IMMIGRATION AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN MINORITY NATIONS.

A longitudinal comparison of Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties in the Basque Country, Corsica, South Tyrol, Scotland and Wales.

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by

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Abstract

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This PhD thesis evaluates the nexus between Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties’ (SNRPs) constructions of minority nations’ identity and immigration. A longitudinal comparison (1992 – 2012) of the Basque Country, Corsica, South Tyrol, Scotland and Wales first explores the impact immigration has on the parties’ construction of the minority nations’ identity. Secondly, I examine if and under which conditions SNRPs consider migrants and migration-generated diversity to constitute an integral part of the minority nations.

The dissertation relies on a qualitative analysis of SNRPs’ discourses on immigration, their construction of the migrant as ‘wanted’ or ‘unwanted,’ and their discourse and policies on migrant-integration.

Finally, the thesis offers an innovative explanation of the diverse approaches to immigration and the construction of the nation confronted with immigration by SNRPs in the selected minority nations. I argue that, on the one hand, robust political-institutional relations between the state and the minority nation and, on the other, robust and conflict-free societal relations between the community claiming to belong to the minority nation and the state majority living within the minority nation have a significant impact on the SNRPs’ approach to immigration.

Societal cleavages, which divide the receiving society in the minority nations are shown to impact the SNRPs’ framing of the minority nation’s identity. Parties instrumentalize the discourse on immigration to differentiate themselves as far as possible from their national governments’ approach to immigration and hence to strengthen their strategic interests for the territory, which usually overlap with demands for further devolution or secession. Thus, most SNRPs develop a particular form of instrumental nationalism which facilitates the construction of an identity based on civic and territorial markers. Such a framing of the minority nation’s identity allows the inclusion of migration-generated diversity, either through multicultural recognition or assimilation, but is constructed against the traditional ‘significant other’, namely the central state.
Acknowledgements

A friend at the rowing club in Florence once compared writing a dissertation to rowing on the Arno. At times, when you are with a friend on a double, every move is smooth and the boat glides through the fresh and sunny mornings. Other times, when in an eight, you need to both execute commands and follow the pace of others; The boat only glides smoothly in the right direction if you all row together. And then there are times when you are rowing alone: every movement hurts; you can’t see where you’re going; and you need to pay attention not to crash or get stuck in the mud. But you continue rowing; one move follows the other; and you find balance and a rhythm. And suddenly the moment comes when the boat glides; you feel the speed in your hair; and everything goes in the right direction. Looking back, the rowing analogy definitely proved to be true. Thanks to everyone who rowed alongside me.

First and foremost, thank you to my first supervisor Prof. Laura Morales Diez de Ulzurrun and Prof. Rob Ford. Laura for your expertise, encouragement, patience and guidance you offered throughout this thesis. I have learned so much from you in terms of analytical thinking, enthusiasm, dedication, and also life-work balance. Rob for your insights and supervision, which were invaluable.

None of this would have been possible without the generous support and academic freedom granted to me by the EURAC – Institute for Minority Rights in Bozen/Bolzano, our director, Prof. Joseph Marko, and our coordinator, Dr. Günther Rautz. Thanks to my colleagues who became friends, and in particular to Alice, Sergiu, Johanna, Alexandra, and Lisa for the continuous support and the innumerable coffee breaks and lunches where we discussed both our academic progress and our fears and doubts in life in general.

This research would not have taken place without Prof. Rainer Bauböck and his support during my visit to the European University Institute, the support of Prof. André Fazi at the University of Corte in Corsica, and Prof. Nicola McEwan at the University of Edinburgh. Data collection in the Basque Country and Wales was immensely facilitated by Matthias Scantamburlo and Craig MacAngus. To Sam Baird I am grateful for the smooth language revision and his enthusiasm.

There are many young scholars in this emerging research field with whom I was able to build a lively and friendly community. Through constant exchange and mutual motivation and help some of you have become real friends! Especially Nuria, you have become much more than just a colleague working on a similar topic.

Last, but by no means least, my family and my husband Patrick. Thank you for keeping me on the path when I strayed, for pushing when I slowed, and for helping me relax when I was close to exhaustion.

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<th>PNV-EAJ</th>
<th>Partido Nacionalista Vasco - Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea</th>
<th>Basque Nationalist Party</th>
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<td>EA</td>
<td>Eusko Alkartasuna</td>
<td>Basque Solidarity</td>
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<td>EE</td>
<td>Euskadiko Ezkerra</td>
<td>The Basque Left</td>
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<td>HB</td>
<td>Herri Batasuna</td>
<td>People’s Unity</td>
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<td>EH</td>
<td>Euskal Herritarrok</td>
<td>We, the Basque Citizens</td>
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<td>B</td>
<td>Batasuna</td>
<td>Unity</td>
<td></td>
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<td>EHAK</td>
<td>Euskal Herrialdeetako Alderdi Komunista</td>
<td>The Communist Party of the Basque Homelands</td>
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<td>ETA</td>
<td>Euskadi Ta Askatasuna</td>
<td>Basque Country and Freedom</td>
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<td>Corsica</td>
<td>CN</td>
<td>Corsica Nazione</td>
<td>Corsica Nation</td>
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<td>CL</td>
<td>Corsica Libera</td>
<td>Free Corsica</td>
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<td>FeC</td>
<td>Femu a Corsica</td>
<td>We make Corsica</td>
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<td>MPA</td>
<td>Muvimentu pà l’Autodeterminazione</td>
<td>Movement for Selfgovernment</td>
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<td>PN</td>
<td>Presenza Nazionale</td>
<td>National Presence</td>
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<td>PNC</td>
<td>Partitu di a Nazione Corsa</td>
<td>The Party of the Corsican Nation</td>
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<td>FLNC</td>
<td>Frontu di Liberazione Naziunale Corsu</td>
<td>National Front for the Liberation of Corsica</td>
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<td>South Tyrol</td>
<td>SVP</td>
<td>Südtiroler Volkspartei</td>
<td>South Tyrolean People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>dF</td>
<td>Die Freiheitlichen</td>
<td>The Liberals</td>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>Südtiroler Freiheit</td>
<td>South Tyrolean Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>BU</td>
<td>Bürgerunion</td>
<td>Union for the citizens</td>
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<tr>
<td>UfS</td>
<td>Union für Südtirol</td>
<td>Union for South Tyrol</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>SNP</td>
<td>Scottish National Party</td>
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<td>Wales</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Plaid Cymru</td>
<td>The Party of Wales</td>
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<td>Other</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>SNRP</td>
<td>Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Party</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

“The Burqini [swimsuit designed in accordance with Quranic admonition for Muslim women] is not a local custom in South Tyrol, and should also not become one, and therefore it needs to be rejected.” (Ulli Mair, Leader of DF – Die Freihetlichen/the libertarians, South Tyrol, 24.07.2015, Tageszeitung/daily Newspaper, p. 4).

“We do not have to make Tyroleans out of immigrants – we should not even make Tyroleans. Everybody keeps his or her cultural particularities, as long as they are in line with the prevailing rules and customs.” (Luis Durnwalder, at the time of the speech president of South Tyrol, SVP – Südtiroler Volkspartei/South Tyrolean People’s Party, 16.12.2008 – Government Declaration)

“And we’re comfortable with the idea of overlapping identities – we know that you can be Scottish and British, Scottish and European, Scottish and Polish or Scottish and Pakistani. Tartan is the distinctive national cloth of Scotland. It’s made up of patterned threads of different colours. I like to think that Scottish identity is like the tartan. There are many colours, many threads, many strands to the Scottish tartan of identity.” (Alex Salmond, former leader of the SNP and First Minister of Scotland at the time of the speech at the college of Europe in Brugge, 28.04.2014)

Who belongs to our territory and our society – and under what conditions? The perception of our collective identity, our territory, and our society is constantly evolving in a dialectic interplay with the outside world. Migration changes the composition of a society and also has therefore an immediate impact on our understanding of identity. Should we assimilate, reject, or include migration-generated diversity into the collective identity of a particular territory?

In this PhD thesis, I evaluate this interplay between discourses on and governance of migration-generated diversity and the reframing of the collective identity in sub-territories characterized by historical, cultural, linguistic, or religious diversity. Scholars also refer to those territories as ‘stateless nations’ or ‘minority nations’ (Keating 1997). Hence the core research question of my PhD thesis states as follows:

- Does international immigration to minority nations impact the political elite’s perception and construction of the collective identity?

The overall research question leads to several sub-questions:
• Is the minority nation’s identity redefined, including the linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity generated by immigration, by blurring the boundary of the minority nation’s identity?
• Or, is the initial boundary of the minority nation’s identity maintained by including the migrants through assimilation?
• Or, is the minority nation’s identity contracted, excluding the newly established diversity?
• Or, does no change take place at all?

As a result of immigration, the ‘old’ diversity of these territories encounters ‘new’ diversity, and “immigrant multiculturalism meets the politics of minority nationalism” (Banting and Soroka 2012, 158). A set of challenges arises: on the one hand, the territories may aim to maintain and further protect their cultural, linguistic, or religious distinctiveness, which also forms the basis of their claims for self-government or nation-building within a larger geographical space, and hence try to forestall further diversity. On the other hand, including newcomers in the sub-state national community, and in particular in the native “mentality of ‘la survivance’” (Kymlicka 2001b, 278) may strengthen the territory’s demography by numerically boosting the population and hence strengthen the negotiating powers of the minority nation vis-à-vis the state.

In this thesis I focus on five minority nations (the Basque Country, Corsica, South Tyrol, Scotland, and Wales) and assess how immigration-generated diversity impacts particular definitions of the collective identity therein. Focusing on the nexus between ‘new’ and ‘old’ diversity, this study reveals in an innovative way the conditions under which identity is (re-)defined in ways that either exclude or include migration-generated diversity. Understanding which conditions facilitate or hinder the development of an inclusive approach towards immigration – one where ‘new’ citizens and their cultural, linguistic, or religious backgrounds can become part of a society’s concept of identity and thus belong to that society and territory – is thus not only important for the minority nations examined in this research. Understanding how to facilitate the development of an inclusive society is of great importance for all contexts which are characterized by ‘old’ diversities and challenged by ‘new’ ones: from the transnational Euroregions to Europe as a whole, as the increasing clash of values and the perception of deprivation and marginalization of citizens with an immigrant
origin and those with a migration background lead to tensions within West European societies.

To explain the wide variety of approaches to migrant integration and to constructions of collective identity in minority regions and stateless nations in Europe, a number of political-institutional, ideological-cultural and socio-economic factors have been proposed: from party ideology (Odmalm 2012, Hepburn 2012), ethnic or civic definitions of nationalism (van der Zwet, 2015), socio-economic factors and regional demographic development (Hepburn 2014), and constraints imposed by the European and supranational context (Keating 1996). Based on the particular complexity arising from the interaction of ‘old’ and ‘new’ diversity in sub-state territories, however, two explanations appear to have a more appreciable causal effect and, thus, merit further attention: first, identity-based explanations such as linguistic barriers or experiences of past oppression (Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero 2014b, Jeram and Adam 2015), and secondly, political-institutional explanations, such as the degree of legislative powers and self-government in managing immigration and integration at the sub-state level (Kymlicka 2001a) as well as the strategic choices and the perceived impact on the political goals (Barker 2015, Arrighi de Casanova 2012a).

The pre-existing claim of each minority nation – the periphery – is the protection and maintenance of its distinctive (linguistic, religious, cultural, or territorial) identity vis-à-vis the state – the centre. The distinctiveness of the territory is maintained against interference from outside, understood here as the state, through claims for self-government, autonomy, or independence. Minority nations also seek to maintain their distinctiveness against intrusion within the sub-state territory from members of the state majority group by establishing strong boundaries between the groups. However, both the claims for self-government as well as the boundaries between groups are never fixed and hence will be open to negotiation and constant redefinition.

Thus, not only our conceptions of identity, but also the political-institutional power distribution between the state and the minority nation and the societal boundaries between minority and state majority populations are continuously reshaped. These processes are constructed and negotiated among a variety of actors. Hence, I take an actor-centred approach and focus on the elite, in particular, on Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties (SNRPs),
as “ethnic identity entrepreneurs” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). SNRPs claim to represent the particular interests of the national minorities and the minority nations and hence play a significant role in renegotiating definitions of identity. Moreover, SNRPs have established themselves as important actors in regional politics in many minority nations. They substantially shape – directly or indirectly, given their position in government or in opposition – regional and local integration policies.

In this dissertation, I argue that in sub-state territories within multi-national states the nature and degree of the centre-periphery relations significantly impact immigrant integration policies and elite discourses. I define the relations based on the responsiveness of the state to the periphery’s claims, the distribution of political-institutional power between the state and the minority nation, the societal boundaries, boundary permeability, and the interactions between the state majority population and the minority population within the minority nation.

Based on a comparison of five minority nations in Europe over a period of twenty years, I argue that the more robust the political-institutional relations (based on a strong autonomy and reflected in a large number of devolved powers for self-government) and the societal relations between the minority and majority populations (based on a high degree of cohesion and interaction), the more likely there is to be an open and inclusive redefinition of the collective identity.

I substantiate the hypothesis that the nature and degree of these relations are situated on a continuum between fragile (conflict prone) and robust (conflict free) relations, using case studies from minority nations in Europe which are characterized by historical linguistic diversity (South Tyrol, the Basque Country, Wales, and Corsica) and by cultural diversity (Scotland). Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties (SNRPs) in all five minority nations express claims for further devolution or are engaged in nation-building projects. Furthermore, the selected minority nations either enjoy a constitutionally granted autonomy status or devolved powers. I show that the higher the level of conflict between the centre and the periphery, or between the state majority population and the minority population within the minority nation, the more sub-state parties instrumentalize immigrant integration to serve their own claims vis-à-vis the centre.
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I empirically verify the hypothesis through a qualitative comparison of party manifestos, parliamentary debates, thematic documents on immigration, integration policies, plans and laws over time. This empirical part of the research shows that conflict-prone relations between the minority nation and the state can not only foster the exclusion of migration-generated diversity from conceptions of collective identity, but can also encourage a preference for instrumental assimilation of migrants into the local collective identity to strengthen the claims for particularity vis-à-vis the state.

The data are analysed through qualitative content analysis (assisted by Atlas.ti.), which allows, on the one hand, for an interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification of codes, themes, or patterns (Hsieh and Shannon 2005), and on the other, for a numerical representation of the results. The data analysis is organized in two complementary steps. I assess first whether immigration and integration are framed as having a negative (identity threat, security threat, economic threat), positive (enrichment, added value, counterbalance), or neutral (inability to control flows, demands for further legislative powers, etc.) impact on the territory. As Korkut et al. (2013, 2) argue, underlying discursive frames affect the politics of immigration and have institutional, legal, and policy implications. The discursive frames also show how boundaries between natives and newcomers evolve. Accordingly, in a second step, I assess how definitions of identity have changed in the discourse on immigration over the last 25 years: is identity constructed as multilingual and multicultural and hence open to new cultures, languages, or religions stemming from migration? Are there proposals to exclude elements of the migrants’ cultures, such as mosques or the headscarf, from what is perceived as ‘who we are’? Are newcomers expected to assimilate into what is constructed as ‘our’ culture and traditions in order to belong to what is defined as ‘our’ identity?

The demographic, socio-economic, and political-institutional diversity of sub-state territories in Europe, as well as the complex and constantly renegotiated nature of the concept of collective identity render it impossible to explore the hypothesis proposed in this research by a single case study of one region. Careful selection of five comparative cases, combined with a longitudinal study of more than twenty years, allow, however, for the acquisition of important insights into whether relations between the sub-state and state level impact the
redefinition of the collective identity once confronted with immigration. Cases were selected both with the aim to combine the well-researched cases of Scotland and the Basque Country with the relatively under-researched ones of South Tyrol, Corsica, and Wales and were based on similarities in relation to immigrant numbers. In all five cases studied, the share of the foreign-born population increased substantially over the last twenty years, and hence immigration has become one of the most debated topics and policy areas. The proportion of the foreign-born population of the five cases is between 6% (in Wales) and 10% (in Corsica) of the total population. However, the countries of origin as well as the migration history and the demographic context vary among the cases. The selected minority nations also differ significantly from each other in relation to the political-institutional power-distribution between the minority nation and the state, hence the degree of autonomy and legislative powers as well as nation-building aspirations, and in relation to the societal boundary between the minority and the majority, hence the boundary between the sub-state population.

At different times and by different actors immigration has been perceived as either a challenge or an opportunity, and newcomers have been constructed as a source of enrichment or necessary labour to counterbalance demographic decline or as ‘social parasites’ and ‘criminals’. The political elites have, therefore, facilitated the emergence of a hierarchy of ‘wanted’, ‘unwanted’ and ‘integrated’ newcomers, thus creating categories of insiders and outsiders, based chiefly on their perceived cultural, social, or economic added value or burden to the given territory.

Confirming the importance of the present research, in all five selected minority nations, immigration is presented by the SNRPs as having an impact on the minority nation’s identity. While immigration in South Tyrol and Corsica is seen as a threat and challenge, in the Basque Country and Scotland, immigration is viewed as an enriching factor that enables the collective identity and the territory to develop and modernize. Finally, in Wales, Plaid Cymru (PC) shifts from presenting immigration as a challenge to Welsh identity to framing it as adding value to the bilingual, multicultural Welsh society.

All five regions share the quest to gain ownership over immigration and inflows from the state. However, the implementation of controls on migration flows demanded would be very different among the minority nations selected, depending on the perceived impact
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immigration has on the territory. South Tyrolean SNRPs propose a restrictive and selective approach towards international immigration. Corsican SNRPs pursue restrictions focussed on internal migrants from elsewhere in France. Welsh, Scottish, and Basque SNRPs want to develop a more welcoming and inclusive approach than the respective state. And the Scottish National Party (SNP) even calls for the resumption of an active attraction of immigrants to Scotland, similar to the one adopted through the Fresh Talent Initiative. Hence, this narrative to gain more legislative powers from the state is used by all SNRPs to show the central state’s lack of responsiveness to the particular regional needs and thus to strengthen their own interests and in particular the claim for further devolution of powers. In both South Tyrol and Wales the relation between newcomers and the domestic minority group is reflected by SNRPs. Being “more than Welsh” (PC, Policy Options 2014) or “more than Ladin” (die Freiheitlichen - dF, Pius Leitner, 6.05.2008) is seen as an important, but equally alarming fact. This shows that the numerical relevance of the relation between the minority population, migrant newcomers, and eventually also the state majority population is a crucial element in the discourse in immigration. SNRPs hence construct newcomers as ‘wanted’ or ‘unwanted’ depending largely on whether they can be ‘used’ to strengthen the claims of the minority nation vis-à-vis the state.

All the SNRPs’ discourses indeed connect immigration and the questions of belonging and defining the identity of the territory. If in the Basque Country past experiences of oppression and assimilation by the Spanish state are echoed in the redefinition of identity by focusing on solidarity and tolerance towards newcomers, in Corsica similar experiences have led to an exclusionary approach towards internal migrants and an opening up of the boundaries towards international migrants. The societal boundaries between the minority and the state majority, which both in Corsica and in the Basque Country are conflict prone, also have a different impact on the discourse on immigration and the construction of identity. And the same can be said about the degree of self-government: Scotland and the Basque Country share nowadays a similar degree of autonomy, but nevertheless Scotland has developed its open and inclusive approach towards immigration and its flexible and multicultural conception of identity in a time where the region did not enjoy any means to legislate on issues important for the region. Corsica does not have great legislative powers to self-govern areas connected to either integration or to the protection of the own interests, but nevertheless
the parties propose an assimilative inclusion of international migrants into the Corsican identity.

In South Tyrol, which has a large degree of legislative powers to shape the integration of migrants as well as to protect the particularities of the region, we find very different dynamics as well. Moreover, past experiences of attempted assimilation do not have the same impact on redefinitions of identity among all SNRPs. All of the parties claiming to represent the German and Ladin populations highlight the particularity of being a minority and the need to protect the particular cultures and languages when defining collective identity in relation to newcomers. Moreover, the mentality of ‘thinking in groups’, which is furthermore supported by the political-institutional framework of the South Tyrolean autonomy, is also often reproduced in the discourse on immigration.

A high degree of self-government and political-institutional powers does not, however, automatically lead to an open and inclusive conception of identity, as I show in this dissertation. Similarly, conflict-prone societal relations and fractures within a society do not automatically lead to an exclusive approach to immigration and to a closed redefinition of collective identity.

Based on the empirical findings of this PhD research I argue that the importance of the political-institutional relations and the power-distribution between the minority nation and the respective state for the SNRPs’ discourse on immigration and framing of the minority nation’s identity is outweighed by the importance of the societal boundaries between the autochthonous communities within a minority nation. I furthermore show that strong societal cleavages do not automatically lead to the exclusion of migration-generated diversity from the redefinition of the minority nation’s identity, but can instead lead to an assimilationist inclusion of the diversity in order to strengthen and boost the SNRPs claims.

With the focus on the two levels of the centre-periphery relations, the political-institutional and the societal relations, I contribute to filling a gap in the research on immigration in minority nations. Scholars (Kymlicka 2001b, Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero 2014b, Zapata-Barrero 2007, Joppke and Seidle 2012, Adam 2013, Arrighi de Casanova 2012a, Rodon and Franco-Guillén 2014, Barker 2015) have already identified a number of factors which
account for the diverse approaches to immigration of SNRPs and regional governments in minority nations. Nevertheless, thus far the connection between explanations for a particular approach to immigration and constructions of the minority nations’ identities has been lacking. The connection between immigration and identity has, however, been confirmed on the national level (Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul 2008) and by Zapata (2014) for minority nations. Hence, this dissertation fills this gap by first of all empirically verifying the nexus between identity constructions and immigration, and secondly by proposing explanations for inclusive, assimilationist or exclusive identity constructions.

Moreover, this dissertation differs from the work of other scholars working on this nexus by bridging and bringing together studies on multilevel and multinational states with research on ethnic conflict and divided societies, boundary making (Wimmer 2008b), and “the significant other” (Triandafyllidou 1998). Theories of boundary making and the significant other have not been applied to minority nations as of yet, but rather have only been discussed at national level. Furthermore, the theories have been developed in light of nation-building, rather than in the context of immigration. Hence, this dissertation also contributes to further advancing these theories of identity construction.

Finally, this dissertation also advances the scholarship in the field of immigration and minority nations methodologically: first, through the development of a framework for a qualitative, but nonetheless relatively ‘large-scale’ analysis with comparisons over a long time period (20 years) across five territories and more than 20 political parties; and secondly, by studying the interplay between integration discourse and policy-making at the sub-state level. The methodological framework developed in this thesis can be extended to the study of new cases and can offer new methodological insights to future cohorts of researchers interested in applying this method to their own research. I furthermore contribute to the research area empirically by studying cases which so far have been under-researched in relation to the immigration-identity nexus (Corsica, South Tyrol, Wales).

**Structure of the dissertation**

The thesis evaluates the nexus between immigration, minority nations, and SNRPs’ constructions of the minority nation’s identity. In addressing this nexus, the thesis is structured around three consecutive parts. The first part includes the introductory chapter,
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outlines the theoretical and methodological frameworks applied (chapters two and three), and contextualizes the selected cases (chapter four). The second part (chapters five to seven) consists of the empirical chapters. Chapters five and six analyse the aspects strictly related to immigration, whereas chapter seven evaluates the impact of immigration and integration on the collective identity at the sub-state level. The third part critically reflects on the relationship between the discourse on immigration and integration, the reconstruction of the collective identity, and the explanatory factors (chapter eight); extracts the main conclusions relevant for further research on minority nations and immigration; and concludes the thesis (chapter nine).

The introductory chapter presents the problem of immigration in minority nations to the reader and outlines why the topic deserves attention. The chapter presents the main research question, namely the impact immigration has on changes of the construction of (minority) collective identity, summarizes the methodology applied, and gives an overview of the subsequent chapters.

Chapter two provides a theoretical framework that links first theories of collective identity, stateless nationalist and regionalist parties, and immigration with the sub-state level, and in particular minority nations. Secondly, the chapter discusses the research question and identifies different expectations in the literature regarding why certain regions have developed an inclusive or exclusionary approach to immigration. At the end of chapter two, specific expectations in relation to the core research questions of this thesis are proposed. These expectations revolve around the relations between the sub-state level and the state, and hence the political-institutional power distribution between the state and the minority nation and the societal boundary within the minority nation. While fragile and conflict-prone relations are expected to lead to a closure of the collective identity for migrants or an instrumentalized inclusion and assimilation of migrants into the collective identity, robust and conflict-free relations are instead expected to lead to a blurring of the collective identity which thus also includes elements stemming from the migration-generated diversity.

Chapter three presents the methodology applied to answer the research questions and introduces the reader to how minority nation’s identity as well as the political-institutional and societal relations between the sub-state level and the state are operationalized. The thesis
applies a qualitative longitudinal and comparative research design and focuses on the perspective of stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs) in the Basque Country (ES), Corsica (F), South Tyrol (I), Scotland (UK), and Wales (UK) over a period of twenty years, from 1992 to 2012. The thesis relies on data derived from party manifestos, parliamentary debates, thematic documents and position papers on immigration and integration, coalition programmes, integration laws and plans, policies on integration, and the composition of the parties. The research applies qualitative content analysis and relies on the Atlas.ti software to assist with a focused and structured comparison.

Chapter four presents the five selected cases in further detail. The chapter focuses in particular on the demographic development and the party politics in the five selected minority nations as well as on the relations between the selected minority nations and the state. The selected minority nations have all experienced significant international immigration over the last twenty years but vary in their political-institutional as well as societal relations with the state.

Chapter five analyses the discourse on immigration and the construction of the category of ‘the migrant’ in the selected territories. This chapter reveals whether SNRPs perceive immigration as a challenge or a threat to their interests, or as a beneficial development. By analysing the discourse on how the category of ‘migrant’ is constructed, the chapter outlines who are the ‘wanted’ migrants, who are perceived as ‘easy’ to integrate, in contrast to the ‘unwanted’ ones, who are perceived as a challenge for integration.

Chapter six compares the integration policies as well as the discourse on integration developed in the five territories over the last twenty years. Due to the general aim of this PhD dissertation, the classification according to various integration models is transposed into the boundary-making language (Wimmer 2008b, Alba 2005), and hence I evaluate how the boundary between newcomers and the receiving society is constructed and whether it changes over time. The analysis of the selected minority nations demonstrates that there are not only differences between the various territories, but that there are also differences over time and within the same case.
Chapter seven shows how the framing of the collective identity has changed in relation to immigration and integration on a sub-state level. I evaluate whether migration-generated diversity is included or excluded in the redefinition of the collective identity, or whether migrants are expected to assimilate into the minority collective identity and in doing so to discard their own cultural, linguistic, and religious particularities in order to belong. The markers of the identity boundary changed towards a multicultural inclusion of migration-generated diversity prior to the period selected in Scotland and are currently undergoing change in Wales. In contrast, in South Tyrol, Corsica, and the Basque Country the markers of the boundary, as constructed by SNRPs, have not changed substantially over the last twenty years. Hence, for migrants to belong, adaptation and assimilation into what is constructed as the minority nation’s identity is required.

Chapter eight reflects on the explanatory relationship between the changes in the framing of collective identity and the relations between the sub-state level and the state. Thus, the chapter evaluates the theoretical framework and situates the findings within the broader body of literature, connecting them also with the other explanatory factors suggested in the literature. Chapter eight therefore reveals explanation patterns of why the boundary of the identity has been contracted, expanded, or blurred in relation to migration-generated diversity.

I argue that within the plethora of factors proposed in the literature to determine the SNRPs’ positions on immigration, for the cases selected for this research, there are three factors, which particularly shape the discourse on immigration and integration as well as the construction of a particular minority nation’s identity. Besides the political-institutional power distribution between the minority nation and the state and the societal boundary within the minority nation, party politics and party ideology substantially impact how immigration is framed, which integration policies are adopted, and how the collective identity is reconstructed.

The final chapter puts the results of the research in a broader framework and identifies the key contributions of this thesis to the state of the art. Moreover, it reflects on what can be learned theoretically from the results of this thesis in relation to the link between immigration, collective identity, and minority nations. The final chapter also discusses possible avenues
for further research in this area, highlighting which important insights can be gained from the arguments of this thesis in relation to cases that have not been included so far and which are characterized by a significant internal cleavage (e.g., Northern Ireland) or particularly conflicting relations with the state (e.g., Catalonia or Flanders).
CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUAL AND EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK

1. Introduction
The relations between immigration and collective identity in five selected minority nations form the core of this thesis. Based on the assumption that, similar to the national level, at the sub-state level “immigration [also] challenges and in some cases reaffirms – notions of group identity, sovereignty, and state control” (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008, 154), the aim of the thesis is twofold. First of all, I assess from the political elite’s point of view whether the construction of the minority nation’s identity changes when confronted with immigration, and if it changes, in which direction:

- Is the minority nation’s identity redefined, including the linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity generated by immigration?
- Or, does no change occur in the definition of the minority nation’s identity and thus immigration-generated diversity and migrants are assimilated into the minority nation’s identity?
- Or, does no change occur in the minority identity except for a contraction of the boundaries of the identity and thus migration-generated diversity and migrants are excluded from belonging to the minority nation?

The second aim is to explain the direction of change in minority nations in light of the relations the periphery has with the state. Thus the question is whether centre-periphery relations influence the direction of identity change. Centre-periphery relations are analysed separately at two levels: the political-institutional relations between the minority nation and the state as expressed through the actual and requested distribution of powers, and the level of societal relations between the minority and the majority population who live within the minority nation, expressed through the boundary between autochthonous communities.

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part connects the most important concepts employed in relation to the core research questions, namely minority nations, minority
nation’s and collective identity and immigration. The thesis relies on a constructivist account of identity building, which reflects the relation and opposition to a “significant other” (Triandafyllidou 2001). Consequently, the role of Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties (SNRPs) as the main identity entrepreneurs in nation building and sustaining is discussed. Collective identity construction is analysed through a boundary-making perspective (Barth 1969, Wimmer 2008a).

The second part of this chapter engages with the literature connecting immigration and the sub-state level, in particular minority nations. I first discuss factors proposed in the literature to explain a particular sub-state approach to immigration. Secondly, I discuss why centre-periphery relations and hence the political-institutional relations between the sub-state territory and the state, and the societal boundary within a sub-state territory contribute to our understanding of the approaches to immigration and integration in minority nations. Finally, I argue that centre-periphery relations significantly impact how the minority nation’s identity is reconstructed once confronted with immigration.

2. The nexus between immigration and minority nations

Minority nations, collective minority nation’s identity, and immigration are connected by a triangular relationship, as Figure 1 shows. Hence, each concept is influenced by, and at the same time impacts the two other concepts, as I will explain below.

*Figure 1 – The triangular relationship between minority nation, collective (minority) identity, and immigration*
2.1 Minority nations

This thesis focuses on sub-state territories, which are characterized by some form of territorial autonomy based on claims for recognition of and the right to protect a territorial distinctiveness vis-à-vis the state in which the territory is situated due to ethnic, linguistic, religious, and/or cultural characteristics.

In particular I focus on those sub-state territories, where the claims are either made by communities, which for various reasons have lost or never formed their own nation state and are, thus, living in a state with a different majority culture, religion or language, such as the Catalans and Basques in Spain or the Scots and Welsh in the United Kingdom. These sub-state territories, whose elites are engaged in nation-building, are referred to in the literature as nations without states/stateless nations/minority nations (Guibernau 1999, Keating 1996, Requejo 2012).

I also focus on sub-state territories where the claims for recognition are made by ethnonational groups, which are the product of the disintegration of Europe’s multinational empires in the late 19th/early 20th century and the consequent re-drawing of international borders. This process seldom created homogenous nation states. Instead, it often led to a change in the political arrangements of ethnic groups, many of whom suddenly found themselves residing in and being formal citizens of states dominated by groups whose language, culture or religion differ from their own. To name a few examples: German speakers in Italy, Hungarian speakers in Romania, ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, etc. The ethnic groups with different linguistic, religious or cultural characteristics from the dominant state population, who are usually concentrated in a sub-state territory they perceive as their homeland or part of their homeland and who claim the right to preserve their distinctiveness within the nation state can be called ethno-national (historical, traditional, or autochthonous) minorities. The territory in which they reside I refer to as minority regions.

The main difference between stateless nations and minority regions are the claims and demands actors make in relation to territory. In stateless nations actors engage in nation-building projects, whereas in minority regions the main claims are directed towards a recognition of the particularity in the form of devolution or granting of self-government
within the existing borders of the state. However, claims and demands are – similarly to the communities living in those sub-state territories – fluid and changing, and constructed by a variety of actors, as I will elaborate below. Thus, the boundaries between stateless nations and minority regions are equally flexible, changing and depending on the claims makers and the elites’ or mass population’s self-definition.

A second difference between stateless nations and minority regions is their (potential) relation to a nation state different from that of the state in which they reside or a neighbouring state. Stateless nations lack a state they can refer to and demand support from, whereas ethno-national minorities have a kin-state from which they are separated by state borders but with whom the elites have constructed a relationship based on cultural, linguistic, or religious characteristics. The German-speaking community in Italy refers to Austria as its kin-state, the Hungarian community in Romania to Hungary.¹ Both types of sub-state territories, stateless nations and minority regions, are situated though in a non-dominant position of power within the state. Hence, also stateless nations are in a minority position within the state; and minority regions express equally claims for sub-state nation building. Thus, synonymous to referring to the selected territories as sub-state territories, I employ the term ‘minority nation’ to refer to both, stateless nations and minority regions.

For the purpose of this research, the following minority nations have been selected: Basque Country (ES), Corsica (FR), South Tyrol (I), Scotland (UK) and Wales (UK).

2.2 Minority nations and the challenge of immigration

Immigration to federal states presents a challenge because of the multiplicity of policies and governmental levels involved (Joppke and Seidle 2012, 3). However, immigration in multinational states, which are also federally organized in most cases, is further complicated because of the closer interrelationship between immigration policy and identity politics, as highlighted by Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero (2014b, 297).

Moreover, in minority nations possible changes to the population’s composition are particularly important because this “can alter the linguistic and political balance” (Joppke and Seidle 2012, 4). Through “segmented assimilation” (Portes and Zhou 1993), the

¹ For a critical discussion see Keating 2012.
integration of migrants into only one segment – either the minority or the state majority – of the society, immigration is portrayed as either having a negative effect on the minority nation because of its potential to decrease the population sustaining the claims of the minority nation, or as an added value in case of migrants assimilating into the interests of the minority nation. Kymlicka discusses a tendency of migrants to integrate into the dominant culture due to greater geographical mobility and increased economic opportunities, and “if migrants in a multi-nation state integrate into the majority group, the national minority will become increasingly outnumbered and so increasingly powerless in political life” (Kymlicka 2001a, 67). Furthermore, a smooth integration of migrants in the dominant culture offers, according to Kymlicka, the nation state an argument to also demand that the minority nation renounces from its particularities and integrates into the majority culture, which thus further weakens the minority nations’ claims for self-government. Additionally, Kymlicka does not attribute to migrants the potential to “understand or share the mentality of ‘la survivance’” and to support mobilizations of nationalism (2001a, 67). This is confirmed by Banting and Soroka (2012) in a study of the sense of belonging of the migrant population in Quebec. They argue that the elites in both Quebec and Canada have developed competing nation-building projects and actively struggle for the affection of newcomers. Thus Banting and Soroka show that the first two generations of migrants living in Quebec are torn between the two competing nation-building projects and therefore develop only a very weak sense of belonging to both of them.

Yet, the ‘Asian Scots for Independence’ or ‘New Scots for Independence’, a branch of the Scottish National Party (SNP) consisting of foreign-born party supporters, suggests the contrary and the 2014 Scottish Referendum saw migrants and ethnic minorities involved in the nationalist movements. Similarly, Medda-Windischer et al. (2011) demonstrate that migrants in South Tyrol are well aware of the higher prestige of the (German) national minority language within the sub-state territory, although Italian offers greater mobility towards the south and is a mandatory subject at school according to the Italian national framework. Regardless of recognizing the importance of the national minority language, Italian language competences among migrants in South Tyrol are much more developed than German (Medda-Windischer et al. 2011a). Similar studies in Catalonia (Brugué et al. 2014), Flanders, Wales, and the Basque Country (Sociales 2010, 12) show in particular in relation to the first generation migrants the same ambiguity between an awareness of the importance
of the national minority language for integration but a prevalence of the use of the majority language. No further studies exist on how language use among migrants relates to support of the interests of the minority nation, but political elites often cite migrants’ lack of knowledge of the national minority language as a sign of lacking awareness of the minority region’s particularity.

Minority nationalists have for a long time been associated with ethnic nationalism and hence exclusive stances towards migration (Ignatieff 1993). Nevertheless, recent scholarship has shown that minority nations are very able to also include additional diversity into their own nation-building projects and to use immigration to further strengthen their own claims. Sanjay Jeram shows how the Basque political elite (Jeram 2012a), similarly to the elites in Scotland (Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 2012), deliberately present immigration as an added value for the territory. Jeram argues that “the policy fields of citizenship and immigration have been added to the mix of identity markers that distinguish the Basque nation from the Spanish one” (2012a, 2). He suggests that the Basque focus on portraying its own minority nationalism as an inclusive one (as also seen in Scotland), in contrast to the exclusive immigration policies by the nation states, is illustrative of a broader trend: integration policies are used by sub-state nationalists to gain broader support and maintain distinctiveness vis-à-vis the nation state (2012a, 4).

Thus it is not clear from previous research how immigration impacts minority nations. Aside from having a positive or negative impact, Zapata-Barrero (2013) differentiates between two effects that immigration has in minority nations and, particularly on minority nationalists. On the one hand, immigration can contribute to strengthening or weakening the legitimacy behind demands for more autonomy and further devolution of powers from the central state, thus immigration influences the minority nation’s political-institutional relations with the state. And on the other hand, immigration challenges the management and protection of the minority nation’s identity, thus impacting the relations between minority and state majority within the minority nation.

This thesis concentrates on the second dimension, the impact of immigration on national minority nation’s identity, but argues at the same time that the demand for more autonomy can equally be an expression of the desire to better protect and strengthen the minority
nation’s identity. As a consequence, the differentiation suggested by Zapata-Barrero needs to be reflected upon critically on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, it is argued that the two dimensions may be present not only contemporaneously within one case, but that there might also be different actors and time periods giving prevalence to one or the other dimension.

This thesis contributes to the research on migrant integration in minority nations by comparing five sub-state territories with strong distinctive collective identities over a period of twenty years. Thus, this thesis will exceed the single case studies often undertaken and offer a comparative perspective on the impact immigration has on the development and construction of the minority nation’s identity from a longitudinal perspective. The analysis of a period of twenty years allows us to see whether in the selected minority nations there are points of rupture and whether and how they are connected with political-institutional, structural, and societal changes in the territory. The comparison of five cases facilitates a review of the explanations for a particular approach to immigration in the selected minority nations, as suggested in this thesis.

2.3 Minority nation’s identity and immigration from a boundary making perspective

The cultural, religious, or linguistic distinctiveness vis-á-vis the population of the state is often referred to as the ground for the legitimacy of minority nations and as the basis of the minority nation’s identity. Although Brubaker and Cooper argue that identity scholarship has dispersed and thus that the term ‘identity’ is no longer useful for the social sciences (Brubaker and Cooper 2000), I sustain research on how the identity of ethno-national minorities and minority nations is constructed due to the utmost importance of the topic to these groups residing in those territories. Alongside protecting the (physical) existence of persons claiming to belong to national minority groups, the ability to protect their collective identity is essential also for the nation-building projects. Minority rights lawyers similarly argue that the right to identity is the Grundnorm and conditio sine qua non of minority protection: Without being officially recognized as a distinct group and lacking the means to protect and promote the
group identity (and as such the distinctiveness of the minority community), their existence is in danger.

Due to the significance of the distinct identity for the minority nations, I suggest that the impact immigration has on the collective identity of those minority nations is even greater than the impact immigration has on the state level. It is well acknowledged that immigration has an impact on national collective identities but there is no evidence how immigration changes national identities and in which particular direction (Wodak et al. 2009, Hjerm 1998, Wright 2011, Esses et al. 2006). As argued by Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul, it “challenges and in some cases reaffirms – notions of national identity, sovereignty, and state control” (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008, 154). The same mechanisms are expected to also be valid for the construction of collective identities at the sub-state level and within minority nations.

This thesis does not apply a primordialist concept of collective identity as a priori given, constant, fixed, and based on objective markers but follows the constructivist tradition: Weber underscored that groups are artificially constructed and based on the subjective belief in a common distinctiveness (1976). Barth further developed this stream of thinking in his influential work on ‘Ethnic Groups and Boundaries’, stressing that “ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves, and thus have the characteristic of organizing interaction between people” (1969, 10). Thus ethnic identity is perceived not as ‘being’ but as a dynamic concept of ‘belonging’ and ‘becoming’ which is constantly negotiated and renegotiated between the members and the ethnic identity entrepreneurs.

The process of group-identity formation and re-formation is contested among scholars from various disciplines. This thesis relies on concepts developed in the literature on nationalism and national identity, which take as their starting point the assumption that the existence of nations presupposes also the existence of other nations. Thus, a struggle between national communities leads to the development of a double-edged nature of national identity continuously balancing between the exclusion and inclusion of others (Triandafyllidou 1998, 594). Building on Weber (1976), and as Zolberg and Long put it, group formation entails confrontation with others and hence “collective identity formation […] usually also
involve[s] self-conscious efforts by members of a group to distinguish themselves from whom they are not, and hence it is better understood as a dialectical process whose key feature is the delineation of boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘not us’” (1999, 8).

Triandafyllidou frames this relationship between ‘us’ and ‘not us’ as the relationship between an in-group and a ‘significant other’ arguing that the ‘the identity of a nation is defined and/or re-defined through the influence of ‘significant others’, namely other nations or ethnic groups that are perceived to threaten the nation, its distinctiveness, authenticity and/or independence’ (1998, 594). But nation building is only one form of group building and hence collective identity formation does not exclusively take place at the state level, but among all groups. Thus the same mechanisms of constructing the in-group or one’s own group against the backdrop of significant others can also be expected among minority nations.

Triandafyllidou further argues that “at any one time there is one significant other” (1998, 600) and describes this concept as “another nation or ethnic group that is territorially close to, or indeed within, the national community and threatens, or rather is perceived to threaten, its ethnic and/or cultural purity and/or independence” (1998, 600). However, there might also be times with more than one significant other. Laxer, Carson and Korteweg suggest, that minority nations, when confronted with immigration, “face the challenge of forging an identity defined simultaneously in opposition to two groups: the national majority, in relation to whom they form a minority, and migrants, for whom they constitute the majority receiving society” (Laxer, Carson, and Korteweg 2014, 133).

However, various minority nations have different histories and patterns of migration, and different migrant groups, such as legal and illegal migrants and asylum seekers, workers and high qualified migrants, or EU and Third Country Nationals (TCNs). This thesis reflects on whether those groups are referred to differently in the integration discourse and whether they are perceived as having a varying impact on the collective identity.

Besides international immigration, internal migration might also change the demographic structure of a sub-state territory and disrupt the balance between the minority community and the dominant nation. Internal migration as a form of population transfer has also been used by states to consciously alter the demographic composition of an area (McGarry 1998).
Therefore, this thesis acknowledges that there might be a significant difference between how international and internal migrants are referred to. The minority nation might have different experiences with international migrants (who add further diversity to the minority nation) and internal migrants (who are part of the dominant nation from which the sub-state territory) tries to differentiate itself and in doing so further strengthen conceptions of the traditional significant other.

Hussain and Miller (2006) study this differentiation between internal and international migrants in Scotland and show that there is a significant difference between how persons with a Pakistani origin and how migrants from England are perceived. They argue that Scotland has developed a positive connection between multiculturalism and sub-state nationalism (2006, 199) and in particular that the elites are deliberatively inclusive since “Scottish elites, like Scottish football fans, have been determined to present to the world a better image than their English counterparts. It is part of their national pride” (2006, 198). The historical role of England as the significant other from which Scotland needs to differentiate is also applied to migrants from England. Migrants with a Pakistani origin, in contrast, find it easier to develop a sense of belonging to the Scottish territory, which has been made the main marker of the Scottish identity by the political elites for the last 20 years (Hussain and Miller 2006, Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 2012).

Thus, although the prime objective of this thesis is not to address whether internal and international migrants are perceived differently, I take into account this possible differentiation and the relation between the two kinds of migrants, made in particular at the level of discourse and will assess whether there has been a shift of the significant other from internal to international migrants. However, this differentiation is less relevant on a policy level, since internal migrants – being citizens of the state – are not the subject of integration policies.

The main object of this thesis is instead to analyse how newcomers and migration-generated diversity impact the construction of the minority nation’s identity. Hence, newcomers and migration-generated diversity can either substitute or complement the traditional significant other. This thesis thus aims to analyse the impact on the minority nation’s identity in more
detail. Are newcomers and migration-generated diversity excluded from the minority nation’s identity, or do they become a part of it and how is such inclusion constructed?

This relation between the minority nation’s identity and migrants is analysed through the boundary-making perspective. Zolberg and Long (1999, 8) suggest three patterns of negotiation around the boundaries between newcomers and hosts: individual boundary crossing, which leaves the structure of the receiving society unaffected; boundary blurring, which also changes the structure of the receiving society; and boundary shifting, which includes a reconstruction of the group identity. Boundary making and changing is described as a gradual process, whereas the broadest form of incorporation of migrants, boundary shifting, can only occur once many individual migrants have crossed the boundary by acquiring attributes such as language, religion, and citizenship of the host society, and thus migrants are no longer the main actors. In order to blur or shift the boundaries, the structure of the host society needs to change and thus the actors also change. Not the individual migrants, but rather the receiving society needs to have undergone substantial boundary change, for example the institutionalization of multilingualism or the possibility of dual citizenship or hyphenated identities, before a new group identity (boundary shifting) can emerge.

I do not examine the initial processes of boundary crossing of migrants on an individual level, but focus instead on all further possibilities of boundary change requiring a transformation of the integrating society. This is justified because Zolberg and Long recognize the limited role of individual migrants in fostering their incorporation in the receiving society, and agree with Bauböck that integration and boundary negotiations are an interactive and bi-directional process (Bauböck 1996). However, this process puts the receiving society in a more powerful position “since the negotiations take place in the host country, power relationships are generally asymmetric in favor of the host majority” (Zolberg 1999, 9).

Translating the initial research question of whether there is a change in the construction of the minority nation’s identity and what the direction of such a change is into the boundary-making language, the thesis asks whether the boundaries between the national minority and migrants as the potential significant other change, and how.
Following on the strategies of boundary making and changing suggested by Wimmer (2008b), the thesis asks whether there is an expansion, contraction, or blurring of the initial boundary. Thus there are the following expectations of how the constructions of the boundary of the minority nation’s identity can change:

- No change of the initial boundary, but a segmented inclusion of migrants and migration-generated diversity into the national minority group by reducing migration-generated diversity through assimilation into the minority nation’s identity. The criteria for the definition of the minority nation’s identity are post-ethnic and thus civic, and migrants can therefore acquire them. Such criteria can be competences in the national minority language or residence in the minority nation. However, the construction of the markers of the minority nation’s identity do not necessarily change.

- No change of the initial boundary, but a contraction of the initial boundary by focussing on those markers of the boundary which are based on ethnic criteria, such as descent, birth, and race and cannot be obtained by migrants.

- A real change of the initial boundary but in particular of the markers of the boundary. This leads to a redefinition of the minority nation’s identity through a blurring of the markers of the initial boundary because new elements based on the cultural, linguistic, or religious diversity stemming from immigration become part of the redefined identity. Hence, migration-generated diversity is recognized and promoted, and ultimately blurred with the previous minority nation’s identity into a newly developed or redefined identity.

Emphasizing the role of the receiving society, Zolberg and Long (2005, 2010) elaborate on how boundaries are enacted at the level of practice, such as in public policies recognizing the Spanish language in the U.S., or religious diversity in Europe, in particular Islam. Alba also takes institutional domains, in particular citizenship, language, and religion to evaluate boundary changes. This thesis follows this approach and uses the process of integration as the domain of where the redefinition of boundaries is assessed. However, this thesis argues that it is important to analyse both the level of practice (the integration policies), and the level of rhetoric (the discourse on immigration, on who is the migrant, and on the process of
integration as such), because at this second (discursive) level boundaries might present themselves more strongly.

2.4 Actors of boundary making and identity construction: Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties (SNRPs)

The concept of identity as used in this thesis refers to a continuous process of constructing, negotiating, and reconstructing the identity of the minority nations, also involving various actors. The role of elites in identity construction is particularly relevant and has been widely discussed in the literature on nationalism. Brady and Kaplan (2009, 34) argue that each group’s social identity (the group’s status and the relationship to other groups) is largely constructed by the elites. Brass also argues that identity is constructed by the elites ‘who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent in order to protect their well-being or existence or to gain political and economic advantage for their groups as well as for themselves’ (1991, 8). Similarly, Wimmer (2008b) refers to boundary making as actor-driven and considers the political elites of a group as the main actors of identity politics, the ‘ethnic identity entrepreneurs’.

A strong regional identity is also represented in the party system, which is characterized by the presence of regionalist parties. De Winter and Türsan (1998) highlight the close relationship between identity politics and the potential for mobilizing the collective mood and scholars engaged in regionalism studies stress that the regionalist political elite, and in particular ethnic parties, are mainly concerned with cultural and ethnic demands focused on the territory in order to maintain and recognize the regional culture and identity (De Winter and Türsan 1998, Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro 2002). Thus, the regional or sub-state political elite can be defined as a primary community-building actor for a minority nation.

The sub-state political elite can be subdivided into two main types of actors: the first is the regional government (executive and legislative institutions) which has gained particular importance through the territorial autonomy granted to the minority nation and is equipped with a variety of legislative competences in areas of importance to the political communities they serve. The regional governments, as the legitimate representation of the whole population of the territory, are not only composed of representatives of the minority claims
but must also represent and respond to citizens from the majority ethnic group who live in the minority nation. Regional governments are not only composed of parties representing the particular demands of the minority nation but also parties closer to the dominant state.

The second type of actors are parties operating on a sub-state level, often referred to as Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties (SNRPs). These parties can be defined as self-contained political organizations that contest elections and that field candidates only in a particular territory (region) of the state. Moreover, “the territorial limitation of their electoral activity is a consequence of their explicit objective of defending only the identities and interests of ‘their’ region” (Massetti 2009, 503, van der Zwet 2015). This preliminary definition allows us to exclude regional branches of state-wide parties and to focus on those parties operating only in the sub-state territory and, secondly, it highlights the close relationship with ethnic parties who “aim to defend/enhance the identity and interests of people belonging to a particular ethnic group, whether such group is defined in terms of language or religion” (Massetti 2009, 503).

De Winter and Türsan summarize regional and ethnic parties under the label ethno-regionalist parties highlighting the proximity of ethno-regionalist parties and identity and territorial politics. According to them, “ethno-regionalist parties are defined as referring to the efforts of geographically concentrated peripheral minorities which challenge the working order and sometimes even the democratic order of a nation-state by demanding recognition of their cultural identity” (De Winter and Türsan 1998, 19). According to Hepburn this term has some limitations since “first, not all parties have mobilized on issues of culture and language in their territorial strategies (...) [and] Secondly, few of these parties would accept an ‘ethnic’ label as they seek to portray themselves as open to multiculturalism and diversity” (Hepburn 2009a, 481). She suggests instead the term ‘Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties’ (SNRPs) which will also be used in this thesis.

Although this dissertation focusses first of all on SNRPs, regional branches of state-wide parties, depending on their strength in the territory, can also contribute substantially to the construction of a minority nation’s identity, and hence future research needs to also engage with their positions on immigration. However, this thesis only considers regional branches of state-wide parties insofar as they influence the agenda and discourse of SNRPs. The
interaction and competition between parties is one of the hypotheses Hepburn (2014) proposes as decisive in understanding the varying approaches of SNRPs towards immigration, as will be shown below.

Secondly, the thesis focuses on the governments of the minority nations, which in some cases overlap with the SNRPs. However, the differentiation between parties and governments seems useful for two reasons elaborated by van Spanje (2010b, 568): first of all, government status is associated with legal and practical constraints and thus a policy cannot simply be changed as the party wishes but needs to be in line with national and European frameworks. Additionally, SNRPs in office are also dependent on the policies of their predecessors; for example, the SNP cannot claim sole ownership of the welcoming integration discourse in Scotland, but rather continue what was laid down by the coalition government between Labour and the Liberal Democrats in the early 2000s (One Scotland – Many Cultures Initiative; Fresh Talent Initiative). Secondly, van Spanje argues, being in government also discourages bold and outrageous statements leading to the de-radicalization of SNRPs once in government (van Spanje 2010a).

A focus on the regional political elite has thus far been characteristic of the literature connecting immigration and minority nations. Only few studies have focused on the attitudes of the minority nation’s political community towards migrants. For example, one study showed that “respondents with a exclusivist regional identification from those Comunidades [Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia] historically characterized by strong ethnic, linguistic and cultural movements are more tied to exclusivist views towards migrants” (Escandell and Ceobanu 2009, 174). Thus Escandell and Ceobanu interpret a strong regional identification with a culture distinct from the nation state as a “mechanism of exclusion” (2009, 174). Banting and Soroka (2012) instead are so far the only ones to study migrants’ sense of belonging and attitudes of migrants towards the minority nations. Hence, we know little about whether migrants are aware of the existence and claims of the minority nation’s community, and whether this is perceived as an advantage or disadvantage for their own integration, but we also know little about the attitudes of the minority nation’s community towards migrants.

This dissertation also cannot compensate for the relatively one-sided approach, which concentrates on the regional political elites that has thus far prevailed in this field of research.
Nevertheless, I argue that understanding the political elite is an important aspect in the field connecting minority nations, immigration, and constructions of identity because the political elite is characterized by a reciprocal interplay with the mass population. While influencing mass identity formation, the political elite is also in turn influenced by the public through electoral behaviour. Putnam characterizes the elite–mass linkage as a “double-sided and interdependent” relationship (1976, 134). The elite can influence the opinion of the mass through multiple channels and communication patterns, especially mass media. Falkenhagen (2009) observes a particular relationship between masses and ethno-regionalist parties. He argues that the configuration of relations between the regional identity and the national identity impacts the degree of radicalization of ethno-regionalist parties. Thus, a strong and exclusive mass identification with the minority nation supports ethno-regionalist parties’ claims for secession. I suggest that in the selected minority nations where SNRPs play a strong role, the masses also support the claims of the SNRPs, and as such, there is a stable connection between the interests of the masses and the political elites.

3. Explanations for an inclusive or exclusionary approach to immigration in minority nations

At this point I have shown that there is a link between immigration and constructions of identity in minority nations. But we still do not know how immigration impacts identity construction and why certain SNRPs promote migration-generated diversity as a new marker of the minority nations, while others instead adopt an anti-immigrant rhetoric. Therefore, this section begins by reviewing the existing literature on the causes of certain outcomes – an inclusive or exclusive approach to immigration in minority nations – and shows the gaps in the explanatory framework. Then I propose an additional explanation based on centre-periphery relations, the relations between the minority nation and the state. I differentiate between political-institutional relations as expressed through the claims and degree of self-government and societal relations defined based on the boundary between the minority population and the state majority population within the minority nation.
3.1 Understanding changes in the approach to immigration in minority nations

As argued above, research in this field has not precisely focused on changes in the minority nation’s identity, but has analysed, on the one hand, the impact of immigration on sub-state or minority nationalism from the perspective of the regional government, and on the other hand, the impact of immigration from the perspective of SNRPs. Since this thesis is based on the assumption that the political elite in minority nations act as identity entrepreneurs, explanations developed in relation to the minority government and SNRPs are particularly important to my account of changes in minority nation’s identity.

Kymlicka (1995, 2001a) has offered ground-breaking work in relation to the government of Quebec and immigration. Starting from a normative perspective and the question of whether minority nationalism and immigrant multiculturalism are compatible with liberalism, he applied his research to the case of Quebec. He formulated a series of preconditions for a positive relationship between minority nationalism and immigrant integration, focusing in particular on the possibilities of the minority nation to manage immigration independently from the state. Zapata-Barrero (2009) further developed this argument but did not focus on explaining what leads to a positive approach to immigration, but instead on how such a positive approach to immigration can impact the quest for more powers to govern immigration by intensifying the conflict between the centre and the periphery.

The relation between immigration and SNRPs has been developed in particular by Hepburn (2009b, 2010), who proposed a list of explanatory factors responsible for an inclusive or exclusive approach taken by various SNRPs in Europe. In addition to these influential authors, a pool of comparative or single case studies by other scholars contribute to a variety of explanations currently debated in the literature.

In the following section I group and classify existing research, distinguishing between political-institutional, ideological, socio-economic, and contextual factors. Finally, the chapter concludes by presenting the alternative explanatory factors developed in this research.
3.1.1 Political – institutional explanations

Legislative powers to govern immigration and/or integration

The earliest and still most prominent (though contested) explanation for how immigration changes the minority nation argues that a minority nation needs powers to control immigration (entrance, flows, and access to citizenship) and integration in order to develop an inclusive approach to immigration. This argument was developed by the Canadian scholars Will Kymlicka (1995, 2000, 2001a) and Joseph Carens (1995) based on their research on Quebec. The francophone province, struggling to preserve the Quebecois language and culture, focuses on attracting immigrants into the French language and community by strengthening the prestige of the French language, facilitating French language learning with the aim to strengthen the autochthonous national minority community. Through the additional ability to control the composition of migrants and in particular the framework developed for integration, Kymlicka argues that Quebec was able to adopt an inclusive approach towards new migrants and develop a post-ethnic minority nationalism (2001b, 282). Hence, in the Quebecois case more legislative powers have led to more openness to include migrants into the construction of the minority nation’s identity, but the powers are executed in a restrictive or illiberal manner, not granting migrants the choice of whether they want to integrate into the francophone or anglophone community. Kymlicka addresses this shortcoming, but he justifies this “genuine dilemma” (2001b, 286) of illiberal policies as applied in Quebec first of all with the priority given to the protection and preservation of the minority national culture and secondly with the argument that minority nationalism has the potential to develop into a violent and “dangerous phenomenon” (Kymlicka 2001a, 78). Finally Kymlicka bases his justification on the migrants themselves who “seem to think that these [illiberal policies] are an acceptable trade-off” (2001b, 288). However, this assumption has not yet been tested empirically and the relationship and attitudes of migrants toward minority cultures deserve further attention. Moreover, recent public opinion research has not confirmed the development of liberal and open attitudes of the general population towards migrants in Quebec (Turgeon and Bilodeau 2014).

Jeram rejects Kymlicka’s line of argument which he characterises as based on the “unfounded assumption that the national minority is inclined towards accepting diversity, and that a lack
of autonomy suppresses its will to become multicultural’’ (2012b, 44). In an examination of the Basque Country, Jeram argues instead, referring to Kaufmann (2004), that minority communities historically often referred to myths of numerical strength which have been used either to restrict access to membership or to expand the territory. Thus, questions on the nature of minority nation’s identity arise and “Kymlicka takes for granted that empowered minority nations are willing to trade their ‘soul’ and adopt multiculturalism without explaining why political autonomy leads to expansive rather than restrictive expressions of dominant nationality” (Jeram 2012b, 45).

However, both Kymlicka and Jeram seem to rely on a static conception of the minority nation’s identity which is challenged by immigration and thus forced to react to this external pressure. The construction of the collective identity can, however, change and gradually adapt to the new situation of a more plural society. Moreover, both Kymlicka and Jeram, although they base their studies on regional governments, in fact analyse approaches to immigration by SNRPs as during the periods analysed both Quebec and the Basque Country were governed by these parties.

Emphasizing sub-national parties and the role of the political elite, Barker further interprets Kymlicka’s argument focusing not on the powers to govern immigration but on political leaders’ perception of the impact immigration has on the potential to influence the nation state (Barker 2012, 20). Barker agrees with Jeram that immigration is used by SNRPs as a nation-building tool and the approach to immigration is often built in opposition to the central state’s approach. An inclusive or exclusive approach depends thus, according to these scholars, not on the legislative powers but on how these powers are used. I will argue below, that the SNRPs approach to immigration is not solely determined by the legislative powers a minority nation has, but on how robust and conflict-free the relations between the minority nation and the respective state are. Hence, the political elite’s perception of the impact immigration has on the potential to influence those relations is, similar to the amount of legislative powers, one of many aspects that determine the robustness of the relations between the state and the minority nation.
Party politics: electoral system, party competition and contagion effect

Hepburn (2012, 13) also contradicts Kymlicka and observes that having less decentralized powers relating to immigration increase the likelihood that ‘parties may unite in calls for more powers over immigration, reducing polarisation on the issue’. Thus she does not directly contest Kymlicka’s argument but links it to the behaviour of political parties and competition among parties. From the point of view of SNRPs, she argues that party polarization and contestation, salient in particular in party systems with an electorally relevant anti-immigrant party, leads to a negative perception of immigration by all parties. This ‘contagion effect’ of anti-immigrant parties has also been described by Bale (2003) and Van Spanje (2010b), and although this effect was examined by both authors on the state level, the same effect can also be expected on the sub-state level. However, as suggested by Van Spanje for the state level, we also need to differentiate at the sub-state level whether the parties are part of the government or not due to the constraints he associates with government status (2010b, 568).

Low party polarization based on a lack of competences to manage immigration, as suggested by Hepburn as one of the factors explaining an inclusive approach to immigration by SNRPs, has also been evaluated by Erk (2014) in both Flanders and Quebec. Erk argues that low party polarization on the issue is not due to a lack of competences, but due to the particular regional election system. First Past the Post Systems such as that employed in Quebec, encourage parties to take a more central course on immigration due to the necessity to attract the largest number of voters. Proportional representation, as applied in Flanders, allows parties to vary more on their stances towards immigration.

This shows that the power argument, while developed long ago, retains some explanatory power but requires an adaptation in order to be applied to the European context where the sub-state level has no powers to manage immigration independently from the state. As I will show below, the expectation that the political-institutional relations between the state and the minority nation influence the stance on immigration is based on an adaptation of Kymlicka’s power argument excluding powers to manage immigration independently from the state, but including integration in combination with a strong regional self-government.
Furthermore, the additional political-institutional factors, such as the party system, competition among parties, and the electoral system, need to be taken into account.

### 3.1.2. Ideological and cultural explanations

#### Party ideology and type of nationalism

In relation to the party system, ideological factors also play an important role in defining the parties’ stances on immigration and integration. Although scholars have shown that party positions on immigration do not always match the general parties’ ideological profiles (Odmalm 2011), centre-right parties are expected to have a more negative perception of immigration than centre-left parties (Hepburn 2012, 12) although due to the former’s liberal stance towards the labour market, greater labour immigration on economic grounds might be favoured. This does not, however, say anything about the relation between party ideology and minority nationalism or minority nations’ identity. Nevertheless, I expect that centre-right SNRPs – being socially more conservative – are attracted by a static concept of the minority community which they try to protect from external influences, whereas centre-left SNRPs are expected to be attracted more by a dynamic vision of the community and are thus more open to change.

A second ideological factor which has been frequently discussed in the literature is the differentiation between a civic or ethnic basis of nationalism and sub-state nationalism. From this distinction follows the argument that ethnic sub-state nationalism leads to exclusionary membership criteria such as race, blood, and ancestry whereas civic nationalism, by promoting criteria such as residence and respect of institutions, promotes the integration of further diversity into the minority community. Various authors (Medrano 2005, Keating 2001, van der Zwet 2015) argue that this distinction is no longer useful, and Kymlicka (1999) argues that contemporary civic forms of nationalism also include ethnic elements, such as language proficiency or knowledge of the particular history and traditions of a territory. Zapata-Barrero suggests that since immigration can alter the power relations in minority nations, “the ethnic dimension [of nationalism] can have more grounds for legitimacy, and may then have a more appropriate context for justification” (Zapata-Barrero 2012a, 224). This ‘ethnicization process’, as he calls it, can also involve a sub-state territory previously relying on civic nationalism (Zapata-Barrero 2009, 25). It is seen as the attempt by the
minority nationalists to attract migrants in order to strengthen the sub-state territory by assimilating migrants into the minority community instead of into the central state culture. This might, however, result in illiberal policies restricting the migrants’ free choices, as for example can be argued for the approach to integration in Catalonia or Quebec.

