EUROPEAN STRATEGIC CULTURE:


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by

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis has not been submitted at any other University or Third Level Institution and that it is entirely my own work.

Paraschos Lianos
ABSTRACT

The central aim of this thesis is to analyse the distinct elements of a potential European strategic culture and their representation in the rhetoric and strategic actions of the Union, with special emphasis in the years of ESDP existence (1998-2005). The discussion rests on the proposition that a common European Strategic culture exists, albeit it is restricted in scope and depth. It is argued that as such, it is associated with three main pillars: humanitarian intervention, outward orientation and the pursuit of the largest possible consensus, i.e. multilateralism. The final objective of the discussion is to test these pillars against the proposition for the existence of a specific, albeit limited European strategic culture. It has been deemed that the most productive way to determine whether the three pillars of European strategic culture can be considered realistically relevant is to assess them against the rhetoric and strategic actions of the European Union that took place within the period 1998-2005, which is the set timeframe for this thesis. Following an up-to-date literature review on the subject (Chapter II), this thesis makes use of a modified framework by Booth and Macmillan in order to explore those parameters that influence the development of strategic culture, such as geography, history and political structures. The modified framework is outlined and discussed in Chapter III. Chapter IV serves to put the concept of a European strategic culture in its historical context. Important milestones in EEC/EU defence history since the need for a common defence was articulated in the 1950s are analysed. The emphasis lays not so much on the origins of common defence and foreign policy initiatives but on recent developments. Chapter V introduces facets of strategic culture as these can be revealed through the rhetoric of the EU. The focus is on those documents that best describe the strategic concept of the EU after the introduction of the ESDP and more specifically, the European Security Strategy (ESS). Chapter VI focuses on EU actions of strategic importance. In this respect, the three EU military operations that took place between the introduction of the ESDP in 1998 and the year 2005, (Operation Concordia, Artemis and Althea are examined). In conclusion, this thesis demonstrates the existence of a European strategic culture, but also confirms the initial proposition regarding the current nature of this strategic culture, which is limited in scope and in depth. As such, it is shown that it is based on the three pillars outlined in the proposition, i.e. humanitarian intervention, outward orientation and multilateralism.
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DEDICATION

To Margarita and Vita
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<tr>
<td>AEW</td>
<td>Airborne Early Warning</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Capabilities Improvements Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHODs</td>
<td>Chiefs of the Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Capabilities Improvements Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Crisis Management Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPS</td>
<td>Comité Politique et de Sécurité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Comité des Représentants Permanents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>EADS</td>
<td>European Aeronautic, Defence and Space (company)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECAP</td>
<td>European Capabilities Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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<td>ERRF</td>
<td>European Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
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<td>FAC</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>GAC</td>
<td>General Affairs Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>HGTF</td>
<td>Headline Goal Task Force</td>
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<td>HHG</td>
<td>Helsinki Headline Goal</td>
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<td>HR-CFSP</td>
<td>High Representative for the CFSP</td>
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<tr>
<td>LoI</td>
<td>Letter of Intent</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Prague Capabilities Commitments</td>
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<td>PoCo</td>
<td>Political Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander in Europe</td>
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<td>SEAD</td>
<td>Suppression of Enemy Air Defences</td>
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<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicles</td>
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<tr>
<td>UMFA</td>
<td>Union Minister for Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The European project originated in the early 1950s in an effort to deal with Europe’s troubled past marked by the two World Wars in the first half of the twentieth century. Since then it has moved on to new directions. The implicit goal of the project was to make war obsolete in Europe through economic integration and growth. Today this goal has been largely fulfilled. The European Union of 2007 is clearly very much different to the Coal and Steel Community of the 1950s. It no longer represents a handful of western states. It is a Union of 27 states stretching from the shores of the Atlantic to the plains of Poland and from the ice-covered tundras of Scandinavia to the sun-flooded Mediterranean islands. It is not a Community of states based solely on the common control of strategic resources, but it is a Union of states that share much more than an integrated economic system; they share common laws, borders and common values. The Union has evolved further than any other international organisation. As a political entity it is more than an institutionalised body, yet less than a sovereign state. Member states, after an evolutionary journey, have delegated many of their sovereign decision making powers to the Union and have agreed to be subject to them. This journey has not been without its troubles, nor do all member states share the same degree of enthusiasm about it. The fact remains, however, that enormous progress has been made in spite of all odds. The next step for the Union, if it wants to assert itself more in the world arena as a single big power, would be the ability to project a single voice on issues that affect its relations with the rest of the world. This project is the most difficult that the Union has yet embarked on. Its difficulty lies in that it hinges on the most fundamental principles of a state’s sovereignty, i.e. the right for independent foreign and security policy.
In the Maastricht treaty (Maastricht Treaty 1992) the first official steps towards a more
integrated foreign and security policy were taken. As many times in the history of the
European project, the whole process gained momentum as a response to a particular crisis.
The Bosnia crisis and later the Kosovo crisis allowed the wheels for such an endeavour to
start moving faster. The process was slow and not without problems. However, in 1998 the
two major military powers of the Union, Britain and France, decided that the time was ripe
for a more robust movement in the field of security and defence (Franco-British Summit
1998). Coming from different ideological backgrounds did not inhibit Tony Blair and Jacques
Chirac to initiate a project that was to bring the Union to a completely different level, where
the rules of the past did not necessarily apply and the stakes were much higher. The
introduction of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the call for a 60,000-
strong force ready to be deployed in one month and be able to sustain itself for 6 months on
the field were a huge step forward in that direction (Franco-British Summit 1998). Since the
formation of ESDP the Union has taken a number of significant measures in this field.
Institutions have been created from scratch, the first missions have taken place successfully,
documents and treaties have been signed; all of which are pointers to the vigour with which
common European strategic goals have been pursued. In spite of all these developments a
pragmatic observer has to acknowledge that the Union is still far from being able to achieve
the objective of a common foreign policy and raise a single voice when articulating its
objectives. The Iraq war testifies to the dissonance of European strategic objectives between
member states. Granted that however, one must not discount the simple fact that so much
has been achieved in such a short time, all the more so when one considers the sensitive
political nature of fields such as security and defence. In order to move closer to the
objective of a common European foreign policy, the convergence of laws and the
production of directives and common positions must be supplemented by a convergence of
hearts and minds. In short, a common European strategic culture has to emerge. A common European strategic culture would enable EU elites and more importantly the citizens of the Union to develop a common approach to the world and to issues such as the use of military tools. The need for such a development has been highlighted at the highest level when Solana incorporated it in the European Security Strategy of 2003: “we need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention” (European Council 2003n: 11, author’s emphasis).

This thesis will try to explore the degree to which the European Union currently has a common strategic culture and if so, of what kind. The study of the existence of a common European strategic culture is significant because it would provide us with a way to examine EU actions that otherwise would be very difficult to explain with the currently available theoretical tools. For instance, why after 9/11 was there such a diverse response from European states to the upcoming Iraq war? This question cannot be answered by realist paradigms. One would have to include in their analysis an examination of the cultural and historical experiences of the different actors. If, conversely, one were to follow the dictates of realism then the European states would have been united in their reaction to the hegemonic tendencies of the US. Events, however, pointed to a rather different reality. European states were divided between those who supported and those who objected to the Iraq policy of the US – “the old and the new Europe” (BBC new online 2003b). Their different positions were heavily influenced by experiences and individual strategic cultural predispositions (Longhurst and Zaborowski 2004: 383). Hence, the study of European strategic culture will allow us to look closer to the causes behind European actions and inactions.
**Thesis proposition**
The proposition of this thesis is that the European Union already possesses a common strategic culture, albeit a limited one. That type of strategic culture is based on three pillars. The pillars consist of adherence to the principles of humanitarian intervention, as these have evolved through the European inteligencia to the moral wars discourse of Tony Blair; an EU foreign policy that would be less introversive and more outward oriented than it had been in the past; and finally multilateralism will constitute the basic tenet for any intervention, military or other.

**Aims and objectives**
*To provide a framework for analysis customised to the European Union*
A caveat of the literature on strategic culture is the fact that it is constructed for dealing with nation-states and not actors of the sort of the European Union. The EU is not a classical Westphalian international actor, nor is it an institution of the sort that we have seen rising in the years after the end of World War II (NATO, WEU etc) or, in fact, at any other time in history. It is rather a hybrid kind of actor with traits both of a state and an international organisation; hence it proves problematic to apply to it frameworks and analytical tools that have been designed for a different variety of actor. Until the present day (2007) there has been very little work on the European Union that provides specific characteristics (Meyer 2005; ; Matlary 2006) for a common European strategic culture. This thesis will try to introduce such a framework that is better suited for the study of the European strategic culture. This framework will be able to provide us with a concrete base of specific characteristics for European Strategic culture that can later be assessed against actual cases during the years of ESDP (1998-2005).
Is there a common European strategic culture?

Given the attention that this question has attracted in recent years (European Council 2003n) the literature on European strategic culture is on the rise. However, the results still remain inconclusive as to whether there exists a common and distinct European strategic culture. The literature on the question is split with both ends of the spectrum represented. Studies are largely divided into two categories; those that have been optimistic about the existence and development of a European strategic culture and those that have been pessimistic. In the first category, we find writers such as Cornish and Edwards (Cornish and Edwards 2001; 2005), Christoph O. Meyer (Meyer 2004; 2005; 2006), Per M. Martinsen (Martinsen 2003), Adrian Hyde-Price (Hyde-Price 2004b) and Janne Haaland Matlary (Matlary 2006). On the opposite spectre of the debate, we find contributions by Julian Lidley-French (Lindley-French 2002), Simon Duke (Duke 2002), Sten Rynning (Rynning 2003) and Stine Heiselberg (Heiselberg 2003). The gap between them is considerable but not without some common ground. As is usually the case, when one is presented with two widely contested opinions on a subject truth lies more often than not in between. The question therefore should not focus on the existence of a common European strategic culture but rather on its qualitative characteristics. Based on that premise I will try to assess specific traits of strategic culture against the actual rhetoric and actions of the Union since the initiation of the European Security and Defence Policy in 1998.

Synopsis

The thesis is divided into seven chapters. It offers an overview of the literature on strategic culture and proposes the existence of a limited European strategic culture with specific characteristics. It continues by providing a historical overview of European initiatives directly related to the EU’s defence initiatives and their role in the development of a common European strategic culture. The European Security Strategy is then analysed and assessed
against the three pillars of a European strategic culture that will be identified in chapter three. The thesis then focuses on three specific EU military operations, after the launch of ESDP, and the way in which a European strategic culture is revealed through them.

Chapter one will examine the background of the research, the formulation of the thesis proposition and will introduce the methodological tools in place. The research was conducted by examining primary and secondary sources gathered in both Brussels and other institutions and think-tanks around Europe. Sources were readily available and were accompanied by interviews of EU officials and experts in the field. Through a close and critical reading of the relevant EU documents and the secondary literature on EU foreign policy and strategic culture, I gained an improved understanding of the issues involved regarding the prospects of a European strategic culture. Accordingly, I developed my own approach, namely the existence of a common European strategic culture, albeit a limited one.

Chapter two will review the literature on the concept of strategic culture. The concept of strategic culture exists in the academic realm since its introduction in 1977 by Jack Snyder (Snyder 1977). However, in the last ten years it has received a new impetus with the rise of constructivism and old debates have resurfaced with neo-realism. The main caveat of the literature on strategic culture in relation to the thesis subject is that it is not readily applicable to the EU since it is mainly dealing with nation-states. As a way out we will be reviewing the framework for the analysis of strategic culture provided by Macmillan and Booth, (Booth and Trood 1999: 363), which required a degree of amendment in order to be fruitfully used in the case of the EU.

Chapter three will introduce the Macmillan–Booth framework of analysis and will apply it to the European Union. The framework is based on the analysis of three major areas;
geography and resources, historical experience, and political structure and defence organization. It is in this chapter that, after having analysed these three major areas in relation to the European Union, I will formulate the basic proposition of the thesis, which, following the application of the modified Booth-Macmillan framework on the European Union, will be that the European strategic culture is based on three pillars; a) humanitarian intervention principles, b) outward orientation of EU policies and c) multilateralism.

Chapter four will review the development of European defence initiatives after WWII and the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community, until the cut-off date of this thesis, the year 2005 and the December Brussels Summit. Here, I will demonstrate that the progress achieved in EU affairs during this period did not contribute explicitly to the forging of a specific common strategic culture, but only provided the foundations for its later development. Additionally in this chapter I will address the question of the origins of the European strategic culture.

Chapter five will deal with the European Security Strategy (ESS) and its effect on the creation of a common European strategic culture. The ESS is a very important EU document given that it is the first such document with clear strategic ambitions and with clear references to the need for forging a European strategic culture. I will assess the three pillars of a European strategic culture against this document in order to determine whether the proposed pillars are supported by the document both in spirit and in letter.

Chapter six will focus on three EU military operations. The operations under scrutiny are *Concordia*, *Artemis* and *Althea*. All three have been selected because they represent military operations of different kinds. After a brief historical overview of the operations I will assess them against the three pillars of European strategic culture. It will be argued that,
withstanding close examination, the proposition put forward in this thesis (that there is indeed a common European strategic culture, albeit a limited one, based on the principles of humanitarian intervention, outward orientation and multilateralism) is upheld.

Finally, the concluding chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the thesis proposition and conclusions. To round off the argument put forward in this thesis I will also discuss the possible limitations of the present study, while proposals for different measures deemed to enhance and promote the further cultivation of a common European strategic culture in the EU will be put forward. Ultimately, I will propose an outline for future research.

**Research Design and Methodology**

This project involves an extensive critical analysis of the relevant academic literature on strategic culture, as well as a textual analysis of primary source materials from European governments, international organisations and semi-official ‘think-tanks’ in relation to three major EU military operations and the European Security Strategy document.

The usefulness of employing case study methodology is that it allows for detailed and in-depth exploration of events and processes, while at the same time being able to identify those processes that are characteristic of the subject as a whole. In other words, it allows for informed generalisations. Case studies may function in the following ways: they may *uncover hidden forms of behaviour; constitute critical cases for testing phenomena; explore the casual links between phenomena; investigate and explain variation; and facilitate an understanding of the nature and source of variation* (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 9). In this thesis we have followed a multiple-case study approach compared to the single-case version as described in Yin (Yin 2003: 147). In effect, my approach could be described as a dual-case study approach with two chapters devoted to two different categories of case studies the one focusing on the three EU military operations and the other on the European Security Strategy document. The chapters themselves are
treated as autonomous entities and in each case study narration is followed by the cross-case analysis, just as the single-case study version would demand. Robert Yin has offered six different ways in organising the structure of a case study: a) linear-study, b) comparative, c) chronological, d) theory building, e) “suspense” and f) unsequenced. The compositional structure of each case study in this thesis is based on the chronological type as described in Yin (Yin 2003: 151). The chronological structure was deemed to be more appropriate since it could unveil correlations between different events and EU decisions. The methods of research used in case study methodology should be multiple and can include interviews, observation, documentation and archival records and surveys. Multiple sources of evidence are thus used to maintain a chain of evidence (Yin 2003: 105).

As regards interviews, Robert Yin (Yin 2003: 89) has identified three different interview techniques. Interviews of an open-ended nature are those that the interviewer can ask the respondent about the facts of the matter as well as their opinions about events. The focused interview might still display the conversational manner of the open-ended one but it is more likely that the interviewer be following a certain set of questions derived from the case study protocol. Finally, the third type of interview entails more structured questions, along the line of a formal survey. Lofland summarised the objective of the non-standardised format of interviewing as aiming to ‘elicit rich, detailed materials that can be used in qualitative analysis. Its object is to find out what kinds of things are happening rather than to determine the frequency of predetermined kind of things that the researcher already believes can happen’ (Lofland 1995: 76). The interview part of this research was conducted in Brussels and in the UK using a non-standardised, open-ended format. The method was considered to be the most beneficial for this research in light of the nature of the study of strategic culture. The author wanted to explore the degree that EU staff and EU analysts shared common perceptions beyond the strict interpretation of EU
regulations and decisions. Many of the respondents, apart from the provision of their own insights, suggested and contacted on my behalf other persons for interview, which was of invaluable help.

The issue of biased or skewed results is always a concern when researching. One must keep in mind when studying sources from individuals that they may yield insights into the views of the wider group of which they are members, but this might not necessarily reflect the truth; the beliefs of a group might as well be different from those of individual members. The whole may be greater than the sum of the parts. Furthermore, sometimes the obvious is omitted and can only be inferred from personal interviews and only if specifically asked to be addressed. Judith Bell highlights potential problems that may arise ‘eagerness of the respondent to please the interviewer, a vague antagonism that sometimes arises between interviewer and respondent, or the tendency of the interviewer to seek out the answers that support his preconceived notions are but few of the factors that may contribute to biasing of data obtained by the interview.’ She called these factors the response effect (Bell 2005: 95). With these factors in mind it was necessary to choose a research sample that would be most suitable for the thesis. Respecting the interviewees’ wishes was foremost for the research as for many a great deal of professional confidentiality was involved. For that reason anonymity was maintained. The information that was gathered from the interviews was refined for use in this thesis. In an effort to minimize bias, the respondents were told the topic of the thesis but not the exact proposition in terms of the three pillars of EU strategic culture.

Because of the historical aspect in parts of the thesis the method of historiography used merits some analysis. Historiography is the method of doing historical research or gathering and analysing historical evidence. There are four types of historical evidence: primary sources, secondary sources, running records and recollections. Historians rely mostly on
primary sources. Emphasis is given to the written word on paper although modern historiography can involve any medium. Secondary sources are the work of other historians or analysts writing history of interpreting it. Running records are documentaries maintained by private or non-profit organisations. Recollections are autobiographies, memoirs, or oral histories. Secondary analysis is the reanalysis of data that was originally compiled by another researcher for other purposes than the one the present researcher intends to use if for.

Often, secondary analysis will involve adding an additional variable to an existing dataset. This variable will be something that the researcher collects on his or her own, from another dataset, or from a common source of information (Yin 2003: 110). This thesis has made extensive use of primary material, in the form of European documents, interviews, as well as secondary analyses.

In conducting the research for the thesis several practical problems were encountered. Many documents related to EU strategic thinking are still largely considered to be classified material. Nevertheless, there are sufficient non-classified sources that, complemented by actor interviews, can give as a representative picture of the status of EU strategic culture. A problem especially prevalent in bureaucratic documents stemming from EU institutions is that they may be intended to justify action and hence may not reveal the true motivation of the author. Due to the immense number of policy papers and individual views publicised on the issue of European security only those writings that have actually crossed over from the theoretical field to the implementation area will be studied. This excludes all those papers or articles produced from various institutes, academic, governmental or NGOs. Despite their ad hoc usefulness on certain occasions in influencing the direction of actual policies, they still constitute individual opinions that cannot be included in the formulation of a strategic culture, all the more so since strategic culture is a collective rather than an individual product.
Reliability of sources is another important issue in the study of strategic culture. Documents may be written with a hidden agenda in mind, so the credibility of the author is very important if we are to avoid being side-tracked from the real clues. Yitzhak Klein (Klein 1991) for instance takes at face value books, reports and lectures delivered by Soviet officials, without taking into consideration that these might be written for propaganda reasons or for mere internal consumption. Charles Kupchan goes even further by using a variety of sources from public opinion data through to film, literature, educational texts and newspapers (Kupchan 1994: 29). Alastair Johnston in his analysis uses strategic writings dating back several hundred years and subjects them to content analysis to determine the key beliefs that influence Chinese strategic culture (Johnston 1995a: 40-60). Unfortunately there isn’t a foolproof way of identifying beliefs from whichever sources one is using. It is up to the researcher to qualify and rank his sources and usually the more sources one has inferring the same thing the more one can be directed towards the opinio communis and evaluate it as such.

The gaps in every argument that can be revealed through close study are the ones responsible for triggering the necessary questions in the mind of the researcher and it is the process through which these questions find their answers that provide the researcher with his/her informed point of view. It is thus that a more complete image of the puzzle under enquiry emerges. Finally, the dictum that in order to start dealing with a problem you have first to identify it applies in the context of this thesis as well.

The chronological focus of the thesis is on the years of ESDP existence; from 1998 to 2005. For the author the ESDP is both a timeframe and a process that provides focus and a structured set of data that can greatly facilitate this study. The cut-off date of 2005 is important in providing a breathing space between events and the time of the current analysis. Analysis of the kind used in this study is important to be based on distilled opinions from
actors that are able to take a step back and reflect. Since EU policies are based on evolution rather than spontaneous creation a selection of relevant documents and sources originating earlier than our time span should be studied. Specific crises or operations of the EU during the period after the initiation of ESDP will be examined in order to identify common elements on the approach of the organized core of the EU. Crises and combat situations are great educators and help foster a strategic culture through experience and the method of trial and error. In times of crises an organization is likely to fare better in choosing a strategy to fit its doctrine and operations to execute its strategy, than one whose officers must learn from academic journals or educational texts.

Overall, this thesis will describe the specific characteristics of a common European strategic culture and will try to identify its existence in EU actions and documents. The existence of a common European strategic culture will be a sign that the Union is closer to formulating a common voice and delivering the appropriate actions on issues concerning its security and defence. Strategic culture is not developed overnight. It takes considerable time to be embedded into the psyche of governing elites and governed people. However, signs of a possible European strategic culture can be traced even today with the limited sources at hand. The thesis aims to complement the study of European strategic culture by offering a more specific and concrete analysis of the possible European strategic culture with the use of the most recent analytical framework.
Chapter II

STRATEGIC CULTURE

The idea of a connection between culture and national security policy exists in classic works such as the works of Thucydides, Sun Tzu, von Clausewitz and Liddell Hart. Indeed, the idea that the “cultural” characteristics of national and international security policies are worth examining can be traced back to ancient times. In Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War, culture gains centre place in the Corinthians plea for help to the Spartans (Thucydides 1998: 167-71, esp I.70). During the deliberations of the Peloponnesian League in Sparta, the Corinthians bring attention to the blunt juxtaposition between the risk-taking nature of the seafaring Athenians on the one hand and the conservative and cautious nature of the Spartans on the other. The effect that these conflicting cultural characteristics have had on their respective strategies could not be clearer. Inter alia, the Corinthians emphasize that the Athenians “are never at home, [while] you [the Spartans] are never from it: for they hope by their absence to extend their acquisitions, you fear by your advance to endanger what you have left behind” (Thucydides 1998: 171.4). Around the same period (fifth century BCE) Sun Tzu pointed out the importance of culture in the formulation and execution of strategy by writing that the only way to minimize the risks involved in battle is to know oneself as well as one’s enemy (cited in van Creveld 2000: 39). This way one “need not fear the outcome of hundred battles” (cited in van Creveld 2000: 39). In the nineteenth century Carl von Clausewitz advanced similar ideas by recognising war and war-fighting strategy as a “test of moral and physical forces”. He advocated that in war “one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind.” He assigned to these characteristics utmost importance as “out of these […] a certain centre of gravity develops, a centre of power and movement, on which everything depends” (von Clausewitz 1989: VIII 4). The
nature of those dominant characteristics has instigated a lot of debate. However, it is generally accepted that they entail a moral aspect. According to him, the goal of strategy was much more than defeating the enemy in the field of battle; it was the destruction of his morale (von Clausewitz 1989). Liddell Hart (Hart 1967), the British military historian, worked on the same principle, when he wrote of a distinctly “British practice of war, based on experience and proved by three centuries of success” (Hart 1967). Liddell Hart’s idea of a British way of warfare, has since been duplicated by a host of other scholars who have produced similar analyses for a number of states, such as the USA (Gray 1981; Weigley 1973), the USSR (Jones 1990), Japan (Berger 1993), China (Kierman and Fairbank 1974) and even for the EU (Everts et al. 2004).

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an anthology of the most important intellectual endeavours on the subject from its birth to the present day. Given the need for focus and the constraints of space an exhaustive review of the literature on the subject of strategic culture is neither feasible nor desirable. Efforts have been made to illustrate the history of the concept from various authors. However, none of them has managed to treat the literature in all its vastness to date (2007). Knowing the roots and the development of the concept of strategic culture will be of great help in observing how it evolved and how its various intellectual caveats have been treated through time and through the lens of changing international conditions.

The concept of strategic culture was first introduced by Snyder (Snyder 1977) in an effort to understand Soviet doctrine and strategy on the issue of nuclear weapons. The concept soon departed from the nuclear issue and was used as a tool in understanding state policy decisions ranging from bombing campaigns and submarine warfare in World War II (Legro

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1 For a concise account of the main arguments, see (Strange and Iron 2005).
1994) to the doctrine of the French army in the interwar period (Kier 1995) and specific strategic cultures of states (Gray 1981; Basrur 2001; Longhurst 2000; Jones 1990; Cornish and Edwards 2005). The concept has been readdressed only recently after an explicit reference on its importance by the High Representative of the EU in the European Security Strategy that stated that “We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention” (European Council 2003n). But what exactly do we mean by strategic culture? What is the referent group for strategic culture? Is it something that changes through time? These are some of the questions that have troubled the writers that have worked with the concept from the point of its inception, and these are the questions that we will bear in mind when reviewing their work.

One barrier to entering into the culture of others, of course, can be language. The famous remark that Britain and the United States are divided by a common language\(^2\) cautions that mutual culture blindness can afflict even those who share a language; it may be that a common language leads to the incorrect presumption of a common culture. However, where a language barrier needs to be crossed the problem may be more obvious but no less difficult. This literature survey has concentrated on sources from the English speaking world. Has the concept of strategic culture spread further? Is there an equivalent in other languages? The answer is most probably yes as the English speaking writers do not claim the sole proprietorship of the term. Nevertheless the barrier remains and we are necessarily constrained to the English speaking world. On a positive note country specific case studies have been made in English by non-native English speakers, hence allowing us to have a glimpse in the way that writers brought up in different cultures approach the issue of strategic culture (Neumann and Heikka 2005; Rasmussen 2005; Graeger and Leira 2005).

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\(^2\) The remark is attributed variably to Oscar Wilde or George Bernard Shaw.
Strategic culture: the beginnings

Snyder first coined the term strategic culture in a report on “The Soviet strategic culture: Implications for limited nuclear operations” in 1977 (Snyder 1977). The report was prepared for the United States Air Force. Therein Snyder offered the following definition for strategic culture:

The sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy (Snyder 1977: 8).

