HISTORIOGRAPHY AND POLITICS:
TWENTIETH-CENTURY ARAB SCHOLARSHIP ON ANTIQUITY

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Historiography and Politics: Twentieth-Century Arab Scholarship on Antiquity

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Abstract

“Both sword and pen are reliant machines for the head of the state on his command”.

Ibn-Khaldūn (d. 1406)

This thesis examines the various ways in which ancient Arab history has been represented in modern Arab historiography in the twentieth century, from the end of the Ottoman Empire to the end of the Ba’thist regime of Iraq.

It is now widely recognised that historiography is influenced by contemporary politics. Over the last few decades, theories about the relationship between politics and historiography have been advanced by Western-based scholars such as Gramsci, Foucault, and Said. It remains unclear, however, whether non-Western traditions of historiography have the same kinds of relationships with politics, or whether politics in historiography in the Arab world exist in a different configuration. To explore this issue, I will address historiographical writing produced in the Arab world during the twentieth century, considering in particular the case of Iraq.

It will focus on writing that addressed a specific period of antiquity – the 1st century BCE to the 7th century CE. It is in this period of antiquity that we can first identify a specifically Arab struggle for the statehood, and the coalescing of Arab-dominated states in the Mesopotamian region. This period was therefore one of particular interest for Arab historians writing in the twentieth century, a time when Arab statehood and the nature of the Iraqi state was debated.

This thesis will show that in the modern Arab world, history writing and politics have become more entangled than ever. Following the end of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the Iraqi state, the need for a sufficient justification for this artificial construction became crucial. Iraqi historiography, then, looked to the past to formulate new narratives, lending legitimacy to current social and political initiatives. Historiography became intimately entwined in the political agendas of Iraqi regimes, from the Monarchy up to the Ba’thist period.

Finally, I argue that without a serious intellectual debate on epistemology of “knowledge” and what its relationship with political power could be, the problem brought on by their 20th century structures have continued to dominate present socio-political developments. In addition, the future Arab world relationships with worldwide communities depend on the re-structuring of this history-politics relationship.
Acknowledgments

I would like to take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation for many organizations and people who have provided their support, help, and encouragement both before and during my research. First of all, I would like to thank the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) for sponsoring my study, as without this help my PhD at a prestigious and world-ranked institution such as the University of Leicester would have remained but a dream.

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Abbreviations

AH = anno Hegiri
anon. = anonymous
Ar. = Arabic
AUB = American University of Beirut
BCE = Before Common Era
c. = circa
CAS = College of Art and Science
CE = Common Era
Ch. = chapter
d. = died
DT = Dirasat Tārīkhīyah
ed. = editor (pl. eds.)
Eng. = English
et al. = and others
etc. = and so forth
HTC = Higher Teachers’ College
i.e. = that is
ICP = Iraqi communist Party
p. = page
pl. = plural
Ps. = pseudo
pt. = part
RCC = Revolutionary Command Council
Syr. = Syriac
SPC = Syrian Protestant College
transl. = translated; translation
vol. = volume (pl. vols.)
vs = versus
A Note on Transliteration and Style

Due to the trans-cultural nature of this thesis and the difficulties of translating the exact meaning of a number of Arabic terms and phrases into English, I have decided to Anglicize them according to the transliteral system used by the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*.

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For the sake of consistency, I apply this method only for the Arabic language, and as such other non-English languages (e.g., Persian and Turkish terms and phrases) will appear as they are commonly written in English. In addition, I would like to point out that all translations from Arabic to English are my own, unless otherwise stated.
Part One: Introduction

Chapter One: Introduction

“I think the intellectual was hounded by political powers, no longer on account of a general discourse which he conducted, but because of the knowledge at his disposal: it was at this level that he constituted a political threat.”

(Foucault 1980, 128)

“Nothing is more important for Iraq’s future than a clear-headed understanding of its past.”

(Makiya 1994, 218)

1.1 Introduction

The period spanning the first century BCE to the seventh century CE is often cited as the formative period of Iraqi history, as it was during this time that the key features of what later became the Iraqi state first emerged. Specifically, this was a centralised Arab-ruled state in the Mesopotamian region.

Although Arab groups existed from at least the sixth century BCE,¹ it was not until the early first century BCE that powerful and centralised Arab-ruled states emerged in Mesopotamia and the Levant, most notably Petra, Palmyra, and Hatra, amongst others.

¹ See also Chapter 2 below.
These states were able to emerge because of a power vacuum in the region. The Seleucid Empire had fallen, and Mesopotamia was now a disputed region between the Roman and later the Byzantine Empire on one side, and the Parthians and later the Sasanians on the other. For eight centuries, identifiable states with a primarily Arab population and Arab rulers existed in this border zone between the empires. They interacted with and often were partly controlled by their powerful neighbours to the east and the west, sometimes functioning as vassal states, but they nonetheless maintained their unique character. This situation remained in place until the first half of the seventh century CE, when the Muslim Arabs conquered the Sasanian Empire and expelled the Byzantines from Palestine and Syria in 639/640 CE. As a result, Mesopotamia was no longer a border zone of quasi-independent states, but the heart of an extensive Muslim empire.

In the twentieth century, modern Iraqi-Arab historians reflected upon this period of emergent Arab states as a way of identifying the roots of their own nation-states. While all peoples look to their past when forming their national identities, this was especially important for Iraq because the state had been created as a result of specific historical circumstances in the early twentieth century. Indeed, the recognition of Iraq as a separate entity has been constantly in question, never more than today given the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum.

This dissertation therefore examines how this crucial period in antiquity has been portrayed by Iraqi historians over the course of the twentieth century, tracing connections between the changing portrayal of the ancient past and the changing nature of contemporary politics. Through its analysis, the dissertation will consider whether there was a specifically Iraqi tradition of historiography, perhaps characterised by an unusually close relationship between contemporary politics and historical perceptions.

Achieving this goal will involve examining two main interrelated questions. The first concerns how contemporary politics impacted on the writing of ancient Arab history by Iraqi scholars. In general, the impact of politics on the production of knowledge, including historiography, is undeniable. This is as true of the West as it is of the Arab
world. But the political context of Iraq represents a unique case, one that this thesis ponders in detail and also considers in comparison to the Levant. The establishment of Arab states in the post-Ottoman era providing the impetus for new narratives which could offer these new states roots in the history of the region, and allow them to claim a continuous identity throughout history. To build this narrative the pre-Islamic period was crucial. In one hand, the political entities of pre-Islamic period such as Petra, Palmira, and Hatra became the best examples of deep roots in history. On the other hand, by integrating all the Semitic peoples of Mesopotamia and the Levant into an Arab identity, this period was able boost a vision that claims continuous and uninterrupted Arab identity through the history.

The second question probes how far the Iraqi historians of the twentieth century generated an independent historiography that was different from the western historiographical traditions. Iraqi historiography was one of the most prolific productions in the Arab world during the twentieth century. But to what extent were the Iraqi scholars able to formulate an Iraqi school of historiography? This dissertation argues that despite of this prolific production, the Iraqi historiographical approach could not develop, over the course of the twentieth century, a distinctive ‘Iraqi’ historiographical approach. Instead, the Iraqi historiographical approach remains depends on the Western development in the field of historiography. Within Western traditions, the British and French traditions began to influence the region’s, knowledge production. However, from the establishment of Iraq, and other countries of the Levant, Germanophone historiography become the more influential tradition in the region. German influence manifested itself in the forms of Rankean empiricism and more importantly the notion of Volk that had a great impact on the formation of the pan-Arabism ideology and history-writing in Iraq and the Levantine states. To answer this question, the thesis considers how far other Arab and western historiographical traditions had an impact on Iraqi historiography.

This thesis also argues that despite the context that made by the end of the First World War and creation modern Arab states with recognised borders in the Levant and Iraq, these states remain to have an impact on each others. Faisal bin Hussein, for instance,
was first installed as a Syrian King in 1920. While Faysal ruled in Damascus, he was surrounded by many ex-Sharifian officers who were originally from Iraq, including Nuri Said, who became the most influential Iraq politician during the Iraqi monarchy. However, when King Faisal moved to Iraq, with a little ideological vision, he relied on the Syrian intellectuals who moved with him from Syria including sati’ al-Ḥuşrī. Those Syrian intellectuals who accompanied Faysal were seeded many visions which were not developed yet in Iraqi including Pan-Arabism. Al-Ḥuşrī, for instance, planted pan-Arabism vision into the school textbook. Al-Ḥuşrī led the Arab nationalist ideology to shift from the French and British free well nation to the German Volk, see chapter 6. According to Ḥuşrī nation is a living organism that could develop organically through common language and history. This vision was able to influence many Iraqi politicians and intellectuals during the course of the twentieth century.

This vision was recasted farther by the Baʿthist socialist party. The Baʿthist party was founded in Syria by the co-founder of the Baʿthist socialist party, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bīṭar. Among the main slogan by the Baʿthist was the Arabs from the Atlantic Sea to the Gulf most united in a single state. This vision was embraced by the Baʿthist party in Iraq and played a crucial part in Iraqi political and intellectual context during the late twentieth century.

In short, close political and socio-economic developments in these Arab states of the Levant and Iraq made necessity to trace the impact of these countries of Iraq and a so make a three case comparison from the Levant: Lebanon, Palestine and Syria.

It is important to establish from the outset that this thesis does not seek to discuss the “reality” of the past events that happened between the first century BCE and the seventh century CE, nor is it about this period of antiquity per se. Instead, it endeavours to explore the depiction of these events as presented in the historical writing of the al-Mashriq al-ʿArabi, and in particular in the state of Iraq during the twentieth century CE.²

² The term al-Mashriq al-ʿArabi is widely used in the Arab tradition that refers to the state of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon,
1.2 The importance of the historiography of the *al-Mashriq al-ʿArabī*

“Their ruins that are behind me, they are idols and statues that people in the past used to worship instead of Allah [...]. Yet, [since] the Prophet Mohammed took down idols with his honourable hands when he went into Mecca [...] it becomes easy for us without any hesitation [to destroy them] even if they are worth billions of dollars”.\(^3\)

Propaganda video by Da’sh

The above quotation is taken from a video-speech by a member of the Da’sh militia,\(^4\) released on the internet in February 2015. The speech is followed by footage showing members of the group destroying irreplaceable ancient Mesopotamian artefacts in Mosul Museum, the second largest museum in Iraq, which before the destruction was known to have 173 original pieces. Unfortunately, this was neither the first nor last demolition of cultural heritage by the militants, who have often released video footage showing their systematic obliteration of ancient Mesopotamian and Syrian artefacts,\(^5\) as well as buildings and thousands of rare books and documents.\(^6\)

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4 The term “Da’sh” is more commonly used by the people of the region. However, other tradition still calls them “the Islamic state of Iraq and Syria/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIS), or “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL).
5 The ancient Assyrian church of Tikrit in 2014; a tomb of the biblical prophet Jonah (or Yunus in the Islamic tradition) in Mosul in 2014; the city of Hatra, specifically the Temple of Shamash, in 2015; the Assyrian city of Nimrud in 2015; the Temple of Baalshamin, Palmyra, in 2015; the Temple of Nabu in Mosul in June 2016. It is necessary to mention here that Da’sh do not limit their destruction to artefacts but also target the scholars who studied these civilizations, such as Khaled al-Asad, a renowned scholar of Ancient Syria, who was hanged from a Roman column in the ruins of Palmyra in Syria.
6 The group has not released, as far as I know, any footage on the destruction of books in Mosul. However, photos published in the media and eye-witness accounts from Mosul in 2014 indicate that the group burned the Mosul Central Library, the library of the University of Mosul, the library of the Mosul Museum, and the library of the Dominican order (see also, Al-Sumaria 2015, 15 February; accessed on 20 March, 2016).
The United Nations defined these actions as “barbaric terrorist acts”, with Irina Bokova, the Head of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), describing it as a “new phase in the cultural cleansing”. The world media quickly suggested that this is “a new crime” by the Da’sh militia. However, such destruction and iconoclasm have a historical legacy. What is happening today in Iraq and Syria is more complex and could be identified in these contexts more precisely by historicising the politics in the Middle East.

The history of Mesopotamia and the Levant is especially important from a political perspective, which is essential to an understanding of how we approach and comprehend their ancient history. Da’sh in Iraq and Syria, for instance, has repeatedly called its strategy of cultural cleansing *izalt al Shirk*, which means “removing polytheism”, and *tathir*, or “purification”. However, these expressions are loosely defined, as they do not refer to any specific *shirk* (polytheism), but may be applied to any concept that does not match the vision and ideology of Da’sh. Hence, these words were used to refer to the destruction of the artefacts in museums, not because they are worshipped (museum artefacts clearly are not ‘live’ religious items), but instead because they represent the history of the *shirk* of the Kurds, the Sh’ites, the Ba’thists, and the West.

It is important to note that it was the ancient past of the Levant and Mesopotamia that was particularly targeted by Da’sh. This was due to two main reasons: first, this ancient history represented the pre-Islamic past, which is seen as *al-Jāhiliyya*, the age of ignorance in Arab Muslim history; and second, because this ancient history has been attributed value by both Arab secular groups in the region and the West. Therefore, Da’sh’s strategy of cultural cleansing can be understood as a new discourse by the group.

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10 By historicising politics, I mean the way that historians and politicians cooperate, voluntarily or involuntarily, in order to interpret their ideologies as a product of historical development. It is thus distinct from politicising history.
Internally, it reaffirms hegemony by informing the people ruled by them that Da’sh holds the power within the area, and that any challenge to this power will be perceived as *shirk* and will thus be ‘removed’ and ‘purified’. Externally, however, it means that there is a ‘pure land’ to which Muslim people can emigrate, rather than remaining in a *shirk* land. In addition, it generally refers to a discontinuity with the previous discourse in Iraq and Syria, and the establishment of a novel discourse for the new “state-building” project. In other words, it can be described as a discourse that claims political power by controlling history. It is painfully evident that control of the ancient past is central to the construction of political power in the Levant and Mesopotamia today. Against the background of this chilling contemporary context, this thesis looks at the way that the ancient past of Iraq and the Levant has been constructed and deconstructed over the course of the last hundred years by Iraqi historians as a response to their own contemporary political contexts.¹¹

1.3 Background: historiography in modern Iraq

Historiography is defined as *the history of historical writing* (Becker 1938, 20; Munslow 2000, 133; Salevouris and Furay 2015, 253). In this sense, historiography does not engage directly with past events, but rather it focuses on the interpretations of these past events and changes to these interpretations over time in the works of historians (for the developments of historiography in the western countries and the Arab world, see Chapter 4).

Within the field of Arabic historiography, there has been a noticeable dearth of research on historiographical developments in Iraq. Studies on the modern history of the Arab world indicate that dramatic events were shaping and exerting influence on the relationships between political ideologies and writing history (Davis 2005). Studies on

¹¹ Iraqi PM declared on 9th December 2017 end of the war against Da’sh after the group completely evicted from Iraq by the Iraqi forces.
specifically Iraqi historiography have not received much attention, with much effort instead devoted to developments of this subject in Egypt, which has played a leading role in the historiography of the Arab world (Choueiri 2011, 497; Di-Capua 2009; Gombár 2000, 67). This is not the case for works of Iraqi history. Amongst non-Iraqi intellectuals, quite a few extraordinarily serious works emerged in the last two decades. Despite the difficulties of accessing Iraqi libraries and source material, even after the collapse of the Ba’thist regime in 2003, non-Iraqi scholars were not discouraged from studying the history of Iraq. The works of Charles Tripp (2000), Eric Davis (2005), Kanan Makiya (1998 [1989]), Ofra Bengio (2002), Peter Sluglett (2007), Phebe Marr (2012), and Orit Bashkin (2009) are examples of the best accounts on modern Iraq history. However, most of these works are primarily concerned with Iraqi history, rather than Iraqi historiography. Nevertheless, studies focused elsewhere on Arab-Islamic historiography and its relationship to Arab nationalism have been undertaken.

This thesis therefore hopes to fill the gap in the scholarly literature. It will build both on the recent scholarship on modern Iraqi history, and also on recent scholarship about historiography elsewhere in the Arab world. It will use these literatures to present an analysis of historiography in modern Iraq – the extent to which it was impacted by contemporary politics, and the extent to which it can be considered as a distinct tradition.

1.4 Methodology and structure of thesis

This thesis is divided into four parts. The first part (Chapters 1-4) introduces the relevant historical, historiographical, and theoretical concepts. Following the introduction (this chapter), the second chapter presents a quick sketch of ancient history in Mesopotamia.

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12 For nineteenth-century Egyptian historiography, see Crabbs (1984); for twentieth-century Egyptian historiographies, see Di-Capua (2009), Gorman (2003), and Mayer (1988).
14 For historiography and Arab nationalism, see Choueiri (2000; 2005), Dawisha (2003), and Phillip (2004).
from the first century BCE to the seventh century CE. Chapter 3 addresses the major political trends and the context within which Iraqi historians worked during the twentieth century, beginning with the early mandate period and ending with the decline of the Ba‘thist regime. The fourth chapter presents relevant theoretical frameworks and historiographical debates for the dissertation and sets out this project’s methodology in more detail.

Part Two of the thesis focuses on the Iraqi materials. I have divided the twentieth century up into four key historical periods: the early mandate period (1917-1932); the period of rising Arab nationalism (1932-1958); the period of growing professional historiography (1950s-1968); and the Ba’athist period (1968-2003). For each period, I have chosen to focus on the work of one or two particular historians, allowing me to discuss their historiographical publications in detail. In each case, I have attempted to choose historiographical works which I felt were representative of wider developments for each period. Chapter 5 examines the early mandate period and in particular Anastās al-Kirmilī, a Chaldean writer. Chapter 6 discusses the later mandate period and in particular the work of Darwīsh al-Miqdādi, an Arab nationalist. Chapter 7 examines Iraqi professional historiography around the same time, mainly focusing on the work of Jawed Ali. Finally, Chapter 8 focuses on the Iraqi historical writing during the Ba‘thist era, and concentrates on the government’s official historical publications.

Part Three of the thesis focuses on materials from the Levant, for the purpose of providing comparison with the Iraqi material. Chapter 9 is dedicated to Lebanon in the late Ottoman period, with a main focus on the works of Jūrjī Zaydān. Chapter 10 focuses on Palestinian historical writings and the impact of the establishment of Israel on such historical texts. The focus of Chapter 11 is the Syrian Ba‘thist project of re-writing history and its impact on historical writings.

The overall conclusions of this study are presented in Chapter 12.
Chapter Two: The Ancient Context (1st century BCE – 7th century CE)

2.1 Who were the ancient “Arabs”?

The initial task that needs to be answered is what do we mean by “Arabs” in antiquity. The answer to this question is extremely difficult for the people who today have been labelled as an Arab let alone in antiquity. Ancient Arabs, like any other group, often lived in overlapping communities where some could define themselves as an Arab while others in the same community might not. Different groups have criteria which determine their identity, such as language, religion, gender etc. These criteria have been used by members of the communities, have made them live within the same community and make them have different determination of their identity. For the case of the Arabs, while there are 22 states today that claim to be Arab countries still they could not provide a clear-cut definition of who the Arabs.\(^1\) Thus, if we could not identify the recent Arabs with definite characteristic then we should not expect to find more than this of the term Arabs in antiquity.

Studies have explored the complexities of defining the “Arab” in the pre-Islamic and early Islamic eras.\(^2\) Language is often seen essential criteria when scholars attempted to define the ancient Arabs (Suleiman 2003, 31).\(^3\) This criterion is, however, problematic.

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1 There are no such definition in the Charter of the League of Arab States. (League of Arab States http://www.lasportal.org/ar/aboutlas/Pages/Charter.aspx (Accessed on 1 December 2017).
2 Webb (2016) argued that the pre-Islamic ‘Arabness’ is Muslim scholars reconstruction; similarly, Donner (2010, 17) rejected a depiction of Islam as a “national” movement”. Additionally, he pointed out that Arab ethnic cohesion was not found in pre-Islamic Arabian society. On the other hand, Macdonald (2009, 1-3) argued that Arab identity must have existed socio-politically prior to Islam. For more discussions on the term ‘Arab’ see: Ephal (1982); Macdonald (2009, 1-33); Retsö (2003, 24-53).
3 Traditionally, the Arabic language has been identified within the Semitic language family, and subsequently this language family has been divided into three sub-groups: the South Semitic languages, Eastern, and North West, (Shah 2008, 255-56), with Arabic considered a part of the North West Semitic sub-group. The term ‘Semitic’ was proposed in 1781 by August Ludwig von Schlözer [1735–1809]. Von Schlözer was inspired by the Biblical account of the physical spreading of the offspring of Noah composed with the different tongues they spoke. At the same time, his theory was primarily based on the phonological and lexical relationships between these languages (McLelland, 2011, 807).
Over the past century, scholars have uncovered many North-West Semitic inscriptions (known as Thamudic, Safaitic, and Liyanite) that represent various dialects of a proto-Arabic language (Rodinson 1981, 5-6; Macdonald 2010). These dialects, however, have major differences, and differ from modern Standard Arabic. In addition, fundamental differences existed between the Semitic sub-groups. However, there is no doubt that some similarities exist between Arabic and other Semitic languages, yet certainly there was no unity (Macdonald 2004). In addition, the proto-Arabic language was utilised only by groups who maintained connections with the tribes that inhabited the Arabian Peninsula (Rodinson 1981, 6). Thus, unifying the pre-Islamic people of Arabia, the Levant, and Mesopotamia through a shared language criterion is not definitive.

A common geographical territory was another common criterion offered for pre-Islamic Arab identity (see chapter 6). This is also problematic as in antiquity, people we might define as Arabs were spread over a large geographical domain stretching from south Arabia, east Egypt, the Levant, and Mesopotamia. This territory, however, was not occupied solely by the Arabs, as they shared it with many other ethno-cultural groups including Greeks, Romans, Persians and of course many people from Semitic origin such as the Babylonians, the Assyrians and Hebrews (Hitti 1964, 3).

The other criterion often used to distinguish the pre-Islamic Arabs from other contemporary groups was their participation in a common way of life, expressed in the form of culture, religion, and statehood (Hitti 1964, 8-9; Mansfield 1992, 14-5). The nomadic way of life was the norm for Arabs in the pre-Islamic era, despite the presence of several Arab groups who established a sedentary lifestyle. Most of these, however, were spread across Arabia, the Levant, and Mesopotamia. Within the sphere of lifestyle, religion, particularly Islam, is the most distinguishable criterion when defining modern and historical Arabs. Gibb (1940, 3-4) noted that for the Arabs the “central fact of history is the mission of Muhammad and the memory of the Arab Empire”. The pre-Islamic Arabs, however, were pagan and their interaction with the inhabitants of the Levant and Mesopotamia introduced several other religions such as Zoroastrianism, Christianity and Judaism (Hitti 1964, 3).
To sum up, neither linguistic, geographic, or cultural (to include religious) criteria can satisfactorily define the concept of the ancient Arab. Thus, it should be admitted that any attempt to use the term involves a certain amount of arbitrariness. However, for the sake of clarity and consistency, the term "Arab" is applied in this thesis in a general sense for groups who, despite the lack of evidence that they designated themselves as such, were designated by ancient historians, Greek, Roman, Iranian and by the local as an Arab; and who lived in an area stretching from the south of Arabia up to the northern Levant, and from the Sinai desert to the east of the Nile to Mesopotamia in the east; who spoke a language related to the Semitic family; and who adopted either a nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life. However, there is no implication in this thesis that these people comprised a homogeneous ethnic group or shared a single overarching sense of identity.

2.2 Emerging statehood (1st BCE - 3rd century CE)

Over many centuries in antiquity, and perhaps even millennia, nomadic groups from Arabia moved into the Ḥaḍr, settled lands, of Levant and Mesopotamia, moving through the lower Fertile Crescent in the absence of a geographical barrier. Although the first mention of these Arab group in Fertile Crescent appears in a Neo-Assyrian text of king Shalmaneser III around 853 BCE (Hoyland 2002, 51), the Arabs were not able to establish an independent political entity in Mesopotamia until the first century BCE.

The Hellenistic empire of the Seleucids, based in Mesopotamia, crumbled in the 1st century BCE. As a result of the power regression, new political and social structures were introduced in the Fertile Crescent (Foltz 2013, 48). The Bedouin Arabs took advantage of this situation and were able to fill this vacuum on both sides of the Euphrates. With increased trade in the region, a combination of these migrants and indigenous groups managed to establish a number of caravan cities on both sides of the Euphrates. In Mesopotamia these includes: Edessa the later capital of Osroene; Sinjar in north Mesopotamia; Characene on the banks of the lower Tigris; and Hatra on the east desert-steppe of Mesopotamia. In the Levant side they included: the Idumaeans of
lower of Palestine; the Ituraeans around Mount Lebanon; the kingdom of Petra; and that of Palmyra (see Shahīd 1984, 3-5; Hoyland 2002, 69).

These cities were remained mostly independent in their domestic issues, but they were culturally and sometimes also politically influenced by their larger and more powerful neighbours: the Romans and later the Byzantines to the west, and the Parthians and the Sasanians to the east. The extension of Roman civitas to the Arabs in Levant under Caracalla in 212 CE, for instance, was one way, among many, of acculturating and assimilating the Arabs and the indigenous into a new combination or a hybrid culture. Thus, the Fertile Crescent acted as a melting pot for different cultures, with the Greeks and Romans to the west, the Iranians to the east, the Arabs to the south, and the indigenous people. Therefore, a cultural mosaic was produced as a result of the shared elements from all these different sources. These new regional powers with their hybrid culture dominated the Levant and Mesopotamia until the third century CE. For reasons of space, this section focuses on three of the main Arab political entities: Petra, Palmyra and Hatra.

2.2.1 Petra

The Nabataeans, called themselves Nbṭw, became the first sedentary group in Syria to be classified by ancient historians as Arab.4 They were depicted primarily as pastoral nomads of Semitic descent, who had settled in southern Transjordan. The Nabataeans developed an autonomous kingdom ruled from Petra (Aramaic Reqem) as their capital, which lasted from 312/11 BCE to 106 CE (Bennett 1997; Lewin 2014, 117). By the second half of the first century BCE, their rulers had adopted the title of ‘king’, and also became sedentary (Strabo 16.4.21-26). However, this shift in lifestyle did not involve the disintegration of the Nabateans tribal structure, since they retained many elements of

4 For the relationships between the term ‘Arab’ and the Nabataeans, see Retsō (2003, 364-91).
their tribal hierarchy even with this change. This transformation was the result of Petra’s evolution to a trade emporium for the traffic of frankincense and incense between the Red Sea and southern Arabia, which made the Nabatean kingdom extremely prosperous (Bennett 1997, 176; Lewin 2014, 117-121; Xinru 2010, 24; McLaughlin 2010, 62; Wenning 2007, 29). By the time of the Roman arrival in Syria, the power of the Nabataeans under the rule of Aretas III had reached its peak (Hoyland 2002, 72).

Relations between the Romans and the Nabataeans strengthened as both shared an interest in the caravan route that passed through south Arabia, which was exceptionally developed at that time (McLaughlin 2010, 71). Emperor Augustus sent an expedition against Himyarite-Sabaean of Yemen in 26/25 BCE led by the prefect Aelius Gallus, and this was supported by the Nabataean king Obodas III, who contributed by Nabataean auxiliaries. Such intervention was motivated by Augustus’ great interest in imperial expansion as well as taking over the means of production (Bennett 1997, 177; Bowersock 1983, 36-47; McLaughlin 2010, 72; Sartre 2007, 65-66). However, his enterprise ended in great failure, and according to Aelius Gallus this was the fault of the Nabataean auxiliaries’ inefficiency (Bowersock 1983, 47-49; Patrich 1990, 26). However, Roman-Nabataean cordial relationships were not damaged and remained strong until the first century CE (Wenning 2007, 33). Nevertheless, this expedition led to the reactivation of the trade route through Nabataean territory (Bennett 1997, 177; Wenning 2007, 33).

By the first century CE, the Romans started an annexation process of the Syrian Kingdoms, which Shahid (1984, 19) called a “policy of absorption” and which Lewin (2014, 126) termed the “dismantlement of the Friendly Kings”. For instance, in 6 CE Judaea became a new Roman province, and in 72 CE Commagene was annexed to the Syrian province (Butcher 2003, 114). Furthermore, Cappadocia and Lesser Armenia

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5 For more discussion on Nabataean lifestyle, see: Alpass (2013); Hoyland (2002, 70-71); Rosen (2007); Sartre (2007, 237-238); Wenning (2007, 29-30).
were placed under the Galatian authority (Bryce 2014, 233-238), and Emesa was incorporated by the Flavian emperors (69-96 CE) during the era of Agrippa II’s rule (Lewin 2014). By 106 CE, largely with no serious resistance, the Roman emperor Trajan annexed Petra and established the new Roman province of Arabia, with Bostra the base for Roman administration (Bennett 1997, 179; Bowersock 1983, 79-80; Butcher 2003, 118; Wenning 2007, 40). From this point onwards, the Nabataean royal family began to disappear gradually from the historical records. Nonetheless, the province of Arabia continued under Roman domination and was governed from Bosra until the Islamic conquest in the 630s.

2.2.2 Palmyra

Palmyra, known as Tadmur by the indigenous people, was an oasis settlement in the northern Syrian steppe. It was situated at the meeting point of the caravan route between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean coast, and its historical relevance was largely determined by its geographical position between the Roman and Sasanian Empires (Pliny 5.88). Palmyra had been an isolated and insignificant settlement during the Seleucid Empire (Kaizer 2002, 35; Smith 2013, 22; Southern 2008, 19), and it was not until the Roman occupation of Syria that the seeds of the future evolution of the city were planted.

The first century CE witnessed the formulation of the Palmyrene political and social structure. During this century, Palmyra was formally incorporated into the Roman imperial system (Southern 2008, 20-24; Edwell 2008, 31-2), adopting Greek polis structures. Yet it retained its distinct Aramaic dialect, which it used alongside Greek, and also embraced a hybrid religious pantheon. While there is no literary and epigraphic evidence for the formal Roman annexation of Palmyra, it is generally agreed that the

6 For more on this process see Bryce 2014, 233-238; Butcher 2003, 114-116; Millar (1993, 80-99).
7 For continuity of the Nabataeans after 106 CE, see: Retsø (2003, 378-383).
8 It seems that both names derived from the name of the date: Taumer in Semitic and Palm in Greek or Latin.
city participated in the “Pax Romana” (27 BC-180 AD), which promoted fundamental changes throughout Syria and turned Palmyra into a “Greek city” (Kaizer 2002, 38; Sartre 2007, 53).

The history of Palmyra in the second half of the third century has always been associated with the prominence of Odaenathus and his family, especially his romanticised widow Zenobia (Kaiser 2002, 40; Stoneman 1992, 111; Southern 2008, 1). A number of sources indicated that after the Sasanian king Shapur I defeated the Romans and captured Emperor Valerian in 259/260, Odaenathus attempted to appease Shapur I with lavish gifts or, as Smith (2013, 29) suggests, to buy peace or to secure the trade route.\(^9\) After Shapur rejected Odaenathus’ gesture, the latter carried out a successful offensive campaign into Sasanian territory in which he not only reoccupied the Roman territory as far the Euphrates Valley, but he also advanced all the way to the Sasanian capital Ctesiphon (Dignas and Winter 2007, 23; Hoyland 2002, 75; Sartre 2007, 354). For this service, Gallienus granted him the title *Dux Orientis* (Leader of the East). In addition, it seems that it was at this point that Odaenathus claimed the traditional Iranian title ‘King of Kings’ for himself and his son (Sartre 2007, 354; Southern 2008, 71; Potter 2004, 259-260).\(^10\) Odaenathus was finally assassinated in Emesa in 267/268 CE together with his son Hairan from his first wife, in mysterious circumstances (Bryce 2014, 291-293; Sartre 2007, 355).\(^11\) Shortly after the death of Odaenathus, Zenobia came forward as the principal leader of Palmyra, while her son Vaballathus the successor of his father remained, as Bryce points out, “a name without substance” (2014, 299). Up to this point, Palmyra had been firmly incorporated into the Roman Empire, but with Zenobia’s rise came a significant deterioration of this relationship.

\(^9\) For Odaenathus’ embassy to Shapur I, see: Dignas and Winter (2007, 158-60); Southern (2008, 60-1).
\(^10\) Recently, Bryce suggested that none of these titles were officially recognised by Emperor Gallienus (Bryce 2014, 290-291).
\(^11\) There are plenty of suspects, including Zenobia, the Roman emperor Gallienus, the Sasanian king, and a group of Palmyrene malcontents. For more on this discussion see Bryce (2014, 291-293), and for collected texts see Dodgeon and Lieu (1991, 69-72).
Zenobia was born in Palmyra around 240/41 CE with the name Julia Aurelia Zenobia. Her ancestry is the subject of intense discussion, with one Palmyrene inscription indicating that she was the daughter of a man named Antiochus (Southern 2008, n.15. 173), and the Historia Augusta claiming that her father could trace his lineage to the famous Julia Domna (170-217 CE) of the Severan Dynasty of Rome (193 and 235). Nonetheless, she held Roman citizenship (Stoneman 1992, 2; Southern 2008, 4). In the Arab Muslim tradition, however, she was believed to have descended from an Arab family, given the minor differences between her and her grandfather’s name. Zenobia herself claimed a descent from the Egyptian queen Cleopatra, who was neither Arab nor Roman, but an Egyptianised Macedonian Greek (Southern 2008, 1; Stoneman 1992, 5). Yet regardless of her ancestry, Zenobia combined symbols from different cultures.

As Rome experienced an imperial crisis, Zenobia became more ambitious to extend Palmyrene supremacy to the eastern Roman provinces. Within a few years, she imposed her control over most of this region, stretching from Egypt to Ankara as well as most of the Levant, and she took the title Augusta for herself and Augustus for her son (Butcher 2003, 59; Sartre 2007, 356). However, by 272, after defeating the Gallic Empire the Emperor Aurelian (270-275) turned his sights to the East, and subsequently achieved decisive victories against Zenobia in Antioch and Emesa, and seized Alexandria early in 272 CE before laying siege to Palmyra. After months of this siege, Zenobia was finally captured while attempting to cross the Euphrates River in a boat and was brought before Aurelian (Butcher 2003, 60; Sartre 2007, 358). This capture effectively ended Palmyra’s role in ancient history, yet at the same time it established the foundation for the legend of Zenobia.

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12 The Roman emperor Caracalla (208–17) had granted Roman citizenship for all the freeborn Roman inhabitants (see: Southern 2008, 4).
13 Her name appeared as Nā'ila bint ʻAmrw ibn al-ʻzarb bin Hassān bin udthina bin al-samyd’ bin Hawr al-ʻmylqī in (al-Ṭabarî Tārîkh 1:36; Ibn al-Athīr al-Kāmil, 1:265) or as al-Zabb’ bint ‘Amrw ibn al-zarb bin Hassān bin udthina bin al-samyd’ bin Hawr al- ‘mylqī (al-Masʿudi Murūj, 2:74-5).
14 For the Roman crisis of the third century, see Watson (2003, 23-38).
Zenobia’s expansion and the complex socio-political structures of the Palmyrene state raise controversial questions regarding the city’s identity and Zenobia’s motive of expansion. Was this expansion an attempt by the local Arabs to challenge the Roman domination? Or should it be interpreted as Romans versus Romans, akin to any other Roman military officer’s attempt to seek imperial power in the third century? In other words, was Zenobia acting as a Palmyrene, a Roman, an Arab, or a combination of all of these?

This topic has led to intense scholarly debate and this chapter considers this complexity whilst concurrently aiming to introduce the main concepts. Smith (2013, 184) argued that Palmyra had a hybrid identity stemming from four different origins, being simultaneously Greek, Roman, Parthian, and native. In contrast, Andrade (2013) challenged the scholarly opinion by championing Palmyra’s “Greekness”, examining local practices in the material record, and pointing out that Palmyrene political practice produced an innovative form of civic “Greekness” (2013, 209-210). In a similar examination, Millar pointed out that Zenobia’s motives for expansion can hardly be ascertained now (1993, 172), yet argued that there is no evidence to depict her movement as a local ethnic movement against Rome (1993, 173). Kaizer (2002, 40) reported a similar vision, suggesting that there are “certainly no grounds for viewing the events as a pre-Islamic Arab movement against the western world”. Similarly, for Sartre (2007, 357) there is little evidence to support the suggestion that their secession was ethnic in nature or related to a nascent Arab empire’s attempts to free itself from Roman dominion.

The above discussions demonstrate that the cultural makeup of the Palmyrene remains an elusive subject, and thus re-constructing the motives of Zenobia’s expansion policy is rather complex. However, even when it is complicated to demonstrate what her policy was, it seems that we can argue what her policy was not, which has allowed for the strong argument that her rebellion against the Romans showed no signs of an ethnic awareness or any link to a pan-Arab movement of the third century CE.
2.2.3 Hatra

The city of Hatra (al-Ḥaḍr) was a round-shaped city on the east desert-steppe of Mesopotamia, and the site is currently 80 km south of Mosul and about 110 km to the west of the Valley of the Thar Thār. Hatra was probably founded during the Seleucid period (312 BC–63 BC), and later flourished as a semi-independent centre for trade and religion, and also as the capital of the “kingdom of the Arabs”, who were subordinate to the Parthian kings (Hauser 2013, 120). About 500 inscriptions and graffiti have been uncovered, primarily in the Aramaic script and language, and they are often dated according to the Seleucid calendar (Dirven 2013, 11). These inscriptions, along with the ruins of the city, show that Hatra functioned as a meeting point of three cultures: Parthian, Roman, and Semitic.

By the first century BCE, Hatra was ruled by a local dynasty. From the middle of this century, it was ruled by the Mry/Maria (Lords) who were from one family and likely belonged to Adiabene’s kingdom until the fall of Trajan’s campaign in 117 CE (Bosworth 1983, 596; Fu’ād and Muṣṭafá 1974, 26).15 As a result of its important location between the Parthian and Roman territories and its status as a caravan city, Hatra began to flourish (Hauser 2013, 120-1). There was a peaceful relationship between the Romans and the Parthians from CE 65 onwards, enabling the prosperity of Hatra. For instance, it seems that the city’s fortification walls were built during this period as part of a Parthian attempt to establish a first line of defence at Ctesiphon.

From the early second century CE, Hatra’s power reached its peak. While Ctesiphon, the Parthian principal capital, fell to the Roman emperor Trajan, the city of Hatra successfully resisted Trajan’s siege in 116/117 CE. In this context the Arsacids elevated the Lord of Hatra to the rank of king, as a buffer against the growing Roman threat (Sommer 2013, 43). This change was followed by the establishment of impressive and

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15 Adiabene was a Jewish kingdom which arose rise during the Parthian era and dominated the land between the greater and lesser Zab Rivers with Arbela as its capital (Frye 1984, 222).
luxurious buildings in Hatra, such as the sanctuary of the sun god Shamash and two Roman style temples. The sanctuary combined elements from different sources, serving as a clear indication of Hatra’s hybrid identity. It was built in the Hellenistic-Roman style, with Parthian or eastern open-fronted curved halls (iwans) yet was dedicated to the Semitic deity Shamash (Potter 2004, 114). The new architectural expansion of the city occurred around the same time as the first mint of Hatra’s coinage by King Snṭrwq, who described Hatra as “the City of the Sun God”, and these two examples attest to Hatra’s wealth and its prominent role in the surrounding area (Dignas and Winter 2007, 156; Fu’ād and Muṣṭafá 1974).

Hatra was able to resist the second Roman siege by Septimius Severus, which occurred around CE 197 and 199. Nevertheless, Hatra was briefly allied the Romans during a later period in face of the rise the Sasanian to power in Iran. Evidence for this can be found in the presence of the Roman garrisons in the city (Hauser 2013, 130-3).

Eventually, Hatra was sacked in 240/241 CE by the powerful Sasanian dynasty (either by Ardashir or his son, Shapur I). Unlike their predecessors the Parthians, the Sasanians attempted to centralise their empire, and as a result Hatra gradually declined and was abandoned. Ammianus Marcellinus described the ruins of Hatra in 363 as an “old city situated in an uninhabited area and deserted for a long time past” (Marcellinus 25.8.5).

2.3 From independent statehood to client states (4th-6th centuries CE)

The third century CE witnessed new political developments in the region. On the east of Euphrates, the Sasanians overthrew the Parthians in CE 224. In contrast with the Parthians who allowed a certain degree of local independence, the Sasanians preferred direct control over the local entities. They therefore put an end to the Mesopotamian regional powers of Mesene in 222 CE (Characene to the Romans), and Hatra 240/241 CE (Bosworth 1983, 594-6). In a similar process on the other side of Euphrates, the Romans had imposed direct domination over the Levant at the end of the first century, and expanded until they overthrew Palmyra in CE 272. By the end of the third century CE therefore, most of the independent caravan cities had either collapsed or been annexed.
This transformed the Arab states from autonomous political and commercial entities to client states, answerable to one or other empire, usually with a tribal character and where religion usually played an increased role.

Yet direct rule proved difficult for both empires. Both empires suffered great losses from engaging the other directly, as well as from continued raids by the Arab tribes. Within this context, both powers initiated a new political structure in the region, which Dignas and Winter (2007, 169) have called a “proxy policy” or as a system of friendly kingdoms by Ball (2002, 30-1). This policy involved allowing the Arabs a certain level of local independence, but requiring them to act as buffers between the two empires. Consequently, two Arab “client states” emerged on both sides of the Euphrates: the Ghassanids on the west bank, and the Lakhmids on the east bank.

2.3.1 The Ghassanids

The Ghassanids were an Arab tribe confederation of Azd that migrated, according to the Arab tradition, from Yemen (al-Masʿūdī, Murūj, 2:84-5). They exploited the political vacuum left by the fall of Palmyra at the end of the third century and settled in southern Syria and the Roman province of Arabia. The first documented Ghassanid ruler was King Jaffna ibn ‘Amr, who founded the Ghassanid principality by settling in Hawran (south of Damascus). As a result of their interaction with the indigenous Aramean and Greco-Roman people, it is assumed that the Ghassanids converted to Christianity in the fourth century and agreed to pay tribute to the newly reshaped Roman Empire, now with its capital at Byzantium/Constantinople (Hoyland 2002, 240). This relationship held for several generations, surviving the transformation of the Roman world to become the Byzantine world (as the loss of the western half of the Roman Empire gradually solidified into a permanent situation).

By the sixth century CE, the Byzantines realised the importance of employing the Ghassanid Arabs of the region to defend their borders against raids from other Arabs and to secure the border against the Sasanian Empire and their allies. In 528 CE, Aretas (Harith ibn Jabala) led a victorious campaign against the Lakhmid Arab territory on the
Sasanian side, which resulted in Aretas being awarded the title of phylarch (Shahīd 1995, 283). It is assumed that Aretas was the first Arab leader to receive such an honour. In return, the Ghassanids continued to provide troops for the Byzantine wars against the Sasanians and served as a counterweight to the latter’s Arab allies. The last Ghassanid king, Jabala ibn al-Ayyām, sent Arab forces to join the Byzantine army of Emperor Heraclius at the battle of Yarmūk. After the defeat of Byzantium by the Arab Muslims in the battle of Yarmūk 635 CE, Jabala and a portion of the Ghassanids retreated to Anatolia with the Byzantine army (Decker 2012; Kaegi 2000, 269), whereas a number of the Arabs remained within the Islamic Arab dominant area.

2.3.2 The Lakhmids

The Lakhmids, also called “Naṣrids”, were an Arab dynasty that ruled for about three centuries from their capital al-Ḥīra, the ruins of which can be found today approximately 3.5 km south of Kufa in Iraq.¹⁶ According to the Arab genealogical tradition, the Lakhmid tribe migrated (as part of a bigger Tanūkh tribal confederation) to Iraq after the collapse of the Marib Dam in Yemen.¹⁷ The Lakhmid migration coincided with the power vacuum of the later Parthian period, and so they were able to populate parts of the Levant, south Mesopotamia, and the north of the Arabian Peninsula.

Unlike many other Arab tribes, such as the Quḍā’a for instance, the Lakhmids did not oppose the Sasanian Empire. Instead, ‘Amr ibn ‘Adī, the founder of the Lakhmid dynasty, allied himself with the Sasanian Empire and was thus able to obtain their support when endeavouring to dominate the neighbouring Arab tribes. In return, the Lakhmids took charge of protecting the Sasanian border against raids and attacks from the Byzantines and their Arab allies the Ghassanids (Wiesehöfer, 2001, 196). This relationship continued until the early seventh century when the last Lakhmid king, Nuʿmān III, was

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¹⁶ The word ‘Ḥīra’ seems to be of Syriac origin, stemming from ‘Ḥērtā’, meaning ‘encampment’ (Bosworth 1983, 597).

¹⁷ However, this depiction has been interpreted as legend and thus as untrustworthy (al-‘Ali 2000, 110).
deposed by the Sasanian king Khusrow II, which ultimately led to the battle of Dhi Qār (Bosworth 1983, 608).\footnote{Dhi Qār is the name of a watering place located near to the city of Kufa in Iraq.}  

Although the battle of Dhi Qār was mainly caused by the Sasanians removing Nuʿmān III, there are other theories about its cause in Muslim Arab historiography (al-Ṭabarī Tārīkh, 1:472-82; al Masʿūdī al-Tanbih, 207-8; al-Isfahānī 24: 35-48). On balance, it is unlikely that the war broke out when Nuʿmān was killed by Khusrow and the Lakhmid dynasty of Hīra was abolished, or when Khusrow entrusted īās b. Qabīṣa with the tasks that had previously been carried out by the Lakhmid dynasty.\footnote{Qabīṣa, the leader of the Arab Tayye tribe, revived the Lakhmids.} Rather, it is likely that the battle began promptly after Khusrow asked the Shaybānī tribe to hand over Lakhmid armour, which had been entrusted to them by Nuʿmān. Their refusal, led Khusrow to send a Sasanian army joint by a number of Arab tribes against the Shaybānī tribe, which ultimately led to the two sides entering into battle, ending with the Shaybānī victory (Bosworth 1983, 536). While scholars generally agree on an Arab victory, it seems have had no immediate impact on the Sasanian power south of Mesopotamia. Hīra, for instance, continued to be ruled directly by pro-Sasanian Arabs after the battle of Dhi Qār (al-Masʿūdī Tanbih 158; Ali 2:99). Nonetheless, the battle has passed into popular legend and generated a huge body of poetry and produced many stories.\footnote{The history of Dhi Qār has primarily been perceived through the Muslim-Arab literature. A number of these historians have provided elaborate accounts (e.g., al-Ṭabarī Tārīkh, 1: 2209-377), whereas others have provided terse accounts (e.g., al-Masʿūdī al-Tanbih, 207-208).} However, we should be wary of seeing it as an ethnic Arab uprising against the Sasanians. In general, this conflict between the Arab tribes and the Sasanians should be viewed as part of the Ayyām al-ʿArab (Battle Days of the Arabs),\footnote{Ayyam al-ʿArab [Days of the Arabs] was a pre-Islamic Arab intertribal war, also known as “war of al-Basus”, “war of al-Abs”.} as Arabs fought on both sides of the battle, many on the side of the Sasanians. One result of the battle was the imposition of Sasanian direct rule on the Arabs of Mesopotamia (Kaegi 2000, 265). The battle was also psychologically important, as Bosworth (1983): pointed out, it convinced the Arabs that the Persians were not
invincible. Finally, it paved the way for the Muslim-Arab conquest in the 630s (Dignas and Winter 2007, 172; Frye 1983, 139). Similarly, with the Zenobia’s rising against the Roman, the battle of Dhi Qār become essential part of any modern Iraqi narrative of the relationships between the pre-Islamic Arabs and the Iranian powers.

2.4 The Muslim conquest (7th century CE)

While internal power struggles and religious disputes weakened both the Byzantine and Sasanian empires, the Arabs in Arabia were about to build an empire under a new religion of Islam. Within few years, the Muslim Arabs initiated a campaign against both Byzantines and Sasanians. In the two decisive battles of al-Qādisiyah and Yarmūk, they were able to conquer the Sasanian Empire and expel the Byzantines from Levant.

2.4.1 The Battle of al-Qādisiyyah and conquest of Mesopotamia

Al-Qādisiyyah was a decisive battle in the 630s that occurred between the Muslim-Arabs and the Sasanian Empire, and which marked the beginning of Arab domination and the end of the Sasanian Empire in Iraq. The sizes of both armies are uncertain but it is likely that Rustam, the Sasanian commander, had a larger army than that of Saʿd bin Abi Waqqāṣ, the Muslim-Arab commander (Donner 1981, 205-9; Morony 2005). Similarly, the date of the battle is uncertain, happening between 634 and 638 (e.g., Donner 1981, 212; Daryaee 2009, 37; Pourshariati 2008, 220). Yet one thing that is certain is that the Muslim-Arabs overcame the Sasanian army over the course of several days, paving the way for the subsequent conquest of Ctesiphon, the Sasanian capital, and ultimately the entire empire.

22 Al-Qādisiyyah was probably the name of a Sasanian garrison town in the defence system on the south edge of the Mesopotamian desert, situated to the southwest of Hīra (Donner 1981, 204).
2.4.2 The battle of Yarmūk and conquest of the Levant

By CE 629, the Muslim-Arabs, after enhancing their power in Arabia, began to attack the Byzantine Empire. In Muatā, in 629 CE, the Byzantines achieved an easy victory over the Muslim army, which initially lead the Emperor Heraclius and his advisers to underestimate the threat they posed. Yet by 633/634 CE, serious confrontations between Muslim-Arabs and the Byzantines began to take place, with the former growing stronger and ultimately able to defeat the Byzantine Empire in a series of battles, including Maʿāb, ‘Ayn Ghamr, and Ajnādayn. Subsequently, the Muslim Arabs conquered many Syrian cities, such as Damascus, Baalbek, and Hims, yet it was not long before the Byzantine forces managed to recapture them (Kaegi 2000, 67). It is generally agreed that the battle of Yarmūk cemented the Muslim-Arab dominance over Syria-Palestine. Muslim-Arab historians agree that the Byzantines were numerically superior the Muslims (Donner 1981: 128-42), yet despite the former’s initial success, they went on to suffer heavy losses. The battle of Yarmūk in 636 CE (Kaegi 2000, 112) decisively broke the Byzantines’ ability to resist the Muslims (Donner 1981, 112), and thus put an end to more than seven centuries of Roman-Byzantine domination of the Levant and heralded a new era of Muslim-Arab domination.
Chapter Three: The Contemporary Political Context (20th century CE)

3.1 Iraq during the late Ottoman Empire

Prior to the British occupation of Mesopotamia, there was no single state occupying the areas of modern Iraq. Instead, three different Ottoman provinces – Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra – existed with no real political bonds or even cultural ties. For Zubaida (2002, 205), the “Iraqi imagined communities” during the late Ottoman Empire were fragmentary and overlapped between different elements of identities (see Lamani and Momani, 2010, 1). In fact, there were two main levels of these “imagined communities”. The lower level was the living space, which was demonstrated by imagined practices of common ethnic, religious and, more importantly, tribal affiliations. In contrast, the upper level was dominated by the idea of belonging to the Islamic Ummah, which was represented by the Ottoman caliphate. Within the Ottoman Empire, there were more differences between “Iraqis” than similarities. For instance, Basra and Baghdad were Arab spaces, yet the former was predominantly Shi’i faith while the second was Sunni. In the north, Mosul was a Sunni province but was divided between the main ethnic groups – the Arabs and the Kurds – as well as many ethnic and religious minorities. The Sunnis monopolised the political administration in the region, especially in Baghdad, the future capital of Iraq and centre of power. These fragmented contradictions were “faithfully” transmitted to the newly created state of Iraq after World War I.¹

World War I played a key role in shaping modern Iraq, as the nation’s fate was decided in the famous Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. According to this agreement, the former Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad, should come under British control, and Mosul decided to come under the French control (Fattah 2009, 155; Nissen and Heine 2009,

¹ For more on the Iraqi society during the late Ottoman era, see Batatu (2004) and al-Wardî (1972).
151). On 11th March 1917 the British army, led by General Stanley Maude, entered Baghdad, Basra was already occupied since 1914, but the occupation of the three Ottoman provinces was not completed until 1918 when the British gained control over Mosul (Fattah 2009, 157; Sluglett 2007, 1). Later, the United Kingdom received a “sacred trust” from the League of Nations Mandate of Iraq, in which the British government committed to creating a self-determining country from these three Ottoman provinces (Dodge 2003, 14-5; Nissen and Heine 2009, 151).

3.2 The Hashemite monarchy (1921-1958)

Imposing the British mandate led to a large-scale uprising in Iraq, known as the 1920 Revolt. During the course of the revolution the Iraqi communities, even with their deep divisions and varied motivation, revolted against of the British. However, the arrival of British reinforcements and lack of ammunition the 1920 Revolution was controlled by mid-October 1920. To pacify the Iraqi opposition to the British mandate, even with no early agreed-upon vision of how to build the Iraqi state, the British came to the conclusion that a constitutional monarchy in Iraq was required, represented by the Hashemite King Fayṣal I (1883-1933) (Dawisha 2013, 13-4; Fattah 2009, 157; Lukitz 2006, 125–38; Sluglett 2007, 39). Fayṣal was not from Iraq originally, but was instead “imported” and proclaimed as the first king of Iraq on 23 August 1921. Keeping in mind the variations in Iraqi society, with Muslim majority, it seems that even though the new king was not from Iraq but being claiming a descendent from the Prophet Mohammed’s clan, the Hāshimī, made him to be the best possible option for the British administration in Iraq (Haddad 2008, 14; Ireland 2009, 319-37). However, problems began to arise when Fayṣal’s government was made up of ex-Sharifian officers, Arab intellectuals from Arab states, Iraqi landowners, and tribal chiefs, largely originating from the Arab Sunni

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2 Mosul was ceded by France to the Great Britain at the Versailles Peace conference in 1919.
3 For more on the British rule in Iraq, see Bashkin (2009), and Sluglett (2007).
4 Faisal brought with him around three hundred former Ottoman army officers, some of them had participated in the Arab Revolt in 1916 and other in Faisal’s administration in Damascus.
community (along with small representatives of Christians and Jews). In contrast, both Arab Shiites and Kurds were poorly represented in the state body, which did not reflect their proportion in the society that became known as Iraq (Marr 2012, 25; Tripp 2000, 45). Iraq was a colonial state that lacked the essential underpinning of a nation (Dawisha 1999, 553), and the power from the outset was tyrannical, monopolised only by one part of the population, the Sunnis.

The first duty of the new king was to organise Iraq’s relationship with Britain, which culminated in the passing of the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty in 1922. According to the treaty, the United Kingdom agreed to respect Iraqi sovereignty, while the latter allowed the former to install their “advisers” through the Iraqi government (Fattah 2009, 162; Sluglett 2007, 49–50). The two sides later signed a 1930 agreement, which preserved two British military bases and cemented their role on important matters, and which ended the British mandate. Two years later, Iraq was recognised by the League of Nations as an independent state and became the first Arab state to enter the League (Tripp 2000, 74). However, Iraq remained under the control of the United Kingdom and political and intellectual life was shaped by the British, which survived until the collapse of the monarchy in 1958 (Bashkin 2009, 4).

During his reign, Fayṣal established a new and ambitious power group, the army officers, adding them to the many ambitious groups that already existed. Fayṣal expanded the Iraqi army with the aim, as he claimed, to “defeat two revolutions that may take place at the same time, in two places” (cited in Kadhim 2012, 152), most likely referring to Kurdistan and the south of Iraq. Ultimately, however, the army officers became the main group to destabilise the Iraqi government after the death of Fayṣal in 1933. In 1936, during the reign of King Ghazi (1912–1939), General Bakr Ṣidqī (1890–1937) carried out the first military coup in both Iraqi and Arabic history. Ṣidqī, however, was

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5 For more on the intrusion of the Iraqi army officers into politics, see Marr (2012, 52-3), Salama and Marashi (2008, 13-42), and Tarbush (1982, 88-110).

6 Bakr Ṣidqī, from a Kurdish origin was a supporter of the Iraqi nationalism. He was accused by the Sunni elite of stripping Iraq of its Arab identity. His assentation most probably carried out by group of pan-Arab nationalists of Iraqi officers. For more on the Ṣidqī’s coup, see Tripp (2000, 88-94).
assassinated the following year and Ghazi dissolved the parliament and called for a new election (Fattah 2009, 176; Hunt 2005, 70; Marr 2012, 38). The government was formed in part by the coup leaders, but it also represented various Iraqi communities. Yet the coup had planted the idea of rebelling against the elected government and opened the door to direct military intervention in politics, a phenomenon that Iraq has suffered as a result throughout the twentieth century, during which time it accelerated towards authoritarian regimes.

Ghazi died in a car accident in 1939, in what were viewed as suspicious circumstances. The abrupt death of the king gave rise to the question of a successor, since Ghazi’s eldest son, Fayṣal (1935-1958), was only four years old. It was decided that until the new King Fayṣal II came of age, Prince ʿAbdul Illāh (1913-1958) would serve as Regent. Nevertheless, Ghazi’s death was the second severe blow to hit Iraq’s fragile centre of power after the death of Fayṣal I (Mohamedou, 1998, 87).

Resistance and its effects on the Portsmouth Treaty (1948) and the establishment of the State of Israel (1948) were the most prominent issues of Iraqi politics in the 1940s and 1950s. In 1947, Iraq and the United Kingdom renegotiated their relationship, establishing a new basis in the post-World War Two era. The two sides signed the Portsmouth Treaty in January of the following year, with the British agreeing to withdraw its army from Iraqi soil yet retaining the right to return in the event of war. The treaty soon led to outraged sentiment and strikes that attempted restoration a full Iraqi sovereignty. This public outcry, known in Iraqi as al-Wathba (rising), was directed against the treaty and the government who signed it. Ultimately the treaty was cancelled, and the government resigned (Hunt 2005, 74; Marr 2012, 64-66; Tripp 2000 119-22).

