Domestic institutions and decision-making in foreign policy and conflict situations: the role of the news media and the Greek-Turkish paradigm

Maria Touri

Introduction

In the contemporary era, commonly described as the information age, it comes as no surprise that much attention has been paid to the public and informational dimensions of those domestic institutions that affect international relations and state interactions in situations of conflict. However, no systematic investigation of the role of the news media as a domestic institution has taken place so far.

The paper addresses this deficit through a conceptual and empirical demonstration of the latent effects of the media logic and output on governmental decision-making. I suggest that with the use of game theory the news media can be systematically located in the decision-making process as a domestic contextual institution that induces apparently irrational strategic choices in the international domain.

An investigation of the coverage that a Greek-Turkish territorial crisis received from the Greek press puts the theory into practice and highlights the significance of the news media in understanding international outcomes.

Domestic institutions and international negotiations

During the last two decades, International Relations theories (IR) have increasingly acknowledged the importance of communications and information in decision-making processes. Two sets of arguments concerning the interaction between domestic and international politics highlight the consequences of publicity and information on international decisions and outcomes, in relation to war. The first set conceptualises domestic institutions as a source of accountability for political leaders (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Morgan and Campell, 1991). Focusing on the possibility of war between two rival states, at least one of which is a democracy, scholars in this tradition view domestic institutions as mechanisms that constrain political leaders by increasing the political risks associated with war (Schultz, 1999). In this case, the constraints derive from the transparency that characterises decision-making in democracies and facilitates mobilisation of opposition. The impact of publicity and transparency on human behaviour is of course hardly new with Kant being amongst the first to argue that the principles of human action could be ethical only if they were public (Kant, 1963 in Brown, 2005: 58). Based on Kant’s observation that even if state leaders do not suffer personally from war, they suffer through the loss of office (Schultz, 1999), Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) argue that an open political environment facilitates the unseating of a government that undertakes costly strategies.

The issue of openness and transparency encountered in democracies is dealt with by a second set of arguments, the informational approach. Instead of approaching transparency as a broad concept and constraining factor, scholars of this school of thought focus on the dissemination of information facilitated by democratic regimes as well as the amount and type of information and how it influences decision-making processes. As suggested by Fearon (1994) and Schultz (2001) domestic political institutions in democratic states...
enable the disclosure of information about governmental incentives and preferences in a
given crisis. The logic of this argument lies in the impact of this type of transparency on
informational asymmetries between the involved parties. The open system enables the
dissemination of more genuine signals or threats and increases the likelihood for a
bargaining process to result in a peaceful solution, as governments become less likely to
engage in bluffing behaviour and misrepresent their incentives.

One could argue that the two sets of arguments complement each other by
providing a different aspect of the impact of information on foreign policy making. While
the former highlights the issue of openness and publicity, the latter focuses on the type of
information disseminated within a democratic environment. By conceptualising the
impact of domestic institutions on international politics as mechanisms of accountability
and sources of information, the two theories provide the grounds to locate the news media
as an equally influential domestic institution. In this case and as Brown notes, the media
can be approached as generators of an open environment that modifies the dynamics of
decision-making processes (2005: 58). While Siegel (1997) suggests that institutions such
as the media take the control of information out of the government’s hands reducing the
opportunities for deception. Along similar lines, Van Belle (2004) sees the news media as
mechanisms that enable the public and foreign states to monitor the behaviour of
governments through a form of ‘panoptic’ mechanism.

The core argument here is that the news media’s potential influence on foreign
policymaking lies beyond their function as sources of information and accountability.
Their influential power is found in their disposition to provide a form of mediated or
distorted transparency. This is the resultant of the media’s organisational interests, the
underlying process of constructing news output that could often be negative and
judgmental and the potential media impact on public perceptions. All this suggests that
governments would try to influence the news content, involving in the commonly known
symbiotic relationship that politicians share with journalists and media organisations
(Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995). The interaction that governments develop with the
national media during bargaining crises is a complex one embodying mutual and
conflicting interests through which the media’s role in international politics is defined.
This paper focuses on the power of the news media to influence decision-making through
the construction of a domestic reality that might not serve the government’s interests and
the possible directions this influence could take.