Snyder suggests that a range of variables such as historic experience, political culture, technology and geography act as constraints on strategic choice and define the development of different doctrines. He claimed that these different cultural contexts led U.S. and Soviet decision makers to ask different questions about the use of nuclear weapons and develop unique answers. Therefore “it would be dangerous to assume that Soviet crisis decision makers will be willing to tailor their behaviour to American notions of strategic rationality” (Snyder 1977: 39). Based on these observations he was able to venture the prediction that the Soviet military would exhibit a preference for the pre-emptive, offensive use of force. The basis of his approach could be found rooted in Russia’s long history of insecurity and authoritarian control. Unlike other authors Snyder did not view strategic culture as rooted in deeply historical-cultural formative experiences. Rather he envisaged strategic culture originating in a mixture of recent historical experiences, ideology, high politics, organizational interests and lastly geography (Snyder 1977: 8; 1990: 4). Ultimately, Snyder argued that strategic culture was “semi-permanent” and that new problems and developments would not be assessed objectively but rather through the perceptual lenses provided by the already existing strategic culture. Ironically, the so called “father” of the strategic culture approach used a far more restricted conceptual definition than many of his followers, and he has tried henceforth to disassociate
himself from them (Snyder 1990). In his contribution to the edited volume by Jacobsen in 1990, Snyder moved from counselling caution in the usage of “strategic culture” as a predictive instrument to the complete denial of its usefulness altogether. He declared that culture-based explanations are to be used only as the “last resort” and disclaimed responsibility for the approach which he himself had introduced (Snyder 1990: 4). In effect, Snyder denounced all those that have used the term after him claiming that they have abused it rather than used it in the manner he had envisaged.

Snyder’s seminal paper provided the basis for other policy analysts to explore the concept. Ken Booth’s *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (Booth 1979) was directed toward the ideational foundations of nuclear strategy and superpower relations. He regretfully stated that the “fog of culture has interfered with the theory and practice of strategy” (Booth 1979: 9). He appealed to the next generation of strategists to be more conscious of the manner in which their own cultural context influenced their thinking. Booth held up “cultural relativism” as the ideal, advocating a “scientific detachment” on the part of the analyst. He concluded that “better strategy requires that ethnocentrism and incuriosity be replaced by sophisticated realism and strategic relativism” (Booth 1979: 16, 181). In a contribution to Carl C. Jacobsen’s edited volume *Strategic Power USA/USSR* entitled the *Concept of Strategic Culture Reaffirmed* Booth provides perhaps the most detailed definition of the concept, noting that strategic culture "refers to a nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force" (Booth 1990: 121). In short, it defines a set of patterns for a nation’s behaviour on issues of war and peace. Furthermore, strategic culture is derived from a nation’s history, geography, and political culture and represents the aggregate of attitudes and patterns of behaviour of the most influential voices (i.e. the political and military elites) (Booth 1990).
Booth hypothesised that strategic culture did not determine policy, as other factors -such as technological advancements- had to play a part in deciding which course of action was chosen. Rather, the primary contribution so to speak of strategic culture in policy-formation was to define that “set of patterns of and for a national’s behaviour on war and peace issues” (Booth 1990: 121). Continuity of behaviour permitted discussion of a “particular national ‘style’” in strategy. Continuity was therefore assumed. A strategic culture was likely to change slowly, except in the event of dramatic changes in circumstances, such as a revolution in technology. Booth nevertheless shared Snyder’s concern that strategic culture studies tended to be insensitive to the possibility of change. He stressed the need to avoid such insensitivity, for change would occur. However, he pointed out also that other approaches could commit the same error. They too could come up with strong predictions through insensitivity to change. To point out difficulties in this new approach can be to ignore the difficulties faced by established approaches (Booth 1990: 127).

Booth accepted that Snyder had sounded some useful warning about the uses and misuses of strategic culture. However he was not convinced by all of Snyder’s arguments or by his basic thesis that strategic culture was an approach of little value with too broad a definition. In any case, for better or worse the broader definition had prevailed and in Booth’s words “the conceptual accident which led to the coining of the phrase is one for which the strategic community is deeply in Jack Snyder’s debt” (Booth 1990: 124). Booth also argued that Snyder failed to take into account that the organisations he described operated within particular cultural environments, and that indeed, the strategic culture approach did not exclude other ‘useful’ explanations. According to Booth, Snyder also failed to appreciate that those other explanations may well themselves contain a cultural dimension (Booth 1990: 123-124). Finally, he rejected Snyder’s charge that such ‘realities’ were subjectively perceived; they were “in part culturally constructed as
well as culturally perpetuated" (Booth 1990: 123-124). Booth acknowledged that the study of cultural traits in different societies would not be easy, as their importance is not quantifiable. However by ignoring them one puts himself in greater wrong: falling victim to ethnocentrism; not understanding the enemy adequately; leaving history out of the analysis; assuming states acted in much the same ways. All these parameters taken together may lead to poor communication based on lack of understanding and on poor threat assessment (Booth 1990: 124-126).

In the early 1980s against the backdrop of the realist mainstream thought which followed the Vietnam War, the concept of strategic culture by Snyder soon found an intellectual proponent in Colin S. Gray. A dual citizen of Britain and the United States whose career eventually included academic appointments and think-tank positions in those countries as well as in Canada, Gray served after the election of Ronald Reagan on the President’s General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Like many other foreign policy advisors in the Reagan administration, he rejected the assumptions underlying the US-Soviet détente of the 1970s. He adapted Snyder’s concept in observing that the United States too had a distinctive strategic culture. Gray argued that the fundamental assumption of American nuclear strategy at the time – that no one could win a nuclear war – was ‘peculiarly American’ and not shared by the Soviets, who had never sincerely embraced the notion of mutual assured destruction (MAD) (Snyder 1977: ; Gray 1981: ; 1986). Building on Snyder’s work Colin Gray defined strategic culture as “referring to modes of thought and action with respect to force, which derives from perception of the national historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behaviour in national terms” and even from “the civic culture and way of life” (Gray 1986). Thus strategic culture “provides the milieu within which strategy is debated” (Gray 1981: 22) and it serves as an independent determinant of strategy patterns. For Gray culture embraces both ideas
and behaviour and thus one cannot sensibly think of strategic behaviour without thinking of cultural behaviour, and behaviour without culture, as these are inseparable terms (Gray 1999a). Studying strategic culture therefore can aid the academic in understanding the actions of US policy-makers. It would also help policy-makers to know themselves and other cultures better and to communicate with others. That way, they would be suited to make better policy and put it into effect. Given that the culture was enduring, it could help both academics and policy-makers to predict the policy of other states in the future (Gray 1981: 21-23).

Gray reiterated his views in 1984, also referring to what he saw as potential caveats in the study of strategic culture (Gray 1984). More specifically, and of special value to the European Strategic culture literature, he acknowledged the possible existence of strategic cultural traits that can be common to more than one “supposedly, and even truly, distinctive, culture” (Gray 1984: 27). The existence of a dominant strategic culture should not, and does not according to him, discard the parallel existence of several other strategic sub-cultures. Further, the essence of these assorted sub-cultures may, possibly, be diametrically opposed to that of the dominant strategic culture. Another potential caveat was that of perceiving the thought processes that define strategic culture and theory derived behavioural outcomes as the result of individual psycho-cultural phenomena. On the contrary, many, he argued, “and probably most, alleged strategic cultural traits are fully rational, in strict realpolitik terms” and derive from the historical experiences of the nation in question (Gray 1984: 27). Finally, Gray commented on the issue of continuity and change within a strategic culture by acknowledging the probability of state action that from time to time is at odds with the dominant features of the traditional culture.

Following from his 1981 and 1986 articles Gray published a book in 1986 where he extended his analysis on these themes. His basic argument in the *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*
(Gray 1986), given the assumption that USA and USSR did not share the same nuclear policy styles, was that the USA had chosen the wrong nuclear strategy. They had done so “through incomprehension of [their] own and Soviet strategic culture and national style” (Gray 1986: ix-xii). Gray highlighted what he considered to be the main features of Soviet and US strategic culture. US decision-makers exhibited a ‘managerial approach’ to the use of force, as opposed to a strategic one, for instance. Their stress was on managing men and resources rather than directing armed forces in battle. The enormous resources available to the United States encourages the view that mobilising resources was more important than developing tactics and strategy, while the security provided by geographic isolation, and history of fighting mainly weaker opponents, obviated the need for detailed strategic thinking (Gray 1986: 40-44).

On the basis of his analysis of the Soviet and US strategic cultures, Gray concluded that the danger existed that should war break out, NATO would be fighting to limit the conflict, and to control escalation, while the USSR would be fighting to win, placing the latter at an advantage. He therefore suggested a strategy for the United States which he believed was more appropriate in the light of his analysis of the Soviet and US national styles in nuclear strategy. His solution put emphasis on war-fighting (Gray 1986: 311-319).

Though Gray remained convinced of the value of a strategic cultural approach and criticised the neglect of the “perspectives of history and cultural anthropology” in strategic studies, he also recognised various pitfalls and limitations to this approach and stressed the need to maintain a sceptical attitude towards it (Gray 1986: xiv). In particular he argued against a deterministic and reductionist approach. Strategic culture produced tendencies but did not determine behaviour, he emphasised. States might therefore act wholly out of accord with their culture at times, when other factors – for example structural pressures – were especially strong. These factors constantly had to be borne in mind, as to overemphasise strategic culture at
their expense would produce distorted analysis (Gray 1986: 34-35). Another pitfall that Gray brought attention to, common in many fields of research is that if one looked hard enough for cultural distinctiveness one would most probably find traces of it even where there weren’t any to be found. One could then interpret his observations, mistakenly, as the cause of any behaviour. Strategic culture could be “misapplied so as to explain, even rationalize, anything and everything. The theory becomes tautological, and in seeking to explain everything, in fact it explains nothing” (Gray 1986: xiii). In Gray’s interpretation strategic culture was not to be seen as a direct cause of behaviour or as its sole cause.

Gray also warned against insensitivity to change in strategic cultures and to divisions within them. Although he expected that, in the absence of any dramatic event, they would change only slowly, change had still to be taken into account (Gray 1986: 37). In addition, the existence of sub-cultures which might be quite different from the dominant culture had to be taken into consideration (Gray 1986: 35). Finally, Gray argued that strategic cultures could contain contradictory elements. Despite the fact that states might act at times in ways entirely in sync with their cultures, instances of exceptional behaviour would always be found which could be used in turn to ‘disprove’ the strategic culture thesis, when used as means to show that it did not produce particular outcomes (Gray 1986: 35-56). Nevertheless provided that these pitfalls were recognised and that strategic culture was not seen as the sole explanation of strategic behaviour or the only worthwhile approach, Gray felt it could enhance understanding of military behaviour and lead to better policy.

In terms of methodology, Gray made limited remarks on the study of strategic culture. Echoing a point made by Ken Booth in Strategy and Ethnocentrism, he argued that an interdisciplinary approach to the subject should be followed (Booth 1979: 139). The strategic culture of a country was, he wrote, “comprehensible through an appropriate combination of historical,
geographical, anthropological, psychological and sociological study” (Gray 1986: 33). He noted too that strategic culture was a direct descendant of the concept of political culture and was in effect a subset of it. Gray then described his own approach as ‘inductive-empirical’, seeking through observations of Soviet and US strategic behaviour to infer different cultural predispositions (Gray 1986: 34). Gray, like Snyder and Booth, proposed no theoretical framework for the study of strategic culture.

Carnes Lord published in 1985 an article in the *Comparative Strategy* that focused on US strategic culture (Lord 1985). The work of both Booth and Gray provided the foundation for his article complemented by the studies on the history of military thinking by Weigley and Kierman (Kierman and Fairbank 1974: ; Weigley 1973). In terms of definition, Lord argued that strategic culture provided the “*fundamental assumptions governing the constitution of military forces and the ends they are intended to serve*” and established “*a basic framework for it, if they do not determine in detail the nature of, military forces and military operations*”(Lord 1985: 271). His article examined whether a unique US ‘way of war’ could be identified and if so, what were its roots and how it could contribute to the understanding of the strategic problems currently confronting the United States. Lord argued that it was clear that states in the past had waged war in distinctive ways. This was due, at least in part, to “changing material circumstances”. He believed that it “made sense” to think of different national ways of war especially when one takes into consideration the various “*social, political and ideological characteristics that are centrally constitutive of a state*”. The enormous political significance of waging a war meant that the governing classes of the nation were in charge of its prosecution. This way military activity was heavily influenced by the nation’s political culture. “Military culture” or “ways of war” were, according to Lord, phrases too narrow to serve as descriptions of this phenomenon. The term strategic culture on the other hand captured the political aspects of
warfare as well. It was defined by Lord as the traditional practices and habits of thought by which military force is organised and employed by a society in the service of its political goals (Lord 1985: 270-271).

Lord took the lack of investigation of strategic cultures thus far as evidence of their potency. Strategists had been so dominated by their own strategic cultures that they had failed to recognise fully that others came from different cultures or that cultural difference could be significant (Lord 1985: 269-270). Lord’s next step was to identify six basic sources of strategic culture. These would vary in importance depending on which state was under examination. There was the geopolitical setting of a state, the nature of its international relationships, its political culture and ideology; its military history, traditions and education, the relationship between its civil and military sectors and its bureaucratic set-up and finally, the military technology available to it. Lord postulated that all these factors could influence strategic culture (Lord 1985: 272-274). These sources according to Lord had provided the USA with a “fundamentally defensive” strategic culture at the level of strategy and that unfortunately, in Lord’s view, shun counterforce war-fighting and war-winning nuclear strategies. This, for Lord, stood in diametrical opposition to Soviet strategic culture (Lord 1985: 272,277). Concluding, Lord raised the questions of how stable and enduring strategic cultures were and whether they were “susceptible to alternation by conscious design”. It is unfortunate that he did not attempt to provide any answers (Lord 1985: 288).

In terms of methodology, Lord provided in his article a case study and some insights, but once more offered little in the way of theoretical elaboration. The same applies to Bradley Klein in an article published in 1988 (Klein 1988). Klein viewed strategic culture from a completely different perspective to previous writers. Though he made some brief references to Carnes Lord and Colin Gray he stopped short from completely dismissing them (Klein
1988: 139). For Klein, they were nothing but agents of the current mainstream strategic scholarship. They accepted the realist assumptions on which strategic studies were based. This meant that in essence they took states for granted as the primary and legitimate actors in the strategic realm. Klein’s chief inspiration was therefore not any previous writer on strategic culture, but rather Antonio Gramsci. While for realists hegemony referred to the dominance of one state over international society, for Gramsci it had to do with the legitimacy of the ruling classes of states. Instead of taking states as a timeless given, Klein was interested in how regime legitimacy had been historically achieved, and also in “the power relations of particular regimes and classes which are able to generate ideas and practices that gain the normalizing status of common currency” (Klein 1988: 134-135).

For Klein strategic culture “embodies the states war-making style, understood in terms of its military institutions and its accumulated strategic traditions of air, land and naval power” (Klein 1988: 136). However, Klein also wrote that “the point of the concept of strategic culture is to historicize what has laid in realist theories of hegemony; the point, too, is to render palpable the political production of hegemony articulated at a theoretical level by the Gramscian conception of hegemony” (Klein 1988: 136). He wanted to examine how state governments could legitimise the use of force and to trace the occasions on which the population would regard the use of force as acceptable. While Klein’s approach can be considered to be based on the thinking of earlier writers, it’s more likely to be considered a departure towards something radically different. Klein’s study is best understood not as an examination of strategic culture, but rather as a wide-reaching critique of strategic studies, informed by critical theory. He makes some insightful remarks on US strategic culture, practice and theory. For example, he pinpointed the rise of the peace movement within US society as informing alternative strategic cultures than the dominant one, resulting in a
challenge of the legitimacy of the discourse propagated by the dominant classes (Klein 1988: 143-144). Klein’s endeavour is in a complete different tune to the rest of the discourse on strategic culture and it is not surprising that his views have not attracted much subsequent attention.

Yitzhak Klein (Klein 1991) did, unlike Bradley Klein, include among his references Snyder and Booth, as well as Gray, yet like his namesake, also came up with a quite different approach. Yitzhak Klein’s contribution to the disciple of strategic culture was that he tried to advance a theory of strategic culture which he tried to test against a case study of Soviet strategic culture between the years 1917-1965. Yitzhak Klein defined strategic culture as “the set of attitudes and beliefs held within a military establishment concerning the political objective of war and the most effective strategy and operational method of achieving it” (Klein 1991: 5). His was a much more limited definition than that of earlier writers. In terms of the referent group, it was limited to the military establishment, excluding the political leadership and the rest of the nation. In terms of the sources of strategic culture, Yitzhak Klein distanced himself from those who looked at the influence of the general culture of a nation, its political culture, and its historical experience, on its strategy. He preferred to concentrate on a narrower scope, namely the institutional culture of the armed forces.

Klein did not see strategic culture as a milieu in which policy is created or as a force operating in the minds of decision-makers without them often realising it. Rather, he saw it as a framework consciously created by decision-makers to aid in the analysis of problems and the formulation of policy. He called it an “indispensable but subjective guide to the planner’s decisions”, and described the study of strategic culture as a synthetic analytic framework (Klein 1991: 6-7 and 12). Klein looked for strategic culture in the writings of leading military figures and in Soviet military journals. He specifically sought out not inferences but their explicitly
stated assumptions (Klein 1991: 9). For Klein strategic culture was only what “is reflected in a military establishment’s policies” (Klein 1991: 14). For him strategic culture was a tangible thing, produced by conscious design and not conditioning. Finally in his concluding remarks Klein argued that only a “comparative, in-depth study of the formation, influence, and the processes of change in the strategic cultures of the major powers in the modern era would make a useful contribution to our theoretical understanding of war” (Klein 1991: 15), Unfortunately he did not develop this point in more detail.

Towards the end of 1980s and into the 1990s, the strategic culture literature showed some signs of growing in sophistication, though much of the work being done was still lacking in refinement. In a 1989 review article, David Twining characterised strategic culture as the “missing dimension” in Western intelligence analysis of the Soviet Union (Twining 1989: 169). Twining defined strategic culture as “those attitudes values and beliefs pertaining to the preparation for and conduct of war” (Twining 1989: 179). For Twining this was the only path to interpret correctly the strategic intention of the Soviet Union from the available intelligence materials. While intelligence experts had failed to take adequate account of the cultural specificity of the Soviet Union, area studies specialists had, Twining asserted, contented themselves with descriptive work and ad hoc explanations, but lacked “sufficient boldness” to look for more systematic comprehension of Soviet behaviour (Twining 1989: 176-177).

Twining regarded strategic culture as a subset of political culture. For him, its power lied in its ability to shift analysts out of their own cultures and into the cultures of others, i.e. absolve them of their ethnocentrism. However, Twining remained doubtful as to whether and to what degree an objective, “apolitical, unbiased, scholarly analysis of the military balance” would ever be possible, with or without strategic culture being brought into the equation (Twining 1989: 173). For Twining the study of strategic culture also calls for an
interdisciplinary approach "to understand Soviet strategic culture calls for the talents of the area specialist, historian, anthropologist, sociologist and the political scientist" (Twining 1989: 180). Herein lays the suggestion that the student of strategic culture has a lot of ground that needs to be covered. Building on the work of Snyder and Gray, he suggested certain core attributes of the Soviet strategic culture, which was distinct from the official culture of the regime. These included an insatiable search for security, influenced crucially by the Soviet experience of World War Two; the need for a strong state; a desire not to rely on others for security; a belief in the political utility of military power; and a tendency, derived from historical experience, to view world affairs as a permanent struggle for power. In the context of these beliefs Twining argued that events such as the 1983 shooting down of the KAL airliner were more readily comprehensible. What might appear at first glance as an excessive use of force could become easier to interpret when one comes to appreciate the extent to which Soviet leaders saw themselves as engaged in a permanent struggle. Twining admitted that the concept of strategic culture was still rudimentary and that it would benefit much from further elaboration. Still, however, its employment as a theoretical tool in the case of USSR was indispensable. Without an informed understanding of Soviet strategic culture an informed assessment of the Soviet threat would be impossible and greater mutual understanding hindered (Twining 1989: 185).

**Strategic culture: coming of age**
The 1990s witnessed the publication of Carl Jacobsen’s *Strategic Power USA/USSR* (Jacobsen 1990). This volume, dedicated to the comparison of US and USSR strategic cultures, marked the coming of age of the debate on strategic culture. Apart from valuable insights to the respective strategic cultures of the two super-powers of the Cold War era, Jacobsen’s compilation is important because two of the major proponents of the concept of strategic culture in the 1970s debates diverge in their support of the term. While Snyder appears
highly critical of strategic culture, Booth affirms its value and usefulness (Jacobsen 1990). The book is organised around the belief that US strategic writing had neglected history and culture. Its aim was to raise consciousness regarding the need to include both of these dimensions in strategic analysis. The book contains forty four chapters comparing US and Soviet strategic cultures with most of the contributors concluding that strategic culture was significant in understanding these policies. The first chapters of the book are devoted to discussions on the concept of strategic culture itself, without however adding much theoretical sophistication. It is in this section that we find the articles by Snyder and Booth, elements of which have been presented earlier in this chapter. Amidst the contributions selected by Jacobsen there are two other key chapters where US and Soviet strategic cultures are explored. Neither of them had much to say on the theoretical side of strategic culture but each raised some points that have proven useful for this thesis.

The first is the chapter by David Jones on Soviet strategic culture (Jones 1990), which comes in stark contrast with Yitzhak Klein’s work on the same subject. Jones stressed the importance of Russian imperial history and its legacy on the Soviet strategic culture, which Klein had not. Jones was keen to avoid taking a deterministic line with regards to the geography of the Soviet Union, but did argue that the geographical setting of the USSR meant there were certain “permanently operating factors” (Jones 1990: 37). For Jones there were three levels to a state’s strategic culture: its basic elements born from geographical, ethno-cultural, and historical variables; the socioeconomic characteristics of society; and its political structure. More specifically, Jones placed greater emphasis on the nature of contemporary interaction between military and political institutions. Together these variables interact to create a state’s strategic culture (Jones 1990: 37). This type of strategic culture does not delimit strategic options. Rather, for Jones strategic culture pervades all levels of strategy.
from grand strategy down to tactics: “such a ‘culture’ presumably affects the whole range of a nation’s broad security and more narrow military policies, beginning with the basic goals of its diplomacy and ending with the ‘style’ or ‘whole series of proclivities’ displayed by its armed forces in peace and war” (Jones 1990: 35).

The second chapter in question was the one by William Kincade. Kincade built upon the work of Booth and others in his approach to strategic culture but offered some fresh insight also (Kincade 1990). Kincade discussed how America’s geo-strategic situation, resources, history, military experience and political beliefs all influenced its strategy and shaped its strategic culture. He cautioned against viewing strategic cultures as overly consistent or homogenous. Discussing the relationship between culture and behaviour he suggested that part of strategic culture could even be a mismatch between beliefs and behaviour. In the case of the strategic culture of the United States, various “dualisms and dilemmas” could be detected due to differing perceptions of US strategic experience and circumstances. There was disparity in the outlooks of politicians and the military but also within the military itself or its service lines. It was necessary to be sensitive to the existence of a multiplicity of perceptions “while seeking regularities or commonalities traceable to the larger determinants of a nation’s approach to war and peace” (Kincade 1990: 10).

In 1993 Desmond Ball contributed to the strategic culture literature with an article on strategic culture in the Asia-Pacific region (Ball 1993). Following the spirit of the Jacobsen edited volume, his premise was that:

*The concept of strategic culture holds that different countries and regions approach the key issues of war, peace and strategy from perspectives that are both uniquely distinctive and deeply rooted, reflecting their different geostrategic situations, resources, military experience*
and political beliefs. These factors profoundly influence how a country perceives protects and promotes its interests and values with respect to the threat or use of force (Ball 1993: 44-45).

Ball noted that hitherto, strategic culture research had focused on states, mainly the United States and the Soviet Union. Little had been written about other states or regions of the world. His own interest lay with the Asia-Pacific region, which had been the focus of much work on “political culture” and “economic culture” but little on strategic culture. He intended to correct this oversight (Ball 1993). In doing so he considered the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, rather than individual states within the region. He believed that while national differences existed, broad regional traits could also be identified. In this he was breaking new ground in terms of the strategic culture literature.

Ball’s article identified a number of principal elements of Asia-Pacific strategic culture, though it was unclear how he had singled them out. Evidence in their support was drawn from the behaviour of states, statements of officials and ancient texts. The sources of these elements of strategic culture were the internal political organisation of the states of the region, its traditions and historical experience, and the wider cultural values of the individual states. Defining the strategic culture of the region largely in opposition to that of the West, Ball argued that Asians tended to think in longer time frames that Westerners and that their politics were characterised to a larger extent by informality. He also added that they believed much more strongly in the principle of non-intervention and that they favoured bilateral international relations over multilateral. Asians, for Ball, defined security in broader terms than the West and they preferred to operate by consensus. They were more pragmatic than

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3 Few years after his article a comprehensive volume on Asia-Pacific strategic culture was produced by Booth and Trood, (Booth and Trood 1999)
idealistic and finally, they approached the use of force with more emphasis on achieving political objectives than military victories.

In 1993 we had the publication of another article on the issue of strategic culture by Thomas U. Berger. *From Sword to Chrysanthemum* (Berger 1993) was followed later in 1996 with a contribution to Katzenstein’s edited volume (Berger 1996). Berger’s focus was on investigating the cases of Germany and Japan in relation to political-military cultures. For him, cultural beliefs and values acted as a distinct national lens to shape perceptions of events and even to channel possible societal responses. He stated that in this sense, “although influenced by the real world, cultures are not merely subjective reflections of objective reality” (Berger 1993: 326). Hence, for Berger, cultures were not static entities hovering above society, directing behaviour while themselves remaining unaffected; they were, rather, transmitted through the often imperfect lens of socialisation and were subject to both internal and external forces of change (Berger 1996: 326). According to Berger, change was neither quick nor easy. The speed and easiness of change in culture depended upon the part of culture that changed. Simply put, instrumental beliefs are easier to change while more abstract or emotionally laden beliefs are more resistant to change (Berger 1996: 326). In the specific cases of Japan and Germany he explained the inability of the realist paradigm to predict their aversion to militarism after their economic revival by analysing the creation of national identities, the historical experience and the domestic-institutional context of the two states. Berger concluded that although Japan and Germany have undergone dissimilar roads of reconstruction and appear socially distinct, similarities in their respective political-military cultures resulted in similar strategic choices (Berger 1996: 356).