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7 The death of King Ghazi led to widespread speculation about the complicity of Nuri Said and the British embassy, with the suggestion of a murder plot. Many Iraqi historians accuse those parties of the King’s death. This accusation was used in the German propaganda of World War 2, which referred to King Ghazi as a “martyr” (DeFronzo 2009, 28; Simon 2004, 39-40).
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict became an “ideological resource” for Iraqi politicians. Both the Iraqi communist Party (ICP) and the Arab Ba’th Socialist Party (henceforth Ba’th) used the slogan “the rescue of the Palestinian” for their political interest against the pro-British Iraqi politicians. Such politicians, including Nuri al-Said, proposed a local autonomy for Jews in the areas where they constituted the majority, which later evolved into the suggestion of setting up a Jewish state (Eppel 1994, 123-4). Nevertheless, the Soviet Union’s call for “an independent, dual, democratic, homogeneous Arab-Jewish state” (Batatu 2004, 597) led the ICP into a bewildering situation. After a period of internal struggle, the ICP embraced the Soviet Union’s vision on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which paved the way for the Ba’thist to depict themselves as the sole defenders of the Arabs of Palestine (Fattah 2009, 179).

As consequences of these two events, the 1940s and 1950s witnessed several strikes in Iraq, which were aimed at establishing socio-economic and political reforms. The failure of the British and Iraqi governments to meet these demanded reforms led to a widespread feeling of discontent and a lack of faith in the political elite and the monarchy in general. Subsequently, it led the Iraqis to seek a solution from outside the established political system, and the army officers were well placed to seize this potential opportunity.

On 14 July 1958, the monarchy was toppled by a military coup. The rebellion was led by Brigadier ʿAbdul al-Karīm Qāsim (1914-1963), a member of the Free Officers of Iraq (FOI) movement, who marched with his forces into Baghdad and immediately proclaimed an Iraqi Republic and the end of the monarchy. This coup was followed by a massacre of many of the Hashemite royal family, including King Fayṣal II and Prince ʿAbdul Illāh, with the survivors exiled (Fattah 2009, 187; Tripp 2000, 143-7).

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8 The ICP had always been anti-Jewish national home in Palestine project. At the same time, they asserted the Soviet Union Is the only super powers to stand by the right of the Arabs in Palestine against the Western imperialism, which founded the “Jewish state on Arab land” (Batatu 2004, 2:255-267).
Despite the progress of nation-building during the monarchy, the Hashemites relied on a narrow sector of the populace, Sunni elites and ex-Sharifians, and thus the monarchy failed to understand the diversity and complexity of Iraqi society. The growth of the role of army officers ultimately led to the collapse of the entire regime, with subsequent ones less able or keen to overcome this dilemma and alleviate the division caused by affiliations in the hardened and politicised ethnic and religious/sectarian groups.

3.3 Rise of nationalism: *al-Qawmīyah al-‘Arabīyah* (Arab nationalism) verses *al-Waṭanīyah al-‘Irāqīyah* (Iraqi nationalism)*9*

In their writings on nationalism, Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm both influentially claimed that the idea of a nation is “imagined” or “invented”, and some groups need more imagining than others (Anderson, B 1991, 6; Hobsbawm 2000, 7). In the context of Iraq, both Zubaida (2000) and Davis (2005, 2) have argued that the people of Iraq have not agreed yet on a single national vision. In the last century, two forms of national identity have been in competition: *Al-Qawmīyah al-‘Arabīyah* (henceforth *al-Qawmīyah*) and *Al-Waṭanīyah al-‘Irāqīyah* (henceforth *al-Waṭanīyah*). The first, *al-Qawmīyah*, or Arab nationalism, considers Arabic language, history, and culture to be the main markers of the national identity of Iraqis, and often strives to unify Arab people in one state (Bashkin 2011, 294; Bashkin 2009, 127). In contrast, *al-Waṭanīyah*, or Iraqi patriotism, placed emphasis on creating a homeland and a sense of identity defined by the Iraqi borders, regardless of ethnic, religious, and sectarian backgrounds (Bashkin 2009, 128; Davis 2005, 13).

As a vision, *Al-Qawmīyah* dominated Hashemite historiography. In line with German *Volk* concept of nation, *Al-Qawmīyah* vision prioritized language, history and culture in defining the Arab identity. In addition, it asserted that the inhabitants of ancient Mesopotamia (the Akkadians, Assyrians, and Chaldeans etc.) were related to the Arabs

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*9 Concurrently there was a Kurdish nationalism movement that differed from these trends to a great extent (see Kirmanj 2015, 120-3).*
(Bashkin 2011, 301; Davis 2005, 13). The vision was supported by ex-Sharifian officers and young Arab nationalist graduates of the American University of Beirut, such as Darwish al-Miqdadî, Zakie al-Arsuzi, and the most influential one, Sâti‘ al-Ḥuṣrî (1880-1968). The latter was a Syrian Sunni writer, educationalist, and an influential Arab nationalist thinker (Dawisha 2013, 79-80). He followed King Fayṣal to Iraq in 1920 and served as Director General of Education in Iraq (1921-1927). His vision seems to have stemmed more from German Romantic nationalism, particularly from Fichte (Hourani, 1970, 312). Al-Ḥuṣrî believed that the Arab nation is a homogeneous entity but plagued by disunity. In addition, he believed that despite the weaknesses of the Arab national consciousness of Iraqis, disunity could be overcome and Arab national affiliation could be promoted by teaching history (1961, 122). In particular, “spiritual kinship” (al-qarabah al-ma‘nawiyah) should be promoted rather than material kinship (see, al-Musawi 2006, 4; Kirmanj 2015, 82-3).

For this reason, al-Ḥuṣrî employed many Arab Sunni educators from Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine who, like their peers, emigrated to Egypt in the late Ottoman period, and were by no means more enthusiastic than the other Iraqis to advance the cause of Arab nationalism. Consequently, they played a crucial role in shaping Iraqi intellectual life at the same time as attempting to marginalise the non-Arab and non-Sunni Iraqis from the educational body (Bashkin 2009, 5-6; Kirmanj 2015, 82-3). Al-Ḥuṣrî’s vision of nationalism later became the predominant one, and was accepted and followed by many Arab nationalists including Michel ‘Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bîtâr, the founders of the Ba‘th Arabic party.11

Al-Waţanîyah, on the other hand, emphasised the Iraqi people rather than the wider Arab world. The followers of this vision employed themes from Ancient Mesopotamia in their arguments, without ignoring pre-Islamic and Islamic heritage (Davis 2005, 13). The Al-Waţanîyah vision emerged after the establishment of Iraq, and was enhanced by

10 For more on the role of the Lebanese in Egypt, see Chapter 6.
11 For more on Huṣrî’s life and ideas, see Cleveland (2016), on impact on Arab nationalism, see Dawisha (2003 49-74).
the Iraqi communist Party (ICP) (1934), whose leader tended to favour the al-Waṭanīyah vision over the al-Qawmīyah. The al-Waṭanīyah movement grew alongside the leftists during the 1940s and became the hegemonic trend during the reign of Qāsim (Bashkin 2009, 128; Bashkin 2011, 294). It was also favoured by some of both the Shi‘ī and Kurdish communities (Marr 2012, 25-6).

Problematically, however, these two visions are not always distinct, as both incorporate Islamic themes, have adopted each other’s metaphors, share anti-colonial sentiments, and are marked by the ability to change and shift their discourse throughout the twentieth century in accordance with the generation and personal position in the society (Bashkin 2009, 128; Bashkin 2011, 294; Tramontini 2012, 416).

3.4 The first republican government

After Iraq was proclaimed a Republic, Qāsim was appointed Prime Minister; Defence Minister; and Commander of the Armed Forces, while his chief supporter, Colonel ʿAbd al-Salam ʿArif (1921-1966), was appointed Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of the Interior; and Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces. The era of Qāsim was thus characterised by army domination of power and ideological antagonism (Fattah 2009, 188; Nissen and Heine 2009, 155), and ideological differences between the two leaders soon led to a rift between them (Dawisha 2013, 173; Hunt 2005, 79-80).

The conflict between the Iraqi patriotism and pan-Arab visions reached its peak during the rule of Qāsim. At the time of his rise to power, the Arab world was imbued with great enthusiasm for Pan-Arab sentiments, a trend best represented by the Egyptian charismatic leader Jamal ʿAbdul Nāṣir, who finally became President of the first unified Arab state of Egypt and Syria in early 1958, United Arab Republic (UAR).12 Fearing that Nasserism, a term frequently used interchangeably with ‘Arab nationalism’, would

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12 For more on the role of the Egyptian president Jamal ʿAbdul Nāṣir in the Pan-Arabism movement and the unity between Egypt and Syria, see Dekmejian (1971, 97-118) or Jankowski (2002, 115-136).
monopolise Iraqi thought, Qāsim placed emphasis on Iraqi patriotism and the Iraqi pre-Islamic Mesopotamian past (Batatu 2004, 818; Fattah 2009, 190; Wien 2012, 105). Nevertheless, he provoked the idea of the greater role of Iraqis within the Arab world to counter the Egyptian Pan-Arab domination of the Levant (Abdi 2008, 6; Tripp 2000, 166). In contrast, Colonel ʿArif (1921–66), was among the main supporters of Nasserism in Iraq who attempted to unify Iraq with the UAR (Fattah 2009, 190). Ultimately, this ideological difference led Qāsim to remove ʿArif from his position and send him abroad to act as Iraqi ambassador to the German Federal Republic.13

By the early 1960s, Qāsim had become increasingly isolated. He was challenged by the Arab nationalists, and dramatically lost the good relationship he had with the Kurds and the support of the top echelons of Iraqi society. The Baʿthist party made several unsuccessful attempts to assassinate Qāsim, including an attempt by Șaddām Ḥusayn (Nissen and Heine 2009, 157). Ultimately, Qāsim was unable to repel his opponents, with the Baʿthist managing a successful coup to seize power in 1963 in cooperation with ʿArif (Dawisha 2013, 183-4).

3.5 Rise of the Baʿth Party and Șaddām Ḥusayn to power

3.5.1 Establishment (1963-1979)

The period of ʿAbd al-Salam ʿArif (1963-1966) and his brother ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (1966-1968) was characterised by a more authoritarian regime with full control quickly falling into ʿArif’s hands. ʿAbd al-Salam ʿArif managed to control the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and oust his former allies from power. He also began a widespread suppression of Communists who he accused of supporting the previous regime (Dawisha

13 Later, ʿArif returned to Iraq but was “charged with plotting against Iraq and the life of Qāsim, its leader” (Haj 1997, 118). He was initially sentenced to death but then this was commuted to life imprisonment and house arrest (Fattah 2009, 191).
2013, 185; Nissen and Heine 2009, 157; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001, 93; Tripp 2000, 177). Yet ʿArif’s reign was short-lived, as he died in a helicopter crash in 1966.

He was succeeded by his brother ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿArif, who attempted to continue his brother’s policies with adding more Islamic “flavour” (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001, 98-9). ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿArif quickly lost support among the Iraqi populace as well as among the military officers. Eventually, a number of military officers of different ideological inclinations ousted ʿAbd al-Raḥmān from power in what has been referred to as the White or Bloodless Revolution of 17 July 1968 (Anderson, T 2011, 20; Bengio 2002, 27; Hunt 2005, 83). Within a few weeks, the Baʿthist party led by Aḥmed Ḥasan al-Bakr (1914-1982), a key figure of the 1963 coup, seized control.

The Baʿthist party gradually moved to centralise and even personalise the power. In September 1968, al-Bakr’s government issued a provisional constitution that established the RCC as the highest authority with legislative function in Baʿthist Iraq. Nevertheless, the RCC leader served as both the Iraqi president and the commander in chief of the military (Hunt 2005, 84; Tripp 2000, 194-6). Accordingly, al-Bakr became President and elevated his cousin, Ṣaddām Ḥusayn, to the position of Vice-President. While, the former represented himself as an Arab nationalist and brought prestige to the regime, the latter, who was described by The Guardian as the “strong man of Iraq”, organised the party in order to (as he himself stated) diminish the possibility of anyone “who disagrees with us [the Baathist party, or more probably himself] from jumping on a couple of tanks and overthrowing the government. These methods have gone” (The Guardian, November 26, 1971).

3.5.2 The reign of Ṣaddām Ḥusayn

Ṣaddām Ḥusayn significantly altered Iraq’s political orientation. In June 1979 he took over the presidency of Iraq after al-Bakr resigned suddenly for “health reasons”. The new president, who was an admirer of Joseph Stalin’s way of rule, developed an authoritarian regime that perpetuated Sunni and Tikrity dominance, and which was characterised by a sycophantic idolization of Ṣaddām and the development of a cult of
personality, concentrating all of the strings of state power into his hands and establishing what was to become one of the most repressive regimes in Iraqi history (Dawisha 2013, 211; Nissen and Heine 2009, 159).\textsuperscript{14} Initially, Šaddām garnered complete power, declaring himself the Iraqi president, Head of the RCC, the Commander of the Armed Forces, and the Secretary General of the Ba‘th Party (Anderson, T 2011, 23-4). After this, in what was the second wave of his seizure of power, he attempted to eliminate any possible future revival or the potential for anything less than unquestioning obedience (Tripp 2000, 222) this attempt began with what Šaddām called the “purge of the Baath party” \textsuperscript{15} (Makiya 1998, 70-1). In addition, Šaddām abandoned the unity negotiation between Iraq and Syria initiated by al-Bakr and Syrian President Hāfiẓ al-Asad.

After consolidating power within the Ba‘thist regime, Šaddām attempted to use the party to dominate all aspects of Iraqi society. This aim was achieved by what has been called Tab‘ith, or Ba‘thization (Bengio 2002, 49-51).\textsuperscript{16} Nevertheless, Šaddām went beyond Tikritization, deploying cadres from Tikrit in state-sensitive centres, to place emphasis on family, as al-Bakr positioned Tikritis at the top of the hegemonic hierarchy before him, and progressively narrowed control by positioning members of his close family in all key posts of the Ba‘thist party and then Iraqi government, including his half-brothers, Barzan, Sab‘awi, and Waṭban (Anderson, T 2011 23-4; Davis 2005, 27). In the same context, one of Šaddām’s typical methods of centralising control involved disseminating fear and cruelty for political purposes (Makiya 1998).\textsuperscript{17} Further, Šaddām developed a cult of personality in order to take over the Iraqi collective consciousness, attempting to reconcile the Mesopotamian past with Arab nationalist ideology by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} Tikrit is a city located north-west of Baghdad, it is the hometown of the Šaddām Husayn, whose population is predominantly Sunni Arabs. For more on the role of Tikrit in Ba‘thist period see (Davis 2005, 3).
\item \textsuperscript{15} On 8th August 1979 numbers’ of al-Ba‘th party arrested, including two ministers, and executed for their alleged involvement in a conspiracy against the new Iraqi president. The latter suspects Syria of being behind the plot. Indeed this “purge” was expanded later to include every future possible opposition in Iraq.
\item \textsuperscript{16} The aim of this process was to turn all Iraqis into members of the Ba‘thist party.
\item \textsuperscript{17} The element of cruelty seems not to have been Šaddām’s innovation in the Ba‘thist party, but rather was emphasised by the founder Michel ‘Aflaq, who clearly argued that “cruelty” can be the most reliable instrument for imposing the party’s ideology (citied in Dawisha 2013, 215).
\end{itemize}
presenting himself as the successor of past great rulers of Mesopotamia such as Nebuchadnezzar, Harun al Rashid, and many others (Abdi 2008; Davis, 2005, 150; Marr 2012, 150; al-Musawi 2006, 79; Tripp 2000, 225-6). In short, considering oneself Iraqi came to be defined by complete obedience to Ṣaddām, whom the Ba’thist discourse insisted was the “necessary” leader. Consequently, this obedience decided whether individuals could maintain their position in society, or even their life. Thus, many Iraqis began to leave the country, including professionals and intellectuals, with Tripp estimating that the figures reached half a million (Tripp 2000, 226).

Ṣaddām’s rise to power coincided with the toppling of the Iranian Shah’s regime by the Islamic Revolution, which was led by the Shi‘ī cleric Khomeini (1902-1989) in 1979. The new Iranian regime drew on Iranian political history, culture and particularly Shi‘ism, to develop a new political vision of the future of Iran based on Shi‘ī doctrine. One of the core elements of this vision was the notion of “exporting the Islamic revolution” to Muslim countries. As a neighbour of Iran, Iraq was the first country to be affected by such development. Consequently, the Shi‘ī loyalty to Iraqi identity soon came under question (Dawisha 1999, 553; Hunt 2005, 6; Ulack 2015, 373). This suspicion increased when the Iraqi Shi‘ī community rejoiced at the triumph of Shi‘ah in Iran and when Shi‘ī activities increased within Iraq (Osman 2012, 142). With this tension in the background, the Iraqi government accused the Shi‘ī community, who constituted more than 50% of the Iraqi population, and particularly the al-Da‘wa Party, of an assassination attempt on the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, ṬāriqʿAzīz (1936-2015). Subsequently, an intense suppression of Shi‘ī elites began, who were accused of supporting the Iranian revolution. In this context, thousands of Iraqi Shi‘īs’ were deported to Iran on the alleged grounds that they were of Persian origin, and a leading Shi‘ī cleric, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr

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18 The concept of “exporting revolution” was based on the idea that Iran is the vanguard of a world revolutionary movement to liberate Muslim countries, which were subjected either to imperialist powers or their clients. Thus, the notion caused much anxiety in neighbouring countries, especially among Gulf States including Iraq. For more on this concept, see Ganji (2002, 129-140), Ramazani (1989, 69-93), and Subani (2013, 279-283).

19 The Shi‘ī community all over the Middle East saw the success of the Iranian revolution as a triumph of Islam’s spiritual values over the modern western-based ideologies. In Iraq, in some predominantly Shi‘ī communities for instance, “sweets were distributed as an expression of joy” (Osman 2012, 142).
(1935-1980), was executed (Davis 2005, 190-1; Fattah 2009, 217; Marr 2012, 180-1; Tripp 2000, 229-30).

By August 1980, a war between Iraq and Iran seemed inevitable. On 4 September 1980, using long-range artillery fire, Iran began to shell the Iraqi cities of Diyala province along the Iranian border, inflicting heavy losses of both life and property. Soon after that, on 17 September, Ṣaddām took the opportunity to abrogate the 1975 treaty in front of the National Assembly (Tripp 2000, 233). Five days later, Ṣaddām launched a preemptive attack on the Iranian air bases, and thousands of Iraqi soldiers crossed the border near Ahwaz. Scholars of the Iraq-Iran conflict have emphasised that Ṣaddām’s decision to go to war was based on a miscalculation (Davis 2005, 27; Johnson 2014, 9; Tabarani 2008, 278; Tripp 2000, 233). Ṣaddām thought that the fragile internal atmosphere of the newly established Iranian government would lead to little resistance and that Iraq would be assured of a quick victory, enabling him not only to reclaim full Iraqi sovereignty of Shaṭṭ al-‘Arab, which been ceded to the shah of Iran in 1975, but also the Arab-inhabited and oil-rich province of Khuzestan. A victory would have strengthened Ṣaddām’s position on both the internal and regional levels. However, his miscalculation proved to be catastrophic for Iraq (Davis 2005, 27; Tripp 2000, 233), as the war lasted until 1988 and drained the Iraqi economy, also causing a huge number of casualties and failing to achieve any of its aims. Despite this, Ṣaddām was able to maintain his control of power in Iraq, yet the economic devastation caused by the war forced Ṣaddām into a new one.21

In 1990 he invaded Kuwait, but was soon expelled by an international coalition (Fattah 2009, 229-30) In the aftermath of this attack on Kuwait, the Kurds and Shīʿī Arabs rose up against Ṣaddām’s regime, only to be ruthlessly suppressed (Hiro 2001, 35-39). Notably, since the invasion of Kuwait, Ṣaddām began a relatively new discourse in which

20 The Algeria treaty of 1975 was signed between Ṣaddām and the Shah of Iran. Under this agreement, Iraq waived any claims to the Iranian Arab-speaking province of Khuzestan and conceded half of Shaṭṭ al-‘Arab to Iran in return for the latter Iran agreed to cut off all supports to the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq (Marr 2012, 154).
21 For more on the Iraq-Iran war, see Donovan (2011), Johnson (2014), and Razoux (2015).
he adopted at least a façade of Islamic faith and depicted himself as the champion of Islam against “Western imperialism” and their allies, the Jews and Persians.\textsuperscript{22} Ultimately, Ṣaddām was overthrown by a coalition led by the United States, which in turn ushered in a new era of Iraqi history.

3.5.3 The Post Ṣaddām era

In April 2003, the Baʿthist regime was removed from power in Iraq. Even after the failure of the invasion of Kuwait and after more than a decade of sanctions, Ṣaddām had managed to remain in power. Yet in 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush insisted on the dismissal of Ṣaddām from power. The war began on 20 March 2003, and was led by the United States and joined by the United Kingdom and several coalition allies. Within less than a month, the Coalition occupied Baghdad and the Baʿthist regime collapsed quickly and completely (Pirnie and O’Connel 2008, 6-9; Allawi 2007, 134). Nevertheless, an insurgency against the coalition began in the same year, particularly after the laws of de-Baʿthification and the dismantling of the Iraqi army, which mostly affected the Sunni Arab community (Fassihi 2008, 135; Hashim 2009, 26-7).

After the occupation of Iraq, the ethno-sectarian divisions again surfaced, accompanied by more violence. In 2005, the first Iraqi constitution was approved by a referendum, and in the same year the first democratic election since the collapse of monarchy was carried out. The Sunnis (approximately 20% of the overall population, for Iraqi population (Ulack 2015, 373; Bahun and Rajan 2016, 52) boycotted the elections (either voluntarily or forcefully, due to the insurgency), with catastrophic effect for the community, which won just 17 of the 275 parliamentary seats (6%) (Katzman 2006, 2). Thus, the Shiʿīs in the first place and Kurds imposed their domination on the parliament and the Iraqi government. The Iraqi president was nominated from the Kurdish coalition, and the Prime Minister, who holds the real power, was nominated from the

\textsuperscript{22} See Chapter 9.
Shīʿī coalition. Thus, whilst power changed, the seat of power remained similar. This reflects that control in Iraq went from a Sunni minority to a majority of Kurds and Shīʿīs. The new government led by the Daʿwa party soon began to alienate the Sunnis from power, which consequently fuelled a Sunni insurgency (Hann, et.al 2015, 66).

After the destruction of the Shīʿī shrine in the Sunni city of Samarra on 22 February 2006, the violence took on a new dimension. The Sunni insurgency rapidly turned into a deadly civil war between Iraqi Sunnis and Shīʿīs. In October, the UN estimated that about 120 Iraqis died every day during the civil war. Since 2014, the conflict has intensified, with increased levels of violence and the rise of the extremist of Daʿsh “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria”, which has seized several key cities in Sunni areas, including Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. It is important to mention here that many statements made by the insurgent groups echoed the anti-Persian, anti-Western, and anti-Israeli sentiments of the early Baʿthist party. Thus, the political systems in Iraq in the post-Ṣaddām era have deepened the ethno-sectarian division and have not succeeded in developing a common Iraqi identity. The situation mirrors the following statement, made by King Fayṣal I a year before his death, in 1933:

“I would say with a heart full of sorrow, in my opinion there are no Iraqi people yet. Instead, there are only blocks of groups with no national sentiments, imbued with religious traditions and trifles, connected by no common tie yet”. (Batatu 2004, 26-6; see Kirmanj 2015, 90-94; Dawisha 1999, 554)
Chapter Four: Historiography and politics

“Appealing to the past are among the commonest of strategies in interpretations of the present”

(Said. E, 1994, 1)

4.1 Historiography: The development of an idea

Historiography as Carl Becker defined it, is “neither the study of history nor history itself but rather the study of the history of historical study” (1938, 20). However, because the past is far beyond the ability of historians to construct and always as White (1973, 281) correctly identified, “contains an irreducible and inexpungeable element of interpretation”, is it more accurate to define history as a representation of past events and historiography as a study of this representation (White 1988, 1193). Historiography can also be defined as a meta-level analysis of historians’ representation of previous events. In short, historiography is on the one hand a focus on the content and context of historians’ philosophy and theories, and on the other hand is a focus on the broader cultural, social, economic, and political elements that conceptualise its writing of the past and authors. Thus, the study of historiography is a crucial intellectual endeavour that allows us not only to acknowledge subjectivity and interpretation in historical works but it is also used to examine changing historical works over time and in various places.

History as an academic discipline was the product of seventeenth and eighteenth-century modernism, which is always associated with the positivism of Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886). The professional orientation of Ranke stemmed from his famous phrase studying history is to know the past as it “actually happened” (Green and Troup 1999, 2; Himmelfarb 2004, 17). For Ranke, historians are able to distinguish between truth and fantasy by following a systematic method of analysing empirical evidence that
eliminates ideology and bias (Gilmour, 2011, 9; Zammito 2005, 66). Therefore, he built a model that could be used to train historians in systematic and critical research methods. To a great extent, the model was narrative in form, descriptive rather than analytical, and political in subject matter (Zewde 2000, 1). Ranke’s approach to history was adopted by many leading history departments particularly in American universities, including prestigious institutions such as John Hopkins, Columbia, Harvard, and Yale (Iggers 2011, 56). Ranke’s method was the product of the social and political context of the nineteenth century, and the turn of the twentieth century meant that his paradigm faced increased criticism (Clark, E 2004, 11-3; Himmelfarb 2004, 17; Iggers 2005, 5).

The idea of history as the quest for past truths was challenged in the early-mid twentieth century. In 1914, William Dunning suggested that the course of “human history is determined no more by what is true than by what men believe to be true” (1914, 220). Similarly, the British historian R. G. Collingwood rejected Rankean positivism and stated that “History, regarded as a knowledge of the past fact is unattainable” (2005 [1946], 394). Collingwood relentlessly criticised his contemporary historical methods, which he called “scissors-and-paste”. For Collingwood this way of historical writing suggests that historians search of what they want to know about history, or simply search for statements to prove what they believe (2005 [1946], 257-61). As a result, this method of analysis meant that historians did not bring history to light, but rather repeated statements that had already been made. Instead, all history for Collingwood is history of thought. For instance, historians who want to understand an action by Julius Caesar must enquire what thought was in Caesar’s mind that determined him to do so (Collingwood, 2005 [1946], 215, for more on Collingwood see: Clark, E 2004, 108-10). Rankean positivism came under more pressure in 1960s especially after the British historian E.H. Carr published his seminal work What is History (1961), in which he discussed the distinction between fact and interpretation. Hitherto historians gradually came to conclude that abstracted objectivity is beyond their grasp (Raphael 2013, 38). Nevertheless, more serious challenges to Rankean positivism came from postmodernism in the late twentieth century.
A key postmodern critique of the writing of history, as Iggers points out, is the fluid border that lies between what is history and what is historical discourse, or between fact and fiction in historical narratives (2005, 13). This blurry border becomes a fundamental threat to the epistemological foundations of history (Hadfield 2006, 209). Among the most critical impacts of postmodernism upon historical writing is what is called the “linguistic turn”. Many philosophers have followed this trend, such as Foucault, Derrida, and Barthes. However, Hayden White’s *Metahistory* (1973), *Tropics of Discourse* (1978), and *The Content of the Form* (1987) became and have remained key works in the field (Murphey 2009, 188). For White, history is the product of a historian’s imagination, and does not corresponded to past events (1974, 2; see also Munslow 2000, 225). He argues that the evidence that historian gains from historical documents cannot produce a complete picture of their subject. For White, these not only undermine the scientific validity of history but also bring history closer to poetic truth. Thus, the past has no reality, and history is simply the product of a historian’s imagination, inspired by the contents of an archive (White 1973, 4). In other words, history is the historians’ construction, and thus is subjected to various cultural, professional, and ideological discourses (Munslow 2000, 225; for more on White, see Ankersmit 1994; Kansteiner 1993; Musschoot 2016). But nevertheless, White argued in his later work *Tropics of Discourse* (1978, 23), in response of his critics, that he never denied the possibility of producing knowledge from history. However, what he attempted to illustrate is that knowledge produced in the humanities is not a similar sort of knowledge that can be produced in physics.

4.2 The relationship between politics and historiography in Western thought

While it is now generally accepted that the writing of history is a socially and culturally embedded practice, several theorists have further explored the specific relationship between politics and history. These writers have, overwhelmingly, come from and worked within a Western academic tradition. In the interests of brevity this thesis focuses on three particularly relevant and influential authors and their theories:
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, Foucault’s theory of power/knowledge; and Said’s notion of Orientalism.

One of the prominent theoretical configurations of the relationship between political power and historiography in the West is Gramsci’s theory of hegemony.¹ For Gramsci, hegemony is a discursive activity performed by a group or a class – primarily a ruling one – to maintain the status quo of power relations in society by using consent and/or coercion (1992, 271). In other words, hegemony is a process of regulating the society in order to impose the culture, morality, and values of the ruling class over subordinate groups by using different methods, including ideology (Gramsci 1992, 160-1).² Hegemony for Gramsci not only aims to symbolise the values of the ruling class as “common sense” for the whole society, but also attempts to devalue and alienate the culture of any opposition (Jones 2006, 52; Bates 1975, 161). Concurrently, Gramsci argued that any new regime that possesses a new culture aims to re-organise the structure and the socio-economic relations, in which “cultural policy will above all be negative, a critique of the past; it will be aimed at erasing from the memory and at destroying” previous culture or memory (Gramsci 1992, 263-4). Thus, hegemony lays the ground for the new social group (Gramsci 1992, 263-4). Gramsci’s notion of hegemony shares several similarities with Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge relations, as both agree that hegemony/domination must be achieved simultaneously by coercion and consent. Foucault radically deviated from Gramsci in one way however, as he rejected power as a thing or as an ideology in the hands of a particular social group or a state apparatus.

Michel Foucault was one of the most influential thinkers in social theory, and had a powerful impact on global intellectual thought in the twentieth century. He wrote on a

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¹ Hegemony as a concept was rooted in Marxist thought. For Marxists, it is related to the cultural leadership of the ruling state class. However, because all states are dictatorships for Marxists, hegemony refers to gaining the consent of the dominated, or the proletariat, by a group of ruling class members through applied force (Bates 1975, 352; Ncube 2010, 10).

² The idea of imposing the culture, morality, and values of the ruling class over the collective consciousness in order to regulate society seems similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power (see Jones 2006, 52).
broad range of philosophical subjects, although he is arguably best known for his theory of power/knowledge relations (Jiang 2012, 12; Mac Naughton 2005, 3; Oram 2016, xi). He criticised historians, who for a long time had focused on who held the power or drove economic developments but had failed to question what the power/knowledge relations actually were (1980, 51). Foucault went beyond a discussion of how the economy and state apparatus contributed to the construction of power, since for him the creation of power did not “obey the Hegelian form of the dialectic [most probably Marx as well]” (1980, 56). He argued this was the case because power is neither reducible to the possession of the means of production, nor in the oppressive state is it a simple apparatus in the hands of a certain class or group, who can use it against other classes (1995, 26-7). He further argued that power was not simply a thing that “is divided between those who have it and hold it exclusively, and those who do not have it and are subjected to it [either]” (2003, 29). Instead, power is omnipresent, and it is a relation of force that only exists in action (1995, 26-7). It is for this reason, Foucault argued, that power must:

“Be analysed as something that circulates, or rather as something that functions only when it is part of a chain. It is never localized here or there, it is never in the hands of some, and it is never appropriated in the way that wealth or a commodity can be appropriated” (2003, 29).

Seeing power as an intangible relational force diffused between different social actors that is impossible for individuals to transcend led Foucault to move beyond the “traditional way” of studying power, and to focus instead on the power/knowledge relation and how they related to each other (1980, 51; 196; see Schulzke 2015, 59; Hall 1997, 47). For Foucault, knowledge cannot be seen as an abstract epistemological phenomenon, but it is part of the regime of truth for a particular society. Thus, he rejected the idea that “knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions” (1995, 27). Instead, for him power and knowledge are not autonomous entities but rather are inextricably enmeshed (1980, 109). For Foucault, this should not be simply interpreted
as power making use of knowledge for its political or economic usefulness, because power and knowledge directly depend on each other (1995, 27). Thus, there is no power without knowledge and no knowledge without power (1980; 51). It is impossible for power to be exercised without knowledge because any exercise of power generates a new object of knowledge, which accumulates a new body of information. Similarly, it is impossible for knowledge to function without generating power, because any exercise of knowledge generates authority in a social space (1980, 51-3). In short, for Foucault the practice of power continuously produces knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly produces “truth” that “induces effects of power” so each exist in relationship with the other (1980, 28).

Whilst Gramsci and Foucault agree on issues surrounding ideas, representation, cultural leadership, and authority, they fundamentally differ on others (Hall 1997, 250). For instance, they agree that power must not be reduced to a sole force of coercion but should also include knowledge, in which writing history has a central role. Foucault explained this as the “subtle mechanism” of production that induces pleasure, forms knowledge, and produces discourse (1980, 102), which is important in that it produces a new form of knowledge and new norms.

On the other hand, while both theorists sought the disclosure of the methods of domination, they differed in their approach. On the one hand, Gramsci was primarily concerned with state ideology as an essential means for imposing hegemony, and almost always remained within the Marxist tradition of class struggles. In addition, power in Gramsci’s hegemony seems to operate in unequal relations almost always from the top to the bottom, or from the powerful down to the powerless (see Hall 1997, 250). On the other hand, Foucault went beyond the question of what is power to a focus on how it operates. He rejected the idea of power as a thing that any group or “subject” could monopolise, and argued instead that power operates at a local, tactical level (1995, 177). Moreover, Foucault rejected using the term ‘ideology’, which was extensively used by Gramsci, as for the former it stood almost always as an opposition to what has been counted as truth (1980, 118).
Said’s work on Orientalism is considered another pillar of theoretical discussion on the relationships between political power, culture/knowledge, and colonial production (Césaire 2013, 21-2; Spivak 1997, 145). For Said, Orientalism is a model of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between the “Orient” and the “Occident” (2003, 2). In other words, Orientalism, for Said, is a Western political vision that was structured to promote the differentiations between the familiar “us” and the strange “them” (2003, 1-2). This distinction, according to Said, is the result of a systematic Western imperial discourse of knowledge that was determined to convey a distorted depiction of the East, and which has created a huge body of knowledge, through extensive investment by successive western generations (2003, 6). Constant operations of this vision turned Orientalism into a system of knowledge about the Orient that became universally acceptable and valid.

Said’s approach was influenced by Gramsci’s idea of cultural hegemony (2003, 6-7) and Foucault’s concept of “discourse” and power/knowledge (Said 2003, 3). 3 From Gramsci, Said embraced the idea of the cultural hegemony of the political elite or economic class, which for the former meant the ability of the dominant group to normalise their social, political, and economic values and beliefs as the inevitable and natural way of life for the whole society. Said expanded the idea of the hegemony of the ruling class over the subaltern group into the wider domain, utilising hegemony as a Western colonial attempt by the “powerful group” to impose their vision over the Eastern subaltern or “less-powerful group”. Nevertheless, while Gramsci connected the cultural hegemony to the political elite and economic class, Said connected Orientalism to race (2003, 33-42; see Mackenzie 2004, 83). From Foucault, Said developed the idea that Orientalism is a form of Western discourse that resulted from the power/knowledge interplay. Orientalism appeared for Said as a systematic discourse by which Europeans were able to “manage, and even produce, the Orient” (2003, 3). He argued that Orientalism is a

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3 For details of both Gramsci and Foucault’s impact on Said, see Bayoumi (2007, 47), Césaire (2013, 22), Jenkins and Munslow (2004, 83), and Al-Malik (2014, 22-3).
“Western continued investment” that established the theory “as a system of knowledge about the Orient, an accepted grid for filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness” (2003, 6). In short, Said has drawn from both Gramsci’s and Foucault’s theorisation of power analysis. However, while Gramsci and Foucault were primarily concerned with power relations within societies, Said was primarily concerned with power relations between societies.4

From the above discussion I shall argue that every text is a discourse and every discourse contain two basic elements, the ideological element and the epistemological element. For example, Copernicus, Darwin, and Einstein, all posed scientific theories that stood against the prevailing social culture discourses of their respective eras. In a similar way, every historical text produced in Iraq and other Arab states contains an ideological element and an epistemological element that stands for or against a certain discourse.

These theories are different and sometimes contradictory, yet their hypotheses are specifically beneficial for understanding the relationships between politics and historical production in Iraq. Among the main valuable points of Gramsci’s model of hegemony, he argued that any new regime will attempt to maintain its hegemony not only through violence or coercion but also through legitimating ideology that generate a new set of foundational myths (Gramsci 1992, 125-6; see also Davis 2005, 2). This illustrates, on one hand, why historical production was a central concern of successive Iraqi regimes and how this production became a crucial part in generating and legitimating the regime’s myth. On the other hand, it illustrates the rapid rupture of Iraqi formal discourse that, ultimately, made the Iraqi identity become a combination of complex

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4 Said’s concept of Orientalism has recently faced real challenges and critiques, and has been seen as impressionistic, selective, and arbitrary rather than as an academic method. One early critic, Bernard Lewis, argued that Said not only reduced the “Orient” into the Middle East but particularly the Arab world, ignoring all other Turkish, Persian, and Semitic groups (1982: 9). In a similar way, John Clarke defined Orientalism as “a counter-movement, a subversive entelechy, albeit not a unified or consciously organised one”, which was based on an eclectic rather than a discursive study of imperial powers (2002, 9). In the same manner, Ibn Warraq argued that Said’s Orientalism displayed an aggressive tone towards the Western tradition and sought to convince not through the use of arguments or historical analysis, but rather by spraying charges of racism, imperialism, and Eurocentrism from a moral high ground (2007, 33). For critique of Orientalism, see also al-ʿAzm (2000) Halliday (1993), Lewis (1982), Ning (1997), and Ibn Warraq (2007).
and contradicted myths. Similar to the hegemonic notion of Gramsci, and the Foucauldian notion of power/knowledge, are useful for this thesis. This is because they undermine the visions that reduced power, even in most authoritarian state, into oppression and censorship apparatus. Then shows intellectuals as having no choice except to accept and propagate the states discourse. Instead, the Foucauldian notion of power/knowledge argues that power is a relation, productive and generates new discourse, of which knowledge, including history, is inextricable part. From Said, this thesis is not interested in Orientalism as a notion but rather as a technique of Otherness.

All three of these theories of power relations were developed in the West, mostly by Western scholars, trained in the Western tradition, and working within Western institutions and environments. If we apply the logic of historiography to these scholars’ work, it is obvious that their ideas about the historiography-politics nexus must have been influenced by the circumstances under which they worked. We should not therefore assume that Gramsci, Foucault, and Said’s theories are universal and “true”, nor should be assume that their ideas about the relationship between politics and historiography, developed as they were in a Western context, are necessarily applicable to a non-Western one. For this reason, we must reassess the circumstances under which these theories were developed.

4.3 The cultural production of Western historiographical theory

As this thesis argues that knowledge production is contextual, it becomes necessary to trace the contexts in which thinkers such as Gramsci, Foucault, and Said, who have theorised the relationship between historiography and power, were working.

For centuries, the production of culture and knowledge in Western Europe was closely connected to religion. Monasteries were centres of learning and crucial repositories for books and other information. Cultural production was also cited in the courts of kings and princes, although knowledge production was perhaps more closely linked with religious rather than political institutions. The early sectarian split in Europe impacted on the development of the systematic education in Europe. For instance, among the
main arguments of Martin Luther (1483-1546) was the development of a comprehensive body of Christian knowledge. Thus, education became a central concern of the sixteenth-century competition between Catholic and Protestant visions. This movement led to many reforms in Christian churches, which led to a more effective educational system (Dowling and Scarlett 2006, 134-137).

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Enlightenment radically changed everything. This included developments in science (Brooke, 2003, 739–61; Capaldi 1998, 41-7; Adams and Sydie 2001, 9-10), and changes in the status of religion (Grayling 2014, 120; Israel 2009, 11; Magarey 2010, 63-76; Outram 2013, 114-129). But it also reconfigured the political sphere crucially introducing secularism (Porter 2001, 22-28).

When it came to the production of knowledge, this had wide-ranging effects. During the eighteenth century, most European universities were dominated by either the Catholic or Protestant church, but in the nineteenth century this control weakened. Université de France, for instance, removed religious studies from its “compulsory curriculum” after the French revolution. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, University College London in 1836 became the first university to be a non-denominational institution (Anderson, R 2004, 27), and this trend was followed by many other universities across Europe over the course of the nineteenth century.

However, even secular universities remained under the control of the state. In Napoleonic France, universities were highly centralized by state organization. After the success of the French Revolution, there had been some pragmatic reconstructions of the traditional model of the university. In principle, this reform was aimed to secularise the educational system, whereas in practice it consolidated the new revolutionary elite and prepared them for military and government offices (Anderson. R. D 2004, 41; Rüegg 2004, 4). Thus, even when universities broke away from the control of clerics and kings, they were forced to submit to another form of hegemony in the form of the efficient bureaucracy of the bourgeoisie and nobles (Zavatti 2016, 29). In Britain, while universities were often independently managed, they still had to apply to the British government for a charter, recognising their status as a university.
However, the following decades saw significant steps taken towards academic autonomy in the universities of both Germany and the United Kingdom. For instance, Wilhelm von Humboldt, who oversaw the Prussian education system, argued the freedom that university should enjoy is not restricted simply to freedom from the church, but rather from all limitations. He was successfully able to persuade the Prussian king to reject the Napoleonic model of a university (Rüegg 2010, 11-3). Ultimately his reforms provided the liberal movement with a strong impulse to disentangle academic institutions from both religious and political powers. Conversely at the same time, universities came under closer state control in countries such as Britain, where government funding began to be issued to universities in the late nineteenth century.

The ideal of intellectual academic freedom coexisted with the reality of government regulation and funding in many European universities into the twentieth century. Things were somewhat different in the USA, where many universities are fully private institutions, not relying on any public funding. This model of the private university began to appear in Europe in the late twentieth century.

Thus, this section argues that, despite their great contributions, Gramsci, Foucault, and Said were products of the twentieth century Western academic tradition. This was characterised by tension between the ideal and the reality of state involvement in the knowledge production. The debate over the ideal of academic independence was perhaps made even stronger by the Cold War, given that Soviet universities were closely controlled by the state. Thus, the contexts of Gramsci, Foucault, and Said were different to that of the Iraqi and Arab world. Therefore, it becomes difficult to apply their theories to the Arab context without taking into account the context of historiography and power relations in the twentieth-century Arab world.
4.4 Knowledge production in the Arab world

While in general, historical production in the Arab world has always had a strong link with political power (Chejne 1960), the circumstances of knowledge production in the Arab world, and in Iraq especially, are somewhat different from those in the West. These are: the fundamental acceptance of multiple realities; the idea of knowledge being abstracted from society as alien; and the specific structures of education.

4.4.1 The fundamental acceptance of multiple realities

Schutz (1945) distinguished between two realities of everyday life. The first was what he called a “paramount reality”, which is in a sense paramount because it imposes itself most strongly on a person’s everyday action that he/she shares it with other individuals (Steets 2014, 141). This reality co-exists with the realities of “finite provinces of meaning”, such as the reality of dreams, imageries, phantasms, religion, scientific contemplation, and many others (1945, 553; 1974, 22-34). Yet the realities of scientific thought and ideal imagination often have an impact on everyday realities, and so both are equally “real”. The simultaneous coexistence of multiple realities may be considered part of the “postmodern turn” in the West. However, within the Arab context, the coexistence of multiple realities has different form and greater impact on knowledge production.

At the heart of this is what has been called the “ambivalent personality” of Arab culture. As an example of this, al-Wardî argued that the urban Arabs are on the one hand

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6 Al-Wardî did not deny that many of the world's urban areas are bordered by desert, but what distinguishes Iraq is its location. According to al-Wardî, Iraq lies at the edge of the greatest nomadic region in the world, the Arabian Peninsula, which makes the impact of nomadism on the country much greater than any other region of the world (31).
7 Al-Wardî excluded the Kurdish area from his hypothesis, arguing that his lack of knowledge of the Kurdish language hindered him from studying it, and because Kurdish nomadism might differ from Arab nomadism as the former came from mountainous regions and the latter from deserts (n.d. 143). For Kurdish nomadism, see Barth (1955), Bruinessen (1992, 15-8), and Leach (1940, 13-28).
chivalrous and bellicose, capable of being revengeful and thus often engaging in incursions against other tribesmen. However, they are entirely different when faced with tax collectors or other government figures, as in that context they tend to become compliant and are capable of accepting insults with tolerance.

Despite the great contribution of al-Wardi to sociology in the Iraqi and Arab world though his prestigious works, his vision of Iraqi society is not above criticism. He himself openly argued that he recasted some of his visions and that others also might need to be criticised. Al-Wardi’s vision contain a certain amount of generalised statements and assertions about particular social phenomena in the Iraqi context, for instance his vision of an unchanging essence underlying Iraqi society since the coming of Islam. In addition, he did not present any indication of potential for future change. Thus, as similar to the other western thinker, al-Wardi’s vision will not adopt uncritically.

Support for the totalitarian regimes by several Iraqi scholars was not only the result of the use of coercion by successive authoritarian regimes in Iraq as a means of defending hegemony, but social consciousness was well prepared to accept dual discourses. On the one hand, these intellectuals became compliant tools in the hands of the powerful, who strove to legitimise their power, and deliver a strong supporter to the authoritarian regimes whereas on the other hand they had a “purely” academic discourse that theoretically undermined the same regime. When this translates to imperial control, it means that acquiescence and resistance are not incompatible, but that both are possible at once. This might appear to be mutually-contradictory from purely theoretical perspective, but were not necessarily so in Iraqi historiographical practice, as the Iraqi historians in practice they simply ignored the contradiction when they practice history writing. For instance, Eric Davis was convinced by Şāliḥ Aḥmed al-ʿĀlī, the editor of *Iraq and History*, published in 1983, that his contribution to the volume of *Iraq through History* resulted from being “coerced to participate” (2005, 328-9, n. 41). However, al-

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8 Contextual identity has been discussed by many scholars. For example, see Jan (2010); Parpală and Loveday (2015, 1-9).
9 This book is discussed in more details see chapter 8.
\'Ālī published other works that were consistent with the line of discourse found in *Iraq through History* (see al-\'Ālī 1985, and al-\'Ālī 1987. This multiple reality leads into the writing of history because it is conceptually possible to have different co-existing truths, and these do not necessarily need to cancel each other out. Therefore, the Iraqi historians were able to write a version of past event that supports a regime and other version that undermines it simultaneously.

4.4.2 The idea of knowledge being abstracted from society as alien

Since the Enlightenment in the West, there has been an ideal that the production of knowledge be separate and independent from its social setting – that universities be independent of both religion and state power, and that “true” or “pure” forms of knowledge can be discovered. This is not the case in the Arab world, and indeed there are reasons for hostility to this Western model of knowledge.

Secularism is an example in point, or the separation of knowledge from religion. In the Arab world, secularism was neither a product of an internal social dynamic nor an indigenous force, but rather was an external and imperial imposition – initially of the Ottomans, and subsequently by the British mandate. Thus, from the outset, secularism was seen as a form of imperial domination, which invoked resistance from the Iraqi religious communities, especially the Shī‘ī community.

Secularism was first “imported” into Iraq by the Ottomans. Midhat Pasha arrived in Baghdad in 1869 as an Ottoman governor, with the aim to implant *Tanzimāt* (reform) in the region, as previously the whole education system in Iraq had been reliant upon religious involvement in the form of the Shī‘ī *Hawza*, Sunni *Katatib* (singular: kuttab), and several Christian theological schools (for Iraqi education during the Ottoman Empire, see Kadhim 2013). Midhat Pasha’s reform marked the beginning of the rise of modern schools in Iraq. He founded Rushdiyya High School in 1869, which paved the way to the establishment of a military school and a vocational school the following year. This development took about 20 years to reach other parts of Iraq, such as Mosul, Basra, and Kirkuk (Kadhim 2013, 32). The schools were primarily designed to educate young
Iraqis in a variety of new subjects, such as Western languages, maths, and science in accordance with western scientific methods, which were previously unavailable in Iraqi religious institutions (Mar 2012, 7). However, the curriculum remained focused on theological subjects (Khaizaran 2007, 122), and the project made no effort to extend modern education to the rural areas (Sluglett 2007, 196). More importantly, because these schools were more prevalent in Sunni communities, which were more willing to engage with these new schools, this new form of secular education became, in the eyes of the Iraqi Shi‘i, an imperial Sunni project against their community, and so the Shi‘i continued their theological education through the Hawza. Consequently, the introduction of secular and “independent” knowledge learning by Midhat Pasha added a new dimension of religious-secular division to the many existing ones.

Secularism was promoted once again by the British upon their arrival in the region. The modern Iraqi state was founded in a similar way to the British Parliamentary system, as the British had a constitutional monarchy, with both a parliament and a monarch (Johnson 2014, 13). This new political system sharply differed from the Ottomans’ system. Yet the British political system, with its similar vision of secular education, was once again an imperial imposition in Iraq, rather than an internal development. Again, it was the Arab Sunnis who seized this opportunity in order to impose their vision on Iraq. For instance, the first council of ministers, which was formed under the British administration, was dominated by the Sunni elite, all of whom were predominantly educated in secular schools. The few of Shi‘i representatives in the government was justified by the Sunni as the former’s lack of qualification, as the Shi‘a were educated only in religious institutions that lacked the pedagogical elements of a modern secular curriculum (Dawisha 2013, 31). Thus, secularism once again became an imperial imposition and not the result of a truly indigenous development. Instead, it was intertwined with political power and the imperial regime. Thus, the Iraqi secularism was

10 The Ottoman political system was a hybrid system: with Caliph at the summit, and self-governing Millets as well as Shari‘a based law; but also the Caliph was a Sultan, there was a parliament, elected local councils and state administration none of which owed anything to the Shari‘a (see: Imber 2012).
not a pure form of secularism, but rather it perceived a sectarian and factional secularism.

The Iraqi monarchy sought an ambitious secularisation and rationalisation project of the education system, which encountered two fundamental changes with the establishment of the Iraqi kingdom. The early years of the Iraqi monarchy marked a significant departure from the Ottoman legacy, as Turkish was replaced by Arabic as the official language of education (Main 2004 [1935], 234), and secondly focus was placed on Arab nationalism rather than on Islamic theology. These two changes were made mostly by the Syrian educators who had been brought in by King Faisal, and changes to the history curriculum included non-religious heroes of European unification projects, such as the attempts made by Garibaldi and Bismarck (Cleveland 2016, 147; Khaizaran 2007, 123). In addition, the number of students rose from about seven thousand to thirty-seven thousand in the 1930s, including seven thousand female students, who were seen during the Ottoman period as a novelty (Main 2004, [1935], 234). The monarchy’s goals for this development did not involve making the state secular, but rather it was designed initially to mould the Shi‘a majority into a broad Arab unitary project with other Arab Sunni majority states (Dawisha 2003, 91; al-Musawi 2006, 19). For that reason, al-Ḥuṣrī insisted on many occasions that the Arab nation had existed long before the rise of Islam, and thus significantly before the fissure between the Sunni and Shi‘a (Dawisha 2013, 65). The Ba‘thist regime followed the path of the former Sunni-dominated Iraqi governments, embracing secularism not as a modernization project but rather as an ideological tool to overcome the Shiite resistance to the Sunni power domination in Iraq (see Chapter 9). Thus, secularism was no longer enmeshed within the rule of a foreign imperial power, but rather had become intertwined with the rule of the indigenous regime, and thus inevitably gained a sectarian flavour. Nevertheless, the secularism promoted by Iraqi communists also was not an indigenous development. Attempts to dissociate knowledge production from political power, or to find an “intellectual autonomy was not an internal development as much as it was external product, its primary aim was to dominate knowledge production to counter the western/liberal version of secularism.
In Iraq, as with the previous religious education system during the Ottomans, the notion of a secular education was therefore fundamentally associated with factional and exploitative systems of power. A reaction against secular education was often a means of political resistance. For this reason, no indigenous movement for secularism or “intellectual autonomy” emerged – these concepts were tools of the occupying imperial powers. Consequently, there is no native Ranke figure in the Arab tradition, and the notion of separating knowledge from its social context, unlike in the Western tradition, is alien. Instead, the Iraqi Arab tradition overwhelmingly sees knowledge either as fundamentally socially embedded, socially produced, socially contingent, or as contingent on God.

4.4.3 Education systems

Another way in which Iraqi society differed from the Western tradition is in relation to the development of higher education. Taha-Tomure (2003, 1-11), in her introduction to a comparative study of the difference between the notion of academic freedom in the Arab world (including Iraq) and the Western tradition, implied that academic freedom is sorely lacking in the academic institutions of the former. This was the result of an incomplete project of modernisation in relation to the production of knowledge in the Arab world, which began at the end of World War One and that plunged into a state of direct domination of both religious morality and political power.

The history of higher education institutions in Iraq dates back to 1908, when the Faculty of Law – previously known as the Law School – was established. In the following years, other institutions also opened, including the Teachers’ College and the Faculty of Medicine in 1927. However, it was not until 1956 that the first university in Iraq was founded, when the College of Baghdad, a high school for boys founded and operated by American Jesuits from Boston in 1932, transformed into Al-Hikmah University (MacDonnell 1994, 167). In parallel with these developments, the Iraqi monarchy announced plans to create the University of Baghdad from the existing state-funded colleges, and in 1957 its first President was designated by a Royal decree. After this,
several universities were established, including the University of Basra and the University of Mosul, which were founded in 1967 by the Iraqi government.

Unlike Western universities, which significantly moved away from political domination after the end of World War Two (and indeed the increase of private universities), universities in Iraq became the hub of the State’s ideological propaganda. In the 1960s and 1970s Iraq universities witnessed unprecedented intellectual dynamism. However, this dynamism lost its effectiveness rapidly after the rise of Ba’thist regime to power, as the production and circulation of knowledge became increasingly politicised in the service of the Ba’thist discourse. From the beginning of the Ba’th party’s rise to power, it dominated the entire educational system, particularly higher education, which it deemed to be critical for its own agenda. In 1969, less than a year after the Ba’th party came to power, the private Al-Hikmah University was dissolved and its colleges attached to the University of Baghdad, which was ruled by the government. In addition, the promotion of pan-Arab nationalism occurred as this was made a compulsory subject for all university students (Khaizaran 2007, 128).

The direct nexus between political change and higher education is evident in the University of Baghdad’s presidential changes. Every change to the Iraqi political order has been followed, within the space of a month, by a change to the University’s president. For instance, Mattī ʿAqrāwī was dismissed in 1958 after the collapse of the monarchy, Abdul Jabra Abdullah was dismissed in 1963 after the collapse of Abd al-Karim Qasim11 rule, Abdul Aziz al-Dūrī was dismissed in 1968 after the rise of the Ba’th party to power, and Mohammed al-Rawi was dismissed in 2003 after the collapse of the Ba’thist regime.12 Moreover, UN sanctions imposed after Ṣaddām’s invasion of Kuwait

11 Of the 11 presidents, only Mattā ʿAqrāwī was Christian. However, his dismissal appears to have been the result of his Arab nationalism rather than religion, since the second president came from the Mandaei religion. This appointment was made by Qasim, who did not have many sectarian concerns (see Chapter 3).
in 1990 did not only impoverish Iraqi universities, but also isolated them from the international academic community (Sassoon 2012, 385).

Sectarianism has cast a dark shadow over academic life. Sectarian allegiance played a decisive role in the position of the University of Baghdad’s president, as all who were in office from 1963 to 2003 came from Sunni communities (for more on the Iraqi government, see Chapter 3). However, collapse of Ba’thist regime has not made a notable impact on universities progress. The post Ba’thist regime witnessed a rise in power of the Shi‘ī community, and since 2003 all the presidents of the University of Baghdad have come from Shi‘ī backgrounds. In addition, higher education, especially in the south, has been forced into an increasingly religion environment (Harb 2006, 1).

* * *

There is no doubt that knowledge and power or historiography and power in any social context are closely and symbiotically related. The analyses of these relations can be traced in different forms in the works of Gramsci, Said and Foucault, but what limits these theories is that they analyse these relations in western contexts which are different from the Arab 20th century context. What should be stressed here is that, not only is the Arab context different from the western, but power:knowledge relations can work differently within any culture at any time as well as between cultures. Their theories may not, therefore, be directly applicable to the Arab world. Gramsci’s theories on hegemony and asymmetrical power relations and Said’s ideas about history as a tool of cultural domination must be adjusted before being applied directly to the Iraqi context, in which social networks of power are qualitatively different. Ideas about geography, the ownership/occupation of land, and the relationship between state/political powers and geographical territories are essentially different in the Arab world because of tribal relationships. In the same way, the power/knowledge relationships of Foucault’s thinking cannot be applied directly to the Iraqi context because of pervasive nomadism. Therefore, when seeking to understand the relationship between Arab historiography and politics, we should not insist on seeing it only through the lens of these Western theories. Instead, we should engage in a detailed study of the material itself, and allow patterns to emerge organically.
4.5 Methodology and sources

The primary material used to answer questions raised by this thesis, are key examples of Iraqi historiography, written during the twentieth century, the content of which addresses the first century BCE to the seventh century CE. Although the focus will be on Iraqi historiographical works, for the sake of comparison and in order to supplement the data, a small selection of Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian works are also included.

