The Political Economy of Higher Education Admission Standards and Participation Gap

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Abstract

We build a political economy model allowing us to shed light on the empirically observed simultaneous increase in university size and participation gap. Parents differ in income and in the ability of their unique child. They vote over the minimum ability level required to attend public universities, which are tuition-free and financed by proportional income taxation. Parents can invest in private tutoring to help their child pass the admission test. A university participation gap emerges endogenously with richer parents investing more in tutoring. A unique majority voting equilibrium exists, which can be either classical or “ends-against-the-middle” (in which case parents of both low- and high-ability children favor a smaller university). Four factors increase the university size (larger skill premium enjoyed by university graduates, smaller tutoring costs, smaller university cost per student, larger minimum ability of students), but only the former two also increase the participation gap. A more unequal parental income distribution also increases the participation gap, but barely affects the university size.

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1 Introduction

The second half of the XXth Century has witnessed a large expansion of higher education, with the US leading the way with the G.I. Bill (1944), and other developed countries gradually following suit. By 1970, the global enrollment rate in universities was about 10 per cent, and it reached 20 per cent by the end of the century (Schofer and Meyer, 2005). In recent decades, the process has extended to most middle-income countries and to a significant number of low-income ones. Currently, about one third of the world’s college age population participate in higher education (Marginson, 2016).

While greater equality of opportunity has often been one motivation to increase university size (see for instance the 1963 Robbins Report of the Committee on Higher Education in the UK), this massive expansion has often not been accompanied by a reduction in inequality of access. For instance, in the UK, studies have consistently found that better-off youths disproportionately benefited from the expansion (even though university education was tuition-free until 1997), so that participation gaps according to parental income actually grew instead of shrinking (see Blanden et al., 2005). This persistence (or even aggravation) of educational inequality across generations despite the expansion of higher education has also been documented in many countries where universities are basically tuition-free (see Vona, 2012, for twelve European countries) as well as in countries with high tuition fees like the US or Australia (e.g. Cameron and Heckman, 2001; Cardak and Ryan, 2009), and in the BRIC countries (Carnoy et al., 2012).

In this paper, we build a simple and tractable political economy model with the objective of shedding light on the stylized fact that the expansion of higher education has not been accompanied by a decrease in the participation gap. The key ingredients of this model are the following. Parents differ in income $w$ and in the ability of their unique child, $\theta$. Children can either attend a vocational program and become low-skilled, or attend university and become high-skilled. Their future wage is the product of their ability and of the reference wage of their skill level. The skill premium –difference in reference wage across the two skill levels– depends on the relative supply of each type of
labor, and is thus a function of the ability threshold democratically chosen.\footnote{This assumption accords well with basic intuition and with state-of-the-art models of the labor market (e.g. Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Carneiro and Lee, 2011).} University is financed with an income tax on the whole (parents) population.

Parents first vote over the minimum ability requirement $\theta_u$ to access university. They then choose whether and how much to invest in costly tutoring for their child. Tutoring allows children to perform better in the university admission test, but does not increase productivity permanently.\footnote{This assumption is in line with the empirical literature. Although high quality empirical evidence strongly suggests the existence of positive short-run effects of tutoring in academic achievement (e.g. Lavy and Schlosser, 2005; Banerjee et al., 2007; Jacob and Lefgren, 2004), the latter two studies also find that this effect quickly fades away. We have not found empirical evidence of long term labor market effects.} Children then take the test, and join universities in the case they pass the test. The resulting skill mix determines equilibrium wages.

Tutoring is an important ingredient in explaining access to higher education for at least three reasons: (i) it is frequent throughout both developed and developing countries;\footnote{For instance, in the UK in 2000, 30\% of year 13 students had some tutoring prior to A-levels exams that determine access to university (Ireson and Rushforth, 2005). In Canada, 8\% to 20\% of students aged 16 had some tutoring in 1999 (CME, 2000, and the number of formal tutoring businesses in major Canadian cities has grown between 200\% and 500\%, according to Aurini and Davies (2004).} (ii) it is especially prevalent in upper secondary years to prepare for university entrance exams (Bray, 2013); (iii) its expansion is paralleling that of higher education (see Bray, 2009; Dang and Rogers, 2008). Observe also that we have made access to university easy to children of low income parents by assuming that there is no correlation between parental income $w$ and child’s ability $\theta$, by assuming that university is tuition-free and accessible based on ability, and by assuming away opportunity costs of going to university in terms of foregone labor market income.

Solving the model, we first establish that richer parents – who face a lower utility cost of tutoring expenses\footnote{This result is in accordance with stylized facts. In the UK, Kirby (2016) shows that the proportion} are willing to pay more in order to raise their children’s signal of ability, as measured during the test, to $\theta_u$.\footnote{This result is in accordance with stylized facts. In the UK, Kirby (2016) shows that the proportion} This result generates a participation gap,
since for any given $\theta_u$ the fraction of students attending university increases with parental income $w$.

We then prove the existence of a unique majority voting equilibrium that can be of two types. In a classical equilibrium, the half population who most prefer a higher-than-equilibrium value of $\theta_u$ is composed of parents of high ability children who favor a smaller university (i) to boost the high-skilled wage of their child, by restricting the supply of future high-skilled workers, and (ii) to decrease the tax cost of university. The other half of the polity wants a larger university, either (i) to enrol their child at university or (ii) to boost the vocational wage of their child by restricting the supply of future low-skilled workers. In an end-against-the-middle equilibrium, the half of the population preferring a smaller-than-equilibrium university size is made of two groups: the same group as in the classical equilibrium above, plus parents whose children have very low ability. This latter group wants a higher-than-equilibrium value of $\theta_u$ in order to decrease the tax cost of university, and pays little attention to the impact on the unskilled wage of a smaller university because of the low ability of their child. Another difference between the two types of equilibria is that, while a strict majority of students attend university in a classical equilibrium, this is not necessarily the case with an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium.

We next identify which factors may explain the empirically observed increase in university size and participation gap. Although we prove some analytical results concerning the university size and type of equilibrium, assessing how the participation gap is affected requires resorting to numerical examples. We obtain numerically that raising exogenously the skill premium for any skill mix (for instance because of skill-biased technical change) increases both the university size and participation gap: the larger skill premium increases the returns to both higher education and private tutoring, inducing especially richer households, who have a lower marginal utility cost of investment, to attend university.

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5The voting problem we consider has an inherent theoretical interest, since individual preferences are neither single-peaked nor single-crossing in $\theta_u$, because of the switch from vocational schooling to university when a threshold value of $\theta_u$ is attained.

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of state-school students who have ever received private tutoring is 30% for richer families but only 15% for poorer families.
sity. We therefore identify a mechanism by which the rise in the skill premium observed since the late 1970s (e.g. Goos and Manning (2007)) could have harmed equality of opportunity while increasing university size. A small reduction in the cost of tutoring may also generate a simultaneous increase in university size and participation gap.

