Schizorevolutions vs. Microfascisms: The Fear of Anarchy in State Securitization

Introduction: Hierarchy as a productive political structure

Any theory that accepts formal anarchy among states as a defining feature of international politics implicitly presupposes the productive effects of hierarchies.

(Mattern and Zarakol, 2016: 642).

This article examines how hierarchy operates as a productive political structure in state securitization, within the third logic of Mattern and Zarakol’s (2016: 623) three logics, within which hierarchy operates in International Relations scholarship: Hierarchy as an institutional function bargain between actors (a logic of trade-offs); hierarchy as differentiated social and political roles shaping behavior (a logic of positionality); and hierarchy as a productive political space or structure (a logic of productivity). In Mattern and Zarakol (2016), ‘the feature of hierarchies most central to the logic of productivity is their practical or performative, ontology’ (p. 641) with the focal point ‘disclosing the mechanisms of power through which particular discursive regimes of truth produce and naturalize hierarchies and the political inequalities that flow from them’ (p.642).

In order to discuss hierarchy as a productive political structure, we investigate the role of“anarchy” in state securitization. By discussing state hierarchies’ struggle with active and reactive anarchic networks, we theorise a state in existential crisis which exploits anti-anarchist discourses to respond to network threats, and in the second part, we
illustrate with examples the use of fear of anarchy in hierarchical productive structures of securitization. In the concluding part, we discuss visions of desecuritizing society, breaking away from majoritarian logics of control, and the coming of other worlds counterposed to the hierarchies producing and reproducing an eternal loop of state and network terror.

The central starting point of this argumentation is that the world system is a hierarchical system, not an anarchic system and that the fear of ‘anarchy’ itself is used as a red herring by states, in the context of the antagonism between statist, hierarchical structures versus network social logics (both active and reactive). We suggest that the network form and 'social principle' in Kropotkin’s (1897) sense translate to statist thought as anarchy in the Hobbesian sense. We suggest that Hobbes inaccurately portrays states as necessarily protective and industry-promoting, a viewpoint untenable from a bottom-up point of view, yet pointing to the necessity of the state's integrative function for capitalism as an axiomatic system. This role is not productive, but rather, consists in separating active force from what it can do, in order to capture it for exploitation. As an 'antiproduction assemblage', the state treats logics stemming from the 'social principle' as a repressed Real, the exclusion of which underpins its own functioning. Applying this analysis to the present day, we analyse the securitization discourse of 'new threats' as a statist response to the uncertainty and fear brought on by the proliferation of opposing network forms of organization. This response is a statist form of terror attempting to fix network flows in place. The scarcity and fear resulting from state terror ensures responses to this structural violence by reactive networks, whilst paradoxically also exacerbating reactive tendencies within social movements, creating a spiral of terror, and the very situation of global civil war which
Hobbesian/Realist IR theory - reliant on the schema of states struggling for power in an anarchic international system - attempts to ward off.

Further, this argumentation is based on a distinction between states and network movements on the one hand, and between two types of network on the other. Elsewhere, we have conceptually divided networks into the affinity-active network form and the reactive network form (Karatzogianni and Robinson, 2010). These derive from the distinctions between active (or schizoid) and reactive (or paranoiac) forces or desires in a Deleuze/Nietzsche synthetical theory (ibid.). Reactive forces are associated with closure of meaning and identity. Active desire subordinates social production to desiring-production. Active forces are associated with difference and transformation: ‘only active force asserts itself, it affirms its difference and makes its difference an object of affirmation’ (Deleuze, 2006: 55-6). Active forces are connected to affirmative desire, and reactive forces to nihilistic desire; affirmation and negation are ‘becoming-active’ and ‘becoming-reactive’ respectively (Deleuze, 2006: 54). For Deleuze, active forces are primary, as without them, reactive forces could not be forces (Deleuze, 2006: 41). Reactive force can dominate active force, but not by becoming active – rather, by alienating and disempowering it (2006: 57).