In 1994 Charles Kupchan published a book entitled The Vulnerability of Empire in which strategic culture –understood as “deeply embedded conceptions and notions of national
security that take root among elites and the public alike”- was the key concept (Kupchan 1994: 5). Kupchan diverged from the mainstream writers on strategic culture that connected it only to war fighting and expanded the term to national security. Kupchan argued that strategic culture constituted the key factor that explained the self-defeating behaviour of great powers. He argued that decision-makers in times of rapid international change and perceived vulnerability of the state ended up propagating extreme policies according to their strategic beliefs. These policies needed to be linked to symbols and images so that the masses could digest those otherwise costly policies with greater ease. It was at the end of this process that a strategic culture or, at least elements of one, were formulated. It was possible that later on the beliefs of the governing elites might shift responding to a changing international setting. At that point, however, elites were constrained by the same strategic culture they had previously been successful in propagating. Abandoning their commitments or arguing for different policies would result in a reduction of their legitimacy and credibility. Kupchan supported his arguments with the case studies of France and Britain in the late 1930s, Germany and Japan in the late 1930s and early 1940s and the US.

Kupchan was keenly aware of the reluctance exhibited by scholarship so far to focus its attention on strategic culture. Culture was more often than not a residual variable, to which scholarship turned when all other modes of argument fell short of providing adequate explanations. A deterrent was that culture was a concept difficult to define. More specifically, in its definition it was important to separate behaviour from the beliefs purporting to explain it; otherwise one was in danger of committing a tautological fallacy. In addition, culture was difficult to measure and incurred methodological problems, which “threaten to mire any cultural argument in intractable dispute over conceptual and evidentiary issues” (Kupchan 1994: 26). If cultures changed slowly, then their effect tended to be non-falsifiable, since it is impossible to test a
counterfactual—that is, whether a specific behaviour would have been different if a different culture had been in place. In response to these problems, Kupchan proposed a narrow definition of culture. In contrast, Snyder’s original definition was as broad as to be untestable. Kupchan, therefore, focused on the “images and symbols that shape how a polity conceives of the relationship between empire and national security” (Kupchan 1994: 28). The hope was that this would maximise the “trade-off between rigor and security” (Kupchan 1994: 29). His conclusion was intuitively geared towards the importance of strategic culture as a variable. It had however been “sorely understudied”, partly because of the difficulty in doing so. The paradox was that: “what makes the notion of strategic culture problematic and unwieldy – its focus on deeply embedded assumptions and collective self-images – is precisely what makes it appealing” (Kupchan 1994: 490).

In 1995, Eric Herring, in his book *Danger and Opportunity: Explaining International Crisis Outcomes*, introduced the concept of strategic culture into his analysis of the crisis behaviour of the United States and the Soviet Union (Herring 1995). Herring’s intention was to bring in both strategic culture and psychological factors to confront the hitherto unchallenged assumption of rationality in crisis management discussed in the early part of his book. For Herring, strategic culture would provide decision-makers with a simplified image of the complex world they faced. Decision-makers, who acted based on that simplified image, might be blind to some of the complexities of the world and behave accordingly in ways “rational” in terms of their image of the world, but “not-rational” in terms of reality. On some occasions, it might merely “wrap the processes leading to the same outcome” (Herring 1995: 62-63). Herring saw strategic culture as possessing explanatory utility in a number of respects. Acting as a prism to the world, it could shape perceptions of it and affect the setting of strategic preferences. Further, it could make certain courses of action more acceptable or
thinkable than others. Alternatively, as a legitimizing discourse, it could justify behaviour based on unrelated motivations. If new generations of decision-makers were to be socialised into this discourse they could come to believe in it and act accordingly (Herring 1995). In his conclusions, Herring postulated that strategic culture was one factor among many in explaining crises. In that guise, however, it was not a central one. For Herring, strategic culture could not be used to predict behaviour since it was heavily dependent on context. In different contexts, the same strategic culture could produce different behaviour (Herring 1995: 291).

Three interesting contributions to the concept of strategic culture appear in the spring issue of *International Security* Journal of 1995. These are by Elisabeth Kier, Stephen Rosen and Alastair Johnston (Kier 1995; Rosen 1995; Johnston 1995b). Elisabeth Kier had undertaken an analysis of the relationship between culture and military doctrine, with specific reference to the case of France between the First and the Second World Wars (Kier 1995). Kier’s basic tenet was that neither military nor civilian behaviours could be predicted by structural or functional analysis. Instead, she argued that “changes in military doctrine are best understood by adopting a cultural perspective” (Kier 1996: 186). Her main area of interest, and the one she believed that strategic culture could provide better insights on, was the choice made by states between offensive and defensive military doctrines (Kier 1995: 66). Kier’s thesis emphasised how organisational culture affected the way the military responded to the limitations imposed by civilian decision-makers. She argued that “domestic politics set constraints; the military’s culture interprets these constraints; the organisational culture is the intervening variable between civilian decisions and military doctrine” (Kier 1995: 68). For Kier, organisational culture was the “set of basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs, and formal knowledge that shapes collective understandings” (Kier 1996: 202). At first glance the idea and definition of organisational culture might seem
to share a lot of elements with strategic culture. Kier, however, argued that as this was not a reference to a military mind or to a general set of attitudes that all military men share, we should not confuse organisational culture with national character or strategic culture (Kier 1995: 70). The former referred to particular military organisations and not to the beliefs held by civilian policy-makers. Kier also suggested that while the military could be influenced by some aspects of the wider culture, its powerful assimilation process could displace the influence of the society and render it insulated (Kier 1995: 70). Of course this does not mean that we can speak of universal military cultures. To the contrary, military cultures themselves are influenced by specific historical and national circumstances. Overall, it seems that Kier defined strategic culture as prevalent in the civilian sector, a role which four years earlier was reserved by Yitzhak Klein for the military (Klein 1991: 5).

Stephen Rosen provided a compelling account of the ways in which social structures affect military and organizational cultures and by extent military effectiveness in battle (Rosen 1995). To Rosen military culture is comprised of “beliefs and assumptions that frame… choices about international military behaviour, particularly those concerning decisions to go to war, preferences for offensive, expansionist or defensive modes of warfare, and levels of wartime casualties that would be acceptable” (Rosen 1995: 12). In his study, Rosen focused on social structures rather than elite beliefs because he believed them to be a more profitable area of study. Social structures have observable behavioural manifestations –symbols with which people can associate, for which they are willing to sacrifice things they value– and these can be studied in reproducible ways (Rosen 1995: 7). Through this shift in attention Rosen distanced himself from studies that focused on the variations in the strategic behaviour of states (Johnston 1995b). Rather, he focused on an investigation of the variations in the size of military power at the disposal of
countries. According to these two studies therefore, organizational culture can be interpreted as an independent or intervening variable that can influence directly strategic choice.

Perhaps the most thorough and methodologically sophisticated work on the concept of strategic culture was published also in 1995. Alastair Johnston introduced his analysis of the concept of strategic culture in a thesis later published as a book under the title Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and the Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Johnston 1995a). His thesis was supplemented with an article in International Security journal entitled Thinking about Strategic Culture (Johnston 1995b). Johnston started by reviewing the current literature on the concept. In the process, he tried to introduce his own understanding of the concept, which he hoped would avoid the pitfalls of earlier attempts, which he highlighted in his analysis. Such pitfalls included according to him: definitions of culture which are tautological; deterministic ideas about the effect of culture; and flawed research designs which do not separate culture and structure. Instead, he sought a falsifiable notion of strategic culture, the formation and development of which could be followed empirically and the impact of which could be assessed relative to other factors. Johnston began with the key strategic texts in Chinese literature from a formative period in strategic culture, looking for the existence of consistent beliefs. His next step was to show that many decision-makers shared these beliefs and that strategic culture was consistent with them (Johnston 1995a: 29).

Alastair Johnston postulated that strategic culture consisted of two basic elements. First was a “central paradigm” of beliefs about the nature of conflict, the nature of enemies and the efficacy of violence. Secondly, derived from this paradigm he argued the existence of “a ranked set of strategic preferences”; which were “collectively shared by decision-makers” (Johnston 1995a: ix-x). The aim of his work was to trace these preferences back to the historical experience of the state and forward to their influence on strategic behaviour. He set
out to determine to what extent a consistent and persistent Chinese strategic culture could be identified, and to what extent it had affected the Chinese use of force (Johnston 1995a: ix-x). He assumed that culture was an “ideational milieu that limits behavioural choices” (Johnston 1995a: 36) and he defined strategic culture as:

…an integrated system of symbols (i.e. argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-standing grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious (Johnston 1995a: 36).

Johnston’s effort focused on producing a falsifiable conception of strategic culture whose effects it would be possible to isolate. The first step was to establish that strategic culture existed over time and was shared by enough actors for it to be considered a major factor in policy-making. In order to prove that strategic culture did influence the behaviour of actors, Johnston tried to trace it from its sources through the process of socialization to the values and assumptions of decision-makers. In order to identify beliefs Johnston chose to concentrate on the Ming period (1368-1644 CE) because decision makers then were heirs to a particular philosophical and textual tradition at a relatively insulated period of time. Among the various possible strategic objects to study, Johnston focused on the documents described as the Seven Military Classics. As the repository of strategic knowledge and a basis for transmitting ideas they were an obvious starting point (Johnston 1995a: 113). He examined these for their principal assumptions on the role of war, the nature of conflict with the enemy and the efficacy of violence. In addition, he studied various symbols: words, names, events that had meanings. Because the use of these symbols could change over time Johnston found it important to triangulate and verify beliefs from their different sources.
Having identified the beliefs, the next stage was to test their effect on the behaviour of
decision-makers. Johnston, in his analysis, identified various possible ways in which the two
might be related. It could be, at one extreme, that strategic culture pointed to one particular
option only and that no other factors were needed to explain the choices made. At the other
extreme, strategic culture could merely be instrumental, used to justify policy caused by other
factors. Between these two extremes lies the interpretation that strategic culture might set a
limited range of available options, with other variables required to explain which particular
option is selected. Alternatively, strategic culture might produce a ranked set of preferences,
which form a prism through which other factors are perceived. This ranked preference
matrix is what Johnston decided to pursue in his thesis, testing it against non-cultural factors,
especially structural, to see if it produced different results. Johnston offered also another
possibility; that strategic culture affected the decision-making process itself, namely that it
had an impact on how decisions were taken, rather than which decisions were taken (Johnston
1995a: 53-54).

The ranked set of preferences invited the question for the decision makers whether they
operated according to it, and whether they were consistent in the prioritisation it dictated
across different objects of analysis. If not, no strategic culture could be identified. While
noting the importance of comparative studies on the issue, Johnston stressed however that in
the first instance a consistency of beliefs in one country was necessary (Johnston 1995a: 55).
His conclusions on Chinese strategic culture were remarkable. He concluded that there were
indeed two strategic cultures in China: a Confucian-Mencian culture exhibiting the features
often claimed for Chinese strategic culture; and a parabellum culture, resembling the Western
realpolitik model (Johnston 1995a: 249). The parabellum culture, which is not often cited by
expert-analysts in Chinese affairs, was proven to be the dominant strain. This raised a major
difficulty for Johnston because the Chinese parabellum strategic culture led to precisely the
behaviour expected by structural analysts. Thus testing it against structural realism was
rendered increasingly difficult. As a consequence, Chinese distinctiveness was challenged and
strategic culture as a tool became severely undermined. Indeed, structural realists would
argue that Johnston’s findings confirmed the critical importance of structures and the
marginal effect of unit level factors. However, while Johnston accepted that his findings
posed difficulties for strategic culturalists in that they diminished cross-cultural difference,
nevertheless he saw value in the strategic culture approach. He also discerned shortcomings
in the neo-realist approach. In his conclusions Johnston argued that he did distinguish a
deply rooted set of cultural beliefs in China that were being transmitted to new generations.
These beliefs were not “natural” but, rather, learned. This observation opened up the
possibility that at the very least they could be unlearned or that they were not being learned
in other countries/contexts. Neo-realism just assumed the existence of realpolitik beliefs.
Johnston’s work showed that particular beliefs were being formed at a particular time and
were passed on to the next generations of decision-makers (Johnston 1995a: 258-66).
Johnston’s work was heavily informed by contemporary progress in political psychology, as
well as contemporary sociological studies of the complex connections between culture and
state behaviour (Landis 2002: 106).

In 1996 Jeffrey W. Legro published in the American Political Science Review an article
entitled Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step (Legro 1996)
making his contribution to the literature on the concept of strategic culture. His analysis
focused on the issue of military constraint in the use of submarine and strategic bombing in
World War II. His article addressed gaps in the literature by developing an explanation that
specified how the organisational culture of bureaucracies shaped state aims and international
outcomes. This approach has a particular relevance for the EU. The EU possesses a very strong bureaucratic mechanism that frequently manages to create policy and to affect international outcomes by its own initiative. The abundance of directives and initiatives that are stemming from the European Commission provide ample examples of that. Jeffrey Legro continued by offering a domestic level cultural explanation of preferences that contrasted with the common view that state-desires are functionally determined or definitively constrained by the international system (Legro 1996: 118). For Legro, the organisational cultures of bureaucracies produced information, plans and capabilities which constituted state preferences in ways that need not correspond efficiently to international circumstances (Legro 1996: 118). Preference dynamics, which were largely shaped by the collective beliefs and customs of the military services, could be central to variations in international conflict and cooperation (Legro 1996: 118). On the issue of how effective culture was as a tool used in order to explain preference and knowledge structures, Legro postulated that organizational culture was quite potent in shaping outcomes (Legro 1996: 134). This flew in the face of critics who claimed that culture could only explain marginal residual variance. Legro concluded that a type of warfare that was antithetical to a particular military structure would be suppressed even in the face of provocative enemy incidents (Legro 1994: 108). He proposed that “the organizational culture approach argues that both Germany and Britain had ‘ways of war’ that worked to suppress inadvertent escalation” (Legro 1994: 133). Finally, he proposed that judging from the importance of culture in the context of armed conflict, one can deduce that its relevance might be even more pronounced in the context of other international relations issues (Legro 1996: 135).

In 1996 a collective volume edited by Katzenstein was published. In The Culture of National Security, (Katzenstein 1996) much of the aforementioned literature can be found (Kowert
and Legro 1996; Johnston 1996; Kier 1996; Berger 1996). The central theme among all the writers of this volume was that the dominance of realist theories in the study of international relations was unwarranted. It was argued that ideational, rather than material factors, explained particular national security policies. For Kier, Rosen and Legro, this type of research provided a fresh impetus towards explaining old empirical puzzles in a way that reasserted the centrality of culture. These writers did not appear to have advanced an alternative theory of national security or to have an agreed theoretical framework as a basis for their work; namely one that would raise questions regarding what should be expected from strategic culture in terms of analysing strategic outcomes (Checkel 1998: 333). The Katzestein volume does attest to the diversity of research within the culturalist program. While Kier assessed organizational culture, and Johnston and Berger identified national cultural trends, Martha Finnemore (Finnemore 1996), Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald (Price and Tannenwald 1996) all considered the ways in which global norms affected state behaviour.

In 1999, a major project by Ken Booth, Russell Trood and Alan Macmillan that had its origins back in 1994, culminated in the publication of “Strategic Culture and Conflict Resolution in the Asia-Pacific Region”, (Booth and Trood 1999). The project was the result of a conference on the same issue, with the purpose of collecting papers on the concept of strategic culture centring on states of the Asia-Pacific region. Aiming to provide a systemic comparative study of strategic culture, the project’s main contribution was the introduction of a standard framework of analysis for the concept. This framework was not intended to be constraining in the study of the concept of strategic culture pertaining to the various states under examination. According to the editors themselves while it pointed to some of the areas in which authors might look for material regarding strategic culture, it provided little
methodological guidance, leaving authors to make their own way (Booth and Trood 1999: 3-22, 363-370).

The framework provided a list of factors that could present themselves as sources of strategic culture to any particular state. The sources were split into three broad categories. The first category comprised all those elements connected with the geography and the natural resources of a state. Issues like natural borders and the existence of strategic resources, valuable both in war and peace were included. Equally, the framework addressed questions on how these issues affected the strategic thinking of the state. The second category included elements concerning the historic experiences of specific states. What was examined in this category were formative periods in the state’s history alongside the collective memory of these experiences. Identification and examination of historical symbols were also added to the equation, thus providing a better understanding of past experiences as these were transcribed in the collective conscience of the state. Thirdly, the study of political cultures was introduced to the framework and in particular the defence organisation of the state. Issues regarding the degree of centralisation in the decision-making process were introduced alongside the relations between the armed forces. Additionally, the role of political leadership and questions on the character of the given society became parameters of discussion. The book also included a thorough critique of the literature on strategic culture, providing an invaluable intellectual compass to students of the concept.4

At the end of the century (2000) Kerry Longhurst (Longhurst 2000), attempted to explain the change in the Post-Cold War behaviour of reunified Germany in a thesis later published as a book (2004) (Longhurst 2004). In her work she produced a hitherto more refined theory of strategic culture, according to which it consisted of three components. First, she presented

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4 The controversies identified will be treated in a later part of this chapter.
the deeper qualities that have their origins in the primordial or formative phases in the development of a given strategic culture. These were called ‘foundational elements’ and were comprised of the basic beliefs regarding the use of force that gave a strategic culture its core characteristics. These beliefs were semi-permanent and could contribute to the construction of a national identity, which in turn led to a kind of ‘national paradigm’ in strategic matters. Foundational elements were highly resilient to change. On a second level, stemming from these foundational elements were the manifestations of strategic culture; namely the long-standing policies and practices that actively related to and applied the substance of the strategic culture’s core to the external environment, essentially achieved by providing channels of meaning and application. These aspects of strategic culture were called regulatory practices. These regulatory practices were less resilient to change. Lastly, midway between the foundational elements and regulatory practices stood the ‘security policy standpoints’. These standpoints were shaped by the contemporary, widely accepted interpretations as to how core values should best be promoted through policy channels, in the sense that they set the preferences for policy choices. Longhurst defined strategic culture as:

...a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, held by a collective and arising gradually over time through a unique protracted historical process. A strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the year of its inception, although it is not a permanent or static feature. It is shaped and influenced by formative periods and can alter either fundamentally or piecemeal, at the crucial junctures in that collective’s experience (Longhurst 2004: 17)

She concluded that, “the existence and functioning of three components mean that a strategic culture is in a continual state of self-evaluation” (Longhurst 2004: 18). Change for Longhurst was not only
possible, but constant, yet most changes in a strategic culture are “fine-tuning” rather than “fundamental” (Longhurst 2004: 18).

The last contribution to the concept of strategic culture that will be examined in this chapter is the 2005 publication of a special issue of Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies, which dedicated a considerable part to the concept of strategic culture. Special emphasis was placed on the way that the concept was perceived by the Nordic intelligence. Iver Neumann and Henrikki Heika (Neumann and Heikka 2005) argued in their contribution that previous work on strategic culture had been using an outdated and reified concept of culture. This was because, they contended, scholars writing about strategic culture had read too little anthropology or sociology. The result for research was that, “the literature on strategic culture does not (yet) give us the kind of dynamic and specific framework for empirical analysis that we need” (Neumann and Heikka 2005: 6). Making use of the work of writers who practice theory, Neumann and Heikka sought to develop a framework whereby “practice and discourse constituted a culture” (Neumann and Heikka 2005: 71). They applied this notion of culture to the strategic realm by considering its use in the context of grand strategy, which they argued was also in need of disaggregating (Neumann and Heikka 2005: 12). Their intention was to rectify the situation by “reconceptualising ‘grand strategy’; from being a coverall term on a par with strategic culture, to being a coverall term for all preconditions for action” (Neumann and Heikka 2005: 13). They continued by providing a new definition for grand strategy as “a set of preconditions of action, at a specific time, in a specific place, that may exist in more or less explicit and systematized form, and that is actualised in practice” (Neumann and Heikka 2005: 14). Neumann and Heikka concluded by acknowledging that at this stage the model they were offering “still treats culture as a clearly bound and homogenous phenomenon.” They sought to supplement it “in such a way that strategic
culture emerges not as the stable product of a homogenous process inside a clearly limited nation-state, but rather as an unstable compromise of a contested transnational type” (Neumann and Heikka 2005: 17).

**Strategic Culture: thinking on the concept in retrospect**

Three generations of scholars have addressed the concept of strategic culture, according to the classification proposed by Johnston (Johnston 1995b). The first generation, which emerged in the midst of the Cold War, focused mainly on explaining why the Soviets and the Americans thought differently about nuclear strategy. The second generation appeared in the mid 1980s and started from the premise that there was a vast difference between what leaders think or say they are doing and the underlying motive behind what they end up doing. In effect, this generation of thinkers was concerned with unmasking the manipulation of strategic culture by elites. The third generation emerged in the 1990s and placed greater emphasis on military organizational culture than on broader strategic cultures. But let us examine the merits and drawbacks behind the thinking of each generation in turn.

The first generation, which included influential writers such as Snyder and Gray, flourished in the late 1970s and early 1980s and was very much concerned with the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. Its main objective was to explain differences between the two in the field of strategy by identifying their differences in areas such as geography, political culture and historical experience. This generation did not manage to offer any methodological clarity resulting in their inability to measure the effect of culture on behaviour, relative to other variables. Authors tended to view one set of beliefs as resulting from one set of experiences and as producing one set of behaviour. The problem with this approach, as identified by Alastair Johnston, was multifaceted. To begin with, the definition of culture they used included too many factors, ranging from technology to psychology. If strategic culture is seen as the product of nearly all relevant explanatory variables, then there
is little conceptual space left for non-strategic culture rationalizations of strategic choice; hence resulted the impossibility of valid tests for the notion (Johnston 1995b: 37). Johnston also criticised the writers of the first generation for being unclear on the sources of strategic culture. This was an additional factor that led to the inability of the conceptual development of strategic culture as an object of scholarly observation. Important questions that would help fine-tune our appreciation of the concept, such as “what sources are repositories of strategic culture”, “how is it transmitted”, and “does it change through its transmission”, were not addressed (Johnston 1995b: 39).

The second generation of literature emerged in the mid 1980s, offering a qualitatively different perspective on strategic culture. Greatly influenced by the Gramscian tradition, this generation, rather than focusing on cultural constraints, was interested in how strategic culture was used by political elites to justify their course of action in the fields of doctrine and policy. They observed a difference between what political elites, that have the power at any given time, say and what they do, and between declaratory and real doctrine. They suggested that political elites were able to act far and beyond what their cultural environment would have expected them to. The division between declaratory and real doctrine contributed to circumventing some of the pitfalls of the first generation by acknowledging the importance of interest formation, while maintaining that some ideas and rhetorical statements remain just that and fail to have any influence on strategic decision-making (Martinsen 2003: 3). Rather than denouncing the link between strategic culture and behaviour, however, the relationship between the two is left largely unexplored. It is not clear from this literature whether we should expect strategic discourse to influence behaviour.

The third generation of literature that emerged in the 1990s took a narrower focus on particular strategic decisions as dependent variables, and had a more eclectic approach on
how it conceptualized the ideational (independent) variables. Behaviour was detached from culture in order to be able to isolate strategic culture as the independent variable and the former as the dependent variable. Inspired by the rise of constructivism, researchers plunged into the gap between structural expectations and security policy realities, with models of culturally bound state behaviour (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996: 4). The rise of constructivism after the end of the Cold War gave a new momentum in the study of strategic culture, domestic cultures and organizational cultures. The constructivists attributed particular importance to notions of identity formation, with connection to organizational process, history, tradition, and culture. Alexander Wendt articulated the constructivist stance that state identities and interests are “socially constructed by knowledgeable practice” and he addressed the thorny issue of how identity and interests are formed (Wendt 1992: 392). Scholars of this generation, for the most part, explicitly excluded behaviour as an element of strategic culture definition, thereby avoiding the tautological traps of the first generation. This approach proved thus less deterministic and more committed to competitive theory testing. For example Kier (Kier 1995) and Legro (Legro 1994) used realist bureaucratic organisation models to prove their arguments. Another element that distinguished the third generation definition of strategic culture from older ones was that culture was not so much a function of history as a function of more recent practice and events. Scholars from this generation have also conducted research on links between culture and national security policy behaviour in different areas of the world (Johnston 1995a: ; Kupchan 1994).

Despite the fact that the concept of strategic culture has been with us for almost thirty years (since 1977) and despite the increased attention it receives in the literature of International Relations, it remains very much a contested issue that still has not been resolved to the degree of reaching a common consensus. Booth, Macmillan and Trood have conveniently
summed up the majority of the theoretical and empirical problems relating to the nature and application of strategic culture (Booth and Trood 1999).

The first of the problems that they identified involved the referent group for strategic culture. In the introductory chapter of Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region they approached the issue in a twofold manner. On the level of strategy states, as the main domain of structured military forces, ought to be the appropriate referent. On the level of culture, however, they argued that “society has a prior claim over State, since they have a more organic relationship” (Booth and Trood 1999: 12). This is a valid point since in some instances polities organised as states contain more than one nation or cultural group. Determining the dominant cultural group, as well as identifying the different subgroups which form a society, is vital in drawing up a strategic culture approach. According to Booth, Macmillan and Trood, the search for the appropriate referent group for strategic culture could not but include the military establishment (Booth and Trood 1999: 8). The challenge here was “whether the strategic culture of a state’s political and military elite can be distinct from the wider national part of which it is part” (Booth and Trood 1999: 8). Stephen Posen argued that it was indeed possible to have differences between the ruling elites and the ruled masses (Posen 1984). His work was geared towards proving that the input of politicians in the way that military organisations formulated and pursued policies was minimal. On the contrary, he did not include much discussion on the beliefs of the masses or public opinion on the issue.

