a even keel in order to pursue other, more delicate and, arguably more pressing issues, such as the nuclear technological partnership. Communism was a concern that ran alongside the main issues of self-determination and economic stability. As it could not be separated, it could only be treated as part of a bigger problem that needed to be faced. This led to communism enjoying a unique position in which it became less important while at the same time remaining relevant. As nations became independent the focus moved away from how the American and the British could save Africa from communism to how the relationship between America, Britain and the African states could continue to grow in strength and not allow the Soviets to break in using aid or propaganda based on American domestic politics, or Britain's past as a colonial power. For areas such as the Federation however, this move created fear as they saw both Britain and America underestimating the communist problem in Africa.

It is clear that 1960 was a year of great change and dramatic events in the Federation, Britain, and America. For the Anglo-American relationship the biggest

\textsuperscript{107} Papers of President Kennedy, Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files, Senate Files, Legislation Background materials 1958-1960, Accomplishments: 85th Congress - Balance of Payments, Box 784, George Padmore to Senator Humphrey, October 1959.
change was, of course the election of John Kennedy as the new American President. However, this change was limited to only one of personnel; the relationship carried on as it had before, if not stronger than it was under Eisenhower. This continuity helped to create a calm atmosphere in which to develop responses to the new issues that had been created for the Federation, particularly after Monckton. The biggest change was the appointment of Mennen Williams in Americas Bureau of African Affairs, which gave policy development an injection of spirit and enthusiasm it perhaps had previously lacked.

However, because this period was one of transition and change, there is little to be said about the way in which the events of 1960 affected the Anglo-American relationship in the immediate period. However, the fact that there was no immediate breakdown in communication or change of tact is in itself revealing. The Anglo-American relationship was able to retain its status and its effectiveness throughout the election process. While the changes within the Federation were dramatic, the Anglo-American relationship and the, perhaps most importantly, the way in which the two nations interacted and communicated on the issue of African decolonisation did not alter. The constitutional conferences, where the true effect of Monckton could be seen, allowed the opportunity for close relations to continue ensure that Britain and America were still on the same path or if the end of Federation would create a rift in the special relationship.
Chapter Six

1960-62: African Constitutions and American Controversy

In the aftermath of the Monckton Report the British Government and those within the Federation came together to begin the task of working out new constitutions for each of the separate territories and the Federation itself. The Federal Review had been scheduled when the Federation was originally created in 1953 and was long thought to be the time at which dominion status would be, if not fully realised, then set in motion. However, the Federation was under a great strain and these constitutional reviews took on new meaning after the Monckton Report conclusions over the issue of secession.¹

The issue of secession being placed firmly in the centre of these talks meant that these constitutional reviews were about more than African advancement and became about African independence. However, this issue was still sensitive with the white settler population and so the discussions were not as straightforward as they perhaps should have been, with the exception of Nyasaland.² The biggest issue would of course be Southern Rhodesia, the only self-ruling colony, a bigger white population and a difficult racial issue. While the arguments in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia centred on the idea of creating an easy transition to majority rule, arguments over Southern Rhodesia were very different. Southern Rhodesia was an extremely difficult concept for the British and the Americans; independence in its current state could not be condoned or encouraged but pressure had to be applied carefully so as not to push them towards either an alliance of some kind with South Africa or a unilateral declaration of independence.³ Care also had to be taken so as not to unnerve the African nationalist movement within Southern Rhodesia and ensure that they were not tempted to find assistance from the Soviets.

The other big issue was Welensky; while the death knell for the Federation may have begun to chime, Welensky was determined not to allow Federation to end without a fight. His interference perhaps only served to highlight the inherent issues of

¹ RG General Records of Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, Records relating to Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1956-1964, Box 2, Bilateral Discussions with the UK, African Problems: The Dilemma of Colonialism, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, no date or author.
² Fisher, Macleod, p.123.
³ Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p.311.
Federation, while also raising doubts over his dedication to the multiracial ideal he proclaimed to stand for. Welensky caused a great deal of grief for Macmillan, particularly over the constitution for Northern Rhodesia in an attempt to halt, delay or foil attempts to allow the territory to become independent under majority rule.⁴ Although he was ultimately unsuccessful, his stance on the issue clearly illustrates the kinds of difficulties that were faced in Central Africa at that time. Multiracialism for Welensky did not mean inclusion of black Africans within the political system and allowing their development, as he believed that Africans had no interest in politics. Instead, multiracialism became a way of preventing black participation by claiming that no race had the right to govern, despite the obvious irony.⁵

Direct American involvement in the constitutional reviews was of course limited, as they had no power over territorial legislation; however, there was a keen interest taken by the Americans in the outcome. The end of Federation in its current form was becoming increasingly inevitable; however, the Americans were eager that some kind of association remained in the area due to the economic benefits that Federation had brought, particularly to Nyasaland.⁶ The desire that there would be an African majority government in each territory if not immediately then in the near future was also clear. While there was an understanding of the wider complexities surround decolonisation, America's stance on freedom and liberty for all had not changed.⁷ However, there was a realisation that America would be expected to assist these new nations, particularly the economically unstable Nyasaland as part of the wider Cold War effort.

Although the Americans could not affect the day-to-day proceedings of the constitutional reviews, they were still able to make an impact on the continent through other means. Speeches and observations made by American political figures during this time also had a bearing on the perception of the country and its policies. Mennen Williams 'Africa for the Africans' comments, Senator Ellender's statements on Africa and the Federation, and Dean Acheson's remarks on Britain and Empire were all embarrassing incidents for the Kennedy Administration. They managed to damage the

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⁴ Shepherd, Macleod, pp.221-222.
⁵ Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, pp.188-9.
⁶ RG 59, Records Relating to Rhodesia and Nyasaland Box 1, C. Vaughan Ferguson Jr, Frederick Picard, Approach to UK Government Concerning Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 3 August 1960.
perception of the Americans in Africa amongst the white population they wanted to keep calm, the Africans they wanted to woo and the British they wanted to keep as allies. All these incidents made the journey to the end of Federation far more difficult and created ill feeling between America and her friends abroad.

The Nyasaland Constitutional Review – July 1960

The Nyasaland Constitutional review was perhaps the simplest of all the conferences that took place in the Federation between 1960 and 1962. Although walkouts were threatened, Banda was, according to Shepherd, a moderating force who appealed to Africans to look at what was on offer.8 However, Macmillan’s own assessment was far more patronising, claiming that ‘Dr Banda, like all these people will be a demagogue one day and something like a statesman another, but this is their nature and we have got to live with it.’9 In the end, as Shepherd notes, ‘after detailed discussions all sides agreed to a plan that was less favourable to Banda and his nationalist supporters than the relatively small European community in Nyasaland had initially dared hope.’10

The main points of interest about this conference were not in the details of what was achieved for Nyasaland, but how they affected the rest of the Federation and why they were passed with such relative ease. The main outcome was the election of Dr Banda as Prime Minister of Nyasaland in 1962; with the clear intention to leave Federation supported with a mandate by the people, secession could no longer be ignored. For Macmillan, ‘Nyasaland remained quiet, and Dr Banda began to win the confidence of Europeans, official and unofficial, by the openness and charm of his own character.’11 Nonetheless, it could be argued that rather than winning European confidence, Nyasaland’s inclusion in the Federation continued to be unpopular with white settlers in Northern and Southern Rhodesia.

Although Nyasaland was unpopular within the Federation, secession would set a dangerous precedent for the more significant Northern Rhodesia. This was the crux of the problem for Welensky and his supporters across the Federation and Britain. There

8 Shepherd, Macleod, p.207.
10 Shepherd. Ibid, p.207.
had developed a strange paradox wherein the future of Federation could become dependent on the removal of an area that had become a burden within the Federation and its curse if allowed to leave. Nyasaland had been viewed as an unimportant area to many within the Federation, with a coalition between Northern and Southern Rhodesia a more favourable option.\textsuperscript{12} However, Nyasaland had become a part of Federation and to let it secede would mean that secession had to become an option for both Northern and Southern Rhodesia. This not only meant that there was a strong possibility that there would be an African majority in Northern Rhodesia and that Southern Rhodesia, when faced with the exit of the other two territories would push for independence too. The problem was that Monckton had made secession unavoidable and so set in motion a domino effect that Britain and America could predict but could not halt.\textsuperscript{13}

Although there was an inherent danger in allowing constitutional change in Nyasaland to be too progressive, there was no great opposition to it like that seen in the Northern Rhodesian Constitution. This seems to have been borne from three simple ideas; firstly that, due to the size of the European electorate in Nyasaland, Banda's election was all but inevitable;\textsuperscript{14} secondly that Nyasaland was a poor country with a large black majority, which skewed the ratio of black to white across the Federation;\textsuperscript{15} thirdly that Welensky seemed to believe that the dangers of Nyasaland's secession were at least surmountable and that the risks would be greater if it were forced to stay within a Federation it had fought so hard against.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{13} RG 59, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, Records relating to Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1956-1964, Box 2, Bilateral Discussions with the UK, African Problems: The Dilemma of Colonialism, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, no date or author.
\textsuperscript{14} Papers of the President, National Security Files, Countries, Box 145, Memorandum of Conversation Hastings Banda and President Kennedy, Situation in Federation of Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 2 May 1961.
\textsuperscript{15} Sanger, \textit{Central African Emergency}, p.76.
\textsuperscript{16} MSS Welensky 679/6 Welensky to John Wallace, Commissioner for Northern Rhodesia in London, 18 August 1960.
The Federal Review Conference – December 1960

The 1960 conference, according to Shepherd, 'succeeded only in demonstrating that the gulf between European and African leaders on the future of the Federation was unbridgeable.' The conference had been originally designed to be the gateway for Federation to be become an independent State; however, recent events had caused it to become something of a farce. The Monckton Commission and the Nyasaland Constitution agreed in August 1960 had placed Federation under dark cloud, with its survival less than certain. The Federal Conference was convened seemingly only to honour the 1953 agreement and to placate Welensky, as it was obvious that no real advances could, or would, be made, especially as Northern and Southern Rhodesia had yet to convene their own constitutional reviews. This is a view that Welensky himself seems to share, illustrated in his observation that, 'as the British Government saw it, I had most tactlessly compelled them to honour at least one of their obligation - their 1957 pledge to hold this conference - and they were determined to make me pay for my colonial stubbornness by turning it into a withering indictment of the Federation and all its works, and of myself.'

Welensky was, even by the time of this conference, still determined to get full Commonwealth status in 1960. According to Franklin, Welensky was 'conscious of the fears and apprehensions in some quarters about this but was ready "to discuss all reasonable ways and means of allaying these fears".' However, it was clearly not the intention of the British Government to grant Federation independence at this point. In fact, the Federation was teetering on the brink politically, with most British politicians believing that if the Federation was to continue it would have to face the reality of its problems and forge a new path.

This can be clearly seen in the a summary of the summary presented to Macleod of a meeting of members of both Houses of Parliament, Conservative Commonwealth Council, Bow Group, Conservative Members, joint East and Central Africa Board, Africa

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17 Shepherd, Macleod, p.212.
19 Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, pp.148-49.
20 Papers of the President, National Security Files, Countries, Box 155A, from Embassy London to the Secretary of State, Letter to Kennedy from Reverend Sithole, 11 December 1962.
In this there was an acknowledgement, ‘that African emotion against Federation, particularly in Nyasaland, however misguided, is too strong to be altered. This led to a number of those present to believe that the break-up of Federation is inevitable.’ This in turn led to an agreed recommendation from all groups involved, except the Bow Group that the British Government:

’should give a firm lead and should make it clear that their intention at the Constitutional Conference was to preserve a modified form of Federation and that during negotiations, they should endeavour to push the Europeans, in particular the Southern Rhodesians delegates, so as to obtain a far higher degree of partnership than exists today. Then having reached an agreement with the European representatives, which HMG considered fair to all parties, they should try to obtain the agreement of the African representatives. Should the Africans refuse to accept, as was considered likely, the agreed policy should nevertheless, be implemented by Her Majesty's Government.’

The main belief of both the British and the American Governments at this point was that while Federation was in the best interests of the area economically, the African distrust and hatred of it meant that it was unlikely that it would survive and continue. Their stance was, therefore, that although Federation was unlikely to succeed and could not be maintained by force, there still was a hope that it could be reformulated in a way that suited both the Africans and the Europeans. It was also clear, although never acknowledged or stated, that there was nothing to gain in being the ones that publically, and finally, killed the Federation, it was better for the Africans to make the break themselves.

Welensky’s determination that American influence was behind the changing nature of British policy, was a misunderstanding of the Anglo-American relationship.

21 For more on Conservative party groups, their roles and influence, see Onslow, *Backbench Debate*, pp. 5-7.
22 CPA, COB 120/1-3, Patrick Wall to Macleod and Sandys, 10 November 1960.
23 Ibid.
24 RG 59, Records Relating to Rhodesia and Nyasaland Box 1, C. Vaughan Ferguson Jr, Frederick Picard, Approach to UK Government Concerning Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 3 August 1960.
25 Ibid.
The very nature of it is that it is based if not on mutual understandings and aims, then on mutual gain. The relationship only works if the two countries have a shared interest and in terms of Africa, the shared interest was that there would be a swift and safe resolution to the problem of Colonisation and an increase in African representation. The reasons behind these differed but the aims stayed the same. So too did the need for swift action to be balanced by careful consideration of the wider issues at play, especially the spread of communist influence in Africa.

