'Is your edition really necessary?' is one of those questions which are so searching that they are rarely asked in polite intellectual society. It comes from the best of sources,¹ and it is important not least because it raises fundamental questions—about why editing of a certain sort is necessary and about the criteria according to which it is carried out. Why, indeed, should anyone undertake critical editing? These questions can be addressed in several ways. This article addresses them by way of considering an edition which, it will be seen, is necessary.² For Noel Malcolm’s is the first successful attempt to produce a critical-text edition of *Leviathan*. Here the reader is offered gold rather than base metal, and in considering such work it cannot be out of the way to ask the questions, both particular and general, that arise from reflecting on it. Neither can it be untimely to do so just now, when textual scholars in the West are becoming more conscious of the basic fact that their practices are not the only ones.³

Why is critical editing necessary? The question is not one that modern pundits of textual scholarship ask foursquarely about this sort of historical reconstruction. A few words at the beginning of the manual on a related topic seem to be thought sufficient,⁴ and

¹ The credit for posing it belongs to Martin West, *Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique* (Stuttgart, 1973), 61.


⁴ e.g. ‘The business of textual criticism is to produce a text as close as possible to the original’, Paul Maas, *Textual Criticism*, trans. Barbara Flower (Oxford, 1958), 1.
it is with pleasure that one encounters helpful if rare obiter dicta in more reflective books and articles.\(^5\) Yet the question is obviously of fundamental importance (possibly that is why it is not directly asked). Its importance relates to whether we can say such work effects a valid addition to knowledge otherwise unobtainable and whether that addition is important. Importance can vary according to the type of text being edited—whether manuscript or print—and according to its subject-matter—the texts of lyric poetry may be susceptible of change in ways different from those of philosophical argument—as well as according to how it is edited. So to identify such importance properly requires one to appraise particular editions as contributions to textual editing. That is true not least because though it is editorial work that occasions (or should occasion) reflection, so that the latter is a secondary activity, yet reflection is required to bring the significance of such work into relief. Thus it is instrumental in developing new thinking because it is a way of raising basic questions and developing answers. Such thinking is important not only for the general field in view but also much more widely. This is so—as we shall point out—because a properly-established text provides the premises necessary for further thinking and because (it scarcely needs saying here) the texts of history of political thought are important not just for its exponents but for other historians, philosophers political theorists, and, indeed, the general reader. So questions about this construction of knowledge and its reliability are fundamental to many concerns.

The task of appraisal, too, is one which in the present instance has not attracted the reviewers and commentators: those who wrote at length, if they said anything at all about editing, gasped in admiration or paraphrased the editor’s own remarks about his work, and moved rapidly to tell their tale about Hobbes.\(^6\) The


present writer, by contrast, judges that textual editing and interpretation are connected in ways which are sufficiently important to warrant fuller attention to the former. For instance, this example of editing raises questions of basic importance for interpreting Hobbes. There is, for one, the question of which version embodies Hobbes final intentions for *Leviathan*. Malcolm’s work, too, occasions general reflection about the adequacy of the criteria according to which many texts are critically edited. Precisely because it is an edition that is itself of key interest, it invites reflection on wider issues. The thinking that arises from reflection concerns not only the text in view but also a ‘method’ widely-received amongst Western textual editors.

This article, accordingly, considers what critical-text editing is and gives a preliminary statement about its procedures, on the way to identifying why such activity is necessary and how it adds to knowledge. Next it examines some aspects of how far the procedures of critical-text editing have been applied to political texts generally, and to Hobbes’s in particular. It then applies its findings in order to show what Malcolm’s work adds to our knowledge of *Leviathan*. This task leads to questions of wider reference—questions about the relation of critical editing to the study of an author’s intellectual development, to questions about the criteria of final intention and about related matters, not least about the application of these criteria to *Leviathan* and to other works. These questions include whether, where they are applicable, the criteria fit all the facts. Thence we are led to pose, very briefly, some parting questions about the relationship of critical editing to interpretation and to the qualifications of interpreters.

Thus attention to a notable edition turns out to occasion questions which are surprisingly novel and which, as they concern fundamental matters, are important. One would not have

expected to be addressing the necessity of critical editing and its benefits at this period in the enterprise. Again, this article turns out to be the first critical study of the edition in view, though the latter appeared in 2012; it could turn out to be, also, the only critical study. Its attention has involved a critical exploration of the textual ‘method’ associated with McKerrow, Greg and Bowers, which has been and continues to be a central feature of editorial practice and theory, in its own terms. This ‘method’ focuses on the final intention of authors and the evidence for it. A desire to develop rather different procedures, i.e. consideration of this ‘method’ in others’ terms, has been common for some time. Such consideration has arisen from a desire to do away with final intention, perhaps to do away with ‘the author’ at the same time.\(^7\) It is rarer to explore final intention in order to identify the range of possibilities (or ambiguities) for editorial practice to be found in its most basic specifications (as distinct from its more elaborate forms). Again, this article locates some notable practical consequences of its findings.

The significance of these findings is manifold. It is not just that this article raises, in proceeding, questions of general interest about the use of holographs in editing printed books and about the relative authority of such books and presentation manuscripts, as well as providing the most searching criticism of Laslett’s edition of *Two Treatises* yet made and points of interest about the development of the literature on Hobbes. More especially, it addresses basic questions hitherto under-emphasized and it returns answers of general interest. It shows the necessity of critical editing as a way of adding to knowledge, a necessity which, curiously, has not been identified properly. It indicates not least the concurrent need for critical editions as tools for the study

of intellectual development, a matter which has been curiously overlooked. It yields practical results in relation to editorial technique, in that it suggests that the ‘method’ under consideration is not univocal. That is to say, when this ‘method’ is applied to complex materials, in particular those that involve questions about authorial revision and authorial control, it can suggest a range of potential copy-texts rather than obviously requiring one rather than another. These findings suggest that it lends itself to development beyond the conclusions of its classic proponents, as well as suggesting further development for the edition under consideration. These reflections lead naturally to a fundamental question about Hobbes, a question not asked thus hitherto: whether the English version of *Leviathan* is the bearer of Hobbes’s final intentions? It suggests that the Latin version deserves consideration as their bearer. Lastly, this article suggests that the ‘method’ is not always adequate to the authorial facts. In short, its findings suggest scope for further work on both particular and general fronts.

So much is by way of preface. Critical-text editing is a part of textual scholarship. Such editing differs from a well-known figure in the Revelation according to St. John not least because it does not bear its name on its forehead. Yet, like the person from Babylon, it is unfamiliar to many amongst those who devote their time to the innocent pursuits that compose scholarship. It must be said, also, that many historians, philosophers and political theorists are quite as much strangers to it as to the person just mentioned, which is more problematical for them in respect of it than in respect of her. So it is needful to say something about

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8 Edwin Curley, in his edition of Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668* (Indianapolis, 1994), says no more than ‘[s]tudents of Hobbes ought to be interested in the different ways Hobbes presented his ideas at different times’, lxxiv. Michael Hunter, *Editing Early Modern Texts. An Introduction to Principles and Practice* (Basingstoke, 2007), 63, reports a generally-received uneasiness about the Latin *Leviathan* that evidently inhibits recognition of its importance, ‘[t]his was first published in 1668, and it is usually presumed that, though revealing of how Hobbes’ thought developed—as also of the version of his ideas that reached an international audience—it is less ‘authentic’ than the original English edition.’
critical-text editing here (those familiar with the subject can move forward to p. 227).

Textual scholarship addresses the problems relating to the composition, text, character and origins of manuscript writings and printed works. Critical-text editing is one of its principal parts. This addresses, in general, the principles relating to the establishment of the best text, the identification of relevant evidence, and the methods of textual emendation, and it addresses, in particular, the specific conditions bearing on the individual work to be edited.

Perhaps the most helpful way of introducing the activity of the critical-text editor is to recall the title of a classic essay, namely ‘The Application of Thought to Textual Criticism’. Such thinking responds to a problem. The problem is that it is not always easy to discover what an author wished to put down in a text. To this problem the critical editor applies his or her mind. Madan offers a concise statement about this editorial problem: ‘[t]he object…is to restore the actual words written by an…author, by the exercise of a trained intellect on the more or less faulty materials which have survived to the present time.’ The problem can arise in a number of ways, of which some are given here merely as a preliminary indication of scope.

The first way is that the author’s original manuscript or other approved text does not survive: what survives in its stead is a number of manuscript copies which we hypothesize derive from that original or (less frequently in practice) precede it. The


10 He or she also looks at other questions of the same sort: for example, in considering dramatic works, there is a question about authorial work in relation to contributions by the players. The editorial results can look rather different according to whether decisions are referred to what the dramatist is taken to have written or to what the players seem to have played. Compare, e.g., the editions of Richard III by J. Dover Wilson (Cambridge, 1954) and John Jowett (Oxford, 2000).

11 Falconer Madan, Books in Manuscript (London, 1893), 59. More than words are involved, of course.
problem is then to reconstruct the author’s text from the evidence afforded by these copies. The latter, in an age before printing, often became very numerous and, thanks to human frailty, were often characterized by complicated errors of transmission—a difficulty compounded because it is not always the more faithful copies that have weathered the hazards of time—and, sometimes, by the possibility of authorial revision. A fair indication of the scale of material for a popular author is that Allen rested his edition of the *Iliad* on 310 manuscripts, which was consciously a selection,\(^\text{12}\) whilst the extent of possible difficulties is suggested by the existence of over 200 manuscripts of the plays of Sophocles and the view shared by his modern editors that *none* of these is satisfactory.\(^\text{13}\)

This—the dubious descent of a text from an archetype which does not survive (or more rarely the dubious ascent from text/s to an archetype)—is the classical problem for the textual editor, both in that it arises in the earliest classics of Western literature, and in that it was (and is) the problem which gave rise to the classic procedures of critical editing. But manuscripts are not the only subject for critical-text editorial technique. The coming of the printed book opened a further field. Early printed books—meaning by that those up to about 1800—were not produced according to the rapid and (we hope) highly accurate methods of contemporary printing. They were put together in ways that made their contents liable to a wide variety of alterations. Some of these were problems introduced by compositors, proof readers and others involved in production: idiosyncrasies, to use no more impolite a term, without authorial sanction. Some of these were modifications introduced by authors—as we surmise—during the process of production, its relatively leisurely character inviting such treatment. Authorial changes facilitated in this way—here


we encounter a topic which will recur—can be very important. One writer, indeed, emphasized that the ‘[p]ower, which Printing gives us, of continually improving and correcting our Works in successive Editions, appears to me the Chief Advantage of that Art.’

Many effects have been attributed to printing, but a philosopher’s opinion that its ‘Chief Advantage’ lay in ‘improving and correcting’ his works must be one of the most striking judgements about it.

Such interventions are not in a very general way different from those which might affect manuscripts—in both sorts non-authorial interventions and authorial revision are possibilities—but print emphasizes an authorial opportunity which can become an editorial problem. Print puts work into cold storage, and the author may wish to raise the temperature at a later date—new thoughts and new literary inspiration may call for alterations. If so, the critical editor must decide what text to print, exercising judgement about every passage. He or she must also present an apparatus which identifies significant points of textual interest. A central criterion for such work, it has long been understood, is ‘[f]idelity to the author’s intentions’ according to the evidence.

A more specific convention that can govern the main text offered to the reader is that the author’s final thoughts should be the standard by which the editor works. Conventions of whatever sort are more properly a beginning than an end to critical editorial activity.


15 ‘Fidelity to the author’s intentions and wishes is indeed the principal merit of an editor; and as no further appeal can now be made to the judgement and taste of the author, the friend to whom he has entrusted the care of his posthumous works has thought proper implicitly to follow the track which he found prescribed for him’, [Mary Berry, ed.], The Works of Horatio Walpole, Earl of Orford (5 vols., London, 1798), i, [p.] vi.