**News Construction Processes and the Framing of Conflict**

It would be rather a cliché to say that in democratic states the media no longer constitute
mere observers but proceed with constructing meanings of reality and contemporary
society. News items are constructed through a decision-making process based on standard
journalistic practices and routines as well as on the organisational structure of the media

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1 This informational perspective of democracy grew out of the literature on crisis bargaining (Schultz, 1999).
The idea is that when information in a bargaining crisis is distributed asymmetrically with at least one of the
involved states having information the adversary cannot observe, agreeing on a mutually beneficial solution
can be problematic. In this case, it is the existence of reliable mechanisms for the disclosure of information
that create scope for a peaceful solution (Fearon, 1992, 1994 and 1995; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow and
Zorick, 1997)
and their position in the market place. Time and space constraints direct journalists to the selection of news stories based on news values including prominence, conflict, controversy and drama (Galtung and Rouge 1965; Tuchman, 1978; Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). Moreover, the growing professionalism of journalists renders them unwilling to rely exclusively on official statements, prompting them to become more analytical and judgmental (Schudson, 2003: 112). This professionalism consists in fitting a story in the media’s organisational standards (Tuchman, 1978: 66) and is driven by the need to produce commodity news that complies with the demands of the marketplace.

Yet, it is important to understand that contrary to Broder’s (1987) claims, the inherent distortion of reality is not the outcome of personal choices or flaws; but the consequence of the constraints newsmakers face. For this reason, Schudson emphasises the replacement of bias by that of ‘framing’ underlining the impossibility of avoiding the depiction of world through certain selected frames (2003: 35-36). Frames in the media can be described as ‘principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens and what matters’ (Gitlin, 1980:6), with the ‘little tacit theories’ encapsulating the journalistic processes.

Two implications of the professional journalistic culture are relevant here. Firstly, the professionalism driven ‘framing’ process is highly likely to result in news stories that oppose the governmental interests. Conceptualising the media as a political institution, Cook argues that the journalistic professionalism might direct the news towards the creation of good stories that do not necessarily translate into good political outcomes (1998: 87-97). Secondly, because of framing processes, journalists tend to promote ‘bad’ news, favouring conflict, action and drama, intensifying the manifestation of conflict even in instances of relative calm (Liebes, 1992 in Schudson, 2003). This tendency is heightened during situations where conflict actually exists. As Wolfsfeld explains, the media construct frames by attempting to fit information into a professionally useful package (1997:33); and once they have their attention down to a conflict, they seek to produce news stories by finding an existing frame that fits their data. A key implication of this framing procedure lies in defining the exposure of decision-making to domestic audiences; and the understanding the public has of a conflict.

Essentially, the public is a resource that both the media and policymakers seek to capture and offers insight into the rationale in the decisions both sides make during a conflict. Although the linkage between the media, public opinion and policymakers is complex and theoretically unanswered, a reported key issue is the audience’s lack of knowledge, which is enhanced by the often abstract and obscure nature of foreign affairs, and its dependence on the media for information and understanding of foreign policymaking. Framing becomes central here since the public’s interpretations are rarely automatically deduced from the reporting of an event itself. On the contrary, problems, causes and policy responses often gain widespread adherence through media frames (Entman, 2000: 124).

Independent of whether the news media shape public opinion, what needs to be recognised is that as Seib (1997) notes, when news organisations set aside the commitment to accuracy, amplify their voices to a sustained roar and pursue a policy goal fervently, they may create a reality that captivates the public. The resulting public opinion can then overwhelm politicians (ibid: 1) as it elicits the anticipation of public punishment. Of course, this process entails the development of governmental strategies to control the information flow and secure favourable news coverage. However, the present paper seeks to demonstrate how in situations of conflict the media can still influence decision-making in a subtle yet decisive way by prompting governing officials to develop preferences that
conform to the anticipated response of the media and the public. Game theory and the
nested game offer insight in the way this impact can be located in the decision-making
during a conflict, underlining the integration of the news media in foreign policymaking
as domestic institutions.