The Review Conference was a chance to get all the interested parties of the Federation together to voice their views. This became, for Welensky at least, a battle as, ‘we who were representing the Federation were confronted with a large array of African nationals from the Northern Territories - almost all of them bitter enemies of everything we stood for and wanted to do - and what had originally been intended to be the completing of the work begun at Victoria Falls in 1953...was a marathon debate in which all our alleged sins...were brought up against us.’ For Franklin, the abuse and the hardship were not borne by Welensky alone. He states that 'Sir Roy Welensky said the Federation was fine and should be left alone. He was not abusive. Dr Banda said the Federation was rotten and should be broken up. He was abusive. Mr Duncan Sandys, in the Chair, just about managed to keep order and not to flinch in the face of insulting remarks from various quarters about the duplicity of his Government.'

Welensky did not seem to agree with this, stating that ‘the most interesting aspects of all the tirades we had heard was to me the fact that they were really criticisms...of the defects in the administration and policies of the Governments of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, for which the United Kingdom Government and not ourselves were responsible.’ For Nkomo the conference was ‘of course useless. The British had no intention of doing anything other than hand back power to the settler electorate that had been allowed to run Southern Rhodesia since the 1920s. It was worth our while attending simply to show the world what was happening.’

The British did indeed face a great deal of criticism from all sides of the divide during this conference, as was to be expected and the conference itself was, as

27 Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, pp.191-92.
28 Welensky, 4,000 Days, p.287.
29 Nkomo, My Life, p.92.
Franklin suggests, 'an excellent charade.' It seemed to serve no real political service other than to cover the cracks that had appeared in the Federation and it quickly descended into farce as four African leaders walked out when Whitehead addressed the conference. It had been hoped that a weekend at Chequers would thaw the tensions between the African nationalists and Welensky and his compatriots. This was the first time that Welensky had in fact met with African opposition leaders in person. However, prominent African figures including Kaunda, Banda, Nkomo and Reverend Sithole walked out of the conference the following day, resulting in Whitehead dismissing Nkomo from his delegation and barring him from Southern Rhodesia Conference. This led Macmillan to conclude that, 'after all our efforts, the three chief African leaders have 'done the dirty' on us... The real trouble is that the Africans are vain and childish. Like children, they easily get excited. Also the Press and TV do infinite harm in flattering their vanity.'

The Federal Review itself ended, having made no real progress, with the intention that it would reconvene after the Constitutional reviews of Northern and Southern Rhodesia had concluded. For Shepherd this meant that 'at least a complete breakdown had been averted, but it was not much of a face-saver.' Nkomo states that, throughout the conference his delegation 'remained solid in opposition to the whole principle of federation. We withdrew from the Conference and I dare say the British were relieved by that. But the federal review was never completed, and the Federation was doomed.' Welensky described the aftermath of the review as 'one of the worst and most difficult periods of political infighting I ever experienced.'

The Americans, however, had little input or views on the review itself. This is partially explained by the fact that the Government was, during this period, in a state of limbo as the Eisenhower Administration were in their final days in power before the

30 Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, p.191.
31 Shepherd, Macleod, p.212.
33 Shepherd, Macleod, p.212.
34 Macmillan Diaries, 12 December 1961.
35 Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 2A, Stevenson to Secretary of State, 26 April 1962.
36 Shepherd, Macleod p.212.
37 Thorpe, Supermac, p.523.
38 Nkomo, My Life, pp.92-3.
39 Welensky, 4000 Days, p.290.
inauguration of John Kennedy as the new President in January 1961. The Bureau of African Affairs was, however, still in action, though it concerned itself with more immediate matters until its new Assistant Secretary, G. Mennen Williams, was able to take up his role and lay out the direction he wished the department to take.

One other possible reason for American lack of attention in the conference was it was perhaps not seen as a serious endeavour. The fact that the review was taking place was in the main merely a way of meeting the obligations of set out in the 1953 agreement; there was no real sign that there was a clear agenda or changes that were being touted.\textsuperscript{39} The other and more significant reason was that, although the Americans could take a view on the situation in the Federation and had their own ideas about the best outcomes for the talks, they had no actual involvement in the formulation of policy or negotiation process. This is a key factor in understanding the role that American had to play in Africa and the development of Anglo-American relations in this area. Although the Americans were not active participants they had an interest in how these talks went and as such were the ghosts that haunted the conferences.

**Northern Rhodesia Conference – February 1961**

The Northern Rhodesian Constitution was perhaps the most difficult and troublesome issue for the Federation during this period. Although an agreement was reached at the conference, subsequent arguments over the contents of it led to it being changed twice and only fully resolved a year later. The fact that the Southern Rhodesian Constitutional Conference was being held at the same time, only added to the political sensitivities that needed to be considered when developing the Northern Rhodesian constitution. One of the first issues to arise was the refusal of United Federal Party (UFP) representatives to attend the conference. Welensky explains this, stating ‘Roberts is not attending the talks, on my instructions. I knew what Macleod wanted was to get the 34 people he had invited to the circus, knowing full well that he UFP would be out-voted by possibly 24 or 26 to 8. He would them impose the constitution that he had already put to me say the majority had accepted it. Roberts was of course willing to walk out, but to walk out at that stage would have meant

\textsuperscript{39} Franklin, *Unholy Wedlock*, p.194.
nothing. You will be interested when I tell you that to a large extent I have been able to thwart Macleod's efforts by what I have done. However, the very fact that U.F.P. representatives were not in attendance prevented any negotiations or alterations to a proposed constitution to be made at the time and led to a controversial reversal of the agreement based upon Welensky's objections.

The British reaction to the boycott was to label it as a mistake as it 'shows party to be dominated by Salisbury and also that they are purely European party.' This is an important point to make, the very fact that Welensky claims to have instructed John Roberts, the UFP leader in Northern Rhodesia, shows that he was involving himself in territorial issues. This obviously caused not only a conflict of interest for Welensky as the leader of the Federation but also created the sense that the territories were not truly free to operate in their own interests. This is something that comes up repeatedly in the constitutional review talks; the effects of the decisions made upon the other territories and the Federation as a whole often overtook the importance they had locally.

While this issue had a lesser impact on the Nyasaland constitution, it became a major sticking point for Northern Rhodesia. Discontent with the Federation within Southern Rhodesia and the unease of white settlers at the prospect of an African majority in Northern Rhodesia began to influence the way in which the constitution was created. As Fisher argues, 'The British Government could have argued that John Roberts and his colleagues were entitled to attend the conference, but as they had chosen not to do so, the United Federal Party had lost the right to influence its conclusions. This would have been the simple and straightforward way to handle the matter but its danger lay in the possibility of disillusionment, leading to desperate and drastic actions by the Europeans – perhaps to a 'coup' involving disorder and bloodshed.'

40 MSS Welensky, 667/5, Welensky to Jim Scott, 11 February 1961.
41 Franklin, *Unholy Wedlock*, p.207.
43 MSS Welensky, 667/5, Welensky to Jim Scott, 11 February 1961.
The constant fear that Welensky or Whitehead would react badly and declare independence hung heavily over the heads of both the British and the Americans. The reality of South African apartheid and the fear that Southern Rhodesia would either align themselves with this regime in some way or follow a similar path of its own gave Welensky leverage. As Franklin, who attended the conference as a representative of the John Moffat's Liberal Party states:

‘Mr Kaunda observed that the Federal Party was haunting the Conference. He was quite right, and those of us that attended the conference might just as well not have been there. Even without the Federal Party present, there was no possibility of agreement with the demands of the African nationalists, and even if there had been the decision was clearly not going to be ours. Ours was the difficult talks of exercising patience and good temper, providing the facade of a Conference to advise the British Government on what our future should be, thus Sir Roy’s fight with the British Government on what it should not be.’

However, there were two other agendas that needed to be considered: that of the British conservatives and the Americans. Macleod had proven an unpopular colonial secretary amongst the backbenches of government. While the main players in Africa needed to be appeased, the growing discontent within the conservative party itself had to be considered. This was not as much of an issue for Macleod as it was for Macmillan as leader. As Shepherd notes, ‘Whether or not Macleod would be able to succeed in giving Africans a greater role in the government of Northern Rhodesia and setting the territory on the right path to independence would depend ultimately on the extent of Macmillan’s continued commitment to African advance when weighed against the depth of opposition among Europeans in Rhodesia and conservatives at home.’

46 Franklin, *Unholy Wedlock*, pp.149-50.
Opposition to Macleod's handling of the Northern Rhodesian Conference came in the form of an early day motion in February, which attracted over 90 signatures.\textsuperscript{49} Shepherd asserts that 'the identity of the signatories suggested that alarm had spread beyond Macleod’s usual right wing critics.'\textsuperscript{50} Although this seemed to be great encouragement for Welensky in Britain, support for the motion petered out, with its only real effect being to damage the image of Macleod and possibly dent his confidence slightly, though Shepherd goes on to claim that Macleod was later 'somewhat dismissive of this backbench pressure.'\textsuperscript{51}

The more damaging attack for Macleod personally came from Lord Salisbury's speech in the House of Lords. As Shepherd explains, 'it was not simply that Macleod had pursued the wrong policies Salisbury’s charges went much deeper than that. He attacked Macleod personally, going far beyond the normal bounds of political debate.'\textsuperscript{52} Fisher too, describes the speech as 'a direct and vicious attack upon the man as well as upon the policies. It was a calculated attempt at character assassination.' However Fisher goes on to assert that the speech was only able to damage Macleod partly because it received publicity in the press, but mainly because many people thought there was an element of truth.\textsuperscript{53} For Shepherd though, Salisbury's attack revealed more about himself rather than Macleod as 'unlike the reactionary Lord Salisbury, Macleod saw that striking an ostrich-like attitude towards emergent African nationalism could only bring bloodshed and destruction on the settlers – the people who he was accused of trying to outwit.'\textsuperscript{54}

In terms of the Americans, although there was no direct interference there was an awareness of the possible impact on their general policy for Africa. By the time of the Northern Rhodesian conference the new Administration, which had placed Africa in the centre of its election campaign, were in office and Mennen Williams, newly instated as head of the Bureau of African Affairs, had begun to visit nations

\textsuperscript{50} Shepherd, Macleod, p.221.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid, p.225.
\textsuperscript{53} Fisher, Macleod, p.170.
\textsuperscript{54} Shepherd, Macleod, p.226.
across Africa. In light of the strong resistance to Southern Rhodesia gaining independence before major changes in their racial policy, it can be argued that there was at least an understanding of how the constitutional reviews would be seen in the US. Welensky’s view that, ‘there has been a rather subtle change towards Africa by both the United States and the United Kingdom of recent times. Even our friend Soapy has been saying that no one of any race - and that includes the white man - is expendable on this continent’ is indicative of his belief that American and British policies ran in tandem.\(^{55}\)

While this assessment was in many ways correct, the underlying belief that British policy was dictated by the Americans, cannot be so easily substantiated. While American interests and opinion were considered, there is no evidence that they took precedence over the views of the British Government, the Africans or, indeed, the European settlers. What is clear is that Britain and America both held similar views, if for different political ends. Because America had no political power within Africa, it is easy to conclude that they used British influence to meet their own needs. Although this may, perhaps, be the case, it is a very simplistic explanation of a much more complex situation. The Americans were able to use British influence because they shared the same basic ideals not because America forced the British hand.

Welensky’s view of the constitution, and Macleod himself, is clearly explained in his letter to F.S. Joelson, editor of an African newspaper in which he states that:

‘things have come to a head and by the time you get this letter I shall have summoned the Federal Parliament and taken a number of actions clearly indicating that I intended to offer what resistance I possibly can to the policies of Macleod, as far as this part of African is concerned. No one has tried harder than myself in the last three weeks to try and reach a reasonable agreement. I’ve tried to look at the thing dispassionately and I’ve made concession after concession but the only thing that will satisfy Macleod is an African majority. He calls it parity, but of course it’s not parity.’\(^{56}\)

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\(^{55}\) MSS Welensky, 638/1, Welensky to Joe and Lila Lisson, 18 August 1961.

\(^{56}\) MSS Welensky, 678/7, Welensky to F.S. Joelson, 21 February 1961.
However, for Fisher, Welensky was far from trying hard to be reasonable and instead 'exerted pressure upon the British Government and was supported throughout by the right wing of the Conservative Party in Parliament. This tended to weaken the resolve of the Cabinet, whose attempts to mollify Welensky created distrust among the Africans. It was a vicious circle. It was interpreted in Salisbury almost as a right of veto and a meaning that Macleod’s proposals required Federal acquiescence.\textsuperscript{57} In reality the Federal Government had no right to interfere in territorial constitutions, however, consultation was required. The problem, as Fisher asserts was that ‘the word ‘consult’ is always ambiguous. There is a good deal of difference between consultation and sustained pressure, backed with the threat of armed force, but the Federal Government eventually went this far.\textsuperscript{58}

The Americans were made aware of the difficulties facing the British over the Northern Rhodesian constitution by F. Taylor Ostrander, Assistant to the chairman of American Metal Climax Inc., in discussions with Chester Dunham of the Bureau of African Affairs. Ostrander told the Americans that ‘1) that the British Cabinet in June gave way to the pressure of Sir Roy Welensky in regard to a constitution for Northern Rhodesia in order to maintain itself in power, and 2) that the British Government will shortly take action designed to strengthen substantially the position of Kenneth Kaunda.\textsuperscript{59} He went on to explain that:

‘The Macmillan Government wrestled not only with tough backbench Tory opposition but also with serious dissension within the cabinet. At this juncture, Sir Roy brought heavy pressure to bear on the Macmillan Government in order to obtain a constitution in Northern Rhodesia more favorable to his United Federal Party. Macmillan apparently thought that, if he did not give way on this point, his enemies on the various other issues might combine to topple his government. In other words, Welensky could threaten Macmillan more seriously in the short run than Kaunda could.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{57} Fisher, \textit{Macleod}, p.167.