The study is restricted to academic and pseudo-academic publications. By academic, I mean publications written by scholars who trained in the discipline of history in an academic higher-education institution, no matter whether they trained inside or outside Iraq. As an example, the works of historian Jawad ‘Alî will be considered as academic works (Chapter 7). As for pseudo-academic texts, these are works written for the adult general public that offer a historical narrative and make claims of historical accuracy, even if the author has not trained in history at an academic institution. As an example, Anastās Mar al-Kirmīlī wrote several historical books (Chapter 5), although he had received a theological education. Amongst these academic and pseudo-academic texts are some works that were sponsored by the various governments, aimed at the general public. Such books were often widely read. Numerous copies were published at a very cheap price or even disseminated free of charge. The importance of such works is that they contribute towards public consciousness.

Other types of literature, such as fiction or primary school textbooks, have not been included. In the case of the former, there is no claim to historical accuracy. In the case of the latter, writing for children is necessarily different in scope and tone from writing aimed at adults. Although it would have been instructive to consider both of these categories, limits of time and space prevented this.

This study is concerned with historiography in the Arab world in the sense that it concentrates on works produced by writers who considered Arab ethnicity as a key element in their identity. Thus, I exclude texts written by non-Arab writers who are or have not been considered Arabs, including Kurdish writers and those who live permanently abroad, despite the fact that the careers of these writers are evidence for
the varying impact of Arab culture and tradition. However, the identity of the former and the position of the latter in a different culture and/or different political tradition have diverged their distance with the dominant political power in the Arab world. However, I have examined historiographical works from all the Arabic-speaking religious communities, including Shiite, Sunni, and Christian groups. Examining Iraqi writers who shared similar ethnic identity but not similar religion or sect and worked in a similar political context will help to identify why and how the historical productions are different.

The authority of historian discourse comes from their use of sources. It is generally agreed that historiography of any topic covers how historians have constructed their narratives about past using certain sources, history has been reconstructed. Thus, this study does question the Iraqi historian’s sources not only to for the type of these, whether they were primary or secondary, but also how they selected their sources, especially what they included and what has been excluded. In addition, what types of sources were available to them and within which tradition these sources had been produced.

I have been fortunate to access many of these works, including books and journal articles, from Iraqi libraries, especially those based in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. These libraries preserve many works that were published within the Iraqi and Arab world, in addition to books that formerly were of limited access to the public during the Ba’thist regime. In particular, libraries that have facilitated this research include the public library of Erbil, the central library of the University of Salahaddin-Erbil, the central library of the University of Sulaymaniyah, and the Museum Library of Sulaymaniyah. In addition, I was able to access other Iraqi libraries through Iraqi scholars. Furthermore, I visited Lebanon twice to utilise the rich collection held at the libraries of the American University of Beirut and the Beirut Arab University. These two libraries were extremely useful for the works on Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. In the United Kingdom, I accessed the collections of the School of Oriental and African Studies, as well as the rich collection of the British Library. Finally, I accessed the websites of Iraqi universities such as Baghdad University and the Iraqi Academy of Sciences, which enabled me to access Iraqi
academic scientific journals and material from other organisations. These websites were launched after the collapse of the Ba’thist regime in 2003, and provide useful information such as university faculty members’ CVs and lists of publications. This significantly facilitated my enquiries into the biographies of Arab writers and provided me with a list of their publications. In addition, I have accessed online Iraqi academic journals, particularly those that were published after 2003.
Chapter Five: The early Mandate period (1918-1932)

This chapter deals with historical writing during the early stages of the Mandate period of Iraq, which can be characterised as a period of transition. During these years, historians began to edge away from the former Ottoman collective identity towards a new formulation of Iraqi identity. In particular, the Chaldeans, an Iraqi minority group, began to collaborate with the British Mandate Administration soon after it occupied Mesopotamia. The chapter traces the Chaldeans’ use of “Othering” to legitimise their propensity to impose their intended vision on the planned future state of Iraq. In addition, it challenges Said’s argument that the mode of Otherness was a western “invention”, instead arguing that this way of signifying the “self” is ubiquitous, found in most, if not all, human societies throughout history.

Britain’s interest in the Chaldean community of Iraq preceded its occupation. In a review of Austen Henry Layard’s famous work Nineveh and its Remains (1848), an anonymous reviewer argued that:

“There is a two-fold interest[s] connected with this singular people [Chaldeans]. They are remarkable not only as being the descendants of ancient Chaldeans, but as constituting a branch of the Catholic church, which, while surrounded by heathen lands, and exposed to the most barbarous persecutions has so long maintained the Christian faith in much of its original purity” (Anon., Westminster Review, Jul 1849, 315).

This religious mode, which portrayed itself as “pure Christianity” competing with other “degenerate” religions, illustrates the driving force behind British activity in Mesopotamia for much of the nineteenth century, manifesting itself primarily in either archaeological pursuits or missionary activities. During the nineteenth century, European archaeological teams from France, Russia, Germany, the United States, and
Britain all poured into Mesopotamia to carry out archaeological fieldwork (Díaz-Andreu 2007, 99-100). However, the British adventurer Austen Henry Layard (for Layard’s biography, see Parry 2004), whose work was carried out under the joint direction of the trustees of the British Museum and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Edward 1870, 38), was among the first who explored several ancient Assyrian cities in Iraq, including the capital Nineveh.

Layard’s work was initially motivated by the opportunity to discover Assyrian texts that could confirm the historical accuracy of Biblical accounts of ancient peoples (Bernhardsson 2005, 44). Because of his theological approach to Mesopotamian antiquities, Layard focused his energies on the small local populations of Christians, to the extent that he almost completely marginalised Arab Muslims from his workforce. Layard’s excavation at the Assyrian capital Calah met with unprecedented success, as he discovered many priceless Assyrian artefacts, including two colossal winged lions that were shipped to the British Museum in 1852 (Pearson 2006, 43).

Layard’s discoveries received great attention among the Christians of most Western countries, as they were used as evidence for the historical validity of the Bible (Bernhardsson 2005, 44; Cohen and Kangas 2010, 10). For instance, in 1857 Edward Hitchcock, President of Amherst College, made a direct link between an Assyrian relief and the Bible:

“Every new discovery of these [Assyrian] lost cities is new testimony to the truth of the Scripture [...] Blessed be God that He opened this new source of Biblical History just at the period when infidelity supposed that history was proven to be false” (Hitchcock 1857, cited in Cohen and Kangas 2010, 13).

Layard’s discoveries were not only important for Christians but also for colonial discourse. Archaeology during the nineteenth century was not seen as simply an academic field but also as a form of knowledge that could establish and defend colonial interests, to the extent that it was occasionally called ‘informal colonialism’ (Sluglett 1999, 416-36), particularly when conducted in the area ruled by the “Sick man of Europe”, the Ottoman Empire. The discovery of Nineveh by British archaeologists struck
at the heart of the political debate of Victorian Britain. According to the *Westminster Review*:

“[the] sudden transition we have been compelled to make from the records of the civilization of ancient Assyria to a sketch of the semi-barbaric condition of the modern Arabs, naturally draws our attention to the history of the intervening period” ([Anon.] *Westminster Review*, Jul 1849; 51, 2, 313).

Thus, the Assyrian artefacts served to link Nineveh not to the “semi-barbaric” Arabs but rather to England, through art, empire, and prosperity (Pearson 2006, 49). In addition, these artefacts were employed to prove British superiority not only over the Ottomans and the local Arabs but also over other Western powers. For instance, *Hogg’s Instructor* pointed out in 1849 that

“The sun of civilization shall surely rise again in the East, and the Anglo-Saxon shall yet build his towers where Belshazzar feasted, and shall launch his bark upon the rivers of Eden” (*Hogg’s Instructor* 3, 1849, 92, cited in Larsen 2013, 123).

These discoveries, however, were even more important for the Christian communities of Iraq, as they not only could prove the historical validity of the Bible but also their own deep-rooted ethnic identity in Mesopotamia. Hanoosh (2008, 31) pointed out that these discoveries renovated the Chaldeans’ and Assyrians’ understanding of themselves, as they were able to use them to establish a triangular correlation between Mesopotamian antiquity, the Bible’s authenticity, and the deep-rootedness of the contemporary Chaldeans and Assyrians in Iraq. As a consequence, Layard’s discoveries and his close work with the Chaldean and Assyrian communities in Iraq set the foundation for the future interests and relationships between these communities and the British Mandate of Iraq.

These common interests between the British and the local Iraqi Chaldeans and Assyrians increased after the British occupation of Iraq. The British administration was aware that
the change in political order needed the formulation of new forms of identity. Since history is a vital aspect of identity (Flåten 2016, 26), the British administration encouraged Iraqi historians to write a version of national history that fitted with the British political views on the future of Iraq. This paved the way for several Christian writers to work closely with the British administration on the basis of this common interest, including Sulaymān Ṣā’īgh (1886-1965),1 Yūsuf Rizq Allāh Ghanīmah (1885-1950),2 and Anastās Mārī al-Kirmiš (1866-1947). While the British attempted to use history as a tool for cultural domination, the Iraqi Christians were interested in writing a “new version” of ancient Iraqi history on the basis of their deep-rooted identity in Mesopotamia and to prove the continuity of the Chaldean identity. Nevertheless, since identity formation almost always involves binary oppositions between Us and Them, or social divisions and social solidarities (Wetherell 2010, 4), the Christians tended to consider the contemporary Arabs as the Other, for whom the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia were irrelevant. Several writers from Chaldean and Assyrian communities participated in this trend. However, al-Kirmiš, the subject of this chapter, is the most significant example, not only because of his religious background but also because he was the most prolific Christian writer at that time, and maintained a close relationship with the British administration.

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1 al-Ṣā’īgh (1886-1961) was born from a Christian middle class family. He engaged in studies of the Christian canon and became in 1904 a priest, then ascended in the church hierarchy to become a bishop in 1954 (al-Ṭālib 2008). In 1923, al-Ṣā’īgh published Tārīkh al-Mawṣil [the History of Mosul] in Egypt in two volumes. In the introduction, he argued that while despite the glorious civilization of the ancient city of Mosul with root back to the famous period of Assyrians but it suffered from ignorant of historians (al-Ṣā’īgh 1923, 1:5). Similarly, with al-Kirmiš, al-Ṣā’īgh extend contemporary Chaldeans and Assyrian identity to depths Mesopotamian past. Notwithstanding his formation of Assyrian and Chaldeans identity was welded in opposition with the inferior Other, the Arabs Muslim.

2 Ghanīmah, (1885-1950), a politician and historian was born in Baghdad to a Chaldean family. In the field of political, Ghanīmah was elected as a deputy for the Baghdad Brigade in 1925, 1928, and 1934. In addition, he served as finance minister in Iraq for six times between 1928-1947, as well as other governmental positions, including the Director of the General of ancient archaeology (al-Matba‘i 1996). Intellectually, Ghanīmah published a severl works: Tijārat al-‘Irāq qadīman wa-ḥadīthan, The Iraqi trade in ancient and modern times (1922); Nuzhat al-mushtāq fi tārīkh Yahūd al-‘Irāq (1924), A nostalgic trip into the history of the Jews of Iraq; al-Ḥifā: al-Madīnah wa al-Mamlaka al-‘arabiyyah (1936) al-Ḥifā: the City and the Arab Kingdom. The central premise of the book is that the Jews were part of the Iraqi society fabric, however they were not originally from Iraq but their ancestors were brought to Iraq by Nebuchadnezzar.
5.1 The life and career of Anastās Mārī al-Kirmilī

Anastās Mārī al-Kirmilī (1866-1947) was among the most respected and prolific Iraqi Christian writers. Al-Kirmilī was an Iraqi linguist, Catholic clergyman and historian, born in Baghdad to a Lebanese father and an Iraqi mother. He obtained his religious education, both elementary and secondary level, in Baghdad (Ibrāhīm 2007; Maṭbaʿī 1995, 1:23). In his young age, he taught Arabic at Carmelite monasteries, and in 1886 joined a Jesuit school in Beirut, where he studied French literature (Bāṭi 1929; Ibrāhīm 2007), after which he travelled to Belgium and France to study philosophy and theology, before returning to Baghdad in 1894 (Maṭbaʿī 1995, 1:23-24). Al-Kirmilī mastered many ancient languages, including Syriac, Latin, and Greek, and several modern languages such as Arabic and French, along with a good ability in Persian, English, and Italian (Ghareeb 2004, 130-131; Ibrāhīm 2007).

Al-Kirmilī was among the first Iraqi historian to collaborate with the British administration after the occupation of Iraq. In 1911, al-Kirmilī established the Arab language journal Lughat al-ʿArab (The Arab’s Language), in which he emphasised the importance of Arabic and the need to translate published histories of Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula written in Western languages (Editors 1911). This was probably the main reason for his exile by the Ottomans after the outbreak of World War I in 1914. However, after the British occupation of Iraq, al-Kirmilī returned to Baghdad where he collaborated with the British administration to publish the al-ʿArab newspaper as a sub-editor, Gertrude Bell became the editor of this newspaper, (Bell 1927, 2:431; Ibrāhīm 2007). This newspaper was described by her as “the first paper published under the new order of Arab liberty” (Bell, 1927, 2:416).³

As he owned the biggest personal library in Iraq, al-Kirmilī’s regular ‘Friday Meeting’ became a place for all who were interested in history (Kahḥālah 1967). Despite the fact

³ Gertrude Bell was adviser to the British high commission of Iraq along with her political duty she became the first Director of the Antiquities Department of Iraq and also she consider as the founder of the Iraqi museum. For more on Ball’s life, work in Iraq and Middle East see: Collins and Tripp (2017, 1-19); Cooper (2013);
that he published under pseudonyms, al-Kirmili is considered to have been one of the most prolific Iraqi authors with publication in various fields such as religion, Arabic language and history (Ibrāhīm 2007; Maṭba‘ī 1995, 1:23). In the field of ancient history, he published *Khulāṣat Tārikh al-ʿIrāq: mundhu nushū’ihi ilā yawmā hādhā* [Recap of Iraq History: Since Its Inception to the Present Day] (hereafter *Khulāṣat*) in 1919, which is the focus of this chapter.

5.2 The Khulāṣat: Method and approach

The *Khulāṣat* was the first comprehensive work published on Iraqi history, in which Iraq is treated as one single state, and which was written by an Iraqi scholar in Arabic (Choueiri 2011, 581). This was promptly produced after the occupation of Baghdad by the British army, and it is notable that it was written in collaboration with the British administration, and thus is similar to the *al-ʿArab* newspaper. The link between *Khulāṣat* and the British administration in Bagdad is indicated in the introduction written by al-Kirmili:

“This book was proposed by the official director of Iraqi education⁴ after one year of the British occupation in Baghdad. [Major H. E. Bowman] suggested the structure of the chapters [...] in writing this book I have relied on about sixty publications in Arabic, French, English, Turkish and Latin. It took nearly three months to complete because he [Major H. E. Bowman] proposed it in June 1918 and I did not start until September due to the intensification of heat in Baghdad in the summer, and I completed it by November” (1919, X).

This *Khulāṣat* was published by the headquarters of the British army in Baghdad, and the army insignia appears on the front page of the book. Then, it had been authorised

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⁴ Major H. E. Bowman was appointed the first Director of Education in September 1918 (Bernhardsson, 2005, 198; Kadhim 2012, 167). This suggests that Bowman proposed the book approximately before two months of being appointed as the Director of Education.
by the official director of Iraqi education as a school textbook for Iraqi history, and to be used in government and private schools.

The text is divided into two parts. The first deals with the history of Iraq from the third millennium BCE until the advent of Islam (11-72), whereas the second part deals with the history of Iraq from the Islamic conquests until the arrival of the British (73-201). However, the text is primarily divided into three main periods, the pre-Islamic history of Iraq, the Islamic period, and modern Iraq, with an almost equal number of pages devoted to each (11-71, 73-150, and 151-210, respectively).

The impact of al-Kirmili’s religious background is evident in this work. For instance, several topics were discussed such as Abraham, the Creation, and the Great Flood were narrated in accordance to the Old Testament (1919, 23). It is worth mentioning that through his work al-Kirmili, as a Chaldean, attempted to minimize not only narratives of the Arabs in ancient Mesopotamia but also the Assyrian Christians (1919, 13; 21; 27; 32-3).

The second characteristic of al-Kirmili’s work is its emphasis on cultural narrative, and its avoidance of narratives of conflict. For instance, he marginalised the conflict between the Semitic people and the Greeks and Romans, and almost completely ignored the Arab Muslim conquest of Iraq.

Al-Kirmili was influenced by his sources, and he attempted to dissociate the Iraqi Arabs from the ancient Mesopotamians. Such a vision was formulated in Victorian Britain (Larsen 2013, p. xii). Notably, both George Rawlinson (1812–1902), a British historian and Christian theologian, and Layard, were influenced by the context; and the latter believed that his ancient Mesopotamian discoveries were irrelevant to local Arab Muslim culture (Layard 1848, 1:70; 1849, 1:64; also see Hanoosh 2008, p. 131-3). Rawlinson suggested that the Aramaic “people continued [to be] the predominant race in the country to the time of the Mohammedan conquest” (1881, 235). In a similar way, al-Kirmili ignored any discussion of the Arabs of Mesopotamia prior to the Arab Muslim

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5 The debate surrounding Chaldean and Assyrian ethnic identity is still a divisive force in the Christian communities in Iraq (see Shapera 2001).
conquests even the Arab Bedouin. Moreover, he denied any cultural evolution by the Arab Muslims during the Rashidun (Rightly Guided) (632-661) and Umayyad periods (661-750) as it portrayed an awakening rather than a new departure, as we shall see in more detail below.

5.3 The interaction between politics and history in al-Kirmili’s work

Throughout history, the dualistic model of cultural Otherness can almost be assumed to have been a universal practice. For Said, Orientalism is a unified, Western body of knowledge depicting the Orient as uncivilized, unprogressive, immoral, passive, and emotional, in addition to many other pejorative characteristics (Said 2003 [1978]). In his vision, Said insisted on the dualistic nature of Orientalism, which is based on the distinction between Us and Them, and specifically between the Occident and the Orient. In this view, while the Orient is assumed to be predominantly stagnant and unchanging, the West is seen as progressive and dynamic (2003 [1978], 73). Yet, the techniques of Otherness that Said described as Orientalism are seemingly unrelated to a specific culture at any given time. Rather, it is a model of cultural difference that has been utilized by many groups, if not all, in many historical conjunctions to formulate their own identity or to justify their domination. In this respect, Ussama Makdisi referred to what he called “Ottoman Orientalism”, using this term to describe on the one hand the techniques in which the ruling elite of the Ottoman Empire explicitly resisted Europe, and on the other hand, their implicit acceptance of it. Thus, he describes the dualistic representations of the indolent Ottoman East, and specifically how this elite represented their subjected Arab periphery as an integral part of their engagement (Makdisi 2002, 768).

This section examines the process of Othering by looking at how Iraqi Chaldeans represented the ancient history of Iraq as an integral part of their identity formation. On the one hand, they implicitly accepted the east representation in nineteenth and early twentieth century Western literature as an inferior Other (Bohrer 1998, 337; Said [1978] 2003, 1-2), whereas on the other hand, they explicitly distinguished themselves
from such representations by creating a cultural boundary between themselves and the Arabs. This distinction was not based on a geographical basis such as that which divided the Orient and the Occident or north and south, but rather was based on cultural differences between people of Semitic origin: Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Jews (except the Arabs), Greeks, Romans, and modern western powers in cultural opposition to the inferiority of Arabic and Turkish culture.

It is broadly accepted that establishing a sense of Otherness is a key element of identity formation which has little to do with real differences between peoples, but much with the discourse of individuals or groups to perceive the Other as different from Us (Kerr 2015, 125-9). This technique allowed a society to divide itself into two sets of values and norms: the valued norms of Us, and the less valuable or even faulty norms of Them. Depicting the Other as inferior, exotic, passive, and eternal, or dehumanising them will provide the dominant group with the self-perception of being superior and civilized (Said [1978] 2003). One should point out that the Iraqi Chaldeans were not used racial dichotomies when distinguishing between Semitic and Aryan people, who were both represented as superior groups. Rather, the Chaldeans’ technique of Othering focused on an ethnic dichotomy that delineated a cultural boundary between two cultures, the Chaldeans and the Arabs, both of whom were assumed to belong to the same Semitic race. Interestingly, al-Kirmilī racially discriminated against the Turks, as he did not consider them to be either Semitic or Aryan.

On the basis of these discussions, the following sections argue that the Iraqi Chaldean writers utilised the same technique of Othering and distinguishing between Us and Them in order to reproduce and re-inscribe notions of cultural dichotomy. Thus, a sense of difference was established between the Chaldeans (Us), who saw themselves as the ancient and civilized people of Mesopotamia, and the uncivilized Arabs (Them), who were viewed as the uncivilised newcomers.
5.4 The notion of Semitic and Western rationality vs. Arab irrationality

For al-Kirmilī, the Chaldeans and Assyrians were the key element of Mesopotamian culture. Al-Kirmilī considered that the Chaldeans, Assyrians, Jews, Aramaeans, and Arabs were all Semitic in origin, but that what made them different was their different lifestyles. For al-Kirmilī, Chaldeans and Assyrians were an ancient urban Mesopotamian people who had an enormous impact on every aspect of Mesopotamia culture. In contrast, he viewed the Arabs as nomadic people, and relative newcomers, who had no significant or even any cultural imprint on Mesopotamia. Accordingly, when he referred to the impact of the Semitic people, it is important to note that he does not include the Arabs.

Al-Kirmilī depicted the Semites as the most ancient people of Iraq and the builders of its ancient civilization. He believed that Iraq was originally inhabited primarily by two groups of people from two different races, the Semitic and Sumerian peoples, and added that the latter had no relation to any of the other races in the region (1919, 10). For al-Kirmilī, although these two groups had an impact on Mesopotamia and on each other’s culture, this situation did not last long. By the eighteenth-century BCE, the Semitic people, according to al-Kirmilī, “swallowed” the Sumerian people (1919, 22). Although the Sumerian language continued to be used in religious contexts, it eventually disappeared and became a dead language, whereas Semitic remained strong and has been spoken by the majority of Mesopotamian people ever since (1919, 22). Thus, for al-Kirmilī this process led the Semitic language and culture becoming the prominent identity of ancient Mesopotamia.

Al-Kirmilī described the people surrounding Mesopotamia (implicitly the Arabs) as having descended into darkness, whereas the Mesopotamians he viewed to be a “civilized people who lived in the light of knowledge” (1919, 12). In this context he drew a very romantic picture of Chaldean cities:

“[If you] entered their cities you could see long roads and great houses, their financial activities were highly organized [...] If you get out of their cities, you would see wide roads and trees on the both sides which leading to the farms
and forests of palm trees. These farms were watered from [manmade] canals of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. You will also see canals and tables on each side, which irrigate these lands. [It] turned the area into a paradise” (1919, 12-3).

To construct a link between past and present Chaldean culture in Mesopotamia, al-Kirmili constructed a link between past Greek and Roman society with contemporary Europe. Rationality, according to al-Kirmili, is the thread that links Greeks, Romans and modern Western cultures. Al-Kirmili suggested that Greeks were the first nation to liberate their thoughts and rely on rationality in order to distinguish between truth and falsity (1919, 40). According to him, this rationality passed to the Romans, who inherited Asia from the Seleucids and became the defenders of the Hellenic mission (1919, 51-7).

For him, then the contemporary Western culture, Tāmadwn al-Garb, became a continuation of Hellenic and Roman rationality mission (1919, 40). Notably, al-Kirmili was keen to mention the acculturation of the Chaldeans, Romans, and Greeks on several occasions (1919, 15; 46-47). In addition, he implied that the relationship between the “Aryans” and Semites in Mesopotamia was harmonious.

This was evident through the absence of a conflict narrative between the Greeks, Macedonians, Romans, and Semitic people of Mesopotamia and the Levant. Nevertheless, according to him the Roman occupation of the Levant was not solely a military occupation. Rather it was an attempt to introduce the means of developments in one hand, with respect to the local population’s culture on the other hand. For instance, al-Kirmili argued that after the Roman occupation of the Levant, Romans never attempted Latinisation of these provinces. Instead Pompey attempted to organise the order in Levant so he divided Levant into provinces under the Roman administration (1919, 50-2). This seems in many ways a parallel with Romanisation vision that was popular during al-Kirmili’s period

In contrast to what he viewed as the rational, dynamic, and civilized Chaldeans and Western people, for al-Kirmili the geographical nature of the Arab homeland distanced the Arabs from any rational thought and prevented them from making any attempts
towards development (1919, 70). Al-Kirmiî argued that Arabia and Mesopotamia were a battlefield between two great powers, the Romans and Sasanians. According to him, power is only acquired through knowledge, which the Arabs were far from producing. The “wise people” of that time believed that the Orient would be subjected to a third power, thought to be the Greeks or the Romans if they were able to re-organize their empire. Thus, it was a “big surprise for the world that the Arabs could rise and manage to create an empire bigger than Alexander’s empire” (1919, 69-70).

For al-Kirmiî, Arab “backwardness” was an essential characteristic, and even when they built an empire, their cultural contribution remained as insignificant as it had been in the pre-Islamic period. Al-Kirmiî suggested that whilst the Arabs produced literature during the pre-Islamic era, it did not reflect any scientific knowledge. For him, the Arabs produced “sensory perception”, such as poetry, genealogy, fortune-telling, and other literature that did not require knowledge or the “power of intellect” (1919, 125). Therefore, even when the Arab Muslims had managed to expand out of Arabia and take over the ancient civilizations of Iraq and Syria, the nature of their characteristics did not allow them to establish an “original civilization” (1919, 128). To give an example, al-Kirmiî argued that although the Arabs moved from a nomadic to an urban lifestyle during the Umayyad era, they did not contribute visibly to contemporary civilization (1919, 128). Similarly, the Abbasid period witnessed an increase in the number of students who produced a great body of scientific and philosophical Arab literature (1919, 129), but nevertheless the foundations of this development, according to al-Kirmiî, remained Greek in nature (1919, 129). In addition, the knowledge was not the product of people of Arab origin, but rather it was the product of people who originally belonged to the Syriac and Persian people, who only spoke Arabic after the Islamic conquests (1919, 130). Thus, for al-Kirmiî the Arabs did not add any contribution to knowledge worth mentioning (1919, 130). Therefore, he believed that every wise Arab, regardless of the time and place, should consider the statement of the Umayyad caliph, Sulaymān Ibn Abdul al-Mlik, who according to al-Kirmiî stated the following:
“I have been stunned by these ‘Ajam, they ruled us for a millennium, but they did not need us for an hour. However, we have ruled them for a century, but we could not dispense with them for an hour” (1919, 112).

5.5 Arab society as static and incapable of self-definition

One of the techniques of Otherness is stigmatizing the exterior group as static in time, and incapable of defining itself and thus dependent upon “Us” (Said [1978] 2003, 208). Al-Kirmilī argued that the Arabs never changed, although he did not see this as an eternal fate. Instead, he thought that the Chaldean and Western “Us” could help “Them” to progress. What should be stressed here is that al-Kirmilī was interested in the technique of Otherness not only to legitimise the dominance of the Western powers but also to exhibit the Chaldeans as an Iraqi group capable of the responsibilities they upheld throughout history.

Al-Kirmilī argued that while the Semitic people of ancient Iraq were able to evolve from a primitive society (1919, 12), the Arabs remained in their innate condition (1919, 149). These differences, according to al-Kirmilī resulted from the Bedouin lifestyle, which had kept living in the “wild” unlike other people who were subject to the laws of urban society (1919, 149). This “wildness”, explains, according to al-Kirmilī, why the Arab Bedouins believed without scrutiny anyone who expressed childish myths, yet could change their opinion with the same speed if someone told them the opposite (1919, 149). It is worth to mention here that a similar idea of a childish Orient was expressed by contemporary and friend of al-Kirmilī’s the British administrator Gertrude Bell as she argued that:

“The Oriental is like a very old child. He is unacquainted with many branches of knowledge which we have come to regard as of elementary necessity [...] He is not practical in our acceptation of the word, any more than a child is practical [...] On the other hand, his action is guided by traditions of conduct and morality that go back to the beginnings of civilisation” (Bell 1908, ix).
The static vision of naïve Arab society provided al-Kirmili with a basis to study shared Arab characteristics (1919, 147), ethics (1919, 148-50), over time. In order to understand the past history of the Arabs, al-Kirmili believed it was necessary to study the modern Arab nomads, as for him the nomads’ attributes had not changed over time. To prove that Arab society was static, he suggested that any individual will read the Arabs’ descriptions of them in the old books, by which he probably meant the Old Testament, and compare them with their modern behaviour, stating: “[he will] not find any difference, not even a pittance. Their recent habits and characteristics are identical to their ancestors” (1919, 148-9).

Another example of the unchanged past and present Arab characteristics explored by al-Kirmili was their putative treacherousness. He claimed that the Arab Bedouins are treacherous and often join the powerful side in battles without moral consideration. He asserted that in the past, the Arabs had killed the Seleucid king, Alexander Balas (150–146 BC), who lost a war against Ptolemy VI Philometor (186–145 BCE) (1919, 149). Similarly, he argued that during the First World War, the Arabs had killed the survivors of the defeated military force, during the Ottomans and Great Britain conflict. According to him, if the Turks had been triumphant, the Arabs would have joined them and killed the British, but if the British had been victorious then the reverse would have happened and the Arabs would have killed the Turks (1919, 149). This seems to be a massage for the British administration of Iraq that to suggest, Arabs should never be trusted. Nevertheless, al-Kirmili went beyond his attempt to stigmatise the Arabs as primitive and static by also dehumanising them. For instance, he described his contemporary Arab Bedouins in the following manner:

Does any sane person accept to see several millions of these “creatures”, who are in their best health, living neglected in the countryside, roaming and nothing come from their hands, except spoiling like predatory wolves [...] Undoubtedly, it is possible to develop them. If they are provided with a wise ruler, [seemingly from outside their community], the will obey as docile as sheep” (1919, 170).
From the above vision, al-Kirmilī established a second one, which was that even when Arabs failed to enter the “civilised world”, the Chaldeans and Westerners, as the “Us”, were capable of achieving this task. The Arabs did not change over time, but this was not necessarily an eternal fate, because the Chaldeans and Westerners could help them to progress. What can be argued here is that al-Kirmili was interested in the technique of Othering, not for the sake of legitimising the dominance of the Western power but to exhibit his own community’s capability. For al-Kirmili, the best period of Iraqi history was the time when it was ruled by the Western powers and the Semitic people. He highlighted the value and impact of Roman civilization on ancient Mesopotamia and Syria, and suggested that the Romans had the biggest impact on the Orient:

“The Romans embed their authority in the orient by organizing the order, building castles and forts. Thus, their era became the greatest in this region. Indeed, the Seleucids founded many Greek cities, but the eruption of dissension and unrest during their rule became a barrier to deploying Hellenistic civilization” (1919, 54).

Therefore, for al-Kirmilī it was during the Roman period that the cities in Syria and Mesopotamia flourished, and many of the remains of the great buildings of this period can be seen today in the area. Buildings, theatres, and baths lie buried under hills, and venerable ruins such as those in Baalbek, Palmyra, and Tikrit pronounce the greatness of the Roman builders and bear witness to their wealth and advanced culture (1919, 54-5).

Similarly, the Semitic people helped to develop Iraq. Through the narrative of Iraqi history, al-Kirmilī asserted that cultural developments occurred in Mesopotamia after new waves of immigration. He argued that one way to develop culturally is to incorporate or integrate into a sophisticated nation or become affiliated with it (1919, 20). In this manner, he claimed that Babylon developed from a small but important settlement into a great state during the reign of Hammurabi (1792-1750 BCE) as a result of the migration and settlement of the Amorites, a Semitic people, in Mesopotamia at the turn of the second millennium BCE (1919, 20). On this basis, al-Kirmilī suggested
that the “backwardness” of the Arab people could be overcome with the help of a “wise leader”.

It can be noted that al-Kirmili did not pay a considerable attention to the Mesopotamian history during the rule of Iranian periods, Achaemenid, Parthian and Sasanian. Even though al-Kirmili’s narrative did not indicate any hostility between Iranian and ancient Iraqi people. Instead in a few sentences he depicted the Achaemenid king Cyrus as a just king who allowed the Jewish people to return to their homeland and built, and connected the empire through a wide range of network of roads. Nevertheless, the Iranian ruler of Mesopotamia was a period of an alien domination (1919, 35-6).

Al-Kirmili’s work reveal the image of the Ottomans, most of the time he used the Turks instead of the ottomans, as an irrational, despotic, and fanatical “Other”. For him, one of the reasons for Iraq’s backwardness is that it was ruled by a “decadent race”, the Ottomans. Al-Kirmili asserted that even when Arabs began to settle in urban cities, they did not change because the Ottomans did not attempt to reform their affairs (1919, 164). He emphasised that the Turks were deemed to be “tyrannical” and “backward” usurpers who lacked good qualities. Thus, they failed to bring cultural evolvement to the Arab world (1919, 111):

“If you look at any [individual] Turkish [person] in the present, and then look at him again after twenty or thirty years, you will note no changes. He will be in the same status of “decadence” and “obsequiousness” or he might have become more decadent. This is due to his racial traits” (Al-Kirmili, 1917, al-‘Arab, 13 July, 1).

For al-Kirmili, the Arabs had been unable to develop themselves, but their problem was not permanent, as it was caused by “those uncivilized rulers”. He stated, “even the ‘savage’ people of Africa managed to develop and enjoy the benefits of civilization when [ruled] by [Western] developed nations” (1919, 177). Ironically for al-Kirmili, the Westerners always attempted to help Iraqis move away from their backwardness, but these aims were always rejected by the Ottomans. He argued that:
“The western governments looked to these areas with gloom and feelings of regret for the people of these countries who degenerated into [an] abyss of ignorance and decadence. [Thus,] they attempted to take them out of this situation. They asked their rulers [Ottomans] to authorize them to introduce the means of civilization, but they refused [...] this kept this country wandering in the darkness of “ignorance” and “foolishness” (1919, 177-178).

Eventually, for al-Kirmili, the arrival of the British led to the hope that the Arabs would be led away from this primitive condition. The coming of the British was seen as a new era of Iraqi developments in contrast to the backwardness of the Ottoman period. For al-Kirmili, the Arabs were tormented by the Ottomans (1919, 210). However, fate drove this country into the hands of a nation who could ease them from this darkness and ignorance towards development and knowledge: “the Iraqis will see a success that they never dreamed of since the remote history” (1919, 179). This, for al-Kirmili, was because of British government attempts to improve the social conditions of the Iraqis (1919, 200-1).

Towards the end of Khulāṣat, al-Kirmili attempted to draw an optimistic image of the future of Iraq under the new power, presenting the British intervention as the beginning of a new era and presenting the hope for national development:

“On 11th March 1917, the Turks evacuated Baghdad. The city experienced unprecedented happiness as a result of their liberators [the British], which cannot be describe by any writer. The local newspapers praised this event in their pages, and the poets in their poems. Within a year all parts of were Iraq subjected to a state which knows how to respect the local populations. Promptly they have worked to improve the country: they constructed the railway; energized agriculture and opened schools [...] there are great hopes that this country [will emerge] out of darkness, ignorance and foolishness, into the modernity and civilization offered by Great Britain” (1919, 211).
To conclude, this chapter sought to demonstrate that the new political context created a new formulation of a past narrative of the written history of Iraq. In the first place, al-Kirmili’s work shows that Otherness or cultural differentiation is not limited to only one culture or tradition at a given time, as Said (1978) argued, but rather that the mode of differentiation could be traced in many societies and cultures at various times, regardless of whether they came from the West/East or North/South. Then, the chapter explored the response of the Iraqi “minorities” to the change in political structure and the way they attempted to use written history as a tool to legitimise their political position in the new “created state”. In particular, Al-Kirmili, who claimed to write for Iraq, was most concerned with the Chaldeans’ history, which he understood to be synonymous with Iraqi’s history. By writing the Iraqi people’s history, he affirmed their superior existence in the present and projected it back into the past; in doing so, the history of Iraq was reduced to the history of the Chaldeans and Assyrians, a stance that denied any role for other people particularly the Arabs in the formation of Iraqi culture. However, this form of writing history has subsequently been challenged by the emergence of pan-Arab nationalism, a project that began by writing a new version of Iraqi and Arabic history that, as we shall see in the next chapter, was completely different from the version of al-Kirmili, despite its parallel method of Othering.
Chapter Six: Rise of Arab Nationalism: Darwīsh al-Miqdādī

Oh, Arab youth,

“Look at the history of your nation and remember the glory of your ancestors. Work for resurrection and raise your nation. Appeal for your past to build the future of your nation”. (al-Miqdādī 1936 [1931], introduction)

“To be united Arabs is better for us than to be sporadic and enslaved nations, we can by our hands create a [unified] state from seventy states. Was not Germany 400 states? And they had no power or authority during the Medieval Age. But when they united and incorporated they become the world’s greatest country in the fields of science, war, economy, industry and trade”. (al-Miqdādī 1936 [1931], 441)

This chapter examines the links between the historical writing of Arab history in antiquity with the development of Arab nationalism as a political doctrine. While many Arab nationalists seized the opportunity to use propaganda through many cultural products, historical texts were able to provide the Arab world with a sense of a glorious past. Historical production, whether for the public or school textbooks, has often privileged Arab nationalist discourses. This chapter seeks to examine the close links between history writing and Arab nationalism, exploring the function that Arab national histories came to play in providing Iraqi individuals with an Arab identity during the transition from mandate to an independent Iraqi. It emphasises that the transformation of power from the British administration to an Iraqi government in 1921 was not able to formulate a new foundation of an Iraqi independent school of historiography. Instead the Iraqi scholars borrowed from western tradition, particularly the German notion of
cultural nationalism volk and consequently the third Reich racism vision into the Arab world.

Recently, Ulrike Freitag and Israel Gershoni (2011) challenged the vision that focused on the collaboration and sympathy of the Arab world towards Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. They argue that this representation was a result of the politicisation of historical works by the founding of Israel and the subsequent Palestinian-Arab-Israeli conflict. On the contrary, they also argue that “many mainstream [Arab] political leaders, intellectual forces and movements actually rejected and opposed the totalitarianism, racism, and imperialism of Nazism and Fascism in the public spheres” (2011, 311). There is no doubt that the pro-liberal, Marxist, and Islamic groups in the Arab world did show opposition to the Nazi and Fascist propaganda, but this should not underestimate the great impact of Third Reich propaganda on the Arab world, not only during the inter-war period but beyond. It is, also, not exaggerating to note that the Third Reich and Fascist propaganda had an impact on the Arab world, particularly Iraq and Syria, up to and beyond the end of the twentieth century.

Up to the end of the WW1, the advanced bourgeois societies of the west, particularly Britain and France, provided models for most Arab nationalists. However, defeat of the Ottomans in WW1 and the subsequent partitioning of the Arab world into areas of British and French domination, led Arab thinkers towards the German notion of the cultural vision of a nation (Tibi 1997 [1981], 116). During the inter-war period, Arab nationalism became the leading ideology in Arab world. Intellectuals such as Qusṭanṭīn Zurayq, Edmond Rabath, and, more importantly, Ṣāṭīʿ al-Ḥuṣrī, sought to employ the European theories of nationalism to re-shape Arab national identity. Among the variety of European visions of nationalism, the Arab intellectuals, particularly al-Ḥuṣrī, opted for the German notion of cultural (primordial) nationalism.¹

¹ Al-Ḥuṣrī himself was inspired by the Anglo-French notion of nationalism in his early days. However, he changed his direction, as Tibi argued, after the French occupation of Syria after the First World War (Tibi 1997 [1981], 119).
The nascent Arab nationalism that drew inspiration from the German concept of nation, was the result of several reasons. First, the philosophers of Britain and France, whose country had been political states since the sixteenth century, claimed that the nation is contextual and exists only within political boundaries. In other words, a nation is a state creation (Dawisha 2003, 52). For instance, from Rousseau’s point of view, people are “citizens, who share a sovereign power, and subjected, to the laws of the state (1762, 12). On the other hand, the German philosophers, whose country was not politically unified until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, saw nation as a cultural creation rather than political. Herder, who significantly contributed to the concept of cultural nationalism, argued that the world is “wonderfully separated” (Herder 8:224; see Carlton 1927, 722; Patten, 2010, 659; Schmidt 1956, 407), not as a result of the political but as a result of the geographical that created different cultures (Herder 1800, 19). In addition, for Herder god acts upon earth not by governments but only by means of religion and language (Herder ix:230; see White, G 2004, 154). The latter concept fitted with the Arab context after the First World War as, similarly to the Germans, the Arabs had political entities, but they were relatively tied by religion and language and assumed to from one geographical place, Arabia.

The position of language was the second important element leading Arab nationalism to adopt German nationalism theory. Unlike the British idea of the importance of language for the nation, German thinkers saw language as the knot that brings the nation together. For Fichte, for instance, the people who speak the same language are by nature an indivisible whole (Fichte 1808, cited from Reiss 1955, 102; for Herder’s and Fichte’s notions of nation, see Özkirimli 2000, 18-9). Finally, the Arab scholars and Germans both saw themselves as victims of the post-First World War developments, and the former saw the latter as lacking colonial ambitions, unlike Great Britain and France (Nordbruch 2014, 277).

Al-Ḥuṣrī, the prophet of Arab nationalism as he has been described by Dawisha (2003, 49), was among the most influential theorists of Arab nationalism. Al-Ḥuṣrī studied in Paris, where he became familiar with the western thinkers of nationalism, such as Rousseau, Renan, Herder, and Fichte. Al-Ḥuṣrī enthusiastically transferred the German
visions of nation as formulated by Herder and later Fichte to the Arab world (Dawisha 2003, 64). For him, a nation is a natural living body, and its preservation is based on the unity of the linguistic community and a coherent history (al-Ḥuṣrī 1928, cited from Murquṣ 1966, 17). Nevertheless, national identity, for al-Ḥuṣrī, is the product of this immutable bonding, inborn and predetermined:

regardless of individuals own preference, religion, sect or the country [in which they] live, anyone who speak[s] Arabic as a mother tongue is an Arab, whether he wished or not; admitted it or did not confess [... even if he deny] He is an Arab however he [might be] ignorant, oblivious or [a] traitor. Nonetheless he is an Arab in any case, he is an Arab [who has] lost his consciousness, feeling, and perhaps soul (al-Ḥuṣrī 1951, 65-6).

It is this concept of nation that al-Ḥuṣrī attempted to implant in Iraqi consciousness through historical writings. During his early work as the Iraqi Director of General Education (1923-1927), he stated that the main and basic aim of historical textbooks, which should be brought out clearly from the beginning, is the idea of the unity of the Arab nation and the Arabism of Iraq (Dawisha 2003, 73). Therefore, al-Ḥuṣrī brought many Arab educators from Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon who shared a similar vision. However, Darwīsh al-Miqdādī was the best at transferring this vision into the Iraqi school curriculum.

6.1 The life and career of Darwīsh al-Miqdādī

Darwīsh al-Miqdādī was an Iraqi-Palestinian historian and activist of Arab nationalism. He was born in 1898 into a middle-class family in Tulkarm, Palestine (al-Jihad newspaper, 14.1.1935; al-Matbaie 1994, 1:70), and later attended al-Madrassa al-Aʿbbassiyah [the Abbasid school] in Beirut until 1916, and then the Syrian Protestant College-Beirut between 1916 and 1918. In 1922, he graduated from the American University of Beirut (AUB), which was becoming an important hub of Arab nationalism during the inter-war period (El-Ehairy, 2010, 324; Kahati 2005, 25). At the University, al-
Miqdādī studied History, Sociology, and Arabic Literature. He began his career as a teacher at the Arab College Dar al-Mu’aleam in Jerusalem. During his early career in Jerusalem (1924-1926), he taught many subjects including history, geography, English, and physical education (Darwīṣh al-Miqdādī 2016).²

Al-Miqdādī’s reliance upon Arab history for political purposes was evident during his early professional life. He was dismissed from his position by the British authority in Jerusalem for refusing to follow Baden-Powell Association guidelines for Boy Scout Troops and insisting that the name of the association should be Arab rather Western. He suggested the name Khalīd Ibn al-Walīd, who was the leader of an Arab Muslim army that expelled the Byzantines in the Levant (Darwīṣh al-Miqdādī, 2016).³ Up to this date, al-Miqdādī’s ideology was the product of two main sources. First, the political situation in his home country of Palestine under the British mandate, and second, the Arab nationalist ideology prevalent at AUB. However, the German Nazi propaganda in the Middle East later formed his third pillar of thought.

Along with other Arab nationalists, al-Miqdādī’s work in Iraq initiated and nurtured an Arab nationalist political educational process, and he wrote textbooks. By 1926 he moved to teach in Iraq, where he was involved with Arab nationalism and anti-British movements. During his stay in Iraq, al-Miqdādī worked closely with Šāṭiʿ al-Ḥuṣrī (al-Ḥuṣrī 1967, 1:557), the pioneer of Arab nationalism, who had a great impact on the Iraqi intelligentsia for many subsequent decades. In Iraq, al-Miqdādī participated and helped to find a number of organisations that were based on the spirit of Arab nationalism, including ‘ash-Shubban al-Muslimun [The Muslim Youth League Association] in 1929, and Nadi al-Muthannā [al-Muthannā club] in 1935 (Cohen 1966, 6; Khoury 1987, 404). The latter was regarded as a pro-Nazi organisation, and it disseminated anti-British propaganda that was shared by many Iraqi intellectuals, politicians, and senior army officers, including Rashīd ‘Ālī al-Kīlānī, the leader of the 1941 pro-German Coup (Baram

Al-Miqdādī’s impact and enthusiasm for radical Arab nationalism in the city of Mosul, where he taught for several years, was summarised by an Iraqi scholar as follows:


From 1929, Miqdādī was actively involved in establishing an Arab nationalist organization in Baghdad. With several Iraqi intellectuals, al-Miqdādī, with his brother and sister (the only female) participated in formulating the al-Jawwāl Association. Al-Jawwāl was officially authorized by the Iraqi government in 1934, during the reign of King Ghazi who was known for his sympathy to Arab nationalists (see chapter 3). Al-Miqdādī was among the most active members of al-Jawwāl and then became its third president (Fadhil Hussein 1982, 241). With the same nationalist vision, in 1935 several Iraqi intellectuals, including al-Miqdādī, submitted a request to the Iraqi government to establish a non-political club called al-Muthannā bin Haritha Al-Shaybānī. Due to the similarity of the aims, the Al-Jawwāl joined al-Muthannā Club, but nevertheless retained its administrative structure within the Club.

Both al-Jawwāl and al-Muthannā were inspired by the radical nationalism of the Third Reich of Germany and fascist Italy. A member of the al-Jawwāl, for instance, claimed that Iraq should lead the Arab nation as they led it during the Abbasid period. In addition, Iraq should play a role in the unification of the Arab world similar to Prussia in uniting Germany, or Piedmont in uniting Italy (Hussein 1982, 285). Likewise, the al-Muthannā Club stated in its internal programme that the aim of the Club was to awaken Arab national spirit. Similarly, to the vision of al-Jawwāl, a member of al-Muthannā Club argued that there was no contradiction between the Arab nationalist movement and the Italian nationalist philosophy during Mussolini’s supremacy. While another member
claimed that the parliamentary democratic system is not suitable neither for Iraq, nor for the expected unified Arab state in the future (al-Zubaidi 2016, 256).

Al-Jawwāl embraced the totalitarian thought of Nazi Germany. In the third part of the al-Jawwāl founding program it was stated that “intellectual freedom is an absolute right but restricted by the interest of the nation” (Arab National Movement 2015, p. 377). The Association made obligatory for its members to prepare a short essay on Arab national thought. The member had to read the Arab national programme, which was published by the Association, carefully and be prepared to answer all the questions related to the Arab national programme. For this preparation, the members had to rely on a specific collection of seven books, most of which were written in accordance with Nazi and Fascist orientations including Hitler’s Mein Kampf. Moreover, shortly after the rise of Hitler to power, in a festival of the al-Jawwāl one member delivered a poem that ended with sentences “wa Qūlū lil-Shabāb tahitlaro” ‘ask the [Arab] youth to become Hitlerian’ (Hussein 1982, 293). Then the al-Jawwāl began to ask its members to read Arabic publications on the Nazi and fascism movement. The growth of Arab sympathy for the Third Reich was recorded by a German diplomat Fritz Grobba, ambassador to the Kingdom of Iraq from 1932 (Schwanitz 2004, 94). He argued that the rise of German power since 1933 provoked passion among the Arabs, who wished that “they too would find a leader who would unite them and bring them freedom” (Grobba 1938, cited from Herf 2010, 31).

It is noteworthy that al-Jawwāl was part of bigger Arab nationalist movement in the eastern Arab world. Salim al-Nuaimi a member of the society argued that the al-Jawwāl Association was a front organization of a secret nationalist Arab group, which was founded in Baghdad but it was based in Damascus (249). Similarly, the al-Muthannahā Club became a hub for Arab nationalists all over the eastern Arab world who resisted Jewish immigration to Palestine. Among them was Haj Amin al-Hassani, who came to Iraq in 1939 and played a critical role in disseminating Third Reich propaganda in the middle east during the second world war (see chapter 10). It is worth mentioning that al-Jawwāl become the intellectual base of many Iraqi and Arab military officers and
politicians. According to one Iraqi historian, Arab heritage and history became the main guide for their behaviour (al-Jawāhirī 1984, 24-23: cited from al-Zubaidi 2016).

It is also noteworthy that al-Jawwāl motivated its members to enrol in European universities, not least in Germany. Al-Miqdādī was among the candidates nominated by the al-Jawwāl, and supported by the Iraqi government, and took a PhD in Arab History in Germany. By the time al-Miqdādī arrived in Berlin in 1936, Nationalist sentiments reached their climax (Darwīsh al-Miqdādī 2016). He was tremendously affected by the political atmosphere and the nationalist emotions of the Third Reich. Nicola Ziadeh, a well-known Lebanese Arab historian who was al-Miqdādī’s student and colleague, recorded a letter that al-Miqdādī sent him after Hitler’s occupation of western Czechoslovakia, in which he questioned “whether one of the Arab leaders will occupy the rest of the Arab homeland and unify them in one entity” (al-Mustaqa-bal, 19 December 2004). In Germany, al-Miqdādī became the chair of the Arab Club in Berlin, which was described by the British administration of Iraq as a centre pro German agitator (Simon 2004, 74).

Al-Miqdādī returned to Iraq in 1939 more imbued with Nazi-style nationalism, and he followed the growing trend of pro-German Arab politicians. He was appointed as a lecturer and then Dean at the Higher Teachers College Dār al-Muʿālemīn al-ʿUlia, which specialised in training Iraqi students to be teachers (El-Solh 2004, 121). From his position, he became one of the main supporters of the pro-German coup in Iraq, led by Rashīd ‘Ālī al-Kīlānī in 1941 (Dawn 1988, 355; al-Matbaie 1994, 1:70; for the German relationships with the coup of 1941, see Record 2010, 37; Tripp 2000, 99). To support this coup the al-Jawwāl Society established small battalions, one of which was commanded by al-Miqdādī. However, following the failure of the coup al-Miqdādī was charged with instigating the public revolt, and was incarcerated in a political prison in the southern Iraqi desert for more than three years (Choueiri 2000, 33-4; al-Jamīl 1992,

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5 The existence literatures are silent about if he was awarded his PhD, nevertheless in his later publications he did not hold the title of Dr.
This sentence succeeded in terminating al-Miqdādī’s activities in Iraq and stripped him of his Iraqi nationality. Moreover, his textbook Tārīkh al-Ummah al-ʿArabiyyah (History of the Arab Nation) (1936[1931]) was banned from Iraqi schools. However, this sentence failed to eliminate the influence of his radical pan-Arab nationalist discourse on later Iraqi intellectuals and politicians, as it continued for decades, especially within the Baʿthist framework, where his book became a point of reference for many Iraqi historians (Ahmed 1981; Ibrahim 2001). Many of those who had participated in the al-Jawwāl and Al-Muthannā Club became active members of Iraqi intellectual and political communities. For example, in the field of Iraqi archaeology Taha Baqir and Fuad Safar; Mattī ʿAqrāwī, became the first president of the University of Baghdad; In the army Khairallāh Talfah, uncle of Saddam Hussein, was an officer and was responsible for fundraising for the al-Jawwāl in the Iraqi army. There were also many others, including two Iraqi Prime Ministers; thirteen ministers and six Deans in the Iraqi universities (Hussein 1982, 299-305).

Al-Miqdādī left a few publications, such as Bayna al-Jahiliyatayn (1967) [Between the Two Periods of Ignorance], and Tārīkhunā bi-Uslūb Qaṣāṣī [Our History in a Novel Genre], co-authored with Akram Zuʿaytir in 1939. However, he became more famous for his textbook History of the Arab Nation, first published in 1931 and then reprinted in 1932, 1934, and 1936, and which is the subject of this chapter.

6.2 History of the Arab Nation: Method and approach

History of the Arab Nation was divided into four parts. The first part, “The Arabian Peninsula”, deals with the history of the Arabs in the Arabian Peninsula from the pre-Islamic period to the end of the Abbasid period, stretching geographically from Yemen in the south to Mesopotamia and the Levant in the north (1936 [1931], 1-382). The second part, “The Arabian Andalusia”, treats the history of the Arab Muslims in Spain

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6 Al-Miqdādī spent his later life moving between Jerusalem, Damascus, Kuwait, and Beirut, where he died in 1961.
from the Islamic conquest to the fall of Granada (1936 [1931], 383-440), whereas the third part, “The Arabian Africa”, deals with the history of the Arabs in North Africa, from the Islamic conquest to the author’s contemporary time (1936 [1931], 441-466). Finally, part four, “The Arabian Peninsula in the Age of Inattention and Awakening”, deals with the history of Arabia and the Fertile Crescent from what al-Miqdādī called the Age of Inattention (1516-1798) and the Age of Awakening (1798) to the author’s contemporary time of early 1930s (1936 [1931], 467-518).

Adeed Dawisha has correctly noted that the title of the book suggests that the “Arab nation” is taken for granted, with no effort to question, discuss, or even defend the concept (2003, 77). Taking the Arab nation as a guarantee was not the last destination, but al-Miqdādī extended the Arab national identity to include all other identities of Mesopotamia and the Levant since the fourth century BCE.

This work was formed within the spirit of al-Ḥuṣrī’s ordinance. Al-Ḥuṣrī argued that the teaching of history should focus on the glorious past in order to provide a basis for the national awakening. Al-Miqdādī adopted a similar approach in the introduction to History of the Arab Nation, arguing that

My aim from this work is to revive the glory of the Arabs [...] I believe that our nation is in urgent demand to know itself, [its] tradition [and] history [in order] to be self-confidant of its power (1936 [1931], n.p.).

Nevertheless, al-Ḥuṣrī asserted that the objectivity of writing history for early-stage pupils is impossible, because historians can only discuss a limited number of events. Thus, they have to be selective, and it is natural to select what is necessary for the nationalist demands (al-Ḥuṣrī 1961, 122). Al-Miqdādī then attempted to put these visions into action by implanting it into the Iraq history curriculum. In this manner, the whole work is formed in a line that signifies the Arabs’ past glories in the fields of military affairs, science, and the Arab contribution to modern civilisation. For instance, the history of the Arab conquests of Iraq, discussed in the chapter entitled “al-‘Arab
Yaftahwnā al- al-ālam”, the Arabs conquer the world,⁷ has been paid special attention (142-56). In contrast, the five centuries of the Ottoman period, called the Age of Inattention, is only allocated eighteen pages (1936 [1931], 467-86). This chapter is followed by a similar short chapter on European supremacy, in which al-Miqdādī insisted that the easy occupation of Egypt by the French occurred because they were armed with modern science and imbued with a great sense of nationalism. In addition, he emphasised the emergence of Arab national awareness against Ottoman imperialism.

In accordance with the custom of his age, al-Miqdādī scarcely mentioned his sources in the course of his work. For the first part, for instance, he used only fifteen references in fifty-five pages; nine of them are from the Arab tradition⁸ and six are European sources.⁹ These references were generally used to corroborate the claim surrounding the geographical unity of the Arab homeland. Nevertheless, it is possible to find some quotations from other works even in the absence of citations, in particular from al-Tabari.

6.3 The interaction between politics and history in al-Miqdādī’s work

The Arab nationalists appealed to history to justify political acts. For al-Miqdādī, history is an accumulation of several falls and several successful events in the past of the Arabs, which are essential for the learning of the current generation. From these events, al-Miqdādī believed that the Arab people desperately needed to draw lessons in order to overcome the misfortunes, failures, and mistakes made by their ancestors. Nevertheless, for him history constructs moments in which the ancestors made victories and glories in the past. These moments should utilise to inspire the contemporary Arab

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⁷ Here I argue that the word Yaftahwnā can be interpreted as triumph rather conquer.
⁸ Al-Bustānī (n.d.), Kitāb Muḥīṭ al-muḥīṭ; Encyclopaedia of Islam (n.d.); al-Hamawi (d. 1229), Kitāb muʿjam al-buldān; al-İṣbahānī (d. 967), Kitāb al-aghāni; Muhammad Ahmad Jād al-Mawlā (n.d.); al-Qalqashandi (d. 1418), kitāb Subh al-ṣahā; Umm al-Qura newspaper (n.d.).
⁹ Jacob (1923), Kings of Arabia: The Rise and Set of the Turkish Sovereignty in the Arabian Peninsula; Philby (1922), The Heart of Arabia: A Record of Travel and Explorer; The Encyclopaedia Britannica (1823).
generation towards believing that they could make even greater contributions to the Arab community.