News Media and Nested games

Game theory is often accused of being too idealistic and exaggerating the control of
political actors over their decisions. The employment of the theory in this study does not
seek to demonstrate that political actors represent instrumentally rational players who take
into account all the objective realities of a given situation. Yet, it assists in comprehending
why the actors in question behave the way they do; and in detecting the potential influence
of factors that are apparently exogenous to a government’s preference, on their decisions.
The concept of Tsebelis’ nested games (1990) provides an effective theoretical framework
and helps investigate the possibility of the news frames influencing the ranking of the
government’s preferences and ultimately the political outcome.

Tsebelis conceptualises the political game as a whole network of games the actor
is involved in (1990: 5-11). The idea is that a decision that appears to be suboptimal or
irrational from the perspective of only one game, is actually optimal when the whole
network of games is evaluated. The term suboptimal represents those decisions that
oppose the utility/preference of an actor and appear more likely to yield cost than gain;
and they are apparently suboptimal when they are not the result of a miscalculation or
misperception of a given situation, but aim at meeting less apparent interests. The concept
of the nested game offers the issue of ‘optimality’ in a given decision as an indicator of
potential influences from background forces. It draws attention to the possibility that the
media logic and resulting news frames create a domestic status quo within which a
decision that meets the international preferences of the government, in relation to the rival
state, is at variance with its domestic preferences and pursuit of public reward. The
government would then be engaged in an evaluation of the potential payoffs of a given
decision emerging from both its international and domestic implications. Hence, current
governmental preferences and their interest in office tenure, which inevitably relates to the
domestic political support they obtain (Van Belle, 1993, in Van Belle 1997), can lead to
decisions that appear irrational when evaluated in the international domain, entailing some
international cost. Yet, they begin to make sense when the media’s presence and domestic
payoff it induces is taken into account.

Effectively, the nested game helps approach potential media influences as the
hidden interests induced by anticipated changes in public opinion resulting from decisions
that divert significantly from current news coverage (Kunczik, 1997). Such interests
manifest themselves in the conduct of suboptimal foreign decisions and reveal an
underlying role of the news media in the understanding of international outcomes. With
the employment of the press coverage of the Greek-Turkish conflict and the 1996 Imia-
Kardak crisis as a case study, the following sections explore how news frames affect
decision making. A fundamental component of this media effect is the ‘tendency of
domestic publics to react more strongly to strategic losses than to comparable gains, and
to punish their readers more for the former than to reward them for the latter’ (Levy, 1992:
285).
Research design and method

The news frames through which the crisis was portrayed in the Greek press were investigated through a qualitative content analysis. Two newspapers, ‘Eleftherotypia’ and ‘Eleftheros Typos’ were selected representing diametrically opposing party inclinations. The former is classified as of centre-left and the latter of conservative disposition. Due to the short duration of the crisis, all relevant news stories were analysed, independent of length or type of story. The unit of analysis was the article while the ‘frame’, as defined by Robert Entman, was used as a coding device for the categorisation of the press content. According to Entman:

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (1993: 52).

Entman’s definition served in capturing the pressure exerted by the Greek media on the government through the evaluation of the causes of the tension and selected strategies as well as speculations about future implications. Two main categories were employed, namely the diagnostic and prognostic frame. The former was further organised in the problem definition and causal responsibility in line with Entman’s definition. In the definition of the given problem, the frame consisted of this information and statements that described the seriousness of the issue that had just arisen. The causal responsibility frame identified the agent responsible for the conflict (E.g. the adversary or the government); and those factors that led to the escalation of the tension. The prognostic category compressed what the press promoted as strategic alternatives available to the two actors and the risk and cost they entailed. As for the payoffs, these referred particularly to the option of war, being the most crucial outcome in the game. The last subcategory in the prognostic frame is the remedy suggestion indicating what the press regarded the best possible solution for the game. The media frame organised based on the coverage of the two Greek newspapers is presented in appendix ii.

The news frames that emerged from the content analysis were translated into payoffs the government received from this media coverage of its selected decisions. These decisions were then evaluated in accordance to the payoff or cost they yielded without or with media coverage in an effort to identify the degree of consistency of the two payoffs and how this could have generated optimal or suboptimal decisions on behalf of the government.