Enough has been said to indicate that critical-text editing implies the application of thought to primary materials. Though there is a practice not uncommon in the making of books, namely to find a single text and print it, either without interrogation of it at all or according to the mechanical application of some belief or convention, that is not critical editing in the proper meaning of the term.\(^\text{17}\) This is not to say that it is unimportant or unnecessary: only that it is something other than critical-text editing.\(^\text{18}\)

A sceptical reader in our age of instant literary gratification may cry out at this point, ‘why not just get on with interpretation?’ The answer was given a long time ago:

\(^{17}\) A study of the ways in which the term ‘critical’ has been misapplied would be very long but not uninteresting. A brief catalogue would include Peter Laslett’s claim that Luigi Pareyson’s translation of John Locke, Two Treatises was ‘the first critical edition’ of that work: John Locke, Two Treatises of Government. A Critical Edition with Introduction and Notes (Cambridge, 1960, 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) edn. 1967), xi; cf. 128, which seems to depend on its having explanatory footnotes, because the translation itself was made from the twelfth edition (1824) of Locke’s Works; see Pareyson, Due Trattati Sul Governo di John Locke, col Patriarca di Robert Filmer (Turin, 1948), 59. Sometimes editors are uncertain in their descriptions of their productions. For example, Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Stanford, CA, 2001), ed. J. C. D. Clark, is, according to its front cover, a critical edition. The title page does not make this claim. The evidence accords with the silence of the latter. For the text is ‘taken from the first edition’ (113), ‘reprint[s] the text of the first edition’ (blurb). Again, it is not stated how the copy-text was constituted or, if a single exemplar was sent to the printer in lieu of a copy-text, which exemplar was used. At 419–23 ‘Textual variations in subsequent editions’ are printed, but the edition or editions in which they made their first appearance are not specified, though we are told that they came ‘later’. Compare Richard Tuck’s use of the word ‘critical’, recorded in note 84 below. Contributors to a single enterprise may give different assessments of its character. Messrs. Continuum’s Lytton Strachey, Eminent Victorians. The Definitive Edition (London, 2002), which bears no editor’s name, has an introduction by Paul Levy, who refers to it as ‘this first critical edition’, [xv], xxxiv, but also ‘A Note on the Text’ by Mark Bostridge, who states that ‘[t]he text of this edition follows that of the original British publication by Chatto & Windus on 9 May 1918’, [xxxvii].

\(^{18}\) It may be worth observing that non-critical editions can have great intellectual value, e.g. by reason of their explanatory or interpretative material, as René Descartes, Discours de la méthode, ed. Étienne Gilson (Paris, 1925). They also have obvious educational uses, though compare George Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge, ed. T. E. Jessop (London & Hull, 1937), vi–vii.
What exactly are we to interpret? Where does our text come from?...We must entirely put aside the delusion that there is a certain *textus receptus*, as to which everyone is agreed, with the exception of occasional variant readings; and also the notion that one text is pretty nearly as good as another, and that all we have to do is master, or think we master, the words before us...we should always know the exact premises upon which we are proceeding. It may be said, Why not take a good, or even a tolerably good text, and confine yourself to explaining that? The answer is; Such a plan is proper in a quite elementary book; but whenever we begin really to discuss difficulties, we shall find the reading and the interpretation are inextricably connected.

That this answer comes from a book of extracts made in Queen Victoria’s time suggests that our sceptical reader is not in the vanguard of intellectual progress.¹⁹ That vanguard still needs to carry forward its work. Even in our own time it has proved possible for a ‘direct reprint’ of Burke’s printed works to appear with a Clarendon imprint.²⁰ The results include the reproduction of strange things. For instance, Burke is made to state that ‘[b]efore society in a multitude of men, it is obvious, that sovereignty and subjection are ideas which cannot exist.’²¹ Direct reprinting here seems to be consistent with neither textual editor nor volume editor nor general editor as much as considering what they attribute to their author or victim. It is plainly needful to apply thought to texts.

Here, then, we come to a place from which enquiry into necessity can begin. The proposition is that to discover the ‘exact


²⁰ The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke (9 vols, Oxford, 1981–2015), general editor Paul Langford, textual editor William B. Todd. Only vol.i, eds. T.O. McLoughlin and James T. Boulton (Oxford, 1997), goes so far as to list systematically variants among separate printings published in Burke’s lifetime; otherwise the text-editorial apparatus is usually confined to registering differences between Burke’s Works (London, 1792–1827) and copy-text. This rather curious conception of editing is complemented by a number of extraordinary errors, oddities and omissions. Only one example is given here.

²¹ Burke, Writings and Speeches, viii, 438.
premises upon which we are proceeding’ in ‘explaining’ a text that contains difficulties of one sort or another implies critical editing. What does such editing provide? What, we may add, does it make possible for interpreters?

A critical editor’s thought runs in the first instance according to a range of practices and conventions, which, for the sake of lucidity, had best be rehearsed here. The rehearsal will look primarily at printed books, for (besides one important manuscript) these are at the core of the edition before us. The first practice—that is to say, the first in time—is to examine copies that are taken to reflect authorial input or which are under consideration as candidates for that status. These may be numerous, and it is not sufficient to examine only one example of an issue or an early ‘edition’: individual variations amongst copies which are ostensibly identical are not uncommon. Indeed, the definition appropriate to work on manuscripts—that ‘recension is the selection, after the examination of all available materials, of the most trustworthy evidence on which to base a text’—is applicable also to printed books.22 This point, indeed, has long been recognized: it was in respect of printed books that Pollard reflected that ‘examination of all the readings in rival authorities is the necessary preliminary of all good editing’.23 Pollard’s point was seconded, for descriptive bibliographers, by Bowers.24 The editor, whether working on manuscripts or printed books, is identifying witnesses for consideration, and there is no sense in


ignoring any of them (if as little in following any of them slavishly).\textsuperscript{25}

Concessions to the weaknesses of the editorial flesh, of course, are not unknown. Opinion varies about their proper extent. Purists—such as J. D. Fleeman—held and hold that there should be no concessions, for they take it that every surviving printed copy should be given full consideration. This judgement can imply a very extensive and protracted task for the editor. So there arises another position. Some suppose that one should collate copies up to the point at which only diminishing returns accrue. Just where that is and what is meant by ‘diminishing’ are always interesting questions. As one cannot discover such limits without going beyond them, practice willy-nilly moves towards the purists’ destination. The trend of considering fully more rather than fewer copies, and all if possible, has been under way for some time. For instance Michael Kiernan’s 1985 edition of Bacon’s essays collated twenty-three copies of a 1625 edition, all extant copies of the first two editions (nine and five copies each), and fifteen copies of the 1612 edition, whilst the 2004 edition of the same writer’s \textit{Novum Organum} by Graham Rees and Maria Wakely, where only a single authorial edition was in view, collated forty-one copies and examined others.\textsuperscript{26}

Though all this makes for a demanding practice, that practice is also a wise one. To take an example twenty years after Hobbes’s death, the first edition of Locke’s \textit{Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity} shows in most copies leaf Y4 as a cancel attached to a stub. However, in at least one copy,\textsuperscript{27} matters are different. This copy (at 343, line 6 \textit{et seq.}) runs:-

\textsuperscript{25} Compare Maas, \textit{Textual Criticism}, 21, ‘the preface should…describe all witnesses’. Such comprehensiveness has at least one other justification. See West, \textit{Textual Criticism}, 63, on editorial fallibility: ‘no one ever checks anybody else’s collations (or their own for that matter) without finding mistakes in them.’


All the effect of it will be just the same it has been these Thousand Years and upwards; Schisms, Separations, Contentions, Animosities, Quarrels, Blood and Butchery, and all that Train of Mischiefs, which has so long harassed and defamed Christianity, and are so contrary to the Doctrine, Spirit, and End of the Gospel: And which must still continue, as long as any such Unmasker shall take upon him to be the Dispenser and Dictator to others of Fundamentals; and peremptorily to define, which parts of Divine Revelation are necessary to be believed, and which Christians may with safety dispense with, and not believe.

Whereas in other copies there is this passage:-

And I desire it may be consider’d how much of the Divisions in the Church, and bloody Persecutions amongst Christians, has been owing to Christianity thus set up against Christianity, in multiplied Fundamentals and Articles, made necessary by the Infallibility of opposite Systems. The Unmasker’s Zeal wants nothing but Power to make good his to be the only Christianity, for he has found the Apostles Creed to be defective. He is as infallible as the Pope, and another as infallible as he; and where Humane Additions are made to be the Terms of the Gospel, Men seldom want Zeal for what is their own.

The difference between these two passages does more than recommend prudence in the search for evidence. The former passage also appears in the collected works that Locke’s publisher issued a decade after his death, so the editor needs to consider which passage embodies Locke’s later thoughts, deciding which is the better of the two texts according to that criterion (or some other).

If the activity of collation—the formal comparison of texts line-by-line—tends to disclose patterns, it also discloses deviations from them. The editor of printed texts or some manuscripts now moves to a second activity, that is to say, through consideration of patterns and deviations to the

identification of a copy-text.\textsuperscript{29} A copy-text is the basis of his or her edition, and, as noted already, it is chosen as the most suitable register of authorial intention, often the last register as understood by the editor. That, however, is not the end of the editorial task. The convention that a copy-text is to be chosen and the judgement that such-and-such a version of the text is the best copy-text are themselves matters to be discussed and justified: for the convention and the judgement are both examples of critical thought, and as such to be examined rationally. Next there are the instances in which the editor judges that deviations from the copy-text are superior to the readings that it contains. Then there is the formal statement of the collation, characteristically in an apparatus either at the foot of the page or at the back of the volume/s, or divided between the two according to one or more criteria. A critical edition generally involves retaining the formal features (such as spelling and punctuation) of a manuscript or printed copy-text.\textsuperscript{30} Other editorial contributions, whether interpretative or explanatory, are added more or less extensively in order to make the work intelligible to readers of the twenty-first century.

The list of practices and conventions could be lengthened: enough has been said for the reader who is fresh to critical-text editing to see that it has at its core the application of thought to evidence. It needs to be added that there are elements in critical editing which call particularly upon judgement rather than rule. This does not imply that judgement is an occult quality, incapable

\textsuperscript{29} Whether the identification of a copy-text is feasible depends upon the state of the evidence. This is commonly better for printed texts and modern manuscripts than for manuscripts from the ancient and medieval periods. An editor of ancient Latin and Greek works may never have occasion to think in terms of copy-text. For a survey of the development of editorial technique in relation to different sorts of text, see G. Thomas Tanselle, ‘Classical, Biblical and Modern Editing’, Studies in Bibliography 36(1983): 21–68.

\textsuperscript{30} Though punctuation can be an editorial addition, as e.g. in works of classical antiquity, and it may be an important contribution to the intelligibility of the text. One thinks of Bywater’s edition of Aristotle’s \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} (Oxford, 1890) in this connection.
of rational statement (though one can think of specimens where no such statement is offered), but rather that matters ranging from the application of rules to the emendation of textual cruces call upon reserves of scholarship and thought in which one editor can differ legitimately from another. For judgement implies that the thinking agent supplies something. For example, the evidence, whether through ambiguity or through paucity or through some other cause, may permit more than one inference. Again, procedures can be developed in more than one way. Such instances characteristically provide the more taxing difficulties of the critical editor’s activity. Such an editor may speak, as Malcolm does, of ‘constructing a text’ (vol.1, 317).\textsuperscript{31}

The result of this construction is an accession of knowledge. That is to say, an exhaustive examination of textual evidence yields a body of information which the editor displays in the apparatus. He or she judges which readings should be placed there and which in the main text. The reader thus obtains easy and rapid access to the evidence, along with the editor’s conclusions, and is therefore enabled to pursue his or her own activities—ranging from considering the editor’s claims to the task of interpreting the content and bearings of the main text. It is not too much to say that a critical edition is in some respects a necessary condition for further work: without it, the reader cannot discover easily whether he or she is proceeding from what is evidenced properly as distinguished from what is not.