In Nick Land’s (2011: 277) terrific take, revolutionary and anti-fascist politics lies in resisting capital’s molar projection of its death. That is the key and the contrast with fascist desire:

Revolutionary desire allies itself with the molecular death that is distributed by the signifier; facilitating uninhibited productive flows, whilst fascist desire
invests the molar death that is distributed by the signifier; rigidly segmenting
the production process according to the borders of transcendent identities.

While open space is a necessary and enabling good from the standpoint of active desire, it is perceived as a threat by the state, because it is space in which demonised Others can gather and recompose networks outside state control. Hence, for the threatened state, open space is space for the enemy. It is a space of risk, which needs to be mitigated. Given that open space is necessary for difference to function, since otherwise it is excluded as unrepresentable or excessive, the attempts to render all space closed and governable involve a constant war on difference, which expands into the fabric of everyday life. Horizontal networks flow around the state’s restrictions, moving into residual unregulated spaces, gaps in the state’s capacity to repress, across national borders, or into the virtual. Networks tend to take a reactive form when exposed to a hostile context. Similarly, Bourdieu argues that neoliberalism strengthens reactive networks by demoralising and producing emotional turmoil (1998: 100), while Bauman links paranoiac social forces to insecurity (Bauman, 2000). Baudrillard argues in The Agony of Power that every extension of hegemony is also an extension of terror: “Terror is multiplied by the grotesque profusion of security measures that end up causing perverse autoimmune effects: the antibodies turn against the body and cause more damage than the virus” (2010: 94).

Within this context, our discussion focuses on unravelling the interplay between security/insecurity, active/reactive, schizorevolutionary/microfascist, and autonomous desire/fear management in contemporary agency, state (in)security, and resistance movements. The key point is that reactive micro-fascist (in)security fear management
discourses represent a distinct standpoint of the state, and not an orientation to protecting civilians or non-state actors. It represents an attempt by the state, to seize control of society, so as to operate social relations according to its own guiding principles. It is thus fundamentally against the interests of non-state social groups and networks. Or as Reid explains, ‘Deleuze does not simply mean that nomads employed warfare against the actual existing states they encountered but that they used war as a means to fend off the emergence of a state apparatus within their own societies (2003: 63). Here, the difference is between forms of war that are codified by the state and “absolute war” defying state codification (Reid, 2016, p. 74). The following section theorises the state in existential crises to set up the fear of anarchy in securitization critique.

The State in Existential Crisis

The statist idea of “anarchy”, as seen in Hobbes (1996 [1651]), Realism and securitisation, is actually a misperception of the affirmative power, the “power-to”, of social networks and social movements. The state misperceives insecurity and disorder whenever its own perceptions do not yield an appearance of order. As Bergson (1998) argues, disorder is a false concept. It is a false perception arising from the recognition of a type of existence undesirable to or incompatible with one’s own interests or needs. Disorder, therefore, is simply undesired order, from a certain point of view. Reality can be defined as disorderly relative to a particular project or set of practical needs. If disorder is relative to a point of view, then the point of view used in statist definitions is the state’s own. The state perceives chaos or (bad) anarchy, not because there is no order, but because this order is incompatible with the state’s own existence. For instance, Singer (1971: 232) describes “anarchy” in the statist sense as “one of the most
fashionable words of our time”, trotted out whenever those in power feel challenged. What was seen as anarchy in France in 1968, in Russia in 1917, and in many other situations is really a question of dual power (ibid 1971: 233-4). Dual power is parallel power – or power of non-state forces – brought to crisis point. It is a necessary part of social transformation. The effect of refusing to recognise dual power is the dehumanisation of adversaries.

