Emmanuel V. Marmaras

CENTRAL LONDON

UNDER RECONSTRUCTION POLICY AND PLANNING

1940 - 1959

Ph.D. Thesis

University of Leicester

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ABSTRACT

CENTRAL LONDON UNDER RECONSTRUCTION POLICY AND PLANNING, 1940-1959

The thesis deals with the formation of the post-Second World War reconstruction and planning machinery in Great Britain on the one hand, and on the other, with the replanning efforts undertaken in London and especially the redevelopment programme regarding its central area in the form of the comprehensive development projects.

The central hypothesis is that, although the planning thought, legislation and technique realised significant evolutionary steps by introducing important innovatory instruments and bold planning concepts, the rebuilding of Central London was not a success to a comparable extent. This divergence between concept, plan and outcome was mainly due to the difficulties faced during the implementation stage as a result of financial problems and, in addition, to the way that the application of aspects of Modern Architecture in some of the new buildings were carried out.

The work is structured in three parts. The first one, under the title "Reconstruction and Planning Machinery", explores the administrative and statutory developments in town planning matters during the period 1940-1959. The conclusion of this analysis is that, because of the sweeping character of the new planning system which was introduced, a contradiction had emerged due to the pluralistic character of the British socio-economic system. The second part has the title
"Replanning London" and deals with the plans proposed for London as a whole during the 1940s. The main finding was that the six plans which were proposed could be considered as sections of one planning endeavour. These plans have a unified and continuous character, although each one had been prepared by a different team of planners. Finally, the third part, under the title "Redeveloping Central London", examines the proposals for the rebuilding of the City of London and for specific areas of Central London located on both sides of the Thames. The main conclusion of this analysis is that, although these projects introduced innovations concerning the control of urban densities, and the hygiene of residence and office accommodation in the city centre, they failed to achieve one of their main targets. This was the unification of both parts of Central London located at the north and south banks of the Thames.
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ABBREVIATIONS

AA    Architectural Association
AMCE  Association of Municipal and County Engineers
AMCS  Association of Municipal and County Surveyors
ARGIT Architectural Research Group in Toronto
B.    Borough
BEA   British European Airways
C.B.  County Borough
CIAM  Congres Internationaux des Architectes Modernes
CLB   Central Land Board
CLD   County of London Development (Plan)
CPO   Compulsory Purchase Order
DF    Daylight Factor
DLT   Development Land Tax
FSI   Floor Space Index
GL    Greater London
LCC   London County Council
LRRC  London Regional Reconstruction Committee
MARS  Modern Architects’ Research Society
M.B.  Metropolitan Borough
M.P.  Member of Parliament
OBE   Order of British Empire
PLA   Port of London Authority
PR    Plot Ratio
PRO   Public Record Office
RA    Royal Academy
RDC   Rural District Council
RIBA  Royal Institute of British Architects
RTPI  Royal Town Planning Institute
TCPA  Town and Country Planning Association
TPI   Town Planning Institute
U.D.  Urban District
U.D.C. Urban District Council
UN    United Nations
PROLOGUE
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Athens, December 1992
I. INTRODUCTION

Town planning, as a set of concepts, ideas and legislative rules, is tested and effectively developed through the given opportunities of implementation in real conditions. Among such opportunities are those which arise after a great disaster in a country. In fact, the effects of a physical calamity or war destruction will require a great national reconstruction effort.

In its widest sense, the term reconstruction refers to the economic, as well as to the "social, moral and physical" revival of a country. As a consequence, the establishment of a central machinery must be considered as a basic necessity in order to realize an extensive reconstruction programme. In this context, the re-planning and re-building of the cities of this country becomes a major component of this total reconstruction activity.

The Second World War was undoubtedly the most disastrous event in twentieth century European History. The need for reconstruction of the European countries immediately after the end of the hostilities was evident. This reconstruction, of course, took place, but the manner by which each country responded to the problem was different from the others; mainly, because of its economic capabilities, as well as the local conditions,
which prevailed. Among these post-war reconstruction cases, the British one presented an additional particularity, in that the reconstruction machinery was organised more or less entirely during the wartime period. This could be explained by the fact that Britain was one of the few European countries which participated throughout the war and at the same time, remained unoccupied during this period. Additionally, this country had the experience of the First World War, when British reconstruction planning had also started before the end of the war. As a result, it had been possible to prepare the reconstruction plans systematically and in an uninterrupted way. The advantages were significant when peace came, for the machinery of the whole reconstruction activity was available. Particularly, in town and country planning terms the developments which occurred led to the establishment of the famous post-war British Planning System. But, as this process was very close to the political developments of that period, the J.B. Cullingworth's view that "the essence is political even when issues are defined in technical terms"², it is accepted as the crucial methodological basis in order to be approached the above planning developments.

Admittedly, there is a general agreement among historians and practitioners that the Second World War marked an important new stage in the development of urban and regional planning in Britain. Indications of a new enthusiasm for planning coincided with the first heavy air raids on London and the big provincial centres, in the autumn and early winter of 1940. However, the main stimulus to new planning thought was the destruction caused by the raids. It was widely felt that extensive urban areas, particularly in the city centres, would need reconstruction, and there was almost universal agreement that this reconstruction would need to be planned under the aegis of central
and/or local government, rather than left to the free play of the market. Quite quickly, the debate broadened out from the simple reconstruction of bombed buildings and districts to the re-planning of the cities as a whole, and even of the regions around them.

In the above context, the re-planning and re-building of London became a burning question of the British political and social scene. Especially, the debate on Central London concentrated very soon, on the one hand, the interest of the private sector, which aimed to participate in the speculative opportunities generated by reconstruction activity, and on the other, the attempts of the various collective institutions and bodies to bring about, in some way, the "rational" development of Central London. By this was understood an intervention conforming to the ideology and procedures accepted as necessary by the more advanced elements of the town planning circles of that time. This clash of approaches was typified in the endeavour, undertaken mainly by the London County Council, to up-grade the south part of London's central area, that is the central districts located on the South Bank of the Thames. This significant but neglected episode will receive particular attention in this thesis.

The research in this thesis focuses on the 1940-1959 period, and it deals with the formation of the British reconstruction and planning machinery on the one hand, and on the other, with the re-planning efforts undertaken in London and especially the redevelopment programme which developed in its central area in the form of the comprehensive development project.

Our central hypothesis is that, although the planning thought, legislation and technique realised significant evolutionary steps by introducing important innovatory
struments and bold planning concepts, the re-building of Central London was not a success to a comparable degree. This divergence between concept, plan and result was mainly due to the difficulties faced during the implementation stage as a result of financial problems, and, in addition, to the adoption of elements of the architecture of Modern Movement in some of the new building carried out. Actually, referring to the latter point, modernism, though originating in Europe in the 1920s, came partly from USA after 1945 in the form of the International Style, an architectural style which was strengthened by the arrival to the USA in the 1930s of some of the leading architects of Europe as refugees, including Walter Gropius, Mies van der Rohe, Marcel Breuer, Jose Luis Sert and Moholy-Nagy, who had years of struggle on behalf of Modern Architecture behind them. Both these sides of modernism were, in a degree, accepted by the young British architects and became their main instrument in expressing the form of the new building structures.

In order to assess the value of post-war British reconstruction activity, this will be examined at two levels: primarily, as a system of conceptualization and implementation in the context of the historical circumstances, and secondly in each of the above sectors separately. It is expected that through this examination will occur the proper arguments to understand the phenomenon of the reconstruction of Central London during the first post-war years. Indeed, this principle will be the methodological basis of this research work. In practical terms, the present work is structured in three Parts, under the following titles: "Reconstruction and Planning Machinery", "Re-planning London" and "Re-developing Central London".

Part 1 consists of seven Chapters, which respond to the
following questions: first, what were the main problems raised in the big British urban agglomerations in town planning terms? secondly, what were the main arguments used on the debate on the necessary urban reconstruction and the formation of a new planning machinery in the pre-war and the war years? thirdly, what were the most important administrative and statutory developments which occurred during the wartime period? fourthly, what was the town planning legislative work produced by the Coalition Government of the 1940-1945 period? fifthly, what were the legislative innovations introduced by the highly innovative Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, passed by the first post-war Labour Government, and what were the reactions to them by the various organised interests of British society? sixthly, which were the needs that led to redevelopment, especially of the central urban areas? and lastly, what were the main innovations of planning technique which facilitated the redevelopment of the central areas?

Part 2 consists of six Chapters, which respond to the following questions: first, what was the general framework of central governmental policy in relation to the re-planning of the London area? secondly, how did the various private institutions react to the need to replan London? thirdly, what were the main features and proposals of the London County Council prepared by J.H. Forshaw and P. Abercrombie? fourthly, what were the important points of the Greater London Plan prepared by Patrick Abercrombie? fifthly, what were the main proposals contained in the County of London Plan prepared by the Town Planning Committee of the London County Council? and lastly, what were the influences and the consequences of the above planning proposals on the reconstruction of London?
Finally, Part 3 consists of three Chapters, which address the following questions: first, what were the first ideas and proposals prepared in the post-1940 period regarding the re-planning of the City of London? secondly, what were the main proposals of the Holden-Holford Plan for the City of London published in 1947? and lastly, what were the main projects and the degree of their successful implementation for comprehensive redevelopment of central areas in London sited on both banks of the Thames?

The thesis ends with a conclusion summing up the British reconstruction experience of the 1940s and 1950s, and the general characteristics of this activity, considered from a town planning and architectural viewpoint.

The main sources of material upon, which the research work is based can be divided into three major categories. The first of them is the archives of the Public Record Office (PRO); 225 PRO files were investigated referring to urban and economic reconstruction of British cities, and especially of London. The second source is the contemporary specialist press, and notably: The Architects' Journal, for the time period from 1938 to 1958; The Journal of the Town Planning Institute, for the time period from 1954 to 1963; and The Town Planning Review, for the time period from 1937 to 1961. The third source is composed of books and other literature, most of them published in the 1940-1959 period but including later material published up to the present day. A full list of sources is provided in the Bibliography of Works Cited (pp. 414 – 432).
Part 1

RECONSTRUCTION AND PLANNING MACHINERY
II. BRITISH TOWN PLANNING ON THE EVE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Our aim here is to identify the condition of British town planning on the eve of the Second World War. The analysis is based on the view that town planning is both, an expression of an utopian idealism which attempts to achieve the "perfect world" and the "ideal city"¹, and the product of an effort to minimize frictional effects in the land and building market, achieving at the same time minimum environmental standards. It follows from this definition, and its historical context, that a summary of the ideas of the pioneering planners on the one hand, and on the other, of the procedure of the "Planning Acts" as it had developed by 1939 will provide a satisfactory foundation for a consideration of the British town planning inheritance on the eve of the Second World War.

Ebenezer Howard's concept of the self-financing, medium-sized cities of about 30,000 people, sited in open countryside and surrounded by a large "green belt", was published in his book Tomorrow in 1898 and re-issued in 1902 as Garden Cities of Tomorrow, is often regarded as the most influential idea and the most decisive contribution in the creation of the British Planning System in the twentieth century². Besides the foundation in 1903 of the first Garden City at Letchworth, and the adaptation of the village-like
residential scale to the creation of a conventional suburb\(^3\) by the establishment of the Garden Suburb at Hampstead in North-West London between 1905 and 1909, the major influence of Howard's ideas lay more in growing concern about land use, urban layout and house design\(^4\). So, according John Stevenson, architects and planners, such as Raymond Unwin, Barry Parker, Patrick Abercrombie, Frederick Osborn and Patrick Geddes, expanded and applied the Garden City concept and combined it with foreign ideas to produce a distinctive British planning movement, although it is considered by Patrick Abercrombie as the implementation of the English ideal of low-density garden and house type of residential planning\(^5\). Anyway, as Anthony Sutcliffe argues the Garden City idea prompted enough achievement in Britain to justify the survival and further development of the idea into 1940s\(^6\).

At the same time, the foundation of the British Urban and Regional Planning System could be considered as an accumulating corpus of legislation contained in a series of "Planning Acts", beginning with the Housing, Town Planning, Etc., Act, 1909\(^7\). According to Anthony Sutcliffe, this Act was a moderate and realistic measure which made town planning powers available to local government within four years of the coinage of the term "town planning" and within less than a decade of the first importation of the town planning idea from Germany\(^8\). In practice, and although Parliament and the people expected the Act of 1909 to be used to promote development of the "garden city type"\(^9\), it basically allowed urban authorities to lay down the pattern of main streets, to designate industrial and residential areas, to set aside land for open space and public buildings, and to fix densities and house types in the residential districts\(^10\).
The Housing and Town Planning Act, 1919 followed. Even though, it was made national and compulsory, it did little in practice to broaden the basis of the town planning. As a matter of fact, town planning was exercised on only a small scale, though since 1820, it had been supervised by a special Department of the Ministry of Health. It is to be noted here, that town planning was not formally separated from housing until the passage of the Town Planning Act, 1925, which was a consolidating measure. It was succeeded by the Town and Country Planning Act, 1932, in which the aspect that the countryside needed planning as much as towns, and the resulting concept of "town and country planning", was embodied. This important Act made it possible in principle for all building development in England and Wales, whether in town or country, to be made subject to planning control. However, effective control was dependent on the existence of statutory plans, and in this respect there were serious deficiencies as late as 1939. For example, there is no question that the failure to relieve the problems created or aggravated by suburban development was largely due to inadequate town planning. According to Harry Richardson and Derek Aldcroft, this failure can be attributed to two factors: defective legislation and the apathy of the planning authorities.

At this point it is necessary to examine the conditions which influenced positively or negatively the actual use of the new planning powers in the 1930s. For this, two subjects must be analysed in a more detailed way; the first one is housing needs, and the second, is the road traffic question in the large urban agglomerations.

As far as housing is concerned a corpus of legislation had built up since the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Well in advance of the passing of the 1909 "Planning Act", local authorities had been provided with extensive powers to clear and replace slum housing, and eventually to provide new housing, unconnected with clearance schemes, to meet "general housing needs". The outstanding statutes were the Artisans' and Labourers' Dwellings Improvement Act, 1875, which permitted the demolition of entire districts of slums and their reconstruction with new housing, and the Housing of the Working Classes Act, 1890, which permitted the construction of housing for general needs. Indeed, town planning was at first seen, in legislative terms, as an extension of the housing power, which explains why the 1909 planning powers were presented to Parliament as part of a housing Bill. However, since 1919, and after the passing of the Housing and Town Planning Act, a new impetus had been given to the production of housing schemes, mainly through a system of central government subsidies and a requirement that local authorities formally assess their housing needs. It was estimated that at least 800,000 houses were needed to replace the slums and make up arrears of house-building from the First World War years, while in 1918 there were 610,000 fewer houses than families.

In 1924, the Wheatley Housing Act increased the State subsidy for houses built for rent. However, little had been done to tackle the twin "evils" of that period, that is of slum clearance and overcrowding. It is estimated that between 1875 and 1930 probably less than 200,000 people had been removed from slum areas and rehoused. The main attempt to face the above twin housing problem started after the passing of the Housing Act, 1930, which introduced a new subsidy system specifically for slum clearance. The subsidy was related not to the number of houses built but to the number of persons displaced and rehoused. This boost
for slum clearance was supplemented by a policy for the relief of overcrowding, initiated by the Housing Act, 1935\textsuperscript{21}. On the basis of local authority returns, it was estimated that 3.8\% (341,000) of the dwellings inspected were overcrowded and that the worst areas in England and Wales were in the East End of London and in North-east England\textsuperscript{22}.

As Harry Richardson and Derek Aldcroft argue that the achievements of the new policy in the 1930s were hardly spectacular, and by 1939 only the fringe of the problem had been attacked\textsuperscript{23}. Altogether barely 375,000 new houses had been built specifically for the purpose of abolishing the slums and overcrowded dwellings\textsuperscript{24}. Most of the houses were built in the form of quite extensive suburban council housing estates, which needed - though they did not always receive - careful planning. Whether the building of housing estates reinforced or undermined town planning as such depended on local circumstances. Normally, the housing estates were planned and built by architects from the Public Works Department, and not by the - usually very small - town planning staffs. Sometimes liaison between the two groups was close, but in other cases the town planners found that they were virtually excluded of essential information. The potential dissension was exacerbated after 1930, when local authorities in the large urban areas turned to slum clearance and reconstruction under the encouragement of the Housing Act, 1930. According to Alison Ravetz, this Act facilitated procedures for clearance and introduced a new Exchequer subsidy which was attached to the number of people displaced rather than the number of new dwellings provided; this subsidy was increased when rehousing was done in flats over three storeys on expensive sites\textsuperscript{25}.

Regarding the road planning question and its legisla-
tive correlation with town planning, the affinity is comparable to that between housing and town planning. Actually, since the arrival of the railways in the 1830s, road traffic had been so reduced that roads outside the urban areas had scarcely attracted the attention of the legislator. Suddenly, all this began to change with the arrival of the motor vehicle from about 1900. The development of statistical data referring to the production of motor vehicles during the inter-war years indicates the rapid rate of change. Britain had produced just 34,000 motor vehicles of all kinds in 1913; however, by 1924 the figure had risen to 146,000, and by 1937 it had reached 507,000. At the same time, in 1914 there were only 140,000 motor vehicles of all kinds in Britain, by 1931 the figure was 1.5 million, and by 1939 three million, two million of which were private vehicles.

In administrative terms, in the early 1900s the county authorities were still weak and inexperienced, and road problems in the countryside were tackled by a powerful central government department, the Board of Trade. In this context, the government set up the Royal Commission on London Traffic which deliberated from 1903 to 1905. The Commission emphasized the need for road widening, for uniformity of building laws and bye-laws to control new development, and for local authorities to define frontages and ensure that new development did not hamper the provision of new roads. Next, the London Traffic Branch of the Board of Trade was set up in 1906, to advise the government on all matters concerning "locomotion, transport and traffic". The problem in London was that many of the outer suburbs, and the outlying free-standing towns, lay outside the boundaries of the London County Council (LCC), making effective road planning by the LCC impossible.
Thus, very early in the twentieth century, the Board of Trade came to take the initiative in road planning for the whole London area, including the County of London. A number of major improvement schemes were suggested for the central area as well; an East to West avenue on the line Bayswater Road - City - Whitechapel and a similar north-south route from Holloway to the Elephant and Castle were the most important ones. However, Board of Trade intervention was not normally direct, for the county authorities were statutorily responsible for main roads within their areas until 1937, when the Trunk Roads Act transferred 4,500 miles of main roads from the local authorities to the Ministry of Transport, which had been established as a new Ministry in 1919, assuming the Board of Trade's road responsibilities. According to J. Michael Thomson, at that time one could find the following pattern of progress which occurred regularly in road planning in London: (a) growing complaints about traffic congestion; (b) production of an ambitious plan; (c) modification of the plan to meet objections on grounds of cost and amenity, and (d) implementation of the modified plan.

The above road traffic situation had variable implications for town planning. Normally, the county authorities could be relied on to ensure that a major radial artery running out of a county borough was continued beyond the city boundary by a compatible road, and the coordination of urban and county road plans was often assured by the regional planning machinery which could be set up under the Housing, Town Planning Act, 1919 and later enactments. In areas where the joint town planning committee was in existence, or where it was ineffective, the Ministry of Transport was willing to intervene directly to bring the county and county borough authorities together, to secure the coordination of their road plans. However, the national frame-
work of road planning helped to keep road planning in the urban areas in the hands of the City Engineer, with the detailed work being done by staff in the Public Works Department, rather than by the town planners. With council housing and roads thus in the hands of others, the town planners found the scope of their work severely circumscribed. Admittedly, it promoted effectively the idea that town and country would be better if they were planned as an entity, or as a system.

However, in addition to both of these factors, one of the greatest environmental disasters of the inter-war years occurred in the form of an urban phenomenon, which was in a way a combination of the traffic and housing developments of that period. This was ribbon development, that is the building of houses along the entire length of the frontages of new main roads, usually by-passes, designed to remove through-traffic from congested urban areas and pretty country towns. These by-passes were normally built by the county road authorities through rural areas to which no town planning powers applied. Thus, there was nothing to stop developers buying up the frontage sites and erecting houses which, because they faced onto an established road, did not incur road charges. The resulting long ribbons of housing, entirely closing in new roads which might otherwise have been landscaped as parkways on the American model, were regarded as undesirable from the social, aesthetic and traffic points of view. Eventually, in 1935, Parliament passed the Restriction of Ribbon Development Act. This statute required all new development within 68 metres of the middle of a "classified" road to have the approval of the highway authority, together with the creation of any new access to the classified road. These powers prevented the worst ribbon development, but still did not amount to effective, comprehensive planning in the vicinity of
major roads, as there were uncertainties between the Ministries of Transport and Health, delay over necessary action and ineffectiveness once it had been taken.35

Besides the above developments, a very uneven distribution of town planning schemes across the country had been established, as a product of the approach to planning adopted in the 1909 Act, and enshrined without essential modification in later enactments. In practice, planning schemes were more likely to be in existence for suburban residential districts developed since 1909 than they were for districts built before 1909, and for industrial districts. Under the 1909 Act, urban authorities were allowed to prepare schemes for individual sectors of their peripheries deemed to be undeveloped or in the process of development, while already developed districts were deliberately excluded. However, the 1932 Act set out to remedy this defect by allowing local authorities to plan the whole of the land within their boundaries. On paper, this was a great step forward, which appeared to compensate in some degree for the abolition of the compulsory planning of peripheral schemes required by the 1919 Act, which had never been enforced in any case.38 However, in practice the planning of developed areas raised serious difficulties, and only the most courageous of authorities attempted it, such as Sheffield from 1938.37 As late as 1937, Sir Gwilym Gibbon, a senior planning official at the Ministry of Health, was writing:

"Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that the biggest, and the most difficult, problem before planners today is that of the replanning of existing towns."38

The explanation for this uneven and disappointing prog-
ress is to be found principally in the failure of the legislature to deal effectively with the perennial problem of compensation. It has to be recognized that compensation, together with the related issue of betterment, was a complex question, both technically and politically. It was related to a long-running strand of land-reform rhetoric which stretched back through John Stuart Mill to Thomas Spence, and which had received a new injection from across the Atlantic in the later nineteenth century in the form of Henry George's "single tax" proposal. The land-reform idea was taken up principally by the Liberal Party and it became part of the ambitious reform programme of the Liberal administration which came to power in December 1905. It was this reformist atmosphere which helped to ease the path of the 1908 planning Act, but it also had the paradoxical effect of weakening the planning clauses. This weakening occurred because when John Burns, the President of the Local Government Board who was the first man of working-class origins to sit in the Cabinet, and his officials at the Board sought advice, principally from the Treasury, on the "compensation and betterment" aspects of town planning schemes, they were told that the broader context of the problem would be tackled in a separate land taxation measure to be brought forward by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Indeed, a series of land taxes were included in the 1909 Finance Bill, which precipitated the notorious show-down with the House of Lords in 1910.

Meanwhile, the Burns Planning Bill made concessions during its passage through the House of Lords, and the upshot was that local authorities were empowered (by Section 58[3]) to recover half the value of any betterment resulting from a planning scheme, and were required to compensate fully for any "worsenent". Not only was the arrangement fundamentally unfavourable to
the authorities, but the valuation problem was virtually ignored. In practice, the betterment levy proved impossible to enforce, and the threat of compensation undermined the position of the authorities in dealing with the private property owners. The matter was not taken up again to any effect until the Labour administration of 1929-1931, which led to the 1932 Planning Act under the National Government of Ramsay Macdonald. In general terms, the "compensation and betterment" provisions were still essentially defective in 1932, and the whole attempt could be characterized as a failure to resolve the fundamental issues of the whole problem.

The "compensation and betterment" question was perceived to be most difficult in the central districts of towns, where the established capital values were at their highest. In the average British city in 1939, the suburbs were normally partially planned under planning schemes approved since 1909. The inner residential districts of early nineteenth century slums were being cleared and rebuilt under the housing legislation. Outside them lay the pre-1909 middle-class suburbs and the monotonous terraced housing built under the bye-laws of the 1870-1914 period. Planning schemes were not normally in force in these areas, but the housing was so new that no redevelopment could as yet be envisaged. The industrial areas were gradually consolidating themselves as factory expansions demolished adjacent housing. This left the city centres, which were not normally subject to planning schemes, but which in the 1820s, and particularly in the 1830s, were being redeveloped by private enterprise to meet the growing demand for shopping and office accommodation. The result was entirely piecemeal and concern grew about the quality of the British townscape. For instance, powers to control the elevations of buildings were
inserted in the 1932 planning Act, and a Ministry of Health circular suggested that they should be used to prevent the building of "monstrosities".

At the same time, traffic congestion became a serious problem in central streets, which had not benefited from extensive improvement in the nineteenth century. There was no question of major street-building schemes in the 1920s and 1930s, and palliatives were introduced, such as Birmingham's central area one-way traffic scheme of 1934, the biggest in the country at that time. Also, between the wars Birmingham acquired sites for its Inner Ring Road, planned in 1917, as and when they became available, and required new buildings along the line of the road to be set back to a building line. Similar schemes existed, or were under study, in other cities, and embryonic outer ring roads were coming into being on the lines pioneered by Queen's Drive, Liverpool, by the City Engineer, J.A. Brodie, before the First World War. By 1938, Leeds had built 17 miles of (outer) ring road, and was looking forward to a big reduction of through-traffic in the city centre. In fact, the utility of ring roads was already reaching the status of planning orthodoxy by the later 1930s, as reflected in the writings on road planning of the London police traffic expert, H. Alker Tripp. However, if the road schemes required compulsory purchase of city-centre properties, they were very unlikely to be carried out in the straitened municipal circumstances of the 1920s, and 1930s, even though part of the cost could in theory be recouped by the sale of frontage sites.

By 1939, the city centres were well on the way to becoming the principal problem, and this state of affairs helps to explain why the planning debate sprang up with such force once the German bombers started to
damage precisely those areas. A heaven-sent opportunity, both figuratively and literally, had presented itself. In the revived planning debate, a collective euphoria was generated in which it was assumed that even the thorniest problems of the past, such as "compensation and betterment", could find radical solutions. This debate is the subject of the following Chapter.
III. THE URBAN RECONSTRUCTION MACHINERY QUESTION

The need for the re-organisation of Britain in economic and physical terms was apparent many years before the outbreak of the Second World War. As we have seen, Peter Hall supports the view that "the need for national/regional planning only became fully evident in the aftermath of the Great Depression of 1929-32". However, the great opportunity was absent from the British scene, although a systematic consideration of post-war problems first began under the War Aims Committee of the Cabinet, which was set up on 23 August 1940, having as a primary object to produce a statement on war aims which could be used publicly as counter-propaganda to the Nazi New Order in Europe. The necessary strong impetus was given by the undesirable fact of the bombing of the most important British cities and towns from the autumn of 1940.

To some extent, the above development is reflected in the voluminous work of the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population, which sat under the chairmanship of Sir Montague Barlow from July 1937 - that is more than two years before the actual outbreak of the war between Britain and Germany on 3 September 1939 - to January 1940, that is some months later than the first air raids on naval targets in the Firth of Forth, Orkney and Shetland in October and November 1939. The main recommendations of the Commis-
sion were threefold: first, a Central Planning Authority "national in scope and character" should be created; secondly, congested urban areas should be redeveloped, and industries and industrial population should be dispersed from them; and lastly, a reasonable balance of industrial development should be encouraged throughout the regions of the country. In addition, and particularly, the continued drift of the industrial population to London and the Home Counties was held to constitute "a social, economic and strategical problem which demands immediate attention."

The publication of the Barlow Commission's report prompted during the wartime years an extensive debate on urban reconstruction, which had as its final result the establishment of a new planning machinery, although the Commission itself merely made a general suggestion in this respect. For the above reasons, this report has often been regarded by historians as heralding the new, post-1945 approach to urban and regional planning. According to Gordon Cherry, "the importance of the report has been that many of its policy recommendations were accepted by all post-war governments, up to the present time." The aim of this Chapter is to examine this public debate, stimulated by the circulation of the Barlow Commission's report, and especially its contribution to the formulation of ideas concerning the questions of the Central Planning Authority, the distribution of the industrial population, and the related subject of the control of urban land.

However, before pursuing the debate on the above three matters, we have to make clear that the term reconstruction, in its widest sense, refers, as has been already demonstrated in the Introduction to this thesis, to the economic, as well as to the "social, moral and physical" revival of a country. As a consequence,
the objectives of post-Second World War British reconstruction were very wide. On the one hand, they contained the organisation of external affairs, such as commercial relations with other countries, war compensation from enemy countries, and the negotiation of loans, mainly from the United States of America. While on the other, it included the management of internal problems, such as employment, education, social security, and public works. It is necessary here to distinguish, among the latter problems, between the non-physical and the physical aspects of reconstruction. The non-physical aspects included labour and employment, health and social security, education and to some extent, food supply and distribution; the physical aspects included all works and buildings, and town and country planning in its widest sense. In the following analysis, we shall be concerned with those internal, primarily physical, aspects of reconstruction which are most clearly expressed by the term urban reconstruction.

At this point, it must be made also clear that the term "urban reconstruction" lost its initial wide meaning very soon, and in the vocabulary of the wartime period it was used with regard to the rebuilding of specific sites in bombed areas. This narrowing led Lord John Reith, the Minister of Works and Buildings, to declare in a press conference on 8 August 1941:

"I wish we could call it "planning" and not "reconstruction", because that is a word that is being used with regard to the League of Nations, and all sorts of things, and it is used in a limited sense."\textsuperscript{12}

Returning to the debate caused by the recommendations of the Barlow Commission's report, the multiplying contributions to the planning literature, and the involve-
ment of various political parties, organisations and other lobbies produced a lively and complex discussion.

Outstanding among these contributions were the following books: *Town Planning*, by Thomas Sharp, which had been published in 1940 by Penguin Books Ltd., and sold 1/4 million copies; *When We Build Again*, published by the Bournville Village Trust in 1941, which was based on research into housing conditions and the environment in Birmingham; *Overture to Planning*, written by Frederick J. Osborn and published in 1941 by Faber and Faber Ltd., which was the first booklet in the "Rebuilding Britain" series edited also by F.J. Osborn; *Ground Plan of Britain*, published by "The 1940 Council" in 1942, chaired by Lord Balfour of Burleigh, in which fourteen maps of Britain were presented, selected so as to "a factual criterion for testing the feasibility and soundness of any proposed broad scheme of planning and reconstruction"; and, *The Machinery of Town and Country Planning*, by Michael P. Fogarty, which was published in 1944 by the Catholic Social Guild. Additionally, the political parties produced a number of pamphlets, as well as the various propaganda and technical associations, such as the Association for Planning and Regional Reconstruction, and The Town and Country Planning Association. Furthermore, it is to be referred here the professional associations, such as RIBA, TPI, AMCE and AMCS.

At the same time, large numbers of individuals participated in it, through public debates, the pages of the scientific journals, newspapers, radio programmes, and films. Lastly, special reference should be made to the plans which were produced during the war for the blitzed cities, and especially the following: *The County of London Plan*, by J.H. Forshaw and P. Abercrombie, in 1943; *The Replanning of Southampton*, by
S.D. Adshead and H.T. Cook, in 1942; *The Plan for Plymouth*, by J. Paton Watson and P. Abercrombie, in 1943; and, *The Plan for Kingston-upon-Hull*, also by P. Abercrombie, in 1945. These were mainly admonitory plans but they were all prepared with a view to implementation after the war.

The above sources have been used, as well as the later published literature, as the main primary research material for the following investigation.

**a. The Central Planning Authority: The case and the debate**

The issue of the establishment of a Central Planning Authority was one of the central ones of the Barlow Commission. The Commission in order to face the problems mainly of the industrial relocation recommended as necessary the planned control of it. An indication of this view comes from the following quotation from the Barlow Commission’s report:

“The problems of location of industry are national in character - they touch and indeed tend to overlap those of agriculture, land, water, transport, roads, amenities and many of the major activities of the national life. The solution of the problems of location, therefore, must be sought along the lines of national inquiry and national guidance. So far as any inquiry or guidance by Government is available at present, it is departmental and not national in character”\(^{18}\).

However, an essential divergence emerged among the members of the Commission concerning the nature of the Authority. This was the reason why, finally, two reports were submitted on this crucial item. According
to the majority opinion, a National Authority should be established, taking
the form of a Board comprising a Chairman and three other Members chosen by reason of their eminence in public life, regard being had to their experience in industry and business from the side of both employers and employed. The Board to be called the "National Industrial Board".\(^{17}\)

The minority view, expressed by three members of the Commission including Patrick Abercrombie, Professor of Town Planning at University College, London, and the leading British authority on town and country planning of his day, was that a new Ministry was needed "to be fitted into the scheme of central and local government, if it is to function properly", and that it would "take over the town planning functions now vested in the Ministry of Health", "some part of the planning functions of the Ministry of Transport", and "possibly some parts of the housing functions of the Ministry of Health".\(^{18}\)

The explanation for this divergence between the two groups of Commissioners is to be found mainly in the fact that the executive powers proposed for the National Industrial Board were considered inadequate by the minority. The general objective was, however, agreed by all.

In 1942, Arthur Greenwood, the Minister of Reconstruction, put before the House of Commons a third possibility for the Central Authority. He said:
"In my view it ought not to reside in a single Department. There should be a National Development Board presided over by a Minister free from departmental responsibilities and composed of the Ministers whose Departments are concerned with various aspects of national development."\(^{19}\)

This third proposal could be considered as a synthesis
of the previous ones, as it combined the characteristics of a Board and its chairmanship by a Minister.

In addition to the above three suggestions, some planning writers supported similar proposals for the form of the Central Planning Authority. In 1940, Thomas Sharp, the distinguished town-planner who became widely known as the advocate of compact planning and of a real urban character in town building, in opposition to the low-density garden-city type of planning, wrote that the planning activity should be in the charge of a Minister directly responsible to Parliament. This Minister and his Department should take over all the land-planning functions, which were scattered among other Ministries, and other governmental departments.20

Soon after, in 1941, the Bournville Village Trust, which intended to promote the provision of "improved dwellings, with gardens and open spaces to be enjoyed therewith", for the "working-class and labouring population in and around Birmingham and elsewhere in Great Britain"21, referring to the rebuilding of Birmingham, argued that the creation of a National Planning Authority, on the lines of the Barlow Commission’s recommendations, was needed. The Trust considered that under the aegis of this Authority local planning could be carried out without restriction by existing administrative boundaries.22

Also in 1941, Frederick J. Osborn, who had with some persistence advocated the policy of dispersal, green belts and new towns by writings, lectures, broadcasts, "lobbying", evidence to Government committees, etc.23, supported that there might be a Ministry of State primarily concerned with securing the best use of the land in the national interests, which should take over the central administration of statutory planning, housing
and (on the construction side) of highways, and which should have stronger powers to prescribe planning standards in all schemes, new powers to guide the location of industry by localized restrictions and inducements, and increased powers to promote the building of satellite towns and trading estates and the rebuilding of town centres.

A more sophisticated suggestion was submitted by Michael Fogarty in 1944. He recommended the creation of an Inter-Ministerial Committee, which would be composed of all the senior Ministers concerned with the forms of development covered by planning. The Committee would be presided over by a Minister for National Development. The business of the Minister for National Development and the Committee as a whole

"would be to take a general view over the whole field of planning, to settle the main lines of advance, and to decide differences of opinion between the various executive departments."

The machinery suggested by Fogarty for the regional level was more complicated. The body responsible for actually making regional plans would be the directly or indirectly elected regional planning authority. The latter authority would work under the supervision of the central Departments concerned with different aspects of policy. As a consequence, the national plan would be drawn in very broad outline, while the regional directions would set detailed recommendations for a particular area. The detailed work, such as the zoning of land for industry and housing, decisions about the layout of minor roads, or the action to be taken locally about health services or industrial development, would be left to the local planning authorities.
b. The distribution of the industrial population: The case and the debate

The Barlow Commission among the other suggestions recommended the decentralisation or dispersal of both industry and the industrial population from such centres. The Barlow Commission argued that the best method of achieving dispersal should be studied by their proposed Central Authority. However, very soon the following question was raised:

"What would happen to agriculture, the countryside, and rural life in general, should these recommendations be adopted as an official policy?"

Partly in response to this issue, the Government set up the Committee on Land Utilisation in Rural Areas under the chairmanship of Lord Justice Scott in October 1941. Lord Justice Scott was chairman of the Acquisition of Land Committee, 1917-1919, whose reports led to the Acquisition of Land (Compensation) Act, and the Agricultural Organization Society, 1917-1922, whilst he was also a member of the Executive Committee of the Council for the Preservation of Rural England. The Scott Committee had the following terms of reference:

"To consider the conditions which should govern building and other constructional development in country areas consistently with the maintenance of agriculture, and in particular the factors affecting the location of industry, having regard to economic operation, part-time and seasonal employment, the well-being of rural communities and the preservation of rural amenities."

The Scott Committee's report, presented in August 1942, distinguished seven broad categories, recognising at the same time that there were no hard and fast lines between these categories. It recommended that indus-
try should be encouraged first to make use of vacant or
derelict sites in towns and that where industries were
brought into country areas they should be located in
existing or new small towns and not villages or the
open country33.

In addition to the industrial location question, the
Scott Committee returned to the question of the needed
machinery and procedure for planning and development.
In other words, they noted the essential distinction
between the formulation of a national plan and its
execution34. Indeed, they visualised the governmental
machinery as consisting of the following parts:

"(a) A standing Committee of the Ministers con-
cerned, under the chairmanship of a non-
departmental Minister of Cabinet rank.
(b) Government Departments concerned with develop-
ment.
(c) A Central Planning Commission.
(d) Such ad hoc bodies as might be needed to carry
out functions not already covered by existing Min-
istries or other authorities or bodies"35.

For the success of national planning, they considered
that it was essential to maintain local initiative and
enterprise and that, subject to the general guidance to
be afforded by the directions of the Commission
"by which national policy will be interpreted, local
authorities will continue to exercise their func-
tions as planning authorities"36.

The criticism which developed of the above suggestion
was related to the difficulty of establishing such a
scheme of national planning. We can summarise it in the
aspects of the anonymous commentator, "Astragal"38, in
The Architects' Journal, who pointed out in December
1942:

"To set up a body which can satisfactorily, conti-
nuously and with reasonable speed, combine the reconstruction schemes of various ministries into a workable national plan: for such a body must be empowered, at times, to secure the modification or rejection of part of the proposals of one or another Ministry"38.

c. The control of urban land: The case and the debate

With regard to the control of land question, the considerations of the Barlow Commission were based on the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1932, under which in certain conditions:

"(1) A person whose property is injuriously affected by the operation of a planning scheme may claim compensation from the planning authority, and
(2) The planning authority may claim betterment from a person whose property is increased in value by the operation of a planning scheme"38.

It also pointed out that there were the following three difficulties in equating compensation with betterment under the existing system:

"(a) If the potential development value of each piece of land is assessed separately, the total sum arrived at is likely to be greatly in excess of the sum which could fairly be claimed if the prospective development of the country as a whole is considered;
(b) The difficulty of providing betterment, and especially, of providing that betterment in any individual case results from a particular planning scheme, makes any betterment provisions largely ineffective;
(c) It is not practicable to levy betterment unless and until the landowner has the betterment actually in hand, i.e. on the disposal of his land"40.
The need for a further investigation of the "compensation and betterment" question and its consequences for the issue of land control was evident to the War Cabinet. In January 1941, as one consequence of this perception, the Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment was set up under the chairmanship of Mr Justice Uthwatt, who was appointed before a judge in the Chancery Division, and was experienced in dealing with knotty problems connected with angles of light, rights of way and the like. He also practised privately at that time and his services were in great demand, as his ability to understand the law on Taxation was unsurpassed.

The Uthwatt Committee had as terms of reference "to make an objective analysis of the subject of the payment of compensation and recovery of betterment in respect of public control of the use of land".

In July 1941, an Interim Report was presented in which two particularly important recommendations for planning were included: first, interim control of development should be extended throughout the country in order to prevent work being done which might prejudice reconstruction; secondly, special reconstruction areas should be defined so that they might be replanned as a whole. The Final Report followed in September 1942, and gave the Committee's solution to the "compensation and betterment" problem.

The Uthwatt Commission used two assumptions as a basis for its work. The first one was that national planning was intended to be a reality and a permanent feature of the administration of the internal affairs of the country. The second assumption derived from the first one, as follows:

"while the principle of national planning has
already been accepted by the Government, much remains to be done to carry it into effect, and the precise shape of the future planning policy and the degree of centralization are as yet undermined.\(^4\)

In this context, the Committee therefore assumed that, in order for the reconstruction procedure to be effective, a Central Planning Authority was needed. However, this did not yet exist, while "national planning" had a meaning not attached to it in any legislation nor in the minds of the public.

On the problem of "compensation and betterment", the main conclusions the Uthwatt Committee had drawn may be summarised as follows:

(a) The existing statutory provisions, which had not proved satisfactory in the sphere of local planning, would be altogether inadequate for application to the circumstances created by planning conceived as a national operation.

(b) The existence of the "compensation and betterment" problem could be traced to three root causes: (i) the fact that land in private ownership was a marketable commodity, (ii) the fact that land was held by a large number of private owners, and (iii) the private values could be altered by public planning decisions.

(c) It was in the sphere of "development value", whether attaching to land already developed with buildings, as in urban areas, or to land suitable for development in the prectictable future, as in the case of fringe land around towns and cities, that the compensation difficulty was acute. Planning control might reduce the value of a particular piece of land, but over the country as a whole there was no loss.

(d) In theory only, compensation and betterment in a
certain area of land should balance each other. In practice, however, they did not. The existing statutory code was limited in operation and was not designed to secure balance. It was not possible to devise any scheme for making the principle of balance effective.

On the compensation for existing development rights question, the Uthwatt Committee recommended that it should be paid, it should be assessed for the whole country as a single sum. This sum was to be called the General Compensation Fund, and its amount would be determined at the land values of 31 March 1939. The spirit of this suggestion was not land nationalization, but the acquisition by the State of the development rights in undeveloped land. This measure of unification in the State of the development rights attaching to undeveloped land outside built-up areas was considered as an essential minimum necessary to remove the conflict between public and private interest.

On the betterment question, it was suggested that, in view of the difficulties inherent in the existing system of collecting it under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1932, and its failure to produce practical results, that system should be abandoned in favour of a scheme for a periodic levy of 75 per cent on future increases in annual site values.

In order to manage the recommended system, the Uthwatt Committee considered that it would be a mistake to create a Government Department concerned with National Development, which would rank with existing Government Departments. The Committee thought it would be enough to appoint a Minister for National Development. This Minister should have no departmental cares, but he should have the advantage of a highly qualified staff.
informed as to economic conditions and needs of the country, competent to put forward proposals for consideration and to advise on the economic and other questions arising out of schemes for development. At the same time, it was suggested that the broad principles of policy would be settled by the Cabinet after consideration by a Committee of ministers presided over by the Minister for National Development. Upon those schemes the Committee would have the assistance of the various Government Departments. As a consequence of this development, the planning functions of the Minister of Works and Planning should fall directly within the sphere of the Minister for National Development.

The publication of the Uthwatt Committee's report, as it was expected, engendered a strong reaction from some parts of British society. The Architects' Journal, in its Editorial in October 1942, noted that the most surprising part of it was the one which dealt with the principles of compensation, mainly because this report had completely altered the perspective in which these matters had been viewed "till now because the men responsible for it, unlike most writers on Town and Country Planning, are authorities on English Common Law."

However, the stronger opposition was presented by the landowners. The Land Union's criticisms were among the strongest. It maintained that the Uthwatt Committee's suggestions were equal to the nationalization of the Building Value of all land outside towns and that it was not convinced that fair compensation for this value would be received. Similar aspects were identified by the National Federation of Property Owners, which argued that the property owners would be at the mercy of officials "as to what buildings in their opinion are below modern standards of fitness." Lastly, the Prop-
Property Owners Protection Association Limited issued a leaflet with the current issue of their official organ, *The Property Owner's Journal*, called "Does the Uthwatt Report Hit You Too?" However, the landowners' fears did not derive only from the fact that they would lose the present value of their land without receiving adequate compensation, but in addition from the fact that they would be deprived of a potential increase in the value of that land without any compensation at all.

Referring to whether the policy suggested by the Uthwatt Committee had a character of nationalization or not, E.S. Watkins argued that nationalization was a political issue and would not, therefore, be considered on its merits. According to his own words:

"Nationalization means, in brief, that the State becomes an intelligent reversioner to all land and actively interested in what is being done to it by the man in possession. If that is a bad thing, then, of course, nationalization stands condemned. If it is good thing nationalization is the only logical way of securing it."

Given the above debate on the machinery for the control of the use of land and the administration of town and country planning, the Government came to the conclusion in 1942, after giving full weight to the views expressed by the Scott and Uthwatt Committees, that, at that stage, the fullest measure of direct responsibility to Parliament should be maintained, with executive responsibility in England and Wales vested in a Minister of Town and Country Planning, and in Scotland in the Secretary of State of Scotland. There was much discussion in 1942 on the appropriate central body to administer the town and country planning powers. The idea of a Commission was discarded, and on 26 January
1943 Sir William A. Jowitt, the Paymaster General, introduced the Minister of Town and Country Planning Bill. The Bill was passed on 4 February 1943 and William S. Morrison was its first minister; his function would be to ensure that the translation of the agreed national policy into terms of land use and physical development was conceived as a single, consistent whole. The new Ministry, as its name suggests, gathered to itself all central town planning powers, responsibility for legislation and the civil servants previously concerned with planning. It is to these administrative and statutory developments that we shall turn in the next Chapter.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE AND STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE WAR

Substantial changes occurred during the period 1940-1945 in statutory planning terms. Besides the reports of the Barlow, Uthwatt and Scott Committees, as well as the public planning debate which was developed in those years, a remarkable number of administrative changes and statutory developments were introduced. Cumulatively, they contributed to the formation of the governmental reconstruction machinery. The investigation of this process of evolution will be the subject of the present section.

According to J.B. Cullingworth, the origin of the reconstruction machinery establishment is to be found in the War Aims Committee of the Cabinet, which was set up on 23 August 1940, with terms of reference, first to make suggestions with regard to a post-war European and world system, and secondly to consider means of perpetuating the national unity achieved in the country during the war through a social and economic structure designed to secure equality of opportunity and service among all classes of the community. It becomes evident from the above terms of reference that, apart from their very broad scope, a kind of social consensus was sought in those first war years for the revival of the country.
Meanwhile, a Coalition Government had been, already, constituted in May 1940, to face the deteriorating war situation. This unique war atmosphere was arguably the principal factor shaping the creation of the reconstruction machinery, at least during the wartime years when its establishment was begun. It occurred through the following developed successive steps.

a. The first attempts to organise the reconstruction machinery.

Despite the establishment of the War Aims Committee, the main changes took place in the central machinery of government from September 1940, when the old Office of Works became the Ministry of Works and Buildings within the new Coalition Government. It was largely the product of the personality of Sir (later Lord) John Reith2, who was appointed as the first Minister of the new department. According to his own account, it attracted him because he was told it would be a wide-ranging Ministry, with control over reconstruction and planning after the war. Indeed, on 24 October, after much discussion, terms of reference were announced which confirmed the responsibilities3. On that day, Attlee, as Lord Privy Seal, made the announcement to the House of Commons that the new Ministry was to consult with the departments and organisations concerned with reconstruction and to report to the Cabinet4.

The main aim of the Ministry of Works and Buildings was to apportion resources between war building work, and the repair of damage caused by enemy attack5. Reith gathered round him a nucleus of enthusiastic planners and gave impetus to developments related to planning. In particular, he appointed Hugh Beaver - borrowed from Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners - as General Director.
of the Ministry. At the same time, he brought over to the new Ministry the pre-war town planning section of the Ministry of Health, headed by George Pepler.