The difference between the two can be considerable. Here are just three examples, taken at random, showing how the readings of a nineteenth-century edition of the English version of \textit{Leviathan} differ from those of the present edition. The reading from the nineteenth century edition is given on the left, and Malcolm’s on the right. Thus:-

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Despoticall Dominion attained</th>
<th>Despoticall Dominion how attained</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>God hath given evidence</td>
<td>God had given Evidence</td>
</tr>
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</table>

\textsuperscript{31} Another editor’s phrase (‘if I were to write a Teubner edition’) is most likely a product of using in a foreign language.
disproving the use of universities disapproving the use of Universities

Such differences in readings, though none are so spectacular as the Lockean example, have a great cumulative effect. If every example in this edition were enumerated, the list would run to thousands.

Any quizzical enquiry about the necessity in a most basic sense for critical-text editing ends here. Such editing provides a relatively secure way of identifying the ‘exact premises’ from which thinking about a text can proceed. It is, indeed, the only way (at least the only one generated so far) to identify ‘the actual words’ and so forth of the author, so that where it is successful a problem not soluble otherwise achieves solution. Thus it provides a basis for further work and, conversely, discloses where there is not a firm basis.32

But these findings do not exhaust the question of the importance of such editing. Importance, as noted, can take different forms, so that the question requires exploration through attention to particular texts and examples of editing. Thomas Hobbes, in this edition at least, provides an occasion to enquire in relation to a relentlessly active thinker.

How does Malcolm see his task? Readers need to see editorial procedures and their evidence if they are to judge the validity of the editor’s construction, and therefore to be assured of the reliability (or otherwise) of what they are reading. Malcolm compares a critical-text edition to an archive—‘an archive of textual information arranged on certain organizing principles’ (vol.1, 317). This is not entirely just when translated into specifics. The archivist’s analytical categories originated in dealing with medieval records, the authorship of which is often unknown, so that they tend to subordinate individuality to general classes of material. By contrast, a textual apparatus registers the contributions of the author/s and other individuals—not excluding their idiosyncrasies and errors—to the versions of a text before

32 For an entertaining example of the latter cf. Fredson Bowers, Textual and Literary Criticism (Cambridge, 1959), 31–33.
us. But the comparison does capture the general truth that the apparatus and critical text together present evidence for the reader’s consideration. To vary the metaphor, they provide indispensable light for the serious study of their subject.

Such light, it must be said, has not shone brightly in every edition of *Leviathan*. Two twentieth-century examples may be mentioned. Michael Oakeshott’s version of 1946 states (discreetly, on the rear of the title page) only this: ‘the errors of the edition of 1651 have been corrected, and the spelling has been modernized. Otherwise no important changes have been made.’³³ There is (as we shall see) more than one edition that bears the date 1651; disquiet is compounded as much by the anonymity of the modernizer as by the lack of information about what counts as important; and the reader may reflect on the judgement of Oakeshott’s own editor that ‘he was not a particularly scrupulous scholar.’³⁴ Edwin Curley’s version of 1994 rendered a significant service to readers by making available selected portions of Hobbes’s Latin version in translation as notes and addenda to the English text and by translating Hobbes’s Latin appendix. Yet it causes even greater perplexity. For it does not identify precisely the copy-text of the English version, saying only that it ‘follows’ one of the early editions, albeit augmented by attention to a modern edition. What it owes to each and why is not disclosed. Indeed, it appears that Curley drew upon yet more versions than he specified.³⁵ Such procedures are not transparent, so that the validity of their outcomes remains in doubt. Yet these two editions have circulated very widely, and for that reason have


been used as the bases of scholarly discussion.\textsuperscript{36} The need for a critical edition of \textit{Leviathan} in particular is therefore very obvious.\textsuperscript{37} It may seem perplexing that one did not appear till the twenty-first century. Text editorial procedures for manuscripts, of course, have a long history in the West.\textsuperscript{38} Yet Sir William Molesworth’s edition of Hobbes’s printed works, which began to appear in 1839, scarcely qualifies as critical. This is not to say that it is without value—in some respects it was a remarkable effort, and it remains the most comprehensive presentation of Hobbes writings to this day.\textsuperscript{39} It also evidences a good deal of work on its texts, even if it is the source of the three examples given above and is in all of those cases shown by comparison with the evidence to be obviously misleading. But not all of the requisites of the critical editing of such texts were available or commonly received in Britain during Molesworth’s day.

The main intellectual preconditions of critical editing include a keen interest in textual and artistic or intellectual content, an understanding of the author and his or her milieu, and procedures suitable for translating these into a properly-presented text. The intrinsic merits of Hobbes’s work have always secured an audience, and if the early response in Britain to \textit{Leviathan} was not always friendly,\textsuperscript{40} the book won its author recognition as a

\textsuperscript{36} e.g. Patricia Springborg, ed., \textit{The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes Leviathan} (Cambridge, 2007), xvii-xviii, nominates Curley’s edition as its standard reference, presumably in order to produce uniformity amongst its various contributions.


kindred figure from the English utilitarians and their associates, of whom Molesworth was one. Perhaps until the eighteen-eighties the lack of a modern history of Gardiner’s calibre was a handicap to or inhibition against close attention to Hobbes’s texts.\footnote{S. R. Gardiner, \textit{History of England from the accession of James I to the outbreak of the Civil War} (10 vols, London, 1883–84), \textit{A History of the Great Civil War}, 1642-9 (rev. edn., 4 vols., London, 1894), \textit{History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate} (rev. edn. 4 vols., London, 1903). The first of these had been published in instalments between 1863 and 1881.} Certainly a keen interest in intellectual content was joined from that decade by a keen scholarly interest in Hobbes’s life and circumstances. It was then that his present place as an object of study for historians, philosophers and political theorists came to be established as part of the professionalization of universities just then going on, specifically at the intellectual point where interest in Hobbes’s thought for general reasons became allied with historical scholarship.

The first academic study to place Hobbes and the whole spectrum of his thought in terms of his time was by the first Grote Professor at University College London, who was also the first editor of \textit{Mind}: an apt combination. In 1886 Croom Robertson carried through his claim that ‘[m]ore than of almost any other philosopher, it can be said of Hobbes that the key to a right understanding of his thought is to be found in his personal circumstances and the events of his time.’\footnote{G.C. Robertson, \textit{Hobbes} (Edinburgh, 1886), v-vi, cf. 235–36.} In 1896 this programme was seconded in broader terms by Tönnies, who thought that Hobbes, along with Hume, was one of the most important philosophers for modern thinking. Tönnies declared that ‘\textit{um die Philosophie des Hobbes richtig zu verstehen, müssen wir sie in ihren historischen Beziehungen und Konstrasten betrachten.}’\footnote{Ferdinand Tönnies, \textit{Hobbes, Leben und Lehre} (Stuttgart, 1896), 75.} He had already studied Hobbes’s manuscripts, as Robertson had done. These advances were deepened in one
direction by Brandt’s book of 1928, and broadened in many by John Laird’s volume of 1934. Laird, for instance, gave fuller attention than Robertson to the effect exerted by Hobbes’s thought. A further move of the same type had been made by John Dewey along a narrower front in 1918, when he addressed himself to Hobbes’s specifically political thought ‘in its own historic context’. A. E. Taylor went a great deal further and faster along the same route in 1938, when he called Leviathan ‘in many ways a popular Streitschrift’. Readers prone to suppose that Hobbes’s relation to contemporary life and thought was straightforward had not long to wait for correction from S. P. Lamprecht. But Taylor’s main destination was a different one: his claims about Hobbes’s moral philosophy stimulated much interest from philosophers and political theorists in Hobbes’s ethics and politics. For instance, Howard Warrender’s work of 1957 showed a similar concentration on Hobbesian content, and developed many interesting distinctions, not all of which, perhaps, receive full textual support, and some of which certainly stimulated responses. More numinous works from Leo Strauss, Carl Schmitt and Michael Oakeshott had already made it clear


that Hobbes had an importance for the development of political thought and, in some sense, for its future that could not be ignored lightly. Its importance for thinking about the politics of the twentieth century in particular had been recognized strikingly by R. G. Collingwood. Maurice Goldsmith asked if attending to what Hobbes ‘intended’ would lead to ‘a clearer understanding’ of his political thought. C. B. Macpherson’s attempt to present Hobbes as a creature, which, if insufficiently swift to be an imperialist running dog, was at least a poodle of the bourgeoisie, was perhaps an appropriate preface to the author of Leviathan becoming an industry as well as a person. In this industry, literatures about the thinker in his time and about the content of his thought have both multiplied, increasingly aimed at


54 The course of interpretative scholarship does not obviously point to the conclusion that Quentin Skinner’s ‘path-breaking work on Hobbes changed the whole nature of modern scholarship in this field’ (i, xii). This claim refers to Skinner’s articles of the nineteen-sixties and early seventies: see Malcolm, ‘On the Clarendon Edition’, 308, cf. i, 65, note 250. These dwelt upon a limited number of items in Hobbes’s political thought and emphasized their resemblance to positions taken by his contemporaries, not least some developed during the Engagement controversy by ‘the de facto theorists’. The ‘nature’ of the scholarship developed from 1886 comprised not least a Hobbes related to his contemporary setting, and it also comprised much besides. Malcolm addresses the Engagement to an effect rather different from Skinner’s, at i, 65-77. In any case, the year of Skinner’s ‘History and Ideology in the English Revolution’, Historical Journal, 8, 2 (1965), 151-78, saw a rather more inventive essay from Keith Thomas, ‘The Social Origins of Hobbes’s Political Thought’, in Brown, ed. Hobbes Studies, 185-236. The essays by Dewey, Taylor, Lamprecht, Oakeshott and Thomas, and a number by Skinner, are collected in John Dunn and Ian Harris, eds., Hobbes (3 vols., Cheltenham, 1997).
audiences of different sorts, so that their respective concerns are now seldom brought together so closely and persistently as this reader would like.

Yet, amidst all this interpretative work from the eighteen-eighties to the nineteen-sixties, the more important results by way of text-editing were three in number. Two of these were Tönnies’ versions of *Elements of Law* and *Behemoth*, both of 1889: works of lasting importance, significantly above the average of their day amongst post-classical political texts. It was just recently that one was superseded.55

Why the relative scarcity of critical editions? One element may have been the absence of a handbook. Madan observed in 1893 that ‘there is no manual of Textual Criticism’,56 and though that soon ceased to be true for English-speaking students of ancient manuscripts,57 it remained true rather longer for modern texts. The political texts of the middle ages began to be treated critically sooner than those of a later date. Marsilius and William of Ockham were leading beneficiaries of such editorial energy.58 Their works were edited from manuscript. Books concerning the editing of printed texts now came to hand. In 1939 McKerrow embodied the reflections of a lifetime’s work into maxims, and in 1942 Greg developed these into rules, albeit acknowledging their provisional character.59 Thereafter, the paucity of critical-edited


56 Madan, *Books in Manuscript*, 177.

57 e.g. W. M. Lindsay, *An Introduction to Latin Textual Emendation* (London, 1896). The long articles of Boeckh and Blass, in German, were somewhat earlier than Lindsay’s book.


texts for the history of political thought may have been due simply to the fact that students of history and politics were slow to learn the skills of critical editing, whilst students of literature had (and have) plenty of editing to do.