This research agrees with authors (Medrano 2005, van der Zwet 2015) on the blurring of the ethnic vs. civic nationalism and the need for further differentiation to properly address the approach taken towards immigration. In particular, in relation to language we need to develop a more nuanced understanding of the dichotomy between ethnic and civic elements. On the one hand, it is an individual’s personal choice to learn a certain language, and thus it can be a criterion for a civic form of nationalism. But on the other hand, language is closely connected with understanding certain cultural contextual nuances, which cannot be learned easily and, as van der Zwet argues, “a person has to be brought up with it” (2015, 67). As such, it can also easily be used as an exclusionary and restrictive criterion. Therefore, this thesis evaluates on a case-by-case basis whether the national minority language is presented as accessible to migrants or whether language is defined in such a way that migrants cannot easily access and master it.

National minority language

The relation between the minority nation’s identity and the national minority language is of particular importance for this thesis not only because the minority nation’s identity is, in sub-state territories, characterized by a different language than the state language, one of the most important identity markers. It is also important because in four of the selected minority nations the national minority language has a particular importance and differs from the state language, whereas in one selected minority nation, Scotland, the language of the minority nation is the same as in the rest of the state. Hepburn (2012) and Erk (2008) argue that the linguistic barrier might become an important factor explaining the exclusionary or inclusive approach to immigration by the political elite. Moreover, newcomers’ lack of proficiency in the national minority language is perceived as a key barrier to integration. Therefore Hepburn puts forward the hypothesis that “immigration is viewed positively by regional parties if migrants share and/or learn the national minority language of the sub-state nation” and in contrast “immigration […] is] viewed negatively by regional parties if migrants speak/adopt
the majority language of the state, rather than the national minority language of the sub-state nation” (Hepburn 2012, 12). This is, as explained above, connected to the fear of linguistic erosion and thus to the argument of Kymlicka and Zapara-Barrero who demand control over integration policies in order to influence that migrants learn the national minority language and in doing so integrate into the minority as a prerequisite to welcome them as part of the minority community.

Based on his study of the political elite’s position towards immigration in the Basque Country, Jeram disagrees with this hypothesis and states that “language rather than other values such as race or religion offer better prospects for the development of an open and inclusive nationalism as long as it is not purposely used as a barrier to prevent the integration of outsiders” (2012b, 5). Due to these contrasting findings, this thesis evaluates on a case-by-case basis, similar to the relation between civic and ethnic criteria for nationalism whether language is defined in the particular minority nation at the given time in an inclusive or exclusionary manner.

**Marginality, solidarity and path dependency**

A third ideological-cultural explanation, which arrives at similarly contrasting results, is the marginality theory initially developed by Fetzer (2000). He suggests that experiencing marginality or oppression itself creates sympathy for other marginalized or oppressed groups. Escandell and Ceobanu are unable to confirm this based on their study of attitudes towards immigration in the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia (2009, 160). Jeram supports such a hypothesis and confirms it in his study of the political elite in the Basque Country. He argues that “ideas about the treatment of minorities generated by historical legacies of repression under the Franco regime altered the understanding of Basque nationhood among elites, and ultimately prevented the development of an assimilationist approach to foreign immigration […] Political elites acted as ‘carriers’ of these ideas and translated them into economic support and multiculturalism in response to foreign migrants” (Jeram 2012b, 7). The same positive attitude of the political elite towards migrants was found by Hayes and Dowds (2006) in Northern Ireland, but is not confirmed for the Northern Irish general population, as McKee shows (2016). Like Jeram, Hayes and Dowds argue that marginality has a great impact on the elite’s positive approach to immigration. Arrighi de Casanova takes
this argument further, suggesting that not only previous oppression and marginality but the “initial boundary and path dependency” (2012, 42-43) in a minority nation substantially impact how the territory deals with new diversity. He suggests that “there is indeed evidence that states have responded to immigration-induced pluralism following cognitive channels established by past experiences with national, religious, ethnic or territorial pluralism” (Arrighi de Casanova 2012, 43). A reference to previous experiences with diversity is also salient for Loobuyck and Jacobs who confirm the importance of history and language in the Flemish nationalist movement (2009, 113).

Nevertheless, all authors acknowledge that although path-dependency is strong and previous experiences influence the current approach towards integration, the political elite reinterpret and re-evaluate these experiences within the contextual constraints to match the current situation, highlighting some features more than others and keeping them still ‘plausible’ and ‘sensible’ enough to convince the electorate (Arrighi de Casanova 2012a, 271).

**Strong regional identification**

A fourth ideological explanation is the relation between immigration and regional identification. Ceobanu and Escandell argue that a strong and exclusive regional identification negatively impacts the approach taken towards immigration in the Autonomous Communities of the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia (2009, 162). This supports Alba’s suggestion of a need to differentiate between ‘porous’ cultures and identities facilitating integration and strong cultures which have difficulties with the integration process. Based on the immigration history of the U.S., Alba demonstrates that in such a ‘porous’ mainstream culture and identity a continuous confrontation with new ethnic and racial groups has accelerated the process of including parts of these groups’ cultures into the mainstream, resulting in a composite culture (Alba 2005, 25). Taking Alba’s line of argumentation further, one would expect sub-state territories with a strong identity such as minority nations to experience particular difficulties in integrating diversity stemming from immigration. A similar argument has been put forward by Walzer (2001) when he distinguishes between thick cultures which are heavily engaged in nation-building and thin cultures based on immigration such as the U.S. In Walzer’s view, it is more difficult to integrate into and to change the so-called ‘thick’ cultures – and he refers to France as an
example – whereas ‘thin’ cultures more easily allow for hyphenated-identities. But transferring the argument of a strong regional identification to the Scottish case, where an identification with ‘Scottish only’ prevails (Leith and Soule 2012) one would expect to find an exclusionary attitude as well. However, this is not the case among members of the SNP and in particular not among members of the majority of the Scottish political elite (van der Zwet 2012). Equally, the argument of a thick or strong regional identity, as is present in the Basque Country, does not automatically lead to the exclusion of migrants from the construction of the collective identity, as Jeram shows (Jeram 2012a).

Thus, as seen already with the political-institutional explanations, the ideological and cultural explanations developed so far also fail to explain variations in approaches to immigration both between minority nations and over time within the same sub-state territory. This literature review concludes with a review of the socio-economic and contextual explanations discussed in the literature, before proposing an additional exploratory framework.

3.1.3 Socio-economic explanations

A strong role is ascribed to those socio-economic conditions characterizing the minority nations such as the demographic profile, a strong or weak economy, and labour market respectively. Thus, it is argued (Hepburn 2012, 11) that a need for foreign workers drives the political elite towards a welcoming approach to immigration in order to boost economic performance. However, Hepburn remains silent on whether this also leads to inclusive integration policies and an opening of the construction of the minority community itself, or whether economic migrants are perceived purely as labour force and are thus excluded from constructions of the minority community.

A similar line of argument is proposed in relation to demographic change: migrants are viewed positively by regionalist parties if they can counterbalance relative demographic decline of the regional minority population in relation to the state majority population and also the absolute demographic decline of the overall population (Hepburn 2012, 10). Hepburn suggests a relation between the level of immigration and the demographic situation in the sub-state territory: high levels of immigration combined with a consistently increasing population lead to hostility and exclusion whereas low levels of immigration combined with demographic decline result in the need to counterbalance the decline and hence a more open
attitude. The question here is the limit of the number of migrants needed to shift the SNRPs’ approach from an inclusive to an exclusionary approach and what time span SNRPs require to identify immigration as a possible new challenge. This research assumes that 5% of the population of the minority nation being of migrant origin is substantial enough to require integration strategies from the political elite. This research analyses the changes in the construction of the minority nation’s identity over a period of twenty years, and hence assumes that this is an adequate time span for the political elite to develop a particular position on immigration and to eventually also change and reformulate the position.

A further factor put forward by Hepburn is the migrant composition, whereas she does not primarily distinguish between high- or low-skilled migrants, but makes a distinction based on the integration capacities of the immigrant community. Thus “immigration is viewed positively by regional parties if migrants are able to easily integrate and overcome the barriers to territorial membership” (Hepburn 2012, 11). Here Hepburn hints at linguistic or religious barriers that are specific to a particular sub-state territory. The integration capacity as an explanation can be linked to strong regional identification based on language and religion, whereas it is decisive whether these regional characteristics can also be acquired by newcomers or whether it is based on criteria such as blood, descent, birth, skin colour, etc., which cannot be changed by the individual.

3.1.4 Contextual explanations: supra-national and national framework

Further explanations for a particular approach to immigration evolve around the national and supra-national context: Globalization is presented by Keating (1996) and Jeram (2012b) as a factor promoting a positive approach towards integration. Jeram says that “the elites of minority nations respond to globalization by embracing one of its main consequences, ethnic diversity, by shifting the goal of the national project from protecting the core ethnie from outside influences, to one that seeks to include all residents of the territorial ‘homeland’ of the nation. A consequence of this […] is that minority nationalist societies are more open towards newcomers, and the elites implement policies to recruit migrants with the aim of increasing the number of people that identify with the nation” (Jeram 2012b, 39). Kymlicka (Kymlicka 2001b) suggests instead that globalization increases the demand for strong local identities and the need to protect local distinctiveness. Thus globalization first impacts the
minority nation’s identity, and as argued above, it is unclear whether strong or weak minority identities lead to a positive or negative approach to immigration.

Europeanization as a supra-national factor impacting the approach to immigration in minority nations has also been debated. Keating argues that Europeanization, defined as European integration, has developed a framework of European values rejecting ethnic allegiances pushing minority nations to support civic nationalism. He claims that “the European political arena has been open to nationalist and regionalist movements that have emphasized territorial and inclusive nationalism and democracy, and not to those that cleave to ethnic exclusiveness or racism” (Keating 2004, 370). This would suggest that more and more SNRPs move towards civic nationalism instead of advocating an ethnic type of nationalism.

Furthermore, it can be argued that the developing European framework for migrant integration forces compliance with EU norms of national governments and thus also regional and local actors. This common framework would suggest that the principles of integration are not only common to all nation states but also to the regions and thus the selected case studies. This has been confirmed by Adam and Jacobs who argue that Europeanization acts as centripetal force and increases convergence between the Francophone and the Flemish positions on immigration in Belgium (2014). However, Campomori and Caponio contradict this hypothesis and argue that “frames of migrant integration emerging at regional levels shape different geographies of social inclusion which are sometimes openly in contradiction with the EU discourse on equal treatment and mobility rights” (2013, 162). Thus, this work takes into account the changing European framework insofar as it is evaluated whether the selected minority nations adapt to the European value framework or whether they continue their approach irrespective of emerging norms at the European level.

Finally, the larger national context needs to also be taken into account when analysing the positions of minority nations towards immigration. Since European regions (apart from the Swiss cantons) – and not even EU states – do not have full competences over immigration in the sense of regulating access, entrance, and citizenship, the national framework is implemented in the respective minority nations and thus automatically sets limits on the

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2 Although the recent refugee crisis hints to a completely contrary development.
approaches taken by the minority political elite. Thus, citizenship criteria restricting or enlarging the admission of migrants to the territory are the same for all minority nations – irrespective of whether they are minority nation or a territorial autonomy or not – within a state and cannot be changed on the level of regional practice. Nevertheless, they can be challenged in discourse and as Jeram states, “the development of oppositional positions in policy areas, such as immigration, has not replaced culture and language as the bedrocks of identity construction and reproduction. Rather, I contend that it is simply a new way for nationalist leaders to articulate distinct values and goals that separate the minority nationalist community from the wider state because contextual changes have made traditional appeals lose some of their bite” (Jeram 2012a, 37). The approach to integration can thus be used as a nation-building tool (Barker 2012, Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero 2014a) or as tool to demonstrate minority distinctiveness vis-à-vis the approach taken by the dominant state which therefore influences the centre-periphery relations in a state.

This research includes the national context when evaluating the changes in the construction of the national minority community as proposed by the regional political elite and assesses whether or not they are in line with the national approach, and in case of disagreement, what are the underlying arguments.

3.1.5 Summarizing overview of the explanations developed in the literature

Table 1 summarizes the main explanatory factors that emerged in the literature for the varying approaches towards the integration of migrants, ranging from inclusiveness to exclusiveness and assimilation that are followed by European minority nations. The table does not reflect the importance attributed to single explanatory factors.
Table 1 – Overview of the main explanatory factors proposed in the literature

| Political-institutional explanations | • Legislative powers to govern immigration and/or integration;  
|                                      | • Perceived impact on negotiation power with the nation state;  
|                                      | • Party competition and polarization  
|                                      | • Regional electoral system.  
| Ideological and cultural explanations | • Party ideology;  
|                                      | • Civic vs. ethnic nationalism;  
|                                      | • Marginality theory/peripheral or oppressed groups;  
|                                      | • Path dependency/previous historical experiences;  
|                                      | • Strong and exclusive regional identification/thick cultures and identities;  
|                                      | • Presence of a national minority language.  
| Socio-economic explanations | • Particular economic and labour market necessities;  
|                                      | • Demographic necessities;  
|                                      | • Composition of the migrant population.  
| Contextual explanations | • Supra-national context – globalization and Europeanization;  
|                                      | • National context.  

Adam argues though, that each of these explanations need to be reflected on the basis of a ‘strategic link’ between the interests of the minority nation and the approach to immigration (2011, 5). She suggests that, based on the interests of the minority nation not to weaken its demographic and political power, the approach to immigration can be shifted from exclusion to assimilationist inclusion in order to strengthen the region’s own interests. Hence, according to Adam, political-institutional, ideological, socio-economic, or contextual explanations have less explanatory power then the interests of the elites in minority nation as such.

This literature review shows that there is a significant number of explanatory factors on the one hand, and a limited amount of minority nations, on the other, which makes it difficult to empirically test all the factors. Hence, the aim of this dissertation is to detect patterns of factors that have explanatory power for each particular minority nation selected. I examine whether the minority nation’s identity is constructed as changing towards a more inclusive
and open one and migrants are either expected to assimilate into the constructed minority nation’s identity or the migration-generated diversity is constructed as an integral part of the minority nation’s identity. Or alternatively, I evaluate whether SNRPs perceive immigration as a negative phenomenon for the minority nation and hence the minority nation’s identity is constructed by excluding migrants as well as migration-generated diversity from the self-definition.

However, this thesis argues also, that the aforementioned explanatory factors do not completely succeed in explaining the direction of the change in the minority nation’s identity because the scholars do not fully take into consideration the relations between the minority nation and the state. Joppke and Seidle argue that “federalism is one among a number of factors that influence the shape of public policies that affect migrant integration (including those that are not migrant-specific) and, ultimately, the outcomes of newcomers and their descendants” (2012, 17). Thus, similarly to Kymlicka (2001) and Zapata-Barrero (2009), Joppke and Seidle rely on an analysis of the political-institutional relations between the minority nation and the state and how those influence migrant integration. Particular dimensions of the societal relations between the minority population and the state majority are equally touched upon by authors such as Arrighi (2012), Hepburn (2012), Escandell and Ceobanu (2009). But this thesis argues that the relations between the sub-state territory and the state need to be seen as two sides of the same coin – thus an analysis of the political-institutional and societal relations together can bring important insight into how the construction of the minority nation’s identity changes once confronted with immigration.

The following section presents the two main hypothesis of this thesis based on the relations of the minority nation with the state. The section shows why these relations are important for the approach to immigration and the subsequent changes in the minority nation’s identity. The five selected minority nations are discussed in light of the centre-periphery relations. Through case selection I identified minority nations which differ in relation to the political-institutional relations expressed through the power-distribution between the state and the minority nation, and the societal relations based on the boundary between autochthonous communities, yet nevertheless are similar with regards to a number of the explanatory factors developed in the literature.
3.2. *Explanations suggested in this thesis: the relation between the minority nation and the state*

This thesis contributes to finding patterns of explanation for the impact immigration has on minority nation’s identity which are valid in the five selected cases – the Basque Country (ES), Corsica (FR), South Tyrol (I), Scotland and Wales (UK) – focusing on the relation between the sub-state territory and the state in which it is embedded. The explanations rely on the assumption that the primary claim of SNRPs is the protection and promotion of the minority nations’ (linguistic, religious, cultural, or territorial) distinctiveness vis-à-vis the state in which the minority nations is embedded. This particularity is aimed at protecting against interference from outside the minority nation, and thus the state as an actor, and against interference from within the minority nation, and thus traditionally from citizens of the same state who share the characteristics of the state population but reside in the minority nation.

Therefore, I suggest splitting the relations between the minority nation and the state into two levels: the political-institutional level of relations between the sub-state territory and the state, articulated by the distribution of powers between the state and the sub-state territory and the claims and degree of self-government, and the societal level of relations, expressed by the delimitation of boundaries between the minority and majority communities living within the minority nation. Neither level is a fixed category, but rather changing and subject to negotiations by the political elite. As such, the relations at both levels between the minority nation and the state can be fragile because they are tense and conflicting or they can be robust and conflict-free, thanks to mutual trust and adaptation, as will be shown below.

Zapata-Barrero and Barker argue that immigration to minority nations strengthens on the one hand secessionist movements, thus intensifying the conflict between the sub-state territory and the state (2014). On the other hand, they argue that immigration increases the societal cleavage or further division between the minority community and the state majority, thus intensifying the conflict internally. This thesis follows up on this effect, but does not take the intensification of the conflict as an outcome but, based on the suggested strategic link between the approach to immigration and the national context, as one of the explanatory factors of why a certain minority nation takes a particular approach to immigration. Thus, a
more salient conflict in the relations between the state and the minority nation is expected to drive the political elite towards using as many policy fields as possible, including immigration and integration, to strengthen their own interests and political aims.

Therefore, I expect that, in general, the more fragile and conflict-prone the relations between the state and the minority nation are, the more this drives the SNRPs to focus on protecting, maintaining and expanding the minority nation’s interests and claims. In such situations migrants are either excluded or strategically assimilated into the minority nation’s identity to reaffirm and strengthen the sub-state territory’s position vis-á-vis the state. Thus, the markers of the boundary of the minority nation’s identity do not change.

I expect robust and conflict-free relations between the state and the minority nation to lead to an inclusive redefinition of the minority nation’s identity and to a blurring and redefining of the boundary in a way which includes migration-generated diversity in the definition of the minority nation’s identity. The next section defines these expectations in detail.

3.2.1 The political-institutional relation between state and minority nation, based on the distribution of powers

The political-institutional relations between the sub-state territory and the state are tracked in this dissertation through the distribution of powers and competences between the two levels of government. As such, the distribution of competences expresses the accomplishment of the SNRPs’ claims to self-government. Thus, a large number of competences or a high degree of self-government is defined as a robust relation between the minority nation and the state (from the perspective of the SNRPs). But the degree of self-government as well as claims to further devolution can continue to vary over time and are not always accommodated by the state. In the worst case scenario, the minority nation receives no self-government or only a very limited and administrative form of self-government, as is the case in Corsica, and thus the political-institutional relations between the minority nation and the state are defined as fragile and conflict-prone. Or, as seen in other cases (for example Scotland from 1970 – 1997), the minority region is at a certain moment in time no longer satisfied with the degree of devolution and thus strives for more powers and competences, whereas this request is not accommodated by the state, and the political-institutional relations between the state and the minority nation are therefore equally defined.
as conflict-prone. Chapter three explains how I account for such eventual shifts in the distribution of powers and competences and, thus, in the political-institutional relations between the state and the minority nation. The next paragraphs rather focus on why the political-institutional relations between the state and the minority nation framed by the distribution of competences between the two levels of governance possibly influence change in the minority nation’s identity.

Kymlicka and other scholars have argued that the inclusion of migrants into the nation-building project of Quebec (Carens 1995, Kymlicka 2001a, b, Walzer 2001) was due to the devolution of powers on immigration (selection and admission). They claim that having powers over immigration abates the perception of a threat coming from the diversity introduced by international migrants and increases the perception of having the ability to use international immigration for regional purposes among the political elite. Thus, according to the Canadian scholar, the elites in Quebec were able to change from an ethnic definition of group identity to a post-ethnic minority nationalism due to the possibility to manage immigration flows and design integration policies independently from the state. Although the argument was developed in the particular context of Quebec and out of a single case study, a similar line of argumentation has been put forward in many other geographical contexts and policy fields based on the principle of subsidiarity: The capacity to influence policy making and to respond to the anxieties of the population decreases the perception of threat among the political elite.

Nevertheless, not all scholars agree with such a proposed automatic mechanism (Hepburn 2012, Jeram 2012b). Joppke and Seidle state in general that “federalism does play a role in the broad, ongoing story of migrant integration, but it is a relatively little one” (2012, 232). Moreover, federal structures can lead to both restrictive and inclusive approaches (Joppke and Seidle 2012, 231). However, the argument has never been empirically tested outside the context of Quebec.

The aim of this thesis is thus to investigate the validity of this argument by comparing five European minority nations in order to assess whether the approach towards integration and its relation to the minority nation’s identity depends on the powers to govern immigration. However, the initial argument by Kymlicka is broadened in this thesis. On the one hand, I do
not focus solely on the competences in the field of immigration and integration but on the overall degree of self-government. And on the other hand, the thesis does not assign explanatory power to the sole existence of legislative competences, but to them as an expression of robust political-institutional relations with the state.

The argument as developed by Kymlicka cannot directly be applied to the European context because no region in the EU has legal powers on the issue of immigration, namely to regulate the flow of international migration resulting in criteria for the selection and admission of migrants (Hammar 1985), as seen in Quebec. The management of migration flows of EU citizens is regulated by the European Union, whereas migration flows of Third Country Nationals as well as criteria for citizenship are regulated on the individual state level. Instead, integration policies dealing with the socio-economic, political, and cultural inclusion of migrants into the receiving society, are increasingly developed at a sub-state level. The ownership of these policies can be described as “cross-sectoral responsibility, whose dimensions are encompassed by policy fields such as labor, health, education, language use, housing, welfare and citizenship” (Kössler 2012, 368).

This research argues that due to this multilevel governance of immigration, competences to manage integration policies might in such a context be a proxy for the management of immigration and integration policies in Quebec. Hence it is expected that having powers to design and implement integration policies independently from the state is an expression of smooth relations between the sub-state territory and the state in the field of integration. Consequently, this is expected to lead to the development of a post-ethnic definition of the minority nation’s identity, blurring the boundary between the traditional markers of the minority nation’s identity and the migration-generated diversity, and thus facilitating the inclusion of migrants into the minority nation’s identity.

It has, however, also been argued that political-institutional powers in the area of integration are insufficient to guarantee that the particularity of the minority nation can be protected, and thus these powers don’t fully countervail against a perception of threat and weakening of the minority community. Moreover, the policy field of integration is said to intersect and overlap

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3 Switzerland is an exception, because of the significant decision making power of the local level in relation to citizenship.
with a number of socio-economic and cultural policy fields, such as housing, labour, welfare, and education. Thus, I argue in this thesis that only the combination of powers in the area of integration and powers to maintain the distinctiveness of the minority nation in identity relevant areas, such as education, culture, and welfare, equip a sub-state territory well enough to control, on the one hand, the integration of newcomers and on the other, the protection of the distinctiveness of the territory and its population. Expanded political-institutional powers are in most cases connected to territorial autonomy and result in smooth relations between the minority nation and the state because the high degree of self-government weakens the perception of threat to the minority’s position and claims.

Only a substantial degree of self-government, also including the policy areas of integration, as an expression of robust political-institutional relations between the state and the minority nation allows the construction of a post-ethnic minority nation’s identity and facilitates the inclusion of migrants into it. The boundary of the minority nation’s identity expands and is therefore redefined and blurred in a way to include migration-generated diversity.

In cases of fragile and conflict-prone political-institutional relations between the minority nation and the state, the approach to immigration and thus the minority nation’s identity can change towards further closure and contraction of the group boundaries. Since we also need to consider the strategic link between immigration and the relation of the minority nation with the state, I expect fragile and conflict-prone relations to eventually also result in no change of the markers of the group identity by assimilating migrants into the minority nation’s identity.

3.2.2. The societal relations between the minority and the state majority population based on the boundary between autochthonous communities

The societal relations between the various communities living in the sub-state territory are characterized by social proximity or distance. Since the greatest difference between communities is based on either culture, language, or in other cases such as Northern Ireland which are not included in this dissertation, religion, the relations between the groups depend on the division of the society along ethno-cultural or cultural-linguistic lines.
According to Lijphart (2004a) a divided society is characterized by the fact that the differences between groups are politically salient, a persistent marker of political identity, and the basis of political mobilization. Thus, political claims are refracted through the lens of ethno-cultural identity and there is an equation of ethno-cultural and political interest. In divided societies, the two or more groups living separately from each other along ethno-cultural lines have established in certain areas parallel political and social structures (parties, educational systems, media, associations, etc.) to preserve their own culture without interference from the other.

As discussed above, the societal relations between the minority nation and the state majority have also been linked to immigration in the work of Escandell and Ceobanu (2009), Jeram (2012a) and Arrighi (2012a). These authors have hinted at the relations between minority and majority when assessing the impact of strong regional identification, competing nation-building projects, or path-dependency on the approach to integration and they have come to diverging conclusions on both the importance of those relations and also on how relations influence the approach to integration. This thesis argues that instead of looking at particular expressions of the minority-majority relations, we need to focus on the nature of the boundary as an expression of the quality of relations between the groups, in order to assess how these relations impact on the approach to integration and consequently on how the minority nation’s identity evolves.

Relying on the importance of boundaries between groups (Wimmer 2008a, Alba 2005) on the one hand, and the need to differentiate against a ‘significant other’ in the process of identity formation on the other, this thesis argues that the nature of the boundaries affects the inclusion of migrant newcomers. Boundaries shift over time, expanding and thus including new markers for the definition of the group, contracting and thus excluding newcomers’ characteristics, or blurring, and as such shifting the focus of attention from one previously important marker to another. In order to assess how boundaries change we need to take a closer look at the nature of boundaries and the differentiation between strong or weak boundaries.

Strong boundaries are defined by Alba as ‘bright’ and “the distinction involved is unambiguous, so that individuals know at all times which side of the boundary they are on”
Such boundaries are difficult to cross, whereas blurred boundaries are defined as “involving zones of self-representation and social representation that allow for ambiguous locations with respect to the boundary” (Alba 2005, 22). Although Alba developed this differentiation between bright and blurred, or strong and weak boundaries, for the inclusion of migrants into a native population, the particularity of minority regions is a significant boundary between the constituent groups. Depending on the salience of this ethno-cultural division between the communities, the boundary is defined as bright and strong, or weak and blurred.

A minority community, when it is part of a divided society, has established strong and bright boundaries between itself and the state majority community, the perceived enemy and significant other. A minority group inclined to the establishment and policing of clear (ethnic) boundaries might see additional diversity triggered by immigration as a further threat and an additional significant other. Migrants might be perceived as a source of tension and a challenge to the balance in the territory. This might be particularly true if migrants share salient characteristics relevant to the divide, for example, Catholic migrants to Northern Ireland would be strongly resisted by Protestants in the region.

This thesis therefore argues that the integration of new diversity stemming from immigration in minority nations is based on the nature of pre-existing boundaries between the autochthonous communities. Bright boundaries will mark a conflict-prone relation and therefore either hinder the framing of a minority nation’s identity which includes new diversity or lead towards a strategic inclusion by assimilating migrants into the minority nation’s identity to further strengthen the minority group and its interests.

Such expectations are backed up by Gilligan et al.’s (2011) findings on the perception of immigration in Northern Ireland. They demonstrate that public attitudes reproduce the segregationist mentality between Catholics and Protestants towards migrants, whereas the political elite thinks of immigration as a bridge to overcome the division in the society. The First Minister of Northern Ireland sees immigration as “the potential to change the context within which the divisions of the past have remained” and “the opportunity for us to develop a better future for our ‘traditional’ sections of community to integrate new arrivals into a more cohesive society” (Gilligan et al. 2011, 254).
As proposed by Alba, the “nature of the minority-majority boundary depends on the way it has been institutionalized in different domains, some of them correlated with an ethnic distinction rather than constitutive of the distinction itself” (Alba 2005, 22). The most institutionalized form of a boundary between the minority and majority population is found in minority nations that are organized along consociational principles. Consociationalism as a form of power-sharing between groups has often been introduced as a means to manage an already very strong and conflict-prone boundary between the minority and majority. However, it is argued that consociationalism, and in particular the principle of proportionality as one of its main elements of power-sharing, can cement divisions between groups (Horowitz 1985). Furthermore, in order to be applied, proportionality needs fixed groups and thus applies a very static conception of identity which is challenged by the increasingly multilevel and multidimensional definition of identity. Thus, consociationalism relies on, and can reinforce, bright boundaries between groups.

One needs, additionally, to differentiate between degrees of division and areas of division: Although societies organized along the principle of consociationalism are divided on the political-institutional level, guaranteeing the proportional representation of communities in governmental bodies as well as the political elite organized along the same dividing lines, the division is not automatically reproduced on the societal and geographical levels. Thus, the nature of the boundary within the minority nation is defined on a scale, ranging from very bright, institutionalized, and present on the political-institutional, societal, and geographical level to blurred, weak, and not present at any of those levels.

In the minority nation where there is no distinction between minority national community and state majority, but the minority national community forms together with the state majority one conjoint society, sharing common structures and interests, we find a blurred and weak boundary between minority national and majority community. Alba refers to such situations of conjoint societies with weak and blurred boundaries as realities when “the composite culture is not uniform but encompasses considerable diversity” (Alba 2005, 25). He argues that in such conjoint, composite cultures, the boundary blurring between the native population and migrants is facilitated. In such a conjoint society, the ethno-cultural element
is not salient, and thus is not used for political purposes, and therefore does not impact the nature of the boundary.

Therefore, it is expected that the more blurred and weaker the boundaries between communities are, the less conflict-prone the relations between communities and thus the more conjoint a society is, the more this facilitates an open approach towards immigration which might lead towards the inclusion into the minority nation’s identity by expanding and redefining the initial boundaries of the conjoint society.

To summarize, this research reflects on the impact of the societal relations between communities, characterized by the boundaries developed between minority and majority, on the integration of migrants and changes to the minority nation’s identity. It argues that, depending on the nature of the pre-existing boundary between the minority and state majority community, this boundary is contracted, expanded, or blurred in relation to immigration.

3.2.2 Summary of expectations

This dissertation focuses on the political-institutional and societal relations between the minority nation and the state in order to assess the boundary changes of the minority nation’s identity. It argues that, fragile and conflict-prone political-institutional relations between the sub-state territory and the state and/or fragile and conflict-prone societal relations between the minority and the state majority community lead either towards an exclusion of migration-generated diversity from the minority nation’s identity or to an instrumentalized inclusion through assimilating migrants into the minority nation’s identity. Robust and conflict-free relations between the communities lead instead to a change in the markers of the minority nation’s identity to represent also migration-generated diversity within in the minority nation’s identity.

4. Conclusion

This thesis is one of the first attempts to develop a link between immigration and minority nation’s identity. Its main focus is on minority nations where the preservation and promotion of the (linguistic, religious, cultural, or territorial) identity is of particular importance for the justification of the minority nation’s distinctiveness vis-à-vis the state. The territories have
experienced significant immigration and thus this thesis assesses how immigration changes the construction of the identity of the minority nation.

Because of the dearth of literature on the relation between minority nation’s identity and immigration, the aim of this chapter was first of all to introduce the most relevant concepts and secondly to review the literature establishing a link between immigration and the sub-state level in general and in particular on minority nation’s identity or minority nationalism. Finally, this chapter has introduced the main expectations for changes in the minority nation’s identity resulting from the relations between the minority nation and the state in which they are embedded, based on the power-distribution between state and minority nation and the societal boundary between autochthonous communities within the minority nation.

The thesis evaluates these expectations for five minority nations: the Basque Country, Corsica, South Tyrol, Scotland, and Wales. The minority nations are characterized by varying relations to the respective states, whereas there is not only variation in the political-institutional relations between the sub-state territory and the state (reflected in the degree of autonomy and powers in the field of integration) but also in the societal relations between the minority and the majority community (reflected in the boundary between them). The variation is, however, not limited to the particular minority nation, but can also change within the minority nation over time. Therefore, a qualitative longitudinal approach to the research question is required.

The next chapter provides an overview of the methodological approach taken in order to fulfil the aims of this thesis. Chapter four introduces the minority nations.
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGICAL AND COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK

1. Introduction

This thesis examines the nexus between immigration and collective minority nation’s identity from the perspective of the Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties (SNRPs) and regional governments. This nexus is systematically compared across five selected minority nations, the Basque Country (ES), Corsica (FR), South Tyrol (IT), Scotland (UK), and Wales (UK), over a period of twenty years, from 1992 to 2012.

The aim of this chapter is to present the methodological framework, the rationale for a comparative study of the five minority nations, the logic behind the case selection, the data, method, the steps of data analysis, and the coding framework.

2. Rationale of comparison and case selection

The particular context and an interplay of a number of explanatory factors determine why certain SNRPs in minority nations have developed an open and inclusive approach towards immigration while others have developed a more restrictive one. Many of the explanatory factors laid down in chapter two have either been developed on a theoretical basis, without being tested empirically yet (Hepburn 2012) or are based on single case (Jeram 2012a, Kymlicka 2001a) or small comparative case studies involving up to three cases (Arrighi de Casanova 2013). There are many explanatory factors, but only a few minority nations which have experienced a significant inflow of international immigration. This prevents the use of a controlled comparison involving a large-N sample to find out which explanations are more relevant than others.

Nevertheless, this thesis aims at accounting for patterns across a variety of minority nations in order to discuss why certain SNRPs and sub-state governments favour one approach over the other. Therefore, this research relies on the structured and focused comparison method (George 1979). The comparison is structured because I follow the same guiding questions
and the same coding framework for all cases, which allows for a systematic accumulation of comparable data. The comparison is focused as I concentrate on two aspects, namely the political-institutional relations between the state and the minority nation and the relations between communities within the minority nation being confronted with immigration.

This approach requires a qualitative comparative design, and hence case selection is crucial. In order to evaluate patterns of explanation, an ideal case selection would follow Sartori’s advice to “choose entities that are similar, if possible, in all variables, with the exception of the phenomenon to be investigated” (1991, 250). However, due to the large number of potential explanatory factors, in practice it is impossible to control for all of them. Thus, careful case selection becomes even more crucial to assess the margin of acceptable variance on other dimensions while still allowing a meaningful comparison of the key relationships.4

I selected cases on the basis of similarity in relation to two dimensions. First of all, I only considered cases where part of the minority nation’s elite has claimed the recognition of its particularity by the state and been granted some form of autonomy to protect and govern this distinctiveness. Secondly, the selected cases need to share basic characteristics in relation to migration. On the one hand, international migration needs to have accounted for a substantial share of the population, which for the present research has been set at 5%. On the other hand, international migration needs to not be a recent but rather a constant phenomenon having occurred for at least 15 years in order to trigger a substantial change in the population and to give the political elite time to react to such a change.

A careful comparison of the above mentioned characteristics highlighted the Basque Country (ES), Corsica (FR), South Tyrol (I), Scotland (UK), and Wales (UK) as strong case study regions. The cases share enough similarities to allow for a meaningful comparison, while there is simultaneously variation regarding the power-distribution between the minority nation and the state and societal relations within the minority nation. Corsica is consistently considered to be the minority nation with the most conflict-prone political-institutional relations with the state, since the Corsican language and culture are not officially and fully

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4 Since case selection is crucial for this thesis, the preparatory case selection process was substantial. I screened a large number of cases in relation to the political-institutional and societal relations between the state and the minority nations as well as to the immigrant population demographics. For details and an overview of the initial screening of the cases see Annex 7.
recognized by the French state. Nevertheless, the island has been granted fragile administrative autonomy which partially allows for self-governance. On the other end of the continuum lie South Tyrol and the Basque Country which have both been able to negotiate with their respective states extensive legislative and fiscal autonomy that has enabled them to self-govern most of the policy areas not connected to external security for more than 30 years. Wales and Scotland are interesting cases because their relations to Westminster and their degree of self-government have changed significantly over the last twenty years.

Regarding the societal relations within the minority nations, the selected cases also show substantial variation. In South Tyrol the relations between the minority and the state majority are institutionalized through a consociational power-sharing system, and thus a political-institutional boundary between the two groups is very visible and bright. In South Tyrol, however, the boundary at the societal level is also very bright as shown by the existence of a two-tiered educational system and persistently segregated areas of residence. In contrast, in all other cases the boundaries between the state majority and the minority are less recognizable institutionally, but in the Basque Country, Wales, and Corsica are present to a varying degree at the societal level. Scotland is the only case where the majority and the minority speak the same language, although with a different accent, and therefore it is the case with the weakest boundary.

However, it is not just the definition of the minority nation’s identity, which is subject to change over time, but also the power-distribution between the sub-state territory and the state as well as the societal boundaries within a minority nation. Therefore, this thesis does not only engage in a comparison between the five selected minority nations, but out of necessity also in a within-case comparison. A within-case comparison over time is useful “because the degree of similarity [of the particular contextual factors] is likely to be higher” (Smelser 1967 114-115), and thus I can more easily assess whether the change in the relations to the state and within the sub-state territory has an impact on the approach to immigration and consequently the construction of the minority nation’s identity.

Thus, the between-cases comparison of the five minority nations is complemented by a within-case comparison of the sub-state where either the political-institutional or societal
relations with the state have changed significantly. Such a diachronic comparison allows this thesis to shed light on patterns of change and continuity (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003).

2.1 Operationalization of the relations between the minority nation and the state

In this research, the relations between the state and the minority nation constitute the main explanatory arguments for why certain SNRPs have developed an inclusive or exclusive approach towards migration, and thus consequently include, assimilate, or exclude migration-generated diversity in a redefinition of the minority nation’s identity. I expect fragile and conflict-prone political-institutional and societal relations between the state and the minority nation to drive the minority political elite into excluding immigration-generated diversity from the minority nation’s identity or to include it in an instrumental way.

As argued in chapter two, I divide the relations between the sub-state territory and the state into political-institutional and societal relations. The external dimension focuses on the political-institutional level and is articulated by the distribution of powers between the state and the minority nation. The societal relations instead are expressed by the boundaries between the minority and majority community within the minority nation. Since both levels are not fixed categories, but are rather volatile and subject to negotiations of the political elites, the next section defines how I operationalize the two levels and how I account for change.

2.1.1 The political-institutional relations between minority nation and state – and the power-framework

The hypothesis that minority nations need to have substantial legislative powers is, as argued in chapter two, a further development of Kymlicka’s initial hypothesis (2001b). However, rather than framing this hypothesis in terms of power (as done by Kymlicka), I see the degree of powers held by the minority nation related to minority nation’s identity and integration as an expression of the relations between the state and the sub-state territory. Thus, the more powers a minority nation has, the more its claims have been accommodated by the state, and thus the more robust the relations between the two levels of government are.
In order to operationalize this argument, I evaluate powers along two dimensions – in relation to the protection of the minority nation’s identity itself and in relation to migrant integration – and create two scales:

- **Powers related to the protection of the minority nation’s identity:** This scale includes variation in the degree of self-government. This depends on the number of decentralized policy areas, to what extent a sub-state territory can independently govern certain areas, and whether it has administrative, executive, or legislative powers over certain specific policy fields.

- **Powers related to the integration of migrants:** Independently from the status of self-government, integration is in many states a devolved policy area. While not directly connected to minority nation’s identity protection, integration cross-cuts a number of areas that are important for the minority nation’s identity, such as education, language, and culture. Therefore, I argue that regardless of the degree of self-government, it is necessary for a minority nation to have powers to regulate the policy field of integration independently of the state.

Table 2 summarizes how the powers in relation to the general protection of the minority nation’s identity and the integration of migrants are distributed along the two scales.
**Table 2 – The power-distribution between the minority nations and the respective states**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Powers related to the protection of the minority nation’s identity</th>
<th>Powers related to the integration of migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no powers</td>
<td>The minority nation is unable to design and implement policies crucial for the identity-preservation of the minority, such as use of language and language policies, education policies, culture and media policies, and the allocation of public posts and social services, but rather executes and administers the policies designed by the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limited powers</td>
<td>The minority nation has powers to shape policies crucial for the identity-preservation of the minority, such as the use of language and language policies, education policies, culture and media policies, and the allocation of public posts and social services designed at the state level in accordance to its own means.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extensive powers</td>
<td>The minority nation can execute its own laws in areas that are crucial for identity protection (language, education, and culture), and also in related areas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The areas where the sub-state territory can execute its own powers are codified in the formal statute which grants autonomy or self-government to the territory. Thus the minority nations have been selected on the basis of the statutes of autonomy or devolution acts. In order to classify the minority nations according to their degree of powers I rely on secondary literature.

Autonomy is, as argued, no prerequisite for powers in the area of integration. However, many issues related to integration, such as culture, education, language learning, social services, etc. are linked to devolved areas. Thus, the present research assumes that in combination with powers related to minority nation’s identity, powers in the area of integration strengthen the ability of a minority nation to develop its own approach towards immigrant integration, as was discussed in chapter two. Therefore, the second scale on powers related to the integration of migrants complements the first scale of powers related to minority nation’s identity. However, there is an overlap between the two scales for each of the five selected minority
nations. Table 3 provides an initial overview of the distribution of the cases in accordance with their powers. Chapter four provides more details and contextualization to the arrangements of autonomy and powers in the area of integration of the single minority nations.

**Table 3 – Categorization of minority nations in accordance with powers in the area of minority nation’s identity protection and immigrant integration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Powers in the area of minority nation’s protection</th>
<th>no powers/conflict-prone/fragile relations with the state</th>
<th>limited powers/limited relations with the state</th>
<th>extensive powers/robust relations with the state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no powers</td>
<td>Scotland prior to 1999; Wales prior to 1999; Corsica</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limited</td>
<td>Wales between 1999 – 2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extensive</td>
<td>South Tyrol; Basque Country; Scotland since 1999; Wales since 2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1.2 The societal relations between national minority and majority communities – and the nature of the boundaries

The second dimension of the relation between the minority nation and the state, namely the societal relation, is evaluated on two levels: the structural level and the societal level. Table 4 summarizes the criteria applied to evaluate the strength of the boundary at the political-institutional and societal level. Thus, a continuous scale ranging from no boundary, and thus no division but rather congruence, to a very bright and strong boundary, thus high division and low congruence, is applied to evaluate the selected cases.
Chapter four contextualizes the positioning of the cases along the divided-congruent dimension through a contextual overview (based on secondary literature) of the relations between the minority nation and the state in terms of the historical development of the minority–majority relations, the development of regional nationalism, the claims for self-determination, and the use of violence to achieve these claims.

**Table 4 – Indicators for a strong and bright boundary within a society**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal structure of the society: social and structural division</th>
<th>societal level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>structural level (Lijphart 2004)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• political system organized along ethnic lines;</td>
<td>• linguistic, religious, ethnic, or cultural criteria to define membership in societal groups;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• parties organized along ethnic lines;</td>
<td>• ethnic-identification systems;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• parallel institutional structures.</td>
<td>• geographic segregation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• interethnic marriages;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• media system: one or more, based on the existence of groups;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• educational system: one or more, based on the existence of groups;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• data on personal belonging (regional identity prevails over national identity);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• historical development of majority-minority relations based on tensions;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• claims for self-determination and the use of violence to achieve those claims.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 provides an overview of the distribution of the selected cases according to the societal relations between the autochthonous communities within the minority nation. A detailed contextualization and description of the nature of the boundary follows in chapter four.

**Table 5 – The strength of the boundary in the selected minority nations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Boundary at the structural level</th>
<th>absent to blurred</th>
<th>intermediate</th>
<th>bright and strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boundary at the societal level</strong></td>
<td>absent to very weak</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intermediate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bright and strong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2 Summary of case selection

Case selection is crucial for this research and as explained above, I selected cases based on similarities in the number of immigrants in each sub-state territory and based on their claims
to be a minority nation within the state. But the cases differ significantly from each other in their political-institutional relations to the state and societal relations within the minority nation which makes it possible to gain important insights into whether these relations impact the redefinition of the minority nation’s identity once confronted by immigration. In chapter four I present the selected cases in more detail regarding both their relations to the state and within the sub-state territory and the other explanatory factors which were identified in chapter two as likely to affect the approach to immigration.

Beyond the rationale of case selection as described, an additional advantage of this case selection is that this thesis combines the study of the well-researched cases of Scotland and the Basque Country with that of relatively under-researched ones: Corsica, South Tyrol, and Wales.

3. Operationalization of comparison

This section presents in detail how I approach the comparison of the five minority nations. First, I discuss how I assess changes in the minority nation’s identity. Secondly, I outline the perspective from which I assess the changes in the minority nation’s identity. And finally, I present the data used and the method of analysis.

3.1. Analysing identity change

Some authors have argued that research regarding identity often suffers from the critique that “identity tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense) or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity)” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 1). In accordance with this criticism, this thesis does not attempt to explain all aspects of minority nation’s identity. Instead I suggest narrowing down changes in the minority nation’s identity to the relation between minority nation’s identity and immigration, thus to how the ‘us’ (minority group) is constructed in relation to ‘them’ (migrants). As explained in chapter two, I use the concept of boundary making (Wimmer 2008a, Alba 2005, Zolberg and Woon 1999) and the concept of the significant other (Triandafyllidou 1998). Hence, this research focuses on whether the construction of minority nation’s identity
changes towards including, assimilating or excluding migration-generated diversity from its own self-definition.

In order to analyse how immigration impacts the construction of the minority nation’s identity, I first of all evaluate how immigration and migration-generated diversity are perceived in the minority nations by the SNRPs and the sub-state governments. To do this, I subdivide international immigration into three dimensions: immigration as a process, the migrant as the subject of this process, and integration as the consequence of this process. Sub-state governments and SNRPs are unable to influence the process of immigration – neither the number of migrants entering the territory, nor their reasons for entering the territory – nor can they select particular categories of migrants, and thus those two aspects are analysed at the rhetorical level. Integration as the consequence of this process, however, requires action on the part of the sub-state government, and thus this dimension is analysed at both the rhetorical level and the level of practice, i.e., at the (integration) policy level.

Analysing the discourse on the process of immigration gives insight into whether immigration is seen by the SNRPs as a threat or a benefit to their interests and which challenges it brings to the minority nation: security, economic, or cultural challenge. Analysing the discourse on the ‘migrant’ allows me to understand who should be included or excluded from the construction of the minority nation’s identity, or said more explicitly, who are the ‘wanted’ and ‘unwanted’ migrants. Analysing the discourse and policies on integration separately clarifies whether there is a preference for the integration of migrants into the overall society of the territory, or whether a differentiation between the integration into the minority or the state majority population is made and what the threshold and criteria for becoming a member of the community is. This differentiation between immigration, the migrant, and integration is reflected in the coding framework, as shown below.

Secondly, and based on the results of the analysis of those three dimensions of immigration, I analyse whether immigration is directly referred to in the definition of the minority nation’s identity and whether and how that definition changes over time.
3.2 Time frame

This research focuses on a period of 20 years, from 1992 until 2012. Using the legislative terms of regional governments, I divide the overall time frame of 20 years into smaller units and assess change from one unit to the next.\(^5\)

The 20-year period was selected because it covers a time-span when immigration was already salient on the European political agenda and when significant migrant populations were established in all five of the selected minority nations. Thus, immigration is no longer a marginal phenomenon at the sub-state level. The length of the period under scrutiny is necessary to provide the political elite enough time to react to immigration flows and to develop an approach and, subsequently, a strategy for dealing with the additional diversity stemming from immigration. Figure 2 shows the increase in the share of the international migrant population\(^6\) in the five selected regions over the last 20 years.

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\(^5\) There are four legislative periods analysed for South Tyrol and Corsica since 1990, four legislative periods for Scotland and Wales since 1999, and six legislative periods for the Basque Country since 1990.

\(^6\) I define ‘international immigrant population’ in this thesis as foreign born nationals who do not possess the citizenship of the state in which they currently reside. The term does not differentiate between EU nationals and Third Country Nationals. However, due to the very different migration history and naturalization procedures in the five selected minority regions, the term ‘immigrant’, when used in the general discussion of this thesis, might also include the ethnic minority population in Scotland and Wales and naturalized migrants in the other regions. When referring to a particular region only, and in particular to Scotland and Wales, I use the term ‘ethnic minority population’.
Contemporarily, the processes of decentralization and regionalism, which only recently began in Great Britain and France, has given regions further strength (Keating 2004). Alongside this, minority nationalism has also increased substantially over the last 20 years. Nationalist feelings can be measured on the one hand by the ‘Moreno-Question’, which asks if a person’s regional identity prevails over their national identity, but unfortunately there are no data available for Corsica and South Tyrol (for an overview of regional identification in the selected minority nations see chapter 4). On the other hand, nationalism can also be measured by support for SNRPs. Figure 3 shows the level of support for SNRPs in the selected minority nations from 1990 – 2013.

Data: see Table 10. Definition of immigrant population: foreign born.
Chapter 3 – Methodological and comparative framework

**Figure 3 – Support of SNRPs (% in the regional parliament) from 1990 – 2013**

![Support for SNRPs, 1990 - 2013](image)

Data: see table 6. Vertical axis: percentage of seats held in the regional parliament; created by the author. Devolution in the UK only began in 1999, and thus Scotland and Wales have only been granted legislative competences and their own governments since then. Thus, in this table I take into account only the support for SNRPs in the post-devolution election.

### 3.3 The perspective of ethnic identity entrepreneurs and Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties

As argued in chapter two, for the present research I chose to examine the perspective of minority nations’ identity entrepreneurs (Brubaker and Cooper 2000), in this case the Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties (SNRPs) due to their self-ascribed role of representing the minority nations’ interests and consequently, due to their conscious role in (minority) identity building and their role as policy makers.

However, depending on the minority nation and the period, SNRPs are in government and/or in opposition. In the Basque Country, South Tyrol, Scotland and Wales there was a convergence between the SNRPs and the sub-state’s governments at a certain period. In Corsica SNRPs were not in government from 1992 to 2015, and only entered government at the end of 2015 (which falls out of the time frame covered in this research).

The parties in the minority nations have been selected not only on the basis of their compliance with the aforementioned definition of SNRPs (see chapter two) but also on the basis of their relevance. For SNRPs relevance has been specified by Massetti as follows: “a) electing representatives to the regional assembly on, at least, three consecutive occasions; b)
in the case of new parties that have not contested three regional elections yet, the criterion is either electing representatives on two occasions or getting into office (at regional level) at the first election; c) in the case where an elected regional assembly does not exist (or did not exist in the past), the criterion is electing representatives to the central parliament” (2009, 505).8

Table 6 presents the parties selected9 and their electoral performance since 1990. For Scotland and Wales, elections to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly are taken into consideration, and thus the time period is shortened to 1999 – 2012.

---

8 The Corsican MPA – Movimento per l’Autodeterminazione (Movement for Self-determination) was not included in the selected ethno-regionalist parties because it did not comply with the criteria of relevance.

9 For the full names of the parties and the English translations see List of Abbreviations.
Table 6 – Overview of the selected parties and their electoral performance from 1990 – 2013

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>party (year of foundation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVP (1958)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dF (1992)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UfS (1992)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF (2007)</td>
<td>split from UfS in 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total seats of ethno-regionalist parties (total assembly = 35)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of regionalist parties in the assembly</td>
<td>65.7%</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>74.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>party (year of foundation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN (1987)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>transformed in PN in 2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PN (2001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 (in coalition with CHJAMA - PNC - CN/INDEP - ANC - VERDI – PSI)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>merged with CN, Rinnovu and A Mossa Nazionale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FeC</td>
<td>merger of UPC, A Scelta Nova and A Mossa Nazionale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total seats of ethno-regionalist parties (total assembly = 51)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of regionalist parties in the assembly</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Basque Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PNV (1895)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HB (1978)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EH (1998)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (2001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EHAK (2002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aralar Party (2000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE (split from EA for 1990 elections, and a part of it merged after 1990 elections with PSE, another again with EA)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA (1987)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total seats of ethno-regionalist parties (total assembly = 75)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of regionalist parties in the assembly</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Scotland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SNP (1934)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG (1999)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total seats of ethno-regionalist parties (total assembly = 129)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of regionalist parties in the assembly</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PC (1925)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total seats of ethno-regionalist parties (total assembly = 60)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of regionalist parties in the assembly</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: homepages of the regional governments.
3.4 Data sources and data collection

For the aim of this research, I chose to focus on official party and government positions as they represent the finalized outcome of the consensus reached by either by the SNRPs or the government relating to the particular policy areas. Thus, this research does not reflect on, evaluate, or analyse the reasoning behind a certain position, nor search for underlying conflicts, justifications, or varying positions within a party, but rather examines just the positions themselves. The data used for this research are official documents as shown in table 7, retrieved either via the internet or from party and governmental archives. I collected the data for South Tyrol during the period I worked as a researcher of the European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano (EURAC) in 2011-2012. For Scotland and Corsica, I collected the data during fieldwork in these regions\(^ {10}\) and through desk research. For Wales, I collected the data through internet research, the archives at the National Library of Wales, and from the Plaid Cymru archives. For the Basque Country I collected data through internet research and relied on the Regional Manifesto Project.\(^ {11}\)

As Table 7 shows, the data collected relate to two levels of analysis, data that serve to analyse the rhetorical level, and data that are used to analyse the policy level. This differentiation is important, as argued in Chapter two, because a significant gap between what is discussed and what policies are proposed and adopted is identified in the literature (Escandell and Ceobanu 2009, Jeram 2012a, Gilligan, Hainsworth, and Aidan 2011). For the data analysis I rely on Atlas.ti, and for this purpose I created one ‘hermeneutic unit’ (HU)\(^ {12}\) for each of the selected minority nations which contains all the primary data for that region. Annexes 1-5 show which specific data form the HU of each sub-state territory.

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\(^{10}\) In Scotland the fieldwork was conducted between October and November 2011; in Corsica, in May 2013. Due to the scarcity of documents available from regionalist parties in Corsica, two interviews with the leader of CN (Corsica Nazione) Jean-Guy Talamoni, and the leader of Femu A Corsica, Gilles Simeoni, were conducted. However, because interviews were not conducted in any of the other regions, these two interviews are only used for background knowledge.

\(^{11}\) The data from the Regional Manifesto Project [http://www.regionalmanifestosproject.com/](http://www.regionalmanifestosproject.com/) were provided by Matthias Scantamburlo from the University of Innsbruck/University of Deusto.

\(^{12}\) A hermeneutic unit (HU) is the organizational structure that Atlas.ti uses to bundle Primary Documents (PDs) representing the data sources as well as quotations, codes used for developing concepts, and conceptual linkages (families, networks). It can be compared to a folder containing documents and information.
In each HU I arranged documents into ‘document families’. Families are necessary to filter the documents and the codes in the data analysis. The following document families were created for each minority nation: government, parties (one specific family for each party), election manifesto, and one family for each legislative period. Due to overlapping information, one document can be part of many families.

**Table 7 – Data collected by level and actor type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Actors – identity entrepreneurs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>regional government</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse/rhetoric</td>
<td>• coalition programmes;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• parliamentary debates;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• press releases either directly dealing with immigration/integration or dealing with ‘identity-related areas’ (education, culture, language) referring to immigration…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• party manifestos;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• thematic documents on immigration, integration, education, culture, and language;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• laws in ‘identity-related areas’ (education, culture, language) referring to immigration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice</td>
<td>• integration policies/integration plans;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• thematic documents on immigration, integration, education, culture, and language;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• laws in ‘identity-related areas’ (education, culture, language) referring to immigration.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

13 Families can be compared to filters that are used during the data analysis process to retrieve not only documents, but also codes. It is possible to retrieve all codes that are allocated to one or more particular families, for example, all sentences/paragraphs that have been coded with ‘immigration_economic benefit’, allocated to the family ‘party_SVP’ and the family ‘1993-1998’.
3.5 Data analysis and coding framework

The data are analysed through qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2000). Given the considerable scope of the research in terms of the time span and number of minority nations and SNRPs (and thus primary documents), qualitative content analysis proves to be the most suitable method for the proposed comparison of identity change in five minority nations over time. It allows, on the one hand, for an interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). On the other hand, qualitative content analysis allows for a numerical representation of the results, which is suitable for a comparative design examining five cases over a time span of 20 years.

The data have been coded with Atlas.ti around the following discursive clusters, as discussed above in section 3.1: the definition of immigration, the definition of ‘the migrant’, the definition of integration, and the definition of ‘identity’. Although the sub-codes were developed inductively from the material itself to guarantee that all important dimensions and specific regional topics were captured, a coding framework was developed which allowed for a subsequent structured and focused comparison of each of the five cases. Table 8 shows the coding framework, which includes the guiding questions from which the sub-codes were developed in each minority nation. The coding framework was developed on the basis of the work of Kleiner-Liebau (2009) which was particularly useful because the author links immigration to national identity at a national and sub-state level.
### Table 8 – Coding framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discursive clusters + sub-codes</th>
<th>time frame = single legislative period (all terms in all cells)</th>
<th>actor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SNRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How is immigration described? e.g., as a threat, contributing to the criminalization of country; as an enriching value, as economic resource; as a neutral fact; as a challenge ...?</td>
<td>legislative term 1</td>
<td>discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What is the role of the sub-state territory/of the state in this process?</td>
<td>legislative term 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>legislative term 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>legislative term 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migrants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What characteristics are given to migrants? what status? what role and what names? e.g., strangers, burden on the welfare system illegal, criminal; additional workforce?</td>
<td>etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is there a difference made between internal and international immigrants?</td>
<td>etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Integration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What is the aim of the actors? e.g., assimilation into minority group; exclusion; how is integration defined? e.g., bi-directional process, etc.</td>
<td>etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What are the principles of integration/are there any values specified?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How to handle integration?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Who are the actors involved? How are other actors and parties criticized?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Which concrete measures are proposed? <em>(only category which relates to the dimension of 'practice'</em>)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minority nation’s identity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What values are given to the territory such as democracy; religiosity; minority rights ...?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How is the identity described?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are there references to the respective nation state?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Codes can correspond to a sentence, a part of a sentence, or a paragraph. The quantification of the results thus depends on the number of codes allocated to a particular text and says nothing of the relation between codes and the overall text. Coding took place in various steps going forth and back through the data.

After coding I grouped codes of each discursive cluster into ‘code families’ reflecting a negative perception, a neutral perception, or a positive one, i.e., integration_negative, integration_positive, and integration_neutral. The specific code list and code families for each minority nation can be found in the annexes 1-5.

For the data analysis I began by creating ‘codes-primary document tables’ and exported them into Excel (by using this function in atlas.ti). A ‘codes-primary document’ table compares the distribution of a particular code or set of codes across selected documents, e.g., the sum of all codes in code family integration_negative plus the sum of all codes in code family integration_neutral plus the sum of all codes in code family integration_positive for each legislative period. As an example, table 9 shows the number of each code on integration for Scotland. From such tables I created a simple line chart in excel. With these tables and the respective charts, I could evaluate whether there was a change over time.

Table 9 – Example of distribution of codes - Scotland – integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INT_negative</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT_neutral</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT_positive</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL CODES INT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Secondly, and in order not to focus only on the quantitative distribution of negative, neutral, and positive codes, I created for each code family a ‘network view’, which can be compared to mind-maps, whereby all codes that are allocated to one discursive cluster can be grouped thematically. The network views helped to filter out the predominant topics and frames through which immigration, the migrant, integration, and identity are referred to.

Atlas.ti offers the possibility of using Boolean operators through a query to retrieve quotations which have been coded with a specific set of codes. For example, it is possible to
retrieve all quotations with ‘INT_basic human rights’ AND ‘INT_education’ BUT NOT ‘INT_political participation.’ These quotations are included largely in chapters 5-7 of this thesis. In particular, the query was a useful tool for historical comparison as it can be limited to a certain document family and thus a certain legislative period; in this way, the trends in relation to one code (or more) can be observed over time.

To summarize, I performed a qualitative content analysis of the data, relying on the Atlas.ti software to assist with the qualitative data analysis. The software was particularly useful because of the large amount of data and it guaranteed the comparability of data over time.

However, the risk of a qualitative comparative study involving five cases over a period of 20 years, wherein most of the cases there is a multiplicity of parties to be analysed, is a lack of in-depth analysis of each single case. Nevertheless, I believe that the added value of this thesis is not a detailed analysis of five single cases, but a comparative evaluation of cases which have been selected due to their particularities regarding the political-institutional and societal relations between the minority nations and the states.

4. Summary

This chapter presented the rationale behind comparing the SNRPs in the Basque Country, Corsica, South Tyrol, Scotland, and Wales over a period of 20 years (1992 – 2012. Moreover, the chapter introduced the data sources and steps of data analysis that guided the research.

The next chapter presents the five minority nations, and in particular it introduces the immigration flows and the demographic development in the minority nations as well as the political-institutional relations and the power-distribution between the minority nations and the respective central states and the societal boundaries within the minority nations.
CHAPTER 4. CONTEXTUALIZATION OF CASES

1. Introduction
The present chapter introduces and contextualizes the five selected cases in more detail. I begin this chapter by presenting the demographic structures, autochthonous historic populations, and the share of the immigrant and ethnic minority populations in each of the selected minority nations. Secondly, I contextualize the selected cases in a comparative manner in relation to the most important explanatory factors identified in the literature.\textsuperscript{14} There is a particular emphasis on describing the development of the SNRPs in the selected minority nations, since these parties are the main focus of the analysis. Finally, I compare the selected minority nations in relation to the main explanatory variables proposed in this research, namely the political-institutional relations between the minority nation and the respective state and the societal relations within the minority nation.

2. Demography of the selected minority nation: emigration and immigration
Table 10 below provides an overview of the selected minority nations in terms of population size as well as in terms of share of immigrant/ethnic minority population.

\textsuperscript{14} Due to the limited word count at my disposal, background information, such as population size, share of immigrant population, and also data on the economic situation are placed into comparative tables. For the information on the economic background of each minority region see Table 21 in Annex 6.
Table 10 – Demographic overview of the selected minority nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority Nation</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>Wales</th>
<th>Basque Country</th>
<th>Corsica</th>
<th>South Tyrol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population (Census 1991)</td>
<td>4,998,567</td>
<td>2,835,073</td>
<td>2,104,041</td>
<td>306,623</td>
<td>440,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population (Census 2011)</td>
<td>5,295,403</td>
<td>3,063,456</td>
<td>2,179,815</td>
<td>314,486</td>
<td>505,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% foreign born population (Census 1991)</td>
<td>147,694 2.9%</td>
<td>75,938 2.9%</td>
<td>less than 0.2%</td>
<td>26,018 10% (1999)</td>
<td>5,100 1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% foreign born population (Census 2011)</td>
<td>347,045 6.5%</td>
<td>167,871 5.5%</td>
<td>139,369 6.4%</td>
<td>27,481 8.7%</td>
<td>44,362 8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% ethnic minority population (Census 1991)</td>
<td>111,818 2.2%</td>
<td>62,392 1.5%</td>
<td>not available</td>
<td>not available</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% ethnic minority population (Census 2011)</td>
<td>432,616 8.2%</td>
<td>208,006 6.8%</td>
<td>not available</td>
<td>not available</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: Census 1991 (Scotland and Wales: Casweb); Census 2011 (Wales: Table Nr. KS204EW; KS201EW. Scotland: Table Nr. KS204SC; KS201SC, Corsica (Recensement de la population 1999 INSEE; INSEE 2011), South Tyrol (ASTAT Census 1991 and 2011)

Scotland is the largest of the five minority nations in terms of both geographical size and population. Throughout the 20th century, and until the early 1970s, the population of Scotland increased gradually. One of the main reasons for this population growth was immigration, which had begun at the onset of the 20th century when immigrants from other European countries, in particular Italy, Russia, and Poland began to arrive in Scotland in search of employment.
However, after reaching its peak in 1974, Scotland’s population then decreased until 2000. This provoked serious concerns regarding a demographic crisis threatening Scotland’s prosperity (Camp-Pietrain 2014, 117). Consequently, and in parallel to a new wave of immigration to Britain in the 1990s and 2000s, the newly devolved government began to seek to attract new immigrants to Scotland. Thus, the foreign-born population has again been on the rise since the early 2000s, and now constitute 6.5% of the Scottish population. The largest non-white ethnic groups in Scotland over the last 20 years have been the Pakistani, Indian, and Chinese communities.