From the beginning of his appointment, Reith focused his interest on tasks related to the Barlow Commission's recommendations, notably by setting up the Uthwatt and Scott Committees, in the context of which lengthy discussions were developed and their reports were submitted two years later, that is in September 1942. Another action was to transfer all town and country planning functions to a reorganized Ministry of Works and Planning; it happened on 11 February 1942, under the terms of the Minister of Works and Planning Act, when the new Ministry took over town planning powers from the Ministry of Health. This development occurred after the following actions by Reith.

In December 1940, Reith presented his recommendations on "Reconstruction of Town and Country" to the War Cabinet, which referred to the defects of the pre-war machinery. The diagnosis was essentially the same as the Barlow Commission's. Specifically, Reith's main objectives were as follows:

1. Decentralisation of excessive concentrations of industry and population and re-development of congested areas.
2. Utilisation of land and minerals to best advantage; preservation of fertile land for agriculture and market gardening; conservation and improvement of land for agricultural purposes, forestry, etc.
3. Balance of industrial development and diversification of industry in [urban] areas; relationship between industry and agriculture.
4. Re-development of damaged areas. Post-war use of buildings constructed for war purposes. Anticipation of conditions of depression.
5. Planning of local areas, including reasonable size and lay-out of towns; architectural, siting of factories and commercial centres, residential areas, public buildings, schools, transport and public utility services, open spaces, amenities, recreation.

6. Co-ordinated development of
   (a) transport services - railways, roads, waterways, airports and access;
   (b) power services - electricity, gas, water.

7. Related development of other public utility and social services, including housing, education, medical.

8. Preservation of places of natural and historic interest.


In addition, Reith’s recommendations called for the collection of the necessary information, especially that relating to war damage. He argued that in order to overcome this damage, reconstruction plans should be drawn up by a central organisation, but, at the same time, regional bodies should be also set up to consider schemes of restoration of war-damaged areas and redevelopment. Especially, referring to the question of regionalism of the reconstruction machinery, Reith stated that:

"I believe in a central authority, and we have been told to assume one, but I do not believe in that authority doing central planning. I believe in its planning central buildings and main trunk roads, and then in its stopping as soon as it can stop, and sending its broad national schemes to those regional authorities and having them fill in all the details, and I believe in the lowest efficient local authority carrying out the schemes which are
finally approved.”

However, on 30 December 1940, that is before the Reith's memorandum had been examined officially, the Prime Minister appointed Arthur Greenwood, who was at that time responsible for the Secretariat of the War Aims Committee, Minister without Portfolio in charge of Reconstruction. The scope of the new Ministry was narrower, but more precise, than that of the War Aims Committee. According to the Prime Minister's words the task of the new Minister was

"to plan in advance a number of practical steps which it is indispensable to take if our society is to move forward, as it must, steps which can be far longer and taken far more smoothly if they are made with something of the same kind of national unity as has been achieved under the pressure of this present struggle for life. The scope of my Rt. Hon. Friend's task is practical and has regard for national unity on the one hand and about three years as a limit on the other".

It is an interesting outcome of the above developments that in this initial stage, that is in late 1940, the Cabinet choice was the formation of a co-ordinating governmental instrument in the form of a Minister without Portfolio who in practical terms had to define his task and the limits of his actions taken from the responsibilities of the other Departments, instead of the establishment of a new Ministry with complete responsibility on the reconstruction question, as the Reith memorandum recommended. The explanation for this development is to be found principally in the following difficulties which Reith's memorandum raised in the internal affairs of the Government.

The first problems had arisen during the transformation
of the Office of Works into the Ministry of Works and Buildings. At that stage, Reith supported the principle that the new Ministry should be ready to take up responsibility for all building, planning and construction arising from the requirements of war and the post-war period. There was strong opposition to these aspirations at that time from the Minister of Health. Consequently, when, by September 1940, the outline of the new Ministry's functions had been agreed, Reith said that parts were left open for settlement when "the new man was on the job". As a consequence, the controversy was avoided at that time, but it reappeared when Reith attempted to realise his aim to transfer all town and country planning functions to a reorganised Ministry by the submission of his memorandum to the Prime Minister. It is to be underlined here that Reith's behaviour was so extraordinary in these matters that he encouraged irresponsibly on 31 December 1940 a deputation from Coventry to plan on a large scale, although he knew that he had no power to back up his encouragement but felt he was justified because the Coventry people were so demoralised. As Reith writes:

"So I told them that if I were in their position I would plan boldly and comprehensively; and that I would not at this stage worry about finance or local boundaries".

In this context, the War Cabinet preferred to tackle the problem by giving the reconstruction responsibilities to the Minister without Portfolio, Arthur Greenwood, but in a very general form. As J.B. Cullingworth argues

"from the beginning the Minister in charge of reconstruction was not expected to do more than collate and co-ordinate, and in exceptional cases to inspire departments to produce official proposals".
b. The formation of the non-physical reconstruction machinery.

The Prime Minister referred Reith's memorandum to an *ad hoc* Cabinet Committee comprised of Attlee, Lord Privy Seal, Greenwood, Minister without Portfolio, Brown, Secretary of State for Scotland, Crookshank, Financial Secretary of the Treasury, Reith, Minister of Works and Buildings, and Anderson, Lord President of the Council, as chairman.

The above Committee held four meetings between December 1940 and January 1941 and, in February 1941, presented an agreed report to the Cabinet. The report stated that the most practical contribution would be, first,

"to define the organisation required to assist the Minister of Works and Buildings in carrying out the duties assigned to him in preparing for the physical reconstruction of town and country planning after the war",

and secondly,

"to indicate generally the scope of the preliminary studies which should be undertaken through his organisation".

The Committee had great difficulties in its discussions, but it did manage to give Reith an indication of the lines along which his work should develop, as follows:

(i) Compensation and betterment.

(ii) Measures necessary to prevent action being taken during the war (e.g. by speculation in site values) which would prejudice the work of future reconstruction.

(iii) Sample surveys of typical areas with a view to assessing the legal and administrative difficulties likely to arise in connection with the post-

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war redevelopment of urban areas devastated by air attack.
(iv) Review of defects in existing legislation on town and country planning, and of general lines of legislation required for any system of planning on a regional or national basis.
(v) Administrative machinery required (national, regional and local) for the operation of a national policy.
(vi) Modification of existing structure of local government required to facilitate regional or national planning.
(vii) Economics of different types of urban development and redevelopment (e.g. satellite towns or suburban development) including comparative expenditure on the connected public services.
(viii) Organisation of building trades, and general research into building methods and supply of building materials.20

It must be noted that work had already started on the first three items in the various involved Departments. Actually, on (i) and (ii) Uthwatt had agreed to be the head of a research team, while, on (iii), arrangements had been made for a survey to be undertaken by inspectors of the Ministry of Health of the heavily damaged areas of Birmingham, Bristol and Coventry21.

The War Cabinet considered the Anderson Committee's report in February 1941, and approved it. The only significant change made was the addition of the Ministry of Labour to the list of Departments to be represented on a new advisory committee, which was set up under the chairmanship of H.G. Vincent from the Ministry of Works and Buildings, as the Interdepartmental Committee on Reconstruction22.
Furthermore, during 1941 a series of Ministerial, Departmental and Inter-departmental Committees were set up to cover the various matters of reconstruction. In this process, the Prime Minister and the Minister without Portfolio developed the following impressive activity concerning the formation of the reconstruction machinery.

On 24 February 1941, the Prime Minister approved the creation of the Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction Problems, under the chairmanship of the Minister without Portfolio with the following terms of reference:

"(a) To arrange for the preparation of practical schemes of reconstruction, to which effect can be given in a period of, say, three years after the war. These plans should have as their general aim the perpetuation of the national unity achieved in this country during the war, through a social and economic structure designed to secure equality of opportunity and service among all classes of the community.

(b) To prepare a scheme for a post-war European and world system, with particular regard to the economic needs of the various nations, and to the problem of adjusting the free life of small countries in a durable international order."23.

Later, on 1 October 1941, the Prime Minister approved the appointment of the Ministerial Committee on Economic Aspects of Reconstruction Problems, also under the Chairmanship of the Minister without Portfolio, with terms of reference

"to consider and advise upon economic problems in connection with the preparation of reconstruction plans"24.

It emerges from a letter of Arthur Greenwood to Sir John Anderson, M.P., in October 1941, that
"this Committee was set up because of the vital importance of early discussions with the USA. Out of these discussions will undoubtedly arise the consideration of wider economic issues".  

It is obvious that in the terms of reference of both these Ministerial Committees, the whole matter of the reconstruction question was included at a general level. For this reason, and in order to help the policy-making work of the Committees, the Minister without Portfolio set up the following two Inter-departmental and two Official Committees.

On 1 July 1941, Greenwood set up the Inter-departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services, with terms of reference

"to undertake with special reference to the inter-relation of the schemes a survey of the existing national scheme of social insurance and allied services, including workmen's compensation, and to make recommendations".  

On 6 August 1941, he set up the Official Committee on Post-War External Problems and Anglo-American Cooperation, with the following terms of reference:

"(a) To formulate the chief problems of post-war external economic policy with special reference to forthcoming discussions with the United States of America.  
(b) To arrange for the preparation of memoranda on monetary financial and commercial policy, international control of raw materials, international investment, and post-war relief and reconstruction.  
(c) To formulate for Ministers the considerations which should be borne in mind in framing policy and to prepare interim material as far as possible for discussions with the United States of America in
those discussions become necessary before the general consideration of policy is complete"27.

On 7 August 1941, the Minister without Portfolio set up the Inter-departmental Committee on Civil Aviation, with terms of reference

"to survey the whole field of Civil Aviation in its international, Imperial and national aspects, and to make recommendations as regards reconstruction, organisation and development both during the transitional period from war to peace conditions and thereafter"28.

Finally, on 31 October 1941, he set up the Official Committee on Post-War Economic Problems, with the following terms of reference:

"(a) To formulate the chief problems of post-war internal economic policy.
(b) To arrange for the preparation of memoranda on these problems.
(c) To formulate for Ministers the considerations which should be borne in mind in framing policy"28.

The above developments should be considered as the foundation of the non-physical reconstruction machinery. According to J.B. Cullingworth:

"By the end of 1941, the administrative machinery for dealing with reconstruction problems had taken definite shape, and had begun the battle with some of the chief questions of post-war home and foreign policy with the assistance of what soon became a substantial documentation built up by the cooperating departments"30.

It is evident that all the dimensions of the non-physical reconstruction plan had been grouped systematically. First, the social sector by the solution of
insurance matters, in order to make easier the establishment of the necessary social consensus. Secondly, the facing of the fundamental financing problem by co-operation with the USA. Thirdly, the improvement of the national and international communication system. Finally, the investigation of the internal economic aspects of the realization of the recovery of the country.

However, this co-ordinating machinery, which seems to be so "simple and comprehensive" became according to J.B. Cullingworth "complex and mysterious" in the following years of the war period. Arthur Greenwood resigned from the office of Minister without Portfolio on 3 March 1942, and Sir William Jowitt succeeded him as Paymaster General, that is, not as a member of the War Cabinet. Furthermore, the Committee on the Economic Aspects of Reconstruction Problems was dissolved and its functions were taken over by a reconstituted Ministerial Committee on Reconstruction Problems under the chairmanship of the Paymaster General. On this subject J.B. Cullingworth notes that "the story of reconstruction in this period becomes more and more diffused and the administrative threads more and more entangled."

However, these developments reflect, at the administrative level, changes in reconstruction policy choices.

Seeking the explanation of these developments, the observation of J.B. Cullingworth that "as soon as reconstruction became a burning question, it was inevitable that control should pass to the senior ministers" should be accepted as correct. Indeed, besides the work of co-ordination of reconstruction by the responsible Minister, the various aspects of reconstruction had started to be faced substantively by the other Minis-
ters too. In these areas, the interventions of Ministers within the sphere of their responsibilities were gradually increasing, while the role of the central coordination of reconstruction as a whole was gradually eroded.

c. Developments in physical reconstruction machinery.

In the area of physical reconstruction activity, the responsible Ministers attempted to play a more effective role in the spheres of their power. This possibility was given to them because, as the years passed, the reconstruction machinery had to move towards practical action on the one hand, and on the other, a new land policy suitable for the needs of extensive reconstruction in the bombed cities had to be formulated. A sign of these developments at the administrative level is the inclusion of the Minister of Works and Planning in the Ministerial Committee on Reconstruction Problems in July 1942, whereas he was not a member of either the Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction Problems of February 1941, nor of the first constitution of the Ministerial Committee on Reconstruction Problems of March 1942.

In this context of developments, Reith did not feel comfortable after Greenwood was given overall responsibility for reconstruction. His unease arose mainly because the boundaries between non-physical and physical reconstruction were not clear. As a consequence, controversies developed between Reith and Greenwood, Reith and Ernest Brown, the Minister of Health, as well as between Ernest Bevin, the Minister of Labour, and Greenwood on the occasion of the establishment of the Ministerial Committee on Economic Aspects of Reconstruction Problems. In fact, it emerges from a letter
sent by Greenwood to Sir John Anderson, M.P., on 20 October 1941, that Greenwood had explained to Reith that the above Committee had been set up because of the vital importance of early discussions with the USA, as it was referred before, and that out of these discussions would undoubtedly arise the consideration of wider economic issues. Before this letter, another correspondence had developed between Greenwood and Bevin about the same matter. This latter controversy was resolved by the intervention of the Prime Minister, who sent a letter to Bevin on 19 May 1941, writing the following:

"I have read the correspondence between yourself and Greenwood on the question of membership of the Reconstruction Problems Committee. I am sorry that you are not fully satisfied with the arrangements made. I note, however, that you propose to give a trial to the plan suggested for the representation of your Department. I hope it will work satisfactorily, but if not, you can of course raise the matter again with the Chairman of the Committee. It is, of course, clear that all the really important issues of principle will have to come to the War Cabinet after they have been worked out in the Reconstruction Problems Committee. You are no more committed to any conclusions reached than I am."

Finally, as Reith writes in his autobiography, "Brown [the Minister of Health] accused me of trying to sidetrack him and his ministry."

However, despite the controversies between the above Ministers, Reith attempted to realise the following very important steps concerning the formulation of the physical reconstruction machinery.

Reith's first step towards the above goal to gather round him town planners of high reputation. It was February 1941 when he constituted his own Reconstruction
Group to undertake work on reconstruction and town planning problems. Among its members were W. Holford, J. Dower, H.C. Bradshaw, and T. Sharp. In April of the same year, Reith appointed a "Consultative Panel" of twenty-two members including industrialists, trade unionists, geographers, as well as F.J. Osborn and F. Abercrombie. He also established a small full-time team of "staff experts" containing Holford, as the leader, Bradshaw, Dower, and H.G. Vincent, a permanent civil servant, as the administrative guide. It emerges from a PRO document that Reith's approach to the formation of the physical reconstruction machinery was strongly supported by his consultant planners. For example, Abercrombie wrote to Dower on 20 February 1941, that

"Leslie Scott and I have been [...] especially pressing him [Lord Reith] not to give way to the Ministers of Health and Transport to keep their planning powers -they would like him to be a shadowy background figure like Addison was after the last war. Scott has been trying to solve the dilemma of the Minister being author and critic [...] . I don't know what he's decided to adopt".

During 1941 and 1942 the Reconstruction Group examined three groups of problems; first, prevention of wartime action that might hinder proper reconstruction; secondly, existing planning machinery and the new legislation needed; and lastly, the relative costs of different layouts and kinds of building development. In respect of these developments, Reith invited the London County Council and the Corporation of the City of London to prepare provisional plans of redevelopment for the County and City respectively. These will be subject of extensive analysis in later chapters of this work. In addition, after the heavy raids on Coventry he had asked the City Council, as we have seen, to prepare plans for the reconstruction of that town.
The second step taken by Reith was the conceptualising of the establishment of the central planning authority in statutory terms; an attempt which met strong controversy in the interior of the War Cabinet. Reith's concept was based on the interim report of the Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment, which was submitted on 25 April 1941 and was signed by A.A. Uhwatt, as Chairman, J. Barr, C.G. Eve and R. Evershed. Its recommendations were based on the assumption that a governmental instrument would be established. Reith wanted this authority to be set up forthwith, but other ministers adopted a stop-gap solution of a Council of ministers, with Reith chairing a body including the Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland.

It is important here to draw attention to the basic departmental positions on this subject, as stated by officials of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Works and Buildings respectively. The former Ministry maintained that

"you [the Minister of Works and Buildings] are responsible for considering what the shape of the law and administration of town and country planning should be, but not for the actual preparation of plans now, which must remain with us, as the central planning authority."

At the same time, a memorandum prepared by the latter Ministry stated that

"my view is that at this stage the preparatory work on the new system and on the plans should be concentrated in one organisation."

This issue was finally resolved in the short term by the foundation of a ministerial Council on the lines suggested within the Cabinet. This decision was implemented by the House of Lords on 17 July 1941. Before
the end of October, the ministerial Council had agreed all the clauses of a new Bill to strengthen planning powers. According to Reith, when T. Johnston, the Secretary of State for Scotland, and E. Brown, the Minister of Health, finally agreed on the development of a structure of powers, it led mathematically to the creation of a new ministry, as the purpose and terms of reference of this Council were:

"To ensure that the administration of the Town and Country Planning Acts and of any legislation implementing the recommendations made in the First Report of the Uthwatt Committee shall proceed in conformity with long-term planning policy, as it is progressively developed"\textsuperscript{46}.

Furthermore, Greenwood had already been convinced that Reith should take over town planning responsibilities from the Ministry of Health\textsuperscript{47}, even though he had not been in favour of a central planning authority at all at the end of August\textsuperscript{48}. A new Minister of Town and Country Planning was therefore proposed. However, Reith, as Gordon Cherry concludes, had gone "too far, too fast"\textsuperscript{49}; subsequent developments would not favour him. On 11 February 1942, under the terms of the Minister of Works and Planning Act, the Minister of Works and Buildings became Minister of Works and Planning, and took over from the Minister of Health the powers of the central government under the Town and Country Planning Acts, while the Secretary of State for Scotland remained responsible for the exercise of these functions in Scotland\textsuperscript{50}. Reith became the first Minister of Works and Planning, but within a fortnight he was asked to resign and was replaced by Lord Portal\textsuperscript{51}.

The Scott and Uthwatt Reports were published after Reith's resignation, in August 1942. Both reports were referred to the Official Committee on Internal Economic
Problems, which reported in October 1942 with recommendations relating to the constitution of the central planning authority. The Committee could not reach a unanimous decision. A minority favoured a commission responsible to a minister who would be chairman of a ministerial committee and acting under his general directions. However, the majority had serious doubts as to whether such a system could be applied with equal advantage to matters of such importance as the control of land use. The arguments continued when the report was discussed by the Committee on Reconstruction Problems. The conclusion of the Reconstruction Problems Committee was presented to the War Cabinet in November 1942. The Committee recommended that a separate ministry of planning should be established with the responsibility for control of the use of land, whether this was exercised through town and country planning schemes prepared by local authorities or otherwise. The War Cabinet accepted the proposals in November 1942, and on 26 January 1943, Sir William Jowitt, the Paymaster General, introduced the Minister of Town and Country Planning Bill.

The proposal of the above Bill was
"to make provision in connection with appointment of a Minister of Town and Country Planning; to provide for the transfer to that Minister of certain statutory functions; and to provide for the establishment of statutory commissions for the purpose of exercising such functions in relation to the use and development of land in England and Wales as may hereafter be determined."

The Bill was passed on 4 February 1943, and W.S. Morrison was appointed first Minister of Town and Country Planning, while the Minister of Works and Planning became Minister of Works.
One of the first activities of W.S. Morrison was to receive the press representatives in his room at the Ministry for his first Press Conference as Minister of Town and Country Planning on 27 May 1943. His statement there includes the following points of interest:

"My duty has been defined by Parliament as that of securing consistency and continuity in the framing and execution of a national policy with respect to the use and development of land throughout England and Wales". The creation of this new Ministry embodies the decision of Parliament that in future national considerations should govern more directly and more actively than hitherto the task of making the best use of our 37 million acres.

I do not wish to minimise the importance of early decisions upon certain major recommendations of the Barlow, Scott and Uthwatt Commissions. But these who are impatient for those decisions to be taken should recognise that such decisions involve not only great financial issues and difficult legal problems. They also involve social problems that demand very careful handling by Government.

The Barlow, Scott and Uthwatt Reports were at one in emphasising the complex factors about which information must be collated before a country can be well and truly planned. "The Central Planning Authority", said the Uthwatt Report, "will base its action on organised research into the social and economic aspects of the use and development of land".

At that time the main objective of the new ministry was the preparation of the legislation concerning town and country planning, and especially, land policy. The
above is additionally confirmed in a note prepared by the Ministry of Town and Country planning for the Lord President; indeed, it is stated there that "the whole basis of planning legislation will need reviewing in order to give statutory expression of this new conception of the objects of planning". This legislative work of the new Ministry will be reviewed in the following Chapter.
V. TOWN PLANNING LEGISLATION UNDER THE COALITION GOVERNMENT

At the outbreak of Second World War, in September 1939, Britain was ruled by a Conservative Government under Neville Chamberlain, who had entered 10 Downing Street as Prime Minister in May 1937. The Chamberlain government had 418 seats in the House of Commons to the 167 seats held by the Labour Party, and an overall majority of more than 2001. But, after the fall of Chamberlain in May 1940, Winston Churchill succeeded him as Prime Minister of a Coalition Government consisted of all parties - bar the Communists - and of no party2. It is to be noted here that, although Churchill had a big majority of seats in the House of Commons, the Coalition government was decided to be supported by all parties to promote national unity.

In general, the legislative work of a coalition government is formed, to a greater or lesser extent, as an outcome of compromise between the various political parties which constitute this type of Cabinet. Such a government is not likely to reach any agreement, other than a compromise agreement. However, in the British case of 1940, disunity within the Government was not a problem during the war. This was, of course, due to the war conditions and, possibly, to the fact that, as Paul Addison points out, Churchill and his circle on the one hand, and the Labour leaders on the other, were to act
as twin centres of power in Coalition, with Churchill at the head of the military and diplomatic machine, and Labour as the chief — though not the sole — animating force in civilian affairs.

Only at the end of the war the problems started to become clear within the governmental circles; especially, when the legislative context of the post-war reconstruction was discussed. An example of this development is contained in a long memorandum prepared in June 1944 from the Minister of Economic Warfare, the Earl of Selborne, referring to the Town and Country Planning Bill, in which he said:

"It must necessarily sometimes be difficult for Conservatives, Liberals and Socialists to agree about post-war legislation. In Town and Country Planning the Socialist and the Liberal will wish to extend State interference with private trade and property much further than most the Conservatives will think necessary or desirable. Many Conservatives hold that State planning can easily be carried to a point where it will impede development and impair freedom, without improving anything."

Given the above context of developments, considerable progress in policy discussions was made during the war, and there was important legislation in various matters of home affairs, and of course in planning legislation which was needed for the reconstruction activity. The detection of these innovations will be achieved through the analysis of the main legislative work of the war period.

The setting up of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning in the middle of the Second World War is to be considered as a turning point in the process of establishment of the British Central Planning Authority.
Actually, Reith, the Minister of Health, and the Secretary of State for Scotland drafted the Bill, based on the Interdepartmental Committee's recommendations, and presented it to the Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction Problems in November 1941. Despite its title - Town and Country Planning (Reconstruction) Bill - it dealt with the extension of interim development control over the whole country, as well as with reconstruction.

As J.B. Cullingworth informs us, the above Bill went through many forms; in July 1942 it was entitled the Town and Country Planning (Temporary Provisions) Bill, "to prevent superfluous development rights from being acquired under the Town and Country Planning Act 1932, during the period of control of building operations imposed under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Acts, 1939 and 1940".

The Bill became later the Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Bill; then the Town and Country Planning (Interim Provisions) Bill; and finally the Town and Country Planning (Interim Development) Bill, which was presented by W.S. Morrison, the Minister of Town and Country Planning, in the House of Commons in April 1943. The end of this legislative process was that during the war two Acts were passed. The latter enactment as the Town and Country Planning (Interim Development) Act, 1943, which extended planning control to all land and made it effective in the "interim development" period before schemes become operative, and the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944, which, as we will see, enabled local authorities to tackle their war damage.

a. The Town and Country Planning (Interim Development) Act, 1943

The Town and Country Planning (Interim Development)
Act, 1943, which will be referred as "the 1943 Act", received the Royal Assent on 22 July, 1943. The objectives of the Act as set out were, first, to bring under planning control land which was not subject to a scheme or resolution under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1932, and secondly, to secure more effective control of interim development. It is to be noted that the 1943 Act applied solely to "the interim development period"; that is, the period between the date of the resolution to prepare a scheme and the date on which the scheme would become operative.

The 1943 Act consisted of thirteen sections; the most important provisions were as follows:

(a) On 22nd October, 1943, all land without exception was deemed to be under planning control, either interim or by operative scheme (section 1).
(b) The Interim Development Authority was allowed to change its mind as its planning scheme neared completion:
   (i) by revoking or modifying planning permission granted before the scheme became operative,
   (ii) by authorising the Minister to intervene,
   (iii) and to send an inspector to hear appeals from interested parties, and
   (iv) by allowing the Interim Development Authority to compensate an owner or agree to purchase (section 4).
(c) Gave the Interim Development Authority strong powers to prevent development without permission:
   (i) by allowing them to pull down a building, and prohibit or reinstate the use of land, where the alteration was impracticable, and
   (ii) to have their powers enforced by the Minister's direction (section 5).
(d) Laid down the rules for paying compensation if claimed within twelve months for work begun before
control was imposed, or in consequence of permission being revoked (section 7).

(e) Permitted a Joint Committee (or sub-committee nominated by them) to be the Interim Development Authority. Joint Committees might be constituted by the Minister on his own initiative (section 9).

(f) Brought Metropolitan Boroughs into consultation where the Interim Development Authority was the London County Council (section 12).

(g) Included County Councils as local planning authorities; as in the 1932 Act, County Districts might relinquish their powers to them. The term "local planning authority" was to include any county council by whom a resolution was deemed to be passed by virtue of this Act, and "Interim Development Authority" included a Joint Committee being an Interim Development Authority as defined by this Act (section 13).

As a Bill, the future 1943 Act was faced in the House of Commons with great scepticism by all the parties. W.S. Morrison, the Minister of Town and Country Planning, who was a Unionist [Conservative], in introducing it, stated that:

"This Bill is but the forerunner of several Bills that must inevitably follow if the real new structure of town and country planning is to be erected".

He also explained that interim development was an inevitable stage in any planning machinery, and was located between the time when the planning authority passed a resolution to plan and the final conferral of statutory force upon the planning scheme. In order to emphasise this need he pointed out that before the passing of the Bill about five per cent of the area of England and Wales was subject to statutory schemes which were in force; the remainder was either not subject to a plan-
ning resolution at all or was in the stage of interim
development according the provisions of the 1932 Act.
After the passing of the Bill, he argued, interim
development would cover 95 per cent of the land of
England and Wales, the other five per cent being
already subject to statutory schemes.

A. Greenwood, Labour, and Mander, Liberal, answering
Morrison, raised the question of landowners' control
and compensation respectively, and stated that problems
of this sort could not be solved without adopting the
Royal Commission proposals, in particular those of the
Uthwatt Report. Furthermore, L. Silkin, Labour,
declared that he welcomed the Bill without prejudice
and on the understanding that it was only the beginning
of a further measure, or measures, which would allow
complete planning powers to be conferred upon local
authorities and the Ministry, which he regarded as
essential and without which, in his view, all talk of
post-war planning reconstruction and redevelopment was
pure mockery.

On the other hand, Captain Ernest S. Watkins, in his
article "Planning will end private property", published
in The Architects' Journal on 30 September 1943, refer-
ing to the formation of the existing machinery after
the passing of the 1943 Act, pointed out that:

"The key-note of the Act as it stands is that it is
largely permissive. A local authority may exercise
its powers to initiate the formation of larger
planning units to replace it, or to acquire land
along new roads to control subsequent development,
or to press claims for betterment against land-
owners who do in fact receive fortuitous advan-
tage."

He added that the 1943 Act presented the following dis-
advantages: first, that the areas and constitution of
local authorities did not make them particularly suited to be planning authorities, and secondly, that their financial interests were often opposed to a sound planning policy. As a solution to the above problems, he suggested, first, that the framing of policy should be in the hands of a central planning authority working through democratically controlled area committees; secondly, the work of supervising and controlling development should be entrusted to a Holding Corporation, which would pay out to the owner the value of the land from money borrowed from the State; and thirdly, development should be left to individual owners, who should enjoy security of tenure subject to conditions laid down in leases, on which private title to land would in future be based.

In short, the 1943 Act, going as far as was appropriate for the war circumstances, expressed the problem which had been created in wartime, when no development or planning was going on, but when speculation was already taking place, and, at the same time, continued the tradition whereby planning control was entrusted to local authorities, arming them with wider and more effective powers. The method employed was to extend "interim development control" to all land in the country not already covered by a scheme or a resolution to prepare one. The effect was that all planning authorities who had not yet done so were assumed to be preparing a scheme for their area, while their hands were strengthened during the "interim" period by provisions enabling them, for the first time, to take immediate enforcement action against development which threatened their planning proposals or was not in accordance with the terms of a permission, and to revoke or modify permission already given, subject to payment of compensation.
Finally, it is to be noted that the 1943 Act did not materially differ from the Bill as printed, apart from the addition of two sections: section 8 as to interim protection of trees and woodlands and section 12, being special provisions as to London and the addition of a sub-section 7 to section 5 which referred to the deposit of waste materials.

b. The Town and Country Planning Act, 1944

As we have seen, the 1943 Act was designed to stop the most conspicuous gaps in the system of planning control. Its more complex successor, the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944, which will be referred to as "the 1944 Act", was directed towards making adequate powers available to local authorities in reconstructing and redeveloping their towns after the war.

According to a Memorandum prepared by Lord Woolton, the Minister of Reconstruction, and submitted to the War Cabinet on 10th June 1944, the Reconstruction Committee started in January 1944 to search for an effective means of controlling the use of land in order to provide a solid foundation for the physical reconstruction of the towns and the countryside after the war, by the introduction of a Town and Country Bill in the House of Commons. Woolton stated that proposals based on the recommendations of the Uthwatt Report for the public acquisition of developments rights and an annual levy on site values would be hotly contested in Parliament, therefore the Committee sought an alternative solution which might command a more general measure of support. The main proposals of the Committee's scheme were as follows:

"(i) The developments rights of the landowner remain vested in him but cannot be exercised until
approval of a proposed development or redevelopment has been obtained.

(ii) When approval has been obtained, the landowner will pay a Betterment Charge if the value of the land has been increased by the approval.

(iii) If approval is refused, the landowner will receive fair compensation unless under the existing law he would not be entitled to it.

(iv) Fair compensation means compensation for loss of development value existing on the 31st March, 1939. No compensation will be paid for loss of any development value accruing after that date.

(v) The precise formula for determining fair compensation will be settled after a period of 5 years. More information will then be available to assist the Government in avoiding the payment of any excess over fair compensation due to the element of "floating" value.

(vi) Land will be divided into three classes: "green" land, "white" land and "built-on land".

Two days later, that is on 12th June 1944, another Memorandum was submitted to the War Cabinet prepared by the Earl of Selborne, the Minister of Economic Warfare. According to it, the suggested by the Reconstruction Committee formula of the 1939 market value was grossly inequitable and derisory, unless it would be related to the post-war cost of replacement which was greatly affected by the altered value of money. To support his view, he argued that the principle of "cost of reinstatement" had already been admitted in the War Damage Act, 1943, in which the owners of blitzed property were entitled either to "cost of works" payment or a "1939 value" payment.

At their meeting on the 9th October, the War Cabinet appointed a Committee to give further consideration to
some questions raised by the Town and Country Planning Bill, and especially this referring to the formula of the 1939 market value. The Committee requested W.S. Morrison, the Minister of Town and Country Planning, to submit to the War Cabinet the principles upon which they were agreed. According to Morrison's Memorandum of 11th October 1944, the general principle was maintained that compensation in respect of land and buildings should be assessed by reference to prices current at the 31st March, 1939. No general increase should be allowed automatically, in respect of any class of property, but exceptional provision was made for some categories of owner-occupiers; according to the Committee, the owner-occupier might be defined as the owner who was in de facto occupation at the date of notice to treat or who could prove to the satisfaction of a tribunal that he had both the right and the intention to resume or take over occupation within five years of the date of the notice to treat or of the end of the war, whichever was the sooner.

The 1944 Act received the Royal Assent on 17 November 1944. This Act covered a great variety of subjects and referred to many other previous Acts. In the main, it dealt with the acquisition and development of land and not with the form and content of planning schemes. According to a, in some ways, prophetic observation published in The Architects' Journal's leading article of 8th February, 1945:

"The Interim Development Act of 1943 was said to be the hors d'oeuvres; the present Act [the 1944 Act] is a bigger assortment of dishes of the same kind. Evidently we shall have to wait until after the War for the full table d'hôte".

In fact, the 1944 Act introduced two main powers; first, those conferred on local planning authorities to
purchase land in "blitzed" and "blighted" areas, and if necessary outside them, and secondly, those making the authorities ground landlords of the purchased land, and enabling them to lease it for private development or to develop it themselves. In more detail, the Act contained 66 sections; the most interesting measures among them being the following:

(a) It introduced the term "area of extensive war damage" and, at the same time, it empowered the Minister to make an order in respect of land which had sustained war damage together with adjacent land, declaring such land to be subject to compulsory purchase where he was satisfied that the land should be redeveloped as a whole (section 1).

(b) It gave powers to the local planning authority to purchase compulsorily land which was an "area of extensive war damage" or was required for relocation (section 2).

(c) It made provision for the Minister to make grants towards loan charges in respect of the acquisition and clearing of designated land (section 5).

(d) It required the planning authority to submit quinquennially to the Minister a financial statement on their redevelopment schemes (section 8).

(e) It permitted a wide authority to purchase land for planning purposes (section 10).

(f) It imposed an obligation to purchase war-damaged land, where permission to develop was refused (section 11).

(g) Restrictions were placed upon the compulsory purchase of commons, open spaces and garden allotments (section 14).

(h) It made provision for the Minister to compile lists of buildings of special architectural or historic interest for the guidance of local authorities in their planning functions (section 42).

(i) Under section 17 of the 1932 Act, a local
authority might by order prohibit the demolition of a building of architectural or historic interest. Power was given to direct that, without the consent of the authority, such a building should not be altered or extended (section 43).

(j) Section 19 of the 1932 Act provided that compensation could not be excluded in respect of a refusal to permit the erection of a new building on the site of a building destroyed within the preceding two years. This protection was extended in respect of buildings destroyed or demolished during the war period to cover a period of two years from the end of the war period or from the date of the coming into operation of the scheme, whichever was the later (section 45).

(k) "Temporary permission" or permission for a limited period could be given in respect of interim development applications (section 46).

(l) It was defined that compensation for the compulsory purchase of land, for damage sustained by severance of the land purchased from other land held therewith or otherwise affecting such other land, and in respect of land injuriously affected by works executed on acquired land should, except in the case of compensation assessed in accordance with rules of the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, be assessed as follows: the value of the interest of the amount of damage where a notice to treat was served within five years from the commencement of the Act should be ascertained by reference to prices current at 31th March, 1939 on the assumption that the land at that date was in the condition in which it in fact was at the date of the notice to treat (section 57).

What, then, were the provisions of major importance introduced by the 1944 Act in terms of urban recon-
struction? Most important of all, it established for first time that a local authority might undertake or promote comprehensive development or redevelopment; and might acquire and develop, or lease for development, any land which they considered it necessary to acquire in order to secure that it be used as their plan proposed. This provision would be implemented in rebuilding the civic and commercial centres of the cities which suffered the most concentrated raiding, such as London, Bristol, Canterbury, Coventry, Dover, Exeter, Hull, Liverpool, Manchester, Plymouth, Southampton and Swansea. Furthermore, the 1944 Act in its reconstruction provisions embodied the principle that, because of the multiplicity of ownerships usually involved, the key to proper redevelopment of towns was public acquisition, to be followed either by the disposal of the land to private developers, under conditions ensuring that they would themselves carry out development in accordance with the plan for the area, or by direct development by the local authority. But, it is necessary to give some account of the provisions for acquisition and development in the 1944 Act. It provided that land required for dealing with war damage might be acquired in two ways; land which the local authority needed urgently, before they had worked out their plan of comprehensive development, could be bought ad hoc whether compulsorily or by agreement. However, local authorities themselves criticised the 1944 Act on the ground that it provided insufficient Exchequer contribution towards the losses they would incur in the acquisition and clearing of war-damaged land before revenue began to come in from new building.

In practical terms, the value of the 1944 Act can be expressed as follows. A slow start was made on reconstruction of the war-damaged business and commercial
city centres, owning to the fact that effort had been concentrated on other more vital work, principally on building houses and schools, and on industrial recovery; the amount of investment that it had been possible to allow in the reconstruction of blitzed city centres was only £0.5 m. in 1949; in 1950 this was increased to £1.5 m., and the amount for 1951 was £4 m. However, the first steps towards comprehensive redevelopment of inner London were undertaken under the powers contained in the 1944 Act to declare areas of extensive war damage subject to compulsory purchase in order to enable them to be laid out afresh and redeveloped as a whole. Examples of the 1944 Act implementation are: first, the Stepney-Poplar area in London which covered 1,312 acres; secondly, the South Bank of the Thames, between Westminster Bridge and Blackfriars Bridge; and thirdly, in the City of London, an area of more than 200 acres declared to be needing comprehensive redevelopment.

However, the above legislative developments could not be considered as in any way equivalent to the creation of the Central Planning Authority establishment, as it had been conceived by the Barlow, Uthwatt and Scott reports. Of course, the main reason for this development was the wartime environment itself, which functioned in two ways; it helped to bring to the fore the need for reorganisation of the planning system on the one hand, and on the other it had to preserve the atmosphere of unity in the Coalition Cabinet. In other words, the years of peace had to come in order to produce the final, practical form of the urban reconstruction machinery. This subject will be faced in the next Chapter. This identifies a policy of greater State intervention in planning matters, which can largely be explained by a general reduction of Conservatives influence in the British political scene after 1943.
VI. THE 1947 PLANNING ACT AND THE REACTION TO IT

In contrast to the wartime period, the first post-war years were characterised by the domination of the British political scene by a strong Labour Government. After the end of the hostilities on 8 May 1945, all three main parties went into the general election, on 26 July 1945, committed to principles of social and economic reconstruction which their leaders had endorsed as members of the Coalition Government. The declaration of the poll results found the Labour Party to have 183 seats more than the Conservatives. Labour won 393 seats, the Conservatives and their allies 210, the Liberals 12, the Common Wealth 1 and the heterogeneous Independents 17. The disparity in votes cast was as follows: Labour polled 11,967,000 (48.0 per cent) against 9,972,000 (39.6 per cent) for the Conservatives. According to Kenneth Morgan, the author of the book Labour in Power, 1945-1951, the period between July 1945 and October 1951 is one of the most crucial in British history and comparable with "the governments of Peel, Disraeli, Asquith, and Lloyd George, and perhaps Gladstone's first term in office".

A significant debate has developed concerning the social context of this first post-war administration. In Arthur Marwick's book, British Society since 1945, the period from 1945 to around 1957 is characterised by the domination of a social consensus, which was a
legacy of wartime. Similar aspects are detected by Lionel Esher in his *A Broken Wave: The rebuilding of England, 1940-1980*. He argues that:

"The post-war consensus should have lasted for twenty years. There were two reasons for this. First, it was bipartisan [...]. Second, it was flexible [...]".

Paul Addison in his study, *The Road to 1945*, saw additionally the post-war Labour Government as the legatees of the consensus of the Second World War. His view has been echoed by marxist approaches, which have seen the Attlee government as essentially "opportunistic", dedicated to a sterile parliamentarism rather than to genuine socialist change. According to this interpretation, the years after 1945 were strictly non-revolutionary.

Another estimate of the post-war political scene comes from I.H. Taylor, who argues in his Ph.D. thesis "War and the Development of Labour's Domestic Programme, 1939-45" that the early period of the Attlee government, perhaps down to mid-1947, is characterised by a sustained shift to the Left, unique in British history; only in the post-1947 era was this Leftwards momentum checked, and even reversed, by a variety of forces, including external financial pressures and Labour's own internal party conflicts from 1951 onwards. Finally, Kenneth Morgan in his above-mentioned book, *Labour in Power, 1945-1951*, presented the post-war Labour Cabinet as a government with great vision in domestic questions, which it expressed by measures related to the nationalization of some components of economic activity, such as that of the Bank of England (1946), civil aviation (1946), cable and wireless (1946), coal (1946), railways (1947), gas (1948), iron and steel (1949) on the one hand, and on the other by a welfare policy, which led, among other things, to the establishment of the National Health Service (1946),

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National Insurance (1946) and National Assistance (1948). This policy had been accepted by the popular strata, as could be proved by the general election results of those seven years. Indeed, in 1945 the Labour Party, as we have already seen, received 48.0 per cent and the Conservatives, 39.6 per cent; in 1950, Labour still secured 46.1 per cent, while the Conservatives reached 43.5 per cent, thanks mainly to a fall in the votes cast for the other parties. Finally, in 1951 Labour's share actually rose to its highest ever at 48.8 per cent, which was 0.8 per cent ahead of the Conservatives, but they lost their parliamentary majority thanks to the single-member-constituency system\textsuperscript{12}.

In addition to the above developments in electoral opinion, the other holders of legislative authority also did not create serious difficulties for the post-war Labour Government. As Kenneth Morgan points out, the monarchy provided no obstacle of any significance. The House of Lords did not offer any real resistance to governmental legislative work except a lengthy fight over the Transport Nationalization Bill in 1947. Finally, the City was not monolithic ideologically, though the Stock Exchange showed a few signs of politically-motivated speculation against the Attlee government\textsuperscript{13}.

The issue of the Town and Country Planning Act in 1947 ought to be placed in the above context. The Act gave greater powers to local authorities over the environment, and a government levy of increases in land values through development, as will be seen in the following analysis. However, before entering into this Act's provisions it is necessary go through the politico-economic problems which the Labour Government was facing in that period.
As Kenneth Morgan notes\textsuperscript{14}, "1947 was a year of almost unrelieved disaster" for Britain. This phenomenon becomes apparent from the data of table 1, which shows the development of the Balance of Payments during the period 1946-1953. As can be seen, the biggest deficit on current account (-£443 m.) was recorded in 1947.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lccccccccc}
\hline
\hline
\textbf{Curr. acc. debits} & 1836 & 2212 & 2347 & 2545 & 2825 & 4259 & 3741 & 3640 \\
\textbf{" credits} & 1538 & 1769 & 2348 & 2576 & 3225 & 3852 & 3871 & 3718 \\
\textbf{US defence aid} & +4 & +121 & +102 & & & & & \\
\textbf{(grant less US share} & & & & & & & & \\
\textbf{of counterpart)} & & & & & & & & \\
\hline
\textbf{Balance} & -298 & -443 & +1 & +31 & +300 & -403 & +251 & +180 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{United Kingdom Balance of Payments, 1946-1953 (in £ millions)}
\end{table}


According to Kenneth Morgan, the main causes of this phenomenon were rooted in the economic policy of "cheap money", which was followed by Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, from July 1945 to November 1947. "Cheap money" meant that a large volume of Treasury bills was issued which formed the basis of credit expansion by the banks. There were those who criticized this policy on technical grounds, though it was generally popular as the smaller investor seemed happy.
enough and the stock-market flourished until the end of 1946. However, in the spring of 1947, it became obvious that things were going seriously wrong; in the second quarter of 1947, from 1 April to 30 July, there were signs of a major crisis, as the volume of exports fell sharply below even the level of the third quarter of 1946. The last hope of the Government, as Morgan argues, was the loan negotiated with the United States in December 1945. The loan became available from July 1946, while a serious drain of dollars began from the start of 1947. On top of this growing balance of payments crisis (table 2), it appeared the even more alarming problem of the convertibility of sterling, due to take effect on 15 July 1947, one year precisely from the passage of the American loan.

Furthermore, by 19 July 1947 it was announced that Britain had had to withdraw a further $150 m. of the above loan. The drain of the dollar reserves was colossal. In the first week of convertibility the loss was $106 m.; in the second, it was $128 m.; in the third, it was $127 m.; in the week ending 16 August, it came no less than $183 m. On 20 August, it was announced that the USA had agreed that the convertibility be immediately suspended on "an emergency and temporary" basis. It was apparent that a new financial policy had to be determined from the above date. This policy, known as "the policy of austerity", began with the autumn budget of November 1947, and the appointment as Chancellor of the Exchequer of Sir Stafford Cripps who was till that time Minister of Economic Affairs. The new policy was expressed by heavy cuts in dollar imports, a sharp reduction of consumer purchasing power, and new rates of purchase and profits tax. In this framework of developing economic crisis, the new
Table 2
United Kingdom Net Gold and Dollar Deficit/Surplus, 1946-1952 (in ± millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>January-June</th>
<th>July-December</th>
<th>January-June</th>
<th>July-December</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>-80</td>
<td>-146</td>
<td>-469</td>
<td>-146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>-469</td>
<td>-555</td>
<td>-254</td>
<td>-169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>-239</td>
<td>-254</td>
<td>-232</td>
<td>-169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>-239</td>
<td>-555</td>
<td>-232</td>
<td>-142</td>
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<td>1950</td>
<td>+78</td>
<td>+209</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td></td>
<td>-564</td>
<td>+57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


planning Bill, with its strong appeal to the Left wing of the Labour Government, was introduced in the House of Commons by the Minister of Town and Country Planning, Lewis Silkin, in January 1947.

**a. The Town and Country Planning Act, 1947**

The Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, hereafter cited as "the 1947 Act", received the Royal Assent in August 1947, but came into general operation on 1 July 1948. The new planning Act sought to create a new body
of town and country planning legislation by embodying the main recommendations of the Barlow, Uthwatt and Scott Committees' reports. It has to be noted here that the 1947 Act also repealed the Town and Country Planning Act, 1932, part of the Restriction of Ribbon Development Act, 1935, the Town and Country Planning (Interim Development) Act, 1943, and most of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944\textsuperscript{15}. Lastly, from another point of view, the 1947 Act was the third part of the legislative trilogy issued in the first post-war years, which were the location of industry, the overcrowding of towns, the question of compensation and betterment, and the coherent planning of larger areas; the other two were the Distribution of Industry Act, 1945, and the New Towns Act, 1946.

According to the *Explanatory Memorandum* of the 1947 Act, the existing planning system was considered as static, too localised; there was no enforceable obligation on local authorities to prepare schemes and it was to a large extent negative\textsuperscript{18}. Consequently, the main purposes of the 1947 Act could be summarised as follows:

First, to provide a framework, or pattern, of land use, against which day-to-day development could be considered; this was the "development plan", which, as every local planning authority was obliged to draw up by 1 July 1951, was a more flexible successor to the pre-war "planning scheme", and wider in its scope in that plan preparation was entrusted to the larger authorities, namely the county councils and county boroughs\textsuperscript{17}.

Secondly, to bring all development under control by making it, with certain exceptions, subject to the permission of a local planning authority or of central government\textsuperscript{18}.

Thirdly, to deal with certain specific problems of amenity, such as the preservation of trees and woodlands,
and of buildings of special, architectural and historic interest, and the control of outdoor advertisements. Fourthly, to solve the problem of compensation and betterment by:

(i) seeking to ensure that land was purchased at "existing use value";
(ii) where land was developed, securing for the community the increase in its value attributable to the grant of planning permission by the imposition of a development charge;
(iii) entrusting the assessment and collection of the development charge to a Central Land Board (CLB) set up under the Act;
(iv) setting aside a fund of £300 m., out of which payments might be made to owners whose land was depreciated by the restrictions imposed by the Act. This fund was the estimated aggregate of the amounts claimed by landowners under a system of unification in the State of the development rights of the whole country's land. It is to be clarified here that this land, though not enjoying planning permission, was deemed to enjoy an enhanced value because it was very close to existing development.