6.3.1 Arab identity in al-Miqdādī’s discourse

The historical formation of Arab identity according to al-Miqdādī revolved around several interrelated ideas: a) the Arab nation is the product of bonding between territory (Arabia) and people (Semitic), and thus the Arab identity is primordial and a cultural creation as a result of its geographical boundary and ethnic origin; b) the geographical boundary is a living body; and c) all Semitic peoples who appeared in history have melted into the Arab identity.

Similarly, with Herder, for al-Miqdādī Arab identity was created and perceived by its distinguished geographical nature. He argued that before the arrival of Islam, the Arabs were dispersed through Arabia but were united through customs, morality, and blood. Their dwelling is the “Arabian Peninsula, where they originated, from its heart they spread, and they are its proprietors since remote past” (1936 [1931], 3).

Being obsessed with Arabness of the ancient Fertile Crescent, al-Miqdādī developed the notion of the ‘Arab homeland’ by amalgamating Arabia and the Fertile Crescent into one geographical entity. He depicted Arabia as “one organic body” composed from three interlinked organs: Arabia as the heart, Iraq and Syria as the head, and the Persian Gulf and Red Sea territories as the wings, with each having a particular function (1936 [1931], 7). From this perspective, the Arabia function of the heart is to support the natural evolution of the fundamental units (the head and limbs) of nations without outside interference. It is probably also an indication of al-Miqdādī’s belief in the pureness of the Arab race as a result of its isolation in Arabia, away from any other ethnic groups. Choueiri correctly argued that the biological analogy is evidently biased in favour of Syria and Iraq (2000, 34-5). This is because al-Miqdādī portrayed these provinces as the head, representing the seat of both intellect and power over the rest of the body. The other purpose of such a biological analogy is to argue the possibility of regeneration and development of the Arab nation. For instance, he argued that even when Palmyra was
destroyed, and its inhabitants killed by the Roman emperor Aurelian, Palmyra was nevertheless revived by a new Arab generation during the Islamic conquests (1936 [1931], 20). In addition, describing the Arab homeland as an organic body allowed al-Miqdādī to utilise the Semitic Wave Theory, as “scientific” proof of the deep-rooted Arab identity.

The other conception of al-Miqdādī’s formation of Arab deep-rooted identity and cultural continuity is built on the assumption that all Semitic groups in the Fertile Crescent had migrated from Arabia.10 During the 1920s, Winckler-Caetan’s ‘Semitic wave theory’ became influential amongst Arab intellectuals (Chejne 1960, 394; Hurvitz 1993, 121; Simon 1986, 43-44). According to this theory, Arabia was originally a territory of great fertility and the motherland of all Semitic groups. Growth of population and decline of productivity led to a constant flow of migrants from Arabia into the Fertile Crescent, either as invaders or peaceful settlers (Lewis 2002 [1950], 17). The hypothetical formation of the Semitic people was used by al-Kirmīlī as evidence of distinction and the superior Chaldean identity in relation to the Arab identity (see Chapter 5). Similarly, with al-Kirmīlī who used the hypothetical formation of the Semitic people as evidence of distinction and the superior Chaldean identity, al-Miqdādī, along with several other Arab nationalists of his generation, utilised the Semitic Wave Theory in the context of Arab nationalist ideology. He argued that the heart of Arabia was the cradle of the Semitic people, and that they emerged from there and spread into the Fertile Crescent (1936 [1931], 11). For him, the Semitic people, including the Babylonians, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Phoenicians, Aramaeans, Nabataeans, Palmyrenes and others, all shared similar “languages, skulls and blood” (1936 [1931], 11). In addition, the Semitic-Arab people’s identity was implanted over six thousand years earlier, long before the establishment of their states (1936 [1931], 11). Nevertheless,

10 The Semitic Wave Theory and its nexus to the Arab nation was widely accepted amongst educated Arabs in the 1920s (see Chejne 1960; 1960; Hurvitz 1993).
al-Miqdādī asserts that the Semitic-Arabs were part of the Fertile Crescent from the earliest possible point of history (al-Miqdādī 1936 [1931], 11, 28).

By arguing in favour of the geographical unity and sole origin of the Arabs, al-Miqdādī’s argument arrived at its final aim. Arab identity was established as an umbrella term that unified underneath it all the Semitic groups. According to al-Miqdādī, most of the Semitic peoples merged into one Arab identity. Thus, he not only saw the modern Arabs as the heirs and offspring of the Semites but also as the only surviving identity, as all the Semitic groups combined to form the Arab ethnicity (1936 [1931], 11).

6.3.2 Racial discourse in al-Miqdādī’s work

It is worth mentioning here a possible link between the concept of a “hygienic race”, which flourished in Germany from the turn of the twentieth century, and al-Miqdādī’s understanding of the “pure race”.

By the nineteenth century, the notion of racial inequality had emerged (Kyllingstad 2014, 87). Arthur de Gobineau was among the early scholars who developed the notion, and in his book The Inequality of Human Races he asserted that

“I convinced myself at last that everything great, noble, and fruitful in the works of man on this earth, in science, art, and civilization, derives from a single starting-point, is the development of a single germ and the result of a single thought; it belongs to one family alone” (De Gobineau 1915, xv).

Nevertheless, for De Gobineau, the existence of a nation depends on maintaining the pureness of the blood of the original race in its institutions (1915, 34). This perspective became ubiquitous within the literature of the Third Reich, which characterised the Nordic people as simultaneously the superior and the most vulnerable race in the world (Arnold 2006, 9). Echoing the German notion, al-Miqdādī presented a similar inequality concept that held that all residents of the state could (or must) be organised according to the distinct hierarchy based on the innate qualities of their race.
Al-Miqdādī believed that although Islam was the tent under which all peoples were gathered, but Arabs had the privilege of controlling the religion and state (1936 [1931], 244). To confirm this concept, al-Miqdādī believed that the Caliph Umar was tolerant of the Arab Christians and did not impose a tribute on them like that imposed on non-Arab Christians, treating them as they treated the Muslim Arabs (1936 [1931], 233). Therefore, if race was the criterion for the early Islamic period, it must also be a criterion for the contemporary world. In the same context, al-Miqdādī praised the “racialist policy” of the Umayyad, who he cited as believing in Arab blood. According to him, the Umayyad lifted the pan-Islamic policy in favour of pan-Arabism. They “despised the Persians” and other foreigners, and expelled the non-Arabs from their places of employment, circulated Arabic language, and maintained Arab national traditions (1936 [1931], 233).

According to al-Miqdādī, this policy was consistent with “nature” and so it was recognised by non-Arabs. He argued that the Mawālī (in Islamic tradition the term Mawālī used for the non-Arabs who converted to Islam) of “ʿAjam” (where ʿAjam is used to refer to Persians/Iranians) and others believed in the superiority of the Arabs, and as they were not vain they called the Arabs their masters and designated themselves as their Mawālī. Moreover, they considered that obedience to and love for the Arabs was their duty, and they believed in Arab superiority in terms of both intelligence and strength. For that reason, he cites al-Muqana, a Persian, who states, “The Arabs are the wisest nations, if I lost their race I must not lose the advantage of their knowledge” (1936 [1931], 234). 11

According to al-Miqdādī, the Arabs considered themselves masters over the non-Arabs, who were seen as being there to serve the Arabs. Therefore, the Arabs in the early days of Islam worked only in politics, and left other careers to non-Arabs. This confirmed al-Wardī notion of Arab ambivalent personality, in which the Iraqi bear both Bedouin and

11 This sentence can also translate as “if I lost their race I must not [lose] the advantage of their relationships”.

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Urban value together (n.d., 12) and the Arabic word *mihna*, career, derived from *mahana*, humiliation.

Consequently, al-Miqdādī indicated that it was not the hazard of war that destroyed the Arab states but rather their dependence on the non-Arabs. Al-Miqdādī narrated many wars that beset the Arab empire, but none of these were depicted as having an impact on the collapse of the empire. On the other hand, it was marriages with non-Arabs that led to such a conquest. For him, Arab Muslims were more monogamous than polygamous after the conquest, although polygamy became common in the Abbasid period. Many Arabs married non-Arab women, and the result was that the Arab children were raised by non-Arab women, which weakened their sense of Arab nationalism. In addition, many adopted, as he saw them, Persian, not Sasanian or Iranian, customs, such as wearing Persian traditional costumes or the veil (for women), and participated in the Persian holidays (1936 [1931] 228). All these undermined the Arab personality, and led to the collapse of their empire (379; 302).

This understanding of race clearly shows the extent to which Arab nationalist thought influenced the theory of pure race and thus led to pass an ideologised version of history in Iraq and the Arab world for generations to come.

6.3.3 Lessons from history: Arab unity as a source of victory

For Nietzsche, the people who are safer from backwardness in the present yet lack inspiration in their own time often invest in the past in order to find inspiration and motivate their contemporary generation (2007, 73; see Jenkins 2014, 170; Jensen 2016, 69). For a similar purpose, al-Miqdādī attempted to draw lessons from numerous victories and failures in Arab history for the benefit of the contemporary generation, teaching that Arab unity was a key aspect of the past Arab glory in contrast to the disunity that was the main cause of Arab failures.

Al-Miqdādī asserted that there is a strong association between the Arab unity and their triumphs, and between Arab disunity and the severity of catastrophes that beset the
Arabs in history (al-Miqdādī 1936 [1931], 467). Al-Miqdādī believed that the Arabs were united by their characteristics, habits, and blood, but also that their disunity prior to Islam led to misery and backwardness in all political and socio-economic levels (1936 [1931], 3-4). Moreover, a lack of agreement between the Arabs led a number of their tribes to prefer submission to foreigners and aggression towards other Arab tribes (1936 [1931], 3). But this situation did not last, as eventually “the Arabs were convinced that they could not rise [again] unless they united, as their blood, characteristics, tradition and language are united” (1936 [1931], 3-4).

The lesson al-Miqdādī aimed to deliver from Islamic history was that Islam had empowered the Arabs to find their empire, but ultimately it was the unity between the Arabs that played the decisive role that led to this victory. In this respect, he narrated a conversation between the second Muslim caliph ʿUmer Ibn al-khaṭṭāb (579-644) (during which time the Arab Muslims were able to conquer Mesopotamia, the Levant, and Egypt) and a Sasanian commander imprisoned after the conquest of Mesopotamia:

“God had not interfered in [the strife] between us [the Sasanians] and you [the Arabs] in al-Jāhiliyya. Thus, we could take over you, because God was not with us nor with you. However, when God became with you [the Arabs], you could overcome us.

[In reply] ‘Umer said: You had overcome us in al-Jāhiliyya, because you were united, but we were dispersed” (1936 [1931], 171).

It is not important here whether this text is historically accurate or if it is the work of a Muslim historian’s imagination, but rather its importance stems from the way that al-Miqdādī used it for his ideological perspective. This text clearly indicates that al-Miqdādī did not see religion as a cause of victory either for the Sasanians or for the Arab Muslims, but rather the unity among the community. Nevertheless, the lack of unity between the Arabs was the door through which the foreigners entered into “the Arabs’ homeland”. Al-Miqdādī, for instance, portrayed the disagreement between the Ghassanids and
Lakhmids as a main cause that enabled the Romans and the Sasanians to establish their hegemony over the Fertile Crescent in the pre-Islamic era:

“If we mediate the history of Lakhmid we find, with my great sorrow, they fought against the Ghassanids. If the Lakhmid had collaborated with the Ghassanids, the Sasanians and Byzantines would never [have] been able to control the Fertile Crescent for such a long period. This proves that foreign powers maintain[ed] their hegemony, as long as the division among the people lasted” (1936 [1931], 28).

Similarly, seeking support from foreigners did not help the Arabs to gain their liberty, but rather it replaced an old colonial power with a new coloniser. Al-Miqdādī, for instance, argued that the Ethiopians subjected the Arabs in Yemen to slavery and persecution. The Arab leader of Yemen, Saif bin Dhi Yazan, sought Sasanian support to liberate the country and expel the foreigners. Despite the success of bin Dhi Yazan’s attempt to drive out the Ethiopians, jointly by the Arab and Sasanian armies, according to al-Miqdādī this did not change the Arab status in Yemen, but rather it replaced “the Ethiopian yoke [with] a Persian one” (al-Miqdādī 1936 [1931], 23).

Thus, for al-Miqdādī, Arab unity is the first and foremost source of Arab glory throughout history, even when they were small in number. For him, a small group could achieve a great victory if united and well organised (1936 [1931], 146; 150; 154; 164). He thought that the Arabs collective consciousness led to a triumph in Dhī Qar (for the battle of Dhī Qar, see Chapter 3) despite their small numbers in comparison with the Sasanian army (1936 [1931], 4). This “victory” was portrayed as an extension of the greater triumph in al- Qādisiyyah (for al-Qādisiyyah see chapter 3) (al-Miqdādī 1936 [1931], 27). Moreover, for al-Miqdādī unity among the community probably was a basic prerequisite for any community to succeed throughout history. For instance, a small number of well- organised united Romans and Arabs managed to transform their small and insignificant cities (Rome and Yathrib, later called Medina, respectively) into the capitals of great empires (1936 [1931], 109). Nevertheless, he insisted that disunity was the main reason for the collapse of the Arab powers, including the Fatimid (909-1171) (1936 [1931], 446),
the Ayyubids (1174-1250) (1936 [1931], 447), the Umayyad in Andalusia (931-1031) (1936 [1931], 441), and the Abbasids (750-1517) (1936 [1931], 379).

It is worth noting here that al-Miqdādī believed that Arab nationalist feeling is a natural result of the relationship between Arab individuals and the terrain, and he thought that the national feeling of the minorities living in the Arab states is a result of a colonial encouragement to spread divisive sentiments among the Arab world. For instance, he argued that French colonialism disseminated among the Berbers (Amazighen) the idea that they were the original inhabitants of North Africa and thus were a different nation from the Arabs, who were presented as newcomers from the desert (1936 [1931], 458). Based on this, for al-Miqdādī one of the lessons that can be learned from the past is to seek to integrate forcefully the minorities into the majority. One of the causes of the Arabs’ defeat in Spain was their reconciliation with the Spanish, who fled to the mountains, and the Arabs did not seek to integrate them (1936 [1931], 405).

Al-Miqdādī was eager to implant his vision in the minds of his students. For instance, Fadil Hussein, who became a well-known Iraqi historian, argued that al-Miqdādī asked him what he learnt from the study of Arab history and Hussein answered that, the Arabs were a great nation and had a great contribution to human civilization. So, it is possible for the Arabs to rise up and restore their great historic role (Hussein 1982, 245).

6.3.4 Images of the “Other”

Arab nationalists generally and al-Miqdādī in particular based their interpretations on the duality between Us and Them (see chapter 4). Unlike al-Kirmīlī, whose duality was based on the Chaldean or Assyrian link with the Western “Us” in opposition to the Arabs as Other, al-Miqdādī situated Arabs in opposition to colonial “Others”, the Persians, and the Romans. He therefore explained Arab history as an endless struggle between Arab Semitic people against the Other that inevitably ended from al-Miqdādī’s point of view with Arab victory.
6.3.4.1 The “malicious” Persians

Enmity between the Arabs and the Persians was a dominant theme in al-Miqdādī’s narrative. While the Persian hostility to the pre-Islamic Arabs was explicit and involved a direct clash and domination, this continuing enmity was transformed into implicit subversion within the Islamic Arab empire. For al-Miqdādī, the Persians’ hatred of the Arabs dated back to the pre-Islamic period. During the Sasanian period, the Arabs, according to al-Miqdādī, hated the Persians due to the large amount of taxes and the spread of the “obscene” Mazdak doctrine (for Mazdak see chapter 9). This hatred was facilitated by the Arab Muslim conquest of Mesopotamia (1936 [1931], 144).

Persian enmity towards the Arabs turned into subversion after the Arab Muslim conquest. Al-Miqdādī argued that after Persian defeat in al-Qādisiyyah and the occupation of their capital Ctesiphon by the Arabs, the Persians held a congress in Nahawand in which they discussed how to get revenge against the Arabs (1936 [1931], 171-2). Al-Miqdādī suggested that after the Persians realised that they could not defeat the Arab Muslims in a direct confrontation, they began to destroy the Arab Muslim power from within. Hitherto, any movements against the Arab Muslim domination were introduced as Persian conspiracies against the Arabs. For instance, Abdullah ibn Sabaʾ portrayed as a proponent of Persian culture (1936 [1931], 183). The Mawālī and Khawārij movements against the Arabs were considered to be Persian movements against the Arab power (183; 200-4). The Persian hostility to the Arabs, according to al-Miqdādī, reached its peak in the Abbasid period, in which the Barmakids, who were depicted as descendants of the Sasanians, imposed their hegemony over the Abbasid power in Baghdad and became one of the causes of the Abbasid dynasty’s failure (1936 [1931], 284).

12 To the Muslim Sunni tradition, Abdullah Ibn Sabaʾ was a Yemeni who convinced al-Mawla that Ali was the right successor of the Prophet, but the preceding Caliphs usurped this “legal right”. Ultimately, Sabaʾ led the rebellion against the third Caliph of Islam to ‘Uthman, which ultimately led to the latter’s death. On the other hand, the Shia tradition has cast doubt on the role of Sabaʾ in these events, and also they doubt whether he even existed.
6.3.4.2 The “greedy” Romans

For al-Miqdādī, ancient Roman imperialism was the consequence of a purely economic aim. According to him, the Arab cities in Arabia and the Levant, such as Petra (1936 [1931], 17), Palmyra (1936 [1931], 17), and Yemen (1936 [1931], 22), became great centres for an ancient trade route along which the people enjoyed a commercial boom. This dramatically increased their share in international trade. Consequently, these developments significantly motivated the ancient imperialist Romans and Byzantines to occupy the ‘Arab homeland’. The economic desires to dominate the international commercial networks were the case with ancient, medieval, and modern western imperialism as well, including the Byzantines’ aim to occupy Yemen (al-Miqdādī 1936 [1931], 22), the Crusades (al-Miqdādī 1936 [1931], 304-5), and modern European colonialism of the Arab world (al-Miqdādī 1936 [1931], 498). Nevertheless, al-Miqdādī argued that imperialism always hides its motivation under false claims of the defence of minorities, such as the Christians (al-Miqdādī 1936 [1931], 22).

Towards the end of his book, al-Miqdādī made an analogy between past and present Arabs under the colonial powers. The last chapter of History of the Arab Nation looks at “ignorance” and “awakening”. The general theme of this chapter is that the Arabs entered a stage of ignorance in the modern day due to their disunity, which implicitly paralleled with the al-Jāhiliyya (ignorance) before the coming of Islam. This ignorance facilitated, according to al-Miqdādī, the occupation of ‘the Arab homeland’ in the modern era by foreigners, including the Mongols from the East and the Crusaders or ‘barbarians’ from the West, as the region was occupied by Romans (al-Miqdādī 1936 [1931], 468) and other European powers such as the Portuguese, French, and English. These foreign occupations subjected the Arabs to a “long period of coma and ignorance” (al-Miqdādī 1936 [1931], 469).

13 For the Arab nationalists’ vision on the economic motivation role of imperialism, see Dawn (1988).
14 Al-Miqdādī believed that the era of Ottoman rule over the Arabs (1516-1798) was a period of ignorance in Arab history (1936 [1931], pp. 467-86).
A new vision of the Arabs’ *Al-Jāhiliyya* that contrasted with the traditional vision was one of the important features of al-Miqdādī’s discourse. Al-Miqdādī attempted to re-examine the traditional vision of the pre-Islamic Arabs, known among the Arab tradition as *Al-Jāhiliyya*, or ignorance. Al-Miqdādī emphasised the existence of an ancient Semitic-Arab civilization before Islam. Most of al-Miqdādī’s evidence comes from ancient Yemen. He argued that various historians considered the Arabs in the pre-Islamic period as decadent Bedouins because they did not manage to build states and neglected agriculture and trade. However, if we examine the history of Yemen, we find the opposite is true. The Arabs in Yemen succeeded in building states, and had kings who possessed ultimate authority, “organized the state, [and] their armies were used for reconstruction […] [and] they built cities, palaces and dams” (1936 [1931], 24).

Al-Miqdādī attempted to draw a secular image of the Arab woman by criticising the dominant vision of decadent and primitive Arab woman during *Al-Jāhiliyya*. He argued that women:

> “Enjoyed a great deal of freedom […] She had the right of choosing her husband. While her father did not impose a husband that she did not like, she had the right [to divorce] her husband”. (1936 [1931], 42; see Choueiri 2000, 36)

Throughout his narrative, al-Miqdādī consistently points to several Arab women whose role was portrayed as crucial in Arab history, such as Ḥalema and Shakela, who became queens of Petra (1936 [1931], 17). Ḥalema had a decisive role in the Ghassanids victory in 531 (1936 [1931], 29). In addition, he argued that the wearing of the veil is not an Arab tradition but rather was a Persian tradition spread among the Arabs during the Persian domination of power during the Abbasid period (1936 [1931], 318-9). Nevertheless, al-Miqdādī’s best example was Zenobia, the Queen of Palmyra (see chapter 10 for more on Zenobia). She served as a primordial heroine of Arab women in history. Al Miqdādī argued:
“After the death of her husband, she became Queen of Palmyra. She was famous for her courage, patriotism and her beauty [...] she had a strong body, wearing a helmet and shield, riding a horse and holding a sword. She led armies and fought against enemies. In addition to Arabic, she spoke Aramaic, Latin and Greek, [and] she personally directed the kingdom. This is Zenobia the heroine of the Arab desert who led her people to glory” (1936 [1931], 19).

Nevertheless, despite al-Miqdādī’s attempt to impose a secular picture on the pre-Islamic Arab woman he failed to go beyond the traditional vision of Arab women which focused on bravery rather than equality with men, and the narrative remained male domination.

6.4 Conclusion

Al-Miqdādī set out to make Iraq the centre of Arab nationalist propaganda from where it could be spread to the rest of the Arab world. He aimed to overcome Iraqi social fragmentation by incorporating other Iraqi identities into the sole pan-Arab nationalism, making it the dominant narrative of Iraq history. To achieve this goal, Iraqi educational pedagogy was the centre for Arab nationalism. It attempted not only to naturalise the Arab national identity but also to encourage the historians to narrate this grand narrative as the right narrative in the hopes of laying the foundation for the future generation of Arab nationalists. It aimed to pass to the next generation a sense that a moment in the distant past is still great and vital in the present. Moreover, the central message for al-Miqdādī was that the new Iraqi generation could or should play a central role in uniting the Arab nation. This might have had a link with al-Ḥuṣrī’s discourse which insisted that Iraq should play the same role of Prussia in unifying Germany (Murqus 1966, 19). It should be stressed here that despite the failure of Pan-Arab nationalism to achieve its political goal to unite the Arab world in one single state, nationalist discourse was able to continue for decades and inspire successive Iraqi and other generations of Arabs. Among the most significant examples is the rise of the Arab Socialist Ba’th Party
in Syria and Iraq (see chapter eight and eleven) in the first place and the narcissism in Egypt in the second half of the twentieth century.

Furthermore, the German tradition became a source for Iraqi historiography in two ways. First, Arab nationalism shifted from a liberal political vision to the German notion of cultural nationalism, which had a great impact on Iraqi historiography. At first, it produced an Iraq imbued with predetermined nationalism, which was a fundamental change from the nation based on the will of the people to a predetermined and unchangeable identity. Hitherto, for successive Iraqi regimes, identity has nothing to do with free will of people; rather it is predetermined. This led to the production of a generation of Iraqi politicians and scholars who represented their discourse as the eternal mission of the Arab world. Thus, they enforced what they saw as the absolute truth, or the only correct vision, as we shall see in Chapter eight. This vision was enhanced by the rise of the German Nazi propaganda, the second source of Arab nationalism. Nazi propaganda of the 1930s in the Middle East made a breakthrough into the Arab society. German diplomats such as Grobba and other Nazi propaganda materials (e.g., films, books, and pamphlets) in Iraq found sympathy within the Arab world (Schwanitz 2004). The idea of a pure or superior race became popular among the Iraqi writers and thus within Iraqi literature for the next generation, as we shall see later in Chapter eight in relation to the Ba'athist regime. Nevertheless, the militarisation of young Iraqi pupils occurred through the use of pedagogical textbooks in schools.
Chapter Seven: Professional historiography: Jawad ‘Ali

In 1886, the King of Sweden and Norway, Oscar II (1872-1907), announced two prizes: one on the history of the Semitic languages, and another on the history of the pre-Islamic Arab civilizations. However, none of the contemporary Orientalists was entirely able to meet the conditions of the awards. The only work considered worthy of honourable mention was that of an Iraqi scholar, Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi, who studied in an Islamic religious school and who received a gold medal and the Order of Wasa from King Oscar in 1889 (Trübner’s Record 1889). Al-Alusi’s work was ahead of its time in terms of its style and the range of the historical detail, yet his approach remained religious in content and contained an undefined Arab self-awareness.

In January 1922, the daily al-‘Iraq newspaper reported that the “Iraqi nation needed professionals more than food” (cited in Bashkin 2012, 17). For the Iraqis at that time, a professional was defined as an intellectual who was educated in a state school; non-religious institution. Or who could work for the government sector. A lack of such professionals prompted the Iraqi government to accelerate the opening of modern schools, and in 1922 they founded Dar al-mu’alamin al-Alya’, the Higher Teachers’ College (HTC). History became an essential part of the curriculum of the HTC, with four out of 11 subjects addressing this discipline: modern history, natural history, urban history, and Arab and Islamic history (al-Mufrijī 2012). Students who graduated from this school obtained a qualification that equated to the Bachelor of Arts. It is worth mentioning here that this institution was proposed and directed by Sati’ al-Ḥuṣrī, who believed that the main duty of intellectuals was to support the pan-Arabism project (al-Ḥuṣrī, 1967, 1:38). In parallel with this development, the Iraqi monarchy began to sponsor Iraqi students in 1921 to continue their higher education in institutions of the Western tradition, including: AUB in Lebanon, and also in overseas institutions, including in the USA, Great Britain, and Germany. Notably, German institutions were favoured by

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1 Oscar II was dethroned from Norway in 1905.
al-Ḥuṣrī more than the others, and as such he encouraged Iraqi candidates to enrol in them (Makkīyah 2005). Consequently, several Iraqis joined German academic institutions, including Jawad ʿAlī, the subject of this chapter. The return of these Western-trained Iraqi scholars, with their qualifications in different subjects, encouraged the Iraqi monarchy to go one step further by opening several colleges in Iraq, including the College of Art and Science (CAS) in 1949, which later became the nucleus of the University of Baghdad (al-Ḥuṣrī 1951, 219-220; Mahmood 2013, 425).

During the 1940s, a radical change took place in Iraqi historiography, as it was gradually transformed from the traditional way of writing history into a professional discipline. Eventually, these efforts bore fruit, as the Iraqi intellectuals who trained overseas began to return home. Scholars such as Abdul Aziz al-Dūrī (1919-2010), who graduated from the University of London in 1942, Saleh Ahmed al-ʿAlī (1918-2003), who graduated from the University of Oxford in 1949, and Jawād ʿAlī (1907-1987), who graduated from the University of Hamburg in 1939, had a greater impact on Iraqi historiography and on the Arab world as well (Kawtharani 2013, 127-128; al Kaabi 2011, 13). Al-Dūrī, for instance, became the first Dean of CAS, whereas al-ʿAlī became an active member of the history department. Both were interested in exploring the social and economic dimension of Arab and Iraqi Islamic history (Choueiri 2011, 498), whereas Jawād ʿAlī was more preoccupied with pre-Islamic history, as will be explored throughout this chapter. The fundamental differences between these Iraqi pioneer scholars was that; while al-Dūrī and al-ʿAlī were more interested in analysing the social and economic structure of Arab Muslim history, ʿAlī was interested in presenting the past Arab history as “it actually happened”; in other words, ʿAlī was concerned with what and how things happened in the first place rather than why they happened.

In addition, during this period the CAS invited several well-known historians from western institutions such as Steven Runciman (1903-2000) and Desmond Stewart

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2 This trend included many other prominent Iraqi scholars such as Taha Bāqir and Fuʿād Safar in Archaeology and Ancient History, ʿAlīal-Wardī’ in Sociology, and Kamāl Muʿtahar Ahmed in Modern Iraq History.

3 For readers attention, please note that al-ʿAlī and ʿAlī are two different Iraqi historians.
(1924–81), who helped to advance historical writing (Mahmood 2013, 425). All these developments facilitated the birth of a modern professional Iraqi historiography that freed itself to a great extent, of course not entirely, from the domination of a theological interpretation of history. However, when professional institutions with their professional scholars became a locus of power, which might undermine the state ideological vision, the state power, especially since the rise of Baʿthist to power, began to enforce its vision on these developments. Hitherto, professionalization became part of power’s “tool bag”. Thus, while Iraqi historiography was developing, even with soft political pressure during the Iraqi monarchy, later Iraqi governments began to block this professionalization as we shall see during the Baʿthist period in the next chapter (Gran 1996, 75).

7.1 The life and career of Jawād ʿAlī

ʿAlī’s social and educational background seems to have been a rare case among Iraqi scholars of his time. While he descended from a middle-class Shiʿite family and was raised in the mainly Shiʿite community in Kāzimiyā city in Baghdad, he married a Sunni woman (al-Maṭbaʿi 1994, 1:47; al-ʿUbaydī 2011) and studied at the College of al-Imām Abū Ḥanīfah Nuʿman, which was a Sunni Islamic school. Additionally, ʿAlī was taught by a Sunni scholar, Mouhamed al-Athārī, and later studied at the HTC (al-Maṭbaʿi 1995, 1:47) under pan-Arab nationalists such as ʿṢāṭiʿ al-Ḥusnā and Nājī al-ʿAṣīl (al-Kaʿbī 2011, 1:23). On the other hand, he spent seven years in Germany (1933-1939) during the rise of Naziest. Finally, he ended his educational journey in the Western liberal institutions of the United States and the United Kingdom. All of these influences left an imprint on his vision and publications. Thus, his thought was a product of the knowledge accumulation from many different and often contradictory intellectual origins, including Shiʿism, Sunnism, secularism, cultural nationalism, and Western liberalism.

Jawād ʿAlī, who was to emerge as one of the most prominent Arab historians of the twentieth century, was born in Kāzimiyā, Baghdad in 1907. He was educated at the College of al-Imām Abū Ḥanīfah al-Nuʿmān and then completed his studies at HTC (al-
Maṭbaʽī 1994, 1:47). After graduating in 1931, he became a teacher in a secondary school and soon received a scholarship to study history in Germany. ‘Alī went to the University of Hamburg due to the presence of a number of German specialists in ancient Iraqi history, who had left Berlin due to their opposition to Hitler’s policy (Ibn Şirāy 2011, 17). ‘Alī conducted his PhD under the supervision of German Orientalist Rudolf Strothmann (1877-1960), who was “considered an expert on Shi‘ism” (Hartmann 1981). ‘Alī’s thesis, entitled “al-Mahdī wa Sufarā’h al-arba‘ah” [al-Mahdi and his four ambassadors], examined the main pillar of the Shi‘ite doctrine, al-Imamia [1939]. The main aim of his thesis, as he argued, was to distinguish between myth and the historical facts of early Shi‘a history (‘Alī 2007 [1939], 5). During his stay in Germany, he wrote for number of Iraqi newspapers that allowed him to attend one of Hitler’s press conferences (al-Ka‘bī 2011, 1:29). Whilst he unfortunately did not mention where he published his report, it was viewed by al-Maṭbaʽī, who had an interview with ‘Alī, as a criticism of the Nazi vision of nationalism (al-Maṭbaʽī 2010). During his study in Germany, ‘Alī also studied ancient languages, including Greek, Latin, and ancient Semitic tongues (al-Ka‘bī 2011, 1:27). His knowledge of these languages, along with German and English, enabled him to trace Arab history through primary sources using different modern perspectives.

‘Alī’s return to Iraq coincided with the anti-British coup of 1941. His first and last direct participation in politics, according to himself, was his support of this coup (Ibn Şirāy 2011, 19). After its failure, he was arrested and sent to prison (al-Maṭbaʽī 1995, 1:47), and upon his release became an active scholar within the Iraqi community of historians. By the end of the 1940s, he was chosen as the Secretary of Authoring, Translation, and Publishing in the Iraqi Ministry of Education (al-Maṭbaʽī 1994, 1:47; al-Mada 13/01/2010), and he later helped to find the Iraqi Academy of Sciences, going on to become its General Secretary 1950. In addition, ‘Alī became a staff member in the department of history at the Faculty of Education at the University of Baghdad until his retirement in 1972. In the 1957-8 academic year, he was appointed as a visiting professor at the Centre for Middle East Studies at the University of Harvard, and then in 1962 at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, which familiarised him with Anglophone studies of Arab history (al-Ka‘bī 2011, 1:26-7).
During his long career, ’Alī published about fifty works. His first publication was al-Tārīkh al-ʿāmm (1927) [The General History], which he wrote when he was no more than 20 years old. Subsequent works included Tārīkh al-ʿArab fī al-Islām (1961) [History of the Arabs in Islam] and Tārīkh al-ṣalāh fī al-Islām (1968) [History of Prayer in Islam], which are among the best works of early Islamic history of its time. However, he became famous for his two-seminal monographs Tārīkh al-ʿArab qabl al-Islām (1950-1959, eight volumes) [History of the Arabs before Islam; henceforth The History] and al-Mufaṣṣal fī Tārīkh al-ʿArab qabla al-Islām (1968-1974, ten volumes, reprinted in 1994) [Detailed History of the Arabs before Islam; henceforth The Detailed History], which are the focus of this chapter.

7.2 The History: organisation and approach

By the early 1950s, ’Alī had begun to publish his multi-volume The History. Despite the fact that this work was described as the best and most important contribution to its discipline (Darwazah 1959, 1:21), within a decade of its completion, ’Alī chose to expand on it in The Detailed History. The fact that this chapter begins with The History rather than The Detailed History is because the aim is to trace the impact of the late monarchy’s political context on Iraqi historiography and also to trace the change in ’Alī’s vision when he published The Detailed History under the first Iraqi republic, and after his interaction with the Anglophone tradition.

The importance of this work for this chapter is because it remains today one of the most important professional works in Iraqi historiography, and deals with the history of the pre-Islamic Arabs. However, most of those who studied the developments of the Iraqi and Arab historiography, despite their tremendous impact on the Arab tradition, have marginalised, if not completely ignored, ‘Alī’s The History and Detailed The History altogether (e.g., Choueiri 2000; Choueiri 2011; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1991; Bashkin 2009).
7.2.1 Organisation

The History is divided into eight volumes: the first four of which are devoted to the political history of the pre-Islamic Arabs; the fifth and the sixth volumes are devoted to the pre-Islamic religions; the seventh volume focuses on the pre-Islamic Arabic languages; the eighth and last volume is devoted to pre-Islamic society and culture. In the introduction to the first volume, ‘Alī points out that he had begun his project on the pre-Islamic Arabs while he was at the University of Hamburg in 1936, and he completed the draft in 1950 (1:3).

Ali presented a contradicted vision on the orientalists works on the Arab history. According to ‘Alī, the Orientalists applied the methods and theories of modern research to the sources of pre-Islamic history, which then opened wide horizons in its study (1950, 1:72-3). For ‘Alī, these “studies burden the Orientalists’ great efforts at times, [as] it was not easy for Europeans to travel in the Arabian desert to obtain inscriptions” (1950, 1:11). This point of view on Orientalists’ studies were altered dramatically when ‘Alī began to explore western studies on the Islamic history, and became even more critical when he published his work on Islamic history (see below).

What distinguishes ‘Alī’s work from traditional Iraqi historiography is his use of a wide range of primary sources, a critical engagement with his sources, and an extensive use of footnotes. In addition to sources from Iraq, ‘Alī’s study in Germany also enabled him to access many primary sources that were not available to his peers at home. This enabled him to examine past events from different angles – first offering a narrative chronological account, and then exploring a range of socio-cultural themes. One of the most important criteria of professional historical writings for ‘Alī was the exposition of source-criticism as an essential part of writing history. Nevertheless, the “truth of the past” is obtainable for ‘Alī, but extraction of the truth from sources needs to follow a certain method and employ critical skills (al-Dūrī 2010). In addition, ‘Alī was very cautious not to accept any statement, even if it was a first-hand observation, such as Strabo’s narrative of Aulius Gallus’s campaign in the Yemen. This is evident by statements such as “the source[s] that are available do not allow us to make a decisive
statement” are ubiquitous (1954, 2:400; 403). Furthermore, unlike contemporary Iraqi historians, 'Alî was less keen to use the past as an ideological tool, and so he attempted to disentangle the discipline of history from the political purposes.

Despite all this, 'Alî’s work raised several concerns. One of the main issues with The History is that 'Alî argued from the beginning that due to a lack of funds available, he could not add to the bibliographic list, however he would publish it in a separate volume (1950, 1:4). In the second volume, he came back to this point and stated that the bibliography would be added to Volume Four (1952, 2:5). However, this did not happen, and the bibliography was still missing even when The History was expanded into The Detailed History in the 1960s, and as such the work still lacks a bibliography (for more on The Detailed History, see next section). Lack of the bibliography was raised doubts about credibility of originality of Ali’s work. For instance, in his review of The Detailed History, Khalid al-'Asalî suggested that the absence of the bibliography was the result of 'Alî having copied several primary sources from modern works without referring to the original texts (1980, 459-60). 'Alî was alive when al-'Asalî published his review, but to the best of my knowledge the author did not respond to this criticism. Nevertheless, it is difficult to suggest a definitive reason as to why 'Alî did not address this limitation, especially when he argued that the work was aimed at specialist readers (1950, 1:4), and this has raised notable doubts about the originality of his work.

7.2.2 Approach

Like many Arab historians, 'Alî followed Ranke’s ideal of objectivity (al-'Allâf 2010; Taha 2010). This vision was generated from 'Alî’s argument that writing history primarily depends on documents because they are the most valuable record of the past. But because these documents contain conscious and unconscious errors and distortions, historians must examine them in a manner akin to a “a man in a laboratory” in order to extract the original elements to show the falsely composed records ('Alî 1983 [1961], 9). The importance of documents and acting similar to the scientist in a lab was the main concern of 'Alî and had a clear impact on his approach (al-Maṭba‘î 1984). In the History
of Arabs through Islam (1961), ‘Alī argued that his method was the same as that of The History, as described as follows:

“Draw the past [narrative] as cemented in my mind, and settled in my understanding, and demonstrate in my mind and clarify it as much as possible without adding to or diminishing it. And avoid expressing personal opinion or giving verdicts, as history, in my opinion, is to draw the past, to diagnose and display non-partisanship or bigotry and not to express an opinion [...] leaving sentences ordered to readers, to make their views as they see and they desire and as they reached their belief of their reading of the subject”. (‘Alī 1983 [1961], 36)

However, ‘Alī’s later interaction with the Anglophone tradition in the United States and Great Britain had an impact on his vision. He began to take into consideration the impact that the socio-political context had on the content. ‘Alī identified two factors that influence historians’ writing, the first of which is their social background. ‘Alī argued that all writing is biased because historians have specific emotions and they cannot remove themselves from their own context. This can be conscious or unconscious and it depends on the context and its power (‘Alī 1983 [1961], 9). The second factor that impacted historians was the “power of public opinion”. ‘Alī believed that historians have to admit that they are often subjected to the power of public opinion. Historians are obliged by virtue of their locus in a social context to take into account public opinion to not be hated. Historians are thus forced to “go through sensitive topics lightly, or without critical presentation that may contradict public opinion” (‘Alī 1983 [1961], 14).

As with Ranke, ‘Alī’s objectivity failed in achieving the “impersonality” that he strove for and claimed to provide (as we shall see in this chapter). ‘Alī argued in favour of the above-mentioned two factors in all aspects of historical writing, but the fact that he lived through a terrible period of Iraqi history (see chapter three) shows that he was cautious in his interpretations of the past, especially when the past in question was politicised to justify the agenda of the Iraqi political elite. When he was asked about the topic of his doctoral thesis in an interview, during the Ba’thist period, ‘Alī argued that it was on
Abraha’s campaign to Mecca in 582/3 CE (al-Rammāḥī 1978). This answer is clearly an indication that ʿAlī sought to avoid any conflict with the dominant Sunni power, because Abraha’s campaign predated Islam and his thesis had actually been on the Shi‘a doctrine. In addition, when one of his Shi‘a students, Ḥusayn Issa al-Hakim,⁴ asked him why he had not translated his thesis, which was originally written in German, into Arabic, ʿAlī answered that “if he translates his thesis, he will be misunderstood” (al-Hakim 2010).

Despite his attempts to avoid bias, ʿAlī’s social and educational background had a fundamental impact on his vision, whether consciously or unconsciously. He did not support pan-Arabism yet remained within the orbit of Arab nationalism. An important distinction exists between the two, because even though it may seem as if the differences between these two visions are much nuanced, they are in fact notable. Pan-Arabism, as discussed earlier in this thesis, was a particular political ideology that attempted to create a united Arab state from the fragmented Arab nations. Most of the Arab unification project of the twentieth century was associated with attempting this vision, and language and culture were pivotal (see Chapter 5).

In contrast, Arab nationalism is more concerned with an individual (and local) Arab state. For this vision of Arab identity, language and culture are two key elements, as with pan-Arabism, but Islam is added as a third pillar. More importantly, Arab nationalism does not claim that the Arab states should join together to form a single political state. While pan-Arabism was developed by Christian and Muslim Arab scholars, such as Michel ‘Aflaq (the founder of Ba‘athism but Christian by birth) and Satī’ al-Ḥuşrī (see Chapter 6), Arab nationalism was developed only the Arab Muslim scholars, who mostly had a religious background, such as ʿAbdul Rahman al Kawākibī. Nevertheless, Arab nationalism is almost invisible within modern historiography and has been mixed with national patriotism such as Iraqi patriotism.

⁴ Al-Hakim is one of the most famous Iraqi Shia families, and includes Ammar al-Hakim who leads the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. Furthermore, Al-Hakim’s Facebook page clearly suggests his Shia background.
7.3 The interaction between politics and history in ‘Ali’s *The History*

Objectivity was the aim of ‘Ali, yet Islam and Arab nationalism were fundamental elements from which he was unable to free himself. Thus, throughout his works, either in the pre-Islamic or Islamic era, ‘Ali committed himself to defending the Islamic perspective of the History. Even when he lacked enthusiasm for pan-Arabism, he remained convinced that Islam and the nation were the axis of the Arab history.

7.3.1 ‘Ali’s characterisation of Arab identity

‘Ali’s hypothesis on the origin of the Arab identity before and during the early Islamic period differs between the first and the second volumes of *The History*, with one contradicting the other. In the first volume, ‘Ali examined the emergence of the term ‘r-b (Arab) and its derivatives by using an extensive range of sources from different ancient languages, including Assyrian (1950, 1:169-70), Babylonian (1950, 1:170), Hebrew (1950, 1:171-6), Greek and Latin (1950, 1:176-182), Iranian (1950, 1:182), Aramaic (1950, 1:182-3), South Arabic (1950, 1:183), and North Arabic (1950, 1:183-4).

‘Ali claimed that none of these traditions used the term ‘Arab’ to refer to a distinctive ethnic group, but rather it was used by most of them in relation to the Bedouin lifestyle. Moreover, ‘Ali points out that there is no Arabic text from the pre-Islamic period that can shed light on when the Arabs themselves started using this term to refer to their distinctive ethnic group, incorporating the Bedouins and urban people simultaneously (1:1950, 184), or used as a common noun to distinguish them from the other ethnic groups (1:1950, 184). The only mention of the term “Arab” in an Arabic text, according to ‘Ali, is the Namārā inscription (fourth century BCE), which again referred to the Bedouins’ lifestyle: “the urban population used the term [the Bedouin] ‘Arabs’ [plural] and Ar. ‘Arabi’ [singular] [meaning] individuals in the sense that [they are] not from the urban population” (‘Ali 1950, 1:184).

Eventually, ‘Ali pointed out that the first text in Arabic to use the term ‘Arab’ to refer to a distinctive group of people, and which “cannot be doubted nor conjectured”, was the Quran (‘Ali 1950, 1:184). The Holy Quran uses the term ‘Arab’ to refer specifically to an
ethnic group, which ‘Alī interpreted as “evidence of the existence of [Arab] national consciousness prior to Islam” (1950, 1:185). It should be noted here that ‘Alī very carefully used the Arabic word Ar. qubaila, which can be interpreted as the ‘immediate past’ or ‘shortly before’, rather than the word Ar. qabla, which means ‘before’ but with no specific period of time in the distant past. Thus, what can be understood from ‘Alī’s discussion is that the usage of the term ‘Arab’ to refer to an ethnic identity does not precede the second half of the sixth century, as no evidence exists in ancient textual traditions or in the Quran.

‘Alī’s work experienced external pressures from the dominant political ideology of the time. A famous dispute in 1927 occurred between al-Ḥusṣrī and the Iraqi poet al-Jāwahiri, who wrote a few lines admiring Iran and the Iranian landscape. As a result of this poem, al-Jāwahiri was dismissed from his educational position by al-Ḥusṣrī, who accused al-Jāwahiri of being Sh’uubī and loyal to Iran.5 ‘Alī himself was aware of such power, and called it implicitly the “power of public opinion” with an indication to the political powers, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Nevertheless, ‘Alī was stigmatised by the pan-Arab nationalists as hatib al-Lāil, the night woodcutter (al-Matba‘ī 2010; al-Mada 2010), an Arabic idiom used to refer to an individual who, by cutting wood at night, endangers himself because he might grab a snake instead of wood. Similarly, it was applied to scholars who took on more than they could bear, to the extent that their work – like the snake – could kill them (Ibn al-Ja‘d 1(d) appx 751-845, 520).

Thus, despite ‘Alī’s logical discussion of the term ‘Arab’ in the first volume of The History, he returned to the Arab identity argument in the second volume, in a place that seems a little odd to discuss Arab identity, and asserted that he would identify Arabs as a distinctive ethnic group:

5 Al-Ḥusṣrī insisted on the dismissal of al-Jāwahiri despite the intervention of King Faisal I (al-Ḥusṣrī 1967, 1:590; see also al-Allawi 2014, 493; Bashkin 2009, 170). Despite the fact that al-Jāwahiri left Iraq during the Ba‘thist period, the charge of Iranian dependency has been made against his descendants, many of whom have been deprived Iraqi citizenship (al-Jāwahiri 2008). This might be the most famous case, however there are many other instances of Iraqi scholars from a Shia background who were accused of Iranian loyalty or attempting to undermine the Arab identity of Iraq (al-Ḥusṣrī 1967, 1:585-590).
“I will use the term Arab in this book [History] for all inhabitants of Arabia, the urban and Bedouin people, regardless of where they lived and what dialects they spoke. All of those, in my point of view, were Arabs even if their lifestyles varied or they had different dialects. From my point of view, this term is the best to name the population of Arabia, and to distinguish them from the other nations [...] we have seen that Muslim historians utilized this term for all tribes and clans regardless of their dialects [...] [and so] it behoves us to do the same and utilize this term for the inhabitants of Arabia, the Levant, and Iraq before Islam” (ʿAlī 1952, 2:277, emphasis added).

ʿAlī’s “new” formulation of the pre-Islamic Arab ethnic identity reveals his consideration and the pressure of pan Arab nationalist discourse, especially as he came from a Shiʿi background. According to al-Ḥuṣrī, the definition of Arab identity is anyone who has an “Arabic tongue and belongs to the Arab people”, and that even if a person was “ignorant, oblivious, impious, a traitor, or he probably lost his conscience, he was still an Arab” (al-Ḥuṣrī 1951, 65-6).

Thus, to avoid a conflict with what ʿAlī called the powerful public opinion, he began to incorporate all the ancient languages that emerged in Arabia under the Arabic umbrella. In the second volume of The History, which was published one year after al-Ḥuṣrī (1951), ʿAlī suggested that

“From my point of view, all dialects of Arabia are Arabic even if they were different and varied, such as Minaeans, Sabaeans, Qataban [...]. No, I would say more than this, I would say [...] every other dialect that might be found in the future in Arabia is an Arabic dialect, even if it differs from Arabic and other Arabic dialects which we considered Arabic. The term ‘Arabs’ – used as identifications [for an ethnic group] – appeared prior to Christ or after [...] So do we turn blind eyes on who dwelled and lived Arabia and gave birth

6 For the use of the term ‘Arab’ by the Muslim historians, see Chapter Two.
before Christ? Do we not talk about them, either positively or negatively? [Just] because they lived before the emergence of this new term? Were neither they nor their predecessors ‘Arabs’? Is there no relation between them and those born after them? [...] do we talk about them as ‘Ajam [non-Arab] even if they lived in Arabia? And do we not call them Arabs just because they did not reach the era of the ‘Arabs’? Do they not deserve the honour of becoming ‘Arab’, nor to inter in the Arab nation? [...] As I said, I never say that and I do not believe that. I believe that there were different dialects in Arabia and we may find new dialectics [see p 122]. But from my point of view they were Arabic, because they were written in the land that germinated Arabic [...] I will consider all texts will reach us whatever it is different language from the language of the Holy Quran, and whatever it diverges for Christ or the advent of Islam, it is an Arabic text as long as the origin of the population is Arabia”. (ʿAlī 1952, 2:280, emphasis added)

The first point to note is that this paragraph was written as an answer and self-defence rather than as a scholarly argument. Further, the vision that ʿAlī provided is consistent with pan-Arab nationalism rather than with an objective scholarly vision. ʿAlī himself claimed that an objective methodology means not imposing a coercive vision of the interpretation of history, generated from an ideological purpose (Taha 2010). But because Iraqi society of the mid-twentieth century was politicised and extremely polarised, ʿAlī had to adopt a vision that adhered to the dominant one. Thus, even when ʿAlī attempted and claimed the necessity of disentangling history as a discipline from the political usage, he could not go too far beyond the line that the socio-political environment had drawn. This presented a critical challenge to the readers of ʿAlī, who had to distinguish between his attempts at objectivity and impersonality, his social and scholarly background, and political pressure.
7.3.2 The image of the Others in ‘Ali’s The History

7.3.2.1 The Greeks and Romans

Several themes controlled ‘Ali’s perception of the Greek and Roman relationships with the Arabs. One such view was that the Arab world was a victim of Western colonial powers, since it was Alexander who attempted to dominate the Arab world due to economic motivations. In addition, while pre-Islamic Arab historiography was of significant interest to Western scholars, the Arab Islamic historiography suffered as a result of scholarly bias towards Judaism and Christianity.

For al-Miqdādī (1936[1931]), Iraq was surrounded on both sides by antagonistic forces, yet for ‘Ali it was only the Western colonials that were a hostile force, starting with the Greeks (and Alexander) and Romans, all the way to the Portuguese, British, and French:

“Alexander’s conquests were a dangerous chapter in humanity’s history book. We read the convergence between the West and the East, face-to-face in a wide area in this world, and the western tendency to occupy the east” (‘Alī 1952, 2:374).

The Western imperial tendency, as ‘Alī argued, resulted from economic desire. Similarly, with the Arab nationalists who “all agreed” (Dawn 1988, 17) that imperialism was economically motivated (see Chapter Six), and ‘Alī claimed it was the wealth of Arabia that attracted the Western powers throughout history. For ‘Alī, Arabia was the strategic centre of the international trade route, with the east shore connecting the Persian Gulf to the western shore of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, which “was and remains a major artery in world trade” (1952, 2:370). For ‘Alī, the desire to control this trade route led the Western powers, from Alexander the Great onwards, to draw different projects in order to occupy Arabia. For instance, he argued that Alexander was neither motivated by the disinterest of the Arab tribes nor his attempts to be the third Arab God, as a contemporary historian of Alexander had argued, but rather his attempt to occupy Arabia was the result of “the news [...] of wealthy Arabia and its importance in world
trade”, which led him to believe that “without the annexation of Arabia his empire [would not be] incomplete” (1952, 2:370-2). Despite the fact that Alexander failed to occupy Arabia, for Ṭʿalī, Alexander became the pioneer of such colonial attempts, and thus first taught the Westerners how to attempt to control the Orient (1959, 8:76).

According to Ṭʿalī, Subsequent for Western leaders attempted to complete Alexander’s colonial project. The Roman emperor Augustus (63 BCE-CE 14), for instance, attempted to occupy Arabia by sending an unsuccessful campaign, led by Aelius Gallus, to occupy Yemen after hearing that the region was “wealthy and their people hoarded gold and silver” (1952, 2:385). Later powers such as the Portuguese, French, and British sought to acquire strategic centres in the Arabian Peninsula to secure their trade routes, and they did not accept any competition even from other Western countries (ʿAlī 1952, 2:371-7).

On the other hand, Ṭʿalī argued the East did not take the Western imperialist tendency into consideration and they exaggerated their hospitality to foreigners even when it was not in the nation’s best interests to do so (1953, 3:94). Western projects were always taking advantage of the disunity between the Arabs. For instance, Ṭʿalī argued that Aelius Gallus’s campaign in Yemen seized the opportunity to advance and expand from Nabataean guides, taking advantage of the conflict that was occurring between the leaders. Nevertheless, if the Arabs stood together against the invaders (e.g., if the Nabataeans had joined with the other Arabs to oppose the Roman invasion), then the Romans would never have been able to advance in their campaign (1952, 2:399). In addition, the Lakhmids and Ghassanids participated in the conflict between the Sasanians and the Romans, and were allied with those empires:

“This conflict rooted in mind of these Arab’s kings [al-Mundhir III 503/5-554 and al-Harith V, 529-569]. Such enmity became more aggression than the hostility between the Romans and the Persians themselves, although they [Lakhmids and Ghassanids] were from one [Arab] origin and they do not have any benefit in such hostility, they only served these powers who look for their interest and nobody else”. (ʿAlī 1954, 4:144)
Like many Arab historians who were active before Said published *Orientalism* (1978), 'Alī did not consider classical or modern Western intellectuals as part of “colonial project” as Said (1978) claimed (see Chapter 4). The appreciation of the western classicists is ubiquitous in all *The History’s* volumes (1957, 7:189). Their work, according to 'Alī, added a lot to the knowledge of pre-Islamic Arab history, and without Greco-Roman literary texts many accounts on the pre-Islamic Arabs would have been lost (1950, 1:35; 3:275). On many occasions, 'Alī repeats that without the classical writers such as Herodotus, Strabo, Pliny, and many others, most of the pre-Islamic history would have been lost (1950, 1:26-9; 1953, 3:275). Similarly, the Western classicists were further appreciated because without them, the translation of pre-Islamic inscriptions would not have occurred (1950, 1:72-85). Nevertheless, 'Alī criticises the Arab scholars who did not advance the study of the ancient history of their nation, which remained the burden of western scholars, some of whom lost their life in the arid Arab deserts whilst attempting to explore ancient cities and Arab history. 'Alī proposed a constructive image of the western classicists, yet such a portrayal began to change within Iraq from the 1980s onwards as a result of intense politicization of the History on the one hand, and the use of Said’s *Orientalism*. This will be explored in more detail in Chapters Eight and eleven.

### 7.3.2.2 The “Persians” in 'Alī’s *The History*

'Alī was uninterested in the representation of the Iranian. The image of Iranian in Iraqi pan-Arabism is always associated with the events: the Sasanian king Shapur II’s (309-379) campaign against the Arabs, Nu‘mān and his relationships with Khusrow Paruiz, and the Battle of Dhī Qār (see Chapters 6, and 8). Through these events, the “Persians” were depicted as fanatical and the historical enemy of the Arab nation. However, for 'Alī the representation of the Persians was fundamentally different.

Unlike the pan-Arab nationalists, 'Alī argued that Shapur II’s campaign (325 CE) against the Arabs resulted from Arabs who decided to graze their cattle within the Sasanian boundaries (1954, 4:34). Nevertheless, the discussion of this campaign lacked any
reference to the deep hatred that the Iranians felt towards the Arabs. Instead, ʿAlī argued that after the campaign, Shapur II was reconciled with the Arabs and settled them in other areas (1954, 4:34). The significance of ʿAlī’s argument is that it indicates the Sasanian superiority over the Arabs, who were depicted as weaker than the Sasanian campaign, with a complete absence of any Arab ethnic awareness in opposition to the Persians. Moreover, ʿAlī narrated a meeting between the Sasanian king Kavadh II with the head of the Arab Kinda tribe, al-Harith. Within this discussion, the Sasanian king referred to Arabs who raid over the Sasanian border as “thieves who committed [an] unprecedented [crime]”, to which al-Harith replied by denying his own participation in such “crime” and calling those who did “Arab thieves”, adding that he could not regulate Arabs without money and weapons (1954, 4:70). The main difference here is that for most of the pan-Arab nationalists, the Arabs who raid over the Sasanian border were almost always depicted as Arab heroes, who defended the “Arabs nation” in Iraq, against the Sasanian occupier (see Chapter Eight). Nevertheless, from ʿAlī’s point of view, the Sasanian king Bahram, who spent his childhood in al-Ḥīra, was taught by a Persian philosopher, while such a philosopher was completely dismissed by other Iraqi scholars (1954, 4:43).