\textsuperscript{58} Franklin, \textit{Unholy Wedlock}, p.187.

\textsuperscript{59} RG 59, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Eastern and Southern Africa Affairs, Records Relating to Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Box 2, Memo of Conversation, Subject: Situation in Northern Rhodesia, F. Taylor Ostrander, Assistant Chairman, American Metal Climax Inc. and Chester G. Dunham, Office of Eastern and Southern Africa Affairs, 17 August 1961.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
The awareness of the immediacy of the threat that Welensky offered is, indeed, a key element to understanding the reasoning behind both Britain’s decision to placate him and Americans lack of vocal objection despite the fact that the changes to the constitution ran contrary to their policy of greater African advancement. Ostrander went on to comment that ‘the British Government is aware that the appeasement of Welensky has resulted in strengthening the African radicals and in weakening the African moderates - particularly Kaunda.’\(^{61}\) This led him to note that ‘apparently, the British Government is prepared to give Kaunda what he wants in the constitution.’\(^{62}\) He then concludes that there was some kind of ulterior motive behind this to and fro as:

‘In order to swing popular support away from the radicals and back to Kaunda’s moderates, the British Government believes that it must do something to make Welensky 'explode' without driving him out of the Federation. The theory is that, after the dust has settled following Welensky's explosion, Kaunda would appear victorious in African eyes. Then the British Government could resume the constitutional dialogue with a moderate African leader who could claim wide popular support.’\(^{63}\)

While there seems to be little to suggest that there was an elaborate plot in play, there is little doubt that there was a great deal of political manoeuvring on all sides. These series of constitutional reviews helped to seal the fate of the Federation in many ways; the right to secede and the increased hatred of the Federation by both Africans across the Federal area and Southern Rhodesian whites were indeed elements that helped to end Federation. What is clear is that Welensky’s pressure did have an effect and the constitution came under review again, much to the surprise of those who attended the conference, as Franklin explains, ‘neither the African nationalists, nor the Colonial Service Officials, nor we of the Liberal Party thought that he stood a chance of winning. It was inconceivable that the British Government, having called every bluff and every threat that had been made and brought Sir Roy to his knees, would ever go back on the plan which the Colonial Secretary, and in all good faith, the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, had so firmly stated was final.’\(^{64}\)

\(^{61}\) Ibid.
\(^{62}\) Ibid.
\(^{63}\) Ibid.
\(^{64}\) Franklin, *Unholy Wedlock*, p.207.
While there was a general agreement within the conference that there should be an African majority over elected members in a new legislative council, Welensky rejected both proposals put forward and as the conference was not going well a new plan was proposed.\(^{65}\) Duncan Sandys, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, had to reassure Welensky numbers for Africans on the Legislative council were not final and African delegates were unhappy at the vagueness of the details for upper roll and that further consultation in Northern Rhodesia was required which would allow UFP a role despite boycott.\(^{66}\) This caused a further headache for Macmillan as not only was Welensky left unhappy but Macleod threatened to resign as 'he was impressed with the sense that we were continually giving in to Mr Welensky and that he was not being allowed freedom in his own sphere of responsibility.'\(^{67}\) Macleod was, for Kaunda, 'a person – at least to those of us who were at this conference still remains the only hope in the British Government. The British Government have betrayed us, and it is clear from what we have been seeing that Macleod has been pushed against the wall by the British Governments attitude and giving in to pressure from Salisbury...Mr Macleod left to himself could have done the right thing, but he suffers because of his collective responsibility to the Cabinet.'\(^{68}\)

The British Government then had a dilemma to face, whether or not to publish the proposals on the constitution given the criticisms of them made by Welensky and Whitehead, and the unwillingness of African delegates to accept them.\(^{69}\) However, Kaunda agreed to give the plan a go and, as Franklin states, 'he was incidentally greatly assisted by the fuss that Sir Roy continued to make about it. This enabled him to put the Plan across to Africans, who thought if the Federal Prime Minister hated it so much, it must be pretty good for them.'\(^{70}\) Macleod believed that although the present plan would not be accepted by either side and would evoke strong criticism, there were grounds for hoping that it would not provoke violence,' and that postponement, 'would be regarded by the Africans as a betrayal of their

\(^{65}\) Shepherd, Macleod, pp.221-222.  
\(^{66}\) Ibid, p.167.  
\(^{67}\) Ibid, p.222.  
\(^{68}\) The Times, 20 Feb 1961 in Ibid.  
\(^{69}\) Ibid, p.223.  
interests, would not give any great satisfaction to the Europeans, and would greatly increase the Governments difficulties at home.\textsuperscript{71}

Nonetheless, the constitution was published, despite Welensky and his supporters' interpretation that the constitutional plan as 'Macleodism' in action. As Allighan explains, was 'the placing of discarded British responsibility into irresponsible African hands before they were capable of receiving it. Better, by far, never to have occupied the Territories if, after sucking the orange dry, it is thrown aside with no care as to whose feel will skid on it.'\textsuperscript{72} Allighan, does go on to explain the rationale of Macleod, seeing him as 'the victim of his period...Having lost the glory which made Britain Great Britain, and developed a belatedly bad conscience over past methods of acquiring a Colonial Empire, fallen Imperialism is like a police-chased thief, frantically throwing away ill-gotten gains. Being under Tory control, it planned to make capital out of a death-bed repentance by exploiting the disgorged colonies for trade purposes before its chief rival, America, sent in its own carpet bagged diplomats.'\textsuperscript{73}

\textbf{Northern Rhodesia Constitution Revisions and Reversion - 1962}

Although the Northern Rhodesian constitution had been theoretically agreed in February, Welensky and Whitehead’s objections had caused it to come under review, with an amended constitution agreed in June 1962. The main reason for this was the combined problem for the British of Southern Rhodesia and Welensky’s insistence. As Fisher notes, 'during his frequent visits to London, Sir Roy Welensky not only wearied Macmillan with endless discussions about the Northern Rhodesian Constitution and the future of the Federation, but was often invited to address the Conservative Commonwealth Affairs Committee. He always took these opportunities to rally Back Bench support for his views and in this climate of political pressure major modifications were made to Macleod’s earlier proposals.'\textsuperscript{74}

Welensky was not the only person wearying Macmillan over this issue; the constant fighting between Macleod and the Colonial Office and Sandys and the

\textsuperscript{71} Shepherd, \textit{Macleod}, p.223.
\textsuperscript{72} Allighan, \textit{Welensky Story}, p.238.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid, p.236-37.
\textsuperscript{74} Fisher, \textit{Macmillan}, p.245.
Commonwealth Office, only added to the issue. This, according to Fisher, 'was a cumbersome procedure, involving the discussion of endless formulae and long hours of often abortive work, but it became necessary because of the conflicting views of Sandys and Macleod.' This was exacerbated by the fact that the two conferences were happening almost simultaneously. The interlinking of these two reviews was such that conflict often arose. As Macmillan explains this was because 'the two Secretaries of State, Sandys and Macleod, although men of sufficient quality to take a broad view, were naturally subject to diverging pressures. Macleod was moved throughout by a high idealism and a deep sympathy with African aspirations. Sandys, no less conscious of the inevitable march of events, sought with unfailing diligence some means to secure progress without disaster.'

The new proposals for Northern Rhodesia were announced in June 1962, before the Southern Rhodesian constitution was finalised. According to Shepherd, 'Macleod was conscious of the keen disappointment that would be felt by Kaunda and his UNIP supporters.' Perhaps unsurprisingly, Kaunda found these new proposals hard to sell to his supporters, causing him to begin calling for changes, much to the chagrin of Welensky. However, the main issue for Fisher was that 'the consultation process led to concessions which not only aroused African suspicions but also misled Welensky, who imagined he could alter basic policy, which he could not.' This was made clear months later when the proposals reverted to something close to the February version despite Maudling replacing Macleod as colonial secretary.

For Hemming, the decision to replace Macleod came because he had become both a personal irritant and political liability. However, Hemming also concludes that although Macmillan hoped that Maudling would be easier to get along with, 'in the end, Macmillan grew to regard Maudling as 'plus royaliste que le roi', and Maudling

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76 Fisher, Macmillan, p.244.
77 Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p.313.
79 Shepherd, Macleod p.232.
80 Ibid, p.233; PREM 11/3493 Evelyn Hone (Governor of Northern Rhodesia) to Macleod, 24 July 1961; Evelyn Hone to Macleod, 15 July 1961; Alport to CWR Office, 16 July 1961; Macleod to Evelyn Hone, 17 July 1961.
81 Fisher, Macleod, p.167.
himself admitted that he sought to continue down the path that Macleod blazed.\textsuperscript{83} This is the key element to this change of personnel; it did not amount to a change of policy in anyway and, in fact, as Darwin asserts, 'in December 1961, Maudling, the new colonial secretary declared that he was not bound by the proposals announced in June.'\textsuperscript{84} According to Fisher this resulted in Maudling making 'a number of concessions to the Africans and finally, though not without difficulty, brought the matter to a conclusion in February 1962 on much the same basis as Macleod had the year before.'\textsuperscript{85} Fisher concludes that 'Macleod’s initiative and determination were needed to launch and sustain the new momentum in African, but Maudling’s firm but milder technique smoothed many ruffled feathers. Macmillan’s judgement was no doubt good in making the change at the Colonial Office when he did.'\textsuperscript{86}

For Fisher, 'the delay had achieved nothing for anyone. It had alienated the Africans without pacifying Welensky. The Federation was now doomed, and the often ambivalent attitude of the British Government had given substance to Welensky’s charge of equivocation. At home critics of Macleod’s African policies had publicly questioned his good faith, and it was to be many years before he lived down this slander upon his political integrity.'\textsuperscript{87} However, Franklin believes that there was in fact some merit to be found in the reversion of the proposals. 'In effect the constitution now was not quite as unfavourable to the Federal Party as it had been originally, but a good deal less favourable than it had been with the June recommendations. But what mattered was the psychological effect upon Africans. Sir Roy Welensky had been defeated. The Federal Prime Minister once again unconsciously helped to restore calm by proclaiming his anger.'\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{84} Darwin, \textit{Britain and Decolonization}, p.275.
\textsuperscript{85} Fisher, \textit{Macleod}, p.246.
\textsuperscript{86} Fisher, \textit{Macleod}, p.175.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid, p.174.
\textsuperscript{88} Franklin, \textit{Unholy Wedlock}, p.215.
Southern Rhodesian Constitutional Conference - 1961

One of the reasons the British agreed to revisit the Northern Rhodesian constitution was due to the difficulties it placed on the Southern Rhodesian Constitutional Conference. Fears of Southern Rhodesia declaring some kind of independence was not only a sign of the increasing fragility of the Federation but was also a sign of the pressure felt upon the British government, limiting the options they had to achieve meaningful advancement in the area.\textsuperscript{89} The growing number of African members in the UN had made the issue of racial discrimination in Southern Rhodesia a high profile, sensitive and embarrassing issue for the British and this was coupled with pressure from the Americans. Due to Southern Rhodesia's status as a self-governing colony, Britain had little control over the area and a declaration of independence would be devastating.\textsuperscript{90}

Darwin suggests that the result of the conference was that Sandys 'persuaded the white ministers to accept a new constitution which gave Africans some 15 members in the assembly of 65, with the prospect of larger representation as more African voters qualified for the franchise. In return for this and certain constitutional safeguards, London agreed to end its reserved powers over the administration of Africans, enabling Whitehead the Prime Minister to claim that Southern Rhodesia was independent in every respect except for the power to change its own constitution.\textsuperscript{91} However, historian Elaine Windrich, believes that the result of the conference was that, 'the Southern Rhodesian Government had succeeded in eliminating Britain's reserve powers, in exchange for the inclusion in the new Constitution of alternative (but inadequate) safeguards for the protection of African rights, they were one step short of independence.'\textsuperscript{92}

While Nkomo faced an obvious difficulty in convincing Africans to accept the proposals, Whitehead too faced problems of his own. As Windrich notes, 'the dilemma for the Whitehead Government was that they were obliged to convince the Europeans of their determination to suppress the African opposition and to ensure the British

\textsuperscript{89} Macmillan, \textit{At the End of the Day}, p.311.
\textsuperscript{90} Welensky, \textit{4000 Days}, p.292.
\textsuperscript{92} Windrich, \textit{Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence}, p.12.
Government of their intention of implementing a policy of ‘partnership’ with the Africans as a basis for an independent Southern Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{93} While the Whitehead government was unpopular with African nationalists, for not being liberal enough in its racial policies, it was also beginning to become unpopular in European circles for being too liberal.\textsuperscript{94} The wait for the referendum on the constitution was therefore a tense time and the possible effects of the Northern Rhodesian constitution made the issue more complicated and thus led to the reopening of the Northern Rhodesian constitution in order to help the Southern Rhodesian constitution come to a successful conclusion.