Lastly, to extend both the powers of public authorities to acquire and develop land for planning purposes, and the scale and scope of grants from central funds to local authorities towards carrying out the acquisition and clearing of land.

The significance of the 1947 Act is also to some extent reflected in its extensive and comprehensive character. The Act consisted of 129 sections, organised in 10 parts, as follows:

(a) In part I, there were four sections (1-4), dealing with the main instruments of the established central and local administration; that is, the Minister, the Central Land Board and the local planning
authorities.
(b) In part II, there were seven sections (5-11) dealing with the innovation of the "development plan".
(c) In part III, there were twenty-five sections (12-36) relating to the control of urban development.
(d) In part IV, there were thirteen sections (37-49) relating to the acquisition of land and powers relating to highways.
(e) In part V, there were eight sections (50-57), under the general title "Amendments of Law relating to Compensation for Compulsory Acquisition of Land".
(f) In part VI, there were eleven sections (58-68) dealing with payments out of Central funds in respect of Depreciation of Land Values.
(g) In part VII, there were six sections (69-74) concerning the development charges.
(h) In part VIII, there were eighteen sections (75-92) dealing with application to special cases.
(i) In part IX, there were seven sections (93-99) relating to finances of local authorities.
(1) Lastly in part X, there were twenty-one sections (100-120) concerning the supplementary provisions as to local planning authorities and general provisions.

The 1947 Act was a radical measure and, though it had a relatively smooth passage through Parliament, it occasioned considerable controversy thereafter. In the context of this situation, the other main parties in Parliament opposed the above planning policy by giving the following answers to a questionnaire specially prepared and issued to the three main political parties by The Architects' Journal to determine their planning policies. The Conservative Party characterised it as nationalisation of land. It argued, and it
was right, that the "development charge" under the 1947 Act provided both a deterrent to development and a discouragement to land being made available\textsuperscript{24}.

At the same time, the Liberals, though they agreed with the general object of Labour legislation, considered the following points as the main faults, and they were right, of the 1947 Act:

(a) The Act imposed a charge on those who developed their land, therefore discouraging all developments by private owners.

(b) Compensation for loss of development value was faulty in principle, as being payment by the community for values created by the community and which should never have been in private hands.

(c) The Act, which was too complicated, involved a great deal of delegated legislation\textsuperscript{25}.

Of more direct interest, however, is the professional reaction of architectural circles as stated in the pages of \textit{The Architects' Journal}. Three months before the 1947 Act came into force, it had been characterised as "extremely complex, but probably contains all that any pre-war planner could have wished"\textsuperscript{26}. Furthermore, it had been noticed that planning authorities had but three months in which to prepare their machinery and that they would suffer many disappointments if they thought that all they needed to do was to appoint a Planning Officer of the pre-war kind and provide him with a few assistants\textsuperscript{27}. On the other hand, the regular commentator, Astragal, referring to the development value of a plot of land, which under the 1947 Act had to be expropriated by the State, as the difference between its market value at the sale and the market value for existing use of the plot as agricultural land, pointed to the problems which would arise in the redevelopment of central urban areas. He wrote in
addition that:

"If a man were to buy a block of twenty 4-floored buildings in a central area, demolish ten of them for open space, car parks, etc., and rebuild the other ten as 8-floored buildings, he would not have increased the floorspace or cubic content of the block at all. Yet it appears that the Board will be compelled to charge him a big development charge on the ten buildings, that were changed from 4 floors to 8, and will not be able to allow him a "credit" for the vanished space in the ten demolished buildings. It may be there is some way round this difficulty within the terms of the Act. If not the situation will be impossible, and so big a defect in one of the most complex Acts ever passed will come in for comment." 28.

It was a logical result of the situation created by the Act, that a great controversy started on this general issue of the development charge. It rapidly became clear that owners were reluctant to sell at existing use value and that buyers were prepared to purchase at higher prices. The description of the phenomenon in the Editorial of The Architects' Journal on 21 October 1948 is characteristic. Among other things it pointed out the following:

"What is happening is equally plain: it is a landowners' strike, or more properly a landowners' lock out [...]. Landowners have therefore decided, in the great majority of cases, not to sell unless they are paid a price equivalent to existing use value plus development charge [...]. If we must continue to wait for the rebuilding of city centres and new towns, and of any goodwill for the Act is to be retained, it is essential that land should be made available at something near existing use value for the small amount of private house building now
being authorised". 

In another A.J. Editorial on 11 November 1948, it was argued that the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, had imposed an additional burden on those whose profession it was to deal with land in any way. In other words, the Act levied a charge on the work of the professions as well as on the value of land.

On the other hand, Alison Ravetz pointed out that the system devised in the 1940s was designed to control the use and value of land, and the mechanism was the 100 per cent "betterment" tax on development. By the term "betterment" it was recognised that an increase in value of private property was due to the activities of society as a whole rather than the individual owner, who therefore could not be considered to have an exclusive right to it. From this point of view, Ravetz considered that in its effect the 100 per cent tax was a revolutionary measure amounting to land nationalization. However, as the 100 per cent charge had never had a chance to become fully operative, the case that it would kill all development, as was argued at that time, was never proven.

Anyway, the criticism which developed in the late 1940s and was directed against the 1947 Act, had focused on a key issue in that the Act threatened to defeat the principal aim of planning by discouraging desirable development. Meanwhile, the established procedure for securing planning permission, which was largely a product of the existing system of democratic local government in which decisions were taken not by officials but by unpaid elected councillors who met at fixed intervals, was considered as extremely slow, and a further discouragement to development.
The above difficulties prompted the production of memoranda criticising, especially, parts VI and VII of the 1947 Act, by a number of professional bodies and representative associations in 1949. Among the most influential were those of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, the Chartered Auctioneers' and Estate Agents' Institute, the Council of the Law Society, the Federation of British Industries, the Association of British Chambers of Commerce and the County Landowners' Association. All these bodies suggested that the liability to development charge put a severe brake on development.

In particular, the Law Society, writing to the Minister Lewis Silkin on 12 May 1949, argued that

"the decision that the development charge should be one hundred per cent in all cases has fundamentally altered the position and I have been asked by the Council to inform you that they fully support the amendment which has been made to the Land Tribunal Bill in the House of Lords and which provides that any person aggrieved by the determination of a development charge by the Central Land Board under Section 70 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, should be enabled to appeal within twenty-eight days to the Lands Tribunal. It is hoped that on consideration you will decide not to oppose the retention on this Clause in the [Lands Tribunal] Bill."

A little later, on 23 May 1949, the Federation of British Industries wrote to the same Minister, referring to the amendment made by the House of Lords to the Lands Tribunal Bill, giving the Tribunal to be set up under that Bill jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals against development charges levied under the 1947 Act, stating that they supported it entirely on
the following grounds:

"When the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, was introduced the intention was that development charges should be levied at a varying percentage at the discretion of the Central Land Board and no right of appeal was accorded. Subsequently, however, on the introduction of the Development Charge Regulations you yourself announced that there had been second thoughts in this matter and that development charges would be at the rate of 100% of the development value. In other words the amount of the development charge in now a pure question of valuation, which is always a matter of opinion. Admirably as the District Valuers may carry out their work it is obviously an unsatisfactory situation that one party to an argument of such a nature should have the power of decision without reference to an independent appeal tribunal"36.

Finally, in a document submitted by the Chartered Auctioneers' and Estate Agents' Institute to the Minister, Lewis Silkin, on 9 June 1949, it was stated that:

"My Council very much hopes, therefore, that you will introduce legislation to provide for a right of appeal to the Lands Tribunal from the determination of the Central Land Board in regard to development charges. It is thought that such a right of appeal would be of help, not only to valuers in private practice and those for whom they act, but also to the Central Land Board and the Valuation Office. If there are objections on grounds of procedure to including a provision of this kind in the Lands Tribunal Bill at present before Parliament, then my Council believe that the matter is important and urgent enough to justify the introduction of a short Bill to amend the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947"37.
Explaining the above objections, J.B. Cullingworth concludes that two main criticisms had been made of the Act:

"First, it was said that the land market was stagnant or that the Act was being frustrated because land was still passing at a price well above its existing use value and that the only cure was to reduce the charge. Secondly, it was argued that no matter how fairly the charge was assessed, the public would never believe, unless there was a right of appeal, that they were being adequately protected against a monopoly".

As a result of the above developments, a process of reconsideration of the consequences of the 1947 Act developed in governmental circles as well. A first indication of the above situation can be considered to be the statement of the Central Land Board in its first Annual Report in 1949 that "much building land has been taken off the market"; in other words, that a restriction on urban development was an effect of the 1947 Act. A second element supporting the above interpretation is that from December 1948 an Official Committee on Development Charges had been established. The Committee met a few times and before it could settle the differences among its members the election of February 1950 intervened. Following the return of a Labour Government and the appointment of Hugh Dalton as Minister of Town and Country Planning, a new urgency was given to the publication of the Official Committee's report, which took place in May 1950. The report was lengthy and detailed but the main proposals were for a widening of the use classes. As a consequence, the changes brought about in 1950 were seen as modest, and did little to allay the general hostility towards the misunderstanding and suspicion of the development charge system.
Indeed, the pressure for a major amendment of the 1947 Act grew. In September 1950, a short Bill was introduced by the Government to amend certain defective provisions of the Act relating to planning control. It must be considered as an outcome of the fact that the development charge, as a new measure, was especially unpopular. The criticism, in particular, of the professional associations was focused on the parts V, VI and VII of the Act; that is, on those dealing with compensation, payments for the acquisition of development rights, and development charges. In this context, the Editorial of The Architects' Journal, referring to the circulation of the second Annual Report of the Central Land Board in 1950, asserted that:

"The failure of this part of the 1947 Act is a serious matter. It is not sufficient for a defender on the Act to say that it is being ignored or misused. The Act set up a new and arbitrary system designed to control a market which had previously been free."

In addition to the above criticism, there was acute awareness among officials of the difficulty of distribution of the £300 m., although nothing could be done until there was an estimate of the claims.

This was the situation till 5 October 1951, when Parliament was dissolved and, after the general election on 25 October 1951, the Conservatives were returned with an overall majority. Winston Churchill became again Prime Minister, whilst Harold Macmillan was appointed head of the newly renamed Ministry of Housing and Local Government on 30 October. As J.B. Cullingworth points out "the term "planning" significantly being dropped; moreover, he argues that the success of the 1947 "solution" was charily going to be short lived; in other words, it was a failure.
b. The revision of the planning system by the Conservatives in the 1950s

In the context of the above opposition to the foundation of the 1947 planning system, born as an idea in wartime and established in legislative terms in the first post-war years, a prominent place has to be given to the Conservative Cabinet of the period 1951-1959. Actually, in those nine years a systematic attempt was undertaken by the State to abolish the most significant points of the 1947 planning apparatus. Already from the general elections of 1950 the Conservatives had promised "drastic changes" to it.48

The Conservative policy on land development had been set out in its election manifesto in 1951, Britain Strong and Free49, as follows:

"The sale of land for the building of houses and for development of all kinds has been hampered by the Socialist Town and Country Planning Act. This has brought the planning of land use into disrepute. Conservatives want to see that the land is used properly and that its beauties and amenities are preserved. Procedure for obtaining planning permission can be simplified and appeals must be heard by a properly constituted tribunal. The development charge has worked unfairly and has also impeded good development. The present scheme for compensation gives inadequate sums to many who suffer genuine loss, but at the same time hands out taxpayers' money to others who would lose nothing. This must be drastically altered. We shall proceed on the principle that for certain classes of property there should be no development charge and no compensation. For others there should be full compensation and a corresponding charge. There must be a right of appeal against assessments"50.
Obviously, the "drastic overhaul" of the planning system promised in the above election manifesto could not be implemented instantly by the new Conservative Cabinet. Nevertheless, the day after Macmillan became minister, a long memorandum from officials was presented to him, as J.B. Cullingworth informs us, on the question "whether we should amend parts V, VI and VII of the Act 1947" which contained "the famous solution to the problem of compensation and betterment". The question was whether the solution contained in parts V, VI and VII was the right one or, indeed, one that was "endurable". Criticisms of the financial provisions of the 1947 Act had fallen into three broad groups. First, it was said that the system of payments from a fixed fund was unfair, and that all claims should be paid in full. Secondly, development charges were generally disliked, as many people considered them arbitrary; it was regarded as a tax on enterprise. Lastly, land for development was not changing hands freely at existing use value; this upset "one of the underlying assumptions of the Act" and, taken with development charge, inevitably increased the cost of development.

Further meetings of these officials with Macmillan led to the elaboration of two outline schemes: the limited compensation scheme and the total set-off one. Both of them were set out in a paper, which Macmillan submitted, together with the report of the Official Committee, to the Woolton Committee in March 1952. This was a ministerial paper on development charges and compensation. This Committee was chaired by Woolton, the Lord President of the Council. The limited compensation scheme would: (i) return development value to private land owners, (ii) abolish development charge altogether, and (iii) compensate owners as and when planning restrictions were imposed. The alternative total set-off scheme would: "(i) preserve the principle that
development values vest in the State, (ii) keep the liability to development charge alive, (iii) but where there was a claim on the £300 m. treat the development charge as balancing the claim, and (iv) allow the owner refused permission to develop to receive the full value of this claim (plus interest)"55. Additionally, a second report was prepared by officials in May 195258.

The Woolton Committee met to consider the report from officials on 26 May 1952. The discussion which followed was confused and, though it was generally agreed that development charge should be abolished, the only other agreement was to resume discussion at the next meeting on 29 May 195257. There was much activity between parliamentary counsel and officials of the Ministry and of the Treasury till the Town and Country Planning Act, 1953, was issued as a Bill. This latter Act abolished the development charge and denationalized rights58. At the same time, the new planning Act repealed the compulsory purchase powers of the Central Land Board, and the question arose as to whether stronger local authority powers were needed to prevent landowners from "holding developers to ransom"58. The Opposition reacted to the above development by stating during the second reading that

"to a Bill which provides no means for the recovery by the community of socially-created land values, endangers the effective powers of local planning authorities to check undesirable development and, by depriving the Central Land Board of the power of compulsory purchase, exposes the developer to extortionate charges"80.

Despite the above objections, the Conservative Government proceeded to pass into law the Town and Country Planning Act, 1954, hereafter cited as "the 1954 Act", which completed the abolition of the 1947 planning sys-
tem. The 1954 Act received the Royal Assent on 25 November, 1954, and it came into force for all purposes on 1 January 1955\(^1\). It was concerned almost entirely with the financial aspects of land planning and hardly touched at all what had been termed the planning provisions proper of the 1947 Act. In effect, it provided a new system of compensation for (i) planning restrictions on the development of land, and (ii) the compulsory purchase of land by local and other public authorities\(^2\).

The 1954 Act was divided into six parts and contained 72 sections and 8 schedules. A short presentation of its main provisions is as follows. Part I dealt with those cases in which an immediate payment from the £300 m., compensation fund could be claimed; that is, with those cases where a claim on the fund had been made and the claim could be said to have matured\(^3\). This part was perhaps the most complicated of the 1954 Act\(^4\). Part II dealt with transactions in the future, cases that arose where a compensation claim arose on a refusal, or on a conditional grant of planning permission, and where there existed in respect of that land an admitted claim on the compensation fund that had not been wholly discharged by a cash payment under part I\(^5\). Part III and IV dealt with the basis of compensation where there was no possible claim on the fund; especially, part III in the case where land was compulsorily acquired outright, whilst part IV where planning permission was revoked or modified, to the detriment of the use of the land by its owner\(^6\). Part V dealt with compensation to be paid by the Minister of Housing and Local Government for past planning decisions, already given before the commencement of the 1954 Act, whereby land had been depreciated in value by reason of planning permission for its development having been refused or granted subject to onerous conditions\(^7\). Finally,
part VI contained some important provisions of a miscellaneous nature.

Interpretations of the new procedures differed. Ernest Watkins, who was a frequent writer of legislative articles in The Architects' Journal, in his analysis of the 1954 Act, when it was still a Bill, argued that it was supplementary to the 1947 Act, because it kept intact the legal mechanism for the control of the development of land laid down by the 1947 Act and because it still based its compensation plans very largely on the £300 m. compensation fund set up by the 1947 Act. However, the Act faced criticism regarding its influence on the previous planning system. Thus, Desmond Heap, who was the Comptroller and City Solicitor to the Corporation of the City of London since 1947 and President of the Town Planning Institute for the period 1955-56, argued that as parts VI and VII of the 1947 Act were complementary, so equally were the two planning Acts of 1953 and 1954. He explained the above thesis as follows: as part VI of the 1947 Act dealt with the compensation side of land control and part VII with the betterment side of the problem, so the 1953 Act by abolishing development charges and by replacing VII of the 1947 Act resolved the betterment side of the "compensation and betterment" question, while the 1954 Act by replacing VI of the 1947 Act in fact was dealing with the compensation side of the problem.

Many years later, Gordon Cherry noted that the situation produced by the 1954 Act was complex and anomalous. There was after its establishment in fact a dual market in land; while private sales were at current market prices, compensation for certain planning restrictions and for compulsory purchase was to be paid on the basis of the existing use plus any admitted 1947
development value. Secondly, J.B. Cullingworth noted that no changes in the powers of compulsory acquisition were made by the 1954 Act, though consideration was given to the possibility. At the same time, other related issues, such as those relating to designation of land for compulsory purchase and the powers of government departments to acquire land came under review. J.B. Cullingworth's observation was derived from the debate which developed in the House of Commons when the 1954 Act had been introduced as a Bill. The strong controversy generated by the Opposition was based on the ground that it failed "to safeguard the public interest in land values created by community endeavour". It was developed in Ungoed Thomas's argument who, as a member of the Opposition, said:

"The two-tier system as [Macmillan] implied, is fundamental to his Bill [...]. What the landowner gets for his land will depend entirely on the chance of who happens to be the purchaser, whether it happens to be the local authority or a private individual. This is an extraordinary price structure to set up. I cannot see how a price structure of that kind can possibly survive[...]. If this two-tier system of prices breaks down, the whole of the Minister's Bill breaks down too".

The above planning disadvantage was faced by the Town and Country Planning Act, 1959, which came into force on 16 August 1959, which restored the 1939 market value principle with respect to compensation payable on the compulsory purchase of land. But according to Desmond Heap, to this general provision there were five statutory modifications, not all of which were new, some of them being based on what had hitherto been customary. The first and most important modification of the market value principle secured that an acquiring authority should not pay any increase in the value of
the acquired land if the increase might be said to have been brought about by the scheme of development which gave rise to the need for the compulsory purchase. The second one secured that if on a compulsory purchase of land the scheme of development caused an increase in value of other "contiguous or adjacent" land belonging to the same owner, such an increase should be set off against the price paid for the land compulsorily acquired. The third modification operated in favour of the vendor whose land had been taken compulsorily and ensured that any diminution in the value of the land caused by the threat of compulsory purchase should be ignored. The fourth one was entirely novel and would be helpful to the vendor whose property was acquired compulsorily; the 1959 Act provided that if, within five years of the completion of the compulsory purchase, the acquired land came to be used for a more remunerative purpose than was thought possible under planning control at the date of purchase, then the vendor could reopen the formerly completed sale of the land and claim additional compensation from the acquiring authority. Finally, the fifth modification made general what was already lawful under certain Acts, namely, the payment on any compulsory purchase of land to which the 1959 Act applied of discretionary allowances to cover costs of removal and trade losses.


"if Acts of Parliament had coats of arms, the Town and Country Planning Act, 1959, could proudly display a bend sinister". So write the authors of this book in their Introduction to Part I of the Act. I'm not sure that "proudly" is the right word, for
a bend sinister is well known as an heraldic mark of illegitimacy. However, this mark certainly fits the case of an Act that by its parentage and purpose has no business to be masquerading under the name of Town and Country Planning”.

To sum up, since the establishment of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, later renamed, by the Labour Cabinet, Ministry of Local Government and Planning and, by the Conservative one, Ministry of Local Government and Housing, six Town and Country Planning Acts had been produced. These were the Minister of Town and Country Planning Act, 1943 and the Town and Country Planning Acts of 1944, 1947, 1951, 1954 and 1959. However, as Desmond Heap points out, the principal Act remained the 1947 Act, parts I to IV of which dealt with the making and amendment of development plans, the day-to-day control of development through the grant or refusal of planning permission for development, and the acquisition and disposal of land for planning purposes, were in force during the whole of the 1950s. At this point, the following question arises: besides the above described general legislation referring to town and country planning matters, what were the special measures which were introduced concerning the technical formation of the built environment, and in particular of the central areas of the cities? This subject will be faced in the following Chapter.
VII. REDEVELOPMENT OF THE CENTRAL AREAS: NEEDS AND PROPOSALS

As commonly understood, the term "central area" contains the principal commercial streets and usually the main public buildings of an urban agglomeration; in other words, it comprises the core of the town's business and civic life. Almost all British towns and cities which were of large size in 1939, had grown greatly between 1840 and 1914; during that period, the total built-up area increased substantially. At the same time, the central areas of these towns also increased in size, but not to a proportional extent.

Nevertheless, it could be argued that by 1840 the urban fabric of the central areas of most British towns and cities had become firmly established. However, by the beginning of the twentieth century congestion in the streets had become a problem of major significance; it was considered that traffic delays imposed a serious economic cost on business in general. As a response, a Royal Commission inquired in 1905 into their extent at several points in London. The Commission concluded that improved transport in London was imperatively necessary, in the interests of public health and for the prompt transaction of business, as well as to make decent housing possible. It also declared that the narrowness of the streets was considered to be the main obstacle to improvement and that a comprehensive plan aiming to improve the road system should be prepared and continuously implemented as final considerations.
The traffic problem in the central areas of towns became more serious after the First World War. It has to be noted that between 1922 and 1939 the number of mechanically propelled vehicles in Britain increased from around 650,000 to 2,500,000. Moreover, the traffic became approximately double between 1928 and 1938. This rapid development of this form of transport, together with improvements in suburban rail services, had important consequences both for towns as a whole and for their central areas.

Another Commission was established to address the above problem, but it was unable to find much evidence of improvement in traffic conditions in built-up areas in 1930. The above problem was summed up in the Ministry of TCP's view in 1947:

"It does not exaggerate the importance of the traffic question to say that by 1939 the future of the central areas of larger towns largely depended on its solution".

In Britain, central area redevelopment probably first began at Birmingham and later at Southampton and Cardiff, but not in the sense of comprehensive planning as it was implemented after the Second World War, when large areas of war damage in existing towns compelled local and central government action.

Referring to this war destruction, the newspaper Daily Worker wrote on 11 September 1945:

"The War Damage Commission has been notified of war damage to 3,281,953 separate properties. Notifications are still coming in at the rate of many hundreds a week. The huge sum of £271,281,171 has been paid out, but
it is impossible to estimate what the final figure will be, as the commission cannot foretell building trade costs in the next few years".

Moreover, according to a PRO document, dated on 16 December 1943, the total number of damaged hereditaments in the United Kingdom was as follows:

England: 2,547,808, of which 2,346,117 were houses (93.45 per cent of the UK)
Scotland: 52,152, of which 44,380 were houses (1.75 per cent of the UK)
Wales: 71,464, of which 65,379 were houses (2.5 per cent of the UK)
Northern: 63,628, of which 59,897 were houses (2.3 per cent of the UK)

An approximate analysis of the 2,346,117 damaged houses in England by Regions is:

Greater London (Metropolitan Police District) 977,626 (42%)
Lancashire and Cheshire (largely S. Lancashire and Wirral Peninsula) 334,947 (14%)
Birmingham and Coventry Area 197,843 (8.5%)
Yorkshire (very largely Hull and Sheffield) 162,351 (7%)
Hants and Dorset (largely Southampton and Portsmouth Areas) 125,980 (5%)
S.W. England (very largely Plymouth, Bristol, Bath and Exeter) 131,649 (5.5%)
Remainder of England 415,721 (18%)

Total 2,346,117

However, neither the national, nor the regional figures necessarily give a true picture in England. 125 totally destroyed houses in Pembroke Dock may involve a larger housing problem than 5,065 totally destroyed houses in
Birmingham. Such figures as are available show that there were 155 towns in which there were more than 100 totally destroyed houses, of which 41 towns each had more than 1,000 totally destroyed houses. It is these 41 towns which were popularly known as the "blitzed" towns. 18 of these 41 towns were metropolitan boroughs, so that treating the London County Council area as one "town" there were 24 "blitzed" towns with more than 1000 totally destroyed houses. These 24 towns can be summarised as follows (the figures in brackets are the numbers of totally destroyed houses in each town):

Greater London
- LCC Area (47,314), West Ham (9,254),
- East Ham (1,498), Willesden (1,079),
- Croydon (1,194). Total: 60,339.

Merseyside Area
- Liverpool (5,487), Bootle (2,006),
- Birkenhead (1,899), Wallasey (1,150).
- Total: 10,542.

Manchester Area
- Manchester (1,951), Salford (1,934).
- Total: 3,885.

Individual Ports
- Plymouth (3,593), Yarmouth (1,636),
- Southampton (4,136), Portsmouth (4,393), Hull (4,184), Bristol (2,909), Swansea (1,124).
- Total: 21,975.

Cathedral Towns
- Bath (1,214), Norwich (1,780), Exeter (1,700). Total: 4,694.

Inland Industrial Towns
- Coventry (4,185), Birmingham (5,065),
- Sheffield (2,906). Total: 12,156.
- Grand Total: 113,591.

Another account of estimated area of war damage for a list of Metropolitan and County Boroughs is given by another PRO document, which was presented in the Conference of Local Authorities on Reconstruction Problems during October-November 1947 (table 3).

Furthermore, in a number of towns a portion of the cen-
tral area had been destroyed by air attack or many buildings damaged beyond repair and the commercial and civic life in these towns had been upset. As a consequence, the 1944 Act and the 1947 Act respectively defined Declaratory Order Areas and Comprehensive Development Areas (table 4) and provided significant statutory powers for their execution.

But, apart from the problem of war damage, redevelopment was necessary in most town centres for a variety of reasons; according to Wilfred Burns, M.Eng., AMICE(M), three main reasons applied to in most redevelopment areas. The first reason was that buildings had become outworn and outdated; a great many British town centres were substantially built up or altered during the intensive building periods in the Victorian age and, as a result, great numbers of buildings had reached the end of their useful life. A second reason for redevelopment was that the town centre had become unable to cope with modern traffic conditions; the shape of most central areas was determined in the days before the motor vehicle had even been invented. Finally, the third main reason was that it was necessary to provide a new environment for a changed way of living; conditions in post-war society were very different from those at the end of the last century. To these three main reasons, two more were to be added. First, the movement of functions out of bombed city centres during the war, and secondly, the fact that central areas had later increasingly attracted the attention of the private developer, as during mid-1950s the value of sites in central commercial areas had risen to a high level in relation to the value of the buildings they carried.
Table 3

The Estimated Area of War Damage (except City of London and City of Westminster)(*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canterbury C.B.</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chatham M.B.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deal M.B.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dover M.B.</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastbourne C.B.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folkestone M.B.</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gosport B.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gr. Yarmouth C.B.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hastings C.B.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowestoft M.B.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margate M.B.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwich C.B.</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portsmouth C.B.</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southampton C.B.</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrow-in-Furness C.B.</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birkenhead C.B.</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bootle C.B.</td>
<td>83</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grimsby C.B.</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hull C.B.</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool C.B.</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester C.B.</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salford C.B.</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sheffield C.B.</td>
<td>108</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Shields C.B.</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stretford M.B.</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunderland C.B.</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tynemouth C.B.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallasey C.B.</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Ham C.B.</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croydon C.B.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tottenham B.</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hornsey B.</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finchley B.</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Twickenham B.</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leyton B.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Erith B.</td>
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Total : 1863

(*) For Ramsgate M.B. and Weymouth M.B. there is no information for the area of war damage form this source. However for the first of them there is an indication that the destruction was in a small area.

Source : "Conference of Local Authorities on Reconstruction Problems (October-November 1947)", PRO file HLG 71/34.
<table>
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<th>Local Authority</th>
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37 2599 28 305.5

(*) Including Declaratory Orders in respect of which a formal Order had not yet been issued, but the Minister had informed the Local Authority of the area to be designated.

Source: PRO file HLG 71/2222.

However, the actual forms of redevelopment which might be undertaken in such areas remained almost unknown. R.H. King, ARIBA (AM), concludes, that the broader ideas implicit in comprehensive redevelopment remained undiscussed and, generally speaking, such ideas that became known to planners largely originated from academic centres and they, to a great extent, owed their inspiration to the writings of Le Corbusier, who based his work solely on the "clean state" or "cleared area" principle; that is, in the idea of extensive clear-
ance of an existing urban area and the rebuilding of it from the beginning. It may well be asked at this stage what happened to the "street", that is, to the town planning orthodoxy relating to the form of the city centres. However, the corridor street formed no part in the plans of Le Corbusier; an implementation of this thesis is the shopping centre of Coventry.

But, Le Corbusier should not be considered as the only inspiration; as Alison Ravetz points out, two primary images, on which several others were dependent, were concentricity and segregation. Typically, the concentric pattern was reinforced by a road pattern in which radial roads converged on the centre, and this was reinforced again in the 1930s, when many large towns created outer ring roads. The concentric model lent itself to the idea that different planning treatment should be meted out to the different zones. According to A. Ravetz, within the concentric pattern areas were to be divided between segregated functions; in general town planning terms, it created the conventional assumption that industry and housing must be separated; in the centre of the towns, it was considered that out of thirteen possible uses only four or five were permissible; these included shops, offices, wholesale warehouses, educational, recreational and public buildings, and possibly light industry.

Furthermore, the growth of motor traffic was also an important influencing factor of town planning. As A. Ravetz argues, it ultimately drove it "towards more rigid, geometrical designs." To this end, the contribution of Sir Alker Tripp, the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Scotland Yard and author in 1942 of the significant book, Town Planning and Road Traffic, was great. Of particular importance were, first, his proposal that a hierarchy of roads was needed; a hierar-
chy, which was equivalent to the principle that each kind of road was allowed to make a junction only with its own type or the type immediately adjacent to it. And second, his invention of the precinct. This emerged from the classified road system, in that a number of "pockets" were created, known as precincts. Each of these consisted of a little local system of minor roads, devoted to industrial, business, shopping or residential purposes. These contributions by Tripp made a major contribution to British urban traffic planning from the early 1940s and they were incorporated to a greater or a lesser degree into the post-war reconstruction plans for central areas.

However, in implementation terms, the above theoretical principles, and particularly Le Corbusier's idea of extensive clearance of an existing urban area and the rebuilding of it from the beginning, led to very expensive and unrealistic solutions for the economic part of the central area problem. This problem which could be summarised in the following duality: the multiplicity of land ownership and the high land values inherent in the laissez-faire system.

A response to this fundamental planning problem was essayed by Sir William G. Holford, Professor of Town Planning in the University of London and later President of the Town Planning Institute (1953-4), in his writings and town plans. In a paper at a general meeting of the Town Planning Institute on 8 February 1949, Holford introduced the question of combining both the "clean state" principle, which had been introduced by Le Corbusier and was considered as the radical solution, and of the Tripp's idea of the "precinct", which was conservative in character; he believed that a combination of these devices were a way to bring the problem "down to earth".
But apart from Holford's suggestion, what were the main trends relating to the technical solution of the basic problems of the central area redevelopment question? In order to respond to this question a presentation of the dominant aspects in town planning circles concerning the manner of intervention in a central area will be undertaken.

Important element in the planning debate after the war was the concept of comprehensive development. In particular, this term was used to describe a scheme covering a large area of land whereon a multiplicity of land uses were integrated into a unified scheme of development comprising roads, traffic planning and car parking, land use, buildings, aesthetics and landscaping. The chief characteristic of such a scheme was the subordination of the individual buildings to the requirements of the general scheme. The size of such an area attracted discussion. According to R.H. King, a site of less than five acres could only be regarded as infilling, and in practice it was unlikely that anything less than twenty acres could be regarded as "comprehensive" since a multiplicity of uses and functions could hardly be performed on anything smaller, even in a small town. In this respect, it is significant that the smallest Comprehensive Development Area proposed in the Administrative County of London Plan was thirty acres in extent. It is to be noted that such a plan, of course, could be prepared only after the most detailed study of the area and its environment, even up to a regional level when the broader issues of town planning were involved.

Regarding the traffic question, which has already been mentioned, there was a general opinion in planning practice that the predominant type of urban road pat-
tern in Britain was the radial system. The thesis that the radial pattern was the best solution, which had to be applied in plans for redevelopment of existing towns, was so strong that almost all official plans of large and medium-sized cities prepared after the Second World War followed this principle of planning. According to this road system, the radial arteries leading to the town were regarded as terminating at an inner ring road; it is to be noted that the principal function of the ring road was clearly to provide easier routes for traffic and also to take the through-traffic out of the central area. On the same issue, Sir Alker Tripp supported the view that at least one good circular road was required within the confines of the town itself to enable the town's own traffic to by-pass the centre as much as possible. For this reason, he believed, that by far the best plan would be to carry the ring road on a level separate from that of the general road system. Therefore, it is to be considered as a logical development that "ring roads" were very often recommended for implementation in many city plans, as for example in those of Greater London, Manchester, and even of New Towns designed on virgin sites.

Other items, related to traffic problem were considered in post-war years. They included, on the one hand the segregation of traffic and on the other, the need for provision of car parking in central areas of towns. The segregation of the pedestrian and the vehicle in British towns had long been advocated by town planners; however, apart from a few New Towns in America (Radburn, 1928 and the Greenbelt Towns, 1933), this planning principle had been mainly restricted to shopping precincts. It is to be noted here that Rotterdam and Coventry were the first such post-war examples of town centre redevelopment; in both of these cities, provi-
sion was made for two-level pedestrian access and circu-
lation. In addition, A. Tripp argued that pedes-
trians ought to be able to circulate freely, and traf-
fic ought to be able to travel fast even in towns, 
because otherwise the value of the speedy motor vehicle 
was neutralized. This is why he was opposed very often 
to the architects and planning authorities who, for 
practical reasons, were often inclined to shy away when 
separation of carriageway levels was demanded for cer-
tain cases.

On the other hand, car parking provision in the central 
areas also became very early a basic problem in the 
solution of the traffic question. Already in pre-war 
years, it had been suggested that underground car parks 
should be built, which, in addition, could be easily 
converted into shelters. However, the real problem 
generating the need for car parking provision was the 
lack of car parking places, mainly in the town centres. 
On this matter, Colin B. Buchanan, who was Professor of 
Transport at Imperial College, University of London, in 
a paper given at the Public Works and Municipal Ser-
vices Congress at Olympia on 19 November 1954, refer-
ing to the car parking question in central areas, and 
attempting to make a more systematic approach to the 
problem, distinguished three primary kinds of parking 
which were generated in any building; first, the dis-
posal of vehicles operating from the building, sec-
ondly, the disposal of vehicles bringing visitors to 
the building, and lastly, the disposal of vehicles used 
for journeys to work by people employed in the build-
ing. To solve the problem, he suggested a set of 
rules to determine the solution to two problems: first, 
what forms of parking, if any, should be subsidized out 
of public funds, and to what extent; secondly, one 
could secure that no serious inequity would arise 
between, on the one hand, developers of new buildings
who were obliged to provide parking space, and, on the other hand, those which escaped this liability either because their sites were too small or awkwardly shaped or because they owned existing buildings where there was no possibility of providing parking space.

As the car parking problem was made up of a variety of individual problems, C.H. Glover, BA(AM), suggested a range of solutions that spanned the possibilities from complete banning of the motor vehicle to absolute provision for it. In particular, he recommended measures for banning or discouraging the vehicle from entering the town centre on the one hand, and on the other, for introducing parking regulations and providing off-street space for the vehicle. These solutions would of course be swamped by reality by the late 1950s when the parking situation was out of control in many cities. By the 1960s the State was being pressed to proceed towards a strategic car parking policy in 1960s. These negative developments, however, lie outside the scope of this thesis. In the 1940s car ownership projections were still based on the experience of the 1930s, as depressed by post-war restrictions on car production. In this perspective, the debate on parking in the 1940s was not unrealistic.

Another important question relating to town centre problems was that of land use. It is to be noted that the debate among the town planners had been mainly focused on the following tasks: the facing of the problems created by the retail trade shops, and of those due to the increase of office demand. Although these did not have an immediate relationship with the wartime destruction, but with the dynamics of post-war economic growth, the above dual question was decided at an interdepartmental level in that it had to be faced as an urgent problem for the revival of the blitzed cores.
of the cities in the form of "commercial building". From this viewpoint, this aspect has to be seen as central to this study.

In particular, relating to the problem of the retail trade shops, new ideas began to be suggested for the design of the "shopping centre". These ideas were based on the principle of the comprehensive planning of the whole area. Very influential here was the pedestrian shopping centre, known as the Lijnbaan, at Rotterdam, which was frequently used to persuade local councils and shopkeepers to adopt an arrangement of shops which involved the segregation of pedestrian and vehicular traffic. This pattern had as an additional feature a unity of design, which, according to its advocates, had been achieved through coordination and co-operation between the architects and interior decorators as well as the municipal authorities. In these new centres most shop buildings were limited to one or two, or, at the most, three floors in height. Meanwhile, the basic shapes of the open spaces were two, the square or court, and the promenade. The latter type was lined with shops, possibly leading to a car park, and was often popular with shoppers, who appreciated the greater feeling of bustle and movement in the more enclosed, intimate space, and with traders, who liked the public to pass close to their window.

To sum up, the segregation of pedestrians from traffic became a basic aim in the civic design of the above schemes. The pioneer schemes of the Lijnbaan and the redevelopment at Coventry were partial segregation schemes or precincts in the shopping and commercial centres. However, the town centre of the New Town of Stevenage, although it was not a war-damaged case, is considered as the characteristic attempt at 100 per cent segregation of pedestrians from traffic.
Finally, according to J. Seymour Harris, FRIBA AMICE(M), the fundamental principles to be taken into account in the design procedure of a shopping centre were accepted in 1960 as follows:

- Elimination of all vehicular traffic from all pedestrian zones.
- Continuity of shopping frontages.
- Protection of the customer from inclement weather.
- Provision of adequate car parking facilities.
- Segregation of service vehicles.
- Use of levels.
- Use of upper floors.
- Maximum freedom for shop fitters compatible with good design.
- Incorporation of amenities for the general public.

The problem of office location in town centres became a burning question after 1954. It is this phenomenon which was investigated by Oliver Marriott in the book *The Property Boom*. Before 1954 the statutory planning framework, which had been established by the 1944 and 1947 Acts, did not give the opportunity to the private developer to tackle redevelopment on a large scale. The state of office building in England and Wales as at 1962 was that in the 94 planning authority areas about 110 million sq.ft. of office space had been approved in post-war years, and that in the remaining authorities an estimated further 10 million sq.ft. had been approved.

Much of this building had taken place after 1954, when the post-war restrictions on office building were removed. Then, in 1963 the Government put forward a policy to make planning control over new office building more effective and to discourage businesses from setting up or expanding in central London in particu-
lar. Actually, the growing seriousness of London's congestion was generally acknowledged; according to Joan V. Aucott, between 1948 and 1958 the LCC approved plans for the creation of 44.4 million sq. ft. of office space in new buildings, replacements, extensions and changes of use in the central area. The peak year was 1954-55 when building restrictions were eased. Since then, the annual rate of approvals had fallen from 6.7 million sq. ft. to about 2.7 million sq. ft. This situation created the need for many firms to move out of central London mainly for two reasons: on the one hand, the office accommodation which was offered in central areas were reduced due to the expansion of the firms, while the central area remained unchanged in size; on the other, they were unwilling to pay central area costs and special inducement rates for routine workers whose space needs, with their office machines, was comparatively high.

The above aspects of the redevelopment of central areas in conjunction with the accumulated problems in them forced the Government to introduce certain measures aiming to establish a framework of technical and legislative rules. These measures had, to a degree, an innovating and pioneering character, which needs a special analysis, and for this reason they will be the object of the following Chapter.
VIII. INNOVATIONS IN PLANNING TECHNIQUE

In step with to the establishment of the statutory and procedural framework provided by the Acts concerning the redevelopment of central urban areas, what is known as the third dimension in planning started to be examined. As early as 1942, Thomas Sharp - who first became widely known as the advocate of compact planning and of a real urban character in town building, in opposition to the low-density garden-city type of planning - facing the question of civic design with special reference to the redevelopment of central areas, stated that:

"However successful a town may be in its functional organisation and its horizontal planning, it will still be very far from being a good town unless its vertical form too has order and organisation".  

Sharp believed that it was easier to "endow" a town with fine spaces and fine ground patterns than with fine buildings. He based this idea on the fact that questions of aesthetics entered into actual building more than into ground planning and, moreover, on the fact that architects, builders and building owners had for one reason or another been unwilling to accept the same degree of discipline in the third dimension of building as had gradually been imposed on them in the two dimensions of site planning. But, what were the main theoretical views of Thomas Sharp on architectural civic design in central urban areas?

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Sharp accepted the axiom that the "Street" and the "Place" were the urban units of design. In other words, architectural order required that buildings which were to be seen in association should be designed with due regard to each other, so that they might together make a coherent whole. The buildings which were seen together were those which stood in the same Street or Place. Therefore, the units of design were the Street and the Place respectively, or those parts of them which could be seen and appreciated at one time; as a consequence, the individual buildings which comprised the Street or the Place were merely considered components of that unit. This principle gave Sharp the opportunity to proceed on a number of suggestions regarding Street and Place design. The objectives of such a design were the avoidance of monotony, the achieving of coherence in the skyline, the harmony of the materials of which the buildings were constructed, the careful study of the vistas, the right proportion between building height and Street or Place width, and lastly, variety between different parts of the same town.

In contrast to Sharp's aesthetic approach to the civic design question, other planners sought a method of controlling building volume, especially in the central areas, from a functional and sanitary point of view. This problem had its roots in the pre-war building regulation system, but the matter started to be discussed again officially with the creation of the separate Ministry of Town and Country Planning. Furthermore as Gordon Cherry and Leith Penny inform us, when the 1944 Act was passed, the Ministry's technical response took a relatively short time to evolve. Preliminary groundwork was done by a committee consisting of former planners and administrators from the Ministry of Health, chaired by G.T. Pound; but it was K.S. Dodd, the Chief
Regional Planning Officer, who raised the problem of central areas with George Pepler in March 1945. Pepler in turn contacted William Holford, Professor of Town Planning in the University of London, having moved to University College from Liverpool at the end of the war, who himself had recently discussed the matter with the Legislation Division. Afterwards, the three men, that is Holford, Pepler and Dodd, met on 10 April 1945.

In this meeting, it was agreed that the most urgent thing was not to formulate semi-legal clauses or amended model clauses, but, quoting a passage from the PRO document:

"Standards which would be intelligible to laymen and planning officers alike".

Actually, Holford suggested that the first stage of such an intervention should be a purely advisory publication, which should take the form of an illustrated leaflet, not as detailed as a manual and dealing only with the more important aspects of the subject; amongst other matters, with shops, business premises, warehouses, public and service building entertainment buildings, hotel and residential buildings, mixed uses and in part with industrial buildings. Finally, it was decided that the Ministry of Town and Country Planning should be recommended to set up a new Committee on "Standards of Redevelopment in Central Areas with particular reference to those acquired by Local Authorities". The Committee would have as its objective to discuss problems of streets, heights (volumes and forms), lighting, access and parking, open space, design, and external building appearance. In reality, it would not go into the detail required for such things as street furniture, lettering, fire prevention, etc., but it would naturally refer to reports or codes of practice which had already appeared, or were soon to
appear, on these subjects. Gordon Stephenson was suggested as director of the work of this Committee. It appears from a letter, written by K.S. Dodd to W. Holford, that the above suggestion became acceptable, so Stephenson was appointed Chairman, while J.A. Stewart and Spence-Sales were the responsible persons representing the Plans Division of the Ministry.

The outcome of the above Committee took the form of a handbook on The Redevelopment of Central Areas, issued in the summer of 1947 and circulated in January 1948. According to the handbook's foreword, it was intended primarily for Local Authority Planning Officers and Consultants and secondly for the members of Planning Committees and others interested in planning. Three important and related codes in town planning technique were formulated by it; the first concerned the "land uses" of the central areas, the second, the "control" of building bulk, and the third, the "daylighting" of buildings.

a. The control of urban land uses.

The idea that the various main uses of urban land should be segregated into functional zones within a plan has its roots in the planning ideas of the early twentieth century. It was later expressed in the Athens Charter at the fourth CIAM of 1933. Subsequently this principle was adopted by many town planners and officials, and the effects are evident in the planning schemes of many towns in continental Europe. In Britain, influences of this principle could be recognised in the advisory handbook published by the Ministry of Town and Country Planning under the title The Redevelopment of Central Areas, which has already been mentioned.
The handbook recommended that any plan for the redevelopment of a central area should be composed of some defined classes of buildings and, also, should be divided into a number of use zones. As a consequence, the building uses proposed for any central area of a large town should contain: shops, offices, wholesale warehouses, public buildings and places of assembly, as well as possibly some light industrial buildings; at the same time, dwelling houses were to be excluded from these areas, whilst other residential buildings, as for example hotels, were considered as unsuitable for them\textsuperscript{21}. According to the handbook’s suggestions, the following four use zones were suitable for the areas, selected from a total number of eight which were considered to cover all the main land uses contained in a town area\textsuperscript{22}. These were shopping, offices, wholesale, and lastly, educational, recreational and public buildings.

Two further recommendations of the handbook are also significant in this context. The first referred to the planned layout of shopping zones, which together with siting of car parks and routing of public service vehicles, was expected to encourage the redevelopment of the central areas\textsuperscript{23}. The second referred to the separation of offices from shopping. In this regard, it was recommended that, since the siting and layout conditions most suitable for shops differed from those most suitable for offices, the bulk of accommodation needed for each of these two uses should be provided in separate zones\textsuperscript{24}. This separation took account also of the difficulty, which had been widely experienced in larger towns before the Second World War, of letting office accommodation on the top floors of buildings over shops and, in addition, of the tendency which existed for business firms to seek office accommodation in office buildings specially designed as such, or,
alternatively, to invade central residential areas.

To sum up, it is obvious that central urban area planning was dominated by the concept of "zoning", and that this was intended to override "free market" or laissez-faire processes, according to which the distribution of space between the various functions in a central area was best determined by the business firms located in the same area. Of course, this choice could be seen as associated with the socialistic ideology, which was the dominant one in the early post-war years in the planning circles of the Labour government.

b. The control of building bulk.

The most significant innovation introduced by the handbook on *The Redevelopment of Central Areas* could be considered to be that referring to the floor space control applied to non-residential building uses other than schools and residential colleges, public buildings and places of assembly. It has to be noted that under pre-war planning schemes there were already for all buildings, including residential, three controls referring to site cover, maximum height and external appearance. At the same time, dwelling houses and flats were subject to density control as well. The permitted site cover to be occupied by the three main classes of buildings might vary according to whether the zone was at the centre or outskirts of the town and according to the proposed height of the building (Model Clause no 42 in June 1939 edition). Regarding the limitation of heights of buildings, no class of building was permitted to exceed a certain maximum height, which might vary according to class of building or location in the town, or a height limited by an angle of elevation from the centre of the street (Model Clause no 44).
Finally, the external appearance was used to control building bulk only in special places of architectural importance. The disadvantages of the above system of control were considered to be, first, that no simple estimation was possible of the amount of building accommodation permitted in a particular zone or zones, and secondly that the restriction imposed on the form of development was unnecessarily rigid, while the objective of limiting volume and ensuring good daylight conditions could be achieved by a more flexible control without imposing a particular building envelope or maximum height on the plot. At the same time, pre-war control was designed for the "negative" planning of all the area covered by a Resolution or Scheme; the post-war system introduced controls had been designed primarily for defined areas of comprehensive development, which included redevelopment, and would need to be adapted for control of isolated development in an area not being comprehensively developed and for which detailed proposals had not been prepared. What then were the main characteristics of the new means of control of building bulk?