The second apprehension by Booth, Macmillan and Trood concerned the roots of strategic culture. They maintained that although analysis rested on historical, geographical and political factors, little attempt has been made to demonstrate the way that these factors interact to produce strategic culture. In this observation they were seconded by Johnston who argued that these “variables are different classes of output” and that “each could stand by itself as a separate
explanation of strategic choice” (Johnston 1995b: 37). If, as mentioned above, strategic culture is perceived as the aggregation of all explanations that can be deemed cultural then the conceptual space left for non-cultural accounts of strategic preferences is minimal. This being the case, Johnston stressed, the concept of strategic culture cannot be falsified. As a result, this approach is methodologically flawed (Johnston 1995a: 37).

Booth, Macmillan and Trood dealt with the issue of methodology in five different instances: in their analysis of the areas of contention within strategic culture; in relation to the important task of identifying the pertinent strategic beliefs and corroborating their existence; in connection with the difference between culture and policy in reference to the extent to which strategic culture influences or determines actual strategic outcomes; and finally, in regard to the impact of change on strategic culture. Answering these questions depends very much on the preferred methodological approach that the analyst is using and the way that s/he perceives the way that culture and strategy interact. Colin Gray asserted that this interaction is a holistic one in which all things strategic have cultural origins and thus “everything a security community does, if not a manifestation of strategic culture, is at least an example of behaviour affected by culturally shaped, or encultured, people, organizations, procedures, and weapons” (Gray 1999b: 52). Hence, according to Gray, there was a two-way relation between culture and state action, with both causing and determining it. His approach classified strategic culture as part of the ideas about war and strategy. The context of these ideas was to be found in perceptions affected by physical and political geography, by political or religious philosophies and finally by familiarity with, and preference for, particular military technologies (Gray 1999b: 52). Gray saw a cultural dimension to all that human beings think and feel about war and strategy and accordingly claimed that strategic culture was “not only ‘out there’, also it is
within us; we, our institutions, and our behaviour, are the context” (Gray 1999b: 53). In his words, “Culture is the context that ‘surrounds’ and the context that ‘weaves together’” (Gray 1999b: 59).

His archrival in this debate Alastair Johnston maintained a completely different approach to the issue. He purported that “cultural patterns and behaviours are not the same thing” (Johnston 1995b: 45). He maintained that if strategy could not fail, but be cultural, then non-cultural or material variables could have no meaning outside of the cultures that condition them. Hence a tautology is inevitable: everything cultural does matter and cannot be disconnected from anything else (Poore 2003: 282). In order to avoid this tautology Johnston suggested that while culture was clearly circuitous (acting both as a stimulant and as an outcome), when approaching the required linearity between preference formation and policy outcome, culture could be limited in its capacity to inform interests and policy, and excluded from the effects of the policy decision itself upon subsequent cultural developments (Johnston 1995a: 38).

His understanding of strategic culture included both cultural and non-cultural variables that interacted to produce a set of limiting options, or else, a set of ‘ranked preferences’ for action conveying individual or group conceptions of their relationship to their socio-political or organisation environment. Within this context strategic culture for Johnston might “exist but may not have any measurable effect” (Johnston 1995b: 55).

In a more conciliatory note Theo Farrell purported that each approach had its uses. Gray’s all-encompassing concept of strategic culture was useful for considering the cultural context of state action. However, if one wished to explore culture as a cause of state action then Johnston was quite right in arguing for a narrower conceptualization, which allowed for consideration of rival, non-cultural causal variables, and which avoided being deterministic by excluding behaviour (Farrell 1998: 408).
The impact of change on strategic culture has been a recurrent theme in many writers’ endeavours. Most would agree that change is slow but inevitable nevertheless. Cultural theorists closer to the first generation of theory analysed strategic culture by identifying a cultural trait and establishing it as a timeless constant. In reality, strategic culture, much like the broader concept of culture, is in a continual state of self-evaluation vis-à-vis external realities, as well as changes within society. It is far more likely that strategic culture will change abruptly, faster and to a greater extent in periods of turmoil and self-criticism by society, or through elite debates. A characteristic example of such a process is described in Kier’s work on French doctrinal change in the interwar period (Kier 1995). As Berger noted, “simple instructional beliefs can be discarded easily” but “more abstract or emotionally laden beliefs and values that make up the core of culture are more resistant to change” (Berger 1996: 326). So how does this average take on the attributes of semi-permanence as Snyder observed? The scholars of the third generation tried to answer this question by introducing elements of organizational culture in the study of strategic culture. For example, Elizabeth Kier described the significance of organizational culture in the development of French military doctrine (Kier 1995). Stephen Rosen provided a compelling account of the ways in which the military and organizational cultures in India have shaped strategy over time (Rosen 1996). What most scholars seem to agree on is that strategic culture consists of a behavioural factor that can be traced in actual policy conduct and a more subtle cultural factor that includes common and stated expressions of ideas, expectations, values and attitudes (Martinsen 2003: 4). On the issue that “practice and discourse constitute culture” (Neumann and Heikka 2005: 71), the real question is how discourse affects practice and vice versa. By answering this question we can trace which of the two is the foundation that strategic culture is based upon. Whichever the degree of interaction between the two, it is the author’s belief that practice and policy are a more solid starting point of enquiry than discourse. As concrete manifestations of political
will they constitute a much better testing area than discourse on an issue like culture. While policy and practice can be evaluated against set benchmarks, discourse, as a collection of ideational constructs, remains very difficult to test.

Another issue that it is even more relevant to this thesis is the fact that the vast majority of the current literature on the concept of strategic culture is focused on the nation-state without making regional or cross-regional comparisons or paying much attention to heterogeneous actors such as the European Union. The first who identified this caveat in the literature was Desmond Ball in 1993 (Ball 1993). Ball focused on the Asia-Pacific area as a whole, rather than on individual states within the region. His premise was that despite the various national differences amongst the nations of this part of the world there was still space for the existence of broad regional traits. A few years prior to Ball, Bradley Klein in his paper on strategic culture and hegemony (Klein 1988) tried to link US strategic culture with that of NATO under a neo-Gramscian framework. The most recent group of studies that have tried to improve on the definitional aspect of strategic culture and advance research frameworks that can be applied at the comparative level can be found in the March 2005 issue of *Cooperation and Conflict*. In their study on the Nordic region the authors approached strategic culture as a “*transnationally nested dynamic interplay between grand strategic discourse and strategic practice*” (Neumann and Heikka 2005: 18). This volume represents a noteworthy collaborative effort between the states of the Nordic Region. The analysis reaffirmed many traditionally associated sources of strategic culture for the region, but, most importantly, it managed to trace their change through the period after the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks. One of the reasons behind this relatively limited production of comparative studies can be found in the sheer complexity of such endeavours as the frames of reference for each case study may be different, i.e. the analyses may be comparing different actors.
Another reason relates to a problem common to regional analyses in general, namely according to which parameters will the region be defined for the purposes of study? There are various ways to address this problem ranging from defining a region by geography, by cultural affinity, by institutional arrangement, to defining it by security block (Buzan and Waever 2003). Determining which states are to be included has affected security and arms control dialogues in the past and has also affected regional and cross regional analyses of strategic culture. The study of the European strategic culture has evaded this complexity since by definition it deals with a specific group of nations confined within a region (i.e. the European Continent) and under a specific institutional structure (i.e. the European Union).

**Conclusion**

Bearing the above discussion in mind, the analytical framework used in this thesis claims neither to provide nor to be based upon a cause and effect theoretical approach. The approach used in this thesis is set on avoiding the temptation of drawing deterministic linkages between strategic culture and behaviour. It will be shown that synthesis and not antithesis is the best way of achieving this goal. It has been argued that there is “no one methodology for cultural studies” (Jepperson and Swidler 1994: 368). As Gray rightly observed, the empirical and theoretical scholarship currently available on strategic culture is so limited that we would probably be best advised to look more for complementarities of approach, than to try and elect one or another view as the methodological winner (Gray 1999b; Johnston 1995b). While this approach might appear to compromise scientific validity, I maintain that it is still a valid academic endeavour and a worthy avenue by way of which to enrich our understanding of the workings of international relations and in particular European studies. In the next chapter we will try to adjust the theory on strategic culture as it has evolved during the last years to the special case of the EU and its special attributes. Issues like referent group, roots, methods and what strategic culture is meant to explain will be dealt
with. Through this analysis we will try to answer crucial questions on the way that the European Union currently functions as a strategic actor and in the way that it envisages itself in the future.
In the previous chapter I laid out the theoretical foundations of the concept of strategic culture, as it has evolved through the recent scholarship discourse. In this I have clarified some of the major questions regarding the concept in relation to its roots, the referent group that I will focus on in my research and the method that I am going to follow. With these in hand I can now turn my attention to the major subject of my thesis, which is European strategic culture, how it has been treated in the current literature and what special qualitative characteristics it possesses. A general approach to the study of the emergence of a European strategic culture presents major dilemmas. First, the EU is not a clearly defined actor in terms of security policy-making; it is not a state in the Westphalian sense. In addition, the study of the feasibility of a homogenous European strategic culture should aim to address the fact that the EU and the institutional underpinnings of ESDP are based on a clash of intergovernmental and federal pursuits. In this chapter, I will revisit the concept of strategic culture and I will lay down the theoretical foundations for my approach to the EU strategic culture. Along these lines, I will pursue my study based on a modified framework provided by Booth and Macmillan and I will try to explore the different strands of strategic culture that can be extrapolated from its application to the EU. I will also attempt to assess the effect that specific parameters, such as geography, history and political structures, have on the development of a common European strategic culture.
Strategic Culture Revisited

Definition of strategic culture

Strategic culture cannot be defined exclusively by a constant set of attributes and characteristics. By nature, it is a vague and inclusive term. It is not a coincidence that there are more than 100 definitions for the word ‘culture’ (Booth 1979). In broad terms, culture has been defined as everything that characterizes us as human beings, including all of our thought processes at their deepest level. It can be very difficult to distinguish its components parts from the broader concept [i.e. what makes up (a) culture] and at the same time it is very resistant to change. Similarly, most definitions of strategic culture are nebulous and rather broad by including references to beliefs, ideas, attitudes, world-views, collective memories as well as practices, habits, traditions, or patterns of behavior. (Johnston 1995a; Gray 1999b; Martinsen 2004; Heiselberg 2003; Longhurst 2004). The conceptual disadvantages of a broad definition of strategic culture can be overcome by focusing on specific and precise outcomes as possible components of culture. As such, we must avoid over-determining outcomes along the lines of national essentialism. After having examined several different definitions of strategic culture put forward not only by Gray (Gray 1999b) and Johnston (Johnston 1995a), but also by Longhurst (Longhurst 2000) and Meyer (Meyer 2005), for the purposes of this thesis I decided to adopt the definition developed and endorsed by the two-year project undertaken by the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the Defence Threat Reduction Agency of the United States Department of Defence. The resulting conference defined strategic culture as:

“shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written) that shape collective
identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives”.

The distinguishing merits of this definition are twofold. Firstly, the concept of strategic culture encapsulates the domestic sources of the motivation behind asserting security objectives much better than either traditional realist theories of international relations or more recent constructivist theories. Secondly, this definition acknowledges equally that strategic culture is a product of a range of circumstances such as geography, history and narratives that shape collective identity, as well as one that has a role in both enabling and constraining decisions about security and, by extension, the use of force.

**The function of strategic culture - the relationship between culture and behaviour**

For the purpose of our research, we will treat strategic culture as the context of behaviour rather than the cause. The reason for such an approach is that we cannot claim positively that a common European strategic culture existed before the initiation of ESDP. Neither can we claim that strategic culture has affected the behaviour of the EU in the fields of Foreign and Security policy after the initiation of EDSP in 1998. By allowing strategic culture to work as a context we allow for the existence of other reasons and motives to justify actions taken. Strategic culture cannot be studied as the cause of actions of the EU unless a significant amount of time has intervened between events and their examination. Only chronological distance would allow us to distinguish clearly the elements of a common European strategic culture and their influence on European beliefs and actions.

The concept of strategic culture should not be considered a comprehensive explanation of a nation's strategy. It defines policy boundaries and assumptions but may not always determine concrete policy choices. The examination of strategic culture is simply another tool that may

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5 For more details on the results of the conference see also [http://www.dtra.mil/ASCO/comparativestrategiccultures.cfm](http://www.dtra.mil/ASCO/comparativestrategiccultures.cfm)
be of assistance in understanding national strategies, which can be very complex. As such, they require examination from multiple, diverse perspectives if one hopes to achieve a deeper understanding. Strategic culture influences policy choices and defines appropriate or responsible behaviour for promoting national security. A strategic culture is the product of distinctive national experiences and the unique characteristics of a state or a group of states. It is entrenched within a security community through processes of socialization and institutionalization. Strategic cultures, however, are subject to change, albeit a slow one, that comes as a consequence of historical experience and in response to changing international conditions, wars, crises and other formative events.

Strategic culture can be considered an additional tool to the realist perspective as it provides a different insight on state behaviour. Realism, with its emphasis on state interests and state relative power, cannot always give adequate explanations for state behaviour. Strategic culture, on the other hand, provides a rounder perspective in this respect because apart from material factors it includes historical experiences and cultural traits that are not effectively represented in the realist paradigm. Even Desch, a critic of the concept of strategic culture, contends that cultural theories might supplement neo-realism in several ways: by providing a base upon which to explain time lags between structural change and alterations in state behaviour, by accounting for seemingly ‘irrational’ state behaviour and by justifying state actions in “structurally indeterminate situations” (Desch 1998: 166). Concerning the latter, Desch writes that structure tends to establish parameters; actual outcomes are sometimes determined by other factors. This makes the competition between cultural and rationalist theories less sweeping but also more intense. In structurally indeterminate environments, culturalist and rationalist theories often make similar predictions about state behaviour and
international outcomes. Thus, the crucial cases for deciding between them will be in structurally determinate environments (Desch 2005: 31)

A reasonable question that stems from the above is what the study of “strategic culture” and more specifically of European strategic culture can hope to add to the discourse. The first point would be that strategic culture applies a security lens on the aforementioned study. It points researchers to a specific task, and correlates data in a way particularly useful to foreign policy. Second, strategic culture fills a gap in international relations theory. It assumes that most actors are likely rational, but insists that rationality must be understood within a cultural context. It explores the ways in which agents within national populations, political administrations and security related institutions are, to use the more common phrase, “rationally bounded” in their decision-making (Johnson 2006).

Referent group
One of the most contested issues in strategic culture literature is that of the referent group; in other words who produces and who consumes strategic culture in a state. Many of the contributions on the issue focus mainly on the defence decision-making elite of a state or, as is otherwise known, its “national strategic community” (Snyder 1977: 8). Others, like Yitzhak Klein, pinpoint to the military establishment as the sole bearer of strategic culture (Klein 1991: 14). Nevertheless, such narrow viewpoints are offset by the vast majority of writers who focus on a broader group, that of the political and military leadership of a state. Very few of them mention public opinion or the beliefs of the masses as having anything to do with strategic culture. Desmond Ball addresses the issue only in very general terms when he included in his analysis, alongside state decision-making groups, cultural beliefs shared by the Indian population (Ball 1993: 46). Bradley Klein for his part and in the context of his Gramscian analysis refers to the peace movements as holders of a different strategic culture
than those in the governing seats (Klein 1988: 143-146). Despite these small variances the
main bulk of the literature considers the state decision-makers to be the principal referent
group in the study of strategic culture.

The way that a state responds to the various challenges it faces equals to the way that it’s
governing elite responds. A state is an abstract construct; it is the people that comprise it that
define it. When it comes to the formation of the strategic policy of a nation, however, while
individuals play a crucial role, it is rather a combination of individual and organizational
cultures that defines it at the end. The final response to crises lays with who will be the
winner in the turf war between individuals and the standing organizations able to influence
decisions. There are plenty of examples in history that can demonstrate how a nation’s
response can be dependent on a single individual who goes against the predominant way of
thinking. Kennedy in the Cuban Missile crisis is a brilliant example of how an individual was
capable of imposing his will against the overriding consensus of the establishment, (in his
case against the pressures of the military establishment) (John W. Young and John Kent
2004: 238). However, most scholars prefer descriptions of political and strategic cultures as
the “property of collectivities rather than simply of individuals that constitute them” (Duffield 1998: 23).

When we speak therefore about a nation’s strategic culture we cannot but refer to a weighted
average of the different individual cultures of those that constitute the ruling elite. This
average is the one that persists in time, and is not considerably affected by the death or
replacement of its members. An important point to be made here is the fact that the
existence of an overarching strategic culture within a state does not interdict the possibility of
the existence of different sub-cultures underneath it. What is more, we can have overlapping
and converging strategic cultures from different states whose elites share common
experiences and socialization.
The issue of subcultures within a state is an issue contested by many strategic culture studies. Snyder, in his seminal report of 1977, underlined the importance of subcultures by discussing two things in the context of the Cold War: whether subcultures could be identified and how were they grouped around one or other of the poles in the deterrence or war-fighting debate, both in the USA and the USSR (Snyder 1977: 10-12). There are two questions that follow from such a treatment, namely what constitutes a subculture and where are these subcultures based. The most obvious answer to these is that subcultures may result from the positions that people hold and with which sub-group they identify themselves. Soldiers, bureaucrats and politicians are all subject to a particular kind of socialization according to their status. It follows from that that they hold different outlooks on life and politics. To assume, therefore, that strategic culture is something homogenous and cohesive for a state is simplistic. There are many different cultures within a state. What matters is which one, or which combination of subcultures, is prevalent at any given time. A more radical angle on a state’s strategic culture is the assertion that leaders are strategic “users of culture” and that they “redefine the limits of the possible” in key foreign and security policy discourses.\footnote{Further on the strategic “use of culture” see (Swidler 1986)} We observe once more that what matters and what creates the strategic culture of a state is the weighted averaged of these subcultures. The referent group therefore for this study can be none other than the political and military elite of the EU, particularly that segment which is directly involved with the strategic and foreign policy decision-making, i.e those individuals that are part of the PSC, the EUMS, the EUMC, the High Representative for CFSP, the parts of the Directories and the Commission involved in foreign policy issues and finally all those that are involved in the actual policy making and the day to day running of it. Insofar as this decision-making elite is a culture bearing unit, (given that its members have ostensibly been socialized in the culture of the EU and more specifically that of
Brussels) and one which is limited in number, it is possible to identify its preferences, especially when those preferences are more often than not to be found explicitly stated in the official documents it produces.

**Perseverance or Change?**

Another very important issue regarding the concept of strategic culture is that of its perseverance in time. Does strategic culture change over time? And if it does what are the processes that affect it? Eckstein (Eckstein 1988: 796) suggested that the socialization of values and beliefs occurs over time. Past learning becomes transfused in the collective consciousness and is relatively resilient to change. Lessons of the past, therefore, serve as a tight filter for any future learning that might occur. Older studies on strategic culture tended to focus more on continuity rather than on change. Writers, such as Gray and Bradley Klein, made the prediction that the strategic culture of the USSR and of the USA respectively would remain unchanged at least “for as far into the future as can be claimed contemporarily relevant” (Gray 1988: 1). Nevertheless, more recent studies on the issue stress the possibility of change over time (Berger 1996: ; Longhurst 2004: ; Meyer 2005). Their argument rests on the condition that if one accepts that historical memory, political institutions and multilateral commitments have the ability to shape strategic culture, then it would seem logical to accept equally that foreign policies around the globe change. In support of this argument the authors drew on studies both on foreign policy restructuring and on constructivist ideas that viewed foreign policy as a discourse (Meyer 2005).

As to the reasons why strategic culture changes opinions are diverse. On the one hand, Jeffrey Landis (Landis 2005: 8) offers two main reasons for change. First, he proposes that external shocks may fundamentally challenge existing beliefs and undermine past historical narratives. Secondly, he argues that foreign policy behaviour may break the traditional
bounds of strategic culture orientations when primary tenets of strategic thought come into
direct conflict with each other. Christopher Meyer, on the other hand, proposes three
learning mechanisms for change. Based on a constructivist framework he postulates that
strategic culture is transformed in sync with changing threat perceptions, through institutions
and the socialisation process that takes place there, and finally by dealing with crises which
function as an impetus to social learning (Meyer 2005: 532-543).

Most scholars agree that any process of change would not be easy. Potential catalysts for
change, Duffield asserts, might be “dramatic events or traumatic experiences [such as revolutions, wars,
economic catastrophes]” that would “discredit thoroughly core beliefs and values” (Duffield 1998: 23).
More specifically, Berger argued that change of beliefs is neither quick nor easy. The speed
and smoothness of transition depend upon those elements of culture that are subjected to it.
Simple, i.e. instrumental beliefs, are easier to change while more abstract or emotionally laden
beliefs are more resistant (Berger 1996: 326).

Going back to the questions we posed in the beginning of this section, one can conclude,
therefore, that strategic cultures exhibit a generally slow capacity for change. In this light they
appear to persevere unaltered through the passage of time. This is just a perception however.
Lack of speed is not equivalent to inertia. Ideas, discourses, norms and the influence of new
generations play a significant role. It is by placing emphasis on these factors that we may
further our understanding of the processes that induce change in strategic cultures (Howlett

**European Strategic Culture**
The EU is a hybrid political unit consisting of a group of different independent states. At the
same time it is an institution that has the authority, under conditions, to speak in the name of
all its constituent parts. Hence, a delicate balance has to be preserved between the centre of
the Union and the centrifugal forces of the different states. When one examines the EU as a whole, one has to take into consideration both of these elements. The duality that the EU represents can, at some instances, be beneficial, particularly as a way of smoothing differences between states. Simultaneously however, it can present a serious obstacle to the formulation of common policies due to the reality of different national interests. Any examination for the existence of a common strategic culture in the EU has to address this problem. Another important parameter for consideration is that national strategic culture in itself cannot be viewed as a fixed notion stemming from only one source. Every nation-state is represented by different actors that affect the end manifestation of strategic culture to the rest of the world. The difficulty in distinguishing the degree of influence of each different actor creates a fundamental problem in the study of strategic culture. Hence in our analysis we will not include the input of different EU actors, such as the EU Military Staff or the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Rather, we will try to explore as much as possible the objective determinants for the creation of a common EU strategic culture. European strategic culture is an amalgamation of European communautaire strategic culture, added to which are the values and interests of its constituent countries. Consequently, an examination of European strategic culture should include both the Brussels-based strategic culture and the pattern of behaviours that can be observed at the national level. Due to the increasing institutionalisation of the ESDP in the past five years (2000-2005), Brussels has moved towards a convergence of views at the level of civil servants and military staff. This has unmistakably led to the creation of a distinct Brussels strategic culture (author’s interview with EUMS staff 2004) frequently different from what exists in the separate EU capitals. The fact that the EU is in many respects a different political entity than any of its component parts can lead us to expect that some of the features of its strategic culture could be different as well. A successful European strategic culture would need to capture and draw upon those
norms, ideas and practices regarding security and defence policy and the legitimate use of force that are similar in most of the member states. In other words, a European strategic culture need not be viewed as replacing national strategic cultures. It should primarily be conceived as the increasing institutionalisation, of those ideas, norms and values that are sufficiently shared at the national level (Meyer 2004: 6) in a pan-European level.

The concept of a common European strategic culture is a relatively new one and the literature is understandably limited. That which exists, however, is divided largely into two categories. The first includes those who postulate that a common European strategic culture is a possibility and in fact already exists in various degrees and forms, and the second those who consider it implausible. In the first, more optimistic, category we find writers such as Cornish and Edwards (Cornish and Edwards 2001; 2005), Christoph O. Meyer (Meyer 2004; 2005), Per M. Martinsen (Martinsen 2003), Adrian Hyde-Price (Hyde-Price 2004b) and Janne Haaland Matlary (Matlary 2006). On the opposite pole of the debate, we find contributions by Julian Lidley-French (Lindley-French 2002), Simon Duke (Duke 2002), Sten Rynning (Rynning 2003) and Stine Heiselberg (Heiselberg 2003). In their contribution to the debate, Cornish and Edwards provide a thorough historical review of events connected with the EU-NATO relationship (Cornish and Edwards 2001) and with the evolution of ESDP (Cornish and Edwards 2005). Significantly however, they fail to provide an elaborate theoretical framework. They define strategic culture simply as “the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments” (Cornish and Edwards 2001: 587). In their analysis they attach great significance to Solana’s move from NATO to the European Union in 1999, arguing that it contributed to bridge the gap between the two organisations and gave the European Union a key leader with experience in military matters (Cornish and Edwards 2001: 591). Going even further,
Martinsen commented on the importance of Solana since his arrival in the European Union by crediting him with “mould[ing] a strategic culture according to his own logic” (Martinsen 2004: 66). In addition, Cornish and Edwards were amongst the first to highlight the importance of the Kosovo war as a formative experience for the Union in its effort to develop a common strategic culture. Heiselberg, on her interpretation of the events during and after the Kosovo war, identified elements of a common culture in the reaction of all member states against “European and Western values being violated.” Her observations are all the more interesting since this reaction did not have its origins in the breach of any major national interests (Heiselberg 2003: 11, 13, 35). Her argument continues, however, by contending that in matters of defence and security EU member states have little in common except the belief that “war should be avoided, and the European values should be defended”. In her study she considers evidence from three different cases – ‘activist’ Britain, ‘pacifist’ Sweden, and ‘defensive’ Germany – and she predicts that even when all EU members agree that “values are being violated” their own national strategic cultures will make it difficult to agree to a common response (Heiselberg 2003). Following a similar typology but slightly changing the groups, (he included France with Britain and isolated Germany to a group of its own) Martinsen draws similar conclusions (Martinsen 2004: 64). In opposition to the above, Lindley-French postulates that the EU lacks both the capabilities and the will to establish a common foreign and security policy in the near future. He describes contemporary Europe as “not so much an architecture as a decaying arcade of stately structures of varying designs reflective of a bygone era” (Lindley-French 2002: 789). In an even more pessimistic tone, Rynning argues that the EU does not have the capacity to become a ‘liberal power.’ Instead it remains driven to unconstrained coalitions by the greatest powers (Rynning 2003: 494). He adds that the EU has negligible chances of developing a coherent and strong strategic culture in the near future (Rynning 2003: 479).
Compared to the rest of the literature, the work of Meyer (Meyer 2004; 2005; 2006) stands alone in that it provides the most robust theoretical framework of them all, which he based on constructivism. He focuses on four types of norms that are relevant to the use of force. The norms he proposes are: a) goals for the use of force, b) the way in which force is used, c) the preferred mode of cooperation and d) the threshold for domestic and international authorization. He argues that some of these norms may be more prone to change and more widely shared across territorially-bound security communities than commonly assumed (Meyer 2005: 524). Meyer finally asserts that the current European strategic culture revolves around three areas: respect to international authorization, preferred mode of cooperation and goals for the use of force (Meyer 2005: 524). His approach does not differ greatly from the one we have outlined earlier in this thesis. In effect the main difference is the importance we place to the outward orientation of EU policies. Meyer stresses that the process of convergence between the different national actors-members of the EU is limited and protracted. The challenges to the emergence of a genuinely trans-EU strategic culture remain strong but nonetheless, he concludes, there are clear, if limited and dawdling, signs of convergence to be detected. Matlary on her part (Matlary 2006) argues that the EU strategic culture, which is at best at an embryonic stage, should be based on the concept of human security. Her argument rests on the basis that there are strong incentives by governments to ‘pool’ sovereignty in the security and defence field. It follows the logic of a two-level game theory. Keeping in mind that EU institutions themselves are developing at present both political and military capacities (Matlary 2006: 107).