For Alport, the referendum win ‘represented a vote in favour of a progressive policy as well as reflecting the level-headedness of the mass of the European electors.’\textsuperscript{95} However, Allighan notes that ‘a solid opposition to it developed among highly vocal sections of both races – those Europeans who objected to all such extensions of authority to the Africans, and the Africans who declared the extension to be insufficient.’\textsuperscript{96} However, Nkomo, Whitehead, and Welensky’s predecessor Godfrey Huggins, ‘and their supporters believed absolutely in white supremacy. But they were at heart paternalists, ready to be polite to Africans who accepted their inferior status.’\textsuperscript{97} Alport’s interpretation of the issue was that the African ‘fears being patronised, feels ill at ease and resents the unspoken assumption in the attitude of so many Europeans that he - the African-in his own land of Africa and under his own sky, is an inferior being. He does not, unhappily, possess in many cases the sufficient moral courage or breadth of mind to enable him to surmount the obstacles which exist to normal relationships with people of different background and colour.’\textsuperscript{98} In terms of the Europeans, Alport suggests that ‘the belief which most Europeans held that the African knew nothing about politics and cared less was simply a comforting illusion. He might

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid, p.13.
\textsuperscript{95} Cuthbert Alport, \textit{The Sudden Assignment: Being a Record of Service in Central Africa During the Last Controversial Years of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1961-63} (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1965), p.76.
\textsuperscript{96} Allighan, \textit{Welensky Story}, p.248.
\textsuperscript{97} Nkomo, \textit{My Life}, p.105.
\textsuperscript{98} Alport, \textit{The Sudden Assignment}, p.150.
be critical of a leader like Nkomo, but his political consciousness was as highly developed as that of most communities in Europe."^{99}

According to Nkomo a mock referendum held by Africans revealed the true African feeling about the constitution rejecting it, 584 to 467,189, while official results saw 41,949 vote yes to 21,848 no.^{100} Welensky disputes this, claiming that the mock referendum 'collapsed in near farce' while Allighan states that 'the police...were able to prove a tremendous degree of intimidation in the conduct of that mock 'referendum' and stated that, in actual fact, no more than 73,000 voted at all. Large numbers voted twice. A 'general strike' call was a colossal failure with less than 5% abstention from work once the Africans were assured of adequate Government protection from violent intimidations.'^{102}

For Noer, the American position was that 'although the growing tension between Great Britain and Rhodesia from 1961 to 1964 did draw some attention to the area, prior to 1964 the 'Rhodesian problem' was a distinctly secondary part of US involvement in white Africa. Many of the reports and analyses of Africa in the early 1960s noted the deteriorating situation in Rhodesia, but they concentrated on the immediate crisis in Angola and on South Africa, the obvious major obstacle to majority rule. Rhodesia remained only a minor part of any official discussion of problems of white Africa during the Kennedy years.'^{103} While this is, on the surface, true, it fails to take into consideration that Southern Rhodesia was a potential problem and not an existing one and as such would not require an immediate reaction. However, Southern Rhodesia was very much an issue that Kennedy discussed, even if that discussion did not lead to clear policies or action. However, Noer goes on to state that, 'Many in the Bureau of African Affairs were suspicious of Great Britain's ultimate intentions in the area. They were certain that both British power and resolve were on the wane. Despite its claims that it was committed to racial equality in Rhodesia some Americans feared

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^{100} Nkomo, My Life, p.96.
^{101} Welensky, 4000 Days, p.310.
^{102} Allighan, Welensky Story, p.250.
^{103} Noer, Cold War in Southern Africa, p.188.
London would eventually give in to white demands for independence without adequate guarantees of African rights.\textsuperscript{104}

Rhodesia was not a high priority for the Americans for a number of reasons however, it was a cause for concern in case it became a high priority issue in the future. The fact that they had no active political role in the area precluded them from being an active part of the talks and resolutions taking place, this is an undeniable truth. However, the Americans did take an interest in the area and had opinion on the best result, if not an answer to the question of how this was to be achieved. This passive role is unusual in American politics of this era. America was used to being the leader, not the one offering suggestions and support from the sidelines. What should not be assumed is that this lack of participation in formulation of ideas and policies was indicative of a lack of involvement in any sense. UK/US talks often included focused talks on Africa and regularly included Rhodesia in its agenda.\textsuperscript{105} The contact between the Africans and the administration as a whole, and Kennedy personally, also show that the Americans were interested in Africa and its future.\textsuperscript{106} The existence of the Bureau of African Affairs and the trips Mennen Williams took to the area, as well as the reports he subsequently made are also indicative of American interest in the area.\textsuperscript{107}

In a summary of one visit to the Federation Williams 'declared that the aims of the Republic of South Africa were wrong but that the aims of the Federation were right; however, the pace of the Federation was too slow. Sir Roy and his United Federal Party appeared too slow; Sir Edgar Whitehead was a bit faster; and Banda was way out in front. The philosophy of Northern Rhodesia regarding the development of blacks was ahead of that of Southern Rhodesia. In summing up his impressions, Governor Williams declared that he admired the ability of Sir Roy Welensky to cope with an

\textsuperscript{104}Ibid, p.188.
\textsuperscript{106}Papers of President Kennedy, President’s Office Files, Countries, Reference Box 123 B, Memo for The President from Dean Rusk, Recommendation that the President Receive Dr Hastings Banda, African Nationalist Leader form Nyasaland, 1 May 1961.
\textsuperscript{107}Records of G. Mennen Williams, Classified Williams Box 3, Memo of Conversation, Subject: The Recent Visit of Assistant Secretary Williams to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 8 September, 1961.
extremely complex situation. This indicates that the Americans were focused on the development of Africans in the area but were also sympathetic to the white electorate and leaders of the Federation and the British.

Both African natives and Europeans in Africa did seem to feel they could express their points of view to Williams as can be seen in the records of telephone calls made during this time. In a call to Williams, the Minister of Rhodesian Affairs Harry Jefferys, is noted as having 'launched into a substantive discussion by saying bluntly that his country was 'in trouble.' He (hoped) that the United States would recognise this and assist in overcoming the present difficulties.' Kaunda also felt that he was able to speak freely to the Americans stating that 'the events which led to the current deadlock in the constitutional talks. In his view, Sir Roy Welensky was almost entirely to blame, having boycotted the constitutional talks in London, called out the territorial troops, and made blustering speeches. In general, Welensky's adoption of an uncompromisingly rigid position against change had increased racial-political tensions.'

Like the British, the Americans were also in fear of the white Rhodesians and their constant threat of a declaration of independence, which could be coupled with some kind of allegiance with South Africa. The defeat of Edgar Whitehead and the election of Winston Field and his Rhodesian Front in December 1962, according to Noer, made 'US officials became even more alarmed.' Nkomo’s assessment of Field was that 'his aim was to make Southern Rhodesia more like South Africa, to build a defensive alliance with the South Africans and the Portuguese, and to abandon the thin facade of racial tolerance to which the white rulers had hitherto paid lip-service.' This, quite obviously, was the very thing that both the British and the Americans had wanted to avoid. This election also seemed to indicate that the

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108 Ibid.
109 Records of G. Mennen Williams, Classified Williams Box 3, Subject: Protest of alleged American interference at farewell call by Rhodesia Minister Mr Harry Jeffreys, 4 May 1961.
110 Records of G. Mennen Williams, Classified Williams Box 3, Subject: Call by Mr Kenneth Kaunda, 18 April 1961.
111 Noer, Cold War in Southern Africa. p.189; Borstelmann, Cold War and the Color Line, p.147.
112 Nkomo, My Life, p.105.
Whitehead government, who had made relatively small strides in African advancement, was too liberal for the white electorate of Southern Rhodesia.\footnote{Butler, 'Demise of the Central African Federation', p.136.}

While the constitution in Southern Rhodesia made some progress and was a success so far as it did not create a pathway to independence in the same way the other constitutions had done, the issue was far from over. The growing dissatisfaction of the Africans juxtaposed by the belief amongst white Rhodesians that Africans were gaining far too much ground and far too quickly created a ticking time bomb that would ultimately result in Southern Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence. Unlike Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, the issues facing Southern Rhodesia were far too complicated to be solved at one constitutional conference. The political situation in the area was so fragile that problems were almost guaranteed, particularly as Britain had less power to enforce changes upon the area in the way they could in the other two territories. In this sense, Federation had been successful in moderating Southern Rhodesia; however, it failed in its attempts at pushing it towards a multiracial state or even accepting many changes in its racial problems. The Federation had been hoped to be the solution to the problem of racial division and decolonisation, and when it failed neither Britain nor America had a clear idea of how to deal with Southern Rhodesia, although they both knew that granting independence would not achieve anything. There was a clear idea of the result that both countries wanted for Southern Rhodesia and there was an agreed policy on these terms, however there was no clear idea of how to achieve it.
Mennen Williams

During a trip to Kenya Mennen Williams, in reply to a question about America's goal for the area, stated 'what we want for the Africans is what the Africans want for themselves.' However, press reports of the incident claimed that Williams had instead claimed that 'Africa is for the Africans.' Kennedy's response, when asked by reporters at a press conference held shortly after the incident was 'I do not know who else Africa should be for.' Muehlenbeck states that Williams speech was a symbol of Kennedys new Africa policy as 'Backed by Kennedy's support, administration staffers were frank in their opposition to decolonization.'

However, Noer asserts that 'Privately Kennedy was less sanguine, as he felt that Williams' comments had been rash and his attempted clarifications contradictory. He ordered Bowles to meet with Williams and ask the assistant Secretary to clear all future public statements with the State Department.' Unsurprisingly this incident caused a great deal of trouble for Williams, particularly amongst those he met during the rest of his visit. Events took a turn when Williams was attacked by an irate Rhodesian at the Lusaka airport in Northern Rhodesia. In a newspaper article describing the incident Williams was 'punched in the face...by a white man who disapproved of US policy in Africa.'

After this incident Williams was more careful with the wording of his public speeches and American diplomats were, in general, made more aware of the sensitivity of the issue. This change was noted by those he met while on these visits and as reflected by Bennett's statement that Williams was 'a changed man; courteous and cautious in his approach, thoughtful about his difficulties, and hesitant about proposing solutions to our problems - almost helpful in fact.' This is expressed again in a telegram from in Lusaka to the Central African Office, which states that Williams

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114 Noer, Soapy, p.239.
115 Ibid.
117 Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans, p.45.
118 Noer, Soapy, p.241.
120 MSS Welensky 590/3, Bennett to Welensky, 7 March 1963.
was well briefed and asked good questions, although his visit was 'generally uninspiring'.

Williams and Macleod shared the belief, according to Shepherd, that Northern Rhodesia, "was an African country that was going to be run by the Africans." Later Macleod explained that, "I have no doubt at all that there would have been bloodshed, there would have been something of a 'coup' by the Europeans in Northern Rhodesia supported by the Europeans in Southern Rhodesia. And the bloodshed that would have followed would have been appalling".

While Europeans in Africa interpreted Williams' message as further abandonment of the whites and perhaps even a call for them to leave the continent black Africans were more receptive. However, as Noer asserts 'the frenzied reaction to his remarks demonstrated that there was still strong opposition in Africa, Europe and Washington to such radical alteration of US priorities and that the complete black rule of Africa was still a highly volatile issue.' While Williams would later become respected by Africans, within the British and Federal Governments he was perceived as something of a nuisance, although he did regain some ground with Welensky on subsequent visits. In Nyasaland however, he was presented with a flywhisk by Banda, symbolic of 'wisdom and authority, and made him an honorary Malawi chief, the only white man ever so honoured.'

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121 DO 183/462, Inward Telegram to the Central African Office, 18 February 1963.
122 Noer, Soapy, p.219.
125 MSS Welensky 590/3, Bennett to Welensky, 7 March 1963.
126 Noer, Soapy, p.235.
Allen Ellender

In a television broadcast made in 16 June Louisiana Senator Allen J. Ellender made critical remarks about African inefficiency while discussing the crime rate in Washington D.C., linking it to African nationalism by citing Ethiopia, Haiti and Liberia as examples of African inability to govern. This led the Ambassadors of Liberia and Ethiopia to each express their dissatisfaction and ask that the Department of State transmit to the Senator their protests and ask for an apology. The Secretary of State expressed his regret and reassured the two men that 'Ellender's statement did not reflect the views of this government or majority of American people.' A few days later a further six African Ambassadors also approached the US government with notes for the President that expressed, amongst other things an 'unreserved resentment for Ellender’s attacks on peoples and governments of Africa'

Already a controversial figure, he made further contentious comments regarding the Federation at a press conference later in the year in which he stated that:

'In my humble judgement no greater mistake could be made then to dissolve this Federation...if the Federation should be dissolved and three separate countries ...formed out of the Federation, I predict that those who will suffer the most will not be the Europeans here but the natives themselves in the course of time and I would prefer to see this great progress that has been developing in the past nine years to be continued, be accelerated in the hope that in the future a sufficient number of natives - I mean the blacks - will be able to step in and assist in the government of this great area. Now it is true that, as I understand it, there a quite a few in the Rhodesian and less in Nyasaland who are probably able to assist in the formation of an independent state, but in my humble judgement, if Nyasaland should choose to go unto itself, it would be a tragedy.'

