Richard Hooker and Writing God into Polemic and Piety

Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
At the University of Leicester

by

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Abstract

This thesis argues that Richard Hooker understands God as the primary authority in the argument of his *Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*. Challenging the canonical view of Hooker in which it is contended that God has left church government undecided and that Scripture and reason are the twin authorities for Hooker, ‘Writing God into Polemic and Piety’ investigates how Hooker develops an extra-Scriptural perception of the guiding authority of God in what is good for the church in all ages.

This study argues that Hooker polemically explains God’s involvement in the church by developing a metaphor which he names ‘Law’, by which Hooker imaginatively presents to the rational minds of his readers what human reason alone cannot grasp of the guidance of God. This thesis uncovers the difference for Hooker between perception and knowledge, divine truth and metaphorical truth, contesting the view that Hooker explains ecclesiology by drawing upon one philosophical ‘school of thought’.

This thesis also investigates how Hooker develops love, desire and affective commitments to the divine in his vision of Christian piety, thus reassessing Hooker’s ‘rational’ outlook for the church. ‘Writing God into Polemic and Piety’ contextually situates Hooker in the theology, philosophy, piety and church controversy of the late sixteenth century, with reference to contemporary English and continental writers.

This study is organised into seven chapters. Chapter One addresses Hooker’s sixteenth-century methodology for discussing the divine, while Hooker’s understanding of the divinely revealed language of Scripture in relation to extra-Scriptural perception will be examined in Chapters Two and Three. Hooker’s metaphor of Law and his argument for God’s guidance of what is good in church polity will be investigated in Chapters Four, Five and Six. Chapter Seven explores the role of affective commitments in Hooker’s polity and piety.
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The majority of my research was undertaken at the British Library. In my study of Hooker and the period, as well as the wider context of the Renaissance, the Reformation and sixteenth-century theology and philosophy, I also researched and read at the following: Leicester University Library, Leicester; The Dr. William’s Library, London; Senate House Research Library, London; The Bodleian Library, Oxford; The Central Library of The Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven; The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek, Leipzig; The Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vatican City; The Huntington Library, San Marino, CA. I wish to thank the staff of each of these Libraries for their assistance and kind patience with me, particularly the staff of the inter-library loan departments at the British Library and at Leicester University Library.

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I thank Melissa for her love and companionship. She has helped me in more ways than she knows.
A Note on Hooker’s Text and Abbreviations

All quotations from Hooker are taken from the modern Folger ‘old spelling’ edition, as is the dual reference system for citing Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie. This reference system incorporates the divisions of the text in John Keble’s nineteenth-century edition. Thus the Lawes is referenced in this thesis as follows: volume number in the Folger edition; colon; page number(s) and line number(s) in the Folger edition; semi colon; open bracket; book number of the Lawes; chapter number (Hooker’s); section number (Keble’s); close bracket. For example: 3:146.21-24; (VII.1.2).

Other citations from Hooker’s sermons are given as follows: volume number in the Folger edition; colon; page number(s) and line number(s) in the Folger edition. For example: 5:113.19-27.

When cited, the title of each of Hooker’s works appears in the following abbreviated form:

Certaintie    A Learned and Comfortable Sermon of the Certaintie and Perpetuitie
             of Faith in the Elect
Jude 1       The First Sermon Upon Part of S. Judes Epistle
Jude 2       The Second Sermon Upon Part of S. Judes Epistle
Justification A Learned Discourse of Justification, Workes, and How the
             Foundation of Faith Is Overthrowne
Lawes        Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie
Pride        A Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pride

Other Abbreviations

Folger        The Folger Library Edition of The Works of Richard Hooker
Repleye       Thomas Cartwright, A Replye to an awersw made of M. Doctor
             Whitgiftes againste the admonition to the Parliament
The Second Replie Thomas Cartwright, The Second Replie of Thomas Cartwright:
                  against Maister Doctor Whitgiftes second answer, touching the Church
                  Discipline
The Rest of the Second Replie Thomas Cartwright, The Rest of the Second Replie agaynst maister
                      Whitgifts second Answer
                      pp. 1-79.
STC           A Short-Title Catalogue of Books Printed in England, Scotland, &
             Ireland and of English Books Printed Abroad 1475-1640, 2nd edn.,
             rev. W. A. Jackson, F. S. Ferguson, and K. F. Pantzer
Introduction

Richard Hooker (1554-1600) wrote *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*, which is the first major theological and philosophical work written in English prose. This thesis reassesses how Hooker perceives, in his great work, the guiding influence of God in governing what is good in church polity. This thesis also reassesses how Hooker perceives organised common affection towards God in church piety. Scholarship has always assumed that Hooker’s sixteenth-century vision of ‘authority’ in the church is based predominately upon Scripture and human reason, but in fact, this thesis will argue, Hooker understands God as the guiding authority in the church who is ‘present’ not only in human reason and Scripture, but also in goodness and in love. Hooker envisages the church as responding to the divine by its common affections in organised prayer, thus developing the Christian community’s affective relationship with God.

Hooker realises that the presbyterian element within the Church of England, which campaigned for Queen Elizabeth I to take on the Genevan ‘Biblical’ model of ecclesiastical government, understood ‘authority’ in a literal sense by interpreting the Bible word for word in their denial of Elizabeth’s hierarchical ecclesiology. Hooker believes that their literal reading of Scripture in matters of ecclesiastical polity limits their understanding of the manifestation of God’s authority. Instead, addressing himself to the presbyterians, Hooker perceives God’s metaphorical guidance in the church, not only in man’s reasoning, but also in what is discovered to be good within the government and customs of the church. The rational argument of the *Lawes* relies, this thesis will argue, upon Hooker’s metaphorical depiction of ‘Law’, which

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1 Although the presbyterian denomination did not emerge in England until the Westminster Assembly (1643-49) fifty years after the context of this study, I use the word ‘presbyterian’ throughout this thesis to denote the Elizabethan Englishmen who insisted that the presbyterian system of church organisation should replace the episcopal system already established in Elizabeth’s church. I further explain this, and Hooker’s understanding of the term ‘presbyterian’, on pp. 2-6 below. I use the term ‘presbyterian’ and not ‘puritan’ in this study because Hooker in the *Lawes* specifically wrote against those who held presbyterian sympathies, and the term ‘puritan’ does not necessarily imply this.
polemically explains God’s authoritative guidance. It is Hooker’s vision that God is intrinsic to
the soul of the public body and to the common good that it seeks. This thesis will contend that
Hooker, throughout Books I-V of the Lawes which this study principally examines, is anxious
that God’s involvement in polity and piety is recognised by the English Protestant community.
In section I of this introduction, I will biographically introduce Hooker, whilst in section II, I will
outline the argument of this study.

I

Hooker, educated at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, had been trained in theology and divinity as
well as in the study of the church fathers and in the history of the church. He had begun life at
Oxford as a chorister and ended it lecturing in logic and Hebrew. The aim of Oxford University
in the sixteenth century, just as at Cambridge, was to produce ‘godly’ men for a career in the
Church of England above any other profession. Hooker gained his BA in 1574 and his MA in
1577, and was ordained a deacon in the Church of England by the bishop of London John
Aylmer at Fulham Palace in 1579. Hooker first made himself known in London by preaching at
Paul’s Cross in 1584, and was later appointed Master of the Temple Church in London from
1585 to 1591, having left Oxford and surrendered his Fellowship.

Hooker entered the Church of England at a time when there were conflicting views over
what exactly was the ‘godly’ way to organise church matters. Elizabeth’s church was governed
by the episcopacy system of bishops, and its customs and prayers were prescribed in The Book of

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3 Hooker’s Paul Cross sermon, on the authority of the modern Folger edition of Hooker’s works, was preached in
1584 and not in 1581 as was widely thought. See Folger, 6: xxii. There is no surviving copy of the sermon.
Common Prayer. The prayer book was originally constructed by Archbishop Thomas Cranmer but underwent minor revisions at the hands of Elizabeth in 1559. In the same year, Elizabeth had also imposed the Act of Supremacy, which in part asserted the authority of bishops and the episcopacy system, and she had also introduced the Act of Uniformity which enforced subscription to the prayer book. Yet the men who called themselves ‘godly’ were dissatisfied with the established church and held sympathies with the presbyterian model of polity, which had been cultivated by John Calvin at the Church of Geneva and was believed to be a discipline of ‘divine’ polity because it was based exclusively upon parts of Scripture. English presbyterians adamantly believed that this ‘divine’ polity should be introduced into Elizabeth’s church, and they opposed two radical extremes: the remnants of Roman Catholicism (‘popery’), and any separatist who sought to split, or break away from, the Church of England. By denying the authority of bishops and wishing to develop a full scale preaching ministry of the Gospel, the presbyterians demanded that each parish be assigned its own pastor (or preacher) and its own teacher (or doctor), as well as demanding that each parish be allowed to elect from its congregation its own eldership for the purpose of administrating spiritual discipline and worship. The presbyterians envisaged equality among ministers (presbyters), not popish hierarchy.

Hooker accepts the word ‘presbyterian’ and, in fact, in Hooker’s view of the church the clergy should be divided into bishops, presbyters and deacons. The words ‘presbyterian’ along with ‘presbyterianism’ will be used in this study, albeit that the latter will be an anachronistic

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6 Lawes, 2: 437.6-448.7; (V.78.2-13).
usage. Hooker understands that the ‘godly’ presbyterians believe that the Holy Spirit has persuaded them not only that Scripture provides a discipline of ‘divine’ polity but also that they, and not others, are ‘Gods children’. In the Preface to the Lawes, Hooker writes: ‘This hath bred high tearmes of separation betweene such and the rest of the world, whereby the one sort are named The brethren, The godlie, and so forth, the other worldings, timeservers, pleasers of men not of God’.

The Elizabethan writers who advocated the ‘godly’ presbyterian system included the outspoken Thomas Cartwright, his friend Walter Travers, the Master of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, Laurence Chaderton, the preacher from Kingston upon Thames John Udall, and the London ministers John Field, Thomas Wilcox, as well as Dudley Fenner, Stephen Egerton, Thomas Sparke and William Bradshaw. Thomas Cartwright was an academic preacher at Cambridge University, famous for his eloquence, and was appointed Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity in Cambridge in 1569. He delivered in 1570 a series of lectures on the ecclesiastical polity found in the first two chapters of Acts, and he praised the embodiment of this polity within the Calvinistic form of church organisation. Based upon his lectures, and despite the Act of Uniformity, Cartwright drew up Six Articles which stated that the Church of England should take the form of the Apostolic Church (described in the New Testament), and should thus abolish diocesan episcopacy.

As a result, Cartwright was deprived of his Professorship in late 1570, and he became an academic teacher in Geneva where he saw at first hand Calvin’s presbyterian system of church

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7 Lawes, 1: 18.14-17; (Preface.3.11).
8 There were, of course, many more: for an outline see, Irvonwy Morgan, The Godly Preachers of the Elizabethan Church, (London: The Epworth Press, 1965), pp. 184-214.
government, now under the guidance of Théodore Beza who claimed its divine right to govern.9

Upon his return to Cambridge in 1572, Cartwright was further deprived of his Fellowship at Trinity College because John Whitgift, the Master of Trinity and the future Archbishop of Canterbury, had discovered that Cartwright, having graduated with his MA in 1560 and been ordained a deacon in the Church of England, was legally required to undertake ordination as a priest by 1567, but had not fulfilled this Fellowship oath.10

Meanwhile in London, the presbyterian view was being publicised by the clergymen John Field and Thomas Wilcox in their treatises An Admonition to Parliament and A View of Popishe Abuses, which were published before the end of parliament in June 1572, and demanded that, instead of the church’s organised worship in The Book of Common Prayer which still retained Roman Catholic practices, Elizabeth should restore the ‘purity’ of New Testament worship.11 Following the publication, which defied the Act of Uniformity, Field and Wilcox were imprisoned for a year, although Field was also debarred from preaching until 1579. Cartwright, undeterred by his damaged career at Cambridge, was quick to pen A Second Admonition to the Parliament in November 1572.12

John Whitgift was sought out at Trinity College by Archbishop Matthew Parker to oppose the Admonitioners and defend the establishment. Whitgift’s task was to prove that there was not a prescribed form of government in Scripture. Rather, Whitgift argued that the

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government of the church should be modelled upon the government of the society in which it is founded, that the Christian prince has divine authority to organise the church, and that the church should exercise its prudent judgement to legislate on matters not mentioned by Scripture. Cartwright, who published several replies to Whitgift, maintained that the zealous and godly ministers with presbyterian sympathies would redeem the Church of England as a ‘true’ church, even if it meant ignoring its corrupt institutional framework and defending it against separatism. A fully Reformed Church of England, Cartwright maintained, would be achieved by the militant struggle of godly presbyterians rather than by an act of State.13

By the late 1580s and the early 1590s, conformists defended the governing of Elizabeth’s church by arguing that the episcopacy system was Apostolic in origin and therefore bishops were ‘godly’. This had already been claimed by Whitgift,14 and was advanced when the *iure divino* case for episcopacy was hammered out by Whitgift’s chaplain and the future Archbishop Richard Bancroft, by the respected Dutch theologian Dr. Adrian Saravia, by the Dean of Exeter Matthew Sutcliffe and by the future Bishop of Winchester Thomas Bilson.15 These writers

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15 Bancroft in a sermon at Paul’s Cross in the late 1580s had set forth the divine right of bishops, which he expanded upon in two polemical works, published in 1593 against presbyterians, entitled *A Suray of the Pretended Holy Discipline*, (1593), *STC* 1352 and *Dangerous Positions and Proceedings, published and practiced within this Iland of Brytaine, under pretence of Reformation, and for the Presbiteriall Discipline*, (1593), *STC* 1344. See also Miller Maclure, *The Paul’s Cross Sermons 1534-1642*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958), p. 216. Saravia, formally active in the Calvinist Church in the Netherlands, now lived in England and was convinced that the episcopacy system surpassed presbyterian organisation. Saravia claimed, in *Of the Diverse Degrees of Ministers of the Gospel*, (1591), *STC* 21749, that because God had established the rule of the bishops their authority was *ius divinum*. There was Sutcliffe’s *A treatise of ecclesiastical discipline*, (1590), *STC* 23471, and Bilson’s *The Perpetual Government of Christes Church*, (1593), *STC* 3065, where Bilson argued that the Church had always been governed by superiors, such as patriarchs, prophets and apostles.
however, as Peter Lake has pointed out, were replicating the *iure divino* claims of the presbyterians by arguing for a divinely sanctioned Apostolic foundation for the church.  

Richard Hooker has also been canonised as a great apologist for the Church of England, especially against the presbyterian threat, defending, like his contemporaries, the office of bishop, although not so much with an *iure divino* defence as a rational support of the rank on pragmatic grounds, which rejected the Roman Catholic belief that the office was divinely commanded.  

Hooker had encountered the presbyterian views of Walter Travers who had been the Reader at the Inner and Middle Temple Church in London since 1581, a position subservient to the Master, which Hooker was named in 1585. Addressing the Temple’s congregation of barristers and lawyers drawn from the Inns of Court, Hooker delivered the Sunday morning sermon, and Travers, whose brother was married to Hooker’s sister, gave the afternoon lecture. In the Hooker-Travers controversy of early Spring 1586, Travers had not only tried to persuade Hooker of the merits of presbyterian ecclesiology, but Travers, as the *de facto* Master of the Temple for three years before Hooker’s arrival, had instituted features of the presbyterian system at the Temple Church with un-ordained elders and deacons drawn from the congregation. This was, of course, illegal, and Whitgift, recently appointed Archbishop of Canterbury in 1583, forbade Travers to preach in March 1586.

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18 Whitgift, who had already expelled Travers from Cambridge in the early 1570s for the latter’s hard-line presbyterian views, also considered Travers’ ordination unfit for a role in the Church of England since Travers had been ordained by Cartwright in a presbyterian ceremony while both were on the continent in Antwerp.
There is however, as Richard Bauckham has argued, no evidence that Hooker in his response to Travers, whilst at the Temple, defended Canterbury against Geneva. Rather, Hooker in the early and mid-1580s was an apologist for the Church of England against Rome, which was a common cause, uniting conformists such as Whitgift with presbyterians such as Cartwright. The controversy at the Temple, Bauckham maintains, was based upon Travers’ mistaken assertion that Hooker was tolerant of Roman errors, misunderstanding Hooker’s anti-papist outlook in which Hooker viewed the Pope as Anti-Christ for perverting the doctrine of justification by faith alone, which Hooker understood as the heart of Christianity. In Hooker’s sermons of this 1585-6 period, entitled *A Learned and Comfortable Sermon of the Certaintie and Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect, A Learned Discourse of Justification, Workes, and How the Foundation of Faith Is Overthrowne*, and *A Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pride*, Hooker still saw Rome as the chief threat to the Church of England, and not without reason, since English Roman Catholic exiles in the 1580s were producing very persuasive and intelligent tracts against the Church of England, accusing it of schism. Hooker did however modify his view of Rome by the time he wrote the *Lawes*, as we shall see.

After Travers’ departure from the Temple (he went on to complete his Book of Discipline which became a primer for English presbyterianism from 1587 onwards), Hooker began to

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20 ibid., p. 50.
23 See S. J. Knox, *Walter Travers: Paragon of Elizabethan Puritanism*, (London: Methuen, 1962), pp. 89-121. The full title of the Book of Discipline is ‘Disciplina Ecclesiae Dei Verbo Descripta’, although, unprinted, it remained in various manuscript forms until it was published in English in 1644 under the title of *A Directory of Church*
work seriously upon his Lawes, although when he first conceived of the project is open to speculation. 24 Hooker wrote his book in the house of John Churchman in Watling Street, London, next to the Church of St. Augustine and not far from Paul’s Cross. Churchman was a wealthy city merchant, whose family Hooker had started living with at some point during his tenure as rector at the village of Drayton Beauchamp in Buckinghamshire, which he was appointed in the summer of 1584 and which he left to become Master of the Temple Church in March 1585. Indeed, Hooker, having married Churchman’s daughter Joan in 1588, continued to live at his father-in-law’s London house (and at Churchman’s country house at Enfield) even when Hooker had moved from his post as Master of the Temple in 1591 to become a sub-dean and canon at Salisbury Cathedral with additional ecclesiastical appointments at Boscombe and Netheravon, although all three were largely absentee posts.

Churchman’s house on Watling Street was also the meeting place for Hooker’s discussions about his work in progress, and he consulted especially George Cranmer, Edwin Sandys and Dr. John Spenser. Hooker had tutored Cranmer and Sandys at Corpus Christi College. George Cranmer was the great-nephew of Archbishop Cranmer, and was now first secretary to William Davidson, the Secretary of State. Edwin Sandys was the son of the Archbishop of York who was Hooker’s patron at Oxford after Hooker’s first patron, the Bishop of Salisbury John Jewel, had died. Sandys was now a lawyer and a parliamentarian. Both of his former pupils advised Hooker on his book, with Sandys often residing at Churchman’s house and even subsidising the printing costs of Books I-V. Dr. Spenser, an undergraduate with Hooker who would become a trustee of Hooker’s will as well as the future president of Corpus Christi

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College, advised Hooker in his capacity as a theologian.\textsuperscript{25} In addition, John Churchman’s servant, Benjamin Pullen, served as Hooker’s secretary and scribe.\textsuperscript{26}

All eight Books of the \textit{Lawes} were in draft form by 1593, with Pullen meticulously transcribing Books I-V ready for the press, which were published in Hooker’s lifetime. The Preface to the \textit{Lawes} and Books I-IV were approved by Archbishop Whitgift and published in March 1593, two months before the Welsh radical separatist John Penry was executed in London. Cranmer and Sandys had urged Hooker to deal with specifically the presbyterian complaints about the Church of England, and Hooker certainly cites Cartwright’s texts from the ‘Admonition controversy’ throughout Books I-V, often referring to Cartwright as ‘T.C’,\textsuperscript{27} although by the 1590s Cartwright had spent brief periods imprisoned by the authorities before living in Guernsey as a free man from 1595 to 1601.

In the Preface and in the first four Books of the \textit{Lawes}, Hooker keeps in mind how Scripture is privileged in the presbyterian case for church government. Hooker addresses the Preface to those seeking to reform the ecclesiastical order of the Church of England, and writes: ‘The wonderfull zeale and fervour wherewith ye have withstood the received orders of this Church was the first thing which caused me to enter into consideration, whether (as all your published bookes and writings peremptorilie mainteine) everie Christian man fearing God stand bound to joyne with you for the furtherance of that which yee tearme the Lords Discipline’.\textsuperscript{28} The Preface then goes on to outline the newly established ecclesiastical discipline, by the ‘industry’ of John Calvin, at the Church of Geneva.

\textsuperscript{25} Dr. John Spenser also later became a chaplain to King James I, and he also worked on the translation of the King James Bible (Authorised Version) as part of the New Testament committee.

\textsuperscript{26} See C. J. Sisson, \textit{The Judicious Marriage of Mr Hooker and the Birth of “The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity”}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), pp. xiii, 45-49.

\textsuperscript{27} Cartwright’s works written during the controversy which Hooker cites are as follows: Thomas Cartwright, \textit{Replye}, (1573), \textit{STC 4711-2}; idem, \textit{The Second Replie}, (1575), \textit{STC 4714}; idem, \textit{The Rest of the Second Replie}, (1577), \textit{STC 4715}.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Lawes}, 1: 2.1-6: (Preface.1.2).
In Book I, Hooker discusses his understanding of laws which for him are the foundation and nourishment of all things, especially in the church, although laws are often ‘concealed’. Hooker then moves on, entitling his second Book with the presbyterian contention that ‘Scripture is the onely rule of all things which in this life may be done by men’. Hooker’s argues that Scripture cannot direct men in all things because, building upon his argument in Book I, God has ‘left sundry kindes of lawes’ to direct the actions of men.

Hooker entitles his third Book with the presbyterian belief ‘that in Scripture there must be of necessitie contained a forme of Church-politie the lawes whereof may in no wise be altered’. Hooker discusses how churches with a faithful community, who grow in holiness, should identify how they are to be ecclesiastically governed by the general and public consent of human reason. Reason is also needed to interpret Scripture because, Hooker argues, the Bible presupposes the application of human intelligence and understanding.

Book IV addresses the presbyterian contention that the Church of England is corrupted by popish orders and ceremonies which were banished from Reformed churches. Hooker believes that rigid uniformity among churches must be avoided because circumstances change in various churches, and this will be attested to by the collective voice of men’s reason. Hooker therefore argues that the Church of England must not imitate the Apostolic Church or the Reformed churches on the continent. Hooker also begins to envisage how the language and actions of worship edifies and sanctifies men.

By the time Book V was published in December 1597, Hooker had moved with his wife and children to the living of Bishopsbourne in Kent, where he enjoyed life as a rural pastor, and

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29 Lawes, 1: 143; (II, title).
30 Lawes, 1: 145.10-12; (II.1.2).
31 Lawes, 1: 193; (III, title).
32 Lawes, 1: 227.2-229.13; (III.8.10), 234.2-31; (III.8.17), 267.18-269.8; (III.11.20).
33 Lawes, 1: 328.18-336.7; (IV.13.2-10).
had become close friends with Dr. Adrian Saravia who was a canon at nearby Canterbury, and it was at Bishopsbourne where Hooker died in November 1600. Book V, longer than Books I-IV put together, defends *The Book of Common Prayer* as the Church of England’s set form of worship against the presbyterian claim that its practices retained popish superstition. In Book V, Hooker investigates the development of religious worship in the church, and then discusses preaching, public prayer, the sacraments, baptism and the ministry of the church.

The remaining three Books of the *Lawes* were published posthumously, with Books VI and VIII first published in 1648, the former arguing against the presbyterian promotion of lay-elders in the church, the latter attesting to the power of the English crown in ecclesiology. In Book VII, first published in 1662, Hooker argues that although the episcopal system of bishops was instituted by Christ, it can also be abolished by the universal consent of men.34

II

The received view of Hooker as an apologist for the Church of England canonises Hooker’s argument in Books I-V of the *Lawes* as a coordination of Scripture, reason and the refinement of years of thought and practice in the church (‘tradition’). But I am unconvinced that this canonisation does justice to Hooker’s vision of the role of God in the Church of England. Recent portrayals of Hooker in the domain of general readership are still insensitive to how Hooker’s view of God thoroughly pervades the argument of the *Lawes*, claiming instead that church order depends for Hooker on ‘human reason’ rather than ‘divine injunction’, that for Hooker the national church should decide matters for itself.35 I believe that we distort what Hooker wanted

34 *Lawes*, 3: 166.7-168.34; (VII.5.8).
to say if we present him as separating men, their reason and their national church away from God.

Peter Lake has correctly argued that Hooker attempted to rectify an epistemological mistake made by presbyterians such as Cartwright and Travers by arguing for the right relation between Scripture, reason and public authority to be recognised within the church. Lake also contends that Hooker’s anti-presbyterianism was actually a disguised attack on the Calvinist stress upon preaching in English Protestantism, with Hooker wishing that the church devote itself instead to the question of how public prayer and the sacraments were to gradually cleanse and edify the minds of men. Lake’s view has been criticised by Mark Perrott in its suggestion that Hooker’s explicit attack on presbyterian non-conformity was a diversion rather than a central message of the Lawes. Perrott claims that Lake misses how Hooker’s use of human reason formed the basis of a more ‘convincing’ conformist response to the presbyterianism articulated by Cartwright, what Perrott claims is the significance of ‘rational authority’ for Hooker.

This study will agree with Lake that Hooker does believe that the church can edify and even sanctify men especially in organised public prayer. But this thesis will also contend that although many scholars rightly argue that Hooker understands the law of nature (human reason) as a legitimate source of insight, Hooker’s argument does not just stop at the ‘rational authority’ of a collective body of men in the church. Rather, an important aim of especially

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36 Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?, p. 147.
37 ibid., pp. 167, 173.
39 See Chapter Six and Chapter Seven below.
Book I of the Lawes is to explain how God is the source of all insight, that reason is the ‘voice’ of God among men. Scholars have also been right to draw attention to the ‘priority’ for Hooker of God’s grace in what he allows in the world. But this does not explain from where good polity and good customs and prayers originate for Hooker, which is what the Lawes intends to investigate. Collective human reason according to Hooker is certainly the means of recognising what is good, but it is not the source of what is good.

Even Nigel Voak, who has provided the most thorough analysis of Hooker’s understanding of human reason so far, does not make clear that what reason ‘sees’ is, according to Hooker, sourced in God. Voak has nevertheless demonstrated that for Hooker common grace allows Christians and non-Christians to reason, and that sanctifying grace grants to Christians ‘divinely enhanced reason’, which transforms their minds to recognise mortal sin. Voak concedes, however, that Hooker lacks clarity on this issue, that Hooker possibly played down the role of grace in the Lawes to establish a polemical advantage over Cartwright and Travers who themselves emphasised grace but in contrast to reason, and that Hooker was more interested in salvaging the importance of the latter. Voak also acknowledges that a key question in the sixteenth century was whether humans could perform good deeds with, or without, the aid of God, yet his study proceeds on the assumption that Hooker is mainly concerned with the divine aid of grace, and thus Voak does not elucidate fully how reason, for Hooker, is the ‘voice’ of

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43 Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, p. 18.
God in the construction of polity, which we shall discuss shortly. We should remember however that Voak’s study does not intend to investigate Hooker’s presentation of Law, or the role of the good in church polity or indeed the guidance of God in that process; the context for his study is how Hooker’s philosophy of mind relates to Reformed theology, with special reference to questions of justification and sanctification. In short, Voak does not intend to shed light on the ‘presence’ of God in the argument of the *Lawes*.

Of course, Hooker’s reverence for God was pointed out long ago by his biographer of the seventeenth century Isaac Walton, who claimed that the ‘conscientious principles of loving and fearing God’ were instilled into Hooker’s ‘soul’ and ‘thus did he walk with God and tread the footsteps of primitive piety’, with Walton declaring: ‘he that praises Richard Hooker praises God’. Although these claims of Walton’s are generally perceived to be nothing more than hagiography, Hooker is anxious, I claim, that the church should continually focus upon the divine and act out its part in God’s divine plan, and not the plan that God intended for the early church. While presbyterians such as Cartwright believed they were ‘godly’ in proposing a ‘divine’ church polity disseminated from parts of Scripture, Hooker proposes an argument which is one step ahead – God is already involved with the running of church government and in developing its ordinances. But what does this mean? It is widely acknowledged that the church

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according to Hooker is in a mystical union with Christ, but for the purpose of salvation, not for influencing ecclesiastical affairs. And the Holy Spirit does not, according to Hooker, guide men in law making – it is wrong to believe, Hooker argues, that the Spirit is involved in this way, which we will examine in Chapter Two. Rather, God is involved, according to Hooker, in far more obvious ways – in the collective voice of reason (as already mentioned), in what is commonly recognised as good and in the love that is manifested in the church.

It could not have been an easy task for Hooker to express God’s guiding goodness in the church whilst, on the one hand, denying the guidance of the Holy Spirit in forming church government and, on the other hand, polemically trying to convince the presbyterian element in the church who only had time for the words of the Bible. Nevertheless, I argue that in the Lawes Hooker expresses God’s guidance of what is good in polity and piety by developing his metaphor of Law, which Hooker lays out in detail in Book I and is assumed in the argument of Books II-V. Human reason for Hooker cannot grasp how God is ‘in’ all good things, but Hooker’s presentation of Law provides the rational argument of the Lawes with a metaphorical explanation of God’s guidance of what is good in the church, with the metaphor helping reason to perceive God’s directive influence.

This raises questions concerning the sense in which Hooker understands God’s involvement – he does so metaphorically for polemical purposes, and not literally. As we shall investigate in Chapter Four, Hooker’s metaphorical understanding of God’s involvement casts doubts on whether the Lawes itself presents a ‘natural knowledge’ of God, irrespective of whether Hooker admits to the capability of reason to provide men with a ‘natural knowledge’ of

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God. In his metaphorical perception of the divine, Hooker certainly does not offer a ‘systematic doctrine’ of God but, rather, Hooker draws upon an eclectic variety of sources to substantiate his account of (i) how God guides metaphorically in Law, of (ii) how what is good is recognised in the church, and of (iii) how love and affection is manifested in church piety. Hooker’s eclectic sources include Plato, Aristotle, Basil the Great, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas, amongst others. Hooker identifies, not only in his metaphor of Law but also in his vision of what is ‘good’, a similarity between these writers in their perception of God, even though their philosophical approaches to the divine or to God may differ. Hooker has found a way to present what the Medieval and Reformation scholar Heiko Oberman describes as how writers after the Reformation look back across previous centuries to an on-going dialogue, ‘not necessarily friendly’, between a broad range of theologians and philosophers about a series of central questions, mainly concerning God, rather than look back to a limited number of identical thinkers who simply provide similar ‘answers’.47 It is certainly the questions which are asked by a wide range of past writers about the divine that are important to Hooker when he considers Law in Book I, the authority of Scripture in Books II and III, and the formation of pious worship and prayer in Book V, rather than a few selective and identical thinkers who have preceded him.

However, although Hooker’s principal source is actually Scripture (his citations of which vastly outnumber his citations of all other writers combined together),48 Hooker’s viewpoint throughout the Lawes, developed at the very beginning through his metaphor of Law, maintains that the Christian God is independent of Scripture. Indeed, Hooker’s perception of God’s

guidance (arranged in his metaphor) is an extra-Scriptural presentation of argument about divinity.

This thesis intends to explore the importance of this distinction for Hooker between Scripture and God. Works written during and after the Reformation in the sixteenth century have been interpreted by traditional scholarship as stressing Scripture as the heart of Protestantism. But, in fact, in their theology and in their understanding of the Christian religion, the reformers, and the Reformed thinkers who wrote subsequently, also realise the function of God. Here the scholarship of Richard Muller is particularly relevant, because he has shown in immense detail, across a vast range of primary sources, that Reformed writers from the mid-sixteenth century onwards had two defining principia – Scripture and God. Muller has proven that the belief in God is embedded in the presuppositions and methods of sixteenth-century theology, that the consideration of God in the Reformed context is profoundly Biblical and situated in exegetical and philosophical contexts, yet is never far from piety and is faithful to its patristic foundations and classical philosophical roots.

Although Muller does not examine, or even mention the work of Hooker, I argue that Hooker is steeped in his sixteenth-century context and places his exposé of the role of God alongside the Scripturalism that was at the heart of Elizabethan Protestantism. What the view point of the Lawes understands as non-conformity in the church is the privileging of Scripture as omnipotent and as the full revelation of the divine purpose for humanity, which for Hooker exaggerates the purpose and content of Scripture to the extent that it is no longer compatible with an understanding of the omnipotence of God in the world. Although scholars realise that Hooker views the Scripturalist mentality as fostering non-conformity in the Church of England, they

argue that Hooker asserts the importance of human reason in the conformist’s case\textsuperscript{51} without explaining the other \textit{principia} in Hooker’s sixteenth-century argument – God. Rather, as this thesis will contend, Hooker in his sixteenth-century context believes that Scripture is a record of the ‘voice’ of God and that other extra-Scriptural instances of the ‘voice’ of God can be recognised by the collective agreement of reason, which discovers what God has deemed good for the church’s circumstances.

Walton’s image of Hooker as ‘humble’\textsuperscript{52} is therefore in one respect turned on its head in this study: Hooker sets himself the task of arguing against other Protestants on God’s behalf, with the \textit{Lawes} confidently asserting how church government and worship should recognise God and his involvement, and not exclude him. Interestingly, many in the Church of England desired the widespread recognition of what was ‘good’: Laurence Chaderton for example, who preached at St. Clements in Cambridge, had claimed, articulating presbyterian sympathies, that the unreformed Church of England was disordered and needed good order.\textsuperscript{53} But within a decade of the publication of Books I-V of the \textit{Lawes}, presbyterians such as William Bradshaw still maintained that ecclesiastical discipline should be rooted in Scripture and that the authority in worship was to be found among the congregation.\textsuperscript{54} The \textit{Lawes} observes the assumption in Elizabethan Protestantism that Scripture ‘represents’ God, and observes the presbyterian assumption that anything contrary to Scripture is therefore ungodly. But such is God’s authority in Hooker’s argument that, where good practice in the church has its source in God, the sacred and secular blur together in the \textit{Lawes}, and the distinction between godly and ungodly is not set

\textsuperscript{51}See for example, Perrott, ‘Richard Hooker and the Problem of Authority in the Elizabethan Church’, pp. 32, 46ff.
\textsuperscript{52}Walton, \textit{The Life of Mr. Richard Hooker}, in John Keble ed., \textit{The Works of Mr. Richard Hooker}, p. 82.
\textsuperscript{53}Laurence Chaderton, \textit{A fruitful sermon, upon the 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 verse of the 12 chapter of the epistle of S. Paule to the Romanes}, (London, 1584), pp. 41-42.
\textsuperscript{54}William Bradshaw, \textit{English puritanisme containinge the maine opinions of the rigidest sort of those that are called puritanes in the realme of England}, (Amsterdam, 1605), pp. 13-29. The presbyterian response to the \textit{Lawes} in the anonymous work \textit{A Christian Letter} (published in 1599) will be examined in Chapters One and Four.
according to Scripture. Hence this thesis investigates how Hooker is not prepared to abstract God and the sacred from his argument, as might be the case in a twenty-first-century ‘secular’ society, or in such a society’s reading of a writer like Hooker.

We will examine how a ‘secular’ twenty-first-century academic community requires sensitivity towards how Hooker merges the sacred and the secular together in church polity and piety in Chapter One, where this study’s methodological approach of contextualisation will also be explained. While Hooker argues that reason recognises what is good, Hooker also presents the source of what is good in ecclesiastical matters through his use of language and metaphor. In Chapter Two therefore, we will examine Hooker’s general understanding of language and metaphor, and in Chapter Three we will examine extra-Scriptural perception in the church for Hooker, mainly analysing Books II and III of the Lawes. Building upon this, we will then move to investigate in Chapter Four Hooker’s polemical presentation of Law in providing reason with a metaphorical explanation of God’s guidance in church polity, as well as investigate the metaphorical (as opposed to the literal) meaning of his argument, mainly based upon an analysis of Books I and III of the Lawes.

What is fundamental to Hooker’s presentation of the church’s detection and reception of holiness is that Hooker does not only focus on two parts of the human soul such as reason and will, but also works into his argument how God is served by at least a third part of the soul – affection. Hooker understands the affections conveyed in Scripture as ‘transplantable’ into the affectionate worship of men; indeed, they are ‘represented’, Hooker argues, in The Book of Common Prayer. The absence in Hooker scholarship of a discussion of Hooker’s positive view

55 As Voak examines. Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, passim.
of affection is striking, but perhaps reflects the trend in scholarship that depicts Hooker as fighting presbyterian ‘godly zeal’ in the name of reason and sober judgment.56

Yet according to Hooker, affection is at the root of man’s pious engagement with God in worship, and is not excluded by reason. The manifestation of goodness in the church, in the past and in the present, legitimises the love and common affection of men. Even the affective commitments to God in pre-Reformation liturgies and public prayers, especially identifiable, Hooker claims, in Basil the Great and in Augustine, are still to be legitimately used because, Hooker argues, men’s souls have not changed in their affections towards God.

Hooker’s perception of God guiding what is good in polity and piety, as well as the divine manifestation of love, will be investigated in Chapters Five and Six, based upon an analysis of Books I, IV and V of The Lawes. Hooker’s appreciation of common affection in organised church piety will be investigated in Chapter Seven, based upon a further analysis of Book V.

This thesis poses the fresh question of how Hooker generates his perception of God’s involvement in ecclesiastical affairs. In doing so, this thesis aims to provide an understanding of how, for Hooker, the authority of God irrefutably influences the construction and maintenance of church polity and church piety.

56 Even a selection of Hooker’s writing topically arranged does not include ‘affection’ as a topic, yet contains an entrance for ‘zeal’, but even then only Hooker’s warnings against excessive zeal. This selection of Hooker’s writing also does not contain ‘good’ or ‘goodness’ as topics. See Philip B. Secor and Lee W. Gibbs, The Wisdom of Richard Hooker: Selections from Hooker’s Writings with Topical Index, (Bloomington, Indiana: AuthorHouse, 2005).
Chapter One

Historicising God? The Twenty-First-Century Academic Problem of Reading the Christian God in Hooker’s Work

I will investigate in this chapter how, in historicising Hooker, we need to be careful about what it is we think we are interpreting when we refer to God in Hooker’s work. Hooker presents himself as thinking and writing in relation to the all-knowing Christian God, but can academically engaged historians and theologians in the twenty-first century detect and preserve the spiritual sensitivity of Hooker’s sixteenth-century polemic? The perception of Hooker in twenty-first-century academia is largely established within a ‘desacrilised’ climate in which Hooker’s belief in the revealed Christian religion and in the God-given faculty of reason (crucial to the formation of polity), has become a matter of analysis. Modern scholars examine Hooker for the purpose of proving academic argument, and not for the purpose of upholding Hooker’s rule of faith in the God of Christianity. Within academia, of course, some modern scholars do attempt to unravel the relevance of Hooker for the twentieth- and twenty-first-century church.¹ Yet this is against the grain of the modern academic use of contextualisation, and if Hooker is primarily to remain connected to his sixteenth-century social community, then it is difficult to interpret his work as serving a ‘trans-contextual’ function.

Hence, in an academic ‘desacrilised’ climate Hooker has been rigorously ‘reconstructed’ into context. The renewed scholarly interest in Hooker in the second half of the twentieth

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century coincided with the fresh emphasis on interpreting literature in its historical context-of-
situation that was mainly perpetuated by the work of new historicists and cultural materialists
from the 1960s onwards. This reading method, influenced in its modern incarnation by
Wilhelm Dilthey in the late nineteenth century, valued the critic’s empathy and understanding of
the ‘socio-historical life-context’ of an author who should not be abstracted from the past but
should be represented in the ‘flow’ of human social life. With what is now a widespread
methodological stress upon always historicising, the English Reformation and the intellectual
history of early modern Europe have undergone stages of revision and post-revision.
Accordingly, the method of contextualisation has destabilised older hagiographical views of
Hooker as codifying Elizabethan ideals, and has highlighted instead Hooker’s authorial
intentions and his ‘cultural conditionedness’.

However, in our aim of identifying the place and influence of God within Hooker’s
argument in the Lawes, should we to contextualise ‘God’ in Hooker’s argument in the same way
that we contextualise Hooker? We must be careful not to inadvertently misinterpret God in
Hooker’s context. For instance, Hooker’s argument is that although human laws are subject to
revision within the history of the church and in the history of society (as Hooker scholars have

3 On the rise of historicising as a coherent method see, Edgar Krentz, The Historical-Critical Method, (Philadelphia:
On Dilthey’s contribution to the understanding of historical context see, Howard N. Tuttle, Wilhelm Dilthey’s
4 On the development of this historiography see, Patrick Collinson, ‘The English Reformation, 1945-1995’, in
Historiography, pp. 307-335.
5 As was still perpetuated just prior to the mid-twentieth-century revolution in historicism by, for example, E.M.W.
Tillyard, The Elizabethan World Picture, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1943), pp. 7, 10-14, 39-42; Hardin Craig,
3.
thoroughly investigated),\(^6\) God, or the eternal law in which ‘God from before the beginning hath set for himselfe to do all things by’,\(^7\) cannot be ‘framed’ for Hooker within what is known of a social context or within the boundaries of what is humanly known about God. Hooker argues that the Jewish sacred history of the Old Testament may record the human reception of God’s interventions, but that God himself cannot be reduced to various and changing contexts because he has revealed precisely his changelessness distinct from the workings of humanity. And yet, Hooker maintains, God remains involved, since any change upon the earth, or any social or ecclesiastical alteration which is verified to be good, is never contrary to what God’s eternal law for men will allow. God ‘approveth much more then he doth commaund’.\(^8\)

But the historical method of contextualisation is potentially deceptive if it presumes that what Hooker knows about God is represented in his sixteenth-century sources as ‘transparent’ and is thus ‘accessible’ to scholarly investigation. One of the foundational points of the Lawes in opposition to the polemical view of presbyterians is that God’s entire will for all ages of the church is not transparent to men in any one specific context – even for the community who read Scripture. God’s divine plan has not, for Hooker, been divinely revealed in Scripture and nor can it be contextualised because, Hooker argues, it is unknown to his social community – least of all can it be reconstructed and understood by an academic community in the twenty-first century. The presbyterians argued that God’s divine plan had been ‘represented’ in Scripture and that speculations outside of Scripture about the divine plan were ambiguous. Hooker intends to clear


\(^7\) *Lawes*, 1: 58.20-1; (I.2.1).

\(^8\) *Lawes*, 1: 188.27-28; (II.8.5).
up this ‘ambiguity’, since he believes that God not only provides for the church, but also that
God’s involvement in matters of ecclesiology is apparent (metaphorically) in the church’s
collective ‘voice’ of reason, as we shall investigate in Chapter Four.

Because of Hooker’s sensitivity towards God’s involvement, the Lawes relies upon more
than the social context of the ‘Admonition controversy’ of the 1570s. It is too simplistic to
conclude that on matters indifferent to salvation (adiaphora) Hooker’s spiritual sensitivity
towards God is somehow irrelevant. This would be for a desacrilised academic culture to miss,
by imposing a critical distance away from the ‘timeless’ divine and away from what it
understands as an older monotheistic culture, Hooker’s awareness of a purposeful God who
exists as much for the sixteenth-century church as for all eternity. Thus what we must ask is
whether Hooker’s view of the guidance of God in what is good for the church can be
contextualised. I argue that what has been guided by God can be contextualised, but the actual
act of God’s guidance according to Hooker’s argument cannot be contextualised or historicised.
As this thesis will investigate, Hooker’s metaphor of Law represents the non-contextual
transcendence of God and also represents, Hooker believes, God’s metaphorical involvement in
human reason and in what is good for a church in an historical age.

Thus we must ask whether we as twenty-first-century readers can proficiently understand
Hooker’s written and unwritten sensitivity towards a God whose involvement is literally un-
presentable. Peter Lake helpfully points out that our reading of Hooker should take into
consideration how Hooker’s contemporaries read him, and, indeed, Hooker’s presentation of
God in conjunction with his presentation of reason and Scripture was received with extreme
sensitivity among contemporaries. This is demonstrated by the anonymous presbyterian author

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9 See Peter Lake, ‘Business as Usual? The Immediate Reception of Hooker’s Ecclesiastical Polity’, Journal of
of *A Christian Letter* (1599) who, in responding to the *Lawes*, urges Hooker to be careful, ‘not onelie for avoyding of offence given to many godlie and religious Christians: but also that the Atheistes, Papistes, and other hereticques, be not incouraged by your so harde and so harsh stile (beating as it were, as we verilie thinke, against the verie heart of all true christian doctrine, professed by her Majestie and the whole state of this Realme)….’ In the 1580s and 1590s, there was little censorship of what was written concerning ecclesiology, which meant that the printed views of presbyterians and conformists were at liberty to be interpreted by the arguments of opposing tracts, which explains the volume of written ecclesiastical controversy in the period.

What Lake does not make clear, however, is that there is a difference between an array of contemporary first readers and subsequent twenty-first-century readers. The methodological assumptions of each are very different, and, again, we must be careful not to understand Hooker’s God by using modern ‘rational’ methodologies in place of Hooker’s sixteenth-century methodological perspectives. When Quentin Skinner wrote in the late 1960s what has now become his famous statement on contextualisation, he was specifically referring to the *linguistic context* of polemical, ideological and political meaning in a past age. The interpretation of linguistic contexts preoccupied the Italian Renaissance right through to the modern formation of hermeneutics via the work of Friedrich Schleiermacher. The present question is whether

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11 Arnold Hunt has pointed out that this was partly because there already existed a doctrinal consensus in the English Church and partly because the licensing system was directed towards marginal texts. See Arnold Hunt, ‘Licensing and Religious Censorship in Early Modern England’, in Andrew Hadfield ed., *Literature and Censorship in Renaissance England*, (London: Palgrave, 2001), p. 130.
14 The word ‘Renaissance’ will be used in this study to indicate the revival in art, literature, learning and in classical scholarship, that began in fourteenth-century Italy and spread throughout Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
twentieth- and twenty-first-century historical, theological, philosophical and linguistic studies, in their stress upon a theoretical relativism that critically distances them from Hooker’s sixteenth-century Christian assumptions, have overlooked the linguistic context of the Lawes in which the sixteenth-century reading community provide their own methodological tools.

There is no straight-forward answer because twentieth- and twenty-first-century academia, which has developed its method of historicity, has also developed an academic approach to God which is, paradoxically, based largely upon an unhistorical framework of ‘rationalist criticism’. We must be cautious that secular theoretical arguments about the Christian God do not seep into our interpretation of Hooker and are not anachronistically associated with his God. Let us briefly consider the modern ‘problem of God’ in section I in order to understand the reception of ‘God’ in the academy today, before moving in section II to explain how contextualising Hooker will mean understanding his sixteenth-century methodological approaches towards God.
Since the Renaissance, education had been based upon the Socratic ideal that privileged knowledge and experience. Yet the transcendence of the divine remained a mystery for the mind of man right up to Hooker’s period. Directly after Hooker, however, René Descartes was influential in claiming that what is not self-evident should be doubted by the mind of man. This gave rise to rationalist Cartesian philosophy and eventually to the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century. Kant understood the human mind and its judgements to be ‘absolutely independent’ from experience and from God. The mind’s search for ‘objectivity’ was to be methodologically secured by theoretical boundaries, which were provided by abstract thought.\footnote{On Descartes see, Peter A. Schouls, Descates and the Possibility of Science, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2000). On Kant see, George Di Giovanni, Freedom and Religion in Kant and his Immediate Successors: The Vocation of Humankind, 1774-1800, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); A. W. Moore, Noble in Reason, Infinite in Faculty: Themes and Variations in Kant’s Moral and Religious Philosophy, (London: Routledge, 2005).} By the twentieth century the idea of God had become an abstract object of inquiry, and ‘speaking meaningfully’ at all of God had become a great academic quandary. This preoccupation was not only precipitated by the ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’ towards organised religion in the work of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, but was also characterised as a ‘linguistic turn’ in the disciplines of theology, philosophy, history and English studies.\footnote{For the argument and documentation of this ‘turn’ see, for example, Richard M. Rorty ed., The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Dan R. Stiver, The Philosophy of Religious Language: Sign, Symbol, and Story, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 1-7; F. R. Ankersmit, Historical Representation, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 29-74; Peter Ludlow, ‘Contextualism and the New Linguistic Turn in Epistemology’, in Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter ed., Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), pp. 11-50.} The central contention was that if language presented human sense experience in signs then God was ‘outside’ of this medium. Instead, believers played, according to the influential Ludwig Wittgenstein, the theological ‘language-game’ in which all statements concerning God were non-
cognitive. \(^{17}\) Thus emerged ‘logical positivism’, as seminally articulated by A.J.A. Ayer in 1935. Ayer argued that unless the theist or the moralist could empirically verify the ‘knowledge’ of their experiences then they were achieving nothing more than self-deception. \(^{18}\)

Of course, the claim that language testifies to little about God harks back to the hypothesis of \textit{via negativa} that was especially represented in third-century Middle Platonism. But the aim of such a hypothesis was to affirm that there was no adequate language or concept to attach to the ‘life’ of the divine ‘First Principle’, which was believed to have existed. Yet the classical Christian mind, with its emphasis upon faith, was re-examined in twentieth-century academia. Religious claims - what John Macquarrie coined as ‘God-talk’ \(^{19}\) - were critically scrutinised. \(^{20}\) This resulted in a large output of philosophical interest in working-through and abstracting in detail the omnipotent concept of God. \(^{21}\)

But it has been questioned whether the conclusions of Enlightenment rationalism, British empiricism and Anglo-American analytical philosophy are discreetly objective. For example, the twentieth-century hermeneutical philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer argued that the critic or interpreter themselves are not rationally self-sufficient. They are not removed by scientific method from the ‘historically-effected’ tradition that has evolved, Gadamer argued, as generations attempt to interpret a past author, nor is a critic’s ‘own’ interpretation removed from


\(^{21}\) See Gijsbert van den Brink, \textit{Almighty God: A Study of the Doctrine of Divine Omnipotence}, (Kampen: J. Kok, 1993), pp. 276-95, whose bibliography cites over a hundred entries on the philosophical subject of God’s omnipotence written in the second half of the twentieth century.
their ‘situatedness’ of culture, personal prejudices and experiences. Gadamer was concerned here with the epistemological status of ‘tradition’ which had been, he argued, understood negatively and had been simplified after the Enlightenment by ‘positivism’ that based interpretation upon rational deductions. For Gadamer, hermeneutical understanding was intrinsically historical, not individualistic and abstract.

Whilst Gadamer’s critics such as Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel argue that he uncritically accepted tradition, it is still not necessarily clear how a twenty-first-century academic community is to ‘access’ and evaluate the sixteenth-century pre-Kantian ‘traditional’ belief in God. The sensitivity of the sixteenth century has become obscured for the twenty-first century by theoretical problems concerning what we are to interpret when we speak of the divine in a previous context. As is demonstrated in present English Renaissance critical theory, there is not even agreement on how we are to interpret and translate the period, although, all agreed, the task should incorporate a hermeneutical understanding of cultural situation. Do we interpret the English Renaissance as a turbulent period of ‘alternative subjectivities’? Must we, in a new historicist view, translate the English Renaissance into our own idioms of understanding to ensure that we ‘grasp’ the historical difference in values and belief? Would such a translation be dictated by our own ‘fragmented’ times, or would we learn more about ourselves by

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providing an interpretation of the ‘alien’ views of the English Renaissance? These approaches allow for variations in interrupting the period, but they do not suggest how we are to perceive the existence and even guidance of a changeless God for those who wrote polemics on ecclesiology and Scripture in sixteenth-century England.

In contextualising the period, the first step must surely be to accept that a pre-modern belief in the Christian God should not be simplified by ignoring the pre-modern communal belief in Christ and the Christian creeds. But it is certainly a moot point whether modern academic studies provide for their readers an awareness of a pre-modernist and a pre-historicist methodological assent to God which is not always scientifically rational, ‘calculative’ or literal. Twenty-first-century academic commentators on Hooker such as Torrance Kirby, Nigel Voak and Corneliu Simut assume that, in the aim of explaining their analysis of Hooker’s theology, their readers can sufficiently arrogate Hooker’s belief and ‘lived-awareness’ of God, although they do not explain how this can be done. The integrity of scholarship is based upon maintaining an analytical ‘voice’ that interrogates a past writer’s belief in God, and this is partly achieved by methodologically imposing upon a past writer a reconstruction of their historical context.

But developing an objective distance from what has been written in the past about God by implementing the historical-critical method cannot function, as the theologian Gerhard Maier has argued, without a preconceived and abstracted idea of what constitutes ‘God’, or the ‘Word of God’, or ‘genuine faith’, which is then used as the starting-point to understand and judge a previous writer’s ‘theory’ of faith, Scripture and God in a historically re-constructed context.

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As already pointed out, Gadamer contended that such pre-understanding influences the interpreter, whilst the hermeneutical philosopher Paul Ricœur wished to critically dissolve such preconceived notions and the ‘idolised’ reception of the Word of God by recovering a sensitivity towards the symbolism, metaphor and narrative that are projected, he argued, from the sacred text of Scripture.\(^{32}\)

What is more, this pre-judgement in the historical-critical method is anachronistic because it is an \textit{a priori} judgement reflecting the justifications, methods and authority of the scholar and the scholarly community who cannot experience \textit{a posteriori} the sixteenth-century communal trust in the Christian God. Without explicitly intending to uphold the rule of faith vested in the \textit{same} God, this twentieth- and twenty-first-century pre-judgement inadvertently ‘reduces’ what the sixteenth-century Christian community believes is a transcendent God to a social context or to an historical theology by stressing that it is relative to the age. Therefore, as the Renaissance scholar Gordon Campbell has pointed out, as students of the period we are in an intellectual dilemma – whilst it is ludicrous to attempt to prove that the Renaissance belief in God was misplaced, so too our aim must be to resist anachronistic judgements concerning God and a faith community.\(^{33}\)

The anachronistic pre-judgements found in the twenty-first-century methodology of historicism (for instance, it pre-judges the sixteenth-century faith in God as relative to a context and as a matter for analysis but not as orthodox truth) will maintain that Hooker’s understanding of God is relative to his Renaissance context, but this is not Hooker’s understanding of God, and the twenty-first-century method without being informed by Hooker’s sixteenth-century methods


will distort what Hooker believes. For example, Hooker has an understanding of historical context - he argues in the Lawes that the church in different historical ages may change its polity and customs depending upon the historical circumstances. But this change is, for Hooker, to take place in accordance with God whose goodness, Hooker argues, all rational men strive to imitate, and whose goodness informs the rational agreements of the Christian community.34 This is one of Hooker’s central arguments, and Hooker certainly does not intend his metaphor of Law to be an historical theology of God or a systematic or dogmatic theology of God. Hooker intends to argue that his God is immanent in, and transcends, his context. ‘Immanent’ here means that, for Hooker, God is present throughout the universe.35 Hooker writes that ‘the substance of God alone is infinite and hath no kinde of limitation, so likewise his continuance is from everlastinge to everlasting and knoweth neither beginning nor end’, and that ‘time considered in it selfe is but the flux of that verie instant wherein the motion of the heaven began’.36 According to Hooker, the unfolding of history originates in God, and history and historical contexts are the resulting flux of divine motion.

The point here is that Hooker’s understanding of historical context is not exactly the same as the twenty-first-century practice of historicising the past, and we must not assume that they are the same. We must carefully contextualise Hooker, and this involves contextualising Hooker’s understanding of God not by implementing twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophical and theoretical methods to discuss ‘God’, but by appreciating Hooker’s sixteenth-century methodological approaches towards God. We must historicise Hooker’s methods or else we will miss how God for Hooker is involved in, and transcends, the sixteenth-century Church of England.

34 See Lawes, 1:73.17-25; (I.5.2).
35 Hooker would have been familiar with the sixteenth-century Latin word ‘immanēre’, ‘to remain in’.
36 Lawes, 2: 359.20-22; (V.69.1), 360.14-15; (V.69.2).
II

Any contextualisation of Hooker’s understanding of God must be informed by two sixteenth-century methodological considerations in Hooker’s argument. The first is the sixteenth-century communal ‘affection’ towards the spiritual existence that transcends its immediate situation. The prevailing view of divine transcendence and omnipotence had continued from the late Middle Ages into the sixteenth century. The spiritual anxiety of Hooker’s Christian community and its faith must not be under-rated. It is precisely because God cannot be comprehended within the sixteenth-century community that faith in God assumes a methodological role.

Hooker makes this clear across his sermons, a principal subject of which is the cause of spiritual despair and humanity’s faith in God. In his Second Sermon Upon Part of S. Judes Epistle, Hooker writes: ‘The strength of every building, which is of God, standeth not in any mans armes or legs: it is only in our faith […] If their be any feeling of Christ, and drop of heavenly dewe, any spark of Gods good spirit within you, stirre it up….’ For Hooker, faith in God is not transitory, but it is the foundation for believing in an eternal and changeless God. In A Learned Discourse of Justification, Hooker writes: ‘If therefore the man which is once juste by faith shall lyve by faith and lyve forever: It followeth that he which once doth beleve the foundacion muste needes beleve the foundacion forever, if he beleve it forever howe can he ever directly deny it?’ What is more, Hooker argues in A Learned and Comfortable Sermon of the Certaintie and Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect that faith in God is not limited to a believer’s own context-of-situation but is ‘invincible’. Yet faith, for Hooker, is intelligible because it has been reasoned to be eternal and is thus not arbitrary but is a method with which Hooker’s Christian

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38 Jude 2, 5: 45.9-10; 54.27-28.
39 Justification, 5: 139.16-19.
40 Certaintie, 5: 76.19.
community engages life, what he describes in the Lawes as a ‘habit of the minde’. Faith, for Hooker, comes to terms with God by love and not by evidence, as we shall explore in Chapters Six and Seven.

The second methodological consideration is Hooker’s use of the Reformed theological methodus which sought to work out the way in which God’s ‘effect’ in the world and in the church should be made known. By the second half of the sixteenth century, the Protestant methodus was taught in an academic context and had also developed into a discipline in the life and work of the church. But this was not a method which sought to develop what we in the twenty-first century understand as making God known by way of an ‘historical theology’ – this would assume that Hooker, for instance, understood that his belief in God was conditioned by history – he did not, he believed that the entire church throughout the history of Christianity shared his belief in God. Rather, divinity was already assumed as universal throughout many ‘topics’ in churches and universities. Whether in doctrinal writings, or in exegesis or in controversies, there were ‘universal topics’ or ‘common places’ that were presupposed as fundamental when laying out polemical argument, organised piety and theology. This Protestant methodus was enkindled by Philip Melanchthon in his work Loci Communes (‘Commonplaces’), first published in 1521, as well as in the writings of Protestants such as Wolfgang Musculus, Andreas Gerhard Hyperius and Peter Martyr Vermigli. They argued that in each ‘common place’ or ‘topic’ the primary locus, God, was assumed (in the sixteenth-century context) to

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41 Lawes, 2: 291.19-21; (V.63.2).
overlap all other loci, ranging from Scripture, the law of nature and the structure of the church and its laws.43

Now, in making the significance of God known in the developing discipline of theology, the Protestant methodus did not logically deduce the ‘relevance’ of God for the times, and nor did it allow the methods that organised arguments with clarity (such as the logic of Petrus Ramus) to change what was known about God. In finding a way in language to develop theology as a discipline and to advance polemical argument and piety, sixteenth-century writers, including Hooker, assumed the presuppositions of the Protestant methodus in their explanation of God’s significance for all other loci. This enabled them to discover God’s divine order, although Hooker, especially, does not confuse God as he is reflected in human thought, language and metaphor with how God is known to himself.

The Protestant method of making argument known was, however, observed differently among Protestants. For Phillip Melanchthon, Wolfgang Musculus and Andreas Gerhard Hyperius, the Protestant methodology was to be based upon the authority of Scripture and constructed around Biblical themes; in other words, Protestant methodology, in producing a system of Christian theology, was to be generated and governed by Scripture. For Jacopo Zabarella, the Protestant method proceeded logically from what was known about the divine to what was unknown.44 But Hooker’s assumptions are not completely identical with either of these variations. Firstly, Hooker is reluctant to base his argument around the sole authority of

Scripture because his polemic seeks to uncover the wider authority of God, although Hooker certainly draws upon the Bible as evidence for his argument. Secondly for Hooker, as argued in the Introduction, the logical argument of the Lawes cannot, on its own, make known how God is involved in, and transcends, the church, and thus Hooker takes the assumptions of the Protestant methodus and adapts them to his metaphor of Law.

Historically contextualising Hooker’s theology and his methods will explain Hooker’s pre-historicist belief in God, which preceded the rise of modern individualism and the critical philosophy of mind. Hooker’s pre-historicist knowledge of the divine, which incorporated a trust and belief in the Trinity (in contrast to the active anti-Trinitarians in the late sixteenth century), did not attempt to ‘contextualise’ God as independent from the Christian life or indeed as independent from the Church of England’s ecclesiology. We must avoid constructing an ‘aesthetic’ presentation of God based upon Hooker’s writings because this would remove Hooker from his polemical intentions. Rather, focusing in this study upon Hooker’s pre-historicist methodology will expose how Hooker’s polemical argument is in a sensitive relation to God and will expose the unique position of God in the lives of Hooker’s reading community. Hooker is able to write in the vernacular about divine involvement, a secular language speaking about the sacred, because he shares common sixteenth-century methods which allow the relation between polemical argument, theological doctrine and the other-worldliness of God to flourish under the community’s rule of faith.

Chapter Two

“Speech is the verie image whereby the minde and soule of the speaker conveieth”: Hooker, Human Language and the Holy Spirit

Prior to beginning the main investigation of this study, we need to clarify Hooker’s key assumptions concerning human language in relation to reason and God. I argue that the Lawes presupposes that extra-Scriptural language can and should express, in addition to Scripture, what is ‘good’ for the church and express Christian piety towards God in common prayer. In his polemic on ecclesiology, Hooker also assumes that language can describe, and that metaphor can envisage, the church’s relation to divinitas, the condition of God. In this chapter we shall explore what underlies these assumptions, namely Hooker’s belief that human extra-Scriptural language is the possession of men, and is not guided by the Holy Spirit.

Although Hooker’s use of rhetoric has begun to gain attention,¹ a discussion of the importance for Hooker of language in partnership with reason is conspicuously absent in recent scholarship.² There is also a notable lack of discussion concerning the relevance of language to how Hooker generates his argument. Human language has always been an instrument in Christian theology, the theology of which may, ever since the early church fathers, have even

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influenced the Western reflection upon language itself. Moreover, speech and language have been linked to reason in an intellectual history spanning from Aristotle in antiquity right through to the Roman philosopher and Christian theologian Boethius in the early sixth century, to the French theologian Peter Abelard in the Middle Ages. For Renaissance humanists in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, language provided an index to express human thought and was the gateway into communicating and understanding doctrine, which had important uses for the Protestant Reformation, as will be discussed in section I.

In the context of sixteenth-century England, Protestant beliefs based upon Scripture were thought to be authoritatively marshalled and accurately preserved in language. Assuming the Protestant *methodus* (as discussed in Chapter One), English writers such as Thomas Wilson in his *Rule of Reason* (1551) and Abraham Fraunce in his *The Lawiers Logike* (1588) both argued that thought originated from God’s grace. Wilson intended to prove that when Protestant doctrine was expressed in the vernacular it shared the ‘authenticity’ of ancient texts written in classical languages. Fraunce aimed to prove that English law was ‘logical’ and ‘authentic’ by highlighting its points of agreement with ancient and modern literature. Language was also joined with reason to form the basis of English sixteenth-century civil society, established by the

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5 The terms ‘Renaissance humanists’ and ‘Renaissance humanism’ are used in this study to denote the cultural and educational movement that spread throughout Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth century. This will be further explained in section I below.
immense authority vested by the Renaissance in the Roman orator and statesman Cicero and his view of how civic society should be developed by ‘truth-telling’.\(^7\)

In this sixteenth-century context, Hooker understands extra-Scriptural language as human in origin and not divine, and he does not believe in any ‘essential’ relation between ‘sign’ and ‘thing’ signified. Let us begin in section I by summarising the intellectual context within which Hooker understands the purpose of language. In section II, we shall examine how, for Hooker, human language is needed to signify God’s Scriptural revelation and divine role within the church but, nevertheless, how the signification of such language is not inspired by the Holy Spirit.