The state goes back 5000 years, and features of its basic logic have persisted from its earliest form to the present (Dean and Massumi, 1992). Deleuze and Guattari theorise the state primarily as a repressive, “antiproductive” force. The state seeks to regulate speed, erecting barriers in the way of migratory packs (1987: 386). It fragments the “parts” from each other to create a formal and empty unity (1983: 212). Hence, the state is a machine for overdetermining, blocking and subjugating social relations via violence (Deleuze and Guattari, 1996: 254-5). State violence is “a violence that posits itself as pre-accomplished, even though it is reactivated every day” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 447). “The State machine and the machine of repression produce antiproduction, that is to say signifiers that exist to block and prevent the emergence of any subjective process on the part of the group” (Guattari, 1984: 34). As well as its own parts such as bureaucracies, it reintegrates the existing social segments as “organs of production” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 198), appropriating reality into its own system (ibid. 210). Hence, the state does not originate but captures social flows and assemblages, decomposing their horizontal connections along the way. Societies, like people, end up torn between the two poles of active and reactive – the deterritorialising flows and the Urstaat (ibid. 260). These poles parallel what elsewhere are portrayed as the two poles of desire, the schizorevolutionary and microfascist, or active and reactive
poles.

This decompositive view of the state is shared by insurrectionist and autonomist authors. For instance, Gilles Dauvé (2000: 28) argues that “the substance of the state resides not in institutional forms, but in its unifying function. The state ensures the tie which human beings cannot and dare not create among themselves, and creates a web of services both parasitic and real”. The irony of a recent British law which defines gathering together in a public place as “anti-social behaviour”, whereby the state poses as the source of society and guarantor against the “anti-social”, when in fact it pursues and flourishes in the destruction of the social, demanding personal direct submission without intermediaries. The state is thus a source of constant social conflict, but blames this conflict on others: people engage in various activities without the state’s permission, the state intervenes, then blames the people for the resultant fight (Ward 1982: 137). In Hardt and Negri’s terms (2004: 239): “Modern sovereignty… does not put an end to violence and fear, but rather puts an end to civil war by organizing violence and fear into a coherent and stable political order.”

A similar theory of the state as viewing social life as risk can be found in Virilio. For him, the military class struggles against the “badly-defined collection of freedoms, risks and uncertainties” of spontaneity in an environment (Virilio 1990: 14), seeking to eliminate chance and contingency from social relations (ibid.18-19). War is the origin of totalitarianism, because it has become an attempt to deny others dialogue, the chance to rework perspectives, instead seeking to control the adversary by redefining their space (ibid. 17). In Virilio’s (1990: 73) terms, the role of security discourse is to suppress the distinctness of civilian society, and place it under military command.
Today’s warfare is “logistical”. It does not simply fight an enemy on an existing terrain, but seeks to rearrange space so as to prevent the enemy from acting (Virilio 1986: 117-18, 145). Applied against the military’s own society, this leads to “endocolonialism”, or the internalisation of colonial power. Virilio (2000: 14) portrays everyday life as colonised or polluted by military ways of seeing, expressed through technologies such as surveillance cameras and disconnected images. Security scares become a kind of “orgy” allowing the release of otherwise repressed emotions (Virilio 1990: 68-9).

**Genealogies of Statist Thought**

Hobbes saw the state as a way for the rich to secure their goods “forever” (1996:70). The state guarantees “industry”: “that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly” (1996: 120). A Hobbesian state overtly relies on “terror” to force compliance (1996:120). In other words, the state does not wage a war against terror, but uses a greater terror to offset a lesser terror: that of each nonstate actor. If this offsets greater terror overall, it is only because Hobbes sees other civilians, and not statists, as the main threat to the peace and welfare of each civilian. Hobbes believed that, in stateless societies, “men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of grieve) in keeping company”, and took Native Americans as an example of this (1996: 88-9). For Hobbes, “crime”, banditry or civil war derive from the absence of concentrated power.

This brief account of Hobbes has relevance for today’s fears of global “anarchy”. For Hobbes, and numerous others, from Machiavelli to Von Treitschke, morality and the good of citizens comes second to the good of the state (Meineke, 1957). Hobbes is writing in the absolutist Europe of the Borgias, Ivan the Terrible and Vlad the Impaler,
a period when the state, allied with an emergent finance capital, first emerged from its
dependence on feudal lords and lineage-based communities. Similar models of
absolutism returned whenever states had overwhelming power: in Bonapartism, in
modern totalitarianism, and today, in securitisation. The ideological limits to state
power, whether religious or political, emerge from its relations with social forces. To
the extent that the state is able to become autonomous of other social forces, it acts on
its own immanent “class ideology” of absolute power.