It may also have been due in part to fashion. After all, the critical editing of post-medieval political texts is a relatively new activity, and one which remains uncommon in relation to the volume of material that would benefit from it. That is to say, it remains relatively uncommon outside of certain areas where political thought overlaps with other intellectual interests: uncommon, perhaps, where the author to be edited is not also a classic of literature (especially French literature) or philosophy (especially American, German and Scottish philosophy). Amongst British scholars, Peter Laslett made a notable mark through the activity. Laslett was not, as he claimed, the first to edit texts that might be used for political science. The versions of Marsilius and Ockham would illustrate the opposite even had the former not been edited in Cambridge, indeed at Laslett’s own college, and had it not appeared when he was at school. Neither did Laslett bring to light the Christ’s copy of Locke’s *Two Treatises*, though somehow another impression has got abroad. That he never claimed. Rather he pointed out that the vigilant reader was Eric Stokes, to whom, one may add, historians of

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61 Locke, *Two Treatises*, ed. Laslett, ix, xiv. The distinctive interest of the Christ’s copy had been identified in print many years prior to Stokes’ undergraduate reading of it, and not just by Thomas Hollis’ emphasis upon it. See [Francis Blackburne], *Memoirs of Thomas Hollis* (2 vols., London, 1780), i, 223–24. Jean S. Yoltonton, John Locke. A *Descriptive Bibliography* (Bristol, 1998), 36, provided the first notice of this fact in contemporary scholarship. Priority amongst twentieth-century students of Locke in referring to the Christ’s copy as of especial interest may belong to A. H. Maclean, ‘The Origins of the Political Opinions of John Locke’ (unpublished University of Cambridge Ph.D., 1947). Maclean stated (2–3) that it was ‘of the greatest interest by reason of the frequent additions and corrections which the author subscribed in his own hand’. Both Blackburne and Maclean are listed in Laslett’s bibliography.
political thought are indebted for other reasons besides. Nor did Laslett, as is supposed sometimes, invent a manner of writing about political thought. Again, questions about the precision and completeness of his editorial work arise. Though Laslett collated eight printings of Two Treatises, using Locke’s own copies where he could, he did not specify which copies he used besides Locke’s. Neither did he provide evidence to suggest that he used more than one copy of any printing, except the first, so that it is doubtful whether on the whole he collated examples of any given printing against each other. Laslett was notable in at least three ways. One was his flair for finding new material—in particular, unearthing a very important manuscript of Filmer’s Patriarcha and recovering a significant proportion of Locke’s library.


65 The information on these points should have appeared in either the ‘Editorial Note’, or at the head of the collations, Two Treatises, ed. Laslett, 146–52, 447. For other difficulties in Laslett’s editing, see J. P. Sommerville, ed., Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings (Cambridge, 1991), vii, and compare Delphine Soulard, ‘The Christ’s Copy of John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government’, Historical Journal 58, 1 (2015): 25–49, at 27–33.

66 Peter Laslett, ed., Patriarcha and Other Political Works of Sir Robert Filmer (Oxford, 1949); John Harrison and Peter Laslett, eds., The Library of John Locke, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1971). Laslett himself emphasized the recovery of the library, see Peter Laslett, in conversation with John Rogers, ‘The Recovery of Locke’s Library’, The Philosophical Canon in the 17th and 18th Centuries, ed. G. A. J. Rogers and Sylvana Tomaselli (Rochester, NY, 1996), 67–82. It is perhaps appropriate for this reason that Antony McKenna’s discovery of Charles La Motte’s life of Pierre Coste, which was edited for publication by Hélène Bouchilloux and Maria-Cristina Pitassi in John Locke,
Another was a combination of literary charm, persuasive skill and entrepreneurial energy which enabled him to impress his message on audiences of many sorts. Perhaps this, or some of it, was a legacy from the father whom he thought the greatest preacher of the day amongst the Baptists of England.\footnote{The present writer is authorised to state this by Dr John Walsh, who had the judgement from Laslett himself.} Whatever the origins of these attitudes and talents, they enabled Laslett to enlist the help and co-operation of experts in the areas which attracted him, whether text-editing or bibliography or demography. The third way was that Laslett was ever willing to turn his hand to whatever task his curiosity suggested, and his curiosity was abundant, for it went along with a sympathy for the dead which at once resembled a pastor’s attitude to his living flock and partook of a preacher’s imagination. These three ways converged to produce one result—one result amongst many—namely to project the importance of critical editing, through the medium of Locke, to readers across the world. Though Laslett considered that the 1713 edition of Locke’s \textit{Two Treatises} was its author’s ‘text for posterity’, he used the Christ’s copy, with its extensive manuscript additions, as his copy-text because it presented Locke’s intentions in a form which he judged unimpeachable.\footnote{Locke, \textit{Two Treatises of Government}, ed. Laslett, 147 (on the \textit{4th printing, 1713, reproducing Locke’s text for posterity}), 149 (for Laslett’s doubts about its relations to the Christ’s copy), 150 (for the ‘unimpeachable authenticity’ of the Christ’s copy amongst reasons for using it the latter as a copy -text). It should be added that Laslett’s ‘Editorial Note’, 146–52, even when supplemented by ‘The Book’, 3–16, is rather briefer and rather less adequate than the case warrants.} This was not quite so critical an attitude as the case warrants, though the outcome is one of a number of reasonable choices. Laslett’s bespoke an historian’s instinct about irreducible fact. Yet it certainly put the significance

of critical-text editing into a very graphic form. This was a form which rested on tangible evidence that was new to almost all readers and which, depending as it did on a discovery and accompanying a new claim for the date of composition, seized the imagination. After Laslett, British university presses have printed rather more attempts at the critical editing of political texts.

All the same, sequence is no sure guide to causation. For instance, it was not any Laslettian inspiration that led Warrender to become interested in Hobbes’s texts. Rather he was led to search for authentic texts because Molesworth’s weaknesses ‘on occasion obliged [him] to resort to the original editions in order to clarify matters of interpretation in Hobbes’s doctrine’. The Clarendon Edition of the Works of Thomas Hobbes began under Warrender’s general editorship. He himself edited De Cive and its English (if probably non-Hobbesian) counterpart Philosophicall Rudiments, and had begun work on Leviathan before his untimely death. The edition as a whole regained visible momentum from 1994, when Malcolm’s elaborate edition of Hobbes’s correspondence appeared. It has done so especially from 2005. To edit Leviathan fell to Malcolm, and his labours extended over more than a quarter of a century.

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To understand what is involved here requires us to identify not least the scale of the task. Firstly, *Leviathan* is not a short book: amongst texts from Hobbes’s peers which we can call broadly political it is rivalled in wordage chiefly by Augustine, Grotius and Montesquieu. Secondly, there survives one very important manuscript of the whole of the English text, a fair copy written on vellum and therefore presumably intended for presentation, as it appears, to Charles II. Thirdly, there are the numerous printed copies of the English text published during or soon after Hobbes’s lifetime, beginning with those of 1651. Then, fourthly, we must add that massive register of Hobbes’s second and subsequent thoughts, his translation of *Leviathan* into Latin, for this is not only a translation but also a substantial expansion and revision, as well as on occasion a subtraction. These are the basic materials on which the critical editor must exert judgement—and the exercise of judgement is itself an extensive task with any book of such size, let alone one like this, with its lengthy printing histories. Then there are the historical materials bearing upon the text, and the task of elucidating its initiation, development and reception. The editor must write about these too. It can hardly surprise that the introduction of this edition constitutes a separate volume. One can add that reading the proofs cannot have been the work of an afternoon. They have been addressed with exceptional accuracy.

It is doubtful is anyone who had only this task could do all these things rapidly, and Malcolm has had many other tasks on hand. Happily, he has not been without assistance. To a commemoration, at once specific and generous, of research assistance from Nigel Hope, Jan Moore and Stephen Plaister for their fundamental work in collation and translation (vol.1, xii–xiii) this writer adds his mite of publicity. Even with extensive assistance from these three pairs of eyes and hands, the task has clearly been formidable in its bulk and in its demands alike. Neither should it be overlooked that if the range of skills required is formidable, so too are the liabilities. As Malcolm observes the ‘conditions of modern academic life are increasingly inimical to

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73 British Library, Ms. Egerton 1910.
scholarly labour of this kind, which requires intensive—and, for prolonged periods, apparently unproductive—work on a mass of details’ (vol.1, xiv). Some idea of the ‘mass of details’ can be had by looking just at the most basic features of the editorial task.

What are the fundamental points that an editor must address in this material? The first question for a critical editor of the Leviathan of 1651 concerns the texts which claim to have been ‘Printed for Andrew Crooke at the Green Dragon in St. Paul’s Church-yard’ during that year. To the incurious eye these look the same. The closer inspection by Macdonald and Hargreaves—whose bibliographical work remains a tool necessary for all editors of Hobbes—distinguished three editions, which they called ‘Head’, ‘Bear’, and ‘Ornaments’ from the devices on their respective title pages. They also distinguished their order of publication from an examination of their errata, placing ‘Head’ first, ‘Bear’ second and ‘Ornaments’ third. Macdonald and Hargreaves identified ‘Head’ as the genuinely 1651 London edition, ‘Bear’ as a Dutch, perhaps Amsterdam version probably not long after 1651, and ‘Ornaments’ as later than both ‘Head’ and ‘Bear’.

Malcolm adopts the general outline of this analysis, and, more interestingly, ingeniously infers, not particular dates (which the evidence he presents would scarcely permit) but fairly precise timeframes. As to ‘Bear’—to which he attributes a more complicated and much more interesting printing history than did Macdonald and Hargreaves—he infers from a number of dated ownership inscriptions and from the recorded cost of copies of ‘Head’ and ‘Bear’ (vol.1, 219–35) that it was completed c.1675–8 (vol.1, 235–38). He also inferentially dates ‘Ornaments’ to c.1695–1702 (vol.1, 271). These are important and valuable hypotheses. Neither are they all that there is at a fundamental level. Malcolm’s treatment of the Latin Leviathan, a topic on which Macdonald and Hargreaves were concise, though still not

negligible, is full and illuminating (vol.1, 274–94). Besides this, certain features of *Leviathan* which have a physical presence though they are not strictly matters of textual editing are elucidated: perhaps most notably (vol.1, 124–28) the choice of the word ‘Leviathan’ for the title. 

These large additions to knowledge are complemented by a significantly closer degree of critical attention to textual variations and their importance than *Leviathan* has received hitherto, a point which applies to the English and the Latin versions alike.

The Latin text has received surprisingly little attention, though in that little there is an important rendering of it. This was François Tricaud’s French translation of 2004, which, along with his 1971 rendering of the English text, Malcolm salutes (vol.1, 307) for their valuable contributions to textual scholarship.

Though the English text has attracted more attention than the Latin, there has not been so much sustained attention by editors to the manuscript and to the variants of ‘Head’, or to what might be gleaned from ‘Bear’ and ‘Ornaments’, as one might have anticipated. The move which has turned out to be basic for twentieth and indeed twenty-first century editors of the English *Leviathan* was made by A. R. Waller in 1904, for which reason his version makes a third to Tönnies’ editions of *Elements* and *Behemoth*. Waller, who was working before Macdonald and Hargreaves had formed their classification, distinguished ‘the original folio issue’ from later copies (though he did not distinguish ‘Bear’ from ‘Ornaments’) and he based his edition on

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‘a copy of the first issue’, i.e. ‘Head’. The better editors have followed his lead, some contributing further work. For instance, Macpherson examined ten copies of ‘Head’ albeit ‘cursorily’, as he said, and inferred that there were at least four different versions. Much more noteworthy as an attempt to address the considerations that interest critical-text editors is Richard Tuck’s version. This, though it does not claim to be critical, embodies important critical features. In particular, it makes detailed use of the presentation manuscript. It also gives prominence to the importance of the large paper copies of ‘Head’, which were made for targeted distribution during the printing process, using one of these for its exemplar for the printer. These choices, especially the first, marked an important change.