I

Renaissance humanism, according to the canonical view established by Paul Kristeller, was a cultural and educational movement concerned with how philosophy and ideas were to be obtained and expressed. Although diverse in its philosophical thought, the humanist movement had consensual agreement on how to acquire and express its ideas - the classical learning and philology of ancient Greek and Roman texts would provide instruction on how this was to be done.\(^8\) In the humanist intellectual movement, language was understood to evolve conventionally, independent from God, and it was prized as a necessity. This understanding of language had been found by Renaissance humanists in Aristotle, in the church fathers and in the


theologians of the Middle Ages. Indeed, by the late fifteenth century the humanist programme of educational reform had prioritised the study of languages in the Latin schools and arts faculties of Europe. And the medieval curriculum for studying the *trivium* - the three linguistic arts of grammar, logic (or dialectical theory) and rhetoric, - was also reformed by advancing a more in-depth understanding of Latin grammar and Ciceronian rhetoric (drawn mainly from Cicero’s *De inventione* and *De oratore*), and was also reformed by a revision of logic which, in the humanist educational view, had become over-sophisticated with terminology at the expense of convincingly ordered argumentation. Indeed, the writings of influential linguistic and educational fifteenth-century reformers, such as Lorenzo Valla and Rudolf Agricola, stressed that rhetoric and dialectic should present and organise credible propositions in language.

Above all, language was not simply a preliminary to be learnt, but was to be a tool for validating all understanding. The study of Hebrew and Greek became key disciplines for acquiring knowledge and were instrumental in developing insight into human nature. The new scholarship that endorsed literary values also provided the basis for revising the New Testament in more accessible Latin than that found in the text of the Vulgate Bible, which had been authoritative in Western Europe since the sixth century and upon which much medieval theology
was based. Here, Valla’s philological work in Biblical studies later influenced Erasmus in the production of his New Testament (entitled *Novum Instrumentum* and first published in 1516). Erasmus continually revised specific words in subsequent editions of his New Testament, demonstrating the humanist contention that a semantic inaccuracy will lead to a theological error.¹³

The humanist appreciation of the accuracy of language therefore led to the formation of the *Studia humanitatis* curriculum, which spread across Northern Europe, directly stimulating the rise of Protestantism.¹⁴ As recipients of humanist learning, Protestant reformers such as Martin Luther, Erasmus, Ulrich Zwingli and John Calvin promoted the power of human speech as a co-operative endeavour with God.¹⁵ Whilst Luther approved of the linguistic arts and was himself a humanist in his reliance upon rhetoric,¹⁶ the educational writings of reformers such as Erasmus, Philip Melanchthon and the Spanish humanist Juan Luis Vives strove to transform the literary values of humanist pedagogy into an educational programme for Protestant societies, in which reading and learning were to be understood as advantageous to pious Christian practice.¹⁷

Thus Hooker was educated to master the linguistic arts and the classical tongues (Latin and Greek) as well as Hebrew at his grammar school in Exeter and at Corpus Christi College,

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Oxford. The latter was founded by bishop Richard Fox in 1517 to propagate the learning of the classical languages and the classical rhetorical tradition for the purpose of serving God, the church and the commonwealth. Indeed, not only did the educational programmes of Erasmus and Melanchthon influence the College, but Vives himself was its Greek lecturer when the College was first formed.18

Hooker’s humanist education developed his abilities and, in the Lawes, he believes that education is an aid in discerning what is good. ‘Education and instruction’, he writes, ‘are the means, the one by use, the other by precept to make our naturall faculty of reason, both the better and the sooner able to judge rightly betweene truth and error, good and evill’.19 Hooker also follows the traditional view derived from Aristotle that human language is conventional,20 and he maintains that language communicates reasonable understanding and he refers to Aristotle’s Politics:

Betweene men and beastes there is no possibilitie of sociable communion, because the wellspring of that communion is a naturall delight which man hath to transfuse from him selfe into thinges wherein the excellencie of this kind doth most consist. The chiefest instrument of humaine communion therefore is speech, because thereby we impart mutuallie one to another the conceiptes of our reasonable understanding.21

However, whereas conformists and presbyterians followed Calvin specifically in using Scriptural perspectives and language to speak about God’s authority,22 Hooker differed from his

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19 Lawes, 1: 76.20-23; (I.6.5). Hooker’s contemporaries also benefited from a humanist education, and many of the presbyterians, including Cartwright and Travers, were part of the ‘godly’ intellectual elite of Elizabethan society, with layman reliant upon the aptitude of their ministries. See Lake, Moderate Puritans, p. 90; Morgan, Godly Learning, pp. 95-120. Cartwright and Travers were educated at Cambridge, as were the conformists John Whitgift and Richard Bancroft.
21 Lawes, 1: 107.2-9; (I.10.12). I will examine Hooker’s use of Aristotle in Chapter Six.
22 Calvin’s emphasis upon the Scriptural perspectives of God’s authority is cited in section II below and will be examined in Chapter Four.
contemporaries because in the *Lawes* he was using extra-Scriptural perceptions and language to argue that God guided in extra-Scriptural polity.

Hence, Hooker assumes that the English vernacular is adequate for divine address. Of course, the majority of the Elizabethan nation who adhered to *The Book of Common Prayer* used the vernacular to address the divine in their worship. But Hooker’s use of the English vernacular in the *Lawes* attempts to express the ‘inexpressible’ authority of God in the church, and in his reliance here upon extra-Scriptural perspectives and images, Law is the central metaphor of his argument. Hooker at no point gives a technical or theoretical definition of metaphor – but we would not expect him to, since Hooker’s metaphor is still ‘live’ in the argument of the *Lawes*. Hooker’s metaphor of Law is the topic of Chapter Four, but I shall at present summarise the importance of metaphor for Hooker’s argument.

Metaphors in the twenty-first century are now believed to be vital to thought and language and the ‘classical’ definition, established by ancient rhetoricians, of metaphor as ‘ornamental’ and even ‘deceptive’ has not only lost its canonical status in the twenty-first century, but its supposed ‘representation’ of the classical understanding of metaphor is now questioned. For example, aside from the ancient rhetoricians and their concern with oratory, metaphor is valued in the breadth of ancient philosophy. The cognitive role of metaphor was admired by Plato and later Platonists, and the logical aspect of metaphor was emphasised by Aristotle, for whom *metaphora* was a special phenomenon. These ancient philosophical interpretations of metaphor were received in the Middle Ages and in the Renaissance.23

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Notably in the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas, with whom Hooker has often been associated,24 found the basis for his principle of ‘analogy’ in Aristotle’s understanding of metaphor. Thomas, who was concerned with how it was possible to speak of God and man in the same human language, argued that when men refer to God by analogy (by attributing human characteristics to God) they understand him improperly and metaphorically. Although Thomas did not set out a formal doctrine of analogy, he drew metaphors from the Bible and then sought to reconstruct their schematic background in almost all his works (whereas, by contrast, Aristotle primarily intended to philosophise upon metaphor).25 Because Thomas was only interested in Biblical metaphors, his theological *summa* on God’s all encompassing divine reason (*aliquid rationis*) does not present God’s law for the world as a metaphor.26 Thus, despite the similarities often noted between Hooker and Thomas, I argue that what Hooker polemically presents in his late sixteenth-century context is very different.

Firstly, Hooker’s polemical presentation of Law is unique because it proposes a distinction between God’s ‘first law eternal’ and God’s ‘second law eternal’, which is not found in traditional Augustinian or Thomist teaching.27 Secondly, Law, for Hooker, is not what is traditionally understood as a superior decreeing that their will be literally imposed on inferiors. Instead, Law, according to Hooker, is a metaphor for the being of God himself whose will voluntarily observes the law or divine reason of his own inner nature (‘the first law eternal’).

When this is not read as a metaphor and is assumed to be literal in meaning, then it appears that Hooker presupposes God’s will to be ‘relative’ to the direction of his divine reason and that Hooker does not account for the ‘inconsistency’ that God was once free from law which, it would be assumed, he literally self-imposed. These are the assumptions of Robert Hoopes, who does not recognise Hooker’s metaphor and bases his interpretation on a literal reading of ‘law’ in Hooker.28 However, when Law is read as a metaphor in Hooker’s presentation, there is nothing ‘relative’ or ‘inconsistent’ in God, whose authority in reason and goodness are metaphorically the guide for all other things in God’s ‘second law eternal’ (including the physical earth and men and their reason).

Hooker engages in the ancient problem of knowledge and representation which went as far back as Aristotle and contemplated the excellence of, and man’s lack of knowledge about, the divine object.29 Whereas the Bible provided Thomas with the analogies and descriptions to interpret new experiences of God, Hooker, by contrast, develops an extra-Scriptural metaphor of God against the presbyterian view of Scriptural omnipotence. But Hooker’s use of metaphor was not exclusive to him. The Italian Renaissance in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had also contemplated how to express what was unknowable and inexpressible about God. In Florence, the influential Italian humanist Coluccio Salutati argued, from a lay theological perspective, that because men lacked concepts and words to properly describe the divine then whatever was spoken about God would be imagined. Salutati continued to observe that all meaning in metaphors, figures, tropes and allegories only carried a falsity of appearance but, within, contained the hidden truth - words referred to something other than what they presented.


Salutati argued: ‘Do you not see that divine literature and the entire Holy Scriptures consist entirely of this kind of speaking and are nothing else? For when we speak of God or of incorporeal creatures nothing is true according to the letter, and there is nothing under that falsity of skin but the truth’.  

Hooker does not mention Italian humanists like Salutati, but he does specifically warn against the dangers of attempting to ‘wade’ into the mysteries of God. Language, he remarks, is likely to offend, and, concerning the divine, the ‘safest eloquence’ is silence, which, on its own, is a similar claim to the views of Luther and Calvin. But Hooker also stresses that there is an obligation for humanity to speak, or else it will remain an accessory to error. Hooker begins the Lawes by asserting such a motivation: ‘Though for no other cause, yet for this; that posteritie may know we have not loosely through silence permitted things to passe away as in a dreame….’ Importantly, Hooker does not attempt to develop a logical system to discuss divinity in the world. Rather, stating the experience of God’s influence relies upon, according to Hooker’s argument, the human imagination. But here, Hooker was not radical, he was quite conventional.

Until the late fourteenth century, the English word ‘experience’ contained the meaning of the word *imaginatio*, which indicated the ascent of the mind and the heart towards God. In short, the imagination was part of human experience, although it did, of course, have its critics, such as the German theologian Meister Eckhart. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, thinkers inherited from antiquity the view that the ‘reproductive imagination’ was used in the mind’s

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31 See for example, Lawes, 1: 59.12-20; Jude I, 5: 16.4-9.
32 Lawes, 1: 1.1-2; (Preface.1.1).
cognition and in emotive feeling. Aristotle, again, had argued that only the imagination could join sensations with mental cognitions, and that the imagination provided mental images for speculative thought and for man’s emotional outlook. Aristotle had also argued that the imagination produced analogies which, as we have seen, helped form the basis of Thomas’ use of analogy between humanity and divinity. Similarly in the sixteenth century, the objects of reason were understood to be presented to the mind imaginatively. For Hooker, all forms of human reasoning utilise the imagination, as we shall examine in Chapter Four. Thus Law has an imaginative authority in Hooker’s argument by making what is unseen accessible to thought and feeling. Images, for Hooker, convey meaning and move men to think, to act and to emotionally engage. ‘Speech is the verie image whereby the minde and soule of the speaker conveieth it selfe into the bosome of him which heareth’.

Here, there is for Hooker a special relationship between extra-Scriptural perceptions, meaning and language. In the canonical view of Hooker as advancing a complementary relation between human reason and bibilical revelation, especially in Books II and III of the Lawes, scholars correctly link Hooker to the Thomistic view that reason and revelation both find their source in God and do not contest each other. But the direct link to Thomas on its own does not explain how reason and revelation are, along with God as the source of what is good, to be mediated in a Protestant society with its affective commitments to God. This leaves unanswered

35 See Chapter Four, section V, below.
36 Lawes, 2: 98.29-31; (V.22.10).
the question of how extra-Scriptural influence and meaning is to be mediated for Hooker in a Protestant society that overwhelmingly invests authority in Scripture.

In addition to his humanist education, Hooker certainly wrote in a context where there existed fresh linguistic possibilities for Protestant thought. As mentioned in Chapter One concerning the Protestant *methodus*, Philip Melanchthon had connected reason and language, and logic and rhetoric because, he believed, humanity had not been deprived after the fall of its God-given ability to reason and communicate. In the latter half of the sixteenth century, second generation reformers on the continent such as Wolfgang Musculus and Andreas Gerhard Hyperius, were meeting the need for finding a ‘Protestant unity’ which had not necessarily been articulated among the Reformed, and had certainly not been articulated by Calvin. For example, there had been irreconcilable differences between the reformers in their proof-texting of Scripture, which had meant that the Bible as a stand-alone-text and the cry of *sola scriptura*, of the literal use of Scripture alone, could not, on their own, ensure Protestant unity. But although these reformers had set patristic and medieval sources into a large body of linguistic erudition, and although Thomas’ systemised concepts of God were filtered into Protestant writing by Peter Martyr Vermigli and Girolamo Zanchi, nevertheless sixteenth-century Protestant societies still maintained that theology was generated and governed by Scripture. While Hooker was also indebted to the Protestant humanist culture, he had all the more need to stress the divine guidance of reason in extra-Scriptural language and perspectives because he

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moved away from his Protestant contemporaries by denying that the Holy Spirit guided human speech, which we shall now investigate.

II

Hooker argues that the Holy Spirit is not an inner guide in the lives of men, but that the Spirit only manifests itself by using reason as its instrument. As Egil Grislis, Peter Lake, Debora Shuger and Nigel Voak have pointed out, Scripture according to Hooker is not authenticated by an ‘internal testimony’ of the Holy Spirit within a Christian, and men’s exegesis of Scripture, according to Hooker, is not guided by the Holy Spirit without men using their reason. 41 Firstly, Hooker argues in Book III of the Lawes that although the Scriptures are the ‘oracles’ of God they are not authenticated by the internal witness of the Spirit, otherwise all of humanity would recognise Scripture as divine truth,

all men that heare it would acknowledge it in hart…[but] the other we knowe that all do not acknowledge when they heare it. There must be therefore some former knowledge presupposed which doth herein assure the hartes of all believers. Scripture teacheth us that saving truth which God hath discovered unto the world by revelation, and it presumeth us taught otherwise that it self is divine and sacred.42

For Hooker, the authenticity of Scripture is agreed rationally among humanity and safe-guarded by the church. Secondly, Hooker argues that Scripture is not self-interpreting because the Holy Spirit does not guide a passive reader. Hooker writes:

[E]ven to our own selves it needeth caution and explication how the testimony of the spirit may be discerned, by what means it may be known, lest men thinke that the spirit of god doth testifie those things which the spirit of error suggesteth. The operations of the spirit, especially these ordinary which be common unto all true christian men, are as we know, things secret and undiscernable even to the very soule where they are, because their nature is of another and an higher kind then that they can be by us


42 Lawes, 1: 231.4-15; (III.8.13).
perceived in this life. Wherefore albeit the spirit lead us into all truth and direct us in all goodnes, yet because these workings of the spirit in us are so privy and secret, we therefore stand on a plainer ground, when we gather by reason from the qualitie of things beleeved or done, that the spirit of God hath directed us in both; then if we settle our selves to beleev or to do any certaine particular thing, as being moved thereto by the spirit.43

Hooker argues that there is a spiritual connection between the Holy Spirit and the goodness that men enact. But Hooker is clear that God, his Holy Spirit and all goodness are intrinsically yet inexplicably linked.

Now, in sixteenth-century Reformed thought the property of the Holy Spirit that is incommunicable is precisely how the Spirit ‘proceeds’.44 The procession of the Holy Spirit according to Hooker is only manifested in the established verdict of collective reason. The Holy Spirit does not reveal things individually to men as this would, Hooker argues, lead to confusion in the church.45 For example, Hooker points out that the belief in the Trinity is ‘in scripture no where to be found by expresse literall mention, only deduced they are out of scripture by collection’.46 For Hooker, the ‘Trinity’ is an extra-Scriptural expression based upon what has been deduced by the collective reasoning of men. Thus according to Hooker, human language is complementary to human reason in signifying and mediating Scriptural authority and meaning, but not directly inspired by the Spirit. This was a remarkable view in the late sixteenth-century context, since although first and second generation reformers such as Luther, Melanchton, Zwingli and Calvin protested against the Roman Catholic emphasis on a ‘spiritual tradition’ that was internally known in the hearts of believers, the reformers did not separate the internally known Word that was ‘living’ by the Holy Spirit from the externally written text of Scripture.47

According to Luther, Christians could only speak intelligibly when guided by the Spirit, and, for

43 Lawes, 1: 232.30-233.9; (III.8.16).
44 See Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 4., The Triunity of God, p. 371.
45 Lawes, 2: 46.7-47.11; (V.10.1-2).
46 Lawes, 1: 126.13-24; (I.14.2).
Calvin, words about God could only be taken from Scripture. Hooker does not strictly adhere to these positions, stressing instead the rational ‘voice’ of humanity as independent from the inspired language of Scripture, and disclaiming that the Holy Spirit continued to inspire spoken human language.

My argument is that for Hooker reason and language, in addition to signifying the authenticity and meaning of Scripture, communicate the authority and guidance of God in the church. Hooker wishes reason and language to continue to signify within an agreed convention, which should, Hooker argues, erode religious enthusiasm that can spiral out of control in unchecked language. Hooker observes that, admittedly, language can encourage different interpretations:

[B]ecause wordes have so manie artificers by whome they are made, and the thinges whereunto wee applie them are fraught with so manie varieties, it is not alwaies apparent what the first inventors respected, much lesse what everie mans inward conceipt is which useth theire wordes.

Thus Hooker concedes that receiving truth by report and by tradition is dangerous, and that the written Scriptures are needed, he urges, to preserve divine truths:

They that so earnestly pleade for the authoritie of Tradition, as if nothing were more safely conveyed then that which spreadeth it selfe by report, and descendeth by relation of former generations unto the ages that succeede…What hazard the truth is in when it passeth through the hands of report, how maymed and deformed it becommeth…Let them that are indeed of this mind consider but only that little of things Divine, which the Heathen have in such sort receyved. How miserable had the state of the Church of God bene long ere this, if wanting the sacred scripture we had no record of his lawes, but only the memorie of man receyving the same by report and relation from his predecessor?

Although Hooker believes that Scripture alone reveals what is true in the matter of salvation, he has nevertheless set himself the task of arguing how Scripture is not the sole focus for faith in the church. In actually confronting how the extra-Scriptural guidance of God is to be mediated in

50 Lawes, 2: 437.20-24; (V.78.2).
51 Lawes, 1: 123.8-23; (I.13.2). See also 1: 129.14-21; (I.14.5).
52 See, for example, Justification, 5:119.18-26; Lawes, 1: 191.16-20; (II.8.7).
the church, Hooker is aware that words uttered about God as the object of faith need to be made credible:

> [T]he name of faith being properly and strictlie taken, it must needes have reference unto some uttered worde, as the object of belief: nevertheless, sith the ground of credite is the credibilitie of thinges credited; and things are made credible, either by the knowne condition and qualitie of the utterer, or by the manifest likelihood of truth which they have in themselves; hereupon it riseth, that whatsoever we are perswaded of, the same we are generally sayd to beleive. In which generalitie the object of fayth may not so narrowly be restrayned, as if the same did extend no further then to the only scriptures of God.\(^5^3\)

Hooker’s argument is that speaking credibly about the role of God in ecclesiology must not be confused with an inspired language that is led by the Holy Spirit.

Hooker does, however, believe that ordained ministers are guided by the Holy Spirit when performing their divine duties: ‘Knowing therefore that when wee take ordination wee also receive the presence of the holy Ghost partlie to guide direct and strengthen us in all our waies…Whether wee [ordained ministers] preach, pray, baptise, communicate, condemne, give absolution, or whatsoever, as disposers of Gods misteries, our wordes, judgments, actes and deedes, are not oures but the holie Ghostes’.\(^5^4\) But this is because the Christian minister’s reason is sanctified by grace in understanding and preaching the gospel, and it is by reason that, according to Hooker, the Spirit can communicate. But Hooker also insists that sermons formed by the wit of man can ‘tast’ of the ‘corrupt fountaine’ from which they originate.\(^5^5\)

Therefore, the credibility of reason and natural discourse is vital to Hooker in speaking in addition to the divinely inspired Scriptures about extra-Scriptural divine sanctions. In his understanding of God’s authority, Hooker moves away from the Protestant principle of *sola scriptura*, according to which divine matters were only validated by the words of the Bible. To express his vision of God in ecclesiology, Hooker’s needs to re-evaluate the relation between human and divine thought and language. In Hooker’s argument of God’s extra-Scriptural

\(^{53}\) *Lawes*, 1: 151.23–152.5; (II.4.1).

\(^{54}\) *Lawes*, 2: 430.2-4, 19-22; (V.77.8).

\(^{55}\) *Lawes*, 2: 99.6-16; (V.22.10). I examine this closely in Chapter Five, section II, below.
involvement in church polity, which is the central investigation of this study, there is need in the church for a ‘natural discourse’ which is not based upon the Bible.

The whole drift of scripture what is it but only to teach Theologie? Theologie what is it but the science of things divine? What science can be attained unto without the help of natural discourse and reason? Judge you of that which I speake, saith the Apostle. In vaine it were to speake any thing of God, but that by reason men are able some what to judge of that they heare, and by discourse to discerne how consonant it is to truth.56

Hooker does not turn away from the Protestant methodus – he maintains its assumption that there is a ‘way’ of making God known to the Christian community; and Scripture, for Hooker, still participates in this. But what Hooker wishes to argue is that there is more to the Protestant assumption than was being recognised by specifically the presbyterians, such as man’s extra-Scriptural language, reason and perceptions, which will be the topic of the next chapter.

56 Lawes, 1: 229.33-230.7; (III.8.11).
Chapter Three

“This present age full of tongue and weake of braine”? Divine Language and the Extra-Scriptural Necessity

In the Lawes, Hooker characterises his own society as ‘full of tongue and weake of braine’ in its attempts and failures to recognise extra-Scriptural goodness in the church. Yet, by endeavouring to prove that God’s influence in church polity is not limited to the words of the Bible, Hooker’s work is not without difficulties, it is not unconditionally judicious. Hooker wrestles with the authority that he invests in the human language of men to mediate and disseminate Christian truth. Hooker is aware that because language is a human convention there is an ineptitude in delivering, receiving and re-stating the truth of verbal and written testimonies of divine and human authority. To resolve the problem Hooker, I shall argue in this chapter, perceives a dual relationship between divine and human language, which firstly demonstrates that Scripture does not ‘represent’ God, and, secondly, communicates God’s extra-Scriptural influence in the church.

The plan for this chapter is as follows: I will introduce Hooker’s understanding of divine and human language in section I; the human need for extra-Scriptural language will be examined in section II; in section III, I shall examine how the presbyterians tangle divine and human language according to Hooker; in section IV, I shall closely examine Hooker’s understanding of divine speech delivered by revelation; then I shall examine Hooker’s understanding of how human language is distinct from divine language in section V and how extra-Scriptural language is divinely sanctioned in section VI; I shall conclude in section VII with Hooker’s argument for extra-Scriptural perception.

1 Lawes, 1: 83.8-10; (I.8.2).
I

In his *First Sermon Upon Part S. Judes Epistle*, the earliest of Hooker’s writings to have survived and preached while at Oxford in 1582/1583,² Hooker aims to establish to whom Christians should listen, since Jesus had warned that there would be ‘mockers’ in the last days. But Hooker struggles to state what the words of humanity (uninspired by the Spirit) can say that is consonant with Christian truth when compared to the authority of Jesus and the Apostles whose words were, Hooker believes, inspired by the Spirit. Hooker firstly argues: ‘The God of this world, whom yee serve, hath provided Apostles and teachers for you, Chaldeans, Wisards, Southsayers, Astrologers and such like: Heare them’.³ A few lines later, however, Hooker dissociates himself from the testimonies of these human teachers, aligning himself instead with the single source of the Apostles and their written testimonies of Jesus and the divine truth of his words. Hooker states:

> He cannot love the Lord Jesus with his heart, which lendeth one eare to his Apostles, and another eare to false Apostles: which can brooke to see a mingle mangle of religion and superstition, Ministers and Massingpriests, light and darknesse, truth and errour, traditions and Scriptures. No; we have no Lord but Jesus; no doctrine but the Gospell, no teachers but his Apostles.⁴

Although Hooker appears here to state the Reformed conviction of *sola scriptura* (of Scripture as the sole authority), he does not substantiate his argument with the words of the Bible. Rather, he supplements his argument with the authority he places upon the fourth-century Latin theologian Hilary of Poitiers, further complicating which ‘voice’ in human language he is preaching as authoritative. ‘[I]t is not lawful for us to heare the things, that are not told us by his Apostles…saith Hilary, those things that are not written in the booke of the law, wee ought not

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² See *Folger*, 5: 1-2.
³ *Jude I*, 5: 20.21-23. Chaldeans (especially Babylonian) were believed to be practitioners of occult arts.
so much as to be acquainted with them’. In reviewing whether Scripture alone reveals the divine will of God, Hooker has found that human language, and the human acts of speaking and listening, play a part in revealing and communicating God’s will.

The transmission of human and divine knowledge is expanded upon later by Hooker in the Lawes in which he argues that God provides human teachers who are to be heard in addition to the Apostles in communicating ‘truth and errour’. This is subtly conveyed by Hooker’s argument, not merely by relying upon oppositions such as ‘light and darknesse’ which were appealing images to the presbyterian view of a taught Christian way of life that was in strict accordance with ‘biblical simplicity’. However, what Hooker struggles to convey is that human reason and human discourse require a vocabulary of expression that is meaningful to humanity but will nevertheless be an independent source from God.

Hooker’s argument is complex. What has been reasoned and stated by humanity, or has been revealed by God in Scripture or by Jesus with his disciples, all share the same medium of human language to convey meanings and laws. And yet, although they all share the same medium, what God has expressed is, for Hooker, distinct from the expressions of men. This distinction is fundamental in allowing men’s collective ‘voice’ of reason to assert what is good in church polity and in allowing the Christian community to express public prayer. But the problem still remains: Christians require divine and human instruction, but the influences of both can potentially merge together in human language undetected, or can potentially contradict each other’s authority.

For example, Hooker presents an analogy to demonstrate for the sixteenth-century Church of England the problem of receiving instruction via language. In discussing the basis of

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human verbal testimony in Book II of the Lawes, Hooker examines the confusion that the Apostles expressed when Jesus, after his transfiguration, implied that the ‘Son of Man’ would soon be raised from the dead, which seemed to contradict the common opinion of the Jewish scribes, according to whom Elias was to first come among them. Hooker writes:

They notwithstanding thought the judgement of the very Scribes in matters divine to bee of some value; some probabilite they thought there was that Elias should come, in as much as the Scribes sayd it. Now no truth can contradict any truth; desirous therefore they were to be taught how both might stand together, that which they knew could not be false, because Christ spake it; and this which to them did seeme true, onely because the Scribes had sayd it.6

The problem as presented by Hooker not only involves reconciling the verbal testimony of Jesus with that of the scribes, but also involves the Apostles’ recognition of other teachers and the words of their testimonies. Hooker assumes the familiarity of his readers with the Gospels, according to which Elias had already come among the Apostles as John the Baptist, and may have been heard but not recognised by those who believed the instruction of the scribes.7 In Hooker’s portrayal, the divine understanding of what Jesus had said was not immediately obvious to the Apostles, nor did they recognise to whom the language of the scribes referred. The Holy Spirit, according to Hooker’s presentation, clearly did not guide the Apostles on this matter. Whilst the testimonies of Jesus and the scribes were believed to be true, both also appeared to contradict the authority of each other.

What Hooker is illustrating is the difficulty of mediating how human words and divinely inspired words can complement and even supplement each other, and who is to interpret them – especially when not passively illuminated by the Holy Spirit in the sixteenth-century context. Although Hooker deems Scripture and all its words to be divine, the Bible operates for Hooker in the field of human language and meaning. The important point for Hooker is that God has made

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6 Lawes, 1: 183.27-184.1; (II.7.7).
divine truth accessible in human language. Rational judgements concerning divine or human authority are, for Hooker, therefore based upon the received human language of a divine or human testimony.

Hence Hooker continues to argue that humans need to receive amongst themselves extra-Scriptural explanations and expressions of thought which will help to decode and communicate the ‘pure’ word of God. Hooker does aim for an objective interpretation of Scripture which should be controlled by a collectively agreed choice of human language, thus avoiding subjective and isolated interpretations that might result in error.8 Hooker is keen to demonstrate, particularly in his First Sermon Upon Jude and in Books I, II and III of the Lawes, a partition – but not an unbridgeable gulf - between what God has revealed and how humanity can speak, write and mediate.9

Hooker’s open acknowledgement that the ‘voice’ of God and the voices of men are both signified in human language provides a remarkable tension in Hooker’s work. In Hooker’s argument divine and human authorities are signified only in the mouths of men. This, according to Hooker, appears to be an oversight on the part of the presbyterians, who argued negatively from Scripture in maintaining that things not mentioned in the Bible should be avoided. Hooker focuses upon the dual relationship between divine and human language because he wishes to polemically argue that the Scriptural laws of God are not the sole divine influence in ecclesiology. In exploring the relationship between divine and human language, let us start by examining Hooker’s view of the human need for its own ‘voice’.

II


9 See ibid., p. 189.
There are, for Hooker, three reasons why extra-Scriptural language is indispensable to humanity. Firstly, as already argued in Chapter Two, there is a human need to authenticate Scripture and its meaning through the faculty of human reason and through the assertions of human language. In regard to reason, Hooker writes in Book III of the *Lawes*:

> Unto the word of God being in respect of that end, for which God ordain'd it, perfect, exact, and absolute in it self, we do not add reason as a supplement of any maime or defect therin, but as a necessary instrument, without which we could not reape by the scriptures perfection, that fruite and benefit which it yeeldeth.\(^{10}\)

As the critic W. David Neelands notes, reason for Hooker ‘criticises’ Scripture by assigning credibility to, and determining the meaning of, the Bible.\(^{11}\)

However, in addition to the connection that Neelands describes, it is precisely Hooker’s point that extra-Scriptural verbal and written assurances must be conveyed and received to ensure that Christians do not contradict Scripture. This, for Hooker, is not the same as Thomas Cartwright’s presbyterian claim that all actions should first be proven to be in accordance with Scripture which alone, Cartwright had argued, assures men that they please God.\(^{12}\) It is untrue, Hooker contends, that *only* the words of Scripture can assure us in matters of truth. When self-assured humans – even heathens – write in language, they generate, Hooker argues, assurance in others on matters of truth. For example, Cartwright had endorsed Cicero’s aversion to assigning authority to anything that men may doubt. But Hooker questions Cartwright’s endorsement of a pagan author: ‘What scripture had *Tully* [Cicero] for his assurance? Yet I nothing doubt that they who alledge him, think he did well to set downe in writing a thing so consonant unto truth’.\(^{13}\)

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\(^{10}\) *Lawes*, 1: 227.2-6; (III.8.10).


\(^{13}\) *Lawes*, 1: 153.11-13; (II.4.2).
The second reason why extra-Scriptural language is indispensable to humanity is, Hooker argues, because there is a human need for God’s guidance to be stated in extra-Scriptural language. This is because, Hooker argues in opposition to the presbyterian view, the sentences of Scripture are not sufficient in scope and variation to guide every human action. In Book II of the *Lawes*, Hooker writes:

> For in every action of common life to find out some sentence clearly and infallibly setting before our eyes what we ought to do, (seem we in scripture never so expert) would trouble us more than we are aware. In weake and tender mindes wee little knowe what myserye this strict opinion would breede, besides the stoppes it would make in the whole course of all mens lives and actions.14

The third reason, according to Hooker, is a human need to explicate in language the reason why a divine law (revealed in Scripture) or a human law (revealed by the collective agreement of human reason) should be obeyed. This is a subject that first concerns Hooker in his *A Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pride*. Preached in 1585/86 at the Temple Church in response to Walter Travers’ refutation of ecclesiastical authorities,15 the following passage appears at the beginning of the sermon.

> A law simply commanding or forbidding is but dead in comparison of that which expresseth the reason wherfore it doth the one or the other…In a word, whatsoever we be taught, be it percept for direction of our maners, or articles for instruction of our faith or document anie waie for information of our mindes it then taketh root and abideth when wee conceave not only what God doth speak but why.16

Asking why God has revealed what he has, Hooker argues, encourages men to discourse amongst themselves, forming testimonies and even identifying the rational guidance of God in polity. For Hooker, what God has revealed is continually mediated by the language and expressions of what humans say. The point here for Hooker is that there is a need for a ‘natural discourse’ that is not based upon the Bible, but that nevertheless recognises Scripture as a sacred code of reference.

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14 *Lawes*, 1: 190.29-191.4; (II.8.6).
15 See *Pride*, 5: 299.
16 *Pride*, 5: 309.11-23.
But establishing that language is an indispensable medium for humanity does not explain why natural or human discourse can authoritatively extend further than the testimonies of Scripture, especially in stating God’s influence in forming church laws. Hooker develops why human language is authoritative in the church by examining, in Books II and III of the Lawes, what he understands as the presbyterian, and particularly Cartwright’s, fundamental error of assimilating the words of the Bible unconditionally into the language of humanity, without distinguishing between divine and human language. Let us firstly outline Hooker’s presentation of this error in more detail, before moving on to examine Hooker’s development of the dual relation between the languages of God and man.

III

In reviewing the Admonition controversy of the 1570s and 1580s, with special reference to the presbyterian model of ecclesiology as outlined in the Introduction to this study, Hooker asks in Book II of the Lawes:

Shall we hereupon then conclude that we may not take knowledge of, or give credit unto any thing, which sense or experience or report or art doth propose, unless we finde the same in scripture? No, it is too plaine that so farre to extend their speeches, is to wrest them against their true intent and meaning.17

As already argued, the divinely inspired words of Scripture are not, for Hooker, the exclusive source for what can be thought and said within the church. Yet it is true, he notes, that misconstructing the sense of Scripture or falsifying the words of ‘divine evidence’ is ‘heynous’.18 Ironically, Hooker argues, the presbyterians have already added to the content of Scripture by dangerously elaborating in human language upon the commandments of God. For example, Hooker cites the position of Cartwright:

17 Lawes, 1: 159.24-160.2; (II.5.3).
18 Lawes, 1: 215.1-6; (III.5.1).
They which first gave out, that *Nothing ought to be established in the Church which is not commanded by the word of God*, thought this principle plainly warranted by the manifest wordes of the lawe, *Ye shall put nothing unto the word which I commaunde you, neyther shall you take ought therefrom, that yee may keepe the commaundements of the Lord your God, which I commaunde you.*

Hooker suggests that the presbyterians falsify the meaning of Scripture by imposing upon it their own organised ‘presbyterian’ argument. Hooker points out that the evidence for their position is their own arrangement of Scriptural ‘proof-texts’, which they believe reflect the law of God for the church. Hooker argues that it is the presbyterians’ own narration and words that corroborates their argument, not God’s communication of himself and his divine plan for the church. ‘[W]hen they come to alleage what worde and what lawe they meane, their common ordinarie practise is, to quote by-speeches in some historickall narration or order, and to urge them as if they were written in most exact forme of lawe. What is to adde to the lawe of God if this be not?’

For Hooker, the presbyterians use human language to distort God’s previously revealed laws for a different context of the church, widening their scope and purpose beyond what can be proven. Hooker not only warns of the judgement of God against those who wittingly misconstrue the sense of Scripture, but Hooker proposes to maintain the credibility of the *actual* content of Scripture by arguing that the Bible provides a limited set of laws for an earlier context of the church. Hooker writes in Book II of the *Lawes*:

> Whatsoever is spoken of God or thinges appertaining to God otherwise then as the truth is; though it seeme an honour, it is an injurie. And as incredible praises geven unto men do often abate and impaire the credit of their deserved commendation; so we must likewise take great heede, lest in attributing unto scripture more then it can have, the incredibillitie of that do cause even those thinges which indeed it hath most abundantly to be lesse reverendly esteemed.

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19 *Lawes*, 1: 214.15-21; (III.5.1). Hooker cites Cartwright in the first italicised sentence. See Cartwright, *The Second Replie*, p. 55. In the second italicised sentence Hooker cites Deuteronomy 4.2; 12.32, which had been endorsed by Cartwright in the Admonition controversy.

20 *Lawes*, 1: 215.8-13; (III.5.1).

21 *Lawes*, 1: 215.17-19; (III.5.1).


23 *Lawes*, 1: 191.25-192.1; (II.8.7).
Hooker implies that by integrating their own language into what God has revealed (by adding to Scripture), the presbyterians assume that their claims can be aligned with God’s communication of law. They assume, Hooker argues, that their own language can incorporate God’s language without problems of interpretation or without facilitating the illusion of spiritual guidance. They assume, Hooker continues, that their use of language whether in Latin or in the vernacular is the same as God’s. Fundamentally for Hooker, there is a clear need to recognise the distinction between the languages of God and men. ‘The mixture of those thinges by speech which by nature are divided, is the mother of all error. To take away therefore that error which confusion breedeth, distinction is requisite’.24

But untangling divine from human speech assumes a good deal in Hooker’s own argument. For example, who or what justifies the spoken and written words of humanity as logical and objective? Do the words of humanity always accurately reflect human reason? Are human words always in discreet accordance with the wisdom of God in reflecting Christian truth, even if they are not guided by the Spirit? Are the words spoken by Christians to be treated as different from those spoken by pagans even though they use the same medium of language? We must remember that pagan philosophers in the Graeco-Roman world conversed with great precision upon matters concerning the divine, influencing the verbal formation of definite doctrinal statements in later Christian thinking.25 The question for Hooker is whether the spoken languages of God, of Christians and of pagans are all authoritative in the world, in the visible church, and amongst those who are sure of their own election in the invisible Church of Christ.

Arriving at these questions in Hooker means that we are now ready to examine Hooker’s understanding of the delivery, interpretation and the human circulation of God’s verbal

24 Lawes, 1: 209.24-26; (III.3.1).
communication. The purpose of this will be to discover the similarities and differences in Hooker’s argument between God’s communication and man’s communication, and the authority they both generate in the world and in the church.

IV

In his works, Hooker argues that God reveals himself by his ‘voice’. In Book I of the Lawes, Hooker writes: ‘since the time that God did first proclaime the edicts of his law upon it, heaven and earth have hearkned unto his voice, and their labour hath bene to do his wil….’ The ‘voice’ of God is also synonymous for Hooker with God’s understanding, as he explains in Book II: ‘wee hold that his speech revealeth there what himselfe seeth, and [is] therefore the strongest proofe of all….’ Hooker admits that humanity has not the ability to comprehend how God can accommodate his revelation into a finite human language. Nevertheless, translating from On The Life of Moses written by the first-century Jewish philosopher Philo Judaeus (now known as Philo of Alexandria), Hooker claims that humanity may rely upon ‘the heavenly support of prophetical revelation, which doth open those hidden mysteries that reason could never have beene able to finde out…."

The point for Hooker is that reason without revealed language could not have discovered the truth of God’s revelation; God has ‘opened’ prophetical revelation and Scriptural laws in language, and not through reason. We shall investigate how God, according to Hooker, now guides instead by collective reason in Hooker’s sixteenth-century context in Chapters Four, Five and Six. At present, Hooker argues that it is human language in the first instance and not human

26 Lawes, 1: 65.16-20; (I.3.2).
27 Lawes, 1: 179.22-23; (II.7.5).
reason that conveys the truth of prophetic revelation. As this is the case according to Hooker, the human accuracy in reading and expressing the words of God’s revelation as stated in Scripture is paramount before reason can receive and scrutinise Scriptural truth. For Hooker, the church can rely unquestionably upon the Scriptural words that convey God’s revelation. But Hooker’s own distinction between divine and human language (which presbyterians tended to merge), revolves around the seeming paradox that for Hooker the words read in Scripture are human in construction although they have been ‘selected’ by God. The immediate question for Hooker is why human language has been privileged as the authoritative medium of communication. Although, Biblically, the original lingua humana was a gift of God to Adam, whose language illuminated the inner nature of his surroundings and was comprehended everywhere as one language, God also inflicted the confusion of tongues at the fall of the Tower of Babel. Nonetheless, Hooker believes that God has chosen to reveal his divine mysteries, commands and purposes in the verbal form for Biblical societies. For them, revelation was delivered, Hooker believes, through the Holy Spirit’s verbal inspiration into the minds of the prophets and holy men, as the critics George Morrel, Egil Grislis and Nigel Atkinson note.

However, the present study argues that Hooker’s presentation of verbal inspiration is not strictly uniform with the traditional view of Scriptural dictation as expounded by writers such as Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great (Albertus Magnus), Giles of Rome (Aegidius Romanus), Henry of Ghent and Alphonsus Vargas. In this tradition, the minds of the prophets were ‘lifted’ and ‘inspired’ with knowledge from God which, afterwards, the prophets themselves then encoded into speech and writing, intellectually connecting the divine inspiration they had

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received with their own choice of human vocabulary. Here, the intellect of the prophets judged the truthfulness of the knowledge presented to their minds, and they worked to mediate God’s revelations into prophecy. In this same tradition, on the other hand, holy men were divinely inspired through their affections and not their intellect. These inspired affections did not produce prophecy but, rather, produced hagiography which formed the books in the Old Testament other than those of the Law and the Prophets.31

Hooker’s view of verbal inspiration has little to do with the rational judgements of the prophets in this traditional conception of Scriptural dictation, but has more in common with an Augustinian view of divine illumination, especially as cast by a writer such as Bonaventure, for whom the Holy Spirit verbally inspired the interior speech of the prophets, directly authoring the Scriptural words of God’s communication.32 The majority of the reformers also belong to this second tradition, although they rarely discuss an actual doctrine of God’s inspiration.33 Hooker presents the prophets in the Bible as recognising the truth of what they predict because of their illumination and instruction, and not because they have rationally worked out for themselves that what they predict is true – the inspiration or illumination of the Holy Spirit has done this for them. But Hooker does not present the prophets as deprived of their senses or as unthinking instruments. In his First Sermon Upon Jude, Hooker writes:

This is that which the Prophets mean by those books written ful within, and without; which books were so often delivered them to eat, not because God fed them with inke, and paper, but to teach us, that so oft as he employed them in this heavenly worke, they neither spake, nor wrote any word of their owne, but uttered sillable by sillable as the spirit put it into their mouths…An instrument whether it be a pipe or harpe maketh a distinction in the times and sounds, which distinction is well perceived of the hearer, the instrument it selfe understanding not what is piped or harped. The Prophets and holy men of God not so. I opened my mouth, saith Ezechiel, and God reached me a scroule, saying, son of man cause

32 Ibid., p. 42.
thy belly to eat and fill thy bowels with this I give thee. I eate it, and it was sweet in my mouth as hony, saith the Prophet...For herein they were not like Harps or Lutes, but they felt, they felt the power and strength of their owne words. When they spake of our peace, every corner of their hearts, was filled with joy. When they prophecyed of mournings, lamentations, and woes, to fall upon us, they wept in the bitteneres and indignation of spirit, the arm of the Lord being mighty and strong upon them.

Here, Hooker writes of the inspiration of both prophets and holy men alike, and what is striking is that both, according to Hooker, were affected by their senses. They ‘felt’ and they ‘wept’, and they did not proceed to rationalise God’s communication because the Spirit had already accommodated the divine knowledge into their ‘mouths’, syllable by syllable. Indeed, ‘They saw things which themselves were not able to utter, they beheld that wherat men and Angels are astonished’. Hooker suggests that it is God who ‘translates’ his knowledge into a communicable human language, and on this point Hooker remains consistent in his later work.

In Book I of the Lawes, he writes:

First therefore of Moyses it is said, that he wrote all the wordes of God; not by his owne privat motion and devise: for God taketh this act to him selfe, I have written. Further more were not the Prophetes following commanded also to do the like? Unto the holy Evangelist Saint John how often expresse charge is given, Scribe, write these things?

The content of Scripture, Hooker continues to argue, is with ‘absolute perfection framed’. This, for Hooker, is because it was already ‘written’ in the divine understanding and has been ‘spoken’ by God (sunt dicta a Deo).

Thus Hooker argues that when God’s speech directed Israel in the days of revelation, his testimonies, like his divine being, were ‘perfect’. In its initial delivery, God’s meaning in human vocabulary was unambiguous. Hence God’s authorship of Scripture is not in doubt: ‘The testimonies of God are true, the testimonies of God are perfect, the testimonies of God are all

34 Jude I, 5: 17.3-24.
36 Lawes, 1: 122.16-21; (I.13.1). See also Lawes, 1: 167.27-168.5; (II.6.1).
37 Lawes, 1: 124.22; (I.13.3).
38 Lawes, 169.23-170.2; (II.6.3).
sufficient unto that end for which they were given’. ‘Perfect’ means ‘complete’ or ‘completion’ in Hooker’s sixteenth-century sense.

However, the critic Nigel Atkinson argues that Hooker is satisfied with the perfection of Scripture, as were ‘all reformed theologians’. The ‘completeness’ of Scripture and its laws was certainly the ultimate supposition in the presbyterian argument for Scriptural omnicompetence. But far from satisfied, Hooker asserts a deep anxiety on the issue of humans interpreting the completeness of Scripture. Although complete in the knowledge of salvation, Scripture is not, according to Hooker, the complete ‘voice’ or plan of God for his church. What is at issue here for Hooker is that there appears a potential problem in how the divine ‘voice’ is perceived in the Church of England by conformists and presbyterians alike. Underlying this, Hooker acknowledges, is the problem of interpreting the intended meaning of words. In his sermon *A Learned Discourse of Justification, Works, and How the Foundation of Faith Is Overthrowne*, Hooker states:

> As a lose toothe is a great greife unto him that eateth; so doth a waivering and unstable word, in speche that tendeth to instruction, offend. Shall a wise man speake wordes of the winde (saith Eliphas) light, unconstant, unstable wordes? Surely the wisest maye speake wordes of the winde. Such is the untoward constitution of our nature, that we neither do so perfectlie understand the waye and knowledg of the Lord, nor so steadfastlie imbrace yt, when yt is understood, nor so graciouslie utter yt, when yt is imbraced, nor so peaceable mainteine yt, when yt is uttered: but that the best of us are overtaken, sometime through blindnes, sometime through hastines, sometyme through impacience, sometime through other passions of the mynde, whereunto (God doth knowe) we are too subject. We must therfore be contented both to pardon others, and to crave that others maye pardon us for such thinges. Let no man which speaketh as a man, thincke him self (whilest he liveth) alwaies freed from scapes and oversights in his speache.41

Hooker’s concern is that although there is a completeness of understanding presented in Scripture (because it is divine), this does not mean that it can be completely understood or that its complete meaning and purpose can be communicated from one speaker to another. This anxiety

39 Lawes, 1: 189.2-5; (II.8.5).
40 Atkinson, *Richard Hooker and the Authority of Scripture, Reason and Tradition*, p. 94.
41 *Justification*, 5: 168.3-18.
concerning communication presents problems for Hooker in how he can claim to write authoritatively about God and about Scripture in the church, to which we must now turn.

V

Hooker develops an extraordinary distinction between the communication that God originally delivered to the prophets and, on the other hand, the sixteenth-century human interpretation of the words of that original divine speech. In his *First Sermon on Jude* Hooker writes:

> God, which lightned thus the eies of their [the prophets’] understanding giving them knowledge by unusuall and extraordinarie meanes, did also miraculously himself frame and fashion their wordes and writings, in so much that a greater difference there seemeth not to bee betweene the manner of their knowledge, then there is between the manner of their speech and ours.  

There exists, Hooker argues, divine perfection in the speech of prophets; but what of ‘our’ speech?

Here, in Hooker’s early writing, he argues that when men now speak what God had originally spoken, they are no longer guided directly by God’s speech, as were the prophets. Instead, men are guided by the Biblical words that they access not via God but via the translations and interpretations of the Bible undertaken in human language by other men. Upon the principle already outlined in Chapter Two that for Hooker the Holy Spirit does not inspire the interpretation of Scripture nor inspire a Christian’s selection of words, Hooker argues even in the early 1580s in his *First Sermon on Jude* that

> For whatsoever wee know, we have it by the hands and ministrie of men, which lead us along like children from a letter to a syllable, from a syllable to a word, from a word to a line, from a line to a sentence, from a sentence to a side, and so turne over.

Hooker’s contention is that ‘whatsoever wee know’ of what God has revealed, it is always acquired through man’s linguistic abilities in consulting Scripture.

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43 *Jude 1*, 5: 15.13-17.
Yet, Hooker questions, do the human abilities of men limit what can be understood of God’s revealed speech? ‘They whose words doe most shew forth their wise understanding, and whose lips doe utter the purest knowledge, so long as they understand and speake as men, are they not faine sundry waies to excuse themselves?’ Hooker’s point is that, again, God’s truths need to be received first in a communicable language before the ‘light’ of reason can understand them. For example, although sound reason for Hooker cannot be undermined by human words, reason according to Hooker nevertheless relies upon receiving opinions from others. In the Lawes, Hooker claims that

The light therefore, which the starre of natural reason and wisedome casteth, is too bright to be obscured by the mist of a word or two uttered to diminish that opinion which justly hath beene received concerning the force and vertue thereof, even in matters that touch most neerelie the principle duties of men and the glory of the eternall God. In Hooker’s argument, opinions that are ‘justly’ received have negotiated the inadequacy of human language. But is human language, according to Hooker, such an unambiguous medium to be able to fully proclaim for the assurance of other minds the exact intended meaning of God’s speech? Hooker needs to resolve this question if he is to authoritatively present how the ‘voice’ of God should be perceived in ecclesiology.

To begin, Hooker wishes to argue that humans can interpret and mediate God’s divine language. Hooker agrees with the presbyterians that the words of Scripture have always been intended by God to be unchanging in their meaning irrespective of whether their purpose in matters indifferent to salvation is no longer applicable. The meaning of what God has spoken still exists in words. Thus for Hooker, it is potentially possible to interpret the intended context and purpose of God’s words. Aside from Scripture spelling out universal salvation, the Lawes insists, as William Haugaard argues, that God’s words were designed to serve specific historical

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44 Jude 1, 5: 16.14-17.
46 See Lawes, 1: 189.17-25; (II.8.5), 1: 190.1-2; (II.8.5).
situations, and thus Hooker unites human historical context with God’s teleology. This is a union that is not found, Haugaard claims, in the writings of Thomas Cartwright or Archbishop Whitgift for example.47 Yet Hooker observes how God’s purpose in various historical contexts is ignored in the Church of England, leading Hooker to even question whether the Bible is being accurately read by those who pride themselves upon supposedly doing so.

The root of the problem, according to Hooker, is that the human use of God’s words in the sixteenth century – whether in the original Hebrew or Greek or translated into Latin and various vernaculars – are potentially ambiguous in meaning, especially as they are read, according to Hooker, without the guidance of the Spirit. The human words into which God accommodated his divine understanding are now at liberty to be wilfully consigned a dimension of meaning not previously associated with God and his speech. This is exactly what has happened, Hooker argues, in the written presentations of presbyterians such as Cartwright and John Udall.48 They assume that because the wording of God’s Scriptural laws has been perfectly delivered and accommodated into speech, the words must be mandatory for the church. But, Hooker points out, they ‘misdistinguish’ by claiming that they rely upon God’s revealed words when, Hooker argues, they actually rely upon their own interpretations and choice of divine and human words. ‘Let them which therefore thinke us blameable consider well their owne wordes’.49

According to Hooker, the presbyterians are at serious fault: they have distorted the meaning and application of God’s language. Thus for Hooker, there should be an awareness of

48 Cartwright’s works are mentioned throughout this study. For Udall’s see, John Udall, The State of the Church of England laid open, (1588) STC 24505, 10400; idem, A demonstration of the trueth of that Discipline which Christ hath prescribed in his worde for the government of his Church, in all times and places, untill the end of the world, (1588) STC 24499, 10400. Hooker had his own copy of Udall’s Demonstration. See Folger, 6: 1202. Hooker had his own copies of Cartwright’s works. See Folger, 6: 1167.
49 Lawes, 1: 212.3-4; (III.3.4).
the difference between divine and human language, and he especially considers the defective nature of the latter language, which, in Hooker’s view, has been used to make unfounded assertions about God. Hooker entirely accepts that communicating by language can be a struggle for men. In his First Sermon on Jude, Hooker writes that ‘When we have conceived a thing in our hearts and thoughlie understand it, as wee thinke within our selves, yer we can utter it in such sort that our brethren may receave instruction or comfort at our mouths, how great, how long, how earnest meditation are we forced to use?’ But the root of the problem of how meaning is distorted by language lies, Hooker argues, with spiritual pride.

For example, Hooker argues in his Sermon on Pride that the earnest desires of men can – although not always - result in proudly setting out in language what is consonant to truth. Such a speaker will ‘browbeat all men which do not receyve their sentences as oracles with meruelous applause and approbation….’ What must especially be rejected, Hooker contends, is the claim that eager speech is in the service of the Spirit. ‘Ask the very soul of Peter and it shall undoubtedly make you it selfe this answere: My eger protestations made in the glorie of my ghostly strength I am ashamed of…’ For Hooker, the heresies, schisms and divisions in the church throughout the centuries were caused by the egotistical attempts to define God and doctrine in language.

Hooker, however, does not explain how to overcome the problematic use of language, but in his Sermon on Pride he does give the following admission: ‘I rather wish that I could exactly prescribe and perswade effectuallie the remedies wherby a soare so grevous might be cured, the

50 Jude 1, 5: 15.  
52 Pride, 5: 324.10-12.  
53 Pride, 5: 320.18-21.
means how the pride of swelling mindes might be taken down’. 54 Although the spoken eagerness and even errors that reflect the work of a proud mind cannot be cured except in the instance of ‘divine chastisement’, 55 Hooker is clear in concluding his Sermon on Pride that he wishes to demonstrate how human language serves human reason in matters of divinity. Men must, Hooker argues, stand upon the proofs of the ‘wisest’ and the ‘learnedest’; men must rely not upon eagerness but ‘waight of speech’. 56

Human speech may be deficient as Hooker has shown, but, in tandem with reason, it is also according to Hooker a gift from God and thus extra-Scriptural language (and therefore extra-Scriptural meaning) should not be easily rejected. Hooker asks in Book II:

But whom God hath induced with principall gifts to aspire unto knowledge by, whose exercises, labours, and divine studies hee hath so blest, that the world for their great and rare skill that way, hath them in singular admiration; may we reject even their judgement likewise, as being utterly of no moment? 57

Hooker devotes special attention to what God has ‘blest’ in learning and communication. For example, against Thomas Cartwright, Hooker argues that the heresy and error which is potentially bolstered by philosophy will be combated if men are thoroughly communicable in learned philosophy and not if they renounce it. Hooker implies that philosophy, contrary to the words of the apostle Paul, teaches against ‘vain deceit’ and can master error. 58 Cartwright had criticised John Whitgift’s reliance upon learned human testimonies (instead of deep Biblical exegesis) as inadequate authorities, rather in line with Calvin’s insistence that Scripture was the only authority against which human conduct could be judged. 59 But Hooker argues in his

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54 Pride, 5: 320.25-27.
56 Pride, 5: 360.25-361.3.6.
57 Lawes, 1: 179.2-6; (II.7.4).
58 Lawes, 1: 223.30-224.11; (III.8.7). Hooker cites Colossians 2.8 for Paul’s warnings against philosophy and against supporting Scripture with human thought/learning.
59 See Morgan, Godly Learning, pp. 71-74.
Sermon on Pride that although the gifts of nature and grace ‘bewtify’ the mind and adorn the human body, man’s ignorance of human knowledge can dangerously lead to pride and deceit.60

So far, we have established that Hooker does not confuse human speech with divine speech, which would, in his view, misconstrue the meaning of Scripture. We are now finally in a position to analyse Hooker’s key explanation of how God has blessed and certified the use of extra-Scriptural language in ecclesiology.

VI
Hooker stresses that the arguments of all parties in the Church of England presuppose that God has sanctioned human verbal communication as the medium to transmit the exegesis of Scripture, to discourse upon church government and to circulate the divine studies conducted by reasonable men. This sanction does not have to be assumed by humanity, Hooker argues, because not only was it the decision of God to choose human words as the medium to transmit his understanding to the Jews as we have examined, but also the verbal use of language amongst humanity was, according to the authority of Scripture, commanded by God. In the Preface to the Lawes, Hooker writes: ‘…[T]he Lorde hath himself appointed, that the Priests lips should preserve knowledge, and that other men should seeke the truth at his mouth, because he is the messenger of the Lorde of Hosts’.61

Hooker also argues that human language is authenticated by the incarnation of Jesus Christ. Hooker is especially concerned with how the faith of which Jesus spoke is still spoken in exactly the same unaltered form. In discussing what constitutes the church, Hooker writes, at the beginning of Book III, that

60 Pride, 5: 315.9-16.
61 Lawes, 1: 13.26-8; (Preface.3.2). Hooker is citing Malachi 2.7.
our naming of Jesus Christ the Lord is not enough to prove us Christians, unless we also embrace that faith, which Christ hath published unto the world. To shew that the angel of Pergamus continued in Christianity, behold, how the spirit of Christ speaketh, Thou keepest my name, and thou hast not denied my faith. Concerning which faith, The rule thereof saith Tertullian is one alone, immovable, and no way possible to be better framed anew...And before Tertullian, Ireney...also reciteth in substance the very same with Tertullian, and thereupon inferreth. This faith the Church being spread farre and wide preserveth, as if one house did containe them; these things it equally embraceth, as though it had even one soule, one hart, and no more; it publisheth teacheth and delivereth these things with uniforme consent, as if God had given it but one onelie toung wherewith to speake. He which amongst the guides of the Church, is best able to speake uttereth no more then this, and lesse then this the most simple doth not utter, when they make profession of their faith.62

By invoking alongside Jesus Christ the testimonies of the second-century bishop Irenaeus and the second- and third-century ecclesiastical writer Tertullian, language for Hooker ‘publisheth’ and ‘preserveth’ as ‘one onelie toung’ when all ‘make profession of their faith’.

The role assigned by Jesus to speech for the purpose of redemption therefore demands, according to Hooker, a relationship between the divine truth of salvation and how it is ‘framed’ in language. This relation was in its infancy, Hooker argues in the Lawes, when the Apostles taught in extra-Scriptural language but were inspired by the Spirit. Hooker explains:

Our Saviour made choice of 12. simple and unlearned men, that the greater their lack of naturall wisdom was, the more admirable that might appeare, which God supernaturally induced them with from heaven. Such therefore as knew the poore and silly estate wherein they had lived, could not but wonder to heare the wisdom of their speech, and be so much the more attentive unto their teaching. They studied for no toong, they spake with all; of themselves they were rude, and knew not so much as how to premeditate, the spirit gave them speech and eloquent utterance.63

New logic and new words are not needed to reassess faith because the meaning of what the inspired Apostles spoke in language was ‘perfectly’ articulated and cannot be refined. Hooker in the above quotation emphasises the work of the Spirit by developing an image of the Apostles as ‘poore and silly’ who could not ‘premeditate’. What they spoke could only have been divine in origin. In his First Sermon on Jude, Hooker has already presented this image of the Apostles as unlearned ‘creatures’ inspired with the saving knowledge of Christ. He writes:

It is death for me to be ignorant of the unsearchable mysterie of the sonne of God: of which mysterie notwithstanding I should have been ignorant, but that a poore fisherman, unknowne, unlearned, new come.

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62 Lawes, 1: 197.4-23; (III.1.5). For the angel at the church in Pergamus see, Revelation 2.12. Ireney is Irenaeus.
63 Lawes, 1: 227.12-21; (III.8.10).
from his bote with his cloathes wringing wet, hath opened his mouth and taught me, *In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the word was God*. These poore sillie creatures have made us rich in the knowledge of the mysteries of Christ. But Hooker argues that, after the disciples, human language was no longer inspired. This will be examined in detail in the next section.

What we at present must ask of Hooker is if God has utilised language for his purposes (as in the case of the Apostles) then is human language in general really incompetent and ineffective? Hooker argues that humanity’s faculty of speech is in fact empowered by following Jesus’ example of using the art of disputation. Hooker argues in the *Lawes*: ‘Our Lord and Saviour him selfe did hope by disputation to doe some good, yea by disputation not onely of but against the truth, albeit with purpose for the truth’. But, Hooker points out, the presbyterians underestimate, firstly, the function of human language. They do not, Hooker argues, acknowledge that the circulation of language in a Christian society (of ‘mutual fellowship’ ‘one with another’ precedes the circulation of Scripture in that community. Therefore, the presbyterian view that extra-Scriptural language is of no value is an oversight and, Hooker argues, is an injustice to the work of humanity and divinity alike. For example, whilst the presbyterians argue that any church which does not follow the supposedly universal Scriptural guide-lines for church government is in the wrong, their declarations are, paradoxically, an injury to all churches – especially to Jesus and the Apostolic Church who followed no such guidelines or rules.

Secondly for Hooker, the presbyterian suggestion that Scripture should stand apart from extra-Scriptural language and meaning is ludicrous. Scripture, according to Hooker, is read through an extant linguistic convention, and the significations of the latter make faith and the

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64 *Jude I*, 5: 20.5-12.
65 *Lawes*, 1: 234.2-4; (III.8.17).
66 *Lawes*, 1: 205.20-206.2; (III.1.14).
Gospel appear reasonable to the ears of men. Indeed, it is not possible for men, according to
Hooker, to simply quote exclusively from Scripture. In Book II, Hooker questions:

[M]ay we cause our faith without reason to appear reasonable in the eyes of men? This being required
even of learners in the school of Christ, the duty of their teachers in bringing them unto such ripeness must
needs be somewhat more, then only to read the sentences of scripture, and then…to vary them with sundry
forms of speech, without arguing or disputing about anything which they containe. This method of
teaching may commend itself unto the world by that easiness and facility which is in it: but a law or a
pattern it is not, as some do imagine, for all men to follow that will do good in the Church of Christ.68

The writings of presbyterians such as Walter Travers, John Field and Thomas Wilcox69 are,
paradoxically, all extra-Scriptural attempts to prove their point, just as the Lawes itself is a
written extra-Scriptural explanation of polity. Hooker questions why the presbyterians think that
their use of words should be more effective than the conformists’, and why they argue to not go
further than Scripture when, clearly, they do.70 The dependence upon literacy in this period, as
Walter J. Ong explains, made it impossible to examine and state truths without writing.71 It is in
language that Hooker calls for a formal agreement to be stated, ending ecclesiastical controversy,
since, Hooker claims, it is the will of God that men should obey the final sentence that is decided
among, and stated by, the mouths of men.72

Hooker is also aware that his confidence in the status of language is not so clearly found
in early Christian writers, and, in fact, has often caused serious altercations. Hooker reviews the
Christological controversies in the days of the Greek and Latin church fathers. In Book V,
Chapter 52, which he entitles ‘The misinterpretations which heresie hath made of the manner how
God and man are united in one Christ’, Hooker acknowledges Christ’s humanity and divinity
and remarks that ‘It is not in man’s habilitie either to expresse perfectlie or conceyve the manner

68 Lawes, 1: 233.25-234.2; (II.8.16).
69 As mentioned in the Introduction.
70 Lawes, 1: 158.28-159.3; (II.5.2).
72 Lawes, 1: 31.24-32.6; (Preface.6.3).
how this was brought to passe’, and he continues to discuss the heresies of Arius, Apollinarius, Nestorius and Eutyches. For Hooker, the church has not always been ‘equallie sincere and sound’, and the heresies were resolved by the disputation and final statements of human Councils. With the Church of Rome, Hooker declares in Book III, ‘we dare not communicate concerning sundrie hir grosse and greevous abominations’. Yet it is Hooker’s prayer that, if it is God’s plan, Rome will ‘frame and reform’ itself and that there will be a unity in which ‘we all may with one hart and one mouth glorifie God’. This is because, for Hooker, there exists an extra-Scriptural language which glorifies God throughout the history of the church. But the presbyterian plea to further reform Elizabeth’s church would, Hooker points out, erase the ‘face’ and ‘memory’ and piety throughout the ages of the church. As we shall see in the next section, it is Hooker’s contention that what has been authoritatively spoken in the history of the church should not be shunned.