In a similar way, the cause of the Battle of Dhī Qār (early 7th century) and its consequences were not depicted as evidence of pre-Islamic Arab national awareness against the Persians. For most of the pan-Arabism advocates, the Battle of Dhī Qār was depicted as showing Arab self-awareness prior to the rise of Islam, and in addition it presented as an episode in the chain of Arab-Persian confrontations that facilitated the eventual conquest of Mesopotamia by the Arab Muslims. In contrast, ʿAlī completely ignored one of the Arab Muslim narratives in which the anger of the Sasanian king Khusrow towards the Arab king of Ḥīra, Nuʿmān, was due to the latter’s refusal to give his daughter in marriage to the Sasanian nobles and insulting Persian women (see Chapter 9). Consequently, Khusrow sent an army against the Arabs, who were able to

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7 As we shall see in chapter (8) this campaign became a source of invented images of the Iranian enmity to the Arabs.
defeat it. Instead, ʿAlī referenced another narrative that indicated that the killing of Nuʿmān resulted from an inter-Arab conspiracy (4:87-8). Ultimately, ʿAlī argued that all these narratives are “suitable to be the subject of a movie that mixes history with imagination” (1954, 4:89). Thus, for ʿAlī the importance of these narratives for modern historians is that “the king of Ḥīra was imprisoned and then killed by the Sasanian king, which led the Arabs to disobey the Sasanians” (4:89). Most of ʿAlī’s word choices in this sentence, including ‘disobey’, are rare in Iraqi historiography on this event. Thus, for most of *The History*, the Iranians are represented in a way that does not show any prejudice, hatred, or stereotypical images. Furthermore, ʿAlī used the terms ‘Persian Gulf’ or ‘Basra Gulf’ (2:337, 374; 8:114) rather than the Arab nationalists’ favoured term, ‘the Arabian Gulf’, which also represents a contrast with the ancient sources of the term. It can be argued that ʿAlī’s disinterested in the Persian relationship with the Arabs was not the result of Shiʿa loyalty towards Iran, but rather a historian’s point of view.

Ali was conscious of the fact that professional historiography requires use of all the sources available. His professional background in modern western languages enabled him to include different sources with different perspectives. He also was aware that the cultural context had to be considered in order to be able to analyse and interpret different sources. He took efforts to employ different types of sources such as inscriptions, coins, and architectural evidence. Among his main sources were inscriptions discovered in Arabia and the fertile crescent, which Ali divided them into two groups: non-Arabic inscriptions (Assyrian, and Babylonian), and Arabic (with different dialects such as Nabataean, Safaitic, Taymanitic and South Arabian inscriptions).

Textual sources were among the other used by Ali. He used classical Greek and Roman literary, which he described as the very important source for pre-Islamic history (1-25) including Aeschylus, Herodotus, Diodorus Siculus and Strabo. He also used the Old Testament and Hebrew inscriptions. Ali, also, extensively used classical Islamic sources, such as Ibn al-Athīr, al-Isfahānī, al-Masʿūdī and al-Ṭabarī. Ali argued that the pre-Islamic narrative was transmitted orally into the classical Islamic sources, which can be divided into two types. First is what he called the *far ancient Jāhiliyya* narrative. He criticized
the Islamic historians who accepted these sources without question, including the worst bits of khurāfa, superstition or fairy tale. The second type of the pre-Islamic narrative within Islamic sources is what he called the narrative of the close period to rise of Islam. This type according to Ali is more reliable from the previous.

Within secondary sources Ali used some modern Arabic material such as Jūrjī Zaydān, Lewies Shikho and Taha Baqir. Finally, modern western sources, including English, French and particularly German publications, such as Altheim and Stiehl 1965, *Die Araber in der alten Welt*; and Glaser, E, 1890, Grohmann A, *Arabien Kulturgeschichte des Alten Orients*.

7.4 From the History to the Detailed History

In 1961, ‘Alī published an account of Arab history after Islam. The overall objective of the work, in addition to challenging the Orientalist vision of Islam, was to prioritise the narrative of Islam over Iraqi national identity and to undermine the pan-Arabism vision that attempted to glorify pre-Islamic history. For the purpose of this chapter, it is not important to analyse ‘Alī’s vision on early Islamic history but rather to question why ‘Alī published another work, the Detailed History, rather than continue a multi-volume on Arabs through Islam.

In the prologue of *Arabs through Islam* (1983[1961]), ‘Alī argued that:

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8 This monograph was divided by ‘Alī into four chapters. The first chapter was devoted to the importance of the history of Islam and its historiography (‘Alī 1983 [1961], 11-43). This chapter was mainly devoted to criticising the Orientalists’ vision of Islam and their works on Islam, such as those of Sprenger and Kettani. The second chapter is on Mecca (‘Alī 1983 [1961], 45-91). The main idea in this chapter is that Mecca, which is a religious centre for Arabs, preserved its tribal traditions with no tolerance and without any renaissance attempt. In addition, Mecca was not subjected to any foreign occupation and the only attempt made by Abraham failed. This discussion is parallel with the main argument that the Arabs attempted to reject any influence of contemporary religions on Islam. The next two chapters document the life of the Prophet Muhammad, from birth to mission (‘Alī 1983 [1961], 93-152), including his role as the Messenger of Allah (‘Alī 1983 [1961], 153-217), and his devotion before and after the revelation. ‘Alī begins the third chapter with a verse from the Quran that refers to the Prophet as a human like any other human. ‘Alī take this verse to indicate that the life of the Prophet must be read by historians as that of a human, otherwise they might fall into contradictions (1983[1961], 93). The main concern of these two chapters is again to challenge the Orientalist’s criticism of the Prophet Muhammad.
“This book will examine the history of the Arabs in the Islamic period. It is a complement to History of the Arabs before Islam. Like the previous work [The History], it will consist of several volumes, the number of [which will] depend on the time when my heart will stop”. (ʿAlī 1983 [1961], 4)

With a similar notion, ʿAlī ended this book by saying:

“The revelation ordered him [Mohammed] to warn his people and not to care or think of the danger [...] How the Prophet told his people the message of God, this is what you will see in the following chapters of this [multi-volume] book”. (ʿAlī 1983 [1961], 216-7)

The above quotations clearly show that ʿAlī attempted to write a multi-volume work of the Arabs’ Islamic history similarly to the pre-Islamic history. However, he did not progress beyond the first volume of this work, as he claimed he would, as instead he chose to expand his early monograph, The History, into a more detailed called The Detailed History, which had ten volumes (1968-1974). Thus, this section attempts to examine the interrelationships between the content and the context of the Iraqi historiography of the 1960s and 1970s in order to ascertain why ʿAlī did not complete Arabs through Islam but rather chose to expand The History into The Detailed History. Was the discovery of new source material the only reason to return to the pre-Islamic history, as he suggested? To what extent did his research in the United States and the United Kingdom influence his approaches? Did the change in the political context in Iraq affect his choice and the way in which The Detailed History differed from The History? Did his vision of ancient Arabs and their relationships with dominant powers the Romans, Byzantines, and Sasanians change between the writing of The History and The Detailed History? In short, this section will trace the change and continuity of ʿAlī’s thought between The History and The Detailed History.
7.4.1 The Detailed History

To answer the above questions, it is important to sketch out, even briefly, the change in the political context of Iraq in the late 1960s and 1970s. By the mid-twentieth century, various Iraqi political groups – particularly the pan-Arabists, Iraqi Watani nationalists, and Communists – were competing for power (Choueiri 2000, 48; see Chapter 3). Each of these groups had its own political vision and advocates within the scholarly community. Nonetheless, they all agreed on the necessity of manipulating knowledge production, especially history, for their political agenda.

In 1958, the monarchical government was overthrown through a coup led by ʿAbd al-Karīm Qāsim who supported the Iraqi Watani nationalism vision, and they, like with the monarchy, permitted relative academic freedom (see Chapter Four). However, from 1963 the Iraqi political context witnessed dramatic changes. Qasim and his regime were toppled by a military coup in 1963, after which the Baʿthist Party rose to power in 1968, eventually resulting in Ŝaddām Ḥusayn gaining control. These groups mostly came from the pan-Arabism background, with an extreme approach to state control over knowledge production that had a fundamental impact on the Iraqi scholarly community. This led several Iraqi scholars to flee from Iraq (e.g., al-Dūrī), whilst others were dismissed from their positions (e.g., Taha Baqir) who was accused of opposing the regime and imprisoned (Goode 2010, 116), whereas others were boosted in their positions after the change of political power (e.g., Șāliḥ Aḥmed al-ʿAlī; see al-Maṭbaʿāī 1994, 1:99). Within such a power-knowledge context, ʿAlī continued his career by neither supporting these powers nor explicitly resisting them until his death in Baghdad in 1987.

In order to avoid trouble or the best possible resistance to power, ʿAlī altered his focus from “specific” to “general”. By specific I mean those controversial topics in society that, at the same time, were sensitive subjects for political powers, such as the root of sectarian division in Islam or the role of the local history of the Arab states within general Arab history. Notably, work on these topics continued to be produced, but mainly by writers who adhered to the ideology of the hegemony. On the other hand, by general I
mean those topics that had no conflict with the local political power’s vision or topics that were of interest to all Arab people, such as the Arab history as a whole rather than local history. Keep in mind that the Pan-Arab project began to decline gradually after the fall of most of the Arab unification projects of the 1960s, most notably the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria (Dawisha 2003, 253-257; Sasley 2015, 26-8).

After living in Britain in 1962, ’Ali’s return to Iraq coincided with the formative years of what evolved into an extreme totalitarian regime, predominately run by Sunni Arabs. As a consequence, the relative freedom that Iraqi scholars had enjoyed shrunk dramatically (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1991, 1409). Thus, the first reason as to why ’Ali shifted his focus from the history of the Arabs during the Islamic era to the pre-Islamic period of Arab history was that the period he was supposed to cover in the following volume of *Arabs through Islam* was a controversial period of Islamic history between the Sunni and Shi’ite sects. In particular, this surrounded the issue of who had the right to be a Muslim Caliph in Islam, which is one of the most controversial issues among the Islamic doctrines. This claim could be confirmed by ’Ali’s answer to the question about the topic of his doctoral thesis, and his decision to say that it was about Abraha’s campaign to Mecca in 582\3 CE (see above). His thesis had no link to this campaign, but rather tackled one of the most problematic issues of the Shiite sect, as discussed early in this chapter. However, the change in the political context should not be seen as the sole factor that caused the change and continuity in ’Ali’s vision, as other factors were also inspirational, such as his interaction with the Anglophone scholarly tradition, which influenced his sources. Thus, the remaining section attempts to trace the change and continuity of ’Ali’s vision.

7.4.2 Organisation and approach

*The Detailed History* expanded *The History* in terms of both the volumes and the number of the pages, but with not much change to the structure. While *The History* was an eight-volumes work, *The Detailed History* was expanded to ten volumes, the last two of which were indexes. Among the structural changes, in the volumes that dealt with the
political history of the pre-Islamic Arabs, ‘Alī removed the chronological structure in favo-
our of a geographical focus, which made it easier for the reader to follow.⁹ In addition, he tremendous-
ly expanded the data, which provided a greater focus on the socio-economic structure of the pre-Islamic Arab community.¹⁰ Regarding his approach, ‘Alī argued:

“My approach in this book is similar to my previous book [The History]. I do not establish myself as a judge whose job is to issue verdicts and prompt views on past historical events. Rather, I merely describe these events and analyses them as it seems to me [...] I tried my best to make this book a detailed [history...] Because my intention was for this book to be an encyclopaedia on the pre-Islamic Arab history, and not let anything be ignored” (1994 [1968], 1:5-6).

From this introduction, it is clear that ‘Alī’s interaction with the Anglophone tradition led him to focus more on socio-economic aspects of history. However, he persisted with Ranke’s objectivity approach, which aims to provide a detailed picture rather than a critical reading of past events.

The Detailed History expanded upon The History’s appreciation of the Western classical scholars, who advanced the study of pre-Islamic history (1950, 1:9-10, 43, 123-4), yet ‘Alī criticised the division of the world into superior and inferior mentalities, which he saw as a Western intellectual construction. ‘Alī argued that the superiority of the European mentality vision was developed by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European scholars, with notable proponents including the French philosophers Ernest Renan (1823-1892) and Graf Arthur Gobineau (1816-1882). For ‘Alī, such unscientific vision suggested that there is a clear boundary between humankind mentality as some

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⁹ For instance, while the history of Yemen was discussed in the first, second, and third volumes of History, the same topic was discussed only in the second volume of Detailed History.

¹⁰ For instance, the socio-economic and cultural factors are only discussed in the eighth volume of History, with 428 pages devoted to this topic, but this was expanded to three volumes in Detailed History (Volumes Five, Seven, and Eight; 2091 pages).
are superior and some inferior, which glorified the European mentality, depicting it as creative and innovative. In comparison, all other people were depicted as inferior, naïve, and simple (1994 [1968], 1:256-7).

ʿAlī pointed out that from such a vision, the German Nazi Party formulated its vision of the superiority of the Aryan race over the rest of the races, and the Nuremberg laws were inspired by these superior and inferior race theories. Hitler, according to ʿAlī, inspired a historian to write history in a way that always shows that human civilization is produced solely by the Aryan peoples, from whom all civilization was purported to have begun and with whom it would continue (1994 [1968], 1:256). Through such an understanding, any suggestion of a Near East civilization was nothing more than nonsense. For ʿAlī, the advocates of this theory stigmatised the Semites as a people who were inclined towards invasion, were irrational and unable to control their emotions, and were individualists with superficial thinking that did not probe deeply into the essence of things as the Greeks had done. Their naïve thinking was believed to be the reason for the spread of monotheistic religions among them (1994 [1968], 1:259). This discussion seems in some way parallel with Said’s later theory of Orientalism. However, ʿAlī’s thinking differed from Said’s theory as the former did not depict all Western works on the Arab world as stereotypical images, but rather he clearly described such texts as a trend within the Western tradition but not one that he saw as mainstream. In addition, he recognised the Nazi impact on this trend and the usage of history for ideological purposes, a dimension that was totally ignored by Said (1978). However, what makes this discussion odd is that ʿAlī did not attempt to provide any example of such an argument related to pre-Islamic history.

7.4.3 Who were the Arabs in *The Detailed History*?

ʿAlī’s identification of the Arab identity had a little change between the second volume of *The History* and *The Detailed History*. He attempted to address the contradiction of the Arab identity between the first and second volume of *The History* by bringing this discussion into the first chapter in *The Detailed History*. In a clear definition, ʿAlī argued
that the term ‘Arab’ became a reference for a “nation [or] specific ethnic group [with a] specific homeland and [...] its own tongue distinguishes it from other tongues, since after Christ” (1994 [1968], 1:33). Thus, ‘Alī extended the Arab identity to five centuries earlier than he had claimed in the first volume of The History. However, he did not present any new data or methodological analyses to support this argument.

‘Alī added a new paragraph to The Detailed History that reveals the influence of Arab nationalism on his writing. His depiction of the relationships between Palmyra and the Romans did not change a lot between The History and The Detailed History, but ‘Alī did add several new paragraphs. In one of these paragraphs he argued that:

“Zenobia [the Queen of Palmyra] deployed an Arab policy after the death of her husband, which insisted on a rapprochement with the Bedouins and winning them and relying on them in her military policy. She considered the Romans as an enemy of Palmyra, [working in] their own interests. With the same policy she approached the sedentary Arabs. She sought to create a powerful Arab state under her leadership, especially after she realized that the Bedouins’ power can be relied on, if they [were] organized”. (1994 [1969], 3:113. Emphasis is added)

Likewise, through studying the pre-Islamic Arab history, ‘Alī attempted to find answers to questions about the relationships between tribalism and Arab national identity, which many Arab intelligentsias were involved in after the mid-twentieth century (for tribalism and nationalism, see Bashkin 2009, 207-10; Abdul-Jabar 2014). ‘Alī found that tribalism was one of the main obstacles of the Arab national identity before and after Islam:

“In fact, it is difficult to reconcile between tribal relationships and national identity, as tribalism does not recognise the existence of an identity except tribal identity, does not imagine any other homeland except the area that [a tribe] dwells in. When they travelled to a new place, this place became their homeland, which needed to be defended. The other places, including the
former tribal home, [are no longer] considered as a homeland. From here it was a vast distance between the narrow tribal thought and the national vision [...]. The Arab governments of al-Jāhiliyya and [later] Islam confronted many troubles [arising from] tribal identity and extreme individualism. This was the main factor of weakening the political institutions of the in the Arab states, and [the tribes were] the fiercest enemies of Arab nationalism, not only in al-Jāhiliyya, but also in Islam as well”. (ʿAlī 1994 [1970], 4:409-410)

ʿAlī thus concluded that the most important aspect that the Arabs needed in the al-Jāhiliyya was the sense of ‘nation’, which transcends both tribalism and regionalism (ʿAlī 1994 [1970], 4:410). The above quotation undermined the whole Pan-Arabism vision, which constantly attempted to depict the pre-Islamic Arabs as a people with an Arab national awareness, and it was this awareness that led to the rise of Islam. Instead, ʿAlī constantly argued the opposite, that it was Islam that was able to save the Arabs from tribal fragmentation and lead them towards national unification.

ʿAlī kept a clear distance between his vision and pan-Arabism. For instance, he argued in a clear statement that he did not include the Semitic people of the Fertile Crescent into the Arab identity. While most early scholars (e.g., al-Miqdādī and Darwazah, see chapter six and nine respectively) claimed that all Semitic groups were Arabs, ʿAlī argued that the historical data did not support this vision (1994 [1968], 1:7-8). Furthermore, he did not consider the political entities that arose in the Levant and Mesopotamia in the early first century CE as Arab despite the fact that the majority of the people were hold Arabic names, “because arguing the peoples identity on a base of their name even which it seems logical and acceptable, but it is not a scientific” (1994 [1969], 2:624). Moreover, the courage, virility, and generosity of Arab tribes, which the Arab nationalists emphasised, were not discussed by ʿAlī. On the contrary, he often stigmatised the Bedouins and tribal relationships as the fundamental obstacle of the Arab nation, saying “The Bedouins do not believe in progress and development, they live as their fathers and ancestors lived” (1994 [1968], 1:278).
7.4.4 The image of the Others

7.4.4.1 Greeks and Romans in the Detailed History

ʿAlī’s basic image of the Romans and other European powers remained relatively consistent in both The History and The Detailed History, with attention paid to the differences between the East and West. The Detailed History in particular constructed the West and East as two opposing entities. Hence, the relationships between these two worlds are coloured by a political-economic motivation of the West to exploit the Arabs in their regions for economic gain and political control. This approach is depicted as a basic rule in the interaction between ancient European powers, such as the Greeks, Romans, and Byzantines, as well as modern European colonialists. Alexander the Great was the first Western figure to attempt to dominate the Arab world and then the entire East. In The Detailed History, ʿAlī began the chapter that deals with the Greeks and Romans with a new paragraph on Alexander the Great that was not present in The History:

“This eccentric man, who died young, dominated wide territories and founded a vast empire sketched from the Red Sea to the Arab Gulf [Persian Gulf] [and] he seized Egypt and the Fertile Crescent. He planned to control the Arabian Peninsula to make it part of his empire, in order to facilitate access to the Indian Ocean and control the trade road across Africa and Asia, and turn this ocean into a Greek sea […] he heard about incense and fragrance in Arab provinces, and precious products. In addition to the vast coastline […] many islands, its many ports that could [harbour] a fleet at anchor, and rich cities, this news ignited in him a longing to grab them”. (ʿAlī 1994 [1969], 2:5-6)

As with The History, this paragraph attempted to symbolise the distinction between the East and West, in which the latter’s attitude towards their eastern neighbours was motivated by economic gain. However, what has changed here is that the stereotypical
image of the “greediness” of the Western powers is transformed by ʿAlī into an “eccentric force” that aims to control and convert the eastern seas into the Greek Sea. Thus, it was an attempt to demonise the west as possessing an imperialistic attitude. These images were generalised in *The Detailed History* to include other European powers in different historical periods. For example, the Romans and Byzantines in ancient history were compared with modern Europeans, who attempted to establish a global empire that could dominate the trade route that passed through eastern Arabia (ʿAlī 1994 [1969], 2:11).

Moreover, the link between the Romans and modern European figures became clearer in *The Detailed History*. For instance, ʿAlī believed that Augustus was the most important Roman Emperor to direct his attention towards the East, to the extent that he considered him “to be the successor of Alexander” (ʿAlī 1994 [n.d.], 7:268-269). Nevertheless, the enmity between these two worlds is a legacy inherited from generation to generation, as ʿAlī claimed:

“After the Roman Empire was divided into two parts, and Constantinople became the capital of the eastern part in 335 CE, [the Byzantines] inherited the Roman imperial legacy of the conflict with the Persians, which was inherited from Alexander the Great”. (ʿAlī 1994 [1969], 2:626)

7.4.4.2 *The Persians in The Detailed History*

ʿAlī’s portrayal of the Persians in *The Detailed History* was more complex than the Roman representation. Even though the Persians were not depicted as the enemy similarly with the *History*. ʿAlī began to depict them as Other, a group that was different from the Arabs ethnically. However, they were not presented as a western Other, such as the Romans and the Byzantines, because the Persians were culturally Eastern. Thus, the Persians were demarcated by two norms established as ‘In’ and ‘Out’ groups with the Arabs.

The Persians were depicted as Other by ʿAlī because they are a different ethnic group called ‘Ajam [foreigners]. ʿAlī conceptualises the word ‘Ajam as:
“Anyone who is non-Arab [different ethnic group] and it is similar to the word ‘Barbarian’ in the English language, which is taken from the Greek origin. It does not mean savages, but it means foreigners/strangers [...] then the Greeks expanded the usage of the term to anyone who did not speak Greek or had a non-Greek language [...], probably this theory transferred to the Arabs from Greece [...] this term was used by the Arabs for both Persians and Greeks”. (ʿAlī 1994 [1970], 8:545)

This distinction between the Arabs and the Persians is based on linguistic differences. ʿAlī utilised ʿAjam for many groups who he considered to be non-Arab, such as the Persians, Greeks, Romans, and Ethiopians (ʿAlī 1994 [1970], 4:308; 4:309; 4:391; 1994 [n.d.], 7:544). Moreover, the confrontation between the Arabs and Persians is because they were two ethnic groups, and ʿAlī did not use the term ‘patriots’ to refer to those who fought against the Persians, as this term was usually used in the context of European colonialism in the mid-twentieth century. ʿAlī’s portrayal of the Sasanians was fundamentally different from that of the Romans, as the former were Eastern, evident in the discussion of cultural similarity between Arabs and Persians. For instance, he claimed that there was a close tie between the Arabs and the Persians before Islam (ʿAlī 1994 [1970], 8:341). In addition, he argues that both Greek and Persian literature influenced Arab literature, but the Persian impact was more significant because the Arabs and Persians had similar tastes (ʿAlī 1994 [1970], 8:341). Likewise, the degree of independence enjoyed by the Arab leaders who were allied with the Sasanians helped the growth of poems in Iraq. This was unlike the Arabs who were allied with the Byzantines, who had a strict policy that did not help the growth of poems in the Levant. This justifies, according to ʿAlī, the lack of al-Jāhiliyya’s poetry written in the Levant, in comparison with Iraq (ʿAlī 1994 [1970], 9:290-292). Furthermore, instead of any narrative of hatred between the Arabs and Persians, ʿAlī argued that the Achaemenids did not restrict the Arab movements (1994 [1968], 1:620).
7.5 Conclusion

This chapter shows the difficulties that the Iraqi professionalization of historiography faced during the mid-twentieth century. ‘Alī is an example of an Iraqi historian who was active at this turbulent time in modern Iraqi history. He wrote history under different governments which had differing and even contradictory political visions, from the monarchy to the Ba‘thist period, yet all these governments were interested in using history as a political tool. In addition, ‘Alī came from an Islamic sect that was not in favour with most of the Iraqi powers that he worked within. All this made it difficult for ‘Alī (and other Iraqi historians) to maintain his position within the Iraqi scholarly community, and also to resist political interference in the scholarly writing of history.

While, Ali’s thesis was on Shi‘ism but because he came from Shi‘i background he could not continue with writing on Shi‘ism within Iraqi context in which the state power was dominated the Sunnis. ‘Alī’s resistance to the political power was not to take a direct opposition, but rather he shifted to spaces in history that were seen as interesting by all the dominant powers but not overtly controversial. This way of writing history, which I called escape from specific to general, became a “model of resistance” for other Iraqi scholars who attempted to escape from governmental censorship.

‘Alī’s case shows that despite the claim of impersonality, no one can escape from his or her socio-political background. ‘Alī’s vision was configured by two main pillars: Islam and Arab nationalism. Both of these pillars were influenced by his social and educational background. While ‘Alī came from a Shi‘a family, he was educated in the Sunni tradition and then in a German institution, so he was the product of multiple ways of thinking. Nevertheless, even though ‘Alī inherited the Arab nationalist discourse and was exposed to fascism in Germany, he was not interested in history to use it as an ideological tool for his own political vision. This is what distinguished him from his Arab historian peers, such as al-Miqdādī (chapter six) and Darwazah (Chapter ten). On the other hand, ‘Alī’s discourse shows the importance of religion, particularly Islam, for the Arab scholars, as the impact of Islam is part of the Arab identity.

It can be argued that within the Detailed History the anti-western rhetoric increased and the reification of the world into Orient and Occident and West (Orientalism in reverse),
before Said even invented the concept. In addition, the moderation and calming of views of the Iranian, who become less of an enemy and political other and more of a cultural other. The first change, even when it is not fully understood, but it might have resulted from the anti-colonial studies in the west. The second might have resulted from an impact of the uninterrupted increase in the Pan Arabism ideology.

To conclude, the relative freedom of the monarchy period and the interaction of Iraqi scholars with the western tradition had a significant impact on historiographical developments. However, these soon fell under political domination, and thus this progress was not able to continue. Nevertheless, The History and The Detailed History are literary monuments, and together were a massive step forward in historical writing in both the Iraqi and Arab worlds.

11 The term “Orientalism in reverse” was first coined by Sadiq Jalal al-ʿAzm (see: al-ʿAzm 2000, 230-8).
Chapter Eight: The Iraqi Ba’thist narrative: Historiography in the service of state ideology

In July 1968, the Arab Socialist Ba’th Party seized power in Iraq. Within a few years, the Party had managed to defeat all the opposition and centralize the state under its chief deputy, Șaddām ǩusayn, who took over the presidency in 1979. The way that Iraq was ruled during Șaddām’s reign can be summarized by one of the regime’s slogans: ʾidhā qāla Șaddām qāla al-ʿIraq, which can be translated as “If Șaddām speaks, Iraq speaks”. Thus, the mechanisms that regulated political-historical writings during the Iraqi Ba’thist period were driven by the exigencies of Șaddām, whose political thought was shaped by two main sources.

First, Șaddām’s political thought was shaped by that of his uncle, who was the father of his wife, Khairallāh Țilfāh, who was a member of the Ba’thist party and an enthusiastic proponent of Pan-Arabism. Șaddām spent much of his early life in Țilfāh’s home, and the latter has been described by Post (2005, 336-7) as Șaddām’s “political mentor”. Țilfāh was a military officer, but as a result of his support of the 1941 movement (see Chapter 3), he was dismissed from the army and imprisoned for a few years after the movement failed (Iskandar 1980, 24). According to Șaddām’s biography, he first learned to hate colonialism while he was at his uncle’s house. Whether this detail is true or fabricated, it nevertheless reflects the vision of Șaddām in the 1980s. Whist at his uncle’s house, he was told tales about his heroic ancestors and relatives, who sacrificed their lives fighting foreign invaders such as the Ottomans and the British. According to his biography, these tales “formulated his early consciousness [...], which will guide him and lead him throughout his whole life: the hatred of colonialism” (Iskandar 1980, 24).

The second source of Șaddām’s political thought was his experiences as a young boy of the school curriculum. After independence, the Iraqi monarchy increasingly began to install military education. Resulting from this attempt and the impact of the Third Reich on Iraqi political thought during the interwar period (see Chapter 6), the designers of
the Iraqi school system attempted to militarise the curriculum, taking inspiration from the Nazis. Muhammad Fadhil al-Jamālī, who was Director of General Education in 1933, 1934, 1937, 1938, and 1940, believed that it was necessary for the Iraqi students to adopt a military training similar to that which had been instilled in young Germans of the Hitler Youth (Simon 2004, 72). It is worth mentioning that both the Pan-Arabism ideology and the Iraqi school curriculum were imbued with anti-foreign sentiments on the one hand, whereas on the other they agreed upon the importance of using historical production to achieve hegemony over the public sphere (see Chapters 3 and 4). Thus, the young Ṣaddām’s worldview, which had been shaped by his uncle and the school curriculum, was imbued with militarisation of the state, use of coercion, and hatred of foreigners.

With such a socio-political background, Ṣaddām attempted to re-write the history of Iraq. From the beginning of his reign, Ṣaddām showed an obsessive preoccupation with writing history. He and his fellow Ba’thist never considered history as an academic discipline but rather their intention was always to use the past events as a political tool to reinforce and impose their political vision on the Iraqi consciousness. In 1977, Ṣaddām asked: *li-man yuktab at-Tārīkh* “for whom should the history be written?”. For him, history “must be written for the living, not for the dead” (Ṣaddām 1988, 261). Thus, for Ṣaddām if coercion is a physical tool for regulating the body, then history is a mental tool for regulating thought.

8.1 Ṣaddām sponsors a re-writing history project

“The president and leader Ṣaddām Ḥusayn realized the necessity of a general book on Iraqi [history]... Thus, he paid [this project] a special consideration and worked for the implementation of this project. With his encouragement, a selection of Iraqi historians has been invited to produce this aim” (al-ʿAlī 1983, 13-14)

The above quotation, from the introduction to *Iraq through History* (1983), summarizes an unprecedented trend within Iraqi historiography. The Ba’th Socialist Party and early
Iraqi governments had been interested in using historical narratives for ideological purposes, but this was the first time that an Iraqi leader had overtly stated the need for a historical book on Iraq, and supported it until its release. This direct interference of the government explains the dramatic increase in the scope and scale of ideological historical publications after the Baʿth Party took power in Iraq, which intensified after the outbreak of war against Iran in 1980. As this war continued, the state discourse and dominant historical production were intimately connected more than ever. For instance, al-ʿAli (1983) states:

“The President Ṣaddām Ḥusayn has a special interest in history, and he is keen to study it. He wrote on the nature of history, its trends, and its influence on the life of the individuals and the community. His studies are rich in deep insights, comprehensive outlooks, and penetrating visions [...] he appealed for the necessity of re-writing [...] With the encouragement of President Ṣaddām Ḥusayn, a committee of senior Iraqi specialists has been brought together to research the aspect that the study of history [in Iraq] should focus upon and signify [...] The scientific institutions that deal with the study of history have received substantial financial and political support. Several ministries spent generously on printing historical and academic books to distribute them in large quantity at cheap prices to ensure their availability for the widest audience possible”. (al-ʿAlī 1983, 13-14)

8.2 The Baʿthist approach to ancient Iraqi history

With such motivation, from 1983 a series of historical publications on Iraqi history were released under the direct sponsorship of the Baʿthist party. This series began with two books called *Iraq through History*¹ and, *The Iraq-Persian Conflict*, both published in 1983. These volumes were followed in 1985 by a larger multivolume book, *Iraqi Civilization*,

¹ This work has no single editor rather it entitled as to be written by an elite group of [Iraqi] scholars.
which spanned 13 volumes. Each of these volumes of the Iraqi civilization began with quotations from Ṣaddām Ḥusayn, and had largely similar covers adorned with date palms (Figures 1-3). These volumes were divided into chapters, each covering a particular period of Iraqi history and written by specialist Iraqi scholars (al-ʿAlī 1983, 14).

The ideological motive of this series appears to have more impact on the nature of the arguments than does the source material. On the history of pre-Islamic Arabs, for instance, Iraq through History and The Iraq-Persian Conflict, despite of they are rarely contained academic footnotes or endnotes, drew on an array of Islamic historians and a few Western sources. Much of the narrative was drawn, in the first instance, from al-Ṭabarî (d. 923 C.E.) Tārīkh al-Ṭabarî: Tārīkh al-rusul waʾl-mulūk [History of the Messengers and Kings], and Ibn al-Athīr (d. 1233 C.E.) al-Kāmil, fi al-Tārīkh [the Complete of History]. Within western sources on this period the contributors mostly relied on seminal works of the French historian Arthur Christensen, L’Iran sous les Sassanides (1944) which was translated into Arabic in Egypt by Yaḥyá Khashshāb (1957). Later volumes of this series, including Army and Weapons (five volumes), City and Civic Life (three volumes), and Iraq in the Caravan of Civilization, originality-impact (three volumes), all of which were published in 1988, were more widely referenced. Like the earlier works in the same series, and despite paying more attention to academic citations and with larger numbers of references, however the range of sources in these works slightly has been developed adding a few more classical Islamic sources. Accordingly, they have relied on the same array of Islamic historians such as the 12th century Muslim historian such as Thaʿālibī (d. 1037/8 C.E.), Ghurar akhbār mulūk al-Furs wa-siyarihim [History of the Persian kings]. And a few Western sources most of which k predated 1970 and Christiansen, whose work was used selectively, remained among the main European sources on Sasanian history in Iraqi historiography.
This series explicitly criticises the previous historiography of Iraq. The first group of publications criticised are those that examined the Iraqi history within the history of the Arabs and Islam. These early publications, as al-ʿAlī argued, paid little attention to the Iraqi people who, he claimed, had maintained their identity since time immemorial and

\[^2\] Chapter 7 argues that writing Arab history become a way of resistance.
whose intellectuals had enriched the Arabic and Islamic traditions (1983, 12). The failings of these works, argued al-ʿAlī, was that they did not put enough emphasis on the role of Iraq as a country, especially at the time when many other scholars were emphasising the roles of their own nations (1983, 12). This criticism, on the one hand, implicitly refers to the early Iraqi scholars such as Jawād ʿAlī and ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Dūrī, whose attentions were on a wider span of Arab history, either pre-Islamic or Islamic. This criticism may confirm the early discussion on the pragmatic and specific historians (see chapter seven).

On the other hand, this vision was part of wider Iraqi Baʿthist discourse which was shifting from pan Arab nationalism to Iraqi nationalism. By the 1980s it had become more concerned with strengthening national pride in Iraq. Thus, there was a gradual and intended increase in space for Islamic and pre-Islamic Iraqi figures and cultures within Baʿthist historiography. Ṣaddām himself confirmed this view of the essential role of Iraq in Arab history in 1979 (Ḥusayn 1979a, 13).

Western scholars were the second group who were criticised in these works. Early Iraqi historiography was not particularly critical of western academic work on Iraq and Arabs. The fact that the majority of ancient Iraqi cities had been explored by western academics, and that they played a crucial role in advancing the study of ancient Iraq, was acknowledged. However, the series also portrayed Iraqi historiography as being dangerously overshadowed by the western colonial academic institutions. Al-Ḥadīthī (1985) argued that the importance of the multivolume book, Iraqi Civilisation, is its presentation of a vision that has been deliberately obscured by the Western cultural and academic institutions, which were motivated by the superiority of European colonialism and eurocentrism (1985, 7). Furthermore, al-Ḥadīthī asserted that the project should be considered as an attempt to break the European stranglehold over ancient Iraqi history, after the breaking of European political domination over modern Iraq (1985, 7).

It is noteworthy that such criticisms of Western academic traditions are not a ubiquitous

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3 Al-Dūrī went into exile as the Baʿth party came to power.
phenomenon in Ba’thist historical narratives during the 1980s. However, such criticism in this series resulted from the nature of the Iraqi intelligentsia, whose ideological background affected their views. For instance, al-Ḥadīthī’, who was considered to be closer to the materialist school of thought, relentlessly criticised the Western tradition. Historical representation in this series is highly selective. Of course, selectivity is evident, with different degrees, in all scientific and historical narratives (Howell and Prevenier 2001, 85; Wylie 2002, 19). This selectivity is, as Wishart argued, because the past is only accessible through relics of evidence, which cannot be representative of all that went on (1997, 115). However, selectivity in Ba’thist historical representation is not a result of the nature of the evidence, but rather is from an intentional ideological motivation. The Ba’thist party was interested in particular events, such as those that amplified the Arab victories, and in turn overlooked the defeats and setbacks of the Arabs. In this context, and in a similar manner to al-Ḥuṣrī, Fawzī (1988) argued in favour of overt ideological selectivity in the writing of history:

“If we want all of this [i.e. the use of the past in order to inform the Arab national character as well as the individual] from history, we must employ selectivity in the presentation of facts. Thus, the facts that we should choose are those that suit the goals that we have accepted. They should highlight the leading ideals and values that reflect the aspirations of the nation and the future vision of the truth”. (1988, 6)

This series deliberately minimised narratives of Mesopotamian history from the Achaemenid period to the advent of Islam. This period is discussed in Iraq through History in one chapter, entitled “Iraq during the occupation era”, which covered approximately 1,171 years of Iraqi history (539 BCE to 630s CE). Yet this long period occupied only 33 pages, with a complete lack of any discussion of the cultural

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4 This book was part of a series, Simplified Historical Encyclopaedia, supervised by the organization of writing Iraq history, which was part of the Ba’th party’s efforts at writing history.
achievements of the era (1983, 235-268). In contrast, the Abbasid Empire, which spanned less than half of this period (750-1258 CE), was explored over the course of 166 pages.

With a similar motive, the multi-volume *Iraqi Civilization*, was divided into four periods. The ancient period (volumes 1-4); the Islamic period (five volumes, 5-9); the modern period (volumes 10 and 11; and the contemporary period (volumes 12 and 13). Not surprisingly, as with *Iraqi Through History*, *The Iraqi Civilization* marginalised the period from the rise of the Achaemenid dynasty to the advent of Islam. This long era was attached to the Islamic period in volume 5, covered in only one chapter of just 19 pages (al-Ḥadīthī 1985, 5:7-25), in which only two pages directly deal with the topic; the rest of the chapter deals with the Arab Muslim conquest and the role of new Arab settlements in Iraq, particularly Kufā and Bāṣra. More specifically, the only idea indicated on these pages is that despite the political domination of Mesopotamia by foreign powers, it had only a minor impact on Iraqi socio-economic structures, which preserved the Babylonian structure. Thus, the socio-economic structures maintained an Iraqi essence (al-Ḥadīthī 1985, 5:7). However, the Abbasid period was given prominent space. Abbasid economic and social organization alone, for instance, was allocated seven chapters, combining a total of 350 pages (1985, 5:53-402).

In addition, *Iraq through History* allocates 10 pages for Sasanian history, which is already a very small portion, yet six of these pages are given over to Ḥīra’s relationships with the Sasanian Empire (Said, M. 1983, 263-268). Similarly, in *The Iraq-Persian Conflict*, out of 21 pages on the Sasanian Empire, 18 are allocated to the Hatra and Ḥīra narratives (al-Hāshimī 1983, 101-120). In contrast, the ‘proxy war’, as Dignas and Winter (2007) points out, between the Lakhmids and Ghassanids, has been ignored completely in *Iraq through History* and *The Iraqi-Persian Conflict*, as it is considered to be embarrassing to the Ba’thist narrative that the Arabs fought each other in defence of non-Arab powers.

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5 Nizar Abd al-Latif al-Hadithy is/was an Iraqi historian who served as chairman of the Assembly of Iraqi Historians and Archaeologists since it was founded in the late 1970s until 2000. In addition, he was Dean of the National Institute of Socialism Studies during the 1980s.
Moreover, the use of ‘The Sasanian Era in Mesopotamia’ as a chapter title in both *Iraq through History* and *The Iraq-Persian Conflict* has been dismissed from the later books in the same series. Instead, in *Army and Weapons, City and Civic Life*, and *Iraq in a Convoy of Civilization, Originality-impact* (all published in 1988), this period was called ‘Iraq in the Proto-Islamic Era’. This shows an attempt to dismiss the Sasanian era from Iraqi historical memory.

8.2.1 Iranians as the past, present, and future enemy of Iraq: Theorising “Persian enmity”

Dualistic differentiation between “us vs. them” and “good vs. bad” might be unconsciously practised by many groups or even individuals, however it becomes a crucial tool during war time, turning the “good-bad” into the “good-evil” or even ideal-evil” relationship. Within such a context, the Self always becomes representative of the “good”, while the Other becomes representative of the “evil”, who as a result is completely separated from any merit of the “good” and “Us”. Zur (1991) has identified seven types of enemy representation throughout history, among which the “threatening enemy in defensive wars” was the most perceived type of enemy during the second half of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The aim of the war represents, in this case, a protection of “Our” country or homeland against the ruthless expansionist of the “Other”, who is perceived as a threat to “our borders, our people, our ideology, our economy or our future” (Zur 1991).

It was necessary for the Ba’thist narrative during the war with Iran to formulate a theoretical basis for the Iranian as a historical enemy. In the weakness of the Iraqi army against the Kurds, in 1975 Šaddām sent a message to the Shah of Iran, in which he urged the latter that Iraq and Iran have a common religion, culture, and family connection, and relationships across the borders with Kurdistan and Khuzestan, which should be used as bases to stand together against western imperialism (Amuzegar 1996, 206: citied from Chehabi 2012, 206). However, less than five years later, when the Iraq-Iran was begun,
Iran turned into a historical enemy of Iraq and the Arabs (for the cause of the Iraq-Iran war, see Chapter 3).

In the introduction to *The Iraq-Persian Conflict*, Raʾūf, with sophisticated arguments, attempted to set out a theoretical notion of the Iranians as the enemy throughout history. According to Raʾūf (1983), after many years of Iranian stubbornness in the war against Iraq, it became clear that such enmity was not the result of a consequence of the recent dispute, which might have had a political solution, but rather was an extension of a deep-seated Persian attitude against Iraq and the Arab nation, which had different form in different period (1983, 11). For Raʾūf, this enmity has three different forms: “barefaced”, meaning a direct military intervention during the ancient periods; a “latent” internal subversion during the Islamic period; and a direct occupation of parts of Arab land and the obliteration of its Arabic identity in the modern day. While the second phase, for Raʾūf, was marked by al-Shuʿūbiyyah the first and the last phase was marked by the aim of *Tafris* (Persianisation), which strove to eliminate Arab identity. Thus, for Raʾūf the question is not whether the Iranian must be seen as an enemy or not but what is the form of this enmity (1983, 11-12).

According to Raʾūf, Iran is an artificial nation-state that is composed of distinctive ethnic minorities whose ethnicity extends beyond Iran’s border. This claim is true of all Iranian ethnic groups except the Persian minority, which has no extension outside of Iran. Therefore, for Raʾūf, because the Persians were culturally inferior, they used force in an attempt to perceive Iran as a nation-state, which Iran is no for Raʾūf. In addition to the internal challenges, for Raʾūf, the Persians soon realized another external challenge on their western border: the Arabs, whose superiority, according to him, was based on cultural supremacy (1983, 14-5). These two challenges, internal heterogeneity, and external dynamic and superior Arab culture, generated, according to Raʾūf, a

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6 ʿImad ʿAbdul Salam Raʾūf is an Iraqi historian born in Baghdad in 1948 to Mosulíain parents, and claims that he descends from “the Abbasid family”. Raʾūf is one of the most prolific Iraqi historians on Islamic manuscripts, and became the chair of the Centre for the Revival of Arab Heritage in Baghdad in 1983 (his Facebook page: accessed on 12 June 2017).
“Persianism expansionist” doctrine aimed to maintain its internal homogeneity by external expansions against the Arabs. This doctrine turns, over the centuries, into a well-established doctrine in Iranian governments, all of which committed to it, even those who came from non-Persian origin (1983, 15). Therefore, the Arabs did not show any hostility to Iran throughout history, according to Raʿūf, who suggested it was the Iranian regimes who continuously showed aggression towards the Arabs and Iraq throughout history. From these bases, all the interactions between Iran and Mesopotamia from the earliest known history were depicted by the contributors in this series as being part of Persian hostility against Iraq. Iranian enmity is explained in part as a consequence of ethnic differences and geography.

Raʿūf’s vision has been criticised by Eric Davis, who points out that this narrative “underline the irony of the all Baʿthist sponsored history” is that it applied a modern concept of nationhood onto the distant past (2005, 186). In the same way, it could be argued that the great effort spent by Raʿūf, who came from a Sunni community, to use the past as an ideological tool for the sake of Baʿthist ideology, could illustrate that the Iraqi scholar’s relationship with the state power was not only coercive but also shows the great interrelationships between the Sunni community of Iraq and the Baʿthist discourse.7

For a better understanding of the developments of the Iranian depiction in this series, this chapter has been divided into a number of prevalent themes as follow.

8.2.2 “Persian” enmity in the pre-Islamic era

This series shows the Baʿthist discourse during wartime, which attempted to define the Iraqi national identity as “praiseworthy” by demonising the Iranian national identity as “Other”. Baʿthist historiography exploited past events of wars and conflicts to illustrate

7 Raʿūf is an example of Sunni scholars who participated in Baathist discours, for more examples see below.
the essential characters of both peoples. For the Ba’thist, Iraqi peoples embodied “Asil”
the authentic given the Arab cultural, social, and religious superiority and above all the
leading role of the Iraqi people within the Arab world in the past, which could legitimise
Ṣaddām’s claimed title fars al-Ummah al-‘Arabiyyah (Knight of the Arab Nation). This
contrasted with the alleged inferiority of Iranian culture, social structure, and false
religion and, above all, their enmity towards the Arabs and Iraqis.

The Sasanian king Shapur II’s campaign against the Arabs, Nu’mān and his relationships
with Khusrow, and the battles of Dhī Qār, are perhaps the most ubiquitous themes that
the Ba’thist historiography used as a propagandistic tool of the pre-Islamic historical
record (for the historical narrative of these topics, see Chapter 3).

In a stereotypical image, Iranians were stigmatized as essentially hating the Iraqis and
the Arabs from the past to the present. Shapur II’s campaign against the Arab tribes in
the fourth century CE is utilized to portray the Sasanian king as essentially malicious
towards the Arabs. Al-Hāshimī states that:

“After a period of instability Shapur II began to confront a danger to the
Sasanian Empire, a deep-seated malevolence appeared against the Arabs [he
cites from al-Tha‘ālibī]. His resentment [towards Arabs] was increasing as he
was growing up, and hatred towards the Arab was in his blood stream”.
(1983, 105)

Al-Hāshimī asked why all this hostility and hatred existed, especially as the Arabs were
not the only group who attacked the Persian Kingdom. For him, Shapur II’s behaviour
reveals without doubt the Persian deep hatred towards the Arabs, caused in the first
place by the Arabs’ painful blows against the Persians. It also reveals Persian
determination to keep the Arabs from political and military advancement (1983, 105).

In addition, Shapur II was accused in this series of slaughtering the Arabs and executing
the first genocidal campaign against them. Al-Hāshimī accused Shapur II of mass killings
of the Arabs in different parts of Arabia (al-Hāshimī 1983, 106). This impression of
Shapur II as carrying out the first genocide in history against the Arabs was repeated by
the contributors (al-Ḥadīthī 1985, 11, 106; Fawzī 1987, 12). Similarly, al-Hāshimī argued that Shapur II’s abnormal behaviour against the Arabs reveals the Persian latent hatred that aimed to eliminate the existence of the Arabs (1983, 105-6). Persian hatred towards Iraq thematically emerged in other chapters of *The Iraq-Persian Conflict*, including ones that focused on the coming of Islam (al-ʿĀnī and Zaʿīn 1983, 133-134), the Abbasid era (Muhammad 1983, 157), and the Mongol era (Khalīl 1983, 191). The final chapter of *The Iraq-Persian Conflict* asserted the assumption that the Persian enmity towards Iraq and Arabs is historically approved (Ahmad 1983, 391-393).

By advocating an essentialist Iranian enmity towards Iraq, these historical narratives justified the Baʿthist efforts to present their war with Iran as an episode in a long chain of ancient hostilities, and it was presented as inevitable and not an ideological and political dispute. Nevertheless, it forecasted an inevitable Iraqi victory as the Iraqi achieved through all these past battles, according to Baʿthist narrative.

During the course of the Iraq-Iran war, the “good-bad” image of the Arabs and Iranians in early Pan-Arabism historical narratives turned into an “ideal-evil” relationship. While the relationship between Nuʿmān, the Arab leader of al-Ḥīra, and the Sasanian king Khusrow II was depicted as a “good-bad” relationship in pan-Arabism discourse (al-Miqdādī 1936, 26-27; see Chapter six), the narrative of the same relationship between the Sasanian king Khusrow II and Nuʿmān embodies the essential Persian evil character traits. For instance, al-Hāshimī described al-Ḥīra as a “symbol of the Arabs’ advancement in Iraq” (1983, 107). At the same time, Nuʿmān is described as an ideal Arab nationalist who succeeded not only in developing economic and cultural prosperity, but also as a leader who succeeded in mobilizing the Arab consciousness (1983, 110-111). On the other hand, Khusrow II, for instance, is described as a “created king” who was inefficient, cowardly, arrogant, and oppressive, and who assaulted and

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8 Khusrow II regained his throne as a consequence of the support of the Byzantine Empire after he was dethroned by the leader Bahram (see Chapter 3).
blackmailed his people (al-Hāshimī 1983, 111-112). He was also seen as spiteful (Said, M. 1983, 262), racist, and immoral (al-Ḥadīthī 1985, 13).

The Iranian people were soon demonised within Iraqi historical writing. Ṭīlīfāḥ, Ṣaddām’s uncle published undated pamphlet entitled “Three whom God should not have created: Persians, Jews, and Flies” (Thalatha kan 'ala Allah an la yakhuqahum: al-Fars, al-Yahud wal-dhabib), the author dehumanises the Persians and attempts to convince Iraqi readers, and Arabs as well, to equate the ancient Iranians with the modern Iranians as a permanent enemy throughout history:

“Persians are animals God created in the shape of humans. However, the only human advantages they have is that they are walking on two legs like a hen [...] Their morals are bad, their traits are vicious, and their beliefs are immoral. This is evident from their belief in Zoroaster and Mazdak as goddess [...] this is similar to the recent claim by Khomeini in Tehran to be a God, and he has portrayed himself as the Spirit of God [...] my Arab brothers, the Persian [s are] your first enemy”. (Ṭīlīfāḥ N.D., 5)

8.2.3 The Persian alliance with Iraq’s enemies

During the 1980s, the Iraqi historical works invoked the idea of a historical Iranian-Jewish conspiracy against the Iraqi people. According to Ba’thist writers, this conspiracy began in the fourth century BCE, when the Jews in Babylonia, who had captivated by Nebuchadnezzar, opened the city’s gates and facilitated the capture of the city by the Achaemenid king Cyrus. This Jewish-Iranian conspiracy against the Iraqi people appeared during the middle of the twentieth century. However, its use in a political context did not appear until 1983, with the Israeli raid on Iraq’s nuclear reactor (Baram 1991, 110-1).

9 This book was probably published during the Iraq-Iran war, as the writer discussed this war as an ongoing one.
Iranians, along with the Israelis and Zionism, were categorised as an axis of saboteurs and conspirators, working together due to their common aims and interests in undermining Iraq and the Arabs throughout history. This assertion can be tracked to Ṣaddām and other Iraqi officials’ speeches. During the war with Iran, the Ṣaddām, for instance, claimed in one of his speeches that:

“The Zionists [and] their allies [western imperialism] bear a grudge towards our nation and at the same time are attempting to stop the advancement and development of the Arab people. After other plots against the Ba’thist revolution were unsuccessful, these powers have found that the Iranian regime which came to power in Tehran is the best tool to eliminate the chance of the Arab nation’s cultural advancement” (Ḥusayn: citied from ʿUdwān 1988, 17).10

Similar notions were expanded by the Iraqi Minister of Defense during the Iraq-Iran war, who stated that, “From the very beginning [of the war with Iran], we never had any illusion about the Iranian regime’s associations with Zionism”. (cited in Workman 1994, 152)

Numerous contemporary historical publications adopted this ideological vision in a deliberate attempt to crystalize the notion of a historical conspiracy between Iran and Israel against Iraq from the farthest reaches of ancient history. In such context, granting permission for the Jewish exiles in Babylonia to return home and rebuild the Jerusalem temple by Cyrus in 538 BCE merged into a wider notion of Persians and Jews conspiring against the nation of Iraq and the Arab people. Barāk argued that

“Several centuries before Christ, the Jewish-Persian alliance was enhanced in a form of a conspiracy against the Babylonian State in Iraq [...] Where the Jews incited the Achaemenes emperor Cyrus to attack Babylon. The Persian

10 This book is a selection of speeches made by Saddām, compiled by Nawaf ʿUdwān but without any mention of dates. However, it is clear that this particular speech was made during the Iraq-Iran war.
army deliberately destroyed the Babylon civilization when they invaded Iraq in 539 BC [because] they sought to eliminate the flame of progress in the world at that time”. (1984, 212)

The author continues to track this alleged plot in various historical periods from the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties down to his contemporary time (1984, 212).

Notably, the notion of Persian and Jewish conspiracy was incorporated into a wider xenophobic tendency, with Șaddām, for instance, arguing that:

“A child must learn at this stage [primary] to be wary of foreigners, because the foreigner is an eye for his country and some of them are subversive forces against the Ba’thist revolution. Therefore, to accompany foreigners and talk with them without controls is not permissible. You have to sow in his\textsuperscript{11} mind to be careful and do not give the foreigner secrets about the state and the [Ba’th] party”. (cited in Ӧusayn 1979b, 10)

8.2.4 From Qādisiyyah’s Sa’d to Qādisiyyat Șaddām

Several historians have acknowledged that a successful regime needs an historical event with which the public-at-large is familiar (Bengio 2002; Davis 2005; Lewental 2014). Arab nationalist discourse stylised the battle of al-Qādisiyyah as one of many Arab military victories over the Iranians. However, the importance of the battle of al-Qādisiyyah exceeded all other historical moments, as the Iraq-Iran war formally designated it as Qādisiyyat Șaddām, or al-Qādisiyyah al-thaniya, the second Qādisiyyah.

In the first speech by Șaddām after the beginning of the war, broadcast on 28\textsuperscript{th} September 1980, he addressed the tension with Iran:

\footnote{In most of his speeches, Șaddām often refers to men with little attention paid to women.}
“We had to unsheathe the swords of ʿAlī, Khalid, Saʿd and al-Qaʿqāʾ [Arab Muslim commanders who fought the Romans and the Persians], to strike this aggressor clique and teach them a new historical lesson to restore the glories of al-Qādisiyah that destroyed the arrogance of Khosrau, and raised the banners of Islam and eliminated infidelity, ignorance and aggression in the region […] When our warning and alarms passed in vain, we ordered our brave army to confront this clique, heir of Khusrow [in other places Khusrow and Rustam] and 20th century Magians [i.e., Zoroastrians], and to defeat them completely. This is what your [Iraqi] army did […] from the early hours of the battle... the honoured Iraqi sword was advancing, appealing to the soul of the nation, its historical mission and its great history [...] reminiscent of the battles of Badr, al-Qādisiyyah, Yarmūk and Hittin”. (al-ʿIrāq: Wizārat al- khārijīyah, al-Lajnah al-Istishārīyah: Documentary File 1981, 231).

Ṣaddām’s equation between modern political and ideological disputes between Iraq and Iran and the seventh century Arab Muslims and Sasanians inspired subsequent Baʿthist writers to focus on the link between the past Arab Muslim conflict with the Sasanian Empire and the contemporary conflict with Iran:12

“Today, one thousand and three hundred years after the “first” al-Qādisiyyah… Iraqis stand to repel the brutal aggression that the Persian enemy is adamant to wage […] But the great victories and the glorious victories achieved by the soldiers of al-Qādisiyyah Ṣaddām … will remain true facts for generations and in the conscience of history”. (Ali, F. 1988, 1: 8)

Thus, within the Baʿthist narrative, the battle of al- Qādisiyyah became an unfolding battle between Iraq and Iran, and after more than 1,300 years, the second chapter of the battle of al-Qādisīyah began again. All the characters of the al-Qādisīyah were

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12 For the Baʿthist use of the battle al-Qādisiyyah in the public sphere, see Abdi (2008), Davis (2005, 188-192), Good (2010 120-123), Makiya (1998, 270-274), and Lewental (2011, 390-399).
embodied again by the new generation, and so Șaddâm was equated with Arab Muslim leaders such as Sa’d and ’Umer bin al-khaṣṭāb, while the Iranians became the heirs of Khusrow III and Rustam.

Figure (2) Iraqi Bank note, Twenty-Five Iraqi dinars, showing Șaddâm with the backdrop portrait of the battle of Qādisiyyah between Muslim and Sassanid Arabs.

8.2.5 Ethnicity in the Iraqi-Iranian conflict

This series emphasised the racial nature of the Iraq-Iran war. Both Davis and Lewental have noted that Șaddâm chose to depict what was a political and ideological dispute as an age-old ethnic clash between the Arabs and Persians (Davis 2005, 193; Lewental 2014, 394). In a speech given on a national day of Iraq in 1981, Șaddâm asserted that “the Persian aggression against Iraq was a result of the arrogant, racialist and evil attitudes of the ruling clique in Iran” (Șaddâm’s speech in 1981, 13).¹³ This series reflected this approach, portraying both the Arab Muslim-Sasanian confrontation in al-

¹³ Such a depiction served the Ba’thist discourse within both internal Iraqi Arabs and with border Arabs. It aimed to minimize the Iranian propaganda that attempted to convince its Shi‘ī population of the Iraqi Shia and present the Iranian as a different ethnicity rather than as similar to the Shia, and to persuade the Arab world that Iraq is defending the eastern gate of the Arab world.
Qādisiyyah and the 1980s war as the natural outcome of the Persian essential racial aggression, which aimed to exterminate the Arabs.