127 Classified Williams, Box 3, Department of State to American Embassy Addis Ababa, 18 June 1962.
128 Borstelmann, Cold War and the Color Line, p.146.
129 Ibid.
130 Classified Williams Box 3, Department of State to Mennen Williams via American Embassy Accra, 25 June 1962.
131 Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 155A, from Salisbury (Geren) to the Secretary of State, 6 December 1962.
These comments clearly ran contrary to the policy laid out by members of the American government and therefore could have proved troublesome for the Administration. However, they seem to have had little impact, perhaps because he was a Republican senator and not a member of Kennedy's Administration. His earlier sentiments on Africa had, perhaps, alerted many to his extreme views on race. It is clear by his response when asked if he was against the United States Government's policy on racial integration that colour was an issue for Senator Ellender not only in Africa but also in the United States. In this, he states that he is absolutely against the policy as 'in the United States we had a doctrine of separate but equal facilities since 1891 and it worked well.'

It is perhaps his response to a press question, relating to the idea that the United States had been viewed incapable of governing themselves during and after the civil war, that are more interesting. His response was 'let Britain come here and take care of you...not the US. That would be my answer to that if Britain thinks you are able to go on and do it, let Britain help you -- but don't you expect any assistance from us, that's the Santa Claus I am talking about.' This however, was not a direct attack on the British but was instead an attack on American aid spending, something Ellender wanted to see drastically reduced.

Although Ellender's comments were inappropriate in scope, content, and timing, they were quite clearly not a reflection of the American administration. He was not a figure within Kennedy's Administration, nor was he a member of his political party but, maybe most importantly, as a representative of the Southern state of Louisiana it was far easier to distance his beliefs with that of the American government as a whole. Unlike other Americans whose turns of phrase were far more damaging, Ellender's comments went mainly unnoticed in Britain and the Federation. The comments do highlight, however, the conflicting attitudes that existed within the United States.

Although Ellender was not a member of Kennedy’s Administration or political party, it is not difficult to imagine that there were those sympathetic to Ellender’s viewpoint within the Democrat party at least. The issue of race was a contentious one,

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132 Ibid, date error in the original text, should be 1896.
133 Ibid.
the fact that this particular racial issue was in Africa and not in Boston or Chicago did not change the view of many politicians or even American citizens who believed that black people were not capable of self-rule or deserving of a political voice. Ellender’s comments therefore speak to the larger racial issue that faced America and Africa, if not the world, at this time.

**Britain has lost an Empire and not yet found a role**

In terms of the Anglo-American special relationship, no incident caused as much furore as the Dean Acheson’s West Point speech 5 December 1962.\textsuperscript{134} Within this speech, addressed to the students of the military academy, Acheson stated that 'Britain had lost an Empire and not yet found a role'. This brief assessment caused widespread fury amongst Conservative party members and the British press and caused a mini crisis in Anglo-American relations.\textsuperscript{135} Unlike Ellender, Acheson did have ties to the Kennedy Administration and had previously been a key member in the Truman Administration; therefore, his views were much harder for Kennedy to distance himself from and were harder for the British to take.\textsuperscript{136} The statement struck a nerve with the British; this was a sensitive time, the decolonisation of Africa, the failure of its nuclear deterrent and subsequent reliance on America, its decision to enter the European Economic community as well as its economic issues had made Britain extremely self aware.\textsuperscript{137} The world was changing and Britain was, for the first time in a long time, not the one leading the change. Britain was conscious of its decline and of its need to find a new place in this new world; to have their closest ally publicly point this out in such a blunt manner was


\textsuperscript{137} CAB 129/86, Draft of Defence: Outline of Future Policy, Presented by the Minister of Defence to Parliament.
destructive to British pride. The most damaging element of the statement was that, although it was insensitive it was in the main perfectly accurate.\textsuperscript{138}

What Acheson failed to express was the search for a role was in itself indicative both of the British spirit and their importance as a world power. While the British would never regain the position it once had it did manage to create a role for itself that was remarkable for its physical size and this was in part because it created a system by which they were able to maintain a connection to the countries that they granted independence. This created a pseudo-empire where Britain could not control the fortunes but could at least remain on friendly terms with a great number of nations across the world. The relationship with the Americans also aided the British in their search for a role, particularly in terms of nuclear sharing.\textsuperscript{139} However, some historians and critics also see the special relationship as an indictment of Britain's decline rather than its saviour.\textsuperscript{140}

What is clear from these incidents is that the situation in the Federation and the decolonisation process in general was extremely difficult for both the British and the Americans to handle, despite close cooperation and consultation on their policies towards Africa. The wider issues at play both domestically and internationally meant that both countries were under pressure to solve a near impossible problem. Racial tension in the Federation could not be easily resolved just as it could not be in America. Attitudes within government as well as amongst the general population needed to move at a pace with which they were not comfortable. Although Mennen Williams’ comments seem quite logical on the face of it, they had a deeper meaning that hit at the heart of fears within the white settler population. While Senator Ellender’s comments were not a true reflection what the Kennedy Administration stood for they did reflect the ideals of many Americans and white Africans, striking a chord with them. Dean Acheson’s comments similarly touched a nerve with those within the British ruling powers and the general population who keenly felt the demise of their once great nation and did not wish to be reminded of it by the young nation that had replaced it.

\textsuperscript{138} Coker, 'Foreign and Defence Policy', p. 16; Brinkley, 'Acheson and the Special Relationship', p. 608.
\textsuperscript{139} Dobson, Anglo-American Relations, p. 13.
In terms of the constitutional reviews the momentum was set for decolonisation and independence for two out of the three nations; the issue of Southern Rhodesia would not be so simple to address. What is apparent however were the limits faced by both the Americans, and surprisingly the British in making the Federation follow the course they felt it should. While the Anglo-American special relationship was able to create an atmosphere of trust and candidness that led to a greater understanding of each nations stance the reality was that they could only do so much. The future of the Federation lay, in truth, within the hands of the inhabitants of the Federation: Britain could lead them, America could court them, but ultimately they were the masters of their own destiny, particularly in Southern Rhodesia. Although Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were both under greater control from the British, the precedent of African freedom had been set in Ghana and Monckton had only served to emphasise this. The end of Federation had been all but confirmed but drama had been so far avoided in Southern Rhodesia and there was still hope that there could be some cooperation between the territories. While this was not what was envisaged for Federation, it was a success of sorts.
Chapter Seven

Welensky's 'Betrayal': The End of Federation and the failure of the experiment

The Federation formally ended on 31 January 1963 after ten years, with the three territories moving on to new and separate paths. The blame for the failure of the Federation cannot be laid at the door of one specific event, person, or nation. Instead, various incidents came together to create and emphasise the inherent problems within the Federal ideal that ultimately lead to its destruction. While charges were made by Welensky of British betrayal and undue American influence, there were also charges made against Welensky himself for allowing African mistrust and hatred for Federation to not only continue but also to increase as time passed. The vast changes in policy and attitudes in the intervening years after Federation was formed were also a factor in its decline; as was the failure of governments involved to recognise these changes and evolve with it. Perhaps, most importantly, there were far too many people, governments, and point of views involved in the area to ever allow for a successful multiracial society to coherently and cohesively exist. The Federation itself was comprised of three territorial governments, a Federal Government, and three African nationalist oppositions. When the British Government, with its High Commissioner and Colonial and Commonwealth Secretaries, along with the Americans are considered, it is immediately obvious that this was never going to be anything but a complicated matter.

The end of Federation did highlight some potential issues for the Anglo-American relationship, particularly in terms of Southern Rhodesia, as there seemed to be no substantive policy for dealing with the difficulties that would result from the end of Federation, particularly how to handle independence. However, the close relations that existed between the two nations allowed there to be a genuine understanding of the issues at play. While a lack of British policy was a concern, the reality was that there was no clear answer to the problems that Southern Rhodesia posed: the matter was far too complicated and the Americans appreciated this fact. While the end of

1 Windrich, *Rhodesia*, p.17.
2 MSS Welensky 683/5 Welensky to Don Wilese, 6 May 1963.
4 Verrier, *Road to Zimbabwe*, pp.74-5
Federation was a disappointment, by 1963 both Britain and America had faced the reality that it could not continue in its current form. While a connection of some kind was encouraged by both sides, the unlikelihood of this was recognized and accepted. The end of Federation was not something that neither the British nor the Americans wanted, but both knew that it was inevitable and worked together to make the transition as smooth as possible.

The failure of Federation

When discussing the causes of the failure of Federation, a number of key factors can be seen as the defining reason. However, in reality, it was the fact that all these issues came together and that the parties involved did little or nothing to address adequately these difficulties that really ended Federation. Its multiracial essence was a bold, ambitious, and indeed noble ideal; however, its execution lacked the imagination and understanding of its complexities to make it work. Welensky's Federal Government did little to address the issues of African mistrust, the British allowed this mistrust to fester and grow when in challenges with Welensky, such as the Constitutional issues of the 1960s, while the American's allowed their Eurocentric bias to cloud their impartiality in Africa. All these failings, when coupled with issues such as Devlin and Monckton allowed the multiracial dream to fester and die.

For Fisher, the Federation had become a burden to big to bear or to justify, stating that, 'the story of Central and South Africa in the last three years of his government had not been a happy one and the amount of time and trouble the problems there had taken was disproportionate to the results the Prime Minster and his colleagues had been able to achieve.'9 By 1962 there was little or no support for Federation in any of the three territories. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were looking for secession and independence under a majority black government, while Southern Rhodesia too had become disillusioned with the Federation and wanted to

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5 MSS Welensky Eden to Welensky, 29 April 1963.
6 Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, p.13.
7 Sanger, Central African Emergency, p.163.
move towards its own independence.\textsuperscript{10} However, Southern Rhodesian independence would look very different from its neighbours, with a continuance of white minority rule, small concessions to African nationalists, and a gradual move towards African rule years down the line, in theory at least, if not in practice.

In his biography of Welensky, published before the end of Federation, Allighan notes that 'Britain and the United States will determine the future of Central Africa by the degree of disinterested support they give to Welensky's courageous experiment in inter-racial partnership.'\textsuperscript{11} While this was in part true, what it failed to address or recognise, were the failings on the part of the Federal Government. While inter-racial partnership was meant to be at the core of the Federation, there was very little progress made to create at least the foundations of a partnership between the races.\textsuperscript{12} The link between African development and abandonment of the white man was made so often that it seemed to render the policy of multiracialism, or at least Welensky's investment in it, defunct. As Welensky explains in a letter to his cousin Sam, 'I keep on saying to every American visitor who comes here constantly talking about help for education and help for this assistance and that, that as long as that is the policy they will never get the black man on this continent to do anything for himself. The black man, like the white man, has got to pull himself up by his socks. If he doesn’t do it that way it will never last.'\textsuperscript{13}

Banda's description of Federation to the Americans seems to illustrate clearly the way in which many Africans saw Federation from its conception. He emphasised that 'the chief nature of the Federation was political rather than economic and that the underlying motive for its creation was to perpetuate the white man’s domination over the black. Whereas the British had always maintained and acted as though they were the trustees of the patrimony of the black man, Sir Geoffrey Huggins (Lord Malvern) and Welensky had never subscribed to this principle but instead had copied

\textsuperscript{10} Papers of the President, National Security Files, Countries, Box 2A, Adlai Stevenson to Secretary of State, 26 April 1962.
\textsuperscript{11} Allighan, \textit{The Welensky Story}, p.253.
\textsuperscript{12} Franklin, \textit{Unholy Wedlock}, p.207.
\textsuperscript{13} MSS Welensky 684/5, Welensky to Willinsky, 11 July 1963.
South African methods and set British principles at naught.\textsuperscript{14} While Federation was meant to create a way for natives and Europeans to work together as Africans, regardless of colour, the need to address the serious limitations Africans faced in order to level the playing field was continually referred to as racial policy by Welensky.

Historian Nicholas Mansergh asserts that 'the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland was not so much misconceived as conceived out of time and place. It belonged to an age when there was if not acceptance than acquiescence by Africans in European control. That age was passing at the very time the federation was brought into existence.'\textsuperscript{15} The volume of African nations becoming independent during the 1960s does seem to indicate a move towards a belief that Africans were entitled to be in charge of their own fortunes. With every newly independent African state, questions over the validity, the success and even the need for Federation grew. With no recognisable improvement in African participation or quality of life that could be attributed directly to Federation in all the years of its existence, the argument for its continuation seemed to hold little weight. The key element of its failure therefore, seems to lie in the fact that it did not seem to achieve anything of real value for the Africans.\textsuperscript{16}

However, the handling of the situation by the British did little to help the Federation to succeed.\textsuperscript{17} The Conservative Overseas Board made the following observation of British policy: 'the continual failure of Her Majesty's Government to reach a decision about the future of the Central African Federation has led to a deteriorating political and economic situation....Unfortunately, however, neither Europeans nor Africans has any faith in Her Majesty's Governments undertakings. It is also becoming increasingly clear that HMG have decreasing ability to influence the trend of events in this part of Africa.'\textsuperscript{18} This clearly illustrates a key issue facing the Federation during its years of operation: the British government did not seem to know how to handle it or enable it to achieve the goals it had been set. Although there was a

\textsuperscript{16} Franklin, \textit{Unholy Wedlock}, p.207.
\textsuperscript{17} Sanger, \textit{Central African Emergency}, p.163.
\textsuperscript{18} CPA, COB 120/1-3, Report on a Visit to Central and Eastern Africa, February 1963.
drive to keep Federation going throughout Macmillan’s term, there was also a lot of doubt expressed over its feasibility and its effectiveness. While there were no easy answers for the problems that Federation faced, it is very clear that the Macmillan government only aimed to continue the Federal system for as long as it could rather than actively investing in its success or its long-term future. This can also be said for both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations; both saw fatal flaws in the way in which Federation operated but offered no alternative plans for it to be improved.

