PARTICIPATION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT:
POPULIST PARTIES AND RAPPROTEURSHIPS

Laura Catherine Ormston MacKenzie
University of Leicester
Department of History, Politics and International Relations

Thesis submitted in partial completion of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Politics

2017
ABSTRACT

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Laura Catherine Ormston MacKenzie

This piece of research develops and tests a model of rapporteurship allocation in the European Parliament, analysing the nature of populist and radical right parties’ engagement in the rapporteurship system, during the fourth and fifth parliamentary terms. The model of rapporteurship allocation builds upon previous research by Yoshinaka et al (2010), and develops the analysis with specific reference to populist and radical right parties. Having discussed the types of populist and radical right parties represented in the European Parliament, this piece of research presents a theoretical framework for studying such parties in a variety of legislatures.

Populist and radical right parties are less likely than parties of other traditions to act as rapporteurs in the European Parliament. This is, in part, due to their anti-establishment position, which sees them advocating for a disenfranchised people unrepresented by the political elite. This anti-establishment position results in many populist parties, particularly those from the right wing, failing to fully engage in the European Parliament’s processes.

This piece of research uses a number of quantitative techniques to analyse the effect certain variables have on the propensity of populist and radical right members to act as rapporteurs. Even when controlling for a variety of variables, I find that populism significantly, negatively, impacts upon the likelihood of a member to act as a rapporteur. This situation is amplified for Eurosceptic members.

The qualitative element of this piece of research seeks to establish whether there is any link between populist and radical right party policy aims and the content of reports their rapporteurs write. Using a coding system derived from the Euromanifesto Project, I conduct a content analysis of reports. Overall, there is little correlation between Euromanifestos and reports, but there does seem to be some parity between general salient party goals and report content.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This piece of research has been completed with the help and support of many people. First and foremost, my parents have steadfastly supported me throughout my studies, always encouraging but never indulgent. Without their continued patience and belief in me – not to mention their constant provision of much-needed cups of tea – I would not be where I am now. Secondly, my primary supervisor, Dr Richard Whitaker, has been instrumental in ensuring this thesis reached completion. He has been a profound encouragement during times of personal difficulty and crippling self-doubt, and has provided constructive criticism and vital feedback throughout.

I am extremely grateful to Professor Gail McElroy from Trinity College, Dublin, and Professor Antoine Yoshinaka from American University, Washington, who very kindly shared data from their 2010 analysis of rapporteurships in the European Parliament, upon which this piece of research is based. Additional thanks go to Professor Yoshinaka for taking an interest in my work and providing me with helpful suggestions and encouragement throughout. I am indebted to Dr Anke Roexe from Leeds Metropolitan University, who helped me with translations of German texts when my high-school language abilities failed, and Dr Bronia Flett from Sage Publications, who injected much-needed humour into a difficult final year.

I am also grateful to Dr Anders Widfeldt from the University of Aberdeen, who first inspired me to pursue a PhD. My thanks, too, go to Dr Aylwin Pillai from the University of Aberdeen, who helped me prepare for my entry into the PhD programme by putting me through a series of rigorous mock interviews (all of which were more terrifying than anything I experienced as a PhD candidate!), and to her husband, Rev Dr Vijay Pillai from Aberdeen Christian Fellowship, whose pastoral support over the past year has been indispensable. Finally, my thanks go to the numerous friends and family members who have read my blog posts, articles, and thesis chapters: you have been extremely kind.
To my parents, James and Florence MacKenzie
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THESIS OVERVIEW

In his 2016 State of the Union address, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, warned that the European Union is at risk of being “weakened by the forces of populism”\(^1\). This statement came in the wake of an unprecedented decision by the United Kingdom in May 2016 to leave the European Union, a situation commonly referred to as ‘Brexit’, and widespread political and economic instability and insecurity across the Union. At the time of writing this piece of research, Spain has only just formed a government after a third election in 12 months; the Italian Prime Minister has resigned following a rejection of his proposed constitutional reforms; and Greece has received further funds in order to meet the conditions of its previous bailout deals. These situations, President Juncker argued, have resulted in fragmentation and a lack of unity across the European Union.

Against this backdrop, Europe has seen populist parties gain momentum in the domestic arena and at the European Parliament level. Commentators anticipated an increase in populist representatives in the European Parliament in 2014, reflecting the growth in support for such parties across the Union (see Bertoncini and Kreilinger, 2013a and 2013b, and Durant et al, 2013). Some new populist or radical right parties received representation, such as Greece’s Golden Dawn, and other older populist parties, such as the Sweden Democrats, received a surge in European support that had hitherto been unprecedented. In the domestic arena, some previously established mainstream centrist European countries, such as Germany, have witnessed the destabilising impact of populism as populist parties have gained electoral salience in regional elections.

It is, however, imperative to note that populist parties have been represented at both the domestic and European levels for several decades, having grown in salience and position since the early 1980s (see Taggart, 2000). Some of these parties, such as the Austrian Freedom Party, have participated in national government, and others, like the French National Front, have consistently been notably present on the domestic arena despite failing to govern or fully participate electorally. In the case of the National Front, the party has been regularly

\(^1\)For the full text of the State of the Union address, see the European Commission press release page at [www.europa.eu](http://www.europa.eu)
successful at achieving high levels of support in French Presidential elections, often coming second to the winning candidate. True to form, in 2017 Marine Le Pen came a very close second in the first round to eventual winner, Emmanuel Macron. Some populist parties have been consistently represented in the European Parliament, over successive parliamentary terms, and expansion of the European Union has brought new populist parties to the fore, suggesting that the concept of populism is one of continued salience across the European Union and over time.

Much of the research into populist parties has focused specifically on populist parties on the right wing, either radical right wing populists or non-radical right wing populists. Scholars such as Betz (1994), Kitschelt and McGann (1995), Mudde (1997), Bale (2003), and Ignazi (2003) have focused on theoretical components of the populist radical right in terms of classification, definitions, and explanations of electoral support. Other researchers have studied specific populist parties or particular geographic areas in detail. For example, Copsey (2004) and Goodwin (2014) have focused on the British National Party; Davis (2002a and 2002b) has studied the French National Front; Rydgren (2006) has focused on Scandinavian populism; and Otjes and Louwerse (2015) have conducted comparative studies of Dutch populist parties.

In recent years, as populism has gained salience on the left wing as well as the right, scholars have begun to analyse populists of other traditions in greater detail. For example, Dardanelli and Mitchell (2014) have studied the Scottish National Party; Decker and Hartleb (2007) have compared left and right wing populists in Germany; Edwards (2005) has conducted research on Berlusconi’s neoliberal populist party, Go Europe; and Moschanos (2001 and 2013) and Kouvelakis (2016) have analysed the left wing populism of Greece’s Panhellenic Socialist Movement, and the Coalition of the Radical Left. In addition to the research conducted on the electoral and ideological salience of specific populist parties, there has been significant analysis of issues of populist communication conducted. Horsfield (2003) has analysed the relationship between the media and populism; Aalberg et al (2016) have conducted a series of comprehensive pan-European studies of the political communication of populist parties; and researchers such as Morris and Carini (2014) have carried out analysis of the populist communication of specific parties such as the French National Front.
Populist parties grew in relevance and support during the 1980s and 1990s. Many found representation at the local level and, for some, this remains the only sphere of electoral influence. Some populist parties, such as the populist radical right Austrian Freedom Party, have achieved a measure of success in national government, operating as part of coalition governments (see Betz, 2001 and Fallend, 2004). Others have found themselves as the sole governing party as in the case of Greece’s left wing populist Panhellenic Socialist Movement (see Moschanos, 2001) and the left wing Scottish National Party within the United Kingdom’s system of devolution (see Dardanelli and Mitchell, 2014).

The European Parliament has provided a unique opportunity for populist parties to have representation at the supranational level, and populist parties have consistently returned representatives to the European Parliament since the first term in 1979. Populist parties have been able to capitalise on the second order nature of European elections, which allows voters the opportunity to express their level of (dis)satisfaction with governing and mainstream parties (see Reiff and Schmitt, 1980, and Hix and Lord, 1997). Because voters often perceive European elections as being of less importance than national elections, they are likely to use the election as an opportunity to register a protest vote (Hix and Lord, 1997, p. 87). Since the unprecedented rise in support for Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament, there has been some rethinking of the relevance of the second order model on voters. Some scholars suggest that voter dissatisfaction with the European Union’s handling of the economic crisis resulted in many voters defecting from pro-European mainstream parties to Eurosceptic parties. This raises the possibility that European issues do have a significant impact on voter choice (see Hobolt and de Vries, 2016).

There is a small body of research into populist parties in the European Parliament, focusing on the extent to which they benefit from the second order election model; reasons for their electoral appeal and support; and their ideological composition. Some scholars have carried out research into the attempts of radical right wing populists to form alliances in the European Parliament. A list of some relevant contributions is shown below:

For example, see Copsey, 2004 and Goodwin, 2011 and 2014 for analyses of the British National Party, which has largely been represented at local government level in the United Kingdom. See e.g. Betz, 1994; Fennema and Pollmann, 1998; Mudde, 2007; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007; Langenbacher and Schellenberg, 2011; McGowan, 2012; Bertoncini and Kreilinger, 2013; Durant et al, 2013.
Parliament, and the behaviour of Eurosceptic members (see Startin, 2010, and Brack, 2012 and 2015). However, it is only comparatively recently that this area of study has been expanded to assess the role populist parties in general play at the European level, and the impact they make. Where the literature has been lacking is on the impact of populism in general on the European Parliament and on the behaviour of populist legislators at this transnational level. It is into this gap that this piece of research fits.

The overarching theme of this research project is ‘Participation in the European Parliament: Populist Parties and Rapporteurships’. By analysing the engagement of populist and radical right parties, and their members’ behaviour, in the process of rapporteurship in the European Parliament, this piece of research makes an important contribution to the study of these parties within an elected supranational arena.

This piece of research takes the following format. The first chapter seeks to define populism in general terms, and then in specific detail with regard to the different types of populist and radical right parties represented in the European Parliament. The second chapter deals with theoretical components of the literature, focusing on the legislative behaviour of populist and radical right parties at both the national and supranational levels and then moving on to the structures and processes of the European Parliament. The latter part of this chapter deals with the concept of populist party goals and how they might be actioned in the European Parliament, and the chapter ends with a presentation of the key hypotheses tested in this piece of research.

The third chapter sets out the data and research design, with an explanation of previous models of rapporteurship allocation and the data collection for this piece of research. Following on from that, the fourth chapter constitutes the first portion of empirical data. This chapter presents the main findings from statistical analysis of the model of rapporteurship allocation developed for this piece of research, and provides discussion of these findings. The fifth chapter comprises the second portion of empirical data, and focuses on qualitative content analysis of European Parliament reports. The final, sixth, chapter concludes this piece of research by summarising the main findings and addressing the primary research question regarding the impact of populism on the process of report allocation in
the European Parliament. In addition, the final chapter suggests areas of further analysis that have come to the fore as a result of this piece of research.

Chapter 1 deals in detail with theoretical definitions of populist and radical right parties. In order to select parties for study, I have initially classified populist parties according to established definitions of populism as expounded by respected authors such as Canovan (1981), Taggart (2000), Luckas (2005), and Mudde (2007), and have summarised populism as having three core components. First of all, populist parties have an inherent focus on ‘the people’, which represent a homogeneous, intrinsically good, group that exists in an idealised ‘heartland’ of the nation or other community. How the people are defined varies according to the different ideological emphases of populist parties, as well as the particular time period and cultural context in which they find themselves. However, all populists present a dichotomous concept of the elite and the people. The second core element of populism is anti-elitism. As with the concept of the people, populists from different traditions define this notion differently, although the elite tends to comprise the political class. The elite is considered corrupt and unrepresentative of the people, who are politically disenfranchised. The third and final component of populism is suspicion and criticism of the institutions of liberal pluralist democracy.

There are six types of parties analysed in this piece of research: radical right wing populists; non-radical right wing populists; left wing populists; neoliberal populists; non-partisan or unclassified populists; and non-populist radical right wing parties. The latter group is included in this analysis, as the parties in this particular classification share many characteristics with radical right wing populists, such that they are often confused.

The largest group of populists represented in the European Parliament is radical right wing populists. Although the terms ‘extreme’ and ‘radical’ are regularly used interchangeably for these parties, I have chosen to refer to them as radical, primarily because these parties do not seek to overthrow the political system as some extreme right parties do: instead, radical parties are opposed to some specific problems within the political system. For the sake of clarification, I have defined some non-populist radical right parties as extreme right. Core to radical right wing populism is the concept of nativism, with the nation divided into
natives and non-natives. In this context, the people are defined as the natives who exist within the heartland. Although nationalism is a central principle of radical right wing populist ideology, non-natives are not always defined in exclusively nationalist or ethnic terms, although this is often the case due to the strong anti-immigration positions held by these parties\(^4\).

Those parties defined as radical right wing populist are not necessarily right wing in a liberal economic sense, but rather socially and some parties in this category, such as the British National Party, in fact hold to a substantially left wing economic position of industrial nationalisation and high taxation. These parties are more likely to express their right wing position through holding a foundational belief in inequality, evinced primarily through their nativist sentiments (see Ignazi, 2003). European parties defined as radical right wing populists include the Austrian Freedom Party, the Belgian Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest, the French National Front, and the British National Party.

Non-radical right wing populist parties share many characteristics with radical right wing populists, especially in terms of nativism and right wing position. However, they differ primarily in terms of their attitude to basic principles of liberal pluralist democracy. Non-radical right wing populists tend to function relatively comfortably within the established democratic system, and many of them hold prominent positions on the political landscape. Although many non-radical right wing populists hold strong nationalist positions, similar to their radical counterparts, they tend to avoid overt references to ethnic nationalism, favouring the rhetoric of civic nationalism instead\(^5\).

As with radical right wing populists, many non-radical right wing populist parties hold strong Eurosceptic positions, regularly advocating for their country's withdrawal from the European Union. Examples of non-radical right wing populist parties represented in the European Parliament include the Hungarian Civic Alliance, and the UK Independence Party and the Democratic Unionist Party from the United Kingdom.

\(^4\)Respected scholars who have carried out analysis of radical right wing populist parties include, among others, Sprinzak, 1991; Merkl and Weinberg, 1993; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Ramet, 1999; Norris, 2005; Minkenberg and Perrineau, 2007; Mudde, 2007; and Rydgren, 2007.

\(^5\)For detailed discussion of non-radical right wing populist parties see, among others, Fowler, 2004; Mudde, 2007; Gormley-Heenan and Macginty, 2008; Abedi, 2009; and Whitaker and Lynch, 2011.
As with populist parties of other traditions, left wing populists hold strong anti-elitist and anti-system positions and they present themselves as representatives of the people. Unlike traditional left wing parties, populist left wing parties place less emphasis on doctrinal integrity and concerns about class-consciousness, instead focusing on the inherently populist dichotomy between the unrepresentative and corrupt elite and the disenfranchised people, usually defined in somewhat vague terms as the working class. The primary areas of difference between left wing populists and those on the right are their emphases on social equality and egalitarianism, and they are often openly critical of free market, capitalist, or liberal economic systems.

In the European context, left wing populists are as likely as radical right wing populists to hold Eurosceptic positions, although they base their criticism of the European Union on the liberal economic nature of integration, particularly on issues relating to the single currency, rather than on issues of national identity. Examples of left wing populists include the Dutch Socialist Party, the Scottish National Party, and Greece’s Panhellenic Socialist Movement.

The fourth group of populist party represented in the European Parliament is that of neoliberal populists. These parties differ from their right wing counterparts primarily because nativism is not a core component of these parties’ ideology or rhetoric, although neoliberal populists do defend national interests. In addition, neoliberal populists do not share the conservative ethical positions held by radical and non-radical right wing populists. Instead, neoliberal populists tend to propound liberal values of freedom of expression, the separation of church and state, and gender equality. Somewhat unusually, given their strong emphasis on liberal values, some neoliberal populist parties have successfully mobilised on an anti-immigration mandate, arguing that outside, foreign religions and cultures threaten national liberal culture and interests. A notable example of a European neoliberal populist party is Berlusconi’s Go Italy.

The fifth type of populists identified in this study is non-partisan or unclassified populists. These parties cannot be easily defined in relation to the

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6See Laclau, 1977; Przeworski, A. and Sprague, J., 1986; Mavrogordatos, 1997; Moschanos, 2001; Arditi, 2003; March, 2007; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008; and Otjes and Louwerse, 2015, for in-depth discussions of left wing populist parties.

7Researchers of neoliberal populism include Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990; Betz, 2003; Akkerman, 2005; and Mudde, 2007.
traditional left-right spectrum because they fluctuate in their position over time and can be ideologically ambiguous. One example of this type of populist party is Italy’s Five Star Movement, which claims to be “beyond right and left”. The party has failed to develop any tangible domestic policy programme, and is ambiguous on almost all points of ideology, regularly fluctuating between being pro-European and Eurosceptic. However, the party has an inherently populist organisational structure, centred on a charismatic central figure, Beppe Grillo. In addition, the Five Star Movement operates in unconventional spheres, such as campaigning through social media, and exhibits strong anti-establishment sentiments, so is defined as populist.

Non-populist radical right parties share many similarities with populist radical right parties but, critically, do not display inherent characteristics required to define them unambiguously as populist parties. Non-populist radical right parties are likely to display elitist characteristics in terms of organisational structure, and some advocate violent political struggle instead of engagement with the liberal democratic system. These latter parties are defined as extreme right wing parties, examples of which include Greece’s Golden Dawn. Elitist radical right wing parties include Italy’s National Alliance.

Chapter 2 develops the theoretical background to this piece of research, and discusses in detail the legislative behaviour of populist and radical right parties, and the structure and processes of the European Parliament. I chose the European Parliament as the focus of this piece of research because it allows a unique opportunity to study populist parties of different traditions, operating in one democratic institution, over time. Analysing their behaviour in a supranational institution such as the European Parliament, where they are subject to the same institutional processes, restrictions and regulations allows for greater parity than cross-national comparisons do. In addition, there exists little detailed research on all populist and radical right parties represented in the European Parliament in the form of comprehensive comparison studies. Much of the research on populist and radical right parties at the European level has focused on radical right wing

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8 For analysis of non-partisan or unclassified populists such as the Five Star Movement, see Mosca, 2014; Corbetta and Vignati, 2014; and Franzosi, Maloni and Salvati, 2015.
9 For information on non-populist radical right wing parties see, among others, Ignazi, 2003; Mudde, 2007; Vasilopoulou and Halkipoulou, 2015; Ellinas, 2015; and Wodak, 2015.
populists or Eurosceptic populists and the extent to which they have benefitted from the second order election type, the nature of their ideology, and the reasons for their electoral support and success. Other research projects have addressed attempts by radical right wing populists to cooperate in the European Parliament, and there have been studies conducted on issues pertaining to Europeanisation. Where this piece of research fills a gap is in its study of a range of populist parties and in its focus on populism as a common factor in the rhetoric and ideology of several different types of party.

I chose the process of rapporteurship as an example of legislative behaviour to be analysed because it is, arguably, the most important role of a MEP. The choice of rapporteur is key and is influenced by several factors, including expertise, partisanship and national interest. Analysing whether populism is a factor in this process of rapporteurship allocation is a comparatively undeveloped area of study, yet has the potential to provide important information about how the European Parliament works, the extent to which there is a democratic deficit in its processes, and whether anti-establishment parties can operate comfortably in an environment of which they are critical.

Chapter 2 concludes with the presentation of hypotheses that are tested in this piece of research. The first hypothesis anticipates that populist or radical right MEPs will be less likely to act as rapporteurs than members from parties of other traditions. This is because populist parties are primarily anti-establishment, and they position themselves as advocates for a people disenfranchised from the political process, and unrepresented by the political elite. In the context of the European Parliament, this anti-establishment position can take the form of Euroscepticism. While not all populist parties are Eurosceptic, many are, and these parties perceive the European Union to be in opposition to the needs of the nation.

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10 For previous research projects studying populist and radical right parties in the European Parliament see, for example, Startin, 2010; and Brack, 2012 and 2015.
11 For detailed information on the roles of European Parliament members, see e.g. Scully and Farrell, 2003, and Corbett et al, 2011.
12 For discussion of the motivation and influences on members, see e.g. Hix and Lord, 1997; Hix, 1999 and 2002; Kreppel, 2002b; Hix et al, 2006; McElroy and Benoit, 2006; and Yoshinaka et al, 2010.
13 For this piece of research, rapporteurship allocation in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms has been chosen for analysis. This builds on research already conducted by Yoshinaka et al (2010), a discussion of which occurs in Chapter 3.
and, in some cases, a threat to economic or cultural concerns\textsuperscript{14}. This anti-establishment position means that populist parties, particularly ultra-nationalist parties from the populist right wing, fail to engage fully in the European Parliament’s processes. This might be evidenced through members choosing to remain unattached, rather than join with a political group; having limited attendance at plenary debates or committee meetings; or not acting as rapporteurs.

This hypothesis is tested, and the results presented in Chapter 4 of this piece of research, through initial descriptive analysis, presenting the numbers and proportions of rapporteurs that were from populist or radical right parties in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms. Binomial logistic regression is conducted as an assessment of an overall model of rapporteurship allocation for the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms.

The second hypothesis focuses on the impact of Euroscepticism on the allocation of reports in the European Parliament\textsuperscript{15}. I hypothesise that Eurosceptic MEPs will be the least likely of all populists to act as rapporteurs. This is because the inherent anti-establishment position held by populist MEPs often results in them also holding anti-European views within the context of the European Parliament. I anticipate that the hard Eurosceptics, defined as Euro-rejecting, who oppose any form of European integration, will be unlikely to choose to engage in the rapporteurship process and will be unlikely to be chosen by their fellow MEPs to act as rapporteurs. In order to test this hypothesis, I compute the predicted probabilities of a member acting as a rapporteur, given a variety of independent variables, and plot these positions according to the member’s position on the Chapel Hill measure of Euroscepticism, which is discussed in detail in later chapters.

The third and final hypothesis focuses on the role of domestic governance in report allocation among populist MEPs. This hypothesis derives from literature on the propensity of MEPs from parties in national government to be more active as rapporteurs, due to their corresponding representation in the Council, and tests

\textsuperscript{14} For indepth discussions of the anti-establishment nature of populist parties, see e.g. Abedi, 2002 and 2004; Mudde, 2007; and Abedi and Lundberg, 2009.

\textsuperscript{15} The concept of Euroscepticism is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis. For further discussion of this concept, see e.g. Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003, and Vasilopoulou, 2010.
this finding against the data gathered for populist and radical right MEPs\textsuperscript{16}. This hypothesis is tested through the addition of interaction terms in the regression analysis models, and through further ANOVA tests.

Chapter 5 focuses on qualitative analysis of the reports held by populist and radical right MEPs. This particular chapter is a first attempt to unpack the relationship between populist party goals in the European Parliament and the choice of reports held by populist members. Using the Euromanifesto Project’s system of coded reports\textsuperscript{17}, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 5, I also code the reports held by populist and radical right MEPs, to see if there is any real attempt to enact policy aims in the European Parliament through the rapporteurship system. As Euromanifestos are only a generally useful guide to party policy aims, I also group the populist parties into categories (separatist/regionalist; Eurosceptic; left wing; and neoliberal) to assess whether there is any link between general aims of parties in these particular categories and the reports held.

This piece of research concludes with Chapter 6, which summarises the main findings of the analyses conducted and concludes that, in the process of rapporteurship allocation in the European Parliament, populism does indeed matter.

\textsuperscript{16} See Høyland, 2006.
\textsuperscript{17} For an explanation of the Euromanifesto Project and the coding system used, see Braun et al, 2015.
CHAPTER 1 – THE CONCEPTS AND VARIETIES OF POPULISM

Populist parties have been present in the European Parliament since its inception in 1979 and there are currently 25 populist parties represented at European Parliament level. Although the current Parliament contains more right-wing populist MEPs than their counterparts from the left, parties from both ends of the ideological spectrum can be defined as populist, as can neoliberal and non-partisan parties, all of which express their populism in different ways.

This variation results in six groups of populist parties: radical right wing populist; non-radical right wing populist; left wing populist; neoliberal populist; and non-partisan and unclassified populists, all of which are discussed in this chapter. Due to similarities between radical right wing populist parties, a further group has been constructed for those parties that are considered non-populist radical right18. As a result, whenever the parties and their MEPs, which are the subject of this piece of research, are mentioned as a collective group they are referred to as ‘populist and radical right’ or ‘populist or radical right’. When considering which parties to include under which banner of populism, one has to go through a process of inclusion and elimination, excluding those parties that do not quite meet the criteria prescribed and ensuring all parties that do fit the definition are included. Generally, a researcher has to make a choice between using a minimal or a maximum definition, judging how best to include all relevant political parties. For the purposes of this piece of research I have, essentially, used both.

A minimal definition applies to a broadly applicable definition, able to accommodate all parties that are in some respect, classifiable in an appropriate way, and which includes parties that are generally considered part of the group. In a sense, this is the technique I have used to identify those parties that could in the

18For detailed information on the various types of populist parties such as those represented at European Parliament level, see e.g. Betz, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Fennema and Pollmann, 1998; DeClair, 1999; Ramet, 1999; Hainsworth, 2000; Huyssseune, 2001; Bale, 2003; Horsfield, 2003; Ignazi, 2003; Copsey, 2004; Fallend, 2004; Blokker, 2005; De Decker et al, 2005; Edwards, 2005; Rydgren, 2006; Mudde, 2007; Abedi, 2009; Almeida, 2010; Dechezelles and Neumeyer, 2010; Ellinas, 2010; Meret, 2010; Lynch, Whitaker and Loomes 2011; Akkerman, 2012; Bartlett et al, 2012; Halkipoulou et al, 2012; Miues, 2012; Ramalingam, 2012; Durant, 2013; and Otjes and Louwerse, 2015.
first instance be described as populist. Freedon (1996 and 1997), in his seminal works on political ideologies, created a framework of core and peripheral, or primary and secondary, concepts which, he argued, form the basis of any ideology. Core concepts can be interpreted as those components of ideology upon which other, additional, concepts can be built (see Freedon, 1997).

In the context of populism, we can distil the overall concept (developed in detail later in this chapter) into several distinct core components:

1. A focus on ‘the people’, referred to in an almost organic sense although differently defined according to the ideological emphasis of the populist party, as well as cultural context and time period. What is consistent is the dichotomy between the people and 'the elite';

2. Anti-elitism, which is usually focused on the political class, although who comprises this elite group differs according to the party’s ideology and position on a left-right scale. Populist parties are consistent, however, in their view that the elite stands in opposition to the people;

3. Suspicion and criticism of the institutions of liberal democracy.

These three components together provide the basis of a minimal definition of populist parties. However, because not all populist parties are the same19, further maximum definitions have been used to correctly define populist parties. With these maximum definitions of each type of populist party key ideological, organisational and rhetorical components must be in evidence in order to attribute each populist party to the correct classification of populism.

I. The concept of populism

Populism is, in many ways, an unusual concept. While it has many of the qualities of an ideology, it is impossible to define solely, or principally, in ideological terms. Populist movements are often dispersed and fractured, and the groups that constitute these movements are often difficult to organise and chaotic in nature (Taggart, 2000, p.1). There were several attempts made to tackle the

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19See e.g. Betz, 2001; Horsfield, 2003; Mudde, 2004; Rydgren, 2006; Jones, 2007; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008; Pauwels, 2011; Bartlett and Birdwell, 2012; and Alberg et al, 2016.
concept of populism in a concise, academic fashion in the 1960s (see Ionescu and Gellner, 1969), the 1970s (see Allcock, 1971 and Laclau, 1977), and the 1980s (see Canovan, 1981). However, it is Paul Taggart’s (2000) thematic synopsis of populism that has been the most helpful in creating a framework within which we can consider and understand this elusive and intangible concept.

Taggart proposes six central ideas, or themes, that run through the concept of populism. The first two of these deal primarily with those individuals, movements or groups defined as populist (i.e. populists are hostile to representative politics, and populists identify themselves with an idealised heartland, found within the community they seek to represent or favour), while the remaining four are concerned with the concept itself (i.e. populism as an ideology lacks core values; populism is often a strong reaction to a situation of extreme crisis; populism contains fundamental dilemmas which make it self-limiting; and populism is a “chameleon”, taking on the colours of the environment within which it finds itself) (Taggart, 2000, p. 2).

At its core, populism is hesitant about politics in general and representative politics in particular, perceiving it as “messy and corrupting” (Taggart, 2000, p. 3). Populism seeks to avoid any active involvement in politics and reluctantly advocates participation only in situations of extreme crisis. Populism is often found where there is popular resentment of the ruling class, perceived as unrepresentative by the electorate or public. There is a strong dichotomy in populism between the elite and the people, however contextually defined. Populism is at best suspicious and, at worst, rejecting of institutions within society that are perceived as being unrepresentative of the collective wisdom and will of the people (Taggart, 2000, p.11). Populists are inherently anti-establishment in outlook, often critical of political systems at large and, specifically, within the national or supranational arena within which they operate. The people are invariably seen as one homogeneous group, bound together within a common Gemeinschaft (community) opposed to an unrepresentative elite.

Margaret Canovan argues that populism can be perceived in some contexts, despite its suspicion of politics and political systems, as the “true, radical ideal of democracy itself” (Canovan, 1981, p.172). Populist democracy strives for direct popular self-governance through referendum, without the participation of a
political elite, and Canovan argues this is evidence of a populist ideology that could be considered to have the same credibility as ideologies such as conservatism or liberalism (Canovan, 1981, p.173). John Luckas (2005) also addresses this democratic element, arguing that populism struggles for an "ever wider and deeper extension of democracy", with populists believing that true democracy has been thwarted by political elites (Luckas, 2005, p. 57). March (2007) suggests that, although populism can be radical in terms of rhetoric, at its core it is reformist. Populism critiques democracy rather than directly opposes it and participation in a government setting often moderates populist parties’ positions on democracy (March, 2007, p. 73).

However, Weyland (2013) argues that populism inherently stands in tension with democracy because populist leaders insidiously seek political hegemony and attempt to weaken and undermine democratic institutions that seek to provide checks and balances to minimise the abuse of power. In addition, populist leaders do not consider opponents as valid adversaries in a competitive arena, but as real and profound threats. This feeds into their ‘us-and-them’ rhetoric, where rivals are viewed as antagonistic to the people, and pluralist democracy is inevitably undermined as a result (Weyland, 2013, p. 21).

Because populist movements and groups vary according to the political environments in which they find themselves, and populist parties exist on both the left and right wings, their reaction to pluralist representative politics also differs. While it is possible, in an abstract way, to reduce this reaction to ‘the ruled versus the rulers’, the reality of how this reaction plays out varies according to the salient issues, assumptions and experiences in different contexts. For example, while the reaction of the Russian Narodniki (a socially conscious, intellectual, middle class movement involved in populist agitation against the Tsardom) to the representative politics of the 19th century was revolutionary, the reaction of the new populists – such as those in the European Parliament – is one of ambivalence and protest (Taggart, 2000, p. 110). However, the common thread found in populist democracy is both theoretical and practical, representing an ideal of governance by the people and also the catalyst for realising this notion of popular governance, regardless of cultural or political context.
This recurring theme of the people in the composition of populism has allowed some commentators to define populism primarily as a movement, or movements, representing the people (see Westlind, 1996) and some populists to view this commitment to the people as being the defining feature of populism (Taggart, 2000, p. 91). However, how populists define the people varies according to time, place and the environment in which they find themselves. In addition, the conceptualisation of the people is complex and is derived, to some extent, from the commitment of populism to other core concepts (Taggart, 2000, p. 91). This lack of consensus over which groups constitute the people allows parties of both the left and right wings to define themselves as populist.

In populism the heartland transcends class and is, in effect, classless. Implicit in the notion of the people is that these members of the heartland are homogeneous, almost undifferentiated in their commonality: the single heartland requires a single people (Taggart, 2000, p.96). The heartland is more than a rhetorical tool: it is the home of a common people, united by a shared experience and will and a collective ownership of cultural resources and cultural hegemony (Pankowski, 2010, p. 6).

While there is no requirement for the heartland to constitute a single nation, the emphasis on a collective people allows nationalism to sit comfortably within populist thought. It is relevant at this point to highlight the differences between patriotism and nationalism. Patriotism is defensive in its love of a land or nation; nationalism is more aggressive and less tangible, propagating a myth of 'the people'. Despite similarities with nationalism and national consciousness, patriotism is largely old-fashioned and has been known to be occasionally aristocratic; nationalism is modern and inherently populist in nature (Luckas, 2005, p.36).

Populist nationalism is inherently collectivist, and the nation is considered the highest authority, essential for the well-being of individual citizens. Populist nationalism differs from other nationalist traditions such as conservatism, as it does not view individual liberty or property ownership as desirable in themselves, but as being possible only in and through the nation (Blokker, 2005, p.373).

Taggart argues that the idea of the nation as the heartland results in populism being inward looking. Populists often consider cosmopolitanism and
internationalism undesirable, preferring isolationism and nationalism. The heartland is an organic community that excludes specific groups, and populists consider ideas and concerns that emanate from outside the heartland unimportant and secondary to those within the heartland. This exclusion of outside ideas and concerns results in a reinforced sense of unity amongst the homogeneous people of the heartland (Taggart, 2000, p.96).

When considering the emphasis of populism on the notion of the heartland, it is important to note that, while populist nationalism excludes those outside of the nation (i.e. the heartland), it does not automatically include everyone within the nation. The emphasis on the heartland is a restricted nationalism, and populists engage with nationalism primarily when it is an extension of the values of the heartland (Taggart, 2000, p. 97). This particular element of populist nationalism will be considered in more detail when I look at the concept of nativism within the ideology and rhetoric of radical right wing populist parties.

The populist parties represented in the European Parliament form part of what Taggart terms the ‘new populists’. New populism emerged in the latter part of the 20th century as a reaction to the political systems and institutions of the modern welfare-state model of mixed economy capitalism, although it is important to note that not all new populists react specifically against the modern Western European economic model (Taggart, 2000, p. 75). Although new populists differ in their ideological position and rhetoric, they are similar in their organisational structures which differ from existing and mainstream parties. This is an attempt to stand in contrast to the dominant model of party organisation (Mudde, 2007, p. 268). New populist parties tend to be committed to the direct participation of party members, and often youth movements within the party, while highlighting key personalities within the party leadership (see Mudde, 2007).

This type of party organisational structure allows populist parties to present themselves as different from established and mainstream parties, thus allowing them the opportunity to reinforce an element of critical appeal to their voters. Appearing distinct from the mainstream underscores the message of the need for change in politics and a movement away from the corrupt systems and institutions of mainstream political parties. Some populist parties also place themselves ideologically outside of the mainstream, further highlighting the
distinctiveness of the party in comparison with the established mainstream (Taggart, 2000, p. 75).

The chameleon-like nature of populism means that populist parties take on issues perceived as salient in their own national and cultural experience, and use them as mobilising factors for anti-system rhetoric and behaviour. As a reaction to the practices and institutions of modern liberal democratic systems, new populism has typically been most prevalent in, although not confined to, Western Europe. However, as the phenomenon of populism has grown over time, previously insignificant populist actors have become an important part of the political tableaux in many European countries (see e.g. Aalberg et al, 2015). With European expansion, populist parties from Central and Eastern Europe have come to the fore with representation in the European Parliament, and each populist party brings its own unique type of populism.

II. Radical right wing populism

There is some disagreement among scholars with regard to the terminology used to describe parties referred to here as ‘radical right wing populists’, with terms such as ‘extreme right’, ‘far right’ and ‘radical right’ being used, often interchangeably, in the literature.

Although the terms ‘extreme’ and ‘radical’ are often used indiscriminately, the differences are crucial and can be summarised thus: extremism is hostile to the constitution and established order of political society; radicalism is opposed to specific problems within the political system. This difference is important in that it allows extremist parties to be more closely monitored by the state, and many are found to be intolerable within certain democratic systems and, thus, are banned. Radical parties are free from this restraint, and have the freedom to oppose the specifics of political systems that they seek to change: here, change is the focus, not decimation of entire political systems.

The term ‘radical’ has been used widely in American literature (see Sprinzak, 1991 and Kitschelt and McGann, 1995), and also German writings on the subject, with the German definition being based on decrees from the Office for the Protection of the Constitution which bans certain parties from standing in
elections (see Frisch, 1990 and Minkenberg and Perrineau, 2007). Norris prefers ‘radical’ as it minimises the likelihood of a researcher prejudging the rhetorical appeal or programmatic content of radical right wing populist parties (Norris, 2005, p. 46), and her position is supported by several other scholars (see e.g. Merkl and Weinberg, 1993, Ramet, 1999 and Mudde, 2007).

The right wing nature of radical right wing populists is defined according to Ignazi’s basic assertion that to be right wing is essentially to hold a foundational belief in inequality (Ignazi, 2003, p. 28). There is agreement amongst scholars that this definition of right wing is simple yet comprehensive, as it allows for divergence in the nature of that inequality. For example, radical right wing populist parties can be right wing economically (see Kitschelt and McGann, 1995), or in a socio-cultural sense (see Rydgren, 2007).

Mudde (2007) emphasises the importance of referring to these parties as ‘populist radical right’ rather than ‘radical right wing populists’, because referring to them in terms of radical right wing populism makes ‘populism’ the primary expression and leaves ‘radical right’ as the “ideological emphasis of this specific form of populism” ( Mudde, 2007, p. 26). However, in the context of this piece of research, these radical right wing parties are considered types of populists, so the designation given to them is radical right wing populists, just as we also have right wing populists, left wing populists, neoliberal populists, and non-partisan or unclassified populists. Although populism is not merely the preserve of the radical right, and this piece of research deals with populists of all traditions as well as the non-populist radical right, the largest group of populists represented at European Parliament level is radical right wing populist MEPs.

The notion of populism as an identification with an idealised heartland finds itself fused with nativism in the ideology and rhetoric of radical right wing populists. Nativism essentially seeks a state comprised of natives at odds with non-natives, and is evidenced through radical right wing populism in an identification of, and with, a heartland found in the community that populist parties seek to represent. This heartland is more than the Gemeinschaft shared by the people, a common experience and understanding, and focuses much more on the nation as an organic entity. Nationalism is a separate branch of radical right
wing populist ideology, and the nation is the core focus of radical right wing populist parties, but it is impossible to separate it from populism entirely.

Of the six elements of populism proposed by Taggart, three, in particular, are directly applicable to Europe’s radical right wing populist parties: hostility to representative, pluralist politics; belief in, and identification with, an idealised ‘heartland’ which exists within the community that populists represent; and reaction to extreme crises, whether real or perceived (Taggart, 2000, p. 2). The other three elements of populism concern the transitory nature of populist movements (i.e. lacking in central ideological values; self-limiting; and reacting to changes in the social and political environments). While the last of these aspects has some bearing on European radical right wing populist parties, these parties are not defined by their tendency to alter with changes in the political and social environments.

The third of these relevant concepts of populism is linked to both the anti-establishment and nationalist nature of Europe’s radical right wing populist parties, and the notion of populist parties responding to crisis within a system harks back to the links scholars have made between radical right wing populism and fascism. Following Nolte’s (1966) reference to the “fascist minimum”, several scholars have argued that radical right wing populist parties have historical links to classical fascism. Ignazi argues this is a key component of the composition of modern radical right wing populist parties (Ignazi, 2003, p. 21), and scholars such as Copsey (2004) and Mudde (2000) have assessed the historical fascist roots of some modern parties.

In addition, some scholars argue that modern radical right wing populist parties share a key ideological component with parties of the fascist and Nazi traditions, namely ultra-nationalism. Griffin (1991 and 1995) proposed a dual notion of fascism that combined ultra-nationalism with a belief in the impending radical rebirth of the nation, a concept he termed ‘palingenesis’. The importance of ultra-nationalism in the ideology of both fascism and the radical right wing populists is also accepted by authors such as Wilkinson (1983) and Payne (1996).

Scholars are generally unified in their estimation that, although radical right wing populist parties might - and not all do - have links with historical fascism, the phenomenon of radical right wing populism is a specifically modern one, and they
refer to radical right wing populists within the context of contemporary developments and post-industrial democracies (see e.g. Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Hainsworth, 2000; Ignazi, 2003).

Radical right wing populist parties are suspicious and critical of liberal democracy and they seek for power and control of the political system to be placed in the hands of the people. These parties define the people in terms of nationalism and their membership of the nation's heartland. It is by combining this sceptical attitude towards representative democracy and notions of national identity that these radical right wing parties show themselves to be inherently populist.

Populists view their nation as being in crisis, a situation brought about by a corrupt and unrepresentative political elite, and action on their part is demanded in order to bring the nation back to the people and back to its former glory (Taggart, 2000, p. 109). It is in this context that we can appreciate the relevance of the concept of palingenesis on radical right wing populists. Populism can be seen very much as a reaction to representative politics, and radical right wing populist parties are essentially protest parties. These parties view the democratic state of their nation's political system as being dire and view direct control by the people as the answer to its decline and fragmentation.

This anti-establishment position has resulted in several radical right wing populist parties being openly critical of their own nation's democratic systems and governments. The Austrian Freedom Party, for example, has effectively used its populist stance to disparage Austria's political systems. As one of the most successful radical right wing populist parties in Europe, it succeeded in attracting voters who were disillusioned with the contemporary political system in Austria. The party presented the now deceased leader, Jörg Haider, as a ‘strong man’ who was willing to stand up to political elites and protect the interests of the ordinary, disenfranchised Austrian people, a tactic which has served the party well even after the death of their charismatic leader (Luther, 2000, p. 439).

Jean-Marie Le Pen – previous leader of the French National Front, one of the longest serving radical right wing populist parties in the European Parliament – had been publicly critical of the French Fifth Republic system, arguing instead for a Sixth Republic that would ensure a “France for the French” through policies of “national preference”. Le Pen, from his standpoint of constitutionalism, argued for
this form of nativist democracy to replace the existing republican democratic system (Hainsworth, 2000, p. 8).

Populism is best understood in terms of the dichotomy of elite and people. Generally, populism is suspicious of societal institutions, unless they represent the will of the people, and it tends to exist when there is popular resentment of political elites, which is perceived by a nation’s public as being unrepresentative and oppressive (Taggart, 2000, p. 11). Radical right wing populist parties, as with other populist parties, are inherently anti-establishment, presenting the establishment as a completely unrepresentative, and undesirable, ‘other’ from the people.

The ‘people’ are perceived as one homogeneous group, defined in nationalist and, often, racial terms, and radical right wing populist parties present themselves as being best placed to represent the disenfranchised people. As a result, many radical right wing populists propound the notion of populist democracy, with the aim of providing the people with control over the political system. Despite this emphasis on direct participatory democracy, along with strong anti-establishment rhetoric, radical right wing populist parties have often found themselves in electorally strong positions both in opposition and government.

Within the context of the European Parliament, this combination of nationalism and anti-establishment sentiment often expresses itself in Euroscepticism, a concept that will be examined in more detail in the next chapter. This Euroscepticism shows itself in different ways, from an outright rejection of any form of European cooperation to a desire to limit further European integration.

In addition to being the most common type of populist party in the European Parliament, populist radical right parties are seemingly pervasive over time, with new parties from this family emerging across Europe. One of these such parties is the Eurosceptic Alternative for Germany which emerged in 2013 on a specifically anti-Euro stance when it stood in regional elections to oppose federal funding policies focused on the Eurozone (Jankowski et al, 2016, p. 1). Since these localised beginnings, the party has won almost 5% of votes in the German federal Parliament elections, as well as being represented in five state Parliaments and

Alternative for Germany is the first Eurosceptic party to have gained such support in national, regional, and European elections, and its Eurosceptic position has unexpectedly had appeal in a traditionally pro-European member state (Grimm, 2015, p. 265). The party has developed its platform beyond specifically negative Eurozone protest to include anti-immigration policies and rhetoric, and has become ever more populist radical right over the course of its short history. Despite presenting itself as a mild Eurosceptic party that supported the principle of European membership and integration, but not the single currency, the party has become increasingly Eurosceptic and nativist in its outlook (Grabow, 2016, p. 175). This change resulted from a fragmentation in the party leadership with the economically liberal wing distancing itself from the increasingly xenophobic rhetoric of the rest of the party, and some key senior leadership figures leaving the party completely (Ibid., p. 175).

Alternative for Germany cemented its populist radical right status following a leadership election in 2015 which resulted in Frauke Petry becoming party chairperson. Petry had been well known for her negative statements about Islam, and her election was seen as a move to the right (Janowski et al, 2016, p. 2). The party’s rhetoric became increasingly nativist, arguing that mass immigration – particularly from Muslim-dominant countries – was threatening the culture and character of Germany, rhetoric which appealed to voters in the wake of the migrant crisis (Ibid., p. 2). In addition, the party developed links with the specifically anti-Islam group, PEGIDA which, in contrast to Alternative for Germany, is an extreme right wing grassroots organisation without parliamentary representation. This association firmly cemented the party as a nationalist, nativist, populist radical right party (Grabow, 2016, p. 178).