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7 The two-level games theory model was introduced by Putnam (1988) (Putnam 1988). Its initial concern was to illuminate episodes in the international arena that could not be explained either by domestic or by international analysis alone. Focusing on one of the two planes of analysis would involve missing out on a good part of the overall picture. Putnam proposed to supplant what he called “partial equilibrium” analyses by “general equilibrium” theories. As opposed to the former, the latter recognized that strategic decisions were taken on the basis of a combined consideration and attempt to reconciliation of both domestic and international imperatives.
Efforts made to codify research on strategic culture (Booth and Trood 1999) are better suited for individual states rather than international actors like the EU. The European Union cannot be considered one state as long as individual sovereignty of member states is maintained and as long as each of them has the power to veto or even to opt out of any decision regarding foreign affairs and national security issues. On condition that member states are not ready to fully submit their national security to the centralized power of a single European security agency, the study of common strategic culture is compromised. Furthermore, even the minimal consensus on security issues that emerged after the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties and the St-Malo Summit cannot be safely and critically evaluated in terms of producing a common strategic culture. Too little time has passed since these agreements took place for their outcomes to affect to any observable degree the individual strategic cultures of member states, let alone to foster a common strategic culture that is consistent and identifiable throughout the Union’s actual actions and policies. A further obstacle in the study of the European Union’s strategic culture is the fact that the Union has not been involved in actual fighting nor has it been as yet faced with decisions involving the declaration of war or the actual use of force on a large scale. The European Union has purposefully confined itself to the Petersberg tasks, which do not include any references to actual territorial defence, leaving that whole area of responsibility in the hands of NATO. The aforementioned obstacle denies us the possibility of actually testing Europe’s responses in issues involving the use of force in a foreseeable time horizon. Added to that drawback is, what one could call, the bias of the Iraq War. This basically describes the fact that recent literature devoted to the development of a common strategic culture has been written under the shadow of the Iraq debacle. As a result, opinions offered are heavily coloured by the debates that ensued regarding the European response.

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In order to proceed in our analysis of a possible EU strategic culture we will be using a modified framework originally proposed by Macmillan and Booth in *Strategic Culture in the Asia Pacific* (Macmillan and Booth 1999). In order to provide a solid base for a regional comparative study Macmillan and Booth presented the contributors of their edited book with a framework for analysis. This framework, which was introduced in chapter II, represented a comprehensive approach to strategic culture, asking contributors to contemplate on the sources of strategic culture. In accordance to the Macmillan-Booth framework the focus of the present study will be divided into three broad categories. First, we will address the issue of geography and resources and discuss their effect, if any, on European Union strategic culture. The second source that will be examined is the historical experience of the Union. When studying history as a source of strategic culture one has to be aware of the very different historical backgrounds that member states come from. Even the oldest members of the EU that have shared experiences in the 50-odd year effort of European convergence do not partake in the same understanding of their historical past as a union of states. Needless to say, that those that have only recently been included have no appreciation of a common history whatsoever. In this respect, it is very important to ask the right questions on the issue of history. Attention should be placed on historical events that can largely be considered to have a pan-European effect and that have affected the way the European Union thinks about itself in a collective way. Particular events that have taken place during the last fifty years of the Union’s existence should be addressed with the stipulation that the discussion does not get dragged into debates that tap on specific national sensitivities. Such examples are inter alia the contested issues between the Hellenic Republic and the FYROM, France and its ambivalent relationship with the US and Germany vis-à-vis Poland. The next source of strategic culture according to Macmillan and Booth is the political structure and the defence organisation of the state in question. In the case of the EU
extra care should be taken to avoid the influence of national political structures and defence organisations into those of the Union. Of course, one has to bear in mind the inevitability of these being transfused in various degrees to EU structures and organisations but the focus should be on how the EU is performing in these areas. Our analysis will focus only on those, admittedly few, years that these structures have existed in the Union. It is a fact that organizational culture and homogenisation of mentalities take time to be effected but some traits can be studied and can offer some foresight into the future. Another important element of the study of a state’s strategic culture and in our particular case of the EU, which falls under the third category of sources, is how particular beliefs evolve from the sources we have already outlined. In this respect, the existence of strong and distinctive beliefs about the use of force and its potency as a tool in international relations should be examined. These can be divided into core and secondary beliefs. The core beliefs concern the philosophical nature of war and history, the role that the Union aspires for itself and how it envisages the nature of security. All are issues that deserve further clarification. The secondary beliefs can be found at a peripheral level. They are less firmly held than the core beliefs; more open to question and examination and more closely linked to actual behaviour. They concern to a larger extent specific policy areas. As secondary beliefs Macmillan and Booth classify issues regarding the value of alliances, the way that crises are treated, the role of technology in the decision-making process, the value of international institutions in the international arena, power projection and the tradition of intervention in other countries, and finally the level of defence spending in periods of peace. Lastly, Macmillan and Booth propose (Macmillan and Booth 1999: 367) that the contemporary strategic beliefs of the state should be examined. These beliefs are concentrated mainly in the way that doctrine is connected to the core beliefs of that state. Therefore, it is pertinent to discuss the issues revolving around the nuclear and conventional strategy of the Union.
Of course, one must not lose sight of the fact that the particular case study of the European Union, especially during the years that the ESDP is active, presents certain peculiarities. First of all, there is no European army and second, a central administration of the nuclear weapons based on European soil and managed by the collectivity of member states does not exist. To be more specific, only France and the UK possess nuclear weapons and the European Union has no command over them. However, even if it did its strategy for using them would be very similar to that of their current owners. Moving on to the area of conventional war fighting, under the premise that the EU will be capable of conducting war fighting operations, we can project the doctrinal advances of the most sophisticated military nations in the Union to the level of a possible future European army.

The Macmillan-Booth framework has been chosen because it provides the researcher with a typified analytical tool that is not restrictive in its application and can be of invaluable help in structuring further research of this kind. By offering a standardized template of all parameters that might play a role in the cultivation of strategic culture, this framework narrows down the most significant amongst the innumerable characteristics of a state or a group of states, that can appear at first sight relevant to the study of strategic culture. The list of course is neither exhaustive nor restrictive, which is an added advantage of the framework. The researcher can pick and choose what parts of the list are relevant to his/her subject of study without compromising academic validity or missing important clues. These attributes are even more important when one studies the EU, given its unique characteristics as a hybrid between a state and an organization.
Sources of European Strategic Culture

Geography and resources

The natural borders of the EU are the Mediterranean on the South, the Atlantic on the West, the Northern Sea and the plains of Ukraine and Belarus on the East. Having defined the physical borders of the EU, it is clear that at least in theory any danger of invasion would come from the East, the traditional path of all extra-European invaders throughout the centuries. In addition, these borders indicate that the EU is territorially very close to areas of increased instability; a condition that will be aggravated in time as the quantities of available hydrocarbons will keep diminishing. It can safely be assumed that an invasion by a third state is not possible in the near future. On the other hand, the presence of a strong EU at the western borders of the Russian Federation might awaken its defensive reflexes. However, at least for the near future we can assume that Russia will be neutralized through increased interdependence in the fields of energy and economics. Overall, threats stemming from the geography of the Union have already been safely dismissed under the new European Union’s Security Strategy (European Council 2003n). Future threats would have nothing to do with actual territorial invasion or anything of this sort. They would consist rather of threats from terrorism and instability in the EU’s periphery. The ‘inner abroad’ would be far more important and unstable in the future than it is today and will constitute a major threat to the stability and prosperity of the EU itself (European Council 2003n).

The development of the EU armed forces will also be naturally affected by geographical factors. The fact that there would be no immediate threat to the EU’s borders and that most of the EU’s interests would be found at the nearest in its inner-abroad and at the farthest in Africa, would suggest that its armies should have a strong expeditionary character rather than being focused on territorial defence. In addition, its navy and air force should be organized in
such a way as to increase the efficiency of such operations. Instead of air and sea battles, the focus of their training should rather be ground support operations.

Strategic resources have always been a major problem for European states. Dependence on foreign resources has made an imprint on individual strategic cultures accordingly. Consequently, the EU’s strategic culture should reflect the need for a guaranteed constant supply of desired materials. However, owing to technology innovations Europeans become better at finding, producing and recycling materials. Diversifying sources of supply and the development of synthetic substitutes and alternative production technologies will continue to weaken the concept of strategic resource dependencies for developed countries. In the event of crisis in a source country, any choke point can now be bypassed. The fundamental interests of EU countries are under little risk from any attack against their trade routes or resources. The only exception to that would be the oil market. Although other sources of supply will eventually become more important, the market is likely to continue to be largely dominated by the Gulf oil-producing countries. Disruptions to Gulf oil supplies due to a short-term crisis could be sidestepped, provided that good relations with alternative suppliers are maintained. In a crisis of longer duration, alternatives would be difficult and prohibitively expensive. Only later in the twenty-first century are alternative energy sources likely to begin to challenge the dominance of hydrocarbons. World reserves of fossil fuels are not expected to run out by 2030, or for some time thereafter, but will become increasingly concentrated geographically (International Energy Agency 2006: 89). The main sources of oil supply will include Russia and Central Asia, Iran and Libya (Gnesotto and Grevi 2006: 63). Gas imports will be covered mainly by Russia, Norway and Algeria. Offshore resources are likely to become a growing source of international dispute and potential conflict, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. In the developing world, there is potential for aggressive competition for
resources as nations seek to industrialize, to cope with population growth and to meet expectations of an improved standard of living. Increasing industrialization, often without effective health and safety or environmental controls, will pose significant hazards both to people and to the environment through accidental or indirect damage. Deliberate damage to the environment may also be used as a strategic tool by adversaries.

It is said that the next regional war will be over water. This statement might seem currently farfetched but the truth remains that ‘blue water’ and other resource shortages may become a cause for tension and conflict. The Middle East and Africa provoke perhaps the greatest concern about water shortage: by 2025, forty countries in the regions are expected to experience water stress or scarcity (UNESCO and WWAP 2003). Resource scarcities and flooding are likely to prompt population migrations, which may place unmanageable burdens on recipient states, many of whose economies are already stressed, whilst inflaming existing ethnic, cultural or religious tensions. Additionally, it is possible that global warming will become an increasing source of tension between industrialized countries, which are seen to be the primary source of the problem, and developing countries, which bear the brunt of the effects. Population-wise, Europe is getting older. Currently 21% of the population of the EU is over 65. This is expected to rise to 34% by the middle of the century (Gnesotto and Grevi 2006: 15). This means that around two-thirds of the population of European countries will not be "economically active" (United Nations 2003). Accordingly, tax revenues will come under pressure, whilst there will be increased demands on health and welfare spending. In particular, most European governments are already faced with pension liabilities, which are projected to rise substantially as a percentage of GDP, making them progressively more difficult to fund from available revenues. One of the possible solutions would be to bring in more resources from outside Europe, as increased trade revenue from finished
goods/services and raw materials. Another solution that has been advocated in order to keep
the support ratio constant (i.e. the ratio of the population aged 15-64 to those aged 65+) is to
allow for increased numbers of immigration workers (Gnesotto and Grevi 2006: 16). Given
the above, an outward-looking strategic culture for the EU is justified when one takes into
consideration its geography and its primary resources. Solana amply described the main
characteristic of this strategic culture in his European Security Strategy: “the first line of defence
will often be abroad” (European Council 2003n: 6).

The few elements of a common strategic culture, that we will show that exist currently in the
EU, are greatly affected by the amount, or better, the lack of specific resources relevant to
the actual implementation of different agendas. The lack of capabilities from the European
Union has been a well documented fact in the relevant literature (Andreani et al. 2001: ;
Courlay 2001: ; Everts et al. 2004: ; Hill 1993: ; Schake 1999). Due to this deficiency the
EU is unable to formulate a credible foreign policy fitting an organization of its aspirations.
For instance, the ability for strategic airlift is currently absent. Until the introduction of the
new A-400 heavy air transporters rectifies this situation, the EU has to rely on the strategic
lift that the US can offer at its discretion under the NATO-EU cooperation schemes (Berlin
Plus Agreement), and on what carriers can be leased from Russia and Ukraine. At sea things
are equally restrained as the European Union lacks the appropriate vessels for a considerable
projection of force beyond the horizon. Further, the EU does not possess any considerable
airplane carrier ability to facilitate operations in hostile environments where the use of land
airports would not be available. The issue of resources available for military operations, as a
whole, is not a novel consideration. It has been a recurring theme in American-European
relations for decades through the renowned ‘burden sharing issue’ (Trainor 1988). The very
fact that Europe is lacking the significant military resources needed for a USA style foreign
policy has given rise to the Venus-Mars debate (Kagan 2002b; 2003). The question that arises so often from this debate forms a circular argument. Does Europe have a more soft power-oriented strategic culture and approach to international affairs because of its weakness in resources or, inversely, is the weakness in resources the result of Europe’s different approach to world affairs? (Kagan 2002b; 2003). The question has yet to be answered satisfactorily. History has plenty of examples that dictate the former to be true and as soon as a state becomes powerful its proclivity towards multilateralism and peaceful solutions dissolves through the aroma of true power (Kennedy 1988). The United States itself presents a prime example of such a change. Early in the last century the lack of significant military strength dictated an isolationist approach, as expressed through the ‘Monroe Doctrine.’ US involvement abroad however, gradually increased relative to its military strength. There is the hope by the international community that such reactions will diminish in the 21st century.

The belief in the power of institutions is something that has characterised the end of the last century. Based on this dichotomy of views we will take the middle road and assume that the European Union, true to its character, will be a hybrid of old and new world powers.

In principle, Europe is as technologically advanced as the USA and perhaps in certain fields even more so. All the while, it does not have the increased American reflexes on the loss of human life and the almost dogmatic belief on the supremacy of the new technologies as war winning tools. These differences could be explained by both historical and factual arguments pertaining to resources. European Union member states employed until recently armies (through NATO) prepared strictly for territorial defence against the superior numbers of the Soviet Bloc. Since the end of the Cold War Europeans have cashed in on the peace dividend

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9 The Monroe Doctrine of December 2, 1823, stated that the United States planned to remain neutral during the wars between European powers and their colonies, whilst at the same time proclaimed US independence from the interference of Europe.
and have greatly reduced their defence spending (at times below the 3% threshold), with the notable exceptions of the Hellenic Republic, the UK and France, each for their own particular reasons. The demilitarization of EU nations inescapably renders unrealistic even the conceptualisation of a more aggressive foreign policy. Rather understandably, the focus is on missions that require minimum military elements under exact timeframes and specific exit strategies (author’s interview with Representative to CIVCOM 2006).

The geography and the resources of the European Union can greatly justify the need to have a strategic culture that would be outward-oriented and based on multilateralism. All the challenges that the Union is facing currently and will potentially be facing in the near future are connected with its physical geography and the resources that it possesses. It is, thus, imperative that the EU keeps an outward-oriented profile. The European Union should be actively interested in the stability of its near-abroad sphere since its own interests can be much affected by any adverse change there. Given the globalized world that has emerged after the end of the Cold War, initiatives backed by single states are very difficult to succeed in the international arena. The European Union as an aggregation of states is largely dependent for its recourses on outside providers such as Russia and the Middle East. In order to be able to maximise its security from outside threats, its buying capacity and its bargaining power vis-à-vis these partners, the best choice presented to the European community is for its constituent states to acknowledge their common ground and to act in cooperation; in other words, to show a distinct preference for multilateral solutions to disputes rather than unilateral ones.

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10 Operation Artemis in DRC was planned to be a one month engagement and was terminated exactly a month after its launch.
History and experience

Europe, the Old Continent, is a geographical space of thousands of years of divergent historical experiences. There are lessons to be taught from each and every one of them. The EU project itself was at its very beginning an effort to transcend recent history and to respond to the destruction caused by World War II. This very fact of historical weight constitutes the core difficulty in order to study the historical course of the Union. Accumulated knowledge of the past plays an important role in the shaping of strategic culture for the constituent members of the EU. The formative years for the EU are the years of WWII, the last time that Europe was engaged in a total war, and its aftermath. These years were traumatic for most EU members. Since then no major military conflict has taken place on European soil, with the exception perhaps of the Yugoslav wars of succession, which in any case were not of a pan-European scale. For one to say that EU states have common historical experiences would be an oversimplification. One must always keep in mind the distinct historical past of each member state. On the one hand, we have nations like the UK and France that emerged victorious from the last generalised war in Europe and both of which were once global empires. On the other, we have countries like Germany and Italy that came out defeated and devastated. In addition, the war experience of some of the member states involved their engagement in places away from the European continent. Examples are France in Indochina in the 1950s and Algiers in the 1960s, Belgium in the Congo in the 1960s and the UK in the Falklands in the early 1980s. The experiences drawn by the different states from these wars varied depending on the nature of the particular conflict and, of course, on its result. For the UK it was made clear that military power was effective and, as such, boosted the self-confidence of an ex world-empire whose prestige had suffered greatly with the loss of its colonies and with events such as the Suez crisis. Conversely, the experience of France’s colonial wars did not do much in enhancing its
prestige. This was inevitable since the extra-European wars that France fought resulted in its humiliating withdrawal and the total loss of its intercontinental territories. Germany, on her part, had no military experience whatsoever post-1945. The reason was that it was self-restrained by its constitution and its foremost consideration was to defend itself from a possible attack from the USSR. At the same time, the countries of the former Eastern bloc are only now beginning to make their individual steps in the world arena after fifty years of political castration by the USSR. Further, the Scandinavian states at large are characterized principally by a distinct approach towards foreign policy, which reflects their loose status in the Nordic Union. Norway and Denmark are both NATO members; Sweden on her part was a principal player in the Movement of the Non-Aligned and became a member of the EU only recently (1995) alongside Finland; Denmark alone participates in both organizations. Finally, we have to take into consideration countries whose own political microhistories do not allow them to be placed comfortably in broad categories. On the one hand, Spain and Portugal have developed an aversion for military intervention that is to be explained by the extensive involvement of their militaries in politics in the past. On the other hand, the Hellenic Republic, even though of a similar political past to that of Spain and Portugal, has a completely different approach to military matters. Its unique approach to the possibility of armed conflict has been shaped by the constant frictions with Turkey. One can conclude from the above that attitudes regarding issues of war and peace in a European context on a state level are heavily dependent on past experience. For that reason they lack uniformity. For some states war, or the threat thereof, remains a useful even if unpleasant, tool of foreign policy, while for others it is not accepted among the modern tools of foreign policy.

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11 The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is an international organisation of states whose members consider themselves not to be in any formal alliance with or against any major political power or power block.

12 The Hellenic Republic's most recent military coup d'état was in 1967 and lasted until 1974.
Efforts to create a common foreign and security European policy can be traced back to the 1950s. During the Cold War such initiatives had little prospects of actually arriving at a concrete end because at that time NATO, and in effect the US, guaranteed European security. The collapse of the Iron Curtain altered that situation. Voices were raised on both sides of the Atlantic calling for an American withdrawal and a more autonomous European security policy. The Franco-German response amidst this climate was to propose a ‘European pillar’ inside NATO. The introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) when the treaty of the European Union came into effect on 1 November 1993 was seen as a step towards this direction (Maastricht treaty 1992). Nevertheless, the reinvigoration of the Western European Union (WEU) for this aim was not as fruitful as it was hoped, since member states failed to expand their defence expenditures or to allow the material development of national or pooled capabilities (Terriff et al. 2001: 1). The development of the Union’s external profile through the development of the CFSP was subject to the willingness of key European states and the Union itself, for varying reasons, to articulate a more comprehensive framework for their external relations in the post-cold war world. This could be achieved by concentrating on the military end of the toolbox of competencies (Deighton 2002: 725). Within the EU at the same time after the Kosovo war, a range of security policies was being developed in the Balkans, supplemented by the wider economic and diplomatic tools of the Union. It was this atmosphere and line of events that produced the Franco-British declaration of St-Malo in December 1998 (Franco-British Summit 1998). The declaration stated that:
“The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role in the international stage. To this end the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible, military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises, acting in conformity with our respective obligations to NATO” (Franco-British Summit 1998).

Perhaps the two most important formulating experiences for the Union in this respect were the Kosovo war and the second Iraq war. Both of these underlined the Union’s inability to control and agree on matters of war and peace.

Events in Yugoslavia during the first half of 1999 highlighted the necessity for greater European cooperation. The Kosovo conflict demonstrated to EU countries that many – though far from all – of their fundamental foreign policy interests were similar. EU governments, supported by a good part of their respective public opinion, were appalled by the ethnic cleansing and turned a worrying eye to the resulting flood of refugees. It was then determined that some form of action should be taken with regard to the policies of Milosevic. EU member governments soon understood that they would be more likely to achieve their objectives if they worked together rather than individually. If all the member states pursued separate and independent policies on how to restore economic and political stability to former Yugoslavia, for instance, their chances of success would be very slim (Heisbourg et al. 2000: 1). Furthermore, the Kosovo conflict demonstrated the serious shortcoming in Western Europe’s ability to undertake a crisis-management-type operation, as the US had to provide around 60% of the aircraft and resources. The lesson learnt by the EU from Kosovo was that if the former had been more effective militarily it would have had more diplomatic clout (Heisbourg et al. 2000: 2). The dramatic events of the ‘wars of Yugoslav succession’ had a major galvanizing effect in respect to common policies. Thus, the
UK appears to have crossed a European Rubicon; France appears to have made peace with NATO and Germany moved towards the relaxation of its aversion to professional militarism and its preference for civil approaches to foreign and security policies (Howorth 2002: 767). Furthermore, the Kosovo war allowed Tony Blair, the UK prime minister, to formulate his moral war doctrine, which was firmly based on the concept that intervention is good, if not necessary, as long as it is humanitarian. In an article in June 1999 in Newsweek, he stated, “We now have a chance to build a new internationalism based on values and the rule of law” (Blair 1999b).

The other formative experience for the European Union in terms of the pooling of military resources was the debate that preceded the second Iraq war in 2003. Europe was divided with tensions rising and creating one of the worst crises inside the Union. The EU did not manage to raise a united voice on the issue apart from some statements of principle that had little to offer to actual events. A series of letters were exchanged during the period preceding the invasion of Iraq. European Union newcomers, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary and Poland aligned with Spain, Portugal, Italy and the United Kingdom together issued the ‘Letter of the Eight’ (José María Aznar et al. 2003), which was published in the European press three days after the European Council of 27 January 2003. The letter called for support for the US cause in Iraq. The second Gulf war and the debate around it clearly demonstrated to the Europeans that they do not have common views on the very basic issue of the use of force, let alone on the cultivation of a common strategic culture. Despite this disagreement European governments did agree on military cooperation under the framework of the Petersberg tasks, which could include the use of force. In its official statements and documents, the European Union had always evangelized a limited use of force and the deployment of economic rather that military weapons in responding to crises. Nevertheless, at the crunch point of the Iraq War crisis and despite the efforts of the Hellenic Presidency at
the time, the EU did not produce a coherent unitary line of policy. The exception was some statements based on the lowest common denominator, urging Iraq to comply with UN resolutions without explicitly threatening with armed violence and which had no real practical use (European Council 2003k: 383). What really mattered at that point were the interests of the different member states and these were deeply divided. The only advantage to be found in the aftermath of this debacle was the realisation by European leaders that the absence of a shared threat assessment, and hence a shared strategic culture, was the key element that defined the dispute over Iraq and the EU approach to security as a whole (Savva 2003).

These two formative experiences, apart from providing the impetus for two major innovations in the European Union (ESDP and ESS), furnished the justification for the re-introduction of the principles of ‘just’ war in public debate. Taking the lead from Tony Blair’s ‘force for good’ (Blair 1999a) the European Union based its involvement in extra-European crises on the premise of humanitarian intervention based on the ‘just’ war tradition.

**Political structure and defence organization**

Since the end of World War II European states have been governed by various gradations of two major political systems, socialism and liberal democracy. Western Europe followed the liberal paradigm, while Eastern Europe was under the influence of the Soviet Union and its political system. The end of this dichotomy came with the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the end of the Cold War. Today, liberal democracy is the norm and in fact, a prerequisite for membership to the EU. In terms of collective defence structures, NATO continues to be the organization of choice. Following its latest enlargement, NATO nowadays covers most of Europe including many of the former Eastern bloc states.
The EU’s military project was formally launched in the 1999 Cologne Council (European Council 1999a), in the midst of NATO’s Kosovo intervention. Javier Solana was confirmed as the new High Representative for the CFSP and set the Union’s military role under the Petersberg Tasks.¹³ Such a breakthrough could not have taken place without the pressures of the Kosovo campaign and without the Anglo-French understanding in the Saint-Malo Summit.

“The European Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises...” (Franco-British Summit 1998).

Core Values and beliefs

The EU member states aspire to develop into a strategic actor with specific and unique values and interests, which have to be protected and projected. In its publication on European Defence: A Proposal for a White Paper (Gnesotto et al. 2004) the European Union Institute for Strategic Studies tries to tabulate these values and interests:

“All EU members have vital interests, beginning with the defence of the Union’s territorial integrity, economic survival and its social and political security. The ‘value interests’ of the Union lie in the promotion of a stable and peaceful environment in its neighbourhood and in the strengthening of the rule-based international order” (Gnesotto et al. 2004: 13).

