Political and Economic Relations between the Ayyūbids and the Baḥrī Mamlūks and the Ashraf of Ḥijāz, 567–784 A.H./1171–1382 A.D.

Thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

at the University of Leicester

by

Musaed Jaber Alenezi

School of History, Political and International Relations

University of Leicester

2017
Abstract

This thesis sheds light on the history of political and economic relations between the Ayyūbids and Baḥrī Mamlūks and the Ashraf of Ḥijāz (567–784 A.H./1171–1382 A.D.). It discusses rule legitimation in Sunnī jurisprudence and its development by some of the most prominent Sunnī jurists. The study examines legitimacy and its importance in the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk sultans’ political and economic policy towards the Ashraf of Ḥijāz. The study also focuses on political relations between the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk regimes in Egypt and the Ashraf of Mecca and conflict with other regional powers for hegemony over Ḥijāz. It also focuses on economic relations between the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks and the Ashraf of Ḥijāz, and the role of the economy in strengthening their overall relations through religious occasions and trade activities.

The thesis comprises an introduction, four chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter analyzes the background of the three main protagonists, the Ayyūbids, Baḥrī Mamlūks and the Ashraf of Ḥijāz. This chapter discusses the emergence of the three regimes and their military systems, and the challenges that faced them at the beginning of their period of rule. The second chapter examines legitimation according to Sunnī jurisprudence and some Sunnī jurists’ views on rule. The third chapter discusses political relations between the Ayyūbids and Baḥrī Mamlūks and the Ashraf of Ḥijāz. This chapter studies the agencies and mechanisms of control and hegemony in Ḥijāz during the Ayyūbid and Baḥrī Mamlūk eras. The fourth chapter discusses economic relations between the Ayyūbids and Baḥrī Mamlūks and the Ashraf of Ḥijāz through religious and trading activities in Ḥijāz.
Acknowledgments

I offer my humble thanks to my supervisor Professor Norman Housley who advised me and offered me assistance to complete this work. I am indebted to him for sharing his knowledge of the history of the crusades and his advice and comments at each stage in this work.

I would like to thank my mother who always encourages me and without her support I would not have been able to finish this work. I also remember my father who had hoped that I would complete my Ph.D. I would also offer my thanks to my uncle, Dr. Saad Alenezi who encouraged and supported all the time. My thanks are also due to my brothers Salem and Sultan and my nephews Jaber and Jodi.
Table of Contents

Abstract  
Acknowledgements  

Chapter One  
Introduction  
1.1 The Subject  
1.2 Importance of the Topic  
1.3 Structure of the Thesis  
1.4 Primary Sources  
1.5 Secondary Sources

Chapter Two  
The Ayyūbids, Baḥrī Mamlūks and Ashraf of Ḥijāz  
Introduction  
2.2 The Ayyūbids  
2.2.1 The Origins of the Ayyūbids and the beginning of their Rule  
2.2.2 The Ayyūbid Army  
2.2.3 Dangers and Challenges to the Ayyūbid Sultanate  
2.2.3 The Baḥrī Mamlūks  
2.3.1 Mamlūks in the Islamic Caliphate  
2.3.2 Challenges Facing the Mamlūks at the beginning of their Rule  
2.3.3 The Mamlūk Army  
2.4 The Ashraf of Ḥijāz  
2.4.1 Ashraf Rule in Ḥijāz
2.4.2 The Ashraf Army

Chapter Three

The Political Legitimacy of the Ayyūbid, Mamlūk and Ashraf

Introduction

3.1 Political Legitimacy in Islamic Regimes
3.2 The Political Legitimacy of the Ayyūbid Sultanate
3.3 The Political Legitimacy of the Mamlūk Sultanate
3.3.1 Internal Conflicts in the Mamlūk Sultanate
3.3.2 Al-Ẓahri Baybars and Support for the Mamlūks’ Legitimacy
3.4 The Legitimacy of the Ashraf Regime

Chapter Four

Political Relations between the Ayyūbids, the Baḥrī Mamlūks and the Ashraf of Ḥijāz

Introduction

4.1 The Ayyūbids’ Political Relations with the Ashraf of Ḥijāz (567-648 A.H./ 1171-1250 A.D.)
4.1.1 Ḥijāz at the Beginning of the Ayyūbid Domination
4.1.2 The Imposition of Actual Domination by the Ayyūbids
4.2.1 Political Relations between the Baḥrī Mamlūks and the Ashraf of Ḥijāz (658-784 A.H./ 1260-1382 A.D.): an overview
4.2.2 The beginning of the Mamlūks’ Domination of Ḥijāz
4.2.3 The Mamlūks’ Policy towards the Ashraf of Ḥijāz after Sultan Baybars
4.2.4 The Conflict between the Mamlūks and Ilkhanids to Dominate Ḥijāz

4.3 Agencies and Mechanisms of control and Hegemony in Ḥijāz during the Ayyubid and Bahrī Mamlūk Eras

4.3.1 The Kiswāh

4.3.2 Ayyūbid’s and Mamlūk’s Conflicts with other Powers about the Kiswāh

4.3.3 ’Ulamā and Jurists

4.3.4 Schools (‘madrasas’) 204

4.3.5 Ribāt

Chapter Five

Economic Relations between the Ayyūbids and Bahrī Mamlūks and the Ashraf of Ḥijāz 218

Introduction 218

5.1 The Region’s Economic Profile

5.1.1 Trade 222

5.1.2 Agriculture 227

5.1.3 Manufacturing 233

5.2 Pilgrimage and Economic Life in Mecca under the Ayyūbid and Bahrī Mamlūk Sultanates 238

5.2.1 The Overland and Maritime Pilgrimage Routes to Mecca 242

5.2.2 The Egyptian Pilgrimage Caravan ‘mahmal’ 254

5.2.3 The Sharif of Mecca and the Pilgrimage Season 257

5.2.4 Natural Disasters and their Impact on Pilgrimage 258

5.2.5 Mecca’s Markets in the Pilgrimage Season 260

5.3 The Port of Jeddah in Ḥijāz in the Ayyūbid and Bahrī Mamlūk Eras 262

5.3.1 Factors Behind the development of Jeddah 265

5.3.2 Jeddah’s Port during the Ayyūbids’ and Mamlūks’ Reign 267

5.3.3 Jeddah’s Prosperity and Decline after the Bahrī Mamlūks’ reign 270

5.4 Taxes in Ḥijāz in the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Eras (‘Mukūs’) 273
5.4.1 Regional Mukūs in Ḥijāz and Ashraf Policy on Imposing Mukūs 275
5.4.2 Interventions by Outside Regimes on Mukūs in Ḥijāz during the Reigns of the Ayyūbids and Bahrī Mamluks 279
5.5 Kārimī Trade in Ḥijāz during the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Eras 284
  5.5.1 The Origins of Kārimī Trade 284
  5.5.2 Kārimī Trade in the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Eras 286
  5.5.3 Kārimī Merchants’ Role in Supporting the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Sultanates 391
5.6 The Arab Tribes and their Role in the Protection of Pilgrimage and Trade 293

6. Conclusion 309

Tables
1. Ayyūbid Sultans 316
2. Ayyūbids of Yemen 316
3. Bahrī Mamlūk Sultans 316

Figure
1. Madrasas in Mecca 318

Maps
1. Map of Ḥijāz and the Red Sea 319
2. Map of the pilgrim routes of Arabia 320
3. Map of Ḥijāz and its neighbours 321
4. Map of Saladin’s Sultanate 322
5. Map of the Bahrī Mamlūk Sultanate 323
Bibliography

1. Primary Sources ........................................ 324
2. Secondary Sources ...................................... 334
1. Introduction

1.1 The Subject

Ḥijāz is one of the most important regions in Islamic history because of its position in the hearts of Muslims due to the locations of Mecca and Medīnah. In the Middle Ages, Egypt had historical, political and economic importance for the Islamic Caliphate and all Muslims in Ḥijāz. There have been many studies that have dealt with the relations between Ḥijāz and Egypt; these relations were a result of their geographical proximity. The relations between Ḥijāz and Egypt developed for many reasons, such as the weakness of the Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad and the emergence of independent political regimes in Egypt; these all exerted a political impact on Ḥijāz.

After the era of the Rāshidi Caliphate (11–41 A.H./632–661 A.D.), Ḥijāz became a secondary province in the era of the Umayyads and Abbāsids, and it did not have any political or economic impact on the Caliphate. Ḥijāz was economically poor, and this prevented the establishment there of an independent political regime. This made Ḥijāz dependent on aid from the Caliphate, whether it was located in Baghdad or Egypt. At the beginning of the fourth century A.H./tenth century A.D., the Alawites established a political regime in Mecca, recognizing the caliph in Baghdad as the ruler of all Muslims. This regime comprised autonomous government by the Sharif over Mecca as well as the neighbouring towns and some ports on the Red Sea, such as Jeddah. The
Ashraf of Mecca remained economically dependent on Egypt’s aid in terms of money and food; this dependence will be examined in detail in the following chapters.

The political regimes in Egypt sought to take control over Ḥijāz and protect the Islamic holy sites in Mecca and Medīnah, which provided a religious legitimization of their regimes. This is well illustrated by the Fāṭimids’ relationship with Ḥijāz after the establishment of the Shi’a Fāṭimid Caliphate in Egypt. The Fāṭimids aimed at seizing the sovereignty of the Islamic world from the Sunnī Abbāsid Caliphate. This was the reason for the increasing conflict between the Islamic powers, which wanted to control Ḥijāz and secure the honour of controlling the holy sites in Mecca and Medīnah. The intra-Islamic conflict, the presence of the Franks in the Levant and the internal conditions of Egypt all led to the collapse of the Fāṭimid Caliphate and the establishment of the Ayyūbid regime, which declared its subordination to the Sunnī Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad. The Ayyūbids in the era of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn imposed their hegemony on Mecca because of its geographical proximity and because Ḥijāz was dependent on Egyptian aid. The Ayyūbids increased their direct control over Ḥijāz after the death of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn, and the Ashraf were appointed to and deposed from the Sharifate by the Ayyūbid Sultan in Egypt. Mecca continued to be under Ayyūbid control until the beginning of the conflict between the Ayyūbids and the Rasūlīds of Yemen; this conflict ended with the fall of the Ayyūbid Sultanate of Egypt to the Baḥrī Mamlūks.

The Mamlūks needed to enhance their political legitimacy as rulers of Muslims. This was because they lacked the legitimacy that must be claimed by any
Muslim ruler who depended on Sunnī Islamic jurisprudence. However, political and regional circumstances benefited the Mamlûks, and their acceptance as Muslim rulers became necessary in accordance with Islamic political reality. The fall of the Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad due to the Mongols, and the success of the Mongols in their invasion of Iraq and the Levant, destroyed most of the polities in this region. This made the Mamlûks the last hope for Muslims and they were encouraged by ’ulamā and Muslims to save the rest of the Muslim countries. The Mamlûks’ success in stopping the Mongol invasion, as well as their control of Ḩijāz and the holy places, had a great influence in supporting their religious and political legitimacy to rule.

In addition to studying political and economic relations among the Ayyūbids, Mamlûks, and the Ashraf in Ḩijāz, we will also examine the precise nature of the political and religious legitimacy that both Ayyūbids and Mamlûks tried to establish through their relations with the Ashraf of Mecca. A chapter in this thesis will study religious legitimacy, using the views of jurists and ’ulamā who discussed legitimacy and the conditions that must be met by a Muslim ruler, and how the Ayyūbids’ and Mamlûks’ regimes dealt with this issue.

As well as analysing the political and military support that the Ayyūbids and Mamlûks supplied to the Ashraf, this thesis will study the religious and social achievements of the Ayyūbids and Mamlûks in Ḩijāz with the goal of strengthening their hegemony there. For example, pilgrimage is one of the most important religious seasons in Islam; however, it was also a tool to strengthen economic relationships. It shows us the
nature of the political ties between the rival regimes attempting to control Ḥijāz. Therefore, we will shed light on the economic roles that the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks played to enhance their political influence in Ḥijāz and support the political standing of the Ashraf of Ḥijāz.

**1.2 Importance of the Topic**

The topic of political and economic relations between Egypt and Ḥijāz in this era (567–784 A.H./1171-1382 A.D.) comprises the rule of the Ayyūbids and Baḥrī Mamlūks in Egypt, and its significance is clear. Major events occurred in the Islamic lands and changed the character of the region. These events were the Islamic-Frankish conflicts in the Levant, the Mongol invasion of the Islamic countries and the migration of the Islamic Caliphate from Baghdad to Cairo, which made Egypt the centre of gravity of the Islamic countries.

These events contributed significantly to strengthening relations between the political regimes in Egypt and the Ashraf of Ḥijāz, and they made all of these parties work to maximize their gains from these relations. At the same time, the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks were trying to stabilize their rule by controlling the holy places in Ḥijāz; while the Ashraf were trying to gain military and economic support to ensure the continuation of their regime. Despite the mutual interests between these regimes, the relations were fraught with sectarian conflicts between Sunnī regimes (in particular the Ayyūbids, the Mamlūks and the Abbāsid Caliphate) and Shiʿa regimes (in particular the Ashraf, who
belonged to the Shi‘te Zāydi sect at that time). The sectarian conflicts are very important in explaining political and economic relations between the Islamic political regimes, and they will be further examined in this thesis.

Political and religious legitimacy is recognized as an important issue for most regimes throughout Islamic history. In this instance, the importance of legitimacy is derived from the vector of political and economic relations between Egypt and Ḥijāz. Mecca was the scene of conflict between regional powers that wanted to take control over Ḥijāz to secure their particular honour of controlling the holy places. As a result, the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks sought to develop links between Ḥijāz and Egypt through their support for religious and educational activities in Ḥijāz, showing their interest in the Islamic holy places. The Ayyūbids’ and Mamlūks’ control of Ḥijāz was intended to facilitate pilgrimage routes; trade had economic benefits for all parties because trade was the primary source of income for Mecca. Thus, political and economic relations between Egypt and Ḥijāz encouraged points of commercial growth in Egypt and Ḥijāz, such as the ports of the Red Sea in the Mamlūk era.

In this study, I researched and collated what I needed from primary sources that were related to the era of the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks and the Ashraf of Ḥijāz. I have adopted an analytical and critical approach to events, depending on primary sources. I travelled to Egypt at the beginning of my Ph.D. work and collected many of the primary sources that I have used in this study. I also studied and analysed some of the historical letters between the political elites in Egypt and Ḥijāz; these letters were contained in the
primary sources. I studied the natural and geographical data in Egypt and Ḥijāz through geographers, travellers and historians who were contemporaneous and near contemporary to the period of study. I added a section that deals with this data in the tables, which draws on the writings of historians and travellers. I also used the inductive approach in studying the role of the Ashraf of Mecca during the pilgrimage season and the impact of political conflicts and natural disasters on the pilgrimage season. I studied the responses of the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk sultanates to those events and how they affected their relationship with the Ashraf of Mecca.

1.3 Structure of the thesis

This thesis is broken down into an introduction, four substantive chapters, a conclusion and a list of primary and secondary sources. The first substantive chapter highlights key aspects of the three main political regimes explored in the thesis. The first section of this chapter examines the Ayyūbid Sultanate and the conditions that assisted the Ayyūbids to establish their rule in Egypt. This section deals with the beginning of the Ayyūbid Sultanate and the success of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn in facing the challenges that threatened his regime. This section also studies the Ayyūbid military system and the army’s role in achieving stability for the Ayyūbid Sultanate in Egypt and its dependent territories. The second section of this chapter is a study of the Mamlūks’ role in the Islamic Caliphate and the emergence of the Mamlūk Sultanate following the supplanting of the Ayyūbid Sultanate. This section also deals with the internal and external challenges that the
Mamlūks faced at the beginning of their rule; in addition, the section explores the role of the Mamlūks’ army in stabilizing that rule. The third section of this chapter deals with the Ashraf regime in Ḥijāz and, in particular, Mecca and the conditions that helped the Ashraf to establish their political regime in Mecca. This section also deals with the system followed by the Ashraf in forming their armed forces (which was a militia rather than a regular army) compared to the Ayyūbids’ and Mamlūks’ army.

The second substantive chapter of this thesis deals with the political and religious legitimacy of the regimes of the Ayyūbids, Mamlūks and Ashraf. The first section of the chapter addresses the general issue of religious legitimacy in the era of the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk sultanates as well as the role of the religious ʾulamā in supporting the authority of the three regimes. The first section also addresses the legitimacy of the Muslim ruler according to Sunnī jurisprudence in Islam, with a discussion of some important scholars’ views and discussions on the political legitimacy of Muslim rulers. The second section of this chapter addresses the issue of the political legitimacy of the Ayyūbid regime and the Ayyūbid Sultans’ desire to acquire legitimacy in various ways, such as earning the ʾulamā’s support and dealing with opposition to their regime directed by Shiʿites on doctrinal grounds.

The third section of the third chapter studies the political legitimacy of the Mamlūks and the role of the ʾulamā in enabling their rule. This section also addresses the most important public works of the Mamlūks, which contributed significantly to the stability of their regime and legitimized their rule; these works include the revival of the
Abbāsid Caliphate and the support of such religious institutions as Al-Azhār. The fourth section of the third chapter studies the legitimacy of the Ashraf of Mecca, and it deals with the most important pillars for their legitimacy as rulers, above all being descended from the Prophet Muḥammad.

The fourth chapter of the thesis is a study of the political relations between the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks with the Ashraf of Ḥijāz, and it is divided into three sections. The first section examines the beginning of the relations between the Ayyūbids and the Ashraf of Mecca as well as the conditions of Ḥijāz at the onset of the Ayyūbids’ hegemony. This section includes political relations between the elites in the two regimes as they are reflected in some of the letters between the two parties. This section also deals with Ayyūbid military activities in Ḥijāz, which aimed to strengthen Ashraf authority and put down any rebellion against the Ayyūbids in Mecca. The second section studies political relations between the Baḥrī Mamlūks and the Ashraf as well as the Mamlūks’ role in strengthening the Ashraf’s authority over Mecca. In addition, this section examines the conditions that assisted the Mamlūks to become the protectors of the Two Holy Mosques in Mecca and Medīnah, giving their rule the religious legitimacy they desperately needed. This section includes the role played by the Baḥrī Mamlūks in internal conflicts between the Ashraf and their reactions towards the Mamlūks’ interventions in Ḥijāz.

The third section of the fourth chapter deals with the agencies and mechanisms of control and hegemony in Ḥijāz during the Ayyūbid and Baḥrī Mamlūk
eras. This section also examines the role of the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks in building *madrasas* and *ribāṭs* in Mecca and the roles of these institutions in giving their regimes religious legitimacy. Attention is paid to the Ayyūbids’ and Mamlūks’ support of the ’ulamā, jurists and students in Ḥijāz and the role of ’ulamā in communicating to the people and strengthening the authority of the ruling regimes. In addition, this section studies the *Kiswa* of the Ka’aba, its manufacture in Egypt and the way the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks made use of it, showing the religious aspect of their rule and the strengthening of their political legitimacy among Muslims.

The fifth chapter studies economic relations between the Ayyūbids and Baḥrī Mamlūks and the Ashraf of Ḥijāz. This chapter is divided into six sections, which deal with the nature of the economic and trading relations in the era of the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks. The first section of this chapter studies the basic elements of Ḥijāz’s economy, such as water, agriculture, trade routes and industry; this provides an essential background for economic conditions in Ḥijāz. This section shows Ḥijāz’s need for economic aid and Egypt’s role in assisting Ḥijāz in the era of the Ayyūbids and Baḥrī Mamlūks. The second section studies the pilgrimage season in Mecca in the era of the Ayyūbids and Baḥrī Mamlūks, exploring the importance of pilgrimage in strengthening the political regimes in Egypt by providing religious legitimacy. This section also studies the land and maritime routes between Egypt and Mecca that were used for pilgrimage and trade. Particular attention is given to the pilgrimage caravan (*mahmal*) and the Amīr al-Ḥajj’s role in imposing the authority of Egyptian sultans on Ḥijāz. This section also emphasizes the role of the Sharif of Mecca in protecting the caravan during the
pilgrimage season. Account is taken of the natural disasters that occurred in Ḥijāz, their impact on the pilgrimage season and the reactions to them of the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks. In addition, this section emphasizes that Mecca benefited economically from the pilgrimage season due to the revitalization of markets and commercial activities for the Ashraf.

The third section of chapter five examines the importance of the port of Jeddah in the era of the Ayyūbids and Baḥrī Mamlūks; it was the most significant port of Mecca in that period. This section highlights the factors behind the port’s development and the benefits which the port’s economic vitality brought to the Ashraf and both the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks. At the end of this section, we give a summary of the most important reasons for Jeddah’s prosperity and decline after the Baḥrī Mamluks’ reign. Section four is a study of the taxation (mukūs) in Mecca that the Ashraf imposed on merchants and pilgrims and this section studies the policy adopted by the Ayyūbids and Baḥrī Mamlūks towards mukūs in Ḥijāz. This section describes the villages and towns in Ḥijāz that paid mukūs to the Ashraf in the event of economic problems between the Ashraf and the Ayyūbids and Baḥrī Mamlūks. This section studies the Ayyūbids’ and Baḥrī Mamlūks’ interventions in the mukūs policy in Ḥijāz and the compensation which the sultans paid to the Ashraf in exchange for cancelling mukūs on pilgrims and merchants.

The fifth section of the fifth chapter highlights the Kārimī trade and the role of Kārimī merchants in the economic activities in Ḥijāz. This section examines the
contribution of the Kārimī merchants to supporting the economy of the Red Sea and the
economic relations between Ḥijāz, Egypt and Yemen in the era of the Ayyūbids and
Baḥrī Mamlūks. The sixth section of the chapter is a study of the Arab tribes and their-role in protecting pilgrimage and trade routes in the Ayyūbids’ and Baḥrī Mamlūks’ era.
This section examines the Ayyūbids’ and Mamlūks’ policies towards those tribes and-their support for the tribes’ sheikhs to protect the pilgrimage and trade routes.

1.4 Primary Sources

In this study, I use a large number of primary sources that were contemporaneous or near-contemporary. The major narrative sources for the subject fall into three groups, reflecting the protagonists, i.e. Ḥijāz, the Ayyūbid Sultanate and the Baḥrī Mamlūks. First of all are the historians of Mecca, and one of the most important historians who studied the history of Mecca was Taqi al-Dīn Al-Fāṣi al-Makki (d.832 A.H./1429 A.D.). Al-Fāṣi’s works are some of the most important sources on the political and economic-history of Mecca since the beginning of Ashraf rule from the fourth century A.H./tenth-century A.D. to 829 A.H./1426 A.D., which was the year Al-Fāṣi stopped writing. Al-Fāṣi studied in Cairo, Damascus and Jerusalem, and he taught in Mecca and became the-judge and muftī of the Mālikī Sect in Mecca. The most important work of Al-Fāṣi is Al-‘Īqd al-Thamīn fī al-Ṭārīkh al-Balad al-Amīn, which comprises biographies of the rulers,-notables, ’ulamā and scholars of Mecca since the advent of Islam in his period.¹ In this

research, I have benefited from this work in the study of political, social and cultural aspects of Mecca. The second work of Al-Fāṣi is *Shifā al-Gharām bī al-Akhbār al-Balad Al-Haram.*\(^2\) This book is an encyclopaedia of the history of Mecca, covering the political, urban, religious, cultural and social aspects; it was particularly useful to me because of its political and social data. The importance of this book is that the author narrated most of the events in the history of Mecca from the pre-Islamic era onwards.

Another important historian of Mecca is Najm al-Dīn ‘Umar b. Fahd (d.885 A.H./1480 A.D.), who studied in Egypt and Syria and wrote the important work *Ithāf al-Wara‘ bī Akhbar Um al-Qura.*\(^3\) This work is one of the most important sources of this research. The book chronicles the history of Mecca and in it the author collected sources for the history of Mecca and arranged them in accordance with the Islamic calendar from the first year of migration (1 A.H./622 A.D.) until the author’s death (885 A.H./1480 A.D). The author presented the events of each year, ending with the most important figures that died in that year. This work has important details on all aspects of political, economic, religious, social and scientific life in Mecca. The work has a number of deficiencies: the author presents no commentary or analysis of the events he is describing, nor is he looking for motives or results. The work is a narrative of the history of Mecca (including some events in Egypt, Yemen and other countries that related to Mecca). Ibn Fahd was interested in the history of the Ka‘aba, the conditions of the pilgrimage and the caliphs and sultans who performed the Hajj in Mecca. He was also

---


interested in Mecca’s Ashraf and judges (Qādis), as well as expeditions that arrived at Mecca from Egypt.

In this study, I also examined the book, *Ghayat al-Maram bi Akhbar Saltant al-Balad al-Haram* by the historian, ‘Izz al-Dīn Ibn Fahd (d.922 A.H./1516 A.D.). This work is considered an important work on the biographies of the Meccan rulers, Amīr and Ashraf, and it chronicles events from the beginning of the Islamic era until the author’s period. In this work, the author mentions the events that took place in the age of each of these protagonists; it is especially valuable for the political aspects of the Ayyūbids’ and Mamlūks’ era. This book offers important information regarding some of the main protagonists relevant to aspects of my research study. I also used Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn al-Furat (d.807 A.H./1405 A.D.) and his work *Tārikh al-Duwal wa al-Mulūk*, which is another important work chronicling the history of Mecca. The book has great significance for the study of political and economic aspects of the emirate of Mecca; it includes helpful information, especially about the internal conflicts among the Ashraf of Mecca. The author also describes the flourishing of the port of Jeddah and gives information about financial conditions in Mecca. Thus, it provides an important contemporaneous account of the economic situation of the region during this period.

The second group of the primary sources focuses on the Ayyūbids’ era. I

---

referred to the historian Ibn Wasel’s work (d. 697 A.H./1298 A.D.), *Muffārij al-Kurrūb fī al-Akhbār Banū Ayyūb*, which is considered to be an important and reliable source for Ayyūbid history in Egypt and Ḥijāz. The book gives information about Ḥijāz in the Ayyūbid era and the author was a known contemporary of the Ayyūbids’ era. The historian Ibn Shadad (d.632 A.H./1234 A.D.) has a significant work entitled *Al-Nawādir Al-Ṣultanīyyah wa Al-Maḥāsin Al-Yūsufīyyah*, which chronicles the life of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn, and narrates many events that connect Ḥijāz with Egypt during the time of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn. This link makes his work particularly important for this period. The historian Abu Shama (d.665 A.H./1267 A.D.), author of the work, *Al-Rawdatāyn fī al-Akhbār al-Dawlatāyn*, was one of the contemporaries of the successors of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn and his work is of considerable importance to any researcher of Ayyūbid history because of the details contained within it. I also benefited greatly from *Al-Kāmil fī al-Tarīkh* by ʿIzz al-Dīn b. al-Athīr (d.632 A.H./1235 A.D.); his work is considered an important source on the Ayyūbids’ era. Ibn al-Athīr provided commentary, as well as simply giving dates for events, which made his work more significant than many others especially on this era. Ibn al-Athīr’s work benefited my research particularly for the history of Mecca during the reign of the Fāṭimids and Ayyūbids.

---


The third group of historians are those who were contemporary to the era of the Mamluks, such as the important historian Taqi al-Dīn Abu ‘Abbās Aḥmad al-Maqrīzī (d.845 A.H./1441 A.D.). He was a famous historian of Egypt in the Middle Ages. Al-Maqrīzī was appointed to several posts in the Mamlūk Sultanate in Cairo, such as the Mamlūk chancery and ḥisbah (business accountability) and teaching in Egypt’s madrasas. This gave him a degree of ‘insider’ knowledge of events within the Mamlūk court. His book Al-Sulūk lī al-Māʾrifat Duwāl al-Mulūk is his famous work compiled from late Mamlūk sources. It includes an abundance of information, and no researcher of the Mamlūk era can complete their study without reference to this book. The book includes historical information as well as a political, economic and social history of Egypt and Mecca due to the close relationship between them. I also engaged with other works by al-Maqrīzī, such as Ittiʿād Al-Hunaffāʾ Bi al-Akhbār Al-Fāṭimīn Al-Khulafāʾ. In this book, al-Maqrīzī wrote about the history of the Fāṭimids in Egypt and Ḥijāz, as well as the work Al-Mawāʾid wa Al-ʿIttibār bī al-Dīkhr al-Khītāt wa al-Athār. In the book, Al-Dahāb al-Maṣbūk fī al-Dīkhr Man Ḥajjah min al-Khulafāʾ wa al-Mulūk, al-Maqrīzī wrote about the pilgrimages of the caliphs and sultans, providing almost unique information on the pilgrimages of the Rasulid King al-Mujāhid, Al-Zāhir Baybars and Sultan al-Nāṣir Qalāwūn. Al-Maqrīzī was a historian who combined

political analysis, a depth of social awareness and economic experience; this is evidently clear from his detailed writings. Throughout his works, al-Maqrīzī shows a great interest in the economic factors that shape historical events; this insight made him an important and useful source when focusing on and analysing the economic effects on both political and religious rule over the Ḥijāz during my period of research study.

The work of the historian Abu al-Barakat Ibn Iyas (d.930 A.H./1524 A.D.), Badai’ Al-Zuhūr fī al-Waqai’ Al-Duhūr, is another publication that is considered an important source for the Circassian Mamlūks’ era.14 While this period lies outside the one studied in my particular research, I was able to make use of his work because he has provided specific information on the political and economic aspects of events that took place in Mecca, especially the mukās in the port of Jeddah.

Al-Durr al-Frāʿīd al-Mundimā fī al-Akhbār al-Hajj wa al-Turūq al-Makkah al-Mukkarramah, by the historian ʿAbd al-Qādir Muḥammad al-Jazīri (d.976 A.H./1568 A.D.), despite the fact that the author is far from the period of study,15 is especially relevant because it refers to those particular events related to pilgrimage. This occurred because the author and his father worked in the Diwān al-Ḥajj, and this fact made the book an important work for the history of the pilgrimage. In it, the author describes the pilgrimage routes from Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Yemen to Mecca, in addition to the

Bedouins and their tribes, whose homes were located along these roads. He also wrote about the internal conflict between the Ashraf of Mecca, and the administrative and financial system followed in the Sharifate of Mecca.

I also found the works of Ibn Khaldūn (d.808 A.H./1406 A.D.), such as Al-‘Ibar wa al-Diwān al-Mubtadā’ wa al-Khabar and Al-Muqqadimah particularly useful to my research study.16 In these works, he discusses Islamic rule and the legitimacy of the Muslim ruler, albeit in more general terms. Ibn Khaldūn was sociologist more than historian, which makes his works both unique and somewhat more objective, especially his interpretations and concept of the Islamic rule system. However, some historians may consider this point as a weakness in Ibn Khaldūn’s works, but this is because he was a contemporary, living with the rapidly changing political, social and religious events of his age.

I have also studied the Rasūlids’ sources, which yield information about the Ashraf of Mecca’s relations with the Rasūlids of Yemen; these works include Al-‘Qud al-Lu’Luyyah fī al-Tarīkh al-Dawlah al-Rasūliyyah of the historian, Ali b. al-Ḥasan al-Khazraji (d.812 A.H./1409 A.D.).17 This book deals with the history of the Rasūlids from their establishment until 803 A.H./1400 A.D. It includes important information about the Ashraf of Mecca’s policy at the end of the eighth century A.H./fourteenth century A.D. In

addition, this work is important to my research because of the social information it has included within it on Ḥijāz society, especially the Mukūs that the Mamlūks sent to the Ashraf of Mecca.

The work of the historian Shams al-Dīn Al-Sakhāwī (d.902 A.H./1497 A.D.), *Al-Daw’ al-Lami fī al-A’yan Al-Qarn Al-Tasī*’,\(^{18}\) which includes biographies of the Ashraf, notables of Mecca and the Mamlūks’ Amīr in Mecca, captures Al-Sakhāwī’s stay in Mecca, towards the end of the ninth century A.H./fifteenth century A.D.. This stay in Mecca enabled him to learn about the general conditions in Mecca and about the lives of the ordinary people there, offering me an important background history of conditions in Mecca during my research study period. In addition to the many encyclopaedias I studied, I also referenced the book, *Subḥ al-A’Shā fī Sina’āt al-Inshā* of Al-Qalqashāndī Ī (d.821 A.H./1418A.D.),\(^{19}\) which is a good source of information on the administrative system of the Mamlūk Sultanate during the research study period. Al-Qalqashāndī Ī was an employee in the Mamlūk chancery, which means that most of what he wrote was based on authentic, ethnographic data; it is an encyclopaedic record of political, economic and social life during the Middle Ages in Arabia. This encyclopaedia also contains valuable information about the nature of the Ashraf and their influences, both political and religious, in Mecca, along with their financial transactions and the administrative divisions in Ḥijāz, as well as describing the maritime and land routes from Egypt to Mecca. I also paid much attention to *Nihāyṭ al-’Arab fī al-Funūn al-Adab* by the

---


historian, Shihab al-Dīn Al-Nuwayrī (d.732 A.H./1332 A.D.). This work covers many political events in Mecca and Al-Nuwayrī is known to have had a strong relationship with the Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn, working in the sultan’s palace as a writer, which makes his work an important narrative and eye-witness account of court activities during the period.

For geographical references, I read Muʿjam al-Buldān, by Shihāb Al-Dīn Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī (d.626 A.H./1228 A.D). This work is considered a classic source of geography in Islamic history. Yāqūt wrote down his observations during his journeys through the towns and villages he visited. Yāqūt was a contemporary of the Ayyūbids, but he did not witness the Mamlūk Sultanate. However, the material he provided in his work was comprehensive, and he captured geographically detailed images about the many places he visited, providing an important sociological record of the region and beyond during the period.

I have also made extensive use of other contemporaneous travellers’ works. They are often unique sources of history, because the authors were eyewitnesses to what they wrote and described; their writings constitute precise descriptions of cities, houses, roads, and historical events as well as economic, social and religious life. One such work is Safarnama by the traveller, Nāṣir Khusraw (d.481 A.H/1088 A.D.). Safarnama is one

---

of the oldest works on travel from this period and therefore, an important book. Nāṣir Khusraw accurately described the cities he visited, especially Cairo, which he visited in the era of the Fāṭimid Caliph al-Mustanṣir (d.487 A.H./1094 A.D.). Another great writer referred to in this research is the Andalusian traveller, Ibn Jubayr (d.614 A.H./1217 A.D.) and his work known as *Ibn Jubayr’s Journey.*

Ibn Jubayr made three major trips and his unique experiences were captured by the notes he wrote down about his daily observations. His work contains interesting information on the political and economic conditions of Mecca, commercial goods and activities in the Red Sea, and the mukūs. His writing on the mukūs has provided a rich reference narrative for this study. I have also made much use of Ibn Baṭṭūta’s journey (d.779 A.H./1378 A.D.), entitled *Tuḥfāt al-Nudār fī al-Garā ’ib al-Amsār.*

Ibn Baṭṭūta performed pilgrimages to Mecca twice, once in 726 A.H./1326 A.D. and again in 727 A.H./1327 A.D. and he stayed in Mecca until 731 A.H./1330 A.D. Ibn Baṭṭūta’s account was a record of what he saw in the Emirate of Mecca during the Mamlūks’ era, and he wrote down his observations on the political, economic and social conditions in Mecca. He also wrote about conditions in the ports of Mecca, Jeddah and Yanbu’. The travel narratives of Arabian travellers in the Middle Ages, although not always entirely objective, help to provide a wider context and historical resource reference to enhance the historical analysis of the period under study in this thesis.

---


1.5 Secondary Sources

In my thesis I engaged with a number of modern works that have been written regarding the history of the Ayyūbid, Mamlūk and Ashraf regimes. Many of the secondary sources focused on the issue of how rule was legitimated, which helped me to grasp the differences between the Islamic regimes which I studied of particular significance were modern studies of the Mamlūk sultanate.

Regarding historiography, Li Guo published a work entitled ‘Mamluk Historiographic Studies: The State of the Art’. This important paper demonstrates the imbalance in much research on Mamlūk history because it is mostly concerned with biographies, historical geography and administrative processes, scarcely considering Mamlūk historians and their output. The author's argument is largely based on Al-'Ayni’s work along with his own.25 Konrad Hirschler has also worked on historiography in his Medieval Arabic Historiography: Authors as Actors. This book focuses on two authors: Abu Shama and Ibn Wasel during the late Ayyūbid and early Mamlūk period, using Al-Rawdatāyn and Muffārij al-Kurraḥ’s document studies. These authors were not mere recorders, rather they were able to translate their narratives into an analysis of the events they were describing and draw out important lessons based on their authorial works.26

D.P. Little also produced a work about historiography entitled An Introduction to Mamluk Historiography. This work provides a useful general overview of Mamlūk

26 Konrad Hirschler, Medieval Arabic Historiography: Authors as Actors (London: Routledge, 2006).
historiography. The author provided a detailed account of the Mamlûks from the origins of their regime, and scrutinized the authorial work of Al ’Ayni and Al-Jazîrî. In addition, Anne F. Broadbridge has worked on historiography, in her ‘Royal Authority, Justice, and Order in Society: The Influence of Ibn Khaldun on the Writings of al-Maqrizi and Ibn Taghribirdi’. This study refers particularly to Mamlûk rule in the later period (15th and 16th century A.D.), based on the Ottoman model. Both writers, Al-Maqrîzî and Ibn Taghribirdi, were influenced by Ibn Khaldûn. Al-Maqrîzî was influenced in terms of taking issue with Ibn Khaldun, while Taghribirdi was influenced indirectly via Al-Maqrîzî.

Concerning the legitimation of rule, I engaged with a number of modern works that focused on the legitimacy of Islamic government, especially in the era of my research topic. Ulrich Haarmann worked on Mamlûk rule in his ‘The Mamluk System of Rule in the Eyes of Western Travelers’, and according to his study western travellers considered Mamlûks to be ‘Christian Apostates’ and/or ‘Renegade Christians’. All of the above authors, in his opinion, claim that the Mamlûks were essentially opportunistic, and only gradually developed broader political ambitions. Caterina Bori has also written about the theology and politics in Ibn Taymiyya’s thought in her ‘Théologie Politique et Islam à Propos d’ Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728 A.H./1328 A.D.) et du Sultanat Mamelouk’. Her paper examines theocratic or dualistic (social and theological) forms of government by

---

comparing theology and politics. These models are discussed within the context of the thoughts and views of Ibn Taymiyya.

Sa’id Amir Arjomand wrote about legitimacy and political organization in his ‘Legitimacy and Political Organization: Caliphs, Kings and Regimes’, and this paper describes what he considers to be a lack of clarity in Islam regarding the idea of Caliphate, which was followed by the ambiguous installation of Caliphs and the pursuit of power by different dynasties like the Hashemites, Umayyads, Abbāsids, Khawārij, Mamlūks, Buyids, Sultans etc. The work of Anne F. Broadbridge has been particularly important for this study, because she focused in her research on the legitimacy of the Mamlūks and Mongols. For example, in her work ‘Mamluk Legitimacy and the Mongols: The Reigns of Baybars and Qalāwūn’, she asserts that the legitimacy of Mamlūks (Baybars and Qalāwūn) as rulers was basically established by utilizing Islamic teachings/themes, and in response to the expectations of the internal audience (Egyptian locals), expectations and by the challenge posed by closer contact with the Mongols (the Golden Horde and Ilkhanids).

Amalia Levanoni has worked on the Mamlūk Sultanate and its rule. ‘The Mamluk Conception of the Sultanate’ discusses the dilemma for Mamlūks of two types of sultanate between which they constantly wavered, i.e. dynastic rule and military

---

oligarchy. However, they generally inclined towards military oligarchy, as they were following non-bloodline lineage.\(^{33}\) P. M. Holt worked on the Abbāsid Caliphate in Cairo during the Mamlūk Sultanate. His ‘Some observations on the Abbāsid Caliphate of Cairo’ demonstrates the apparent concerns over Baybars' installation of Al-Mustanṣir and Al-Ḥākim as Caliphs. While Al-Ḥākim was given more prominence and privileges, Al-Mustanṣir was also given preference. Al-Ḥākim survived, but Al-Mustanṣir was lost to the annals of history.\(^{34}\)

Richard Mortel has written extensively on Ḥijāz history, particularly his work on the structure of the Ashraf regime in Mecca, ‘Zāydi Shi’ism and the Hasanid Sharifs of Mecca’, which is an important contribution. This paper examines the rule of Mecca by Banū Ḥasan in establishing the Hasanid Sharifate (Ja'farids - 4th to 15th century), also known as Hawashim. It also chronicles the ideology of Zāydi and Ja’farids as well as their opposition to the Abbāsids.\(^{35}\) Charles Melville’s study on Mongol rule is also important, particularly ‘The Itineraries of Sultan Öljeitü, 1304-16’, which discusses the structure of Ilkhanid rule. Melville’s paper assesses the journeys of the Mongol ruler Öljeitü and compares them with those of the Iranian king, Cyrus. Öljeitü’s travels were generally seasonal, in winter and summer. His rule was a hybrid of the nomadic and


sedentary existence followed by tribal and urban Abbāsid rule, and it also preserved Iranian rule courtesy of its bureaucracy.36

I also surveyed works on religious policy during the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk eras, many of which interpreted relations between the rulers and 'ulamā. Sherman A. Jackson’s work, ‘The Primacy of Domestic Politics: Ibn Bint Al-ʾĀz and the Establishment of Four Chief Judgeships in Mamlūk Egypt’ affirms that, in an attempt to legitimize his crown as a torchbearer of Islamic rule, Sultan Baybars of Egypt appointed Taj Al-Dīn, Ibn Bint Al-ʾĀz as judicial head, a move which resulted in the alienation of the other schools of law. Thus a move designed to resolve conflicts among four madhhabs (four Sunni legal schools) had the opposite effect.37 Jonathan P. Berkey’s paper on Mamlūk use of religion in their policy, ‘Mamluk Religious Policy’, begins by defining the Muslim world's perception of the relations between state and religion. It explains the concept of mīḥnāh (‘religious conflict’) in the Abbāsid era, Mongol hegemony to the supposed Mamlūk ‘secular approach’. However, the Mamlūks (during Baybars’s regime), were influenced by their predecessors the Ayyūbids.38 Another important work, produced by Yaacov Lev, concerning the relations between the 'ulamā and the Mamlūks, ‘Symbiotic Relations: 'Ulamā and the Mamluk Sultans’, argues that the rule of the Zengids, Ayyūbids and Mamlūks was greatly influenced by the Fāṭimids. Lev explains the role of theology and social practice in the times of plague, and Mongol

---

36 Charles Melville, ‘The Itineraries of Sultan Öljeitü, 1304-16’, Iran, 28 (1990), 55-70.
and Ottoman threat, and concludes that the ‘ulamā and rulers had continuous consultations on such matters.\textsuperscript{39}

Richard Mortel has produced an interesting work on the \textit{madrasas} in Mecca, ‘Madrasas in Mecca during the Medieval Period: A Descriptive Study Based on Literary Sources’. In this he demonstrates how religious policy had been based upon the authority and legitimacy of the political regimes in Mecca with the goal of ensuring their continued hegemony. Mortel’s paper also provides us with an account of the spreading of \textit{madrasas} in Mecca and India. Twenty-three \textit{madrasa} systems have been defined and explained, according to their role, and Mortel has also examined those of the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th centuries A.H. comparatively, in the same context.\textsuperscript{40} Adam Sabra’s work \textit{Poverty and Charity in Medieval Islam: Mamlûk Egypt 1250–1517} studies charity and endowments established in Egypt. Sabra’s book explains the conditions of Mamlûk poverty between the 13th and 15th centuries A.D. It surveys the impact of Sufism, the provision of charity to protect the status of chastity, and religious debates regarding the same. The work also investigates the concept of \textit{Waqf} (endowment), and its impact on provision to the poor in medical care, education, food, burials, the living standard of the poor, and famines.\textsuperscript{41}

On the political and economic side, I have reviewed many articles and books that illuminate Ayyūbid and Mamlûk control over Ḥijāz. David Ayalon has produced a

\textsuperscript{40} Richard Mortel, ‘Madrasas in Mecca during the Medieval Period: A Descriptive Study Based on Literary Sources’, \textit{Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London} 60, no. 2 (1997), 236-52.
\textsuperscript{41} Adam Sabra, \textit{Poverty and Charity in Medieval Islam: Mamlûk Egypt 1250–1517} (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006).
number of important works on Mamlūk history that study the Mamlūk regime and its army. In his series of papers, ‘Studies on the structure of the Mamluk army’, Ayalon studied the nature and structure of the Mamlūk army and their military system. In the first paper, ‘Studies on the structure of the Mamluk army – I’, the author contradicts contemporary and scholarly information on the Mamlūk army structure, and instead asserts that the Mamlūk army was composed of: 1.) Royal Mamlūks - a. Ruling Sultan, b. Mamlūks transferred from other services, 2.) Amir Mamlūks, and 3.) Ḥalqa troops (sons of Amirs and Mamlūks ).

In his ‘Studies on the structure of the Mamluk army - II’, Ayalon discusses the purpose of the Ḥalqa, basing his discussion on two opinions: 1.) Protecting the elites, and 2.) The Turkish method of encircling enemies. The paper further discusses the downfall of this force, which was active until the reign of Al-Nāsir Muhammad. In his third paper, ‘Studies on the structure of the Mamluk army - III’, Ayalon goes on to discuss the structure of the Mamlūk army within three basic categories: 1.) Men of the Sword - Mamluk Caste, 2.) Holders of Administrative Offices – Civilians, and 3.) Holders of Religious Offices or Men of Turban - Clerical Class.

Eric Vallet has studied the economic history of Yemen in this era and his work, ‘Yemeni Oceanic Policy’ has provided an interesting account of Rasūlid oceanic policy by offering a comparative sketch of different dynasties in Egypt, Syria, Persia and India in medieval Islamic times. On geographic, political and religious grounds, the

Rasūlids’ ocean policy was more inclined towards India.\textsuperscript{45} Another work on a similar subject is A. Paul’s study about economic activities in this period, ‘Aidhab: A Medieval Red Sea Port’. Paul’s study on Aidhab asserts that it is relatively unknown in established history on the subject, but the port was used by an Arab freebooter in the ninth century A.H/fourteenth century A.D.. Although Christians attacked the port, it was thought to be safe from incursions from Christian ships. The port was greatly affected by Ibn Baṭṭūta’s fight with pilgrims there, and later on by the depletion of gold and emerald mines in the region.\textsuperscript{46}

Like Vallet, John L. Meloy has studied economic activities in the Red Sea. In his paper, ‘Imperial strategy and political exigency: The Red Sea spice trade and the Mamlūk Sultanate in the fifteenth century’ Meloy found that the Mamlūk sultanate of Egypt and Syria was seriously troubled in the fifteenth century A.D. due to plague, internal turmoil, the misrule of the Circassian sultans, and the invasion of Syria. However, Barsbay made some political and military adjustments and was then successful in extending the sultanate to Cyprus and Ḥijāz.\textsuperscript{47} Further to this, Meloy has produced an important work on Mamluk economic history \textit{Imperial power and maritime trade, Mecca and Cairo in the later Middle Ages}. This book deals with the period of the Meccan Sharifate from the 14th century A.D. to the defeat of the Mamlūks by the Ottomans in the 16th century A.D. Meloy’s book provides an important account of the

Sharifs’ utilization of their resources and their genealogy, and Meloy makes a significant comparison with Mamlūk rule in Egypt, coupled with their negligence of Mecca.48

Another important work on the economic history of Ḥijāz is Richard Mortel’s paper ‘Prices in Mecca during the Mamlūk Period’. This paper explains that there were many attempts at Ḥijāz rulership by various dynastic rulers. During the Mamlūk period specifically, the price of food and commodities in general fluctuated, due to different factors including drought. Nonetheless trade and commerce flourished and the region had both gold dinar and silver dirham as its currency.49 Mortel has another work on taxation in Mecca, ‘Taxation in the Amirate of Mecca during the Medieval Period’. In this paper, Mortel found that the internal resources of Ḥijāz were not sufficient and that during Ayyūbid and Fāṭimid rule, Jeddah became the economic pivot of the Mediterranean basin. The Sharif’s revenue was dependent on taxation from pilgrims, but the majority of his income was from taxation on commodities arriving from Yemen and India.50

Li Guo’s other work on the economy during the Mamlūk era Commerce, Culture, and Community in a Red Sea Port in the Thirteenth Century, elaborates on the historical documents available on a family business in Al-Qusayr port during the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk period. These texts were retrieved from Sheikh Abu Mufarrij’s

48 John L. Meloy, Imperial power and maritime trade, Mecca and Cairo in the later Middle Ages (Chicago: Middle East Documentation Center, 2010).
house, known as the ‘Sheikh’s House’, during its excavation. These documents contain information relating to Abu Mufarrij's family tree, his associates and employees, commerce, matters on belief and religion, and both business and private correspondence.\textsuperscript{51} Nayef Al-Shamrookh studied the economic situation in Yemen during the period of the Rasūlids, and their relations with Mecca, in his dissertation ‘The Commerce and Trade of the Rasūlids in the Yemen (630-858 A.H./1231-1454 A.D.)’. Al-Shamrookh studied the Ayyūbid conquest of Yemen and the emergence of the Rasūlids, the relationship between them, the politics of the Rasūlids, and more generally the agricultural and industrial products manufactured under their reign. The dissertation also explores the Rasulid trade routes by land and sea, coinage, taxation, domestic and international trade and commerce.\textsuperscript{52}

The Kārimī trade and its beginnings were studied by S. D. Goitein, in his paper ‘New Light on the Beginnings of the Kārimī Merchants’. Goitein’s research found that, during the times of Saladin and the Fāṭimids, there existed Kārimī merchants, who were usually referred to as the ‘Kārimī Convoy’. An account of their existence is provided amidst Jewish and Mamdun traders in the regions of Aidhab, Sawakin, Aden, and India.\textsuperscript{53} C. G. Brouwer has also published a paper regarding the trading history of Yemen. His research paper ‘Pepper Merchants in the Booming Port of al-Mukha: Dutch Evidence for an Oceanwide Trading Network’, explains medieval trade via Aden and, as

a result, the emergence of Al-Mukha port and the increased trade to India - predominantly spices, though he also mentions the growing trade of coffee. Brouwer’s paper also refers to the trade of different commodities via Tihāmah and other ports in Yemen and the Red Sea.\textsuperscript{54}

Sato Tsugitaka also researched and published on the Kārimī merchants in the Mamlūk era. His paper ‘Slave Traders and Karimi Merchants during the Mamluk Period: A Comparative Study’, dealt with the rivalry between slave traders (originally Khawajas), human commodities (Mamlūk & Jariyah slaves), the various types of activity (the provision of information about local rulers), the part played by Kārimī merchants (originally from the Kharrubi family), and commodities (spices, lumber, gemstones, wheat, sugar, pottery).\textsuperscript{55} E. Ashtor’s paper regarding the Kārimī merchants’ activities in his work ‘The Kārimī Merchants’, chronicles the lives of 14 prominent Karimi traders who are consistently mentioned in history. He argues that they made their fortune from scratch or at least the most prominent among them did, and that they played an important, indeed pivotal, economic role in Oriental trade.\textsuperscript{56}

All of the above studies have elucidated the origins and internal history of the powers that dominated the Levant between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries and they have shed some light too on the region’s commercial activity.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{55} Sato Tsugitaka, ‘Slave Traders and Karimi Merchants during the Mamluk Period: A Comparative Study’, X., (2006), 141-156.
\end{itemize}
However, nobody to date has focused their attention on the political, economic and financial links between the rulers of Egypt and Syria on the one hand, and the Ḥijāz on the other. It is not clear why the topic has been neglected, given the overwhelming importance of Islam’s holiest cities and the clear need of the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks to find legitimation. My goal in this thesis is to fill this gap in the existing scholarship. In doing so I shall take into account, not just the different characteristics of their regimes and the challenges that they faced at different times, but also the role played by other regional powers, above all the Mongols and the Rasūlids.
Chapter Two

The Ayyūbid, Baḥrī Mamlūk and Ashraf of Mecca

Introduction

The relationship between the Ayyūbids, the Mamlūks and the Ashraf warrants the exploration of the origins and fundamental characteristics of these three protagonists. In the first section of this chapter, I will discuss the roots and the origins of Ayyūbid rule and the challenges they faced. I will focus on the Ayyūbid army because their effective organization of military power was crucial if the sultanate’s goals were to be realized. In the second section, I will explore the roots of the Mamlūks and the establishment of their rule, along with the major characteristic of the Mamlūks’ army. In the third section, I will discuss the Ashraf of Ḥijāz and the development of their rule and the military forces of the Sharif of Mecca.

2.2 The Ayyūbids

2.2.1 The Origins of the Ayyūbids and the Beginning of their Rule

The various groups in Islamic societies in the Middle Ages were generally multi-ethnic in nature. This applied equally to the ʾulamā, the army, Sufī groups and the guilds of various
craftsmen. For example, Islamic armies in all Muslim countries consisted of a mixture of ethnicities, men who embarked on a professional career of war and were trained in the art of fighting from childhood. It is notable that the Seljuk Vizier, Nizam al-Mulk (d.485 A.H./1092 A.D.), praised Sultan Maḥmūd of Ghazni (r. 388–421 A.H./998–1030 A.D.) for the diversity of his army which comprised of many different ethnicities. Nizām al-Mulk warned rulers against becoming dependent on a single ethnicity in their army because it could lead to sedition and conspiring against rulers.

The Atabek stage of 'Imad al-Dīn Zengī (r. 521–541 A.H./1127–1146 A.D.) is an important period in Islamic political history largely because of the Frankish presence in the Levant. 'Imad al-Dīn was interested in the military and his major military forces consisted of several ethnicities, such as Türkmen and Khorāsānī (North east of Iran) and Ḥalabī (from Aleppo), in addition to the presence of the Jurists and Sufis. 'Imad al-Dīn’s army also had Kurdish military forces consisting of cavalry and infantry, but they differed from the Turks in the fact that the Kurds had almost become Arabs because they lived alongside the local Arabs. Conversely, according to Claude Cahen, the

---

60 Atabek is a Turkish word meaning ‘the father Amīr’, the man who educates the Sultan’s son, which later became a title of honour for the Amīr of the army and the deputy of the Sultan: Al-Qalqashandi, *Subḥ al-AʿShā*, vol 4, 18.
Turks had a reputation for behaving cruelly towards those of other ethnicities.\(^{62}\)

The Ayyūbid dynasty continued to apply the same system in the Seljuk army in buying many Turkish Mamlūks and employing them in the military, but the Ayyūbids were free Kurds and not slaves, unlike the Mamlūks. The historian, Ibn Tagri Bardi (d. 874 A.H./1270 A.D.), denied that Shadhi, the grandfather of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn, was a Mamlūk of Behrouz al-Khādim, who was appointed by the Seljuk Sultan Ghayath al-Dīn Muḥammad (r. 498–512 A.H./1105–1118 A.D.) in defense of Iraq.\(^{63}\) Ibn Tagri Bardi mentions that Shadhi was in fact not a Mamlūk, nor did any of the Ayyūbids become slaves, rather Shadhi served with Behrouz, who appointed Shadhi as governor of the castle of Takrīt (North Iraq).\(^{64}\) In addition, Ibn Khallikān mentioned that the Ayyūbids were indeed Kurds of Azerbaijan from a village called Divn and Shadhi had contacted Behrouz, the governor of Iraq, who had appointed Shadhi as governor of the castle of Takrīt, in a region that was at that period predominantly Kurdish.\(^{65}\)

Thus, the Ayyūbids were considered free compared with Turkish Mamluks who were working in the Seljuk army. Shadhi’s efficiency helped him during his rule of the castle of Takrīt, after he proved his administrative ability during his service

---

\(^{62}\) Claude Cahen, *The East and West in the Crusade Wars*, translated by Ḥmad Al-Sheikh (Cairo, Dar Sina, 1995), 220.


\(^{64}\) Ibid.

Moreover, the Ayyūbids’ rule of Takrit contributed to creating a social base for them away from the Kurds, the residents of the city, who contributed along with the Ayyūbids to the formation of a considerable military force. This development is the reason for the important shift in the history of the Ayyūbids and their rise to power in the troubled political landscape of the period.

After Shadhi’s death, his son Najm al-Dīn Ayyūb (d. 569 A.H./1173 A.D.) succeeded his father as governor of the castle of Takrit. The developing political circumstances led Najm al-Dīn to serve ’Imad al-Dīn Zengī, the Amīr of Mosul and Aleppo, and he also assisted ‘Imad al-Dīn’s army after he sought refuge after he was defeated by the Seljuks. The Seljuks in turn deprived Najm al-Dīn Ayyūb of the emirate of Takrit after his assistance to ‘Imad al-Dīn, which led to the enrollment of Najm al-Dīn in to the service of ’Imad al-Dīn, who appointed him as governor of Baalbek (in Lebanon) after he had conquered it. At that time, the Ayyūbids were associated with Zengī’s family; thus, after the death of ’Imad al-Dīn in 541 A.H./1146 A.D., Najm al-Dīn and his brother, Asad al-Dīn Shīrkūh, were the commanders of King Nūr ad-Dīn Maḥmūd (r. 541–570 A.H./1146–1174 A.D.) military forces. Nūr ad-Dīn Maḥmūd was by that period established as the Amīr of Mosul and Damascus.

In 559 A.H./1164 A.D., political conflict intensified in Egypt at the end of the Fāṭimid Caliphate between the rival viziers of the Fāṭimids, Shawar and Dirgham.

---

68 Ibid, 23.
This ultimately led the Fāṭimid Caliph al-ʿĀḍīd (r. 544–567 A.H./1149–1171 A.D.) and his vizier Shawar, to request assistance from Nūr ad-Dīn in order to deprive Dirgham of achieving power. In the process Dirgham not only persistently deprived Shawar of any leadership ambition he also killed one of his sons.\(^6^9\) At the same time, the volatile political situation in Egypt lured in the involvement of King Amalric I of Jerusalem (r. 558–570 A.H./1163–1174 A.D.), who opportunistically tried to invade the Fāṭimid Caliphate in Egypt in an attempt to seize power during the in-fighting of the viziers. However, Nūr ad-Dīn sent a military expedition to Egypt led by Asad al-Dīn Shīrkūh (r. 564 A.H./1169 A.D.) who took his nephew Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn as soldier with the army. This expedition threatened the Franks so they tried to intervene in the affairs of Egypt and foil Nūr ad-Dīn’s expedition. There were battles between King Amalric and Shīrkūh which finally led to an agreement in 559 A.H./1164 A.D., in which both agreed to leave Egypt.\(^7^0\)

However, despite his foiled attempt to conquer Egypt, the military expeditions of Nūr ad-Dīn continued and were repeated three times, finally ending with the victory of Shīrkūh, who was thereafter appointed as a vizier of the Fāṭimid Caliphate by al-ʿĀḍīd.\(^7^1\) Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630 A.H./1233 A.D.) has noted that Nūr ad-Dīn Maḥmūd supported Asad al-Dīn Shīrkūh during his third expedition to Egypt to the amount of 200,000 dinars, in addition to weapons and clothes and horses.\(^7^2\) Abu Shama (d. 665

---


\(^{71}\) Ibid, 29.