The present edition embodies systematic attention not only to Hobbes’s presentation manuscript and to the usual printed editions of the English Leviathan, but also to the large paper versions and to in-press variants (which are listed at vol.3, 1293–97). Five copies of ‘Head’ have been collated for the English text, and a further ten consulted, whilst three copies of ‘Bear’ have been consulted. For the Latin Leviathan, six copies of the 1668 edition have been collated, and a further five copies consulted, besides consultation of further copies of the 1670 edition and its 1676 and 1678 issues (vol.3, 1293, vol.1, 327; vol.3, 1305, vol.1, 330–1), though it need scarcely be added that detailed attention has been paid to other material and that readings from other sources appear in texts and apparatus alike, along with textual

77 Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. A.R. Waller (Cambridge, 1904), v-vi.
80 This information, one need scarcely add, is distributed to several places, which makes unnecessary work for the reader. One can see no reason why it should not be united in one place, e.g. the bibliographical description at vol.1, 326-31, and, where necessary, partially repeated in others (compare vol.1, 318-20 with vol.2, xi-xii). Again, it would be helpful to know more about what is comprised in consulting or examining a copy, as distinguished from collating it. For a consciously informal and incomplete estimate of the proportion of ‘Heads’ to ‘Bears’ in circulation, see vol.1, 238.
emendations (see the remarks in vol. 1, 308–21; and compare 200–20 on the value of the manuscript). Though the collations of copies of ‘Head’ against each other and copies of the 1668 Latin version against one another do not by any means exhaust the available copies, that is not for the present the important point about them. The point is that Malcolm’s edition makes a very considerable advance over previous versions for what is, after all, a rather long work. (To which one can add that after twenty-five years on the job an editor may reasonably call time).81

The inductive basis of this edition is not only the most extensive hitherto but is also the deepest. For two extensive chapters of textual introduction (vol.1, 197–302) set out and describe the history of the manuscript and early editions as preconditions of selecting a copy-text. The result is that the exemplar sent to the printer for the English is a large paper copy of ‘Head’, and for the Latin a copy of the 1668 printing in Hobbes’s Opera philosophica (vol.1, 309).82 Thus the basis for the text printed here is the result of a much more sustained and systematic work than any printed hitherto, or likely to be printed for a considerable time.83 The significance of this point is not

81 As Martin West once suggested to the present writer: ‘let us leave work for future scholars’.

82 Malcolm refers to the (copies of) exemplars sent to the printer with editorial changes indicated on them as copy-texts (i, 309, iii, 1293, 1304). It is perfectly reasonable to refer to the physical item sent to the printer as a copy-text, for it is the copy from which the printer copies. On the other hand, with critical-text editing, where the copy-text is modified by the effects of collation, judgement, etc., this usage is less perspicuous (though more elegant) than ‘exemplar sent to the printer’.

83 An informed reader will have noticed by now the absence of Rogers and Schuhmann’s edition of Leviathan from the discussion. This was the first attempt at a critical edition of Leviathan, and for that reason would deserve note even if it did not contain much valuable work and interesting information. Yet its text is flawed by the strange decision to use modern versions as substitutes for original copies of ‘Head’, which is criticized effectively by Malcolm, i, 305, cf. ‘The Making of the Bear’, and ‘The Making of the Ornaments’, esp. s.1. This side of the edition was the work of Schuhmann, to whom students of Hobbes owe much, and who at the time that this edition was underway was suffering from a mortal illness which made his task very difficult. It seems best to touch lightly on this aspect of his work, and to reflect that in less adverse conditions its defects might well have been absent. One might reflect, too,
diminished by comparing this state of the art with that for *De iure Belli ac Pacis*. This edition of *Leviathan* is really the first since Hobbes’s time to compass current standards for critical editing.

The results of this effort are evident in the apparatus of textual variants given at the foot of each text page. The English *Leviathan* yields, usually, three to five variants per page. These are recruited principally from the manuscript, and to a lesser but significant extent from ‘Bear’. When there are more variants, it may be because the subject was especially fine-textured, as vol.2, p.326, on liberty and necessity. The Latin variants, which are entered for the versions of 1668 and 1670, seem to be fewer in number on the whole than the English variants, but can be pretty extensive when Hobbes had something to add (e.g. vol.2, p.283).

It is not just that cumulatively the apparatus comprises thousands of items. It is rather, qualitatively, that it provides at once the means to identify what Hobbes (or others) wrote at various times, and therefore also the indispensable means to commence considering reasons for the change.

It thus identifies a necessity of critical editing for further historical interpretation. Such interpretation needs the critical editor’s work if it is to proceed satisfactorily. This point is not one that has received the degree of attention it deserves. Such conditions might have silenced a less single-minded scholar. Compare Malcolm’s acknowledgement of his other writings, vol.1, xiii.

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84 That work still lacks a critical edition, *pace* Richard Tuck, *The Sleeping Sovereign. The Invention of Modern Democracy* (Cambridge, 2016), 71, note 12. The lengthy title of Hugo Grotius *De iure belli ac pacis libri tres in quibus ius naturae et gentium item iuris publici praecipua explicantu curavit B.J.A. de Kanter-van Hettinga Tromp editionis anni 1939 quae Lugduni Batavorum in aedibus E.J. Brill emissa est exemplar photomechanice iteratum annotationes novas addiderunt R.Feenstra et C.E.Persenaire adiuvante E. Arps-de Wilde* (Aalen, 1993) is not intended to disguise the fact that the 1939 edition was designedly not a critical one, but rather an uncritical version of the five editions taken to be prepared by Grotius, see xii-xv, 923–26. The apparatus of the 1939 edition was copied, with some additions, from the 1919 edition by P.C. Molhuysen, who had followed previous editors’ work—not least that of Jean Barbeyrac. The 1993 version, amongst other changes for the better, adds numerous corrections to the citations of Grotius and his editors.

85 For instance, the manuals by professed historians say little or nothing about it, as P. D. A. Harvey, *Editing Historical Records* (London, 2001) and Hunter, *Editing*. The
neglect can arise from adventitious reasons. Locke, for instance, has received less attention in this way than one might anticipate because the best editor of An Essay did not live to execute his plan of outlining the development of Locke’s ideas about the human understanding, and because Laslett, though he devoted much attention to the dating of the original composition of Two Treatises and to the additions in the Christ’s copy, gave comparatively little to the development of Locke’s thought. But the need is present. To give only one example (chosen just because it is familiar to this writer), the change in Locke’s Essay from the first edition’s ‘That GOD has given a Law to Mankind, I think, there is no body so brutish as to deny’ to the second and subsequent editions’ ‘That God has given a Rule whereby Men should govern themselves, I think there is no body so brutish as to deny’ can be understood as marking the author’s sense that he had not made out so satisfactorily as he had wished a position about knowledge of natural law. But examples could be multiplied. For one, a philosopher’s alteration of ‘action’ to ‘agent’ in his manuscript may give pause for thought to subsequent philosophers. Historians of philosophy may smile in reading Mill’s Hamilton to discover that the author’s comments in his preface to the third and fourth editions ‘give no clear guidance to his rewriting and imply that much less took place than is actually the case’ in response to his critics, ‘responses… of a kind rare even in the Logic and the Principles’. Again, for

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historians and philosophers alike, the ease with which the reader can study multiple revisions in *Theory of Moral Sentiments* through a critical edition contrasts with the harder work required in dealing with the A and B versions of *Critique of Pure Reason.*

Herein lies a necessity for critical-editing in a sense appropriate to Hobbes, Locke and other highly active thinkers. It registers the development of thought, spontaneous or otherwise, and so makes study of that development, whether for historical or philosophical purposes, feasible and even pleasant. This character is not identical to the one suggested by Malcolm’s comparison between a critical text and an archive in an important way. Both, it is true, present evidence; but with a difference. An archive is a repository, whilst the apparatus of variants or the separate printing of very extensive changes is an identification of facts selected for their evident importance. Such an identification not only facilitates study but also prompts questions. The spectacular example given above from Nuovo’s edition of Locke’s *Second Vindication* puts that point in dramatic form: why such a change? What was going on in Locke’s mind? The answer sees textual scholarship yield questions for historical interpretation. Critical editing not only provides this prompt but also identifies the place from which interpretation can begin with some security—or, alternatively, the knowledge that security is not available presently.

These points, as they are fundamental, may seem obvious once stated. Yet they have not been brought into the relief they deserve. The preoccupations of editorial theorists lie with editing rather than the development of thought. Most examples of critical editing belong to literature, whether ancient, medieval or modern. By no means all the denizens of history departments are as much at ease with the content of abstract thought as with a world

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conceived in other terms, even in isolation from such thought.\textsuperscript{90} Even some of those who concern themselves with such thought may wish to assimilate it to other things. That propensity, interestingly, has not recommended itself to Hobbes’s editor, who points out that examining the ‘political and biographical context’ of the book ‘may help to elucidate the timing of its composition, and…some of its particular features’, yet that would be ‘very far from exhausting the meaning of his work, or from explaining why Hobbes believed that what he wrote was true.’\textsuperscript{91} Though some historians may not be attuned to abstract thought, others may be so much at ease with it that they take change in it for granted. Students of philosophy, theology and their histories—who provided the examples of critical editing just mentioned—may treat change in mind as a very common feature of intellectual life rather than as something that requires editorial emphasis. At any rate, the need for critical editing of texts to disclose intellectual change is inescapable.

All of this raises the question of copy-text and of final intention. A copy-text displays one version of an author’s thoughts, and treats other versions in relation to it. This implies an assessment of which version is be taken as embodying what the author thought best. Where the thinking concerns works of philosophy and abstract thought more widely, it is more or less natural to suppose that the author’s latest thoughts were those he thought best. The supposition is no doubt enforced at a deep level by the fact that those who specialize in editing such texts often began their philosophical reading with an author whose thought was ‘work in progress’ to the very end of his life, namely Plato. Whatever its origins, this supposition harmonizes with the view that critical-text editing should interest itself in final intentions. Thus the choice of copy-text for such works may be at once an implied statement about critical editing and one about the

\textsuperscript{90} Hunter, \textit{Editing}, which is written for this audience, devotes no section to discussing the development of such thought. Compare note 8 above for an impression Hunter records.

\textsuperscript{91} i, 82, and cf. 19–20, 195.
author’s view of his or her own work. Considerations other than final intention may determine the choice of copy-text, of course, but supposing that it does determine it, where would that choice take us with *Leviathan*?

This edition displays skill of a high order. Though editors of printed works have commonly much less to do by way of emendation than those of manuscripts, the editor shows not only skill, but relish. There is an interesting example at vol.3, 1090. There Malcolm shows a closer attention to sense than Hobbes’s own. Again, at vol.3, 787 there is a good emendation of the Latin version, accompanied by a lively sense (note n) that there are other possibilities. One feels that the editor might enjoy a larger and more demanding field for textual emendation. His policy about the scope of annotation is fairly austere (vol.1, 324), though sensible in relation to the size of Hobbes’s book and the scale of the task an editor would have wished upon himself otherwise on this occasion. Such abstinence—and one feels that the editor enjoys his work—is consistent with a fuller commentary at a later date.\(^\text{92}\) There is much of value in the notes: for instance, vol.2, 155 has a very good observation (note g) on Hobbes’s ambiguity in Latin. Throughout felicitous qualities of observation and thought are apparent, and that their results are at a uniformly high standard may make them less noticeable than they deserve. It is especially pleasant to record a case where the editor observes that the meaning of a sentence changes according to the positioning of a comma (vol.1, 314–15, and vol.2, 358, 360).