Although not represented in the European Parliament during the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, and thus excluded from the analysis conducted in this piece of research, it is nonetheless important to mention the Alternative for Germany, as the party is evidence of the continued appeal of populist radical right ideology and rhetoric. In addition, it shows support for Eurosceptic sentiments across Europe, even in such traditionally Europhilic member states as Germany.
III. Non-radical right wing populism

Although non-radical right wing populist parties share many similarities with radical right wing populist parties in terms of nativism, right-wing position and populism, the fundamental difference between these two types of parties is that those considered as non-radical right wing populist parties do not reject outright the fundamental principles of liberal pluralist democracy (Mudde, 2007, p. 26). Non-radical right wing populist parties tend to exist within the established democratic system, rather than without, although some of them might have begun life on the fringes. Within the European Parliament, some non-radical right wing populist parties make a deliberate attempt to distance themselves from radical right wing populist parties, despite their shared positions, refusing to participate in party groups with those parties considered radical. One example of this is the UK Independence Party’s leader, Nigel Farage, who refused to consider joining with the National Front’s Marine Le Pen and the Dutch Freedom Party’s Geert Wilders in their creation of a radical right wing group in the current European Parliament, Europe of Nations and Freedom.

The UK Independence Party (and its offshoot, Veritas) is a hard Eurosceptic party, traditionally faring poorly domestically but achieving notable successes in European Parliament elections, although this trend was bucked at the last UK general election in 2015 when the party won nearly 4 million votes but only one parliamentary seat, due to the First Past the Post system. This Euro-rejecting, anti-establishment party perceives the European Union as being an elitist, corrupt organisation, and it encompasses some elements of nativism peculiar to radical right wing populist parties (Abedi, 2009, p. 73).

The UK Independence Party openly rejects ethnic nationalist rhetoric in favour of a civic form of nationalism, and nativism is expressed in the party’s emphasis on championing “British values” and the rejection of multiculturalism: the natives are those who embrace British values, regardless of ethnicity, and the non-natives are those who do not (see UK Independence Party’s 2015 general election manifesto). The party is inherently populist, presenting itself as a party that represents the British people who have been unrepresented by successive

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20 For detailed information about this party group, see Europarl, the Website of the European Parliament, www.europarl.europa.eu.
governments. The us-and-them rhetoric is similarly levelled at the European Union, which the party accuses of being comprised of unaccountable elites (see UK Independence Party’s 2015 general election manifesto).

Similarly, the Democratic Unionist Party is a non-radical right wing populist British party that has come from the fringes onto the mainstream in the past decade or more. Despite the party having a similar history to the UK Independence Party in terms of marginalisation and more recent widespread success – most notably in terms of the deal the party struck with the governing Conservative party following the 2017 general election – the Democratic Unionist Party has a specific slant to its populism that comes from its position as a Northern Ireland political party (see e.g. Southern, 2005 and King, 2008). A staunchly unionist party with strong religious overtones (the party’s long-time leader, Ian Paisley, led the Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster denomination as well as the political party), the Democratic Unionist Party’s us-and-them rhetoric is levelled at several different groups within society.

On the one hand, the party uses the fault line of Irish identity to express its populism. The Democratic Unionist Party can be considered an ethnonational party (see Gormley-Heenan and Macginty, 2008), opposing Irish nationalism and promoting unionism between Northern Ireland and Britain. This results in the party viewing the nation as being Britain and the people as being the British, in a Northern Ireland context. This stands in direct contrast to the Irish left wing populist party, Sinn Féin/We Ourselves which perceives the people as being Irish people of a unified Ireland consisting of North and Republic.

On the other hand, however, the Democratic Unionist Party views the people in religious terms. Under the leadership of Ian Paisley, the party actively promoted a conservative, Protestant, Christian worldview rooted in evangelicalism. Standing in opposition to both Catholicism and Protestant Christianity that the party considered liberal or ecumenical, the Democratic Unionist Party was able to define the people in terms of their commitment to the conservative Protestant, specifically Presbyterian, cause (Southern, 2005, p. 130). Due to the unique issue of Irish identity, which retains its salience even in a post-Peace Agreement Northern Ireland, the party could distil its view of the people.
down into a specific group of Protestant, Northern Irish unionists, who perceived themselves as British (see Gormley-Heenan and Macginty, 2008).

Despite the party being a regionalist party, fielding candidates only in Northern Ireland, it is interesting to note that the Democratic Unionist Party's nativism is not confined to this geographical area. Instead, the party propounds a British nationalism that is inherently xenophobic, directed against Catholics, Irish nationalists and individuals considered moral deviants, such as homosexuals (Mudde, 2007, p. 55).

Although there are some core ideological and rhetorical similarities between radical right wing populists and non-radical right wing populists, the key difference between the two groups of populists is their attitude to, and relationship with, the liberal democratic system. While radical right wing populists openly criticise the democratic processes in their own countries, non-radical right wing populists tend to avoid such open criticism and, instead, work comfortably within the pluralist democratic system. This democratic cooperation is what enables non-radical right wing populists to participate happily in government, either in coalition governments or as sole governing parties.

One example of a non-radical right wing populist party governing successfully is Hungary's Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance. The party was originally considered a nationalist conservative party when it entered government in 1998 in coalition with two smaller parties, the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Independent Smallholders’ Party. The party narrowly lost the 2002 election but was the first party in the 2004 European Parliament elections and, following a landslide victory at the European elections of 2009, Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance won an overall majority in the national elections of 2010.

Although the party began life as a liberal party, morphing into a nationalist conservative party in the early 1990s (see Fowler, 2004), Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance has become steadily populist in its rhetoric and ideology since its first term in government in 1994, and some scholars define the party as populist radical right (see Jungwirth, 2002 and Rupnik, 2002). However, given its engagement with the democratic political system in Hungary, I have characterised it as non-radical right wing populist. In recent years, since the party re-entered government in 2010, Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance has become more authoritarian and
increasingly radical. However, the party was not represented in the European Parliament until the sixth term in 2004, so it is excluded from this analysis on that basis.

IV. Left wing populism

Although, traditionally, many left wing parties have been suspicious of populism, its emphasis on anti-elitism, welfarism, and elements of inclusiveness make it, in many ways, a natural fit for parties on the left (see Arditi, 2003). Some scholars have argued that socialism is inherently populist with its electoral appeals to the people beyond the traditional proletariat, since the early 20th century (see e.g. Przeworski, A. and Sprague, J., 1986 and March, 2007), and Laclau (1977) has referred to socialism as the highest kind of populism.

As with all types of populists, left wing populists exhibit anti-elitist and anti-system characteristics and claim to stand for the “common people” (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008, p. 123). Where they differ from traditional left wing parties is in their lack of concern for doctrinal integrity and issues of class-consciousness, and they have a much stronger focus instead on the paradigm of the people (who are inherently good and moral) against the corrupt and unrepresentative elite. Left wing populist parties have organisational structures similar to populist parties of other traditions, in terms of being centred on a charismatic leader and rejecting formal organisation. However, the key areas of difference involve their emphases on egalitarianism and on economic and social inequality as being the foundation upon which modern, unrepresentative, political systems are founded. Left wing populists are often openly critical of capitalist or liberal economic systems (March, 2007, p. 66).

Mudde (2004) suggests that left wing populist parties were more prevalent than their right wing counterparts from the 1960s until the 1980s, when radical right wing populist parties began to come to the fore. It was at this point, Taggart (1995) argues, that radical right wing populist parties could capitalise on the post-war decline of Keynesian economics and campaign on the basis that mainstream socialist parties had ‘sold out’ and let the people down. This allowed parties such as the French National Front to appeal to traditional left wing voters, maximising
electoral opportunities found after the collapse of the French Communist Party, and cement its base among the French working class (see Davies 2002a and 2002b). This situation was common across Europe, and left wing populist parties had no space in which to operate and grow.

However, March (2007) argues that, since the collapse of communism in the 1990s, a new electoral space has opened up for left wing populist parties. This has been combined with a move to the right on the part of social democrats, leaving room for new left wing populists (March, 2007, p. 67). In Western Europe, parties like the Scottish National Party, the Dutch Socialist Party, and the German Party of Democratic Socialism have successfully combined traditional socialist ideology with a robust populist rhetoric.

As with populists of other traditions, left wing populist parties deal in the concept of the idealised heartland, which is the focal point and community of the people. In rhetoric surprisingly similar to that of the palingenesis concept of radical right wing populists, left wing populist parties consider the heartland to be a prior social democratic society, before it was eroded by capitalism and liberal free-market enterprise (see e.g. Mavrogordatos, 1997, Mudde, 2004 and March, 2007). The people tend to be the working class, although the definition of this group is sometimes quite vague and all encompassing. The rhetoric, however, is clearly focused on the common people and some charismatic left wing populist party leaders have been known to make grand gestures in order to establish their position as champions of the average person: the leader of the Scottish Socialist Party, Tommy Sheridan, for example, insisted on taking an “average worker’s” salary in order to prove that he was one of the people (March, 2007, p. 68).

As with populists of other traditions, left wing populist parties rail against an unrepresentative elite which is, for them, to be found in a political establishment they perceive as being corrupted by corporate interests. They argue that politicians and public servants need to be on the same level as ordinary citizens (i.e. the people), all working together in a socially oriented type of market economy (March, 2007, p. 68). Left wing populist parties deal in the notion that mainstream social democratic parties have betrayed the people, and that they alone represent the interests of the people in a globalised world.
On the issue of the European Union, left wing populists and radical right wing populists are the two types of parties most likely to be Eurosceptic (see Vasiloupoulou, 2010). Left wing populists generally oppose the transfer of power to supranational, bureaucratic institutions such as the European Union because they see the European Union as an elitist, capitalist project that stands in opposition to the interests of working people (Otjes and Louwerse, 2015, p. 4). In the European context, left wing populists are often as openly critical of the European Union and its institutions and processes as their right wing counterparts are. The Dutch Socialist Party, for example, has appealed to the issue of national sovereignty in opposing the European constitution, warning that the Netherlands could become a powerless region in an undemocratic European Union. In addition, anti-elitism is a prevalent part of the party’s rhetoric, which regularly criticises European bureaucrats for failing to respond to the will of the people (Otjes and Louwerse, 2015, p. 4).

Some left wing populist parties, however, have moderated their antagonism to the European project. The Greek Panhellenistic Socialist Movement, for example, was strongly opposed to the European Union, and Greek membership thereof, from the 1970s to early 1990s (Moschonas, 2001, p. 12). The party’s criticism of the European Union came from a position of anti-imperialism, a component of traditional left wing ideology. This stance used the rhetoric of Greece as a “threatened” nation that needed to return to a position of national independence and affirmation by leaving imperialist institutions such as the European Community, as it was then, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Moschonas, 2001, p. 12). This anti-European Union position was moderated in response to widespread Greek acceptance of the economic benefits of European Union membership (Moschonas, 2001, p. 14).

Still other left wing populist parties are in favour of European integration, choosing to express their populism solely in the national context. The Scottish National Party, for example, took a Eurosceptic position in the early days of the United Kingdom’s membership in the 1970s, campaigning initially against membership (Dardanelli and Mitchell, 2014, p. 97). This position changed over the 1980s until it began to resemble the party’s current stance of advocating for an independent Scotland in the European Union. The Scottish National Party
expresses its populism in the national context, presenting itself as the defender of the Scottish people against an elitist and unrepresentative establishment south of the border at Westminster. The party sees itself as advocating for Scottish interests in the events of disputes with the Westminster administration (Daradanelli and Mitchell, 2014, p. 92).

Left wing populism has had a resurgence across Europe in recent years, most closely linked with the financial crises in the Eurozone. One of these most notable organisations is The Coalition of the Radical Left, Greece's left wing anti-austerity party that won power in 2015 on an anti-European financial sector mandate (Kouvelakis, 2016, p. 45). The Coalition of the Radical Left successfully grew its support in a short period from 4.6% to 36.3% of the vote, becoming first an opposition party in 2012 and then forming the government in 2015, its rhetoric and charismatic young leader a 'hit' with the electorate (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014, p. 120). The Coalition of the Radical Left campaigned on a mandate that rejected the neoliberal austerity policies of the European establishment, a message that proved popular with swathes of the electorate who found themselves the subject of unemployment, numerous tax increases, and public spending cuts in the aftermath of the Greek government-debt crisis that began in 2009. The party exploited the articulatory function of 'the people', declaring that they could do everything; that the power was very much in their hands (Ibid., 128).

This apparent empowerment of a people who, at the time, felt disenfranchised, put upon and exploited by an incompetent government and a corrupt European establishment, resonated and the Coalition of the Radical Left's alternative to austerity was given approval when the party became the largest in Parliament after a snap general election in 2015 (Kouvelakis, 2016, p. 45). Despite this new left wing populist government subsequently capitulating to the European Union's and the International Monetary Fund's terms surrounding a bailout of the Greek economy, which resulted in further austerity, the party was nonetheless re-elected to form the government in September 2015, suggesting its rhetorical appeal is greater than its practical governmental record.

The Spanish left wing populist party, We Can, has charted a similar course to Greece’s Coalition of the Radical Left, successfully campaigning on a platform of
anti-austerity. As in Greece, this message has resonated with the Spanish electorate, grappling with their own difficulties following crises in the Eurozone. Unlike the majority of their right wing counterparts, these new left wing populists have generally supported the European project and have advocated for a socially and politically integrated European Union (Kioupkiolis, 2016, p. 100). Their antagonism has been directed primarily at the neoliberal pursuit of austerity domestically, with only indirect criticism of the European establishment.

What is interesting to note about these new left wing populist parties is the clear extent to which they embody a reaction to real or perceived crisis in the political arena, one feature of populism suggested by Taggart (2000). In Spain, collective protest against perceived and real financial inequality began in 2011, when a variety of left wing grassroots movements converged to oppose the neoliberal economic establishment (Kiopkiolis, 2016, p. 101). The message of these protests focused on demands for government to become more accommodating of popular sovereignty and more active in producing downward redistribution of wealth. It was at this stage that We Can came on the scene, seeking to embody the grassroots anti-austerity movement within a structured, cohesive political party (Ibid., p. 102). This reaction to a crisis of political representation resulted in a successful hybrid of popular momentum and political expression, peculiar in many ways to populist parties (Iglesias, 2015, p. 10).

Left wing populists are a somewhat more diverse group than radical and non-radical right wing populists are. Although they are united in their antagonism to corporate interests and present themselves as the representatives of the common people against a corrupt and elitist capitalist political class, the object of their antipathy varies according to time and situation. Although the more radical left wing populists consider the European Union to be an elitist and corrupting influence, there are those parties who have moderated their position and have chosen to direct their ire towards the political establishment at home.

V. Neo-liberal populism

Some scholars have considered neoliberalism a core component of radical right wing populists. Kitschelt and McGann (1995), in their seminal work on
comparisons of Western European radical right wing populist parties, contend that a combination of social conservatism and neoliberalism is the “winning formula” for radical right wing populist parties in Europe (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995, p. 7), and Betz (1994) and Ignazi (1992) have emphasised the neoliberal characteristics of radical right wing populist parties.

However, along with Mudde (2000 and 2007), I would argue that neoliberal populists differ notably from populist radical right parties. Crucially, nativism is not a core component of neoliberal populist ideology or rhetoric as it is for radical right wing populist parties, although neoliberal populists do tend to defend national interests. It is this element that contributes towards their often isolationist and Eurosceptic positions (Mudde, 2007, p. 28). In addition, the socioeconomic emphasis of neoliberal populists is not central to populist radical right parties, and some of them, for example, the British National Party, can in fact be considered economically left-wing (see e.g. Cospey, 2004). Similarly, the traditional and conservative ethical positions propounded by many neoliberal parties are not always shared by populist radical right parties who sometimes perceive traditional values as being elitist, particularly when they are propounded by religious institutions (Mudde, 2007, p. 28). Although Mudde (2007) suggests that neoliberal populists can be classified as right wing populists, I have created a separate group for the purposes of this piece of research. This is because the populism of neoliberal populists is found in, and expressed through, their liberalism. Right wing populists focus predominantly on issues of inequality (see Ignazi, 2003), which is expressed in the nativism of radical right wing populism or the social conservatism of the non-radical right wing populists. In the context of populism, right wing position is not necessarily an economic one, whereas neoliberal populist parties have a liberal economic ideology at their core.

The Danish Progress Party consistently advocates for neoliberal reform in the economic market, including deregulation and restrictions on big capital (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990, p. 199). Both the Norwegian and Danish Progress Parties have a core neoliberal aspect to their populism, perceiving the elite as the politicians and public sector bureaucrats who have diminished the market through interventionism. The parties present themselves as working on behalf of consumers, who constitute the people in neoliberal populist rhetoric, and they
advocate the return of power to the people through deregulation of the market (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990, p. 201).

Combined with a liberal approach to economics, and a neoliberal interpretation of the epitomic populist elite/people dichotomy, is a defence of liberal values. It is in this regular promotion of freedom of expression, gender equality, and the separation of church and state that we see the real difference between neoliberal populists and their right wing counterparts. Where they are united, however, is in their defence of the nation, however defined, and in their often-strong anti-immigration position (Akkerman, 2005, p. 337). Immigration is much less of an issue for left wing populists as it is for the populist radical right, right wing populists and neoliberal populists. This is because left wing populists do not necessarily define the heartland in ethnic or national terms, although some left wing populist parties do hold an anti-internationalist position (see e.g. Moschanos, 2001 and March, 2007). Although anti-immigration rhetoric is not core to neoliberal populists, several Western European neoliberal populist parties have combined their defence of liberal values and neoliberal economic position with an anti-immigration position, most notably Italy’s Northern League, Denmark’s Progress Party, and the Dutch Pim Fortuyn List.

In the case of the Pim Fortuyn List, the party’s voters could be distinguished from other liberal parties in the Netherlands by their desire to tighten controls of immigration and to restrict re-entry of immigrants (Akkerman, 2005, p. 340). This is because the Pim Fortuyn List presented itself as an outsider party (a truly populist position) which, unlike the mainstream parties with vested interests, could openly address concerns about immigration. Although a nationalist position is seemingly at odds with a liberal position, as it implies a rejection of fundamental universal rights (see Betz, 2003), one of the remarkable traits of populist parties is their ability to combine apparently incongruent ideological positions into a cohesive ideological position. In the case of neoliberal populist parties, there is a successful combination of two seemingly opposing positions: the use of anti-immigration rhetoric to support the defence of liberal values.

Neoliberal populists argue that democracy, gender equality, and the separation of church and state in public life are all liberal values inherent to the nation, or populist heartland. These values must be defended against attack and
corruption from outside forces, usually immigrants and immigrant religion (Akkerman, 2005, p. 341). Gender equality issues have also become central to the anti-immigration rhetoric of some neoliberal populist parties. The Norwegian Progress Party, for example, has used issues of genital mutilation and enforced marriage to justify its anti-immigration position, under the mantle of defending liberal human rights. Freedom of expression has also been used to successfully campaign against immigration. The Pim Fortuyn List, for example, campaigned against the “Islamisation” of Dutch culture by arguing that the religion restricted freedom of expression for certain groups in society, such as homosexuals (Akkerman, 2005, p. 341).

Italy has been the only Western European country to have had both successful radical right wing populist and neoliberal populist parties (Mudde, 2007, p. 294). Go Italy, Silvio Berlusconi’s party, is an example of a successful neoliberal populist party, with a commitment to free-market economics and advocating for privatisation, cuts in income tax, and reduced public spending (see Edwards, 2005 and Mudde, 2007). It is worth mentioning, while on the subject of Italy, that it is possible for populist parties to change not only their rhetoric and emphasis, but also their classification. Italy’s Northern League is a good example of a populist party that, although it remains populist, has changed it ideological and rhetorical position. Although the Northern League could now be considered a radical right wing populist party, characterised by nativism, in the 1990s during the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms that are the subject of this piece of research, the party was a neoliberal populist party. An ethno-regionalist party, the Northern League began life as a conglomerate of Leagues focused primarily on northern secession from Italy. Its electoral base was found in the northern regions of the country, and its primary goal was to create greater autonomy for these areas. The party’s inherently populist position aimed to represent a disenfranchised area of Italy that was being neglected by the unrepresentative, centralised system of national government (Agnew, 1995, p. 158). After the Northern League joined a coalition with Go Italy and the National Alliance, it found itself operating as a national party and received a disproportionately large number of seats in the Italian Parliament’s lower house (Betz, 2001, p. 399).
The Northern League began as a relatively liberal party, in terms of economic position as well as its defence of liberal freedoms and rights, and has been torn between regionalism and nationalism. Populism has always been a key feature of the party and of its former leader, Umberto Bossi, but, crucially, nativism and authoritarianism have not been core components. (Mudde, 2007, p. 56). This is perhaps due to the party’s political opportunism, which has allowed it to remain relatively ideologically fluid (Fieschi et al, 1996, p. 241). However, the party began to become increasingly authoritarian during the late 1990s and through the 2000s, to the point that it could now be considered a populist radical right party (Mudde, 2007, p. 56).

Although there are some similarities between neoliberal populists and their radical right wing and non-radical right wing counterparts, some key differences result in neoliberal populist parties being classified separately in this piece of research. The crucial differences are found in the neoliberal populists’ rejection of traditional, socially conservative, ethics that are largely propounded by both radical and non-radical right wing populists. Neoliberal populists, rather, favour the liberal values of freedom of expression, separation of church and state, and gender equality. It is in their defence of these values, however, that they are often found to be anti-immigration in a similar way to radical and non-radical right wing populist parties. Multiculturalism is seen as a threat to the intrinsically liberal values of Western European democracies, and neoliberal populists take up a similar stance against the perceived external menace of the foreign culture and religion (Akkerman, 2006, p. 341). In addition, neoliberal populists have a specific economic element to their populism that radical right wing populist and non-radical right wing populist parties do not. Although some non-radical right wing populist parties do have a coherent economic policy, their right wing position is not primarily economic (see Ignazi, 2003).

VI. Non-partisan or unclassified populists

Although most populist parties can be defined according to the left-right dichotomy (including those that change their position like the Northern League), there is a handful of parties that are not easily described in such terms, and still
others that fluctuate repeatedly in their position. Because populism cannot be understood solely in ideological terms, it takes on different characteristics in different circumstances, histories and timeframes (see Canovan, 1981, Taggart, 1996 and 2000, Luckas, 2005, and Panizza, 2005). This allows for a range of populist parties from different ideological traditions, and those that are not easily defined according to the traditional left-right dimension. These latter parties I have termed ‘non-partisan’ or ‘unclassified’ populists.

Italy’s Five Star Movement is an example of one of these non-partisan or unclassified populist parties. Although inherently populist, centred on Bepe Grillo, its charismatic leader, the party is wholly ambiguous on many aspects of ideology, and operates in spheres different from mainstream parties. Favouring online campaigning over traditional campaign tactics, and oversimplifying complex political issues, the party has achieved recent electoral success (Mosca, 2014, p. 36). Focusing only on core areas of policy, which it terms the “five stars” (i.e. the environment, water, sustainable development, technological mobility, and energy), the Five Star Movement has cemented itself as a catch-all party, having defined itself as being “beyond right and left”. In a country where voters have been polarised between left and right the party successfully appealed to all, gaining support initially from the left wing and from previous non-voters; next from the right, taking support from the Northern League (which, by this stage, could be considered populist radical right); and finally from the centre in the elections of 2013 (Mosca, 2014, p. 46). The Five Star Movement has also campaigned strongly against political corruption, a tactic used by other populist parties in Italy, and it advocated the direct democratic participation of Italian citizens (Franzosi, Maloni and Salvati, 2015, p. 111).

Not only is the Five Star Movement ambiguous on positions of policy and ideology, it vacillates between different stances on European integration. At times, Grillo has called for a referendum on Italy’s membership of the Euro; at other times, he advocates further integration (Corbetta and Vignati, 2014, p. 56). The party has made calls for “more Europe”, has expressed admiration for the founding fathers of the European Union (e.g. Adenauer, Monnet, and Schumann), and has referred to itself as the only pro-European movement in Italy. However, on the other hand, the party’s leader has repeatedly criticised the European Union for
being too distant and remote in some areas, and too interfering in others (Franzosi, Maloni and Salvati, 2015, p. 113).

Generally, the party’s most consistent position in the European context has been in its anti-establishment stance, demonstrated by its vociferous criticism of the European political class as much as the Italian ruling class. This Euroscepticism has primarily been expressed through popular slogans but, since the end of 2013, the party has also developed some Eurosceptic policy positions, most notably focused on anti-austerity measures (Franzosi, Maloni and Salvati, 2015, p. 113).

Because the Five Star Movement is consistent only in terms of populism and its championing of the people against an elitist and unrepresentative establishment, and ambiguous in almost all ideological positions and policy areas, the party has been defined in this piece of research as a non-partisan or unclassified populist party. However, the party only gained representation in the European Parliament in 2014 so is not included in analysis: its mention here serves to illustrate the variety of populist positions found across the European Union.

Another populist group that defies traditional classification on the left-right dimension is Denmark’s People’s Movement Against the EU. This political association was formed in 1972 as a cross-party movement against Denmark’s accession to the European Union. The organisation is strongly Eurosceptic, consistently advocating for Denmark’s withdrawal from the European Union, but it cannot be easily placed on the left-right scale. The party considers itself ideologically non-affiliated and it has drawn supporters from both the left and right wings. Although the group has attempted to cooperate with other political parties, it does not contest national or regional elections, choosing only to operate at the European level. As a result its policy platform is limited, its primary focus being one of Euroscepticism and opposition to Denmark’s membership of the European Union (see e.g. Archer, 2000).

Despite being non-partisan, the People’s Movement Against the EU is an inherently populist popular movement. The organisation has campaigned on a traditional mandate of Danish Euroscepticism, which is insidiously populist in and of itself, based on a concept of Danishness focused on justice, citizenship and
national currency (Archer, 2000, p. 94). The party has prided itself on being a popular movement, although this position is not specific to this organisation: the Danish People’s Party, for example, also illustrates elements of this popular base in its party title and in its rhetoric.

VII. Non-populist radical right

Populism takes on different characteristics in different circumstances, histories and timeframes (see Canovan, 1981, Taggart, 1996 and 2000, Luckas, 2005, and Panizza, 2005). This allows for a range of populist parties from different ideological traditions. The European Parliament has played host to a wide range of populist parties: radical right wing populists (e.g. the French National Front, the Austrian Freedom Party and the British National Party); non-radical right-wing populists (e.g. Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance, and the UK Independence Party); left-wing populists (e.g. the Dutch Socialist Party, and Greece’s Radical Coalition of the Left); neoliberal populists (e.g. Go Italy, and Denmark's Progress Party); and non-partisan or unclassified populists (e.g. Italy's Five Star Movement and Denmark's People's Movement against the EU).

One group of political parties often confused with radical right wing populist parties is the non-populist radical right. These parties share many similar ideological and rhetorical characteristics with radical right wing populist parties, but lack a core populist element to their composition, organisation and outlook. Some parties, such as the French National Front and the Belgian Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest, began life as non-populist radical right and came to adopt populism from the 1970s onwards (Mudde, 2007, p. 49). Others, however, remain non-populist radical right.

These parties broadly fall into two categories: those that can be typically classified as extreme right, and those that are elitist in organisation and structure. Radical right wing populist parties are, ostensibly at any rate, democratic and operate within the confines of democratic processes and institutions, although they are openly critical of democratic systems in their own country at a supranational level. Parties that could be called extreme right (see e.g. Ignazi,
are invariably undemocratic, seeking to overthrow the democratic political system rather than work within it.

One example of an extreme right political party is Greece’s Popular Union Golden Dawn (generally referred to simply as Golden Dawn), which came to the fore in 2012 when it entered into opposition in the Greek Parliament and then returned representatives to the European Parliament in 2014. It is also described as a neo-Nazi party (see Vasilopoulou and Halkipoulou, 2015, Ellinas, 2015, and Wodak, 2015). Although there are some elements that Golden Dawn shares with radical right wing populist parties, it differs in some key areas.

First of all, like many radical right wing populist parties, Golden Dawn has nationalism as a core element to its ideological identity. The party, however, subscribes to a more extreme notion of nationalism than that propounded by most radical right wing populists. Considering nationalism on a par with ideologies such as communism and liberalism, the party advocates a form of ethnic nationalism where, for example, Greek children are separated from foreign-national children on linguistic grounds. In addition, the party makes references to nationalism in biological terms, calling for the legal recognition of the “inequality” of races (see Ellinas, 2015).

Secondly, Golden Dawn, although actively contesting elections and returning representatives to the national and European Parliaments, does not advocate political struggle solely through democratic means. Party members and representatives alike have been involved in violent attacks on foreigners and women, and some of the party’s MPs have been imprisoned for violent conduct. Crucially, the party (see Bistis, 2013, Vasilopoulou and Halkipoulou, 2015, and Ellinas, 2015) has not formally condemned these incidents.

The third key area of difference between Golden Dawn and European radical right wing populist parties concerns the organisational structure of the party. Although ostensibly centred on one dominant leader, with a strong grassroots base, the party is, in reality, elitist with a structure akin to a paramilitary organisation with a strong hierarchy (Ellinas, 2015, p. 6).

Although sharing some characteristics with radical right wing populist parties, Golden Dawn is more similar to the British National Party in the 1980s and 1990s, before it began to moderate its position (see e.g. Cospey, 2004 and
Goodwin, 2011). Like many radical right wing populist parties, Golden Dawn holds an anti-establishment position, being vociferous in its criticism of established political systems and officials. The party also expresses its anti-establishment rhetoric in its attack on the European Union and its institutions and processes, and stands in opposition to Greek membership of the European Union. Despite this anti-establishment position, however, the party lacks a populist element. Its structure and organisation is elitist and hierarchical, and it does not appeal to the popular cause. In addition, the party favours undemocratic challenges to the political system, and advocates hierarchical separation of the Greek population on biological and ethnic grounds. For these reasons, it is most appropriate to refer to Golden Dawn as a non-populist radical right party, or an extreme right wing party.

Another party that is better described as an extreme right wing party, rather than a radical right wing populist party, is Germany's National Democratic Party, which, like Greece's Golden Dawn, is sometimes defined as a neo-Nazi party (see Baker et al, 1981, Atkins, 2004, and Decker and Miliopoulos, 2009). Despite success in local and regional elections in areas of Eastern Germany, the party has failed to win much national support although the party returned its first representative to the European Parliament in 2014. The National Democratic Party appears to have some of the hallmarks of populism, in terms of attracting a young electoral base, and expressing anti-establishment sentiment against unpopular welfare reforms passed by federal and regional governments. In addition, the party has portrayed populist elements in terms of its name, operating under a list with the German People's Union as ‘Popular Front from the Right’ (Decker and Miliopoulos, 2009, p. 96). However, despite these elements, they are arguably nothing more than a pragmatic tool rather than a representation of core populist position.

The party has only thinly veiled its adherence to National Socialist ideology, and the party, like Golden Dawn, has failed to distance itself from extreme right wing violence (Art, 2004, p. 128). The National Democratic Party has a rhetoric of biological nationalism coupled with a desire for an insular and state-owned national economy, and has failed to develop a programmatic profile beyond these elements (Decker and Miliopoulos, 2009, p. 101). In addition, the party has not centred itself on a strong charismatic leader or demonstrated any strong popular
appeal. The party also lacks a democratic organisational structure, which is a key component in the ‘self-destruction’ of extreme right wing parties (Decker and Miliopoulos, 2009, p. 103). Despite the National Democratic Party superficially displaying some pseudo-populist characteristics, particularly in terms of anti-establishment rhetoric, this is not enough to classify the party as a populist radical right party. Rather, with its lack of a democratic organisational structure and strong central leadership figure, as well as its open attachment to National Socialism and its ambiguous relationship with violent political struggle, the party is better characterised as an extreme right wing party. Nonetheless, the National Democratic Party successfully returned one representative to the European Parliament in 2014. This, however, was largely due to a ruling that declared Germany’s election threshold of 5% and, latterly, 3% unconstitutional, which meant that the party was able to have one MEP elected with only 1% of the popular vote, rather than a real indication of the party’s electoral appeal (see Fitzgerald 2014).

Although violent, grassroots-based extreme right parties were more common in the early 1980s (see e.g. Mudde, 2000a and 2007, and Greven, 2016) and many gradually morphed into more electorally-acceptable populist radical right parties, some extreme right organisations nonetheless persist and others have arisen across Europe in recent years. One example of the latter is the specifically anti-Islamic movement, PEGIDA, which emerged in 2014 in the wake of the migrant crisis. Led by people with histories of petty crime and violence, the movement began life as a messy organisation whose aims were unclear beyond its anti-Islam focus – the name means ‘Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West’ in German (Grabow, 2016, p. 176). As support for the movement grew, so did its ideological platform. PEGIDA’s rhetoric contains elements of populist radical right ideology, such as the nativist focus on an idealised culture that is at threat from an outside force; the emphasis on law and order; and the demand for direct democracy (Grabow, 2016. P. 176). However, the organisation retains a distinct extreme right character in its encouragement of public, often violent, demonstrations by angry, disenfranchised people, rather than the peaceful engagement in electoral activity as preferred by populist radical right parties.
Not all non-populist radical right parties can be considered extreme right, however. Italy's National Alliance is a non-populist radical right party but this is due to its inherently elitist organisational structure, rather than its rhetoric of violent political upheaval. The National Alliance is the main successor party to the Italian Social Movement, which is commonly considered a neo-fascist party (see Ignazi, 1996, Eatwell, 2003, Mudde, 2007 and Spruce, 2007). The National Alliance is a much more socially conservative party than its predecessor (Mudde, 2007, p. 56), and it does not engage in nativist rhetoric (see Griffin, 1996, and Ignazi, 2003), although it has been occasionally referred to as a post-fascist party, retaining some of its predecessor’s organisational structure (see Ignazi, 1996 and Spruce, 2007).

It is primarily in the party’s top-down leadership structure that we see its divergence from populist parties. The party has also retained strong ties with the Catholic Church, a position at odds with neoliberal populists, for example, and it regularly campaigns on a strong law-and-order mandate (Spruce, 2007, p. 100). Although some populist radial right parties also hold a strong law-and-order position they, crucially, advocate law reform and harsh punishments in a nativist context, where non-natives are perceived as criminals, damaging the wholesomeness of the nation and heartland (see e.g. Mudde, 2000a and 2007). The National Alliance has no such nativist element to its law-and-order rhetoric.

Although the National Alliance is considered non-populist radical right, the Social Movement-Tricolour Flame is included as a radical right wing populist party. This party also came out of the Italian Social Movement and comprised those more radical individuals who did not associate with the more mainstream, conservative National Alliance. Although the Social Movement-Tricolour Flame identifies with the fascism of the Italian Social Movement, its political structure and rhetoric is much more populist and nativist than its predecessor (Mudde, 2007, p. 56).

Paul Taggart makes a distinction between neo-fascist parties and new populist parties (see Taggart 1995, 2000). Neo-fascist parties bear similarities to new populist parties but are, in reality, closer to extreme right wing parties. Neo-fascist parties tend to be focused on violent grassroots action and avoid the political arena. Populists, on the other hand, participate in the parliamentary and electoral process (Taggart, 1995, p. 35). Like extreme right parties, neo-fascist parties tend to have an elitist, rather than a centralised structure, and tend to find
their support amongst poorer, often unemployed, sections of the electorate. (Taggart, 1995. p. 38).

Taggart argues that some parties combine elements of neo-fascism and new populism, most notably the French National Front; the German Republicans; and the Belgian Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest. This is because party positions are not static but liable to change over time. The National Front, in particular, has been through various phases in its life as a populist radical right party and has, at times, displayed elements of right wing extremism or what Taggart terms neo-fascism. The National Front is a particularly interesting case in this regard, as there is evidence to suggest the more radical a party, the less likely it is to change its position. Equally, if a party does moderate its stance, its electoral base is likely to resist such a change (Shields, 2011, p. 78). Yet the National Front has changed in emphasis throughout the period of leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen, and more specifically during the more recent Marine Le Pen years.

The most notable area of change in the ideology and policy of the National Front in recent years, since the transition from Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen is in its approach to immigration and cultural policy. Under Jean-Marie Le Pen, particularly in the earlier years, the National Front did not have a well-developed cultural policy, preferring instead to take the narrow and focused approach to immigration typical of an extreme right wing party. With a divergence in the party between the neoliberal and conservative wings came a wider policy platform and, by the early 2000s, the National Front had a well-developed policy on culture that extended beyond the previous anti-immigration rhetoric (Almeida, 2017, p. 2). This included a clearly defined concept of French culture, which was expressed in the nativist terms of the populist radical right.

Under Marine Le Pen, the party has retained its populist radical right position, but thrown off all vestiges of former extreme right ideology. Marine Le Pen actively attempted to improve the party’s public and media image and refine the party’s rhetoric and programmatic profile. For example, the focus shifted from the immigrant as the threat to national culture, and focused instead on the undemocratic elite which was preventing the people from accessing all aspects of culture: the us-and-them rhetoric continued, but the focus was different (Ibid., p. 4).
In addition, although still antagonistic to large-scale immigration into France and the European Union at large, Marine Le Pen’s rhetoric took on an almost neoliberal populist tone, as she argued that immigrant cultures were a threat to France’s secular liberal values (see Alduy and Wahnich, 2015). With this rhetorical change the party remains a populist radical right party, but a more refined and ostensibly moderated one, free from its extreme right roots. Therefore, notwithstanding the party’s relationship with what Taggart terms the neo-fascist, the National Front has been defined in this piece of research – and in keeping with the wider literature – as populist radical right.

VIII. Populist parties in the European Parliament since 1979

Populist parties have been represented in the European Parliament to a greater or lesser extent since the first term in 1979. As the European Union has expanded, the number and variety of populist parties and representatives has increased, so we have seen a trend of more parties in representation over time. Additionally, some parties, such as the Italian radical right wing populist party Social Alternative-Mussolini List, have only appeared for one parliamentary term, whereas other parties, such as the French radical right wing populist National Front, Greece’s left wing populist Panhellenic Socialist Movement, and Ireland’s neoliberal Fianna Fáil/Republican Party have been consistently represented in most parliamentary terms. Still other parties, such as Greece’s radical right wing populist Golden Dawn, Italy’s non-partisan or unclassified populist party, the Five Star Movement, and Spain’s left wing populist We Can, entered the current European Parliament term in 2014, a situation which caused consternation among some academic and media commentators (see e.g. Bertoncini et al, 2013, Grabbe and Groot, 2014, and Marcela, 2014). Table 1.1 overleaf illustrates all populist parties represented in the European Parliament since the first parliamentary term in 1979.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATIONAL PARTY</th>
<th>EP TERM*</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Radical Right Wing Populists</strong></td>
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<td>Alliance for the Freedom of Austria (Austria)</td>
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<td>Austrian Freedom Party (Austria)</td>
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<td>British National Party (United Kingdom)</td>
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<td>Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest (Belgium)</td>
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<td>Greater Romania Party (Romania)</td>
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<td>Social Alternative – List Mussolini (Italy)</td>
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<td>Social Movement – Tricolour Flame (Italy)</td>
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<td>Sweden Democrats (Sweden)</td>
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<td>True Finns/Finns Party (Finland)</td>
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<td><strong>Right Wing Populists</strong></td>
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<td>Hungarian Civic Alliance (Hungary)</td>
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<td>Law and Justice Party (Poland)</td>
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<td>Movement for France/Majority for Another Europe (France)</td>
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<td>Rally for France (France)</td>
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<td>UK Independence Party (United Kingdom)</td>
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<td>Veritas (United Kingdom)</td>
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<td><strong>Left Wing Populists</strong></td>
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<td>Coalition of the Radical Left (Greece)</td>
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<td>Left Party (Germany)</td>
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<td>Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Greece)</td>
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<td>Party of Democratic Socialism (Germany)</td>
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<td>Scottish National Party (United Kingdom)</td>
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<td>Self Defence of the Republic of Poland (Poland)</td>
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<td>Sinn Féin/We Ourselves (Ireland/United Kingdom)</td>
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<td>Socialist Party (Netherlands)</td>
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<td>We Can (Spain)</td>
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<td>NATIONAL PARTY</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neoliberal Populist</td>
<td>Fianna Fáil/Republican Party (Ireland)</td>
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<td>Go Italy (Italy)</td>
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<td>Northern League (Italy)</td>
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<td>Progress Party (Denmark)</td>
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<td>Non-Partisan/Unclassified Populist</td>
<td>Five Star Movement (Italy)</td>
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<td>People’s Movement against the EU (Denmark)</td>
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<td>Non-Populist Radical Right</td>
<td>Golden Dawn (Greece)</td>
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<td>Italian Social Movement (Italy)</td>
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<td>National Alliance (Italy)</td>
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<td>National Democratic Party (Germany)</td>
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<td>National Political Union (Greece)</td>
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*European Parliament terms:
EP1 = 1979-1984
EP2 = 1984-1989
EP5 = 1999-2004
EP7 = 2009-2014
EP8 = 2014-present

This piece of research focuses in detail on populist and radical right parties present in the fourth European Parliament term (1994-1999) and the fifth European Parliament term (1999-2004), although reference is made throughout to parties that have been represented in the Parliament at other times.
CHAPTER 2 – THE LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOUR OF POPULIST PARTIES

I. The electoral and legislative behaviour of populists at the national level

Much of the post-WWII period in Europe was characterised by strong mainstream parties, and populism had little or no salience. However, since the 1990s, populist parties in general have increased in popularity, with radical right wing populist parties proving the most electorally prevalent of all the populist party types (Mudde, 2007, p. 2).

Populist or radical right parties initially found representation at local government level and, for many, this remains the only opportunity to enact their policies. In the United Kingdom, for example, the radical right wing populist British National Party achieved its biggest ever local success in 2008 when it polled over 5% to win a seat in the London Assembly, adding to its number of local representatives which had previously stood at 13 (Goodwin, 2014, p. 887). With the exception of one European Parliament term in 2009, where the party returned two MEPs, the British National Party has only ever had limited electoral success locally.

While in the United Kingdom populist or radical right parties represented only at the local level have limited opportunities for significant impact on the political landscape, in other European countries populist or radical right parties have found themselves able to implement their policies successfully in local settings. This is because, while national governments usually comprise coalitions, thus limiting any populist or radical right party to a junior member, representation at the local level allows the party to be more dominant or, in some cases, the only party in government (Mudde, 2007, p. 279). It is not only in different European countries that we see different forms of engagement at the local level; the same party can often operate differently in different regions. The radical right wing populist National Front in France, for example, ruled rather differently in each of the four regions in which it had control in the 1990s (Davis, 2002b, p. 84).
In countries with devolved legislatures, populist or radical right parties can find themselves in very different electoral and governing positions. In the United Kingdom, for example, the left wing populist Scottish National Party has been in the unusual position of being in both government and opposition since 2007\footnote{The United Kingdom began a process of devolution of powers to the home nations with the creation of three devolution Acts in 1998. Since then, further transference of powers has occurred, with Scotland receiving greater fiscal autonomy following the unsuccessful referendum on Scottish independence. For detailed information about devolution in the United Kingdom, see Bognador, 1998 and Mitchell, 2009.}. The party formed a minority government in the Scottish Parliament in 2007, a majority government in 2011, and another minority government in 2016. Because the party only contests seats in Scotland, its representation in the central Westminster Parliament tends to be limited; however, the 2015 general election saw the Scottish National Party claiming 56 of a possible 59 seats in Scotland and becoming the third largest party in Westminster. This position of government in Scotland and opposition in Westminster has allowed the party significant agenda-setting opportunities (see Dardanelli and Mitchell, 2014).

Despite differences in electoral success and governmental position throughout Europe, it is possible to make some generalisations about the behaviour of populist or radical right parties when they choose to engage, particularly at the local level. Radical right wing populist parties, for example, tend to restrict their influence to community policies and symbolic gestures, as they realise that it is difficult to enact primary policies at the local level – on issues pertaining to their nativism in particular – and that support from higher levels of government is limited. This includes renaming streets to reflect more ‘appropriate’ influences, the increase of national symbols in towns and cities, and redistribution of local resources and subsidies (Mudde, 2007, p. 279). In each of these instances, the change favours the native at the expense of the non-native.

One example of such behaviour comes from the French National Front. In 2016, the Mayor of a small town in France unveiled his plans to rename a local street ‘Rue du Brexit’, in honour of the British decision to leave the European Union (see Crumley, 2016). Although, as alluded to in previous chapters, the National Front position on Europe has changed over time, the party has nonetheless been consistently Eurosceptic in recent years and made no secret of its support for the Brexit vote.
However, although it is primarily radical right wing populists that make use of such techniques to express their nativism, there have been examples of other populists renaming streets in order to make ideological or rhetorical points. For example, in Madrid, a left wing Mayor came under criticism for her intention to remove British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s name from a square in the city. In response to her coalition partners, the anti-austerity left wing populist We Can, calling for the change, she declared that Thatcher had “enslaved the labour movement” (see Badcock and Sabur, 2015). This deliberate obliteration of a tribute to a prominent conservative politician was an intentional declaration of a stance against austerity and neoliberal economics, although it was also accompanied by proposals to remove Franconian monuments and signs from Spain’s capital city.