A.H./1267 A.D.) also stated that Nūr ad-Dīn supplied Shīrkūh with a thousand horsemen from the regular army of Nūr ad-Dīn of Turks and Kurds, and Nūr ad-Dīn further gave each soldier twenty dinars for undertaking the expedition.\(^{73}\)

Shīrkūh died nine weeks after the Fātimid Caliph appointed him as vizier in 564 A.H./1169 A.D. As a result, chaos ensued between Shīrkūh’s army of Turkish and Kurdish soldiers regarding who should assume the office of vizier after Shīrkūh; however, despite the bitter protests Caliph al-’Ādid was eventually appointed.\(^{74}\) Al-’Ādid thereafter appointed Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn as a vizier, which led to Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn being supported by the Asadiyya Mamlūks (Asad al-Dīn Shīrkūh’s Mamlūks), who claimed that Shīrkūh had recommended Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn to succeed him as a vizier.\(^{75}\) We can deduce from this event that Caliph Al-’Ādid wanted, through his choice of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn as vizier, to regain the full powers of his Caliphate after the death of Shīrkūh. Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn was, at the time of his appointment, younger than any other Amīr in Shīrkūh’s army, compared to Shihāb al-Dīn Al-Ḥārmi and the Turkish Amīr, ’Ayn Al-Dawlah al-Yaruqi. However, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn proved his remarkable ability and power by the support which he attracted from the Asadiyya and Nūriyya Mamlūks (Nūr ad-Dīn’s Mamlūks), and he eventually assumed the title, *Al-Mālik Al-Nāsir* (King al-Nāsir).\(^{76}\)

The historian Ibn Wasel (d.697 A.H./1298 A.D.) has referred to the

\(^{73}\) Abu Shama, *Al-Rawdatāyn*, vol 1, 173.


\(^{75}\) Al-Maqrīzī, *Ittī ād Al-Hunaffā*, vol 3, 309.

attempts of Al-ʻĀḍid to regain his powers, when he asked Nūr ad-Dīn to withdraw his Turkish forces from Egypt while retaining Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn and his assistants in Egypt. But Nūr ad-Dīn refused this request.\textsuperscript{77} Nūr ad-Dīn’s refusal of Al-ʻĀḍid’s request is most probably due to his former plans to eliminate the Fāṭimid Caliphate, which caused Al-ʻĀḍid some concern because of the presence of these invading forces in his dominion. Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn also made several attempts to end the Fāṭimid Caliphate, and the most important of these attempts was to isolate the Fāṭimid judges and appoint Sunnī Shafi‘ī Judges, who followed the same doctrine (\textit{mathhab}) as Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn.\textsuperscript{78} In addition to the establishment of Sunnī Shafi‘ī and Mālikī schools and the abolition of Shi‘ite phrases in \textit{Adhān} (the call of the prayer) such as, ‘\textit{Ali walī Allah, hayya ʻala al-Khāyr al-ʻAmal}’ (‘Ali is the headman of God, Come on for the best deed’),\textsuperscript{79} Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn also weakened Al-ʻĀḍid’s power by isolating his followers in the army and seizing their properties and money, then giving it to his fellow soldiers from Asadiyya and Ṣalāḥiyyah Mamlūks (Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s Mamlūks).\textsuperscript{80} In the first \textit{khuṭbah} of the year 567 A.H./1171 A.D., Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn declared his allegiance to the Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad and thus ended the Fāṭimid Caliphate in Egypt, which had lasted more than 250 years.\textsuperscript{81}

\textbf{2.2.2 The Ayyūbid Army}

Nūr ad-Dīn’s refusal of Al-ʻĀḍid’s request to withdraw his army from Egypt appears to indicate that Nūr ad-Dīn was largely dependent on the Turkish Mamlūks in his army. Nūr

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{77} Ibn Wasel, \textit{Muffārij al-Kurrūb}, vol 1, 183.
\item \textsuperscript{78} Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Al-Mawā’id wa Al-‘Itībār}, vol 1, 185.
\item \textsuperscript{79} Mohring, \textit{SALADIN}, 32–33.
\item \textsuperscript{80} Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Ittiʿād Al-Hunaffī}, vol 3, 321.
\item \textsuperscript{81} Man, \textit{SALADIN}, 69.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
ad-Dīn knew very well the Turks’ capabilities and level of combat, as they contributed to dominating many cities in Syria and Egypt when they were under the command of Asad al-Dīn Shīrkūh. Nūr ad-Dīn may have refused Al-ʿĀṣid’s request because Nūr ad-Dīn wanted to keep military forces opposed to Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn, so that he could not establish an independent rule in Egypt. The forces that were under the command of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn were comprised mostly of Kurds, particularly the Kurds from the tribe, Al-Hadanyīn, who ruled Erbil (North Iraq) before the rule of the Ayyūbids. According to Ibn Wasel, this claim appears to be verified when he states that the al-Hkari Kurds were also among the top divisions of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s military forces. In addition, Ibn Shadad (d. 632 A.H./1234 A.D.) documents that the famous commander, Amīr Ali b. Aḥmad al-Hkari, nicknamed ‘Al-Mashtūb’ (because of an injury to his face in one of the battles), was among Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s commanders and Ibn Shadad gave him the title, "great king of the Kurds". The jurist, Diya al-Dīn 'Isā al-Hakari, played a major role in winning the support of Nūrī’s commanders in Shīrkūh’s Army in supporting Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn, after the death of his uncle Shīrkūh.

As we have noted in the first section of this chapter, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn began to remove the effects of the Fāṭimid Caliphate by using various military, religious and cultural strategies. He demobilized Fāṭimid soldiers from the army. He then began to

establish a private army from the Turkish Mamlūks and all Kurds who were attracted to Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s political and military authority and his economic power.\textsuperscript{88} Moreover, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn bought the loyalty of the Turkish Mamlūks and gave them the title, *al-Ṣalāḥiyyah* or, *al-Nāsiryyah* Mamlūks (relative to his title *al-Nāsir li-Dīn Allah*).\textsuperscript{89} Abu Shama has noted that the al-Ṣalāḥiyyah Mamlūks eventually became the private guards of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn.\textsuperscript{90}

It would appear that the Turkish Mamluks in Egypt, during the reign of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn, became fewer in number than that of the Kurdish forces. This is most probably due to the withdrawal of al-Yaruqi’s division, the commander of the al-Yaruqiyyah division in Shīrkuh’s army, after the inauguration of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn as a vizier in the reign of the Fāṭimid Caliphate.\textsuperscript{91} Ibn Shadad has indicated that the al-Yaruqiyyah division joined with the Ayyūbid army when Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn sent them to face the German crusaders heading toward the coast of Syria and Palestine.\textsuperscript{92} In addition, Badr al-Dīn Dildirim al-Yaruqi supported the Ayyūbids and they jointly successfully stopped the Franks from entering Jerusalem, where Dildirim was leading a large army of Turkmens.\textsuperscript{93}

In fact, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn was not only dependent on the Kurds and the Turkish Mamlūks for his army, whom he personally paid to be his private guards, he also

\textsuperscript{88} Lyons & Jackson, *Saladin*, 52.  
\textsuperscript{89} Abu Shama, *Al-Rawdatayn*, vol 1, 125.  
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid, vol 1, 125.  
\textsuperscript{92} Ibn Shadad, *Al-Nawādir Al-Ṣulṭaniyyah*, 126.  
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid, 211.
employed many trusted Arabs.\textsuperscript{94} Abu Shama asserts that Shīrkūh heavily relied on the Arab tribes in Egypt and the Levant to defend his prominence.\textsuperscript{95} These tribes, who largely inhabited the deserts in the Levant and in Egypt, were mostly farmers (\textit{fāllahīn}) settled on the banks of the Nile among the population of Egyptian villages. Abu Shama, confirming this reality, states that, when Shīrkūh arrived in Giza, he was able to attract Arab tribes, such as the Ashraf of Jaʿfīrah and Tuluiyyūn and others.\textsuperscript{96} Abu Shama also states that large groups of Arab tribes joined the ranks of Shīrkūh’s army when he arrived at Qus (South Cairo).\textsuperscript{97} Before Shīrkūh adopted the Arab tribes, Nūr ad-Dīn had also adopted the Arab tribes in Syria to work with him as guides (\textit{kashīf}) for his army because of their knowledge of trails and caravan routes in the Levant and Egypt, as confirmed by Ibn al-ʿImad al-Isfahani.\textsuperscript{98} We can assert that the Arab tribes who joined with Nūr ad-Dīn and Asad al-Dīn Shīrkūh, probably did so because of the somewhat mercenary nature of Bedouin tribes, who were usually coveted by anyone who would pay them enough money in exchange for their service under their particular authority.

As a leader, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn continued to follow the previous pattern set by Shīrkūh, in accepting the Egyptian Arabs into his army and it is known that some of them also joined his regular army. Al-Maqrizī (d. 845 A.H./1442 A.D.) records that Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn held a military parade on the same day that he declared the fall of the Fāṭimid


\textsuperscript{95} Abu Shama, \textit{Al-Rawdatāyn}, vol 1, 168.


\textsuperscript{97} Abu Shama, \textit{Al-Rawdatāyn}, vol 1, 169.

Caliphate and delivered the sermon in the name of the Abbāsid Caliphate in 567 A.H./1171 A.D. It is said that the Arab soldiers present in this parade numbered more than 7,000 horsemen. But Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn reduced the number of Arabs in the army to 1,300, reducing their salaries, which caused many of them to then ally with the Franks. Al-Maqrīzī also notes that Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn, in retaliation for the disloyalty, ordered the Arab tribes’ lands in al-Sharqia and Beheira regions to be confiscated, in 577 A.H./1181 A.D. The given reason is that they were smuggling grain and rations to the Franks. We can interpret Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s policy towards Arab tribes as relating to the fact that the majority of these tribes were actually loyal to the Fāṭimid Caliphate, and were generally believed to be followers of the Shi’a sect. Al-Maqrīzī has not referred to this, but it is my assumption that this is the most plausible explanation for this action. Further, after the collapse of the Fāṭimid Caliphate and the sectarian policy of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn against the Shi’ites, it would appear that his aim was to diminish any residual power of Fāṭimid influence in Egypt.

The Arab tribes tended historically to follow rulers who paid more, regardless of the political and religious considerations. This is because their primary aim was to obtain as much money as possible from any party, whether Muslims or Franks. In addition, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn, through this policy towards the Arab tribes, wanted to weaken their power and any possible threat to his rule. In particular, he was embroiled in internal struggles with the remaining followers of the Fāṭimid Caliphate. As a result, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn may have feared a tribal rebellion against his rule, and the Franks could have possibly

---

100 Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, vol 1, 68.
101 Ibid, vol 1, 94.
exploited this position and attacked Egypt. Ibn al-'Imad al-Asfhani says that the Bedouins behaved maliciously through their support of the Franks against the Muslims and further adds that the Bedouins supported the Frankish military in times of war and in times of peace, and they also became spies for the Franks against Muslims. However, H. Gibb has conversely indicated that the Arab tribes contributed to Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s victory against King Richard’s forces during his advances on Jerusalem.

Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn followed the quasi-feudal military system of the ‘Iqtā’ for payment of the Ayyūbid forces raised in Egypt and the Levant. This system proved its effectiveness on behalf of the Ayyūbid Sultanate, especially in waging war against the dangerous incursions of the Franks who were threatening the Ayyūbids’ existence. In the primary sources, we find the use of the words jund and ‘askār, but their meanings differ significantly in the various military regimes of the Middle Ages. Al-Qalqashândī (d. 821 A.H./1418 A.D.) has explained, in discussing the Diwān al-Jaysh (the Office of Army), that the difference between jund and ‘askār is that the jund are the Amīr’s forces who support the Sultan in warfare in exchange for their fiefs, while the ‘askār are the regular armies of the Sultan. Therefore, it would seem that jund meant the reservist forces and ‘askār was understood to be the regular forces.

It is difficult to determine the combined numerical strength of the regular and

102 Ibn Al-'Imad Al-Isfahani, Sanā' al-Barq, vol 5, 72.
103 Ibid, 5, 75.
105 Lyons & Jackson, Saladin, 53.
reservist forces in Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s era and in that of his successors among the Ayyūbids. The regular army, or the ’askār, served on a permanent basis in exchange for fiefs (‘Iqtā) and remained in the service of the Sultan, who sometimes ordered them to protect the forts and fight in wars. Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn made the most of this army of Mamlūks, Turks and Kurds, and so they were the main contingent in the Ayyūbid army. It can be assumed that Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn and the Ayyūbids after him aimed to maintain their rule through military groups that had no loyalty to any ruler except themselves. These military groups were required to fight at any time, while the involvement of the Arab tribes in the army was more dependent on other contingencies.

### 2.2.3 Dangers and Challenges to the Ayyūbid Sultanate

Beginning with Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s rule, the Ayyūbid Sultanate faced many challenges that threatened its political stability. The first challenge was the conflict between Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn and Nūr ad-Dīn Maḥmūd, the ruler of Mosul and Damascus, because of the difference in their political objectives. Nūr ad-Dīn wanted to unite Egypt and Syria under his rule, but because Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn feared losing control of Egypt, he missed the opportunity to establish his own Sultanate there. Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn firmly believed that the presence of the Fāṭimid Caliphate gave him the legitimacy to rule Egypt because he was the vizier of the Fāṭimid Caliph, Al-ʿĀḍid. In addition, the Fāṭimid Caliphate gave Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn the opportunity to move away from the influence and control of Nūr ad-Dīn until circumstances allowed him to declare independence from Nūr ad-Dīn, despite the

---

overall weakness of the Fāṭimid Caliphate. Hence, although Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn continued to resist Nūr ad-Dīn’s orders to declare the end of the Fāṭimid Caliphate, he finally carried out the orders after he had secured his own position. After the death of Nūr ad-Dīn, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn unified Egypt and Syria under his authority and then confronted the Franks in the Levant. The Ayyūbid’s jiḥād against the Franks also enhanced the legitimacy of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn, as the protector of the Islamic lands and holy cities of Mecca and Medīnah, particularly after he had repelled the attempts by the Franks to conquer them. 111 Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s wars with the Franks ended with the signing of the treaty of Ramla, in which Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn conceded to the Franks all the lands he dominated in Palestine except the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem. 112 Ibn Shadad has described the military situation of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn before accepting the treaty by claiming to quote Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn as saying:

‘I am hesitating whether to accept the treaty, and I do not know what will happen next. The enemy (the Franks) will be stronger, then they will have the power to reconquer the remaining lands, and you see every one of those people ‘Jama’āt’ (Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn meant the Amīrs of his army) has sat on the top of a hill (i.e. in their forts).’ 113

Clearly, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn had suffered a moral defeat, and he was unable to control his army. He therefore had little option except to finally relinquish his control over all his lands except the Islamic sites in Jerusalem.

112 Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 360.
113 Ibn Shadad, Al-Nawādir Al-Ṣulta‘iyyah, 235.
After the death of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn in 589 A.H./1193, internal conflicts began among the Ayyūbids, which weakened the unity he had achieved. In fact, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn was the primary cause of the disruption of the unity of Egypt and Syria because he distributed his kingdom between his sons, which led to their internal struggles for power. Moreover, the Asadiyya and Ṣalāḥiyyah Mamlūks played a major role in aggravating the conflict among the various members of the Ayyūbid family. The internal conflicts continued in the Ayyūbid Sultanate until Al-Salih Najm al-Dīn seized power in Egypt with the support of Al-Kāmilīyyah’s Mamlūks (the Mamlūks of his Father al-Mālik al-Kāmil). The internal conflicts among the Ayyūbids and the ever-increasing influence of the Mamlūks, particularly during the reign of Al-Salih Najm al-Dīn, eventually caused the fall of the Ayyūbid Sultanate in Egypt.

The Ayyūbids’ increasing weakness and their internal conflicts affected Ḥijāz and also disrupted the political situation in Mecca and Medīnah. At the beginning of the Ayyūbids’ rule, the Abbāsid Caliphate looked forward to controlling Mecca and Medīnah because of the Ayyūbids’ military conflicts with the Franks. However, the Ayyūbids showed a growing interest in Ḥijāz, especially after the entry of Sayf al-Islam Tughtekin (brother of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn) in Mecca in 581 A.H./1185 A.D., which confirmed Ayyūbid rule in Mecca. Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s interest in the pilgrimage was evidenced by his cancellation of the mukūs. After his death and because of the conflict among the Ayyūbids, conflict in Hijāz between the Ḥasani Ashraf of Mecca and the Ḥusaynid

115 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 1, 144.
117 Ibn Fahad, Ghayāṭ al-Maram, vol 1, 540.
118 Ibn Fahd, Ithāf al-Warāʾ, vol 2, 538.
Ashraf of Međīnah resumed. Al-Mālik al-Masʿūd, the Ayyūbid ruler of Yemen, abated the conflict between the Ashraf in Mecca, but after his death, the Rasūlids entered the political arena and began hostilities with the Ayyūbids for the control of Mecca.\footnote{Al-Jażārī, \textit{Al-Durr al-Farāʾīd}, 587} The Ayyūbid–Rasulid hostilities continued until the fall of the Ayyūbid Sultanate, which led to the Rasūlids’ hegemony in Mecca. The continued internal conflicts among the Ayyūbids regarding the political situation in Ḥijāz will be explained in detail in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.

\section*{2.3 The \textit{Baḥrī} Mamlūks}

\subsection*{2.3.1 Mamlūks in the Islamic Caliphate}

The word ‘Mamlūk’ means, in Arabic, ‘a slave who is bought and sold’, and it came to mean the white slaves (usually understood as ‘Franks’ or ‘Romans’) who were brought to the Islamic territories in captivity or by purchase.\footnote{Robert Irwin, \textit{The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate 1250–1382}, (London: ACLS Humanities E-Book, 1984), 3–4.} Successive Islamic governments used Mamlūks to perform military services, so the governments eventually formed ‘Mamlūk divisions’, which became the most important divisions within Islamic armies.\footnote{Aḥmad Mukhtār Al-ʿAbadi, \textit{Qiyām Dawlāt al-Mamālik al-Ūla, fī al-Misr wa al-Shām [The Emergence of the First Mamluk State in Egypt and the Levant]}, (Beirut, Dar al-Nahdah, 1986), 11.} The Abbāsid Caliph al-Muʿtaṣim biʾlлаh (r. 218–227 A.H./833–842 A.D) is considered the first Caliph who depended heavily on the Turkish Mamlūks in his internal and external wars and who became, after his death, the dominant force in the Caliphate.\footnote{Al-Suyūṭī (911 A.H./1505 A.D.) mentioned that al-Muʿtaṣim’s Mamlūks were about 13 to 20 thousand strong. Jalāl al-Dīn Abu al-Fāḍl Al-Suyūṭī, \textit{Tārīkh al-Khulaṣāʾ [The History of Caliphs]}, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbdul Ḥameed (Cairo: Dar al-Yaqīn Publications, 2003), 268; Al-ʿAbadi, \textit{Qiyam Dawlat}, 11–12.} Al-
Duri has commented that the Caliph al-Mu‘taṣim bi‘l-lāh wanted to end the Persians’ control that had contributed to the establishment of the Abbāsid Caliphate and so he formed his own division from a different ethnic group (Turks).\(^\text{123}\) Al-Qalqashāndī stated that Egypt ‘has moved from the emirate into the Kingdom’ - when Ibn Ṭūlūn became the ruler of Egypt in the seventh Abbāsid caliph al-Ma‘mūn’s (198–218 A.H./813-833 A.D.) era.\(^\text{124}\) The Turkish Mamlūks formed the core element of military movements to achieve independence from the Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad and many formed their own armies. These armies played a vital role in the Abbāsids’ history, such as the Samanid dynasty (r. 204–395 A.H./820–1005 A.D.), the Saffarid dynasty (r. 245–298 A.H./859–911 A.D.) and the Ghaznavid dynasty (r. 366–582 A.H./977–1186 A.D.).

We have already asserted that the Turkish Mamluks’ existence in Egypt dates back to the reign of Ibn Ṭūlūn, who employed large numbers of Turkish Mamlūks to serve in his army. After the Tulunids’ era, Egypt became internally turbulent, and as a result the Fāṭimids tried to invade Egypt. Eventually, the Turkish Mamlūk, Muḥammad b. Ṭughj, established the Ikhshidid dynasty in Egypt (r. 323–358 A.H./935–969 A.D.).\(^\text{125}\) Al-Qalqashāndī asserts that the number of the Mamlūks in the era of Ibn Ṭūlūn reached more than twenty thousand, and during the reign of the Ikhshidid there were only around eight thousand.\(^\text{126}\)


\(^{124}\) Al-Qalqashandi, *Subḥ al-A‘Shā*, vol 3, 493. Ibn Ṭūlūn (r. 254–271 A.H./868–884 A.D.) was a Turkish Mamlūk from Bukhara (Uzbekistan) and ruled Egypt for 18 years.


Since the beginning of the Fāṭimid Caliphate’s era in Egypt (r. 358–567 A.H./969–1171 A.D.), the Fāṭimid Caliphs enlisted large numbers of Turkish Mamlūks and other ethnicities, such as Moroccans and sub-Saharan Africans into their ranks. The Fāṭimid Caliphate accepted these large numbers in their army because they aimed to control the territories under the Abbāsids’ rule, such as the Levant, Ḥijāz and Yemen. However, although they succeeded in dominating these regions, tensions occurred between the Turkish Mamlūks and other sub-ethnic groups in the Fāṭimid army. Nāsir Khusraw (d.481 A.H./1088 A.D.) noted that the Turkish Mamlūks had a considerable influence in the Fāṭimid army, particularly during the reign of Al-Ḥākim bi-Amr-Allāh (r. 386–481 A.H./ 996–1021 A.D.), and they made many attempts at rebellion because of their financial claims and their favouring the Seljuk regime in Iraq in 462 A.H./1070 A.D.\(^\text{127}\)

It is thus clear that the increased Turkish Mamlūks’ influence was largely due to the weakness of the Abbāsid Caliphate. The conflicts between the political elite in the Abbāsid and Fāṭimid Caliphates were the subsequent reason for the Caliphs’ adoption of the Turkish Mamlūks in order to strengthen their political status, as also happened during the reign of Abbāsid al-Muʿtaṣim bi’llāh. However, Turkish Mamluks then became the reason for the Caliphate’s political weakness because of their significant influence in the army and asserted power.

After Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn caused the fall of the Fāṭimid Caliphate in Egypt and

went on to install his rule, he enlisted Turkish Mamlūks and formed a Mamlūk division called the ‘Ṣalāḥiyyah Mamlūks’, as referred to in the first section. The Turkish Mamlūks’ influence had increased in the Ayyūbīd Sultanate, to such an extent that that they eventually isolated and appointed the sultans, as shown by the Sultan Al-Adil II (635–637 A.H./1237–1239 A.D.) and the appointed Sultan al-Salih Najm al-Dīn (637–647 A.H./1239–1249 A.D.). Ibn Aybak al-Dawadari (date of his death unknown) has indicated that Sultan al-Salih Ayyūb employed larger numbers of Mamlūks than any other Ayyūbīd Sultan before him, and called them Al-Mamālik al-Salahiyyah al-Najamīyyah, who later became, after al-Salih’s death, the rulers of Egypt.

Turanshah, Amīr of Ḥisn Kayfa (southeastern Turkey), is considered to be the last ruler of Ayyūbīd Sultans and he was summoned by Shajar al-Durr after the death of his father Sultan al-Salih. Peter Thorau has commented that Shajar al-Durr kept the news of his death secret so as not to affect the morale of the Ayyūbīd army, who were then facing the Franks in Damietta (northern Egypt). In spite of the victory of the Mamlūks over the Franks, Turanshah entered into a conflict with them in order to increase his control and power in Egypt. This conflict is most likely due to the substantial influence of the Mamlūks on the Ayyūbīd Sultanate and their powerful representation within the Ayyūbīd army. Therefore, Turanshah wanted to get rid of the Mamlūks in order to become able to rule Egypt alone, without the influence of al-Salih’s

128 Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatāyn, vol 1, 125.
129 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 1, 295.
132 Holt, The Age of the Crusades, 83.
Among the reasons for Turanshah’s death is the fact that he did not listen to his father’s advice, who recommended that Turanshah depend on the Mamlūks. Al-Nuwayrī (d. 733 A.H. /1333 A.D.) quoted the Sultan al-Salih’s testament to his son, saying ‘I recommend the Mamlūks to you, whom I depend on and trust, and without the Mamlūks I could not ride a horse’. But the actions of Turanshah and his lack of experience and disrespect for the Mamlūks, added to his malicious dealings with Shajar al-Durr, all led to his eventual murder by the Mamlūks. Ibn Aybak al-Dawadari describes Turanshah’s actions, saying

‘The reason for Turanshah’s death is that he was a boy lacking thought, reckless, arrogant, unlike his father, and also he isolated the senior Mamlūks who were the opinion makers, and depended on the advice of those who were with him in Hisn Kayfa, and they were the worst people who became the rulers’.

These actions and their consequences were not considered by Turanshah, and they resulted in the end of the Ayyūbid Sultanate upon his death, and the beginning of the Baḥrī Mamlūks’ era.

2.3.2. Challenges Facing the Mamlūks at the Beginning of Their Rule

134 Ibn Aybak al-Dawadari, Kanz Al-Durār, vol 7, 381–82
After the death of Turanshah, the Mamlūks agreed to make Shajar al-Durr, the wife of Sultan al-Salih, Sultan of Egypt with the assistance of Amīr ‘Izz al-Dīn Aybak (r. 652–655 A.H./1254–1257 A.D.). As a result of this decision, the Mamlūks were subjected to widespread criticism, particularly from the Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad, because of Shajar al-Durr’s lack of legitimacy, based on the Muslim ruler’s conditions in accordance with Islamic jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{135} Al-Maqrīzī states that Al-Musta’sim bi’l-lāh, the Abbāsid Caliph (640–656 A.H./1242–1258 A.D.), sent a letter to the Mamlūk Amīrs of Egypt expressing his opposition to the coronation of Shajar al-Durr, allegedly stating ‘If there are no men in Egypt, tell us and we will send you a man’.\textsuperscript{136} This is evidence of the extent of indignation and opposition to the influence of Mamlūks at the beginning of their rule. Religious legitimacy was of considerable importance for the Mamlūks, so after three months of Shajar al-Durr’s rule, she was obliged to hand over rule to Amīr ‘Izz al-Dīn Aybak, as a result of her subsequent marriage to him.\textsuperscript{137}

Several factors helped the Mamlūks to establish their rule in Egypt, despite the troubled situation and political vacuum in Egypt during that period. The first factor is the Mamlūks’ defeat of the Franks in the Seventh Crusade, which increased their popularity among Muslims in Egypt and gave them political, though not the required religious, legitimacy. The Mamlūks managed to obtain political legitimacy after the political vacuum caused by the death of Sultan al-Salih Najm al-Dīn and their plotted

\textsuperscript{135}Irwin, \textit{The Middle East}, 26.
\textsuperscript{136}Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Al-Sulīk}, vol 1, 368.
murder of his son. The proof of their lack of religious legitimacy was the objection and criticism, which we have previously noted, by the Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad of the Mamlūks. The power transition to Amīr ʾIzz al-Dīn Aybak was an attempt to rebuff the overt criticisms of the Mamlūks.

However, the Mamlūks also faced internal challenges, as internal struggles for power arose between the Mamlūks themselves, particularly between Amīr Aybak and his wife Shajar al-Durr, and the attempt of each party to eliminate the other. The historian Baybars al-Mansūrī (d.725 A.H./1325 A.D.) claims that, Amīr Aybak wanted to marry the daughter of the Amīr of Mosul, Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu, which gave Shajar al-Durr the motivation to kill Aybak.¹³⁸ Shajar al-Durr was successful in killing Aybak, but she was then herself killed by the Mamlūks, who therefater appointed Amīr Nūr ad-Dīn Ali b. Aybak as Sultan of Egypt, and Amīr Qutuz became his Atabek in 655 A.H./1257 A.D.¹³⁹ The appointment of Qutuz as Atabek motivated many of the Mamlūk Amīrs to flee to the Levant because of the internal conflicts between the Mamlūks that led to a number of Mamlūk assassinations, such as Amīr Aktaī who was killed by Qutuz (d.655 A.H./1254 A.D.).¹⁴⁰

In these troubled times, the serious threat of the Mongol invasion was increasingly looming over the emerging Mamlūk Sultanate, particularly after the Mongols eliminated the Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad, in 656 A.H./1258 A.D.. Further,

¹³⁹ Irwin, The Middle East, 29.
¹⁴⁰ Al-Qalqashândî, Subh al-AʾShā, vol 4, 18; Holt, The Age of the Crusades, 68.
after the Mongols’ virtual conquest of the Levant, the newly emerging situation required a powerful ruler to face this challenge and so Qutuz isolated Sultan Nūr ad-Dīn Ali and thus became the Sultan of Egypt.\(^{141}\) The historian Georges Ibn Al-Amid (d. 672 A.H./1274 A.D.) noted that Amīr Nūr ad-Dīn Ali was quite young and could not manage the Sultanate; therefore Qutuz led a coup against him and exiled him with his mother and brother to Damietta.\(^{142}\)

The Mamlūks were at last able to achieve an important victory over the Mongols at the Battle of ‘Ayn Jalut, in 658 A.H./1260 A.D., and they were in great need of this victory. The victory secured Egypt’s protection from Mongol invasions and united Egypt and the Levant once again under the Mamlūks’ rule.\(^{143}\) In addition, they achieved greater actual political legitimacy as a result of this victory. Moreover, this significant victory gave the Mamluks’ domination over the Levant because of the loss of the Ayyūbids’ legitimacy as defenders of the region and their apparent inability to defend Islamic lands.\(^{144}\) The Mamlūks’ victory at ‘Ayn Jalut was seen as proof of their potential threat to the rest of the Frankish rulers remaining in the Levant and further led to their control of Ḥijāz and revival the of the Abbāsid Caliphate in Cairo, which all supported their religious and political legitimacy.\(^{145}\)

\(^{141}\) Ibn Tagri Bardi, *Al-Najūm al-Zāhira*, vol 7, 84; Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, vol 1, 368.


2.3.3. The Mamlūk Army

As noted previously, the Mamlūks were originally white slaves who were brought into the Islamic lands with the aim of serving in the Islamic military forces. These emerging Mamlūk divisions formed a military force across the Islamic armies that were able, in the end, to impose their control on the powers that actually recruited them. The Mamlūk army not only comprised the white Mamlūks, who were originally bought slaves, but also included the sons of the Mamlūks, who were not slaves but free individuals, in addition to the groups that voluntarily chose to enter the Mamlūk army, such as Arabs. Some of them came through the slave trade and others came as gifts offered to the Sultans by Amīrs and kings, as well as prisoners of war.

While the Mamlūks themselves remained the basis of strength in the Mamlūk army, there were several factors that contributed to the buoyancy of their trade and its continuity. The first of these factors was the Sultans’ interest in buying Mamlūks, and the slave traders’ awareness that this trade market was popular in the Mamlūk Sultanate. In addition, the spread of epidemics and famines in the lands from which the Mamlūks originated had a major role in increasing their numbers, as their families often preferred to sell their children rather than see them die. The wars and raids on the Mamlūks’ homelands like the Kipchak steppe lands, increased their numbers in the

149 Antoine Doumit, *Al-Dawlat Al-Mamlūkīyyah [The Mamluk State]*, (Beirut, Dar Al-Hadatha, 1980), 25
Mamlūk Sultanate, such as the Mongol raids on the Kipchaks and the Khwarazmian raids on the Circassians’ lands, and the invasion of the North Caucasus by Tamerlane (r. 772–808 A.H./1370–1405 A.D.). The European slave traders also contributed to the Mamlūk trade, particularly the Genoese traders who monopolized the slave trade across the Black Sea and established a significant colony in Caffa (eastern Crimea), which was the biggest slave market at the time.

Antoine Doumit claims that about two thousand Mamlūks were brought annually to Egypt by sea to Damietta, then from Alexandria to Cairo. Al-Maqrīzī has also stated that the Mamlūks’ numbers, in Sultan Barquq’s reign, in 791 A.H./1388 A.D., were around two thousand Mamlūks per annum, at the end of the Baḥrī Mamlūks’ era. Regarding the Mamlūks’ prices, the primary sources are scarce and do not give us a clear indication of the actual prices at the time of the period under study, although, Doumit estimates that they were between 40 and 100 dinars each, for a Mamlūk slave. Al-’Arini says that the Mamlūks’ prices in Egypt in the ninth century A.H./fifteenth century A.D. were between 50 and 70 dinars.

In terms of the Mamlūks’ education, the Sultan, who usually bought them, would then send them to the tibaq (a place dedicated to the Mamlūks’ housing); each tibaq consisted of a number of housing accommodations, each contained about one

---

151 Robert Irwin, *Mamlûks and Crusaders; Men of the Sword and Men of the Pen*, (Farnham: Ashgate /Variorum, 2010), 73–104.
thousand Mamlūks. Ibn Tagri Bardi stated that Sultan Baybars built two ṭibaq in the Cairo citadel. Al-Maqrīzī claims that the Mamlūks were sent to al-Tawashi, a man who was responsible for the Mamlūks’ education, such as teaching them reading, writing, fighting and horse riding. Al-Maqrīzī further adds that Mamlūks in ṭibaq did not go out at night and were allowed to bathe only once a week and they received harsh treatment, particularly if they defaulted in their duties. After the end of the training period in ṭibaq, the al-Tawashi gave each Mamlūk a weapon, a horse and special cloth and a fief intended to support him for life.

The Mamlūk army was divided into several military divisions; the most important were the royal Mamlūks, Amīr Mamlūks and the local divisions. The royal Mamlūks’ division was the primary division and was considered the right arm of the Sultan. It consisted of several sections; some of them called al-Mushtrawat (‘the purchases’) that were bought by the Sultan. These divisions also included al-Mustakhdimūn, who were Mamlūk veterans whose Amīrs had died or been demoted. The second division was the Amīr’s Mamlūks who were under the Amīr’s service directly and were in his service in peacetime and in his company under the leadership of the Sultan during war time. If the Amīr died, was isolated or arrested, his Mamlūks then

---

158 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 2, 637.
159 Ibid, vol 2, 637.
160 Al-Qalqashāndī, Subh al-A ʾShā, vol 11, 173.
moved to the service of the Sultan directly.\textsuperscript{162} The local divisions in the Mamlūk army consisted of Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds, who served in the Mamlūk army in exchange for fiefs and salaries from the Sultanate.\textsuperscript{163} Ibn 'Abdul Al-Żāhir (d.692 A.H./1292 A.D.) stated that Sultan Baybars adopted Arab divisions in his wars against the Franks and the Mongols who conducted reconnaissance missions and Mongol-Mamlūk border control in exchange for horses and land tenures.\textsuperscript{164} Abu al-Fida (d.732 A.H./1331 A.D.) stated that, during the reign of Sultan Qalāwūn (r.678–689 A.H./1279–1290 A.D.), about 4,000 Arabs joined the Mamlūk army in the Battle of Homs against the Mongols in 680 A.H./1281 A.D.\textsuperscript{165} Humphreys has indicated that the Sultans used Kurds in the Mamlūk army, and they were the remnants of the Ayyūbid Sultanate, such as the al-Shahrazuriyya Kurds.\textsuperscript{166} However, Ibn Tagri Bardi noted that the Kurds attempted to assassinate Sultan Baybars, which resulted in their being killed and dismissed from the army, with the exception of a few of them.\textsuperscript{167}

\section*{2.4 The Ashraf of Ḥijāz}

\subsection*{2.4.1 Ashraf Rule in Ḥijāz}

The Ashraf of Mecca were descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad through his daughter,


\textsuperscript{165} 'Imad al-Dīn Ismā‘īl Abu al-Fida, \textit{Al-Mukhāsir fī Akhābār al-Bashar [The History of People]} (Cairo: Al-Hussayniya Al-Misriyyah Publications, 1905), vol 6, 112.

\textsuperscript{166} For more details, see Stephen Humphreys, ‘The emergence of the Mamluk army’, \textit{Studia Islamica}, 45 (1977), 67–99.

\textsuperscript{167} Ibn Tagri Bardi, \textit{Al-Nujūm al-Zāhirah}, vol 8, 44; Al-‘Arīnī, \textit{Al-Mamālik}, 73.
Fāṭima and her husband, 'Ali b. Abī Ṭālib, from their son Ḥassan b. 'Ali. The Ashraf family is considered the noblest Arab family because of its affiliation to the Prophet Muḥammad and the Qur’āysh tribe, who gained this honour through their housing tribal hegemony and control over Mecca since before the advent of Islam.168 The Alawites (both Hasanids and Hussaynids) believe in their right to rule, and the royal families that ruled Muslims, such as the Umāyyīds and Abbāsids, did not in their estimation, have legitimacy because they did not have direct lineage from the Prophet Muḥammad.169 Thus, the Alawites conducted several revolutions against the regimes in order to gain power and did become able to manage some of the political regimes, such as the Idrīsid dynasty in Morocco (r.172–363 A.H./788–974 A.D.) and the Fāṭimid dynasty in North Africa.170

The Alawites in Ḥijāz observed with interest the troubled situations in the Abbāsid Caliphate that had resulted in the creation of many independent regimes, which all declared some nominal allegiance to the Abbāsid Caliphate. At the beginning of the fourth century A.H./tenth century A.D., the Alawites, led by Sharīf Ja’far b. Muḥammad in Mecca, declared their independence from the Abbāsids and instead established the Emirate of Mecca, in 358 A.H. /969 A.D.171 In the meantime, the Fāṭimids looked to extend their control over Ḥijāz, and so they offered protection to the Sharīf of Mecca.

---

However, the Sharif refused this offer and insisted on maintaining independence. The initiative of the Fāṭimids to intervene in Ḥijāz indicates the importance of this region and what Mecca and Medīnah represented as both a political prize and a religious legitimizer for any ruling dynasty who could lay claim to being the guardians of the holiest lands for the entire Muslims. However, Sharif Ja’far felt the specific need to ally with the Fāṭimids and declared loyalty to them and referred to the Fāṭimid Caliph in a khūṭbah, in 358 A.H. /969 A.D..\textsuperscript{172}

The Ashraf of Ḥijāz took fortuitous advantage of the existence of two massive opposing powers in the region, the Sunnī Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad and the Shi’a Fāṭimid Caliphate in Egypt. These two competing powers created a balance of power for the Ashraf in Ḥijāz, allowing them to maintain their rule uninterrupted.

Because of the Abbāsids’ control over Ḥijāz before the transmission of the Fāṭimid Caliphate from Tunisia to Egypt and the Abbāsids’ hostility towards the Alawites, the Ashraf declared loyalty to the Fāṭimids. Moreover, it has been noted that this sectarian motive played an important part in determining the loyalty of the Ashraf to the Fāṭimids; as the Ashraf were Zāydi Shi’ites and as one of the Shi’a groups, they were theologically closer to the Fāṭimids than the Abbāsids.\textsuperscript{173} However, the Ashraf also conducted some independence movements in Mecca from the Fāṭimid Caliphate, as exampled in Sharif Abu al-Futuh’s era, who declared the Ashraf Caliphate in Mecca and its independence.


from the Fāṭimids.  

The Fāṭimids, of course, opposed this movement and instead declared their support for the Ashraf, who were opponents of Abu al-Futuh. This resultant reaction of the Fāṭimid Caliphate pushed Abu al-Futuh to then declare loyalty to the Fāṭimids again.  

Ashraf rule continued in Mecca throughout the Fāṭimid era until the termination of the Fāṭimid Caliphate in Egypt caused by Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn, who declared his loyalty to the Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad. Because of Ḥijāz’s historic relations to Egypt, politically and economically, Sharif Ḥisā b. Fulāyta declared his loyalty both to the Ayyūbid Sultanate and to the Abbāsid Caliphate. The Ayyūbids’ victory in ending the Fāṭimid Caliphate and controlling Ḥijāz is considered a strategic victory for the Abbāsids because Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn had declared his loyalty to the Abbāsids in the pulpits in Egypt. With the fall of the Fāṭimid Caliphate, the Ashraf lost their staunch ally in terms of their religious beliefs and doctrines. So, in this political situation the Ashraf needed to appease the Ayyūbids and therefore declared their loyalty to the Abbāsids.

The Ashraf were able to preserve the independence of their rule in Mecca throughout the Ayyūbids’ era in spite of the political and military unrest that occurred in Mecca, which will be addressed in Chapter Four. After the fall of the Ayyūbid Sultanate in Egypt in 648 A.H./1250 A.D., and the Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad in 656 A.H./1258 A.D., the Baḥrī Mamlūk Sultanate was established and was then able to

extend its control and influence to the Ḥijāz. Sharif Abu Namā declared loyalty to Sultan Baybars and the Abbāsid Caliphs in Egypt in 667 A.H./1269 A.D., after Sultan Baybars revived the Abbāsid Caliphate in Cairo.\footnote{Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Al-Sulūk}, vol 1, 454.} The details of this will be explored in Chapter Three. The \textit{khutbah} continued to be controlled by the Abbāsid Caliphate and the Mamlūk Sultans in Cairo, during the reign of the Baḥrī Mamlūk dynasty, except during certain periods in which conflicts between the Rasūlids in Yemen and the Mamlūks in Egypt to take control over Mecca occurred. Again, the details will be explained in detail in Chapter Four.

As for the system of Ashraf rule, it was a hereditary monarchy which passed from father to son or from brother to brother, uninterrupted. After the Sharif became the ruler of Mecca, the Abbāsid Caliphate sent a \textit{marsum} officially appointing the Sharif, though the \textit{marsum}’s presence in Mecca was purely symbolic and was meant to indicate the Ashraf’s loyalty to the Abbāsid Caliphate.\footnote{Ali Abdul Qadir Al-Ṭabarī, \textit{Al-ʻArāj al-Maskī fi al-Tarīkh al-Makki [The History of Mecca]}, ed. Mustafa al-Saqa (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr Publications, 1983), 334. Ibn Fahad, \textit{Iḥāf Al-Warā’}, vol 3, 29.} The Ashraf’s system of rule was largely similar to that of the Abbāsids’ and the Ayyūbids’, but it differed from the Mamlūks’ system, in which power moved from the dead Sultan usually to another non-relative. The exception was in some cases where power in the Baḥrī Mamlūk Sultanate was transmitted from father to son. For example, in the Qalāwūnids’ dynasty during which they ruled for more than 60 years.\footnote{P. M. Holt, ‘The Position and Power of the Mamlūk Sultan.’ \textit{Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London} 38, no. 2 (1975): 237-49.}

Ashraf rule was subject to many challenges, particularly during the
Ayyūbid and Mamlūk eras. These challenges did not aim to end the Ashraf rule, but rather to impose the Ayyūbids’ and Mamlūks’ hegemony over Mecca and confirm the Ashrafs’ loyalty to the Sultans in Egypt. We shall see that the levy of mukūs (taxes) on pilgrims and merchants in Ḥijāz created problems between the Sharif and the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Sultans. The Sultans usually dealt with these incidents by sending aid and money to the Sharif of Mecca in exchange for cancelling the mukūs on pilgrims and merchants. In addition, political challenges resulted from the presence of other powers in Muslim regions that were seeking to take control over Mecca because of its religious importance, such as the Ilkhanids in Persia, the Rasūlids in Yemen and, of course, the Mamlūks. All of these powers desired to take control of Ḥijāz. The reasons will be explained in detail in Chapter Four of this thesis.

2.4.2 The Ashraf Army

The Sharif of Mecca was considered the supreme commander of the military forces in Mecca, and he was responsible for the defense of the holy city and for achieving both the security and stability of the city.\(^\text{181}\) In spite of the control of foreign powers such as the Fāṭimids, Ayyūbids and Mamlūks, the Caliphs and Sultans were not able to extend their military influence to Mecca. The Ashraf traditionally used their own military system for the defense of Mecca, and the system was imposed according to the historic cultural tradition (‘urf) of the land of Ḥijāz. The forces affiliated with the Sharif of Mecca were divided into two groups: local and external forces.

The local forces in Mecca included the troops (‘askār) that the Sharif of Mecca commanded in times of need, and they received stipends from the Sharif. In some primary sources, the Sharif’s military forces were called ‘asākir (soldiers) and other volunteers, which included both slaves and ‘urāban (Bedouins).\textsuperscript{182} The local forces were divided into two types: infantry and cavalry and some primary sources indicate the actual numbers of these combined forces. Ibn Tagri Bardi mentions that in 675 A.H./1267 A.D., while Sharif Qaṭāda of Mecca and Sharif Jammaz b. Shiḥā, the ruler of Medīnah, were fighting, there were 200 cavalry and 180 infantry in Sharif Qaṭāda’s forces.\textsuperscript{183} Al-Maqrīẓī has also noted that, in 798 A.H./1395 A.D., Sharif Ḥasan b. ‘Ajlan’s forces consisted of 1000 infantry and that 200 reserves were raised from slaves, ‘urabān (Bedouins) and the general people of Mecca.\textsuperscript{184}

The Sharif of Mecca gave stipends, clothes and gifts to the Arab tribes in Ḥijāz in order to encourage them to join his military forces; if the Sharif did not bestow on them the money and gifts, they would then rebel and become his enemies.\textsuperscript{185} Al-Jazīrī (d.977 A.H./1569 A.D.) stated that, in 571 A.H./1175 A.D., Sharif Mukthīr b. ‘Isā gathered numbers of Ashraf and tribesmen to prepare to fight the Abbāsid’s forces because Sharif Mukthīr declared his independence from the Abbāsid Caliphate.\textsuperscript{186} Ibn Fahd states further that, in 613 A.H./1216 A.D., Sharif Qaṭāda with his forces raised from slaves and ‘urbān actually defeated the Thaqif tribe in Tā’if, because of their rebellion

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{182} Shihab al-Din Abu al-Abbas Al-Qalqashandi, \textit{Qalā’id Al-Juman fī al-Ma’rifat al-‘Arab Al-Zamān [The History of Arabs]}, ed. Ibrahim Al-Ebyarı (Cairo, Dar Al-Kitab Al-Misri, 1982), 42.
\item \textsuperscript{183} Ibn Tagri Bardi, \textit{Al-Nujum al-Zāhirah}, vol 7, 146.
\item \textsuperscript{184} Al-Maqrīẓī, \textit{Al-Sulūk}, vol 3, 862.
\item \textsuperscript{185} Abu al-Fida, \textit{Al-Mukhtasar}, vol 4, 74.
\item \textsuperscript{186} Al-Jazīrī, \textit{Al-Durr al-Frā‘iḍ}, vol 1, 571; Ibn Fahad, \textit{Ithāf Al-Warā‘}, vol 2, 536.
\end{itemize}
against his rule.\textsuperscript{187}

The second type of force was the external forces that arrived in Mecca by the orders of the Sultans in Egypt. These forces mainly aimed to impose direct control over Mecca, and to take political legitimacy on behalf of the Sultans. Abu Shama stated that Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn sent his brother Turanshāh to Yemen, and he entered Mecca on his way to Yemen, where there was a conflict between Sharif Mukthīr and his brother Sharif Dāwūd. Turanshāh was then able to end the conflict and make a peace treaty between the brothers because the presence of his impressive military forces gave him the ability to dominate the situation in Mecca.\textsuperscript{188}

During the reign of the Mamlūks, when Sultan Baybars visited Mecca to perform the Ḥajj in 667 A.H./1269 A.D, the Sultan appointed Shams al-Dīn Marwān as his deputy in Mecca. The Sharif of Mecca then expelled Shams al-Dīn, who had vastly depleted military forces in the following year because of his intervention in Mecca’s affairs.\textsuperscript{189} The external military forces intervened in a number of incidents in the Ashraf’s internal conflicts. For example, Ibn Duhayrah noted that Sharif Jammaz b. Shihā, the ruler of Medīnah, asked Sultan Qalāwūn to supply him with a military expedition to fight Sharif Abu Namā. The Sultan thus sent him military forces, but the contemporaneous historical sources do not mention their actual numbers.\textsuperscript{190} In addition, the second type of

\textsuperscript{187} Al-Fāși, \textit{Al-ʻIqd al-Thamīn}, vol 7, 76.

\textsuperscript{188} Abu Shama, \textit{Al-Rawdatāyn}, vol 1, 27.

\textsuperscript{189} Al-Maqīzī, \textit{Al-Dahab al-Mashūk}, vol 1, 177.

external forces were those coming to Mecca, accompany the Amīr al-Ḥajj in the pilgrimage season.\textsuperscript{191} The pilgrimage season, during the period covered in this thesis study, was a particular time when the various conflicting forces gathered to try to impose control over Mecca, such as the Abbāsids, Ayyūbids, the Rasūlids of Yemen, and the Mamlūks. This matter will be explained in more detail in the following chapters of the thesis.

\textsuperscript{191} Ibn Fahd, \textit{Iḥaf al-Wara‘}, vol 2, 538.
Chapter Three

The Political Legitimacy of the Ayyūbid, Mamlūk and Ashraf Regimes

Introduction

The political and religious legitimacy of any Islamic regime was considered by contemporaneous jurists to comprise the most important pillar of any regime in the Middle Ages. Islamic regimes used all available means—religious, political, economic and social—to promote their political legitimacy and thereby extend their lives as long as possible. Islamic regimes, particularly the Ayyūbid dynasty and the Mamlūks, used particular tools that enhanced their religious and political legitimacy. These tools included written sources, of which two played key roles in Islam: the Qur'ān and the Sunnah (Prophet Muḥammad’s deeds and sayings). The latter source (the Sunnah) was represented by the Prophet’s companions and the Muslim ʿulamā, who occupied an important place in relation to Muslim rulers.192 The ʿulamā supported the rulers’ legitimacy by using religion to persuade the Muslim community to support the rulers.

Said Amir Arjomand has claimed that by the time the Shi’ite Būyids (Buwayhids) captured Baghdad in the mid-fourth/tenth century, they ruled Iraq alongside the Abbāsid Caliphate, effectively becoming the first ‘secular’ rulers to assume the title of Sulṭān and they claimed the transfer of political power from the Abbāsids to their dynastic-state, which they titled dawla. The introduction of this dual sovereignty; into Caliphate and Sultanate, was the manifestation of an emerging, autonomous political order in the form of a monarchy from the Caliphate that had actually already existed for decades. This period of political and religious bifurcation roughly coincided with the development of Islamic law and the consolidation of the normative authority of the Sharī’a. The result was that by the end of the fourth/tenth century, the constitutional order of the Caliphate had developed into two distinct and recognisable components: monarchy and the Sharī’a. The subsequent duality began to be reflected in the medieval literature on statecraft and kingship, as a theory of two co-existing powers, al-dīn wa al-siyāsī (‘religion and politics’) or, as Arjoman describes it, ‘Prophecy and kingship’.

The great medieval Muslim philosopher and sage, Al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111 A.D.) writing on the subject, inspired the maxim, ‘religion and kingship’ when he coined the phrase, siyāsat al-khalq bi’l-salṭana (‘government of the people via the monarchy’). This evolving dual system gave rise to a new lexicon of particular terms, largely aimed at distinguishing religious duties as nominally understood as those of the Caliph (Abbāsids), and the Sulṭān’s responsibilities as a political leader. Thus, for example, maxims of

---

194 Ibid.
195 Ibid.
Arjoman asserts that many jurists and 'ulamā focused their research studies on devising theories and a religious, legal premise to legitimise this developed dual system of rule which generally concluded that God had chosen two classes of men above the rest of mankind: the Prophets were chosen to guide mankind to salvation; and the kings to preserve law and order, as a prerequisite to salvation. This theoretical and theological framing allowed for the legal pluralism of the Islamic empire in which the Caliph represented the Prophet(s) and the Sulṭān, as a ‘just’ ruler, made possible the pursuit of salvation by ensuring Divine law(s) across the various communities of religious traditions residing in the ‘Islamicate’ spaces. In defence of Islamic imperial regimes Arjomand criticises Montesquieu’s widely accepted ‘Oriental despotism’ theory by firstly admitting that Muslim imperial monarchies were undoubtedly autocratic but, ‘they were not systems of total power without law’. Instead, he continues that autocracy was both bound by public law of the empire/dynasty and limited by Divine law in the form of sharī‘a. As such, he further claims that the ethico-legal order established by such regimes, created a large degree of civic autonomy for commercial and social enterprises that allowed for educational institutions (madrasas), charitable endowments (awqāf), and welfare societies (rī‘ayyat) to flourish and accelerate as a direct result of sharī‘a’s (civic) law of endowment (waqf) under the ‘military patronage system’.  

---

In the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk eras, the rulers managed to maintain their power for the longest period possible through their control over public opinion and with the support of the ‘ulamā. In order to counter the rulers’ lack of legitimacy, the ‘ulamā played a major role in supporting the religious legitimacy of their regimes by playing down those conditions of Islamic rule that emphasized personal freedoms and Arab descent and opposition. Ulrich Haarmann has noted the observations of western travellers to the Near Middle East during the Mamlūk era who were at odds to understand how under Mamlūk-rule in Egypt, former purchased slaves could apparently rise through the military ranks, joining the ruling elites and in some cases even become Sultans.  

Haarmann also refers to several contemporaneous chronicles that reflect the tensions between the Bedouin (Arabs) and their Mamlūk masters, as a phenomenon that appears to have generally rankled the Arabs because of their perceived indignity at being ruled by ‘al-’ajam al-ʼabd’ (‘non-Arab slaves’) and ‘awlād al-kafarah’ (“sons of true unbelievers”).

Most European travellers concluded that the Mamlūks were in fact ‘all Christian apostates and renegades’. Ironically, Haarmann comments that the majority of the European traveller-chroniclers to Egypt were obsessed with the fact that a minority of the Mamlūks were originally captured European Christians from as far as, France,

---

201 Ibid, p.5
Germany, Spain and Italy, noting that, because of this relatively rare occurrence, ‘…the few became the many, a noteworthy and typical but proportionately insignificant group became the whole.’\(^{202}\) Thus, the ruling Mamlûks were imagined by Europeans, in the majority, to be Christians who were forced into Islam via slavery and, thereafter, selected to reign over their Egyptian ‘Moor’ (Arab Muslims) counterparts.\(^ {203}\) The concepts of the ‘necessary ruler’ and the ‘Overcomer ruler’ were the main terms by which the ʿulamā justified the legitimacy of the regimes under the pretext of preserving the land of Islam (dār al-Islām) from weakness in the face of enemies of the Umma.\(^ {204}\) The rule of the Ayyūbid dynasty and Mamlûks continued with the support of the ʿulamā until the sultanates fell because of internal intrigue and dissent.

In this chapter, I will explore the importance of religious legitimacy in the Ayyūbid and Mamlûk eras, in addition to the ʿulamā’s role in supporting the political legitimacy of their various regimes. In the first section, I will examine the political legitimacy of Muslim rulers in terms of Islamic jurisprudence and its evolution by discussing the Muslim ʿulamā. In the second section, I will examine political legitimacy and its importance for the Ayyūbid dynasty and the sectarian conflict at the beginning of its regime in Egypt along with the role of the ʿulamā in promoting Ayyūbid authority. In the third section, I will examine the political legitimacy of the Mamlûks and the role of the ʿulamā in promoting their regime. This chapter will also discuss the Baḥrī Mamlûks’ most important public works and activities, which consolidated their power through the

\(^{202}\) Ibid, p.7.
\(^{203}\) Ibid, p.6.
role of Al-Azhār and the revival of the Abbāsid Caliphate in Cairo.

Broadbridge asserts that most historians assume that Mamlūk legitimacy was directly in relation to an internal audience, i.e., the ‘ulamā’, jurists and general Muslim population within its dominions. However, she claims that, ‘Mamlūks assertions of legitimacy can be detected in the diplomatic letters and embassies Baybars and Qalāwūn exchanged with each Mongol power.’205 As most diplomatic letters sent to the Mongols by the Mamlūks were written by religious scholars, Broadbridge opines the religious overtones of the letters reflect the theological aspirations and motifs of the ’ulamā who wrote them.206 Whilst the Mamlūks maintained their primary assertion that they were to rule by ‘Divine Will’, so too did the Mongols, who actually believed they were destined to rule the then known world and that all rival powers were simply ‘rebels’ for whom the Mongols had a ‘Divine Command’ to defeat.207

The ethnic origin of many of the Mamlūks was, at least historically, if no longer culturally, rooted in Mongol civil’Īsātion. In fact, the Mamlūk Sultans had welcomed many Mongols into their military elites.208 Yet, compared to the prestigious Mongol rulers, the Mamlūk Sultans appeared to be largely ill-suited to justify their rule, given that they uniformly suffered from their more recent origins as military ‘slaves’ – if not the sons or, grandsons of slaves. This perceived lack of pedigree presented both the Mamlūk Sultans and their religious clerics with a clear ideological problem, that being

205 Broadbridge, Anne, ‘Mamluk Legitimacy and the Mongols: The Reigns of Baybars and Qalāwūn.’…, p.91
206 Ibid, p.92.
207 Ibid, p.93.
208 Ibid.
religious legitimacy. A number of Mamlūk Sultans were on the receiving end of many cutting insults from various Mongol, Ilkhanid and Armenian Kings, and al-Nāṣir Muḥammad and his father Qalāwūn were openly insulted by Ghazan to local 'ulamā during the Ilkhanid occupation of Damascus in 699 A.H./1300 A.D.\textsuperscript{209} Thus, the Mamlūk Sultans and their 'ulamā coupled military prowess with the physical sanctity and protection of Muslims and their lands, along with the continued endorsement of the Abbāsid Caliphate, as political and theological capital when responding to the realities of the ideological and military challenges of Mongol hegemony.\textsuperscript{210} Broadbridge states that, ‘the Mamlūks maintained their ideology and religious guardianship in the face of Mongol prestige at least, until the death of Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad.’\textsuperscript{211} Equally, when Baybars met with Berke Khān’s embassy in Cairo, he was at lengths to assert his legitimacy and prestige to the Golden Horde delegation. To this end, he inaugurated a refugee Abbāsid Aḥmad b. Al-Ḥasan, as the Caliph, Al-Ḥākim, in the presence of the Mongol leaders and the Cairo Mumlūk elites and dignitaries. After Al-Ḥākim’s linage had been verified, Baybars swore allegiance to the newly appointed Caliph and was in turn rewarded with the care of Muslims lands and Muslims in general and declared the Caliph’s, ‘partner in supporting the truth [in religion].’\textsuperscript{212} Al-Ḥākim then reminded all present at the ceremony that they had a religious duty to both fight jiḥād and obey those in command, i.e., Baybars. Broadbridge further asserts that Baybars was clearly aware of Berke Khān’s recent conversion to Islam, his own humble origins as the son of a military ‘slave’, and

\textsuperscript{210} Broadbridge, ‘Mamluk Legitimacy and the Mongols’, p.95.
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid, p.97.
the impact of the inauguration of the Abbāsid Caliph, Al-Hākim would have on Berke Khān, in terms of legitimising his own political and religious status.

P. M. Holt observes that, ‘as far as the political situation is concerned, Baybars had no further need of caliphal legitimation [after already restoring Al-Mustanṣir as the new Abbāsid Caliph in Cairo, on 17 Rajab, 659, A.H./17 June, 1261, A.D.] and it is noticeable that he received no new diploma promulgated in Al-Hakim’s name.’ Further, Baybars did not provide Al-Hakim with a Caliphal household or a private army, as he did with Al-Muntaṣir. Instead, Al-Hakim was given residence in a tower in the Citadel, complete with personal tutors from the ‘ulamā to improve his religious knowledge. Holt asserts that Al-Hakim merely represented a ‘mouthpiece in communicating with the convert to Islam [Berke Khān].’ However, Al-Hakim actually reigned, if only symbolically, for forty years, until his death in 701, A.H./1301, A.D., and was the progenitor of a continued dynasty of Caliphs that lasted until the Ottoman conquest of Egypt. The Abbāsid Caliphs under the Mamlūks were effectively impotent and their primary functions were ceremonial – namely legitimising, through officially ratifying the accession of new Mamlūk Sulṭan. Holt comments that throughout the successive Mamlūk intrigues and rival factions for control of the Sultanate, the Caliph remained as a necessary, symbolic legitimiser for the various opposing Mamlūk groups from the late seventh/thirteenth century onwards. Nonetheless, when Al-Muntaṣir was installed in 659, A.H./1261, A.D., it was Baybars who pledged allegiance (bay‘aḥ) to him

---

214 Ibid, p.503.
as leader of the *ummah*, but by stark contrast, in 922, A.H./1516, A.D., the roles were reversed and the Caliph performed the *bay‘ah* to the Sultan.\(^{216}\) Citing Khalīl al-Zāhirī, a chronicler during the reign of Sultan Jaqmaq (842-57, A.H./1438-53, A.D.), Holt notes that al-Zāhirī describes the dwindling power and function of the Caliph, thus;

‘His appointment is to concern himself with scholarship and to have a library. If the Sultan travels on some business, he is to accompany him for the benefit of the Muslims. He has numerous sources of revenue, and fine dwellings.’\(^{217}\)

Holt concludes regarding the Mamlūk's apparent opportunistic appropriation of the Abbāsid Caliphate as a strategy that relegated the Caliph to that of, ‘[…] a nominal head of the Religious Institution [‘ulamā and jurists], but without any jurisdiction.’\(^{218}\) What is clear, despite the political realities of Mamlūk autocracy via their control of the Caliphate, is that in the imagination of the majority of Muslims; Sultans, ‘ulamā, jurists and ordinary people, the mere continued presence of the Caliph actually legitimated the whole *ummah*. What needs to be understood is that, it was only when these hegemonic regimes utilized their need of religious authority for legitimation that they then could established their relations with Ḥijāz.