The results, in short, represent a very major advance not only in our information but also in what can be termed properly our knowledge of the text. Here we see the results of a rare combination of hard work and detailed thinking about its results. The resulting reflection on the basic features of this edition and related matters is mostly practical, as is entirely reasonable in addressing an individual work. Though there are eight pages on the specific characteristics of this edition, there is only one on its

\(^{92}\) Conversely, there are ample precedents for commentaries printed without texts, e.g. Andrew R. Dyck, *A Commentary on Cicero, De Legibus* (Ann Arbor, 2004).
‘general assumptions’—and most of that is devoted to dealing (very neatly) with criticisms of these (vol.1, 308–316, 317) rather than to the exposition, development and justification of these ‘assumptions’. At this point a little more explicitness might have been useful, for it would have brought into the light the related task of justifying the choice of copy-text. Tuck’s work and the elaborate account given in the textual introduction here are such that it would be perfectly reasonable to choose ‘Head’ as copy-text for the English *Leviathan*, but one has missed explicit reasoning to justify this choice. The choice is not self-evident in principle, and exploration of principle suggests that more than one candidate merits consideration in practice. So we should turn to questions about criteria and their application, and in due course we shall turn to questions about the Latin *Leviathan*.

What are the criteria? Malcolm states that he follows ‘the basic principles’ of the ‘Greg-Bowers method of textual criticism’ (vol.1, 317). This method treats final intention as a criterion for copy-text, but there is more to it than that. We need to attend to what is implied in those ‘principles’ according to those who framed them, and to attend also to an important distinction generated by one of them. Attention to ‘more’ indicates variations in editorial perspective about just where final intention is to be located and variations relating to the distinction. These differences and variations have potential effects upon the choice of copy-text to be made, and so require attention here.

Where or with whom to seek our ‘more’? Walter Greg and Ronald McKittrick developed hypotheses in the course of their editorial work, and reflected on these as they proceeded. Fredson Bowers placed a forcefully re-iterated emphasis on the conclusions McKittrick and Greg had reached when they laid down their pens, and spent much more time in elaborating the detailed working-out of these positions, especially one of Greg’s, than in developing fresh hypotheses. It is helpful to begin with McKittrick, who seems to have invented the term ‘copy-text’.  

He considered that a copy-text for a critical-text edition of a printed work should correspond to the fair copy of the author’s manuscript as closely as possible—that manuscript being considered as the embodiment of the author’s final intentions. This ideal standard of the author’s manuscript was adopted by Greg. The obvious consequence of this view is that if this manuscript does not survive (and it does all too rarely), and no manuscript approaching to it survives either, then the editor’s best evidence is the earliest printed edition, so that that this should be his or her copy-text.

McKerrow devised and Greg formalized this way of proceeding with respect to Shakespeare. Shakespeare, though many of his plays appeared in print during his lifetime, is an author whose works have a very complex history. Part of it took place when he, being dead, was unable to exert any control over the transition from (now lost) manuscripts to the printed versions of his works, works which the players, the earliest editors and indeed other dramatists were only too ready to alter. This is a situation in which the longer a sequence of printed editions becomes, the further the reader may be driven from what the author wrote, or may have written, and the closer to a text characterised by features in which others have worked their will. But Will’s situation is not the only one.

Other authors have been better placed to control their printed versions, and also to revise or rewrite these more or less heavily. Greg, on reflection, recognized in a famous essay that evidence of authorial revision after a first printing would justify editorial choice of a later rather than a first printed version as copy-text, provided that ‘if the reprint be selected, then the original reading must be restored when that of the reprint is due to unauthorized

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But though he thus went some way towards recognizing that authors may develop the content of their work rather markedly through a sequence of editions and may see these through the press, he did not consider the whether such cases could be ‘normal’, despite noting one important example.\(^97\) Neither did he reflect then that if it was ‘normal’ or common or just important such a practice would imply a need for development in thinking about critical editing. Such authorial revision may imply that a later edition, for example, the last edition of the author’s lifetime, or even a posthumous one that can be judged on good grounds to be connected with the author, is the best evidence about final intention. The choice of copy-text could reflect that state of affairs.

Similar points about a criterion and its relationship to facts that were not fully considered in its formulation apply to a notable distinction Greg made in the same essay. He distinguished ‘substantives’ from ‘accidentals’. The former term denoted textual readings that ‘affect the author’s meaning or the essence of his expression’, whilst the latter denoted those which affect ‘mainly its formal presentation, which may be regarded as the accidents…of the text.’ The implied ontology is one appropriate for early modern texts in that Aristotle and Locke alike would have recognized it. But why would it matter? Greg supposed that scribes and compositors could be ‘assumed’ to aim at reproducing the former, but would ‘normally’ follow their own habits or inclinations in dealing with the matter. So, for instance, if we are dealing with a printed book, it would be likely that ‘accidentals’ would be features which did (or do) not belong to the author’s fair copy, but rather to the first printed edition. The scribe producing a non-authorial manuscript or the compositors working in a printing house, rather than the author, would have controlled


capitalization, punctuation, spelling and so forth and worked their will upon them.

Bowers laid a very heavy accent on ‘the genius’ of Greg in making this ‘definitive statement’, and averred that ‘Sir Walter Greg is as sound as a...Swiss franc’.98 A currency may be very sound, yet its exchange value varies. To the extent that the author is known or surmised to control such features as punctuation, etc., they are eligible for consideration as evidence of his or her meaning—which is what Greg meant by ‘substantives’.99 Even Bowers recognized that where the author engaged in ‘sweeping rewriting’ and ‘marked up a printed’ copy ‘so thoroughly’ that authorial and compositorial work cannot be distinguished clearly, there ‘an editor has no choice but to accept the accidentals of the minute revision as more authoritative on the whole than those of the first edition’. These he termed ‘special circumstances’, just as Greg described authorial revision of printed texts as ‘rare’.100 One is at liberty to ask how ‘special’ or ‘rare’ such instances are. Greg himself stated in another place that ‘[i]t is not altogether unusual for an author to revise his work’.101 In due course Bowers discovered that he had a ‘serious quarrel’ with Greg’s hypothesis of ‘the lesser authority of a revised version in cases of doubt’ concerning ‘accidentals,’ and he added for good measure that, as post-Renaissance compositors might be thought relatively reliable, ‘indifferent’ substantive variants in certain revised editions were more likely to be authorial than compositorial.102 If so, then editors of such later works may find that ‘the accidentals are an inseparable whole with the substantives in transmitting the


author’s total meaning’, and indeed editors can exercise judgement in about ‘other areas on the same basis that Greg urges for the substantives’. Thus, though the distinction between ‘substantives’ and ‘accidentals’ remains of considerable interest, even its devoted advocate recognized on reflection that in some instances authors control features which otherwise could be ‘accidentals’. In such cases the distinction between ‘substantives’ and ‘accidentals’ may be more valuable as a source of questions than of ready-made positions. For instance, systematic editorial attention to punctuation, etc., may yield useful indications of authorial intention and authorial control.

The view of copy-text taken by McKerrow and Greg’s rather later recognition that variation from it might make sense, like Greg’s distinction and its subsequent qualification reflected particular experiences. McKerrow and Greg spent most of their working lives as editors on English renaissance drama and as writers on related topics, and to their textual range Bowers added eighteenth and nineteenth-century literature in English. Extensive rewriting and repunctuating, etc. by the author—rather than the complex problems arising from distinguishing the work of author from that of compositors, players et al.—was not a phenomenon which fell under the eyes of McKerrow and Greg with sufficient frequency to find its way into—here one borrows Greg’s term—the essence of their criteria or ‘method’. It was Bowers who extended their ‘method’, developed as it was with reference to the


circumstances of renaissance drama, to a much more extended period and a rather more varied range of materials.

It was only quite late in his life, when Bowers turned to editing the works of an academic philosopher and psychologist, that he discovered his ‘quarrel’ with Greg. Rewriting of an obviously authorial origin on a large scale, embodied in successive printed editions, is perhaps more common in works of abstract thought than in those of literature. Philosophers, for instance, are not only prone to second thoughts and therefore to extensive rewriting, but also attend keenly to meaning, and therefore to capitalization, punctuation and so forth. One claimed—in a not uncharacteristic tone—that the ‘degree of accuracy’ he had brought to ‘correcting’ his work had made it ‘probably much more labour’d…than any other production in our Language’, even that he had examined it ‘carefully five times over’. Philosophical revision—taking philosophical in a broad as well as a narrow sense—can be more intensive than Hume’s care. From Hobbes’s own century not only Locke but also Newton provide marked examples of noteworthy intellectual development after a first edition. From the next Smith not only revised his philosophical positions time after time but also attended carefully to his capitalization and punctuation. Besides, he invited corrections from William Strahan, his publisher. Where does Hobbes stand in respect of authorial control and authorial revision?

Let us turn to the English Leviathan. Malcolm presents argument and evidence to suggest that the presentation manuscript of the English Leviathan, which is nowadays difficult


reading, is a text prior to the hypothesized manuscript of ‘Head’, which Hobbes presumably sent to the printer. Malcolm suggests also that the presentation manuscript has some corrections not found in ‘Head’, and that Hobbes was in a position to revise proofs of ‘Head’ (vol. 1, 199, 203, 209, 93). Malcolm, again, indicates that ‘Bear’ embodies authorial changes (vol.1, 233, 313, 315–16). He also finds (in an investigation conducted with considerable aplomb, contrasting with the rather briefer treatment in Macdonald and Hargreaves) that it had a rather unsettled printing history, part of which lay in the hands of Dutch-speaking compositors. He does not discuss in his account of this printing history (vol.1, 233–53) whether Hobbes had much or any control during that process, though he states later that ‘we simply do not know whether he was involved in some way in its production’ (vol.1, 313). ‘Ornaments’, as noted already, he places after Hobbes’s lifetime, identifying it as made from a copy of ‘Bear’ (vol.1, 260). It was on Malcolm’s account the first edition postdating Hobbes’s death in 1679. In this edition, then, we have a fairly full account of Hobbes’s activity and its likely limits, one which accrues from an extended survey of the material and thoughtful inferences from it.

Malcolm’s findings provide much matter for reflection on the criteria or ‘method’ and on Greg’s distinction in relation to the choice of copy-text. They also provide a case that bears consideration. Hobbes was able to exert much more control in the printing history of his work than poor Shakespeare, but perhaps not quite as much as Hume. Questions about copy-text and about ‘accidentals’ as distinguished from ‘substantives’ can arise interestingly in a situation like Hobbes’s, and, it turns out, various answers can be returned to them.

Suppose we begin with McKerrow’s criterion for a copy-text, that it is the first printed edition if the authorial manuscript of it or something close to the latter is not available. That criterion suggests that the presentation manuscript—which Malcolm takes to antedate the manuscript sent to the printer of ‘Head’—deserves consideration prima facie as a candidate for copy-text. For McKerrow’s criterion privileges an authorial manuscript because
it provides the editor with access to authorial intention uncontaminated by unauthorised and potentially unwelcome alterations from a scribe or printing-house. The presentation manuscript, though not a holograph, bears marks of Hobbesian control. Its claims could be considered in at least two ways. One would be to ask whether it can be judged sufficiently close to the hypothesized manuscript of ‘Head’ to afford adequate evidence about that manuscript. Malcolm judges that in ‘the great majority of cases…Hobbes’s reasons for making his changes to the copy-manuscript sent to the printers seems to have been essentially stylistic’, though the ‘Review and Conclusion’ is in a form slightly earlier than that of ‘Head’. Some passages about the Independents were dropped from the latter. Malcolm acknowledges that these Independent changes may have been made by the printer (vol.1, 204, 207, 203, 64). Malcolm’s information about definitely ‘substantive’ changes appears to be consistent with a judgement in favour of the surviving manuscript as copy-text. Another way to consider the claims of the presentation manuscript would be ask whether the presence in it of authorial corrections later than ‘Head’ does not indicate that this manuscript supersedes the latter as the appropriate copy-text. Malcolm’s view that this manuscript was written and revised at a more leisurely pace than the manuscript sent to the printer (vol.1, 209) could feature in support of that claim. So could the fact that the presentation manuscript is the leading source of the substantive variants Malcolm brings into his text. One might add the historical point that Hobbes judged this manuscript was fit for a king.\footnote{The question of the relative authority of presentation manuscripts and of subsequent printed versions, which it would not have been out of place to discuss in this edition, is a matter of some interest.}

Attention to matters which might count as ‘accidentals’ if the author was indifferent or powerless but could count as ‘substantives’ if the author controlled them suggests something similar. Malcolm accepts the distinction between accidentals and ‘substantives’ as part of the ‘Greg-Bowers method’ (vol.1, 312,
recognizes that ‘orthography, capitalization, italicization, punctuation, and paragraphing’ have ‘potential importance for the study of...meaning’ (vol.1, 308). He also suggests that the presentation manuscript is ‘certainly closer than ‘Head’ to Hobbes’s own usage’ for spelling (vol.1, 221). This judgement favours the presentation manuscript’s claims to be treated as copy-text because it suggests that it may yield ‘substantives’ where ‘Head’ provides ‘accidentals’.