The European Union is a community firmly based on values such as liberal democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The European Union’s

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¹³ The Petersberg tasks were set out in the Petersberg Declaration and adopted by the WEU during its Ministerial Council in 1992. They took their name from the Hotel Petersberg near Bonn where the Council was convened. In 1997, during the European summit in Amsterdam, the tasks were explicitly incorporated in the Treaty on European Union, (Article 17). They cover a wide range of possible military missions, including a) humanitarian and rescue tasks, b) peacekeeping tasks and c) tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
international face is based on the projection and support of these values and interests. As such, they are incorporated in the Articles 2 and 3.4 of the draft Treaty for the Constitution:

“\textit{The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. These values are common to the Member States in a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination . . . In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and protection of human rights and in particular children’s rights, as well as to strict observance and development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter}” (Inter Governmental Convention 2003: Article 2).

Because of its turbulent past the European Union relies, as a guiding principle, on peaceful means through which to negotiate and settle disputes (Gnesotto et al. 2004: 27). As a consequence, the EU has created a preference to use as a first port of call it’s so-dubbed ‘soft’ power rather than its ‘hard’ power. Conversely, it is argued by many that this preference for ‘soft’ power is not a result of the turbulent past but rather of its inability to muster the appropriate capabilities for such action (Kagan 2002b). Still, the preference for ‘soft’ power is in line with the Union’s attempts over the past decades to cultivate and implement a moral diplomacy. In this, European governments have been at the forefront of the international community in recognising and promoting humanitarian intervention. This practice has been institutionally incorporated in the Petersberg Tasks leading to the Union’s active involvement in various humanitarian crises both in Europe and beyond. Finally, the EU views the UN Charter as the cornerstone of international security and stability. For the Union, the UN Charter should be the essential guide for any peace enforcement and peacekeeping operation.
throughout the world. Overall, international agreements in the context of international institutions are considered the best way of attaining security. Finally, there is a distinct preference on behalf of the EU for the multilateral use of force. A preference that is clearly stated in the European Security Strategy document of 2003:

“In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective” (European Council 2003n: 9).

Intervention therefore cannot be possible unless it has at least the efficacy of a clear ethical or humanitarian goal. Tony Blair articulated an updated *jus in bello* doctrine in April 1999 (Prins 2002: 148-150). Is the International community convinced that a supreme humanitarian emergency is at play? Has diplomacy been exhausted? Will the intervention do more good than harm? Are the involved countries prepared to invest in a long run presence? Is the intervention in the national interest? The last criterion might strike the observer as a bit out of place but Blair justified it by suggesting that responses to human suffering can be in the national interest of a state, thus adding ‘a cosmopolitan’ component to the traditional method of legitimising power (Prins 2002: 151).

In addition, any European government would only be able to sustain political support for intervention if its purposes are perceived as just and legitimate (Hyde-Price 2004a). The European Union therefore aims at utilizing the principles of *jus ad bellum* as these have been
established in that tradition through centuries of intellectual labour amended for its needs, with special emphasis on the humanitarian intervention theme.

The principles of humanitarian intervention are largely derived from the tradition of Just War and have been outlined by Wheeler (Wheeler 2000: 33-36) in his book “Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society”. He purports that these are: having just cause, using force as a last resort, having means proportional to the end, and finally, there should exist a high probability that the use of force will achieve a positive humanitarian outcome. More specifically, the criteria necessary for an intervention to be defined as humanitarian are as follows:

_Just cause._ A state may be justified to intervene in another state only for the right reason, i.e. only in the case of an extreme humanitarian emergency. The ‘just’ causes most frequently put forward include: the protection of innocents from brutal, aggressive regimes and punishment for a grievous wrongdoing which remains uncorrected, or cases that the external intervention is the only hope of saving lives.

_Right intention._ A state must intend to fight the war only for the sake of its just cause. Having the right reason for initiating an intervention is not enough: the actual motivation behind it must also be morally appropriate. Ulterior motives, such as a power or land grab, or irrational motives, such as revenge or ethnic hatred, are ruled out. The only right intention allowed is in order to see the just cause for resorting to the intervention secured and consolidated. If another intention is present, moral corruption sets in.

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14 See more on just war principles in: (Wills 2004), (Walzer 2006), (Orend 2006)
Last Resort. A state may resort to the act of intervention only if it has exhausted all plausible, peaceful alternatives to resolving the conflict in question. This refers in particular to diplomatic negotiations.

Proportionality. A state must, prior to resorting to the use of violent means, weigh the universal goods expected to result from it, such as securing the just cause, against the universal evils that it may cause. The latter refers most notably to casualties. Only if the benefits are proportional to, or considered ‘worth’ the costs, may the violent action proceed. (Orend 2000: 525)

Production of a humanitarian outcome. A state may not resort to the use of violent means if it can foresee that doing so will have no measurable impact on the situation. The aim here is to block mass violence whose futility can, to an extent, be anticipated, and which is not foreseen to ameliorate the conditions of the subject state considerably.

An important but rather contested issue in the ‘just cause’ justification for intervention is whether, in order to be justified in intervening, one must wait for the emergency actually to take place, or whether in some instances it is permissible to launch a pre-emptive strike against anticipated emergency. Francisco de Vitoria, the fifteenth century Spanish theologian who fought for the rights of the indigenous Americans versus the Spanish conquistadores and advocated the limits of the concept of just war, argued that one must wait to be provoked before engaging in warfare. It would be absurd to “punish someone for an offense they have yet to commit” (Orend 2005). Others, like Walzer (Walzer 2006), strove to define the exceptional criteria that could account for pre-emptive action by stressing the seriousness of the anticipated aggression; the kind and quality of evidence required; the speed with which one must decide; the issue of fairness and the duty to protect one’s people. If one is aware of imminent danger, one owes it to one’s people to shift from defence to offense. The best
form of defence, as Clausewitz put it, is a good offense. But the problem that creeps in is
that there is a very fine line between being a ‘justified’ aggressor and the perpetrator of
‘unjustifiable’ violence. The UN adamantly forbids pre-emptive strikes unless they are clearly
authorized in advance by the UN Security Council. The presiding US foreign policy over Iraq
and the inclusion of preemptive warfare in its National Security Strategy have highlighted the
debate. The U.S. currently enjoys, according to its National Security Strategy, the right to
strike first as part of its war on terror. The EU itself faced the same dilemmas, the changing
attitudes towards which can be followed in the evolution of ESS drafts. The word “pre-
emption” was included on the initial draft, later to be dropped, under German pressures, in
favour of the term “prevention” (Meyer 2006: 133). And of course the question that
underlies all this debate is who decides what counts as ‘clear evidence’ in such cases (Wheeler
2000: 35).

The possession of right intention is ostensibly less problematic when compared to that of
just cause. The main argument of the concept is that a nation launching a humanitarian
operation should be doing so for the cause of justice and not for reasons of self-interest.
However, it can reasonably be argued that a humanitarian intervention cannot be considered
‘humanitarian’ if the motives behind it are overridden by issues of national interest. All these
qualitative elements in framing what constitute a humanitarian intervention and under what
circumstances it is justified has given ground for many debates. Philosophically, they present
a plethora of problems by either their independent vagueness or by mutually inconsistent
results. Nevertheless, the analysis of these debates is out of the scope of this thesis. For our
purposes we will treat them as ‘useful guidelines.’ In this guise, they are a constructive
starting point for ethical discussions, remain a pressing concern for political leaders and
increasingly form part of state and institutional policies, the EU included.
With the publication of the ESS, the EU has moved towards a holistic approach to security. It does not concentrate only on what is denoted by the traditional definition of the term (military and territorial security). It includes global warming, energy security and various regional crises, as well as, placing at the same time more emphasis on four main threats to European security: terrorism, WMD proliferation, failed states and organized crime (European Council 2003n). In the same vein, the methods prescribed to tackle these threats are all-inclusive, rather than being limited to military tools. The ESS stresses that ‘today’s threats are more dynamic and more complex […] none of the threats is purely military; each requires a mixture of instruments’ (European Council 2003n).

Secondary beliefs and behaviour

It can be argued that many European states have a long-standing trust in the value of contracting alliances. Europe has witnessed in the course of its history many great alliances rise and fall within its geographical confines. The United States of America is a traditional ally of Europe and for almost half a century it has underwritten Europe’s security through NATO. This alliance is not going to change in the near future. However, NATO’s importance is expected to acquire an inverse relation to that of the EU. As the power of the EU increases NATO’s will decrease. It is significant that the EU, as a political aggregation of states, cannot point to a single common or traditional enemy. The EU itself consists of former traditional enemies. Its short history makes the identification of new ones premature at the very least. What the above signifies in effect is that EU member states are not yet aligned in outlook and interests to have common enemies. Overall, the European Union is not considered to have any enemies in the traditional form of territorially bound political entities, i.e. nation-states. Threats against its security take a different form and can originate from within. European nations have a history of having to deal with different terrorist movements that range from pure nationalist ones, such as the IRA in Ireland or ETA in
Spain, to social revolutionary movements such as the Red Brigades in Italy, the Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof) in former West Germany and 17th November in the Hellenic Republic. However, after the 9/11 attacks a new breed of terrorists has taken prime stage. They are terrorists that are involved in religious fundamentalist organisations and are against the West at large. Attacks in London and Madrid have introduced this new era of terrorism to the Old Continent and have raised terrorism to the number one state threat in Europe today.

On a Union level, countries with strong military establishments have traditionally had more influence in decisions concerning matters of defence and security. ESDP was initiated by such states, namely France and the UK. As discussed above, EU states have very different approaches to the use of military force stemming from their different capabilities and attitudes. On account of these differences, it can be inferred that any attempt to identify a singular doctrine for EU military operations would be hindered. Nevertheless, this problem can be bypassed if the UK and France, objectively the two most militarily powerful states, take the lead (Everts et al. 2004: 13). These states, because of their military capabilities, have cultivated a different strategic culture from the rest of the European States. Their doctrines have been developed and tested in real scenarios under dangerous conditions and can provide the seed for a more comprehensive Pan-European Doctrine. At the same time, the tradition of international intervention of several member states is slowly becoming transfused to the European level: “...the first line of defence is often abroad...” (European Council 2003n). Following from this statement in the European Security Strategy document it is evident that power projection has ceased to be the prerogative of France and the UK, whose military power allowed them the threat of physical force during the implementation of their policies in their farthest colonies. The ESS has officially endowed the EU with the same capability.
Traditional concepts of large standing armies have long given way to the modern warfare doctrines that stress quality and professionalism against quantity and conscripts. Military preparedness has been a long-standing problem that the EU needed to address. Under the Headline Goal there has been an effort for “…member states to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military force of up to 60,000 persons…” (European Council 1999b). At the same time, there has been a slow but steady shift towards new technologies that can act as multipliers of force. The only restraint is the enormous cost that is entailed in such purchases. Many European citizens do not consider a high defence budget as necessary for security. Put differently, European citizens are not prepared to sacrifice the welfare state for increased military spending. The debate between guns and butter is still largely shifting towards butter. A huge effort for the consolidation of the European defence industries, resting precisely on these premises, is currently under way (Keohane 2004). This move is considered the only way towards independence in procurement and the best way to take advantage of economies of scale both in production and in the all-important sector of research and development.

The aforementioned beliefs are quite widely shared, at least within the European elites and even more so within those that are based in Brussels (author’s interview with Representative to CIVCOM 2006: ; author’s interview with EUMS staff 2006: ; author’s interview with EUMS staff 2004). Admittedly, there is a level of discrepancy between shared beliefs in Brussels and in the individual capitals (author’s interview with Representative to CIVCOM 2006). One could say that consolidation is one-step ahead in Brussels than in the rest of Europe. This is the result of a process of bureaucratic socialization (Glarbo 1999: 646) which helps to mould a diplomatic and strategic identity for those based in Brussels. EU civil servants considered the Union a largely civilian power with not much space reserved for
military people (author's interview with European Commission staff 2006). This notion resulted in frictions between the two branches, especially after the creation of the European military staff. The appearance, for the first time along EU corridors, of personnel in military uniforms did not leave many heads unturned. Rivalry and suspicion were observed at almost all levels of administration. Added to that was the fact that military operations require a level of security and a certain protocol, which was unknown to the civilian personnel at the time (author's interview with EUMS staff 2006). It was a gradual process before both branches grew accustomed to one another. The introduction of military personnel inside the Union’s headquarters added new instruments to its toolbox. Neither the rules nor the way that these instruments would be used were clear at the beginning—and remain unclear to an extent. It has taken the dominant personality of Javier Solana to even out partially the awkwardness and tensions (author’s interview with Representative to CIVCOM 2006).

The EU style of crisis management differs greatly from the American approach in that political solutions are vastly favored against those that entail the use of force. The Union proves itself committed to exhausting all possibilities for a peaceful and political resolution before it decides on the deployment of ground forces. A telling example of this tendency is the whole debacle over Iraq in 2003. It is debatable whether the increase in the Union’s military options will affect that preference. The only certain outcome from this is the augmentation of the Union’s alternative courses of action at any given time and possibly, as a consequence, a boost of its credibility. Crises have traditionally been the breeding place of innovation for the EU. Even though they can be traumatic events, they can also provide the Union with the impetus to make considerable steps forward that otherwise might not have been attempted (author's interview with Representative to CIVCOM 2006).
Military strategy

The European Union, by virtue of the arsenals of France and the UK, can be considered a nuclear power. Under the assumption of one EU state, both countries would have placed their arsenals under EU control to be used as a deterrent. Even though such an assumption is unrealistic for the time being, the seeds of national nuclear power being at the disposal of the Union have been planted first by the then President of the French Republic Jacques Chirac in his speech to the Institute of Higher National Defence Studies (Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale - IHEDN) on 8 June 2001. He stated that French nuclear power:

"...must also – this is France's wish – contribute to European security. [...] In any event, it is for the President of the Republic to assess, in a given situation, the damage that would be inflicted on our vital interests. This assessment would of course take account of the growing solidarity among the countries of the European Union" (Chirac 2001).

France and the UK and, by extent, the EU are not prepared to view nuclear weapons as the answer to security threats. The Union, through its members, is a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of nuclear weapons, a stance which the EU re-affirmed on 12 December 2003 (European Council 2003e). In addition, on 30 April 2004, the Vice-president of the European Commission, Loyola de Palacio, officially informed Mohamed El-Baradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency of the United Nations (IAEA), that the member states of the Union were ready to apply the Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. The aim of this protocol is to enhance the ability for inspection beyond the conventionally suspicious installations directly related to the production of fusion materials (European Commission 2004). Alongside the mechanisms of the IAEA, the EU possesses its own corps of inspectors, counting 200 members, and
maintains a database containing details of all civilian nuclear materials within its territory. Additionally, the EU Council is a signatory member of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (European Commission 2004).

Moving on from nuclear strategy, the conventional strategy for EU forces revolves around three main areas: prevention, protection and projection. To begin with, the goal of prevention is to avert the emergence of potentially dangerous situations and of direct or indirect threats, to check the use of force and to contain crises and conflicts at the lowest possible level. Secondly, the protection of populations, institutions, territory, essential cultural values, major economic activities (supply and information flows) and deployed forces is a constant necessity in a context where distinctions between internal and external security are disappearing. This is especially the case in the fight against terrorism. Lastly, the effectiveness of the permanent security posture is closely linked to the projection of capabilities outside EU territory. These capabilities require a high aptitude for anticipation and reactivity and the constant capability to adapt to changes in the international environment (France MOD 2002).

The political structures and the defence organisation of the EU as they currently stand are very much in tune with the adherence to the principles of humanitarian intervention. Hence, foreign intervention can only be attempted for humanitarian reasons. Furthermore, concepts of power projection and multinational intervention forces are becoming the norm in the national militaries of the Union. This means that multinational forces gradually grow more embedded in national military doctrines and are incorporated into national strategies.

Conclusion
Based on the implementation of the Macmillan-Booth framework for the analysis of strategic culture to the European Union we can argue that the strategic culture of Europe will be
based on three pillars: principles of humanitarian intervention, outwardly orientated foreign policy and finally, multilateralism. The principles of humanitarian intervention although previously present in European discourse (i.e. in the Petersberg Tasks), became part of official policy only recently, namely after the conclusion of the Kosovo war. It was at that time that Tony Blair, followed by EU leaders, first introduced the concept of humanitarian intervention and of morality in war. Thereafter, all military interventions by EU members were obliged to offer a justification in compliance to the humanitarian intervention principles, i.e. satisfying or, if one cared to be a cynic, appear to be satisfying all the main criteria advanced by the advocates of this tradition. If this prerequisite is not met, no foreign intervention can be authorized.

Given the specific geographical and geopolitical position of the Union we have argued that introspective policies are not beneficial. Instead, the Union has to keep an outward oriented perspective. The European Continent is not blessed with abundant supplies of critical strategic resources, for which the EU has to rely on outside providers. It is thus in its utmost interest to be involved constructively in the affairs of its immediate, as well as its more distant, neighborhoods. Furthermore, as the EU’s social structure itself is not impermeable to social unrest, (an indicative example of this were the recent Paris riots (BBC news online 2005a)), large population movements of economic or even environmental immigrants should be controlled and contained before they create problems. This means that the European armed forces need to restructure away from their Cold War emphasis on collective territorial defence towards expeditionary operations of power projection with special emphasis to humanitarian emergencies. In short, they need to address a far wider mission statement.

Multilateralism at the initial stages of the European project was seen as the balancing mechanism vis-à-vis European nationalism and the best guard against the resumption of
hostilities after the end of WWII. It has remained at the core of the Union for the latter half of the twentieth century. By and large, it is considered to be respected as long as it does not infringe upon vital interests of the member states. Nevertheless, through the integration process of the last fifty years it has become embedded in EU thinking and mentality. With 81% of decisions taken by consensus, the European Union functions under the fundamental principles of multilateralism (Heiselberg 2005). Consensus is welcomed when feasible and desired when not. The challenge now, however, is to move further to issues that really bear upon state sovereignty. As sensitive as the issue is, recent economic imperatives and strategic considerations have led European leaders to the realisation that the Union as a political institution can achieve a better standing in the globalized arena than individual states can hope to do. European strategic culture therefore has to be firmly based on the idea of multilateralism and the institution of consensus for any future intervention to take place. In this context, the use of force will be permissible only as a measure of last resort and only under the authorization of the UN.

One could describe the EU of the future as a gentle giant able to inflict damage but thinking twice beforehand. It has become plain enough from the aforementioned discussion that currently we cannot speak of a common European strategic culture that is as deep and wide as a national one. Rather, what we are up against is a narrower and shallower one that nevertheless can constitute the base for a future common European strategic culture.

A national strategic culture is the product of a long formative process, which has particular references to the political unit’s historical past among other elements. The study of a national strategic culture therefore necessitates the knowledge of a nation’s history. This is as important as it is complicated for a hybrid actor such as the EU. The European Union lacks the deep and clearly defined history of a nation-state. It is precisely because of this, that its
past deserves more detailed examination. The next chapter of this thesis will concentrate on exploring European history in the last fifty years in relation to the EEC/EU process and its consequences on the forging of a European strategic culture.
The purpose of this chapter is to review EU history in the security and defence area (Stirk 1996; Archer and Buttler 1992; Gnesotto 2004; Deighton 1997; Dwan 2001; Furdsom 1980; Gambles 1991; Duke 2000) and to explore its possible links with the three pillars of a common European strategic culture, as proposed by the author in chapter III. These pillars are: principles of humanitarian intervention, outward orientation and multilateralism. Furthermore, in this chapter we will address the question of the chronological origins of European strategic culture. A first step towards the growth of strategic culture is the development of institutions that could serve as the background against which it can be formulated and developed. This is because strategic culture is larger than the individuals who make the decisions at any given time. It is a collective phenomenon. It is not an adequate representation of the thoughts of a leader or the product of a neat mathematical formula. Furthermore, individuals very rarely manage to change the dominant culture. Rather, the reverse is the case: people are socialized by the beliefs that dominate the organisations of which they are part (Legro 1994: 110). Therefore, there is a need to explore how European institutions have developed over the years and to what extent they have served as the background for the development of a European strategic culture. It will not be possible in the space of this chapter to undertake an exhaustive analysis of the initiatives of the past sixty years in the area of EU Security and Defence. An effort of this detail would justify the compilation of a thesis on its own. Instead, this chapter’s premise will be that despite the considerable changes in character, shape and size that the Union has undergone throughout these years, one can nevertheless trace hints of a common strategic culture in the
making. Strategic culture as we have defined it in the previous chapter does not emerge from an empty vessel; rather, it is formed gradually over time, being the product of a unique and protracted historical process. Stine Heiselberg observed that because “theorists within the structural approach have focused on cases where a strategic culture already exists and have argued for its importance in explaining outcome”, they have all but ignored “the formative period where the seeds for strategic culture are sown” (Heiselberg 2003: 8). Therefore, it is essential in a study on European strategic culture that the process of EU’s development is not ignored but rather incorporated in the overall analysis. We cannot expect to deduce conclusive insights for the development of modern European strategic culture from it, but we can gain a deeper appreciation of the continuity and evolution of EU political structures, which arguably form the backbone upon which strategic culture rests. Finally, this chapter will attempt to approximate the chronological beginnings of the forging of a recognisable European strategic culture. It is the author’s belief that this can be placed in the period immediately after the Kosovo campaign and the initiation of ESDP following the St Malo Summit.

Amongst the effects of WWII was the slowing down of growth rates in industrialized countries and the destruction of the image of superiority of European states against the rest of the world. The new world order that emerged after WWII and the new balance of power that followed it, had as an immediate effect a reduction in the power of the old colonial European powers. This vacuum was soon filled by the increasing influence of the United States and of the USSR. In the second half of the 20th century and after the destructive experience of two World Wars, European nations embarked on an effort for greater cooperation in the field of economics and defence. Treaties signed in the 1950s reflected this effort –i.e. the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) (European Coal and Steel Community 1951), and the European Defence Community (EDC)(Communauté
Européenne de Défense 1952). In the two decades that followed, more plans were proposed that aimed at a more integrated European approach to defence issues, such as the Pleven Plan and the Fouchet initiative. Their results, however, were rather disappointing and unproductive as no European state proved willing to commit fully to these ideas. In the 1970s there was an attempt to go beyond the economic and social platform that the treaties signed in the 1950s were based upon. Documents, such as the Luxembourg Report of 1970 (Davignon 1970) and the Copenhagen Report of 1973 (European Community 1973b), which launched the European Political Community (EPC), established procedures for consultation prior to decisions in the foreign policy area. The 1980s witnessed few developments in the foreign policy co-operation front, apart from the issuing of the Solemn Declaration on the European Union by the European Council in Stuttgart (European Community 1983) and the signing of the Single European Act of 1986, which institutionalized EPC and formally stated that “common principles and objectives are developed and defined in the foreign policy area” (European Community 1986). In 1992 the signing of the Maastricht Treaty signalled the launch of a more systematic effort on the part of the European nations to achieve the target of integration. The Treaty of Maastricht on European Union (European Union 1992) was the first to contain provisions anchoring the Union’s responsibility for all questions relating to its security, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Article J.4).

From 1950 to 1987: The Creation of European Political Co-operation
Throughout the various stages of European integration, the prospects of a political union, a common foreign policy or even a common defence policy have regularly been put on the table for discussion through a series of policy proposals. The first attempts at a substantial transfer of competences for these sensitive policies were blocked by a minority of member states due to their nonnegotiable adherence to intergovernmental decision-making. As a
result, the gradual transfer of powers was given priority only in the 1970s. But let us look at the various prospects in more detail.

In the 1950s the creation of a European Defence Community (EDC) (European Coal and Steel Community 1951) was proposed by the French under the belief that it was necessary to boost German rearmament in order to counter the threat of communism that was spreading from the East, in the context of the Cold War. Although the EDC was a French ‘brainchild’ it was destined to be ‘killed’ by those who had fathered it (Sirius 1954). By 1954 France had realized that her national interests would be harmed by a prospective common European defence.\(^{15}\)

The EDC of 1952 differed from previous defensive associations in that, instead of keeping defeated Germany at arm’s length, it aimed at providing a tangible solution to the so-called ‘German problem’. The EDC went further in proposing the establishment of a supranational defence arrangement where the newly-found German state would be incorporated. The idea that it was absurd to engage into hostilities in Eastern Europe while Germany would remain a spectator was circulating already from 1948 and it was favourable among the French high military circles (Dumoulin 2000: 19). They also recognized the need for German rearmament in the face of the 100,000 men policing the Russian zone of occupation (Dumoulin 2000: 20). Germany thus, was considered essential for the conduct of the Cold War. If she was not absorbed into a Western system of defence and rather remained neutral then the possibilities of her entering the Soviet sphere of influence would render the western cause futile. Nevertheless, the French political circles did not seem at the time to embrace any prospect of German rearmament. Indicatively, Robert Schuman, the

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\(^{15}\) French resistance to the EDC was due to a combination of factors. To name but a few: French industrial circles and their fear of competition, French aversion to supra-nationalism, France’s engagement in Indochina and its fear that the potential ratification of the EDC would undermine its status as a colonial power.
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated firmly in July 1949 in the National Assembly that Germany does not have an army, that “elle ne doit pas en avoir”, and also that “elle n’a pas d’armament et qu’elle n’en aura pas” (Dumoulin 2000: 21). French public opinion was also against any such prospect as the memories of war were still fresh in the minds of the people. Therefore, the Pleven Plan of the following year proposing “the creation for the common defence of Europe of a European Army under political institutions of a United Europe” (Furdson 1980: 89) marked a 180 degree turn in French foreign policy.

The European Defence Community was the sophisticated elaboration of the Pleven Plan. It provided for common institutions, armed forces and budget, all of which would be controlled by a Council of the six participating countries whose decision-making would be based on unanimity. This new organization was clearly supranational in character (Stirk 1996: 126-128). Its ‘Inspirer,’ as Jean Monnet who drafted it was dubbed by General Charles de Gaulle, had closely modelled it on the European Coal and Steel Community. The political corollary of the EDC, proposed in 1953, was a project aimed at establishing a federal or confederal structure within the EU. The European Political Community (EPC) as it was called would have created a two-chamber parliamentary assembly, a European Executive Council, a Council of Ministers and a Court of Justice. The EPC was to have very wide powers and was destined, in the end, to absorb the ECSC and the EDC. However, the Treaty that was eventually signed in Paris on 27 May 1952, after 2 years of negotiations, was very different from the original Pleven plan (Stirk 1996: 129). In the end, following a period of delays and reconsiderations it was officially discarded two years later on 30 August 1954, without ever so much as being laid down for discussion (Sirius 1954).