### 3.1 Political Legitimacy in Islamic Regimes

In Islamic regimes, political and religious legitimacy contribute towards their continuity

\(^{216}\) Ibid.
\(^{217}\) Al-Zāhirī, cited in, Ibid., p.505.
\(^{218}\) Ibid.
and the support of the Muslim populations they rule. Throughout Islamic history, having political and religious legitimacy has been the main goal of most Islamic regimes, which they usually achieved by strengthening the role of religious institutions and the ʿulamā, in order to strengthen the loyalties of the people.

Yaacov Lev posits that the relations between Mamlūk rulers and their patronised ʿulamā was not simply that the religious scholars were much-needed mediators between the Mamlūks elites and the general population or, that their patronage by the Sultans should be reduced to notions of religious legitimation by the ʿulamā. Rather, the relationship was both complex and reciprocal or, as Lev prefers to describe it, symbiotic. Citing Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, Lev confers that in the first two centuries of Islam the tendency for religious legitimāfīsātion of political power was strong and persistent. Thus, forcing both the Umāyyad and Abbāsid Caliphs to assume the title, khalifāt Allāh (‘God’s vicegerent’). Lev further asserts that the implications of assuming such a title demanded both obedience by the Muslim community per se, and the veto of the Caliph on all religious matters. At the same time, the development of religious sciences, in particular, fiqh (jurisprudence), was encouraging the emergence of an elite religious class; the ʿulamā and fiqahā (jurists). Lev agrees with Muhammad Qāsim Zaman’s view that, during the early Abbāsid era there was no separation between politics and religion and that the function of the ulamā, jurists and Caliphs was interdependent. Before the emergence of the madḥahib (jurisprudential schools), the

---

220 Ibid, p.3.
Caliph appointed the qādi (chief judge) who would interpret religious law in light of the laws instituted by the Caliph.221

By the time of the Fāṭimid period, qādīs were state sponsored and invested with official and executive authority, symbolised by the ceremonial sword he carried at his investiture. The Fāṭimids also paid the ʿulamā, mūʿādhin, qārī and jurists of both Sunnī and Shiʿī sects. Thus we can assume that the Fāṭamid patronage of the collective religious scholars was not entirely altruistic and there was in fact a great benefit in the Caliph in doing so. The tradition of the Fāṭamids was continued across the rules of the Zangid, Ayyūbid and Mumlûk Caliphates. For example, Salaḥ al-Dīn appointed the Kurdish qādī, Īsā bin Dirbās (d. 605, A.H./1209, A.D.) as the official qādī of Egypt, in 566, A.H./1170, A.D.222 Equally, Baybars appointed Ibn Khallikān as the qādī od Syria, in 659, A.H./1260, A.D., and his religious responsibilities included; nominating deputies, managing awqāf (endowments), teaching (or, at least supervising teaching) at the madrasas (law colleges).

Lev notes that long before the Mamlûks, the role of the qādī was seen as more that that of simply a jurist and that the political dimensions associated with the post meant that any critique of the regime by the qādī was taken seriously by the state.223 Outspoken qādīs were often imprisoned or exiled, largely due to their unwillingness to endorse what they saw as injustices and vices perpetrated at the hands of the regime. Ultimately, the qādīs criticisms of the regime were in fact religious rulings on their political legitimation. Lev states that, ‘[a]n honest judge meant an honest government,

221 Ibid, p.4.
222 Ibid, p.5.
since such people were not easily manipulated.' As a result, the boundaries between politics and religion brought about two major responses from the ‘ulamā‘; either estrangement from the state, or, endorsement and cooperation. Certain regimes adopted particular schools of law and doctrines from the ‘ulamā they patronised, whilst the ‘ulamā would often seek state intervention in doctrinal disputes, thereby imposing a religious ‘orthodoxy’.

The following concise discussion provides a brief introduction to Islamic regimes using the writings of three major commentators as reference points. The nature of Islamic governments was, in practice, *de facto* rule. Al-Mawārdī (450 A.H./1058 A.D.) defined the exercise of power in Islamic jurisprudence as the ‘Emirate of Seizure’, which means that power arises through the Amīr’s control of the land by force. The Caliph usually issued a *marsum* appointing the Amīr to manage the government’s affairs. The jurists then eventually justified this type of governance by the Caliph, recognizing that it was the only way to preserve the unity of the Islamic lands under the Caliphate’s nominal rule.

Muslim jurists divided the concept of power in Islamic jurisprudence into two types: i) authority based on religion, which is the Caliphate, and ii) authority based

---

on force, which is the Sultanate. The disorder of the Caliphate regime in the Abbāsid era and the Caliph’s inability to lead the government and army led to the relinquishing of power to the sultans. Therefore, al-Mawārdi rationalized this political reality by arguing that the sultans were appointed based on Islamic jurisprudence to separate the Caliphate’s provisions and the Sultanate’s provisions. However, the Sultanate regime persisted, and the Sultans became stronger than the Caliphs, whose authority was then nominal. Therefore, the Sultans had a significant role in maintaining the Caliphate and the continuation of the Abbāsid regime.

Many factors contributed to the stability of the Sultanate regime and its control of the state’s resources and the person of the Caliph. The Sultans were able to control the Caliphate’s financial sources because of their economic control and the quasi-feudal system, in addition to the distinction drawn between the legitimacy of the Caliphs and that of the Sultans. The jurists classified the Sultanate regime and made it subject to necessity (fiqh). In practice, the effect was to exempt the Sultans from the conditions that applied to the Caliph, such as Arabic origin and affiliation to the Qur’āysh tribe. The jurists believed that the period lacked a just ruler who was capable of managing the affairs of Muslims. Evidence of this belief was provided by the famous jurist ʿIzz al-Dīn b. ʿAbd al-Salām (d. 660 A.H./1261 A.D.), who accepted the Mamlūk Sultans notwithstanding their lack of religious legitimacy, and exhorted the people to support

---

229 Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkām al-Sultanīyyah, 37.
them in accordance with the argument of necessity (dhurāyyāt), because of the threat of the Mongols’ invasion of Egypt. In this way, the conditions required of the Caliphs became distinct from those of the Sultans.

The transition of legitimacy and power in the Islamic system is exemplified in the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk regimes. In an Islamic political regime, there was no specific system with regard to inheriting the throne within the ruling families because of the transition from the shurā (consultation) to a hereditary monarchy (mulk) in the first century A.H. / seventh century A.D.. In the Caliphate system, the legitimacy of the Caliph was justified by his ability to retain power and maintain the unity and cohesion of the state. This differed from the Sultanate system. It is most likely that the primary reason for this was the predominance of the military. In the Sultanate regime, legitimacy was related to the Sultan's ability to perform jihād and contain the most influential groups in the community by using them in the military.

The beginning of the military assumption of power was in 248 A.H./862 A.D with the killing of the Abbāsid Caliph al-Mustaṣir bi-llāh (r. 247-248 A.H./861-862 A.D.) by the Turks in the Caliphate army, whose influence and strength had gradually

234 Ibid, 65.
increased.\textsuperscript{235} After this date, in the Abbāsid Caliphate, the killing of Caliphs or depriving them of power and therefore the appointment of others became commonplace.\textsuperscript{236} For example, Lev notes that at the inauguration of Al-Hakim, after the death of Al-Mustanṣir on \textit{jihād} in Iraq, Lev concludes that the official \textit{taqlīd} (oath document) publicly recited during the ceremony, ‘…shows a conscious evolution in defining the Islamic content of Baybars’ state.’\textsuperscript{237} Further, the document also attest that the ‘ulamā were integrated into the fabric of the Mamlūk state apparatus and endowed it with its Islamic content and as such, they could then serve the state without hesitation.\textsuperscript{238} In 663, A.H./1264, A.D., Baybars made changes in how the appointment of the Chief \textit{qāḍī} occurred, by appointing four \textit{qāḍīs}; one from each of the four Sunnī \textit{madhhab}s. This move allowed a greater degree of flexibility to the judicial system and proved popular with both the ‘ulamā and the general public.

As Lev’s paper clearly demonstrates, the religious policies generally applied by successive Mamlūk Sultans were ecumenical in promoting and propagating the teachings of the four Sunnī legal schools. Lev comments that, ‘as much as the ‘ulamā shaped the Islamic identity of the Mamluk state, it was also shaped by the deeds of the ruler.’\textsuperscript{239} The Mamlūk rulers engaged and acculturated themselves with the ‘ulamā and in so doing, won their general cooperation. In turn, the ‘ulamā made enormous gains and


\textsuperscript{238} Ibid, p.14.

\textsuperscript{239} Ibid, p.17.
preserved their role and status as the embodiment and guardians of religion. However, the interrelationship between ruler and ’ulamā was not without friction, particularly in the matters of imposing taxes and control of endowments. On balance, the Caliphs usually gained the upper hand, but as Lev’s suggests, the ’ulamā were not powerless or without considerable influence. It is important also to emphasize the role played by the ’ulamā by issuing fatāwa (religious rulings), which deprived the Caliphs of power, such as the deposition of the Abbāsid Caliph Al-Musta’in bi-llāh in 251A.H./866 A.D. The effective application of force by the Amīrs and the army commanders became the standard of legitimacy and practically the only way for the power transition to occur.

Al-Mawārdī (450 A.H./1058 A.D.) is generally considered to be one of the first scholars to write about the political system in accordance with Islamic jurisprudence. He linked the absolute power of the Caliph with the principle of obedience (bay’ah) according to the Qur’ān. In practice, al-Mawārdī was very close to the Abbāsid Caliph al-Qā’im bi-Amr ʿllāh (r.422-467 A.H./1031-1075 A.D.). However, he was aware of the Caliph’s weak authority, so he did not object to the transition of actual power from the Caliphs to the Būyid Sultans (r. 344-446 A.H./956-1055 A.D.). After Al-Mawārdī, the jurists followed his approach (taqlīd) to reconcile the Caliphate and the Sultanate in order to preserve the unity of authority in an Islamic community. In the Rāshidi Caliphate (11-41 A.H./633-662 A.D.) politics and religion were linked by the four Rāshidi Caliphs, who

240 Al-Suyūṭī, Ṭarīkh al-Khulāfā’, 422.
241 Al-Mawārdī, Al-Ahkām al-Sultanīyyah, 7.
242 Black, The History of Islamic Political, 86.
were companions of the Prophet Muḥammad and knew jurisprudence. This was no longer available after this regime and the presence of Caliphs, most of whom were not the Prophet’s companions and were not generally considered religious. Therefore, the jurists had a major role in relation to the Caliph in attempting not to move away from the pattern of the Rāshidi Caliphate, especially after the Umāyyad regime changed the Islamic regime from the Shurā to a hereditary one.

Amalia Levanoni conversely opines that the Mamlūks appear to have preferred a nonhereditary system of Sultanate, even though dynastic rule was an intermittent feature of Mamlūk rule across the various dynasties; Baḥri, Circassian and Qalāwūnid periods. She argues that this was essentially the case because, despite the Mamlūks appearing to waver between both dynastic rule and military oligarchy, the latter was more generally preferred because it was consistent with the Mamlūk nonhereditary system. This she asserts was a preference due to the continued factionalism and strife which remained throughout the Mamlūk era and because the Sultan usually represented a coalition consensus of the most powerful factions as a tool to ensure their interests. Thus the Qalāwūnid dynasty, which lasted for forty years after the death of Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, can be explained as a shift in Mamlūk attitudes in favour of dynastic rule, even though the dynasty proved weak and was constantly influenced by the various

factions from the Mamlūk amīrs. Fractional groups could only realise their shared ambitions when a particular group was strong enough to assert its influence and impose its will on rival factions. Mamlūk Sultans were, as a result, only able to ensure their individual polity through the patronage and promotion of Mamlūks from amongst their peers and households.

Sultans who could successfully consolidate their positions through patronage were then able to exercise authoritative rule and act with almost arbitrary discretion. So it was that successive Mamlūk Sultans were able to either assert their political dominance, through a system of preference and skilful negotiating with oppositional amīrs or, they were reduced to mere puppets at the hands of factional groups, toppled or assassinated. The removal of ineffective or weak Sultans was usually undertaken by an established practice of mutual consent amongst factional amīrs, sometimes agreed in advance of a coup, other times as a result of agreed consultation – muttafaq ‘alay (‘reached agreement’). Through this election process, in theory, any amīr was eligible to become Sultan, but it was mutually and implicitly understood that although factional interests might be suspended during the election itself, the nominated Sultan would be obliged to ensure the interests of his electors. With the potential threat of being usurped, the elected Sultan maintained the support of his electorate only so long as he served their particular interests. Thus, a form of elitist ‘power sharing’

---

247 Ibid, p.375.
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid, p.376.
ensued amongst the factional Mamlūk amīrs as a process that was not so much democratic as it was Machiavellian.

Levanoni states that of all the dynastic Mamlūk Sultanates, only Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s reign was the longest and she attributes this to his basing the legitimacy of his rule not on any theological dynastic principle, but on force. Al-Nāṣir is attributed to have said, ‘I did not take the rule by heredity [which he in fact did], but I took it by my sword.'

Levanoni’s paper claims that Al-Nāṣir, on numerous recounted occasions actually expressed his dislike and outright opposition to naming any one of his fifteen sons as his successor. She asserts that it was actually the amīrs who forced him on his deathbed to appoint a hereditary successor. Plotting the unfortunate histories of each of al-Nāṣir’s Sultan heirs, Levanoni states that despite the forty-nine year rule of the Qalāwūnid dynasty, each successive Sultan was unable to establish their own authority over the factionalism of the Mamlūk amīrs and that seen through this particular lens, dynastic rule through the Qalāwūnids does not testify to any profound changes in Mamlūk political attitudes, but instead serves to example the ‘strained factional interrelations that prevailed in the Mamluk army in the wake of Al-Nāṣir’s death.’

The subsequent internal conflicts and intriguing between the amīrs fostered a growing mistrust and d’Īsārray amongst the Mamlūk military and political elites. The Sultanate was only eventually restored as a result of a desperate economic crisis which forced the factional amīrs to call off the rivalries and instead work collectively to save the Mamlūk Treasury. A new nine-man majlis al-shūra (‘consultative council’) was established and chaired by a tenth man, ra’s nawba. After instituting sweeping economic reforms, many

---

251 Ibid, p.382.
relating to the distribution of *iqṭā*, the council then handed over the Treasury to the responsibility of the Sultan, who was in turn awarded a fixed daily allowance of one-hundred dirhams.\(^{252}\)

In seeking further mutual benefit and political agreement, the council then agreed to appoint an *al-amīr al-kabīr* (‘Grand Leader’) who wielded ultimate power. From this point on, the *kabīr* began to operate as the effective Sultan and the Qalaunids were stripped of all real power.\(^{253}\) A series of strategic policies by successive *kabīrs* strengthened their individual powers and eventually culminated in the appointment of Barquq who, somewhat ruthlessly, asserted his dominance, removed his potential opponents and took up residence in the Sultan’s palace. Thereby, Barquq became regarded as the *bona fide* Mamlūk Sultan and the Sultanate institution of government was restored against all of the traditional Mamlūk factional struggles.\(^{254}\) Although future developments between the various Sultans and factional *amīrs* sporadically manifested in occasional acts of rebellion and treason, particularly when some Sultans attempted to re-establish hereditary Sultanates, provided the Sultan continued to function as the elected appeaser among the Mamlūk ruling factions, the security of his office was usually guaranteed.

The jurists ceased adhering to the Rāshidi Caliphate once they realized that it lacked the authority necessary for the unity of the community.\(^{255}\) It is reasonable to conclude that the principle of the necessity rule was the original reason for the jurists’ support of the rulers’ unjust policies; a power vacuum would have led to potential discord.

\(^{252}\) Ibid, p.383.

\(^{253}\) Ibid, p.384.

\(^{254}\) Ibid, p.385.

among Muslims. Abdullah b. 'Umar (d. 74 A.H./693 A.D.) is recorded as saying of this period ‘I hate to sleep a single night and [in which] I have no allegiance to the Amīr’.256 Moreover, Al-Ghazzālī (d. 505 A.H/1111 A.D.), the renowned Islamic scholar, said, ‘Forty years of the unjust sultan’s reign, better than one night without a Sultan’.257 Although the Umayyad Caliphate moved away from the pattern of the Rāshidi Caliphate, the Umayyad Caliph Mu’awiyah b. Abī Sufyan (r. 41-60 A.H./661-680 A.D.) linked his regime and his affiliation with the tribe of Qurāysh, and he considered himself an extension of the rule of the third Rāshidi Caliph Uthmān (r.23-35 A.H./644-655 A.D.).258 In addition, Mu’awiyah also considered himself a relative of the Prophet Muḥammad, and as such a legitimate ruler. He was also a senior leader in the early expansion of Islam.259 According to Al-Balādhurī (d. 278 A.H./892 A.D.) Mu’awiyah said ‘Umar (the second Rāshidi Caliph) inaugurated me in Syria, and after him Uthmān (the third Caliph) did so, then Allāh (God) inaugurated me over Muslims’.260 This statement indicates the views of Mu’awiyah and subsequent Caliphs regarding the concept of power as a ‘divine right’.

The jurists worked hard to defend the Umāyyad Caliphs and the concept of the Caliphate. In addition, the ‘ulamā also had a great influence on weakening the

259 Ibid, 62.
opposition against the Caliphs.\textsuperscript{261} Assuming power at the end of the Umāyyad regime, the Abbāsids were keen to emphasize their difference from it, and to highlight the clear manifest religious justifications of their rule. In the process, the Abbāsid Caliphs assumed titles that apparently showed their relationship to Islam and how they followed the path of guidance (\textit{al-Ṣirāt al-Mustaqīm}), such as al-Mahdi, al-Rashid and Al-Mutawakkil bi-Allāh.\textsuperscript{262} However, the Abbāsids reached a political stalemate when the Alawis did not recognize their legitimacy and counter-claimed their right to the Caliphate. To deal with this fierce opposition, the Abbāsids justified their rule by claiming their religious authority. For example, based on the Qur’ān, they asserted that they were not normal humans, because they were the successors of God on earth (\textit{khalīfat Allāh fī al-Arḍ}) and therefore they had the right to have the people’s obedience.\textsuperscript{263} The Abbāsids also added a new title, ‘God’s Shadow’, which made the people concentrate on the nominal religious authority of the Caliphs and reduce their objections to the political power of non-Arab Amīrs, an approach adopted by Al-Mawārdi in separating religious authority and political power.\textsuperscript{264}

Nonetheless, Al-Mawārdi and other scholars failed to address the external dangers that threatened the existence of the Abbāsid regime. The establishment of two Islamic Caliphates in North Africa and in Andalus (the Umāyyads in Andalus and Fāṭimids in Egypt) had a further negative influence on the legitimacy of the Abbāsid

\textsuperscript{263} Ibid, 230.
\textsuperscript{264} Ibid, 234.
Caliphate. The Abbāsid Caliph was no longer the only religious authority; there began to emerge alternative successors. Since the third century A.H./ninth century A.D., the amīrs in the Abbāsid Caliphate worked to maintain their privileges and their positions in power, but they neglected their responsibility of defending the Caliphate. This gave the Fāṭimids the opportunity to claim their right of rule after their expanded dominations of Egypt, Syria and Ḥijāz. According to Ibn al-Athir, the Judge of Damascus Abu Sa’ad al-Harawī (d. 518 A.H./1124 A.D.) approached the Abbāsid Caliph to ask him for help in fighting the Franks who had seized Jerusalem, but the Abbāsid Caliph did not concede and offered no assistance.\textsuperscript{265} The Fāṭimid Caliph actually connected legitimacy to the performance of jiḥād and this growing power began to threaten the Abbāsid Caliphate. However, the Zengids, who nominally recognized the Sunnī Abbāsids, faced the Franks, and they were able to alleviate the frustrations of the Abbāsid Caliphate. This gave religious and political legitimacy to the Ayyūbid regime. It also proved to Muslims and the 'ulamā that the Ayyūbids were more capable of defending Muslim lands than were the other Sultans who controlled the Abbāsid Caliphs in Baghdad. However, because the Ayyūbids had to deal with internal conflicts at the end of their rule they failed to face external dangers. Hence, power passed to the Mamlūks who succeeded in both stopping the Mongol invasion and challenging the Franks in the Levant.

\textbf{In the Mamlūk era, the jurists’ view of the concept of power evolved because of the changed political circumstances. Al-Mawārdī and the jurists in his era had insisted on applying the conditions of the Muslim ruler, but the views of later jurists, such}\n
\textsuperscript{265} Ibn al-Athīr, \textit{Al-Kāmil}, vol 10, 284.
as Ibn Khaldūn (d.809 A.H./1406 A.D.) differed. Ibn Khaldūn confirmed that the religious and political laws were applicable because they secured the well-being of the people. He also believed that an Islamic regime was not legitimate when it lacked a Caliph who was able to manage the Muslims’ affairs, but Muslims were obliged to obey, an opinion with which al-Mawardi would have agreed. Ibn Khaldūn differed from al-Mawardi with regard to the most important condition: the Caliph must be of Qur’āyshi origin. Al-Mawārdi had believed that Qur’āyshi origin was the most important condition of a Muslim ruler, which differed slightly from the opinion of Ibn Khaldūn. It seems likely that their views differed because of the different political times in which they lived. Al-Mawārdi lived in the fifth century A.H. / eleventh century A.D. in a period of conflict between Muslims in power. Ibn Khaldūn lived in the eighth century A.H. / fourteenth century A.D., when the Caliphate was no longer important and had only symbolic authority. Moreover, many Islamic governments were established in the East and the West within the framework of the Caliphate. In the Mamlūks’ era, when Ibn Khaldūn lived, the Caliph had only symbolic authority, and he did not interfere in the political affairs of the state; it was the Mamlūk Sultan who was the army commander and the political ruler. Ibn Khaldūn’s disregard for the Qur’āyshi condition was because of his close relations with the Mamlūk Sultans, who were generous to him and appointed him a judge of the Sunnī Mālikī school and a professor at Al-Azhār. In fact, the neglect of Arab origin as a condition of Caliphate is considered a sign of Ibn Khaldūn’s congruency

---

266 Ibn Khaldūn, Al-Muqadimah, 364.
267 Ibid, 366.
268 Al-Mawārdi, Al-Aḥkam al-Ṣulṭāntiyah, 6.
269 Ibn Khaldūn, Al-ʿIbār, vol 1, 506.
with his era, which thus supported the Mamlūk Sultans who were not Arabs. Hence, Ibn Khaldūn considered that the most important duties of the Caliph were to conduct *jihād* and protect the Islamic state, which the Mamlūks did during their era.\(^{271}\)

In contrast to the ideas of Ibn Khaldūn is the jurist Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728 A.H./1328 A.D.), who was one of the most important figures of the Sunnī Šalafī school. Ibn Taymiyya opined on the conditions that must be met by the Muslim ruler, including that of Qurʿāyshi origin.\(^{272}\) This view was at odds with the dominant view during the Mamlūks' era in which he lived, and this condition was not met by the non-Arab Mamlūk Sultans. However, Ibn Taymiyya supported the legitimacy of a ruler who defeated the existing political government, thereby winning the ability to control the government and enforce laws and security.\(^{273}\) Ibn Taymiyya’s opinion may have also been shaped by his ideological conflict with Shiʿite intellectuals, who believed that the Caliphate must comprise descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad and his family. In spite of the positive relationship between Ibn Taymiyya and the Mamlūk political elite, he fell into political disfavour, which ended in his imprisonment and death in a Damascus, in 728 A.H./1328 A.D.. we cannot be certain that Ibn Taymiyya was imprisoned solely because of his political views, the primary reason was most likely his extremist views in general, which led to his censure by the Mamlūk Sultanate.


\(^{273}\) Ibid, vol 1, 142.
From this perspective, the Sultans’ regimes were legitimate because of the jihādist role that was played by the Sultans, whether their jihād were for religious or political causes, they earned the sympathy of Muslims, which led the Caliphs to abandon their leadership and, thereby, lack any meaningful political power for a long time. In addition, the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk regimes gained religious legitimacy through their control over Ḥijāz and their achievements in Mecca and Mecca, such as supporting the ‘ulamā‘ and students and establishing madrasas and ribāts.

3.2 The Political Legitimacy of the Ayyūbid Sultanate

After the Fāṭimid Caliph appointed Šalāḥ ad-Dīn as a vizier of the Fāṭimid Caliphate, Šalāḥ ad-Dīn pursued a policy to then undermine and end Fāṭimid rule. The appointment of Šalāḥ ad-Dīn as a Sunnī vizier for a Shi‘ite Caliph was not unprecedented because other Sunnīs were viziers in the last century of the Fāṭimid Caliphate. However, the situation then changed with the appointment of Šalāḥ ad-Dīn. The Zengids played a significant role in protecting the Fāṭimid Caliphate from the Frankish threat and ended an internal conspiracy that threatened the Fatimid Caliphate. The most important change was the Zengids’ dependency on the Sunnī Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad, which had been the traditional enemy of the Shi‘ā Fāṭimid Caliphate in Egypt for more than 250 years. It was clear that Šalāḥ ad-Dīn wanted to implement his policy at a sectarian level because he and his followers were in a doctrinal dispute with the Fāṭimid Caliphate. Šalāḥ ad-Dīn

used diverse political and military means to spread Sunnī doctrines and eliminate Shi’ite doctrines in Egypt. Șalāḥ ad-Dīn’s policy was the first phase of a plan to end the Fāṭimid Caliphate and enforce a doctrinal change in Egypt, thus creating an appropriate religious and social climate for his own political regime.

There were several reasons for Șalāḥ ad-Dīn’s policy to eliminate Shi’ite doctrines and disseminate Sunnī doctrines in Egypt. First, the Shi’ite military opposition considered that Șalāḥ ad-Dīn did not deserve to rule Egypt because of his youth and inexperience in aspects of political life. Furthermore, he was a Sunnī who followed the Zengid Sultan and therefore the Abbāsid Caliphate. Șalāḥ ad-Dīn was also a defender of the Sunnī Abbāsid Caliphate, so he suppressed the Shi’ite rebellions against him, such as the Al-Mu’tamin rebellion and the Amara al-Yamānī rebellion. As we have noted in Chapter 2, after Șalāḥ ad-Dīn was appointed as vizier, he established his own military forces to counter any possible opposition from within the Fāṭimid army, such as the Sudanese soldiers’ rebellion. He established al-Șalāḥīyyah guards, including his uncle Shīrkhū’s Mamlūks and Turkish Mamlūks, to prevent any opposition to his rule.

The Sudanese in the Fāṭimid army led a rebellion against Șalāḥ ad-Dīn, but he was able to quell it and he then exiled the rebels to Saʿīd Miṣr (Upper Egypt). In 568 A.H./1173 A.D., the followers of the Fāṭimid Caliphate, such as the judge al-A’z al-

---

275 Ibn Aybak al-Dawadari, Kanz Al-Durār, vol 7, 35.
276 Al-Maqrīzī, Ittīād Al-Hunafā, vol 2, 328.
277 Lyons & Jackson, Saladin, 52, Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatāyn, vol 1, 125.
‘Awrīs and the poet Amara al-Yamānī, led a rebellion against Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn, allegedly in alliance with the Franks to invade Egypt. Most of the men involved in this rebellion were later executed.\(^{279}\) The accusations, which may have been a figment of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s imagination, impressed upon the Egyptians that the supporters of the Fāṭimid Caliphate were traitors who were allied with the Franks. Thus, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn was able to both eliminate the rebels and gain the support and sympathy of the people of Egypt. In addition, a rebellion was led by Kanz al-Dawlah, a Fāṭimid army commander, in 570 A.H./1174 A.D.. Kanz al-Dawlah gathered the rest of the Sudanese soldiers and black slaves in Aswan, in southern Egypt, and tried to dominate Qūṣ. However, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn defeated them and also killed Kanz al-Dawlah.\(^{280}\) Had they succeeded, these rebellions would have ended Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s rule and foiled the Zengids’ plans to revive the Abbāsid Caliphate and eliminate the Shi’ite sect. Thus, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn was able to create an environment that allowed him to gain both religious and political legitimacy.

With regard to economics, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn benefited from the quasi-feudal military system that he learned from the Zengids and then applied in Egypt.\(^{281}\) Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn also brought his father and his brothers from Syria and gave them positions in his government. For example, he appointed his father to the state treasury, which allowed him to control the country’s economic resources.\(^{282}\) He also cancelled the Mukūs in Egypt and Cairo, which Ibn al-Athīr estimated reached the annual total of 200,000 dinars.\(^{283}\) In

\(^{279}\) Ibn Shadad, Al-Nawādir Al-Ṣuṭṭānīyyah, 89–90.
\(^{281}\) Ibn Shadad, Al-Nawādir Al-Ṣuṭṭānīyyah, 7; Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Mawāʿid, vol 3, 405.
\(^{282}\) Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol 9, 344.
addition, Şalāḥ ad-Dīn cancelled the Mukūs that the Sharif of Mecca imposed on the pilgrims from Egypt in the port of Jeddah, and he compensated the Sharif with an amount of money and fiefs in Egypt. All these economic measures earned Şalāḥ ad-Dīn the support of the Egyptians. Moreover, by cancelling expensive Mukūs, he gained the support of the Muslim pilgrims who passed through Egypt on their way to Mecca.

With regard to religion, Şalāḥ ad-Dīn took several steps to weaken the Shi‘ā Fāṭimid institutions on one hand and strengthen the Sunnī equivalents on the other. For example, in 565 A.H./1170 A.D., Şalāḥ ad-Dīn abolished the Shi‘ite Adhān that contained the words ‘I testify that Ali is vice regent of Allāh’ and ‘Hayya ‘alā al-khayr al-‘amal’ (‘The time for the best of deeds has come’), and mentioned the names of three Caliphs who were respectful to the Sunnīs in the Friday khutbah. Abu Shama further mentions that Şalāḥ ad-Dīn ordered the removal of the names of the Fāṭimid Caliphs that were written on the walls across mosques in Cairo. He also encouraged contemporaries to question the authority of the Fāṭimid caliphs. The Fāṭimids obtained their religious legitimacy through their ties to the Prophet Muḥammad. Therefore, if rumours questioning their lineage were circulated, the holy status of the Fāṭimids would be reduced in the hearts of Egyptian people, which is what Şalāḥ ad-Dīn desired.

With regard to educational institutions, in order to gain legitimacy as a
guarantor of Sunnī Islam and defender of the Abbāsid Caliphate, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn established Sunnī schools across Egypt. These schools played a substantial role in spreading Sunnī doctrines, Sharī‘ah knowledge and prevented the teaching and proselytising of Shi‘ā Ismā‘īli knowledge. In 566 A.H./1170 A.D., Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn established al-Nāsiryyah school in Cairo, which taught Sunnī Shafi‘ī jurisprudence, which he followed.  

He also established Al-Qamhiyyah school for Mālikī jurisprudence in Cairo.  

Amīr Qaraqush bought a house owned by the Jewish physician Ibn Jumay and established the Al-Ashurīyyah school, which taught the Sunnī Ḥanafī jurisprudence.  

Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn established the first Sufī khāniqāh north of the Fāṭimid palace in Cairo, and prevented the Friday Khuṭbaḥ in the Al-Azhār, because it was a center of the Ismā‘īli Shi‘ites.  

It is noteworthy that Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn did not limit teaching in the schools he established to the Sunnī Shafi‘ī doctrines he adhered to. Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn instead promoted diversity in the Sunnī schools in order to eliminate Shi‘ite influence on the Egyptian population. In Chapter 4, I will discuss in detail Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s complementary efforts in spreading Sunnī doctrines in Ḥijāz through schools and ribāts, and his support of ʾulamā and Kiswah manufacturing in Egypt for the Ka‘aba in Mecca. The building and patronage of madrasas (See, Chapter 4) was also an important development between political, state sponsorship and endorsement of the Caliph by the ʾulamā, as protector and propagator of the faith. However, Devin Stewart and George Makdisi have highlighted the independent regulation of madrasas by the ʾulamā during the Mamlūk period and that the ʾulamā

---

289 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Mawā‘id, vol 2, 368.  
remained the arbiters of Islamic orthodoxy, quite independently of the state. Nevertheless, the 'ulamā expected the Mamlūk rulers to defend Islam, ‘as a territorial and political entity (dār al-Islām) and as a social organ‘Īsātion (ummaḥ).’

Lev also affirms that Baybars’ reinstitution of the Abbāsid Caliph, Al-Muntaṣir, in Cairo, and his bay‘aḥ to him is evidence that, ‘Baybars’ oath to the caliph reveal the Islamic content of the regime established by him’ and that the oath was, ‘entirely in line with the political norms and ethical values of the Middle east Muslim world in the Middle Ages.’

With regard to the judiciary, Şalāḥ ad-Dīn prohibited Ismāʿīli jurisprudence and promoted Sunnī jurisprudence. He further deposed all the Fāṭimid judges and replaced them with Sunnī judges as part of his plan for a total doctrinal change. In 566 A.H./1171 A.D., during Şalāḥ ad-Dīn’s tenure of the office of vizier, he appointed the Shafi‘ī jurist Sādr al-Dīn b. Dirbās (d. 605 A.H./1209 A.D.) as a senior judge of Egypt. Ibn Dirbās transferred the Friday khuṭbaḥ from Al-Azhār to Al-Hakmy mosque and appointed Shafi‘ī judges in the towns and cities of Egypt, which established Sunnī Shafi‘ī jurisprudence throughout Egypt. Şalāḥ ad-Dīn supported Sunnī ‘ulamā and jurists who played a major role in stabilizing his authority, eliminating the Shi‘ā Ismā‘īlis and supporting his religious legitimacy through their influence on the community. In Chapter 2, I have noted the role of the jurist 'Isā Al-Hakārī who was able to win over the opponents of Şalāḥ ad-Dīn because he was a vizier of the Fāṭimid Caliph. Similarly, the jurist Zāyn al-Dīn b. Najā (d. 600 A.H./1204 A.D.) disclosed the

---

292 Lev, Symbiotic Relations p.10.
293 Ibid, p.11.
295 Ibid., 343.
296 Al-'Abassi, Athār Alā al-ʿUlā, 146.
conspiracy of Amara al-Yamānī against Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn.297 Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn also improved the government’s correspondence by appointing Al-Qāḍī al-Faḍīl as chief of the administrative literature.298 Al-Badawī has recorded that the annual income of the ‘ulamā and jurists from the fiefs that Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn gave them was between 200,000 to 300,000 dinars.299

After carrying out these measures to stabilize the legitimacy of his rule, in 567 A.H./1171 A.D. Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn declared the Friday khutbah for the Abbāsid Caliphate and raised the black flags of the Abbāsid.300 By this time, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn now controlled the state agencies, particularly the military forces. In addition, the religious and economic policies of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn were further successful in eliminating rebellions against his rule. As previously discussed, all attempts to eliminate Ayyūbid rule by the supporters of the Fāṭimid Caliphate and groups in the army who rejected Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s policy arose generally from self-interest. The exception was the rebellion of Amara al-Yamānī, the renowned poet, who called for the revival of the Fāṭimid Caliphate, which relied heavily on a religious motivation, centered on the claim that the Fāṭimids were sayyids (pl., ‘Sadā’, meaning, the blood line descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad) and therefore the legitimate political and religious rulers of Egypt and, more importantly, the Ḥijāz. By strengthening the role of the ulamā and jurists, building his army and establishing generous economic policies, including the cancellation of Mukūs, Ṣalāḥ ad-

297  Ibn Wāsīl, Muṣṭāfīj al-Kurrah, vol 1, 244.
298  Al-Qālqash Handy, Subh al-‘Aṣhā’, vol 1, 130–131.
Dīn gained the acceptance of the people, which made them less likely to rebel. In addition to these policies, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn further increased his religious and political legitimacy through his conflict with the Franks, which cast him as a protector of Islam in the eyes of many Muslims. Due to Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s increasing popularity, the Sultan’s successors failed to sustain his program of consolidation and legitimation. At the end of the Ayyūbids’ rule, because of their weaknesses in dealing with their internal conflicts and their inability to thwart the Mongol invasion, they lost their legitimacy, and power was transferred to the Baḥrī Mamlūks.

3.3 The Political Legitimacy of the Mamlūk Sultanate

After the assassination of the last Ayyūbid Sultan Turanshah at the hands of the Mamlūks, there was a political vacuum, which they soon filled. In 647 A.H./1249 A.D. the Mamlūks defeated the Franks at Faraskur during the Seventh Crusade. This victory provided the Mamlūks with an opportunity to gain power and further legitimize their political regime. In the middle of the seventh century A.H./thirteenth century A.D., the political situation changed across many Islamic countries because of the impacts of the Mongol invasion. Although the Mamlūks were able to protect Egypt, they lacked a strong political legitimacy, which might have prevented them from ruling other dominions. However, the Mamlūks were able to remain in control of the lands they had captured by taking advantage of the political circumstances prevailing when they gained power in Egypt.
3.3.1 Internal Conflicts in the Mamlūk Sultanate

The Mamlūk era began with internal conflicts between the rival Mamlūk Amīrs regarding their individual eligibility to rule. As we have noted in Chapter 2, the administrative role of Shajar al-Durr in the Sultanate gave her the inherent and legitimate right to rule Egypt, and al-Maqritī actually considered her the first Bahri Mamlūk sultan. However, some historians considered that Shajar al-Durr was instead the last Ayyūbid sultan in Egypt, because she was the wife of Sultan al-Sāliḥ Ayyūb, and she came to prominence as a result of the Ayyūbid regime rather than being the first sovereign of the Mamlūk regime. As we have seen, the rule of Shajar al-Durr sparked widespread criticism among Muslims, including the Abbāsid Caliph in Baghdad along with the jurists and `ulamā. In Islam, it is generally considered (majmu’ā al-`ulamā) that women are forbidden to rule. The intervention of the Abbāsid Caliph set a historical precedent, not because Shajar al-Durr was a slave, but rather because she was a woman.

Ibn Iyās (d. 930 A.H./1524 A.D.) has mentioned that Shajar al-Durr tried to win approval by distributing money and gifts, granting fiefs and reducing the Mukūs

301 Al-Maqritī, Al-Sulūk, vol 1, 361.
303 Al-Maqritī, Al-Sulūk, 1, 368; Irwin, The Middle East, 26.
levied on the people. However, these actions did not strengthen the internal position of Shajar al-Durr, because the Egyptians did not accept the presence of a woman in power. It seems apparent that the Sultan Shajar al-Durr was aware of this opposition, she was therefore careful not to have her name mentioned in the khuṭbah and marsum; instead she was designated (Umm Khalil) ‘Khalil’s mother’. Al-Nuwayrī (d.734 A.H./1333 A.D.) stated that the preachers mentioned Shajar al-Durr’s name in the Friday khuṭbah from the pulpits with the words, ‘God Save the Queen of Muslims and the infallibility of the religion and life, the mother of Khalil al-Musta’simyyah, the wife of Sultan al-Sāliḥ’. This statement is evidence that Shajar al-Durr sought legitimacy by promoting these religiously legitimizing expressions. According to Ashur, Shajar al-Durr expressed her closeness to the Abbāsid Caliph al-Musta’sim by assuming the title ‘al-Musta’simyyah’ (‘of Musta’sim’), which referred to her relationship to the Abbāsid Caliph. Protests against Shajar al-Durr did occur on the streets of Cairo, and they may have been be supported by the jurists and ‘ulamā. Sheikh al-’Īzz b. ’Abd al-Salām, the senior religious leader in Egypt, wrote a book about the effects on Muslims of appointing a woman as Sultan.

In Syria, the Ayyūbids also objected to the rule of Shajar al-Durr, but there is no evidence that their objection was for religious reasons. The Ayyūbids

---

304 Ibn Iyās, Badai’ Al-Zuhūr, vol 1, 286.
305 Al-’Abadi, Qiyām Dawlat al-Mamlūk, 119.
considered Egypt part of their kingdom; therefore, power there should be transferred to an Ayyūbid Amīr after the death of Turanshah.\textsuperscript{308} The Ayyūbids of Damascus and al-Karak declared a rebellion against Shajar al-Durr, which witnessed the removal of Syria from her control.\textsuperscript{309} This is evidence of the difficult situation that faced the Mamlūks at the beginning of their rule. If Shajar al-Durr continued to rule Egypt, under such opposition and religious hostility, their survival was threatened. Opposition to the Mamlūks consisted of the Abbāsid Caliphate, the 'ulamā, the Ayyūbids in Syria and a large number of the Egyptian population. Therefore, the Mamlūks had little choice but to find a solution to the resulting legitimacy crisis. Shajar al-Durr responded to the demands of the Mamlūk Amīrs and transferred the Sultanate to Amīr Aybak. She did so by first marrying him, which enabled the transfer of power to him and the Mamlūks were thus able to stabilize their rule and gain legitimacy according to the religious juridical argument of necessity.

Nonetheless, the Ayyūbids continued to oppose the Mamlūks, and they prepared to invade Egypt. The Mamlūks decided to confront the invasion, and they appointed an Egyptian Ayyūbid, the ten-year-old Al-Ashraf Mūsa, as Sultan of Egypt.\textsuperscript{310} However, the Ayyūbids became aware of this strategy and realized that Al-Ashraf Mūsa had no real power, and that the actual ruler was still Amīr Aybak.\textsuperscript{311} Therefore, they continued their preparations for an invasion of Egypt. Aybak thus declared Egypt to be part of the Abbāsid Caliphate and therefore considered himself as ruler on behalf the

\textsuperscript{308} Al-Mansouri and Baybars, \textit{Al-Tuhfa Al-Mamlūkīyyah}, 27.
\textsuperscript{309} Al Ayni, \textit{Aqd al-Juman}, vol 1, 32; Al-Nuwayrī, \textit{Nihāyt al-ʿArb}, vol 29, 368.
\textsuperscript{310} Al Aynī, \textit{Aqd al-Jumān}, vol 1, 135.
\textsuperscript{311} Ibn Tagri Bardi, \textit{Al-Nujūm al-Zāhirah}, vol 7, 6.
Abbāsid Caliph.  This action was a clever and calculated manoeuvre in order to gain further legitimacy for the Mamlūks’ rule, but the Ayyūbids were not convinced and they instead decided to invade. This expedition led to the defeat of the Ayyūbids in 648 A.H. / 1251 A.D., which was an important step in stabilizing the Mamlūks’ rule.  

Although Aybak became the Sultan of Egypt, the Mamlūks were opposed by the Arab tribes in Egypt, who declared their objection to the rule of the Mamlūks in 651 A.H./1253 A.D.. Al-Maqrīzī has stated that the cause of this rebellion was largely economic. The Mamlūks raised taxes on agricultural products, which caused the Arab farmers to leave their lands and migrate. Ibn Tagri Bardi has also mentioned that Sharif Ḥīsn al-Dīn led the Arabs, who began criticizing Aybak and the Mamlūks, by saying ‘We want a Sultan born an Arab from both sides’. This is clear evidence that the Arabs opposed the rule of the Mamlūks because of their non-Arab (‘ajam) origin. The Arabs were not free under the Mamlūks, and so their objections generally became focused based on the origins of their Mamlūk masters. The Mamlūks were able to put down this rebellion, but Sharif Ḥīsn al-Dīn retained his office at the center of Egypt until the reign of Sultan Baybars, when he was arrested and then executed. Although the main reason for this particular rebellion was economic, the Arabs’ focused their objections on the fact that the Mamlūks were non-Arabs, and thus an ethnic justification for the rebellion encouraged the Arabs to further rebel. The Arab tribes did not usually

---

312 Abu al-Fida, Al-Mukhtasir, vol 6, 88; Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 1, 361.
313 Al-Mansouri, Al-Tuhfa Al-Mamlūkīyyah, 28–29; Irwin, The Middle East, 28.
316 Al-Nuwayrī, Niḥayt al-‘Arb, vol 29, 429.
declare opposition to any authority except when their livelihoods were threatened. In Chapters 4 and 5, I will discuss in further detail the role of Arab tribes in trade and the pilgrimage caravans in Egypt and Ḥijāz.

The Mamlūks continued to be challenged by internal conflict regarding their legitimacy as rulers. The conflict ended with the eventual murder of Aybak by Shajar al-Durr and the murder of the latter by the first wife of Aybak, Um ’Ali. Consequently, Al-Mansour ’Ali, who was 15 years old, became Sultan of Egypt and Amīr Qutuz was appointed Atabek of Al-Mansour.317 External events also affected the Mamlūk Sultanate. The Mongols destroyed the Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad in 656 A.H./1258 A.D. and invaded Syria in the following year (657 A.H./1259 A.D.). These events changed the political situation in the region largely to the benefit of the Mamlūks. The destruction of the Abbāsid Caliphate meant the elimination of opposition to the Mamlūks’ rule, and the destruction of the Ayyūbid emirates in Syria ended the military threats to the Mamlūks. Gaining the complete political and religious legitimacy of their regime now depended on their ability to stop the Mongol invasion and protect the rest of the Muslim world. In these circumstances, Amīr Qutuz deposed Sultan Al-Manṣūr and appointed himself Sultan of Egypt.318 Sultan Qutuz gained legitimacy from the people, the Mamlūk Amīrs and the jurists, who were led by Al-‘Izz b. ’Abd al-Salām.319 Hence, the rule of the Mamlūks became a necessity, which gave them the religious and political legitimacy that they had lacked.

317 Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, 53.
318 Georges Ibn Al-Amid, Akhbār Al-Ayyūbīn, 169; Al-Nuwayrī, Nihayt al-‘Arb, vol 29, 468.
3.3.2 Al-Ẓāhir Baybars and Support for the Mamlūks’ Legitimacy

In 658 A.H./1260 A.D. the Mamlūks were able to stop the Mongol invasion at 'Ayn Jalūt. However, they then assassinated Sultan Qutuz directly after the battle because of his opposition to them. The assassination of Qutuz did not however cause a political crisis because the Mamlūks instead appointed Baybars as the Sultan of Egypt.\textsuperscript{320} The Mamlūks’ achievement in defeating the Mongols and protecting Egypt was a boost for the much-needed legitimacy of their regime, despite their usurpation of power and lack of the customary Muslim conditions for rulership. The victory of the Mamlūks gained them political and religious legitimacy as well as acceptance by the 'ulamā and the wider Muslim community.\textsuperscript{321}

Sultan al-Ẓāhir Baybars pursued a policy that enhanced the political and religious legitimacy of his regime and enabled him to maintain the Mamlūks’ rule. In order to do this, Baybars distributed administrative positions among the Mamlūk Amīrs who trusted him, and he made them members of his administration, which was an important factor in the stability of the regime.\textsuperscript{322} Baybars also reduced the Mukūs levied

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{320} Thorau, \textit{The Lion of Egypt}, 93.  \\
\textsuperscript{321} Ashur, \textit{Al-‘Asr Al-Mamālikī}, 36.  \\
\textsuperscript{322} Al-Mansouri, \textit{Al-Tuhfa Al-Mamlūkīyyah}, 160.
\end{flushright}
on the people and issued a general amnesty for political prisoners.\textsuperscript{323} He put down the internal rebellions that threatened his rule, such as the Sharīf Ḥīṣn al-Dīn rebellion and the rebellion of Amīr Sanjar al-Halaby, the Deputy of Sultan Qutuz, in Damascus in 658 A.H./126\textsuperscript{1} A.D.\textsuperscript{324} In 658 A.H./1260 A.D. he defeated the Shi’ite rebellion in Cairo, which was led by al-Kūrānī, who wanted to end Sunnī dominance and revive Shi’ite rule. Al-Kūrānī and his followers controlled the weapons stores and horses, but Baybars defeated them, after which he ordered their execution.\textsuperscript{325}

Baybars’ most important step appears to have been the revival of the Abbāsid Caliphate in Cairo in an effort to gain religious legitimacy. After the fall of the Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad, there was a spiritual vacuum in the Muslim world. The Sultans had marginalized the Caliph’s political role over several centuries, but Muslims still considered its presence a religious necessity. The fall of the Abbāsid Caliphate created an unnatural situation that had not existed since the death of the Prophet Muḥammad, and the Abbāsids could not revive their Caliphate in Baghdad after it became a part of the Mongol Empire. Islamic regimes did not neglect this opportunity to revive the Abbāsid Caliphate in an effort to gain prestigious honour and legitimacy for their own regimes. Al-Nāṣir Yūsūf, the Ayyūbid ruler of Damascus and Aleppo, tried to revive the Abbāsid Caliphate in Damascus when an Abbāsid Amīr sought refuge in Damascus.\textsuperscript{326} However, the acceleration of events, such as the fall of Damascus to the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{323} Ibn Tagri Bardi, \textit{Al-Nujūm al-Zāhirah\textemdash Nujūm Al-Zāhirah}, vol 7, 103.
\item \textsuperscript{324} Al-Nuwayrī, \textit{Nihāyat al-ʿArb}, vol 30, 44–45; Al-Mansouri, \textit{Al-Tuhfa Al-Mamlūkīyyah}, 45; Thorau, \textit{The Lion of Egypt}, 97.
\item \textsuperscript{325} Al-Maqūrī, \textit{Al-Sulāk}, vol 1, 440.
\item \textsuperscript{326} Ashur, \textit{Al-ʿAsr Al-Mamālikī}, 342.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Mongol armies and the conflict between the Ayyūbids in Syria and Mamlūks in Egypt, prevented al-Nāṣir Youssef from realizing his plan. Al-Suyūṭī has stated that, after ’Ayn Jalūt, Sultan Qutuz knew that one of the Abbāsid Amīrs, named Aḥmad Abū al-Abbas, had found his way to Damascus. Qutuz ordered his deputy in Damascus to then send him to Cairo. Al-Suyūṭī further states that Sultan Qutuz pledged his allegiance to the Abbāsid Amīr as a new Caliph, but the assassination of Qutuz ultimately prevented the implementation of this plan during his reign.

During his reign, Baybars realized the importance of reviving the Abbāsid Caliphate in Cairo as a means of bolstering his legitimacy and expanding his influence as the Sultanate of the Islamic world. Baybars also implemented this plan in response to the demands of the ’ulamā and the general populace, who supported the principle of the Caliphate. It is most probable that the various rebellions in Damascus and Cairo contributed to Baybars’ insistence on the implementation of his plan to try to ensure the religious legitimacy of his regime. The revival of the Sunnī Abbāsid Caliphate in Cairo appears to have prevented the Shi’ites from implementing their plan to revive the Fāṭimid Shi’ā Caliphate in Cairo. Added to this, the presence of the Abbāsid Caliph in Egypt increased the prestige of the Mamlūk Sultans, which became greater than that of other rulers across the Islamic world during this era. It also motivated the Mamlūk Sultans to extend their authority over their Sultanate in both Egypt and Syria. Further, the Mamlūks’ hegemony in Ḥijāz, and the presence of the Abbāsid Caliphate in Cairo, gave

327 Al-Suyūṭī, Tarīkh al-Khulafāʾ, 530.
328 Ibid, 530.
329 Ridhwan Al-Sayed, Al-Fiqh wa al-Fuqahā wa al-Dawlaḥ [The Jurisprudence, the Jurists and the State], (Beirut: Al-Ijtihad, 1989), 137.
the Sultan in Cairo the custody of the Two Holy Mosques in Mecca and Međınah – the religious legitimacy to which all Muslim Amīrs aspired. Several attempts to control the Ḥijāz were made by the Hāfsids in Tunisia and the Rasūlids in Yemen, because of the preoccupation of the regime in Egypt in confronting and quelling the Mongol invasion, as well as internal conflicts, and these issues will be addressed in detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis.

In 659 A.H./1261 A.D. there arrived in Damascus an Abbāsid Amīr named Abu al-Qāsim Aḥmad. Sultan Baybars sent a letter to his deputy in Damascus ordering him to hastily send Abu al-Qāsim to Cairo. Al-Maqrīzī mentions that, when Abu al-Qāsim arrived in Egypt, celebrations took place in Cairo, and Sultan Baybars and the ʿulamāʾ greeted the Abbāsid Amīr. Sultan Baybars then pledged his allegiance to the Abbāsid Amīr, as a new Caliph of Muslims and he assumed the new title of Al-Mustanṣīr Bi’llāh. Baybars ordered Muslim kings and Amīrs to pledge allegiance to the new Caliph and officially declare his name in the khulūbah. The Caliph’s parade was indeed impressive, and it is clear that Sultan Baybars intended to make use of the prestige of the Caliphate in the hearts of the people as a means of convincing them that the Mamlūk regime fully adhered to the religious concept of the Caliphate. According to Al-

---

330 Irwin, The Middle East in the Middle Ages, 43.
332 Abu al-Fida, Al-Mukhtasar, vol 3, 212.
333 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 1, 448.
Maqrizi, celebrations were held across the city, and the people greeted the new Caliph: ‘people were happy to see their new Caliph and the day was one of the greatest days of Cairo’. The new Abbāsid Caliph subsequently declared Sultan Baybars a Sultan over Islamic lands. Thus Baybars became a legitimate sultan, which, as a result, strengthened his political authority. Baybars’ measures in reviving the Abbāsid Caliphate benefited the Mamlūk Sultans by winning them the public’s approval as protectors of the Islamic Caliphate, not only in Egypt but also across all Muslim countries.

Admittedly, some historians have rightly questioned the personality of the new Caliph and his lineage in the Abbāsid family. Abu Fida (d. 732 A.H./1331 A.D.) mentions that, in 659 A.H./1261 A.D., a group of Arabs with a ‘black man’ (the Abbāsid Amīr) arrived in Egypt. The Caliph may have possibly had a black mother; if so, he was of the common people (mūwallad) and not of pure Arab lineage. Nonetheless, Sultan Baybars managed to gain religious support regardless of the rumours about the ancestry of the Caliph, especially after the confirmation of jurist Taj al-Dīn b. Bint al-‘Izz regarding the Caliph’s lineage. It would seem that the Mamlūk sultans, after stabilizing their regime, no longer needed to protect the Abbāsid Caliph who represented the overall Islamic Caliphate. The Mamlūk sultans instead reduced the support they gave to the Abbāsid Caliph, and they even imprisoned, exiled and deprived some members of the Caliphatal family. The Abbāsid Caliphs no longer had any significant role in the

335 Al-Maqrizi, Al-Suluk, vol 1, 429.
336 Ibn ’Abd al-Ẓahir, Al-Rawd al-Zāhir, 100.
337 Abu al-Fida, Al-Mukhtasar, vol 3, 212.
338 Al-Mansouri, Al-Tuhfa Al-Mamlukīyyah, 47.
administration of the state. However, their names continued to be symbolically mentioned by the Sultans in Friday *khutbah* throughout Egypt and other lands they dominated.\(^{340}\) The Mamlūks were more than aware of the importance of the Abbāsid Caliphs for Muslims, and their great influence in maintaining religious and political legitimacy.

The Mamlūk Sultans were interested in the control of Al-Azhār Mosque, the influence of which had been weakened when the Ayyūbids came to power in Egypt and then cancelled the Friday *khutbah* there.\(^{341}\) The Mamlūks realized the importance of Al-Azhār and encouraged religious and educational activities there based on Sunnī Islam doctrines. During his reign, Sultan Baybars donated money to Al-Azhār and ordered the mosque to be reopened. A new pulpit was constructed and the first Friday *khutbah* was held in 665 A.H./1262 A.D., about 100 years after it had been closed by the Ayyūbids.\(^{342}\) The Mamlūk Amīr, Balbik al-Khazandar, built a large compartment in the mosque and appointed specialist 'ulamā to teach the Shafi’ī jurisprudence of the Sunnī tradition, which was also Sultan Baybars’ sect.\(^{343}\) Many important intellectuals taught at Al-Azhar, such as Ibn Khaldūn, who came from Tunisia in 784 A.H./1382 A.D.. Ibn Khaldūn has mentioned that Al-Azhār had many students from Iraq, North Africa and West Asia, which is clear evidence of the mosque’s important religious influence on the


\(^{343}\) Ibid, vol 2, 275.
Muslim world. Ibn Baṭṭūta has mentioned that when he visited Egypt in 726 A.H./1325 A.D., Al-Azhār had many Muslim ’ulamā, such as Qawām al-Dīn al-Karmani, Shams al-Dīn al-Isfahānī and Sharf al-Dīn Al-Zawāwi al-Mālikī. In later periods, some Al-Azhār ’ulamā had great influence on the Mamlūk Sultanate and held positions in the judiciary and the government, such as Ibn Tagrī Bardi (d. 874 A.H./1469 A.D.), Badr al-Dīn al’Aynī (d. 855 A.H./1451 A.D.) and Al-Sakhāwi (d. 902 A.H./1496 A.D.). In addition, the Mamlūk sultans had major roles in the establishment of schools and ribats in their Sultanates in Egypt and Syria, especially in Ḥijāz, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

3.4 The Legitimacy of the Ashraf Regime

The Ashraf regime in Mecca differed from the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk regimes in the nature and character of the rulers and in their legitimacy. The Ashraf originated from Ḥijāz and belonged to the Prophet Muḥammad’s family (al-Sāda) and his tribe Qur’āysh Ashraf, which is the most honoured Arab tribe. Because of their ties to the Prophet Muḥammad, they were respected and honoured by all Muslims, and their sanctity was derived directly from the sanctity of the Prophet Muḥammad. Thus, the Ashraf possessed the conditions required of Muslim rulers according to Sunnī jurisprudence for absolute

344 Ibn Khaldūn, Al-Muqqadima, 48.
345 Ibn Baṭṭūta, Tuhfāt al-Nādār, 46.
religious legitimacy. Moreover, the Ashraf had both political and religious legitimacy according to Shi’ite jurisprudence, which states that rulers must be descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad. The Ashraf were Zāydi Shi’ites during the era that is the focus of this research thesis.348 The Ashraf gained political legitimacy after they established a political regime in Mecca, the holiest city of Muslims. Hence, other Islamic regimes looked forward to earning the religious support of the Ashraf to legitimize their individual rule.

Ashraf rule was based on a hereditary system. Rulership was transmitted from father to son or to brother, in a manner similar to the Abbāsid Caliphate system. However, the Ashraf regime was dependent on major regional powers, such as the Abbāsid and Fāṭimid Caliphates, the Rasūlid Kingdom and the political regimes that followed the Abbāsid Caliphate, such as the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks. The geographical location of Mecca and its lack of economic resources in Ḥijāz forced the Ashraf and the people of Mecca to depend on the economic support provided by the regional Islamic regimes, especially in Egypt.349 In exchange for this support, the various regional Caliphs and Sultans obtained moral support for their regimes through political and religious events held during the annual Muslim rituals. The importance of Mecca and the Ashraf increased the interests of the caliphs and sultans in the Friday khutbah at the Grand Mosque in Mecca, to which they annually sent the Kiswah and established madrasas, ribāts and other service organizations.