Other populist parties have been known to make symbolic, often dramatic, gestures that, in practice, have little legislative impact but display key characteristics of their populism. Left wing populists, Sinn Féin, an Irish party that fields candidates in the Republic of Ireland as well as Northern Ireland have been in a position of consociationalist power sharing in Northern Ireland since devolution in 1998. The party fields candidates, but refuses to take up seats, in Westminster in protest at historic British rule and a desire for Irish unification, a significantly populist gesture that has traditionally had no real legislative impact but great popular appeal (see e.g. Ó’Broin, 2009).

Despite the representation of populist or radical right parties being primarily at the local level, at least initially, there have been several notable cases where these parties have achieved a level of electoral success such that they have acted as partners in coalition governments. During the initial period of increased popularity for radical right wing populist parties in the 1990s, those parties who joined coalition governments often found themselves the inexperienced junior partner and, thus, their role was limited. This was particularly true for Eastern European governments, which comprised an ideologically diverse number of parties involved in the transition phase, many of whom were themselves nationalists or radical right wing populists (Mudde, 2007, p. 280).

Italy has been the only West European country to have had electorally successful populist parties of different varieties (Mudde, 2007, p. 294). Go Italy,
Silvio Berlusconi’s neoliberal populist party, formed its first coalition government with another neoliberal populist party, the Northern League, and the non-populist radical right National Alliance in 1994. Following the collapse of the coalition soon after its original success, Go Italy entered a period of opposition, then returned to government for a term in 2001 (see Edwards, 2011).

Although many niche or non-mainstream parties encounter problems when making the transition from opposition to government, populist or radical right parties have their own unique issues to deal with. These parties have typically garnered support due to their criticism of mainstream parties and their opposition to political elites, and they have proposed radical alternative policies in areas such as membership of the European Union, economic reform, immigration, welfarism, and forms of political representation\(^\text{22}\). This presents a potential area of tension for populist radical right parties, as they have to retain the anti-establishment and populist identity that is salient with their supporters, while participating in parliamentary politics in a way that requires pragmatism (Zaslove, 2012, p. 424).

This pragmatic reality of government participation has, arguably, resulted in some small success for populist or radical right parties being able to influence government policies. In Austria, for example, despite being forced to sign a protocol ensuring their adherence to European “spiritual and moral values” upon their entry to government in 2000, the Austrian Freedom Party was active in the introduction of more restrictive immigration policy (Zaslove, 2004, p. 67). However, this followed earlier changes to immigration policy that had been made by previous governments, of which the Austrian Freedom Party was not a part, so it is difficult to know for definite whether later policy changes were the result of the party’s presence in government (Mudde, 2007, p. 281).

Some populist or radical right parties have found, upon their transition from opposition to government that their previously radical stances must be moderated. Greece’s left wing populist party, Panhellenic Socialist Movement, for example, had a radical ideological programme that was focused on antagonism to the European project and anti-imperialism. With the party’s entry into government in the 1980s, its position on European membership was moderated,

\(^{22}\)Despite this, they are not specifically anti-system in the way that fascist parties are, and they do not necessarily oppose liberal democracy and parliamentary politics per se: these are factors that result in them being characterised as ‘radical’ rather than ‘extreme’ (Rydgren, 2007, p. 243).
largely in acceptance of the fact that Greek membership was a reality. Over the next five years, into its second term in government, the Panhellenistic Socialist Movement gradually moderated its previously radical anti-European stance until it became unequivocally pro-European, even to the point of presenting the European Council’s adoption of Integrated Mediterranean Programmes as the result of the party’s own policy (Moschonas, 2001, p. 14).

Populist or radical right parties also find that their presence in parliamentary politics can act as a catalyst for the introduction of policies against them and their political stance. For example, in Belgium in 1991, when the Belgian radical right wing populist Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest received what was its highest share of the vote up until that point, the government introduced tighter law and order policies which were in line with the party’s tough stance on crime and security. However, at the same time as introducing these strong changes to law and order policies, a Commissioner on Immigration Policies was introduced. He became the strongest opponent of the Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest and a staunch defender of Belgium’s multicultural society, in a move that was widely regarded as specifically targeting the party’s stance on immigration (De Decker et al, 2005, p. 161).

II. The electoral and legislative behaviour of populists at the supranational level

Despite some success locally and nationally, the European Parliament has provided a unique platform for populist or radical right parties to achieve representation. The second order nature of European elections (see Reiff and Schmitt, 1980, and Hix and Lord, 1997) has allowed voters the means of expressing their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with governing parties. Voters often consider European elections less important than national elections in terms of determining political impact and, thus, use the opportunity to register a vote of protest (Hix and Lord, 1997, p. 87). While this way of voting benefits opposition and smaller parties of all political persuasions, populist or radical right parties, especially those that hold Eurosceptic positions, often find themselves the beneficiaries of protest votes. European integration provides populist or radical right parties with a powerful
issue on which to compete and to cement their position as anti-establishment dissenters (Almeida, 2010, p. 237).

Much of the research on populist or radical right parties in the European Parliament has focused on the extent to which they have capitalised on this second order election type, and the composition of their vote share and supporters in subsequent elections, as well as their ideological makeup. Some research has been conducted on the attempts of radical right wing populist parties to form alliances with one another in the European Parliament, but it is only comparatively recently that this research has been expanded to assess the role populist or radical right parties in general have to play, and the impact they make, at the European level. Where the literature has been largely absent is on the impact of populism in general on the European Parliament and on the behaviour of populist legislators at the transnational level. Research on the performance and conduct of MEPs from left wing, neoliberal, and non-partisan or unclassified populist parties has been largely lacking from this field of study. This piece of research plays an important role in increasing knowledge and understanding of populist parties in Europe, as it provides a comprehensive overview of populist parties of all traditions, not only those from the right wing, and their legislative behaviour (in the form of rapporteurships) at the supranational level of the European Parliament.

Almeida (2010 and 2012) has assessed the impact European integration has had on the ability of radical right wing populist parties to operate within the European Parliament as ‘Europeanised’ actors. The concept of Europeanisation concerns the process of parties responding to the results of European integration (Ladrech, 2002, p. 389), and has been applied to parties of all political types. The general nature of this definition allows for a range of responses and attitudes towards European integration and, thus, enables populist parties at large to be categorised in terms of the extent of their Europeanisation. Almeida (2010) argues that the level to which parties respond to European integration is evidenced by two changes: programmatic change and organisational change. The first element concerns the extent to which parties define their aims with reference to European

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multi-level governance; the second focuses on the attempts of parties to influence decision-making processes (Almeida, 2010, p. 238).

Radical right wing populist parties have experienced limited Europeanisation, which has resulted in their minimal involvement in European Union policy-making and failed attempts to cooperate transnationally with one another (Ibid., p. 237). Some members of radical right wing populist party family, such as the French National Front, have been successful in establishing programmatic responses to European Union integration. The National Front has long indulged in “ethno-European” rhetoric, whereby it views the European Union as a forum for France to regain political and cultural influence across the world: in other words, the European Union exists to strengthen French national interest (Ibid., p. 241).

Despite the successful positional responses to European integration by parties such as the National Front and the Austrian Freedom Party, radical right wing populist parties at large have failed to present themselves as serious actors at the European Parliament level. Their failure to cooperate transnationally has resulted in the domestic arena proving a more appropriate setting, within which radical right wing populist parties can pursue their policy choices and, ultimately, achieve their intended European aims (Ibid., p. 250).

This failure to cooperate within the European Parliament has characterised radical right wing populist party behaviour across successive parliamentary terms. Any cooperation between radical right wing populist parties stems from strategic necessity rather than an ideological basis, making cooperation in the form of European Parliament party groupings, which are intended to negate national aims in order to be configured along ideological lines, incredibly difficult. Although there can be many specific events that contribute to the collapse of cooperation, it is simply too difficult for nationalist parties to cooperate transnationally (Startin, 2010, p. 441).

This position of non-cooperation is not necessarily shared by populists of other traditions in the European Parliament. Many left wing populist MEPs have been happy to cooperate with other left wing MEPs in a radical left, socialist, or green parliamentary group. Neoliberal populists such as MEPs from Go Italy have been comfortably consolidated within the centre right parliamentary group or
have cooperated in their own grouping, as was the case in the fourth European Parliament term when the Go Europe group was made up entirely of Italian MEPs (see European Business Journal, 1994).

As radical right wing populist parties in the European Parliament do not hold a unified view on the issues of Europe and European integration, transnational cooperation has been difficult. While the parties share common ground on issues such as national identity or immigration – although there are differences in the degree of extremism and the application of these ideological aims – there has been a failure among these parties to agree on whether the European Union should exist at all, how it should be organised and the extent to which European integration should be developed.

Although all radical right wing populist parties represented in the European Parliament, as well as non-radical right wing populists, are Eurosceptic to some degree they do not all share the same position of antagonism towards the principle or process of European integration. Those parties displaying higher levels of nationalism are more likely to adopt a hard Eurosceptic position and, in particular, parties that combine nativism with territorial assertions are more likely to be more hostile to the European Union (Halkipoulou et al, 2012, p. 505). For example, the soft Eurosceptic Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest contrasts strongly with the National Front and the UK Independence Party in their views on Europe, with the latter advocating the withdrawal of their countries from the European Union (Vasilopoulou, 2010, p. 10). In addition, being a member of an institution that many radical right wing populist parties and their MEPs oppose results in an uncomfortable relationship within the party family and with elected members from other parties.

Euroscepticism is not unique to radical and non-radical right wing populist, however: many left wing populist parties are as likely as radical right wing populist parties to be Eurosceptic (see Vasilopoulou, 2010). For example, before its period of moderation, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement was vociferously opposed to Greek membership of the European Union, largely due to its anti-imperialism position (see Moschonas, 2001). In addition, the Dutch Socialist Party has been just as Eurosceptic as its radical right wing populist counterpart, the Dutch Freedom Party, both at the national and European Parliament level (see
The Eurosceptic positions of populist parties represented in the European Parliament will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.

While nationalistic rivalry and a lack of agreement have contributed to the failure of radical right wing populist parties to cooperate in the European Parliament, there are several institutional and systematic factors that contribute to this situation. The European Union’s political elites have employed tactics similar to the *cordon sanitaire* used by Germany and Belgium in order to prevent the advancement and success of radical right wing populist parties within the European arena. Diplomatic measures were taken against the Austrian coalition government, which partnered the Austrian People’s Party with the Austrian Freedom Party. In addition, the technical groups that were present in the European Parliament from 1984 to 1994 were not permitted to chair committees (Startin, 2010, p. 432).

A further institutional factor that limits cooperation among populist parties in the European Parliament is the existence and nature of the Parliament’s political groups. The intended basis for party groupings is political affinity and, since the 2009 elections, groups have to comprise a minimum of 25 members (five more than the previous 20) gathered from at least seven different member states. Many populist MEPs have chosen to remain unattached whilst others have joined different groups, which has resulted in a dispersion of populist parties across the political groupings. This lack of consensus largely stems from the varied array of ideological and organisational positions found among populist parties, a factor that has a large impact on the extent, and nature, of cooperation within the Parliament (Hagemann, 2007, p. 1).

Populist parties do not tend to cooperate with one another, across ideological lines, as populism is not a sufficiently cohesive position. Instead, populist parties tend to cooperate with parties that might not be populist but which share particular ideological components on either the left or right wings. For example, MEPs from the Greek left wing populist party, Panehellenic Socialist Movement, joined the Party of European Socialists parliamentary group in the fourth European Parliament term. This group also comprised parties such as the French Socialist Party and the German Socialist Party, neither of which are populist
parties. In the fifth term, after disbanding the Go Europe group, MEPs from the neoliberal populist party, Go Italy, joined with the centre right European People's Party/European Democrats group. This parliamentary group also contained MEPs from parties such as the United Kingdom’s Conservative Party and Germany’s Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union.

Cooperating with parties of other traditions is most problematic for radical right wing populist parties, who have largely chosen to attempt to cooperate only with one another or to remain unattached. A few radical right wing populists have joined other parliamentary groups, such as one French National Front MEP who joined the Union for Europe of the Nations group in the fourth term, for example, but this is generally an exception to the rule of non-cooperation. The creation of radical right wing populist parliamentary groups is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.

III. The role of the media in the electoral and legislative behaviour of populists

Populist parties have long had a love-hate relationship with the mainstream media, often courting it, often criticising it. However, it seems that parties benefit electorally from media coverage regardless of whether the coverage is positive or negative (see Horsfield, 2003 and Aalberg et al, 2016). Scholars are in agreement about the importance of the mass media in increasing populist parties’ appeal, and Aalberg et al (2016), in their comprehensive and in-depth study of populist political communication in Europe, argue that populist actors need “the oxygen of publicity”, which is often plentifully supplied by the mass media (Aalberg et al, 2016, 2%). The decline of the traditional partisan press, a growing dependence on advertising, and more concentrated media ownership have favourably contributed to a developing populist discourse (Ibid., 2016, 81%).

McNair describes four types of political public relations activity: media and issues management; image management; internal communications of the party; and information management (see McNair, 1995). Successful populist parties have been particularly adept at using the first two of McNair’s strategies, by utilising access to free media and by marketing the leader of the party (Horsfield, 2003, p.
Jean Marie Le Pen, long-time leader of the French National Front, for example, exploited his position as perceived underdog to gain support: both when the media reported him negatively and when he was reported positively, his support increased (Horsfield, 2003, p. 230). Umberto Bossi of Italy’s Northern League exploited an us-and-them image generated by negative media publicity in order to gain support in regional areas where voters felt mainstream parties did little to represent their interests. The Austrian Freedom Party has used professional expertise in media relations to maximise the impact of press releases at strategic points (Ibid., p. 230).

Pim Fortuyn, the now-deceased leader of the Dutch Pim Fortuyn List, is cited as an example of a populist party leader who benefitted from media attention, not directed towards him but rather towards responses from mainstream politicians. The reactions of politicians inadvertently raised Fortuyn’s profile and focused attention on the issues his party was addressing. This resulted in heightened voter support which, in turn, prompted further media attention and, subsequently, more intense responses from mainstream politicians (see Akkerman, 2006 and Mius, 2012). Likewise, in Austria, the now-deceased Jörg Haider, leader of the Austrian Freedom Party before he became chairman of the breakaway party, Alliance for the Future of Austria, became the most visible communicator of public concerns over Austrian national identity (Ellinas, 2010, p. 205). This was due, in large part, to the media giving more attention to the party than was proportionate to their political standing (Ibid., p. 205).

Aalberg et al (2016) identified three patterns in the relationship between media and populist parties and actors. First, a populist party is likely to receive less coverage than other political parties if its electoral potency is low, and if mainstream parties attempt to exclude a populist party from power by means of either a formal or informal cordon sanitaire. This was the case in Belgium, when the radical right wing populist party, Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest, became an established outsider when it had previously been a political pariah. Similarly, in the Netherlands, newspaper coverage of radical right wing populist parties was initially negative but gradually became more understanding and accommodating of populist ideology (Aalberg et al, 2016, 81%).
Secondly, populist parties seem to benefit from media coverage, even when it is primarily negative. The radical right wing populist Sweden Democrats was the subject of a disproportionate level of media coverage, such that the party received more media attention than many established mainstream parties. Even though most of the media coverage was negative, the party nonetheless benefitted in terms of increased popular support (Aalberg et al, 2016, 81%). This experience has been the same for the non-radical right wing populist party, the UK Independence Party, which has successfully shrugged off negative media attention. Despite being the subject of frequent scandals exposed in the media, the party managed to achieve its best-ever general election result in 2015 with 12% of the vote, leading to some scholars and media outlets referring to the party as ‘Teflon’ because none of the negative commentary seemed to stick (see Goodwin, 2014b and MacKenzie, 2015a).

The third pattern identified with regard to the media’s relationship with populist actors is the trend of media outlets to criticise populist parties due to a concern for the continued healthy functioning of democracy. In Germany, radical right wing populist parties are invariably considered a threat to democracy, and such parties are met with universally critical media coverage. This is the same situation found in Portugal, where populism is considered an overly simplistic and emotional approach to political engagement, and political elites perceive populism as having a negative effect on the democratic system (Aalberg et al, 2016, 81%).

In some countries, populist parties have been quicker than mainstream political parties to make use of new media. In Sweden, for example, the Sweden Democrats used new and social media to spread information and propaganda, and to organise demonstrations prior to their entry into Parliament in 2010 and, in March 2012, the Facebook page of the party’s leader, Jimmy Akesson, had nearly 25,000 ‘likes’, compared with less than 3,000 for the current Swedish Prime Minister (see Birdwell, 2012). In 2011, the Austrian Freedom Party had around 40,000 official members but boasts twice as many Facebook fans, and the British National Party, which had just under 15,000 members, had over 80,000 Facebook followers (Bartlett et al, 2011, p. 33). While these figures do not necessarily translate into real-world political participation, there is some evidence to suggest that online political activism does accurately reflect the views and preferences of
voters. According to a recent study conducted by British think-tank, Demos, two-thirds of these Facebook supporters had voted for the Sweden Democrats; almost half were official party members; and a fifth had participated in a demonstration or protest organised by the party (see Birdwell, 2012).

Goodwin (2012) suggests that online and social media allows populist parties and groups to strengthen links with their supporters in a more private and closed community, free from the stigma encountered in mainstream media. He argues that new media has facilitated populist groups’ quest for credibility and cites the radical right wing populist British National Party as an example. In 2012, the party had almost the same number of Facebook ‘likes’ as the Liberal Democrats, and five times more than the Greens (see Goodwin, 2012). In addition, social media has enabled populist parties to strengthen the support of followers and create a collective online community. Followers have a sense of shared beliefs and values, as well as a feeling of acceptance that they do not receive in the real world. Electronic media also offers new ways for populist groups to mobilise, as has been seen in the case of the Sweden Democrats and its popular protests and demonstrations, support for which was garnered online.

New media allows populist parties to demonstrate their anti-establishment position in bypassing traditional media gatekeepers. This has been particularly the case for the non-partisan or unclassified populist Five Star Movement, in Italy, and the left wing populist We Can, in Spain. This use of social media is a symbolic, as well as practical, gesture of anti-system sentiment, where populist parties can show their opposition to the established party system (Aalberg et al, 2016, 57%). The use of social media, particularly on the part of new populist movements like the Five Star Movement and We Can, has highlighted the generational disparities between the populist parties and mainstream parties. Pablo Iglesias, the leader of We Can, regularly used Twitter to communicate with his followers, many of whom were young and familiar with social media. This technique was highly successful, resulting in him having 500,000 followers of his personal account (Ibid, 2016, 57%).

Populist parties have been adept at using both traditional forms of media and, more recently, new and social media for publicity, and key populist party figures have benefitted from vast media attention. This publicity has allowed these
parties a platform to share their policy aims publicly, even when they do not have a strong electoral platform. However, media attention is not the only way populist parties communicate politically. Populist parties that contest national and European elections, particularly those that are more cemented on the political landscape, make use of party political broadcasts and election materials in order to communicate their populist message, and sometimes court the media in order to maximise the party’s electoral potential. The radical right wing populist Danish People’s Party, for example, uses press releases more than other parties at election time in order to provide ready-made news stories. The party has found this to be much more effective than using paid advertisements at election time (Aalberg et al, 2016, 8%). Populist parties make use of simplified slogans and statements in order to appeal to the electorate. Radical right wing populist parties, in particular, use simple statements that are based on a notion of division between the people and the elite, or between natives and non-natives in society. For example, in election communications the Sweden Democrats have used slogans such as “Sweden belongs to the Swedes” or “we are the true democrats” to succinctly demonstrate both their nativist and anti-elitist positions (see Hellström and Nilsson, 2010).

Election communications for European Parliament elections are of particular importance to those populist parties that hold Eurosceptic positions. Public campaigning and disseminating of electoral material allows these parties a unique platform to express their anti-European Union views, when the opportunity might not usually exist in the sphere of regular, national, political discourse. Adam and Maier (2011) conducted content analysis of political parties’ election communications prior to the 2009 European Parliament elections, in six countries. They found that countries with a significant number of Eurosceptic parties, or with few dominant Eurosceptic parties, placed more of an emphasis on subjects relating to European integration than those countries where Euroscepticism was not a salient political issue. This suggests, firstly, that the existence of Eurosceptic parties influences the national policy agenda and, secondly, that Eurosceptic parties successfully communicate their anti-European Union message using election campaign materials and opportunities.
IV. The history and structure of the European Parliament

The European Parliament held its first election in 1979, when it became a democratically legitimate arena with directly elected full-time members focused on European issues. Prior to 1979, legislative power was conferred on the Council, which comprised members from national governments who acted on proposals from the Commission. The Council could approve Commission proposals with a qualified majority, where each member state had a weighted vote related to its size. At this time, the Parliament consisted of delegates from national governments and was primarily used as a consultative body prior to the Council adopting Commission proposals (Corbett et al, 2011, pp. 3-4). However, it became apparent that this role was too limited and the Parliament became a fully-fledged co-legislature, forming a bicameral legislature with the Council.

This shift happened as a result of changes to existing treaties and the creation of new treaties. In 1970 and 1975, the budget treaties enabled the Parliament and Council to have budgetary authority, where they could jointly decide annual budgets. In addition, Parliament was permitted the ability to amend the budget, not only to vote to adopt or reject the proposals. In 1975, a conciliation procedure was agreed to ensure conflict between the Council and the Parliament was avoided. Wherever there was disagreement between the two institutions, a committee comprising Council members and MEPs in equal number would assess and decide on the situation (Hix et al, 2007, p. 15).

The third step in making the Parliament a co-legislature came with the first election by universal suffrage. This resulted in greater democratic legitimacy for the Parliament, as well as the opportunity for more debate on European issues among full-time members. The Single European Act in 1987, as well as the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and, most recently, Lisbon in 2009, greatly extended the scope of co-decision making and afforded increased powers to the Parliament (Ibid., p. 16).

Corbett et al (2011) highlight a number of characteristics peculiar to the European Parliament that sets it apart from other Parliaments. The European Parliament is the foremost institution that replaces international diplomacy with
transnational democracy and, as part of the European Union, contributes to a unique institution that operates according to a combination of intergovernmental cooperation and supranational powers. The Parliament is developing quickly, having only been elected for the first time 37 years ago, and it continues to grow in size with 751 members from 28 countries and approximately 200 national political parties represented. Unlike any European national legislature, but similar to the Congress of the United States, the European Parliament does not produce a government so elections are not concerned with forming an executive. As a result of these peculiar characteristics, the European Parliament is not easily categorised and is, arguably, set apart from other supranational institutions (Corbett et al, 2011, p. 2). It is this unique and complex nature that makes the European Parliament such a fascinating and important field of study.

V. The roles of MEPs

The role of a member in the European Parliament is complex and varied, but his/her primary responsibility is to scrutinise legislation. In the plenary sessions, MEPs can speak in debates as representatives of their political groups, or in open ‘catch-the-eye’ sessions where the floor is free for any member to speak after the rapporteurs and political group spokespeople. This system allows for greater spontaneity in debates and opens up the forum to backbenchers to participate. Individual members can also put written questions to the Council or Commission; table and action amendments to any committee text or the Rules of Procedure; raise points of order; participate in voting; and ask questions pertaining to the work of the Parliament’s leadership in the form of the Conference of Presidents, Quaestors, and the Bureau. MEPs are split between the Parliament and their constituencies, and are expected to spend a week or so a month in their member states. Many MEPs also join with extra-parliamentary delegations, which provide links with other Parliaments and Assemblies in European applicant states or in regions with which the European Union has special foreign relationships.

24For detailed explanations of the roles of MEPs, see Scully and Farrell, 2003; Hix et al, 2007; and Corbett et al, 2011.
Despite these varied and important responsibilities, however, the primary area of work is conducted in the European Parliament’s committees. It is in these committees that reports setting out the Parliament’s position on a particular policy area or piece of legislation is drawn up, and MEPs take on the responsibility of acting as rapporteurs in committees that correspond to areas of expertise or national party interest (see Corbett et al, 2011).

VI. Rapporteurship in the European Parliament

Rapporteurship is the means by which committee reports are prepared in the European Parliament. This legislative behaviour has been selected for analysis in this piece of research due to its importance in policy formation: the way in which committee reports are distributed determines, to a greater extent than other legislative activity, whose interests and party political aims are represented at European policy level (see Hausemer, 2006).

Rapporteurs are supported by fellow MEPs through the political group system so membership of a group leads to committee representation and, thus, more impact on the political process. Political groups receive a quota of ‘points’ related to their size in the committee or, in some cases, their size in Parliament. After agreeing on the subject matter of opinions and reports, committee coordinators decide on the number of points to allocate to each specific subject and, subsequently, make bids for reports on behalf of their group (Corbett et al, 2011, p. 158). For some common or important reports the groups often agree a rotation system, allowing reports to be shared either across groups or between selected experts from different groups. While the appointment of rapporteurs is sometimes highly contested (see Corbett et al, 2011), rapporteurs are essentially appointed by acclamation from fellow MEPs. Those MEPs who choose to specialise in a particular area of legislative policy often receive several reports on the same issue for comparatively few points, and some reports or opinions viewed as unimportant are sometimes assigned for zero points. Occasionally, the groups use an auction system in order to encourage their rivals to spend more points than they would otherwise, and groups have been known to trade on, or pool, their points (Benedetto, 2005, p. 71).
Despite the obvious importance of the political groups in the appointment of rapporteurs, formally it is the committees that provide the context for the production of reports. As a result, rapporteurs have to ensure their reports broadly reflect the position of the committee as a whole, regardless of party group (Corbett et al, 2011, p. 161). In addition, rapporteurs have to appeal to the broad range of positions in the plenary if they require a majority of MEPs to support the legislation. This is particularly important for amendments to budgets or second reading of codecision, which require an absolute majority of MEPs (Benedetto, 2005, p. 71).

The role of rapporteur is an important one, as it is s/he who initiates the discussion on the proposed subject within the committee, and provides the draft text of the report. Once amendments have been made at committee level, the rapporteur is then responsible for presenting the report in the plenary and providing an overview of the committee’s position and recommendations. Due to the lengthy process of co-decision, which consists of three rounds of reading, the Council and Parliament often attempt to create an early agreement. It is in this context that the rapporteur is extremely important, as it is s/he who represents the Parliament on the issue under discussion. Thus, the choice of an appropriate rapporteur is crucial (Yoshinaka et al, 2010, p. 462). Benedetto (2005) argues that, in this situation of internal bargaining, rapporteurs are appointed to maximise consensus and the influence of the European Parliament, and they are expected to negotiate across party groups and also with the Council and Commission (Benedetto, 2005, p. 67).

Costello and Thomson (2010) contend that rapporteurs influence the European Parliament’s decision when proposals are subject to early agreements under co-decision, and when they are under consultation. They argue that rapporteurs are motivated primarily by national interest, rather than the interests of their European Parliament political group (Costello and Thomson, 2010, p. 219). This presents an alternative view of rapporteurs as partisan actors, rather than consensus-builders. Because rapporteurs are expected to represent both party group positions in the European Parliament and their national party, their potential to present a partisan position is limited, although they have the means by which they can pursue specific policy goals. Party groups in the European
Parliament are generally multinational and, thus, diverse in ideological positions despite their shared affinity. This means that any partisan positions held by rapporteurs must be shared or, at least, agreeable to their fellow party group members, and there is occasionally conflict between national party policy goals and party group position (Yoshinaka et al, 2010, p. 465).

A rapporteur plays a key role in European Parliamentary processes. They draft legislation that reflects the committee’s – and, by default, the Parliament’s – position on a policy matter and negotiate on its behalf with the European Commission and Council of Ministers. This means that they are a key player in both inter- and intra-institutional decision making and have both important responsibilities and privileges (see Hurka et al, 2015). Next to committee chairs (see Neuhold, 2001) and party group coordinators (see Kaeding and Obholzer, 2012), rapporteurs are the most important in shaping committee proceedings and building consensus (Hurka et al, 2015, p. 1232). This means that rapporteurs have a substantial impact on European legislation (see e.g. Benedetto, 2005 and Høyland, 2006). Benedetto (2005) refers to rapporteurs as “legislative entrepreneurs”, who have access to resources not permitted other MEPs (Kaeding, 2005, p. 85). In addition, Yoshinaka et al (2010) portray rapporteurs as “relais actors”, performing crucial negotiating roles with the Council and Commission.

One check on the position of rapporteur is that of the shadow rapporteur, drawn from other party groups or representing other interests in committees. Due to the importance of rapporteurs, the role of shadow rapporteur has taken on increasing significance. A shadow rapporteur essentially follows the progress of legislation through the committee and plenary sessions, and has the opportunity to join the chief rapporteur in conversation with representatives from the Commission and Council (see Judge and Earnshaw, 2008). This means that rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs tend to work together to jointly move legislation through the committee and plenary processes, despite inherent hierarchy in the positions (Ringe, 2010, p. 59).

Despite the many benefits of acting as a rapporteur, there are also costs to this post and some MEPs may choose not to engage as rapporteurs as a result. The need to act as consensus builders might put rapporteurs in contention with their party group, if they find they have to mitigate their group’s position in order to
reach a position of cross-party agreement (Benedetto, 2005, p. 72). In other situations, MEPs might find that they are unable to draft reports on particular issues due to the divergence of their views from those of their committee as a whole. In these scenarios, if a MEP refuses a report, the group is able to conserve its points and put itself in a position of opposing any eventual amendments with which it does not agree. Other MEPs find that they can exert influence on the legislative system outside of the rapporteurship system by putting pressure on rapporteurs themselves, or committee chairs, or by using the party group system in their favour (see Mamdouh and Raunio, 2003). Those MEPs who are opposed to integration are more likely to engage in campaigning than in the process of rapporteurship, as many do not wish to become part of the European Union hierarchy (Benedetto, 2005, p. 72). However, it is worth noting that not all self-exclusion from the European Parliament’s process of rapporteurship is specifically Eurosceptic or anti-system.

**VII. The European Parliament’s committees**

Committees perform a key function in the European Parliament, allowing a smaller, more specialised group than the plenary at large to scrutinise legislation and executive appointments. This situation allows minorities to have an influence where they might struggle in other settings (see Sartori, 1987), something that is particularly important in the European Parliament where there is a large number of members and a variety of languages spoken (Whitaker, 2011, p. 7).

The committees in the European Parliament are divided along policy lines, although it is difficult to entirely delineate policy areas as there are so many potential areas of overlap (Corbett et al, 2011, p. 145). Individual committees are not all equal in terms of status and strength. The Budgets Committee, for example, has traditionally played an important role in negotiating the financing of parliamentary programmes, although this role has also been shared by other committees, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs has typically attracted high profile members, despite having few formal powers (Corbett et al, 2011, p. 145). There are a few smaller committees that have a more restricted remit and, thus,
have fewer legislative proposals to address. These committees tend to operate on the basis of own-initiative reports or focus on very specific areas of interest.

Although committees have existed since the days of the European Coal and Steel Community, their structure and scope have altered in order to reflect the changing nature of the European project, the extension of the European Union’s competences and size, and the developing scope of the Parliament’s responsibilities. Several committees changed their names and focus between the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms as part of a reduction in the number of permanent committees from 20 to 17, although some name changes did not do much to alter the focus of the committee. For example, the committee for Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection became Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy, but retained its primary focus. Other committees limited their focus (for example, Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy became Economic and Monetary Affairs) while still others expanded their remit (for example, Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy became the committee for Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, adding issues of human rights to its concerns)\(^{26}\).

This piece of research focuses solely on rapporteurships and committees in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, and Table 3.1 overleaf illustrates the committees and their related areas of policy in these two terms (N.B. the policy areas attributed to these committees are derived from the Euromanifesto Project’s coding scheme, which is discussed at length in Chapter 6).

\(^{26}\)For more detailed information about the changes to the European Parliament’s committees, see Whitaker, 2011, pp. 27-28.

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<td>Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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VIII. The European Parliament’s political groups

The Parliament’s political groups are of key importance, playing a central role in choosing the President, Vice-President and committee chairs. Political groups set the agenda by choosing rapporteurs and deciding on speaking time. In addition, groups receive substantial financial aid from the Parliament and have their own staff (Corbett et al, 2011, p. 78). The make-up of the parliamentary groupings has remained fairly consistent over time. The two largest groups have tended to be Socialists and Christian Democrats and there has always been a Liberal group, which has often been the third largest group. There has always been a group to the left of the Socialists and a group comprising Greens and/or Regionalists. There has always been one, and sometimes, two groups to the right of the Christian Democrats, often one comprised of moderate Eurosceptics and, occasionally, one of more extreme Eurosceptics. Although the composition of the groups have changed constantly, with members joining and leaving groups, and others choosing to be unattached, the type of political groups in the Parliament has been relatively consistent since 1979 (Ibid., 2011, p. 81).
There is a general understanding that political parties are rational actors and, since Downs (1957), rational choice theories of party politics have played increasingly important roles in the understanding of party and voter objectives. The advantage of rational choice theories is that they are generally applicable regardless of situational differences and they resist ad hoc explanations (Strøm, 1990a, p. 565). Owens (2003) argues that the rational nature of parties explains, to some extent, why largely purposive legislators tend to join and work within political parties. Parties offer the possibility of collective action with like-minded individuals, along with identification with a political ‘brand’ that enhances electoral support and provides them with resources to enable them to pursue their policy goals (Owens, 2003, p. 13).

In addition to political parties in general being rational actors, European Parliament party groups are key players. Cicchi (2011) argues that the European Parliament has evolved from what Farrell et al (2006) described as a “multi-lingual talking shop” to one of the most powerful assemblies in the world, so its relevance is indisputable (Cicchi, 2011, p. 145). Hix (2002) suggests that Euro-party groups are key actors, or ‘principals’, along with national parties, and their strategic influence comes from their control of different ‘goods’ in the European Parliament: committee assignments, leadership positions, speaking time, and financial resources (Hix, 2002, p. 688). Hix et al (2003) also argue that the party system in the European Parliament is highly developed, relatively stable and fairly competitive and has strengthened as the power of the European Parliament has increased (Hix et al, 2003, p. 328).

Kaeding and Obholzer (2012) argue that party group coordinators occupy a crucial position in terms of decision-making in the EP, due to their ability to “pull the strings from behind the scenes” (Kaeding and Obholzer, 2012, p. 16). In addition to being key actors in the European Parliament, party groups offer many incentives for membership. An official party group is entitled to greater speaking time; funding for administration, campaigning and promotion of political ideas; and more favourable time slots, so the incentives for parties to form, or join with, a political group are many (see Hagemann, 2007).

The intended basis for party groupings is political affinity and, since 2008, groups have to comprise a minimum of 25 members (five more than the previous
20) gathered from at least seven different member states. This means that party
groups should behave in a cooperative way, with voting dictated by shared
transnational aims rather than national affiliation. MEPs, however, are not
compelled to vote cohesively (Hix et al, 2003, p. 310). Intra-party cohesion in the
political groups is dependent largely on shared values and the extent to which
decision-making is centralised (Owens, 2003, p. 28). However, Hix et al (2007)
have found that increased fragmentation in terms of ideological diversity has no
impact on the cohesion of the group. This contrasts with decreased cohesion
following from fractionalisation of a political group along national lines, suggesting
that the effect of national diversity within a group is greater than internal

While all European Parliament groups possess some voting power,
membership of medium and large groups results in greater influence, but smaller
groups are marginalised. Raunio and Wiberg (2002) argue that, although medium-
sized groups have limited voting power, their ideological positions enable them to
influence legislative outcomes beyond their actual numerical size (Raunio and
Wiberg, 2002, p. 75). They contend that the voting power of the two largest
groups increases as the decision rule becomes more rigorous. In addition, broad
centrist coalitions are often the most powerful in Parliament, with a fragmented
opposition. This fragmentation results in some smaller groups aligning with larger
groups in order to increase their voting power (Raunio and Wiberg, 2002, p. 88).

Of all the types of populist parties represented in the European Parliament,
radical right wing populists are the most likely to attempt to form their own
parliamentary grouping, with the exception of the Italian neoliberal populist party,
Go Italy, which formed its own group for part of the fourth European Parliament
term. Radical right wing populist parties are largely ultra-nationalist and this
means that it has been difficult for them to find common ground in spite of their
shared ideological heritage. There are varying degrees of nationalism and, indeed,
extremism to be found in the populist radical right party family and this makes it
difficult for parties to unite in a transnational format.

There had been no attempt to create a specific radical right wing populist
grouping since the doomed venture of Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty, until
the current European Parliament term, when Marine Le Pen of the French National
Front and Geert Wilders of the Dutch Freedom Party joined forces. Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty was created in January 2007, following the enlargement of the European Union to 27 nations and initially comprised 20 members, the minimum number required to form a group, several of whom were controversial and high profile figures. Among them were the Le Pens of the French National Front and Alessandra Mussolini, granddaughter of Benito, from the Social Alternative – List Mussolini. Wrought with difficulty, this alliance turned to animosity and finally collapsed following a verbal fracas between Mussolini and the Romanian contingent. The group, however, had been doomed from the start as the Bulgarian and Romanian MEPs were not directly elected to the European Parliament but, rather, were nominated by their national governments. This meant that the group did not meet the institutional requirements set by the Parliament, and it sowed the seeds for its dissolution (see Hagemann, 2007). Despite this, there were shared ideological convictions that led to the creation of the group in the first instance, most notably a common ‘Euro-nationalist’ viewpoint and a shared desire to promote patriotic parties at a European level.

The procedural problems with the Romanian and Bulgarian MEPs combined with a sense among the other members that it was difficult to cooperate with the members from central and eastern Europe, due to perceived differences in political culture. It was in this context of tension that Mussolini made remarks deemed offensive by the Romanian contingent, who subsequently withdrew from the group, rendering it unsustainable. It folded in November 2007 (Startin, 2010, p. 442).

The current European Parliament term has seen the creation of another populist radical right dominant group, headed up by Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders. This group, called Europe of Nations and Freedom is largely comprised of National Front MEPs, along with radical right wing populist representatives from the Austrian Freedom Party; Poland’s Congress of the New Right; Italy’s Northern League (which is now considered a radical right wing populist party, having previously been classified as a neoliberal populist party); the Dutch Freedom Party; and Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest; and assorted independents. Despite being the smallest group in the European Parliament, with 40 members from seven member states the group has seemingly achieved a semblance of credibility that
the Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty group could never achieve. However, other radical right wing populist MEPs are spread across other party groups or remain independent in the current Parliament, limiting the level of cooperation between like-minded members (see MacKenzie, 2015b).

In the fourth European Parliament term, 27 MEPs from the neoliberal populist party, Go Italy, joined with several members from Italian Christian Democratic parties in order to create their own group, Go Europe. This group was notable for only including members from one member state, Italy: under current parliamentary guidelines for the formation of groups, this particular political group would not meet the relevant criteria. The group lasted only one year until it merged with the European Democratic Alliance group to form the conservative/neoliberal/centre right political group, Union for Europe (see Smith, 1999). Despite being founding members of the group, Go Italy’s MEPs chose to join with the larger centre right group, European People’s Party, in the fifth European Parliament term.

The focus on shared goals in European Parliament groupings means it is hard for a collection of ultra-nationalist radical right wing populist parties to cooperate sufficiently to create a viable grouping in the European Parliament. In addition, radical right wing populist MEPs are small in number and it has proved difficult to form a party grouping with the appropriate number of members. This situation is not helped by the dispersion of radical right wing populist MEPs across the European Parliament’s political groupings, and the reluctance of some more mainstream MEPs to align themselves with more extreme members. Even other populists are reticent about joining with radical right wing populists; in the current Parliament, for example, Nigel Farage of the non-radical right wing populist party, UK Independence Party, refused to join with the National Front and the Dutch Freedom Party in their new political group venture, citing his discomfort with rhetoric he considered xenophobic and racist. Ironically, the new radical right wing populist group met all the criteria for forming a group only when the United Kingdom MEP, Janice Atkinson, joined as an independent, having been expelled from the UK Independence Party following an expenses scandal (see MacKenzie, 2015b).
In addition, the rules for party groupings have changed. Since 2008, a minimum of 25 members from at least seven different member states has been required to form a political group; this was an increase from the previous 20 member minimum. Given the difficulty ultra-nationalist radical right wing populist MEPs have in working together in a transnational format, the new rules have served to minimise radical right wing populist cooperation in the party group system in the European Parliament. However, the situation in the current Parliament, with the creation of the Europe for Nations and Freedom group, seems to be somewhat different: the group has lasted longer than commentators anticipated.

In addition to the ideological and systemic factors pertaining to party group formation, there are various procedural and institutional factors that limit transnational cooperation between radical right wing populist parties in the European Parliament. Since the entry of the National Front into the Parliament in 1984, which prompted the first Committee of Inquiry, the European Union has been keen to react in order to limit the emergence and potential cooperation of the populist radical right and to marginalise them. For example, in 1994 the European Parliament urged the Italian government to “remain faithful to the Community’s values”, following the inclusion of several National Alliance members (Fieschi, 2000, p. 524). In 2007, the decision to make incitement to racism a European Union-wide crime was partly prompted by the creation of the Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty group (Startin, 2010, p. 432).

This difficulty in cooperation does not tend to be shared by MEPs from other populist parties, who have been content to join with the established party groups: even those left wing populists who hold Eurosceptic views have been able to cooperate in the radical left group. This is because left wing populist MEPs, although likely to hold to a position of ultra-nationalism similar to radical right wing populists (see Vasilopoulou, 2010) centre their Euroscepticism on economic concerns, which tend to be shared by fellow left wing Eurosceptics (see Benedetto and Quaglia, 2007). Radical right wing populist parties, on the other hand, tend to express their Euroscepticism in nationalist terms, which results in conflict with other ultranationalist parties in spite of general shared positions.
IX. The role of party goals in the legislative behaviour of MEPs

What political parties want and what they aim to achieve, in terms of maximising votes, obtaining office or developing policies, affects their behaviour and strategic decisions. It is generally accepted that parties have a variety of goals, namely votes, office and/or policy. However, despite the usefulness of rational choice models of the vote-seeking (see Downs, 1957), office-seeking (see Riker, 1962) and policy-seeking (see Budge and Laver, 1986) parties, it is not necessarily accurate to say that all parties share common goals and, thus, behave similarly in the same situations (see Helboe-Pederson, 2012). Party goals differ from one party to another and are affected by both internal organisation and position in the political arena.

Strøm (1990) contends that party goals can vary across political systems and across parties. Conflicting party goals means that parties face trade-offs when making strategic decisions (Strøm, 1990, p. 570). This range of party goals is determined by institutional factors and the party system within which the parties operate, as well as organisational features of the parties themselves (see Müller and Strøm, 1999). For example, large parties are more office-seeking than smaller parties, and parties at either end of a left-right spectrum are more likely to favour policy over office-seeking than their centrist counterparts. This would suggest that size and policy position of parties determines the trade-off between office and policy (see Helboe-Pederson, 2012).

Niche parties, generally defined as those parties representing non-mainstream; regional; extreme; or single issue interests (see Hix and Lord, 1997, Meguid, 2005 and Adams et al, 2006), have to balance maximising votes with retaining core voters. While moving nearer the median voter in terms of policy issues can result in greater electoral rewards for mainstream parties, evidence suggests that the opposite is true for niche parties: they tend to lose votes when their core position is moderated (Ezrow, 2008, p. 208).

Since party goals vary across political parties, it would be logical to expect their behaviour to vary, too, even in similar circumstances. Even when the essential aim of a political party is to seek office, or a share of office, parties differ
in their reasons for power-seeking and populist parties are by no means unified in their reasons for power seeking. Even when parties hold a clear view on their goals in a parliamentary arena, there is always the potential for party organisation and goals to conflict, particularly in populist right wing parties.

Anti-establishment niche parties are defined as parties that challenge the status quo in major policy and political system areas; see themselves as challengers to political parties that make up the political establishment; and hold to the assertion that there is a disconnect between the political establishment and the people (see Abedi, 2004). These parties differ in organisational composition from mainstream parties, as well as in policy profile, which is linked to their populism and electoral appeal (Abedi, 2009, p. 72). Populist parties, as examples of anti-establishment niche parties, often see office-seeking goals come to the fore in the context of an unexpectedly successful electoral performance. However, office-seeking often results in adaptive organisational constructs, with anti-establishment parties conforming to the positions of mainstream parties (Ibid., p. 77). Here, we see the conflict between party organisation and party goals. Populist parties need to capitalise on anti-party and anti-system sentiment in order to attract and retain voters (i.e. they need to have vote-seeking goals). However, an unexpected electoral success opens the door to office-seeking goals and the refinement of intra-party organisation in order to adapt to the political process (see Taggart, 1996).

The inherently anti-establishment position of populist parties is an ideological factor that has the potential to limit participation in the political process even by parties that are constituent parts of coalition governments. These parties are suspicious of societal institutions and resentful of political elites, believing them to be unrepresentative of the people who are viewed as being one homogeneous group, disenfranchised from the political system but sharing a common experience and unity of will (Taggart, 2000, p. 11).