VII

Let us draw together the conclusions that Hooker reaches which lead him to link language in a fundamental relation with human reason. Hooker argues that the communication of reason and judgement has to be demonstrated in words. Hooker writes:

The strength of mans authoritie is affirmatively such that the waightiest affayres in the world depend thereon. In judgement and justice are not hereupon proceedings grounded? Sayth not the law [Scripture]

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73 Lawes, 2: 211.24-25; (V.52.1).
74 Lawes, 2: 211-216; (V.52.1-4).
75 Lawes, 1: 201.11-12; (III.1.10). See also Lawes, 1: 203.2-18; (III.1.11), Jude 1, 5: 21.29-22.1.
76 See, for example, Hooker’s discussion of Arius, who was ‘a priest in the Church of Alexandria, suttle witted and a marvelous faire spoken man’ who had ‘occasion of laboringe with greater earnestnes…to intangle unwarie mindes with the snares of his damnable opinion,’ (Lawes, 2: 166.9, 18-20; [V.42.2]), and Arius’ condemnation by the First Council of Nice (325 AD) at Lawes, 2: 166-173; (V.42.9).
77 Lawes, 1: 202.14-23; (III.1.10).
78 This will be investigated in Chapters Five and Seven.
79 Lawes, 1: 175.8-13; (II.7.1).
that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shalbe confirmed? This the law of God would not say, if there were in mans testimonie no force at all to proove any thing.80

For Hooker, Scripture has authorised the language and testimony of men to convey truth independently from the Bible, the divine sanctioning of which the presbyterians ignore but nevertheless assume. Unwilling to consider God’s sanctioning of extra-Scriptural sources and perceptions, the presbyterians present muddled logic which, Hooker points out, is ‘in effect as much as to say, Wee knowe not what to say well in defense of this position, and therefore least wee should say it is false, there is no remedie but to say that in some sense or other it may be true, if wee could tell how’.81

Because of what Hooker understands as the weakness of the presbyterian position, he believes that their speech is unsafe because their language may wrongly assure others. ‘That which they have in this case spoken, I would for brevities sake let passe, but that the drift of their speech being so dangerous, their words are not to be neglected’.82 The important point for Hooker, which has been argued as foundational in this chapter, is that man’s verbal authority is influential to the extent that language conveys faith and the ordering of law in the church. Following the above quotation, Hooker writes:

Wherfore to say that simpie an argument taken from mans authoritie doth hold no way, neither affirmatively nor negatively, is hard. By a mans authority we here understand, the force which his word hath for th’assurance of an others mind that buildeth upon it….”83

The assurance of words for the minds of others brings us to the underlying question in Hooker of the relation between spoken language and the language of thought, to which we shall now turn.

As already commented, Nigel Voak argues that for Hooker the Holy Spirit is manifested in those people who use strong arguments for their beliefs.84 But Hooker also acknowledges that

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80 Lawes, 1: 175.25-30; (II.7.2). In the italics Hooker cites from Deuteronomy 19.15, and Matthew 18.16.
81 Lawes, 1: 220.24-27; (III.8.1).
82 Lawes, 1: 175.13-16; (II.7.1).
83 Lawes, 1: 175.16-20; (II.7.2).
reasoned arguments are only used with effect when *communicated* within the Christian community. The immediate question for Hooker is whether the Holy Spirit guides human speech to deliver ‘accurate’ meaning as well as guide the hearer to the intended meaning. Would certifying the manifestation of the Spirit diminish for Hooker the ‘estimation and credit of man’?\(^85\) Hooker is unambiguous. Arguing against the presbyterians, he states: ‘They give men great cause to doubt that some other thing then judgement doth guide their speech’.\(^86\)

For Hooker, communicating in language is a human ‘arte’. Hooker explains this in detail by referring to the apostle Paul. In a lengthy passage in Book III of the *Lawes*, Hooker argues that Paul denied that he spoke his own words so that, Hooker maintains, there could be no observable discrepancy in authority between Paul’s own speeches and those spoken by the disciples of Jesus. But, Hooker argues, Jesus’ disciples spoke a divinely inspired language, whilst Paul selected words by his own ‘arte’ and ‘naturall industrie’, unfurnished by the Spirit. Hooker writes of Paul:

> His writings [are] full of great words, but in the power of miraculous operations his presence not like the rest of the Apostls…Hereupon it riseth that whatsoever time he had spent in the studie of human learning, he maketh earnest protestation to them of Corinth, that the Gospell which hee had preached amongst them, did not by other meanes prevaile with them, then with others the same Gospel taught by the rest of the Apostles of Christ. *My preaching*, saith he, *hath not bene in the perswasive speeches of humaine wisdome, but in demonstration of the spirit and of power, that your faith may not be in the wisdome of men, but in the power of God.* What is it which the Apostle doth here deny? Is it denied that his speech amongst them had bene perswasive? No, for of him the sacred historie plainly testifieth, that for the space of a yeare and a halfe he spake in their Synagogue every Saboth and *perswaded* both Jewes and Græcians. How then is the speech of men made perswasive? Surely there can be but two waies to bring this to passe, the one humane, the other divine. Either S. Paul did *onely* by arte and naturall industrie cause his owne speech to be credited, or els God by myracle did authorize it, and so bring credit thereunto, as to the speech of the rest of the Apostles. Of which two the former he utterly denieth. For why? If the preaching of the rest had bene effectuall by miracle, his *onely* by force of his owne learning: so great inequalitie betwene him and the other Apostles in this thing had bene enough to subvert their faith. For might they not with reason have thought, that if he were sent of God as well as they, God would not have furnished them and not him with the power of the holy Ghost? Might not a great parte of them being simple happely have feared, least their assent had bene cunningly gotten unto his doctrine, rather through the weknes of their owne wits, then the certaintie of that which he had taught them?\(^87\)

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\(^84\) Voak, *Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 223-4.

\(^85\) *Lawes*, 1: 175.6; (II.7.1).

\(^86\) *Lawes*, 1: 210.19-20; (III.3.2).

\(^87\) *Lawes*, 1: 228.4-33; (III.8.10). Hooker cites 1 Corinthians 2.4 and Acts 18.11.
For Hooker, Paul successfully constructed speeches because of the ‘force of his own learning’.

Here, Hooker illustrates that human language is efficient and responsible when spoken by the learned and righteous, and it is polemically necessary for him to formulate an argument in which a speaker is measured by their reputation in linguistic art. Considering Cartwright’s claim that men can never speak with precision because of their infirmity (although Cartwright had assumed that he could understand and state God’s Scriptural meaning by the guidance of the Spirit), Hooker rhetorically asks:

Again, what reason is there why alleaging testimonies as proofes, men give them some title of credite, honour, and estimation whom they alleage unlesse before hand it be sufficiently knowne who they are; what reason hereof but only a common ingrafted perswasion, that in some men there may be found such qualities as are able to countervayle those exceptions which might be taken against them, and that such mens authoritie is not lightly to be shaken off?

Hooker reveals a problem in how human testimony is to be received as authoritative, since clearly the presbyterians were unyielding to receive such ‘authority’ which appeared to them to be unashamedly human and not based upon the wording of God. Therefore, in addition to the quality of a speaker is the necessity in Hooker’s argument to establish the role of hearing words that are spoken in the Christian community.

In Hooker’s early work he stresses that Christian teaching is served by people listening to humanly spoken words. In his *Sermon on Pride* he argues: ‘But as I take it there is a difference between the talk that beseemeth nurces amongst children and that which men of capacity and judgment doe or should, receyve instruction by’. Hooker argues that in considering men’s deeds and their words and thoughts, all that is good should be publicly communicable to help counsel the perplexed.

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88 Lawes, 1: 184.17-23; (II.7.8).
But in the *Lawes*, the purpose of listening to the words of men has a different urgency in Hooker’s argument because the act of hearing others speak is, for Hooker, the only way that a Christian community develops what it can say with *agreed* rational authority. Hooker concludes that humanity is not forbidden but is sanctioned to hear what men of credit say.

Hooker illustrates his point with the fourth-century church father Augustine. Hooker writes:

> Saint Augustine exhorteth not to heare men, but to hearken what God speaketh. His purpose is not (I thinke) that we should stoppe our ears against his owne exhortation, and therefore he cannot meane simply that audience should altogether be denyed unto men, but eyther that if men speake one thing and God himselfe teach an other, then hee, not they to be obyed; or if they both speake the same thing, yet then also mans speech unworthy of hearing, not simple, but in comparison of that which proceedeth from the mouth of God. Yea, but we doubt what the will of God is. Are wee in this case forbidden to heare what men of judgement thinke it to be?

Although the traditional view of Augustine is that he is sceptical of the human ability to convey truths through speech and that men should ‘listen’ instead to Christ as the ‘inner teacher’, Hooker argues that Augustine does not propose that men of judgement should not be heard in discovering the true will of God. Augustine implies, Hooker points out, that both God and man can ‘speake the same thing’ on the proviso that man does not contradict the speech of God. As will be investigated in Chapters Four, Five and Six, God for Hooker is the source of all reason and goodness that men think and do, but Hooker, at this point, has placed himself in the position where human speech is based upon ‘inner’ human (and not divine) language. It must be remembered that in the sixteenth century not only was spoken and written language understood to be conventional, but it was still understood as corresponding to an inner mental language. Hooker certainly assumes that human inner language signifies the meaning of spoken words so

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92 *Lawes*, 1: 28.4-8; (Preface.5.2).
93 *Lawes*, 1: 182.23-32; (II.7.6).
that what is thought can be exactly stated, and what is stated can be thought. He explains that ‘In speaking thus largely it is presumed, that mens speeches will be taken according to the matter whereof they speake’.  

Upon this general assumption of how language is transmitted and its meaning secured by the listener, there are, according to Hooker, cases in which the process of human reasoning cannot discover truths but they are nevertheless provided by the endurance and continuation of speech. For Hooker, Christians have much to learn from what has been preserved in language. In Book II of the *Lawes*, Hooker writes:

> Men are blinded with ignorance and error; many things may escape them, and in many things they may be deceived; yea, those things which they doe knowe, they may eyther forget, or upon sundry indirect considerations let passe; and although themselves do not erre, yet may they through malice or vanitie, even of purpose deceive others. Howbeit infinite cases there are wherin all these impediments and lets are so manifestly excluded, that there is no shewe or colour whereby any such exceptions may be taken, but that the testimony of man will stand as a ground of infallible assurance. That there is a Citie of Rome, that Pius Quintus and Gregory the 13. and others have beepe Popes of Rome, I suppose we are certainely enough perswaded. The ground of our perswasion, who never saw the place nor persons before named, can be nothing but mans testimonie.

In some cases, Hooker argues, ‘infallible assurance’ is only provided by the testimony of men. This active use of language suggests that Hooker envisages the church as a ‘speaking community’. But Hooker is careful not to describe this as ‘tradition’. As argued in Chapter Two, Hooker is suspicious of ‘tradition’ and, as W. David Neelands points out, for Hooker the word ‘tradition’ has a negative association with Roman Catholicism. Rather, Hooker has in mind the ‘voice of the Church’, and in Chapters Five and Six we will investigate how the church’s ‘voice’ is, for Hooker, the collective rational agreement among men.

The argument in the current chapter has been that extra-Scriptural language for Hooker is needed to signify content and authority in the Christian community. Language, as a medium

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96 *Lawes*, 1: 174.6-8; (II.6.4).
97 *Lawes*, 1: 177.9-22; (II.7.3). Pius Quintus was pope from 1566 to 1572; Gregory XIII from 1572 to 1585.
98 W. David Neelands, ‘Hooker on Scripture, Reason, and “Tradition”’, pp. 89-93, 90 n. 34.
99 See, for example, *Lawes*, 2: 39.8; (V.8.2).
chosen by God for his revelation, is needed by human reason to signify the words of God in the first instance, to which men then ‘enforce assent’. Hooker writes in Book II:

Yea, that which is more, utterly to infringe the force and strength of mans testimonie were to shake the very fortresse of Gods truth. For whatsoever we believe concerning salvation by Christ, although the scripture be therein the ground of our believe; yet the authoritie of man is, if we marke it, the key which openeth the dore of entrance into the knowledge of the scripture. The scripture could not teach us the things that are of God, unless we did credit men who have taught us that the wordes of scripture doe signifie those things. Some way therefore, notwithstanding mans infirmitie, yet his authority may enforce assent.100

Because men signify the meaning of Scripture there is, Hooker argues, an easy tendency to slot the words of the divine language of God into human discourse. This can potentially confuse Scripture’s true intention with an extra-Scriptural meaning for words, thus reworking God’s intentions. This, for Hooker, had been the case with the presbyterians, who thought that Scripture was the only manifestation of God’s wisdom for men and who took part in ‘prophesyings’, which were regular gatherings of the clergy who formed a small community to interpret Scripture and to instruct unlearned ministers, ‘practical divinity’ conducted by non-conformists in the Church of England.101

But Hooker argues that extra-Scriptural language is coherently used by human reason in setting out human law external to Scripture. Hooker has uncovered that language is the coherent link between God’s Scriptural revelation and human understanding. But we must examine how, for Hooker, human language and human reason form extra-Scriptural perceptions in ecclesiology. What type of ‘freedom’ is, according to Hooker, created for men by extra-Scriptural language and extra-Scriptural meaning? We are now in a position to turn to this question, since this chapter has provided the foundation for investigating in Hooker how men can authoritatively discourse in the church.

100 Lawes, 1: 177.25-34; (II.7.3).
Chapter Four

“Hee filleth heaven and earth although he take up no roome in either”: Hooker’s Metaphor of Law and its Polemical Expression of the Guidance of God

Man’s linguistic independence is not, for Hooker, the same as asserting that man with his language is sufficiently independent to regulate church government without any involvement from God. The dominant conformist view within the Church of England was that its government was a matter indiff erent to salvation, left undecided by God and subject to the human authority of the Crown. The episcopal form of church government was thought by conformists to complement the monarchical state of Elizabethan England. Hooker does not entirely agree that church government has been left undecided by God.1 Hooker argues in the Lawes that although laws may seem to be made by men, they are instead made by God. Men are only the ‘finders’ of law.2 Hooker argues that all rational men are guided by the divine reason. Men ‘finde out what thinges reason bindeth them of necessitie to observe, and what it guideth them to choose in things which are left as arbitrary’.3 Hooker also argues that the collective ‘guided’ voice of reason discovers good laws, that a ‘lawe is the deed of the whole bodie politike, whereof if ye judge your selves to be any part, then is the law even your deed also’.4 The voice of the church is both human and divine, and these overlap because, Hooker argues, God guides men through human reason, whereas in Biblical societies he guided through revealed language.

1 By contrast, Peter Lake argues that Hooker did assume the same conformist view that ecclesiology had been left undecided by God, even though Lake argues that Hooker was out of step with conformists by resorting to ‘systematic’ ‘first principles’ to explain the world. See Peter Lake, ‘The “Anglican Moment”? Richard Hooker and the Ideological Watershed of the 1590s’, in Stephen Platten ed., Anglicanism and the Western Christian Tradition, (Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2003), pp. 91, 98-99.
2 Lawes, 1: 84.14-16; (I.8.3).
3 Lawes, 1: 138.2-5; (I.16.5).
4 Lawes, 1: 27.33-28.2; (Preface.5.2).
In this chapter, we will investigate how God’s extra-Scriptural guidance in all good things is presented by Hooker as Law, which is a metaphor in Hooker’s usage that offers to the rational mind how to perceive God’s involvement in various ‘laws’. In other words, Law, for Hooker, is a conceptual metaphor with a cognitive function. Hooker’s metaphorical presentation of Law is not therefore decorative or ornamental, even though metaphor was criticised by a range of contemporary and later philosophers and scientists, such as Galileo, Montaigne, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Bayle, Harvey and Leibniz. For Thomas Hobbes, metaphor was a misleading and deceitful abuse of language. But for Hooker and his polemical intention to persuade his reader that God’s ‘voice’ is in wisdom and reason and what is good (and not only in the words of Scripture), the metaphor of Law that describes the guidance of the divine reason forms the explanatory hypothesis in the Lawes of God’s involvement in the reasoned thought of humanity in developing church government. The metaphor also explains how God is involved in the visible and the known, and in the invisible and the unknown, worlds. What is more, Hooker’s whole treatise works with the belief that what he argues always serves according to God’s will. This is because he continually assumes God’s guidance in various ‘laws’. Indeed, Law serves to fill (for Hooker and for most students of Hooker) the ‘gap’ in human understanding between human and divine actions.

Thus for Hooker, as the critic John Hughes argues, all good law is of divine origin and, as Nigel Voak points out, Hooker is deeply concerned with man’s obedience to God. I argue, however, that Hooker is aware of the dilemma in stating the presence and authority of God’s

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involvement in the world and in the church – especially because, I shall argue, Hooker goes some way in rejecting a literal or absolute knowledge of God \textit{in se}. Rather, Hooker is able to present a metaphorical perception of God because, in his sixteenth-century context, he holds a series of assumptions and hypotheses, which we shall now clarify.

Hooker argues that the will of humanity must follow the will of God in all things otherwise humanity sins.\textsuperscript{8} Early in Book I of the \textit{Lawes}, Hooker writes:

\begin{quote}
Behold therefore we offer the lawes whereby we live unto the generall triall and judgement of the whole world, hartely beseeching Almightie God, whome wee desire to serve according to his owne will, that both we and others (all kinde of partiall affection being cleane laide aside) may have eyes to see, and harts to embrace the things that in his sight are most acceptable.\textsuperscript{9}
\end{quote}

Importantly for Hooker’s argument, God is a greater object of faith than the scope of Scripture. For Hooker, God is prior to – and exceeds the content of – Scriptural revelation. This is paramount to Hooker in asking if church polity and public prayer are, in their formation, affected or guided by the ‘existence’ of God. Hooker wishes to shape the polemic of the \textit{Lawes} by setting out a church polity that is in accordance not only with God’s will but also with God’s wisdom, reason and goodness. It is Hooker’s working belief that the ‘presence’ and authority of God’s wisdom, reason and goodness are reflected in Christians in the church.

In polemically stating that God is a greater object of faith than the scope of Scripture allows, Hooker establishes three basic hypotheses throughout Book I. Firstly, Hooker argues that there is a continual need for God. ‘[T]here is no kind of faculty or power in man or any other creature, which can rightly performe the functions allotted to it, without perpetuall aid and concurrence of that supreme cause of all things’.\textsuperscript{10} Secondly, Hooker argues that humanity must employ the gifts given by God when seeking his will and purposes. ‘[U]se we the pretious giftes

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  \item \textsuperscript{8} \textit{Lawes}, 2: 205.2-7; (V.49.4).
  \item \textsuperscript{9} \textit{Lawes}, 1: 58.5-10; (I.1.3).
  \item \textsuperscript{10} \textit{Lawes}, 1: 92.25-28; (I.8.11).
\end{itemize}
of God unto his glory and honour that gave them, seeking by all meanes to know what the will of our God is, what righteous before him, in his sight what holy, perfect, and good, that we may truely and faithfully doe it’. And, thirdly for Hooker, it must be accepted that what is taken to be the will of God - even if it is not expressed in the Bible - should retain the same authority as the written Scriptures. ‘That which is of God, and may be evidently proved to be so, we denie not but it hath in his kinde, although unwritten, yet the selfe same force and authoritie with the written lawes of God’.

The underlying supposition here in all three of Hooker’s hypotheses above is how, in the sixteenth-century context, knowledge of God’s involvement is conveyed among men and how it is used in Hooker’s argument to demonstrate that all things, including human laws, serve the will of God. Hooker’s third hypothesis stated above would potentially generate an enormous amount of anxiety in late sixteenth-century England, and we must examine how Hooker claims firstly to discover the will of God which has not been expressed in divine language. Secondly, we must examine how Hooker is able to express God’s will in extra-Scriptural human language to those such as the presbyterians who already press the charge of superstition against the rituals and language of the Church of England’s Book of Common Prayer.

I will begin this chapter by exploring the limitations for Hooker of a knowledge of God, and by exploring Hooker’s presentation of God as the ‘divine object’ of faith. This will help us to understand how Hooker forms his perception of Law which is not literal truth but nevertheless, Hooker believes, reflects divine truth. This will also in turn reassess the canonical view of Hooker (especially of Book I of the Lawes) as ‘representing’ a metaphysical order and a speculative hierarchy of law. I am not suggesting that Hooker does not allude to hierarchies and

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11 Lawes, 1: 134.14-18; (I.15.4).
12 Lawes, 1: 129.24-27; (I.14.15).
orders, but this does not explain how he perceives God and uses that perception polemically to the best advantage against the presbyterian position of ‘Scripture alone’, as outlined in the Introduction. In the latter parts of the chapter, we will examine Hooker’s use of the imagination to perceive God in his metaphor of Law, and how the metaphor has an imaginative authority in Hooker’s argument. I am advocating that we need to examine how Hooker generates perception in his work, how he ushers his late sixteenth-century reader into an understanding of the guidance of God in the world within which they live and in the Church of England within which they worship.

I

The view that Hooker presents God as the divine being of metaphysics is attractive to critics who wish to read Hooker into, for example, the philosophical and hierarchical structures of Christian Neoplatonism, as is led in the twenty-first century by Torrance Kirby. In Kirby’s view, when Hooker discusses law he adopts Thomas Aquinas’ Neoplatonic cosmology found in the Summa Theologiae. According to the metaphysical logic of Thomas, everything has emanated from the divine unity, which means that the procession of being descends down a hierarchy in the spiritual nature of reality towards the human soul. This metaphysical structure, Kirby points out, is derived from the Christian Neoplatonic principle of lex divinitatis, or divine ordering, according to which the original law (God) remains simple in itself but also emanates a procession of many derivative forms of law. Kirby claims that this un-Augustinian ontology of mediation was formulated by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (who wrote approximately in the

13 See Lawes, 3:331.19-332.1; (VIII.2.1).
15 Thomas, Summa Theologiae, Ia.IIae.90-97.
16 Kirby, Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist, pp. 3-4.
year 500 AD), although it appears that Pseudo-Dionysius’ cosmology was not directly read by Hooker who, instead, takes the formulation from Pope Boniface VIII’s text *Unam Sanctam* (1302) which was familiar to Hooker from his knowledge of canon law.17

However, Kirby continues to argue that in Hooker’s distinction between a first and a second eternal law he re-positions his Neoplatonism away from the Pseudo-Dionysian emphasis presented in the scholastic model of Thomas and moves towards an Augustinian Christian Neoplatonism. The latter upholds the principle of a Christocentric immediacy within the world which was characteristic, Kirby claims, of the theology of the reformers. According to this Augustinian thought in Hooker, Kirby concludes, all the derivate species of law (such as the law of physical nature and the law of reason [natural law]) that are found within the second eternal law are understood by Hooker as commonly participating in their one divine source, and are not understood as a mediated hierarchy between creator and created.18

I do not intend to disagree with Kirby’s argument. But the *Lawes* not only presents how everything is sourced in the divine but also how everything is guided by the divine, presenting Scripture as not the only divine guidance in governing the church. Hooker’s understanding of divine guidance does combine the Thomistic view that everything is ordered according to the divine reason with the divine immediacy in everything, that is associated with the Augustinian view. But Kirby suggests that the two are in conflict in the *Lawes*. Yet, in my reading, Hooker’s

18 Kirby, *Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist*, pp. 3-5, 38-39. Hooker’s references to Augustine’s work are vast when compared to other extra-Scriptural writers, including Thomas. See *Folger*, 7: 20-24.
presentation in the *Lawes* conjoins the two by the use of metaphor, not necessarily for the purpose of attempting to provide a sound philosophy, but for polemical purposes. Crucially, Hooker’s use of metaphor to conjoin the Thomistic and Augustinian views is the method he uses to identify this perception of the ordering and immediacy of divine involvement, which Hooker names as Law. In other words, Hooker expresses the common participation of everything (except God himself as the first eternal law) within this one divine source (the second eternal law).

Kirby argues that Hooker, in presupposing the cosmic metaphysical hierarchy between lower beings and higher beings, adheres to the theory of the One as expounded by fifth-century pagans such as Iamblichus and Proclus who drew predominately upon the third-century thought of Plotinus. Kirby points to the Neoplatonist principle in Hooker’s proclamation in Book I of the *Lawes*: ‘God is one, or rather *verie Onenesse*, and mere unitie, having nothing but it selfe in it selfe, and not consisting (as all things do besides God) of many thinges’. But Hooker is also aware of the difficulties that God’s transcendence spawns for his polemic. And instead of continuing to interpret God at the head of the cosmic order, we should take a critical step away from Kirby at this early point. This is because Hooker so often asserts the inscrutability of the divine that he is not simply reasserting a Neoplatonist view of the unknowable One, nor, contrary to the argument of Peter Lake, is Hooker simply supplementing his work with occasional exhortations towards God.

If Hooker aims to confidently express God’s authorial place in the world and in the church then he requires authoritative knowledge of the extent of God’s involvement. This presupposes a human understanding of God that needs also to be expressed in the polemical

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19 Kirby, *Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist*, pp. 39 n. 47; 40-41; 41 n. 52.
20 ibid., p. 39. *Lawes*, 1: 59.20-22; (1.2.2).
presentation of the Lawes. As argued in Chapter One, the involvement of God in matters of ecclesiology (of whether or not God has ordained rules for the polity of all churches) was ‘ambiguous’ in the sixteenth-century context. Hooker wishes to be sensitive towards the divine will, separate from the revelation of Scripture. Hooker wishes to argue that ecclesiology should serve the purpose of a transcendent, but nevertheless involved, God. My point is that we must be very careful in making assumptions about what Hooker’s language predicates of God.

For example, we must be careful not to assume that Hooker’s metaphor of Law is identical with metaphors of emanation that describe the way in which spiritual principles ‘flow’ and exercise their causality, as used by Neoplatonic writers such as Iamblichus, Eriugena, Maximus the Confessor, Damascius and Pseudo-Dionysius. After Pseudo-Dionysius, Christian Neoplatonists stressed the Biblical notion of creation more often than a metaphor of emanation, and, in any case, Thomas re-thought the metaphor of emanation in terms of Aristotle’s final causes. It should, however, be noted that given the amount of Platonic material transmitted through Moslem authorities in the Medieval universities, Thomist metaphysics was indebted to Augustine, Proclus and Plotinus, and in places owed more to them than to Aristotle.

Nevertheless, in Hooker’s metaphor, God has no inherent need to multiply beyond himself, unlike Pseudo-Dionysian Neoplatonism in which the emanation of the One is passed down the hierarchy of being from intelligence to intelligence. For Hooker, everything has already been assigned its direction in ‘laws’. But if Hooker’s is not a Neoplatonist metaphor of emanation, then we must ask how Hooker can authoritatively express any knowledge of God and his

23 ibid., pp. 22-23.
25 Hooker’s perception of God’s guidance in the human time and history of the church conflicts with the Greek understanding of the timeless procession of existence and the world as eternal. Indeed, Hooker’s perception of teleology is different from Aristotle’s insofar as Hooker’s is providential and personal at the same time.
involvement with men, if the starting point in Hooker’s argument is the inscrutability of an unchangeable God?

Let us begin to answer this by returning to the Neoplatonic logic of ‘the One’ as principally developed in the third century by Plotinus in his work *The Enneads*. There is no evidence that Hooker read Plotinus; indeed, Hooker does not mention him in the Lawes, but on the rare occasions that Hooker alludes to Plotinus in his *Sermon on Pride*, Hooker refers to the work of the Jesuit missionary Robert Parsons who in turn cites Plotinus. I briefly introduce Plotinus now, however, because *The Enneads* played a major role in shaping Renaissance Platonism.

According to Plotinus, the One is beyond being, is without attributes and transcends existence and knowledge and description. For Plotinus, humans reflect upon the One by being aware that there is a presence superior to knowledge – for there can be no human knowledge of the superior presence. The term One is only a common indicator because positive statements about the One are inadmissible. Men cannot even say of the One that *it exists*, is a *cause* or that *it is*, because these would claim to identify that of which men have no intuition. Men can only speak of the One allusively. There are some areas of concordance here with Hooker’s argument. In the Lawes, Hooker also argues that humanity is born without any understanding or knowledge of God. ‘We bringe not the knowledg of God with us into the world’. Although humanity, according to Hooker, can perceive truths about God (as will be examined in detail in section III of this chapter), Hooker does not defend an innate, or even a natural knowledge of

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26 See *Pride*, 5: 355.4-7. See also *Folger*, 5: 829.
29 *Lawes*, 1: 74.20-21; (I.6.1). See also *Lawes*, 1: 97.29-31; (I.10.2).
30 *Lawes*, 2: 85.25-26; (V.21.3).

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God, contrary to the claim of William Harrison.\textsuperscript{31} We must be wary of how we define ‘knowledge’. Calvin, for instance, understands ‘knowledge of God’ as not restricted to the cognitive function of the intellect, but, in accordance with the Biblical definition, he identifies faith as a form of knowledge, and he identifies knowledge as a human perception of God, which is not particularly based upon ‘evidence’. Because man in his fallen condition is unable to gain proper knowledge of God, the question for Calvin is really how God’s accommodation of himself appears to the human capacity.\textsuperscript{32}

On this point Hooker is careful to argue that, via natural reason, men can gain an awareness or perception of God. He argues that humanity can never properly comprehend anything about God, that

\begin{quote}
our soundest knowledge is to know that we know him not as in deed he is, neither can know him:
and our safest eloquence concerning him is our silence, when we confesse without confession that his glory is inexplicable, his greatnes above our capacitie and reach. He is above, and we upon earth, therefore it behoveth our wordes to be warie and fewe.\textsuperscript{33}
\end{quote}

I suggest that it is precisely Hooker’s point here that the human capacity cannot ‘reach’ a transcendent God. Torrance Kirby argues, as we have seen, that Hooker presents a metaphysical vision of the hierarchy of being which is ‘consistent’, Kirby claims, with the mystical work of Pseudo-Dionysius’ \textit{Celestial Hierarchy}.\textsuperscript{34} But even Pseudo-Dionysius, who was taken to be the principal source and authority on hierarchy in the Middle Ages and in the Renaissance, argued that although the function of hierarchy is to draw lower orders into union with God, humanity still nevertheless belongs to a lower earthly order that cannot grasp divine knowledge instantly


\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Lawes}, 1: 59.15-20; (I.2.2).

\textsuperscript{34} Kirby, \textit{Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist}, p. 39.
and intuitively as does the higher angelic order. According to him, God knows and directs his purpose, whilst humanity is simply ignorant. When humanity thinks it has grasped God’s purpose it erroneously assumes it can ‘see’ as much as God.

Thus, significantly, it is logical for Hooker not to present a knowledge of God, a knowledge which would be potentially faulty. This is similar to the charge that Augustine levels against the Platonists: the latter claimed to know of the existence of God and to know of the higher intelligible world. Plato, in *Theaetetus*, had even concluded that knowledge was not the same as perception. Augustine points out therefore that the Platonists only partly understood what they professed to fully know. The picture of the higher intelligible world given by the Platonists, Augustine continues, was incomplete and liable to error because it was actually a perception, not proper knowledge. For Hooker, as for Augustine, human souls can only attain the full knowledge of God when ‘alongside’ Angels in heaven.

Hence men, for Hooker, can only perceive God. A metaphysic of God, of understanding God as being (God in se), is totally absent from Hooker’s work. Hooker clearly states that he does not actually propose to inquire into the ‘power, force, wisedome, and other properties that God hath, and how all things depende upon him’. It is not his intention to examine the natural, necessary and internal operations of God.

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36 See for example, *Lawes*, 1: 74.17-24; (I.6.1).

37 *Lawes*, 1: 84.19-22; (I.8.4).

38 *Lawes*, 1: 168.28-169.1; (II.6.2).


42 *Lawes*, 1: 87.13-17; (I.8.7).

43 *Lawes*, 1: 59.6-9; (I.2.2).
All of this explains why Hooker decides not to speculate on the incomprehensible essence of God, and why instead he repeatedly warns against attempting to ‘wade’ into the mysteries of God with the limitations of the human mind. It also explains why Hooker does not endeavour to understand God in an absolute or literal sense - the Lawes deliberately does not inquire into the infinity or intelligence of God, as he is known to himself.

And yet, it is fundamental to Hooker’s argument about forming church polity that God is present in the world and in the church. Midway into Book V, Hooker states:

Impossible it is that God should withdrawe his infinite. Hee filleth heaven and earth although he take up no roome in either, because his substance is immateriall, pure, and of us in this world so incomprehensible, that albeit no parte of us be ever absent from him who is present whole unto everie particular thing, yeat his presence with us wee no way discerne farther then only that God is present, which partly by reason and more perfectlie by faith we knowe to be firme and certaine.

For Hooker, God is never absent because he is present in ‘everie particular thing’. But this cannot be discerned by men: ‘yeat his presence with us wee no way discerne farther then only that God is present’. Hooker does make some specifically theological comments about how the substance of Christ is inseparably joined to the personal Word of God and to the divine essence. These comments appear, along with the quotation above, in the Chapter 55, Book V, which discusses the ‘personall presence of Christ every where’. Hooker argues that men are not severed from Christ and his divine substance; Christ has a universal presence. Christ exerciseth both as God and as man, as God by essentail presence with all thinges, as man by co-operation with that which essentaillie is present. Touchinge the maner how he worketh as man in all thinges, the principall powers of the soule of man are the will and the understanding, the one of which two in Christ assenteth unto all thinges, and from the other nothinge which deitie doth worke is hid. So that knowledge and assent the soule of Christ is present with all thinges which the deitie of Christ worketh.

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44 See, for example, Lawes, 1: 59.12-20; (I.2.2), 1: 62.10-13; (I.2.5), 1: 64.12-17; (I.3.2), 1: 66.15-22; (I.3.3), 1: 121.10-12; (I.12.2), 2: 30.8-10; (V.4.1), 2: 94.7-11; (V.22.8).
45 Lawes, 2: 228.22-30; (V.55.3).
46 Lawes, 2: 233.28-234.4; (V.55.8).
Hooker argues that Christ is present when men assent to him. But Hooker also argues that the application of Christ as the personal wisdom of God, the logos, is without measure within the world. He writes:

> Albeit therefore nothing be actuallie infinite in substance but God onlie in that he is God...there is no stint which can be sett to the value or merite of the sacrificed bodie of Christ, it hath no measured certaintie of limites, boundes of efficacie unto life it knoweth none, but is also it selfe in infinite in possibilitie of application.47

For Hooker, the body of Christ has an unlimited presence; it is part of nature and links deity with nature and men, irrespective of whether men are aware of Christ’s presence.48 The Christological bias of Hooker’s theology has been noted by scholars,49 but for the purposes of this study Hooker’s argument about the presence of Christ will be important to section VI of this chapter when the personal wisdom of God as a metaphorical ‘guide’ for men will be examined.

For now, Hooker accepts God as the first and final cause and acknowledges that even the heathens trust in some first cause, including the ancient Stoics and their belief that the world was caused by fire.50 Hooker also concedes that the human mind is by nature speculative and delights in contemplation.51 Hooker even admits that the desire to attain knowledge of God is the ‘cause of all iniquitie amongst men’.52 But, I suggest, the contention that Hooker is a metaphysician speculating on the hierarchy of being and speculating on the ontological and cosmological arguments for existence is seriously flawed. If Hooker was a metaphysician, he

47 Lawes, 2: 234.14-20; (V.55.9).
48 Lawes, 2: 234.4-10; (V.55.9).
50 Lawes, 1: 59.33-60.11; (I.2.3).
51 Lawes, 1: 86.15-16; (I.8.5).
52 Lawes, 2: 65.8-9; (V.18.1).
would arrive at the essential attributes of God’s being such as unity, but attributes such as omnipotence, immensity, mercy and general and special providence would be missed because they are truths of faith not known to metaphysics but to theology, which takes the transcendence of God as the ‘object’ of faith. And the application of the divine ‘object’ within the world, as we have just seen, is beyond measure when theologically understood.

Although Hooker accepts that the transcendence of God is incomprehensible, this does not explain how Hooker can literally express God’s authority in the church if God and humanity belong to different spheres of understanding. We have briefly examined Hooker’s theological understanding of Christ’s presence. But we must now return to our original question of how the ‘presence’ of God can be expressed not as the divine being of metaphysics but as the object of faith. In short, Hooker would rather not speculate because, he is clear, only Scripture provides legitimate words about the divine ‘object’.

II

Hooker is content in his writings for the being of God to remain a mystery to man, but nonetheless for God to remain the object of worship, whose presence we know ‘more perfectlie by faith’ than by reason. Surveying the importance of the revealed Scriptures in Chapter 11, Book I of the Lawes, Hooker argues: ‘Then are we happie therefore when fully we injoy God, as an object wherein the powers of our soules are satisfied even with everlasting delight…Complete union with him must be according unto every power and facultie of our minds apt to reaceave so glorious an object’.\footnote{Lawes, 1: 112.17-19; (I.11.2), 113.7-9; (I.11.3).} The importance of God for Hooker is that he \textit{is} God, he \textit{is} the deity.
But how does Hooker envisage the presence of ‘so glorious an object’, and how can he express it? In concluding Chapter 11, Hooker writes of the envisaged presence of the object towards which humanity’s faith, hope and charity are drawn:

Concerning faith the principall object whereof is that eternal veritie which hath discovered the treasures of hidden wisedome in Christ; concerning hope the highest object whereof is that everlasting goodness which in Christ doth quicken the dead; concerning charitie the finall object whereof is that incomprehensible bewtie which shineth in the countenance of Christ the sonne of the living God; concerning these virtues, the first of which beginning here with a weake apprehension of things not sene, endeth with the intuitive vision of God in the world to come; the second beginning here with a trembling expectation of thinges far removed and as yet but onely heard of, endeth with recall and actuall fruition of that which no tongue can expresse; the third beginning here with a weake inclination of heart towards him unto whome wee are not able to aproch, endeth with endlessse union, the misterie wherof is higher then the reach of the thoughts of men...Ther is not in the world a syllable muttered with certaine truth concerning any of these three, more then hath beeene supernaturally received from the mouth of the eternall God.54

Hooker argues that the ‘principall’, ‘highest’ and ‘finall’ object of faith is primarily ‘known’ through Christ and his hidden wisdom and everlasting goodness. When reflecting upon this object, men have weak inclinations and trembling expectations which will end in the world to come with the ‘intuitive vision’ and ‘endlesse union’ with God. But in this world, what men can speak with ‘certain truth’ of the object can only be that which has been supernaturally received by God’s divine speech in Scripture – supernatural knowledge of the divine object. Crucially, Hooker implies that, aside from what God has spoken, men do not have the natural freedom in language to speak with certainty about the divine object.

However, the problem for Hooker is that he cannot strictly adhere to this because he needs to find a way to argue for the place of God in ecclesiology which exceeds the content of Scripture. Hooker needs to take a step back from the certainty of God’s words in Scripture and incorporate their supernatural or divine truth into a wider usage of extra-Scriptural language to envisage the presence and guidance of God. This is a priority for Hooker - it will explain how church ordinances serve God’s will and serve God as the object of faith who, at the same time, is incomprehensible and transcendent: ‘Hee filleth heaven and earth although he take up no roome

54 Lawes, 1: 118.31-119.17; (I.11.6).
in either’. But how can Hooker refer to God as ‘filling’ heaven and earth without attempting to express any speculative knowledge of the hidden (yet present) divine object?

III

In the Lawes (especially in Book I, but also in Books II-V) Hooker describes an awareness of God in the world and in the church. This awareness is expressed by Hooker in his metaphorical presentation of Law. Although Hooker wishes to make a very serious examination of the role of God, he also acknowledges that God is best described in Scripture. But the Lawes assumes that the supernaturally revealed words of Scripture are simply not enough with which to make a polemical case in favour of God’s guiding presence. Therefore, Hooker metaphorically refers to God as Law. In the metaphor, God exercises his goodness by sustaining an assembly of actions (laws) which he has created and which are to be observed by himself and by his creation including humanity, all carrying out the divine bidding for the purpose of serving the divine goodness. Law, for Hooker, is therefore a metaphorical ‘guide’ in which God is perceived as guiding all things according to what he has planned.

The metaphor of Law in its basic form appears in Book I where, Hooker writes, God has (metaphorically speaking) two eternal laws. Hooker argues that although there exists God’s first lawe eternall which ‘God before all ages hath set down with himselfe to do all things by’, God has also ‘set down’ the second lawe eternall which is to be obeyed by everything other than him. The latter, Hooker argues, is ‘laid up in the bosome of God’, and comprises of different operations that have ‘sundry kinds of names’. These operations and their names are as follows: the celestial law which the Angels observe; the law of physical nature that orders

55 Lawes, 1: 63.2-3; (I.2.3).
56 Lawes, 1: 63.6-64.3; (I.3.1).
57 Lawes, 1: 63.14-17; (I.3.1).
natural agents; the law of reason (natural law) which binds reasonable creatures; the divine law of special revelation (Scripture); and human law which is ‘gathered’ from the law of reason which, in turn, is a manifestation of the divine reason. In Hooker’s presentation, God is metaphorically present in the *first lawe eternall* and in the *second lawe eternall*, the content and guidance of the former God has ‘set’ himself to enact, whilst the guidance of the latter God has ‘set’ for creation to obey. In the latter also, God is the source of angelic, natural, rational and human laws, as well as the source of wisdom, reason, goodness and love.

Thus in the metaphor, men are not self-sufficient; they rely upon the guidance of God in nature. ‘What would become of man himselfe,’ Hooker asks, ‘if the frame of that heavenly arch erected over our heads should loosen and dissolve it selfe?’58 Hooker continues:

> This worlds first creation, and the preservation since of things created, what is it but only so far forth a manifestation by execution, what the eternall lawe of God is concerning things natural? [...] If here it be demaunded what that is which keepeth nature in obedience to her owne law, we must have recourse to that higher lawe wherof we have already spoken, and because all other lawes do thereon depend...Although we are not of opinion therefore...that nature in working hath befoir hir certaine exemplary draughts or patterns...neverthelessse, for as much as the works of nature are no lesse exact, then if she did both behold and studie how to expresse some absolute shape or mirror always present before her; yea, such her dexteritie and skill appeareth, that no intellectuall creature in the world were able by capacitie to do that which nature doth without capacitie and knowledge; it cannot be, but nature hath some director of infinite knowledge to guide her in all her wayes. Who the guide of nature but only the God of nature?...Those things which nature is said to do, are by divine arte performed, using nature as an instrument: nor is there any such arte or knowledge divine in nature her selfe working, but in the guide of natures worke. [...] That lawe the performance whereof we behold in things naturall, is as it were an authenticall, or an originall draught written in the bosome of God himselfe; whose spirite being to execute the same, useth everie particular nature, everie mere naturall agent only as an instrument created at the beginning, and ever since the beginning used to worke his owne will and pleasure withall. Nature therefore is nothing else but Gods instrument.59

Hooker argues that what keeps things in obedience to nature can only be explained by referring to ‘that higher law’, upon which all other laws depend. In other words, nature routinely obeys God’s plan, and to perceive this Hooker draws upon the metaphor of God’s second law eternal (set for all things other than himself to obey), according to which heaven and earth labour to do his divine will. The metaphor presents a ‘director of infinite knowledge’ and nature’s actions are

58 Lawes, 1: 65.24-26, 66.3; (I.3.2).
59 Lawes, 1: 65.10-18; (I.3.2), 66.27-67.20, 68.13-19; (I.3.4).
by ‘divine arte performed’ even though, Hooker points out, nature has no such knowledge or ‘arte’. It metaphorically appears that nature does ‘behold and studie how to expresse some absolute shape or mirror always present before her’. What is ‘present’ before nature is metaphorically represented by Hooker as ‘That lawe the performance whereofer we behold in things naturall, is as it were an authentical, or an originall draught written in the bosome of God himselfe’.

Hooker concedes that what is perceived in his presentation of Law has been described by a variety of names in the past:

This workman, whose servitor nature is, being in truth but only one, the Heathens imagining to be moe, gave him in the skie the name of Jupiter, in the aire the name of Juno, in the water the name of Neptune, in the earth the name of Vesta and sometimes of Ceres, the name of Apollo in the Sunne, in the Moone the name of Diana, the name of Aeolus and divers other in the windes, and to conclude even so many guides of nature they dreamed of, as they sawe there were kindes of things naturall in the world. These they honoured, as giving power to worke or cease accordingly as men deserved of them. But unto us there is one only guide of all agents naturall, and he both the creator, and the worker of all in all, alone to be blessed, adored and honoured.60

The one and only guide is named by Hooker as Law, which forms the perception that all things partake in the first and second, or twofold, lawe eternall. This means that God is perceived to be the directive force in all things. ‘So that a twofold law eternall being thus made, it is not hard to conceive how they both take place in all things’.61

Hooker moves to how the metaphor is to be conceived: ‘That which doth assigne unto each thing the kinde, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the forme and measure of working, the same we tearme a Lawe’.62 He also adds that a ‘law therefore generally taken, is a directive rule unto goodness of operation’.63 Thus for Hooker, there is unmistakable ‘goodness’ in Law’s guidance of various laws. Importantly for Hooker, the

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60 Lawes, 1: 68.25-69.6; (I.3.4).
61 Lawes, 1: 64.1-3; (I.3.1).
62 Lawes, 1: 58.26-29; (I.2.1).
63 Lawes, 1: 84.16-17; (I.8.4).
law of reason that guides the actions of men is forever bound out of necessity to the guiding goodness of God. This constraint is, for Hooker, Law’s power, and it is perceived as impersonal and indifferent to human desires, even though, Hooker admits, most men prefer their own private and sensual good, even before ‘whatsoever is most divine’.

Nevertheless, the constraint and guidance of Law is to be respected because, Hooker argues, it performs the purpose of God - Law is the manifestation of his divine reason which metaphorically ‘appears’ in the world and in men, and ‘appears’ in the social and church laws that men perpetuate. Hooker writes:

Lawes do not only teach what is good but they injoyne it, they have in them a certain constraining force...[Men respect this constraint because they] presume that the lawe doth speake with al indifferencie, that the lawe hath no side respect to their persons, that the lawe is as it were an oracle proceeded from wisdome and understanding.

In Hooker’s metaphorical explanation, God has power over men because he has created them and influences their church and social laws which they ‘find out’ by way of natural law (the law of reason).

We have introduced what Hooker perceives in his metaphor, which we shall return to later in the chapter. Let us now examine Hooker’s strategies that enable his metaphor to occur in the Lawes.

Firstly, it is possible for Hooker to argue for a perception of the divine because he contends that men can still perceive some truths about God’s intentions, as the critic William P. Haugaard observes. Although for Hooker, perception must not be confused with a ‘knowledge of God’. Admittedly, Hooker’s emphasis upon God’s metaphorical guidance in all things is a

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64 Lawes, 1: 89.26-31; (I.8.8).
65 Lawes, 1: 101.11-25; (I.10.6).
66 Lawes, 1: 102.1-18; (I.10.7).
67 Lawes, 1: 102.21-24; (I.10.8).
69 See Chapter Four, section I, above. To be discussed in further detail in Chapter Four, section IV, below.
move away from his many assertions about the transcendence of God that he makes exterior to the metaphor. But because he presents a metaphoric perception, it can be contrasted to his admission that God transcends human knowledge.

Secondly, the perception is strategically able to occur in the Lawes because Hooker enlarges the sense or meaning of law. As critics such as Paul E. Forte and Lee W. Gibbs correctly point out, Hooker differs from the classical and medieval heritage as well as from his contemporaries by stipulating that laws are not authoritarian commands.70 The various components within the metaphor of Law as outlined above, guide all actions according to God’s appropriately decreed ends. Hooker explains that

They who are accustomed to speake apply the name of Lawe unto that only rule of working which superior authority imposeth, whereas we somewhat more enlarging the sense thereof, terme any kind of rule or canon whereby actions are framed a law’.71

What this means is that Hooker metaphorically ‘enlarges’ the sense or the perception of what his contemporaries took to mean as law to include all actions – so that his metaphor of Law speaks of God ‘in’ everything. The result is that the metaphor of the second lawe eternall figuratively expresses the union of what is literally incompatible: human understanding and God’s understanding. The rational actions of men are (according to the metaphoric perception of the second lawe eternall) an expression of the manifestation of God’s understanding.

A third strategy enabling Hooker to use Law as a metaphor is that the perception that it presents is shaped by attributions. Thus Law is also presented by Hooker to denote wisdom, reason, goodness, love as well as causes and purposes – all of which share God as their divine source. When terms such as reason and goodness are used by Hooker in isolation from Law, their use is analogical, rather like the use of analogy discussed in Chapter Two in reference to

71 Lawes, 1: 63.11-14; (1.3.1).
Thomas. Hence for Hooker, the reason and goodness of men have an analogical relationship with God’s reason and goodness from which they are derived. Indeed, Hooker argues that all things seek to resemble God as the ‘highest’, and that man in working his actions aspires to resemble God, even though man cannot actually resemble God because, Hooker concedes, God works according to what he has already planned which cannot be imitated. But when, for instance, the perception of goodness is projected by Hooker’s metaphor of Law, our reading of Hooker becomes more complicated and we can no longer read analogically.

For example, in defining how all things act in obedience to God, Hooker argues that the general purpose of God’s external working is ‘the exercise of his most glorious and most abundant vertue’. Hooker argues that in finding laws there can be for man ‘no goodnesse desired which proceedeth not from God himself, as from the supreme cause of all things’. The guidance of God is vast, and Hooker not only attempts to perceive it (and perceive all that naturally obeys it) as various laws, but he also presents it in the above quotations as a metaphor of divine immensity - of the ‘most glorious’, the ‘most abundant virtue’, of all desired goodness proceeding only from God. However, if we attempt to work analogically here we would say, on the basis of analogy, that what derives from God is true for men as it is true for God. But the problem is that we can not identify the what here by using analogy because Hooker has inadvertently prevented this by using a metaphor to express what in actuality is incommunicable. Hence in describing God’s vast guidance, Hooker’s metaphor of divine immensity names something that can not be classified by a generic name that is analogically common to both man and God alike. Man does not have divine immensity. Instead, we can only ‘view’ God – and man’s participation – within Hooker’s metaphor of divine vastness.

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72 Lawes, 1: 73.14-15; (1.5.2); 77.20-30; (1.7.2).
73 Lawes, 1: 61.6-7; (1.2.4).
74 Lawes, 1: 73.5-7; (1.5.2).
Now, God, for Hooker, is wise in the sense that man analogically can also be wise, as is claimed by a writer such as Thomas. 75 According to Hooker, this literal application to God of the attributes of men can, again, only occur when God on his own is thought of in his eternity. But when human and divine wisdom, reason and goodness are considered as inter-connected within the metaphors of the first lawe eternall and the second lawe eternall they are not literally but are metaphorically perceived as involved with each other in the variously guided actions or laws. God’s wisdom and man’s wisdom for instance are not literally two separate sources or entities, as is the case in analogical thinking. But ‘wisdom’ appears as the mergence of God involved with man, because this is a new perception generated by Hooker’s metaphor of the guidance of laws. Therefore, the metaphor enables Hooker to describe what appears at first to be separated by words and concepts (reason appears different from goodness) to be inter-connected and joined in the same one perception (in obeying God, the pursuit of reason is the pursuit of goodness).

The value of understanding this as twenty-first-century readers is that Hooker’s metaphorical perceptions in illustrating his argument are not necessarily the same as setting out a literal understanding of the universal order and its cosmology. There is also a subtle distinction in Hooker between literal or epistemological knowledge and the perception of truth that is formed by metaphors, and we should be wary of ‘labelling’ Hooker with theological or philosophical categories regarding the presentational method of his argument. The intellectual way in which Hooker uses his metaphor of Law, and its cognitive function in persuading the presbyterians that Scripture is not the only godly law or guidance, is often hard to recognise, and goes unnoticed. This is mainly because the metaphor is still ‘live’ in the Lawes. Arthur Stephen

McGrade points out that Hooker makes ‘law’ appear as if it came into existence by itself. Yet Hooker believes that what he presents is a reflection of divine truth, and he does not seek to provide (as Aristotle and Thomas did) a technical or schematic background to his metaphor. Hooker does not undermine or ‘collapse’ Law by critically evaluating, and explicitly attesting to, his use of metaphor. Let us briefly anticipate here a counter-argument that might suggest that Hooker does not present a metaphor but instead, following Thomas, presents all law as grounded upon reason (aliquid rationis).

Hooker does argue that various laws are grounded upon reason, he argues that all good laws are rational since they originate ultimately from God’s divine reason which is upheld in all law by God’s divine will. But Hooker has set himself the task of attempting to explain how God’s divine reason is involved in a debate about church government. And Hooker’s use of metaphor is part of his intellectual thought in explaining this. Hooker metaphorically perceives the grounding of divine reason. This is only tenable if we acknowledge the rational discourse that is pressed into service by metaphor, as was understood by Plato who masterminded new metaphors such as ‘idea’, ‘methodos’ and ‘theoria’, and by Aristotle who claimed that metaphors are unique because they formulate perceptions by identifying and naming something which cannot otherwise be named, thus teaching us how the world may be seen and understood. ‘But’, Aristotle writes, ‘the greatest thing, by far, is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius since a good

metaphor implies an intuitive perception….”79 The argument here is that rational thought is informed by what is perceived in metaphors, and metaphor is therefore an eminently rational practice.

What is perceived in the metaphor of Law provides Hooker’s argument with a rational structure - the metaphor organises the truth of God’s involvement, it organises what Hooker wants to say about the guidance of all laws in relation to God’s self-knowledge (which Hooker terms ‘eternal law’). Law organises Hooker’s perception of man in relation to the living ‘voice’ of God, the viva vox Dei. Hooker also develops a sense of piety towards what is perceived in his metaphor – his rational argument includes a sense of wonder directed towards the guidance of the divine. Hooker’s metaphor of Law is therefore rational and pious in presenting God’s guiding actions for men, physical nature, angels and even for God himself, and this is a theme that will be explored throughout the rest of this study.

So far we have established that for Hooker only the words that God has accommodated into language can be legitimately applied to the object of faith. But God as the object of faith needs to be presented by Hooker as being served in accordance with the divine plan. The complication for Hooker is that the content of Scripture is not synonymous with God’s entire plan for the church. What is more, Hooker’s metaphor of God’s guidance is a human perception and is not supernaturally revealed truth. It is not the literal truth about God either because, again, the only words that can be spoken with certainty about God are, for Hooker, Scriptural words. Hence the metaphor forms a descriptive awareness that is persuasive and rational in human extra-Scriptural terms.

Before we can enter into a detailed analysis of this however, we must consider in the next section the different senses of divine truth, literal truth and metaphorical truth which are distinctions in Hooker’s meaning that have been assumed so far in this chapter. Nigel Voak points out that Hooker does not discern any methodological difference between how theologians pursue revealed truth (in Scripture) and how philosophers pursue natural truth through the use of reason – their method, according to Hooker, is to argue from first principles. But Hooker is not only concerned with how truths are discovered by the same method – he presents perception and knowledge in different ways.

For example, we must be very cautious not to embrace the idea that Hooker understands truths about God as ‘transparent’ knowledge available for all to fathom. As noted in the Introduction, Peter Lake claims that Hooker intends to lay out an epistemological structure to restore right relations between Scripture, reason and human authority in the church. However, I argue that in regard to Hooker’s perception of God against the Scripturalism of the presbyterians, we must be careful not to bring to a reading of Hooker an idealist epistemology which exaggerates in Hooker what can be known by the mind of man.

Rather, different senses of truth in Hooker’s argument determine how things are known - but this is not the same as determining how things exist. Even one of Thomas’ most recurring assertions is that the order of being is not the same as the order of knowing - being is prior to knowing, and being is entirely different from thought and perception. In the Lawes, Hooker distinguishes between literal truth (what men understand as true is also true in the understanding of God), divine truth (what God understands as true and is accommodated into the understanding

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80 Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, p. 30. See Lawes, 2: 84.31-85.24; (V.21.3), 2: 290.6-31; (V.63.1).
81 Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?, p. 147.
of men), and what is metaphorically true (what men understand of God’s involvement, but is sourced in the perceptions and words of men, not in God, although it may ‘reflect’ divine truth). If we ignore the sense in which Hooker presents truth especially in regard to God, then we will erroneously analyse superficial readings of what Law represents.

### IV

Readers of Hooker will recognise the centrality of ‘law’ to Hooker’s polemical argument - church discipline is not secured in Scriptural law alone but also in the other laws created by God and by humanity. Hooker claims that if the manifestations of Law had been properly understood then the controversy over church discipline, which continued for over two decades, would not have ensued for any longer than a day.\(^{83}\) In aiming to settle the matter, Hooker presents what modern students of Hooker call his ‘hierarchy of laws’.\(^{84}\)

But ‘hierarchy’ suggests a strong metaphysical or ontological commitment in Hooker to a ‘world-view’, and there are grounds for contesting the prominence of such a commitment in what Hooker has written, which will now be examined in this section. To prepare for this discussion however we must recognise the misleading presupposition that Hooker’s presentation of Law is the representation of absolute or literal truth.

What Hooker has written about Law does not have the direct supernatural source of God’s revealed wisdom. Instead, Hooker has approached God and the issue of law by way of human reason. In other words, Hooker relies upon natural theology as opposed to revealed theology. But as we shall see, Hooker is concerned about the limitations of natural theology in its reference to God. At this stage, however, Hooker argues that it is by the approach of reason

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\(^{83}\) _Lawes_, 1: 139-29-32; (L.16.5).

that ‘man attaineth unto the knowledge of things that are and are not sensible’. 

Men can investigate laws by reason and without supernatural and divine aid because reason binds reasonable creatures in the world. Although twenty-first-century critics such as Nigel Voak and William Harrison argue that Hooker strongly advocates a natural and specific knowledge of God, I suggest that, more accurately, Hooker subscribes to a knowledge that is aware of God through reasoning but is nevertheless an incomplete knowledge - it is not specific and absolute truth. For Hooker, natural causality (or natural theology) is a human awareness of the existence of God. There are two ‘objects’ here in Hooker’s argument which must not be confused by us as one. The object of faith in Hooker’s theology is of things divine (res divinae), and this object is believed to be perfect or complete. But the divine object as considered by reason is imperfect or incomplete in its human understanding according to Hooker. This is because, for Hooker, the basic sense or ‘knowledge’ of the divine is not, as already mentioned, innate in a Platonic sense, nor is it a knowledge infused supernaturally, but it is acquired through the powers of reason. Thus the human intellect for Hooker draws upon the ‘light’ of nature, but it is never capable of a specific and complete understanding of God, or capable of naturally acquiring supernatural divine truth about God.

Thus Hooker concedes that it is left to natural discourse to explain and describe the cause of all things, even though, Hooker claims, we do not literally know the ‘divine efficiencie’, and we do not literally know what is divine. He writes that

The manner of this divine efficiencie being farre above us, we are no more able to conceive by our

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85 Lawes, 1: 77.3-4; (I.7.1).
86 Lawes, 1: 90.5-9; (I.8.9).
88 Lawes, 1: 68.2-8; (I.3.4).
89 Lawes, 1: 83.26-33; (I.8.3).
reason, then creatures unreasonable by their sense are able to apprehend after what manner we dispose and order the course of our affairs. [...] Wherefore although we knowe not the cause, yet thus much we may know, that some necessary cause there is.90

Because of the limitation of natural reason, men according to Hooker cannot access how God literally exists or is literally involved. If what Hooker presents of Law were literally true, then Hooker would assume that what is true for man’s understanding is just as true for God’s understanding which, as we have already seen, Hooker denies. Thus, for Hooker to be consistent, he cannot possibly present God’s ‘hierarchy of laws’ as literal truth because, he conceives, humanity cannot naturally comprehend God’s understanding of the universe, although humanity is aware that God’s intentions exist for a fixed divine reason. For Hooker then, God’s involvement in the order of being cannot be literally known.

By contrast, it was because Calvin, for instance, read Dionysius’ *Celestial Hierarchy* as pertaining to literal truth that he branded the work as simply ‘talk’, and he characterised Dionysius as having descended from heaven and relaying what he had actually seen.91 Similarly however, the analysis of Torrance Kirby suggests a literal reading of Hooker. Kirby observes that, for Hooker, God is law and that the life of God is the substance of law, but Kirby does not recognise this as a metaphor in which Hooker perceives God for his polemical argument. By not observing that Hooker’s meaning is not literal, Kirby presents Hooker’s sense of law as no different from the presbyterians’ literal reading of Scripture as the guide for all – from which Hooker was keen to disassociate himself by perceiving God’s metaphorical guidance.92 If what Hooker understands about God were literally true, then his would be the same as the Gnostic

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90 Lawes, 1: 68.2-6; (1.3.4), 83.28-29; (I.8.3).
claim in the early Christian centuries to have the benefit of insightful knowledge into the divine
realm itself.93 Hooker is not a Gnostic.

The way in which sixteenth-century writers understand how (literally or figuratively)
their knowledge and reasoning embraces the divinity of God and represents the reality that stems
from God, seems to be of the utmost importance. On the one hand, we must not confuse their
approach with the rationalist Cartesian philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
that took human reason as the source of truth and as the guide for all human efforts, technically
elaborating upon God in rational categories. Hooker does not preempt the rationalist ideal of a
literal language to communicate his perception of God. He differs from later writers such as
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke who argue against figurative and metaphorical language in
favor of a more ‘precise’ philosophical language.94 This is because Hooker does not
philosophically explain all of the loci of his theology; he does not allow reason principal
authority in his argument in place of the authority he accords to God. Rather, as already
mentioned, there is a difference for Hooker between God as the complete divine object of faith
and God as the object of reason which is an incomplete knowledge about divine reality.

On the other hand, Hooker does not assume that he strictly works according to, for
example, Aristotle’s ‘philosophical categories of existence and knowing’ when reflecting upon
God’s relation to the Church of England. Hooker is more concerned about the sound and
rational perception that is formed by his metaphor of Law – he is not a rigorous metaphysician
presenting a whole-sale ‘metaphysical vision’. Indeed, could Hooker in the 1590s (when Books

93 On the supposedly literal ‘insight’ into divinity purported by the Gnostics in the early centuries after Christ, see
Jacob Neusner and Bruce Chilton, The Intellectual Foundations of Christian and Jewish Discourse: The Philosophy
I-V of the Lawes were published) really have been committed to one ‘philosophical school of thought’ concerning the knowledge of God?

According to current scholarship, there were various views on the knowledge of God that had surged ever since the late medieval period and throughout the sixteenth century. In the decade after 1590, Protestant theology developed as a scientia and was taught in universities with textbooks appearing on the first principles of Reformed Protestant metaphysics. But the metaphysics of Protestant theologians in the late sixteenth century were eclectically drawn from classical and medieval sources (that were available in early modern printed editions) and were also drawn from the works of earlier Protestant sources, making the commitment to any single source of thought impossible.95 I suggest that Hooker would have been sensitive to the various discussions of the knowledge of God that were inherited by the reformers from the late Middle Ages, specifically to discussions of understanding God literally. Let us briefly consider the basic arguments.

The great debate in the Middle Ages was over the synthesis of, and the ‘divisions’ between, faith and reason, theology and philosophy, led by thirteenth-century writers such as Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Albert the Great (Albertus Magnus) and his student Thomas Aquinas. Their views were severely questioned by fourteenth-century writers such as Duns Scotus, Durandus, William of Ockham and Gabriel Biel, and the debate was unresolved in the Franciscan and Augustinian orders.96 For example, although Thomas stressed the transcendence of God and concluded that humans actually have no purely rational or literal knowledge of God in se,97 Duns Scotus criticised the argument of Thomas (which viewed the world as comprised of

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causes and effects) for its inability to ‘produce’ the transcendent God of Christian theology.\(^9^8\) Scotus especially asserted that there should be a strict separation between the God of metaphysics and the transcendent divine ‘object’ of theology.\(^9^9\) The contrast between a faith in the divine transcendence and the literal experience of the reality of the world was further embodied in William of Ockham’s ‘razor’ that ‘sliced away’ at the speculations concerning the hierarchy of being. This was nominalistic in the sense that literal reality could only refer to human individuals, and not to speculations.\(^1^0^0\)

It is interesting that sixteenth-century Protestant writers were alert to these lines of argument, whether ‘Thomistic’, ‘Scotistic’ or ‘nominalist’, each had disseminated from the late Middle Ages into the Renaissance and Reformation eras. For example, the disputation over metaphysics as literally reflecting the truth of reality is certainly assumed in the work of Martin Luther, who harboured doubts (similar to nominalist doubts) about the legitimacy of rational speculation on the literal truth of God, preferring to accept the hiddenness of God.\(^1^0^1\) Ulrich Zwingli argued that the knowledge of the ‘hidden’ Christian God should mainly be drawn from biblical exegesis.\(^1^0^2\) Calvin, however, asserted that knowledge of God was a priority, and provided detailed discussion of the essence and attributes of God in his Commentaries, although this was omitted in his Institutes of the Christian Religion.\(^1^0^3\)

\(^9^8\) Muller, The Divine Essence and Attributes, p. 68.
\(^1^0^0\) On Ockham and nominalism, see Heiko A. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 50-52, 57-61; Oberman, The Dawn of the Reformation, pp. 52-57.
elaboration on God’s ‘logical’ being in, for instance, Wolfgang Musculus’ *Commonplaces of Christian Religion* and in Peter Martyr Vermigli’s *The Common Places of Peter Martyr*, which coincided with the re-interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics in the light of other traditions and materials. But as Richard Muller points out, the proofs offered for the existence and being of God by Musculus and Vermigli and by writers such Philip Melancthon and Calvin take on rhetorical rather than demonstrative forms, with persuasive argument instead of philosophical rigour. None attempted to provide complete knowledge of God in the literal sense of understanding God as a knowable being.