The idea of the floor space index (FSI) was introduced to control the density of building distribution particularly in the central areas. This was a ratio between the total area of the floors contained within a building or buildings and the area of plot or other land area on which it stood, including half the width of adjoining public streets. The area of floors was the sum of the roofed areas at each floor level, including wall thickness, corridors, staircases and basements. According to the Handbook

"the Floor Space Index is considered to offer the simplest means of determining, comparing and controlling the building accommodation contained or to be provided within land areas of any size."
By introducing the FSI into planning practice it was considered that the following aims could be achieved:

(i) The provision of a street system adequate for the traffic that might be expected within each part of a central area.

(ii) The regrouping of buildings within reasonably large and regularly shaped street blocks.

(iii) The provision of good conditions for each building, including a high standard of daylighting, ventilation, access for goods vehicles, etc.

(iv) A reasonable compactness of building development within each street block - that is, the area which is bounded on all sides by streets having carriageways but is not subdivided by any such street - zone and the central area as a whole.

In addition to the above improvements in the technique of planning, the FSI was considered as an immediate positive measure in the case of the preparation of redevelopment plans for the central areas, because the chosen FSI was to be based on the existing building densities of 1939 and the main aim was to reduce the great differences in density of development that existed before the war between the various parts of central areas. It is to be noted that at the time of the Handbook's issue, the Ministry of Town and Country Planning had not yet been able to make a full examination of the FSI of existing central areas, but the available information indicated that in provincial towns of about 250,000 population the FSI of individual street blocks ranged from about 4.5 down to 0.5, and that the average FSI for all street blocks did not much exceed 1.5. Nevertheless, it was recommended that if differences were thought necessary between the FSI of zones, it would probably prove desirable for the lowest index to apply to the shopping zone, the next lowest to the office zone and the highest to the wholesale ware-
houses and light industrial zones. The range of variation might be of the following order in a town where the overall FSI had been fixed at 1.5: in shopping zones: 1.5, in office zones: 2.0, in wholesale warehouses zones: 2.0-2.5, while in educational, recreational and public buildings zones it was suggested that as in some towns the relevant zones might contain a relatively greater amount of open space or other unbuilt-on land than other zones, for this reason the FSI was not considered as the suitable instrument for controlling the detailed distribution of building accommodation in this zone\textsuperscript{38}. It is apparent from the above regulations that through the defining of FSI per use zone and per town, the Ministry was trying to reduce speculation in the urban land of the central areas and, at the same time, to formulate a desirable built environment in those districts.

Furthermore, it was suggested subsequent to the publication of the Handbook that, while the FSI was a suitable instrument for broad control of the floor space to be provided for each building block, another ratio should be invented which would be more suitable for allocating the total floor space of the block between different plots\textsuperscript{37}. This was needed because, in cases where a block was redeveloped as a whole, that is not divided into plots, the FSI was adequate as it gave the aggregate floor space allowed and complete freedom in its distribution within the block. However, in cases where only part of a block could be redeveloped, or where the block was subdivided into plots for different developers, there were considerations which the block FSI might not satisfy\textsuperscript{38}.

The above situation led to the following outcomes: the principle, that the width of streets surrounding a block should be included in the amount of floor space
permitted, was already acknowledged in the block FSI irrespective of the method of redevelopment; if, however, the block FSI was applied to plots individually two possibilities should be taken into account: first, the advantage in floor space lay with plots having maximum frontage, irrespective of depth (figure 1), and secondly, building volume would not be evenly distributed, but would be "weighted" at each external corner and the central part of a block would be "light" or short of floor space in relation to plot area.

Figure 1
Calculation of Floor Space Index in plots

Assuming FSI = 1.0

Plot A = 120' by (60'+30') = 10,800 sq. ft. of floor space

Plot B = 60' by (120'+30') = 9,000 sq. ft. of floor space

Plots A & B are equal in area, but Plot A has 20% more floor space than Plot B

Source: "The Application of Floor Space Indices, August 1948". PRO file HLG 71/1300.

As a consequence, it started to be considered that there was no reason why the extent of frontage should be the controlling factor, as, for example, the relation between frontage and traffic generation varied considerably within a zone. Corner plots enjoyed certain advantages in location over intermediate plots and it was advisable not to increase this advantage by automatically permitting additional floor space, although the FSI for corner and intermediate plots should be made as attractive to developers as corner plots.
As a result of the above considerations, it was suggested in 1948 that as long as reasonable access was assured to all plots within any block, the total floor space should be distributed according to the plot size and not the site area, that is plots and half adjoining streets. The total floor space within a block as a whole would, of course, have been fixed by the FSI. This plot distribution of floor space within the block FSI was called the plot ratio method\(^4\). As plot ratio was defined the ratio between total area of floors and the area of plot without including half the width of adjoining public streets\(^2\), according to the following formula:

\[
\text{plot ratio} = \frac{\text{FSI} \times \text{Site Area}}{\text{Plot Area}}
\]

There were planning arguments for and against this use of plot ratio. However, from the developer's point of view the plot ratio was more acceptable as an instrument of control in that it was based clearly on the actual area of plot without reference to areas of adjoining streets or open spaces\(^3\). Furthermore, this method encouraged developers to build in areas of comprehensive Redevelopment rather than to be involved in small plots building.

c. The control of building daylighting.

The need to control building daylighting derived from the fact that the amount of daylight available in a town centre was not naturally limited, but was reduced by local atmospheric pollution, and by the many building obstructions. As a consequence, the total amount available within buildings was often rather less than the ideal amount required for working purposes. The first official indication of a method to be implemented
in developing building sites in such a way that the illumination would be secured appeared in the handbook, *The Redevelopment of Central Areas*.

Before the above publication, the owner of a site might erect a building of considerable height, if the covenants of the deed of grant and the building bye-laws permitted, either contiguous or in close proximity to the boundary of a neighbour's vacant land and with windows overlooking it. This was considered as a risky procedure, as the neighbour might erect a similar structure on his own land, the same distance from the boundary, and so restrict the amount of daylight that would otherwise have reached the building previously erected on the adjoining site. So long as the original building had not enjoyed the daylight reaching its windows for over 19 years, no legal action could be taken to restrain the neighbour successfully and no compensation would be granted to the original building owner in respect of loss of light. The penalty of erecting a building close to an existing one, in this way, was the creation of deficiency in the access of daylight to both structures. It therefore frequently happened that the neighbour took care to keep the new erection on his land further from the boundary than the original building so as to avoid undue loss of daylight. In such a case, the owner who built first secured as advantage in the use that could be made of his site. This was obviously an unfair use of land.

The above situation was tackled by the advisory handbook in its Appendix 3 under the title "The Daylighting of Buildings". It provided a standard by which the measuring of daylight in office buildings could be controlled. The office buildings were taken as typical of those in central areas within which good daylighting was of great importance for their function. Especially,
the daylight indoors was measured as a percentage of the total light available outdoors under an unobstructed sky and the percentage of daylight was called the *daylight factor* (DF). As a consequence, a DF of 1 per cent meant that at the point of measurement the illumination was 1 per cent of that which could have been obtained if from that point the whole hemisphere of the sky could have been seen. The standard recommended for offices was a DF per 1 per cent at a distance of 12 feet from the external wall and at a height of 2 feet 9 inches above the floor. The objective of this idea was to develop a system of daylighting control which would provide this standard within all buildings that contained a normal number of windows of reasonable dimensions, and it was recommended that this standard should be applied in all zones of a central urban area. This method of controlling the daylighting or overshadowing of buildings was likely to promote the more efficient and convenient layout of buildings and, from this point of view, the method could be applied more easily to land acquired by Planning Authorities with a view to redevelopment.

In the ensuing criticism of this method of daylight buildings control the contributions of John Swarbrick and of A. Murray Graham were of particular interest.

John Swarbrick published his views in *The Builder* on 21 October 1949 under the title "Planning for Daylight: A new method of developing building sites". Additionally, he tried through a memorandum submitted to the Minister, Lewis Silkin, to influence Government policy. Swarbrick recommended that a uniform angle should be set from the centre of a street and land boundaries and that anyone who wished to build beyond this line should advise the Minister as to what should be allowed. This proposal was considered as crude by the officials.
of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning.

A. Murray Graham argued in 1955 that experience had shown that the introduced method of daylight control had only limited application in everyday planning problems and could rarely be applied successfully to the smaller, piecemeal redevelopment projects that formed an increasingly large proportion of central urban planning applications by that year. Furthermore, he argued that because daylight control was based on one standard size of window and one standard of illumination and penetration for a given class of building use, it could not operate successfully in mixed areas containing buildings of varying age and form, and varying internal arrangements. As a response to the above disadvantages, Graham tried to devise a method of measurement that would obviate conversion of linear dimensions into angles and, at the same time, would retain the versatility of the diagram introduced by the official handbook. This device eliminated measurement and conversion, plotting, drawing and planimeter work and substituted direct reading and summation of unit sky-factor values. The above A. Murray Graham's proposals were submitted to the Chief Architect and Planning Officer, the Department of Health for Scotland; the Department was actively interested in Daylight Control but had not formally adopted the methods described above, when they had been published in the Journal of the Town Planning Institute, that is in January 1955.
Part 2

REPLANNING LONDON
IX. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR REPLANNING LONDON

As has become clear in the previous Chapters, the need to replan London was already acute by the first years of the twentieth century. However, together with the other problems which obstructed any attempt at comprehensive planning, the fact that there were over a hundred planning authorities by 1919 in the Greater London Region made it more difficult. As a consequence of this situation, central government policy was focused very early on the above question.

Soon after the Housing and Town Planning Act of 1919 made joint planning possible, groups of authorities in the Home Counties formed Joint Planning Committees and prepared advisory plans and reports. Later, Neville Chamberlain, as Minister of Health from 1924 to 1929 - a post which then comprised not only health but also the functions later discharged by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government - called all the authorities in conference and induced them to form an Advisory Joint Town Planning Committee for Greater London, roughly the area within a radius of 25 miles from Charing Cross. The Committee appointed Sir Raymond Unwin, the famous architect who had recently retired from the Ministry of Health, as their technical adviser and in the course of a few years produced two reports in rather general terms.

As Gordon Cherry informs us, Unwin worked energetically...
and the First Report of the Greater London Committee was issued in 1929. This dealt particularly with the question of open spaces and a green belt, and with ribbon development on main roads. He estimated that at least 62 square miles of additional playing fields and 142 square miles of additional other or general open space were required. Two Interim Reports followed, one on open spaces in which Unwin pointed out the rate at which the existing spaces were being used up, and one on decentralisation. He recommended self-contained satellite communities at distances of up to 12 miles, and still more complete industrial garden cities located between 12 - 25 miles from Charing Cross. However, the 1931-2 government economics led to the expenses of the Committee being curtailed. The next Report of the Committee, under the title Second Report of the Greater London Regional Plan Committee, was published in 1933. In it, a narrow green girdle around London was suggested, as well as a proposal for seventy-one new or improved roads. But again, as Cherry points out, the limitations on the financial resources had effectively terminated the enterprise.

In the hope of getting something more definite, the Minister of Health induced the authorities to reconstitute the Joint Committee on more positive lines and Major Hardy Syms was appointed Chief Technical Officer. It was set up under section 3 of the 1932 Act, and in 1935 the London County Council (LCC) decided to contribute £2 million during the next three years to the formation of a green belt around Greater London. According to George Pepler, who was Chief Technical Officer responsible for Town and Country Planning at the Ministry and had great influence in planning matters amongst the local authorities, it happened because the Committee was more positive and the LCC found it a nuisance. Although the Green Belt idea had
been recommended by the original Committee, the LCC wished the idea to be considered an original one of their own and dealt with the Home Counties severally and not through the Joint Committee. This LCC opposition brought the operations of the Joint Committee to a standstill and to save the situation the Minister of Health called the authorities together again and induced them in 1937 to substitute for the Joint Committee a Standing Conference on London Regional Planning, a body to be available to consider any planning problems that might be referred to it. E.C. Culpin, ex-Chairman of LCC, was elected Chairman of the Conference, but, as Pepler relates, the LCC had shown no enthusiasm for this development.

The representation on the Standing Conference was two from each of the Counties of Essex, Hertfordshire, Middlesex, Surrey and Kent, three from the LCC, one from the City, one from the County of Buckinghamshire, one from each of the County Boroughs, two representing all the non-County Boroughs, two representing all the Urban District Councils, and two representing all the Rural District Councils. The County Councils, the County Boroughs and the City agreed to contribute between them the total sum of £360 per annum to cover expenses.

One good thing the Conference did was to appoint a Technical Committee comprising the Planning Officers or Engineers of the Counties, County Boroughs and City, plus selected technical representatives of the Boroughs, Urban and Rural Districts, each en bloc. The Committee prepared a broad surface utilisation map for the whole region and obtained a very interesting report from the London Passenger Transport Board. However, the war brought work to a standstill. The Conference last met on 28 April 1939.

Following the severe bomb damage suffered by the City
and County of London, early in March 1941 Lord Reith, the Minister of Works and Buildings, with the concurrence of the Minister of Health, asked the LCC and City Corporation to begin provisional plans for the redevelopment of their bombed areas. Lord Portal, the successor of Lord Reith, trying to express the need for rebuilding of the central urban districts, in a letter to E.C. Culpin on 15 April 1942, argued that:

"Lord Reith took the view, with which I agree, that in planning the reconstruction of the London region a beginning should be made within the central areas, particularly in view of the fact that enemy bombing had been largely concentrated on the centre".\(^{15}\)

In fact, Reith had asked the two authorities to cooperate and had intimated that when they could give a sufficient indication of their schemes, arrangements might be made for the extension of planning over the outer areas. As a response, the LCC instructed J.H. Forshaw, their Architect and Planning Officer, to prepare provisional plans, and appointed Professor Patrick Abercrombie as Consultant. Abercrombie made clear to the LCC at the beginning that he would have to take within his purview a wider area than the County. Meanwhile, the City instructed their Surveyor, F.J. Forty, to prepare their plan\(^{16}\).

It emerges from a PRO document written by George Pepler that the Clerks to the Home Counties were alarmed in October 1941, just after they had heard that the City and LCC plans were well advanced and after the statement of Lewis Silkin, who was Chairman of the LCC Planning Committee at that time, that planning could not stop at the County boundary\(^{17}\). The Counties feared that they might have a plan sprung on them which affected their interests but had been prepared without any con-
sultation with them. C.W. Radcliffe, who was Clerk to the Middlesex County Council, together with the other County Clerks, wrote on 29 October 1941 to Lord Reith saying that he felt most strongly that the Home Counties and County Boroughs should take a constructive part in the planning of their areas and suggesting that they should form a Committee to confer with Professor Abercrombie and the City Corporation in the preparation of redevelopment plans affecting areas outside London. Sir Geoffrey Whiskard, who at the time of his appointment in 1941 as Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Works had just completed his five-year term of office as British High Commissioner in Australia, then wrote to Sir John Maude, Secretary in the Ministry of Health, sending him a copy of Radcliffe's letter and asking him to agree that Lord Reith should call an informal meeting of representatives of the Home Counties and County Boroughs to discuss the matter. Sir John Maude replied to say that he agreed but suggested that it would be preferable, if practicable, to postpone the meeting until after the formal announcement that the planning powers of the Ministry of Health were to be transferred to Lord Reith. The urgency of the matter was that the LCC plans were nearing completion and the Home Counties were afraid of being faced with a fait accompli or of indiscreet utterances from members of the LCC.

The informal conference was held on 21 January 1942. As at that date no announcement had been made about transfer of powers, Lord Reith steered the conference so that the request to appoint Professor Abercrombie might come from the representatives. He also explained that at the outset he had directed his attention to coordinated action in the City and the London County Council areas, these being central areas and those of major damage. On the other hand, representatives
referred to the unwieldy size of the Standing Conference and the more simple machinery of their proposed Committee, which would be democratic in character; they agreed that the planning should be done by a "master-mind", such as Professor Abercrombie.

Finally, the conference expressed the following opinions:

(a) Lord Reith should instruct Professor Abercrombie to prepare an outline plan, covering such an area of London and the Home Counties as Professor Abercrombie thought appropriate;
(b) that provisions should be made for Professor Abercrombie to work in collaboration with the Technical Committee of the Standing Conference on London Regional Planning22.

Informal negotiations then took place with LCC officials who needed some persuading that it was necessary to make use of the Standing Conference23. Furthermore, Lord Reith invited representatives of the City and the LCC to meet him informally and obtained Treasury approval for the Ministry to spend up to £5000 on Professor Abercrombie's fee and technical expenses24.

Summing up the above developments, it could be concluded that at this initial stage of the war, the central government had decided to play a narrow role in the replanning of London, as the basic responsibility on this matter had been transferred gradually to the LCC for the most part. Actually, the planning position of London at that time was as follows: the City and the LCC had, at the request of Lord Reith, been involved in the procedure of producing provisional outline plans, while regarding Greater London, the boundary of the area had been agreed and Professor Abercrombie was on the way to preparing an outline provisional plan that
was to link up appropriately with the LCC plan. At this point, the following question emerges: what were the main objectives of such a replanning of London?

The basic problems faced by the British metropolis at that time could be summarised by the following four crucial points:

(a) the need to check the drift of industrial population to London;
(b) to halt its further physical growth;
(c) to re-plan the urban areas to give better environments;
(d) to decentralise employment and people.

It becomes obvious from the above that the decentralisation of industry from London would become the main question to which the planners were called to respond. Furthermore, the problem of industry had to be considered from the point of view of type on the one hand and quantity on the other. But, how were these dimensions of the problem specified and in which way were they faced by the Central Government officials?

Referring to the kind of industry to be decentralised, it had been argued that some industries could best be carried on very near the places where consumers lived. Examples were the distributive trades, domestic labour, bakeries, builders, maintenance and supply services. The employment provided in such industries was considered to be largely a function of the size of the population and of the prevailing standard of living. On the other hand, there were industries whose location bore no relation to the distribution of population. In London such industries fell mainly under the following headings:

(i) Those highly concentrated industries whose efficiency depended on a central market or on close personal contact between their component firms.
(ii) Industries depending on *fashion* or where products and services were sold by individual contact through relatively few central channels.

(iii) Industries consisting of a collection of highly *specialised* firms linked to each other through the necessity for very frequent trade relations.

(iv) Heavy industries using much power and where the cost of plant and machinery formed an important part of the cost of the final product.

In addition, there were industries whose location, though more flexible than those mentioned above, was still severely restricted:

(v) Industries tied to special facilities such as water transport.

(vi) Industries employing large numbers of highly skilled workmen.

Moreover:

(vii) It might be possible to remove factories belonging to a highly concentrated industry from one industrial centre to another at which skilled labour and ancillary trades were also available.

(viii) Certain areas were becoming recognised as locations for noxious trades and it might not be easy to move them anywhere else.

(ix) It would be found difficult to move industries with a traditionally high labour turnover from their recognised labour pools.

Referring to the amount of industry to be decentralised, it was dependent upon the population which it was necessary to move far from London, and especially from its central areas. For this reason, an attempt was made to suggest the methods by which the relationship between industry and population could be established more precisely, letting the density of population determine the density of industry, rather than vice
versa. Therefore, it was considered necessary first to determine how many people were to be decanted to reduce the average population density in each sub-region of London to the target density. For this purpose, it was seen as essential to base actions on recent figures and not to make estimates on pre-war information. Adjustments in the light of current changes would necessarily be much smaller and more certain than if 1938 conditions were allowed to determine the plan.

Having determined the areas whose density was to be reduced, the first step should be to ensure that factories decentralised or defunct were not immediately replaced by new factories or immigrants; to this end it would help if authoritative announcements were made, as soon as areas were determined, that it was the Government's intention to decentralise population and industry from them. It was considered that such announcements would have a considerable psychological effect and would discourage employers intending to set up business there. The next step was considered to be the determination of what proportion the employed population bore to the resident population in the selected overcrowded areas. It was expected that this proportion would differ from district to district and that its composition by age, sex and occupation would also vary; in short, that certain districts had become "unbalanced" in the employment they provided.

Finally, having obtained the population to be decanted it would next be necessary to translate it into individual places of employment; a large proportion of these would belong to the residentiary industries described above. Of course, it would extremely difficult to achieve a fine adjustment between places of work and places of residence of the populations to be
decentralised, but some adjustments could be made through extension or curtailment of the area over which employed persons travelled to their work and the quota of firms necessary to provide employment for the decanted population could probably be found in all cases within the sub-regional areas whose population was to be dispersed.

In order to facilitate the above procedure, it was considered that a start could be made with industrial decentralisation by interviewing those firms among the Board of Trade's applicants for removal, which were destroyed or damaged during the war and which sought new premises. The majority of them had asked for sites in central London, but something like one-third was considered possibly suitable for decentralisation beyond the planned green belt of London (table 5). For the most part these firms had premises in inner London before the war and their removal would, therefore, contribute to decongestion. It was, of course, recognised that these firms would provide only a small proportion of the amount of decentralisation required and resort would have to be made the method outlined above.

The above proposals could easily be considered as a product of the influence of the recommendations contained in the Barlow Report. But, at this initial stage of the war the position regarding the planning of London was not very satisfactory, as S.L.G. Beaufoy of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning pointed out in early 1943. However, beside the lack of officially executed plans for London at that time, other bodies
Table 5
Sample list of firms whose premises had been destroyed or damaged by enemy action and who were prepared to move to an outlying district.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>code (1)</th>
<th>Type of Industry (2)</th>
<th>Labour (3)</th>
<th>Locality (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturers of Motor Cars</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>50 Miles Radius NW London</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Food Containers</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20/50 Miles Radius South of Thames</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gear Manufacture</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>30 Miles Radius South of Thames</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastic Component Manufacturers</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Dunstable-Luton-Harpenden-Welwyn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturers Building Materials</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30 Miles Radius of London</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Manufacturers</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tool Manufacturers</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>40 &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remilling Soap Chips to Soap Flakes</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>20/30 &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing Manufacturers</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>50 &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Machinery Manufacturers</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>30 &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing Manufacturers</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30 &quot; &quot; N of London</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30 &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodworking</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>Home Counties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cellulose Films</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>50 Miles Radius S &quot; &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeds, Flowers</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>Southern Counties-Kent-Surrey-Sussex</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydraulic Engineers</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>30/50 Miles N of London</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacks-Bags-Hop Pockets Manufacturers</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Mid Kent or East Kent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Electric</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>Willing to go anywhere</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washing Machines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tool Manufacturers</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>30 Miles Radius to London</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builders Joinery</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Kent or Surrey - 15 Miles Radius</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological Products</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>25 Miles Radius of London</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Engineers</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>50/70 Miles Radius of &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bookbinding</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>40 Miles &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Equipment</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>Home Counties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jam Making - Fruit</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Kent essential</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preserving</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing Woodworkers</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>50 Miles Radius of London</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5296</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "Greater London Plan Policy, Cabinet paper 1946".
PRO file HLG 71/119.

had devoted time, energies and money to the task of presenting their own ideas on the replanning of London. Their value lies in the fact that they presented a variety of ideas which were known only in town planning circles and which, by obtaining publicity, refreshed the whole attempt to replan London. The examination of these plans will be the task of the next Chapter.
X. THE INDEPENDENT PLANS FOR LONDON

Three plans were produced for London by private associations and institutions during the war: the Modern Architects' Research Society Plan, the Royal Academy Plan and the London Regional Reconstruction Committee Plan. The aim of this Chapter is to analyse, in a synoptic way, the above plans. This analysis will follow a standard format in order to permit comparisons between their various proposals. This format will allow examination of the main proposals on the basic tasks of planning, as well as the planning debate which developed after their publication. It is to be noted from the beginning that although these plans were not based on adequate analytical material because of wartime conditions, they reflected a variety of aspects of planning thought, and were of great importance in town planning theory terms. The presentation of the three plans will follow according to their date of publication.

a. The Modern Architects’ Research Society Plan

The June 1942 issue of The Architectural Review published a master plan for London carried out by the Town Planning Committee of the Modern Architects' Society (MARS) Group, which was the British section of CIAM.
Preparation of the plan started in 1938 but it was ready in its final form at the outset of the war, that is in 1939. In the year of the publication of the plan of London, 1942, the secretary of the MARS Group was Ralph Tubbs, the author of the well-known Penguin book, *Living in Cities*, which provided a popular and persuasive vision of a replanned Britain after the war. Some of its prominent members were Holford, Sharp and Gibbert, the head of the Architectural Association (AA) School.

According to *The Architects' Journal* on 2 April 1942:

"Mr. Ralph Tubbs holds the fort and keeps the MARS group alive by maintaining contact between ninety members flung by the war into the most unexpected places. Amongst those withdrawn from circulation for the duration are Brett, Gunnery Instructor; Nicholson, Royal Navy; Fry, Major R.E.; Samuel, Captain, R.E.; Gropius, Harvard Professor; Moholy Nagi, Head of the Bauhaus, USA; Tatton Brown, Officer Cadet."

The influence of the MARS Group was also spreading overseas. In addition to the Australian MARS, ARGIT (The Architectural Research Group in Toronto) had been set up in Canada and an organisation called TECNE had appeared at that period in Argentina.

According to P. Johnson-Marshall, the MARS proposal for London was a bold, schematic plan, quite unrelated to the existing conditions of London, but nevertheless a fine study of great value as a demonstration of planning ideas prepared by an exceptionally able team of young and enthusiastic architects. What, then, were its main features?

Examining the plan (fig. 2, 3, 4), it becomes evident
Fig. 2. The MARS Plan for London

Fig. 3. The MARS Plan for London: One of the great City Districts

Fig. 4. The MARS Plan for London: A proposed Borough Unit as part of one of the great residential blocks.

that it was influenced by the Ciudad Lineal of Soria y Mata. Its proposals were based on an estimated population of 8,655,000 people and a calculated area for Greater London of 443,450 acres, that is an average density of 75 inhabitants per acre; 115,500 acres of the above whole area were required for residential purposes, 20,480 acres of industrial ones and 3,840 acres for administration, shopping, and other social needs. The remaining area of 303,630 acres, or 68.4 per cent of the total, was suggested to serve the leisure needs of the population. Further examination shows that the London area was divided into sixteen separate districts. Each was a veritable linear town about two miles wide and eight miles long, housing 600,000 inhabitants arranged along a traffic artery running north to south. These districts were linked together by a main traffic artery running from east to west and serving two big trading estates where the shopping and administrative functions for the whole region were concentrated as well as the vast majority of the heavy industry, while certain parts of the latter were located near the goods ring-roads, i.e. on the outside of the traffic artery.

It is apparent that the MARS Group proposals for London’s renewal were on radical lines, but, as Gordon Cherry argues, they were a futuristic fantasy. At this point, it is interesting to pursue the criticism which was developed just after the publication of the MARS Plan in the pages of The Architects’ Journal. It related to both, the functionalism of the suggested transport system and the aesthetics of the proposed urban character. Regarding the first task, the Editorial pointed out on 9 July 1942 that by providing public transport facilities for passengers travelling from east to west along one route only, as the east-west roads provided by the plan were for private cars only,
in a town the size of London "is to exaggerate the truth of the saying that the longest way round is the shortest way home". Furthermore, the plan appeared to overlook the desirability of planning to avoid peak traffic and the Editorial argued that linear development, by providing for a tremendous increase in speed, would make it possible to handle large volumes of traffic very much more efficiently than it was possible to do at present. However, it remained the fact that if everybody wanted to travel in the same direction at the same time, twice as many buses or trains were needed to carry them, as would be needed if one-half were moving from B to A while the other half were moving from A to B. However, these aspects of disadvantages of the proposed transport system for London became the basis for developing the criticism of the MARS Plan in aesthetic terms. The argument here was that although the plan was really no more than a diagram illustrating certain principles on which the design of a transport system might be based, it was called a plan for London and alarm was expressed that "in the interests of simplicity almost every feature that makes London recognizable has been wiped out".

At the same time, the most aggressive criticism of the aesthetic outcome of the MARS Plan came from Lionel Brett of the Royal Academy. He supported the view that London had character and, despite its elephantiasis, it also had a certain unity. Brett noticed that by studying the MARS Plan anyone could see that of the original London it showed only the Tower, St. Paul's Cathedral, the British Museum, London University, Whitehall and Aldwych "standing up rather forlornly in a tempestuous sea of squiggles". Brett, afraid that the MARS Plan would destroy London's aesthetics, argued that the character of London in the field of aesthetics might be
rescued and re-emphasized.

Felix Samuely, one of the authors of the description of the MARS Plan that appeared in *The Architectural Review*, responded to both the above critiques in a letter to *The Architects' Journal*¹⁴. He supported the plan, pointing out that it had never been the intention of the MARS Group's Town Planning Committee to advocate a uniform or standardized city and that the use of the grid in their plan was a theoretical pattern and not a practical one. With regard to the suggested transport system, he maintained that the east-west artery would not need to transport anything like the number of people mentioned, as the majority of the workers could be assumed to live in the district opposite their work and, thus they would travel mainly in a north-south direction. Finally, referring to the aesthetic criticism, he argued that while he agreed with the view that one "wanted to see London grow more like London"¹⁵, care might be taken to distinguish between, first, historical London and the parts that were worth keeping; second, the slum areas; and last, districts without character exemplified by many of the new suburbs. He also stated that

"The spirit of London, that distinguishes it from other capitals, is the smile and the cheerfulness of the man in the street what adversity he must overcome (and many that he now faces are unnecessary), things will better one day"¹⁶, and declared his belief that the people of London preferred to live in a town planned as a working one and not

"to suit the idiosyncrasies of two or three hundred who love one place of another so much"¹⁷.

It becomes evident from the above arguments, used by both sides, on the pros and cons of the MARS Plan, that
the basis of the discussion which followed its publication was rather ideological. It helps us to conclude that the value of the plan could be characterised as significant, not only because it prompted the development of a planning debate in theoretical terms, but mainly because it spread the left-wing ideas of the young architects and planners who, as we saw, were involved at that period in MARS Group circles.

b. The Royal Academy Plan

To the opposite extreme from the left-wing MARS Plan stands the right-wing Royal Academy (RA) Plan\textsuperscript{18}. It was executed by a Planning Committee of fifteen members under the chairmanship of Sir Edwin Lutyens. Outstanding among its members were Lord Keynes, H. Alker Tripp, Professor Aberorombie, Lord Esher and Sir Charles Bressey\textsuperscript{18}. The scheme was a result of three years' research work and was exhibited at Burlington House, London, from 15 October 1942. The committee had been formed in January 1940 by the President of the Royal Academy

"to consider and plan a scheme for the architectural redevelopment of London"

and

"to work on the basis of the proposals of the Highway Development Survey, 1937, better known as the Bressey-Lutyens Report, for dealing with the traffic requirements of London and was primarily concerned with the architectural aspects of the new routes and the adjacent sites affected by them"\textsuperscript{20}.

From the Official Report of the Planning Committee it can be seen that the general aims of the scheme were, first, to preserve the essential character of London as it was

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"developed through centuries of high ambition and achievement",
and secondly, to avoid
"a monotonous regularity which would be obviously alien to its nature"²¹.
It is apparent from this statement that the committee wanted to ignore the aspects of the just a few months before MARS Plan published.

The RA Plan, though it was the work of planners, did succeed in suggesting an architectural concept based on Beaux-Arts lines²². What then were the main points of this plan for London? Referring to urban aesthetics, the committee recommended that before any plans were put into execution, consideration might be given to laying down building lines and to the design of street junctions, roundabouts and vistas. As a consequence, according to a proposed pattern of three-dimensional planning rules, the one building might be designed in relation to the other. At the same time, "scale" and "skyline" were considered as essential means which should not be left to mere chance or the choice of individuals. It was also noted that the distant as well as the near view ought always to be taken into account, with special regard for the aspect from the river and parks²³. A similar item, which was referred to in the Official Report of the committee, was the height of buildings; it was considered that the existing Building Acts, Local Regulations and Bye-Laws were complicated and lengthy. Instead, it was suggested that in exercising control over the height of buildings, the authority should take account of the angles of lighting measured from the opposite side of the street²⁴. Regarding the provision of open spaces, it was recommended that not only squares of ordinary size, but large open spaces with play grounds for children and adults; in general, public parks and gardens, should be so arranged that
all sections of the people of London should be within ten minutes' walk of such places of rest and recreation. Finally, referring to car parks and pedestrians, the report suggested that building owners should be required to provide parking spaces within the areas of the larger business premises on the one hand and, on the other, that many streets and spaces should be closed to motor traffic and reserved for the walking public.

A further examination of the RA Plan (fig. 5) makes clear that the dominant feature of the scheme is a ring road round the central area of London, which follows a route passing Tower Bridge, Gardiner's Corner, Great Eastern Street City, Pentonville, Euston and Marylebone Roads, Marble Arch, Hyde Park Corner, Victoria and eastward to Tower Bridge Road. The principal idea of the ring road is to connect the radial trunk roads, to discharge and to direct traffic to and from the network of roads in the central area and to link all the main railway termini. As N.J. Aslan observed, it was very surprising to find that most of the main line termini, such as Waterloo, London Bridge, Fenchurch Street, Liverpool Street, Broad Street, King's Cross, St. Pancras and Euston stations, had been moved to meet the ring road, instead of the ring road being designed to meet the requirements of all the existing stations, whilst Paddington Station had been left out completely. Nevertheless, this domination of the ring road in the whole concept of the scheme, which was based on the Bressey-Lutyens Report as has been already pointed out, was popular at the time which will be present in all almost the future plans submitted for London. However, the comments of Astragal in The Architects' Journal argued that though the RA Report talked a lot about open space, the drawings did not show much apart from roundabouts and strips of garden lining traffic.
Fig. 5. The RA Plan for London showing Ring Road and positions of main railway stations.

An even more detailed observation of the RA Plan leaves one with the impression that many of the parts had been designed independently of each other. For example, as N.J. Aslan maintained, the Elephant and Castle scheme and the improvement of the West End and City had been planned without any inter-relationship. Especially, distinct was the Elephant and Castle area which was suggested for drastic replanning with a site for an airport south (fig. 6). Meanwhile, a generous "place" had been designed around St. Paul's Cathedral (fig. 7). Finally, the recommendations for the City took no account of its character and incidentally stirred up a strong protest at the possibility of the suggested removal of the Markets being taken seriously.

The above suggests why, though the RA Plan was well received by the popular press, it did not meet the same approval from the technical press. So, despite both the statement in the RA Planning Committee's Report that the scheme was one "for the architectural redevelopment of London", and the stance of the Committee's Secretary, Austen Hall, published in The Sunday Times, that the whole scheme was an attempt to bring the architect into planning in its earliest stages, the plan was rejected in the technical and planning press by the growing view at that time in town planning terms that planning was not "only an affair of Avenues, Places, Axes and Boulevards". As a fact of the matter, the RA Plan had been approached as architecture on a grand scale with some street improvements, and not as a town planning question. The feature of the RA Plan which was particularly pointed out was that it "completely ignores the fact that the persons principally responsible for a town plan should be town planners and that both engineers and architects..."
Fig. 6. The RA Plan for London: The development on the south side of the river with the Elephant and Castle in the centre.

Fig. 7. The RA Plan for London: The layout of the area surrounding St. Paul's Cathedral.

need to be given their terms of reference by somebody with a wider view of the problem than their own if they are to build to good purpose... But on the whole the exhibition merely proves that engineering plus architecture is not town planning.3e

Lord Esher, who was one of the RA Planning Committee’s members, undertook to answer the criticism which was raised in The Architects’ Journal. He supported the suggested scheme on the ground that it preserved the character and personality of London and argued that even the changes recommended by it, though they were not fundamental town planning in the modern sense, had excited alarm lest the character of London be lost or Haussmannized into a reflection of Paris. Moreover, he stated that if the town-planners wanted to go farther than this, it was surely essential that they should show how the application of their ideas could be effected without London becoming perhaps “better”, but decidedly something else.37 The next Editorial of the above journal was dedicated to Lord Esher’s letter and insisted that re-development along the RA Plan lines would be utterly false to the tradition of London. It argued that the character of this metropolis particularly demanded development in landscape terms.3e

Summarising the RA Plan and the debate which it caused, it could be noted that its value lay more in publicising an alternative to the MARS Plan and less in the significance of its recommendations which were characterised later as “a period piece of academic nostalgia incorporating every cliche in the Beaux Arts repertoire”.3e
c. The London Regional Reconstruction Committee Plan

With the publication of the London Regional Reconstruction Committee's (LRRC) Report in May 1943 the trilogy of privately prepared plans for London in the war years was complete. Not only was it the third in the series, but its basis was realistic and not ideological as both of the previous ones were. The plan started to be studied in 1941, when the Council of the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) appointed the LRRC after nominations made by the RIBA and the Architectural Association (AA). Arthur W. Kenyon, as chairman of the LRRC was appointed while the remaining members of the committee were Henry V. Ashley, Robert Atkinson, Henry Braddock, J. Murrey Easton, W. Curtis Green, Stanlet Hamp, Frederick R. Hiorns, Charles Holden, H.V. Lanchester, S. Rowland Pierce and Verner O. Rees. It is to be noted that A. Brian O'Rorke served on the committee from its inception until March, 1942; upon his resignation H. Braddock was elected to the Committee. The terms of reference of the LRRC were as follows:

"To consider and formulate the policy of the RIBA, and its Allied Societies, on the subject of post-war reconstruction and planning in its widest aspect.

To work in co-operation with the Regional Committees appointed jointly by the Allied Societies and in co-operation with the Reconstruction Committee of the RIBA.

To cover the London Region on the same lines as the other Regional Committees set up jointly by the Allied Societies.

To report to the Council of the RIBA through the Reconstruction Committee." 

The LRRC Report had appeared in May 1943 in the form of the Second Interim Report of the committee on the occa-
sion of the Public Exhibition of the Regional Plans held at the National Gallery from May to June of that year. But, what were the main points of the LRRC Plan?

The LRRC's study area contained the complex generally known as "Greater London". This was composed of the administrative area of the London County Council (LCC) with its twenty-eight Metropolitan Boroughs, as well as sixty-five Boroughs, Urban and Rural District Councils outside the LCC. In all, and including the City of London and the six County Councils, there were 101 local administrative authorities within the Region, which covered an area of about 850 sq. miles and contained an estimated pre-war population of 8,500,000.

However, it is to be noted that the most important point introduced by the LRRC Plan was the seven assumptions, which were considered as necessary actions before any replanning for London started to be implemented. These were the following:

(i) The constitution of an essential machinery for a national plan.
(ii) The satisfaction of human needs as a foundation for reconstruction.
(iii) A decision on the outline of the national plan.
(iv) The simplification of the existing legislative system of Acts, Bye-laws, etc., by the introduction of a National Code to cover the whole country.
(v) The reorganisation of building industry and modernisation of building techniques.
(vi) A financial system for reconstruction.
(vii) The solution of the general items concerning control of land, changes in the location of industry, building new satellite towns, the creation of a local improvement fund, and the provision of housing related to war damage and the increasing number of
families 43.

But, what were the main principles of the plan?

The LRRC scheme covered four sectors of planning: first, the communications of the London Region; second, the reconstitution of urban areas in it; third, the location of the industrial areas; and last, the preservation of its historical features and natural character 44. Within these four sectors we can notice the following elements in particular.

As far as communication inside the London Region was concerned four tasks were defined. As part of the first task, the railways and arterial roads of the London Region were to be considered as a part of the national transport system (fig. 8, 9). As a consequence, the roads forming the radial trunk routes of their plan were to be continued as far into the centre as might be consistent with the planning of the relieving trunk ring-roads 45. As part of the second task, the railways, arterial roads, canals, rivers and the larger permanent open spaces were to be used as limiting components for areas of local planning. The railways and main roads in particular were considered to be destructive of amenities and as endangering life; therefore they might be used as fundamental barriers between urban areas 46. In the third task, the access to arterial roads was to be strictly controlled and located in positions predetermined by the local planning; proper segregation of the various kinds of roads was also considered necessary 47. Finally, in the fourth task, intercommunication between railways, roads, canals, docks and aerial transport was to be properly planned 48; indeed, the Inner Airport proposed by the plan, north of the Isle of Dogs, was located in a position that would link to all parts of the London Region by an integrated system of rail and road connections 49.
ROADS WITHOUT SPEED-LIMITS AND PLANNED FOR UNINTERRUPTED THROUGH TRAFFIC

SPEED-LIMIT ROADS WITH PLANNED ROUNDABOUTS, CROSS-OVERS ETC

REGIONAL BOUNDARY

Fig. 8. The LRRC Plan: The trunk road system.

Fig. 9. The LRRC Plan: The main line railways.

The reconstruction of urban areas (fig. 10, 11) was approached through five stages. The first one referred to the definition of areas of land created by the basic network-barriers of trunk communications and open spaces, which had to be replanned in order to provide re-centralised urban areas50. In the second stage, these urban areas were to be made self-contained, "each with its own local civic sense and pride, each provided with its own amenities in the form of schools, clinics, hospitals, recreational, shopping and administrative centres, and each having planned provision for local light and domestic industries and for district-distribution"51.

The size and population of the urban areas might be definitely limited. These aspects remind us certainly of the Garden City concept of Ebenezer Howard. Howard's Garden Cities with populations of up to 32,000 were to be grouped in clusters—"social cities". Howard himself never applied this idea to London but it is implicit; eventually the sites of the large towns and cities could be redeveloped with clusters of Garden Cities52.

In the third stage, much greater public open space could be provided around the built-up areas, especially in parkways along which main roads and railways could be segregated53. In the fourth one, where land desirable for parkways and open spaces for amenity was already built over, buildings might be scheduled for progressive elimination. Finally, in the fifth stage, land scheduled as unsuitable for building development might be converted into parkways or green belts with recreational facilities, market gardens, allotments, and sites for special types of schools, hospitals, etc54.

The location of industrial areas was presented from three perspectives. The first one included industry and its supply services. According to the LRRC scheme,
Fig. 10. The LRRC Plan: The density of the Region, as existing.

Fig. 11. The LRRC Plan: The density of the Region, as proposed.

areas for heavy industry might be segregated from living areas and related to the transport system. The second perspective referred to the location of the London commodity markets. According to the scheme, London was to be served by five recentralised commodity markets; one for the central area (to the Northern Terminal Station) and four others to serve respectively the north-western, north-eastern, south-western and south-eastern sectors of the whole region. The third perspective on the location of industrial areas related to new dock facilities; the old ones were considered to be undersized and not well sited relative to the London plan as a whole. The new proposals were aimed at providing modernised dock service to the Port of London, as well as ensuring that heavy sea-going traffic should not proceed further up the Thames than the Isle of Dogs, where a number of new docks had to be constructed (fig. 12).

Finally, the preservation of all existing natural features, open spaces, rivers, streams, historic buildings and other places of intrinsic merit together with the continuity of traditional character were regarded in the LRRC Plan as an essential factor of planning and reconstruction. In this context, it was proposed that certain parts of the City and of other historical places should be improved to permit their better display, whilst some clearance around important buildings, such as St. Paul's Cathedral, Westminster Abbey and many other smaller features of the skyline and plan of the centre was considered readily capable of execution.

The publication of the LRRC Plan, paradoxically, did not generate a long enough debate to secure full discussion of its ideas. In a criticism which appeared in The Architects' Journal on 10 June, 1943, it was
Fig. 12. The LRRC Plan: The proposed inner airport.

pointed out that this scheme would no doubt be popular for it maintained that "the easy way is possible". Further, it offered the Londoner all he might wish for, that is the little house and garden or a flat if he chose, plenty of amenities, a generous amount of green space, good work places, decent transport and the historic places left undisturbed. At the same time, however, it remarked that when viewed as a whole, the main defect of this plan was the lack of a functional basis, in which all the elements of the town would be examined "under the microscope and put them together again" in a systematic way, in which the various elements would be clearly ordered and work co-operatively and harmoniously. Instead of this, the LRRC Plan "tries to obtain the symptoms of health by tackling the symptoms of the urban malady".

In conclusion, it is to be pointed out that the LRRC suggestion was merely a draft for a master plan. It was certainly not a scheme for action. Its main principle was an attempt to manage the urban problems of the capital city with a considerable contribution in its organisation through the proposed transport system. Perhaps, the location of employment was not convinced, but this plan with the "garden city" concept, which was radical, leads clearly to Abercrombie's proposals for London, which will be analysed in the following two Chapters of this work. From this point of view, the LRRC Plan was not only realistic in its suggestions, but also very influential in the question of replanning London.
XI. THE LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL'S PLAN

Entering to this Chapter, it has to be noted from the beginning that the discussed plans here, and in the following two Chapters as well, are public and official. As a consequence, they were better prepared, better produced and more political. It, also, means that the material and the evidence is better organised for the researcher.

The preparation of the first official plan for London followed from the request made by Lord Reith, the Minister of Works and Buildings, to the London County Council (LCC) in April 1941 to study the problem of physical reconstruction. According to Lord Latham, Lord Reith asked the LCC to prepare a new plan for the post-war redevelopment of London and "to plan on bold lines, assuming that new legislation would make positive planning a practical proposition".

The LCC requested J.H. Forshaw, its chief architect who was 45 years old in July 1941 when he was appointed Architect to the LCC and Superintending Architect of Metropolitan Buildings in succession to Frederick R. Hiorne, to prepare such a plan. It, also, called in Professor Patrick Abercrombie to act as consultant. In addition to these two, a team of 47 persons, most of whom were town planners, worked investigating and collating existing material and making new studies in col-
laboration with other LCC departments, the various local authorities including the London boroughs, governments departments, the railway companies, the port authority, outside experts and public bodies.

The result of this intensive work, known as the County of London Plan, was described at the time as the most comprehensive and carefully considered report of its kind that had ever appeared in Great Britain. It was completed in July 1943, and after being accepted in principle by the LCC, formed the planning basis for the County. Before its approval by the LCC it had been sent to the Minister of Town and Country Planning, the Minister of Transport, the Corporation of the City of London, the Metropolitan Boroughs and other bodies. It is to be noted that the total number of the interested authorities was more than eighty. It is clear that with this submission the LCC wanted to have official approval before proceeding in the formulation of its detailed policy. In any case, the Metropolitan Borough Councils had a statutory right to be consulted on plans made by the LCC, under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1932. At the same time, by publishing this work the LCC had placed the "ball fairly and squarely into the court of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning". But, what were the main proposals of the LCC Plan?

The subject of the scheme was the County of London, that is an area of about 116 sq. miles with an estimated population of 4,053,620 people in 1937. The City of London was not dealt with in the plan, because its planning authority was the Corporation of the City of London and not the LCC. Ten main objectives of the scheme were stated in the report. First, the social and functional analysis of the city; second, the decentralisation of population and industry; third, the provi-
sion of adequate open spaces; fourth, the solution of the communications problem; fifth, the building of new housing accommodation; sixth, the consideration of London as a great industrial city; seventh, the facing of the existing conditions and problems of reconstruction; eighth, the designation of land use zones and building development densities in the city; ninth, the provision of public utility services (i.e. schools, hospitals, etc.); and last, the identification of areas for special development in the city (e.g. the West End, the River Front, the South Bank), as well as the protection of buildings of historic and architectural interest. But, let us examine the main features of the above items.

(1) As regards the social and functional analysis of the County of London, four functional categories of urban area were recognised. The first was the Central area, comprising the West End, as Empire and Government centre, business, shopping, amusement, university, etc., and the City, as centre of commerce, finance and shipping, with the adjoining areas of mixed general business and industry. The second was the system of the Port and the Thames, and the Lee-side heavy industrial areas. The third category consisted of the Central Residential Areas comprising the housing district, extending in the west from Regent's Park round the west side of Hyde Park to Pimlico and coming within the influence of the West End, and the working class districts, extending north of the river from Poplar to Kentish Town. The last category consisted of the suburbs. Furthermore, it was argued that the identity of the existing communities had to be reinforced by increasing their degree of segregation. Moreover, as a means of establishing the size and organisation of the component areas of these communities, the principle of the neighbourhood was adopted, with the residential area large
enough to be served by the elementary school⁰¹³.