Malcolm’s judgement about orthography is given in the course of a brief account (vol.1, 219–22) of Hobbes’s attitudes to it and related matters, an account which is itself part of the editorial treatment of ‘Head’ (vol.1, 209–26). The comparative slightness and subordinate character of this account, which seems to be the only one about such matters given in these volumes, makes one wonder whether fuller attention is not in order. It also raises a general point. Sometimes one feels that editions of printed texts might gain from fuller attention to the resource provided by holographs. Malcolm judges that a Hobbesian holograph of a treatise survives (vol.1, 201).110 Attention to what he takes to be Hobbes’s own practice when using a pen for intellectual purposes might afford a standard against which to compare the presentation manuscript systematically and to compare both with the printed versions. True, this exercise calls for caution—for instance, it may be that an author would be more casual in a given holograph than s/he would be with a manuscript prepared for the press (though Malcolm, vol.1, 219, thinks that Hobbes allowed the typesetters considerable latitude)—but, conducted carefully, such a study might yield significant dividends. It might provide further guidance about which practices of capitalization, punctuation and so forth reflect authorial meaning. Such guidance would have wider importance. One purpose of Greg’s distinction was to assist in testing the credentials of each change in a potential ‘substantive’ before accepting it as the author’s. Full information

110 Cf. Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, 139–44, for manuscripts of Elements of Law and a digest of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the former with Hobbesian corrections and a holograph of the epistle dedicatory, the latter with Hobbesian additions and corrections.
about an author’s habits with the pen might assist some of this testing.

At any rate, by McKerrow’s criterion the presentation manuscript requires consideration for copy-text and, whether one accepts that criterion or not, this manuscript, in company with Hobbesian holographs, provides a resource for consideration by editors judging copy-text.

Suppose, turning away now from the presentation manuscript, we attend only to the printed versions in thinking about copy-text. The McKerrow criterion suggests ‘Head’ should be the basis of copy-text because it is the printed version closest to an hypothesized authorial manuscript. But the relative importance of ‘Bear’, including as it does hypothesized authorial changes from one printed version to another, rises according to the modification of McKerrow’s criterion admitted by Greg when he acknowledged the importance of authorial revision after a first printing. That raises the further matter of deliberating on the claims of ‘Bear’ to be treated as copy-text.\footnote{111} In commencing the deliberation, we would note a puzzling omission. Though Malcolm examined three copies of ‘Bear’, he does not claim to have collated them. To collate copies of ‘Bear’ is necessary on his own finding that it embodies authorial revisions. Indeed, to do so would be necessary even if one supposed only that it appeared in Hobbes’s lifetime or soon afterwards in order to assist in assessing whether authorial input was or was not present.\footnote{112} The unsettled printing history of ‘Bear’ suggests another ground for collating it. Reasons like these are reflected in the fact that collations from all the printings published in the author’s lifetime

\footnote{111} Any changes Hobbes made for ‘Bear’ are likely to have been conveyed to the printers in one or more manuscripts of some description (e.g. ms. alterations to a copy of ‘Head’ or a set of ms. pages), but the point is not the mode of transmitting authorial changes, but that on the revised Greg criterion ‘Bear’ rises in importance because it embodies the author’s later intentions. Thence follows the question of whether it would be helpful or otherwise to take it as copy-text.

\footnote{112} That the 1670, 1676 and 1678 issues of the Latin \textit{Leviathan} have not been collated against each other or the 1668 version, cf. i, 330–31, is rather less important on Malcolm’s account, esp. i, 293–94.
will be found in Laslett’s version of *Two Treatises* (and beyond Locke’s lifetime, we should add), as also in other critical editions of works in philosophy, political thought and so forth. Once provided with such a collation—which we hope to find registered in a second edition of Malcolm’s work, doubtless drawn from somewhat more than three copies—we would be better able to consider the claims of ‘Bear’ as copy-text. One might add, parenthetically, that though Malcolm’s account indicates that ‘Ornaments’ has no authorial input it would be worth collating copies of it in order to make that judgement more secure. But to return to the question of copy-text.

The criteria or ‘method’ Malcolm adopts can generate more than one reasoned choice about copy-text. This indicates that deliberation about the matter is required on grounds which are not merely formal, but which involve considering the different choices possible within the frame provided by the criteria or ‘method’ and in weighing the evidence. The evidence, it appears, requires fuller collation, and, again, editorial use of it would gain from fuller attention to authorial habits.

These reflections are consistent with much that appears in the editorial material provided here. Whereas Greg’s distinction was framed in order to deal with instances in which a choice of copy-text cannot be guided closely by historical, bibliographical and other evidence—because this does not exist in a useful form—one of the distinguishing merits of this edition is that its textual introduction provides a considerable amount of evidence and inference about which alterations in the text were or were not likely to have originated from Hobbes. Whilst it is true that to bring such knowledge to a point in order to compare it with the criteria and the ways in which these can be understood would be no light task, this is also an instance where much could be learnt from that task.

This situation implies reflection not least about questions of editorial criteria in relation to the task in hand. Does the editor of *Leviathan*—and of other works—need to go beyond McKerrow and Greg (and Bowers) in some way or ways? A discussion is in order, and in discussion about this work the question of authorial
supervision of the press would arise in relation to ‘Bear’ as well as ‘Head’, in which an editor could make an inference from information obtained by collating ‘Bear’ with ‘Head’ and the presentation manuscript. The discussion would involve not only the relative merits of the presentation manuscript, ‘Head’ and ‘Bear’ as copy-texts, but also the question of which criteria are best. ‘Best’ might be understood both in general and with respect to the characteristics of this individual work. In general, it might be asked whether the criteria or ‘method’ require revision or development or replacement. In particular, a contribution to considering copy-text for _Leviathan_ might be made by comparing what Malcolm has discovered about its printing history with histories of other works by Hobbes himself and by other authors of his day. One could ask, also, which copy-text would best assist the study of Hobbes’s development from the presentation manuscript to ‘Bear’. Such a discussion might well be complex and protracted, but its results might well be illuminating.

All of this said, intellectual interest is no guarantee of significant discovery or definite conclusions. Supposing, for a moment, that such a discussion did not produce these, one might suggest that the evidence about authorial supervision of ‘Head’ and the number of authorial revisions in ‘Bear’ would make it convenient to treat the former as a copy-text. Convenience is a criterion in selecting copy-text. The choice of a copy-text is an important sense always a matter of convenience, but in another it is a choice that can consult the convenience of the reader. For instance, Nidditch, whose edition of Locke’s _Essay_ has been a standard work for over forty years, though he thought that the first edition of it could ‘with some historical advantage’ serve as copy-text, also considered that to treat it as such would make life ‘hard and troublesome’ for readers using the critical apparatus. Readers’ convenience was not his _sole_ criterion, of course. Nidditch reasoned clearly and concisely for an eclectic version which treated the fourth edition as copy-text and modified it with passages from the fifth which he judged were authentically
Lockean.\textsuperscript{113}

Nidditch was an independently-minded scholar, not prone to deference, who studied closely various examples of editorial procedure and theories about it critically over an extended period. He proceeded away from ‘the basic principles’ of the ‘method’. Theoretical reflection about editing since his day has admitted change. It is \textit{not} ‘sixty years since’ Tanselle proposed ‘an overarching framework’ which he intended to subsume rather than to supplement ‘Greg’s rationale’, one which would accommodate not only it but also a genealogical interest in manuscripts and the contribution (if such it is judged to be) of the printing house. The editions issuing from this framework, he thought, would vary according to the evidence for ‘uninfluenced authorial final intention’ and for ‘the joint product of the author and the publisher’s staff’. Their editors would select its copy-text according to their judgements of such more or less complex cases.\textsuperscript{114} This conception, which is at once more flexible and more inclusive than ‘the basic principles’, seems more like a series of recognitions than a framework, and is perhaps none the worse for that.

These recognitions are significant. Tanselle, who reflected thoughtfully on his predecessors, implied that the liberty of judgement appropriate to a learned and skilled editor is rather larger in scope than one might suppose from the ‘basic principles’. The range of that liberty would include not only attention to printing history and so forth but also extensive deliberation about copy-text and related matters on the way to identifying the choices appropriate to the particular work under consideration. Its exercise, in other words, would involve not only attention to matters that Malcolm evidently enjoys but also

\textsuperscript{113} Nidditch, ‘Introduction’, Locke, \textit{An Essay}, xxxix, xli–xlii. It is unfortunate that the paperback version of Nidditch’s edition (Oxford, 1979, and often reprinted) omits this information, cf. its xxv.

consideration of the matters rehearsed here. Thus, though this article and Tanselle’s are not identical, they suggest convergent conclusions.

There again is it in the English version that we find Hobbes’s final intentions for *Leviathan*? For the reader’s delight in finding the Latin and English versions *en face* arises from much more than pleasure at what is for many readers a splendid novelty.115 This presentation is a great help to the study of Hobbes’s thinking and its development. The juxtaposition has many useful effects. The most obvious of these is assistance in interpreting known content. This is sometimes true in respect of what you always supposed (not least from the title page) but are glad to have confirmed so easily, as that Hobbes rendered *power* by *potestas* not *potentia* (e.g. vol.2, 278–79). Sometimes the clarification is more interesting, as when ‘Feare’ became *metus* rather than *pavor* or *timor* let alone *terror* (e.g. vol.2, 162–63, 464–65). Sometimes there are more intriguing translations, as where Hobbes rendered *propagation* by *constitutio* (vol.2, 180–81). Juxtaposition also permits easy comparison between the two versions, and this puts the question of final intention before the reader.

Particular merit belongs in this connexion to the editor’s dogged identification of the many differences between the English and Latin versions. Hobbes’s mind continued to move in many respects. Very extensive changes were made to three chapters, and the appendix was added. Sometimes Hobbes omitted passages (e.g. at vol.2, 208/9), sometimes revised content, sometimes altered the wording on other grounds (see vol.1, 175–95, especially 175, 176, 179, 185, 186, 195, for editorial discussion). That the extent, variety and importance of Hobbes’s changes should be indicated (let alone translated) was a supererogatory undertaking for the editor, but the results are a very significant addition to our knowledge. They fully justify his care and effort.