Through this series, and unlike the primary sources, the Ba’thist narrative of al-Qādisiyyah minimized the political and ideological factors of the conflict in favour of the ethnic Arab-Persian struggle. Al-‘anī and Za’in (1983, 133-134), for instance, portrayed the Arab Islamic conquests as a new Arab renaissance that dissatisfied the Persians, who saw it as a threat to their racist ambitions. In addition, Al-‘anī and Za’in, along with the other contributors of this series, often presented both Mesopotamia and Iran in racialist terms, frequently depicting Mesopotamia as the Arabs while presenting the Iranians as the Persian enemy. For instance, they argued that liberating of Iraq became a central goal for the “Arab state” due to several reasons: Iraq is an integral part of the Arab land, which was occupied by the Persians, and the Iraqi Arabs began their operations against the Persians earlier than other places, so it was a national obligation upon the Arab state to support their struggle (1983, 135). Such a depiction was frequently adopted by many Iraqi writers in this series and other publications (Z’ein and al-‘Ani 1988, 4:274; 5:63; al-Ḥadīthī 1985, 5: 13-4).

Another way of emphasising the ethnic nature of the Arab Muslim-Sasanian conflict by the Ba’th narrative was to depict the Sasanian Christians as Arabs who supported and embraced the Arab Muslim conquerors due to their Arab ethnic affiliation. Despite a number of accounts, in ancient sources, of fluctuating loyalties of the Sasanian Christians, who moved their allegiance from the Sasanians to the Muslim Arabs, there is no indication of ethnic affiliations between the Sasanian Christians and the Arab Muslims. Nevertheless, Webb (2016) argued that the pre-Islamic Arab identity was a ninth-century construction by Muslim historians. This is despite the Ba’thist narrative, which presented the Sasanian Christians as Arab Christians and insisted that they aided

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14 As with rest of this thesis, the question often is not what the reality of the pre- and Islamic Arab history was, but rather how the political context impacted narratives of such events. In this context, it is not the aim of this thesis to examine whether the Sasanian Christians supported the Arab Muslim conquerors or not.
the Arab Muslims due to their Arab national consciousness. In a speech by Ṣaddām in late 1980, he stressed that:

“The Iraqis fought the Persians with their Arabism before they became Muslims. Many of them were Christians, who knew when the Persians were defeated by the Muslims, they would be asked to convert to Islam, but this did not allow anything to deter them from demonstrating their Arabism against the Persians” (Cited from al-Baṣrī 1980: 63-64)

According to al-Ḥadīthī, the Nestorian Church incited the Christians’ against the Sasanians (al-Ḥadīthī 1985, 5: 12). For him, the Arab Christians in Iraq were motivated by their Arab awareness and took part in the Arab-Muslim wars against the Sasanians, in which they chanted “we fight with our nation” (al-Ḥadīthī 1985, 5: 12-4). The Christians support of the Arab Muslims became a frequent theme in Ba’thist propagandistic historiography.

By emphasising ethnicity rather than religion, the Christian community in Iraq was not targeted as much as it indirectly targeted the Shi‘ī community. The Baathists attempted to weaken the sectarian affiliation which might side with the Iranian Shi‘ī regime. Instead the Baathists emphasised ethnic differences between “Iraqi Arabs” and “Iranian Persians”. Ṣaddām himself emphasised the Arab identity of the Iraqi Shi‘ī as he argued that:

“Its [Najaf, a holy city for Shiites] soil is Arab and its great symbol is our grandfather Imām ‘Alī ibn ‘bī Ṭālib, who is definitely not the grandfather of Khomeini”. (Cited from Lewental 2011, n. 1668, 425)

Thus, for al-Baṣrī, who was a Ba’thist Shi‘ī and targeted his community, the Christians support of the Arab Muslim in al-Qādisīyah is evidence that Arab national loyalty had replaced sectarian and confessional loyalty, and that the Christians who have joined Islam or allied with it expressed their loyalty to Arabism (1980, 64-5). The selection of the words “sectarian” and “jurisprudence” indicates the differences between the same
religion (Sunni and Shi‘ī) rather than differences between two religions (Muslim and Christians).

It is worth mentioning that the ethnic nature of the Persian enmity was not confined to the Islamic period only, but rather extended to include the farthest accessible event in the past. Fawzī, for instance, believed that history confirms that the Persian enmity to the Arabs is rooted in the dawn of history and was raised regardless of the historical period (1987, 11). For Fawzī, the Persian hostility is not the result of a specific historical moment, but rather is timeless and emerged in many different historical phases. For him, one of the oldest cases is the occupation of Babylon by the Achaemenid emperor Cyrus in 539 BCE, which was then followed by the Parthian and Sasanian occupations (Fawzī 1987, 11-2). The aim of such assertions was not only to immunize the Iraqi Shi‘ī community against the Iranian propaganda, as Lewental points out, but also to withdraw the responsibility of starting the war on Śaddām or Iraq, considering that the current war with the Persians is not the result of current regional disputes, but rather it was a renewal of an old enmity that attempted to overcome the deep sense of defeat and shame after the battle of al- Qādisīyah (al-Basirei 1980, 34, 95). Thus, for the Ba‘thist narrative it is historic and thus the enmity is inevitable.

8.2.6 Arab superior character

The Ba‘thist historical narrative represented the Arab with a superior quality and if they united under a proper leader then they would be able to defeat the Other as they defeated the “Persians” in al-Qādisīyah. The Muslim caliph was presented as a heroic, wise, and capable ruler. Al-‘anī and Z‘ein claimed that the Muslim Caliph ʿUmer ibn al- khaṭṭāb realized that al-Qādisiyah had been a fateful battle, and so he mobilised all Arab resources “with an aim of crushing and destroying the racist Persian army” (1983, 139-140). The authors consistently attributed much more personal responsibility to the Muslim caliph, despite his far away from the battlefield, for the preparing and directing of the battle. For instance, the caliph was ordered the location of the battle; he announced a general mobilization in Arabia and called all orators, poets, and sent them
to the battle of al-Qādisiyyah (1983, 140-143). Al-ʻanī and Z’ein argued that the caliph attempted to lead the army by himself, however he was advised by the Arab elite to stay at Medina and sent another Arab commander (1983, 140). Nevertheless, al-Ḥadīthī (1988) claimed that among the indirect factors that led to the Arab victory in al-Qādisiyyah were a great number of skilled Arab leaders in the al-Qādisiyyah army (52-53). However, for al-Ḥadīthī (1988, 55-56) there is no doubt that the superior leadership, along with the ability of Sa’d in sounding the introspection of political and military matters and assessing situations logically before they occurred, was the direct factor of this victory. It was Sa’d who had a comprehensive view of dealing with the particulars of battle, which helped to avoid what might happen from the confusion and mistakes and a natural consequence of the limit of central control.

The Arab superior character expanded to the other commanders. Al-Qa’qā’, for instance, emerged as the day’s hero at the battle of al-Qādisiyyah and in the battle of jalawlaā. In addition, during the battle of al-Qādisiyyah, al-Khālidī, Z (1989, 237) argued that Qa’qā’ was among those who cut off the trunks of elephants that accompanied the Sasanian army. In addition, al-Qa’qā’ attacked the Sasanian army in the night, and was able to kill several Sasanian commanders (al-Ḥadīthī, 1988, 48; al-Khālidī, Z 1989, 237). Qa’qā’ was also depicted as having a crucial role in the battle of Nahawand and, according to Al-ʻanī and Z’ein, he was able to kill the Sasanian commander (1988, 87).

Such depictions of Arab courage were not limited to men only, as the Ba’thist narrative attempted to present it as an element of both genders, perhaps because the Ba’thist depicted it as to be an inherited character in the Arab nation. For instance, Al-ʻanī and Z’ein argued that during the battle of al-Qādisiyyah, al-Khansā’, who presented as a model for Arab women in the Ba’thist narrative (for more on al-Khansā’ see, Lewental 2014, 457-62), encouraged her four sons to fight faithfully, and all were subsequently killed (1983, 144). Arab women played a significant role at the battle of al-Qādisiyyah as they provided first aid to the Arab warriors (Al-ʻanī and Z’ein, 1983, 144; al-Khālidī, Z 1989, 233).

In contrast, the Sasanian characters were portrayed as imprudent, impolitic, and cowardly. Yazdegerd III, the Sasanian king, and Rustam, the Sasanian commander of al-
Qādisiyyah, were equated with the Iranian supreme leader Khomeini, and portrayed as cowardly leaders.

“The defeat of the Persians in the first battle of al-Qādisiyyah turned into a frenzy of hatred that has tainted the memory of the Persians. This negative inheritance has descended over time from the representation of a defeated grandfather (Yazdegerd III) in Qādisiyyah Saʿd to a depraved grandson (Khomeini) in Qādisiyyah Ṣaddām” (‘Iwachy 1981).

According to al-Basri (1980, 46-48), after the failure of negotiations between the Arab delegation and Yazdegerd III in the earlier battle of al-Qādisiyyah, the latter became furious, saying if messengers could be killed, he would kill all of them, and then sent dirt to the Arab delegation. This has been interpreted as both an imprudent move and also a good omen, because it indicated that Iraqi “dirt” would eventually be handed over to the Arab Muslims. A similar event occurred when the Arab delegation met with Rustam, and after the failure of the negotiation the latter became angry and told the Muslims that “I swear by the sun, it does not rise until I will kill you all” (Al-ʻanî and Za’in 1983, 143). Likewise, in a dramatic scene (al-Basri 1980, 52-53), Rustam was presented as a cowering commander who attempted to escape along the river from the Arab Muslims, before he was captured and killed.

Arab heroes were a crucial part of Ba’thist narrative. Narrative of Arab heroic leaders were in part to legitimise and present Ṣaddām as the latest hero, in some cases as god-like, and part of a long chain of Arab hero leaders. For that reason, the Ba’thist propaganda intensified around Ṣaddām, who became the heir of Saʿd and other ancient Iraqi and Arab Muslim leaders. Therefore, these historic Arab Muslim leaders were linked directly to Ṣaddām’s decisions during the Iraq-Iran war (Nawaf 1988, 76) and claimed that the victories in “both Qādisiyyah” were the result of two great leaders, ῾Umer ibn al-Khaṭṭāb and Ṣaddām Ḥusayn (al-Hadithi 1990, 6).
Another dichotomy set up by the books was that the Iraqis and Arabs were the creators of an original civilization, which was then imitated by all other groups in the region. In contrast, Iranian culture was described as lacking in innovation and they are depicted as importing their civilization, largely from ancient Iraq. This Iraqi cultural superiority was explicitly depicted in the introduction of *The Iraq-Persian Conflict*, as the contributor ʿImād ʿAbd al-Salām Raʿūf argued:

“The real challenge to the Persians came from the west, *al-waṭan al-ʿArabī*, the Arab homeland, which, despite its power, was not military in its nature but instead culturally advanced. Since the Persians were not at the same level as this advanced civilization that existed in the west [i.e. in Iraq], this made them a receiver of civilization rather than being a creator of it... This leads scholars to conclude, among them even those who are largely supportive of the Persians, that the ancient Persian state was merely a continuation of the Mesopotamian states". (Raʿūf 1983, 14-5)

Similarly, al-Ḥadīthī implies that the superiority of Iraqi culture was never overshadowed, even when it was colonized by the inferior Persian culture, as he states, “It was clear that the Achaemenids entered Iraq as colonizers and succeeded in overwhelming Iraq’s militarily. However, they failed to overcome it culturally” (1985, 5:7). In the same sense, al-ʿAlī argued even when Iraq was occupied by foreigners who had enormous armies and equipped with lethal weapons, Iraq still maintained its traits and the essence of its culture. Furthermore, what the foreigners appropriated was greater than what they provided (1983, 7-8).

Nevertheless, the Sasanian era is presented as being empty of all cultural achievements. Despite the four centuries that the Sasanians governed in Mesopotamia, this series denied that this resulted in any significant cultural impact. Al-Ṣāliḥī argued that the architecture during the Sasanian era was an extension of the ancient Iraqi style. In this sense, he rejected the argument that viewed the palace of *Madaʿen*, or Ctesiphon, as
influenced by the architecture of the sixth-century Byzantium despite some similarities. Instead, he believes that the planning of the construction and the decoration of the façades of *Taq Kasra*, sometimes called *Iwan Khusrow*, resembles Hatra and the Assyrian architectural style. In addition, he argued that the palace’s construction dated back to the late Parthian or early Sasanian era, rejecting the argument that it was built by Khusrow I, and only imitated the early Iraqi style (1985, 3: 245-250).

Similarly, the founding of Sasanian cities was not taken as a form of cultural impact on Mesopotamia, but rather as a tool for changing the Arabic national identity of Iraq. Al-Hāshimī argued that Ardashir I exercised “a malicious policy” in a long-term attempt to change the Arabic identity of Iraq, by founding several Persian cities in Iraq and the Arabian Gulf [Persian Gulf] (Al-Hāshimī 1983, 101).

In addition, the inferiority of the ancient Iranian civilization, as argued by the Ba’thist historical narrative, led to the development of a ‘permanent psychological complex’ on the part of the Persians. In the introduction to *The Iraq-Persian Conflict*, Raʿūf, with complex arguments, set out a theoretical notion that the Persians suffered from a permanent psychological complex. In his attempt to track the causes of Persian historical aggression towards the Iraqis and Arabs, Raʿūf argued that this was the Persians’ response to realizing their own cultural inferiority in light of the dynamic civilization of their western neighbour. It was this, as Raʿūf claimed, that led to “Persian” military expansion against Iraq (1983, 15).

8.3 The ancient Arab-Roman and Byzantine relationships

The Romans are largely ignored within this series. In fact, the volumes justified ignoring the Sasanian and Roman periods because they were deemed not part of Iraqi national history. Nonetheless, the existence of a number of stereotypes of the Romans and Western culture can be tracked. The Seleucids and the Romans, as with early pan-Arab nationalism, were considered to be Western enemies and both are portrayed as greedy and seeking power. With the death of Alexander the Great, Babylon was portrayed, by Said, M, in this series as divided among three nations with different stereotypical
images. The first group were the indigenous Babylonians, who did not participate in any conflict and were essentially concerned with building civilization. The second group were the Persian mercenaries, who mourned the end of the Persian Empire and the extinguishing of the Zoroastrian sacred fire (for more on the Iranians, see above). The final group were the Macedonian soldiers, who were concerned only with money and the succession of Alexander (Said, M. 1983, 247). This greediness is evoked again during the description of Hatra’s siege by Severus, whose Roman soldiers were portrayed as greedy and seeking Hatra’s treasures (Said, M. 1983, 248).

Throughout the volumes, the Romans and Sasanians were stereotyped differently. While the Persians were often depicted as a destructive force, the Romans and other Western powers were depicted as colonial forces seeking occupation and economic interest. For instance, Mu’ayyad Said argued that

“...The cities of Babylon and Hatra remained an attraction and lure on a permanent basis for the Western armies that invaded Mesopotamia. The Romans coveted the treasures of the sun temple in Hatra. The story of the death of Alexander the Great in Babylon, and his dreams of making it his capital, has [ignited the] western desire to enter it. Thus, Trajan offered sacrifices in the same room where Alexander died in Babylon, four hundred years after the death of Alexander the Great”. (1983, 258-259)

On the other hand, the Sasanian Empire is accused of having contributed to the destruction of Babylon completely, which became eternally desolate (Said, M. 1983, 258).

8.4 Conclusion

The practice of harnessing history as part of the Ba’thist discourse reached its peak during the years of the Iran-Iraq war. The Iranians began to feature in Iraqi historical writing as the Other, the historical enemy of the Iraqis and Arabs. During the war with Iran, Iraqi historical works frequently produced stereotypical images of Iranian enmity
towards Iraq. Within such a context, Iraqi historical writings focused on the production of narratives of continuous warfare between Iraq and Iran. Hundreds of conflicts, struggles, and conquests were used as “historical proof” of the unchanging Iranian attitudes towards Iraqis and Arabs.

Iraqi Baʿthist discourse during this period of war was a multi-layered discourse, with each element connected but sometimes contradictory. The Iraqi Baʿthist party formulated a parallel discourse in which the war with Iran was depicted as an example of endless Iranian aggression against the Iraqi people. Although the Baʿthist party was originally generated from Pan-Arabism ideology, the brittle nature of Iraqi identity forced the Baʿthists to promote Iraqi nationalism alongside Pan-Arabism. The Baʿthist party promoted the idea of a unified Iraqi identity throughout history, one that is contiguous with modern Iraqi borders. The contributors of this idea asserted the existence of a primordial Iraqi identity, one that had been around since the dawn of history, and which had a specific character that was rooted in ancient Mesopotamia, rendering cultural identity contiguous with modern Iraqi boundaries. Thus, the Baʿthist party asserted that unity among the Iraqis was an essential part of Iraqi identity and character, and that it had always led the Iraqis towards triumph, and the foreigners, particularly Iranians, were never able to defeat the Iraqis except when the latter were not united or as a result of internal betrayal. Thus, the Iraqi identity was defined in opposition to an Iranian, or Persian, identity. For such discourse, the Iraqi writers moulded much of their arguments of the ancient relationship between the Arabs and Persians in terms of an ideal Iraqi identity that was threatened by the external aggression of the “evil” Iranians.

During the Iraq-Iran war, Baʿthist discourse presented the conflict against Iran as an endless ethnic conflict between Arabs and the enemy, the “Persians”. While there is no sign of an ethnic clash in the primary sources (see Chapter two), the Baʿthist narrative represented the battle of al-Qādisīyah of 636 CE as a deep-rooted ethnic clash between Arabs and “Persians”. The aim of this was not only to convince the Iraqi Arabs, regardless of whether they were Sunni or Shiʿī, of the dualistic nature of the war between Us (the Arabs) and Them (the Persians), but also to convince the wider Arab
world of the Persian threat. Ṣaddām repeatedly asserted that the Iraqis were battling the “Persians”, who he claimed were not only a threat to the Iraqis but also to the Arabs as a whole. In an interview with the editors of two Saudi Arabian newspapers on 10th October 1988, Ṣaddām asserted that the Iranians believed that the time belonged to them, as the Shi‘ī doctrine encouraged them to build their empire upon the Arab world. Then, he suggested that since the Ottomans had been able to rule the Arabs for hundreds of years through religion, so the Iranians could not do the same (Ṣaddām N.D, 57). Thus, from him, the Arabs must view Iran as a historical Arab enemy.

Nevertheless, the use of the al-Qādisīyah narrative was part of the wider Ba‘thist wartime discourse. Through this narrative, the Ba‘thist party attempted to justify Ṣaddām’s decision to commence military action against Iran by creating the image of the Iranian enemy through a mythic narrative. In addition, the Ba‘thist narrative attempted to immunise the Iraqi Shi‘ī community from countering Iran’s Islamic Revolution propaganda that depicted the war with Iraq as an Islamic, implicitly Shi‘ī (see the above speech by Ṣaddām), revolution against a secular regime.

In addition, the Ba‘thist narrative attempted through the al–Qādisīyah narrative to reinforce the notion that the battle represented an extreme example of Arab military prowess. Thus, if Arab unity, coupled with these innate characteristics, had been capable of defeating Rustam and Yazdegerd III in the seventh century, then a unified Iraq, along with its inherited characteristics, would be capable of defeating Khomeini. Further, reference to Arab heroic leaders was in part intended to legitimise and present Ṣaddām as the latest hero, in some cases even god-like, and certainly part of a long chain of Arab leaders. For that reason, the Ba‘thist propaganda intensified around Ṣaddām, who was represented as the heir of Sa‘d and other ancient Iraqi and Arab Muslim leaders. For instance, al-Ḥadīthī (1990, 6) claimed that the victory in both the “Qādisīyahs” was the result of two great leaders, ʿUmer ibn al-Khaṭṭāb and Ṣaddām Husayn (al-Ḥadīthī 1990, 6).

Thus, by the end of the Iraq-Iran war, the images of the Iranians turned into Iranophobia and became a well-established doctrine within the Iraqi consciousness, particularly within the Sunni community that continued to promote Ba‘thist depictions of the
Iranians after the end of the war in 1988, and even after the collapse of the Ba’thist regime in 2003.

It is important to note that the enemies of the Arabs, according to the Ba’thist narrative, changed between the 1970s and 1980s, but the mechanism of Otherness remained similar. Pan-Arabism was generated as an ideology against Western imperialism, which was seen as an external threat to the Arab world. But because ancient Mesopotamia was not occupied directly by the Romans for a long period, most of the discourse surrounding Western enmity towards the Arab world and Iraq was derived from earlier examples from the medieval age, and especially the Crusades, which would be a fertile topic for future research.
Part Three: Levant Scholarship on Antiquity

Before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq and the Levant were interconnected through political power, culture, and economy, nevertheless borders that were created at the end of the First World War between the Arab communities were not to mean complete separation, and transborder impact on both sides was continued for the rest century. Rather the interconnection remained within most of these areas, particularly within political ideologies as they all submitted to the Western colonial powers. For instance, the growth of pan-Arabism in the Levant had a significant impact on Iraq (see chapter 6 and 10). The same is true for the rise of Ba'thisim which originated in Syria and then moved to Iraq (see chapter 8 and 11). Moreover, the recent growth of Da’sh is another example of this continuity of ideological impact on the both sides. It is this impact that made a necessity for the examination of Iraqi political and historiography relationships with consideration of the Levant impact. Thus, this study intended to make several case studies to trace the impact and make a comparison between the politics and historiography relationship of developments in Iraq with similar in developments Levant.

Chapter Nine: Lebanon and early interaction with western tradition

By the early years of the sixteenth century (1516), the Ottomans controlled all the lands that were subjected to the Mamluks in the Levant, including Lebanon. Such control of Lebanon had great political, social, and economic impact on the region, and this influence continued far beyond the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War.

By the mid-nineteenth century, a socio-political struggle within Lebanon turned into an endemic religious conflict. In 1860, a local dispute between a Maronites (are unique Syriac Christians group mostly live in the Lebanon) and a Druze (are an esoteric ethnoreligious group descend from the Ismaili credo were part of Shi’a Muslims) escalated into a bitter conflict between the two groups. The Druze initiated a wide
massacre of Christians in different parts of Lebanon, and in many villages, Catholic monasteries and Catholic consulates were destroyed. The events spread to Damascus, where the Druze massacred Christians. At times, these killings were carried out with the knowledge and participation of the Ottoman soldiers (Traboulsi, 2007, 24-40). An immediate consequence of the violence was the involvement of France, as the French considered the Maronites to be their subjects. France launched a military campaign to return home the Christians who had been expelled from the Druze villages. They also arrested a number of Druze and deported them outside Lebanon. As a result of an international agreement between the Ottomans and the European powers, the multi-communal administrative decision known as the Qaimaqamate of 1840, which divided Mount Lebanon into two parts, one for the Druze and the other for the Christians, was abolished (Heraclides and Dialla 2015, 135-6; Harris 2014, 112-4). Instead, Mount Lebanon was united again under the direct rule of the Ottomans, a situation that continued until the end of the First World War. This event had a fundamental impact on the future of Lebanon, in which its society was polarised into two religious groups who looked to either the Ottomans or the European powers as protectors against their fellow citizens.

Despite the sectarian and religious tensions that resulted in the bloody events of the 1860s, Lebanon became a hub for trade, Christian missionary activity, and a centre for Arab intelligentsia. Christian missionaries poured into Lebanon in the nineteenth century, and founded a number of schools in accordance with modern developments in Europe, as well as a few universities such as the Syrian Protestant College (SPC, now the American University of Beirut, AUB), established in 1866; and the French St. Joseph’s University, founded in 1875. These developments, along with direct interaction with western intellectuals; the European way of life; the Ottoman Tanzimat; and the contemporary developments in Egypt, all became the basis for the future Arab Nahda (awakening or renaissance) in Lebanon (for Arab Nahḍah, see Traboulsi 2007, 63-7). It was within this socio-political context that Jūrjī Zaydān, born in 1961, grew up, and as such it had a deep imprint on his vision and writings.
9.1 Jūrjī Zaydān’s background

Jūrjī Zaydān (1861-1914) was a Lebanese intellectual, born into a modest Greek Orthodox family in Beirut, and later based in Egypt. He became one of the most productive Arab intellectuals of the late Ottoman period, and has been described as a pioneer of the theoretical foundations of the secular ideology of Pan-Arabism and a leader of the Arab nahḍah, renaissance (Philipp 1973, 22; Zaydan 2012, xi; Massad 2007, 57-8).

Zaydān’s first educational experience was extremely difficult. He joined a traditional religious class run by Greek Orthodox teachers, which he described as more like a cattle pen than a school, where the teachers inflicted harsh punishments on the students for minor offences or even for no reason at all (Zaydān 1968, 7-14). However, Zaydān reported that unlike his peers, he was never punished at the hands of his teachers, not because of his “innate virtue” but rather because he was shy and strongly feared punishment: “I avoided the causes of hatred in my childhood, and I have noticed that this is my natural disposition” (Zaydān 1968, 14-5). It is likely that this sense of caution and desire to avoid direct conflict remained with him during his career. This caution is reflected in his latter writings. For instance, despite his radical writing on the history of the Arabs and Muslims, along with his historical stories, he never sought direct conflict with society. One reason for this seems to be that he was always aware of being a Christian writer within an Islamic society at the turn of the twentieth century (see below).

Zaydān’s first interaction with Lebanon’s educated elite was through his work in his father’s business. He described himself as hungry for knowledge, but he had to help his father’s restaurant that led him to abandon his education (Zaydān 1968, 43-4). During his work at the restaurant, Zaydān was able to socialise with the teachers and students of the SPC who, according to his reflections, followed the Western style in Lebanon, and this exposure to their ideals had a significant effect upon the course of his future life. With the assistance of SPC teachers, Zaydān succeeded in furthering his profound interest in education and passed the entrance exams of the SPC’s School of Medicine. This marked an enormous change in his life, from working in a small business for his father to becoming a well-known intellectual.
Zaydān’s secular thought and ideological stance were formed in Beirut, yet his works were published in Cairo. The SPC’s scholarly atmosphere had a great impact on his ideas and works. Throughout his life, Zaydān indicated his aspiration for the development of a new science, especially Darwin’s theory of evolution, and like many of his contemporary intellectuals, he made a great effort to deploy it in his social interpretation of history (Elshakry 2013, 137). This attempt ultimately caused him to be dismissed from the SPC. His expulsion was the result of his support for Professor Edwin Lewis, who referred to Darwin’s theory in a lecture on 19 July 1882, which was viewed by the administration of college, in Beirut and the United States, as a contradiction to their objectives (Zaydān 1968, 64-95, see Massad 2007, 58). It is thus, his early severe religious clash with traditional conservative vision at the SPC made him to stand strongly for secular reform within Arab society.

Resulting from his dismissal, Zaydān left Beirut and headed to Egypt, with the intention to continue his degree in Cairo (Zaydān 1968, 95). However, he was unable to do so, and instead settled in Egypt along with many of his peers from Syria, all of whom were looking for better job opportunities. During the 1880s while Zaydān settled in Cairo he frequently travelled to Beirut to study both Hebrew and Syriac, and he became involved in several literary and scientific societies such as al Majmaʿ al-ʿilm al sharqi (The Eastern Scientific Academy) and Freemasonry, which both ignited in him an interest in antiquarianism (Elshakry and Nappi 2016, 375). Thus, as Philipp (2011, 84) rightly points out, Zaydān’s key intellectualism was formed during his time in Beirut rather than in Cairo.

In Egypt Zaydān became an active advocator of Arab nahḍah. By 1883 he had arrived in Egypt to continue his degree. Since his attempts to study medicine had failed, he instead decided to embark upon a career in journalism, translation, and history. His first job was working for the al-Zaman (Time) newspaper and he soon became its editor. Later, Zaydān worked as a translator for the British administration and then he joined Garnet Wolseley’s expedition to Sudan in 1885 (Philipp 2013, 1; Elshakry and Nappi 2016, 375). Resulting from this service Zaydān awarded a medal from the British army (Massud and
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Jumaa 1994, p .80; al-Sawy 2000, p .89; Abū Khalīl 1981, 17). ¹ He then visited England in 1886 for a month, during which time he frequently visited the British Museum and the University of Oxford (Dupont 2012, 88-9; Philipp 2013, 1), which might have added more to his enthusiasm for antiquarianism.

In 1892 Zaydân founded the journal al-Hilāl (Crescent), which might be the only one that is still published in Egypt today for such a long period, offering a wide range of subjects on science, history, and literature. Through this journal, Zaydân was eager to acquaint his readership with aspects of supposedly positive images on modern European civilization and similarly show his sympathies for Great Britain (Philipp 2005, 212-3; 2011, 79-80). Al-Hilāl degenerated into a platform to debate the racial evolution theory for both Arab and world readers. Such discussions were seemingly motivated by the contemporary racial and anthropological sciences of the British anthropometric surveys conducted in both Egypt and Sudan (Elshakry 2013, 88). Zaydân himself participated in this debate, by a series of articles on the evolution theory which published in al-Hilāl in 1894-5. In this series Zaydân presented a brief biographical sketch of Darwin’s life with his principal theory of natural selection. Such intellectual and political environments in Egypt, along with his early secular background, moulded the thoughts and visions he expressed through his historical writings.

It is worth to mention here that although Zaydân and al-Kirmilî coming from a Christian background they took two different platforms. The former was growth within the socio-political environment that full of competing visions and ideas from the traditional background and from western generated vision and ideas. Zaydân came under the influence of modern western developments of modernity and then, adopted values of this trend particularly secularism. As a result, he became a pioneer of Arab secularism (discussed in more detail below). On the other hand, the latter despite his interaction with Western tradition that left a great imprint on his writing, but, as he came from

¹ Unfortunately, these sources did not proved details of the type of this medal.
more close and traditional environment of late nineteenth century in Iraq, his religious vision continued to be his main approach to writing history.

In short, Zaydān can be described as an individual preoccupied with self-improvement and secularism, and a cautious intellectual. Thanks to these characteristics, he became an advocate of revolutionising the Arab society on the basis of modern sciences that were conducted by his contemporary European intellectuals. However, any analysis of Zaydān’s approach to Arab history should not focus solely on the influence of the Western tradition on his vision, but must also take into account the vital role played by the socio-political environments of his childhood and studies in Beirut.

9.2 Zaydān’s works

Alongside being a well-known intellectual, Zaydān was also one of the most controversial and divisive Arab scholars. Hourani (1970) argues that Zaydān “Did more than any other to create a consciousness of the Arab past” (1970, 277), and Al-Manār also praised his intellectual credibility:

“We trust the virtuous author [Zaydān] because he did not write about Islam and Muslims, but rather what he believes. Even though he is not a Muslim he is an equitable and intellectual individual, and beyond any religious fanaticism unlike many others” (1902, 357).

However, other scholars viewed Zaydān in a less favourable light, including al-Hindi (1912), Abū Khalīl (1981), and Massud and Jumaa (1994):

“One oddity of this era is that a writer composes a book on the history of Islamic civilization, and include a distortion of words, camouflage the falsehood, a reverse of the narrative, infidelity in the transmission, and deliberate lies, more than is confined and [he] exceed the ultimate line [...] His purposes are to show contempt for the Arab nation and highlight its weaknesses” (al-Hindi 1912, 1-3).
“Zaydān’s grammatical mistakes in The History of the Arab Literature make us to doubt the originality of his texts and make us argue that his text was written in a foreign language, English or French, with Western Orientalist concept, and passed to Zaydān the – “British intelligence/secret agent” - who translated and formed this work without examination or consideration of the authenticity of events” (Abū Khaflī 1981, 13).

We never saw since the Crusaders [the writers, here implicitly depicted Zaydān as a Crusaders] any one worked in the Arab world attempted to distort and degrade the Islamic history as much as Jūrjī Zaydān did”. (Massud and Jumaa 1994, 79)

The above quotations demonstrate the extent of Zaydān’s controversial reception within the Arab intellectual community, even a century after the publication of his works.

A careful reading of Zaydān’s works shows that despite the significant influence of orientalist views on his thinking and his sympathetic discussion of the European way of life in al-Hilāl (1st November 1912, 89-100), it is a mistake to view him as a Western advocate or that his interest in history was not motivated by self-interest alike. Instead, he was a pragmatic intellectual whose socio-political background had a great impact on his vision on the one hand, whilst on the other he entered the debate of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries on the adoption of European concepts and practices to solve the problems of Arab disintegration and backwardness. Within this debate, the majority of Arab scholars agreed to adopt European developments, although primary differences existed, including whether Arabs should imitate European development completely or selectively.

In such a context, Zaydān sought for reforms in the Arab world by transforming the Arab society from the religious to the secular thinking which had succeeded in producing the modern scientific developments that had taken place in Europe. These developments could be adopted due to what Zaydān perceived as its universal value. In doing so, Zaydān criticised the religious interpretation of history. Instead, he argued that interpretations should be subjected to the contemporary scientific theories such as
evolution. This might have been misinterpreted by other Arab intellectuals as an attempt to undermine Islamic values by a “Christian pen”. Nevertheless, Zaydān was not criticised only by the Muslim scholars but also entered an intense debate with Christian religious writers such as Louis Cheikho the editor of al-Muqtaṭaf. Interestingly, Zaydān was reluctant to “Westernise” the Arab world fully, as he was concerned that such a complete embracing of these values might lead to the uprooting or dilution of Arab cultural identity and what was at the time a nascent national identity. As such, in addition to the European theory of evolution, Zaydān also utilised a parallel theory generated within the Arabic tradition, ḍabīyah’s (social solidarity) popularised by Ibn Khaldūn. Thus, Zaydān attempted to formulate an Arab intellectual reform that was able to borrow from European secular developments on one hand, whilst maintaining Arab characteristics on the other.

Zaydān’s intellectual works are defined by three complementary focuses: the historical novel, the Arabic language and, in relation to the focus of this thesis, pre-Islamic and Islamic Arab history. In his historical novels, Zaydān consciously imitated the Scottish historical novelist Walter Scott. Between 1891 and 1914, Zaydān released twenty-two historical novels, some of which have been translated into various languages (Abedin 2013, 53; Matthews 2006, 12, 5-6; Philipp 2013, 325-7; Zaidan 2013, xii). Despite the fact that these novels have remained popular with Arab readers (Patel 2013, 177), Zaydān’s works have been heavily criticised by scholars because he borrowed a considerable amount of his materials from contemporary European writers, occasionally without mentioning his inspiration (Patel 2013, 177). Such an approach by Zaydān, seemingly resulted from his belief that “the end justifies the means”, as his aim for these novels was to awaken the Arab readers’ sense of national pride by providing them with accounts of past glories in order to offer an inspirational model in their search for a national identity (Hafez 1982). In doing so, Zaydān paid a little of attention to presenting Islamic history in idealist images as it was common within Arab scholarly tradition. It is

2 See section three of this chapter.
for that reason his novels were criticised in the Arab world, Iraq and Egypt for instance, due to its “disrespectful approach” to Islamic history (Bashkin 2006, 363).

Within the field of Arabic language, Zaydān published three works and many articles. These works shared similar notions with his historical writings on evolution theory. Zaydān claimed that language such as any living body is subjected to the code of evolution (1904b, 12), believing that it changes with the evolution of human conditions. For example, the transformation from nomadism to urbanism brings a new mode to life, and during such a process new words and new meanings are generated. But as a consequence, the old words disappear along with their usage (Zaydān 1911/1914, 2:5-6). In this context, Zaydān encouraged Arab intellectuals to not hesitate to use new words, ones that had not been previously used by them (Zaydān 1904b, 8). This linear evolution implies rejecting the traditional notion of the Arab language, in which it completed its developments with the revelation of the Qur’an (Philipp 2011, 84). Thus, devotion from Qur’anic Arabic standards does not necessitate the loss of linguistic quality as much as it represents natural developments. Nevertheless, the importance of language for the Arab identity in Zaydān’s vision appeared in an article published in al-Hilāl in which he criticised Sir William Willcocks, who was the first preacher to adopt the Egyptian Arabic dialect instead of standard Arabic. According to Willcocks, who presented a lecture in 1893 entitled Why Egyptians Lack the Power of Invention Now, Standard Arabic was the main cause of the “lack of invention in Egypt” as it is a foreign language that Egyptians have learned (Salah 2015, 2). Zaydān argued that the use of Egyptian Arabic dialect is very problematic because even if it “saves us from one evil, it exposes us to a greater one” (al-Hilāl 1st February 1893, 200). For him, this is because it endangered, al-jamiʿa al- ‘Arabiyah, the Arab unison, which was maintained by the standard language. Hence, without the Standard Arabic

3 William Willcocks (1852-1932), a British civil engineer, was the first to translate the Bible into Egyptian Arabic (Salah 2015).
“The Arab people will be dispersed and each of the “Arab countries” will become independent⁴ of each other [...] as happened to the Latin speaking nations, whose [intricacies] resulted in independent languages, causing contemporary nations to be unable to understand each other, such as France, Italy, and Spain” (al-Hilāl 1st February 1893, 200-4).

Within the field of history, Zaydān published eight historical books in addition to enormous articles in al-Hilāl.⁵ The critical works on which this chapter focuses are Tārīkh al-tamaddun al-Islāmī (The History of Islamic Civilization) (hereafter The Islamic Civilization), which was first published between 1902 and 1906 in five volumes,⁶ and al-ʿArab qabla al-islām (The Pre-Islamic Arab), published in 1907/8.⁷ Zaydān’s interest in the pre-Islamic Arabism was a reflection of two sources. First, the impact of the British Victorians’ and other Western countries’ enthusiasm for classical heritage, which Zaydān had interacted with them during his journey to the British Museum and Oxford University. Second, the Arab feeling of contemporary weakness an intense nostalgia for the great past that had swept the Arab world. Therefore, the Arab intellectuals attempted to derive “lessons” from the past glorious which could be applied for the present and future.

Thomas Philipp argues that Zaydān’s choice to include in the title of his work the Islamic Civilization is odd because this title does not reflect the content. For Philipp, it is not clear whether Zaydān intended originally to write about all of the work chronologically and geographically, or whether he simply followed the thinking of European Orientalists. Thus, the relationships between the title and content “remain open to speculation”

⁴ This was published when the Arab world was part of the Ottoman Empire and they have not divided into independent states yet.
⁶ To the best of this researcher’s knowledge, this work has been reprinted six times, five by al Hilāl’s publisher (1902-1906; 1921; 1927; 1947; 1973) and once by Hindawi (2013).
⁷ To the best of this researcher’s knowledge, this work has been reprinted four times by al-Hilāl’s publisher (1907/8; 1922; N.D; 2006).
(2011, 86). Indeed, Zaydān’s plan was shifted over the course of the first to the fifth volume of *The Islamic Civilization*. While he presented a brief political history of the Islamic states in the first volume, in the fourth he suggests that the success of the first three volumes in the non-Arab-speaking world, especially in the West, caused him to dedicate the fourth volume to the political history of the Islamic states (Zaydān 1905, iv: 3-8), which was not planned initially (Zaydān 1902, i:7). In addition, he decided against compiling a volume on the influence of Islamic civilisation on Western civilisation as he had originally planned (Zaydān 1902, i: 7).

Whilst Zaydān’s organisation of the work shifted between the volumes, his motif did not deviate from its essential points, such as the continuous discussions revolving around the subject of social evolution theory. According to Zaydān, nature as a whole is subjected to the “law of evolution”, and so obviously for him history is no exception (1904b, 12). It is worth mentioning here that Zaydān believed that the historical causes of evolution in history depend either on external challenges (e.g., migration), challenges by an enemy, or internal challenges (e.g., the emergence of prophets or an ambitious leader), but almost always are primarily related to the first factor (Zaydān 1899, 12; 1904b, 12; 1907/8, 44).

Zaydān devoted his volumes on Islamic civilization to the Islamic political institutions, preceded by a brief political history of pre-Islamic and Islamic Arab history, including the financial system, Arab and non-Arab science before and during the Islamic period, the political history of the pre-Islamic Arabs and Arabs/non-Arabs in Muslim states after Islam, and the Arab social system from the pre-Islamic to the Abbasid era.

The common denominator between these five volumes is that they all, with the exception of volume two, begin with a background of the pre-Islamic period and end with the Abbasid collapse, thus establishing a chain towards the *linear* development of Arab people. The initial aim was to highlight to Arab readers that the Islamic civilization inherited its features from different sources, the pre-Islamic Arabs and from previous dominant powers such as the Romans, Byzantine and Sasanians, whose subordinates became part of the Islamic Empire. Thus, Zaydān implicitly criticises the traditional Muslim historians’ vision, which presents the history of the Arabs prior to the
emergence of Islam as Jāhiliyya (ignorance), thus suggesting that the rise of Islam was not the beginning of Arab advancements but rather a continuity from the previous cultures. In the second volume, Zaydān attempts to articulate that the interpretation of Islamic history, like any other field, should be subjected to modern scientific theories such as evolution rather than religious interpretations. This could explain why he terminated The Islamic Civilization project after he released the fifth volume in 1906, and initiated a new work entitled The Pre-Islamic Arabs in 1908. It is important to bear in mind that Zaydān published this work during the Ottoman Empire. His decision to end The Islamic Civilization history with the collapse of the Abbasid Empire not only highlights the impact of the Orientalist vision on his narrative but also further reveals his aim to raise the Arabs’ self-awareness by disconnecting their history from the Ottoman Empire on the one hand, and carefully situating Arab Christians within Arab/Islamic culture on the other. This might be the same reason that prevented Zaydān from writing on Christian history before or after Islam, so the thread of the history should focus on the people/states rather than their religion. This approach reveals conscious attempts by Zaydān of utilizing the history as instrumental to raising Arab consciousness for separation religion from state power. Despite of the wide range of topics that Zaydān participated in, but his work on the Arab antiquity is more relevant to this study, particularly The Pre-Islamic Arab.

The Pre-Islamic Arab is divided into three parts, preceded by an introduction. Zaydān followed the work of traditional Muslim genealogists who divided the Arabs into three groups⁸, each of which is the subject of one section of his work. The first part deals with the earliest Arabs, the ‘Arab ba’da, meaning the extinct or ancient Arabs, whilst the second section explores the following group of Arabs, known as the al-‘Arab al-‘Āribah, the pure or the genuine Arabs. Finally, the last section assesses the third Arab group, the al-‘Arab al-Musta’ribahi, the Arabicised Arabs. This organisation reflects the impact

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⁸ For the traditional Arab view on the Origen of the Arab see chapter 4.
of the Arab Muslim traditional division, which somehow contradicted the biblical division of pre-Islamic Arab history.\(^9\)

Zaydān used an extensive variety of sources in his historical works. Zaydān’s command of several modern European language such as English, French and later in his life German; ancient languages such as Hebrew and Syriac; and of course Arabic made him able to employ an array of primary and secondary historical sources. Form the classical Islamic sources he used al-Tabari, ibn al-Atheer etc. Zaydān used this type of source with much critical vision applying what he learnt from his translation a few works of Charles Langlois (Philipp 2010, 66). As an example of this, he denied the exaggerations of the accounts mentioned in the Islamic literature on the long life of the pre-Muslim people, describing them as *khurāfa*, superstitions, transmitted to Islamic books from Jewish sources such as the Talmud (1907/8 10).

Zaydān had a great familiarity with Orientalist works on Arab history. In his book *Tarikh al-Adab al-ʿArabi, History of the Arab Literature*, Zaydān provided a chronological list of most Orientalist works on Arab history and Arabic language from the seventeenth century to his time with a brief on their nationalities (Zaydan n.d, 4: 146-61). Then, he extensively employed these materials in his historical works without much criticisms. Instead of bing critical to his Orientalists sources as he did with Islamic sources, he most probably added several passages from western secondary sources directly to his works. This point was among the clear example which Zaydān has been criticised by Louis Sheikho and others, a Christian Jesuit, his quotation from Carl Brockelman’s History of the Arab literature (Dupont 2012, 104-5).

\(^9\) The prime difference between the biblical and Islamic tradition is that the former divides the Arabs into two groups (al-ʿArab al-ʿĀribah and al-ʿArab al-Mustaʿribah) rather than three.
9.3 The interaction between politics and history in Zaydān’s works

Thomas Philipp describes Zaydān as an “archetypal member of the Arab nahḍah at the end of the nineteenth century” (2011, 79). By the middle of the nineteenth century, Arab consciousness had begun to express itself in this pan-Arab movement, dubbed idiomatically as nahḍah, which emerged primarily within the Christian intellectual elite during the Ottoman Empire, especially in Lebanon and Syria. This was synchronised with a Pan-Islamic movement in Egypt (Masters 2001, 173-5; Phillips 2011, 11; Volk 2010, 44), and both agreed upon the necessity of reforms within the socio-political condition of the Arab world. However, they did not agree on the way to achieve this goal. On the one hand, the Pan-Islamic movement called for a prioritisation of the bond of Islam over any racial or linguistic bonds. Al-Afghani (1838-1897), for instance, argued that “the secret behind the Muslims disregard, despite their originating from different countries, for different nationalities and their rejection of any group loyalty ʿasabīyah (solidarity) apart from their loyalty to Islam” (cited in Wendell 1972, 173). On the other hand, the nahḍah reformists, such as Buṭrus al-Bustānī (1819-1883) and his son Salīm al-Bustānī (1848-1884), called for the prioritisation of the Arab national bond over any other bonds, including religion. In an article published in the periodical al Jinan, for instance, Salīm al-Bustānī argued that the emphasis on religion rather than nationality is a legacy of the past, suggesting instead that the world is based on national ʿasabīyah (1. 1870, 643: cited in Havemann 2011, 155).

Zaydān, along with many other Christians, followed the nahḍah mainstream that promoted collective Arab identity as a means of rising above the contemporary religious

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10 Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) was a Muslim religious and political activist who became an influential character of the Pan-Islamic movement in the late-nineteenth century.
11 Buṭrus al-Bustānī was a Christian Arab nahḍah figure from Lebanon. He worked closely with the American Protestant Mission during his lifetime, and called for the need to revive Arabic literature in order to formulate an Arab identity. He released a weekly journal called Nafir Suriya (Clarion of Syria) and established the Al-Madrasa al-Wataniya “National School”, which soon won a good reputation and attracted students from many parts of the Levant.
12 Salim Bustani (1848-1884) was a Christian Lebanese journalist. He mastered French, Turkish, and English and so was appointed as a translator at the US consulate, but left to join the press with his father (Zolondek 1966).
and sectarian divisions. He believed that language and culture should be recognised as
the most meaningful dimension of modern Arab identity (Mansour and Boyd 1999, 350; Philipp
1973; Shambayati 1998, 986). These differences were critical in the context of
the late Ottoman Empire, since a number of Muslim nahḍah pioneers, such as
Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849-1905) and ʿAbduh al-Raḥmān al-Kawkābī (1855-1902), had
a great interest in Arab nationalism despite their opposition to the Ottoman domination,
although they retained their acceptance of Islam as a political structure (Weismann
2015; Kurzman 2002, 50-60; Ismail 1995, 94). Zaydān’s modernity project aimed to
adopt the western version of political structure in order to ensure a smooth
transmission to what he called al-tamaddun hadith (modern civilisation), viewing the
European nations as the earliest to deploy modern developments and raise the banners
of science and industry (Zaydān 1899, 9). Thus, for Zaydān the West was a model of
social, political and economic developments that should be imitated by the Arabs, rather
than something to be seen as a threat to Islamic Arab identity as it was seen by the first
group of nahḍah. To achieve this, Zaydān allied, like most Christians, with the Arab
intellectuals who taught that secularism is the avenue to modernise the Arab world on
the basis of equality between all religions.

In other words, 19th century European colonialism had an impact on the Arab
historiography. It led Arab writers to interpret past Arab history in a way that could break
with traditional Arab Muslim historiography which always found religion, particularly
Islam, as the thread that bound Arab history. However, Zaydān, who sought for
secularisation of the Arab world, insisted on interpretation of Arab history on the basis

13 It is worth to mention here that the Christian intellectuals were divided into two camps. First, the secular
intellectuals who attempted to adopted scientific doctrines and published their views in al-Hilāl such as. Second, the
Christianity theologians, who supported a traditional religious and published their views in al-Muqtatf which was
edited by Louis Cheikho a conservative Protestant and the Jesuits. This seems was a parallel with similar debate in
Cambridge and Oxford universities on religion and scientific doctrines. For the historical context of differences
between Muslim and Christian views, see Chapter 4.

14 In his book Umm al-Qura, al-Kawkābī listed twenty-six reasons for Arab superiority. Thus, according to him the
Caliph should be an Arab. In addition, he expressed his explicit opposition to the Ottoman Empire on the grounds of
Muslim stagnation as a consequence of Ottoman tyranny. He published this book under the pseudonym ʿIbn al-Furati
(son of Euphrates) (al-Kawkābī 1931).
of ethnic identity rather than religion. It is important to note, that Zaydān largely failed to secularise Arab society, but nevertheless, his works became important for Arab nationalism in the Levant and Egypt, consequently a great impact on the Iraqi historiography as we saw in chapter 6.

This led Zaydān to a number of theories. First, the Arab Islamic era was but one episode of the history of Arab civilization and was not the beginning. The second, a “cross-fertilization” of civilization, was a major source of the progress of civilizations throughout history. Thus, the Arabs should not hesitate to deploy modern European sciences and social progress. It seems that it was for that reason that Albert Hourani considered Zaydān to be among the Christian intellectuals who, unlike the Arab Muslim nationalists of his generation, attempted to bring the Arabs “under the benevolent protection of liberal Europe” (1970, 277). Nonetheless, Zaydān rapidly argued that all cultures have borrowed from each other, citing examples such as the Greek civilization, which was based on an Asian model for instance, since the Egyptians and Phoenicians had initially brought tamaddun (civilization) to the Greek world (Zaydān 1899, 12; 1902a, i:13). Further, Zaydān also argued that the Persian culture was based on Mesopotamian heritage (Zaydān 1902a, I: 13-14), with Muslims having borrowed from Persians and Romans for their culture (1907/8, 44), and that the contemporary Western civilization was based on the knowledge of Arab Muslim culture (al-Hilāl 1st March 1914, 410-15).

Zaydān was the first Arab intellectual to outline a national identity of all Arabs as far back as ancient history (Philipp 1973). He argued that the true history of a nation is not the narrative of its wars and conquests, as suggested by other Arab historians, but rather it is the history of the nation’s urbanisation and civilization, and thus it should seek to address a nation’s “civilizational capacity” (Zaydān 1902a, I: 8). In order to find an Arab “civilizational capacity”, Zaydān began to incorporate the history of regional peoples of ancient Mesopotamia and the Levant into an Arab history. From language structure and

15 See Chapter 14
terminology comparisons, he concluded that the Hammurabi and the Babylonians of ancient Mesopotamia, were Arabs (Zaydān 1907/8, 49-51). On a similarly ideologically motivated basis, he argued that the Hyksos in Egypt (Zaydān 1907/8, 59), the Nabataeans (Zaydān 1907/8, 78-9), and Palmyrans (Zaydān 1907/8, 89), and the Minaeans, Sabaeans, and Himyarites in Yemen were all Arabs (Zaydān 1907/8, 135-6). Identification of all these people as Arab allowed Zaydān to depict Arabs as the first people “to urbanise, construct, and organise governments, build cities, enact laws, establish schools, and promote social conditions to upgrade the status of women” (Zaydān 1907/8, 135), suggesting that these practices dated back four-thousand years. Moreover, as Zaydān’s focus was more on social development rather than war narrative, this might be the reason he did not account the Assyrians as an Arab origin despite of his sources argues that both came from Semitic origin. The reasonable justification of this might be influenced by the orientalists’ view of Assyrians as war seekers. In contrast, the Babylonian was considered by the Victorians as an advanced culture in ancient history. Such vision he implied in *The Pre-Islamic Arab* (1907/8, 135)

For Zaydān, the Islamic civilization was not the first era of Arab civilization or even the best example of what Arab people had achieved throughout history (Zaydān 1902a, i:9). According to him, for instance, ancient buildings such as the *Ma‘rib* dam, which was built by the “Arabs” of Yemen, remain amongst the wonders of history (Zaydān 1902a, i: 11-2). This dam, according to Zaydān, proved that the Yemeni “Arabs” were one of the earliest nations to utilise geometry (Zaydān 1902a, i: 12).

For Zaydān the true history of a nation is its civilizational capacity (Zaydān 1902a, i:8). This seems to prove that even the Abbasid civilization, which Zaydān viewed as the last link in the chain of the Arab civilization, had come to its end (Zaydān 1905, iv: 209-212). However, the Arabs have not lost their civilizational capacity yet, as they have actively contributed to modern civilization (Philipp 2011, 86).

Zaydān adopted the idea that the rise and decline of civilizations are linked and united by social solidarity, what Ibn Khaldūn called ‘aṣabīyah. According to Ibn Khaldūn, this enables tribes to conquer urbanised states. However, with the passing of time, as the tribe lives in the “luxury and opulence” provided by urbanisation, the group’s ‘aṣabīyah
is gradually impaired, which ultimately leads to the group being overthrown by new tribes, who soon face the fate of the first group (Ibn Khaldūn 2004, 1:281). On the base of this vision, Zaydān argued that civilization is a source of prosperity and luxury that leads to indulgence in pleasures, which in turn leads to the reduction of social solidarity and thus weakens the group (Zaydān 1907/8, 34-35).

Zaydān applied this theory to the ancient history of Mesopotamia and the Levant, arguing that the Sumerians in Mesopotamia took control from an earlier urbanised people. By incorporating some of the culture of this previous group, the Sumerians were able to establish their culture and evolve socially. As a consequence, they became urbanised and life became more luxurious, and the more this occurred, they weaker they became, until they relied entirely on the Semitic people for protection. Ultimately, this was enable the Semitic people to overthrow the Sumerians and took their civilization and developed it (1908, 34-5). In a similar way, Zaydān argued that the Nabataean’s “luxury living” enabled the Romans to occupy Petra which ultimately led not only to the collapse of the Nabataean’s kingdom but also to the dissolution of their social solidarity and to their disappearance from the history completely (1907/8, 78).

For Zaydān this was a similar case to other civilizations such as the Sasanian Empire which collapsed at the hands of the Arab Muslims who had stronger ʿasabīyah (Zaydān 1905, iv: 105). According to Zaydān, this cyclical pattern has been the “law of life” since the dawn of time (1908, 35). This theory allowed him to exhibit Arab history as a series of nahḍat, or awakenings, followed by “dark ages” (Elshakry 2013, 123), and more importantly it stood against the concept that islām or religion was the cause of Arab rise in history.

Zaydān implied that most of these nahḍat resulted from a wave of migration or external challenges (Zaydān 1902a, I: 22-3). The Hyksos dynasty of Egypt, for instance, was an Arab nahḍah that resulted from the migration of the Asian Arabs to Egypt (Zaydān 1907/8, 56). Similarly, he described the “contemporary Syrian nahḍah” as a result of Lebanese migration to Syria (1907/8, 35), implying that the Lebanese in Egypt, including himself, had the same role as the Egyptian nahḍah. Similarly, nahḍah was raised as a result of external challenges. For instance, the Yemeni Arabs’ civilization flourished after
the Roman expedition led by Aelius Gallus (Zaydān 1907/8, 172; 176). The advancement of Arabs under Islam, which Zaydān describes as “ʿAdnanites advancement” (Adnan is the tribe of the Prophet Muhammad), resulting from the challenge of al-ʿAḥbash (the Ethiopians) in the second half of the sixth century. For Zaydān, this challenge not only contributed to the emergence of Islam, but simultaneously the most important Arab warriors during the Islamic period resulted from this challenge (Zaydān 1907/8, 172; Zaydān 1902a, I: 23). In another example, Zaydān argued that the Ghassanids were urbanised through their interactions with the Romans (1907/8, 184). Consequently, Zaydān implied that the French challenge in the modern era was behind the development of Egypt in the era of Muhammad Ali (and his subsequent dynasty), who Zaydān considered as the “hero” of the modern Egyptian nahḍah (al-Hilāl 1st December 1892, 123-5).

Zaydān believed that Arabs are “innately” prepared for civilization, but did not deny the significance of acculturation on Arab culture. For him, all past and present cultures have borrowed from each other, causing cultural development rather than dissolution. For instance, the Babylonian developments were derived from those of the Sumerians (Zaydān 1907/8, 44), while the Persians built their civilization on the remains of the Babylonian, Assyrian, and Chaldean civilizations (Zaydān 1902a, I: 13-4). As for the Arabs of Arabia, they were affected by Jewish customs and traditions (Zaydān 1902a, I: 15), and the Arab-Muslim civilization was derived from Roman and Iranian origins (Zaydān 1902a, I: 13-4). He continues to explain his concept of the advantages of acculturation until the modern era, as he believed that in order to acquire progress, contemporary Arabs should borrow the modern tamaddun developed on the European continent (Zaydān 1899, 9).

Despite the discourse of binary opposition between East and West that influenced Zaydān’s theories, he attempted to criticise a number of stereotypical Orientalist visions of the Arab world. He argued that we cannot determine when the conflict between the East and the West began, but we know that the two regions differ in their opinions on the matter. In addition, such conflict is enhanced by differences between the various peoples in terms of language, ethnicity, complexion, and ethics, which have led to
divergence and discord (al-Hilāl 1st January 1912). In a later discussion, Zaydān represented the Mediterranean as divided between these two worlds (al-Hilāl 1st January 1914, 403). On the other hand, he criticised the Europeans who represented the West as exclusively active and diligent, and the East as a paradigm of “inactivity and stagnation” (al-Hilāl 1st January 1912). In the same manner, Zaydān criticised the argument that the Arabs have made no civilizational contributions in pre or during the Islamic era because they are innately far from being civilised (Zaydān 1902a, I: 9), instead arguing that:

“We consider that the Arabs are among the most capable people when it comes to establishing civilizations and governing them, and certainly no less so than any other nations” (Zaydān 1902, I: 9).

9.4 Conclusion

Zaydān attempted to revive Arab culture and language through the use of historical consciousness, not for the sake of history itself but rather to reconstruct the Arab society on a secular basis and to eliminate the religious dimension of Arab identity. His attempts were ignored latter by the rise of the nationalist ideology in the Arab world in which the intense discussion was not on how to separate religion politics but on how to combine Islam into the Arab nationalist ideology. Further, he endeavoured to build a bridge with western powers on the one hand, and to establish a legitimate basis for the separation of the Arab world from the Ottoman Empire on the other hand.