Despite the economic and religious convergence of the interests of the Ashraf and other political regimes, they diverged ideologically. The Ashraf were followers of the Zāydi Shi’ite sect, which believes in revolution against an unjust ruler. The Prophet Muḥammad’s descendants were subjected to repression and persecution from the Umāyyad and Abbāsid authorities, and it may have been this that caused the Ashraf to adopt the Zāydi sect. The Ashrafs’ various revolts earned them the sympathy of Muslims generally and the support of the opponents of the regimes that they confronted. People favoured rebellion against such unjust rulers for many reasons, such as the massacres of Muslims in the holy cities of Mecca and Medīnah, as well as the persecution of the Ashraf as descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad. The conflict that occurred in the Abbāsid Caliphate between the Caliphs, Amīrs and the army commanders eventually led to its inability to control all parts of the Caliphate.

The Fāṭimids’ domination of Egypt began in 358 A.H./968 A.D. and their control over Mecca forced the Ashraf to declare their loyalty to the Fāṭimid Caliphate. The Fāṭimid Caliphs in turn recognized the Ashraf as rulers of Mecca; they reciprocated by declaring the khutbah in Mecca, in the name of the Fāṭimid Caliphs, who supported the Ashraf economically. The Ashraf recognized the Fāṭimids for several reasons besides their military and economic strength. Both the Fāṭimids and the Ashraf

---

were equally descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad and they held approximately the same Shi‘ite religious doctrines. The Abbāsid also belonged to the Qur‘aysh tribe, but they were not blood line descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad, and because they were Sunnī, they differed theologically from the Ashraf and the Fāṭimids. The extent to which the Ashrafs’ motivation to recognize the Fāṭimid Caliphate was based on sectarian motives is somewhat uncertain, but Realpolitik and the military strength of the Fāṭimids were most certainly the main reasons for the Ashraf’s recognition of their suzerainty.

After the fall of the Fāṭimid Caliphate, a sectarian conflict occurred in Mecca between the Ayyūbids and the Ashraf. The Ayyūbids banned the rituals of the Shi‘ite sect, such as the Shi‘ā adhān. They established madrasas and ribāfs and supported the Sunnī `ulamā in fighting the Shi‘ite sect. Despite the Ayyūbids’ sectarian policies in Mecca, the Ashraf did not rebel against the Ayyūbid regime, and they did not stop the Abbāsid Caliphate’s khutbah declaring the Ayyūbid sultans. For their part, the Ayyūbids continued to support the Ashraf regime financially, by giving them fiefs in Egypt and protecting the trade and pilgrimage routes to Mecca. This is evidence that the Ashraf regime was pragmatic and dealt with political reality, regardless of the doctrinal policies adopted by the various regimes that controlled Mecca.

In the Mamlûks’ era, as we have mentioned previously, changes in the

---

353 Hamid Gunaim, Al-‘Ilaqāt al-‘Arabīyya, 333.
354 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 1, 64; Al-Jazīrī, Al-Durr al-Farādī, vol 1, 360; Al-Fāṣī, Al-‘Iqd al-Thāmin, vol 6, 123.
political situation across the Islamic world benefited the Ashraf. Many regional regimes competed to earn the Ashraf’s support, such as the Rasūlids of Yemen, the Ilkhnids of Persia and the Hāfsids of Tunisia, who tried to take control of Mecca. However, it was the Mamlūks who gained political legitimacy and the support of the ʿulamā and the ordinary people, especially after their military victories, which gave them greater opportunities to impose their hegemony in Mecca. The Mamlūks followed the Ayyūbid policies in supporting the Ashraf of Mecca financially, by giving them fiefs in Egypt and protecting the trade routes in the Ḥijāz. The Mamlūks also followed a similar religious policy in Mecca, by establishing madrasas and riḥāts, and by supporting the ʿulamā, students and the poor people of Mecca. The Mamlūks were aware of the religious significance of Mecca and of the Ashraf as a means of strengthening their legitimacy. The strategic potential for a symbiotic relationship between the various regimes as evidenced above, clearly demonstrates their need for both political and religious legitimization in order to establish control of the Ḥijāz. In the following chapters, 4 and 5, we will examine in detail the political and economic relations the Ayyūbid and Mamlūks developed with the Ashraf of Mecca and their role in the political and religious legitimization of these hegemonic regimes.

355 Irwin, The Middle East in the Middle Ages, 43.
Chapter Four

Political Relations between the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks and the Ashraf of Ḥijāz

Introduction

Favourable political relations between the Ayyūbids and Bahrī Mamlūks and the Ashraf of Ḥijāz contributed to the Ashraf’s stability for a long period of time. This particular historical period was characterised by many political events that affected Islamic religious, economic, military and cultural history. The Ḥijāz Province has historical importance, as well as religious significance for Muslims, because of the presence of the two holy cities of Mecca and Međīnah. Despite the fact that Mecca was never the capital of any Islamic state, most of the political entities that ruled Iraq, Syria and Egypt were keen to place Mecca under their political and religious control. Thus, the ‘Abbāsids and other regimes were keen to rule Mecca under the name of the ‘Abbāsid Caliph. The Ayyūbids and Mamlūks also attempted to control Mecca because of its religious significance and their urgent need to increase their power and legitimise their political and religious rule. Mecca could often easily be made subject to an external political
authority because of the many disputes between the Ashraf rulers. The Ashraf accepted the control of other powers for a number of reasons; the most important was economic because the Ḥijāz province was poor and desperately needed economic support from the powers that dominated the Levant and Egypt in particular. Egypt and the Levant were rich provinces in terms of both agriculture and commerce and they were geographically proximate to the Ḥijāz. In addition to this economic reality, there were many internal conflicts between the Ashraf leaders, and these parties received military and economic support from the Ayyūbids and Baḥrī Mamlūks and even from the Banū Rasūl, the rulers of Yemen, during certain historical periods. Thus, Ḥijāz was subject to politically and militarily stronger powers that could provide its rulers with the military and economic aid which they needed.

This chapter is divided into three sections, and each section deals with a topic related to the political relationships that existed between the regimes under study in this thesis. The first section deals with the Ayyūbids and the Ashraf of Ḥijāz and the internal conditions within the Ashraf that shaped domination of the Ḥijāz on the part of the Ayyūbids. In addition to the relationships between the two political elites, as reflected in their letters of correspondence and their public religious sermons, I will also highlight the military activities of the Ayyūbids that were undertaken either to strengthen Ashraf authority or to suppress any rebellion or uprising by the Ashraf, against their Ayyūbid overlords.
The second section describes political relations between the Mamlūks and the Ashraf of Ḥijāz, and the Baḥrī Mamlūks’ activities that strengthened their political power over Ḥijāz. The Baḥrī Mamlūks presented their rule in a distinctly religious manner, portraying themselves as the protectors and sponsors of *al-Ḥarāmīn*. In addition, this chapter will focus particular attention on the role of the Baḥrī Mamlūks and their management of the internal conflicts between the Ashrafs and how, in turn, the Ashraf responded to the Mamlūks’ intervention.

The third section focuses on the agencies and mechanisms of control and hegemony in the Ḥijāz during both the Ayyūbid and the Baḥrī Mamlūk eras. This section also analyses the Ayyūbids’ and Baḥrī Mamlūks’ roles in the Ḥijāz through the building and endowment programmes of *madrasas* and *ribāts*. In addition, the chapter examines the patronage of the ‘Ulamā by the Ayyūbid and the Baḥrī Mamlūk rulers because they helped convince the public of the important role these regimes played in fostering science and learning, thereby strengthening their authority. This chapter will also evaluate the religious importance and significance of the *Kiswa Ḥ* and its manufacture in Egypt, as a means of evidencing how both the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks used the symbolism of the *Kiswa Ḥ* to support their political and religious legitimacy.

---

356 *Al-Ḥarāmīn* are the two holy mosques in Mecca and Medina.
4.1 The Ayyūbids’ Political Relations with the Ashraf of Ḥijāz (567–648 A.H./1171–1250 A.D.)

4.1.1 Ḥijāz at the beginning of the Ayyūbids’ Domination

Since the beginning of the reign of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn (r.567–589 A.H./1174–1193 A.D.) in Egypt, after the death of the last Fātimid Caliph, al-ʿĀḍid ī al-Dīn Allāh (544–566 A.H./1149–1171 A.D.), his goal was to secure Egypt and unite it with the Levant in order to repel Frankish power. Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn eventually controlled Nubia, in southern Egypt, as a result of his struggle with Nūr ad-Dīn Zengī (r.541–569 A.H./1146–1174 A.D.). His plan was to use Nubia as an alternative base in the event that he was expelled from upper Egypt, and this fact appears to also explain his despatch of his brother, Turanshah, at the time engaged in a military campaign to control Yemen, to Nubia. During his advance towards Yemen, Turanshah entered Mecca without confronting any opposition, instead finding both a warm welcome and cordial acceptance from the Sharif of Mecca. Turanshah thereafter announced the Ashraf’s obedience to Nūr ad-Dīn Zengī and pledged to declare the ʿAbbāsid Caliph in Jumā’s Sermon (khuṭbah). This action on the part of Turanshah shows us that Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn was not keen to have his name recited in the khuṭbah, because he did not wish to provoke nor alarm Nūr ad-Dīn Zengī, convincing him that he may be disobedient. This event seems to confirm the pragmatic nature of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’ in dealing with the events and circumstances surrounding him, which will

357 Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatāyn, vol 2, 178.
hopefully become even clearer as we examine his dealings with the Ashraf of Ḥijāz.

At the beginning of the Ayyūbids’ rule, Mecca was ruled by the Ashraf of the Hasānids dynasty. In addition, the Ashraf of al-Muhanna, from the Hussāynids branch, ruled Mecca, and they had continuously declared loyalty to the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate from their pulpits. For that reason, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn did not engage in any military campaigns to eliminate their rule, although they belonged to the Shi’ite Zāydi sect. This contrasts with Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s struggle against manifestations of Shi’ism in Egypt from the end of the Fāṭimid Caliphate through to the closure of the Al-Azhār mosque, as well as the killing of thousands of Shi’ites. Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn increasingly focused on securing the paths to Mecca for pilgrims and stability for the people of Ḥijāz through the elimination of discord and disputes.

Relations between the Ayyūbids and the Ashraf were generally cordial at the beginning of Ayyūbid domination of Mecca, in 569 A.H./1173 A.D., during Turanshāh’s (d. 577 A.H./1181 A.D.) Yemeni campaign. Turanshāh entered Mecca and confirmed the Sharīf of Mecca, ʿĪsā b. Fulayta al-Ḥassani (r.556–570 A.H./1160–1174 A.D.), in order to counteract the threat of ‘Īsā fighting Turanshāh. The historian Al-Fāṣi (d.832 A.H./1428 A.D.) has noted that the Ashraf appeared to offer prayers in the

358 Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi, Mīrāʿat Al-Zamān, vol 8, 188.
359 Ibn Jubayr, Rihlat Ibn Jubayr, 81.
khutbah for the ‘Abbāsid Caliph, al-Mustadi (535–576 A.H./1142–1180 A.D.) and Nūr ad-Dīn Zengī. Upon the death of Nūr ad-Dīn Zengī, Šalāḥ ad-Dīn ordered the Ashraf to then begin to mention his name after those of the ‘Abbāsid Caliphs, and this can be said to mark the actual beginning of the Ayyūbid domination of Mecca.\textsuperscript{362} This event also confirms our view that Šalāḥ ad-Dīn was cautious not to have his name mentioned after those of the ‘Abbāsid Caliphs during the life of Nūr ad-Dīn Zengī, and it also confirms his keenness to obtain nominal domination over Mecca during this period. In addition, historical sources indicate that the Ashraf in Ḥijāz adhered to the Shi’ite Zāydi sect, which caused the Ashraf’s loyalty to swing between the Fātimids in Egypt and the Sunnī ‘Abbāsid Caliphate in Iraq.\textsuperscript{363}

The political influence over Ḥijāz continuously moved between Baghdad and Cairo, according to the ability of each of these powers to impose their control and dominance. ‘Abbāsid control of Ḥijāz was somewhat nominal during the reign of the Sharif of Mecca, ‘Isā al-Ḥassani, and it then continued during the reign of his son, Dāwūd (r.570–587 A.H./1174–1191 A.D.), who thereafter entered into a conflict with his brother, Mukthīr (r.587–597 A.H./1191–1200 A.D.) over the Sharifate of Mecca.\textsuperscript{364} Some historians have stated that the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate supported Sharif Mukthīr in removing his brother from the Amīrate of Mecca because of the ‘Abbāsid Caliph’s belief that Sharif Dāwūd intended to gain independence from the Caliphate in

\textsuperscript{362} Al-Fāṣi, vol 5, 438–9.
Baghdad. However, Turanshah came to Mecca and reconciled Mukthīr and his brother Dāwūd after he returned from Yemen, without further interfering in the internal affairs of Mecca.\footnote{Ibn Fahd, \textit{Iḥāf al-Warā}, vol 2, 537.} This demonstrates that during this period, the Ayyūbids did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of Ḥijāz because of their desire to unify Egypt and Syria in the process of consolidating their military strength in their struggles against the Franks. It also indicates that the Ayyūbids were concerned about the ‘Abbāsids’ attempt to control Mecca without their counsel, which would reduce the Ayyūbids’ power in Ḥijāz. The ‘Abbāsid Caliph may well have been encouraged to enter into the conflict in Mecca because of the Ayyūbids’ ongoing conflict in the Levant. All these considerations suggest another way of interpreting the diplomatic approach of the Ayyūbids in Ḥijāz during this period.

The ‘Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad did not stop these continued attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Mecca, in fact the ‘Abbāsids actually attempted to enter Mecca and impose their control over the Ashraf. However, Sharif Mukthīr, after his reconciliation with his brother, Sharif Dāwūd, worked to strengthen his authority in Ḥijāz, created fortifications in Mecca, purchased weapons and recruited tribesmen to protect the Amīrate from any further ‘Abbāsid interventions.\footnote{Ibn Fahd, \textit{Iḥāf al-Wara’}, vol 2, 537; ‘Abdul Malik b. Husayn Al-‘Asimi, \textit{Simt al-Nujūm al-‘Awāli fi al-Anba al-Awā’il wa al-Tawālī}, ed. ‘Adil Ahmad ‘Abd al-Mawjud and ‘Ali Muhammad Mu‘awwad (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Elmiyah, 1998), vol 4, 220.} Consequently, the ‘Abbāsid Caliph sent a military campaign led by Toghtekin to depose Sharif Mukthīr from the Amīrate of Mecca, in 571 A.H./1176 A.D. Toghtekin defeated Mukthīr, who
escaped from Mecca with some of his followers. Toghtekin entered Mecca and allowed the ‘Abbāsid army to loot and rob Meccan properties and traders. Toghtekin then appointed the ruler of Međīnah, Sharif Qāšim b. Muhanna al-Ḥusayni (d. 583 A.H./1187 A.D.), as the new Sharif of Mecca, but he failed to create stable conditions in Mecca. Sharif Qāšim decided to return to Međīnah and left Mecca, perhaps because he failed to gain the overall acceptance of the Meccan people and thus lacked the necessary support to remain Sharif of the city. As a result of Qāšim’s tactical withdrawal back to Međīnah, Toghtekin was forced to reappoint Sharif Dāwūd and subsequently excluded Mukthīr from the Sharifate of Mecca, though this strategy was actually conditional on the promise of the abolition of taxes (Mukūs) on pilgrims.

It is clear that ‘Abbāsid influence in Mecca was strong, to the extent of appointing and removing rulers. As we have noted previously, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn did not want to intervene in the internal affairs of Mecca provided his name was mentioned in the official sermons along with that of the ‘Abbāsid Caliphs. It is quite possible that Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn did not wish to create any interference or controversy that might anger the ‘Abbāsid Caliphs, in case such actions might lead to hostility in addition to the one he was already facing from the Frankish. The ‘Abbāsid Caliphate was suffering from an increasing political weakness to the point of being unable to curtail the Frankish presence in the Levant during this period. Further, in addition to dividing its dominions under the rule of various dynastic families that were nominally admitted to the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate,

367 Ibn Fahd, Ghayat al-Marām, vol 1, 540.
368 Al-Fāṣi, Al-‘Iqd al-Thamīn, vol 5, 439.
369 Ibn Fahd, Ithāf al-Warā, vol 2, 538.
and who had no real impact on the Caliphate, the ‘Abbāsids’ power and influence within the region were diminished in strength. Thus, the intervention of the ‘Abbāsid Caliph in Ḥijāz and the attempt to control Mecca were both attempts to restore the prestige and power of the ‘Abbāsids. Its eventual domination of Mecca provided the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate with a moral victory, especially for a large section of ‘ulamā‘ and the public, because of Mecca’s sacredness to all Muslims. The issue of the taxes (Mukūs) imposed by the Sharif of Mecca on pilgrims was used by Toghtekin as a pretext to control Mecca. The ‘Abbāsids could compensate the Sharif in Mecca with an amount of money that would have easily matched the abolished taxes, but the use of the Caliphate’s power to impose its control over Mecca was justified by the Caliph’s need for a moral victory in the midst of increasing weakness, and its preoccupation of other threatening powers, such as the Ayyūbids, despite their own internal leadership problems.

4.1.2 The Imposition of Actual Domination by the Ayyūbids

After Toghtekin withdrew from Mecca at the end of 571 A.H./1176 A.D., the conflict between Sharif Mukthīr and his brother Dāwūd, who was appointed by Toghtekin, resurfaced. Although the conflict was eventually ended with the victory of Sharif Mukthīr in 572 A.H./1176 A.D., he did not continue to honour the commitments he had given to the Abbāsids regarding cancelling taxes (Mukūs) for pilgrims.370 Mukūs were considered an important part of the financial income of the Ashraf, particularly when financial aid

---

from the external powers that controlled Mecca was delayed, for example in 572 A.H./1176 A.D.\(^{371}\) Thus, this failure on the part of Sharif Mukthīr forced Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn to resolve the problem directly. Ibn Fahad (d. 885 A.H./1480 A.D.) has mentioned that the guards of the Sharif stopped Sheikh ‘Alwan Al-Asadi, one of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s loyal followers, when he arrived in Jeddah in order to perform pilgrimage (*Hajj*) in 572 A.H./1176 A.D. The Sharif’s men insisted he pay the tax, but he refused, saying that he intended to return to Egypt.\(^{372}\) On hearing this the Sharif feared that this incident could lead to a crisis in terms of his relations with Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn, therefore the Sharif attempted to justify the taxes because of the poverty of Ḥijāz. When Al-Asadi returned to Egypt, he informed Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn that he had decided to compensate Sharif Mukthīr with 2,000 dinars and a large quantity of wheat.\(^{373}\) Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn then granted the Sharif further agricultural fiefs in Egypt and Yemen to provide food for the poor people of both Mecca and Meḍīnah.\(^{374}\)

A short time after, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn sent a letter to Sharif Mukthīr formally acknowledging the cancellation of the *Mukūs*. In response, the Sharif sent a letter of reply to the Sultan thanking him for the grain and money. To which Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn replied ‘Oh Sharif! We have received your letter expressing your heartfelt thanks, and I have decided to double the grain and aid given every year to all the people of Mecca and Meḍīnah’.\(^{375}\)

---

374 Al-Asfāḥānī, vol 1, 153-4.
In spite of this, Sharif Mukthîr began collecting taxes (Mukûs) from the pilgrims once again, particularly when the arrival of supplies and money from Şalâh ad-Dîn was delayed. This action caused Şalâh ad-Dîn to send the Sharif a threatening letter in 573 A.H./1177 A.D., warning him of the injustice of continuing to collect the taxes. The letter was translated by Al-Fâsi as follows:

‘Oh Sharif, you must know that God (Allah) did not remove the blessings from his places and that he makes people revolt against injustice because God does not forgive the perpetrator. Either you will respect al-Haram al-Sharîf (Ka’aba), or we are prepared to fight you. You will see, not read, our answer’.  

These letters between the Sharif and Şalâh ad-Dîn are key texts that illustrate the Ayyûbids’ interest in the stability of Ḥiṭāz and the security of pilgrims to Mecca. The ‘Abbâsid Caliph, in contrast, did not interfere in the taxes that Sharif Mukthîr levied on the pilgrims. There are several possible explanations for this. As mentioned earlier, the Abbâsid Caliphate were suffering from the continued effects of diminishing power, and the Caliphs lacked the authority to issue decisions regarding military conflict, because of the increasing control of the Seljuks over the Caliphate. However, Şalâh ad-Dîn, in Egypt, considered himself a ruler under the spiritual authority

---

376 Al-Fâsi, Al-‘Iql al-Thââmîn, vol 6, 123.  
377 Ibid, vol 6, 123.  
of the `Abbāsids, and therefore he implemented his orders in Ḥijāz despite the policy
differences regarding exceptions of Ḥijāz, as evidenced by the attempt on the part of the
`Abbāsids to control Mecca and exploit the Ayyūbids’ growing concerns regarding these
events. The Ayyūbids controlled Egypt, Yemen and most cities in the Levant, and these
provinces were in close proximity to Ḥijāz. The Ayyūbids could therefore support the
Ashraf, in terms of their need for financial assistance and grain. The `Abbāsid Caliph
could not sustain control over Mecca for extended periods of time because of its
decreasing economic situation (the financial needs of the city were met through the
granting of aid relief), and his increasing unpopularity among the population of Mecca.379

Based on the first letter, it is fair to conclude that Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn preferred
to send aid to the Sharif of Mecca, rather than provoke him by refusing it. The Sharif had
also been granted large agriculture fiefs in Egypt and Yemen, and the amount of annual
financial assistance provides evidence to suggest that Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn did not wish to enter
into any new conflict. However, the Sharif quickly reimposed taxes if the aid from Egypt
was delayed, most probably because of the Ayyūbids’ continued conflict with the Franks
and Amīrates of Syria, which refused to unite with Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn. It would have been
remarkable and counterproductive had Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn provoked the Sharif of Mecca; he
was in dire need of continued stability in Ḥijāz and religious legitimation through the
inclusion of his name in the official khūṭbah after that of the `Abbāsid Caliphs. It would
appear that Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn did not completely neglect Ḥijāz in the course of his struggles

379 Muhammad Hasan Al-‘Aydarous, Al-Hayāt al-Ijtīmā‘īyyah wa al-Iqtisādīyyah wa al-Fikrīyyah fi al-
with the Franks, because of the strategic, political and religious importance of this province to him and his dynasty. The protection provided by Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn to the people of Mecca and the pilgrims considerably raised his status amongst the people, which was confirmed by him receiving the title of ‘Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’ (*Khādim al-Ḥaramāyn al-Shārīfāyn*).\(^{380}\)

During the rule of Sharif Mukthīr, a rebellion against Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn by his deputies occurred in Yemen after the death of Turanshah in 576 A.H./1180 A.D. In order to put down this rebellion, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn agreed to a military campaign to Yemen, to be led by his brother Sayf al-Islām Tughtekīn (d. 593 A.H./1197 A.D.), which consisted of a thousand horsemen.\(^{381}\) After his success in the Yemen, Sayf al-Islām Tughtekīn entered Mecca and supported Sharif Mukthīr in the Sharifate, giving him personal gifts of money and luxurious clothes.\(^ {382}\)

This action on the part of Sayf al-Islām Tughtekīn indicates that he did not intend to make a change in the Sharifate of Mecca and did not wish to provoke a new rebellion because his main mission was to put down the rebellion in Yemen. However, when Sayf al-Islām Tughtekīn left Mecca, the conflict between Sharif Mukthīr and his brother Sharif Dāwūd was renewed and eventually lead to the defeat of Mukthīr. As a result of his victory Dāwūd then became the Sharif of Mecca. When Sayf al-Islām Tughtekīn returned from Yemen, he again entered Mecca, in 581 A.H./1185 A.D., which

---


\(^{381}\) Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol 10, 111.

caused Sahrif Dāwūd to retreat from Mecca to his fort in the nearby mountains.\textsuperscript{383} Sayf al-Islām Tughtekin entered the city and killed Sharif Mukthīr’s followers to prevent the congregational prayer being offered in accordance with the Shi’ite Zāydi sect. He then called for the authority of his brother Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn to be established in the city and issued dinars and dirhams in the name of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn.\textsuperscript{384} When Sayf al-Islām Tughtekin returned to Yemen, Sharif Dāwūd b. ’Isā returned to Mecca and re-established his own authority over the city in 587 A.H./1191 A.D.

The events in this period illustrate the change in the Ayyūbids’ policy towards Mecca and the internal conflict between the Ashraf. Sayf al-Islām Tughtekin’s incursion into Mecca and his institution of direct rule after isolating Sharif Dāwūd, were made possible by the Ayyūbids’ victories in Syria and Yemen, which gave them the opportunity to enter Mecca in force. However, Sharif Dāwūd was aware that the Ayyūbids’ confrontations and preoccupation with the Third Crusade in the Levant would be an opportune moment to seize the Sharifate once again. As we can see, these events helped to strengthen the Ayyūbids’ control and policy towards Ḥijāz but they largely depended on political and military conditions in Egypt and the Levant, and even the sectarian issues in Ḥijāz regarding the authority of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn.\textsuperscript{385}

After the death of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn (d. 589 A.H./1193 A.D.), an internal

\textsuperscript{384} Al-Jazīrī, \textit{Al-Durr al-Farā’id}, vol 1, 574; Ibn Fahad, \textit{Ghayat al-Maram}, vol 1, 548.
\textsuperscript{385} Abu al-Fida’ Ismā’īl Ibn Kathīr, \textit{Al-Bidāyya wa al-Nihāyya}, (Beirut, Dar Ibn Kathir, 2010), vol 14, 400.
conflict over leadership occurred among the Ayyūbids, thus causing their focus on the political intrigues in Mecca to be increased. As a result of the subsequent power vacuum, the sectarian conflict in Mecca returned; Sharif Qatāda al-Ḥassani (r. 598–617 A.H./1201–1220 A.D.) re-instituted the Shi’ite adhān and killed Sunnī Imams in Mecca, which included the Imams of Ḥanafī and Shafī’ī schools publicly in front of the Ka’aba. This aggressive, totalitarian behaviour most probably caused the reaction on the part of Sayf al-Islām Tughtekin, who prevented the Shi’ites from performing worship ritual according to their doctrine.

In 597 A.H./1200 A.D. Al-’Ādil became the Sultan of the Ayyūbids in Egypt and the Levant and selected Sharif Qatāda as Sharif of Mecca. Sharif Qatāda pledged to mention Al-’Ādil’s name in khatbah after that of the ’Abbāsid Caliph Al-Nāṣir (r. 576–622 A.H./1180–1225 A.D.). Thus, we can clearly understand the importance of the khatbah in asserting the legitimacy of the powers that dominated Mecca. Invoking the name of the Caliphs and Sultans, publicly in front of the populace and in the most holy place for Muslims, gave them a moral victory and religious legitimation that they needed. Historians have different opinions regarding the exact date of Al-’Ādil’s official acknowledgement in the khatbah. Al-Fāsi has asserted that it was in 611 A.H./1214 A.D, while Ibn Khaldūn states that it was in 615 A.H./1218 A.D.  

---

386 Ibn Fahad, Ghayat al-Maram, vol 1, 572; Al-Fāsi, Al-‘Iqd al-Thamīn, vol 5, 468. Al-Fāsi mentioned that Qatāda killed the Imams of Ḥanafī and Shafī’ī in 607 A.H./1210 A.D., while Ibn Fahad noted that they were killed in 606 A.H./1209 A.D. Ibn Fahad, Ithaf al-Wara’, vol 3, 9.
It is clear that when Al-ʿĀdíl became Sultan in Egypt, the sermon (khutbah) did not take place with his name included for at least 15 years. The historical sources do not reveal the reason why this was actually the case. It perhaps could have been because there was no Ayyūbid force in Ḥijāz to impose their policy upon the Ashraf in Mecca. In addition to the Ayyūbis’ preoccupation with their affairs in Egypt and Syria and their struggle with the Franks, a military expedition led by al-Mālik al-Masʿūd b. al-Kāmil (r. 613–626 A.H./1216–1229 A.D.) travelled to Yemen to quell the rebellion there.389 Sharif Qatāda prepared to fight al-Mālik al-Masʿūd b. al-Kāmil, but negotiations took place between the two and conflict was thus avoided. The resulting treaty agreed that Sharif Qatāda pledged to mention Al-ʿĀdíl in the sermon (khutbah) in exchange for gifts and money.390 The Meccan historian Ibn Fahd (d. 885 A.H./1480 A.D.) has noted that al-Mālik al-Masʿūd b. al-Kāmil gave Sharif Qatāda a thousand dinars and also clothes to the value of a thousand dinars.391 This incident confirms that the Ayyūbis had clearly neglected Ḥijāz until the reign of Al-ʿĀdíl and that this was the reason for the military campaign to re-establish the Ayyūbis’ nominal control across all of Ḥijāz, and not just Mecca. A number of historians assert this as fact because Al-Mūʾazzam ʿĪsā b. Al-ʿĀdíl entered Meḍīnah, giving Sharif Sālim b. Qāšim al-Ḥusāyni many gifts and installing him as the Sharif of Meḍīnah.392 This event confirms that the Ayyūbis engaged in political and military activities to maintain, strengthen and increase their hegemony in Ḥijāz.

---

391 Ibid., vol 1, 590.
The Ayyūbids were not content with nominal control over Mecca; they exerted their efforts to impose full control over all of Ḥijāz. The reason for this was that the Ayyūbids felt that the Ashrafi in Mecca, in particular, had changed their allegiances on several occasions and violated the orders of the Ayyūbid Sultans in Egypt, particularly in regard to taxes (Mukūs) on pilgrims to Mecca. This is confirmed by the conflict that occurred between the Sharif of Mecca, who was supported by the Ayyūbids, and the Sharif of Mecca. Al-Mū’azzam ʻĪsā equipped an army led by Sharif Sālim B. Qāsim al-Ḥusāyni. He was succeeded by his nephew, Qāsim b. Jammaz, who was able, along with his army composed of the people of Međīnah and supported by Ayyūbid forces led by al-Nahid al-Karkhi, the commander of the Ayyūbid army in Syria, to enter Mecca and defeat Sharif Qatāda’s army. The historian Abu Shama (d.665 A.H./1267 A.D.) has said that Sultan al-Kāmil in Egypt received a letter of appeal from Sharif Qatāda in 613 A.H./1216 A.D., asking him to give Al-Kāmil Yanbū’, in northern Ḥijāz, in exchange for protecting him from Sharif Qāsim b. Jammaz. Thus, Sharif Qatāda was able to resist Al-Mū’azzam ʻĪsā’s army and the Sharif of Međīnah and, ultimately, he was able to defeat them.

In 620 A.H./1223 A.D. Mecca fell under direct Ayyūbid hegemony, when al-Mālik al-Mas’ūd b. al-Kāmil, who ruled Yemen, equipped a military expedition to assist Sharif Rājiḥ b. Qatāda al-Ḥassani to control Mecca. Sharif Rājiḥ b. Qatāda had

393 Al-Fāsi, Al-ʻIqd al-Thamīn, vol 6, 124.
previously appealed for assistance from al-Mālik al-Mas‘ūd against his brother Sharif Ḥassan b. Qatāda. Al-Mālik al-Mas‘ūd controlled Mecca and defeated al-Ḥassan and his followers, who escaped with him from Mecca. Regarding the policy of al-Mālik al-Mas‘ūd in Mecca, historians indicate that his army began looting the city and beating people in the sacred mosque. However, this claim may be somewhat exaggerated because al-Mālik al-Mas‘ūd actually ordered his army to stop the looting of the city and return all the monies that had been taken by Sharif Ḥassan b. Qatāda back to the Meccan people. In addition, he ordered his army to give Banū Shaybaḥ, the servants of Ka‘aba, money in exchange for allowing the pilgrims to enter the mosque (Al-Haram) during the day and at night because they had been preventing Muslims from entering without first paying to enter. Those historians who were hostile to the Ayyūbids and loyal to the Abbāsid Caliphate, such as Ibn Al-Athīr, may have possibly fabricated these charges against al-Mālik al-Mas‘ūd.

It is my opinion that al-Mālik al-Mas‘ūd took these extreme actions regarding Mecca because of the followers of Sharif Ḥassan who supported him. Further, it would seem irrational that al-Mālik al-Mas‘ūd would indiscriminately punish all the people of Mecca. It is clear from the Ayyūbids’ policy that this was an attempt to increase their followers in Mecca, rather than creating enemies. However, the conflicts among the Ashraf did not abate in Ḥijāz even after al-Mālik al-Mas‘ūd returned to Yemen. In 622 A.H./1225 A.D.

395 Al-Jazīrī, Al-Durr al-Frā‘īd, vol 1, 587.
398 Al-Fāṣī, Shhīfā’ al-Gharam, vol 2, 236.
the Sharifate of Medīnah, which was ruled by the Hussāynids, invaded Mecca and expelled the deputies appointed by al-Mālik al-Masʿūd. This spurred Malik al-Masʿūd to take control of Mecca after the death of Sharif Qāsim b. Jammāz, and he was succeeded by Sharif Shihā b. Hāshim al-Ḥusāynī.400

This narrative gives us a clear understanding of the internal situation in Ḥijāz during the Ayyūbids’ period, including the nature of political relations between the Ayyūbids and Ashraf, and how the latter tended to attempt to remain independent from other Islamic forces. Still, the lack of full independence and the most important elements of economic capacity caused them to yield to other forces that had greater power and could impose their control over Ḥijāz, even if only on a temporary basis.

It should be noted that external powers had ambitions to capture Ḥijāz during the Ayyūbid period, the most important of whom were the Franks in the Levant, and Banū Rasūl in Yemen. The Franks aimed to control Ḥijāz and thereby take control of the Red Sea ports, such as ʿĀydhab port, in addition to controlling the pilgrimage routes and the Islamic holy sites of Mecca and Medīnah. The hegemony of the holy sites in Mecca and Medīnah was the most strategically important, particularly for the commander of these campaigns, Renaud de Châtillon of Montreal castle (d. 583 A.H./1187 A.D.). The primary objective of Renaud de Châtillon was a religious one, as is clear from the campaigns targeting the capture of Medīnah and thus the control of the Prophet’s

400 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 1, 219.
mosque. The control of Medīnah would have given the Franks overwhelming power due to their control of the most important Islamic cities, in addition to their control of Jerusalem. Thus, this attempt to weaken the Ayyūbids and force them to fight on two fronts would have increased the Franks’ chances to finally defeat them.

Renaud de Châtillon tried to implement his plans to control Ḥijāz in 577 A.H./1181 A.D., and then again in 578 A.H./1182 A.D. However, the second attempt proved far more dangerous than the first. The Franks’ advances brought them close to Medīnah, but Al-’Ādil, the deputy of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn in Egypt, was subsequently able to defeat them and continue protecting the city. The most important evidence relating to this topic is Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s letter to the Abbāsid Caliph informing him of the victory over the Franks and the continued protection of Medīnah. The letter reads as follows:

‘The Franks sailed on the sea and boarded boats and equipped them with fighters and supplies and stopped in the coasts of Tihāmah (the coastal region of Ḥijāz). The Muslims thought it was the end of the world or one of its portents, but God poured out wrath to protect his House (Ka’aba) and the shrine of the Prophet. Then, there were no enemies remaining, and God put all the disbelievers into hell.’

---


144
The Ayyūbids capitalized on this event, using it as propaganda among the general Muslims. They projected themselves as the defenders of the holy places, who had been sent by God to defeat the enemies of their religion. Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn assumed the title, ‘Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’ (Khādim al-Ḥaramāyn al-Shīfāyn), which further provides evidence of the religious legitimacy he was able to obtain through this dramatic event. Also, based on the above letter, we can deduce that Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn also needed political legitimacy from the Sunnī ‘Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad. Despite the lack of support from the ‘Abbāsids, such as military forces or food to meet the needs of the Meccan people, the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate still maintained spiritual and political importance, which motivated Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn to send the letter to the ‘Abbāsid Caliph.

The other danger to the Ayyūbids’ hegemony in Ḥijāz was the Banū Rasūl in Yemen. Conflict continued between these two entities for nearly 20 years (629–650 A.H./1231–1252 A.D.). After the death of al-Mālik al-Masʿūd, authority was assumed by his deputy in Yemen, Nūr ad-Dīn ‘Umar b. ‘Alī b. Rasūl. His loyalty to the Ayyūbids continued, and he did not stop pronouncing their names in official sermons and sending gifts to Sultan Al-Kāmil.404 However, Nūr ad-Dīn ‘Umar took advantage of the Fifth Crusade and the internal conflicts in Egypt, particularly after al-Kāmil’s offer of Jerusalem to the Franks, and his conflict with his brother, Sultan al-Nāṣir Dāwūd of Damascus.405

405 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 1, 237.
The Rasūlid historian Al-Khazraji (d.812 A.H./1410 A.D.) stated that Nūr ad-Dīn ’Umar began building forts in Yemen and appointing his loyalists and in so doing he isolated or killed the Ayyūbid followers who rebelled against him.\textsuperscript{406} This demonstrates that during this period, the Ayyūbids were too preoccupied to focus on the affairs of Yemen, which gave the Banū Rasūl the opportunity to assert their independence and separate from the Ayyūbid Sultanate in Egypt. Al-Khazraji has also mentioned that in the year 630 A.H./1232A.D., Nūr ad-Dīn ‘Umar declared independence in Yemen, issued money in his name, initiated the official sermons to include his name across all parts of Yemen, and began to title himself, ‘al-Mālik al-Manṣūr’.\textsuperscript{407} It would seem that Nūr ad-Dīn ‘Umar may have fully comprehended the conflict between the Abbāsids and Ayyūbids regarding control of Ḩijāz and Yemen. Thus, he formally acknowledged the spiritual authority of the Abbāsid Caliphate in Yemen and subsequently sent the Caliph gifts, which resulted in the Abbāsids’ recognition of his kingdom.\textsuperscript{408} As a result of this action Nūr ad-Dīn ‘Umar was able to achieve many objectives. He obtained independence for Yemen, obtained the official recognition and support of the Abbāsid Caliphate, broke the Abbāsid and Ayyūbid harmony and policy towards Yemen, and also ended the Ayyūbids’ hegemony over Yemen forever.

The Banū Rasūl had their own specific motivations for taking control of Mecca and Ḩijāz. Their hegemony over the holy places of Mecca and Medīnah would give them a legitimate prominence among Muslims and assist their

\textsuperscript{407} Ibid, vol 1, 51.
\textsuperscript{408} Ba Makhrahmah, \textit{Tarīkh al-Thiqir ’Ādan}, 207.
efforts to establish their rule in Yemen. In addition, Ḣījāz included the properties of al-Mālik al-Masʿūd, who had been succeeded by Nūr ad-Dīn ṬUmar, which had assisted him in imposing his control of Ḣījāz.\footnote{Al-Khazraji, \textit{Al-ʿQud al-LuʿLūyyah}, vol 1, 40.} Moreover, Ḣījāz was considered the main military route for the Ayyūbids’ campaigns in the Yemen, so the Rasūlīds’ control over this province created an effective buffer zone in the region thus allowing them to protect their rule in Yemen and transfer any possible conflicts to other more remote areas. Thus, Ḣījāz became the zone of conflict between the Ayyūbids and Banū Rasūl, rather than Yemen, granting the Rasūlīds the ability to stabilise their authority in Yemen.

Some historians confirm this point of view, believing that Nūr ad-Dīn ṬUmar sent consecutive expeditions to Ḣījāz, which thereby led him to dominate the province, but that the Ayyūbids continually sought to reinstate their hegemony over the region.\footnote{Al-Fāṣi, \textit{Al-ʿIqd al-Thāmīn}, vol 4, 374.} The conflict between the Ayyūbids and Banū Rasūl continued in the region until the reign of Al-Mālik as-Sāliḥ Najm al-Dīn Ayyūb (r. 637–647 A.H./1240–1249 A.D.), who was able to restore the rule of the Ayyūbids over Ḣījāz.\footnote{Ibn Fahd, \textit{Iḥṭaf al-Waraʾ}, vol 3, 57.} However, Nūr ad-Dīn ṬUmar led a large, successful military campaign to Mecca and was able to eliminate the Ayyūbids’ hegemony of Ḣījāz permanently, in 635 A.H./1238 A.D. The historian Ibn Fahd (d. 885 A.H./1480 A.D.) has noted that Nūr ad-Dīn ṬUmar ordered Sharīf ʿĀlī b. Saʿād b. Qatāda, Amir of Yanbūʾ, to destroy its castle.\footnote{Ibid., vol 3, 58.} By this action Nūr ad-Dīn ṬUmar aimed to cut the supply route that was being used by the Ayyūbids to control Ḣījāz. This event confirms our view that the Rasūlīds ensured their rule in Ḣījāz by

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{Al-Khazraji, \textit{Al-ʿQud al-LuʿLūyyah}, vol 1, 40.}
\item \footnote{Al-Fāṣi, \textit{Al-ʿIqd al-Thāmīn}, vol 4, 374.}
\item \footnote{Ibn Fahd, \textit{Iḥṭaf al-Waraʾ}, vol 3, 57.}
\item \footnote{Ibid., vol 3, 58.}
\end{itemize}
seizing any opportunity that would assist the Ayyūbids dominance in Ḥijāz, and in particular, Mecca.

As we have asserted, Ḥijāz, instead of Yemen, thus became the centre of the conflict between the Ayyūbids and Banū Rasūl. By instigating this situation, the Rasūlids were able to protect their kingdom in Yemen from the threat of the Ayyūbids. In addition, the Abbāsids’ moral support of the Rasūlids assisted the latter in implementing their plans to take control of Ḥijāz and thus gain religious and political legitimacy. On the other hand, the situation in Egypt, where they were in fierce conflict with the Franks, did not allow the Ayyūbids to send military forces to support their control of Ḥijāz. The campaign led by Louis IX threatened the Ayyūbids’ presence in Egypt, requiring the Ayyūbids to assemble their forces rather than sending armies to other fronts, which were considered secondary threats in comparison to the defence of Egypt. Moreover, Abbāsid-Ayyūbid relations continued to be fraught by conflict over the control of Ḥijāz, despite the fact that the Ayyūbids actually needed the legitimacy of the Abbāsid Caliphate. Thus, we can observe that between the late-twelfth and mid-thirteenth centuries A.D., all the region’s Islamic powers attempted to gain both political and religious legitimacy by controlling Mecca, thereby gaining the honour of being patrons of the Holy Mosques.

4.2.1 Political Relations between the Baḥrī Mamlūks and the Ashraf of Ḥijāz (658–784 A.H./1268–1382 A.D.): an Overview

Mecca and Medīnah have historically had a major effect on all of the political regimes
that have attempted to dominate them, but this was particularly the case in the Bahri Mamluks’ era. As we have seen in Chapter 2, Mamluk rule differed in nature from the other political regimes that dominated the holy cities of Mecca and Medina; the Mamluks had a greater need to establish legitimate reasons for their rule because of their non-Arab ethnic origins. However, their political and military achievements at the beginning of their rule gave them the opportunity to forge a new political regime in the region largely due to the disappearance of other major political entities, such as the Abbasiid Caliphate in Baghdad. In addition, their successful opposition of the Mongol invasion at the battle of ‘Ayn Jalut (658 A.H./1260 A.D.) boosted their efforts in gaining the support of the ‘ulama and Muslim generally, as leaders and protectors of Islam against its enemies.

In the previous section, we have provided an overview of the political situation in Hijaz during the Ayyubids’ era, under Salah ad-Din and his successors. In addition, we have discussed the Ashraf’s’ policy towards the other powers during the same period, such as the Abbasiids in Baghdad and Banu Rasul in Yemen, in the second half of the Ayyubid era. We have also addressed some of the important contacts between the Ayyubids and Ashraf and other political entities, which have all provided a good illustration of the nature of their political relations. The major aspects of the situations faced by the early Mamluk sultans were threefold: the frequent interventions from Yemen; the infrequent interventions from Baghdad; and the pragmatic, political skills of

413 See Stanley Lane-Poole, The History of Egypt, vol 6, 242–43.
the Ashraf.

As we have demonstrated, during the era of Sharif Qatāda b. Idrīs, conditions in Mecca had stabilised and the Sharif was able to establish both security and stability in Mecca whilst at the same time defeating the opponents of the Ashraf by maintaining strong relations with the Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad. But conditions began to deteriorate in Mecca after his death, when the Ayyūbids asserted their dominance in the city, whilst also coming into conflict with the Banū Rasūl. The situation remained volatile until the reign of Sharif Muḥammad Abū Namā (r. 661–700 A.H./1263–1301 A.D.) in Mecca at the beginning of the Mamlūk era.415 After the reign of Sultan al-Mālik al-Ẓāhir Baybars (r. 658–676 A.H./1260–1277 A.D.), the Mamlūks sought to control Mecca and establish a special relationship between themselves and the Ashraf, who remained strong throughout the reign of Baybars’ successor, Sultan Sāyf al-Dīn Qalāwūn al-Ṣāliḥī (r. 678–689 A.H./1279–1290 A.D.). But new political conditions changed the balance of power between the regimes in the Mamlūk era. The Franks had lost most of their lands in the Levant, except for some coastal cities. In addition, this period saw the end of the Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad and its revival in Cairo, during the reign of Ẓāhir Baybars, giving the Mamlūks a greater degree of political and religious legitimacy. However, the military conflict for the control of both Mecca and Ḥijāz between the Mamlūks and the Banū Rasūl of Yemen remained.

In this section, we will discuss the beginning of the Mamlūks’ control of Ḥijāz and Mecca, relations between the Mamlūks and the Ashraf, and the correspondence between the ruling elites. This section will also address the Mamlūks’ conflict with the Banū Rasūl who were in control of Ḥijāz, and the military role of the Mamlūks in establishing their presence in Mecca. In addition, we will discuss the role of the Mamlūks in the suppression of a rebellion in Ḥijāz, which could have seriously compromised their influence and control over the region and possibly eliminated their presence in Mecca.

4.2.2 The Beginning of the Mamlūks’ Domination of Ḥijāz

At the end of their reign over Ḥijāz, the Ayyūbids’ control was gradually weakened because of their internal conflicts and their wars with the Franks. In addition, the growth of the Mamlūk forces in Egypt presented a looming threat for them. These factors led to the emergence of further conflicts with the Ashraf in Ḥijāz, who were seeking to take control of the Sharifate in Mecca and Međīnah. The Meccan historian al-’Isāmī (d. 1111 A.H./1699 A.D.) has stated that conflict occurred between Sharif Muḥammad Abū Nāma and the son of al-Ḥassan b. Qatāda, Sharif of Međīnah, in 656 A.H./1258 A.D., but it ended with the victory of Abū Nāma, resulting in him ruling Mecca. This gives us a clear indication of the intensification of the conflicts between the Ashraf; it also illustrates that none of the major powers in the region sought involvement in the internal

---

affairs of Ḥijāz providing they had nominal control. The unfolding events in Ḥijāz were further exploited by the Rasūlids in Yemen in an effort to take control of Mecca, Medīnah and Yanbū’ in the North of Ḥijāz, thereby potentially securing the region from any future Egyptian military campaigns.

This was an intense period in the history of the Middle East; the political map of dominant powers had changed in more areas than Ḥijāz alone, and the continued shifting loyalties led to the emergence of new political regimes who sought to impose their control over larger areas of land and expand their influence over their jurisdictions. The Mongol invasion and destruction of Baghdad ended the Abbāsid Caliphate, after nearly five hundred years of rule and representing the spiritual focus of all Muslims in the region. The gradual conquest of the coastal cities, from the control of the Franks, facilitated the hegemonic control of the Mamlūk Sultanate, which was concerned about the potential threat of the Mongols and also its ambition to inherit the legacy of the Islamic Caliphate.417 The Mamlūks asserted their efforts to obtain political and religious legitimacy across the Muslim world by reviving the Abbāsid Caliphate in Cairo after its disastrous collapse in Baghdad.418 In addition, they successfully abated the Mongol invasion at ‘Ayn Jalūt (658 A.H./1260 A.D.) and thus prevented Mongol control over most of the Muslim regions, thereby giving the Mamlūks greater military influence at the

418 John L. Meloy, Imperial Power and Maritime Trade, Mecca and Cairo in the Later Middle Ages, (Chicago: Middle East Documentation Center, 2010), 13.
beginning of their rule.\footnote{Reuven Amitai, ‘Mongol Raids into Palestine (A.D. 1260 and 1300)’, \textit{Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland}, 2 (1987), 236–255.}

After the fall of the Abbāsīd Caliphate in Baghdad and the collapse of the Ayyūbids in Egypt, attempts were made from a number of different quarters to seize control of Mecca and Meḍīnah. The Tunisian historian Ibn Qunfud (d. 810 A.H./1407 A.D.) mentioned that Amīr Abū ’Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. Zakarīyyah, the Hāfsid Amīr in Tunisia (r. 647–675 A.H./1249–1277 A.D.), took control of Mecca at least nominally. The Hāfsid Amīr had pronounced himself the ‘Caliph of Muslims’ in Tunisia in 657 A.H./1259 A.D., after the collapse of the Abbāsīd Caliphate in Baghdad, and then assumed the title of ‘al-Mustanṣir’.\footnote{Aḥmad b. Hussein Ibn Qunfud, \textit{Al-Fārisīyyah fī al-Mubāda’ al-Dawlah al-Hāfsīyyah (The Beginning of the Hafsid Amīr ate)}, (Tunisia: Dar Tunisia, 1968), 120.} The combined impacts of these events forced Sharīf Muḥammad Abū Nāma to recognise the legitimate succession of the Hāfsids, considering them the heirs of the Abbāsīd Caliphate and invoking them in the pulpits of Mecca.\footnote{Ibn Qunfud, \textit{Al-Fārisīyyah}, 120; See also Muhammad b. Ibrāhīm Al-Zakarshy, \textit{Al-Tarīkh al-Dawlatāyn fī al-Bilād al-Maghrib (The History of the Mohads and the Hafsids)}, (Tunisia: The Tunisian State Publisher, 1872), 25.}

The Hāfsids justified their declaration of succession on a set of principles of legitimacy that gave them religious legitimation as caliphs for the Muslims. The most important principle was that the Caliph must be of Arab origin, but also key was their affiliation with the Qur‘āysh tribe, the tribe of the Prophet Muḥammad, and specifically
with the bloodline of the second Caliph, 'Umar b. Al-Khattāb. The Hāfsids were proud of their ancestral bloodline and promoted it on every occasion, even commissioning poets to compose poems in praise of their noble lineage. Some poets named their kingdom the 'Umari or, al-Farūqiyyah kingdom (these names are related to the title of 'Umar al-Farūq, meaning, ‘One who differentiates between right and wrong’).

Several factors supported the Hāfsids’ declaration of succession. The most important, as mentioned previously, was the fall of the Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad and the recognition by the Sharīf of Mecca of the Hāfsid succession. Another important factor was recognition by the king of Granada, Ibn al-Aḥmār, and his pledge of allegiance to the Hāfsids, in addition to the Marinids in Morocco and the Zayyānids in Tlemcen, Algeria. The historian al-Silāwi (d. 1315 A.H./1897 A.D.) wrote that when the Marinids ruled Morocco, they were simply holding khutbah for the Hāfsids, because they were relatives of the Almohads, who had ruled Morocco before the Marinids. We also cannot neglect the ambitions of the Hāfsids to control Ḥijāz in economic, religious and political terms. Throughout history, the forces that have controlled Ḥijāz dominated trade in the Red Sea, from the Tulunids to the Ikhshidids and the Fāṭimids. Control of the Ḥijāz, in order to dominate the Red Sea, was the same policy followed by the Ayyūbids and the Mamlūks and the Ottomans after them.

423 Al-Abadi, Dirasāt fī al-Tarīkh al-Maghrib , 123.
425 Al-Abadi, Dirasāt fī al-Tarīkh al-Maghrib , 127.
Abū Nāma’s policy towards the Hāfsids demonstrated his intention to strike a balance of power in Ḥijāz and Mecca. Mecca was consistently under the control of the Ayyūbids in Egypt or Banū Rasūl in Yemen, both militarily and economically, albeit sometimes nominally. Therefore, the emergence of a third power with ambitions to take control of Mecca provided the Ashraf with the opportunity to strategically play the various parties off against each other; Abū Nāma’s acceptance of the Hāfsids’ hegemony demonstrates his strategic and political intelligence. The Hāfsids had the ability to support Mecca economically, but they could not control it militarily, and this is what the Ashraf and Abū Nāma hoped to achieve through their short-lived recognition of the Hāfsids.

In 659 A.H./1261 A.D., the Rasūlims once again came to dominate Mecca, under al-Mālik Al-Muẓaffar Yūsūf (r. 684–696 A.H./1250–1297 A.D.), who came to the city to perform Ḥajj accompanied by his military forces. The historian Ibn Ḥātim (d. 702 A.H./1302 A.D.) noted that al-Mālik Al-Muẓaffar Yūsūf took several actions to prove his domination of Mecca. For example, he distributed money and other charitable gifts to all the people of Mecca and to the visiting pilgrims. Additionally, he gave Egyptian pilgrims money and gifts and also provided them with boats and cattle for their return trip to Egypt. Finally, Al-Muẓaffar Yūsūf washed the Ka’aba, and thus the khutbah was held for him.426 To ensure the Rasūlims’ hegemony in Mecca, Al-Muẓaffar

led an army from Yemen to Mecca to confirm their authority over the city and dissuade any other power from attempting the capture of this important city and thereby gaining religious legitimacy. We should note that the entry of armed troops to Mecca is actually contrary to Islamic tradition, which forbids any armed access to the Holy Mosque in Mecca.\footnote{Qur’an 1:191, Allāh said: ‘Do not fight them at the sacred mosque, unless they fight you there’.} However on this occasion al-Mālik Al-Muẓaffār’s entry with his army was not aimed at fighting, but at installing the Rasūlids as rulers of Mecca. The Rasūlids claimed that they belonged to the Prophet Muḥammad’s tribe, which increased their legitimacy according to Sunnī jurisprudence. This made belonging to the Qur’āysh tribe of Prophet Muḥammad the main religious condition of political legitimacy of the Muslim ruler.\footnote{Muhammad b. Isma’il Al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, (Beirut: Dar Ibn Kather Publications, 1987), vol 3, 1290.}

The historian al-Khazraji mentioned that the Banū Rasūl sent Kiswah twice: once in 661 A.H./1263 A.D. and again in 666 A.H./1268 A.D. The second gift included a Kiswah in addition to money for decorating the Ka’aba.\footnote{Al-Khazraji, Al-‘Qud al-Lu’Luyah, vol 1, 169.} These actions help explain the extent of the Banū Rasūl’s interest in Mecca and pilgrims, in addition to the affairs of the Ka’aba. This is what was sought by most political entities, a situation in which their control of Mecca and their interest in pilgrims’ affairs gave them prestige in the eyes of Muslims, as servants of al-Ḥarāmīn.

Having considered the Hāfsids and Rasūlids, we will now turn to the major protagonists, the Mamlūks. Sultan Al-Zāhir Baybars was very interested in the
affairs of Ḥijāz when he came to power in 658 A.H./1260 A.D., and it is confirmed by Al-Maqrīzī that Baybars sent the Kiswah to Mecca in 661 A.H./1263 A.D.\(^{430}\) This was the same year that al-Mālik Al-Muẓaffar Yūsūf also sent the Kiswah to Mecca, which clearly demonstrates to us the nature of the spiritual conflict between the political powers that were competing for control of Mecca. Al-Fāsi has mentioned that the Rasūlids’ Kiswah was not placed on the Ka’aba until after the departure of the Amīr of the Egyptian Ḥajj, in order to avoid disputes or conflict between the opposing parties.\(^{431}\)

It is well established that khutbah was held for Sultan Baybars after his domination over Mecca through the mandate given to him in Cairo by the Abbāsid Caliph, al-Mustanṣir, in 659 A.H./1261 A.D., which gave him the title of ‘Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’, in addition to appointing Baybars as a deputy of Mecca.\(^ {432}\) This year is considered the beginning of the actual conflict between the Mamlūks and Banū Rasūl for control of Ḥijāz, protecting the honour of the Ka’aba and caring for the religious pilgrims. Al-Maqrīzī and Ibn Fahd have both stated that in this year, the khutbah was held in Mecca in the name of both Sultan Baybars and al-Mālik Al-Muḍāffar.\(^{433}\) This gives us some insight into the existence of a hidden competition in this period, particularly given the information we have regarding the gifting of the Kiswah to the Ka’aba.

\(^{430}\) Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulīk, vol 1, 502.
\(^{431}\) Al-Fāsi, Al-‘Īqd al-Thamīn, vol 7, 489.
\(^{432}\) Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 1, 454; Al-Basha, Al-Alqab Al-Islamiyah, 268.
The conflict between the Mamlūks and Banū Rasūl was not direct; it operated through their allies in Mecca, the Ashraf themselves, who ruled Mecca in this period under Sharif Najm al-Din Abu Namā and Baha al-Dīn Idrīs. The historian Ibn Abdul Al-Ẓāhir (d. 692 A.H./1292 A.D.) has stated that in 667 A.H./1269 A.D. Sharif Abu Namā expelled his uncle, Sharif Idrīs, from Mecca and sent a letter to Sultan Baybars justifying his actions. Sharif Abu Namā was able to convince Sultan Baybars that Baha al-Dīn Idrīs was favouring the Rasūlids and therefore could have threatened the Mamlūks’ authority in Mecca.\textsuperscript{434} In addition, Sharif Abu Namā demanded that Sultan Baybars supply him with money and aid and the Sultan contacted the Sharif of Medinah and requested that he not help his uncle Sharif Idrīs if assistance was requested.\textsuperscript{435} Therefore, Sultan Baybars quickly blessed the actions of Abu Namā and supplied him with money and other necessary aid each year.\textsuperscript{436}

Al-Maqrīzī and Al-Fāṣi have both mentioned that Sultan Baybars gave Abu Namā annual financial assistance estimated at around 20,000 dirhams, in addition to caring for pilgrims, abolition of taxes (\textit{Mukūs}) and holding \textit{khutbah} for Sultan Baybars, while ceasing to hold it for the Rasūlids, which was approved by Abu Namā.\textsuperscript{437} Al-Maqrīzī and Al-Fāṣi did not specify the reason that the Mamlūk sultan gave this large amount to the Sharif of Mecca. However, it is clear that this big grant was most probably compensation to the Sharif of Mecca for the cancellation of taxes on the pilgrims and

\textsuperscript{434} Ibn ‘Abdul al-Dahir, \textit{Al-Rawd al-Zahir}, 352.  
\textsuperscript{435} Al-Fāṣi, \textit{Al-‘Iqd al-Thamīn}, vol 1, 459.  
\textsuperscript{436} Ibid., Al-Fāṣi, \textit{Al-Thamīn}, vol 1, 460; Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Al-Sulūk}, vol 1, 579; Al ‘Ayni, \textit{‘Aqd al-Juman}, vol 2, 118–119.  
\textsuperscript{437} Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Al-Sulūk}, vol 1, 579; Al-Fāṣi, \textit{Al-‘Iqd Al-Thamīn}, vol 2, 151.
visitors to Mecca. Providing this financial compensation to the Sharif of Mecca was intended to stop him from switching his allegiance to the Rasūlids, who competed with the Mamlūks for control of Mecca.