Hooker is aware of his task to persuade the presbyterians and the Church of England generally of his perception of the truth about God’s involvement. Hooker’s appreciation of his task is not dissimilar to the ‘state of mind’ that the Renaissance scholar Charles Trinkaus finds in Italian humanists such as Lorenzo Valla and Giovanni Pontano, who both questioned what kind of language and what kind of reasoning would produce meaningful persuasion. After all, the Reformation in the sixteenth century had, as we have seen, generally developed a culture that had persuaded by argumentation, especially in matters of religion and ecclesiology. In producing meaningful persuasion, Hooker is clearly attentive to arguing in senses that distinguish between divine truth, literal truth as well as what is metaphorically true. But the anonymous presbyterian author of *A Christian Letter*, in rebuking the Lawes, is not particularly clear on these senses in Hooker, perhaps deliberately intending instead to stress the divine truth of Scripture. The author pleads for Hooker to be more literal in his meaning:

104 As mentioned in Chapter One, section III. See also Muller, *The Divine Essence and Attributes*, pp. 90-1.
105 Muller, *The Divine Essence and Attributes*, pp. 170-77.
Whether your meaning bee to shewe your selfe to bee some rare Demonsthenes, or extraordinarie Rabbi, or some great Pythagoras, that enjoyne your schollars or your adversaries to five yeares silence, before they can be perfect in your meaning or able to reply; [...] or that you would heare down the cause with swelling wordes of vanitie, and cunningly framed sentences to blinde and intangle the simple; or that you would shew your selfe another Aristotle by a certaine metaphisicall and crypticall method to bring men into a maze, that they should rather wonder at your learning, then be able to understand what you teach in your writinge. [...] In your writing wee are mightily incombred; wee walke as in a labyrinth, and are suddenlie overwhelmed as in deepe sea; sometime it seemeth to us that wee see great flourishing of warlike and glittering weapons and to heare the lowde outcryes and noyce of them which pursue their enemies in battell, thundering, gunshot, tossing of speares, and ratling of harnesse; yet cannot we perfectly perceiue any thinge almost rightly to touch the adversarie pretended [...] howe great and large your five bookes would bee, if you had used reasonable, intelligible and logical arguments onely as other writers and disputers doe, and had left out all needless wittie closes and Rhetoricall shadowes in preambles, discourses, digressions, amplifications [...] sett out your reasons in playne termes and wordes of sinceritie, without these hugie embossemements or stuffed bumbasing, that poore playne men, which cannot skill of such hidden misteries, may perceiue and learne something by your great travailes.

The author claims not to be able to ‘perfectly perceiue any thinge’ in the Lawes ‘almost rightly to touch the adversarie’. The author calls for Hooker’s meaning to be ‘sett out’ in ‘playne termes and wordes of sinceritie’. Preferring the standard form of disputation with a treatise laid out in questions and answers, which had been the method for church controversies since the 1560s, the author understands Hooker’s meaning as a ‘maze’ containing ‘hugie embossemements’. ‘In your writing wee are mightily incombred; wee walke as in a labyrinth, and are suddenlie overwhelmed as in deepe sea’.

Whilst the presbyterians embraced the divine truth of Scripture, Hooker also has a special reverence for the divine truth revealed by Scripture, which, interestingly, he does not grant to the natural and the human: ‘how should our festred sores be cured, but that God hath delivered a law as sharpe as the two edged sword, pearcing the very closest and most unsearchable corners of the hart which the lawe of nature can hardly, humaine lawes by no meanes possible reach unto?’

But Hooker wishes to ‘reflect’ divine truth in his metaphor. Indeed, the metaphor is needed because men cannot literally behold the divine understanding. That is why God ‘is the card to
guide the world by’ and ‘with religious ignorance we humbly and meekly adore’.\textsuperscript{110} For Hooker, the cause and workings of all things is generally understood by humanity as ‘obscure, darke, and intricate, (for many talke of the truth, which never sounded the depth from whence it springeth, and therefore when they are led thereunto they are soone wearie, as men drawne from those beaten pathes wherewith they have beene inured)….’\textsuperscript{111} For Hooker, the search for what is literally true is painful enough and is not often discovered,\textsuperscript{112} but this is especially so when the ‘depths’ or ‘foundations’ are not ‘sounded’.

Importantly, Hooker is not proposing that the awareness of Law is to be ‘drawn literally’ out of heaven and earth; rather, it is found out by discourse. ‘Notwithstanding whatsoever such principle there is, it was at the first found out by discourse, and drawne from out of the very bowels of heaven and earth’\textsuperscript{113} The point here is that, for Hooker, the soul, with no innate knowledge, searches how to perceive the guidance of God which must be obeyed. Hooker writes:

\begin{quote}
The soule of man being therefore at the first as a booke, wherein nothing is…we are to search by what steppes and degrees it ryseth unto perfection of knowledge. […] [H] resteth therefore that we search how man attaineth unto the knowledge of such things unsensible as are to be knowne that they may be done.\textsuperscript{114}
\end{quote}

Again, Hooker does not want to commit the mistake of believing that he can perceive things about God outside of Scripture in a literal or absolute sense. Instead, Hooker has found a language, or a sense and manner of speech, to express the known and the unknown together at the same time, which literally of course is impossible but metaphorically is perceivable, although, from the literal standpoint, the presbyterian author of \textit{A Christian Letter} describes Hooker’s perception as a ‘labyrinth’, as a ‘deep sea’.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[110] \textit{Lawes}, 1: 61.28-62.13; (I.2.5).
\item[111] \textit{Lawes}, 1: 56.27-30; (I.1.2).
\item[112] \textit{Lawes}, 1: 81.10-12; (I.7.7).
\item[113] \textit{Lawes}, 1: 86.9-11; (I.8.5).
\item[114] \textit{Lawes}, 1: 74.25-28; (I.6.1), 1: 77.4-6; (I.7.1). My italics added.
\end{footnotes}
Hooker’s inquiry of how men attain a perception of God is aided by his appreciation of precepts, which allows Hooker to extend his inquiry by human means. In his final chapter to Book V on the role of learning in ministry, Hooker argues:

Precepts do allwaies propose perfection, not such as none can attaine unto, for then in vaine should wee aske or require it at the handes of men, but such perfection as all men must aime at to the ende that as largelie as humaine providence and care can extend it, it may take place.\textsuperscript{115}

For Hooker, precepts propose not a divine perfection or completeness of understanding, but a ‘perfection’ that is human.

What this means is that Hooker opens up a way of thinking in the \textit{Lawes} which allows perceptions to be achieved by reason, by the imagination and by metaphor, which certainly met resistance in \textit{A Christian Letter} as a ‘crupticall method’. In perceiving that human thought is derived from, and expresses, God’s immutability, men for Hooker are at liberty to \textit{imagine} divine truth from the human point of view.

Thus there is an authority that is imaginatively presented in the \textit{Lawes} – especially since Law is still a ‘live’ metaphor, not critically undermined by Hooker’s argument - which authoritatively ‘frames’ human perceptions of divine truth. In other words, man’s reason can frame itself to an imagined or metaphoric perception of divine goodness, which for Hooker is a precept. This brings us back to the very centre of our explanation of Hooker’s metaphor – particularly in regard to the imagination and the acceptance in Hooker that demonstrative proof for the metaphor of Law is not needed, which we must now analyse in detail.

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Lawes}, 2: 476.30-34; (V.81.4).
V

For Hooker, the manifestation of God’s will in all types of law is not a knowledge that is demonstrative or speculative but it is, significantly, to be presupposed, without need of proof or without any possibility of error.116 But how can the perception of such unquestionable certainty about God rely upon presuppositions in the Lawes? What we must recognise is that Hooker assumes of his readers accepted beliefs about God which are not ‘systematically’ set out in the Lawes as first principles or propositions. The beliefs presuppose a theology exterior to the text. As Hooker points out:

As though there were any kind of science in the world which leadeth men into knowledge without presupposing a number of things already knowne. No science doth make knowne the first principles whereon it buildeth, but they are alwaies either taken plaine and manifest in them selves, or as proved and graunted already, some former knowledge having made them evident.117

I suggest that if we attempt to read into Hooker a ‘systematic theology’ especially concerning God as George W. Morrel has attempted,118 then we must be aware of our own role in shaping that reading, which will not be the same as Hooker’s own presentation of argument, as was discussed in Chapter One. By projecting an external system of theology on to the Lawes, Morrel does not read what Hooker has written of the symbolisation of God’s involvement as Law. Indeed, by assessing Hooker to be a ‘systematic theologian’, Morrel even argues that Hooker is completely opposed to the symbolisation of God.119 This, in my view, is a fundamental misreading of how Hooker presents and symbolises the guidance of God in various laws other than just by Scripture. It misses how Hooker crafts the perception of his argument.

We must also avoid the simplicity of applying to a reading of the Lawes itself the theories that Hooker discusses. To be clear, we must not attempt to superficially match the content of

116 Lawes, 1: 87.13-20; (I.8.7).
117 Lawes, 1: 230.29-231.2; (III.8.13).
119 ibid., p. 34.
Hooker’s arguments (especially concerning man’s reason) with the way in which Hooker presents the perceived involvement of God in laws. Rather, we must recognize the assent towards God that is presupposed in the metaphor of God’s second lawe eternall, distinguished from Hooker’s own theory of assent in human reasoning. Let us consider this difference, from which will emerge the role of the imagination in the perception generated by the metaphor of Law.

The acquisition of intelligible knowledge or the judgment of deeds is, Hooker argues, the sentence of reason. And man’s acquisition of the knowledge of himself in reference to all other things is, Hooker states, the ‘mother’ of all principles. Nigel Voak points out that, for Hooker, the human assent to intelligible knowledge is an act of the mind in acknowledging the truth of something, which is the function of human reason, and not the function of the human will. Thus for Hooker, Christian doctrine assents to first principles and to demonstrative conclusions. Hooker states: ‘axioms or principles more generally are such as this, That the greater good is to be chosen before the lesse’. Voak correctly comments that this is a proposition, a first principle that, for Hooker, requires mental assent, but it is not a simple ‘essence’ apprehended by the understanding in a non-complex manner as is an object such as a cat. Voak especially observes that the assent to first principles is, for Hooker, a habit of the mind since particular habits bring about recurring acts of assent.

I agree with Voak, but I wish to stress that for Hooker the habit of assent is not always apparent, even though Hooker is convinced that the main principles of reason are apparent.

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120 Lawes, 1: 88.28-89.5; (I.8.8).
121 Lawes, 1: 86.25-29; (I.8.6).
122 Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, pp. 30-31.
123 ibid., p. 197.
124 Lawes, 1: 85.13-15; (I.8.5).
125 Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, pp. 197-98.
126 Lawes, 1: 85.6-7; (I.8.5).
discussing how reason guides men, Hooker notices that men can assent to things without knowing it. ‘In many things assent is geven, they that give it not imagining they do so, because the manner of their assenting is not apparent’. And a habit of the mind that induces assent does not, for Hooker, require demonstration. ‘In every kind of knowledge some such grounds there are, as that being proposed the mind doth presently embrace them as free from all possibilitie of error, clear and manifest without proofe’. For Voak, this leads to Hooker’s theory of the ‘habit of faith’.

But I wish to examine in Hooker not the assent to first principles and propositions but, instead, the act of assenting to perceptions and presuppositions without rational demonstration or proofs, when the assent of the mind is not always apparent and when the images drawn from the imagination are embraced in the Lawes. There are two questions being asked here. Firstly, is the assent towards God’s involvement a ‘habit’ that is presupposed in the Lawes? Secondly, to what extent are the perceptions about God in the Lawes (such as the perception that all good actions express the divine will) offered by the imagination in the metaphor of Law? I argue that, for Hooker, assent can be given to the guidance of God in the metaphor of Law. Indeed, there is already in the Lawes a habitual assent to the presupposed authority of Law that is imaginatively expressed in Hooker’s metaphor.

For instance, the perception of God’s second lawe eternall (and the metaphorical collection of laws within it) is presented with the presupposition that it is an authoritative perception of God. This perception is unique because its authority does not, for Hooker, need to be rationally proven. The authority of God’s involvement in a multiplicity of guiding laws (all expressing the divine will) is assumed by Hooker. It is remarkable that Hooker’s description of

127 Lawes, 1: 103.7-9; (I.10.8).
128 Lawes, 1: 85.10-15; (I.8.5).
129 Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, pp. 197-99.
the perception of what is presupposed about God’s authority in laws is sustained and influenced by the imagination. Even Voak concedes that, for Hooker, all forms of human reasoning utilise the imagination – for Hooker, the imagination is required to understand this world but will be non-existent in the world to come because all things will be intuitively understood. Voak also points out that, for Hooker, reasoning is therefore a difficult process because it is corrupted by the imagination. For Hooker, Voak contends, the imagination is a ‘passion of the mind’ which relays human sensual judgements to the reason and to the will, of which, when acted upon, sins of passion occur.130 However, had Voak thoroughly examined ‘law’ in Hooker his argument may have run into difficulty.

For example, although for Hooker man’s reasoning is an expression of the divine will which is a corrupted version influenced by the imagination because of man’s fallen condition (as Voak correctly asserts), nevertheless Hooker’s development of his metaphor is able to make ‘transparent’ all of God’s ‘laws’ and adds an intelligible value to his argument. The uniqueness of Hooker’s metaphor of Law is that it presents, without proof, what appears to be the complete harmony of God’s involvement with the world, even though, according to Hooker, as we have seen, whatever is stated about ‘God’ inadequately describes God. Assenting to the perception generated by the metaphor is, for Hooker, to assent to something which is not naturally apparent to the understanding.

Hence Law has an imaginative authority, but it presupposes the divine truth of God’s involvement. The metaphorical resemblance of Law with God, wisdom, reason and goodness is an imaginary identity of God in the Lawes, since only Scriptural words about God signify with certainty for Hooker. This is not an extraordinary claim because metaphor and the imagination

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130 ibid., pp. 63, 82, 87.
have played their role in presenting divinity in the history of Christianity.\textsuperscript{131} Rowan Williams has also remarked that ‘law’ for Hooker is a metaphor and that it has an imaginative authority in Hooker’s work. Williams argues that ‘law’ presents the interdependence between all things, so that if God is not, for Hooker, encountered as a commanding will, then he is present in the laws and regularities that sustain the intelligible world.\textsuperscript{132} Williams’ argument is well taken, but we must be cautious here. Without relying upon proof, the metaphor of Law must not breed superstition for Hooker. Presbyterians such as Cartwright, Travers and Udall had accused the Church of England of upholding superstition in its customs,\textsuperscript{133} and Hooker admits that superstition ‘neither knoweth the right kinde, nor observeth the due measure of actions belonginge to the service of god, but is allwayes joygned with a wronge opinion touchinge thinges divine’.\textsuperscript{134} Such a ‘wronge opinion’ in Hooker’s view is connected to those who show devotion towards the divine but whose concepts and descriptions create a superfluity, an excess, in religion.\textsuperscript{135}

Hooker does have in mind here Eastern heretics such as Arius, as mentioned in Chapter Three. Hooker specifically warns against the heretical deception caused by language. The wittes of the Græcians [were] evermore proude of theire owne curious and subtile inventions, which when at anie tymne they had contrived, the greate facilitie of theire language served them readily to make all thinges faire and plausible to mens understandinge. Those grand hereticall impieties therefore which most highlie and immediatlie touched God and the glorious Trinitie, were all in a manner the monsters of the East.\textsuperscript{136}

In marked contrast, Hooker develops a piety towards the Christian God which always appears in reference to the imagined authority of Law, and which presents God as on the side of


\textsuperscript{133} To be examined in Chapter Six.

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Lawes}, 2: 28.13-16; (V.3.2).

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Lawes} 2: 28.22-24; (V.3.2).

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Lawes}, 2: 28.30-29.3; (V.3.3).
whomsoever recognises the divine as metaphorically working through all laws. But those who can perceive this are not ‘mere natural men’ who reason without the sanctified grace of God, but are Christians who have the ‘eyes’ to discern God’s involvement. In other words, Hooker accepts that pagans, who have been granted common grace enabling them to reason, have some notion of the immaterial and intellectual heavens, and desire to teach truth and virtue, as do the Scriptures. But Hooker also states: ‘Let it therefore be suspected, let it be taken as grosse, corrupt, repugnant unto the truth, whatsoever concerning things divine above nature shall at any time be spoken as out of the mouthes of meere naturall men, which have not the eyes wherwith heavenly thinges are discerned. For this we contend not’.  

To summarise, Hooker not only argues that God is metaphorically present everywhere as Law (although literally nowhere), but he also argues for a piety towards the imaginative image of God in all laws. He even encourages assent to this imaginative image by introducing personifications of the divine involvement. We shall now examine this in the next section.

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137 See, for example, Lawes, 1: 70.16-22; (I.4.1).
138 Lawes, 1: 178.19-179.2; (II.7.4).
VI

In concluding Book I of the Lawes, Hooker describes Law:

Thus we see how even one and the selfe same thing is under divers considerations conveyed through many lawes, and that to measure by any one kind of law all the actions of men were to confound the admirable order, wherein God hath disposed all lawes, ech as in nature, so in degree distinct from other. Wherefore that here we may brieflye end, of lawe there can be no lesse acknowledged, then that her seate is the bosome of God, her voice the harmony of the world, all thinges in heaven and earth doe her homage, the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power, but Angels and men and creatures of what condition so ever, though ech in different sort and manner, yet all with uniforme consent, admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy.139

To limit the guidance of God to the supernatural revelation of Scripture is, for Hooker, to ‘confound’ what is ‘admirable’. What must be acknowledged, Hooker argues, is the perception that all laws have been ‘disposed’ by God. In the metaphor, Hooker imaginatively personifies Law (or God) as ‘her’: ‘of lawe there can be no lesse acknowledged, then that her seate is the bosome of God’. Everything in heaven and earth pays ‘homage’ to her ‘power’ and ‘care’. Importantly, irrespective of whether men are Christian or not (‘of what condition so ever’), and irrespective of any perceived hierarchy between Angels, men and creatures, their consent to her, to God, is ‘uniforme’. Hooker adds that ‘By her from him we receive whatsoever in such sort we learn’.140 Polemically for Hooker, Scriptural law (or divine law) is only a part of ‘her voice’. The voice of Hooker, which speaks as the collective ‘we see how’, encourages the acknowledgement of ‘her’ as the ‘mother’ of peace and joy.

The feminine pronoun applied to Law by Hooker is, as Rowan Williams has suggested, analogous to the divine figure of wisdom that appears in Scripture in the sapiential books of Proverbs, Job and the Wisdom of Solomon.141 Williams characterises Hooker as a ‘sapiential theologian’ because what Hooker metaphorically claims for Law, and for its imaginative

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139 Lawes, 1: 142.3-14; (1.16.7-8).
140 Lawes, 1: 84.4-5; (1.8.3).
authority, is similar to what the Bible claims for the guidance of God’s wisdom. Now, although Hooker never explicitly refers to the goddess wisdom (Hokhmah) who in the mythology of Jewish polytheism was the daughter of the wise creator (Elohim), I would add, in addition to Williams, that the female gendering of Law also metaphorically includes for Hooker the personal wisdom of God that incorporates the logos, the Word, and Christ as the second person of the Trinity. The personal wisdom of God is, for Hooker, the ‘bosome of God’, it is the ‘voice’ that achieves the ‘harmony of the world’. This appears for Hooker to be distinguished from the essential wisdom of God that is common to all three of the Trinity.

The significance of this is that Law is girded together by Hooker’s theological and Biblical precision in personifying the personal wisdom of God (Christ, the logos). As pointed out in section I, Christ as the divine wisdom has, according to Hooker, an infinite possibility of application in the world, unlimited and not restricted to Scriptural revelation. What is more, in Hooker’s metaphor the guidance of Law is appointed by God’s own wisdom:

> The rule of divine operations outward, is the definitive appointment of Gods owne wisedome set down within himself. The rule of naturall agents that worke by simple necessity, is the determination of the wisedome of God, known to God himselfe the principall director of them, but not unto them that are directed to execute the same.143

‘Directive rules’ are the regulation of God’s wisdom in everything, and wisdom is therefore imagined as working in Law. Indeed, near the beginning of Book II, Law is personified as an image of wisdom. We should again note that early Judaism and early Christianity had personified wisdom – Hooker’s presentation is hardly unique.144 But for Hooker’s polemical

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143 *Lawes*, 1: 84.16-22; (I.8.4).

purposes, the figure of wisdom, in personifying God’s personal wisdom, is shrewd in administrating her teaching to the world in different ways. Hooker answers the assertion of Thomas Cartwright that ‘every good way’ is drawn only from the divine wisdom of the Bible by arguing that ‘wisdom’ (again, metaphorically speaking) has other influences which should be perceived:

> Whatever either men on earth, or the Angels of heaven do know, it is a drop of that unemptiable fontaine of wisdom, which wisdom hath diversly imparted her treasures unto the world. As her waies are of sundry kinds, so her maner of teaching is not meerely one and the same. Some things she openeth by the sacred bookes of Scripture; some things by the glorious works of nature: with some things she inspireth them from above by spirituall influence, in some things she leadeth and trayneth them onely by worldly experience and practise. We may not so in any one speciall kind admire her that we disgrace her in any other, but let all her wayes be according unto their place and degree adored.\(^{145}\)

Here, wisdom is a metaphor for the practical ways in which God imparts, leads, inspires, and opens whatever good is known and done. We must not confuse this with the view that Renaissance thinkers secularised wisdom by humanising it, which reflected the knowledge of men and their manipulation of human things, but did not reflect God.\(^{146}\) For Hooker, the divine ‘figure’ of wisdom assigns to humanity the empirical training of ‘worldly experience and practise’. Even if many Reformed theologians in the sixteenth century believed that the Bible was God’s exclusive guide,\(^{147}\) Hooker believes that it is a false conception that Scripture alone is the grounds for Church discipline. Hooker perceives that wisdom guides men in the Church of England in many ways. ‘We may not so in any one speciall kind admire her that we disgrace her in any other’. And the failure to perceive the ‘sundry kinds’ of divine wisdom working in the world is, Hooker argues, impious because ‘lawes ar the sacred image of his wisdom’\(^{148}\)

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\(^{145}\) Lawes, 1: 147.23-148.6; (II.1.4).


\(^{147}\) See Folger, 6: 525.

\(^{148}\) Lawes, 2: 497.27; (V.81.16).
In the *Preface* to the *Lawes*, Hooker points to the ‘manifold dangers’ and ‘false opinions’ of the presbyterians who believe that their church discipline (fashioned upon Scripture alone) follows the ‘absolute commandement of almighty God’.149 ‘For whereas the name of divine authoritie is used to countenance these things, which are not the commaundements of God, but your owne erroneous collections’.150 According to Hooker, the presbyterians seriously underestimate – and prevent themselves from following - the involvement of God’s guidance. ‘In such kinds of error the minde once imagining it selfe to seeke the execution of Gods will, laboureth forthwith to remove both things and persons which any way hinder it from taking place’.151 Here, Hooker has returned to the issue of how to ‘access’ the will of God. He maintains that the presbyterian argument for church polity is short-sighted because devotion solely to Scripture will inevitably lead the presbyterians to become unfaithful to the wider divine plan. Hooker, by contrast, argues that the guidance of wisdom cannot be detached from men, especially in forming church ordinances. Thus Hooker argues that the greatest conformity with the divine reason is accomplished by Christians who are ‘wise’, which we shall now examine.

VII

Wise men are valued in Hooker’s argument, even the wisdom of pagans is divine. Hooker writes:

> [B]y proceeding in the knowledge of truth and by growing in the exercise of virtue, man amongst the creatures of this inferiour world, aspireth to the greatest conformity with God, this is not only knowne unto us, whom he himselfe hath so instructed, but even they do acknowledge, who amongst men are not judged the neerest unto him. With Plato what one thing more usuall, then to excite men unto the love of wisedome, by showing how much wise men are thereby exalted above men; how knowledge doth rayse them up into heaven; how it maketh them, though not Gods, yet as gods, high, admirable and divine?152

149 *Lawes*, 1: 42.2-3; (Preface.8.5).
150 *Lawes*, 1: 42.4-6; (Preface.8.5).
151 *Lawes*, 1: 42.9-12; (Preface.8.5).
152 *Lawes*, 1: 73.32-74.10; (I.5.3).
As the critic Audrey Chew has pointed out, for Hooker the wise man, at first, can be classed either as a Platonic abstraction or as a Christian saint. Regarding the former, Chew questions Hooker’s motive - by referring to Plato he smartly avoids any association with the human pride found in the Stoic view of wisdom. Stoic pride was treated with caution in the sixteenth century, and, as we examined in Chapter Three, Hooker is keen to avoid human and spiritual pride. Rather, Hooker understands the reasoning of the wise as in conformity with God, their ‘knowledge doth rayse them up to heaven’.

Now, on the one hand, Hooker argues that the wisdom of Christ has ‘built her house of that nature which is common to all’, dwelling not only in the few but in all humans for the purpose that all may be saved. Yet, on the other hand, Hooker argues that only wise Christians can ‘imitate’ God’s wisdom in forming church government, a matter indifferent to salvation. Hooker argues that God works through ‘sacred instruments’, including nature and wise Christians. Hooker’s example of the latter is God’s influence, he believes, in crowning Elizabeth.

It was God, Hooker claims, who kept Elizabeth safe during the Marian persecutions and then enthroned her, and with Elizabeth God brought the state of Reformed Christianity, raised from the dead like a miracle. No worldly means could have reinstated Reformed Christianity in England except the ‘hand’ of God. Significantly for Hooker, God, through Elizabeth, returned himself to the centre of a pious view of the Church of England after the ‘reign’ of

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154 ibid., pp. 1-58, 71-76.
155 Lawes, 2: 213.17-22; (V.52.3).
156 Lawes, 1: 343.28-344.7; (IV.14.7).
157 Lawes, 1: 344.9-14; (IV.14.7).
idolatry in organised religion (Hooker has in mind the Catholicism imposed by Queen Mary who had persecuted Protestants in the 1550s). Book IV ends with these words:

[What can we lesse thereupon conclude, then that God would at leastwise by tract of time teach the world, that the thing which he blesseth, defendeth, keepeth so strangelie, cannot choose but be of him? Wherefore if any refuse to believe us disputing for the veritie of religion established [by Elizabeth’s Church], let them believe God himselfe thus myraculouslie working for it, and wish life even for ever and ever unto that glorious and sacred instrument whereby he worketh.  

Hooker argues that the divine is not just present as the Word in the Bible, but that God has also ‘myraculouslie’ established the ordinances of Elizabeth’s church. Hooker contends that what God has blessed and defended cannot help but be of God - God has taught the world this by ‘tract of time’.

However, although Hooker identifies Elizabeth as a wise Christian who is a ‘glorious’ and ‘sacred’ instrument of God, we still must ask of Hooker how church ordinances are to be approved in the ‘sight’ of God. The presbyterians had precluded this question by pleading conformity with Scripture. But the question still stands for Hooker.

He concisely sums up his argument on the approval of God near the end of Book III, in Chapter 9, entitled: ’How lawes for the regiment of the Church may be made by the advise of men following therein the light of reason, and how those lawes being not repugnant to the worde of God are approved in his sight’. Hooker deliberates how ‘guidance’ is to be recognised, and he begins by stating: ‘Lawes for the church are not made as they should be, unless the makers follow such direction as they ought to be guided by’. On the one hand, Hooker judges it ‘prophane, impious, and irreligious’ to think that Scripture does not stand the church in any stead. But on the other hand, Hooker argues that a number of things there are for which scripture hath not provided by any law, but left them unto the

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158 Lawes, 1: 343.28-344.32; (IV.14.7).
159 Lawes, 1: 235.23-24; (III.9.1).
160 Lawes, 1: 235.25-236.3; (III.9.1).
carefull discretion of the church; we are to search how the church in these cases may be well directed to make that provision by lawes which is most convenient and fit.\textsuperscript{161}

The recognition of divine guidance is a form of obedience in the argument of the Lawes. For Hooker, God and the church must both be obeyed. It is, Hooker argues, dutiful towards God to obey ‘our mother’ the church because God is expressed ‘in’ the divinely constructed laws of church government, which cannot therefore be repugnant towards God or his divinely revealed words in Scripture.\textsuperscript{162} ‘[T]he lawes thus made God himselfe doth in such sort authorize, that to despise them is to despise in them him’.\textsuperscript{163}

To recognise God’s guidance and approval, Hooker argues that wise Christians should understand that human reasoning is divine guidance. It is through the ‘light’ of reason that God’s rational guidance and approval is discovered in forming church rules: ‘That which doth finde them [church rules] out is the force of mans reason. That which doth guide and direct his [man’s] reason is first the generall law of nature, which law of nature and the morall law of scripture are in the substance of law all one’.\textsuperscript{164} For Hooker, God is the ‘substance’ of Scripture and the ‘substance’ of the law of nature (or the law of reason).

Hooker seems to prefer the use of the word ‘substance’ as opposed to ‘essence’, and ‘substance’ suggests that the actual content of the law of nature (the content of reason) is divine. But this is not surprising, since according to the metaphor of Law, God has made everything subject to his divine reason. Thus Hooker metaphorically identifies not only God’s approval but also God’s authorship of man’s reasoning, upon which the Church of England should rely. He writes:

\textit{The author of that which causeth another thing to be, is author of that thing also, which thereby is caused. The light of naturall understanding wit and reason is from God, he it is which thereby doth illuminate every}

\textsuperscript{161} Lawes, 1: 236.3-7; (III.9.1).
\textsuperscript{162} Lawes, 1: 238.3-11; (III.9.3).
\textsuperscript{163} Lawes, 1: 238.11-13; (III.9.3).
\textsuperscript{164} Lawes, 1: 237.8-12; (III.9.3).
man entering into the world...He is the author of all that we think or do by virtue of that light, which himself hath given. And therefore the lawes which the very heathens did gather to direct their actions by, so far forth as they proceeded from the light of nature, God him selfe doth acknowledge to have proceeded even from him selfe, and that he was the writer of them in the tables of their hartes. How much more then he the author of those lawes, which have bene made by his Saincts, endued furder with the heavenly grace of his spirit, and directed as much as might be with such instructions, as his sacred word doth yeeld? Surely if we have unto those lawes that dutifull regard which their dignitie doth require: it will not greatly need, that we should be exhorted to live in obedience unto them. If they have God him selfe for their author, contempt which is offered unto them cannot choose but redound unto him. The safest and unto God the most acceptable way of framing our lives therefore is, with all humilitie lowliness and singleness of hart to studie, which way our willing obedience both unto God and man may be yielded even to the utmost of that which is due.\textsuperscript{165}

There is a ‘dignitie’, Hooker argues, in the guidance of God, and reason guides with as much instruction as God’s ‘sacred word doth yeeld’. This is consistent with Hooker’s earlier argument that what is taken to be of God has the same force and authority as the written laws of God. The Lawes suggests that God, as he is ‘known’ in laws, is a metaphorical reflection of divine truth and guidance. With Law, Hooker has created his own code of reference in regard to the divine, and as twenty-first-century readers we should be aware of the explanatory power of Hooker’s metaphor in the Lawes. Indeed, Hooker argues that in assessing the ordinances of church government, men must not ignore God’s eternal guidance. Hooker urges in Book I:

\begin{quote}
But if we will give judgement of the lawes under which wee live, first let that law eternall be always before our eyes, as being of principall force and moment to breede in religious mindes a dutifull estimation of all lawes, the use and benefite whereof we see; because there can be no doubt but that lawes apparently good, are (as it were) thinges copied out of the very tables of that high everlasting law, even as the booke of that law hath sayd concerning it self, By me Kings raigne, and by me Princes decree justice. Not as if men did behold that booke, and accordingly frame their lawes, but because it worketh in them, because it discovereth and (as it were) readeth it selfe to the world by them when the lawes which they make are righteous. Furthermore although we perceive not the goodness of lawes made, nevertheless sith thinges in themselves may have that which we peradventure discerne not; should not this breede a feare in our hearts, how we speake or judge in the worse part concerning that, the unadvised disgrace whereof may be no meane dishonour to him, towards whom we professe all submission and awe? Surely there must be very manifest iniquitie in lawes, against which we shall be able to justifie our contumelious invectives. The chiefest roote whereof, when we use them without cause, is ignorance how lawes inferiour are derived from that supreme or highest law.\textsuperscript{166}
\end{quote}

Men cannot ‘behold’ God; rather, Hooker speaks of what can be ‘seen’ in his metaphor in which the guidance and approval of God ‘worketh’ in men. Hooker wishes to reflect divine truth,

\textsuperscript{165} Lawes, 1: 238.23-239.16; (III.9.3).
\textsuperscript{166} Lawes, 1: 136.4-24; (I.16.2).
acknowledging that ‘Although we perceive not the goodness of lawes made, nevertheless sith things in themselves may have that which we peradventure discerne not’. The everlasting Law does ‘(as it were) readeth it selfe to the world’, whilst all laws ‘are (as it were) thinges copied out of the very tables of that high everlasting law’.

How the collective reasoning of the wise is to change, with ‘submission’ and ‘awe’, church polity in accordance with what God guides as good, is the topic of the next chapter. The present chapter has investigated how, for Hooker, the greatest ignorance is in not acknowledging ‘how lawes inferiour are derived from that supreme or highest law’. God not only ‘appears’ in the Lawes but he is the single most important authority upon which Hooker bases his argument. The metaphor of God as author and guide, and the incorporation into the metaphor of God’s wisdom, reason, causes and purposes, are a series of positive terms about the divine. This is unlike the Neoplatonist practice of via negativa which alludes to God by stating what he is not. It is also unlike the metaphysical speculative knowledge of God’s eternal essence. It is, in fact, God’s eminence that directs the construction of church ordinances in Hooker’s view.

The value for Hooker scholarship in understanding Law is that it uncovers how Hooker wrote his polemic on ecclesiology in relation to his specific perception of God, which he believed was universal for all to ‘see’. Hooker’s perception of God as the guiding authority must be taken into account in what has been canonically thought by generations of Hooker scholars who have argued that Hooker rests church authority upon Scripture and reason. Actually, Hooker argues that God should not only be perceived as preceding Scripture and reason but he should also be perceived as the directive force within them. It is precisely Hooker’s argument that the image of God as the twofold lawe eternall must be ‘seen’ and dutifully obeyed. ‘First let
that law eternall be always before our eyes, as being of principall force and moment to breede in religious mindes a dutifull estimation of all lawes’.
Chapter Five

“Lookinge inward wee are stricken dumb, lookinge upward we speake and prevaile”: God and what is Good in Church Government

This chapter fits into the overall argument of this study by investigating how the church in Hooker’s vision is to discover the extra-Scriptural good in accordance with God. I argue that Hooker develops his vision of how pious customs should be governed in the church according to how he perceives goodness – the goodness of God, its manifestation in the world and its relation to the good of the common people in the church. I wish to introduce the contention that, for Hooker, God’s guidance of what is good, in addition to revelation and reason, is a sacred influence in the formation of church polity.

The presbyterians had claimed that the Church of England’s public duties in exercising the Christian religion were superstitious. But for Hooker, the church’s outward expression of its religion cannot be superstitious because instead it serves what is good. Although Hooker aims to persuade the Church of England about the truth of God’s guiding involvement in forming church government, the disciplinarians had been arguing since the 1560s that despite having been reformed in doctrine, the governing of the church was essentially corrupt just as, they alleged, the Church of Rome. John Field and Thomas Wilcox, who authored the first Admonition to parliament in June 1572, argued that the Church of England’s use of The Book of Common Prayer as a set form of public worship encouraged unthinking devotion instead of allowing spontaneous and private prayer, and was often read in churches at the expense of a preaching ministry. Thomas Cranmer, Archbishop of Canterbury from 1532 to 1556, had devised much of the prayer book which was produced twice in 1549 and 1552 when the reform of worship had
become state policy under the reign of Edward VI. After Queen Mary’s allegiance to Rome and her burning of Cranmer as a ‘Protestant heretic’, Elizabeth had reintroduced The Book of Common Prayer with The Act of Uniformity in 1559.\footnote{See Diarmaid MacCulloch, *Thomas Cranmer: A Life*, (London: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 221-6, 404-21, 504-12, 524-9, 620-28. For the prayer-books, see J. Ketley ed., *The Liturgies of 1549 and 1552 with other Documents set forth in the Reign of Edward VI*, (Cambridge: Parker Society, 1844), and John E. Booty ed., *The Book of Common Prayer 1559: The Elizabethan Prayer Book*, (Washington: The Folger Shakespeare Library, 1982).} Whilst the prayer book was a repository of reformed doctrine, and although under Elizabeth many of the more radical ceremonial aspects were omitted,\footnote{The 1559 version elucidates why some ceremonies have been abolished and why others have been retained. See John E. Booty ed., *The Book of Common Prayer 1559: The Elizabethan Prayer Book*, pp. 18-21. See also G. J. Cuming, *A History of Anglican Liturgy*, (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 120.} it still contained many translations of ancient prayers not found in the Bible, explaining that ‘although they have been devised by man, yet it is thought good to reserve them still’\footnote{Booty ed., *The Book of Common Prayer 1559*, p. 18. For example, the prayer book still stipulated the use of the ancient, but not Biblical, hymn ‘Gloria patri’, which we shall examine in Chapter Seven, section II.},\footnote{See Booty, ‘Introduction: Book V’, pp. 183-86, 223, 226, 229.} In 1571 the clergy had been compelled to subscribe to the prayer book, which provoked in 1572 the accusation made by the Admonitioners Field and Wilcox that ‘this book is an unperfecte booke, culled and picked out of that popishe dunghill, the Masse booke full of all abomimations’.\footnote{Field and Wilcox, *Admonition to Parliament*, p. 28. See also Eamon Duffy, *The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, c. 1400-c. 1580*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 588-589. The Admonitioners disapproved for instance of the church’s prayers, sacraments, fasts, times and places of public worship, burial services, and ecclesiastical elections and ordinations.} The Admonitioners even observed that the prayer book had given ‘legitimacy’ to superstitious customs not even found in the book.\footnote{See Booty, *Introduction: Book V*, pp. 183-86, 223, 226, 229.}

John E. Booty argues that Book V of the Lawes defends nearly every part of the prayer book - not however as it was generally used in the very late sixteenth century but as Cranmer had intended it: to transform not only individuals but society as a whole.\footnote{See Booty, ‘Introduction: Book V’, pp. 183-86, 223, 226, 229.} For both Cranmer and Hooker, Booty points out, public prayer was the essential means by which the commonwealth could fulfil its religious duty, achieve protection against wickedness and maintain the happy
Public prayer for Hooker, as Ramie Targoff observes, guaranteed common devotional practice within the church. But what, I wish to ask, is Hooker’s underlying argument for why public prayer should be valued as so effective in uniting the common people? Was it because, as Cranmer had argued, that corporate prayer was to be ‘common’ to all people as a uniform rite for the nation, and thus was to be a liturgy preformed ‘commonly’ by the clergy and people together?

I argue that Hooker envisages a more profound justification for the common usage of public prayer. In his reflection upon public devotion, Hooker is preoccupied with what can be valued as good within the church, which he links to a perception of God and his ‘goodness’ – to the extent that devotion is a ‘good’ practice that serves and praises the ‘goodness’ of God. Hooker’s concern with what is good in devotion is an off-shoot of his wider argument in the Lawes that God has endowed men with reason to find what is to be valued as good for the governing of the church in a given age. It was assumed throughout the previous chapter that in Hooker’s metaphor of Law there is an unmistakable goodness in the guidance of ‘laws’, and that human laws which are constructed with God’s guidance will always be ‘good’. It was concluded that in Hooker’s metaphoric perception of the eminence of God, God’s goodness affects all the ‘laws’ he has set for the world in his second law eternal, and thus he is not only their source but he is also their guide. Hooker further develops this in Book V in connection to how ‘good polity’ is to be found, which this chapter will explore.

What is important to understand at this point is that Hooker presents the divine attribution of goodness as a guide that is divinely accommodated into the world of humanity and into the

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7 ibid., pp. 195-96.
‘kingdom’ of the public body of the visible church. For example, *The Book of Common Prayer* stipulated that men should pray that God for the worthiness of his Son will grant to them what men in their unworthiness dare not ask of God. This, Hooker notes in Chapter Forty-Seven, Book V of the *Lawes*, is criticised as a popish fear by those such as Thomas Cartwright who think that what is good for the church is that it *needs* to be further reformed in line with a set template which, Hooker shrewdly notes, human authority has distilled from parts of Scripture.10

But Hooker argues that men in their earthly condition are unworthy creatures, and with fear and affection they should look to heaven and pray. This is not popish for Hooker, nor is there need for further reform on the part of the church – because it is God and not the unworthiness of men who, for Hooker, guides or ‘reforms’ the church to the needs of a given age. Hooker observes the ignorance of men when they do not know the author who continually provides them with what is good. Hooker observes dissimulation in those men whose hands are more open than their eyes when receiving from God. Hence, Hooker argues, the unworthiness of men should be readily admitted, and in understanding their guidance by not looking at themselves but to God, men can ‘speake and prevaile’. Hooker writes:

> For as humilitie is in suters a decent virtue, so the testification thereof by such effectuall acknowledgments not only argueth a sound apprehension of his supereminent glorie and majestie before whome we stand, but putteth also into his handes a kind of pledge or bond for securitie against our unthankfulness, the verie naturall roote whereof is alwayes either ignorance, dissimulation, or pride; ignorance, when wee know not the author from whome our good commeth; dissimulation, when our handes are more open then our eyes upon that wee receive; pride, when wee thinke our selves *worthie* of that which mere grace and undeserved mercy bestoweth. In prayer therefore to abaite so vaine imaginations with the *true concept of unworthines* is rather to prevent then commit a fault. [...] that beinge to stand, to speake, to sue in the presence of so great majestie we are afraid, let no man blame us...The verie silence which our unworthines putteth us unto, doth it self make request for us, and that in the confidence of his grace. Lookinge inward wee are stricken dumbe, lookinge upward we speake and prevaile.11

As this chapter will explore, Hooker’s point is that God is man’s worthy guide. It is my contention that Hooker presents the good, alongside revelation and reason, as an intermediary

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10 *Lawes*, 2: 186.24-27; (V.47).
11 *Lawes*, 2: 187.13-25; (V.47.2), 186.10-24; (V.47.3-4).
between God and humans for establishing with authority what is right in the church. For their part, men meet the divine accommodation of what is good by utilising, Hooker argues, not only revelation and reason, but also love, desire and affection.

The plan for this chapter is as follows: I will examine in section I why Christianity is ‘good’ for Hooker; in section II, I shall investigate Hooker’s difference from his contemporaries on the issue of God’s guidance; in section III, I shall assess Hooker’s understanding of the common recognition of the divine by all in the church; and in section IV, I shall analyse the detail of Hooker’s argument for the measures the church should take in accessing what is good for it.

I

Hooker investigates why Christianity is ‘good’ when God is worshipped by the public expression of piety. In Chapter 1, Book V, Hooker states:

To make therefore our beginninge that which to both partes is most acceptable, Wee agree that pure and unstayned religion ought to be the highest of all cares apperteyninge to publique regiment: as well in regarde of that aide and procetion, which they, who faithfullie serve God, confesse they receave at his mercifull hands; as also for the force which religion hath, to qualifie all sortes of men, and to make them in publique affaires the more serviceable, governors the apter to rule with conscience, inferiors for conscience sake the willinger to obay. It is no peculiar conceipt, but a matter of sounde consequence, that all duties are by so much the better performed, by how much the men are more religious from whose habilities the same proceede. For if the coorse of politicke affaires cannot in any good sorte goe forward without fitt instrumentes, and that which fitteth them be theire virtues, let politic acknowledge it selfe indebted to religion, godlines beinge the cheifest top and welspringe of all true virtues, even as God is of all good thinges.12

Hooker writes of the force that Christianity has within the conscience of rulers and men alike in enabling duty to be ‘better performed’. In Hooker’s understanding, the Christian religion should be ‘pure’ and ‘unstayned’, it is to be the ‘highest’ of all cares, and in the public domain it

12 Lawes, 2: 16.24-17.11; (V.1.2).
develops godliness as the pinnacle of all true virtues. Hence Hooker writes of how public affairs cannot advance in any good way without Christianity.

In reading Hooker we must therefore acknowledge that what he values the most within a society is his view of the Christian religion. Hooker has already argued in Book I of the Lawes that the very soul of the public body, the ‘common weale’, is animated into action and held together by what the common good requires. For Hooker, the ‘purer and perfecter our religion is, the worthier effectes it hath in them who stedfastly and sincerely imbrace it, in others not’. Indeed, the hearts of men that are ‘possessed’ by Christianity need, Hooker argues, no other restraint from evil. Hooker is able to claim that the ‘true Christian religion’, in worshipping God, is the principal restraint from evil because his primary contention is that Christianity itself is good and godly in its public expression. Hooker is tracing a link between the public expression of ‘good’ worship and how this goodness is in someway imitative of God who ‘is of all good thinges’.

Anthony Milton has argued that Hooker, especially in Book IV of the Lawes, was the first Elizabethan theologian to define the membership of the visible church by its outward profession of Christian belief rather than by its doctrinal purity, thus enabling Hooker to include the Church of Rome within the visible Church of God and to argue for the retention of pre-Reformation church customs. Milton’s contention is attractive, but if, as I claim, Hooker

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13 As we shall examine in section II, Lake also outlines the importance of religion for Hooker. See Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?, p. 164. But Lake does not connect religion and worship with the role that is played for Hooker by what is ‘good’, nor does Lake investigate in full detail the roles played by desire, love and affection in Hooker’s vision of ‘good worship’, which is the topic of this chapter and the following two chapters.
14 Lawes, 1: 96.17-23; (I.I.10.1).
15 Lawes, 2: 21.27-28; (V.1.4).
16 Lawes, 2: 19.12-13; (V.1.2).
perceives the good in ecclesiastical customs and polity to be sourced in God, then Hooker is acknowledging that expressions of God’s wisdom and goodness have been accommodated into the church’s ranks, whether in the sixteenth-century Church of England or in the Church of Rome and its long history back to the church fathers, many of whom Hooker respected.

This still does not mean that Hooker’s definition of the church is based upon its ‘doctrinal purity’, but it does mean that Hooker is implying that the goodness in the thought and practice of pre-Reformation Rome is sourced in God, a further reason why Hooker values pre-Reformation writers. But as will be illustrated in this chapter and in Chapter Seven, a claim such as Milton’s that Hooker defined the church as an outward rather than a pure expression of Christianity is not exactly accurate. It is too simplistic to understand the Lawes as only defending the outward ceremonial customs of worship – this trivialises God’s involvement – because God, according to Hooker, is not external to the church’s ecclesiastical affairs and practices. Hooker believes that holiness is present in the church; Hooker also believes that God’s guidance of what is good edifies and sanctifies the Christian community.

At this stage, Hooker wishes to argue that the customs and prayers which he discusses in Book V are intrinsically ‘good’. The outward expressions of religion in the Church of England, Hooker argues, are ‘pure’ because they give ‘life’ and ‘perfection’ to all endeavours, they breed joy, gladness, satisfaction and ‘reasonable contentment of minde’. Indeed, Hooker argues that earthly satisfaction for the mind and soul of man is found in seeking and worshiping the goodness of God. This end is, according to Hooker, capable of being fulfilled within the visible church by the community’s expression of its love and affection for God in an organised human language of worship. Indeed, God’s goodness demands to be loved and worshipped as a divine

19 Lawes, 2: 19.13-17; (V.1.2).
‘publique’ duty of the Christian religion. For Hooker, there ‘is a sollemne outward serviceable worship belonginge unto God…[sollemne worship] belongeth to the church or publique societie of God by way of externall adoration’. And what Hooker explores in Book V is the intrinsic goodness found in the various forms of ‘externall adoration’.

But we must remember that Hooker’s vision of God as determining what is good and wise for the governing of church worship in a given age is presented by Hooker as having been motivated in the first instance by the disagreement in Elizabeth’s church over the organisation of worship. My contention is that Hooker’s vision in the Lawes investigates why individuals and groups such as presbyterians have mistakenly blurred the perspectives of goodness and superstition. Underlying this is Hooker’s argument that the legislation of church worship must adhere to God’s guidance, although the Archbishop of Canterbury John Whitgift had claimed that it should adhere to human prudence. Let us therefore examine in section II the clash in argument and opinion within the Church of England from the 1560s to the 1580s, which Hooker reflects upon in the 1590s and which provides the context for his argument of how God guides within a church body.

II

The relevant features of the Church of England’s historical context that are important to the reading of Hooker offered in this study can be identified by the following line of inquiry: why did presbyterians such as John Field, Thomas Wilcox, Laurence Chaderton, Thomas Cartwright and Walter Travers reject in the 1570s and 1580s what Hooker deems by the 1590s to be good practice that honours God’s guiding involvement with Christians? The answer, in part, is that

20 Lawes, 2: 31.7-13; (V.4.3).
these men relegated the importance of devotion that is fostered for Hooker by organised communal prayer. Hooker’s appreciation of public organised prayer was not to be found in the presbyterian case to sweep the church free of any prayer book customs that resembled ‘popery’, nor was it to be found in the argument for less worship and more frequent sermons put forward by moderate non-conformists.21

Hence for moderates and presbyterians, the type of Protestantism that was regimented by the prayer book reflected, they argued, the superstition affiliated with the Church of Rome.22 It is, however, important to understand that there were vast numbers of the conforming laity across the country who happily embraced The Book of Common Prayer - many parishioners demanded that their ministers should conform to the prayer book and demanded that the laity should be allowed to participate in the service that was stipulated by The Book of Common Prayer.23 Nevertheless, presbyterians criticised the prayer book for being too long, for spending time in singing and in reading the Psalms, for using the Lord’s Prayer too often and for intermingling too many prayers with readings. Indeed, fearing that the wide usage of officially prescribed prayers would oust sermons at a time when there was a shortage in educated Protestant clergy, the disciplinarians scolded the clergy in Elizabeth’s established church as ‘dumb dogs’ who read the set prayers instead of allocating more time to preaching.24 In the presbyterian discipline, a pastor would preach and in addition a doctor would teach the congregation correct doctrine.

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21 See the scholarship of Patrick Collinson. Collinson, The Elizabethan Puritan Movement; idem, The Religion of Protestants; idem, Godly People. See also Lake, Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church.
22 Maltby, Prayer Book and People in Elizabethan and Early Stuart England, p. 15.
23 Ibid., pp. 41-45.
moderate non-conformists already gave lectures that provided supplementary preaching in the parishes of London and in the parishes of many parliamentary boroughs across England.25

The view of the moderates and the radicals is considered by Hooker to be wrong because it is entirely blind to the relationship between God and what is good in the church. Certainly it is man’s duty to worship the divine within the church, and in this respect Hooker observes the rectitude not of Geneva but of Rome.

Furthermore the Church of Rome hath rightlie also considered, that publique prayer is a dutie intire in it self, a dutie requisite to be performed much oftener than sermons can possiblie be made. For which cause, as they, so we have likewise a publique forme how to serve God both morninge and eveninge, whether sermons may be had or no.26

For a Protestant to accept Rome as having been ‘right’ was surely unusual within a generation which, as Eamon Duffy concludes, had grown up not understanding the Catholic past to have been their own, had believed the Pope to be Antichrist and had known little else than the Protestant prose of Cranmer’s prayer book and the unremitting ‘no-popery’ sermons.27 Hooker therefore controversially argues that Rome may have always been a true church, and that insofar as Rome acknowledges Christian truth then they are part of the ‘familie of Jesus Christ’.28

However, this does not mean that Hooker’s opinion agreed with English Roman Catholics. For the latter, *The Book of Common Prayer* presented a possible replacement to pre-Reformation Christianity.29 Indeed, the Church of England’s liturgical *book* was different from the Roman liturgical *form*. As Judith Maltby has observed, the prayer book broke with pre-Reformation Christianity and was not a feature of the Catholic Counter-Reformation in

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26 Lawes, 2: 122.12-17; (V.28.3).
28 Lawes, 1: 202.16-18; (III.1.10). See Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?*, pp. 155-160. On Hooker’s defense of Rome as a true church and a similar defense that was to follow in the writings of eminent men such as William Laud and Richard Montagu see, Anthony Milton, *Catholic and Reformed: The Roman and Protestant Churches in English Protestant Thought, 1600-1640*, pp. 146-150.
England.\textsuperscript{30} For its part, the Catholic faith had survived in the 1570s, 80s and 90s,\textsuperscript{31} and Elizabeth had wanted to retain the Romanist party within the church. At first, wishing not to offend, she omitted article 29 of the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England which, composed in 1563, had condemned the Roman doctrine of ‘Transubstantiation’ that asserted that the elements of bread and wine used in the Eucharist were transformed into the body and blood of Jesus Christ. However, after Elizabeth had been excommunicated by Rome, she restored the Article in 1571.\textsuperscript{32} And in any case, Protestantism had met resistance in the writings of English Catholics such as William Allen.\textsuperscript{33}

Hooker, in contrast to Roman Catholics, certainly respects that the Church of England is Protestant, but he is anxious over the extent to which presbyterians and moderate non-conformists alike had advocated that the church should express its Protestantism almost exclusively in a preaching ministry. Hooker is resolved: in Book V of the \textit{Lawes} he wishes to unshackle the organised worship of God from any form of subordination to preaching. Hooker has his own view of godliness which testifies to what God shapes as ‘good’ for church government and which testifies to the goodness of God in prayer, distinguished from the ‘godly’ presbyterians who believed that the prayer book did not concord with Scripture.

Hooker’s starting point is his understanding that Christianity should seek to worship the goodness of God and this simply is not to be found, for Hooker, in preaching alone, if at all. On balance, Hooker admits that preaching is valuable:

\textsuperscript{33} See William Allen, \textit{A true sincere and modest defence of the English Catholiques that suffer for their Faith both at home and abroad}, (Rouen: Robert Parson, 1584) STC 373. Hooker had his own copy of this work. See Folger, 6: 1158.
So worthie a part of divine service we should greatlie wronge, if we did not esteeme preachinge as the blessed ordinance of God, sermons as keyes to the kingdom of heaven, as winges to the soule, as spurres to the good affections of man, unto the sound and healthie as goode, as phisicke unto diseased mindes. Wherefore how highlie soever it may please them [the moderates and the presbyterians] with wordes of truth to extoll sermons, they shall not herein offend us.  

But, as argued in Chapter Two, Hooker is wary that sermons, based upon the wit of man, can ‘tast too much’ of that ‘over corrupt fountaine from which they come…our sermons, be they never so sound and perfect, his [God’s] worde they are not as the sermons of the prophetes were, no they are but ambiguouslie termed his worde’. There are, Hooker argues, other equally viable customs and even more pious means of approaching God and salvation. The Admonitioners and the presbyterians championed extempore preaching and prayer, but had moved to argue that the church should take the Genevan service book as its official liturgy because it was, according to them, a ‘plainer’ form of worship than that provided by The Book of Common Prayer. As Hooker comments in Book V of the Lawes, they retracted their position to allow for a prescribed form of prayer after thinking better of it. But the presbyterian form showed which prayers and which hymns were to be sung only upon the day appointed for preaching, and according to this form, Hooker writes, ‘it must stand for a rule, No sermon no service. Which oversight occasioned the French spit efullie to terme religion in that sorte exercised a meere preach’. Hooker argues that in men who recognise that it is their duty to publicly exclaim their adoration for God (irrespective of whether a sermon has been given on that day or not) there appears a goodness which is absent in those who do not recognise their duty. The fanatical endorsement of preaching at the expense of other pious customs, Hooker argues, clouds the reception of what is good for worship in the church.

34 Lawes, 2: 87.20-26; (V.22.1).
35 Lawes, 2: 99.6-16; (V.22.10).
36 Lawes, 2: 119.7-19; (V.27.1).
37 Lawes, 2: 122.17-24; (V.28.3).
By indicating that the good of the church must be sought, Hooker sets alongside preaching the church’s established custom of publicly reading God’s authoritative words in Scripture, which was objected to by the Admonitioners Field and Wilcox. The 1559 prayer book declared in its preface that in hearing the whole of Scripture read throughout the year, the congregation would be ‘stirred up’ with ‘godliness’ and would be ‘inflamed with the love’ of God’s religion. According to Hooker, the churches throughout the land have been so abundantly provided for by the goodness of God that Hooker deems the practice of acclimatising the community of the church with what God himself has said as pious and as serving ‘inestimable good’, although the ‘godly’ presbyterians did not. Hooker wishes that the presbyterians would have a ‘just estimation’ of public Scriptural reading, just as Whitgift had urged of Cartwright. But because the presbyterians do not, they, in Hooker’s view, offend God’s church with ‘greate disgrace’. And if a presbyterian church government chose to not hear the ‘voice’ of God read, then there would be, Hooker points out, an ‘emptines’ in the ‘flowinge sea’ of its sermons.

Again, Hooker is sensitive to the language which ‘presents’ God. Hooker claims that the public reading of Scripture should be the means by which the church can best ‘hear’ God. It is, Hooker writes, to

furnish the verie simplest and rudest sorte with such infallible axiomes and preceptes of sacred truth, delivered even in the verie letter of the law of God, as may serve them for rules whereby to judge the better all other doctrines and instructions which they heare. For which ende and purpose I see not how the scripture could be possiblie made familiar unto all, unlesse farre more should be dailie read in the peoples

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38 Lawes, 2: 103.31; (V.22.16).
41 Lawes, 2: 104.27-29; (V.22.17).
42 Lawes, 2: 88.11-13; (V.22.2).
44 Lawes, 2: 87.26-88.3; (V.22.1).
45 Lawes, 2: 104.6-11; (V.22.16).
Hooker argues that the public reading of Scripture is ‘effectuall’ in saving souls. This is because, firstly for Hooker, reading in the ‘peoples hearinge’ makes them more familiar with Scripture first-hand than can be ‘opened’ by preaching and, secondly for Hooker, men can acknowledge the authority of God’s words spoken about eternal life, distinct from the words of other men. Indeed, the public reading of Scripture states the word of God in the most authoritative way, which is a means that pleases God in his ‘gracious goodnes’ to instil ‘cœlestiall veritie’ into men. In listening to this divine authority, men can go on to judge all extra-Scriptural preaching and doctrine.

The primary point here for Hooker is that a predominate focus upon preaching at the expense of ceremonial reading and worship leaves rather adrift how the public are to interact with God. Hooker takes this to be a question of what in the first instance constitutes the visible church and what are its appropriate religious expressions towards God. This is an obvious question for Hooker since the consideration of the right worshipping of God was a central inquiry of the continental Reformation and the Admonition controversy. But although Hooker formally cites at the beginning of some of his chapters in the Lawes what Cartwright had written during the Admonition controversy, we must be careful not to assume that Hooker necessarily wishes to directly engage in the controversy. Rather, I argue that he uses the Admonition controversy, particularly selected quotations from Cartwright, to help build his vision of the guiding good in the church. To explain this, we need to return to the basic features of the Admonition controversy that seethed particularly between the years 1572 to 1577.

46 Lawes, 2; 89.13-27; (V.22.2), 2: 94.15-22; (V.22.8).
What underlined the Admonition controversy as articulated between John Whitgift and Thomas Cartwright was a difference in opinion over how the ‘true’ religion of the visible church was to be governed. Cartwright understood the relation between God and England as a covenant in which God would bless his spiritual graces upon the church in an unprecedented way in return for the establishment of the presbyterian discipline – which, based upon Scripture, would purify the church, enabling it to become ‘purely spiritual’. This was to be a symbolic turn towards God away from what the Admonitioners and presbyterians took to be the popish governing of the church. Whitgift, however, criticised Cartwright for applying to the governing of church practices an exalted language that was normally applied to the internal process of individual salvation. In other words, the language of spiritual salvation which, for Whitgift, was only appropriate to the invisible church was used by Cartwright to discuss the outward religious expression of the visible church. This, in Whitgift’s view, was the road to sectarian fanaticism, while in Cartwright’s opinion virtually nothing could be regarded as indifferent to salvation in the active ministry of the church.

Hence the controversy revolved around the question of what the church could decide for itself, distinguishing between humanly constructed forms and ‘divine’ Scriptural forms. As mentioned in the Introduction to this study, Cartwright and others, including Travers and Udall, defended the presbyterian system derived from passages of Scripture and established on the continent, whilst Whitgift argued that it was a matter of prudence for the church to adjust its ministry according to its particular ecclesiastical context. For Whitgift, the church could legislate something as long as it was not expressly ruled out in Scripture because after all, Whitgift claimed, the Bible did not present a formulated doctrine of church polity that could act
as an explicit commandment for every church.\textsuperscript{47} But was Hooker concerned with a more profound argument about God’s involvement with the church, not via Scripture but to be found among a community of Christians who worship?

We can start to answer this by observing Hooker’s difference from his Protestant contemporaries in his vision of the national membership of, and the process of sanctification in, the church. Hooker’s difference has been examined in particular by three critics of his work. Peter Lake argues that Hooker places more importance upon worship in the visible church than had any of his conformist predecessors. The visible church for Hooker is, according to David Neelands, a kingdom of grace and is also, according to William Harrison, the locus of sanctification in Hooker’s outlook for the Christian community. Let us briefly examine the position of each of these critics before I declare my own.

Firstly, Hooker’s valuation of public devotion is so advanced, Lake argues, that he develops in the \textit{Lawes} an alternative form of piety from the Calvinist mainstream in England. Lake argues that Hooker is not anti-Calvinist, but the distance he takes away from the disciplinarian programme leads him to deviate away from even Elizabethan Protestants who loyally conformed to the Calvinist ideal of a preaching ministry, including Hooker’s early patron Bishop John Jewel of Salisbury who had written an early justification in the 1560s for the Elizabethan settlement.\textsuperscript{48} According to Lake, Hooker’s move away from the mainstream is enthused by his focus on worship – specifically prayer, liturgical or ceremonial forms (such as


\textsuperscript{48} Lake, \textit{Anglicans and Puritans?}, pp. 159-60, 171, 173. John Jewel, \textit{An Apologie, or answere in defence of the Churche of Englane, with a briefe and plaine declaration of the true Religion professed and used in the same}, (London: R. Wolfe, 1564). \textit{STC} 14591.
Lake also points out Hooker’s view of Christology according to which the entire nation can potentially be a part of the mystical body of the church because, Hooker believes, Christ had died for all men and the sacrament offers Christ’s body and blood to all who received it in good faith. In Hooker’s view, Lake continues, the visible and invisible churches thus merge to form a national inclusive church that does not depend upon a Calvinist view of election. In regard to praying that all men may find God’s mercy, Hooker asserts that those who believe are saved: ‘Howbeit concerninge the state of all men with whome wee live…the safest axiomes for charitie to rest it selfe upon are these, Hee which alreadie believeveth is; and Hee which believeveth not as yeat may be the child of God’.  

Lake, however, goes on to argue that a belief in election was represented in the English Calvinism of moderate non-conformists and presbyterians on the one hand and conformists such as Whitgift on the other hand. The former believed that they reflected their election by godly behaviour (‘experimental predestinarians’), while the latter insisted upon the doctrine of predestination but refrained from making the distinction between godly and ungodly behaviour in the church (‘credal predestinarians’). Lake concludes that in departing in the Lawes from this Calvinist mainstream, Hooker displaces the focus on predestination in Elizabeth’s church towards a sacrament- and prayer-centred piety.