Zaydān had an impact on Arab historiography in a different manner. As he adopted contemporary European theories, particularly positivism, his method of writing history could be seen as an early challenge to the traditional Islamic historiography in the Arab world. In one hand he began to criticise Arab Muslim historians and on the other claimed that he was not writing a religious history but rather a national and Arab cultural history. Thus, a great part of criticism of him by the Arab intellectual was targeted at this “new” model in Arab historiography.
In addition, Zaydān had a great impact on contemporary pre-Islamic Arab historiography. He presented a radical vision on pre-Islamic Arab, al-Jāhiliyya. Instead of presenting this period as ignorant or as a “barbaric” anarchical society in Arab history, he presented Arab society as an advanced civilization. Thus, he began to restructure Arab history in such a way that all ancient civilizations of the fertile crescent and south Arabia became part of Arab national history. A clear example of this was Zaydān’s integration of Babylonian history into Arab history, particularly Hammurabi and his code (see above). Nonetheless, although Zaydān was not completely successful in his endeavours, his discourse and way of approaching history provided the impetus for the next generation of Arab nationalists, as we saw with al-Miqdādī, and shall see with Muhammad Darwazah in the next chapter.
Chapter Ten: Arab nationalism in its cradle; Muḥammad ʿIzzat Darwazah

10.1 Palestine political background

In November 1917, the British Foreign Minister, Arthur Balfour, declared that the United Kingdom would support the Jewish people in establishing a “Jewish National Home” in Palestine. Whilst the Jewish aspiration for a national state preceded this statement, this was the first international promise to establish a Jewish state in modern history. This statement later was included in the San Remo Conference of 1920, which the League of Nations would approve two years later. These events sparked the Arab-Jewish conflict.

Throughout the twentieth century, both the Arabs and the Jews have exerted significant effort to claim Palestine as their own. Militarily, both sides entered into wars in 1948, 1967, and 1973, which mostly ended with Jewish victory. Politically, many international conferences have been organised throughout the twentieth century, but none have resulted in stable peace between the two sides. More importantly for this dissertation, historical writings have played a pivotal role in this conflict, as both sides sought to prove their historic right to Palestine and to disqualify the other’s claim. Within this context, the Palestinian writer Mohamed ʿIzzat Darwazah appears to be one of the strongest proponents of the Arabs’ national right to establish their sole state in Palestine.

10.2 Muhammad ʿIzzat Darwazah

Muhammad ʿIzzat Darwazah\(^1\) (1887-1984) was a historian and an important pioneer of Arab nationalism whose impact on Arab thought has continued up to the present day.

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\(^1\) As a surname, al-Darwazah has no link with the Druze who are a religious minority lives in the Levant (Britannica)
(Murray 2003, 27). Darwazah’s political and intellectual thought is a mirror of his early life. Born in Nablus to a mercantile Arab Muslim Sunni family (Darwazah 1993, 1:45), he was thus raised in a religious context: “from my childhood, an awareness of religiosity was a dominant trait of my family” (Darwazah 1993, 1:46). Later in life, Darwazah received Islamic education from many scholars of his town and became a member of the Naqshbandi Sufi order (Darwazah 1993, 1:70-1; 1:116). Unlike other members of his generation who continued their education in universities in Istanbul or Beirut, Darwazah terminated his education at preparatory school level in 1902 (Darwazah 1993, 1:159). However, his great enthusiasm for education allowed him to continue in the pursuit of knowledge, and he became a “self-taught intellectual” (Darwazah 1993; Muslih 1993, 178). Having served in the imperial post and telegraph service during the Ottoman period, Darwazah learned Turkish and French (Darwazah 1993, 1:157-8; see Matthew 2006, 267) and also possessed a basic knowledge of English (Darwazah 1993, 1:645). During the 1920s, he first attempted to implant his political ideology into the educational system whilst serving as an educator and as the principal of the an-Najah National School (Matthew 2006, 50). These three pillars of his early life, family, education, and early career, guided him throughout the rest of his life.

As was the custom with the intellectuals of his generation, Darwazah engaged in direct political activities. In 1919, he was one of the organisers of the first Palestinian Arab Conference (Darwazah 1993, 1:327), at which he defended the annexation of Palestine to Syria. Darwazah was also one of the founders and later even a leader of opposition to the British mandate in Palestine known as the Muslim-Christian Associations. He became a member of the leadership of the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine and was close to radical Palestinian nationalist Haj Amin al-Husseini3 (Darwazah 1988, 16).

Encyclopedia World Religions 2006 p.304). However, Muhammad Darwazah himself argued that it referred to the career of his grandfather, who was a tailor (Darwazah 1993, 1:46).

2 the introduction of Darwazah memory imply that he completed it around 1975. However the publisher have no any comments whether there was an edition published by dewazah before his death in 1984.

3 Haj Amin al-Husseini represented the most radical wing and the most uncompromising segment of the Palestinian national movement.
Darwazah also participated in direct military resistance against the Western occupation of the Arab world with the founders of the organisation *Fata Filastine*, the Young of Palestine, who from 1919 began preparing for armed action (Darwazah 1988, 14-5). In 1932 he became, along with other Arab nationalists such as Sheikh ʿIzzaddin al-Qassam, a founder of the *Hizb al-Istiqlal* Independence Party (Darwazah 1993, see Zachary 2011, 8).

Darwazah did not limit himself exclusively to the Palestinian political movements, but was also in constant contact with Syria and Lebanon, and to a lesser extent with Egypt and Iraq. When the Ottoman administration withdrew from Levant, Darwazah went to Beirut, Amman, and Damascus, where between 1919 and 1920 he became secretary of the Syrian National Congress (Darwazah 1993, 1:350). In 1939 he was imprisoned by the French for two years at the request of the British (Darwazah 1993, 3:839-40). Five years later he returned to Palestine to engage in nationalist political action within the Arab Higher Committee, and was active in this movement until 1948 when his health began to deteriorate. He finally retired from politics to devote himself to research and writing (Darwazah 1988, 16).

In the field of the intellect, Darwazah was one of the most prolific Arab writers, publishing hundreds of articles and translations. He wrote on many different topics. In 1911 he wrote his first historical novel entitled *Wufūd al-Nuʿman ʿala Kisra Anu Shirvan* (*Nuʿman’s, delegations to the Sasanian king Khusrow II*). He indicated that this novel was inspired by Abd al-Raḥmān Al-Kawākibi⁴ (Darwazah 1993, 1:158) and designed to invoke images from Arab history in order to encourage Arab national consciousness (Darwazah 1911; 1993, 1:17). He wrote in other disciplines including Islamic studies, for instance, *al-Tafsīr al-Ḥadīth : tartīb al-suwar ḥasab al-nuzūl* (*Modern interpretation: arranging the Verses according to revelation*) ten volumes (1961-1964), the Arab nationalist thought and contemporary Arab movements, for example *al-Waḥdah al-

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⁴ For Al-Kawākibi was one of the prominent precursors and ideologists of the Arab Nahdah movement. His vision fluctuates between Arab nationalism and Islamic revivalism. See Hourani 1970, 371-3 and Wightman 2004.
ʻArabiyyah (the Arab unity) (1957), the Palestinian issue for instance, Fi sabīl qaḍīyat Filastīn wa-al-waḥdah al-ʻArabīyah wa-min waḥy al-nakbah wa-lī-ajli muʻālajatihi (For the Sake of the Palestinian Question and Arab Unity, From the Inspiration of the al-Nakba and for its Management) (1973). In addition, he wrote six autobiographical volumes, and being inspired by British textbooks on the genre of the novel, he also published Durūs fī al-tārīkh al-ʻArabī min aqdam al-azminah ilā al-ān (Lessons of Arab History: From Antiquity to the Present Time) composed of two volumes (hereafter Lessons of Arab History) (Darwazah 1929/1930), Durūs fī al-tārīkh al-qadīm, (Lessons of the Ancient History) (Darwazah 1932), and Durūs fī al-Tārīkh al-Mutawassīt wa al-ḥadīth (Lessons of Medieval and Modern History) (Darwazah 1930). The Lessons on Arab History with editing, became the first Arab school textbook in contrast to a mere history of particular Arab states in that decade, including Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq (Darwazah 1993, 1:645; Choueiri 2000, 25). Unlike Kirmili’s textbook (for Kirmili see chapter 5), Darwazah’s textbooks become a cornerstone of disseminating anti-British sentiment.

10.3 Darwazah’s The History of the Arab Race in Various Periods, Stages and States

The impetus of Darwazah’s historical writing, and that of most Arab nationalists, was not seeking an academic interest. Rather he attempted to mobilize a nationalist project. (Darwazah 1988, 24) pointed out that his “historical project is an essential part of his [Arab] nationalist project”. Thus, to raise public awareness of Arabism, Darwazah intended to reach beyond the academic audience. He demonstrated in the introduction to the Tārīkh al-jins al-ʻArabī fī mukhtalaf al-āṯwār wa-al-adwār wa-al-aqtār (The History of the Arab Race in Various Periods, Stages, and States) (hereafter History of the Arab Race) that the work does not address specialist historians but rather targets as wide a

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5 For the Nakba see chapter 3.
6 For the complete works of Darwazah, see the appendix
range of readers as possible. One such target audience that Darwazah had in mind was the “Youth and non-specialists who do not find the motivation and the time for lengthy historical books” (Darwazah 1959, 1:8). Therefore, the work was not constructed to be an academic examination of history that adopts critical analysis and interpretation of historical sources, but rather it was intended to spread a specific political ideology to a wider range of Arab readers. In this context, unlike other Arab nationalists such as Zaydân\(^7\), who attempted to reveal the great Arab civilizations in the pre-Islamic era, or al-Miqdâdî\(^8\), who attempted to depict the Arabs as an “organically unified body”, most of Darwazah’s historical configurations revolve around the idea of a deep-rooted Arab identity in various Arab states and the continuity of this identity throughout time, from antiquity to his day (1959, 1:6). Thus, Darwazah called for “correctness” of Arab history. For him correctness was defined by that of western scholars who based their vision on the Bible and who had called all the groups who lived in the fertile crescent Semitic not Arab. For him, then, it was scientifically necessary to integrate all the Semitic groups who live in the fertile crescent into Arab identity and ignore the term (1959, 1:17-8). Therefore, Darwazah argued that “correctness” of Arab history is among the main aims of the work, illustrating that a lack of Arabic work on Arab history is not the only motivation of his work but also the existence of publications such as Zaydân (1908) and ‘Alî (1951-1985) followed the western vision of the ancient Arab identity and did not point out the unity of Arab race throughout history (Darwazah 1959, 1:8-19). This attempts by Darwazah could be seen as an early individual attempt to re-write Arab history in accordance to a certain ideological vision, which was intensified later in the Arab world for political purpose (see chapter 8 and 11).

In his ambitious project on Arab history Darwazah provide an authoritative historical summary of the "Arab nation". He depended on the secondary sources and a rare reading of the classical Islamic historians quoted simply and unreflectively. He thus

\(^7\) For Zaydân see chapter 9.  
\(^8\) For al-Miqdâdî see chapter 6.
dismisses the historical context in which the narrative of the pre-Islamic operate. For him then, there is nothing new in historiography, therefore, as he argued there is not much new to be expected in *History of The Arab Race*. Darwazah has understood this as to be “the nature of historical works as all historians’ quote from each other” (Darwazah 1959, 1:7). This idea allowed Darwazah to move away from formulating a logical hypothesis in favour of prompting his discourse through selective quotations that corresponded to his political vision. Nonetheless, even when Darwazah attempted to support his vision using “scientific” method through footnotes and references to a number of Arabic and Western academic sources, he was unsuccessful due to the limited amount of references incorporated. For instance, chapter one merely depended on a number of secondary Arabic sources such of Jawād ʿAlī, *The Histor* (1950-9); Jūrjī Zaydān pre-Islamic Arab history; Taha Baqir, introduction in ancient civilization and Salih al-ʿAlī, Lecturers on the Arab history. For the western source he readied only the work that had been translated into Arabic such as Philip Hitti, *History of the Arabs* (1937); Breasted, *A history of the ancient Egyptians*. For the classical Islamic historians he depended on, al-Ṭabarī (d. 923) *Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī*; and al-Masʿūdī, (d.957). Murūj al-dhahab. Nevertheless, Darwazah included no such sources with regard to the generally Greek and Roman well-known historians who were widely ignored and none of the Herodotus, Strabo; Ammianus Marcellinus, Procopius, Priscus, Menander Protector and Theophylact Simocatta. Within this limited data he borrowed an extensive amount from other historians; in some case he mentioned his sources while in other he did not. For instance, he noted that the majority of his chapter dealing with Kinda’s history is copied from *The History of Jawad ʿAlī* (Darwazah 1961, 5: 126-131).

For Darwazah, Arabism or the Arab race is defined more by a sense of unity of language and culture than by blood, Darwazah used the words al- *al-jins*, as a synonym with Arabic word *alqawm*, Nation. Darwazah initiated his argument by illustrating what he meant by race in relation to Arab people, specifying that he did not mean a group of people who are biologically different from other groups, which is a misleading concept. Instead, similarly with Herder’s understanding of nation, by the term ‘Arab race’ he meant a group of people who had lived in Arabia since the dawn of history and shared a common
language, thought, and culture. With the passage of time, these characters developed into the concept of a sole nation. The Arabs retained these shared characteristics when migrating from Arabia to neighbouring provinces such as the Levant, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Yemen (Darwazah 1959, 1:8).

Once Darwazah established his definition for the Arab race, he argued that it would be a consistent thread that links the volumes of *History of the Arab Race* together. Darwazah divided Arab history into three broad stages, each of which has its distinct socio-political and cultural features. According to Darwazah, each of the volumes examines a different historical period in order to reconsider the deep and significant role of Arab racial identity of the modern Arab states (Darwazah 1959, 1:9). The first stage is that of the Arab race before explicit Arabism, the second is explicit Arabism of the pre-Islamic era, and the final stage is explicit Arabism after the rise of Islam.

10.4 The interaction between politics and history in Darwazah's *History of the Arab Race*

“The innovative nature of this book is (a) its collection and coordination of the feats and movements of the Arab race in history. It highlights their vitality and characteristics in different stages and states before the emergence of explicit characteristic of the Arabs before and after Islam. Along with the present Arab race in one sequential format, based on the

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9 Darwazah argues in the introduction that this work would be twelve volumes and cover Arab history in its entirety. However, he published only eight volumes.
10 This division of the Arab history might implicitly reject division of history into ancient, medieval, and modern periods, which seem based on European history.
11 This stage is covered by the first four volumes: 1) Introduction and History of Arab Ethnicity and Their Achievements before the Explicit Arabism Stage; 2) The Arab Waves to the Nile Valley and Their Achievements before the Explicit Arabism Stage, 3) The Arab Waves to Iraq and Their Achievements before the Explicit Arabism Stage, and 4) The Arab Waves to the Levant and Their Achievements before the Explicit Arabism Stage.
12 This stage was covered by the sixth and seventh volumes The Explicit Arabism In Islam Under the Banner of the Prophet; seventh volume, The Explicit Arabism In Islam Under The Banner of The Al-Khulafā’ Al-Rāshidin, Rightly Guided caliph and eight volumes; The Explicit Arabism In Islam Under The Banner of The Al-Khulafā’ Al-Ummawiyyin, the Umayyad caliph.
unity of the Arab race throughout history and the necessity of making this
vision a basis for the writing of Arab history, (b) It includes our opinions,
conclusions, thoughts, comments and corrections for the sake of [the unity
of the Arab race], (c) it include a chain of connected history of the Arabs’ and
Muslim states that emerged in different parts of the Arab homeland
throughout history, be they independent or subjected to other powers”.
(Darwazah 1993, 1:7)

The above quotation explains that Darwazah’s historical configuration is a mirror of an
Arab nationalist project. Georg Iggers points out that nationalist historiography can be
identified in several ways. First, it “possesses an intimate sense of its past, and often its
ancient past, as the foundational source of identity and historical destiny” (2013, 105).
Darwazah has discussed these issues in the context of an Arab nationalist framework,
albeit as part of a more assertive vision than a theoretical analysis. For Darwazah,
despite the importance of the natural geographical unit for the nation, the people are
the decisive element for creating the nation’s homeland (Darwazah 1959, 1:8-11; see
Dawn 1988). This has been explained by the structure of the works which track the
Arabs history in ancient Mesopotamia and Levant rather than the history of these
regions. He argues that the Arab domination of the Fertile Crescent and Yemen was
achieved since remote antiquity. Consequently, for instance, the history of Akkadians,
Assyrians, and Babylonians is without doubt, is a history of the Arabs in Mesopotamia
(Darwazah 1959). Furthermore, Darwazah aimed to demonstrate that Arab history has
a series of links forming one race since the dawn of history to his day. Those waves,
according to Darwazah, involved shared language, ideas, facial characteristics, and skin
colour in various stages. The constant sharing of these merits, it is more likely that
Darwazah used the word merit as a particular feature of the Arab Jins, race which refers
implicitly to Arab racial superiority, in various stages between those waves, which from
his point of view had been supported by enormous archaeological and historical
evidence, not only justifies the consideration of the unity of the Arab race from the dawn
of history but also expresses the extension of Arab identity of contemporary countries
to “tens of centuries” before the arrival of Islam (Darwazah 1959, 1:9).
The second mode of national historiography as argued by Iggers is a nationalist historiography premised on an awareness of the in-group and out-group. “This consciousness, however, may or may not lead to a critique of the ‘Other’. Thus, it may lead to a critique of colonialism” (2013, 105). Unlike the Arab-Christian nationalists of his generation (e.g., Zaydān and Najīb ‘Āzūrī), whose aim was to bring the Arabs “under benevolent protection of liberal Europe”.14 Darwazah’s formulation of Arab identity relied on binary opposition as a primary structural principle of Arab history, such as the Arab-Western colonialism schema. For him the notion of colonial enmity to the “Arab nation” was evident in western attempts to disconnect the identity of the recent Arabs with pre-Islamic populations. Darwazah pointed out that his perception of Arab identity as connected from past to present will contribute to “foil the malevolent project of colonizers, missionaries and Orientalists, who are the enemies of Arabism and whose concepts of Arab history are beyond all logic and impartiality” (Darwazah 1960, 4:36).

Nevertheless, for him, the colonial discourse attempts to separate the ancient history of the Arabs from the latter Arab race. For Darwazah, colonialism in Lebanon ignored the Arab origins of the ancient people of the Levant, for him, such as the Canaanites, Phoenicians, and Aramaeans, along with the explicit Arabism waves that shaped the modern Levant. Their aim was to influence the recent inhabitants, generally the Christians and especially the Maronite who are for him “definitely Arab,” and weaken the link between them and the original Arabism by causing them to consider modern Arabs as invaders (Darwazah 1959, 1:9). From this primary aim, Darwazah devoted the first four volumes to Arab history in what he called the pre-explicit Arabism stage.

10.4.1 The Arabs in the pre-explicit Arabism stage

“The designation of this stage as pre-explicit Arabism is because the term “Arab” did not apply to all of the Arabs [he here used the term Arabs instead

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14 See Chapter 14.
of Semitic], and a standard Arabic represented by the Quran was developing but had not been formulated yet”. (Darwazah 1957b, 47; 1962, 6:4)

On the base of this definition, Darwazah argues that, even though he believed that the Arab presence in Mesopotamia might go back even to before the fifth millennium BCE, because writing was not invented yet, he limits his study to historic period only (Darwazah 1959, 3:18). Thus, he concluded that the period between the fifth millennium to the end of the second millennium BCE embodies the pre-explicit Arabism stage of Arab history (Darwazah 1959, 1:26). This notion revolves around two prime assumptions: (a) all the groups of the ancient Fertile Crescent shared a common origin originated from one origin, and (b) all these groups shared similar language and culture. Thus, the Arab identity is not determined by the political context as Rousseau, Locke and their follow thinkers might argue rather it is determined by the culture, similarly to the cultural nationalism adopted by the German thinkers such as Herder.

Darwazah was ready to accept new scholarly visions however any new vision should not challenge the ancient root of Arab identity. In the History of the Arab Race Darwazah implicitly withdrew the idea that Mesopotamia could be considered the cradle of Semitic race, which he had previously claimed in The Lessons of History (Darwazah 1932, 5-6), as this vision was heavily criticised by Ali 1951, 1952 (for ‘Ali see chapter 7). Instead, he exhibits this idea with other hypotheses discussed in detail in The History, suggesting that Yemen or Arabia was probably the first homeland of the Arab race (Darwazah 1959, 1:25-7). Darwazah believes that wherever the origin of the Arabs may be, they retained their common identity throughout history. Hence, successive waves from Arabia constantly migrated to the Fertile Crescent, in some cases thousands of years before Islam. The people shared similar languages, traditions, and culture that identified their common Arab origin. As such, even when a new character emerged in the territories where these waves settled in the Fertile Crescent and the Nile Valley, gradual mingling occurred between the newcomers and the indigenous people (Darwazah 1959, 1:11). However, this intermingling failed to strip the Arabs of their
identity. On the contrary, the Arabs imposed their common identity on the regions in which they settled (Darwazah 1960, 4:8).\(^{15}\)

The crucial point of Darwazah’s argument of the pre-explicit Arabism stage was that the term “Semitic” should be replaced with “Arab”. This because the former was not based on a “scientific hypothesis”, but rather was formulated in the Western tradition and then disseminated into the Arab tradition via “infectious quotations” (Darwazah 1959, 1:16-7; 1961a). Darwazah rightly points out the complexity and problematic use of the term “Semitic” as an ethnic identity, although his suggestion is not less arbitrary or a simplification of the usage of “Arab”. Nonetheless, despite what Darwazah argued, the term “Semitic” can still be used in its linguistic sense (Baasten 2003, 66-67). From that point Darwazah described all groups previously identified as Semitic as being Arabs, including, for instance, the Chaldeans (Darwazah 1959, 3:20-48), Aramaeans (Darwazah 1959, 3:66-72), and Assyrians (Darwazah 1959, 3:73-148). In this context, Darwazah criticised both Zaydân\(^{16}\) and ‘Alî\(^{17}\) for their use of ‘Semitic’ instead of ‘Arab’. Darwazah argued that Zaydân rightly included the Hammurabi in Arab history. However, he should include the rest of the “Semitic” waves into Arab history in Iraq, including Aramaic, Assyrian and Chaldean. These waves belong to the same wave, originated from the Arabia Peninsula which had shared language, beliefs, and culture, that brought Hammurabi to Mesopotamia (Darwazah 1959, 3:13). In a similar manner he criticised The History of ‘Alî because, according to Darwazah, ‘Alî himself argued that the term ‘Arab’ is the most “scientific”, accurate, and truthful than Semitic term (for Ali see chapter 7). Therefore, it was necessary for ‘Alî to include the history of these groups in the history of the Arab race (Darwazah 1959, 3:14). Surprisingly, even Darwazah’s assertion of ancient Arab identity is more reliant on the Arabs who shared a language and culture, but apart from simplistic name comparisons between past and present

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\(^{15}\) like many other ideas the argument of Semitic waves was a western influence on the Arab world tradition, particularly after the translation of work Breasted’s textbook into Arabic in 1926, see Dawn (1988, 69).

\(^{16}\) For Zaydân, see Chapter 11.

\(^{17}\) For The History of ‘Alî see chapter 5. In The Detail ‘Alî insists on this distinction (1993, 1:7) see chapter 6.
Arabs, as we shall see below, he dedicated no effort to analysing what he meant by Arabs’ sharing a similar culture.

The second basis of Darwazah’s argument is that profound similarity of structure in the languages and in etymology shared by all groups in the Fertile Crescent in different periods and their connections with the Arabic of today alone justify the common origin of the waves that migrated from Arabia with those who stayed (Darwazah 1959, 1:11). Through comparison between a list of Fertile Crescent cities name narrated by Muslim classical historians with modern names Darwazah concluded that all the groups of Mesopotamia and Levant who used these names are clearly have a common origin. In this context he argued that from a linguistic comparison, it is undeniable that all Semitic languages are convergent dialects generated from one particular language. All of the people who speak them are part of branches of the one race, in that descended initially from a single group (Darwazah 1959, 1:12). Therefore, Darwazah concluded, the history of Aramaeans, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and other groups of the Fertile Crescent should be grouped into the Arab race:

“It is not only indisputable but also a reiteration of a historical fact that has been in continuous existence for tens of centuries before Christ, also revising the direction of history and to give credence that the existing explicit Arabism of Iraq is a continuation of the explicit and pre-explicit Arabism centuries prior to Islam. In addition, this highlight and signifies the extension and capacity of the Arab race in various intellectual, literary, cultural, political, and military fields. In so doing, we will interrelate the Arab capacity of Iraq in both stages that appears as an interrelated chain” (Darwazah 1959, 3:14).

From this notion of an Arab common origin until the end of the first millennium BCE, Darwazah set the foundation for the next stage of Arabs in the explicit Arabism stage prior to Islam.
10.4.2 The Arabs in the explicit Arabism stage prior to Islam

“This stage in known as explicit Arabism because the name ‘Arab’ is used as an ethnic group and standard Arabic, or what was evolving toward the standard, became its language” (Darwazah, 1957, 47).

Modern scholars have not yet agreed on “moments” when the term “Arab” as the ethnonym occurred (Webby 2016, 110-5). The most sympathetic opinion argues that the mention of the Arab as an ethnic identity in historical sources does not pre-date Islam by more than several centuries (ʿAlī 1951, 184-5) or not pre-date the Common Era (ʿAlī 1968, 32-33). 18 Yet, for Darwazah, even these visions seem unconvincing. For Darwazah the emergence and development of the term ‘arab and ‘arabia in Assyrian inscriptions of the nineteenth century BCE, and later in Greek and Roman texts, demonstrates the emergence of Arabs as a practical ethnic group in the history. Darwazah argues that, from the early first millennium BCE, Arabs gradually transformed from pre-explicit Arabism to the explicit Arabism stage. This development, according to Darwazah, is evident from the Arabic labelling and identification of a number of individuals or leaders by Assyrians, the Old Testament, and Greek and Roman texts. This development was parallel with the development of the Arabic language, which reached the standard formulation in the seventh century (Darwazah 1961, 5:10-11). Darwazah identified this stage as a middle section of the chain of the long Arab racial development that originated in the Arabian Peninsula. As such, he invokes specific themes from pre-Islamic history to link the previous stage of what he called the pre-explicit Arabism stage with the later explicit Arabism stage in Islam. Nonetheless, it is unclear why, unlike the other two stages, Darwazah devoted only one volume, the fifth, to this stage.

Arab racial interpretations of ancient Mesopotamia and Levantine history are the dominant theme in this fifth volume, in which Darwazah repeatedly argued that Arabs are the only origin of all people of ancient Fertile Crescent and hence, the ancestors of

18 For the developments of Arab ethnic identity, see Chapter 2.
subsequent groups. Furthermore, he argues that the Arabs’ designation unified all the inhabitants of the provinces despite their differences. Despite various identities of pre-Islamic Mesopotamia, the Levant, and Yemen as political entities, such identity construction evades the controversy against non-Arabic identities identifications. Darwazah established Arabic identity as the fountain term which flow from it all subsequent identities. This notion of pre-Islamic Arabs entities was built on two assumptions. First, it was based on the similarity of names that exist in non-Arabic Semitic and Arabic languages. Petra, for instance, is represented as an Arabic entity by tracking the origin of the name Nabṭ in the Arabic language. Darwazah argued that:

“The word Nabṭi is not unusual in the Arabic language and the ancient Arabic names. It is probably related to the root of Nabṭ (‘extract) or Anbtā (elicitation), from which the word istanbat (‘water extraction’) comes to mean to obtain knowledge, i.e. knowing its senses. In the Quran, the word is identified as belonging to the latter. This indicates the authenticity of this word in the Arabic language, and therefore the Arabism of this state and its people” (Darwazah 1961, 5:339-40).

Furthermore, Darwazah argued that the word Nabṭ appeared in other Arab contexts, such as amongst the Minaeans kings in the early first millennium BCE (Darwazah 1961, 5:340). Likewise, it is recorded in Qtabani and Sabaiet inscriptions, which all strongly indicate an Arabic origin and its popularity before and after the explicit stage of Arabism. In addition, according to Darwazah this might suggest that an Arab wave from the south of Arabia arrived in eastern Jordan in the early first century BCE, who called themselves Nabṭ or it was their leader’s name. Therefore, when they occupied the province they gave it, their name (Darwazah 1961, 5:340).

The notion of the Arabness of the Nabataeans, depending on the terminology, is applied to the other groups and political entities in the Fertile Crescent and Yemen. The city of Tadmur is demonstrated to be Arabic as the name reveals a strong relationship with Arabic names (Darwazah 1961, 5:356-7). Interestingly, in this context Darwazah criticised Arab scholars who hesitated to consider the Palmyrene as Arabs due to their
dialect, which included Aramaic words (Darwazah 1961, 5:359). Nevertheless, in spite of the most Palmyrene inscriptions being in the Aramaic language, with different dialects, Darwazah claimed that the Arabic dialect is ubiquitous in Palmyrene inscriptions (Darwazah 1961, 5:360). This assertive narrative is based on the ferocious politicization of history. That transfers history from an academic discipline into an ideological discourse.

The second assumption was based on binary racial oppositions between indigenous Arabs and foreign colonials. The Arabness of the Fertile Crescent’s political entities is carried forward and examined their relationships with neighbouring powers. Darwazah implies that the race factor was the fundamental impetus of historical developments. According to him, in the last few centuries BCE and the early centuries CE, the Arabs founded a number of developed states in the Levant (Darwazah 1961, 5:317-94) and Mesopotamia (Darwazah 1961, 5:395-426). The power of such states arose from Arabs, regardless of whether they were from pre-explicit or explicit Arab waves. The Arabs in Petra, for instance, succeeded in founding a great state. The common race of the rulers and ruled was the prime factor in Arab steadfastness for a long time against the Romans in Petra. By contrast, the Romans easily overthrew the Ptolemaic dynasty in Egypt, the Seleucid Empire in Syria, and the Greeks in Phoenicia as a result of disagrees between indigenous people and the political elite of these powers were seen by the indigenous not only a strange but also as a “impure race” and their authority was seen as foreign and a form of colonialism (Darwazah 1961, 5:351-2). In fact, for Darwazah, the Romans portrayed their victory at Petra to be a great conquest, which is evident from their minting of coins to commemorate of confirms this binary racial opposition (Darwazah 1961, 5:352). Moreover, the Maccabean revolts, for instance, were portrayed as a political activity of Arab origin groups against the domination of the Seleucids (Darwazah 1960, 4:309). The depiction of Jewish as an Arabs appears to be unique to Darwazah’s dissertation.

In same context, Darwazah argued that the impact of Hellenistic and Roman culture on the Levant was superficial. The impact of Hellenistic and Roman culture on Phoenicia, Syria, Palestine, and Jordan, being limited to the large cities only, and particularly to the
elite families who attempted to access states’ power (Darwazah 1960, 4:308). He also claimed that many scholars, both Arab and non-Arab, agreed with this assertion, but without citing any (Darwazah 1960, 4:308). Furthermore, he claimed that the majority of the population retained its culture and language, despite a thousand years of Greek and Roman domination, and despite the significant efforts of these empires to impose their cultures on the Levant primarily through the arrival and settlement of tens of thousands of Greeks and Romans in the area (Darwazah 1960, 4:326-7). What proved this vision, according to Darwazah, was that the Hellenistic and Roman cultures disappeared a few generations after the collapse of their respective empires. In contrast, the indigenous people were rapidly integrated into the Arab wave that came under the banner of Islam. This led the Arab-Islamic identity dominate the Levant within a few generations of Islamic conquest. This quick and easy integration can be explained only in terms of the racial unity between the indigenous people and the newcomers, which facilitated a smooth merger between them (Darwazah 1960, 4:327). In contrast, indigenous resistance to the Muslim conquerors did not invoke racial differences according to Darwazah, because such resistance resulted from religious differences and the foreigners conspiracy (1959, 1:10). The aim of such suggestion is to evade other scholars’ arguments of indigenous resistance of Islam19, and also, showed that Darwazah attempted to present the Arab culture as an authentic which has no “Others” cultural influence.

10.4.3 The Arab race in the explicit stage after Islam

“The third stage of the history of the Arab race is explicit Arabism under Islam, which continues to this day [...]. The message of Islam that was sent to Muḥammad, the Arabs and in Arabic, has involved long-term aims in different social, political, economic, and behavioural aspects [...] including

19 For indigenous resistance to the early Islamic conquests see (Etanî 2011)
coverage of the entire human race at every time and in every place […]. It also supported [the Arab people] with a great incorporeal power, and solidified its holiness and eternal spread, which not only was immeasurable from its past roles, but also had no parallel in any stage of history of any nations on the Earth” (Darwazah 1962, 6:16).

The rise of Islam and its numerous effects on Arabic identity, which Darwazah clearly argued in the above quotation, is introduced against the socio-political backwardness of the Arabs prior to Islam. Darwazah initiated this stage of Arabism in Islam on volumes six with the chapter title “the dangerous status in which Islam has emerged” (Darwazah 1962, 6:16). Politically, the Arabs seemed weak and powerless. “Arab political entities” such as Petra, Palmyra, Buṣra, and Ḥīra, all of which had arisen in the Common Era, had collapsed. In addition, the enmity generated by the Romans and Sasanians between the Arabs led the Ghassanids and Lakhmids to fight each other without interruption (Darwazah 1962, 6:16-7). Socially, Arabs were depicted as barbaric and their tribal society as in need of enlightenment. Darwazah argued that the Arabs had entered a stage of the moral and social dissolution (Darwazah 1924b). The other parts of Arabia, which were not dominated by foreigners, were spread between small tribes who fought for many reasons, which led to tensions and feuds between Arabs, some of which escalated to war. Each tribe would boast of its victory over another (Darwazah 1962, 6:17).

Moreover, for Darwazah, the Jewish and Christian conflict involved moral decadence, and deviated from the essential principles of their authentic religions. This led to bewilderment and confusion among the Arabs, who “wished that God would send a guide to the Arab nation that would lead them to the right path and save them from misguidance and bewilderment” (Darwazah 1962, 6:17–8). It was at that difficult moment that the Prophet was sent to guide humanity out of darkness (Darwazah 1962, 6:18). This backwardness, thus, for Darwazah, with other factors was on one hand the cause of the success of the “al-daʿwa al-Muḥammadiyah”, the mission of Muḥammad, which became the foundation of national and religious unity among the Arabs (Darwazah 1962, 6:21).
On the other hand, it was Islam that enabled the Arabs to overcome their apparent backwardness and it was only Islam that was able to unify and eliminate tribalism amongst the Arabs (Darwazah 1962, 6:21). It is worth mentioning here that Darwazah believed it was only Hijaz, Arabia that survived the influence of the foreigners, which seemed to justify to him why Islam emerged in Mecca (Darwazah 1962, 6:24). The aim of arguing that Arabia had largely survived from falling under foreign control, was not only to purify Islam of any non-Arab elements but also, the Arab “race” with the Arabic language of Quran and the Arab prophet, legitimise the Arab leadership and their duty to spread the message of Islam to all nations, and no one could dispute their authority in relation to this religion. Darwazah had clearly asserted such differences in *Racial Conflict in the Early of Islam Between the Arabs and Others* (1924c), in which he argued that:

“The [Arabs] feeling of national pride and the power of their spirit race was not limited to state formalities at this stage [Umayyad] but was also widespread between the Arabs in different social rank as well. They saw themselves as honourable descent, more efficient, far more energetic and rightful rulers over all non-Arabs. [In addition] they had the right to excel the other, and differentiate themselves from the others because they were the source of guidance, source of wisdom, generosity, the origin of honest manners, and they called the others “the Red” and “mawālī” and they did not see them as competent to them in any of the cases”.  

Therefore, for Darwazah the Arabs had without doubt the right to see themselves as the supreme power among the other nations (Darwazah 1924).

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20 *Mawālī* is a term has used for varied meaning according to the context and period. However, in this context is used in a sense of non Arab Muslims. Regarding the term Red, it might need more research, but as far as I understand from Darwazah that he divided the world in term of coulure: the Asian were called the yellow, Africans the black and the Europeans a Red.
Islam and Arabism have a complementary relationship. Darwazah indicated the important role of the Arabs in the spread of Islam. According to Darwazah, over the centuries Islam succeeded in separating into different parts of the globe, such Iran and Armenia, which meant that either the Muslims were powerful or weak (Darwazah 1962, 6:27). Notwithstanding, for Darwazah Islam lacked “pride, vitality, and power” when led by non-Arab races. Islam only achieved these elements when Arabs became its leaders or when Arabism was endorsed by its elite (Darwazah 1962, 6:27). Thus, Islam became the official vehicle and played a key role in Arab hegemonic identity among non-Arab people. Darwazah indicated that as a result, the main rites of Islam must be performed in Arabic (Darwazah 1962, 6:25), which means that Muslims should learn Arabic regardless of their ethnicity. Consequently, Islam perpetuated and reinforced the spread of Arabic. Yet, language is not only letters and words, but also the emotions, tendencies, traditions, customs, and history of the people who speak it. As such, the spread of the Arabic language is the spread of Arab power (Darwazah 1924; 1962, 6: 24-6).

The final conclusion of Darwazah’s argument is that the Arab Muslim waves moulded the population of the Levant and Mesopotamia, and of course the whole modern Arab world, from both pre-explicit and explicit Arab waves into an explicit Arabic identity that became a comprehensive and holy immortal character of this territory (Darwazah 1960, 4:8-9). Thus, for Darwazah, the rise of Islam and its early conquests of the Fertile Crescent, and of course other provinces, symbolised the most invaluable and last link in a long chain of Arab ethnic identities that had evolved since the dawn of history.

10.5 Conclusion

Arab interaction with western powers, culture and scholarly tradition had, in many ways, an impact on the Arab historiography during the interwar period. On one hand it moved Arab historiography away from the traditional Islamic tendency. On the other, it transformed the image of the west from powers who could support the Arab struggle against the Ottomans to threats to Arab identity.
The early historiography of the Arab world and particularly the fertile crescent of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine maintained the traditional and purely Islamic tendency in which Arab historiographical works showed great interest in analysing the importance of Islam upon the Arab identity throughout history. However, works of the interwar period, as a result of interaction with western scholarly tradition, tended to focus on Arab ethnic identity, often presented as one and indivisible throughout history. Importantly for the subject of this dissertation, unlike the Islamic tradition which depicted the pre-Islamic period as al-Jāhiliyya, interwar historiography began to deal with pre-Islamic and Islamic ages as equally important. This shift in approach is discernible in the work of Mohammed Izzat Darwazah, among other Arab historians who began to follow this growing trend.

Darwazah’s *Tarikh al-jins al Arabi* argued that the thread that linked his work was the continuity of Arab identity from pre-Islamic to Islamic times. To make this connection Darwazah began to integrate all the pre-Islamic people into the Arab identity. Similarly Islam, instead of being the force creating Arab identity, came to be discussed as the manifestation of Arab consciousness toward their unity. Thus, for Darwazah the modern Arab racial consciousness is a result of the combining of the early dynamic ethnic group with a new religion of Islam.

The challenge to the Arab world arising from the creation of Israel gave new meaning to Arab nationalism. It strongly drove the Arab world more for unitary pan Arab vision. Unlike the early 20th century Arab nationalists whose aim was to bring the Arabs “under benevolent protection of liberal Europe” (see chapter 9). Darwazah depicted the Arab neighbours, particularly the Western powers, as a historic threat to the Arab unity. This led Darwazah to produce a narrative connecting the past and present, an Arab identity to “foil the malevolent project of colonizers, missionaries and Orientalists, who are the enemies of Arabism and whose concepts of Arab history are beyond all logic and impartiality” (Darwazah 1960, 4:36). For this ideological purpose Darwazah drew lessons from Arab history in which unity was always the cornerstone of victory while disunity was a cause of Arab failure. This, then, has been connected directly with the modern Arab struggle with Jewish challenges to the Palestinian Arabs.
Nevertheless, it is also important to note that the interwar Arab historiography adopted the German romanticism of Herder and Fichte. Darwazah’s depiction of Arab identity emphasised the idea of Volk as the defining feature of Arab nationalism. For Darwazah, a nation was not simply the people who share a country, but a metaphysical entity defined by the nexus of individuals who produces a particular art, culture, religion and collection of customs.
Chapter Eleven: the Syrian Ba’thist narrative

A coup led by a group of officers in 1963 brought into power the Syrian Ba’th party. Within a short period ‘Alawites then consolidated their power within the army. As Batatu points out, “many Sunnis are still in the officer corps but, if they are important, they are important not as a group but as individuals” (Batatu 1981, 343). Hafiz al-Asad, who came from the Alawite community was appointed as a Minister of Defence and as commander of the Syrian Air Force. While he was in his post in June 1967, Syria was defeated by Israel, its army was annihilated and the Golan Heights were lost to Israel. Even though most of the blame was put on al-Asad, he ascended to the power in a bloodless coup in 1970. Shortly after gaining power, al-Asad created a new legislature and local councils to govern smaller provinces, consolidated political parties, wrote a new constitution, and declared Syria a secular socialist state with Islam as the majorities religion. Al-Asad died in 2000 and was succeeded by his son Bashar.

11.1 The Syrian Ba’th Party and the Re-writing History Project¹

It is important to argue from the outset, that this chapter is not primarily concerned with the process of re-writing history itself, but rather focuses on the ways that such governmental projects have affected the Syrian historiography understandings on antiquity. Thus, the process of rewriting history is not examined in detail, (for more details see Ulrike Freitag (1999, 1-16)). It is worth to mention that the process of re-writing history in Syria preceded a similar process in Iraq. While Saddam, gave his first

¹ This chapter is not primarily concerned with the process of re-writing history itself, but rather focuses on the ways that such governmental projects have affected understandings of the ancient Arab relationships with Roman, Byzantine, and Sasanian history. Thus, the process of rewriting history is not examined in detail. For more details see Ulrike Freitag (1999) ‘In search of ‘historical correctness’: The Ba’th Party in Syria’, Middle Eastern Studies, 35:1, 1-16.
vision of the re-writing history in 1975, then in 1977 and 1979, in Syria, this process began in the early 1960s as will be discussed below.

Soon after their rise to power, the Syrian Ba’th faction realised the importance of using history to legitimise their regime. Only two years after the Syrian Ba’th party came to power in 1963, an issue of *al-Ma’rifa Journal*, published by the Syrian Ministry for Culture and National Guidance, raised a question “How do we write our national history?” (al-Khush, *al-Ma’rifa* 41, May 1965). Although this question had been preceded by earlier attempts by Arab individuals and academic institutions, this was the first attempt endorsed by the Syrian government.² The main aim of the symposium, according to Sulaiman al-Khush, the Minister of Culture and member of the Ba’th Party, was to draw public attention to the “Ba’thist interpretation of history as an alternative to Marxist and Salafist tendencies” (Freitag 1999). Nevertheless, the symposium remained a discussion, relatively, open to non-Ba’thist visions and scholarly concerns as well. The question soon evolved by 15 contributors from the Arab world (1965, issues 41-44) and a French academic Jacques Berque (*al-Ma’rifa* 46, October 1965). They discussed issues including: critical reading of Arab Muslim sources; whether or not the writing of Arab history should focus on the Islamic period (1965, issues 33 and 43), maintenance of archaeological sites; raising funds for scholarly research, and also ideological concerns (Tuama *al-Ma’rifa* 42, June 1965). The symposium did not, however, provide a final answer to how national history should be written.

In 1975, five years after Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad’s rise to power, the issue of writing Arab history again came to the forefront, but this time the discussion was limited to ideological concerns. While, the Ba’thist party had been eager to confront the Marxist and Salafist tendencies in 1965, the rise of al-Asad to power led to Arab nationalist ideology becoming a crucial device not only for legitimising the “Ba’thist interpretation of history” but also consolidating the ‘Alawite minority elite by minimising sectarian division in the Syrian socio-political context. For such an aim, the pre-Islamic era was crucial because

² In 1959 the American University of Beirut held a seminar on the same issue.
it could offer a basis for a new formulation of Syrian identity that went far beyond the sectarian division of the Islamic period. In this manner, the 12th National Congress of the Syrian Ba’th Party in 1975 explicitly recommended a “revision [of] Arab history” (Hizb al-Ba’th al-‘Arabī al-Ishtiraki 1978, cited in Freitag 1999).

Notably, after this recommendation the process of re-writing history accelerated. A year later, Ḥāfiẓ al-Jamālī, who had held the post of Minister of Education in 1973, and who had been seen as a relatively well-educated figure of the Syrian Ba’thist elite, initiated a new discussion in al-Ma’rifā entitled Mulāḥażāt ḥawla Ṭarīkh (Notes about History) (1976, issue 170, April 17-29). Al-Jamālī’s main concern was “why particular peoples progressed after backwardness whilst others fall into backwardness after progress” (19). Al-Jamālī argued that since the late-nineteenth century, many Arab individuals had attempted to answer this dilemma yet all had failed because, either they had emphasised a single aspect, for example the tyranny of al-Kawākibī, or the attempts had not been endorsed by a state to inoculate the result of such attempts in the collective consciousness. Thus, al-Jamālī concluded that there was a need for a comprehensive study on the Arab failure in history. For al-Jamālī, the aim of such study, is to develop a certain vision that shared by the public, intellectuals, and the state. Furthermore, for al-Jamālī it was not necessary for this vision to be objectively true, but rather that it needed to be subjectively adopted and shared by the Arab people (1976, 17-29). This may had a direct impact of Saddam speech on September 1977 (see chapter 8).

Five months later, ʿAbda ʿAbbūd wrote an article in al-Ma’rifā entitled ḥawla Da’wat Ḥāfiẓ al-Jamālī li-iʿādat kitābat al-tārīkh (On the Call of Ḥāfiẓ al-Jamālī for Re-Writing History) (al-Ma’rifā issue 174, August 1976, 177-183). Interestingly, this was the first shift of the discussion away from how to write Arab history to how to re-write Arab history. In his article, ʿAbbūd asked why we need to re-write history. For him, certainly the aim should not be the sole academic goal, but rather the essential aims should be practical, which must serve “our current struggle for liberty, unity, and social progress, in such frame the study of history became practical necessity” (1976, 179-80).
In the same year, 1976, a Preparatory Committee (PC) for writing comprehensive references on Arab history began. According to the PC, historical works should highlight the characteristics of Arabs throughout history, with the first suggested to be as follows:

“The Arabs have retained a profound propensity to solidify the unity of the Arab nation. The backwardness and disunity “diseases” among the Arabs did not skew the spirit of the underlying fixed aspirations [for the unity]” (The Preparatory Committee 1980).

The tendency towards a new ideological version of history intensified, and through the Preparatory Committee (PC) working principles were developed that stipulated that Arab history should be written with three perspectives in mind: the Arab unionist perspective, the cultural interpretation of Arab history, and scientific methods. Each of these principles was further explained. For instance, they should aim to demonstrate the correlation between “Arab countries”, specifically in relation to when they were confronted by external threats that targeted either the Arab fatherland or parts of it. In addition, the Arab cultural contribution to humanity should be acknowledged to have continued throughout the ages, along with its effectiveness and its high humanitarian values. To achieve these goals, the PC recommended establishing a specific journal, the Dirasat Tārīkh (DT) (Historical Studies), which was first printed in 1980.

Interestingly, DT became a journal for both ideological and academic discussions. Freitag (1999) argued that the attempts to ideologise Syrian historiography were transformed into an important scholarly endeavour. However, careful reading of DT’s articles reflects a reality of historiography that was unique to the Syrian Ba’th party. The journal had become the space for advocates of the utilitarian view of history, especially the Ba’thist and pan-Arabism ideology. In the first issue of the DT, Ahmed Badr, one of

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3 The first page of DT appeared as follows: “The Historical Studies is a quarterly scientific journal concerned with studies about Arab history; issued by the Committee of Writing the History of the Arabs at the University of Damascus; first issue, Rabī’ al-thānī 1400 H, March 1980; Chairman of the Committee Dr. Shaker al-Faham, Committee Dr. Mohamed Khairi Fars, Dr. Nabil ‘Aqil, Dr. Abdul Karim Rafiq, Dr. Ahmed Badr, Dr. Muhammad Mahfai, Editor, Nazim Kalss.”
the editors, argued, in the first issue of DT, that objective history is only possible with theory and not just practice, and that every historical construction is biased towards a certain ideology. In addition, all people since ancient history have used history for their own agendas and goals. Thus, the Arab *Ummah* should compare its past with that of other peoples’ histories (Badr 1980, first issue, 9-26). Other editors of DT were more concerned with Arab representations in the Western tradition. Al-Faḥam, a Chairman of the Committee, claimed that Arab history should be written in light of the fact that the Western account of Arab history has “never [been] written objectively” (al-Faḥam 1980, first issue, 3-8). For al-Faḥam, Western historians and their followers, with their imperialist visions, had distorted the image of Arab history and exhausted their venom and lies in order to satiate their greedy ambitions and meet their colonial and malignant goals (al-Faḥam 1980, DT issue 3, December). Such discussions, with ‘Adel ’Abdul al-Ḥaq 1960, might indicate a nascent understanding of what Edward Said termed as Orientalism (1978).

On the other hand, the DT provided a space for Syrian academics to produce an enormous amount of work that did not focus on the PC’s recommendations. A number of Syrian academics charged themselves with avoiding certain untouchable or “sacred” subjects, such as President al-Asad or criticism of the pan-Arabism ideology, and thus, similarly to Iraqi scholars, they applied a kind of self-censorship in order to survive and maintain their positions within academic institutions and/or even their lives. Works published in DT, with the exception of a few words in the introduction to clarify personal commitment to the regime, had no strong connection with or response to the official Ba’thist ideology of Syria, although at the same time the journal did not show an explicit rejection of this ideology. One of the many examples is that of ‘Adnan al-Bunī, who published a number of valuable articles on Palmyrene and other Syrian archaeological sites without any association with the Ba’thist ideology (1980, DT, issue 2, June; 1993, DT, issues 45-6, March). In addition, the DT held several seminars on writing Arab history in the 1980s and 1990s intermittently, which provided valuable opportunities for academic interaction.
11.2 The Syrian Ba’th Party and writing Arab Relationships with the Romans

Writing Arab history projects attempted to frame and theorise the Syrian Ba’thist vision of Arab nationalism as an eternal mission to unify the Arab nation. For the Ba’thist, the past should be examined through its association with the present and the future together (Freitag 1999). The Syrian Ba’thist historical vision has two main pillars, Arab nationalism and secularism. On the one hand, this vision is a trans-historical approach to Arab experiences in the ancient Levant and Mesopotamia, which is crucial in order to deepen Arab identity in ancient history and to draw lessons for the present. On the other hand, the secularist approach aimed to move beyond the advent of Islam and religion in general, rejecting it as the beginning and primary element of Arab identity.4

Within pre-Islamic Arab history, it can be suggest that the Ba’thist rhetoric emphasised a number of visions: (a) all peoples of the pre-Islamic Levant were ethnically and culturally Arab, with liberation aspirations, and (b) the Ba’thist vision does not oppose the idea of acculturation, but it does seek to undermine and downplay the impact of the West as the colonial culture, instead highlighting and amplifying the brilliant “high culture” of the “Arabs” as “the colonised”. The Palmyrenes, for instance, who have been considered to be Arabs of Syria by the Syrian Ba’th, are depicted as having had a profound impact on their colonisers’ culture. In other words, whilst the Romans succeeded in imposing their political and economic domination on Levant and Palmyra, they failed to leave a lasting imprint of their culture on the area. Instead, the colonised Palmyrenes managed to impose their cultural pattern and norms on the Romans, not only in Syria but also in Rome. This leads to two more visions of the Ba’thist rhetoric: (c) it aimed to invent a history imbued with an Arab unitary rhetoric throughout and interpret any opposition and upheaval of the indigenous people against the dominant powers as an Arab national consciousness against the occupiers, and (d) while the Iraqi Ba’thist presented Iraq as an eastern gate of the Arab world, the Syrian Ba’thist

4Zisser (2006, 192) argued that the discovery of ancient cities likes Ebla and Ugarit impacted on the regime’s interest in ancient history.
interpretation of history emphasised the intermediate, between West and East civilizations, and homogeneity of Arab cultural characteristics in all Arab world, and highlighted the differences between the East and West, with the latter being positioned as the “other” (e.g. Roman) while, the former being positioned as the “Us” (e.g., Palmyra). Whilst a number of studies have been conducted in light of these perceptions (e.g., Bahnasī 1983; Buhayrā 1997; Dad 1985; Muḥaysin 1999; Zuhdī 1990), Moṣṭafā Ṭläss’s Zinūbiyā: Malikātu Tadmur (Zenobia: The Queen of Palmyra) (1985a) has been exceptionally influential.

11.3 Moṣṭafā Ṭläss’s Life, Career, and Thought

Moṣṭafā Ṭläss (1932-2017) was born into a Sunni family and later became an active Syrian politician, army officer, and writer. His life is characterised by unlimited dedication and loyalty to the Syrian president Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (1930-2000), and his adoption of the pan-Arabism ideology. These two characteristics led to his role as one of the longest serving Ministers of Defence (1971-2004) in the Arab world, and he played an active role in both the political and intellectual life in Syria and the Arab world in general. Ṭläss joined the Military Academy in Homs in 1952, where he became friends with Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad, and both were became members of the Ba‘thist party. As a supporter of pan-Arabism, Ṭläss enthusiastically supported the unifying project between Syria and Egypt into one state, the United Arab Republic (UAR 1958-1961) (Ṭläss 2007, 697-710). In 1970, al-Asad seized power in a military coup, known in Ba‘thist rhetoric as the “Corrective Movement”. Ṭläss was appointed as Minister of Defence, a post he held until 2004 without interruption. He played a brutal part in the massacre of Hama in 1982, and maintained his loyalty to Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad after the latter fell into a coma in 1984. As such, Ṭläss became one of al-Asad’s most trusted loyalists. During his service as the Syrian Minister of Defence, Ṭläss was able to establish strong relations with the Soviet
leaders, and obtained a Diploma with two PhDs in the Soviet Union.\(^5\) In 2003, he played an influential role in securing the smooth transmission of power from Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad to his son, Bashār al-Asad, after the former’s death. Finally, Ṭläss retired from his post in 2004 and then fled from Syria to France in 2012 after the outbreak of the Syrian revolution where he died in 2017.

Ṭläss’s early life had a fundamental impact on his latter visions and beliefs. In his memoirs, he explained his thoughts during World War II, when he was a teenager:

“[Our] tendencies and passion were with the Nazis at that time and we hoped that they could save us from French colonialism. The German military victories in the battlefield were part of my pride and bragging [...]. [We] the poor were with Adolf Hitler’s party [...] and his blow to the Jewish saboteurs inside Germany, who were termed a fifth column, gave us psychological comfort because the Zionists are the Arabs’ historical enemies [...]. I [used to] read newspapers to the peasants [...] [and I tended to] show a great enthusiasm for the Germans victories [...] and underestimated the importance of the successes achieved by the English and Americans”. (2007, 51)

Crucially, the first edition of this biography was published in 2003, which shows that Ṭläss was still proud of his early vision, as he points out that he is “free to selectively choose his topics” (2007, 15). In addition, these few sentences might explain his standpoint on a number of critical issues within Syrian historiography. First, opposition to modern Western colonialism was one of his main concerns, since he equated it with

\(^5\) A diploma at the Academy of the General Staff (Voroshilov) from the Soviet Union 1972; doctorate in political science from the Voroshilov Academy 1980; and a doctorate in historical sciences 1990 from the Soviet Union (his biography is available on Union of Arab Writers: Damascus. [http://www.awu.sy/?page=DetMembers&id=324&lang=ar; cited in 3, September 2016]).
Greek and Roman colonialism. Second, his characterisation of the Jews as the historical enemy of the Arabs became part of his main discourse later.

With more than forty books, bearing his name, Ţläss addressed many subjects, including works on popular medicinal plants (e.g., *The Benefits of Garlic for Longevity* (1987), poems (e.g., *Poet and poem*), military and historical works (e.g., *A Study of the Algerian Revolution* (1984), *Sword of God: Khalid bin Walid* (1985b), *The Immortal Feats of the Soviet People: A Military Study* (1986); and Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad: *A National School Immortal* (2002), and many other topics. However, this chapter focuses specifically on his work *Zenobia: The Queen of Palmyra* (1985a).

11.4 Zenobia: The Queen of Palmyra.

*Zenobia: The Queen of Palmyra* (hereafter *Zenobia the Queen*) was published by Ţläss House in 1985. This work is divided into five parts, with the chapters of each part covering particular themes: 1) Palmyra: the bride of the desert; 2) The kingdom of Palmyra and its historical roots; 3) Zenobia and the Kingdom of Palmyra; 4) The Palmyrene civilization; and 5) Palmyra and its historical experience, plus an introduction and a historical appendix. Ţläss (1985a) did not generally follow a historiographical method, nor use the theories that were applied by the contemporary generation. For instance, the work is poorly referenced, with “the Udhaïna family and independence inclination” (223-9) each having only one reference, and the chapter on “Zaynab the queen of Palmyra” (231-240) having only two references. The work represented visions and quotations but did not mention the sources (1985a, 149). Furthermore, the few primary sources that were used are often have been depicted as unreliable sources or late, such as *Historia Augusta* which described as a “fabrication” (Syme 1983), or “a few, very few, of its statements [on the Aurelian period] may be true” (Drinkwater 1999, 262).