The 1996 Imia-Kardak Crisis

The onset of the Imia/Kardak crisis dates back to December 26, 1995, when a Turkish cargo boat named ‘Figen Akat’ ran aground Imia-Kardak, a pair of uninhabited islets, located approximately 5.5 miles from the Greek island of Kalymnos and 3.8 miles off the Anatolian coast of Turkey. The captain of the ship refused to be towed by the Greek
authorities, claiming that he was within Turkish territorial waters. The ship was eventually towed by a Greek tug but the incident gave rise to a dispute over the salvage fees between the Turkish and Greek captains leading to a routine exchange of verbal notes between the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Greek Embassy in Ankara over the sovereignty of the Imia-Kardak islets.

The exchange of the diplomatic notes was kept secret, until the Greek private television channel ‘ANTENNA’ covered the story on January 24. On January 25 the Mayor of Kalymnos raised a Greek flag on the islet, which was removed the following day by a team of journalists of the Turkish newspaper ‘Hürriyet’ who flew to Imia-Kardak by helicopter and raised the Turkish flag. On January 29, Turkey made the first official challenge of the status quo, questioning the sovereignty over Imia-Kardak and numerous other islets in the Aegean. Furthermore, Turkey demanded the removal of the Greek commandos and flag, suggesting bilateral negotiations regarding the territorial status of the Aegean Sea.

It needs to be mentioned that at the time of the crisis, both Turkey and Greece faced domestic instabilities that influenced their handling of the tension. In Turkey as Güzer (2005) notes, politicians and bureaucrats were deeply confused by results of the newly-held general elections of December 1995 which revealed the increased popularity of Islamist Welfare Party (WP) led by Necmettin Erbakan, perceived by the Turkish Military, as a major threat to the national security (Gundogdu, 2001:108-9). At the same time, there were allegations about Çiller’s potential involvement with the local mafia (ELIAMEP, 2006) that along with the country’s deteriorating economy was putting additional pressure on the government. Therefore, the running aground of Figen Akat and the emergence of the so-called ‘flag war’ on the islets handed the Turkish administration with an opportunity to distract the public from the country’s internal problems. In Greece, a newly formed government that came into power in Greece, after the deterioration of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou’s health, found itself under immense pressure to deter the challenges of the historical enemy effectively. These domestic instabilities played a key role in turning an apparently trivial incident into a crisis that led the two countries on the brink of war. Attention is placed on the response of the Greek government to Turkey’s overt challenge of the status quo, its failure to maintain a consistent deterrence strategy and its contribution in what appeared as an unreasonable escalation of the tension.

Greece, which in this game was the ‘defender’ of the status quo, initially responded to the flag incident with a threat regarding the re-evaluation of Turkey’s future position in the EU as well as the placement of commandos around the islet, which did reflect an attempt to deter the adversary with a combination of threat and manoeuvre. Being inferior to Turkey, in military terms, and domestically vulnerable at that specific point in time, Greece was less interested in and capable of handling an armed conflict. However, the Greek government failed to implement a counteroffensive deterrence strategy based on the threat of retaliatory punishment at the timing of its choice (Arvanitopoulos, 1997). With the rapid aggregation of forces around the islets it marked the further escalation of the crisis, from which a costless withdrawal was no longer possible. The crisis was eventually resolved with the intervention and disengagement plan of USA. At the time of the crisis, USA was the only superpower involved; and since, in theory, superpowers do not tend to change the status quo and the structure of the international system, unless they are directly affected by this change, (Chase et al 1999:159-217), stability was in the interest of the US government. The crisis was also an opportunity for USA to preserve its dominance in the region.
The strategic analysis of the crisis and the Greek strategy aims to identify the potential impact of the Greek news frames on the decision making process by attaching a domestic cost or payoff to certain strategies, influencing the ranking of the payoffs and preferences of the government. In game theoretic terms, the crisis could be presented in the form of a three-person game tree of sequential moves (see appendix i, figure 1). The payoffs for Greece and Turkey are ranked from 0.5 to 4, while payoffs for Greece are always stated first. In these, payoff 4 is the most preferred outcome and 0.5 is the worst possible outcome that translates into war and punishment from USA. Apart from the payoffs the two countries receive from their interaction, their payoffs are affected by their interaction with the mediator and their response to the disengagement plan. Complying with or rejecting the USA plan either will leave their payoff (p) unaffected or will reduce it by p/2 respectively. Although USA is not directly affected by the outcome of the game, its preferences help define its payoff too. It will therefore receive a standard payoff p from mediating which increases to p + 1 if the crisis is resolved; or it reduces to p – 1 if the two countries involve in an armed conflict. If the US government decides to remain uninvolved, it receives no payoff (p = 0).