We identify two other factors which increase university size but decrease the participation gap: a decrease in the unit cost of university (spending per student in the UK has been halved in the last two decades of the past century according to Greenaway and Haynes, 2003, although this of course may have decreased the quality of the service rendered, a phenomenon we do not take into account here) and a larger minimum ability of children (as a consequence of the expansion of secondary education and increase in the minimum school leaving age). Finally, a rise in household income inequality (such as the one documented by Goos and Manning (2007) since the 1970s) increases the participation gap, but it barely affects university size.

Our paper belongs to a relatively small but growing literature studying access to higher education and its financing. A large strand of that literature compares the impact of fees and of various subsidization policies. Fernández and Rogerson (1995) study voting over the size of a tax-financed subsidy and obtain that it is regressive, since the equilibrium subsidy level is not large enough to allow poor students to access higher education. García-Peñalosa and Wälde (2000) compare the efficiency and equity effects of a traditional tax-subsidy scheme, a graduate tax and loans, and obtain that the latter two fare better than the former. Del Rey and Racionero (2012, 2014) analyze the political support for, and the efficiency and equity properties of, income-contingent loans. Borck and Wimbersky (2014) study numerically majority voting over a traditional subsidy scheme, a pure loan scheme, income contingent loans and graduate taxes. Surprisingly, they find that the poor favor the subsidy scheme, even though they pay part of its tax cost.6

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6 Other important contributions in the area (e.g. Epple et al., 2006 and 2016; De Fraja and Valbonesi, 2012; Haupt, 2012; or Fu, 2014) are less closely related to this paper. Ichino et al. (2011) develop a dynamic political economy model to study the political determinants of the intergenerational elasticity of income. They model education policy in a reduced form, as a parameter of the dynastic production
Two papers study admission tests either together with, or instead of, (subsidized) tuition fees. Gary-Bobo and Trannoy (2008) study the socially optimal examination-cum-fees policy. They assume that students observe only a private, noisy signal of their ability, and that universities can condition admission decisions on the results of noisy tests. Tests are part of the optimal policy provided that their results are not public knowledge. The paper most closely related to ours is De Fraja (2001). As in our model, parents differ in income and in the ability of their child and face a binary educational choice but, unlike here, universities charge fees to students, and the future income of children is random and determined only by their own education decision (assuming away general equilibrium labor market effects). Thus, the participation gap emerges (with preferences exhibiting Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion), because better-off parents are more willing to take the financial risk of enrolling their child at university. Our paper then extends the work of De Fraja (2001) in four directions: (i) we model general equilibrium labor market effects, so that the decision to attend university by an additional agent exerts an externality on others by lowering the skill premium; (ii) we study majority voting over the admission test level in the presence of (full) subsidy of fees; (iii) we allow for parental investments in tutoring; and (iv) we apply our framework to explain the stylized fact outlined above. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to tackle the issue of the determinants of a simultaneous increase in university size and participation gap.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: after presenting the model in section 2, we solve it by backward induction, starting with the private tutoring decision in section 3. We then describe parents’ preferences over the admission ability threshold in section 4. Existence of a majority voting equilibrium is studied in section 5. Section 6 provides a comparative statics analysis of the majority chosen university size and participation gap. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model

We model a static economy with a continuum of households of mass one. Parents differ in their (exogenous) income $w$ and in the ability of their only child $\theta$. We assume that income is distributed over $[w, \bar{w}]$ according to the cdf $G(w)$ while ability is distributed over $[\theta, \bar{\theta}]$ according to the cdf $F(\theta)$, so that income and ability are independently distributed.\(^7\)

Both distributions have full support. While the smallest conceivable ability may tend toward zero, the smallest ability level actually observed in the economy is $\theta$. We denote by $\theta_{med}$ the median value of $\theta$, and by $Ew$ the average value of $w$. With a slight abuse of language, we denote by $(w, \theta)$ the type of the parent.

The (binary) skill level $j$ of children is determined by education. Children who go to a vocational school ($j = V$) become low-skilled, while those who go to university ($j = u$) become high-skilled. A child’s ability $\theta$ is known to her parent but not to the government, which performs a test to elicit it. Access to university is rationed by the results of this admission test. We denote by $\theta_u$ the minimum level of the test mark required to be admitted to a university and to become high-skilled.

Parents can make a private tutoring investment in their child prior to the taking of the test, in order to boost her test mark. This investment is costly to the parents, and does not generate any lasting impact on the child’s ability, beyond the improvement of her test mark for university entry. There is no uncertainty as to the result of the test. A student of ability $\theta$ who does not receive additional parental investment obtains a mark equal to her own ability. If a parent decides to invest privately, he will invest the minimum amount necessary for his child’s mark to reach the threshold for university attendance.

We denote with the function $p(\theta_u - \theta)$ the investment cost for the parent to bring his child’s mark to the required level $\theta_u$ when her ability is $\theta \leq \theta_u$, and we assume that this cost is increasing and convex in the gap between requirement and ability: $p'(\cdot) > 0$, and $p''(\cdot) > 0$. We moreover assume that $\lim_{\theta \to \theta_u} p(\theta_u - \theta) = \lim_{\theta \to \theta_u} p'(\theta_u - \theta) = 0$, so that there

\(^7\)We make this simplifying assumption not to bias the model from the outset in favor of a university participation gap. All our analytical results hold when income and ability are correlated.
is no fixed cost in the private tutoring technology. We denote by $H(\theta_u)$ (resp., $L(\theta_u)$) the fraction of the children population who accesses university (resp., who attends the vocational schools) when the threshold test level for university admittance is set at $\theta_u$, with $H(\theta_u) + L(\theta_u) = 1$ by definition. We will compute these fractions $H(\theta_u)$ and $L(\theta_u)$ in section 3.

After completing school, children work and obtain a wage which is the product of their idiosyncratic ability, $\theta$, and of the reference wage for their skill level, $\omega_i$, $i \in \{L, H\}$.

High and low-skilled reference wages depend on the relative supply of each type of labor. As the supply of high-skilled labor $H(\theta_u)$ increases, the low-skilled reference wage $\omega_L$ goes up while the high-skilled wage $\omega_H$ falls. Thus, the skill premium $\omega_H - \omega_L$ is increasing (resp., decreasing) in the fraction of low-skilled labor supplied, $L(\theta_u)$ (resp., high-skilled, $H(\theta_u)$). As a shortcut, we denote the reference wages as functions of the test threshold: $\omega_H(\theta_u)$ and $\omega_L(\theta_u)$. Furthermore, to avoid unrewarding complication, we assume that the skill premium is always positive: $\omega_H(\theta_u) > \omega_L(\theta'_u)$, $\forall \{\theta_u, \theta'_u\} \in [\underline{\theta}, \overline{\theta}]^2$.