However, the role of both the British and the Americans was not one of direct involvement. In fact the very idea of Federation was, in part, to reduce the input Britain needed to have in Central Africa. The Macleod led Colonial Office did make great strides to push for more African involvement in the affairs of the territorial and Federal governments, however this seemed to run slightly contrary to the overall Conservative policy, as seen in the unpopularity of Macleod amongst backbenchers. The very fact that the Macmillan government was able to achieve some levels of change within Central Africa, in the face of such vitriolic opposition by Conservative backbenchers such as Lord Salisbury is indeed remarkable. However, this achievement took, arguably, far longer than it needed to, especially in the wake of the Monckton report. As Franklin states ‘for well over two years the British Government knew perfectly well that the Federation had failed, but still had not, to use one of Sir Roy’s favourite words, the guts to say so and to act accordingly.’

The biggest issue that faced the Federation and, ultimately the key to its failure was of course, its lack of African support. As Franklin states, ‘the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland failed before it began. Its fragrant imposition upon the vast majority of the peoples of the territories, in the teeth of their virulently expressed opposition, ensured its failure in advance.’ The Federation needed to engage and encourage African nationalism under the Federal system, it needed to allow for greater African involvement and it needed to at least lay the foundations of trust in the African

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19 Papers of the President, National Security Files, Countries, Box 2A, Stevenson to Secretary of State, UK, UN and Central Africa, 26 April 1962.
20 Ibid.
21 Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, p.13.
22 MSS Welensky, 628/7, Joelson to Welensky, 6 January 1961.
23 Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, p.215.
community. It failed to do this from its earliest days, and made little or no progress in the ten years of its existence and became the villain; the reason for the lack of advancement for Africans in the region instead of the hero it had been intended to be. Indeed, perhaps Federation became the victim of its own ambition; as Horne suggests 'had the Federation blossomed, it would have been a brilliant example of racial harmony, but - in retrospect - Macmillan saw its three components as so different in character that it would have been "like trying to unite under a single system East and West Germany."'\textsuperscript{25} For Noer, 'the Central African Federation was never successful. The agreement called for a common defence and economic policies, but it reserved 'local affairs' to each nation. To whites in Southern Rhodesia, this condoned racist policies. The whites intensified racial segregation, banned African labor and political organisations, and enlarged heir police and army reserves. By 1960 England conceded that the Federation was a failure and moved to dissolve it.'\textsuperscript{26}

**Welensky's 'Betrayal'**

For Welensky, the end of the Federation was the culmination of his betrayal of the British government and the abandonment of the white man in Africa. As he states in a letter to Stewart; 'I have never understood why I could not have been told four years ago, that the British Government had changed its mind. This remarkable discovery by [RAB] Butler that the Africans in Nyasaland didn’t want Federation and that a similar situation applied in Southern Rhodesia struck me as being one of the most cynical things I’ve ever struck in my political life. They just didn’t have the guts to say after Macmillan’s 'Winds of Change' speech that they were liquidating the Commonwealth and, of course, the first job the wreckers had to do was get rid of the colonial empire.'\textsuperscript{27} An argument can be made that Welensky should have seen the changes in policy coming and understood their impact on his position and his administration. However, it is clear that no British Government official ever made their misgivings known to Welensky and that the continuance of public support for the Federation created at the very least a confused situation for the Federal leader.

\textsuperscript{26} Noer, *Cold War in Southern Africa*, p.8.
\textsuperscript{27} MSS Welensky, 618/6, Welensky to Stewart, 9 March 1963.
Although he may have felt that British support was waverling, without any public or private indication that Federation would soon be over, he was given a false sense of security; this only served to make the end of Federation seem like a personal betrayal.\textsuperscript{28}

Welensky also felt that the British government sought to make him the scapegoat for all failures of Federation, even those beyond his control and involvement.\textsuperscript{29} In a speech at a Conservative Backbench meeting in March 1963, Welensky stated that ‘he was blamed by the British for the series of occurrences which were in fact due to territorial not federal action; but he was made the scapegoat for everything.’\textsuperscript{30} While it is true that many of the difficult issues in the Federation were territorial, instances such as the Constitutional reviews in Northern and Southern Rhodesia were gravely affected by Welensky’s involvement despite his lack of jurisdiction in these matters. Welensky’s role and influence had a much farther reach than his official role allowed, and as such, his responsibility for the failures of Federation too reached further than his role seemed to indicate.\textsuperscript{31}

One of the key charges Welensky made during the last months of the Federation and in the aftermath was that the British had chosen to abandon the white man in Africa.\textsuperscript{32} As Welensky explains in a letter to Don Wilese, Senator for Western Australia, ‘the tragedy, of course, is that in fact they have now made it very clear to us that we whites, on this Continent at least, are expendable. The idea of a multiracial society has been wiped out. I wouldn’t feel so bad if this came as a result of the actions of either the whites or black extremists, but it has come, Don, as a result of the actions of the one government that was committed to supporting the Federation, the British Government.’\textsuperscript{33} In these terms, abandonment was allowing the African majority to rule, instead of the white minority. Although new majority governments were in danger of alienating the white settler population, neither of the African nationalist governments in Nyasaland or Northern Rhodesia had any policy plans that involved

\textsuperscript{28}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{29} MSS Welensky 683/5 Welensky to Wilese, 2 July 1959.
\textsuperscript{30} Macmillan, \textit{At the End of the Day}, p.328.
\textsuperscript{31} Franklin, \textit{Unholy Wedlock}, p.107.
\textsuperscript{32} MSS Welensky 683/5, Welensky to Wilese, May 6 1963; MSS Welensky 587/6 Welensky to Eden, 18 April 1963; Papers of the President National Security Files Countries Ref Box 123B, Visit of Sir Roy Welensky, Talking Paper, 20 October 1963.
\textsuperscript{33} MSS Welensky 683/5, \textit{Ibid.}
removal of white settlers in any way. In fact, the idea that black dominated nations would discriminate against whites was disputed in study by the Americans on newly independent African nations. It found that except in two cases where 'constitutions militate against a white man becoming a citizen, no discrimination against whites has been found, if by discrimination is meant arbitrary and unequal treatment between citizens which is injurious.'

Welensky’s charge also extended beyond Africa; he also felt that the white man had been abandoned within the Commonwealth in favour of the new Afro-Asian nations. In a letter to Bennett, Welensky laments 'how tragic it is that the United Kingdom should be sacrificing her image and stature among the old Commonwealth members...for the sake of currying favour with a mass of tuppeny ha'penny nations.'

The growing number of independent African and Asian nations in the Commonwealth had created a shift in the balance of power. This was also felt in the UN and the pressures these countries placed on the British, particularly over issues such as the decolonisation of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa meant that there was a feeling that Afro-Asian nations were creating trouble. However, the basic fact is that Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and colonial issues were already vital issues for the British Government; this pressure did not create the focus, it merely added to it.#

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35 MSS Welensky 590/3, Bennett to Welensky, 16 December 1963.
Nyasaland

Nyasaland's transition from white to black African rule was relatively easy and uneventful. Mennen Williams' assessment of the situation was that 'Dr Banda still seems to have things pretty well under control in Nyasaland. He is delighted that his old enemy the Federation is about to break up and he is looking forward to independence.' Most importantly, he notes that there is 'no question Banda's heart lies with Britain and especially US.'\textsuperscript{36} Department of State Executive Secretary William Brubeck concurs on this issue, noting that 'partly as a result of our operations and partly as a result of the influence of Dr Banda, the United States enjoys a favourable representation in Nyasaland.'\textsuperscript{37} Banda himself was able to show publicly his allegiance to the West in a speech in the Legislative Council in 1962 in which he stated that 'Anyone who does not want the Americans here would do well to pack up and go. We welcome American support. We are grateful to the US, especially President Kennedy, for talking on active and personal interest in Nyasaland.'\textsuperscript{38} Even the American Consul were confident and full of praise for Banda, his regime and his relations with the US, stating that 'Dr Banda continues to make it a joy for Americans to serve in Nyasaland.'\textsuperscript{39}

However, despite this apparent support and faith in Banda and his command, there was an awareness of the possibility that Banda's key strength in Africa was not who he was, what he believed or what he could achieve, but apprehension about who would replace him. Leading African figures, Kanyama Chiume and Masuoko Chipembere were feared due to their 'intolerance for non-Africans and have made some rash statements in the past which they have been at pains to modify in recent months. Whether this new mild look will survive independence is unknown.'\textsuperscript{40}

Although this opinion comes from an article in the London \textit{Times}, its inclusion in State

\textsuperscript{36} Records of G. Mennen Williams 1961-66, Williams Trips Files 1962- February 1963, Box 24, Williams to Secretary of State, 20 February 1963.
\textsuperscript{37} Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 3, Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy from William H. Brubeck, Constitutional Advance in Nyasaland, 26 January 1963.
\textsuperscript{38} Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 3, Memo for McGeorge Bundy, Proposed Visit to the United States by Prime Minister H.K. Banda of Nyasaland, 23 August 1963 attached Biographic Sketch of Hasting Kamuzu Banda.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
Department files seems to indicate that there was at least an awareness of this issue, even if this was not regarded as being reflective of the situation as seen by American public officials.

However, the real fear for the Americans was possibly the link between Banda and subversive communist influences. The Times article claims that 'the question of who is pulling the strings, however, is one of the chief conversational topics among whites and some blacks in Nyasaland; and there is intense disagreement. Nobody, though, seems to disagree about which way the strings are being pulled. Dr Banda has often proclaimed his admiration for Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah, and he seems to be imitating many of the practical details of the Ghana leader's administration.'  

Although there seems to be no evidence of communist infiltration in Nyasaland, this was always a concern for the Americans and any threat or possible point of entry needed to be acknowledged. In fact, Banda’s apparent respect for America, especially President Kennedy and Mennen Williams, seems to indicate a strong affinity with the US, and thus the West especially as Banda professed to have a strong relationship with Macleod in the UK.  

Nyasaland therefore made the move from Federal territory to independent nation relatively easily. The economic issues Nyasaland faced were immense and there is no question that the Federation would have created a better economic future for Nyasaland if it had continued. However, the political damage that the Federation had caused and would continue to cause for any African leader in the area, on balance, far outweighed any financial gain. Psychologically too, the break away from Federation was an important step for black Africans along the path to true independence; Nyasaland’s future would be led by, and therefore would either succeed or fail while in the hands of, the African majority.

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41 Ibid.
Northern Rhodesia

A similar picture can be seen in Northern Rhodesia, despite the fact that this territory had a greater significance to the Federation. The main reason for this was, according to American officials, the strength of leadership in the African nationalist party, particularly its head, Kenneth Kaunda. Williams, in a letter to the Secretary of State, praised Kaunda's 'excellent character and intelligence. Sir Ronald [Sir Ronald Prain, Rhodesian Selection Trust] regards as one of the best African leaders and essentially moderate. Stands high with African leaders, especially in PAFMECSA [Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central, and South Africa] and feels corresponding responsibility to them religious and serious. Has not yet complete mastery of his own party and some troubles particularly with youth group who are more activist.'

In a letter to Williams, the Consul General of Northern Rhodesia Robert C. Foulon explained his observations of both Kaunda and Northern Rhodesia were extremely positive, despite early misgivings. Foulon states that 'before arriving and during my early days here I felt that all I had heard was too good to be true and that there was something missing in this analysis.' However, he asserts 'I am tremendously impressed with the quality of its top leadership and especially the high motives and leadership of Kenneth Kaunda. Comparing Kaunda alone or the party's top leadership as a group, the quality here exceeds anything in my past African experience.' Nonetheless, he is also quick to note that:

'There are, as Kaunda himself has discussed with me, the UNIP's [the United National Independence Party] strongest emotions existing at lower echelons of the party. These are the natural negative emotions which one could expect of Africans living in a country of white (read Western) privilege and considerable exploitation. It is a great credit to Kaunda's leadership that he has been able to channel the reluctant aspirations into such constructive paths but we must recognize, as Kaunda does, that his supporters must see his methods barng the fruit of political, economic and

43 Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 155A, Williams to Secretary of State, Report Northern/Southern Rhodesia, 20 February 1963.
social progress or some mighty unpleasant elements could take control of the party.\textsuperscript{45}

While Kaunda was considered friendly to the US and the West, he did not have the same affection for America as seen in Nyasaland. As Foulon warned Fredericks: 'Although we can look forward to the best of relations with Zambia and its prospective leader, I am somewhat concerned that this prospect may lead us to overplay the American presence too soon. As you know, Kaunda and some of his lieutenants are under some fire regarding their close association with things American. While I am sure he will let us know when anything we do tends to embarrass him and hurt his chances, we must be constantly aware of the delicate nature of this transitional and formative period in Northern Rhodesia and also of how closely our activities are observed by the British civil servant element and Kaunda’s potential African opposition.'\textsuperscript{46}

Northern Rhodesia presented very few problems for either Britain or America during the end of Federation. However, unlike Nyasaland, the issues that could come from independence were mainly political not economic. While the leadership were friendly with the West, they were not as openly supportive as Banda and so the threat of communist subversion or at least inadvertently pushing it towards forming bigger and stronger links with the Soviet bloc was a very real threat. Although the area was not as vulnerable to a Soviet economic link, the ill feeling among black Africans for the white settlers was in danger of becoming a difficulty if the situation was not handled carefully.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
Southern Rhodesia