Information about authorial changes matters not least because these may be important for content. One brief example must suffice here. In chapter 14 (vol.2, 212–13) the English version states that ‘[c]ovenants entred into by fear, in the condition of meer Nature, are obligatory’, whereas the Latin has a claim which is more precise and (if possible) more striking. *Pactum etiamsi Metu extortum sit, in conditione tamen hominum naturali validum est* – ‘a covenant has effect albeit in the natural condition of men, even if it be extorted by Fear’.¹¹⁶

If we are to take the author’s final intentions as a standard for choice of copy-text in a critical edition—which is the standard implied by adopting ‘the basic principles’ of the ‘Greg-Bowers method’—we need to ask whether the Latin version should not claim our attention. Plainly, this would not be as a copy-text for the English version. But if we are seeking final intentions for the work, then the Latin rather than the English version has claims in point of a combination of date, authorial situation and content. It postdates 1651 significantly. It comes from an author who had already exceeded by far the normal lifespan for his day, and who knew his health was very imperfect. Hobbes might be supposed reasonably to conclude that the time had come to declare his later thoughts. He devoted much energy and thought to the content of the Latin version, and by contrast seems to have put rather less effort into ‘Bear’—effort which Malcolm judges to be along lines similar to those of the Latin version, though evidently they extended rather less far (e.g. vol.1, 233, 315–16). He also addressed a larger audience (the choice of Latin implies that he looked to the Continent as well as to the English-speaking world) and worked under different conditions. All these considerations suggest that this was the time to declare his views anew, altering, withdrawing or confirming them. Here, then, is a matter that merits attention, and quite a few questions are involved in it. For instance, was Latin the chosen medium because this was the text Hobbes expected to embody both his latest and his most

¹¹⁶ *Metus* can suggest intimidation, e.g. *si metu me coegeris aut dolo induxeris*, Gaius, *Institutes*, 4.117.
considered statements? Does it contain his final intentions in specific respects that the English version does not? If so, should it claim our attention, not just besides the English version but rather as succeeding to it according to the canons employed in textual scholarship? The answers to these questions would seem to be ‘yes’. 117

One could ask a different question about the work: whether Leviathan does not justify a reconsideration about the adequacy of the McKerrow-Greg criteria? That is to say, could one ask whether the modifications in ‘Bear’ show Hobbes proceeding as far as he thought he could go without moving unduly from his text of 1651, whilst the Latin version shows him making an opportunity to develop his thought anew. If so, and supposing that the English and the Latin versions are indeed versions—versions of one work—then there would be two sets of final intentions for the same work, relative to the English and Latin versions respectively. But the McKerrow-Greg criteria or ‘Greg-Bowers method’ assume that there is only one set per work. It is not obvious that the criteria or ‘method’ capture all the facts that require attention here. These are not the only facts that tell in the same way. There are other works, for example, Piers the Plowman, the Prologue to The Legend of Good Women, and The Prelude, which editors regularly present in more than one version. 118 So perhaps some rethinking of the criteria or ‘method’

117 Final intention, as understood by textual scholars, need not accord with a reader’s view of intellectual quality. Readers are at liberty to determine whether the author’s last version is his or her best according to their canons of judgement. It is conceivable that a case might be made, pointing perhaps to Hobbes’s deteriorating Latin idiom, to the effect that the Latin Leviathan does not represent the most intellectually adequate version of Hobbes’s conclusions about its subject-matter. Such a case and an assessment of it would be complex and perhaps would prove indecisive. Certainly, they would need to take into account the whole development of Hobbes’s views. These are sufficient reasons for not opening the matter here. If they were not sufficient, Shillingsburg’s point, Scholarly Editing, 87, that some editors have been known to treat ‘final’ as something other than ‘last’ would add sufficient complication to the question to make them so.

118 Interestingly, J. C. Maxwell, whom we encountered as editor of Greg’s Collected Papers, edited also The Prelude. A Parallel Text (Harmondsworth, 1971).
is in order. In this edition we have an instance of how important examples of critical editing occasion further reflection both about its text and about the questions it raises. ‘Every book presents its own problems and has to be investigated by methods suited to its particular case’, as McKerrow noted in another connexion, and so it gives rise to fresh thought. Fresh thought can concern not least the adequacy of established ‘method’.

One foresees that for many reasons articles and essays, perhaps even books, will flow from Malcolm’s treatment of the English and Latin texts. This edition of the latter, not least, may stimulate interest in Hobbes’s Latinity, something that would have pleased him very much (even though the editor’s criticisms of some of it would have elicited a long and sophistical defence). Malcolm’s translations of the Latin version, where it departs significantly from the English version, and of the appendix Hobbes added to the Latin version, are in these times a necessary aid to many readers. They are throughout elegant and lucid.

Being given much stimulates a desire for more. Textual editing is one of the more powerful sources of this craving, amongst readers as well as editors. The latter ‘learn all kinds of things that they did not know and never wondered about’, and this raises

119 The facts suggest implications for editorial theory that it exponents seem not to have faced. See, e.g. G. Thomas Tanselle, ‘The Editorial Problem of Final Authorial Intention’, Studies in Bibliography 29 (1976): 167–211, 195–96: ‘The most familiar situation in which more than one ‘final’ intention can be said to exist occurs when an author, at a later stage in his career, extensively revises a work completed years before… The two are discrete works.’


121 This reader, without having checked these translations systematically, notes a point of interest in passing. Quaesit is translated as ‘please’ (iii, 1142–43). This is not wrong, but fails to render the point that because this verb has for its basic idea to seek, look, try to obtain, it has here the force of please tell me. Compare Horace, Satires, I.x.50–51, age, quaeso,tu nihil in magno doctus reprehendis Homero? Hobbes’s quaeso reinforces his explica mihi. Curley, in his edition of Leviathan, 498, renders the phrase as ‘Explain to me, I beg you’.

122 West, Textual Criticism, 8.
an appetite in the former to learn still more. That applies with especial force with this edition, where so much and so varied erudition is set before the reader. A couple of desires may be mentioned here.

Has evidence of further revision after the Latin *Leviathan* and ‘Bear’ been sought later than ‘Ornaments’? If ‘Bear’ embodies Hobbesian changes and belongs to the date Malcolm assigns to it that there would be little opportunity remaining to Hobbes for such changes. But neither would changes be impossible. Again, there is the question of whether revisions made earlier, but not registered in ‘Bear’, might not find their way into print at a significantly later date. Malcolm remarks on ‘Ornaments’ as an edition which appeared perhaps ‘more than twenty years after Hobbes’s death’ and therefore ‘unlikely to have relevance to the study of his textual intentions’.123 Yet when we reflect that Palmerston supposed that Hong Kong would never be an important trading port, we are reminded that the apparently unlikely does happen. And in this connexion distance may be no object. Scholars have long been familiar with the point that the best readings are sometimes found only in the most recent manuscripts.124 Something similar can apply to printed works: the argument that the latest authorial revisions in *Pamela* appeared in 1801, some forty years after Richardson’s death, exemplifies this possibility.125 Again, almost sixty years after Locke’s death, an edition of *Two Treatises* drew on the Christ’s Copy, following Thomas Hollis’ serendipitous find of the latter. So we might wish to learn more about posthumous editions, not excluding ‘Ornaments’. Would the 1750 edition of Hobbes’s moral and


political works yield something or nothing?

There is another omission here, one closer to the likely needs of most readers, and one within the scope that the editor stipulated for himself elsewhere. A register of persons mentioned in the text, like the one for the correspondents in Malcolm’s edition of Hobbes’s letters, would have been very welcome. Again, the decision not to provide cross-references to Hobbes’s other works (vol.1, 322), which Warrender did provide in his editions of De Cive and Philosophicall Rudiments, foregoes an important aid to readers interested in Hobbes’s intellectual development. Such references are helpful even if or indeed precisely because the parallel proves tenuous—as sometimes was the case with Warrender’s candidates. Still, we have his editions to help in comparing one text with another, whilst here the provision of very good indexes—a notable omission from so many versions of Leviathan—is a major boon. They are a considerable gain for serious study of the text. Yet there still remains something more to ask.

We can reasonably hope for a further instalment of writing about Leviathan from Malcolm, that is to say, a further development of the implications of this absorbing example of critical editing. Critical editing requires no justification couched in terms other than its own, where it adds to knowledge, and such additions are of a fundamental sort, and that such work is necessary in more than one sense is evident. Yet, precisely

126 It is mentioned at i, 271; Rogers and Schuhmann in their edition of Leviathan, i, s.III.7, 184–200, give a concise account of it, emphasizing its ‘unique’ solutions to textual problems as well as its less desirable features.

127 They are, of course, identified as they appear, but that practice tends to our learning less rather than more about them. For a different view, see Hunter, Editing, 96, criticizing Malcolm’s register in his edition of the correspondence as overly elaborate. Tuck’s edition has a concise register. The apparently curious point that the non-biblical persons there were identified by its editor and the biblical ones by the present writer reflects not least the fact that the latter, spending quite a lot of time on trains during early mornings one year, wanted some work which required only two compact volumes.

128 There is scope for at least one further index to complement this edition, namely an index verborum for the Latin text.
because it is necessary to understanding, it follows that this way of making additions to knowledge is in that respect not an end in itself. The end of attending to textual considerations is to obtain a better understanding of texts. One of the most distinguished of critical editors long ago made an important point about ‘details’. ‘Their dignity comes from their being essential to complete treatment’. Complete treatment, since critical editing focuses upon authorial meaning, implies a movement from editing to interpreting more broadly, not least because, as we saw earlier, ‘the reading and the interpretation are inextricably connected’. It is natural that Malcolm shows an inclination here to interpret some features of Hobbes’s thought, and the results are extremely interesting, even a cause of pleasure. It would be good to learn more about how and how far the critically-determined readings given here alter existing interpretations or give grounds for new ones. Again, more broadly, it is a serious question, where the ‘essential’ is concerned, whether a scholar who has studied a text for so long and so closely is not rather better qualified than many others to interpret it. One answer is borne out by ample


130 e.g. i, 48, cf. 80, 87. There Malcolm likens Hobbes’s tendency to look upon philosophical error and popular delusion as features of one ‘complex mass of errors and absurdities’ to Cobbett’s view of corruption in nineteenth century Britain as manifestations of ‘The Thing’. Whether there were one or more common features uniting Hobbes’s ‘Thing’ in his mind or elsewhere bears consideration. So does the question of whether a comparison in this respect (as well as others) between Hobbes and the later Collingwood in respect of each one’s ‘Thing’ might not be more illuminating than one between Hobbes and Cobbett. Collingwood drew a line from the philosophers of his youth, who insisted that philosophy could make no difference to practice, through the politicians and press of his middle-age, to irrationalism and Fascism. See his Autobiography (Oxford, 1939), esp. pp.48-9, 146-67. He suggested next that error about the character of metaphysics undermined civilization and science alike, An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford, 1940), esp. pp.342-3, before going to argue that philosophy rightly understood was necessary to practice, that the proper end of the latter was to minimize force in our dealings with others, and that this account of civilization contrasted with force and irrationality—as he now called it, barbarism. See The New Leviathan, 1.21, 1.63-68, 18.1-19.92, 34.5-34.52, 36.1-36.12, 36.9-36.94, 41.12, 41.16, 41.54. As with Hobbes, so with Collingwood, a comprehensive ‘Thing’ and a comprehensive alternative to it stand in contrast.
precedents. Here, then, are good reasons to await Malcolm’s biography of Hobbes, as well as a commentary on *Leviathan* from his pen, with great interest.

Meanwhile, we can turn back to the present edition. Some first impressions are recorded here. It is right to leave the reader with an enduring one. It is said that Beaverbrook, on being presented with a very large biography of another press baron, remarked ‘this book weighs too much’. The weight of *this* book, whether physical or intellectual, though not disproportionate to its subject, is considerable, and not everyone will pick it up: but this reader records that he did not put it down for a long time. Here is an item from which all students of Hobbes, amongst others, can learn, and those who are wise will learn for many years. Learning may include learning to ask further questions about critical-text editing.

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131 e.g. John Burnet, ed., *The Ethics of Aristotle* (London, 1900); Cyril Bailey, ed., *T. Lucretii Cari, De rerum, natura* (3 vols., Oxford, 1947); and, in our own time, the work of Martin West on Hesiod as editor, commentator and translator, too numerous in its manifestations to list here. One willingly recognizes that there are examples on the other side of the question.


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