The game officially begins with the demand made by the Turkish government for the removal of the Greek flag and the commencement of bilateral negotiations to which Greece could respond by escalating the crisis with the use of force, which is here named strategy A, withdrawing, which is strategy B, or deterring with the use of threat, as strategy C. The depiction of the crisis in the game tree summarises the variance of payoffs for both countries and helps explain why strategy C could prove more beneficial for Greece. Considering the incentives and interests of Turkey, if Greece chose to refrain from any action/negotiation and Turkey chose to escalate the crisis by sending forces or even attacking, Turkey would end up worse off. Suppose USA decided to refrain from intervening, Turkey’s defective move towards an adversary that had not attempted to escalate the crisis would strengthen Greece’s position as the ‘defender’ and harm Turkey’s international reputation, as both its allies and public opinion would condemn the escalation as overreaction, turning a minor event - a ship running aground - into a confrontation.

Given that the Turkish government sought a reward from the public, a Greek decision to deter with no use of force, would ultimately increase the cost of escalation for Turkey, which would receive a payoff of 2.5 if Greece complied with the Turkish demands; and the payoff of 1 (war) if Greece resisted. Greece in this case would receive 2 if it withdrew and 1 if it resisted. In case USA chose to mediate, there would be high probability for the game to end as escalation was unilateral and it would be extremely harmful for Turkey to continue resisting. Although Turkey would not have its payoff reduced by p/2 as would be the case if it continued to defect, it would get a smaller payoff than if there was no mediation. This would amount to p/1.5 = 2 while Greece would receive 3. For Greece I interpret (3, 2) to be more damaging than if Turkey withdrew without prior mediation (4, 3); because mediation could require some concessions for the Greek government too. However, Greece would still be better off than Turkey. Moreover, knowing that the interest of USA in the status quo made mediation highly likely and provided Greece made no escalating moves, Turkey would be better off withdrawing, in order to avoid the enforcement of costs from USA. Hence, by backwards induction Greece would be better off choosing strategy C, since this was likely to lead to Turkish withdrawal, for fear of the US and public sanctions.

I argue that from the observer’s point of view, the Greek government committed an apparently suboptimal decision, by shifting from strategy C, with which it entered the
crisis, to strategy A. I therefore suggest that the integration of the news media in the game can shed light on the optimal nature of the strategy.

The Role of the Media

Undoubtedly, factors such as the unexpected deterioration of the then Prime Minister, Papandreou’s health that led to a rapid swearing-in of the new government generated internal divisions and a sense of instability that was crucial for the handling of the crisis. Nevertheless, I argue that the nationalistic and critical reporting of the Greek press should not be exempt from the fitful decision of the Greek government to escalate the crisis with the use of force.

As shown in appendix ii, although the anti-governmental newspaper E. Typos disseminated a more critical framing, the coverage of Eleftherotypia was considerably negative and judgmental too. This observation is indicative of the amount of pressure exerted by the media, given that Eleftherotypia is traditionally well disposed towards the government. At the same time, according to research on the role of the media in crises, unanimous media criticism has often been blamed for forcing political leaders to reconsideration of strategies (Wolfsfeld, 1996; Robinson, 2001).

With the aid of the decision tree depicted in figure 2 (appendix i), I suggest that each strategy available to the Greek government entailed an additional payoff resulting from the coverage the strategy received from the press. This payoff is called $m$ and amounts to the original payoff with an added value equal to 1 when the press supports the strategy and the same value deducted when the strategy is portrayed negatively. The degree of criticism embodied in the news frames is evaluated according to its presumed anticipated impact on the public and as a warning for future, anticipated criticism. The decision tree in figure 2 shows payoff $m$ below the payoffs of the three players and only for Greece.