Unquestionably, the most difficult issue that arose from the end of Federation was the future of Southern Rhodesia. This problem would plague the British government and their American allies until the early 1980s, and arguably to the present day. The issue of independence for Southern Rhodesia was annexed from the ending of Federation by the British Government, who made it clear that discussions on this issue would take place after Federation was dissolved.\(^4^7\) However, the matter still loomed large within the State Department and other annuls of the American government mainly due to the belief that Britain had no clear policy in regards to the handling of Southern Rhodesia or its future.\(^4^8\)

The African nationalist leadership in Southern Rhodesia was not as unified, effective or well led as those in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. Williams assessment was that 'Nkomo is today the obvious leader but wide recognition that his leadership largely symbolic and inadequate. Successor not on horizon but Nkomo could well be replaced. Not highly regarded by fellow African leaders either as ability or courage. Personally I am not duly impressed by his competence. Seems lacking in skills and energy.'\(^4^9\) This was a particular issue because of the heightened issues in play in Southern Rhodesia. The situation was far more complicated in this region than any other in Central Africa; the problem of segregation and lack of African advancement required a strong and united African nationalist movement to fight against it.\(^5^0\) The election of Winston Field of the Rhodesian Front in 1962 was indicative of the fear within the white electorate.\(^5^1\) The Whitehead government, although unpopular with African nationalists, had made some moves towards African advancement. His failure to gain re-election was due, in part, to the perception of white settlers, that these

\(^4^7\) Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Box 171, Stevenson to Secretary of State, 12 April 1963.
\(^4^8\) Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 3, Williams to Secretary of State, Talks with UK officials, parts one and two, 12 March 1963.
\(^4^9\) Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 155A, Williams to Secretary of State, 20 February 1963.
\(^5^0\) RG 59, Records Relating to Rhodesia and Nyasaland Box 1, Roger Hilsman to the Secretary of State, White Southern Rhodesia? White Redoubt or biracial African State, 2 November 1962; Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 155A Williams to Secretary of State, one of two, 20 February 1963.
\(^5^1\) Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 3, Rostow to Planning Group Members, Attached Paper, Problems of Southern Africa, 3 March 1963.
advancements were not in the best interests of Southern Rhodesia and could increase to a level that was not acceptable.\textsuperscript{52}

Field, in a speech at a Conservative Backbench meeting, 21 March 1963, stated that 'he had always suspected Federation would prove unworkable, but had nevertheless tried to make it work. Now that it was obviously going to be abandoned by the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesia would seek methods of co-operation with other territories, but would insist on independence.\textsuperscript{53} The issue of independence for Southern Rhodesia was highly controversial as it was not simply a case of allowing the majority to take over the nation but was instead the legitimisation of a white domination.

Whitehead’s loss was also a key element in the failure of Federation; while the issue of secession in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia caused problems, the perceived lack of support from Southern Rhodesian whites for Federation that came with Whitehead’s election loss was damning.\textsuperscript{54} As Welensky notes, Whitehead’s electoral loss was 'at once interpreted as the prelude to the complete break-up of the Federation, it made my position just that much more difficult.\textsuperscript{55} Federation now seemed have no support among the strongest political forces in Central Africa, both black and white. On the issue of Federation ending, there was a surprising agreement between the African nationalists of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the white supremacists of Southern Rhodesia as they found themselves with a mutual aim.

The main fear for the British and American governments regarding Southern Rhodesian independence was the danger of some form of alliance between Southern Rhodesia and the Union South Africa.\textsuperscript{56} Both nations shared a similar belief in the need for political subjugation of Africans and segregation policies. In a letter to Lord Salisbury, Welensky noted that 'as far as I am concerned…I have crossed the Rubicon. I feel now that we've got to look to South Africa and to the Portuguese states as our

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 3, Rostow to Planning Group Members, Attached Paper, Problems of Southern Africa, 3 March 1963.
\textsuperscript{55} Welensky, 4000 Days, p.354.
\textsuperscript{56} Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 155A, Brubeck Memo for McGeorge Bundy, enclosed Situation Report on Southern Rhodesia, 16 April 1963; Butler, 'Demise of the Central African Federation', p.136.
friends. It doesn’t seem as if we can look anywhere else. However Williams was far more realistic in his appraisal of the situation stating that the ‘most costly result break-up federation would be isolation Southern Rhodesia which would associate with South Africa. Welensky's continued believe apartheid wrong. 'We have tried to implement partnership.' Federation has been strongest force operating in Southern Rhodesia for multiracialism and presence Africans in Southern Rhodesian Legislature is result multiracial Federation Parliament. Chester Bowles also stated that it was 'generally agreed that regardless of what else may happen there is little likelihood of Southern Rhodesia joining Union of South Africa.'

However, the fear that Southern Rhodesia would push for independence after Federation ended was a very real threat. There was a fear that Britain would feel compelled to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia despite their racial issues, or that Southern Rhodesia would declare their independence without consent, if they did not achieve it through the proper channels. In a letter left at the American Embassy, Reverend Sithole shared his fears that:

'The United Kingdom Government intends granting independence to Southern Rhodesia under white settler minority rule. Mr Richard Butler, the British Minister responsible for Central Africa, was pressed to give an assurance that he would not grant independence to Southern Rhodesia before there was established in the country a fully representative government based on free majority elections, but he has declined to give that necessary assurance. His non-committal attitude and the rumours coming from the inner circles of the United Kingdom Government leave us in no doubt that Mr Richard Butler intends granting independence to Southern Rhodesia before the majority have to vote."

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59 Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 155A, Bowles to Secretary of State, For President, Secretary of State, Ball, McGhee, Johnson and Williams, 11 October 1962.
61 Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 155A, Secretary of State from London Embassy, Verbatim Text, Letter from Reverend Sithole to President Kennedy, 11 December 1962.
The reaction of the American Embassy was that 'during recent US-UK talks on Africa, Ambassador Matthews reiterated impression UK would feel free to exercise influence after Southern Rhodesian RPT [repeat] after Southern Rhodesian elections, but got neither direct response nor RPT nor dissent. Central Africa Office Representative did however express hope that after elections Whitehead would act to widen franchise. No RPT no information available which would indicate HMG thinking along lines posited by Sithole.' However, Francis Plimpton, part of America’s delegation at the United Nations stated that 'UK representatives here, while implying UK will use withholding of Independence as a weapon, have not ever given us any direct statement regarding UK policy. Indeed in private they even speculate UK does not in fact have clear policy, certainly none on which they are informed.'

This belief that the British did not in fact have a policy to deal with Southern Rhodesia is repeated by Williams in a letter to the Secretary of State, in which he notes that, 'admittedly, Butler playing cards very close to chest, but he appears tired, perplexed, and if not worried at least greatly concerned and without clear course of action.' However, Adlai Stevenson, US Ambassador to the UN, asserted that, in a conversation with Iain Macleod, at that point the leader of the House of Commons and Chairman of the Conservative party, he was 'assured government would break up the Federation but not grant Southern Rhodesia independence. Doubted African population would risk uprising in view of strong army, air force, and police. Will exert influence to dissuade extremists and progressively meet reasonable African demands.'

In a meeting with Williams, 'Sithole said that the impatience of the people of Southern Rhodesia is mounting rapidly and they see nothing but violence left as a means of achieving their aims of majority rule.' Williams however, assured Sithole that the US was interested in the issues of Southern Rhodesia and that the 'US was

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62 Ibid.
63 Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 155A, Plimpton to Secretary of State, 3 April 1963.
64 Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 3, Williams to Secretary of State, 12 March 1963.
65 Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Box 171, Stevenson to Secretary of State, 12 April 1963.
66 Records of G. Mennen Williams, Williams Classified Records, 1961-1966, Box 2, Call of Edabaningi Sithole to Governor Williams, 16 April 1963.
trying to be helpful as possible in ways that would not always be apparent to ZAPU and subject to many practical limitations upon our scope for activity. ZAPU would perhaps not always agree with the way in which the US went about playing its role, but it should rest assured that our motives were always clear.¹

Mansergh asserts that:

'This explains the lack of direction in Whitehall when...the Federation was dissolved. In Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, as already in Kenya, the privileges and the power of the colonists were ended: African majority rule was established. But in Southern Rhodesia there was no such assurance about the next step. The colonists, whose privileged minority position the British now deemed politically expended, were more numerous, and prepared to be recalcitrant. For Britain without a clear aim and for a multiracial Commonwealth, their resistance to the winds of change was for fifteen long years to present issues, touching on sensitive racial chords.'²³

Brubeck’s assessment of the situation was that:

'The British share essentially the same objectives as the United States in Southern Rhodesia. From a narrow national interest point of view, they would probably prefer to get out as quickly as possible. However, as is the case of other dependent territories, they are showing a marked sense of responsibility and making persistent endeavours to work out pragmatically arrangements acceptable to the various elements concerned...HMG is fully aware of the explosiveness and the intricacies of the Rhodesian situation. It is aware also, through representations made at all levels, of US nervousness over the problem and our views as to how it should be handled. We have recognised that this essentially a British problem and sought to extend what assistance we could in the UN. Loss of British Control of the situation, could, of course, entail wide repercussions on our policy objectives in African as a whole.'²⁴

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¹ Mansergh asserts that:
³ Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 155A, Memo for McGeorge Bundy from William Brubeck, Situation Report on Southern Rhodesia, 6 April 1963.
The unusual element of the situation in Southern Rhodesia was that it was the white settler population that caused the main issue for both the British and the Americans. As Horne notes, 'Africans are not the problems in Africa; it is the Europeans.' The movement towards at least a greater African involvement, if not full African control of African nations became to be seen as an abandonment of whites in Africa. As Noer asserts, 'whites in South Africa, Rhodesia and other European colonies charged that Williams had called for the end of their presence on the continent.' However, Noer goes on to argue that America needed an Africa first policy as 'colonialism was dead and the white enclaves of South Africa, Angola and Rhodesia were doomed. Washington needed to stop its temporizing and deference to Europeans and white South Africans and align itself with the aspirations of black Africa.'

**America**

The end of Federation was not something that the Americans could have prevented, nor was it something that they could be actively involved in. However, their influence was felt across Central Africa as well as within the British Government as they had a lot invested in the successful transition of the area and the peaceful resolution of the issues of Southern Rhodesia. As Noer suggests, 'some whites even suggested that Great Britain's rejection of Rhodesia's independence was the result of American pressure.' The real issue, according to the Conservative Overseas Bureau was that 'relations between the Federal Government and the United States are deteriorating, and though Southern Rhodesian Government at present have no direct dealings with the United States, they will inherit an unhappy relationship should they become independent.'

For Walt Rostow, Special Assistant to the President, American strategy for the area was clear and 'should be to encourage racial accommodation in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and Portuguese Africa, leaving the hard core of South

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70 Horne, *Macmillian*, p.188.
71 Noer, *Soapy*, p.239.
Africa for later attention. To this end, we shall have to work closely with the UK, Old Commonwealth and Western European governments, and keep the African governments of the northern three quarters of the continent currently informed of our objectives and major moves.\textsuperscript{75} Rostow saw the 'probable development' of increased hostility in Southern Africa between blacks and whites as an embarrassment to 'the West throughout the Afro-Asian world and could compromise the global US strategy of fostering a cooperative community of free nations across the North South lines of race and wealth. This in turn would enhance Sino-Soviet opportunities in Africa.\textsuperscript{76}

The basic American policy in 1962 was 'the transfer of political power to the Africans under conditions that will foster the development of non-racial societies and responsible governments that respect the principles of the UN Charter. The United States must co-ordinate its policy with the United Kingdom, whose objectives are broadly similar, and recognize its paramount responsibility for reaching an orderly solution to the problems of Federation and the component territories. The good will enjoyed by the United States among the African of the Federation may be very useful in bringing about orderly change.\textsuperscript{77} There was a real awareness of the importance of the British in the achievement of American aims in Central Africa, as seen in a letter from Williams to Butler in which he states that 'the responsibilities of the United Kingdom in Central Africa are indeed crucial. It was most helpful to me to have had this opportunity to hear your ideas about this complicated and important area, and I know the urgency and concern with which you are working in seeking a viable solution.\textsuperscript{78}

For Welensky and his followers, the American influence on Britain was extremely detrimental to the future of Federation. In a letter from a friend in New York Welensky is told that 'attitudes in this country, as a result of masses of misinformation and the continuous brain washing by both the press and the administration are so deplorable - racialism of the most vicious kind reigns supreme - only in reverse.'\textsuperscript{79} This

\textsuperscript{75} Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 3, Problems of Southern Africa 25 March 1963 attached to W. Rostow to Planning group members, Planning Group Meeting Tuesday 23 April 1963, 17 April 1963.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} DO 183/462, Message to Butler from Williams, 18 March 1963.
\textsuperscript{79} MSS Welensky 602/1, From Barbara E Barb to Welensky, 22 October 1962.
idea that American officials were perpetuating a negative image of Central Africa for its own means was one that found support in the Federal Government. Welensky believed that American influences were at play within the British Government and had helped to cause the move towards ending Federation. As he states in a letter to Wilese:

'Believe me, the destruction of this Federation after nearly ten years of its existence was not an act done on the spur of the moment, or out of fear of the African nationalists. It was a deliberate act of policy. Many people here believe it is as a result of American influences. Whether this is right or wrong I don’t know, but there are no two ways about it, the Americans are doing their best to replace—or should I say fill the vacuum-created by the exodus of the British from the various parts of this continent.'80