For centuries, however, the largest immigrant group to Scotland has been internal migrants from England (Hussain and Miller 2006, 20). In the 1991 census, 7% of the Scottish population was born in England, and in the 2001 census 7% describe themselves as “white British but neither Scottish nor Irish” (Hussain and Miller 2006, 21). In the 2011 census, these figures had increased to 9% of the population of Scotland being born in England, and 8% declaring a ‘British’ national identity, 2% an exclusively ‘English’ identity, and 2% a combination of UK identities excluding the Scottish. In contrast, 83% of the population claimed a Scottish national identity (National Records of Scotland, Statistical Bulletin, 26.09.2013, 3).

Thus, both internal and international immigration have always been a considerable factor in the composition of the Scottish population. At the same time, emigration has also been a constant in Scottish history. In particular, between 1841 and 1931 a high number of young Scots left the country in search of a better life in England and overseas in Australia, the USA, and Canada, but also South Africa and other places. Thus, both emigration and immigration have played important roles in Scottish history, the composition of the population, and also therefore the construction of the particular Scottish identity, as chapter seven will demonstrate.

The second-largest (in terms of geography) minority nation selected for this research is Wales. It has currently a population of 3,063,456. Similar to Scotland, until recently Wales was also characterized by high emigration rates, while in the mid-19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century the coalfields in South Wales began to attract immigrants from England and Ireland, who were then followed by South Europeans. Migration to and from
Wales has traditionally been connected to the question of Welsh language and culture (Loughlin 2003, 5), and when a second large wave of in-migration from Ireland (as a consequence of the Irish famine) occurred, this resulted, as also experienced in Scotland, in a “conflict between them and the native Welsh, caused by the differences in religion (Catholicism vs. non-conformist Protestants) and language” (Loughlin 2003, 5). In-migration from Ireland did not continue into the 20th century, and at the 1991 census, less than 1% of the Welsh population was born in Ireland. Rather, 19% of the Welsh population was born in England, a figure which increased to 20% by the 2011 census. In relation to national identity in 2011, 11.2% declared an ‘English only’ national identity, whereas 57.5% claimed a ‘Welsh only’ identity. Hence, similar to the Scottish case, migration from England and Ireland have significantly impacted the population structure and the construction of the Welsh identity.

Besides first international migration in the 1960s and 1970s to the Cardiff area, international migration did not affect Wales again until the late 1990s: the 2001 census reports that 2.1% – or ca. 62,000 people in Wales – were foreign born and did not have a ‘white’ background. At the 2011 Census, the foreign-born population accounted for 5.5%, and although the ethnic minority population in Wales is very diverse, similarly to Scotland the population with South Asian backgrounds prevails.

In 2011 the Basque population amounted to 2,179,815. The Basque Country also has a long history of internal migration, and it is only recently (since 2000) that the largest migration flows have originated outside of Spain rather than in other Spanish regions. In 1998 the share of the foreign-born population in the Basque Country was 0.72% but in less than a decade this rose to 4.98% (in 2006 98,524 foreign born) (Blanco Fernández de Valderrama 2008, 191). From 2007 to 2010 there was another significant increase of new immigrants settling in the Basque Country (ca. 40,000), thus leading to a 6.4% (139,369) share of the region’s population in 2011. Until 2007 most of the immigrants came from Latin America (more than 50%), followed by Romanians and Moroccans (Blanco Fernández de Valderrama 2008, 193), but in 2011 the largest groups were Romanians (10.9%) and Moroccans (10.4%), followed by Colombians (9.2%) and Bolivians (8.6%) (Eurostat, Population and Housing Census 2011).
Similar to Wales and Scotland, in the Basque Country internal migration also has a long history. Between the late 19th century and 1930 the Basque economy expanded, which provoked a significant increase in the population; it nearly doubled due to immigration of workers from other Spanish regions, and again increased significantly in the 1950s and 1960s due to a renewed expansion of the Basque economy (Conversi 1997, 201).

South Tyrol is very similar to the Basque Country when it comes to the pattern of recent influxes of international migrants in comparison to past large waves of internal migration. South Tyrol has a population of 505,067 (Census, 2011). Since the 1990s there has been a rapid and substantial diversification within the South Tyrolean population: international immigrants – especially from the former Yugoslavia, North Africa, and recently from Latin America – have settled in the province (Medda-Windischer and Girardi 2011b, 16). In 2011, 44,362 immigrants (8.7% of the South Tyrolean population) from 134 countries were registered. One third of them were from EU countries; one third from other European countries (especially the Former Yugoslavia and Albania); 16.5% from Asia; 12.7% from Africa; and approximately 5% from the Americas. The largest groups residing in South Tyrol are the Albanians with 5,500 persons, followed by Germans (4,700), Moroccans (3,600) and 3,032 people from Pakistan. Thus, in only 20 years the percentage of international immigrants living in South Tyrol grew from 1% to 8.7% (ASTAT 2012). Due to the short history of migration there is, as also in the Basque Country, as of yet no established second or third generation of immigrants, nor have there been many naturalizations.

Internal migration was particularly strong in the first years after Italy’s annexation of the territory in 1918-1919. In 1910, according to the last Austrian census, 223,913 persons resided in South Tyrol, of which 89% were German speakers. At that time 7,339 persons (2.9% of the population) were Italian speakers, 9,429 persons (3.8%) Ladin speakers, and 10,770 (4.3%) did not declare belonging to any of the three linguistic groups. By 1920 the Italian-speaking population amounted to 10.6% (27,048) which reached its peak in 1961 with 34.3% (128,271) (ASTAT 2008, 19) due to the active migration policy of the Fascist government as a means to Italianize the province (Lantschner 2008). However, after the 1960s the Italian population in South Tyrol began to decrease again, before stabilising since the 1970s at around 26%.
Corsica is geographically the smallest of all minority nations selected and its population of 309,693 (as of 2011) constitutes 0.48% of the French population. Nevertheless, Corsica has, aside from the Île de France region, the highest proportion of immigrants in the French state (Henders 2010a, 93). Similar to Scotland and Wales, and also to a lesser extent the Basque Country and South Tyrol, the demographic development of Corsica has been characterized by emigration of autochthonous Corsicans and immigration from other French regions and other countries.

From the late 19th century until the 1960s Corsica experienced a significant influx of immigrants from neighbouring Italy (Luciani 1995, 49). In the early 1960s, however, the newly-gained independence of France’s former colony, Algeria, led instead to the arrival of a second wave of immigrants, primarily men from Algeria and other post-colonial states of the Maghreb. Combined with a significant influx of persons from the French state, the population of the island increased between 1960 and 1980 from 170,000 to 240,000, but at the same time a large proportion of the autochthonous population emigrated. As Henders points out, “by the early 1980s, the time of the special [autonomy] status, one in three islanders originated elsewhere” (2010a, 93). In 1999 there were 26,000 immigrants residing in Corsica, which constituted about 10% of the population (INSEE 2004). They are mainly from the Maghreb region, with 80% of them having immigrated from Morocco. The next largest groups are from Portugal and Italy. In 2011 8.7% of the Corsican population (27,481) persons are foreign born and additional 9,523 are of foreign origin but have acquired French citizenship (INSEE, RP2011).

Internal immigration from the French mainland is a politically contested, yet important factor for Corsica. In 1990 62% of the Corsican population had been born on the island, 21.3% in continental France, and 6% in a foreign country but held French citizenship at birth. The share of persons born in continental France increased to 28.6% by 2011, reducing the population born on the island to 56.3% and those holding French citizenship at birth who were neither born on the island nor in continental France to 5% (INSEE, 2011).

Although internal immigration is an important factor in all of the selected minority nations, the question of how to deal with internal immigration from France and with those holding French citizenship born outside of France – mainly those who resettled in Corsica after the
independence of Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria, many of whom had Corsican ancestry – is one of the most contested topics among the Corsican SNRPs, as will be shown in detail in chapters five, six and seven.

This overview of the demographic structure of the selected minority nations shows that by 2011 each of the minority nations had reached an immigrant population amounting to more than 5% of the sub-state territory’s total population. And although the particular migration histories differ between the minority nations, Scotland, Wales, and Corsica are characterized by outmigration, early waves of immigration from neighbouring countries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, immigration from other regions of the same state, and recent waves of international immigration. South Tyrol and the Basque Country, in contrast, did not experience waves of international immigration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, but rather a significant influx of persons from other regions of the same state, and hence the recent international immigration waves constitute their first experiences with cultural and linguistic diversification of the population aside from previous contact with citizens of the state majority. In chapter five I show how the different immigration histories and waves of immigrants have influenced how SNRPs frame current immigration and in particular, how SNRPs construct and define the different waves of immigration in relation to the autochthonous population.

3. Political-institutional framework

3.1 Party system, party ideology and electoral system

Table 6 in chapter two gave an overview of the selected SNRPs and their electoral performance from 1990 to 2013. Moreover, the table also demonstrated the importance of the respective SNRPs in relation to the state-wide parties operating in the particular minority nation. In this section, I provide further details on the minority nation’s party systems, competition between parties, and the ideological positions of the selected SNRPs. It is expected that the party system and in particular, the party ideology significantly impact the SNRPs’ positions on immigration (Hepburn 2012). Variation in the electoral system instead,
as proposed by Erk (2014), cannot be taken into account in this dissertation, since all of the selected minority nations employ some form of proportional representation.

The party system in South Tyrol can be characterized by the dominance of the ethnic cleavage (Pallaver 2010, 212). The Südtiroler Volkspartei (South Tyrolean People’s Party – SVP) was founded on 8 May 1945 as a successor party to the Deutscher Verband (German Association) in order to give the German- and Ladin-speaking populations in South Tyrol a voice: it considered itself from the very beginning the ethnic representation of both autochthonous linguistic groups. Until the mid-1950s, the SVP’s politics were characterized as moderate-conservative (Holzer and Schwegler 1998, 164), and it was in this period that the party negotiated the First Autonomy Statute with the Italian state (1948). The SVP also played a central role in the negotiation of the subsequent second autonomy statute and the so called ‘package agreement’, a road map which led to the full implementation of the Second Autonomy Statute in 1993.

The relevance of the party can be understood not only through its role in the negotiation of the legislative framework of South Tyrol but also by looking at its electoral dominance. From the first elections in 1948 until today, the party has held an absolute majority in regional assembly seats, and it was only in 2008 that it lost the absolute majority in terms of votes. Moreover, the regional president has always been a member of the SVP. The SVP can thus be called, according to Sartori (2005), a ‘hegemonic’ or even ‘predominant’ party, but it has never ruled by itself due to the ethnic quota system which requires governmental representation of all autochthonous linguistic groups.

Defining the South Tyrolean party system according to Sartori’s patterns of party competition and taking into account the number of parties in the assembly, the party system can be defined as “polarized pluralism” (1976, 119-128). In order to classify the party system in South Tyrol one has, according to Pallaver (2009, 260-262), to also take the ideological position of the parties into account. He suggests, however, classifying the parties not according to ideological distance between the ideological right and left, but rather according to their position regarding the claims for self-government or nation-building. Thus, the party

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15 Between 1948 and today there have been between 6 and 11 parties present in the assembly.
system can be classified as a form of ‘polarized pluralism’: there is foremost a polarization between the SNRPs representing the German and Ladin speakers who demand self-government or secession, and the parties representing the Italian speakers who demand a stronger role for the state. Until 1993 the SVP was the only relevant SNRP but since then new parties have emerged, and there is now polarization among them on the degree of self-government: greater autonomy is demanded by the SVP, and secession (dF, SF), or reunification with Austria (UfS, SF) is demanded by the other parties.

The Union für Südtirol (Union for South Tyrol – UfS) was established in 1989. The party can be defined as a conservative right-wing party which demands the secession of South Tyrol and reunification with Austria. In 2007, one of the most prominent members of the UfS, Eva Klotz, founded her own party, the Südtiroler Freiheit (South-Tyrolean Freedom – SF) which can be defined as even more separatist as it demands a referendum on immediate secession from Italy and either the development of an independent state or reunification with Austria. Die Freiheitlichen (the Liberals – dF), founded in 1992 as an opposition party to the SVP, has by now become the second strongest SNRP which currently holds 5 seats in the regional assembly and competes with the SVP for the votes of the German language group. Similar to SF, dF campaigns for independence from the Italian state, but not for re-unification with Austria.

There are a number of similarities in the political landscape of the Basque Country to its South Tyrolean counterpart (Acha Ugarte and Peréz-Nievas 1998): there is an equally high fragmentation among SNRPs, and thus the party system also falls under Sartori’s pattern of ‘polarized pluralism’. Until 2009, the strongest party traditionally, the Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea – Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party – EAJ-PNV) occupied an equally strong position in the Basque Country as the SVP in South Tyrol. Although the EAJ-PNV never held an absolute majority of seats in the regional parliament it has been the strongest political party since the end of the Francoist regime and provided the president of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country, the Lehendakari, until 2009. The EAJ-PNV can be characterized comparably to the SVP, as a centre-right party with Catholic roots, and it also similarly negotiated with the (Spanish) government on the autonomy statute (of the Basque Country). Thus, both parties can be defined as pragmatic autonomist parties.
which do not aim for the secession of the respective minority nations. The two autonomous communities, South Tyrol and the Basque Country, also resemble each other regarding the most prominent cleavages: cleavages tied to nationalism are more prominent than traditional class-based cleavages. Moreover, the position regarding the claims for self-government or secession is also decisive in the Basque political landscape. Nevertheless, in the Basque Country the parties claiming secession are situated more to the left than the EAJ-PNV, whereas in South Tyrol the parties expressing stronger claims for self-determination and secession are situated more to the right than the ruling SVP.

The anti-system party *Herri Batasuna* (People’s Unity – HB), which was founded in 1978 and renamed *Euskal Herritarrok* (We, the Basque Citizens – EH) in 1998 and subsequently *Batasuna* (Unity – B) in 2001, is situated on the extreme left and has also been seen as the political arm of the ETA. It was declared unlawful in 2003 by the Spanish Constitutional Court due to its financing of the ETA and was thus banned from participating in further elections. However, from 1980 until its ban from politics in 2003, the party always secured representation in the Basque parliament. After the final banning of the party in 2003, lastly acting under the name *Batasuna*, most attempts to reorganize the party were unsuccessful. *Euskal Herrialdeetako Alderdi Komunista* (The Communist Party of the Basque Homelands – EHAK), founded in 2002 by some of *Batasuna*’s former members after it was banned, was successful in the 2005 elections winning 9 seats, but was also subsequently banned in 2008. Only the Aralar Party, which emerged in the 1990s from the HB and opposed the violent struggle of ETA, survived and entered the Basque government in the 2005 elections. The Aralar party can be defined as a Socialist and separatist party which, however, promotes its aims less radically than HB and does not condone or utilize violence (Moreno del Río 2000).

The *Eusko Alkartasuna* (Basque Solidarity – EA) splintered from the EAJ-PNV in 1987 and became an opposition party to both the EAJ-PNV and the HB. EA felt under pressure to differentiate itself from the EAJ-PNV and expressed claims for a stronger self-government which would lead to eventual secession from Spain. It also abandoned the Christian roots of the EAJ-PNV and can be defined as a Social democratic party. However, its electoral success was modest in relation to the continuing success of the EAJ-PNV. For the regional elections

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16 For more details on ETA see sections 4.1 and 4.2 in this chapter.
in 2011, the EA joined with the left wing Alternatiba Eraikitzen and the platforms Araba Bai and Herritarron Garaia to form the left-wing nationalist and pro-independence coalition Bildu, which was renamed EH Bildu (Euskal Herria Bildu – Basque Country Unite) in 2012 after Aralar, Alternatiba, Sortu, and independents of the Abertzale-left joined the coalition. In the 2012 elections, they won 21 (out of 75) seats and hence established themselves as the second most important party after EAJ-PNV.

The Socialist Euskadiko Ezkerra (Basque Country Left – EE), which “shared the nationalist political space with a significant level of electoral support” (Pallarés, Montero and Llera 1997, 145), will not be considered in this dissertation because it merged with the National Socialist party (PSOE) in 1991.

As shown, the Basque Country is – similarly to South Tyrol – characterized by a highly-fragmented political landscape. In sharp contrast to these two minority nations which have a plurality of SNRPs competing for votes, in both Scotland and Wales there is only one party in each case that falls under the adopted definition of an SNRP. Thus, SNRPs in Scotland and Wales do not compete against each other but rather against regional branches of state-wide parties. Moreover, the latter two minority nations also differ from South Tyrol and the Basque Country because of the more recent establishment of devolved sub-state government which influences party dynamics substantially. Massetti differentiates between the Scottish and Welsh party systems pre-dating and after devolution stating that “the Scottish and Welsh party systems were, therefore, born only in May 1999”

17 (Massetti 2009, 8). But although the two minority nations have a shorter history of self-government than South Tyrol or the Basque Country, in Scotland and Wales SNRPs have been in existence since the early 20th century.

The Scottish National Party (SNP), as the main regionalist party of Scotland, was founded in 1934 through the merger of the National Party of Scotland and the Scottish Party with the aim of promoting secession from the UK. Although it remained electorally insignificant until the mid-1960s (Newell 1998, 105), since 1967 it has been represented in Westminster continuously, and devolution “created the primary arena for SNP activity, eclipsing both

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17 The Scottish Parliament (Holyrood) was reestablished by the Scotland Act in 1998 equally to the Welsh National Assembly (Cardiff Bay), which was formed by the Government of Wales Act in 1998.
Westminster and the European Parliament” (Lynch 2011, 152). Its electoral support has increased since 1999, the first elections to the Scottish Parliament. After governing the territory from 2007 until 2011 as a minority government, in 2011, despite the mixed-member proportional representation system which was designed to prevent majority governments (Johns, Mitchell, and Carman 2013), the SNP achieved a majority, thus becoming the first majority government since the re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament. The SNP is expected to maintain its majority position at the 2016 elections.

At the time of its founding, the SNP already claimed to be the party representing the Scots, and there is, according to Newell, a clear link between voting for the SNP and strongly identifying as Scottish (Newell 1998, 108). Consequently, the primary aim and ideological concern of the SNP has always been the question of self-government, but from the mid-1980s onwards, the party established itself as a left-of centre nationalist party, both in terms of policies and electoral support (Lynch 2011, 149). Devolution substantially changed the SNP and their demands, as Lynch argues, since the party profile became “more mixed and the centre-left profile was de-emphasized – evident in its manifesto commitments for the 2003 and 2007 Scottish elections and in relation to its programme in government” (2011, 150).

Currently the SNP, as the strongest Scottish party, has to face the challenge of adapting to government office, a process the EAJ-PNV in Basque Country and the SVP in South Tyrol experienced much earlier in their histories. In comparison to South Tyrol and the Basque Country, where the systems can be defined as being of moderate to ‘polarized pluralism’, the stabilized party system in Scotland “falls within Sartori’s class of limited pluralism, with two major parties – Labour and SNP – two minor parties which must be considered relevant – the Conservatives and Lib-Dems – and one borderline party – the Greens” (Massetti 2009, 11).

Similarly to the SNP, Plaid Cymru (The Party of Wales – PC), the only SNRP in Wales, also has a long history: the party was founded as a lobbying group in 1925 with the aim of protecting and promoting the Welsh language, but its role in British and Welsh politics remained very peripheral until the mid-1960s (Christiansen 1998, 125). The 1960s marked the development of PC into a full regionalist party demanding freedom for the Welsh nation either in the form of Welsh autonomy within the UK or within a “Europe of the peoples” (Wyn 2007, 146-164). In the 1966 elections, the first PC MP was elected to Westminster, but
PC could not retain the seat in the subsequent elections, and has only achieved continuous representation in British politics since 1974. The creation of the National Assembly of Wales was thus a new opportunity for PC to “boost its political representation, shape policy making and possibly even enter regional government” (Elias and Tronconi 2011, 64), focusing consequently on the economy, social justice, cultural vitality, democratic renewal, and environmental stability. Although it was unexpected, with this new programme PC was successful at the first elections to the National Assembly of Wales, gaining 28.4% of all votes, which equals 17 out of 60 seats in the regional government (Elias 2011), and in 2007, having won 15 seats, the party formed a government coalition with the Labour Party until 2011. In contrast to the SNP, however, PC could not boost its success and the party only won 11 seats in the 2011 elections. Thus, the Welsh party system can also be characterized as one of limited pluralism, but, as Massetti argues, “given the very strong position of the Labour party, it looks more like a hybrid falling in between limited pluralism and predominant party system” (2009, 20). The SNP has successfully competed with Labour for the status of the largest party, but in Wales the dominant position of Labour has only been interrupted by the PC–Labour coalition from 2007 to 2011.

In sharp contrast to the party system in South Tyrol and the Basque Country, which is dominated by the SNRPs, and in contrast to the political landscape in Scotland and Wales, where the SNP and PC also play a significant role, SNRPs in Corsica were only marginally represented and influential in the Corsican Assembly until 2011. This is partially due to their division, their disappearance, and their subsequent re-emergence with a new name. It was only in the 2015 regional elections when the Pé a Corsica (For Corsica) coalition, which includes all SNRPs on the island, obtained 35% of all votes (and 24 of 51 seats), and thus SNRPs are now governing the island for the first time. The party system and especially the nationalist movement can be characterized by a high degree of fragmentation (Olivesi 1998, 179).

Yet despite only achieving significant success in Corsican politics in 2015, SNRPs in Corsica date back to the 1980s: at the first elections to the Corsican Assembly in 1982, 9 out of 61 seats were given to ethno-regionalist parties. However, from 1992 and the reorganization of the Corsican assembly, a slight increase in the success of ethno-regionalist parties can be
assessed. At the first elections in 1992 after their founding, the Corsica Nation (Corsica Nation – CN) and the equally newly founded Muvimentu pà l’Autodeterminazione (Movement for Self-government – MPA) were able to enter the Corsican Assembly with 9 and 4 seats respectively. At the following election in 1998 CN gained 8 seats, and in 2001 was transformed into the Presenza Naziunale (National Presence – PN). At the 2004 elections, the coalition of CHJAMA – PNC – CN/INDEP – ANC – VERDI – PSI gained 8 seats, and at the 2010 elections, the Corsica Libera (CL), a merger of Corsica Nazione, Rinnovu, and Corsican Nationalist Alliance, gained 4 seats, and demanded full independence and supported the violent actions of the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica (FNLC). Instead the coalition of U Partitu di A Nazione Corsa (Party of the Corsican Nation – PNC), the merger of UPC, A Scelta Nova, and A Mossa Naziunale, called Femu a Corsica (We make Corsica – FeC) won 11 seats. The FeC demanded a strengthened autonomy, but not full independence, and also condemned the violent actions of the FLNC.

Table 11 summarizes the selected SNRPs classifying them according to their distribution along the centre-periphery dimension and their distribution along the left-right ideological spectrum (in brackets), following the classification of Massetti (2009, 507). The table shows that a majority of SNRPs are supportive of secession and hence engaged in nation-building. Secondly, with the exception of the SNRPs in South Tyrol and PNV in the Basque Country, all parties selected are situated to the centre-left of the ideological spectrum. Thus, in relation to party ideology South Tyrol constitutes an outlier case.

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18 The short life of ethno-regionalist parties in Corsica is a challenge not only for the selection of the parties to analyze but also in relation to data collection.
Table 11 – Overview of the ideological positions of the elected SNRPs in the five minority nations. (The electoral system is indicated in brackets on the row headings)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-secessionist parties</th>
<th>Ambiguous parties</th>
<th>Secessionist parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>moderately autonomist</td>
<td>assertive autonomist</td>
<td>strongly committed to secession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(by violent means)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Tyrol</strong></td>
<td>SVP (centre-right)</td>
<td>UfS (right); dF (right); SF (right)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(personalized proportional representation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basque Country</strong></td>
<td>PNV (1990-2000; centre-right)</td>
<td>PNV (2000s; centre-right)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(closed list proportional representation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scotland</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>SNP (centre-left)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mixed member proportional representation system)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wales</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>PC (left)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mixed member proportional representation system)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corsica</strong></td>
<td>FeC (left)</td>
<td>CL (left); Coalition of CHJAMA - PNC - CN/INDEP - ANC - VERDI – PSI (left); MPA (left)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(personalized proportional representation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Relations between the centre and the periphery

As I argued in chapter two, this thesis proposes that political-institutional relations and the power-distribution between the minority nation and the respective state, as well as the societal boundary within the minority nation, are one of the main explanatory factors determining the SNRPs’ approach to immigration, integration, and ultimately the construction of the minority nation’s identity in relation to newcomers. I differentiate
between political-institutional relations between the minority nation and the state, and societal relations between the minority community and the state majority community living within the sub-state territory. In chapter three I explained how I operationalize the two different, yet complementary, types of relations and in the following paragraphs I will give an overview of how the relations play out in the selected cases.

4.1 Political-institutional relations between the state and the minority nation

Table 3 in chapter three gave an initial overview of the variation of the political-institutional relations between the state and the minority nations. There is, however, not only variation between the selected cases, but also variation within a particular case over time. The aim of the following paragraphs is, hence, to present the selected cases and their relations with the respective states within the time period selected for this thesis.

The political-institutional relations are operationalized through the power-distribution between the sub-state territory and the respective state, the degree of legislative competences in the field of minority nation’s identity protection and in the powers related to immigrant integration which the minority nation have at their disposal. The degree of competences thus serves as a proxy indicator of the successful accomplishment of claims for self-government.

According to the classification of chapter three, South Tyrol and the Basque Country are the two strongest cases with the most robust political-institutional relations with the respective states. The First Autonomy Act of South Tyrol dates back to 1948, following direct negotiations between Austria (as a kin-state to South Tyrol) and Italy on how to best protect the German-speaking population in South Tyrol. Dissatisfaction among the German-speaking population due to a lack of implementation of the autonomy statute by the Italian state led to clashes and violent incidents between the South Tyrolean German-speaking population and the Italian government in the mid-1960s. This conflict-prone period ended after an Austrian intervention at the UN, with the initiation of negotiations for a Second Autonomy Statute, subsequently passed in 1972. This led to the formal settlement of the dispute between Italy and Austria before the UN, and the full devolution of all competences mentioned in the Second Autonomy Statute by 1992. The Autonomy Statute was amended and further broadened in 2001, attributing to South Tyrol the status of “one of the most
Chapter 4 – Contextualization of cases

successful examples of the accommodation of minorities” (Woelk, Marko, and Palermo 2008, xi). Since the Italian constitutional reform process occurred in 2001, competences have also gradually been expanded to areas that are not strictly related to the protection of the German and Ladin populations. The basic principle of the Autonomy Statute is the cultural autonomy granted to the German and Ladin speakers, the parity of the three languages (German, Ladin, and Italian) granting all citizens equal rights irrespective of their belonging to a linguistic group, the principle of proportionality based on a quota system, and veto rights as the ultimate weapon of the minority. The institutional setting in South Tyrol is thus based on a power sharing system and the “strict separation and forced cooperation of the two main linguistic groups, German and Italian speakers” (Wolff 2008).

The province of South Tyrol enjoys primary legislative competences in a number of areas, with the most important for the protection of the minority being related to toponymy, local culture and schools, town and country planning, tourism, professional education, agriculture, and welfare. Additionally, the province is vested with a large number of secondary legislative competences, with the most important area for minority protection being primary and secondary education, including teacher training. The territory also has all the administrative competences needed to exercise the given legislative competences. Thus through the Autonomy Statute, the Autonomous Province of Bolzano is not only empowered to protect the German and Ladin minorities and their cultures but also to effectively self-govern the territory.

These primary and secondary legislative competences also include many areas that are important for immigrant integration such as education, language learning, town planning, and in particular, welfare. These competences could, as argued in chapter two, be applied not

19 ‘Primary legislative competences’ means that the territory is the sole responsible law maker and does not have to share the competences with the State, as long as laws are in line with the Constitution, international commitments of the Italian state, national interests, and the EU framework. Before the 2001 reform of the autonomy statute, laws made by the province of South Tyrol also needed to be in line with the principles of the Italian legal system, the framework of socio-economic reforms, and national interests.

20 The full list of primary legislative competences is laid down in Art. 8 of the Autonomy Statute.

21 ‘Secondary competences’ means that the regional legislator has to respect the guidelines and principles laid down in state legislation.

22 The full list of legislative competences are established in Art. 8 and 9 of the Autonomy Statute.

23 For a full list see Parolari and Voltmer 2008, 81-82.

24 The official political name of South Tyrol is ‘The Autonomous Province of Bolzano/Bozen’.
only to the national minority or the autochthonous population living in the area, but also to immigrants. Thus, South Tyrol has, through the autonomy framework, the ability to substantially influence the integration process. However, South Tyrol has also gained an important role in the integration process due to the national framework on immigration and integration: immigration policy is regulated in Italy at the central state level, but the importance of regional and local actors in the policy field of integration was first recognized in Italian immigration law as early as in 1986. With the constitutional reform of 2001, Italian regions and autonomous provinces gained further influence in this field, and they are now the sole responsible actor for social policy.

Because of the great variety and the broad extent of legislative powers both in the field of minority protection as well as immigrant integration, and also due to the relative absence of claims for independence which are expressed by the two opposition parties df and SF, internal relations between South Tyrol and the Italian state are – during the selected time period– consistently defined as smooth.

The ‘Basque Autonomous Community’ 25 (or the Basque Country) enjoys a similar level of self-government as South Tyrol. Basque provinces historically had a special relationship with the Kingdom of Castille based on fueros (charters) which guaranteed the provinces extensive autonomy to control their own financial, legal, and administrative structures. Thus, the Basque Country has a much longer experience of self-government than South Tyrol, which was, however, interrupted for more than 40 years in the 20th century during the Francoist regime (1939-1975). The new Spanish constitution re-granted various forms of autonomy to the various regions in 1978. Thus, the provinces of Alava, Guipuzcoa, and Vizcaya were granted the right to collectively form the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. The formal Act of Autonomy was passed by the Spanish parliament in 1979 and subsequently confirmed through a referendum by the Basque population on 25 October 1979.

25 According to some interpretations, (Conversi 2000), the Basque Country historically encompassed all communities where the Basque language is spoken, thus also the provinces that form the Basque Autonomous Community in Spain, a part of Upper Navarra, which is part of the Autonomous Community of Navarra in Spain, and a part of the French Département of Atlantic Pyrénées.
The Basque Autonomy is considered one of the most far-reaching autonomies in Europe (Benedikter 2007, 115). Similar to South Tyrol, the Basque Country is vested with exclusive powers on most policy matters, and most importantly for the Basque population, on all cultural matters and the use of language in education. In addition to this, since 1981, the Basque Country has also had a different fiscal regime (alongside Navarra) than the other Spanish regions, thus strengthening the Basque autonomy financially. This not only differentiates the Basque Country from most of the other autonomous communities in Spain, but also significantly differentiates the autonomy of the Basque Country from the South Tyrolean case, Wales and Corsica. Scotland, however, also has very limited fiscal autonomy.

Similar to Italy, the central Spanish government also retains primary control over immigration flows, admissions, and naturalization, as laid down in Art. 149.1.2 of the Constitution. Nevertheless, Spanish autonomous communities have, in direct comparison to Italian regions, a more prominent role in managing immigration through their role in determining numbers of workers required annually. Additionally, a new trend is emerging in the area of issuing work permits which strengthens the role of the autonomous communities (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011, 301.).

In contrast to immigration policies, the responsibility of managing integration processes has been increasingly transferred over time to the autonomous communities and the local level in both Italy and Spain. The Spanish government has developed national integration plans (GRECO 2000; PECI – Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración 2007 – 2010) as frameworks for all autonomous communities which are inspired by the principle of efficiency and cooperative federalism (Zapata-Barrero 2012b, 136) and have “institutionalised de facto distribution of responsibilities” (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011, 308). Following the framework set out in these plans, autonomous communities are able to develop their own integration plans. Alongside the integration plans, socio-economic integration is designed in accordance with the division of competences between the central state and the autonomous communities.

In particular, agriculture, forestry and land-use planning, fishing, water resources management, environmental protection, health and hygiene, regional transportation, social assistance, social security, and all cultural matters.
communities, and thus in particular, language learning, education, housing, and access to social services are governed directly by the autonomous communities.

Although the effective protection of the Basque culture and identity is currently guaranteed through the autonomy agreement, this has often created disputes between the Basque and Spanish governments, ultimately resulting in the proposal of a new autonomy statute in 2003-2004 (Plan Ibarretxe) which would grant the Basque Country an even more far-reaching autonomy as well as the right to self-determination. The new autonomy statute was approved in 2004 by a large majority within the Basque Country, but was not allowed for debate in the Spanish Parliament in 2005, when a majority of the parliamentarians (313/344) voted against it. Since then, no further changes to the autonomy statute have been proposed; Basque SNRPs, however, have very closely followed the secessionist movements in Scotland and Catalonia and discussed their applicability in the Basque Country.

Alongside the political elites’ attempts to enlarge the Basque autonomy, from the late 1960s to the official declaration of permanent ceasefire and cessation of armed activities in 2006, the armed nationalist and separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Country and Freedom – ETA) fought for more rights for the Basques and the establishment of an independent state. Despite having close connections to some SNRPs, this thesis does not take ETA’s positions on immigration, integration of the construction of the minority nation’s identity nor the position of a similar paramilitary group, the FLNC, in Corsica into account, because of the difference between official and recognized political parties and the paramilitary groups. However, for this thesis, the existence of an armed struggle for more autonomy is an additional indicator of conflicting relations between the minority nation and the state. Hence, because the Basque Country is a very strong sub-state territory regarding both powers on minority nation’s identity protection and the management of immigrant integration, the relations between centre and periphery are classified as robust; but the relations remain, however, much more conflict-prone than in the South Tyrolean case.

27 ETA was founded in 1959 by a youth group breaking away from PNV (Conversi, 1997, 90). After the official declaration of ceasefire, three parties, which had previously been forbidden due to their connections to ETA, came together to form the nationalist coalition ‘BILDU’. The coalition became the second most important political force after the regional elections in 2012.
Moreover, in the Basque case, the autonomy statute was not altered between 1990 and 2012, and thus powers in relation to the protection of the national minority did not change; however, the sub-state territory gained increased responsibilities in relation to integration.

Wales and Scotland were selected particularly for the changing power framework: Scotland and Wales naturally share a number of characteristics due to belonging to the same state, the UK. The last 20 years have been of utmost importance for the two sub-state territories since during this period the process of devolution granted them a form of self-government. Since 1998, a number of policy areas have been devolved to both sub-state regions in different periods, in order to strengthen their self-governing capacities. Thus “devolution is having a profound effect (…) and is strengthening the territorial dimension of these communities” (Loughlin 2003, 18).

From the Middle Ages until 1707 Scotland was an independent state, and although it entered into an incorporating union with England forming the Kingdom of Great Britain, it kept its separate legal system as well as its distinct educational and religious institutions. This semi-independence under the crown guaranteed the survival of the distinct Scottish culture and identity. From the 1970s onwards, claims for more self-government, or even full independence, re-emerged, and although Scotland regained a broad number of legislative competences from the UK through the 1998 Scotland Act, leading to the creation of a Scottish parliament in 1999, demands for full independence have continued. These claims culminated in the granting of a referendum on independence in 2014, following the election of an SNP majority in the Scottish Parliament in 2011. The narrow defeat of the independence-seeking parties (in particular, the SNP) was partially based on the UK government’s promise of further extensive negotiations on devolution, and thus claims and negotiations regarding further devolution between the UK and the Scottish government are ongoing.

Devolution to Wales began simultaneously with Scotland with the Act of Wales 1998, but in contrast to Scotland, only a very limited number of policy areas were initially devolved. The Government of Wales Act in 2006 increased the legislative competences of Wales substantially, and a further extension was agreed upon by a referendum in 2011. Consequently, a Commission on Devolution in Wales has been established to discuss the
further devolution of policy areas. The Commission’s recommendations formed the basis of the Wales Act 2014, which further increased the region’s degree of self-government.

Since 2011, both territories have had legislative competences in the same areas, in particular, in relation to health, education and training, local government and public administration, social work/welfare, housing, planning, tourism, economic development and financial assistance to industries, some aspects of transport, the environment, natural and built heritage, agriculture, and forestry and fishing. Wales also has legislative competences on the Welsh language.

However, even before the devolution occurred the Welsh language was made the second official language in Wales (through the Welsh Language Act 1993), and thus the public sector was obliged to provide all of its services in both English and Welsh. Moreover, Welsh speakers gained the right to use their language in court proceedings. Additionally, the Welsh Language Board was established to promote the use of the language in public and private life. In 2011 a Welsh Language Commissioner was installed to further strengthen the regional language, and to ensure that Welsh and English could be used on an equal footing.

Both Wales and Scotland are able to manage issues relating to migrant integration from the powers they hold in the devolved area. However, although the UK has a long history of policy making in relation to the governance of immigration, the role of its constituent entities is marginal. Thus in relation to integration, Wales and Scotland are considered middle-range power regions as they both have gained powers related to immigrant integration from their devolution acts, but not from the national framework on immigration and integration, as is the case in the Basque Country and South Tyrol.

In sum, the relations between both Scotland and Wales and the UK are defined as fragile until 1998. Due to the Welsh Language Act in 1993 and the different episodes of devolution, both have become relatively strong regions over the selected time period.

Nevertheless, the tensions between Scotland (in particular the SNP) and the UK began to consistently increase after the SNP’s 2007 election campaign and its desire to call for a referendum on independence. Although the period after the referendum and the newest negotiations for further devolution – from 2014 onwards – falls outside the scope of this
thesis, in the Scottish case I dedicate special attention to the period after 2007 to evaluate whether the increasing tensions impacted the discourse on immigration, integration, and the construction of the Scottish identity.

Corsica is the case with the most fragile form of self-government and the most conflicting relations with the French state. It was also selected because is also a telling case for this research due to the absence of formal recognition of the Corsican language and culture by the French state and the fragile administrative autonomy the island was granted in 1981.

The French decentralization reform of 1981/1982 led to the first Special Statute (statut particulier) for Corsica, following claims for more self-government and recognition of Corsican particularity (Henders 2010b, 91). These claims had been ongoing since the 1960s, and similarly to the Basque Country, in Corsica the claims were also supported by a militant separatist group, the FLNC. The first special statute granted Corsica greater powers in comparison to other French regions.

The Joxe reforms in the early 1990s and the Matignon process in the early 2000s further changed the first special statute, but nevertheless did not substantially expand the Corsican autonomy (Daftary 2008). The changes of the early 2000s followed a period of intensive violence, which included, on the one hand, attacks and killings by the FLNC and thus had a political dimension, and, on the other hand, were the result of personal and clan-based vendettas (Henders 2010a, 96). Currently, the Corsican autonomy is very fragile and characterized as a “mainly functional administrative” autonomy (Henders 2010b, 99) due to the lack of legislative competences of the Corsican Assembly which can only suggest legislative or regulatory changes concerning the social, economic, and cultural development of the island, and in particular, changes regarding education, housing and transport. The Corsican Assembly can make these suggestions by its own initiative or at the request of the French prime minister. Since 1994, Corsican language education has been a mandatory subject from elementary to post-secondary education (three hours per week). Additionally,

28 The FLNC (Frontu di Liberazione Nazionale Corsu – National Liberation Front of Corsica) is similar to ETA in the Basque Country, a militant separatist group advocating for an independent state. The FLNC launched its first violent attacks in 1976 and officially declared a ceasefire in 2014. Similar to the ETA, it was especially supported by the Corsican SNRPs in its early years. Most of the attacks targeted either French officials or state property.
Corsica was given “greater administrative responsibility in regional economic planning, housing, transport, water, and agricultural and rural development, although still without legislative or regulatory authority or tax-raising powers” (Henders 2010b, 101). A further reform of the Corsican statute in 2003 was rejected by the island’s population by a narrow majority (51%), and currently a new reform process is underway, but an expansion of the Corsican autonomy seems, according to Corsican scholars, unrealistic due to a lack of willingness on the side of the French state (Fazi 2013). However, the victory of the SNRPs in the 2015 regional elections might substantially increase the pressure and hence also the chances for further negotiations for more autonomy.

In relation to managing immigration and integration, the island also lacks any say due to the centralized French immigration and integration policies. Moreover, the relations between the SNRPs on the island and the state are characterized by constant conflict due to both the claims for more recognition and autonomy and the close connection between Corsica Libera/Corsica Nazione (CL/CN) and the FLNC (La Calle and Fazi 2010). In sum, in the frame of this research, Corsica is considered to be the most fragile minority nation with the most conflicting relations between the sub-state territory and the state because it has only very limited possibilities to govern itself, to protect and maintain the Corsican language and culture, and because it lacks formal and official recognition of its particularity by the French state.

This description of the political-institutional relations between the selected minority regions and the respective states has shown that there are substantial differences between the cases as well as within the individual cases over time. Corsica is the most fragile of all five selected cases and thus we can expect to find that all actors claim more competences in order to strengthen the Corsican language and culture to protect it from migration-generated diversity. Following the theoretical assumptions presented in chapter two, I furthermore expect that the Corsican political elite view immigration as a threat to the Corsican language and culture,

29 When I claim the relations between the Spanish State and the Basque Country are smooth, and the relations between France and Corsica are more conflict-prone, I am aware, that this evaluation is based only on the institutional framework and degree of self-government and neglects the history of separatist militant groups, such as ETA in the Basque Country and the FLNC in Corsica, which operated until 2011 or 2014 respectively. I take into account the impact such armed groups have on the relations between the minority nation and the state when discussing the internal relations between the sub-state territory and the state.
and thus boundaries between the groups are expected to harden and to contract over time, to exclude migration-generated diversity from the constructions of the minority nation’s identity.

The Basque Country and in particular, South Tyrol are, in contrast, classified as the most robust cases over time regarding the political-institutional relations to the respective states, whereas Scotland and Wales have only beginning in 1998 and with time developed a more robust self-government framework. However, in both the Basque Country and since 2010 especially in Scotland, claims for independence have gained further strength and momentum. These developments will be taken into consideration when evaluating the trends in the framing of immigration and integration and the construction of the minority nation’s identity.

4.2 The societal relations between the minority and the state majority community

This research argues that the internal structure of the society and the salience of cleavages existing independently of and prior to immigration substantially impact how the political elite link immigration-generated diversity and the interests of the autochthonous population over time. Table 5 in chapter three gave an initial overview of the variation of the societal relations between the minority and the state majority populations, and in the following section I describe these pre-existing cleavages within the five selected cases in more detail. The five regions show very different degrees of internal division or congruence.

According to the political-institutional system, corresponding to the model of consociational democracy, the South Tyrolean society is divided along ethno-linguistic lines. The basis of the consociational system is the proportional representation of all linguistic groups in public administration, the distribution of financial resources especially in the field of housing and culture, and the proportional composition of various political bodies (Lantschner and Poggeschi 2008, 225). For the successful implementation of the quota system, every Italian citizen residing in South Tyrol has to declare an affiliation to one of the three recognized linguistic groups, once s/he turns 18.

Furthermore, the Autonomy Statute established two separate and parallel school systems from preschool to secondary school, with pupils being taught in their mother tongue by
teachers of the same language, three separate administrative systems (one for each group), and consequently three educational policies. However, parents are free to choose the education system they prefer for their children. The two main linguistic groups have also established their own private and public monolingual media systems.

The division along ethno-linguistic lines established by the institutional structure is also mirrored on the geographical level: the Italian-speaking community is concentrated in the capital city of Bolzano and the neighbouring town Laives, where it constitutes a local majority (70%), as well as in Merano, Bressanone, and four other small cities. The other towns are all primarily inhabited by German speakers, and in 81 out of 116 municipalities, the German speakers constitute more than 90% of the population (ASTAT 2010, 120).

At the societal level, however, the distance between the two major groups is much less salient; only “one quarter of the Germans and 12% of the Italian pupils say that, in the last year, they have never or only very rarely had relations of friendship with members of the other group” (Abel, Vettori, and Forer 2010). Additionally, knowledge of the state majority language by the minority community and knowledge of the national minority language by the state majority community is high when compared to Wales, the Basque Country, and especially Corsica. Since 2004, the knowledge of the other groups’ language has increased significantly, and as of 2014 only 5% of the population does not understand or speak Italian, and only 11% declared having no competences in German (ASTAT, Sprachbarometer 2014, 165). However, knowledge of the South Tyrolean variation of German, the language mostly used among German speakers in South Tyrol (Abel, 2012, 399-400) is much more limited and constitutes, according to Abel et al. (2010), a significant barrier to integration.

The regional identity is very pronounced among the whole population: at first glance, 55% of the population declare a ‘South Tyrolean’ identity. However, examining the feeling of belonging among both German and Italian speakers, a great difference emerges: in 2014 80.7% of the German speakers, compared with only 7% of the Italian speakers, identified primarily as ‘South Tyrolean’ (ASTAT, Sprachbarometer 2014, 170). A decade earlier, in

30 For the Ladin group, Ladin language instruction is provided on equal footing with the German or Italian language, depending on which school system the parents elect to send their children to.
2004, 85% of the German speakers and 25% of the Italian speakers had identified as ‘South Tyrolean’ (ASTAT, Sprachbarometer 2004, 158).

The perception of a conflict between the two linguistic groups also decreased substantially over time. In 1991 38% of the population perceived the cohabitation system to be problematic; by 2004 this had decreased to 11%, and by 2014 to 7% (ASTAT, Sprachbarometer 2004, 179). Instead, by 2014 35% perceived the intergroup cohabitation system as a form of enrichment (ASTAT, Sprachbarometer 2014, 172).

Thus, in South Tyrol there is a substantial degree of division in the society based on the ethno-linguistic cleavage but that the cleavage is particularly salient at the institutional level. Additionally, the relations between German and Italian speakers have improved substantially over time. It is therefore particularly interesting to analyse whether the improvement of the relations between German and Italian speakers impacts the framing of immigration and the relations to newcomers.

Both the Basque Country and South Tyrol are both multilingual minority nations, and although there are two main spoken languages in both sub-state, there are also substantial differences between the two. The Basque language, in sharp contrast to the position of the German language in South Tyrol, also constitutes a national minority language in the Basque Autonomous Community itself as only approximately 25% of the population use Basque as their first language (Zabalo 2008, 801). This has important consequences for the development of Basque nationalism, as has been argued by a number of scholars (Zabalo 2008, Zabalo, Mateos, and Iraola 2013, Conversi 1990, 1997, Ruiz Vieytez and Kallonen 2002-2003).

Sabino Arana (1865-1903), founding father of contemporary Basque nationalism, replaced language as a core element of Basqueness with race and religion (Conversi 1997, 173) because neither he himself nor large parts of the population who strongly supported Basque nationalism spoke Euskera as their first language. However, he positioned the Basque language as a symbol of patriotism rather than a means of communication (Conversi 1997, 177, Medrano 2005). Hence, the Basque language continues to constitute an important element for defining Basque identity (Peral 2013). Ruiz-Vieytez and Kallonen argue that “it is obvious that knowledge of the Basque language plays a role in the socialization of people
in the Basque-speaking areas and also in social relations, but linguistic differences do not affect fundamental social attitudes in the Basque Country” (2002-2003, 254).

The particular Basque educational system, which grants parents the option to have their children taught in Spanish (model A), Basque (model B), or in both languages at the same time (model D), is one of the reasons for an increase in the number of Basque speakers in the last years since a majority of parents send their children to Basque or bilingual primary schools (Ruiz Vieytez and Kallonen 2002-2003, 256).

Aside from the educational system, the media system in the Basque Country is also more bilingual than in South Tyrol. Alongside several public and private TV and radio channels which either transmit exclusively in the Basque language or shift between Basque and Spanish, there are also newspapers in both languages as well as bilingual ones. And even though the Basque language is predominantly used in rural areas and the countryside, geographically there isn’t such a clear distribution of the two ethnolinguistic groups (Zabalo 2008), as was seen in the South Tyrolean case. Thus, the use of and attitudes towards the Basque language do not constitute, as in South Tyrol, an important indicator for the societal relations between the minority population and state majority.

However, Basque identity is very strong, and the percentage of people who declare themselves to be either ‘more Basque than Spanish’, or ‘only Basque’ remains constant at about 50-60% of the population (European Values Study 1999 and 2008). Comparing the data from the European Values Study of 1999 and 2008 shows, however, that the percentage of people who declared themselves as ‘only Basque’, rather than ‘more Basque than Spanish’ has decreased over time. In 1999 more than 30% declared themselves as ‘only Basque’, whereas in 2008 only 12% selected this response (European Values Study 1999 and 2008).

Basque identity is, as argued above, not based purely on linguistic difference, but “more on ideological aspects than on objective criteria of belonging to one or another social-cultural group (…) the language does not constitute an element of clear social division in the Basque Country” (Ruiz Vieytez and Kallonen 2002-2003, 254). Nevertheless, the Basque Country is characterized by a significant degree of division regarding the claims for self-government

31 There is no model C.
and nationalism which has found violent expression in terrorist acts by the ETA, rendering Basque nationalism a “formidable challenge to the Spanish state” (Medhurst 1987, 9). Keating argues that it would “be misleading to identify the Basque Country as an ethnically divided society, since the division [between nationalists and non-nationalists] runs through the community of native Basques as well as between them and the incomers” (Keating 2008, 324). Instead, Keating (2008), as well as Zabalo (2008), base both Basque nationalism and the division within the society on political-constitutional aims for the territory. Consequently, for the purposes of this research, the Basque Country will thus not be classified as an ethnically-divided society with low intergroup contact, like South Tyrol, but as a society nevertheless divided on nationalist claims and the future status of the territory. Hence, both South Tyrol and the Basque Country are classified in this thesis as minority nations with fragile societal relations within the minority nations themselves.

Wales can be compare to the Basque Country regarding the status of the national minority language as well as the geographical distribution of the language: both the Basque language and Welsh are only spoken as a first language by a minority. In 1991 18.5% of the population spoke Welsh on a regular basis (Census 1991), and in 2011, 19% (Census 2011). In both minority nations, the Basque Country and Wales, the national minority language is mainly spoken in the rural areas. Geographically, Welsh is spoken as a first language mainly in the rural north and the west of Wales. Despite the low Welsh language proficiencies, in 2011 58% of the population considered itself to be ‘only Welsh’ (Census 2011); further deconstructing this statistic, people who can speak Welsh are more likely to report an exclusively Welsh national identity (77%) than those who do not speak Welsh (53%) (Census 2011). As I outlined above, migration to and from Wales has traditionally been connected to the question of Welsh language and culture, not only due to internal migrants from England but also due to the settlement of international migrants in urban areas as opposed to the rural areas where Welsh is mainly spoken, thus lowering the contact between newcomers and Welsh speakers.

In contrast to the Basque language, however, the Welsh language is an important marker of Welsh identity (Loughlin 2003, 8), and has experienced a slow revival in the last 10 years assisted by the emergence of a Welsh-speaking urban elite (Loughlin 2003, 9). This may also
be due to the fact that the Welsh language became – through the implementation of the Welsh Language Act 1993 and the Government of Wales Act 1998 – the second official language of the territory, and hence compulsory in public administration and jobs reserved for Welsh speakers as well as a mandatory subject in schools.

The support for the Welsh language and culture translates into support for the regionalist party *Plaid Cymru* (Loughlin 2003, 8) and demands for more self-government. Thus, similarly to the Basque Country, division in the society is not primarily based on linguistic criteria, but on political-nationalist factors. However, Welsh claims for nationhood have never been as strong as in Scotland, which is exemplified by the 1997 referendum on the establishment of a Welsh Assembly which passed with only 50.3% (and had a voter turnout of only 50.1%) and the one in 2011 which passed with a majority of 63.5% (but had a very low voter turnout of only 35.6%).

Thus, as Loughlin argues, linguistic and political cleavages are still existent (Loughlin 2003, 8) which also further differentiate Wales from Scotland. Wales is therefore characterized as a society with a high degree of intergroup contact, yet despite the low degree of division, as a society that is not free of cleavages around issues related to cultural or linguistic identity.

Scotland, similar to the Basque Country and Wales, also cannot be perceived as a divided society based on ethno-cultural criteria. Scots and Gaelic, the two languages spoken by a tiny minority, have not acted as major symbols of nationalism (Ager 2003). In the 2011 Census, 1.1% of the population claimed to speak Gaelic, and 38% to speak Scots. Gaelic is connected to the Celtic culture, and both languages are promoted by the government constituting integral parts of the Scottish culture and traditions, and hence the government has tried to revive knowledge of both languages. The Gaelic Language Act 2005 established norms broadcasting and teaching in Gaelic, whereas for the Scots language, a Language Plan has been under development since 2010.

While nationalism has traditionally focused on economic or democratic arguments, (Keating 1996, 189) leaving culture to the private realm, from the 1970s onwards it experienced a revival which especially concentrated on a Scottish culture, “not based on tribal attachment or ethnic exclusion but on a distinct civil society and shared values” (Keating 1996, 215) and
highlighted the territorial dimension. Thus, Scotland has developed a very strong civic regional identity, focusing on the inclusion of the entire population residing in the territory.

Identification with the Scottish territory and culture has been constantly strong over the last 30 years. The 2011 Census revealed that the large majority of the population identifies as ‘Scottish’ (84%), whereas in 1986, when the ‘Moreno question’ was posed for the first time in Scotland, 39% of the population identified themselves as ‘Scottish not British’, 30% as ‘more Scottish than British’, and 19% with ‘equally Scottish as British’.

Although Hussain and Miller argue that in the Scottish society ‘Anglophobia’ is present and that the relations with the ‘English’ are characterized by mistrust (Hussain and Miller 2006, 74), ethno-cultural divisions in the Scottish society are absent. Hence, for the purposes of this research and in comparison with the other selected cases, Scotland is defined as the most congruent society with the most robust societal relations between the state majority and the regional population.

The last case under examination, Corsica, can generally be best compared to the Basque Country, and, in particular regarding the status of the language as national minority language on the island itself, to Wales. Although Corsican was the native mother tongue of the islanders, after WWII all islanders had a working knowledge of French, and by the 1960s there were no longer any monolingual Corsican speakers. The language underwent a revival due to the nationalist movements of the 1970s and 1980s, and by 1999 approximately 70% of the population had at least some basic Corsican language proficiency, while of this 70%, around 10% had it as their mother tongue and therefore used it on a regular basis (INSEE 2004). Thus, similar to the Basque Country, language is not the main prerequisite for Corsican nationalism, but nevertheless constitutes a substantial factor for Corsican identity. Aside from demands for the recognition of the Corsican language as a second official language on the island, and the promotion and protection of the language and culture,

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32 Introduced in 1986 by Luis Moreno, the ‘Moreno Question’ asked the Scottish populace about perceptions of identity. Alongside the mentioned categories, the other possible answers were ‘More British than Scottish’ and ‘Only British, not Scottish’.

33 Divisions within Scotland, for examples between the Lowlands and Highlands or between Catholics and Protestants, were, however, much more prominent in the past.
Corsican nationalism is focused on demands for specific economic development and environmental protection of the island.

In contrast to the other selected cases, there are no data available on regional identification and feelings of belonging in Corsica. Electoral support for SNRPs claiming to strengthen the Corsican identity and culture is therefore used as an alternate indicator of support for the Corsican language and culture. However, as data from the other cases and in particular, from Scotland and Wales, show, high regional identification does not translate into an equally high support for regionalist and nationalist parties. Nevertheless, as data from the other cases and in particular, from Scotland and Wales, show, high regional identification does not translate into an equally high support for regionalist and nationalist parties. Nevertheless, as table 11 in chapter three demonstrated, in Corsica support for SNRPs increased from 15.7% in 1998 to 35% in the 2015 elections. Therefore, I argue that support for Corsican nationalism as well as popular identification with the minority nation’s identity have also increased over this period.

Thus, similar to the Basque Country and Wales, cleavages in Corsican society are not based exclusively on ethno-linguistic criteria but also on demands for recognition and more self-government. Similar to the Basque Country, in Corsica the presence of a militant separatist group, the FLNC, has also fuelled this cleavage. However, the main target of the militants’ actions was not the French population on the island, but the French state and its representatives. Candea argues that the relations between Corsican nationalism and the French state are characterized by ‘politics of victimhood’ (Candea 2006). He shows that the Corsican nationalist discourse often refers to what is perceived as the stigmatization of Corsica as racist, primordial, and backwards in the French national discourse: “It is true that French media representations often associated racism with Corsican nationalism, either by blankly equating the two, or by hinting that they were both informed by the same logic of ‘insularity’ and ‘fear of the other’” (Candea 2006, 377). According to Candea, this perception of a ‘politics of victimhood’ forms the basis for the resistance and mistrust in the relations between Corsica and France.

For the aims of this dissertation Corsica is classified as a congruent society, with an underlying cleavage resulting from the lack of recognition of the Corsican people as distinct from the French nation, the lack of recognition of the Corsican language, and the consequent inability to adequately promote and protect it.
Similar to the political-institutional relations, this description of the societal relations within the selected minority regions has shown that there are substantial differences in particular, between the cases, and less within the cases over time. Again, in Corsica we find the most difficult relations between autochthonous Corsicans and the French majoritarian population living on the island. Yet in contrast to the political-institutional relations, in relation to the societal boundary between minority and majority community, due to the institutionalization of the boundary between the communities, South Tyrol is classified as the case with the most conflicting cleavage for the aims of this research. This cleavage is, on the one hand, based on the division established by the political-institutional framework based on power-sharing and consociationalism. On the other hand, the perception of a cleavage has been high among the South Tyrolean population (in 1991 38% of the population reported perceiving a cleavage between the groups, ASTAT Sprachbarometer 2014), but this has been decreasing. Hence it is particularly interesting to evaluate the changing societal relations in South Tyrol in relation to the discourse on immigration and integration.

5. Conclusion

This chapter introduced the cases in more detail and acts furthermore as a bridge between the first (theoretical) section of the thesis and the second (empirical) section. I will therefore conclude this chapter by summarizing the main expectations in relation to the five selected cases. Table 12 gives an overview on the expectations.
Table 12 – Overview of the expected outcomes in the framing for the minority nation's identity, based on the main hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relations between the centre and the periphery</th>
<th>Expectations in relation to SNRPs framing of minority nation’s identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political-institutional relations/power-distribution</strong></td>
<td><strong>Societal boundary</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basque Country</strong></td>
<td>High/robust level of legislative competences/but claims for more devolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corsica</strong></td>
<td>Low/fragile level of legislative competences/substantial claims for further devolution and high degree of dissatisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Tyrol</strong></td>
<td>High/robust level of legislative competences/few claims for more devolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scotland</strong></td>
<td>Increasing to high/robust level of legislative competences/but increasing claims for more devolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wales</strong></td>
<td>Increasing level to substantial legislative competences/limited to increasing claims for more devolution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the above description of the selected cases shows, aside from the aforementioned similarities shared by each of the selected cases, the minority regions differ substantially in relation to the political-institutional and societal relations between the centre and periphery. This variation allows for a comparison of a variety of relations between the states and the minority regions, how the variation impacts the discourse surrounding immigration and integration, and of the reconstruction of the minority nation’s identity.

Corsica has been selected due to its fragility in relation to the protection of the Corsican minority community and the governance of the integration process, and the low but underlying cleavage and degree of social division. I would expect that in the Corsican case my hypothesis – that a low level of competences and a substantial division leads to an exclusive approach towards immigration and integration – should hold true for the SNRPs on the island.

South Tyrol instead promises interesting insights because, on the one hand, it is a case with a very high level of legislative competences to protect the German minority as well as to self-govern the territory and to decide on integration strategies. Thus, based on the political-institutional relations and the power-distribution between South Tyrol and the Italian state, I expect an open and welcoming approach towards newcomers. On the other hand, there is a substantial cleavage between the German- and Italian-speaking populations which, while being stronger on the political-institutional level, is also present on the societal level. Consequently, regarding the societal relations, an exclusive approach and restricting boundaries towards newcomers are expected. Hence, South Tyrol is also included in this research due to the variation between political-institutional between the minority nation and the state and the societal relations within the minority nation, which provides insights into which type of relations has more of an impact on the discourse on immigration, integration, and the construction of the national identity.

The Basque Country is very comparable to South Tyrol due to the same high level of legislative competences, but nevertheless the societal relations differ significantly between the two cases. In the Basque Country there is no cleavage and division institutionalized by the political-institutional framework, but there is a substantial societal division based on
support for nationalist goals. Hence, I would expect to find an inclusive and welcoming approach towards newcomers in the Basque Country.

The evolution of the societal relations in the Basque Country is similar to how the same relations developed in Scotland over time. Disagreement over the future constitutional status of the territory fuels the division between the Scottish and the English as well as between the Basque and the Spanish. Hence, through the Scottish case I can assess whether shifting – and unsatisfied – demands for a change in the constitution impact the central research question of this thesis.

However, Scotland and Wales are also telling cases because they both offer insights into the changing political-institutional relations and the power-distribution between the sub-state territory and the state in general. For both minority nations, devolution was a window of opportunity and hence constituted a change in the discourse and framing of immigration and integration, but in particular, a change in the framing of the collective identity is also expected.

As shown, there is enough variation regarding the relations between the selected minority nations and the states to evaluate the possible impact these relations have on the direction of the discourse on immigration, integration, and collective identity. This will be done in chapter eight. But before I evaluate this impact, I assess how the discourse on immigration evolved (chapter five), how the discourse and policies on integration advanced (chapter six), and how this has impacted the framing of the collective identity (chapter seven).
CHAPTER 5. THE DISCOURSE ON IMMIGRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CATEGORY OF ‘THE MIGRANT’

1. Introduction

Immigration has become one of the most politicized issues in contemporary Europe, dividing electorates and politicians. At different times, immigration has either been perceived as challenge or benefit; migrants have been seen as sources of necessary labour to counterbalance demographic decline in Europe or as social parasites and criminals. The political elite have, therefore, established a hierarchy of ‘wanted’, ‘unwanted’, and ‘integrated’ migrants, creating categories of insiders and outsiders, based chiefly on their perceived added value to the given territory.

This chapter analyses how the various SNRPs both frame the arrival and settlement of immigrants and construct the categories of newcomers. As Korkut et al. (2013, 2) argue, underlying discursive frames affect the politics of immigration and have institutional, legal, and policy implications. But these shifting frames also show how boundaries between natives and newcomers evolve. Hence, it is possible to identify both the relationship migrants have with the receiving society, and the categories of migrants that are subject to integration policies. Schneider and Ingram (1993) and Verkuyten (1997) emphasize the importance of studying the construction of immigrant populations, due to its impact on and reflection in policies of integration. If immigration is framed by SNRPs as a security threat for the sub-state territory, and migrants as criminals and social parasites, we might expect integration policies to be more restrictive. If, instead, immigration is framed as an added value for the sub-state territory, then integration policies are expected to be more open and welcoming. As such, this chapter examines whether the boundaries of the minority nation’s identity change over the time period selected towards the inclusion, exclusion, or assimilation of immigration-generated diversity.
The chapter begins with a comparative evaluation of whether immigration is perceived as having a positive or negative impact on the territory, and which frames are used to justify this belief. In accordance with the general aim of the thesis, I pay particular attention to whether immigration is framed as having a direct impact on the minority nation’s identity, and whether this link is constructed as positive or negative by the parties. Secondly, the chapter elaborates on how migrants are constructed in each case: which migrants are perceived as ‘wanted’, ‘unwanted’, or ‘integrated’. Moreover, I evaluate whether they are perceived by SNRPs as the new ‘significant other’, thus replacing the state or the state majority as the most relevant counterpart in the identity-building process. Furthermore, the chapter evaluates how the perceptions of immigration and migrants have changed over time and between SNRPs, or in cases where the SNRPs are not in government, whether there are differences between the SNRPs and the government.

As the chapter will show, immigration is directly linked to the development and the construction of the collective identity by each of the SNRPs examined. It is framed as having a negative effect on the territory and the society in Corsica and South Tyrol, and as having a neutral to positive impact in Wales, the Basque Country, and Scotland. The distinction between migrants that are ‘wanted’ and those that are ‘unwanted’ due to their particular characteristics is also much more clearly articulated in the discourse of the SNRPs in Corsica and South Tyrol.

As outlined in chapter three, the following analysis relies on party manifestos, thematic documents on immigration, government and coalition programmes, and parliamentary debates. The qualitative text analysis of the data is assisted by Atlas.ti.