After Sharif Baha al-Dīn Idrīs realised the actions that Abu Namā had taken to prevent him from entering Mecca by force, he negotiated with Abu Namā and recognised the Mamlūks’ sovereignty over the city.438 It is clear that Sultan Baybars aspired to assert his control over Mecca, but he was waiting for the opportunity that would enable him to intervene in the affairs of the holy city, which did not actually occur until 667 A.H./1269 A.D. This shows us the Ashrafs’ policy in dealing with the powers that all aspired to control Mecca and impose their influence on Islam’s holiest cities. The Ashraf did not change their policy after the incidents that followed; they were careful to maintain their autonomy in exchange for economic and military aid, if and when needed. The Mamlūks’ gain of control over Mecca, though a nominal victory in this instance, can be attributed to several factors.439 The Mamlūks possessed a powerful new military, and their victories — including stopping the Mongol invasion — helped them gain the sympathy and support generally of Muslims. In addition, the revival of the Abbāsid Caliphate in Cairo convinced most Muslims that the Mamlūks were actually legitimate representatives of the Islamic Caliphate, more so than the Rasūlids in Yemen and even the Hāfsids in Tunisia.440

Economically, Egypt and Syria, which were under the Mamlūks’

438 Al-Fāṣi, Al-‘Iqd al-Thamīn, vol 2, 152.
439 Irwin, The Middle East in the Middle Ages, 56.
440 Ibid, 43.
domination, had enormous economic power in this period compared with other regional powers such as the Rasūlids. Agriculture, trade and the pilgrimage season, particularly the Egyptian mahmal (the Ḥajj caravans), provided the Ashraf with an annual income that helped them to maintain rule over Mecca. This pushed Sharif Abu Namā to request support for the Mamlūks and reject the Rasūlids because economics were of primary importance in determining the Ashraf’s’ policy towards all political entities. Sultan Baybars made an impressive reputation for himself in the Islamic world and strengthened his power in Egypt by declaring himself the ‘Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’, which led the Mamlūks to hold the khutbah in his name. In addition, Sultan Baybars was also able to assist the Ashraf to gain actual control over Mecca under the Mamlūk Sultanate in Cairo, which led them to accept the Mamlūks’ annual support and continued protection.

It is important to emphasise that the Mamlūks did not intervene directly in the internal conflicts of Ḥijāz, their priority was instead to stabilise the situation in Mecca by pushing out the Rasūlids. Nor did the Mamlūks interfere in internal conflicts among the Ashraf of Mecca, but they instead gave the Ashraf the freedom to choose who became the Sharif of Mecca. In 670 A.H./1271 A.D. there was a military conflict between the Ashraf of Meḍīnah, pitting Sharif Jammāz b. Shiḥā and Sharif Idrīs b. Ḥassan b. Qatāḍa (Amīr of Yanbu’) against Sharif Abu Namā, which ended with the

---

441 Ibn Jubāyr, Rihlat Ibn Jubāyr, 81.
442 Al-Fāṣi, Al-ʻIqd al-Thamīn, vol 2, 151
443 Al-Anqawi, Lexicon of Ashraf Al-Ḥijāz, vol 2, 1162.
victory of Abu Namā. Al-Fāṣi has stated that Sharif Jammāz b. Shiḥā and Sharif Idrīs bin Ḥassan had mounted a military campaign consisting of 250 cavalry and 600 infantry soldiers heading for Mecca; however, this battle also ended with the victory of Abu Namā, who was able to entrench and stabilise his authority in Mecca. These events suggest that the conflict between the Ḥassani Sharif of Mecca and the Hussāynids Sharif of Medīnah was a manifestation of the deteriorating situation in Ḥijāz during the reign of Sultan Baybars, particularly because Sharif Abu Namā probably exploited the political situation of the Mamlūk Sultanate in Egypt and the Levant, in their conflicts with the Mongols and their allies, the Seljuks of Anatolia.

Sultan Baybars’ focus on the conflict with the Mongols could well account for his non-interference policy regarding internal conflicts in Ḥijāz. Al-Fāṣi has asserted that Sharif Abu Namā exploited the war between the Mamlūks and the Mongols, and that Abu Namā’s treatment of the pilgrims was very poor before Baybars’ pilgrimage in 667 A.H./1269 A.D..

4.2.3 The Mamlūks’ policy towards the Ashraf of Ḥijāz after Sultan Baybars

After the reign of Sultan Baybars, the Mamlūks remained preoccupied with their military

---

444 Al-Fāṣi, Al-ʻIqd al-Thamīn, vol 1, 460; Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 1, 604.
445 Al-Fāṣi, Al-ʻIqd al-Thamīn, vol 1, 460.
conflict with the Mongols and their allies, the Seljuks of Anatolia, which gave Sharif Abu Namā the chance to switch his allegiances to the Banū Rasūl in Yemen. The Mamlūks still sought control of Ḥijāz despite the fact that the Sharif of Mecca began holding khutbah in Mecca for the Banū Rasūl in 659 A.H./1261 A.D.. In the process, Abu Namā had begun to cement a political relationship with Sultan Qalāwūn (r. 678–689 A.H./1279–1290 A.D.) and sent his son with a group of Ashraf to visit Sultan Qalāwūn in Cairo, in 681 A.H./1282 A.D.. Ibn Abdul Al-Ẓahir described the grandeur of the reception prepared by Sultan Qalāwūn for the Ashraf and the distribution of gifts, money and clothing, as well as the exchange of salaries for judges and the 'ulamā of Mecca.

Ibn Abdul Al-Ẓahir did not give further details as to why Sultan Qalāwūn gave these lavish gifts to the Ashraf, but it seems most likely that the Mamlūks were aiming to ensure the Ashraf’s’ loyalty and obedience to the Mamlūk Sultan. Al-Khazraji wrote that the Sultan al-Mālik al-Mu'ayyad gave Abu Namā 80,000 dirhams in exchange for declaring his allegiance to the Banū Rasūl. This is significantly larger than the amounts given previously by the Mamlūks to the Ashraf (Sultan Baybars gave Abu Namā 20,000 dirhams). The size of these payments shows us the importance of religious legitimacy, to all the region’s political powers that were competing with each other for control over Mecca. Providing financial support assisted all of these parties in

446 Al-Jazīrī, Al-Durr al-Farā’id, vol 1, 671.
447 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 1, 454.
449 Al-Khazraji, Al-ʿQud al-Lu'Luyah, vol 1, 335.
450 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 1, 579.
imposing their control over Mecca and thus ensuring the loyalty of the Ashraf. The Mamlūks also had a policy of trying to gain the loyalty of the Meccan 'ulamā through annual salaries, which were considered a guarantee of loyalty on the part of the 'ulamā and all people in Mecca to the Mamlūk Sultan. The 'ulamā had a very strong influence over Muslims because they represented religious authority, in addition to giving religious legitimacy to the Sultans through their religious khutbahs and preaching.

However, according to Ibn Abdul Al-Ẓāhir, Sharif Abu Namā did not continue to follow the covenants agreed upon with the Mamlūks: to respect the pilgrims and abolish taxes (Mukās) levied on them. This may provide an explanation for the high-pressure tactics adopted by the Sharif of Mecca in forcing the Mamlūks to send money and other supplies. It became clear that the Ashraf had returned to levying taxes on pilgrims in such circumstances, starting in the time of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn. As a result, in 683 A.H./1282 A.D., Sultan Qalāwūn equipped a military campaign of 300 soldiers, led by Amīr al-Ḥajj 'Alam al-Dīn Sinjīr al-Bashaqrdi, because Abu Namā had begun to impose taxes on the pilgrims. The campaign led to the defeat of Sharif Abu Namā and a reconciliation between him and Amīr al-Ḥajj 'Alam al-Dīn Sinjīr.

Hijāz never attained stability in this period, particularly during the

---

452 Ibn 'Abd al-Ẓāhir, Tashrif al-Ayyām wa al-Sur, 19.
453 'Alam al-Dīn Sinjīr was one of the most important military commanders (Amīrs) in the Mamlūk army. Al-Asimi, Simt al-Nujūm al-Awalī, vol 4, 223; Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulāk, vol 1, 724.
454 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulāk, vol 1, 726.
conflict between the Ashraf of Mecca and of Međīnah, each of whom aspired to control the other’s property and enter into an alliance with the Mamlūks to expand their dominions. Al-Maqřīzī and Ibn Fahd have referred to Sharif Jammāz b. Shiḥā’s request for assistance from Sultan Qalāwūn to fight against Sharif Abu Namā and control Mecca. Jammāz succeeded in his plan: he entered Mecca, held khutbah for the sultan Qalāwūn and issued money in his name.455 Sharif Jammāz was then forced to leave Mecca and return to Međīnah, in late 687 A.H./1288 A.D., because of the correspondence between Abu Namā and Sultan Qalāwūn, which made Sharif Jammaz fear that they would conspire against him. Al-Fāṣi commented that Sultan Qalāwūn helped Sharif Jammāz because Abu Namā broke the covenants, but Sultan Qalāwūn did not actually prefer another Sharif to replace Abu Namā because the Mamlūk Sultanate were convinced by their deputies (especially their deputy in Mecca) that Abu Namā had more obedience and respect for conventions.456

There is no doubt that these incidents provide important information about Sharif Abu Namā’s personality and his method of dealing with the powers that aspired to control Ḥijāz, in particular the Mamlūk Sultanate. Despite the Mamlūks’ military power and their ability to send soldiers to Ḥijāz, Sharif Abu Namā followed his own policies which did not conform to those of the Mamlūks, particularly on the issue of taxing pilgrims (Mukūs). At the same time he did confirm the Mamlūks’ nominal hegemony in Ḥijāz through Sultan Qalāwūn’s policy that aimed to achieve the spiritual

456 Al-Fāṣi, Al-‘Iqd al-Thamīn, vol 2, 155.
benefits conferred by the Ashraf of Mecca. So, we find the title ‘Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’ among the titles of Sultan Qalāwūn, as well as further records illustrating that he called himself the ‘the Sultan of the higher noble house in Mecca’ (*Sultan al-Bayt al-‘Āli al-Sharīf bī al-Makkah*) in a treaty with the king of Aragon in 689 A.H./1290 A.D. 457

After the death of Sharif Abu Namā in 701 A.H./1301 A.D., the situation between his 21 sons was strained in Mecca. 458 The traveller al-Tajībī (d. 730 A.H./1329 A.D.) mentioned that the people of Mecca considered Sharif Rumāytha b. Abu Namā to be the crown prince, but that his brother Humāydah b. Abu Namā disputed with him for the Sharifate. 459 Al-Fāṣi also added that the dispute over the Sharifate of Mecca was not limited to the sons of Abu Namā, but included their cousins from the Ashraf, who also coveted the Sharifate. 460 The most important aspect of these historical events is the policy of the Mamlūks towards the conflict in Mecca and the position of the other regional powers, such as the Mongols in Iraq and Persia, and the Banū Rasūl in Yemen.

After the conflict began between Abu Namā’s sons, the Sharifs of Mecca, and their cousins, the Sharifs of Yanbu’, the historian Badr al-Din al-’Ayni recorded that Sharifs Rumāytha and Humāydah arrested their brothers Sharif Utāyfah and

460 Al-Fāṣi, *Al-‘Iqd al-Thamīn*, vol 1, 421.
Abu al-Gāyth and put them in prison.⁴⁶¹ Rumāytha and Humāydah were afraid of their brothers and wanted to isolate them from the Sharifate of Mecca, particularly because of the support they received from large numbers of Sharifs and slaves in Mecca.⁴⁶² However, Sharif Utāyfah and Abu al-Gāyth managed to flee and take refuge with their cousin, Sharif Idrīs b. Ḥassan b. Qatāda, in Yanbu’. In 701 A.H./1302 A.D., Sultan Baybars al-Jashnakir (r. 708–709 A.H./1308–1309 A.D.) made a pilgrimage to Mecca, met Sharif Utāyfah and Abu al-Gāyth, talked with them about the persecution of their brothers and appealed for help from the Mamlūks.⁴⁶³ Sharif Utāyfah and Humāydah were contacted by Sultan Baybars al-Jashnakir and admonished over their policy towards their brothers, but Utāyfah and Humāydah only responded by demanding that the Mamlūks not interfere in the brothers’ internal affairs.⁴⁶⁴ Sultan Baybars thereafter decided to arrest them and take them to prison in Cairo; he then appointed their brothers, Sharif Utāyfah and Abu al-Gāyth, as Sharifs of Mecca.⁴⁶⁵

These events represented the beginning of the Mamlūks’ direct intervention in Mecca’s internal affairs, as well as an increase in the conflicts between the Ashraf themselves. The Mamlūks supported two of Abu Namā’s sons against two others, which constitutes a much higher level of interference in the internal affairs of Sharif than in previous eras. The internal intervention did not end here, but also included sectarian

---

⁴⁶⁵ Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 1, 927; Al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyāt al-ʿArab, 32–33, 7.
interferences. The Mamlūks ordered the Sharif of Mecca to stop the Shi`īte adhān that contained the phrase ‘the time for the best deed has come’ (Hayya ‘ala al-khāyr al-‘amal).\textsuperscript{466} Sultan Muḥammad b. Sultan Qalāwūn (r. 698–708 A.H./1299–1309 A.D.) sent a letter to Sharif Uāyifah and Abu al-Gāyth in 702 A.H./1303 A.D. to repeal the Shi`īte adhān and prevent Shi`īte Zāydi from praying in the Grand Mosque, and they gave in to his demand.\textsuperscript{467} Further, the Amīr of the Egyptian Hajj, Bargali al-Ashrafi, committed some acts that caused additional unrest, such as removing the wooden stick that the servants of Ka’aba put on the Ka’aba’s wall to give it sanctity and make the pilgrims pay money when they touched it.\textsuperscript{468} Despite all of the Mamlūks’ actions, the situation in Mecca did not improve, leading Sultan Muḥammad b. Sultan Qalāwūn to isolate Sharif ‘Utāyfah and Abu al-Gāyth and reappoint Sharifs Rumāytha and Humāydhah, after releasing them from prison.\textsuperscript{469}

It is clear that the Mamlūks were aiming to stabilise affairs in Mecca by using a policy of direct intervention and also to prevent chaos that could lead to disorder during the pilgrimage. The Mamlūk Sultan was considered the custodian of the two holy mosques on behalf of all Muslims and was therefore responsible for the stability of the pilgrimage, enabling Muslims to perform Ḥajj without any disturbance. Thus, the goal of Sultan Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn and his predecessors in the Mamlūk Sultanate was not to interfere in the internal affairs of Mecca or to rule it directly as another province of the


\textsuperscript{468} Al-Tajibī, \textit{MUSTAFĪD AL-RIHlah}, 265; Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Al-Sulūk}, vol 1, 940.

\textsuperscript{469} Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Al-Sulūk}, vol 1, 948.
Sultanate, nor did they hope to achieve economic benefits from intervention. It is fair to say that they were responsive rather than proactive or expansionist.

However, tensions persisted between the Mamlūks and the Ashraf of Ḥijāz, so Sharif Humāydah stopped holding kḥṭbah for Sultan Muḥammad b. Sultan Qalāwūn and began instead to hold kḥṭbah for the Rasūlids’ Al-Mu‘ayyad Dāwūd (r. 695–722 A.H./1296–1322 A.D.). According to historians Abu al-Fida (d. 732 A.H./1331 A.D.) and Al-Fāṣi, conflicts emerged between Sharif Humāydah and Sharif Rumāytha because Sharif Humāydah became attentive towards the Rasūlids, while Sharif Rumāytha retained his loyalty to the Mamlūks. We do not fully understand the reasons for the conflict between the two brothers, but we may infer from the above events that the Mamlūks became the decision-makers in appointing the Sharīf of Mecca. This affected the independence of the Ashraf of Mecca and introduced a clear interference from an external power that was seeking more than nominal gains in this important region. The Banū Rasūl, like the Mamlūks, also aspired to control Mecca through holding kḥṭbah, and therefore neither political entity actually coveted the annexation of Mecca and Ḥijāz during that period. Sharif Humāydah’s policy was politically preferable for an alliance with the Banū Rasūl, who promoted the stability of Ashraf rule in Mecca, rather than with the Mamlūks, who appointed and deposed the Ashraf, according to their own interests.

470 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 2, 145.
Because of Sharif Humaydah’s policy towards the Mamluks, Sultan Muḥammad b. Sultan Qalāwūn sent a military expedition to Mecca in 716 A.H./1316 A.D. to depose Sharif Humaydah and instead appoint his brother, Sharif Rumaytha, by force. This led to the defeat of Sharif Humaydah, who escaped with some of his followers to the Mongol Ilkhanate in Iraq.\footnote{Al-Nuwāyri, Ṣiyāṣa al-Adab, 32–33, 315.} Sharif Humaydah had been made very welcome by Ilkhan Öljeytu (678–716 A.H./1280–1316 A.D.), who was better known as ‘Khodabandeh’ (after converting from Sunni to Shi’a Islam). Political relations between the Mamluks and the Mongols in this period were particularly troubled, and this prompted Sharif Humaydah to turn to the Mamluks’ enemy.\footnote{Al-‘Aṣr, Al-‘Itq al-Thamīn, vol 4, 238.} In 716 A.H./1316 A.D., Öljeytu, accompanied by Sharif Humaydah, equipped an army of thousands of Mongols and Arabs to march on Mecca; however, Öljeytu died en route and the army dispersed in the middle of the journey. At the same time, Sultan Muḥammad b. Sultan Qalāwūn had also equipped a Mamlūk army to repel the Mongol campaign, but it returned to Cairo because there was no longer a need to fight, especially after the death of Öljeytu.\footnote{Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 2, 147; Abu al-Fida, Al-Mukhtasir, vol 4, 84.} I would assert that had the campaign taken place, this could have substantially altered the configuration of the region’s politics. There might have been a repeat of the battle of Ayn Jalut, but this time fought in Ḥijāz.

In 717 A.H./1317 A.D. Sharif Humaydah finally entered Mecca and
expelled his brother Sharif Rumâytha, taking many reprisals against the Mamlûks. He stopped holding *khutbah* for Sultan Al-Nâsir Muḥammad and instead started holding it for Abu Sa’îd Bahadur Khan, the Ilkhan of the Mongols. In addition, he began to deal severely with the pilgrims and the poor of Mecca; taxes he imposed led to the deterioration of the social and political situations in Mecca, which in turn threatened to escape from the control of the Mamlûks.\(^{475}\) Firstly, Sultan Al-Nâsir Muḥammad sent an army, led by Amîr Bahadur al-Ibrâhîmî, who failed in his mission to arrest Sharif Humâydah, in 718 A.H./1318 A.D.. Next, the Sultan sent another force, led by Amîr Badr al-Dîn al-Turkûmânî,\(^{476}\) who was able to enter Mecca and capture al-Ibrâhîmî because of his failure in his mission, as well as Sharif Rumâytha, who had helped his brother Sharif Humâydah to enter Mecca, despite the opposition of the Mamlûks.\(^{477}\)

Sultan Al-Nâsir Muḥammad b. Qalâwûn gave the rule of Mecca to Sharif ‘Utâyfah b. Abu Namâ, who was a resident of Cairo at the time. In 791 A.H./1319 A.D. Sharif ‘Utâyfah entered Mecca along with a Mamlûk military expedition to assist him consolidate his authority, in addition to the support of Amîr Badr al-Dîn al-Turkûmânî, who then returned to Cairo after the restoration of the political situation in Mecca.\(^{478}\) After stabilising the situation in Mecca, Sultan Al-Nâsir Muḥammad, then travelled to Mecca for a pilgrimage in 719 A.H./1320 A.D.. This journey may have been

---


undertaken for a number of other reasons related to the dominance of the Mamlūks, not only in Mecca but also across the Ḥijāz generally. Al-Maqrīzī stated that the Sultan Al-Nāsir took a pilgrimage one year after the arrival of the first Ilkhanid caravan to Mecca to evict Sharif Humāydhah, who held the khutbah for Il-Khan, Abu Saʿīd Bahadur Khan (r. 705–736 A.H./1305–1335 A.D.) in 718 A.H./1318 A.D. So, Sultan Al-Nāsir’s pilgrimage to Mecca was intended to assert the Mamlūks’ hegemony in Ḥijāz and also to stop the threat of the Mongols to Mecca. It should be noted here that the historian Al-Jazīrī has mentioned that a group of Mongols had come to Mecca to perform the Ḥajj, but they quickly disappeared because they were afraid of being taken captive by the Mamlūks. However, Sultan Al-Nāsir then summoned them, honoured them and gave them guarantee of their safety. However, Al-Jazīrī did not explain how the Mamlūks detected these Mongols on their pilgrimage. In addition, Sultan Al-Nāsir Muḥammad distributed money to the people of Mecca and in particular to the Ashraf of Mecca, who had similarly and previously been given grants and money by Sultan Al-Nāsir.

During the pilgrimage of 719 A.H./1320 A.D., some merchants and ʿulamāʾ requested Sultan Al-Nāsir to leave a Mamlük garrison in Mecca in order to protect them and prevent Sharif Humāydhah from entering Mecca. This information gives us a clear picture of how economic and commercial life in Mecca was being disrupted by the conflicts between the Ashrafs. Aside from this, religious life was also seriously affected by the conflicts and many pilgrims were prevented from entering

480 Al-Jazīrī, Al-Durr al-Farāʾīd, vol 1, 677.
481 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Dahab al-Mashūk, 103.
482 Al-Nuwāyri, Nihāyt al-ʿArab, vol 30, 459.
Mecca to perform Ḥajj. All of this led Sultan Al-Nāṣir to devise an idea that was in accordance with the policy of the Mamlūks, who were seeking to establish their hegemony over Mecca and Ḥijāz. So, when Sultan Al-Nāṣir returned to Cairo, he sent Amīr Sayf al-Dīn Baybars al-Hajib to Mecca leading 100 horsemen. They arrived in Mecca in 720 A.H./1320 A.D.. Amīr Baybars had issued a decree preventing the people of Mecca from carrying weapons in order to maintain security; thus, maintaining security became the self-imposed task of the Mamlūks. 483

4.2.4 The Conflict between the Mamlūks and Ilkhanids to Dominate Ḥijāz

In the same year, 720 A.H./1320 A.D., the Mamlūks and the Ilkhanate reached an important political agreement concerning the pilgrimage caravan, because the two great powers did not see conflict in Ḥijāz as inevitable. The Mamlūks recognized the right of the Ilkhanids to send the pilgrim caravan from Baghdad, provided that the Ilkhanid caravan was accompanied by two Sanjaq (banners), 484 one Sanjaq in the name of the Sultan of Egypt and another on behalf of the Khan of the Mongols of Persia. 485 Sultan Al-Nāṣir ordered the Sharif of Mecca to honour the Iraqi Amīr al-Ḥajj when he entered Mecca to implement the agreement. This agreement was more important in political than religious terms. The Mongols, after converting to Islam, wanted to impose their control on Ḥijāz, even if nominally, and their ally Sharif Humāydah gave them an opportunity to

483 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 2, 203; Al-Fāsi, Al-‘Iqd al-Thamīn, vol 5, 214.
484 Sabaq Halaq, Lexicon of the Ayyūbids (Mamlūk), 120.
do so. But after the assassination of Humāydah, the Mongols realised they might not be able to militarily confront the Mamlūks in Ḥijāz, which prompted them to negotiate and sign an agreement with the Mamlūks. The agreement makes it clear that the Mongols were to officially acknowledge the Mamlūks’ hegemony over Mecca, which in turn gave an important moral sign to the Muslims regarding the Mongols’ converting to Islam. Al-Maqrīzī mentioned that in the same pilgrimage season, 720 A.H./1320 A.D., the ḵuṭbāh was held first in the name of Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, and then of the Il-khan Sultan, Abu Saʿīd Bahadur; this is considered a sign of his approval of Mamlūk hegemony over Mecca.486

After the Mamlūk hegemony over Mecca was established through the Mamlūk-Ilkhanid agreement, another conflict began between the Ashrafs regarding the Sharifate of Mecca. We have seen that the Mamlūks and other powers that controlled Mecca, such as the Ayyūbids and Banū Rasūl, did not intervene directly in the affairs of Mecca, except on certain occasions. The most important objective for these dominant powers was to get nominal recognition from the Ashraf of Mecca and to ensure that ḵuṭbāh would be held for them in the pulpits of the Two Holy Mosques (al-Ḥarāmīn) in Mecca and Međīnah. In 721 A.H./1321 A.D. a dispute began between brothers Sharif ʿUtāyfah and Sharif Rumāythah. ʿUtāyfah managed, in 722 A.H./1321 A.D., to defeat Rumāythah and continue as the Sharif over Mecca.487 However, Sultan Al-Nāṣir resolved the dispute between the two brothers by making them cooperate with each other in ruling

---

Mecca, which they continued to do for many years after.\footnote{488 Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Al-Sulūk}, vol 2, 238; Ibn Fahad, \textit{Ithaf al-Wara'}, vol 3, 176.}

In 726 A.H./1326 A.D., Sultan Al-Nāṣir summoned Sharif Rumāytha to Cairo because of his advocacy of the Zāydi doctrine in Mecca and his attempts to support Zāydi’s Sunni rituals.\footnote{489 Al-Fāṣi, \textit{Al-‘Iqd al-Thamīn}, vol 5, 214.} The traveller Al-Tajībī noted that Sultan Al-Nāṣir sent a message to Sharif ‘Utāyfah in the presence of Sharif Rumāytha in Cairo, ordering him to eliminate the Zāydi shrine from the Grand Mosque in Mecca and to expel the Zāydi Imam from Mecca.\footnote{490 Al-Tajībī, \textit{Mustafād al-Rihlah}, 297.} It is possible that Sharif Uāyifah may have complied with these orders in an attempt to draw closer to Sultan Al-Nāṣir and thereby rule Mecca alone, without his brother Sharif Rumāytha. But Sharif Rumāytha did not remain in Cairo long and he soon returned to Mecca, where the traveller Ibn Baṭṭūta noted that the Sharifate was contested between Sharif ‘Utāyfah and Sharif Rumāytha.\footnote{491 Ibn Baṭṭūta, \textit{Tuhfāt al-Nudār}, 149.} In addition, Ibn Baṭṭūta also mentioned that during the Ḥajj of 726 A.H./1326 A.D., the \textit{khūṭbah} in the Holy Mosque acknowledged Sultan Al-Nāṣir, followed by the Rasūlid King, al-Mujahid Nūr ad-Dīn ’Ali (r. 722–764 A.H./1322–1363 A.D.), the then King of Yemen;\footnote{492 Ibid, 160.} it was not performed for the Ilkhanid Sultan, which was a breach of the agreement between the two parties.

Il-khan Sultan Abu Sa’īd was able to establish friendly relations with Sharif
Aḥmad b. Rumāytha, who stayed in Iraq for some time.\textsuperscript{493} In 729 A.H./1329 A.D., Sharif Aḥmad returned to Mecca along with an Iraqi pilgrimage caravan composed of senior Ilkhanid statesmen. Sharif Aḥmad b. Rumāytha was able to reach the top of Mount Arafat and raise the Ilkhanid banner over the Mamlūk banner.\textsuperscript{494} Sharif Rumāytha was unable to prevent his son Ahmad from doing this, as most of the Ashraf commanders supported Sharif Aḥmad. Sharif Aḥmad thereafter returned to Iraq with the Iraqi pilgrimage caravan at the end of the pilgrimage season and was honoured by Sultan Abu Saʿīd, who by way of reward gave him the Amīrate of Arab tribes in Iraq.\textsuperscript{495}

The Ilkhanids could not hope to receive more than nominal recognition in Mecca because they were relatively recent converts to Islam and lacked religious legitimacy in the eyes of general Muslims. We must take into account the Mamlūks’ motivations for preventing the \textit{khuṭbah} from mentioning the Ilkhanid Sultan in the Holy Mosque in Mecca and also for minimising the importance of the Iraqi pilgrimage caravan. As Patrick Wing has noted, the Ilkhanids’ expansionist policy in Syria and provinces under Mamlūk protection might have pushed the Mamlūks to use their powers in Mecca in preventing the \textit{khuṭbah} from paying homage to the Ilkhanid Empire, and thus stopping the Il-Khan from having his name spoken in the Holy Mosque.\textsuperscript{496} It is also clear to us that the Mamlūks wielded more influence in Mecca than any other power since after the death of Sharif Abu Namā, in 701 A.H./1301 A.D., Sultan Al-Nāsir Muḥammad

\textsuperscript{494} Ibn Batuta, \textit{Tūḥfāt al-Nudār}, 241.
\textsuperscript{495} Al-Fāsi, \textit{Al-‘Iqd al-Thamīn}, vol 3, 24.
worked hard to depose and appoint the various Ashrafs in order to ensure the stability of the situation in Mecca; he sent several expeditions to Mecca to deal with the disturbances that threatened to destabilise the security situation and the city and also weaken Mamlûk control. But the Mamlûks did not quite have undisputed control over Mecca; the Ilkhanids were even able to control Mecca for a short period in 718 A.H./1320 A.D., because of their alliance with Sharif Humâydah b. Abu Namā. It was this power struggle that led to the creation of the eventual Mamlûk-Ilkhanid agreement in 720 A.H./1320 A.D.

The situation soon stabilised in Mecca in 734 A.H./1333 A.D., and relations between Sharif Rumâythâ and the Mamlûks were greatly improved. When Sultan Al-Nâsir Muḥammad undertook the pilgrimage for the third time, in 732 A.H./1332 A.D., Sharif Rumâythâ, along with his army commanders and some of the Ashrafs, travelled to Yanbu’ to receive the Sultan and accompany him on his march to Mecca.\textsuperscript{497} The situation further continued to stabilise in 744 A.H./1343 A.D., when Sharif Rumâythâ waived his right to rule over Mecca in favour of his two sons Thuqba and ‘Ajlan, who in return gave their father 60,000 dirhams.\textsuperscript{498} However, Sharif Rumâythâ then later returned to rule Mecca in the same year, in accordance with the decision of the Mamlûk Sultan, al-Sâliḥ Ismâ’il b. Sultan Al-Nâsir Muḥammad (r. 743–746 A.H./1342–1345 A.D.). Sharif Rumâythâ died later that year.\textsuperscript{499} With Sharif Rumâythâ’s death, a very important era ended in the history of the Mamlûks in Mecca, in which the Mamlûks

\textsuperscript{497} Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Al-Dahab al-Mashūk}, 106.
\textsuperscript{498} Al-Fāṣi, \textit{Al-‘Īqḍ al-Thamīn}, vol 4, 107.
\textsuperscript{499} Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Al-Sulūk}, vol 2, 699.
had managed to take control over Mecca by direct military intervention because of the conflicts between the sons of Sharif Abu Namā on inheritance claims to the Amīrate of Mecca. The Mamlūks did not continue to maintain a military presence in Mecca, but they instead returned to defend it when the situation worsened or the region was exposed to an external threat, as when, for example, the Ilkhanids intervened in Ḥijāz. Overall, and despite the Mamlūks’ influence over Mecca, the Ashraf continued to have great freedom in managing the internal affairs of the Amīrate of Mecca.

In 746 A.H./1345 A.D., Sharif ‘Ajlan b. Rumāytha gained the approval of the Mamlūk Sultan, Sha’ban b. al-Mālik al-Kamil b. Al-Nāsir Muḥammad (r. 746–747 A.H./1345–1346 A.D.) to rule the Amīrate of Mecca after the death of his brother, Sultan al-Sāliḥ Ismā’il.500 There was unrest in Mecca from the beginning of Rumāytha’s son’s rule, to the end of the eighth century A.H./fourteenth century A.D.. In this period, Mamlūk influence over Mecca increased despite the weakness of the Mamlūks in Cairo, because of the young ages of the sultans and the conflicts between the senior Amīrs regarding the right to rule.501

It is clear from the events in 750 A.H./1349 A.D. that rule in Mecca had been shared between Sharif ‘Ajlan and his brother Sharif Thuqba since 748 A.H./1347 A.D., but that ‘Ajlan had the greater influence over Mecca.502 ‘Ajlan’s

---

500 Ibid, vol l2, 678.
501 Ashur, Miṣr wa al-Shām, 201.
502 Al-Fāṣi, Al-‘Iqd al-Thamīn, vol 5, 190.
monopoly in the governance of Mecca was a major cause of conflict between them both; ‘Ajlan also had a larger tax base because of his greater political power. This led to military conflict between Sharifs ‘Ajlan and Thuqba; however, the military leaders of Sharif Thuqba were successfully able to reach a reconciliation with ‘Ajlan and thereby prevent the conflict from spreading further. Yet, despite the reconciliation, conflict between ‘Ajlan and Thuqba continued. According to Al-Maqrīzī, ‘Ajlan travelled to Cairo in the same year and requested Sultan al-Mālik Al-Nāṣir Ḥasan b. King Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, to provide him with a military force to help him control Mecca. But the Mamlūk Sultan refused to do so, allowing Sharif ‘Ajlan only to purchase and use some Mamlūk mercenaries in his war against his brother. ‘Ajlan bought nearly 40 Mamlūks and was joined by many Arab tribesmen; his force ultimately reached 100 horsemen.

Sharif Thuqba also tried to enlist the Mamlūk Sultan as an ally, through a letter sent to him thanking him for help in resolving the differences between him and his brother. However, the Sultan ordered that Sharif ‘Ajlan be granted the sole rule of Mecca at the end of the year 750 A.H./1349 A.D.. ‘Ajlan entered Mecca without any objection from his brother, who left Mecca and headed to Yemen. It is interesting to note that the Mamlūk Sultan did not agree on the division of the Amīrate of Mecca between ‘Ajlan and Thuqba, despite the fact that power sharing could have helped to stabilise the situation. It is only possible to conclude that the Mamlūk Sultan saw that the

---

504 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 2, 746.
506 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 2, 821.
507 Ibid, vol 2, 820.
previous period of power sharing between the Ashrafs led to military conflicts that in turn caused instability in Hijāz. So giving power in Mecca to one ruler may have promoted stability there, thereby solidifying the Mamlūks’ hegemony.

The Mamlūks continued to promote the stability of their power in Mecca by isolating and appointing the Ashrafs, and occasionally playing them against each other in a contradictory fashion; at one point they isolated Thuqba and appointed ‘Ajlan, and at another point they did the opposite. In 752 A.H./1351 A.D. Sharif Thuqba obtained an alliance with Sultan al-Mālik al-Sālīh, who gave him the Amīrate of Mecca alone and isolated ‘Ajlan. According to Al-Fāṣi, Sharif ‘Ajlan refused to hand over Mecca to Sharif Thuqba, who awaited the arrival of the Amīr of the Egyptian caravan at Mecca; however, the Amīr refused to assist Thuqba against ‘Ajlan, in order to preserve the safety of the pilgrims under his charge.508 So the great Egyptian judge ‘Izz al-Dīn b. Jama‘āh (d. 767 A.H./1366 A.D.), who had accompanied the Egyptian caravan to perform the Ḥajj, intervened to resolve the conflict.509 ‘Izz al-Dīn b. Jama‘āh then held talks with Sharif ‘Ajlan, leading ‘Ajlan to accept the principle of the division of the Amīrate between him and his brother. Thuqba was pleased with this suggestion and entered Mecca, handing 70,000 dirhams over to his brother.510 Historians do not mention why Sharif Thuqba paid this amount to the Sharif ‘Ajlan, but it seems to have been compensation to ‘Ajlan as well as a means of demonstrating goodwill in relations between them. It is also noteworthy that the Amīr of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan had begun interfering in resolving

disputes between the Ashrafs because of the presence of the military forces that cooperated with them in the implementation of their mission, whose first goal was to protect Egyptian pilgrims coming to Mecca for the Ḥajj.

By the end of the eighth century A.H./fourteenth century A.D. no political force had approached the region to compete with the Mamlūks for control of Mecca. When the Rasūlid King, al-Mālik al-Ashraf Ismāʿīl b. ’Abbās (r. 779–803 A.H./1377–1400 A.D.) took the initiative to send a Kiswaḥ for the Ka’aba with the Yemeni pilgrimage caravan in 780 A.H./1379 A.D., the Amīr of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan prevented him from entering Mecca.⁵¹¹ He then allowed the Amīr of the Yemeni pilgrimage caravan to enter Mecca and stand on Mount Arafat, but without allowing them to handle the Kiswaḥ of the Ka’aba.⁵¹²

Conditions in Ḥijāz were politically stable until the end of the Bahrī Mamlūk period, but turbulence occurred through the differences between the Ashrafs themselves. It is clear, based on the political relationships of the Bahrī Mamlūk with Ḥijāz that the Mamlūks hoped to maintain economic and spiritual control without military intervention, except on certain occasions. The Ashrafs were therefore able to establish a political balance between the competing forces during that period, despite the support of the Mamlūks for some parties of the Ashrafs in the various conflicts. Some Ashrafs aligned with the Rasūlids of Yemen against the Mamlūks when the latter

⁵¹¹ Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 3, 345.
interfered directly in the affairs of Mecca.

The Rasūlids were content with wielding political power and economic support through the money and supplies that were delivered to Mecca, which some Ashrafs looked forward to receiving instead from the Rasūlids. However, the Rasūlids’ support did not substantially benefit those Ashrafs who were allies of the Banū Rasūl, because it was Mamlūk military intervention that frequently and ultimately settled conflicts, particularly during the reigns of Sultan Qalāwūn and his son, Al-Nāsir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn. At the same time, a new power appeared in the arena of the conflict in Ḥijāz, one that aimed to take control of this important region: the Mongol Ilkhanate, which was based in Persia. The Mongol Khan converted to Islam and, unlike the Rasūlids, the Mongols possessed the potential military power to control Mecca. However, the Mongols failed to control Ḥijāz for internal reasons — most importantly, as previously discussed, the death of Ŭljeitū and the Mamlūks’ support for their allies in Ḥijāz in the defence of Mecca. It is clear that Egypt’s role in Ḥijāz was both politically and militarily the most important. In most periods, Ḥijāz remained under the control of Egypt politically, militarily and – as we shall see - economically.
4.3 Agencies and Mechanisms of Control and Hegemony in Ḥijāz during the Ayyūbid and Baḥrī Mamlūk Eras

Ḥijāz was thus an important province both for the Ayyūbids and for the Mamlūks, who imposed control in certain historical periods that ranged from the nominal to the concrete and substantial. The Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Sultanates’ central plan was to ultimately control Ḥijāz, because of its important meaning for all Muslims due to the existence of Mecca and Me’dinah. Thus, it was required that the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks enhance their rule through a number of means that manifested their legitimacy and ensured their continuing power in both Egypt and Ḥijāz for as long as possible. The Ayyūbids’ policy in Ḥijāz in the reign of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn depended largely on political circumstances in Egypt, as they were facing both the Isma’īli Shi’īte forces and the Franks in the Levant.513 These conditions supported the Ayyūbids amongst the majority Sunnī people, as defenders of Sunnī doctrine and the two Holy Mosques in Ḥijāz; thus, they gained religious and political legitimacy.514

In this section, we will address the most important tools that the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks focussed on throughout their policies towards Ḥijāz. The policies of the Ayyūbid Sultans were in accordance with those of the Mamlūk Sultans in some

ways, but they differed in others; ultimately, all of these policies were designed to serve the interests of the two regimes, and most importantly, to maintain their control over Ḥijāz. Comparison between the policies of the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks gives us a general overview of the circumstances of these regimes, along with the political circumstances in Ḥijāz itself. Thus, in this section, we will examine the Ayyūbids’ and Mamlūks’ support of the Kiswaḥ of Ka’aba in Mecca, schools (madrasas) and ribāṭs, as well as their supports of ’ulamā and jurists. We will also study the amount of money the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Sultanates spent on projects such as Kiswaḥ, schools and ribāṭs and supporting the ’ulamā, though it is unrealistic to hope for a comprehensive view of the expenditure involved. We will examine whether the Sultanates allocated specific revenues to support their projects in Ḥijāz; which sources provided financial funding for these institutions; and those who made it. The attention that the Sultans of the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks paid to preachers and ’ulamā who served their policies in front of the public in Ḥijāz, in turn strengthened their political and religious legitimacy.

4.3.1 The Kiswaḥ

The manufacturing of the Kiswaḥ for Ka’aba was throughout history one of the most important tasks performed by the rulers of Mecca concerning the Sacred House. It imposed on all Muslims the duty to respect and revere the rulers who were responsible; thus, the rulers used it to gain legitimacy. It bestowed on the authority that controlled Mecca, religious legitimacy among Arabs before the advent of Islam and all Muslims
after the advent of Islam. Therefore, the *Kiswaḥ* also gave the ruler political legitimacy and conferred on his ruling the religious nature of the Muslim community (*ūmmah*) as a servant (*Khādim*) of the Ka’aba and Mecca, the holiest city to the Arabs and Muslims. For these reasons, there was always bound to be competition between regional powers to control Mecca and to use this dominance in the implementation of their political, religious and cultural projects.

It is important to stress that even before Islam a relationship existed between political powers and the provision of the *Kiswaḥ*, in part because of the cost involved and in part because of the conspicuous nature of its arrival in Mecca’. Al-Mas’ūdī stated that the first king who presented the *Kiswaḥ* to the Ka’aba was the king of Yemen Tuba’ b. Ḥassan Abu Karb (d. 198 A.H./430 A.D.), who ruled Yemen and Ḥijāz, and that the *Kiswaḥ* was made from Yemeni reed. However, the *Kiswaḥ* stopped being brought from Yemen because of this country’s internal circumstances and the Ethiopian invasion of Yemen. After that, the Prophet Muḥammad’s grandfather Qusāy b. Kilab, who was the ruler of Mecca, imposed taxes on all Arab tribes to support the purchase of the *Kiswaḥ* every year. Abu Rabi‘ā b. Al-Mugirah offered the *Kiswaḥ* to the Ka’aba one year and the tribes of Qur‘āysh the following year; thus, the Arabs gave al-Mugirah the title of Al-‘Adil because he alone paid half the costs of the *Kiswaḥ* with the other half coming from the tribes of the Qur‘āysh. Al-Kharbutli also mentioned that Khālid b.

517 Ibid, 177.
Ja’far b. Kilab was the first man to cover the Ka’aba with brocade before Islam, in addition to Nutaylah the mother of ’Abbās b. ’Abd al-Muṭṭalib, the Prophet’s uncle.⁵¹⁸

After the advent of Islam, Al-Fāṣi and Al-Kharbutli mentioned that the Prophet Muhammad had provided the Kiswa, which was a Yemeni cloth, to the Ka’aba; it continued to be provided during the reign of his successors Abu Bakr, ‘Umar and ‘Uthmān.⁵¹⁹ Al-Qalqashāndī pointed out that Mu’āwiyyah b. Abu Sufyān (r. 41–60 A.H./661–679 A.D.) was the first Umayyad Caliph who sent 10 Kiswa made of Egyptian silk.⁵²⁰ Al-Suyūṭī has mentioned that in the ’Abbāsid era, the third ’Abbāsid Caliph al-Mahdi (r. 158–169 A.H./775–785 A.D.) visited Mecca on a pilgrimage in 160 A.H./776 A.D., and the elders of Mecca asked him to provide the Kiswa for the Ka’aba; he agreed and the Abbāsid Caliphs continued to do so annually.⁵²¹ According to Al-Maqrīzī, in the era of the Mahdi, the following was written on the Kiswa:

‘In the name of God, the Grace of God, this Kiswa was provided by Abu ‘Abdullah Muhammad al-Mahdi, Amir Al-Mu’meneen, and it was made in Tennis, by order of the ruler of Egypt, Muslim b. Khattāb in 159 A.H.’⁵²²

From this brief historical narrative, the importance of the Kiswa

---

⁵¹⁸ Ibid, 179.
⁵¹⁹ Al-Fāṣi, Shifa’ al-Gharam, vol 1, 120; Al-Kharbutli, Tarīkh al-Kā’bah, 176.
⁵²⁰ Al-Qalqashāndī, Subh al-A’Sha, vol 4, 278–79.
⁵²² Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Mawā’id, vol 1, 181.
throughout history is clear and the Ka’aba was considered a Sacred House even before the advent of Islam, despite the presence of idols that were worshipped by the pre-Islamic Arabs. Even when the Arabs were buying Kiswah and imposing taxes for that purpose, the aim was not political as much as it represented the honour and the glory to the donor due to the fact that the Ka’aba is the holiest Sacred House. It seems that the only regional entity before Islam that was seeking political domination over Mecca was the Kingdom of Tuba’ al-Yemeni. The reason for the lack of interest in taking over Mecca by the powers in Iraq, Syria and Egypt was that they did not consider the Ka’aba as a Sacred House as it was to the Yemenis, who believed in Ka’aba and worshipped the idols. In addition, the attempt to impose control over Mecca and the Arabs came in the period leading up to the birth of the Prophet Muḥammad, led by Al-Habasha (‘the Ethiopian’) Christians in Yemen who aimed to demolish the Ka’aba and push the people instead towards making a pilgrimage to the Church of Al-Habasha in Yemen, in order to dominate the Arabs in both political and religious terms.

After the advent of Islam, Ka’aba had become the qibla (direction) to all Muslims and the holy House with the abolition of all worship of idols. Thus, the Ka’aba became the most important way to gain political and religious legitimacy over the other political entities. In the first three centuries of Islam the Ka’aba did not witness competition between the region’s political powers because power was concentrated in a single regime, whether the Umāyyad in Damascus or the Abbāsid in Baghdad. This

523 Al-Mas’udi, Murruj al-Dahāb, vol 2, 76–77.
524 Ibn al-Athīr, Al-Kāmil, vol 1, 342.
525 Qibla is the correct direction for all Muslims to face when they carry out their daily prayers.
continued until the rule of the Fāṭimids and their domination over Ḥijāz and the Ka’aba, and they began to compete with the other Sunnī political powers, particularly the Abbāsid Caliphate. Even after the collapse of the Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad, the Abbāsids in Cairo continued to send the Kiswah to the Ka’aba, except for the occasional conflicts between the Rasūlids and Mamlūks. During the reign of the Umāyyads and Abbāsids, the Kiswah was manufactured in Egypt and then sent to Mecca, and there are several explanations for this. Firstly, it is most probably because Egypt is traditionally famous for cotton and cloth production, as it is to this day. Secondly, it may be because of the strength of the Egyptian economy, which primarily depended on agriculture and the availability of the Nile water, and provided Egypt with a large annual income. Thirdly, Egypt's geographical location and its proximity to Ḥijāz would appear to be the simplest explanation.

In the Ayyūbid period, there is no evidence that the Ayyūbid Sultans sent the Kiswah to the Ka’aba, despite their control of Ḥijāz and their takeover of Egypt’s financial capabilities. In their writings, historians on this period have focussed on the Ayyūbid conflict with the Franks and their internal problems with Ismā’īli Shi‘ā. Furthermore, the Ayyūbids admitted the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate after the fall of the Fāṭimid Caliphate, and the ‘Abbāsids ordered that the Kiswah be made in Egypt and then sent to

526 Al-Maqrīzī, Iti‘ād al-Hunāfa, vol 1, 222.
Mecca; thus, it is natural that historians have attributed this to the ‘Abbāsids. This was also confirmed by the Meccan historian, ’Abd al-Qādir al-Ṭabarî (d. 1070 A.H./1659 A.D.), who stated that the Kiswah [was] sent from Egypt by its endowments, and it was made of black silk [with the following] written on it: ‘There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah’, and written by the sincerity chapter (Sūrat al-Tawhīd), and it was brought to Mecca every year from Egypt, and [was] placed on the Ka’aba on ‘Eid al-Adhā ['The Celebration of the Sacrifice'] after the end of the pilgrimage season.

Therefore, the endowments of the Kiswah were often located in Egypt because of the economic activity and the agriculturally sophisticated society at that time. This is a clear indication that the Ayyūbids were actually sending the Kiswah, but it was attributed to the Abbāsids because Egypt was nominally following them. In addition, Ṣalah ad-Dīn made the endowments for the Ka’aba and Međīnah, as did his successors, but the Kiswah began to be sent from Egypt in the name of the Sultans (Mamlūks) only after the revival of the Abbāsid Caliphate in Cairo. Ṣalah ad-Dīn also created many endowments for al-Ḥarāmīn, as did his successors.

In the Mamlūk period, the political map of the Islamic world had been transformed by the fall of the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad because of the

---

532 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Mawā’id, vol 1, 181.
Mongol attack, which swept through Persia, Iraq and Syria and was stopped only in Galilee, thanks to the victory of the Mamlūks. The Mamlūks began to send the *Kiswa* to Mecca again, but this time in the name of the Mamlūk Sultans, unlike during the Ayyūbid era. Sending the *Kiswa* in the name of the Mamlūk Sultans gave them greater honour and the pious reputation they needed to strengthen their political and religious influence over Muslims. The best example of this strategy was when the Rasūlid King, Muzā'affar Yūsūf, took advantage of the struggle of the Mamlūks with the Mongols in 659 A.H./1260 A.D. and visited Mecca to perform the pilgrimage and gifted the *Kiswa*; that was the last *Kiswa* made outside Egypt during the reign of the Mamlūk Sultans.\(^{533}\)

Sultan Baybars was the first Mamlūk who provided the *Kiswa*, in 661 A.H./1262 A.D., and the Mamlūks continued sending it annually with the Egyptian Ḥajj *maḥmal*.\(^{534}\) The Sultan’s treasury was responsible for *Kiswa* affairs until the reign of Sultan Shihab al-Din Aḥmad b. Al-Nāsir Muḥammad (r. 743 A.H./1342 A.D.).\(^{535}\) In the era of Sultan al-Sāliḥ Ismāʿīl b. Al-Nāsir Muḥammad (r. 743–746 A.H./1342–1345 A.D.), one-third of the income of the village of Pesos was given as an endowment for the *Kiswa*. In 754 A.H./1353 A.D., Sultan al- Sāliḥ Ismāʿīl also used the village of Sordos as an endowment to support the *Kiswa*; the production of this village was more than 7,000 dinars, while 60,000 dirhams were provided from Pesos.\(^{536}\) Sultan Ismāʿīl appointed an official of his treasury as a supervisor for the two villages’ incomes, which


\(^{535}\) Ibid.

provides further evidence of the importance of the *Kiswaḥ* and demonstrates that it was a priority for the Mamlūk Sultans.⁵³⁷

Before the rule of the Ayyūbids and Mamluks, Muslim Caliphs had organised some endowments in Egypt and used them to fund the *Kiswaḥ* manufacture for the Ka’aba. Al-Maqrizī asserts that at the time of the Abbāsid Caliph al-Mahdī, the village of Tennis in Egypt was also made into an endowment for the manufacture of the *Kiswaḥ*.⁵³⁸ In addition, the village of Tuna produced the *Kiswaḥ* during the reign of Abbāsid Caliph Hārūn Ar-Rašīd, but Al-Maqrizī did not mention if this village was actually made an endowment for the *Kiswaḥ* manufacturing or if it was just the place where the *Kiswaḥ* had been made.⁵³⁹ It seems that the historical sources provide no information regarding the names of other villages as endowments of *Kiswaḥ* manufacturing except those mentioned by Al-Maqrizī.

### 4.3.2 The Ayyūbids’ and Mamlūks’ Conflicts with other Powers about the *Kiswaḥ*

As we have mentioned previously, the *Kiswaḥ* had special importance for the Islamic powers that were ambitious to take control over Mecca because the *Kiswaḥ* is an icon and symbol of the control of the Muslim Sultan who protects the Ka’aba. In the Ayyūbids’ period, they did not face competition from any other Muslim powers in controlling Ḥijāz.

---

⁵³⁹ Ibid, vol 1, 181.
However, at the end of the period of the Ayyūbids, conflict broke out between the Ayyūbids and the Rasūlids in Yemen over who ruled Mecca after the fall of the Ayyūbid sultanate in 647 A.H./1249 A.D.. The Rasūlids were able to take control of Mecca because of the preoccupation of Mamlūks with their internal conflicts and the Mongol invasion they faced that threatened their rule.540

In 659 A.H./1261 A.D. the Rasūlid Sultan, Al-Muḍaffar Yūsuf, went on a pilgrimage to Mecca, and Ibn Ḥātim noted that al-Muẓāffar offered the Kiswah for the Ka’aba, washed it inside and out, and a sermon was then held at the Grand Mosque541. Al-Khazraji has mentioned that in 666 A.H./1268 A.D. Sultan Muẓāffar continued to control Mecca during this period and he sent the Kiswah and silver-gilded sheets that weighed 60 lbs. for the Ka’aba.542 Al-Maqrīzī has clearly contradicted what was stated by Ibn Ḥātim; Al-Maqrīzī stated that Sultan Baybars had sent the Kiswah to the Ka’aba in 661 A.H./1261 A.D.. Al-Fāṣi has also noted that King Muẓāffar continued to send the Kiswah to the Ka’aba, but his Kiswah was placed on the Ka’aba after the departure of the Egyptian Ḥajj caravan to Egypt.543 This historical evidence proves the Muslim Sultans’ interest not only in the Kiswah of the Ka’aba, but also in the Kiswah as a tool for establishing religious legitimacy to an authority that intended to impose their control over Mecca.

540 Ibn Khaldūn, Al-‘Ibār, vol 4, 106.
541 Ibn Ḥātim, Simt al-Ghāli Al-Thamīn, 350.
542 Al-Khazraji, Al-‘Qud al-Lu’Luyah, vol 1, 169.
543 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 1, 502.
Sultan Baybars went on a pilgrimage to Mecca in 667 A.H./1269 A.D., where he persuaded Sharif Abu Namā to cancel the taxes for traders and people of Mecca, distributed alms to the poor, offered the Kiswah and also washed the Ka’aba.\footnote{Ibid, vol 1, 579.} It seems that Sultan Baybars wanted, through this journey, to emphasize to the Rasūlids the Mamlūks’ domination of Mecca. However, conflict continued during the Mamlūks’ era over provision of the Kiswah after the death of Sultan Baybars. Ibn Al-Furat (d.807 A.H./1404 A.D.) has stated that Sultan Qalāwūn made Sharif Abu Namā swear in God’s name that he would not accept any Kiswah coming to Mecca from any other Islamic regime and certainly intended that the Rasūlids and Abu Namā should obey his orders.\footnote{Ibn Al-Furat Muḥammad b. Abdul Rahim, Tārīkh al-Duwāl wa al-Mulūk (The History of States and Kings), (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1942), vol 7, 246.}

During the reign of Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn, the Rasūlid King, Al-Mujāhid tried to offer the Kiswah in 733 A.H./1333 A.D. and tried to construct a new door to the Ka’aba, but the Sharif of Mecca refused to accept it because of the Mamlūks’ strong control over Mecca.\footnote{Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 2, 362.} However, King Al-Mujāhid did not stop trying to control Mecca through various tools and devices that gave him domination, such as the Kiswah and attention to the Ka’aba. After the death of Sultan Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad in 741 A.H./1341 A.D., internal conditions disrupted the Mamlūk Sultanate, and King Al-Mujāhid took the opportunity and went on a pilgrimage to Mecca, in 742 A.H./1342 A.D.. King Al-Mujāhid gave the Sharif 40,000 dirhams in addition to gifting the Kiswah to the Ka’aba and distributing various types of perfumes and clothes along with money to
the rest of the Ashraf depending on their marital ranks in Mecca.\footnote{547}{Al-Khazraji, \textit{Al-‘Qud al-Lu’Luyah}, vol 2, 70; Also see Al-Fāṣi, \textit{Al-‘Iqd al-Thamīn}, vol 6, 169.}

During the reign of Sharif ‘Ajlan, he restored loyalty to the Mamlûks’ Sultanate and accepted their control over Mecca. The reason for Sharif ‘Ajlan’s action remains unknown, but it can be explained and traced back to the internal conflict in Mecca between ‘Ajlan and his brother Sharif Thuqba, the sons of Abu Namā.\footnote{548}{Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Al-Sulûk}, vol 2, 321.} Sharif Thuqba was loyal to the Rasûlids, and ‘Ajlan wanted to gain control over Mecca; therefore, ‘Ajlan wanted the support of the Mamlûks, against the Rasûlids, to help him to impose his rule over Mecca, and the Mamlûks’ control of Mecca and to have the \textit{Kiswa}\footnote{549}{Ibid, vol 2, 320.} sent annually from Egypt.\footnote{550}{Ibid, vol 3, 345.}

It seems that no political power competed against the Mamlûks in the eighth century A.H./fourteenth century A.D. to attempt to enforce control of the Amīrate of Mecca, so the Mamlûks, without fear of military threat, prepared a pilgrimage caravan (\textit{mahmal}) annually to Mecca. In addition, when the Rasûlids King Al-Ashraf Ismā’îl initiated the gifting of the \textit{Kiswa} to the Ka’aba with the Yemeni Ḥajj Caravan in 780 A.H./1379 A.D., the Amīr of the Egyptian caravan (\textit{mahmal}) prevented them from entering Mecca.\footnote{550}{Ibid, vol 3, 345.} However, he later allowed them to enter Mecca after the mediation of Sharif Aḥmad b. ‘Ajlan, but the Ka’aba was not covered with the Yemeni \textit{Kiswa}. Through this we can understand the importance of the \textit{Kiswa} in the conflict between
regional powers in trying to control Mecca. Interest in the Ka’aba, both its washing and 
Kiswa manufacturing, was only religious symbolism, which was politically motivated to 
impose and legitimise the Muslim Sultan’s rule. It is confirmed by the Rasūlid-Mamlūk 
conflict that if the Sultans’ goal was related to their interest in the sacred mosque and the 
Ka’aba, they would compromise on the Kiswa through an agreement between them, but 
the Kiswa was a political tool as a means to control Mecca and thereby make the Sultan 
the protector of the Ka’aba and the ‘Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’.

4.3.3 ’Ulamā and Jurists

The ’ulamā and jurists in Ḥijāz had an important role in the Ayyūbids’ and Mamlūks’ 
period, through their association with the political elite and their unique status in mixing 
with the general public. They also had an impact on the course of events through the 
positions they took towards the Sultanates, whether peaceful or non-peaceful. The public 
also took positions towards the Sultans, whether they were supporting or opposing their 
policies, according to the impact of the ’ulamā and the opinions of the scholars.⁵⁵¹ As a 
result, the ruling authorities recognized the importance of winning over the ’ulamā and 
jurists to support the orientations of the various Sultans’ policies.

In the Fāṭimid and Ayyūbid eras, many of the historians who wrote 
about the history of Mecca and visited it, also wrote about the ’ulamā and scholars and

⁵⁵¹ Hussein Abdul Qadir, Al-Rayāl al-ʾAm wa al-Diʾayah (Cairo, Anglo Misriyyah publications, 1997), 7.
their influences on public life during that period. For example, the Egyptian jurists and scholars were the majority who had settled in Ḥijāz in this period, rather than the Iraqis and Moroccans and Yemenis.⁵⁵² We believe that the reason for the large number of Egyptian scholars in Ḥijāz was as a result of the Fāṭimids’ control of Ḥijāz (Shi’ites) and their political and intellectual conflict with the ‘Abbāsids (Ṣunnī), which continued throughout the Ayyūbids’ reign.⁵⁵³ The Fāṭimid Caliphate collapsed in 571 A.H./1171 A.D., but its effect was present in Egypt and Ḥijāz and accounts for the rebellions against Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn in Egypt, for example, the ‘Umar al-Yemeni rebellion against the Ayyūbids.⁵⁵⁴ Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s sectarian policy in Egypt, such as the closure of the al-Azhār mosque and the killing of thousands of Shi’ite Egyptians, confirms the most important aspects of Fāṭimid influence on Egypt, as well as the support of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn for the Ṣunnī ’ulamā and scholars to publish Ṣunnī beliefs in Egypt and Ḥijāz as a cultural, intellectual and doctrinal war against Shi’īsm. This is perhaps to be expected; the Fāṭimid Caliphate lasted more than two centuries, and thus the impact of its religious, intellectual and cultural policies was deep-rooted, indeed some of them continue to this day, such as the festivals of the birthday of the Prophet and his descendants.⁵⁵⁵ This was in addition to the geographical proximity of Egypt to Ḥijāz, which made Ḥijāz become dependent on Egypt economically and the nominal subordination to the rulers of Egypt politically.