Feminist IR theory exposes this relationship in graphic terms. Feminists argue that
there is a close connection between “manly men, states and war” (True, 2001:237), as
part of a system which privileges certain meaning and values, partly by associating
them with masculinity (Charlesworth, 2002; Harding, 1986; Tickner, 1997). Statist
thought is associated with masculine ideals of rationality, proactivity and strength, in
which the heroic actor gets his hands dirty by doing what needs to be done, and
vulnerable others are ostensibly protected by “manly men” (True, 2001:252) but never
given power or voice. Although claiming to be rational, this approach actually
subordinates supposedly “lower” to “higher” faculties (Elshtain, 1992), privileging
aggressive emotions over caring emotions (Cohn, 1993, Sjoberg, this issue). For
example, in her study of Morgenthau’s Realism, Tickner (1998) shows how statist IR
theory relies on reactive affects of domination and objective control. The clearest
demonstration of this statist bias is Cohn’s (1993) empirical study of the mentality of
strategic planners. In a war simulation, planners interpreted ameliorative, “soft”
decisions as weakness (coded as “like a woman” or “wimpy”), meaning that de-
escalating, depolarising, and compromising tend to be “preempted by gender discourse”
Anarchy and State Securitization

The state seeks to make societies “legible” (Scott, 1999: 2). In doing so, it simplifies them both analytically, by ignoring the complexity, and materially, by imposing the categories it uses to simplify in practice (ibid., 33, 81-2). Such simplifications “represent techniques for grasping a large and complex reality; in order for officials to be able to comprehend aspects of the ensemble, that complex reality must be reduced to schematic categories. The only way to accomplish this is to reduce an infinite array of detail to a set of categories that will facilitate summary descriptions, comparisons, and aggregation” (ibid., 77). States, argues Scott, seek to turn “the population, space, and nature under their jurisdiction into the closed systems that offer no surprises and that can best be observed and controlled” (ibid., 82). This is the matrix from which securitization emerges. It is arguably a re-emergence of the “reasons of state” studied by Foucault (2004) and Scott (1999).

Further, Scott argues that such practices serve state, not social, interests. States simplify to serve state – not social – functions. This is similar to Foucault’s argument that biopower seeks to render bodies useful for power (1983: 269). For example, the state seeks simplification so it can tax and conscript, and to head off rebellion (ibid. 2). The state lens brings into focus “certain limited aspects” of society which happen to interest the state (ibid. p. 11). State simplification is “necessarily schematic” and thus “ignores essential features of any real, functioning social order” (ibid. p. 6). The formal scheme ends up parasitic on everyday life to sustain it. Illegibility is relative to the state perspective. What seems illegible to the state is often entirely legible to locals within the context. For example, a complex set of customs of land ownership, redistribution
and mutual obligation effectively meets peasants’ needs, but is utterly incomprehensible to state lawmakers. Plasticity and adaptability are advantages for peasants, but problems for the state (ibid, pp. 33-4).

Today, securitisation is the pretext *par excellence* for both kinds of simplification. Practices such as lockdowns and roundups ignore, violate and overwrite the density of the social spaces on which they are imposed and the needs and desires of those who inhabit these spaces. Risk-management, for instance, simplifies complex lives into risk-profiles based on aggregates, which might be irrelevant to the case at hand. This is the source of the recurring scandals of civilians being raided, searched or interrogated based on random combinations of facts.