Several populist parties are explicitly critical of the democratic processes and systems in their own nation. The Austrian Freedom Party, for example, has used its populist stance, and success in attracting disillusioned voters, to denigrate Austria’s political systems (Luther, 2000, p. 439), and the National Front’s Jean-Marie Le Pen was openly critical of the French Fifth Republic during his time as
party leader (Hainsworth, 2000, p. 8). In addition to disparaging their own nation’s governments and democratic systems, populist parties are often publicly opposed to the European establishment, albeit to varying degrees. Right wing populists criticise the European project on grounds of national identity and community issues, and left wing populists criticising the European Union for perceived economic disenfranchisement of their country (see Adam and Maier, 2011).

When populist parties enter into positions of power in local or national government, or in the European Parliament, it can be argued they become part of the political establishment they opposed in pre-election campaigns, and this can cause an identity crisis for some parties (Startin, 2010, p. 431). This was, notably, the case for the Austrian Freedom Party when it became part of the coalition government in 1999, after receiving 27% of the vote (Meret, 2010, p. 17). The party struggled with the shift from anti-establishment fringe party to a member of the government, and support declined as a result of the Freedom Party’s need to compromise its economic viewpoint in supporting its coalition partner’s neoliberal reforms. In addition, the government generally became unpopular over its proposed tax reforms and the Freedom Party suffered accordingly, with key figures resigning and electoral support reducing to around 10% at the following election (Ibid., pp. 187, 206).

The Sweden Democrats, however, have thrived as part of the political establishment, perhaps partly as a result of their position as an opposition party in the Swedish Parliament. Since their creation in 1988, they have presented themselves as advocates of true democracy (Widfeldt, 2000, p. 496) and the champions of the Swedish people (Widfeldt, 2008, p. 272), and their anti-establishment sentiment served them well at the 2010 parliamentary elections, when they polled 5.7% and won 20 seats. The party has blocked a number of bills, including the sale of shares in the national postal service and a Swedish telecommunications firm, actions that have resulted in increased media attention that has been occasionally positive. Although the party has chosen to broaden its scope and indulge in less inflammatory rhetoric, taking up issues such as the care of the elderly and law and order, in order to widen its electoral appeal and effectiveness in Parliament, the party has retained its core nationalist, anti-
multiculturalist stance. By combining traditional attitudes of nationalism, which attracted voters to the party in the 1980s, with contemporary issues salient to voters, the Sweden Democrats have ensured their role as part of the establishment has not affected their support (see Scrutton, 2012).

The left wing populist Greek party, the Panhellenistic Socialist Movement, spent a substantial, and relatively successful, period in government. During the 1970s and 1980s, the party cemented itself on the political landscape with a uniquely popular combination of anti-capitalist, Marxist rhetoric, and conservative symbolism (Moschonas, 2001, p. 11). Crucially, however, the party moderated its previously radical position while in government, a common response of populist parties to governmental participation (see Abedi, 2009), and the party’s pragmatic modernisation was most evident in its shift from being staunchly anti-European to adopting a strongly pro-European position during the latter part of the 1990s into the 2000s (see Moschonas, 2001).

A left wing populist party that has had notable success in a governmental position while sustaining its populist appeal is the Scottish National Party (see Dardanelli and Mitchell, 2014). Critically, however, the party has been in power in the devolved Scottish Parliament, not the central Westminster administration. Although the United Kingdom’s system of devolution allows for the transference of some powers to the home nations, including tax-varying powers and fiscal autonomy for Scotland, it does not comprise a system of federalism. The Scottish National Party has been able to govern in Scotland on a populist anti-establishment mandate without moderation, largely because the party’s anti-elitism is directed primarily at the Westminster establishment (Dardanelli and Mitchell, 2014, p. 92). In addition, the Scottish National Party successfully avoided the expenses scandal that tainted establishment politics at Westminster in 2009, which allowed the party to maintain its populist rhetoric against a corrupt and unrepresentative elite (Ibid., 2014, p. 91). The avoidance of scandal when mainstream parties have been implicated has benefitted several populist or radical right parties, such as Italy’s Northern League and National Alliance, who successfully avoided any links with the Tangentopoli political corruption scandal of the 1990s, and presented themselves as representing a fresh start for Italy (see Agnew, 1995). The Scottish National Party has successfully resisted moderating its
anti-establishment rhetoric primarily because it has not become part of the establishment against which it stands: the party has been in a privileged position of power while not having to acquiesce to mainstream parties.

The radical right wing populist British National Party, however, when in local government positions, has largely disengaged from the political process. The party retained a populist rhetoric throughout local election campaigns, pushing for taxpayers to have a greater say in how their money was spent and campaigning against council funds being used to support asylum seekers and ethnic-minority organisations (Copsey, 2004, pp. 124-150). However, once in local authority positions, the British National Party has done little to effect change by pushing forward policies for which the party gained electoral support. There have been reports of BNP councillors failing to turn up to council meetings and sometimes failing to put forward the alternative budget on behalf of the official opposition (see Lowles, 2004).

However, Goodwin (2011) argues that the British National Party’s decision to contest the European Parliament elections reflected their shift towards engaging with elections (Goodwin, 2011, p. 95) and seeking to benefit from new political opportunities. In addition to engaging with the European electoral process, McGowan (2014) argues that the two British National Party MEPs – Andrew Brons, who resigned from the party in November 2012 and saw out the duration of the seventh European Parliament term as an independent, non-attached MEP, and Nick Griffin – also engaged with the political process in the European Parliament during the seventh parliamentary term. Both MEPs regularly worked 12-hour days in the Parliament, attended committees, prepared speeches and attended plenary sessions (Ibid., p. 674). However, despite this engagement with the political process, both Brons and Griffin regularly used the debates and meetings to rail against the European Union and to criticise its policy decisions. They also attempted to pursue party priorities, such as issues of migration, behaviour that suggests that the British National Party’s engagement with the European Parliament’s political processes did not represent a change in its anti-establishment and anti-system positions (Ibid., pp. 674-5).

Other parties pursue more policy-motivated goals in reconciling their anti-establishment position with representation in the European Parliament. For
example, the radical right wing populist Dutch Freedom Party has campaigned for more transparent decision-making in the European Union and has been critical of the European political establishment, often calling for fraud and corruption to be revealed in European Union institutions (see Crum and Van Kessel, 2009). The overtly Eurosceptic non-radical right wing populist UK Independence Party cements its anti-establishment position by regularly campaigning for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (Lynch et al, 2011, p. 733), a position which saw success in June 2016 when the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union.

The dilemma of having to balance anti-establishment sentiment with operating within the establishment is particularly relevant for Eurosceptic populist parties in the European Parliament, many of whom oppose the composition, nature or, indeed, very existence of the European Union (Startin, 2010, p. 431). McGowan (2014), when referring to radical right wing populist parties, highlights the paradox of parties opposing the institution that has given them representation:

“…there is an interesting paradox at play here for while…far right parties may publicly denounce the EU construct and call for its dissolution, it is this same EU and especially the European Parliament that have not just propelled far right parties onto the wider European political stage but facilitated their contact with like-minded parties and opened up the possibilities of greater pan European cooperation” (McGowan, 2014, p. 667).

Given the varying degrees of Euroscepticism that exist among populist parties, this conflict between ideological belief and political position manifests itself in varying forms of behaviour. Generally, however, in spite of the varied behaviour displayed by populist parties in the European Parliament, they tend to continue to exhibit the anti-establishment behaviour prevalent during campaigning. This is because many of these parties view their position in the European Parliament as being separate from the European establishment at large, and they seek to use their position to highlight their Eurosceptic stance and perform anti-system roles (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008, p. 131).
Some parties manifest anti-establishment behaviour by failing to cooperate with one another. Cooperation among radical right wing populist parties, in particular, has been notoriously difficult, characterised by the collapse of the Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty political grouping after only a few months. This group showed evidence of a West-East divide among the radical right wing populist parties: with several Western European parties opposing the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the European Union, forming an alliance with the Greater Romania Party and Bulgaria’s Attack was virtually impossible, in spite of their shared ideological convictions (Startin, 2010, p. 440). Even the current, relatively successful, Europe of Nations and Freedom group, which is dominated by radical right wing populist parties, had a shaky start in terms of ensuring the group met all the requirements set by the European Parliament.

The anti-establishment nature of populist parties in challenging the political establishment, and often failing to cooperate with one another within the organisational constructs of the European Parliament, suggests that populist anti-establishment parties are more likely to be disengaged from the political process than their mainstream counterparts.

X. The role of Euroscepticism in the legislative behaviour of MEPs

Many populist parties express their anti-establishment sentiment in the European context by showing themselves to be Eurosceptic, albeit to greater or lesser degrees, with radical right wing populist and left wing populist parties being most likely to be Eurosceptic (see Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008, Vasilopoulou, 2010, and Halkiopoulou et al, 2012). Many radical right wing populist and left wing populist parties, as well as some non-radical right wing populist parties, such as the UK Independence Party, have been successful at mobilising on an anti-European integration mandate, particularly in European Parliament elections, and have consistently set themselves apart from mainstream parties on this issue.

Both types of populist party have demonstrated a similar position on the European Union, characterised by scepticism based on notions of the right to self-rule and national self-determination. Halkiopoulou et al (2012) argue that this is
due to the importance of nationalism in the ideological make up of each party family, despite their many differences (Halkilopoulou et al, 2012, p. 505). Nationalism is a component shared by the radical left, including many left wing populists, as well as radical right wing populist parties and that, while the distance between mainstream parties on issues of opposition to, and support of, European integration has increased, left wing populists and radical right wing populists side together (Ibid., p. 505).

Despite sharing an antagonism to the European project, however, radical right wing populists and left wing populist parties have different ideological foundations for their Euroscepticism. In essence, radical right wing populists focus on issues of national identity whereas left wing Eurosceptics tend to focus their criticism on the market-liberal character of European integration (Adam and Maier, 2011, p. 437). Although both types of populists can express nationalist sentiments in their Eurosceptic rhetoric, this is more prominent among radical right wing populists. Left wing populists tend to refer to the nation's role in European integration being threatened in economic terms, whereas radical right wing populists tend to view this threat as being primarily cultural (see e.g. Moschonas, 2001). In addition, parties displaying higher levels of nationalism are more likely to adopt a Eurosceptic position. In particular, parties that combine nativism (belief in national independence and protection from external, non-native threats) with territorial assertions are more likely to be more hostile to the European Union (Halkilopoulou et al, 2012, p. 533).

Lubbers and Scheepers (2007) also argue that voters of both radical right wing populist and left wing populist parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic than voters of other party traditions. Voting for radical right wing populist and left wing populist parties at national elections is largely explained by Euroscepticism over and above other socio-political factors (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007, p. 91). Euroscepticism and dissatisfaction with the European Parliament affect voting for radical right wing populist and left wing populist parties to a greater extent than they do for other parties or for non-voters. However, voters who hold anti-immigration sentiment or perceive immigrants as being an ethnic and cultural threat are more likely to vote for radical right wing populist parties than left wing populist parties. This suggests that is the focus on the European Union, rather than
on wider issues related to immigration and nationalism, that is the characteristic shared by the two party families (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007, p. 91, 92).

How we define Euroscepticism is key to understanding how it affects Eurosceptic populist MEPs’ behaviour. Ultra-nationalism, or nativism, is a key ideological component of radical right wing populist parties. The nation is at the core of populist ideology, and radical right wing populist parties advocate a homogeneous nation state populated exclusively by natives, where non-native elements are considered a threat (Mudde, 2007, p. 19). Non-natives are not necessarily determined on ethnic or racial grounds, but can also be perceived as those who are culturally or religiously at odds with the nativist nation.

Eurosceptic populist parties do not share a unified stance on the issue of the European Union, and parties differ over the extent of expansion and which countries should be integrated into the Union. The general objection to enlargement among Eurosceptic populist parties on the right wing is based on either religious or ethnic concerns, stemming from a view of Europe as the successor to Greek, Roman and Christian civilisations but not all parties are specifically antagonistic towards the concept of the European Union per se. For example, the radical right wing populist Belgian party, Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest, holds a relatively soft Eurosceptic stance compared with the National Front, which calls for a referendum on French membership of the European Union (Startin, 2010, p. 431). The non-radical right wing populist UK Independence Party is heavily Eurosceptic, regularly campaigning for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union and some right wing populist parties advocate an alternative form of European cooperation (Mudde, 2007, p. 165).

Left wing populist parties are much more likely to be antagonistic to the liberal economic character of the European Union, particularly in terms of integration in monetary policy in the form of a single currency (see e.g. Moschonas, 2001 and Benedetto and Quaglia, 2007). Eurosceptic left wing populism takes on a nationalist element in terms of a defence of the nation against perceived international imperialism. The European Union is considered an imperialist institution that will restrict the economic and cultural development of the member state. In addition, left wing populist parties that have been influenced by a radical left or communist history are more likely to be antagonistic to the European
project than newer left wing populist parties, or those that have not had links to communist parties of the Cold War period. This is because the USSR was strongly opposed to European integration and, through the USSR’s financial and symbolic assistance to many old left wing European parties that have morphed into modern day left wing populist parties, an anti-European position was developed (Benedetto and Quaglia, 2007, p. 484).

For Eurosceptic populist MEPs, being a member of an institution, whose very existence they question, presents a dilemma that is difficult to resolve. It is also difficult for MEPs who value Euroscepticism as a key ideological tenet to cooperate fully with parties of a similar ideological tradition that do not hold an Eurosceptic stance. Additionally, it proves difficult for parties to work closely with MEPs from countries whose accession they opposed, such as in the case of the French National Front and Romanian and Bulgarian MEPs (see Hagemann, 2007).

Given the variety of positions held by populist parties in the European Parliament, it is not useful to define Euroscepticism as purely antagonism towards European cooperation. Instead, the well-respected definition of Szczerbiak and Taggart’s (2008) ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism is more applicable. Hard Euroscepticism is defined as a “principled opposition to the European Union and European integration” and applies to parties seeking withdrawal, or prevention, of European Union membership. Examples of parties holding this position are the radical right wing populist British National Party and the French National Front, and Greece’s left wing populist Panhellenic Socialist Movement in the 1980s and early 1990s (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008, p. 7). Soft Euroscepticism is where “concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU” but there is not necessarily an objection to the concept of European integration or cooperation (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008, p. 8). The ideology and rhetoric of the Dutch left wing populist Socialist Party demonstrates this position, and the radical right wing populist Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest and Sweden Democrats also hold to this view (Mudde, 2007, p. 165).

Mudde (2007) argues that the majority of Eurosceptic populist parties, with notable exceptions such as the radical right wing populist British National Party and the non-radical right wing populist UK Independence Party already mentioned, believe in the basic concept of European integration but are sceptical
about the current nature, composition and direction of the European Union. Very often, populist parties in European countries that are not yet members of the European Union claim not to be against membership, but their propaganda is almost exclusively negative when it comes to views on the European Union. Alternatively, they propound a weak pro-European Union position but argue that the time is not right for their country to join (Mudde, 2007, p. 165).

Vasilopoulou has developed the hard and soft notions of Euroscepticism to create three alternative Eurosceptic positions – opposition to the principle of the European Union; opposition to the practice of the European Union; and opposition to the future of European integration (see Vasilopoulou, 2010). Although these three descriptions are essentially variations of the hard and soft concepts of Euroscepticism, they allow us to differentiate more easily between parties that are opposed to the very principle of European cooperation and integration; those who are opposed to the European Union in its current form, but not in principle; and those that are opposed to either increased expansion or greater integration of existing member states.

It is important to recognise that the Eurosceptic positions of parties are not static but, in fact, change over time. This can be a programmatic response to changes in party leadership or to political change at the national, supranational or global level. Despite now being known for their Eurosceptic positions, during the 1980s many populist radical right parties from West European countries were in favour of European integration and, specifically European Community membership. Most of these parties, such as the German Republicans, were relatively moderate in terms of the ideology and rhetoric of their populist radical right position (Mudde, 2000a, p. 45). The Republicans initially advocated for European integration to the point of supporting a type of European federal state. However, as the party gradually moved its programmatic position away from that of national conservatism to the populist radical right, it also changed its position on Europe. The party became increasingly sceptical of the process of, and approach to, European expansion and integration and began to favour the vague notion of a ‘Europe of Fatherlands’ as expressed by de Gaulle (Ibid., p. 45), which would embody a core union of ‘old’ European states. This emphasised a change in attitude towards the European Community, which coincided with wider ideological
modifications that highlighted an attitude of exclusionism and a focus on the German ethnic community. Although the Republicans did not express a hard Eurosceptic, or Euro-rejecting, position, they nonetheless shifted from being pro-integration to being suspicious and critical of the existing form of European cooperation.

It is not merely the more moderate populist radical right parties that have shifted their position on European integration. The French National Front, one of Europe’s most prominent populist radical right parties, often considered a prototype of the party family (see Mudde, 2007), began life as a pro-European party. In the early 1980s, around the same time as the Republicans were advocating for a federal European Community, the National Front was calling for common European policies on defence, foreign policy, and even currency (Fieschi et al, 1996, p. 240). Notably, however, this pro-European stance was tempered by the desire for French leadership in the European context: Jean-Marie Le Pen believed that France was a “model” for other European countries (Ibid., p.240) and the party’s vision for the EU was one modelled on the secular republicanism of France.

The Front National’s stance changed with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. For the party, as well as many other populist radical right parties, the Maastricht Treaty signalled a substantial growth in European power and a shift towards subsuming national sovereignty into an increasingly intrusive supranational organisation. The Maastricht Treaty, formally the Treaty on European Union, established the three pillars of the European Union and laid the foundations for the common currency, the most significant integration thus far of European membership. From this point and throughout Jean-Marie Le Pen’s leadership of the party until 2011 when his daughter assumed the mantle of party leader, the Front National remained staunchly Eurosceptic. Vasilopoulou defined the party towards the end of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s leadership as Euro-rejecting, with a stance that sought to renegotiate all European treaties and to withdraw France from the bloc should such renegotiations fail (Vasilopoulou, 2010, p. 9). In stark contrast to its position in the early 1980s, the Front National began to talk in terms of liberating France from the control of the European Union (Harmsen and Spiering,
2004, p. 47) and regaining sovereignty in terms of currency, foreign and defence policy.

Marine Le Pen continued this Eurosceptic stance when she took over leadership of the Front National from her father in 2011. In 2015, the party successfully managed to form a, albeit short-lived, group in the European Parliament with fellow anti-European Union and populist radical right members (see MacKenzie, 2015b). During this period, the National Front presented its Euroscepticism in terms of preserving and promoting France’s rich cultural heritage. Although antagonistic to large-scale immigration into both the European Union and France Marine Le Pen’s rhetoric drew inspiration from neoliberal populist parties, arguing that immigrant cultures threatened France’s uniquely progressive secular liberal values (see Alduy and Wahnich, 2015). Although more refined than the rhetoric of her father, the message was still consistently protectionist and Eurosceptic: within the context of the United Kingdom’s vote to withdraw from the European Union, Le Pen was repeatedly reported in mainstream media as the self-titled “Madame Frexit”.

However, during the French presidential elections of 2017, Marine Le Pen appeared to soften her anti-European Union stance returning instead to a position of renegotiation of treaties, similar to that held by her father. She vowed to negotiate with the European bloc in an attempt to restore French sovereignty in issues such as the Euro, although she crucially defended the need for Europe to retain the single currency even if France withdrew from the Eurozone. Despite the National Front’s position as pre-eminent anti-European populist radical right party, its Euroscepticism has fluctuated over time. It is important to consider changes such as these when measuring the impact of Euroscepticism on the behaviour of populist members in the European Parliament, as parties and individuals can hold different views on European membership and integration at different points in a parliamentary term, or over successive parliamentary terms.

It is worth noting here that, while there are different Eurosceptic views held by populist parties in the European Parliament, some of which change over time, not all populist parties are Eurosceptic. For example, the Italian neoliberal populist party, Go Italy, considered the European Union a useful bridge between the United States of America in the West and Russia in the East, and a check on
hegemony from either former Cold War superpower (see Pasquino, 2003, Raniolo, 2006, and Edwards, 2011). Changing views on European integration is not the sole preserve of Eurosceptic parties, either. Some parties that are now, or have been in the past, pro-European Union began life as suspicious of the European project. One example of this is the left wing populist Scottish National Party which, despite being cautiously Eurosceptic in the 1970s, now holds a very strong pro-European position and campaigns on a mandate of independence for Scotland within the European Union (see Dardanelli and Mitchell, 2014 and Dye, 2015).

During the 1973 European accession referendum in the United Kingdom, the Scottish National Party campaigned on the ‘No’ side, with some senior party figures arguing that the Scotland should not seek membership of the European Union on the terms of the United Kingdom. Scottish nationalism and the pursuit of independence underpinned this particular form of Euroscepticism: the party was less suspicious of the European project and more about the decision-making of the United Kingdom. In addition, there were some in the party who hoped that Scotland would vote differently from the United Kingdom as a whole in order to highlight ideological, political and electoral differences between the home nation and the country at large (see Baker and Seawright, 1998). This mild Eurosceptic position did little to help the party’s position in terms of positing Scotland as an independent country, and the party gradually revised its view over time.

During the 1980s, the Scottish National Party’s position softened and became focused on the concept of Scotland being independent within Europe. The party began to argue that Scotland should leave the United Kingdom but remain a member of the European Union, availing itself of the full benefits of membership. This position persisted in spite of doubts being raised over the feasibility of Scotland being able to retain its status as a member state outside of the United Kingdom (Dardanelli and Mitchell, 2014, p. 97). This position has again modified over time. The Scottish National Party dropped its commitment to join the Euro and, instead, vowed to retain a similarly peripheral role to the United Kingdom as a whole (Ibid., p. 97). Much of the party’s focus in terms of its European policy has been to emphasise perceived differences in public opinion in Scotland in comparison to the United Kingdom at large. The Scottish National Party has long argued that Scotland is vastly more Europhilic than its Eurosceptic English
counterpart. However, until recent years, Scottish public opinion has not reflected this and has been, instead, only slightly more positive than that of England (Dardanelli and Mitchell, 2014, p. 98). The 2016 referendum on the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union, however, showed some greater disparity than in previous years, with every local authority area in Scotland voting to retain European membership, which equated to 62% of the voting electorate. This contrasted with the whole-country result of 48% in favour of remaining in the European Union.

There is some evidence to suggest that the Scottish National Party has once again moderated its position on the European Union. Although being consistently pro-membership, since the Brexit vote of 2016 the party has criticised elements of European Union policy and advocated for reform of the bloc. The Scottish National Party has often condemned the Common Fisheries Policy, for example, and the party’s manifesto for the general election of 2017 emphasised its desire to see reform in the European Union. Nonetheless, despite these elements of criticism, the party has remained consistently Europhilic since the 1980s and is one of few pro-European populist parties represented in the European Parliament.

Although Euroscepticism tends to focus on policies specifically relating to membership of the European Union, in Eurosceptic populist rhetoric it is often combined with an anti-globalisation stance. Left wing Eurosceptics in particular tend to conflate these two elements in economic terms, criticising the European Union for its market-liberal character and opposing elements of the single market (Adam and Maier, 2011, p. 437). Although not inherently populist per se, anti-globalisation movements have often embodied the grassroots populism shared by many of Europe’s populist political parties (Taggart, 2004, p. 270). In addition, anti-globalisation movements – much like Eurosceptic movements – draw support from left, right, and neoliberal parties.

Globalisation, Euroscepticism and populism are linked primarily through the positioning of populist parties as the champions of the people, and their tendency to create an us-and-them platform. This, combined with the positioning of many of these parties on the ideological periphery leads them to pursue an anti-globalisation agenda, where they advocate on the side of the perceived ‘losers’ in the globalised society and promote a protectionist agenda (Kriesi et al, 1998, p. 437).
In addition, Taggart (1998) found that these peripheral actors are most likely to mobilise on a Eurosceptic mandate. Right wing peripheral actors tend to be more culturally protectionist, whereas those on the left are more likely to be economically protectionist, in their rhetoric. Eurosceptic populists on the left oppose the open borders and global markets of globalisation because they resist economic liberalism and believe that the left's influence will be diminished at the domestic level. Right wing populists are more likely to oppose globalisation because it threatens national identity (Kriesi et al, 1998, p. 928).

Although both left and right wing populist parties exploit this 'loser' status – and radical left parties are as likely as radical right populist parties to be Eurosceptic (see Vasilopoulou, 2010) – there is some evidence to suggest that the anti-globalisation rhetoric of right wing populists is more successful in appealing to the perceived losers. Radical right wing populists are adept at exploiting fears and perceived grievances among sections of the electorate, and they portray the open borders, free movement of people, and cultural exchange that come with globalisation as being a threat to national identity and opportunity.

Anti-globalisation sentiments and Euroscepticism are especially linked in the rhetoric of political parties in new EU member states or states going through the accession process. For example, in Turkey, Euroscepticism and anti-globalisation positions are regularly combined in a generic 'anti-West' paradigm (see Yilmaz, 2011). Here, secular Turkish nationalist interests are pitted against the European Union due to the perception that the West carved up Turkey for its own ends with the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 that ended the Ottoman Empire. Right wing populist nationalism successfully presents an image of the European Union and its globalised Western allies as threatening Turkish national identity. During the period of accession in Croatia both left and right wing populists, who presented the European Union as being opposed to national interests and argued that the only way to resist global control of national economies was to oppose European membership, exploited this type of nationalism. In this way, Euroscepticism and anti-globalisation sentiment were conflated (see Lindstrom, 2002).

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27 See e.g. Betz (1993); Kitschelt and McGann (1995); Kitschelt (2001); Ignazi (2003); Mudde (2000a and 2007) for discussions of the programmatic profiles of populist radical right parties and their electoral appeal.
Despite the existence of some populist parties with pro-European stances, and the changing nature of both Euroscepticism and Europhilia, the majority of populist parties represented choose to exhibit their anti-establishment sentiment in some form of Euroscepticism.

XI. The role of domestic governance in the legislative behaviour of populist MEPs

MEPs tend to be influenced by their national party and Hix (2002) argues that it is, ultimately, national parties that affect how MEPs vote. Although political groups in the European Parliament are important in terms of allocating resources, speaking time, rapporteurships, etc., it is national parties, in control of candidate selection, that shape how MEPs behave (Hix, 2002, p. 696). In the United Kingdom, for example, during the mid- and late-1990s, Labour Party MEP candidate selection was influenced by a desire to send to the European Parliament those candidates who were more likely to advocate and propagate New Labour’s approach to Europe (Ladrech, 2007, p. 214).

European Parliament political groups appear cohesive when national parties decide to vote together; however, when national parties take up differing stances on policy, cohesion in the European Parliament groups crumbles. Hix (2002) contends that legislative cohesion breaks down when candidate selection is decentralised. In the context of the European Parliament, MEPs are selected by their national party and this means the European Parliament groups have no real means of punishing legislative rebellion or of rewarding loyalty (Hix, 2002, p. 697). European Parliament political groups can, theoretically, expel an individual MEP or national delegation from the group but this is extremely rare. Expulsion has to be supported by a majority of group members and is only desirable if expulsion will not weaken the group in relation to the other political groups in the European Parliament (Hix, 2007, p. 135).

While MEPs in general are influenced by their national party, MEPs from parties that are in national governments are more likely to vote with their group (Hix, 2007, p. 102). This is due to the fact there may be more at stake for these MEPs at legislative votes as their national parties are also present at the Council. If
the Council adopts a legislative proposal, it seems that parties from national
governments put pressure on their MEPs to ensure this legislation passes through
the European Parliament. This means that a greater percentage of MEPs from
parties in national government in a European Parliament party group results in a
higher level of party cohesion and suggests that MEPs from governing parties
might be more likely to vote with their political group (Hix, 2007, p. 102, 141).

Ladrech (2007) proposes another reason for the strong influence of
national parties on MEPs. He suggests that the European policy-making process
can be used as a “smokescreen” for the policy intentions of national party elites,
who can advance initiatives that might be politically risky if restricted only to the
domestic arena (see Ladrech, 2007). This is particularly true for MEPs from
national governing parties.

However, Mühlböck (2012) argues that national parties fail to ensure
voting unanimity between MEPs and ministers and she raises doubts about the
influence of national parties on MEPs’ voting behaviour. By comparing voting
behaviour of MEPs and that of Council ministers from the same national party,
Mühlböck considers MEPs voting with their ministers as adhering to the party line.
If an MEP votes with his/her group against the minister, that is considered
defection from the party line (Mühlböck, 2012, p. 612). This is because MEPs in
general are much more likely to vote with their European Parliament group than
with their minister (Mühlböck, 2012, p. 624). However, there are drawbacks to
Mühlböck’s conclusions, primarily the ambiguous nature of what constitutes the
‘party line’: it is possible that, in situations of voting divergence, MEPs are in fact
loyal to their national party and ministers are the ones who depart from the party
line. In addition, her study focuses only on MEPs from national parties in
government, and not on those in opposition.

Høyland (2006) argues that MEPs from governing parties are more active
as rapporteurs when it comes to codecision legislation. He suggests this is because
rapporteurs from parties represented in the Council might incur lower costs by
coordinating their proposals with conversant actors in the Council, which means
they will be more interested in writing codecision reports than MEPs from national
parties that do not have representation at Council level (Høyland, 2006, p. 30). In
addition, MEPs from national governing parties are more likely than those from
parties in opposition to support amendments at second reading of codecision. This is because most of the governments that support the common position want to move the policy even further away from the status quo, which results in them using the process of European Parliament amendments to push the policy further towards their own ideal policy.

While there is evidence for membership of a national governing party affecting legislative behaviour of MEPs in the European Parliament, there seems to be some indication that it affects the behaviour of MEPs from niche parties more than legislators in the European Parliament overall (Jensen and Spoon, 2010, p. 174). Jensen and Spoon (2010) replicated the models used by Hix et al (2007) to gauge the effects on European Parliament voting behaviour and applied them to niche parties specifically. Jensen and Spoon defined niche parties as including anti-European Union, far right, regional and Greens. Populist parties can fit within three of these categories to varying degrees. For example, the ‘anti-European Union’ group includes parties on both the left and right wings such as the non-radical right wing populists UK Independence Party, and the left wing populist Dutch Socialist Party. ‘Far right’ includes radical right wing populists such as the French National Front and the Austrian Freedom Party, and ‘regional’ includes separatist populist parties such as the left wing populist Scottish National Party and the formerly neoliberal, now radical right wing, populist Northern League. Some populist parties, such as the Scottish National Party and Italy’s National Alliance, display agrarian tendencies and can be classified according to the ‘Green’ group, although this would not constitute a defining characteristic of their ideology or rhetoric.

Jensen and Spoon’s (2010) results suggested that niche parties are more influenced by their national party if it is in power than European Parliament legislators in general, largely due to the ideological diversity of niche party families. If all parties in a particular party family share the same view, for example, a positive attitude towards European integration, then one would expect all parties to be pro-European integration regardless of whether or not the parties were in national government. However, due to the ideological diversity of niche party families, Jensen and Spoon argue that government participation correlates with the ideological positions of the parties and results in MEPs from niche parties being

XII. Hypotheses

a. Populism and overall rapporteurship allocation

As discussed in previous chapters, populist or radical right parties tend to be anti-establishment in their ideology and rhetoric. This applies to parties of all populist traditions (radical right wing populist; non-radical right wing populist; left wing populist; neoliberal populist; and non-partisan or unclassified populist), as well as non-populist radical right parties. Because of the emphasis on a homogeneous people, disenfranchised from the political process by an unrepresentative elite, populism is inherently antagonist to the establishment, which constitutes the political elite.

Radical right wing populists tend to express this anti-establishment in nativist terms, where the nation is divided into natives and non-natives. Non-radical right wing populists highlight democratic concerns, where the people are being ignored by a corrupt and undemocratic elite. The focus of left wing populists tends to be anti-capitalist, presenting a perception of a political class that has capitulated to big business concerns at the expense of the hard-working people. For neoliberal populists, a liberal economic position is combined with the championing of liberal values that are being threatened by the compromise of political elites. Non-partisan or unclassified populists have a range of ideological positions, but are united in their stance against the political class, which is inherently unrepresentative of the nation's people. Non-populist radical right parties, such as extreme right parties and elitist radical right parties, also tend to be anti-establishment despite their relatively hierarchical organisational structure and outlook. They perceive the people as being put upon by a corrupt elite, but that the means for returning the nation to its former glory is found in violent political struggle in the case of extreme right parties, or through strong law and order measures in the case of elitist radical right parties.

In the European context, this anti-establishment position takes on an additional aspect of Euroscepticism. Although not all populist parties are
Eurosceptic, many are to a greater or lesser degree. For Eurosceptic populists, the European establishment is at odds with the nation, although this is expressed in different ways. For right wing populists, the European Union presents a threat to national community culture. For those on the left wing, objections to the European project focus on the neoliberal nature of integration. Eurosceptic populist parties do not hold a unified stance on European integration, with some opposing the practice but not the principle of integration, while others oppose any form of pan-European cooperation.

This anti-establishment position results in populist parties, particularly those from the right wings who hold ultra-nationalist positions, failing to cooperate fully in the European Parliament’s processes. This might be evidenced through MEPs remaining unattached, choosing not to participate in the political group system, having limited attendance at committee meetings or plenary debates, or not acting as rapporteurs.

Hypothesis 1 – populist or radical right MEPs are less likely to act as rapporteurs than MEPs in general.

I hypothesise that populist or radical right MEPs are less likely to hold rapporteurships, and will have fewer reports when they do, than MEPs overall. This is due to their anti-establishment party goals, as well as the salience of Euroscepticism in the ideology and rhetoric of many populist parties, resulting in a lack of engagement with European Parliament processes.

b. Euroscepticism and rapporteurship allocation among populist or radical right MEPs

In Chapter 3, I looked at the prevalence of Eurosceptic sentiment among populist or radical right parties. Not all populist parties are Eurosceptic, most notably the Scottish National Party, although the party’s position has changed over time. This is because the party’s anti-establishment rhetoric is almost entirely directed at the Westminster political class: the party advocates for an independent Scotland in the European Union. Those populist parties that are Eurosceptic fit broadly into two categories as defined by Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008): those who oppose European integration in any form as considered hard Eurosceptics,
and those who are opposed to the practice but not the principle of integration are considered soft Eurosceptics. Vasilopoulou (2010) has developed these concepts to accommodate various Eurosceptic positions. She identifies three varieties of Euroscepticism: Euro-rejecting parties who are against European integration in any form, Euro-conditional parties who are not opposed to the principle of integration but oppose the practice and future of current integration, and Euro-compromising parties who support the principle and the practice of current integration but oppose any future integration.

Radical right wing populists and left wing populists are the populist party types most likely to hold Eurosceptic positions, due to the salience of nationalist sentiment in their ideology and rhetoric, and voters of these parties are most likely to be Eurosceptic. However, right wing populist Eurosceptics and left wing Eurosceptics base their European antagonism on different ideological principles: right wing populist Eurosceptics are more likely to cite nativist concerns about national and cultural identity, whereas left wing populists are opposed to the neoliberal economic nature of European integration.

In addition, the conflation of Euroscepticism with anti-globalisation sentiment is a particular trait of populist parties. Left wing Eurosceptics especially combine these two strands in terms of economic position, often disparaging the market-liberal style of the European Union and being antagonistic to elements of the single market (Adam and Maier, 2011, p. 437). Although not populist by definition, anti-globalisation movements nonetheless tend to display the grassroots populism shared by populist parties (Taggart, 2004, p. 270).

It is possible to see where Euroscepticism, anti-globalisation sentiment, and populism are linked in the ideologies and policy platforms of populist parties when we consider the us-and-them rhetoric. This, combined with the placement of many of these parties on the political and ideological periphery results in them having an anti-globalisation platform, where they position themselves as advocates for the perceived losers in a globalised world, and they promote a protectionist agenda (Kriesi et al, 1998, p. 928). In addition, these peripheral actors are the most likely to use Euroscepticism as a tactical and electoral lever (see Taggart, 1998).

Although radical left parties are as likely as radical right populist parties to be Eurosceptic (see Vasilopoulou, 2010), and populists on both the left and right
wings exploit this globalisation loser status, it seems that the culturally protectionist stance of right wing populists is more successful in appealing to the perceived losers.

For those Eurosceptic populist MEPs who oppose even the existence of the European Union, having representation in the Parliament provides a tension in terms of identity. Often, these MEPs find cooperation difficult, particularly if they hold an ultra-nationalist position, which results in them remaining non-attached or being spread across party groups rather than cooperating with similar populist parties. Attempts between Eurosceptic populist MEPs to create specific parliamentary groupings has been restricted to radical right wing populist MEPs, and these groups have usually been short-lived and acrimonious. The exception to this position seems to be in the current Parliament, where the Europe of Nations and Freedom group, heading up by the radical right wing populist National Front, has lasted since 2014.

**Hypothesis II**–Eurosceptic populist MEPs will be the least likely to act as rapporteurs, and will have fewer reports when they do.

I hypothesise that Eurosceptic populist MEPs will be the least likely group of populists to act as rapporteurs, and that they will get fewer reports when they do. This is because the anti-establishment position of Eurosceptic MEPs results in their lack of engagement in key parliamentary processes and institutions, such as party groups. Those Eurosceptic MEPs who disagree with the very existence of the European Union and who object to the principle and practice of the European Parliament will be unlikely to choose to act as rapporteurs or, if they do attempt to participate in the rapporteurship process, will be unlikely to be chosen by their fellow MEPs to act as rapporteurs.

Not only do Eurosceptic MEPs have limited engagement with the European Parliament, they use media outlets and election communications in order to expound their anti-European viewpoints rather than to present policy positions. Public campaigning and the use of election broadcasts and written material provides a unique opportunity for Eurosceptic populist parties to share their anti-European Union positions when they might not usually have the prospect of doing this in the course of regular everyday politicking. Researchers such as Adam and Maier (2011) have found that Eurosceptic parties have both the opportunity to
influence the political agenda and to freely and successfully express their views, particularly in countries where either several Eurosceptic parties exist or where they are firmly cemented on the political landscape.

I anticipate that Eurosceptic populist parties will use their Euromanifesto documents for the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms to present their Eurosceptic positions. Eurosceptic parties tend to use election communications to share their anti-European integration views instead of using the opportunity to develop a policy programme for election to the European Parliament. This means that highly Eurosceptic parties will not be likely to have concrete policy aims for policy they want to see carried out at the European level, as those who oppose the principle of European integration naturally oppose policy being made at this level.

c. Participation in national government and rapporteurship allocation among populist MEPs

MEPs tend to be influenced by their national party, and cohesion in European Parliamentary groups tends to falter when members from the same national party take up different policy positions. While national parties influence their MEPs in general, MEPs in national government in particular are more influenced by their national party. This is because national parties in government are also present in the Council, and national parties put pressure on their MEPs to ensure legislation adopted by the Council passes through the European Parliament. There is some evidence that niche parties, such as populist parties, in government are even more likely to be influenced by their national party in terms of European Parliament voting due to their ideological specificity and diversity not found in other party families. There is also evidence that MEPs from governing parties are more active as rapporteurs in the context of codecision legislation. As with voting in the European Parliament, rapporteurs are under pressure to coordinate their proposals with their party's counterparts in the Council.

These findings concern MEPs who are from parties that have representation in the Council. Populist or radical right parties in government are much more likely to act as junior coalition partners in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms. As a result, they are unlikely to receive key cabinet
portfolios, unless they compromise on policy and ideological distinctiveness. This means that populist or radical right parties in national government are less likely to have representatives from the same party in the Council, although their senior governmental coalition partner will be represented. However, as all members of a coalition have a collective interest in the coalition itself succeeding, even junior partners are likely to be influenced by conversant actors in the Council. In addition, it is possible a junior minister might attend Council meetings, which means that minor coalition parties can have the opportunity to be represented at Council level (see Corbett et al, 2011).

**Hypothesis 3** – populist or radical right MEPs from parties in national government will be more active as rapporteurs than populist or radical right MEPs from parties that are not in government

I hypothesise that the findings pertaining to the increased likelihood of MEPs acting as rapporteurs when they belong to parties in national government will also apply to populist or radical right MEPs. This hypothesis seeks to confirm previous research conducted by Høyland (2006), which indicates that MEPs who form parties in government are more likely to act as rapporteurs than those from parties not in government during the European Parliament term.
CHAPTER 3 – DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Chapter 1 put forward a definition of the populist radical right, and Chapter 2 focused on the structures and procedures of the European Parliament. From these chapters, a set of hypotheses was developed, to be tested in the empirical section of this piece of research. The data is analysed primarily quantitatively, replicating statistical analysis conducted by Yoshinaka et al (2010) of rapporteurship allocation in the European Parliament in terms four and five. These datasets have been added to, with the inclusion of variables pertinent to populist radical right MEPs. The qualitative aspect of this piece of research focuses on policy aims of populist radical right parties, as set out in national party manifestos, and the salience of such aims in the production of committee reports.

I. Quantitative versus qualitative research methods

There is some debate over the efficacy of different quantitative and qualitative methods. Proponents of quantitative, statistical, methods cite their inherent emphasis on general applicability and replicability, causal explanations and the ease with which a researcher can analyse a large number of cases over several time periods. Quantitative research designs are, it has been claimed, more scientific than those employing qualitative research methods (King et al, 1994, p. 3). By contrast, qualitative methods do not rely on numerical data and there is a wide range of methods that can be employed in qualitative research design. These methods tend to be narrower in focus, using only one or a small number of cases, in order to obtain a comprehensive and in-depth account. The strength of qualitative methods lies in their ability to provide detailed knowledge about the event, phenomenon or case in question rather than in generalisations with wide applicability (Ibid., p. 4).

King et al (1994) argue that the traditional quantitative-qualitative dichotomy is false and that both methods can be both scientific and systematic, relying on the same logic of inference (Ibid., p. 5). Much research does not fit neatly into one category or another, and neither method is superior to the other. Rather, good scientific research is that which adequately makes inferences, whether descriptive or causal, about the phenomenon or case being analysed,
based on empirical observations (King et al, 1994, p. 8). Arguably, therefore, a researcher should employ a range of tools in his/her method design in order to most adequately make inferences that go beyond the immediately observed. It is within this framework that I seek to employ both quantitative and qualitative research methods in order to test the hypotheses already defined.

This piece of research concerns the legislative behaviour of populist or radical right MEPs in the fourth and fifth European Parliamentary terms, using rapporteurship as the primary indicator of legislative activity. Using datasets on rapporteurship allocation in the European Parliament in the same terms, compiled and statistically analysed by Yoshinaka et al (2010) with the addition of new variables salient to this body of research, the quantitative element of empirical research takes the following format.

The first section deals with an overall model of rapporteurship allocation in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, beginning with descriptive statistics pertaining to the number and proportion of populist or radical right MEPs overall, and the number and proportion of populist or radical right MEPs acting as rapporteurs. This descriptive analysis is conducted using a cross tabulation technique. The section then continues with, more specifically, rapporteurship allocation amongst MEPs in general (i.e. does a MEP get a rapporteurship or not?) with an emphasis on whether or not being a populist or radical right MEP makes a difference to rapporteurship allocation. This includes binominal logistic regression models of rapporteurship allocation, testing for the effects of membership of a large party group; membership of a large member state; committee chair position; expertise; MEP in previous parliamentary term; and general activity. Added to these control variables are variables specific to my analysis of populism, such as membership of a national governing party and level of Euroscepticism.

The next sections focus on the impact of Euroscepticism and national government on rapporteurship allocation. The effect of Euroscepticism is analysed using predicted probabilities as part of the binominal logistic regression. The interaction between the national government variable and populism is analysed using interaction terms as part of the binominal logistic regression, and ANOVA will also be conducted.
II. Previous models of rapporteurship allocation – Yoshinaka et al (2010)

Yoshinaka et al (2010) conducted a seminal piece of research into rapporteurship allocation in the European Parliament, focusing on the fourth and fifth parliamentary terms. Yoshinaka et al’s primary aim was to determine whether committee rapporteurs are more influenced by partisan concerns or if they act as consensus-seeking technical experts in given policy areas. In order to answer this question, they conducted an in-depth analysis of the patterns of rapporteurship allocation among MEPs in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, using a range of variables derived from hypotheses pertaining to the roles of rapporteurs, the partisan nature of MEPs, and the process of party group formation. They used two statistical models, one focusing on whether or not a member got a report and, secondly, how many reports the rapporteur had.

The first hypothesis concerned the partisan nature of rapporteurs, both in terms of their affinity to their European Parliament party groups and their ideological commitment to the policy positions of their national parties. Citing research by Kreppel (2002a), McElroy and Benoit (2006) and Hix, Noury and Roland (2007), Yoshinaka et al developed a bifurcated hypothesis of partisanship that anticipated, firstly, that members who were ideologically close to their party group median would get more reports than those who were ideologically far from the median. Secondly, they hypothesised that members who were ideologically close to their national party median would get more reports than those who were far from the median.

The second primary hypothesis focused on the nature of rapporteurs as experts. Yoshinaka et al expected that MEPs who had had career experience in an area associated with the committee(s) on which they sat would be more likely to act as rapporteurs, and would receive more reports, than their non-expert counterparts. Linked with this notion of expertise was the issue of seniority, or the length of time (in months) the MEP had spent in the European Parliament. Yoshinaka et al hypothesised that MEPs who had spent longer in the European Parliament would be better placed to see reports through from start to finish, and
anticipated that the number of reports held would be positively correlated with a MEP’s level of seniority.