A further conclusion is that we must not distort what Hooker has written by assuming that he follows in the steps of a band of conformists such as John Whitgift, John Bridges and Matthew Sutcliffe in their defence of the established governance of the church, as argued in the

50 Lawes, 2: 203.15-22; (V.49.2). See also Lawes, 2: 182.16-184.3; (V.45.1-2).
Introduction to this study. Indeed, Hooker actually moves away from Whitgift since the latter has more in common with Cartwright on the issue of the visible church, and hence Whitgift and Cartwright both keep within their debate. For example, and secondly, as David Neelands points out, Whitgift strictly separates the visible from the invisible church, and agrees with Cartwright that although the ‘reprobate’ may move among the visible church, only those whom God has elected to salvation can be counted as members of the invisible church - which disagrees with Hooker’s view. Neelands argues that for Hooker the visible church is a kingdom of grace for all who realise that justification, and not election, is the key to the invisible church. This means, Neelands contends, that the visible and invisible churches unite and overlap according to Hooker because there is no effective difference between the two, both share a universality that endures.53

However, and thirdly, William Harrison points out one fundamental difference for Hooker between the two ‘churches’: Harrison argues that while Book V of the Lawes presents justification as the gateway into the invisible church, it is also concerned with the process of sanctification within the visible church.54 Harrison argues that Hooker develops a sacramental sanctification (although Harrison does not mention organised public prayer), and that according to Hooker the participation in the sacraments – in Christ – is sanctifying because it creates a life of holiness and virtue, particularly for those who will be the ecclesiastical law-makers for the Church of England.55 In this, however, we should note that Hooker may have differed from Calvin and his strict adherents for whom inner sanctification was found only in the invisible church,56 but he did not depart from Protestantism. According to Nigel Voak who discusses how

sanctification is related by Hooker to his philosophy of mind and action (with Voak making no such connection between sanctification, the visible church, and the sacraments),

Hooker differs from the Roman Catholic theologians of the Middle Ages by asserting a very Protestant distinction between justification and sanctification.

I agree with the above views that for Hooker the liturgy of the sacraments provides sanctification, and that Christ and Christology are essential for Hooker in the sanctifying process. This is clearly explained by Hooker in Chapters Fifty to Fifty-Seven of Book V.

But when we move to Hooker’s argument on the spoken words of prayer and how church government is to be formed, a different side of Hooker emerges. Firstly for Hooker, organised prayer sanctifies the church body by acknowledging and worshipping the goodness of God, and, secondly for Hooker, the formation of church government is also part of the sanctifying process for the church body because God’s guidance for what is good is pursued.

In the first, I argue that the language of public prayer for Hooker is a sanctifying liturgy in which the goodness of God is essential, not Hooker’s view of Christology. As Hooker acknowledges, instruction and prayer are duties that serve as a grounding for everything else that follows in the church, and the sacraments and their Christological basis are, Hooker is clear, chief among what follows instruction and prayer. And while instruction or preaching may point to God as the supreme truth, public prayer for Hooker testifies that God is the sovereign good. In Hooker’s vision, this public testimony to the goodness of God is part of the sanctifying

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57 Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, pp. 192-3.
58 ibid., pp. 171-2.
60 See Lawes, 2: 207-248; (V.50-57).
61 Lawes, 2: 207.10-12; (V.50.1).
process for the national membership of the church. This will be examined in detail in Chapter Seven.

In the second, I argue that for Hooker God’s goodness and wisdom sanctify the church by determining its ‘good’ polity. Whereas the presbyterians believed that constructing a ‘divine’ polity based upon sections of Scripture would be a symbolic turn to God, there is, for Hooker, no need to make such a symbolic gesture because the goodness and wisdom of God is already involved with the visible church. This is the beginnings in Hooker of an argument about the Christian religion following the divine guidance of what is good for the ecclesiastical ages of the church, and not simply about the opinions of men forming laws for external church ceremonies. If Hooker has taken a step further than the presbyterians in understanding that the Church of England already adheres to the plan that God has for it, then we would expect Hooker’s focus to have dramatically shifted from the disciplinarian-conformist debate on whether or not Scripture provides a universal polity for all ages. Hooker writes that this is indeed the case. The Whitgift versus Cartwright debate concerning the ‘right way’ of worshipping God in the visible church, a question first raised by the continental Reformation, is, for Hooker, too general for the argument that he intends to propose:

But for as much as all the difficultie is in discerninge what thinges doe glorifie God and edifie his church, what not; when we should thinke them decent and fitt, when otherwise: because these rules beinge too generall come not neere enough unto the matter which wee have in hande.62

We must remember that Hooker did not have a career that ‘locked’ him within the disciplinarian-conformist debate: he was not one of the seventy-six bishops who were consecrated in the reign of Elizabeth, nor was he an ecclesiastical lawyer or administrator, and thus he was not obliged to enforce conformity within the church. He was, in Lake’s phrase, ‘an outsider’63 when compared,

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62 Lawes, 2: 32.15-19; (V.5.1).
for instance, to Richard Bancroft and Thomas Bilson who, as mentioned in the Introduction, both wrote in the 1590s against presbyterianism and who both became bishops (of London and Winchester respectively) in 1597, the publication year of Book V of the Lawes.

The Admonition controversy, or even the anti-presbyterian approach of Bancroft and Bilson, are too general for Hooker because although he does not wish to formally examine the actual substance of the Christian religion\(^64\) he does nevertheless wish to examine how organised public worship is to identify and then publicly praise the guiding goodness of God in the church. What this means for Hooker is that the guiding goodness of God in all of its manifestations (in all ‘laws’, as argued in Chapter Four) should, where it is communally recognised in the church, be praised in the worship of public prayer. Although participation in sacramental theology will sanctify men with a holy life, this alone for Hooker, contrary to the argument of Harrison, will not make men good judges and wise law-makers within the church.\(^65\) Harrison does not make clear that God is the underlying guide according to Hooker. The current study argues that it is God as the author of reason, wisdom and what is good who, for Hooker, is the directive force in the construction of church law. God and what is good are to be ‘found’ when men seek reason and wisdom. And since Hooker has widened the membership of the church to a national level, every Christian in England is, in Hooker’s view, potentially guided by the goodness of God. It is, according to Hooker, a duty for such divine guidance to be publicly praised. Let us devote the next section to an assessment of these conclusions, and to an examination of how they tally with Hooker’s argument concerning God’s guidance which we have already established in Chapter Four.

\(^{64}\) Lawes, 2: 31.17-18; (V.4.3).

Hooker has in mind a vision of a popular religion in which all the people of England can partake and in which all the religious acts of worship are sanctifying. ‘The church is to us that verie mother of our new birth in whose bowels wee are all bredd, at whose brestes wee receyve nourishment’. All men in Hooker’s vision are potentially able to recognise what is good for their church within their age, and all men in his vision should be encouraged to publicly worship the goodness of God. I wish to stress that this is Hooker’s vision for the church; he does not appear to be describing or defending the popular religion of an actual society, even though the ceremonial customs and prayers of the Church of England feature in his vision as the forms of worship that are good for the society of his time. As Patrick Collinson has argued, it would be difficult to specify a ‘popular religion’ that broadly belonged to the people of the Elizabethan period; indeed, it is even difficult to conclude that the prayer book and the Homilies were the sole influences over a society at large given that the ‘multitude’ still retained some superstitious views and thoughts in their daily lives, irrespective of what Christianity taught them. Keith Thomas has concluded that although after the English Reformation organised religion explained for men their daily problems and misfortunes and that church sermons and catechizing helped in the formation of most citizens, organised religion was never so influential to dispel superstition and other rival systems of belief such as astrology and magic. Not wishing to defend the ‘false’ notions and superstition of the common people provides a further reason why Hooker presents a vision to re-orientate English society to God.

66 Lawes, 2: 207.13-15; (V.50.1).
67 Collinson, The Religion of Protestants, pp. 190-93.
Debora Shuger, who perceptively writes of the ‘imagined community’ of the *Lawes*, also argues that Hooker has a vision not of an elitist but of a popular religion; yet she goes on to infer that, for Hooker, law-making requires humanist training and is therefore restricted to the elite few.69 I argue that humanist learning for Hooker can discover the guidance of God as in the case of the wise man,70 but also that all Christians for Hooker can universally assent via the law of reason to God’s guidance. It is important in Hooker’s vision of a popular religion which sanctifies all areas of men’s lives that the entire church body can assent to God’s involvement in the construction of laws. As Hooker concludes towards the end of the *Lawes* in Book Eight in reference to making ecclesiastical ordinances: ‘so we affirme that in like congruitie the true originall subject of power also to make church lawes is the whole intire body of that church for which they are made’.71 This, Hooker continues, is a law of nature: ‘But nature it self doth abundantly authorize the church to make lawes and orders for her Children that are within her’.72 The church in Hooker’s definition is the public body and, as should be familiar from the analysis of Chapter Four, Hooker argues that God metaphorically guides in nature. What this means is that Hooker’s presentation of the consensual theory of law in which a body of participants agree on ecclesiastical polity (through the universal guidance of reason in what is good) thus takes God as its directive source, which is metaphorically understood in Hooker’s presentation.

Now, whilst for Hooker it is an obligation towards God for men to make good judgements as William Harrison correctly observes,73 it is, also for Hooker, God who has already created what will be found to be good by the human capacity. After all, like Augustine and

70 As discussed in Chapter Four, section VII.
71 *Lawes*, 3: 386.4-13; (VIII.6.2).
72 *Lawes*, 3: 386.12-13; (VIII.6.2).
Thomas Aquinas, Hooker argues that men can discover and maintain the one true religion by using the law of reason because it is the directive of God.\textsuperscript{74} Here, the law of reason is immutable and will be recognised by all reasonable men, and hence the correct use of reason will never contradict what has been deemed to be good by God’s \textit{first lawe eternall}. It is this recognition of God in the Christian religion that is so important to Hooker, and he uses the example of the presbyterians as what in his estimation is a classic case of misrecognising God.

Whilst presbyterianism would put the control of the church to the vote of each individual congregation (such as in deciding its own pastor and deacons), there is an anxiety in Book V as to whether the guiding goodness of God can be effectively followed by the presbyterian human decision making process, and, in turn, whether the extent of God’s guidance could possibly be acknowledged effectively in the worship of such a congregation. Hooker argues that a congregation that is not devoted as a common cause to recognising the guidance of God in what is good and instead advises its own direction will meet with a range of impious complications.

He explicitly sums up the problem at the opening of Book V: it is with ‘pain’ and ‘hazard’ that men make themselves advisers for the ‘common good’.\textsuperscript{75} And, again, this anxiety is addressed at the beginning of Book VI of the \textit{Lawes}. There, Hooker argues that spiritual authority in the church \textit{appears} to stem from two separate sources. The first spiritual authority is the power that Christ has invested in the body of the church:

\begin{quote}
The Spirituall power of the Church being such, as neyther can be challenged by right of nature, nor could by humane authoritie bee instituted, because the forces and effects thereof are supernaturall and divine, wee are to make noe doubt or question, butt that from him which is the head, it hath descended unto us that are the bodye now invested therewith: He gave it for the benefitt and good of soules, as a meane to keepe them in the path which leadeth unto endles felicitie, a bridle to hold them within their due and convenient bounds, and if they doe goe astray, a forcible help to reclame them.\textsuperscript{76}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Lawes}, 2: 19.30-20.9; (V.1.3), 22.17-18; (V.1.5). Augustine, \textit{City of God}, 8.1-10, Thomas, \textit{Summa Theologiae}, 1a.2ae.91.2.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Lawes}, 2: 16.5-12; (V.1.1).

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Lawes}, 3: 4.25-5.7; (VI.2.2).
The purpose of this authority is to keep souls ‘in the path’ of good. However, Hooker moves on to identify a second source of spiritual authority in the church which he names as ‘spirituall jurisdiction’, the purpose of which is also to ‘provide for the health and safety of mens soules’, and is derived from what ‘publick wisdome shall judge expedient for the common good’. But just as the first spiritual authority stems from Christ, so too, according to the Lawes, the second also results from God. Hooker’s perception of how God provides the public with the wisdom of what is good, rather than men merely advising themselves on such matters, will be analysed thoroughly in the next section and in Chapter Six. In preparation for this, let us briefly summarise what bearing the findings of this study so far will have on the direction of the remainder of this chapter.

In Book V, Hooker argues that because reasoning forms the basis of agreement among men, it ‘appeare that God would in deed have all mens judgements give place unto it [reason]’. God metaphorically appears for Hooker to guide the judgement of common consent when men commonly acknowledge their use of the law of reason. Hooker does not accept that individual men are led or guided by God’s Spirit to what is ‘right’ in religion and in the church – the individuality of such an experience, though necessary in Biblical times, would, Hooker is clear, now only result in confusion for the whole church which is not God’s plan. But at the same time, English Protestants (and Catholics for that matter) believed in the sixteenth century that human law was conditioned by, and depended for its validation upon, divine law, and within this frame Hooker argues that commonly agreed laws cannot be ungodly.

77 Lawes, 3: 6.12-13; (VI.3.1).
78 Lawes, 3: 5.15-16; (VI.2.2).
79 Lawes, 2: 47.4-5; (V.10.1).
80 Lawes, 2: 46.7-47.11; (V.10.1).
In this, Hooker cannot be accused of arguing that the religion of the Church of England obeys the law of man at the expense of not obeying God, which was the general accusation made to mock the bishops as ‘reprobate’ in the notorious Marprelate Tracts that appeared between October 1588 and September 1589. Whilst the Marprelate writings were a last cry for the presbyterian vision which, by the 1590s, was an impossible reality, for Hooker the notion that men successfully construct laws for the outward religious expression of the church without any involvement from God is also an impossible reality. Hooker is misunderstood if his vision of the governing of church piety and worship is thought to be formed solely by human methods, as we shall see in the next section. What we must appreciate is that although we in the twenty-first century may generally remark that religion was interrelated with most parts of English life in the sixteenth century, for Hooker religion is not a human phenomenon. Hooker believes that religion is grounded in the reality of God, a reality which, as was discussed in detail in Chapter Four, Hooker sums up as metaphorically ‘filling’ heaven and earth, but as literally ‘taking up no roome in either’.

To begin with, Hooker is in line with the continental reformers of the early sixteenth century, such as Calvin who believes that religion is based entirely upon the fundamental sensus divinitatis. This enables Calvin to argue that every aspect of the service to God in earthly life is to be considered as worship, and that there is no aspect of life in which men do not have

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82 For instance see, Martin Marprelate, Oh read over Dr Bridges (the Epistle), (Fawsley: R. Waldegrave, 1588) STC 17454; idem, Certaine Minerall and Metaphisicall Schoolpoints to be defended by the reverende Bishops, (Coventry: R. Waldegrave, 1589) STC 17455. Hooker had his own copy of the latter. See Folger, 6: 1186. The Marprelate Tracts are thought to have been authored by Job Throckmorton (1545-1601), who was the Member of Parliament for Warwick in 1586. See Leland H. Carlson, Martin Marprelate, Gentleman: Master Job Throkmorton Laid Open in His Colors.

83 Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?, pp. 84-5.


85 Muller, Prolegomena to Theology, p. 167.
This was, of course, also endorsed by moderate puritans and presbyterians alike, often leading to their characterisation of themselves as ‘godly’. However, Hooker has grasped an understanding of religion which is not grasped by the moderates’ emphasis upon preaching and is excluded in the presbyterian ‘precision’ in following Scripture. Hooker perceives that because religion is not a human phenomenon then men in discharge of their duty towards the divine must regard all the religious activity within the church as having been necessitated by the gracious providence of ‘almightie God’. For Hooker, the ‘cold affection’ of the disciplinarians towards the organised public religion of the Church of England is unhelpful, not least to themselves because they do not perceive how God is already involved, even though they desire a ‘divine’ polity.

Hooker himself, on the other hand, goes as far as to argue that ‘solemn’ reverence towards God should be the primary goal of the church; the controversy about ecclesiastical laws is only secondary. In the Dedication to Book V, he writes:

To seeke reformation of evill lawes is a commendable endeavour, but for us the more necessarie is a spedie redresse of our selves. Wee have on all sides lost much of our first fervencie towards God; and therefore concerning our own degenerated waies wee have reason to exhort with S. Gregorie…Let us returne againe unto that which we sometime were: but touching the exchange of lawes in practise with lawes in devise which they say are better for the state of the Church if they might take place, the farther we examine them the greater cause wee find to conclude…although we continue the same we are the harme is not great. These fervent reprehenders of things established by publike authoritie are alwaies confident and bolde spirited men. But their confidence for the most part riseth from too much credit given to their own wits, for which cause they are seldome free from error.

Fervency towards God is to be upheld in Hooker’s vision by public authority, and such authority reflects the common guidance of God in reason and in what is good. In this, Hooker is critical of those who fervently reprehend the public authority that adheres to the consensus of reason which

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86 Philip W. Butin, *Reformed Ecclesiology: Trinitarian Grace According to Calvin*, (Princeton: Princeton Theological Seminary, 1994), pp. 26-27. This is also similar to Luther’s declaration that human life is spent *coram deo*, in the presence and scrutiny of God.

87 Lawes, 2: 16.12-17; (V.1.1).

88 Lawes, 2: 16.12-13; (V.1.1).

89 Lawes, 2: 1.18-2.7; (V.Ded.2).
in turn has discovered what is good; he is critical of those who, instead, confidently value their individual intelligence against the consensus of public reason. Hooker faces a challenging question: how can men who give too much credit to their own wit possibly recognise the guidance of God?

This question inadvertently highlights what at first appears to be an oversight in how Hooker, up until this point, has presented his rationale for the common recognition of God’s guidance. In Hooker’s vision of popular religion all men can potentially be saved, but also, all men can potentially recognise via reason what is good for the church – so why, in reality, is this not the case in the Church of England? Some of the leading moderate puritans and presbyterians were men of reason, including Edward Dering, William Whitaker, Laurence Chaderton as well as Cartwright and Travers, all of whom were credible intellectuals and Cambridge scholars. Why are they not in unison with Hooker in recognising via reason what is ‘good’ for the church?

Certainly there is always a benevolent tone towards the good when it is mentioned in controversies or in discussions about the offence caused by church disputes. Hooker apologises that ‘sorie we are that any good and godly mind should be grieved with that which is done’ in the church, whilst Cartwright had previously offered a similar sentiment on behalf of the Admonitioners: ‘we wold be sory to offend any…to offend the godly man, is farre from our meaning, for God knoweth we altogether seeke to do such good’. But we need to account for the lack of consensual agreement amongst Hooker, the presbyterians, and even Whitgift on what is ‘good’ in the expression of religion. Is it enough to say, as Lake concludes, that in post-Reformation England religious identity was unstable, that there were different ‘versions’ of

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90 See Lake, Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church, passim. See also Harry C. Porter, Reformation and Reaction in Tudor Cambridge, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), passim.
91 Lawes, 1: 305.23-24; (IV.10.1).
92 Cartwright, A Second Admonition to the Parliament, p. 82.
religion rather than the religion of Protestants or the religion of prayer book Protestantism, that there were many myriad answers to the wide problem in the period of what actually was the religion of Christianity?93

In fact, Hooker provides his own answer, and he may well have anticipated this criticism of his argument because he takes substantial time in explaining the measures required to recognise what God esteems as best for the church in historical situations. This line of inquiry is very advanced when compared to the Whitgift-Cartwright debate about the evidence and limitations of Scripture in illuminating the way for polity. And we shall now spend section IV in analysing the measures for Hooker that access what is good for the church.

Because he finds the Admonition debate about what is fit for the church too general to present a ‘sound’ solution - and lest what glorifies God should become generalised and not specific94 - Hooker, for his argument of accessing what is good for the church, provides four propositions in Chapters Six to Nine of Book V, which also form the basis to dispel the Admonitioners’ accusation of superstition against the authority of The Book of Common Prayer. His propositions aim to prove, firstly, that setting forward godliness should be reverently thought of as good; secondly, that men, by framing their understanding to the wisdom experienced across the centuries, are able to perceive what previously has been considered to be good; thirdly, that the church has the power to change to what is good for it, but by conferring with the common assent of reason and past wisdom; and fourthly, that the church can discover what out of necessity is good or best for its given circumstances. Let us now analyse these four.

In each, I argue that Hooker is particularly concerned with how human affection can be formally organised in response to the non-human phenomenon of religion. And Hooker clearly

94 Lawes, 2: 32.15-20; (V.5.1).
thought that his perception of God’s involvement would privilege his vision of the church’s spiritual growth in piety. After all, Hooker argues that the established church ceremonies and worship which feature in his vision must be ‘presumed as good’ by all parties in the church, and must not be sought to be outlawed. Rather, Hooker maintains, the ‘perswasion’ of those offended should be altered.95

IV

In Chapter Six, Book V of the Lawes, Hooker argues that, according to his first proposition, ceremonies and worship display public affection towards the divine as a matter of religious duty. He writes:

In the powers and faculties of our soules God requireth the uttermost which our unfained affection towards him is able to yield. So that if we affecte him not farre above and before all thinges, our religion hath not that inwarde perfection which it should have, neither doe we indeed worship him as our God. That which inwardlie each man should be, the Church outwardlie ought to testifie. And therefore the duties of our religion which are seene must be such as that affection which is unseen ought to be. Signes must resemble the things they signifie. If religion beare the greatest swaie in our harte, our outwarde religious duties must show it, as farre as the Church hath outwarde habilitie. Duties of religion performed by whole societies of men, ought to have in them accordinge to our power a sensible excellencie, correspondent to the majestie of him whome we worship.96

Hooker argues that men in their outward religious worship must testify to their inward affection towards God. For Hooker, God requires the ‘uttermost’ and ‘unfained’ affection in public worship that the power and faculty of men’s souls are able to yield. If men do not outwardly ‘affecte’ God as ‘above’ and ‘before’ all things, then their religion, Hooker argues, is not inwardly perfected and nor do they worship him as the divine.

It is specifically the majesty of God which, for Hooker in the above quotation, should be worshipped by societies of men. This is consistent with what we explored in Chapter Four concerning the importance for Hooker of the deity as the object of worship. We should note that

95 Lawes, 1: 306.15-22; (IV.10.1).
96 Lawes, 2:33.21-34.3; (V.6.1-V.6.2).
this focus upon the majesty of God is widespread in the sixteenth-century context: for Calvin, the majesty of God inspires awe and induces the notion that God must be served in worship. Hooker however advances his argument by envisaging that the majesty of God can be signified in worship: societies of men should perform an ‘excellencie’ in worship that will publicly ‘signifie’ the divine majesty of God, and the ‘sensible excellencie’ of religious duties is to be correspondent to the ‘majestie’ of the divine. And for Hooker this ‘sensible excellencie’ is to be provided by the rituals and words of the prayer book. We shall investigate Hooker’s argument that the language of prayer signifies the majesty of God in Chapter Seven.

At this stage, what is important is that Hooker’s argument assumes that it is good to achieve this ‘excellencie’ in church ceremonies. But Hooker only assumes this if man’s internal and unseen affection for God (which is to be publicly demonstrated in worship) is motivated to serve what God esteems as good. Moreover, Hooker believes that God demands that ‘signes’ of worship must motivate the internal affections of men in achieving ‘excellencie’. And such motivation, provided by religion, is to have for Hooker the greatest sway in the ‘harts’ of men.

Here, we return to Hooker’s view of a ‘pure’ religion – and its ‘purity’ is proportional to the response of the human affections towards, firstly, the non-human phenomenon of God and, secondly, the divine but saving mystery of Christ. As discussed in section I of this chapter, Hooker’s argument is that a ‘pure’ concentration in worship will provide ‘worthy’ affections, and that this godliness is the pinnacle of all virtues. But now, Hooker’s argument has developed again – his first proposition is that the inward affections that embrace what is good also recognise God at the centre of Christianity.

In other words, the recognition of God at the centre of worship is therefore dependent upon man’s inward affection, which Hooker values as a human strength as he discusses in

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97 Calvin, *Institutes*, I.i.3, I.xiii.13, II.vi.4, II.xii.1.
Chapter One, Book V. Hooker highlights that according to Scripture, King David was a man after ‘God’s own harte’ because, Hooker interprets, David’s affection was ‘hartie’ towards God. David prayed, Hooker continues, that this state of religion led by affection towards God would be kept by David’s people.98 The point for Hooker is that when God is ‘unfainedly loved’ both inwardly (by the heart) and outwardly (in an organised display of public affection), then this will ‘perfecteth mens habilities unto all kindes of virtuous services in the common wealth’, and with the increase in ‘virtuous service’ society will thus be safeguarded by what is good.99

Otherwise, Hooker argues, if men forsake God by not doing what is good in recognising him at the centre of worship and religion, then men will fall into evil, as was experienced, Hooker points out, by many of the Kings after David.100 Hooker admits that not all affections are good – the affections of fear and zeal when they are not kept in due proportion will betray reason, and thus betray what reason discovers to be good. And although the church for Hooker began as a charitable affection, it was not good but superstitious affections, Hooker claims, that grew disproportionately as an ‘incrochinge evell’ in the Church of Rome.101 Affections that are unchecked are dangerous according to Hooker, and that is precisely why he argues that worship needs to be organised, to guarantee that the right type of affections and in good measure are being displayed towards the majesty of God. We shall return to this in relation to superstition in Chapter Six.

For now, Hooker’s argument in his first proposition is that organised public affection is key to the edification, or the improvement of the spiritual health, of the church body. Hooker begins to develop this argument much earlier in Book IV of the Lawes, where he writes:

98 Lawes, 2: 22.2-6; (V.1.4).
99 Lawes, 2: 22.14-17; (V.1.5).
100 Lawes, 2: 22.6-13; (V.1.4).
101 Lawes, 2: 29.7-26; (V.3.4).
The end which is aimed at in setting downe the outward forme of all religious actions is the edification of the Church. Now men are edified, when either their understanding is taught somewhat whereof in such actions it behoveth all men to consider, or when their harts are moved with any affection suteable therunto, when their minds are in any sorte stirred up unto reverence, devotion, attention and due regard….  

Hooker’s view that religion edifies when the minds of men ‘recognise’, and are ‘stirred up’ with reverence to ‘affecte’, God is, as I contended in sections II and III, an important move away from the Admonition debate. For Whitgift, edification merely meant imparting formal doctrine, and for him personal godliness was to be limited to the private sphere. For Cartwright, public ceremonies and worship did not edify men, but, as a trickling-effect, private and individual godliness would in turn spread, edifying the church body. Insofar as the public sphere should reflect private affections, Hooker has more in common with Cartwright than with Whitgift. But overall Hooker fundamentally differs from both men in his claim that it is edifying for the church body to ‘affecte’ God publicly by demonstrating affections that are ‘stirred up’ in organised common prayer, and if this is not done, Hooker argues, then the church will not worship him as God.

Hooker is suggesting that divine worship edifies by harnessing the congregation’s godly affection into a form of public sanctification. Cartwright would not agree, since his focus is not on communal but individual prayers within a public setting.

Hooker would be troubled by Cartwright’s privileging of the private over the public because Hooker argues that it is good for all men to be included in the organised public expression of joy towards God. In Hooker’s view, Cartwright focused too much on what is a good outcome for the individual. Let us briefly illustrate this with the example of fasting, which Hooker discusses much later in Chapter Seventy-Two of Book V. Although Cartwright had

102 *Lawes*, 1: 273.29-274.3; (IV.1.3).
considered both the merit and the corruption of fasting, he had criticised the yearly and weekly fasts that were prescribed by the Church of England, preferring instead that a day’s fasting should only occur after extraordinary occasions, particularly after affliction. By contrast, Hooker writes:

Much hurt hath growne to the Church of God through a false imagination that fastinge standeth men in no stead for anie spirituall respect, but onlie take downe the franknes of nature and to tame the wildnes of flesh… I much woonder what they who are thus perswaded doe thinke, what concept they have concerning the fastes of the Patriarkes, the Prophetes, thapostles, our Lord Jesus Christ him selfe. Thaffections of joy and grieve are so knit unto all the actions of mans life, that whatsoever wee can doe or maie be don unto us, the sequell thereof is continualie the one or the other affection…we must note that as resting so fasting likewise attendeth sometimes no lesse upon the actions of the higher, then upon thaffections of the lower part of the minde. Fasting saith Tertullian is a worke of reverence towards God. The end thereof sometimes elevation of minde; sometime the purpose thereof cleane contrarie. The cause why Moses in the mount did so long fast was mere divine speculation, the cause why David, humiliation. Our life is a mixture of good with evell. When we are partakers of good thinges wee joy, neither can wee but grieve at the contrarie. If that befall us which maketh glad, our festival solemnities declare our rejoicing to be in him whose mere undeserved mercie is the author of all happiness; if anie thinge be either imminent or present which wee shun, our watchinges, fastinges, cryes and teares are unfained testimonies, that our selves wee condemne as the onlie causes of our own miserie, and doe all acknowledg him no lesse inclineable then able to save.

For Hooker, fasting works upon the mind and the affections in tuning their relation towards God. Indeed, ‘fastinges, cryes, and teares’ are ‘unfained testimonies’ that Christ saves, and generally ‘festival solemnities’ are ‘good thinges’ because they rejoice in him who is the ‘author of all happiness’. Hence the above quotation is consistent with Hooker’s first proposition - the church should accept what has been proven to be effective firstly in ‘betokeninge the greatenes of God’ and secondly in ‘beseeminge the dignitie of religion’.

Hooker is introducing two discussions here which we should acknowledge. Firstly we should note that for Hooker religion should be performed in a good way. In connection to fasting for instance, Hooker quotes the eleventh- and twelfth-century canonist Joannes Zonaras in Book I of the Lawes: ‘Fastinges are good, but let good things be done in good and convenient
maner. He that transgresseth in his fasting the orders of the holy fathers, the positive lawes of the Church of Christ, must be plainly tolde, that good things doe loose the grace of their goodnesse, when in good sort they are not performed.¹⁰⁷ Hooker’s point is that churches should achieve an amiable goodness in the performance of their customs, and we shall examine this further in Chapter Six. Secondly, we should note that Hooker’s view of the human mind and affections is not dissimilar to the Augustine view of spiritual existence in which men come to God through love, desire and joy (rather than exclusively via knowledge). Hooker is of a piece with the revival of Augustinianism in the English Renaissance (alongside writers such as John Donne and George Herbert) where emotion is not suppressed but is redirected towards God.¹⁰⁸ This will also be thoroughly examined in Chapters Six and Seven.

Although in Hooker’s first proposition the church in his vision should accept that God’s greatness is to be betokened in worship, there is still the problem for Hooker of effectively arriving at what is good in displaying godliness. This, Hooker considers in his second proposition which occupies Chapter Seven, Book V. Hooker begins by arguing that churches assume that the customs which have been ‘long approved’ for many years will in all probability be the best. He argues:

To the best and wisest, while they live, the world is continewallie a froward opposite, a curious observer of theire defectes and imperfections, theire virtues it afterwardes as much admireth…For the world will not indure to heare that we are wiser than anie have bene which went before. In which consideration there is cause why we should be slow and unwillinge to chaunge without urgent necessitie the ancient ordinances rites and longe approved customes of our venerable predecessors…That which is new, if it promise not much, doth feare condemnation before triall; till triall, no man doth acquite or trust it, what good soever it pretend and promise. So that in this kinde there are fewe thinges knowne to be good, till such time as they grow to be ancient.¹⁰⁹

Hooker contends that the judgements made in antiquity must be evaluated and not rejected without due consideration. But for Hooker, the good experienced throughout the ancient

¹⁰⁷ Lawes, 1: 141.23-27; (I.16.7).
¹⁰⁹ Lawes, 2: 36.18-37.9; (V.7.3).
churches is not an authoritative ‘tradition’ and the good was certainly not ‘created’ by men. Rather, in what Hooker writes directly after the above quotation, his metaphor of wisdom reappears to explain how the experience of antiquity is formed: it is ‘wisdom’ that has generated the intelligent thought underlying religious ceremonies and customs encountered by generations. ‘That which wisdome did first begin and hath bene with good men longe continewed, chalengeth allowance of them that succeede, although it plead for it selfe nothinge’.  

In pleading nothing for itself, wisdom, Hooker implies, is not necessarily easy to recognise in his contemporary context. Hooker observes that contemporaries usually distrust what is new, irrespective of the good that it promises, and that contemporaries believe instead that the ancients were better than themselves at recognising wisdom, whether in Biblical times (as the presbyterians believed) or in regard to the saints of antiquity (as Rome and, to an extent, Elizabeth’s church believed). Hooker, to begin with, discusses such attachment to ancient ways of worship, although Hooker does not fully agree with this position, as we shall see. Let us begin with his understanding of why contemporary men can however trust ancient worship, albeit that they should not in his view blindly attach themselves to its customs.

Hooker reasons that men who can recognise the appropriate wisdom for their contemporary context are also likely to understand the wisdom recognised in antiquity. ‘And for this cause many tymes that which most deserveth approbation would hardlie be able to finde favour, if they which propose it were not content to professe themselves therein schollers and followers of the ancient’. Hooker concedes that the good which is discovered in one ecclesiastical age will be reflected upon in subsequent ages, and he stays in line with his main contention that all good actions in the church are in accordance with the guiding wisdom of God
and nature. Drawing on Aristotle, Hooker writes: ‘It is therefore the voice both of God and nature not of learninge onlie, that especiallie in matters of action and policie, The sentences and judgements of men experienced aged and wise, yea though they speake without any prooфе or demonstration are no lesse to be harkned unto, then as beinge demonstrations in them selves, because such mens longe observation is an eye wherewith they presently and plaineлиe behold those principles which sway over all actions’. Here, we confront the problem discussed in Chapter Three concerning which ‘voice’ Hooker is presenting as authoritative. The pagan learning of Aristotle or the guiding wisdom of God? The answer in this case is a perspective derived from both because, in Hooker’s view, Aristotle’s use of the law of nature (reason) is guided by God, and hence Aristotle, although pagan, can legitimately attempt to explain the divine who is the source of his thought. Thus Hooker uncritically accepts Aristotle’s reasoning: although the wisdom of men’s experience is without any demonstrative proof, it is by taking the long view of observation that they know that God guides in matters of action and policy. Hooker does however allow for error in pagan thought, as when he refutes Aristotle on the lasting validity of ‘principles which sway over all actions’ upon the grounds that this is impractical in every historical circumstance of the church, as we shall examine in Hooker’s fourth proposition.

So far we have established that according to Hooker’s second proposition the wisdom of the wise is to be trusted, and the judgement of those who have over many years experienced the guidance of wisdom is also to be taken into account. Indeed, what the ancients drew from

\section*{Footnotes}

\footnote{Lawes, 2: 35.29-36.4; (V.7.2).}
\footnote{See Lawes, 2: 43.6-44.13; (V.9.2).}
\footnote{Lawes, 2: 35.4-12; (V.7.1).}
‘wisdom’ can, for Hooker, be applied appropriately in later times of the church, thus making any age of the church equally as wise as it was in antiquity.115

However, Hooker is not simply arguing that the customs of antiquity must be given priority, although Rome had argued that may be they should, just as the presbyterians had argued that the ancient customs in Scripture should be given priority. According to Hooker, what is good transforms in various ages. Let us understand his argument. Wisdom in his metaphor is immutable: wisdom is not only associated with antiquity but continues to be associated with contemporary men who recognise it. And because in Hooker’s metaphor wisdom, due to its divinity, is an incomprehensible size, men in various ages thus recognise different aspects of wisdom, and each aspect is good. Thus ‘wisdom’ presents a challenge: ancient thought can be refined with new innovations that are also good. We must remember that, in Hooker’s vision, the church aims to discover what is good for its age, whether innovative or ancient - and both are derived from God’s wisdom. This would suggest that it is a mistake to canonically regard Hooker as simply defending established or ‘set’ church customs just because they have been experienced and esteemed by many men across the centuries.

I lay emphasis here upon Hooker’s central argument about the guidance of God’s wisdom because I think that we do not entirely understand Hooker if we suppose, as does William Harrison, that church laws are decided for Hooker strictly by human prudence as a method in practical decision making.116 I think this misses the vital ‘image’ of God that Hooker presents.

For example, Harrison admits that Hooker is not a modern pragmatist, and correctly points out that men according to Hooker understand the good as being consistent with God’s

115 Lawes, 2: 36.5-11; (V.7.2).
intentions although they may not understand their place in the divine purpose.\footnote{Harrison, ‘Prudence and Custom: Revisiting Hooker on Authority’, p. 904.} Yet although Harrison also argues that for Hooker prudence is a means of participating in God’s will, he contends that prudence is a human method capable of adapting church customs to particular circumstances.\footnote{Ibid., p. 910.} But I argue that Harrison’s account does not fully examine how, in Hooker’s vision, societies of men are to recognise the work of God in governing church worship. We must be sensitive to Hooker’s awareness of God: men for Hooker are not bound by what their particular society may judge to be prudent and acceptable, but rather for Hooker, men are bound to what God guides as good for a set of circumstances. The perception of God is imperative for Hooker. Certainly Whitgift had argued that human judgement and discretion should decide law (as we shall see shortly), and W.D.J. Cargill Thompson has contented that Hooker’s argument was merely an extension of Whitgift’s.\footnote{W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, ‘The Philosopher of the “Politic Society”’, in William Speed Hill ed., Studies in Richard Hooker, p. 24.}

But I argue that we must not confuse Hooker with Whitgift. For Hooker, the guiding goodness of God must not be misrecognised as human prudence, he does not argue for human authority over divine Scriptural authority, but presents an authority which he takes to be equally divine in its source and, what is more, which he takes to be the divine’s specific plans for the changing historical contexts of the church. Nor must we confuse Hooker with the methodological prudence of the French philosopher Peter Ramus for whom the ‘natural’ method of prudential explanation only took into account the human experience of time, place and audience.\footnote{Walter J. Ong, Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 246; Morgan, Godly Learning, p. 107.} For Hooker, the church requires a more ‘watchful guide’ than what men prize as their own methods. Indeed, according to Hooker, God’s guidance in different ages will of course
overrule what even the saints of antiquity recognised as good for their ages. Again in Chapter Seventy-Two, Book V, Hooker, in discussing the days appointed for festivals, warns:

[I]n as much as the verie admiration of Sainetes, whether wee celebrate theire glorie or follow them in humilitie, whether wee laugh or weepe, morne or rejoyce with them, is (as in all thinges thaffection of love) apt to deceive, and doth therefore need the more to be directed by a watchfull guide, seeinge there is manifestlie both waies even in them whom wee honor that which wee are to observe and shun.\footnote{Lawes, 2: 398.4-10; (V.72.15)}

As this study argued in the previous chapter, the Lawes is anxious that divine guidance is realised in the human activity of the church, and this is why Hooker contends that the ecclesiastical governing of worship should foster such recognition of God. We should note that although in the above quotation the affection of love for other humans is ‘apt to deceive’, Hooker is clear elsewhere in Books I and V that the love for God does not deceive men but enhances their rational search for what is good, as we shall examine in the next chapter.

To sum up, Hooker argues that the continued guidance of wisdom within the world will further influence the construction of all good law. Therefore Hooker moves in Chapter Eight, Book V, to his third proposition: that the church, in observing ‘wisdom’, always has the authority to frame its ordinances according to what is good for it in any age. This, however, is his vision, and again we must not necessarily assume that he means to actually describe Elizabeth’s church. Hooker is of course sensitive to the church of his age, and in preparing for his explanation of his vision, he discusses in Book IV why churches alter laws on the one hand and why churches are cautious in their approach to change on the other hand. But Hooker presents these in the context of the church’s toleration of evil and corruption among its society. And the evil and corruption of this context is resolved for the church, Hooker thinks, in his vision of God’s guiding good. Let us briefly examine Hooker’s remarks in Book IV, which will prepare for our return to the development of his vision in his third proposition.
Laws are usually altered in churches, Hooker comments, on the following grounds: previous rites and ceremonies have hindered, due to contemporary circumstances, the pious service to God; what is established in former ages is no longer beneficial; further still, customs have become ‘hurtefull’ against ‘that good for which humaine societies were instituted’.\(^{122}\) Hooker points out that churches are generally cautious formally not to revoke or abrogate a law that would contradict ‘the waight’ of ‘many mens judgment’ and the ‘long experience, which the world hath had thereof with consent and good liking’.\(^{123}\) Hooker observes that churches generally prefer to tolerate the lesser of two evils: ‘sith the custome of easines to alter and change is so evill, no doubt but to beare a tollerable soare is better then to venter on a daungerous remedie’.\(^{124}\)

But this is not what would happen in Hooker’s vision, even though Hooker’s discussion of moderate change is at the core of the canonical view that regards Hooker’s stance on church polity as conservative. For Hooker, man’s alteration or maintenance of law will not be enough to surmount the evil within the church. For example, Hooker argues, God foresees that men will not always have the intelligence to understand that, in altering what they think will be for the good, they may inadvertently impose evil. Hooker finishes Book IV by writing:

> But the Almightie which giveth wisedome and inspireth with right understanding whom soever it pleaseth him, he foreseeing that which mans wit had never been able to reach unto, namely, what tragedies th’attempt of so extreme alteration would raise in some parts of the Christian worlde, did for the endless good of his Church (as we cannot choose but interpret it) use the bridle of his provident restrayning hand, to stay those eager affections in some, and to settle their resolution upon a course more calme and moderate….\(^{125}\)

God, in foreseeing the evil that may be caused, uses his ‘restrayning hand’ to settle the eager affections of men who, Hooker points out, seek a change that will unwittingly work against the

\(^{122}\) \textit{Lawes}, 1: 336.10-337.26; (IV.14.1-2).

\(^{123}\) \textit{Lawes}, 1: 337.15-19; (IV.14.1).

\(^{124}\) \textit{Lawes}, 1: 338.18-20; (IV.14.2).

\(^{125}\) \textit{Lawes}, 1: 342.7-15; (IV.14.6).
‘endlesse good’ of his church. Hooker is not explicit as to whether God’s ‘restrayning hand’ is another metaphor for the common ‘voice’ of reason. But nevertheless, God’s interest in the ‘endlesse good’ of his church is fundamental in Book V to the crux of Hooker’s vision.

Indeed, Hooker’s third proposition is developed around his perception of the ‘endlesse good’ – he contends that the church ‘hath authoritie to establish that for an order at one tyme, which at an other time it maie abolish, and in both doe well’.126 Hooker’s argument is that two separate historical ages in the church can both ‘do well’ because both enact and serve what is good. We have already established that what is good for spiritual affairs will not, Hooker contends, always be of ‘ancient continewance’,127 and by ‘ancient’ Hooker should be understood as referring not only to the early formation of the Romish Church, but also to the early Apostolic Church that was revered by the presbyterians. Yet how, I ask, can Hooker expect to rationally explain that ‘good law’ appears in various forms?

Hooker can account for the good authority of custom and for the good authority vested in change and innovation within the church because, again, his argument is explained by the metaphor of wisdom which enables him to overlap the authority of both custom and change. In the metaphor, wisdom, as God’s directive, assists the church in establishing its divine worship in any age. Describing wisdom in his third proposition, Hooker writes:

To proscribe the order of doinge in all thinges, is a peculiar prerogative which wisdom hath as Quene or Soveraine commandresse over other vertues. This in everie severall mans actions of common life apperteyneth unto morall; in publique and politique secular affairs unto civill wisdom. In like manner to devise any certayne form, for the outward administration of publique duties in the service of God, or thinges belonginge thereunto, and to find out the most convenient for that use, is a pointe of wisdom ecclesiasticall.128

Although Hooker has already asserted that godliness is the highest of virtues, he now adds that wisdom, as ‘Soveraigne’ over every virtue, has a ‘peculiar prerogative’ to order how things

126 Lawes, 2: 38.17-19; (V.8.2).
127 Lawes, 2: 38.2-3; (V.8.1).
128 Lawes, 2: 38.6-14; (V.8.1).
should be done in public, political and moral affairs as well as to order every ecclesiastical administration in the service to God.

Hooker’s aim here in his third proposition is to promote, as part of God’s wider plan for the ‘endlesse good’ of his church, the common public recognition of what is good for an age, bearing in mind that Cartwright had asked in the 1570s why judgement should rest with the church body. In Hooker’s explanation, wisdom as the metaphorical ‘commandresse’ over all virtues is vital. If a large section of the public body is influenced by ‘wisdom ecclesiasticall’ then the more likely it is, according to Hooker, that the common ‘voice’ of the church will recognise what is good. And, Hooker writes, what the ‘voice of the church’ by ‘her ecclesiasticall authoritie shall probablie thinke and define to be true and good, must in congruitie of reason overrule all other inferior judgementes whatsoever. […] The bare consent of the whole Church should it selfe in these thinges stop their mouthes who livinge under it dare presume to barke against it’.

For Hooker, the majority who consent to what wisdom governs as good are right to prevail over the dissenting ‘barke’ made by presbyterians such as Cartwright. Whereas the presbyterians sought to withdraw their obedience from Elizabeth’s church, in Hooker’s vision the Church of God is not unstrengthened in its capacity to adhere to divine authority, and hence her laws may exact obedience at the hands of her own children, whose duty it is to submit. As mentioned in section III, in Hooker’s estimation presbyterianism misrecognises God, except now Hooker seems to imply that this misrecognition is widespread among the society of the church, and that neither the consenting majority nor the dissenting minority should underestimate the influence of God and nature: ‘Might wee not thinke it more then wonderfull, that nature should...

130 Lawes, 2: 39.11-14; (V.8.2), 39.22-24; (V.8.3).
131 Lawes, 2: 40.7-24; (V.8.4).
Hooker’s point is that everything which is good has been divinely organised. But Hooker is aware that what he is saying may be misunderstood. Although men in a given historical age of the church can, by the grace of God’s wisdom, universally recognise what is conclusively good, Hooker is anxious that a particular instance of the good should not be perceived as universal for all ages. If Hooker were to argue that it should be universalised then he would be hypocritically making the same type of argument as the Admonitioners and presbyterians, simply replacing their universal, Scripture, with his own universal, the good.

Here, there emerges an important slant in Hooker’s argument. What is good for the church is not, for Hooker, what in principle is good. Hooker astutely understands that the church does not necessarily need to identify the nature of ‘the good’, but it will need to linguistically re-state what is meant by ‘good’ in different ecclesiastical ages. Hooker’s vision of goodness is really a theory of value and not necessarily a theory of universals such as in, for example, Plato’s general theory of Forms. The Platonic Good as a philosophical abstraction would be compromised for Hooker by man’s experience of what is good, especially in divine worship, as will be thoroughly analysed in Chapter Six.

Hooker has new grounds now for criticising as too general the debate over what can be universally enforced as fit and unfit in church ceremony. This leads Hooker to his fourth proposition in Chapter Nine, Book V. Here, he contends that God has ordered things in such a way that, when what is best for the circumstances cannot be humanly provided, then out of necessity the guidance of God must be commonly recognised in directing what good will be allowed in particular situations. Hooker writes:

132 Lawes, 2: 39.26-40.2; (V.8.3).
According to Hooker’s fourth proposition, men who abide by the law of reason are capable of asserting what is good in various circumstances. The presbyterian argument for enforcing Scripture as the exclusive rule for polity does not, Hooker points out, take necessity and circumstances into account. ‘Now that which causeth numbers to storme against some neccessarie tolerations, which they should rather lett passe with silence, consideringe…that which maketh odious unto them manie thinges wherein notwithstandinge the truth is that verie just regard hath bene had of the publique good’.134

In his vision, Hooker prizes the ‘verie just regard’ of what is good because only such sensitivity among the church body will induce it to recognise what is truly good for its particular age, which may not be what is truly good for another age since conditions change in human societies, they are temporal not eternal. Hooker is making a subtle distinction: there is always a higher good in any age of the church which overrides individual human prudence and overrides what has previously been appropriate in ecclesiastical ages. According to his distinction, the higher good is neglected by the presbyterian argument about general Scriptural principles to be applied to all ages and neglected by Whitgift’s valuation of individual human prudence especially on the part of bishops. Let us firstly examine in Hooker’s fourth proposition his refutation of presbyterianism in this context, before moving to his divergence from Whitgift’s position. And we should bear in mind, as I claimed in sections II and III, that Hooker argues from outside the Admonition debate.

133 Lawes, 2: 41.10-11; (V.9.1), 41.26-42.2; (V.9.1).
134 Lawes, 2: 43.1-8; (V.9.2).
Hooker contends that, unlike the common assent to what out of necessity is good, those who propagate general principles for the church ‘insnare’ the guidance of good. He writes:

…that which in a great part of the weightiest causes belonging to this present controversy hath insnared the judgementes both of sundrie good, and of some well learned men, is the manifest truth of certaine generall principles, whereupon the ordinances that serve for usuall practise in the Church of God are grounded. Which principles men knowinge to be most sounde, and that the ordinarie practise accordingly framed is good, whatsoever is over and besides that ordinarie, the same they judge repugnant to those true principles. The cause of which error is ignorance what restraintes and limitations all such principles have, in regard of so manifold varieties as the matter whereunto they are appliable doth commonlie afford. These varieties are not knowne but by much experience, from whence to draw the true boundes of all principles, to discerne how farre forth they take effect…requireth more sharne of witt, more intricate circuiations of discorse, more industrie and depth of judgment then common habilitie doth yield. So that generall rules till there limits be fullie knowne…[are] no other to the eye of mans understandinge then cloudie mistes cast before the eye of common sense…And even as little is there certaintie whose opinions generalities onlie doe guide. With grosse and popular capacities nothinge doth more prevale then unlimited generalities…nothinge lesse with men of exact judgement, because such rules are not safe to be trusted over farre. Generall lawes are like generall rules of phisick, accordinge whereunto as no wise man will desire himselfe to be cured, if there be joygned with his disease some speciall accident…[the cure] to him [may be] either hurteful, or at least unprofitable: So we must not, under a coulorable commendation of holie ordinances in the Church, and of reasonable causes whereupon they have bene grounded for the common good, imagen that all mens cases ought to have one measure.135

Let us understand this passage in reference to Hooker’s reflection upon the Admonition controversy. Within the presbyterian terms of the debate, only sound principles disseminated from parts of the Bible and used to form church discipline were to be framed as good, anything contrary was to be judged as repugnant. Walter Travers, for example, had written in 1574 that perpetuating the church discipline that had been ‘fixed’ by Jesus Christ was crucial in preserving the gospel – discipline and doctrine were to be understood as completely entwined.136 Hooker argues that what is best for the common good within different ecclesiastical circumstances cannot be diagnosed by one measure that superficially applies general principles and is unable to ‘reach’ the good in certain circumstances, thus blind to God’s real plan for what is good whilst at the same time dangerously misappropriating Biblical contexts.137

135 Lawes, 2: 43.6-44.13; (V.9.2).
137 As argued in Chapter Three above.
On the other hand, what is best for the church is not, in Hooker’s argument, sourced in human opinion and prudence, contrary to the claims of Archbishop Whitgift. Hooker does however follow Whitgift in disputing presbyterianism. Whitgift had argued that ecclesiology was a matter indifferent to salvation, an adiaphora issue, when compared to the doctrinal teachings of the gospel. Instead, church discipline and ceremonies for Whitgift were to be determined by historical conditions as observed by the human discretion and good judgement of the bishops and the civil magistrates who assisted them.138

But Hooker argues that polity should not be left to the prudence of the bishops, rather polity should be based upon ‘wisdom’ in which it is God who provides many variances of the good that are to be accommodated into human conditions. What men are better advised in judging, Hooker argues in the passage quoted at length above, is the limitation of all principles (even those constructed by bishops), and this requires more ‘intricate circuitations of discorse, more industrie and depth of judgment then common habilitie doth yield’. For Hooker, judging the limits of general rules is an elite task for the wise, but the national ‘voice’ of the church should, according to Hooker’s fourth proposition, recognise via the law of reason the manifold varieties of the good.

For sith all good lawes are the voices of right reason, which is the instrument wherewith God will have the world guided; and impossible it is that right should withstande right, it must follow that principles and rules of justice, be they never so generallie uttered, doe no lesse effectuallie intend, then if they did plainelie expresse, an exception of all particulars, wherein theire litterall practise might any waie prejudice equitie.139

Hooker envisages the ‘voice’ of the church to be guided by a higher goodness, honoured above human judgements. Hooker has already claimed this in Book I: ‘[U]nlesse wee will be authors of confusion in the church, our private discretion, which otherwise might guide us a contrary way, must here submit it selfe to be that way guided, which the publike judgement of the church

139 Lawes, 2: 45.2-8; (V.9.3).
hath thought better…mens private phancies must give place to the higher judgement of that church which is in authority a mother over them’. And in Hooker’s fourth proposition the common ‘voice’ of the church should, in matters of necessity, discover the ‘higher judgement’ which has been divinely accommodated.

The analysis of this section has established that making ecclesiastical laws for the orchestration of divine worship relies, for Hooker, upon the church’s perception of what is ‘good’. Indeed, this section has assumed that Hooker’s argument is layered with several interconnecting meanings of ‘good’, ‘right’ and ‘best’. Firstly, Hooker contends that goodness is directed by God and that men naturally desire to find and follow God’s good direction in all historical conditions. Secondly for Hooker, the society of the church publicly recognises what ‘wisdom’ dictates as good because, as a body utilising reason, the church will grasp what is worthy and best, whatever the circumstances. Thirdly for Hooker, the society of the church is to some extent intrinsically good. This is because the society, when ordered under the guidance of wisdom to what is right for its circumstances, becomes good in the sight of God. Moreover, Hooker’s four propositions outlined in this section highlight how human reason and affection, in responding to God, become for Hooker the bearers of the intrinsic good within the church, they create for Hooker not an organised religion of generalised principles but a ‘pure’ view of Christianity that rationally follows and affectionately worships God.

Yet as twenty-first-century readers we may not fully appreciate this argument without examining what Hooker specifically means by ‘good’ and how it has an assumed conventional meaning in his thought, and how it has philosophical and ethical roots underpinning his argument. We shall turn to this examination in the next chapter, in which I shall explain how what is good for the church is initially approved to be good according to the argument of the

140 Lawes, 1: 141.19-29; (I.16.7).
Lawes, and how the goodness of God’s guiding wisdom is to be recognised by desire, love and reason in Hooker’s vision.
Chapter Six

“Goodnesse is seene”: Hooker’s Theological and Philosophical Argument for Goodness and Affection in the Church

So far we have been engaged in exploring how Hooker, frustrated by the presbyterian view that polity is prescribed exclusively by Scripture, asks whether or not the church should be governed by what is good for it, and if so, is not this goodness directed by God. In this chapter, I introduce the contention that, in fact, the Lawes inquires into how God guides what is good for the church by endowing men not only with reason to recognise ‘wisdom’ but also with desire and love for what is good. This does not appear, at first, to be an extraordinary claim. In the Reformed Protestant theology of the sixteenth century divine goodness is generally understood as characteristic of all the divine relations to the finite order, it is understood as the primary divine affection and is found in divine love, grace and mercy. In the metaphysical discussions of the period the goodness of God (the bonitas Dei) is, along with ‘oneness’ or unity, an essential attribute of the divine essence.² It is also hardly surprising that what Hooker and indeed his contemporaries including Thomas Cartwright² have written about the good has Platonistic resonances, since historically the most influential type of Christian theory about the good has been Platonistic in outlook.³

But, as was argued in Chapter Four, we must be cautious of reading into Hooker strictly Greek philosophical conceptions of God and, now we may add, strictly Greek conceptions of ‘the good’. We should be wary of appending specific philosophical labels to Hooker’s name

¹ Muller, The Divine Essence and Attributes, p. 503.
because his influences are highly eclectic. He is influenced by more than just one pagan
philosopher or school of philosophy. At the same time, he has several fundamental differences
from pagan philosophy; he has similarities with the Augustine view of Christian love, whilst also
adhering to the Protestant emphasis upon the goodness of God’s relation to the finite world.

The result for Hooker is that he presents not a general but a distinctive rationale for how
Christianity is to be expressed in the church’s outward forms. For example, in Hooker’s
treatment of ‘goodness’ in religion, he writes of a love and an affection towards God in the
church that the divine reciprocates back to the church body. Hooker’s view that God in his
goodness reciprocates love sets apart Hooker’s Christian outlook from other non-Christian forms
of goodness. Of course, Hooker, like Augustine and Thomas, does follow Plato and Aristotle in
forming his conception of man’s ‘good’ or ‘end’ – there is, for Hooker, nothing else which
satisfies men except the vision of an ultimate end with God. But in the Graeco-Roman world,
Plato and Aristotle had argued that God could not possibly love anything finite, and certainly
would not reciprocate love. Further, Aristotle’s ethics were based upon human prudence that
would guide contemplation, and the self-sufficiency of human reason had also been taught by the
Stoics – but in neither is there found Hooker’s view of men understanding that what they
diligently reason in the church has been created, thought and given by the Christian God.

It is important to note that Hooker describes the ancient Greeks as ‘affected atheists’
because their religion according to Hooker was pagan wisdom. Hooker, early in Book V,
opposes those who ‘extoll the wisdom of Paganisme’ and who ‘give it out as a mysticall precept
of great importance….’

Hooker argues that devout and humble Christians in understanding
their religion can rely more confidently upon the precepts provided by the guiding goodness of

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4 *Lawes*, 2: 26.15-17; (V.2.4).
God. For Hooker, God’s guidance of reason and God’s provision of what is good for the church must be affectionately put into practice by men as a Christian duty towards the divine.

Basil Willey suggested that because Hooker argues for a God-centred view in which man’s final orientation is towards God, then man will naturally desire what Willey called ‘goods’; but Willey did not analyse how this is connected in Hooker to polity and piety. Instead, Willey concluded by re-affirming the canonical view that Hooker strikes a balance between revelation and reason, between grace and nature, which Willey stereotyped as a peculiar English gift on Hooker’s part.

As should already be clear, in my opinion we do not do Hooker justice by narrowing his argument to a dual understanding of revelation (Scripture) and reason, as a balancing act between what God reveals and what men can think in establishing authority for the church. Rather, I argue in this chapter that for Hooker man is guided in his orientation towards God in what he does in the church not by two but by several influences including revelation, reason, love, desire, affection and, of course, by what is good. Because for Hooker Christians in the church should make use of this range of influences, our view in the twenty-first century of Hooker as concerned solely with revelation and reason is a distortion since there are many stimuli that are not separate but are interconnected and rely upon each other in what Hooker writes. For example, reason may be needed in order to understand revelation, but also for Hooker the good is needed to guide reason to what is best for the church. What is more, what is good and has been reasoned to be so, is, according to Hooker, also desired and loved and is to be affectionately and solemnly expressed in language by the church body.

5 Lawes, 1: 64.12-18; (I.3.2).
7 ibid., p. 114.
We must be prepared to find the *Lawes* complex and subtle, and be prepared to ask complex questions. For instance, Hooker defends philosophical learning as has been examined in Chapter Three, but does he go a step further and link love with philosophy, as Plato had done? Hooker asks in Book III of the *Lawes*: ‘Could secular knowledge bring the one sort unto the love of Christian faith? Nor Christian faith the other sort out of love with secular knowledge’.\(^8\) Certainly Hooker’s aim to find what is best for the church leads him to inquire, similar to Plato, into how love by nature seeks the good and also how love is an ongoing search for the good.\(^9\)

In this chapter, I will discuss the philosophical and theological basis of Hooker’s argument about ‘goodness’ in the church and its relation to reason, desire, affection and love. I shall conclude the chapter with how Hooker offers what is good for the church as a counter-claim against the presbyterian charge of superstition in the Church of England.

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\(^8\) *Lawes*, 1: 224.13-15; (III.8.8).

I

The foundation of Hooker’s inquiry into goodness is philosophically laid out in Book I where Hooker’s primary purpose in Chapters Five to Eleven is to ask how, in his own words, ‘rules’ are ‘found out concerning that goodnes wherwith the will of man ought to be moved in humaine actions’. Hooker’s general thesis is that the faculty of reason stipulates for the human will what it should choose as good. Hooker argues that to choose what is good is to will one thing and not another – and to will is to ‘bend’ the soul to what is ‘seeen’ by reason as good. ‘Goodnesse is seeen with the eye of the understanding. And the light of that eye, is reason. […] Reason is the director of mans will by discovering in action what is good. For the lawes of well doing are the dictates of right reason’. Hence reason, for Hooker, enables men to discern what is good without the aid of divine revelation. And although men need to actively discern the good as a result of their fallen condition, Hooker, like Thomas, assumes that the human aptitude for understanding goodness has not been destroyed by sin. Thus all reasonable men can generally agree upon what reason attests to be good – and this is precisely Hooker’s definition of the law of nature that is found among men.

Now, whilst the pursuit of what is good is fundamental to Hooker’s argument about discovering what is right in polity, Hooker also intends to persuade his sixteenth-century presbyterian reader that what is perceived as good can be linguistically expressed by the church in extra-Scriptural language. After all, what Hooker believes Elizabeth’s church already perceives as right in polity has not been divinely revealed in Scriptural language. Rather for

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10 Laws, 1: 81.30-82.1; (I.8.1).
11 Lawes, 1: 78.1-3; (I.7.2).
12 Lawes, 1: 78.3-4; (I.7.2), 79.10-12; (I.7.4).
13 As made clear by Voak. Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, pp. 104-105. As mentioned in the Introduction, Voak does not analyse in Hooker the role of the good in church polity or indeed the guidance of God in that process; the context for his study is how Hooker’s philosophy of human reason and will relates to Reformed theology, with reference to questions of justification and sanctification.
Hooker, what reason stipulates as good when guiding the human will should correspond with what language can express in the church about the goodness of customs. Hooker assumes that reason will perceive and language will state the direction of the divine. The language of prayer in forming good worship for Hooker will be examined in Chapter Seven. The question which the current chapter explores is how for Hooker the good in its various manifestations is to be recognised, spoken about and enacted in different ecclesiastical ages, especially in the good’s reference to desire, affection and love.

Let us begin to analyse this by starting with the law of reason which Hooker defines as the “law wherby man is in his actions directed to the imitation of God”, and in which goodness is presented by Hooker as a connection between human reason and the divine. At several points in the discussion we shall pause to consider key philosophical and theological influences upon Hooker’s argument.

Hooker argues that all things (except God) desire to progress in their perfection, and that all perfections are contained ‘under the generall name of Goodnesse’. Because for Hooker everything in the world inclines towards ‘perfection’ then everything that exists must therefore incline towards seeking what is good. Importantly for Hooker, there is no ‘goodnesse’ desired which does not proceed from God as the supreme cause of all things; men not only resemble God as their cause, but they covet the ‘participation of God himselfe’ within their lives.

In desiring what proceeds from God men principally seek, Hooker maintains, two degrees of goodness. Firstly, men desire to resemble God in the eternal continuation of their being.

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14 Lawes, 1: 72.25-26; (I.5.1).
15 Lawes, 1: 72.27-73.3; (I.5.1).
16 Lawes, 1: 73.3-5; (I.5.1).
17 Lawes, 1: 73.5-10; (I.5.2).
Secondly, men, in their attempt to achieve ‘constancie’ and ‘excellencie’, affect resemblance with God by striving to imitate divine immutability and absolute exactness.\textsuperscript{18} These two degrees of goodness are so intrinsic to men, Hooker contends, that men scarcely perceive them. What is more apparent to men, Hooker argues, is a third degree of goodness which enables men to grow in their awareness of truth and which enables men to grow in their exercise of virtue and, as was examined in Chapter Four, is a goodness with which men aspire to conform with (and not necessarily imitate) God.\textsuperscript{19} This is Hooker’s general account of man’s desire for goodness, but to avoid simplifying Hooker we should pause here to consider the philosophical influences upon him, beginning with the Platonic structure of Hooker’s argument, which appears to be obvious at this early stage. As discussed in Chapter Four, Torrance Kirby contends that Hooker’s thought relies on two very different Neoplatonic interpretations of the divine rule over humanity – on the one hand, the Augustine view of a Christocentric immediacy in which all things participate in God and, on the other hand, the cosmology of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite in which the divine mediates the hierarchical structure of all things.\textsuperscript{20} But I wish to ask whether Hooker is strictly Neoplatonic in his conception of goodness.