2. The discourse on immigration

In South Tyrol and Corsica, immigration has been portrayed predominantly as a negative phenomenon for the sub-state territory. In contrast, Scotland has tended to view immigration in a positive light, while Wales and the Basque Country view it as having primarily neutral implications. Negative depictions of immigration rely on it being framed and perceived as a threat – namely, as a threat to the security, identity, economy, and/or welfare system of the territory. In contrast, a neutral depiction refers to immigration as a fact and challenge, but not
as a problem. Frames referring to the lack of control over immigration flows and the opposition to national immigration policies are also classified as neutral, because these frames do not assess whether immigration is positive or negative for the minority nation, but instead refer to the relations between the minority nation and the state. Positive depictions frame immigration as a counterbalance to demographic decline, a necessity for the economy and labour market, and more generally, a source of economic, social, and cultural enrichment for the sub-state territory. Figure 4 gives an overview on whether a positive, negative, or neutral framing prevails in each minority nation, while Table 13 gives a preliminary overview on which themes and frames are used by SNRPs in the selected minority nations.

**Figure 4 – Overview of the discourse on immigration in the selected minority nations (comparative overview of the overall selected period)**

Table 13 – Most used themes and frames in the selected minority nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes and Frames</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Positive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security threat</td>
<td>Identity threat</td>
<td>Economic advantage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identity threat</td>
<td>Economic threat</td>
<td>Demographic advantage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic threat/welfare threat</td>
<td>Inability to control flows</td>
<td>Opposition to national immigration policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Country</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corsica</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Tyrol</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>x (until mid-2000)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.1 Immigration as a threat and a challenge in South Tyrol and Corsica

In South Tyrol and Corsica, immigration is mainly seen as a negative phenomenon. In South Tyrol, this negative framing has not changed substantially over the last twenty years, while Corsica has experienced a shift from negative to neutral and even positive frames, particularly after 2010.

Since migrants first began arriving in significant numbers to South Tyrol in the late 1980s and early 1990s, immigration has been generally perceived, by South Tyrolean SNRPs and the government alike, as a threat and a challenge. Immigration has only been referred to in a positive light in relation to the labour market, particularly in the tourism, caretaking, and agricultural industries. Figure 5 shows the relative stability of the framing of immigration in South Tyrol, although in the 2000s there is less negativity than in 1990s – and more positive discourse.

Figure 5 – Overview of the development of immigration stances among South Tyrolean SNRPs

The three right-wing and opposition parties, die Freiheitlichen (dF), Südtiroler Freiheit (SF), and Bürgerunion (BU), refer to immigration in predominantly negative and neutral terms,
while the only party discussing immigration as a neutral to positive phenomenon is the ruling Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP).

The negative perception of immigration in South Tyrol is based on three main narratives: immigration as a threat to the welfare system, as a cultural/identity threat, and as a security threat. Moreover, there is a neutral narrative of demanding control over immigration flows and a positive narrative portraying immigration as an added value to the labour market.

At the beginning of the 1990s, two parallel narratives characterized the discourse on immigration: security threat and identity threat. Different parties engaged with the two frames, which referred to two different aspects of immigration: while the security threat referred to international immigration, during this period the identity threat referred to internal immigration.

As it had done in the past, the SVP prioritized the issue of internal immigration and the mobility of workers from other Italian regions, especially with respect to the necessity of guaranteeing “the right to ‘Heimat’ (homeland) for the autochthonous population in order to protect the sub-state territory from ‘overalienation’ due to artificially supported and uncontrolled immigration” (3-P18, SVP Grundsatzprogramm 1993).34 In other words, the SVP framed internal immigration as the main threat to South Tyrolean identity and culture. The party only began to engage with international immigration from 1998 onwards, and internal immigration eventually disappeared as a topic and point of reference in subsequent discourses on immigration. This is due primarily to the low levels of internal immigration after the 1970s and secondly also to the mutual recognition of the full implementation of the Second Autonomy Statute and the robust political-institutional framework between South Tyrol and the Italian state.

In 1993, the newly created dF was instead the first South Tyrolean SNRP to engage with the topic of international immigration, in a period when the percentage of international immigrants (non-EU immigrants) amounted to around 3% of the territory’s total population.

34 Explanation for the citation of documents: the first number refers to the number of the Annex, the second number following the P refers to the number of the document as allocated by Atlas.ti. The numerical information is followed by an indication of character of the document (which party, or government etc.) and the year it was issued. 3-P18 hence refers to Annex 3, South Tyrol, and document 18 in the Atlas.ti program, which equals the SVP Document on Basic Principles from 1993.
dF first referred to immigration as a security threat and demanded the immediate expulsion of foreign “delinquents” (3-P21, dF Election Manifesto, 1993). In contrast to dF, neither the ruling SVP nor the opposition party Union für Südtirol (UfS) perceived international immigration in the early 1990s as an issue important enough to include in their election manifestos. Thus, international immigration was first of all framed as a security threat, and the linkage to the identity was only reactivated later, during the election campaign in 1998.

In the 1998 election campaign, UfS declared South Tyrol to be “not a country of immigration” (3-P13, UfS Election Manifesto, 1998; 3-P22, dF Election Manifesto, 1998). As a result, the framing of immigration as a security threat, which stemmed from the “increase of social insecurities and conflicts due to uncontrolled immigration” (3-P13, UfS Election Manifesto, 1998), as well as from “increases in the crime rate” (3-P22 dF Election Manifesto, 1998), gained further strength. From 1998 onwards, dF would, in parallel to the security threat, also emphasize the negative impact continued immigration would have on the autochthonous linguistic groups, whose particularity or distinctiveness needed to be protected above all else (3-P22, dF Election Manifesto, 1998). Thus, the identity frame was reintroduced into the discourse on immigration, but the SVP lost ownership of the issue to the dF.

In contrast, the SVP did not include international or internal immigration in their 1998 election manifesto, and only made reference to them in the party’s coalition program, under the headings ‘security’ and ‘labour market – economy’. In this sense, the government responded to the security theme of the opposition parties dF and UfS. More specifically, it declared that it would devote special attention to the maintenance of public order in South Tyrol, “which is said to be related to immigration” (3-P58, Coalition Programme, 1998). The government, moreover, underlined the necessity of international immigration, particularly of foreign workers, for the local labour market, and the need to treat them equally in their access to the welfare system. No preferences regarding the countries of origin were expressed, but rather a willingness to fill particular gaps in the agriculture and tourism sectors (3-P58, Coalition Programme, 1998). Thus, the government introduced an economic framing of
immigration into the discourse and was able to define immigration as having both a negative and positive impact on the South Tyrolean territory.

From 2003 onwards, immigration became a topic that engaged all SNRPs in South Tyrol. The three frames introduced before by dF were taken up by the other parties: immigration was framed as a security and welfare threat, a challenge for the identity, and (conversely) a necessity for the labour market:

Locals are not to be discriminated against in regards to foreigners. Our right to a homeland and identity does not allow for uncontrolled and unlimited immigration. South Tyroleans have the right to live without fear of losing their lives and their property. (Einheimische dürfen gegenüber Ausländern nicht benachteiligt werden. Unser Grundrecht auf Heimat gestattet keine unbeschränkte und unkontrollierte Zuwanderung. Die Südtiroler haben das Recht, ohne Angst um Leben oder Besitz in Sicherheit zu leben.) [3-P4, dF Election Manifesto, 2008]

BU and SF, the splinter parties of UfS, have carried on the UfS’ framing of immigration as a challenge and a threat. BU concentrates more on relating immigration to crime and public order, while SF focuses on identity aspects and the challenges immigration poses for the German and Ladin minorities. In particular, SF argues that migrants assimilate into the Italian speaking community by learning their language and, hence, shift the numerical distribution to the disadvantage of the German-speaking population:

The mass immigration of the last years causes anxiety amongst the population and also creates a big challenge for our cultural identity. Many foreigners come here and think that this territory is a normal Italian province, and not a part of the historical Tyrol, which is above all German. Thus, they adapt to the majority state population, speak Italian, and go to Italian schools. Finally, their children become normal Italians. For South Tyrol this means that the relation between the linguistic groups and the proportional representation changes to our disadvantage, and the German population risks becoming a minority in its own homeland over the next years (Die massive Einwanderung der letzten Jahre bereitet vielen Menschen Angst und stellt uns vor große Herausforderungen, die auch unsere kulturelle Identität betreffen. Viele Ausländer kommen nämlich hierher im Glauben, dass es sich um eine gewöhnliche italienische Provinz handelt, und nicht um einen Tiroler Landesteil, der in erster Linie deutsch ist. Dementsprechend passen sie sich dem italienischen Staatsvolk an, sprechen zumeist nur Italienisch und besuchen italienische Schulen. Spätestens ihre Kinder werden normale Italiener werden. Für Südtirol bedeutet dies, dass das Verhältnis der Sprachgruppen und somit auch der Proporz zu unseren Ungunsten verschoben werden, zumal die deutschsprachige Bevölkerung Gefahr läuft, in einigen Jahren zur Minderheit im eigenen Land zu werden.) [2-P5, SF Election Manifesto, 2008]

However, only the SVP continues to perceive immigration as an added value and necessity for the South Tyrolean labour market. They requested the devolution of competences from the state to manage the flows independently; a demand, however, which has also been raised
by dF, UfS, and lately also SF. Each of the SNRPs agreed that if the competences were devolved they would use them to restrict flows and prioritize only those immigrants who could contribute to the labour market, as well as citizens from other EU countries which are perceived to be “closer to our culture, language, and life-style” (P7, SVP Manifesto 2003). By introducing such references to cultural proximity between newcomers and the receiving minority society, the perceived impact immigration has on the minority nation’s identity is highlighted. In particular, the SVP and SF underline the challenge immigration poses to the minority nation’s identity due to its particular status within the Italian state:

We shall not forget that South Tyrol is in a particular situation. Immigration to South Tyrol is always connected to the threat of weakening South Tyrolean culture. We are a minority territory and therefore we have to pay particular attention not to lose our culture. Immigration will be a problem in the future, if we do not manage to attract foreigners to our culture, language, and traditions. (Wir dürfen nicht vergessen, dass Südtirol in einer besonderen Situation ist. Einwanderung läuft in Südtirol gleichzeitig auch immer mit der Gefahr einher, dass die eigene Kultur zurückgeht. Wir sind ein Minderheitengebiet und deshalb müssen wir aufpassen, dass wir unsere Kultur nicht verlieren. Deshalb wird die Einwanderung in Zukunft ein großes Problem werden, wenn wir es nicht schaffen, die Ausländer für unsere Kultur, für unsere Sprache und für unsere Traditionen zu gewinnen.) [3-P98, Debate in the South Tyrolean Parliament, 18.09.2009, Sven Knoll, SF]

In 2011, the South Tyrolean government adopted the Law on the Integration of Foreigners. This law lays down the principles and main measures to support the integration of migrants into the South Tyrolean society and equals in function the Basque Integration Plan, which will be described below. The five parliamentary debates (3-P28, 06.10.2011; 3-P29, 07.10.2011; 3-P30, 15.09.2011; 3-P31, 6.09.2011; 3-P32, 21.10.2011), which preceded the adoption of the law highlighted the immigration frames that the SNRPs used in their respective 2008 election campaigns. The security and identity frames as well as the welfare chauvinistic (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990) and economic framing of immigration played decisive roles in influencing the adoption of the new law – a subject that will be further discussed in chapter six. Thus, measures to “attract foreigners into our culture, language and traditions” (3-P98, Debate in the South Tyrolean Parliament, 18.09.2009, Sven Knoll, SF) are also discussed, whereas in particular the SVP calls for the integration of newcomers into the minority nation’s identity (3-P7, SVP Election Manifesto, 2003). Moreover, the claim for more competences from the Italian state to manage immigration flows was raised with great salience in the parliamentary debates.
After the adoption of the Law on the Integration of Foreigners in 2011, the topic of immigration lost much of its potential to polarize parties in South Tyrol. Indeed, the SNRPs did not devote much attention to immigration in their 2012 election manifestos, but focused rather on integration policies and, thus, on regulating and governing integration. This could be interpreted as a sign that each of the parties and the government have accepted immigration as a fact that can neither be reversed nor limited, yet still needs to be governed. It could, however, also be a reaction to the Law on the Integration of Foreigners. As I will demonstrate in chapter six, each of the SNRPs proposed measures to limit access to social services and justified this as a means to control immigration (3-P9, SVP Election Manifesto, 2013; 3-P6, SF Election Manifesto, 2013; 3-P20, dF Election Manifesto, 2013), thus also bringing the framing of immigration as a welfare threat into the integration discourse.

To summarize, immigration in South Tyrol has been framed predominantly as a threat to the security, welfare system, and minority nation’s identity of the sub-state territory, but by the SVP in particular, also as an economic advantage. The frame of immigration as an identity threat is very present among South Tyrolean SNRPs, and is linked directly with the need to protect the particularity of the German and Ladin populations: their numerical strength as well as their language and culture. However, unlike in the period between 1940 and 1970, when internal immigration was perceived to be a threat to the minority nation’s identity – more specifically, as a tool by the Italian state to increase the share of the Italian-speaking population in South Tyrol (Lantschner 2008) – in 2015 the parties do not explicitly connect experiences of internal and international immigration (with the exception of the SVP in the 1993 election manifesto), but rather press to select immigrants who are closer to the German language and culture, and focus on integration measures that also highlight the minority nation’s identity and culture.

Unlike in the South Tyrolean case, historical experiences with immigration significantly impact contemporary perceptions of immigration in Corsica, where both internal and international migration have had a much longer history. Indeed, between 1990 and 2011, the share of immigrants in Corsica remained virtually unchanged, accounting for 10% of the total population (persons born outside France, INSEE). At the same time, however, the Corsican population increased from 249,737 (01.01.1990) to 322,120 (01.01.2013), and the share of
persons with French citizenship born outside Corsica increased from 21.5% in 1990 to 28.9% in 2011.

Corsican SNRPs view immigration, whether internal or international, as an attempt by the French government to weaken Corsica’s autochthonous language and culture, describing it as a:

> Massive human and foreign settlement that is occurring at the expenses of a significant reduction of our community (le lit d’une installation humaine massive et étrangère au détriment d’une diminution importante de notre communauté.) [2-P4, CN, Press Release, 2007]

Indeed, when referring to immigration, the SNRPs do not differentiate explicitly between international and internal migration:

> But most migration flows, which came from France or elsewhere, were massive numbers of repatriates from former colonies, immigrants, officials… (Mais surtout les flux migratoires venue des France ou d’ailleurs ont été massifs repatriés de retour de anciennes colonies, immigrés, fonctionnaires…) [2-P1, ANC, Pruposti Politichi, 1990, p. 166]

Although Terrazzoni (2010) and Peretti-Ndiaye’s (2012) analyses of racism in Corsica show instances of Corsican SNRPs negatively framing international immigration, the parties deal, in their official election manifestos and public statements, mostly with the topic of internal migration. In particular, the SNRPs discuss the impact of internal migration on the labour market, with respect to both public administration and the housing situation. There have been numerous cases of people from mainland France moving to the island, seeking public administration jobs, buying second homes along the coast, and receiving residence permits and, thus, the political rights of everyday Corsicans. Corsica Nazione Indipendente (CNI) interprets this phenomenon as ‘depriving the Corsicans of the ability to control their future’.

> Each year, 4,000 newcomers come and flood the property market and labour market. They register in large numbers in the electoral lists and thus gradually deprive the Corsicans of the ability to control their own future (Chaque année, 4000 nouveaux arrivants viennent confisquer le marché de l’immobilier et de l’emploi. S’inscrivant massivement sur les listes électorales, ils privent progressivement les Corses de la maîtrise de leur devenir.) [3-P7, CNI Party Conference, 2008]

Between 1990 and 2014, Corsican SNRPs therefore made further demands for autonomy in managing the island’s immigration flows:

> As for the immigration problems, they cannot be addressed seriously until the Corsicans have the power to define in this area, as in others, a policy of respect for human rights, maintaining cultural and demographic balance, and the interests of the Corsican people as the only legal community of Corsica.
Corsican and South Tyrolean SNRPs ultimately differ in their interpretations of how to manage immigration. As a result of the decreasing salience of internal migration in contemporary discourse, South Tyrolean SNRPs are chiefly concerned with limiting international immigration. In contrast, Corsican SNRPs aim to limit internal migration and, what they call, ‘the colonization’ of Corsica by the French state (3-P 6, CN Election Manifesto, 2003). This view of internal immigration as a threat to identity was particularly strong among Corsican SNRPs until 2004. Since then, it has been complemented by the framing of internal immigration as having a negative impact on both the island’s economy and housing market.

As I will argue in chapter eight, this focus on the perceived threat from internal migration can partially be explained by the lack of official recognition of the Corsican people and their culture and language and the limited degree of self-government the island has at its disposal. Hence, conflicting relations between the island and the French state continue to strengthen the perception of the French state and people as the most ‘significant other’ for their nation building.

Since 2010 instead, international immigration has increasingly become a source of concern for Corsican SNRPs. In particular, Femu a Corsica (FeC), the coalition between moderate SNRPs and the Green party, which together gained 11 out of 51 seats (out of a total of 13 seats gained by SNRPs) in the 2010 elections, has started to frame international immigration in neutral and even positive terms, focusing on the necessity of integrating immigrants into Corsican society and the interests of the Corsicans. They thus stated the need:

\[
\text{to mobilize every Corsican, those originating here and those adopted, and to involve them in the collective project of building a modern society (mobiliser chaque Corse, qu’il soit d’origine ou d’adoption, et de l’impliquer dans le projet collectif de construction d’une société moderne.) [3-P11, FeC, Election Manifesto, 2010]}
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Figure 6 is particularly indicative of the shift in the Corsican SNRPs’ framing of immigration from being a negative phenomenon to a neutral and eventually positive one.
Chapter 5 – The discourse on immigration and the construction of ‘the migrant’

**Figure 6 – Overview of immigration stances among Corsican SNRPs**

Data: All entries of the document family ‘party manifestos’ in the hermeneutic unit ‘Corsica (total number of documents used for this graph: 23), coded on ‘immigration’ (unit of analysis: paragraphs/sentences), and in code family ‘negative’, ‘neutral’, and ‘positive’; y-axis: percentage of codes in relation to total codes on immigration (total number of codes in this graph: 30); see document list and code list in Annex 2.

In particular, the FeC coalition has emphasized the necessity of developing integration strategies which protect both human rights and the particularity of the Corsican language and culture. As I argue in chapter eight, FeC, comprised of moderate nationalist parties demanding further autonomy rather than secession, positioned itself at the 2010 regional elections successfully in juxtaposition to the separatist and more radical Corsica Libera (CL), and hence impacted the discourse on immigration with its moderate and cooperative discourse.

For the most part, however, Corsican SNRPs only marginally engage with the discourse on international immigration; as the next chapter shows, the issues of integration and ongoing demands for recognition of the Corsican identity are much more salient.

However, unlike the South Tyrolean case, no Corsican SNRP is in government. In fact, the role of the SNRPs in the opposition was only marginal until the 2010 elections, when they won 13 out of the 51 seats in parliament. In this sense, the negative framing of immigration, which all Corsican SNRPs had adopted before 2010, did not succeed in challenging the government’s position.
One of the most critical differences between the Corsican and South Tyrolean cases is the lack of constitutionally-granted legislative powers. Because of this, the Corsican government is unable to adopt and design its own integration policies and, thus, only marginally engages with immigration. Throughout the period observed, consecutive Corsican governments, independently of which parties were elected, only engaged with the topic of immigration in relation to international immigration, thereby differentiating the government from the Corsican SNRPs. Nevertheless, like its South Tyrolean counterpart, the Corsican government has tackled immigration from a primarily economic standpoint, linking it to the needs of the labour market, particularly in segments requiring difficult and low-skilled labour, such as agriculture, construction, and tourism. The first regional integration plan, PRIPI 2006, recognized immigration as a permanent fixture of Corsican reality and reflects on the changing nature of immigration itself from being an “immigration of workforce” to an “immigration of people” (3-P28, PRIPI, 2006-2009). The second integration plan, PRIPI 2010, focuses primarily on adapting the national framework for integration to the regional context by referring to the Corsican language as a particularity of the island:

The Corsican language and culture are the cement of the insular collective identity. It is essential to learn the French language, but [French language and integration courses] also take the historical, cultural, and linguistic elements into account that can facilitate living in Corsica. (La langue et la culture corses sont le ciment de l’identité collective insulaire. A côté de l’indispensable apprentissage de la langue française, ces formations prendront en compte les éléments historiques, culturels et linguistiques pouvant faciliter leur vie en Corse.) [3-P21, PRIPI 2010-2012]

Thus, although not including any SNRPs, the Corsican government adapts the national integration framework to recognize Corsican particularity and acknowledges the distinctiveness of the Corsican minority’s identity. Nevertheless, the Corsican government frames the link between immigration and the minority nation’s identity from the point of view of the newcomers, and hence that knowledge of the minority culture and language facilitates integration into the minority society. In contrast, for the SVP-led South Tyrolean government, integration into the minority nation’s identity strengthens a priori the minority interests, and the interests of newcomers are second order interests.

South Tyrol and Corsica have both framed immigration as a threat to the survival of their minority identities, although the extent to which they rely on this framing ultimately differs. In South Tyrol, framing immigration as a security and welfare threat receives more attention
than framing it as a threat to identity. Moreover, in South Tyrol the framings of the SNRPs overlap with those of the government. In contrast, the concept of migration as a threat to Corsican identity is related to internal migration, not international immigration, and is used by SNRPs, but not the government. As a result, the two minority nations pursue different goals in their calls for more autonomy in managing migration flows. Even the economic framing of immigration, which is equally present in both minority nations, differs due to the great differences in the economic situation of both minority nations. It is only the references to immigration as being integral to the seasonal labour market that both minority nations, and all parties, share.

The two cases significantly differ though in their political-institutional relations with their respective states. South Tyrol has the most robust and conflict-free political-institutional relations to the state and is a sub-state territory with a high degree of autonomy. The relations between Corsica and France, by contrast, are not only characterized by a lack of recognition for Corsica and limited administrative autonomy but also by constant tensions between the SNRPs and the national government. Regarding the societal relations, namely the relations between Corsicans and French citizens living on the island and the South Tyroleans and Italians living in South Tyrol, both cases are characterized by fragility and tensions, although on different levels and to a different extent. Hence, based on the comparison of South Tyrol and Corsica one could come to the conclusion that societal relations significantly impact the discourse of immigration.

2.2 Immigration as a benefit: Scotland, Wales, and the Basque Country

Unlike South Tyrol and Corsica, both the regional governments of Scotland, Wales, and the Basque Country – irrespective of whether they are governed by SNRPs or by regional branches of the state parties – and the SNRPs argue that international immigration is an opportunity for growth and an added value for the territory.

Although each of the three minority nations had previously experienced internal migration like South Tyrol and Corsica, SNRPs in Scotland, Wales, and the Basque Country do not connect internal migration to international migration; instead, the SNRPs in the latter three
minority nations rely on their experiences of emigration in constructing a neutral and often even positive view of immigration.

Wales shares a number of commonalities with Corsica, but *Plaid Cymru* (PC) has not developed the same approach to immigration as the Corsican SNRPs, neither focusing predominantly on internal immigration nor framing it as a threat to the minority nation’s identity. The two minority nations share a similar history of immigration, on the one hand, characterized by the early influx of foreign labourers who settled in the most populated areas, such as (in the case of Wales) the coastlines and the urban centres of Cardiff, Swansea, and Newport. And, on the other hand, both minority nations, have experienced significant internal immigration.

Before 1998, PC shared though a number of common issues with the Corsican SNRPs, such as the belief that internal immigration threatened the local language and negatively impacted the housing market:

> Throughout Wales, we have seen the character of our towns and villages changing before our eyes. Throughout the 1980s, the great discrepancy in employment levels and personal incomes between the south-east of England and Wales led to massive in-migration of wealthy people who could outbid local businesses to acquire shops, pubs and garages, and who could buy home at prices well beyond the reach of our young people. As a result, the identity of our communities and the future of our language are threatened. [5-P217, PC Election Manifesto, 1992]

However, the perceived weakening of the Welsh language and culture was also linked to the high number of Welsh emigrants between 1980 and 2000:

> If the language is to survive then a crucial part of that process lies in maintaining the viability of those communities where the Welsh language is the normal, everyday language of community life. It is those communities which in the last decade have faced the greatest sociological change in their history, with a huge influx of non-Welsh speakers, and a continuing net outward migration of young indigenous people. [5-P217, PC Election Manifesto, 1992]

Until the Government of Wales Act of 1998 and its subsequent expansion by the Government of Wales Act 2006 and 2011, Wales also shared another problem with Corsica: little to no autonomous power. It was only in 2006 that the Welsh government was able to begin independently and substantially governing certain policy areas pertaining to integration, such as health, education, economic development, culture, housing, and social welfare.
As early as 1998, at the first legislative elections in Wales, PC began to change its approach to immigration. Although PC’s election manifesto did not explicitly mention immigration, it made references to a changing identity, a process that ultimately “must involve all of the diverse cultural and linguistic elements” (5-P199, PC Election Manifesto, 1998, p. 5). In other words, the manifesto called for integration based on an inclusive citizenship in bilingual Wales.

Figure 7 shows how PC progressed from viewing immigration – that is, internal migration – in a negative light to outlining its negative effects on wages and the labour market (5-P3, PC Election Manifesto, 2005) to, finally, ceasing any discussion about immigration, whether internal or international, in an effort to better focus on concrete integration measures. The first policy paper dedicated to immigration, ‘Migration and Wales’, was presented in 2014 and referred to immigration as a positive phenomenon, noting that “the major demographic shift that is taking place globally represents opportunities for Wales through the creativity, economic activity, cultural diversity and new thinking that migrants bring” (5-P7, PC Policy Paper, Migration and Wales, 2014).

As a result, the Welsh identity has been redefined as “bilingual and multicultural” (5-P6, PC Election Manifesto, 2011, p. 3), with the Welsh language, in particular, being made accessible to everyone, as will be shown in chapter seven.
Chapter 5 – The discourse on immigration and the construction of ‘the migrant’

Figure 7 – Overview of immigration stances of PC

Data: All entries of the document family ‘PC manifestos’ in the hermeneutic unit ‘Wales,’ (total number of documents used for this graph: 7), coded on ‘immigration’ (unit of analysis: paragraphs/sentences), and in code family ‘negative’, ‘neutral’, and ‘positive’; y-axis: percentage of codes in relation to total codes on immigration (total number of codes in this graph: 42); 1992 refers to the general elections, from 1999 party manifestos for the elections to the Welsh National Assembly were used; PP refers to the Policy Paper on immigration, EU to the EU elections; see list of documents and code list in Annex 5.

The neutral and negative aspects in PC’s 2011 election manifestos referred to the approach of the UK government in dealing with immigration and in particular with asylum seekers. Both PC and the Welsh government condemn the British government’s practice of placing asylum seekers, in particular children, in detention or removal centres (5-P6, PC Election Manifesto, 2011). The same critique of the UK government has been expressed by the SNP and the Scottish government.

This shift from a negative framing of immigration to a neutral and, since 2011, even a positive one took place not only within PC but, to a larger extent and earlier than within PC, also within the Welsh government.

From 1999 to 2007, the Welsh government highlighted the fact that immigration was not a devolved issue. Indeed, despite its attempts to intervene in the national parliament, the Welsh government was ultimately unable to counterbalance Westminster’s often restrictive and discriminatory asylum policy:

I do not consider the issue from a different perspective; I consider it from the perspective that is right for Wales, which requires us to deal humanely with asylum seekers and refugees, to put policies in place
and to put the money that we have from the Assembly block to good use to ensure that they can participate as full members of society. [5-P73, Debate in the Welsh National Assembly, 03.02.2004, Edwina Hart, Welsh Labour]

Since 2003, the Welsh government has increasingly tried to use its competences in secondary areas such as culture, education, or children’s rights to counterbalance the UK’s asylum, immigration and integration strategies, although both Westminster and Wales were governed by the Labour Party.

Of course, immigration policy is not devolved, but children’s rights override that question, because their rights must come first. [5-P153, Debate in the Welsh National Assembly, 21.10.2008, Rhodri Morgan, Welsh Labour, First Minister]

Moreover, from 2007 onwards the Welsh government, formed by a coalition between Labour and PC, has linked the need for immigration with the need for more highly-skilled labour, in particular doctors. Thus, the framing of immigration as being a challenge to the collective identity and labour market of Wales has been replaced with the framing of immigration as a positive and necessary phenomenon that can both safeguard and improve the conditions of society and further strengthen the image, that PC aims to diffuse, of a progressive and outward-looking Wales. As a result, the Welsh government tries to counterbalance the restrictive national immigration policy and find ways to attract immigrants:

We will bring forward the recruitment campaign in the early part of next year. That would be helped by a review of immigration policy. We are not having the doctors arriving in Wales that we used to, because immigration policy is too strict. Over the weekend, I was stunned to hear the UK Minister for immigration suggesting that it was a good thing that fewer student and work visas were being issued. I cannot understand how that can be seen as anything other than a drain on our economy. [5-P 188, Debate in the Welsh National Assembly, 29.11.11, Rhodri Morgan, Welsh Labour, First Minister]

Hence, in Wales, and in particular within PC, there is a direct temporal link between devolution and changing approaches to immigration. The more opportunities the minority nation had to develop its own approach to immigration, the more they used those opportunities to, on the one hand, construct a narrative of an inclusive and bilingual Wales and, on the other, to develop a narrative of decry the UK government for not being responsive to the needs of Wales. This is evident in particular in relation to the asylum policy and gaps in the labour market that the Welsh government proposes to fill by attracting highly-skilled immigrants. Furthermore, the framing of immigration as an identity threat is replaced by framing immigration as a way to modernize Welsh society.
As I will show in chapter eight, PC’s participation in government (2007 – 2011) and adaptation to their new role significantly challenged the party’s own aims and ideology in particular in relation to the party’s goal of promoting and protecting the Welsh language and culture (Elias 2009). Hence, the shift in the framing of immigration needs to be interpreted also in light of the general development of PC.

Framing immigration as an economic advantage has an even longer tradition in Scotland than Wales or South Tyrol. The narrative of a welcoming and inclusive Scotland which perceives immigration as an enrichment to the society, and blames the UK government for the inability to react properly to local needs is well entrenched in Scotland. The SNP, but also every Scottish government since 1999 – irrespective of whether they were formed by the SNP or a coalition of Labour and Liberal Democrats – has opposed restrictive elements of the UK's immigration policy (in particular those regarding entrance) and attempted to gain more competences in order to attract a higher number of immigrants to the minority nation. This opposition is motivated mainly by the demographic pressures of falling birth-rates and aging population, both of which are perceived to threaten the territory’s economy and impact Scottish political influence relative to England, which has a faster-growing population:

So people are leaving and the economy is in trouble - a cycle that will only get worse unless we break it. [4-P61, Speech at St. Andrew’s University, 21.08.2003, Alex Salmond, SNP]

The SNP, therefore, refers to the Scottish situation as “a crisis that puts us in a different position from that of the rest of the UK” (4-P35, Debate at the Scottish Parliament, 10.02.2005, Christine Graham, SNP). Consequently, all Scottish parties, but in particular the SNP, have framed immigration over the last twenty years in a positive and welcoming light:

I want to start from a simple proposition – Scotland is not full up. We need more people. And if people from other countries are willing and eager to come to Scotland and make their futures here, then I say we should welcome them. [4-P61, Speech at St. Andrew’s University, 21.08.2003, Alex Salmond, SNP]

With the support of the SNP, the coalition between Labour and Liberal Democrats established the Fresh Talent Initiative and the Working in Scotland Scheme in 2004 to attract highly-skilled workers and students and boost the Scottish economy. After the suspension of these programmes in 2008, the SNP-led government continued to propose similar initiatives such as a Scottish Green Card (3-P3, SNP, Election Manifesto, 2007) or earned citizenship,
based on a point system similar to the one applied in Canada or Australia (3-P28, SNP, General Election Manifesto 2010), but none of the suggestions were ultimately implemented.

Once in government, the SNP maintained the Labour coalition’s approach to immigration by lobbying for more competences. The party has underlined, on the one hand, the purely economic aspect of Scottish attraction schemes and, on the other hand, the potential for abuse or illegal activity in an open-door policy:

I have suggested to ministers north and south of the border that the fresh talent initiative is a good model - the motion makes that point - on which we might be able to build a solution. I hope that we can do that for skilled and semi-skilled workers, perhaps through a pilot programme in Scotland. We would not wish to allow any abuses - no one would want to see that - and we certainly do not want to have illegal immigration; rather, we want to have sensible, planned immigration to address the needs that we have been discussing. I hope that a more sensible approach will be taken by colleagues in Westminster to allow the Scottish Government to press forward with plans to improve the Scottish economy in this area, and that a good Peshwari naan bread will not become a thing of the past. [4-P36, Debate at the Scottish Parliament, 10.09.2008, Brian Adam, SNP]

The attraction schemes proposed by the SNP also suggest bringing the diaspora back by pursuing “an immigration policy that welcomes new Scots and encourages people to move back to Scotland” (4-P27, SNP General Election Manifesto, 2005) and utilizing asylum seekers and refugees who are already present in Scotland as a labour resource. This attraction scheme goes hand in hand with the critique of the UK asylum system, which – after the critique of the national immigration system – is the second strongest criticism Scottish governments have expressed in relation to the UK immigration policy:

But in reaching out to new migrants, we should not forget those who are already here. There are many asylum seekers in Scotland who could make an enormous and long term contribution to Scottish society if only they were given the chance. The way in which some asylum seekers are treated by the UK immigration authorities is not only, on occasion, morally wrong. It also deprives Scotland of much needed talent and risks sending the wrong message about our country to the very people we are encouraging to come here to live and work. [4-P64, SNP Press Release, 26.11.2005]

An SNP administration will promote a new, positive attitude towards asylum seekers and refugees that regards them as an asset to our community, not as a burden. [4-P3, SNP Election Manifesto, 2005]

The UK’s policies on immigration and asylum have been vilified in both Wales and Scotland as being racist, abusive, and contrary to the interests of the Welsh and Scottish populations. This criticism again underlines the SNRPs’ instrumentalization of immigration to position itself in contrast to England:
It is bad enough that we have immigration laws that are debated and approved at Westminster, which are clearly racist in conception. [4-P53, Debate in the Scottish Parliament, 25.05.2000, Linda Fabiani, SNP]

Figure 8 shows that within the SNP the positive framing of immigration has dominated the discourse since the late 1990s. The neutral framing refers mainly to requests for more competences from the UK government in the areas of immigration and asylum as well as the critique of the UK’s immigration policy. Thus, the SNP frames immigration as having a positive effect on Scotland’s economy, population size, and even national identity:

Scotland is a wonderful, modern country, with an enviable record of celebrating diversity and welcoming new people to further enrich our national life. There are many strands and colours in the Scottish tartan. [4-P62, SNP Press Release, 15.12.2007]

**Figure 8 – Overview of immigration stances of the SNP**

Linguistic and religious diversity has been seen a source of enrichment by every Scottish government since 1999, but more so by the SNP in government and in opposition, whose rhetoric on presenting immigration as a defining element of a modern Scotland has been particularly strong:
Scotland has a long and proud history of welcoming migrants. The positive cultural, economic and social contribution that migrants make in shaping a modern and vibrant Scotland benefits us all. [4-P50, Debate in the Scottish Parliament, 23.02.2011, Kenny MacAskill, SNP]

Modern Scotland has a wide diversity of cultures, linguistic and racial, which serve as a source of enrichment in all aspects of our society. [4-P53, Debate in the Scottish Parliament, 25.05.2000, Michael Matheson, SNP]

This line of argumentation, which has been pushed primarily by SNP, presents Scotland as a ‘mongrel nation’ that has benefitted from previous waves of immigration (4-P59, Debate in the Scottish Parliament, 31.10.01, Linda Fabiani, SNP). This historical view of immigration as being a beneficial component of modern Scotland is also connected to the territory’s significant emigration history. These historical references are not only used to present immigration as constituting a long-standing positive contribution to the Scottish society, but also to make the Scottish population more empathetic toward newly immigrated persons and asylum seekers:

    We should not forget that, in the course of our country’s history, although long ago, we have also suffered repression and forced emigration to other shores. We, from this country, we’re indeed asylum seekers. [4-P59, Debate in the Scottish Parliament, 31.10.01, Linda Fabiani, SNP]

Thus, the SNP uses its territory’s history of immigration in stark contrast to SNRPs in Corsica, which do not refer to Corsica’s similarly long history of emigration. Furthermore, in contrast to the Corsican SNRPs, neither the Scottish Government nor the SNP refer in their discourse on immigration to inflows from other parts of the UK. Hussain and Miller argue that ‘Anglophobia’ or xenophobia against the white English population is widespread amongst the Scottish population, who either displace or channel racism against ethnic minorities into racism against the English (2006, 36). Anti-English sentiments are also reported in Wales, and both political parties, the SNP and PC, have been accused of fuelling such racism against the state population:

    There is also an English-Welsh issue, which is a dimension that we must not neglect. This week, the front page headline of the Cambrian News in Aberystwyth is about racially motivated crime, and it is between Welsh and English people, which is equally abhorrent. [5-P96, Debate in the Welsh National Assembly, 17.05.2005, Nick Bourne, Welsh Conservative Party]

Do you believe that when senior Members of Plaid Cymru, in senior positions of authority begin to talk about the English threatening our way of life and English pensioners being a burden on Welsh society, that we must be clear about what it is - racism, pure and simple? [5-P59, Debate in the Welsh National Assembly, 25.01.2001, Alan Pugh, Labour]
PC and SNP, however, reject such accusations, and Alex Salmond, former and long-lasting leader of the SNP as well as former first minister of Scotland, often claims to be an ‘Anglophile’ (Hussain and Miller 2006, 68). The Corsican SNRPs instead actively fuelled anti-French sentiments in the 1990s, by coining the term ‘I Francesi Fora’ (The French out) (2-P22), a reference to French citizens moving to Corsica from mainland France to occupy important positions in public administration and buy second homes on the island, in doing so threatening Corsicans claims to the island.

The immigration discourse in the Basque Country engages with the topic of internal immigration from other Spanish regions, but not anti-Spanish sentiment. This differs from South Tyrol, Wales, and Corsica, where more direct and negative connections between previous and current immigration flows are made. The argument in the Basque Country is ultimately based on the assumption that the current wave of international immigration cannot be compared to the previous internal immigration waves of the 1960s. Eusko Alkartasuna (EA) defines the current migration wave as multicultural, and states:

> Because today we are getting, as seen elsewhere in Europe although still to a much lesser extent, a new type of immigration: Africans, Maghrebi, Asians, South Americans, East Europeans. It is a multicultural immigration, with very different attitudes and values. (Porque hoy, como en toda Europa, aunque todavía en mucho menor grado, entre nosotros estamos recibiendo un nuevo tipo de inmigración: africanos, magrebíes, asiáticos, sudamericanos, europeos del Este. Es una inmigración multicultural, con mentalidades y escalas de valores muy diferentes.) [1-P83, Debate in the Basque Parliament, 09.06.2000, Iñigo Ormaetxea Garai, EA]

Hence, immigration is framed by the Basque SNRPs not as a problem, but as a social phenomenon:

> Immigration is not a problem. Immigration is a social phenomenon and, therefore, in the law it should not have been treated as a problem, but from the point of view of integration. (La inmigración no es un problema. La inmigración es un fenómeno social, y, por lo tanto, en la ley debía haber sido tratada no como un problema, sino desde el punto de vista de la integración.) [1-P82, Debate in the Basque Parliament, 07.03.2001, Karmele Antxustegi Urkiaga, EA]

Basque SNRPs – Partido Nationalista Vasco (PNV) and Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), but not Herri Batasuna (HB) which does not substantially engage with the topic – agree that this new approach to the current immigration wave needs to be based on equality and respect for human rights.
Like in South Tyrol, discourse on international immigration in the Basque Country only began in the late 1990s, as a result of the delayed salience of immigration due to low migration inflows prior to that period. However, in South Tyrol even low numbers of migrants triggered negative reactions from the right-wing SNRPs in South Tyrol (UfS, dF, and SF) at an early stage and a delayed engagement with the issue at the government level. In the Basque Country, in contrast, low numbers of migrants triggered, on the one hand, positive reactions from both the left-wing EA and the more conservative Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) and, on the other hand, an earlier engagement with the issue at the government level which resulted in the first Basque Immigration Plan of 2003. The importance of a prevalence of right-wing SNRPs in contrast to a prevalence of a left-wing discourse (led by EA) and the impact on the contrasting approaches in South Tyrol and the Basque Country will be further discussed in chapter eight.

Figure 9 shows that the PNV and EA, which formed the Basque government for most of the period studied,35 have framed immigration as a neutral phenomenon with a positive effect on various dimensions of Basque society, and on policies in the field of welfare, culture, and economics:

The Basque government interprets this as an enrichment on all levels: in social terms, in cultural terms, and in economic terms. Yes, they need us, but at the same time we need immigrants to develop our Community. (El Gobierno Vasco lo interpreta como un factor de enriquecimiento en todos los órdenes: en el plano social, en el plano cultural y en el plano económico. Nos necesitan, sí, pero igualmente necesitamos a las personas inmigrantes para sacar nuestra Comunidad adelante.) [1-P106, Debate in the Basque Parliament, 02.04.2004, Javier Madrazo Lavin, EB]

35The exception was the legislative term 2009–2012 when the Basque Country was governed by PSE-EE (Partido Socialista de Euskadi – Euskadiko Ezkerra/Socialist Party of the Basque Country – Basque Country Left).
EA began to engage with the topic as early as 1998, emphasizing the need to respond to international immigration by neither closing gates nor supporting racism. Thus, from the very beginning, EA framed immigration as a positive challenge for the Basque Country. The tripartite coalition between PNV, EA, and the left-wing Ezker Batua (EB) (1-P7, Debate in the Basque Parliament, Government Program, p. 27) similarly introduced the topic in their coalition program in 2001 and set future agendas by both adopting a multi-year immigration and integration plan and creating a Ministry of Immigration.

Immigration is, hence, defined as a positive phenomenon contributing to all aspects of Basque life:

Immigration is part of a social and plural process and enriches all aspects of the social life (La inmigración es parte de un proceso social pluralista y enriquecedor en todos los órdenes de la vida social.) [1-P4, PVI, 2003-2005]

Furthermore, immigration is framed as a factor enabling Basque society to modernize, ‘Europeanize’, and generally advance as a modern, developed, and plural society, comparable to other countries in the neighbourhood:

The Basque Immigration Plan starts from the assumption that immigration is a positive and necessary phenomenon. Immigration contributes in an essential way to the enrichment of Basque society, both
economically and from a cultural perspective. Progressive immigration and pluralism of our society is a factor of modernization, Europeanisation, and dynamism that brings us closer to the modern, pluralistic and developed societies in our neighbouring countries’ (El Plan Vasco de Inmigración parte de la asunción de la inmigración como un fenómeno positivo y necesario. La inmigración contribuye de modo esencial al enriquecimiento de la sociedad vasca, tanto en el ámbito económico como desde una perspectiva cultural. La inmigración y el progresivo pluralismo de nuestra sociedad es también un factor de modernización de la misma, de europeización y dinamismo que nos acerca a las modernas sociedades desarrolladas y plurales de otros países de nuestro entorno.) [1-P4, PVI, 2003-2005]

In this sense, Basque SNRPs have a long history of framing immigration in economic and identity terms. This positive framing is also present among state-wide parties and the regional branch of PP, the Popular Party, and PSOE, the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (Morales, Ros and Pardos-Prado 2015), which upon being elected in 2009, stated that

Immigration contributes to increase the plurality and diversity that characterizes the traditional Basque society. (La inmigración contribuye así a aumentar la pluralidad y diversidad que caracteriza de origen a la sociedad vasca.) [1-P3, PVI, 2011-2013]

Alongside the positive framing of immigration, Basque SNRPs, like all other SNRPs in the selected minority nations, criticize the Spanish state’s immigration policy. The Basque government, when composed of SNRPs, positioned itself against the Immigration Law (Ley de Extranjería) in 2000 and its subsequent modifications (1-P2, PVI, 2007-2009). PNV generally perceives the Spanish immigration policy as ‘frustrating’ and ‘defective’ (descorazonadora, errónea, PNV; P91, 2000), and “based on repression and a lack of human rights” (1-P 4, PVI, 2003 - 2005 p.8-9). As a result, PNV bases its own approach to immigration and integration on equality, non-discrimination, and human rights.

EA and PNV, with the support of the coalition partner EB-IU, ultimately base the Basque approach to immigration on two principles: framing immigration as an enrichment of the Basque Country and developing integration policies based on equality, human rights, and an inclusive citizenship (1-P107, Debate in the Basque Parliament, 02.04.04, Javier Madrazo Lavin, EB). These principles, which were already laid down in the first Basque Immigration Plan of 2003, remain at the heart of the Basque approach to immigration.

Hence, in the Basque Country the link between immigration and identity is, similarly to Scotland and recently also Wales, constructed as a positive link contributing to the modernization of the society. The three minority nations use the positive framing of
immigration though to present a progressive and outward-looking sub-state approach that differs from the national one.

However, the three minority nations vary in relation to how the political-institutional relations with the respective states and the societal relations with the state majority populations developed. Comparing Scotland and Wales, the impact of devolution on Wales and PC is particularly evident and will be further evaluated in chapter eight. Comparing Scotland and the Basque Country instead will show, that the discourse on immigration is instrumentalized by the SNRPs in their escalating quest for independence and adds another dimension which strengthens the differences between the centre and periphery.

3. The construction of ‘the migrant’

The next pages analyse who the subjects of immigration are in the five selected minority nations and what characteristics are ascribed to them. Narratives about migrants involve a positive or negative demarcation of the target population (Schneider and Ingram 1993); as a result, certain migrants are framed as an added value to the territory while others are perceived as a challenge and a threat. Hence, certain migrants are more wanted and are perceived as ‘easier to integrate’ than others. Figure 10 provides an initial overview of whether a negative, neutral, or positive depiction of migrants prevails in each sub-state territory, whereas table 14 shows which frames are used for the negative, neutral, or positive references to migrants. The analysis of how the category of ‘migrant’ is constructed in the individual territories reveals important insights into why newcomers with certain characteristics are perceived as threatening; for example, in their construction of the ‘unwanted migrant’, South Tyrolean SNRPs underline the differences between the German and Italian speakers in the territory and how the Italian state as the ‘significant other’ is strengthened by migrants. The analysis below also reveals why certain migrants are constructed as ‘integrated’ – for example, as seen in the SNP’s framing of the ‘New Scots’ – and how that contributes to presenting immigration as an added value for the territory.
Table 14 shows that negative depictions of migrants primarily exist in South Tyrol where migrants are referred to as ‘criminals’, ‘welfare tourists’, and ‘difficult to integrate because of their ethnic background’. This is in line with the predominantly negative framing of immigration as a threat to the identity, security, and welfare system in South Tyrol, and the positive framing of it in the Basque Country, Wales, and Scotland. Corsica constitutes a special case because although a negative framing of immigration prevails, the parties do not frame migrants, unless they are internal migrants from France, in negative terms but use more neutral denominations such as ‘workers’, ‘migrants’, or ‘foreigners’. References to asylum seekers or refugees in all minority nations have a neutral connotation. References to ‘highly skilled workers’, ‘close to our culture’, and ‘new citizens/co-citizens’ are a sign of the positive framing of migrants, while the latter two could also be interpreted as a step further in the integration process, and also in their inclusion into the minority society and hence identity.
**Table 14 – Most used frames and themes referring to ‘migrants’**

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<th>Negative – unwanted</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Positive – wanted</th>
<th>integrated</th>
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<td><strong>South Tyrol</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>x (since 2013)</td>
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<td><strong>Corsica</strong></td>
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<td>(Corse d’adoption)</td>
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<td>x (since 2007)</td>
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<td><strong>Basque Country</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Scotland</strong></td>
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Chapter 5 – The discourse on immigration and the construction of ‘the migrant’

The framing of immigrants shows which features or perceived characteristics are appreciated and hence which migrants are wanted, and which, in contrast are not appreciated and thus how persons associated with those criteria become unwanted. Migrants referred to as ‘new citizens’ are grouped within the category of ‘integrated’ migrants, because that frame does not reflect the wanted/unwanted dichotomy, but instead refers to a group of people who are perceived by SNRPs as already belonging to the territory and society.

SNRPs in South Tyrol, the Basque Country, and Corsica use the denomination of ‘migrants’ or ‘immigrants’ (Einwanderer/inmigrante-migrante/émigrant) but also ‘foreigners’ (Ausländer/extranjero/étranger) to refer to the subjects of immigration flows.

The term ‘migrant’, taken literally, refers to a physical movement and does not differentiate between the first generation of migrants and their descendants, who have not physically moved from a country of origin to the respective minority nation. Due to the recent history of migration in South Tyrol and the Basque Country and the relative absence of a second generation of migrants, this differentiation has not yet been so salient, and thus most of those referred to as ‘migrants’ actually have moved from one country to another. However, in Corsica there is a substantial second and third generation which require differentiation between those that have moved themselves, and those that have been born as descendants of migrants. Hence, Corsican SNRPs, when not differentiating between those persons who physically moved to the island and their descendants, not only neglect the long history of immigration, but also fail to recognize that these persons are from Corsica, and hence belong to Corsica. Using the term ‘foreigner’ to formally reflect the status of not being a citizen of the state further underlines the distance between the receiving society and the newcomers and highlights their ‘non-belonging’ to the particular territory.

In Wales and Scotland, besides naming newcomers as ‘migrants’, persons with a migration background are predominantly referred to as part of the ‘black and ethnic minority population’ or just as an ‘ethnic minority’. This denomination signals a particular position in the society and the relation between the receiving society and the newcomers - those that are different from them. However, in contrast to ‘migrant’ and ‘foreigner’, minorities are part of a larger society. When evaluating the framing of migrants in the selected cases one also has, though, to recognize the particular national frameworks, migration and colonization histories,
Chapter 5 – The discourse on immigration and the construction of ‘the migrant’

and the terms used in that particular national context and hence the differentiation between migrant and ethnic minority should not be over-interpreted as a priori inclusive or exclusive.

The terms ‘migrants’ and ‘ethnic minorities’ have been coded for the aim of this thesis as neutral categories although I am well aware that these terms are not neutral categories per se but carry a particular contextual meaning (Van Dijk 1997). However, referring to newcomers as migrants or ethnic minorities does not, in the first instance, say anything about whether they are perceived as positive or negative for the territory, and hence are wanted or unwanted. Therefore, the terms have been coded as neutral.

‘Asylum seekers’ and ‘refugees’ form a separate category in the discourse and are, throughout all cases and across all parties and governments, equally referred to in a neutral to positive way. The salience of the discourse on asylum seekers and refugees in Scotland and Wales follows the broader British political discourse. However, asylum seekers are welcomed by SNRPs in both Scotland and Wales, and the Scottish and Welsh discourse is characterized by the opposition of the minority nation’s governments and SNRPs to the policies of Westminster on how to deal with the asylum seekers, in particular children, who have been sent to detention centres in Dungavel (Scotland):

Wales has a long tradition of being a welcoming nation. Asylum seekers are mainly people who have suffered injustice and hardship, and we should make them welcome. [5-P26, Debate in the Welsh National Assembly, 12.10.00, Edwina Hard, Welsh Labour]

Sadly, the situation in Dungavel is all too typical of the way in which the United Kingdom Government treats asylum seekers. [4-P38, Debate in the Scottish Parliament, 11.09.2003, John Swinney, SNP]

Hence, references to asylum seekers and refugees are made in Scotland and Wales in order to differentiate the sub-state territory and the particular approach to immigration from the central state’s approach.

As chapter six will show, the positive approach toward refugees and asylum seekers also resulted in the ‘Refugee Inclusion Strategy’ in Wales (2013) and the ‘New Scots: Integrating Refugees in Scotland’s Communities’ strategy in Scotland (2013) and hence the positive framing is also transposed into policies supporting refugees.

In South Tyrol, irrespective of the predominantly negative framing of immigration, both the SNRPs and the government point to the vulnerability, the increased risk of deprivation, and
the marginalization of refugees and asylum seekers who require special assistance and basic welfare services. Even the radical right-wing party dF acknowledges in all its election manifestos the necessity of granting asylum – and basic welfare services – to everyone who is persecuted due to racial, religious, or political convictions (3-P4, 3-P20, 3-P22). The positive approach toward asylum seekers at the governmental level resulted in South Tyrol in specific social policies being adopted in 1999 and 2000, much earlier than policies for the integration of migrants were discussed in the sub-state parliament.

3.1 The ‘unwanted’ – negative frames

In the discourse in both Corsica and South Tyrol there are particular categories of migrants which are negatively connotated and seen as ‘unwanted’ because of the characteristics ascribed to them. In South Tyrol, the ‘unwanted’ migrants are those who are culturally distant from the minority population, either because of their linguistic or religious background, or because they are negatively stereotyped as ‘criminals’ and ‘exploiters of the welfare system’.

In Corsica and partially also in Wales it is rather internal migrants who are negatively regarded. The differentiation between internal and international migrants refers to a hierarchical relationship between the two groups. Internal migrants are part of the state majority, and once they move to the minority nation they automatically change the numerical relationship – and hence also the power-relationship – between the minority and state majority populations. Thus, internal migrants are often perceived as automatically threatening the minority nation’s identity and thus become ‘unwanted’, whereas international migrants form a separate category. Internal migrants were also an issue in the Basque Country (Conversi 1997, 187-221), in South Tyrol (Lantschner 2008) in the 1950s and 1960s, and in both, Scotland and Wales, where previous internal immigration from England and Ireland significantly changed the population and caused substantial internal tensions. But as I will discuss below, in the Basque Country, Scotland and South Tyrol, and partially also in Wales internal migration is no longer salient, and SNRPs no longer associate it with current discourse on immigration and the construction of migrant categories.

In Corsica the differentiation between internal and international migrants is crucial in the discourse on immigration. At the level of government, Corsica does not make a distinction
between internal and international migrants, but the differentiation is very salient among Corsican SNRPs. Since the early 1990s, Corsican SNRPs have directly engaged with the anti-internal immigrant discourse. The nationalist camp, consisting of SNRPs and the militant *Front de libération nationale de la Corse*/National Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC), coined the term *I Francesi Fora* (2-P22) to demand that those French citizens who had migrated to Corsica from mainland France leave the island again. Internal migrants are, as shown already above, accused of depriving ‘real Corsicans’ of their island. The *I Francesi Fora* slogan was also applied for a short while to migrants from the Maghreb Area (*Arabi Fora*), but it was first of all not used by the SNRPs, but rather by civil society, clandestine movements, and the FLNC, and secondly, was mainly used in relation to two Tunisians who were caught selling drugs in 1986 (Terrazzoni 2010, 155).

In the Basque Country the differentiation between internal and international migrants is only made by SNRPs in relation to the education system and different needs of pupils. It is recognized that differentiation needs to be made between pupils immigrating to the Basque Country from other Spanish regions, and those immigrating from other countries because of the different linguistic issues the two groups face:

> Because, of course, there are two types of students from outside the Basque community: students from other regions of the rest of Spain, and others, students from abroad. And the pedagogical handling of both groups deserve is very different. (*Porque, claro, alumnos provenientes de fuera de la Comunidad vasca son dos: unos, alumnos de otras comunidades autónomas del resto de España, y otros, alumnos provenientes del extranjero. Y el tratamiento pedagógico que merecen ambos colectivos, los dos colectivos, son muy distintos.*) [1-P152, Debate in the Basque Parliament, 25.02.04, María Isabel Celaá Diéguez, PSOE]

However, this differentiation of needs does not reflect any value-based judgment nor does it refer to those internal migrants as ‘unwanted’.

Hence, in contrast to Corsican SNRPs, internal migrants are no longer constructed as the ‘significant other’ by Basque, Scottish, Welsh or South Tyrolean SNRPs. However, within the SNP and PC the construction of a ‘significant other’ has shifted from the state population to the central government. Thus, the ‘significant other’ is the government and its alleged failure to respond to Scottish or Welsh needs in terms of (international) immigration control.
In South Tyrol, SNRPs construct the category of ‘unwanted’ migrants on a number of different factors. These range from perceived threats to security and the welfare system to the potential threat to the minority nation’s identity. Additionally, while internal migrants no longer feature in South Tyrolean political discourse, references to the state population and the identity and characteristics of the Italian state also play a role in the construction of the categories of migrants.

Migrants are referred to as ‘social parasites’ or ‘social tourists’ by the opposition parties dF, UfS, and BU who predominantly frame immigration as a threat to the welfare system. UfS occasionally also connects refugees and asylum seekers to the concept of ‘social tourism’ by calling them ‘pseudo-refugees’ whose ‘social-fraud’ and abuse of the welfare system needs to be stopped (3-P13, BU Election Manifesto, 1998).

dF has made a connection between crime, security, and migrants, irrespective of their legal status, since the beginning of the 1990s and in all of its election manifestos (3-P3, 3-P4, 3-P20, 3-P21, 3-P22). The party also introduced this connection in 1994 into the debates of the regional parliament and has continued to do so until today (3-P28, 3-P53, 3-P89). SF also makes a direct connection between migrants and criminals in the election manifesto of 2013 (3-P6). SVP, UfS, and BU, While SVP, UfS, and BU refer to immigration as a challenge for security, they do not connect migrants with criminality in their official documents. The framing of migrants as exploiters of the welfare system very much resembles the populist right-wing tradition of the Austrian Freedom party which has always had a strong personal connection to the South Tyrolean dF. In contrast, the framing of migrants as criminals resembles the discourse of Italian right-wing parties, in particular the Lega Nord (Colombo 2013).

In South Tyrol, the second most important factor is migrants’ capacity to integrate and the cultural proximity between newcomers and the receiving society. ‘Wanted’ by SNRPs are newcomers who are perceived as possible to assimilate into the German culture and language due to their linguistic, religious, or cultural proximity. Romanian, Bulgarian, and Albanian citizens are considered to be closer to the Latin, and thus to the Italian language and culture, rather than to the German language, and are therefore viewed more negatively. Muslims are considered distant from the Catholic culture, and are therefore ‘difficult to integrate’. This
concept of cultural proximity was first introduced into the discourse in 2001, and is now shared by all SNRPs. They connote cultural proximity with language competences (in particular German-language competences), sharing a similar – but not explicitly defined – cultural background, and a ‘willingness to integrate’:

There is a willingness to integrate and there are people who are willing to integrate, but there are also others who are not willing to integrate. (Es gibt ein integrationsfähiges Ausmaß und Leute, die integrationswillig sind, aber auch andere, die integrationsunwillig sind). [3-P33, Debate in the South Tyrolean Parliament, 13.12.2006, Ulli Mair, dF]

Experience has shown that there are differences between migrants from different countries in their ability and willingness to integrate. With European migrants there are less problems than with Arabic, African, or Asian migrants. This is due to the fact that persons with a European cultural background are closer to our culture than others. (Die Erfahrung hat gezeigt, dass sich Zuwanderer aus verschiedenen Nationen in Integrationsfähigkeit und Integrationswillen stark voneinander unterscheiden. Mit europäischen Ausländern gibt es generell weniger Probleme als mit arabischen, afrikanischen und asiatischen Zuwanderern. Dies liegt daran, dass Menschen mit einem europäischen kulturellen Hintergrund unserer Kultur näher sind als andere.) [3-P38, SVP Grundsatzpapier 2003]

We need to make sure that predominantly persons from other EU countries come, who are closer to our culture, language, and lifestyle. (wobei darauf zu achten ist, dass in erster Linie Personen aus anderen EU-Ländern kommen, welche unserer Kultur und Sprache, unserer Lebensauffassung nahestehen) [3-P8, SVP Election Manifesto, 2008]

Preference for workers from North and East Tyrol, and the rest of Austria, Germany, and other countries, whose populations we do not have integration problems with (Bevorzugung von Arbeitskräften aus Nord- und Ost-Tirol, dem restlichen Österreich, Deutschland und anderen Ländern, mit deren Bevölkerung es keine Integrationsschwierigkeiten gibt) [3-P6, SF Election Manifesto, 2013]

Roma and Sinti, Muslims, and to lesser extent Albanian nationals are the most negatively connoted migrants by all SNRPs in South Tyrol. This is not limited to South Tyrol, as these groups are among the most discriminated against in many European states. Albanian nationals, who came to South Tyrol at the beginning of the 1990s as refugees, were first seen as refugees and, thus, in ‘need of assistance’, but the discourse shifted after 2005 to perceiving them as ‘violent and creating problems’:

…currently they have a big problem with Albanians in the the Puster Valley. The police also have a big problem, because Albanians were the only group that was mentioned in the report on security in 2009, because they are violent’ (Die Pustertaler haben gerade mit den Albanern ein riesengroßes Problem. Auch die Polizei hat ein riesengroßes Problem, denn die Albaner waren im Sicherheitsbericht 2009 die einzige Gruppe, die spezifisch erwähnt worden ist, weil sie besonders gewaltbereit ist.) [3-P28, Debate in the South Tyrolean Parliament, 06.10.2011, Pius Leitner, dF]
Since 2000, Muslims have replaced Roma and Sinti as the most negatively framed migrants, because they are ‘difficult to integrate’ and create parallel societies with their own legal system, which ‘they try to impose’ on the South Tyrolean society:

We have an limited capacity for integration. This also requires the willingness to integrate from those that come to us. And this willingness is not there among many Muslims. (Wir haben eine bestimmte Integrationsfähigkeit, die aber auch voraussetzt, dass diejenigen, die zu uns kommen, auch einen bestimmte Integrationswilligkeit mit sich bringen. Diese ist bei vielen Muslimen nicht festzustellen.) [3-P99, Debate in the South Tyrolean Parliament, 01.12.1999, Pius Leitner, dF]

We cannot stand on the sidelines and observe how parallel societies are created and imposed. Franz Pahl [member of the SVP] continued to say that we should not underestimate the strategies of Jihad and the efficacy of Sharia. (Man kann nicht zuschauen, wie es zur Bildung von Parallelgesellschaften und zu einer schleichenden Überstülpung kommt. Franz Pahl hat immer wieder gesagt, dass wir die Strategie des Jihad und die Wirksamkeit der Scharia nicht unterschätzen sollten.) [3-P99, Debate in the South Tyrolean Parliament, 01.12.1999, Eva Klotz, SF]

Besides Muslims migrants from Romania and Bulgaria are also defined by dF as ‘difficult to integrate’ and not as ‘close to our culture’:

I talk about Romanians and Bulgarians. Although they are from EU countries, it is as if they were from non-EU countries and thus more difficult to integrate than those that are closer to us. (Ich spreche ganz dezidiert Rumänien und Bulgarien an. Es sind zwar EU-Länder, aber es ist teilweise so, dass sie als Nicht-EU-Bürger viel schwerer zu integrieren sind als jene, die uns vielleicht kulturell näher stehen.) [3-P28, Debate in the South Tyrolean Parliament, 06.12.2011, Pius Leitner, dF]

Hence, in relation to Muslims, Roma and Sinti, and Albanians there is an overlap between constructing them as ‘unwanted’ because of their cultural distance to the minority nation’s identity and because of the perceived security threat they are accused to pose.

The construction of migrants’ ‘otherness’ within South Tyrolean society resembles the discourse on the national level. As Clough Marinaro and Walston point out, the othering of migrants “serves to perpetuate the myth of a clear split between a unified national culture and identity, and ‘them’, the foreigners” (2010, 6).

Parties and governments in the Basque Country, Corsica, Wales, and Scotland neither engage in such a particularly salient manner with specific national, ethnic, or religious groups, nor construct a category of proximity between the newcomers and the receiving society. Only Roma (or gypsies/travellers, as they are referred to in the British discourse) are present in the discourse, but they are referred to in a neutral way and as having particular needs or being the target of racial attacks (Basque Country: 1-P102; 1-P279; 1-P15. Scotland: 4-P72; 4-P75.
Wales 5-P60; 5-P125; 5-P129.). The Welsh and the PNV-led Basque governments expressed themselves proudly to be ‘pioneers’ of having separate strategies to promote the inclusion of Roma in the Basque Country (1-P279, PNV Election Manifesto, 2005) and gypsies and travellers in Wales (5-P129), as will be discussed in chapter six.