On the other hand, the Ayyūbids, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn and his successors,

⁵⁵² Al-Fāṣi, Al-‘Iqd al-Thamīn, vol 2, 101; Ibn Batuta, Tuhft al-Nudār, 45.
⁵⁵⁴ Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol 10, 19
⁵⁵⁵ Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Maw‘īd, vol 1, 446.
followed a sectarian policy towards the Shi’ā. Therefore, they encouraged the migration of a large number of Sunnī ’ulamā and scholars to Ḥijāz, and prior to that, they had stepped up their activity in Egypt, which was dominated by the Ismā’īli Shi’ā.\footnote{Ibid, vol 10, 32.} One feature of this policy was the closure for the duration of the Ayyūbid era of the Al-Azhār mosque in Cairo, which was founded by the Fāṭimids as a knowledge institute for Shi’ites and other Islamic doctrines.\footnote{Ibn al-Athīr, \textit{al-Kāmil}, vol 10, 19.} The Ayyūbid Sultanate encouraged the Sunnī ’ulamā to teach Sunnī jurisprudence, so there developed a kind of cultural exchange between Ḥijāz and Egypt. Al-Fāṣi mentioned the names of many Egyptian scholars who had taught in Ḥijāz, and Ḥijāzian scholars who taught in Egypt.\footnote{Al-Fāṣi, \textit{Al-‘Iqd al-Thamīn}, vol 2, 266.}

One example was Sheikh Abu al-Faṭḥ Muḥammad b. Abu Talha, who came to Egypt from Ḥijāz and studied in both Cairo and Alexandria and then returned to Mecca and was the Imām of the Hanbalī school in Mecca until his death in 590 A.H./1193 A.D..\footnote{Ibid, Al-Fāṣi\textit{Al-Thamīn}, vol 1, 132.} In addition, Sheikh Ibn al-Hubāb al-Mālikī was born in Mecca and came to Cairo before studying in Alexandria and then returning to Mecca to oversee the judiciary until his death in 605 A.H./1208 A.D..\footnote{Ibid, vol 2, 122.} The well-known Ḥijāzian, Sheikh Qutb al-Dīn Al-Qastalānī, was one of the most prominent scholars in Ḥijāz, who taught at Al-Arsūfī School. He moved to Egypt to teach and then returned to Mecca, where he was appointed as the senior judge in 645 A.H./1247 A.D., until his death in 686 A.H./1287 A.D.
Sheikh Sidūq b. Qur‘aysh came to Egypt to study in the era of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn and then returned to Mecca and took over teaching the Ḥanafī jurisprudence in Al-Zinjābīlī madrasa.  

On the other hand, the Ayyūbids also encouraged Egyptian scholars to migrate and teach in Mecca. It would appear that their motivation was to fight Shi‘ite ideology by supporting Sunnī scholars and preventing Shi‘ites from playing the same role in teaching their beliefs. For example, Sheikh ’Abdullah b. Yūsūf al-Tamīmī was born in Alexandria, followed the Malikī school and moved to Mecca, where he taught the Fiqh (jurisprudence) until his death in 623 A.H./1226 A.D.. Similarly, Sheikh Abu al-Qāsim ’Ali b. ’Abdul Wahāb founded a ribāṭ in Mecca and made it an endowment for the poor. He also taught Ḥadīth until his death in Mecca in 624 A.H./1226 A.D.. In addition, Sheikh ’Abdul al-Mu’tī b. Mahmūd al-Malikī, one of the senior religious scholars in Alexandria, moved to Mecca and taught jurisprudence there until his death in 638 A.H./1240 A.D..  

During the Mamlūks’ era, political circumstances changed with the fall of the ’Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad and the Mongols’ attack on the Islamic lands. The Mamlūks played an important role in resisting the Mongols and revitalising the ’Abbāsid Caliphate in Cairo, which in turn supported their legitimacy. Thus, the

561 Ibid, vol 5, 321.  
562 Ibid, vol 5, 403.  
563 Ibid, vol 1, 490.  
564 Ibid, vol 6, 204.  
565 Ibid, vol 5, 480.  
566 Al-Nuwāyrī, Nihāyat al-Arab, vol 30, 14.
‘ulamā and scholars supported the legitimacy of the Mamlūks, despite the Mamluks’ lack of their compliance to the conditions that should apply to a Muslim ruler, because their political influence had more prominence and appeal than the rigid rules of religious texts.

The fact that Ḥijāz was affiliated with Egypt in the Mamlūk era led to the decision, marsum, to appoint and dismiss the judges issued by the Mamlūk Sultans in Cairo directly. The new judge was unable to practise his duties until reading the official marsum of his appointment in the Grand Mosque of Mecca, in the presence of Ashraf and ’ulamā. Further, because of the toleration policy of the Islamic Sunnī sects followed by the Mamlūks, Sultan Baybars appointed judges of all Islamic sects except the Shi‘ites in Egypt in 663 A.H./1264 A.D. Sultan Baybars found that the judge of the al-Shafī‘ī sect, the official sect of the Mamlūks, did not admit the other Islamic Sunnī doctrines. This system was delayed in Mecca until 806 A.H./1403 A.D., and judges in Mecca from all other Sunnī sects were absent before this date. This could also be interpreted as indicating that the Ashraf of Mecca followed the Zāydi Shi‘ā doctrine, and many of the Meccan people did also, despite the presence of the Sunnī Shafī‘ī followers, the official sect of the Sultans in Egypt. As mentioned previously, the judge had a prominent place in Mecca, as he was second to the Sharīf of Mecca, if not equal to him, and his appointment by a Sultan’s marsum made him directly subordinate,

569 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 1, 349; Al-Tabarī, Al-‘Irīf al-Maṣḥī, 84.
administratively, to the Sultan in Egypt.

On the other hand, Al-Fāṣi noted that judge Kamāl al-Dīn Abul Fādl al-Nuwāyṛī had a high position among the Meccans; at the same time, the Rasūlid Sultan Ashraf Isma‘īl appointed him as administrator of the Rasūlid schools in Mecca, such as al-Mansūrīyyah and al-Afdhalīyyah.572 In spite of al-Nuwāyṛī dealing with Rasūlids, the Mamlūk Sultan could not relieve him of his position because of his high religious and social status in Mecca.573 This demonstrates how ‘ulamā could be more powerful, in some cases, than even the Sultans. In addition, many scholars were famous and received support from the Mamlūk Sultanate in Ḥijāz, such as Sheikh Aḥmad b. Ibrāhīm Al-Ṭabarī, who was from a famous family in Mecca and took over the judiciary. Al-Ṭabarī was taught Ḥadīth in Al-Mujāhdiyyah madrasa and succeeded his father in the imāmate of the prayer in the Sacred Mosque till his death in 750 A.H./1349 A.D..574 Moreover, Sheikh Aḥmad b. Ali Al-Ḥanafī was the imām of the Ḥanafī school in Mecca and he taught at the madrasas of Al-Zinjābilī and Aragun until his death in 763 A.H./1361 A.D. in Mecca.575

4.3.4 Schools (Madrasas) (see fig. 1)

Madrasas are considered a new foundation that did not exist in the period of the Prophet and his contemporaneous adherents. Al-Maqrīzī has noted in al-Khitat that ‘a madrasa

572 Kamal al-Dīn al-Nuwāyṛī was a famous Shaf‘i jurist and the jurist of Mecca (d.786 A.H./1384 A.D.). Al-Fāṣi, Al-‘Iqd al-Thamīn, vol 1, 300-3; Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 3, 22.
is a new foundation that has been established in Islam and it did not exist in the period of the Prophet Muḥammad and his adherents until the fourth century A.H. (tenth century A.D.) and the first madrasa was established in Nishapūr by the famous Sunnī Ḥadīth scholar Al-Bayhāqi (d. 458 A.H./1066 A.D.). Madrasas committed to teaching theology and jurisprudence spread throughout Mecca during the Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad. The madrasas that were in Mecca during the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk periods were considered a meeting place for the adherents of the Islamic madrasas teaching fiqh, Ḥadīth and Qurʾān knowledge; each madrasa was mostly concerned with the teaching of a particular doctrine. It is striking that most of the founders of these madrasas were not originally Meccans, which may be due to the intense competition between the followers of Islamic sects in the establishment of madrasas that publish the corpus of jurisprudence of their doctrine. This confirms that Mecca was the most important city for Muslims, and that the founders of the madrasas were seeking to spread their doctrine in Meccan society in order to serve their political and religious policies. In addition to the teaching of religious knowledge, the objective of the madrasas was to impose cultural domination on the people by changing their religious beliefs, particularly in Egypt and Ḥijāz, under the Fāṭimid Shiʿā Caliphate. This occurred along with the establishment of madrasas with the aim of political control, such as those established by the Rasūlids in Mecca with permanent endowments to support them, as Mecca was the centre of the Rasūlid–Mamlūk rulership conflict.

580 Al-Fāṣī, Al-ʾIqd al-Thamīn, vol 6, 222.
The modus operandi of the schools adhered to a system of delegated tasks and responsibilities. The most important post in each school was the jurist, who received knowledge and religious approval from the ’ulamā. The most important tasks of the Sheikhs were to: monitor the teachers’ affairs, appoint teachers, determine the number of students in the class, and supervise the endowment of the school.\textsuperscript{581} The second most important post was that of the teacher; their primary task was to teach jurisprudence after receiving the certificate of teaching from the senior scholars and Sheikhs.\textsuperscript{582} The third post was that of the teaching assistant, who repeated to the students the lesson that had been given by the Sheikh or the teacher, to ensure that the students had a good understanding of the lesson.\textsuperscript{583} The fourth position was the reader, who assisted the teacher in reading from a book and further explaining the teacher’s lesson. The fifth position was al-Khazin, who was responsible for the library in the madrasa.

\textit{Madrasas} played a major role in the Fāṭimid Caliphate in Egypt, which had the main goal of spreading Shi’ā Ismā’īlī doctrine. Before the establishment of the Fāṭimid dynasty in Egypt, the Sunnī doctrines al-Malikī and al-Shafī’ī were the prevalent sects among the Egyptians. After the transfer of the Fāṭimids from Tunisia to Egypt, they attempted to change the doctrine of Egyptians from Sunnī to Shi’ite Ismā’īli by the establishment of \textit{madrasas} and supporting the ’ulamā.\textsuperscript{584} Al-Maqrīzī reports that they

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{581} Al-Sakhāwī, \textit{Al-Daw’ al-Lāmi’}, vol 5, 93.
\textsuperscript{582} Al-Fāṣi, \textit{Al-’Iqd al-Thamīn}, vol 2, 350.
\textsuperscript{583} Al-Fāṣi, \textit{Al-’Iqd al-Thamīn}, vol 2, 350; See also Al-Qalqashandi, \textit{Subh al-’A’sha}, vol 5, 436.
\textsuperscript{584} Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Al-Mawā’id}, vol 2, 340.
\end{footnotesize}
also used intimidation in spreading their doctrine; he stated that in 381 A.H./991 A.D. the Fāṭimids hit a man because he was carrying the book *Al-Muwatta* of Malik b. Anas, the founder of Malikī school.\(^{585}\) However, the teaching of Sunnī doctrines did not stop in Egypt, and in 525 A.H./1130 A.D. the Fāṭimids appointed two judges from Twelver Shiʿites and Ismāʿīli Shiʿites, and two judges from Sunnī, one of the Malikī and the other from Shafiʿī.\(^{586}\) When Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn came to Egypt and established his rule there, he cancelled the Shiʿa laws and replaced them with Sunnī laws and then pledged allegiance to the Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad. In addition, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn established a school for the Shafiʿī sect and another one for the Malikī sect, both of which appear to have contributed to the disappearance of the Shiʿites in Cairo.\(^{587}\)

In Ḥijāz, the Sunnī sects were dominant during the Abbāsid’s hegemony over the region before the establishment of the Fāṭimid dynasty and their control of Ḥijāz. But after the Fāṭimids’ control, the Hasanid Ashraf of Mecca followed the Zāydi Shi’a.\(^{588}\) The traveller Ibn Jubāyir mentioned during his journey to Ḥijāz that the sacred mosque in Mecca had four imāms of the Sunnī schools and the fifth imām was from the Zāydi Shiʿa and the rulers of Mecca followed the Zāydi sect.\(^{589}\) Ibn Taghri Bardi also noted that the ruler of Mecca (Sharif) was a Shiʿite rejecter and malignant, which may be the reason that the Shiʿites refused to acknowledge some of the Prophet’s


\(^{586}\) Ibid, vol 2, 343.

\(^{587}\) Ibid, vol 2, 343.


\(^{589}\) Ibn Jubāyir, *Rihlat Ibn Jubāyir*, 78.
Occasionally disputes between the rival sects caused actual bloodshed in Mecca. Ibn Fahd also noted that in 472 A.H./1079 A.D. a conflict occurred between Sunnīs and Shiʿites in Mecca, causing the Sharif of Mecca, Muḥammad b. Jaʿfar, to kill two of the Sunnī imāms, Abu al-Fādhl b. Qawām and Abu Muḥammad Al-Anmātī. In 607 A.H./1210 A.D. the Sharif of Mecca, Qatāda b. Idrīsī Bam, killed the imām of the Sunnī Ḥanafī sect and the imām of the Malikī in Mecca.

During the Ayyūbids’ hegemony over Ḥijāz, they appointed the senior imāms of the sacred mosque in Mecca from the Shafiʿī school, and they also provided the preachers in the Friday prayer ‘Jumā’.

The Ayyūbids were interested in the establishment of madrasas that would have a role in spreading Sunnī theology in the Ḥijāz, such as Al-Arsūfī, Al-Zinjābīlī and Tab al-Zamān al-Habashīyyah madrasas. The Ayyūbids also enlisted the contributions of donors, followers of the Sunnī sect, to initiate these projects, such as the Kiswaḥ manufacturing and the establishment of madrasas and ribāts in addition to supporting the ’ulamā. The Ayyūbids supported these madrasas financially in addition to showing their respect for the ’ulamā. However, the preoccupation of the Ayyūbids, particularly in Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn and his brother Al-ʿAdil’s era, and their conflicts with the Franks meant that most of these madrasas were founded by people who did not actually follow the Ayyūbids’ administration, but who instead belonged to the Sunnī sect, which did not interfere with the Ayyūbids’ religious projects.

591 Ibn Fahad, Ihāf al-Wara’, vol 2, 480.
592 Al-Fāṣi, Al-ʿIqd al-Thamīn, vol 7, 47
593 Ibn Jubāyr, Riḥlat Ibn Jubāyr, 78.
In 579 A.H./1183 A.D., the Al-Zinjābīlī school was established in Mecca by Amīr Fākhīr al-Dīn Uthmān Al-Zinjābīlī, the deputy ruler in Aden for Sultan Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn. The *madrasa* was dedicated to the teaching of Sunnī Ḥanafī jurisprudence, and it was located in front of the gate of Ḫumraḥ, at the gates of the Sacred Mosque and next to the Al-Zinjābīlī ribāṭ. Many Ḥanafī jurists taught Sunnī Ḥanafī jurisprudence at the *madrasa*, such as Sidīq b. Yūsuf, one of the Ḥanafī scholars from Egypt, who migrated to Mecca during the reign of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn to teach the Sunnī Ḥanafī doctrine. In addition, Al-Sakhawī noted that many Sheikhs taught at this *madrasa*, such as Sheikh Ḥūsain b. Ahmad b. Nāṣir Al-Badr, who was the official representing *madrasa* endowments in Aden. The Al-Zinjābīlī owned large agricultural lands and shops in Aden and used them as endowments to support the school in Mecca. It is important to note here that the historian Ibn Duhāyrah stated that the school was established in 620 A.H./1223 A.D.; however, Al-Fāṣi confirmed that Ibn Duhāyrah died before 620 A.H./1223 A.D., which means the first date is likely to be more accurate.

The historian Ibn Fahad reported a school that was founded through the support of Tab al-Zamān al-Habashīyyah, the mistress of the Abbāsid Caliph Al-

---

Muṣtadi, in 580 A.H./1183 A.D..\textsuperscript{600} The school taught Shafi‘i jurisprudence and was located in the southwest of Dār Zūbāydaḥ (House of Zūbāydaḥ).\textsuperscript{601} Historians did not mention the names of the Sheikhs who taught in the school, but it is likely that the school taught Shafi‘i jurisprudence, similar to what the Shafi‘i Sheikhs in other schools were teaching.\textsuperscript{602} Al-Fāṣi pointed out that the Al-Arsūfī school was the first Ayyūbid school in Mecca, and it was founded in 591 A.H./1194 A.D. by ’Abdullah b. Muḥammad ’Afīf Al-Arsūfī.\textsuperscript{603} The school was located in the northwest corner of the Sacred Mosque near the gate of 'Umraḥ.\textsuperscript{604} Many Sheikhs taught there, such as Sheikh Nāṣir b. ’Abdullah Al-Maṣri, who was Sunnī Shafi‘i, as the school taught the jurisprudence of the Shafi‘i doctrine.\textsuperscript{605}

In addition, the Rasūlid king Al-Muẓaffar, the King of Yemen, established the al-Muẓaffarīyyaḥ school, in 645 A.H./1247 A.D..\textsuperscript{606} The madrasa was located at the exit gate of 'Umraḥ at the Sacred Mosque, and inside the school there was a water well. Ibn Baṭṭūta mentioned that he resided in, and studied at, this madrasa during his journey.\textsuperscript{607} The historians and travellers did not mention the particular doctrine taught at this school, but we believe that Sunnī Malikī jurisprudence was taught, as Ibn Baṭṭūta was a Malikī who studied at the school for a short period.\textsuperscript{608} Thus, we note that people

\textsuperscript{600} Ibn Fahad, \textit{Ithaf al-Wara‘}, vol 2, 553; Al-Fāṣi, \textit{Al-‘Iqd al-Thamīn}, vol 1, 117.
\textsuperscript{601} Al-Fāṣi, \textit{Al-‘Iqd al-Thamīn}, vol 1, 117.
\textsuperscript{602} Ibn Fahad, \textit{Ithaf al-Wara‘}, vol 2, 553.
\textsuperscript{603} Al-Fāṣi, \textit{Shifa’al-Gharam}, vol 1, 27.
\textsuperscript{604} Ibn Fahad, \textit{Ithaf al-Wara‘}, vol 2, 561.
\textsuperscript{605} Al-Fāṣi, \textit{Al-‘Iqd al-Thamīn}, vol 7, 316.
\textsuperscript{606} Al-Fāṣi, \textit{Shifa’al-Gharam}, vol 1, 330.
\textsuperscript{608} Hussein Mu’nis, \textit{Ibn Baṭṭūta wa al- Rihlatiḥū} (Alexandria, Dar al-Ma’arif publications, 2003), 17.
who did not belong politically to the Ayyūbid Sultanate established most madrasas; we can infer that the Ayyūbids had to concentrate on their political and military conflicts with the Franks. The Ayyūbids did not oppose the contribution of dignitaries and traders of the Abbāsid Caliphate or Yemen, or even from the people of Mecca, in building madrasas, provided they were Sunnī, to help in the implementation of their religious sectarian project.

After the collapse of the Ayyūbid Sultanate, the Mamlūks required the stability of their political regime, particularly in the face of great threats that could possibly lead to the termination of their rule in its infancy, including the Mongol threat and conflicts with the Franks in the Levant, as well as the competition with the Rasūlıds in Yemen over the control of Mecca. In addition, the Mamlūks had a more pressing need than the Ayyūbids had to enhance their religious legitimacy as Muslim rulers. Therefore, the establishment of madrasas and the financial support of the ’ulamā and jurists, made the Mamlūks major patrons of science and scientists, who in turn would support the Sultans’ policies in the general public domain.

In 720 A.H./1320 A.D., Amīr Argun al-Nāsiri built the madrasa that carries his name, during his journey to Mecca to perform the Ḥajj, and it was also named by the travellers the Dār al-’Ajālaḥ madrasa. The school was located to the left of the Grand Mosque and followed the Sunnī Ḥanafī doctrine; the Amīr also appointed a Ḥanafī

judge from Cairo. At the time, Islamic madrasas taught the Qur’ān and Arabic script, and students memorised the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth. The madrasa fell into ruin due to a lack of maintenance, especially after the sons of Sharif Rājīḥ b. Abū Namā took over. Many famous teachers taught at the madrasa, including Sheikh Yūsūf b. Al-Ḥassan al-Ḥanafī. The Imām of the Ḥanafī followers in Mecca taught at the madrasa until his death in 761 A.H./1359 A.D.

In addition, the Al-Mujāhidīyya madrasa was founded by the Rasūlid king Ali b. Dāwūd, who was nicknamed Al-Mujāhid, in 739 A.H./1338 A.D., and it was located to the south of the Sacred Mosque. Sultan ’Ali created the madrasa as an endowment, to teach Shafi‘ī jurisprudence, which was the Rasūlids’ doctrine in Yemen. Many Shafi‘ī jurists taught at the madrasa, such as Sheikh Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Ṭabarī, Sheikh Jamāl al-Dīn b. Duhāyraḥ al-Makhzūmī and Sheikh Aḥmad b. Muḥammad Al-Nuwāyri.

The Rasūlids were also very interested in the establishment of the madrasa, as the Rasūlid King Al-Afżal b. Al-Mujāhid established this madrasa in 770 A.H./1368 A.D. and taught Shafi‘ī jurisprudence there. The madrasa was located on the eastern side of

---

610 Al-Fāši, Shīfa’ al-Gharam, vol 1, 523.
611 Adam Sabra, Poverty and Charity in Medieval Islam: Mamlūk Egypt, 1250–1517 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), 81.
612 Al-Fāši, Al-‘Iqd Al-Thamīn, vol 1, 283.
615 Al-Fāši, Shīfa’al-Gharam, vol 1, 524.
616 Al-Fāši, Al-‘Iqd Al-Thamīn, vol 3, 141.
617 Ba-Makhirmah, Tārīkh al-Thāqīr al-Adān, 139.
the Sacred Mosque in front of the Ka’aba gate. The madrasa had many jurists who taught there, such as Sheikh Kamāl al-Dīn Abu Al-Fāḍl al-Nuwāyrī and Sheikh ‘Izz al-Dīn Nuwāyrī.

The Ashraf did not have a major role in the establishment of madrasas in the Ayyūbid era because of their internal conflicts, which did not provide them with the opportunity to involve themselves in the cultural affairs of Mecca, and also because of the sectarian policy of the Ayyūbids that aimed to eradicate the Shi’ite doctrinal influences, held by the Ashraf who were Zāydi Shi’ites. In the Mamlūk era and after the establishment of many Sunnī madrasas, Sharif ‘Ajlan b. Rumāytha established a school in Mecca to teach Zāydi jurisprudence, in 744 A.H./1343 A.D.. Al-Fāṣi reported that the madrasa was located beside the south gate of the Sacred Mosque and was called the Gate of Sharif ‘Ajlan madrasa. Ibn Tagri Bardi mentioned the following in the history of ‘Ajlan when he died: ‘He (‘Ajlan) was a wise man and artful, and had a knowledge of political matters, and he loved the Sunnīs, unlike his fathers and forefathers, who support the Shi’ites’. This shows the difference between ‘Ajlan and his family, which is considered rare for the Ashraf, who mostly belonged to the Zāydi Shi’ites. This indicates that Sharif ‘Ajlan was the first ruler of Mecca for some time to sympathise with the Sunnī people, but the madrasa was Zāydi, and this theological reorientation may have been politically motivated, rather than based on any genuine

620 Al-Fāṣi, Shifa’ al-Gharam, vol 1, 383.
621 Ibid, vol 1, 383.
622 Ibn Tagri Bardi, Al-Nujūm Al-Zāḥiraḥ, vol 11, 139.
religious belief.

On the other hand, the Muslim kings of India were among the greatest supporters of the establishment of *madrasas* in Mecca during the Mamlūk era. King Gıyath al-Dīn Mansūr b. Muẓaffar, the King of Bengal, established the Al-Giyāṭīyyah school in 813 A.H./1410 A.D. The king originally bought two houses next to the Sacred Mosque, on the Yemeni side of the Ka’aba, demolished them and built the *madrasa* on this ground. The *madrasa* taught all the Sunnī doctrines, including the Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shafi’ī and Hanbalī, and it contained student accommodation. King Ghiyath al-Dīn appointed four teachers at the *madrasa*. The teaching of Sunnī jurisprudence in the school was evidence that King Giyāṭh al-Dīn Mansūr did not intend to set up this *madrasa* for any political or ideological reasons and this was largely due to the geographical distance and the absence of any ambition on the part of the Muslim kings of India to take control of or exert their influence in Mecca.

It is clear that the interests of the kings and Sultans in the establishment of *madrasas* in Mecca included serving their policies. However, there was a difference in the implementation of policies due to the political circumstances experienced by the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks. The Ayyūbids had a strong interest in the dissemination of Sunnī doctrine in any way possible, whether through the establishment of these *madrasas* by themselves or through other charitable parties. In the Mamlūk era,

---

the struggle between regional powers is clear, particularly between the Rasūlids and the Mamlūks in the establishment of madrasas for the control of the city of Mecca and the region of Ḥijāz. In addition, the Ashrafs did not have a major role in supporting schools and their establishment in the Ayyūbid period, perhaps because the Ayyūbids’ openly religious-sectarian policy inhibited them. However, they did found a madrasa in the Mamlūk era to spread their doctrine, particularly after the establishment of many Sunnī madrasas in Mecca, which may have forced them to change their Shi‘ī beliefs in the future.

4.3.5 Ribāṭ

In the Arabic language the term ribāṭ refers to a fort located on a coast, on a river or in a desert, usually at the outpost of a particular ruler’s dominion; the purpose behind its creation is to house fighters and defenders of the Islamic state.625 The term shifted to mean housing for the poor, students and followers of Sufism.626 It is difficult to determine when the ribāṭ appeared in Mecca, but the historical sources do not refer to them until the fourth century A.H./tenth century A.D.. In the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk eras, the ribāṭ were different in terms of the objectives of their establishment; some provided accommodation for all Muslims of different ethnicities and doctrines, some were specific to Sufism and some were specific to a particular theological doctrine or jurisprudential school. A man called ‘Sheikh al-Ribāṭ’, who was responsible for the alms and food distribution to the

---

residents of the ribāṭ, usually poor and needy students, supervised the ribāṭ.627

The ribāṭ in Mecca played a significant role during the pilgrimage season, as pilgrims stayed there during the Ḥajj.628 They also had an important relationship with students and immigrants to Mecca who intended to reside there for a longer period of time. Thus the ribāṭ provided visitors with amenities, accommodation, food and drink; they were a place for the poor and immigrants of all ethnicities and origins.629 In addition, the ribāṭ had a major role in the knowledge and cultural life of Mecca during the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk eras. Al-Fāṣi has mentioned that some of the ribāṭs in Mecca provided accommodation for their guests for periods of up to three years, such as ribāṭ Al-Arsūfī. It gave the opportunity for scholars and students to stay in Mecca; most guests of the ribāṭ were attending schools in Mecca that taught jurisprudence and religious knowledge.630 In addition, some ribāṭs held lessons in jurisprudence, such as ribāṭ Rabī’.631

The ribāṭs also had a considerable social influence in Mecca for the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks, as most of their residents were expatriates from Egypt, Levant, India, Morocco, Yemen and Iraq and they were also scholars, Sufis, traders or poor people. There is no doubt that the gathering of these people in one place, despite the

---
628 Al-Fāṣi, Al-‘Iqd Al-Thamīn, vol 1, 120.
629 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Mawā’id, vol 2, 427.
630 Al-Fāṣi, Shifa’al-Gharam, vol 1, 536.
631 Ibn Fahd, Ihaf al-Wara’, vol 2, 564; See Al-Fāṣi, Al-‘Iqd Al-Thamīn, vol 1, 121.
differences in their origins and accents and languages, had a significant impact on Mecca’s social and cultural life. The ribāṭs influenced Meccan society, which was affected by the diversity of the customs, traditions, costumes and the many different foods found in Mecca. Thus, Meccan society became unusually diverse from all these ethnicities; some of them lived and settled in Mecca permanently.

There were differences between the Ayyūbids’ and Mamlūks’ policies regarding the ribāṭs’ foundations because of political circumstances largely linked to control and influence. Amīr Qaymaz b. ’Abdullah, the Sultan of the Rum Seljuks, established a ribāṭ in 578 A.H./1182 A.D., which was located at the top of the mountains of Mecca near the Majzarah ground. Sultan Qaymaz intended the ribāṭ to be an endowment for the poor and visitors to Mecca who could not find housing, and he made it especially for the Sunnī Ḥanafī followers.632 The most important person who stayed in this ribāṭ was Sheikh Ibn Ayān al-Gazal al-Miṣrī, in 841 A.H./1437 A.D..633 The historian Ibn Fahad has stated that Amīr ‘Ali b. ’Uthmān Al-Zinzāḫīlī, the Deputy of Sultan Șalāḫ ad-Dīn in Aden, established a ribāṭ in 579 A.H./1183 A.D..634 The ribāṭ was located next to the Al-Zinzāḫīlī school at the ’Umrah gate at the Sacred Mosque.635 The historian Ibn Fahad mentioned that the ribāṭ was made as an endowment for the Sunnī Ḥanafī, it was inhabited by Ḥanafī Indians in the Mamlūk era and it was known as the

634 Ibid, vol 4, 548.
635 Ibn Tagri Bardi, Al-Nujūm Al-Zāhīrah, vol 6, 117; Al-Fāṣi, Shīfa’ al-Gharam, vol 1, 524.
Indians’ ribāṭ.\textsuperscript{636}

In addition, ribāṭ Rabī’ was established in 594 A.H./1197 A.D. by ’Abdullāh b. Māhmūd Al-Mardīnī, the agent of Sultan Al-Afzāl b. Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn. The ribāṭ, located on Mount Ajyad overlooking the Haram in Mecca, was an endowment for use by poor Muslims.\textsuperscript{637} As one of the most important and famous ribāṭ in Mecca, it was visited in 726 A.H./1325 A.D. by Ibn Baṭṭūta who described it as follows: ‘It’s the best ribāṭ in Mecca, and there is a sweet water well inside it... Those who live here are good people and the people of Hijāz respect the ribāṭ very much’.\textsuperscript{638} The historian Ibn Fahad stated that Sultan Al-Afzāl Nūr ad-Dīn gave the ribāṭ a large library as an endowment.\textsuperscript{639} This donation provides evidence of the importance of ribāṭs in community service, particularly in providing religious teaching and as housing for people who lived in them.

In 642 A.H./1244 A.D. Sheikh ’Ali b. Ibrāhīm al-Maṣrī established Ribāṭ Gizzī, which was located on Ajyad Mountain overlooking the Sacred Mosque.\textsuperscript{640} The ribāṭ was a waqf (endowment) for the accommodation for all the poor and needy Muslims of Mecca, and that was written on its door, according to Al-Fāṣi.\textsuperscript{641} The most important man to serve as an official of the ribāṭ was Sheikh Muḥammad b. Subā’īh al-

\textsuperscript{636} Ibn Fahad, \textit{Iḥaf al-Wara’}, vol 2, 549.
\textsuperscript{637} Al-Fāṣi, \textit{Shīfa’al-Gharam}, vol 1, 335; Ibn Fahad, \textit{Iḥaf al-Wara’}, vol 2, 564.
\textsuperscript{638} Ibn Baṭṭūta, \textit{Tuhfāt al-Nudār}, 154.
\textsuperscript{639} Ibn Fahad, \textit{Iḥaf al-Wara’}, vol 2, 564.
\textsuperscript{640} Ibid, vol 3, 61.
\textsuperscript{641} Al-Fāṣi, \textit{Al-‘Iqd Al-Thamīn}, vol 1, 121.
Husami; he served as its official until his death in 763 A.H./1361 A.D.⁶⁴²

In addition, the Abbāsid royal family supported the establishment of social foundations. Zumurud Khatun, the mother of the Abbāsid Caliph al-Nāsirī al-Dīn Allāh, established a ribāṭ in 579 A.H./1183 A.D., located to the north of the Sacred Mosque.⁶⁴³ The ribāṭ was a waqf for all the poor and Sufi inhabitants of Mecca, and the Ashraf.⁶⁴⁴ The ribāṭ continued to be used as housing for the poor until 736 A.H./1335 A.D., when it was seized by Sharif Ṭūṭyfah during his struggle with his brother Rumaythā for the Amīrāte of Mecca, and he took the ribāṭ as private accommodation for himself.⁶⁴⁵ The takeover of the ribāṭ by the Ashraf was considered a serious event, as most ribāṭs were endowments. However, Sharif Ṭūṭyfah may have read literally what was written on the door of the ribāṭ, that the ribāṭ was an endowment for the Ashraf and the poor together.⁶⁴⁶

It is clear that the Ayyūbids in this period did not care much about the construction of ribāṭs in Ḥijāz, especially in Mecca and Medīnah, despite their need for such similar social buildings to play a role in enhancing their image among the ordinary people. The Ayyūbids had struggled after the Fātimids as a result of internal conflicts with the Shiʿites in Egypt, as well as their external conflicts with the Franks. At the

---

⁶⁴⁴ Al-Fāṣi, *Al-ʿIqd Al-Thamīn*, vol 1, 118.
⁶⁴⁶ Al-Fāṣi, *Shifaʿ al-Gharam* vol 1, 528.
beginning of Şalāḥ ad-Dīn’s rule, he had a political and sectarian project to change the
doctrine of people in Egypt from Shi’ā to Sunnī, either peacefully or by force. Historical
books that discuss Şalāḥ ad-Dīn’s era report that the approaches he adopted against his
opponents in Egypt were to make them change their religious beliefs.647 However, we do
not see the same interest from Şalāḥ ad-Dīn in spreading Sunnī doctrine in Ḥijāz, the
reason perhaps being that Egypt was the base and the centre of the Ayyūbids’ rule and the
Ayyūbids had limited aspirations in Ḥijāz. This would also explain the lack of interest in
the deployment of the Shafi’ī doctrine, the official Ayyūbid Sunnī doctrine, in Ḥijāz,
which was confirmed by the Ḥanafī school and the ribāṭs that were established by al-
Zinjabīlī, the deputy of Şalāḥ ad-Dīn, contrary to the doctrine of Şalāḥ ad-Dīn.

On the other hand, we find that the ribāṭs in the Mamlūk era had
reached a high degree of organisation and close attention from the Mamlūk Sultans.
During the Mamlūk period, many ribāṭs were established because of the Mamlūks’
arhitectural policy, which in turn enhanced their cultural influence over the general
people. The well-known judge Sheikh Abu Bakr Muḥammad b. ’Abdullah al-Maraghi
established a ribāṭ in 575 A.H./1179 A.D., located to the east of the Sacred Mosque, in
front of the funeral gate.648 Al-Maraghi intended this ribāṭ as an endowment for the
followers of Sufism and Hermits of the Arabs and non-Arabs.649 Many became officials
of the ribāṭ, including Sheikh Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Al-Kilānī in 753 A.H./1352 A.D.

647 Aḥmad b. Ibrahim Al-Hanbali, Shīfa’ al-Gulub fī Akhbār Banū Ayyūb, ed. Nazim Rashid, (Baghdad,
648 Al-Fāṣi, Al-‘Iqd Al-Thāmin, vol 1, 118.
649 Al-Fāṣi, Al-‘Iqd Al-Thāmin, vol 1, 118; Ibn Fahad, Ḥaḥaf al-Wara’, vol 2, 543.
and Sheikh Abu Ja’far Al-Ḥamāmi, who was known as ‘Al-Zankī’. The ribāṭ existed until 882 A.H./1477 A.D., when it was demolished by the Mamlūk Sultan, Al-Ashraf Qaytbay, who ordered his agent in Mecca, al-Khawāja Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn 'Umar, to build a ribāṭ and school in his name, for the poor of Mecca. Therefore, al-Khawāja chose to demolish the ribāṭ of al-Maraghi, and a school and new ribāṭ were built on its grounds.

This was in addition to ribāṭ Khalilah, which was established by Sheikh Abu al-Qāsim b. Kilālah al-Tabībi in 644 A.H./1246 A.D. and was located in the ritual walking place in the Sacred Mosque between al-Ṣafā and al-Marwāḥ, and was a waqf for all the poor. Ibn Baṭṭūta mentioned that when he visited Mecca in 726 A.H./1325 A.D., the official of the ribāṭ was Sheikh Saʿīd al-Hindi, and after him, it was Sheikh ‘Abdullāh b. Abu al-Qāsim and Sheikh Aḥmad b. Abdul al-Muʿtī Al-Ansārī.

The sources emphasize that the Mamluks were generally interested in building and construction projects. In addition, political circumstances during the period were different from the circumstances faced by the Ayyūbid, especially in the military sphere after the defeat of both the Mongols and the Franks by the Mamlūks. The Mamlūks needed to strengthen their political and religious legitimacy among the general public through their interest in Muslim cultural, educational and religious developments.

650 Al-Fāṣi, Al-‘Iqd Al-Thamīn, vol 2, 67.
653 Ibn Baṭṭūta, Tuḥfāt al-Nudār, 154.
The Mamlūks’ need for religious and political legitimacy was much greater than that of the Ayyūbids, and this explains the Mamlūks’ growing interests in supporting the poor and ʿulamā. Therefore, ribāṭs and other public agencies and amenities reflect the general goals of the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks and the rulers’ lack of attention to them may be evidence of both internal and external problems that prevented the various rulers from focusing on them, as was also the case during the Ayyūbids’ era.
Chapter Five

Economic Relations between the Ayyūbids and Baḥrī Mamlūks and the Ashraf of Ḥijāz

Introduction

Economic relations between Egypt and Ḥijāz are considered ancient, beginning prior to the development of Islam and lasting until the present day. Some historians have noted that Qur‘aysh traders came to Egypt; for example, ‘Amr ibn al-’As lived in Alexandria in order to trade with Egyptian merchants. After the Islamic conquest, relations between the two regions were strengthened more than ever, and Egyptian caravans carried evermore supplies to Ḥijāz. Due to its poverty, Ḥijāz was particularly vulnerable to economic crises caused by drought and a consistent lack of rainfall. Economic relations between Egypt and Ḥijāz had a privileged position because of the Egyptian rulers’ interest in Ḥijāz both financially and economically, particularly for Ḥijāz’s Ashraf tribesmen and residents. The Egyptian pilgrimage caravan, known as a mahmal, came each year from Egypt to Ḥijāz, bringing with it money, Kiswa, grain and general

---

654 ‘Amr b. Al-’As was one of the Qur‘aysh merchants before the advent of Islam and was to later become the Muslim conqueror of Egypt in 21 A.H./641 A.D.
supplies for the people of Ḥijāz.\textsuperscript{657} The economic crises Egypt occasionally itself faced had a clear influence and direct impact on Ḥijāz, leading to economic distress of the region.

Mecca had a significant impact on the economic and financial development of cities in Ḥijāz and across the Arabian Peninsula generally. The city was one of the most important commercial stations in the Hijāz province due to its position on the trade route between Yemen, Syria and Egypt, and as a destination used by trading caravans since pre-Islamic times. In addition, Mecca has an important position as a religious city; because of the Ḥajj season, Mecca became the region’s most important economic centre, despite its lack of the basic economic preconditions required by most other cities in the world. Although Mecca and Ḥijāz both suffered weaknesses due to the volatility of agriculture and water scarcity, these factors did not stop the cities of the Ḥijāz from becoming commercial stations and prompting the regional powers to want to control them.

This chapter is divided into six sections that examine the key features of Ḥijāz’s economy and trade, particularly in the reigns of the Ayyūbids and Bahrī Mamlūks. In the first section, Ḥijāz’s economic profile is examined in terms of financial resources such as water, agriculture and trading routes. This section also analyses trade,

manufacture, and agriculture in Ḥijāz during the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk reigns. This gives an overall impression and background of Ḥijāz’s economic conditions. In addition, this section clarifies the needs of the political elite in Ḥijāz for economic aid and explains how other regional powers in Egypt, and even Yemen, met shortfalls in their economic needs with the goal of controlling Ḥijāz.

In the second section, I study the pilgrimage season in Mecca during the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Sultanate periods and the significance of pilgrimage as a means to strengthen the religious legitimacy of their rule. This section also explores the overland and maritime routes to Mecca used at the same time by pilgrims and merchants. The section will specify the villages, cities and ports that the pilgrims and merchants passed through to reach Mecca. The Egyptian caravan (maḥmal) and the role of Amīr Rakb Al-Ḥajj (‘the leader of pilgrims’) in leading and protecting the caravan are also studied in this section. The Sharif of Mecca’s duties in the pilgrimage season are explained as well as his role in protecting the maḥmal. In addition, the section will discuss the occurrence of natural disasters and their impacts on the pilgrimage season. The last topic in this section will focus on the pilgrimage season’s benefits to Mecca in making its markets and trade flourish.

The third section explains the importance of the port of Jeddah, as the main maritime port to Mecca in Ḥijāz during the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk eras. This section highlights the factors that combined in developing the port of Jeddah and its importance
for the Ashraf tribesmen and the Ayyūbid and Bahrī Mamlūk Sultanates. At the end of this section, I summarise the rise and decline of the port of Jeddah during the Circassian Mamlūk era. Although the Circassian Mamlūk era is outside this study’s historical remit, it is helpful to acquire an overall perspective of its economic fortunes as the main port to Mecca.

The fourth section surveys and explains the taxes, known as *mukūs* in Arabic, imposed by the Ashraf and the role of Ayyūbids and Mamlūks in their taxation policy in Ḥijāz. This section focuses on the villages and cities that paid taxes to the Ashraf when economic aid from Egypt was occasionally cut off. In addition, this section explains the major interventions from the regimes in Egypt and their policy of substituting other sources of money as compensation to the Ashraf in Mecca.

The fifth section explains the Kārimī trade influence and its importance in Ḥijāz and the role of the Kārimī merchants in the region’s commerce. This section highlights how the Kārimī merchants contributed to the economic situation in Ḥijāz, Egypt and Yemen in both the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk eras. Finally, the sixth section discusses the Arab tribes and their role in protecting pilgrimage and trade routes in the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk eras. This section explains the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk policies towards the tribes and supporting the sheikhs of those tribes to secure and protect the pilgrimage and trade caravans.
5.1 The Region’s Economic Profile

5.1.1 Trade

The growth of Egypt’s financial wealth and the abundance of its agricultural and industrial productions were in contrast to Ḥijāz’s poverty and distinct lack of resources. This made for easy trade exchanges between the two provinces because of their geographical proximity. The ports in Ḥijāz, particularly the port of Jeddah, were considered the economic lungs of Ḥijāz. It was here that Ḥijāz received Egyptian supplies via these ports; this was also a transit point where Egypt could receive goods imported from India and East Asia.658 We shall see that Jeddah’s port evolved in the eras of the Fātimids, Ayyūbids and Mamlūks and received commercial ships from Egypt, China, India and Ethiopia. In addition, the port of Jeddah was the nearest port to Mecca, so it was the arrival point of Egyptian pilgrims who contributed to the business dealings of Mecca and Ḥijāz.659

There were several routes between Egypt and Ḥijāz that contributed to the boom in trading activity between the two regions, such as the trade routes between the Nile and Qus, then to Aswān and Nubia, and even up to the ‘Aydhab port, on the Red

659 Al-Ḥamawī, Mu‘jūm al-Buldān, vol 4, 89; Also see Al-Maqqāsī, Aḥsan al-taqāsīm, 24.
Sea. These were in addition to the commercial road linking Mecca to the Red Sea, and then to the port of al-Jar, which is considered the port of Medīnah. The goods that came to Egypt passed through the Red Sea to the Nile, and then either south to Cairo or north to Rosetta and Alexandria. This route was the safest road for traders because of the security precautions taken by Egypt’s rulers who sought to secure the trade routes to the Mediterranean ports and on to Europe.

Many ports and inland towns were distributed throughout these areas; trade routes facilitated contact between the two countries, and we will focus on the most important ports in Hijāz and Egypt. The first of those stations in Egypt was the city of Fustāṭ, the first Islamic capital in Egypt after the Islamic conquest in 21A.H./641 A.D.. Al-Idrīsī described the city by saying, ‘Fustāṭ now is [a] great city [with] very excellent architecture and lush … beauty, its roads are wide and elaborate constructions and [it] has many markets’. The city was also important because of its proximity to the Nile; its location, midway between the northern and southern ends of the country, meant that Fustāṭ was a natural point on the Nile to separate the country into two geographical parts. In addition, it related to all parts of Egypt, from Aswān in the south to the north Mediterranean coast. Fustāṭ continued to be an important city into the era of the Fāṭimid minister, Shawar, at the end of the Fāṭimids’ rule. It was he who ordered the burning of

---

the city, out of fear that the Franks would seize it. Ibn Jubayr stated that when he visited Fustat in 579A.H./1183 A.D. and saw the effects of the devastation wrought by the burning, the Ayyubids had renovated the buildings and business activities had returned to them.

In addition to Fustat, Cairo was as important as a commercial station in Egypt. It competed commercially with Fustat because it was a station between the confluences of trade routes and was on the road used to transport goods between Africa and Asia. Cairo was also a centre for African pilgrims going to Mecca. Cairo was the Fatimid capital and centre of both the military forces and the Fatimid administration, so the city was a lucrative station for Red Sea and Mediterranean traders. Al-Maqrizi described the booming trade in Cairo, saying, ‘Cairo is a great city, people come to it from the east, west and south and the north and nobody can count its population but Allâh’. Trading commodities came to Cairo from Alexandria and Damietta on the Mediterranean Sea and were sent to Bulaq port on the Nile, near Cairo, so Cairo had all kinds of commercial goods, both local and foreign. In addition, it was home to Italian and other European fabric markets, a Persian market and the Karim traders and merchants.

---

664 Al-Maqrizi, Al-Mawā’id, vol 1, 286.
667 Al-Maqrizi, Al-Mawā’id, vol 1, 286.
Alexandria and Damietta, on the Mediterranean Sea, were both important commercial ports for the Egyptian Ayyūbids and Mamlūks.669 Alexandria was home to many markets, and the most important spice markets and foreign merchant stations and their consulates were in the city, where they could oversee the outgoing and incoming trade from and to Europe.670 Alexandria was also a way station for traders of fabrics, European timber and Sudanese gold, in addition to the importation of Persian carpets. In short, the city was the centre of international trade exchange during the period. Damietta was a commercial station connecting Ḥijāz and Egypt, while also serving as a port for the navy’s ships. Damietta was among the most important commercial and industrial cities where commercial and warships alike were manufactured. This made the city vulnerable to attacks, and there was always a risk from the Franks. This danger peaked during the Seventh Crusade, at the end of the Ayyūbid period and at the beginning of the Mamlūk period.671

The most important Egyptian port on the west coast of the Red Sea was ‘Aydhab, which was the point of contact between Hijāz and Egypt. This port derived its importance from its role as a naval base and for trade from the Far East to Europe and Egypt. In addition, it was a station for convoys of Egyptian pilgrims to Ḥijāz and Africans travelling through ‘Aydhab, on to the port of Jeddah.672 Because of the poor economic conditions in Egypt during the reign of the Fāṭimid Caliph, Al-Mustanṣir, in

669 For more details on the Egyptian’s trade in the Mamlūk’s era see; Ashtor, Eliyahu, *Levant Trade in the later Middle Ages*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1983).
460 A.H./1067 A.D. convoys of Egyptian and Moroccan pilgrims turned away from the land route in the Sinai Peninsula and, instead, toward the port of ‘Aydhab. Travellers continued to use that route throughout the period of Ayyūbid rule because of the Frankish wars. Pilgrims used the road to Ḥijāz for more than 200 years, which led to a trade boom in ‘Aydhab. The port of ‘Aydhab flourished under the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks, and during his journey to Ḥijāz, Ibn Jubayr noted that ‘Aydhab was a large port that collected all manner of preparations associated with the enormous commercial ships from India and Yemen, in addition to boats of pilgrims bound for the port of Jeddah. He said that he could not count the boats in the harbour, on account of their great numbers.

In addition, we believe that ‘Aydhab flourished because of the security that was available: it was free from any risk of invasion by the Franks. Al-Maqrīzī and Ibn Jubāyr, who noted that goods could be left in the port without being exposed to theft before their owners could come and collect them, confirm this opinion. In addition, the port’s proximity to Jeddah meant the yields that it accessed coming from the east coast of Africa, Yemen and India, all bound for the port at Aden, the beginning point of the Red Sea, and could be transmitted directly to the port of Jeddah and from Jeddah on to ‘Aydhab.

In Ḥijāz, the port of Yanbu’ was an important location on the east coast of the Red Sea, as it served as the port for Medīnah. It was a very active port, particularly under the Ayyūbids’ rule and their time of control over Ḥijāz. They made major repairs in

---

674 Ibn Jubāyr, Rihlat Ibn Jubayr, 45.
the city, built a great castle in 621 A.H./1224 A.D., and installed a garrison to further protect the port.\textsuperscript{677} In addition, the city of Yanbu‘ was a land station for pilgrims and traders from Egypt, and the route was the starting point from Cairo to Suez city, so pilgrims moved to the port of ‘Aqaba by ship and then took the land route to Mecca through Yanbu‘.\textsuperscript{678} This road remained in use until after the establishment of the State of the Mamlûks in Egypt. In addition to the seaports in Ḥijāz, Sirin port, located west of Mecca, was a second commercial access point to Mecca. The Sharif of Mecca was appointed the agent of the port and was charged with collecting taxes from the merchants. This port shared the task with Jeddah of directly providing Mecca with all of its needs for commercial goods.\textsuperscript{679} The port of Jeddah was, of course, of crucial importance and we shall consider this later in this chapter.

5.1.2 Agriculture

Ḥijāz’s agriculture hugely depended on rainwater and wells, and rainwater was the main source of irrigation.\textsuperscript{680} Ponds were built to store rainwater on the outskirts of valleys, and these reservoirs were used to water animals. Many channels were also built to irrigate farms.\textsuperscript{681} Hijāz’s primary agricultural crops were corn, barley and wheat; corn was considered the main food for many people because of the lack of plentiful production of the others across Ḥijāz. Wheat was grown in several areas, such as Khyber, north of

\textsuperscript{677} Al-Asimi, \textit{Simt al-Nujām al-Awalt}, vol 4, 301.
\textsuperscript{678} Al-Jazîrî, \textit{Al-Durr al-Farâ’id}, vol 3, 313.
\textsuperscript{679} Al-Idrîsî, \textit{Nuzhat al-Mushtâq}, vol 1, 138.
\textsuperscript{680} Al-Qalqashandi, \textit{Subh al-A’Shâ} vol 4, 246.
\textsuperscript{681} Al-Fâsi, \textit{Shifâ’ al-Gharam}, vol 1, 339.
Medīnah. Barley was produced in Medīnah, and residents there depended on it for food, in addition to date crops. The barley crops covered their needs for grain. In addition, barley was grown in Tāʾif and the surrounding villages. Wheat was less prevalent in Ḥijāz than barley and corn, as it required large amounts of water for cultivation. For this reason, wheat was grown mostly in places that were relatively wetter and nearer more plentiful water sources. Tāʾif was considered the most important area in Ḥijāz for producing wheat, but its output was not sufficient to satisfy all the needs of the region.

Vegetables were also found in Ḥijāz. One traveller, Ibn Jubāyr, noted that he saw many kinds of vegetables grown there, such as eggplant, carrots and cabbage. This was confirmed by Al-Qalqashāndī, who stated that vegetables were grown in Ḥijāz, particularly in Tāʾif. In addition to the fruits that came to Mecca from Tāʾif, some Arab geographers described it as a small city that had fresh water and a mild climate that enabled many farms to produce fruit. In addition, palms were one of the most important crops in the desert, as they could withstand the drought and the severity of the heat. It is rare to find fruit-bearing plants that can adapt to such harsh conditions.

The most important cities in Ḥijāz for palm cultivation were Tāʾif, Jeddah, Medīnah and

682 Al-Qalqashāndī, Subh al-AʾShā, vol 4, 291.
683 'Abdullah Muhammad Al-Saif, Al-Hayyāt Al-Iqṭisādiyyah wa Al-Ijtīmāʾyyah fī al-Najj wa Al-Ḥijāz fī Al-ʾAsr Al-ʿUmawīyy (The Economic and Social life in Najj and Ḥijāz during the Umayyad Period) (Beirut, Muʾsasat Al-Risalah, 1983), 59.
687 Al-Qalqashāndī, Subh al-AʾShā, vol 4, 259.
Agriculture in the Ḥijāz area was not able to adequately meet the needs of all its inhabitants. The cultivated land areas and production were less than capable of feeding the increasing population, making it dependent on Egypt, which cultivated its soil rigorously and yielded crops and vegetables, as agriculture was the mainstay of the Egyptian economy. Al-Maqdisī described what Egypt offered to Ḥijāz in terms of crops, saying, ‘Egypt is the province of God that was mentioned in the Qur’an, and Egypt is the dome of Islam and its Nile is one of the greatest rivers, and from its rewards Ḥijāz flourished and by the Egyptians the pilgrimage season delighted, and the good of Egypt prevails in the East and the West’. Wheat was the most important crop in Egypt, and the country sent large quantities to Ḥijāz to help the people. The Egyptian Ḥajj maḥmal travelled to Ḥijāz every year and delivered supplies of wheat, barley, flour and other grains for the Ashraf and its people.

Al-Maqdisī (d. 380 A.H./990 A.D.) mentioned during his visit to Egypt that he saw many mills in the village of Mashtūl, which allowed for the production of flour for Ḥijāz. Mashtool village was one of the villages that supported Ḥijāz with food and other products, particularly through the maḥmal journey every year. Al-Maqdisī counted at that time of the year 3000 camels every week, all of them carrying grain and

---

689 Al-Maqdisī, Aḥsan al-Taqāsim, 193.
690 Al-Maqrīzī, Itiʿad al-Hunafa, vol 1, 246.
flour. In addition, Al-Maqrīzī mentioned that the Fāṭimids sent 8940 ardib of grains (one ardib is equal to 8.490 kg) to Ḥijāz. When Egypt experienced hardship as a result of drought and low water in the Nile, the grains that normally were allotted to Ḥijāz were no longer being sent, and the people of Ḥijāz were quick to go to Egypt to ask for help and assistance. After the end of the Fāṭimids’ rule in Egypt, at the beginning of the Ayyūbids’ rule, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn sent 8000 ardib of wheat to Ḥijāz every year. It was reported by Ibn Jubāyr that Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn ordered the Ashraf of Mecca to stop collecting the taxes that were imposed on pilgrims, and he compensated the Ashraf with 2000 dinars and 2000 ardib of wheat each year.

Wheat prices in Ḥijāz were related to what was sent from Egypt every year, so if Egypt stopped shipping supplies, prices increased a great deal. Al-Fāṣi mentioned that, in 447 A.H./1055 A.D., the price of bread in Mecca was quite expensive and had reached a rate of ten pounds of bread for one Moroccan dinar. This was so high that people could not afford it, and the pilgrims experienced a great famine. The reason for the famine was because the Nile in Egypt did not reach the flood level that watered agricultural lands, so the Ayyūbids could not supply Mecca. In 567 A.H./1171 A.D. the price of five Sā’ of wheat (one Sā’ is 2.03 kg) was one dinar because of the late arrival of

---

691 Al-Maqdisī, Aḥsan al-taqāsim, 195.
693 Ibn Al-ʿImad Al-Isfahani, Sana al-Barq Al-Shami, vol 1, 154.
694 Ibn Jubāyr, Rihlat Ibn Jubāyr, 55.
695 Al-Fāṣi, Shifāʾ al-Gharam, vol 2, 270.
supplies delivered from Egypt. Ibn al-'Imād al-Isfahānī stated that in 572 A.H./1176 A.D., one quarter of wayba of wheat (0.15 ardib) was sold in Mecca for a quarter dinar, and that this was a very expensive price. When Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn sent 8000 ardib of wheat, the prices fell precipitously.

As the above makes clear, agriculture in Egypt and Ḥijāz had a large and clear impact on lowering prices and the abundance of food commodities; this spurred economic and social activity for the people, except in periods of economic crises in Egypt, usually occurring as a result of a drought. In Egypt, the people depended on the Nile River, and if the floods did not come, the Nile could not reach the level needed to irrigate lands. The Egyptians were unable to avoid the serious consequences of this natural phenomenon, as they lacked a consistent system for irrigating their crops in times of crisis. On the other hand, the Nile’s great floods were no less dangerous than the lack of flooding. Although flooding was a rare occurrence, its impact was dangerous, as too much water led to sinking lands and spoilt pastures, destroying cattle and causing crises for farmers. In any case, agriculture was not possible in many areas of Egypt. It follows that there was a lack of food supplies, relative to demand, and rising prices and prevailing high prices affected the lives of the population, who suffered as a result of the lack of nutritious crops. When the Nile’s waters rose to the extent appropriate for agriculture, farmers could cultivate their lands, and the prices came down, stabilising the conditions

696 Ibid, vol 2, 270.
698 Ibid, 79.
for people in Egypt and Ḥijāz.

Nāṣir Khusraw (d. 480 A.H./1088 A.D) stated that when he visited Egypt, the Nile had reached the proper height to irrigate crops and there was great prosperity, to the point that he saw many crops, including melons, grapes, beans, bananas and others. He also mentioned that the reason for this was the nature of Egypt’s climate, which included warm summers and cold winters; thus, a variety of crops were available due to the varying environment. In addition, Al-Maqdisī mentioned that during his journey to Egypt in times of prosperity, Al-Fustāṭ had many markets, and the physical condition of its inhabitants was good. He reported buying 30 pounds of bread for one dirham, and that eggs, bananas and dates were very inexpensive. As we have seen, Al-Idrīsī agreed, commenting that the markets were quite active, and crops were available, making people financially prosperous, and merchants and people feel secure. This description by Al-Idrīsī reveals the great impact of agriculture on people's lives and the sense of stability they felt as a result of agricultural success. In short, agriculture was a source of prosperity and wealth for Egypt, and crops’ availability had a positive impact on the daily activities of the population.

However, Ḥijāz was dependent on rainfall in most of its territories, as the arrival of rain was crucial for the area’s prosperity, accounting for its agricultural state

---

699 Nāṣir Khusraw, Safarnama, 93.
700 Al-Maqdisī, Ahsan al-taqāsim, 197.
701 Al-Idrīsī, Nuzhat al-mushtaq, vol 1, 322.
and low farm prices. When rain in Ḥijāz was really limited, the province was exposed to drought, famine and rising prices. Sometimes there are contradictions between the sources on this issue. In the case of 579 A.H./1183 A.D., for example, Ibn Fahad stated that, ‘the people of Mecca [were] subjected to drought, and cattle died because of the heat, the rain did not come down on them in the spring, autumn and winter’.\footnote{Ibn Fahad, \textit{Ithaf al-Wara‘}, vol 2, 547.} On the other hand, Ibn Jubāyr, who visited Mecca in the same year, noted that the people of Ḥijāz were enjoying a time of prosperity as a result of rainfall and the cultivation of the lands. The price of four Sā’ of wheat was one Moroccan dinar.\footnote{Ibn Jubāyr, \textit{Riḥlat Ibn Jubāyr}, 100.} This discrepancy in the sources could indicate that conditions varied significantly in a single year.