Universities are costly while the cost of vocational education is normalized to zero. The (constant) cost per student of university education is $c_u$, and is financed through

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8So, even though there are only two skill levels, the actual income of workers of a given skill level is continuously increasing in their ability. All results in this paper can be generalized to a setting with uncertainty (as to the probability of actually graduating or the future wage amount) as long as the expected wage of students increases with $\theta$ (for instance because of a lower dropout rate) and is larger when attending university rather than the vocational school, whatever $\theta$.

9More precisely, we assume that $\omega_L$ (respectively, $\omega_H$) is differentiable (and hence continuous) in $L(\theta_u)$ (respectively, $H(\theta_u)$) and bounded. This back box approach can be given micro-foundations by introducing for instance a CES production function with both types of labor as substitute inputs. One could then obtain the wage functions from usual profit-maximization conditions. Proceeding this way would lengthen the presentation of the model and complicate equations without bringing much new insight. Observe also that we assume that parents do not compete with their children in the job market.
a proportional tax on income at rate $t$, paid by all parents.\footnote{Since all children get some form of education in our model, adding a cost for vocational education would not change our results provided we interpret $c_u$ as the difference between the per student university and vocational school costs. Also, the assumption of proportional taxation is made for simplicity only, with all our results continuing to hold provided that taxes paid increase with income.} The government budget constraint is then

$$tEw = c_u H(\theta_u),$$

so that

$$t(\theta_u) = \frac{c_u H(\theta_u)}{Ew}. \quad (1)$$

Parents care both about current consumption and the wage of their child. A parent’s utility is

$$U_u(\theta_u, w, \theta) = u(w(1 - t(\theta_u)) - p(\theta_u - \theta)) + \delta \theta \omega_H(\theta_u), \quad (2)$$

if their child attends university, where we assume that $p(\theta_u - \theta) = 0$ when $\theta \geq \theta_u$, since in that case the parent has no incentive to invest in the test preparation. A parent’s utility is

$$U_V(\theta_u, w, \theta) = u(w(1 - t(\theta_u))) + \delta \theta \omega_L(\theta_u), \quad (3)$$

if their child attends vocational school. The parameter $\delta > 0$ measures the intensity of the altruism of parents towards their child, while the utility function $u$ is continuous and twice differentiable with $u' > 0$ and $u'' < 0$. We assume for simplicity that parent’s utility is linear in their child’s wage, as more complex formulations would not bring any further insight.

The timing of the model is as follows. Parents first vote over the admission cut-off $\theta_u$. They then choose individually whether to invest or not in private tutoring for their unique child to access university. Finally, they decide whether to enrol their child at university if she passes the admission test.

Solving the last stage is straightforward: since the skill premium is always positive and the investment cost $p(\theta_u - \theta)$ is a sunk cost at the final stage, all parents of children whose test marks are at least $\theta_u$ do enrol their child at university. We then solve the
model backward, studying first which parents do invest in the preparation to the test (section 3), before turning to preferences over the threshold level $\theta_u$ (section 4) and to the aggregation of these preferences through majority voting (section 5).

3 Private tutoring decision

The tutoring investment stage takes place after the vote, once the cut-off of the admission test $\theta_u$ is known, and before the test. We therefore take the test cut-off ability $\theta_u$ as given in this section. Parents with children whose ability is above the threshold do not invest, since the investment is costly and generates no lasting effect beyond improving the test mark. We then focus on parents whose child’s ability is below the threshold $\theta_u$.

**Proposition 1** (i) For each income level $w$ and test threshold $\theta_u$, there exists a threshold ability, denoted by $\theta_m(\theta_u, w)$, with $\theta_m(\theta_u, w) < \theta_u$, such that parents with type $(w, \theta)$ such that $\theta \in [\theta_m(\theta_u, w), \theta_u]$ invest just enough for their child to qualify for university, while those with $\theta < \theta_m(\theta_u, w)$ do not invest and send their child to vocational school. (ii) This threshold $\theta_m$ increases with $\theta_u$ and decreases with $w$.

**Proof.** See Appendix A in Online Supplementary Material.

Only parents whose child’s ability is close enough to the required threshold invest in tutoring, while those whose child ability is too far below the threshold do not invest at all. This is intuitive, since tutoring costs increase in a convex way in the distance between child’s ability $\theta$ and the test threshold $\theta_u$. The fraction of children who become high-skilled is then given by

$$H(\theta_u) = \int_{\theta_m(\theta_u, w)}^{\theta_u} (1 - F(\theta_m(\theta_u, w))) dG(w),$$

with $L(\theta_u) = 1 - H(\theta_u)$.

As $\theta_u$ increases, the cost of investment goes up for every parent and so does the threshold $\theta_m$. A richer parent has a lower marginal utility from consumption and is thus
willing to pay more in order to raise his child to the test level required, so that \( \theta_m \) decreases with \( w \). This generates a higher education participation gap.

We next look at parents’ preferences over the threshold level \( \theta_u \) before aggregating these preferences through majority voting.

4 Individual preferences over \( \theta_u \)

We proceed in two steps. We first look at individual preferences over \( \theta_u \) as a function of the (for the moment, exogenous) type of education received by the child (academic or vocational). More precisely, we study separately the utility attained if the child becomes high-skilled (see (2)) or low-skilled (see (3)). In each case, we determine the individually most-preferred value of \( \theta_u \), and we perform some comparative statics analysis. We then study the two cases jointly, and we determine whose parents prefer to set \( \theta_u \) so large (resp., small enough) that their child becomes low-skilled (resp., high-skilled). In all cases, when considering their preferred value of \( \theta_u \), parents correctly anticipate investment choices and the corresponding equilibrium allocation of students across educational tracks.