(2) Regarding the objective of population and industry decentralisation, the authors of the LCC Plan, having accepted the general recommendations of both the Committee on Unhealthy Areas presided over by Neville Chamberlain in 1920 and the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population under the chairmanship of Montague Barlow in 1940⁰¹⁴, suggested that a large number of people, about 500,000, and a considerable amount of industry, might be removed from the then central location to be re-sited elsewhere⁰¹⁵.

(3) The LCC Plan assumed that the main standard for open space was 4 acres per 1,000 people⁰¹⁸ and that the required new open space calculation should be based on the average net density of 136 persons per acre. As a consequence, the existing open spaces in London, totally 7,888 acres, were not considered enough to cover the needs, which were estimated to reach a total of 13,316 acres⁰¹⁷. For this reason it was recommended that the deficiency of 5,428 acres should be met in part by securing 1,271 acres of effective open space, leaving the remaining 4,157 acres to be found chiefly in built-up areas or on bombed sites⁰¹⁸.

(4) London's most urgent problem at that period was possibly that of the communications of the metropolis. In response, the proposals of the LCC Plan covered all the factors of this problem; that is, the road system, the railways, the Underground, the aerodromes. The suggested road system was based on a network of ring-roads and radial roads⁰¹⁸. There were three ring-roads and ten radial roads, named respectively for the first category A, B and C, and for the second one 1, 2, 5, 8, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18 and 21 (fig. 13). The A ring-road was considered to be the main circulatory one for Central Lon-
Fig. 13. The LCC Plan for London: The road plan.

don traffic. It linked the main railway termini and utilised existing roads for long sections of the route. This route was situated on the periphery and formed the boundary of the imperial, cultural and commercial core of London. The B ring-road, perhaps the most important of the three in traffic terms, was intended to facilitate the circulation of dock traffic around Central London and between the docks, decentralised markets, goods stations, marshalling yards and industrial centres, notably those on the western approaches of London. The route of the B ring-road, it was suggested, should follow a line north of Regent's Park and on the west side, and the line of the existing West London railway between Fulham, Kensington and Chelsea, crossing the river via a new Battersea Bridge to Clapham Common. To the south, it followed the railway barrier at Ruskin Park, passing through a tunnel under the river to the Isle of Dogs, and then northwards on the west side of Poplar, between the Poplar and Stepney communities. The C ring-road was largely on the same lines as the proposed route no 19 of the Bressey-Lutyens Plan submitted in 1937, a solution which, as we saw in the previous Chapter, was adopted in the RA Plan. Finally, referring to the co-relation between ring and radial roads, the main concept proposed that the above ten arterial roads should contact the B ring-road and connect to the trunk roads of the country. This was the reason for the great importance of the B ring-road for the LCC Plan. At the same time, referring to the railway and Underground system, the electrification of most of the lines leading into London was suggested, together with the connection of the suburban lines with the Underground system. As far as the civil aerodromes were concerned, no suggestion was adopted in the plan. An explanation for this omission, mentioned in the report, was the difficulty of predicting, at that period, about the future technique of
landing, elimination and subjugation of noise, a fact which arose from the lack of relative data because of war safety reasons. However, a central aerodrome was considered in principle as very useful because it could give quick and direct access to all parts of London.

The provision of new housing accommodation was also a very urgent task, which ought to be tackled immediately after the war. Comprehensive schemes of redevelopment were proposed for extensive districts, where the planning, building and architectural standards were low. All the suggested re-housing projects were based on the concept of mixed layouts of houses and flats with the proportions of each varying according to local conditions and requirements. At the same time, the maximum residential densities of the above projects were fixed at 100, 136 or 200 persons per acre. As a result, and for a theoretical 50-acre site, it was calculated that the corresponding figures of housing type were as follows. First, for the density of 100 persons per acre, up to 55 per cent of the people could be in houses, mostly two-storey with a few three-storey, and 45 per cent in flats; secondly, for the density of 136 persons, the proportions could be 33 and 67 per cent respectively; and thirdly, for the density of 200 persons, all housing could be in flats, with between 65 and 85 per cent of these being from 7 to 10 storeys high.

As regards the problem of industry in the London area, two dimensions of it were considered as the most important: its decentralisation, and the reconstruction of the remaining industrial districts within the County of London. The decentralisation of industry, in particular, would have a threefold target. First, of freeing the congested structure of inner London by making land available for other purposes, principally housing and...
open spaces; secondly, of reducing traffic congestion by taking away heavy industrial traffic from the city centre and residential areas; and thirdly, of reducing the substantial amount of time and money spent in travelling between residence and work place. Meanwhile, reconstruction of the remaining industry was to aim: first, at grouping factories producing clothing, other types of light industry, light chemicals, and furniture; secondly, at eliminating noxious industries from the central area; and thirdly, at opening up industrial estates - specialised in printing, food, light engineering and manufacturing chemists - in some of the south London Boroughs, which possessed a big labour pool.

Another interesting question faced in the LCC Plan was the solution of the reconstruction problems in general terms. Especially, they prepared detailed schemes for three typical areas, in Shoreditch and Bethnal Green, in part of Stepney, and in Bermondsey. In particular, the suggested redevelopment in Shoreditch and Bethnal Green (East London) was referred to a site of 980 acres and its axonometric view (fig. 14), made by T.L. Marshall, showed the character of development at the 136 density and the proportions of flats and houses that it was possible to provide; it is interesting to notice in the above suggested composition the Gropius-like slabs - Zeilenbau. Moreover, for the implementation procedure of the above areas three stages of reconstruction were suggested. The first one referred to the rebuilding of bomb-cleared sites and development on land already purchased; the second stage referred to the clearance of slum areas and the building of lower density housing; finally, the third stage referred to the completion of reconstruction, including the full provision of public open spaces, erection of civic centres, etc.
Fig. 14. The LCC Plan for London: Reconstruction of an area in Shoreditch and Bethnal Green.

Regarding the land use proposals, these were restricted to a general "development and zoning plan", which showed main principles rather than details in land use terms (fig. 15). As a consequence, there was no intention in the proposed scheme to alter drastically the existing use zoning of the County. In general, the location of the main industrial, housing and central business areas had been determined by the presence of docks, roads, railways, canals, rivers, etc., or by tradition, or by the evolutionary growth of London. Meanwhile, the zoning for density of building development, as had set out in the statutory scheme of Battersea and Wandsworth, provided for seven zones of dwelling houses, ranging from four to twenty houses to the acre, and four zones for blocks of flats ranging from 150 to 300 persons per acre. The LCC Plan proposal for a common density of population per acre basis for all residential development would combine these into one range of densities, which its limits should vary between 100 and 200 persons per acre (fig. 16). These latter density zones graded outwards from the central areas towards the County marginal areas; the proposed "A" and "B" ring-roads were the approximate boundaries, with certain exceptions, of these density zones. Lastly, it must be noted here the relevant issue of the adoption of lower maximum heights of building in order to avoid overcrowding; however, in some areas, as the surroundings of squares mainly in central areas, greater intensity of land use was encouraged.

The provision of public utilities, the special proposals for the River Front and for the South Bank, and those for the protection of interesting building from a historic or architectural point of view, were three topics about which the LCC Plan had made significant recommendations. With regard to the first of them, it was considered that for future hospital re-
Fig. 15. The LCC Plan for London: Development and zoning plan.

Fig. 16. The LCC Plan for London: Diagram showing the approximate location of the three density zones of 100, 136 and 200 persons to the acre.

organisation suitable land could be found along the B
ring-road. With regard to the second topic, an
increase in the length and number of the stretches on
the River Front and the South Bank accessible to the
public as open spaces or as sites of non-industrial
buildings was proposed. After a detailed analysis of
the Thames frontage (fig. 17), it had emerged that fif-
ten Boroughs had a frontage on the river and of these,
six had no riverside amenity open space, nine had no
residential buildings fronting on it and nine, again,
had no public or business building. For the South
Bank (fig. 18) in particular, it was recommended that a
comprehensive improvement scheme be approved in order
to establish a cultural centre, which scheme should be
extended to embrace the whole hinterland as far as the
Elephant and Castle. Finally, with regard to the
third topic, it had been suggested, first, that the
area round Westminster Abbey and the Houses of Parlia-
ment should be considered as a focal point of special
interest, and secondly that the architectural control
should be graduated in degree according to the location
and importance of the streets or squares concerned.
For example, the buildings facing normal streets sug-
gested to be subject to greater control; whilst those
facing the most important thoroughfares and open
spaces, and at all points where a unified design was
considered essential, would be required to conform to
an accepted scale of design and grouping previously
prepared as a complete unit. Furthermore, where build-
ings of national importance were under consideration,
the assistance of some authoritative body or vehicle of
opinion proposed to be sought.

Ending this presentation of the main points of the LCC
Plan, it is to be noted that the authors of the Report
had argued that the best method of carrying out its
various proposals was by building them into stages of
Fig. 17. The LCC Plan for London: The banks of the Thames.

Fig. 18. The LCC Plan for London: Axonometric view of the suggested treatment of the South Bank from County Hall to Southwark Cathedral.

development covering a long-term programme of 50 years\textsuperscript{43}.

The publication of the LCC Plan prompted an intense public debate, which was expressed mainly through the opposition raised by the Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA). The first sign of dissension appeared in a lecture given on the County of London Plan by F.J. Osborn on 2nd September 1943\textsuperscript{44}. Osborn, advocating the establishment of New Towns rather than extensions of existing cities, argued that the chief things wrong with London were the great and growing difficulty of securing a family house with garden near one’s work, the congestion of street and other means of transport, and the insufficient space for recreation\textsuperscript{45}. These defects emerged because London was not managed in a correct way. However, Osborn’s major criticism was focused on the fact that the LCC Plan failed to address itself to the biggest problem of the citizens of London, which was “the restoration of good family living conditions in the County”\textsuperscript{48}. Although it accepted nominally the need for the decentralisation of population and business, it failed to acknowledge the very high volume of decentralisation of people that was required, while at the same time it was equivocal about the decentralisation of industry and business. Osborn’s basic concept was that London should be planned on the basis of a clear reduction of its industrial and business concentration. Such a policy should be achieved by the discouragement of London’s business which had been evacuated in wartime from coming back\textsuperscript{47}. A further point in Osborn’s argument was that the increase in the density of population in the western areas, as well as, in the reconstruction projects, implied the mass introduction of multi-storey flat living in London\textsuperscript{49}, which was contrary to the wishes of Londoners. As Osborn pointed out, all the surveys had shown that less than
10 per cent of families preferred flats and "it was quite hopeless to fly in the face of popular demand on an issue of such importance." The above aggressive criticism by the TCPA was continued at a meeting held at Bethnal Green on 16 October 1943. According to The Architects' Journal, it was "a campaign launched by the TCPA apparently with the object of sabotaging the LCC plan." At this meeting, F.J. Osborn criticised the LCC Plan in the morning and R.L. Reiss offered an alternative scheme in the afternoon. As the main point of this controversy had become the level of population density, it is to be noted here that while the maximum net density proposed by the LCC was 136 persons per residential acre, which worked out at about 70 per acre overall (gross density), the TCPA favoured a gross density of 12 persons per acre only. This argument by Osborn and Reiss for lower densities was, of course, more popular than the corresponding argument by Forshaw and Abercrombie, as Astragal noted at the time. In this climate, it was very difficult to urge that "a good town is a compact thing, concentration is not necessarily an evil." But, this latter view shows that the whole controversy over the LCC Plan was mainly based on the antithesis between the types of built environment which emerged from the various views of the planners. However, as the LCC Plan had as its main aim to facilitate the decentralisation of population and industry from London, it did not give the opportunity to develop any fundamental criticism of the proposals, especially by the TCPA, which was in agreement with this basic thesis. It is to be noted that the main controversy was focused on the fact that the LCC Plan was the opposite of the TCPA policy at that time. This policy favoured the establishment of satellite towns to solve the town planning problem of London, where about 1.5 million people and a
corresponding proportion of industry had to be moved from the capital.

Contrary to the criticism of the TCPA, the twenty-eight Boroughs within the County of London showed general support for the proposals of the LCC Plan, although they reacted in a different manner. Some of them, including Kensington, Hackney, Camberwell, Poplar and Woolwich, were faced by the problem in its national dimension. Others, including Marylebone, Chelsea, Westminster and Holborn, rejected the major road proposals in the plan, because they affected their localities directly. Many Boroughs showed a considerable anxiety about the housing densities proposed in the LCC Plan and the widespread introduction of flats. Most of them accepted the need for a proportion of flats, but there was considerable opposition to flats of more than three storeys and almost universal rejection of flats of more than seven storeys. Finally, most of the riverside Boroughs welcome the proposals, because they gave Londoners access to their greatest open space.

At the same time, the Port of London Authority (PLA), which it was not, of course, a Borough but, being involved in riverside matters of London as well, although it did not make any public announcement on the plan, made known its views through its chairman's, Thomas Wiles, statement in their bulletin PLA Monthly, as follows:

"the means of livelihood must take precedence over the problematical attractions of riverside gardens"

and that

"shipowners [...] are convinced that interference with the traditional use of the river frontage would be seriously detrimental to trade."

As Gordon Cherry pointed out in 1988, the major weak-
ness of the LCC Plan lays not of its own making, but in the narrow geographical confines to which it had been addressed, that is, the Administrative County of London, whereas territorially what was in fact London spread far wider than that\textsuperscript{58}. Complementary effort to the LCC Plan, which intended to remedy the problems raised from its narrow limits, was the Greater London Plan. This plan was prepared also by Patrick Abercrombie approximately one year later than the LCC Plan. It will be the subject of the following Chapter.
XII. THE GREATER LONDON PLAN

In December 1944, an exhibition was held at the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, open only for the planners and not the public in general, illustrating the proposals of Professor Abercrombie and his team for the London Region. Work on this plan had started in August 1942, when Abercrombie had been commissioned, on behalf of the Standing Conference on London Regional Planning and at the request of the Minister of Town and Country Planning, to prepare an Outline Plan for those parts of greater London which lay outside and the jurisdiction of the LCC\(^1\). Among the collaborators of Professor Abercrombie were named for research and design work, Harry Stewart, Chairman of the Technical Committee\(^2\) of the Standing Conference on London Regional Planning\(^3\), Gordon Stephenson, T.C. Coote, P.W. Macfarlane, L.F. Richards, P.F. Sheapheard and V.N. Prasad\(^4\), while the section on Road Planning greatly benefited from the help of H. Alker Tripp\(^5\). On the same day as the exhibition was inaugurated, an advance edition of the plan report was circulated to the Local Authorities and the Executive Joint Committee for their consideration. In effect, the scheme, known as Greater London Plan 1944, represented the views of Professor Abercrombie as an independent consultant\(^6\). But, what were the main features of the Greater London (GL) Plan? And, first of all, what was the area of the plan?

The GL Plan dealt with an area of 2,599 sq. miles,
which extended outwards from the LCC boundary for roughly 30 miles from the centre of London, and which in 1938 had a population of 6.25 millions. The area included the whole of the counties of Middlesex, Hertfordshire and Surrey and parts of Kent, Essex, Hertfordshire, Buckinghamshire and Berkshire. It is to be noted that the total area of Greater London envisaged in the plan, including the County of London and the City, amounted to about 2,717 sq. miles, with a population of about 10.25 millions. The area was formed roughly by a quadrangle having corners at Haslemere in the south west, Gravesend in the east, Royston in the north, and High Wycombe in the north west (fig. 19). It was partly built-up, while containing large stretches of agricultural and woodland most of which was in private hands.

Aim of the GL Plan was, in collaboration with the County of London Plan, to discourage the further growth of industry and population within the London Region and to provide for their better distribution and grouping on the one hand, and on the other, to make suggestions for communications improvements, and for the conservation and extension of the green belt around London.

The next important feature of the GL Plan concerns its structure. In general terms, the plan was based on a division of the above area into four concentric rings (fig. 20). These four rings were described as:

(i) the Inner Urban Ring;
(ii) the Suburban Ring;
(iii) the Green Belt Ring;
(iv) the Outer Country Ring.

The Inner Urban Ring represented the fully urbanised built-up areas adjoining the LCC area; the Suburban Ring represented the area beyond the Inner Urban Ring and approximately within 12 miles of Charing Cross, in
Fig. 19. The Area of London Region.

Source: "The Area - The Four Rings". PRO, file HLG 71/169.
Fig. 20. The GL Plan: The proposed four rings.

which the excessive densities of the Inner Urban Ring had not yet been reached, but in which land had been built up to a some degree by tolerable conditions; the Green Belt Ring extended for about five miles beyond the Suburban Ring, comprising much open country and including numerous established centres of population; finally, the Outer Country Ring included the remainder of the Region and contained distinct urban communities situated in land otherwise open in character and mainly agricultural.

In regard to the size of population, it is to be noted that in the period 1919-1939, while the population of the LCC and City areas decreased by 501,962, there was an increase of 2,007,048 in the area of the GL Plan (Table 6). The net increase for the Region was thus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>LCC and City (2)</th>
<th>GL Plan Area (3)</th>
<th>Total of Columns &amp; (2) &amp; (3)</th>
<th>England &amp; Wales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919-1921</td>
<td>-55,539</td>
<td>41,868</td>
<td>-13,671</td>
<td>1,086,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1931</td>
<td>-87,520</td>
<td>834,573</td>
<td>747,053</td>
<td>2,065,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-1935</td>
<td>-358,303</td>
<td>1,130,607</td>
<td>771,704</td>
<td>1,293,623</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total -501,962 2,007,048 1,505,086 4,448,000

1,505,086, a third of the total increase for England and Wales during the inter-war period. Since the natural increase was normal, the above phenomenal growth is to be accounted for by the internal migration, that is, by movements of the population within the country, excluding overseas emigration and immigration. Two main occupational groups were represented in this movement. First, skilled and unskilled industrial workers from South Wales, the North and North-West, and secondly, white-collar workers, clerks, assistants and scientific workers. It is interesting to point to the fact that the second group of the workers was increasing more rapidly than the first one.

In the context of the decentralisation of population from London, the report recommended that a total of 1,033,000 persons should be moved, 618,000 of them under the County of London Plan (see Chapter XI), and 415,000 under the GL Plan proposals. The redistribution proposed within the Region entailed three major movements. First, provision was made for the development of a few smaller sites which, though they were recognised as being unacceptable from a planning point of view by reason of their relative nearness to London, could not be avoided, if immediate accommodation was to be found for overspill, in the interest of a short-term housing policy and providing for 120,000 people from the County of London and 5,000 from Croydon. Secondly, additions were proposed to existing towns together with the establishment of eight new towns, providing for 261,000 people to move to the existing towns and 383,000 people to, according to Professor P. Abercrombie’s term, the eight new satellite towns. A third aim was to decentralise 163,750 persons outside the GL Plan boundaries, mostly between 40 and 50 miles from the centre of London. Finally, it was also suggested that 100,000 persons should be decentralised beyond London’s area of
The effect of the above decentralisation of population policy on the form of the four-ring structure of London Region was to be as follows. Within the Inner Ring Road, which was the ring adjoining, or almost adjoining, the LCC boundary, the proposed maximum net residential densities were 100 and 75 persons per acre for different parts of this zone, while it was from this ring that the greatest decentralisation from areas covered by the Report was proposed. It is to be noted here that in the County of London Plan the authors had proposed three density zones of 100, 136 and 200 persons to the acre (Fig. 16). In the Suburban Ring, which was the remainder of the continuously built-up area of London, a general net residential density of 50 persons per acre was proposed as a maximum and the only increase to be allowed was the building up of vacant frontage. In the Green Belt Ring only small increases to existing towns were to be allowed, as this was to provide primarily for the recreation of Londoners and to prevent further suburban growth. Finally, in the Outer Country Ring, the Report proposed that the new satellite towns should be located, as it was considered to be the principal reception area for the decentralised population. In other respects, however, the agricultural, and not the recreational, background was to predominate in this zone.

Referring to pre-war industrial trends, it was recognised that in the County of London developments had fallen broadly into three groups. First, the heavy industries, mostly located in big units along the Thames water-front and adjoining the canals and railway junctions, were concerned with food manufacture and processing, heavy chemicals, heavy engineering and public utility plants. Secondly, a wide variety of
small-scale light industry and workshops intermixed with occasional large factories and with congested working-class housing, located in the East-End Boroughs and spreading westwards into Islington and St. Pancras, as well as the West End Boroughs of Westminster and St. Marylebone, was concerned mainly with clothing, light engineering, metal work, furniture manufacture, light chemicals, printing and stationery. Lastly, an area of more modern industry associated with the motor and electrical trades and the preparation of foodstuffs was located in medium to large factories in the Boroughs west of London. It was noted that approximately 30 per cent of Greater London's factory growth between the wars was accounted for by the decentralisation of industry from congested sites in Inner London; the principal labour pool had remained on the east and south-east sides of London giving rise to "an excessive daily journey to work".

The above industrial situation for London changed to a significant degree after the heavy bombing. A limited number of key firms, mostly on engineering work, either moved out completely at the Government's request, or erected shadow factories in other parts of the country. Mostly these industries moved right out of the Greater London Region to sites in the west of England and the north-west. Industrial damage had been fairly severe in some of the congested London Boroughs, especially among factories in the 100-300 employee group. According to the Report, the "decentralisation of business firms is very desirable and as far as is practicable firms who have moved to the suburbs or to the provinces should be encouraged to stay there at any rate for dealing with their routine work".

Furthermore, the industrial proposals within the GL Region were twofold, negative and positive. On the one
hand, new industry was prohibited in certain areas, principally in the three inner rings (Inner Urban, Suburban and Green Belt Rings), while on the other, it was encouraged in the selected towns outside the Green Belt Ring, and in some cases outside the London Region. In particular, it was proposed that north of the Thames and within the Inner Urban and Suburban Rings no further industrialisation should take place except in the Barking-Dagenham area. Some industry from Reconstruction Areas should also be decentralised with a proportion of the population to the outer towns or new satellites, and noxious industry to more isolated areas.

Referring to the south of the Thames, the proposed industrial ban would apply to the Inner Urban and Suburban Rings, except for the Mitcham-Croydon neighbourhood, secondly to a limited extent in the Erith neighbourhood and thirdly in the Cray Valley if the adjoining land on the west was used for a quasi-satellite.

As far as communications were concerned, a number of proposals were made referring to road system, the airways, the navigable waterways and the railways. A new road system was recommended consisting of five concentric rings, ten express arterial highways and a sub-arterial road system as follows (fig. 21). The "A" ring-road was a sub-arterial for all-purpose traffic in the central area. The "B" ring-road was an arterial for fast traffic around the central. The "C" one was a sub-arterial for all-purpose traffic too ("North and South Circular"). The "D" was an express arterial at a radius of 12 miles from the centre along the Green Belt Ring, which was needed for express one-purpose traffic on the one hand, and on the other, to girdle the general limits of the built-up area.

Lastly, the "E" ring-road was a sub-arterial of parkway types for all-purpose traffic. At the same time, the
Fig. 21. The GL Plan: The road proposals.

ten express arterial highways were suggested to link London, through the "B" ring-road, with the whole country.

Referring to the airways, a ring of airports around London was envisaged, with one large trans-ocean airport at Heathrow. Communications to London should be provided by road via express arterials 2 and 1, by the express arterial "D" ring, which passed the eastern side of the site, and by electric railway to Waterloo and Victoria Stations by means of a short branch to the existing Southern Railway line east of Feltham31.

Meanwhile, regarding the navigable waterways, the maintenance of the canal system from the Midlands to the Thames was suggested as an important and cheap form of transport. Furthermore, the following recommendations were made: first, canal frontages should be planned, secondly, locks at Brentford and Tottenham should be reconstructed to increase the rate of transit of craft, thirdly, investigations should be made into the possibility of giving increased access by water to the Park Royal and Slough Trading Estates and, lastly, at salient points central collecting and distributing centres with adequate warehouse and loading facilities should be set up32.

Finally, in respect to the railways, it was considered that the solution of their problems was largely inherent in the proposals for the decentralisation of population and industry, which would materially reduce the amount of daily travel between London and the suburbs, and that no drastic alterations or additions to the railways were necessary. The suggestions put forward mainly concerned: first, the general electrification in the Greater London area of the main lines leading outwards to certain points, as Didcot, Princes Risborough,
Aylesbury, Watford, Luton, Hitchin, Bishop's Stortford, Chelmsford and Basingstoke; second, the provision of certain additional short length of passenger track; and thirdly, three branches from the Outer Goods Ring, mentioned in the County of London Plan, were suggested, mainly comprising existing tracks, over which it might be found convenient to develop goods traffic33.

The conservation of good agricultural land, which as we saw in Chapter III was the main aim of the Scott Report, became a central point of the GL Plan and was combined with the issue of the preservation and extension of the green belt around London. It is a matter of fact that a wide green belt was proposed immediately, where building would be allowed in exceptional circumstances only, and which would be primarily for recreational use. This green belt would lead into an open countryside kept mainly for agricultural use. Lesser girdles were proposed for the separate communities, both old and new ones. At the same time, it was suggested that the green wedges leading from the open country into the Inner Urban and Suburban Rings should be preserved, as well as to retain every existing open space. The deficiency in open space for the population proposed, was calculated to be 10,526 acres if a standard of 10 acres per thousand population was adopted and 4,243 on the basis of 7 acres per 1,000 population. Furthermore, to estimate the total acreage of open space needed in the built-up area of London it was necessary to add to the above figures the 8,273 acres deficiency of open space shown in the County of London Plan (see Chapter XI)34. However, the revolutionary feature of the open space proposals was that on all the background land, outside the areas delimited for building, no new buildings was to be allowed; as a consequence, the need for wholesale public acquisition of open areas was reduced35.

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In addition to submitting his Report on the physical aspect of the Region and on his proposals for its replanning, Professor Abercrombie drew attention to the fact that there were 143 Local Planning Authorities, excluding the County Councils, in the Greater London area as a whole. He also pointed out that the movement towards Joint Committees had progressed somewhat slowly in this area, and that a mere reduction in the number of planning units and an increase of their size would not, of itself, necessarily produce the desired results. Moreover, to ensure that future developments in the area would conform to the suggestions, he proposed that Parliament should be asked to create a Planning Authority responsible to the Minister of Town and Country Planning. This Authority would have power to buy, sell and administer land, and be in charge of a Master Plan, which would be based on the County, City and Greater London Plans.

As far as the educational requirements and the health services were concerned the GL Plan took account correspondingly the Educational Act, 1944, and the White Paper "A National Health Service" presented by the Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland to Parliament in February, 1944.

Especially, an attempt had been made to estimate what the new educational requirements would mean, on the grounds that the school is an increasingly important element in any residential neighbourhood and that the school system should help shape community plans. Consequently, in any community plan the location of the various schools was considered by Professor Abercrombie of great importance.

In the areas already developed or partly developed many sites would be unalterable, while in redevelopment
schemes, fixed points in the educational layout would be provided by those existing school buildings which were worth preserving. For a new community of 60,000 population the suggested total number of schools would be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nursery</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (Boys' Modern)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; (Girls' &quot; )</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; (Boys' Grammar)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; (Girls' &quot; )</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; (Technical)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young People's College</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical College</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, relating to the health services, it was understood that a fully organised system of hospitals would be the key-stone of the National Health System Service, and that the new hospital service might be complete and ready of access. It would include general and special hospitals, sanatoria for tuberculosis, accommodation for maternity cases, for the chronic sick and for rehabilitation. Ancillary hospital services would also be provided for pathological examination, X-ray, electrotherapy, ambulances and other purposes. As far as the location of the above building installations, it was proposed that certain larger special hospital facilities might well be placed in defined parts of the Green Belt Ring, and that each community in the Region should seek to define the provision it should make and allow for that provision in its community and neighbourhood plans.

Turning now to the public reaction which followed the publication of the GL Plan, it has to be stressed first of all that it was a setting out of the principles...
according to which the London Region should be replanned, and not a comprehensive development plan. Correctly making this assumption E. C. Kent and Felix J. Samuely, in their article published in *The Architects' Journal* on 1 November, 1945, under the title "London, the Regional Plan: An analysis of Sir Patrick Abercrombie's scheme", proceeded to criticise Abercrombie's GL Plan by putting six questions, as follows:

(i) Does the plan fit into a national and regional pattern of reconstruction?
(ii) Does the plan preserve and develop the individual character of the Region's various parts?
(iii) Does the plan establish an organic pattern of development?
(iv) Does the plan provide for the private life of the citizen?
(v) Does the plan cater for the collective needs of the community?

The result of their review of the Plan amounted to the following criticism; because of the fact that the proposals of the GL Plan aimed to implement the Barlow Commission's recommendations, and dealt almost exclusively with the location of industry and the industrial population, they failed to examine London as a commercial and administrative centre as well. From this point of view, Kent and Samuely argued that the whole task of decentralisation as it was considered in the GL Plan would have to be reviewed. The proposed size of the London Region also created some doubts, if the whole area were to be considered as one planning unit, even though the solution of the problem was based on a perfect communication system on the one hand, and on the other, if the establishment of separated units within London, and new satellite towns as well, could contribute to the character of London as a Metropolis. Their view was that the creation of physically separated...
towns was bound to promote dissolving rather than unifying tendencies within London, seen as a regional unit.42

As for the assumption of the GL Plan that a Planning Authority should be established with powers to control location of industry and movement of population, the authors, while considering it to be a very effective structure, objected that it was based on a more or less static total population number for the whole Region. They believed that it seemed to be entirely possible that with very different population numbers the basic ideas of the plan would not be found to be workable.43

Furthermore, regarding the conditions provided for the citizens' life, two matters which arose from the GL Plan proposals were, first, the distance between the work place and the home, and secondly, open spaces. In general terms, the decentralisation both of industry and of the population was intended to bring work and home nearer to each other. Also, decentralisation could be effective in several ways, but only the use of satellite towns had been identified as a significant means. The authors remarked that the claim that if a town of 60,000 people could offer industrial services of sufficient variety for all suggested that the ideal size of a satellite town had been chosen rather arbitrarily.44 On the other hand, individual needs for recreation had been recognised and open space had been given prominence, although the problem of equitable distribution did not seem to be completely solved. From this latter point of view, to some of the people in the Suburban and Inner Urban Rings, little open spaces were available, and they had a long way to go to find large green spaces.45

In the meantime, Kent and Samuely argued that there was
no doubt that the collective needs of the communities, with possibly a few exceptions, had been well served by the proposals of the GL Plan. In more detail, they stated that if everything was carried out as intended, education and health services would be of a very high standard, satisfying completely the most modern requirements.

As far as traffic in general was concerned, the suggestions for roads, railways and airfields would in themselves have a very beneficial effect, but it could not be forgotten that the efficiency of a plan for the London Region was very much dependent on the efficiency of the LCC area, although the latter was not dealt with in this plan. Moreover, regarding the central aerodrome in Heathrow, the fact that its area was sited far from the sea was considered as an disadvantage, because there were no facilities in it for marine aircraft as well, although by 1950 it was a fact that seaplanes were irrelevant.

Finally, referring to the practicability of the GL Plan, the most promising indication for its realisation was considered to be the suggested "administrative machinery", that is the formation of a Planning Board to supervise all activities and deal with individual problems through its various branches, such as an Open Spaces Board, a Housing Corporation, and a Regional Public Cleansing Department.

Concluding the above analysis of the GL Plan, as criticised by Kent and Samuely, its chief merits were perhaps to be found in the general boldness of the approach, in the fact that the problem of the Region as a whole was always kept in mind, that decisions were at this stage made only in respect of matters which might be dealt with by a central authority, that machinery
was proposed to create such central authority as a permanent institution, and that sufficient scope and encouragement was given to Local Authorities for preparing the many detailed plans still required.

Moreover, dispelling some doubts on the GL Plan, Peter Hall considered as very important its contribution because it supported the principle of planned decentralisation to New Towns. In other words, it opened the way to be established the New Towns Act in 1946, which recommended that the New Towns should normally be built very much as Howard had proposed them, with size range of 30,000 to 50,000 or perhaps 60,000, by a special development corporation set up for the purpose, generally responsible to Parliament and with direct Treasury funding. As Gordon Cherry argued, the idea of decentralisation through satellite development gained widespread acceptance, although it was not everywhere that New Towns were seen as the machinery for dispersal.

Recapitulating the GL Plan, it should be noted that it has made an important step forward in the idea of planned location for the industry and housing, while its advocacy for planned decentralisation became the post-war model for all urban areas. Therefore, since this plan was the last advisory in character, it has helped start the period of execution of the operational plans for London, and especially of the County of London Development Plan, which will be analysed in the following Chapter.
The final plan for London in the 1940s started to be executed by the Town Planning Committee of the LCC in July 1948, under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947. The Committee had three years to complete its work and submit its proposals to the Minister for approval. Indeed, submission occurred on 31 December 1951, when the County of London Development (CLD) Plan had been already approved by the LCC, and it was formally transmitted to the Minister of Housing and Local Government. According to Derek Childs, who was a frequent commentator of The Architects' Journal in town planning matters during the period 1951-2, the preparation of the Development Plan had followed "the lines of the diagnosis", as they had been determined by the County of London Plan, 1943, by Forshaw and Abercrombie (see Chapter XI), which could be summarised on the following lines: firstly, congestion of traffic, secondly, depressed housing, thirdly, intermingling of housing and industry, and lastly, lack and maldistribution of open spaces.

The great difference between the CLD Plan and the previous ones was that it was operational and not merely advisory as, for example, was the County of London Plan, 1943. It must be seen essentially as the outcome of a combination of the LCC's own development programme for the next twenty years, and of the forecasted requirements of government departments, the Metropoli-
tan Boroughs and other authorities. As Childs argued, the importance of this plan was threefold: first, in the fact that it was a kind of official statement of the LCC policy both on immediate and long-term redevelopment, second, because it provided an order of priority for the carrying out of proposals, and third, because it attempted to estimate, very broadly, the cost of the proposals at current price levels. Especially, for the latter point, it is, we think, interesting to note that the maximum annual gross capital expenditure, which the LCC could undertake during the period of the Development Plan would amount to roughly £27 millions during the next twenty years, i.e., a total of £400 millions over the whole period. This estimate did not take into account the LCC's current programme of housing in the out-county estates; expenditure on this account during the first five years of the plan was likely to amount to about £33 million. However, the LCC believed that this scale of development was not likely to be reached owing to shortages of labour and materials, especially in the years of rearmament, and that some adjustment in the order of priorities for the different sections of the plan would have to be made from time to time.

The CLD Plan's approval by the Minister occurred on 7th March, 1955, as the process of Public Inquiry and Ministerial investigation had taken up over three years after of its submission. Nearly 7,000 objections were received when the plan was placed on exhibition, but, as Arthur Ling, the Chief Planning Officer of the LCC, informs us, about 30 per cent of these were either withdrawn before the Public Inquiry or were not made the subject of debate. The result of this long-term procedure was that for the first time in the history of planning in the County of London there was an approved plan having statutory authority. In this context, the
Minister's approval was an important event which led to the culmination of a planning process which began as long ago as 1924, when the Council passed resolutions to prepare planning schemes for areas on the fringes of Hampstead Heath and Streatham Common. However, what were the main proposals contained in the CLD Plan?

Besides the written material, two basic plans had been prepared by the Town Planning Committee, that is by the Planning Section of the Architects' Department of the LCC. The first of them was the Town Map which outlined the proposed Use Zones, and the other, the Programme Map, which showed the phases of development. In both of these plans the main proposals of the CLD Plan were concentrated on the following tasks: road programming, industrial decentralisation, urban densities in comparison with housing needs, and comprehensive development areas.

In regard to the road proposals (fig. 22), the concept of a fast motorway, known as the "A" ring-road, through the Administrative County had been already abandoned by the Minister of Transport in May 1950. As a consequence, the CLD Plan had had to base its road proposals on the existing routes. Actually, important radials were suggested to be linked to the inner circular route and to be supplemented by inner and outer-cross routes. In fact, the proposed main concept of the main roads was formed by an inner circular, which was bounded by Marylebone Road on the north, Elephant and Castle on the south, Edgware Road on the west and Aldgate on the east, and which could be compared to the "A" ring and two intersecting inner cross-routes fulfilling in some ways part of the "B" ring's functions of the County of London Plan, 1943 (see Chapter XI). The basis of the success of such a planning idea was the construction of new links. The amount of construc-
Fig. 22. The CLD Plan: The diagram indicates the general basis for road planning upon which the priority road works in the twenty year road programme had been based.

tion which the LCC hoped to achieve within the twenty-year period included six new intersections on the fly-over principle, thirty-seven intersections on the roundabout principle, eleven miles of new principal traffic roads, seven miles of major widenings, two miles of tunnel, and the rebuilding of two Thames bridges, as well as a river wall.

Referring to the industry task, the Town Planning Committee recognised that the relocation of industry was primarily a national rather than a local problem on the one hand, and on the other, that opportunities to be achieved by planning control were at those times limited strictly to the LCC's financial resources, as we have previously referred, which were virtually negligible in proportion to the size of the problem.

However, the Minister, in approving the plan, reduced the proposed acreage of land zoned for industrial purposes, which at that time was used in other ways, mainly for residential occupation. He also pointed out that the CLD Plan allowed for 1,163 acres for new industrial building but he seemed to be under some misapprehension, because the Council's clear intention was to reserve this land for the relocation of wrongly sited industries from other parts of the County. As Arthur Ling argued, perhaps the Minister felt that such a wholesale movement of non-conforming industries was unlikely during the next twenty years because of financial limitations, and meanwhile the existence of substantial areas of land zoned for industry was an unnecessary temptation to other industrialists, who were not tied to London or even in London at the moment.

The residential densities became one of the most controversial components of the CLD Plan (fig. 23, 24). It proposed that the distribution of population in the
Fig. 23. The CLD Plan: The existing residential density.

Fig. 24. The CLD Plan: The proposed residential density.

county area should be in the form of five main density zones, as follows: 200, 136, 100, 70 and under 70 persons to the acre. The 200 zone included the City, Westminster, Finsbury, Holborn, the southern part of Paddington, St. Marylebone, St. Pancras and a few small areas including that adjoining the west end of Kensington Gardens. The 136 zone covered most of Chelsea and such areas as Poplar on the north side and Southwark on the south side of the river. The 100 zone included Fulham, most of Hammersmith and parts of outer London, for instance Hampstead. The 70 zone included Greenwich, Woolwich, parts of Lewisham, Wandsworth and adjoining Boroughs. Lastly, the under 70 zones were more in the nature of low density pockets.

As a result of the above distribution of residential densities, the CLD Plan recommended the moving out of the County of London of about 380,000 people. It was estimated that in the first five years of the scheme implementation, the overspill would amount to 145,000 and the balance of 235,000 would occur in the second period of 6 to 20 years. The Minister had not accepted this precise figure, and had preferred to amend the Statement, so that it referred to the fact that the realization of the proposals in the Development Plan is dependent upon accommodation being provided outside the County for a large number of people, probably in excess of 250,000.

However, the main controversy with the Ministry started when the Minister reduced the densities of population in areas, such as Hampstead, Highgate, Sydenham Hill and Blackheath, which were envisaged as 70 or above, down to 50 or 30 persons per acre. The proposals of the CLD Plan for allowing higher densities in these areas of great residential amenity had already met with
strong objection at the Public Inquiry\textsuperscript{21}. It is to be noted, that the LCC's view was that London could not afford to have people spread thinly on the ground in the best residential areas, while so many were living in overcrowded conditions on low-lying land which in many cases was alongside industrial areas, railways or gasworks. The LCC had already demonstrated the principle of making these pleasant areas on high ground next to large open spaces available to a larger number of Londoners by its imaginative proposals for the redevelopment of extensive sites adjoining Putney Heath and Wimbledon Common\textsuperscript{22}.

A materialised example of the above controversy consists in the fact that the LCC had designated a number of areas for compulsory purchase at Sydenham Hill and these had been removed from the plan by the Minister\textsuperscript{23}. Moreover, although the Minister had increased, as we have seen, the extent of residential zoning, the areas in which this had been done were in nearly all cases most unsuitable for residential development, being on low-lying land next to industrial areas\textsuperscript{24}. However, finally, the total effect of the Minister's modifications on the housing programme of LCC was a reduction in potential housing accommodation for approximately 12,000 people over the next twenty years\textsuperscript{25}.

Projects for comprehensive development had been recommended by the CLD Plan (fig. 25) for the following eight areas: the City of London, Stepney and Poplar, Bermondsey, South Bank, Elephant and Castle, Bunhill Fields and Finsbury, Lewisham and, lastly, Woolwich\textsuperscript{26}. These were areas of upwards of 39 acres that the LCC had selected for early development. For the projects of City, South Bank and Elephant and Castle, in particular, the following proposals had been made. In the City, 244 acres were scheduled for comprehensive rede-
Fig. 25. The CLD Plan: The areas of comprehensive development are shown superimposed on the main areas of slum, obsolescent and war-damaged property.

velopment, with a concentrated effort to be made in the first period of rebuilding on the areas of bomb devastation behind Moorgate and to east of St. Paul's Cathedral. Along the South Bank, an area of 425 acres including 137 acres of the River Thames had been designated for comprehensive redevelopment with priority given to the provision of new governmental offices.

Finally, at the Elephant and Castle the intention was to redevelop to new building lines and to lay out a large roundabout serving the existing roads some of which were to be widened, notably London Road. The Minister approved on 7th March, 1955, the eight areas of comprehensive development which the CLD Plan contained, making certain modifications to the proposals for the City of London, relating particularly to traffic problems. The most important of these was the elimination of the western and eastern ends of Route 11.

Furthermore, it is to be noted that the CLD Plan had designated six areas on the Town Map as Special Areas or Precincts, the general intention being that planning control should aim to preserve and further encourage the traditional functional and architectural character of the areas. The Minister reduced the size of the Government and Commonwealth area, enlarged the St. Paul's Cathedral Precinct, indicating at the same time that he was not satisfied with the detailed proposals that had been prepared so far, and left practically unaltered the proposals for the University of London and British Museum area in connection the very important project for a National Library which was a subject of heated argument at the Public Inquiry and which he approved. He also deleted any reference to a special Medical and Professional area in St. Marylebone, making it instead part of the residential zone in which professional institutions and uses associated with the medical profession would be allowed. At the same time, he indi-
icated that the same policy of restriction should be followed in the case of offices, which had increased enormously. The Minister amended the Written Statement so that normally the LCC would not give consent to any change of use to offices where the premises either with or without adaptation could continue to be used for residential purposes, whether it be as blocks of flats, dwelling houses, hotels, residential clubs or hostels.

As a conclusion to the above analysis of the CLD Plan, it should be mentioned that it secured a positive acceptance from the public, as well as the professionals, perhaps because it was realistic and based on the previous planning experience for London, which had been assimilated by the interested parties. Some serious omissions were however noted, particularly in the road proposals,

"which will need better defence than they have yet been given to make them acceptable."

However, the main deficiency of the plan lay in the initial stage of its introduction. It is interesting to refer that the Town Planning Editor of The Architects' Journal was pointed out in December 1951:

"But this plan is not the proper beginning; it is doubtful if the completion of it through the filling in of details should be the responsibility of its authors. Whereas ordinarily the best system of planning may be through two tiers, a regional one and a local one within the national superstructure, London being as vast and complex as it is an intermediate tier, a sub-regional plan, i.e., this present plan, is beyond all doubt valuable, and perhaps essential. But although the LCC admits, and indeed emphasises, that the carrying out of this plan depends on the goodwill and co-operation of
its neighbours, a proper regional plan for Greater London has never even been attempted and no agency to make it exists. The County of London Development Plan may fail because of this. But there is perhaps not much that can be done about that now except through forced co-ordination by the responsible Government departments. It may also fail at the other extreme, i.e. because the LCC using this intermediate as a beginning, will proceed to detailed local planning."\[34\]

In addition, and while at first sight it may seem that the Minister had made substantial alterations to it till its approval in 1955, it is apparent that in its main principles and in the majority of its details, the Minister had endorsed the LCC Development Plan.

All of the above were well indicated by the Arthur Ling's judgment, where he said,

"it is a source of some satisfaction that after so many years of preparation, negotiations and patient investigation both by the members and officers of the Council and by the Minister and his staff, there is now available for the County of London a plan for its future activities, based on a carefully considered financial budget, and that the Minister in approving the Plan has expressed his opinion that it will "provide a sound and wisely conceived framework, within which the life of London can continue to advance and develop in the years ahead". "The preparation and adoption of this comprehensive design for the world's greatest city is", says the Minister in his letter, "a significant event, which in years to come will be accorded a notable place in the pages of London's history"."\[35\]

At the end of this examination of the administrative
procedure of the CLD Plan and its statutory establishment, the following question arises: what were the influences and the consequences of the planning activity developed mainly during the 1940s on the reconstruction process of London? The attempt to give a response to this issue will follow in the next Chapter.
XIV. INFLUENCES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROPOSED PLANS IN THE RECONSTRUCTION PLANNING OF LONDON

As town planning is not a static process, but one which moves forward at a pace equal to that of the economic resources by means of which the plans are carried out, we must now turn to the following question: what was, in action terms, the progress of the planning results developed for the London area during the early post-war years, that is in the late 1940s and in the 1950s?

In regional terms, the main objective could be summarised as the task of decentralisation or dispersal of industry and population as it had been defined by the Barlow Commission (see Chapter III). It was to be achieved mainly through the strengthening of the existing peripheral towns and the establishing of new satellite towns at 20 to 30 miles distance from London. Indeed, this initiative was also fundamental to the plans proposed by LRRC (see Chapter X, c), LCC (see Chapter XI), GL (see Chapter XII), and CLD (see Chapter XIII).

Meanwhile, State policy, prompted partly by missile attacks (V1 and V2) in 1944, adopted the above recommendations in principle, and undertook in an initial stage attempts to discourage the return to London of evacuated persons, firms and Government Departments, and later to move population, industry and offices out of the County of London area. This policy is foreshowed
in a Memorandum, written by the Minister of Reconstruction, Lord Woolton, on 15 September 1944. The Minister stated that he accepted the suggestions submitted by the Minister of Health on the need to take all possible steps to postpone the return to London of people who for one reason or another left London during the war. As it is wellknown, the establishment later of the 1945 Industry Act gave the Board of Trade powers to control factory development.

In his turn, Lord Woolton recommended the Minister of Health and the Chancellor of the Exchequer to take action towards a policy preventing the reentry of this population into London, especially, as legal powers to prevent entry into London were not available. The Minister of Reconstruction proposed the following actions:

"(1) I have asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will agree to keep out of London for the present all the Departments and sections of Departments, which are still situated in other parts of the country. There will be strong pressure in many cases for their return to London, but this should be resisted.

(2) The Minister of Health, in the name of the Government, should ask evacuated commercial and industrial firms to stay out of London for the present. This should be done by general advice to firms and by individual letters to some of the larger undertakings (e.g. the Prudential Assurance Company). The Ministry of Health can no doubt get a list of the large undertakings in question (it need not be complete) from other Departments.

(3) The Minister of Health should continue his publicity urging evacuees to stay away until the housing position gets better".

The above recommendation was accepted by the Chancellor
of the Exchequer and was approved by the Sub-Committee on Housing, which had as members: Lord Woolton (Minister of Reconstruction) in the Chair, Ernest Bevin (Minister of Labour and National Service), Thomas Johnston (Secretary of State for Scotland), H.V. Willink (Minister of Health), Lord Portal (Minister of Works), and other officials. At the Meeting on 18 September 1944, it was pointed out that there was already a general prohibition on the return of Government Departments to London, although there were some exceptional cases, where new and special considerations had arisen since the original evacuation took place.