\section*{5.1.3 Manufacturing}

Ḩijāz was an extremely poor province because of its terrain as a nomadic desert environment. For this reason, industries did not progress there as they did in Egypt, as manufacturers need stability and the availability of raw materials and agriculture. In addition, they require a large number of markets and consumers. For this reason, industrial production in Ḥijāz remained limited and specialized, such as jewellery manufacturing in Meḍīnah, due to the availability of gold in the area near Meḍīnah and Yanbu.\footnote{Aḥmad ṬAb Al-Ḥamīd Al-ʿAbbāṣi, \textit{ʿUmdat Akhbār fi Madīnat al-Nabi Al-Mukhtār}, (The History of the City of the Prophet Meḍīnah) (Cairo: Alexandria Al-Ameriyah, 1915), 331.} This had been one of the best-known industries operated by the Jews, before they were driven out of Meḍīnah because of their conflict with the Muslims.\footnote{Al-Sayf, \textit{Al-Hayāt Al-Iqāṭīdīyyah wa al-Ijtimā‘īyyah}, 157.} The most important types of jewellery products that enjoyed a high reputation in Ḥijāz were rings,
earrings, necklaces and bracelets of gold and silver. Demand for such types of jewellery increased, particularly after a higher standard of living was achieved for the people of Ḫijāz as a result of the Islamic conquests, thus increasing the demand for luxuries. Al-Samhudi (911 A.H./1505 A.D.) mentioned that the jewellers in Medīnah had their own market in Al-Zahra village and the number of jewellers exceeded 300.

Tā’if was famous for its leather manufacturing. Al-Idrīsī noted that Tā’if had a lot of leather traders, and their prices were high because of their fine quality. Leather manufacture was mainly based on tanning manufacture that they used in some products, such as clothing. Al-Hamdānī (334 A.H./945 A.D.) mentioned that ‘Tā’if is the country of leather manufacturing and was famous for the Tā’ifi cloak’. The availability of animals in Tā’if such as cows, camels, sheep and deer, helped this industry to flourish and it became famous in Ḫijāz. The traveller Al-Bakri (d. 487 A.H/ 1094 A.D) described the leather of Tā’if: ‘The quality of the leather of Tā’if is unsurpassed in any other country’. People in Ḫijāz used the leather products for numerous purposes such as water conservation and preservation of fats, oils and perfumes and food needed by the traveller in his trips at that time. Leather was also used for military purposes, such as

708 Al-Idrīsī, Nuzhat al-Mushtāq, vol 1, 144.
710 Al-Sayf, Al-Hayāt Al-Iqtisādiyyah wa al-Ijtima‘iyyah, 158.
body armour to protect the body from swords and arrows, and head helmets. Due to the availability of iron in several places in Ḥijāz, some people, mainly in Mecca and Medīnah, manufactured weapons, such as swords.

The people of Ḥijāz also worked in perfumery, utilising certain types of flowers that grow in the Ḥijāz, such as Basil and Senna. Tāʾif was also famous for perfumery, and most of its output was exported to Mecca, where the Ka’aba was washed out after mixing the perfumes with Zamzam water. In addition, the wealthy people in Mecca created a high demand for the perfumes. The perfumer (‘aṭṭār) profession was very important and he was effectively a doctor, pharmacist and perfume-seller at the same time. The perfumer had to have knowledge of herbs and ingredients for medicines that met the pharmaceutical needs of his customers and patients. This profession had its own market in Medīnah called Sūq al-‘Aṭṭarīn (perfumers market).

Ibn Jubāyr mentioned that the Meccans were famous in the sweet industry and made many types of honey and sugar products. It seems that sugar came to Mecca from Egypt, most probably with the Egyptian Ḥajj mahmal. Ibn al-Mujāwir

---

714 Al-Hamawi, Mu'jam al-Buldān, vol 3, 58.
716 Saqer, Tāʾ if fī al-’Asr al-Jāhilīyyah, 45.
717 ’Abd Al-Jabar Al-’Ubaydī, Al-Tāʾ if wa Dawr Qabilat Thāqif min al-’Asr al-Jāhilī Hatta al-Qiyām al-Dawlat al-Umawīyyah (Tāʾ if and the Role of the Tribe Thaqif from the Ignorance era until the Umayyad era), (Riyadh, Dar Al-Rifa’i, 1982), 51.
719 Al-Samhudi, Wafaʾ al-Wafaʾ, vol 2, 736.
720 Ibn Jubāyr, Riḥlat Ibn Jubāyr, 98.
stated that Ḥijāz was famous for manufacturing the millstones used to grind grains, and the area made some of the cisterns used to maintain drinking water, in addition to cooking utensils.\(^{721}\)

On the other hand, manufacturing in Egypt was relatively quite advanced and this stimulated its economic progress. The rulers of Egypt could export goods produced in excess of domestic needs and import goods that were not found in Egypt, thus leading to commercial progress and a higher standard of living. Manufacturing cooperation between Egypt and Ḥijāz under the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks was good, with Egypt exporting oil, flour and wax to Ḥijāz every year via the Egyptian pilgrimage mahmal.\(^{722}\) Al-Qalqashândī mentioned that Egypt sent 27 quintals of oil lamps to Meḍīnah every year to illuminate the Prophet's Mosque, as well as 160 large and small candles.\(^{723}\)

In terms of Egypt’s reputation in the textile industry, its most famous manufacturing points were Tennis, Tuna and Damietta. As we have seen in the previous chapter, throughout the period of Ayyūbid and Mamlūk rule, Egypt manufactured the Kiswah and sent it every year to Mecca, accompanied by the Ḥajj mahmal. Al-Maqrīzī stated that, when Yahyā b. al-Yaman came to Mecca from Egypt in 384 A.H./994 A.D., he presented gifts of money, horses and two Kiswah for the Ka’aba, manufactured in


\(^{723}\) Al-Qalqashândī, Subh al-A’Sha , vol 4, 204.
Tennis. Ibn Jubāyr reported that during his trip to Mecca, he saw the Sharīf of Mecca, Mukthīr b. ʿIsā al-Ḥassānī wearing a golden robe and a turban made of Shurb, a thin fabric that was well known and made in Tennis and Damietta, in Egypt. Al-Maqrīzī mentioned that, during the Fātimids’ rule in Egypt, every year they sent 10,000 dinars to cover the price of goods such as sweetmeats and wax in Ḥijāz. In addition, Al-Maqdisī stated that he saw in the Ka’aba some mosaics made in Egypt and signed by Egyptian craftsmen. He also saw some in the corridors of the Ka’aba that had come from Alexandria.

Therefore, we must conclude that Ḥijāz was almost entirely dependent on the arrival of Egyptian manufactured goods, which was dictated by economic troughs and booms. In addition to the gifts that were sent from the rulers of Egypt to the Ashraf in particular, to strengthen political relations between them, the Ashraf were dependent on the Egyptians for financial support. If this support was withdrawn, it would aggravate political problems and would lead the Ashraf to impose taxes on the pilgrims. As it turns out, there was interest among the Egyptian rulers in manufacturing related to the Ka’aba, in Mecca, and the Prophet's Mosque, in Medīnah, which gives us a clear understanding of the importance of the two cities to the rulers of Egypt, in both political and religious terms.

---

726 Al-Maqrizī, Al-Mawāʿid, vol 1, 492.
727 Al-Maqdisī, Aḥsan al-Taqāsim, 72.
5.2 Pilgrimage and Economic Life in Mecca under the Ayyūbid and Baḥrī Mamlūk Sultanates

Pilgrimage has great importance for the global community of Muslims as well as for the various Islamic powers that have controlled Ḥijāz and the surrounding regions. Pilgrimage gives legitimacy to any religious and political powers that control Ḥijāz and Mecca, and maintain the pilgrimage’s routes and protect the pilgrims. Rulers who can secure the pilgrimage season and protect the pilgrims become the Two Holy Mosques’ servants and this ensures them Muslims’ loyalty.\(^{728}\) In addition, pilgrimage is an annual gathering of all Muslims from all groups and ethnicities; when they return to their countries, the pilgrims will take with them an impression of the rulers in securing the pilgrimage and facilities to Muslims.\(^{729}\) Thus, the rulers of Mecca earn the loyalty of the rest of the Muslims who are subject to other governments.

Pilgrimage is considered one of the most important religious obligations for Muslims, and it is the fifth pillar of Islam. Therefore, Muslims of different languages, origins, countries and political and sectarian affiliations perform the pilgrimage in the same place and at the same time. Thousands of Muslims gathered in one place under the local authority of the Ashraf as well as under the overarching authority of the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk sultanates. The two regimes were both affected, in terms of their public profile, by pilgrimage: those who maintained and guarded the routes and those responsible for the defence and maintenance of the shrines. As a result, these

\(^{728}\) Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn was the first ruler who had this title after dominating Mecca and Medīnah. See Ibn Shahnshah, *Midmar al-Haqā‘iq*, 52.

rulers held a special position in the eyes of Muslims.\textsuperscript{730}

In the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk eras, when pilgrims came to Mecca for the pilgrimage they often stayed for several months or even years. This was particularly true if the pilgrims were ’ulamā, students who resided in Mecca to study in its schools and ribāts and then returned to their countries of origin. When these pilgrims returned to their countries, they shared their impressions of the pilgrimage and the attention of the Sultans to the holy places in Mecca. As we saw in the previous chapter, the Sultans and Ashraf, and even the kings of countries that were far from Mecca, such as India, spent a great deal of money to build schools and ribāts and to pay salaries and alms to the ’ulamā, students and poor people of Mecca.\textsuperscript{731}

However, most of these rulers were not ruling according to Sharī‘a (Islamic rules and jurisprudence), so they were secular rulers rather than Islamic. For example, the Sultans and Ashraf taxed pilgrims in a way that was contrary to Islam and also delayed the pilgrimage seasons in some years because of conflicts between the Ashraf or between the Sultans in general. According to Ibn Fahad, during the reign of the Ayyūbid Sultan Al-’Adil in 608 A.H./1211 A.D., the Sharif of Mecca killed hundreds of Iraqi pilgrims during the Ḥajj season.\textsuperscript{732} An assassin, who was a follower of Al-Ḥasan b.

\textsuperscript{731} Richard T. Mortel, ‘Madrasas in Mecca during the Medieval Period: A Descriptive Study Based on Literary Sources’, \textit{Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London} 60, 2 (1997), 236–52.
\textsuperscript{732} Ibn Fahad, \textit{Ihaf al-Wara’}, vol 3, 11.
Sabah, the Amīr of the Assassins and ruler of the fortress of Alamut in Iran,\(^{733}\) tried to assassinate Sharif Qatāda of Mecca, but he instead killed his cousin, Hārūn Abu Qatāda, who bore a strong resemblance to Sharif Qatāda. In retaliation, Sharif Qatāda killed hundreds of Iraqi pilgrims, and he did not stop killing them until they gave him 100,000 dinars as (fidya) compensation.\(^ {734}\)

Al-Maqrīzī also detailed several incidents showing the discontent of pilgrims as well as others showing their satisfaction with the Sultans. For example, Sultan Nūr ad-Dīn Maḥmūd performed the pilgrimage in 556 A.H./1160 A.D.\(^ {735}\) to Mecca, distributing money to the poor inhabitants of the city.\(^ {736}\) On the other hand, Nūr ad-Dīn arrested two Franks who claimed they were Muslims, but wanted to steal the body of the Prophet Muḥammad from his grave by digging an underground tunnel.\(^ {737}\) The legend states that the Prophet Muḥammad came to Nūr ad-Dīn in a dream and asked him to save him from these two men, which Nūr ad-Dīn did.\(^ {738}\) Based on this incident, I would argue that events such as Nūr ad-Dīn’s dream of the Prophet are simply ingenious ways of showing that this Sultan was acceptable to God and the Prophet and that he was the legitimate protector of the Islamic holy lands.

\(^{733}\) For more information about the Assassins, see Bernard Lewis, ‘Saladin and the Assassins’, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 15, 2 (1953), 239-45.


\(^{735}\) While this event is outside of the chronological parameters of the thesis, it is revealing and therefore worth referencing.


\(^{738}\) Ibid, 123.
In addition, al-Maqrīzī stated that the Ayyūbid king of Yemen, al-Mālik al-Masʿūd, performed the pilgrimage in 610 A.H./1213 A.D., when he fought Sharif Ḥasan b. Qatāda inside Mecca and defeated the Sharif, looting Mecca and treating its people and pilgrims aggressively. Al-Masʿūd had ‘insulted the sanctity of the Kaʿaba and shed blood, and if he goes to sleep, his soldiers beat the pilgrims with swords so as not to disturb his sleep’. On the other hand, during the Mamlūk era, Sultan Baybars performed the pilgrimage in 667 A.H./1268 A.D., changing the Kiswah of Kaʿaba and distributing money to the poor people. Moreover and quite significantly, he did not make guards stand between himself and the people.

From these examples, we may deduce that the Sultans and Ashraf of Mecca were keen to ensure the security of the pilgrimage season and the lives of the pilgrims in Mecca, and to protect the holy places due to the great importance of such security in legitimizing their political regimes. However, this policy was not always followed, particularly with regard to al-Mālik al-Masʿūd’s relations with the people of Mecca and that of the Sharif of Mecca with Iraqi pilgrims. Political motives for imposing control over Mecca were sometimes more important than simply giving the pilgrims a good impression of the administration of the Sultan or the Sharif of Mecca during the pilgrimage season.

---

739 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Dahāb al-Maṣbūk, 138.
740 Ibid, 128.
741 Ibid, 150.
This section reviews the pilgrimage to Mecca and the importance of this season of worship for all Muslims in the economic life of Ḥijāz. Rather than offering a history of the pilgrimage for the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks, we shall focus on occasions of pressure or crisis in the period covered by this thesis. In addition, this section also addresses the administrative, financial and military aspects of government in Ḥijāz, which ultimately served and secured the pilgrimage to Mecca.

The beginning of this section focuses on the main routes to Mecca, which were used by people for pilgrimage and as commercial routes throughout the year. Then, the functions and tasks of the Ashraf of Mecca in securing and organising the pilgrimage season, administratively and financially, will be addressed. The section studies the relationship between the Ayyūbids, and Mamlūks and Ashraf with the Arab tribes that inhabited the pilgrimage routes and their role in protecting the mahmal of the pilgrimage.

5.2.1 The Overland and Maritime Pilgrimage Routes to Mecca

The successive Islamic polities collaborated in the construction of routes to Mecca used by the pilgrim convoys from Egypt, North Africa, Andalous, Syria, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula. Along these routes, the Islamic powers established mosques, houses, fields and water wells to serve the pilgrims. At the main points of these routes, traders also
established commercial markets to meet the needs of pilgrims and then helped to develop towns and villages in those centres. The pilgrim convoys from Muslim countries had four main routes; these routes were the ancient trade routes that were known to the Arabs in *jahiliyyah* (the ignorance period before Islam) and were used by people who visited Mecca, whether for trading or pilgrimage.\(^{742}\)

The most important route was the Iraqi pilgrimage route that was known as *Darb Zubaydah*, called after the wife of Abbāsid Caliph Ḥārūn Al-Rashīd (r. 170–193 A.H./786–809 A.D.). Zubaydah spent extensive amounts of money setting up facilities and charities to serve the pilgrims, who were mostly from Iraq, Iran, Khorāsān and the eastern Islamic lands.\(^{743}\) The second route was through the Levant, known as the *Shāmi route*, and was used by pilgrims from Syria, Turkey and all Levant. The third was the Egyptian route, used by pilgrims from Egypt, North Africa, West Africa and Andalūs; they gathered in Egypt and then used this route, either the land route or the maritime route, through the port of Aydhah. The fourth was the Yemeni pilgrimage route, which was used by pilgrims from Yemen, Oman and Southern Arabia. There was no change from the beginning of the Islamic era (7\(^{th}\) century A.D.) until the fourteenth century A.H. (20\(^{th}\) century A.D.) to the Egyptian, al-Shāmi, *Darb Zubaydah* (Iraq) and Yemeni routes.

In this section, the study focuses on the Egyptian pilgrimage route and its

---

\(^{742}\) See Map 2. Map of the pilgrim routes of Arabia.

\(^{743}\) Al-Ya’qūbī, Ahmad b. Ja’far, *Mushākalaṭ al-Nāṣīṭī al-Zamānīhīm* [People’s writing to their history], (Qatar: Documentation and Humanities Studies Center, 1993), 206.
connections to Ḥijāz because of Egypt’s political and military predominance from the fifth century A.H./eleventh century A.D. to the Mamlūk era. After the Fāṭimid Caliphate moved from Tunisia to Egypt, the pilgrimage port of Aydhab was developed on the Red Sea and had a major role in the Far East and Red Sea trade. The importance of Aydhab increased from the beginning of 460 A.H./1067 A.D., because of the significant distress that the Egyptians suffered during the reign of Caliph al-Mustanṣir bi-llāh (r.427–487 A.H./1029–1094 A.D.); this economic crisis led to deterioration in trade conditions during his reign. Following the crisis, Aydhab’s port remained a central location for pilgrims from Egypt, Morocco and Africa, and it became the main port for trade with Jeddah on the Red Sea. Due to the importance of the Egyptian pilgrimage route, it interested many Muslim scholars, travellers and passengers who accompanied the pilgrimage convoys, resulting in many geographical and historical accounts that are considered crucial in understanding the pilgrims’ routes, facilities and conditions. The most important of these geographers and travellers were Naāṣīr Khusrāw (d. 443 A.H./1051 A.D.), Ibn Jubāyr (d.579 A.H./1183 A.D.), Abu al-Qāsim b. Al-Tājibī (d. 730 A.H./1329 A.D.) and Ibn Baṭṭūta who used the port of Aydhab in 727 A.H./1326 A.D.

The rulers and Sultans were interested in developing pilgrimage routes starting in the era of the Umāyyad Caliphate (41–132 A.H./662–750 A.D.), and their interest in pilgrimage was natural because it is one of the most important annual Islamic

---

744 Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Mawā’id*, vol 1, 201.
events. In addition, securing pilgrimage routes gave rulers legitimacy and confirmed their strength and control over their dominions. Moreover, the rulers and Sultans equipped a military expedition to accompany the pilgrimage convoys to provide protection for them. The Umāyyad Caliphs focused on the Shāmi pilgrimage route and Mecca over others and the Abbāsid Caliphs focused on the Iraqi pilgrimage route. The Ayyūbid and Mamlūk sultans of Egypt focused on the Egyptian pilgrimage route, particularly after the revival of the Abbāsid caliphate in Egypt, in the reign of Sultan Baybars in 660 A.H./1262 A.D., and the rulers of Yemen focused on the Yemeni pilgrimage route. Therefore, it is arguable that Islamic powers’ interests in the pilgrimage routes were more political and pragmatic than religious, as they sought to gain the loyalty of the Muslim community and their own religious legitimacy.

The pilgrimage routes were not used solely in the pilgrimage season; they were also trade routes from the time before Islam was founded until the beginning of the twentieth century A.D.. In addition, military expeditions used these routes from Egypt to Mecca and from Mecca to Yemen. In particular, the Fāṭimid, Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Sultans were interested in these routes to maintain their prestige and status across the Muslim world, to provide comfort for pilgrims and merchants. Further, for the security and safety of pilgrims and traders, the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks entrusted the Arab tribes who were living on these routes to guard them in exchange for funds granted by the Sultanates.

---

In the Ayyūbid era, Egyptian and North African pilgrims used the maritime route to Mecca due to Frankish control of the overland routes in the Levant; thus, the maritime route was safer than the overland route. Egyptian and North African pilgrims gathered in Cairo; from there, they travelled on ships through the Nile River to Asyūṭ in southern Egypt, then to the city of Quṣ.

Quṣ was a large commercial city and had an active market with Yemeni, Indian and Ethiopian traders. In addition to its market, the city had orchards and farms and was surrounded by a strong wall to protect it from enemies. From Quṣ, the pilgrims took ships through the Nile River to Aswān in southern Egypt and then began the daunting trip to Aydhab’s port in the Red Sea, which is a distance of around about 200 miles and took about 15 days.

Aydhab was a port on the western shore of the Red Sea, opposite the port of Jeddah; it was famous for the role that it played in trade as a naval base to the Far East, the Red Sea trade and Egypt then to Europe. In addition, it was a station for the pilgrimage convoys that sailed from Aydhab to Jeddah and then went by the land route to Mecca. Al-Idrīsī (d. 560 A.H./1166 A.D.) and Ibn Jubāyr (d. 614 A.H./1217 A.D.) and al-Ḥimyarī (d. 900 A.H./1495 A.D.) stated that a pilgrim paid eight dinars as a mukūs when

---


751 Ibn Jubāyr, Rihlat Ibn Jubāyr, 41.

752 Nāṣir Khusraw, Safarnama, 116.

753 Al-Jazārī, Al-Dhur al-Farāʿid, vol 1, 119.
he left Aydhab for Jeddah. This *mukūs* became quite important, particularly during the crisis (460 A.H./1067 A.D.) in Egypt in the Fatimid Caliph al-Mustanṣir’s era. Egyptian and North African pilgrims also continued using the route from Cairo to Aydhab, instead of the overland route to the Sinai Peninsula, for more than 200 years, throughout the Fāṭimid era and then into the Ayyūbid era, because of the Frankish wars. The *mukūs* were taken in Aydhab because this was the last and main port in Egypt on the Red Sea before entering Ḥijāz and Aydhab was under the Ayyūbids’ control. In Cairo and Quṣ the *mukūs* were not taken from the pilgrims, though they paid for the facilities they used, e.g. Khans (hotels) and ships they rented to travel on the Nile. In Ḥijāz, Jeddah was the main port of the Ashraf, and they compelled the pilgrims and merchants in some periods to pay *mukūs*. So, in Jeddah the *mukūs* went to the Ashraf, while in Aydhab they went to the Ayyūbids and the Mamlūks.

Ibn Jubāyr and Ibn Battūta both wrote that Aydhab was located in the desert and thus very poor in agriculture; therefore, the city imported water and dates and other provisions from Saʿīd Miṣr, Upper Egypt. Al-Idrīsī stated that two agents managed Aydhab, one of them was chosen by the population of Aydhab while the Sultan of Egypt chose the other; *mukūs* were divided in half between the two of them. The function of the agents of the Sultan of Egypt was to bring food and water to the city, while the local agents protected the city from the Ethiopians. Ibn Battūta visited Aydhab in 726

---

755 Muhammad b. ʿAli Ibn Muyasir, *Akhbar al-Miṣr* [The history of Egypt], (Cairo: The French Institute, 1919), vol 1, 2; See also Ibrahim b. Muhammad Ibn Diqmaq, *Al-Jawhar Al-Thamīn fi al-Sīrat al-Khulafāʾ wa al-Mulūk wa al-Ṣalātīn* [The biography of the Caliphs, kings and Sultans], ed. Abdul Fatah ʿAshur, (Mecca: Um Al-Qura University Press, 1982).
A.H./1325 A.D.. The local ruler of Aydhab was called Al-Hadrābī, and the mukāṣ were divided in half for the agent of the Mamlūk Sultan Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn and the other half for Al-Hadrābī.\textsuperscript{758} Al-Maqrīzī (d.845 A.H./1442 A.D.) noted that the people of Aydhab benefitted from trade with pilgrims, although the people of Aydhab treated traders poorly; as a result, Ibn Battūta did not perform a pilgrimage through Aydhab again.\textsuperscript{759} After Aydhab, the pilgrims arrived at Jeddah’s port by ships called al-Jallab.\textsuperscript{760} The distance between Aydhab and Jeddah is approximately 200 miles and took around eight days.\textsuperscript{761}

At the beginning of the Mamlūk era, the Arab tribes rebelled in Upper Egypt and cut off the routes to Aydhab, so the traders stopped using the route. Turbulence continued along this route throughout the Mamlūk period. Al-Maqrīzī stated that in 767 A.H./1365 A.D. an Arab tribe called Al-’Akarmah revolted near the city of Manfalūṭ in Upper Egypt, and they cut off access and prevented traders from using this route.\textsuperscript{762} Most of these rebellions were protests against the Mamlūks’ rule and also because of the tribes’ need for financial resources; this became the best way for them to meet their financial needs. As a result, the pilgrimage route became an overland route through the Sinai Peninsula, and Aydhab continued to play its role only as a commercial station.

\textsuperscript{758} Ibn Baṭṭūta, \textit{Tuhfat al-Nudār}, 53.
\textsuperscript{759} Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Al-Mawā’id}, vol 1, 202.; Ibn Baṭṭūta, \textit{Tuhfat al-Nudār} , 53.
\textsuperscript{762} Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Al-Sulāk}, vol 3, 108.
The other maritime route runs from Cairo to the port of Kolzum (Suez port), and Nāṣir Khusrāw travelled to Mecca by this route in 439 A.H./1047 A.D. The port of Kolzum was an important commercial station for the Egyptian and Moroccan pilgrims and remained important until the mid-fifth century A.H. (tenth century A.D.). The port was destroyed because of the devastation that occurred following the crisis in the period of Fāṭimid Caliph Al-Mustanṣir. As a result, in 626 A.H./1228 A.D., Al-Ḥamawī described the port as being in a ruined condition. Nāṣir Khusrāw started his journey from Cairo to the port of Kolzum and then to the port of Al-Jar on the east coast of the Red Sea, and it took about fifteen days. Then the pilgrims continued their journey from Al-Jar by the land route to Medīnah and then to Mecca, which took about four days.

The port of al-Tur in the south of Suez was a commercial port in Sinai, but because of the Frankish wars the port was neglected and the port of Aydhab instead flourished. At the end of the Frankish wars, the port of al-Tur became active again and the main port for ships sailing to Jeddah, particularly after the turbulence on the way to Aydhab. It took about twenty days to travel from the port of Al-Tur to the port of Yanbu’, according to the Andalusian traveller Al-Qalaṣādī (d. 891 A.H./1487 A.D.) who said about his journey: ‘We travelled by ships from the port of Al-Tur in the sixteenth of Sha’bān (Islamic lunar

763 Nāṣir Khusrāw, Safarnama, 119.
764 Al-Ḥamawī, Mu’jam al-Buldān, vol 4, 387.
765 Nāṣir Khusrāw, Safarnama, 119.
766 Ibid, 119.
month) 851 A.H./1447 A.D. and arrived at Yanbu’ on Friday the seventh of Ramadan.\footnote{Abu Al-Ḥasan ʿAli Al-Qalaṣādī Al-Andalusi, \textit{Riḥlat al-Qalaṣādī [Al-Qalaṣādī’s Journey]}, (Tunis, The Tunisian Press Company, 1978), 130.} Al-Jazīrī also stated that the port of al-Tur was used during the reign of Sultan Qa‘it Bay (r.872–901 A.H./1468–1496 A.D.) in 897 A.H./1491 A.D.\footnote{Al-Jazīrī, \textit{Al-Durr al-Farā’id}, vol 2, 1172.} This gives us an idea of the continued importance of the port of Al-Tur as a trading station for the duration of the Ayyūbids’ and Mamlūks’ rule. The historian Ibn Iyās (d. 930 A.H./1522 A.D.) confirmed that in 911 A.H./1505 A.D. the Mamlūks sent the \textit{Kiswa} of Ka’aba to Mecca by ships from the port of al-Tur to the port of Jeddah.\footnote{Ibn Iyās, \textit{Badā’i al-Zuhūr}, vol 4, 89.} Al-Maqrīzī mentioned that the port of al-Tur was characterised by the presence of huge warehouses and customs facilities for the import of Indian trade, coming through the port of Jeddah twice each year.\footnote{Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Al-Sulūk}, vol 4, 823.} The Mamlūk authorities made a considerable effort to guard the convoys, traders and travellers who were using this route. Al-Tur continued to remain active until the end of the Mamlūk era, when the Portuguese fleet invaded the Indian Ocean and threatened the maritime shipping in the Red Sea after the Portuguese closed the entrance of Mandīb Strait and dominated Socotra Island.\footnote{Al-Himyari, \textit{Al-Rawd al-Mi‘ār}, 327; Ross, E. Denison. ‘The Portuguese in India and Arabia between 1507 and 1517’, \textit{Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland}, 4 (1921), 545–62.} So the port of Al-Tur collapsed in the first ten years of the tenth century A.H./sixteenth century A.D., until it became a deserted village and a rare passage of commercial convoys by overland and maritime routes.\footnote{Ibn Iyās, \textit{Badā’i al-Zuhūr}, vol 4, 207.}

In addition to the maritime route, the Egyptian and other pilgrimage caravans used overland routes from Egypt to Mecca. The Egyptian pilgrimage caravan
stopped using the overland route that ran from Cairo to Mecca across the Sinai Peninsula in the sixth century A.H/ twelfth century A.D., because of the Frankish presence and the danger to pilgrims and traders.\textsuperscript{773} As a result, the pilgrimage and trade caravans turned to the maritime route through Aydhab and Al-Tur in Egypt. However, Sultan Al-Ẓāhir Baybars (r. 658–676 A.H./1260–1277 A.D.) travelled to Mecca to perform the pilgrimage and began using the overland route, which was re-used as a route of pilgrimage and commerce because the Sultan secured it from the Frankish attacks.\textsuperscript{774} This route flourished in the Mamlūk era, and the Sultans were interested in improvements and the removal of obstacles: digging wells and setting up water tanks and maintaining facilities along the route.

Al-Maqrīzī referred to the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan in the Mamlūk era and its importance to the Mamlūk Sultanate. Al-Maqrīzī also mentioned that the officials of the pilgrimage caravan summoned people who intended to perform the Ḥajj in mosques and public places in the month of Rajab each year (the seventh lunar month in the Islamic calendar) by saying: ‘O Muslims, the pilgrimage season has begun, and the Sultan’s caravan will be equipped as usual and it will have horses and camels and supplies with it’.\textsuperscript{775} From this, we can deduce that the pilgrimage caravan was of interest to the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Sultans because it supported their political and religious legitimacy in the eyes of Muslims in Egypt. The pilgrimage caravan did not come out of Egypt without the assistance of a contingent from the Ayyūbids’ and Mamlūks’ army. In

\textsuperscript{774} Al-Jazīrī, \textit{Al-Durr al-Farā‘īd}, 282.
\textsuperscript{775} Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Al-Dāhāb al-Maṣḥbūk}, 11.
the Ayyūbid era, the soldiers protected the caravans from Frankish attacks, and from the risk of the Arab tribes who robbed the pilgrims in the Mamlūk era.776

After the pilgrimage caravan had been equipped with money, food and troops, the pilgrims gathered near Cairo, in a village called Birkat Al-Ḥajj located in the northeast of Cairo. This was considered an assembly point for the Egyptian, Moroccan, Andalusians and African pilgrims.777 Subsequently, the pilgrims moved from Birkat al-Ḥajj to a village called Ajroud; the distance between them is five days. The traveller Ibn Khurdadbiḥ (d. 912 A.H./1506 A.D.) reported that the village was very poor and had an old water well and its water was not fit for drinking.778 The pilgrims left Ajroud for the next village, Nakhil, and the historian Al-Nabūlsi (d. 1143 A.H./1731 A.D.) stated that this village was one of the most important commercial stations in Egypt. The Sultan, Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn, ordered the construction of a pool of water and water tanks in Nakhil village.779 The pilgrimage caravan moved from Nakhil to the city of Kolzum on the Red Sea coast and was replenished with supplies for the journey from Egypt to Ḥijāz; the city had commercial agencies and was an important port.780 Then, the caravan moved from Kolzum to the town of Ayla in the Sinai Peninsula, which is considered the Egyptian border and the beginning of Ḥijāz. Ayla was also considered an important

commercial centre, and flour, barley and hay were available in its markets.\footnote{Ahmad b. Wadhi Al-Zaqib, *Al-Buld\'an [the kingdoms]*, (Beirut, Dar Ilhya al-Turath al-Arabi, 1988), 98; Abu Ali Ahmd b. \text{`}Umar Ibn Rastah, *Al-A\text{'}laq al-Nafisah [The precious Necklaces]*, (Beirut, Dar Ilhya al-Turath al-Arabi, 1988), 166.} Ibn Tagri Bardi (d. 874 A.H./1470 A.D.) mentioned that the Sultan, Mu\text{h}ammad b. Qal\text{w}un, repaired the routes leading to Ayla because this town was primitive and very difficult for the pilgrimage and trade caravans.\footnote{Ibn Tagri Bardi, *Al-Nujum Al-Zahirah*, vol 9, 60.}

The caravan began the route from Ayla along the coast to the town of Tab\text{u}k in Northern Hij\text{z}. Then the pilgrims moved to the village of Muw\text{ay}l\text{h}, which was characterised by the presence of water and wells, orchards and a large fort, a garrison and warehouses of food.\footnote{Al-\text{`}Ayashi mentioned that it had markets and a marina for the ships coming from Suez and Jeddah and it sold dates, fish and whatever else travellers needed.\footnote{Al-\text{`}Ayashi, *Al-Rihlat al-\text{`}Ayashyi\text{'}a [Al-\text{`}Ayashi\text{'}s Journey]*, ed. Mu\text{h}ammad Sobhi, (Ribat, Dal Al-Maqrib press, 1977), 308.} After Al-Muw\text{ay}l\text{h}, the pilgrimage caravan passed through several small villages until it reached the city of Yanbu\text{'}, which is considered the most important station for the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan. Yanbu\text{'} was characterised by the presence of date palm farms and active markets, and the Maml\text{u}k Sultans sent ships from Egypt carrying grain and alms to the pilgrims and the poor people in Hij\text{z}.\footnote{Al-\text{`}Ayashi\text{'}s Journey, ed. Mu\text{h}ammad Sobhi, (Ribat, Dal Al-Maqrib press, 1977), 308.}

The pilgrimage caravan moved from Yanbu\text{'} to the village of Rabigh, which had big palm trees, farms and water wells, and a large market. Then, the pilgrims

\footnote{Al-\text{`}Ayashi\text{'}s Journey, ed. Mu\text{h}ammad Sobhi, (Ribat, Dal Al-Maqrib press, 1977), 308.}
moved from Rabigh to mīqāt, where the Egyptian, Moroccan and African pilgrims prepared to enter Mecca and wear the ritual dress (iḥrām) of Ḥajj. After three days, the caravan arrived at Kholais, which was one of the largest villages of Mecca, with water, farms and a military fortress, from where the pilgrims entered Mecca. Al-Fāṣi (d. 832 A.H./1429 A.D.) mentioned that the Sultan, Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn, was interested in Kholais and contributed funds to provide access to water there in 719 A.H./1319 A.D.

5.2.2 The Egyptian Pilgrimage Caravan (Mahmal)

The pilgrimage caravan or mahmal, is named after the camel that carries gifts and Kiswaĥ to Ka’aba in Mecca every year before the beginning of the pilgrimage season. Doris Behrens-Abouseif indicated that the first pilgrimage caravan appeared in the late Ayyūbid era and the beginning of the Mamlūk Sultanate when Shajar al-Durr, the wife of Sultan Najm al-Dīn Ayyūb, travelled to Mecca to perform the Ḥajj in 645 A.H./1247 A.D.. It is difficult to determine the date of the appearance of the mahmal, as a predecessor to the mahmal could have existed even before Islam was introduced. Prior to that, the Arabs blessed the Ka’aba and sent it gifts, but the mahmal in this official celebration and the great interest of the Sultans emerged in the Ayyūbid era centuries.

---

787 Ibn Jubayr, Rihlat Ibn Jubayr, 163; Al-‘Abdari, Al-Rihlat al-Maghribiyah, 166.
788 Al-Fāṣi, Al-‘Iqd al-Thāmin, vol 7, 76.
after Islam was introduced.

we can deduce several things: first, the importance of the *mahmal* pilgrimages to the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks because through it they could enhance their image as rulers of the Muslims. In addition, the preparation and money that was spent on it gave Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Sultans the religious legitimacy they sought. Moreover, through this *mahmal* and the military expedition accompanying it, the Sultans imposed their nominal or actual control over Mecca and Međīnah as the two holiest cities in Islam.

The *mahmal* was led by *Amīr Rakab al-Ḥajj*, also called Amīr al-Ḥajj (the leader of pilgrims), and he was primarily responsible for the *mahmal*. Al-Mawārdi noted that Amīr al-Ḥajj was responsible for several important things regarding the *mahmal*. First, Amīr al-Ḥajj was responsible for leading the pilgrims on their way to Mecca and arranging their accommodation on the route. Second, the Amīr led the *mahmal* through the best routes that had sufficient water for the pilgrims, camels and horses. Third, we believe the most important task of the Amīr was protecting the *mahmal* and pilgrims from possible dangers, such as those related to thieves, bandits and Arab tribes that were attacking the pilgrims.\(^{791}\)

Amīr al-Ḥajj had great prestige because of the military forces that

accompanied him and because he led the most important religious caravan. Ibn al-Athīr mentioned that in the Fāṭimid era, the Amīr al-Hajj, Badis b. Zirī, along with military forces, led the *mahmal* in 367 A.H./977 A.D. On his way to Mecca, some of the Arab tribes negotiated with Badis to refrain from attacking the *mahmal* in exchange for 50,000 dirhams. Amīr Badis rejected the condition, defeated the tribes and saved the pilgrims, and even the merchants who used this route, from danger.

In addition, Amīr al-Ḥajj interfered in the internal affairs of Mecca, as explained in the fourth chapter. For example, Al-Fāṣi mentioned that in 571 A.H./1175 A.D. the Abbāsid Caliph ordered Amīr Tughtekin b. Abdullāh, the Iraqi Amīr of the pilgrimage, to isolate the Sharif of Mecca, Mukthīr b. 'Isā, and supported his forces with catapults and weapons. Tughtekin defeated Sharif Mukthīr who escaped from Mecca, and Amīr al-Ḥajj issued a decision to appoint Sharif Qāṣim b. Muḥanna as the Sharif of Mecca. Sharif Qāṣim was incapable of managing the affairs of Mecca alone, so Tughtekin decided to appoint Sharif Dāwūd b. 'Isā, the brother of Sharif Mukthīr, to be the Sharif of Mecca and pledged to cancel all the taxes and *mukūs* imposed on the pilgrims.

---

793 This event is outside of the thesis’ chronological parameters, but Ibn Al-Athīr and Ibn Fahad, who were contemporary to the study’s chronology, mentioned this event in their works to clarify that the dangers on the pilgrimage caravan existed before the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk eras.


5.2.3 The Sharif of Mecca and the Pilgrimage Season

The Sharif of Mecca was considered the ruler of the Amirate of Ḥijāz and the Deputy of the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Sultans in Ḥijāz, as well as one of their agents. For the Principality of Mecca, the Sharif was responsible for security in the conduct of its affairs and enjoyed a direct relationship with the Mamlūk Sultan of Egypt. The historian Al-Khālidi (d. 937 A.H./1530 A.D.) described the Sharif of Mecca’s duties by saying ‘The Sharif of Mecca secures Mecca, saves its villages and its lands and secures its merchants and people who come and live there.’

The first and most important duty of the Sharif of Mecca was protecting the pilgrimage maḥmal and securing it once it entered his lands. The Mamlūk Sultans were also keen that the Sharif of Mecca should exercise power and influence over the Arab tribes along the pilgrimage route, to protect maḥmal and trade caravans from looting in periods lacking security and stability.

Protection for the pilgrimage maḥmal depended primarily on the relationship between the Sharif of Mecca and the Arab tribes with homes on the

---

797 Al-Jazīrī, Al-Durr al-Farā’īd, vol 1, 228.
pilgrimage routes. This relationship was based on common interests between the two parties, not from the desire of these tribes to help the Sharif of Mecca. The relationship was founded on money that was paid by the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Sultans to the tribes, and sometimes from the Sharif of Mecca to tribes in exchange for guarding the pilgrimage and trade caravans. Historical sources mention tribal raids on the pilgrimage and trade caravans; in 713 A.H./1313 A.D. the Banū Lam tribe in Ḥijāz raided the Egyptian pilgrimage mahmal at Tabūk, but the tribe was defeated by the Egyptian Amīr of the mahmal. In 719 A.H./1319 A.D. the Arab tribes raided the Iraqi pilgrimage caravan and killed and looted most of the pilgrims.

5.2.4 Natural Disasters and Their Impact on Pilgrimage

The natural disasters that afflicted Mecca during the reign of the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks led to the disruption and destruction of facilities and pilgrimage routes and the spread of diseases and epidemics. The heavy rains also caused floods and thereafter the outbreak of fires, which damaged the religious places of Mecca. These disrupted and even prevented the pilgrimage season, making it difficult to perform the Ḥajj rites in certain years.

A. Natural Disasters in Mecca and Medīnah

798 Al-Qalqashandi, Qalāʾīd Al-Jumān, 42–45, 90.
Although the Ḥijāz is famous for its general lack of rain, it is also quite famous for its torrents and floods, due to the fact that Mecca is located in a deep valley. For example, in 651 A.H./1253 A.D. at the end of the Ayyūbids’ rule and the beginning of the Mamlūks’, Mecca had a terrible flood that led to many deaths and destroyed many houses. In 669 A.H./1270 A.D., a large torrent occurred in Mecca, leading to a landslide that covered the mosque, making it difficult for people to pray that day. In 686 A.H./1287 A.D., a considerable torrent occurred in Mecca and damaged the roof of the Ka’aba, causing rain water to leak into the centre of the mosque; houses around the Ka’aba also collapsed. In 771 A.H./1370 A.D., a flood swept through Mecca, causing the Ka’aba to be closed from the beginning of the night until noon the next day. The flood led to the demolition of more than a thousand houses and the deaths of more than a thousand people; it also destroyed a trade caravan consisting of 40 camels.

In addition to floods, fires that occurred in Mecca and Medīnah in the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk eras caused major damage to the two holy mosques. In 651 A.H./1253 A.D., the Prophet’s mosque in Medīnah was burned and fire damaged the roof of the Prophetic room, which contains the tomb of the Prophet, and burned the pulpit from which the Prophet Muḥammad preached to Muslims. Al-Yafti’i (d. 768 A.H./1366

---

802 Al-Azraqi, Akhbār al-Makkah, vol 2, 214; Al-Fāṣi, Al-ʿIqd al-Thamīn, vol 1, 207.
803 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 1, 737; Ibn Al-Furat, Tārīkh al-Duwal wa al-Muluk, vol 8, 41.
804 Al-Azraqi, Akhbār al-Makkah, vol 2, 217.
805 Ibn Iyas, Badāi’ al-Zuhūr, vol 1, 291.
A.D.) reported that in 654 A.H./1256 A.D. Međinah was burned, which led to the collapse of many houses and damaged the Prophet’s mosque, while the fire burned the Prophetic room. Al-Suyūfī (d. 911 A.H./1505 A.D.) mentioned that in 686 A.H./1287 A.D. lightning struck the Prophet's mosque and burned the whole mosque, causing the roofs to collapse and damaging the Prophetic room, leading to the death and injury of many people.

B. Consequences of the Disasters

The most important impact on the pilgrimage season was the high price of commodities due to political circumstances and natural disasters that disrupted the conditions for the pilgrims. High prices were evident at the end of the Ayyūbid era, in 649 A.H./1251 A.D., and in the Mamlūk era, in 665 A.H./1266 A.D., significantly affecting people in Mecca. The high prices also affected the Arab tribes in Hijāz in those years because of the drought, and Al-Fāṣi confirmed that barley prices in Mecca reached three-quarters of a dinar, which he considered to be a significant increase in price. The historian Ibn Al-Furat (d. 807 A.H./1405 A.D.) noted that during the reign of Mamlūk Sultan Al-'Adil Kitbugha (r. 693–695 A.H./1294–1296 A.D.), the price of a gararit of wheat (equal to 100 bowls of wheat) was 480 dirhams. In addition, in 727 A.H./1327 A.D. prices rose in Međinah; a sā’ of wheat (3 Egyptian pounds) reached 18 dirhams.

---

809 Al-Fāṣi, Shifā’ al-Gharām, vol 2, 312.
810 Ibn Al-Furat, Tārīkh al-Duwwāl wa al-Mulāk, vol 8, 172; Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulâk, vol 1, 815.
which led to chaos in Medīnah, and many lootings occurred in the city for eight days.\textsuperscript{811} The historian Ibn Qāḍī Shahbah (d. 851 A.H./1447 A.D.) noted that one gararit of wheat had been sold in Mecca for 480 dirhams.\textsuperscript{812} These high prices in Mecca led to many deaths due to hunger and displaced many Meccan people. So, Amīr Yalba’ al-Atabik\textsuperscript{813} ordered that more than 2,000 ardib of wheat be sent to Mecca to be distributed to its people. In addition, he issued a decision to cancel all taxes imposed on pilgrims, with the exception of Yemeni Kārimī traders, the tax on horses and taxes on the Iraqi pilgrims.\textsuperscript{814} Amīr Yalba’ reimbursed the Sharif of Mecca with a fief in Egypt and gave him 40,000 dirhams.\textsuperscript{815} At the end of the Baḥrī Mamlūk era, Ibn Hājar (d. 852 A.H./1448 A.D.) reported high prices in Ḥijāz, which affected all kinds of foods; the price of wheat had risen in Medīnah to more than 400 dirhams.\textsuperscript{816}

The natural disasters in Mecca also led to the spread of epidemics and diseases in the city. As an example, Ibn Iyās reported that in 813 A.H./1410 A.D. massive swarms of locusts attacked Mecca then moved to the Levant and damaged many crops.\textsuperscript{817} In 837 A.H./1434 A.D., a great epidemic spread in Mecca and led to the deaths of

\textsuperscript{811} Shams Al-Dīn Muḥammad Al-Jazri, Hawādīth al-Zamān wa al-Abnā’īt wa al-Wafyāt al-Akabir wa al-‘Ayān min al-Abnā’īb, [the events of history and the biographies of notable people], ed. ‘Abdul Salam Tadmuri, (Beirut, Al-Maktabah Al-‘Arshiyah, 1998), vol 2, 179.

\textsuperscript{812} Taqi Al-Dīn Abū Bakr Ibn Qādi Shahbah, Tarīkh Ibn Qādi Shahbah [The History of Ibn Qadi Shahbah], ed. Adnan Darwish (Damascus, Al-Ma’had Al-‘Almi Al-Farancy l’ Al-Dirasat, 1997), vol 2, 261; Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 3, 97.

\textsuperscript{813} Yalba’ Al-Atabik was one of the most important Amīrs in the reign of Sultan Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn and had the title ‘Nizam Al-Mulk’. Al-Fāṣi mentioned that Yalba’ supported teaching the Sunni Ḥanafī jurisprudence in Mecca. Al-Fāṣi, Al-‘Iqd al-Thamīn, vol 2, 291; Ibn Fahad, Iḥaf al-Wara’, vol 3, 296.

\textsuperscript{814} Ibn Qādi Shahbah, Tarīkh Ibn Qādi Shahbah, vol 3, 65.

\textsuperscript{815} Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 3, 460.

\textsuperscript{816} Ibn Iyās, Badā’i al-Zuhūr, vol 3, 301.
thousands of people in the city and the number of those who died, both women and men, reached 50 people every day, according to Ibn Iyās. In 843 A.H./1439 A.D. an epidemic also occurred in Tā’if, a half-day distance from Mecca, and led to the deaths of many people and their cattle. Inevitably, these natural disasters in Ḥijāz had a serious effect on people's lives and disrupted the pilgrimage season and trade.

5.2.5 Mecca’s Markets in the Pilgrimage Season

Mecca was a thriving market throughout the year, because of its large number of immigrants, students and pilgrims. In addition, it was surrounded by villages and had many agricultural labourers and cattle herders. All these people came to Mecca daily to sell their animals, crops of grains, fruits and vegetables, and to buy what they needed from the commodities available in Mecca. The importance of this market increased in the pilgrimage and ’Umrah seasons, in the Rajabi ’Umrah (the seventh month in the lunar Islamic year) and in Dhu al-Ḥijjah, the pilgrimage month. Al-Idrīsī noted that the pilgrims spent most of their money during these two seasons and the merchants of Mecca also conducted most of their trade then, so the market became very active. During these two seasons, Mecca received many thousands of pilgrims and traders who came to perform the pilgrimage, along with trade.

---

818 Ibid, vol 1, 803.
Mecca was ready to receive many thousands of people, as the city’s economy depended on them; the city had markets and streets, hotels and ribāṭs that were used in the pilgrimage season as accommodation.\(^{821}\) Therefore, some Meccan people became quite rich as a result of their revenues, homes and livestock, in addition to what was available in the market from goods coming from the surrounding villages.\(^{822}\) Around the sacred mosque (al-Masjid al-Ḥarām) from al-Ṣafā to al-Marwān (two small hillocks in Mecca), Mecca had a market, which Nāsir Khusrāw (d. 480 A.H./1088 A.D.) described as one of the largest markets in Mecca.\(^{823}\) In the days during the pilgrimage season, the entire city of Mecca became a market where all kinds of commercial goods were sold, ranging from food to jewellery and gemstones.\(^{824}\) Nāsir Khusrāw described a large market on the east of the sacred mosque called Sūq al-ʻAṭṭārīn (the perfume market, and al-ʻAṭṭārīn were also pharmacists of that time) and said, ‘the market has beautiful buildings and all of the salesmen are ʻAṭṭārīn’.\(^{825}\) Al-Maqdīsī (d. 380 A.H./990 A.D.) reported that in the Mina area, around four kilometres from the sacred mosque, was a big market in the days of the pilgrimage and the market was two miles long.\(^{826}\) This market only lasted three days and consisted of shops, water wells and mosques.\(^{827}\)

We should also highlight some commercial goods that were sold in these

\(^{822}\) Al-Idrīsī, Nuzhāt al-Muṣḥāq, vol 1, 108.
\(^{823}\) Nāsir Khusrāw, Safarnama, 121.
\(^{824}\) Ibn Jubayr, Riḥlat Ibn Jubayr, 160.
\(^{825}\) Nāsir Khusrāw, Safarnama, 123.
\(^{826}\) Al-Maqdīsī, Aḥsan al-Taqāsim, 76.
\(^{827}\) Ibid, 77.
markets and during the pilgrimage season, which can be divided into two categories: food and luxury goods. Food, including fruit and vegetables - grapes, figs, pomegranates, melons, beans and eggplant - came to Mecca from Tā’if, even in the winter. Different types of raisins, honey, sugar cane and dates were sold. Animal products like milk, butter, cheese and meat were also available in Mecca. In addition, grain, barley and corn were sold, brought by most of the Arab tribes in Tā’if loyal to the Sharif of Mecca. Ibn Jubāyr described Mecca as the market of all luxury products integrating the east and west, including jewellery, rubies and gemstones. All kinds of perfumes were available, such as musk and camphor; Indian drugs and Iraqi, Yemeni, Persian and Moroccan goods were also sold.

It is important to note that Mecca’s market activity was as a result of the Arab tribes bringing their goods and selling them to Meccan merchants. Nāsir Khusrāw mentioned that the reason for this is the proximity of the tribes to Mecca and the ease of travelling there. In addition to the economic opportunities offered by the pilgrimage season, the Sarat Mountains, with their large farms and local markets, did not absorb the surplus production and at the same time, the people of these tribes wanted to buy what they needed from the goods available in Mecca. In addition to Nāsir Khusrāw’s explanation, this illustrates the reason for the people of Ḫijāz coming with their goods to

---

828 Nāsir Khusrāw, Safarnama, 124.
830 Ibn Baṭṭūta, Tuhfāt al-Nudār [Ibn Battuta’s Journey], 164.
833 Ibid, 67.
834 Nāsir Khusrāw, Safarnama, 112.
Mecca during this season and the rest of the year.

Therefore, trading activity in Mecca continued through the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk eras, and goods came from many Muslim countries and Muslims came to Mecca for pilgrimage and trade at the same time. Ibn Al-Mujāwir (d. 690 A.H./1291 A.D.) noted that the Meccan people were famous for being professional merchants, having a lot of money and knowing how to take advantage of the pilgrimage season. Mecca’s merchants bought all the goods from villages and tribes neighbouring Mecca and then resold the goods to the pilgrims during the pilgrimage seasons. That did not mean that the markets of Mecca flourished every year, as Mecca suffered civil strife and famine because of war and drought, often leading to a depressed market. When this was the case, Mecca depended solely on Egypt’s support in the shape of food, alms and supplies. Al-Maqrīzī and Ibn Fahad both reported that in 440 A.H./1048 A.D., the prices of goods became high in Mecca because of the drought, which prevented the Iraqi pilgrims from performing the pilgrimage that year.

5.3 The Port of Jeddah in Ḥijāz in the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Eras

Jeddah is a coastal city on the Red Sea that has drawn interest through the ages from

---

travellers, historians and geographers as the port serving Mecca since the reign of the Rāshidi Caliph Uthmān b. ’Affān (r. 23–35 A.H./644–656 A.D.). Historians have differed in their descriptions of Jeddah from one historical period to another, but they are unanimous in affirming its importance due to its strategic location on the Red Sea. Jeddah’s fortunes as a port city rose and fell with the tides of conflict and politics during the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk dynasties, finally falling when an explorer made one paramount discovery.

Some historians, such as Ibn al-Mujāwir, state that before the advent of Islam had reached the coast of Jeddah, the Persians built the city of Jeddah and made a wall to fortify it. Ibn Faraj (d. 1010 A.H./1601 A.D.) wrote that Jeddah was far, approximately one day away, from Mecca and that its people were wealthy traders. It had a trade season before the pilgrimage season; ships came to the port to sell goods for the pilgrimage season. Al-Tājībī (d. 730 A.H./1329 A.D.), who visited Jeddah in 696 A.H./1296 A.D., said Jeddah was considered the shipping hub where traders exchanged their goods with the people of ’Aden and Aydhab. Ibn Baṭṭūta, on his visit to Jeddah, said it was an ancient city on the seacoast that had been established by the Persians and had water wells.
These descriptions of Jeddah make it clear that it was a prosperous coastal city due to its developed port, which was considered the hub of Mecca’s trade. Moreover, Jeddah flourished for many reasons until it became one of the most important ports in the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk eras, along with others such as Aydhab and Suez. In the Mamlūk era, Jeddah was not only the main port of Mecca, it became the main port of the Ḥijāz region and for the Mamlūks on the eastern Red Sea coast. As far as the channelling of East-West trade through the Red Sea was concerned, the port of Jeddah had an important role in the transit trade. That was reflected in the boom of the Sharifate of Mecca and the Ashraf’s financial situation, particularly during the pilgrimage season, when markets in Mecca prospered.

5.3.1 Factors behind the Development of Jeddah

As we have said, Jeddah became a flourishing port in the Mamlūk era for several reasons. Maritime trade through the Red Sea was prosperous in the middle of the seventh century A.H./thirteenth century A.D., due to the political circumstances that affected land trade routes between China and Anatolia. The Mongols’ invasion of Persia and Iraq, the fall of Baghdad in 656 A.H./1258 A.D., and the invasion of Syria and Anatolia in 657 A.H./1259 A.D., disrupted the land trade routes, particularly after the Mongols

established their kingdom in Persia (the Ilkhanate dynasty). This invasion increased the number of bandits attacking trade caravans, making the land routes very dangerous. At the same time, the maritime trade route between East Asia and the Persian Gulf was weakened by the activities of pirates from Bahrain (the region that now extends from Basra to Qatar). The only secure route for trade ships was through the Red Sea, which dominated the trade routes when Sultan Baybars made his pilgrimage journey to Mecca in 667 A.H./1268 A.D.

Another factor in Jeddah’s rise was its relationship with Aden at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Aden had a major role in trade, including extending trade to the port of Jeddah. Aden was the most important commercial centre in the Indian Ocean. Trading ships came to Aden from India, China, Oman and Persia. Because of the importance of Aden’s trade, it was named the Passage of China. Ibn Baṭṭūta described the port of Aden as a large marina for ships in a fortified city surrounded by mountains. It had only one entrance and was considered a marina for the ships of India’s merchants and other people. The overall result was a rise of prosperity in Jeddah, and al-Idrīsī described the people of Jeddah as follows: ‘There are no people who are wealthy and in good situations in the cities of Mecca and Medīnah in Ḥijāz region except the Jeddah

847 Al-Fāṣi, *Al-Iqd Al-Thamīn*, vol 1, 177.
people.\footnote{Al-Iдрисй, Nuzhйt al-Mushtйq, vol 1, 138.}

The Ashrafs of Mecca were interested in Jeddah because of its proximity to Mecca and because of Jeddah’s importance to international trade through the Red Sea. Jeddah is also considered the ‘Ḥijāz Gate’ (al-mīqāt) for the pilgrims from Egypt, Morocco and Africa. The traveller Nāsir Khusrāw (d. 443 A.H./1051 A.D.) wrote that Jeddah’s governor was the deputy of the Sharif of Mecca, Taj Al-Mа’alі Abu Al-Futūḥ, and was appointed by him (r. 430-453 A.H./1038–1061 A.D.).\footnote{Nāsir Khusrāw, Safarnama, 135.} Ibn Jubāyr (d. 579 A.H./1183 A.D.) similarly wrote that the Sharif of Mecca had appointed Jeddah’s governor, and the most important responsibility of the governor was collecting taxes from the merchants coming to Jeddah.\footnote{Ibn Jubāyr, Riḥlat Ibn Jubāyr, 154.}

In some cases, the Ashraf of Mecca confiscated the goods of merchants who came to Jeddah, particularly if the Sharif was suffering from a financial crisis. For instance, Sharif Abu al-Futūḥ seized from the people of Jeddah the money of a dead merchant and did not entrust it to his heirs.\footnote{Ibn Fahad, Iḥhaf al-Wara’, vol 2, 437.} This was in 400 A.H./1011 A.D., after the Fāṭimid Caliph prevented Egypt from giving financial aid to Mecca because Abu al-Futūḥ declared insurgency against the Fāṭimid Caliph in Egypt and admitted the Abbāsid caliphate’s hegemony over Mecca.\footnote{Ibn Hazm, Jumharāt Anṣab al-’Arab, 54; Ibn Fahad, Iḥhaf al-Wara’, vol 2, 438.}
5.3.2 Jeddah’s Port during the Ayyūbids’ and Mamlūks’ Reign

Jeddah’s pivotal importance in the economic infrastructure of the entire region is demonstrated by the impact on its trade of the incessant clashes between members of the Ashraf and the Yemeni rulers. In 566 A.H./1171 A.D. the Sharif of Mecca, Malik b. Fulāytaḥ, confiscated money from Yemeni merchants who came to Jeddah via the maritime route, during the military conflict between Sharif Malik and his brother Sharif Ṭūs, in the Emirate of Mecca.⁸⁵⁶ It is likely that the Ashraf of Mecca subjected the merchants to much abuse during the seventh century A.H./thirteenth century A.D. This may be inferred from the fact that Sultan Baybars, during his pilgrimage to Mecca, demanded of the Sharif of Mecca, Muḥammad Abu Namā, in 667 A.H./1269 A.D. that he refrain from abusing merchants; this was in exchange for money offered by the Mamlūk Sultanate to the Sharif of Mecca.⁸⁵⁷

After the death of Sharif Abu Namā in 701 A.H./1301 A.D., the political situation deteriorated in the Sharifate of Mecca due to conflict between his sons over the emirate, and the incomes and revenues of the merchants of Mecca and Jeddah became insecure.⁸⁵⁸ Some Ashraf seized money from the merchants, particularly if the Ashraf needed it to buy the loyalty of the men who were fighting with them to gain power in

---

⁸⁵⁶ Al-Jazīrī, Al-Durr al-Frā‘id, vol 1, 270.
⁸⁵⁷ Al-Tājibī, Muṣṭafād al-Rihlat, vol 1, 306; Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 1, 579.
Mecca. The exclusion of merchants from travelling to Mecca and/or the confiscation of their money became important economic weapons used by many of the Ashraf of Mecca during the eighth century A.H./fourteenth century A.D. The Ashraf did this to force the Sharif of Mecca to leave his position, because it would lead to an acute shortage of financial resources available to him for his rule over Mecca. In 707 A.H./1308 A.D., during a war between the Amīr of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan and the slaves of the Hasanid Ashraf, the Ashraf took advantage of the war and looted the merchants’ money on the way from Jeddah to Mecca. 859

In 746 A.H./1345 A.D., Sharif Rumāyth b. Abu Namā died and his sons ‘Ajlan and Thuqba fought each other for the rule of Mecca. ‘Ajlan was victorious over his brother and ruled Mecca in 751 A.H./1350 A.D. Sharif Thuqba attacked merchants’ ships on the Red Sea and tried to take control of the port of Jeddah, to benefit from the taxes collected on goods and to control the caravans from Mecca to Jeddah. 860 In 752 A.H./1352 A.D., Sharif Thuqba took large amounts of tax money from the Yemeni merchants who came to Jeddah. 861 In 753 A.H./1353 A.D., Sharif ‘Ajlan took control of Jeddah, collected taxes from the merchants and refused to give his brother Sharif Thuqba his share. 862

In the same year, King Al-Mujāhid of the Rasūlid dynasty prevented the

Yemeni merchants from travelling to Mecca and Jeddah after he returned to Yemen from Egypt. The Egyptian pilgrimage Amīr had captured him in the pilgrimage season in 751 A.H./1351 A.D., and had jailed him in Cairo. As a result, Yemeni merchants stopped coming to Jeddah until 756 A.H./1355 A.D.. Throughout this period Mecca’s Sharif ‘Ajlan suffered from a financial crisis because Yemeni merchants were prevented from trading in Jeddah. In the same year, 756 A.H./1355 A.D., Sharif Thuqba and his brothers Sanad and Maqāmis attacked Jeddah and seized the ships anchored in the port and loaded with goods, in an effort to weaken their brother Sharif ‘Ajlan and force him to relinquish the Emirate of Mecca. In 762 A.H./1361 A.D., Sharif Sanad b. Rumāythα seized the ships that were in the port of Jeddah and distributed the money to the HasanidAshraf to gain their support against his brother Sharif ‘Ajlan.