3.2 The ‘wanted’ - positive frames

In contrast to the negative connotations of Roma, Sinti, Muslims, Romanians, Bulgarians, and Albanians, migrants from countries who are deemed “closer to our [the South Tyrolean] culture” (3-P8, SVP Election Manifesto, 2008), are positively perceived in South Tyrol. Hence, in the South Tyrolean discourse migrants who can be assimilated into the German language and culture and thus into the minority nation’s identity constitute ‘wanted’ migrants. Such a discourse of proximity or willingness to integrate cannot be found in the other cases.

However, in the Scottish discourse, which is characterized by the request to expand immigration flows and attract more newcomers, the most ‘wanted’ and appreciated migrants are overseas students who have studied in Scotland and are willing to remain in the minority nation after the completion of their degrees. They are called ‘fresh talent’ (2003) and are the main target group of the New Scots: Attracting Fresh Talent to Meet the Challenge of Growth (2003) campaign, which was further expanded to workers and in particular highly-skilled workers which were needed in particular sectors of the labour market:

As part of Scotland’s long tradition of providing hospitality to people from other nations, we have particular links with Poland. Several of those links have been mentioned tonight, but I draw members’ attention to the link between medicine in Poland and medicine in this country. During the dark years of World War Two, the University of Edinburgh gave hospitality to the entire Polish School of Medicine. Many Polish doctors graduated from the school by doing all their studies in Edinburgh and some of those stayed on and worked in this country. [4-P54, Debate in the Scottish Parliament, 30.01.2008, Ian McKee, SNP]

Migrant workers are perceived in all minority nations as neutral, but depending on the sector or on their qualifications, they can also be perceived as positive. In South Tyrol, it is the seasonal workers for the tourism and agricultural sectors, as well as women who take care of the elderly, who are perceived as a particular asset to the local reality. In contrast, in Scotland and Wales the contribution of highly-qualified/highly-skilled persons are emphasized (Wales
5-P162; 5-P159; 139; 5-P141; 5-P138; 5-P174; 5-P188; Scotland 4-P27; 4-P35; 4-P59; 4-
P67):

The idea that in our country there are more than 2,000 foreign co-citizens that take care of our elderly, and that we need them, should be recognized more in any heated debate and should remind us of human basic values. (Allein der Gedanke, dass in unserem Land mehr als 2.000 ausländische Mitbürger unsere alten Menschen pflegen und dass diese Personen gebraucht werden, soll zum Abbau von Emotionen und zur Rückbesinnung auf menschliche Grundwerte beitragen). [3-P8, SVP Election Manifesto, 2008]

We will introduce measures to encourage doctors who come from other countries to study here, to stay on and work in the Scottish NHS [National Health System] when they graduate. [4-P25, SNP Election Manifesto, 2005]

We are not having the doctors arriving in Wales that we used to, because immigration policy is too strict. Over the weekend, I was stunned to hear the UK Minister for Immigration suggesting that it was a good thing that fewer student and work visas were being issued. I cannot understand how that can be seen as anything other than a drain on our economy. [5-P188, Debate in the Welsh National Assembly, 29.11.2001, Rhodri Morgan, Welsh Labour Party First Minister]

There is agreement among the SNP and the Scottish Government and PC and the Welsh Government in relation to the necessity of attracting highly-skilled workers. The theme of highly-skilled workers is less connected to the frame of migration as cultural enrichment, but more to migration as an asset for the economy. Hence, it is also used to refer to the national government which is accused of depriving both the Welsh and Scottish economy, and thus also serves the aim of differentiating the sub-state approaches in these territories from the national one.

In Corsica, the distinction between migrants working in construction and in the agricultural and tourism sectors, and those working in public administration from mainland France is blurred with the distinction of internal migrants. Internal migrant workers from the mainland are seen as negative expressions of the French ‘colonial system’, whereas international migrant-workers instead are categorized as ‘vulnerable’ and facing the risk of marginalization. Hence, in the Corsican discourse the relations between the nation-state and the minority nation also enter the discourse on constructing wanted and unwanted migrants.

The Basque Country differs from the other cases because migrants are only connected to workers twice, in the first and third Basque plans on immigration. The first Basque immigration plan condemns this predominantly economic lens which portrays migrants primarily as workers and not as humans (1-P4, PVI, 2003-2005), and the third Plan on

Muslims constitute another type of migrants that are, as shown above, part of the ‘unwanted’ migrants in South Tyrol, but are ‘wanted’ in Scotland and Wales. The Welsh Government as well as the Scottish one and in particular, the SNP presents Muslims as a vital part of the Welsh/Scottish community whose particularities need to be protected and promoted:

Rhodri, and other Ministers, have done their best to ensure that we consider the Muslim communities as a part of the Welsh community. [5-P17, Debate in the Welsh National Assembly, 06.11.2001, Paul Murphy, Labour Party, Secretary of the State]

There is no doubt the Scottish Muslim community sits at the heart and in the mainstream of modern Scotland (…) Next year I hope to be Scotland’s First Minister and I want to make clear that I will work to ensure that nothing threatens the place of Scottish Muslims, or any ethnic community, at the heart of our society. [4-P63, SNP Press Release, 20.08.2006, Alex Salmond;]

This constructed added value of Muslims is not only celebrated in the discourse, but also embraced at the level of practice. Besides candidates with a Muslim background regularly appearing on the SNPs election lists, there have also been two SNP MSPs with a Muslim background sitting in the Scottish Parliament, Bashir Ahmad (2007–2009) and Humza Yousaf (2011–ongoing), and one in the House of Commons, Tasmina Ahmed Sheikh (2015–ongoing). Furthermore, the pro-independence “Scots Asians for Independence” group, launched by Bashir Ahmad at the SNP general conference in 1995, became an important part of the SNP. Moreover, PC has a supporter group called “Muslims for Plaid” and includes black and ethnic minority candidates in its election lists as well as a supporter group “English for Plaid”, which to some extent counterbalances the accusations of anti-English sentiments towards PC. Thus, SNP and PC practice their openness towards black and ethnic minorities and internal migrants from England to Wales not only at the level of discourse, but also at the level of practice.

3.3 The ‘integrated’

After an analysis of who are the ‘wanted’ and hence positively connoted migrants, and the ‘unwanted’ and negatively framed ones, there is another frame used to refer to immigrants, namely the ‘integrated’ ones, or those that are ‘part of the receiving society’. This category
of the ‘integrated’ migrant links the discourse on the construction of the migrant to the discourse on integration, which will be the focus of the next chapter.

In each of the minority nations newcomers are referred to as ‘co-citizens’/’new citizens’, or in Scotland as ‘new Scots’. The term ‘new Scots’ was officially introduced by the coalition government of Labour and Liberal Democrats in the title of their strategy to attract highly skilled workers in 2003 (New Scots: Attracting Fresh Talent to meet the Challenge of Growth, 2003). The notion of ‘new Scots’ was also adopted by the SNP in its manifesto for the 2005 general elections, when the party aimed to ‘pursue an immigration policy that welcomes new Scots’ (4-P27, SNP Election Manifesto, 2005).

Scotland has the longest tradition of referring newcomers as ‘new citizens’ (‘new Scots’). The term is used for newcomers even before they have entered Scotland. It, hence, does not refer to integration requirements but proposes a very immediate and inclusive notion of Scottishness.36

By 2007, PC also started to talk of new citizens in its election manifestos. And in South Tyrol the denomination of migrants as ‘co-citizens’ was introduced by the SVP and was for the first time used officially in the coalition program between SVP and PD in 2013 (3-P44, ‘new co-citizens’ – *neue MitbürgerInnen und Mitbürger*), and was used by the new president in his inaugural speech in 2013:

Now is the time to create the basis for the best possible integration of the new co-citizens. (*Es gilt nun, die Grundlagen für eine bestmögliche Integration der neuen Mitbürgerinnen und Mitbürgern zu schaffen*) [3-P42, Debate at the South Tyrolean Parliament, 09.01.2014, Opening speech of the legislative term, Arno Kompatscher, SVP, President]

Plaid Cymru believes we should celebrate and support the cultural riches of the diverse and vibrant communities that make up modern Wales, and welcome the input of new citizens, without in any way forgetting what makes us a unique nation. [5-P5, PC Election Manifesto, 2007]

Hence, in South Tyrol and Wales this term was introduced only recently, and is neither part of the larger vocabulary nor is it used by parties other than the governing SVP and PC respectively.

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36 Convergència i Unió, a Catalan SNRP, employs a similar discourse of calling migrants ‘new Catalans’ (*Nous Catalans*) and has named its foundation which supports integration the Foundation of New Catalans (*Fundació Nous Catalans*) (Franco i Guillén 2015, 85).
The Basque Country instead introduced the concept of ‘new neighbour’ (1-P3) in the Third Immigration Plan (2011). This concept is closely connected to the inclusive citizenship which was proposed in the First Immigration Plan in 2003. As will be shown in chapter six, this Basque integration strategy proposes to include migrants into the nation-building project by granting them political rights (e.g., voting rights).

Similar to the Basque Country, Corsican SNRPs have also proposed a form of regional citizenship, as will be described below. In their framework, the denomination of migrants as ‘Corsicans by adoption’ has been used to differentiate between autochthonous Corsicans and newcomers, who are nevertheless included in the common conception of a Corsican people:

The existence of the Corsican people as a historical and cultural community includes the Corsicans by origin and Corsicans by adoption. (l'existence du people corse communauté historique et culturelle vivante, regroupant les Corses d’origine et les Corses d’adoption.) [2-P19, FeC Election Manifesto, 2010]

4. Comparative Summary and Conclusion

This chapter analysed the discourse on immigration and the construction of the ‘migrant’ within the discourses in the selected minority nations. The analysis confirms that in minority nations, immigration is strongly connected to the construction of collective identity. In all five cases, immigration is presented by the SNRPs as having an impact on the minority nation’s identity. While immigration in South Tyrol and Corsica is seen to be a threat, in the Basque Country and Scotland, immigration is viewed as an enriching factor that enables the local identity to develop and modernize. Although the coalition of SNRPs in Corsica, FeC, began in 2010 to positively link international immigration, but even more integration, to the minority nation’s identity, CN and previous coalitions of SNRPs have insisted instead on highlighting internal migration as a threat to the Corsican identity. Finally, in Wales, the PC has shifted from presenting immigration as a challenge to Welsh identity to framing it as an added value to the bilingual Welsh reality.

In Scotland, Wales, and the Basque Country the discourse on immigration is framed in opposition and contrast to the central state discourse. Not only do Scotland and Wales propose to attract more newcomers, and in particular highly-skilled workers, but the two minority nations also construct refugees and asylum seekers as ‘wanted’ migrants who need
to be integrated into the sub-state reality. Similarly, SNRPs in the Basque Country construct a discourse of immigration as a neutral phenomenon requiring responses and integration plans based on equality and human rights, as will be shown in chapter six.

PC in Wales shifted from presenting immigration as a challenge but not a threat to the Welsh identity and in particular to the Welsh language, to framing immigration as an asset and enrichment for the minority nation. Nevertheless, the cultural and linguistic heritage of the minority nation is underlined as a particularity which needs further enhancement in the integration policies. In the Basque Country immigration is also not framed as having a negative impact on the identity but as a means to modernize the minority nation. SNRPs and the government highlight the necessity to raise awareness among immigrants of the Basque language and identity. In Scotland immigration is instead mainly framed as an economic asset and a means to counterbalance demographic decline. Nevertheless, the SNP, but also the Labour and Labour–Liberal Democratic governments before SNP involvement, presented immigration as a benefit for the society and a way to develop Scotland.

Hence the SNRPs in the Basque Country, Scotland, and recently also in Wales have incorporated immigration into their broader political projects and the quests for further devolution and eventually independence. Thus, by constructing a counter-narrative to the state-level discourse, the parties use immigration as a nation-building tool. By showing that the particular territory is more ‘progressive’ and modern, more outward looking and hence distinct from the state level, the parties underline their claim that a distinct political culture should have distinct political institutions. Barker (2015) finds a similar use of immigration as nation-building tool and an instrumentalization of the discourse on immigration by SNRPs in Catalonia and Quebec. She further argues that “in multinational states where sub-state and central state levels compete over questions of national identity and culture”, due to its impact on identity, culture, and language immigration represents a policy area which is especially amendable to the interests of SNRPs (Barker 2015, 164).

The discourse among SNRPs in Corsica and South Tyrol instead highlights immigration as a negative phenomenon for the minority nation, as it threatens the security and welfare system (only in South Tyrol) and the local identity. Hence, they present immigration as hindering the further promotion of sub-state particularity.
All five cases also share the quest to acquire ownership over immigration and inflows from the state. However, the impact of control over migration flows would be very different among the cases depending on the perceived impact immigration has on the territory: South Tyrolean SNRPs propose a restrictive and selective approach towards international immigration; Corsican SNRPs pursue restrictions towards internal migrants; Welsh, Scottish, and Basque SNRPs seek a more welcoming and inclusive approach than their state. The SNP even calls for a resumption of active attraction of immigrants to Scotland, similar to the policy adopted through the Fresh Talent initiative. Hence, this narrative to gain more powers from the state is used by all SNRPs to highlight the central state’s lack of responsiveness to particular sub-state needs, and thus to strengthen their own interests and in particular claims for further devolution.

The economic framing of immigration is equally present in all minority nations. However, it is very weak in Corsica and applied only to internal immigration from mainland France. In each of the other minority nations the impact immigration has on the local economy is defined as positive, contributing to particular segments of the labour market which are not occupied by the local population.

In contrast, the framing of immigration as a means to overcome population decline is only present in Scotland, referring to the particular Scottish population decline; while the framing of immigration as a security and welfare threat is only applied to immigration by South Tyrolean SNRPs, although the crime rate is not particularly high in the territory, and the welfare system is not very weak. Instead, the right-wing SNRPs in the opposition were also successful in inserting their negative framing of immigration into the discourse of the governing SVP.

South Tyrolean SNRPs frame the negative impact of international immigration on identity, targeting in particular migrants with a Muslim background, Roma and Sinti, and nationals from Albania, Romania, and Bulgaria, who are seen as ‘difficult to integrate’. Corsican SNRPs instead highlight internal migrants from the French mainland as threatening and weakening the minority nation’s identity.
In South Tyrol these frames are not only used by SNRPs but also by the government, which complements the security and welfare chauvinism frame and the identity frame by also framing immigration as a necessity for the labour market. Thus, particular categories of migrant workers (especially seasonal workers and care-takers) have also become a ‘wanted’ category because of their role in the local labour market.

In Corsica there is a great difference between highly-skilled workers, who are mostly internal migrants and thus ‘unwanted’, and low-skilled migrant workers who are referred to as vulnerable and in need of protection. The negative framing of internal immigration of the SNRPs is not reproduced at the governmental level. Thus, Corsica is the only case where there is a substantial gap between the discourse of the government and the SNRPs.

In general, congruence between SNRPs and regional governmental positions on immigration and their framing of ‘the migrant’ is high in all selected cases except for Corsica. Congruence on the positive framing of immigration between the SNP (when forming the opposition) and Scottish Labour or Labour–Liberal Democratic governments is high. Indeed, as Hepburn (2014) argues, there is little polarization between parties on the issue. The same congruence between the PC, claiming to represent the minority interests, and the state-wide parties has also been seen in Wales since 1999, and mostly also in the Basque Country. In contrast, in South Tyrol and Corsica, there are more SNRPs claiming to represent the minority interests, and greater variation among the parties. In South Tyrol and Corsica there is also a difference between the parties in government and the SNRPs in opposition. The ruling party in South Tyrol, the SVP, frames immigration in more neutral and positive terms than the opposition parties, which are ideologically more right-wing than the SVP. And in Corsica, the coalition of nationalist movements, FeC, which is currently the largest opposition party, also frames immigration more positively than the more traditional and secessionist, but nevertheless left-wing, CN.

This analysis of the SNRPs’ discourse on immigration and the construction of ‘the migrant’ reveals three important things for the general research question of this thesis. First of all, all SNRPs, irrespective of their ideological positioning, the particular sub-state context, and the particular political-institutional and societal relations between the centre and periphery, connect immigration and the collective identity.
Secondly, not only do SNRPs connect immigration and the reframing of the minority nation’s identity, but in the Basque Country, Scotland, and recently also in Wales the parties actively use immigration for their own nation-building. In chapter seven I will discuss in greater detail how the parties use the immigration policy field to construct a progressive, outward-looking, inclusive, and ultimately multicultural collective identity which either allows for the inclusion of migration-generated diversity or the creation of overarching and hyphenated identities.

Thirdly, in contrast to the expectations spelled out in chapter two, a strong autonomy and a high degree of self-government both in the field of integration and for the protection of the minority in general, as in the case of South Tyrol and the Basque Country, does not lead to the same positive framing of immigration. On the other hand, societal cleavages, as in Corsica and the Basque Country, and institutionalized societal cleavages as in South Tyrol, also do not lead automatically to the same negative framing of immigration.

The next chapter analyses the discourse on integration and whether integration is framed as assimilation or a multicultural inclusion of migration-generated diversity. Thus, it is expected to find a discourse proposing integration as assimilation in South Tyrol, whereas I expect to find more multicultural elements in the other four minority nations. At the same time, the next chapter also analyses the policies, laws, and plans on integration in order to assess whether there is a gap between policy and discourse.
Chapter 6 – Discourse and policies on integration

CHAPTER 6. FROM DISCOURSE AND POLICIES ON INTEGRATION TO BOUNDARY-MAKING

1. Introduction

The previous chapter analysed the discourse on immigration and the construction of ‘the migrant’ as wanted or unwanted, or integrated and hence belonging to the minority nation. The previous chapter also determined that immigration is indeed perceived by all SNRPs as having an impact on the territory and society, and thus on identity. As a consequence, in each of the selected cases the perception prevails that the boundaries of identity need to be redefined once confronted with immigration. The present chapter evaluates this process of boundary redefinition. This chapter offers insights into both the discourse on integration and integration policy making. Combining an analysis of discourse and policy is particularly important because, as the previous chapter showed, SNRPs engage heavily in presenting immigration either as a benefit or a threat to the territory. Furthermore, SNRPs have constructed ‘wanted’ and ‘unwanted’ migrant categories, fitting their particular perceptions and regional aims. Thus, the present chapter serves to monitor whether or not the discourse is transposed into policy, which is particularly interesting as SNRPs have been involved in policy making for at least one legislative period in each of the minority nations except for Corsica.

Hence, I can evaluate on a case-by-case basis the gaps between policy and discourse (Gilligan, Hainsworth, and Aidan 2011, Escandell and Ceobanu 2009), and evaluate if the gaps relate to legislative powers the selected minority nations have at their disposal.

Like the previous chapter, this chapter relies on party manifestos, SNRPs’ thematic documents on immigration and integration, government and coalition programmes, and parliamentary debates in relation to immigration and integration. The policy analysis derives

from integration plans, integration strategies and laws, as well as on strategies, policies, plans, and laws in those areas where integration and identity overlap, such as in education, culture, language learning, welfare, and the labour market. The qualitative text analysis of the data is assisted by Atlas.ti.

2. Translating integration discourses and policies into boundary making

Integration is the process of newcomers “becoming an accepted part of the society” (Penninx 2005, 141, Zuber 2014) but it is not a one-sided process affecting only newcomers, but “narratives about ‘integration’ also reflect national stories about the nation and its people. They create boundaries between the nation’s people and migrants and define the thresholds for their inclusions in the institutions of the state” (Wimmer 2006). By looking at how SNRPs frame integration in discourse and which integration policies are implemented in practice, we can gain insight into whether and how the boundaries between newcomers and the receiving society of the minority nation change.

Penninx (2005) introduced a classification of integration policies ranging from inclusion to exclusion based on three different dimensions: the legal-political dimension, referring to questions of defining whether and under which conditions migrants are considered full members of society (in particular naturalization, residence rights, and the granting of political and voting rights); the socio-economic dimension, referring to access to the labour market, education, and the welfare system; and the cultural and religious dimension, referring to the recognition of their particularity. There is great variation in the conditions and extent to which migrants are granted rights on all three dimensions. This classification, developed for the national level, needs to be adapted to the institutional context of minority nations.

Although they are equipped with varying degrees of legislative powers to govern integration, the minority nations selected in this research do not have powers to legislate on naturalization and residence rights, and their powers are also limited in relation to granting political and voting rights. Their powers are greater on the socio-economic dimension and greatest when granting rights in relation to the culture, language, and religion of the newcomers. Therefore, this research focusses on integration policies and discourses regarding the socio-economic and cultural dimensions and limits the political dimension to political participation.
Penninx’s traditional classification distinguishes between inclusion and exclusion but does not differentiate between various forms of inclusion; however, a further distinction can be made between the assimilationist inclusion model and multicultural-pluralist inclusion model (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008, 162). The assimilationist model demands adaptation and assimilation into the national – and for the sake of this thesis – sub-state territory’s culture. Migrants are required to give up past languages, identities, cultural practices, and loyalties, thus reducing the cultural, linguistic, or religious differences between newcomers and the receiving society. In contrast, the multicultural-pluralist model recognizes and accommodates migrants’ own cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious particularities (Kymlicka 1995, 2001a). However, Borkert and Caponio (2010) suggest that they are ‘ideal models’ which converge and appear in different forms and strength.

The main focus of this thesis is to evaluate whether the minority nation’s identity and therefore the definitions and constructions of the boundaries of the receiving society change over time once confronted with immigration. The relations between newcomers and the receiving society are not evaluated primarily in terms of integration models but in terms of a boundary-making perspective (Wimmer 2008b, Alba 2005). I transpose the language developed for the integration models into the boundary-making language, and as argued in chapter two, I distinguish between three ideal types of boundary making, ranging from exclusion to inclusion:

1) The exclusion of newcomers from the dimensions proposed by Penninx equates in the boundary-making language to no change of the initial boundary. The markers of the boundary are based on ethnic criteria, such as descent, birth, and race which cannot be obtained by migrants.

2) The inclusion of newcomers through assimilation equates in the boundary-making language to an expansion of the initial boundary without, however, changing the markers of the boundary. The markers for the definition of the minority nation’s identity are post-ethnic or civic and can be achieved by migrants. Such markers could include learning and knowledge of the national minority language and culture, residence in the minority nation, support for the regional and nationalist aims, etc. Although newcomers are included in the receiving society, the framing of the
The multicultural inclusion of newcomers equates in the boundary-making language to a blurring of the initial boundary, and hence a real change not only of the boundary, but in particular of the markers of the boundary. Hence, the multicultural inclusion of newcomers equals a change in the receiving society’s collective identity because new elements based on the cultural, linguistic, or religious diversity stemming from immigration become part of the redefined identity. Hence, migration-generated diversity is recognized and promoted, and ultimately blurred with the previous minority nation’s identity into a newly developed or redefined identity.

The inclusion of newcomers can, but does not necessarily have to, change the markers of the boundary of the receiving society. Therefore, I differentiate between the expansion of the initial boundary with no marker change (and hence no change to the collective minority nation’s identity), and the expansion of the boundary with an accompanying change to the defining markers of the boundary (and hence to the identity).

Based on the analysis of the immigration discourse in the previous chapter, I expect the framing of the collective identity not to change, but to either include newcomers by demanding assimilation or to exclude them outright (type 1 or 2).

From Corsican SNRPs I expect proposals for restrictions in the access to public administration and the housing market for those that are referred to as ‘unwanted’ migrants and an assimilationist inclusion of ‘wanted’ migrants. However, because SNRPs refer mainly to French citizens as ‘unwanted migrants’, I expect proposals for restrictions only at the level of discourse. First of all, because prior to 2015 Corsican SNRPs had never been in government, and the sub-state territory lacked any substantial powers to design integration policies. Secondly, even if Corsican SNRPs could influence policy making, national and EU law do not allow for differential treatment of domestic and EU citizens. Therefore, I do not expect to find a change of the framing of the minority nation’s identity in Corsica, but, similar to South Tyrol, either an inclusion of newcomers by demanding assimilation or their exclusion (type 1 or 2).
Chapter 6 – Discourse and policies on integration

In Wales, Scotland, and the Basque Country a positive framing of immigration as a form of enrichment prevails, and hence I expect SNRPs to develop discourse and policies recognizing, valorising, and accommodating the migration-generated diversity. Consequently, I expect a discourse of multicultural inclusion in the three minority nations and therefore a change in the receiving collective identity (type 3).

3. Comparing the discourse and policies on integration

Different frames are observable in each of the minority nations relating to integration, which can be categorized into positive, neutral, and negative groupings. Some examples of positive frames referring to integration are references to welcoming cultures, the definition of integration as a bidirectional process, and the aim to eliminate all forms of discrimination. Neutral frames instead highlight the various areas of integration, such as health, education, and political participation, while negative frames try to restrict access to these particular areas or define integration as a duty for immigrants, but not for the autochthonous population.

Comparing the immigration and integration discourses in each of the selected cases, for the most part they fell into similar categories, with variation being primarily observed in Wales and Corsica. SNRP discourses on integration in the Basque Country and Scotland follow similar patterns as the discourses on immigration (Figure 11 below; compare with Figure 4 in chapter 5). In the Basque Country a neutral framing of integration prevails (referring to particular areas such as housing, education, and the labour market), whereas Scotland focusses on presenting the positive aspects of integration (referring to a welcoming culture, a bidirectional process, the fight against racism). In Wales a positive integration discourse prevails, although the discourse on immigration referred to neutral implications for the territory such as the lack of control over immigration and the distance from the UK government’s position. In Corsica the discourse on integration is framed mostly in neutral terms, whereas in South Tyrol there is a balance of negative and neutral framing. In the latter two minority nations, the discourse on immigration was characterized by a salience of negative frames, highlighting the perceived threat that immigration poses to the identity, demography, and welfare system as well as to security.
SNRPs in the five selected minority nations emphasize different areas of integration and approach them distinctly. Table 15 provides an initial overview of the frames dominating the discourse on integration in each case. In South Tyrol the focus is on the cultural aspects of integration, namely integration through language and education, whereas in Scotland and Wales the discourse highlights equality and anti-discrimination as well as the link to respecting and promoting different religions. In the Basque Country the focus is on promoting equal access to services and guaranteeing the participation of migrants in society in general and in political life in particular. In Corsica there is, on the one hand, a focus on restricting access to the housing market and the public administration and, on the other, an emphasis on integration through promoting the Corsican language and sharing the historical values of the Corsican people. Thus, from the perspective of the SNRPs, the cleavage between internal migrants, who should be excluded as much as possible from Corsican society, and international migrants, who should be assimilated into what is proposed by SNRPs as a ‘community of destiny’ can be noticed in the discourse on integration.
### Table 15 – Overview of major topics in the SNRPs’ discourses on integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority Nation</th>
<th>Corsica</th>
<th>South Tyrol</th>
<th>Basque Country</th>
<th>Wales</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dimension of integration</strong></td>
<td>Legal-political</td>
<td>Right to vote connected to Corsican citizenship; restrictions based on residence.</td>
<td>Right to vote not present in the discourse; but consultative body foreseen in ‘Integration Law’.</td>
<td>Right to vote connected to concept of ‘Basque citizenship’ foreseen in the discourse and in the integration plan</td>
<td>Right to vote not present in PC discourse, but government highlights necessity to include more BME in Welsh assembly; PC has support groups: ‘Muslims for PC’ and ‘English for PC’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socio-economic</td>
<td>Restrictions to housing/labour market – public administration for internal migrants; based on residence.</td>
<td>Restrictions to housing/access to welfare, based on residence.</td>
<td>Equal and unlimited access.</td>
<td>Equal and unlimited access.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Chapter 6 – Discourse and policies on integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension of integration</th>
<th>Corsica</th>
<th>South Tyrol</th>
<th>Basque Country</th>
<th>Wales</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural - language</td>
<td>Corsican language for everybody; migrants should be attracted to learning the language; seen as a factor strengthening integration and social cohesion.</td>
<td>Language is the most important factor of integration, German and Italian equally important for SVP; dF and SF give prevalence to German.</td>
<td>Basque language open to everybody; migrants should be attracted to learn the language, seen as factor strengthening integration and social cohesion as well as economic integration.</td>
<td>Welsh language open to everybody; migrants should be attracted to learn the language; seen as factor strengthening integration and social cohesion.</td>
<td>Scots and Gaelic not mentioned in the discourse on integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural - education</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
<td>Challenge of migrants in the education system /weakening the learning of ‘native population’ (SF, dF) and thus demands to base restriction to education on language and knowledge.</td>
<td>Migrants should be attracted into model D (Education entirely in Basque, with Spanish as a compulsory subject.)</td>
<td>Necessity to include BME in history curriculum.</td>
<td>Faith Schools. Adapting curriculum to diversity (SNP Manifesto 1999, P1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural - religion</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
<td>Against mosques; polemics about allowing religious practices.</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
<td>Commitment to equally respect all religions and practices.</td>
<td>Commitment to equally respect all religions and practices.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Besides the very particular frames that dominate the discourse on integration in the selected cases, in all of them but Corsica the discourse on integration is linked to fighting racism, promoting equality, and non-discrimination. This particular aspect of the discourse is also reflected in anti-discrimination policies in Scotland, Wales, the Basque Country, and South Tyrol.

Based on the UK’s general anti-discrimination framework the discourse and also the policies combating racism and inequality are strongest in Scotland and Wales. Moreover, policies addressing migrants’ needs are not, as in other European countries and the other selected minority nations, framed predominantly as integration policies, but subsumed under policies regulating race relations, ethnic minorities, community cohesion, and anti-discrimination (Spencer 2011, Saggar and Somerville 2012). Anti-discrimination and equal opportunities are reserved matters of the UK government, and thus, both Scotland and Wales are bound by the UK Race Relations Acts (1976, amended 2000) and the Race Equality Act (2006, amended 2010). However, Shisheva et al. (2013) argue that through the Scottish Act of 1998 the Scottish Government has the possibility to further develop equal opportunities “with a wider definition of equality than contained in primary UK legislation”. Hepburn (forthcoming-a) confirms that “the Scottish Government has fully utilized this wriggle-room” to broaden the human rights and equality principles laid down in the UK legislation. Equality has been made one of the founding values of Scotland since devolution, and hence it is a value constantly promoted throughout the entire government. A similar commitment to equality has also developed within the Welsh Government (section 120, Government of Wales Act 1998).

The UK legislation foresees an Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC; formerly the Commission for Racial Equality) becoming responsible for monitoring and promoting non-discrimination. Since 2006 the EHRC does not exclusively focus on discrimination relating to race, culture, religion, or language (i.e. discrimination based on migration-generated diversity) but on all types of discrimination. In Wales, the EHRC works in compliance with the principles set out by the Welsh Language Act (1993) and treats the English and Welsh languages equally.
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In South Tyrol the SVP is the most active SNRP in promoting equality and non-discrimination at the level of discourse, although SF and UfS also refer to the general necessity of fighting racism (SF 2008, UfS P70, 2002). Only the dF does not campaign to fight racism and instead the party has during parliamentary debates frequently defended its positions of welfare chauvinism and nativism against accusations of being racist. In South Tyrol the parties’ commitment to eliminating racism is not fully transposed into anti-discrimination policies. The Social Plan 2000 was the very first policy document providing special support to all marginalized and vulnerable groups, including Roma and refugees. Additionally, in 2004 a Monitoring Centre on Anti-discrimination (Centro di tutela contro le discriminazioni razziali della Provincia di Bolzano) was established as a temporary and third-party funded (by the European Social Fund) project. Once the funding finished in 2008, the monitoring centre was closed down, but a reopening has been foreseen in the general framework on integration (Autonomous Province of Bozen, Provincial Law on the Integration of foreign citizens, Nr. 12/2011). As of yet the centre has not resumed its work.

However, the discussions on the re-creation of such a monitoring centre highlight again the connection made by SF and dF between the perception of migration as a threat to the minority nation’s identity and the aim to protect the German and Ladin language groups as well as the experiences of past threats of assimilation. Fighting against discrimination towards migrants has been viewed as being in direct competition with the fight against discrimination of German and Ladin speakers within South Tyrol:

… prevalence is given to cases of discrimination against foreigners over the daily discrimination of the autochthonous people! In the future we will have an ombudsman whose main focus is foreign citizens and Third-Country-Nationals. I realize with resentment that this is your aim. The long-lasting discrimination of locals, and in particular of the German population in relation to their right to use their mother tongue, was never worth the trouble for you, and you never engaged in creating an ombudsman which we really needed! (…dass Euch der eine und andere Fall von Diskriminierung von Ausländern wichtiger ist als die tagtägliche Diskriminierung der eigenen Landsleute! Es wird diese Beschwerdestelle also in Zukunft geben, und bei den Zielgruppen ist die Wichtigkeit ja schon ausgedrückt: Die erste Zielgruppe sind ausländische Bürger und Bürgerinnen aus Nicht-EU-Staaten. Ich stelle mit Verbitterung fest, dass das Euer Ansporn ist, so eine Stelle zu schaffen. Die jahrzehntelange Diskriminierung der Einheimischen, vor allem der deutschen Bevölkerung, in Bezug auf das Recht auf Gebrauch der Muttersprache war Euch nie der Mühe wert, eine Beschwerdestelle einzurichten, und die hätte es bei Gott gebraucht!) [P29, Debate in the South Tyrolean Parliament, 07.10.2011, Eva Klotz, SF]

The discourse on equality and fighting racism is also very strong in the Basque Country where SNRPs built the particular Basque approach to immigration and integration on the
principles of equality, human rights, and non-discrimination. However, the discourse on racism and anti-discrimination in the Basque Country is more tightly incorporated into the general approach to integration than in Scotland, Wales, and South Tyrol, and therefore I will discuss this aspect in greater detail below.

The next sections evaluate in detail how integration is framed in each of the selected minority nations, how the framings changed over time, and how the discourse is transposed into policy making.

3.1 The assimilation of migration-generated diversity into pre-existing boundaries in South Tyrol and Corsica

Chapter 5 demonstrated that the framing of immigration in South Tyrol and Corsica is dominated by negative themes which refer to immigration as a threat to the welfare system, the local identity, and security. In contrast to South Tyrol, in Corsica we observe over time, and in particular after 2010, a shift towards a more neutral framing. Integration discourse and policies resemble the discourse on immigration in both minority nations: South Tyrolean SNRPs continue to highlight integration as the duty to assimilate, whereas Corsican SNRPs have recently shifted from an exclusionary view of integration to an assimilationist framing.

3.1.1 South Tyrol

Figure 12 shows that although integration is positively referred to in South Tyrol by linking it to equality, participation, and the fight against racism, a negative framing also dominates the discourse on integration throughout all legislative periods, with the exception of the period 2003 – 2008, when a neutral approach outweighed the negative one.

The prevailing negative discourse is characterized by a demand to introduce restrictions on access to the welfare system and the housing market with the aim of not disadvantaging the local community. Moreover, the discourse is characterized by demands to foster respect for and adapt to the local culture. Thus, the dominating frames do not suggest a change of the markers of the boundaries between the receiving society and the newcomers, but suggest, depending on the category of migrants, either the assimilation of newcomers into the existing boundary or their exclusion.
The right-wing opposition parties dF, SF, and UfS/BU are the parties which focus most on demanding adaptation and assimilation as well as on restricting access to the welfare system. dF stands in the tradition of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) of Jörg Haider. The close connection to Haider (Pallaver 2007) can be recognized particularly in the tendency to frame integration as a hierarchy between the local population, which needs to be advantaged, and newcomers, who must adapt. Haider organized a referendum in 1993 with the slogan ‘Austria First’ (Österreich zuerst) which proposed reducing immigration to Austria and restrictions on immigrant access to social services, public education, and the labour market. Concurrently, dF introduced ‘South Tyrol First’ (Südtirol Zuerst) as the party’s election slogan, and adopted the same policy proposals as its main political goals. In 2008, the slogan ‘South Tyrol First’ was changed and the subsequent two election campaigns used the new slogan ‘Natives/Locals First’ (Einheimische Zuerst) in order to further highlight the importance of the South Tyrolean population vis-à-vis migrants.

Since 1993 the party has portrayed integration as potentially disadvantaging the receiving society, particularly in relation to access to the welfare system and the housing market, and has demanded the introduction of restrictions based on 10 years of residence in the territory.
The party expanded their demands to favour locals “against strangers coming from outside the region” (3-P21, dF Election Manifesto, 1993), which in 1993 particularly referred to those moving to South Tyrol from other Italian regions, whereas since the election campaign in 1998 the reference has shifted to migrants from outside Italy. Hence, dF uses the same phrase, but shifts the target from internal to international migrants.

In 2013 dF proposed to further tighten restrictions and to introduce a proof of language competence and a language test in either the German or Ladin languages. The party argued that this would be necessary for the purposes of “protecting the two language groups and fully implementing the autonomy statute” (3-P20, dF Election Manifesto, 2013). Although the dF has never explicitly campaigned for the sole interests of the German group, the party currently communicates primarily in German\textsuperscript{38} and finds its main base of support in rural areas which tend to be predominantly inhabited by German speakers. In this sense, the dF’s ‘Natives/Locals First’ approach could also be interpreted as ‘German Speakers First’.

Consequently, the party refers to integration as a one-directional adaptation and assimilation into the receiving society, and hence the party does not propose any change to the markers of the boundary between newcomers and the receiving society. Instead dF promotes inclusion into the existing boundaries through assimilation:

\begin{quote}
I grant every foreigner the decision of how far he/she wants to live his/her culture. This is certainly not forbidden, but we can well demand that we defend our culture and do not adapt to everything. This would mean we have to consider 136 cultures. Are we crazy? The migrants instead would have to look at one single culture, namely ours! (…) Integration means that we teach them our issues, and not that we integrate or adapt to what comes from outside (Ich gestehe jedem Ausländer zu, zu entscheiden, inwieweit er seine eigene Kultur leben will. Es ist ja nicht so, dass es verboten wäre, aber man darf schon verlangen, dass wir unsere Kultur verteidigen und nicht alles annehmen. Das würde ja heißen, dass wir uns 136 Kulturen anschauen müssten. Ja sind wir denn narrisch? (…) Integration ist, wenn wir den Ausländern unsere Dinge näher bringen und nicht, dass wir uns integrieren oder das annehmen müssen, was von außen kommt.) [3-P29, Debate in the South Tyrolean Parliament, 07.10.2011, Ulli Mair, dF]
\end{quote}

The same prevalence of the local (German) population over foreigners as well as a one-directional and assimilationist framing of integration was also demanded by UfS/BU from 1998 to 2008 (3-P11, BU Election Manifesto, 2008; 3-P12, UfS Election Manifesto 2003; 3-

\textsuperscript{38} An exception is the constitution for a ‘free state’ (independent state) that the party presented in 2013, which was presented in German, Italian, and English.
There is a family from Mals who originated in Morocco, yet have been living in Mals for 15 years. When you hear their son speaking the [South Tyrolean] dialect, there is no detectable difference to any other person from Mals. If I am not mistaken, he is even a member of the local fire service. The mother cooks Knödel and not Couscous. This is a positive example of integration. (….) Positive integration does not mean that we import cultures to South Tyrol. Those coming to South Tyrol shall perceive the local culture as something positive and deal with it (Dabei wurde eine Familie aus Mals gezeigt, die aus Marokko kommt und seit 15 Jahren in Mals lebt. Wenn man einen Sohn im Dialekt reden hört, so unterscheidet sich dieser in keiner Weise von einem anderen Malser. Wenn ich mich nicht täusche, ist er sogar Mitglied der Feuerwehr. Die Mutter kocht zu Hause nicht etwa Couscous, sondern Knödel. Das sind positive Beispiele von Integration. (…) Positive Integration bedeutet nicht, dass man Kulturen nach Südtirol importiert. Diejenigen, die nach Südtirol kommen, sollen die lokale Kultur als etwas Positives anerkennen und sich damit auseinandersetzen.) [3-P98, Debate in the South Tyrolean Parliament, 09.06.2009, Sven Knoll, SF]

Thus, the right-wing South Tyrolean SNRPs agree in demanding assimilation in terms of language learning, and also in terms of culture and religion. This is also expressed in relation to opposing changes in the school-curriculum and in relation to Catholic religious symbols in schools (3-P33, Debate in the South Tyrolean Parliament, 13.12.2006, Ulli Mair, dF). Lately, the parties have connected the assimilationist frame to the demand for restrictions, proposing obligatory German language courses for the access to welfare services, preparatory language courses for pupils before entering the educational system (3-P5, SF Election Manifesto, 2008), or quotas for migrants in the public schools (3-P20, dF Election Manifesto, 2013).

In relation to access to education, proposals are made to counterbalance the perceived risk of dilution of the German-language learning of the receiving society. In the 1990s and early 2000s most migrant pupils enrolled predominantly in the Italian school system (education entirely in Italian with German as a compulsory subject). But since 2005 this has shifted towards an increase of pupils with a migration background in the German school system (education entirely in German with Italian as a compulsory subject), although there was no active governmental or SNRP-led campaigns to attract more migrants into the German school system. On the contrary, in their discourses dF and SF highlighted the potential challenge of rising numbers of migrant children in the German school for native speakers due to the “slower pace of learning because migrant pupils do not yet understand the language” (3-P88, Debate in the South Tyrolean Parliament, 09.06.2009, Pius Leitner, dF) leading to both
SNRPs demanding the introduction of a limit on migrant pupils in German schools (3-P93) or a German language exam prior to enrolment. (3-P20, SF Election Manifesto, 2013). A limit of 30% of pupils with a migration background in a single class was finally introduced by the sub-state territorial government in 2008 under the heading “equal distribution of migrant children” (Autonomous Province of Bozen, Resolution Nr. 4724, 15.12.2008).

Hence, the above analysis shows that dF, SF, and UfS/BU mix the assimilationist frame with an ethno-cultural and nativist frame based on a perceived fear of disadvantaging the autochthonous community and their culture and language through the implementation of new integration policies. The nativist frame is particularly strong in the field of social housing, but is also present in the discourse on language learning and education and the continuous references to the particularity of South Tyrol and its three autochthonous language groups. The need to guarantee the protection of the German and Ladin languages and cultures thus highlight the nativist frame. The parties’ discourse on language learning and choosing either the German or the Italian school system also shows the two-sided challenge migrants themselves face in a divided society: if they respond to assimilationists’ demands by enrolling in German schools they are criticized for undermining educational quality for native pupils; if, instead, they enrol in the Italian schools, they are criticized for failing to make a full effort to assimilate to the German culture.

In contrast to SF, dF, and UfS/BU, the governing centre-right SVP does not frame integration in a linear and coherent assimilationist-exclusive way. The party has developed its approach to integration from reflecting on it as a ‘bidirectional process’ (3-P38, SVP, Grundsatzpapier, 2003), to framing integration as exclusion and parallel co-existence, and finally back to framing it as a process which involves the whole population. In any case, the burden of assimilation is placed mainly on newcomers’ shoulders. The SVP shifts between proposing a change of the markers of the receiving society’s boundary by including elements of the migration-generated diversity into the definition of the receiving society’s collective identity and not changing the markers, but rather assimilating newcomers into the existing boundary.

In 2003 the party engaged for the first time with the concept of integration, highlighting language as its most important element. However, in contrast to SF, and partially also dF and UfS/BU, the SVP does not propose a sole focus on the German language, but instead
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perceives the presence of the three historical linguistic groups as an added value “to promote mutual understanding and open-mindedness towards other cultures” (3-P7, SVP Election Manifesto, 2003). Newcomers are referred to as ‘new citizens’ and are required to respect the local cultures and traditions while at the same time the receiving society shall make an effort to learn more about the new cultures, to respect them, and to interact and accept their “being different” (3-P39, SVP Grundsatzpapier, 2003). Thus, the SVP in 2003 framed the boundaries of the receiving society as dynamic and amenable to change:

The migrant shall not be put in a social or urban ghetto, but s/he needs to have the chance to integrate into South Tyrol. This means that s/he needs to get to know the cultural diversity, the territory, and the people. Those who feel like unwanted ‘guest-workers’ can never positively contribute to the society of a territory. And finally, our land can only deal with immigration if it accepts the new citizens in their ‘being different’ (Der Zuwanderer darf nicht in ein soziales oder bauliches Getto gesteckt werden, er muss die Chance erhalten, sich in Südtirol zu integrieren; das heißt er muss die kulturelle Vielfalt, Land und Leute kennen lernen. Und dann an der Zukunft dieses Landes auch mitgestalten können. Wer sich als ungebetener „Gast-Arbeiter“ fühlen muss, der kann keinen positiven Beitrag für die Gesellschaft in unserem Land leisten. Letztlich kann aber unser Land mit der Zuwanderung nur dann zu Rande kommen, wenn es Neubürger in ihrer Andersartigkeit auch akzeptiert.) [3-P38, SVP Grundsatzpapier, 2003]

Since 2008 the party has shifted away from framing the boundaries as dynamic and open and seeing integration as a bi-directional process. In the party’s more recent discourse we find two possibilities for integration: the first proposes keeping the receiving society and the newcomers segregated, and hence focusing on coexistence governed by the rule of law. This option also mirrors the party’s general perception of South Tyrolean society comprised of the three separate autochthonous linguistic groups whose coexistence is regulated by the consociational and power-sharing mechanisms of the Autonomy Statute. Hence, the party proposes to transfer the principle of ‘tolerance through law’ (Woelk, Marko, and Palermo 2008) to the governance of migration-generated diversity and the coexistence of the autochthonous groups and those stemming from migration:

Migrants do not need to become Tyroleans; they shouldn’t even become Tyroleans. Everybody instead shall keep and protect his/her particularities, as long as they are in accordance with the prevailing rules. (Aus Einwanderern müssen keine Tiroler werden, sollen keine Tiroler werden. Jeder wird vielmehr seine Eigenheiten behalten und pflegen, solange sie mit den geltenden Regeln im Einklang stehen.) [3-P113, Debate in the South Tyrolean Parliament, Government Declaration, 16.12.2008, Luis Durnwalder, SVP.]

The second option depends on the ‘willingness to integrate’ which consists of ‘learning the official languages, knowing our culture, respecting our values and our traditions which are
also based on our religion’ (3-P37, SVP Policy Paper on Integration, 2010) and hence requires assimilation into the existing boundaries of the society. The SVP and its coalition partner, the local branch of the state-wide Democratic Party (PD – Partito Democratico), highlight the need to learn both Italian and German, and in its discourse the SVP focusses on assimilation into the German and Ladin language groups and lobbies for the inclusion of German-language competences as a criterion for additional points in the integration contract\(^39\) (Medda-Windischer 2014). As I show below, during policy making, references to both languages, German and Italian, prevail. Hence, the coalition of the German SVP and its Italian counterpart PD impacts policy making substantially. Although the learning of both languages is promoted, the parties present themselves as well aware of the burden and challenge for migrants to concurrently learn two new languages and therefore they frame this issue predominantly as ‘either German or Italian’ or ‘starting with one language, but gradually aiming for both languages’.

As discussed, SNRPs in South Tyrol all coincide in framing integration as a process of assimilation and adaption, highlighting the role of language, and restricting access to social services and housing. Moreover, the parties agree in framing the markers of the collective identity as static and hence as not changing due to immigration. The parties differ, however, in their positions on whether newcomers should assimilate exclusively into the German language and culture, or whether they should adapt to the bilingual setting.

The frames dominating the discourse also enter the policies on integration. Nevertheless, while the government, composed of the SVP and PD, actively tried to introduce restrictions in the access to social services, it has been much less interventionist in relation to demanding assimilation and language learning. In chapter eight I further discuss the impact PD has on the discourse, and in particular policy making in relation to integration.

The adoption of the law regulating support for housing in 1998\(^40\) transposed the restrictions for internal as well as international migrants from the level of discourse into the policy area

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\(^39\) The ‘integration contract’ (Accordo d’Integrazione) was introduced by national law Nr. 94/15.07.2009. It forms the basis for the extension of the residence permit and thus eventually leads to granting Italian citizenship. The integration contract is signed between the Italian state and the individual migrant, and requires the acquisition of language competences and knowledge of Italian history and the Constitution from the migrant.

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for the first time. Alongside economic limitations, access to (financial) support for the acquisition of housing was limited to those persons residing or working in the province for at least five years, regardless of whether they had moved to South Tyrol from elsewhere in Italy or from another EU state (Art. 45.1a). In addition to these requirements, TCNs are required to have worked in the province at least for three years. Italian citizens as well as EU citizens and TCNs with a long-term residence permit are furthermore required to declare themselves as belonging to one of the three official language groups as the distribution of welfare benefits is regulated (by the Autonomy Statute) in accordance with the proportional representation of the historical language groups.41 Since these restrictions are neither in line with the principles of the EU Law of Free Movement, the EU-Anti-Discrimination regulations, nor with national legislation, they have been challenged several times at the European Court of Justice but have so far been justified due to reasons of minority protection and the connected aim of safeguarding the autochthonous population (Eisendle 2015).

The abovementioned restrictions were reaffirmed by the 2011 ‘Law on the integration of foreign citizens’,42 but were subsequently challenged by the Italian constitutional court and finally abolished in 2013. The aim of the integration law was to define a framework for integration in South Tyrol. Thus, the law did not introduce concrete policy measures, but defined integration as a ‘process of mutual exchange and dialog’. In the integration law, given the importance placed on newcomers’ language learning by each of the parties, this is also defined as one of the most important tools for integration alongside labour market participation and “getting to know each other, the various cultures and identities present in South Tyrol, and at the same time the knowledge of the local history and culture” (3-P23, Law on Integration, 2011). However, the law neither proposes interventionist measures favouring one language over the other and, instead, offers measures to support the learning of both official languages, hence declaring both languages as equally important for the integration of migrants. Nor does the law, as demanded by SF and dF and as implemented for example in Catalonia, combine language learning with sanctions or advantages (Zuber

41 Hence, the total welfare benefits are distributed in accordance to the numerical strength of the autochthonous language groups, i.e. around 70% of all benefits are allocated to the German speakers, 26% to the Italian speakers, etc.

42 An integration law is the preferred way of executing regional legislative powers in Italy and is the equivalent of an integration plan or integration strategy, hence defining the guiding principles of integration.
Alongside the importance given to language in the integration law, in 2007 the government had already established a centre within the Department of Education responsible for the coordination of learning the German and Italian languages for pupils with a migration background.

This analysis of the discourse and policies on integration in South Tyrol shows that there is an overlap between the two levels in framing integration as assimilation into the South Tyrolean society and the two official languages. Moreover, the analysis shows that each of the South Tyrolean SNRPs frames integration in a way which does not allow for the development of open and permeable boundaries between the receiving society and newcomers. Instead, the markers of the boundaries are defined as static and newcomers are expected to adapt to them.

3.1.2 Corsica

As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, Corsican SNRPs frame immigration as a challenge to the local labour market, but increasingly refer to international migrants as a way to possibly strengthen their own interests in consolidation of the Corsican language, culture, and self-government vis-à-vis the French state. Similar to South Tyrol, in Corsica there is a convergence between the framing of immigration and the framing of integration. Figure 13 shows that a neutral framing of integration dominates the discourse, whereas the differentiation between international and internal migrants again constitutes an important element of the discourse.

The neutral framing of integration refers to the ‘community of destiny’, composed of ‘Corsicans of origin’ and ‘Corsicans by adoption’ and to learning the Corsican language. The main negative framings relate to the housing situation and the fear of a sale of Corsican real estate to foreign and, in particular, mainland French citizens who are accused of not only being the cause of increased housing prices but of outnumbering the autochthonous Corsicans due to their settlement on the island. Thus, restrictions to the housing market proposed by Corsican SNRPs target French citizens, whereas in South Tyrol they target mainly international migrants.
The concept of a ‘community of destiny’ (*communauté de destin*) and its expansion to a conceptual ‘Corsican citizenship’ are the two most important SNRP proposals in relation to integration. The development from the community of destiny to the Corsican citizenship shows the shift from an exclusive to an assimilative framing of integration:

This community of destiny, a central concept of Corsican nationalism, is composed of Corsicans by origin and Corsicans by adoption, who have intermingled with our people for centuries. (*Cette communauté de destin, notion centrale du nationalisme corse, est composée de Corses d’origine et de Corses d’adoption qui se sont agrégés à notre peuple depuis des siècles.*) [2-P7, Conf CNI 2008; 2-P22, U Rimbombu 1998 – 2004]

The concept of a community of destiny was developed by Corsican SNRPs at the beginning of the 1990s with the aim of integrating those who live on the island and who share the wish to “maintain the cultural and linguistic heritage of the historical Corsican people” (2-P22, U Rimbombu 1998 – 2004). This construction of a larger community of Corsicans serves the aim of strengthening the position of Corsica vis-à-vis the French state and hence the quest for independence, since in particular for CN they form the ‘only legal community’ on the island:

As for the immigration problems, they cannot be addressed seriously until the moment that the Corsicans have the power to define in that area, as in others, a policy of respect for human rights, which maintains
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cultural and demographic balance, and acts in the interests of the Corsican people as the only legal
community of Corsica. (Quant aux problèmes liés à l’immigration, ils ne pourront être abordés
sereinement qu’à partir du moment où les Corses auront le pouvoir de définir dans ce domaine, comme
dans les autres, une politique respectueuse des droits de l’Homme, des équilibres culturels et
démographiques, et conforme aux intérêts du Peuple Corse, seule communauté de droit sur la terre de
Corse.) [2-P3, CN, Press Release, 2006]

The community of destiny consists of ‘Corsicans by origin’ and ‘Corsicans by adoption’ (2-
P7, Conf CNI 2008; 2-P22 U Ribombu 1998 – 2004). The criteria to join the community of
destiny are met either by birth in Corsica or Corsican ancestry and thus exclude first
generation migrants. A second important element of the community of destiny is the Corsican
language, which is declared as the most visible element of Corsica’s cultural identity. SNRPs
present the Corsican language as accessible to everyone who wants to learn it, and as an tool
for strengthening social cohesion and integration. Hence, through language learning and
support for the ‘Corsican issue’, second and third generations of internal and international
migrants could gain access to the community of destiny:

The Corsican language, as one of the most visible elements of the Corsican cultural identity, is a medium
of communication and existence and also a factor strengthening social cohesion. Knowledge of the
Corsican language is necessary for the integration of everybody who lives on the island (…) independent
of his/her origins (A lingua corsa essendu riccunisciuta com’è l’elementu u più visibuli di l’identità
culturali di a Corsica, un mezu di cumunicaz ioni èdi criazioni è ancu un fattori chi favurizighja a
cuesioni suciali, a so cunniscenza è un so usu so i cumpitenzi linguistichi nicissari pà chi l’integrazioni
di ugni parsona chi campa à nantu à l’isula (…) indipindentimenti di a so urighjini.) [2-P34, Report to
the Corsican Parliament, 10.05.2013, Proposal for a co-official status of the Corsican Language]

Since the beginning of the 2000s, the community of destiny has been complemented by
proposals for a conceptual Corsican citizenship. In contrast to the community of destiny the
most important element of the Corsican citizenship is permanent residence on the island for
a certain period of time. Femu a Corsica (FeC – Faisons la Corse; Let’s Build Corsica) is
the main driver behind the Corsican citizenship concept, and states that the main criteria for
access is not legal citizenship, but rather a 10-year term of residence on the island:

To everyone, French, foreign, from the EU or not, who permanently resides on our island for a significant
amount of time (as is already applied in many European regions), [the regional citizenship] would give
voting rights and eligibility for all local elections… (A tous ceux, français, étrangers, communautaires
ou non, qui résident de manière permanente dans notre île, depuis une durée significative (de
nombreuses régions européennes en bénéficient déjà): celle-ci apporterait alors les droits de vote et
d’égibilité à l’ensemble des élections locales…) [2-P11, FeC Election Manifesto, 2010]
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A Corsican citizenship, based on 10 years of residence, as a prerequisite to be able to purchase property (Une citoyenneté corse fondée sur 10 ans de résidence comme condition pour acquérir un bien immobilier.) [2-P39, U Ribombu 2010 – 2014]

The conceptual Corsican citizenship is hence constructed as more open and easier to attain for both internal and international migrants than membership of the ‘community of destiny’. Membership in the community of destiny is not connected to any rights but to a symbolic belonging, whereas the Corsican citizenship is connected to specific rights: FeC connects it to voting rights (2-P11, FeC Election Manifesto, 2010), and Corsica Nazione (CN) and its successor-party Corsica Libera (CL) additionally connect it to the right to employment in public administration (2-P22, U Ribombu 1998-2004) and to acquire land and real estate (2-P39, U Ribombu, 2010-2014). Since EU law does not typically allow such restrictions, CN argues that in other European regions such as the Åland Islands and New Caledonia and French Polynesia (2-P6, CN Election Manifesto, 2003) similar forms of regional citizenship exist to restrict certain rights to the autochthonous population.

However, the parties’ framings of the boundaries of the Corsican identity only marginally impact integration policies for two reasons: First, before the victory at the regional elections in 2015, Corsican SNRPs had never been part of the government. However, prior to 2015, they had acquired an influential position after the elections in 2010 when they gained 29.4% of all seats. Secondly, the Corsican government has only very limited legislative powers and is essentially just tasked with mirroring the French national approach to integration. Withol de Wenden argues, though, that the national framework on integration is characterized by a “territorial approach to the treatment of social difference” (2014, 143), and thus regions have limited possibilities to react to their territorial particularities based on social and economic differences.

Hence, a focus on economically deprived areas opens up a window of opportunity for the Corsican government to engage in policy making. In 1990 the French Ministry of Towns was created and in 1996 the Pact for City Revival (Pacte de relance pour la ville) legitimized territorialized public intervention by establishing zones at risk of poverty and social exclusion (zones urbaines sensibles – ZUS). The selected towns were supposed to formulate particular town contracts (contrats de ville) in order to improve and promote social cohesion. In 2008 the State Secretary to the Ministry of Towns launched a new Pact for City Revival reinforcing
the focus on deprived areas. In Corsica five such zones were identified: four in the capital Ajaccio and one in the town of Bastia. Ajaccio approved a town contract in March 2007, and Bastia in February 2007. Both contracts focus on social cohesion, and – as proposed by the French national framework – on equality instead of the integration of diversity-stemming from immigration or from the historical presence of Corsican speakers. As Withol de Wenden argues, this strict focus on equality is based on the perception that ethnicity and positive discrimination are “still taboo in this country of formal equality of rights” (2014, 143). Consequently, the town contracts do not include references to the learning of the Corsican language and culture for migrants in either Ajaccio or Bastia, but refer instead to improved frameworks for learning the French language.

The second and more important area of influence for the Corsican regional government comes from the Regional Programmes of Immigrant Integration (Programme régionaux d’intégration des populations immigrées – PRIPI). These programmes were first established in 1990 by the French Government (through decree Nr. 90, 14.02.1990) but only became obligatory through the reform of the National Law on Social Cohesion in 2005 (law Nr. 2005-32, 18.01.2005) and were subsequently redefined in 2010. PRIPIs have become the most important framework for the development of coordinated actions to support the social and cultural integration of migrants as well as their integration into the labour market nationwide. The responsibility for developing these programmes in each region or French department (département) was given to the regional prefect. In Corsica, this was done in collaboration with the Territorial Collectivity of Corsica, which allows for adaptation to the specific Corsican situation.

As of yet three PRIPIs have been developed for Corsica. Based on the French national framework, the most important principles are French language acquisition, access to the labour and housing markets, access to education and the welfare system, the fight against discrimination, access to rights, and participation in associations. Despite the limited scope of action and the limitations stemming from the national framework, each of the PRIPIs recognizes the difference between Corsica as a particular territory and ordinary mainland French departments. The first PRIPI focuses more on Corsica’s geographical situation as an island than on the distinctiveness of the Corsican language, culture, and identity, and the
additional challenge resulting from the existence of two distinct official languages and cultures in one region. Thus, in the first PRIPI there is no focus on Corsican language learning as one of the most important tools for integration and therefore, no measures to strengthen the language-learning framework are foreseen. However, the second and third PRIPIs recognize the distinctiveness of the Corsican language, culture, and history and support the learning of the national minority language as a factor facilitating integration (2-P21, PRIPI, p. 60).

Hence, although the Corsican SNRPs have never been part of the government, they have been successful in raising the salience of the Corsican language as a tool for integration in the governmental discourse and in certain policies, such as in the PRIPI and also the development plan ‘Agenda 21’ (2013).

There is a shift in the discourse of SNRPs promoting the Corsican particularities among migrants, from a discourse presenting Corsican identity as based on birth and ancestry to one presenting the Corsican identity as accessible for newcomers who have resided on the island for 10 years and are willing to learn the Corsican language and assimilate into the mentality of promoting and protecting the language. The promotion of regional particularities among migrants has also entered governmental discourse, despite the SNRPs being weak and marginal until the 2010 elections. The few policies designed by the Corsican Government focus on French language education and view Corsican language acquisition as a supplemental complement to French. Thus, the discourse of the Corsican SNRPs can be described as a boundary expansion by assimilating newcomers into the Corsican identity, whereas the discourse and policies of the government are characterized by boundary expansion through assimilation into the French identity, complemented by the Corsican language.

3.2 From assimilation to a recognition of migration-generated diversity in the Basque Country, Wales, and Scotland

Chapter five demonstrated that in both the Basque Country and Scotland a positive framing of immigration as a benefit to the territory has prevailed among SNRPs over the period selected, whereas in Wales, PC only began to frame immigration as positive for the
development of the territory simultaneous to devolution period. In the discourse on integration, Basque and Welsh SNRPs do not refer to the boundary of the receiving society as being as open and permeable as the SNP does. Instead, the national minority languages – Basque and Welsh respectively – are highlighted by the SNRPs as important markers for the collective identity and hence the parties try to attract newcomers to learning the language by valorising this particular element of the collective identity. In contrast, the SNP refers to integration as a framework for the multicultural inclusion of migration-generated diversity.

3.2.1 The Basque Country

The Basque Country shares the same point of departure as South Tyrol. International immigration became a relevant issue in the late 1990s in both territories; and both regions are situated within similar national frameworks, with both Italy and Spain tightening their laws on immigration at the beginning of the 2000s (in Spain known as Ley de Extranjería, Ley Orgánica 4/2000, 11.01.2000; subsequently modified by law 8/2000; 14/2003 and 2/2009) as well as expanding the responsibility of the regions in social affairs. In South Tyrol a governmental response to the increasing influx of migrants as well as a discussion about integration were postponed and SNRPs, with the exception of dF, only developed a negative framing of immigration and integration after 2003.

In the Basque Country, the same point of departure, instead, triggered first of all an immediate reaction and secondly, a different framing of immigration and integration, both in the discourse as well as in policy making. As I demonstrated in chapter 5, the discourse on immigration in the Basque Country is characterized by a neutral to positive framing of immigration as a fact and a means to modernize the territory. This includes the positioning of the Basque SNRPs in opposition to the restrictive turn in immigration policy which was introduced by Popular Party (PP – Partido Popular) once they obtained a full parliamentary majority in 2000 (Ros and Morales 2015, 122).

Figure 14 shows that until 2001 neutral and positive framings developed in parallel in the Basque Country. From 2001 onwards the Basque SNRPs continued to frame the discourse on integration predominantly in neutral and positive terms, and it was not until 2012 that a negative framing presented itself. Additionally, even after 2009, only 1% of the discourse of
SNRPs reflect negative perceptions. These are related to consequences of migration such as the rise of xenophobia and the demand for adaptation from migrants.

**Figure 14 – Overview of SNRPs’ discourse on integration in the Basque Country**

![Graph showing SNRPs' Discourse on Integration](image)

Data: All entries in the hermeneutic unit ‘Basque Country’, document family ‘parties’ and ‘election manifestos’ (total number of documents used for this graph: 17) coded on ‘integration’, and in code family ‘negative’, ‘neutral’, and ‘positive’; y-axis: percentage of codes in relation to total codes on integration (total number of codes in this graph: 118); see document list and code list in Annex 1.

Within the positive framing of integration three topics prevail: first, the fight against racism and the desire to create equality; secondly, social and political participation; and thirdly, the perception of migration as an added value for the Basque society which requires integration through the recognition of cultural, linguistic, and religious differences. Neutral frames on integration which dominate the whole discourse on integration refer to human rights as the foundation of the approach to integration as well as to specific policy areas, such as education and the focus on the Basque language.