In 1947, an official Memorandum was circulated to give the Local Authorities guidance in the preparation of their development plans. This set out in detail exactly where the overspill from London was to go. The Memorandum may be summarised as follows:

"(1) London authorities were asked to adhere in the control of development and the preparation or revision of planning schemes to Abercrombie's Greater London plan as modified by the Report of the Advisory Committee for London Regional Planning and subject to certain comments contained in the Memorandum itself. In effect the Greater London Plan as conceived by Abercrombie was accepted subject to detailed modifications and with it, of course, was accepted the general idea of decentralisation from the inner core, the stabilisation of the population level in the suburban ring, the preservation of the green belt ring and the building up of selected localities in the outer country ring in order to accommodate the decentralised population.

(2) Distribution of population. This is the essence of the Memorandum. The whole Greater London policy was expressed in terms of the distribution of population - so many in this locality and so many in
that, with the implication that these were the populations for which the local authorities should plan. The decentralisation scheme was of course included in the tabulations of population distribution given in the Memorandum, for in addition to giving the target population for the whole region there were also set out in detail the ultimate populations and accepted expansions of the places in the green belt, outer country ring, and outside the region, which were nominated to receive the overspill from the inner parts of London. Reception capacity in all these places was added up and equated to the decentralisation necessary from inner London and by implication the ultimate populations of the overspill areas were also fixed. Thus the Memorandum did set out in detail exactly where the overspill from London was to go. (It should be noted here that the Memorandum as published left certain points unsettled e.g., South Essex and W. Middlesex had still to be considered, and not all the New Towns sites had been decided upon, but these gaps were filled in reasonably soon after publication, and all references to the 1947 Memorandum in this paper refer to the published document as subsequently added to or slightly amended).

(3) Industry. The Memorandum affirmed the Government’s policy of restraining the growth of London’s industry and to ensure that existing industry in the inner areas was decentralised to keep in step with the overspill of population.

(4) Communications. The Memorandum set out the broad plan for future highway development being a modification and simplification of the original Greater London Plan proposals. At the time of publication of the Memorandum Abercrombie’s railway proposals were still under examination.
(5) Open spaces. The Memorandum reaffirmed the principle of the green belt and the green wedges and announced the Ministry's intention to prepare a plan which would show in detail the land to be preserved for further development. This plan was prepared and issued to local planning authorities soon after."

By 1953, the position in terms of the distribution of population could be summarised as follows. The main task of decentralisation of population from the Inner Urban Ring of London (see Chapter XII) still remained to be done, as only a modest start had so far been made and the population reductions achieved had been counter-balanced by natural increase. There had been some tendency for people to leave the central areas of their own will as was already happening pre-war, but there was no evidence to show that they were moving to places selected for expansion nor was their employment moved with them. In the Suburban Ring there had been a steady build-up of population in spite of the policy to keep it stable, while in the Green Belt and Outer Country Ring there had been a further build-up of population. Actually, it is difficult to estimate the exact position of the populations in the various rings of the Greater London Plan, but Table 7 gives a rough comparison between the figures for 1938 and 1949. It is interesting to note that the reductions of population in the LCC and Inner Urban Rings over the period 1938-1949 were primarily due to the non-return of people who left Central London during the war.
Table 7. Rough Estimates of Population by Ring
(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mid-1938</th>
<th>June 1949</th>
<th>% increase or reduce</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LCC</td>
<td>4,063</td>
<td>3,375</td>
<td>-16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner Urban</td>
<td>1,396</td>
<td>1,257</td>
<td>-9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban</td>
<td>2,983</td>
<td>3,377</td>
<td>+12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Belt</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>1,081</td>
<td>+25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer Country Ring</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>+19.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10,150 10,085 -0.4


In employment decentralisation terms, controls exercised since the war had been almost exclusively concerned with industry as opposed to other forms of employment. The operation of the policy of restraining industrial growth in the London Region up to October, 1948, was reviewed in the White Paper on Distribution of Industry (Cmd. 7540) and it is relevant to quote three points. First, up to that date in the Greater London Area the effect of the restrictions was to limit any industrial building to 5.3 per cent of the total for the country. Second, this was a much smaller proportion than its share of the total working population which was then 22.3 per cent. Third, there was a striking contrast with pre-war, namely that between 1932 and 1938 Greater London and the whole of the Midlands had 57 per cent of the new industrial development, whereas a roughly comparable figure for the post-war period (to October 1948) would be 19 per cent.
However, since the end of 1948, the overriding considerations of dollar exports, import saving and defence had tended to make the problem much more difficult even than it was before. Industrial growth in the London Region had been more and more at the mercy of the fact that very many of the British key industrial resources, which could make valuable contributions to the national well-being, happened to be located in the London area. For example, the only manufacture of submarine telegraph cable in the British Empire had been established at Greenwich for more than 80 years, so when such a firm proposed an efficiency measure or a scheme which was tied to the main works because the new development was dependent upon the research staff and skilled workers there and because production would be tied in with many existing processes in the works, the firm's export performance and dollar earning capacity made it quite impossible to prevent some expansion.

It is interesting to note here in late 1950, the Minister of Town and Country Planning, referring to the continuing growth of London, made the following nine recommendations:

"(1) a much stricter distribution of industry control over all new factory building and factory extensions in the Greater London Area;
(2) licences to be available in new towns for factories which will make the most effective contribution to decentralisation;
(3) my Department to work out, in consultation with others concerned, ways of reducing industrial values in the inner London area;
(4) the Departments to work out at the same time the inducements that might be needed, following reduction of industrial values, to persuade industries to move out;
(5) my Department to explore with the Treasury the
need for a higher rate of Exchequer grant towards loss on acquisition by local authorities of industrial land in the inner London area;
(6) the Board of Trade to control the use of all existing industrial premises in the Greater London Area;
(7) local housing authorities to be empowered to control all sales or lettings of houses or to acquire any house in the Greater London Area;
(8) local authorities to be encouraged to acquire as much land as they will despite restriction of capital investment;
(9) my Department to work out a scheme for nationalisation of the land through unification of the reversion, to take effect in not more than 10 years".8

Furthermore, another great problem of the decentralisation effort was the fact that London was functioning as a "magnet" and attracted the industrialist, because of the market of London. A market which was considered as "the biggest market on his doorstep and that is a saving in transport cost".e

According to the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, the core of this problem, as it was stated in early 1947, was that:

"The pull of London will not be completely checked and can only be counteracted by creating new employment outside. New firms will not be encouraged to come into London or existing firms to expand".10

In practice, the above policy was very difficult to apply in the first post-war years. At that period, new firms were springing up, while existing firms were expanding on a considerable scale. As a logical consequence of this situation, the whole trend was
towards the greater industrialisation of London.\footnote{11}

Moreover, E.J.L. Griffith, who was an official of the LCC and one of the officers who had been trying to carry out the Council's policy of partial industrial decentralisation, argued that the main problem of excessive employment in London was found in its central area, an area which was congested with industrial, commercial and office uses. Except from these problems up to the end of 1953, 145 industrial firms had moved out of the London area, transferring to the out-County estates (73 of them), to the New Towns (71 of them), and to the expanded towns (only 1 of them).

However, contrary to the recommendations made by the CLD Plan, according to which land in the County "shall be reserved for the reorganisation of existing industry which must remain in London and shall not be regarded as available for new industry or for industry coming from outside the Administrative County,"\footnote{15} and to the principle of the GL Plan in limiting or reducing industry, a survey, carried out in 1952 in the County of London, showed that out of 23 premises used by 18 firms which had moved to New Towns, 22 had been reoccupied for the same or similar purposes, and one had been demolished for housing. Meanwhile, of the 73 firms which had moved to the out-County estates, only 12 had been displaced by redevelopment.\footnote{16}

It is to be noted that a similar problem appeared when localities vacated by those moving to the New Towns were re-populated by families moving to London from the provinces; these new-comers arrived at an estimated rate of about 100,000 a year.\footnote{17} In its general dimensions, this problem derived from the fact that, according to the law, no permission was required for
changes of use within seven industrial use classes\textsuperscript{19}. In addition, no permission was required for a change from general to light industry\textsuperscript{20}.

Finally, the issue of the dispersal of offices out of Central London must also be discussed. By 1948, the Government had put forward a plan to move out 40,000 to 50,000 civil servants, principally for strategic reasons. But, as the nuclear threat appeared to reduce the strategic value of dispersal, the programme was not pursued with great vigour\textsuperscript{21}.

However by the early 1950s, the London Transport Executive pressed for the dispersal of work to the suburbs on the ground that it was uneconomical to provide equipment for use only at peak periods. Until then, government policy had been concentrated only on industrial dispersal, and offices and commerce were dealt with separately from industry. This policy changed in 1955, when the Minister approved the Development Plan for the County of London, and asked for further surveys of existing and potential office employment. At the same time, his amendments to the plan re-zoned some office and commercial areas in the Central Zone for residential use\textsuperscript{22}.

By 1956, the office problem was put in perspective. The point was put clearly by Duncan Sandys, then Minister of Housing and Local Government, telling the Town Planning Institute in his speech to its Annual Dinner in March, 1956, that:

\begin{quote}
"The biggest town planning problem in Britain today is that of reducing the fearful congestion in London[...]. It is primarily due to the enormous movement of office workers, which in turn is due to the fact that so many offices are concentrated in a comparatively small central area[...]."
\end{quote}\textsuperscript{23}.
What, however, was the precise problem of offices in Central London? After all, during the war the population of this central area had fallen by 25 per cent, and that of the rest of the County by 16 per cent. As Joan V. Aucott wrote in her article "Dispersal of offices from London" in *The Town Planning Review* of April 1960, after the war the population rose again but not to pre-war levels. By 1948, the central area population had begun to fall again and by 1952 the whole County was decreasing. Up to 1954, the Green Belt and Outer Country Ring showed a very large increase of population. By 1960, about 1.25 million people were employed in the six Central London Boroughs, that is in the City of London, Westminster, Finsbury, St. Pancras and St. Marylebone, their number having risen steadily since 1948. Meanwhile, the rest of the County had remained static. Between 1948 and 1958 the LCC approved plans for the building of 44.4 million sq. ft. of office space in new buildings, replacements, extensions and changes of use in the central area. The peak year was 1954-1955, when building restrictions were eased.

What then was the extent of the dispersal of offices from Central London? According to the above survey undertaken by Aucott, the total number employed by all the firms of decentralised offices was estimated to be 12,500 in the late 1950s. Two efforts to disperse offices out of Central London are of especial interest. The first one was the experiment by Hemel Hempstead New Town in offering 100,000 sq. ft. of new office space in early 1950; the second one was the emergence of the provincial city of Norwich as the home of the large Norwich Union Insurance Societies. Moreover, about 27,000 civil servants in decentralised public services must be added to the dispersal total. The total of these two figures, about 40,000 people, is equivalent to about 3.5 per cent of the central area's labour.
force. These data make clear that office dispersal represented a very low percentage in the employment decentralisation issue in London.

In any case, the planning situation of London in the early 1950s was not considered as satisfactory by the authorities. It is interesting that in an extended, but unfortunately, unsigned and undated (c. 1950) paper, prepared probably by the Minister of Town and Country Planning, under the title "London; Our Great Planning Failure", it was argued that the real solution of this problem should be identified as the public ownership of urban land. Furthermore, the anonymous author pointed out that the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, conferred wide powers of acquisition on local authorities, but restrictions on capital investment in the post-war period had virtually confined public acquisition to land needed for immediate development. Moreover, he added that a substantial relaxation of the restrictions on capital investment might be seen as a useful long-term proposal, in order to allow large-scale public acquisition.

The developments relating to the road planning of London in town planning terms will be examined here, whereas practical progress in the redevelopment areas will be the central subject of the last part of this work. As we saw, the RA (see Chapter X, b), LCC (see Chapter XI), and GL (see Chapter XII) Plans had incorporated some of the suggestions of the Bressey-Lutyens Scheme, correctly known as the "Highway Development Survey 1937" (Greater London), published in 1938. In addition, the CLD Plan (see Chapter XIII) proposals, which submitted in December 1951 and approved by the Minister in March 1955, provided, as pointed out in 1956 by Colin Buchanan, a town-planner who had been interested in traffic problems for many years, merely
for a series of isolated improvements at well-known black-spots and bottlenecks, which however should give some relief, but could not cure London congestion.

In the context of the above proposals, the "A" ring-road was intended to be main circulatory route for Central London traffic. As a consequence, it became of major importance. Meanwhile, in April, 1950, it was announced in the House of Commons that the proposed "A" ring-road would not be built. This must be considered as an important development, because decisions in principle had been already reached by Central Government on most of the major proposals in the officially suggested London plans relating to the new and improved roads.

Furthermore, the London traffic problem became the subject of a special report by the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee in 1951. The report recommended that ten specific schemes in inner London should be undertaken at once, and six others just outside the centre should be given second priority. The first group included the Hyde Park Boulevard and the widening of a section of Euston Road, while the second included the Cromwell Road Extension and the Notting Hill Gate widening. It was also recommended that the possibilities of arcading, that is of setting back the footways under cover of the buildings, should be explored as a means of providing additional road space.

Finally, in the area of London railway planning, as had been recommended in the LCC Plan, an Expert Committee, the Inglis Committee, was appointed early in 1944 to examine the whole situation and to make recommendations. Indeed, the Inglis Committee submitted its proposals, which later were reviewed by a working party.
set up by the British Transport Commission. These new, revised, proposals were submitted to the Ministry of Transport in February, 1949. Subsequently, the Ministry considered the relationship of these proposals to the London plans in consultation with the local planning authorities, but it soon became clear that most of the major rail improvements would have to wait for a long time and there could be no urgency about the more radical proposals contained in the Railway Plan.

Ending the above approach of the implementation degree of the suggested plans for London from a regional and town planning point of view, it is now time to proceed in the examination of the features of the various reconstruction projects of comprehensive character which implemented in Central London area mainly in the 1950s. This latter point will be the subject of the following and last part of this research work.
Part 3

REDEVELOPING CENTRAL LONDON
When someone is referred to the replanning process of the City of London after the air-raids of the Second World War, he will recall first of all the "lost opportunity" of its rebuilding after the Great Fire of 1666 and the legend of the so-called "rejection" of Wren's Plan. It was to be argued by C.H. Holden and W.G. Holford, planners of the post-Second World War Plan of the City, that this Fire and the period of reconstruction possessed interesting similarities and contrasts when compared with events since 1940. As is well known, the Fire started in a baker's shop in Pudding Lane, just north of the Old London Bridge, in the early hours of Sunday, September 2nd, and by the end, three-quarters of the old City had been burnt out. It has been estimated that 13,000 houses, St. Paul's Cathedral, 87 out of 109 parish churches, 43 Livery Company Halls, a third of the buildings on the Bridge, and nearly all the public buildings were destroyed or gravely damaged. Especially, a plotting from John Leake's "Exact Surveigh" of the Fire area gives an acreage of 373 of almost total loss within the walls and 64 acres outside, making a total of 437 acres in all. Only about 75 acres remained undamaged within the City walls, the ruin being so complete that the Thames could be seen from Cheapside. As Holden and Holford inform us, the damage was estimated at £10,000,000 in the currency of the day, a sum which it is difficult to estimate at modern values.
On the other hand, the areas destroyed in the 1940-5 war amounted to approximately 225 acres widely distributed over the 660 acres which today comprise the City. The loss of rateable value between 1939 and 1944, almost wholly caused by air-raid damage, was £2 million or about one-quarter. The cost of replacing totally destroyed buildings was estimated to be about £70 million; this amount did not take account of the contents of the buildings or of roads and services, or of the cost of repairing damaged buildings. Consequently, the value of buildings destroyed was probably less in 1666 than in 1940-5, but socially and economically the earlier catastrophe was by far the greater for in those days in City comprised nearly all of London.

Both of these disasters had been considered as the “golden” opportunity for rebuilding this central place of London, which suffered as well heavily because of the need to redevelop speedily “as a centre of international trade and finance”. So, within a few weeks of the Great Fire, 1666, several plans for a new layout for the City had been published, such as those of Val. Knight, Evelyn and Wren. A similar situation was observed after the 1940-1941 aerial attack on the City. Indeed, as we have seen in the case of the replanning of London as a whole, the private and the public interests, regarding the facing of its future development, were expressed with the publication of a number of plans. However, before entering into the examination of these plans, it is important to make some reference to the problems which had been accumulated in the City of London during the first decades of the 20th century.

As Holden and Holford inform us, at the death of Queen Victoria, which was in 1901, the City had become in all essentials similar to its condition in 1939. The streets and the buildings were mostly the same. How-
ever, about one-fifth of the buildings existing in 1905 had been rebuilt by 1939, and the different business activities were distributed in the manner shown in figure 26. The changes between 1901 and 1939 might be summarised as being a consolidation and a detailed improvement on the position at the turn of the century. The most obvious changes were the virtual disappearance of horse-drawn transport and the erection of several hundred large steel-framed buildings, notably the head offices of the big banks. Analogous changes in quantitative terms as those pointed out in the built environment (one-fifth or 20 per cent) should be considered them which occurred to the transportation level; indeed, the number of daily workers travelling into the City, increased from 400,000 in 1901 to about 500,000 in 1939, that is an increase of 25 per cent. At the same time, as the City was the commercial heart of London, with some of the chief metropolitan routes passing through and intersecting within it, the volume of traffic in the City had grown between 1905 and 1935 by 60 per cent. Improvements of the existing street lay-out were expensive to carry out and the problem seemed to be unsolved by 1939. The great opportunity for rebuilding the City appeared during the Second World War, when a third of it was destroyed. But, what were the main features of that damage?

According to Holden and Holford, the war damage occurred everywhere in the City fabric, but the main destructions were concentrated into six sections (fig. 27). The first was around Shoe Lane, extending from the newspaper offices on the north side of Fleet Street to Holborn Circus, and around Ludgate Circus.

The second one comprised the following five areas:
- Upper Thames Street from Blackfriars to London Bridge;
- the south-east of St. Paul's from Cheapside down to
Fig. 26. City of London: Distribution of trades and activities, 1938.

Fig. 27. City of London: Areas proposed for comprehensive redevelopment.

Queen Victoria Street;
-the north of St. Paul’s from Newgate Street to the Churchyard;
-the area around Wood Street and north from Cheapside to Cripplegate;
-the area near the Metropolitan Railway cutting15.
The third section was extended around parts of Queen Victoria Street and Walbrook16. The fourth one contained parts of Lime Street, Billiter Street and Fenchurch Street, as well as the Commodity Market area north-west of the Tower17. The fifth section was the smallest one, extending around the Camomile Street18. Finally, the sixth section comprised the Houndsditch and Aldgate High Street area, and the south-east corner of the City19. This new catastrophe of the City, which as a whole was an historic monument, prompted public opinion to press very early for action for its rebuilding.

Not without significance is the fact that the first plans for the new City were prepared by institutions and planners acting privately. The first of them was the Royal Academy (RA) Plan, which, as we saw in Chapter X, was published on 15 October 1942 and included proposals for the City as part of its plan for the central London area. The second plan was suggested by N.J. Aslan, a young town planner. He published his proposals for the City in The Architects’ Journal on 9 December 194320. It is very interesting to go through Aslan’s proposals for the new City.
Aslan's Plan for the City needs to be examined together with the scheme for central London by the same author in order to make his recommendations clearer. It was published in The Architects' Journal on 8 October, 1942, and it made a big impact in wartime planning literature. This latter scheme was prepared by N. Aslan as his thesis for the diploma in Town Planning and Civic Architecture at the University of London in 1936, and this is the reason why it was not included in the review of independent plans for London (see Chapter X).

Aslan proposed that a ring road should pass via London Bridge station and other main railway stations. The Elephant and Castle is a suitable starting point for a description of the ring road. It from the Elephant and Castle would intend to absorb Newington Causeway and Borough High Street and continued north-east to a "Place" west of London Bridge Station which had been extended to take over the traffic from Blackfriars, Holborn Viaduct and Cannon Street Stations. These were to be made underground, thus making London Bridge Station the south-east suburban terminus. At this point where the ring road was leaving London Bridge "Place" to connect to a roundabout at the junction of Eastcheap, Gracechurch, King William and Cannon Streets, the speedway under the Thames, surfacing again at the junction of the new Mile End - St. Paul's Road. Aslan argued that from this new road St. Paul's would be visible for over two miles. Continuing north the ring road contacted Liverpool and Broad Street Stations, which would be combined and extended to from north and north-east suburbs Terminus, and took over the traffic from the redundant Fenchurch Street Station. An open space west of Liverpool Street Station
was reserved for a bus and coach terminus. To the north-east the ring road was joining City Road at the junction of East Road and Old Street. Further west a circus was made at the junction of Pentonville, Goswell and Essex Roads and St, John and Upper Streets. Continuing west it passed south of Euston Station to join the roundabout at Tottenham Court Road and Hampstead Road, and then to the junction of Albany Road and Baker Street. Further west it passed south of Marylebone Station to Edgware Road junction, where the new terminus to Harrow Road was planned, thus by-passing the congested area of Edgware Road. The ring road then was passing north of Paddington Station, absorbing Bishops Bridge Road, to a roundabout which was connected to Western Avenue; then through Westbourne Grove and Notting Hill Gate, absorbing Brunswick Gardens to Kensington High Street. Here the Town Hall and the shopping centre had been by-passed east to west by running the road over the low-level District Railway. Further south, the ring road crossed Cromwell, Brompton and Fulham Roads to a circus at the junction of Kings Road. Here roads branch off to South West London across Albert and Battersea Bridges, which the speedway tunnels under the Thames. Continuing south-east the ring road was crossing the river from the roundabout southwest of the Royal Chelsea Hospital, on the new Ring Bridge, then it forked east to the junction in Queens Road, proceeding south of Battersea Power Station to a roundabout where a bridge was to be constructed giving direct access to Victoria Station. From this roundabout the ring road absorbed Nine Elms Lane running eastwards to a circus at Vauxhall Station, an important road junction. The railway lines to Waterloo went underground. The ring road continuing through Kensington runned into the Elephant and Castle again from the west.23.
In the above way, Aslan considered that the City would be bisected so that the commercial centre remained part of inner London, while the industrial area would be excluded from it. Incidentally, London Bridge, where the ring road crossed the river, was the terminus for large relatively ships. Furthermore, Aslan proposed the retention and improvement of the existing street network by means of re-designed road junctions and, where necessary, the construction of new routes.

Aslan's new proposals for the City (fig. 28), that is those of 9 December, 1943, differ somewhat from tentative suggestions put forward as part of the plan for central London as proposed by him on 8 October, 1942. According to Aslan latest proposals, the City was considered as one of the local centres which suffered especially from traffic congestion. So, in order to relieve the pressure of through traffic, two north-south and two east-west by-pass routes were provided, which would collaborate with the proposed on 8 October, 1942, ring road. The two north-south relief roads were: (i) St. Paul's Tunnel, which was at the junction of Aldersgate and Barbican and which was expected to take all traffic southwards, (ii) London Bridge Tunnel, which had entrance by Liverpool Street Circus and exit at Borough High Street. At the same time, the other two, east-west relief roads were: (i) an extension of the Embankment from Blackfriars Bridge to Tower Hill, (ii) a new road connecting Farrington Street and Liverpool Street Station, following roughly the line of Charterhouse Street, Barbican and Eldon Street.

At the same time, through traffic having been catered for by the above four relief routes, the flow of traffic within the City was improved by the provision of the following five facilities. Firstly, by roundabouts at the most important road junctions, e.g. Holborn Cir-
Fig. 28. Aslan's proposals for the City of London.

cus, Ludgate Circus, the north-east corner of St. Paul’s churchyard, Bank, London Bridge, Liverpool Street, Aldgate, Gardeners Corner, etc. Secondly, by local service roads and service spaces for every business zone, leaving the main thoroughfares to carry only traffic which was in motion; these service spaces would act as car parks and open-air markets as well as adding greatly to the amenity of the neighbourhood. Thirdly, by a new bridge south of St. Paul’s—a proposal dated from c. 1910—, which would help to give a more intimate connection between the north and south banks and create an opportunity for opening up a view of the Cathedral from the river; additionally, traffic would not be allowed further north than Victoria Street, the remainder of the monumental approach being reserved for pedestrians. Fourthly, by an improved approach to St. Paul’s from Fleet Street, the open space around the Cathedral being slightly increased in size and the roads widened to avoid the bottleneck which would otherwise be created between Lutgate Hill and Cannon Street. Fifthly, by widening Upper and Lower Thames Streets to act as service roads for riverside wharves.

Moreover, other improvements were suggested in Aslan’s plan for railways and the markets, including the City area. Blackfriars, Holborn Viaduct, Cannon Street and Fenchurch Street stations were placed underground and connected with London’s existing underground railway system, which made it possible to remove all railway viaducts from the City area. The sites released were to be used for building and open space. Smithfield Market with its established activities, which surrounded it, was to be retained. Leadenhall Market, on the other hand, was merged with Smithfield Market, with a Square created on its side. Billingsgate Market was to move eastward to St. Katherine’s Docks, thus relieving mor-
ning congestion and, at the same, freeing additional space for the expansion of the produce market of Mincing Lane and Eastcheap.

Aslan's Plan for the City had also suggested a method of private redevelopment. According to this method, commonly known as pooling and derived from German practice before 1914, all owners within a given block [such as that having Cheapside to the north, Queen Street to the east, Cannon Street to the west] should come together and discuss future development on the basis of the procedure outlined below. Firstly, each owner would furnish through his surveyor information concerning the superficial area of his property, and also the maximum area that would have been obtained had it been developed before the war to the full extent permitted by the London Building Act of 1894. A standard unit would then be determined, which would allow for position as well as extent of property, and in terms of which the value of the various properties would be calculated. Secondly, the building line would be adjusted as necessary to provide better service roads and service spaces, which would greatly enhance the value of the property and have the additional advantage of allowing redevelopment to an average height of eight storeys. It was also suggested that the heights of the different zones would be varied in accordance with: (i) the locality, (ii) the width of the adjoining streets, and (iii) the contours of the ground. For instance, to preserve amenity around St. Paul's, buildings in this area should not be as high as in other parts of the City. On the other hand, buildings outside this area, especially those overlooking open space, and those on low ground near the river, might go as high as ten storeys in addition to a basement and perhaps a sub-basement. The resulting superficial area, which would be about the same or more than before pooling, would be redivided.
among the owners on the basis of the unit valuation given to their original property, each being given, as far as possible, the same site as before.

The criticism generated by Aslan's Plan for the City, had been focused on the proposals for specific sites. In particular, the area around St. Paul's Cathedral and the Bank had been subject to negative comments.

The problem with the proposals for St. Paul's was that the result of the various traffic regulations at this point was that the Cathedral was still ringed around by roads. Actually, though an attempt had been made to divert through traffic from the immediate neighbourhood of the Cathedral, both St. Paul's Bridge and the new approach road to the Cathedral from the south on the one hand, and on the other, the provision of an alternative route for north-south traffic in the form of a tunnel under the river required St. Paul's to remain separated from the area of the Cathedral precinct of which it naturally formed part, and especially in the east, south, and south-west directions. This separation was the outcome of a stream of traffic coming from Aldersgate, Cheapside and Cannon Street and wishing to proceed west via Ludgate Hill.

The other outstanding problem of Aslan's proposals for the City was that the traffic problem around the Bank of England, the centre of City business, remained unsolved. The idea of establishing a road surrounding the nine-way crossing in front of the Bank was very difficult to be applied. So, Aslan's suggestions for two east-west relief roads and those for north-south tunnels were likely to prevent only to some degree the traffic which wished to pass diagonally through the City from gravitating towards the Bank.
Besides Aslan's Plan for the City, another, known as the Sketch Plan, was prepared by Kenneth J. Lindy and B.A.P. Winton Lewis, and was presented in early 1944\textsuperscript{33}. However, this Plan had no significant influence on the developments which followed in City planning from the official point of view.

\textbf{b. F.J. Forty's proposals for the City}

The first systematic attempt to replan the City of London during the war was undertaken by the Improvements and Town Planning Committee of the Corporation of London chaired by the City Engineer, F.J. Forty. It was published under the title \textit{The Preliminary Draft Proposals for Post-War Reconstruction in the City of London} in July 1944\textsuperscript{34}. But, let us examine it in a more analytical manner.

On 8 January 1941, Alderman Sir Howard Button, the Town Clerk, and F.J. Forty were called by Lord Reith, the Minister of Works and Buildings, to discuss together various aspects of town planning matters for the City. The Minister asked for the following information. First, the nature and extent of the damage which had occurred, and an estimation of the proportion of destroyed buildings or those which would need to be demolished in relation to those which could be repaired. Secondly, any proposals which the Local Authority had in mind for redevelopment, and whether the destruction of parts of the area by enemy action had facilitated or modified plans previously made. Thirdly, whether planned redevelopment of the area was likely to be prejudiced by: (i) speculation in site values, (ii) the risk, notwithstanding wartime restrictions, of uncontrolled development pending the application of a redevelopment plan, and (iii) any special
conditions or interests. Fourthly, whether there were any special financial considerations affecting the redevelopment of the area apart from the questions of the relations between local government and national finance awaiting settlement after the war. Fifthly, whether it was likely that any rebuilding on the sites of wholly demolished buildings would be in the public interest during the war.

On 7 March 1941, Lord Reith was asked officially by the Corporation of London for permission to prepare a provisional plan of redevelopment for the City of London. On 24 July 1941, the existing Improvements Committee of the Corporation of London became the Improvements and Town Planning Committee, consisting of thirty-four members. The proposals of the new Committee were submitted on 24 May 1944. According to the Committee's Report, on the form which the reconstruction proposals should take, three courses appeared to have secured the Committee's attention:

"(1) To present an "ideal" plan expressing a physical shape of the City which, given unlimited means, might fulfil every ambition for the future.

(2) To present a plan of immediate post-war improvements and other proposals limited to war-damaged sites, such as might be carried out within a few years, all within customary practice and financial capacity.

(3) To present plans embodying the principal needs of the area which would be more closely related to practicability and realisation than (1); wider and larger in vision than and yet embodying to whole of (2); and generally such as might reasonably be carried out over, say, twenty to twenty-five years by extended statutory powers at a cost not incommensurate with the benefits, direct and indirect, which should accrue."
In practical terms, the above approaches were studied with regard to their application to proposals especially concerning the use of land and the height of buildings zoning, some special areas of the City, traffic, and lastly matters of legislation, procedure and realisation.

With regard to the use of land, uses were proposed for all of the unused land and for streets zoned for the purposes most beneficial to the several parts of the City. The purpose of zoning was to guide and stimulate desirable development, to deter the undesirable and to exclude the obnoxious. Four zones were suggested, for "Special Business", for "General Business", for "Commercial" use and, lastly, an "Undetermined" category, excluding all types of special industrial buildings and industrial building in general. Especially, it was recognised that the area of which the Bank of England was the effective centre was designated as "Special Business". Furthermore, the greater part of the rest of the City and all main street frontages were proposed as "General Business", while the "Commercial" zone, including warehouses, stockrooms, workrooms, etc., covered the Wood Street district and some similar areas. Finally, as the "Undetermined" zone was classified the river, which had the effect that no building could occur over the foreshore without the consent of the Court of Common Council.

At the same time, regarding the permitted height and coverage of buildings, the principles of the Corporation's control, as presently exercised, were adopted. The actual suggestions for the height of buildings could be summarised as follows:

"(1) Limitation of overall height to roof on top storey to the same extent as the London Building Acts, i.e., approximately 100 ft. throughout the
City except in the St. Paul's area and over 100 ft. in exceptional cases by special consent and consultation with the London County Council as the authority for the London Building Acts.

(2) Limitation of street height of elevation from ground level to cornice (or wall-head) in relation to street width, and angular limit of set-back thereabove; there are two zones for this - (i) in the central area, where the sheer height permissible is twice the street width, with 63.5° set-back, (ii) in the rest of the City, where the sheer height permissible is one and a half times the street width, with 56° set-back. In both cases, the 80-ft. cornice limit of the London Building Acts is effective. In the St. Paul's area, special cornice limits are defined.

(3) Limitation of light-wells (whether enclosed on all sides or not) to an angle of 63.5° from first floor slab level throughout the City.42

Meanwhile, the Corporation's control of coverage of buildings as it was exercised until the end of the war could be tabulated as follows43:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commercial and all uses other than residential</th>
<th>Residential uses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 16 ft. above ground level, 100%</td>
<td>Up to 40 ft. above ground level, 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 16 ft. to 40 ft., 90%</td>
<td>From 40 ft. to 60 ft., 45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 40 ft. to maximum height, 75%</td>
<td>From 60 ft. to maximum height, 40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With regard to the proposals for some special areas of the City, measures referring to the environment of St. Paul's Cathedral and of the churches and other historic
buildings were suggested. Especially, referring to St. Paul's Cathedral, the Report recommended that in the future it should be less encompassed by buildings than it was, particularly on the south, east and west sides. The building lines should be defined so as to create a quiet formality, without forced symmetry, at sufficient distance to provide a larger forecourt in the west and a wider stretch of greensward surrounding the south and east. Furthermore, the buildings should have a cornice at about 60 ft. above ground level and a uniform skyline, with the fenestration and the materials of the elevations determined for their harmony with each other and with the Cathedral. Moreover, the general form of the Ludgate Hill approach should be retained, subject to widening to 80 ft. in order that the full composition could be seen at a greater distance down the Hill. At the same time, a view of the total height should be obtained from both the north and the south opposite the porches under the dome; the south should be open from the River front by an appropriate treatment of the approach levels; additionally, the north should possess an approach for pedestrians. According to the Report, both these approaches demanded formal but subdued architectural treatment and careful selection of elevational materials.

Besides St. Paul's Cathedral, the churches and other monuments of architectural and historic distinction, such as Guildhall, the Mansion House, Halls of the Livery Companies, etc., were considered to be subject to reconstruction policy. Especially, the reconstruction of Guildhall and its offices was under the consideration of another Committee, but the Report expressed the view that, in whatever form it was ultimately effected, the site should have dignified approaches and a suitable environment.
Furthermore, according to the Report, the proposed street improvements contained both a new circular route, 80 ft. wide, intended to act partly as a by-pass and partly as a distributive road for through traffic including public service vehicles, and street widenings within this ring whose effect would be to relieve congestion mainly in the western and more heavily damaged section of the City. The circular route consisted of two sections, the northern and the southern. The schemes for the northern section were: (i) from Aldersgate Street at its junction with Barbican; from Aldersgate Street passing generally along the site of Fore Street to Moorgate, (ii) an alternative proposal in the same general direction but passing on each side of the Church of St. Giles, Cripplegate, and associated with a larger area of clearance to expose the line of London Wall. On the other hand, the southern section of the circular route continued the Victoria Embankment by passing under Blackfriars Bridge and proceeding eastwards under London Bridge to Tower Hill. Moreover, the northern and southern sections could be joined by an eastern arm between Aldgate and Tower Hill, while a western arm consisted of the use of New Bridge Street, Farringdon Street and Farringdon Road with a junction at Blackfriars. So, it was considered that the construction of the circular route would relieve the City of traffic.

Finally, we must examine the legislative framework. Work on the Forty Plan for the City started under the regulations of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1932. However, the subsequent passing of the War Damage Acts of 1941 and of 1943, as well as of the Town and Country Planning (Interim Development) Act, 1943, gave further provisions and powers to the scheme and made it more effective. It is to be noted that especially the latter Act enabled the Corporation, as the planning authority
for the City, to postpone consideration of applications which could not be carried out immediately. Moreover, the pressing need for new legislation to deal with reconstruction issues was reflected on the Report. But, what was the criticism which developed after the publication of the above City Plan?

The reaction of Astragal, the regular commentator of The Architects' Journal, was a distinctive one. He pointed out on 10 August, 1944, that:

"After three whole years of hard work the Improvements and Town Planning Committee of the City of London can come to no decisions upon the surroundings of St. Paul's, upon the extension of the Thames Embankment, upon the removal of the anachronistic meat and fish markets, upon the tidying up of the welter of main line terminal stations; all that it can say with conviction is that the City requires a Ring Road and that many internal roads require widening."

He added:

"It is simply designed to restore the rateable values of the City to their pre-war position, to maintain them and to increase them. In the pre-war minds of its authors high rateable values are apparently dependent upon three things - extensive street frontages, terminal railway stations and wholesale markets; no provision is made for adequate open spaces, for through passenger traffic or for the removal of the wholesale markets because, obviously, every open space would reduce the amount of ground available for building - and rating."

Obviously, this kind of criticism is harsh but we believe that it represents the timid character of the scheme's proposals. Apart from details and special sites, the five objectives of the scheme were: (i)
improvements in communication for all types of internal and by-pass traffic, (ii) improvements in typical commercial and office accommodation, (iii) improved services, (iv) improved settings for historic monuments and notable buildings, and (v) improvements in amenity and recreation, which were unsuccessfully pursued\textsuperscript{53}.

Moreover, as it was argued in the Editorial of \textit{The Architects' Journal} on 10 August, 1944:

"In matters of architecture and civic design it looks rather as if there is a willingness to do what is proper, but a lack of knowledge, technique, and designing ability to demonstrate it"\textsuperscript{54}.

This latter point seems to be the explanation of the above features of the Forty Plan for the City. Indeed, it emerges from a PRO document, dated 18 February 1943, that the Ministry of Town and Country Planning had little confidence

"that the present opportunities are to be seized or that there is any real planning concept behind the proposals"\textsuperscript{55}.

This judgment was based on the fact that

"the plan is under the guidance of the City Engineer, who has not and can hardly be expected to have the proper qualifications need for a job of this kind; he has a planning officer, Mr. Lovett, who has done some extensive survey work, but there are indications, nothing more, that he is being kept in the background"\textsuperscript{58}.

Criticism of the Forty Plan was also issued by the Royal Fine Art Commission. It pointed out that the proposed plans were mainly traffic-related, other considerations being secondary. At the same time, they did not appear to envisage any marked improvement in the size, shape, and alignment of building blocks\textsuperscript{57}. How-
ever, the Commission agreed in principle with the opinion expressed in the Forty Report that small open spaces were more suited to the use and character of the City than large ones.

Nevertheless, the Forty Plan for the City was rejected by the last Minister of Town and Country Planning in the National Government, W. S. Morrison, who argued that the scheme as it stood was mean and unimaginative, that even the elementary and basic requirements of convenient accommodation and good circulation had not been faced, and that the obvious idea behind the proposals, of avoiding land purchase and interference with existing boundaries, was nothing less than a dominating negative. The Minister also suggested that as the problem was of such national importance, its solution demanded the very best town planning advice. Actually, the Corporation of the City of London was advised by the new Labour Minister, Lewis Silkin, in July, 1945 "to make a fresh start and to discuss with him the appointment of consultants."

This development had led to Dr. C. H. Holden and Professor W. G. Holford being invited to act as consultants and to proceed in the formulation of their recommendations for the City of London.
XVI. THE HOLDEN-HOLFORD PLAN FOR THE CITY OF LONDON

After the turning down of the City Engineer's Plan for the City, Professor William Holford, a distinguished architect and planner who also was Director of Research in the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, and Dr. Charles Holden, a senior architect who had the stature and the experience to command respect in the conservative City\(^1\), were appointed in 1945 by the Corporation of the City of London as consultants to prepare proposals for its replanning.

In March 1946 they submitted their Interim Report to the Improvements and Town Planning Committee, and subsequently to the Court of Common Council on 17 July 1946 with the recommendation that it should be accepted in principle and as a basis on which the Final Plan and Report could be prepared for submission to the Minister\(^2\). Put very broadly, they recommended that the City should specialise in its own forms of accommodation, and maintain its reputation as a centre for the convenient transaction of business, while at the same time they recognised that the biggest problem in its replanning was that of traffic congestion\(^3\).

Especially, in this first stage of the Plan they suggested that the total amount of accommodation to be aimed at should be as would provide for a day-time population of about 470,000\(^4\), that is slightly less than in 1931, but at a generous standard of floor-space per
person; it was also suggested that every office should be well lighted and ventilated, and circulation between offices should be made easier. Additionally, the consultants in referring to the traffic circulation task proposed that the road system should be designed to carry twice the pre-war volume of traffic⁵. In order to meet this target, they recommended new roads in the war-damaged areas, widened roads in a distributive circuit around St. Paul's and the Bank crossing, and placing of pavements under ground-floor arcades where new and undamaged frontages made widening impracticable. In this context, a special road was proposed to take traffic from Holborn Circus or from Gray's Inn Road, over Farringdon Street and the Central Markets, and then directly to Liverpool Street and Broad Street Stations, while Thames Street was proposed for substantial widening, to allow local through-traffic to move easily between Tower Hill and the Victoria Embankment⁶ (fig. 29).

Referring to the use-zoning system for the City of London, the consultants suggested that the whole area, apart perhaps from the Inner and Middle Temples, St. Bartholomew's Hospital and the historic buildings, had to be organised as the commercial zone of London. As a consequence, other uses, whether residential or industrial, should require approval from the Corporation, even they were essential to commercial operations. It was also noted that the uncontrolled spread of purely commercial buildings into adjacent areas, unless forming part of another and separate centre or sub-centre, was not a proceeding which the Corporation would wish to see encouraged by the adjacent Planning Authority whose territory surrounded them. Within this major commercial zone there were a large number of essential uses, as those of offices, public buildings, service buildings (including those for transport and post
Fig. 29. The Holden-Holford Plan for the City of London: The proposed main road system.

office purposes, and power supply), warehouses, riverside wharves, cold stores, wholesale and retail markets, and shops.

Furthermore, the consultants had a general aim, first to establish three main zones: viz., an Office Zone, a Warehouse Zone and a Zone of Combined Office and Warehouse buildings together with a Special Building Zone; second, to suggest the appropriate ratio of floor-space to site area in each zone and the limits of variation above and below this overall figure, which would be appropriate to sub-divisions of the zone and to whole street blocks; third, to suggest a method by which uses ancillary to those of the two main zones (such as shops and institutions) could be admitted without discrimination in principle but with reasonable control over individual applications.

Regarding civic design, the consultants recognised three problems to be involved: the preservation or improvement of the settings of buildings of historic and architectural importance, the creation of opportunities for fine new buildings, and the maintenance of "character" in City architecture, blending the richness and diversity of buildings of all periods, with necessary improvements in standards of accommodation, internal and external.

Referring to the first task, St. Paul's, was without question the most important monument. It was therefore proposed to enlarge its "precinct" to the dimensions proposed by Wren and to preserve the Ludgate Hill approach, but to make the last part of it a ceremonial approach only, diverting bus traffic along Carter Lane.

Moreover, it was suggested that the Tower should be
within a precinct which included the Gardens, as proposed by the Tower Hill Improvement Trust; Guildhall should be rebuilt with the old hall retained against a background of modern building, comprising new offices, committee rooms and council chamber, and a civic hall available to the Livery Companies and others whose own premises had been destroyed by bombing; finally, the City churches should not be overwhelmed by new office buildings.

Concerning the creation of opportunities for fine new buildings, according to the consultants, it would occur if the proposals were adopted at many places such as the New Square, which was suggested to be made at the crossing of Carter Lane, Queen Victoria Street and Cannon Street, as well as in the case of the buildings facing St. Paul’s. Finally, referring to the maintenance of character in City architecture, it was proposed that town planning control of floor-space access and daylighting should be consistently operated and that in certain areas, e.g., around St. Paul’s, there should be an architectural control over the height and external appearance of buildings. It was argued that the redevelopment of whole blocks, or of property on both sides of a “corridor” street, should be contemporaneous.

As Astragal pointed out, very wisely, Holden and Holford had interpreted their terms of reference liberally, and had cast their report not as a detailed criticism of the rejected City Engineer’s Plan, but in the form of new proposals. Actually, the new plan, besides the fact that its road proposals differed considerably from those suggested by the previous one, contained a two-stage programme for realisation of the recommendations; for example, the immediate construction programme for new main roads in areas of extensive
war damage was referred, first to the new east-west link between Aldersgate and London Wall; second, to the new north-south relief road from Finsbury Pavement, alongside Guildhall across Gresham Street and Cheapside to Cannon Street; and third, to the New Street itself.

Furthermore, according to the authoritative biography of Holford, written by G. Cherry and L. Penny under the title *Holford: A study in architecture, planning and civic design*, another characteristic point of the consultants' suggestions was that while Abercrombie's London Plans had called for a substantial dispersal of population and employment, Holden and Holford did not choose to recommend that the City contribute to this metropolitan exodus, but they argued that the decentralisation of population and industry did not necessarily involve any significant loss of population and industry and financial activities in which the City specialised.

In presenting the Interim Report, the Improvements and Town Planning Committee made certain observations to the Court of Common Council referring: first, to the road proposals, which in its view would have the effect of bisecting the market place of the Mincing Lane area; second, to the Upper Thames Street viaduct, which they did not like but preferred a street at ground level sufficient to accommodate all future requirements; third, to the St. Paul's Cathedral environs, which they felt had not yet achieved the necessary finality in the proposals for treatment; and fourth, to the river front about which they were not convinced of the feasibility of the construction of the proposed high level riverside walk along the greater part of the front from Blackfriars to London Bridge. Finally, the Committee accepted the Interim Report of the consultants as a
whole and recommended its approval; this happened on 17 July 1946, when the Court of Common Council approved it in principle.

The Final Report on Reconstruction of the City of London was presented to the Improvements and Town Planning Committee of the Corporation by the joint planning consultants, Dr. C.H. Holden and Professor W.G. Holford, in April 1947. Since the publication of the Interim Report, the planning climate had changed; it was due mainly to the fact that at that time the new Town and Country Planning Bill, which led to the establishment of the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, was in the House of Commons. The problem was that the responsibilities of the City under the Bill with regard to the execution and direction of the plan would undergo great changes, the LCC taking over control. Indeed, according to the subsection 1 of the section 114 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, that the local planning authority for the administrative county of London was defined as the London County Council. However, at the same time, matters such as those related, first, to the obligation to purchase land on refusal of permission in certain cases (1947 Act, section 19), to orders for preservation of trees and woodlands (1947 Act, section 28), to powers to expedite completion of compulsory acquisition of land for development (1947 Act, section 39) and to default powers of Minister (1947 Act, section 100), second, to the powers of a local authority to make agreements regulating development or use of land (1947 Act, section 25), and third, to construction and improvement of private streets (1947 Act, section 48), should be exercised in the case of land in the City of London by the Common Council of the City.

To turn to the proposals themselves, the consultants
succeeded with great skill in finding solutions to the urgent traffic problems, attempting, at the same time, to preserve the character of the City and all its monuments. In addition to the road proposals, they had made two important contributions to town planning practice; especially to that referring to central area planning. The first contribution was their recommendations for the distribution of floor space throughout the City by a kind of density-control, and the conception of the Standard Plot Ratio, while the second one referred to the suggested new Day-lighting Code (see also in Chapter VIII). What, then, were the main features of the above recommendations and the introduced innovations?

The Holden-Holford Plan for the City was based on an inventory of accommodation provided in and immediately adjacent to the City in 1939. The pre-war floor space was calculated by dividing the whole area of the city into street blocks, these being groups of buildings surrounded by uncovered streets containing carriage ways\(^22\). The street blocks were measured in three ways:

(i) *Built-on Area*, this was land within the street that was covered by structures at ground floor level.

(ii) *Block Area*, this was the area obtained by following round the external building line of the street block, cutting across any internal access-roads leading into the block.

(iii) *Gross Area*, this was the Block Area, plus half the width of all surrounding streets\(^23\).

Two useful indices were the outcome from these calculations: first, the *net ratio* of floor space obtained by dividing the total floor area by the Built-on Area, and second, the *floor space index*, obtained by dividing the total floor space by the Gross Area\(^24\). It is apparent that the net ratio is of main concern to the owner and
his architect, since it indicates the bulk and disposition of the building mass itself, while the floor space index is the town planner's measuring "rod" and enables him to suggest the right balance between accommodation and traffic, building and open space, concentration and spread.