By the end of the Baḥrī Mamlūk era, the merchants had suffered massive damage to their trade because of the conflict in 789 A.H./1387 A.D., between Sharif ’Alīb. ‘Ajlan and his cousin ’Anan b. Maqāmis. In the same year, Sharif Kubāysh besieged the city of Jeddah and confiscated three ships belonging to the Kārimī merchants who had arrived in Jeddah from Yemen. According to Al-Fāṣi, the value of the goods carried by the ships that were stolen by Sharif Kubāysh was about 600,000 gold dinars. In addition, Sharif ’Anan b. Maqāmis looted money from the Yemeni
merchants who were residing in Jeddah in late 789 A.H./1388 A.D. Moreover, in 795 A.H./1392 A.D. in the era of Al-Sharif ’Alī b. ‘Ajlan, some Hasanid Ashraf seized money from merchants who were travelling overland from Jeddah to Mecca. This forced the merchants to stop using the land route to Mecca; they travelled instead to Yanbu‘ due to the unrest in Jeddah and used the alternative route leading to Mecca.

5.3.3 Jeddah’s Prosperity and Decline after the Bahrī Mamluks’ Reign

The port of Jeddah developed and flourished in the Circassian Mamlūk era and in the era of Sharif Ḥasan b. ‘Ajlan, in the first quarter of the ninth century A.H./fifteenth century A.D. The reason for this boom was the instability in Asia after the fall of the Ilkhanate in Persia; this pushed the merchants to use the maritime route through the port of Aden to Jeddah and other ports on the Red Sea. Trade movement in the port of Aydhab began to weaken because of the disturbances that were provoked by the Arab tribes who looted trade caravans on the overland route from Cairo to Aydhab. When the Circassian Mamlūk Sultans failed to impose control over the Arab tribes, the trade route moved from Aydhab to the Red Sea ports, and Jeddah was the most important of these. In 799 A.H./1397 A.D. Sharif Ḥasan b. ‘Ajlan cancelled a third of the taxes that were levied on the merchants in Jeddah; he also worked on improving security in Jeddah and trade activity in the port to maintain the position of the merchants. The result was the

---

871 Al-Fāṣi, *Al-‘Iqd Al-Thamīn*, vol 6, 212.
872 The Circassian Mamlūk era is not in the timeline of the study; however, I am highlighting it to illustrate the decline of Jeddah’s port.
874 Fadl Hasan, *The Arabs and Sudan* (Khartoum: Khartoum University, 1973), 76.
875 Ibid, 79.
return of the Yemeni merchants to Jeddah and Mecca. The Sharif’s *mukūṣ* revenues from the merchants increased.\(^{876}\)

The port of Jeddah began to decline in the late ninth century A.H./fifteenth century A.D.. This decline had three predominant causes. The first was an economic factor: the arbitrariness in tax collections in the port of Jeddah, which prompted the merchants to return to doing business in the port of ’Aden. Contributing to this, the Taḥīrid rulers in Yemen (r. 858–945 A.H./1454–1538 A.D.) worked to promote the commercial position of ’Aden over Jeddah and this led ’Aden to become one of the most important ports in the Indian Ocean in that period.\(^{877}\) The decline of Jeddah escalated after 902 A.H./1497 A.D., in spite of Sultan Qaytbay’s *marsum* (edict) to the Sharif of Mecca and his deputy in Jeddah to take measures that would force the Indian merchants to stop in Jeddah instead of ’Aden.\(^{878}\)

The second factor that led to the collapse of the port of Jeddah was the political conflict that followed the death of Sharif Muḥammad b. Barakāt in 903 A.H./1497 A.D.. The conflict between Sharif Barakāt and Aḥmad Al-Jazānī ultimately led to the exposure of Jeddah and its port to looting and attacks on pilgrims and merchants via the land route between Mecca and Jeddah.\(^{879}\) Finally, the port of Jeddah collapsed commercially after Vasco da Gama (d. 930 A.H./1524 A.D.) successfully

---

\(^{877}\) Meloy, *Imperial Power and Maritime Trade*, 191.
reached the Cape of Good Hope and arrived in India without passing through the Red Sea in 904 A.H./1498 A.D. This Portuguese explorer’s achievement led to the Portuguese and other Europeans taking control of the spice trade and to the collapse of the Mamlūk ports, damaging the port of Jeddah and the Mamlūk government more generally.  

5.4 Taxes in Ḥijāz in the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Eras (Mukūs)

*Mukūs* is taxes that are imposed on people with no Islamic basis (secular laws), so they are not legitimate religious laws. The Ashraf of Ḥijāz imposed them on goods coming into Ḥijāz. Ibn Jubāyr noted that before Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s era, *mukūs* was taken from pilgrims and traders at the port of Aydhab, and if *mukūs* was not taken from them in Aydhab, it would be taken from them at the port of Jeddah. Ibn Jubāyr added that if a pilgrim or trader refused to pay *mukūs*, the Sharif of Mecca’s agents would bar them from pilgrimage or trade, and they may even have been tortured.

5.4.1 Regional Mukūs in Ḥijāz and Ashraf Policy on Imposing Mukūs

---


Jeddah was affiliated with the Sharif of Mecca and the agent of the Sharif of Mecca in Jeddah’s port managed the *mukūs*. This agent was responsible for guarding the port, and looking after the needs of the people who worked in it, and for collecting alms in addition to the *mukūs*. The *mukūs* that was collected from traders and pilgrims in Jeddah helped the Sharif of Mecca to protect and secure the route from Jeddah to Mecca.

The port of Jeddah was in this period the main port in Ḥijāz for Mecca to collect *mukūs* following the establishment of the Emirate of Ashraf in the fourth century A.H./tenth century A.D.. Thus, the traders who arrived at Jeddah paid *mukūs* on goods they traded to the deputy of the Sharif of Mecca in Jeddah. Al-Istakhri (d. 340 A.H./951 A.D.) stated that *mukūs* in Jeddah’s port was one dinar for baskets of saffron, two dinars for wheat and two dinars for wool.\(^884\) Al-Maqdisī (d. 380 A.H./990 A.D.) noted that the deputy of the Sharif of Mecca took a half dinar for each camel carrying wheat and three dinars for clothing.\(^885\)

There was also *mukūs* imposed on pilgrims who came to Mecca through the port of Jeddah. For example, in 696 A.H./1296 A.D., the deputy of the Sharif of Mecca in Jeddah was responsible for collecting *mukūs* from pilgrims at the port. Al-Tajibī (d. 730 A.H./1329 A.D.) mentioned that the *mukūs* was imposed on pilgrims’ food and materials, and they paid a quarter of the value of what they carried.\(^886\)


paid mukās at the port of Jeddah starting from the Fāṭimids’ rule in Mecca in the fourth century A.H/ tenth century A.D.; the traveller Ibn Ḥawqal (d. 367 A.H./977 A.D.) wrote: ‘In the port of Sirin, the agents of the Sharif of Mecca were taking mukās from pilgrims and merchants, which was one dinar on each camel and one dinar on each basket of saffron, and for slaves [it was] the same amount’.887

It seems that the Sharif of Mecca collected those mukās at this time because Sirin port was under his control. There is no evidence of mukās collection from this port in the Mamlūk era, because Sirin port was not a source of taxes for the Emirate of Mecca during this period. Ibn Shahīn (d. 893 A.H./1487 A.D.) noted that Yanbu’ was the second port to Mecca after Jeddah and that the ships came to Yanbu’ from Egypt with supplies and the deputy of the Sharif collected the taxes in Yanbu’ reaching approximately 30,000 dinars annually.888

In addition to mukās collected by the Sharif of Mecca from the pilgrims and traders in Jeddah, he also collected mukās from areas surrounding Mecca. These mukās was not collected consistently and it varied according to the political and economic situation of Mecca. The Ashraf were not wholly dependent on the mukās levied on trade and pilgrimage, they had other sources from which to collect mukās. The Sharif of Mecca controlled some of these areas at certain times, such as the city of Haly (south

887 Abu Al-Qāṣim Ibn Ḥawqal, Sūrat al-Ard [the Image of the Earth], (Beirut, Maktbat Al-Hayat, 1979), 33.
888 Ibn Shahīn Al-Dāhiri, Zubdat Kashf Al-Mamalik, 16.
of Mecca), so the Sharif imposed *mukūs* on farms every year, when it was under his domination.\textsuperscript{889} For instance, in 763 A.H./1361 A.D., the Sharif of Mecca ‘Ajlan b. Rumāytha imposed *mukūs* on the Amīr of Haly, Aḥmad b. ’Īsā al-Ḥarāmi, after Sharif ‘Ajlan defeated him in the battle of Qahzah, near Haly.\textsuperscript{890} When Sharif ‘Ajlan wanted to increase the *mukūs* on Amīr Al-Ḥarāmi, the Amīr refused and came close to starting a war between the Sharif and Al-Ḥarāmi. However, they negotiated a settlement and ended hostilities when the Sharif persuaded al-Ḥarāmi to pay a little more than the regular *mukūs*, which was less than the Sharif wanted.\textsuperscript{891}

In addition, the Sharif of Mecca took *mukūs* from the people of Murr Valley (Fāṭīmaḥ Valley), which was famous for its palm farms. So, when the Sharif of Mecca suffered from a financial crisis, he came to the Murr Valley and collected the *mukūs* personally from the local people. In 755 A.H./1354 A.D. Yemeni-Ḥijāzi relations were soured because the Sharif of Mecca arrested the Rasūlid King of Yemen, al-Mujāḥid, in the pilgrimage season.\textsuperscript{892} When the Yemeni king was released and returned to Yemen, Al-Mujāḥid then prevented traders from travelling to Mecca. Sharif ‘Ajlan b. Rumāytha had a financial crisis and went to the Murr Valley. He imposed a *mukūs* of 2–4 dirhams on palm farmers for each palm in the Nakhīl village.\textsuperscript{893} Despite the fact that the people were his own subjects he used force, later he invaded the area because its people

\textsuperscript{889} Al-Fāṣi, *Shifāʿ al-Gharām*, vol 1, 43.
\textsuperscript{891} Ibn Fahad, *Ithāf al-Wara‘*, vol 2, 188.
\textsuperscript{893} Al-Fāṣi, *Al-‘Iqd Al-Thamīn*, vol 6, 64.
refused to pay the *mukūs* and he collected the *mukūs* and supplies by coercion, in 762 A.H./1360 A.D..  

### 5.4.2 Interventions by Outside Regimes on *Mukūs* in Ḥijāz during the Reigns of the Ayyūbids and Baḥrī Mamlūks

Interventions on *mukūs* in Ḥijāz by outside powers were frequent and they were shaped by their goals in the region, as well by domestic pressures in both Egypt and Yemen’. When Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn became the deputy of Sultan Nūr ad-Dīn Maḥmūd, he cancelled most of the Fāṭimid *mukūs* that was taken from the people of Egypt and Ḥijāz in 567 A.H./1171A.D.. The decision was made to gain the support of the Egyptians who followed the doctrine of the Fāṭimids, the Shi‘īte Ismā‘īli, and to encourage them to become Sunnīs. Abu Shama (d. 665 A.H./1267 A.D.) mentioned that 88 *mukūs* were cancelled by Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn, and proceeds amounted to around 100,000 dinars, in addition to the pilgrims’ *mukūs* that were cancelled after he took power in Egypt in the same year. Ibn Fahad (d. 885 A.H./1480 A.D.) mentioned that the reason for cancelling the pilgrimage *mukūs* was that when Sheikh ʽAlwan Al-ʽAṣadi arrived in Jeddah from Egypt to perform the Ḥajj (ʽAlwan had a close relationship with Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn), the agent of Sharīf Mecca in Jeddah asked him to pay the pilgrimage *mukūs*. The Sheikh refused to pay the *mukūs* and wanted to return without performing the pilgrimage. Sharīf Mukṭhīr b. ʽIsā was afraid of this due to ʽAlwan’s relationship with Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn, and ordered

---

’Alwan’s release and excused him from paying the *mukūs* and allowed him to go to Mecca. When Sheikh ’Alwan arrived in Mecca, Sharif Mukthīr complained to him about the economic conditions of Mecca and how the average income was far too low; it was this that obliged him to impose *mukūs* on the pilgrims. Sheikh ’Alwan wrote a letter to Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn in Egypt, who then abolished the tax and compensated the Sharif of Mecca with an annual subsidy.\(^{897}\)

Ibn Tagri Bardi (d. 874 A.H./1470 A.D.) commented that Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn gave the Sharif of Mecca 2,000 dinars as an annual salary and a thousand ardid of wheat and fiefs in Egypt and Yemen; the total crops from those fiefs were 8000 ardid of wheat, sent to the Sharif in Mecca every year to compensate for the *mukūs* he had agreed not to impose.\(^{898}\) It was customary for the Sharif of Mecca to take 7.5 dinars from each pilgrim. No pilgrims were allowed to enter Mecca without paying this *mukūs*; otherwise the Sharif’s troops would imprison them and not release them until the end of the pilgrimage season.\(^{899}\)

The cancelling of *mukūs* continued throughout the reign of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn, but they were again imposed during the reign of Al-’Adil Sayf al-Dīn Abu Bakr in 635 A.H./1237 A.D.. In addition, the successors of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn neglected to send the amount promised to the Ashraf of Mecca that had led the Sharif to give up the right to collect *mukūs* from the pilgrims and merchants. As we have seen, after the Ayyūbids’ rule over

---


\(^{898}\) Ibn Tagri Bardi, *Al-Nujūm Al-Zāhirah*, vol 6, 79.

Mecca, the Rasūlids of Yemen dominated Mecca, particularly during the Mamlūks’ internal conflict at the beginning of their rule. When the Banū Rasūl dominated Mecca, King Al-Mansour ʿUmar cancelled the pilgrimage and trade mukūs in 639 A.H./1241 A.D..\textsuperscript{900} The marsum (decision) to cancel the mukūs was put up on the Ka’aba wall and remained until 646 A.H./1248 A.D. when the mukūs was again imposed on pilgrims and merchants by the Sharif of Mecca with the agreement of Muḥammad b. al-Musayyab, the deputy of Sultan al-Mansour in Mecca.\textsuperscript{901}

In the Mamlūk era, the mukūs were collected in the port of Jeddah for the Sharif of Mecca, whether he ruled Mecca alone or, equally, if there was another Sharif who shared the rule. Al-Maqrīzī (d.845 A.H./1442 A.D.) reported that in 753 A.H./1352 A.D., Sharif ʿAjlan arrived at Jeddah to collect mukūs, and when Sharif Thuqba gained knowledge of this, he sent word to ʿAjlan to request his portion of the mukūs, but ʿAjlan refused to give him anything.\textsuperscript{902} Al-Fāṣi (d. 832 A.H./1429 A.D.) wrote that when Sharif ʿAjlan shared in the ruling of Mecca with his son Aḥmad, in 763 A.H./1361 A.D., Sharif ʿAjlan gave Aḥmad 25 per cent of the annual mukūs of Mecca, and thereafter ʿAjlan gave him half of the mukūs.\textsuperscript{903} The mukūs that was taken from the merchants in Jeddah was not cancelled in Sharif ʿAjlan’s reign along with the other mukūs. In 766 A.H./1364 A.D., Sharif ʿAjlan agreed to cancel the mukūs in the emirate of Mecca except those in the port

\textsuperscript{900} Ibn Ḥātim, Sīmt al-Ghali Al-Thāmīn, 217; Al-Khazraji, Al-ʿQud al-LuʿLuyah, vol 1, 65.
\textsuperscript{901} Al-Fāṣi, Al-ʿIqd Al-Thāmīn, vol 1, 386; Ibn Fahad, Ghayat al-Maram, vol 1, 319.
\textsuperscript{902} Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulāk, vol 2, 887; Ibn Fahad, İthaf al-Wara’, vol 3, 257.
\textsuperscript{903} Al-Fāṣi, Al-ʿIqd Al-Thāmīn, vol 3, 88.
of Jeddah and those collected from Kārimī merchants who came from Yemen. The mukūs that was paid by merchants in Jeddah was set at a rate of 10 per cent of the value of their goods.

In 667 A.H./1268 A.D., Sharif Abu Namā defeated Sharif Idrīs b. 'Alī from Mecca and became the Sharif of Mecca. Sultan Baybars placed conditions on Abu Namā to be flexible with the worshippers in Ka’aba and not oppress them by abusing his judicial powers, and to allow the visitors to visit the Ka’aba by day or night. When Sultan Baybars arrived in Mecca in the same year, Sharif Abu Namā pledged to the Sultan to cancel all mukūs on the Egyptian and Syrian pilgrims arriving at Mecca, regardless of whether they were notables, merchants or poor people.

It is clear from Sharif Abu Namā’s pledge that Abu Namā and his successors were not allowed to take mukūs from pilgrims, including those from Egypt and Syria, who were under the rule of the Mamlūks. The amount of mukūs imposed on pilgrims coming from Yemen by land was 30 dirhams on each camel, compared with 50 dirhams on each camel of the Egyptian pilgrims. The sources do not give us the reason for the difference between the Yemen and Egyptian mukūs, but I think that the reason was the political relations between the Mamlūks and the Rasūlids: the Mamlūks did not

904 Al-Fāṣi, Shiḥā’ al-Gharām, vol 2, 389; Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 3, 98; Al-Jazīrī, Al-Durr al-Farā’īd, vol 1, 664.
906 Ibn Fahad, Iḥāf al-Wara’, vol 3, 94.
want to make a problem with the Rasūlid government. When Sultan Baybars made a pilgrimage to Mecca in 667 A.H./1268 A.D., he abolished all *mukūs* and gave the Sharif of Mecca 20,000 dirhams annually.\(^ {908}\) It seems that Abu Namā received money regularly from Sultan Baybars, but Abu Namā imposed *mukūs* when the annual stipend was cut after Sultan Baybars’ death. *Mukūs* was abolished until 683 A.H./1284 A.D., when Abu Namā imposed it again on pilgrims from Egypt and Yemen at the amount of 30 dinars.\(^ {909}\)

The Ashraf of Mecca cancelled the *mukūs* from time to time to placate the Mamlūk Sultans in Egypt and to obtain financial compensation from Egypt. Al-Khazraji (d.812 A.H./1410 A.D.) mentioned that in 704 A.H./1304 A.D., the Ashraf of Mecca Humāydah and Rumāytha, the sons of Abu Namā, cancelled part of the *mukūs*.\(^ {910}\) Ibn Fahad also noted that, in 746 A.H./1345 A.D., in the era of the Sharif ‘Ajlan b. Rumāytha, justice and safety prevailed in Mecca, and he cancelled a quarter of the *mukūs* on the pilgrims.\(^ {911}\) It is noted that the Ashraf of Mecca cancelled *mukūs* in the years that the Mamlūk Sultans made a pilgrimage and compensated the Sharif of Mecca with money. For example, in 719 A.H./1319 A.D., Sultan Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn arrived in Mecca for pilgrimage and cancelled all *mukūs* in Mecca and compensated the Sharif of Mecca with fiefs in Egypt and Syria.\(^ {912}\)

\(^{908}\) Ibn Fahad, *Ithaf al-Wara’*, vol 3, 93.


5.5 Kārimī Trade in Ḥijāz during the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Eras

5.5.1 The Origins of Kārimī Trade

Historians disagree about the meaning of the word Kārimī. Some interpret the word as referring to the Kārimīk, a group of merchants who worked in the spice trade of India and the Far East. Al-Qalqashândī posited that Kārimī was derived from Kanem, a region including parts of present-day Sudan and Chad. Al-Maqrīzī (d. 845 A.H./1442 A.D.) believed that Kārimīk and Kārimī were derived from the name of a spice pronounced kararima in the Amharic language. The spice was later pronounced ‘Kārim’, and the form Kārimī was used to refer to the spice merchants.

The Red Sea ports flourished during the Fāṭimid Dynasty, when Syrian goods came into the port of ’Aqaba (south of Jordan) to be exported to Egypt, Ḥijāz, Africa, India and China. The Fāṭimids created a council of taxes (Diwan al-Mukūṣ) to tax the import and export of goods. The Fāṭimid authorities also worked to secure trade activity in the Red Sea, to protect sea trade from pirates and to protect commercial

---


915 Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulāk*, vol 1, 899.

caravans crossing the desert from Bedouin raids.\textsuperscript{917} Fāṭimid policy towards Eastern and Western merchants increased the influence of the ports of Aydhab and Qus, as merchants came to prefer the Egyptian commercial markets. The Fāṭimid dynasty’s protection of fleets and ports against pirates may be seen in Al-Qalqashāndī’s writing, which mentions a Fāṭimid fleet of ships in Aydhab charged with protecting Kārimī merchant ships from pirates raiding ships in islands in the Red Sea.\textsuperscript{918}

Aden, a port city in Yemen, was the trade centre of the Kārimī traders in the Fāṭimid era, when Indian merchants exported spices to Aydhab during certain seasons of the year. The Fāṭimids benefited from the loyalty of the rulers of Yemen and Ḥijāz to secure the interests of Kārimī merchants in the Red Sea and to strengthen trade relations with Ḥijāz.\textsuperscript{919} In 510 A.H./1116 A.D., the Franks took advantage of the Fāṭimid garrison’s weakness and occupied the Port of Ayla. The Franks remained in control of the port and were a threat to trade in the Red Sea until 566 A.H./1171 A.D., at which time the Ayyūbid army regained control of the port.\textsuperscript{920} As part of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s conflict with Nūr ad-Dīn Zengī, his brother, Turan Shah, conquered Yemen in 569 A.H./1174 A.D..\textsuperscript{921} Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn was aware of the importance of Yemen in the Kārimī trade in the Red Sea and sought to protect Kārimī trade in the port of Aden.

\textsuperscript{918} Al-Qalqashāndī, \textit{Subh al-A’Shā}, vol 3, 524.
\textsuperscript{919} See, Mely, \textit{Imperial Power and Maritime Trade}, 68–70.
\textsuperscript{921} Ibid, vol 2, 177.
5.5.2 Kārimī Trade in the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Eras

The Ayyūbids sought to keep control over Ḥijāz to maintain its religious position and to protect Egyptian trade in the Red Sea, the most active sea for Kārimī merchants. But the Rasūlids in Yemen were not content with control over Yemen; they challenged the Ayyūbids to gain control over Ḥijāz as well. The Kārimī trade in the port of Aden increased the Rasūlids’ wealth, as well as their political and economic influence on the Ashraf of Mecca. The Rasūlids were keen to protect Kārimī trade in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean and fostered relations with India, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and China, establishing consulates to that end.

During the Ayyūbids’ rule, the port of Yanbu’ emerged as the main port of Medīnah. The Ayyūbids bought the port from the Husaynids’ Ashraf of Yanbu’ in 621 A.H./1222 A.D., for 4000 mithqal (17,000 grams) of gold. The port of Yanbu’ contributed heavily to the Kārimī trade in the Red Sea; the port’s annual revenue was estimated at 30,000 dinars. Kārimī goods such as pepper and spices, clothing, silk, wood, sugar and toiletries came through ’Aden on their way to Italian cities. However,

---

925 Ibid, 90.
spices remained the most important commodities of Kārimī merchants. The merchants achieved a significant position in the Middle Ages, particularly during the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk dynasties; they formed an important social class of great wealth and communicated with rulers and Sultans. Kārimī merchants financed schools, religious buildings and ribāṭs in Egypt and Ḥijāz.

At the beginning of the Mamlūk dynasty, Sultan Baybars sought to reinforce the rule of the Mamlūk Sultanate to save the new regime and protect it from external and internal threats. Sultan Qalāwūn (r. 678–689 A.H./1279–1290 A.D.) sought to stimulate trade in the Red Sea and establish Egypt as a commercial link between the East and the West. This strategy required the protection of trade caravans from thieves and pirates, both in Egypt and on the Red Sea. Arab tribes who lived along pilgrimage and trade routes were a particular threat to trade and pilgrim caravans. The Sultan also established a trade policy to encourage commerce in the Red Sea, ordering his deputies to conduct business with traders and enforce justice in cities.

The Mongol invasion of western Asia in 656 A.H./1258 A.D. disrupted trade in central Asia, but also increased the significance of the Red Sea as a line of

---

929 Ibid, 287.
communication between East and West. The Red Sea was located far from combat zones and merchants continued to use it until the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope by the Portuguese in the late ninth century A.H./fifteenth century A.D. The Mamlūks, particularly the Bāhri Mamlūks, followed the Ayyūbids’ policies of strengthening commercial activity in the Red Sea and levying taxes on pilgrims and merchants. Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ordered the Sharif of Mecca to discontinue taxing pilgrims and compensated the Sharif with money and fiefs in Egypt and Syria.\footnote{930} The Mamlūks also issued a decision in 766 A.H./1365 A.D., to discontinue taxing pilgrims and merchants, with the exception of \textit{mukūs} on the Kārimī and Iraqi merchants and horses. The Mamlūks compensated the Sharif of Mecca with fiefs in Egypt and 400,000 silver dirhams.\footnote{931}

When Mamlūk Sultan Baybars conquered Ḥijāz, he gave Sharif of Mecca Muḥammad Abu Namā a large fund on the condition that he did not tax merchants.\footnote{932} The Mamlūk Sultans provided aid to the Ashraf of Mecca to protect Kārimī merchants from harassment, and gave their approval to the large \textit{mukūs} that was imposed on them in the pilgrimage season to promote trade in Egypt and Ḥijāz.\footnote{933}

To protect the merchants in Nubia and southern Egypt, Sultan Baybars invaded all the areas that threatened Kārimī trade. For instance, while the Mamlūk Sultanate was engaged in a war with the Mongols, King David of Nubia attacked the port

of Aydhab and looted Kārimī merchants in 670 A.H./1272 A.D., and 674 A.H./1275 A.D. Consequently, Sultan Baybars funded an expedition led by Amīr Qarasunqer, who defeated the Nubian King, released the prisoners and presented the recovered booty to Sultan Baybars. In 716 A.H./1316 A.D., Arab tribes attacked messengers of the Rasūlid King who were carrying gifts from the King of Yemen to Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad in Aydhab. Sultan al-Nāṣir funded two expeditions to discipline the Arab tribes, prevent their attacks on trade caravans and secure Kārimī merchants.

In 717 A.H./1317 A.D., the Banū Kanz, an Arab tribe, threatened the trade route between Aydhab and Qus (on the Nile) and cut the trade route between Egypt and Yemen. Sultan Muḥammad financed an expedition led by Prince Maqaltay, who defeated the Banū Kanz and secured the route between Aydhab and Qus, and Yemen and Egypt. However, the Arabs continued to attack the Kārimī merchants in Aydhab. In 720 A.H./1320 A.D. Arab tribes attacked the port of Aydhab and killed the agent of Sultan al-Nāṣir. Sultan al-Nāṣir financed a substantial expedition led by Amīr ’Aqūsh al-Mansūrī, who defeated the Arab tribes and imposed Mamlūk control over Aydhab and the trade route from Aydhab to Cairo.

936 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 2, 162.
938 Salem, The Red Sea, 95.
During the reign of Sultan Sha’bān (764–778 A.H./1363–1377 A.D.), in 766 A.H./1365 A.D., Sha’bān ordered Sharif ‘Ajlan to cease imposing mukūs on the Kārimī merchants and prohibited him from taxing any commodities sold in the markets of Mecca. Sultan Sha’bān then compensated Sharif ‘Ajlan with 160,000 dirhams and 1000 ardib of wheat annually from Egypt.\textsuperscript{939} In spite of the transformation of the pilgrimage route since 666 A.H./1267 A.D., from a sea route to an overland route through the Sinai Peninsula, the ports of Aydhab and Qus continued as centres of Kārimī trade until 760 A.H./1358 A.D.. Subsequently, Kārimī merchants were forced to operate through the ports of Jeddah and Suez by the continued existence of large number of bandits in Aydhab.\textsuperscript{940}

Kārimī merchants understood Yemen’s significance as a centre of trade between the Indian Ocean and Red Sea, and they promoted their commercial and social influence in Yemen and Egypt throughout the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk eras. They had access to the highest position in the kingdom of Yemen, such as Minister Yahyā b. Abdullāh Al-Tirkī.\textsuperscript{941} The Kārimī merchants lent Egyptian and Yemeni Sultans large amounts of money because of the significance of the Kārimī commercial companies, financial institutions, commercial fleets and warehouses in the major ports in the Red Sea and Yemen.\textsuperscript{942}

\textsuperscript{939} Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Al-Sulūk}, vol 2, 340.
\textsuperscript{940} Salim, \textit{The Red Sea}, 87.
\textsuperscript{941} Al-Shamrookh, \textit{The Commerce and Trade}, 140.
Kārimī merchants were also able to take advantage of political differences between the Yemeni rulers and the Mamlük Sultans in Egypt. The merchants appealed to the Egyptian Sultans if they were harassed in their trade in Yemen, and they received the Sultans’ support. For instance, in 704 A.H./1304 A.D., a delegation of the Egyptian Kārimī merchants came to Sultan Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn to complain of high mukūs on their trade by the Rasūlid King, al-Mu‘āyyad, in Yemen. Sultan Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad wrote a threatening letter to the King of Yemen, demanding that he stop taxing the Kārimī merchants, but King al-Mu‘āyyad continued his policy of oppression of Egyptian merchants. 943

5.5.4 Kārimī Merchants’ Role in Supporting the Ayyūbid and Mamlük Sultanates

The wealth of Kārimī merchants enabled them to establish themselves politically and socially in the Kingdoms in which they traded, and they lent significant funds to the Mamlük Sultanate to support war efforts and carry out interior projects. In 687 A.H./1288 A.D. Kārimī merchant Abu Bakr ’Atīq provided a loan to Sultan Ashraf Khalil (r. 689–693 A.H./1290–1293 A.D.) to wage war against the Franks. 944 Some Kārimī merchants even repaid loans that the Mamlük Sultans had borrowed from Frankish merchants. For instance, in 711 A.H./1311 A.D. Kārimī merchants paid 16,000 dinars to Frankish

944 Ibid, vol 1, 73.
merchants in repayment of a loan on behalf of Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad. In 753 A.H./1352 A.D., the Mamlūks borrowed a large amount from Kārimī merchant Sālīh b. Muḥammad to equip a military campaign to counter the rebellion of Bibgarous, the Mamlūk Vice-Sultan, in Aleppo.

In addition, Kārimī merchants provided loans to the Kings of Tukulors (Senegal), Yemen and Ḥijāz. When King Mensa Moses, the king of the Tukulors, came to Egypt in 725 A.H./1325 A.D. and his funds were depleted, he and his comrades borrowed from the Kārimī merchant Siraj al-Dīn b. Al-Kuwayk, to continue his pilgrimage to Mecca. The Kings of Yemen also appealed to the merchants for money. For example, in 751 A.H./1351 A.D. King al-Mujāhid ’Alī tried to challenge the Sultan of Egypt, Abu al-Mūḥasīn b. Muḥammad in Ḥijāz, but al-Mujāhid was imprisoned by the Amīr of an Egyptian caravan and was released in 752 A.H. /1352 A.D. Moreover, the Sharif of Mecca ’Alī b. ‘Ajlan took a large loan from Kārimī merchants in 789 A.H./1387 A.D., because of the dominance of Sharif ’Annan b. Maqāmis over Jeddah. Al-Sakhāwī (d. 902 A.H./1497 A.D.) wrote that Kārimī merchant Ḥasan b. Muḥammad, who was well known by ‘Al-Tāḥir’ (‘The Pure’), was lending to the people of Ḥijāz and helping the poor.

---

945 Ibn Tagri Bardi, Al-Nujūm Al-Zāhirah, vol 9, 131.
948 Al-Maqrīzī, Al-Sulūk, vol 2, 867.
949 Ibn Hajar al-’Asqālānī, Inbā‘ al-Gumūr, vol 1, 249.
Karimī merchants also played an important role in financing military campaigns during the Mamlūk Dynasty, particularly by providing troops, money and weapons.\footnote{951} Karimī merchant Ibn Rawāha had halls full of weapons in Alexandria and was able to equip 100 to 200 soldiers in times of danger. Ibn Rawāha guaranteed security in Alexandria to the Mamlūk Sultans and paid soldiers’ salaries without the knowledge of the Sultan\footnote{952}. In 727 A.H./1326 A.D., the Mamlūks accused Ibn Rawāha of preparing a rebellion against the Sultan Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, sentenced him to death and executed him the same year.\footnote{953} It was in the Karimī merchants’ interest to provide money and weapons to defend the Sultanate to ensure the prosperity of their trade.

\section*{5.6 The Arab Tribes and Their Role in the Protection of Pilgrimage and Trade}

The overland route between Egypt and Mecca was divided into four sections, and historians interested in these four sections all make mention of the Arab tribes who were living on those routes. The mission of these tribes was to guard the pilgrimage and trade route in exchange for amounts of money paid to them by the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Sultanates. Al-Qalqashāndī (d. 821 A.H./1418 A.D.) reported that the first section of the route was from Cairo to the city of Ayla, took 15 days, and was dominated by two Arab tribes, the Banū Attyah and Al-’Ayd tribes.\footnote{954} The second section was from Ayla to Al-Azlam in Tabūk north of Ḥijāz, which took 11 days and was dominated by the Al-

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{951}{Al-Ashqar, Tujār al-Tawābil, 373.}
\item \footnote{952}{Ibid, 373.}
\item \footnote{953}{Ibid, 374.}
\item \footnote{954}{Al-Qalqashāndī, Qalā’id al-Jumān, 65.}
\end{itemize}
Rashidat and Banū Attyah tribes.\textsuperscript{955} The third section was between Al-Azlam and Yanbu’, which took about 16 days and was dominated by Al-Ahamidah and Banū Ḥasan.\textsuperscript{956} The fourth and last section was between Yanbu’ and Mecca, which took about 13 days and was dominated by the Banū Ibrāhīm tribe.\textsuperscript{957}

The historian Al-ʿUmari (d. 749 A.H./1348 A.D.) noted that the Sultans of Egypt issued decisions (marsum) for the tribes from Egypt to Ḥijāz to secure the route from the beginning of the pilgrimage mahmal journey from Cairo until its arrival in Mecca. The Sultans required the tribes to prevent thieves from trying to rob the pilgrims accompanying the mahmal. If a thief were to do so, then the tribes must arrest him or pay compensation to Amīr al-Ḥajj.\textsuperscript{958} The Ayyūbids and Mamlūks paid money to these tribes, which was explained by al-Jazīrī when he said: ‘For the guards who secure the mahmal, they will receive sacks of gold money amounting to 33 dinars — a third of these sacks for the Bali tribe, and the second third for Awlād Jaʿbar tribe and the last third for the Awlad ’Anqa tribe’.\textsuperscript{959} Al-Jazīrī added that the mahmal was holding the salaries allotted to these tribes, as the Amīr al-Ḥajj was responsible for giving these amounts to the tribes along the way from Egypt to Mecca.\textsuperscript{960}

In addition to administered cash, the Mamlūk Sultanate provided gifts for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{955} Ibid, 90.
\item \textsuperscript{956} Ibid, 44.
\item \textsuperscript{957} Al-Jazīrī, \textit{Al-Durr al-Farāʾid}, vol 2, 134.
\item \textsuperscript{958} Shihab al-Dīn Ahmad Al-ʿUmari, \textit{Al-Taʿrif bī al-Mutalah al-Hadith [Clarification of the Narration]}, (Cairo, Al-ʿAsima Press, 1894), 78.
\item \textsuperscript{959} Al-Jazīrī, \textit{Al-Durr al-Farāʾid}, vol 1, 238.
\item \textsuperscript{960} Ibid, vol 1, 250.
\end{itemize}
the Sheikhs of the tribes and clothes. Al-Jazīrī mentioned that the Mamlūk Sultans gave the tribes the Sultani clothing that was manufactured in Egypt and made from the best and finest cloth and also packaged sweets, barley and supplies from Egypt. Moreover, the Mamlūks gave the tribes weapons, swords, spears, arrows, oil and whatever they needed from the Sultan’s Zerdakhanh (the Sultanate weapons factory). Al-Jazīrī noted that the Amīr al-Ḥajj at times paid money to the Arab tribes from his own funds, which happened in 681 A.H./1282 A.D., with Amīr al-Ḥajj Badr al-Dīn Al-Sawāni. Al-Sawāni was the first Amīr al-Ḥajj of the Shāmi mahmal who paid around 13,000 dirhams of his own money and a tax of about 20 dirhams on every camel in the mahmal to the Arab tribes, to avoid problems with Bedouins and to ensure the safety of the mahmal.

The Arab tribes started looting the pilgrims and merchants of Egypt, Syria and Iraq when the Sultanate cut off the amounts of money that were given to them to protect the pilgrimage and trade routes. The conflicts that occurred among the Ashraf of Mecca were further reasons to push the Arab tribes into a state of chaos and into looting travellers. In 582 A.H/1186 A.D. disorder occurred in Mecca during the pilgrimage season between Iraqi and Syrian pilgrims, and Sharīf Mukthīr sided with the Syrians’ Amīr against Tughtekin, the Amīr of the Iraqi pilgrimage, which led to a bloody battle. Tughtekin sent a letter to the Abbāsid Caliph in Baghdad telling him the news, and the Caliph sent a military expedition to Mecca in 586 A.H./1190 A.D. to eliminate Mukthīr, but he defeated the Abbāsid Army with the support of the Arab tribes. The Abbāsid

961 Ibid, vol 1, 268.
962 Al-Qalqashāndī, Subh al-A’Shāḥ; vol 4, 11.
963 Al-Jazīrī, Al-Durr al-Farā’īd, vol 1, 608.
964 Ibid, vol 1, 270; Ibn Fahad, Iḥāf al-Wara’; vol 2, 566.
Caliph incited those among the Ashraf who were hostile to Sharif Mukthīr, so Sharif Qatāḍa b. Idrīs defeated Mukthīr and deposed him from the Emirate of Mecca in 597 A.H./1200 A.D.\textsuperscript{965} Al-Fāṣi reported that Sharif Qatāḍa won in this conflict with the assistance of the Juhāynāḥ tribe and entered Mecca with Juhāynāḥ men in 597 A.H./1200 A.D.. Sharif Qatāḍa was able to consolidate his rule by eliminating the Arab tribes who supported Sharif Mukthīr and his brother Dāwūd.\textsuperscript{966} Ibn Fahd reported that Sharif Qatāḍa led a military expedition to Tā’īf in 613 A.H./1216 A.D., to fight the tribes Thaqīf and Hawāzin and was able to defeat them; he also frightened the rest of the tribes to the south of Mecca.\textsuperscript{967}

We note that this incident occurred in the Ayyūbids’ era, when they were in conflict with the Franks; thus, the Abbāsid caliphate had the opportunity to increase its influence over Mecca. However, the Sharif of Mecca did not prefer the Abbāsid Caliphate to have the strongest influence on the Ḥajj season and over Mecca. Thus, Sharif Mukthīr sided with the Syrian pilgrims against the Iraqi Amīr. In addition, we can attribute this dispute to the existence of doctrinal differences because the Ashraf in that period were Zāydi Shi’ites while the Abbāsid caliphs and the Ayyūbids were Sunnīs.

\textsuperscript{965} Ibid, vol 1, 272.
\textsuperscript{966} Al-Fāṣi, Shifāʼ al-Gharām, vol 2, 208; Ibn Duhairah, Al-Jamīʼ al-Latīf, 98.
\textsuperscript{967} Ibn Fahad, Iḥaf al-Wara’, vol 2, 249.
We deduce from this that the tribes’ economic situation in the Ḥijāz during the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk eras was worsening, pushing them to loot merchants’ caravans and harass pilgrims. This led to a decline in security and the spread of poverty, famine and isolation, and illiteracy within tribal society. The serious situation was an indication of the weakness of the control exercised in Ḥijāz by both the Sultans and the Ashraf. The Sultans and the Ashraf alike purchased the loyalty of these tribes with money because the tribes had no religious deterrent to prevent them from looting caravans, even those of the religious pilgrims. However, the Sheikhs of these tribes held an important position for the Caliphs and Sultans and other rulers, because it was only through these Sheikhs that the rulers were able to secure the pilgrim and trade routes. In addition, the Sheikhs had a political role and supported one or other of the parties to the numerous internal conflicts in Ḥijāz. The tribes’ position in relation to the Sharif or other rulers was not determined without paying money to the Sheikhs of the tribes, so these tribes derived their political positions based on money.

The Arab tribes formed an instructive contrast with the Kārimī traders. The Kārimī were a wealthy and influential group who were important to the rulers of Ḥijāz, Egypt and Yemen, but at the same time needed their protection in order to flourish. The Arab tribes were poor but they had the capacity to disrupt the routes, which were crucial both for pilgrimage and for trade, and therefore had to be handled with care; in particular they required financial support, as well as tokens of respect. The two

---

contrasting groups illustrate the delicate balance on which the region's economic system depended, and the ease with which that system could be damaged.
6. Conclusion

This study has addressed political and economic relations between the Ayyūbids and Baḥrī Mamlūks and the Ashraf in Ḥijāz (567–784 A.H./1171–1382 A.D.) and the role of both political and religious legitimation in shaping these relations. It was an era that witnessed significant changes in the political, religious, social and economic life of the entire region. The struggle between the Islamic powers and the Franks and Crusaders, the Mongol invasion and the fall of the Islamic Caliphate in Baghdad: all these factors had the end result of strengthening the position of the political regimes in Egypt and bolstering their legitimacy. This study has also dealt with cultural activity in Ḥijāz during the Ayyūbids’ and Mamlūks’ era and the ways in which they used it to strengthen their political regimes. This conclusion will assume the form of six sections outlining the study’s results: i) issues of political authority and legitimation in the two regimes, ii) the economic dependency of Ḥijāz, iii) strategies deployed by the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks to counter the assertion of Ashrafite autonomy, iv) diplomatic and military endeavours towards the maintenance of regional hegemony in the face of threats by other powers, v) the control of strategic seaports and pilgrim/trade routes, and vi) the securing of religious legitimation through Islamic endowments (awqāf), ribāṭs and madrasas in Mecca and Cairo.

Firstly, it needs to be clearly understood that both political authority and legitimation differed in the Mamlūk era from the scenario that faced the Ayyūbids. The
Ayyūbids created a political regime in Egypt on the ruins of the Fātimid caliphate and were nominally part of the Abbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad. Despite the fact that the Ayyūbids were not Arab in origin and did not meet the conditions of rule, they derived legitimacy from their struggle with the Franks, their conflict with the Shīʿites in Egypt and their support for the Sunnī foundations that strengthened their power in Egypt and Ḥijāz. This gave the Ayyūbid Sultans religious titles such as ‘the custodian of the two holy mosques’ in the case of Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn.

But the Abbāsid caliphate fell in Baghdad with the Mongol invasion of Iraq and all the emirates in the Levant, and this compelled the Mamlūks to defend their very existence. The Mamlūks gained political legitimacy by defeating the Mongols and protecting the rest of the Muslim countries with the support of the ʿulamāʾ and jurists. Several factors assisted the Mamlūks in stabilizing their rule; the most important being the revival of the Abbāsid Caliphate in Cairo. The Mamlūks were aware that this step would enable them to enhance their legitimacy, as they were the protectors of the Islamic Caliphate. This Caliphate had no impact on political events. However, it enabled the Mamlūks to impose their political agenda on the rest of the Islamic regimes, which considered the Mamlūk Sultan to hold a commission from the Caliph to rule in his name. Thus, while relations with Ḥijāz were important for both regimes, they were not a sine qua non for their legitimation.

Secondly, it was not viable for the rulers of Ḥijāz to maintain their independence. Ḥijāz was economically poor, and this made its people and rulers
financially dependent on Egypt. This was particularly the case when drought threatened the region with famine, but even in times of good harvests external food supplies were needed. This economic dependence naturally made Ḥijāz subordinate to Egypt politically. The extent and character of this subordination were shaped less by events in Ḥijāz than by developments further north. Above all, the fall of the Abbāsid Caliphate and the preoccupation of the Mamlūks with the Mongols opened up the opportunity for other regional powers to impose their political hegemony and economic influence over Mecca, such as the Rasūlīds of Yemen and the Hafsids of Tunisia. This propelled the Mamlūks to go to Ḥijāz and impose their overall control over Mecca, albeit nominally in the reign of al-Ẓāhir Baybars, and support the Ashraf of Ḥijāz, in exchange for cancelling *mukūs* for the pilgrims and merchants. For logistical reasons it was impossible for a regime based in Egypt to maintain consistent military control over Ḥijāz. But the Mamlūks were able to send military expeditions, especially at times of pilgrimage, and even to impose actual rule in Ḥijāz for limited periods of time. Furthermore, they did not want the Ashraf to create chaos and rebellion against the Mamlūks – especially when the Ashraf could ally with other regional powers that were already in conflict with the Mamlūks for both economic and political control over Mecca.

This study has therefore argued that political relations between the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks with the Ashraf in the Ḥijāz were highly dependent on particular circumstances. It was these circumstances that shaped both the intensity of Ayyūbid and Mamlūk intervention and the ability of other regional powers to assert themselves. The Ayyūbids took control of Ḥijāz, which was under Fāṭimid rule, immediately after Ṣalāḥ
ad-Dīn’s declaration of the end of that rule. However, the Ayyūbids did not actually intervene in the administration of Ḥijāz due to Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s desire to concentrate on the unification of Syria and Egypt and his struggle against the Franks. This facilitated the Abbāsid Caliph’s attempt to intervene directly in the rule of Mecca and impose his control by sending a military expedition, which the Ashraf were nevertheless able to defeat. Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn mainly confined his self to supporting the Ashraf financially in exchange for cancelling the mukās for pilgrims and merchants. However, even this limited policy changed after Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s era. The division of his Sultanate between his sons and brothers led to the independence of each constituent province. The preoccupation of Sultan al-Kāmil of Egypt with the conflict with the Franks and the geographical proximity between Mecca and Yemen that was ruled by Al-Mālik al-Maṣʿūd encouraged the latter to invade Mecca and intervene in its affairs. Al-Mālik al-Maṣʿūd imposed concrete Ayyūbid rule in Mecca. He appointed some of the Ashraf and deprived others of the Sharifate. Al-Mālik al-Maṣʿūd’s policy in Mecca was to control trade and collect mukās from pilgrims and merchants. However, the death of Al-Mālik al-Maṣʿūd and the emergence of the Rasūlids of Yemen, who tried to control Mecca in the weak era of the Ayyūbids, intensified the regional conflict to impose hegemony in the Mamlūk era.

As diplomatic and military circumstances in Mecca changed after the reigns of Sultan Baybars and Sultan Qalāwūn, the Ilkhanids of Persia and the Rasūlids of Yemen launched several attempts to impose their control over Mecca. Intra-Ashraf conflict began in Mecca, and each party came to the Mamlūks in Egypt looking for
financial and military support. This gave the Mamlūks the opportunity to impose actual control for a period during the reign of Sultan Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad by both appointing and deposing the Ashraf and maintaining a Mamlūk garrison in Mecca.

The fifth conclusion of this thesis is that the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks showed a substantial concern to enhance economic activity in Ḥijāz during religious seasons such as Ḥajj and its associated pilgrim and trade caravans. In the Ayyūbid era, maritime trade routes flourished more than land routes because of the Frankish presence north of Ḥijāz that threatened trade. In the Mamlūk era, overland trade routes attained significance alongside the maritime routes that were used for trade. This led to the emergence of several ports on the Red Sea for the economic benefit of the Ashraf, in particular the ports of Yanbu‘ and Jeddah. As a consequence of the flourishing of trade in Ḥijāz in the Mamlūk era, the Mamlūks intervened in the management of Jeddah’s port and the collection of mukūs from merchants through an agent appointed by the Mamlūks. This shows that the Mamlūks did not want the Ashraf to have a large economic income; their fear was that opportunities to declare independence would be increased. In addition, the Mamlūks realized that the mukūs of Jeddah’s port were very large and important and, therefore, would help them to impose their own hegemony on Ḥijāz. In the era of the Ayyūbids and the Mamlūks there emerged powerful business lobbies like the Kārimī merchants, who increased their activity in Ḥijāz, Yemen and Egypt and played a significant economic role. They had strong relationships with the rulers of Mecca, the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Sultans, and Kārimī activities increased in their era. Kārimī merchants also made political and military contributions in the Mamlūk era by imposing
security on some occasions, giving us further evidence of the importance of the economic relationship between the various regimes.

The study of political, military and economic developments has to be complemented by that of juristic influences, and cultural and educational initiatives. These reveal the attempts made by successive Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Sultan to win the support of the ’ulamā for their asserted leadership claims. The authority of the Sultan was among the necessary jurisprudential measures established by Islamic law and known as the Overcomer Emirate. Unlike some ’ulamā like Al-Mawārdi, Ibn Khaldūn did not see the necessity for an Arab origin for a Muslim ruler. This shows the evolution of jurisprudence in Islam in accordance with the changing political and social conditions of the Muslim community, and the fact that jurists like Ibn Khaldūn were close to the rulers of their time and many were swayed by the political conditions experienced by Sultans who were not Arabs. Through the jurists and their various rulings, we can witness the theory of rule in Sunnī schools of jurisprudence evolving in response to changing political circumstances. The change in jurisprudence served the political regimes that came to power by establishing more liberal and accommodating conditions.

Legitimacy is an issue that has importance for all Islamic political regimes. Religious legitimacy enhances the ability of these regimes to continue and face the internal and external challenges that could threaten their existence. We examined three models of jurists from three different Sunnī schools (Al-Mawārdi, Ibn Khaldūn and Ibn Taymiyya) to identify the conditions that any Muslim ruler was expected to meet. But
the strongest evidence for the sultans’ sensitivity towards the opinions of the ´ulumā lies in their policy of endowments. Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn promoted the establishment of madrasas and ribāts and made endowments (awqāf) in Egypt to support Ḥijāz with its needs such as agricultural supplies. Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn’s interventionist policy in the Ḥijāz was an attempt to gain the support of the Muslim community and ´ulumā for his political regime as a protector and patron of the two holy mosques in Ḥijāz. His initiative was followed by many of his successors.

The political and economic relationship between Ḥijāz and Egypt became stronger in the era of the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks. The Ayyūbids and Mamlūks acquired their core legitimacy by leading jihād against the Franks and the Mongols. But both regimes sought to bolster their religious legitimacy by controlling Ḥijāz because the Sultans perceived the gain that would accrue for their authority. They could not hope to control the region as thoroughly as they did Egypt and Syria. But hegemony over Ḥijāz assisted these regimes in terms of legitimacy, while at the same time they benefited politically by preventing other powers from controlling Ḥijāz, and economically by controlling trading activity in the region.
## Tables

### Ayyūbid Sultanate

(567-652 A.H./1171-1254 A.D.)

#### Table 1. Ayyūbid Sultans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sultan</th>
<th>Reign Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Şalāḥ ad-Dīn</td>
<td>r. 567-589 A.H./1171-1193 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-’Azīz</td>
<td>r. 589-595 A.H./1193-1198 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manṣūr</td>
<td>r. 595-597 A.H./1198-1200 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ādīl I</td>
<td>r. 597-615 A.H./1200-1218 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Kāmil</td>
<td>r. 615-636 A.H./1218-1238 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ādīl II</td>
<td>r. 636-638 A.H./1238-1240 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Sāliḥ Najm al-Dīn</td>
<td>r. 638-647 A.H./1240-1249 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turanshah</td>
<td>r. 647-648 A.H./1249-1250 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ashraf</td>
<td>r. 648-652 A.H./1250-1254 A.D.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 2. Ayyūbids of Yemen

(r. 569-627 A.H./1173-1229 A.D.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sultan</th>
<th>Reign Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Mu’azzam Turanshah</td>
<td>r. 569-577 A.H./1173-1181 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Azīz Tughtekin</td>
<td>r. 577-594 A.H./1181-1197 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mu’izz al-Dīn Ismā’īl</td>
<td>r. 594-599 A.H./1197-1202 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Nāṣir Ayyūb</td>
<td>r. 599-611 A.H./1202-1214 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Muzaffar Sulāymān</td>
<td>r. 611-612 A.H./1214-1215 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Mas’ūd Yūsūf</td>
<td>r. 612-627 A.H./1215-1229 A.D.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Baḥrī Mamlūk Sultanate

(648–784 A.H./1250–1382 A.D.)

#### Table 3. Baḥrī Mamlūk Sultans
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ruler</th>
<th>Reign Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shajar al-Durr</td>
<td>(r. 648 A.H./1250 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Izz al-Din Aybak</td>
<td>(r. 648-655 A.H./1250-1257 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nūr ad-Dīn 'Alī</td>
<td>(r. 655-657 A.H./1257-1259 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şayf al-Din Qutûz</td>
<td>(r. 657 A.H./1259 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Zâhir Baybars</td>
<td>(r. 657-676 A.H./1260-1277 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Sa‘īd Berke Khân</td>
<td>(r. 676-678 A.H./1277-1279 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-’Adîl Sulâmîsh</td>
<td>(r. 678 A.H./1279 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manṣûr Qâlâwûn</td>
<td>(r. 678-689 A.H./1279-1290 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ashraf Khâlîl</td>
<td>(r. 689-693 A.H./1290-1293 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Nâṣîr Muḥammad (first reign)</td>
<td>(r. 693-694 A.H./1293-1294 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-’Adîl Kitbugha</td>
<td>(r. 694-696 A.H./1294-1296 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manṣûr Lâjin</td>
<td>(r. 696-698 A.H./1296-1299 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Nâṣîr Muḥammad (second reign)</td>
<td>(r. 698-708 A.H./1299-1309 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Muẓâﬀar Baybars</td>
<td>(r. 708-709 A.H./1309-1310 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Nâṣîr Muḥammad (third reign)</td>
<td>(r. 709-741 A.H./1310-1341 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manṣûr Abu Bakr</td>
<td>(r. 741 A.H./1341 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ashraf Kujûk</td>
<td>(r. 741-742 A.H./1341-1342 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Nâṣîr Aḥmad</td>
<td>(r. 742-743 A.H./1342 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Sâliḥ Ismâ‘îl</td>
<td>(r. 743-746 A.H./1342-1345 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Kâmil Shâ‘bân</td>
<td>(r. 746-747 A.H./1345-1346 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Muẓâﬀar Hajjî</td>
<td>(r. 747-748 A.H./1346-1347 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Nâṣîr Ḥasan (first reign)</td>
<td>(r. 748-752 A.H./1347-1351 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Sâliḥ Sâliḥ</td>
<td>(r. 752-755 A.H./1351-1354 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Nâṣîr  Ḥasan (second reign)</td>
<td>(r. 755-762 A.H./1354-1361 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manṣûr Muḥammad</td>
<td>(r. 762-764 A.H./1361-1363 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ashraf Shâ‘bân</td>
<td>(r. 764-778 A.H./1363-1377 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manṣûr  ’Alî</td>
<td>(r. 778-783 A.H./1377-1381 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Sâliḥ Hajjî b. Shâ‘bân (first reign)</td>
<td>(r. 783-784 A.H./1381-1382 A.D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Zâhir Barqûq (first reign)</td>
<td>(r. 784-791 A.H./1382-1389 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Sâliḥ Hajjî b. Shâ‘bân (second reign)</td>
<td>(r. 791-792 A.H./1389-1390 A.D.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Figure

Madrasas of Mecca

1-Al-Zanjabili madrasa 5-Dar al-ʿAjalah madrasa
2-Al-Zanjabili ribāṭ 6-Qaytbay madrasa
3-Tab Al-Zaman al-Habashiyyah madrasa 7-Al-Afdaliyyah madrasa
4-Al-Arsofi madrasa 8-Al-Mujahidiyyah madrasa
9-Sharif ʿAjlan madrasa
1. Map of Ḥijāz and the Red Sea
2. Map of the pilgrim routes of Arabia
3. Map of Ḥijāz and its neighbours
4. Map of Saladin’s Sultanate
5. Map of the Baḥri Mamlūk Sultanate
Bibliography

1. Primary sources


Al-‘Umari, Shihab al-Dīn Ahmad, Al-Ta’rīf bī al-Muṣṭalāḥ al-Sharīf [Clarification of the Noble Term] (Cairo, Al-‘Asima press, 1894).


---, Ḩaghāthāt al-ʾUmma bī al- Kashf al-Juhumma [The Famines in Egypt], ed. Hilmi Farahāt (Cairo, Al-Taʾlīf wa Al-Ṭarjama wa Nasr Committee, 1940).


Ibn Faraj, ʿAbdul Qadir b. Aḥmad, Al-Silah wa Al-ʿUdah fī Tarikh Bandar Jeddah [The History of Jeddah Port], ed. Aḥmad Umar Al-Zaylaʾy (Riyadh, King Saud University, 1984).


2. Secondary Sources


Al-Sayyid, Riḍwān, *Al-Fiqh wa al-Fuqahā wa al-Dawlah (The Jurisprudence, the Jurists and the State)* (Beirut: Al-Ijtihād, 1989).


---, ‘Studies on the Transfer of The ‘Abbāsid Caliphate from Baġdād to Cairo’, *Arabica* 7, no. 1 (1960), 41-59.


Hasan, Yūsūf Fadl, The Arabs and Sudan (Khartoum, Khartoum University, 1973).


Housley, Norman, ‘Saladin's triumph over the crusader states; the battle of Hattin, 1187’, *History Today* vol. 37 (1987), 17-23.


Irwin, Robert, *Mamlûks and Crusaders; Men of the Sword and Men of the Pen* (Farnham: Ashgate /Variorum, 2010).


Johnson, Kathryn, ‘Royal pilgrims: Mamlûk accounts of the pilgrimages to Mecca of the Khawand al-Kubrā (Senior wife of the Sultan)’, *Studia Islamica*, no. 91 (2000), 107-31.


---, *Imperial power and maritime trade, Mecca and Cairo in the later Middle Ages* (Chicago: Middle East Documentation Center, 2010).


---, ‘Madrasas in Mecca during the Medieval Period: A Descriptive Study Based on Literary Sources’, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 60, no. 2 (1997), 236-52.


Salem, Sahar, History of Egypt in the Ayyubids and Mamluks’ Era (Cairo: Al-Jami’a Youth Foundation, 2010).