The discourse on racism and the quest for equality have a well-established tradition within the Basque Country and reflect the conflicting relationship with the Spanish state. Sabino Arana (1865-1903), the founding father of Basque Nationalism, has often been accused of racism against Spaniards (Conversi 1997), and hence SNRPs have had to – similarly to their Corsican counterparts and PC in Wales – continuously defend themselves from accusations of fuelling a particular form of xenophobia against internal migrants. In 1998 *Eusko Alkartasuna* (EA – Basque Solidarity) expanded this discourse, which initially referred to the
relationship between Basques and Spaniards, to international migrants and demanded the awareness raising and prevention of racism (P 291, EA Election Manifesto 1998, p. 40). However, since 2005 integration has entered into the discourse of every SNRP, and the fight against racism and the promotion of equality are no longer exclusively connected to Basque–Spanish relations but to everybody residing within the territory, particularly to marginalized and vulnerable groups such as illegal immigrants and Roma.

In the meantime, the tri-partite coalition government of EA, PNV, and EB (Ezker Batua–Berdeak/Izquierda Unida–Verdes) established their coalition government programme of 2001 which focuses on immigration and integration and proposes a Basque approach to the topic based on human rights and equality to counterbalance the restrictive turn in Spanish immigration law (1-P7, Debate in the Basque Parliament, 11.07.2001, Presentation of the coalition program, Ibarretxe Markuartu, PNV). Although the three parties diverge significantly from each other on the left–right divide, the PNV approximated its position to the coalition parties and positioned itself on the left in relation to immigration and integration. Jeram argues that the PNV has successfully “connected immigration with the broader nationalist discourse to reinforce its claim that the Basque nation has different values than the Spanish one and to buoy national solidarity” (Jeram 2013, 15). He furthermore suggests that the PNV has successfully established itself as the “champion of immigrant’s social rights and diversity” (Jeram 2015, 2) by using diversity as a new marker of Basque nationalism. Hence, the PNV’s strategy of using immigration and integration to build a counter-narrative against the discourse of the state resembles, as argued in chapter five, the SNP’s strategy to position the party in contrast to the Westminster government in order to strengthen the justification of further devolution.

Parallel to the inclusion of immigration and integration into the discourse, at the beginning of the 2000s the Basque Government initiated the drafting of a Plan on Immigration and created specific institutions, such as the Directorate on Immigration, to govern demographic change, as will be shown below, and to compensate for the central state’s policies which were criticized as ‘quite frustrating’ (‘bastante descorazonadora’, 1-P91, Debate in the Basque Parliament, 21.10.2000, Miranda González de Txabarri, PNV). Thus, in the Basque Country
there is chronological overlap between discourse and policy making, whereas in South Tyrol the discourse began much earlier than the planning of integration policies.

The tri-partite coalition created the Directorate on Immigration within the regional Ministry of Housing and Social Affairs (Decree 40/2002), which was led by the left-wing EB (the former Basque branch of United Left, IU) from 2001 to 2009. EB appointed Boladji Oke, an immigrant from Benin, as Director. Hence, similar to the SNP MP Bashir Ahmad, the involvement of persons with a background in immigration creates a connection between the party’s discourse and the level of practice. The Directorate is, similar to the Coordination Unit on Integration in South Tyrol, responsible for the development and implementation of a strategy to govern immigration and integration, and hence it drafted the First Basque Plan on Immigration which was debated and approved on 9 December 2003. Moreover, the tri-partite coalition government created a number of services related to integration, such as a Forum/Service Point for Integration and Intercultural Cohabitation’ (Servicio Vasco de Integración y Convivencia Intercultural – Biltzen) offering intercultural consultation on issues relevant to private and public institutions working in the field; the Basque Immigration Observatory (Observatorio de Inmigración - Ikuspegi) which collects data and provides systematic knowledge on migration flows; HELDU, a service offering advice on legal issues and social care for immigrants as well as funding possibilities for private entities; and a municipal network of immigration support centres.

The creation of these institutions and the approval of the Basque immigration plan provoked neither as much discussion nor as much resistance as in South Tyrol (Carlà 2014). This shows that in the Basque Country policy making prevails over discourse, whereas South Tyrolean SNRPs heavily engage in discourse against immigration and integration with scarce results in policy making.

In the Basque Country, contrary to the other selected minority regions, the coalition government has been the main actor in advancing and driving the discourse on integration, and hence also in developing integration policies. The first Basque Plan on Immigration (PVI – Plan Vasco de Inmigración) defines integration as a bidirectional and dynamic process which requires adaptation on both sides, from the migrant as well as the receiving society (1-P04, PVI, 2003-2005, p. 63). Integration is furthermore distinguished from assimilation and
Integration, from a cultural or political point of view, does not necessarily mean either the convergence of identities or the assimilation of other cultures into the receiving society. An advanced concept of integration implies the possibility of a free development of the diverse identities on an equal footing as well as a process of interaction and interrelation between them. Interculturalism does not seek the construction of mixed identities or forced incorporation into autochthonous identities, but the creation of complex and compound identities for reconciling the common good with the free development of the personality of all. (La integración, desde el punto de vista cultural o político, no equivale necesariamente a la confluencia de identidades ni mucho menos a la asimilación de otras culturas en la/s de la sociedad de recepción. Un concepto avanzado de integración implica la posibilidad de desarrollo libre de las diversas identidades en pie de igualdad, así como un proceso de interacción e interrelación entre ellas. La interculturalidad no procura la construcción de identidades mixtas o la incorporación forzosa a identidades propias, sino la creación de identidades complejas y compuestas que permitan compaginar el bien común con el libre desarrollo de la personalidad de todos/as.) [1-P04, PVI, 2003–2005, p. 63]

The Basque Plan on Immigration is based on the following principles: the elimination of discrimination, equality, human rights, and social and political participation (1-P04, PVI, 2003–2005, p. 67). Furthermore, these four principles form the basis of a form of ‘inclusive citizenship’ which is presented as the starting point for further integration measures:

Conceptual citizenship is defined in all three Basque immigration plans and SNRP discourse as based on residence and not nationality or identity. The concept of a regional citizenship proposes granting the same socio-economic, political, and cultural rights to all persons residing in the Basque Country, irrespective of whether they are legally or illegally residing in the territory:
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Inclusive citizenship eliminates the administrative distinction between regularity and irregularity. (La ciudadanía inclusiva obvia la distinción administrativa entre regularidad e irregularidad.) [1-P2, PVI, 2005-2009, p.80]

The Basque Government wants to implement this plan for citizenship within its primary law-making competences in areas connected to integration such as welfare, education, and culture.

Ruiz-Vieytez argues that by focusing on factual residence instead of nationality or the form of citizenship enshrined by law, a conceptual form of inclusive citizenship can be fostered which can lead to a redefinition of what it means to be Basque, and therefore can include everyone living in the territory (Ruiz-Vieytez forthcoming). This concept of inclusive citizenship continued to be the dominating topic of the second PVI, which was passed in 2007. This extended the commitment of the Basque Government to creating a society which includes all cultures, religions, and languages living in the Basque Country. Thus, the tripartite coalition government has proposed open and permeable boundaries of the Basque society, and integration is consequently presented as boundary expansion.

A slight change in the debate and approach to integration occurred after the government changed in 2009 from the former tripartite coalition of SNRPs to PSE-EE (PSE/PSOE, Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party and EE, Euskadiko Ezkerra-Basque Country Left). The PSE-EE government was supported by the Basque branches of the Spanish Partido Popular (PP, Popular Party). Despite having earned a good reputation among immigrant associations, HELDU, the service offering legal advice and other forms of assistance to immigrants, was closed down in 2010. The PVI was also suspended for two years in order to critically evaluate its effects, and a new Plan for Immigration, Citizenship, and Intercultural Coexistence (Plan de Inmigración, Ciudadanía y Convivencia Intercultural) was launched in 2011. Despite being created by the PSE-EE government, the third PVI mainly continued with the same principles established before, namely the need for the development of a particular and inclusive Basque citizenship and the aim of creating an intercultural Basque society.

After the PSE-EE took over, emphasis continued to be placed on the Basque language. Similar to Corsica and Wales a bilingual reality is recognized and learning the national
minority language is perceived as a facilitator for integration due to its connection to identity in the sub-state territory:

Another key priority for this term should be efforts to attract new speakers into our language and to achieve new fields of use for the Basque language. That’s the goal. And to achieve this objective we will pay special attention to the incorporation of immigrants into a bilingual linguistic reality. (Otra prioridad fundamental para esta legislatura deberá ser el esfuerzo por lograr nuevos hablantes para nuestra lengua, así como por lograr nuevos ámbitos de uso para el Euskera. Ése es el objetivo. Y para lograr tal objetivo prestaremos una atención especial a la incorporación de la población inmigrante a una realidad lingüística bilingüe.) [1-P8, Debate in the Basque Parliament, Presentation of the Government Program, 22.06.2005, Juan José Ibarretxe Markuartu, PNV]

Economically encourage the teaching of Euskera to support learning among those who come to live in the Basque Country and do not have economic resources. (Incentivar económicamente la enseñanza del euskera para favorecer su aprendizaje a quienes vengan a vivir a Euskadi y no tengan recursos económico.) [1-P280, PNV Election Manifesto, 2009; 1-P291, PNV Election Manifesto, 2012]

The focus on the Basque language was part of the first and second immigration plans (P2, P4) but abandoned in the third Basque Immigration Plan, which was, unlike the first two plans, drafted by the PSE-EE and supported by PP and not a coalition of SNRPs. However, in 2012 all Basque SNRPs included a focus on the Basque language for migrants in their election manifestos, and thus a new focus on promoting Basque for migrants is likely to continue.

SNRPs propose an inclusion of migrants into the Basque language community and identity, and hence the expansion of the group boundaries through inclusion. Jeram argues that the Basque Government followed a “group-based approach in the socio-economic domain and [a multicultural approach] in the cultural domain” (Jeram 2012a, 122). Although the proposed inclusive citizenship recognizes the construction of a new Basque society which includes, alongside their Basque and Castilian counterparts, other languages, cultures, and religions, Basque SNRPs base their approach to integration on the respect of human rights and equality rather than promoting migration-generated diversity. Thus, the SNRPs propose open boundaries which are subject to change. As a result, Basque SNRPs favour an expansion of the group boundaries also including migration-generated diversity. As Jeram argues though, the recognition of diversity as an added value becomes the new marker of national identity proposed among Basque SNRPs (Jeram 2012a). Nevertheless, the promotion of the particularity of the Basque Country and the Basque language among migrants also, remains of great importance.
3.2.2 Wales

The discourse on integration in Wales follows a similar path to the discourse in the Basque Country, highlighting the positive and enriching aspects of cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity, the development of a multicultural identity and, in particular, the need to promote equality and non-discrimination. But the focus on equality and discrimination is even stronger in both Wales and Scotland due to the particular policy framework of the United Kingdom. As I argued above, the term integration is rarely and inconsistently used in the British context (Saggar and Somerville 2012, Spencer 2011) and, thus, there are no explicit integration plans or strategies, as seen in the Basque Country or South Tyrol. Instead, Scottish and Welsh policies promoting and supporting the settlement of newcomers are organized under the heading of race and equality policies.

Within the UK devolution has occurred along different time frames; a slower pace of devolution has occurred in Wales and the devolved institutions currently have less powers than their Scottish counterparts. Hence, both the discourse on equality and non-discrimination as well as the development of Welsh approaches are not as well established or as salient as in Scotland. Chaney and Williams (2002) even argue that in Wales prior to devolution there was very limited engagement in this policy field, including in regard to immigration. Figure 15 shows that the discourse on integration of PC shifts between a neutral and a positive framing. The positive discourse is dominated by the fight against racism and by referring to cultural diversity as an added value to the territory. The negative framing of integration refers instead to the English population in Wales and to the effects of immigration as strengthening pre-existing forms of racism.
The discourse of presenting Wales as ‘welcoming’ and open to migrants, who are perceived as enriching the society, is salient. Due to the revival of the Welsh language and culture, the discourse focuses in particular, on promoting the Welsh language and culture in relation to migration. PC first engaged with this frame in 1999, when it referred to the strengthening of the Welsh regional identity which is related to the encounter between the Welsh and English and the exchange with new cultures stemming from migration:

Wales as a nation is vibrant. The revival of our national language has contributed to a stronger sense of identity among Welsh and English speakers alike. The two cultures have invigorated each other, a process further enlivened by the newer cultures that migration has brought into Wales. [P199, PC election manifesto 1999]

One of PC’s main aims continues to be the protection and promotion of the Welsh language and culture (Elias 2009). Alongside creating new opportunities, devolution is argued to also have been a turning point for the party itself as it allowed the party to form a coalition and to directly influence policy making (Elias 2011, 259). Nevertheless, the party’s electoral success varied greatly between 1999 and 2013 due to PC’s problem with forming a strategy for handling the Welsh language issue (McAngus 2013, 100). The party aims to create a bilingual society (5-P6, PC Election Manifest, 2011) but has had to face accusations of being
xenophobic towards English speakers (see chapter 5) while reacting to increasing migration-generated diversity. The 1999 election manifesto tried to bridge these two challenges by portraying the English language and culture as one alongside many others which consolidate the Welsh identity. In the subsequent 2003 election manifesto the party was more explicit in highlighting the positive contribution of migrants to Welsh society, recognizing and promoting the black and ethnic minority population, without diluting the primary goal of promoting the Welsh language and culture:

Plaid Cymru believes we should celebrate and support the cultural riches of the diverse and vibrant communities that make up modern Wales, and welcome the input of new citizens, without in any way forgetting what makes us a unique nation [5-P5, PC Election Manifesto, 2007]

In line with the framing of Wales as open and inclusive, the Welsh language is also promoted as an added value for all the people residing in Wales:

The Welsh language belongs to all the people of Wales, wherever they live, whichever language they speak. [5-P203, PC Visions for Wales, homepage, last accessed 01.02.2016]

This opening of the Welsh language to everyone becomes particularly important because internal migration has been a historical feature of Welsh history and workers, particularly from England, Ireland, and Europe, contributed significantly to the erosion of the Welsh language in the early 20th century (Jones 2014, 138). Hence, the protection of the Welsh language and culture from outside influences has been a characterizing feature of Welsh nationalism for a long period and is still discussed in relation to spatial planning and housing. PC suggests, similarly to Corsican SNRPs, that restrictions on settlers from outside Wales buying houses and changing the linguistic landscape should be in place:

Housing has to be planned carefully in a way which is sensitive to the linguistic profile of the communities affected. Population growth figures in many areas are based on unsustainable assumptions that undermine Welsh-speaking communities... A system driven by the investment interests of private developers will always prioritise profit margins over social considerations. That is what has to change. Council Tax on second homes should be increased to discourage holiday-home ownership in Welsh-speaking communities [5-P212, PC Policy Paper, A Language for an Independent Wales, 2012]

Since the Welsh Language Act of 1993 put English and Welsh on an equal footing in the public sector, the other political parties have increasingly engaged with protecting Welsh particularities, and PC has lost its exclusive ownership of this issue. Thus, the Government
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Wales has a language of its own, that we are rightly proud of. The Welsh Language is spoken throughout Wales, and you will find television and radio programmes, publications and signs in both Welsh and English. We would certainly encourage you to learn Welsh, as well as English. [5-P192, 2012, Government of Wales – Understanding Wales]

The close connection between learning both English and Welsh is also made in other governmental strategy papers, such as the Getting Together – a Community Cohesion Strategy for Wales (2012) or the Iaith Pawb – a National Action Plan for a Bilingual Wales (2006), which were all developed either before or after PC formed a coalition government with the Welsh Labour Party (2007 – 2011). Nevertheless, during its period as a coalition partner, PC made important policy gains in strengthening the status of the Welsh language and its role in education in general (Elias 2011, 279). In relation to migration, PC argues in its 2014 policy paper that there is a need to create, parallel to English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL), WSOL, a strategy to promote Welsh for Speakers of Other Languages (5-P7, PC Policy Paper, Migration in Wales, 2014), and to support understanding of the particular Welsh culture:

The ESOL programme is currently integrated with citizenship classes and this too could take place for a WSOL programme, with participants learning about the civic, democratic and cultural life of Wales… Ultimately, if a person migrates to Wales and later becomes a citizen then they must develop a good understanding of our democratic life, our civic life and our culture. If not, then the system is failing. At present the citizenship and integration programmes on offer do not provide new migrants with such an understanding. [P7, PC Policy Paper 2014]

Regardless of the weight and recognition given to the Welsh language in supporting integration and its promotion as a language of cohesion by PC as well as the other parties in government, there is, as argued by Higham, “no strategy or pathway to facilitate Welsh language learning for immigrants” (2014, 115) and few strategies regarding how to attract newcomers or ethnic minorities into the quest for further promotion and protection of the ‘Welsh issues’.

In relation to political participation PC and the Welsh Government have been active and successful. Similar to the SNP in Scotland, PC also has various support groups, amongst them Muslims for Plaid and English for Plaid. In 2007 the Government supported the
“Operation Black Vote (OBV)”, a UK-wide non-profit organisation to enhance the political participation of the black and minority ethnic population (BME) in the sub-state government and to increase awareness of barriers to participation. Nine members of Welsh BME groups shadowed nine Assembly Members from all four main parties (PC, Liberal Democrats, Labour, and the Conservative Party). After its successful implementation in 2007 OBV was transposed into the ‘Step Up Cymru’ mentoring programme which supported individuals from underrepresented groups to get involved in politics. Former Welsh Labour politician Mohammed Ashgar was elected as an Assembly Member (AM) to the Welsh Assembly as a member of PC in 2007, and again as a member of the Conservative Party in 2011. Since 2013 there have been two AMs elected with a BME background: Mohammed Ashgar (Conservative Party) and Vaughan Gething (Labour Party).

The analysis of the discourse of PC and the policies relating to the settlement of newcomers in Wales shows that there is a substantial gap between the rhetoric promoting the inclusion of migrants into the Welsh-speaking community and actual policies supporting such inclusion. So far these policies follow and implement the national framework, based on the Race Relations Acts, and promote community cohesion, equality, and the ESOL strategy to foster the learning of the English language among migrants. PC has changed from perceiving the boundaries of the Welsh community as closed to presenting them as open to newcomers, irrespective of their backgrounds. Similar to the SNRPs in Corsica, PC has also opened the boundaries to internal migrants from England. But since PC tries to attract migrants into a bilingual Welsh–English minority nation’s identity, its discourse can be characterized as assimilative inclusion.

A similarly open discourse is present at the level of government, but the Government places less emphasis on Welsh particularities and promotes a more multicultural understanding of Wales than PC. However, there are still only few policies which promote and support Welsh language acquisition, and therefore the access to the Welsh minority nation’s identity. Thus, the Welsh government does not intervene actively in promoting the Welsh particularities through concrete measures and policies.

This analysis hence shows that PC has shifted from a framing of the Welsh nation based on a static boundary, characterized primarily by the Welsh language, to framing the boundaries
as open and dynamic in order to construct a bilingual and modern minority nation. This shift started after 2006 when the Welsh National Assembly was created and equipped with a limited variety of legislative powers through the Government of Wales Act. Since then the party has increasingly constructed the collective identity as a process that must involve all of the diverse cultural and linguistic elements that make up the changing identity, but also nevertheless emphasizes that “we should celebrate and support the cultural richness of the diverse and vibrant communities that make up modern Wales, and welcome the input of new citizens, without in any way forgetting what makes us a unique nation” (PC, 2007). Hence, although elements of a multicultural inclusion of migration-generated diversity prevail in the recent discourse of PC, those migration-generated markers of the boundary are accompanied with an emphasis on the previous core markers of the boundary, such as the Welsh language and support for the Welsh interests.

3.2.3 Scotland

As mentioned above, while Scotland and Wales share the same national framework, the degree as well as the pace of devolution has varied between the two minority nations, which has affected the scope of action of the sub-national governments, and hence their approach to integration or equality and non-discrimination shows substantial variation.

Figure 16 demonstrates that the SNP has continuously framed integration in positive terms over the period selected. This positive framing has increased over time alongside the progressive devolution, whereas the neutral framing has simultaneously decreased.
The neutral framing of integration in Scotland is linked to the fight against prejudice within the native population and to education and language learning, while religion and citizenship are mentioned as further measures supporting integration. The few negative frames (only 4% of total codes) refer to problems such as finding adequate housing as well as negative perceptions of integration measures in the welfare system and the fear of disadvantaging the local community. The positive framing of the settlement of newcomers refers to the fight against racism and the promotion of equality. Within the discourse of the SNP there is a great focus on presenting Scotland as a multicultural and welcoming nation and to diversity as an added value:

The diversity of Scotland as a multicultural society will be encouraged [4-P24, SNP General Elections Manifesto, 1992]

Scotland has a long tradition of welcoming those who choose to live here. [4-P2, SNP Election Manifesto, 2003]

Hence, the SNP highlights the open and permeable boundaries and promotes the multicultural inclusion of migration-generated diversity into the Scottish society and identity.
Chapter 6 – Discourse and policies on integration

In the 1992 general election manifesto the SNP connected the fight against racism not only to diversity as an added value but also to the future independence of Scotland. This connection remains salient over time and is an extension of the discussion in chapter 6 regarding the discourse on immigration; the integration policy field is increasingly used to position the SNP and (once in government) the Scottish Government in opposition to Westminster:

As far as racism is concerned, the SNP utterly reject any discrimination on racial or ethnic grounds. The Bill of Rights will outlaw such discrimination. The presence in Scotland of people from diverse origins is a source of enrichment for Scottish society. [4-P24, SNP General Elections Manifesto, 1992]

The efforts of the Labour-LibDem coalition to tackle racism have been hampered by the fact that control over key policy levers such as immigration, asylum, and equal opportunities are reserved to Westminster. With Independence, however, the SNP will deliver a fair immigration policy without racial bias. [4-P2, SNP Election Manifesto, 2003]

Asian Scots, or members of Scottish society with an Asian background (which often overlaps with a Muslim background), are singled out in the SNP’s discourse and presented as particularly enriching for the modern and forward-looking Scotland. In 1995 the party launched its first support group “Asian Scots for Independence”. Similar support groups, such as the “Africans for Independent Scotland” and “Poles for Independent Scotland” were established themselves during the preparations for the 2014 Independence Referendum. The SNP was particularly proud when its delegate Bashir Ahmad was elected in 2007 as the first person with a BME or Muslim background to become a Member of the Scottish Parliament (MSP). However, Commonwealth citizens, and many of the Asian Scots, enjoy favourable treatment in the UK regarding political participation and voting rights. Hence they form a much more important electoral constituency than migrants in the other minority nations, who are excluded from the right to vote until they have been naturalized:

And as the first Scots-Asian MSP, he [Bashir Ahmad] symbolised the very best of our new Scottish democracy – our nation enriched by, indeed united by, diversity. There are so many stories and memories about Bashir that we all share. I will never forget his first speech to our party conference some fourteen years ago. He reminded us that what really matters in Scotland is not where we come from, but where we are going – together. [P6, SNP, Alex Salmond, speech at the SNP Spring Conference 2009]

Bashir Ahmad (2007 – 2009), creator of Asian Scots for Independence, was followed by Humza Yousaf, former convener of the youth group Young Asian Scots for Independence
Chapter 6 – Discourse and policies on integration (2011 - 2016).43 Both SNP MSPs gave their oath both in Urdu and English, wearing a Scottish Tartan. These two SNP MSPs provide an example of how the SNP’s inclusive discourse is reflected in practice.

Neutral frames in the discourse on integration highlight refugees and asylum seekers as a particular category of people in need of concrete integration measures, for example, with the SNP claiming to have “a new, positive attitude towards asylum seekers and refugees which regards them as an asset to our community, not as a burden” (4-P2, SNP Election manifesto 2003). Specific measures, as proposed by the SNP, should improve the situation in asylum seeker detention centres, in particular the one in Dungaval, and rely on the skills of both refugees and asylum seekers to overcome needs in the labour market in order to grant them permission to work, and the same economic, social, and political rights as other migrants. These claims, made at the level of discourse before the SNP entered government, were ultimately transposed in the “New Scots: Integrating Refugees in Scotland’s Communities strategy” in 2013 once the SNP was in government.

The settlement of newcomers, which in South Tyrol, Corsica, and also the Basque Country is referred to as integration requiring actions on both the side of the receiving society as well as the newcomers, is framed in Scotland less as requiring actions and concrete policy measures and more as a ‘welcoming tradition’. The boundaries of the Scottish identity are presented as open and permeable, following the principles of equality and non-discrimination, while diversity is not only respected but appreciated. Thus, the Scottish discourse follows the multicultural model where the initial boundary is constantly changing and incorporating elements stemming from migration-generated diversity.

Skilling (2007) argues that the promotion of cultural diversity in discourse can be seen as a ‘performative act’ which over time has become a value in the Scottish public discourse. One example of this multicultural discourse is the One Scotland – Many Cultures campaign. Parallel to the Fresh Talent Initiative, the campaign was launched in 2002 (and subsequently renamed One Scotland in 2005) to “raise awareness of racism […] and to promote the

43 Bashir Ahmad was born in Amritsar, India, in 1940. He migrated to Scotland from Pakistan at the age of 21. He is therefore a first generation immigrant. Humza Yousaf instead was born in Glasgow, is of Pakistani origin, and interestingly worked as an aide to Bashir Ahmad.
benefits of a diverse population in Scotland”. Although the campaign was introduced by the Labour–Liberal Democrat coalition Scottish government, it was supported and maintained by the SNP-led government. Hepburn and Rosie (2014) argue that there is a significant consensus among all Scottish parties in crafting an open, inclusive, and multicultural Scotland where migration-generated diversity plays a substantial role.

However, this multicultural discourse is less evident in policies supporting and representing migrant national minority languages, religions, and traditions. Skilling argues that the Fresh Talent Initiative was framed “in purely economic terms” (2007, 102), and cultural integration was perceived as a long-term project which was substantially constructed through discourse with the purpose to transform ideal practices into policy through rhetorical force.

Nevertheless, elements of this multicultural approach can be found in educational policies, where each school’s administration can adapt the curricula to reflect the diversity of the pupils. Moreover, as foreseen by the national framework, in both Scotland and Wales, a Strategic Migration Partnership (SMP) grouping the local authorities, the Scottish or Welsh Government, and key players of the public, private, and volunteer sectors has been set up to coordinate and develop strategies facilitating the integration of newcomers, refugees, and asylums seekers and the creation of an inclusive society. The SMPs are funded by both the UK and Scottish governments and play an important role in mediating between the national level and the UK Border Agency, the framework for immigration and integration outlined in Westminster, and the regional and local levels.

Although Hepburn (forthcoming-a) argues that the coordination between government levels on immigrant integration policies is low in the UK and Scotland, there is evidence of compliance with the national framework and respect and recognition of regional particularity. Education, including adult education, is a devolved matter, but the Scottish approach to supporting newcomers’ language learning differs from the UK only insofar as it expands the national ESOL strategy to offer “more ESOL language provision per capita than England” (Hepburn forthcoming-b). The Life in the UK citizenship test, first introduced in 2004 and required for naturalization (since 2005) and settlement (since 2007), was adapted in its second edition to pay greater attention to regional diversity in the UK, with candidates in Scotland asked questions about the Scottish Parliament, and those in Wales asked about the
Welsh National Assembly. Moreover, migrants can choose to demonstrate proficiency not only in English, but in two other recognized languages: Scottish Gaelic in Scotland and Welsh in Wales. Hence, there is much more awareness and recognition of regional languages and identities in the Life in the UK test than in the test to fulfil the Italian Integration Pact, for which South Tyrolean SNRPs lobbied to give additional points to migrants if they are able to speak German as one South Tyrol’s official languages, or in the Spanish and French naturalization processes.

4. Comparative conclusion: from integration to boundary making

This chapter analysed the discourse and policies on integration in the five selected minority nations. It evaluated whether the settlement and participation of newcomers is perceived (discourse) and organized (practice) in a way which fosters either the exclusion of migration-generated diversity from the boundaries of the minority nation’s identity, its inclusion into the pre-existing boundary through the assimilation of migrants into the minority nation’s identity, or a multicultural inclusion of the migration-generated diversity where the new cultures, languages, and religions become an integral part of a reframed minority nation’s identity.

Table 16 summarizes the positioning of the SNRPs in the various minority nations in relation to integration and boundary making.

The analysis has demonstrated that there are not only differences across the minority nations, but also differences over time and within individual cases. The construction of the boundary over time changed most in Wales and Corsica, and remained the most stable in Scotland and the Basque Country. The differences between the various SNRPs are instead most salient in South Tyrol.
SNRPs in South Tyrol do not – over the period examined in this thesis – propose any change of the boundary of the minority nation’s identity, but certain parties demand the exclusion from welfare services (dF) of those migrants who are referred to as ‘unwanted’. The majority of the parties in South Tyrol demanded adaptation and assimilation into what is constructed as the South Tyrolean identity which is primarily based on being a minority in Italy and learning both official languages, German and Italian.

In Corsica, the discourse shifts between demands for the exclusion of first generation internal and international migrants from the ‘community of destiny’, to the exclusion of internal migrants from the right to property and voting rights, and ultimately to the inclusion of both internal and international migrants into a conceptual shared regional citizenship based on residence, historical values, and the learning of the Corsican language. In both Corsica and South Tyrol SNRPs frame integration as the assimilative inclusion of migration-generated diversity into the collective identity. Thus, the boundaries of the collective identity are presented as static and do not change due to immigration, and consequently, migration-generated diversity does not become an integrated part of a redefined collective identity.

In the Basque Country the discourse on integration is dominated by the concept of equality and human rights and the proposal of an inclusive citizenship as the practical implementation

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44 The marker for the position of the Welsh approach is situated in between the two types of boundary change because I find elements of both types in the discourse of PC. However, in comparison with the Basque County, the latest position of PC is closer to the “multicultural inclusion” category.

45 The marker for the position of the Basque approach is situated in between the two types of boundary change, because I find elements of both types in the discourse of the Basque SNRPs. However, in comparison with Wales, the positioning of Basque SNRPs is closer to the “assimilationist inclusion” category.
of these values. In contrast to Corsica, however, in the Basque Country the same idea of a conceptual regional citizenship is used to promote the expansion of the boundary of Basque society by promoting inclusion and the granting of equal rights to everyone who resides in the region, a position that contrasts the Basque Country with the Spanish state. Nevertheless, while residence is the most important criterion, I also find references to Basque culture and language as important values that should also be shared by migrants. Hence, within the discourse of Basque SNRPs a framing of integration is salient which presents cultural diversity and the recognition of different cultures, languages, and religions as an added value to the development of the society. However, the parties do not propose the migration-generated cultures, languages, and religions as new markers of the collective identity, but instead they propose the abstract recognition of diversity as a marker of the Basque minority nation. Hence, Basque SNRPs use the discourse on integration to frame the boundary of the Basque minority nation as open to all newcomers residing in the Basque Country, and as open to the recognition of the concept of diversity, thus relying on civic markers of the identity. Nevertheless, the parties do not promote migration-generated elements as new and integrated parts of Basqueness, but instead emphasize the learning of the Basque language.

Since 1998 PC has adopted a similar discourse on integration, emphasizing the inclusion of migrants into the pre-existing boundaries. Similar to SNRPs in the Basque Country, PC tries to attract newcomers into the Welsh collective identity by promoting the learning of the Welsh language as an asset for integration and development. Since 2011 PC has begun to also promote migration-generated elements as new markers of a modern and forward-looking Wales, in doing so shifting towards a multicultural inclusion of migration-generated diversity as a marker of the Welsh identity.

In contrast, throughout the entirety of the period analysed, the SNP has promoted a discourse of integration based on the recognition and incorporation of migration-generated diversity into the collective Scottish identity. The party proposes that the new languages, cultures, and religions form an integral part of a progressive and modern Scotland. The promotion of a vision of a modern and forward-looking, open, and multicultural nation which develops in contrast to what is referred to as backward-looking, exclusive, and ultimately racist central state was salient over the selected timeframe within the SNP in Scotland and, as mentioned
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above, has also recently been introduced by PC in Wales. The parties thus actively used both immigration and integration in their discourse as nation-building tools. Thus, among the five selected minority nations Scotland, recently Wales, and partially the Basque Country frame integration based on the minority nation’s blurring of the initial boundary, which is seen in a real change having occurred, not only of the boundary of the minority, but also in particular of the markers of the boundary. In Scotland and Wales the new markers include elements of migration-generated diversity, whereas in the Basque Country the new marker is an abstract concept of recognition of diversity, but not any particular element stemming from migration.

In all cases with the exception of Scotland, the discourse on the national minority language ranges among the most important and frequently referred themes in relation to the integration of migrants. As I will show in chapter seven, the national minority languages are framed both as an important marker of the collective identity and as a tool for further integration and inclusion. The analysis shows that there is a substantial gap between discourse and policies. In each of the five minority nations access to neither the minority nation’s identity and society as a whole nor to specific policy areas is conditioned by knowledge of the national minority language, although in each of the regions (other than Scotland) the language is referred to as both an important marker of the identity and a tool for integration. Length of residence in the region is instead used to restrict access to the welfare system in South Tyrol and internal migrants’ access to political participation and buying property in Corsica.

In this chapter I laid the groundwork for chapter seven where the analysis will not focus on whether the boundaries between the receiving society and migrants are open to change or not, but on the markers of those boundaries and of the collective identity in the selected minority nations.
CHAPTER 7. THE DISCOURSE ON THE MINORITY NATION’S IDENTITY

1. Introduction

This is the last of three chapters in which I present the empirical analysis of the intersection of immigration, integration, and minority nation’s identity as constructed by SNRPs. The present chapter constitutes the last step in answering the initial research questions, namely whether and how immigration impacts the self-definition of a minority nation; whether immigration provokes a change in the construction of the collective identity and how the identity changes – towards including or excluding the migration-generated diversity.

In the previous chapters I first demonstrated how immigration is perceived as having an impact on the minority nation’s identity (chapter five) and secondly, that the boundary of the minority nation’s identity is only constructed as open to change in Scotland, and partially in Wales, but does not change and instead newcomers are included into the pre-existing boundaries in South Tyrol, Corsica, and to a great extend also in the Basque Country (chapter six). The present chapter engages with the markers of the boundary and with the features that make up ‘modern and multicultural Scotland’ and the collective identity in the other cases.

As in previous chapters, this chapter focuses on the perspective of the SNRPs and evaluates the parties’ positions in relation to the position of the regional government. This chapter relies on the same dataset as the previous chapters: the SNRPs’ party manifestos, thematic documents on immigration and integration, coalition programmes, and parliamentary debates in relation to immigration and integration. It does not engage with discourses and policies specifically developed to protect and promote the minority nation’s identity.

Hence, in line with the central research questions, the minority nation’s identity is always analysed in relation to immigration and integration, which might represent a limitation to the study of the minority identities as such. However, this particular intersection of immigration, immigrant integration, and minority nation’s identity, and the confrontation of the minority nation’s identity with an additional and new potential ‘significant other’, has the potential to
offer new insights into the study of identity formation. Based on these limitations and the
genral challenges of identity research (Brubaker and Cooper 2000) as well as the
methodological implications spelled out in chapters two and three, the present chapter
concentrates on evaluating the elements used by the SNRPs to construct the boundary
between ‘us’ and ‘them’.

In this chapter I will show that migrants have not replaced the state as the most important
significant other against whom the minority nation’s identity is constructed in any of the
selected cases. Only in South Tyrol are some migrants, in particular Muslim migrants,
constructed as an additional significant other. In the other cases, particularly Scotland, the
discourse on immigration and integration is used to further highlight the difference between
the collective identity of the minority nation and the state and hence between the ‘us’ and the
most significant other.

The chapter first evaluates on a case-by-case basis which main frames and criteria SNRPs
rely on when constructing identity and whether those criteria are based on civic and post-
ethnic elements such as residence, the link to democratic institutions, or the willingness to
belong, or, instead, ethnic elements, such as ancestry, race, or birth. Civic markers are
amenable to change whereas ethnic ones cannot be changed. Leith and Soule (2012) argue
that ethnic markers of identity are seen as primordial, closed, exclusive, and pre-modern
forms of identity, whereas civic markers are associated with open, inclusive, and modern
societies.

However, the line between civic and ethnic criteria is blurred. Bauböck (2002) and Winter
(2011, 3) argue that “national identities defined in narrow ‘ethnic’ or cultural terms are
obviously problematic because they tend to homogenize and thereby preclude ethnic
minorities from full participation in the polity. Strictly ‘civic’ definitions of citizenship,
however, have been deconstructed as illusionary”. In particular language is situated in
between the civic-ethnic dichotomy. As van der Zwet (2015, 67) argues, anyone can learn a
language and it is therefore an open and inclusive marker of identity. However, newcomers,
even if they gain a very high level of proficiency in the new language, will most likely be
recognized by their accent and intonation. Moreover, understanding the cultural nuances and
the conceptual meanings attached to a language does not come easily to those not brought up
in a certain context. Language can thus also be used to exclude newcomers, including those who have learned the local language.

In chapter six I showed that SNRPs in the Basque Country, Corsica, South Tyrol, and Wales perceived learning the language of the minority as one of the most important aspects for the inclusion of newcomers. However, in none of the selected cases was this presented as a requirement. Instead, the parties highlighted national minority language acquisition as a tool for facilitating integration. Therefore, this chapter examines whether SNRPs frame learning the national minority language as the only path to group membership or whether there are other complementary or parallel paths to gain entry to the collective identity.

As shown in chapter four, in all selected cases but Scotland, the national minority language is an important marker of the collective identity, and SNRPs base their claims to distinctiveness and hence also to self-government on the particularity stemming in part from the sub-state national minority language. However, in Wales, the Basque Country, and Corsica the sub-state language can be seen as a less advantageous choice for newcomers than the majority language for two reasons: first, within the territory it is only spoken by a minority of the autochthonous population, and secondly, it does not allow for greater mobility as there is no other state or greater territory where the national minority language forms the national language. In this chapter I demonstrate how SNRPs in these minority nations and stateless nations place less importance on the national minority language in their framing of the collective identity and also include other identity markers into their construction of the boundaries of the identity. Hence, in these minority nations the national minority language becomes a tool for integration and hence a civic marker of the identity. In South Tyrol instead, the German language is spoken by the majority of the autochthonous population, and it is also one of the official languages of neighbouring Switzerland and the national language of Austria and Germany. Thus, learning German can potentially increase migrants’ mobility. SNRPs in South Tyrol place greater emphasis on the importance of the German language and its status as national minority language as the most important marker of the minority collective identity, and hence it is a much stronger ethnic marker than in the other cases.

Furthermore, the chapter evaluates whether SNRPs frame the minority nation’s identity as overriding or overarching all other affiliations. Bauböck (2002) argues that in order to allow
migrants full participation in the receiving societies they are often required to adopt the national identity as overriding all previous affiliations. He criticizes this as ‘a cure that is worse than the disease’ (2002, 12) and proposes instead shared identities, or what Calhoun calls a ‘nested identity’ (Calhoun 1994, Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001). These latter forms of group identity are overarching and overlapping identities which allow for multiple identifications instead of requiring a single identity.

2. The discourse on the minority nation’s identity

The evaluation of how the boundaries of identity are constructed in the discourse on immigration and integration shows that international migrants have not replaced the nation state as the most significant other in any of the selected cases. Instead, in every case migrants and ethnic minorities are proposed as potential members of the minority nation’s identity. Access to the identity is conditioned, however, by assimilation in South Tyrol and Corsica, whereas in Scotland and partially in Wales and the Basque Country migration-generated diversity becomes a new marker of the collective identity. The markers of the collective identity include civic markers (such as residence) and the willingness to support sub-state and nationalist interests in Scotland, the Basque Country, Wales, and to a lesser degree in Corsica. In contrast, in South Tyrol ethnic markers prevail in the framing of the minority nation’s identity. In all minority nations except Scotland, the national minority language is presented by SNRPs as a useful instrument and tool for facilitating integration. However, no SNRPs in the selected cases – with the exception of SF and dF in South Tyrol – frame learning the national minority language as a requirement and condition for access to the society or the welfare system.

In the upcoming sections I further elaborate on details of the development and construction of the minority nation’s identity in each case before finally highlighting the comparative points between the cases in the concluding section.
2.1 The exclusion or assimilation of migration-generated diversity from or into the minority nation’s identity

Immigration is defined by SNRPs in South Tyrol as a threat to the collective identity of the German and Ladin populations. In Corsica internal immigration is also framed as having a negative impact on the Corsican society. Consequently, in these two cases, migration-generated diversity does not become a marker of how the SNRPs frame the minority nation’s identity.

2.1.1 South Tyrol

Figure 17 shows that when referring to the South Tyrolean collective identity, SNRPs refer in particular to two concepts: heimat (homeland) and being a minority. The minority status is further connected to protecting the German and Ladin languages and cultures; to autonomy as a means to fulfil this aim; to the relations with the Italian state and population; to the historical experiences of shifting state boundaries and hence shifting the belonging to a national culture; and only marginally to the development of a multilingual territory.

The discourse on the South Tyrolean identity is dominated by the SVP and the SF, and the main marker of the collective identity used by both parties is ‘homeland’. Although for both parties the protection and development of homeland is one of the main aims, as spelled out in the various party manifesto, the meaning given to it differs substantially between the two parties. For both parties, homeland is a positively connotated concept which is not just worth preserving but also further developing:

‘Heimat/homeland’ makes us into what we are. It is at the same time the source of our identity and the expression of our bonds with the place we live in and which shapes us. The preservation of our ‘homeland’ is therefore not only a question of our history, but also of our future. (Die Heimat macht uns zu dem, was wir sind. Sie ist gleichsam Quell unserer Identität und Ausdruck unserer Verbundenheit zu dem Ort, an dem wir leben und der uns prägt. Die Erhaltung unserer Heimat ist daher nicht nur eine Frage der Verantwortung vor unserer Geschichte, sondern auch vor unserer Zukunft.) [3-P5, SF Election Manifesto, 2008]

To develop and carve out South Tyrol as a ‘homeland’ worth living in for all South Tyroleans. A well-functioning coexistence, a lively culture, a good economy, a just social system, and a sound environment should make up the ‘homeland’ we want to pass to future generations (Südtirol als lebenswerte Heimat für alle Südtirolerinnen und Südtiroler zu gestalten. Ein funktionierendes Miteinander, eine lebendige Kultur, eine gut aufgestellte Wirtschaft, ein gerechtes Sozialsystem und eine intakte Umwelt sollen jene Heimat bilden, die wir unseren nachkommenden Generationen übergeben.) [3-P9, SVP Election Manifesto, 2013]
Data: All entries in the hermeneutic unit ‘South Tyrol’ (total number of documents used for this graph: 16), grouped in the code family ‘identity’ (unit of analysis: paragraphs/sentences); y-axis: percentage of codes in relation to total codes on identity (total number of codes in this graph: 60); see document list and code list in Annex 3.

But SF proposes to further enhance the homeland, in particular by strengthening the German and Ladin languages and cultures, strengthening links with historical Tyrol (in Austria), weakening the bonds with the Italian state, replacing what is described as ‘Fascist topographical names’ with historical German names, and demolishing buildings constructed in South Tyrol during the Fascist period by the Italian state (3-P5, SF Election Manifesto, 2008; 3-P6, SF Election Manifesto, 2013). As such, SF’s homeland belongs to the German and Ladin speakers living in the territory:

The difference between South Tyrol and most of the other Italian provinces is its particularity due to the regional identity, which is based on the German and Ladin populations which have been living here traditionally (Das, was Süd-Tirol im Unterschied zu den meisten übrigen italienischen Provinzen besonders macht, ist seine eigene Identität auf Grund der hier seit alters lebenden deutschen und ladinischen Bevölkerung.) [3-P6, SF Election Manifesto, 2013]

Belonging can be expanded, according to the party, by the belief in the common ‘homeland’ and the ‘willingness to stand up for it’. From the Italian language group, the party explicitly demands a renouncement of fascist symbols, which are not, however, from the point of view
of the party, only particular fascist period buildings, but also all bilingual topographical names. Hence, the party defines assimilation into a German and Ladin dominated territory and society as a condition for belonging (3-P5, SF Election Manifesto, 2008).

As shown in chapters five and six the party wants to limit immigration from outside Italy as much as possible and reduce it to guest workers from neighbouring Austria, who are perceived as ‘easy to integrate’ due to their linguistic and cultural proximity to the German speakers. Furthermore, migrants already residing in the territory need to be ‘integrated’ in the party’s meaning of assimilation into the German language and culture. Hence, SF proposes above all a static understanding of what South Tyrol is and to whom it belongs. The collective identity is defined by birth and ancestry within the German or Ladin groups and is thus limited to those two groups. Through assimilation, the concept can be expanded to include Italian speakers. The party does not propose the collective identity as overarching but rather as overriding all other affiliations. Based on their framing of the minority nation’s identity, the party also demands secession from the Italian state and either reunification with Austria or the formation of an independent state. Hence, the Italian state remains the most significant other against whom they construct the collective identity.

dF shares a number of commonalities with SF, such as the demand for separation from the Italian state. However, reunification with Austria is not proposed as a solution, and instead the party focuses on the creation of a trilingual Free State of South Tyrol, including all three autochthonous language groups (Art. 4 of the Constitution of a Free State, dF 2012). Thus, for dF, belonging is also limited to the three groups that have been living in the territory, and the marker of the identity is again ancestry and birth. As laid down in greater detail in chapters five and six, dF also demands control over and restrictions of international immigration as well as either the exclusion or assimilation of newcomers. Thus, for neither SF nor dF do migrants and migration-generated diversity form part of the construction of a collective identity, and this need not change, as the leader of dF sharply pointed out in a discussion on Muslim cultures:

The Burkini [swimsuit designed in accordance with Quranic admonition for Muslim women] is not a local custom in South Tyrol, and it also should not become one and therefore needs to be rejected. (In Südtirol ist ein Burkini nicht ortsüblich, solle das auch nicht werden und sei daher strikt abzulehnen) [Ulli Mair, leader of dF, Tageszeitung, p. 4, 24.07.2015]
The SVP positions itself between SF and dF, because, on the one hand, it focuses on framing the identity of the German and Ladin groups as based on being linguistic minorities, which need protection, and, on the other hand, it proposes the development of shared identity between the German and Ladin groups and the Italian group. Hence, similar to its approach to immigration and integration, the SVP shifts in its framing of the collective identity between constructing a territorially based discourse including the three autochthonous groups and a focus on ethno-linguistic elements strengthening the German and Ladin groups.

The protection of the German and Ladin languages and cultures as the main basis of the collective identity remained a central element of the SVP’s discourse on homeland over the period selected (3-P7, SVP Election Manifesto 2003). Moreover, the party highlights the close interrelationship between autonomy and the German and Ladin languages and cultures:

The South Tyrolean autonomy is based on the cultural identity of the German and Ladin nation/people. Culture is the foundation of identity and hence the existential basis of an ethnic minority and its survival. But the will to protect and promote the cultural identity justifies the quest for autonomy. (*Die Autonomie Südtirols fußt auf der kulturellen Identität der deutschen und ladinischen Volksgruppe. Kultur ist Identität stiftend und daher für eine ethnische Minderheit die eigentliche Grundlage ihrer Existenz und ihres Fortbestehens. Aus dem Willen der Volksgruppen, die kulturelle Identität zu bewahren und zu verstärken, lässt sich das Ringen um Autonomie ableiten und rechtfertigen.*) [3-P8, SVP Election Manifesto, 2008]

Thus, the main markers used by the SVP to frame the collective identity are homeland, being a minority, autonomy, and the culture of the German and Ladin groups. These markers remain stable throughout the SVP’s discourse and hence reflect a static and ethnic framing of the minority nation’s identity.

But over the period selected the party developed a second, additional framing of the collective identity which is not based on belonging to the German or Ladin groups, but on territorial belonging. Alongside identifying with the German and Ladin minorities, the party also promotes a shared identity among all South Tyroleans and a focus on protecting the ‘homeland’ through sustainable development, environmental protection, and viewing bi- and multilingualism as an added value (3-P7, SVP Election Manifesto, 2003 and 3-P8, SVP Election Manifesto, 2008). Within the discourse of the SVP, over time the importance of the Italian state as the significant other for the construction of the minority nation’s identity has decreased and been replaced by a strong focus on a multilingual territory:
South Tyrol is a multilingual country within Europe (Südtirol ist ein mehrsprachiges Land in Europa) [3-P18, SVP Grundsatzprogramm, 1993]

Equal coexistence among the three language groups is not implicit, but a success. We worked hard for this and will continue to do so. (gleichberechtigte Miteinander der drei Sprachgruppen ist keine Selbstverständlichkeit, sondern ein Erfolg, an dem wir hart gearbeitet haben und an dem wir weiter arbeiten werden) [3-P9, SVP Election Manifesto, 2013]

Hence, the reference to homeland as the basis for identity remains, but it has also become the basis for the development of an open and tolerant encounter with newcomers and their cultures:

‘Homeland’ and tradition create identity and therefore the basis for openness, self-confidence, and comprehension for the encounter of co-citizens with different cultures (Heimat und Tradition schaffen Identität und damit die Voraussetzung für Offenheit, Aufgeschlossenheit, Selbstbewusstsein und Verständnis in der Begegnung mit Mitbürgern und Mitbürgerinnen und anderen Kulturen.) [3-P7, SVP Election Manifesto, 2003]

The framing of the South Tyrolean identity as shared between the German, Ladin, and Italian language groups is further promoted through the development of the concept of homeland through the Euroregion Trentino – South Tyrol – Tyrol (3-P8, SVP Election Manifesto, 2008). Although not part of the discourse on the intersection between minority nation’s identity and immigration, the discourse on the Euroregion prominently promotes the development of an overarching common identity. The Euroregion was established in 1995 to foster the collaboration beyond state borders between South Tyrol, neighbouring Trentino on the one (southern, Italian) side, and Tyrol on the other (northern, Austrian) side. One of the main promoters of the Euroregion has been the SVP. One of the aims of the Euroregion is the strengthening of bonds between the three administrative regions and the populations and the reactivation of a historical common identity of Tyrol. Although the main target groups are the historical populations, the German, Ladin, and Italian speakers, there have been initiatives to foster collaboration in the field of immigrant integration and the governance of refugees and asylum seekers.46

However, although the shared collective identity is presented as ‘open and tolerant’, languages and cultures brought into the territory through migration have not yet entered the SVP’s discourse on homeland or a shared South Tyrol. Instead, as I demonstrated in chapter six, migrants are required to assimilate into one of the two official languages (German or

46 Protocol of Intent of the Euroregion Trentino, South Tyrol, and Tyrol to strengthen the collaboration between the three entities, signed on 03.11.2011.
Italian) in order to be able to belong to a South Tyrolean identity. Hence, the SVP constructs the collective identity as overarching the historical division between German, Ladin, and Italian speakers, but as overriding migration-generated diversity.

Although, as seen in chapters five and six, immigration is perceived by all SNRPs as a challenge and ultimately a threat to identity, none of the parties directly connect immigration flows or migration-generated diversity to changes of the minority nation’s identity. Instead, SF in particular continues to focus on the elements that constitute a minority, namely the relations with the state majority and the will to protect distinctive characteristics. Migration-generated diversity has neither become one of the defining features of how the SNRPs construct the German and Ladin minorities, nor have migrants replaced the Italian state as the most significant other against which the minority nation’s identity is constructed. Within the SVP’s discourse there are tendencies to promote nested or shared identities, overarching primarily the division between German, Italian, and Ladin speakers, but not yet promoting the inclusion of newcomers. Hence the blurring of the boundary between the traditional groups is promoted, but no boundary change is proposed to include migration-generated diversity. Migrants can, however, assimilate into one of the traditional groups by learning either the national minority language, hence, German, as suggested by SF and dF, or one or both of the official languages, German or Italian, as suggested by the SVP. However, the national minority language is used by all SNRPs in South Tyrol as a substantial marker of the collective identity of the autochthonous German group, and is always also connected to birth and ancestry. Thus, the framing of the national minority language as an ethnic marker prevails, and in relation to migrants it becomes a tool (SVP) or requirement (SF, dF) for assimilation.

In conclusion, all South Tyrolean SNRPs continue to frame the minority nation’s identity as a static concept, with protection and preservation prevailing over development. In relation to the Italian group, the SVP adopts an additional framing of the collective identity as overarching the traditional language groups, but this framing does not include migration-generated diversity. Hence, shared or nested identities (Bauböck 2002, Calhoun 1994) are not yet found within SNRP discourse connecting immigration, integration, and the minority nation’s identity in South Tyrol.
2.1.2 Corsica

The relations with the traditional ‘Other’, the French state, dominate the Corsican SNRPs’ discourse on minority nation’s identity. The parties frame the collective identity through two main aspects: the (unsatisfactory) relations with the French state, on the one hand, and the cohabitation of the autochthonous Corsican community and the internal migrant French population on the island, on the other.

Figure 18 shows the frames used most often by SNRPs when referring to the Corsican society, territory, and values. SNRPs construct the minority nation’s identity as a ‘victim of the French state’, which is said to have a negative perspective of Corsica. This is also referred to as ‘Anti-Corsican Racism’ (Racisme anti-corse) (2-P5, CN Press Release, 2008). Furthermore, the frame of ‘being a victim of the French state’ is based on the denial of official recognition of the ‘Corsican people’ and rejection of a stronger form of self-government. In chapter three I demonstrated that Corsica is the only selected minority nation which lacks constitutionally granted autonomy and devolved legislative powers for self-government. Hence, recognition as Corsican people and the granting of strengthened autonomy by the French state are the most important goals advocated for by all SNRPs.
In 2004 the SNRPs, under the lead of *Femu a Corsica* (FeC), proposed the introduction of a regional (conceptual) Corsican citizenship to regulate the cohabitation between the autochthonous Corsican community and the internal and international newcomers. As previously discussed, Corsican citizens are divided into ‘Corsicans by origin’ and ‘Corsicans by adoption’. Adoption is based on 10 years of residence, a willingness to join the struggle for self-government, and recognition of the Corsican interests and language. Although these criteria are of a civic nature and hence anyone – both internal French migrants and international migrants – could become members of the ‘peuple corse’ (Corsican people), the parties promote the Corsican citizenship with the aim to restrict voting and property rights
on the island and consequently exclude internal migrants. Hence, although the markers of the Corsican people are civic and inclusive, the aim of this concept is the exclusion of ‘unwanted migrants’.

The Corsican language and culture remain important aspects within the discourse on what it means to be Corsican. In particular, since the elections in 2004 FeC has promoted the development of a bilingual society, and thus the party proposes a change of the minority nation’s identity from focusing on the protection of only one language and culture, Corsican, to the formation of a bilingual and multilingual society. The Corsican language is promoted as accessible to anyone who wants to learn it and as an important factor for integration. Thus, the Corsican language becomes, on the one hand, a civic marker of the boundary of the *peuple corse*, and, on the other, a tool for inclusion:

> The question of the Corsican language occupies a prominent place. It is a central aspect of our heritage, part of our existence, an irreplaceable factor of integration and openness. The language is not an essence but it is essential. Therefore, the necessity to grant it an official status is not one of many goals, but is the goal, because it allows us to finally reach a situation of multilingualism in Corsica, as it is already the rule throughout Europe and the world. (...la question de la langue corse occupe une place primordiale. Aspect central du patrimoine, ferment de la création, facteur irremplaçable d’intégration et d’ouverture, la langue n’est pas une essence mais elle est essentielle. Alors, la nécessité de la doter d’un statut officiel n’est rien d’autre que cela, mais tout cela, et permettra enfin d’accéder au multilinguisme paisible dont la Corse et le monde ont besoin et qui est la règle partout en Europe et dans le monde.) [2-P11, FeC Election Manifesto, 2010]

As shown in chapter three, the new coalition of cooperative SNRPs, FeC, significantly increased their number of seats at the elections in 2010 and in 2015. At the 2015 general election, FeC and *Corsica Libera* (CL) formed the *Pè a Corsica* (For Corsica) list which gained a majority of seats, and SNRPs entered government for the first time. The recognition of the Corsican language on the island as ‘co-official’ with the French language by the Assembly on 17 May 2013 shows the increasing impact SNRPs have and also the development of a bilingual society not just in the SNRP discourse but also in practice.

In contrast to FeC, CL and its predecessor *Corsica Nazione* (CN) define the Corsican people as the ‘only legal community’ of the island. They argue that problems arising from immigration cannot be properly addressed until Corsicans gain the power to regulate matters concerning human rights, cultural and demographic balance within the territory, and sub-state interests (3-P3, CN Press Release, 2004). Hence, according to CN, the island belongs to the Corsican people, which the party, parallel to Femu a Corsica, constructs as a
community of destiny consisting of Corsicans by origin and Corsicans by adoption. In contrast to Femu a Corsica, CN/CL do not, however, define 10 years of residence and joining the quest for the protection and promotion of the interests of the Corsican people as criteria for ‘adoption’. Instead, CN/CL refer to historical residence only (2-P22, U Rimbobu47, 1998 - 2004). Since 2004 CN has also referred to social justice, the rejection of xenophobia, and the protection of the environment as markers of the collective identity with the aim to create a modern, open, and plural Corsican society:

The creation of a Corsican society based on the historical and cultural values of our people, of social justice, and of the rejection of xenophobia (l’avènement d’une société corse responsable fondée sur les valeurs historiques et culturelles de notre peuple, la justice sociale, protection et le rejet de la xénophobie) [2-P12 – PNC Program]

The Corsican people have the right to live in a society based on solidarity, pluralism, secularism, the rejection of racism, respect of human life, and social justice. (Le people corse a le droit de vivre dans une société solidaire basée sur le pluralisme, la laïcité, le rejet du racisme, le respect de la vie humaine et la justice sociale.) [2-P22, U Ribombu, 1998 - 2004]

Since 2004 every Corsican SNRP has constructed the boundary of the Corsican society as plural and open to expansion; however, the parties do not engage with the possibility of including and representing the migration-generated languages, cultures, and religions within the Corsican society. Instead, the discourse presenting the Corsican society as not based on ethnic and exclusive elements but rather on learning the Corsican language, bilingualism, and 10 years of residence accommodates the culture and language brought to the island by the internal (French) migrants but does not accommodate additional diversity.

The concept of Corsican citizenship, as proposed by SNRPs, is framed, however, as a shared or nested identity between the Corsicans ‘by origin’ and those ‘adopted’ and thus between internal and international migrants. ‘Adoption’ for international migrants does not allow representation and promotion of their own languages, cultures, and religions and therefore refers to assimilation.

In summary, since 2004 Corsican SNRPs have framed the Corsican identity as overarching between the French and Corsicans living on the island and have based it on civic markers such as long-term residence, French-Corsican bilingualism, respect and the promotion of solidarity, pluralism, social justice, and support for the quest for further autonomy. However,

47 U Rimbombu is the party newspaper of CN; it was also used by FLNC for official communications.
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this framing assimilates or excludes migration-generated diversity from the markers of the collective identity.

2.2 Migration-generated diversity as a new marker of the collective identity

In the Basque Country, Wales, and Scotland the discourse on the collective identity is much more open towards the recognition of migration-generated diversity as a new marker of the collective identity than in Corsica and South Tyrol. In the former three cases the discourse on immigration and integration are instrumentally linked with the reframing of the collective identity. I concur with Zabalo (2008, 806), who argues that the discourse on the nation and the collective identity are made up of a combination of ‘cultural elements and objectives with political aims’. Hence I elaborate in the next sections on how the accommodation of migration-generated identity as a marker of the collective identity is used by the SNRPs in these minority nations to construct a counter-narrative to the state’s discourse and hence to strengthen their cases for further autonomy/devolution or independence.

2.2.1 Basque Country

Historically, for the most part, Basque nationalists based membership in the Basque society on purely ethnic terms. For Sabino Arana, the founder of the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco – PNV), race and religion were the two defining features of Basque identity until the early 1970s. Although the Basque language was a central element of Basque identity and a symbol for belonging to the movement, many founding members did not speak it. Thus, Arana did not rely on language to define either the Basque nationalist movement or the Basque identity but instead on ethnic purity and Basque ancestry, proved by having at least one Basque surname (Zabalo 2008, 799).

Faced with an increasing influx of internal migrants from other Spanish regions and, what Zabalo calls the “dilemma of maintaining theoretical purity or choosing political growth” (2008, 799), the PNV distanced themselves from Arana’s race-based ideology. In 1971 the party issued a special issue of its newsletter Alderdi entitled ‘43 Words for You, Immigrant in Euskadi’ directed towards internal immigrants from other Spanish regions. Therein the party called for newcomers from other parts of Spain to respect the Basque culture and
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language and to join the struggle for independence and democracy. In return newcomers would find a welcoming Basque society which was ready and open to include them.

At the same time, the Basque language became an important element in the discourse on the Basque identity, but instead of framing it as exclusive ethnic marker, the PNV presented it as a tool offering immigrants and newcomers access to the Basque identity. This discourse of presenting the Basque language as a tool for unity and social cohesion still continues within the PNV and has also been introduced by EA, and due to the arrival of new immigrants from other countries, it has subsequently also been expanded to include them into the Basque identity:

Hence, PNV and EA in particular propose focusing on, and financially supporting, Basque language education for migrants, as discussed in chapter six:

Economically encourage the teaching of Euskera to favour its learning to those who come to live in the Basque Country and do not have economic resources. (Incentivar económicamente la enseñanza del euskera para favorecer su aprendizaje a quienes vengan a vivir a Euskadi y no tengan recursos económicos.) [P6, PNV Election Manifesto, 2012]

Bring Euskera to immigrants to favour their social and economic integration and their involvement in the educational process of their children. (Acercar el euskera a las personas inmigrantes, para favorecer su integración social y laboral y su implicación en el proceso educativo de sus hijos e hijas.) [1-P282, EA Election Manifesto, 2009]

A similar discourse is also observable within the Popular Unity party (HB – Herri Batasuna). The Basque language is referred to as a central, if not the most important, marker of the Basque identity, and the party also proposes using the language as a tool to unite historical divisions between the different Basque-speaking territories in Spain and France and also between the Spanish and Basque speakers within the current Basque Autonomous Community and in doing so to create a modern and multilingual territory and society:

Herri Batasuna will not stop until our language, Euskera, is the official language of the Basque Country. We are not against other languages and cultures, but we favour ours. We know that it is not an easy task
because of foreign oppression over many centuries and the betrayal of the leaders which have left Euskera, the most important value of our people, in agony. (Herri Batasuna no cejará hasta que nuestra lengua, el Euskera, sea la lengua oficial de Euskal Herria. No estamos en contra de otras lenguas y cultura, sino a favor de la nuestra. Sabemos que no es una empresa fácil pues la opresión extranjera de tantos siglos y la traición de los jauntxos han llevado a la agonía al Euskera, máximo valor de nuestro Pueblo.) [P294, HB Election manifesto 1990]

... to achieve a Basque-speaking Basque Country, populated by multilingual citizens, as it corresponds with our nation’ (...para conseguir una Euskal Herria euskaldun poblada por ciudadanos/as multilengües, como corresponde a nuestra nación) [1-P295, HB Election Manifesto, 1994]

Thus, there is a path-dependency in the discourse on presenting the Basque language as a tool facilitating the inclusion of international migrants which is shared by all SNRPs (Jeram and Adam 2015).

Conversi argues that there was a shift from ethnic markers characterizing the Basque society to civic markers, and “action became more important than race and generally it was also more important than language” (Conversi 1997, 202). However, this shift from framing the Basque collective identity based on race and language to framing it based on active support for the quest for protection and promotion of nationalist interests occurred prior to the period selected for this research. I find that in relation to immigration and integration, the SNRPs construct the discourse on the collective identity not primarily based on language but rather on civic markers such as residence and in particular on values such as plurality, flexibility, and openness, on the one hand, and solidarity and the prevention of poverty, on the other (see Figure 19).