Having the above indices as basic instruments, the consultants recommended

"that for the standard office block a maximum ratio of 5 to 1 should be established between the amount of floor space in a particular building or group of buildings and the area of the plot which the building owner is developing."

Furthermore, relaxations enabling a ratio of up to 6 to 1 to be used were suggested for certain types of occupancy to meet special cases. It is to be noted that a plot ratio of 5 had been found that would produce a floor space index of the corresponding Block as a whole of about 3; of course, in the case where one of the plots was occupied by a church or some other building of low density, the average plot ratio was less than 5 and the index less than 3. As a consequence of the above suggested density policy, the whole City, consisting of 318 street blocks and assuming a plot ratio of 5 for new developments, had approximately an average plot ratio of 4.3 and a corresponding floor space index of 2.5. At the same time, in total floor space terms the City had an area of 65.75 million sq.ft. in 1939. It had been reduced by approximately a third to 59 million in 1947 after the war destructions, and the future figure suggested was no more than 82 million. In addition, the target day-population figure for the City was set at about 470,000 and this represented a reduction of 6 per cent on what was estimated as the peak figure before the war. Figures 30 and 31 show the total floor space in each section of the City in 1939 and in
Fig. 30. The Holden-Holford Plan for the City of London: Floor space in each section for 1939 and 1947 (in thousands of square feet). The final figures in bold type are the 1947 figures.

Fig. 31. The Holden-Holford Plan for the City of London: Floor space in each section (shown in thousands of square feet) as in 1947 and, in bold type, after redevelopment.

1947, and the figures likely to be realised when all existing commercial plots have been developed, if the trends suggested in the Final Report and the recommended density control both came to pass. Criticising the value of the above system of floor calculations, G. Cherry and L. Penny argued that the plot ratio provided one of the major devices whereby the City was prevented from turning into a miniature New York.

The daylighting code suggested by the consultants took the form of Appendix C in their Final Report. In practice they recommended a revision of the City's Draft Clauses on Height and Site Coverage, which had been devised before the war with the purposes of securing adequate daylight, ventilation and access for firefighting. A similar code has already presented in Chapter VIII of this thesis. It appeared in the Advisory Handbook on The Redevelopment of Central Areas of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, also in the form of Appendix. However, the daylighting code introduced by Holden and Holford had a specific character appropriate to the particular problems which were concentrated in the case of the City of London.

The main difference between the proposed new City code and existing height and set-back regulations might be summed up in the fact that the code recognised that it was not the amount of accommodation on a given area that controls the daylight reaching windows so much, as the arrangement of the accommodation. As a matter of fact, according to the code the proportion of well lighted floor space in a building was almost wholly determined by the following five factors:

(i) Obstruction outside the windows.
(ii) Overall width of building block.
(iii) Height of the various floors above ground level.
Furthermore, it was argued that the relative importance of these various factors could be judged with tolerable accuracy by plotting the No-sky-line resulting under various conditions which already existed in City buildings or would exist under the code introduced. As No-sky-line was defined, the diagonal line running from window head to floor in most rooms, behind which no portion of the sky could be seen, and the depth of penetration of the No-sky-line into a room, were considered as a good guide to day-light conditions in it (fig. 32 and 33). Finally, it is to be noted that the proposals of the new daylighting code were based on the assumption that the density of accommodation in the City would in future be controlled in the manner contained in the main corpus of the Final Report, which among others included the norm that for the standard office block a maximum ratio of 5 to 1 should be established.

Introducing a very strong framework of intervention in the built environment by both of the above controls, the City’s consultants went on to provide solutions to other town planning problems. It is to be noted here that the most urgent question which had to be faced was the City’s road system. As is well known, for centuries the City has had no adequate canalisation of traffic from east to west. With the growth of Westminster to the west, and the Stepney and Finsbury to the east and north, an enormous volume of through-traffic had been created, which was finding its way slowly through the medieval City routes. It has been calculated that in 1936 the average speed of a vehicle from Ludgate Circus to Aldgate was not much greater than walking pace.
Fig. 32. The Holden-Holford Plan for the City of London:
Six sets of conditions as regards daylight access.

A record of destruction and survival. London:
The Architectural Press, 1951, p. 322.

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Fig. 33. The Holden-Holford Plan For the City of London: Section showing depth of penetration of No-sky-lines on each floor for cases in the previous figure.

Anyway, this through-traffic, which had no business in the City as it was coming from and going to points at some distance from it, had to be catered for by improvements in the County plan as a whole. On the other hand, the activities and functions of the City itself were generating a lot of traffic congestion. As a consequence, the most southerly route, Thames Street, was blocked during part of the day by Billingsgate traffic and other warehouse vehicles. The next route, consisting of Queen Victoria Street, Cannon Street and Eastcheap, had difficult crossings at the Mansion House, which is the residence of the Lord Mayor, and London Bridge. The next west-east route, consisting of Holborn, Newgate, Cheapside, Cornhill, Leadenhall Street and Aldgate, was the most direct way through the city, and at the same time because of the narrowness of the road in some parts and the frequency of its crossings, the slowest. North of this cross-route there was practically no main thoroughfare going from west to east. Finally, the north-south routes all approached bridgeheads; the most important of them from the traffic point of view were those which crossed Blackfriars and London Bridges.

The consultants, trying to find a solution to the above traffic problem, suggested both improvements of the existing routes and the construction of new ones. The improvements contained on the one hand interim remedies, as for example: (i) the prohibition of standing vehicles on all the main routes, (ii) the maximum possible facilities for parking cars and public service vehicles off the public ways, (iii) the wider distribution of bus routes and the improvement of bus stations, (iv) the increased use of road studs and upright traffic signs to indicate lanes for particular streams of traffic, (v) the carrying on of loading and unloading operations, and (vi) in some narrow thoroughfares
arcading over the pavement was proposed as an interim stage in the perspective of street widening. On the other hand, they suggested measures for adding to pedestrian facilities including increased open spaces, as well as the linking up of these with sequence of shops or shopping centres, historic buildings and open view-points. In this category of improvements, they included some proposals referring to special traffic works concerning, for example, the sinking of the railway line at Blackfriars Bridge below ground leaving the existing level for local traffic, as well as the Liverpool Street and Broad Street approaches.

In addition to the foregoing road improvements, two completely new roads were suggested for the City. The first of them was the road which links Gray's Inn Road and Holborn with Liverpool Street, occupying two levels: the existing ground level for turning traffic and an upper level which flew over Farringdon Street and other streets to take the through-traffic to Aldersgate, Moorgate and Liverpool Street. The other one was a two-level route at Thames Street; the lower level road was proposed to be used by the slow-moving vehicles coming to the wharves and warehouses and by cars and lorries that wanted to park underneath the terraces, while the latter would take the quicker moving office traffic and possibly some of the local through-traffic, which wanted to get quickly from the east to the west of the City and beyond (fig. 34).

A second town planning problem, which received a radical solution in the consultants' proposals, was that referring to the zoning of the City. They recommended that the City, excluding the Inner and Middle Temples, should be considered for all general zoning purposes as one zone. Reference was also made to the desirability of abolishing in the near future the distinction
Fig. 34. The Holden-Holford Plan for the City of London: The proposed longterm street plan in 1947.

between zones in which the height and cover clauses varied.

In regard to "use zoning" also, the distinctions between "free-entry" and "permissive" areas for Special Business, General Business, Commercial and Undetermined Uses, was to be abolished, and in their place were to be indicated on the first development plan, and on the subsequent five-yearly revisions, those sections in which particular types of commercial user would be considered normal, those in which a special case would have to be made to secure normal status, and those in which a special case would have to be substantiated before planning permission was granted. The plans would also define the sites or at least the closely approximate localities in which open spaces and uses other than commercial were to be either encouraged or excluded, and those which were designated for particular uses by the local authorities, statutory undertakers or Government Departments. Lastly, the descriptive statement attached to the plans would prescribe certain forms of user.

Furthermore, it was recommended that a General Zone be delineated covering the area of the City, flanked by similar zones in certain parts of Westminster, Holborn, Finsbury and Stepney. This General Zone would cover all building uses grouped under the following headings:

(i) residential buildings (including hotels, hospitals, hostels and flats);
(ii) offices (including banks and safe deposits, and also private canteens and luncheon clubs);
(iii) business premises (including wholesale, warehouses, exchanges, salerooms, and workshops incidental to the business and not using mechanical plant);
(iv) shops (including retail markets, post offices, public houses, bars, restaurants and ticket
offices);
(v) public buildings and places of assembly (including churches, chapels, clubs, Company Halls, fire and police stations, professional institutes, secondary schools, technical colleges, exhibition halls, theatres and public libraries);
(vi) storage warehouses (including builders' and contractors' yards, cold stores, furniture depositories, and multi-storey garages);
(vii) light industrial buildings (including those defined in Section 151 of the Factories Act, but having only electrically driven power-machinery establishments, and workshops for personal services);
(viii) petroleum filling stations;
(ix) transport and public utility structures (including bus and underground stations and depots, electricity sub-stations, telephone exchanges, pumping stations, water towers and accumulators, railway stations and yards);
(x) industrial buildings (including large printing works and presses, garages and repair shops, breweries and factories requiring, however, special permission in the Inner Section);
(xi) dwelling houses (including nursery schools, requiring also special permission in any Section of the City, except in the area which lay north of the line of Barbican-Beech Street-Chiswell Street);
(xii) special industrial buildings, requiring permission;
(xiii) Special Places of Resort (including amusement galleries and Fun Fairs).

Apart from these proposals of a general character for the City, the consultants recommended measures for certain areas of it as well. They deserve the term "precinct", in that they have a character of their own,
somewhat withdrawn from the run of commercial buildings and which had to be protected from major thoroughfares running through them. The most important of them should be considered the St. Paul's precinct and the Guildhall precinct.

The significance of St. Paul's Cathedral as a monument was not in question. Moreover, its escape from major damage by bombing and the fact that the Cathedral with its dome became during the war something of a symbol of resistance and survival created a very strong sentimental feeling among the planners which helped suggest the opening up of more space around the Cathedral and, on the other hand, the preservation of more extensive views of it than existed before the bombing.

As a consequence, in preparing the layout of the St. Paul's precinct, the following factors were brought under review by the consultants: first, the establishment of a ceremonial approach from Fleet Street, up Ludgate Hill; second, the need for an adequate forecourt, with a layby for vehicles during special functions; third, the diversion to Carter Lane of the main traffic stream and bus route from its existing close proximity to the west and south fronts of the Cathedral and the reduction of disturbance to the religious services; fourth, the opening up of the Churchyard on the south and east; fifth, the closing of the east side of the Churchyard to north-south traffic and making, at the same time, provision for that traffic to flow easily from Cannon Street to Newgate Street and St. Martin's-le-Grand; sixth, the preservation of the best views of the Cathedral and its great dome, without making an excessive demand for open space; seventh, the maintenance and improvement in every way possible of the famous prospect of St. Paul's from Bankside; and eighth, the dedication of some of the open space.
cleared by bombing as a memorial to the events of 1940-45 and to the Cathedral's almost miraculous survival from destruction. It is to be noted here, that especially for the preservation of the very fine view of the Cathedral from the south-east, which continues all the way down Cannon Street, the authors of the plan proposed that no building whatever should occupy the ground between the Cathedral and Cannon Street and Carter Lane on the south, so that only the little church of St. Augustine in Watling Street would remain as foil and foreground to the grass and trees, and possibly the building up of a low platform to include some actual debris from bomb damage as a memorial.

In regard to the Guildhall, which had lost its roof during the war, but whose walls with their monuments had survived and remained almost intact, it was suggested that it should be repaired and rebuilt and set as a kind of symbol in near surroundings. It is significant that the rest of the Civic Centre at this place, apart from a few offices, had been destroyed and therefore the rebuilding of the Guildhall and its yard was considered as an essential part of City reconstruction. In that area, the Mansion House, which lies some way away from the Guildhall, was considered, according to the consultants' view, as an associated building in the context of the Guildhall precinct. Both of these buildings together with the surrounding offices, committee rooms, council chamber and some of the departments of the Corporation of City, which were dispersed in various parts, were proposed to be conveniently grouped in this place into a precinct.

The last important task contained in the Holden-Holford Plan for the City was to establish the stages of its realisation and the legislative procedure which was to be followed. As regards the stages of realisation, the
consultants in their report tried to envisage how much
could actually be planned on the basis of fact, and how
much must be planned as conjecture only. For this rea-
son, the proposals were shown as divided into two
parts. The first part was a Ten-year Programme showing
the main street improvements to be put in hand in that
time and the areas of land which would either have to be
acquired to be developed in the way proposed, or
else redeveloped by the owners in accordance with the
plan. The second part was a nominal Thirty-year Plan
which depended for its validity on the carrying out of
major schemes, such as the provision of new underground
railways.

In this context, the earliest tentative Building Date
for normal commercial buildings was proposed to be
April, 1949. It occurred because it had been assumed
that little labour would be available for permanent
commercial building at the outset, and that the optimum
size of the building labour force might be expected to
be reached in 1965. In more details, the consultants'
calculations had been as follows: in the first five
years, that is from 1949 to 1953, 28 million cubic feet
of building could be completed by a building labour
force rising from 550 men, at the Building Date, to
3,000 men, at the end of this first period. On the
assumption that the labour force for war-damaged and
normal replacement combined climbs to 5,000 men by
1965, and that the optimum area and distribution of
building sites was made available at any given time,
the reconstruction proposals for the City as a whole
would be realisable by 1975.

Finally, the legislative procedure of the above plan
was based on the assumption that the Improvements and
Town Planning Committee would forward to the Minister
an application for a Declaratory Order under the Town
and Country Planning Act, 1944. It would be also supported by proposals for improvement in the recognition that this would be a step towards the eventual approval of a development plan under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, which was at that time under debate as a Bill in Parliament, including the designation of land subject to compulsory purchase, and any compulsory purchase orders already made. In recommending the areas suitable for designation for compulsory purchase, there were only two firm criteria for guidance: the first being the definition of areas of extensive war damage which required to be developed as a whole, and the other, the addition of other land, including areas of bad layout and obsolete development, required for the carrying out of essential planning improvements. In fact, these were the criteria for the Declaratory Areas under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944.

During the examination of the Holden-Holford proposals for the City of London, the following question has arisen, referring to the planning strategy for the reconstruction of Central London: what were the main projects suggested within comprehensive replanning, and how were these organised under the town planning legislative framework introduced in the 1940s and 1950s? This issue will be the objective of the next Chapter.
XVII. THE PROJECTS OF COMPREHENSIVE REDEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL LONDON

In the previous Chapters it became apparent that the sudden clearing away of large built-up areas of the British cities caused by the blitz was followed by systematic work at the legislative and planning level. However, very soon in those reconstruction years, the possibility of the application of the above measures was tested in special projects which were undertaken in specific areas of the damaged towns. In London, and especially in its central area, there were extensive areas damaged by the enemy action, which became subject to the preparation of three-dimensional schemes.

The foundation of the above planning work was, on the one hand, the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944, which set out the procedure of Reconstruction Areas, and on the other, the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, which not only made the submission of a Development Plan obligatory, but also enabled Planning Authorities to define areas of Comprehensive Development, which was a similar but more flexible idea than that of Reconstruction Areas.

Furthermore, the Administrative County of London Development Plan, 1951, which, as we saw in Chapter XIII, was the first established statutory plan for London, stated that some 100 areas stood in need of comprehensive treatment, but in fact, owing to the financial
liability likely to be incurred, only the eight most urgent areas were selected to be dealt with as Comprehensive Development Areas\(^1\), as follows: Stepney-Poplar, Bermondsey, South Bank, Elephant and Castle, Bunhill Fields, Barbican, St. Paul's Precinct and Tower of London\(^2\).

Examining in this Chapter the suggested proposals for rebuilding the damaged areas of Central London, an analysis will follow of those of the above Comprehensive Development Areas having central use character, that is in the projects of St. Paul's Precinct and Barbican, which are included in the City's boundaries, and also in South Bank, and Elephant and Castle, which belong to the south part of London's central area to the south of the Thames and are less developed.

\textbf{a. The St. Paul's Precinct Project}

Although the Advisory Plan for the whole of the City, prepared by Holden and Holford in 1947 (see Chapter XVI) had been approved in principle, the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, caused a significant delay, because the Advisory Plan proposals had to be incorporated in the Development Plan for the County of London, which, however, had not been submitted to the Minister until 1953. In approving the Administrative County of London Development Plan, the Minister of Housing and Local Government, Duncan Sandys, made certain modifications, one of which was the withdrawal of the area surrounding St. Paul's on the ground that it should be studied afresh in order to provide a worthy setting for the Cathedral\(^3\).

It was in March 1955, when Sir William Holford, who had recently retired from his position as consultant for
the City of London Corporation, told the Corporation's Improvements and Town Planning Committee that he "will be honoured to undertake the preparation of a scheme" for St. Paul's precinct. The Committee, which had asked Holford for his views on this matter, made its recommendations to the Court of Common Council at the end of the same month (March)⁴, and subsequently asked the Minister if he would agree to his appointment as their consultant with terms of reference to prepare a detailed scheme for the immediate precincts, and to advise them on their architectural policy with regard to all buildings coming within the orbit of the dome of St. Paul's⁵. The Minister approved the suggestion and Holford started work on 1 April, 1955⁶ under the guidance of an Advisory Committee consisting of the Minister and the Chairmen of the City Improvements and Town Planning Committee, and the LCC Town Planning Committee⁷.

As L. Hugh Wilson, OBE, ARIBA(AM), informs us, various architects and others attended meetings of the Committee and one could appreciate his comment that "their opinions varied considerably". However, by the end of September 1955 the Committee had listed a number of points to be considered by the consultant⁸. Subsequently, Holford submitted his Report to the Corporation in time for the meeting of the Court of Common Council on 22 March, 1956⁹.

Examining Holford's Report on St. Paul's precinct, we could summarise the basic elements of the scheme as follows. It had four objects: first, to justify public expenditure on clearing ground near the Cathedral, putting a term to the life of existing buildings, and erecting new ones by the creation of a precinct with a character of its own, which would add to the interest and beauty of this historic site and made it more
attractive, as well as more impressive as a centre of pilgrimage and a national monument; second, to establish a system of circulation in and around the precinct for pedestrians and vehicles; third, to make provision for new accommodation for a variety of uses, including offices, warehouses, shops, public buildings and some dwellings, thus replacing the floor space lost during the war to the maximum extent compatible with the two first objects of the scheme; and fourth, to devise a programme of development, starting with the sites already cleared on which building could proceed immediately, making allowance for traffic improvements, and leading directly and comprehensively to those later stages of the scheme which could not be embarked on at once without the demolition of more property than could be afforded at that moment.

Moreover, four principles of design were adopted as well for achieving the "worthy setting" of the area surrounding St. Paul's. The first one was the contrast of the adjacent buildings to Wren's Cathedral, rather than from attempts at harmony of scale or other architectural features. The second principle was the moving viewpoints rather than the fixed ones, as, although St. Paul's Cathedral was a symmetrical building about its east-west axis, the setting of its surrounding area was not axial at any point. Consequently, according to Holford it offered views only at the end of streets, alley ways and gaps between buildings. The third principle was the adoption of rectangularity in the setting of the surroundings to the Cathedral in order that the first principle of the contrast be achieved; this principle was adopted although, after the Great Fire, Wren had accepted the position of St. Paul's in the form of a Y whose arms began in the forecourt, passed the transepts, widened out at the east end of the Churchyard and continued as Cannon Street and Cheapside.
and even more although Holford himself had adopted a semi-circular forecourt in a model made in 1955\textsuperscript{18}. Finally, the fourth principle was that of a varied skyline, which would be the result of the entirely contrary principle of more open planning, in comparison with the existing one, with blocks of different height, as Holford argued it thus permitted a less congested layout offering, at the same time, views through and between the taller buildings to the many interesting silhouettes of trees, towers, spires and domes in which this area was already rich\textsuperscript{17}.

Furthermore, in the context of the latter principle, he suggested that the measures recommended in the Holden-Holford Plan for the City of London in 1947, and in order to protect the southern views of St. Paul's, they should stand subject to an allowance for minor towers and architectural features, while additionally he proposed that outside this area of specific height restriction, locations of new building could be divided into the following two categories: (i) those which formed part of a view of historic or scenic importance, seen from a viewpoint to which the public could have access, and (ii) those in situations where no interesting view of St. Paul's would be prejudiced by a high new building, and also where a high building was part of the desired architectural composition of an area of comprehensive development\textsuperscript{18}.

Describing Holford's proposals for St. Paul's precinct (fig. 35), we can recognise that the scheme had been conceived in three dimensions and was essentially a detailed design, specifying site areas and volumes for groups of buildings surrounding the Cathedral and enclosing a series of related open spaces at varying levels. These spaces consisted of the forecourt at the west end of the Cathedral with the approach from Lid-
Fig. 35. The Holden-Holford Plan for the City of London: The proposals for the precincts of St. Paul's.

gate Hill flanked by two office buildings (A & J on fig. 35)\(^1\), the Paternoster Square approached by steps from the forecourt and planned with two lower floors of car parking\(^2\), Stonemason’s Yard approached from the forecourt through Temple Bar and with the existing Chapter House on the north, the existing garden between the Cathedral and Cheapside\(^3\), the space at the east end of the Cathedral at the side of the existing St. Paul’s Church Yard flanked by the proposed building for the Choir School incorporating the tower of St. Augustine’s church\(^4\), and lastly the great lawn on the south side between the Cathedral and Cannon Street\(^5\). In addition to the above open spaces, the proposals illustrated comprised a group of buildings (K, L, M, N, P on fig. 35) planned around the existing roads (Old Change, Knightrider Street, and Distaff Lane) and with a raised pedestrian terrace on the line of the south transept\(^6\).

It is significant to note here that Holford, concluding his proposals, emphasised that he tried to keep the buildings diagrammatic in his plans and not the expressions of a personal taste and preference, and as a consequence would not look upon them as architectural designs in the full sense\(^7\). However, he also argued that there was a complete design behind the scheme as a whole, and it could be recognised in the form of the related open spaces between the buildings and around the Cathedral, rather than in the form of the individual structures, as these spaces made the setting for St. Paul’s and the scheme would stand or fall according to whether they were effective or otherwise\(^8\).

The same objective was again justified by Holford in late 1956, when he wrote to the Journal of the Town Planning Institute that:

"The Precinct is not in itself a purely architectural design, since the architectural centrepiece is
there already, and in a form which cannot be simply extended or repeated. What is needed is a frame or setting. At the same time it is something more than "an area of comprehensive development", in terms of the Act. It has to have architectural unity, even if the setting is a foil or contrast to the object it frames. It has therefore been a basic principle of the design to maintain a consistent character, scale and module throughout, from the walls of the buildings to the units of paving, and from the largest open space to the smallest. This unity is carried through the choice of materials and street furniture, the services (such as heating, cleaning and maintenance), the provision of car parking and loading space, and the planting of grass and trees. Like the Rockefeller Centre in New York the whole Precinct is conceived as a single urban estate — and not a very large one either²⁷.

The proposals of Holford for St. Paul's precinct received fairly wide publicity. After the Press Conference given on 16 March 1956, most of the newspapers and weekly magazines carried notices, all of them illustrated by photographs of the model or by specially commissioned line drawings; among them we could refer first to the newspapers: Evening Standard and Evening News (16 March), The Times, Manchester Guardian, and Telegraph (17 March), Spectator (24 March), Observer and The Sunday Times (25 March), and second the articles of John Summerson in the New Statesman (31 March), of Christopher Hussey in Country Life (22 March), and of Nikolaus Pevsner in the Home Service (6 May) and the Listener (10 May)²⁸.

It is to be noted that the critiques of C.H. Aslin, Hugh Casson and Patrick Abercrombie in The Sunday Times, of R. Furneaux Jordan in the Observer, of Myles
Wright in the Manchester Guardian and of the architectural correspondent in The Times, were in favour of Holford's proposals at least in that as they pointed out the good qualities inherent in them. Analogous was the criticism of Astragal in The Architects' Journal and of L. Hugh Wilson in the Journal of the Town Planning Institute. Especially, Astragal argued:

"Holford, although his fame is deservedly international, has not had any comparable schemes to design to such detail, and everyone will admit that he has risen to the occasion admirably. No site is more important and few could have done as well. The Minister of Housing and Local Government, Duncan Sandys, should feel singularly satisfied with the proposals for new London, which, by his action, he has caused to be designed."31.

At the same time, L.H. Wilson wrote in support that:

"Sir William Holford has succeeded in creating a design in the English tradition, which is a fine example of the art of townscape and also a very practical solution of the problems which arise in the rebuilding of this most valuable site, economically, visually and historically, in the City of London."32.

However, in the above climate of general acceptance of Holford's proposals for St. Paul's precinct, there was also the voice of Sir Albert Richardson, as we can see from the Editorial of The Architects' Journal of 5 April, 1956, which was opposed to these aspects. He argued that

"the contrast between the magnificence of St. Paul's and the commercial treatment proposed for the surroundings was very strong."33.

Sir Albert Richardson believed that the correct solution would be

"a wonderful framework that would be more than
Richardson's view was a significant counter-argument which would receive growing support in the 1960s and 1970s and it was one of the few predictive voices in those years, when the ideas of modernism were widely spread in the British scene and which were favoured in the policy-making circles as well. Actually, it is important to note here that the Minister of Works, David Eccles, in his annual message to The Architects' Journal in January 1954, stated that:

"Gradually it becomes possible to free more kinds of building from control, and to make a serious start on many large projects, such as the office blocks in the City of London. I do hope that building-owners will call for modern architecture and decoration. Our generation wants a style of its own and from what I have seen since I came to the Ministry of Works, if our architects are given the chance they will create such a style, worthy of the past and expressive of the new reign".

Even though the way of implementation of modernism in the post-war era is considered nowadays as that which contributed effectively to the inhuman formulation of the built environment and the future of Paternoster Square next to St. Paul's Cathedral is, according to the Prince of Wales's view,

"central to the argument between modernist and traditional architecture, or, as I'd rather put it, the argument between the inhuman and the human", it is a fact that although Holford's concept for St. Paul's precinct was entirely valid in town planning terms, however it was very poor regarded from the architectural point of view. Indeed, the architectural result of Holford's proposals could not be considered
Fig. 36. St. Paul's Cathedral view from Paternoster Square.

Photo: The author (March 1990).
Fig. 37. St. Paul's Cathedral's entrance and the new buildings.

Photo: The author (March 1990).
Fig. 38. The new tower in the Paternoster Square.

Photo: The author (March 1990).
as inspiring, even in the context of Modern Architecture itself (fig. 36, 37, 38).

b. The Barbican Project

The largest scheme, which had been defined as an Area of Comprehensive Development within the City of London in the context of the approved County of London Development Plan, was the heavily bombed Barbican area. This area of the City was the centre of the rag trade in London and was situated north of the Guildhall, between Aldersgate and Barbican Station on the west, and bounded on the east by Moorgate Station. It covered an area of approximately 40 acres of the Development Plan. All the buildings of this area had been destroyed by the German bombardment on the nights of 26 and 27 December 1940, while the only historic structures which had survived were the medieval church of St. Giles and sections of the Roman wall.

As Percy Johnson-Marshall pointed out, one of the great difficulties in regarded to the three-dimensional scheme for the Barbican was the reluctance of the City Corporation, which was the potential land owner, to accept such a scheme at all. He informs us that

"It was in fact only after the submission of a project prepared for a private group by the architects Sergei Kadleigh, William Whitfield and Patrick Horsbrugh in 1954 and the ensuing Public Enquiry, that it became obvious that there would have to be an official project."41

But, which were the main characteristics of the above proposed scheme?

The architects were instructed by the New Barbican Committee, a private group chaired by Sir Gerald Barry,
on 28 July 1954 to investigate and prepare an outline project for a comprehensive development of the blitzed area. In doing so, among other things, they were expected to keep the following main aims in view: (i) to develop the site as a complete whole, and to provide accommodation for a variety of uses all urgently needed in the City, (ii) to relieve traffic congestion by providing adequate parking facilities for vehicles on a realistic scale, (iii) to respect the historical associations, traditions and monuments of the City, (iv) to provide gardens and open space with trees and plants, (v) to achieve a form of development which would pay its own way and constitute a reliable investment, and (vi) to create buildings in a form worthy of the finest City monuments, not by a slavish copy of their outward form or “style”, nor by an equally thoughtless use of a “modern style”, but by expressing in contemporary materials, and in the service of contemporary necessities, the essential character of the City.

The architects in their project rejected the form of “piecemeal” sporadic development of the site and adopted the principle to develop it as a fully comprehensive scheme; comprehensive in the sense that the visual, social and functional aspects would be united in a complete whole, which would make out of the total development something far greater than the sum of each separate aspect.

According to the architects, it was suggested to excavate large areas on either side of the existing railway lines, that is the Metropolitan Railway and two tracks of British Railways, to a depth of some 60 ft. The historical monuments - the Roman wall and St. Giles’ church - were excluded from the excavated area so that they could be preserved in the open setting of a park. The excavated area was proposed to be filled with four
floors of fully equipped warehouse accommodation served by its own road system and having access to the railway by means of new sidings. In addition, car parking for at least 3,000 vehicles could be provided within this area.45

At ground level, the unexcavated area forming the historical centre with the remains of the Roman wall, St. Giles church and the old graveyard was to become a park extending to form about 7 acres of open space through the site joining Route 1148, a six-lane highway proposed in the Holden-Holford Plan for the City in 194747.

Above ground level, it was proposed to build three floors of warehouse or industrial accommodation; this accommodation formed three large terraces north of Route 11, which also contained perimeter offices, while south of Route 11, the blocks were all offices with arcaded shops. The top surfaces of all these blocks were linked together by bridges and formed a continuous terrace some 45 ft. to 50 ft. above ground level. On this raised residential level, served by road, escalators, and lifts, it was proposed to build four-storey maisonettes. Additionally, there would be local shops, restaurants, public houses, cinema, etc., and also schools and playgrounds for resident children48.

Rising up above the residential area, it was proposed that there should be five tall blocks of offices of varying heights. The top levels of these office blocks would be high grade residential flats making use of the roof gardens on top of the offices adjoining, served by express lifts by-passing the office levels48. It was lastly proposed that the site should be heated by means of a district heating system50.
Summarising the above analysis of the first scheme suggested for Barbican area, it is to be recognised that it was a coherent project from the "total planning" point of view. However, when it went before the Court of Common Council of the City Corporation it was rejected; this happened in December 195451. In fact, the Council had approved the reports of its Improvements and Town Planning Committee, which included the following points of criticism made by the City Planning Officer: the project introduced such a large volume of industrial uses that the result would be contrary to the provisions of the County of London Development Plan in which the area was zoned for commerce and not for industry; furthermore, no attempt had been made to comply with planning standards as, for example, those for natural light; moreover, there was no evidence that consideration had been given to the economic aspect of the matter; and finally, the acceptance of the proposals for acquisition of the remainder of the site, as would be necessary, would be contrary to the Corporation's present policy52. As a matter of fact, they did not want to take further land into public ownership, although, as Oliver Marriott informs us, before 1951 "the City was busy acquiring large tracts of land under its new powers of compulsory purchase"53.

Besides the Kadleigh, Whitfield and Horsbrugh project for New Barbican, two official proposals for the comprehensive planning of this area had been produced, one by the LCC and the other by the City Corporation. The first one, which had been prepared by Arthur Ling's LCC planning division, under the direction of Dr. J. Leslie Martin54, was especially interesting. In this scheme, six-storey maisonettes were proposed, grouped around the church of St. Giles, with shops underneath, providing a residential area. Other blocks were were proposed largely for commercial use and there were two point
blocks for office uses.55

The second scheme had been prepared by William Holford in collaboration with Anthony Mealand, the Planning Officer of the City Corporation.56 In this scheme five office blocks were proposed to run parallel with Route 11 and a closer development of blocks for offices and commerce was planned. Furthermore, the above, twenty-storey, point blocks for offices were sited in similar positions to those in the LCC's scheme, while some blocks of flats were introduced on the far side of St. Giles' church.57

It is true that both of the above schemes did not have the imaginative character in architectural terms of the first one. However they had the merit of recognising the need for some overall scheme at the political level, although with the Government's lifting of the ban on office building developers were beginning to submit proposals haphazardly throughout the area.58 This latter became apparent as a need after Macmillan lifted the development charge in 1953 and Birch the building controls in 1954, and the space granted planning permission by the LCC jumped from 2.4 million square feet of space in 1952 to 3 million in 1953, and 5.7 and 5.9 in 1954 and 1955 respectively.59 As a consequence, although the City of London had reduced the Redevelopment Area from the one discussed in the war - the Minister made, on December 13th, 1948, the City of London Declaratory Order, 1948, in respect of 231 acres of the 272 acres applied for, while in the Development Plan an area of approximately 244 acres was defined within the City of London as an Area of Comprehensive Development - the public opinion in London had expected and favoured a comprehensive, planned development of the Barbican; to this direction many journalistic projects published in the press since
1950, which liked to the public, had been effectively contributed.

Actually, at the request of the Corporation of City of London another project was ready for the Barbican area in 1956 prepared by a private firm of architects (Chamberlin, Powell and Bon). At this point it becomes necessary to recall that the architects' first project was submitted in 1955, approached the design of the low buildings in a fundamentally different way to the one built, owing, according to the criticism for the Barbican development published by Sherban Cantacuzino in The Architectural Review of August 1973, little to prewar planning theory and anticipating Sir Leslie Martin's studies in land use and built form of the late 1950s\(^2\). Indeed, it consisted of a chequeboard of four-storey housing around alternative private and public courts. This project was rejected by the LCC on planning grounds because of its excessively high density and lack of clear open space\(^2\). Afterwards they had been invited to prepare a scheme for the residential area, as the Barbican area was divided into two parts: a commercial zone of 28 acres and a residential area for over 6,000 people. However, very soon they saw that the area could be enlarged to great advantage and suggested including the proposed commercial development to the west. As P. Johnson-Marshall pointed out, although negotiations for the use of this site had already taken place, the Corporation eventually accepted the change of use, and thus gave the opportunity of preparing a much better project for the residential neighbourhood\(^2\).

According to Cantacuzino, in so far as the Barbican plan introduced a residential pocket into a predominantly commercial area it broke away from the strict zoning of the CIAM's Athens Charter and the "fuctional
city" which it envisaged, and reflected the mood of the 1950s, which first sensed the improvement of urban life that would result from the abolition of rigid segregation of housing, offices, recreation, transportation, etc. But, what were the main features of the Chamberlin-Powell-Bon Plan for the Barbican area?

The project proposed housing between 6,000 and 7,000 people in 2,355 flats in an area of about 30 acres. The plot ratio of the scheme was 3.5:1 instead of the proposed 5:1 in the Holden-Holford Plan for the City and retained in the Development Plan of 1951; the density was calculated to be 300 people to the acre. Additionally, it proposed new buildings for the City of London School, the City of London School for Girls, the Guildhall School of Music and Drama, 1,840 garages, a restaurant, three public houses, a concert hall and theatre (each seating 700 persons), an art gallery, a conservatory and various playgrounds, walks, and ornamental water.

In architectural composition terms, the suggested buildings formed a series of inter-connecting courts, with vertical emphasis provided by three 30-storey residential tower-blocks running approximately parallel to the axis of the four towers of offices which were proposed for the north side of Route 11. In the centre the schools, with the theatre, concert hall and art gallery, formed the four sides of a court, in which a pavilion was proposed containing the Lord Mayor's coach. To the north of this court, beyond a strip of ornamental water, was an open-air stage and arena. The semi-circular building beyond consisted of six storeys of single and two-room flats. Below the flats, and below part of the arena, were two floors of garages. East of the arena, the ornamental water extended into a court formed by seven storeys of maisonettes over two storeys.
of garages. Down the centre of the court was a Broad Walk, which formed a central pedestrian spine for the whole scheme. A cross-axis had been formed at the east of this walk, consisting of an evergreen labyrinth, a glass pyramid-shaped conservatory, and a fountain and cascade descending from the canal to form a pool around the conservatory. Flanking the east and west sides of the central quadrangle were paved areas which faced classrooms, school halls, and, on the east, an eight-storey block of maisonettes and flats. To the south of the quadrangle was the St. Giles' church, its churchyard and a running track. Enclosing the latter was another court consisting of a continuous line of seven, eight and nine-storeys of maisonettes and flats. Above the Barbican, to the north, was a further area of offices and flats as well. At the same time, the existing roads between Fore Street and the Barbican had been closed and the whole area was proposed as a pedestrian precinct, with its own restaurant, shops and open space (fig. 39)

The above scheme was approved after many discussions with both LCC and City Corporation planners. However, the execution of the scheme was delayed due to one or two controversial aspects of its design. One factor was that it involved moving a stretch of the Metropolitan Railway, and another was the proposal to provide a large number of flats with internal kitchens, i.e. they were not naturally ventilated, to which the LCC members took strong objection.

Furthermore, by 1968 the plans for a fullblown arts centre were approved, including a theatre for the Royal Shakespeare Company, a concert hall for the London Symphony Orchestra, a public library, an art gallery, a small cinema, restaurants, bars and shops. Finally, the project, after some revisions, was built in late
Fig. 39. The Barbican Development. Architects: Chamberlin, Powell & Bon.

1970s, although there were facilities which were almost ready, as for example four of the group of six office towers around Route 1189.

According to P. Johnson-Marshall, probably the most important contribution of the Barbican development was to illustrate the new principle of pedestrian segregation as applied to a commercial area. Meanwhile, S. Cantacuzino, in considering the built form which the Barbican finally took, argued that two complementary influences might be taken into account; on the one hand there were Le Corbusier's prewar projects and certain precepts of the Modern Movement as a whole; on the other, growing dissatisfaction with the Modern Movement was making architects look increasingly at earlier historical models. Finally, O. Marriott argued that the Barbican project with its 44-storey blocks of flats, Guildhall School of Music and new concert hall for the London Symphony Orchestra was one of the biggest comprehensive schemes in Western Europe, and one of the most progressive.

All of these views about the value of the Barbican project are giving us the real dimensions of its contribution in the rebuilding of post-war Central London. Indeed, it was an imaginative and bold architectural solution in harmony with the ideas of that era, although it was at the same time an outcome of compromise between the LCC and City planning authorities.

c. The South Bank Project

It had long been recognised that the section of the South Bank of the Thames, between Vauxhall and Southwark Bridges, was overdue for redevelopment. As Gordon Stephenson informs us, it was not until 1905 that the
LCC decided to acquire an extensive riverside site for its offices and which required two private Acts, those of 1906 and 1909, in order to carry out its intention. In 1909 work began on the river wall and the County Hall. However, this was interrupted by World War I and the County Hall was not opened until 1922. Another eleven years passed before the northern section was completed. In the years between 1933 and the beginning of the World War II the LCC made several attempts to acquire land between the County Hall and Hungerford Bridge. The first purchase, and that by agreement early in 1940, was of the land north of India Stores.

It was during the war that ideas about the South Bank began to crystallise. At the end of 1941 the LCC received a deputation from the Royal Philharmonic Society about a concert hall. The earliest conference with the National Theatre Committee took place in 1943; as G. Stephenson remarked, it happened a month before the publication of the County of London Plan (see Chapter XI). As a consequence, the first comprehensive scheme for this area was illustrated and described in the Forshaw-Abercrombie Report. According to the authors' view, a complete and splendid renewal of the reaches between the County Hall and Southwark Cathedral was proposed (fig. 40). It was to be carried out by high density frontage development of office building or housing behind a new river wall.

Immediately after the war, the LCC, which had the great advantage of owning all the land, was advancing rapidly along the broad lines indicated by the County of London Plan, in which the South Bank was proposed as the southward extension of the central area of London. In this context, the intentions of the proposals were to improve traffic conditions, to allocate areas for central and local government purposes and for cultural,
Fig. 40. South Bank: The completed scheme as it had been proposed in the context of the LCC Plan.

office, commercial and industrial uses, and to provide open space combined with an extension of the river wall, with public buildings as the background. The whole area could be roughly divided into five sectors: Albert Embankment, St. Thomas's Hospital precinct, the Permanent Development Scheme including County Hall, the area between Waterloo and Blackfriars Bridges and Bankside, between Blackfriars and Southwark Bridges. It is apparent from the previous description that the total length of the South Bank runs from Vauxhall Bridge right down to Southwark Bridge, but, thanks to the Festival of Britain, 1951, the sector between County Hall and Waterloo Bridge was the sector in which comprehensive central-area planning was concentrated. Actually, the Festival of Britain, 1951, prompted a number of proposals and attempts that had, as a result, the permanent comprehensive development scheme which was implemented in the South Bank area of Central London as follows.

In October 1948 Gerald Barry, Director of the Festival, announced that the theme in 1951 would be the Britain's contribution to civilisation. As a consequence, the central exhibition was not intended to be a trade fair, so the British Industries Fair of 1951 would be complementary to the exhibition and not competitive. The Festival's aim was to tell the story of British life, to offer a coherent and imaginative picture of British achievement past, present, and to come, and of its contributions to the thought and action of the world. In this context, it was considered that the most interesting point about this project was that the demonstration buildings would all be completed when the exhibition was over, and the entire neighbourhood then handed over for normal and permanent occupation. Though the site was not yet settled at that time, it was proposed to be chosen from among the redevelopment areas scheduled in
the County of London Plan, making use of bombed sites as near to the centre of London as was practicable.

A Presentation Panel had been appointed under the chairmanship of Cecil Cook, the Director of Exhibitions, with overall responsibility for the design of the Exhibition as a whole, whilst the following were members of it: Misha Black, Central Office of Information, Hugh Casson, Director of Architecture, Town Planning and Building Research, Ian Cox, Director of Science and Technology, James Gardner, James Holland, Central Office of Information, Dudley Ryder, Council of Industrial Design and Rulph Tubbs. It is to be noted here that since 1946, Misha Black plumping for the South Bank as a site for housing the 1951 Exhibition, he imagined an architectural composition in space, a fabulous steel and glass mountain topped with a helicopter tower, which contained suspended within its ribs hundreds of pavilions and attractions linked by ramps and widening waterways (fig. 41). By August, 1948, the Presentation Panel had been convinced that the South Bank site seemed to be an almost certain bet for 1951 Exhibition.

However, as the days went by increasing complications appeared. Half the site, it seemed, was on lease to the Ministry of Works, who were about to start work on an office block. On the other half, the LCC started to prepare plans for the immediate redevelopment of the area between County Hall, Waterloo Bridge, the river and York Road in late 1948. In this context of proposals, the embankment wall would be continued from the County Hall to Waterloo Bridge, Belvedere Road was to be improved, and a concert hall was to be built. The LCC intended to create a cultural and administrative centre between Hungerford and Waterloo Bridges, which was going to be designed by the LCC architect, Robert
Fig. 41. Misha Black's conception of the 1951 Exhibition on the South Bank.

Matthew. This centre could become the means to be overcome the traditional unwillingness to cross the river by people in search of pleasure and refreshment, as Southwark was once an active recreation centre but for several centuries, though the South Bank was near to the Strand as Picadilly, the river had been an impassable psychological barrier. This latter fact must be considered as the meeting point of the various aspects suggested at those years for South Bank development, according to which the holding of the 1951 Exhibition there should have done much to break this barrier down.

The Exhibition took place between May and September 1951, and it was in architectural terms a triumph of Modern Architecture. This was the fact that made the editors of The Architects' Journal state in their leading article under the title "Modern Architecture makes good", that

"for the last twenty years it has been evident in this country that, in the dreary battle of styles, modern architecture was slowly but inevitably winning";

also that

"this '51 Festival as a whole, and in particular the Lansbury and South Bank exhibitions, are showing the nation just how worthwhile modern design can be";

and lastly, that

"Modern architecture in the mass (surprisingly enough, state approved and sponsored) has well and truly arrived, and the people love it".

Another, indirect, recognition of the success of this architectural experiment was the fact of Hugh Casson's appointment as consultant to the government on the immediate future of the South Bank site. Casson had in
collaboration with LCC architect, Robert Matthew, and the chief officer of the Parks Department, L.A. Hud-dart, to jointly submit a report under the following terms of reference:

"To examine those parts of the South Bank Exhibition which may be made accessible to the public as gardens or other open space, and to advise the LCC in consultation with the Festival Office how the existing assets can most suitably and economically be put to use in the interim scheme towards the development of the Council's proposals for the future of this area as a public open space." But, what then was the policy-making process which converted South Bank Exhibition site to a place with permanent installations?

Both the Foreign Secretary and the Lord Privy Seal were anxious to counter the widespread impression that after the Exhibition closed the South Bank would relapse to a slum, and they probably wished to issue a statement on these lines on or about the 28th September, 1951, so that it could be taken into account when the results of the Festival were reviewed. At any rate, it was clear that after the closing of the South Bank Exhibition the way was open to the next stage of the development of the area along the general lines envisaged in the County London Plan.

As a result of the above factor, a Working Party on the Winding up of the South Bank Exhibition was appointed by the Lord Privy Seal to prepare proposals for the disposal of the exhibits and buildings on the South Bank site before work began on the new permanent buildings. Among other proposals, the Working Party recommended that the major part of the section of the site upstream from Charing Cross railway bridge should be handed over to the Ministry of Works as soon as the
exhibits had been removed from the Festival buildings, in order that the Ministry could proceed at once with certain urgent defence work which would eventually form part of the permanent Government building.

The Lord Privy Seal disagreed with the above recommendation on three grounds: first, because he thought that it would be a mistake to proceed with the idea of a Government building on the South Bank site; second, he thought that it would be another mistake to start excavation work until full plans for the scheme had been published and were known to be acceptable to public opinion; and third, he feared that in practice there would be a long interval after the excavations and before the superstructure of the building could proceed during which the site would be closed to the public and would remain an eyesore.

In the meantime, the joint report by the LCC Architect, the Chief Officer of the Parks Department and Hugh Casson was ready for submission on 8 November 1951, (hereafter cited as the "Casson Report"). According to its recommendations the South Bank site was divided into five zones (fig. 42), as follows: Zone 1 was the Riverside Promenade, including the Shot Tower, which was the most easily and quickly transformed from its exhibition use into an attractive public open space and whose existing character should, if was recommended, be kept. Zone 2 was that of the Homes and Gardens, which lay between Belvedere Road and York Road downstream of Hungerford Bridge, and although not directly associated with riverside views, had important visual links with the Thames and the Royal Festival Hall. It was suggested that the existing layout and type of structure of this zone gave it the opportunity to be treated in part as an extension of the riverside promenade in the form of gardens, bandstand and terraces, and in part
Fig. 42. South Bank: The proposed zones by the Casson Report.

Source: "South Bank Site - Interim Development, joint report by the Architect, the Chief Officer of the Parks Department and H. Casson, 8 November 1951". PRO file HLG 71/1574.

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for commercial use. Zone 3 was that of the Station Gate, which had the probability that it would be taken over by British European Airways, with its bus and car parks and general circulation areas. Zone 4 was that of the Ministry of Works, where they had assumed that the whole of this area was required by the Ministry of Works for building operations, with access from Belvedere Road. Finally, Zone 5 was that of Chicheley Street, which although it was a small area lying outside the Exhibition boundaries was, it was suggested, to be the subject of a separate detailed recommendation.

Commending the Casson Report, the Working Party on the Winding up of the South Bank Exhibition recommended, among its other suggestions to the Minister of Works, that the proposals in the Casson Report for the layout of the fence dividing the upstream section of the riverside promenade should be studied sympathetically. But, an even more important consideration was the proposal to use the Station Gate as a passenger-handling terminal for British European Airways (BEA), because it would help the South Bank to achieve "an active and useful working life of its own."