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16 Author’s translation: that it (Germany) should not have [an army], that it (Germany) does not have armaments and that it will not have any.

17 For an in depth analysis of the Pleven Plan see (Stirk 1996: 126)
Should the EDC have gone through we might have been able to speak of a common strategic culture in a European level much sooner. The EDC would have been a huge step towards integration, perhaps premature for its time, but it would have contributed to the forging of a common understanding and approach to foreign relations and the use of force. As the EDC did not succeed, the EU remained an institution focused predominantly on the economic aspects of policymaking. This aspect was highlighted with the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957 under the Treaty of Rome (European Community 1957). The European Economic Community (EEC) was an organization established between the ECSC countries Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, France, Italy and West Germany, known informally as the Common Market or ‘the Six’. The EEC aimed at the eventual economic union of its member nations, ultimately leading to political union. It worked towards the free movement of goods, service, labour and capital, the abolition of trusts and cartels, and the development of joint and reciprocal policies on labour, social welfare, agriculture, transport, and foreign trade (European Community 1957). The goal of a greater level of integration with the single market and the introduction of the common currency in the late 1990s took almost thirty years to be achieved. Nevertheless, the seed of multilateralism was planted during the formative years of the 1950s. Ideas of integration and co-operation in all levels (economic, military and political) were introduced for the first time to such a degree. Although European states were unsuccessful in these first attempts it is very important to consider in terms of this thesis that in 1952 with the EDC military circles were willing to go where the political ones coiled back. Events proved that the EDC at the time of its introduction was a step too far too soon for a Europe that was still feeling unsure about itself in the mist of the uncertainties of the Cold War and the nuclear age. Intellectually, however, the 1950s provided the foundation for later progress in the field of a common foreign policy and by extent, the development of a common strategic culture.
In 1960, the French initiated a consultative process aimed at the creation of a Europe based upon inter-governmental collaboration, rather than on the supranational ideas of the EEC Commission (European Community 1982c). By the spring of 1961, representatives from the Common Market nations were meeting as members of a commission chaired by Christian Fouchet. Between 1961 and 1962 the Committee discussed two drafts of a proposed plan for European Political Unity. The Fouchet Proposals, as the outcomes of that consultation became known, envisaged the disempowerment of the Commission and the Council of Ministers and the subjection of Community law to national law (European Community 1982b). The five other member states of the Common Market rejected Fouchet’s plan (European Community 1982a), prompting a violent attack by de Gaulle on Commission President Walter Hallstein (Camps 1967: 88-89). This disagreement, which led to widespread ministerial resignations in France, reflected in effect the divide, which still dogs EU policy making to this day, between inter-governmentalists and supra-nationalists. De Gaulle sought again to reduce the supranational dimension of the European Community by rejecting the Commission’s proposals relating to the financial regulation of the common agricultural policy (CAP) (De Gaulle 1970: 402-409). This led, in 1965, to the “empty-chair” crisis, which ended the following year with the adoption of the “Luxembourg compromise.”

The aim of de Gaulle in proposing the Fouchet Plan was twofold. First, he was an ardent proponent of the severing of Europe’s dependence for military security on the Atlantic Alliance and the USA. Secondly, his vision of Europe dictated the restructuring of the Community by turning it into a voluntary union of independent states whose headquarters

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18 On 30 June 1965 the French Permanent Representative in Brussels, Couve de Murville, was asked by de Gaulle to withdraw and effectively paralysed the EEC in its ability to conduct anything other than routine business. This also threatened the Community with the prospect of entering a fiscal year with no approved budget. The ‘empty chair crisis’ was resolved at an informal meeting of the foreign Ministers of the Six on 28-29 January 1966, with the ‘Luxembourg compromise,’ which essentially watered down the method of Quality Majority Voting. More specifically, a member state had the ability to stall the implementation of a majority voting decision if it felt vital interests were under threat. (Sürk 1996)
would be based in Paris. Most importantly for de Gaulle, member states would enjoy extensive national veto powers over all common policies. More than anything the Fouchet Plan marks another example of the all too familiar dispute between Europeanists and Atlanticists. Indeed the major reasons behind the demise of the Fouchet Plan were the intransigent nature of the French proposals themselves and the stalwart British ‘outside’ defence of Europe’s transatlantic ties (Duke 2000: 48). In effect, the Fouchet Plan got caught in between two conflicts. One was about institutions and one about purposes. France opted for an intergovernmental structure against the preference of other countries, such as the Netherlands and Belgium, for a supranational one, in which majority voting ensured that the smaller states would be able to counterbalance the influence of the bigger ones in decision-making. The second one was a clash between de Gaulle’s aspiration to create a more “European Europe,” independent from US power and will, and the reluctance of France’s partners to challenge that preponderance, thereby risking to jeopardize US protection of Europe during the Cold War (Hoffmann 2000).

Moving forward in time, the 1960s was in itself a multifarious period. It was a decade of great economic growth for all member states but it was also a time of social unrest. The 1960s witnessed the wartime baby boomers coming of age and demanding to be heard (i.e. May of 1968 riots in Paris). For the European project, General de Gaulle dominated the scene, promoting intergovernmentalism and leaving little room for any supra-national progress even in areas far less controversial than that of a common European strategic culture. Negative typifications of mutual suspiciousness hindered the whole European project by spurring national diplomacies towards conducting foreign policy based on their narrow national interests (Wendt 1992: 405), placing them above the European idea.
Following de Gaulle’s failed attempt to introduce a ‘purely European’ defence dimension into the EEC, efforts to increase the EEC’s defence and security profile continued in the 1970s. By the mid-1970s, it was obvious that the EEC was more than an economic grouping. With the European economic revival and rehabilitation program complete, the institutions of the immediate post-war years now served as the cornerstones of a ‘Europe’ which was increasingly acting as a single entity in world affairs. With the accession of the UK, Ireland and Denmark the EEC had enlarged and a newfound flexibility was evident in the foreign policy of its member states, most notably West Germany, under the leadership of Willy Brandt who pursued his famous Ostpolitik. France on her part believed that a common EEC approach to foreign policy would help anchoring West Germany firmly within the West (Kissinger 1982: 152). In addition, the smaller European states saw an advantage in the coordination of national foreign policies under the EEC, especially since the end of the Gaullist era and the British entry had eased their fears over single state domination. Further, in response to calls by the heads of state and government of EEC members for a study of possible ways of moving forward on the political level, a document known as the 'Davignon Report' was presented in 1970 at the Luxembourg Summit (Davignon 1970). This was the starting point for the introduction of the European Political Co-operation (EPC), launched unofficially in 1970 before being enshrined formally in the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 (European Community 1986). The main feature of EPC was consultation among the member states on foreign policy issues. The sanction of its joint deliberations was the responsibility of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). State agreement over the EPC was facilitated by the fact that its approach was of a much less coercive nature and entailed less coordination than envisaged by its predecessors, (EDC, EPC) (Duke 2000: 57). However, bearing testament to the way that European integration
was headed, a way that was not solely influenced from external factors, the issue of defence and security was not included in its agenda.

It can be argued that the 1970s produced a good deal of enthusiasm over the prospect of strengthened European political co-operation. The Paris Summit of 19-20 October 1972 discussed political union and other Community pertinent topics (Stirk 1996: 181). Following its conclusion, the Heads of states expressed their satisfaction at the results obtained through the EPC over the past two years (European Community 1972). Nevertheless, further inter-governmentalisation of the EPC process was resisted by the smaller member states, as a result of their fears over the imminent enlargement of the community and of a potential Paris-Bonn-London entente (Duke 2000: 58). In the Copenhagen Summit of 14 December 1973, the Document on the European Identity (European Community 1973a) stressed the importance of co-ordinating foreign and security issues for a more united Europe. The main task of this text was to assess progress towards the eventual goal of political union and to underline the importance of unity and Europe’s common goals (Duke 2000: 58). Further, the 1975 Tindemans Report (Tindemans 1975) explicitly recognised that the ‘European Union’ would be incomplete without a common security policy. The report proposed integrating the foreign, defence and fiscal policies throughout the EEC. It also called for close co-operation on defence issues, but maintained that a truly independent defence of Europe without the US would be impossible (Tindemans Report 1975). Yet, Tindeman’s ideas were far more radical and federal in their approach to stand any chance of support (Duke 2000: 60). The establishment of the European Council in 1974 contributed to better coordination in EPC due to the power it ascribed to the Heads of state and government to define the general orientation of Community policy (European Community 1974). The outlines of this institutional novelty, which was also to form the highest political decision-making body
within EPC, was essentially inter-governmentalist and promised to preserve traditional national prerogatives within foreign policy (Glarbo 1999: 642).

Equally, symbolic processes were paramount in another institutional context, which was at least of comparable importance to the European Council. This context involved the creation and institutionalization of the so-called ‘Gymnich’ formula for meetings between foreign ministers. Launched by the West German presidency in the same year as the European Council (1974), the highly informal and relaxed design of the semi-annual ‘Gymnich’ meetings envisaged face-to-face interaction between foreign ministers without fixed agendas and the presence of diplomats. Initially, it was a deliberate means of remedying short term disagreement over the Middle East and energy policy (Nuttall 1992: 90-93). To the surprise of the EPC partners however, this highly unorthodox institutional novelty soon enjoyed formidable success, not only in clearing up internal differences, but also in restoring American–West European relations. From that point onwards, the role of the presidency and the publicity given to the work of the EPC reinforced each other through official statements of position by the European Economic Community. Moreover, it can be argued that the Gymnich formula achieved its success without jeopardizing existing typifications of how diplomacy should work. Originally only an idiosyncratic solution to short-term problems, the formula was communicated and reproduced as a central part of the institutional structure of European political co-operation—a role which, as a matter of fact has persisted to the present day (Glarbo 1999: 642). Presently, in addition to the ‘Gymnich’ meetings, 19 which are attended by foreign ministers, informal lunches take place that fall under the same informal concept and are organised strictly without agenda. Participation in

these is not restricted and they are attended usually by members of various committees, including the Military Committee (European Council 2004a).

In addition to the occasional assertiveness of member states in foreign policy making, external circumstances of the 1970s, such as the oil crisis and the new Atlantic Charter,\(^\text{20}\) proved a setback for European unity. Despite these impediments, however, the pre-scheduled meetings in the European Council, the political committee, the working groups and the ‘Gymnich’ formula for meetings all contributed to the formulation of a cooperative spirit, put in place before the diplomats were called to convene. The ‘Gymnich’ formula for meetings between foreign ministers, for instance, helped greatly in the socialization of the ruling elites of member states in a more relaxed environment. This process was far separated from the formal way of diplomacy practiced until then. Its key merit was that it offered European elites the opportunity to discuss, exchange opinions and hence, to solve differences and misunderstandings before these had the chance to evolve into serious issues.

The principal contribution of the institutional framework that was put up during the 1970s was that it provided a stable arena to social interaction between diplomats as well as fonctionaires from different countries. The socialisation process that is embedded within EU institutions can be viewed as the mechanism through which inter-subjectively shared understandings of co-operation in the fields of politics and security supplied codes to be drawn upon by all decision-making actors (Glarbo 1999: 646). This institutional socialisation process enabled European elites to understand in the first instance the culture of other member states and following that to appreciate the degree of mutual influences. This ultimately led to the creation of a tighter esprit de corps (EUMS staff 2004), hence laying the

\(^{20}\) Henry Kissinger, the national security advisor to Nixon, proposed the development of a new Atlantic Charter, which embodied principles that would re-define US-European relations in political, economic and strategic terms. The proposal was understood by the Europeans as linking defence with trade (Kissinger 1982: 152).
foundations for a future common strategic culture. In the same vein, the Document on the European Identity, stressed the inability of single member states to affect international events and highlighted the importance of working together towards their common goals in a multilateral way and always in “accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter” (European Community 1973a).

The aftermath of the crisis in the Middle East after the Six-day War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 triggered a change in EEC stance. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran brought home to the member states the growing impotence of the EEC to influence international affairs. These developments resulted in the Venice Declaration of 1980 (European Community 1980), which was the first genuinely official European statement of a strong political position regarding the Middle-Eastern question. Issued in the wake of the US-sponsored Camp David Accords, the Venice Declaration (European Community 1980) proclaimed that “traditional ties and common interests” with the Middle East obliged EEC member states to play “a special role” in the pursuit of a peace settlement. Setting itself apart from the US at Venice, the EEC also called for the participation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in peace negotiations and criticized Israeli settlements in the occupied territories as illegal under international law. Almost thirty years later, the Venice Declaration still incorporates the basic principles of European policy towards the Middle-Eastern peace process. European leaders regularly highlight the historical prescience of the Declaration and how many of its key demands have been accepted and legitimated over time, most notably the need to include the PLO in the negotiating process and to accept the Palestinian right to self-determination. That being said, one can testify to the enormous importance of such documents in the process of forging a common strategic culture. The Venice Declaration
was the earliest product of the common approach to foreign affairs issues within the EEC. It might not address directly issues of forceful intervention but was, nonetheless, the first serious distancing of the EEC from the United States in a matter of utmost foreign policy importance. That way, the consensual independence of the EEC, agreed upon by all member states, was underlined.

Determined to strengthen EPC, European leaders adopted the London Report in 1981 (European Community 1981), which required the multilateral prior consultation between member states and the European Commission on all foreign policy matters that had a pan-EEC appeal. In June 1983, the European Council issued the Solemn Declaration on the European Union in Stuttgart (European Community 1983). The Solemn Declaration strengthened the powers of the European Council by authorising it to issue general guidelines for the EPC. It built upon the London Report and stressed that ‘by speaking with a single voice in foreign policy, including the political aspects of security, Europe can contribute to the maintenance of peace’ (European Community 1983). Finally, it established the link between political co-operation and the ‘co-ordination of positions of member states on the political and economic aspects of security, so as to promote and facilitate the progressive development of such positions… in a growing number of foreign policy fields’ (Colombo 1992).

A further development in the co-ordination of member state foreign policies was the Dooge Committee Report of 1985 (European Community 1985). Drawn up in preparation for the Intergovernmental Conference which was to lead to the Single European Act (SEA) (European Community 1986), the Report contained a number of proposals concerning foreign policy. The provisions introduced by the SEA established an institutional basis for EPC, the group of European correspondents and a secretariat working under the direct authority of the Presidency. Additionally, the objectives of EPC were extended to all foreign policies.
policy issues of general interest. With the entry into force of the Single Act in 1987 (European Community 1986), EPC acquired a legal basis for the first time in seventeen years following its launch. The SEA also recognised that “closer co-operation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters” (European Community 1986: article 30 §6). Overall, the SEA marked a development far removed from a federal foreign policy of the type recommended by the Tindemans Report. Even though no specific reference was made to defence, the SEA did provide the building material that was to form the basis for the later Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. In support of this, it has been argued rightly that:

*The Single European Act did not fundamentally change European Co-operation. It innovated considerably by putting ‘Davignon machinery’ in treaty form, thereby ending its precarious status, but it left unchanged its character, its working methods, and its legal and institutional separation from the EEC institutions. Taking into account that the SEA was preceded throughout the 1970s and the 1980s by debates, proposals, initiatives, and the work of the Intergovernmental Conference, it follows that the arrangement reached in 1986 will form the basis for the Community’s diplomatic co-operation for many years ahead, possibly for the remainder of this century (Ifestos 1987: 358).*

The years preceding the end of the Cold War were *per force* shadowed by the confrontation of the two super-powers, leaving little room for other actors to have a substantial input in international affairs. The European Economic Community (EEC) suffered as this state of affairs disallowed it to develop a more balanced portfolio of attributes. During this period, member states were still learning the ropes of political co-operation under common objectives, old enemies needed time to overcome their traditional suspicion of one another in order to work together and dated mindsets had to be reconfigured in the new order of
things. After the turbulent first half of the twentieth century, European states had accepted co-operation, and not confrontation, as their aim. National reflexes for protection of national interests were still very much in place and the sense of a common future was only just emerging in the ranks of the member states. It was in this period preceding the fall of the Iron Curtain, however, that the foundations needed for the development of European strategic culture in the years after the end of the Cold War were laid. The ‘Gymnich’ formula of meetings, the conventions of the European Council and the European Commission were first introduced during that time. EU leaders started to learn to work together and public servants transferred to Brussels became exposed to the culture of their fellow Europeans. Given the limited population movements in the previous era this knowledge through familiarity was hard to obtain. According to long-standing participants in this policy structure of the early EPC, its added value rested on the fact that it provided a sense of informal shared community and fellow-feeling (Tonra 2000: 158). What Brussels delegates have observed in their sojourn and work there is a sense of common identity and collective purpose (Representative to CIVCOM 2006). A formal internalisation of shared norms and precedents has taken the place of the informal ‘consultation reflex’ in which Political Directors sought to accommodate the views of their fellows in an almost personalistic fashion (Tonra 2000). No matter how limited these advancements towards a common European strategic culture may appear to be, they form essential building materials for the developments one witnesses after the end of the Cold War. It is to these that we shall now turn.

Defence and Security Initiatives after the End of the Cold War

During the Cold War initiatives towards a common defence and security had little prospects of actually arriving at a concrete end, because at that time NATO, and in effect the US, guaranteed European security. The collapse of the Iron Curtain altered the situation
completely. Voices on both sides of the Atlantic for an American withdrawal and a more autonomous European security policy were raised with increasing frequency and strength (Colombo 1992). The Franco-German response to this state of affairs was to propose a ‘European pillar’ inside NATO: the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) (Mitterrand M. François et al. 1990). The introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), when the treaty of the Union came into effect on 1 November 1993, was seen as a step towards this direction (European Union 1992).

The Introduction of CFSP
In the early 1990s the security environment in Europe was one which at best could be described as fluid and at worst as schizophrenic. The threat that was looming large over the continent had miraculously disappeared, leaving a void in its place, both in economic and geopolitical terms. At the same time, the guarantor for European security, NATO and through it the United States, was left behind victorious but without, at least initially, a clear purpose (Cornish 1996: 751). This ambivalence was observed clearly during the Maastricht summit of December 1991. On the one hand, countries like the UK, who were in favour of NATO’s primacy, acknowledged the need for greater coordination of foreign policy, but were opposed to any transfer of competence in security matters to the Union. On the other hand, France, who saw it in its interest to reassert its desire to strengthen its relationship with Germany, suggested raising its military collaboration with Bonn to a European level (Mitterrand M. François et al. 1990). The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) was eventually signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992. The Maastricht Treaty (European Union 1992) was the first to contain provisions anchoring the Union's responsibility for all questions relating to its security, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (European Union 1992: Article J.4). The Treaty envisaged that the EU, which had no military
capabilities of its own, would request from the Western European Union (WEU) to elaborate and implement planned military measures on the EU’s behalf. CFSP was established as an intergovernmental pillar of the European Union. Nevertheless, the reinvigoration of the WEU for this aim was not as fruitful as it was hoped, since member states failed to expand their defence expenditures or to allow the material development of national or pooled capabilities (Terriff et al. 2001). The Maastricht Treaty introduced the three-pillar structure of the European Union with CFSP as the second of the three, placed between the European Communities pillar and that of Justice and Home Affairs. The overall objectives of the Treaty are outlined in Article B (European Union 1992: Article B). As far as defence and security are concerned, the Union is to ‘assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’. The Treaty TEU outlines the main features of the CFSP in Title V (European Union 1992: Title V). The main features of the CFSP can be summarized as follows: the CFSP is to include all questions of foreign and security policy and the ‘eventual framing’ of a Common Defence Policy (CDP) which might ‘in time’ lead to a common defence. Overall, the single most important element of the CFSP is that its aim is to establish a common foreign and security policy and not merely to promote co-operation, as had been the prime concern of the EPC (Duke 2000: 102).

The development of the CFSP and with it the Union’s international profile depended on the willingness of key European states and the Union itself, to formulate a comprehensive framework vis-à-vis its foreign relations in the post-Cold War era. An approach that was deemed promising was to focus on the military end of the toolbox of competencies (Deighton 2002: 725). Within the EU, a range of security policies was being developed at the same time in the Balkans, supplemented by the wider economic and diplomatic tools of
the Union (Stavridis 2001: 15). The different national interests of the member states as well as their diverse views on European integration were reflected clearly in the contradictions and vagueness of the terms of the CFSP. At the end of the day, the CFSP did not represent a union as such. Rather, it was nothing more than an exercise in balancing the various national interests. The alternating intergovernmental and supranational applications that formed the basis of policy-making in the CFSP and in external economic relations respectively, also contributed to the creation of a general impression of incoherence on the part of the Union (Duke 2000: 124).

By the time the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) was under way to revise the TEU further, many of the innovations brought by the Maastricht Treaty were still to take root. Some, as for instance the relation between COREPER (Committee of Permanent Representatives) and the PoCo (Political Committee) over the issue of initiative in the agendas for ministerial discussions, were only starting to attain currency as a modus operandi. The so-called ‘Community style’ predominated ultimately in the working groups that were merged after the Maastricht Treaty (Tonra 2000: 152). An important effect of this dominance was the acculturation of participating officials to the ‘Brussels’ work ethic which resulted in the “…withering away of the old ‘club’ atmosphere…” (Regelsberger 1997: 79) and the consequent integration of personnel, styles and agendas. On 2 October 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam (European Union 1997) was signed. This Treaty continued on the trajectory that Maastricht had set towards added Council control over issues of foreign policy. According to it, the CFSP framework was to apply to all questions relating to the security of the EU, including the structuring of a common defence. The relevant article of the Amsterdam Treaty states that:
The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, in accordance with the second subparagraph, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements (European Union 1997).

The Treaty of Amsterdam also tried to clarify some of the vagueness of the Maastricht Treaty by incorporating the Petersberg tasks into Title V (European Union 1997: Article V). The Treaty stated that the questions that would be appropriate for handling by the CFSP would ‘include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’ (European Union 1997: Article 17.2). Following the Franco-German demand for a strong figure presiding over the CFSP it was decided that the Secretary-General of the Council would become the High Representative for the CFSP (Chirac and Kohl 1996). This official would be responsible for assisting the Council in CFSP-related matters by contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of decisions. At the request of the Presidency, he/she would act on behalf of the Council in conducting political dialogue with third parties (European Union 1997: Article 18). The Amsterdam Treaty also addressed the issue of voting procedures. The debate was mostly political since it touched directly upon the fundamental query of the extent of the supranational or intergovernmental nature of the CFSP. The Amsterdam Treaty upheld the unanimity principle as the general rule but it allowed for adoption by a qualified majority in two cases. First, for decisions applying to a common strategy defined by the European Council and second, for any decisions implementing a joint action or common position already adopted by the Council (European Union 1997: Article 23). However, there existed a
safeguard clause enabling member states to block majority voting for important reasons of national policy. In such cases, following an examination of the reasons of the member state concerned, the Council reserved the right to decide by a qualified majority to refer the matter to the European Council for a unanimous decision by Heads of state and government. In addition, qualified majority voting does not apply for matters pertaining to military or defence.

Concerning the WEU, the Amsterdam Treaty specified that the Western European Union was to be drawn into closer co-operation with the European Union. The aim was to foster closer institutional relations “with a view to the possible integration of the WEU into the European Union, should the European Council so decide” (European Union 1997: Article 17). By linking the WEU with the EU, the Amsterdam Treaty granted to the EU access to a military toolbox it did not hold previously. Nevertheless, the goal of achieving progress in the field of foreign policy and external relations was, for many observers, not reached (Ojanen 1999: 6).

The Maastricht Treaty was received as a breakthrough, however modest. The Amsterdam Treaty, on the other hand, was largely perceived as preserving the status quo (van Hoonacker 1997: 8). Foreign policy, however, is not an area where the logic of integration can easily replace the logic of individual action. Member states were uncomfortable to observe such a sensitive issue as foreign and security policy to be drawn into the ‘Community machine’ (Tonra 2000: 158). For this reason, they chose to follow a bureaucratic approach where the intergovernmental nature of foreign policy co-operation remained the basic rule of the game (Gnesotto 2004: 35). Furthermore, on an intellectual level, the concept of a European defence identity was at odds with the reduced budgets and peace dividends demanded by public opinion. This basic reality explained the dedication of the second pillar of the EU, created at Maastricht, to a common foreign policy, leaving defence issues to be decided later.
on (author’s interview 2006). The Treaty of Amsterdam, while maintaining the same spirit as
that of Maastricht, was an effort to ameliorate some of the weak points of its predecessor.
Apart from sorting out voting procedures, a vital issue for the smooth functioning of the
Union, its more fundamental contributions rested with the so-called Petersberg Tasks and
with the introduction of the High Representative. Both of these can be seen as steps towards
the formulation of a common strategic culture. By defining the questions that would be
appropriate for the CFSP, the Petersberg tasks were instrumental in the setting of the future
military and security priorities of the Union. By extent, they provided the bases upon which
the strategic thinking of the Union would be built. Accordingly, issues like humanitarian
intervention, peace-making, and peace-keeping were placed at the heart of the EU’s policy
creating a niche for it different to that of NATO or to the narrow objectives of national
military forces under the traditional concepts of security and defence. In terms of strategic
culture one must acknowledge that while at that time these proclamations did little to alter
the thinking of EU elites both military and political, the Petersberg Tasks have since been
fundamental to the formulation of EU policy and to the way that governments and
fonctionnaires alike think about the use of force and the nature of foreign intervention. The
High Representative, additionally, provided the focal point that would give an individual
voice to the Council. Javier Solana, who was appointed the first High Representative, has
proven to be an asset to the position itself (author’s interview 2006). Solana, in effect, created
this position from scratch putting in place the rules and the norms under which it functions
today. Having a single person being the principal channel of communication with third
parties and ‘picking up the phone for Europe’ has contributed to a sense of continuity and
stability. Furthermore, the ‘personal’ culture of the High Representative may be disseminated
to the lower echelons of bureaucracy, thus creating a common organizational culture which
in most cases is passed onto official documents and policies (author’s interview 2005).
Consequently, it can be argued that the provision for a single authority presiding over EU foreign and security matters can facilitate the development of a common European strategic culture (author’s interview 2005).