State simplification renders swathes of social life as a Lacanian Real. In each case, “a whole world lying ‘outside the brackets’ returned to haunt [the] technical vision” (Scott, 1999: 20), many of which are consequences of the state’s tunnel-vision (ibid. 21). In the case of securitisation, this returning Real appears as the uncontrollable “black holes” and spiralling insecurity of the current period, as well as the failure of state initiatives such as the Iraq war. In the war on terror, “black holes”, or illegibility, are seen as risk or insecurity (Innes, 2008), zones of potential terrorism, crime, drug trafficking, human rights abuses (such as FGM), and so on. As this assumption renders social life illegible, it leads to a cascading retreat into gated spaces. At root in this process of state terror is the pernicious fantasy of an entirely legible social order, fitting exactly with the state’s perceptions – in other words, the denial of all autonomy to social forces. Legible, “securitised” space is fantasmatically “terrorist-free”.
Securitisation also goes hand-in-hand with insecuritisation, or the creation of everyday fear to provide pretexts for control (Bigo 2000: 330). Securitisation involves framing-out any claims, demands, rights, or needs, which might be articulated by non-state actors. Such actors are simply disempowered, and either suppressed and “managed” or paternalistically “protected”. Securitisation tends to seek to control others by reducing or constraining their agency (e.g. Situational Crime Management, which removes opportunities for crime), without engaging with others as actors in their own rights. The frame is fundamentally monological, recognising no actors other than a managerial elite.

Securitisation does not represent a response to an increase in existential threats to the state. Rather, it is a discursive shift towards framing all social problems and differences as “security” issues or “risks” has created an illusion of expanding dangers. American unipolar dominance has led to shifts towards asymmetrical and unconventional warfare (Kilcullen, 2009: 25-6; Freedman, 1998: 15). The discourse of “new threats” frames issues such as armed opposition or “terrorism”, organised crime, arms proliferation and environmental problems as security issues (Gasteyger, 1999: 77). As a result, the field of security studies “risks losing all focus” (Freedman, 1998: 53). Securitisation creates a field where certain social actors can expand their roles. It merges and de-differentiates militarism against external enemies and internal social regulation (Bigo 2000: 320). The resultant military functions may be carried out by the military, the police, or other social agencies, which are handed securitised tasks (for example, teachers, doctors and social workers commanded to implement Prevent duties).

The expanded scope of the term “security” has irritated traditional security scholars,
who see such issues as relatively insignificant compared to interstate rivalry (Mueller, 2004: 110; Todd, 2004) or even as pretexts for interstate hegemony (Mastanduno, 2007). Further, many of these “new” issues are not “new” at all (protest, armed rebellion, organised crime, and environmental damage have histories longer than capitalism), but newly securitised, sometimes connected to increased scope or internationalisation. Securitisation is primarily a framing issue – a question of the understanding of and appropriate response to social problems, and the capture of resources among different state agencies. Securitisation effectively places the entire field of illegibility under the remit of the military/police apparatuses. On a global scale, failed states are seen as a threat to the US (NSS 2002: 1) or even as “engulf[ing] the rest of the world” (Eizenstat et al, 2005: 135). The approach typically blames local societies or states for “failure”, ignoring the political-economic context (Jackson, 2000: 296; Zartman, 1995: 5) and replacing international dependency issues with internal capacity issues (Hill, 2005: 149). Further, it has been alleged that the category is unclear and selectively deployed (Boas and Jennings, 2007: 478).

In this sense, Virilio, the revelationary, in The Administration of Fear (2012: 14) talks of fear as a world and the management and administration of fear instead of confronting fear fundamentally:

Fear is now an environment, a surrounding, a world. It occupies and preoccupies us. Fear was once a phenomenon related to localised, identifiable events that were limited to a certain timeframe: wars, famines, epidemics. Today, the world itself is limited, saturated, reduced, restricting us to stressful claustrophobia: contagious stock crises, faceless terrorism lightning pandemics, “professional”
suicides...Fear is a world, panic as a “whole”.