Augustine had commended Platonists for associating the good with God,\textsuperscript{21} and had written that because God is perfectly good then the beings that he has created are also good or else they would not exist.\textsuperscript{22} In Pseudo-Dionysian cosmology, which follows the influential Neoplatonists Plotinus, Iamblichus and Proclus, God’s goodness is the primary operative cause of all things. In his work \textit{The Divine Names}, Pseudo-Dionysius argues that God can take ‘the

\textsuperscript{18} Lawes, 1: 73.11-23; (1.5.2).
\textsuperscript{19} Lawes, 1: 73.25-74.5; (1.5.3).
\textsuperscript{20} Kirby, \textit{Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist}, pp. x, 3-5, 29-56. See Chapter Four, section I above.
\textsuperscript{21} Augustine, \textit{City of God}, 8.7-8, 8.13.
\textsuperscript{22} Augustine, \textit{City of God}, 12.1-3, 12.8-9.
name of good’ because he subsists everything, he, through goodness, is the One. Augustine however had gone on to criticise Platonists for not worshipping the goodness of God, and, moreover, for Augustine the lower material part of the universe (the earth and its creatures including man) is directly created by God and is not an emanated imitation of the higher sphere as Porphyry, Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius had argued. Nevertheless, both Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius agree that what is created by, or emanates from, the goodness of God is therefore also good. Although Hooker would accept this, what he is confronting is a very different problem.

Hooker’s argument is not so much about the being or goodness of God, or about the mystical union with the immaterial and indefinable One, but is more concerned with what can be valued as good for the church. For Hooker, goodness is certainly sourced in God but is also perceived in different manifestations - all divinely sanctioned for different ecclesiastical ages. Furthermore, what is good needs to be articulated in extra-Scriptural language. Kirby does not inquire into Hooker’s view that the church seeks what is good in its polity, but his general thesis is that Hooker remains Neoplatonic in outlook - drawing away overall from the Dionysian emphasis of Thomas (which divides into hierarchies the realms of being according to a Neoplatonic metaphysical logic) towards a more Augustinian Neoplatonism which distinguishes between creator and created but understands that everything participates in the one divine source. Yet Hooker’s understanding of the good is, I argue, initially influenced by Plato, not Neoplatonism.

24 Augustine, City of God, 8.7, 10.1-3.
26 Kirby, Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist, pp. 3-5.
We must remember that the Renaissance did not recognise any deep division between the teachings of Plato and Neoplatonists, and that any distinction between these two categorises became even more obscure when in the fifteenth century an enormous amount of Neoplatonic literature was recovered that was considerably larger than the Platonic Corpus. We must ask whether Hooker’s understanding of goodness is derived from pagan and Christian Neoplatonism, especially from the idea of the One and, in turn, whether this according to Hooker’s understanding is taken from Plato? The answer is that Hooker does understand the goodness that is naturally strived for in all things in a Neoplatonic sense, but he also understands the pursuit of what is good in Plato’s sense. And this suggests that, in his understanding of goodness, Hooker is aware of a divergence between Plato on the one hand and pagan and Christian Neoplatonism on the other.

Let us firstly outline the differences between Plato, and pagan and Christian Neoplatonists, before returning to the perspective of Hooker in the sixteenth century. Although the Neoplatonists may in general translate Plato’s idea of the Good into the One (with the essential goodness of the One enabling the realisation of the hierarchy of existence), there is also reason to think that the idea of the unknowable One is not derived from Plato at all. The very unknowableness of the One as expounded for example in the Neoplatonism of Plotinus in the third century suggests that it was not Platonic in terms of Plato’s innate awareness of the Good, but has more in common with Philo in the first century who wrote about the One as utterly unknowable. For Plotinus, the One does not seek to create a living creature, although Plato’s

representation of the artificer of the world does deliberate creating other existence. Even so, underlying the idea of the One, as found in Christian Neoplatonism, is an idea of goodness which is privileged, especially in the work of Pseudo-Dionysius in the sixth century. Although for Pseudo-Dionysius the Good, the Beautiful and the One are blurred together by him as unique and are not particularly distinguishable, Goodness or ‘the name of Good’ is, for him, prior to being and prior to life and wisdom. Pseudo-Dionysius is relying here upon pagan Neoplatonism in which Goodness is the unambiguous attribution of the First Principle because Goodness is equivalent to, and not causally after, God, and upon it everything else depends. Thus in Pseudo-Dionysius’ doctrine, Goodness already applies to the One and the latter is able to do the work of the former.

But the main point here, I argue, is that the general translation of the Good into the One in both pagan and Christian Neoplatonism loses Plato’s sense that the goal of life is to pursue the idea of the Good, which, I suggest, is close with what Hooker begins to say about goodness in church polity. Admittedly, Hooker’s citation of Plato is limited, and is extremely sparse in citing Plato on the topic of goodness, although Hooker did have access to Plato’s collected works. Nonetheless, in Hooker’s abundant usage throughout the Lawes of the terms ‘good’, ‘the good’ and ‘goodness’ he is not necessarily referring to the Neoplatonic idea of the One, a term he very

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30 For a discussion see Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, p. 318.
31 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names, 4.7.
33 Although Hooker cites Plato’s Republic only once in his Lawes (1: 132.25-29; [I.15.4]) and the Apology once (2: 184.25; [V.46.1]), neither is used in connection to Hooker’s argument about goodness, and Hooker never cites the Symposium in any of his writings. However, in Hooker’s Lawes he does cite Theaetetus once (1: 87.18-19; [I.8.7]), and Timaeus twice (1: 87.21-22; [I.8.7], 3: 362.5-9; [VIII.4.5]) in connection with the Good. Hooker had access to, and cited from: Plato, Opera, 3 vols., (Geneva: Henri Estienne, 1578). See Folger, 6: 1192. Hooker was also familiar with Plato’s thought through his reading of the fifth-century writer Stobaeus and his work Eclogues. See P. G. Stanwood, ‘Stobaeus and Classical Borrowing in the Renaissance’, Neophilologus, 59, (1975), pp. 141-146. Peter Munz provides a general discussion of Plato and Hooker, but he does not examine Hooker’s central concern with ‘goodness’ in the church, and Munz even concludes that Hooker was in no way influenced by Plato or Neoplatonism. See Peter Munz, The Place of Hooker in the History of Thought, pp. 147-172.
rarely uses and certainly never uses in relation to Christ as the knowable One which was Augustine’s practice. And putting the issue of the One aside, philosophical theologians from the early church fathers right up to Hooker’s period have had Plato’s strategy concerning the pursuit of the good available to them, and it is worth summarising in brief before examining how it is adapted in what Hooker begins to say about goodness in church polity.

For Plato, the Form of the Good is the highest philosophical principle of metaphysics and epistemology, it is the causation of, and makes possible the knowledge about, other Forms such as justice, excellence and beauty which stem from and are organised around the Good. This is explained by Plato in *The Republic* when he speculates on the Form of the Good with the metaphor of the sun: just as the sun is the source of all energy making possible the existence of every living thing, so also the Form of the Good causes all the other Forms of existence. And, Plato continues, just as objects can be seen due to the sun’s supply of light and illumination, so too human reason can know the Forms (such as justice) due to the intercessions made by the Form of the Good. These intercessions are characterised by Plato in *Timaeus* as the very generous nature of goodness, which enables the Forms to be ‘copied’ in the sensible world.

The Good is therefore worthy of admiration for Plato, and in his work the *Symposium* the material world is united with the higher, intellectual and immaterial world of the Forms by love, what Plato calls Eros, which pursues and admires the Good as its object. Also for Plato, the

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34 See Chapter Four, section I above.
Good differs from justice since, unlike justice, no one needs to be persuaded to seek the Good - every soul pursues the Good and it is the social responsibility of the philosopher who begins to understand the Good to apply such knowledge to social and political purposes.\textsuperscript{41} The Form of the Good, as the goal of life, justifies and makes sense of the human pursuit of ‘value’, although Plato stops short of actually articulating in detail any role that the Good might play in human ethics.\textsuperscript{42}

From this brief outline, we can understand the beginnings of Plato’s influence in Hooker’s argument about why the church seeks the value of good customs. For example, Hooker asserts that by the word ‘goodness’ he means in one sense to imply what is beautiful and amiable, as did, he points out, the Græcians.\textsuperscript{43} By ‘amiable’ Hooker means what is worthy of love.\textsuperscript{44} Indeed, Hooker relies upon a Platonic vision when he argues that the church must pursue what is amiable and beautiful - as mentioned in Chapter Five, Hooker thinks customs such as fasting are ‘amiable’. Thus for Hooker, what is of ‘good’ value to the church is marked not only by rectitude but also by beauty – not only by what is piously profitable but also amiable in public worship. We shall examine Plato’s influence in more detail later in this chapter.

For now however, we must take a critical step away from Plato and seriously ask whether Hooker’s argument about goodness is completely Platonic in structure. For example, Hooker’s argument does contradict Plato’s stipulation that the Good is not concerned with instrumental goodness, usefulness or well being.\textsuperscript{45} Hooker embraces all three of these in his vision, as we shall see. Further, Plato argues that men are perplexed about the good, and that they are not even

\textsuperscript{43} Lawes, 1: 82.20-27; (I.8.1). Hooker cites here the Greek word \textit{Καλοκαγαθία} to mean beauty and goodness.
\textsuperscript{44} See Lawes, 1: 70.22; (I.4.1), 82.20-23; (I.8.1), 84.25-85.2; (I.8.4).
able to possess a stable belief in it.\textsuperscript{46} The latter is completely alien to Hooker’s argument in which discerning what is good (via reason) and stating it (in the extra-Scriptural language of the prayer book for instance) relies unquestionably upon a stable faith in what is perceived of the goodness of the divine object.\textsuperscript{47} Indeed, only when there is, for Hooker, a stable faith in the divine source of goodness is it then possible for goodness to be perceived as eternally causing and eternally guiding.

On the point of discerning goodness therefore, it seems reasonable to ask why should we name Hooker a Platonist and not for example an Aristotelian? After all, Hooker’s account of goodness in Book I of the \textit{Lawes} is informed by a cosmic view of the world in which God moves natural agents as efficient causes and moves intellectual agents as final causes, and this is influenced by Aristotle.\textsuperscript{48} Aristotle, whom Hooker describes as ‘the Arch-Philosopher’,\textsuperscript{49} analyses things, not ideas, and he has an empirical view of existence in which everything has a natural end or purpose, which is attractive to Hooker in his perception of God as directing, according to set purposes, his creation and everything that is good in it. And on this, Hooker cites Aristotle and his works \textit{Metaphysics} and \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} several times.\textsuperscript{50} In fact, in making his point that all things seek the highest good and covet the participation of God himself (as discussed at the beginning of this section), Hooker cites Aristotle and his works \textit{On the Soul} and \textit{On the Heavens}, and does not directly refer to Plato or to any Neoplatonist, whether pagan or Christian.\textsuperscript{51}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{plato2005} As was examined in Chapter Four, section II.
\bibitem{lawes1905} See \textit{Lawes}, 1: 70.4-6; (I.4.1).
\bibitem{lawes1905} \textit{Lawes}, 1: 99.28; (I.10.4).
\bibitem{lawes1905} See, for example, \textit{Lawes}, 1: 70.20-21; (I.4.1), 83.33; (I.8.3), 84.2-4; (I.8.3), 87.19-23; (I.8.7). Hooker uses the edition of Aristotle’s works that was compiled by Erasmus: Aristotle, \textit{Opera quacunque hactenus extiterunt omnia}, D. Erasmus ed., 2 vols., (Basel: Froben, 1550). See \textit{Folger}, 6: 1160.
\bibitem{lawes1905} \textit{Lawes}, 1: 73.8-10; (I.5.2), 73.24-25; (I.5.2).
\end{thebibliography}
For his part, Aristotle in his work *Nicomachean Ethics* criticises the Platonic account of goodness in not allowing for varieties of the good. Aristotle argues that there is good predicated in the various categories of existence, such as the goodness of God and the goodness of the mind in the category of substance, as well as the goodness of virtues, moderation, usefulness, and the opportune in the respective categories of quality, quantity, relations and time.\(^{52}\) Thus for Aristotle, there are various types of the good which are instrumental for many purposes, and not simply a single Platonic Form of the Good.\(^{53}\)

As mentioned, Kirby has argued that Hooker goes beyond Aristotelian (and, for that matter, Thomistic) accounts and inclines towards Augustine Neoplatonism.\(^{54}\) But, I suggest, we must not underestimate the influence of Aristotelianism. By the middle of the third century, Aristotelian along with Stoic and even Oriental elements were incorporated into the Neoplatonism that was being developed by Plotinus and which influenced the church fathers in the fourth and fifth centuries.\(^{55}\) And whilst Platonism was being revived in Western thought from the thirteenth century through to the seventeenth century, the dominant philosophical force still remained Christian Aristotelianism.\(^{56}\)

In the period currently under study, the sixteenth century, the universities of Europe – whether Romish or Reformed – all kept Aristotle at the centre of their philosophical studies – not that Aristotle was agreed with in everything, but an eclectic view of Aristotelianism took dominance (until Descartes) over lesser influences such as Platonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism,

\(^{53}\) ibid., 1096a24-27, 1096b8-26. See Gerson, *God and Greek Philosophy*, pp. 82-141.
\(^{54}\) Kirby, *Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist*, p. 3.

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and Scepticism.\textsuperscript{57} In the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, Aristotelianism served the educated elite in their learning of logic and reason and in their comprehension and exegesis of godly knowledge.\textsuperscript{58} The graduates who were employed by the Church of England to be Protestant ministers (ranging from presbyterians, moderate non-conformists as well as conformists) argued that it was necessary to retain the Christian Aristotelian belief in the natural or divine order to help minister and build a Reformed Christian society.\textsuperscript{59} The Aristotelian science of the physical universe (updated in the second century by the astronomer Ptolemy of Alexandria) was the authoritative world-view held by the scholastics in the Middle Ages and was fused into humanist thought in the Renaissance, and it was a world-view accepted by Hooker.\textsuperscript{60} We should note that, although tensions remained, there was a steady fusion of the humanist approach to Aristotle with traditional scholastic methods in the sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{61} For example, even when the medieval scholastic Aristotelian system was challenged in the late sixteenth century by Peter Ramus on the grounds that its logic did not have any application to living experience,\textsuperscript{62} it is possible to argue that Ramus was a modified Aristotelian, and that some of his best arguments were taken from Aristotle.\textsuperscript{63}

To summarise, we have paused to consider the possibility that Platonic and also Aristotelian influences inform Hooker’s perception of goodness, with the outcome that there is


\textsuperscript{59} Morgan, \textit{Godly Learning}, pp. 96-97.

\textsuperscript{60} See Folger, 6: 488-489. See Laves, 1: 70.20-22; (I.4.1); 2: 360.8-15; (V.69.2). Also see Harold P. Nebelsick, \textit{Circles of God: Theology and Science from the Greeks to Copernicus}, (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1985), pp. 1-87.


\textsuperscript{62} Copenhaver and Schmitt, \textit{Renaissance Philosophy}, p. 65.


stimulus for Hooker’s argument from both. However, the case will presently be made that this is mainly an influence in regard to man’s desire for God and for what is good, although Hooker’s account of goodness also fundamentally disagrees with pagan philosophy, as we shall now examine.

II

Having signposted the philosophical influences, we shall bear them in mind as the discussion engages now with the central premise that underlines Hooker’s argument about goodness. This premise for Hooker is that the discovery or recognition of what is good is a two-way process in which Christians and God both accept the other with love and affection. This is essential in Hooker’s vision of God’s guidance in the church and in his vision of church worship. In this respect Hooker certainly does not follow the Greeks since they did not accept that God could love anything finite, as we shall explore. Rather, Hooker, (for reasons which Kirby does not examine), adheres to Augustinian Christianity according to which emotion is not suppressed but is linked to reason and cognitive experience, with love, knowledge and the mind interconnected and drawn towards the desired divine object.

Debora Shuger has also argued that Hooker presupposes the Augustinian dialectic of love and knowledge. Let us outline her contentions before I present my own. Shuger explores how rhetorical discourse has an essential role in pursuing truth and goodness in the Renaissance and how love nourishes knowledge in the search for God. Shuger points out that the inseparability of love and knowledge is supported by the Biblical anthropology of the Renaissance which appreciated that the Bible did not discriminate between knowledge and emotion. And although the Renaissance understood classical philosophy as, by contrast, distinguishing between
knowledge and emotion, Shuger points out that the Renaissance also assumed the Aristotelian argument that emotion is not irrational but is the offspring of belief. Quoting Hooker’s *A Learned and Comfortable Sermon of the Certaintie and Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect*, Shuger argues that for Hooker emotion has a role in the act of faith because faith grasps its object by love, not by evidence. According to Hooker, loving what he calls God’s ‘heavenly sweetness’ will create a certainty of adherence to God, and Shuger concludes that for Hooker knowledge and love are mutually dependent, although love ‘outstrips’ evidence in matters of faith.

I agree with Shuger, but wish to add that it is a prerequisite of Hooker’s position on discerning the good that the church should not only love God but that God also loves the church. Here, Hooker is similar to Augustine and to the latter’s turn against Platonism, which is worth outlining so that we can understand Hooker’s similarity. For Augustine, who studied the Platonists before his conversion, the limits of knowledge prompt a re-evaluation in the status of belief in the Platonic tradition. Plato claimed, as already stated, that men cannot simply believe in the Forms – only knowledge or ignorance concerning the Forms is possible. And knowledge for Plato is only gained by first-hand experience, with which Augustine agrees. But paradoxically, this agreement leads Augustine to diverge away from Plato: as John Rist comments, Augustine does not accept that the Good in this life can be comprehended and understood. Rather for Augustine, discerning what is good in this life does not merely require

66 Shuger, ‘The Philosophical Foundations of Sacred Rhetoric’, p. 59. Shuger does not move on to analyse this in the *Lawes*.
67 Augustine was baptised in 387 AD.
‘cognitive’ knowledge of God but necessitates a pure heart and a loving faith which enables men to progress in moral and theological understanding.\(^{69}\)

What is important here for this study’s understanding of Augustine is his emphasis on man’s love for God – human assent involves not only a determining judgement but also a determining love.\(^{70}\) Thus in Augustine’s conception of will or ‘voluntas’, human love and will are identical.\(^{71}\) Indeed, for Augustine human assent and human will are primarily formed by man’s love for God, although this concept overlaps somewhat with the love for the Good and the Beautiful in Plato’s concept of Eros. Nevertheless for Augustine, as Rist concludes, man’s cognitive status involves affective commitments, especially that of love, and also involves the proper ordering of the emotions. Indeed, God and the good are to be perceived in the light of love which is the teaching of Scripture and of Augustine’s Catholic tradition.\(^{72}\)

Hooker does not discuss Augustine in this depth,\(^{73}\) but there is a primary point of agreement with how he thinks the church can proceed to recognise what is good in worship. Hooker’s key presuppositions in discerning the rectitude of church customs are, firstly, that God’s love is the foundation of what is good and, secondly, that man always retains a love for God and goodness. In the Lawes Hooker is impressed that humans have an affectionate desire for God, that humans have a love for discovering and enacting what God has valued as good, he is impressed that, in addition to reason and wisdom, God has also endowed men with love which guides them to affectionately embrace what is good.

\(^{69}\) Augustine, The Trinity, 15.21.41.


\(^{71}\) Augustine, The Trinity, 4.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3, 4.2.4, 4.10.13, 4.11.14, 4.12.15.


\(^{73}\) Although Hooker does cite a broad range of Augustine’s works throughout the Lawes.
There are two principal points here for Hooker. In the case of the divine, it is through reason that God (because of his love) presents to men the good that they should love. In the case of men, finding what is to be valued as good and loved accordingly is achieved by the drive of desire. In the case of God, Hooker’s argument stands in an antagonist relation to Greek thought which, as mentioned, does not concede that God could love what is finite. In the case of men, there is an overwhelming agreement between Hooker’s argument and Greek as well as Patristic and Medieval writers.

Let us now examine in detail both cases which will investigate Hooker’s premise that the discovery of what is good is a two-way process in which Christians and God both accept the other with love and affection. This will lead to a discussion on how what is ‘good’ governs worship.

In the case of God, Hooker assumes that what is good is given by God because he loves the world and mankind in particular. Again, how God is perceived is the key here. In Reformed theology, God’s love, as part of the nature of his goodness, is understood as follows: the love of the Father for the Son, God’s general love for all creatures, God’s love of human beings, God’s special love for his elect, and God’s love for all the manifestations of what is good. These various understandings of divine love (a consequence of the essential divine goodness) are spelt out by Reformed writers such as Wolfgang Musculus in his 1560 work *Loci communes sacrae theologiae* (translated and published in London as *Commonplaces of Christian Religion*). As pointed out in Chapter One, we should take especial notice that Musculus sourced his argument in Scripture.74

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This is significant because the sixteenth-century Protestant view of God’s love that is based upon the Bible is generally distinguished, in the Protestant view, from ‘philosophy’, and we need to ask where Hooker fits here. Plato and Aristotle, by contrast, had argued that in their conception of God he could not possibly love the finite world, with Aristotle even claiming that there could not be any sort of divine interest in finite things since God (not Hooker’s Christian God, but the divine mind, the unmoved mover) would always engage in the best activity which would be to always contemplate the best object – God. And Plato had already argued that the object of love or Eros is always something that is desired or needed, and, because God or the gods cannot lack what is beautiful and good, Plato concluded that Eros appears incompatible with deity. In other words, the gods for Plato do not love wisdom because they are already wise and thus have no desire or Eros for wisdom. However, it is important for us to note that Plato’s sense of Eros, in which the soul strives after the object it desires, was developed by Aristotle to cosmic significance, where the whole universe including physical nature and human beings bear the marks of Eros, with everything longing for the likeness of God. Aristotle’s development does of course overlap into the Renaissance Aristotelian and Neoplatonic conceptions of everything seeking its perfection, which we find in Hooker as discussed in section I, and to which we shall return shortly in discussing man’s desire.

At present we must ask from which source does Hooker take his view of God’s love? Like Reformed writers such as Musculus who base their view of God’s love upon the Bible, Hooker maintains that God is a deity who certainly does love, not least on account of his

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goodness, and Hooker maintains that God is not an assembly of qualities as argued by Plato and Neoplatonists, nor a self-contemplating cause more absorbed in himself than in lesser beings as argued by Aristotle.\textsuperscript{79} But we should realise that Hooker’s view also agrees with the conclusion of pre-Reformation scholastics from the Middle Ages such as Thomas, for whom God, out of love, has created what is good in matters of necessity and has created the goodness in all things.\textsuperscript{80}

We should therefore note that Hooker’s vision is extraordinarily distinctive because it matches together his agreements with Augustine’s view of divine love, Thomas’ scholastic view of divine love and Reformed Protestant views of divine love, which Hooker is able to do because he perceives all three in his metaphor, as we shall explore. But first, what, in his distinctive view, is the difference between divine and human love, and what is the difference in how both love the good?

When Hooker writes of the goodness found by men in the world and in the church, he does not intend goodness to be understood as completely synonymous with the divine being or as a being at all. Hooker’s argument is more concerned with the good that is apparent to men than with attempting to explain the transcendent good or being. On the one hand, as argued in Chapter Four, Hooker does not wish to intellectually probe into God as the transcendent good. Instead, he alludes to what the Bible states about God’s goodness,\textsuperscript{81} and he accepts a human perception of the divine involvement as articulated by his metaphor of Law. But on the other hand, Hooker argues that the church can know and love what is good when it is perceived. This


\textsuperscript{80} Thomas, \textit{Summa Theologiae}, Ia.20.2.

\textsuperscript{81} Compare \textit{Lawes}, 1: 86.7-9; (I.8.5) with Romans 2: 14-15. Also compare \textit{Lawes}, 1: 112.11-12; (I.11.2) with Matthew 19: 17.
means for Hooker that goodness is to be known and loved within the church not as an identifiable being, but when the value of what is good for the church is apparent.

But we require clarity here: should what is apparently good for the church be classified for Hooker as a human good, ‘detached’ from the divine being, or should it be classified as an intrinsic good in the mind of man that has developed by following God’s rational guidance? This restates the dilemma for Hooker that was investigated in Chapter Four: is God’s goodness apparent in both heaven and earth, or is what is good for the world and for the church independent from God?

We can begin to answer this by returning to Hooker’s argument which assumes that the human love for the good is not the same as God’s love for it – men, unlike God, do not innately know what is good for the church within a given age, and men will only become aware of the good once it has been discerned. And the good for Hooker is made apparent by intellectual activity; we should remember that the intellect, according to Hooker, is one of the many intrinsic goods that serves the church. Thus Hooker contends that ‘Goodnes doth not moove by being, but by being apparent; and therefore many things are neglected which are most pretious, only because the value of them lyeth hid’. The value of what is good for the church may at first be hidden, but for Hooker this does not mean that the search for the good should be neglected.

This is not dissimilar to Plato’s metaphor of the sun (as outlined above). For example, when what is good for the church is apparent for Hooker it is loved because it is good. In other words, the added incentive for the church to love the apparent good is that all goodness originates from God. But when we realise here the sympathy and affection in Hooker’s argument towards the Christian God, then the Platonic thought in what he argues seems to become over-shadowed by a love of God that is distinctively Christian, albeit echoing the

82 *Lawes*, 1: 80.3-6; (1.7.6).
Christian love characterised by Augustine, and albeit that Hooker differs from the Protestant reformers of his own century on the point of loving the variations of goodness. Let us elucidate this.

God’s goodness is apparent for Hooker in both heaven and earth, and it is apparent not only in Scripture but also in the discovery of the extra-Scriptural good. Hooker’s argument is further consolidated by his vision that it is men’s duty to God to love what is good for the church. And his criticism of the Admonitioners and presbyterians is that the church owes it as a ‘divine duty’ to God to seek what is good for it, even if what reason dictates as good is to be found outside of Scripture, which is not exactly in line with Protestant Reformers such as Luther, Calvin and Melanchthon. This is a ‘divine duty’ for Hooker because, firstly, the church should honour God for endowing men with reason, virtue and love and thus for directing their searches. Secondly for Hooker, men should revere God as the provider of what is to be valued as good within the church since men will not find any good independent from God. According to Hooker, God’s influence of goodness for his church cannot be measured by one source (Scripture).

In thus ‘finding’ the good it is important in Hooker’s argument that men should not understand reason as independent from, or as supplanting, God. Indeed, similar to Augustine, Hooker is anxious that men must never let their praise of human reason supplant God as the supreme good and guide. For Hooker, God has prescribed the content of reason and wisdom and neither should be loved for its own sake without reference to God, as we shall examine in regard to discerning goodness. There are of course ‘Platonic questions’ that still remain to be asked of Hooker, such as whether the good discovered by reason is knowledge or opinion, and how the

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link between knowledge and opinion is explained by Hooker in metaphor. We shall explore this in section V.

III

Having established that human reason for Hooker does not supplant God and his love, we are ready to move to our second case: what primarily drives men towards goodness is the affection of desire. By way of explaining in Book I how desire is appropriate to his polemical argument, Hooker at first discusses man’s desire for earthly and everlasting happiness.

On earthly happiness, Hooker argues that all men desire to lead a happy life, further commenting that a man’s desire to be loved by others imposes a natural duty upon him to love them, which means that reason discovers an affectionate duty that will lead to the fulfilment of man’s desire to be loved in his community.

On everlasting happiness, Hooker not only follows in the steps of Thomas and Patristic writers such as Augustine by adopting Aristotle’s ethical principle that all human desires point men to pursue human happiness, but Hooker also argues that the church body has a natural desire towards what is beyond nature. In Chapter 11, Book I, he writes:

Then are we happy therefore when fully we enjoy God, as an object wherein the powers of our souls are satisfied even with everlasting delight: so that although we be men, yet by being unto God united we live as it were the life of God. Happiness therefore is that estate whereby we attain, so far as possible may be attained, the full possession of that which simply for itself is to be desired, and containeth in it after an eminent sorte the contentation of our desires, the highest degree of all our perfection. Of such perfection capable we are not in this life. For while we are in the world, subject we are unto sundry imperfections, griefs of body, defectes of minde, yea the best things we do are painefull, and the exercise of them grievous being continued...which tediousnes cannot fall into those operations that are in the state of blisse, when our union with God is complete. Complete union with him must be according unto every power and facultie of our mindes apt to receave so glorious an object. Capable we are of God both by understanding and will, by understanding as hee is that soveraigne truth, which comprehended the rich

84 Lawes, 1: 97.1-3; (I.10.2).
85 Lawes, 1: 88.16-18; (I.8.7).
treasures of all wisdom; by will, as he is that sea of goodness, whereof who so tasteth shall thirst no more. As the will doth now worke upon that object by desire, which is as it were a motion towards the end as yet unobtained, so likewise upon the same hereafter received it shall worke also by love. *Appetitus inhiantis fit amor fruentis*, saith Saint Augustine. *The longing disposition of them that thirst is changed into the sweete affection of them that tast and are replenished.* Whereas wee now love the thing that is good, but good especially in respect of benefit unto us, we shall then love the thing that is good, only or principally for the goodness of beautie in it self. The soule being in this sorte as it is active, perfected by love of that infinite good, shall, as it is receptive, be also perfected with those supernaturall passions of joye peace and delight. All this endlesse and everlasting.87

In this passage, Hooker argues that men are ‘capable’ of God (of apprehending the divine) when they understand that he is the ‘soveraigne truth’, and men are also ‘capable’ of God when the human will ‘thirsts’ no more, having ‘tasted’ God as ‘the sea of goodness’. On earth, Hooker argues, men love what is good especially when it is beneficial, and in the world to come the soul will be ‘perfected by love of that infinite good’. Indeed, the soul will be ‘perfected with those supernaturall passions of joye peace and delight’. Yet Hooker is also implying here that men in this life desire these ‘supernaturall passions’, he implies that although God’s love is different from that of men, humans desire resemblance between their love and divine love. Let us consider this.

Hooker’s choice of the words ‘supernaturall passions’ is interesting. In the above passage, Hooker is discussing the passions that belong to everlasting souls in their love for God, and, indeed, earlier in Book I he has already written of the love of the Angels for the beauty of God.88 But Hooker writes of the soul becoming ‘perfected with those supernaturall passions’ that are ‘received’ from the divine, he writes of a love, sourced in the ‘finite good’, that purifies the soul. According to Hooker, everything in the world to come will be an imitation of God, and Hooker does not indicate any reason why this would not include imitating supernatural passions.

87 *Lawes*, 1: 112.17-113.24; (I.11.2-3).
88 *Lawes*, 1: 69.21-72.24; (I.4.1-3).
But does Hooker agree with Article 1 of the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England concerning God? In Elizabeth’s final revision of 1571, Article 1 states that God is without passions. If Hooker conforms to this belief, how can he imply that men desire to resemble ‘supernatural passions’?

In Reformed theology God is understood as having affections that characterise his relationship to the world, with an analogy made between God’s divine affections and human affections, but on the proviso that the analogy does not indicate essential change in God. In the late Middle Ages, the Socinians conceded that there were changing affections and passions in the Godhead, while Thomas had argued much earlier that the notion that God is ‘moved’ by feelings or emotions can only be treated as a metaphor. I argue that Hooker does not intend to disagree with the Thirty-Nine Articles but, like Thomas, Hooker in the passage quoted above assumes that the passions are figuratively or metaphorically attributed to God and to the supernatural realm. This is consistent with Hooker’s method of presenting images and metaphors to illustrate the unseen divine object and its involvement, which reason contemplates and love embraces. Thus although Hooker writes of the complete union with God in the world to come, his use of the present tense to assert that men are ‘capable’ of God and that ‘complete union’ with God is to be ‘according unto every power and facultie of our mindes’ which are ‘apt to receave so glorious an object’ in this world thus presents an image of men united in an earthly union with a loving and affectionate God. In doing so, Hooker straddles Thomas’ figurative ‘view’ of God and the Reformed Protestant emphasis upon the essential changelessness of God.

90 ibid., pp. 28, 37.
91 Muller, *The Divine Essence and Attributes*, pp. 551-555.
92 ibid., p. 554.
But why does Hooker present an image of an earthly union? Does he mean that men can resemble divine ‘passion’ in this life when ‘receiving’ the ‘glorious object’? The Eros which in Plato was the desire to envisage the ideal beauty became for the pagan and Christian Neoplatonists the desire for the union with God, but that union was to be in the immortal or eternal life.94 This does not agree with Hooker’s position. I suggest that for the purpose of his polemic, Hooker wishes to stress the ‘closeness’ of God and, as this study has argued, he metaphorically envisages this earthly union as Law and, now we may add, as God’s guidance of ‘goodness’, which men can love once they have rationally reflected upon it.

The image of this earthly union in which God guides through reason and goodness also reflects for Hooker the earthly process of sanctification which temporarily satisfies man’s natural desire for what is beyond nature. David Neelands comments that, for Hooker, the natural desire of those men who are justified is, in the world to come, to be perfected by grace into a kind of divine love.95 Neelands, in discussing desire, also points to Hooker’s assertion that men are naturally ‘capable’ of God by human understanding and human will.96 Yet, I argue, when Hooker writes of ‘desire’ he does not only mean human ‘conscious desire’ but, following Thomas, Hooker also means an inclination in which all things are naturally drawn to their perfection.97 For Hooker, this is explained in his metaphor of the second law eternal. But this is not a Neoplatonist metaphor of emanation, rather it is a metaphor to explain that God’s created ‘laws’ overlap amongst themselves, with the divine law of Scripture understood by the law of reason. Yet in all laws, goodness manifests itself and is, for Hooker, a guiding feature,

96 ibid., pp. 84-5. *Lawes*, 1: 113.9; (I.11.3). Quoted in full in the passage above.
especially for reason, Scripture, as well as for the law of physical nature and for the law set down for angels, as discussed in Chapter Four.

Thus Hooker means that men are only ‘capable’ of understanding God in accordance with God’s guiding ‘sea of goodness’, which is a connection that Neelands does not observe. The connection is essential however because it allows Hooker to argue that although men may not consciously desire God, their reason and will nevertheless incline towards what is good.

For example, although Hooker concludes in Book I that all men naturally desire to be happy – for how otherwise, Hooker asks, is it possible that all men do desire happiness? - Hooker does concede much later at the beginning of Book V that some men convince themselves that seeking their happiness does not include desiring God. Here, Hooker argues that this type of affected atheism is the extreme opposite of true religion. Hooker, by assuming that human morality is understood more clearly by those who believe in God, argues that those who do not desire God are unaware that their own intrinsic excellence has been influenced by him. Hooker questions: ‘It is not woonderfull that base desires should so extinguish in men the sense of their own excellence, as to make them willinge that their soules should be like to the soules of beasts, mortall and corruptible with their bodies?…For how should the brightnes of wisdome shine, where the windowes of the soule are of verie sett purpose closed?’ Hooker goes on to argue that although men may ‘close’ their souls to God, he in his goodness nevertheless continues to guide them, and truth ‘obtrudes’ itself into their knowledge, not allowing them to be ignorant about God’s earthly world. God ‘obtrudes’ naturally as the author of reason.

And here we return to not only what is perceived in Hooker’s metaphor of Law (that everything is inclined to be what God has prescribed for it), but also to where we began this

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98 Lawes, 1: 114.8-10; (I.11.4).
99 Lawes, 2: 23.19-27; (V.2.1).
100 Lawes, 2: 24.3-6; (V.2.2).
chapter (that everything naturally desires to perfect itself in what is good), except now we can observe a crucial development in Hooker’s argument. Whereas Neelands correctly argues that for Hooker human will and understanding enable men to be happy by naturally discerning (independent from Scriptural revelation) that there is a God, I wish to point out, in addition, that what makes men good will, according to Hooker, also make men happy and pious, especially in the church. The provision of what is good, with God as its source, cannot, again, be supplanted by men or by a congregation deciding its own rules. Let us examine what Hooker means here.

Hooker states that if the souls of men only sought being in this world, then men would be fully contented by the things in this life, as are other creatures. But, Hooker insists, men are not content, they ‘earnestly thirst’ for the higher good, ‘nature even in this life doth plainly claime and call for a more divine perfection’, which for Hooker is provided by God, his eternal blessedness and his overriding guidance of goodness.

What Hooker argues is in line with both Thomas and Augustine and, it may be added, even at first with the classical philosophy of Stoics such as Epictetus, who all argue that what makes men good also makes them happy. But what is important here, as with Hooker, is the role assigned to God. Augustine criticises the Stoics in that whereas the latter teach that the life of virtue (by ruling the mind with reason) is the only good road to happiness, Augustine claims that what makes men good and thus happy is God. Later, Thomas had expanded on how happiness is in proportion to desire - what men desire is a share in resembling God, and thus a

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101 Lawes, 1: 115.13-19; (I.11.4).
102 Lawes, 1: 115.19-25; (I.11.4).
104 Augustine, The City of God, ix.iv.
share in resembling what is by nature good which will only have the outcome of making them happy.\textsuperscript{105}

And Hooker, like Thomas, argues in Book I of the Lawes that men can only be blessed and made happy by participating (or ‘conjunction’) with what God causes to be good.\textsuperscript{106} Desiring what is good will undoubtedly lead men into right actions because this, Hooker points out, is to resemble God in the manner of working.\textsuperscript{107}

The conclusion that Hooker draws is that although men naturally seek the ‘triple perfection’ of the sensual, intellectual and spiritual just as Aristotle had argued, Hooker nevertheless maintains that all men have ‘intentive desires’ for what exceeds sense and for what exceeds the capacity of reason. What exceeds both for Hooker is the spiritual. In other words, the desires for spiritual perfection, according to Hooker, ‘reach’ higher than man’s sensual and intellectual capacities.\textsuperscript{108} But all three perfections for Hooker enable men to be naturally ‘capable’ of God – which means perceiving the divine beyond nature, a perception driven for Hooker by the desire for what is good and perfect beyond the sensible knowledge of this world.

But what does this mean in terms of the polemic of the Lawes? In ecclesiology, it means that man is driven by his desire for what God values as good in ecclesiastical law-making, which I argue is central to the Lawes and of which Hooker’s explanation of happiness is only a part. Thus Hooker presents goodness as an image of ‘straightness’, whereby men’s actions can adhere to God by enacting what is good in the church. ‘Goodnesse in actions is like unto straightnes; wherefore that which is done well we term right. For as the straight way is most acceptable to him that travaileth, because by it he commeth soonest to his journeys end: so in action, that

\textsuperscript{105} Thomas, Summa Theologiae, Ia.6.1.
\textsuperscript{106} Lawes, 1: 111.33-112.17; (I.11.2).
\textsuperscript{107} Lawes, 1: 77.20-29; (I.7.2).
\textsuperscript{108} Lawes, 1: 114.10-115.13; (I.11.4).
which doth lye the evenest betweene us and the end we desire, must needes be the fittest for our use’.109

The use of what is good within the church will be examined later in section VI. Although in Chapter Five we examined the four measures which the church, for Hooker, should take in recognising what is good, we must now ask of Hooker how the good that is beautiful and beneficial is to be discerned by the church for its worship, independent from Scripture, yet guided by God. As mentioned, even Plato had difficulty resolving the problem of applying his philosophy of the Good into a linguistic statement concerning what is good. Let us see how Hooker resolves the question, before we draw conclusions on how Hooker argues for the goodness, and not the superstition, of church customs.

IV

In Book I, Chapter Eight, entitled ‘Of the naturall way of finding out laws by reason to guide the will unto that which is good’, Hooker argues that there are two ways of discerning goodness. Firstly, it can be discerned by the knowledge of that which causes what is good, which is the most sure and infallible way, but is extremely hard to discover, and, secondly, it can be discerned by observing the ‘signes and tokens’ that accompany goodness, of which there are many, some more certain than others.110 In the second, the most certain ‘token’ for Hooker is the general persuasion of all men in recognising when goodness is apparent. As an example, Hooker argues, the axiom ‘God to be worshipped’ is, as soon as it is alleged, acknowledged by all men to be good and requires no further proof in the assurance of its goodness.111 Indeed, when ‘signes and tokens’ are apprehended (when, that is, the direct cause of what is good is too obscure for the

109 Lawes, 1: 82.15-20; (I.8.1).
110 Lawes, 1: 82.27-83.17; (I.8.2-3).
111 Lawes, 1: 86.4-9; (I.8.5).
mind of man) then the universal consent of men provides the ‘perfectest’ and ‘strongest’
recognition that goodness is apparent.112

And their consent, as this study has argued, is directed by reason which does not supplant
God, but is his instrument. Hooker writes:

The generall and perpetuall voyce of men is as the sentence of God him selve. For that which all men have
at all times learned, nature her selfe must needes have taught; and God being the author of nature, her
voyce is but his instrument. By her from him we receive whatsoever in such sort we learn. Infinite duties
there are, the goodnes wherof is by this rule sufficiently manifested, although we had no other warrant
besides to approve them. Thapostle S. Paul having speech concerning the Heathen saith of them, They are
a law unto themselves. His meaning is, that by force of the light of reason, wherwith God illuminateth
every one which commeth into the world, men being enabled to know truth from falsehood, and good from
evill, do thereby learne in many things what the will of God is; which will himselfe not revealing by any
extraordinary meanes unto them, but they by naturall discourse attaining the knowledge therof, seeme the
makers of those lawes which indee are his, and they but only the finders of them out. A law therefore
generally taken, is a directive rule unto goodnes of operation.113

The claims in the above passage have been analysed in detail in Chapter Four, but we can now
advance in our understanding of Hooker’s argument: Goodness, which is ‘sufficiently
manifested’ through ‘laws’, works in all things. Hooker contends that Angels are set to work by
their intuitive judgement of the amiable beauty and ‘high goodness’ of the divine object, while
men on earth utilise the sentence of collective reason,114 and Hooker marks out three instances
when the latter discerns beneficial ‘goodness’. Firstly, when the sentence is mandatory in
showing what must be done because it is incontrovertibly good when compared to what is evil.
Secondly, when the sentence is permissive in declaring which good may be done. Thirdly, when
the sentence is admonitory (by which Hooker means instructive) in opening which good is the
most convenient to be done.115

The second and third instances apply to Hooker’s argument of how the continuation and
innovation of church ceremonies should be decided by what is collectively recognised as good,

112 Lawes, 1: 83.17-26; (I.8.3).
113 Lawes, 1: 83.33-84.17; (I.8.3-4).
114 Lawes, 1: 84.25-85.6; (I.8.4).
115 Lawes, 1: 88.28-89.12; (I.8.8).
which is a higher divine judgement accommodated into historical circumstances, as examined in Chapter Five. And the collective desire for the good ensures that reason will always conduct its search. But the drive of desire in stimulating the capacity of reason is an interesting admission on Hooker’s part. And we must ask of Hooker whether the recognition of what is good for the church is ever influenced by human affection and human love? They are both to be found in Hooker’s view of organised worship,¹¹⁶ and that rather begs the question of whether they are influential, in conjunction with common reason, in determining what is good in the expression of religious worship. Hence, let us now explore the philosophical basis of how affection and love are influential in the Lawes.

V

We must remember that Protestant discussions of man’s mind and will, written during and after the Reformation, took place in the context of Christian Aristotelianism and specifically Aristotelian-Scholastic ‘faculty psychology’, according to which the soul (anima) could be distinguished into the faculties or parts (partes) of intellect (intellectus) and will (voluntas) and this division of the soul also accommodated the affections associated with the will.¹¹⁷ Writing within this context Hooker argues that, whereas the object of the will is the good which is recognised by reason, on the other hand affections such as joy, zeal, grief, fear and anger are forms of appetite, and the object of the appetite is the sensible good that is recognised by the sense organs.¹¹⁸ At first it seems that for Hooker affections only have influence over what is

¹¹⁶ As was discussed above in Chapter Five, section IV, where it was argued that for Hooker the recognition of God at the centre of worship is dependent upon man’s inward affection and love, which Hooker values as human strengths.
¹¹⁷ Muller outlines this Christian Aristotelian ‘faculty psychology’ in Muller, The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition, pp. 164-170.
¹¹⁸ Lawes, 1: 77.1-81.23; (1.7.1-1.7.7).
discovered to be good by the senses, which is different from the good in intellectual and spiritual matters that is recognised by reason. As Nigel Voak points out, Hooker therefore distinguishes between sensitive appetites and intellectual appetites, the former are sensory whilst the latter as intellectual desires are governed by the human will that acts upon the good discovered by reason. In this, Hooker follows the scholastic position of Thomas and Duns Scotus, for whom emotion could have a relation to moral virtue, but was excluded from man’s higher intellectual activities.119 Yet this was not the argument of the Protestant reformers.

Reformed Protestant writers such as Calvin, Melanchthon and the German Bartholomew Keckermann, who followed Augustine in not distinguishing between the human will and sensitive appetites, thought it unnecessary to claim that emotion was only exposed to the good found by the senses. They allowed that emotion could love God and yearn for everlasting bliss, both of which had previously been considered to be intellective appetites by a scholastic such as Thomas.120 Thomas however did account for love: he argued that all natural love upon earth was a passion stirred by good. And, moreover, Thomas argued that the intellect could be influenced by passions121 and, although the intellect could also resist passions,122 the first motion of the will or any appetite (sensual or intellectual) was always love.123 And this was not dissimilar to what Pseudo-Dionysius had previously argued: all things not only desire but also love the beautiful and the good.124

Where does Hooker fit here? Hooker argues that affections and especially love have their part in ‘good’ public piety. As the central argument of this study suggests, Hooker’s contention

119 Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, pp. 52-3.
121 Thomas, Summa Theologiae, Ia.IIae.9.2.
122 ibid., Ia.81.3; Ia.IIae.10.3.
124 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names, 4.10.
is that God expects everything to perform the function that he has allocated. In other words, Hooker argues that God expects Scripture to fulfil its task (in revealing the means of salvation which cannot otherwise be known for Hooker), just as God expects reason, desire, love and affections to fulfil their allotted tasks. Thus the appetite, which is ‘stirred with affections’, is the ‘sollicitor’ of the will and, at the same time, the will is the ‘controller’ of the appetite. Does this mean that for Hooker the will can even assent to sensitive appetites such as emotions? As mentioned, the will for Hooker governs not sensory but intellectual desires – but there is one limitation. Whist Voak argues that in contrast to Calvin the freedom of the human will is one of the cornerstones of the Lawes, Voak also concedes that Hooker agrees with both Thomas and Calvin in accepting that there is one compelling obligation for the faculty of the human will – it always desires the good, and this is what concerns us in this study.

Because the will always desires the good, Hooker argues, then it approves of an emotion that brings it closer to the good – as long as the emotion does not repel reason or faith. As Voak points out, Hooker argues that the appetite can solicit the will but only via the mediation of reason, which is still in line with the scholastic theory propounded by Thomas and Duns Scotus. Thomas, for instance, had argued that man’s love of God can bring the divine object nearer to the lover. But this also means something else. The sensitive appetite, for Thomas and, I argue, for Hooker, is essential to the will in choosing what is good. The passions have the potential to direct the activity of the soul to a new series of potential goods. The will embraces these goods because it desires them. And when embracing such goods, the will consents to a

125 Lawes, 1: 78.10-26; (I.7.3).
126 Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology; p. 54, n. 86.
127 ibid., p. 55. Lawes, 1: 82.1-5; (I.8.1).
128 Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology; p. 53. Lawes, 1: 80.6-11; (I.7.6).
129 Thomas, Summa Theologiae, Ia.IIae.66.6.
movement of passion which, in turn, is vetted by reason as a movement towards what is good, and the passions thus instigate the change of the subject towards the good desired.\textsuperscript{130}

Hence for Hooker, affections and love, given by God as a disposition of nature, solicit or provoke the will towards the goodness of an object. This means that affection and love solicit what God expects of them, especially that men should have an affectionate form of love for God, which Hooker wishes to argue is a universal love among men for the divine. Such universal love for God among Christians and non-Christians alike is found for Hooker in his citations of Plato, Aristotle and the Old and New Testaments. He writes:

\begin{quote}
[F]rom that knowne relation which God hath unto us as unto children, and unto all good thinges as unto effectes, whereof himselfe is the principall cause, these axioms and lawes naturall concerning our dutie, have arisen, That in all thinges we goe about his ayde, is by prayer to be craved, That he cannot have sufficient honour done unto him, but the utmost of that we can doe to honour him we must: which is in effect the same that we read, Thou shalt love the Lorde thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soule, and with all thy minde. Which lawe our Saviour doth terme the First and the great Commandement.\textsuperscript{131}
\end{quote}

Hooker’s argument accepts that knowledge is informed and enhanced by emotions and passions, specifically in reference to God and what is good - if affections were entirely corrupt or had no part in the higher desires of men then, according to Hooker’s argument, God would not expect (or command) men to use their affections to love him. For Hooker, the desire or pursuit of goodness is inseparable from the love of the good. And this is also why Hooker can claim, as we examined in Chapter Five, section IV, that God requires the ‘uttermost’ and ‘unfained’ affection in public worship which men and the faculties of their souls are able to yield in pursuing or loving the good.

This type of public piety actually provides a solution to Cartwright’s musings over a society which wants to keep the divine its loving God.\textsuperscript{132} Hooker stresses that a Christian society has been allocated the capacity to maintain God’s love, with God’s goodness especially spurring

\textsuperscript{130} See Anthony Levi, S.J., \textit{French Moralists: The Theory of the Passions, 1585 to 1649}, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{131} Lawes, 1: 87.17-26; (I.8.7).
\textsuperscript{132} Cartwright, \textit{A Second Admonition to the Parliament}, pp. 131, 133.
men to repent unto him – and the love of men for God is nothing else but a desired union with
the divine which, Hooker points out, greatly pleases God. Near the beginning of Book VI, Hooker writes:

What is love towards God, butt a desire of union with God? And shall wee imagine a sinner converting
himselfe to God, in whome there is noe desire of union with God presupposed? I therefore conclude, that
fear worketh noe mans inclination to repentance, till somewhat else have wrought in us love alsoe. Our
love and desire of union with God, ariseth from the strong conceite which wee have of his admirable
goodnes. The goodnes of God, which particularly mooveth unto repentance, is his mercie towards
mankind, notwithstanding sinne.133

We are now finally in a position to comment upon why, in Hooker’s argument, reason is
not alone in naturally seeking the good for the church. Let us approach this by reviewing what
we have established. In developing his argument, Hooker metaphorically ‘sees’ God as
sanctioning what is to be valued as good in the public piety of the church, and Hooker is very
clear that it is ‘brutish’ to imagine that the expression of religion in the church is simply man-
made just because Scripture is not used to dictate church government.134 Hooker readily admits
that God’s influence in religion is a force which men may not understand or even apprehend.
‘For as the authoritie of higher powers hath force even in those things which are done without
their privitie [men’s knowledge, consent]’.135 Yet God’s influence must not be ignored, Hooker
argues. In his vision, the society of the church directly follows God’s plan for it, and does not
follow God’s plan in Biblical times for the Jews. And Hooker implies that the presbyterian
claim to be godly in matters of church government is rather irresponsibly based upon the wrong
‘part’ of the divine plan for polity, which is all the more paradoxical as the ‘godly’ presbyterians
generally believed that their lives rested in the providence of God, although they also generally
insisted that there was a gulf separating God from man.136 Hooker, in my reading, deliberately

133 Lawes, 3: 9.21-29; (VI.3.3).
134 Lawes, 1: 95.27-96.4; (I.10.1).
135 Lawes, 1: 78.32-79.1; (I.7.3).
136 See Lake, Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church, pp. 116-168.
presents Law as a metaphor for God’s continued influence, which for Hooker is also a close influence manifested through goodness, with which everything interacts.

This is not the same however as simply recognising that for Hooker the medium of reason is the link between God and the actions of men. McGrade points out that Thomas, in comparison with Hooker, had asserted that law is an intrinsic action by which God instructs men on how to achieve the good, with the law of reason thus serving the purposes of the common good.137 This is correct for Hooker, as we examined at the beginning of this chapter. But does reading Thomas to explain Hooker completely account for how the latter perceives the extent of God’s involvement?

I argue that we cannot understand what Hooker wants to say about the good in church polity without understanding his metaphoric presentation of God’s guidance. In his metaphor of Law, the perception of God is not only based upon the knowledge of the divine as revealed in the words of Scripture and upon the awareness of the divine through nature, but is also based upon opinions about God that are laden with affective commitments, especially love and desire. Hooker stresses that reason, desire, affections and love rightly perform the functions that, in his metaphor, God has allotted to them, which means they all ‘concur’ with the ‘supreme cause of all things’.138 And all of these are to interact with what is good for the church. Importantly for Hooker, reason on its own does not guide the church; rather, reason discovers what is good, and what is good directs the governing of church worship. And in Hooker’s Christian view of the church, the ample nature of goodness, which allows some good actions to be ‘better’ than others,139 can only be metaphorically understood as stemming from God, with God’s wisdom

138 Lawes, 1: 92.23-28; (I.8.11).
139 Lawes, 1: 89.19-28; (I.8.8).
and goodness metaphorically ‘in’ all things. This is argued steadily throughout Book I as we have examined in this chapter; it is also outlined in the early chapters of Book V which we analysed in Chapter Five; and Hooker succinctly summarises much later in Book V:

[T]hinges that are of God have God in them and he them in him selfe likewise. Yet because their substance and his whollie differeth, their coherence and communion either with him or amongst them selves is in no sorte like unto that before mentioned. [Hooker has been discussing how the Church participates in Christ.] God hath his influence into the verie essence of all things, without which influence of deitie supportinge them theire utter annihilation could not choose but followe. Of him all things have both receaved their first beinge and their continuance to be that which they are. All things are therefore partakers of God, they are his offpringe, his influence is in them, and the personall wisdome of God is for that verie cause said to excell in nimblenes or agilitie, to pearce into all intellectuall pure and subtle spirites, to goe through all, and to reach unto everie thinge which is. Otherwise how should the same wisdom be that which supporteth, beareth up, and sustaineth all?...The father as goodnes, the Sonne as wisdome, the holie Ghost as power doe all concurre in everie particular outwardlie issuinge from that one onlie glorious deitie which they all are. For that which moveth God to worke is goodness, and that which ordereth his work is wisdome, and that which perfecteth his worke is power. All thinges which God in their times and seasons hath brought forth were eternallie and before all times in God as a worke unbegunne is in the artificer which afterward bringeth it unto effect. Therefore whatsoever wee doe behold now in this present world, it was inwrapped within the bowells of divine mercie, written in the booke of eternall wisdom, and held in the handes of omnipotent power, the first foundations of the world beinge as yeat unaide. So that all thinges which God hath made are in that respect the offpringe of God, they are in him as effectes in their highest cause, he likewise actuallie is in them, thassistance and influence of his deitie is their life.140

Hooker not only argues that all things were in the ‘bowells’, ‘booke’ and ‘handes’ of God before the world began and were brought into effect by God, but also that God ‘actuallie is in them’, they still have ‘their life’ by the assistance and influence of his deity. Hence God should, according to Hooker, be ‘blessed, adored and honoured’ by men.141 What Hooker wants to contend is that such divine assistance is to be recognised and adored in the church. And this is to be achieved for Hooker by the use of precepts, which he forms with reason, affection, imagination and metaphor. But what does this mean?

At the beginning of Book V where Hooker develops his argument about the solemn public worship of God in the church, he argues that the adoration of God is achieved by church ordinances which, if they are good, then they are as much divine as they are human since their

140 Lawes, 2: 236.18-237.25; (V.56.5).
141 Lawes, 1: 69.5; (I.3.4).
goodness is sourced in God. In short, God will be adored by the public recognition of his guidance in what is good. Yet in addition, Hooker argues that the adoration of God is also achieved by ‘preceptes’, which inform man’s outlook in the church, as explained in Chapter Four, section IV. Hooker identifies as ‘heavenly preceptes’ the peace and unity of which Jesus had spoken, and he identifies God’s commandments as ‘speciall precepts’.

Hooker’s point is that precepts - formed by love, affection, desire and by the relation between reason and imagination in metaphor – are required to ‘see’ what is to be worshipped of God. In other words, the adoration of God in worship requires a blending of the rational with precepts and opinions and their affective commitments. This means that Hooker is actually arguing that the church’s perception of the divine is to be imagined and articulated in the language of its worship, on the proviso that any claim about God is rational (such as the ample nature of his goodness). We should recall that for Hooker all thought makes use of the imagination, and set forms of prayer for instance present a precept in which God is metaphorically ‘seen’ and worshipped accordingly. Hooker writes:

Againe for as much as religion worketh upon him who in majestie and power is infinite, as we ought we accompt not of it, unlessse we esteeme it even accordinge to that verie height of excellencie which our hartes conceive when divine sublimitie it selfe is rightlie considered.

Hooker is arguing that religion, working in adoration towards God, must esteem and worship the ‘verie height of excellencie’, which is conceived for the purposes of worship by the precepts that are based on affectionate ‘hartes’ and on opinions about God that ‘rightlie’ consider ‘divine sublimitie’. Precepts therefore enable worship to be performed well since they keep a balanced focus (rational and affectionate) upon God.

142 Lawes, 2: 31.14-17; (V.4.3).
144 Lawes, 1: 216.14-220.6; (III.7.1-5).
145 See Chapter Four, section V above. See also Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, p. 64.
146 Lawes, 2: 33.17-21; (V.6.1).
Chapter Seven will examine how men according to Hooker are to respond to such ‘sublimitie’ in prayer. We may close this section by observing that what Hooker is arguing is some move away from simply sticking to the Scriptures for how God is to be perceived in worship as the presbyterians had wanted. Also, this chapter has off-set any interpretation that may suggest that Hooker’s idea of worship is strictly rational. In Chapter Two we noted the canonical view of Hooker as suggesting that emotion and imagination are a risky digression from logic and reason for him, especially in his understanding of the reformers who appealed to people’s affections in persuading them that they were ‘inspired’ by the Holy Ghost. But I argue that such distrust of affection and imagination is untrue of Hooker in his proposed vision of how God and the governing good are perceived in public worship. In Hooker’s vision, divine precepts propose not a divine perfection or a rational completeness of understanding (they do not propose the literal truth about the divine), but a ‘perfection’ that is human, with human affective commitments. This ‘perfection’ in worship, especially prayer, generates organised human opinions about God in public piety, in the same way that Hooker’s metaphor of Law generates opinion about God in the Lawes. Philosophically, Hooker is again close to Plato in that opinions, which are received as right, are a good guide for men, even though the opinions are not evidence or knowledge.\footnote{On opinion as a good guide for Plato, see Jerome Eckstein, The Platonic Method, (New York: Greenwood Publishing, 1968), pp. 66-68.} In adoring what the church cannot fully know until the world to come, precepts imagine or metaphorically present for Hooker the church’s affective opinions of the divine in the expression of its worship, which we shall return to in Chapter Seven.
VI

We are finally in a position to conclude. The general question we have explored in this chapter and in Chapter Five is how Hooker provides a solution to the difficulty of discerning what glorifies God and edifies his church. The presbyterians since the 1560s had openly declared as superstitious the Church of England’s public ceremonial customs such as prayers and fasts, and had campaigned for further reform. John Field and Thomas Wilcox in their Admonition to Parliament had asked: ‘Is a reformation good for France? and can it be evyl for England?’

Certainly the Church of France was believed by those on the continent to have set an example for the Church of England. The Frenchman Theodore Beza, who had first claimed that presbyterianism was the only ‘legitimate’ form of church government and who was Calvin’s successor at the Church of Geneva, wrote a letter in 1566 to Edmund Grindal, Bishop of London, at the time of the controversy over the wearing of vestments by clergy, and made an appeal to Grindal’s ‘good nature’ and ‘worthye and fatherlie goodnesse’ in commending to him the French Church.

Beza finished his letter with the verse: ‘England repent, Bishops relent’.

In place of the bishops who in the episcopal system controlled the Church of England and who were therefore the focus of so much presbyterian attack, Thomas Cartwright, acquainted with Beza while in Geneva in the early 1570s, envisaged a new unity for the church. The new unity would employ all of God’s good gifts, for which all men would praise God with their hearts. Ministers who taught the Scriptures regularly were, for Cartwright, to be the ‘jewels’ of God in the church, not bishops. He writes:

Field and Wilcox, Admonition to Parliament, p. 19.


Cartwright, A Second Admonition to the Parliament, p. 132.
howe beautifull are the feete of them [ministers] which bring good tidings of peace: they must be
sent of God, endued with the giftes of God, furnished with his graces unto that ministerie, that they may be
able to bring the good tidings of peace, and good things to their congregations, that their feete may be
beautiful to them, that they may knowe that they are jewels of God bestowed upon his churche…."  

Cartwright argues that the bishops were blinded by a worldly view of God, as were, Cartwright
argues, the popish bishops. If men were deceived by the latter, Cartwright asks, why will they
not be deceived by the former?  

Hooker, reflecting in the 1590s, takes the point that men who believe in superstition will
be deceived by its perpetrators. But in the Lawes he evaluates and then quashes superstition in
his vision of the church.

Firstly, Hooker identifies that superstition is a human problem, not divine. In Book V
Hooker is very clear that misguided zeal and misguided fear of divine glory are the paths to
superstition. And yet, according to Hooker, the affections of zeal and fear should, in moderation,
frame the ‘stamp and character’ of man’s religion. Nevertheless for Hooker, with zeal, unless it
has a ‘sober guide’ and is ‘ordered aright’, the ‘corne in the feilde of God is pluckt up’,
jeopardising the life of Christianity.  

Superstition for Hooker is an erroneous relation to God because it is based upon wrong opinions
(and not knowledge). In its first beginnings however superstition is, according to Hooker,
generally harmless, its fertile disposition is good and not evil, and it even blooms with devout and charitable affections. But it is, Hooker writes, the ignorant opinions of idolaters, their ‘senselesse stupiditie’, which is unfortunately ‘imputed to custome’. And as customs exceed their due proportion in the church, Hooker points out, idolatry and superstition become a ‘creepinge and incrochinge evell’. Thus Hooker argues in the passage quoted above that there are indeed right and due measures that belong to the service of God.

All of this so far, Hooker admits however, agrees with Cartwright’s basic presbyterian aim: ‘That in all such things the glorie of God and the edification or ghostlie good of his people must be sought’. But Hooker understands the Admonition controversy to have revolved around Scripture, whereas Hooker wishes to focus directly upon God. Hooker even attempts to break down the barriers within the church that surround and preserve Scripture as the only ‘voice’ of God. Hooker attempts this to allow for his own vision, in which glorifying God and sanctifying the spiritual good of God’s people must be done in accordance with what God guides as good. And the barrier which Hooker tries to crumble in the first instance is the thorny issue of a ‘good conscience’.

Hooker ponders whether men with a good conscience can still enact evil within the church. The presbyterians had assumed that the Holy Ghost inspired the human conscience with what was right, and a good conscience thus could not possibly be embroiled with evil or wrong-doing within the church. Field and Wilcox had concluded their Admonition by stating that they took comfort in presenting a testimony of good conscience. And Cartwright had

157 Lawes, 2: 29.9-26; (V.3.4).
158 Lawes, 1: 92.2-22; (I.8.11).
159 Lawes, 2: 29.9-26; (V.3.4).
160 Cartwright quoted by Hooker, Lawes, 2: 32.13-14; (V.5.1).
161 Lawes, 2: 30.12-13; (V.4.1).
162 Field and Wilcox, Admonition to Parliament, p. 40.
concluded *A Second Admonition* by stating that it was a matter of conscience for him and his disciplinarian colleagues to campaign for the Biblical basis of God’s church order, and that any future objections to reform would cause trouble to many good consciences.  

But Hooker argues that the consolation of a good conscience in matters of polity is subjective, not validly objective and certainly not ‘inspired’ by the Holy Ghost, as was discussed in Chapter Two of this study. Hooker points out that a good conscience is not the same as what is for the good of the church, and men in not realising this act upon a ‘deceiptfull pleasinge’ of themselves ‘in error’.  

Hooker even has more in common here with Calvin than Field, Wilcox or Cartwright could claim, since Calvin writes that conscience is an insufficient guide and is likely to isolate men.

Yet Hooker *does* envisage a role for conscience within Christianity – but does not contradict himself. Throughout this chapter it has been argued that religion for Hooker is a force that works within the conscience, that religious consciences should appreciate (though not guide) customs and rites, with affective commitments conducive to public devotion. This must not be confused, Hooker is clear, with what is good for an ecclesiastical age, which is guided by ‘wisdom’. The presbyterians tended to understand man’s devotional practice in Elizabeth’s church as governed by *human* laws. But according to Hooker, the presbyterian claim is defective in ‘accusinge Lawes’ of existing as the consequence of ‘mens oversights’. Laws exist for Hooker because of God, and for Hooker the presbyterians misconceive what is good and label it as evil, dangerously leading the conscience of other men to a rebellious view of God’s order.