As shown in appendix ii, what is striking about the press coverage is the onset of critical reporting of the situation right after the raising of the Turkish flag on the islet but before the two countries officially entered the crisis period. The framing is critical of the governmental attempt to deter the adversary with the use of threat and representative of the nationalistic discourse that the Greek media have been promoting for years in relation to Turkey, portraying Greece as a nation under threat from its neighbours. It is therefore possible to have attached a cost to the initial deterrence strategy, cultivating public agitation and anticipation of a drastic response to rectify the initial procrastination of the government and rendering any strategy other than confrontation domestically costly. Hence, strategy C automatically received a payoff $m = p - 1$, while the media framing generated the anticipation that only if Turkey withdrew instantly from its claims, would the payoff $m$ for strategy C change into $m = p + 1$.

On January 30, the Greek government responded by switching to strategy A, with the increase of forces in the Aegean. From the standpoint of the government’s international preferences and interests, this could reflect an apparently suboptimal move. In combination with Turkey’s respective preparation for war, the two countries were involved in a mutual escalation that, as shown in the left-hand side of the decision tree, would lead to war unless Greece withdrew or USA mediated. However, as the payoffs $m$

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1 The payoff the government receives for each strategy in relation to the press coverage is $m = p +/- 1$, where 1 is added to or deducted from the original payoff of the player, independent of the payoff induced by USA.
at the end points of the tree indicate, the media criticism gave a small advantage to Greek strategy A, when compared to strategy C if USA remained uninvolved \(^1\); which however looms even larger when evaluated within the context of the tense atmosphere the framing generated on a national level. By identifying the governmental ‘inaction’ as the main cause for the Turkish challenge, the Greek media attached a domestic cost to the government’s initial strategy. The news frame conformed to the expectations for nationalistic and drama orientated coverage. It produced a newsworthy story, enhanced the media’s role as guardians of the national interest and, through its anticipated impact on the public, increased the domestic payoff for the escalation strategy.

Concluding remarks

In line with the ‘bad news is good news’ journalistic axiom, the Greek press promoted a premature ‘crisis’ frame along with the costly implications that governmental failure to do something drastically would yield. This framing reflects a distorted or mediated sense of transparency that generated ideal conditions for an agitated public opinion. Considering the weight that policymakers accord to public perceptions regarding the success or failure of a strategy, it became a compelling risk indicator and source of domestic cost.

The nested game offered theoretical basis that enabled the understanding and manifestation of the impact of news frames through the concept of the suboptimal decision; and through this impact, it also revealed the news media’s role as a domestic institution in the understanding of decision-making during conflict. The application of the nested game on the press coverage of the 1996 Greek-Turkish crisis exemplified news production processes and their output in relation to a domestic cost, a dynamic that is commonly important to governmental actors. It therefore enabled the consideration of the media logic as an analytical instrument for foreign policy decision-making.

One could argue that the validity of the approach employed in this study as well as the alleged impact of the Greek press on the escalation of the crisis is down to the socio-political context within which the media’s role was examined. It is beyond doubt that the use of the Greek – Turkish conflict provides an ideal framework of analysis. The length and nature of the relationship between the two countries and its implications on people’s perceptions of the adversary have only been reinforced by the national media strengthening the fear of the ‘other’ (Tsagarousianou, 1997 in Ozgunes and Terzis, 2000) and framing the nation as under constant threat by Turkey. Such frames have inevitably helped maintain a tense and alarmed climate in Greece placing governments under tremendous pressure. However, seen within the wider context of a constantly evolving communications and media environment, the implications of this study could become valid on a more universal level.

During the last decade, we have witnessed the rapid proliferation of communications technologies leading to the multiplication of online information sources, the even more speedy transmission of news and the generation of a new environment where politicians are no longer the sole definer of information. Within this new communications landscape, the media come closer to becoming the domestic institution that provides the kind of transparency and accountability that, as suggested by IR theories, constrains policymakers and facilitates peaceful conflict resolutions. At the same time, the openness that new technologies provide, have changed the role of more traditional media

\(^1\) The average payoff \(m\) equals 2.14 for strategy A and 2.0 for strategy C.
such as the press, with commentary being the new technique and at times, even more important than the news. Considering the increasing competition that accentuates the need for controversial news, focus on conspiracy and, to put in the words of the outgoing Prime Minister of Britain Tony Blair, ‘search for impact’ (Guardian, 13 June 2007, p. 6), news content can generate an overwhelming environment for politicians. Governments become compelled to cope with the media constantly making their anticipated commentary and impact an integral part of their decision-making process; and rendering the news media a player to take into consideration not just due to its presence and the latent effects it generates but also due to its content.