Yoshinaka et al also controlled for factors that might affect rapporteurship allocation. One factor that could impact upon a member’s opportunity to act as a rapporteur was the notion of absenteeism. Following from previous research by Kreppel (2002a), it was expected that reports would be more likely to be given to MEPs who actively participated in the processes of the European Parliament. Activity was defined as attendance at plenary voting sessions, and Yoshinaka et al hypothesised that the number of reports given to MEPs would be positively correlated with their attendance. In order to take into account the fact that members who entered or left the European Parliament part-way through a parliamentary term would be naturally less active than their counterparts who were present as MEPs for the duration of a term, Yoshinaka et al also included a variable representing the number of months a member had served in each parliamentary term.

Other control variables included committee chair (the hypothesis being that that chairs of committees are responsible for writing more reports than MEPs who are not committee chairs, due to either their position of influence or their position as “rapporteurs of last resort”); large member state (to take into account any possible bias towards MEPs from large member states); large party group (to control for any variation in institutional processes between large groups and less-institutionalised party groups); and length of time on a committee (in order to account for the fact that some MEPs spent a whole parliamentary term on just one committee, others move between committees, and still others sit on several committees at once)\(^\text{28}\).

Yoshinaka et al used two separate models to determine what affects rapporteurship allocation. The first model had as its dependent variable the dichotomous measure of whether a case (i.e. a MEP sitting on a committee as a member of a party group) received a report or not. In the second model, the dependent variable was the number of reports held by a MEP sitting on a committee as a member of a party group. They found that their results were

\(^{28}\) The large member states (i.e. the France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom) were coded as ‘1’ and all others as ‘0’. The large party groups (i.e. the European People’s Party and the Party of European Socialists) were coded as ‘1’ and all others as ‘0’.
largely consistent across both models and both parliamentary terms. Because I am interested in the effect of populism on a MEP’s chances of acting as a rapporteur, I primarily use the first model which focused on whether or not a MEP was a rapporteur or not. The second model of the number of reports is used only to determine whether government participation resulted in a member receiving more reports.

Yoshinaka et al found that distance from party group median was negatively correlated with a MEP’s tendency to act as a rapporteur: the further a member was from the party group median, the less likely s/he was to hold a report. They also found that expertise related to policy areas salient to the committee was positively correlated with a member’s propensity to act as a rapporteur. Committee chairs were also more likely to get a report than MEPs who were not chairs, as were members with high rates of attendance. These findings provide some evidence to suggest that both expertise and partisanship are important factors in determining report allocation, and that rapporteurs act according to both partisan interests and as consensus-seeking technical experts.

Yoshinaka et al’s research provided comprehensive datasets for further analysis about factors affecting rapporteurship allocation, and offered a reliable theoretical foundation upon which to build my research into the impact populism has on the allocation of reports in the European Parliament. I am interested in discovering whether, when all else (i.e. partisanship, expertise, and activity, as well as Euroscepticism and national government participation) is taken into account, being a populist affects a MEP’s chances of acting as a rapporteur.

III. The datasets

The datasets used for quantitative analysis are combined datasets using Yoshinaka et al’s (2010) data on rapporteurship allocation in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, with the addition of salient variables pertaining to populism, Euroscepticism and national government. I began with Yoshinaka’s full datasets for the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms. I am grateful to Professor Gail McElroy (Trinity College, Dublin) and Professor Antoine Yoshinaka (American University, Washington) for sharing with me their datasets for the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms.
contained the raw data that provided the basis of their analysis into rapporteurship allocation in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, and some amendments, corrections and manipulation of variables were required in order for the datasets to be used appropriately in analysis.

The variables relating to ideological distances from party group and national party ideological median had to be calculated, as the Yoshinaka et al datasets only showed scores for individual members. These median policy positions were calculated using Hix, Noury and Roland’s (2006, 2007) measure of ideology, which is often used to map the position of members within a legislature. This measure was determined using the NOMINATE algorithm primarily used to determine the ideal point of US Congress members using roll-call vote data (see Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). In addition, as members are under pressure to align themselves with their national party positions in roll-call votes (see Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007), the distance from national party median was measured as well as the distance from party group median.

The ideological position of European Parliament party groups and national parties was measured using two dimensions of ideology. The first dimension measured left-right position, and the second measured government and opposition elements, as well as positions on European integration. Distance from national party and party group medians was measured by taking the individual member’s score and calculating the median for, firstly, the European Parliament party group and, secondly, the national party delegation in the European Parliament. The individual members’ scores were then subtracted from the median. Because I was not interested in the direction of the variation from the median (i.e. whether the member was to the left or the right of the ideological median), only how far away the member was, the values were squared to provide positive results to indicate the distance from the median.

I also added variables into the dataset that had particular salience for my analysis of rapporteurship allocation, but which were not included in Yoshinaka et al’s analysis. These included variables relating to national government participation and Euroscepticism. National government was included as a variable

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30 For a detailed description and analysis of the ideological dimensions used in this analysis, see Hix, Noury and Roland, 2006.
in order to test Høyland’s (2006) findings that MEPs from governing parties are more active as rapporteurs due to their corresponding representation in the Council. Parties in government for the full European Parliament term were coded as ‘1’; those who were in government for part of the term were coded as ‘0.5’; and those parties not in government at any point during the European Parliament term were coded as ‘0’.

Radical right wing populist parties and left wing populist parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic than parties of other traditions (see Vasilopoulou, 2009). In the European context, populism inevitably takes an us-and-them position, perceiving the European Union as being undemocratic and unrepresentative of the people. Therefore, I anticipated that Eurosceptic sentiment would negatively correlate with a member’s propensity to hold a report. That is to say, the more Eurosceptic a MEP, the less likely s/he is to act as a rapporteur or, put another way, the less Eurosceptic a MEP is, the more likely s/he is to hold a report.

The measure of Euroscepticism used was Chapel Hill’s measure of attitudes to European integration\textsuperscript{31}. The measure used was the ‘position’ variable, which determined the overall position of the party towards European integration in the year in which the survey was conducted (Bakker et al. 2015). Parties scored between ‘1’ (strongly opposed) and ‘7’ (strongly in favour), and scores were specified to six decimal places within those parameters.

Although Yoshinaka et al’s dataset included MEPs’ gender, it was not included as a variable for analysis in their two models of rapporteurship allocation. I included gender as a control variable, in order to take account of possible gender bias in rapporteurship allocation. Research has been conducted on the extent to which political parties and institutions encourage or inhibit female participation and representation in legislatures (e.g. see Kunovich and Paxton, 2005; Lühiste and Banducci, 2016; and Lühiste and Kenny, 2016), so gender was included as a control variable in the analysis of rapporteurship allocation.

Some corrections were required to be made to Yoshinaka et al’s datasets in order to allow for full and accurate analysis. The original datasets included the names of parties as they currently are. However, some parties have changed their

\textsuperscript{31} For an up-to-date full and comprehensive explanation of the Chapel Hill measurements of European parties’ positions, see Bakker et al, 2015.
names over time and were represented in the European Parliament under
different names than those given in the datasets, so I changed these to correctly
represent the actual names the parties had in the fourth and fifth European
Parliament terms. Some parties changed their names during the party term, or
stood as umbrella movements specifically for the European Parliament elections
(e.g. France’s Movement for France initially entered the European Parliament in
the fourth term as Majority for Another Europe, so was labelled as the latter for
this term. The party became known as Movement for France in late 1994 so in the
fifth European Parliament term was labelled thus).

The only party that posed a potential problem was Italy’s National Alliance,
which entered the fourth European Parliament as the Italian Social Movement
although was known as the National Alliance for the rest of its time in the
European Parliament. The party changed its name in 1995, just one year into the
fourth European Parliament term, but also changed its ideological focus and it is
this particular change in position and policy that provided a slight problem in
terms of naming the party. In addition to changing its name, its focus, and its
ideology, the party also entered government for the first time in 1995 and there is
some evidence that its new ideological and policy positions enabled the party to
gain a position in government. Therefore, the party is an anomaly: whereas most
parties changed their names but not their focus – for example. Belgium’s radical
right wing populist party, Flemish Bloc, became Flemish Interest towards the end
of the fifth European Parliament term in 2004 in an attempt to rebrand itself but,
especially, did not change its ideological or policy position – the non-populist
radical right National Alliance made a concerted effort to shift its focus from the
fascism that characterised the Italian Social Movement and became a very different
party.

Despite this ideological and policy shift, I decided to refer to the party as the
National Alliance in both the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms. The
party was known as the latter for almost the entirety of the two terms, having
changed its name so early on in the fourth term. In addition, because the party
changed its focus so completely at the same time as rebranding itself, the

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32 For further information about the Italian Social Movement’s change into the National Alliance, see
additional variables of Euroscepticism and government participation salient to this party relate primarily to the National Alliance and not to the Italian Social Movement, so it seemed theoretically and analytically irresponsible to retain the party’s earlier moniker.

In the final dataset, the unit of analysis was the individual member on a committee in a party group. Every MEP assigned to a committee as a full member was an individual case such that MEPs on multiple committees appear more than once in the dataset. If a member changed party group during the term, s/he was classed as separate cases. The theory behind this method of classification was that each committee member was a possible candidate for rapporteur. If the MEP sat on several committees in one term, s/he had additional chances to act as rapporteur. For example, in the fourth European Parliament term, the National Alliance MEP, Sebastiano Musumeci, was a full member of four committees: Development and Cooperation; Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights; Fisheries; and Institutional Affairs. As a result, he appears in the dataset four times.

In order to account for theories of partisanship, Yoshinaka et al included MEPs who switched party group affiliation as separate cases for each committee they sat on as members of different party groups. In order to maintain consistency, I also kept this format. For example, in the fifth term, the UK Independence Party MEP, Michael Holmes, began the term in the Europe of Democracies and Diversities group along with the other UK Independence Party MEPs, but then left the group and remained non-attached for the duration of the term. He was, therefore, classed as four separate cases: once each for the Fisheries and Budgets committees, on which he sat as a non-attached member, and twice for the Budgetary Control committee, on which he sat as a member of the Europe of Democracies and Diversities group and also as a non-attached member.
CHAPTER 4 – ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

I. Rapporteurship allocation in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms

This chapter constitutes the first empirical chapter of this piece of research, with the next chapter, Chapter 5, focusing on qualitative empirical analysis. This chapter presents a model of rapporteurship allocation, based upon Yoshinaka et al’s (2010), with an additional emphasis on populism, Euroscepticism, and government participation. This chapter analyses the hypotheses set out in Chapter 2 by using a range of quantitative methods, including initial descriptive statistics, binomial logistic regression, interaction terms, and ANOVA.

The first section of this chapter presents basic descriptive statistics of the number and proportion of populist and radical right rapporteurs in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, and moves onto cross tabulations of rapporteurship and populism. Next, a model of rapporteurship allocation is analysed, using binomial logistic regression to determine whether there is any relationship between populism and the likelihood of a member acting as a rapporteur. Following on from this, predicted probabilities are presented and the second hypothesis, pertaining to the impact of Euroscepticism on rapporteurship allocation, is tested. The third and final hypothesis relating to the relevance of government participation on report allocation is next analysed using interaction terms as part of the logistic regression, and then an ANOVA test. Results are tabulated and presented graphically throughout this chapter.

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 overleaf show descriptive statistics for the number and proportion of populist or radical right MEPs in the fourth and fifth European Parliaments, respectively. These purely descriptive statistics give an idea of the proportion of cases that can be categorised as populist or radical right.
TABLE 5.1 – PROPORTION OF POPULIST AND RADICAL RIGHT MEPS, EP4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency (n)</th>
<th>Percent (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Populist 0</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populist 1</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1361</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5.2 – PROPORTION OF POPULIST AND RADICAL RIGHT MEPS, EP5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency (n)</th>
<th>Percent (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Populist 0</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>83.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populist 1</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1093</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total number of cases in the fourth European Parliament term was 1361, of which 307 or 22.6% were populist or radical right (i.e. 1). The total number of cases in the fifth term was 1093, and the number of populist or radical right MEPs was 176, comprising 16.1% of cases.

Tables 5.3 and 5.4 overleaf illustrate the proportion of rapporteurs to be found in this group of populist or radical right MEPs. These are purely descriptive statistics, without any analytical or explanatory component, to see if there is any relationship between two categorical variables (i.e. is X a member of a populist or radical right party? Yes (1)/No (2). Is X a rapporteur? Yes (1)/No (2)). In order to see if there is a relationship between two categorical variables, I used Pearson’s chi-square test, which is based on the idea of comparing frequencies observed in certain categories to the frequencies one might expect to get if the two variables were independent of each other. Pearson’s chi-square ($\chi^2$) is represented by the following equation, where $i$ and $j$ represent the rows and columns of the table respectively:

$$\chi^2 = \sum \frac{(Observed_{ij} - Model_{ij})^2}{Model_{ij}}$$
For the chi-square to be meaningful, each case must contribute to only one cell of the contingency table, and expected frequencies in a chi-square test should be greater than 5. It is acceptable to have 20% of expected frequencies below 5 in larger contingency tables (although never below 1), but this results in a weaker analysis as the test might not detect a genuine effect.

As statistically significant relationships can be determined between variables, even with relatively small differences in cell frequencies, I have included row and column percentages in order to interpret any effects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5.3 – CROSSTABULATION OF POPULIST/RADICAL RIGHT RAPPORTEURS, EP4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rapporteur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the fourth European Parliament term, 11% of rapporteurs were populist or radical right MEPs, which comprised 22.1% of all populist and radical right MEPs. In the fifth term (shown in Table 5.4 overleaf), where the overall number of cases was lower, 8.5% of rapporteurs were populist or radical right MEPs, and this represented 28.4% of all populist and radical right MEPs.
In both parliamentary terms, all expected cell frequencies were greater than 5. There was a statistically significant association across both Parliaments between populism and the propensity to act as a rapporteur, with \( x^2 = 84.427, p < .001 \) in the fourth term, and \( x^2 = 53.185, p = < .001 \) in the fifth term.

In addition, there was a moderately strong association across both parliamentary terms between populism and the likelihood of acting as a rapporteur. Using the *phi* measure of strength of association between two variables, \( \varphi = -0.249, p = < .001 \) in the fourth term, and \( \varphi = -0.221, p = < .001 \) in the fifth parliamentary term, suggesting that being a populist has a negative effect on a MEP’s chances of acting as a rapporteur. This basic analysis, however, did not control for any additional variables, such as a member’s distance from the party group or national party ideological distance; expertise; committee chair; activity; national government; Euroscepticism; or gender.

In order to develop a more comprehensive model of rapporteurship allocation in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms I carried out a binomial logistic regression, including variables in addition to populism. Binomial regression was chosen because the dependent variable was a dichotomous categorical variable (i.e. does X get a rapporteurship or not? Yes (1)/No (0)) and the predictor variables were either categorical or continuous. Logistic regression allows us to predict which of two categories an individual (or case) is likely to
belong to given other specified information; in this case, predicting whether or not a MEP gets a rapporteurship.

In simple linear regression, where the dependent variable is continuous, the outcome variable is predicted from the equation of a straight line. Unlike linear regression, we are not trying to ascertain the predicted value of the dependent variable, but of the probability of being in one or other category of the dependent variable given the independent predictor variables. In multiple regression there are several predictors, each with its own coefficient. The outcome variable \((Y)\) is predicted from a combination of each predictor variable multiplied by its respective regression coefficient. In binomial logistic regression, a transformation is applied which means that the logit of the dependent variable is predicted rather than the category of the binominal logistic regression directly. A binomial logistic regression model with, for example, four independent variables, is represented by the following equation, where \(X1\) to \(X4\) inclusive are the independent variables and \(Y\) is the dependent variable:

\[
\text{logit}(Y) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \beta_4 X_4 + \epsilon
\]

The intercept, or constant, is represented by \(\beta_0\), \(\beta_1\) is the slope coefficient for \(X_1\), etc, and \(\epsilon\) represents the errors.

In linear regression, the assumption is that the relationship between the variables is linear. In binomial logistic regression, where we have a dichotomous dependent variable, obtaining a linear result is problematic. In order to generate a linear relationship, the data can be transformed using a logarithmic transformation, in order to make the form of the relationship linear while still leaving the relationship itself as non-linear.

In linear regression, the correlation coefficient \(R\) and the corresponding \(R^2\) (i.e. Pearson’s correlation between observed values and those predicted by the regression model) are good measures of how well the model fits the data. In binomial regression it is possible to create a version of the multiple correlation, which is known as the \(R\)-statistic, which indicates the partial correlation between the individual predictor variables and the outcome variable. These vary between -1 and +1, with a positive value indicating that the likelihood of the event occurring (in this case, whether or not a MEP gets a rapporteurship) increases with the
predictor variable. If a variable has only a small $R$ value, it only contributes slightly to the model. $R$ is represented by the following equation:

$$R = \pm \sqrt{Wald - (2 \times df) \over -2LL(Original)}$$

$-2LL$ indicates the $-2$ log-likelihood for the original model, which is the measure used to assess the fit of the model using the observed and predicted values. The Wald statistic has a chi-square distribution and, like the $t$-test in linear regression, it tells us whether the $b$-coefficient for the individual predictor is significantly different from zero. This enables us to tell how well the model fits each individual predictor variable, as well as the overall data.

Binomial logistic regression was carried out for both parliamentary terms. Like Yoshinaka et al, I did not pool the data from both terms into one model but kept them as separate analyses. This is primarily because Hix, Noury and Roland’s (2003) measures of ideology are not designed to be comparable across terms. In addition, there were changes in party groups and in procedures from the fourth to the fifth term that could have resulted in inappropriate or inaccurate assumptions being made about the aggregate data, should both terms have been pooled.

The continuous variables (i.e. activity, Chapel Hill Euroscepticism, and distance from party group and national party ideological medians on two dimensions) were assessed for linearity using the procedure set out by Box and Tidwell (1962). A Bonferroni correction (see Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007) was applied using all 20 terms in the model, which resulted in statistical significance being accepted when $p < .0025$. It was, therefore, found that all continuous independent variables – across both parliamentary terms and, thus, both models – were linearly related to the logit of the dependent variable.

I initially evaluated the contribution of each of the independent variables to the model, and their statistical significance. Table 5.5 overleaf illustrates the significance of each of the variables in the first model of the fourth European Parliament term.
TABLE 5.5– VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION, EP4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>$B$</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>$p^*$</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>95% C.I. for Odds Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.128</td>
<td>.144</td>
<td>.788</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.375</td>
<td>.880</td>
<td>.663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Chair</td>
<td>1.988</td>
<td>.478</td>
<td>17.329</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>7.303</td>
<td>2.864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>.322</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.571</td>
<td>1.080</td>
<td>.829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Legislature</td>
<td>-.145</td>
<td>.265</td>
<td>.300</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.584</td>
<td>.865</td>
<td>.514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>3.054</td>
<td>.336</td>
<td>82.446</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>21.207</td>
<td>10.969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Expert</td>
<td>.380</td>
<td>.144</td>
<td>7.010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>1.463</td>
<td>1.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Member State</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.958</td>
<td>.993</td>
<td>.761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Government</td>
<td>.188</td>
<td>.261</td>
<td>.518</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.472</td>
<td>1.207</td>
<td>.723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapel Hill</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>18.346</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.244</td>
<td>1.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populist/Radical Right</td>
<td>-.733</td>
<td>.188</td>
<td>15.245</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.481</td>
<td>.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from Party Group Median on 1st Dimension</td>
<td>-.040</td>
<td>.857</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.963</td>
<td>.961</td>
<td>.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from Party Group Median on 2nd Dimension</td>
<td>.983</td>
<td>.413</td>
<td>5.667</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>2.672</td>
<td>1.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from National Party Median on 1st Dimension</td>
<td>-2.482</td>
<td>1.894</td>
<td>1.717</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.190</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from National Party Median on 2nd Dimension</td>
<td>-.545</td>
<td>.403</td>
<td>1.823</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.177</td>
<td>.580</td>
<td>.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.661</td>
<td>.419</td>
<td>76.431</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*with probability at $p =< .05$ level
From the first model run for the fourth European Parliament term, Populism/Radical Right is signed in the direction we would expect. We can see from the odds ratio that, for each unit increase in the independent variable (i.e. from 0 (not populist or radical right) to 1 (populist or radical right)), a MEP is 0.481 times less likely to act as a rapporteur. If we invert the odds ratio, for clarity (i.e. \( \frac{1}{0.481} = 2.079 \)), for each unit reduction in the independent variable, the odds of being a rapporteur increases by a factor of 2.079. That means that a MEP who is a member of a populist or radical right party is approximately half as likely (i.e. 0.481) to get a report as a MEP who is a member of a non-populist or radical right party, who is approximately twice as likely (i.e. 2.079) to act as a rapporteur.

Euroscepticism is also signed in the way we would expect: for every unit increase on the Chapel Hill scale, the odds of a MEP being a rapporteur increase by 1.244. This means that the further up the Euroscepticism scale a MEP is (i.e. the more pro-Europe the MEP is), the more likely s/he is to hold a report. The impact of Eurosceptic sentiment on a member’s chances of acting as a rapporteur is discussed further in the next section of this chapter, where we consider the interaction between the predicted probabilities of acting as a rapporteur and a MEP’s position on the Chapel Hill Euroscepticism scale. We can also see that Committee Chair (\( p = <.001 \)), Activity (\( p = <.001 \)), and Committee Expert (\( p = .008 \)) are signed positively. These results correspond to Yoshinaka’s findings that rapporteurs are technical experts aiming for consensus in the parliament and that, as expected, activity and the likelihood of being a rapporteur are linked. In terms of partisanship, only one measure of a member’s distance from the ideological median was statistically significant: Distance from Party Group Median on 2nd Dimension (\( p = .017 \)). As the second dimension measures attitudes towards European integration, this is particularly interesting given that Euroscepticism added significantly to the model (\( p = <.001 \)). Most interesting for this analysis is that Populist/Radical Right was also statistically significant (\( p = <.001 \)) in the expected direction. The variables that did not add significantly to the model were Gender, Seniority, Previous Legislature, Large Member State, National Government, and
the other three measures of a member’s distance from party group and national party median.

The two main purposes of logistic regression are to determine which, if any, independent variables statistically significantly affect the dependent variable, and how well the overall model predicts the dependent variable. I ran the analysis for both terms initially without the populism and radical right variable, but with all other relevant independent variables, then ran the analysis again with the populism variable included. The model coefficients suggest that the models without populism were poorly fitting models, unlike those models that included populism. Table 5.6 show the tests of model coefficients as well as the variance explained, for the fourth parliamentary term.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5.6 – MODEL FIT AND VARIANCE EXPLAINED, EP4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WITHOUT Populism/Radical Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Coefficient (sig)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance Explained (Nagelkerke $R^2$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*with probability at $p = .05$ level

In the analysis of the overall model of the fourth European Parliament term we see that both models are statistically significant. However, more variance (26.0%) is explained when populism is included in the model, compared with 24.6% when it is not included in the model.

Table 5.7 overleaf illustrates the effect of the same independent variables on the dependent variable (i.e. acting as a rapporteur) in the fifth European Parliament term.

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33 Yoshinaka et al (2010) did not report the findings of the control variables, so it is not possible to make an assessment on the extent to which the findings in this piece of research are similar.
TABLE 5.7– VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION, EP5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>p*</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>95% C.I. for Odds Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.192</td>
<td>.163</td>
<td>1.386</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.239</td>
<td>.826</td>
<td>.600–1.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Chair</td>
<td>2.974</td>
<td>1.037</td>
<td>8.224</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>19.578</td>
<td>2.564–149.490</td>
</tr>
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<td>Seniority</td>
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<td>.110</td>
<td>3.548</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.812</td>
<td>.654–1.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Legislature</td>
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<td>.224</td>
<td>2.623</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>1.438</td>
<td>.927–2.230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>3.518</td>
<td>.388</td>
<td>82.217</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>33.716</td>
<td>15.761–72.125</td>
</tr>
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<td>Committee Expert</td>
<td>.616</td>
<td>.163</td>
<td>14.282</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.851</td>
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<td>Large Member State</td>
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<td>.157</td>
<td>6.928</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.661</td>
<td>.486–.900</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Government</td>
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<td>2.058</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.151</td>
<td>1.338</td>
<td>.899–1.990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapel Hill Euroscepticism</td>
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<td>.053</td>
<td>9.932</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>1.182</td>
<td>1.065–1.312</td>
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<tr>
<td>Populist/Radical Right</td>
<td>-.603</td>
<td>.232</td>
<td>6.770</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.547</td>
<td>.347–.862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from Party Group Median on 1st Dimension</td>
<td>-2.128</td>
<td>1.232</td>
<td>2.986</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.011–1.331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from Party Group Median on 2nd Dimension</td>
<td>.232</td>
<td>.919</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.801</td>
<td>1.261</td>
<td>.208–7.634</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distance from National Party Median on 1st Dimension</td>
<td>-.418</td>
<td>.864</td>
<td>.233</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.629</td>
<td>.659</td>
<td>.121–3.582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from National Party Median on 2nd Dimension</td>
<td>-2.097</td>
<td>1.084</td>
<td>3.743</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.123</td>
<td>.015–1.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.862</td>
<td>.476</td>
<td>36.076</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*with probability at p =< .05 level
As with the fourth European Parliament term, the Euroscepticism and Populist/Radical Right variables are statistically significant in determining a MEP's chances of getting a rapporteurship, and the odds ratios are also similar to their values in the first model of the fourth term. Euroscepticism is statistically significant at $p = .002$, and with each unit increase along the Chapel Hill Euroscepticism scale, from 1 at the Eurosceptic end through to 7 at the pro-Europe end, the odds of a MEP getting a report increases by 1.182.

The Populist/Radical Right variable adds significantly to the model at $p = .009$, and, in those cases that are coded as ‘1’ (a populist or radical right MEP), the likelihood of a MEP acting as a rapporteur decreases by .547. In other words, a non-populist or radical right MEP is 1.828 times more likely (i.e. $\frac{1}{.547} = 1.828$) to be a rapporteur than a populist or radical right MEP.

As with the first model, of the fourth European Parliament term, we see that Committee Chair ($p = .004$), Activity ($p =< .001$), and Committee Expert ($p =< .001$) all add significantly to the model. In this model, however, membership of a large member state is also statistically significant ($p = .008$) and, surprisingly, seems to negatively impact a MEP’s chances of getting a report (i.e. the odds ratio is .661 for those from a large member state compared with those who are not.

This could be because, although there was a slightly larger proportion of MEPs from large member states (i.e. France, Germany, Italy or the United Kingdom) in the fifth European Parliamentary term than in the fourth term, (i.e. 59.4% of cases (650) in the fifth term were MEPs from large member states, compared with 56.6% (771) in the fourth term), a smaller proportion of MEPs from large member states in the fifth term were also members of a large European Parliament group (i.e. 24.7% of MEPs in the fifth term were from a large member state and also in a large party group, compared with 30.4% of MEPs in the fourth term). Because we know that membership of a large party group gives MEPs access to more resources, not only in terms of finances and staff, but also in terms of speaking time and access to rapporteurships (see e.g. Hix, 2002), it is possible that, in the fifth European Parliament term, the lower numbers of MEPs from large member states also joining with large party groups results in this variable being
statistically significant in terms of having a negative effect on the likelihood of a MEP acting as a rapporteur.

Table 5.8 sets out the tests of model coefficients and variance explained for the fifth European Parliament term.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5.8 – MODEL FIT AND VARIANCE EXPLAINED IN EP5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WITHOUT Populism/Radical Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Coefficient (sig)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance Explained (Nagelkerke $R^2$)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*with probability at $p = .05$ level

As with the fourth term, both models are statistically significant, but slightly more variance is explained with the inclusion of populism (31.1%) than without (30.1%).

Binomial logistic regression estimates the likelihood of an event (in this case, acting as a rapporteur) occurring, and it is important to test the effectiveness of the predicted outcome against the actual outcome. Table 5.9 shows percentages of accurate predictions without the variables in the model, and with the variables, for both parliamentary terms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5.9 – CLASSIFICATION TABLE, EP4 AND EP5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WITHOUT variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*cut value is .500

The cut value of .500 means that, if the probability of a case being classified into the ‘1’ category (i.e. rapporteur) is greater than .500 then that particular case is classified as ‘1’. Otherwise the case is classified as ‘0’ (i.e. not rapporteur). This classification table shows that 53.3% of cases in the model analysing the fourth European Parliament term and 54.0% in the fifth term could be correctly classified as being either a rapporteur or not, without any independent variables. When the independent variables are included in the model, more cases were correctly predicted as being a rapporteur or not: 67.4% in the first model, analysing the fourth term, and
72.6% in the second model of the fifth term. This suggests that the inclusion of all the relevant independent variables improves the overall prediction of cases into the appropriate observed category of the outcome dependent variables, over both models.

I hypothesised that populist and radical right MEPs would be less likely to act as rapporteurs than their mainstream counterparts. This is due to the prevalence of anti-establishment sentiment in the rhetoric and ideology of populist parties and MEPs. This anti-establishment position is common to populist parties of all types, as well as non-populist radical right parties. Populist parties tend to set themselves up in opposition to the establishment, choosing to present themselves as the champions of the people against an unrepresentative elite.

Although anti-establishment sentiment is common to all populists, how it is expressed varies according to the type of populist party. Radical right wing populists express this anti-establishment position through the concept of nativism, where the nation is divided into natives and non-natives. Radical right wing populists advocate for the natives, however defined, and stand in opposition to the undemocratic elitist establishment which, they claim, is in support of the non-natives against the people. Left wing populists present the establishment in economic terms as a political class that has surrendered to the interests of big business to the detriment of the hard working people. Neoliberal populists combine a liberal economic viewpoint with the promotion of liberal values, which they argue are compromised by political elites.

In the European Parliament, this anti-establishment position is expressed primarily through Euroscepticism. Although not all populist parties are Eurosceptic – the left wing Scottish National Party is an example of a pro-European populist party in the European Parliament – many of them are to a degree. For those populist parties that hold Eurosceptic positions, the European establishment is at odds with the nation and does not have domestic interests at heart. This Euroscepticism is expressed in different ways, according to the ideological and policy emphases on the populist parties. For right wing populists, the European Union is a cultural threat, whereas left wing populists object to European integration due to the economically liberal nature of the European project. Eurosceptic populist parties do not hold a unified stance on the issue of European Union membership, integration, or expansion, and some parties have changed their position over time.
This anti-establishment position means that populist parties, many of whom are Eurosceptic, are less likely to fully participate in the European Parliament’s processes than their mainstream counterparts. This might be shown through MEPs choosing not to join party groups but to remain unattached; having low attendance at committee meetings and plenary debates; or choosing not to act as rapporteurs.

The effect of the measures of populist or radical right MEPs and the measure of Euroscepticism are statistically significant across both European Parliament terms, suggesting that being a populist or radical right MEP has an impact on rapporteurship allocation in the European Parliament. This result is amplified for Eurosceptic MEPs. In addition, the results are signed in the expected way, indicating that being a member of a populist or radical right party has a negative impact on the propensity of a MEP to act as a rapporteur, thus supporting the hypothesis.

II. The impact of Euroscepticism on rapporteurship allocation in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms

Having found that Euroscepticism significantly affects the overall model of rapporteurship allocation, I then ran an analysis looking at this variable in more detail. As part of the logistic regression modelling, I computed the predicted probabilities of a MEP acting as a rapporteur given a variety of independent variables. The predicted probabilities can be calculated using the following formula\(^{34}\):

\[
Pr(Y = 1) = \frac{\exp(\alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2)}{1 + \exp(\alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2)}
\]

The earlier models showed that the more pro-integration is a MEP’s party, the more likely s/he is to act as a rapporteur based on the Chapel Hill measure of preferences on integration. For the purposes of this analysis, the years used were 1996 for the first European Parliament term (using the earlier Ray, Marks and Steenbergen

\(^{34}\) See Field, 2005 for detailed discussion of the calculation of predicted probabilities.
data) and 1999 or 2002 data for the fifth European Parliament term, depending on which political parties were represented in which year. The seven-point scale measures the following positions on European integration: 1 = strongly opposed, 2 = opposed, 3 = somewhat opposed, 4 = neutral, 5 = somewhat in favour, 6 = in favour, and 7 = strongly in favour. Parties measured between 1 and 7, and were also placed between individual units of measurement according to their position. The final scores represent mean values of expert judgements.

As discussed in previous chapters, a party’s position on European integration and European Union membership can vary over time. This means that it is feasible that a party will measure differently from one European Parliamentary term to the next. However, for the purposes of this piece of research, the Chapel Hill measurement taken at the time of data collection is considered an accurate reflection of that party’s position. As the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms are analysed separately rather than in aggregate data, there is no need to take into account variations in political parties’ Eurosceptic position in the datasets. However, this is undoubtedly of crucial import in interpreting results and making extrapolated judgements about the impact of Euroscepticism on a MEP’s propensity to act as a rapporteur.

During the fourth European Parliament term, the predicted probability that a MEP acted as a rapporteur ranged from .18 for the lowest-scoring members (i.e. those MEPs who were most opposed to European integration) to .61 for the highest scoring members (i.e. those who were most in favour of European integration). The median position was .37, for those MEPs who were neutral on the subject of European integration.

In the fifth European Parliament term, the predicted probabilities were .26 for the most Eurosceptic members, and .65 for the MEPs with the most pro-European integration positions. The median position was .45. These results are very strong, and consistent across both models, and suggest that attitudes towards European integration are important in determining rapporteurship allocation in the European Parliament. Those MEPs who are most opposed to European integration are also those who are least likely to get reports, and those members most in favour of European integration are the most likely to act as rapporteurs.
Figure 5.1 illustrates a scatterplot based on the predicted probabilities of the entire model, with all relevant independent variables, with the Chapel Hill variable on the x-axis and predicted probabilities on the y-axis, for the fourth European Parliament term.

![Figure 5.1 - Full Model Scatterplot of Predicted Probabilities and Euroscepticism, EP4](image)

With the predicted probabilities calculated for the entire model, there is a moderate to strong correlation between position on the Chapel Hill scale and the likelihood of a MEP acting as a rapporteur. The general trend is towards a greater propensity for a MEP to act as a rapporteur if s/he scores more highly on the Euroscepticism scale, indicating a more pro-European position. When the Chapel Hill variable is isolated from the overall model, a very strong correlation is seen between
position on the Chapel Hill scale and the likelihood of getting a report, as Figure 5.2 shows.

![Figure 5.2 - Simple Scatterplot of Predicted Probabilities and Euroscepticism, EP4](image)

Figure 5.3 overleaf shows a scatterplot based on the predicted probabilities of the entire second model, with all relevant independent variables, with the Chapel Hill variable on the x-axis and predicted probabilities on the y-axis, for the fifth European Parliament term.
Again, we see a moderate to strong correlation between position on the Chapel Hill measure and a member’s chances of getting a report. Those MEPs who were more pro-European were more likely to act as rapporteurs than those who were opposed to European integration. The correlation is highlighted clearly in Figure 5.4 overleaf, which shows a simple scatterplot of Euroscepticism and predicted probabilities in the fifth term.
In earlier chapters, I hypothesised that Eurosceptic MEPs would be unlikely to act as rapporteurs, and would hold few reports when they do. Euroscepticism is defined as antagonism towards some aspect of European integration. As alluded to in previous chapters, Eurosceptic populist parties do not share the same views on European Union membership, expansion or integration. Neither are all populist parties inherently Eurosceptic. Among right wing Eurosceptic populist parties, the overall criticism of European enlargement is based on ethnic and/or quasi-religious concerns, based upon an idealised view of Europe as the successor to Greek, Roman and subsequent Christian civilisation. However, not all right wing Eurosceptic populist parties are antagonistic to the principle of European membership, integration or enlargement. The Belgian Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest, a radical right wing populist party, for example, holds a
relatively soft Eurosceptic stance in comparison to Euro-rejecting right wing populist parties like the French National Front, which calls for a referendum on France’s membership of the European Union (Startin, 2010, p. 431). The United Kingdom Independence Party, whose *raison d’être* was for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, something the country voted for in 2016, is a non-radical right wing populist party that rejects all forms of European integration. Other right wing populist parties propose alternative forms of European cooperation (Mudde, 2007, p. 165).

Unlike their right wing counterparts, left wing populist parties are more likely to criticise the liberal economic character of the European Union. This is particularly evident in widespread antagonism to monetary integration in the form of a single European currency and denigration of elements of the single market (see e.g. Moschonas, 2001 and Benedetto and Quaglia, 2007). Left wing Eurosceptic parties adopt an element of nationalism when they defend the nation against perceived imperialism from international and supranational institutions. Left wing Eurosceptics tend to view the European Union as an imperialist limitation on the cultural and economic development of the member state. In addition, those left wing populist parties that have links with communist parties of the Cold War period are more likely to be opposed to the European project than newer left wing populist parties, or those left wing parties that have not been influenced by a communist or radical left history. This is because the USSR was vociferously antagonistic to European integration. Many old left wing parties in Europe, that have now changed into modern-day left wing populists, have benefitted from the USSR’s financial and symbolic aid, and so have retained and developed an anti-European position (Benedetto and Quaglia, 2007, p. 484).

Many populist parties specifically express their anti-establishment sentiment in the European context in reference to the European Union, showing themselves to be Eurosceptic, albeit to varying degrees. Radical right wing populist and left wing populist parties are the most likely to be Eurosceptic (see Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008, Vasilopoulou, 2010, and Halkiopoulou et al, 2012). Euroscepticism has been a highly useful electoral lever for many radical left wing and right wing populist parties, in addition to some non-radical right wing populist parties, such as the UK Independence Party. These parties have successfully mobilised on an anti-European integration.
platform, particularly in European Parliament elections, and have consistently differed from mainstream parties on this issue.

Both left and right wing populists who hold Eurosceptic positions have demonstrated similar views on European integration, primarily focused on notions of self-rule and national self-determination. Halkiopoulou et al (2012) argue that this is because nationalism is prevalent in the ideological make up of each party type, in spite of their many differences (Halkiopoulou et al, 2012, p. 505). Nationalism is an ideological tenet shared by the radical left, including many left wing populists, as well as radical right wing populist parties. Despite the distance between mainstream parties on issues of support for, and opposition to, European integration has increased, left wing and radical right wing populists often side together (Halkiopoulou et al, 2012, p. 505).

In spite of this shared antagonism to the European project, however, left wing and radical right wing populists have different ideological bases for their Euroscepticism. Essentially, radical right wing populists focus on issues of cultural and national identity. Left wing Eurosceptics, in contrast, tend to focus their criticism on the market-liberal character of European integration and the single market (Adam and Maier, 2011, p. 437). Although nationalism is prevalent in the Eurosceptic rhetoric of both types of populist party, this tends to be more prominent among radical right wing populists. Left wing populists tend to refer to the threat of European integration on the nation’s economic position, whereas radical right wing populists tend to perceive this threat as being primarily cultural (see e.g. Moschonas, 2001). In addition, those populist parties that display higher levels of nationalism are more likely to hold Eurosceptic positions.

MEPs who are opposed to the European project experience an almost existential dilemma of being representatives in an institution whose very existence they oppose (see Startin, 2010). As a result, I anticipated that their reluctance to engage in the European Parliament's processes, in terms of either the party group system, or the committees system, and their Euroscepticism would be evident in their lack of participation in the process of rapporteurship. The results presented in this section would appear to support this hypothesis. Using the Chapel Hill measure of Euroscepticism, there was a moderate to strong correlation between Euroscepticism and the likelihood of a MEP writing a report. Those MEPs who scored higher on the
scale, indicating pro-European positions, were much more likely to write reports than those who scored low down the scale, indicating anti-European positions.

The explanation for this situation is multi-factorial. Some MEPs may choose not to participate in the process of rapporteurship. We know that many Eurosceptic MEPs refuse to engage with the political procedures in the European Parliament because they do not believe in the existence of the institution in which they work. For example, former leader of the non-radical right wing populist UK Independence Party, Nigel Farage, attended only one of 42 meetings of the Fisheries Committee, of which he was a member for three years. Rapporteurs also have conflicting interests. Benedetto (2005) argues that the main role of a rapporteur is to maximise consensus as they are expected to negotiate both with the Commission and the Council and also across party groups (Benedetto, 2005, p. 67). This is a role difficult for many Eurosceptic populist parties, especially ultranationalist Eurosceptics, to fill, as they struggle to cooperate in transnational party groups (see Startin, 2010, and MacKenzie, 2015b).

Rapporteurs are also expected to represent the interests of both their national party and their European Parliament party group. This means their opportunity to present a partisan position is restricted. Because party groups in the European Parliament are multinational and so represent diverse policy positions, in spite of their ideological affinity, any partisan positions held by rapporteurs must be agreeable to their fellow group members. This means there is sometimes conflict between domestic policy goals and party group positions (Yoshinaka et al, 2010, p. 465). This, therefore, limits the potential that Eurosceptic MEPs have to promote their anti-EU agenda.

Combined with this is the focus on consensus building and compromise enshrined in the processes and institutions of the European Parliament (see Corbett et al, 2011). MEPs who fail to participate in this consensual decision-making process are excluded so with, Eurosceptic MEPs, we have a ‘double whammy’ situation whereby their Eurosceptic sentiment prohibits them from fully participating in an institution they oppose, and the institution itself stands in opposition to them in terms of restricting their opportunities to act as rapporteurs. Chapter 6 further explains the impact of Eurosceptic sentiment on a MEP’s chances of acting as a rapporteur, in terms of the

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For analysis of MEPs’ behaviour and activity in terms of attendance, voting, reports drafted, etc. the VoteWatch website is particularly useful. See www.votewatch.eu for more information.
effect that Eurosceptic Euromanifesto positions have on the level of MEPs’ engagement with the rapporteurship process.

### III. The impact of domestic governance on rapporteurship allocation among populist and radical right MEPs in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms

Høyland (2006) found that MEPs from parties in domestic government are more likely to act as rapporteurs co-decision dossiers. He argues this is because governing parties have representatives in the Council, so rapporteurs from parties in government tend to coordinate their proposals with their corresponding delegates in the Council. As a result, Høyland argues, they are more likely to be more interested in writing co-decision reports than MEPs from national parties that do not have representation at Council level.

My final hypothesis seeks to test this finding for populist and radical right MEPs in particular. Although Høyland’s findings focused on MEPs whose parties had representatives at Council level, and populist or radical right parties in government are invariably junior partners in a coalition government, the likelihood of populist or radical right parties gaining key cabinet portfolios is low (see McEnhill, 2015). This means that they are unlikely to have representatives from the same party in the Council, as their senior coalition partners are more likely to return delegates. However, all coalition parties are concerned with the coalition as a whole doing well, and junior ministers often have the opportunity to attend Council meetings (see Corbett et al, 2011). This means there is no sound reason to suggest that the effect of national government will be any different for populist or radical right parties than it is for governing parties in general.

A national government dummy variable was created, and all parties were coded for national government during the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms. Parties were given a score of ‘0’ if they were not in national government at any point during the corresponding European Parliament term, ‘0.5’ if they were in government for any part
of the term, and ‘1’ if they were in government for the whole European Parliament term. Because national elections do not necessarily correspond to European Parliament elections, and governing terms at the national level might not be the same length as the set five-year European Parliament term, parties might have been in government for the duration of a national electoral term but only for part of the European Parliament term.

In order to test for any effect of national government on populist and radical right parties, interaction terms were used as part of the logistic regression process modelling rapporteurship allocation in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms. Interactions in this context allowed me to test whether the relationship between the likelihood of acting as a rapporteur and membership of a party in national government is the same or different for populist and radical MEPs than for non-populist MEPs. The presence of a significant interaction suggests that the effect of one predictor (independent) variable on the outcome (dependent) variable is different at different values of the other independent variable. This is tested by adding into the model a term where two independent variables are multiplied. Adding an interaction term to a model changes the interpretation of all the relevant coefficients (i.e. national government and populism).

In a binomial regression analysis, the equation used to assess the predictive effect of two independent variables (represented by $X$ and $Z$) is:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1(X) + \beta_2(Z) + e$$

In the two-variable formula, there is only one $\beta$ coefficient. With two independent variables $X$ and $Z$ explaining $Y$, there are two different $\beta$ coefficients. Coefficient $\beta_1$ represents the effect of variable $X$ on variable $Y$ whilst controlling for the effect of variable $Z$. Coefficient $\beta_2$ represents the effect of variable $Z$ on variable $Y$ whilst controlling for variable $X$.

When an interaction term is added to the model, the regression equation used is:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1(X) + \beta_2(Z) + \beta_3(XZ) + e$$

Here, $XZ$ is a product of the first two variables, and $\beta_3$ can be interpreted as as the amount of change there is in the slope of the regression of the dependent variable $Y$.
on the independent variable $X$ when the second independent variable $Z$ changes by one unit.