4.1 Preferences if the child attends vocational school

Assume first that the child attends vocational school and becomes low-skilled. The individually most-preferred value of \( \theta_u \) maximizes \( U_V(\theta_u, w, \theta) \) as given by (3), with the following FOC for an interior value of \( \theta_u \):

\[
\delta \theta \omega_L'(\theta_u) = u'(w(1 - t(\theta_u))) \omega_L' \theta_u. \tag{4}
\]

This individually optimal size trades off the smaller low-skilled wage associated to a smaller university (the left-hand side of (4)) with the smaller tax bill (the right-hand side of (4)). We denote by \( \theta_u^V(w, \theta) \) the value of \( \theta_u \) satisfying (4) and we assume from now on that \( \underline{\theta} < \theta_u^V(w, \theta) < \bar{\theta} \) for all \((w, \theta)\) and that the SOC

\[
u''(\cdot)[\omega_L'(\theta_u)]^2 - u'(\cdot)[\omega_L''(\theta_u)] + \delta \omega_L''(\theta_u) < 0
\]

holds, which is the case for instance when \( t''(\theta_u) > 0 \) and \( \omega_L''(\theta_u) < 0 \).
4.2 Preferences if the child attends university

We now move to the case where the child becomes high-skilled, in which case the utility of the parent is denoted by (2). Recall that \( p(\theta_u - \theta) = 0 \) if \( \theta \geq \theta_u \) while \( p(\theta_u - \theta) > 0 \) if \( \theta < \theta_u \). The marginal utility with respect to \( \theta_u \) is:

\[
\frac{\partial U_u(\theta_u, w, \theta)}{\partial \theta_u} = -u'(w(1 - t(\theta_u)) - p(\theta_u - \theta)) \left[ wt'(\theta_u) + p'(\theta_u - \theta) \right] + \delta \theta \omega_H'(\theta_u). \tag{5}
\]

Observe first that \( U_u \) is continuous and differentiable in \( \theta_u \) even at \( \theta_u = \theta \), since \( \lim_{\theta \to \theta_u} p(\theta_u - \theta) = 0 \). Also, equation (5) can be simplified to

\[
\frac{\partial U_u(\theta_u, w, \theta)}{\partial \theta_u} = -u'(w(1 - t(\theta_u)) - p(\theta_u - \theta)) wt'(\theta_u) + \delta \theta \omega_H'(\theta_u) > 0
\]

when \( \theta_u < \theta \): utility is increasing in \( \theta_u \) as long as \( \theta_u < \theta \), since a larger value of \( \theta_u \) decreases the tax bill \( (t'(\theta_u) < 0) \) while it increases the reference wage \( (\omega_H'(\theta_u) > 0) \). We then have that the most-preferred value of \( \theta_u \), denoted by \( \theta_u^*(w, \theta) \), is strictly larger than \( \theta \), and is such that (5) is equal to zero. In words, \( \theta_u^*(w, \theta) \) balances the marginal benefits of a smaller university (derived from tax savings and from a larger high-skilled wage) with the marginal (utility) cost of raising the child’s mark in the admission test.

We assume that the SOC holds:

\[
u''(\cdot) [-wt'(\theta_u) - p'(\theta_u - \theta)]^2 + u'(\cdot) [-wt''(\theta_u) - p''(\theta_u - \theta)] + \delta \theta \omega_H''(\theta_u) < 0,
\]

which is the case if \( \omega_H''(\theta_u) < 0 \) together with either \( t''(\theta_u) > 0 \) or \( p \) sufficiently convex. Put together with the fact that \( U_u \) is increasing in \( \theta_u \) for \( \theta_u \leq \theta \) and that \( \theta_u^*(w, \theta) > \theta \), we obtain that \( U_u \) is single-peaked in \( \theta_u \).

The following lemma performs the comparative statics analysis of \( \theta_u^* \) and \( \theta_u^V \).

**Lemma 1** (i) \( \theta_u^V(w, \theta) \) decreases with \( \theta \) and increases (resp., decreases) with \( w \) if the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) is smaller (resp., larger) than one. (ii) \( \theta_u^*(w, \theta) \) increases with \( \theta \) and with \( w \).

**Proof.** See Appendix B in Online Supplementary Material.
Parents with a brighter child put more weight on the reference wage (whether $\omega_L$ or $\omega_H$) and are thus in favor of a larger (resp., smaller) university if their child becomes low-skilled (resp., high-skilled), as $\omega_L$ decreases (resp., $\omega_H$ increases) with $\theta_u$. Richer parents pay more taxes and are thus in favor of a smaller university, other things equal. This statement has to be qualified in the case where the child becomes low-skilled, since a larger income translates into a smaller marginal utility and thus a smaller utility cost of taxation. The first effect is then larger than the second when marginal utility does not decrease too fast –i.e., when the CRRA is smaller than one.

The following lemma will be useful in several proofs.

**Lemma 2** For each income level, there exists a unique value of $\theta$, denoted by $\hat{\theta}(w)$, such that $\theta^u_v(w,\theta) > \theta^u(w,\theta)$ for all $(w,\theta)$ with $\theta < \hat{\theta}(w)$, and $\theta^u_v(w,\theta) < \theta^u(w,\theta)$ for all $(w,\theta)$ with $\theta > \hat{\theta}(w)$.

**Proof.** Results from $\lim_{\theta \to 0} \theta^u_v(w,\theta) < \lim_{\theta \to 0} \theta^u_v(w,\theta) = \bar{\theta}$, $\theta^u(w,\theta) \geq \theta$ and $\partial \theta^u_v(w,\theta)/\partial \theta < 0$ while $\partial \theta^u(w,\theta)/\partial \theta > 0$. □

### 4.3 Preferences with endogenous educational choice

We now study the preferences over $\theta_u$ when the child’s educational track is endogenous. This means that a $(w,\theta)$ parent anticipates that his child will be low-skilled for any $\theta_u$ such that $\theta < \theta_m(\theta_u, w)$ and will attend university and become high-skilled for values of the cut-off satisfying $\theta \geq \theta_m(\theta_u, w)$. Her utility over $\theta_u$ is then given by

$$U(\theta_u, w, \theta) = U_u(\theta_u, w, \theta) \text{ if } \theta \geq \theta_m(\theta_u, w),$$

$$= U_V(\theta_u, w, \theta) \text{ if } \theta < \theta_m(\theta_u, w).$$

Observe that $U$ is continuous in $\theta_u$ since $p(\theta_u - \theta)$ does not include a fixed cost. Preferences are single-peaked in $\theta_u$ for all $(w,\theta)$ parents with $\theta > \hat{\theta}(w)$ (see Figure 1) but may not be for $(w,\theta)$ parents with $\theta < \hat{\theta}(w)$ (see Figure 2).

Insert Figures 1 and 2 around here.
The following proposition studies which parents most-prefer a university size compatible with their child becoming high-skilled.

**Proposition 2** (i) For each income level \( w \), there exists a unique value of \( \theta \), denoted by \( \tilde{\theta}(w) \), such that all \( (w, \theta) \) parents with \( \theta < \tilde{\theta}(w) \) most-prefer putting their child in a vocational school with \( \theta_u = \theta^V_u(w, \theta) \), while all \( (w, \theta) \) parents with \( \theta > \tilde{\theta}(w) \) most-prefer enrolling their child at university with \( \theta_u = \theta^u_u(w, \theta) \). (ii) Moreover, we have that \( \tilde{\theta}(w) < \hat{\theta}(w) \).