In an expression of a similar sentiment, Welensky wrote to Joelson that ‘the “Evening Standard” here carried the “Daily Express” cartoon, which you will no doubt remember. It was the one with Macmillan in an American uniform on the bridge of a ship stranded on the rocks. Most people felt that that really explained the situation.’81

In an appraisal of his visit to the United States Welensky told his friend Sarah Millian that:

'Kennedy is a presentable man and I spent some thirty minutes with him. He gave me all the openings I wanted to present my side of the story, but what impact I had on him I just could not assess. I also saw Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, who I took a liking to, and who struck me as being quite a warm fellow with a considerable understanding of the difficulties. He kept on talking about the need for time but, as I pointed out to him, there is no time now. We are in such a mess that decisions have got to be made and they cannot be delayed. You will realise, of course, that what I was trying to do was alert those Americans who still have some hope that democracy can survive to the dangers that were taking place.'82

80 MSS Welensky, 638/5, From Welensky to Willese, 6 May 1963.
81 MSS Welensky, 629/1, Welensky to Joelson, 27 July 1962.
82 MSS Welensky, 647/6, Welensky to Sarah Millan, 15 October 1963.
However, Welensky was critical of the American policy in Africa, as he explained in a letter to his cousin Sam Wilinsky; 'America's outlook in regard to this part of the world is so prejudiced by its anti-colonial approach that it is doing many wrong things here. I am all for throwing dirty water away when you have clean. I am just as anti-colonial as any American is, but I am damned if I am going to put the clock back to a stage where we have events such as have happened in the Congo, and I think will happen in Ruanda Urundi as well.'\(^{83}\) He goes on to emphasise this stance in a later letter, again to Wilinsky in which he states that 'I find it difficult to be reasonable about American policy in Africa. They go on supporting people like Nkrumah, Kawawa and others here who not only take everything the Americans give, but kick them in the teeth as thanks for it. Where I think American policy is so basically wrong is the belief that you can confer on any one civilization, development or anything else that matters in this world.'\(^{84}\)

Welensky was also critical of the Anglo-American relationship and its effect on the status of Britain. In a letter to Millan, he comments that 'looking at the wider scene for the moment...I must admit that I, as a man who has believed in the mission the United Kingdom once had, in relation to the Commonwealth, become increasingly disturbed by the lowering of Britain's prestige. The Americans are determined, of course, to reduce her to a fourth class power, but what I can't understand is why Macmillan collaborates with this attitude.'\(^{85}\)

In papers made in preparation for Welensky's visit to the United States in the dying months of the Federation, Brubeck made the following assessment of Welensky: '[he] has said some extreme things and been the object of much criticism in his all-out fight for the Federation over the past ten years. He remains, however, potentially the most effective leader in persuading the whites to accept the necessity for gradual concessions; his problem will be primarily one of how, and how fast to move...In summary, he might be a very useful person with whom to establish good communication.'\(^{86}\) There was also an awareness of one of Welensky's main aims would

\(^{83}\) MSS Welensky, 684/4, Welensky to Willinsky, 3 July 1962.
\(^{84}\) Ibid, Welensky TO Willinsky, 16 October 1962.
\(^{85}\) MSS Welensky, 647/5, Welensky to Millan, 7 January 1963.
\(^{86}\) Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 155A, Memorandum for the President, William Brubeck, Meeting with Sir Roy Welensky, 7 October 1963.
be a, 'reversal of what he believes to be one of the cornerstones of US policy in Africa; the expendability of the white man', as well as the belief that 'he and the Rhodesian whites are blameless for the failure of federation and put the blame on everyone else.'

The paper urges that the US make the point that, 'the failure of the Federation as an experiment in multiracialism has been a source of great regret in the US, which, as Sir Roy knows, was among its earliest champions' and that 'It should be impressed upon Sir Roy that during the life of the Federation no public statement critical of it was ever made by a representative of the US Government.'

What is clear from Welensky's reaction to perceived American influence is that he was unwilling to shoulder any of the blame for the end of Federation. Although his claims of betrayal do have some substance, they do not absolve him of any responsibility for the Federation's failure. Welensky's attitudes towards the racial issues in America seem indicative of his own racial beliefs that run contrary to the multiracial model he was charged with creating. Welensky's lack of understanding and empathy for the issues facing black Africans were the real issues; had African engagement been properly sought, fought for and secured by Welensky's Federal Government than the idea of a 'plot' by the British or the Americans to unload the colonies and 'abandon the white man' would have been more believable. As it was, the Federation ended because it failed to execute the multiracial plan.

The end of Federation was an inevitability by 1963; the multiracial experiment had failed due to the combination of a great number of factors that were not adequately challenged by on a Federal or Territorial level. Although the British and the Americans foresaw the end of Federation awareness of the difficulties that the demise of Federation would create, particularly in Southern Rhodesia made it clear that Federation had to come to a natural end, rather than as an act of policy. While the United States were aware of the difficulties that Britain faced in Central Africa, there was also an awareness that over involvement in the area could be destructive and as long as British policies were, in the main, in line with their own, no extra influence would be necessary or constructive. There was, therefore, an awareness that the role

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87 Papers of President Kennedy, President's Office Files, Countries Reference Box 123B, Visit of Sir Roy Welensky Talking Paper, 2 October 1963.
88 Ibid.
of the Americans in this scenario was, in essence, to play the role junior partner. However, although Britain was the controlling power in dealings with Central Africa, an awareness of how Anglo-American relations could be effected was never far from the minds of British officials. The issues that arose from the end of Federation continued to blight both the British and the Americans for decades after, however, the end of Federation was, in spite of the various problems that arose, relatively smooth.
Conclusion

Decolonisation was, for the British, part of a larger issue of power status, decline, and waning influence. The prospect of the end of Empire, although a moral and economic necessity, left the British bruised and a little battered in terms of political significance.\(^1\) The new world order created by the superpowers had left Britain with a lesser status than it had historically been accustomed to. The Anglo-American special relationship either sped this process up or helped Britain to carve a new and unique standing on the political stage depending on the interpretation. The relative decline of British status and the existence of a strong relationship between America and Britain are rarely denied. What is questioned is the validity of the idea that this relationship helped Britain and that Britain was respected and encouraged by the Americans.

Nigel Ashton asserts that 'Macmillan held office at what was very much a transitional period in terms of Britain's international position as a whole, and more specifically in terms of the Special Relationship. Since transitions are far more difficult to manage than the mere maintenance of a well-charted course we should perhaps adopt an appropriately less stringent standard in judging his handling of the Special Relationship.'\(^2\) This transitional idea can be extrapolated to include all of Africa, as well as Europe, in the latter end of the 1950s and 1960s. While Kennedy's New Frontier ideology captured the mood of America in 1960 it also spoke to a much wider audience, far removed from the shores of the United States. Britain and Africa faced their own frontiers, their own uncertain and new paths and all of this came together to create a unique period where old alliances were tested and new associations were formed.

It is with in this context that the policy decisions of Britain and America should be judged; while taking steps towards an unfamiliar future is it best to existing strong relations stronger or to risk them to establish new relations? When all other issues are stripped back this was the conundrum that faced both Eisenhower and Kennedy during their time in the White House. America's decision to view Africa with a Eurocentric bias

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\(^1\) James, *Congo Crisis*, p.205; Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled*, p.203; Brendon, *Decline*, p.498.

is more understandable when this idea is taken into consideration. However, while the value of connections with European partners made America’s relationship with Britain important, it was not what made it Special; that is a far more complex matter.

It can be argued that just as the personal connections Kennedy forged with leaders of newly independent African nations made Africans believe they were being taken seriously by America, the personal relationship Macmillan maintained with both American Presidents was similarly superficial.³ This certainly plays to the idea that the special relationship did not in fact exist and was merely an illusion created to distract from Britain’s post war decline. It is certainly true that Kennedy’s ability to talk with African leaders such as Hastings Banda and Kenneth Kaunda in a friendly and open manner, displaying a full appreciation of not only the problems they faced but also knowledge of their nations’ history and an interest in their future.⁴ Similarly, Macmillan was able to enjoy a similar relationship on a personal level with Eisenhower and Kennedy, however, what separated the Anglo-American relationship was the fact that it went beyond this to create a relationship that went beyond the personal and into the political.

The fact that Macmillan was able to foster close relations with two Presidents was remarkable and allowed for the development of the special relationship to continue after its initial revival after Suez. Although a wartime friendship between Eisenhower and Macmillan made rebuilding the relationship easier, it by no means guaranteed its success. However, the recognition by both sides that they not only shared mutual aims but, had a greater chance of succeeding in them by working together made reconstruction not only a desire but a necessity. The relationship was able to continue during Kennedy’s term, creating a bond based on the very difference that should keep them apart - age.⁵

The reality is that it is easy to form strong relations when all involved are united in their aims and both stand to gain from the relationship. This was true of the Anglo-American relationship and Africa; Britain wanted a way out of Africa that avoided

⁴ JFKL, OHT, William Atwood, Oral History Statement, 8 November 1965.
political or economic difficulties and America wanted to see the liberation of Africa without losing ground to the Soviets in what could become a politically sensitive area.  

While Eisenhower and Kennedy had different ideas as to how this could be achieved in general terms, both saw Britain as key to its success. The need for allies in the wider Cold War context, particularly in the realms of military and defence only strengthened the relationship. Britain needed America and America needed Britain; this simple truth is what made the special relationship work.

The question of how successful the relationship was in achieving these aims is a little more complex. What is certain is that in terms of the most basic analysis of the Federation there were both successes and failures. Although not the result that either side hoped for, the break-up of the Federation, had become inevitable perhaps even before Macmillan became Prime Minister. However, the fact that neither the British nor the Americans pushed to dismantle the Federal plan for the area is an interesting demonstration of their shared aims. While both British and America political figures clearly understood that Federation had run its course, with no obvious alternative Federation had to find its own natural conclusion. The Americans did not want to force the British into an action that could expose the area to an increased threat of communist infiltration by creating such a volatile situation when the status quo served them so well. However, this was a short-term solution to a long-term problem; understanding of the issues facing their transatlantic partners and closer cooperation were the only ways to find the answers both sides needed.

The successful transitions of both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to independent African nations under African majority rule are indicative of the positive outcomes of the Federation’s failure. The establishment of positive relations between the leaders of both of these nations with the American government, especially with Kennedy himself and with G. Mennen Williams also show the way in which American

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6 Herter, Christian A Papers, Box 23, 'Will Africa go Communist?' By Stewart Alsop, Bilderberg Meeting Québec, Canada, 21-23 April 1961.
7 Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, p.13.
8 RG59, General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Records relating to Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1956-61, Box 2. Letter, Mr. P. O'Sheel, Bureau of African Affairs and Bureau of Public Affairs, 'Situation in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland ' to Mr Halsema, Office of Policy and Plans, US Information Agency from, 17 November 1960
9 Ibid.
relations with Africa evolved. While a Eurocentric bias existed within the American administration as a whole, the movement away from viewing Africa through its colonial rulers had almost completely taken place. Relations had been fostered and policy began to be tailored through discussion and development between America and specific African nations rather than through their European rulers. Africa as a political issue had yet to fully disengage itself and become truly decolonised; Cold War considerations ensured this. However, the progress that was made in this short timeframe is remarkable.

Unfortunately, the problems of Southern Rhodesia were far too big for the highly optimistic and aspirational multiracial ideal to effectively deal with or counteract. Southern Rhodesia’s inclusion within Federation had been an attempt to help combat racial inequality within the area. However, this was in constant conflict with the fear that too much pressure on the Southern Rhodesian white minority would encourage association with South Africa or a unilateral declaration of independence. Thus, a self-defeating loop was created that eventually led to Federation imploding. While the failures of the Federation and its leaders, particularly Roy Welensky, to actively push the multiracial model beyond a concept and into a reality played their part, arguably the battle was already lost. White settler fear of British abandonment and black rule was far too strong to break, particularly in an area with the level of self-governing autonomy that Southern Rhodesia possessed.

What the handling of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland reveals about the Anglo-American relationship during the Macmillan era is that it was able to work without a crisis or imminent threat pushing it. The 1960s in particular were full of crises; from Berlin to Cuba to Skybolt. While all of these give an insight into how the UK and America worked or consulted a time of great pressure, decolonisation showed how the two nations could work together without the urgency of crisis. The

11 Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans, p.4, p.9; Dickson, Sub-Saharan Africa, p3.
12 James, Britain and the Congo Crisis 1960-63, p.33, Dickson, ‘US Foreign Policy’, p.303.
relationship worked in this respect by close communication, clear understanding, and empathy for the issues facing each nation and an appreciation of the right time to place pressure and the right time to accept the realities of the situation. This was not a battle to gain what they could from the other side, this was a recognition that both were invested in the outcome and understanding the larger context enough to avoid conflict.

The communication between the United States and the British over Africa, which itself stemmed from close relations established between the Prime Minister and the Presidents, created this level of understanding. While differences of opinion did occur, they were not allowed to damage the relationship. This may be due, in part, to the fact that the issue was so complicated that America could offer no other solution, nor did it wish to take on the issue itself, and so were happy to allow the British to take the lead, offering only guidance on what the result should be. However, it is also because the special relationship had reached a peak; the British and the Americans were so attuned that they were able to work together in a way that would not be repeated until the Thatcher and Reagan years.
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