In chapter five I demonstrated that immigration is portrayed by the Basque SNRPs as having a positive impact on the development of the Basque Country. Thus, the governing Basque SNRPs (the PNV and EA) and non-governing Aralar propose a conceptual Basque citizenship to, on the one hand, manage the challenges connected to immigration and, on the other, modernize the territory. Although situated at the level of discourse, Basque SNRPs have introduced the concept of symbolic citizenship into the Basque integration plan.
The Basque citizenship is constructed, similarly to Corsican citizenship, as open to all people residing in the territory (with no length of residence requirement, unlike Corsica) and is based on respect for the Basque language, culture, and political interests. Hence, the PNV, EA, and Aralar base membership in the Basque citizenship on civic markers:

The requirement for access to the new citizenship is residence. The new concept of citizenship must be separated from nationality in the classical sense as well as from any other element related to identity. It must be based solely on residence. (El vínculo exigido para el acceso a la nueva ciudadanía es la residencia. El nuevo concepto de ciudadanía debe desligarse de la nacionalidad en sentido clásico, así como de cualquier otro elemento identitario, para sustentarse exclusivamente en la residencia de hecho.) [1-P4, PVI, 203-2005; 1-P2, PVI, 2007-2009]

This integration must have a two-way character clearly based on mutual respect, on the development of different identities sharing rights and duties, (...) full citizenship based on residence and not nationality. (Esta integración ha de tener un carácter claramente bidireccional, basada en el respeto mutuo, en el desarrollo de las distintas identidades compartiendo derechos y deberes, (...) la ciudadanía de pleno derecho en función de la residencia y no de la nacionalidad.) [1-P283, Aralar Election Manifesto, 2009]

Hence, the SNRPs propose the Basque citizenship as a shared identity; however, there are differences in whether the parties frame a common identity as representing or assimilating migration-generated identity. Euskal Herria (EH) strongly focuses on creating a ‘national
culture’ with a focus on the Basque language and hence propose the inclusion of other cultures, based on similarities with the Basque identity:

In order to assert the national identity, it is necessary to create the national culture. Therefore, the activities aiming to strengthen the Basque identity are based on four primary pillars of the national culture: nationality, the Basque language, popular culture, and universality. [...] EH always keeps the doors open for cultural exchange with other cultures. We will search for those elements we have in common with other cultures, because if we know how others live in freedom, we can find appropriate ways of how to relate to other people. (Para reafirmar la identidad nacional, es necesario fomentar la cultura nacional. Por tanto, la actividad dirigida a reafirmar la identidad vasca se basará en los cuatro pilares principales de la cultura nacional: nacionalidad, euskaldun bat, carácter popular y universalidad: [...] Euskal Herria siempre tendrá abiertas las puertas para el intercambio cultural con otros pueblos. Buscaremos los elementos que tenemos en común con otras culturas, pues conociendo las múltiples formas de vivir en libertad es como se alimentan de forma más adecuada las relaciones entre los pueblos.) [1-P297, EH Election Manifesto, 2001]

Aralar instead frames citizenship, and hence membership in the Basque society, as an overarching and hyphenated identity also representing migration-generated diversity:

An inclusive concept of citizenship which allows the full participation of immigrants in the political community but which simultaneously allows them to maintain their identities. (Un concepto de ciudadanía inclusiva, que permita la plena participación en la comunidad política de las personas inmigrantes, posibilitando al mismo tiempo el mantenimiento de sus identidades.) [1-P282, EA Election Manifesto, 2009]

The PNV similarly focuses on creating a Basque society based on openness, tolerance, democracy, solidarity, and cohesion:

EAJ-PNV has always been conscious of the plural character of the Basque society. [...] The open, tolerant, and integrative nationalism which characterizes EAJ-PNV aims for the future to support an economic, social, and cultural project for all citizens, whether they have nationalist sentiments or not, because this project does not have the slightest exclusive dimension. (EAJ-PNV siempre ha sido consciente del carácter plural de la sociedad vasca [...] Es nacionalismo abierto, tolerante e integrador que define y caracteriza a EAJ-PNV tiene porvenir y futuro, y un proyecto económico, social y cultural que ofrece a todos los ciudadanos, se sientan o no nacionalistas, porque este proyecto no tiene el más mínimo afán excluyente.) [1-P278, PNV Election Manifesto, 1998]

The PNV has maintained its discourse of presenting the Basque Country as open to everyone since the 1970s, and as such the expansion of its discourse from previously targeting immigrants from other Spanish regions to international immigrants follows a path-dependent logic. As shown above, SNRPs highlight the plurality, flexibility, and openness of the identity, where everybody is included, regardless of origin, culture, and language. Hence ‘Basqueness’ can also be perceived as a shared and overarching identity for everyone residing in the Basque Country.
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As I demonstrated in chapter six, the PNV also successfully adapted to the left-wing discourse of presenting immigration as an added value to the territory, promoting equality, and participation as major aspects of integration. However, as the discourse on immigration and in particular the discourse and policies on integration show, the policy field is used by the PNV (and also the other SNRPs) to construct the vision of an inclusive Basque Country in contrast to an exclusive Spanish state. Jeram similarly argues ‘that the Basque nationalist movement embraced multiculturalism to present a stark contrast between its priority of immigrant welfare and the security-oriented goals of the Spanish state. In other words, diversity became a new marker of national solidarity for Basque nationalists’ (2012a).

SNRPs hence continue to perceive the Spanish state as the most significant other, and neither internal nor international migrants replace it in this function. Conversi argued as early as 1997, prior to the significant influx of international immigration into the Basque Country, that ‘in Basque scholarship – as in politics – the main issue has been Euskadi’s [the Basque Country’s] confrontation with the Spanish state. Immigration is no more than a sub-category of that issue’ (188). The construction of the boundary of the Basque society did not change over the last 25 years, and the focus on civic criteria, such as the willingness to join the quest for autonomy or independence and the desire to maintain the Basque culture, including the language, has remained constant. International immigration has not ultimately changed the construction of the boundary of the society because the boundary had already been constructed as open and blurred before the recent arrival of international immigrants; however, the boundary is expanded so that international immigrants can gain access to the Basque identity.

2.2.2 Wales

This research shows that since 1990 the discourse on collective identity in Wales has shifted: first, from the protection of the Welsh language to highlighting the bilingual character of the territory, and secondly, from constructing the minority nation’s identity in opposition to the English identity to framing it as multicultural. This development is closely connected to the how the Welsh language is framed by Plaid Cymru (PC), and the Welsh language as an important marker of the collective identity has shifted from being an ethnic and exclusive marker to a civic and inclusive one.
Jones argues that “historically, Welsh identity has been discussed and posed in terms of opposition to ‘English’” (2014, 138); however, PC has gradually opened the Welsh identity and in particular the Welsh language which traditionally has been the most important marker of the identity to everyone living in Wales, including the English.

PC first referenced a bilingual Wales in its 1992 general election manifesto, and in its 1992 spelled out its aim to “change Wales from being a country with a national minority language to being a truly bilingual nation” (5-P199, PC Election manifesto, 1999). These changes were reflected in practice, while although Welsh was first elevated to the status of the second official language of the territory in 1976, the Welsh Language Act of 1993 took things further, introducing a Welsh Language Board, language services on the public radio, and Welsh immersion schools further strengthened its position.

Furthermore, when PC entered government as a coalition partner with Labour (2007 – 2011), it introduced the protection and promotion of the Welsh language into the government program Iaith Pawb:

Our aspiration is a truly bilingual Wales, by which we mean a country where people can choose to live their lives through the medium of either or both Welsh or English and where the presence of the two languages is a source of pride and strength to us all [Welsh Assembly Government, 2003, p. 1]

A number of measures were thus introduced in order to lead to a more bilingual Wales by further strengthening the Welsh language among those not born into Welsh-speaking families.

Figure 20 shows that a multicultural Wales is the third most commonly used frame in PC’s discourse characterizing what it means to be Welsh. Thus, since 2011 PC has aimed at including not only the English but also international migrants and ethnic minorities as an integral part of the Welsh nation. Hence, there is a shift from presenting the English internal migrants as the most significant other towards including them into an overarching bilingual Welsh identity, on the one hand, and from perceiving migrants as a threat to framing them as an added value to the Welsh territory, on the other.
However, opening the Welsh identity and presenting it as modern, inclusive, and based on civic values such as residence (no temporal restrictions) and learning the language (no specific required proficiency level) is also connected to PC’s aim to strengthen the position of Wales not as a minority nation within the UK but as a ‘country’ and ‘nation’ within Europe:

Our vision of a bilingual and multicultural Wales is also based on seeing Wales become an equal partner in the community of European nations – a Wales that through becoming an actor on the international stage will create new opportunities – politically, socially and economically. [5-P6, PC Election Manifesto, 2011]

As argued in chapter five, PC is following the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) example of using immigration and integration as a policy field for nation building. However, the expansion of the boundary of the Welsh identity and the multicultural inclusion of everyone residing in the territory raised criticism from within the PC. Accusations of diluting the Welsh identity by not exclusively focusing on the Welsh language, but on a bilingual Wales, led to the formation of the pressure group Cymuned (Elias 2009, 125).  

48 Cymuned was founded in 2001 and campaigns in the name of Welsh local, and in particular rural, communities for a better protection of the Welsh language and the communities against demographic change, against the use of English instead of Welsh in private services offered (e.g., the train company Arriva Trains
has constantly discussed the significant impact both international and internal migration have on the development of Wales. Irrespective of internal criticism and the formation of pressure groups such as Cymuned, the PC shifted between presenting immigration as having a negative impact on the Welsh identity towards presenting immigration as an added value and a tool to further develop the territory and to strengthen the particularity of Wales through what is defined by PC as the ‘Welsh uniqueness’.

Although the uniqueness is not further defined by PC itself, its position in the discourse on a bilingual and multicultural territory supports the interpretation that Welsh uniqueness could be the development of an overarching and shared Welsh identity which includes elements from other cultures and languages (also including the English culture and language) but is glued together by the Welsh language and the will to promote and further strengthen the position of Wales as a distinct nation within the UK and Europe.

In sum, the analysis of Wales shows that PC’s shifting position towards immigration is also reflected in its reconstruction of the Welsh identity as open, progressive, and inclusive towards migration-generated diversity. The inclusive framing is also extended to the English if they join the quest for further devolution and protection of the Welsh uniqueness. Similar to the developments in Scotland, PC uses the discourse on immigration to construct a counter-narrative to Westminster, and hence to underline the particularity of the Welsh identity and territory within the United Kingdom, and to strengthen the claims for further devolution.

### 2.2.3 Scotland

The reframing of the political community as multicultural and inclusive occurred in Scotland much earlier than in Wales. The minority nation is a paradigmatic example of how the boundary of the collective identity has been reconstructed to include migration-generated diversity into what is defined as ‘Scottish’. The framing of the Scottish identity as open, inclusive, and based on various forms of diversity has a long tradition in Scotland, and hence, over the period studied for this thesis, there is no change to the inclusive framing of identity. Nevertheless, through devolution and in particular the SNP’s entrance into government, the

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Wales), and against urban planning which allows English citizens to purchase vacation homes along the Welsh coastline and in the rural areas.
party further strengthened the construction of the multicultural, inclusive, and progressive framing of Scotland as a counter-narrative to what is portrayed as a backward-looking and exclusionary approach to immigration by Westminster.

Most scholars consider the current Scottish national movement and thus also the Scottish collective identity to be based on civic markers (Hearn 2000: 59-66; Keating 1996: 694; Nairn 2000; Hepburn 2009). The SNP also describes itself as “civic nationalist” (Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 2012, 109). The prevalence of civic markers is confirmed by Figure 21, which shows the main frames used by the SNP in the discourse to refer to the Scottish collective identity.

*Figure 21 – Overview on the main frames used by the SNP in Scotland to refer to the collective identity*

Data: All entries in the hermeneutic unit ‘Scotland’, grouped in the document family ‘Parties/SNP’ (total number of documents used in this graph: 6), and code family ‘identity’ (unit of analysis: paragraphs/sentences); y-axis: percentage of codes in relation to total codes on identity (total number of codes in this graph: 48); see document list and code list in Annex 4.

The main markers adopted by the SNP for the Scottish collective identity are its multicultural, open, inclusive, and modern characteristics and values:

Scotland is a multi-cultural and multi-faith country and I am very pleased to celebrate those traditions here tonight. [4-P67, SNP Press Release, 29.10.2006, Alex Salmond, SNP]
Furthermore, the multicultural framing is based on references to the Scottish history of immigration, on the one hand, and emigration, on the other. The SNP uses these historical references to strengthen the justifications for its welcoming approach towards newcomers:

We should not forget that, in the course of our country’s history, although long ago, we have also suffered repression and forced emigration to other shores. We, from this country, were indeed asylum seekers. [4-P59, Debate in the Scottish Parliament, 31.10.2001, Linda Fabiani, SNP]

Scotland is not only a nation of immigrants but also a nation of emigrants. Wherever we went in the world we were almost uniformly treated with dignity, compassion and respect. As a nation we should extend those same values to all who make Scotland their home. [4-P62, SNP Press Release, 22.02.2010, Kenny MacAskill, SNP]

Many of us are descended from people who came to Scotland fleeing famine or persecution – or just hoping to build a better future for their families. They helped to shape our nation and make us the people we are. [4-P2, SNP Election Manifesto, 2003]

The Scottish identity, as constructed by the SNP, has undergone what Winter calls a “multicultural transformation” (2011, 4). She argues that in Canada multiculturalism has changed from being a policy towards minorities to becoming the basic feature of a shared identity. The same can be said for the SNP’s vision of Scotland. Aside from multiculturalism, Scottishness has been constructed not as a singular and exclusive identity based on certain defined markers but as an overarching and shared identity, accommodating a plurality of complementing identities:

We have a wide range of identities in modern Scotland – Scottish, British, English, Irish, Pakistani, Chinese, Polish, French and many more besides – and this diversity all contributes positively to modern Scottish society. [P62, 10.12.2013, SNP Press release]

This concept of an overarching Scottish identity is also reflected in the governmental program of ‘One Scotland. Many Cultures’. Newcomers and ethnic minorities are portrayed as one constituent part of a multicultural Scotland and are thus neither expected to assimilate into a particular construction of a collective identity nor discard their particular cultural, linguistic, and/or religious identities. Instead, both the SNP as well as the Scottish Government celebrate the diversity of migration-generated cultures, religions, and languages. In the SNP’s discourse, newcomers gain access to Scottishness through residence (with no temporal restrictions) and the willingness to contribute to the territory and society with its particular history, traditions, and quest for further devolution or independence. Ahmad also made one of the most widely quoted statements when referring to SNP’s civic concept of the Scottish national identity (first quotation below):
It isn’t important where you come from, what matters is where we are going together as a nation [P, SNP Conference 1995, Bashir Ahmad]

Who shall be citizens? – All people resident in Scotland and all those who were born in Scotland [P MacCormick, SNP, 1999]

Scotland has a long tradition of welcoming those who choose to live here. [P2, SNP Manifesto 2003]

This analysis shows that in Scotland the collective identity is framed as open towards newcomers based on the recognition of their cultural, linguistic, and religious particularity and as an overarching and shared identity. As spelled out at the beginning of this section, however, this positive framing did not change during the period observed in this research.

However, as chapters five and six demonstrated, the framing of immigration as having a positive impact on the Scottish identity is closely connected to the salient discourse on independence in Scotland. Hussain and Miller (2006) argue that in Scotland multiculturalism and sub-state nationalism have interacted positively and merged into a particular form of “multicultural nationalism”.

The SNP has been successful in using the discourse on immigration and integration to differentiate Scotland from England and in particular from the Westminster Government. In doing so the party has strengthened the stark contrast between a multicultural and progressive Scotland and what is framed as right-wing and racist UK policies. Moreover, the framing of the SNP’s approach to immigration as a counter-narrative to the policies of Westminster is used to strengthen the claims for further devolution and independence:

The appalling provisions included in the immigration bill clearly impacts our devolved services and the UK Government are arrogantly imposing their UKIP inspired agenda on our devolved responsibilities. Scotland wants nothing to do with the race to the bottom on who can be hardest on immigrants and they should stay right out of our devolved responsibilities. [4-P64, SNP Press Release, 30.01.2014]

We need a Scotland specific approach to this crucial issue and if Westminster won’t deliver then it should pass this key responsibility to the Scottish Parliament. [P64, SNP Press Release, 28.06.2010]

Hence, not newcomers and migration-generated diversity, but rather the government at Westminster has become over the years the most significant other for the Scottish identity as constructed by the SNP.
3. Comparative Conclusions

This chapter has shown that minority nation’s identity is indeed influenced by immigration but does not necessarily change due to immigration. Instead, immigration and migration-generated diversity become part of the already existing discourse on identity.

The ‘Scottish tartan with many different strands’ (4-P62, SNP Presse Release, Alex Salmond, 15.12.2007) is a good example of the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) framing of the Scottish identity as overarching and recognizing multiple elements of migration-generated diversity as hyphenated identities. In the other selected cases, SNRPs do not refer in their discourse to hyphenated identities. SNRPs in South Tyrol frame the collective identity as overarching and recognize migration-generated diversity the least. There is disagreement between the parties on whether the collective identity refers to an overarching identity for both German- and Italian-speaking groups, or whether it refers to the German speakers only. In contrast, in the discourse of the Basque SNRPs, and more recently also in the discourse of Plaid Cymru (PC) in Wales and SNRPs in Corsica, being Basque, Welsh, or Corscian can equally include speakers of the national minority language and the state language but requires recognition and support for the distinctive territory with its history, culture, and in particular its quest for further devolution and eventual independence. Hence, I argue that in the Basque Country, Wales, Corsica, and Scotland a territorial framing of collective identity has developed, while most parties in South Tyrol still adopt an ethnic framing.

The markers of the identity boundary effectively changed only in Scotland and, partially, in Wales towards a multicultural inclusion of migration-generated diversity. In the Basque Country, tolerance and the acceptance of diversity are instead used as new markers of the collective identity, but individual migration-generated diversity is not recognized within the framing of the Basque collective identity. Hence, although the Basque identity is constructed as a shared identity for everyone who resides in the territory and is willing to join the quest for the protection and promotion of the Basque culture and tradition, this shared identity does not recognize elements of individual migration-generated identities.

In Wales and in particular in Scotland instead, the cultures, languages, and religions stemming from migration are recognized and celebrated in addition to the collective identity.
which is framed as overarching and bridging individual particularities. However, for the studied period, such a change in the markers of the collective identity can only be seen in Wales; in Scotland the framing of the collective identity changed prior to 1990. In the Basque Country a change from framing the collective identity based on ethnic markers such as race, religion, and language to one based on civic markers such as support of the nationalist cause and residence also occurred prior to 1990.

In South Tyrol and Corsica the markers of the boundary and the collective identity as constructed by most of the SNRPs do not change either. But in contrast to the Basque Country, Wales, and Scotland, migration-generated diversity is neither recognized as an added value nor integrated as a new marker of the collective identity. Instead, in these minority nations, SNRPs propose the assimilation of diversity into the existing collective identity. As I argued above, however, the FeC coalition and to a lesser degree the SVP present an exception to this assimilative discourse.

Table 17 provides a comparative overview on the prevailing markers of the collective identity as proposed by SNRPs in their discourse. The table also summarizes whether the collective identity is framed by the respective SNRPs as overriding or overarching other migration-generated cultural, linguistic, and religious identities.
### Table 17 – Comparative overview of the discourse on the collective identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>National minority language</th>
<th>Prevailing ethnic markers</th>
<th>Prevailing civic markers</th>
<th>Identity in relation to migration-generated diversity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basque Country</td>
<td>Facilitates inclusion but is not a requirement</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>‘Basque inclusive citizenship’: residence (no temporal limit); willingness to learn the Basque language; diversity</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corsica</td>
<td>Facilitates inclusion but is not a requirement</td>
<td>From ‘community of destiny’: birth or ancestry</td>
<td>To ‘Corsican citizenship’: residence (10 years) and willingness to learn the Corsican language</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Tyrol</td>
<td>Marker of identity and hence tool for assimilation</td>
<td>Sf/dF: birth and ancestry; focus on German and Ladin language group SVP: two parallel discourses, one focusing on ethnic elements and particular language, and the other on civic and territorial markers</td>
<td>SVP: two parallel discourses, one focusing on ethnic elements and particular language, and the other on civic and territorial markers</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Residence (no temporal limit) and willingness to be ‘Scottish’, multiculturalism, and openness</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>Definition of Welsh language changes from exclusively an identity marker to tool for inclusion</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The markers of the minority nation’s identity are in most cases, other than South Tyrol, residence and a willingness to join the promotion of the interests of SNRPs: usually the struggle for further recognition, devolution, and eventual secession. Although the national minority language constitutes an important marker of identity in all minority nations but Scotland, it is framed not as an ethnic and exclusive marker of identity, but rather as open and flexible and thus as a tool for inclusion and integration.

As in chapters five and six, in this chapter I came to the same results for Scotland and the Basque Country, and partially also for Wales and Corsica. SNRPs construct the minority nation’s identity, on the one hand, as plural and changing, and, on the other, as open, inclusive, progressive, and modern in order to differentiate their approach from that of the central state. However, only in Scotland, and somewhat in Wales, is migration-generated diversity framed by the SNP and PC as a constituent part of the minority nation’s identity. In the Basque Country it is not the particular migration-related culture, language, or religion, but rather the abstract recognition of diversity and tolerance towards others that becomes an integral part of the collective identity and is used as a marker of identity. Thus I show in this chapter, and especially related to Scotland, Wales, and the Basque Country, that the SNRP’s decision to embrace multiculturalism is a way to establish a distinction between the minority nation’s identity and the state’s national identity, and the boundary vis-a-vis the majority identity incorporates diversity and multiculturalism as a new element.

The empirical findings in the last three chapters illustrate the complexity of changes, contractions, or expansions of the boundary of the minority identities. Although, this research primarily engages only with the perspective of SNRPs and, hence, with a particular segment of the regional elite, the empirical findings suggest a close interrelation between immigration, integration, and the construction of the minority nation’s identity. The next chapter puts the results of chapters five, six, and seven in relation to the explanatory variables discussed in chapter two and in particular the ones central to this doctoral research, namely the societal and political-institutional relations between the minority nation and the state or the state population.
CHAPTER 8. WHAT DRIVES THE MINORITY NATIONS’ APPROACH TO IMMIGRATION – INTEGRATION AND IDENTITY? EXPLAINING SOURCES OF VARIATION BETWEEN THE SELECTED CASES

1. Introduction

This thesis explores the relation between immigration, migration-generated diversity, and the construction of minority nation’s identity from the perspective of stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs). In chapter two I defined the research question as first enquiring whether ‘international immigration into minority nations impact the political elite’s framing of the minority nation’s identity’. Second, this thesis does not only propose an evaluation of whether immigration leads to an alteration in the framing of the minority nation’s identity; rather, I aim to find the drivers for certain outcomes and to map patterns of factors that explain the differences between the selected cases. In chapter two I suggested an alternative explanation for what drives or hinders change in the SNRPs’ framing of the minority nation’s identity based on the political-institutional relations and the power-distribution between the minority nation and the state and the societal boundaries within the minority nations.

To answer the central research questions, I provide a detailed analysis of the discourses on immigration, integration, and minority nation’s identity, as well as on the policies on integration in the empirical part of the thesis (chapters five, six and seven). The empirical analysis shows that in each of the selected minority nations, the discourse on immigration and integration is closely connected to the construction of the minority nation’s identity. However, the analysis also shows that there are substantial differences between the selected minority nations and the various SNRPs.

First, the approach to immigration and integration differs between the selected minority nations. SNRPs in South Tyrol and in Corsica perceive immigration as threat to the minority nation’s identity and the social welfare system, whereas SNRPs in Wales, the Basque
Country, and Scotland frame immigration as a benefit to the territory and as a means to facilitate modernization. Secondly, the framing of integration varies from defining it as assimilation into pre-existing boundaries in South Tyrol and Corsica to recognizing and partially including it as a new marker of the minority nation’s identity in the Basque Country, Wales, and Scotland. Based on the discourse on immigration and integration, SNRPs do not change their framing of the minority nation’s identity once confronted with immigration in South Tyrol, and only do so somewhat in Corsica.

This chapter seeks to answer the last part of the research question, namely what drives a particular approach to immigration and integration, and what leads to or hinders change in the construction of the minority nation’s identity in the selected minority nations. Table 12 in chapter four summarized my expectations in the SNRPs’ framing of the minority nation’s identity, based on the main hypothesis that the political-institutional relationship and the power-distribution between the state and the sub-state territory as well as the societal cleavages within the minority nations significantly impact SNRPs’ perspectives towards immigration, integration, and identity.

Based on the consistently high level of legislative competences at their disposal over the period studied and on the factual broad and robust autonomy enjoyed by both the Basque Country and South Tyrol, I expected to find the inclusion of migration-generated diversity in the SNRPs’ framing of the minority nation’s identity in those two cases. In Corsica instead, based on the consistent fragile factual legislative framework and the limited and only administrative autonomy, I expected Corsican SNRPs to exclude migration-generated identity from the framing of the Corsican minority nation’s identity. In Wales and Scotland, the legislative framework changed substantially over the period observed towards greater devolution and an expansion of the devolved legislative competences. But in particular, in Scotland claims for secession gradually increased as well and culminated in the independence referendum in 2014. Due to the factual expansion of the legislative competences and thus the increase in the robustness of the political-institutional relations, I expected in these two cases
a gradual inclusion of migration-generated identity in the construction of the minority nation’s identity by the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru (PC).  

Expectations regarding the inclusion or exclusion of migration-generated diversity in the framing of the minority nation’s identity based on societal relations also diverge between the selected minority nations. Scotland and the Basque Country are the cases with the lowest divisions based on ethno-cultural factors; thus, I expected an inclusion of migration-generated diversity as a new marker of the minority nation’s identity. In Wales and Corsica there is an underlying cleavage between those who speak the national minority language, support the nationalist claims and define themselves as autochthonous Welsh/Corsican, whereas in South Tyrol the division between minority and state majority population is institutionalized. Therefore, South Tyrol has been characterized for the aim of this research as the case with the strongest cleavage, and as such, I expected to find the exclusion of migration-generated diversity from the (re)construction the minority nation’s identity.

The previous empirical chapters show, however, that not all expectations related to the two main hypotheses, namely the power-distribution between the minority region and the state, and the societal boundary within the minority nation proved correct. Although I found the distribution of powers and strength of the autonomy framework to play an important role, pre-existing cleavages, such as the one between German and Italian speakers in South Tyrol or between previous immigrants from France and the autochthonous Corsicans, considerably determine the SNRPs’ framing of the minority nation’s identity in exclusive terms. Hence, I argue in this chapter that the power-distribution hypothesis finds less support than the societal cleavage hypothesis.

After evaluating the performance of the two specific hypotheses, I relate the findings on the framing of the minority nation’s identity to the main political-institutional, socio-economic, and cultural-ideological factors which have been proposed as determining the relations between immigration and SNRPs, as chapter two outlines (see table 1 in chapter two).

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49 As the selected research timeframe ends in 2012, the period between 2013 and 2014 when secession was under discussion in Scotland falls outside the scope of this thesis.
In order to better comprehend the results of the research thus far, the present chapter methodologically relies on process tracing. Collier defines this analytical tool as “a systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in light of the research questions and hypothesis posed by the investigator” (2011, 823). In the specific framework of this dissertation, process tracing involves identifying the interplay between the development of the discourse and policies on immigration, integration, and identity and the evolution of the particular socio-economic, political-institutional, and cultural-ideological context in each region as well as the power-distribution between the minority regions and the respective states and the societal boundaries within a minority nation.

2. Variation due to the relations between the minority nation and the state

In the next sections I evaluate how relations between the selected minority nations and their respective states impact the changing discourse on immigration, integration, and the minority nation’s identity construction.

2.1 Political-institutional relations and the power-distribution

Table 18 summarizes the main expectations in relation to the distribution of power between the minority nations and the state as well as the main outcomes of the empirical analysis in the previous chapters. The findings in chapters five, six, and seven show no consistent correlation between robust and conflict-free political-institutional relations between the minority nation and state and a positive and welcoming approach to immigration and a reframing of the minority nation’s identity to include migration-generated diversity.

This is mostly evident in a comparison of South Tyrol, the Basque Country, and Corsica. Based on the distribution of powers, I had expected in the first two minority nations to find a reframing of the minority towards greater openness and the accommodation of migration-generated diversity, and in Corsica instead, based on the limited autonomy, an exclusion of migration-generated diversity. Instead, I find opposing outcomes in South Tyrol and the Basque Country and a similar outcome of framing integration as assimilation and the minority nation’s identity as not including migration-generated diversity in South Tyrol and Corsica.
### Table 18 – Overview of the main expectations in relation to the power distribution and the empirical findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power distribution</th>
<th>Expectations in relation to SNRPs’ framing of minority nation’s identity</th>
<th>Empirical findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basque Country</strong></td>
<td>High level of legislative competences/claims for more devolution</td>
<td>Inclusion of migration-generated diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Enrichment and way to modernize the territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corsica</strong></td>
<td>Low level of legislative competences/substantial claims for further devolution and high degree of dissatisfaction</td>
<td>Exclusion of migration-generated diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Tyrol</strong></td>
<td>High level of legislative competences/few claims for more devolution</td>
<td>Inclusion of migration-generated diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scotland</strong></td>
<td>Increasing to high level of legislative competences/increasing claims for more devolution</td>
<td>Inclusion of migration-generated diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wales</strong></td>
<td>Increasing level to substantial legislative competences/limited to increasing claims for more devolution</td>
<td>Gradually increasing inclusion of migration-generated diversity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
South Tyrol has been classified as a case with strong and robust autonomy, strong protections for the German and Ladin minorities, and strong capacities to develop its own approach to integration over the period studied. Moreover, the ruling SVP, has – over the last 25 years – not expressed any demands for independence and has maintained cooperative relations with subsequent national Italian governments. Political-institutional relations between South Tyrol and the Italian state did not change substantially within the selected time frame, but following reforms of the legislation on immigration and integration, and in particular of the Constitution in 2001, South Tyrol became solely responsible for social and integration policy. Despite this promising framework, SNRPs refer to immigration and integration in negative terms, demand assimilation from migrants, and do not reconstruct the minority nation’s identity to also include migration-generated markers. As opposed to my expectations, the SVP does not frame immigration positively as an added value to the territory, but instead as a challenge and a threat. In relation to integration, the SVP has developed an assimilationist position. With regards to the framing of the minority nation’s identity and what it means to be South Tyrolean, the SVP has developed two parallel discourses: one which has shifted from an ethnic definition highlighting the German and Ladin languages to a territorial definition which further includes the Italian-speaking population, and focuses on the autonomy and the development of the territory. However, this discourse does not incorporate migration-generated diversity and newcomers with other cultures and languages. The second parallel discourse is still based on defining the identity in ethnic terms, focusing on the German and Ladin language and cultures and the position of the German and Ladin speakers within the Italian state. The other South Tyrolean SNRPs have adopted an even more hostile position towards immigration and similarly demand assimilation from newcomers as part of their construction of the territory and society. Also, while SF and dF recognize that Italian speakers have become a part of contemporary South Tyrol, they nevertheless emphasize an ethno-linguistic identity based on the German and Ladin languages.

Hence, through the analysis of South Tyrol I do not find enough evidence to support the hypothesis that a strong autonomy leads towards more openness in relation to migration-generated diversity. The analysis of the Corsican case does not support this hypothesis either. Based on Kymlicka’s (2001a) power argument, the fragile autonomy in Corsica should have led to the exclusion of migration-generated diversity and a focus on ethnic criteria to define
the minority nation’s identity. Instead, in Corsica I observe demands to assimilate migrants and migration-generated diversity into the proposed minority nation’s identity, and contrary to all expectations, Corsican SNRPs have developed a slightly more open approach to migrants. Since 2010 the Corsican SNRPs have begun to frame the collective identity in more civic terms than their counterparts in South Tyrol, although based on the robust political-institutional relations between South Tyrol and the Italian state we would have expected more openness and a civic framing of the identity there.

Formally, the relations between Corsica and the French state did not change substantially over the period selected, as neither the Joxe nor the Matignon reform process substantially increased the level of autonomy of the island. Nevertheless, the Matignon process at the beginning of the 2000s was followed by increased violence by the FLNC, which caused the French state to distrust the nationalist parties. However, these developments did not change the parties’ positions on immigration, integration, or the framing of the Corsican identity based on Corsican ancestry, birth, and support for the language and the nationalist goals. Corsican SNRPs consistently differentiate between internal immigration, framed as a threat to the Corsican culture and language and a problem for the housing market, and international immigration, presented in more neutral terms. Since 2010, however, there has been a slight change in the framing of the minority nation’s identity in Corsica, which is mostly visible in the proposal of a symbolic Corsican citizenship based on language, residency, and support for Corsican autonomy which is open both to internal and international immigrants. This more open framing of the Corsican identity is particularly promoted by the coalition Femu a Corsica (FeC), the coalition which experienced the most significant gains in the 2010 regional elections. FeC groups the moderate and autonomist parties together, in contrast to the secessionist and hard-line Corsica Nazione (CN).

Hence, in Corsica, the reframing of the minority nation’s identity is not impacted by a change towards a stronger constitutional status (and thus an increase in legislative powers) and an improvement of the relations with the French state, but rather by shifts in party competition, as seen in the rise of a more moderate and co-operative SNRP (FeC) and the decline of the more hard-line SNRP (CN) which was hostile to the central state. The diverging strategic positioning and aims of the FeC, in contrast to CN which also won electoral support, have
had a greater impact on the framing of the minority nation’s identity than have the fragile autonomy and the conflict-prone power distribution between the island and the French region.

The strategic positioning of the SNRPs is also important in the Basque Country. Similarly to South Tyrol, the Basque Country has been presented throughout this thesis as a case of a minority nation with strong autonomy. Similar to South Tyrol, the discourse on immigration and integration and therefore also the connection of these discourses with the reconstruction of the Basque identity only began in the mid-2000s, in response to an increase in the immigrant population, on the one hand, and the federalization of integration policy, on the other. However, due to the Spanish state’s rejection of proposals for further devolution (Ibarretxe Plan, 2005) and the political salience of decentralization, the relations between the Basque SNRPs and the Spanish state are much more strained than in South Tyrol.

As in South Tyrol, changes in the legislative framework did not impact the parties’ positions on immigration, which remained stable throughout the period analysed. However, in stark contrast to South Tyrol, all of the Basque SNRPs concur in their position on immigration as economically valuable, as an enrichment, and as a means to modernize the region. The SNRPs’ positions on integration are also not characterized by assimilation, but rather by demands for equality and the protection of newcomers’ human rights. In addition, the parties emphasize residence and support for the regional Basque language, culture, and claims for autonomy as the most important elements in their definition of the identity of the Basque Country. However, Basque SNRPs highlight the differences between their positions on immigration and integration and those of the Spanish government, in particular during the period the PP governed Spain (1996-2004). During that period in particular, the SNRPs constructed a Basque identity characterized by openness and tolerance against the backdrop of the security-oriented discourse of the Spanish Government with the aim to underline the particularity of the Basque Country within the Spanish state, and hence to further justify their claims for more autonomy. In other words, Basque SNRPs instrumentalize the discourse on immigration and integration to strengthen their own nation-building projects by also attracting migrants and newcomers to their interests and aims.
The evaluation of South Tyrol, the Basque Country, and Corsica shows first of all that the political-institutional relations, the degree of autonomy, and the satisfaction of the SNRPs with the responsiveness of the central state to their demands for devolution do not directly impact the parties’ positions on immigration and integration, nor their reconstructions of the collective identity. Secondly, I only find a change in the framing of the minority nation’s identity in Corsica. The change towards a more open definition of the minority nation’s identity and the inclusion of civic markers, such as residence, is due to the changes in party competition and the rise of a moderate and autonomist left-wing coalition which replaced the left-wing, yet secessionist, hard-line CN. In contrast, in South Tyrol the framing of the minority nation’s identity as constantly based on ethnic markers, excluding migration-generated diversity, did not change over the last twenty years. In the Basque case, the framing of the minority nation’s identity also remained consistently based on markers of residence and support for the nationalist claims over the last 20 years, and the change from an ethnic to a post-ethnic framing occurred much earlier, in the 1970s, as discussed in chapter seven.

In Scotland, the main change in the boundaries of the construction of the minority nation’s identity; occurred prior to the period selected, but the tendency to frame the Scottish identity as based on residence and other civic markers became more pronounced. Furthermore, Scotland and the Basque Country vary in relation to two aspects: first, the SNP’s framing of Scottishness recognizes and even celebrates migration-generated diversity and multicultural markers as integral parts of the collective identity, whereas Basque SNRPs highlight the value of diversity and tolerance as markers of the identity, but not the migration-generated cultures, languages, and religions. Secondly, as explained above, there was no change in the legislative framework and the power distribution between Spain and the Basque Country, whereas in Scotland a substantial change occurred in these areas.

Devolution has significantly impacted the SNRPs’ behaviour in Scotland, and even more so in Wales. The SNP has presented immigration as an added value to the territory for decades and has framed the Scottish identity as multicultural and inclusive towards the new languages, culture, and religions brought to Scotland by migrants. This positive and inclusive framing of immigration was not affected by the changes of the constitutional status of the territory in 1998. However, when entering into government in 2007, then SNP further
emphasized its anti-Westminster elements in all policy fields, including in relation to immigration. The SNP thus uses immigration and the particular construction of a multicultural Scottish identity to highlight the distinction between Scotland and England and to reinforce their claims to independence.

Similar dynamics are also found in Wales. As seen in chapter five, in Wales there is a clear link between advancing devolution and the gradual expansion of the Welsh identity to include migration-generated diversity, as well as a shift from a negative framing of immigration to a positive one. Although the Welsh Language Act 1993 had significantly strengthened the position of the Welsh language, the perception of immigration as a threat to the Welsh language and culture, as well as the differentiation between internal and international immigration, was still present in the discourse of PC until devolution began in 1998. In particular, there was an anti-English element in PC’s discourse on immigration.

Since devolution began in Wales, there has instead been a gradual increase in PC’s framing of immigration as an opportunity. Moreover, since 2007 both the Welsh Government and PC, while in government and while forming the opposition, have focused on the need for migrants to fill gaps in the labour market. Simultaneously, PC also developed a discourse of promoting the Welsh identity and language by opening it and by attracting migrants to acquire Welsh language skills. Parallel to the beginning of the devolution process, since 1998 PC has emphasised the UK Government’s mismanagement of particular aspects of immigration and asylum policy and related this criticism to demands for further devolution. Hence, similar to the SNP in Scotland, and also the SNRPs in the Basque Country, PC positions itself in contrast to the UK Government’s approach, aiming to create a counter-narrative to the state’s discourse and thus to underline the particularity of the region. PC is thus another example of SNRPs adopting an instrumental form of nationalism.

In sum, I do not find consistent evidence in support for the hypothesis that a robust framework of legislative powers leads to an opening of minority nation’s identity and the inclusion of migration-generated markers into the definition throughout the cases studied. Only the behaviour of PC in Wales supports this hypothesis, whereas in Scotland the SNP’s framing of the collective identity as open and multicultural did not change, despite dramatically increased powers for the devolved Scottish Parliament during the period selected. And, as
shown above, a consistently robust legislative framework in South Tyrol and the Basque Country has produced opposing results in the two regions. Moreover, the counter-hypothesis that a fragile power-setting leads to the exclusion of newcomers from the framing of the minority nation’s identity is not substantiated in Corsica either, as SNRPs have begun to demand the assimilation of newcomers into a collective identity which has been reframed as open and based on civic markers.

2.2 Societal relations and boundaries

Based on the empirical analysis of the previous chapters, I find support instead for the second hypothesis proposed in this research, namely that there is a relation between a high degree of societal divisions and an exclusive framing of the minority nation’s identity. As Table 19 shows, in Scotland, South Tyrol, and partially in Corsica and Wales the empirical results meet the expectations expressed in chapter four. Hence, there is more empirical evidence to support the societal cleavage hypothesis than the power-distribution hypothesis.
Table 19 – Overview of the main expectations in relation to the societal cleavage and on the empirical findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Societal relations</th>
<th>Expectations in relation to SNRPs framing of minority nation’s identity</th>
<th>Empirical findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basque Country</strong></td>
<td>Weak cleavage</td>
<td>Inclusion of migration-generated diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corsica</strong></td>
<td>Substantial cleavage</td>
<td>Exclusion of migration-generated diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Tyrol</strong></td>
<td>Substantial and institutionalized cleavage</td>
<td>Exclusion of migration-generated diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scotland</strong></td>
<td>No cleavage</td>
<td>Inclusion of migration-generated diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wales</strong></td>
<td>Decreasing cleavage</td>
<td>Difficulties in inclusion of migration-generated diversity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Scotland has been presented as the ethno-linguistically and culturally most cohesive case, although anti-English sentiments are reported by Hussain and Miller (2006) among SNP activists, but not for the political elite. As chapter seven shows, the SNP has been successful in constructing an overarching open and multicultural Scottish identity based on residence and the willingness to feel Scottish, including, and even celebrating, migration-generated languages, cultures, and religions as integral parts of contemporary Scottish identity. Thus, the analysis of the Scottish case empirically supports the initially developed hypothesis of a cohesive society free from ethnically based cleavages facilitating the framing of the identity as multicultural, based on civic markers, and including migration-generated diversity.

Aside from in Scotland, in each of the other selected minority nations there is an additional internal cleavage between the minority population and the state majority based predominantly, but not only, on linguistic differences. Therefore, depending on the degree of division, I would expect SNRPs in each case other than Scotland to frame the collective identity by partially excluding migration-generated diversity, or by having difficulty in including said diversity. The empirical analysis supports this expectation, but as will be explained below, the variation in the degree and nature of division also leads to a variation in the framing of the collective identity.

I classified South Tyrol as the case with the strongest cleavage between its minority population and state majority. Although the cleavage decreased over the period studied at the societal level, it remained stable at the structural political-institutional level, and the strong boundary between the groups is institutionalized through the consociational power-sharing mechanisms enshrined in the autonomy statute. I thus expected the exclusion of migration-generated diversity from the framing of the minority nation’s identity. As I showed in chapters five and six, the internal cleavage forms part of the discourse on immigration and integration, as the SNRPs consistently frame immigration as a threat to the language and culture of the German speakers and express concerns about demographic weakening if newcomers integrate into the other (Italian-speaking) group. When expressing their preferences for integration, South Tyrolean SNRPs first of all differentiate between the integration of migrants into the German or the Italian language groups. Secondly, when framing the conditions for integration, the parties demand assimilation into the German-
speaking group to prevent the strengthening of their Italian-speaking counterpart. The SVP has also begun to develop, alongside its framing of the South Tyrolean identity as based on the German and Ladin languages and cultures and their status as minorities, a parallel discourse on integration into an overarching South Tyrolean identity, based on bilingualism. Hence, the party frames integration policies as migrants having the choice of which language to learn first, but nevertheless highlights the importance of the German language in the discourse. The SVP does not propose the exclusion of migration-generated diversity but rather its assimilation into a collective identity which is constructed as bilingual, overarches the autochthonous groups, and is based on the territorial particularity.

I show the same trend in chapter seven when evaluating the reconstruction of the minority nation’s identity. Every SNRP in South Tyrol, again with the partial exception of the SVP, promotes sectarian identities based on ethno-linguistic criteria rather than an overarching identity based on territorial criteria. The cleavage between the groups thus hinders, on the one hand, the development of a discourse on immigration and integration detached from the historical boundaries. On the other hand, the SNRPs use immigration and the discourse on integration to further strengthen the boundary between the traditional groups, which consequently also prevents a re-evaluation and construction of a collective identity which could initially embrace the German and Italian speakers and subsequently also newcomers with diverse cultures, languages, and religions. Thus, the evaluation of the framing of the minority nation’s identity in relation to the societal cleavage in South Tyrol supports the second hypothesis addressed in this thesis. The strong and institutionalized societal cleavage, which is also reproduced within the party system, prevents SNRPs from, first of all, framing the minority nation’s identity as overarching the autochthonous language groups, and secondly, from also including migration-generated diversity into the framing of the collective identity.

The discourse on immigration in Corsica follows a similar logic yet has a different outcome than South Tyrol. The cleavage between French and Corsicans on the island is not overcome in the parties’ discourse on immigration and integration, but the parties highly differentiate between the ‘unwanted’ internal migrants from France and the ‘tolerated’, yet not explicitly ‘wanted’, international ones. However, unlike South Tyrolean SNRPs, Corsican SNRPs and
in particular FeC propose a symbolic Corsican citizenship which is open to everyone due to its foundation in residence and the willingness to support the Corsican cause, and thus the quest for autonomy and the protection and promotion of the particular language. Therefore, the cleavage is not, as in South Tyrol, further highlighted, but rather FeC tries to overcome it with the symbolic Corsican citizenship, which is shared by the autochthonous population and both internal and international migrants once they have lived on the island for 10 years. Similar to the South Tyrolean SVP, FeC includes both the minority and state majority languages and cultures in the framing of the collective Corsican identity. And although FeC also aims to strengthen the Corsican language and refers to it as important tool for the integration of migrants, the party points to the French language as equally important for the construction of a bilingual Corsican society.

The symbolic Corsican citizenship, which includes all residents and is based on the two languages, can thus facilitate the construction of a shared identity overarching historical cleavages. However, similar to the overarching South Tyrolean identity as proposed by the SVP, migration-generated diversity does not become a marker of this collective identity, but the new cultures, languages, and religions are expected to assimilate therein. The formation of the concept of the Corsican citizenship is, as already argued above, in relation to the power-distribution hypothesis, also due to the increasing electoral support for the moderate FeC and the decline of the hard-line CN. A change towards supporting a more moderate SNRP could also be interpreted as a sign of a decreasing cleavage between those claiming to be autochthonous Corsicans and those labelled as Corsicans by adoption. The gradual shift from framing the Corsican collective identity as being labelled the ‘community of destiny’ and based on ethnic markers, in particular birth and ancestry, to basing it on residence and support for the language and the aims of SNRPs is thus both connected to a decrease in the cleavage and due to party politics. And, although the internal cleavage is related to the discourse on immigration and integration, the empirical evidence only partially supports the cleavage hypothesis because the strong cleavage in Corsica does not result in the exclusion of migrants, but rather in demands for assimilation.

A similar construction of a territorial identity overarching historical cleavages is also observable in the Basque Country and Wales. And comparable to Corsica and the SVP in...
South Tyrol, through the construction of an overarching identity, SNRPs do not exclude migrants from the definition of the collective identity, but rather require their assimilation. In this thesis I define both Wales and the Basque Country as minority nations with an underlying internal cleavage which is partially, but not predominantly, based on the linguistic difference between the minority population and the state majority.

As I argued above, the SNRPs’ positions on immigration and integration in the Basque Country did not change over the selected time frame. However, the governing SNRPs (PNV and EA) did begin to refer to immigration as a way to modernize the territory and its society. As such, they propose a symbolic Basque citizenship based on equality, human rights, diversity, and tolerance which is open to everyone residing in the territory. In contrast to Corsican SNRPs, the Basque parties do not set a temporal restriction to accessing the symbolic citizenship. The Basque SNRPs also promote the development of the Basque Country as a bilingual society, where Euskera (the Basque language) and Spanish enjoy an equal status. Although the parties promote diversity as an added value and a marker of the collective identity, the individual migration-generated languages, cultures, and religion do not become part of what they refer to as ‘modern Basque Country’. Instead migrants are required to assimilate into the bilingual society. Basque SNRPs do not, in contrast to their South Tyrolean and Corsican counterparts (with the exception of FeC), strengthen the underlying cleavage in the discourse on immigration and integration, but rather focus on overcoming it. And the demographic change brought about by immigration is portrayed as a means to modernize and overcome the existing cleavage. As such, the empirical evidence in the Basque Country does not directly support the initial cleavage hypothesis that a strong cleavage leads to the exclusion of migration-generated diversity and the reinforcement of ethnic criteria, but rather in this case the cleavage leads to demands for assimilation into an overarching collective society based on territoriality instead of ethnic markers.

I also observe a similar empirical development in Wales. Over the time period studied, PC gradually began to frame international immigration as an added value to the territory and also to increasingly refer to the Welsh identity as being inclusive to everyone, multicultural, and bilingual. Similar to the SNRPs in the Basque Country, Corsica, and the SVP in South Tyrol, the national minority language (i.e., Welsh) is promoted as a tool for integration alongside
its function as a marker of the collective identity. However, PC does not transfer the cleavage between the Welsh and English into the discourse on immigration, but instead, similar to the Basque Country, refers to the new Welsh identity as based on residence, support for devolution, and the promotion of Welsh uniqueness (and thus on support for the minority nation’s claims). As shown in the previous chapters, over the course of the timeframe adopted for this research, PC shifted from excluding newcomers and migration-generated diversity from the Welsh identity, to ignoring demographic change, to framing it as an added value and form of enrichment. Therefore, in the framing of the Welsh identity, ultimately the discourse of PC comes to resemble that of the SNP. Both parties refer to the sub-state territory as multicultural, but PC additionally highlights Wales’ bilingual nature and the importance of the Welsh language and culture. Comparing PC’s framing of the Welsh identity with the Basque SNRPs’ framing of the Basque collective identity, recently PC has more strongly emphasized multiculturalism and the recognition of migration-generated languages, cultures, and religions becoming a part of bilingual, multicultural Wales.

In the Basque Country and Wales SNRPs do not incorporate or reproduce the boundary between the minority and majority language speakers in the discourse on immigration and integration. Instead, the SNRPs in both regions use immigration to construct an overarching sub-state territorial identity based on civic criteria. At the same time, similar to the SNP in Scotland, the parties in both regions construct the overarching sub-state territorial identity in contrast to the national, state-wide identity. Although internally the cleavage between the majority and minority groups is overcome through the overarching territorial identity, SNRPs in both regions reinforce the cleavage between the minority region and the central state.

In sum, I find empirical evidence to support the cleavage hypothesis. At the same time, I observe that the initially formulated cleavage hypothesis does not result in the exclusion of migration-generated identity from the framing of the collective identity, but instead in demands for assimilation into the minority nation’s identity. In the Basque Country, Corsica, Wales, and partially within the SVP in South Tyrol I find, moreover, that migration and the demand to assimilate the migration-generated diversity into the construction of a collective identity has resulted in the development of a regional identity which overarches historical cleavages and is based on territory instead of ethnic markers. Hence, in future research I hope
to further engage with the reformulated hypothesis of whether migrants might function as a bridge to overcome historical cleavages and to develop a shared overarching identity based on territorial markers.

2.3 Conclusion

In sum, I have evaluated the performance of the two initially proposed hypotheses, the power-distribution hypothesis and the cleavage-hypothesis, in relation to the SNRPs’ reframing of the minority nation’s identity once confronted with immigration. Although I do not find consistent support for the hypothesis that a robust level of legislative powers leads to the opening of the minority nation’s identity and the inclusion of migration-generated markers, I do find empirical evidence supporting the cleavage hypothesis. Nevertheless, based on the findings in the Basque Country, Corsica (after 2010), Wales (after 1999), and South Tyrol (only the SVP after 2008) I propose a reformulation of the initially developed hypothesis that the cleavage leads to the exclusion of migration-generated diversity, to a cleavage leading to the assimilation of migration-generated diversity into the construction of an overarching and shared identity.

3. Additional explanations

At the end of chapter two I summarized the factors proposed in the literature to explain variation in the discourse on immigration and integration in minority nations. However, the previous scholarship did not connect the discourse on immigration and integration with the framing of minority identities. Yet, as I demonstrate in this thesis, there is enough evidence to argue that the SNRPs’ discourse on immigration and integration impacts the framing of the collective identity. As such, factors shaping the discourse on immigration and integration also ultimately have an impact on the framing of the collective identity.

Nevertheless, due to the large number of explanatory factors proposed in the literature, I do not review all of them in this thesis in a consistent manner throughout the five cases. Instead, I focus on aspects which relate most clearly to the proposed hypotheses and suggest a further analysis of those aspects in a structured comparison as part of the future research agenda I propose in chapter nine.
3.1 Demands on the labour market and demographic decline

Hepburn suggests that both demand on the labour market and a negative demographic profile lead SNRPs to develop a positive stance towards immigration (2010; 2014). Indeed, in Scotland immigration is framed by the political elite as a necessity to respond to a stagnant and aging population (Hepburn and Rosie 2012, 249). Furthermore, in Scotland, and also in Wales and South Tyrol, there is also a discourse on migration as being necessary to fill particular segments of the labour market. In Scotland and Wales this is focused on highly skilled migrants and in Wales, in particular on doctors, whereas in South Tyrol, low-skilled persons willing to work in seasonal positions in agriculture and tourism are seen as desirable. Since 1999 the Scottish governments have also transposed the labour shortage and the demographic decline from discourse into policy, aiming to attract highly skilled and young people, as I show when discussing the Fresh Talent initiative in chapter five.

Negative socio-economic parameters thus seem to support the development of a welcoming approach towards those who are framed as a means to overcome labour shortages. In South Tyrol the welcoming attitude is limited to migrants as a labour force and is not connected to newcomers and the migration-generated diversity in general. In Wales the welcoming approach developed by PC similarly targets doctors, who are presented as ‘the most wanted’, as I show in chapter five, but due to the general framing of immigration as a way to modernize the territory, the target has been expanded to all newcomers and to immigration in general.

Thus the three cases provide partial evidence for a relation between socio-economic structures and a positive approach to immigration. However, the positive position of SNRPs resembles an instrumental approach based on the need to find solutions for a particular challenge.

3.2 Political – institutional factors: party system, party competition and the contagion effects

It is disputed among scholars whether particular party ideologies determine a party’s position on immigration, and although left-wing parties might generally adopt more open and inclusive stances on immigration and integration than right-wing parties, positions on immigration do not always match the parties’ broader ideological positions on the left-right
divide (Odmalm 2012, Benoit and Laver 2007). In particular, in relation to SNRPs, Massetti and Schakel (2015) argue that the centre-periphery cleavage might outbalance the classical ideological cleavage.

All SNRPs analysed in this research, with the exception of the PNV in the Basque Country, translate their ideological positioning on the left-right divide to their discourse on immigration and integration. Left-wing parties frame immigration in neutral to positive terms, whereas right-wing parties refer to it as threat. Table 20 reminds us of the ideological positions of the particular SNRPs in the selected regions and their discourse on immigration and integration.

Scotland, Wales, and Corsica have been traditionally dominated, on the one hand, by regional branches of nation-wide parties and, on the other, by left-wing parties. The Scottish, Welsh, and Corsican SNRPs are all left-wing (see chapters three and four for further detail). The expectation that left-wing SNRPs are more positive in their framing of immigration is largely accurate and is backed by the empirical evidence in this thesis.

However, party ideology, as in particular the analysis of the Basque Country and South Tyrol shows, is not the only factor influencing SNRPs’ positions on immigration, integration, and identity. Instead, in the latter two minority nations I find evidence for the polarization hypothesis proposed by Hepburn (2014) as well as for the contagion-effect, as suggested by van Spanje (2010a). In South Tyrol I find the contagion effect in two forms: spreading from the right-wing populist opposition parties (SF, and dF) and from the left-wing coalition partner (PD) to their right-wing counterparts (SVP). In the Basque Country only the latter is observable (from EA to PNV).
Table 20 – Overview of the ideological position of the SNRPs, their discourse on immigration and their framing of the minority nation’s identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideological position of SNRPs (those who are/were in government have been underlined)</th>
<th>Empirical findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discourse on immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aralar HB-B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corsica</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNC, CL, CN, FeC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Tyrol</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVP (centre-right) UfS dF SF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

255
In South Tyrol each of the SNRPs analysed, including the SVP, can be classified as leaning towards the right. Due to its anti-establishment and anti-immigration discourse, dF, in particular, can be categorized as a radical right-wing populist party. From 1998 to 2004, the SVP’s position on immigration and integration was characterized by a more open and welcoming approach, but since 2004 the party has become more hostile due to the salience of the radical right-wing dF. dF has advanced as the main opposition party since 1992, consistently gaining votes and seats, while the SVP has lost votes. Scantamburlo and Pallaver (2014) argue that the hegemony of the SVP has been broken by dF and its anti-immigrant discourse. However, the coalition between the centre-right SVP and the Partito Democratico (Democratic Party – PD) may have prevented the SVP from positioning itself even further on the right and hence closer to the challenge coming from dF. This is backed by the gap in the discourse on immigration and integration, where the SVP takes a much more hostile and assimilationist position than in its policies, which are the product of negotiations with its coalition partner, the PD.

In the Basque Country I find the opposite trend. Aside from the PNV, the Basque SNRPs analysed in this thesis can all be classified as left-wing parties. In the analysis of the PNV’s discourse on immigration I come to the same result as Jeram, who argues that the PNV-led Government or the coalitions between a centre-right SNRP (PNV) and a left-wing SNRP (EA) has led to the establishment of an integration policy characterized by equality and support for the full participation of migrants in Basque society (Jeram 2013). Hence, against prior expectations, the PNV’s position on immigration and integration has shifted towards the left. However, in both the Basque Country and South Tyrol the impact of left-wing coalition partners is difficult to assess, because both right-wing SNRPs have always governed in coalition with a left-wing partner, so we never observe their discourse or policy choices when governing alone or with right-wing partners.

It is also difficult to evaluate the support for the contagion hypothesis in Scotland, Wales, and Corsica because radical right-wing parties have not been successful as of yet. Although both the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the British National Party (BNP) fielded candidates in both Scotland and Wales, the parties have not won seats in either region’s legislature. Ford and Goodwin (2014, 244) even argue that UKIP is “particularly weak in
Scotland”. In Corsica, the Front National (FN) won just one seat in the 2015 regional elections, its first ever. Hence, in these three cases the relative weakness of right-wing parties facilitates the prevalence of a left-wing discourse on immigration and integration.

South Tyrol is therefore the only case in this thesis where I detect a contagion effect from the right-wing populist dF on the governing SVP. However, based on the analysis of both South Tyrol and the Basque Country, I find some support for a contagion effect from the coalition partners. Moreover, there is evidence from every SNRP in the Basque Country, with the exception of the PNV, for the support of the ideology hypothesis. As such, in contrast to what Massetti and Schakel (2015) propose, in relation to immigration the centre-periphery cleavage does not overrule the left-right position of SNRPs.

3.3 Cultural-ideological factors

In contrast to the party-ideology hypothesis just discussed, I did not find evidence to further pursue a detailed analysis of either the cultural-ideological hypothesis, which proposes a strong regional identification leading to an exclusionary stance towards immigration, or the contextual hypothesis, which proposes that the supranational and national framework determines the parties approach to immigration. In chapter two I examine the blurring of the lines between civic and ethnic nationalisms in each minority region, and as I show in chapters six and seven, this dividing line is even more blurred in the selected cases in relation to the national minority language. The SNRPs in Wales, Corsica, the Basque Country, and partially in South Tyrol all present the national minority language as open to migrants and as an important tool for their integration. The national minority language is therefore both a marker of identity and a tool for integration. Furthermore, since the parties neither connect language to birth or ancestry, nor require a specifically high level of knowledge, the national minority language in the Basque Country, Corsica, Wales, and partially also South Tyrol is classified as a civic marker.

I therefore argue that the presence or absence of a national minority language, as proposed by Hepburn (2014), is not relevant for the discourse on immigration and integration. According to Hepburn’s argument, the absence of a national minority language facilitates a welcoming approach to immigration in Scotland. She and Rosie find evidence for this based
on the evaluation of the Scottish case (Hepburn and Rosie 2014). However, the analysis in this thesis shows that parties in minority regions which are characterized by national minority languages, such as the Basque Country and Wales, have also developed a welcoming approach towards immigration and have proposed the opening of boundary of the minority nation’s identity towards the inclusion of migration-generated diversity.

However, the empirical evidence in relation to the cleavage hypothesis pursued in this doctoral thesis suggests that a welcoming approach towards immigration is not facilitated by the absence of a national minority language, but by the absence of politicization of the national minority language as an important marker of the cleavage. The national minority language is framed as the main marker of the societal cleavage in South Tyrol, whereas in the other minority nations discussed, while the cleavage is to a degree based on language, it is predominantly based on nation-building goals. Therefore, I suggest a comparison of the immigration discourse in South Tyrol and another minority nation where the national minority language is an important marker of the collective identity and impacts the societal boundary between the autochthonous groups, such as Flanders in Belgium. Also a comparison with Northern Ireland seems fruitful, since in both minority nations there is an institutionalized cleavage which is, however, based on language in the former and religion in the latter. Through such a comparison I would gain important insights not only into the minority-language hypothesis proposed by Hepburn (2012) but also into the cleavage hypothesis as outweighing the national minority language hypothesis as the current research proposes.

4. Conclusion

In this chapter I evaluate the two main hypotheses proposed to determine the SNRPs’ framing of the minority nation’s identity once confronted with immigration, namely the power-distribution hypothesis and the societal cleavage hypothesis. Although I do not find consistent empirical support for the former, I find evidence in support of the latter.

Nevertheless, the analysis suggests that a strong societal cleavage does not lead per se to the exclusion of migration-generated diversity from the framing of the collective identity, as initially proposed. Instead SNRPs, with the exception of most SNRPs in South Tyrol,
construct an overarching and shared identity to both overcome historical cleavages and, at
the same time, strengthen the territorial dimension of the collective identity. SNRP’s expect
migrants to assimilate into their overarching territorial framing of the minority nation’s
identity. Only the SNP in Scotland recognizes and includes migration-generated diversity
into its framing of the collective identity, and in doing so proposing a multicultural inclusion
of the various cultures, religions, and languages.

However, as discussed in chapters five, six, and seven, the SNRPs in the Basque Country,
and also PC in Wales and particularly the SNP in Scotland, use the discourse on immigration
to differentiate themselves as much as possible from their national governments’ approach
and hence to strengthen their strategic interests for the territory, which mostly overlap with
demands for further devolution or secession, by constructing a shared identity as a counter-
narrative to the national identity of the state. Thus, the empirical findings of this research
partially concur with the findings by Barker (2015, 36-39), who argues, based on case studies
of Scotland, Quebec, and Flanders, that ‘the perceived impact of immigration on sub-state
goals’ determines whether political leaders activate the discourse on immigration and
integration to strengthen their positions.

Thus, there are three important insights from this doctoral research. First, in relation to
immigration, SNRPs have developed a particular form of instrumental nationalism which
facilitates the construction of a collective identity based on civic and territorial markers. Such
a framing of the collective identity also allows the inclusion, either by multicultural
recognition or assimilation, of migration-generated diversity, but is constructed against the
traditional ‘significant other’, namely the central state.

Second, the power-distribution hypothesis, in its initial version as proposed by Kymlicka
(2001a), further developed versions by Hepburn and Zapata (2014b), and the version adopted
in this thesis, which combines legislative powers on integration with the degree and claims
for self-government, does not find consistent empirical support. Instead, I find support for
the importance of a societal cleavage dividing the receiving society in the minority nations
and hence negatively impacting the SNRPs’ framing of the collective identity. Thus, this
thesis adds a further explanatory factor to the list of possible explanations for an inclusionary
or exclusionary approach to immigration in minority nations. Moreover, in relation to the
positions on immigration and integration, the party-ideology hypothesis, which has been largely researched for parties at the national level, also seems to have strong explanatory power for the behaviour of the particular niche parties studied in this research, namely the SNRPs.

Chapter nine concludes this doctoral thesis by summarising the key findings, discussing their relevance and connection to the existing scholarship, and further proposing new research endeavours to amplify the insights gained in this research.
CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION

1. Key findings

This research began by asking whether immigration impacts the construction of the collective (minority) identity in minority nations characterized by claims for the protection of historical particularity. This project thus evaluates who belongs to a so-called minority nation, whether newcomers and migration-generated diversity also belong, and if so, under which conditions. To answer these questions, I analysed the perspective of Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties (SNRPs) who claim to represent the interests of the communities inhabiting the minority nations. Most of these SNRPs are engaged in nation-building projects and therefore have a particular interest in constructing a political community in line with their political aims. Thus, this dissertation focuses on the construction of the collective identity, once confronted with immigration, as a particular elite project.

In this concluding chapter I attempt to summarize the main findings of the analyses conducted in the previous chapters, point out the main substantive issues and limitations raised in this thesis and suggest an agenda for future research.

In South Tyrol and Corsica, immigration is mainly referred to as a negative phenomenon. In South Tyrol this negative framing has not changed substantially over the last twenty years. In contrast, Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties in Corsica have experienced a shift from perceiving immigration as a negative phenomenon to framing it in more neutral and even positive terms after 2010. The negative perception of immigration by Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties in South Tyrol is based on three main narratives: the perception of immigration as a threat to the welfare system; as a cultural/identity threat; and as a security threat. Moreover, there is a neutral narrative of demanding control of the immigration flows and a positive narrative portraying immigration as an added value to the labour market. South Tyrolean SNRPs do not make an explicit connection between experiences of internal and international immigration, but emphasise the importance of selecting immigrants that are closer to the German language and culture and with focusing on integration measures that also highlight the minority nation’s identity and culture.
Unlike in the South Tyrolean case, historical experiences with immigration significantly impact contemporary perceptions of immigration in Corsica. The SNRPs differentiate between internal immigration in the form of French citizens moving from the French mainland to the island, and international immigration. The former is constructed as a threat to the minority nation’s identity, economy and labour market. The latter, however, is framed as a neutral phenomenon, albeit one that requires efforts to integrate migrants into the Corsican identity and language. In Wales PC shifted from presenting immigration as a challenge to the Welsh identity and in particular to the Welsh language, to framing immigration as an asset and enrichment for whole region. Nevertheless, the cultural and linguistic heritage of the sub-state territory is underlined as a characteristic that needs further enhancement in the integration policies.