**Proof.** See Appendix C in Online Supplementary Material. ■

The parent of a higher ability child benefits relatively more from university, for two reasons: (i) the child benefits more from the skill premium and (ii) the investment to be made in order for the child to pass the university entry test is smaller and thus less costly to the parent. This explains why there exists a unique threshold value of \( \theta \) for each income level \( w \) below (resp., above) which parents most-prefer a university size consistent with their child becoming low-skilled (resp., high-skilled).

We now move to the determination of the majority voting equilibrium threshold ability.

## 5 Majority voting equilibrium

We start by introducing a straightforward definition and an assumption.

**Definition 1** Let \( \theta^\text{MV}_u \) be the median most-preferred value of \( \theta_u \) in the population.\(^{11}\)

**Assumption 1** \( \max_w \left[ \theta^V_u(w, \tilde{\theta}(w)) \right] \leq \theta^\text{MV}_u \).

Proposition 3 proves that \( \theta^\text{MV}_u \) is the Condorcet winner when voting over \( \theta_u \) and that the majority voting equilibrium can be of two types. Assumption 1 is essentially technical

\(^{11}\theta^\text{MV}_u \) exists since \( \theta^u_u(w, \theta) \) and \( \theta^V_u(w, \theta) \) are continuous and strictly monotone in \( w \) and \( \theta \) for all \( (w, \theta) \) and since \( G(w) \) and \( F(\theta) \) have full support.
and guarantees the existence of a Condorcet winner in the second type of equilibrium.\footnote{We present in Appendix F of the Online Supplementary Material numerical examples where \( \theta_u^{MV} \) is the majority voting equilibrium even though Assumption 1 is not satisfied. We refer the reader to Appendix A for a description of the equilibrium existence issues faced when Assumption 1 is not satisfied.}

**Proposition 3** (a) If \( \max[\theta_u^V(w, \bar{\theta}), \theta_u^V(w, \theta)] < \theta_u^{MV} \), then \( \theta_u^{MV} \) is the unique Condorcet winning value of \( \theta_u \), and we have a “classical” majority voting equilibrium, where, for any \( w \), high-\( \theta \) (resp., low-\( \theta \)) agents prefer a larger-than-\( \theta_u^{MV} \) (resp., smaller-than-\( \theta_u^{MV} \)) value of \( \theta_u \).

(b) If \( \max[\theta_u^V(w, \bar{\theta}), \theta_u^V(w, \theta)] > \theta_u^{MV} \) and if Assumption 1 is satisfied, then \( \theta_u^{MV} \) is the unique Condorcet winning value of \( \theta_u \), and we have an “ends-against-the-middle” majority voting equilibrium where, for any \( w \), both low-\( \theta \) and high-\( \theta \) agents prefer a larger-than-\( \theta_u^{MV} \) value of \( \theta_u \), while agents with intermediate values of \( \theta \) prefer a smaller-than-\( \theta_u^{MV} \) value of \( \theta_u \).

**Proof.** See Appendix B  

The type of majority voting equilibrium depends on the preferences of the richest (resp., poorest) parent of the lowest ability children when CRRA < 1 (resp. CRRA > 1). If such parents (who most-prefer not to enrol their children at university) prefer a relatively large university system, then the decisive voters (who most-prefer \( \theta_u = \theta_u^{MV} \)) all enrol their children in the university at equilibrium. Parents with high ability children favor a smaller-than-equilibrium university size (to save on the tax cost of university, and to boost their children’s high-skilled wage) while parents with low ability children favor a larger-than-equilibrium university size (either to enrol their children in universities, or to boost their low-skilled wage).

If CRRA < 1 (resp., CRRA > 1) and the richest (resp., poorest) parents of the lowest ability children prefer a relatively small university system, the majority voting equilibrium is of the “ends-against-the-middle” type. Decisive voters are then made of two groups of agents: parents with high-ability children who enrol in university at equilibrium (as above), but also parents of low-ability children who attend vocational schools (see Figure 12).
3). Parents with children of intermediate (resp., high) abilities prefer a university size larger (resp., smaller) than equilibrium for the same reasons as explained above. Parents with children of low abilities favor a smaller-than-equilibrium university size because they put little weight on variations of the reference unskilled wage, but care relatively more for the tax cost of the university.

Before turning to the comparative statics analysis of the majority voting equilibrium, we briefly study the equilibrium size of the university.

**Proposition 4** In a classical equilibrium, strictly more than one half of the children population attend university.

**Proof.** See Appendix D in Online Supplementary Material.

Observe first that $\theta_{u}^{MV} > \theta_{med}$ in both types of equilibria (because $\theta_{u}^{u}(w, \theta) > \theta$ and $\theta_{V}^{u}(w, \theta) > \theta$ for all parents), but that this by itself does not imply that less than one half of the children population attend university. Indeed, in a classical equilibrium, those who attend university at equilibrium are composed of the half of the population who prefer a larger-than-$\theta_{u}^{MV}$ value of $\theta_{u}$, but also of agents whose parents would prefer a slightly lower-than-$\theta_{u}^{MV}$ value of $\theta_{u}$ (because they would like to economize on their tutoring costs).

Hence Proposition 4. By contrast, in an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium, a fraction of the agents who prefer a larger-than-$\theta_{u}^{MV}$ value of $\theta_{u}$ do not enrol their child at university, so that the equilibrium size of the university may be lower than one half of the polity.

We now move to the comparative statics analysis.

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13 Figure 3 corresponds to the case where CRRA < 1, and is easy to redraw when CRRA ≥ 1. See Figure 4 in the proof of Proposition 3 for a description of the set of voters in the $(w, \theta)$ space.
Comparative statics analysis of the majority chosen university size and participation gap

Various factors may affect both the type of equilibrium (classical or ends-against-the-middle) and the majority chosen size of the university, given the equilibrium type. The next proposition addresses both issues analytically.

**Proposition 5**

(a) A skilled wage less sensitive to supply (i.e., a lower absolute value of $\partial \omega_H(H)/\partial H$) increases the majority chosen university size in both types of equilibrium, and renders the ends-against-the-middle equilibrium more likely.

(b) An unskilled wage less sensitive to supply (i.e., a lower absolute value of $\partial \omega_L(L)/\partial L$) decreases the majority chosen university size in an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium, does not affect the chosen size in a classical equilibrium, and renders the ends-against-the-middle equilibrium more likely.

(c) A lower level of altruism $\delta$ increases the majority chosen university size in a classical equilibrium, has an ambiguous impact on the chosen size in an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium, and renders the ends-against-the-middle equilibrium more likely.

(d) A lower university cost per student $c_u$ increases the majority chosen university size in both types of equilibrium, but has an ambiguous effect on the type of equilibrium.