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164 *Lawes*, 2: 30.12-15; (V.4.1).
166 *Lawes*, 2: 32.27-29; (V.6.1).
167 *Lawes*, 2: 16.12-24; (V.1.1).
But the presbyterians argued of course that the established customs of the church were already corrupt practices. Cartwright had argued, Hooker points out in Book IV, that common reason teaches that evils must be cured by their opposite, that a popish church that has been infected with the ‘poyson’ of ‘anti-Christianity’ must be cured by its contrary, the gospel. But Hooker argues that ‘infection’ within the church will not be dispelled by the agreement of consciences about the gospel, but that instead ‘skilfull cures’ only result from the knowledge of what is affected and from the knowledge of the evil that affects it. Hooker realises that such knowledge of evil presupposes the prior knowledge of what is good. In fact, it is important to Hooker’s whole rationale that good is prior to evil, although he confesses that men sometimes use good things scandalously even though good things have no scandalising nature in them. ‘At good things evill men may take occasion to do evill’. But when the nature of what is good is observed by men who do not harbour deliberate evil intentions then according to Hooker men will respect goodness. This is already explained by him in Book I: ‘Good doth followe unto all things, by observing the course of their nature, and on the contrary side evill by not observing it’. And abiding by the good is undoubtedly to follow God: ‘there is no kind of faculty or power in man or any other creature, which can rightly performe the functions allotted to it, without perpetuall aid and concurrence of that supreme cause of all things’.

Hooker’s conclusion is that a right relation to God will not breed superstition, men must know that the good is purposefully caused and designed by God. Hooker is also developing his vision of what it is to be religious. For Hooker, Christianity is ‘pure’ when it concentrates upon

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169 Lawes, 1: 298.24-25; (IV.8.1).
170 Lawes, 1: 321.4-9; (IV.12.2-3).
171 Lawes, 1: 320.17-18; (IV.12.2).
172 Lawes, 1: 93.30-32; (I.9.1).
173 Lawes, 92.25-28; (I.8.11).
worshipping God, its ‘purity’ gives life and perfection to all other endeavours and for this reason religion itself, in contradistinction to Cartwright, does not need to be reformed.\textsuperscript{174}

Such is Hooker’s general argument concerning what is good and religious. But if we take a critical step away from Hooker’s refutation of a ‘good conscience’, we can see that he does conflate his view of the religious conscience with his contention that reason discovers good polity. As argued in Chapter Five, for Hooker public duties are better performed by those men who are more religious – but this means that polity itself is indebted to religion since godliness, as the chief of all virtues, accompanies reason as an ‘instrument’ to ‘fitteth’ and ‘order’ the course of public affairs in the church.\textsuperscript{175} Hooker is arguing that godliness, in applying piety to the affairs of men, enhances the application of reason and its reception within the church. The principal role of religious public piety therefore is to affectionately embrace God. And whereas Hooker metaphorically views God’s involvement chiefly as Law, he also metaphorically views the divine as the guiding ‘justice’ governing of church piety. For Hooker, ‘justice’ should be commonly recognised as overseeing that church government goes forward in ‘good sorte’.

Religion and justice for Hooker are \textit{naturally} joined, and without one there is neither. In Book V, Chapter I, Hooker writes:

\begin{quote}
So naturall is the union of Religion with Justice, that wee may boldlie denye there is either, where both are not. For how should they be unfainedly just, whom religion doth not cause to be such; or they religious, which are not founde such by the proofe of theirie just actions? If they, which imploie theirie labour and travaile, about the publique administration of justice, followe it only as a trade, with unquenchable and unconscionable thirst of gaine, beinge not in harte perswaded that justice is Godes own worke, and themselves his agentes in this busines, the sentence of right Godes own verdict, and them selves his preistes to deliver it…which was necessarilie ordained for the common good.…\textsuperscript{176}
\end{quote}

Hooker envisages ‘justice’ as God’s own verdict for the common good, and men’s collective ‘voice’ of reason serves ‘justice’, as does the religious expression of men. Thus Hooker

\textsuperscript{174} Cartwright, \textit{A Second Admonition to the Parliament}, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{175} \textit{Lawes}, 2: 17.3-11; (V.1.2).
\textsuperscript{176} \textit{Lawes}, 2: 17.11-22; (V.1.2).
conflates man’s reason, which identifies God’s guidance, with man’s religious conscience that worships God. A modern might want to call this conflation ‘religious psychology’, but Hooker calls it ‘justice’, which metaphorically does the same work as Law in directing everything to its good end.

We should note here the consistency in the Lawes of Books I to V concerning how men are to embrace God’s own verdict, particularly in the church. Taking a different view, McGrade argues that Hooker intends Books I-IV to describe man’s philosophical and theological existence, distinct from Book V which describes, McGrade insists, man’s devotional level of ordinary life,177 and John E. Booty describes this as a contrast between intellectual emphasis and customary practices in the church.178 But it is my contention that Hooker’s perceptions of God especially throughout Book I accord rather than contrast with the devotional piety developed in Book V. Hooker proposes the perception of God’s guiding goodness, especially in his metaphor of Law as presented in Books I-III, to be perceived throughout Book V as an explanation of how the governing of worship is to be identified as good.

This study has maintained that it is precisely Hooker’s argument that the process of reason should not be separated from a human affective piety towards God.179 Contrary to McGrade’s argument that Hooker proposes an ‘objective Christian rationalism’,180 I argue that Hooker does not mean to completely ‘abstract’ emotional elements from his perception of God within the lives and workings of men. It is, after all, Hooker’s vision that God is intrinsic to the soul of the public body and to the common good that it seeks.

179 Hooker makes this clear at Lawes, 2: 18.25-28; (V.1.2).
The intrinsic connection of God with the religion of the church is very important to Hooker, and goes some way to defuse superstition. Indeed, religion does more for Hooker than serve the justice of God’s verdict for what is good; religion, especially pious worship, is to be part of the church’s moral outlook. Based upon his claim that religion and ‘justice’ are inseparable, Hooker develops a moral argument for why there must be religious justice in church laws, they must be performed with pious love and affection or else they will not be morally perfect in the sight of God. In regard to baptism, for example, Hooker writes in Book V, Chapter 62:

The greatest morall perfection of baptisme consisteth in mens devout obedience to the law of God, which lawe requireth both the outward act or thinge done, and also that religious affection which God doth so much regarde, that without it whatsoever wee doe is hatefull in his sight, who therefore is said to respect adverbs more than verbes, because the ende of his law in appointinge what wee shall doe in our own perfection, which perfection consisteth chieflie in the vertuous disposition of the minde, and approveth it self to him not by doinge, but by doinge well…So that accordinge to lawes which principallie respect the harte of men, workes of religion beinge not religiouslie performed cannot morallie be perfect.181

Hooker is unwavering: whatsoever is done without religious affection is hateful in the sight of God. When men perform their worship well they perfect themselves and are approved by God, and what is not religiously performed with virtue of mind will not morally perfect the hearts of men.

The principal conclusion here is that what should guide the governing of worship in Hooker’s vision is the intrinsic ‘justice’ found not only in doing what is good but also in doing it suitably and admirably. It is a key conclusion of this chapter that Hooker envisages an excellence in the performance of worship which means discovering a ‘perfect form’ of worship for an age and maintaining the excellence of its performance by publicly organising it, with its precepts (loving and adoring God) ordered into a form of public piety. The application of doing well in worship is, for Hooker, disdainful of superstition because performing excellence in

181 Lawes, 2: 281.3-18; (V.62.15).
worship is morally perfecting when in line with God’s guidance, although the application within the church is also amiable and in this sense Hooker is closely aligned with Plato’s idea of amiable goodness, as discussed in section I.

At first, Hooker concedes not only the piety of his own position but also that of the presbyterian view. ‘On both sides the end intended betwene us, is to have lawes and ordinances such, as maie rightlie serve to abolish superstition and to establish the service of God with all thinges thereunto appertaininge in some perfect forme’. But for Hooker, the church governments described fragmentarily in Scripture cannot be reshuffled and adapted to provide for his vision of God’s ‘justice’ for each ecclesiastical age. Instead, ‘appertaininge’ within certain ages of the church ‘some perfect forme’ is made possible, Hooker claims, by the pious desire for what is good, discovered by common reason, envisaged in precepts and enacted for the good of all men in the knowledge that it is divinely sanctioned. ‘The same pietie, which maketh them that are in authoritie desirous to please and resemble God by justice, inflameth everie way men of action with zeal to doe good (as farre as theire place will permitt) unto all. For that they knowe, is most noble and divine’.

By arguing that men resemble God by justice, Christianity for Hooker involves the immersion of men and their reasoning, faith, affections, love and desire into the noble and divine guidance of God. But the failure of the church to immerse itself in the way that Hooker describes will leave it vulnerable to be misguided by unexpected evils which, Hooker argues, often cause men to mistakenly think upon divine power with ‘fearefullest suspitions’. There is, Hooker argues, only one rational alternative to the suspicious or misinformed view about God’s involvement – the rational view is that the divine has in place the good direction of men: ‘howe

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182 Lawes, 2: 31.4-7; (V.4.3).
183 Lawes, 2: 17.23-18.2; (V.1.2).
should wee looke for any constant resolution of minde in such cases savinge only where 
unfained affection to godward hath bredd the most assured confidence to be assisted by his 
hand?184

I stress here that for Hooker it is human affection that maintains the constant resolution of 
the mind, affection elevates the confidence that men are divinely assisted. And for Hooker the 
affections in religion manifest themselves into society. ‘My desire therefore to be loved of my 
equals in nature as much as possiblie may be, imposeth upon me a naturall dutie of bearing to 
them-ward fully the like affection’.185 Hooker also argues that if men do not retain affective 
commitments that are due to God but instead disseminate them elsewhere, then this will result in 
idolatry, which would be wickedness according to Hooker’s sensitive vision of God’s guidance 
in the world. Concerning idolaters, he writes in Chapter Seventeen, Book V:

The truth is, that as no man serveth God and loveth him not; so neither can anie man sincerelie 
love God, and not extremelie abhor that sinne [idolatry], which is the highest degree of treason against the 
supreme guide and monarch of the whole world, with whose divine authoritie and power it investeth 
others.186

We can conclude that Hooker’s vision centres upon the public affection towards God as 
the good guide amongst men, and, indeed, securing men’s affections towards God is for Hooker 
one of the primary purposes of a religion of public organised worship. Hooker’s view of piety is 
not strictly based upon the workings of man’s reason but takes affection, love and desire into 
account. Hooker even contends that the pious precepts that focus on God must take priority in 
the church and in its worship: he claims that if the mind is divorced from affections it will only 
ever be a ‘spectacle of commiseration’, even if it possesses the ‘full perfection’ of all the other 
‘ornaments’ of the mind.187 Indeed for Hooker, Christianity allows men to desire God188 and,

184 Lawes, 2: 18.12-19; (V.1.2).
185 Lawes, 1: 88.16-18; (I.8.7).
186 Lawes, 2: 62.2-7; (V.17.2).
187 Lawes, 2: 18.25-28; (V.1.2).
even if men have chosen a false religion, they will reap whatever benefit it can offer, whilst those
who do not bear their religion any affection will reap no benefit at all.  

Seinge therefore it doth thus appeare that the saftie of all estates dependeth upon religion; that religion
unfainedly loved perfecteth mens habilities unto all kindes of virtuous services in the common wealth; that
mens desire is in generall to holde no religion but the true; and that whatsoever good effectes doe growe out
of theire religion who imbrace in steede of the true a false, the roote thereof are certaine sparkes of the light
of truth intermingled with the darknes of error, because no religion can whollie and onlie consist of
untruths, wee have reason to thinke that all true virtues are to honor true religion as theire parente, and all
well ordered common-weales to love her as theire cheifest staye.

It should be clear that Hooker’s vision extends further than the church – an organised
common-weal should love its religion as its ‘cheifest staye’. This study agrees with the
canonical view that Hooker values society, but Hooker also emerges from this chapter as not
dissimilar to the Augustinian humanist view of society, generally respected in the Renaissance,
in which men’s affective lives and love for God and love for fellow humans animates them to
publicly engage with each other (as opposed to a Stoic withdrawal into the private and
abstract). Not that Hooker has in mind some sort of ascetic or even monastic conception of
the life of a community spent in prayer and worship, which for example the English religious
reformer John Wyclif had strongly reacted against two hundred years prior to Hooker. But
Hooker does envisage a community’s collective movement of mind towards God, which
certainly was not a new idea, and had previously appeared in different formations, with an earlier
variation found in the devotio moderna lay group of the fifteenth century that taught
‘singlemindedness’ in devotion.

188 Lawes, 2: 19.19-20; (V.1.2).
189 Lawes, 2: 21.30-22.2; (V.1.4).
190 Lawes, 2: 22.14-24; (V.1.5).
192 For the general Renaissance Augustinian humanist view of society see William J. Bouwsma, ‘The Two Faces of
Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought’, A Usable Past: Essays in European Cultural
Hooker does not only argue that men’s engagement with the church, as a nationally inclusive society, is necessary for the welfare of a commonwealth, but, this chapter has argued, Hooker contends that men should engage with what has been publicly verified to be good, especially in public worship. Importantly for Hooker, the public engagement with Christianity fosters the understanding of what is good. The ancient Jews, Hooker points out, were constantly in extreme hazard but were always animated in their religion. Even before, in the felicity of the innocent world, men of their own accord, Hooker remarks, loved equality and loved what was right – and this estate of happiness, Hooker stresses, was the work of religion. And Hooker himself, I argue, also develops a vision of the estate of happiness within the church when its society sensitively adheres to what is good. ‘For if religion did possesse sincerely and sufficiently the hartes of all men, there would neede no other restrainte from evell’. Let us finish by outlining Hooker’s vision of this estate of happiness within the national society of the church.

In drawing Book V to a conclusion, Hooker argues in Chapter 76 that ministering divine duties should not only show the way to salvation but should also provide earthly happiness. In Hooker’s vision, God is a focal point of affection in the ministry of holy things because he is publicly honoured and worshipped by his church, and men themselves are a focal point of affection in the ministry of holy things because they are able to achieve great happiness by means of Christian worship. For Hooker, the ‘worldlie peace and prosperitie, the secular happiness, the temporall and naturall good estate both of all men and of all dominions hangeth

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194 Although this is implied by Booty. See Booty, ‘Introduction: Book V’, pp. 191-199.
195 Lawes, 2: 18.19-24; (V.1.2).
196 Lawes, 2: 19.2-13; (V.1.3).
197 Lawes, 2: 19.12-13; (V.1.3).
198 Lawes, 2: 413.24-414.4; (V.76.1).
chieflie upon religion’, but what is more, Hooker emphasises, full joy and felicity arise when the
community detects God’s blessings in the society of the church.199

What Hooker is arguing is that the happiness of men depends upon God’s ‘sacred
function’ within the world,200 and to this end he identifies four assertions: firstly, that nothing in
the present world can be ‘injoyed’ against the will of God who has made all things; secondly,
that impiety prevents the impious from ‘injoying’ temporal blessings on earth; thirdly, that God
has appointed earthly blessings as ‘handmaids’ upon religion; and fourthly, that religion can not
continue in the world without the administering of divine duties.201 In regard to these assertions,
Hooker argues that the temporal things which are good, such as man’s ‘length of daies’, ‘health
of bodie’ and ‘store of friends’, are naturally every man’s desire specifically because they are
good, which is consistent with his argument that men always desire what is good. And crucially
for Hooker, God, by creating what is good for the societies of his church, has graciously blessed
them.202

In all this, temporal happiness or felicity is, according to Hooker, an instrumental good in
the service of religion. ‘It appeareth therefore how all the partes of temporall felicitie are onlie
good in relation to that which useth them as instrumentes, and that they are no such good as
wherein a right desire doth ever staie or rest it self’.203 If it is not clear to men how the good is to
be instrumental then, Hooker argues, men are taught by reason that their actions, when in
accordance with ‘right desire’, will always refer to the goodness of God, who men always desire
to imitate when striving for their own excellence.204 ‘None whose desires are rightlie ordered

199 Lawes, 2: 414.4-16; (V.76.1).
200 Lawes, 2: 414.24; (V.76.1).
201 Lawes, 2: 414.16-25; (V.76.1).
202 Lawes, 2: 414.28-415.6; (V.76.2).
203 Lawes, 2: 416.5-8; (V.76.3).
204 Lawes, 2: 415.9-13; (V.76.3).
would wish to live to breath and move without performance of those actions which are beseeming mans excellencie’.  

The impious, who do not receive any temporal blessings via God’s ‘handes’ due to their own error, place what they think is good above what is actually more worthy. What is more worthy is found for Hooker in his definition of godliness which gives secular prosperity the understanding of sufficiency and the discharge of want and greed. It is Hooker’s conclusion that true felicity upon earth occurs when the nobler part of men is, as already mentioned, immersed in Christianity. When immersed, Hooker explains, temporal happiness can be greatly achieved as when, in the loss of what may have been good, is ‘purchased’ what is better, or when, in sustaining misery, great praise is gained. Indeed, secular prosperity in Hooker’s vision is indebted to Christianity for its virtuous conduct and is indebted to God who blesses what is good for it. The point for Hooker is that God ‘shows’ men the excellence needed for their earthly welfare and secular success, and they should honour him through the instrument of man’s religion.

This singular grace and preeminence religion hath, that either it gardeth as an heavenlie sheild from all calamities or els conducteth us safe thorow them, and permitteth them not to be miseries; it either giveth honors promotions and welth, or els more benefit by wanting them then if wee had them at will; it either filleth our howses with plenty of all good thinges or maketh a sallet of grene herbes more sweet then all the sacrifices of the ungodly.

This chapter has investigated the enormous amount of prominence that Hooker places upon what is ‘good’. Christology explains his view of sacramental worship, but Hooker relies upon more than Christology and, for that matter, he relies upon more than human reason: for

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205 Lawes, 2: 415.13-15; (V.76.3).
206 Lawes, 2: 416.22-417.23; (V.76.4).
207 Lawes, 2: 417.23-28; (V.76.5).
208 Lawes, 2: 419.10-21; (V.76.5).
209 Lawes, 2: 419.31-420.6; (V.76.6).
210 Lawes, 2: 423.4-11; (V.76.8).
Hooker, what is ‘good’ sanctifies by shaping the religion of men and by shaping the governing of their worship, and it is Hooker’s route into the public piety of the church.
Chapter Seven

“Feeling Knowledge”: God and Common Affections in Public Prayer

Hooker’s vision that men should secure their affections in relation to God was the conclusion of the previous chapter. I now move to investigate in the current chapter Hooker’s argument on how to engage men’s affections in common prayer. My contention is that Hooker does not envisage a dispassionate church body exclusively using objective reasoning, but that men according to Hooker do experience their emotions in addition to the intellectual part of their soul, that according to Hooker men love the divine object addressed in common prayer.

I shall focus upon Chapters 23 to 49 of Book V of the Lawes, in which Hooker sustains his argument that rather than misuse affections, they should be directed towards God in public prayer. In my reading of this section of Book V, Hooker does not merely defend the practices of the Church of England, but he also explains how men’s affections should be assimilated into what men experience as holy; indeed, Hooker explains how men’s affections have a ‘divine’ value in the public realm, as we shall investigate in this chapter.

I start with the hypothesis that Hooker is motivated by his belief that at the centre of prayer book worship is God. Such a motivation is not unique to Hooker or to the 1580s and 1590s when he wrote. The crisis of reform earlier in the sixteenth century came when the church could no longer be considered holy, when the conduct of ecclesiastical institutions could no longer be trusted in matters of Christian truth.¹ In the Church of England, Archbishop Thomas Cranmer had sought to re-teach the congregation that sacred worship should be set in the realm of human social relations, instead of a private pursuit of holiness that would disconnect the

¹ As Brian Tierney notes. See Brian Tierney, ““Only the Truth has Authority”: The Problem of “Reception” in the Decretists and in Johannes de Turrecremata”, Church Law and Constitutional Thought in the Middle Ages, (London: Variorum Reprints, 1979), p. 89.
sacred from society. Even in his early drafts of the prayer book in the mid-1530s when he was being wooed by the Zwinglians Martin Bucer and Heinrich Bullinger, who both tried to convince him that they and he and the Church of England could collectively combat papistry and radicals, Cranmer had always intended to cultivate the uniformity of worship in the English church. Cranmer envisaged the prayer book as providing, in conjunction with the Bible, the ‘action’ within English communities to allow the sacred entrance into secular society. The prayer book for Cranmer was to be a foundation for Christian living, supplying devotional instruction to be consulted in all aspects of English life.

When scholars examine Hooker’s view of prayer they usually stress its public aspect (with Hooker presented as in line with Cranmer), but very rarely, if at all, have scholars noted Hooker’s understanding of prayer as expressing affective relations to God. Peter Lake and Torrance Kirby both discuss Hooker’s reference to the ascent and descent of prayers between God and his church, of the Angels’ intercourse and commerce between God and men, of prayer as an action shared by the church triumphant in heaven and by the church militant upon earth. Lake continues to point out Hooker’s reverent view of public worship, of men offering their hearts to God in prayer, but, as examined in Chapter Five, Lake primarily argues that Hooker upholds public prayer at the expense of preaching. Kirby moves on to analyse Hooker’s view of common prayer as a liturgy that participates in Christ, reflecting Kirby’s project of portraying Hooker as a Reformed theologian. In the Reformed context, Christ had certainly been put at the

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5 Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?*, pp. 166-67, 170. I examined Lake’s argument in Chapter Five, section II.
centre of church piety by men such as Huldrych Zwingli and Bullinger in Reformed Zurich earlier in the sixteenth century,\(^7\) and Christ had certainly been believed by Luther in Wittenberg and by Calvin in Geneva to be the only mediator of prayer between God and men.\(^8\) Hooker is undoubtedly in agreement with these Reformers over the church’s mystical union with Christ.\(^9\)

Yet none of the above scholars examines Hooker’s claim that common prayer appropriately expresses men’s love, feelings and affections towards God. Perhaps at first, Hooker does not appear to be unveiling anything extraordinary, since all of the key Reformers on the continent were men of prayer, they had all understood that prayer expressed the humility of the believer’s relationship with God, and they had all instilled this into the movements they led. Calvin, for instance, understood that the ‘feelings God has placed in human nature are in themselves no more corrupt than their author himself’, that men should be consumed in the worship of God, employing their senses, feet, hands and arms to magnify God.\(^10\) Such devotion in glorifying God is precisely what Hooker admires in the ancient church. ‘[T]here needed no penal statutes to drawe them [the ancients] unto publique prayer. The warning sound was no sooner hearde, but the churches were presentlie filled, the pavementes covered with bodies prostrate, and washt with theire teares of devout joy. […] [T]hey in the practise of theire religion weared chieflie theire knees and handes’.\(^11\)

On closer inspection, however, Hooker elevates affection as an emotional influence which draws men to God. This emotional influence, which for Hooker is common to all men, is


\(^9\) Stressed, for example, by Egil Grislis, ‘Richard Hooker and Mysticism’, pp. 259-262.


\(^11\) *Lawes*, 2: 114.17-26; (V.25.2), 2: 488.8-9; (V.81.10). Lake also notes Hooker’s emphasis upon worship and devotion here, see Lake, *Anglican and Puritans?*, p. 172.
represented, Hooker argues, by the Biblical affections expressed in prayer book worship. Hooker believes that such affective commitments encourage the public to explore its desires and offer its emotions to God, particularly men’s love for God, men’s desire for divine glory, and men’s reverend fear of the divine. Brian Vickers implies that Hooker intends only to occasionally allow the church public to demonstrate its ‘feelings’ towards God, which, Vickers points out, is a sensibility associated with later poets in the seventeenth century such as George Herbert, Thomas Traherne and Richard Crashaw. However, I argue that Hooker intends to allow the church a good deal of scope in publicly utilising its affections, and we should be wary of the dangers of associating Hooker’s understanding of affection with later periods.

For example, in the context of later generations the use of passion in religious worship, as well as the function of affection in relation to reason, had been developed, as Isabel Rivers points out, in the literature of non-conformists from the turn of the seventeenth century through to the restoration in 1660 and on into the eighteenth century. This is especially true, Rivers claims, of the evangelical tendency since the Reformation to react against its own use of reason, leading to the development of a practical religious psychology by men such as Richard Baxter (1615-1691), Isaac Watts (1674-1748) and Philip Doddridge (1702-1751). But what distinguishes Hooker’s understanding of affection from the ‘affectionate religion’ developed by later non-conformists?

The answer rests with different understandings of what is ‘rational’ for the public good. For instance, non-conformists in the later context, following their exclusion from the Church of England and their persecution in the period 1662-1688 and following the Toleration Act of 1689, considered it ‘rational’ that forms of worship should not be imposed and that there should be a

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liberty of thought and conscience, as well as a separation of church and state.\textsuperscript{14} In marked contrast, Hooker in his late sixteenth-century context argues that it is ‘rational’ for worship to be imposed by common prayer because men are to ‘feel’ the same affections and emotions towards God, they are not at liberty to nurture \textit{any} affection of their choice in worship because they may offend God with unholy emotions. Men should learn to approach and respond to God and to what is holy in the church, which, for Hooker, is taught by \textit{The Book of Common Prayer}. The affections represented in the prayer book are appropriate for Hooker because they duplicate the affections represented in Scripture, which are ultimately sourced in the divine.

Even without referring to the later context, Hooker’s argument opposes the non-conformity of his contemporary Thomas Cartwright. Hooker deliberately presents what, in his view, is the misrecognition of prayer book affection by Cartwright, observing that the church’s congregation were deemed by Cartwright to be ‘ignorant’ and ‘simple’ because of the ease with which they used the prayer book.\textsuperscript{15} Cartwright had also complained about the length of church services, but, according to Hooker, omitting half an hour of the service would cut the greatest part of common prayer which specifically serves, he argues, man’s love and desire for things most holy.\textsuperscript{16}

Hooker aims to preserve the affective reception of the presence of God in men’s hearts, which he believes is not conserved in the presbyterian and moderates campaign to increase sermons. Whereas Cartwright asserted that by many prayers the devil drives preaching out of the church,\textsuperscript{17} it is, according to Hooker, a stratagem of Satan to bring common prayer into

\textsuperscript{14} ibid., p. 165. Hooker would not be able to concur in a separation of church and state because of his complex view of the sacred blurred with the secular, see the Conclusion below.
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Lawes}, 2: 135.35-36; (V.31.4).
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Lawes}, 2: 139.15-21; (V.32.4).
\textsuperscript{17} Cartwright, \textit{The Rest of the Second Replie}, p. 184, quoted by Hooker at \textit{Lawes}, 2: 138.10-14; (V.32.3).
contempt. Hooker notes that if different means of worship ‘sleepe’ because ‘people showeth everie where’ a ‘singular affection’ towards preaching and a ‘cold disposition’ towards other ‘holsome’ proceedings, then men are at fault in thinking that acts of worship are ‘imperfect’ and ‘lame’ if they are ‘discharged’ by other than an ‘able preacher’. Hooker argues that the emotional bias towards God, common to all men, is supplied with Biblical affections in prayer book worship, as in, for example, the affections inspired by God in the Book of Psalms that were read and sung in church worship. Understood from Hooker’s viewpoint of precepts, God’s ‘voice’ within worship should encourage affective commitments and should not be interrupted or displaced by extemporal wit in prayer. Extemporal or spontaneous prayer was advocated in the Church of England by presbyterians, although they generally did not object to the moderate use of set forms of prayer, advancing their own set forms based upon the Geneva model which also used the Book of Psalms as a centrepiece of its worship, as we shall examine in section II. Nevertheless, Ramie Targoff briefly points out that Hooker objects to the lack of correspondence in extemporal or spontaneous prayer between the language of men and the divine, and that Hooker recognises the challenge for how men should best communicate with God.

Hooker meets this challenge, I argue, by elevating the affections expressed towards the divine in prayer. This coincides with what Hooker has already argued in the Lawes concerning how human reason regulates and works with affections and emotions as examined in Chapter Six, as well as concerning how God’s ‘voice’ which is represented in the prayer book is taken

18 Lawes, 2: 117.10-16; (V.26.1).
19 Lawes, 2: 109.6-21; (V.22.20).
20 Lawes, 2: 136.22-25; (V.31.3).
21 I explain Hooker’s view of precepts above in Chapter Six.
from Scripture. Hence reason and Scripture remain indispensable authorities for Hooker, but they do not complete Hooker’s argument on authority.

We can begin to understand what in church worship Hooker takes to be authoritative by remembering that Hooker’s approving view of affection reflects his allegiance to Augustine Christianity. The revival of Augustinianism in the English Renaissance, as discussed in Chapters Five and Six, established emotion and affection as inseparable from Christian inwardness when encountering God, linking rather than polarising reason and emotion, as derived from Aristotle’s stipulation that emotion is not irrational but the offspring of belief. In this context, Hooker views faith as ennobled by emotions and not threatened, even though emotions have the potential to threaten objective rational inquiry. Hooker believes that the affections expressed in the psalms embrace God and Christian truth, and this actually presents a new configuration in which reason does not have exclusive access to divine matters. Yet reason in Hooker’s argument is not sceptical of affections because it understands that affections direct the heart and mind towards God and that affections communicate an awareness of the ‘presence’ of the divine.

I argue that there emerges, from what has been explained so far, two authoritative sources that provide Hooker with his understanding of affection in common prayer: firstly Scripture and, secondly, an extra-Scriptural ‘oral’ liturgical tradition that fosters affection and love towards God in prayer.

In the first, Scripture, Hooker is impressed by how the ancient Jews of the Old Testament demonstrated their affections to God. ‘The publique estate of the Church of God amongst the Jewes hath had many rare and extraordinarie occurrentes, which also were occasions of sundrie open sollemnities and offices, whereby the people did with generall consent make show of

24 See Chapter Six.
correspondent affection towards God’. Hooker partly feeds this ancient affection back into his view of common prayer by, as already mentioned, awarding a high status to the affections expressed in the psalms, as we shall examine in section II.

Hooker, in a second authoritative source, relies upon an extra-Scriptural ‘oral’ tradition of prayer in which affections and love towards God are communicated in addition to the Jewish communicants in Scripture, although this extra-Scriptural tradition of prayer duplicates the affections presented in the Bible. This second source is shaped and justified, for Hooker, by Basil the Great and by Augustine. In his work *On the Holy Spirit*, Basil argues that the work of God is mainly hidden and is not fully explained by written formulations (such as Scripture); but that, nevertheless, God’s work can be witnessed to in an ‘oral’ tradition that consists of liturgical practices within the church.

Although Basil warns against an excessive sentimentality in prayer, he argues that men, in sharing this liturgical ‘oral’ tradition, are able to partake in the ‘summit of their desires…to become God’. In other words, Basil contends that liturgical practices will enable men to achieve what, in the Greek Eastern Church, was understood as the aim of human life – deification, becoming God, with men’s feelings attesting to God’s presence. Hooker accepts this, explaining: ‘God hath deified our nature, though not by turninge it into him selfe, yeat by makinge it his owne inseparable habitation, wee cannot now conceive how God should without man either exercise divine power or receive the glorie of divine praise. For man is in both an associate of Deitie’. Hooker is also clear that men should reassert their ‘fervency’ towards God, even quoting Basil’s friend Gregory Nazianzus: ‘To seeke reformation of evill lawes is a

25 *Lawes*, 2: 162.23-27; (V.41.1).
27 *Lawes*, 2: 224.14-18; (V.54.5).
commendable endevour, but for us the more necessarie is a spedie redresse of our selves. Wee have on all sides [presbyterians, conformists] lost much of our first fervencie towards God; and therefore concerning our owne degenerated waies wee have reason to exhort with S. Gregorie…Let us returne againe unto that which we sometime were’. 28

Basil’s opinion on liturgical practices was propagated half a century later in the West by Augustine, for whom an authoritative extra-Scriptural tradition could legitimately form church worship since the unwritten ‘oral’ tradition was based - like the New Testament and its interpretation - upon the apostolic message and the apostolic affections. 29 Hooker continually cites Basil and Augustine when discussing men’s affections in prayer, and they therefore inform his argument - yet, as we shall see, Hooker remains sure that the virtuous affections fostered by extra-Scriptural liturgy originate from God.

The plan for this chapter is as follows: I will examine, in section I, Hooker’s understanding of the role of affection in public prayer; I shall then investigate Hooker’s understanding of affection in sanctifying men and glorifying God in section II and in petitioning God and offering him thanksgiving in section III; and in section IV, I shall draw conclusions on the significance for this study of Hooker’s discussion of man’s affectionate relation to God in common prayer.

I

Hooker is protective of the language that addresses God in prayer. Hooker points out that God respects the ‘precise appointment even with what worde or sentences his name should be called

28 Lawes, 2: 1.18-23; (V.Ded.2).
29 See Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, pp. 369-371. Basil’s view was propagated into the Middle Ages but was at odds with the sola principle.
on amongst his people’. Whilst not accepting on the one hand that the Holy Ghost guides men’s choice of language in prayer, Hooker, on the other hand, believes that the ‘phancie of extemporall and voluntarie prayers’ irreverently approaches God with a ‘superflitie of wordes’. The words which are most likely to please the divine, Hooker claims, are only the ones selected by Jesus in the Lord’s Prayer (‘Our Father’). Against Cartwright’s view that the repetitive use of the Lord’s Prayer is ritualistic (the prayer was to be used in every morning and evening service, every day of the week), Hooker writes:

[W]ordes so pleasinge to the eares of God as those which the Sonne of God him selfe hath composed were not possible for men to frame. Hee therefore which made us to live hath also taught us to pray, to the ende that speakinge unto the father in the Sonnes own prescript forme without scholie or glosse of oures, wee may be sure that wee utter nothinge which God will either disallowe or denie…. Hooker argues that men can be sure that God will not reject their supplications because men have spoken in the ‘Sonnes own prescript forme’ - without adding their own words.

But is Hooker suggesting that the prayers of men do not have the same reverence that is provided by the words of ‘Our Father’? And is he suggesting that, independent from the Lord’s Prayer, men cannot appropriately present their affections towards the divine by using their own choice of language to please ‘the eares of God’?

Hooker cannot be proposing either of these because he defends many of the prayers in the prayer book, and most are not based on the words of Jesus and some are not even based on the words of Scripture. So what is Hooker recommending? There were, according to the critic Kenneth Stevenson, two different opinions on the Lord’s Prayer in the sixteenth century. On the one hand, Calvin understood ‘Our Father’ as a Scriptural guide for how all prayers were to be

30 Lawes, 2: 116.23-117.6; (V.25.5).
31 See Chapter Two above.
32 Lawes, 2: 117.19-23; (V.26.2).
34 Lawes, 2: 146.30-147.13; (V.35.3).
framed and, similar to Calvin, the words of the Lord’s Prayer for Cartwright were to be paraphrased to form the basis for other prayers,\(^\text{35}\) since the Lord’s Prayer was, Cartwright wrote, ‘a rule and squire to frame all our prayers by…[although] there is no necessitie laid upon us to use these very wordes and no more’.\(^\text{36}\) Cartwright contended that there were many words that could be used in addition to ‘Our Father’, because it was only a guideline. Yet, on the other hand according to Stevenson, Luther, Cranmer and Hooker understood the Lord’s Prayer as a set Scriptural prayer to be used repeatedly in the church.\(^\text{37}\)

But I argue that Hooker understands the Lord’s Prayer as more than a Scriptural prayer to be repeated, and I also argue that other prayers for Hooker should not necessarily aspire to the language of ‘Our Father’ as a Scriptural guide. This is because Hooker understands the Lord’s Prayer as the ‘perfect idea’. Hooker comments in Book I of the Lawes: ‘[O]ur Saviour himselfe being to set downe the perfect idea of that which wee are to pray and wish for on earth, did not teach to pray or wish for more then onely that here it might be with us, as with them it is in heaven’.\(^\text{38}\) Hooker suggests that the affections expressed in other prayers should aspire to the template of Jesus’ affection expressed in ‘Our Father’. And here Hooker is similar to Cranmer for whom the words of the prayer book taught nothing new but moved the hearers of the words into action.\(^\text{39}\) Hooker argues that God respects the affections that are demonstrated towards him, and Hooker therefore defends the pre-arranged prayers in the prayer book because they express Biblical affections towards God.


\(^{38}\) *Lawes*, 1: 70.1-4: (I.4.1).

\(^{39}\) On this aspect of Cranmer, see Wall, *Transformations of the Word*, p. 46.
Scholars often note that Hooker describes prayer as a ‘dutiful affection’ and, as already mentioned, the result of ‘holie desires’ to have ‘commerce’ with God, but they do not acknowledge that prayer for Hooker espouses public affective commitments towards God such as love and fear. Scholars do not acknowledge that men for Hooker must imitate the affective commitments that the Son of God displayed to the Father, that men for Hooker must imitate Jesus’ ‘perfect idea’ in their prayers and wishes upon earth. To be clear, my principal argument here is that Hooker examines prayer from the viewpoint of public affection – if he did not, then prayer for Hooker would not serve the purpose of a human society that is emotive and loving when worshiping God. There are two components of Hooker’s argument at this point: firstly, men’s affections are to address God in prayer and, secondly, men’s affections must be represented in a verbal form that communicates those affections to God. Let us examine both of these components.

In the first, affections are to address God as the divine, and Hooker disapproves of Cartwright’s argument which reduces how God is addressed to that of a worldly prince. For example, Cartwright regarded as ‘unsaverie’ the church practice of intermingling lessons with prayers, arguing that in public supplications, like those offered to a mighty prince of the world, the pausing and intermingling might dissuade the prince, leading him to think that the public had forgotten its requests or had been distracted in its understanding. Hooker points out that God’s omniscience must not be overlooked, that God does not need to be informed of what men lack. Rather, Hooker argues, God honours the affections demonstrated to him in prayer. Hooker writes:

40 Which Hooker states at Lawes, 2: 110.13-14; (V.23.1); 2: 110.29; (V.23.1). See for example, Booty, ‘Introduction: Book V’, pp. 190, 191-93; Stevenson, ‘Richard Hooker and the Lord’s Prayer’, p. 48. See also note 4 above.
41 Cartwright, Replye, p. 138, quoted by Hooker at Lawes, 2: 140.31-141.4; (V.34.2).
Our speech to worldly superiors we frame in such sorte as serveth best to informe and perswade the mindes of them, who otherwise neither could nor would greatelie regard our necessities: Whereas because we knowe that God is in deede a kinge, but a great kinge; who understandeth all thinges before hand which no other kinge besides doth, a kinge which needeth not to be informed what wee lacke, a kinge readier to grant then we to make our requestes; therefore in prayer wee doe not so much respect what precepts art delivereth touchinge the method of persuasive utterance in the presence of great men, as what doth most availe to our own edification in pietie and Godlie zeal.42

According to Hooker, men’s affections in addressing God should not be demonstrated by precepts of art or by a ‘method of persuasive utterance’, but men’s affections require a language that avails them in their ‘edification in pietie’ and in their ‘Godlie zeal’. Thus Hooker asks: ‘Should we hereupon frame a rule that what forme of speech or behaviour soever is fitt for suters in a Princes courte, the same and no other beseemeth us in our prayers to almightie God?’43

The answer to this may not at first be clear, because in a previous context Hooker has remained adamant that if attire and ornaments can beautify the solemn actions of royalty then there is no reason why they should be a ‘staine’ in the Church of God.44 Nevertheless, Hooker is consistent in arguing that God should not be addressed in the same way as men; rather, men’s unworthiness testifies to God’s ‘supereminent glorie and majestie’, which men must praise.45

Therefore Hooker needs to explain how prayer should name and describe the divine object to be praised. In the polemical argument of the Lawes, Hooker’s metaphor of Law expresses the manifestations of God as does his metaphor of ‘wisdom’, but Hooker does not directly refer to these metaphors when discussing prayer. Hooker does however accept, as we concluded in Chapter Three, the legitimacy of extra-Scriptural language – it describes his metaphor of Law. But, moving to the second component of Hooker’s argument, the communication of affections for Hooker should not be restricted to one verbal arrangement of extra-Scriptural language - rather, the affections expressed to God in short prayers are as equally

42 Lawes, 2: 141.4-14; (V.34.2).
43 Lawes, 2: 143.1-4; (V.34.3).
44 Lawes, 2: 123.18-19; (V.29.1).
45 Lawes, 2: 187.6-16; (V.47.2).
valid as those in longer prayers. The Reformed presbyterian churches on the continent in the
sixteenth century tended to offer lengthy prayers to God, and, Hooker points out, Cartwright had
criticised the Church of England’s prayer book for ‘endeavouring to please God’ with too many
versicles, short prayers and ‘divers short cutts or shreddings, rather wishes then prayers’.46
This, for Cartwright, was ‘vile and despicable’. But Cartwright’s view, Hooker contends,
opposes ‘vertuouslie disposed mindes’, and it is virtuous minds and affections which Hooker
wishes the church to cultivate in public prayer.47 Let us examine this.

To begin, Hooker expects the ‘vertuouslie’ minded to use every prayer in the prayer book
as an outlet for their affection towards God. Men’s ‘ardent affections [as] the verie wynges of
prayer are delighted to present our sutes in heaven, even sooner then our tongues can devise to
utter them’, whilst in short prayers ‘devout minds have added a pearchinge kinde of brevitie’.48
Hooker’s point is that common affections are ‘felt’ before they are expressed in words. Indeed,
Hooker states that it is his personal supposition that the words which express ‘devoute
invocation’ of the name of God presuppose men’s virtuous thoughts and feelings.49 Hence
Hooker argues that the words of prayer must not obscure the virtuous minds of common men
who love and respect God. Hooker writes:

Use in prayer no vaine superfluitie of wordes as the Heathens doe, for they imagin that theire much
speakinge will cause them to be heard, where as in truth the thinge which God doth regarde is how vertuous
their mindes are, and not how copious theire tongues in prayer; how well they thinke, and not how longe
they talke who com to present theire supplications before him.50

46 Cartwright, Replye, p. 138, quoted by Hooker at Lawes, 2: 139.22-25; (V.32.4).
47 Lawes, 2: 140.11-15; (V.33.1).
48 Lawes, 2: 140.3-9; (V.33.1).
49 Lawes, 2: 110.24-26; (V.23.1).
50 Lawes, 2: 137.5-11; (V.32.1).
Hooker understands public prayer, at this stage, as an opportunity for many virtuous minds to present affective supplications and worship to God, and Hooker is certainly egalitarian here – he argues that it is a ‘part of religious ingenuitie to honour virtue in whomsoever’.51

Hooker’s vision of a public body of good and virtuous minds will be familiar from Chapters Five and Six, but Hooker argues now that the widespread virtue of mind which is encouraged by common prayer is created by God in an ‘originall mould’, with all ages of the church retaining the ‘same analogie’ in its virtue, which should not be distorted by the intelligence or voluntary extemporal wit of men. Writing of an ordered common prayer serving God, Hooker argues that

No doubt from God it hath proceeded and by us it must be acknowledged a worke of his singular care and providence, that the Church hath evermore held a prescript forme of common prayer, although not in all things everie where the same, yet for the most part retaineing still the same analogie. So that if the liturgies of all ancient Churches throughout the world be compared amongst them selves, it may be easily perceived they had all one originall mould, and that the publique prayers of the people of God in Churches throughlie settled did never use to be voluntarie dictates proceedinge from any mans extemporall wit.52

Because all ancient church liturgies follow one ‘mould’ and because all common virtue is divine in origin, ‘prayer’ fulfils multiple purposes for Hooker: he asserts on the one hand that no service but prayer finds greater acceptance with God,53 but on the other hand he argues that the name of prayer signifies all services performed to God.54 We will soon return to Hooker’s view that God is the root of all virtuous affections in common prayer. First, we must realise that the name ‘prayer’ signifies for Hooker many different inward dispositions of the heart and mind towards God – by which Hooker specifically means that prayer allows the public to explore its emotions and affections in petitioning and worshipping God. Hooker argues that

Mindentes religiouslie affected are woont in everie thinge of weight and moment which they doe or see, to examine according unto rules of pietie what dependencie it hath on God, what reference to them selves, what coherence with any of those duties whereunto all things in the world should leade, and accordingly

51 Lawes, 2: 109.31-32; (V.22.20).
52 Lawes, 2: 116.14-23; (V.25.4).
53 Lawes, 2: 110.19-20; (V.23.1).
54 Lawes, 2.110.22-24; (V.23.1).
they frame the inwarde disposition of their minds sometime to admire God, some tymes to blesse him and give him thankes, sometime to exult in his love, sometime to implore his mercie. All which different elevations of spirit unto God are conteined in the name of prayer. Everie good and holie desire though it lacke the forme, hath notwithstandinge in it selfe the substance, and with him the force of a prayer, who regardeth the verie moaninges grones and sighes of the harte of man.55

Without understanding the priority that Hooker grants to the affections of men, his argument may appear vague. Indeed, affections are prioritised by Hooker because ‘rules of pietie’ depend upon men’s affections, which are inward dispositions of the mind framed to admire God, bless him, give him thanks, exult in his love and implore his mercy. All of these, Hooker claims, are the ‘verie moaninges grones and sighes’ of men’s hearts towards God, with every ‘holie desire’ – even before it is expressed in a verbal form – the substance and force of prayer.

Because it is the ‘harte of man’ that gives prayer its force, Hooker does, of course, admit to problems. In ‘our speech of most holie thin ges, our most fraile affections manie tymes are bewrayed’.56 We have already examined in Chapter Six the danger for Hooker of extreme zeal and fear, and Hooker now concedes that the ‘dulnes’ of men’s affections can slow men and make it hard for them to believe, as was the case, Hooker observes, with Jesus’ disciples.57 But this is precisely why, Hooker argues, the church requires exhortations (prayers) and expositions (lessons and Scriptural readings).58 With exhortations and expositions men profit from two influences which Hooker recognises as fundamental in counteracting extreme affection and in strengthening emotions that are otherwise ‘dul’ or ‘fraile’.

The first influence is that prayer is a divine exercise. Hooker presents prayer as the attempt by men and their affections to connect with God, especially since men’s inward virtues, expressed in prayer, are of divine origin. The second influence is that the declaration of the church body, of its desire and affection towards God, comforts men. Hooker values a multitude

55 Lawes, 2: 189.15-28; (V.48.2).
56 Lawes, 2: 99.9-10; (V.22.10).
57 Lawes, 2: 104.22-25; (V.22.17).
58 Lawes, 2: 104.25-26; (V.22.17).
of voices all ‘offering up hartes and tongues’, which for him is the most effectual communication of men’s affection to God, and the most comforting for all men to hear.\textsuperscript{59}

We shall now examine both influences in more detail for the purpose of defining just how far common prayer is to be rooted in the affections of the Christian community for Hooker. Beginning with how prayer is divine for Hooker, we need to review, as examined in Chapter Six, his understanding of how affection works in the soul.

Hooker believes that affections, which belong to the lower part of the soul, should be balanced by exercising the higher intellectual part of the soul. This balance is struck, Hooker argues, by maintaining exhortations and expositions in ‘close knit’, especially by intermingling lessons with prayers. He writes:

\begin{quote}
Againe for as much as effectuall prayer is joyigned with a vehement intention of the inferior powers of the soule, which cannot therein longe continewe without paine, it hath bene therefore thought good so by turnes to interpose still somewhat for the higher parte of the minde the understandinge to worke upon, that both beinge kept in continewall exercise with varietie, neither might feele any greate weariness, and yeat each be a spurre to other. For prayer kindleth our desire to behold God by speculation; and the minde delighted with that contemplative sight of God taketh everie where newe inflammations to pray, the riches of the mysteries of heavenlie wisdome continuallie stirringe up in us correspondent desires towards him. So that hee which prayeth in due sorte is thereby made the more attentive to heare [the lessons], and he which heareth the more earnest to pray....\textsuperscript{60}
\end{quote}

Hooker contends that human emotions require the outlet of prayer, while the mind requires the stimulation of lessons or readings. When both of these requirements are met, Hooker argues, the lower and higher parts of the soul work together (each a ‘spurre’ to the other), with affective commitments balanced with the higher intellectual part of the soul, avoiding ‘weariness’. This reflects a specifically Augustinian view of the soul which, rather than suppressing emotional power, seeks instead the divine harmony of the entire soul of man in the belief that the soul will regain its original role as the link between humanity and divinity. In this, Augustine broke with pagan Neoplatonism in that human destiny was no longer to be understood as the absorption of

\textsuperscript{59} Lawes, 2: 148.14-29; (V.36.3).
\textsuperscript{60} Lawes, 2: 140.17-30; (V.34.1).
the individual back into the One or the All, but was understood as seeking recovery through the
divine re-ordering of the soul – especially of the will, the intellect and the emotions.61

Hooker, close to Augustine here, argues that common prayer re-orders the weaknesses of
men enabling them to perform service to God by ‘affections of harte’ and other ‘dispositions’ of
the soul, such as love and intellect. Hooker argues that

A great parte of the cause, wherefore religious mindes are so inflamed with the love of publique
devotion, is that virtue, force and efficacie, which by experience they finde that the verie forme and
reverende solemnitie of common prayer dule ordered hath, to help that imbecillitie and weakenes in us, by
means whereof we are otherwise of our selves the lesse apt to perfore unto God so heavenlie a service,
with such affection of harte, and disposition in the powers of our soules as is requisite.62

We should note that when the mind is ‘inflamed’ by love it is not weakened but, for Hooker, is
fortified. Importantly for the current discussion, Hooker also argues that the affection of the
heart should embrace the virtuousness of ‘mindes’, since such virtuousness should always be
manifested in public prayer, and can be done so through affections. Lake quotes the above
passage to demonstrate Hooker’s belief that common prayer must be composed and used with
the greatest care and reverence,63 but Lake does not contextualise the passage within Hooker’s
Augustinian view of how a resolution between the intellect and the love and affection of men
shapes the public experience of common prayer.

I therefore stress Hooker’s argument that the souls of men can respond to God in
common prayer. Cartwright had characterised as ‘confused noise’ the congregations’ verbal
responses which followed the communicants of the minister and were set by The Book of
Common Prayer;64 but Hooker argues that the good of men’s souls ‘deceives’ men’s ears if there
is any unpleasantness of sound. Besides, men should not, Hooker explains by way of analogy,

61 See Chapter Six above. See also Bernard McGinn, ‘The Human Person as Image of God: Western Christianity’,
62 Lawes, 2: 113.19-26; (V.25.1).
64 Cartwright, Replye, p. 139, quoted by Hooker at Lawes, 2: 147.17; (V.36).
‘cast away a sharp knife because the edge of it maie sometimes grate’. The point is that the congregations’ responses and prayers demonstrate for Hooker affective ‘concurrence’ with God by all of the congregation simultaneously expressing desire for what delights God’s nature, irrespective of the sound it creates. Hooker’s view of harmonious sounds, however, will be examined in section II.

We can finally note that, in public prayer, the emotional and affective ‘concurrence’ of the lower part of the soul with God is described by Hooker as divine. This ‘concurrence’ in prayer is divine for Hooker not only because men imitate, in all public prayer, the Son of God’s affection for the Father in the Lord’s Prayer, and not only because virtue in prayer is divine in origin, but also because Hooker argues that a life spent in public prayer is celestial since prayer is common to Angels and men alike.

By believing that common prayer, with its emotions and affections, is divine, Hooker is able to understand prayer as providing comfort for men. This brings us to public prayer’s second influence for Hooker: it is able to counteract extreme affection and encourage affections when they are absent. Indeed, Hooker claims that the divine exercise of public prayer ‘betters’ the church more than by private prayer because the public expression of men’s affections comforts other men. Hence Hooker argues that a whole society ‘conditioned’ by public prayer will exceed the ‘worth’ of individual spontaneous prayers. ‘By prayer we doe good to all’. Hooker continues to explain:

When we publiquely make our prayers, it cannot be but that we doe it with much more comforte then in privat, for that the thinges we aske publiquely are approved as needfull and good in the judgment of all, we heare them sought for and desired with common assent. Againe, thus much helpe and furtherance is more yielded, in that if so be our zeale and devotion to Godward be slack, the alacritie and fervor of others

65 Lawes, 2: 149.4-12; (V.36.4).
66 Lawes, 2: 110.20-22; (V.23.1).
67 Lawes, 2: 111.18-19; (V.23.1).
68 Lawes, 2: 111.24-112.8; (V.24.1).
69 Lawes, 2: 111.2; (V.23.1).
serveth as a present spurre. *For even prayer it selfe* (saith St Basil) *when it hath not the consorte of many voices to strengthen it, is not it selfe.*

Hooker provides a rationale for why Basil’s claim - that prayer is strengthened by the ‘consorte’ of many voices - should be endorsed: public prayer approves, with common assent, the holy desires of all men, and public prayer is also instrumental in ‘spurring’ the affections of zeal and fervour if ‘devotion to Godward be slack’.

However, Hooker finds it difficult to describe the ‘solide comfort’ that men share when they glorify God with, for example, the Lord’s Prayer. ‘[There] is noe sufficient reason for us as much as once to forbeare in anie place a thinge which uttered with true devotion and zeale of harte affordeth to God him selfe that glorie, that aide to the weakest sorte of men, to the most perfect that solide comfort which is unspeakable’. The ‘solide comfort’, perhaps ‘unspeakable’ for Hooker because it is divine in origin, is nevertheless an enduring love among the church public.

To understand this, we need to recall what ‘public’ denotes for Hooker, since we are misled if we think Hooker envisages an exclusively rational public. My argument in Chapters Five and Six was that the church public, in Hooker’s definition, embraces love, affection, devotion, and agrees to what is good on the grounds of rational consensus. I now add that Hooker is also adamant that the public love of God should rise above controversy, which is Hooker’s conclusion when discussing, for instance, the attire ‘belonging’ to the public service to God. In the vestment controversy of the 1560s many clergy including Edmund Grindal, then bishop of London, had refused to wear the canonical garments instated by Elizabeth, believing that they resembled popery, and Cartwright in his controversy with Whitgift in the 1570s had

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70 *Lawes*, 2: 112.14-113.1; (V.24.2).
71 *Lawes*, 2: 146.30-147.13; (V.35.3).
also voiced objections. Hooker is baffled that men have threatened to withdraw their hearts and affections from the public service to God over an issue such as garments. He writes:

The wise man which feared God from his harte, and honoured the service that was don unto him, could not mention so much as the garments of holiness but with effectuall signification of most singular reverence and love. Were it not better that the love which men beare to God should make the least thinges that are employed in his service amiable, then that there over scrupulous dislike of so meane a thinge as a vestment should from the verie service of God withdrawe their hartes and affections?

It is Hooker’s argument that the love of God fosters good and amiable practices among men towards God. If an enduring public love of God and the ‘solide comfort’ it provides fails to overcome controversy, such as over vestments, then there is a problem, according to Hooker, in how holiness is perceived in some quarters.

Hooker is clear that the problem does lie with faulty perceptions - men in favour of wearing vestments do not think themselves holier because they wear such attire, and they should not be thought of as unholy by dissenters only because the latter do not wish to wear garments. Hooker implies that in the push for further reform from within the church, by ministers including Robert Crowley in the vestment controversy, Cartwright in the Admonition controversy and others with presbyterian sympathies, the holiness of men has been judged by their actions. This is a mistake, according to Hooker, because affections and not actions should be judged. For example, the custom of making physical gestures in prayers and readings, such as standing when the words of Jesus are declared or bowing at the name of Jesus, had been judged by the Admonitioners Field and Wilcox to be popish, but for Hooker it ‘showeth’ reverend regard for

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75 As examined in Chapter Six above. We shall analyse Hooker’s understanding of fearing God ‘from the harte’ in section IV below.
76 *Lawes*, 2: 123.9-18; (V.29.1).
77 Robert Crowley, *A brieve discourse against the outwarde apparel and Ministring garmente of the popishe church*, (1566) STC 6078.
the Son of God. Hooker argues that by perceiving holiness in the church, men’s affective commitments to God will multiply.

At this stage in Hooker’s argument, the place in which God is worshipped needs to be understood as conducive to men’s perception of holiness – the place even needs to be understood as holy itself. Hooker makes the case, which he claims is drawn from Basil, that the majesty and holiness of the place in which God is worshipped is a sensible help to stir up devotion. This is because, Hooker argues, the place of worship has its own virtue, force and efficacy to ‘bettereth even our holiest and best actions’, it is a court beautified with the ‘presence of cœlestiall powers’ in which all men are to stand, pray and ‘sound forth’ hymns to God. Hooker points out that Jesus sanctified the church as his ‘Temple’ and entitled it ‘the house of prayer’: the pre-eminence of its dignity bestowed by Jesus renders it, Hooker maintains, an apt location for common prayer. ‘[H]ow can we come’, Hooker asks, ‘to the house of prayer, and not be moved with the verie glorie of the place it selfe, so to frame our affections prayinge, as doth best beseeeme them, whose sutes thalmightie doth there sitt to heare, and his angels attend to furder?’

Hooker believes that the purpose of a church building is to help ‘move’ men when they are framing their affections in prayer. An expensive and sumptuous church for King David, Hooker remarks, testified to men’s ‘cheerful affections’ in witnessing God’s ‘almightiness’. Because God does not intend his glorious creatures to be consumed by secular vanity, a church, according to Hooker, should preserve its perfections of grace, comeliness and dignity, and is

79 Lawes, 2: 133.3-11; (V.30.3).
80 Lawes, 2: 60.27-61.9; (V.16.2).
81 Lawes, 2: 114.13-15; (V.25.2).
82 Lawes, 2: 114.3-10; (V.25.2).
83 Lawes, 2: 114.17-21; (V.25.2).
84 Lawes, 2: 59.13-20; (V.15.4). Hooker cites 1 Chronicles, 28: 14; 2 Chronicles, 2: 5.
85 Lawes, 2: 59.20-24; (V.15.4).
‘defrauded’ when prevented from its due honour.\(^{86}\) Therefore ‘anie blinde and secret corner’ is not a ‘fit house of common prayer’ for Hooker.\(^{87}\) God has not revealed that it is his ‘delight’ to ‘dwell beggerlie’ among men; rather, Hooker claims, the place of the church should be fit for the ‘greatnes’ of Jesus Christ and the ‘sublimitie’ of his Gospel.\(^{88}\)

In this section we have investigated Hooker’s argument for how common affections characterise prayer, and have investigated Hooker’s understanding of how affections should be assimilated with what is experienced as holy. We are now ready to examine Hooker’s argument for how affections expressed in the church are instrumental in sanctifying men and glorifying God.

II

In this section, we will begin with how, according to Hooker, the affective commitments presented in the psalms are edifying. We will then move to investigate how, for Hooker, affections expressed in the prayer book hymns Magnificat, Benedictus and Nunc Dimittis glorify God. My contention throughout is that Scripture is, for Hooker, a resource of virtuous emotions that supply for men’s lives, and for their divine worship, authoritative ‘feelings’ towards God. Let us start with Hooker’s appreciation of how the psalms serve the public sanctification of men.

*The Book of Common Prayer* had set the Book of Psalms (the Psalter) to be read and sung in its entirety every month of the year, with psalms appointed for Morning Prayer and Evening Prayer on every day of the month.\(^{89}\) The official English Psalter of 1562 (still in use when Hooker wrote the *Lawes*) had been produced by Thomas Sternhold and John Hopkins; they had

\(^{86}\) Lawes, 2: 60.16-27; (V.16.1).
\(^{87}\) Lawes, 2: 116.23-117.4; (V.25.5).
\(^{88}\) Lawes, 2: 57.11-18; (V.15.3).
versified the psalms and set them to music.\textsuperscript{90} The constant repetition of the Psalter (as well as the appointment of the entire Bible to be read as lessons over the course of a year) meant that most of the language used in worship would be Biblical,\textsuperscript{91} although, by reading and singing all of the psalms within a month, the Psalter would be ‘heard’ more often than any other part of Scripture.

In the Reformed churches on the continent, the singing of psalms was considered just as important. The French Psalter was completed also in 1562, with the task of a versified translation of the psalms into French begun by Clément Marot and continued by Théodore Beza, both under Calvin’s direction at Geneva. Within four years of completion, the French Psalter was translated and adapted as a song manual for the Reformed Church of the Netherlands and, in 1573, was translated into German for use in the Reformed Church of Germany. Even Sternhold and Hopkins in their English Psalter had partly borrowed from an early formation of the French version.\textsuperscript{92}

Hooker, in exonerating the daily reading and singing of the English Psalter, is fascinated by how the affections towards God expressed in the psalms can nurture the emotions of a public worshipping God. This is similar to how, for Hooker, the Lord’s Prayer guides affection. The psalms are expressed ‘movingly’, Hooker claims, because of their poetical form, and it is precisely Hooker’s argument that the affectionate expression of the psalms written by the

\textsuperscript{90} The metrical Psalter of Sternhold and Hopkins was the accepted English version from the middle sixteenth century through to the nineteenth century, although other English versions existed such as Archbishop Parker’s Psalter (1567/8) which was set to the music of Tallis. See Morrison Comegy Boyd, \textit{Elizabethan Music and Musical Criticism}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edn., (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962), p. 40ff.
prophet David should appeal to men in every age, who should all iterate in public a familiarity with this ‘treasure house’. Hooker writes:

The ancient when they speake of the booke of psalmes use to fall into large discorses, showinge how this parte above the rest doth of purpose sett forth and celebrate all the considerations and operations which belonge to God, it magnifieth the holie meditations and actions of divine men, it is of thinges heavenly an universall declaration, workinge in them whose hartes God inspireth with the due consideration thereof, an habit or disposition of minde whereby they are made fitt vessels both for receipt and for deliverie of whatsoever spirituall perfection. What is there necessarie for man to knowe which the psalms are not able to teach? They [the psalms] are to beginners an easie and familiar introduction, a mightie augmentation of all virtue and knowledge in such as are entered before, a stronge confirmation to the most perfect amongst others. Heroicall magnanimitie, exquisite justice, grave moderation, exacte wisdom, repentance unfained, unwearied patience, the mysteries of God, the sufferinges of Christ, the terrors of wrath, the comfortes of grace, the workes of providence over this world and the promised joyes of that world which is to come, all good necessarilie to be either knowne or don or had….  

For Hooker, the psalms magnify the ‘holy’ meditations and actions of those men whose minds are prepared for ‘spirituall perfection’. What Hooker is envisaging, I argue, is the public sanctification of men when they avail themselves of the emotions expressed ‘movingly’ by the psalms. The emotions in the psalms sanctify by appealing to, and affecting, the divine souls of men, thus instigating their transformation, Hooker argues, into ‘divine men’.

In the 1570s, the Admonitioners John Field and Thomas Wilcox argued that there was only ‘confusion’ and nothing edifying in the church’s order of service, and they complained that the church ‘tosse[s] the Psalmes in most places like tennice balles’. Cartwright, arguing against Whitgift, considered the Psalter to be ‘abused’ when read ‘hand over head’ more than any other part of the Bible. But according to Hooker, the psalms, as a ‘celestiall fountaine’, express the ‘choice and flower’ of everything that is profitable in the other books of Scripture, and the psalms even express, for the benefit of men, all virtue and knowledge.

93 Lawes, 2: 150.5-8; (V.37.2), 2:150.26-151.3; (V.37.2).
94 Lawes, 2: 150.8-26; (V.32.2).
97 Lawes, 2: 150.5-8; (V.37.2), 2:150.26-151.3; (V.37.2).
Now, everything that is expressed by the psalms, Hooker continues, is further enhanced by accompanying psalms with musical harmony. Indeed, the prophet David, Hooker points out, had singular knowledge not only of poetry but of music also, and, by adding melody to poetry in public prayer, David believed that both vocal and instrumental melody ‘sweetened’ men’s hearts and affections towards God, which, Hooker argues, should continue in the church. But we need to ask of Hooker whether musical harmony in accompanying psalms communicates affection and helps sanctify men, and thus whether harmony is divine or, at least, whether musical harmony produces divine worship?

It is now generally accepted that English reformers on the whole in the sixteenth century were not hostile to the composition of church music, and psalm-singing blossomed between 1549 and 1600 with the publication of 167 editions of metrical psalms. But contrary to the historian Horton Davies, Hooker in the Lawes does not commend music because of its aesthetics as did Queen Elizabeth, but, I argue, Hooker is more concerned with the affect of music upon the divine soul of man and how music conveys ‘seasonable’ affections in times of grief and joy.