In the context of the discussions about the future uses of South Bank site, the proposal of the Minister of Civil Aviation, Lord Ogmore, for the establishment of an airstop for helicopters on the South Bank, is of interest. In the Minister's view, there were three sites in the area any of which could be suitable for an airstop; the best of these was probably the area immediately downstream from Waterloo Bridge, known as the Lower Ground, which at that time was occupied by a blitz debris crushing plant and had been earmarked for a Science Centre, the second site was known as the Upper Ground including the News Chronicle Printing
Works and Bowaters Paper Depot and some smaller properties, and the third one was the "up river" site on which government offices were due ultimately to be constructed. However, the suggestion met a negative response from an official of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, named Philips, who stated

"that the suggestion of siting an airstop on the South Bank was incompatible with the present policy for making this part of the South Bank a Cultural Centre".

Further opposition came from the representatives of the LCC who took the line that any suggestion of a permanent airstop and probably even of a temporary one would be strongly resisted "because of the noise and nuisance".

Dame Evelyn Sharp, who became Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government and Planning in 1951, and as such was the first woman civil servant to have charge of a ministry, came to the same view. She pointed out that

"the intention, dating from the Abercrombie Plan, is that the South Bank should be brought into the life of London, made a place of public resort by day and by night, the river (at this point) becoming a unifying force (like the Seine) instead of at present a barrier".

In the meantime, the proposal to form a British Science Centre in London had been announced by Herbert Morrison, the Chairman of the LCC, in the House of Commons on 21 November 1950. The floor space requirements totalled nearly 800,000 sq. ft. gross, as follows:
Floor Space required
(sq. ft.)

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<tr>
<td>1. National Scientific Library (including Patent Office Library)</td>
<td>141,000</td>
<td>163,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Patent Office</td>
<td>126,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Department of Scientific and Industrial Research</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Research Bodies (including Agricultural Research Council, Medical Research Council, Nature Conservancy)</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>54,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Learned Societies (in total 16)</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>280,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Common Accommodation</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<td>7. Storage</td>
<td>77,000</td>
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<td>666,000</td>
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Furthermore, the Minister of Works had consulted the Ministry of Housing and Local Government informally that an international conference centre would be the most suitable of all the suggested developments for the South Bank site.

By April 1952, the situation in connection with the long-term redevelopment of the South Bank site had reached in a confused and uncertain point. However, it had been made clear that for present purposes the South Bank site was considered to contain the following three areas of land: first, that which extended between County Hall and Hungerford Bridge; second, that between Hungerford Bridge and Waterloo Bridge; and third, that immediately below the Waterloo Bridge.

It was also clear that in the first area the LCC wanted
to develop with public buildings, at any rate in part, so as to provide a fitting neighbour for County Hall, and also to secure an economic return on the land. Moreover, this area was considered as a magnificent one which would in particular be ideal for the proposed conference centre for which no comparable site could be found in Central London. Another suggestion was that part of this site might be used for the building of a hotel, particularly if the idea of a conference centre was proceeded with.

In the second area, the Royal Festival Hall was already built (fig. 43, 44), while the land fronting the river between the Hall and Waterloo Bridge had been earmarked for the future National Theatre (fig. 45, 46). Apart from the National Theatre site, there was no specific Government interest affecting that area and no immediate question arose for decision, so the future layout and its development was a matter for the LCC as planning authority and owner.

Finally, the third area, which was partly derelict and belonged to the Duchy of Cornwall, had been earmarked for the building by the Government of a Science Centre which would also include the Patent Office and its Library, which would be developed as a National Scientific Library. This Centre would also be the home of the Royal Society and some twenty learned societies most of which were at that time inadequately housed in Burlington House. It was this third area which the Ministry of Civil Aviation had, however, suggested for (at any rate temporary) use as a helicopter stop for the operation of services to Paris, Amsterdam, etc., as well as to different parts of Great Britain.

Another important consideration affecting the South
Fig. 43. The Royal Festival Hall.

*Photo:* The author (March 1980).
Fig. 44. The promenade to the Royal Festival Hall.

*Photo:* The author (March 1990).
Fig. 45. The National Theatre.

Photo: The author (March 1990).
Fig. 46. The National Theatre from the Waterloo Bridge.

Photo: The author (March 1990).
Bank site by 1952 was the fact that the redevelopment of the above three areas was intended by the LCC, as planning authority, to be the first stage of their long-term scheme for the comprehensive redevelopment of the whole of the South Bank from Westminster Bridge to London Bridge. The general intention was that the whole of this river frontage should be laid out with new buildings for public, cultural, office and commercial purposes, together with provision for public open space and improved roads, so as to give the South Bank a character and appearance that would worthily match that of the North Bank and as befitted this magnificent stretch of the river in the very heart of London. So, how did the above policy decisions on components of the South Bank site redevelopment relate to the corresponding situation in town planning terms? The answer to this question will follow.

As has already been mentioned, in 1943 Abercrombie and Forshaw suggested in their County of London Plan a comprehensive reconstruction scheme for the riverside area, with sites for public buildings, offices, theatres and gardens. After the war, the LCC prepared plans for the whole of the South Bank from Southwark Bridge to Vauxhall Bridge, and in the Administrative County of London Development Plan the area was zoned for public buildings and was shown bisected by a widened Belvedere Road with provision for an open space strip, 30 feet wide, on the river side of the road and a strip affording access from the riverside open space to Belvedere and York Roads.

In addition, in the Development Plan, submitted to the Minister of Housing and Local Government, the site had been characterised as a Comprehensive Development Area under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947. However, immediately after the Festival of Britain was
over, the LCC, anxious to enable the public to continue its enjoyment of the riverside amenities, carried out a temporary scheme, laying out the site with lawns, flower beds and paved walks with provision for adults' and children's recreation and amusement. Meanwhile, work had started on plans for the permanent development of the site. In this context, the LCC's Town Planning Division prepared a scheme, under the direction of the Architect to the Council, J.L. Martin, the Senior Planning Officer, Arthur Ling, the Assistant Senior Planning Officer, Reconstruction Areas, P. Johnson-Marshall, and a team of ten more persons. The proposals of this plan were circulated in October, 1953, and they had the following main features.

The basic conception of the scheme was the grouping of a number of large public and office buildings in such a way as to give a feeling of spaciousness and vitality at a focal point on the south bank of the river, and to present to the moving eye of the Londoner a continuously interesting series of visual compositions, both in height and depth. The scheme was proposed to have three levels: ground level for pedestrians and essential vehicular access, a lower level for vehicle parking, and an upper one for a pedestrian promenade and intercommunication from building to building, extending right across the site from Waterloo Bridge to the BEA Air Terminal and to Waterloo Station at platform level. The scheme was bisected by the Hungerford Railway Bridge into "upstream" and "downstream" sectors.

In the upstream sector, behind the gardens, the National Theatre and a new hotel were sited, while between Belvedere Road and York Road a large office complex and the BEA Air Terminal was proposed. The buildings were grouped to form major interconnected
"places", one of which lay around Theatre Square and the other around Terminal Square. The dominating feature of this sector was a tall office building 25 storeys high. Careful thought had been given to the contribution these buildings could make towards the river scene. So, from the Victoria Embankment, one would see an asymmetrical composition designed essentially in three dimensions, while walking through Theatre Square one would catch a glimpse of the BEA Air Terminal. Between the high office building and the National Theatre, and entering Terminal Square, one would find that it was enclosed on all four sides. It was suggested that over the roof of Waterloo Station, there should be a Helicopter Air Stop, with provision for access to and from the BEA Air Terminal.

On the same time, it was suggested that the downstream sector should have two major squares, one was paved and the other was green. The Royal Festival Hall was linked with an International Conference Centre to be built alongside Waterloo Bridge. It was intended that the whole complex could in fact be used as a single unit or as separate buildings. Lastly, special emphasis had been placed on the needs of pedestrians, and, indeed, the whole river front had been given over to them. According to the suggested planning controls for this part of the South Bank Comprehensive Development Area, it had been zoned for Public Buildings as the predominant use and "programmed" in the first five-year period. The plot ratio was 5:1 over the whole sector, but the comprehensive nature of the development under one ownership had given the opportunity of varying the floor space on each site so as to give the best architectural result and the maximum amount of open space. Moreover, the scheme had been developed in accordance with the Daylighting Controls.
Assessing the above scheme in its wider setting and in the context of the details of the three-dimensional arrangement, Gordon Stephenson pointed out that as the Development Plan for the County of London allowed for a theoretical 15 per cent increase in office accommodation:

"One may well ask what will be the effect on the London plans if the City, which housed some half-million office workers, the south bank and the City of Westminster are to go on increasing in volume of building. Traffic congestion threatens to bring central London to a standstill. It can only be relieved in some small measure at a fantastic cost, and already there is the most serious threat that five of the great squares will be annihilated for the sake of parking relatively few cars, partly at the expense of the country's taxpayers and some London ratepayers"117.

In other words, Stephenson defined the issue of the general consequences of such a development with central uses on the South Bank site. For this reason, he also added that:

"If the south bank reclamation is to proceed apace, and all the arguments are in favour, it should be accompanied by a reduction in the total of working accommodation in the cities of London and Westminster. Without this redistribution of building, and values, decentralisation will merely lengthen the journeys to work and increase fatigue, frustration and central congestion"118.

The above observations have to be accounted as of great importance for the effects of the South Bank site redevelopment, because they defined some more general dimensions for the attempt to upgrade this part of south Central London. But, what problems emerged in endeavouring to turn the plans into reality?
The first negative development was that British European Airways decided to build their Air Terminal elsewhere. However, this development had its good side too, as it was decided that the site was unsuitable for the landing of helicopters, on grounds of noise, as was proved by an extensive research study carried out by the LCC. On the other hand, the first large building to be erected after the scheme was published in 1954 was the LCC's extension to the North Block of its own headquarters.

This was followed up by the Shell Petroleum Company building complex in 1956, which however was a deep architectural disappointment and was characterised as the "South Bank's Vertical Failure." The building was designed by Howard Robertson, who was one of the team of designers of the UN Secretariat, the glass-sided slab of offices in New York, which set a standard for post-war office building. The architectural design of the monumental, stone-faced, Shell building went backwards instead of forwards for its inspiration (fig. 47).

Furthermore, the National Theatre remained on paper for several years owing to lack of money, but it became reality in late 1960s. In 1961, the LCC announced that the Royal Festival Hall itself would be considerably extended and that the Cultural Centre, which had been proposed to be adjacent to it, would be carried out; the latter was to include a small Concert Hall for 1,100 people and a large Exhibition Gallery. Lastly, it is to be noted that after negotiations the St. Thomas's Hospital also erected a big project across Westminster Bridge Road from County Hall in the late 1960s.

Having a final look on the progress of South Bank pro-
Fig. 47. The Shell Petroleum Company Building Complex.

Photo: The author (March 1990).
ject, it is to be noted that planning of the scheme was developed over a twenty-year period and that execution was characterised by financial restrictions, by the high plot ratio permitted and implemented, and by the lack of architecture of high quality within the Comprehensive Development Area.

d. The Elephant and Castle Project

If the South Bank project was the "facade" of the attempt to extend cultural, commercial and administrative uses in the south part of Central London, the Elephant and Castle could be considered as its "heart"; in the sense that if this latter project was successful, then the underlying motive of up-grading the south part of Central London would also be achieved.

The Elephant and Castle area, which took its name from an old coaching inn erected in 1760 and rebuilt first in 1818 and again in 1898, was a considerable centre, which however by 1940 had become hopelessly congested\(^{128}\), and an important road junction south of the Thames, where the roads from Lambeth, Westminster, Waterloo and Blackfriars Bridges converge, before joining the Kent Road\(^{127}\). Like the other main traffic focal points in London, Elephant and Castle needed urgent replanning to enable it to deal efficiently with the growing number of vehicles using it. The opportunity was given by the war destructions the area suffered, which made it possible to create not only a major improvement in traffic terms, but also a new centre for this part of London.

A first attempt to face the Elephant and Castle area's problems is contained in the County of London Plan, 1943 (fig. 48). It had proposed a traffic solution to
Fig. 48. Elephant and Castle: Sketch plan of a roundabout suggested in the context of the LCC Plan for London.

the junction of six main roads and a co-ordinated architectural treatment of the surrounding buildings, while in the centre of the resulting hexagonal round-about a large public building would be built. P. Johnson-Marshall argued that this treatment of the Elephant and Castle area by the County of London Plan was "an academic exercise in grand manner planning". It is a matter of fact, that this proposal ran counter to the creative character of the whole County of London Plan.

More systematic planning work started after the definition of an area about 30 acres around the Elephant and Castle site as a comprehensive development area in the context of the Administrative County of London Development Plan, 1951 (see Chapter XIII). However, this project got off to a slow start, possibly because only part of the land was in the ownership of the Council. In any case, in the early 1950s no private developer was willing to risk money in the hinterland of South London, when there were so many other profitable sites to exploit, as for example those in the West End. The first comprehensive development scheme was designed in 1954 (fig. 49, 50). As P. Johnson-Marshall pointed out:

"when we were considering its future during the preparation of the 1951 Development Plan, Arthur Ling and I suggested that it might be turned into a bold multi-level inter-section of a parkway type."

However, the above proposal met with favour neither from the traffic experts on financial grounds nor from the property experts on grounds of the potential loss of property values. The substantial existing buildings also presented difficulties, coupled with the unwillingness of the London Passenger Transport Board to pay...
Fig. 49. Elephant and Castle: Plan of the 1954 scheme.


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Fig. 50. Elephant and Castle: A model of the 1954 scheme.

for the combining of their two separate underground stations and surface ticket offices into one\textsuperscript{132}. Finally, it was the Ministry of Transport which decided that the traffic intersection should be resolved by a single level roundabout\textsuperscript{133}. This development, of course, should be considered as representative of the limited governmental intervention in the Elephant and Castle project. In the event, 1953 scheme was reduced to creating some degree of order in the development, with one high building acting as a focal point.

However, after these developments, the LCC decided to intervene and in fact made it an attractive proposition for development. This development occurred when the LCC held limited competitions for the other available sites. The first was for the commercial area on the north-east, which included the Trocadero Cinema as an apparently fixed element. Another limited competition was held for the central shopping centre site\textsuperscript{134}. In addition to laying out the new road junction with its pedestrian underpasses, stairs, and ramps, the proposed London College of Printing, specialised Technical College, was moved up to the prominent site adjoining the large roundabout and the design was prepared for it by the Schools Division of the LCC Architect's Department. This led to a revised scheme for the area in 1960\textsuperscript{135} (fig. 51). It is to be noted that the roundabout remained unexcavated but it contained a memorial to Faraday\textsuperscript{138}. Furthermore, there were no less than five buildings ensembles in the new composition, instead of the single one in the original scheme.

In architectural terms, the result of this comprehensive redevelopment scheme was extremely poor. The London College of Printing (fig. 52), and the Shopping Centre (fig. 53) were formulated as very simple tall buildings according to the Modern Architecture rules,
Fig. 51. Elephant and Castle: The revised scheme, 1960.

Fig. 52. Elephant and Castle: The London College of Printing and St. George's Road.

Photo: The author (March 1990).
Fig. 53. Elephant and Castle: The Shopping Centre.

Photo: The author (March 1990).
while Alexander Fleming House, which belongs to the Department of Health and Social Security, lying between Borough High Street and New Kent Road (fig. 54) is a more interesting modern building.

However, in the above "empty" composition there still remains a building at the corner of London Road (fig. 55) showing the old architectural character of this urban area on the one hand, and on the other the road to the City of London (fig. 56). This latter is a unique element which has remained to remind us of the unsuccessful endeavours of the post-war architects and planners to connect sufficiently the poorer south and the richer north parts of Central London (fig. 57), on the two banks of the Thames (fig. 58).
Fig. 54. Elephant and Castle: The Alexander Fleming House (Dept. of Health and Social Security).

Photo: The author (March 1990).
Fig. 55. Elephant and Castle: The old building of the Underground Station.

Photo: The author (March 1990).
Fig. 56. Elephant and Castle: The view from the Square to the North Bank.

Photo: The author (March 1990).
Fig. 57. North Bank: Building, dated in 1878, in the City of Westminster.

*Photo:* The author (March 1990).
Fig. 58. A view of the Thames from Waterloo Bridge.

*Photo:* The author (March 1990).
EPILOGUE
XVIII. CONCLUSION

During the decades of the 1940s and 1950s the British planning scene was dominated by an urban reconstruction atmosphere. An aim of this creative era was to solve the intractable problem of the redevelopment of the central districts of cities in a radical way, that is, in those urban areas where established capital values were at their highest. It is a matter of fact, that city centres were not normally subject to planning schemes until that period. In the 1920s, and particularly in 1930s, they were being redeveloped by private enterprise to meet the growing demand for shopping and office accommodation, and the result was entirely piecemeal.

Of course, such a target as the planned redevelopment of a city centre was very difficult to achieve. From this point of view, this whole decision and effort are to be seen as a massive task of great importance. It was all the more significant in that this activity gave a strong impulsion to the evolution of the British planning system and through it to the international one. A crucial question in this endeavour was the redevelopment of Central London in both the City and the West End, the comprehensive rebuilding of its war-damaged areas, and the connection of its two parts lying respectively on the north and the south banks of the Thames.
Our method of approaching this great initiative has been organised on the assumption that it must be examined at two levels: first, as a system of conceptualisation and implementation in the context of its historical circumstances, and second, in each of the above sectors, north, south, east and west, separately. The conclusion of our analysis could be described as follows.

As regards the establishment of the reconstruction machinery, it may be argued that the whole conception of such an instrument was the apotheosis of public intervention in the town planning field; in the sense that, according to the legislation introduced, the initiative in planning choice terms was a privilege of central and local government. This fact, in conjunction with the widespread - at that time - idea of comprehensive planning, leads us to the conclusion that the character of the established reconstruction machinery was essentially a sweeping one. Because of this nature of the reconstruction machinery, a kind of contradiction emerged in relation to the character of the British socio-economic system. The British society and economy were and are based on a pluralistic pattern of organisation. This means that the framework of the system is wide and gives many possibilities to everybody for action. However, it presents some limits which cannot be exceeded; it is a kind of equilibrium which permits the whole system to fluctuate between private and mixed economy. In this logic of organisation, the conceptualisation of the post-war reconstruction machinery was polarised more to one side, that of the mixed economy. From this point of view, it came into confrontation with the above very wide limits of British society and it met its first difficulties in implementation terms.
As a consequence, while the Barlow Report suggestions in 1940 found the people, to quote Peter Hall, "ready to leave" on the one hand, and on the other, the State mature enough to accept the establishment of a Central Planning Authority, in the form of a new Ministry with town and regional planning terms of reference, and even more, while British society proved also ready to accept the pioneering recommendations contained in the Scott Report of 1942, referring to the need for the preservation of rural amenities and life in a period when the urban reconstruction and growth were a crucial issue—a fact which led Gerald Wibberley to characterise the Scott Report as "a text for all time," and the Uthwatt Report's proposals, which make up the third part of the trilogy on which the post-war reconstruction machinery had been based, they moved far away from the crucial point of equilibrium in the British socio-economic system. Better, quoting H.R. Parker, they became "the end of the road".

Another significant aspect of the introduced machinery was that the central government had decided to play a narrow role in the urban reconstruction activity. As a matter of fact, the established Central Planning Authority in February 1943, which took the form of a Ministry with main objective the preparation of the legislation concerning town and country planning and, especially, land policy, transferred gradually the basic responsibility on these matters to the local authorities. This development is obvious in the Planning Acts of 1944 and 1947. Of course, this choice had many positive implications in practical terms, however it also became very soon the cause of a most serious deficiency in the whole system; that of raising the necessary financial sources for the implementation of urban development projects.
Actually, under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, which was the statutory expression of the above proposals, all development rights were vested in the State. Owners were required to apply for permission when they wished to develop their land, and when permission was given a "development charge" was imposed which taxed away the development value at the rate of 100 per cent; furthermore, as the officials were not ready enough to plan on the scale introduced by the post-war planning system, the development charge delayed building, having so a negative function in implementation terms. Even more, no compensation was to be paid for the lost development values that existed on the enactment date but a fund of £300 million was set aside to meet cases of hardship that might result. So, as those decisions were the result of the "golden age" of planning, they were in a high degree utopian theses, which according Peter Hall are indications that "the planners ignoring trends". This was a main reason why, although the post-war planning system as introduced was bold and clear in its conception, it became problematic in implementation terms and it led the State officially to call it, in the case of London's reconstruction, "our great planning failure". As a consequence, we can legitimately conclude that the above strengths and, at the same time, weaknesses of the planning legislation were the reasons which led to the political pressures which changed it drastically after 1951.

On the other hand, the conception of comprehensive planning gave the opportunity to realise in this period significant planning proposals for the British cities and above all for London. This, of course, could be accounted a positive result of the influence of the widespread thesis in the 1940s in favour of public intervention in planning matters. So, it is not by
chance that the most famous London plans were prepared during the 1940s in the war and post-war period. It is a matter of fact that this fruitful period in town planning terms was an outcome of the collaboration between eminent town planners and the State, as well as of the mutual influences and competition developed between the various teams of town planners. Into this unofficial and semiofficial debate developed in those years, which had not been created in such a degree in the case of other cities, should be sought the reason why the London plans were so good. Actually, although some of the plans suggested for London had been undertaken by private organisations or institutions, the most important of them were a result of public initiative at the central and/or local government level. This fact shows additionally the established connection between the conception of comprehensive planning in both the reconstruction machinery formulations, and the technique of preparation of the town plans.

Another important point in the case of the plans suggested for London in 1940s is that, even if they had been prepared by different teams of planners, the fact that some of them were members of more than one planning team and/or were at the same time participating in official Committees investigating various planning issues - as for example, Professor Patrick Abercrombie, Professor William Holford and Dr. Charles Holden, who were members, respectively, of the team of the RA Plan for London, of the LCC Plan, of the GL Plan and of the Consultative Panel of Lord Reith, the Minister of Works and Buildings, the second one in the previous Consultative Panel of Lord Reith and in the team of the City of London Plan and the third one in the team of the LRRC Plan and of the City of London Plan (see Chapters IV, X, XI) - it undoubtfully gives to this planning activity a unified and continuum character. From this point
of view, the six plans of London, apart from the fact that they express the same philosophy in planning terms, that of comprehensive redevelopment of certain parts of London and of its whole area as an entity, they are sections of, substantially, one planning endeavour.

As a result, if we give an overall glance at the succession of them, it should be distinguished that they can be divided into three sub-units. The first one includes the MARS, RA and LRRC Plans. This sub-unit is characterised by the statement of a variety of aspects and ideas referring the future growth of London, and from this point of view it could be said that this coincides with the submission of the preliminary or preparatory stage of the whole planning process. The second sub-unit contains the following two plans, the LCC and the GL Plans. They were characterised by a maturity and cohesiveness and from this optical angle they could be regarded as at the stage of submission of the definitive proposals for London. Finally, the third sub-unit consists of the CLD Plan, which had an operational and practical character, and it appears to correspond to the implementation stage of the planning process.

However, the implementation stage of the replanning for London contained, as well, suggestions for the rebuilding of its central area. Among them, the proposals for the City of London prepared by Holden and Holford are of particular value. This is, mainly, because they left the level of general and theoretical proposals and formulated specific solutions for the inner city problems. In the context of these latter proposals, the introduced innovations concerning the control of urban densities and the hygiene of residence and office accommodation in the city centres, must be considered of
great importance in planning technique terms. Especially, because they suggested solutions to the crucial problems of Central London on the one hand, and on the other, they influenced the international way of solving some of the inner city's town planning problems through the introduction of plot ratio and daylight controls. The criticism which could be raised on this task derives from the fact that the introduced rates of plot ratio were high enough; meanwhile, in some cases, especially in St. Paul's Cathedral area, maybe a drastic reduction of them should have been adopted. As a result, it could been considered that the "great opportunity", which had been appeared by the war destruction for the revitalisation of the Central London as a whole, have been lost in high degree, as the core of the metropolis preserved the most of its pre-war urban functions, especially in density and traffic terms.

At the same time, the rebuilding of Central London presented two other aspects of endeavour. The first one refers to the quantitative degree and the rapidity of the implementation of the various projects of comprehensive development in the core of London; the other one concerns to the attempt of up-grading the south part of London's central district, that is that lying on the South Bank of Thames and the Elephant and Castle area. As far as the first endeavour is concerned it is a fact that many of the programmed schemes in the areas of Central London damaged by war action were carried out in a more or less satisfactory way, although they were admittedly many financial difficulties and deficiency in building materials. However, this could not to be said of the second endeavour. Actually, while the suggested proposals for the South Bank and the Elephant and Castle areas could be characterised as very successful in town planning terms, the target of the unification of Central London has not been reached. The
metropolis of Britain continues to be divided into two parts with different levels of growth and land values.

Furthermore, the rebuilding of Central London, and especially in those areas of comprehensive development, failed to achieve great architectural quality. Nowadays the criticism of the result of the post-war reconstruction activity in British cities and among them especially Central London arises from the highest level of the British society. Charles, the Prince of Wales, in an article in *The Sunday Times* on 3 September, 1989, that is a week before the publication of his book *A Vision of Britain*, characterised some of the buildings which had gone up in the past thirty years as "deformed Frankenstein monsters". Among them the future formation of Paternoster Square, next to St. Paul’s Cathedral, became central. Certainly, this kind of criticism derives from the fact that rebuilding after the war had gradually succeeded in wrecking London’s skyline and spoiling the view of St. Paul’s in a jostling scrum of skyscrapers, all competing for attention. This rebuilding, of course, has its roots in the first post-war years, but it developed as an urban phenomenon during recent decades, especially after 1960. An interesting example of such an uncontrolled development is the new Docklands of London in the 1980s, which in a way express the triumph of commercial expediency over civic values. An explanation to the above phenomenon belongs to Max Hutchinson, President of the RIBA, who argued in 1989 that "modern architects were struggling to realise building forms beyond their time".

As a consequence, we believe that critical review of the post-war rebuilding of Central London must seek, apart from evaluating the extent of success in the implementation of the adopted architectural styles, the attention to urban scale and the appropriate formation
of the planning laws, to take economic factors as well into account, especially with regard to the speculative character of developers whose criteria usually fluctuated between the minimum building costs and the maximum returns from the sale of the building product. These aspects are hidden in the dark side of the whole process and for this reason operated effectively and determined the real rules, the wider framework and the logic according to which it functions and which forms the man-made environment as a final result.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

I. INTRODUCTION


II. BRITISH TOWN PLANNING ON THE EVE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR


15. Ibid.

16. For a recent discussion of the development of hou-


18. Ibid., p. 222.


21. Ibid., p. 185.


24. Ibid.


27. Ibid., p. 130.


29. Ibid., pp. 94-5.

30. Ibid., p. 95.

31. Ibid., p. 96.

32. Ibid., p. 98.

33. According to Peter Hall, the need for regional/local planning was already coming to be recognized when Geddes was writing in 1915, but the need for national/regional planning only became fully evident in the aftermath of the Great Depression of 1929-1932. See: Hall, P., *Urban and..., op. cit.*, p. 84.

36. For the planning system under the 1932 Act, see:
   Heap, Desmond, Planning Low for Town and Country.
   London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1938.
38. Gibbon, Gwilym, Sir, Problems of Town and Country
    293.
41. See: (a) Ibid., p. 299, (b) Sutcliffe, A.R.,
    Towards..., op. cit., pp. 72-5.
42. Ashworth, W., The Genesis..., op. cit., p. 186.
43. Whitehand, J.W.R., "Commercial townscapes in the
    making". Journal of Historical Geography, 10(2),
45. See: Sutcliffe, Anthony - Smith, Roger, Birmingham,
46. Anonymous, " J.E. Asfield, City Engineer of Leeds
    and President of the Town Planning Institute". Jour-
    nal of the Town Planning Institute, 25(1), 1938, p.
    4.
47. See: Tripp, H. Alker, Town Planning and Road Traf-

III. THE URBAN RECONSTRUCTION MACHINERY QUESTION

1. Hall, Peter, Urban and Regional Planning. London: G.
   84.
2. Cullingworth, J.B., Environmental Planning,
   1939-1969: Reconstruction and Land Use, 1939-1947,
3. Ashworth, William, The Genesis of Modern British
   Town Planning: A study in economic and social his-


14. "The 1940 Council" was formed in February 1940 as a result of a conference held at the Royal Institute of British Architects, which received support from many organisations interested in the planning of social environment. "The 1940 Council" had among its members Sir Montague Barlow and Professor Patrick Abercrombie, and was maintained in close contact with the Planning Department of the Ministry of Health. The objects of "The 1940 Council" were: (i) to promote the planning of a social environment
through research groups and by other means; (ii) to make widely known the need for such planning; and (iii) to secure its effective realisation. See: "The 1940 Council: A Council to promote the planning of social environment, 18.10.1940". PRO file HLG 86/1. Furthermore, on the one hand "The 1940 Council" had welcome the appointment of the Minister of Works and Buildings charged with the specific task of preparing machinery for post-war reconstruction, and on the other suggested that the plans for reconstruction should be based on a survey of the national resources in the field not only of industry, but also of agriculture and of amenities, and the relation of all these resources to the proper distribution of the population. See: "The 1940 Council: Reconstruction, 13.11.1940". PRO file HLG 86/1.


26. Ibid., p. 31.
27. Ibid., p. 32.
32. These categories were the following:
   (1) Extractive Industries and certain industries based thereon.
   (2) Immobile or Rooted Industries.
   (3) Linked Industries.
   (4) Mobile Industries.
   (5) Public Utility Undertakings.
   (6) Rural Trades and Crafts.
   (7) Trades providing the conveniences of life.
   For the above data, see: Ibid., p. 61.
33. Ibid., p. 70.
34. Ibid., p. 80.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 82.
37. As it comes out from a discussion with Sir Hugh Casson on 5th October 1937 and after a lecture given by him in National Technical University of Athens, the writer of Astragal in *The Architects' Journal* was Hugh Casson: (i) from 1937 to 1939, continuously, (ii) from 1940 to 1944, occasionally, and (iii) from 1945 to 1951, continuously.
40. Ibid., p. 117.
44. Ibid., p. 169.
45. Ibid., p. 171.
49. Ibid., p. 176.
55. Ibid., p. 235.
57. Ibid., p. 73.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE AND STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE WAR


6. Ibid., p. 199.


11. PRO file HLG 71/574.


13. Cullingworth, J.B., Environmental..., op. cit., p. 5.


15. Ibid., p. 76.

The Committee had been constituted as follows:
- The Minister without Portfolio (Chairman).
- The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- The Chancellor of the Exchequer.
- The Minister of Labour and National Service.
- The President of the Board of Trade.
- The Secretary of the Department of Overseas Trades.
- Sir G. Chrystal, Secretary.
- Other Ministers would be invited, or would be represented at meetings of the Committee at which matters of particular concern to their Department are to be dealt with.

"Committees concerned with Reconstruction Problems, revised September 1942". PRO file CAB 124/599.
"W.F(G)(41)101". PRO file CAB 117/20.
42. Cullingworth, J.B., Environmental..., op. cit., p. 16.
43. "Letter to G. Vincent, 20th February 1941". PRO file HLG 71/574.
44. "13th March, 1941". PRO file HLG 71/574.
45. Reith, J.C.W., Into the..., op. cit., p. 430.
47. Reith, J.C.W., Into the..., op. cit., p. 433.
48. Ibid., p. 432.
53. Ibid., p. 73.
54. Ibid., pp. 73, 75.


V. PLANNING LEGISLATION UNDER THE COALITION GOVERNMENT


3. Addison, P. *The Road..., op. cit., p. 75.*

4. "War Cabinet, Town and Country Planning Bill, Memorandum by the Minister of Economic Warfare, 12th June, 1944". PRO file CAB 123/51.


6. Ibid., p. 79.


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid. p. 332.

11. Ibid. p. 334.


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13. Ibid., pp. 234-6.

14. There were active buyers of real estate during the war. According to Oliver Marriott, they had the following philosophy: if the Germans won the war, everything was undone, themselves included; if the British won, prices were bound to recover from the extremely depressed wartime level. See: Marriott, Oliver, The Property Boom. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1967, p. 45.


17. "War Cabinet, Town and Country Planning: The control of land use - Memorandum by the Minister of Reconstruction, 10th June, 1944". PRO file CAB 123/51.

18. Ibid.


20. Ibid., p. 3.


22. Ibid., p. 2.


25. The data were adapted from ibid., pp. 115-26.


27. Ibid., p. 39.

28. Ibid., p. 40.
VI. THE 1947 ACT AND THE REACTION TO IT

3. Ibid., p. vii.
7. These aspects belong to Ralph Miliband and David Coates. See: Morgan, K.O., Labour..., op. cit., p. 5.
8. Ibid.
10. Ibid., pp. 97-8.
11. Ibid., pp. 157, 172-3.
14. The used information has been adapted from ibid., pp. 331-48.


18. *Ibid.* It is to be noted here that, at the same time, the 1441 planning authorities of the country were reduced to 145.


28. The writer of the "Astragal" column was Sir Hugh Casson from 1937 to 1939, continuously, from 1940 to 1944, occasionally, and from 1945 to 1951, continuously. The above information was provided by Sir Hugh himself to the author in Athens on 5 October 1987.

34. Ibid., pp. 12-3.
41. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
42. Ibid., p. 51.
43. Ibid., p. 54.
45. Cullingworth, J.B., *Environmental..., vol. IV, op. cit.*, p. 59. Also, it is to be noticed that the decision to distribute £300 m. in 1953 was based on the assumption that land would be depreciated to its existing use value; this had not happened and there-
fore the decision to distribute that sum should be reconsidered. See: *ibid.*, p. 57.


52. Based on the annual reports of the Central Land Board, in 1949 the Board collected £2,084,616 from 16,511 cases, that is an average of £126 per case. In 1950, the figures were £3,159,492 and 14,992, while the average £211 per case. See: Watkins, Ernest S., "Development Charges", *The Architects' Journal*, vol. 115, March 27, 1952, p. 392.


62. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
68. Ibid., p. 36, and Watkins, E.S., "Technical...", op. cit., p. 409.
76. Ibid., p. 43-4.
VII. REDEVELOPMENT OF THE CENTRAL AREAS: NEEDS AND PROPOSALS


5. Ibid., p. 5.


9. See: PRO file ADM 1/19037.


11. Ibid., p. 3.


247.
16. Ibid., p. 49.
17. Ibid., p. 50.
19. Ibid., p. 75.
23. Ibid., p. 77.
25. Ibid., p. 15.
34. Ibid., p. 50.
39. Ibid., pp. 22, 25.
41. Ibid., p. 195.


49. *Ibid.*., p. 44.

VIII. INNOVATIONS IN PLANNING TECHNIQUE


7. *Ibid.*.


9. *Ibid.*., p. 34.


12. "Standards of Redevelopment in Central Areas, signed by William Holford on 10 April 1945". *PRO file HLG 71/801*.

13. *Ibid.*.

14. *Ibid.*.

15. *Ibid.*.

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20. For example, it emerges from: Gillies, B., "Central Commercial Zones, 29.12.1949", PRO file HLG 71/218, that "a central commercial zone will only be defined where it is useful".


22. The list of the recommended total use zones for every town were the following:
   zone 1: residential,
   zone 2: business (shop),
   zone 3: business (office),
   zone 4: business (wholesale warehouses),
   zone 5: educational, recreational and public buildings zone,
   zone 6: light industrial zone,
   zone 7: industrial zone,
   zone 8: special industrial zone.
   For more details, see: Ibid., p. 26.

23. Ibid., p. 27.
24. Ibid., p. 28.
26. Ibid., p. 2.
27. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 2.
30. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p. 9.
33. Ibid., p. 36.
34. "Draft notes for Minister's speech to Local Authorities on Reconstruction under the 1944 Act; Planning Technique, signed by R.T.K. on 17th September 1947". PRO file HLG 71/34.
37. Ibid., p. 4.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., p. 4.
42. "Floor Space Control and the Developer", *op. cit.*, p. 4.
43. Ibid.
46. Ibid., pp. 43-4.
47. Ibid., pp. 98-9.
48. "Interview with Mr. Swarbrick, 14 December 1948". PRO file HLG 71/780.
49. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., p. 42.
53. Ibid.
IX. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR REPLANNING LONDON

5. Ibid., p. 101.
11. "Note of an informal meeting with representatives of the six Home Counties at Lambeth Bridge House, at 11 a.m. on Wednesday, 21st January, 1942". PRO file HLG 71/116.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
29. Ibid., p. 6.
30. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
31. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

X. THE INDEPENDENT PLANS FOR LONDON

5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
9. Cherry, G., Cities..., op. cit., p. 112.
11. Ibid., p. 20.
12. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 54.
16. Ibid., pp. 54-5.
17. Ibid., p. 55.
21. Ibid., p. 266.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., p. 266.
26. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p. 289.
32. Some of the comments of the Observer and *The Sunday Times* were republished in *The Architects' Journal*, vol. 96, October 22, 1942, p. 261.
33. Austen Hall's statement included the following:
   "This is an attempt to bring the architect into planning in its earliest stages. The traditional method is for the engineer to build his road and then leave the architect to make what he can of it. But by then it is usually too late for the architect to do anything effectively". See in *The Sunday Times*, October 18, 1942.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
43. Ibid., pp. 7-15.
44. Ibid., pp. 16-47.
45. Ibid., pp. 18-9.
46. Ibid., p. 18.

53. It was stated, with particular regard to this component, that:

"Some indication of the existing state of open space in relation to population may be obtained from the known areas of the City and County of London; the total area of public open space including playing fields is 7,890 acres, which is 10.5 per cent of the total area of 74,850 acres. The Greater London Regional Planning Committee suggested in their Reports that one-tenth of the Greater London area should be acquired for public open space with an addition of 7 acres per 1,000 of the population for playing fields. If these last figures be accepted, the total population of the City and London Area, 4,397,003 persons (1931), would call for 38,164 acres, or nearly five times the area of existing open spaces and playing fields in this area".

See in: LRRC, Greater London..., op. cit., pp. 37, 40.

54. Ibid., p. 31.
55. Ibid., p. 42.
56. Ibid., p. 44.
57. Ibid., pp. 44-5.
58. Ibid., p. 48.
60. Ibid., p. 384.
61. Ibid., p. 383.
XI. THE LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL'S PLAN

3. F.R. Hiorns was for many years a senior member of the architectural staff of the LCC and also a member of Lord Reith's Consultative Panel, Ministry of Works and Buildings. See in: Anonymous, "Mr. Hiorns retires". The Architects' Journal, vol. 94, July 10, 1941, p. 18.
6. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
12. Ibid. p. 28.
13. Ibid.
15. Ibid. p. 34.
17. Ibid., p. 41.
18. Ibid., p. 42.
19. According to the LCC Plan (see: Ibid., p. 49), the objectives in planning the road system were: first, the improvement of traffic flow; second, the segregation of fast long-distance traffic from traffic of a purely local nature; third, a reduction in the number of accidents; and last, the maintenance of existing communities and the removal of through traffic from them.
20. Ibid., p. 63.
21. Ibid., p. 61.
22. Ibid., p. 63.
23. Ibid., pp. 69-70.
24. Ibid., p. 73.
25. Ibid., p. 74.
26. Ibid., p. 78.
27. Ibid., p. 79.
28. Ibid., p. 83.
29. Ibid., p. 96.
30. Ibid., pp. 97-8.
31. Ibid., pp. 103-4.
32. Ibid., p. 107.
33. Ibid., p. 108.
34. Ibid., p. 114.
35. Ibid., p. 115.
36. Ibid., p. 119.
37. Ibid., p. 121.
38. Ibid., p. 127.
39. Ibid., p. 135.
40. Ibid., p. 136.
41. Ibid., p. 139.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., pp. 145-53.
XII. THE GREATER LONDON PLAN


2. The Technical Committee had the following composition: Harry Stewart (Ministry of Works and Planning), Major H.E. Adlington (Ministry of War Transport), J.H. Forshaw and H. Westwood (LCC), F.J. Forty (City of London), R.H. Buckley (Essex County Council), Lt. Col. A.E. Prescott (Hertfordshire County Council), F.W. Greig (Kent County Council),
A.G. Harfield (Middlesex County Council), W.P. Robinson (Surrey County Council), A.H. Prince (Buckinghamshire County Council), C.E. Boast (Croydon County Borough Council), A.T. Bridgwater (East Ham County Borough Council), E.P. Pye (West Ham County Borough Council), H. Cliffe (Non-County Borough Councils), E.E. Ryder (Urban District Councils) and A.J. Wilshire (Rural District Councils). See in: "Standing Conference on London Regional Planning, letter sent by Jackson to Stewart on 13 August 1942". PRO file HLG 85/24.


5. Ibid., p. iv.


10. See: (a) Ibid. (b) "Professor Abercrombie's Outline Plan...", op. cit.

11. Abercrombie, P., Greater..., op. cit., p. 27.

12. Ibid., p. 28.

13. Ibid., pp. 32-3.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., pp. 33-4.

18. Ibid., pp. 34-5.

19. Ibid., pp. 35-6.
20. Ibid., pp. 36-7.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 44.
25. Ibid., pp. 44-5.
26. Ibid., p. 47.
27. Ibid., pp. 55-6.
28. Ibid., p. 56.
29. Ibid., pp. 56-7.
30. Ibid., pp. 62-78.
31. "Professor Abercrombie's Outline Plan...", op. cit., p. 5.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., p. 6.
36. Ibid., p. 212.
38. Ibid., p. 118.
39. Ibid., pp. 120-1.
41. Ibid., p. 316.
42. Ibid., p. 317.
43. Ibid., p. 318.
44. Ibid., p. 319.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., p. 322.
47. Ibid., p. 323.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., p. 325.

XIII. THE COUNTY OF LONDON DEVELOPMENT PLAN

7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 127.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 127.
32. Ibid., p. 126.
34. Ibid., pp. 759-60.

XIV. INFLUENCES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PROPOSED PLANS IN THE RECONSTRUCTION PROCEDURE OF LONDON

2. "R(H)(44)13, 28th September 1944". PRO file CAB 87/35.
4. Ibid., p. 6.
5. Ibid., p. 7.
6. Ibid., p. 11.
7. Ibid.
9. Dalton, Charles, "What has happened to the London

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.


14. 69 of the firms came from inside County of London, while the rest 76 from outside the County. See in: ibid., p. 54. As regards the types of the firms, it is observed that 50 (34.5 per cent) were industries for engineering and electrical goods, 12 (8.3 per cent) were industries of manufacture of wood and cork. See also in: ibid., p. 55.


19. The classes were as follows: (a) light industry, which covered uses which create no nuisance; (b) general industry, which covered the remainder of industry, apart from special industries; (c) five special industries use classes, covering a great variety of noxious and offensive trades. See in: Griffith, E.J.L., “Moving...”, op. cit., p. 60.

20. General Development Order, 1950, First Schedule, Class III.


22. Ibid., p. 38.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.
XV. THE FIRST IDEAS FOR REPLANNING THE CITY OF LONDON


5. The most heavily blitzed areas of the City were estimated in 231 acres, according to the following evident: "City of London Reconstruction Projects". PRO file HLG 71/147.


7. Ibid.

8. This sentence has been quoted from the sub-title of the following book: The Institute of Bankers, The City of London, as a Centre of International Trade and Finance. Kent: Stapples Printers Ltd., 1961.


10. Ibid., pp. 178-81.

11. Ibid., p. 182.


15. Ibid., pp. 192, 196, 203, 206, 212.

16. Ibid., p. 216.

17. Ibid., pp. 218, 221.

18. Ibid., p. 223.


27. Ibid., p. 432.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., pp. 421-2.
34. Improvements and Town Planning Committee, Preliminary Draft Proposals..., op. cit.
35. Ibid., pp. i-ii.
36. Ibid., p. ii.
37. Ibid., pp. c, iv.
38. Ibid., p. 5.
39. Ibid., p. 9.
40. Ibid., p. 10.
41. Ibid., p. 11.
42. Ibid., p. 12.
43. Ibid., p. 13.
44. Ibid., p. 16.
45. Ibid., pp. 17-8.
46. Ibid., pp. 21-4.
47. Ibid., p. 21.
48. Ibid., pp. 22.
49. Ibid., pp. 22-3.
50. Ibid., p. 28.
52. Ibid., pp. 96-7.
53. Editorial, "The City Plan". The Architects' Journal,
vol. 100, August 10, 1944, p. 95.

54. Ibid., pp. 95-6.


56. Ibid.


58. Ibid., pp. 198-9.


61. "Memorandum prepared for Minister (Silkin), Programme of Work". PRO file HLG 71/1020.

XVI. THE HOLDEN-HOLFORD PLAN FOR THE CITY OF LONDON


3. Ibid.


5. Ibid., p. 49.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., pp. 51-2.

8. Ibid., p. 48.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., p. 301.
27. Ibid., p. 302.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., pp. 304-5.
139.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 323.
37. Ibid., p. 56.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., pp. 56-7.
40. Ibid., p. 57.
41. Ibid., pp. 288-7.
42. Ibid., p. 289.
43. Ibid., p. 281.
44. Ibid., p. 288.
45. Ibid., pp. 59-60.
46. Ibid., p. 60.
47. Ibid., pp. 290-3.
49. Ibid., p. 293.
50. Ibid., p. 80.
51. Ibid., pp. 298-9.
52. Ibid., p. 297.
53. Ibid., p. 60.
54. Ibid., p. 82.
55. Ibid., p. 296.
56. Ibid., p. 91.
57. Ibid., p. 270.
58. Ibid., p. 308.

XVII. THE PROJECTS OF COMPREHENSIVE REDEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL LONDON

2. Ibid., pp. 178-93.


6. Ibid.


8. Ibid.


10. Ibid., pp. 66-7.

11. Ibid., pp. 67-73.

12. Ibid., p. 68.

13. Ibid.


15. Ibid., p. 69.


18. Ibid., p. 73.

19. Ibid., pp. 74-6.

20. Ibid., pp. 76-7.

21. Ibid., pp. 79-80.

22. Ibid., pp. 81-2.

23. Ibid., pp. 82-3.


25. Ibid., pp. 91-2.
26. Ibid., p. 92.
35. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 266.
44. Ibid., p. 458.
45. Ibid., pp. 459-61.
46. Ibid., p. 461.
49. Ibid., p. 465.
50. Ibid., p. 466.
52. Marriott, O., The Property..., op. cit., p. 69.
62. Ibid., p. 70.
pp. 190-1.


70. Ibid., p. 191.


72. Marriott, O., The Property..., op. cit. p. 70.


74. Ibid., p. 3.

75. Ibid.


82. Anonymous, "LCC scheme for the Thames...". Ibid.
86. See in: (a) Astragal, "Notes & Topics: New hope for the South Bank". The Architects' Journal, vol. 114, November 1, 1951, p. 515. (b) "London County Council, South Bank Site - Interim development: Joint report by the Architect, the Chief Officer of the Parks Department, and Mr. Hugh Casson, MA, FRIBA, 8th November, 1951", p. 2. PRO file HLG 71/1574.
90. "Future of the South Bank site: Memorandum by the Lord Privy Seal, 1 October 1951". PRO file HLG 71/1574.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. London County Council, South Bank Site - Interim Development: Joint report by the Architect, the Chief Officer of the Parks Department, and the Mr. Hugh Casson, MA, FRIBA, 8th November 1951". PRO file HLG 71/1574.
95. Ibid., p. 4.
92. "An Airstop on the South Bank: Memorandum by the Minister of Civil Aviation, 28th December 1951". *PRO file HLG 71/1574.*
98. "Letter sent by David Eccles to P.A. Buttler on 19th March 1952". *PRO file HLG 71/1575.*
the Council at its meeting on 20th October 1953”. PRO file HLG 71/1575.


110. Ibid.
111. Ibid., p. 501.
112. Ibid., p. 502.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid., p. 504.
116. Ibid., p. 506.
118. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
121. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid., p. 258.
127. Ibid., p. 185.
130. Ibid., p. 186.
131. Ibid., p. 187.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid., p. 260.
134. Ibid., pp. 186-7.

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135. Ibid., p. 262.
136. Ibid.

XVIII. CONCLUSION


5. Ibid., p. 5.


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