**Proof.** See Appendix E in Online Supplementary Material 

The intuition for these results runs as follows. A skilled wage less sensitive to skilled labor supply decreases $\theta_u^v(w, \theta)$ for all individuals (by decreasing the incentives to restrict the university size in order to boost the skilled wage) but does not affect $\theta_u^v(w, \theta)$. The majority chosen university size then increases in both types of equilibrium. As for the type of equilibrium, recall that it depends on the comparison between $\theta_u^v(w, \theta)$ (for either $w = \bar{w}$ if CRRA < 1 or $w = \bar{w}$ if CRRA > 1) and $\theta_u^v(w, \theta)$ for some agents $(w, \theta)$. Since the former is not affected, while the latter decreases for all $(w, \theta)$, an ends-against-the-middle situation is made more likely.
An unskilled wage less sensitive to unskilled labor supply increases $\theta_u^V(w, \theta)$ for all individuals (by decreasing the incentives to enlarge the university size in order to boost the unskilled wage) but does not affect $\theta_u^u(w, \theta)$. The majority chosen university size then decreases in an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium, but not in a classical equilibrium. Since $\theta_u^V(w, \theta)$ increases, while $\theta_u^u(w, \theta)$ is not affected, an ends-against-the-middle situation is made more likely.

A lower level of altruism $\delta$ decreases $\theta_u^u(w, \theta)$ for all individuals (by decreasing the incentives to restrict the university size in order to boost the skilled wage) while it increases $\theta_u^V(w, \theta)$ for all individuals (by decreasing the incentives to enlarge the university size in order to boost the unskilled wage). This results in an increase in the majority-chosen university size in a classical equilibrium but has an ambiguous impact on the chosen size in an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium. Since $\theta_u^V(w, \theta)$ increases while $\theta_u^u(w, \theta)$ decreases, an ends-against-the-middle situation is made more likely.

A lower university cost per student decreases both $\theta_u^u(w, \theta)$ and $\theta_u^V(w, \theta)$ for all individuals (by decreasing the tax cost of any university size), resulting in an increase in the majority-chosen university size in both equilibria. Since $\theta_u^V(w, \theta)$ and $\theta_u^u(w, \theta)$ move in the same direction, the impact of a lower $c_u$ on the type of equilibrium is ambiguous.

Going beyond the previous results to study the impact of other factors on the higher education participation gap as well as size (and equilibrium type) requires resorting to numerical simulations. Our base case in this section is built on functional forms and numerical assumptions detailed in Appendix F in the Online Supplementary Material. These assumptions have not been chosen to fit any specific empirical observation, but because they generate an ends-against-the-middle majority voting equilibrium where Assumption 1 is satisfied (thereby showing that this assumption may indeed be satisfied). In this equilibrium, the ability threshold for access to university is set such that 55.9%

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14This counter-intuitive result is only valid locally: as $\delta$ decreases, $U_u(\theta_u^V(w, \theta), w, \theta)$ also decreases so that more agents prefer to send their child to vocational school and to restrict the university size.
of the population do attend university.\textsuperscript{15} The half of the electorate who want a smaller university is composed of 4.9\% of parents of low-skilled children (who would like to decrease the fiscal cost of university) and of 45.1\% of parents of high-skilled children (who would like to increase the skill premium as well as decrease the fiscal cost of university). The participation gap is such that 54.1\% of the children whose parent’s income is in the bottom quintile (Q1 henceforth) attend university, while 57.5\% of children in the top quintile (Q5) do attend university.\textsuperscript{16}

We identify numerically (see Appendix F in the Online Supplementary Material for more details) two comparative statics results leading to an increase in both the equilibrium university size and the participation gap: a larger skill premium (for instance because of skill-biased technical change) and smaller tutoring costs. A higher skill premium makes university attendance more attractive to everyone, increasing its size. Its impact on the participation gap is more complex, because the higher skill premium affects differently the benefit and the cost of university attendance for parents of different income levels. On the one hand, richer parents have a lower marginal tutoring cost (thanks to a lower marginal utility of consumption) than poorer ones, so that a higher skill premium induces an increase in the participation gap. On the other hand, recall from Proposition 1 (ii) that the skill level of the marginal tutored student, $\theta_m$, is decreasing in income, so that marginal students of lower income parents benefit more from the higher skill premium, inducing a decrease in the participation gap. In our numerical example, the former effect...
is larger than the latter, so that the participation gap increases with the skill premium.

Smaller tutoring costs have both a positive direct effect on university size (since more people invest in tutoring, and access higher education, for any given value of $\theta_u$), and a negative indirect effect (as voters choose a larger value of $\theta_u$). The direct effect is larger than the indirect one, so that the equilibrium university size increases compared to the base case. This bigger university goes hand in hand with a larger participation gap, with higher income parents taking more advantage of the smaller tutoring costs. Note that this is a local result, valid for small decreases in tutoring costs: if tutoring costs were driven all the way to zero, all parents would invest in tutoring and the participation gap would disappear (similarly, the participation gap would disappear in our model if tutoring costs were sufficiently high to prevent all parents from investing).

Two other comparative statics results lead to an increase in the equilibrium university size but decrease the participation gap: raising the minimum value of $\theta$, and lowering the university cost. A more unequal parental income distribution (obtained through a mean-preserving spread) barely affects the university size but increases the participation gap. Finally, the degree of altruism impacts the university size (less altruism decreasing the university size), but does not affect the participation gap much.

7 Conclusion

We have built a political economy model allowing us to shed light on the empirically observed increase of university size and participation gap. In our model, the participation gap emerges because tutoring investments (a widespread and growing phenomenon) increase with parental income. We find that an increase in the skill premium—as observed in many countries since the late 1970s, for instance because of skill-biased technical change—can replicate our stylized fact, by making university attendance more attractive and by inducing more especially richer parents to invest in tutoring (because they have a lower marginal utility cost of tutoring expenses). Two other phenomena increase the university size, but decrease the participation gap: a decrease in the per student university
cost, and an increase in students’ minimum academic ability (the latter reflecting the expansion of participation in secondary education). Another empirically observed factor, greater inequality in parental income, increases the participation gap but barely affects the university size. Finally, we identify another potential factor, namely a change in the tutoring technology – making it cheaper – which may, within some range of $p$, increase both the university size and the participation gap.

We have voluntarily refrained from providing a welfare analysis of our model, as well as policy recommendations,\textsuperscript{17} because both would hinge crucially on whether tutoring only has short term effects (as in this paper) or allows to increase long term abilities of students. Empirical research is sorely needed to answer this question, although the preliminary evidence, on which this paper is based, is currently quite negative.