For example, Hooker contends that when music suitably sounds praise to God it is admirable, not because it edifies the understanding of men since it does not teach, but because it edifies men’s affections since ‘therein it worketh much’. Hooker explains in detail:

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98 Lawes, 2: 152.12-21; (V.38.2).
100 See Folger, 6: 699, n. 2: 151.4.
101 Davies, Worship and Theology in England: From Cranmer to Hooker, 1534-1603, p. 397.
102 Lawes, 2: 151.10-14; (V.38.1).
103 Lawes, 2: 152.31-153.4; (V.38.3).
[Because of the] admirable facilitie which musique hath to express and represent to the minde more inwardlie then any other sensible meane the verie standinge risinge and fallinge, the verie stepes and inflections everie way, the turnes and varieties of all passions whereunto the minde is subject: yea so to imitate them, that whither it resemble unto us the same state wherein our mindes alreadie are or a cleane contrarie, wee are not more contentedlie by the one confirmed then changed and led away by thother. In harmonie the verie image and character even of vertue and vice is perceived, the minde delighted with their resemblances and brought by haveinge them often iterated into a love of the thinges them selves. For which cause there is nothinge more contagious and pestilent then some kindes of harmonie…[of which some are] more inclyned unto sorrowe and heaviness; of some, more mollified and softned in minde; one kinde apter to staie and settle us, another to move and stirre our affections; there is that draweth to a meravelous grave and sober mediocritie, there is also that carryeth as it were into ecstasies, fillinge the minde with an heavenlie joy and for the time in a maner severinge it from the bodie…[T]he verie harmonie of soundes beinge framed in due sorte and carried from the eare to the spirituall faculties of our soules is by a native puissance and efficacie greatlie availeable to bringe to a perfect temper whatsoever is there troubled, apt as well to quicken the spirites as to allaye that which is too eger, soveraigne against melancholie and despaire, forcible to drawe forth teares of devotion if the minde be such as can yeld them, able both to move and to moderate all affections.104

In this passage, Hooker contends that musical harmony, when ‘carryed’ from the ear to the ‘spirituall faculties’ of men’s souls, influences men’s hearts, moving and moderating all affections and passions. Hooker also expects music to not only move and moderate but also to convey passions inwardly to the mind because, for him, the image and character of virtue and vice can be perceived in musical harmony. Because harmony ‘frames’ the image and character of virtue (we should recall the divine origin of virtue105), men are brought into a love of things themselves, especially as harmony, according to Hooker, is very contagious and can hence fill men with a ‘heavenlie joy’ that is ‘severed’ from the body. This ‘joy’ fulfils in Hooker’s argument the human need, discussed in Chapter Three, for a sensible or audible expression in worship that represents the beliefs of the congregation.

To summarise, we have established so far that vocal and instrumental harmonies produce, according to Hooker’s argument, forceful and pleasing effects on men’s inward affections, even advancing the sanctification of men. The latter is explained by Hooker as follows. If musical harmony only pleased the ear – as in ‘curiostie and ostentation of arte’ – then the affective

104 Lawes, 2: 151.14-152.12; (V.38.1).
105 As examined in section I above.
impressions assembled and transmitted by music would not please the soul. But because the soul facilitates the beauty and virtue expressed by music then, Hooker continues, the soul itself is harmonious, it is ‘divine’, which on its own is a Platonic view. But Hooker complicates this by maintaining that men’s passions operate in collusion with the higher intellectual part of men, which is un-Platonic yet remains an Augustinian view. In Hooker’s representation of this Augustinian view, men are orientated towards God via their passions, in addition to the intellectual orientation of the soul towards God. Men who are not attracted to the melody accompanying psalms ‘must’, Hooker writes, ‘have harte very drie and tough’ because musical harmony should delight the passions and affections of men, it should nourish the love of their soul towards God. However, Hooker still needs to justify why the singing of psalms and hymns, when accompanied by music, should be used to stir and edify the affections.

Hooker has previously acknowledged, rather sarcastically, that the ‘skilfull eares’ of the presbyterians ‘perceyve certaine harsh and unpleasant discordes in the sound of our common prayer, such as the rules of divine harmonie, such as the lawes of God cannot beare’. Hooker, by contrast, points out that it is not unlawful for people to sing praises to God, that the divine law of Scripture does not forbid the singing of the psalms with voice and heart. But Hooker is also aware of extra-Scriptural innovations in the church, developed specifically for the purpose of expressing affections in common prayer. Whilst singing in the early church was only a ‘melodious kinde of pronunciation’, Hooker notes that the development in expressing affection through public prayer is a valuable innovation because it serves a practical purpose: into ‘grosser

106 Lawes, 2: 151.5-10; (V.38.1); 2: 152.26-31; (V.38.3).
108 As argued above in section I, and in Chapter Six.
109 Lawes, 2: 153.4-7; (V.38.3).
110 Lawes, 2: 121.8-10; (V.27.2).
111 Lawes, 2: 157.25-158.4; (V.39.3).
and heavier minds whome bare wordes doe not easily move’, Hooker writes, the ‘sweetnes of melodie’ in psalmody creates ‘entrance for good thinges’.112

Hooker traces this innovative use of affection in the church’s history because he wishes to underscore how the words of prayer and how musical harmony have a history of directing men’s affections at the centre of public worship. Basil again, Hooker observes, had argued that the harmonious tunes accompanying psalms were devised to appeal to the ‘proneses’ of men’s affections, to convey by the pleasures of melody the ‘treasure of good things into mans mind’.113 Hooker explains that in the fourth century Basil, with the church ‘incensed’ against him by Marcellus, bishop of Ancyra in Galatia,114 on the grounds of supposedly authoring psalmody as a new device in the service of God, retorted that the singing of psalms, or singing them in response to parts of the liturgy, was already a universal custom in the churches of Egypt, Libya, Thebes, Syria and Mesopotamia, and elsewhere.115 These churches according to Basil, Hooker maintains, authorised psalmody to commence after prayers, thus making multiple use of men’s affections. Hence the singing of psalms directly after prayers is, Hooker writes,

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a thinge, which as Basil was perswaded, did both strengthen the meditation of those holie wordes [the psalms] which were uttered in that sort, and serve also to make attentive and to raise up the hartes of men; a thinge whereunto Gods people of old did resort with hope and thirst that thereby especiallie theire soules might be edified; a thinge which filleth the minde with comefort and heavenly delight, stirreth up flagrant desires and affections correspondent unto that which the wordes conteine...[a thing which] watreth the harte to the ende it may fructifie, maketh the vertuous in troble full of magnanimite and corage...so fitlie accordeth with thapostles own exhortation *Speake to your selves in psalmes and hymnes and spirituall songs, makinge melodie and singinge to the Lord in your hartes*....116

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112 Lawes, 2: 153.7-14; (V.38.3).
113 Lawes, 2: 153.17-154.4; (V.38.3).
114 What the Galatians and Romans named ‘Ancyra’ is modern-day Ankara in Turkey. Although Hooker in the sixteenth century refers to the friction between Eastern bishops such as between Basil and Marcellus, the aggressive attributions of Marcellus and the general fear in the East of his theology have since been questioned (because of insufficient evidence) in the twenty-first century. See Sara Parvis, *Marcellus of Ancyra and the Lost Years of the Arian Controversy*, 323-345, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
115 Lawes, 2: 156.2-10; (V.39.2).
By acknowledging that men ‘hope’ and ‘thirst’ for the edification of their souls when they sing the words of the psalms, Hooker implies that the rational or intellectual part of men lacks what is otherwise provided by the mediation of the psalms by men’s affections. Indeed, Hooker argues that men believe that singing the psalms will ‘stirreth up flagrant desires and affections correspondent unto that which the wordes conteine’. Hooker also implies that the affections, which correspond to the ‘holie wordes’, are not unholy themselves. Indeed, as argued in section I, affections according to Hooker do engage in divine exercises because, when ‘stirred’ by ‘holie wordes’, they ‘watreth the harte to the ende it may frutifie’, with affections enabling sanctification.

In focusing upon men’s affections towards God, Hooker, in addition to men’s edification, is equally attentive to how affections glorify God. He discusses the range of ‘spirituall songs’ in the prayer book, but devotes the largest amount of space to discussing the short hymn of praise entitled ‘Gloria patri’ (‘Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost’). The hymn was required by the prayer book to conclude the reading and singing of psalms and was sung in English, although, taken from the New Testament, it was originally written in Greek and used in the early Eastern and Western Churches.

But, Hooker laments, the continual use of Gloria patri had been understood by the Admonitioners, and Cartwright in particular, as excessive (although they had found the words to be favourable), and they had demanded that its use be diminished in case, Hooker ridicules, ‘wee cloy God with too much service’. Hooker classifies Gloria patri as a ‘sacred hymn’ of

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117 Lawes, 2: 165.24-26; (V.42.1). See for example, Philippians 4: 20, as well as Matthew 28: 19, Romans 16: 27 and Revelation 5: 13.
118 Booty ed., The Book of Common Prayer 1559, pp. 53, 64. The hymn reads: ‘Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost, As it was in the beginning, is now and always, and to the ages of ages. Amen’.
120 Lawes, 2: 175.23-27; (V.42.11).
which ‘nothinge doth sound more heavenly in the eares of faithfull men’. Hooker explains that Gloria should conclude the psalms because it praises God’s excellence, which Hooker understands as a public duty in glorifying God. He writes:

Touchinge the hymne of glorie, our usuall conclusion to psalmes, the glorie of all thinges is that wherein their highest perfection doth consist: and the glorie of God that divine excellencie whereby he is eminent above all things, his omnipotent infinitie and eternall beinge, which Angels and glorified Saintes doe intuitively behold, wee on earth apprehend principally by faith, in part also by that kinde of knowledge which groweth from experience of those effectes the greatnes whereof exceedeth the powers and habilities of all creatures both in heaven and earth. God is glorified when such his excellencie above all things is with due admiration acknowledged. Which dutifull acknowledgment of Gods excellencie by occasion of speciall effectes, beinge the verie proper subject and almost the only matter purposlie treated of in all psalmes, if that joyfull hymn of glorie have any use in the Church of God whose name wee therewith extol and magnifie, can wee place it more fitlie then where now it serveth as a close or conclusion to psalmes?

According to Hooker, the divine is glorified when God’s excellence is acknowledged. Men apprehend divine excellence, Hooker continues, principally by faith and also by empirical knowledge ‘which groweth from experience’ of God’s glory. Yet in addition, Hooker claims that God’s excellence is the primary subject of all the psalms. Therefore, Hooker reasons, the hymn of Gloria which extols and magnifies God cannot be placed ‘more fitlie’ than in closing the reading and singing of psalms.

We need to examine the importance here for Hooker of the role of affection in acknowledging and expressing God’s excellence. To begin, Hooker concedes that men were not always curious about which syllables or particles of speech they used in honouring the ‘blessed trinitie’. Hooker maintains, for example, that Basil in the fourth century was quite indifferent to the language of Gloria when he used it to conclude public prayers. Basil ‘glorifyinge sometyme the father with the Sonne and the holic Ghost, sometyme the father by the Sonne in the Spirite’. But, Hooker explains, because the former, glorifying the Father with the Son and the Holy Ghost, was customary, the use of the latter – the Father by the Son in the Spirit -

121 Lawes, 2: 175.23-25; (V.42.11).
122 Lawes, 2:172.10-25; (V.42.7).
123 Lawes, 2: 174.30-175.3; (V.42.11).
124 Lawes, 2: 175.3-5; (V.42.11).
marked Basil as the ‘author of suspitious innovation’, especially at a time when Arianism denied the divinity of the Son and the Holy Ghost. In the fourth-century context, Hooker notes that the Arians had altered the hymn of Gloria to reflect their belief that the Father was greater than the Son in honour and excellence. Now Hooker, contrary to Arianism, accepts that glory should be expressed equally to the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, but he uses his example of adversity in the fourth-century Eastern Church to demonstrate that there must be innovations in expressing men’s affections towards God, innovations in the affectionate praise of God.

We should recall from Chapter Five of this study that Hooker understands the necessity of innovation within the church, especially in resolving crises over defective language and over corrupt beliefs and corrupt emotions. Hence Hooker commends innovations that further enable ‘feeling’ the ‘brightness’ of God’s glory spreading throughout the world, irrespective of whether in language God is glorified as the Father with the Son and Holy Ghost, or the Father by the Son and by the Holy Ghost. What is important for Hooker is that men should ‘feel’ the brightness of God based upon, as mentioned, their apprehension of the divine, either by faith or by the empirical knowledge acquired from ‘experiencing’ God’s glory in the world. Hooker therefore sympathises with Basil for focusing more upon men’s affections in communicating glory to God, and who, having changed one or two syllables in the church liturgy, wrote to justify his position to friends and contemporaries.

At this point in his argument, Hooker is acutely aware that men’s affections towards God are mixed with their affections towards others in the community of the church, and, what is

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125 Lawes, 2: 175.5-12; (V.42.11).
126 Lawes, 2: 173.9-174.9; (V.42.9). The fourth-century Arian variation on Gloria patri, used to deny the divinity of the Son and Holy Ghost, reads: ‘Glory be to the Father, with the Son, through the Holy Spirit’.
127 See Chapter Five, section IV.
128 Lawes, 2: 174.9-28; (V.42.10).
129 Lawes, 2: 175.14-21; (V.42.11). Basil wrote On the Holy Spirit to explain the divinity of the Holy Spirit as a reply to his enemies.
more, that in affectionately glorifying God, men’s affections towards each other can change detrimentally. Hooker questions: ‘Howe are the judgmentes hertes and affections of men altered? May wee not woonder that a man of St Basils authoritie and qualitie, an Archprelate in the house of God, should have his name farre and wide cald in question…?’

Hooker continues to observe how the accusations against Basil contrast with the presbyterian accusations against Elizabeth’s church, but he cannily notes the similarity of the affection in both cases: ‘It was thought in him [Basil] an unpardonable offence to alter any thinge; in us as intolerable that we suffer any thinge to remayne unaltered’.  

Hooker argues that the emotional energy used in the negative employment of affection towards other men must be redirected to concentrate upon God. For Hooker, men must prioritise their affective commitments to God, even if men dwell among the false human teachings of Arianism for instance. Hence Hooker maintains that by the repetition of Gloria patri, men offer a ‘heavenly acclamation of joyfull applause to his prayses in whom wee believe…whither Arrianisme live or die’.  

However, Hooker is very sure that if the priority of men’s affections in glorifying God is maintained, then affections of love will be generated. Hooker writes:

And if the prophet David did thinke that the verie meetinge of men together, and theire accompanyinge one an other to the howse of God, should make the bonde of theire love insoluble, and tye them in a league of inviolable amitie, ps.54.14. how much more may we judge it reasonable to hope, that the like effectes may growe in each of the people towards other, in them all towards theire pastor, and in theire pastor towards everie of them, betwene whom there dailie and interchangeablie passe in the hearinge of God him selfe, and in the presence of his holie Angels so manie heavenlie acclamations, exultations, provocations, petitions, songes of conforte, psalms of prayse and thanksgivinge, in all which particulars, as when the pastor maketh theire sutes, and they with one voice testifie a generall assent thereunto; or when he joyfullie beginneth and they with like alacritie followe, dividinge betweene them the sentences wherewith they strive which shall most shove his own and stirre up others zeal to the glorie of that God whose name they magnifie…yeat that which God doth no lesse approve, that which savoureth more of meekenes, that which testifieth rather a feelinge knowledge of our common imbecillitie, unto the severall branches thereof severall lowlie and humble requestes for grace at the mercifull handes of God to performe the thinge which

130 Lawes, 2: 175.13-17; (V.42.11).
131 Lawes, 2: 175.21-23; (V.42.11). My italics added.
132 Lawes, 2: 177.7-10; (V.42.12).
Hooker envisages an insoluble love in the church - of which David wrote – that binds men together enabling them to daily sing ‘heavenlie’ exultations, petitions, thanksgivings and psalms of praise. As examined in Chapter Five, the church according to Hooker should, with ‘one voice’, testify to its general assent to what is good, but now Hooker adds that the church should also testify to a ‘feeling knowledge of our common imbecillitie’.

This ‘feeling knowledge’ of common weakness should, according to Hooker, be affectionately expressed to God, and is legitimately done so by every form of interlocutory speech, such as requests, protestations, readings and songs, all are testification, and the inflammation, of the love of a public towards its God. But because the public should be bound by an insoluble love, Hooker points out, then glorifying God will involve ‘stirring up’ zeal in others. Hooker is confident that glorifying the divine will bring men closer to each other because they share a common love for God.

It would be difficult to criticise Hooker here by attempting to claim that in his view of glorifying God the individual subjectivity of men can offer any affection to God. Hooker’s argument neatly avoids the possible whims of such individual subjectivity because, according to Hooker, all men should attest to the same affections expressed in pre-arranged prayer, which rather re-enforces the need in Hooker’s argument for common prayer. The public or common affections that glorify God will, in Hooker’s view, bring men emotionally nearer to God, cultivating a public, and not individual, love for God.

133 Lawes, 2: 154.18-155.19; (V.39.1).
The public fostering of common affection among men is certainly engaged, Hooker moves on to argue, by other spiritual songs that glorify God such as Magnificat, Benedictus and Nunc Dimittis, all based upon Luke’s Gospel and sung in English, usually at Evening Prayer as directed in The Book of Common Prayer, and all to be concluded by Gloria patri.134 Let us consider these songs and why they foster public affection.

The song Magnificat (‘My soul doth magnify the Lord’)135 is taken from Luke 1: 46-55, and are the words of the virgin Mary spoken after the visitation of the Angel Gabriel, whilst Benedictus (‘Blessed be the Lord God of Israel’)136 is taken from Luke 1: 68-79, and are the words spoken by Zacharias after his wife Elisabeth, cousin of Mary, bore a child despite her barrenness, and Nunc Dimittis (‘Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace’)137 is taken from Luke 2: 29-32, and are the words spoken by Simeon, bishop of Jerusalem, whilst holding the child Jesus in his arms. Cartwright had claimed that it was not ‘convenient’ to make ordinary prayers of these sections of Scripture.138 Hooker points out that this dissent understands the purpose of these spiritual songs only in the contexts in which Mary, Zachariah and Simeon uttered the words.139 Now, instead of debating the historical context (although, as stressed throughout this study, Hooker usually advocates that the Bible should be understood in its historical context, but, remarkably, he does not here, even though Cartwright does), Hooker argues that these songs resemble the human emotions felt upon discovering the arrival and presence of Christ. These songs, Hooker writes, are the ‘first gratulations wherewith our Lord and Savior was joyfullie receaved at his entrance into the world by such as in theire hartes armes

135 ibid., pp. 61-62.
136 ibid., p. 57.
137 ibid., p. 63.
139 Lawes, 2: 160.26-29; (V.40.3).
and verie bowels embraced him; beinge propheticall discoveries of Christ allreadie present, whose future comminge the other psalmes did but foresignifie….¹⁴⁰

Hooker’s point is that the affections resembled within these songs are not bound to the saints who first expressed them, but are accessible to others who may ‘fruitfully’ resemble such affections. Hooker explains that this can occur for three reasons. Firstly, the mystical communion in Christ that binds all faithful men ensures that they are interested in each other’s blessings from God. Secondly, when anything is spoken to extol the goodness of God, men can appropriately use the same words of praise if they have received similar benefits from God, since it is the same ‘fountaine’ which affects men and is therefore to be praised. Thirdly, by ‘often usinge their wordes in such manner our mindes are dailie more and more inured with their affections’.¹⁴¹

In valuing these songs, Hooker asserts that they are, in contrast to the ‘obstinate incredulitie’ of the Jews, the most ‘luculent’ testimonies of the Christian religion; they are, Hooker claims, the only ‘sacred hymnes’ that are peculiar to Christianity, since Jews and Christians alike praise God by singing the psalms.¹⁴² Hooker is even prepared to argue that Magnificat, Benedictus and Nunc Dimittis should concern men more than the psalms of David because, according to Hooker, the New Testament ‘toucheth’ men more than the Old.¹⁴³ At first glance, Hooker appears to contradict himself since he has already contended that the psalms should be read and sung more often than other parts of Scripture. But, I argue, we should realise that for Hooker the psalms are important for the edification and sanctification of men, whilst the New Testament ‘toucheth’ men more in their glorification of God, principally through Christ.

¹⁴⁰ Lawes, 2: 160.16-21; (V.40.2).
¹⁴¹ Lawes, 2: 161.7-25; (V.40.3).
¹⁴² Lawes, 2: 160.21-26; (V.40.2).
¹⁴³ Lawes, 2: 159.20-27; (V.40.1).
And, Hooker argues, affections differ in Scripture when edifying men and glorifying God. John Barton and John Halliburton argue that Hooker’s reading of Scripture is ‘doxological’, that Scripture for Hooker glorifies God rather than edifies men. But, I argue, Hooker is concerned with a range of affections that are represented in Scripture and which he wishes the church to duplicate towards God. It is a distortion to think that Hooker classifies the affections in Scripture in one way. Affections serve different purposes within Hooker’s view of the church, not only in edifying men and glorifying the divine, but also in petitioning God and offering him thanksgiving, which we shall now examine.

Hooker argues that men’s desires and affections should rightly petition God in common prayer. He writes:

Petitionarie prayer belongeth only to such as are in them selves impotent and stand in neede of reliefe from others. Wee thereby declare unto God what our own desire is that he by his power should effect. It presupposeth therefore in us, first the want of that which wee pray for; secondly, a feeling of that want; thirdly, an earnest willingnes of minde to be eased therein; fourthly, a declaration of this our desire in the sight of God, not as if he should be otherwise ignorant of our necessitities, but because wee this waie show that wee honor him as our God, and are verely perswaded that no good thinge can com to passe which he by his omnipotent power effecteth not.145

Hooker contends that the public, in pursuing holy desires, should declare to God its ‘want’, which in turn will express the public’s ‘feeling’ of that ‘want’ and its willingness of mind to permit such feeling. In laying open its feelings to God and not intellectually restraining them, the public will honour the power that men attribute to God, they will be aware that their affections cannot escape from his omnipotence.

In exploring the church’s feelings and the church’s declaration of its wants, Hooker considers the Litany in *The Book of Common Prayer* which, as a ‘petitionarie prayer’, consists of recitations appointed for the minister with set responses appointed for the congregation (such as ‘Good Lord deliver us’ and ‘Lord have mercy’).146 Hooker sums up the Litany as a public appeal in the church spoken with solemnity to appease God’s wrath and to avert public evils.147

To begin making his case for the above claims, Hooker recounts the historical development of the Litany. It originated, Hooker explains, as an occasional service used when the tombs of holy martyrs were visited, but by the fourth century the Litany had been organised by John Chrysostom, Archbishop of Constantinople, into a processional service of clergy and laity and was used to counteract the heretical processions of Arians who denied the divinity of

145 Lawes, 2: 189.28-190.9; (V.48.2).
147 Lawes, 2: 163.13-17; (V.41.2).
Jesus Christ. In the fifth and sixth centuries, Hooker continues, Litanies were appointed to set
days by, for example, Mamertus, Archbishop of Vienne in Gaul, in 460,\(^{148}\) and by the Council of
Aurelia (in Italy) in 506. In Hooker’s own century, he points out, the Council of Cologne (1536)
ordained that all public processions and supplications to God should only occur in the House of
God, the place sanctified for public prayer.\(^{149}\)

The purpose of the Litany for Hooker therefore is to expose, in the sanctity of the House
of God, what \textit{all} living men wish and feel in regard to God. Noting that Cartwright had written
in the 1570s that there was no cause ‘why all lands should pray to be delivered from the
incommodities that some [other] land hath bene troubled with’,\(^{150}\) Hooker argues:

\[\text{D}o\not\text{h not true Christian charitie require that whatsoever any parte of the world, yea anie one of all our}
\text{brethren elswere doth either suffer or feare, the same wee acceopt as our own burthen? What one}
petition is there founde in the whole letanie whereof wee shall ever be able at any time to say that no man}
livinge needeth the grace or benefit therein craved at God’s handes? I am not able to expresse how much it
doeth grive me, that thinges of princappl excellencie should be thus bitten at, by men whom God hath
indued with graces both of Witt and learninge for better purposes.\(^{151}\)

Hooker contends that what is ‘craved at God’s handes’ by an individual should, in the name of
charity, become the concern of the entire church in its prayers. Hooker observes the example of
Jesus: ‘As man what could beseeme him [Jesus] better, whether we respect his affection to
Godward, or his…charitie and love towards men?’\(^{152}\) Hooker’s point is that men’s affections
towards God \textit{and} towards other men should be respected since Jesus, as the Son of God, urged
men to take on the troubles of others, which Hooker examines in the petition for the deliverance
from all adversity contained in the Litany.\(^{153}\) Hooker argues that because it is a natural desire to

\(^{148}\) Vienne is near modern-day Lyon in France. Gaul is present-day Western Europe, ranging from Northern Italy to
France and Belgium.
\(^{149}\) Lawes, 2: 163.6-165.2; (V.41.2-3).
\(^{150}\) Cartwright, \textit{A Replye to An Answere}, p. 137, quoted by Hooker at Lawes, 2: 162.18-21; (V.41).
\(^{151}\) Lawes, 2: 165.13-22; (V.41.4).
\(^{152}\) Lawes, 2: 192.6-8; (V.48.5).
\(^{153}\) See Booty ed., \textit{The Book of Common Prayer 1559}, p. 72. This petition for deliverance from adversity is also
included in the Collect for Trinity Sunday, see ibid., p. 174.
avoid adversity, affections should therefore demonstrate the want of deliverance for all men. Let us explore Hooker’s argument here.

Firstly, Hooker again notes that Cartwright had argued that men should not ask God for their continual deliverance from adversity because Scripture does not promise human freedom from vexations, calamities and troubles. But Hooker contends that men may lawfully express all their desires in prayers (with the exception of unholy desires). Hooker is clear that although what men desire may contradict what the will of God has determined, nevertheless the desires of men do not generally deviate away from God. This is because men’s petitions testify to their affections which never desire what can not be given by the ‘hands’ of God. Hooker discusses this affection by recounting the adversity that Jesus felt in the Garden of Gethsemane when contemplating his earthly death:

The workes and operations of our Saviors humane will were all subject to the will of God and framed according to his law…[But] let the manner of his speech be weighed, My soule is now trobled, and what should I saye? Father save me out of this hower. But yeat for this very cause am I come into this hower…Let no man marvaile that in this case the soule of Christ was much trobled. For what could such apprehensions breed but (as their nature is) inexplicable passions of minde, desires abhorringe what they imbrace, and embracing what they abhorre? In which agonie how should the tunge goe about to expresse what the soule indured?

Hooker argues that although God’s will was resolved that Jesus should suffer the pains of death, Jesus’ human will desired to avoid and to accept death, with ‘inexplicable passions of minde’ embracing what the soul abhorred.

Now, whilst Hooker acknowledges the absurdity of thinking that Jesus petitioned God in prayer, the point for Hooker is that Jesus’ affliction was naturally grievous. And whilst nature

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154 Cartwright, Replye, p. 136, quoted by Hooker at Lawes, 2: 189.7-11; (V.48). See also Lawes, 2: 189.12-15; (V.48.1).
155 Lawes, 2: 198.22-199.16; (V.48.11).
156 Lawes, 2: 195.17-19; (V.48.9), 2: 195.33-196.3; (V.48.9), 2: 196.19-197.5; (V.48.9). Hooker quotes Jesus’ words at John 12: 27.
157 Lawes, 2: 197.18-198.22; (V.48.10), 2: 195.20-33; (V.48.9).
158 Lawes, 2: 192.3-6; (V.48.5).
causes men to fear, nature also, according to Hooker, teaches men to pray against all adversity.\textsuperscript{159} 

‘[M]ost vertuous mindes wish peace and prosperitie allwaies where they love, because they consider that this in it selfe is a thinge naturallie desired: so because all adversitie is in it selfe against nature, what should hinder to pray against it…?’\textsuperscript{160} Hooker argues that it is natural to pray against adversity because virtuous minds love peace.

What Hooker is advocating here is that men, with virtuous minds, must not be afraid to show or communicate their affections to God by praying for things of which they have no sure or certain knowledge, such as the secret determinations of God.\textsuperscript{161} Even if men pray for what is contrary to the secret determination of God, men do not transgress, according to Hooker, their lawful bounds in demonstrating their affection to God.\textsuperscript{162} In the absence of authoritative knowledge, Hooker implies, affections take the lead by representing men’s desires to God.

What this means for Hooker is that, with affections representing natural desires, the ‘petitionarie prayer’ of the Litany expresses the relation between affection and natural desire. For example, affections demonstrate man’s natural desire for deliverance from adversity, and demonstrate, in another petition of the Litany, that God will have mercy upon all men.\textsuperscript{163} In short, men’s affections for Hooker should petition God on behalf of their desires. Hooker writes:

\begin{quote}
In praying for deliverance from all adversitie wee seeke that which nature doth wish to it selfe; but by intreatinge for mercy towards all, wee declare that affection wherewith Christian charitie thirsteth after the good of the whole world, wee discharge that dutie which thapostle [Paul] him selfe doth impose on the Church of Christ as a commendable office, a sacrifice acceptable in Gods sight, a service accordinge to his harte whose desire is to have all men saved….\textsuperscript{164}
\end{quote}

Hooker’s point is that the affection of Christian charity naturally ‘thirsteth’ after the good of the whole world, serving according to God’s ‘harte’. Thus affections should, as Hooker has already

\begin{footnotes}
\item[159] Lawes, 2: 201.24-26; (V.48.13).
\item[160] Lawes, 2: 202.3-7; (V.48.13).
\item[161] Lawes, 2: 199.20-23; (V.48.11).
\item[162] Lawes, 2: 191.29-192.3; (V.48.4).
\item[164] Lawes, 2: 202.18-24; (V.49.1). Regarding the apostle Paul, Hooker cites 1 Timothy 2: 3.
\end{footnotes}
mentioned, demonstrate the ‘want’ of deliverance for all men, affections should take on the troubles of others. This is because, Hooker stresses again, to pray in public for all living men is to communicate the same affection ‘born’ by Jesus Christ towards humanity.\textsuperscript{165}

This brings us back to the different view of Cartwright, for whom there is no cause why all countries should pray to be delivered from what troubles other countries. Hooker, by contrast, argues that men’s affections not only reflect the universal desires of men but affections also naturally wish to ‘inlarge’ what the mind of men apprehends as good, and this sensibility is particularly assisted by love. Hooker writes:

For whatsoever the minde of man apprehendeth as good, the will of charitie and love is to have it inlarged to the verie uttermost extent, that all may injoy it to whome it can any way add perfection. Because therefore the farther a good thinge doth reach the nobler and worthier wee reckon it, our prayers for all mens good no lesse then for our own...[is] a worke commendable for the largenes of thaffection from whence it springeth, even as theires, which have requested at Gods handes the salvation of manie with the losse of theire own soules, drowninge as it were and overwhelminge them selves in thabundance of their love towards others, is proposed as beinge in regarde of the raresnes of such affections...more then excellent.\textsuperscript{166}

Hooker concedes that it may be rare for men to abundantly love others, but, in Hooker’s vision, the ‘largenes of thaffection’ which has nurtured love towards others is what is commendable in men.\textsuperscript{167} As already mentioned, Brian Vickers implies that Hooker hardly ever encourages public affections and feelings; but I argue that it is precisely Hooker’s argument that common affection ‘perfects’ men’s petitions to God and their human relationships.

As outlined in Chapters Five and Six, Hooker is fascinated by the excellence of affections, and he believes that, in public prayer, affections set examples to others. For instance, the affection of the heart in pleading to ‘die the death of the righteous’ sets an example, Hooker

\textsuperscript{165} Lawes, 2: 205.20-28; (V.49.5).
\textsuperscript{166} Lawes, 2: 203.30-204.12; (V.49.3).
\textsuperscript{167} On Hooker’s distinction between his vision of the Church of God and Elizabethan society, see Chapter Five, section III above.
argues, to men that they should desire to draw closer to God through death, as Hooker points out in the petition in the Litany for the preservation from ‘sudden death’.\textsuperscript{168} Hooker remarks:

\begin{quote}
[T]he neerer wee draw unto God, the more we are oftentimes inlightned with the shininge beames of his glorious presence as beinge then even almost in sight, a leasurable departure may in that case bring forth for the good of such as are present that which shall cause them for ever after from the bottom of theire hartes to pray, \textit{O let us die the death of the righteous and let our last end be like theire.}

All which benefites and opportunities are by suddaine death prevented.\textsuperscript{169}
\end{quote}

In another instance, affections according to Hooker can strengthen men in adversity. Hooker comments that tribulation, when apprehended by the senses as offensive to nature or apprehended by reason as causing men to fall away from God, breeds sorrow and fear, which are two affections that men, according to Hooker, naturally attempt to moderate.\textsuperscript{170} The afflicted therefore use their affections, Hooker argues, as nurses to feed their grief and as a ‘whetstone’ for their wit and memory.\textsuperscript{171}

So far we have established that for Hooker the church can legitimately express its feelings and its natural desires (such as wishing for deliverance from adversity), and that affections even strengthen men in adversity, nursing their grief. But affections for Hooker should have a particular purpose in relation to God, to which we shall now turn.

Hooker argues that petitioning God and offering him thanksgiving requires the excellence of men’s affections. Cartwright had viewed these two, petitioning and thanksgiving, as in a tentative relation, arguing that there was not in \textit{The Book of Common Prayer} thanksgivings for all the petitioned benefits. Instead, Cartwright claimed, every petition should be answered by a sentence of thanks in the church liturgy.\textsuperscript{172} Hooker agrees that there is indeed ‘great cause’ why men should ‘delight’ more in thanksgiving than in requesting benefits. Men who offer thanks,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[168] See Booty ed., \textit{The Book of Common Prayer 1559}, p. 69.
\item[169] Lawes, 2: 185.26-186.3; (V.46.2).
\item[170] Lawes, 2: 200.26-32; (V.48.13).
\item[171] Lawes, 2: 194.24-27; (V.48.8).
\item[172] Cartwright, \textit{Replye}, p. 138, quoted by Hooker at Lawes, 2: 178.5-8; (V.43). See also Lawes, 2: 178.15-179.4; (V.43.1).
\end{footnotes}
Hooker explains, ‘annex’ the affection of joy because they have reaped happiness, while men who petition seek and sow with apprehensive affections, such as fear. Yet, Hooker claims, it is no marvel that the church formally offers more supplications than thanksgivings to God, since the particular benefits received by every man is seldom known in public – and yet, conversely, the common necessities needed by all men are seldom unknown.173

But, significantly, Hooker goes on to argue that men should apply their ‘instinct’ to offer, drawn from psalms and hymns, what best serves as thanksgiving for the specific benefits they have received: ‘[O]ut of so plentifull a treasure [of psalms and hymns] there might be for every mans harte to choose out his owne sacrifice, and to offer unto God by particular secret instinct what fitteth best the often occasions which any several either partie or congregation may seeme to have’174. By insisting that men’s hearts should choose their thanksgivings to God and offer it by ‘secret instinct’, Hooker values men’s passions and affections in conducting their divine praise. The largest part of the daily service suddenly becomes very important for Hooker not only for the purposes of edification and divine glorification but also for thanksgiving, selected by the hearts of men from a variety of psalms and hymns and offered by instinct to God. This makes clear why Hooker claims that the Admonitioners, who demanded the removal of the daily use of psalms and hymns, should in fact be the last to reprove any ‘scarcitie’ of thanksgiving in the Church of England.175

Yet we need clarification here, since by ‘secret instinct’ and the ‘hartes’ of men Hooker appears, at first, to endorse individual subjectivity in selecting affections towards God. But for Hooker this is not the case because men’s hearts and instinct should only draw on the vetted affections expressed in public prayer, men are not in isolation in the affections that they feel.

173 Lawes, 2: 179.4-24; (V.43.2).
174 Lawes, 2: 179.28-180.1; (V.43.3).
175 Lawes, 2: 180.1-6; (V.43.3).
Hooker stresses this in his consideration of festival days much later in Book V. Rather than instinctively thank God in isolation, Hooker is adamant that men should set aside festival days to honour God publicly with thankfulness. Hooker argues that

The sanctification of dayes and times is a token of that thankfullnes and a part of that publique honor which wee owe to God for admirable benefites, whereof it doth not suffice that wee keepe a secret kalender taking thereby our privat occasions as we list our selves to thinke how much God hath don for all men, but the daies which are chosen out to serve as publique memorials of such his mercies ought to be clothed with those outward robes of holines whereby theire difference from other dayes maie be made sensible.176

These days, as ‘outward robes of holines’, include celebrating, Hooker points out, the Annunciation, the Nativity, Epiphany, Easter, Ascension Day, Whitsuntide, Trinity Sunday and Saints’ Day, all of which refer to Christ, or to the glorification of Christ by his apostles and saints.177 Cartwright had objected to festival days (except the seventh day of rest, the Lord’s Day), arguing that they bred superstition and were abused by the papists.178 But interestingly, Hooker’s justification of festival days is that they develop the excellence of men’s affections towards God.

For example, Hooker argues that men attending festival days should express joy to God by three ‘elements’ – praise, bounty and rest. In the first, men according to Hooker should set forward God’s praises with ‘cheereful alacritie of minde’.179 In the second, men according to Hooker should express comfort and delight when they charitably give materialistically, ‘partlie as a signe of theire owne joy in the goodness of God towards them, and partlie as a meane whereby to refresh those poore and needie’.180 Hooker observes that men are eternally bound to honour God with their material substance and to acknowledge that all is from his sovereign dominion, lest men imagine, Hooker continues, that the world is their free and independent

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176 Lawes, 2: 363.2-9; (V.70.1).
177 Lawes, 2: 367.16-368.28; (V.70.8).
178 Cartwright, Replye, pp. 151-152, quoted by Hooker at Lawes, 2: 370.19-34; (V.71.1), 2: 373.8-41; (V.71.3).
179 Lawes, 2: 363.15-16, 363.23-364.6; (V.70.2).
180 Lawes, 2: 363.18-19, (V.70.2), 2: 364.6-14; (V.70.3).
inheritance, since, after all, the ‘hартes of men doe so cleave to these earthlie thinges’. Hooker quotes Augustine: ‘By festivall solemnities and set daies wee dedicate and sanctifie to God the memorie of his benefits, least unthankfull forgetfullnes thereof should creepe upon us in corse of time’. Hooker further adds that what is materially offered should testify to the permanency of men’s affections towards God. In the third element that expresses joy to God, men according to Hooker should take rest from ordinary labours since festival rest ‘representeth’ the perfection and abundant sufficiency of the ‘cœlestiall estate’. Hooker concludes: ‘[T]o celebrate these religious and sacred daies is to spende the flower of our time happilie. They are the splendour and outward dignitie of our religion, forcible witnesses of ancient truth, provocations to the exercise of all pietie, shadowes of our endles felicitie in heaven, on earth everlasting recordes and memorials’.

Because Hooker is interested in how men’s hearts can be directed in public towards honouring God, festival days for Hooker cultivate the affective relationship between men and God in the most ‘effectuall sorte’. Festival days are ‘effectuall’ according to Hooker because he does not accept that mentioning thanksgiving briefly by inserting into the liturgy a prayer of a few lines, is enough to thank God for his blessings which are ‘universallie sensiblie and extraordinarily bestowed’. What is remarkable is that Hooker, who has been canonised as promoting sound objective reason in church matters, should actually argue, based upon the analysis of this section, that affections should not only petition God, but also that the ‘hartes’ of men should draw thanksgivings from the common liturgy and offer it by ‘secret instinct’ to God.

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181 *Lawes*, 2: 448.13-449.24; (V.79.1).
183 *Lawes*, 2: 449.25-455.13; (V.79.2-8).
184 *Lawes*, 2: 363.19-21; (V.70.2), 2: 364-365.27; (V.70.4).
185 *Lawes*, 2: 383.14-19; (V.71.11).
186 *Lawes*, 2: 180.24-181.6; (V.43.4).
187 *Lawes*, 2: 180.17-24; (V.43.4).
IV

Let us now conclude by reviewing Hooker’s notion of ‘affection’ in common prayer. My primary conclusion is that prayer for Hooker not only communicates words but also communicates affections towards God. Hooker argues that the church’s affective commitment to God is the foundation for honouring the divine in public prayer. But this also means for Hooker that affective commitments should themselves be given honour in the church.

Hooker’s first clarification therefore is that the communication of affections involves understanding honour. Hooker looks back to Cartwright who had argued, contrary to Whitgift, that praying against many earthly miseries is presupposed by men to be expedient to God.\footnote{Cartwright, \textit{The Rest of the Second Replie}, p. 209, quoted by Hooker at \textit{Lawes}, 2: 178.8-14; (V.43).} But to think men presuppose this, Hooker argues, is to dishonour men’s affective commitments to God, and offers no solution to how God is to be approached by human desire, fear, joy and so on. Men who agree with Cartwright, Hooker argues without mentioning names but implicating presbyterianism generally, ‘wave in and out, no way sufficiently grounded, no way resolved what to thinke speake or write….’\footnote{\textit{Lawes}, 2: 181.22-23; (V.43.5).} In Hooker’s view, men have reason to be ‘sufficiently grounded’ - their petitions, supplications and thanksgivings to, and their glorifications of, God do not \textit{suppose} expediency to God, but honour their affective bond with the divine.

In explaining this affective bond, Hooker argues that men should feel their unworthiness in approaching God, they should be kept under the ‘sense’ of their own wretchedness.\footnote{\textit{Lawes}, 2: 188.27-28; (V.47.4).} Cartwright, of course, had criticised the emphasis in \textit{The Book Of Common Prayer} on the
unworthiness of men, describing it as a ‘popish servile fear’.  But, Hooker continues to explain, the affection of fear nurtures the humility of men. Hooker argues that without a moderate fear of God, men risk diminishing their reverence towards the divine. Hooker writes:

[I]s it a falt that the consideration of our unworthines maketh us fearefull to open our mouthes…?
[...] [W]ho respectinge superiors as superiors can neither speake nor stande before them without feare .when Christ in mercie draweth neere to Peter, he in humilitie and feare craveth distance; that beinge to stand, to speake, to sue in the presence of so great majestie we are afraid, let no man blame us. […] As therefore our feare excludeth not that boldnes which becommeth Sainctes; so if theire familiaritie with God doe not savor of this feare, it draweth too neere that irreverend confidence wherewith true humilitie can never stand.

According to Hooker, men’s ‘familiaritie’ with God should savour of fear – this, for Hooker, is ‘true humilitie’. By maintaining this affective commitment of fear towards God, men will never tolerate, Hooker argues, other men’s ‘irreverend confidence’ in their holy affairs. And by continually admitting to their unworthiness and to a fear of the divine, Christians offer an apology to God for not always recognising God’s glory and grace in their lives and, Hooker writes, Christians ‘puttetth also into his [God’s] handes a kind of pledge or bond for securitie against our unthankfulness’.

We have concluded that for Hooker men should preserve their affective bond with God, but why is their affective bond honourable if Hooker is so keen to stress their unworthiness?

The answer lies in Hooker’s chief example of an honourable affective commitment to God - man’s desire for ecclesiastical office and ministerial power. Hooker finishes Book V by reviewing how honour in divine matters is achieved by ambition. Unfortunately, Hooker concedes, ambitious minds esteem it the greatest happiness to be admired and revered above others, exploiting lawful and unlawful means to bring themselves into ‘high roomes’. Hence

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192 Lawes, 2: 187.26-28; (V.47.3), 2: 188.7-12; (V.47.3), 2: 189.1-5; (V.47.4).
193 Lawes, 2: 187.17-18; (V.47.2).
ambition, according to Hooker, is generally a vice which seeks honour inordinately.\textsuperscript{194} But when considered in its ‘divine’ context, ambition is a worthy affection in Hooker’s view, especially for ministers. Hooker points out that ministers are separated from other men by belonging to a special order ‘consecrated unto the service of the most high in thinges wherewith others may not meddle’.\textsuperscript{195} Hooker claims that the authority of ministers is derived from God, not from men, and the ‘power of the ministerie of God translateth out of darknes into glorie, it rayseth men from the earth and bringeth God him self down from heaven’.\textsuperscript{196}

In this ‘divine’ context therefore, the desire for the power of ecclesiastical office is ‘ambitious’ because it admits to loving the ‘painful’ burden of ministerial power.\textsuperscript{197} At this point Hooker declares that affections are not always predicable, since the burden of ministerial power can induce contrary affections in virtuous men, some in humility decline and with reverence shun the divine office, while others with fervent alacrity and devotion covet it.\textsuperscript{198} But in the ‘divine’ context, the desire for ministerial power – and the declaration of that desire – is honourable because, Hooker claims, it is holy and good.\textsuperscript{199}

Honourable affections to one side, there still remains Hooker’s admission that not all emotions are without offence, he warns that men should be careful in case ‘affection to that which hath in it as well difficulltie as goodnes sophisticate the true and sincere judgment which before hand they ought to have of theire own habilitie….’\textsuperscript{200} In other words, Hooker urges men to be cautious in case affections embellish, with sophistic deception or sophistic play, what reason has judged as sound emotions. Hooker disregards the desires of sophistry – especially for

\textsuperscript{194} Lawes, 2: 431.11-15; (V.77.10).
\textsuperscript{195} Lawes, 2: 425.19-22; (V.77.2).
\textsuperscript{196} Lawes, 2: 424.21-425.6; (V.77.1).
\textsuperscript{197} Lawes, 2: 433.31-32; (V.77.13).
\textsuperscript{198} Lawes, 2: 431.21-27; (V.77.10).
\textsuperscript{199} Lawes, 2: 431.27-432.2; (V.77.10).
\textsuperscript{200} Lawes, 2: 434.1-10; (V.77.14).
self-praise, aesthetic pleasure and playfulness - because the detail of his argument relies upon the affective desires in the Christian commitment to God. When unchecked by bonds and commitments that preserve Christian affections then, Hooker is clear, desires and affections occasionally abuse what God and nature govern.201

But this is precisely why, as claimed throughout this study, the guidance and wisdom of God is at the centre of Hooker’s argument in the Lawes. In the final pages of Book V, Hooker writes:

But the eye of lawe is the ey of God, it looketh into the hartes and secret dispositions of men, it beholdeth how farre one starre differeth from an other in glorie, and as mens severall degrees require accordinglie it guideth them, grauntinge unto principall personages privileges correspondent to theire high estates, and that not onlie in civil but even in spirituall affaires, to the ende they maie love that religion the more which no waie seeketh to make them vulgar, no waie diminishteth theire dignitie and greatenes, but to doe them good doth them honor also and by such extraordinary favours teaceth them to be in the Church of God the same which the Church of God esteemeth them, more worth then thousands.202

The ‘eye of lawe’, Hooker’s metaphor, ‘looketh into the hartes and secret dispositions of men’, guiding and granting them privileges not only in civil but also in spiritual affairs for the purpose, Hooker argues, of cultivating love. The ‘eye of lawe’ therefore ‘teacheth’ men that the honour found within the Church of God is ‘worth more than thousands’. And the ‘voice’ of the church, guided by the ‘eye of lawe’ as argued in Chapters Four and Five, is itself also honourable in the church, even if, Hooker astutely notes, men do not possess the affections to embrace the truths it exposes. He writes:

[A]s becometh them that followe with all humilitie the waies of peace, wee honor reverence and obey in the verie next degree unto God the voice of the Church of God wherein wee live. They whose wittes are too glorious to fall to so low an eb, they which have risen and swollen so high that the wals of ordinarie rivers are unable to keepe them in, they whose wanton contentions in the cause whereof wee have spoken doe make all where they goe a Sea, even they at theire highest flote are constrained both to see and grant, that what theire phancie will not yeald to like theire judgment cannot with reason condemn. Such is evermore the finall victorie of all truth that they which have not the hartes to love hir acknowledg that to hate hir they have no cause.203

201 Lawes, 2: 434.21-22; (V.77.14).
202 Lawes, 2: 482.28-483.4; (V.81.6).
203 Lawes, 2: 379.6-17; (V.71.7).
If men’s intellectual wits are ‘too glorious’ and prevent men from loving truth with their hearts and ‘phanicie’, the judgement of men nevertheless acknowledges that men have no cause to ‘hate’ truth even if they are not ‘moved’ by common emotions, the ‘wals of ordinarie rivers’, to love. Hooker argues, contrary to Cartwright, that there is no reason to condemn the means which effect public honour towards God in the church. This is because Hooker argues that what the church wants – expressed by its affections – is actually determined by what God requires.

For example, Hooker remarks that it is a positive precept of men that God grants them the liberty to select festival days of rest. But as a precept, this assumes, as argued in Chapters Four, Five and Six, that God guides what is appropriate. Hooker observes, referring to festival days, that if ‘it be then demaunded whether wee observe these times as being thereunto bound by force of divine law [Scripture], or els by the onlie positive ordinances of the Church [established by the common assent of men], I answer to this, that the verie law of nature it selfe which all men confesse to be Godes law requireth in generall no lesse the sanctification of times then of places persons and thinges unto Godes honor’. God, in Hooker’s metaphor of Law, requires the church, and its persons and their things, and its times and places, to be sanctified in honour of him.

God’s requirements can be met by the church because men’s spiritual functions are ambitious in striving to honour God. Here, Hooker’s view is similar to the claims of Basil and Augustine – there is a legitimate ‘oral’ tradition in the church that strives to worship God which is divinely required. Here also Hooker advances his view of why the church will be able to obey

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204 Lawes, 2: 435.1-6; (V.77.14).
205 Lawes, 2: 374.7-375.7; (V.71.4).
206 Lawes, 2: 368.28-369.2; (V.70.9).
207 Lawes, 2: 435.15-19; (V.77.14).
divine requirements - divine love will effect what it has ordained. For instance, Hooker questions whether the very ordination of a minister is a

scale as it were to us that the selfe same divine love which hath chosen the instrument to worke with, will by that instrument effect the thinge whereto he ordained it, in blesseing his people and acceptinge the prayers which his servant offereth up unto God for them?...Againe if there be not zeale and fervencie in him which proposeth for the rest those sutes and supplications which they by there joyfull acclamations must ratefie; if he praise not God with all his might; if he power not out his soule in prayer; if he take not their causes to harte, or speake not as Moses, Daniel and Ezra did for there people; how should there be but in them frozen couldnes, when his affections seeme benumbed from whom theiries should take fire? Vertue and godlines of life are required at the handes of the minister of God....

Hooker argues that virtue is an impulse not only in ministers but in men generally because it is a form of love, and specifically a form of love that connects with divine love. Augustine had argued similarly that virtue is the supreme love for God, that even if virtues are rational as the Stoics taught, virtues are still modes of love. Hooker argues that men can approach God and divine love in the church by practicing doing well in their habits and customs, that men should repeatedly attempt to grasp virtue, and in doing so their minds will finally be brought into the perfection of their love for God, which is what God has required all along. ‘The constant habit of well doinge is not gotten without the custome of doing well, neither can vertue be made perfect but by the manifold workes of vertue often practised. Before the powers of our mindes be brought unto some perfection our first assayes and offers towards vertue must needes be rawe, yeat commendable because they tend unto ripenes’. Hooker’s argument is that virtue imitates God’s love, especially in public prayers which, in Hooker’s view, provides their ultimate justification.

Hooker again places God at the centre of his argument with a set of basic premises: God guides what is appropriate in accordance with what he demands, which is obeyed by the ‘voice’ of the church, either by reason in the common assent of men or by emotion in men’s affective

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208 Lawes, 2: 115.10-26; (V.25.3).
210 Lawes, 2: 372.4-9; (V.71.2).
relation with God. This cycle occurs repeatedly in the *Lawes*, whether in Hooker’s polemical argument for church government or in his development of piety in common prayer.
Conclusion

Hooker argues in the Lawes that the collective agreement of human reason among men expresses the ‘voice’ of God, to the extent that what is good for the church is created by God and discovered by reason. The Lawes therefore argues that God’s guidance is ‘present’ in the church, and Hooker tackles the difficulty of polemically explaining this to presbyterians, and to his sixteenth-century Protestant readers more generally, who only take the Bible as the ‘literal word’ of God. God’s guidance is polemically explained by Hooker’s metaphor of Law, which provides for the view point of Books I-V what the logical argument of the Lawes cannot, of its own accord, literally understand about God’s omnipotent involvement. Protestant discussions in the sixteenth century positioned logic at the centre of any dispute about Scripture,¹ but in the Lawes Hooker’s metaphor of Law works in partnership with reason to discuss matters of divinity that extend beyond, and focus outside of, Scripture. Hooker did introduce reason into the conformist’s case for defending Elizabeth’s church government,² but this still was not enough for Hooker to make his case against the presbyterian claim that Scripture was the sole authority in matters of church polity. After all, Hooker did not wish to argue that past ecclesiastical customs, and the customs of the Church of England, were authorised solely by human opinion.

The first conclusion of this study is that Hooker does not base his argument exclusively upon ‘rational authority’. We must be careful in our assumption of what Hooker intends to achieve. If we assume that Hooker is intending to provide a systematic theology in which sits a doctrine or a philosophy of God then we may expect to find inconsistencies in his argument. As we investigated in Chapter Four, Torrance Kirby finds two incompatible forms of Neoplatonism in Hooker’s thought - the Augustinian immediacy of God in men’s lives and the Dionysian

mediation of God’s order of all things arranged by first and final causes. Kirby argues that for Hooker ‘God is Law’, yet without clarification he assumes this is literally true for Hooker. But Hooker so often reminds his reader of the impossibility of literally knowing how God is involved with the church, that if his readers and critics attempt to render in philosophical terms Hooker’s presentation of God they will distort his argument. This is because Hooker is not attempting to provide a literal or rational understanding of God based upon one school of philosophical thought.

Instead, Hooker believes that God is metaphorically ‘present’ in the church’s collective voice of reason, and is metaphorically ‘involved’ in what is good for the church. Hence, Hooker’s understanding of the consensual agreement of reason among men in church matters must not be confused with especially the rationalist Cartesian philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that took human reason as the source of truth and as the guide for all good human efforts. We must not anachronistically present Hooker as in line with alien (and later) philosophical systems and foundations of knowledge. For example, in rationalist philosophy exists the modern problem of faith ‘verses’ reason, where God cannot be the object of faith if he cannot be rationally explained, and thus Christian religious faith is formally justified by metaphysics, in which rationalists prioritise reason over faith and Scriptural revelation. This is antithetical to sixteenth-century Reformed perspectives just as it is adverse to the pre-Reformation scholastic organisation of theology – both maintain that the divine unknowable truth about God himself should not be confused with the human capacity to reflect and elaborate

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3 See Kirby, Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist, pp. 50-1. In addition, Rory Fox claims that the argument of the Lawes is riddled with contradictions because Fox assumes that Hooker is attempting to provide a rational and systemised philosophy. See Rory Fox, ‘Richard Hooker and the Incoherence of Ecclesiastical Polity’, The Heythrop Journal, 44, (2003), pp. 43-59. The same premise is also assumed in Mark Goldblatt, ‘Inherited Flaws: The Problem of Circularity in Hooker’s Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie’, (Ph.D. thesis, CUNY Graduate Centre, 1990).
upon what it believes about the divine. Hooker does not believe that God can be explained, let alone understood, by rational ‘transparent concepts’, and Hooker does not allow reason and its human limitations the status of *principium cognoscendi.* Hooker still believes in a piety in which men’s souls are expressed to God by common affection in worship, which Hooker wishes the church to maintain at the expense of letting men in the church think that they and their intelligence are separate from God and free to go their own way.

Lack of clarity over these issues has led firstly to a misconception in mid-twentieth-century scholarship that Hooker, as a supposed rationalist, believes God is removed from the world because he has set everything in motion and endowed humanity with reason. There is also a persistent view, which has carried-over into the twenty-first century, of Hooker as privileging man’s ‘rational authority’ and distancing himself from men’s emotions and affections.

The first misconception aimed to provide a dogmatic reading of Hooker, often presenting him directly in opposition to presbyterians like Cartwright and Travers, as well as to the doctrines of Calvin. But this older trend failed to understand the role of God for Hooker because, firstly, Hooker never explicitly differentiates his view of God from a presbyterian or

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6 For instance, Voak pieces together Hooker’s ‘philosophy of mind’ (Voak, *Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology,* pp. 25-67), but does not examine how this is to relate to the emotive experience of virtuous minds in piety, which was clearly of primary importance to Hooker in Book V. I discussed this emotive experience in Chapter Seven and will state my conclusions below.
Calvinist view of God, and because, secondly, Hooker does not intend to develop a systematic doctrine of God that would presuppose the use of one identifiable method of philosophy.\(^7\)

In fact, and moving to the prevailing view in the twenty-first century that Hooker grants ‘rational authority’ to men, we must be clear that Hooker does not exclusively privilege reason in the church as a tool or method by which men somehow work and systemise independently from God. Firstly, God is the primary authority in the Lawes, and Hooker uses reason in partnership with metaphor to discuss the implementation of God’s authority. The role of reason for Hooker is to discover the good which is sourced in God. Secondly, Hooker does not divorce man’s ‘rational authority’ from God because, according to Books I-V of the Lawes, the sacred and the secular merge together in the Christian community (because of God’s involvement in what is good), which we shall summarise shortly. And thirdly, as the sacred and the secular overlap in Hooker’s vision for the church, the church’s affective commitment to what is holy is not downgraded by Hooker just because he understands common reason to be used in discovering good polity. The sustained focus in Hooker scholarship upon reason as the natural law has marginalised Hooker’s view of common affection. As discussed in Chapter Seven, Hooker actually presents affection and what he terms ‘feeling knowledge’ as an important part of the soul’s expression to God, and as part of the soul’s divine exercise. Let us sum up these conclusions.

In the first, scholarship has traditionally maintained that God’s very nature is understood by Hooker as the ‘divine reason’, by which God has set his own workings and his own divine

will. The critic Robert Hoopes asserted that ‘against the Calvinistic God of Absolute Will Hooker sets up a God of Absolute Reason’. But God’s nature and its divine reason is what Hooker defines as ‘law’, in which Hooker metaphorically presents what he knows is ‘unrepresentable’ about God. It is in the perception generated by the metaphor that the argument of the Lawes ‘sees’ God as providing what is needed for the church – including wisdom and goodness as well as authority. The credibility of various authorities in the church is explained by Hooker in the metaphor, which offers the perception of the single divine source of each authority. For example, the law of nature (reason, which guides the collective ‘voice’ of the church through history [‘tradition’]) and the divine law (Scripture), are manifestations of the ‘voice’ of God. Thus all good things, according to Hooker’s argument, will undoubtedly concur with God because, in the metaphor, God has caused them.

Law therefore encompasses what may be literally or rationally contradictory philosophical positions drawn from Plato, Aristotle and from forms of Neoplatonism. Yet by representing these philosophical positions in his explanation of Law Hooker believes that each offers truth. Hooker is a learned writer who eclectically rolls together Christian and pagan recognitions of God’s influence because, he believes, God’s common grace grants all men the

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ability to reason and hence access the ‘voice’ of God. Even ‘false religions’, Hooker argues, contain some elements of divine truth within them. In short, the Lawes does not present a literal knowledge of God based upon ‘rational authority’; rather, the rational argument of the Lawes depends upon Hooker’s metaphorical perception of God, and Law as an explanation has an imaginative authority in Hooker’s polemic. Understanding how Hooker generates his perception of God by metaphor finally explains why Hooker is difficult, if not impossible, to categorise as a thinker - he presents an argument substantiated by very different sources – such as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Philo Judaeus, Basil, Augustine, Thomas, not to mention King David, Jesus and St. Paul - yet who are all united in perceiving ‘God’, which suits Hooker’s purposes.

Secondly, the misconception that, according to Hooker, men maintain ‘rational authority’ to act independently from God presupposes that Hooker separates the secular from the sacred. But when Hooker writes of human laws and divine laws, he does not understand the secular as detached from the sacred; for Hooker, it is the ‘sacred laws of man’s nature’ with which men carry out their work in the world and in the church. Because Hooker perceives that men’s actions are subject to sacred influence, it is hardly surprising that he goes on to understand in the later Books of the Lawes the unification of the church with the state as one society. The church and the commonwealth were also understood to be united in the thought of Archbishop Whitgift, but they were to be rigidly separated according to Thomas Cartwright, with the latter arguing that even if the governments of the church and the commonwealth were both holy, they should still be set apart. But because Hooker argues that Scripture works in conformity with human

10 See Lawes, 2: 16.3-22.13; (V.1.1-4).
11 Lawes, 1: 96.27; (I.10.1).
12 Lawes, 3: 324.16-331.9; (VIII.I.5-6).
14 Thomas Cartwright, The Rest of the Second Replie, pp. 151-152.
reason (since they are both sourced in God), Hooker has an authoritative basis upon which to justify why the English church and the English state can be parts of an integral whole, which had been essential to the Henrician reformation just prior to Hooker’s birth. In fact, Hooker defends a God-centred, or theocentric, view of the world against the secular realism that had been propagated by Machiavelli at the beginning of the sixteenth century which posited religion as a political device.

But if Hooker does defend a God-centred view of polity and piety, then we need to reassess whether Hooker in the early Books of the Lawes emphasises man’s intellectual understanding in the church (what A. S. McGrade claims is Hooker’s ‘objective Christian rationalism’), and whether this really contrasts with Hooker’s emphasis upon devotion towards God in Book V? If Hooker did emphasise both of these contrasting standpoints, then Hooker would need to envisage a secular ‘space’ in the church in which men intellectually think for themselves distinct from the sacred involvement of the holy in what men think, reason and love in the church. But this is not what Hooker argues, since he believes that everything Christians do is in reference to God, especially in their use of reason and in the good that they discover and enact.

The question here for Hooker, typical of the Renaissance, especially after the Reformation, contemplates the integration of philosophy with emotion and love. We need to reconsider if Hooker is, as the Folger edition claims, exclusively part of a ‘classical intellectualist

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18 I first asked this question in Chapter Six above.
tradition’ along with Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas\textsuperscript{20} at the expense of valuing the role of emotion and affection in man’s encounter with God. We need to reconsider whether Hooker adapted the reception of Augustine in the Renaissance to the context of his day, especially concerning the common affection towards God organised in the public prayer of the late sixteenth-century Church of England.

Thus, and thirdly, this study has argued that Hooker values affection as part of the soul, along with reason. Although affections for Hooker should be moderated by public organised prayer, men’s affections do enter into their outlook in church polity. This is because Hooker advocates fearing God from the heart (as discussed in Chapter Seven) and Hooker certainly does not expect this fear of God, an affective commitment, to be ‘abstracted’ from how the divine is perceived in the lives and workings of men. Books I to V consistently maintain that men, in the pious community of the church, are to embrace God’s authority, whether by reason, love or affection.

In Hooker’s vision of the pious Christian community the authority of God is also embraced when the sacred is encouraged by men to enter into the secular realm, as when the Christian community endorses Thomas Cranmer’s re-creation of Christian worship into the vernacular language of the prayer book. Hooker argues that Scriptural affections should be presented in the extra-Scriptural ‘secular’ language of public prayer, just as Hooker’s extra-Scriptural metaphor of Law explains the involvement of the sacred in the secular world. To be clear, God, for Hooker, does not guide men by their affections as a ‘law’ (in the way that God guides with reason or natural law), but God has, indirectly, made virtuous affections available in the divine law of Scripture. These affections, Hooker believes, should be imitated in worship because they express the wants, desires and needs of the souls of men towards God, they express

men’s common affective commitments to the divine. In this, Hooker even goes one step further than the presbyterians by ensuring that Biblical affection stays at the centre of set public prayer, whereas when they advocated spontaneous and extemporal prayer they could not guarantee that their affections would always be ‘Biblical’ or untainted by spiritual pride which Hooker is eager to avoid. This is a miraculous twist in Hooker’s argument against the presbyterian view, but one which can only occur because Hooker focuses in the Lawes upon the manifestations of God in reason, in what is good, in Scripture, whereas the presbyterian view, in Hooker’s estimation, reduces God to a literal reading of Scripture.

Hooker does not emerge from this study as a defender of past church customs come what may – as essentially conservative. Hooker’s argument is that God’s entire plan for the church is not ‘set’ in Biblical times, just as it is not ‘set’ in the Romanish church. The church, for Hooker, should not be bound to an ‘authoritative tradition’, if that means a set model for all subsequent ages that has been fashioned by men. Instead, this study has argued that Hooker defends the changeable governing of the church in accordance with what God has metaphorically guided as good in the collective ‘voice’ of reason throughout history. Hence this thesis has been asking just how ‘orthodox’ was Hooker by sixteenth-century Reformed Protestant standards, since a God who allows for change will not also have provided static decrees for universal church polity in the revealed word of Scripture. The Reformed Protestant principle of sola scriptura does not satisfy Hooker’s vision of the role of God in the church.

Rather, Hooker builds his metaphorical picture of God’s presence ‘moving’ in the Christian community, and the latter, according to Hooker, should approach what is good in polity and piety with collective reason and common affective commitments. Hooker’s polemic reacts to what he understands as the narrow Scripturalism of the presbyterians; but to maintain in the
twenty-first century that Hooker’s reaction is authoritatively based upon Scripture, reason and ‘tradition’ is itself a narrow view of Hooker, who was a thinker of greater breadth in his perception of God’s authority in the church.
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