Framing social problems as “new threats” leads to militarised responses to social problems. The blurring of boundaries between state security and social problems leads to a zone of indistinction (Agamben, 1998) in which anyone can become the enemy, the exceptions applying in wartime or in colonies are applied across the state’s terrain, and any area can become like a camp at any moment (1998: 112). Lundborg (2016) explains Agamben’s concept of the virtual – how life is potentially expendable and how this is to be resisted with the refusal to draw lines: “the lines that determine who is included and excluded through the actualization of the sovereign ban” (p.265). For example, the securitisation of migration detracts from humanitarian and political-economic frames, drawing Agamben’s lines, and leading to violent, repressive responses (Bigo, 2000; Buonfino, 2004), as is currently evident in the French state’s responses to the jungle in Calais. Set to be abolished in late 2016, it has been a battleground between active and reactive networks: local anti-refugee and pro-refugee protests have occurred reflecting the stand-off between opposing actors in the European refugee and migrant crisis.

Zygmunt Bauman’s (2000) analysis of the relationship between securitisation and consumerism, neatly summarises our analysis here. In Bauman’s argument, communities gate themselves off in a residue of an old utopia of a good society, which is without worry because of its basic sameness (ibid. 92). Such a community is defined by what it excludes rather than what it contains, and becomes “more secure but less free” (ibid. 94). What it refuses, in particular, is any kind of dialogue or negotiation across difference, and therefore any public interest or public sphere arising from
negotiation (ibid. 100). This vision of community destroys any possibility of life in common. The more difference is excluded, the more threatening it looks (ibid. 106). Spaces that remain are marked by the “redundancy of interaction” to their functioning (ibid. 105). Bauman analyses securitisation as flight from contact with difference (ibid. 105), rooted in neoliberal regimes of fluidity and uncertainty (ibid. 108). Evans (2010) ups the ante by arguing that a new virtual economy of affect is at work in combination with a pre-emptive virtualisation of terror “in which the self-propelling tendencies to provoke the virtual cause, will, through revealing its most catastrophic potential, set out the new conditions of the real” (Evans, 2010, p.9).

**State Terror Produces Network Terror**

At the intersection of the threatened state and the sources of its anxiety lies the collapse of marginal integration and “addition of axioms” in neoliberalism. Capitalism has been clenching its fists on the world for some time, yet many spaces and people are falling through its fingers. The formal sector of the economy is shrinking, leaving behind it swathes of social life marginalized from capitalist inclusion. Much of the global periphery is in effect being forcibly “delinked” from the world economy as inclusion through patronage is scaled down due to neoliberalism. For instance, “Sub-Saharan Africa has almost dropped out of the formal international economy” (Mann, 2005: 55-6). Religious, militia and informal economic organisations have replaced the state on the ground across swathes of Africa, and “whole regions have now become virtually independent, probably for the foreseeable future, of all central control” (Bayart, Ellis and Hibou, 1999: 19-20). These spaces are the locus of the state’s fear of “black holes” where state power breaks down and insurgents can flourish (Korteweg, 2008; Innes, 2008).
Viewed in affirmative terms, these excluded sites and peoples are associated with the network form. The last few decades have seen a proliferation of network-based movements -- some emancipatory, others less so -- drawing their membership from marginalised groups and creating autonomous zones in marginal spaces. In the South, such movements often grow out of the everyday networks of survival, which “provide an infrastructure for the community and a measure of functional autonomy” (Hecht and Simone, 1994: 14-15; Lomnitz, 1977; Chatterjee 1993). The discontented and excluded lie at the heart of today’s asymmetrical wars. For instance, the Pakistani Taleban flourishes mainly among young people who do not receive “peace, income, a sense of purpose, a social network” from the established structure of tribal power (Giustozzi 2007: 39), while Watts (2007) has referred to what is known locally as the “restive youth problem” as central to the conflict in the Niger Delta.

Ignoring for the moment the distinctions among such movements, their vitality can clearly be traced to their networked and marginal loci. Resisting or eluding the terror-state’s grab for space, horizontal networks flow around the state’s restrictions, moving into residual unregulated spaces, gaps in the state’s capacity to repress, across national borders, or into the virtual. Repression drives dissent from open to clandestine forms, creating a field of diffuse resistance and deviance, which “returns” as intractable social problems and inert effects. Those with no place in social life, such as inner-city children, wage “jungle warfare” against the constraints of dominant discourse (Ward, 1978/1990: 89-90).