We would like to conclude by explaining the price exacted by tractability on our model, simplifications which we would like to address in future research. First, we ignore the multi-tiered structure of university systems, with multiple tests determining whether a student graduates and on what terms, generating finely discriminating signals of student quality. Second, we ignore the signalling aspect of education, which is arguably the strongest argument for admissions requirements. Third, we do not address how admissions and subsequent testing requirements affect student effort, which presumably has an impact on their productivity as skilled workers. Fourth, another dimension absent from our analysis is immigration; this is a significant omission for its effects on the labor market, and because of the growing internationalization of higher education. Finally, observe that we have assumed that the joint distribution of income and ability is exogenous. In reality, it is itself determined by the education system. This is a feedback effect which would be most interesting to study in a dynamic version of our model.

\textsuperscript{17}For instance, the Sutton Trust recommends introducing a means-tested voucher scheme to enable lower-income families to provide supplementary education to their children and decrease the participation gap (Kirby, 2016).
Appendix A: Assumption 1

To convey the intuition for why Assumption 1 is needed to establish the existence of an end-against-the-middle equilibrium, assume that there is only one income level, \( w \). When Assumption 1 is not satisfied, the individual \( \tilde{\theta} \) is indifferent between \( \theta_u = \theta^u_w (w, \tilde{\theta}) < \theta^M_u \) and \( \theta^V_u (w, \tilde{\theta}) > \theta^M_u > \tilde{\theta} \). Unlike in the proof of Proposition 3 (b), \( \theta^M_u \) is not preferred to all \( \theta < \theta^M_u \) by individual \( \tilde{\theta} \), since this individual attains a higher utility level with \( \theta_u = \tilde{\theta} - \varepsilon \) with \( \varepsilon > 0 \) low enough. This opens up the possibility of a Condorcet cycle and of the inexistence of a Condorcet winning value of \( \theta_u \).

Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3

To prove that our candidate \( \theta^M_u \) is indeed a Condorcet winner, we first define the set of decisive voters, that is, the set of voters whose global peak is exactly at \( \theta^M_u \) (i.e. at the median of the distribution of peaks). We define the global peak of \( (w, \theta) \) voters as \( \theta^*_u (w, \theta) \), with

\[
\theta^*_u (w, \theta) = \begin{cases} 
\theta^V_u (w, \theta), \forall (w, \theta) \text{ such that } \theta \leq \tilde{\theta} (w), \\
\theta^u_w (w, \theta), \forall (w, \theta) \text{ such that } \theta > \tilde{\theta} (w).
\end{cases}
\]

We denote by \( D(x) \) the set of agents \( (w, \theta) \) who most-prefer \( \theta_u = x \), so that \( D(\theta^M_u) \equiv \{(w, \theta) \text{ such that } \theta^*_u (w, \theta) = \theta^M_u \} \). Lemma 3 characterizes this set.

Lemma 3 (a) If \( \max[\theta^V_u (w, \theta), \theta^V_u (w, \theta)] \leq \theta^M_u \), then the set of decisive voters \( D(\theta^M_u) \) corresponds to the locus of \( (w, \theta^*_u (w, \theta^M_u)) \) pairs with

\[
\theta^*_d (w, \theta^M_u) \equiv \{ \theta \text{ such that } \theta^u_w (w, \theta) = \theta^M_u \}.
\]

We have that \( \theta^*_d (w, \theta^M_u) \) decreases with \( w \), and that all \( (w, \theta) \) voters with \( \theta > \theta^*_d (w, \theta^M_u) \) (resp., \( \theta < \theta^*_d (w, \theta^M_u) \)) have \( \theta^*_u (w, \theta) > \theta^M_u \) (resp. \( \theta^*_u (w, \theta) < \theta^M_u \)).

(b) If \( \max[\theta^V_u (w, \theta), \theta^V_u (w, \theta)] > \theta^M_u \) and Assumption 1 holds, then \( D(\theta^M_u) \) equals the union of two loci:

\[
D(\theta^M_u) = (w, \theta^*_d (w, \theta^M_u)) \cup (w, \theta^*_d (w, \theta^M_u)),
\]
with \( \theta^V_d(w, \theta^MV) \equiv \{ \theta \text{ such that } \theta^V_d(w, \theta) = \theta^MV \} \). We have that \( \theta^V_d(w, \theta^MV) \) increases (resp., decreases) with \( w \) when CRRA < 1 (resp., CRRA > 1), and that all \((w, \theta)\) voters with \( \theta < \theta^V_d(w, \theta^MV) \) or \( \theta > \theta^V_d(w, \theta^MV) \) have \( \theta^*_u(w, \theta) > \theta^MV \), while all other voters have \( \theta^*_u(w, \theta) < \theta^MV \).

**Proof of Lemma 3**

(a) Given that \( \partial \theta^V_u(w, \theta) / \partial \theta < 0 \) (see Lemma 1), max \( \left[ \theta^V_u(w), \theta^V_d(w) \right] \) \( \theta^MV \) implies that \( \theta^V_u(w, \theta) < \theta^MV \) for all parents. Hence, only \((w, \theta)\) parents with \( \theta > \hat{\theta}(w) \) may be decisive, and so \( D \) is given by locus (6). Recall from Lemma 1 that \( \partial \theta^u(w, \theta) / \partial \theta > 0 \) and \( \partial \theta^u(w, \theta) / \partial w > 0 \), so that the implicit function theorem implies that \( \theta^V_d(w, \theta^MV) \) is decreasing in \( w \). The rest of part (a) follows from the fact that \( \theta^V_u(w, \theta) < \theta^MV \) and that \( \partial \theta^u(w, \theta) / \partial \theta > 0 \) for all \((w, \theta)\).

(b) Part (a) has established that \((w, \theta^MV) \in D(\theta^MV) \) in case (b) as well. Application of the intermediate value theorem given that max \( \left[ \theta^V_u(w), \theta^V_d(w) \right] \) \( \theta^MV \), that Assumption 1 holds and that Lemma 1 has established that \( \partial \theta^V_u(w, \theta) / \partial \theta < 0 \) means that \( D(\theta^MV) \) is also composed of another set of voters, namely those with \((w, \theta^V_d(w, \theta^MV)) \).\(^{18}\) Recall from Lemma 1 that \( \partial \theta^V_u(w, \theta) / \partial \theta < 0 \) and \( \partial \theta^V_u(w, \theta) / \partial w > 0 \) (resp. < 0) when CRRA < 1 (resp. CRRA > 1), so that the implicit function theorem implies that \( \theta^V_d(w, \theta^MV) \) increases (resp., decreases) with \( w \) when CRRA < 1 (resp., CRRA > 1). Finally, (i) agents with \( \theta < \theta^V_d(w, \theta^MV) \) prefer \( \theta^*_u(w, \theta) = \theta^V_u(w, \theta) \), which is larger than \( \theta^MV \) since \( \partial \theta^V_u(w, \theta) / \partial \theta < 0 \), (ii) agents with \( \theta > \theta^V_d(w, \theta^MV) \) prefer \( \theta^*_u(w, \theta) = \theta^u(w, \theta) \), which is larger than \( \theta^MV \) since \( \partial \theta^u(w, \theta) / \partial \theta > 0 \), while (iii) the other agents prefer either \( \theta^*_u(w, \theta) = \theta^V_u(w, \theta) \) (if \( \theta < \hat{\theta}(w) \)) which is smaller than \( \theta^MV \) since \( \partial \theta^V_u(w, \theta) / \partial \theta < 0 \), or \( \theta^*_u(w, \theta) = \theta^u(w, \theta) \) (if \( \theta > \hat{\theta}(w) \)) which is smaller than \( \theta^MV \) since \( \partial \theta^u(w, \theta) / \partial \theta > 0 \).