With the interaction term added to the models for the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, the models were once again statistically significant, with $p = < .001$ for both terms. With the full model, including the interaction term, 27.5% of the variance was explained for the fourth term, and 31% for the fifth term, using the Nagelkerke $R^2$ assessment. Tables 5.10 and 5.11 overleaf show the relevant variables in the equation for the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms. Although this analysis was based on the full models of rapporteurship allocation, with all independent variables included, I have just illustrated the variables relevant for the interaction (i.e. National Government, Populist/Radical Right, and National Government*Populist/Radical Right) in the tables.
### TABLE 5.10 – VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION, EP4 (INTERACTION TERM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p*</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>95% C.I. for Odds Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Government</td>
<td>-.076</td>
<td>.275</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.782</td>
<td>.927</td>
<td>.540 - 1.590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populist/Radical Right</td>
<td>-1.618</td>
<td>.367</td>
<td>19.461</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>.097 - .407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Government*Populist/Radical Right</td>
<td>1.781</td>
<td>.643</td>
<td>7.677</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>5.933</td>
<td>1.684 - 20.906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>.435</td>
<td>61.111</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*with probability at $p = < .05$ level

### TABLE 5.11 – VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION, EP5 (INTERACTION TERM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p*</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>95% C.I. for Odds Ratio</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Government</td>
<td>.276</td>
<td>.214</td>
<td>1.668</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>1.318</td>
<td>.867 - 2.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populist/Radical Right</td>
<td>-.652</td>
<td>.322</td>
<td>4.103</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.521</td>
<td>.277 - .979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Government*Populist/Radical Right</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>.591</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.828</td>
<td>1.138</td>
<td>.357 - 3.626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.860</td>
<td>.477</td>
<td>35.999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*with probability at $p = < .05$ level

143
The first interesting thing to note here is that the interaction between the independent variables National Government and Populist/Radical Right is not at all significant in the second model of the fifth European Parliament term ($p = .828$). This would suggest that being a populist or radical right MEP does not significantly affect the impact of national government on a member’s chances of being a rapporteur (and vice versa: being a member of a party in national government does not statistically affect the impact of being a populist or radical right MEP on a member’s chances of acting as a rapporteur). In fact, if we look back at the original model, without the interaction term, we can see that National Government did not significantly affect the model at all ($p = .151$), suggesting that this was not a factor in determining the allocation of reports, whereas Populist/Radical Right did significantly add to the model ($p = .009$). With the interaction term included in the model, Populist/Radical Right is still a statistically significant variable ($p = .043$).

The results for the fourth European Parliament term, however, are different. There is a significant interaction between National Government and Populist/Radical Right ($p = .006$). In order to assess the effect more accurately, I disaggregated the data and created dummy variables for the different levels of the National Government variable (i.e. ‘1’ = in government for the full European Parliament term, ‘0.5’ = in government for part of the term, and ‘0’ = not in government for any part of the European Parliament term), and also for the two levels of the Populist/Radical Right variable (i.e. ‘1’ = populist or radical right and ‘0’ = non-populist radical right). After running the analysis again, I found that there was a strong measure of collinearity for the National Government dummy variable representing 0.5 (i.e. in government for party of the term) and other dummy variables. I then recoded the National Government variable into a new dummy variable with only two categories (i.e. ‘1’ = in government for part of, or the whole, European Parliament term, and ‘0’ = not in government for any part of the term) and re-ran the analysis with interaction terms for each of the National Government dummy variables and each of the Populist/Radical Right dummy variables. Table 5.12 overleaf shows the relevant variables in the equation for the fourth term, including interaction terms. Although the analysis was run for the full model of rapporteurship allocation, with all relevant independent variables
included, the table only shows the variables relevant for analysis of the interactions (i.e. National Government, Populist/Radical Right, National Government*Populist Radical Right, National Government (Recoded)*Populist/Radical Right, National Government (Recoded)*Non-Populist/Radical Right).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p*</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>95% C.I. for Odds Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Government</td>
<td>.419</td>
<td>.512</td>
<td>.670</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.413</td>
<td>1.521</td>
<td>.558 - 4.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populist/Radical Right</td>
<td>-1.845</td>
<td>.425</td>
<td>18.892</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.158</td>
<td>.069 - .363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Government*Populist/Radical Right</td>
<td>.763</td>
<td>1.130</td>
<td>.456</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.499</td>
<td>2.144</td>
<td>.234 - 19.629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Government (Recoded)*Populist/Radical Right</td>
<td>.426</td>
<td>.713</td>
<td>.357</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.550</td>
<td>1.531</td>
<td>.379 - 6.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Government (Recoded)*Non-Populist/Radical Right</td>
<td>-.448</td>
<td>.391</td>
<td>1.313</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.252</td>
<td>.639</td>
<td>.297 - 1.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.488</td>
<td>.443</td>
<td>61.848</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*with probability at p = < .05 level
With the recoded variables, although the model is highly significant ($p \leq 0.001$), and goodness-of-fit test is not significant ($p = .119$), suggesting that the model is a good fit, it becomes apparent that there is no significant interaction between the National Government and the Populist/Radical Right variables. Although the Populist/Radical Right variable remains highly significant ($p \leq 0.001$) there is no longer any significant interaction between National Government and Populist/Radical Right. Considering that National Government was not significant in either of the original regression models, without interactions, and it was not statistically significant in the interaction model of the fifth term, it is possible that the interaction term in the model of the fourth term was providing a false $p$ value. In order to rule out any statistically significant effect of populism on the impact of government participation in rapporteurship allocation, I ran some simple descriptive statistics to understand the proportions of populist MEPs in government acting as rapporteurs in comparison with non-populist MEPs from parties in domestic governance. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 overleaf illustrate descriptive statistics relating to national government participation and populism.
FIGURE 5.5 – RAPPORTEURS (n) IN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, EP5

The chart above shows that MEPs from parties in national government were more likely than not to act as rapporteurs. This situation was not mirrored among populist or radical right MEPs, who were much less likely to act as rapporteurs in general, even when they were members of parties in national government. In addition, there were much fewer populist or radical right MEPs in national government than their non-populist or radical right counterparts. Figure 5.6 overleaf shows rapporteurs from parties not in national government during the fourth European Parliament term.
Again, populist and radical right MEPs were much less likely to act as rapporteurs than non-populist or radical right members. In addition, MEPs from parties not in national government were more likely to not be rapporteurs and, when we compare this chart with Figure 5.5 above, we can see the disparity in rapporteurships between MEPs from parties in national government and those not in national government: approximately four times as many rapporteurs were from parties in national government than from parties not in national government.

In order to assess whether it is possible to observe a correlation between national government and rapporteurship, and whether this affect might be different for populist and radical right MEPs than for MEPs in general, I ran a second analysis of the fourth European Parliament term with a slightly different model. Instead of using the likelihood of rapporteurships as the dependent variable, I selected the number of reports to see if there was any relationship between national government participation and the number of reports held. I also
performed an interaction between government participation and populism, using a two-way ANOVA.

Factorial ANOVA is an analysis of variance involving two or more independent variables or predictors, and two-way ANOVA is conceptually similar to one-way ANOVA. We find the total sum of squared errors (\(SS_T\)) and break this down into variance explained (\(SS_M\)) and variance that cannot be explained (\(SS_A\)). In a multi-way ANOVA, we break the model sum of squares down into variance that is explained by the first independent variable (\(SS_A\)), variance explained by the second independent variable (\(SS_B\)) – and so on for each independent variable – and variance explained by the interaction of these variables (e.g. \(SS_{A\times B}\) for a model with two independent variables). The total sum of squared errors is indicated using this equation:

\[ SS_T = s_{\text{grand}}^2(N - 1) \]

The model sum of squares – which is broken into the various components of variance explained by the first variable, that explained by the second variable and variance explained by the interaction of these two (or more) variables – is calculated using this equation:

\[ SS_M = \Sigma n_k(\bar{X}_k - \bar{X}_{\text{grand}})^2 \]

In order to determine how much variance is explained by the interaction of several independent variables (i.e. the interaction term), we can use subtraction. The equation for an interaction term of two variables is as follows:

\[ SS_{A\times B} = SS_M - SS_A - SS_B \]

The degrees of freedom can be calculated in the same way:

\[ df_{A\times B} = df_M - df_A - df_B \]

The residual sum of squares (\(SS_R\)) represents the variance that cannot be explained by factors that have been statistically manipulated. The value is calculated by taking the squared error between each data point and the corresponding group mean. The equation for this is as follows:

\[ SS_R = s_{\text{group1}}^2(n_1 - 1) + s_{\text{group2}}^2(n_2 - 1) + s_{\text{group3}}^2(n_3 - 1) + \cdots + s_{\text{groupn}}^2(n_n - 1) \]
Each effect in a multi-way ANOVA (the main effects calculated from the independent variables, and the interaction effect) has its own $F$-ratio, which is calculated first by calculating the mean squares for each effect, and then by calculating a mean squares for the residual term. In a two-way ANOVA, this would be represented by this equation:

\[
MS_A = \frac{SS_A}{df_A} \\
MS_B = \frac{SS_B}{df_B} \\
MS_{A\times B} = \frac{SS_{A\times B}}{df_{A\times B}} \\
MS_R = \frac{SS_R}{df_R}
\]

To calculate the $F$-ratios for the independent variables and their interactions, their mean squares are divided by the residual mean squares. In a two-way ANOVA, this would be represented by the following equation:

\[
F_A = \frac{MS_A}{MS_R} \\
F_B = \frac{MS_B}{MS_R} \\
F_{A\times B} = \frac{MS_{A\times B}}{MS_R}
\]

Each of these $F$-ratios can show whether these effects are likely to have arisen by chance, or if they reflect an effect of statistical manipulation. If an observed $F$-ratio exceeds the corresponding critical value, it is deemed significant.

A two-way ANOVA was conducted for the first model of the fourth European Parliament term, as it was this term that seemed to initially show a statistically significant result for the interaction term added to the binomial logistic regression model. The dependent variable used in this second analysis was the Number of Reports, rather than Rapporteur, to assess whether the effect of national government participation was different on populist or radical right MEPs.
than on non-populist or radical right members, in terms of the number of reports allocated.

Initially the profile plots produced by the ANOVA test, which are useful for giving an initial impression of the data, suggested a significant ordinal interaction between the two independent variables. They seemed to suggest that, although populist or radical right MEPs receive fewer reports than rapporteurs in general, the number of reports increases for all MEPs (both populist or radical right and non-populist or radical right) who participated in national government for part of the European Parliament term. What was most interesting, however, was that the effect of national government participation for the entire term was different for populist or radical right MEPs than for other members. While non-populist or radical right MEPs who were from parties in government received fewer reports if they were in national government for the duration of the European Parliament term, populist or radical right MEPs in national government for the whole term received slightly more reports than those who were from parties either not in national government at all or in government for only part of the term. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 overleaf show the profile plots, illustrating this effect graphically.
FIGURE 5.7 – ESTIMATED MARGINAL MEANS OF NUMBER OF REPORTS, EP4

Estimated Marginal Means

National Government

0 0.5 1

0 0.5 1

0 0.5 1

0 0.5 1

0 0.5 1
However, this apparent effect of national government participation on populist or radical right MEPs was not found to be statistically significant ($F(2, 1355) = .229, p = .795, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .000$). Nonetheless, discovering a non-statistically significant interaction does not mean that an interaction effect is entirely absent from the population (see e.g. Fox, 2008 and Faraway, 2015). In fact, it is rarely thought that there are no interactions at all between two independent variables, and not rejecting the null hypothesis does not necessarily mean accepting it (see e.g. Searle, 2006). In this situation, anticipating that there was some effect between the two variables, even if the effect did not entirely explain the allocation of reports or the number of reports held by rapporteurs, I further analysed the data by interpreting the main effects and using Type III sum of squares. This is generally the recommended method for analysing non-significant data when one anticipates that there is an effect occurring. This method analyses
unweighted marginal means and is widely considered to provide valid results even if the principle of marginality is violated\textsuperscript{37}. Table 5.13 overleaf illustrates some of the main statistics in this analysis.

\textsuperscript{37} For detailed discussion of this area of analysis, see Maxwell and Delaney, 2004; Fox, 2008; and Stevens, 2009.
TABLE 5.13 – TEST OF BETWEEN-SUBJECTS EFFECTS, EP4  
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE – NUMBER OF REPORTS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Type III Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p*</th>
<th>Partial $\eta^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Model</td>
<td>284.165</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>56.833</td>
<td>10.758</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>520.195</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>520.195</td>
<td>98.467</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populist/Radical Right</td>
<td>70.550</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>70.550</td>
<td>13.354</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Government</td>
<td>72.068</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36.034</td>
<td>6.821</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populist/Radical Right*National</td>
<td>2.420</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.210</td>
<td>.229</td>
<td>.795</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>7158.346</td>
<td>1355</td>
<td>5.283</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>9802.000</td>
<td>1361</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Total</td>
<td>7442.511</td>
<td>1360</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*with probability at $p = .05$ level
The significance value for the main effect of the Populist/Radical Right variable on the number of reports allocated was statistically significant \( F(1, 1355) = 13.354, p < .001, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .010 \). However, because this is a result of an interaction, it is misleading. It is not possible to assert, based on this test, that the Populist/Radical Right variable had an effect on the dependent variable Number of Reports, because there is an ordinal interaction with National Government present. There was, however, a statistically significant main effect of National Government \( F(2, 1355) = 6.821, p = .001, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .010 \).

All pairwise comparisons were run, with reported 95\% confidence intervals and \( p \) values that were Bonferroni-adjusted. The unweighted marginal means (where data are mean ± standard error) of Number of Reports scores for populist or radical right and non-populist or radical right rapporteurs were 1.172 ± .266 for those in national government for the duration of the entire European Parliament term; 1.261 ± .098 for those in national government for part of the European Parliament term; and .663 ± .130 for those not in government at any point during the fourth European Parliament term.

Table 5.14 overleaf shows the relevant pairwise statistics for the effect of National Government on the number of reports allocated.
### TABLE. 5.14 – PAIRWISE COMPARISONS FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, EP4
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE – NUMBER OF REPORTS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(I) National Government</th>
<th>(J) National Government</th>
<th>Mean Difference (I-J)</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>( p^{*+} )</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval for Difference*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-.599</td>
<td>.163</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>-.990 - .207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-.510</td>
<td>.296</td>
<td>.257</td>
<td>1.219 - .200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.599</td>
<td>.163</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.207 - .990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.283</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.990 - .769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.510</td>
<td>.296</td>
<td>.257</td>
<td>-.200 - 1.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-.089</td>
<td>.283</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.769 - .590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*with probability at \( p = .05 \) level

* with adjustment for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni)
The only statistically significant difference in the Number of Reports score was between those rapporteurs who were not in national government at any point during the fourth European Parliament term, and those who were in government for part of the term \((p = .001)\). There was no statistically significant difference between the other categories of the variable (i.e. between members who were not in government at any point during the term and those who were in government for the duration of the European Parliament term \((p = .257)\), or between those rapporteurs who were in national government for part of the term and those in government for the entire term \((p = 1.000)\)).

Being a member of a party in national government for part of the fourth European Parliament term was associated with a mean Number of Reports score \(.599 (95\% \text{ CI}, .207 \text{ to } .990)\) points higher than being a member of a party not in national government for any part of the fourth term, a difference which was statistically significant \((p = .001)\).

Figure 5.9 overleaf graphically represents the mean number of reports for rapporteurs in different categories of national government participation during the fourth European Parliament term.
Having run interaction terms in regression analysis models of both the fourth and fifth European Parliament term, it was concluded that there was no significant interaction between the Populist/Radical Right and the National Government variables for the fifth term. A statistically significant result seemed to be found in the fourth term, so the data was disaggregated and the analysis run again with the interaction term. This time, there was no significant result, so I concluded that the statistically significant result found in the first regression model with interactions was, in fact, a false result influenced by the existence of other variables in the analysis.

When an ANOVA was conducted for the fourth European Parliament term, the dependent variable was Number of Reports, rather than Rapporteur. Initially, there was no significant result for the interaction between the two independent variables, suggesting that the impact of being in national government did not affect populist or radical right MEPs any differently than other members. In addition, there was no statistically significant result to suggest that being a member of a part
in national government actually affects the number of reports held by rapporteurs in general.

However, the likelihood of there being zero interaction between the two variables was low, so I ran an assessment using Type III sum of squares. Although there was a significant result for the Populist/Radical Right variable, this was considered misleading as it was not possible to separate this result from the interaction with National Government, in this analysis. There was a statistically significant result between rapporteurs who were not in government at any point during the fourth European Parliament term and those who were in government for part of the term, but not between any other comparison groups. It was possible to state that being a member of a party in national government for part of the term was associated with a mean Number of Reports score .599 (95% CI, .207 to .990) points higher than being a member of a party not in national government for any part of the fourth term. This suggests that being in government for part of the term resulted in rapporteurs receiving more reports than those not in government at all.

However, given the low significance of the results overall, in terms of the regression analysis and the ANOVA results, it is not possible to state that being in national government has an effect on either rapporteurship allocation or the number of reports. Neither is it possible to argue that being a member of a party in national government affects populist and radical right MEPs differently from MEPs in general.

I hypothesised that MEPs from populist and radical right parties in government will be more likely to act as rapporteurs than their counterparts from political parties not in domestic government. This is because MEPs, while influenced by their national party in general, are more likely to be influenced when their national party is in government. This is primarily because national parties in government are also represented in the Council and pressure is brought to bear on MEPs to ensure legislation adopted by the Council is passed through the European Parliament (see Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007).

In addition, Høyland (2006) contends that MEPs from governing parties are not only more influenced by their national party but are more likely to act as rapporteurs in codecision legislation, such as that of the European Parliament. He
argues this is because rapporteurs from governing parties, which are represented in the Council, might incur lower costs if they coordinate their proposals with actors in the Council. This means they might be more interested in writing codecision reports than MEPs whose national parties are not represented in the Council (Høyland, 2006, p. 30). Not only are MEPs from governing parties more likely to act as rapporteurs, they are also more likely than those from opposition parties to support amendments to legislation at the second reading stage. There is also evidence to suggest that the effect of governing national party influence on the legislative behaviour of MEPs is more pronounced for MEPs from niche parties (Jensen and Spoon, 2010, p. 174). Jensen and Spoon (2010) conducted replication research using the models and variables produced by Hix et al (2007) measuring the effects of national government participation on MEPs’ legislative behaviour, and applied them specifically to niche parties.

However, the findings show that there is no significant interaction between the national government variable and the rapporteur outcome variable. As a result, in this piece of research, I cannot support Høyland’s (2006) finding that MEPs from parties in national government tend to be, in general, more active as rapporteurs due to the existence of conversant actors in the Council. When all other variables are taken into account, participation in national government during the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms did not seem to have a determining factor in terms of either general rapporteurship allocation, or on the number of reports held by rapporteurs. In addition, there was no significant difference in terms of the effect of national government participation on populist or radical right MEPs. Therefore, these particular hypotheses were not supported.
CHAPTER 5 – WHAT TYPE OF REPORTS? A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF POPULIST RAPPORTEURS’ REPORTS

The qualitative element of this piece of research seeks to analyse the link between populist parties’ policy aims and the types of reports they receive in the European Parliament. The expectation is that the ideological positions of populist or radical right parties may explain the choice of reports.

Previous literature has focused on MEPs’ concerns with preparing reports in areas of specific salience to them, individually, according to their experience and expertise. Kaeding (2004) argues that the European Parliament’s committees, in the same way as Weingast and Marshall (1988) presented Congressional legislators, allow MEPs to “trade influence” with one another, thus gaining power in a policy area of specific salience to them by relinquishing the opportunity to determine policy in less salient areas (Kaeding, 2004, p. 357). There seems to be some evidence that rapporteurs are more likely to act as technical experts in search of consensus, in addition to (and in some cases, instead of) being politically partisan. Von Beyme (1998) found that rapporteurs in the German Bundestag exert influence through expertise rather than political bias. Likewise, Yoshinaka et al (2010) found that MEPs with expertise in areas related to the committees of which they were members are more likely to act as rapporteurs, suggesting that expertise not only determines the content of reports but also the likelihood of acting as rapporteur in these areas (Yoshinaka et al, 2010, p. 472).

However, there is also a body of literature that highlights the importance of European Parliament party groups in determining the salient nature of reports. Hausemer (2006) found that salient reports are more likely to go to those party groups closest to the centre of the political and ideological spectrum. In addition, the party groups with a majority in the legislature (i.e. the larger party groups) are more likely to determine the direction of policy, due to their majority vote share. (Hausemer, 2006, p. 513). Hix, Noury and Roland (2007) argue that the European Parliament’s party groups are key actors, and that their agenda-setting positions mean that MEPs who correspond with the median position in roll-call votes will be more likely to be on the ‘winning side’ in salient votes. Similarly, the party groups’
control of strategic committee assignments means that rapporteurs who are closer to the party group median will be more likely to both act as rapporteurs, and hold ideologically salient reports. This is because the more ideologically central groups are more likely to be part of the winning coalition on votes, and larger groups are more likely to be able to write more salient reports (see Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007).

It is difficult, however, to entirely separate out the roles expertise and party group membership have to play in rapporteurs obtaining salient reports, because the party groups are so involved in the process of appointing rapporteurs. Groups are permitted to do deals with each other in terms of proposing rapporteurs. In cases where groups propose a rapporteur at an early stage, and that suggested rapporteur is seen as an expert on the issues in question, groups will generally find it easy to get agreement on his/her nomination. In addition, in technical areas where there is little political disagreement but a requirement for expertise, a committee member who is a specialist in the area might find him/herself appointed repeatedly, often at the expense of very few group points (Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton, 2011, p.158).

Hausemer develops Wleizen’s (2004) definition of policy responsiveness to argue that MEPs are most representative when they pursue policy areas that are of interest to their constituents. The more time and effort MEPs spend on addressing policy areas of concern to their constituents (i.e. if their focus is on obtaining reports in salient policy areas), the greater their level of representativeness and better their “representational performance” (Hausemer, 2006, p. 507). Costello and Thomson (2010) argue that rapporteurs are motivated primarily by national interests, rather than by their European Parliamentary party group interests (Costello and Thomson, 2010, p. 219). They contend that national governments keep strong links with their home state’s MEPs, regardless of their political party affiliation. Lobbyists tend to target MEPs from their own member state, and MEPs are reluctant to hold positions that could be perceived as standing against national interest (Ibid., p. 224).

Hix argues that MEPs are influenced by their national party, particularly in terms of voting behaviour, largely due to the control national parties have over candidate selection (Hix, 2002, p. 696). Although party groups are important in
terms of their control of various goods in the European Parliament (i.e. speaking time, resources, staff, etc.), it is national party solidarity within the party groups that contributes to cohesion: when members of national parties hold different positions on policy, cohesion in the groups disintegrates (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2006, p. 137).

This research project is interested in the salience of reports for national parties, and how the reports obtained by populist rapporteurs correlate with national party policy aims, as set out in Euromanifestos. By conducting content analysis of the reports held by populist rapporteurs, we can better understand the extent to which populist parties in the European Parliament action the policy aims of their national parties through their choice of reports. It is important to note here that many of the parties that are the subject of this piece of research are small and, as a result, their opportunities to win the chance to write reports on many policy areas covered in their manifestos are limited. Therefore, it would not necessarily be surprising to find that few of the areas in the parties’ manifestos are actually covered by the reports they write. What is of greater importance is ascertaining whether the reports that populist or radical right MEPs write reflect some of the priorities as reflected in their manifestos rather than whether all the areas in the manifestos are covered by reports they write.

Chapter 4 showed that populist or radical right MEPs are less likely to write reports than other members, so the expectation in this chapter is that this will be reflected in the content of reports held. In other words, as populist or radical right MEPs write fewer reports in general they will, therefore, be less likely to address numerous areas of policy as presented in Euromanifestos.

I. The Euromanifesto Project dataset

In order to ascertain salient policy areas, coded election manifestos were used. Manifestos and other party literature pertaining to the relevant European Parliamentary elections were used, instead of national election manifestos, in order to ensure consistency of policy focus across all relevant political parties. All manifestos and related party documentation were produced in the same time
period (i.e. prior to each European Parliament election), and pertained to the same electoral event (i.e. European Parliament elections for the fourth and fifth terms).

In addition, some parties only contest European Parliament elections, rather than domestic elections, and others form specific groupings in order to mobilise differently at European elections than they do in national elections. For example, in the fourth European Parliament elections the French right-wing populist party, Movement for France, mobilised initially under the European grouping, Majority for another Europe. This list combined with another unsuccessful European-specific group, Fighting for Values, to create the party, Movement for France, in late 1994. The People’s Movement against the EU, a Danish organisation, only contests European Parliament elections. Created to contest Denmark’s accession to the European Union in the early 1970s, the cross-party organisation has fielded candidates in European elections since 1979 and has had representatives in each of the European Parliamentary terms. The organisation does not consider itself a political party and does not contest national elections in Denmark, but instead seeks to oppose Denmark’s membership of the European Union on a similar basis to other Euro-rejecting parties such as the UK Independence Party.

The use of election manifestos in determining political parties’ policy positions is a widely used technique. Manifestos provide insights into the programmatic changes of political parties over time (e.g. see Zons, 2016); the specificity of electoral ‘promises’ in mainstream and niche parties (e.g. see Tolosa and Garcia, 2014); and the general placement of political parties in terms of ideology and policy programme (e.g. see Dolezal et al, 2012 and Merz, Regel and Lewandowski, 2016). Manifestos cover a wide range of political positions, subjects and themes, so can be considered as a “set of key central statements” (Budge, Robertson and Hearl, 1987, p. 18). Election manifestos are reliable sources of information about political parties’ positions on policy areas, because they are generally ratified at party conventions. In addition, party manifestos represent the views of the party as a whole, not just a party leader or individual representatives (Braun et al, 2015, p. 5). However, there are some criticisms of the efficacy of using manifesto data. Dinas and Gemenis (2010), for example, have been notably critical of the Comparative Manifesto Project’s placement of Greek parties on the
left-right spectrum. Their research showed that alternative methods of positions proved much more accurate than those commonly excepted as standard by the Comparative Manifesto Project.

There are two respected manifesto data projects commonly used in political science and electoral studies research: the Manifesto Project Database (also known as the Comparative Manifesto Project), based at the Social Science Research Centre, Berlin, and the Euromanifesto Project, part of European Election Studies, at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research. The Euromanifesto Project specifically focuses on manifestos and associated political party literature for European Parliament elections, whereas the Manifesto Project Database uses a range of electoral material for both European and national elections. In addition, the Manifesto Project Database for national elections misses a significant number of populist and radical right parties included in this study whereas the Euromanifesto Project includes all but one of the parties considered here for the periods relating to the fourth and fifth European Parliamentary terms. For these reasons, the Euromanifesto Project data was favoured over the Manifesto Project Database.

One disadvantage of using Euromanifesto data is that manifestos are unlikely to provide specific policy aims for action at the European level unless a party has representation in the Council. This is because the European Parliament does not have initiation power, so the opportunity to enact policy at the European Parliament level is limited (see Corbett et al, 2010). This situation is amplified among strong Eurosceptic parties, who are more likely to use their manifestos to criticise the European project than to present concrete policy positions. Public campaigning and the use of election broadcasts and written material provides a unique opportunity for Eurosceptic populist parties to share their anti-European Union positions when they might not usually have the prospect of doing this in the course of regular everyday politicking. Researchers such as Adam and Maier (2011) have found that Eurosceptic parties have both the opportunity to influence the political agenda and to freely and successfully express their views, particularly in countries where either several Eurosceptic parties exist or where they are firmly cemented on the political landscape.
Nonetheless, Euromanifestos can provide a general idea of overall party policy aims, particularly when we consider general policy areas of salience to different types of parties. As this is the first real attempt to understand the correlation between populist party policy aims and the content of European Parliament reports, I grouped the populist or radical right parties that had rapporteurships in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms into five categories: regionalist/separatist, Eurosceptic, far right, neoliberal, and left wing. The primary methodological reason for deciding to group them according to broad ideological categories was the quantitative finding that populism primarily has an impact on the likelihood of a MEP to act as a rapporteur. Being a populist makes a MEP half as likely as a non-populist MEP to hold a rapporteurship. It is, therefore, logical to conclude that those populist MEPs who hold reports have, in some sense, overcome the disadvantage of populism in order to engage in the rapporteurship process. Therefore, I anticipate that the content of their reports will be focused more on policies related to their ideological and rhetorical bent rather than their populism.

Some of the group definitions derive from research on niche parties, such as that conducted by Jensen and Spoon (2010) on niche parties in the European Parliament. Other parties not considered niche parties were grouped according to their general position on a left-right spectrum or their definition of populism. From considering these classifications, it is possible to make generalisations about areas of policy of salience to these parties.

Regionalist or separatist parties, such as the Italian neoliberal populist Northern League or the left wing populist Scottish National Party, place an emphasis on issues of decentralisation and separation of power (see Agnew, 1995; Gormley-Heenan and Macginty, 2008; Liable, 2008; Gallagher, 2009; Jensen and Spoon, 2010; Dardanelli and Mitchell, 2014; and Jolly, 2015). The Scottish National Party, whose raison d’être is for Scotland to achieve independence from the United Kingdom, regularly discusses the perceived need for further devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament (see Dardanelli and Mitchell, 2014). The Northern League seeks to represent interests in northern regions of Italy and advocates for the decentralisation of power away from Rome (Agnew, 1995, p. 158). We would,
therefore, anticipate that issues relating to decentralisation would have prominence in Euromanifestos, as in other party material.

Eurosceptic parties include the Austrian Freedom Party, the French National Front, and the UK Independence Party. These three parties are hard Eurosceptics, regularly advocating for their country’s withdrawal from the European Union (see Szcerbiak and Taggart, 2008). Jensen and Spoon (2010) classify the Austrian Freedom Party and the French National Front as examples of far right niche parties (Jensen and Spoon, 2010, p. 196). However, I have classified them as Eurosceptic for the purposes of this section of this piece of research, as I anticipate that their primary focus in the context of European Parliament elections will be to criticise the European project and, therefore, the majority of statements in these parties’ manifestos will be negative statements about the European Union.

One party that I have classified as far right, however, is Italy’s National Alliance. This party, while making negative comments on specific aspects of European policy, tends to hold a pragmatic position on European membership and is considered a non-populist radical right party, as defined in Chapter 1 of this piece of research. As a radical right (or far right) party, I would anticipate that issues pertaining to a strong law and order position would be emphasised (see Tarchi, 2003, and Ruzza, 2004), as would issues of nationalism (see Agnew, 1995).

Two parties are classified as neoliberal in this section: Ireland’s Fianna Fáil/Republican Party, and Go Italy, both of which are defined as neoliberal populists in Chapter 1 of this piece of research. Neoliberal parties have a liberal economic position at their core, combined with liberal social values of freedom of expression, gender equality, and separation of church and state. I would anticipate, therefore, that these parties would make clearer statements about economic policy than parties that do not emphasise a specific economic position (see Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990, and Betz, 2003).

The final category in this section is left wing, which includes the Dutch Socialist Party and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement. Left wing parties tend to emphasise issues of equality and welfarism (see Arditi, 2003) and, in the European context, can often be Eurosceptic and openly critical of the liberal economic process of European integration (March, 2007, p. 66). I anticipate, therefore, that these parties might include several anti-European statements in its Euromanifesto,
in a way similar to the primarily Eurosceptic parties mentioned earlier in this chapter.

Because this is the first attempt to analyse any relationship between populist party policy aims as evidenced in their Euromanifestos and the content of the reports they write in the European Parliament, there is no theoretical framework beyond ideological patterns, upon which to base expectations of findings. Although I anticipate that position on a left-right scale and ideological standpoint will be more influential on the content of reports written by populist rapporteurs than their populism, it is difficult to develop concrete and comprehensive hypotheses. Therefore, findings are discussed using the technique of ‘retroduction’, or ‘abductive reasoning’.

The theoretical basis for retroduction focuses on a reinterpretation of the hypothesis as an inductive research tool set out by American philosopher, Pierce, in the late 19th Century. Whereas hypotheses are usually expressed expectations generated from a sound theoretical framework and previous observable and testable research, retroduction starts with the observation and seeks to find the best possible explanation (see Ragin, 2008 and 2014, and Belfrage and Hauf, 2017). In the context of this piece of research, I observe the findings from content analysis of European Parliament reports and attempt to offer the simplest and most logical explanation based on what is already known about these types of parties and their policy aims.

The Euromanifesto Project aims to analyse all Euromanifestos produced by political parties in advance of the European Parliament elections in all EU member states. The object of the project is to analyse election programmes in order to measure policy positions and issue emphases of political parties at certain points in time. These election programmes come in the form of pre-election manifestos or from other official material such as election leaflets and posters, but can also be found in other sources such as newspapers, magazines, or research papers. In some countries, parties do not produce official election material at all, so the definition of what constitutes a party’s electoral programme includes any available documents that summarise “authoritative statements of a party’s policy positions” (Braun et al, 2015, p. 5).
In order to estimate parties’ policy positions from these documents, a coding system was devised to facilitate quantitative comparative content analysis of these manifestos and other literature\(^{38}\). The coding unit used is a “quasi-sentence”, which is defined as an argument. This can be one complete sentence, in which any one single argument is presented, or part-sentences representing a clear argument. The coding system developed 69 specific content categories under which every quasi-sentence could be classified and seven more general overarching policy areas. In total, there are 256 codes, 170 of which are regular codes and 86 sub-codes. These categories are designed to be as widely applicable across party types, countries, and time frames as possible.

In addition to the seven general policy areas – external relations; freedom and democracy; political system, sub-divided into a general category and European Union category, economy; welfare and quality of life; fabric of society; and social groups – the coding system includes an additional layer to indicate whether the policy statement is focused on the national political level, the European Union, or the world (or otherwise unspecified political level). By coding the policy statements of parties’ manifestos and other election communications in this way, a comprehensive dataset was developed, setting out, among other variables, the parties’ position on a left-right scale; party family; European Union position; and European Parliament political group, as well as the parties’ positions according to the coding categories (see Braun et al, 2015).

The Euromanifesto Project dataset used was an integrated dataset, combining the 1979-2004, and the more recent 2004-2009 datasets (there will be further additions to the dataset once the 2009-2014 European Parliamentary term is coded and included). Some variables have missing data, signifying that the particular policy position on a given variable was irrelevant or unmentioned in the coded manifesto. In addition, some variables are country-specific and are only applicable to selected member states. For example, Foreign Special Relations (either positive or negative) could refer to Commonwealth countries, or Ireland, in the case of the United Kingdom, or Scandinavian relations in the case of Sweden.

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\(^{38}\) For detailed information about the methodology and usefulness of content and textual analysis, see e.g. Berelson, 1971 and Krippendorf, 2013. For information detailing the usefulness of content analysis in measuring populism in particular, see Pauwels, 2011 and Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011.
There are also some categories that are not commonly used in some countries, or some specific member state problem that does not fit the Euromanifesto Project coding system. In these cases, the categories are left blank. 39

II. Populist rapporteurs in the fourth and fifth European Parliamentary terms

Of all rapporteurs in the fourth European Parliamentary term, of which there were 617, approximately 10% (i.e. 67) were populist. In the fifth European Parliamentary term, the figure is even less with 48 out of 586 rapporteurs (approximately 8%) being MEPs from populist parties.

In both Parliaments, a range of populist parties had MEPs acting as rapporteurs, with Go Italy being the most active party in terms of the number of rapporteurs and number of reports won by its MEPs. In the fourth European Parliamentary term, a total of 32 rapporteurs were members of Go Italy, with a total of 64 reports between them. The picture is similar in the fifth Parliament in terms of Go Italy being the most active populist party. Although the numbers of rapporteurs are lower, with 19 rapporteurs they were proportionally more active, holding a total of 59 reports. Despite the National Front being consistently present in the European Parliament since 1984 the party has been very inactive in terms of rapporteurship, with only two MEPs holding six rapporteurships in the fourth term and no MEPs acting as rapporteurs at all in the fifth term.

The Euromanifesto Project coded each party’s manifesto (or other relevant documents, where manifestos were unavailable) prior to the European Parliament elections in 1994 (elections to the fourth European Parliament) and 1999 (elections to the fifth European Parliament) according to the percentage of policy statements given over to a particular area. Because the total number of quasi-sentences, excluding headlines, differs between documents the process was standardised to focus on percentages of statements given over to each policy area. Each overarching policy domain is broken down into sub-headings, and it is according to these sub-headings that policy statements in the form of quasi-

39 For in-depth information about the Euromanifesto Project coding system, and challenges in determining the codes appropriate to the policy statement being analysed, see Braun et al, 2015.
sentences are coded. Over the two European Parliamentary terms, a total of 11 populist parties had rapporteurs, with several parties winning reports in each term. These 11 parties have had their European Parliament election literature coded according to the Euromanifesto coding system.

Each variable uses the same format: per_v[x]_dccs[a/b], where [x] is the respect governmental level the variable is concerned with, [d] is the relevant overarching domain, [cc] is the position of a category within that domain, and [a/b] relates to whether the quasi-sentence is positive (a) or negative (b). For example, a quasi-sentence referencing a positive policy statement on the issue of women’s equality in the member state would be represented by the variable per_v1_7061a, because the governmental level is the member state (1), the domain is Social Groups (7), the sub-code is 061, and the statement is positive (a).

The salient policy areas for each of the relevant parties in the fourth and fifth European Parliamentary terms, excluding the missing or unavailable variable data, are presented in a table in the Appendix to this piece of research. In the table, the policy area takes the format of political level/policy area/positive or negative.

III. The content of reports

Although there has been a great deal of research conducted with regard to the processes of committee assignment, and of co-decision and conciliation report allocation in the European Parliament, with particular reference to partisanship and informational and distributive perspectives, there has been very little analysis of the actual content of reports. Hauserman (2006) touches on the salience of reports in terms of national party interests in his analysis of representation of constituent interests in the European Parliament, and Whitaker (2011) has conducted studies on report allocation and national party policy goals at the European Parliament committee level. However, an in-depth empirical analysis of report content and the relationship to national party policy aims has been largely absent from the literature. This piece of research goes some way to plugging that gap, with an analysis of the reports held by populist or radical right MEPs, in light of their national parties’ policy aims.

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40 See e.g. Hauserman, 2006; Høyland, 2006; Kaeding, 2004 and 2011; McElroy, 2006; Whitaker, 2011; Yordana, 2009 and 2011; and Yoshinaka et al, 2010.
Due to the lack of any systematic study of European Parliamentary report content, there is no recognised or tested method for coding reports, so this piece of research is the first attempt to produce a system for analysing reports in light of existing coding systems; in this case, the Euromanifesto Project. In order to create some kind of parity between parties’ election manifestos and reports the same coding system has been used, albeit in an adapted way to accommodate the difference in styles and emphases of documents. Detailed information on the reports produced in each term can be found online, on the European Parliament’s Legislative Observatory website. Using the ‘search’ function, results can be filtered according to European Parliament term, rapporteur, committee, political group, etc. Each result brings up a ‘procedure page’ with detailed information about the procedure, the report authors, the legislative process, as well as a summary of the report and the subject matter. Using the report summary, it was possible to determine how best to categorise each report for analysis.

The Euromanifesto Project coded manifestos and other election material by categorising policy statements in the form of quasi-sentences that formed a complete policy statement. Because European Parliament reports cover a limited range of topics in great detail, and some reports focus only on amendments to draft legislation from the Commission or Council (Corbett et al, 2011, p. 153), rather than superficially addressing a wide range of policy areas in the way that election manifestos do, it was not possible to code reports in the same way. Instead, the entire report was categorised according to the Euromanifesto project coding system, following the same domains, subheadings and emphases as the manifestos. For example, in the fourth term the National Alliance MEP, Amedeo Amadeo, authored a report for the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection committee on the ‘protection of individuals against ionising radiation in medical exposures’. This report was categorised by the European Parliament as being in the medicine and diseases category, and it made recommendations for reducing health risks to patients and health care workers by minimising exposure to radiation during medical procedures in member states. The report was therefore coded using the same variable format for Euromanifesto documentation as

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41All the coded data includes only that related to reports held by rapporteurs from populist parties. That means that only the committees of which populist rapporteurs were members have been coded, as have the reports held only by these rapporteurs.
per_v1_5043a, where [1] is the national political level, [5043] is Health Care and Nursing Service, and [a] is positive because the emphasis of the report was on making improvements to the protection of patients, visitors and health care professionals, where previously protection had been lacking.

The coding of European Parliament reports, as with Euromanifestos, is open to interpretation on the part of the coder, especially when some reports might appear to address several policy areas. For example, a report held by Scottish National Party MEP, Allan MacArtney, in the fourth European Parliament term focused on the subject of ‘EC/Guinea fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 1st January 1996 to 31st December 1997’. This could be seen to fit into either Foreign Special Relationships (General) due to its focus on European-African relations, or into Environmental Protection because of its emphasis on fishing practices. As with categorising Euromanifestos, a decision had to be made on which policy area was of most concern in terms of the report content, so the report was coded as per_v2_101a as the primary focus was on European relationships with foreign countries, with a sub-focus on fishing practices. When a report is coded, it does not necessarily only come under that one policy code, but the primary emphasis of the report has been coded according to one category alone, in order to make for the best comparison with Euromanifestos.

The section that follows provides a discussion of the policy emphases of each of the populist parties that held rapporteurships in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms. Each sub-section focuses on the salient Euromanifesto policy areas and the European Parliament report policy areas, with a discussion of the correlation between the party’s policy aims and its parliamentary reports. The policy areas presented in the Euromanifestos and European Parliament reports are presented graphically throughout. The policy areas referenced in the analysis are presented with codes, as the variable names are long and cumbersome: they are, however, explained using full variable names throughout the analysis. Where only the policy codes are shown, the corresponding policy and domain areas are presented in the Appendix to this piece of research.
a. National Alliance

The policy area that was given most prominence in Italy’s National Alliance’s election manifestos was *Europe, European Union (General)* (per_v2_108a), primarily with a positive focus. In the election communication for the fifth term, positive policy statements about the European Union accounted for 16.15% of the entire document. This is particularly interesting, as National Alliance is considered Eurosceptic in both European Parliamentary terms. In the fourth term, it rates 2.3 on the Chapel Hill Euroscepticism scale, and in the fifth term the party rates 3.7. In both terms, the party is considered Euro-compromising, using Vasilopoulou’s measures of Euroscepticism. Although the party is noticeably less Eurosceptic in the fifth term, it is surprising that positive statements about the European Union would feature so prominently. However, the party has traditionally taken a pragmatic view to European Union membership, showing willingness to concede sovereignty on general areas such as economic regulation (Vasilopoulou, 2009, p. 8), as well as desiring for Italy to be part of the European project in an influential capacity (Vasilopoulou, 2009, p. 11), so it might be the case that the party makes positive comments about the general European project, while it might also criticise specific elements of European policy. In addition, radical right parties such as National Alliance tend to view the European Union as a whole, rather than singling out specific policy areas for comment, so it is possible for the party to have a generally favourable impression of the European Union while simultaneously being critical of specific policy areas or the prospect of further integration or expansion. This approach would certainly explain why a Eurosceptic party might make so many positive policy statements under the Euromanifesto category of Europe, European Union (General). Figure 6.1 overleaf shows aggregate data for National Alliance’s policy statements in election material for the fourth and fifth European Parliamentary terms, in order of most salient to least.
Of National Alliance’s 30 reports in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, only one could not be coded according to the Euromanifesto coding scheme, a directive on summer-time arrangements produced by Spalato Bellerè on the Transport and Tourism committee in the fourth term. Figure 6.2 overleaf shows aggregate data for National Alliance’s policy statements in European Parliament reports for the fourth and fifth European Parliamentary terms, in order of most salient to least. The parliamentary reports have been converted into percentages for parity of analysis.
The most interesting thing to note in the distribution of National Alliance’s reports is the apparent lack of similarity with the party’s policy aims as set out in the European election manifestos. Two of the most common report subjects were Technology and Infrastructure, either at the national (per_v1_411a) or European (per_v2_411a) political level, with a total of five reports focusing on issues pertaining to transport and the development of transport networks, and Agriculture and Farmers (per_v1/v2_7031a) also with five reports dealing with issues related to the Common Agricultural Policy and support for producers. After these two areas, Law and Order (per_v2_605a) was the subject of three reports and Health Care (per_v1_5043a), Competences of the European Parliament (per_v2_306a), and Foreign Special Relationships (General) (per_v2_101a) were the focus of two reports.

Unlike Italy’s Northern League, National Alliance’s uncomfortable bedfellows in the 1994 Berlusconi government, the party did not originally have a focus on agricultural or agrarian concerns (Agnew, 1995, p. 157). However, following the party’s second stint in government in 2001, National Alliance began to develop a set of policies that fused conservativism and radical right-wing sentiment that focused on labour, agricultural and agrarian concerns. The party
began to talk about an earthy form of patriotism, where Italian identity and culture was rooted in pursuits of the soil, farming, husbandry and agricultural technology (Tarchi, M. 2003, p. 140). However, these principles and policy statements were very much focused on the national, Italian, level rather than at the European level. As a result, agricultural concerns do not seem to feature so much in Euromanifestos.