The changing context of communication has inevitably changed the relationship between politics, the media and public life, highlighting the media’s role as a mechanism that sets off the threat of domestic losses and validating the need for them to be incorporated in the decision-making analyses of international relations. The present study provides a conceptual and methodological approach and suggestion for a more systematic investigation of media-government interactions as well as the introduction of communications as an instrument for the analysis of international politics.
Figure 1: The 1996 Imia-Kardak Crisis in the form of a game tree – payoffs from the interaction of the two countries and the USA mediation
Figure 2: Payoffs $m$ from the interaction of the Greek government with the national press
The 1996 Imia – Kardak crisis
‘Eleftherotypia’ & ‘Eleftheros Typos’, 27 January – 1 February

Diagnosis

27 January
The territorial claim Turkey made over the islet is just ridiculous’
(E. Typos, page 9)

28 January
N/A

29 January
‘The Ministry of Defence is alarmed’
‘The government is very close to a general mobilisation’
(Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr)
‘How can Pangalos say there is no issue?’ (E. Typos, pages 8-10)

30 January
‘War is in the air in the Aegean – Ready for war’
‘Ankara invites Athens for a negotiation round in order to change the status quo in the Aegean’
‘Ankara wants to ‘erase’ all the existing regulations regarding the Aegean since 1974’
‘There is no issue whatsoever since the islets are Greek’
(Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr)

31 January
‘The incident is not accidental despite the official statements’
‘The crisis is going beyond the limits despite the official assurance that everything is under control’
(Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr)
‘We are about to be in a war/ War is in the air’
‘The situation is more serious than in 1987’
(E. Typos, pages 22-28)

Diagnosis – Causal responsibility

27 January
‘The governmental dispersal gave Turkey the chance to proceed with new territorial claims’
(E. Typos, page 9)

29 January
‘The weakness that the government showed in handling the initial Turkish provocation, gave Ankara the green light to escalate the crisis’
(E. Typos, pages 8-10)

30 January
‘The Turkish provocation against Greece is confirmed’
‘They are using as an excuse the incident in the islet asking for negotiations in order to solve the problem’
(Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr)

31 January
‘The Turks continue to play dangerous games’
(Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr
‘Ankara ‘cultivates’ the tension in the Aegean with the encouragement of USA’
‘The Turks want to reorganise the Aegean’
‘The Turkish government is following their usual provocative tactic’
(E. Typos, pages 22-28)
Prognosis - Anticipated risk and cost

27 January  ‘The issue is expected to cause further complications in the Greek –Turkish relationship’
(Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr)

29 January  ‘There is fear for future rearrangement of the shelf’
‘If we accept negotiate about the status quo in the Aegean, this will have future consequences for Athens’
(Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr)
‘There will be more Turkish provocations in the future’
(E. Typos, pages 8-10)

30 January  ‘Turkey will turn to Thrace next’
‘Unless the government resists, the future holds even worse’
‘The government will lead the country to national defeat and humiliation’
‘Greece will be forced to commence negotiations not only for the islet but for the whole region’
(Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr)

Prognosis -Strategic alternatives *

29 January -  ‘There cannot be any negotiations for an issue that does not exist’
‘There has to be either a war or we must ensure the USA agrees we are right’

1 February

Prognosis - Remedy Suggestion

29 January  ‘The government needs an intransigent policy’
‘There should be no negotiation with Turkey’
(Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr)

30 January  ‘The government has to provide evidence and argumentation about the status of the islets’
‘They [the government] have to resist’
(E. Typos, pages 10-11)

31 January  ‘We have to make them step back without engaging into a war’
(Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr)
‘One of the two sides has to withdraw or there will be a war’
(E. Typos, pages 22-28)

* The specific strategic alternatives are being reproduced by the four newspapers throughout the crisis
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