We now prove Proposition 3.

\(^{18}\)Assumption 1 together with max \( \left[ \theta^V_u(w), \theta^V_d(w) \right] \) \( \theta^MV \) imply that \( \theta^V_u(w, \theta^MV) \) exists for at least some values of \( w \), but may be not for all. All statements below must then be qualified as “when \( \theta^V_d(w, \theta^MV) \) exists for a given \( w \).”
(a) Assume first that \( \max[\theta^V_u(w, \theta), \theta^V_u(\bar{w}, \theta)] < \theta^M_u \), so that we claim that

\[ \theta^M_u = \theta \text{ such that } \int_{\mathcal{W}} (1 - F(\theta^V_u(w, \theta))) \, dG(w) \]

is preferred by a majority of parents to any other value of \( \theta_u \). In this case, Lemma 3 shows that the set of agents with \( \theta^*_u(w, \theta) > \theta^M_u \) are such that \( \theta > \theta^*_u(w, \theta^M_u) \). They prefer \( \theta^M_u \) to any value of \( \theta_u < \theta^M_u \), since \( U_u(\theta_u, w, \theta) > U_V(\theta_u, w, \theta) \) for all \( \theta_u < \theta^M_u \leq \theta^*_u(w, \theta) \) and since \( U_u(\theta_u, w, \theta) \) increases with \( \theta_u \) when \( \theta_u \leq \theta^*_u(w, \theta) \). Since this group by definition represents one half of the polity, \( \theta^M_u \) cannot be beaten by any \( \theta_u < \theta^M_u \).

We now look at agents with \( \theta^*_u(w, \theta) < \theta^M_u \), i.e., those with \( \theta < \theta^*_u(w, \theta^M_u) \). They are all such that \( \theta^V_u(w, \theta) < \theta^M_u \) (since \( \max[\theta^V_u(w, \theta), \theta^V_u(\bar{w}, \theta)] < \theta^M_u \) and \( \partial \theta^V_u(w, \theta)/\partial \theta < 0 \)) and \( \theta^*_u(w, \theta) < \theta^M_u \) (since \( \partial \theta^*_u(w, \theta)/\partial \theta > 0 \) and \( \partial \theta^*_u(w, \theta)/\partial w > 0 \)). Hence, their utility \( U(\theta_u, w, \theta) \) decreases with \( \theta_u \) for any \( \theta_u \leq \theta^M_u \), so that this half of the population prefers \( \theta^M_u \) to any larger value of \( \theta_u \), and \( \theta^M_u \) constitutes the unique Condorcet winner.

(b) Assume now that \( \max[\theta^V_u(w, \theta), \theta^V_u(\bar{w}, \theta)] > \theta^M_u \), so that we claim that

\[ \theta^M_u = \theta \text{ such that } \int_{\mathcal{W}} F(\theta^V_d(w, \theta)) \, dG(w) + \int_{\mathcal{W}} (1 - F(\theta^V_d(w, \theta))) \, dG(w) = 0.5 \]

is preferred by a majority of parents to any other value of \( \theta_u \). Figure 4 illustrates the preferences over \( \theta_u \) of the voters in the \((w, \theta)\) when CRRA<1 (with CRRA>1, the function \( \theta^*_d(w, \theta^M_u) \) is decreasing in \( w \)).

Insert Figure 4 around here

By the same argument as in part (a) of this proof, voters with \( \theta^*_u(w, \theta) < \theta^M_u \) strictly prefer \( \theta^M_u \) to any other \( \theta_u > \theta^M_u \) and constitute by definition one half of the electorate. Thus, \( \theta^M_u \) cannot be defeated in pairwise contest by any alternative \( \theta_u > \theta^M_u \). The set of agents with \( \theta^*_u(w, \theta) > \theta^M_u \) is now given by all \((w, \theta)\) agents with \( \theta < \theta^*_V_d(w, \theta^M_u) \) or \( \theta > \theta^*_V_d(w, \theta^M_u) \). Again, part (a) applies to prove that \((w, \theta)\)
agents with \( \theta > \theta_u^V(w, \theta_u^MV) \) strictly prefer \( \theta_u^V \) to any \( \theta_u < \theta_u^MV \). We then have to prove that the remaining group, \((w, \theta)\) voters with \( \theta < \theta_u^V(w, \theta_u^MV) \) prefer \( \theta_u^MV \) to any lower value of \( \theta_u \). For this group, we then have that \( \theta < \theta_u^V(w, \theta) < \theta_u^MV \leq \theta_u^V(w, \theta) \). 

A necessary and sufficient condition for \( \theta_u^MV \) to be preferred to any lower value of \( \theta_u \) is that \( U_u^*(w, \theta) = U_u(\theta_u^V(w, \theta), w, \theta) < U_V(\theta_u^MV, w, \theta) \) for all \( \theta < \theta_u^V(w, \theta_u^MV) \). It is easy to see (from the proof of Proposition 2) that \( \partial (U_u^*(w, \theta) - U_V(\theta_u^MV, w, \theta)) / \partial \theta > 0 \) so that, since \( U_u^*(w, \theta_u^V(w, \theta_u^MV)) < U_V(\theta_u^MV, w, \theta_u^V(w, \theta_u^MV)) \), all agents with \( \theta < \theta_u^V(w, \theta_u^MV) \) strictly prefer \( \theta_u^MV \) to any lower value of \( \theta_u \). We then have that \( \theta_u^MV \) cannot be defeated at the majority voting and is the unique Condorcet winner.

References


Figure 1. Single-peaked preferences

Figure 2. Non single-peaked preferences
Figure 3. Ends-against-the-middle Equilibrium

Figure 4. Decisive voters and coalitions – Ends-against-the-middle Equilibrium
Highlights

- Higher education enrolment has increased in most countries.
- This has not been accompanied by a decrease in the participation gap.
- We develop a political economy model to shed light on this stylized fact.
- A participation gap emerges endogenously as richer parents invest more in tutoring.
- A larger skill premium and a smaller cost of tutoring replicate our stylized fact.