It is imperative to note, however, that the focus of the Agriculture and Farmers reports in the European Parliament is on the Common Agricultural Policy, dealing with issues of the trade in agricultural products and livestock across the common area, and support for agricultural producers. Despite the lack of specific emphasis on agricultural concerns in National Alliance’s Euromanifestos, the party’s national policy aims are nonetheless effected at the European level by engagement with the Common Agricultural Policy so, although this issue is not specifically addressed in European election material, the subject matter is of importance to the party at the national level.

Similarly, there does not seem to be any particular emphasis on issues of Technology and Infrastructure set out in the party’s European election material. However, the issue of technological development is one which has prominence in National Alliance’s domestic programmatic documents, where the party emphasises its vision for a technologically-advanced European Union. The party is particularly in favour of reducing the transatlantic gap in technology by promoting European interests through projects such as the Trans-European Energy Network, and by supporting renewable energy (Vasilopoulou, 2009, p. 11).

Law and Order is also an issue that is emphasised regularly by National Alliance at the domestic level. The party focuses on both liberty and authority, seeing the two concepts as intertwined and arguing that individual interests and the interests of society are inextricably linked. In order to preserve the social order, which National Alliance considers as of the utmost importance, liberty must have limits and authority must be upheld (Tarchi, M, 2003, p. 143). This emphasis on social order has led the party to consistently seek to pursue policies of drug criminalisation and the harsh punishment of drug use, and to advocate strong action on the part of the state and its institutions (Ruzza, 2004, p. 169). In addition, the party supports the continued criminalisation of prostitution and the
importance of custodial sentences, although capital punishment is rejected (Tarchi, 2003, p. 152). Perhaps surprisingly, given the party’s emphases, the *Law and Order* reports held in the European Parliament focus less on punishment and more on compensation to victims, although there is also an emphasis on trans-European cooperation in order to prevent crime.

Although, on the face of it, there is a real disparity between National Alliance’s policy aims as set out in European election communications for the fourth and fifth parliamentary terms, when we take into account the emphases the party places on issues at the domestic level, there doesn’t seem to be so much of a disconnect. Figure 6.3 overleaf illustrates the apparent disparity between party policy aims and the content of reports written by National Alliance rapporteurs in the European Parliament in the fourth and fifth terms by setting out the policy areas covered in both the Euromanifestos and in the European Parliament report. In order to give an overall view, the data have been contracted so that the political level and the positive or negative emphasis have been dropped, and only the policy area considered.
Figure 6.3 – National Alliance Salient Policy Areas, EP4 and EP5 (EU Manifestos and EP Reports)
Only three policy areas mentioned in National Alliance’s Euromanifestos for the fourth and fifth terms were also the subject of European Parliament reports: *Executive and Administrative Efficiency*, *Foreign Special Relations (General)*, and *Transfer of Powers to the European Union*.

*Executive and Administrative Efficiency* could be considered a fundamental position of the party. Following National Alliance’s creation in 1994, the party was determined to present itself as a stable, innovative, sleaze-free party emerging from the remnants of the First Republic and the mess caused by the Tangentopoli scandal. Consequently, the party focused on institutional reform and administrative efficiency in its programmatic documents. (Tarchi, 2003, p. 139).

Similarly, in its manifestos and policy documents prior to its participation in Berlusconi’s 2001 government, as well as in its Euromanifesto documents, National Alliance pledged to improve the process of public administration (Tarchi, 2003, p. 139). Crucially, though, this focus was primarily at the national rather than the European level, and the report held in the European Parliament on the subject of *Executive and Administrative Efficiency* concerned the improvement of European administration of the Coal and Steel Research Fund.

The party’s focus on issues related to *Foreign Special Relationships (General)* have tended to emphasise the identity and role of Italy within Europe and the wider world. For example, towards the end of the fourth European Parliament term in 1998, the party made a point of referencing mass immigration and ensuring that Italy’s cultural identity was defended while simultaneously respecting other cultural identities (Tarchi, 2003, p. 146). At the European level, the party is hostile to multiculturalism and mass immigration which, it says, threatens to take over the identity of Europe in its entirety. As a result, National Alliance seeks to support efforts to create more employment opportunities across Europe and in immigrant countries in order to minimise migration from outside the European Union (Tarchi, 2003, pp. 153, 154). In addition, the party actively promotes foreign policy in Africa, the Middle East and the Mediterranean, with a view to encouraging regional development in these areas (Tarchi, 2003, p. 166).

It is this latter focus that is the subject of one European Parliament report, which deals with relationships with Mediterranean and Southern European countries at the supranational European level. However, the party has also
.advocated for creating greater links with Taiwan and other non-communist South East Asian countries, in order to act as a check on the increasing global position of China (Tarchi, 2003, p. 166). The second European Parliament report held by a National Alliance rapporteur focuses on continuing and deepening the European Union's relationships with Asian countries. These two reports certainly seem to correlate with National Alliance party policy aims, both at the European and national political levels.

The final common policy area to be addressed in both the party's Euromanifesto documents and European Parliament reports is that of the *Transfer of Powers to the European Union*. National Alliance has been traditionally ambivalent when it comes to the European Union, acknowledging willingness to concede some degree of national sovereignty to the European Union, particularly at the economic level (Vasilopoulou, 2009, p. 8), while also advocating for limitations to integration and expansion (Tarchi, 2003, p. 166).

Interestingly, the party has been very concerned that the European Union should not limit or reduce competition and cooperation between member states, but encourage it, arguing that the European Union must, in fact, support and encourage such relationships (Tarchi, 2003, p. 167). It is this position that is the subject of the European Parliament report on the agreements between the European Union, member states and regional authorities on issues of employment contracts. The report recommends the limitation of European powers in this area, something which directly relates to National Alliance's position of ensuring the European Union does not limit member state freedoms.

The first impression might be that National Alliance policy aims are not actioned in the European Parliament with regard to the content of reports held, as there are only three policy areas set out in the party's Euromanifestos that are also addressed in European Parliament reports. However, when one also takes into account issues that are salient and prevalent at the national level, the overall picture seems to be that the party does successfully action policy aims in the European Parliament. Of course, this situation raises questions about the party's use of European election documentation, as they do not seem to be the primary forum for communicating policy positions. It might be that National Alliance seeks to use Euromanifestos as more of a propaganda tool, rather than a statement of
policy, something alluded to in Chapter 2 of this piece of research, in the section focusing on populist parties' use of the media.

b. Fianna Fáil/Republican Party

Fianna Fáil/Republican Party made a wide range of distinct policy statements in their election documentation pertaining to the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, covering a total of 42 areas. By far, the most salient policy area in the party's Euromanifestos was the issue of *European Union Structural Funds* (per_v2_4011a), with a positive focus. Positive policy statements on this issue accounted for 9.64% of the Euromanifesto documents for the fourth and fifth European Parliament elections. The European Structural Funds include the European Regional Development Fund, European Social Fund, European Maritime and Fisheries Fund, European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, and the Cohesion Fund, and all five funds support various forms of economic development across the European Union. It is perhaps not surprising that this was a prominent focus of the party, as Ireland has benefitted greatly from European Union funding and Fianna Fáil/Republican Party, one of Ireland's two largest political parties, has been a strong advocate for the benefits of European funding in the country (Kelly, 2014, p. 422). Other areas of salience included *Internationalism* (per_v1/v2/v3_107a/b), *Political Authority* (per_v1/v2_305a/b) and *Peace* (per_v1/v2/v3_106a).

In some ways, these three policy areas are interlinked in the ideology, position and focus of many Irish parties, Fianna Fáil/Republican Party included. Ireland’s struggle for independence from Britain and its 100-year history as a sovereign nation since then has resulted in a combination of nationalism and internationalism in Irish politics (Rast, 2014, p. 499). O'Sullivan argues that internationalism, with particular support for supranational institutions such as the United Nations and the European Union, has characterised Ireland's international relations since the end of the Cold War era (O'Sullivan, 2015, p. 1083).

The issue of political authority in Irish politics has been inextricably linked with Irish independence, the relationship between the Republic and Northern Ireland, and the Irish peace process, so it is unsurprising that these two policy
areas feature prominently in Fianna Fáil/Republican Party’s Euromanifesto documents. The party broke away from the nationalist Sinn Féin in the 1920s, but has retained a strong republican focus, desiring primarily to secure a republican government in the Republic while advocating for a unified Irish state (Kelly, 2014, p. 415). The European Union made a significant contribution to the Irish peace process, and Fianna Fáil/Republican Party, along with other mainstream Irish political parties, has consistently acknowledged this, as the party’s Euromanifesto documents prior to the fourth and fifth European Parliament elections would suggest. Harris argues that European Council summits provided vital meeting places for parties and groups on both the British and Irish sides of the peace process debate and, by encouraging conciliatory attitudes on both sides, the European Union played a crucial role in helping to secure the peace process (Harris, 2001, p. 203).

Figure 6.4 overleaf shows aggregate data for the policy areas addressed in Fianna Fáil/Republican Party’s Euromanifestos in order of salience, from most salient to least.
Fianna Fáil/Republican Party rapporteurs held a total of 61 reports in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, and all were coded according to the Euromanifesto project. Figure 6.5 illustrates the aggregate data for salient policy areas in Fianna Fáil/Republican Party’s European Parliament reports in the fourth and fifth terms. The reports have been coded proportionally, according to the percentage of reports given over to each policy area, so as to provide parity of analysis with the Euromanifesto documents.


What is surprising to note is the prevalence of *Environmental Protection* (per_v1/v2_501a) in Fianna Fáil/Republican Party's European Parliament reports, when this policy area is not addressed at all in the Euromanifesto documents. The subject matter of these reports concerns fishing, in terms of marine conservation and the Common Fisheries Policy, and they are almost all held by one rapporteur, so it is possible that this subject matter is much more representative of the rapporteur than the party as a whole although, as an island nation, Ireland has benefitted significantly from the Common Fisheries Policy and from the Maritime and Fisheries Fund. The second largest policy area addressed by Fianna Fáil/Republican Party rapporteurs in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms was *Foreign Special Relationships (General)* (per_v2_101a). As this policy is
closely linked to issues related to *Internationalism*, which was prominent in the party’s Euromanifesto reports, it is perhaps not too surprising that this also features heavily in European Parliament reports.

Figure 6.6 overleaf shows the policy areas addressed in both the Euromanifestos and in the European Parliament reports. Again, the data have been contracted so that the political level and the positive or negative emphasis have been dropped, and only the policy area considered.
Just under one third of policy areas were addressed in both Fianna Fáil/Republican Party’s Euromanifestos and the European Parliament reports held by the party’s rapporteurs. European Union Structural Funds were the most prominent policy area in the party’s pre-election documentation and were also highly salient in European Parliament reports, with nine reports (12.68%) being given over to this policy area. Two of these reports had a specific focus on Ireland, and concerned Ireland’s position as a European island nation and the operation of the Cohesion Fund in the country. Ireland benefitted greatly from this particular fund, particularly during the term of the fifth European Parliament (see the Irish Government website on EU Structural Funds), so the prevalence of this issue in the reports held by Fianna Fáil/Republican Party would suggest that the party is motivated by national interest in addition to party interest. Indeed, many of the areas addressed in both the party’s Euromanifestos and the European Parliament reports address national concerns and interests. Foreign Special Relationships (General) and Peace were both concerned addressed in the European Parliament, perhaps in recognition of the role the European Union has played in the Irish peace process.

One policy area not addressed in Fianna Fáil/Republican Party’s Euromanifesto, but which is the subject of five (7.04%) reports is Agriculture and Farmers. These reports covered several issues within this policy area, from the welfare of animals in transportation to the recognition of wool as an agricultural product, and European subsidies for Irish farmers. This is an issue of salience in Irish politics generally, but Fianna Fáil/Republican Party has also focused on rural Ireland and the agricultural industry as a matter of policy, advocating for support for the ‘family farm’ model, fair inspection regimes and fair funding for farmers. Despite this area being unrepresented in the party’s Euromanifestos for the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, it seems that the party is nonetheless advocating for core issues at the European Parliament level. In the salient policy areas addressed by rapporteurs in European Parliament reports, as well as in Euromanifesto documents, it would seem that Fianna Fáil/Republican Party is motivated by both domestic party interest and by issues of relevance to Ireland as a whole.
c. Go Italy

Go Italy covered a wide range of policy areas in its Euromanifestos for the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms with *Decentralization* (per_v2_301a) being the most salient policy area, accounting for over 12% of policy statements. The issue of decentralisation has been prominent in Go Italy rhetoric, especially during the 1990s which saw Lega Nord’s first electoral successes, culminating in their position in government alongside Go Italy and National Alliance. Federalism has been a foundational principle the Northern League’s ideology, with the party favouring fiscal autonomy for regions of northern Italy. Following the *Tangentipoli* bribery scandals of the early 1990s, distrust of central government was high and Italian support for federalism gained traction (Sorens, 2009, p. 263).

When the Northern League joined an electoral alliance with Go Italy and National Alliance in 1994, winning the general election, Go Italy ignored Northern League’s demands for reform of the state with regard to federalism. This prompted a rebellion on behalf of Northern League led by the party’s leader, Umberto Bossi, and the coalition collapsed. In the run-up to the 2001 elections, however, Northern League once again formed an alliance with National Alliance and Go Italy, and the coalition went on to form the ‘House of Freedoms’ government. This time, Go Italy made a genuine commitment to pursuing electoral reform and decentralisation, but it was the third coalition partner, National Alliance, that blocked reforms. This was largely due to the party having most of its support in the poorer southern regions of Italy and fearing that a federalised Italy would result in loss of income in the south (Sorens, 2009, p. 264). Due to the reluctance of the National Alliance to back federal reforms proposed by Go Italy and Northern League, the government was unable to implement its proposals and, by the time the plans had been developed and agreed and put out to a referendum, the coalition had lost the general election and was hugely unpopular, a situation which largely contributed to the defeat of the proposals.

The issues of Italian federalism and decentralisation have had most salience in northern regions of Italy where constituencies are primarily wealthy and conservative, and have focused on the extent to which northern resources support poorer southern regions (Sorens, p. 264). These regions have traditionally supported the Northern League and its predecessor, Lombardy League, a collection
of small parties or leagues from Italy's northern regions. However, when the party became increasingly radical right in the late 1990s, many voters switched allegiance to Go Italy, which had a more centrist position and was sympathetic to business interests (Koff, 2007, p. 329). This contributed to the issue of decentralisation taking a prominent position in election material and party rhetoric.

The second greatest policy area addressed in Go Italy's Euromanifesto documentation was that of Peace (per_v1/v2_106a), accounting for nearly 10% of all policy statements in Euromanifestos from this period. Go Italy has typically taken a pragmatic view of conflict and peacekeeping, considering peace not as the ultimate goal but as something achievable through a variety of means, even including warfare (Raniolo, 2006, p. 442). Go Italy has held a position of conditional pro-Europeanism and pro-Americanism with Berlusconi desiring, in much the same way as Tony Blair, to act as a bridge between the European Union and the United States. This foreign policy position led Berlusconi to wholeheartedly support George W Bush in the early stages of the Iraq invasion in 2003. Following huge public opposition to this policy, he guaranteed that Italy would play a peacekeeping, rather than a combative, role (Edwards, 2005, p. 230).

Other salient policy areas in Go Italy's Euromanifestos are closely linked with issues of Decentralization and Peace. Executive and Administrative Efficiency (per_v1/v2_303a) which accounted for 8.54% of policy statements, can be seen to be linked with issues of federalism and decentralisation. Go Italy has campaigned on a mandate to reduce inefficiency in public administration, and the party itself has attempted to be seen as an efficient, streamlined party in terms of its internal structure and organisation (Raniolo, 2006, p. 450). In addition, the issue of Military (per_v2_104a) can be seen as the flip side of Peace, with the Iraq war being a salient issue at the time of the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms.

Figure 6.7 overleaf shows aggregate data for the salient policy areas mentioned in Go Italy's Euromanifestos for European Parliament terms in question.
The most salient policy area addressed in reports held by Go Italy's rapporteurs do not seem to bear much similarity to the subjects that were the focus of the party's Euromanifestos. The most common areas were *Agriculture and Farmers* (per_v2_7031a) and *Foreign Special Relationships (General)* (per_v2_101a) with 17.48% of reports given over to each of these subjects. The reports held by Go Italy rapporteurs on the subject of *Agriculture and Farmers* cover a wide range of rural, agricultural and agrarian concerns from regulation of vineyards to prices of dairy products, yet this is an issue which is notably absent from the party's election material and, indeed, from the party's rhetoric at large. With support concentrated in wealthy, northern regions and in the largest industrial and urban areas, the party does not tend to address agrarian and rural concerns, so it is surprising that this would be a subject of interest to the party's rapporteurs in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms. It is possible that, as with the National Alliance, a party that also focused heavily on *Agriculture and Farmers* in its European Parliament reports, Go Italy is addressing something of national rather than regional concern. As a party in government for part of both of the European Parliament terms, it is possible that it is choosing to focus on wider
national concerns, particularly when the majority of these reports focus on areas of responsibility under the Common Agricultural Policy, which are primarily actioned at the European Union level.

In terms of *Foreign Special Relationships*, some of these reports focused specifically on the European Union’s interactions with the United States. Go Italy has taken a strongly pro-American stance, so it is not surprising to see party rapporteurs focusing on issues that would bring about greater cooperation between the two blocs. The party has also been quite vocal about its desire for Russia to be admitted into NATO, with Berlusconi speaking highly of Putin and his democratic and West-leaning credentials (Edwards, 2005, p. 230). However, the European Parliament reports focus more on Mediterranean-specific relationships, and links with developing countries in Africa and Asia, than they do on European-Russian relations. While it is reasonable to assume that Go Italy is representing national interests, perhaps in its capacity as a party of government, in the reports on Mediterranean affairs, there is no indication in the party’s Euromanifestos or national policy positions of its stance towards aid to developing countries.

Figure 6.8 illustrates the salient policy areas in European Parliament reports in the fourth and fifth terms, with percentages of reports given over to specific policy areas.
Seven policy areas were addressed in Go Italy’s Euromanifestos and also in the reports held by the party’s rapporteurs. Three were European Union specific: European Union Structural Funds, European Union Enlargement (General), and Transfer of Power to the European Union. Although the party has been considered moderately Eurosceptic at various points in its history (see Edwards, 2005), Go Italy scores a score of approximately 4 on the Chapel Hill Euroscepticism scale in both the fourth and fifth European Parliamentary terms, which places it just beyond the neutral halfway mark and slightly pro-Europe, and all reports focusing on European institutional issues had a positive focus. Similarly, the Euromanifesto policy statements that focused on these subjects were entirely positive. Three further areas concerned foreign policy: Human Rights, Internationalism, and Foreign Special Relationships (General). Given Go Italy’s pro-American position, it is not surprising that many reports on issues of Foreign Special Relationships (General) concerned European-American relations and, considering Berlusconi’s ambivalence towards Russia as well as his support for the European Union.
strengthening relations with the West, the issue of *Internationalism* is one which has had prominence in both Euromanifestos and European Parliament reports. Figure 6.9 overleaf illustrates the policy areas addressed in Go Italy’s reports in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, according to the relevant policy area.
It seems that Go Italy has sought to action party policy aims in the European Parliament, particularly in terms of international relations. However, there are some areas left entirely unaddressed in European Parliament reports, despite having salience at the national level. For example, the party has emphasised issues of decentralisation, both at party level and at a national federal level, but this is an area of policy entirely absent from the reports. Similarly, there are areas addressed regularly in the European Parliament’s committees but which are wholly ignored in the party’s Euromanifestos. While *Agriculture and Farmers* is perhaps a surprising area of importance, we might expect *Technology and Infrastructure* to be addressed in Euromanifestos as well as in parliamentary reports.

With its party leader as a businessman who has sought to apply business acumen to his political life, Go Italy has regularly focused on business issues at the domestic level, seeking specifically to free business from unnecessary regulatory burdens (Edwards, 2005, p. 229). In addition, the party has found its greatest support in affluent northern areas, which are home to centres of business and technology. We would therefore expect the party to tackle areas pertaining to *Technology and Infrastructure* in the European Parliament to the extent that it seems to. What is strange, however, is the total absence in the Euromanifestos of policy statements relating to this area, given the party’s obvious interest in pursuing these issues in the European arena.

d. Austrian Freedom Party

Austria’s Freedom Party entered the European Parliament in 1996, part way through the fourth term, when Austria acceded to the European Union. However, there are only Euromanifesto data available for the fourth European Parliament term in 1999 but this is consistent with the party’s pattern of rapporteurships as its MEPs only held reports in the fifth term. Figure 6.10 overleaf shows the party’s salient policy statements in Euromanifestos for the fifth European Parliament term, in order of most salient to least.
What is interesting to note about the party's policy statements is that the majority of those focusing on the European Union, in terms of enlargement; competences of institutions; and finances, are negative. The Freedom Party has been staunchly Eurosceptic since the early 1990s, and was notably opposed to Austrian membership of the European Union primarily due to issues of sovereignty and a concern about European enlargement and further integration, especially the question of Turkey's accession to the Union and the common European currency (Meret, 2009, p. 204). In addition, the overtly populist party was concerned about the 'elitist' nature of the European Union and, upon Austria's admission to the European Union, the party expanded its criticism of its own country's political processes and governmental elites to include those at the supranational level of the European Union.

The Freedom Party steadily became increasingly Eurosceptic throughout the 1990s, campaigning for Austria's withdrawal from the European Union but, in 2000, when the party went into coalition with the Austrian People's Party, it was forced to moderate its Eurosceptic position. Having been able to safely rail against European integration while in opposition, the party now found that it had to participate in a government that publicly supported the European project (Mudde, 2007, p. 281). This perceived capitulation to a pro-European government
resulted in a leadership struggle within the party following Haider’s resignation. Despite these later concerns, the Austrian Freedom Party was nonetheless still strongly Eurosceptic prior to the European elections of 1999 and it is this position that comes out quite clearly in the party’s Euromanifesto documents.

Negative statements about *Financing the European Union* (per_v2_1081b) account for nearly 13% of Euromanifesto policy statements, and negative statements about *Competences of the European Commission* (per_v2_308b) and Austria’s relationship with *Europe, European Union (General)* (per_v1_108b) are also highly salient. Negative policy statements about *Transfer of Power to the European Union* (per_v2_3011b) are also made. Conversely, positive statements about *Political Authority* at the national (per_v1_305a) and European (per_v2_305a) levels were made.

**FIGURE 6.11 – AUSTRIAN FREEDOM PARTY SALIENT POLICY AREAS, EP5 (EP REPORTS)**

The Austrian Freedom Party had just one rapporteur in the fifth European Parliamentary term, and he authored one report and acted as rapporteur for opinion on six others. This means it is hard to get a comprehensive idea of the extent to which the party attempts to action policy aims in the European Parliament. The subject of over half of the reports was *Environmental Protection*
(per_v1/v2_501a/b), with Single Market (per_v2_4084a) and Technology and Infrastructure (per_v2_411a) being the subject of the other reports.

Despite the Freedom Party being relatively inactive in terms of rapporteurships, we can nonetheless draw some interesting conclusions. None of the 10 MEPs in the fourth European Parliamentary term acted as rapporteurs and they all chose to remain unattached, outside of the party group system. In the fifth term, the national party delegation was relatively small with only four MEPs, and again all remained unattached, and only one MEP acted as a rapporteur. We know that being a member of a party group allows MEPs greater access to rapporteurships, so one explanatory factor for the lack of reports might be the position of the Austrian Freedom outside of a party group.

It might also be the case that the party considers its representation in the European Parliament as an opportunity for espousing Eurosceptic views. Considering the number of negative policy statements directed at the European Union and its processes, funding and institutions in the Euromanifesto documents, this seems strong evidence that MEPs seek to continue their anti-European Union rhetoric in the European Parliament. This finding confirms previous research on the subject, such as Brack’s (2012 and 2015) work on Eurosceptics in the European Parliament, and Whitaker and Lynch’s (2014) work on the formation of Eurosceptic groups in the European Parliament. This scenario seems likely when one considers the lack of similarity between Euromanifesto policy statements and those in European Parliament reports. Figure 6.12 overleaf highlights the disparity in policy subject matter addressed in each type of document.
It is difficult to get a clear picture of the Austrian Freedom Party’s goals in the European Parliament but, given the prevalence of Eurosceptic statements in the party’s Euromanifesto for the fifth European Parliament term, and the lack of engagement in the process of rapporteurships over the fourth and fifth terms, it would not be unreasonable to assume that the party sees the European Parliament more as a platform for presenting its anti-European Union position than a forum for enacting national or party policy aims.

This is particularly interesting, given the party's position as a junior coalition partner at the national level with the Austrian People’s Party for the majority of the fifth European Parliament term. The fact that the Freedom Party is so inactive in terms of rapporteurships might add credence to the hypothesis that Høyland’s findings of a greater likelihood of rapporteurships among MEPs from governing parties does not apply to the same extent to populist parties, who invariably find themselves as junior parties in coalition governments.

However, at present, this is merely conjecture and, at best, a measured argument using descriptive, rather than explanatory, analysis. Further analysis of
junior coalition partners who are not populist or radical right would be required in order to make any sound analysis of this phenomenon. The small number of Austrian Freedom Party MEPs in the European Parliament, particularly in the fifth term, does not allow us to make any definite inferences about the nature of their behaviour in the area of rapporteurships, but it does pose some interesting questions for future research.

**e. National Front**

As with the Austrian Freedom Party, France's National Front only had one Euromanifesto coded by the Euromanifesto Project: the party's policy document for the fourth European Parliament election. However, the party only held reports in the fourth European Parliament term, so there is consistency in terms of the policy documents and reports considered.

The policy statements mentioned in the National Front's Euromanifesto provide a very clear insight into the party's staunch Euroscepticism and its position on matters of democracy and political authority. Figure 6.13 shows the salient policy areas for the party in its election documentation for the fourth European Parliament term, in order from most salient to least.
Negative statements about the *Transfer of Power to the European Union* (per_v2_3011b) accounted for nearly 7% of all policy statements, and negative statements about France *Financing the European Union* (per_v1_1081b) and about *Europe, European Union (General)* were also made.

Although now considered the “prototype” of Euroscepticism (Mudde, 2007, p. 159), the French National Front was not always anti-European Union. In the 1980s, the party was benignly disposed towards the concept of European integration, arguing for a shared defence strategy, immigration and foreign policy, and even a common currency (Ibid., p. 159). Crucially, though, the National Front saw that France would be the leader of this European project of ‘civilisations’ and, when the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 brought about greater accession of national sovereignty, the party began to change its position to become a Eurosceptic party (Milner, 2000, p. 57). The party is now considered a hard Eurosceptic party, advocating for full French withdrawal from the European Union (Startin, 2010, p. 431). It is entirely consistent with the party’s Eurosceptic position to have so many negative policy statements focusing on the European Union.

Positive statements made in the National Front’s Euromanifesto focused on issues pertaining to *Political Authority* (per_v2_305a), *Executive and Administrative*
Efficiency (per_v2_303a), and Market Regulations (per_v1_403a). The party has held relatively authoritarian views on issues such as law and order, advocating for tough sentencing and a zero tolerance approach to criminal behaviour, supporting law enforcement agencies and seeking to ensure more powers to political authorities (Shields, 2007, p. 282). It is unsurprising, therefore, that the party would make positive statements about issues of political authority in its Euromanifesto.

Although the National Front had originally based its economic policies on principles of Poujadism, in the 1970s the party moved towards a position of free market capitalism, advocating for reduced state intervention and lower taxation. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the party began to move to a position of economic protectionism and, by the fourth European Parliament term in 1994, the National Front’s economic policies focused on state welfare provision and protectionism (Ibid., p. 272). Despite the party’s fluid economic position over time, positive statements relating to regulation of the economic market are to be expected in the Euromanifesto relating to the fourth European Parliament term. Similarly, it could be argued in this context, that the policy statements pertaining to Executive and Administrative Efficiency are entirely consistent with the party’s economic position, in terms of advocating for tighter controls of tax systems and regulations to the market.

In the fourth European Parliament term, the National Front had two rapporteurs who held a total of six reports. Figure 6.14 overleaf illustrates the salient policy areas addressed in these reports.
The few reports held by National Front rapporteurs relate to specific areas of policy, none of which are addressed in the party's Euromanifesto. *Technology and Infrastructure* (per_v2_411a) is the most salient policy area, accounting for half of the reports. The other policy areas are *Single Market* (per_v2_4084a), *Agriculture and Farmers* (per_v2_7031a), and *Health Care and Nursing Service* (per_v2_5043a). Figure 6.15 overleaf shows the real disparity between policy statements made in the party's Euromanifesto, which relate primarily to negative statements about the European Union, and the policy areas addressed in the fourth term European Parliament reports.
The notable lack of overlap between policy areas addressed in the National Front’s Euromanifesto and those in the reports held by the party’s rapporteurs suggests that, as with other hard Eurosceptic parties like the Austrian Freedom Party, the National Front seeks to use its Euromanifesto as a means by which it can share its anti-European Union position, rather than as a document in which it can state clear policy aims. However, despite this apparent desire to protest against the European Union and its processes and institutions, and a strong commitment to France’s withdrawal from the European Union, it is interesting to see that the National Front does make use of the committee system in the European Parliament to action practical policy aims. Instead of expanding its Euroscepticism to include a lack of participation in the European Parliament’s processes, National Front MEPs seem to engage in rapporteurships, despite the inevitable disadvantage at which they find themselves as unattached members.

However, the National Front does use the European Parliament, as well as its Euromanifestos, as a platform for espousing its populist rhetoric. Plenary speeches allow the party’s MEPs to share its position as representatives of a
disenfranchised people, against an unrepresentative European elite (see Morris and Carini, 2014). Although the party’s rapporteurs do appear to be addressing very specific and applicable policy areas in their reports, when we consider the level of Euroscepticism evident in the party’s Euromanifesto, as well as its tendency to use the platform of plenary speeches in the European Parliament to present its populist position, it seems reasonable to describe the National Front’s relationship with the European Parliament as rhetorical: like other staunchly Eurosceptic populist parties, the National Front seeks to use its position in the European Parliament to share anti-European Union messages and populist rhetoric, rather than actioning specific party or national policy aims through the rapporteurship process.

f. **Northern League**

Italy’s Northern League were represented in the fourth but not the fifth European Parliamentary term, so the Euromanifesto document considered is from 1994. The party made a wide variety of policy statements in its Euromanifesto, with the issue of *Decentralization* at the European (per_v2_301a/b), the national (per_v1_301a) and the international (per_v3_301a) levels being the most salient policy concern. Figure 6.16 overleaf shows the party’s salient policy areas from its 1994 Euromanifesto.
The Northern League has had concerns about decentralisation and federalism at the core of its ideology and rhetoric. The party had its roots in the Lombardy League, an inherently populist organisation that represented a disenfranchised northern region against an unrepresentative, centralised system (Agnew, 1995, p. 158). This group joined with five other northern ‘leagues’ in order to create one conglomerate Northern League in 1991. The party has focused primarily on regional concerns, and has found most of its support in the northernmost part of Italy. Following its entry into coalition with Go Italy and the National Alliance, the party found itself operating as a national party with a disproportionately large number of seats in the lower house of the Italian Parliament (Betz, 2001, p. 399). Nevertheless, the Northern League continued to focus on federalist issues and put pressure on the main coalition party, Silvio Berlusconi’s Go Italy, to action policies of decentralisation and federalism.

The Northern League also presented itself as being an anti-system party, much in the same way as the Austrian Freedom Party. The party perceived itself as being the means by which Italy’s political system could become more representative of the Italian people, and it argued that the only way to achieve this aim was through a process of decentralisation and the dismantling of the existing political system (Betz, 2001, p. 402). It is unsurprising, therefore, that the area
given over to the most policy statements in the party's 1994 Euromanifesto was *Decentralization*. Statements relating to this subject at the national, European, or international level accounted for 14.66% of Euromanifesto statements.

Another salient policy area was *Democracy* (per_v1/v2/v3_202a/b). In the Northern League's ideology and rhetoric, the issues of federalism and democracy are closely linked. The party considers the centralised Italian political system to be inherently undemocratic and biased against northern regions (Agnew, 1995, p. 158). In addition the Northern League's intrinsic populism allows it to present itself as champions of true democracy, envisaged as federal populism as opposed to the inefficient, bureaucratic centralised democracy of the Italian state (Meret, 2010, p.163). Lega Nord’s immigration policy has also included the rhetoric of democracy, with the party viewing Islam as a particular threat to the democracy not only of Italy's northern regions, but of the West in general (Betz, 2001, p. 412).

Positive statements about *European, European Union (General)* (per_v1/v2/v3_108a) were also prevalent in the party's election documents. Despite the Northern League becoming increasingly Eurosceptic in more recent years – a policy change which accompanied the party’s move to the right – in the early 1990s, the party was strongly pro-European. During the fourth European Parliament term, Chapel Hill gives the party a score of 6 on its seven-point Euroscepticism scale, indicating its very pro-European stance. The party's regionalist position extended to the European Union, which they included in their federalist model of political and economic governance, advocating for financial distribution across all levels of the federal system: European Union, the federal state, and regional municipalities (Meret, 2010, p.163).

The party considered the European Union an example of efficient governance unlike the bureaucratic and inefficient government of Italy's centralised state. The Northern League used the slogan, ‘far away from Rome, but closer to Europe’ to emphasise its sense of affinity with Brussels and the European Union over the centre of Italy's political system (Meret, 2010, p.177). In addition the northern regions of Italy, from which came the party’s core support, benefitted from European Union investment, particularly in terms of support for small and medium sized enterprises. As a result, the Northern League held to an extremely pro-European position throughout the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms,
supporting Italy’s membership of the Economic Monetary Union and advocating for the benefits of being in a united and unified Europe, in an age of globalisation and international insecurity (Huysseune, 2010, p. 69). During the late 1990s, during the fifth European Parliament term, the party began to shift to the right and also became increasingly Eurosceptic, possibly as a response to its new-found right wing radicalism or as a reinterpretation of its regional, territorial politics in a globalised world (Ibid., p. 64).

There were just two Northern League rapporteurs in the fourth European Parliament term, who held a total of five reports. Figure 6.17 shows the policy areas that were the subject of the reports.

![FIGURE 6.17 – NORTHERN LEAGUE SALIENT POLICY AREAS, EP4 (EP REPORTS)](image)

It is difficult to make any analytical judgements about the extent to which the Northern League action policy aims through the rapporteurship system in the European Parliament as there are only five reports, all of which are focused on a separate policy area – *Single Market* (per_v2_4084a), *Technology and Infrastructure* (per_v2_411a), *Agriculture and Farming* (per_v3_7031a), *Foreign Special Relationships (General)* (per_v2_101a), and *Social Justice* (per_v3_503a) – and, when we look at the policy areas covered in both the Euromanifestos and the EP reports together as in Figure 6.18 overleaf, we can see the lack of similarity.
FIGURE 6.18 – NORTHERN LEAGUE SALIENT POLICY AREAS, EP4 (EU MANIFESTOS AND EP REPORTS)
The only area addressed both in Northern League Euromanifestos and European Parliament reports was *Foreign Special Relationships (General)*. As the party has been more focused on internal politics of Italy than on issues of internationalism, it is difficult to make any real judgement about the existence of this subject in both types of documents. The Northern League's primary position on foreign relations during the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms was anti-Americanism and pro-Europeanism, and the two positions were rather intertwined with the party considering the United States as having a negative role in relation to the European Union (Meret, 2010, p. 180). However, the report that focused on *Foreign Special Relationships (General)* concerned the European Union’s policy of agricultural assistance in developing countries, a subject largely absent from Northern League policy documentation.

The Northern League has been compared with the Austrian Freedom Party (see e.g. Betz, 2001 and Meret, 2010), but the similarities are more striking now than they were during the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms. In the sense that both parties had a small national delegation, few rapporteurs who held few reports, and a position as a junior coalition partner in domestic government, there are some comparisons to be drawn. However, the Austrian Freedom Party’s lack of reports might also be due to the fact that the party’s rapporteurs remained unattached, and to the party’s Eurosceptic position; at the time of the fourth European Parliament term the Northern League’s rapporteurs joined the European Liberal, Democratic and Reform group, and the party was strongly pro-European Union.

Where the Northern League can be compared with the Austrian Freedom Party, and with the French National Front, is in its use of populist rhetoric in election documents. The Northern League, like its Austrian and French counterparts, uses explicitly populist language which appeals to the ‘ordinary’ people and which is expressed in visual ways, through posters or banners, as well as through traditional election material such as Euromanifestos (Aalberg, 2016, 50%). However, there has been insufficient research conducted on how the Northern League has used its position in the European Parliament to continue to espouse its populist rhetoric. The low number of reports is likely to have more to do with the relatively small national party delegation than any desire to make a
populist, anti-system statement. In fact, during the fourth European Parliament term, the Northern League was decidedly pro-European so it is reasonable to assume that the engagement of two of its MEPs in the process of rapporteurship is a genuine desire to influence policy positions in the European Parliament.

g. Panhellenic Socialist Movement

Greece’s Panhellenic Socialist Movement returned representatives to the European Parliament in both the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, and Euromanifestos for both elections were coded by the Euromanifesto Project. The party covered a range of policy areas in its election documents, with *Internationalism*, at the world or unspecified political level, with a positive emphasis (per_v3_107a) being the most salient policy area addressed by the party. Figure 6.19 overleaf illustrates aggregate data for the Panhellenic Socialist Movement’s Euromanifesto policy statements, in order of most salient to least.
The Panhellenic Socialist Movement throughout the 1970s and early 1980s was a nationalist, isolationist party, whose foreign policy positions were influenced by its anti-imperialism standpoint. The party drew on general Greek sentiment of being a ‘threatened’ nation, influenced by the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and perceived interventions by the West in Greek political life. This led the party to hold to both an anti-American and anti-European position, rejecting Greece’s membership of the European Economic Community. By holding to this position, the party successfully pursued anti-communist goals, by limiting the influence of communism by adopting an anti-foreign interventionist position favoured by Greek communist supporters, and simultaneously weakened the appeal of conservatism by appropriating nationalism (Moschonas, 2010, p. 12).

Over time, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement became more moderate in its Euroscepticism and eventually became a supporter of the European project. By the fourth and fifth European Parliament term the party was extremely pro-European, measuring 6.7 for the fourth term and 7 for the fifth term, on the Chapel Hill Euroscepticism scale, respectively. With an increasingly pro-European stance came a more internationalist position as a member of Socialists International, as well as a standpoint of economic internationalism as a party of government (Moschonas, 2001, p. 13). Despite the party’s early isolationist nationalism, it is perhaps not surprising that Internationalism is such a salient policy area in the party’s Euromanifestos for the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, as this accurately reflects a change a policy and position in the 1990s.

The second most salient policy area in the Panhellenic Socialist Movement’s Euromanifestos was Political Authority at the national level (per_v1_305a), accounting for nearly 35% of policy statements. Political Authority is an important subject for populists who are critical and suspicious of political systems and institutions, perceiving themselves as the true proponents of democracy (see Canovan, 1981 and Taggart, 2000). While the Panhellenic Socialist Movement can today be considered non-populist, or even anti-populist, due to its transformation from populism to modernisation, during the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, the party indulged in openly populist rhetoric (Aalberg et al, 2016, 44%).
In the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement held a total of 100 reports, the aggregate data for which is shown in Figure 6.20.


The most salient policy area that was the subject of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement’s reports was *European Union Structural Funds* (per_v2_4011a), accounting for 10% of the reports. Greece has benefitted substantially from European Union Structural Funds, so it is no surprise that this is a policy area which was considered positively by Greek parties during the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms. In addition, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement position on the European Union was moderated largely in response to growing appreciation of the financial benefits to Greece of European Union membership. (Moschonas, 2001, p.13). This position is one reflected in the Greek electorate at large during the period of the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, with the majority believing that Greece had benefitted generally from European Union membership, and that the country had achieved economic stability and prosperity in particular (Ibid., p. 14). In pursuing reports on the subject of *European Union Structural Funds*, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement is not only actioning party policy aims, but is also addressing national concerns.
The second most salient policy area addressed in parliamentary reports was also economic: Economic Planning (General) (per_v2_404a). Since beginning a process of modernisation, which began in the late 1980s and ended in the 2000s, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement began to develop a comprehensive and balanced economic programme. The party adopted policies encouraging private capital and economic incentives, adding to its traditional position of increasing productivity and direct progressive taxation (Tassis, 2003, p. 4). The party made economic goals a priority throughout the 1990s and early 2000s – the period of the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms – as it attempted to attract a broader base of support among small business owners, while simultaneously seeking to appease the demands of the state through fiscal redistribution (Moschonas, 2013, p. 33). It is not surprising, therefore, that the Panhellenic Socialist Movement focused on Economic Planning (General) in the European Parliamentary reports held by the party’s rapporteurs.

The presence of Law and Order (General) (per_v2_605a) as a salient policy area in the Panhellenic Socialist Party’s reports is somewhat surprising. Unlike many right wing populist parties, who hold an authoritarian position with a strong emphasis on law and order, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement’s populism did not include this element. The party focused its nationalist populist rhetoric on the division of Greece between the ‘unprivileged’ majority, which comprises the ordinary Greek people, and the ‘privileged’ minority which represents foreign economic interests (Allberg, et al, 2016, 44%). In presenting their populist ‘us-and-them’ rhetoric in such a fashion, the party successfully combined an anti-internationalist position with socialist economic principles. The focus of the party was on the nationalisation of specific industries and areas of the Greek economy, welfarism, and nationalism, and law and order policies were notably absent from the party’s literature and rhetoric (Aalberg et al, 2016, 44%). It is, therefore, unexpected that this policy area would be the subject of 8% of European Parliament reports in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms.

Five policy areas were addressed in both Euromanifestos and European Parliament reports: Special Foreign Relationships (General), Market Regulations, Human Rights, European Union Structural Funds, and European Union Enlargement.
(General). Figure 6.21 overleaf shows the aggregate data for both Euromanifestos and European Parliament reports in European Parliament terms four and five.
Four of the five policy areas covered in both Euromanifestos and European Parliament reports are related to the most salient areas of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement’s ideology and rhetoric already discussed: internationalism (*Foreign Special Relationships* and *European Union Enlargement (General)*) and the economy (*Market Regulations*, *European Union Structural Funds* and *Economic Planning (General)*).

The fifth policy area concerns *Human Rights*. As with the majority of European Social Democratic parties, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement has valued welfarism and social justice issues (Moschanos, 2001, p. 19). Although this ideological position focused initially primarily on Greece, due to the party’s inherent nationalism and suspicion of external foreign relations, as the party modernised and developed a more international position, so its focus on issues of social justice became more outward-looking, including global human rights issues in its social justice concerns.

Although there are several policy areas that have been addressed either only in Euromanifestos or in European Parliament reports, those subjects that were salient at both Euromanifesto and report level focused on issues core to the Panhellenic Socialist Movement’s ideology and rhetoric, namely internationalism and the economy. It seems that the party’s rapporteurs were intentional about actioning the policy aims considered most important to the party.

**h. Scottish National Party**

The Scottish National Party returned MEPs to both the fourth and fifth European Parliaments, and salient policy areas from coded Euromanifestos for both terms are illustrated in Figure 6.22 overleaf.
The most salient policy area in the Scottish National Party's Euromanifestos in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms was *Europe, European Union (General)*, at the national level, with a positive focus (per_v1_108a), accounting for around 25% of all policy statements. Since the 1970s, the Scottish National Party has been strongly pro-European advocating for a Scotland, independent from the United Kingdom, in the European Union, and the party measures 6 on the Chapel Hill Euroscepticism scale for the fourth term, and 6.5 for the fifth term.

Although the party began as Eurosceptic in 1973, and campaigned against the United Kingdom's accession, it began to soften in its attitude towards the European Union over the 1980s and eventually began campaigning on a platform of ‘independence within Europe’ (Dardanelli and Mitchell, 2014, p. 97). Since then, the party has consistently advocated a Scotland, separate from the United Kingdom, existing as a sovereign state in the European Union and, thus, being able to benefit from membership of the single market, and participation in decision-making in the European Union (Ibid., p. 97). The party continues to highlight the perceived Europhilia of the Scottish people in comparison to the Euroscepticism of the English electorate, a position which has gained traction in 2016 following the
United Kingdom vote to leave the European Union. This belief has been combined with an acknowledgement of the interdependence of nations in a globalised world, to create a party which, although it began life suspicious of, and antagonistic towards, the European project, by the time of the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, was strongly pro-Europe. It is, therefore, not surprising that positive statements about Scotland’s relationship with the European Union was the most salient policy area in the Scottish National Party’s Euromanifesto.

The second most salient policy area addressed was Decentralization, again at the national level (per_v1_301a), accounting for nearly 18% of policy statements. This is, again, entirely consistent with the Scottish National Party’s separatist position, as it seeks to move more and more power away from the centre at Westminster to the regions. During the fourth European Parliament term, from 1997 to 1999, a process of devolution was enacted in response to an overwhelming vote in favour of Scotland having its own Parliament for the first time in nearly 300 years. The Scottish Parliament was established two years after the referendum, in 1999, at the very end of the fourth European Parliament term so it is not surprising that the Scottish National Party made this one of the subjects of its Euromanifesto for both European Parliament terms.