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6 He explained earlier that he sees no difference between French and British colonialism.
7 This work has been translated by the same publisher (Ţläss House) into French (1986) and English (2000).
and al-Ṭabarî (d. 92CE.) and they have not been critically evaluated. It important to note that Nāhid Ṭlāss, daughter of Moṣṭafā Ṭlāss, is the owner of Ṭlāss House, founded in 1984. Thus, Ṭlāss with his own publisher had the power to disseminate his visions within Syrian and the Arab world; his book later was translated into English and French.

*Zenobia the Queen* represents the author’s greatest effort to boost the Ba’thist ideological vision through historical narrative. However, the title does not reflect its content, clearly indicated by the fact that the chapter that deals directly with the period of Zenobia’s history does not exceed ten (231-240), of its 383 pages. Instead, the aim of the work was to focus on the alterity of the Hellenic and Roman cultures, depicting them as the “Other” in comparison with indigenous Syrian culture presented as “Our” pre-Islamic Arab culture. In short, *Zenobia the Queen* is a work moulded within ideological interest rather than academic motivation.

In providing his historical narrative of Palmyra, Ṭlāss’s commitment to the working principle developed by the PC is evident, despite the fact that he does not directly mention this. Ṭlāss (1985a) identified three interrelated “stories” within the history of Palmyra: 1) ‘The Story of Palmyra’, including its civilization and the “arduous journey across hundreds of years”; 2) ‘The Story of al-Malikah Zaynab’ (Queen Zenobia), who led her kingdom on the road to al-Ḥarakat al-istiqlālīyah (independence movement); and 3) ‘The Story of the Roman-Palmyrene War’, which set a decisive end to all these stories and formed what Ṭlāss calls the Palmyrene tragedy. Each of these stories is critically analysed to find out the interrelationships between Syrian historiography and the political challenges.8

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8 In order to provide a consistent insight into Ṭlāss’s argument, I have combined his “The Story of Palmyra” and “The Story of Palmyrene-Roman relationships”.

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11.4.1 “The Story of Palmyra”

The dominant theme of Ṭlāss’s work is summarised in his opening lines:

“For a long period, Palmyra lived in the bosom of sham (Levant) desert, its star was raised and glazed in the two decades after the middle of the third century. This was coupled with the House of Udhaïna and Queen Zaynab. Then, the [...] Romans’ barbaric and savage invasion destroyed the capital of the desert and took its Queen. The Romans thought that history will cover their savage crime with a curtain of secrecy, but history, with its wisdom and dignity, refuses to close its mastery in front of the seekers of knowledge, who are thirsty for the truth. Thus, the veils lay bare and the curtains fall down from the lofty edifice on the desert sands, revealing the threads of the catastrophe of Palmyra and its Queen Zenobia⁹ during their last days”. (1985a, 7-8)

Ṭlāss’s work clearly attempts to depict Palmyra in a romantic and idealistic way, juxtaposed with the arrival of the “barbaric” and “savage” Romans, who destroyed this “idealistic nation” and stunted its development. Before he moved into further discussion on the Palmyrene-Roman relationships, Ṭlāss aimed to lay the foundation of the work by placing Palmyra more firmly within the Arab identity.

For Ṭlāss, the Palmyrenes were undoubtedly Arab. It is generally agreed that the Palmyrenes descended from various socio-political and cultural backgrounds (Smith 2013; Southern 2008, 1; Kaizer 2002, 35). In addition, it was called by (Millar 1993: 470) “the only publicly bilingual city in the Roman Near East”, with a distinctive Aramaic dialect and its own unique script. Nonetheless the vast majority of the Palmyrene texts were written in Greek. However, Ṭlāss criticised such visions, claiming that it attempted

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⁹ Within the Arabic version of Zenobia the Queen, Ṭlāss rarely used the Latin transcription of “Zenobia”, preferring the Arabic transcription of the name Zaynab. However, with the English and French versions he used the Latin transcription of “Zenobia”. 

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to “weaken the fact that Palmyra was dominated by the Arabs” (1985a, 131). He believed that the majority of Palmyrenes came from an Arabic ethnic background:

“The Arab race, in a strict sense, began to gradually overwhelm [Palmyra] from the beginning of the tenth century B.C. until the Seleucid period where the Arabs became the majority who controlled Palmyra” (1985a, 131).

Similarly, he claimed that even with the collapse of Palmyra at the hands of the Romans, Arab dominance in the region continued. During the Byzantine era, the Bishop of Palmyra, who was called Theatimus the Arab, took part in the Synod of Antioch in 363. This was interpreted by Ṭläss as evidence that “Palmyra preserved its Arab originality, as it was before in all eras and earlier periods” (1985a, 136-7). In the same manner, Ṭläss concluded that the similarities between Palmyrenes and Arabic names, art, deities, and rituals suggested that the Palmyrene were not only ethnically Arab but were culturally Arab as well (1985a, 97; 173).

After fusing Arab and Palmyrene identity, Ṭläss moved on to the significance of Palmyra’s civilization in relation to the ancient world, particularly with the Roman Empire. For Ṭläss, studying of Palmyra’s relationship with the Romans is significant because it can be set as a basis for Roman relationships with other contemporary “Arab entities”. He claimed that the tragic end of the Palmyrene-Roman relationship opened a wide sphere for scholars to evaluate other “Arab tragedies” inflicted by Roman colonialism, such as the “Phoenician tragedy”, the “Nabataean tragedy”, and the “Ghassanid tragedy”, all of which he associated with Roman rule and continuous “conspiracies” (1985a, 10). All of these entities were depicted as Arab and had high cultures that were eventually destroyed by the Roman Empire. Framing all pre-Islamic political entities in the Levant in an ethnic and cultural unity against the common enemy, usually the West, was one of the core objectives that the PC sought to sow in Syrian historiography.

Even with this binary opposition of the idealised ‘us’ and the savage ‘them’, spaces exist for collaboration, particularly in the face of a common enemy. The only collaboration presented between Palmyra and the Romans by Ṭläss was their collaboration against
the so-called “foreign” and “subversive” Jews. Ṭläss argued that the Palmyrenes, during their early period, participated in the Roman campaign against the Jews of the Levant, which Ṭläss interpreted as Rome’s need for Palmyra’s power. However, such a collaboration, according to Ṭläss, should not be interpreted as the Palmyrenes placing their capabilities at the disposal of Roman colonialism. From Ṭläss’s point of view, the Jews were considered “strangers” in the region and their presence a threat:

“[Jewish] existence in Palestine, and close to Petra, constituted a menace to the Arab entities. [... Thus], it was expected that the princes of these [Arab] princedoms [would] cooperate with the Romans to destroy the strangers, who were known for their dissension, corruption, and sabotage in the region. [In addition,] this cooperation represented a kind of common interest on a strategic level between Palmyra and Rome rather than any kind of dependency on Rome” (1985a, 46-7).

For Ṭläss, the historical experience of Palmyra is highly significant. According to him, this experience unveiled two types of civilizations, the “contributor” civilizations such as Palmyra, and the “impotent” civilizations, such as Rome.¹⁰ According to Ṭläss, the latter was considered “impotent” because it was solely and fundamentally based upon power and as such was marked by the use of violence rather than force of culture as a means of expansion. Moreover, the importance of the historical experience of Palmyra is that it not only unveiled to what extent the Roman Empire was an “impotent”, “non-contributing”, and “unproductive civilization” but also showed that Rome was a “civilization of power” rather than a “powerful civilization” like Palmyra (1985a, 11-2). Ṭläss depicted the Roman civilization as purely based on force, and one that measures its progress in terms of geographical expansion. He believed that even though the Romans made a large empire and built massive monuments, they were not civilized like the Palmyrenes. Hence, this geographical expansion is no guarantee that the Romans

¹⁰Ṭläss seems implicitly to criticise Toynbee’s vision of “fossilized civilizations” such as Mesopotamia and Egypt (see Toynbee 1945, I:51).
added anything to world civilization, while Ṭlāss believed that Palmyra had a “powerful civilization” that added a lot to humanity:

“The Palmyrene civilization was based essentially on caravans and commerce. Even though it did not neglect the integration in its civilizing construction, thus it focused on developing agriculture, industry, and architecture [...] The [Palmyrene people] were agents of communication among various peoples; by the nature of their role [in ancient commerce], they were open-minded to other contemporary cultures. They took with them their commodities, ideas, visions, and beliefs and spread them around the world. This exhibited the highest concept of civilization” (1985a, 12).

Conversely, for Ṭlāss, it was the Syrian civilization that made an impact on the Romans, and not the other way around. Ṭlāss argued that the colonised Arabs managed to impose their cultural pattern on their colonisers, not only in Syria but also in Rome. He claimed that Roman occupation in 64 BCE witnessed the peak of Syrian architecture and urban design. This led the Romans to use great Syrian engineers such as Apollodorus of Damascus to design and carry out most of the great architectural projects in the Roman Empire and in Rome itself. Ṭlāss claimed that an archaeologist, whom he does not name, argued that “the Romans were not the inventors of the criteria of building cities, but found it [in their periphery] and presented it as their own [invention]” (185a, 149). Similarly, he argued that other scholars who, again he fails to name, point out that the Orontes river, which flows through Syria, also flows into the Tiber, “carrying with it language, tradition, and art” 11 (1985a, 149). Likewise, cited from Khalid al-As’ad, Ṭlāss 12 states that the Syrian impact on Rome still can be observed in many preserved monuments of Rome. Such monuments, according to Ṭlāss, were built at the time of

11 The sentence seems to have been quoted from Juvenal (3.62). The original quotation is “For the Syrian Orontes has long since polluted the Tiber, Bringing its language and customs”. It seems the word “polluted” has been deliberately omitted by Ṭlāss.
12 Khalid al-Asad was a leading Syrian archaeologist of Palmyra, and was brutally murdered by militant Dā’sh aged 82 years. Syrian state news reported that “the elderly caretaker may have died protecting the same history he had dedicated his life to exploring” (The New York Times, August 20, 2015).
the Syrian Arab Emperors of Rome and Syrian Popes who rose to the throne in Rome (1985a, 149).

For Ţlāss, even when the Romans succeeded in imposing their political domination on the Levant, they failed to leave any lasting imprint of their culture. According to him, when Pompey first occupied Syria in 64 BCE, Syria’s art was greatly advanced and prolific within the Eastern context. As such, the Romans were unable to change the characteristics of Palmyrene art, despite their occupation of the area:

“Two and half centuries of rule [in Palmyra] and with all interactions, the West was unable to change the characteristics of Palmyrene sculpture [and arts], which the people of Palmyra and their Eastern neighbours shared”.
(Ţlāss 1985a, 148-9)

Nonetheless, even when Palmyra borrowed from Hellenistic and/or Roman civilizations, it was on a superficial level and had no impact on the Palmyrene culture, which maintained close relations with Arab culture through its language, art, architecture, and religion (1985a, 196). For Ţlāss, the insignificant impact of the Hellenistic and Roman cultures on Palmyra is hugely significant. On the one hand, it revealed an implicit Palmyrene resistance to every culture and tradition other than its own, in addition to a national dignity (1985a, 197). On the other hand, it confirmed “the authenticity of the Arab nation and its deep-rooted commitments to [Arabic] virtues and values” (1985a, 313). Thus, according to Ţlāss, this is the true measurement of civilization’s progress, “not only as the Arab “man” understands it but also as any “civilized man” understands” (1985a, 313-4). This led Ţlāss to examine how modern colonialism is related to old colonialism.

Ţlāss made a comparison between the results of previous and modern colonialism, arguing that old and new colonialism share the same “cruelties” (1985a, 177). For him

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13 For Roman cultural imprint of Syria see, chapter 2.
the answer of why Palmyra was described as a petrified civilization (a term he rejects) can be found in the “colonial relationships”. Ṭläss argued that while the Western scholars heavily praised the Hellenic civilizations, they deliberately described Palmyra’s civilization as stagnant. The reason for such a double standard is that the Hellenic civilization was a Western product (1985a, 302). Ironically, even when Ṭläss rejected the notion of petrification of Palmyrene civilization and depicted it as a Western colonial vision, he returns and attempted to examine why the Palmyrene civilization was petrified. Similarly, with other aspects the Romans were the cause of such petrification. According to Ṭläss, Palmyrene and other Syrian civilizations were blocked due to external oppressive powers (1985a, 302). More specifically, for him the Roman randomness and barbarism blocked the progress of civilizations of Palmyra and other Syrian entities, and stunted their development. For him, this phenomenon can be compared with what nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western colonialism did to what are known as “the developing countries”, which were subjected to colonial powers. Even when these countries won their independence, their civilisations were affected and set back (1985a, 303).

“According to this viewpoint, [one can add] another dimension of civilization to the Palmyrans, which is the independence movement that was led by Udhaīna and completed by Zaynab, [who] continuously felt that they were the victims of western cultural expansion”. (1985a, 303)

After these discussions, Ṭläss came to his final suggestion on Roman civilization and its relationship with Palmyra:

“The Roman Empire emerged without a mask and no decorative utterances to cover the wickedness of its colonisation and its crimes against civilizations and humanity. [At this point], there is nothing left [...] of the Roman civilization, which stole all its manifestations of civilization from its subjected entities by power, taking not only their endeavours, treasures, and potencies but also all of their existence” (1985a, 10-11).
11.4.2 “The Story of al-Malikah Zaynab”

The presentation of Zenobia in Ṭläss’s work revolved around a number of themes. First, she was depicted as an Arab rebel against Roman imperialism. Second, she embodied a primordial image of Syrian Arab values, including virtue, wisdom, tolerance, courage, beauty, love of freedom, the spirit of resistance, and determination against Roman “barbarism”, “savagery”, and “thirst for control and domination”. Thirdly, her fall was not presented by Ṭläss as the result of personal incompetence, but rather as the result of objective factors such as the imbalance between Rome and Palmyra’s power, conspiracy between Rome and Persia, and abandonment by the Arabs. Nonetheless, it was her qualities that caused her story to pass into legend and be preserved throughout the ages. In contrast to Aurelian, the Roman emperor, who despite victory against Zenobia, has become an indistinct emperor among the long list of Roman emperors. Interestingly, all these themes were an echo of Syrian Ba’thist discourse, which attempted, as Kadar identified, to present the al-Asad family as a link in the chain of Arab leaders “who, by sheer force of personality, had throughout history brought periods of great glory to their people” (2005, 133).

In a similar way to the Arabness of Palmyra’s civilization, Ṭläss sought to Arabise Zenobia ethnically. Like many other Arab writers, however, Ṭläss deliberately ignored the fact that ethnicity is a self-ascription rather than a fact (see Kaizer 2002, 58). It is generally agreed that Zenobia did not claim to have an Arab background, but rather claimed lineage from Cleopatra, who was neither Arab nor Egyptian, but a Macedonian Greek (Southern 2008, 1). Additionally, she combined elements of her Aramaic and Arabic ancestry in addition to the adoption of many symbols of the Roman Empire (Andrade 2013, 335; Millar 1993a, 170-173; Southern 2008, 1; for a careful discussion of the relevant evidence, see Warwick 2002, 78-79). However, Ṭläss was anxious to present Zenobia as an iconic Arabic woman. As such, he began the chapter that dealt with

14 See Chapter 10.
Zenobia’s history with a quest to link her genealogical descent to an Arab origin, as well as to describe her as having a strong personality and being well-educated, it is for that reason he seems to favour her Arabic name (Zaynab) over Zenobia:

“Known to the Arabs by the names “Hind”, “Zaynab”, “Al-Zabba’a”, or the “daughter of al-Atiyah”, Zenobia was the daughter of an Arab Prince of Beni Smedaa [...]. She was more beautiful than Cleopatra, and braver than Semiramis. Historians agreed that she had a stronger personality and was more ambitious than her husband, Udhaiña [...]. She was highly educated and spoke many languages” (1985a, 231).

Zenobia and Udhaiña were not only depicted as ethnically Arab, but also every aspect of their lives was associated with an Arab consciousness. Throughout his text, Ṭläss takes every opportunity to remind his readers of the distinct Arab identity of Zenobia and Udhaiña: “she went with inflexible resolution and sharpness, as sharp as an Arabian sword” (1985a, 13); “The two great powers, Roman and Sasanian, felt the danger of this ‘Arab state’ [Palmyra], which dominated the East” (1985a, 13); Zenobia “founded an Arab Empire free from the Roman domination, even if it was short-lived, but it anticipated the Arab Islamic state four centuries later” (1985a, 240); “the struggle of Palmyra was particularly on behalf of the Arabs” (1985a, 282); “[Udhaiña] the king of the Arabs, was killed” (1985a, 227); “Udhaiña, who embodied the best of the Arabic virtues [...]. The killing of Udhaiña has shaken the Arab conscience” (1985a, 229), and so on.

Zenobia’s narrative served one of the longest discourses of the al-Asad family. Syria was depicted as the vanguard of the Arabs and the East’s struggle, especially against Zionism (Dawisha 2003, 271; Kedar 2005, ix). Zisser (2000, 245) pointed out that the al-Asad family portrayed Syria as the “beating heart of the Arab nation”, as the authentic and possibly even the exclusive representative of the pan-Arab vision.¹⁵ This discourse was

¹⁵ Labelling Syria as the “beating heart of the Arab nation” was first mentioned by Jamal Abdel Nassir in his first speech
generated and promoted by the death of the Egyptian president Jamal Abdul Nassir (1918-1970), as he was the most significant figure of pan-Arabism in the twentieth century. His death thus rendered vacant the “imaginary Arab throne”, which drove many of the Arab leaders to “battle” in order to prove their eligibility for the throne. A Syrian writer on the al-Asad political thought claimed that:

“The absence of Jamal Abdul Nassir created a dangerous vacuum, and there was no choice but to fill it. It was a historic moment that evoked the emergence of Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad. There was a new era that looked for those who could personify and contribute to it, and shape its major events […]. At this point the leadership of Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad emerged which, in fact, was a response to the reality of the Arab world, which was facing many challenges” (Qudsī 1984, 161).

This discourse of the leading role of Syria and its figures in the Arab world reflected in Ṭlāss’s portrayal of Zenobia as the leader of the Arabs and the East, fighting Roman colonisation. Ṭlāss claimed that:

“Zaynab took charge of leading the liberation movement on behalf of the entire [East] or, more specifically, all the Arabs. Thus, the East generally and the Arab specifically must had responded, because this stage was required in order to mobilise [all] efforts into one [united] front” (1985a, 282).

Within the same context, Ṭlāss discussed the reasons for Zenobia’s fall against the Romans. He asked to what extent her decision to declare war against Rome was hasty or reckless, as it led to the absolute destruction and tragic end for both Zenobia and Palmyra (1985a, 271). Ṭlāss argued that even with lack of sources and references which

in Damascus (24th February 1958) after the announcement of the Egyptian-Syrian unity (Ṭlāss 2007, 708).
might not demonstrate a satisfactorily answer. However, for him, the early discussions are allowed to reach clear and specific conclusions:

“Palmyra played a leading and pioneering role for the whole East. Therefore, it had to act according to its role, with all the burdens and sacrificial consequences. Thus, Zaynab had to take a stand that was commensurate with the interests of the Eastern kingdoms and emirates [...]. Zaynab was never reckless or hasty in taking any stand that had to end in a decisive military confrontation with the strongest empire of the world of that day” (1985a, 273).

The above discussion allowed Țlăss to conclude that the fall of Zenobia did not result from her inability. According to Țalâs, Zenobia was not responsible for the “lost war” against the Romans, he claimed, placing blame instead at the foot of the other entities, especially the Arabs, who did not aid Palmyra in her “ordeal”. Țlăss argued that Arab entities, from Petra across Damascus to Homs and the Euphrates, did not mobilise their powers to help Palmyra because:

“The Arabs at the time were not used to co-ordinating and allying in the face of foreign aggression, [... And thus] there was no co-operation between the Arab kingdoms and entities [when Zenobia faced the Romans]. On the contrary, [...] the Ghassanids took advantage of Palmyra’s absence to assert their existence. [Moreover,] the conflict between the “cousins” of the Ghassanid and the Lakhmid, [...] proof of the weak nexus between the Arabs. Since, in order to dominate all east, both Persia and Rome made use of them” (1985a, 278).

Another cause of Zenobia’s fall, according to Țlăss, was the “conspiracy” between the Roman and Sasanian empires. Țlăss argued that even when the great powers are struggling against each other, they still have the same policy against the Arabs. In this context, the Sasanians, despite their long history of enmity with the Romans, did not aid Palmyra. Țlăss asserted that the Sasanians stood passively whilst the Romans invaded
Palmyra, because both the great powers felt threatened by the domination of the East by an Arab power. Particularly, the Sasanians saw the rise of Palmyra and its power as potentially a “direct threat to the expansionist ambitions of the Persian empire which grow in the Persians dreams” (1985a, 276-7). The result of such fear, according to Ṭläss, led to an “unplanned conspiracy” between the Romans and the Sasanians:

“While the Roman Empire initiated a barefaced attack on Palmyra, [they] reached Palmyra and captured it after fierce fighting and a long siege and took its Queen Zaynab into captivity. The Persians got ready to exploit this victory, which did not cost them anything [as they had] stood passively in the face of the Roman invasion. Thus, [the Sasanian position of Roman destroying Palmyra] allowed them to dominated Mesopotamia and the Arabian Gulf, and extended their power to reach the heart of the Arabian Peninsula up to Yemen” (1985a, 13-4).

The depiction of both the West and the East as the Arabs’ enemy allowed Ṭläss to move smoothly into the importance of Arabic self-reliance, which according to the Ba’th party would enable Syria to curb Western imperial agendas and help the Arab nation to liberate itself from the domination of the West (Bar 2006, 365). Ṭläss attempted to justify other al-Asad family discourses of the Syrians’ need for self-reliance in order to resist Western colonialism. He called for Syrian self-reliance in their struggle against colonial powers rather than depending on other great powers who always work in their own interests. Ṭläss invoked themes from Zenobia’s narrative to prove that Syria, particularly Palmyra, was the central geographical location between the West and the East, indicating how even in the past the Syrians relied on themselves in their resistance of colonial powers, just as they have to do in the modern day (1985a, 43-5). Therefore, it was not logical for Zenobia to rely on Rome or the Persians (1985a, 342-3). Instead, it was significant for the Palmyrene “to build a self-capability on the basis of steady relationships and deep confidence which [should be] built throughout a long period” (1985a, 350).
Ṭlāss attempted to examine the motives of the independence movement in Palmyra, asking why Zenobia sought independence. According to him, this question cannot be answered without analysing “al-ʿAlaqāt al-istiʿmāriyah” (the colonial relationships), as this help “us to understand the nature of Roman colonialism” (1985a, 208). For Ṭlāss, the Roman-Palmyrene relationship was part of a wider context of Roman colonialism with other subjected people (1985a, 209). The oppressions of the Romans led the submitted peoples to seek freedom from the yoke of the Roman Empire (1985a, 209). Nonetheless, for Ṭlāss, beside these general motivations against the Roman Empire, Palmyra had its particular motivations. It was between of two great powers, who both aimed to expand their territories into the surrounding ones, and especially the Arab world (1985a, 349). In addition, according to Ṭlāss, the tendency towards independence was strong in Palmyra and might be stronger than any other places in the East. This could be due to their awareness of their own power, and/or the availability of intelligent and ambitious political leadership. It could also have resulted from “aggravated feelings against the Roman oppressors greed and avarice, or could be a combination of all of these factors” (1985a, 273-4).

Ṭlāss attempted to present Zenobia as a model of Syrian tolerance. In May 2001, the Syrian president Bashar al-Asad presented a statuette of Emperor Marcus Julius Philippus, also known as Philip the Arab, as a gift to Pope John Paul. In a statement to the press, the presidential spokesman noted:

“Philip the Arab ruled Rome in 244–49. He was born in Shahbāʾ in southern Syria in 200, and his accomplishments during his rule include the abolition of slavery, the pardoning of prisoners, and granting permission to political exiles to return to their homes. Philip was also known for his commitment to the principle of rule by law and for fostering religious tolerance” (Cited in Zisser 2006, 180-1).

Depicting Philip the Arab as a tolerant emperor is a frequent theme in Syrian historiography, as other Syrian writers have heavily emphasised tolerance (e.g., Bahnasī 1983; al-Zuhdī 1990). Ṭlāss presented the idea of the centrist nature of the Syrian
civilization, arguing that it is in the middle of different nations, which causes it to be flexible and open-minded (1985a, 309). Thus, this characteristic caused Zenobia to emerge as an intellectual and open-minded leader. Her initiative to protect the Christians from Roman persecution is evidence of this, and most importantly for Ţläss is the fact that Zenobia’s tolerance “left a lasting mark on the East even after the elimination of Palmyra” (1985a, 309-10).

Mordechai Kedar pointed out that since the early period of Ba‘th party’s rise to power, the al-Asads have alluded to a link between the status of women and social modernism (2005, 17). From this standpoint, Ţläss was anxious to depict Zenobia as an ideal representation of the emancipation of Syrian women citing Roman sources, he claimed that:16

“It is generally agreed that she had a stronger personality and more ambition than her husband, Udhaïna […]. She was highly educated and spoke many languages: Palmyrene, Greek, Egyptian, and Latin. She compiled a history of the East and of Egypt in her handwriting. Out of her love for literature and philosophy […], her voice was unquestionably strong. She was cautiously generous, extraordinarily manageable of her own fortune. She rode the horse, but most often she walked on foot with the soldiers for a few miles. Despite her modesty, she used to drink with her leaders. She even drank with the Persians and the Armenians and beat them at that” (232-4).

Ţläss ended his work with the theme of learning from history, aiming to summarise his vision and outline lessons for contemporary Syrians. Ţläss attempted to link between the Syrian past and present.17 He argued that the historical experience of Palmyra was

16 The reliability of some of the sources, Historia Augusta for example, should be questioned especially since most were written after the death of Zenobia. Other historical narratives underwent many transformations before reaching recent historians, and some were written with Roman bias (see Southern 2008, 2).
17 Kedar identified the importance of the use of history for the Syrian Ba‘thist discourse. For instance, al-Asad states that history serves us best through the lessons it teaches us; history is brimming with valuable lessons when we are familiar with it (2005, 134).
not an ordinary or minor experience similar to other historical experiences, but rather that its significance exceeded the limits of space and time. It has a universal importance because it embodied a type of relationship that dominated human societies as a whole (1985a, 339). For Ṭlāss, this made the Palmyrenes’ experience important for humanity as a whole and primarily for the Syrians’ the “heir of Palmyrene”, whose land was the theatre of incidents (1985a, 340). In addition, for Ṭlāss, what made this experience more important for the Arabs was its regularity with other contemporary “Arab political entities”, such as Phoenicia and Petra (1985a, 339). Furthermore, for Ṭlāss it is important to learn from the past even when things were unpleasant. For him, the worst thing is to fail to learn from past or self-experience (1985a, 340).

Thus, for Ṭlāss the Arabs should draw from the historical experience of Palmyra, despite the fact that the world has developed significantly since the city’s fall. For him, the nearest example to that of Palmyra is the Arab situation today, as he views the Roman garrisons, which were constructed near Petra, Damascus, and Palmyra and designed to protect the Roman interests, as identical to the Israeli or “Zionist” garrisons in the occupied territory of Palestine: “there is no difference between the challenge which Palmyra faced and the challenge which the Arab nation faces in its struggle with the ‘Zionist’ state” (1985a, 341). Therefore, he asked his readers to consider the possibility of a new Petra or a new Palmyra falling down every day. For him, the possibility depends on whether the Arab people are willing to take a lesson from Palmyra’s historical experience in the face of an important decision (1985a, 341).

11.5 Conclusion

Arab relations with Rome and particularly the period of Palmyra held special symbolic significance for the Syrian Baathists. This era was seen as a period of direct conflict between the ancient Syrian and European powers, which offered meaningful parallels to Syrian Ba’thists concerned with the challenge of Israel.

It is quite evident, and not surprising, from the preceding discussions, that Ṭlāss did not save any effort in his work to use history as a political and ideological tool. For instance, Zenobia was symbolized as an Arab revolutionary struggling for Arab self-determination
against the Romans, who were portrayed as identical to modern westerners and Israelis. In addition, Ṭläss aimed throughout his work to legitimate the unelected Asad’s discourse including Asad’s leading role in the Arab world, with Syria as the beating heart of the Arabs, by means of use the trans-historical images from Palmyra.

It might be worth mentioning here that Ṭläss’s work on Zenobia was part of a wider project that invoked in every aspect in Syrian official state. In addition to the historical works, Zenobia was depicted on Syrian bank notes and in a TV series in which she was depicted as a symbol of the Arab struggle against the West and Israel. Also Palmyra became a flagship of Syrian efforts to develop a tourism industry. Nonetheless, Palmyra became the subject of many academic studies and conferences involving archaeologists and ancient historians from all over the world. It is this role and function of Palmyra’s and Zenobia’s images in the Syrian socio-political atmosphere which brought together Arab secular ideologies, and scholars from the Arab and Western world alike, which meant it became a particular target for extremist groups, such as Da’esh militants, to destroy irreplaceable parts of the city, particularly the temple of Baal, to claim an ideological victory against the rest of the world.

It is also important to note that, despite the great efforts spent on the rewriting history project in Syria, it did not bear the fruit the regime intended; rather it turned in many ways into a scholarly platform.

Figure (3) Syrian Bank Note.
Chapter Twelve: Conclusion

This concluding chapter begins by summarising the evidence in chronological order, before turning to two key overarching themes: the representation of western ‘Others’ in this historiographical works considered, and their representation of eastern ‘Others’. At the end, it will revisit the research questions outlined in the introduction to this thesis, and draw some overarching conclusions.

12.1 Characterisations of antiquity within the Mandate narrative

During the late Ottoman Empire, French hegemony over the Levant, particularly Lebanon, and British domination of Egypt promoted their political models within the Arab world. Their philosophical visions became sources for several Arab intellectuals. For Jūrjī Zaydān (chapter 9), for instance, the British and French models of political and economic progress, with their liberal values, were the best for evolving the Arab world, and were also seen as the best models to emulate in order to involve the Arab world and to integrate it into the modern world.

During their domination of Iraq in the Mandate period, the British attempted to promote their influence on Iraqi political and scholarly thought (Chapter 5). The British authorities in Iraq used historical writings as a means of domination. For this reason, they built a close relationship with the Christian community in Iraq, which had its own agenda and vision. This relationship was not based on using coercion, but rather on mutual interest. While the British had embarked on a project of imperial domination, the Chaldean community of Iraq, like other Christian groups, cooperated with the new authority and became engaged with an identity formulation project to deepen awareness of their own historical roots in Iraq. Not surprisingly, both groups sought to depict the Arabs in Mesopotamia as the inferior people, or the “Other”, a group represented as having neither ethnic roots nor connections with ancient Mesopotamian civilizations.
In Chapter 5, we saw in detail how the Iraqi Chaldean writers utilised the Othering technique to distinguish between “us” and “them”, in order to reproduce and re-inscribe notions of cultural dichotomy. Thus, a sense of difference was established between the Chaldeans as the “us”, who saw themselves as the ancient and civilized people of Mesopotamia, and the uncivilized Arabs as “them”, who were presented as the uncultured newcomers. In particular, the ancient Arabs were characterised as a Bedouin people who have no identity root in the Fertile Crescent. Al-Kirmili’s work was an early step in the clash of opinions about the past in the quest for political legitimacy in Iraq. As we saw in the work of al-Miqdadi, this caused another Iraqi group, the Arabs, to respond by tracing their own roots in the history of Mesopotamia. It is interesting to note that this point, there seems to be no clear understanding on either side of the concept of nation as defined in the British or French understanding – as a body of associated people who live within certain political boundaries.

12.2 Characterisations of antiquity within the independence narrative

The establishment of the Iraqi kingdom in 1921 encouraged a move from a more “amorphous” Arab nationalist ideology to a more targeted discourse against the European colonialist powers and their models of nationalism. Thus, while the British and French succeeded in imposing their political domination during the interwar period, they could not achieve a similar success in imposing their models of the concept of the “nation”. Instead, the Arab world shifted more towards the German concept of Volk, or cultural nationalism.

It is widely accepted that the notion of nationalism is a European development, and the introduction of this concept to the Arab world led to a fundamental change in the conditions under which history was written and read in the region. Yet, the European philosophers had multiple visions on the concept of the nation. As discussed in Chapter (6), despite of the different perceptions among British and French thinkers of the concept of the nation, both regarded a unified state as a key characteristic of nation creation. In his most famous work “what is a nation?” the French thinker Ernst Renan
argued that while several European countries fail, the French succeeded to be a nation through the King of France, “partly through his tyranny, partly through his justice” (Renan 1882, cited from Bhabha 2013 [1990]). The French philosopher, saw the nation and state are symbolically tied together (Dawisha 2003, 55). In contract to the British and French models, German thinkers, who before 1870 lacked a unified state, posited the notion of Volk, people, which emphasises cultural and ethnic uniformity (chapter 6). In short, for the British and French the nation was a state creation and instrumental attachments, while for Germans it was primordial attachments of individuals to communities, and was a matter of culture, not of politics.

The first and most influential Arab thinker who brought the German notion of nation to the Arab World was Ṣāṭiʿ al-Ḥuṣrī (for the German influence on the Arab world during the late Ottoman period see chapter 6). At the time, Al-Ḥuṣrī was seen as the prophet of Arab nationalism, and he adopted the German notion of cultural nationalism. As Minister of Education in the Kingdom of Iraq, he used historical textbooks to advance his model of Arab nationalism, which he thought should emphasise clearly and from the beginning the idea of national unity among Arabs who shared a similar language, culture and history. Al-Ḥuṣrī relied on several Arab nationalists to implant his vision into the Iraqi consciousness, including Darwīsh al-Miqdādı, who became the author of the first nationalised Iraqi historical textbook, in which the Arabs were portrayed as a “nation” with a common culture and language from remote history. Al-Miqdādı did not present the Arabs as either a “political or state creation”, but rather saw Arab national identity as a cultural creation. His German conception and presentation of the Arab nation was unequivocal. Under the supervision of al-Ḥuṣrī, a generation of young Iraqi intellectuals were taught, many of whom went on to become politicians, including King Ghazi and Ṣaddām Ḥusayn, the future President of Iraq, influenced from an early age by pan-Arabist ideology.

Chapter 6 argued that pan-Arabism became a resource for the scholarship that engaged in a symbiotic relationship and was mutually beneficial with the political power. Charles Tripp points out that the first Iraqi King, Faisal I, faced a huge challenge, as on the one hand he rose to power and acquired the throne thanks to the British authority in Iraq,
whereas on the other he did not want to be “used as a cipher to validate British domination of Iraq” (2000, 53). To confront this dilemma, the Iraqi king, who had no clear ideological vision, relied on a number of Arab intellectuals who were already passionate about developing Pan-Arabism. Consequently, they entered into a symbiotic and mutually advantageous relationship: the pan-Arabists provided the Iraqi king with an ideology that would enable him to win the trust of a large proportion of Iraqis and legitimise his claim to the throne, whilst the king provided resource and power to the pan-Arabists, through whom he hoped to win the minds of the Iraqi masses. Importantly, the Arab scholars of this period did not simply collaborate with the political power to gain employment, as they were also motivated to disseminate their political vision as well.

Empirical evidence from the work of al-Miqdādī shows that the Iraqi monarchy attempted to use historical writings as a tool to legitimize its own authority, borrowing the power of the intellectuals that was socially recognized as being of scientific value. At that point, history became a crucial tool for the state. Importantly, the power that the pan-Arab nationalists obtained from the political power placed the historians in a position that prevented them from popularising their ideology and also put pressure on other Iraqi intellectuals. Jawad Ali, for instance, who was seen as a respectable academic historian (see Chapter Seven), extended Arab ethnic identity five centuries earlier, under pressure from the Arab nationalists. As a consequence, his revised representation of Arab identity became a reference for later Arab scholarship.

As we saw in Chapter 3, recent scholarly works and theories about pre-Islamic Arab ethnic identity point to an absence of any pre-Islamic Arab ethnos in the historical record. However, the impact of Pan-Arabism on the Arab historiography shifted this discussion towards a different path. Arab scholars began to assert the existence of a pre-Islamic Arab ethnic identity from the ancient past.

Al-Miqdādī claimed that Arab ethnicity was a product of bonding between territories (Arabia) and people (Semites). This suggestion attempted to claim the pureness of the Arab race as a result of its isolation in the “heart [of] Ḥijāz”. In a more assertive way, Darwazah claimed that all the various groups living in Arabia who migrated to the Fertile
Crescent shared one common origin, and so on this basis these groups also shared a similar language and culture. As part of this politicised vision, Arab scholars, including Jawad Ali, attempted to formulate an academic vision of Arab identity by the mid-twentieth century. Yet, under pressure from the political ideology, such an attempt was soon thwarted. The “failure” of Jawād Ali’s attempt to formulate an academic argument shows how strong the impact of political power was on Arab historiography. In addition, it reveals that obstacles stood in the way of the progress of Arab historical writing, and prevented the emergence of “Rankeism” in the Arab world to call for the separation of political power from knowledge production.

Thus, the Iraqi idea of Arab nationalism, as formed using the German model, emphasized the Arab unity of language, culture, and history. This vision served as fertile ground for the birth of a new Arab historiography sponsored by several Arab governments that focused on continuing the historical cultural unity of the Arab people throughout history. But nevertheless, attempts to make historical writing a driving force towards a unified Arab people following the German model was a failure. From what we see today, it is obvious that the pan Arab use of history has no lasting success, and that it failed particularly in its efforts to unify the Arabs into one state. Instead, many Arab scholars increasingly realized that the Arab territorial states have developed its own identities, rather than being mere artificial creations of colonial powers.

It is important to note that this thesis has not looked only for the impact of nationalist ideology alone on Iraqi historiography, but also has paid considerable attention to the other ideologies, particularly the Marxist analysis of history. Surprisingly, however, I have encountered no Iraqi historians who adopted a Marxist-Leninist analysis to write ancient Arab history.

12.3 Characterisations antiquity within Ba’thist narratives

During the Ba’thist period in Iraq, chapter 8, historical writings continued with control and co-option, but with one difference. Several scholars have proposed a vision that the Iraqi historiography during the Ba’thist period was derived by control and repression
(Baram 1991; Davis 2005). Although there might be some evidence to support this vision, but the empirical evidence (provided in Chapter 8) challenges this argument. Political power and historical writings during the monarchy and the Ba’thist period complemented each other, although nuanced differences did exist. Scholars working for the monarchy had collaborated with the political power to advance their pan-Arab nationalist ideology, while subsequently the Iraqi Ba’thist party began to employ intellectuals to support and propagate the state’s ideology. Consequently, the Iraqi scholars who worked closely with the dominant political power during the Ba’thist period in Iraq could not work for the sake of advancing their political ideology, but rather for resources and work positions that were controlled by the political hegemony. This is evident from the fact that Iraqi historical writing during the Ba’thist era did not add any new philosophical vision to the existing scholarship, but rather it served to advance the state’s discourses. Therefore, when the political power changed its discourse, the Arab scholars quickly shifted also, focusing on the “new state discourse”. For example, after the 1975 Algiers Agreement between Iraq and Iran, the historical hostility that had occurred between the Iranians and Iraqi Arabs disappeared from historical writings. Yet this changed in 1980, when the policy of the Iraqi government led to a change in Iraqi historiography, which highlighted the alleged enmity between the two nations.

The scholarly environment in Syria was similar to the Iraqi context with an exception of being more open on the world-wide developments of the historical writings. This made the Syrian historians, even when the truth of the state was not allowed to be challenged, but they were able to produce a version of history accessible by the world scholarly community and which could be seen as not being consciously biased.

Chapter (8) argues, while the Ba’thist party was stridently supporting the pan-Arab ideology before its rise to power but being in power forced the Ba’thist to restructure its ideological vision. The Ba’th began gradually to promote two different visions within same discourse: pan-Arab and the Iraqi. Within such a context the ancient Arab characterisation was continued with a pan-Arabism line in which all the groups of ancient Mesopotamians were depicted as Arab with the main focus on the similarity of linguistic and cultural pre-Islamic Arabs. Nevertheless, the ancient Iraqi Arabs had a
leading role within the Arab world. It is worth to mention, that as part of the Iraqi Ba’thist attempts to rewrite Iraqi history, the Ba’thist party began to formulate several hypotheses, among these, as we saw in chapter (8) the Ba’thist narrative began to use term al-Qabā’il al-Jazīria/al-Jazīrain the peninsula tribes instead of the Semitic people. In short the characterisation of the ancient Arab continued with the early Pan Arabism vision with prioritising the Iraq people within the ancient Arab people.

Regarding the re-writing history projects in Iraq and Syria, they were similarly politically and ideologically motivated to legitimise the truth of the state and, at the same time, to avoid knowledge that could undermine the truth of the power. The Ba’th parties in both countries attempted to use historical production to legitimise their regimes, but more importantly the heads of the regimes, Saddam and al-Asad. These two men had a personal dispute over the project of unification between Iraq and Syria, and both sides entered into a long struggle to represent themselves as the true representative of the Ba’th Party and to reposition the other side as split from the basic principles of Ba’thism. They also strove to represent themselves as capable leaders of the Arab world, particularly after the death of the Egyptian president, Jamal ’Abdul Nasir. These political issues had a great impact on the way the rewriting history projects were shaped in both countries.

Another similarity between the two projects was that they both began with pan-Arab visions of history, but both ended in regional nationalism. In Iraq, the early Ba’thist vision, particular, Saddam during the 1970s, propagated pan-Arab ideology. However, from the beginning of the 1980s, especially with the Iraq-Iran war, all efforts were directed to prove that the Iraqis were the true leaders of the Arab world. In Syria, the project focused on re-writing Arab history, and finding evidence to prove that Arab unity throughout history was the key factor of Arab success. Within such discourse Syria presented itself as the “the beating heart of Arabism”. However, the Syrian Ba’thists began to invest in a Syrian uniqueness and excellence narrative. For that reason, the Ba’thist began to incorporate more symbols from ancient Syria, such as Zenobia.

The reason of this similarity, is that the Ba’thist party in both countries had a similar situation. For instance, the elites of both countries came from a minority community.
While in Syrian the Shia Alawites dominated the majority Arab Sunni, in Iraqi the Sunni Arabs minority dominated the majority of Arab Shia and the Kurds. Thus, the re-writing history project was used as a means of overcoming internal fragmentation.

While both Saddam and al-Asad had a similar attitude towards historical production, the presentation of the “Other” differed in both countries. In the Iraqi context, Iran was positioned as dangerous to the political structure, more than any other factor. In Syria, Israel was depicted as the most dangerous enemy. Thus, much of the effort to politicise history in both countries focused on representing Iran and Israel as external enemies. This had a massive impact on the narrative of the Arabs in antiquity. For the case of Iraq, Iran was equated with ‘Persia’ and depicted as a historical enemy, thus hatred of Iraq was the common denominator of all ancient Iranian powers. For Syrian historiographers, the Jews were represented as the main threat to the Arabs in addition the Romans were equated with modern western powers. It is worth mentioning that the Iraqi historians during the Ba’th era were isolated from the international community, and thus global developments in historical writing had very little impact on Iraq. In addition, the Iraqi most prestigious journal Sumer deteriorated since the war against Iran and now no more world historians attempted to publish, and most of the international archaeological team soon abandoned Iraqi archaeological sites after the beginning of war with Iran. In contrast, Syrian historians experienced censorship but continued their interaction with the rest of the world, which helped to maintain modern developments in world historiography. For instance, the journal of the al-Hawlīyāt al-atharīyah (The archaeological annals of Syria) had many contributors from outside Syria, and many prestigious scholars continued to publish in it. In addition, the peaceful environment in Syria prior to the civil war allowed archaeological teams from all over the world to carry out excavations using modern technology and methods in archaeology.
12.4 Characterisations of interactions between ancient Arabs and their Western neighbours

In twentieth century Iraqi, Syrian and other Arab states’ historiography, characterisations of interactions between the pre-Islamic Arabs with western powers were strongly influenced by the experience of modern Western imperialism, contributing to a preference for German over British intellectual influence.

During the late Ottoman period and early mandate period several Arab scholars, such as Zaydān and al-Kirmili, attempted “to bring the Arabs under the benevolent protection of liberal Europe” (see Chapters 5 and 9). Within this narrative, the ancient Romans and Byzantines were depicted as civilized powers and as major sources of progress to the ancient Arab world. In addition, they presented the Greek, Roman, and Byzantine cultures as the basis for future Arab Islamic civilization. Thus, adoption of the modern and liberal political and economic model of the West would facilitate a smooth and orderly process of Arab transition from putative backwardness to development. It is important to note that Iraqi historical writing during the mandate period attempted to minimise narratives of military actions, wars, victories, and heroic figures.

The domination of British and French colonialism over the Arab world after the First World War provided a fertile environment for Nazi propaganda, with the ideology of the Third Reich having an impact on Arab identity. German diplomats in the Arab world presented themselves as an anticolonial power at the 1920s, and this approach enabled Third Reich diplomats during the 1930s to establish a common ground with the Arab world in the face of “common enemies”, which included European colonial powers such as the United Kingdom and France, and also the Jews. In a meeting with Heinrich Wolff, head of the German Consulate in Jerusalem, al-haj Husseini, Mufti of Palestine, argued

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1 The efforts of German aim for cultural influence the Arab world preceded the First World War and back to the Ottoman period. The German archaeologists, for instance, began to tussle the British over control of Mesopotamian archaeology in the final years of the Ottoman period but this attempt of the pre-world war one, as far as I examined, did not made fundamental changes on the Arab tradition, rather the impact remain within what became the modern Turkey (for early German activities in Mesopotamia see Bernhardsson 2005, 53-56).
that “Muslims inside and outside Palestine welcome the new regime in Germany and hope for the spread of fascist, antidemocratic state leadership to other countries” (Herf 2010, 16). After the accession of the pro-Arab nationalist King Ghazi (see Chapter 6), German diplomats in Iraq seized the opportunity to invite Iraqi military officers to Germany for a military exercise, and the visiting Iraqis expressed their admiration for German progress during the Third Reich period.

Yet after growing concern in the Arab world surrounding the Nuremberg Laws, and to strengthen the Third Reich’s influence in the region, the Nazi party had to redefine the racial categorization of Semitic. The German Embassy in Cairo declared that “the Nuremberg race laws are aimed only at the Jews (without regard to their citizenship)”. In a similar way, the German diplomat in Iraq, Fritz Grobba, translated Hitler’s Mein Kampf into Arabic, which led to it appearing in Iraqi and Lebanese newspapers from 1934. Because of the ideological purpose of the book, Grobba did not translate the entire work, and he also modified several terms used. For instance, he replaced the term “anti-Semitic” with “anti-Jewish”. In addition to Third Reich propaganda appearing in newspapers, it also began to be broadcast via short-wave radio directed at the Arab world. It is not suggested that Anglo-French notions of nation and their political discourse had an insignificant impact in Iraq, but rather that it was the German tradition and political ideologies that left a deeper imprint on the Arab world down to the mid of the twentieth century, especially given the Pan Arabism ideology to have been inspired by Nazi depictions of western imperialism. In addition, the infiltration of Nazi propaganda promoted a trend of militarised historiography in the Arab world, especially in Iraq. Furthermore, these developments had a fundamental impact on the reception of the Arabs as ‘us’, and the Romans, Byzantines, and Persians as ‘them’, throughout Arab historiography.

While al-Ḥusri and his Arab nationalist followers popularised the German definition of the concept of cultural nation, it was Third Reich propaganda that laid the foundation for fanatical and fascist nationalism. This led to the development of pan-Arabism through the work of Ba’thist intellectuals, who proposed a semi-fascist military dictatorship in Iraq and Syria in the middle of the twentieth century.
developments had a fundamental impact on Iraqi and Arab historiography. Whilst Iraqi historiography, under the impact of Arab nationalism, attempted to formulate a primordial Arab identity, under Nazi influence pan-Arabism discourse attempted to militarise the Arab past by focusing on historical victories and heroism. Al-khaṭṭāb, for instance, criticized the way that the military history of the Arabs had been marginalized within the colonial context, stating:

“Since the colonial powers entered Iraq, their rhetoric [has] spent concerted efforts to condone everything that evokes the spirit of pride, glory, and honour of the past Arabs. [He asks] will this book [on Arab history] silence the reprehensible voices who worked hard to destroy our history and our heritage and “import” a history and heritage from across the border?” (al-Khaṭṭāb 1964, 8-21).

The Arab nationalists broke away from the early mandate’s historiography and attempted to formulate different images of the Romans, Byzantines, and Sasanians, presenting the former two as greedy people motivated by an economic interest to occupy the “Arab land” (for Sasanian see the next section). Historical writings by Iraqi nationalists attempted to represent the indigenous people of the ancient Fertile Crescent as purely Arab people whose cities became a crucial point in the ancient international commercial networks. Thus, the Arab world became since ancient times a desirable target for greedy western imperialism. This historical presentation was turned into stereotypical images of the west exploited by both the Ba’thist party and the extremist groups that grew after the end of Ṣaddām’s regime, and occupied part of Iraq and Syria in 2014.

12.5 Characterisations of interactions between ancient Arabs and their Eastern neighbours

As with the presentation of the Romans in early Arab Iraqi historiography, the Iranians were not seen as a threat to the Arab people throughout history. Despite paying very little attention to the Arab relationship with the Iranian people, al-Kirmili, for example,
did not show any enmity towards the latter. Nevertheless, he argued that the Arab Islamic civilization was mainly developed by the Syriac and Persians people. Importantly, the Iraq Arab writers such as ʿAlī Ẓarīf al-Aʿẓamī, who came from Sunni religious background, had a similar “natural” images toward the Iranian, even when he used the word Persian instead of Iranian in many cases but the use was not to “insult” the Persians or depicting as a “historical enemy”, but it seems that it was the influence of the Islamic historiographical tradition which used to use the word ‘Persians’ of all peoples of Iran, without distinction between them.

However, the depiction of the Iranians shifted under the Iraqi Baʿthist regime, which presented them as the historic enemy of both the Iraqis and the Arabs. Under Ṣaddām Ḥusayn’s regime, the Iraqi Baʿthists considered historical production to be the key cultural instrument to reaching an ideological hegemony, by promoting the legitimacy of its military efforts against Iran. To achieve this goal, the Baʿthist party initiated a new historiographical approach and embarked upon a project to re-write Iraqi history. The resulting works combine to form a remarkable example of historical work during wartime in the Arab world, bringing together the work of scholars and propagandists. Among the main aims of the project was the goal to construct a stereotypical image of the Iranians as ‘Other’, stigmatizing them as worthy of Iraqi and Arab hatred.

Presenting the Iranians as the historic and even ultimate enemy of the Iraqis was at the heart of this project’s objective. This Baʿthist historical narrative was structured in a way that presented hostility and conflict as dominating the relationship between Mesopotamia and Iran at every historical juncture, thus rejecting any possibility of a peaceful relationship in the future. Within Baʿthist historiography, Iranian and Arab enmity came in two stages. In the first, during the pre-Islamic era, the hostility was explicit and involved direct clashes between the two groups. In the second stage, this continuing enmity was transformed into an implicit hatred and an interior subversion movement, known as Shuʿūbiyyah, after the Persian defeat at the battle of al-
Thus, the historical writings demonstrate a strong interconnected nature of political power discourse and historical production, as well as the production and dissemination of the image of the ‘enemy’ during wartime. On the other hand, in Syria, Iranian enmity towards the Arabs was not part of state discourse after the rise of the Alawite Asad family to power. Indeed, after the Syrian revolution, several Syrian writers portrayed the Sasanian Empire as a state friendly to the Arabs. Thus, Syrian historiography contrasted strongly with historical writings produced in Iraq during the same period over past Iranian relationships with Arabs.

Finally, it is not surprising that under the Ba‘thist regimes, historical writing in Iraq was concerned with historical Iraqi/Arab-Iranian relationships, while such writing in Syria focused on Syrian/Arab-Roman relationships throughout history. But the questions that arise, and which require more discussion, concern the differences between the portrayal of the Iranians in Iraqi historical writing and the Romans in Syrian historical writing, and how these depictions have been associated with the modern West and Iran. In the first place, both Iraqi and Syrian historiographies portrayed the Iranians and Romans as the “Other”, or occupiers of Arab land, and in both cases these peoples were linked with the modern West and Iran. However, the historiographies differ in how they portrayed this. In Iraqi Ba‘thist writing, the Iranians became “Persians” and were presented as the historical enemy of Iraq and the Arabs, and thus were demonised and dehumanised. In Syrian writing, however, the Romans were not transformed into a historical enemy, and thus they – along with the Byzantines – were not demonised but rather portrayed as greedy and ruthless forces that aimed to plunder Arab wealth. Further, the West was presented as an extension of avaricious Roman ambitions in the Arab world. As such, within Syrian historiography, both the Romans and the modern West were presented as not dealing with the logic of reason but rather with the logic of force, in order to impose their domination. But what should be clear here is that, in

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2 Shu‘ūbiyyah is a term appeared in the medieval Islamic tradition argues that Persians pretended that they adopted Islam and Arab tradition, but they secretly sought to undermine the Arab state and regain their former status.
contrast with Iraqi Ba’thist historiography which demonised the Iranian people in the past and present, the Romans and their “descendants” modern Western people, from Syrian point of view, where not demonised. What made this stereotypical image worse was Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism, which was exploited by the Iraqi and Syrian Ba’thist regime to add Western intellectualism to Western colonialism, without paying any attention to the historical context. Thus, a stereotypical image of the Romans was created and equated with the modern West, and this influenced Arab historical production in the entire Arab community. More importantly, radical groups in the recent Arab world, after the decline of the pan-Arabist ideology, have now taken these stereotypical images and rhetoric as a “scientific” hypothesis to support their extremist and hostile ideas for everything that comes from the West. Therefore, attempts should be made by both communities to dismantle this stereotypical image of the Romans and Byzantines, and their association with the modern West in Arab historiography. This will not only help to increase collaborations between the Arab and Western academic contexts, but also between the two communities. Additionally, the perpetuation of stereotypical images of Iranians as “Persians” and as the historical enemy of the Arabs by the Iraqi Sunnis, even after the fall of Şaddām’s regime, remains a problem, compounded by the adoption of this discourse by radical groups. Without dismantling these stereotypical images implanted by successive Iraqi regimes within Iraqi historiography, any attempt to bridge the gap between Arabs and the West, and Iraq and Iran, will not succeed.

12.6 Characterisations of interactions between ancient Arabs and their Eastern neighbours

This thesis began by questioning how (a) did politics influence historiography in 20th century Iraq, tracing connections between the changing portrayal of the ancient past Arabs and the changing nature of contemporary politics, and (b) was there a distinctive Iraqi school of historiography? My research has led me to conclude that:

a) politics had a crucial impact on historiographical production in 20th century Iraq.
From the 19th century, European historical writing began to rise as an epistemological discipline independent of power. Theoretically, politics began to dissociate itself from knowledge production and allowed knowledge to be formulated in new systems, with “scientific standards”, which were claimed to be beyond the control of state power. In Iraq, however, historiography and politics were closely related from the establishment of Iraq. The formation of Iraq was a foreign imposition rather a result of internal developments. In addition, the Iraqi intelligentsia was also externally formed, through education in Istanbul, Beirut, Damascus and later in European institutions. Thus, the Iraqi political foundation and its intelligentsias were external imposition. As a result these two fields had a strong connection in twentieth century Iraq.

Historiography was from the beginning was not designed to produce autonomous knowledge, but it proved itself to be part of power endeavours to from collective consciousness that coincided with the ‘truth’ of the state. Power in Iraq offered resources and positions to those writers that accepted the preferred state line, and could legitimise political projects offered by the governing power. Thus, politics in Iraq became the main driver in the field of historiography. Its aim was to recruit scholars who could produce a narrative which could persuade the popular masses that the political ideology of the regime is the common good for the nation. Thus, political power in modern Iraq has dominated historical writings from the beginning. Nevertheless, this domination was increased dramatically, from the monarchy from the early 20th century to the Ba’thists at the end of the same century, when all historiographical efforts were designed to legitimise Ba’thist ideology and president Saddam Hussein.

b) There was no coherent development of an indigenous school of Iraqi historiography, in part because politics had such a crucial impact. Specifically, the influence of external powers on the contemporary politics of Iraq meant that the production of Iraqi historiography was deeply and fundamentally influenced by external traditions.

Historical writing in Iraq up the end of the 19th century remained faithful to traditional Islamic historiography. However, with the turn of the twentieth century, especially with establishment of the Iraqi state, this approach was increasingly challenged by
introducing European developments in the field of historiography to the Arab world. Resulting from the imposition of Western colonial powers on the Arab world and increasing interaction between Western scholars, and the al-Mashriq al-Arabia, Iraqi historians gradually adopted the western tradition and thus, they failed either to develop the Islamic approach or to introduce a distinctive ‘Iraqi’ historiographical approach. Instead, the western model has become predominant in the Iraqi historiography.

Within the Western historiography the Germanophone approach exercised more impact on the modern al-Mashriq al-Arabi and Iraqi historiography. During the nineteenth century Egyptian historians, Syrians, and Lebanese scholars began to adopt the French and British historiographical styles such as Jūrjī Zaydan, and early works of Sati’ al-Ḥuṣrī, who produced their works in accordance with French and British model. However, the growth of Arab nationalism who adopted the German “Volk” definition of the nation, became the channel through which German historiography began to enter the Arab world in addition to the influence of Rankean empiricism and the Third Reich propaganda in the Arab world between the two World wars. Resulting from the above factors Iraqi historians failed to develop the Islamic approach or to introduce a distinctive ‘Iraqi’ historiographical approach. Instead, the western model has become predominant in the Iraqi historiography.
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