In a context where the state treats civilians (and especially marginal groups) as
disposable, the formation of reactive networks offering security (economic security, fixed identities, military retaliation against dominant groups) is almost inevitable. If the marginal are treated as disposable, if the state threatens them and the social mainstream rallies to the state, then the marginal will look for human security to armed opposition groups, gangs, and reactive networks of all kinds. The state’s misframing of its enemies as savage, absolute Others, and the corresponding, inverted form of this misframing aimed at the dominant group, reinforce each other in a cycle of escalation. Actors joining ethnoreligious armed groups are often from the restive youth stratum who are left out of both the modern economy and the remnants of the traditional system. Reactive networks offer a mixture of wealth (from payments and opportunities for loot), power, identity (masculine and ethnoreligious), self-esteem and something to believe in.

Within the system reactive desire is the fear arising from state terror and it becomes fear of losing subsistence, if one is poor or losing property, and status if one is less poor, and outside it becomes fear of state repression and violence (McMarvill and los Ricos n.d.: 15). The emotional effects of state terror on movements can be discussed in terms of the effects of experiences of oppression. In the work of David Matza for instance, everyday humiliation and indignity produces “moods of fatalism” which suspend constraints on action along with the sense of being a human agent (Matza 1964). Material scarcity arising from capitalist/statist resource grabs can reinforce tendencies for networks to become reactive. With conditions of life put at risk, irrational mass attachments resurface, channelling in a distorted way the new class contradiction between included and excluded.
Reactive desire can take three different forms: as external blockage of active desire, as internal “repression” in the psychoanalytic sense, and as desire itself when disempowered by repression (Deleuze, 2006: 61). If movements respond to state terror by internalising its effects, internalising scarcity as an existential condition and fear as emotional, sexual and bodily rigidity, they reproduce the affective form of state power, even while adopting the network form in their social interrelations. With reactive desire operating inside emergent networks, a split appears between affinity-networks based on active desire and reactive networks, which give a central place to reactive desire. Affinity-networks create and are sustained by what Sahlins terms “primitive affluence”, a type of existential abundance. This way of experiencing the world is difficult to sustain amidst state terror. However, there are different ways of responding to state-induced anxiety. The compositive energies of affinity are present in both types of networks. In internal structure, reactive groups rely on active energies and affinity. Hence, Marc Sageman’s account of Wahhabi groups emphasises the emotional force of the “small-world network” as their integrative force: ties of kinship, friendship and discipleship create a strong emotional force of cohesion (Sageman, 2004: 107:138). However, reactive networks also internalise statist-majoritarian conceptions of self. Reactive networks seek to psychologically recompose the self, acting-out violence against outsiders for the purpose of internal composition of the self and in-group (Theweleit, 1987). They are defined by a refusal to identify with their actual life-condition as minoritarian, networked, excluded or marginal people. Instead, they hide behind a myth of belonging to a superior in-group, which should become the new master.

The passage from state terror to reactive network terror occurs through the graded
stratifications, whereby majoritarian categories enter everyday life (Wallerstein 2004: 37-9). These stratifications, constructed around marked and unmarked terms, discursive exclusions and hierarchies, are products of the field of “ideology” or “fantasy” surrounding the state. Status-groups, or “neoarchaïsms” as Deleuze and Guattari call them (1983: 257-8), occur at the intersection of states and networks and can attract either emancipatory or reactive forces. For instance, Pieterse argues that rigid ethnic identities arise from authoritarian institutions and political cultures, and are an effect rather than a cause of conflicts based on “the politics of hard sovereignty” (Pieterse, 1998). Outside such contexts, communities are neither denumerable nor exhaustive of identity (Chatterjee 1993: 223).