Scotland already had autonomy in areas of the legal system, education and health, and the devolution process conferred some minimal tax-varying powers on the Scottish Parliament. The Parliament was allocated funding for public policy, with full control over how it spent the subsidy. Although the process of devolution did not radically change the formal division of power in the United Kingdom, the freedom of the Scottish Parliament to determine policy in devolved areas differently from the Westminster administration resulted in the continuation of the Scottish National Party’s decentralisation rhetoric (Dardanelli and Mitchell, 2014, p. 90). As Scotland gradually began to operate differently from the rest of Britain, so the party could stress the difference and use it in support of its independence aims. The existence of devolution did nothing to dampen the party pursuit of decentralisation, and the Scottish National Party continued to make this a salient policy aim throughout the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms.

Linked with this issue of Decentralization is the policy area of Political Authority at the national level (per_v1_305a), which was also a highly salient policy
aim in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, comprising over 16% of policy statements in the Scottish National Party's Euromanifestos. The party regularly talks about political authority within the context of decentralisation and devolution, talking about Scotland's responsibility for determining its own future in a globalised and interconnected world (Dye, 2015, p. 16).

Although the Scottish National Party had a small national delegation in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, its MEPs were active as rapporteurs. Figure 6.23 shows the salient policy areas in parliament reports held by the party's rapporteurs.


![Graph showing percentage of reports for different policy codes]

The most salient policy area addressed by the Scottish National Party in the European Parliament in the fourth and fifth terms was *Competences of the European Parliament* (per_v2_306a). Unusually, this policy area accounted for less than 4% of statements in the party's Euromanifestos but over 20% of European Parliament reports. Although it seems this is an area of particular interest to the party in the European Parliament, in reality the vast majority of reports on the subject of *Competences of the European Parliament* were authored by one rapporteur, and focused almost exclusively on individual members' immunity. The
A high number of reports on this subject does not seem to indicate a particular interest in pursuing any changes or clarification to the European Parliament's competences on the part of the Scottish National Party, but a specific focus by one rapporteur.

*Agriculture and Farmers (per_v2_7031a)* was the second most salient policy area in the party's reports, yet was notably absent from Euromanifestos. Scotland is a largely rural country, with a strong agricultural industry and the Scottish Executive commissioned a Rural Development Programme. In addition, the Scottish National Party has made agriculture an issue of concern at the national level, with comprehensive policies on farming and rural issues (Dardanelli and Mitchell, 2014, p. 96). It would seem that, during the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms, the Scottish National Party sought to action these particular policy aims at the local, national level, where the Scottish Parliament has autonomy over rural development and agriculture.

Figure 6.24 overleaf illustrates the salient policy areas in both Euromanifestos and European Parliament reports in the fourth and fifth terms, showing the areas of overlap.
Only three policy areas were addressed both in the Scottish National Party’s Euromanifestos and European Parliament reports: *European Union Structural Funds, European Union Enlargement*, and *Competences of the European Parliament*. The Scottish National Party’s softening towards the European Union was partly in response to the economic benefits of the United Kingdom’s membership of the Union (Dardanelli and Mitchell, 2014, p. 97), so it is unsurprising that the issue of structural funds is one pursued by the party in the European Parliament. Particularly taken in conjunction with the emphasis on agriculture, it is logical to assume a link between rural concerns and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.

Appreciating the Scottish National Party’s strongly pro-Europe position, it would be reasonable to assume that, despite the large lack of overlap in many policy areas between those salient in Euromanifestos and those in European Parliament reports, the areas the party chooses to address are consistent with its Europhilic position. It would seem that the party chooses to address issues that are salient to its pro-European standpoint when in the European Parliament rather than issues of national interest, which are more likely to be addressed at home.

i. **Dutch Socialist Party**

The Dutch Socialist Party did not have any representatives in the European Parliament in the fourth term, and returned just one MEP to the Parliament in the fifth term. This one MEP, however, engaged in the rapporteurship process, although he only held two reports.

Figure 6.25 overleaf shows the salient policy areas in the Dutch Socialist Party’s Euromanifesto for the fifth European Parliament term.
The most salient policy area for the Dutch Socialist Party in its Euromanifesto for the fourth parliamentary term was *Political Authority* at the European Level (per_v2_305a). As a populist party, the issue of political authority is always salient: the populist party believes in the general will of the ‘people’ as the means of political expression, and considers itself the true representative of the people against a corrupt and unrepresentative political elite (Mudde, 2007, p. 23). As a result, populist parties are often critical of the established political system and parties, advocating for political authority to lie with the people and its representative, the populist party.

In the case of the Dutch Socialist Party, this antisystem populism is combined with Euroscepticism: the party measures 2.6 on the Chapel Hill Euroscepticism scale and can be considered a ‘Euro-conditional’ party under Vasilopoulou’s definition, supporting the principle but not the nature or future of European integration (see Vasilopoulou, 2009). The Dutch Socialist Party has perceived the European Union as being bureaucratic and has highlighted the ‘democratic deficiency’ in the Union’s institutions and processes. In addition, the party has opposed further European integration and enlargement and the transfer of powers to the European Union (see Otjes and Louwerse, 2013). It is, therefore,
not surprising that the Dutch Socialist Party has as its most salient policy area in its Euromanifesto the issue of political authority at the European Union level, or that the second most salient policy area was both positive and negative statements about the nature of *Democracy* at the European level (per_v2_202a/b), which accounted for around 15% of policy statements. The third most salient policy was also focused on the European Union, with negative statements about *Europe, European Union (General)* (per_v2_108b) comprising nearly 7% of all Euromanifesto policy statements.

In the fifth European Parliament term, the Dutch Socialist Party’s sole MEP authored two reports, the details of which are shown in Figure 6.26.

**FIGURE 6.26 – DUTCH SOCIALIST PARTY SALIENT POLICY AREAS, EP5 (EP REPORTS)**

Because there were only two reports held by the party’s MEP, it is not possibly to make any analysis of the link between the Dutch Socialist Party’s policy aims and European Parliament reports. The reports focused on two issues: *Technology and Infrastructure* (per_v2_411a) and *Environmental Protection* (per_v2_501a), issues not addressed at all in the party’s Euromanifestos, as Figure 6.27 overleaf shows.
FIGURE 6.27 – DUTCH SOCIALIST PARTY SALIENT POLICY AREAS, EP5 (EU MANIFESTOS AND EP REPORTS)

Policy Areas

- Political Authority
- Democracy
- Europe
- European Union (general)
- Structural Funds
- Decentralization
- Human Rights
- Military
- Political System
- Internationalism
- Transfer of Power to the European Union
- Competences of the European Union
- Competences of the European Commission
- Competences of Other European Institutions (general)
- Executive and Administrative Efficiency
- Peace
- Constitutionalism
- Freedom
- Technology and Infrastructure
- Environmental Protection

Percentage of Policy Statements/Reports (%)
Like other Eurosceptic populist parties, such as the Austrian Freedom Party or the French National Front, the Dutch Socialist Party appeared to use its Euromanifesto to espouse its anti-European Union rhetoric, rather than to present concrete policies to enact at the European Parliament level. The majority of policy statements focusing on the European Union generally, or on its institutions and processes, as well as on related areas of political authority and democracy at the European level, are negative, and there is little focus on specific policy areas. However, the Socialist Party's sole MEP did engage in the process of rapporteurship, authoring two reports, which Yoshinaka et al found was the average number of reports held by individual MEPs in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms (see Yoshinaka et al, 2010). Nonetheless, it is not possible to draw any sound conclusions from the data on the Dutch Socialist Party's engagement in the process of rapporteurships, and the relationship with the party's policy aims, due to the very small numbers of MEPs and reports in the fifth European Parliament term.

**j. UK Independence Party**

The UK Independence Party entered the European Parliament in the fifth term, returning three MEPs, with one of them acting as rapporteur. Prior to this, the party had a position of not taking up any seats it might win in the European Parliament, due to its strongly hard Eurosceptic position (Usherwood, 2008, p. 257). Figure 6.28 overleaf illustrates the party's salient policy areas in Euromanifestos for the fifth European Parliament term, in order of most salient to least.
The most salient policy area addressed in the UK Independence Party's Euromanifesto for the fifth European Parliament term was *Europe, European Union (General)*, with negative statements about the United Kingdom's relationship with Europe (per_v1.108b) accounting for over 28% of all policy statements made. As a hard Eurosceptic party, advocating for the United Kingdom's full withdrawal from the European Union, which it perceives as being corrupt and elitist (Abedi and Lundberg, 2009, p. 23), it is of no surprise that negative statements about the European Union featured so prominently in the party's Euromanifesto. The UK Independence Party was created in the early 1990s to contest seats at Westminster and at the European Parliament, with the aim of securing the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union. Despite an initial position of refusing to take up any seats won in the European Parliament – in a similar way to Irish nationalists Sinn Féin refusing seats at Westminster, in protest at British ‘rule’ of Northern Ireland – the UK Independence Party modified its position and began returning representatives to the European Parliament for the fifth term in 1999 (Usherwood, 2008, p. 257).

Although Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom has been salient to some extent among mainstream parties, largely with the Conservative party traditionally being ambivalent on European matters, it is the UK Independence Party that
primarily represents British Euroscepticism (Abedi and Lundberg, 2009, p. 73). As with other staunchly Eurosceptic parties, especially those hard Eurosceptic parties advocating for their country's withdrawal from the European Union, such as the Austrian Freedom Party and the French National Front, the UK Independence Party emphasises its Eurosceptic position through its Euromanifesto policy statements.

The prevalence of Eurosceptic sentiment in the party’s Euromanifesto is evidenced by the second most salient policy area: negative statements about the Transfer of Power to the European Union (per_v2_3011b), which comprised over 10% of all policy statements. In fact, negative statements about European Union specific policy areas accounted for 44.61% of all policy statements made, focusing on issues such as Competences of the European Parliament (per_v2_306b), Financing the European Union (per_v2_1081b), Competences of the European Commission (per_v2_308b), Competences of the European Council (per_v2_310b), and Competences of the European Court of Justice (per_v2_312b). Negative statements about related policy areas, such as Decentralization, at both the national (per_v1_301b) and European (per_v2_301b) levels, accounted for a further 5.04%. In fact, positive statements about the European Union, its institutions and processes comprised only 2.88% of all policy statements made.

The UK Independence Party’s MEPs did not engage fully with the rapporteurship process, with only one MEP holding just one report in the fifth European Parliament term; the other two MEPs, one of whom was the party leader, did not act as rapporteurs. This is not surprising, as the UK Independence Party has been found to not engage in the process of rapporteurship in other parliamentary terms. Whitaker and Lynch (2014) found, for example, that the UK Independence Party made much less use of the rapporteur system than did the Northern League when the two parties were in the same parliamentary group in the seventh term from 2009 to 2014. The UK Independence Party rapporteur held one report in the area of Environmental Protection (per_v2_501a), advocating for tighter controls and checks of fishing vessels in deep-sea areas. The party has consistently criticised European fisheries policy, arguing against both the financial cost and the perceived cultural and industrial cost of the policy (Lynch et al, 2011, p. 2). This view has found salience among the UK Independence Party’s voters,
particularly those in rural areas who consider agricultural and fisheries workers to be the ‘losers’ in the process of European integration (Whitaker and Lynch, 2011, p. 362). Although this report seems to fit with the party's position on the European Union's position on fishing through the Common Fisheries Policy, it is not possible to draw any reasonable conclusion about the significance of this report's policy area as the numbers are simply too low. However, it is interesting to note that the issue of fishing within the policy area of Environmental Protection seems to be entirely absent from the party's Euromanifesto, as Figure 6.29 overleaf illustrates.
FIGURE 6.29 – UK INDEPENDENCE PARTY SALIENT POLICY AREAS, EP5 (EU MANIFESTOS AND EP REPORTS)
The low numbers of rapporteurs and reports in the fifth European Parliament term means that it is not possible to make any reasonable judgement as to the extent to which the UK Independence Party MEPs seek to action national policy aims in the European Parliament. In addition, the party only had representatives in the fifth parliamentary term, so we cannot compare rapporteurship behaviour with other terms.

However, it does seem, as with other hard Eurosceptic parties, that the UK Independence Party seeks to express its anti-European Union position through its Euromanifesto. The vast majority of policy statements made focused on the European Union, and were almost entirely negative. It is possible that the minimal engagement in the rapporteurship process is an indication of a strong Eurosceptic position on the part of a party that began life refusing to take up any seats in the European Parliament, but the numbers are too low to draw any conclusions on this. What does seem to be consistent with other hard Eurosceptic parties, however, is the focus on espousing Eurosceptic views in election material.

IV. The correlation between populist party goals and European Parliament report content

The content analysis section of this piece of research, demonstrated in this section, focused on the salience of reports for national parties and the level of similarity between Euromanifesto policy areas and European Parliament reports. The aim of this analysis was to better understand how populist or radical right parties in the European Parliament seek to action their national party’s policy aims through their choice of parliamentary reports.

Content analysis of Euromanifestos and European Parliament reports was based on the Euromanifesto Project coding scheme, where election manifestos and related documents for the fourth and fifth terms were coded according to relevant policy domains. The Euromanifesto Project focuses specifically on election material for European Parliament elections, and codes policy statements in the form of quasi-sentences according to seven overarching policy domain areas, and a number of sub-domains. I adapted this model in order to code European Parliament reports. While acknowledging that the entire process is partially open
to interpretation, as some policy areas can be ambiguous or not easily coded, I chose to code the entire report instead of single statements within the reports. This was because parliamentary reports tend to focus on one primary policy area, whereas manifestos cover a range of policy issues. Whenever there was ambiguity over which policy area a report should be coded under, or if it seemed that a report could fit into several categories, I chose the policy area that seemed most dominant even if other policy areas were touched upon. Only one report out of several hundred could not be coded.

Overall, there seems little correlation between populist or radical right party goals as set out in Euromanifestos and the content of reports held by rapporteurs in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms. Generally, most parties have just a handful of policy areas that are addressed in both Euromanifestos and parliamentary reports, and these are often not policy areas that rank as the most salient, and some parties such as the UK Independence Party have no overlapping areas of policy at all. I initially anticipated that the content of European Parliament reports would correlate with a party's ideological and rhetorical bent. Although there is some evidence in support of this, the policy areas addressed in the content of European Parliament reports seem to reflect national influences and areas of policy relevant to the domestic, rather than the European arena.

The regionalist/separatist parties included the Northern League and the Scottish National Party. Both of these parties focused on issues of decentralisation, which is entirely consistent with their domestic policy as regionalist parties. The Northern League has traditionally found most of its support in the north of Italy, although the party enjoyed national influence when it entered into coalition with Go Italy and the National Alliance. The party nonetheless continued to place an emphasis on issues of federalism and decentralisation. The Northern League campaigned for greater representation in the Italian political system, and argued that the only way to achieve this was through decentralisation and an overhaul of the existing political system. The Scottish National Party seeks to take a greater number of policy areas away from the centre at Westminster and allocate them to the devolved regions in the United Kingdom. Decentralisation is a key aim of the
party, both at home and in the European Parliament, so the salience of this issue in the party's reports is entirely consistent with its domestic policy.

The neoliberal populist parties, Fianna Fáil/Republican Party and Go Italy, did not pursue overly neoliberal economic policies in terms of the content of their reports in the European Parliament. Fianna Fáil/Republican Party focused on European Union Structural Funds, but this is arguably evidence of their position as an Irish party rather than their neoliberal identity. Ireland has benefitted greatly from European Union funding, and Fianna Fáil/Republican Party has long been a proponent of the financial benefits of European Union membership. The main focus of the party's reports seems to be linked to national concerns, primarily that of peace. The European Union has been an essential supporter and enabler of the Northern Irish peace process, an issue affecting parties on both sides of the Irish border, and Fianna Fáil/Republican Party’s reports seem to support this position. Go Italy was primarily concerned with the issue of decentralisation, perhaps as a response to the position of its coalition partner, the Northern League. The content of the neoliberal populists' reports seems to bear much less relationship to their parties' ideological policy positions and much more to issues of national relevance.

Similarly, the far right National Alliance seemed to focus on areas of domestic concern in its reports, particularly in areas of institutional reform and administrative efficiency. These issues could be considered indicative of the party's Eurosceptic position, which, although ambivalent at times, is comparatively strong when measured on the Chapel Hill scale. However, it is also possible that they reflect a general domestic focus on administrative efficiency, developed in the wake of Italy's Tangentopoli scandal, when the party attempted to distance itself from the corruption and sleaze dogging other parties.

The most interesting and most important finding from this content analysis of Euromanifestos and European Parliament reports is the confirmation that Eurosceptic parties, particularly those considered hard Eurosceptics (see Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008) or Euro-rejecting parties (see Vasilopoulou, 2010) give over large portions of their Euromanifestos to anti-European statements. This finding is entirely in keeping with the quantitative results that illustrate a significant, negative, correlation between Euroscepticism and the likelihood of a MEP acting as a rapporteur. In addition, this finding corroborates previous
research carried out by Adam and Maier (2011) which found that Eurosceptic parties tend to make use of election material, public campaigning and media broadcast slots in order to express their anti-European Union views. In doing so, they successfully impacted the public policy agenda with Eurosceptic views and were given sufficient opportunity to espouse their positions prior to European elections. Benedetto (2005) found that MEPs in opposition to integration are more likely to be concerned with campaigning than with engaging fully in the European Parliament processes, as many do not wish to be perceived as part of the European Union hierarchy. The prevalence in parliamentary reports of negative statements about European integration or the European institutions and processes is entirely consistent with these previous analyses and pieces of research.

In addition, the finding from this content analysis of Euromanifestos and European Parliament reports in the fourth and fifth terms further validates the established view that populist or radical right parties make use of media outlets to further their political positions. While all political parties do this to a greater or lesser extent, it seems that populist or radical right parties benefit from media attention even when it is negative, which is not the same for mainstream parties. When it comes to European elections, populist or radical right parties seem much more concerned with expressing anti-establishment and anti-European views than they are with clarifying a policy programme. This finding is further endorsed by analysis conducted on some Eurosceptic populist parties’ speeches in the European Parliament plenary, which suggest that when these parties engage with political processes they do so primarily to cement their Eurosceptic platform (see Morris and Carini, 2014).

It seems that we can conclude that some populist parties do engage with European Parliamentary processes such as rapporteurships. However, when they do so, they focus less on party policy aims and more on specific concerns. This might be an indication of rapporteurs acting as technical experts rather than as partisan actors (see Yoshinaka et al, 2010). It might also be evidence of national concerns taking precedence over supranational issues, which raises interesting questions about the applicability of second order election models to political parties themselves, not simply voters. It is possible that the second order model affects political parties in general, and populist parties in particular, who view
domestic issues as more important than supranational European issues (see Willermain, 2014). In addition, this finding might illustrate that populist parties are more concerned about vote-seeking (see Downs, 1967) and office-seeking (see Riker, 1962) than they are policy-seeking (see Budge and Laver, 1986).

The most definite conclusion, however, is that Eurosceptic populist parties are much more likely to seek to make use of European elections to express anti-establishment and anti-European Union views, rather than to action any serious policy aims through the European Parliament. This is an important finding because it corroborates and adds additional support to previous research. In addition, this finding from the qualitative content analysis of these European Parliament reports adds credence to the quantitative analysis conducted in this piece of research, which demonstrates the negative impact of Euroscepticism on a MEP's chances of engaging in the European Parliament's rapporteurship process.
CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION: DOES POPULISM MATTER IN THE SYSTEM OF RAPPORTEURSHIPS?

I. Summary of findings

This piece of research provides an important contribution to the study of populist or radical right parties’ behaviour in elected supranational institutions, by analysing their engagement with the rapporteurship process of the European Parliament. Populist parties have been classified initially according to established definitions of populism as set out by respected authors such as Canovan (1981), Taggart (2000), Luckas (2005), and Mudde (2007), and can be considered to have three core components. Firstly, populist parties have a focus on the people, a homogeneous, essentially good, group that exist in an idealised heartland of the nation or other community. Populist parties define this concept of the people differently, according to their different ideological emphases, time period and cultural context, but all populists have at their heart the dichotomy between the elite and the people. Secondly, populist parties are inherently anti-elitist. The elite tends to comprise the political class, although populist parties from different traditions define this concept differently. Integral to populist thinking is that the elite are corrupt and unrepresentative of the people, who are disenfranchised from the political process. The third core component of populism is suspicion and criticism of liberal pluralist democracy and its institutions. There are six groups of parties studied in this piece of research: radical right wing populists; non-radical right wing populists; left wing populists; neoliberal populists; non-partisan or unclassified populists; and non-populist radical right wing parties. The latter group is included in this study as the parties in this particular classification bear many similarities to radical right wing populists, such that they are often confused.

Radical right wing populists are the largest group of populists represented in the European Parliament. Although the terms ‘extreme’ and ‘radical’ are often used interchangeably for these parties, I have chosen to refer to them as radical because these parties do not seek to overthrow the political system as some extreme right parties do: rather, radical parties are opposed to specific problems within the political system. The concept of nativism is at the core of radical right wing populism, where the nation is divided into natives and non-natives. It is the
natives who are considered the people, and who exist within the heartland. Although nationalism is a core element of radical right wing populist ideology, non-natives are not always defined in nationalist or ethnic terms, although this is often the case as these parties tend to hold strong anti-immigration positions. Radical right wing populist parties are not necessarily right wing in a liberal economic sense, but rather socially and some parties in this category, such as the British National Party, hold to a significantly left wing economic position of high taxation and nationalisation of industry. These parties tend to express their right wing position through holding a foundational belief in inequality, which is evidenced primarily through their nativist sentiments. European parties defined as radical right wing populists include the French National Front, the Austrian Freedom Party, and the Belgian Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest.

Non-radical right wing populist parties share many characteristics with radical right wing populists, primarily in terms of nativism and right wing position. However, they differ in terms of their attitude to fundamental principles of liberal pluralist democracy. Non-radical right wing populists tend to operate relatively comfortably within the established democratic system, with many of them holding prominent positions on the political landscape. Although many non-radical right wing populists hold strong nationalist positions, similar to their radical counterparts, they tend to avoid overt references to ethnic nationalism, favouring civic nationalism instead. As with radical right wing populists, many non-radical right wing populist parties hold strong Eurosceptic positions, often advocating for their country’s withdrawal from the European Union. Examples of non-radical right wing populist parties represented in the European Parliament include the UK Independence Party and the Democratic Unionist Party from the United Kingdom, and the Hungarian Civic Alliance.

As with other populist parties, left wing populists hold strong anti-system and anti-elitist positions and they champion the people. Unlike traditional left wing parties, populist left wing parties tend to place less emphasis on doctrinal integrity and concerns about class-consciousness, preferring instead to focus on the inherently populist dichotomy between the unrepresentative and corrupt elite and the disenfranchised people, who are usually defined as a somewhat vague notion of the working class. The primary areas of divergence between left wing
populists and their counterparts on the right are their emphasis on egalitarianism and social equality, and they are often openly critical of liberal economic, free market or capitalist systems. In the European context, left wing populists are as likely as radical right wing populists to hold Eurosceptic positions, although their criticism of the European project is on the liberal economic nature of integration, particularly on issues pertaining to the single currency, rather than on issues of national identity. Examples of left wing populists include Greece’s Panhellenic Socialist Movement and the Dutch Socialist Party.

Neoliberal populists differ from their right wing counterparts because nativism is not a core component of these parties’ ideology or rhetoric, although neoliberal populists do defend national interests. In addition, the traditional conservative ethical positions held by radical and non-radical right wing populists are not shared by neoliberal populists, who tend instead to propagate liberal values of gender equality, the separation of church and state, and freedom of expression. Somewhat paradoxically, given their emphasis on liberal values, some neoliberal populist parties have mobilised successfully on an anti-immigration mandate, arguing that national liberal culture and interests are threatened by outside, foreign cultures and religions. A notable example of a European neoliberal populist party is Berlusconi’s Go Italy.

The fifth type of populist party identified in this study is the non-partisan or unclassified populist party. These parties cannot comfortably be defined according to the traditional left-right spectrum because they fluctuate in their position over time or are ideologically ambiguous. One example of this type of populist party is Italy’s Five Star Movement which claims to be “beyond right and left”. The party is ambiguous on almost all points of ideology, fluctuating between being pro-European and Eurosceptic, and failing to develop any concrete policy programme domestically. However, the party has an inherently populist organisational structure and is centred on a charismatic central figure, Beppe Grillo. The party operates in unconventional spheres, such as campaigning through social media, and exhibits strong anti-establishment sentiments so is considered populist. Non-populist radical right parties share many similarities with populist radical right parties but, crucially, don’t display inherent characteristics required to define them as populist. Non-populist radical right parties tend to display elitist characteristics
in terms of organisational structure, and some advocate violent political struggle instead of engagement with the liberal democratic system. These latter parties can be considered extreme right wing parties, examples of which include Greece’s Golden Dawn. Elitist radical right wing parties include Italy’s National Alliance.

The European Parliament was chosen as the sphere of study because it allows a unique opportunity to study populist parties of different traditions, operating in one democratic institution. Studying their behaviour in a supranational institution where they are subject to the same institutional processes, regulations and restrictions allows for greater parity than cross-national comparisons do. In addition, little in depth research has been conducted on all populist parties represented in the European Parliament in the form of comprehensive comparison studies. Much of the research on populist parties at the European level has focused on radical right wing populists or Eurosceptic populists and the extent to which they have benefitted from the second order election type, the nature of their ideology, and the reasons for their electoral support and success. Other areas of research have included attempts by radical right wing populists to cooperate in the European Parliament, and there have been studies conducted on issues pertaining to Europeanisation. Where this piece of research fits a niche is in its study of a range of populist parties and in its focus on populism as a common factor in the rhetoric and ideology of several different types of party.

The process of rapporteurship was chosen as the example of legislative behaviour to be analysed because it is, arguably, the most important role of a MEP. The choice of rapporteur is crucial and is influenced by several factors, including partisanship, expertise and national interest. Analysing whether populism is a factor in this process of rapporteurship allocation is a relatively undeveloped area of study, yet it has the potential to provide crucial information about how the European Parliament works, whether there is a democratic deficit in its processes, and whether anti-establishment parties can operate comfortably in the establishment they criticise.

I hypothesised that populist or radical right MEPs would be less likely to act as rapporteurs than MEPs of other traditions. This is because populist parties are inherently anti-establishment, advocating for a disenfranchised people
unrepresented by the political elite. In the European context, this can take on the additional aspect of Euroscepticism. Not all populist parties are Eurosceptic, but many are, perceiving the European Union to be at odds with the nation, and a threat to cultural or economic concerns. This anti-establishment position means that populist parties, particularly those from the right wing who hold ultranationalist positions, fail to fully engage and cooperate in the European Parliament’s processes. This might be evidenced through MEPs remaining unattached, choosing not to participate in the political group system, having limited attendance at committee meetings or plenary debates, or not acting as rapporteurs.

Initial analysis began with descriptive statistics of all rapporteurs, which illustrated that 11% of rapporteurs in the fourth European Parliament term were populist or radical right MEPs, and 8.5% of all rapporteurs were populist or radical right in the fifth term. Binomial logistic regression was then carried out as an assessment of an overall model of rapporteurship for the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms. Adding the populism variable to the model resulted in greater significance and a better fit for the data. In addition, the results indicated that MEPs that are populist or radical right are much less likely to receive a rapporteurship than MEPs who are from parties that are not populist or radical right: approximately half as likely in both Parliaments. It seems that, even when controlling for other factors such as activity, expertise, and seniority, being a populist or radical right MEP has an effect in determining rapporteurship allocation.

The second hypothesis focused on the impact of Euroscepticism on the allocation of reports. I hypothesised that Eurosceptic MEPs would be the least likely of all populists to act as rapporteurs. This is because the inherent anti-establishment perspective of populist MEPs in the European context often results in them holding anti-European Union positions. I anticipated that the hard Eurosceptics, or those who could be defined as Euro-rejecting, who disagree with any form of European integration, would be unlikely to choose to engage in the rapporteurship process and would be unlikely to be chosen by their fellow MEPs to act as rapporteurs.
Having found that the Euroscepticism significantly affected the overall model of rapporteurship allocation, I computed the predicted probabilities of a MEP acting as a rapporteur given a variety of independent variables. For the fourth European Parliament term, the predicted probability that a MEP acted as a rapporteur ranged from .18 for those MEPs who were most opposed to European integration to .61 for the members who were most in favour of European integration. The median position was .37, for those MEPs who were neutral on the subject of European integration. In the fifth term, the predicted probabilities were .26 for the most Eurosceptic members, and .65 for the MEPs with the most pro-European integration positions, and the median position was .45. These results were strong and consistent across both models, suggesting that members’ attitudes towards European integration are a salient factor in determining their likelihood of acting as rapporteurs. The MEPs who are most opposed to European integration are also those who are least likely to get reports, and those most in favour of European integration are the most likely to act as rapporteurs.

In addition, I anticipated that the populist parties that held Eurosceptic positions would use their Euromanifesto documents to espouse their Eurosceptic views, instead of presenting clear policy aims which they would intend to action in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms. Previous research indicates that Eurosceptic parties use election communications to share their anti-European integration views instead of using the opportunity to develop a policy programme for election to the European Parliament. I anticipated that there would be less of a link between the policy content of Eurosceptic rapporteurs’ reports and their parties’ Euromanifestos, because the election materials will be limited in their policy platform and will not give a clear indication of comprehensive policy aims other than anti-European sentiment.

Having analysed populist or radical right MEPs’ European Parliament reports, I found that Eurosceptic parties, especially Euro-rejecting parties, used their Euromanifestos to express anti-European sentiments, rather than to present clear policy positions. This finding validated previous research which suggests that Eurosceptic parties are more likely to make use of election material and campaign broadcast slots in the run up to European elections to criticise the European project than they are to construct an actionable policy programme.
These findings also support previous research that suggests the Eurosceptic populist parties use speeches in the European Parliament plenary sessions to further cement their Eurosceptic position by condemning European integration and criticising the European project.

The final hypothesis centred on the role of domestic governance in report allocation among populist MEPs. Previous research has found that members from parties in national government at some point during the European Parliament term are more likely to act as rapporteurs than MEPs from parties not in government (see Høyland, 2006). This is because rapporteurs from parties in government are under pressure to coordinate their proposals with conversant actors in the Council, which means they will be more interested in writing codecision reports than members from parties not in government. I hypothesised that this would be the same for populist or radical right members.

Having run interaction terms in regression analysis models of both the fourth and fifth European Parliament term, it was concluded that there was no significant interaction between the Populist/Radical Right and the National Government variables for the fifth term. A statistically significant result seemed to be found in the fourth term, so the data was disaggregated and the analysis run again with the interaction term. This time, there was no significant result, so I concluded that the statistically significant result found in the first regression model with interactions was, in fact, a false result influenced by the existence of other variables in the analysis. When an ANOVA was conducted for the fourth European Parliament term, the dependent variable was Number of Reports, rather than Rapporteur. Initially, there was no significant result for the interaction between the two independent variables, suggesting that the impact of being in national government did not affect populist or radical right MEPs any differently than other members. In addition, there was no statistically significant result to suggest that being a member of a part in national government actually affects the number of reports held by rapporteurs in general.

However, the likelihood of there being zero interaction between the two variables was low, so I ran an assessment using Type I sum of squares. Although there was a significant result for the Populist/Radical Right variable, this was considered misleading as it was not possible to separate this result from the
interaction with National Government, in this analysis. There was a statistically
significant result between rapporteurs who were not in government at any point
during the fourth European Parliament term and those who were in government
for part of the term, but not between any other comparison groups. The results
from the regression analysis and ANOVA, however, did not indicate that being a
member of a party in government had any significant impact in terms of report
allocation for any MEPS, whether they were populist or radical right, or not. It was
not possible to argue that national government had an effect on either the
likelihood of a member acting as a rapporteur, or that it had an effect on the
number of reports allocated. Neither was it possible to argue that membership of a
party in government affected populist or radical right MEPs different from MEPs
overall. As a result, I could not support the national government hypothesis.

The most significant finding from this analysis of populist and radical right
MEPs in the European Parliament in the fourth and fifth European Parliament
terms was that Euroscepticism is a highly significant factor in determining the
likelihood of a MEP acting as a rapporteur. The more Eurosceptic a member (i.e.
the lower they ranked on the Chapel Hill scale), the less likely they were to act as a
rapporteur. In fact, with each one step up the Chapel Hill scale (i.e. with a one unit
increase in pro-European sentiment), a member was 1.244 times more likely to act
as a rapporteur. This is, perhaps, not surprising as it stands to reason that a
supranational institution that is based on consensus-building would favour those
members that are supportive of, and invested in, the European project. However,
this is the first time that analysis has produced such compelling results
demonstrating the impact Eurosceptic sentiment has on the ability of a member to
perform one of his/her core responsibilities in the European Parliament.

It is possible to conclude, after this in-depth analysis of rapporteurship
allocation in the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms that being a member
of populist or radical right party has a negative effect on the likelihood of a
member acting as a rapporteur. This, of course, is due to several reasons such as
being a member of a small party group or being non-attached. However, even
when we control for other possible factors, being a populist or radical right MEP is
still a highly significant factor in determining rapporteurship allocation. This
analysis has provided an essential study into one of the most prevalent new
rhetorical and ideological characteristics found in many parties represented in the foremost supranational institution in the world: populism.

II. What does this research contribute?

This piece of research was based upon, and developed, Yoshinaka et al’s (2010) analysis of rapporteurship allocation in the European Parliament in the fourth and fifth terms. The main aim of that analysis was to establish whether rapporteurs are more influenced by partisan interests or their technical expertise in specific policy areas. Yoshinaka et al tested two hypotheses. First, they presented a dual hypothesis of partisanship that proposed that MEPs who were ideologically close to both their party group median and their national party median would get more reports than those who were far from the median. Secondly, they anticipated that MEPs who had spent longer on the committee of their choosing would be more likely to act as rapporteurs than MEPs who were not experts or long-serving members. This resulted in Yoshinaka et al producing a picture of rapporteurs as being both consensus-building technical experts and partisan actors.

This piece of research replicated the analysis of Yoshinaka et al, but with the addition of populism as a predictor variable. In addition, variables relevant to their legislative behaviour were added, in order to test a variety of hypotheses including participation in domestic governance and levels of Euroscepticism. As a result, this is the first piece of research to analyse in depth the behaviour of populist members in a supranational legislature, and the impact their ideological profile has on their legislative attitudes. Despite the prevalence of populist parties across Europe and represented in the European Parliament, this is nonetheless an under-researched area of study.

Research into populist parties has, for the most part, focused on right wing populist parties. Theoretical frameworks of the ideological nature of the populist radical right has been developed by scholars such as Betz (1994), McGann (1995), Bale (2003), Ignazi (2003), and Mudde (2007), with the focus being on how best to define and classify these parties and how to explain their electoral appeal. Others have focused primarily on specific parties or geographical areas, be it the United
Kingdom (see Copsey, 2004 and Goodwin, 2014), France (see Davies 2002a and 2002b), the Netherlands (see Otjes and Louwerse, 2015), or Scandinavia (see Rydgren, 2006). As left wing populist parties have gained traction, scholars have begun to turn their attention to these parties, as well as neoliberal populists, although the balance of populist literature is still very much weighted towards those parties on the right wing.

Although the European Parliament provides a unique frame of reference for studying populist parties, there is still only a small body of literature into the electoral and legislative behaviour of these parties at the supranational level. This literature tends to focus on the extent to which these parties benefit from the second order election model as niche parties (see Jensen and Spoon, 2010), or their electoral appeal at the European level (see Bertocini and Kreilinger, 2013 and Durant et al, 2013). While Startin (2010) and Brack (2012 and 2015) have conducted research into radical right wing populist alliances in the European Parliament, and the behaviour of Eurosceptic members, the field is nonetheless limited in terms of analysis of the role that populist parties play at the European level, and the impact they have on European legislation.

There is new and developing research on the issue of populist communication in terms of rhetoric and use of media (see Horsfield, 2003, Morris and Carini, 2014, and Aalberg et al, 2016). However, there is very little research combining these varied aspects of research into one comprehensive study of the electoral, legislative and rhetorical behaviour of populists. This piece of research is one of the first attempts to consolidate and develop the existing research into populist parties into one comprehensive and in-depth study. This piece of research focuses on populist parties of all traditions, viewing populism as the unifying thread uniting these disparate groups, and analyses the legislative behaviour of populist members in the European Parliament. In addition to conducting quantitative analysis on the behaviour of populist MEPs in the process of rapporteurship, this piece of research is the first to develop the comparatively new area of study into populist communication and apply it to European Parliament reports. With a combination of research techniques and methodological approaches, this piece of research not only plugs a gap in existing
research, it opens doors to further areas of research that have, as yet, been largely ignored in the existing literature.

III. What next for research?

This piece of research has been a first attempt to consolidate much of the literature on populist parties and their behaviour in the legislative arena. Despite the European Parliament being the ideal setting within which to study these parties, due to its ability to provide parity as a result of common rules and regulations, it is nonetheless an under-researched area. This piece of research has built on existing studies of the legislative behaviour of members in the European Parliament, but has applied such theoretical frameworks and methodological studies specifically to populist parties. Given the prevalence and salience of populism across Europe and time, this piece of research is of great import and relevance.

As an initial starting point, this piece of research used the fourth and fifth European Parliament terms as the timeframe for study. This was in order to replicate previous analysis conducted by Yoshinaka et al (2010), and to develop the scope of those findings by focusing specifically on populist and radical right parties. The next development to this research would be to expand out the timeframe to include all European Parliament terms, in order to determine trends over time. Although the data on rapporteurships is available to view publicly on the European Parliament’s Legislative Observatory, it only encompasses those rapporteurships held from the fourth to current terms. For the first three terms, in 1979, 1984, and 1989 respectively, the data is not available in any comprehensive form. This would require a researcher to compute the data by hand by using archive documents from the European Parliament. Although time-consuming, collating data on rapporteurships for all parliamentary terms would be an important addition to this field and would be achievable, despite it not having been attempted before. The creation of a single dataset showing all rapporteurships held according to individual, member state, party, parliamentary group, and a

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43 The datasets used as the basis of analysis in this piece of research are available from the author upon request.
variety of other variables would be a significant contribution to the body of literature on legislative processes in the European Union. Collecting rapporteurship data from the sixth, seventh and current terms would be the first starting point for future study in this area, with a view to creating a comprehensive dataset of all rapporteurships over time. This could be presented in a similar way to Høyland’s MEP database, which is publicly available for research purposes. This wider time frame would allow for greater comparison and more comprehensive research findings. In addition, it would enable a researcher to take into account the newer parties represented in the European Parliament as a result of enlargement. The 2004 accession of Poland, for example, brought with it some populist and Eurosceptic parties such as the Law and Justice party and the Congress of the New Right. Replicating the analysis of this piece of research over more parliamentary terms would ensure a significant contribution to the literature on the legislative behaviour of populist parties, and on the processes and workings of the European Parliament.

This piece addresses questions about the legislative behaviour of populist parties in the European Parliament: further research would draw comparisons with behaviour in national legislatures. Across Europe, many populist parties find themselves in a position of legislative power. Additional research would elucidate the impact their populism has on their potential to influence law-making, either through domestic systems of rapporteurship, or through government participation, plenary speeches or questions. Such future analysis would also expand upon the relationship between the national and supranational legislatures, assessing the impact of Europeanisation on national parties (see, e.g. Benz, 2005; Bale and Taggart, 2006; and Ladrech, 2012). Furthermore, future research would better analyse the extent to which MEPs use the European Parliament as a lever in order to gain electorally and politically at the domestic level. This piece of research has touched on the relationship between national party goals and Euromanifestos, and further analysis would provide a more comprehensive understanding of this issue. In addition, although this piece of research has focused primarily on rapporteurships as the mode of legislative behaviour for MEPs, future analysis of other forms of activity by populists in the European Parliament – such as committee attendance or voting (see Hausemer, 2006, and
Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007) – would help to develop a more comprehensive view of populist behaviour at the supranational level.

Future research would also develop the serious questions raised about the democratic legitimacy of the European Parliament as a supranational legislature. There have been allegations of a ‘democratic deficit’ in the European Union (see Featherstone, 1994, Hix, 1997 and Follesdal and Hix, 2006). This piece of research goes some way to supporting this argument, as it seems that the institutional processes in the European Parliament are designed to limit the influence of MEPs from particular types of parties, despite their role as democratically elected representatives of European citizens. In addition, due to the low level of participation on the part of populist – and possibly other – parties, this piece of research raises questions about the salience and legitimacy of the European Parliament as an institution. Further research would develop this hypothesis to test whether the European Parliament has lasting relevance and legitimacy as a legislative organisation. This would be a particularly pertinent addition to the literature, given the recent periods of turmoil in the European Union. The financial crisis in the Eurozone, the ongoing migrant crisis, the rise of populist parties across the bloc, and the impending exit of the United Kingdom in 2019 have all challenged the Union and raised questions about its future. Comprehensive analysis of the European Parliament, such as that developed by this piece of research, would go some way to assessing the current and future relevance of this institution and its efficacy as a supranational law-making body.

Questions are also raised about the impact and future of European integration. As the European Union has enlarged, so the number of Eurosceptic and populist parties has increased. Given that this is the case, it is possible that this might indicate an undercurrent of dissatisfaction across the Union. There have been suggestions from some scholars that public opinion about European integration has hardened across the Union, especially in Central and Eastern European countries (see Hanley, 2014). This is largely due to a reluctance to commit to the single currency, largely due to suspicion of the Euro following economic crises in several Eurozone countries such as Greece and Spain. In addition, the perceived lack of a cohesive European approach to the migrant crisis of 2015-16 has led some Eastern European countries, some of which have found
themselves struggling at the frontline of the catastrophe, to adopt more Eurosceptic attitudes. This piece of research contributes to this discussion by specifically analysing the impact of Eurosceptic populist parties on European law-making. By conducting country-specific research in terms of comparing Eurosceptic attitudes among voters and parties, as well as electoral turnout for European elections, further analysis would build upon the findings of this piece of research in terms of assessing the extent to which Euroscepticism impacts upon European integration and participation. This piece of research, and future analysis, adds to studies conducted by scholars such as Brack (2012, 2013, and 2015). Brack's analysis of Eurosceptic MEPs has been invaluable in developing the literature on the relationship between legislative behaviour at the national level and that at the supranational level, and is part of a wider study into the roles performed by Eurosceptic MEPs. Future research would be able to build upon the foundation laid by such studies and provide comprehensive and nuanced analysis of Euroscepticism and populism in the European context.

In 2017 – when Europe has seen the start of Brexit negotiations as the United Kingdom prepares to leave the European Union, and elections in the Netherlands and France have renewed concerns about the potential for populist radical right parties to gain traction at the national level – future analysis building upon this piece of research would be both highly topical and imperative. In addition, as economic uncertainty still lingers within the Eurozone, populist left wing parties gain support from a disaffected populace, suggesting that populism is a lasting phenomenon with resonance, support and success. Given the persistence of populism across the European Union, and the prevalence of both academic and media speculation on the future of the bloc in light of recent turbulence, this piece of research has gone some way to filling a gap in the contemporary literature on the subject. While future analysis would further develop the findings presented here there can be no doubt that, when it comes to European law-making, populism matters.
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| National / Military / Positive | per_v1_104a | 0.72 |
| National / Internationalism / Positive | per_v1_107a | 2.16 |
| European Union / Internationalism / Positive | per_v2_107a | 0.72 |
| National / European Union (General) / Negative | per_v1_108b | 28.06 |
| European Union / European Union (General) / Negative | per_v2_108b | 1.44 |
| National / European Union (General) / Positive | per_v1_108a | 1.44 |
| National / Financing the European Union / Negative | per_v1_1081b | 1.44 |
| National / Democracy / Positive | per_v1_202a | 2.16 |
| Unspecified / Democracy / Positive | per_v3_202a | 0.72 |
| National / Decentralization (General) / Negative | per_v1_301b | 4.32 |
| European Union / Decentralization (General) / Negative | per_v2_301b | 0.72 |
| National / Decentralization (General) / Positive | per_v1_301a | 1.44 |
| European Union / Transfer of Power to the European Union / Negative | per_v2_3011b | 10.79 |
| European Union / Executive and Administrative Efficiency / Positive | per_v2_303a | 0.72 |
| National / Political Corruption / Positive | per_v1_304a | 1.44 |
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| National / Political Authority / Positive | per_v1_305a | 1.44 |
| European Union / Competences of the European Parliament / Negative | per_v2_306b | 2.88 |
| European Union / Competences of the European Commission / Negative | per_v2_308b | 1.44 |
| European Union / Competences of the European Council/Council of Ministers / Negative | per_v2_310b | 0.72 |
| European Union / Voting Procedures in the European Council / Positive | per_v2_3101a | 1.44 |
| European Union / Competences of the European Court of Justice / Negative | per_v2_312b | 0.72 |
| European Union / Free Enterprise (General) / Positive | per_v2_401a | 2.16 |
| National / Incentives / Positive | per_v1_402a | 1.44 |
| European Union / Incentives / Positive | per_v2_402a | 2.16 |
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