Unlike in South Tyrol and Corsica, SNRPs in Scotland and the Basque Country argue that international immigration is an opportunity for growth and an added value for the territory. Hence, in the Basque Country the link between immigration and identity is, similarly to Scotland and recently also Wales, constructed as a positive link contributing to the modernization of the society. The three minority nations also use the discourse on immigration to construct a counter-narrative to the discourse at the state level and hence to show how much the minority nation and its society differ from the central state. Hence, SNRPs rely on the normative power of their discourse, too. In the Basque Country immigration is not framed as having a negative impact on the minority nation’s identity, but rather as a means to modernize the territory. SNRPs and the government highlight the necessity to raise awareness among immigrants for the Basque language and identity though.

The analysis of the selected minority nations shows that there is a strong connection between the discourse on immigration and the discourse on who belongs to ‘us’, to ‘our’ society and territory, and consequently to ‘our’ collective identity. I demonstrated that SNRPs in all five selected minority nations perceive immigration as having an impact on the development of the minority nation’s identity. In Scotland, Wales, and the Basque Country this impact is constructed to be a positive one, and immigration is framed to be an enrichment, an added value to the minority nation, and a means to bolster further development. Yet in South Tyrol and Corsica particular dimensions of immigration are framed as a threat to the minority identity.
nation’s identity. South Tyrolean SNRPs perceive immigration of those persons who are culturally more distant from the (German) national minority language and culture as a challenge. Corsican SNRPs highlight in particular internal immigration as a challenge for the future survival of the Corsican people.

Transposing these results into the boundary-making language, I show that all SNRPs perceive immigration as having a positive (Scotland, Wales, Basque Country) or negative (South Tyrol, Corsica) impact on their framing of the boundary of the minority nation’s identity, but the framing of the boundary of the minority nation’s identity only changed in some of the cases once confronted with immigration.

In Scotland, over the past 20 years, there has been no change in the construction of Scotland as an inclusive and open territory, a ‘mongrel nation’ based on “a wide range of identities (…) – Scottish, British, English, Irish, Pakistani, Chinese, Polish, French and many more besides – and this diversity all contributes positively to modern Scottish society” (SNP, Alex Salmond, 1997). Moreover, the SNP not only proposes to accept a variety of cultures, languages, and religions as part of the Scottish society, but suggests interweaving them into one modern Scottish concept of identity, where “there are many strands and colors in the Scottish tartan” (SNP, 2007). Although Scotland did not have any degree of self-government and thus no legislative powers to influence immigration and integration policies at the beginning of the 1990s, the SNP, as well as the Scottish Labour and Liberal Democrats approached immigration in an open and inclusive way, which is also based on the much slower population growth than in England. Hence, the construction of identity as open to everybody and inclusive to elements of other cultures did not change with the devolution of competences by the Scotland Act in 1998 and 2012. Over time, however, the SNP increasingly used the discourse on immigration to differentiate the Scottish approach from the one in Westminster, and hence to strengthen its own nation-building project.

A similar discourse is present in the Basque Country. Although SNRPs adapted such a welcoming and open approach only in the beginning of the 2000s, the parties present the Basque collective identity as based on solidarity and tolerance towards everyone, irrespective of their language, culture, and religion. At the same time, the Basque SNRPs underline the necessity to overcome, within the Basque Country, the dichotomy of Basque vs. Spanish, and
to instead support the development of one bicultural and bilingual territory and society. The parties propose the development of a conceptual Basque citizenship as a formal status of belonging, based on the criteria of residence. Hence, this particular sub-state citizenship would be open to everyone living in the Basque Country, and would not only be a symbolic marker of belonging but would also grant voting rights at the regional level to newcomers. Similar to the SNP in Scotland, Basque SNRPs used this open discourse strategically to further underline the difference between the Basque Country and Spain.

The aim to construct a bilingual and modern nation has also been recently highlighted in Wales. PC, which has for a long period deemed the English population in Wales as a threat to the survival of the Welsh language and culture, has shifted towards a discourse of presenting the Welsh language as open to everyone and towards perceiving various cultures within Wales not as a threat but as an enrichment. This shift started after 2006 when the Welsh National Assembly was created and equipped with a limited variety of legislative powers through the Government of Wales Act. Since then the party increasingly constructs the collective identity as a process that must involve all of the diverse cultural and linguistic elements that make up the changing identity (PC, 1999) but underlines that “we should celebrate and support the cultural richness of the diverse and vibrant communities that make up modern Wales, and welcome the input of new citizens, without in any way forgetting what makes us a unique nation” (PC, 2007). Hence, in the case of Wales, the changes in the degree of devolution also triggered a change in the position of PC towards constructing a more open, inclusive, and bilingual conception of identity without, however, leaving aside the strong bonds to the Welsh particularities.

Although Corsica is the most fragile of the five cases in relation to the degree of self-government and political-institutional power, Corsican SNRPs construct ‘Corsican-ness’ similar to Wales and the Basque Country as a bilingual territory and society, with a strong focus on the Corsican language and culture. Furthermore, they highlight a strong Corsican identity as an advantage for the integration of newcomers. The SNRPs, similar to their Basque counterparts, also propose a Corsican citizenship which should include ‘Corsicans by origin’ and ‘Corsicans by adoption’ and hence those newcomers who wish to assimilate into the Corsican concept of identity. The conceptual symbolic Corsican citizenship, which
is constructed as equally open to everyone residing in the territory, would also grant voting rights, as well as access to welfare benefits. However, Corsican SNRPs differ between internal migrants and international migrants, and continue their exclusionary approach towards the former, while proposing an inclusionary concept of Corsican identity to the latter. Hence, the strong boundaries between the Corsicans and the French, which did not change over the last twenty years, continue to be reproduced in the constructions of identity, but are not transposed to international newcomers.

I analyse the second part of the research question, specifically how the boundary of the identity is constructed, and whether it is constructed as the exclusion, or the assimilative or multicultural inclusion of migration-generated diversity, by focusing on how the process of settlement of newcomers is perceived and organized. I show that in South Tyrol, Corsica, the framing of the boundary of the minority nation’s identity does not change; newcomers can eventually and conditionally be included through assimilation into the predefined boundary. In contrast to the other cases, in Scotland and partially also in Wales, the boundary of the identity is constructed as expanding and changing towards a multicultural inclusion of the migration-generated diversity. Hence, in Scotland and Wales the defining characteristics of the boundary are open to change, whereas in the other cases the definition of what makes up the minority region does not change. In the Basque Country the boundaries of the minority nation are partially open to change and to including diversity stemming from immigration, but so far SNRPs have rather referred to the abstract concept of recognition of diversity as a new marker of the Basque minority nation then concrete elements of migration-generated diversity, such as new languages or religions brought into the territory by migrants.

Ethnic markers, and in particular the national minority language, continue to prevail among South Tyrolean SNRPs. In contrast, Corsican SNRPs shifted between focusing on ethnic markers, such as ancestry and birth, to civic markers, such as residence and the willingness to support their political aims. I also observe a shift in the framing of the minority nation’s identity within Plaid Cymru (PC) in Wales. The latter party has gradually shifted from framing the Welsh language as an exclusive and ethnic marker to presenting it as a civic marker, since it can be learned by anyone who is willing to do so, and has further combined
the framing of the Welsh identity with other markers such as the support and quest for further devolution and the multicultural inclusion of migration-generated diversity.

In both the Basque Country and Scotland, SNRPs shifted from framing the minority nation’s identity in ethnic terms to focusing on civic markers prior to 1990, the year adopted as the starting point for this research. However, in both minority nations a further change in the framing can be observed. In the Basque Country, the framing of the minority nation’s identity has changed towards the inclusion of diversity and tolerance as a new marker of the collective identity, but nevertheless SNRPs do not celebrate particular migration-generated religions, cultures, or languages as new markers of the collective identity. In Scotland instead the multicultural, open, and civic framing of identity is increasingly constructed as a counter-narrative to the English national identity and is used to strengthen the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) claims for further devolution or independence.

SNRPs in all five minority regions highlight the possibility to attract (certain) migrants into the minority nation’s identity to strengthen the sub-state territory’s position vis-à-vis the central state. In all five selected case studies, the ‘significant other’ against whom the minority nation’s identity is delimited, is – and remains – the central state. The minority nation’s identity is thus constructed in opposition to the state/national identity, rather than in extension of it or as a complement to it. But based on the findings of this doctoral research I concur with Winter that ‘there are different types of outsiders’ (2011, 108). I highlight that international immigration has not replaced the state as a particular ‘significant other’ in any of the selected minority nations. Instead, in South Tyrol immigration has generated a multiplicity of ‘others’ against whom the collective identity is constructed. In the other cases selected, and in particular in Scotland, the Basque Country, and lately in Wales, the SNRPs have appropriated the discourse on immigration and integration to bolster their particular nation-building projects. Hence, the parties construct, through the discourse on immigration and integration, a shared collective identity for the minority nation based on civic and territorial markers, including the migration-generated diversity, as a counter-narrative to the national identity. As Franco-Guillén (2015, 154) puts it, minority nations are reconstructed “in a way that newcomers can fit within the nation and therefore develop loyalty towards it, stateless nationalists are able to keep the ‘common enemy’”.
When discussing explanations for the behaviour of SNRPs, I demonstrate that the political-institutional relations and the power-distribution between the minority nation and the state – operationalized through the degree of self-government and a territory’s ability to influence immigration and integration policies – is neither the main factor in shaping the SNRPs’ positions on immigration and integration nor in reframing the minority nations’ identity. Instead, I find empirical evidence to support the cleavage hypothesis, that is the explanatory power that conflicting and fragile societal relations and strong boundaries between autochthonous communities within the minority nation, and hence within the receiving society, have on the SNRPs’ positions on immigration and integration and finally on their framing of the minority nation’s identity. However, there is strong evidence for the claim that a cleavage within the receiving society does not lead SNRPs to reframe the minority by excluding migration-generated diversity, but rather to assimilate migration-generated diversity into their own particular framing of the collective identity.

Although this doctoral research focused on the political-institutional relations between centre and periphery and the societal boundaries within the minority nation through a structured comparison, at the beginning of this research I introduced a large number of additional potential explanatory factors proposed by a number of scholars. Even though I could not systematically review and evaluate all of them in this thesis, I find party politics and party ideology to relate most clearly to the empirical results of this research. Accordingly, similar to national parties, in their positions on immigration SNRPs follow their general ideological stances. In the sections below I will propose a way to further engage with the additional explanatory factors which so far I only touched upon.

2. Implications of the thesis and contribution to knowledge

This thesis contributes to the research area of the governance of cultural diversity at the sub-state level as well as to that of minority nations and SNRPs. Furthermore, this dissertation contributes to the study of collective identity formation. In doing so, it adds to the three areas theoretically, methodologically, and empirically.

Theoretically, on the one hand, by bridging and bringing together studies on multilevel and multinational states, ethnic conflict and divided societies, boundary making (Wimmer 2008),
and ‘the significant other’ (Triandafyllidou 1998) with research on immigrant integration. As shown in chapter two, immigration in multinational states and the nexus between SNRPs and immigration have both been widely studied, but none of the scholars (Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero 2014b, Erk 2010, 2014, Jeram 2012a, Jeram and Adam 2015, Jeram, van der Zwet, and Wisthaler 2015, Kymlicka 2001a, Kleiner-Liebau 2009) have linked immigration in minority nations to pre-existing boundaries in those societies. However, Franco i Guillén (2015b) and Arrighi (2012) successfully connected the boundary-making strategies and theories of ‘the significant other’ to immigration in minority nations, in particular to Catalonia, Scotland and Quebec.

My research further broadens the application of the mentioned theories to additional case studies. Based on the comparison of five minority nations with different degrees and natures of pre-existing boundaries between the autochthonous communities, I find substantial empirical evidence to support this cleavage hypothesis. First, I show that boundary making and the demarcation of the in-group (namely the population the particular SNRP claims to represent) against others (in particular the central state and those migrants that have a connection to the central state; for example, internal migrants, or migrants which are linguistically or culturally closer to the state language and culture) are central strategies of SNRPs to strengthen their own interests. Second, I illustrate that societal cleavages and strong and bright pre-existing boundaries significantly impact an exclusionary or assimilationist framing of the minority nation’s identity.

Hence, this doctoral thesis adds a further explanatory factor to those already proposed through single case studies (Jeram 2012a) and small n-comparisons (Arrighi de Casanova 2012a), but with the advantage that the hypothesis found empirical support in a comparative study of five cases.

Furthermore, this thesis also contributes to the study of collective identity formation which has been thoroughly analysed at the national level (Guibernau 2007, Brubaker 1996, Brubaker 2011, Wodak et al. 2009) as well as in relation to immigration (Biles and Spoonley 2007, Winter 2011). However, while collective identity formation has in the past been widely studied for minority nations (Bond 2006), more recent developments such as globalization and demographic change have not yet been taken into account for minority nations, despite
a strong impact of these themes on the national level having been established (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008), on the one hand, and various and innovative forms of minority nationalism increasingly challenging the nation state, on the other. Community formation, and in particular the construction of communities based on strategic interests, is thus an important topic which deserves further attention. This thesis partially addresses this gap in the research by not only evaluating whether SNRPs rely on civic or ethnic forms of nationalism in their framing of the collective identity in minority nations, but by empirically analysing what the proposed markers of the boundaries in the specific minority nations are and how they change. Hence, this thesis does not remain on the abstract level, discussing the distinctions and the usefulness of ethnic vs. civic forms of nationalism, but goes into detail regarding whether particular boundary markers and criteria, such as the national minority language or the length of residency, are constructed in the concrete minority nation as open and accessible for newcomers or whether they are constructed as barriers to integration.

Methodologically I contribute to the three research areas mentioned in particular in relation to two aspects. First, I have developed a framework for a qualitative, yet nonetheless relatively ‘large-scale’, analysis with comparisons over a long time period (20 years) across five territories and more than 20 political parties. This methodological framework can be extended to the study of new cases and can offer new methodological tools to future cohorts of researchers interested in applying this method to their own research. Secondly, I have developed a structured method of analysing the construction of collective identity through the discourses on immigration, integration, and the construction of the category of ‘the migrant’. Combining the discourse analysis of the three areas allows for important insights into the construction of a political community and the exclusion or inclusion of migration-generated diversity. This project has also contributed to the research area empirically by studying cases which have often been neglected (Corsica, South Tyrol) both in the literature on minority nations as well as in the literature on immigration at the sub-state level.

3. Limitations of the thesis and an agenda for further research
However, any research has its limitations. Many times, these limitations are based on methodological choices or practical issues such as time constraints or language knowledge.
Rather than listing the potential limitations this particular thesis suffers from, I propose an agenda for further research to overcome them partially.

This entails first of all broadening the case selection and including Northern Ireland as a case study characterized by the intersection between historical religious diversity and migration-generated diversity. Northern Ireland is a very fruitful case for a study on the discourse and governance of migration-generated diversity in multilevel governance systems due to the significant boundary (Wimmer 2008, Triandafyllidou 1998) within the society based on religious grounds, as well as due to its history of armed conflict as an expression of conflicting societal relations. Expanding the research to Northern Ireland would allow for a comparison with the cases of Scotland and Wales previously examined in this doctoral research: all three entities are located within the same national framework, are affected differently by devolution, and are characterized by different types of diversity. Additionally, Northern Ireland needs to be compared to the other three cases studied in my doctoral research which are characterized by different degrees of armed conflict and internal division (the Basque Country, Corsica, and South Tyrol). The expansion to cases characterized by highly conflictual relations between the centre and periphery and armed conflicts constitutes a novelty in the research area on the nexus between multi-national states and immigration. From this expansion, I expect innovative insights into whether and how historical conflicts between groups and between the centre and periphery are transposed to the discourse on and governance of migration-generated diversity.

Moreover, in this thesis there is empirical evidence in relation to the cleavage hypothesis, which suggests that the outcome of strong boundaries between the autochthonous communities leads not to the exclusion of migration-generated diversity, but to the development of a shared collective identity, overarching historical divisions, which also assimilates migration-generated diversity. Gilligan, Hainsworth and Aidan (2011) have already explored this aspect in relation to public attitudes in Northern Ireland and hence it would be very fruitful to expand this line of research to the political elite.

A further limitation of this doctoral research is its exclusive focus on SNRPs. Due to their particular nature, SNRPs pursue strong nation-building goals and are hence inclined to further strengthen the cleavage between the minority nation and the central state. Therefore,
both the cleavage hypothesis and the power-distribution hypothesis analysed in this
dissertation would further benefit from an examination in relation to additional actors, and in
particular in relation to the perspective of the central state. I thus propose an expansion to
include the study of the political elite claiming to represent the state majority and the
perspective of the centre in multinational states. I plan to extend the focus to the regional
branches of national parties in South Tyrol, Scotland, and Wales to investigate the similarities
and differences between the perspective of the centre and the state majority population and
the perspective of SNRPs claiming to represent the historical minority communities. I
suggest South Tyrol and Scotland as the two most different cases in relation to the complex
configurations between historical diversity and migration-generated diversity. I also suggest
Wales because it adds an interesting perspective because it is situated within the same
national framework as Scotland, and hence the two minority nations are similar in many
contextual respects. Furthermore, regional branches of national parties are much stronger in
Wales than in Scotland. And finally, in the upcoming 2016 elections, the breakthrough of a
radical right-wing party is expected with greater likelihood in Wales than in Scotland, which
would facilitate a further test of the ‘contagion-hypothesis’ (the influence of radical right
wing parties on SNRPs), which is shown to have an important impact on the governing party
(SVP) in South Tyrol.

If we agree with Putnam that the elite-mass linkage is characterized by a “double-sided and
interdependent” relationship (1976, 134), the attitudes and positions on immigration of
historical communities, both those who identify primarily with the state and those who rather
identify with the particular minority nation, are partially represented by the political parties.
The success of political parties can hence give us insights into mass opinion, and which issues
are considered relevant at a given time. As such, one could argue that through the focus on
SNRPs, the segments of the population supporting SNPRs are partially represented by the
SNRPs and hence their views and opinions are partially represented in this thesis.

However, in most European countries, and hence also in most European minority nations, a
great share of the first-generation migrant population is excluded from elections at the

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50 As noted earlier, the UK constitutes a partial exemption, since migrants stemming from former
Commonwealth countries are immediately granted voting rights once they reside in the UK.
national and regional levels. There is also a substantial gap between the political participation of the autochthonous population, on the one side, and that of first-generation migrants and persons with a migration background, on the other (Morales and Giugni 2011). Therefore, a link between political parties and migrants and their descendants is more difficult to construct. Moreover, the field of research connecting minority nations and immigration suffers from a dearth of research of the positions and attitudes of newcomers. Hence, we know little about whether migrants and persons with a migration background face particular challenges when integrating into a minority nation, or whether they might even perceive the historical diversity and the claims to recognize a particular national minority language, culture, or even religion as facilitating their own process of integration and of developing new forms of belonging, such as overarching or multiple identities which combine their migration-related identities with the new realities of the receiving societies.

Therefore, I argue for broadening the whole research field connecting minority nations and immigration and propose to study the organizations and associations, or party-support groups (e.g., Asian Scots for Independence), claiming to represent the migrants’’, ethnic minorities’’, and refugees and asylum seekers’ challenges and claims in integrating into minority nations.

Studying all communities and their representatives in minority nations also serves the aim to avoid falling into the same trap in which some SNRPs and minority nationalists currently find themselves. Why should the cultures, languages, religions, or traditions, which historically have been characterizing minority nations, have been promoted and protected against the state majority culture, language and religion, when at the same time newcomers and migration-generated diversity do not have a place within a minority nation and are assimilated into what is presented by SNRPs as the dominant collective identity? Such an approach leads to the creation of a hierarchy of diversities and double standards in the promotion of identities, which in the long run creates further cleavages and boundaries between newcomers and the receiving societies, or between persons with a migration background and their autochthonous peers. Hence we need to find ways to reconcile different types of diversities while avoiding the creation of a hierarchy of diversity by recognizing, first of all, that identities are fluid and dynamic and secondly, by allowing and promoting multiple, hyphenated, or multileveled (collective) identities.
Finally, to throw a cat among the pigeons, such a reconciliation of diversities needs to take place not only at the level of discourse but also on the level of practice and policy making in minority nations and even beyond, in states and in Europe as a whole.
ANNEXES 1 - 7

Explanation of the numbering system for Annexes 1 – 5:

Each document has been assigned a combination of numbers and letters, based on Atlas.ti’s system of document numbering. The first number refers to the specific annex number (1-5, P is assigned by Atlas.ti, followed by the number the document has been assigned in Atlas.ti’s Hermeneutic Units (specific folder in Atlas.ti). The numbering does not always start at 1 and some numbers have not been allocated because some documents previously stored in Atlas.ti were cancelled, and thus their number is no longer in use.
Annex 1 – The Basque Country

1. List of Documents

1.1 Integration Plans/Laws


1.2 Parliamentary Debates in the Basque Parliament


1-P 5: 31.011991_integracion cultural_programa de gobierno
1-P 6: 29.12.1998_programa de gobierno
1-P 7: 11.07.2001_programa de gobierno
1-P 8: 22.06.2005_programa de gobierno
1-P 9: 05.05.2009_programa de gobierno
1-P10: 12.12.2012_programa de gobierno
1-P11: 29.12.1994_programa de gobierno
1-P12: 10.05.1994_integracion cultural
1-P13: 11.04.1991_integration cultural
1-P14: 11.06.1993_racismo_immigracion
1-P15: 13.12.1991_racismo
1-P18: 24.09.1993_immigracion
1-P27: 06.06.1997_racismo
1-P28: 08.11.1996_immigracion
1-P30: 01.02.1998_racismo
1-P31: 11.06.1998_immigracion
1-P78: 03.11.2000_immigracion
1-P79: 05.05.2000_immigracion
1-P81: 05.11.1999_immigracion
1-P82: 07.03.2011_racismo_immigracion
1-P83: 09.06.2000_immigracion
1.3 Election Manifestos

For the full name of the party see List of Abbreviations. The party manifestos have been provided by Matthias Scantamburlo, University of Innsbruck and Deusto University as well as the Regional Manifesto Project http://www.regionalmanifestosproject.com/ (last accessed: 16.02.2016). All manifestos can be shared upon request by the author.

2. List of Codes

2.1 Codes on Immigration

**Immigration_negative**
- IMMI_against expulsion
- IMMI_against fortress Europe
- IMMI_based on negative messages
- IMMI_challenge for identity
- IMMI_challenge for living together
- IMMI_challenge_needs attention
- IMMI_low wages_consequences
- IMMI_negative views based on stereotypes
- IMMI_problem is emigration

**Immigration_neutral**
- IMMI_Against spanish state
- IMMI_always factor for BC
- IMMI_asylumnn
- IMMI_competences
- IMMI_competences for work permit
- IMMI_creates different social realties
- IMMI_demographic change
- IMMI_different now from 60ties
- IMMI_don't close door, but don't open totally neither
- IMMI_EU cannot only apply values - freedom, progress, equality, inside
- IMMI_from other spanish regions
- IMMI_get competences from state
- IMMI_globalization
- IMMI_historical fact
- IMMIillegal migrants
- IMMI_labour market needs
- IMMI_limiting should not be the aim
- IMMI_mainly seen through economic lens by public
- IMMI_needs integration
- IMMI_needs legality
- IMMI_needs political willingness to inetgrate
- IMMI_no competences to tackle properly
- IMMI_north-south divide responsibe
- IMMI_not compare to previous historical movements
- IMMI_not new phenomenon
- IMMI_poverty_marginalization challenges social order
- IMMI_reality
- IMMIRequires solidarity
- IMMIRequires structural and attitudinal changes
IMMI_similar experiences of locals emigrating
IMMI_social phenomenon
IMMI_welfare distribution in the world

Immigration_positiv
IMMI_contributes to cultural richness
IMMI_contributes to labour_welfare
IMMI_development
IMMI_enrichment
IMMI_helps to modernize
IMMI_increased diversity
IMMI_needs to be seen as positive for our community
IMMI_no problem
IMMI_no security issue
IMMI_not accept social chauvinism perspectve
IMMI_not only economic perspective
IMMI_opportunity
IMMI_positive phenomenon

2.2. Codes on Integration

Integration_negative
INT_adaptation from migrants requested
INT_equity not reached
INT_prejudice welfare system
INT_there is racism in the BC society
INT_xenophobia a threat for democracy

Integration_neutral
INT_access to Basque culture
INT_activ
INT_Actors
INT_Against multiple discrimination
INT_aim
INT_aims for social integration
INT_all areas_labo private and public life
INT_asylum
INT_Based in competences of autonomy
INT_based on equality and socio-economic security
INT_based on progressive ideological view with broad and open culture; and the protection
of human rights of all persons
INT_basis human rights
INT_Basque as barrier
INT_Basque language
INT_BC country of reception and solidarity
INT_BC integration model compensates for shortcomings of spanish legal framework
Annex 1 – Basque Country

INT_bidirectional enrichment
INT_bidirectional process
INT_both
INT_both Spanish and Basque language
INT_citizenship
INT_common values
INT_cultural diversity
INT_culture
INT_dialog
INT_dignified life
INT_economic, political, cultural, linguistic and welfare
INT_education
INT_education_increase in model B
INT_education_integrate mainly in model A
INT_education_limit to x% immigrants in one school
INT_education_no problems
INT_education_risk and opportunity
INT_educational system inclusive and valorizes pluralism
INT_entities created
INT_equal access to health
INT_equal access to welfare services
INT_equality
INT_example CAT
INT_Example Quebec
INT_extend rights
INT_focus on women
INT_full incorporation into basque society
INT_give voice to immigrants
INT_health
INT_housing
INT_integral and transversal
INT_intercultural
INT_into bilingual reality
INT_labour
INT_language learning
INT_limit to municipal level
INT_limits in labour market integration because of legal situation
INT_living together
INT_measures to promote origin culture
INT_media
INT_multiannual plan
INT_multicultural
INT_needs management
INT_new realities
INT_no assimilation
INT_no discrimination
INT_normalization of all services
INT_not apply Spanish law
INT_not populism
INT_not possible with judicial category of irregularity
INT_prioritize Basque
INT_public perception
INT_public responsibility
INT_refugees
INT_requires citizenship
INT_requires host society to create space for intercultural actions
INTRequires strategy form public authorities
INT_tolerant host society
INT_respect for origin culture
INT_responsibility of employer
INT_responsibility of public authority to remove barriers of equality
INT_restriction based on residence
INT_right to vote
INT_rights
INT_role of associations, ngo etc
INT_role of municipalities/local level
INT_sensibilisation
INT_Social pact
INT_Sport
INT_support regularizaton
INT_through development aid
INT_welfare

Integration_positive
INT_added value
INT_against antigitano - roma
INT_against exploitation on labour market
INT_against fascims
INT_Against multiple discrimination
INT_against racism
INT_against social exclusion and poverty
INT_Against violence
INT_based on peace, democracy, solidarity, human rights, diversity and equality
INT_basque welcoming country
INT_equalty of rights, of opportunites and angleichung
INT_everybody involved
INT_include in basque national project
INT_inclusive society
INT_no gender discrimination
INT_no repression but integration
INT_not populism
INT_not segregation
INT_participation
INT_protect most vulnerable
INT_Recognize differences
INT_Social cohesion
INT_social inclusion
INT_social pluralism
INT_Vvalorize our culture
INT_welcoming material
INT_willingness of BC society to integrate

2.3 Codes on “the migrant”

Migrant_negative
MIG_seem passive

Migrant_neutral
MIG_badanti
MIG_construction
MIG_foreigners
MIG_high qualified
MIG_illegal
MIG_illegal = hypocritical
MIG_illegal_risk of deprivatiation
MIG_immigrants
MIG_internal immigrants
MIG_international immigrant
MIG_legally resident
MIG_make no difference between legal and illegal
MIG_make no difference between migrants and citizens
MIG_persons
MIG_persons with distinct origins
MIG_pupils
MIG_refugees
MIG_Risk of marginalization
MIG_Roma
MIG_women
MIG_work in "low" segments
MIG_work in agricultre
MIG_workers

Migrant_positive
MIG_citizens
MIG_contribute_enrich
MIG_equal
MIG_everybody who shares our destiny
MIG_have normal necessities like all other pesons
MIG_human
MIG_long conrtributers to the basque society
MIG_more and more plural
MIG_multicultural
MIG_new citizens
MIG_not foreign
MIG_our neighbours and friends
MIG_recently arrived_want to integrate
MIG_some speak basque
MIG_vulnerables
MIG.want participation
MIG_Willing to integrate

2.4 Codes on identity
identity_against poverty and marginalization
identity_also those from other spanish communities
identity_associations
identity_based on basque culture and language
identity_based on dialog and recognition of differences
identity_based on immigration from Spain
identity_based on international immigration
identity_basque as particularity
identity_basque as richness for everybody
identity_basque common language to overcome divisions
identity_bilingual
identity_Bilingual_bicultural
identity_culture basis for id
identity_democracy, autonomy and civil rights
identity_distinct
identity_divided
identity_equality
identity_europe
identity_Everybody included
identity_flexible_open
identity_historical challenge of living together
identity_historical diversity
identity_historical exclusion
identity_IMMI creates complex forms
identity_IMMI demands re-considering it
identity_include diaspora
identity_inclusive
identity_intercultural society
identity_language
identity_living together
identity_minoritized language
identity_minority
identity_mixed
identity_modern
identity_multicultural_multilingual
identity_needs respect for plurality
identity_new values: peace, cultural integration and cohesion, solidarity
identity_no ethnic-civic but identitybased-civic
identity_not only nationalist citizens, but all residents
identity_not threatened by IMMI
identity_ours = all members, not just one community
identity_peace
identity_plural
identity_recognition of human rights and liberties
identity_recognize the difference
identity_shared among people
identity_show BC open to the world
identity_social welfare
identity_solidarity
identity_superate division
identity_territory_and values belong to all residents
identity_tolerant
identity_tradition of emigration
identity_where we want to go together
identity_young

2.5 Other codes

Citizenship

citizenship not based on identity criteria
citizenship_based on residence
citizenship_equality
citizenship_inclusive
citizenship_no differentiation between legal and illegal
citizenship_not connected to nationality
citizenship_rights
Annex 2 – Corsica

1. List of Documents

1.1 Integration Plans/Laws


1.2 Parliamentary Debates in the Corsican Parliament

Date of Debate, followed by keyword I used in the search engine: accessible on the homepage of the Assembly of Corsica, using the date indicated below for each document in the search engine, http://www.corse.fr/Les-seances-publiques_r117.html (last accessed: 16.02.2016)

2-P31: 20.07.2009_officialite_corse
2-P32: 28.05.2009_racisme_anti_corse
2-P33: 07.02.2013_enseignement_corse
2-P34: 16.05.2013_coofficialite_corse
2-P35: 2010_delibertion_corse_terre_sans_expulsion
2-P36: 2013_motion_corse_terre_sans_expulsion_angelini
2-P37: 26.05.2013_officialite_corse
1.3 Election Manifestos and Policy Papers

2-P6: CN, Projet Politique. Pour une devolution, 2003
2-P7: CN, CNI et les élections municipals, 2008.
2-P11: FeC, Un souffle démocratique, 2010
2-P12 and 2-P17: PNC, Valeurs, moyens et objectifs, 2002,
2-P16: PNC, I statuti. (personal archive).

1.4 Other Documents and Press Releases

2-P4: CN, Compilation of Press Releases, 2007
2-P5: CN, Compilation of Press Releases, 2008
2-P22: u ribombo_1998 - 2004.pdf (U Ribomu is the newspaper of CNI; it was also used by FLNC for official communications)
2-P24: u rimbombo 2004 - 2010.pdf
2-P18: Arriti 2009.pdf (Arriti is a local newspaper edited by nationalist groups supported by CN)
2-P19: Arriti 2010 - 2014.pdf
2-P20: Arriti_2010-2014.pdf
2-P38: Arrit 2010-2014.pdf
2-P39: u ribombo 2010 - 2014.pdf
2. List of Codes

2.1 Codes on Immigration

Immigration_negative
IMMI_against
IMMI_against French state
IMMI_challenge for identity
IMMI_changes the socio economic landscape
IMMI_consequences_negative
IMMI_Corsica has no power
IMMI_liberate Corsican land from foreign hands
IMMI_sent back pieds noir
IMMI_settlement policy form French state
IMMI_sign of colonial will to limit economy _sectors unproductive and consumerism
IMMI_threat

Immigration_neutral
IMMI_bring back diaspora
IMMI_challenge_needs attention
IMMI_cultural and demographic equilibrium
IMMI_define in the interest of the Corsicans
IMMI_get competences from state
IMMI_labour market
IMMI_management of flows
IMMI_needs integration

Immigration_positiv
IMMI_contributes to welfare
IMMI_respect for human rights

2.2. Codes on Integration

Integration_negative
INT_i corsi fora
INT_against Le Pen
INT_assimilation difficult because of increased francisation
INT_exploitation from employers
INT_french model failed
INT_housing market_restrict
INT_housing_problems
INT_housing_restrictions
INT_into town difficulties_Ajaccio
INT_problem
INT_restriction based on residence
INT_risk of ethnic fractures_Bastia
INT_second houses
Integration neutral
INT_based on experience of colonisation
INT_bidirectional process
INT_community of destiny
INT_concrete measures
INT_education
INT_french requirements
INT_historical values
INT_housing
INT_integration contract
INT_into associations
INT_into Corsican community
INT_into corsican language increases social cohesion
INT_labour
INT_labour restriction
INT_language
INT_language learning
INT_learning about Corsican life, culture, etc
INT_not assimilation_not insertion
INT_particularity because of minority status
INT_previous problems with racism = black pages
INT_respect historical values
INT_respecting constitution, rule of law and local customs
INT_right to vote
INT_sensibilisation
INT_solidarity
INT_speaking corsican
INT_strengthened through strong corsimse
INT_through citizenship promotion
INT_through strenghtening links with orgin culture

Integration positive
INT_activ
INT_against racism
INT(corsican language for all
INT_everybody involved
INT_no discrimination
INT_participation
INT.requires tolerant host society
INT_social promotion

2.3 Codes on “the migrant”

Migrant_negative
MIG_Francesi Fora
MIG_from France
MIG_treated like slaves
MIG_unemployed

Migrant_neutral
MIG_agricultural workers
MIG_Asylum seekers
MIG_corse d'adoption
MIG_don't understand relations between France and Corsica
MIG_foreigners
MIG_from former colonies
MIG_italian citizens
MIG_italians assimilated
MIG_maghreb
MIG_migrants
MIG_naturalized
MIG_new north african_Maghreb
MIG_pieds noirs
MIG_portuguese
MIG_public administration
MIG_Reside on the coast
MIG_Sans papier
MIG_traditional Italian and Portuguese
MIG_work in agriculture
MIG_work in construction and tourism
MIG_Work in tourism and agriculture
MIG_workers but humans

Migrant_positive
MIG_vulnerable

2.4 Codes on identity
anti-corsism
anti-corsisme_areas
Ausverkauf der Heimat
corsican language under threat
Corsicans seen from French state_negative
cors caractéra
identity_anti-ethnic
identity_bilingual
identity_corsica is a land of migration
identity_corsicans a minority
identity_culture basis for id
identity_incarnation of historical corsican nation
identity_inclusive
identity_language
identity_modern
identity_not a country of immigration
identity_open
identity_open for the latin world
identity_people corse=orgin and adopted
identity_plural
identity_proud of culture and patrimony
identity_reject xenophobia
identity_social justice
identity_terre sans expulsion
Identity_tolerant
people corse
people corse_everybody who shares our values and culture
people corse_who not

2.5 Other codes

Citizenship
corsica_nationalism_defined
corsican_citizen_definition
corsican_citizenship
corsican_citizenship_open_to_diaspora
corsican_citizenship_open_to_all
corsican_citizenship_years_of_residence
example Aaland
example new caledonia_new polynesia
Annex 3 – South Tyrol

1. List of Documents

1.1 Integration Plans/Laws


3-P44: SVP –PD, Koalitionsabkommen (Coalition Program) zur Bildung der Landesregierung für die Legislaturperiode 2013 - 2018 (Personal Archive)

3-P45: SVP –PD, Koalitionsabkommen (Coalition Program) zur Bildung der Landesregierung für die Legislaturperiode 2008 - 2013 (Personal Archive)

1.2 Parliamentary Debates in the South Tyrolean Parliament


3-P75: 12.12.2003_koalitionsprogramm
3-P27: 09.01.2014_ST_RG_Rede Kompatscher Wahl des Landeshauptmanns_2013
3-P28: 06.10.2011_ST_RG_PDdebatte_integrationsgesetz
3-P29: 07.10.2011_ST_RG_PDdebatte_integrationsgesetz
3-P30: 16.09.2011_ST_RG_PDdebatte_integrationsgesetz
3-P31: 15.09.2011_ST_RG_PDdebatte_integrationsgesetz
3-P32: 21.10.2011_ST_RG_PDdebatte_integrationsgesetz
3-P33: 13.12.2006_ST_RG_PDwortprotokoll_klotz_ulli mair
3-P43: ST_Government Declaration_1994
3-P46: 09.02.1990_gesetzesentwurf_förderung der kultur des zusammenlebens
3-P47: 10.07.1991_grünen bringen albanische flüchtlinge in welsberg ein
3-P48: 08.10.1991_flüchtlinge neues problem
3-P49: 08.11.1991_schutz der minderheiten_gegen assimilierung
3-P50: 05.12.1991-aufruf tagung einwanderung von TCN { 
3-P51: 08.01.1991_wer ist eine minderheit_und siegesdenkmal
Annex 3 – South Tyrol

3-P52: 05.04.1991_neuordnung sozialdienste
3-P53: 04.10.1994_grüne bringen gesetzesentwurf ein für integration von EG Bürgern; aktuelle Zahlen
3-P54: 05.10.1994_fortsetzung grüne gesetzesntwurf
3-P55: 09.02.1995_roma und sinti
3-P56: 09.09.1998_wohnbauförderung
3-P57: 10.09.1998_wohnbauförderung
3-P58: 28.01.1999_vorstellung koalitionsprogramm
3-P59: 13.04.1999_leitner_Südtirol zuerst
3-P60: 05.05.1999_errichtung flüchtlingsheim
3-P61: 08.11.2000_einwanderungsquote
3-P62: 06.03.2001_einwanderer_moscheen
3-P63: 07.03.2001_wohnbaufördergesetz
3-P64: 09.03.2001_wohnbaufördergesetz
3-P65: 13.06.2001_leitkurltur_wohnbaufördergesetz
3-P66: 10.10.2001_saisonsarbeiter
3-P67: 06.11.2001_saisonsarbeiter
3-P68: 12.12.2001_Arbeiterwohnheim
3-P69: 06.03.2002_leitner_sicherheit_einwanderung
3-P70: 09.04.2002_aufenthaltsgenehmigungen islamische bürger
3-P71: 07.05.2002_sozialwohnungen_TCN
3-P72: 04.03.2003_kury_errichtung beobachtungsstelle
3-P73: 11.03.2003_leitner_zuständigkeiten an land
3-P74: 17.07.2003_leitner moschee
3-P76: 03.02.2004_leitner_kompetenzen
3-P77: 02.03.2004_sozialwohnungen
3-P78: 22.09.2004_mig in ital. schulen
3-P79: 12.10.2004_einwanderer kriminell
3-P80: 29.06.2005_sprach_integrationskurse
3-P81: 12.07.2006_wohngeld ansässigkeit
3-P82: 10.10.2006_leitner integration
3-P83: 15.12.2006_integration in ital. schule
3-P84: 08.05.2007_neueinwohner_südtirol zuerst
3-P85: 26.06.2007_wohngeld
3-P86: 12.07.2007_wohngeld_gedenkjahr 2009
3-P87: 13.12.2007_sozialsystem
3-P88: 03.04.2008_ausländer in schule
3-P89: 06.05.2008_sozialwohnungen
3-P90: 27.05.2008_ausländerwahlrecht_familienzusammenführung_wohnen
3-P91: 10.06.2008_gegen ghetto_gegen immersion
3-P92: 12.06.2008_ordnung kindergarten unterstufe
3-P93: 13.06.2008_ordnung kindergarten_unterstufe
3-P94: 08.07.2008_sozialpolitik zuwanderung
3-P95: 12.09.2008_wohnen
3-P96: 03.10.2008_wohnen
3-P97: 02.04.2009_kompetenzen einwanderung
3-P98: 09.06.2009_einheimische zuerst
1.3 Election Manifestos

The election manifestos have been collected from the party archives, and are shared by the author upon request.

3-P5: SF, Landtagswahlen 2008.
3-P8: SVP, Mit Euch für Südtirol, Wahlprogramm 2008-2012.
1.4 Other Party Documents (Press releases, Policy Papers etc.)

Policy Papers have been collected in the party archives and can be requested from the author.


3-P38: SVP, Grundsatzpapier 2003. (Statute 2003)

3-P39: SVP, Stolz auf Suedtirol. (Policy Paper on Minority Protection)


3-P15: dF, Parteigründung, 1992. (Statute)

3-P16: SF, Satzung, 31.05.2007. (Statute)

3-P17: SVP, Gruendungsprogramm 1945. (Statute)


3-P19 and 3-P36: SVP, Statut (Statute)

2. List of Codes

2.1 Codes on Immigration

Immigration_negative
IMMI_against
IMMI_challenge for identity
IMMI_challenge_needs attention
IMMI_costs too much
IMMI_demographic change
IMMI_family reunin
IMMI_family reunion_restriction criteria
IMMI_illegal migrants
IMMI_increased criminalisation
IMMI_low wages_consequences
IMMI_mismanagement Italian state
IMMI_more than ladins
IMMI_needs control
IMMI_no coordination from EU
IMMI_prefer locals for labour market
IMMI_problem not for labour but housing
IMMI_restrict
IMMI_result of globalization_economy_challenge
IMMI_right to heimat does not allow uncontrolled immigraiton
IMMI_security concern
IMMI_social tourism
IMMI_south Tyrol attractive
IMMI_support return
IMMI_threat
IMMI_uncontrolled
IMMI_unemployment
IMMI_used by right wing parties
IMMI_used to get votes

Immigration_neutral
IMMI_actors_coordination
IMMI_against emigration
IMMI_asylum
IMMI_consequences
IMMI_coordination EU
IMMI_employment
IMMI_examples for management in Germany and Austria
IMMI_for management of flows
IMMI_free movement
IMMI_get competences from state
IMMI_globalization
IMMI_labour market
IMMI_model to attract labour migrants
IMMI_need for data
IMMI_needs integration
IMMIpermanent
IMMI_quota in schools
IMMI_reasons for
IMMI_seasonal work

Immigration positive
IMMI_contributes to welfare
IMMI_find solution together with state
IMMI_for foreign labour if needed
IMMI_high qualified
IMMI_labo

r market needs
IMMI_natural fact
IMMI_needed_caretakers
IMMI_normal
IMMI_opportunity
IMMI_Schengen positive
IMMI_students

2.2. Codes on Integration

Integration negative
INT_adaptation from migrants requested
INTequality not reached
INT_prejudice welfare system
INT_there is racism in the BC society
INT_xenophobia a threat for democracy
INT_adaptation from migrants requested
INT_antidiscrimination union no
INT_beneficiaries of welfare system
INT_change of balance of power
INT_creation of dormitory for foreigners
INT_discrimination of locals/german
INT_education language tests for immigrants
INT_follows italian principles
INT_germans become a minority in their own terr
INT_housing in emergencies
INT_housing problems
INT_housing restrictions
INT_islam requirement of german or italian
INT_locals first
INT_needs management
INT_no disadvantage for local community
INT_no mosque
INT_no need for respect/support of their cultures
INT_no parallel worlds
INT_no price dumping
INT_not allowing muslim religious practices
INT_not for criminals
INT_not for refugees
INT_not needed but return
INT_not populism
INT_problem
INT_quota for migrants
INT_residence permit only with adequate housing and labour
INT_respect for autonomy statute
INT_respect for local culture
INT_respecting constitution, rule of law and local customs
INT_restriction based on labour
INT_restriction based on language learning
INT_restriction based on residence
INT_restrictions of family reunion
INT_separate school for immigrants
INT_similar experience with italian migration
INT_social welfare_basic
INT_voting right EU_restrict
INT_weak integration law

Integration_neutral
INT_Actors
INT_aim
INT_asylum
INT_become south tyrolean
INT_bidirectional process
INT_citizenship
INT_civic education for adult immigrants_obligatory
INT_concrete measures
INT_coordination
INT_demand willingness to integrate
INT_demaning and supporting
INT_duties and rights
INT_education
INT_equal access to health
INT_everybody from other region to ST, also Italians
INT_example Austria
INT_example CAT
INT_example Germany
INT_facilitated through intercultural mediation
INT_german_ladin_italian
INT_humanitarian-christian values
INT_into associations
Annex 3 – South Tyrol

INT_into german and ladin
INT_into german group
INT_into italian group
INT_into south tyrolean society
INT_labour
INT_labour and housing
INT_language
INT_language and labour
INT_language centre
INT_multianannual plan
INT_parents
INT_particularity because of minority status
INT_protect local identity
INT_refugees
INT_religion
INT_responsibility of employer
INT_role of associations, ngo etc
INT_role of municipalities/local level
INT_role of women
INT_second generation
INT_support for housing
INT_through education
INT_through family
INT_through language

Integration_positive
INT_activ
INT_added value
INT_against racism
INT_basis human rights
INT_basis of three language groups as basis for further integration
INT_data and coordination exist
INT_dialog
INT_equality
INT_everybody involved
INT_gender equality
INT_german school success
INT_language groups and new diversity_together
INT_meeting each other
INT_minority should not force others into own culture
INT_needs a budget
INT_no discrimination
INT_no problem
INT_no quota for migrants
INT_no threat for identity
INT_no threat for social security
INT_not segregation
INT_open_tolerant_clear borders
INT_participation
INT_positive integration
INT_prejudice welfare system
INT_requires tolerant host society
INT_right to religion
INT_right to vote
INT_sensibilisation
INT_south Tyrol has done a lot
INT_South Tyrol welcoming country

2.3 Codes on “the migrant”

Migrant_negative
MIG_Albania
MIG_basis for recognition is commitment to heimat
MIG_criminals
MIG_criminals_send them out
MIGIllegal
MIG_illegal_risk of deprivatiation
MIG_muslims
MIG_not aware of particularity
MIG_sinti and roma
MIG_social tourists
MIG_social tourists_measures
MIG_unemployed

Migrant_neutral
MIG_beneficiaries of law
MIG_children
MIG_differentiate
MIG_foreigners
MIG_good and bad ones
MIG_guests
MIG_refugees
MIG_seasonal workes
MIG_TCN
MIG_women
MIG_workers

Migrant_positive
MIG_closer to our culture
MIG_EU countries
MIG_high proportion of EU
MIG_high qualified
MIG_new co-citizens
MIG_not automatically misusing social welfare
MIG_prefer from EU
MIG_recruited people
MIG_take care of our old people
MIG_Willing to integrate
MIG_workers but humans

2.4 Codes on identity
"heimat"
autonomy_further develop for identity
catholic
christian_humanitarian values
culture_identity_freedom_tolerance_human dignity
different form Italy
forced to become Italian
historical experiences
history_minority
identity_associations
identity_culture basis for id
identity_dialog
identity_ehrenamt
identity_protection of german and ladin culture
local customs_identity
modern
multilingual territory
relation with Italy and between groups
together as value

2.5 Other codes

Autonomy
autonomy
autonomy_strengthened minority
autonomy_further develop for identity
autonomy_not enough for minority protection
Annex 4 – Scotland

1. List of Documents

1.1 Integration Plans/Laws and Government Programmes


1.2 Parliamentary Debates in the Scottish Parliament (Date of Debate)


4-P29: 03.09.2003
4-P33: 05.11.2009
4-P35: 10.02.2005
4-P36: 10.09.2008
4-P38: 11.09.2003
4-P41: 12.02.2004
1.3 Election Manifestos

4-P 1: SNP, Election Manifesto, 1999.
4-P13 and 4-P27: SNP, If Scotland Matters to You, Make It Matter in May, (General Election) 2005
4-P14: SNP, Our Independence Manifesto, 2005.
4-P15 and 4-P28: SNP, Elect a local champion, (Local Elections) 2010
4-P23: SNP, Re-elect a Scottis Government working for Scotland, 2011.
4-P25: SNP, Yes we Can! Win the Best for Scotland, (General Election) 1997
4-P26: SNP_Heart of the Manifesto, 2001

1.4 Other Party Documents (Press releases, collected with the keyword I indicate; Policy Papers, Speeches etc.)

4-P62: SNP, Compilation of Press Releases - Diversity and Racism
4-P63: SNP, Compilation of Press Releases - Identity
4-P64: SNP, Compilation of Press Releases - Immigration
4-P65: SNP, Compilation of Press Releases - Integration
4-P66: SNP, Compilation of Press Releases - Language
4-P67: SNP, Compilation of Press Release -1999
2. List of Codes

2.1 Codes on Immigration

Immigration_negative
IMMI_against Westminster
IMMI_low wages_consequences
IMMI_problem
IMMI_security concern

Immigration_neutral
IMMI_demographic change
IMMI_get competences from UK
IMMI_challenge_needs attention
IMMI_natural fact
IMMI_need for data

Immigration_positiv
example Australia
example Catalonia
IMMI_against aging population
IMMI_against emigration
IMMI_against falling population rate
IMMI_attract
IMMI_Example Quebec
IMMI_for management of flows
IMMI_good for economy
IMMI_labour market
IMMI_labour market needs
IMMI_opportunity
INT_diversity_added value

2.2. Codes on Integration

Integration_negative
INT_beneficiaries of welfare system
INT_housing in emergencies
INT_housing_problems
INT_no disadvantage for local community

Integration_neutral
INT_citizenship
INT_concrete measures
INT_education
INT_health
INT_labour
INT_labour and housing
Integration_positive

Migrant_negative
n.a.

Migrant_neutral
MIG_black and ethnic minority
MIG_children
MIGMuslims

2.3 Codes on “the migrant”
MIG_poland
MIG_qualifications
MIG_refugees
MIG_Students
MIG_travellers
MIG_workers

Migrant_positive
MIG_ethnic minorities
MIG_high qualified
MIG_many different communities
MIG_new co-citizens
MIG_not always criminals
MIG_Scots
MIG_skilled
MIG_Welcome

2.4 Codes on identity
identity_diversity_based on historical exp.
identity_modern
identity_multicultural
identity_multiple
identity_open_inclusive
identity_scottish flag
identity_values
Annex 5 – Wales

1. List of Documents

1.1 Integration Plans/Laws and Government Programmes

5-P190: Welsh Assembly Government, A Welcome to Wales Pack for Migrant Workers, 2006,

5-P191: Welsh Assembly Government, People, Plans and Partnerships - National Evaluation of Community Strategies in Wales, 2006,

5-P192: Welsh Assembly Government, Understanding Wales, 2010,


5-P194: Welsh Assembly Government, Strategic Equality Plan and Objectives 2012 – 2016,


5-P196: Welsh Assembly Government, Race Equality Scheme

1.2 Parliamentary Debates in the Welsh National Assembly (Date of Debate)

Date of Debate, accessible on the homepage of the Welsh National Assembly, using the date indicated below for each document in the search engine,

5-P 8: 01.02.2000
5-P 9: 02.11.2000
5-P10: 03.05.2001
5-P11: 04.04.2000
5-P12: 04.07.2000
5-P13: 04.12.2002
5-P14: 05.02.2002
5-P15: 05.07.2001
5-P16: 06.07.1999
5-P17: 06.11.2001
5-P18: 07.03.2002
5-P19: 07.05.2002
5-P20: 07.06.2000
5-P21: 07.12.1999
5-P22: 08.02.2000
5-P23: 09.11.2001
5-P24: 10.05.2000
5-P25: 12.07.2001
5-P26: 12.10.2000
5-P28: 13.07.1999
5-P29: 14.03.2002
5-P30: 14.05.2002
5-P31: 14.09.2000
5-P33: 15.01.2002
5-P34: 15.05.2001
5-P35: 15.11.2001
5-P36: 15.12.1999
5-P37: 16.01.2001_1
5-P38: 16.10.2001
5-P39: 17.07.2001_1
5-P40: 17.07.2001
5-P41: 18.01.2000
5-P42: 18.06.2002
5-P43: 18.10.2001
5-P44: 19.01.2000_01
5-P45: 19.03.2003
5-P46: 19.05.1999
5-P49: 21.06.2001
5-P50: 22.01.2003
5-P52: 22.05.2001
5-P53: 23.01.2001
5-P54: 23.04.2002
5-P55: 23.11.2001
5-P56: 23.11.1999
5-P57: 24.05.2001
5-P58: 25.01.2000
5-P59: 25.01.2001
5-P60: 25.04.2002
5-P61: 26.03.2003
5-P62: 26.06.2001
5-P63: 27.06.2001
5-P64: 27.06.2002
5-P65: 27.11.2001
5-P66: 28.01.2003
5-P67: 29.03.2000
5-P68: 29.03.2001
5-P69: 30.04.2002
5-P70: 30.05.2002
5-P71: 01.12.2004
5-P72: 02.11.2004
5-P73: 03.02.2004
5-P74: 03.03.2004
5-P75: 03.10.2006
5-P76: 03.12.2003
5-P77: 05.05.2004
5-P78: 05.07.2006
5-P79: 07.07.2004
5-P81: 08.03.2006
5-P83: 08.07.2003
5-P84: 08.11.2006
5-P88: 11.01.2006
5-P95: 16.06.2004
5-P96: 17.05.2005
5-P98: 17.11.2004
5-P100: 19.05.2004
5-P102: 21.09.2004
5-P106: 24.05.2005
5-P111: 27.01.2004
5-P116: 28.03.2007
5-P119: 01.03.2011
5-P120: 01.07.2009
5-P121: 02.02.2010
5-P122: 02.06.2009
5-P124: 03.12.2008
5-P125: 04.11.2008
5-P127: 06.06.2010
5-P128: 06.07.2010
5-P129: 06.10.2009
5-P130: 06.11.2007
5-P133: 09.07.2008
5-P134: 10.03.2009
5-P136: 10.12.2008
5-P138: 11.03.2009
1.3 Election Manifestos

5-P 1: PC, Wales First, European Election Manifesto, 2014.
5-P 3: PC, We can build a better Wales. Westminster Election Manifesto, 2005.
5-P 5: PC, Make a Difference, National Assembly Election Manifesto, 2007.

1.4 Other Party Documents (Press releases, collected with the keyword I used; Policy Papers, Minutes from Annual Conferences etc.)

The Annual Conference Minutes were provided by Craig McAngus, University of Aberdeen, and can be shared upon request. The collected motions on immigration and integration have been provided by the Secretary of PC.

5-P201: PC, Compilation of Press releases _identity
5-P202: PC, Compilation of Press releases _immigration
5-P204: PC, Annual Conference 2001 Minutes
5-P205: PC, Annual Conference 2003 Minutes
5-P206: PC, Annual Conference 2002 Minutes
5-P207: PC, Annual Conference 2000 Minutes
5-P208: PC, Annual Conference 1999 Minutes
5-P209: PC, Annual Conference 1997 Minutes
5-P210: PC, Annual Conference 2009 Minutes
5-P211: PC, Annual Conference 2010 Minutes
5-P212: PC, Annual Conference 2004 Minutes
5-P213: PC, Collected Motions 2007
5-P214: PC, Collected Motions 2011doc
5-P215: PC, Annual Conference 2008 Minutes
5-P216: PC, Motions referring to Migration
2. List of Codes

2.1 Codes on Immigration

**Immigration negative**
- IMMI_against Westminster
- IMMI_challenge for identity
- IMMI_internal from UK
- IMMI_low wages_consequences
- IMMI_not devolved matter
- IMMI_security concern
- IMMI_threat
- IMMI_threat for housing market
- IMMI_threat for language
- IMMI_against Westminster

**Immigration neutral**
- IMMI_asylum
- IMMI_challenge_needs attention
- IMMI_coordination EU
- IMMI_employment
- IMMI_Example Quebec
- IMMI_Example Scotland
- IMMI_for management of flows
- IMMI_free movement
- IMMI_get competences from UK
- IMMI_historical connection with Patagonia
- IMMI_impact on education
- IMMI_labour market
- IMMI_labour market needs
- IMMI_long history
- IMMI_natural fact
- IMMI_reasons for
- IMMI_Select
- IMMI_similar experiences of locals emigrating
- IMMI_slower increase

**Immigration positiv**
- IMMI_against emigration
- IMMI_attract
- IMMI_gives face to assembly
- IMMI_good for economy
- IMMI_needed for skills shortage
- IMMI_opportunity
2.2. Codes on Integration

Integration_negative
anti-English
Ausverkauf der Heimat
INT_prejudice mass population
INT_racism in the Valleys
INT_racism looks for scapegoat

Integration_neutral
historical experiences
INT_asylum
INT_childcare
INT_citizenship
INT_concrete measures
INT_devolved areas
INT_education
INT_education_language tests for immigrants
INT_faith schools
INT_health
INT_historical experiences
INT_housing
INT_housing in emergencies
INT_housing_problems
INT_include BME in history curriculum
INT_into Welsh language
INT_labour
INT_language
INT_language learning
INT_participation
INT_refugees
INT_religion
INT_role of associations, ngo etc
INT_role of municipalities/local level
INT_second generation
INT_secondary competences in education_health
INT_social welfare_basic
INT_sports
INT_through language
INT_Welsh and English

Integration_positive
INT_activ
INT_against bullying
INT_against exploitation
INT_against racism
INT_against trafficking
INT_basis human rights
INT_cohesion
INT_dialog
INT_diversity_added value
INT_equal access to health
INT_everybody involved
INT_no discrimination
INT_not populism
INT_not segregation
INT.requires tolerant host society
INT_respect for origin culture
INT_respecting constitution, rule of law and local customs
INT_Wales welcoming
INT_Welsh for everybody
multilingualism_added value
multilingualism_good for economy

2.3 Codes on “the migrant”

Migrant_negative
MIG_more than Welsh
MIG_risk of marginalisation
MIG_unemployed

Migrant_neutral
MIG_Asylum seekers
MIG_black and ethnic minority
MIG_children
MIG_citizens of Wales whose first language is neither Welsh nor English
MIG_differentiate
MIG_ethnic minorities
MIG_EU countries
MIG_internal from UK
MIG_migrants
MIG_muslims
MIG_poor
MIG_pupils
MIG_racial minorities
MIG_refugees
MIG_Romania_Bulgaria
MIG_Somalis
MIG_Students
MIG_travelers
MIG_vulnerable
MIG_wealthy
MIG_workers

Migrant_positive
MIG_great ambassadors
MIG_high qualified
MIG_new co-citizens
MIG_not always criminals
MIG_not automatically misusing social welfare
MIG_take care of our old people

2.4 Codes on identity
identity_against fascism
identity_bilingual
identity_changing
identity_civic
identity_cosmopolitan
identity_culture basis for id
identity_diversity_based on historical exp.
identity_don't forget_uniqueness Welsh
identity_ethnic
identity_feeling Welsh
identity_history
identity_language
identity_local
identity_modern
identity_multicultural
identity_multiple
identity_open_inclusive
identity_skills shortage
identity_values
identity_welsh
vision for future_pos
Wales_safe heaven
Annex 6 – The economic background of each minority nation

Table 21 – Overview of the economic background of the selected minority nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority Nation</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>Wales</th>
<th>Basque Country</th>
<th>Corsica</th>
<th>South Tyrol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP per inhabitant in € (2011)</strong></td>
<td>21,600-41,800 (Highlands and Islands – North Eastern Scotland)</td>
<td>17,200-24,000</td>
<td>32,100</td>
<td>23,300</td>
<td>38,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment rate (2011) with intra-regional variation when considerable</strong></td>
<td>4.6% - 9.9% (North Eastern Scotland – South Western Scotland)</td>
<td>9.9% - 6.5% (West Wales and the Valleys – East Wales)</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>7.8% (2012)</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main sectors of business</strong></td>
<td>tertiary sector/banking, manufacturing, oil industry</td>
<td>light industry, manufacturing, tourism.</td>
<td>industry, tertiary sector.</td>
<td>tourism, agriculture.</td>
<td>agriculture, tourism.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: Eurostat 2011.
Annex 7 – Preparatory work for final case selection

After an initial screening of all possible minority nations and national minority groups living in Europe, I selected the cases listed in 7.1 and prepared for each case a “case profile” following the variables listed in 7.2. Then, I prepared tables which included the important variables regarding minorities and migration. Finally, I prepared ‘maps of potential cases’ (Table 22 and Table 23 in 7.3). Based on the tables and background work, I selected the cases following the rationale explained in Chapter three.

7.1 Overview of possible cases
List of possible cases – national minorities and minority nations

South Tyrol (I) – German speakers  
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia (I) – Slovenian speakers  
Sardegna (I) - Sardinians  
Catalonia (ES) – Catalans  
Basque Country (ES) – Basques  
Northern Ireland (UK) – Catholics (or look at Protestants? Or both?)  
Scotland (UK) – Scots  
Wales (UK) – Welsh people  
Flanders/Wallonia (B) – German group  
Ticino (CH) – Italian speaking group  
Corsica (F) – Corsicans  
Aaland Island (FIN) – Swedish speakers  
Quebec (CAN) – French speakers

7.2 Important variables
Migration related information

Number of migrants  
History of migration/second and third generation  
Biggest groups  
Peculiarities

Minority related information
Data

• number (in the territory/region inhabited by them and on national level)  
• geographical concentration  
• historical settlement
Constitutional status (legal protection mechanisms)
- Constitutionally recognized
- Group rights constitutionally confirmed
- Territorial or cultural autonomy
- Distribution of legislative powers between centre and periphery

Functional approach: What does a national minority group need to survive/what does a minority claim as necessary to preserve and promote their distinctiveness/their identity?
- Political participation
  - at national level/at regional level
- Use of minority language
  - In public life, in education system, in media;
- Organization of the educational system
- Organization of the media system

Nationalistic atmosphere
- Expression of nationalistic ideas
- Nation-building goals/Will for self-determination

Organization of society
- degree of division
- ways of co-habitation
7.3 Maps of potential case studies

Table 22: Map of potential case studies according to the degree of intergroup contact/degree of division in the society, and the degree of minority protection (competences in the areas of integration in brackets)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>social and political-institutional division</th>
<th>high social division/high degree of political—institutional division</th>
<th>low social division/medium degree of political-institutional division</th>
<th>no social and no political-institutional division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>level of minority protection (competences in the areas of integration/level of autonomy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low protection = no to very few competences to protect their distinctiveness (no powers to govern integration/low level of autonomy)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Corsica</td>
<td>Slovens in Friuli-Venezia-Giulia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>middle protection = some competences to protect their distinctiveness (some powers to govern integration/middle level of autonomy)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>Sardegna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high protection – territorial autonomy, (many competences in the areas of integration/high level of autonomy)</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>South Tyrol Basque Country</td>
<td>Catalonia Ticino Scotland Quebec German Community in Belgium Aaland Island</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 23: Map of potential case studies according to main demography of immigrant population (history of immigration wave in brackets in years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predominant groups</th>
<th>% of total pop</th>
<th>Less than 5%</th>
<th>Between 5 and 10%</th>
<th>More than 10%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European – EU</td>
<td></td>
<td>Northern Ireland (~ 20)</td>
<td></td>
<td>German community in Belgium (~ 40; most of them are from Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aaland Island (~ 10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European – non-EU</td>
<td></td>
<td>South Tyrol (~ 20)</td>
<td>Slovenes in Friuli-Venezia-Giulia (~ 20)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-European</td>
<td>Sardegna (~ 8)</td>
<td>Basque country (~ 20)</td>
<td>Scotland (~ 20)</td>
<td>Catalonia (~ 20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wales (~ 10)</td>
<td>Corsica (~ 50)</td>
<td>Quebec (~ 50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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