Conclusion: Desecuritizing Society

If the security state is able to wrest control from global capital and from active and reactive networks, fascism is the likely outcome. In a new twist on the old Marxist tale of the means of production outstripping the social relations which produce them, capitalism now produces technologies which enable the exercise of diffuse power, at the same time as trying in increasingly paranoid ways to restrict them. Existing technologies vital to contemporary capitalism – such as the Internet, global travel, and financial flows – are already profiled as “risks” in securitisation discourse (which in many ways, reflects a backlash by the state against the loss of control suffered under 1990s liberalisation). New technologies underpinning any economic revival – such as mass-market drones, artificial intelligence, 3D printing, distributed ledger technologies, biological self-modification – pose even greater “risks” which may prove uncontrollable. If the deep state continues to see security as the bottom line, it may ultimately have to rupture with its global capitalist allies and impose a similar
generalised chilling of social life and antiproduction against unregulated flows, including those unleashed by capitalism.

There are several alternatives, all of which require de-securitising society. Firstly, the system could switch from a subtraction to an addition of axioms approach, using social policy rather than securitisation/militarisation to respond to “risks”. Secondly, people could seek security in diffuse rather than concentrated power, moving towards smaller-scale, more densely networked patterns of life and work, which reduce both the anxiety underpinning securitisation and risks originating from global flows. Third, the securitization system itself is ineffective so new visions developed are needed for creating possibilities for trust-building and conflict transformation in the situations of systemically-produced scarcity which currently generate “risk”. A Clastrean balance of power among diffuse social actors, or a situation of mutual tolerance based on a global ethic of valuing locality and diversity, might succeed in keeping relations among empowered diffuse groups largely peaceful.

On the other side, we should find hope in the proliferation of resistance among the excluded. We need to see in movements of the excluded the radical potential and not only the reactive distortions. To take Tupac Shakur’s metaphor, we need to see the rose that grows from concrete, not merely the thorns. The problem is, rather, that many of the movements on the network side of the equation are still thinking, seeing and feeling like states. Such movements are potential bearers of the Other of the state-form, of networks as alternatives to states, affinity against hegemony, abundance against scarcity. Hence, as Vaneigem argues, “[t]o work for delight and authentic festivity is barely distinguishable from preparing for a general insurrection” (Vaneigem 1967: 50-
1). It has been argued in utopian studies that fear and hope form part of a continuum, expressing “aspects of affective ambivalence” connected to the indeterminacy of the future (McManus 2005). The type of hope needed is active and immanent, brought into the present as a propulsive force rather than deferred to the future. Deleuze and Guattari use the term “absolute deterritorialisation” for this possibility.

In his work on conflict transformation, John Paul Lederach emphasises the need to turn negative energies into creative energies and mobilising hope against fear (Lederach and Maiese, n.d.: 2-3; Lederach, 2005). How is this change in vital energies to be accomplished? Deleuze and Guattari invoke a figure of the shaman as a way to overcome reactive energies (1983: 167-8). They call for a type of revolutionary social movement “that follows the lines of escape of desire; breaches the wall and causes flows to move; assembles its machines and its groups-in-fusion in the enclaves or at the periphery”, countering reactive energies (ibid. 277). As Zvevnik (2016) discusses, disrupting scopic regimes involves moments of anxiety, where the anxious gaze puts one’s identity and one’s places in the social fantasy under question (p.133). Countering reactive energies while belonging to a hierarchical productive structure involves a dismantlement of the illusion, whilst ‘subjectification is never without a black hole in which its lodges its consciousness, passions and redundancies’ (Zvevnik, 2016: 133, cites Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 186).

Hence, it is in open spaces, safe spaces, and spaces of dialogue that hope can be found to counter the spiral of terror. This opening of space, this creation of autonomous zones, should be viewed as a break with the majoritarian logics of social control. The coming “other worlds” counterposed to the spaces of terror are not an integrated “new order”,

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but rather, a proliferation of smooth spaces in a horizontality without borders. These “other worlds” are being built unconsciously, wherever networks, affinity and hope counterpose themselves to state terror and the desire for fixed identity be it national, ethnic, religious or cultural. It is in the incommensurable antagonism between the autonomous zones of these “other worlds” and the terror state’s demands for controlled spaces to serve capital, that the nexus of the conflicts of the present and near-future lies.

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