Overall, it can be claimed that the intervening period between the two Treaties has witnessed a low level of ‘communitarisation’ and development of a common strategic culture. However, one cannot deny that there has been a shift towards standardised Community norms in terms of participation and working methods. This has been achieved at the expense of the old informal, ‘clubby’ atmosphere. Unfortunately, the precise effect of these developments on collective policies and actions cannot yet be fully assessed.

**The St Malo Summit**

Arguably the most important step towards a common European defence policy was taken at the St Malo summit of 1998 (Franco-British 1998). On 4 December 1998, Britain and France issued a declaration, which introduced the plan for an EU role in defence. The declaration stated that:

“The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. To this end the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible, military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises, acting in conformity with our respective obligations to NATO” (Franco-British 1998).

It also affirmed that the Union should undertake the creation of a rapid reaction capability of corps strength by 2003. This denoted the employment of 60,000 troops as part of the EU’s new objective of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This corps capability is generally known as the EU ‘Rapid Reaction Force’.
The St Malo Declaration was only made possible because all three major players in European
defence issues, each for different reasons, amended their outlook. To begin with, the
Americans decided to tip the balance of US policy in favour of a greater autonomy for the
EU, primarily as a way of satisfying Congressional demands for burden-sharing, but also in
the hope that this would relieve the pressure on an overstretched imperium with increasingly
complex global security responsibilities (Kennedy 1988: 534). In spite of the perceived need
to satisfy these concerns, the United States never really made up its mind on how much
European capacity on security and defence issues it was willing to condone. With the
dilemma of political decoupling looming, due to the Union’s egalitarian ambitions with
respect to NATO, and the converse but similar fear of a strategic decoupling, due to
technological obsolescence and the inadequacy of European defence expenditure, those
decisions were difficult (Howorth 2000b: 19).

At the St Malo summit, the United Kingdom made a 180 degrees change of policy by giving
the green light to a European defence and security initiative. After years of blocking any
initiative for a European security policy the UK crossed its European Rubicon (Howorth
2000a: 34). The motives for this radical change were varying in nature. To begin with, there
was Blair’s Europeanist attitude. Ever since he became Prime Minister he had sought to
make the UK an actively engaged member of the European Union. He wanted it to put
down its half-hearted European attitude and assume a leading role in European affairs as
France and Germany had already done (Andreani et al. 2001: 9). Given that the UK had
opted out of the euro and most elements of the Schengen Agreement, defence was the
obvious choice. Secondly, the UK policy shift was fuelled by a practical concern to improve
the way in which the EU conducted foreign policy (Andreani et al. 2001: 10). The complex
diplomatic exchanges in relation to the Kosovo debacle, which preceded St Malo, became
lessons which stressed the inadequacy of the EU to deal efficiently with crises of that sort. Thirdly, and most importantly perhaps, was the realization on the part of the UK that the US would no longer automatically overwrite European security in the same way as during the Cold War. London believed that NATO survival depended on, rather than was threatened by, ESDP (Howorth 2000a: 48). Enhanced European military capability through ESDP was now perceived by the UK as the most convincing tool against all those voices in Washington that propagated isolationism. Most importantly, it was at the same time a stout reply to the advocates of ‘burden-sharing’ (Howorth 2000a: 34).

France for its part was more than happy to follow the UK along this road of enhancing European security. The 5th Republic had realized that the post Cold War era demanded more collective action rather than unilateral action, or action with ad hoc allies, which was what had dominated its policy during the Cold War. The harsh reality of military intervention in Bosnia was a sufficient catalyst for France to draw ever closer to NATO (for reasons of interoperability and military efficiency) (EUMS staff 2004) and to posit a new and viable working relationship between Europe and the United States, albeit one which concentrated essentially on the construction of the Common European Security and Foreign Policy (CESDP) (Howorth 2000b: 29). Moreover, the traditional areas of French influence, in Africa especially, had become less attractive and less significant (Hoffmann 2000: 193). France also considered that the emergence of an ESDP with actual military capabilities would consolidate and strengthen a more balanced and therefore a stronger Atlantic Alliance (Howorth 2000a: 33). Additionally, the ESDP has been regarded by France as a necessary fallback in case NATO becomes ineffective at meeting European needs (Clarke 2000: 733).
After St Malo

Germany held the EU presidency during the first half of 1999. After an initial scepticism over the St Malo Declaration Germany soon embraced the initiative as it spotted the opportunity to overcome the painful tensions between itself, France and the UK on issues of defence and security. At the Cologne Summit of June 1999 Germany succeeded to extend the St Malo proposals to an EU-wide framework (European Council 1999a). The Cologne summit was the birthplace of the European Security and Defence Policy. ESDP was coined in order to replace the then used European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) (European Council 1999a). The summit established a set of new institutions in Brussels in order to facilitate the carrying out of the Petersberg tasks. A Political and Security Committee (generally known as COPS -an abbreviation of the French Comité Politique de Sécurité), consisting of national representatives with political and military expertise, would coordinate the ESDP on a daily basis. A new EU Military Committee, made up of the national Chiefs of Staff or their deputies, would give military advice to the Political and Security Committee. There would also be an EU Military Staff to assist the new committees and in the ministerial meetings. This Staff would be drawn, in part, from the WEU’s existing personnel. Formally, the ESDP falls under the jurisdiction of the European Council. Nevertheless, Javier Solana, the appointed High Representative for the CFSP, has also been involved in the workings of the ESDP. His former appointment as Secretary General of NATO gives extra credibility and coherence to the project.

In the European Council of December 1999 in Helsinki (European Council 1999b), where the ‘Headline Goal’ was defined, the EU engaged in the building of military –ESDP– and civilian capabilities for crisis management, without possessing nevertheless an overall strategic framework for its external action. The objectives of the CFSP are defined in Article
11 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (European Union 1997: Article 11). These, however, are statements of principle rather than policy objectives and hence far too general to provide a framework for day-to-day policy-making. As to the role of the military instrument, the TEU stipulates which types of operations the EU can launch, by putting forward the so-called Petersberg Tasks as originally defined by the WEU in Article 17 (European Union 1997: Article 17): humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. Intriguingly, it provides no guidelines as to the circumstances under which the use of the military instrument can be considered. This vagueness provided the ground for long debates revolving around the purposes of EU military forces and the rules governing their deployment. The endless debates are not necessarily a bad thing in themselves, since discussing an issue is better than ignoring it. It can also be argued that through the conflict of ideas strategic culture is born, building upon the success of some and the failure of others.

The main target of the Helsinki Summit was to boost European military capabilities. The result was the introduction of the Headline Goal where EU member states promised that by 2003 they would be able:

"to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of the Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000 to 60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics,

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21 These are: “to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter; to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders; to promote international co-operation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (European Union 1997).
other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member states should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the additional forces. Member states have also decided to develop rapidly collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport.” (European Council 1999b: 82)

The effort to increase the military and institutional capabilities of the EU continued under the Portuguese Presidency. In the Santa Maria da Feira Summit (19-20 June 2000) (European Council 2000b) EU leaders agreed to set up four ad hoc EU/NATO committees on security, capability goals, modalities for the use of NATO assets and permanent consultation mechanisms. They also agreed to a Headline Goal of up to 5000 police officers for international missions across the range of conflict prevention and proposed the establishment of a committee for the civilian aspects of crisis management.

“The European Council reaffirms its commitment to building a Common European Security and Defence policy capable of reinforcing the Union’s external action through the development of a military crisis management capability as well as a civilian one, in full respect of the principles of the United Nations Charter.” (European Council 2000b)

The Nice Summit that followed in December 2000 was a step towards consolidating what was introduced in previous summits (European Council 2000a). EU leaders redefined the Headline Goals, established the new permanent political and military structures and consultation arrangements and discussed the definition and implementation of EU
capabilities. The further revision of the TEU was finalised (European Union 2000). Concerning the new ESDP bodies, Articles 25 and 27 regarding the role of the PSC were amended and inserted respectively in the TEU, as the first line of business of the Nice Treaty (European Union 2000: Article 1). According to this amendment, enhanced co-operation was allowed in foreign policy, but not on defence. Further, guidelines for setting up military operations were agreed. Lastly, it was decided that the Treaty of Nice would enter into force in February 2003.

In accordance with the guidelines established at Helsinki, the Nice Summit of December 2000 solidified the creation of three new military structures that would include as part of their responsibilities the oversight of policies and strategies that would influence European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) operations. The first structure is the PSC. It replaces the Council-level Political Committee and adds security to its list of duties. Further, it provides “political control and strategic direction” to the EU’s military response to crises. It is scheduled to meet on a regular basis both during crisis and non-crisis periods (European Union 2000: 80/8). It is composed of National Representatives at senior/ambassador level, placed within the framework of the Permanent Representations of member states. The PSC, as the institutional core of the CFSP, has a central role to play in the definition of and the follow up to the EU’s response to a crisis and matters related to the CFSP (European Council 2001a: 191). In order to do so, it exercises political control on the EU military as such and communicates with NATO and third states. The CFSP has three main tools at its disposal, all of which engage the PSC at some level of their organisational structure. These are: Common Statements, which involve declarations of EU opinions about current international issues, which are nevertheless considered legal acts from the CFSP perspective; Common Positions, which form a basis for a coordination of national foreign policies by all
EU members; and Joint Actions, which are the strongest instrument of the CFSP. They commit member states to a coordinated international action, diplomatic, economic or military. Every decision taken by the EU regarding military and security issues can only be adopted by consensus. This means that all the member states have to agree on the final decisions.

![Diagram of the institutional configuration of ESDP](image)

The second vital military structure that was introduced in the Nice Treaty is the EUMC. It consists of military personnel at the levels of Chiefs of Defence who report back to the PSC on the military policy of the EU. The EUMC may initiate proposals and is responsible for maintaining an official military relationship with non-EU countries and organizations. Formal consultations between the EU and NATO, however, will occur at the level of the PSC and the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The Chairman of the EUMC (CEUMC) acts as the primary Point of Contact (PoC) for the Operation Commander (OpCdr) during military
operations of the EU (European Council 2001b: 195). Meetings would occur between the EU and NATO twice a year at the highest level (once for each EU Presidency) and six times a year at the ambassadorial level (European Council 2001b: 193). The first meeting of the EU Military Committee and the Military Committee of NATO took place on 12 June 2001 (EU-NATO 2001).

The third structure is the EUMS. It is made up of the broader Military Staff, seventy or so in number, provided by the member states or contracted ad hoc. Their responsibilities include the monitoring of political developments, the assistance in the provision of strategic planning for the upkeep of the Petersberg tasks. They also entail the identification of European national and multinational forces and the frequent liaison with national and multinational military headquarters. Most importantly, however, the Staff would provide the military expertise necessary to implement the CFSP and to ensure that the EU has sound military options upon which the ERRF could act (European Council 2001c: 196). Part of this responsibility includes developing military strategic options and the preparation of military directives to the OpCdr for the EUMC.

Finally, a lesser, although indispensable, structure needs to be examined. All of the above three institutional structures are dependent on secure lines of communication and have access to intelligence and pieces of analysis prepared by the EU’s Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN). This is processed on the basis of open source as well as confidential information provided by national and EU sources (Muller-Wille 2004: 19). The problem of national ‘spin’ on the intelligence sources provided for evaluation is solved through a process of cross-checking and triangulation (Meyer 2006: 115).
The question that arises after all these advancements in institutional structures within the EU is whether they have contributed to the convergence of strategic cultures among member states. This is not a simple question to answer, least of all with any amount of certainty. Any informed evaluation is hindered by the brief existence of these structures and the limited amount of empirical data available. As a preliminary assessment of the question, however, it becomes evident from interviews and surveys done on EU institutions and committees (Meyer 2006; Juncos and Pomorska 2007; Duke 2005; EUMS staff 2004; European Commission staff 2006) that an esprit de corps does exist within them, even if it does not always translate into problem-solving discussions that have the capacity to bring about attitude change through learning and adaptation (Meyer 2006: 136). Overall, one can argue that the greatest contribution of these new ESDP structures towards the formation of a European strategic culture, and one that cannot be discounted, is the creation of physically closer relationships between representatives from the member states in matters of a common security. To maintain a good working order, these relationships have to be based on mutual confidence and respect. These working principles can then be disseminated among member states, including the most sceptical ones (e.g. the UK). We will now turn our attention to developments in European security on the civilian level. This can be seen as a further contribution to the development of a common strategic culture as it brings European cooperation on security and defence down to the local level.

The Göteborg Summit, under the Swedish Presidency, brought to the foreground the issue of crisis management on a civilian level (European Council 2001d). EU leaders agreed on new targets for the civilian aspects of crisis management and adopted the ‘EU Program for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts’ (European Council 2001d: 30).
“The European Union is committed to developing and refining its capabilities, structures and procedures in order to improve its ability to undertake the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks, making use of military and civilian means” (European Council 2001d: 30).

As reflected in the Presidency report it was recognised that the introduction and subsequent emendations to the role of the ESDP have strengthened the Union’s capacity to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter (European Council 2001d). In regard to the civilian aspects of crisis management it was decided that these would focus on the preservation of the rule of law. Granted that on any given mission civilian resources on a local level would be sought after to supplement EU resources (especially human resources), the overall aim of this provision was to reinforce the overall EU capabilities in times of crisis. Finally, according to the new targets set in Göteborg, member states should voluntarily contribute up to two hundred officials to that end by 2003. Following up on the Helsinki Headline Goal (1999), during the workings of the European Council in Laeken (December 2001), EU leaders launched the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) and declared that the EU was now capable of conducting some crisis management operations (European Council 2001e).

The year 2002 has to exhibit few developments in terms of new institutions in the areas of defence and security. Officials were mostly preoccupied with the upcoming EU enlargement by a further ten members from the Eastern parts of Europe and with the negotiations of the modalities governing the EU-NATO co-operation. The latter was particularly nuanced by the dispute regarding the degree of control of non-EU European NATO members over decision-making for operations led by the EU. Turkey was particularly worried regarding the autonomy of the ESDP as envisaged in the St Malo Summit. Agreement on the issue was
finally reached with the Declaration of EU-NATO on ESDP, the so-called Berlin-Plus agreement of December 2002 (EU-NATO 2002). Following three long years of negotiations, the Copenhagen decision on enlargement, US pressures and, most importantly, the electoral victory of Tayyip Erdogan’s party in Turkey cleared the way for the ratification of the Nice provisions regarding ‘Berlin-Plus.’ The Brussels agreement of 16 December 2002 thus prompted the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO on crisis management. The Berlin-Plus arrangements cover three main elements that are directly connected to operations and which can be combined. These include: EU access to NATO planning, NATO European command options and the use of NATO’s assets and capabilities.

The following year, 2003, was marked by the repercussions in EU policy of the US invasion of Iraq. Despite the severe disagreements over the issue of Iraq the Union managed to put the bases for several important innovations that were to affect its future course. The European Security Strategy (ESS) was introduced in Thessaloniki (European Council 2003: 142) and, subsequent to the finalization of the Berlin-Plus agreement the previous year, the first military operations, Concordia and Artemis, were launched in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) respectively. Concordia was launched on 31 March and was the first EU operation that drew on NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin-Plus arrangement. It involved 350 lightly armed military personnel and was scheduled to be in operation for six months. Artemis, on its part, was the first EU military operation outside Europe without NATO assistance. It involved the deployment of 1,800 military personnel, mostly French, whose aim was to stabilise the security situation in Bunia, the capital of the Ituri province in DRC. Both operations were instrumental in breaking the taboo regarding the use of military power on
the part of the EU for crisis management purposes, thus arming it with an extra tool in their box of competencies, namely confidence. Additionally, the ESS (European Council 2003n) provided the Union with an innovative document that outlined the pillars upon which its foreign policy would be based. ‘Effective multilateralism’ was the key notion.

In the European Council at Thessaloniki in June 2003 (European Council 2003l), amidst Iraq-induced disagreements between member states, the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, presented a draft paper for a European Security Strategy.22 The Council also adopted the ‘Declaration on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (European Council 2003l: 150) that included the ‘Basic Principles’ for an EU strategy against the proliferation of WMD and the resulting ‘Joint Action Plan’ that was to implement these principles. Further, the succeeding presidency (Italy) was tasked with drawing up plans for the establishment of an EU agency in the field of armaments, which later became known as the European Defence Agency (EDA) (European Council 2003l). An examination of these documents confirms that the Union recognised the necessity of a broad approach and also that political and diplomatic preventive measures and resort to the competent international organisations formed ‘the first line’ of defence. In this respect, the Union supported the establishment of additional verification instruments within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regime, including non-routine inspections, the strengthening of export control mechanisms and the pursuing of an international agreement on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons (European Council 2003f). The Union called for a stronger partnership with the United States and Russia. Most importantly, it recognised that coercive measures, including the use of force as a last resort, in accordance with the UN Charter, could become necessary when political and diplomatic measures would

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22 The analysis of the ESS and its effects on European strategic culture is examined in detail in Chapter Five.
have failed. The declared intention was to render multilateralism more effective by actively promoting the universalisation of the main treaties, agreements and verification arrangements on disarmament and non-proliferation. Additionally, a further intention was to foster the role of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on this issue, to enhance political, financial and technical support towards the smoother execution of the verification processes and to strengthen export control policies. Furthermore, enhancing the security of proliferation-sensitive materials and strengthening identification, control and interception of illegal trafficking was included in the intentions of the Union (European Council 2003a: 108). Finally, of paramount importance to this thesis is the fact that the report on the ESDP produced in Thessaloniki included the first official mention of the term ‘security culture’ in a European Union context (European Council 2003m: 157). The EU officially recognized the potency of military force as part of its pallet of options. (European Council 2003n: 7) Furthermore, it stressed the need for multilateral solutions and adherence to international treaties and law.

Building on the success of Operation Artemis (see chapter VI), France, Germany and the United Kingdom presented in February 2004 the so-called ‘battle group’ concept with a view to improving the capacity of the EU for rapid reaction (UK/France/Germany 2004). Two months later, EU defence ministers approved the trilateral proposal, transforming it into a European initiative (General Affairs and External Relations Council 2004a). According to this concept as it is outlined in the trilateral proposal (UK/France/Germany 2004: 10-16), battle groups (or ‘tactical groups’) of 1,500 troops, including the appropriate support elements that could be ready for deployment within fifteen days, would be formed. They should be capable of high-intensity operations, either as stand-alone forces or as initial entry forces for operations on a larger scale. In order to be deployable within a fortnight, battle
groups would need to be fully manned, equipped and trained. At the same time, member states providing battle groups ought also to earmark sufficient strategic lift assets to ensure deployment in that short time span. In line with the ESS, these forces would be designed specifically, but not exclusively, for use in response to requests put out by the UN. The aim would be to establish two to three such high-readiness battle groups by 2005, and seven to nine by 2007. In this manner, the ‘first-stop’ option for EU rapid response would be provided, particularly relevant for crisis management operations in failed or failing states (European Council 2004f: 297). Battle groups could be formed by a single nation, by a lead nation with other nations contributing niche capabilities, or as a multinational formation, in the case where individual countries are unable to contribute a complete battle group. As the concept is based on small force packages, it significantly increases the flexibility of the Union’s armed forces, and as such constitutes an important step towards the Headline Goal of 2010:

“Member States have decided to commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union.”

In 18 July 2005, in an effort to address a demand for a more homogenous mentality in the field of military command the European Council introduced the creation of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). The ESDC was to be based on a network between national institutes, colleges, academies and institutions within the EU dealing with security and defence policy issues, as well as on close co-operation with the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) (European Council 2005a: 236). The need for a homogenous military culture was first addressed in official documents with the declaration of

the EU training concept for the ESDP, which took place in the General Affairs and External Relations Council in Brussels on 13 September 2004 (General Affairs and External Relations Council 2004b). The aims of the European Security and Defence College reflected the entire reach, civilian and military, of the European Security and Defence Policy (European Council 2005a: 237). It was deemed important for civil servants and military officers alike to have a common training on the ways to make the best use out of the instruments that the EU has at its disposal. In compliance with that notion, the promotion of personal contact and the formation of ties amongst its participants were one of the College’s essential goals. The College would constitute an introductory vehicle for civil servants and military officers from the new member states of the EU, as well as from regional or international organisations to familiarise themselves with the ESDP. The courses taught at the ESDC included European Security and Defence Policy and its relation to civilian and military capabilities (including early warning) for crisis-prevention and management; the study of EU institutions and procedures and European instruments and legal aspects of the EU; an induction into the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy; coordination and co-operation over crisis prevention and management between the EU and regional and international organisations and, finally, co-operation with non-governmental organisations. The overarching principle that would govern its running would be the effort to enhance the European security culture within the ESDP (European Council 2005a: 237). That being said, even if in reality the ESDC is nothing other than a ‘virtual’ college without a permanent campus or a budget it, nonetheless, serves a very important purpose in the preparation of EU cadres from different member states and, hence strategic backgrounds, for the way the EU functions. It also provides them with a first taste of the culture that prevails in the Brussels corridors.
The progress in the fields of security and defence that took place in the years following the end of the Cold War was substantial. From a practically non-existent status, the Union embarked in a process of strengthening the related institutions, which had as their focus the provision of coherence in the fields of security and defence. The Union, as is its preference in most areas of involvement, moved with small and cautious, yet meaningful, steps. The introduction of EU institutions specialising in security and defence made the gradual development of a more coherent strategic culture possible. These institutions provided the fora where people could discuss EU foreign and security policies and where decisions and recommendations for decisions could be made. The first decade of the twenty-first century has been extremely productive in the area of European security and defence. The launch of the first EU operations (Concordia and Artemis) and the production of the first purely strategic documents (ESS) put the process of the forging of a European common strategic culture in motion. When a political unit, in our case the EU, realises the need for a concerted strategic plan on security and defence, it inadvertently initiates the process for the creation of a particular type of strategic culture. Conversely, inaction can only breed a culture of inaction. Put simply, if one supposes that a political unit does not need to have a unit security strategy then it cannot possibly develop a strategic culture. The effect of theory and action from the part of the Union on the field of security and defence will be examined in detail in the following two chapters of this thesis. Suffice to say at this point that traits of a common European strategic culture can be traced in the EU operations that have taken place in the very recent past and in the ESS document, as this was conveyed in 2003. The principles of humanitarian intervention, outward-orientation and multilateralism are sustained as elements of a common European strategic culture in both the rhetoric and the actions of the Union, thus supporting our initial proposition of their existence.
European Defence Initiatives Revisited

European efforts for a common defence and a security strategy throughout the post WWII period are as much alike as they are different. During this period, European decision-makers have been concerned mainly with three issues: the balancing of the UK between its European and transatlantic priorities; French concerns over German intentions and power and the former’s unique view on the levels of European integration and, finally, questions on the durability and the nature of US commitment to Europe. In order to assess the similarities in the basic assumptions behind any integrated defence initiative we will look briefly at each of the above concerns in turn.

The UK has traditionally been the nation that resisted and in many cases blocked efforts made for the creation of a common European defence policy. London believed that it could not serve both Europe and the US, as being a good European was mutually exclusive to being a good Atlanticist (Roper 2000: 9). During the Cold War, the UK did not appear willing to consider any alternative for European security other than NATO and the US commitment to it. By extent, it exercised an effective veto on any structured linkage between the EEC/EC/EU as an institutional organisation and European defence issues. As a result, this attitude frequently condemned to failure or irrelevance any initiatives, which aspired to establish such a linkage.24 The main concern for the UK was that the creation of a militarily more self-sufficient Europe would push Washington into isolationism and NATO into collapse. Formulated first at Whitehall at the beginning of 1947, that remained the UK’s official stance throughout the Cold War up until St Malo in 1998. Its veto served as an impassable blockade to any movements towards a more integrated European security. NATO was the sole guarantor for Europe’s security and that was not negotiable (Howorth

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24 Examples of UK blocking of EU defence or security policy initiatives: 1947 (creation of Western Union); 1950-54 (introduction of EDC); 1962 (proposal of Fouquet Plan); 1997 (merger of EU and WEU).
2000a). Upon his return from the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in June
1997, Blair reported to the House of Commons along the same lines of policy:

> Getting Europe’s voice heard more clearly in the world will not be achieved through merging
> the European Union and the Western European Union or developing an unrealistic
> Common Defence Policy. We therefore resisted unacceptable proposals from others. Instead
> we argued for – and won – the explicit recognition, written into the treaty for the first time
> that NATO is the foundation of our and other allies’ defence (House of Commons June
> 1997, col. 314, quoted in (Roper 2000: 9)).

Moving on to the second concern mentioned above, France had adopted throughout the
Cold War period and during its aftermath the position that the main lesson to be learnt from
the two World Wars, as well as that of the Cold War, was that Europe should not remain
dependent upon the US as an ally for its security and that it should organise its own
autonomous security structures. This should nevertheless be achieved in close coordination
with NATO and Washington, which, in the French view, were bound to remain
indispensable allies, although they should not be allowed to hold ultimate authority in
decision-making (Howorth 2000b: 48). Owing to her defeats from Germany in the World
Wars France had always been extremely sceptical about the true intentions of its former rival.
Building on a stance that could be described as reflecting an “if you’re not with us you’re
against us” attitude France valued further integration in Europe with Germany as a major
cornerstone of European defence. This was highlighted by the French position regarding the
matter of German re-unification, which bore fruit only after Helmut Kohl (the German
Chancellor during re-unification) made express reassurances to Germany’s former European
World War enemies. These reassurances, which appealed particularly to France, included
putting increasing emphasis upon the link between German re-unification and increased EU integration (Stirk 1996: 220).

Lastly, the issue of the degree of US involvement in European security and defence has been in the foreground since the American intervention in World War I. Following the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, the matter was rather put to rest by the need of the European continent for the American nuclear umbrella and the strategic cover that this offered. France was in effect the only European state to challenge this dependence. Under the leadership of de Gaulle, the Republic took steps to distance itself from American protection. Nevertheless, the core justification of US presence in Europe was never challenged. After the end of the Cold War, voices from both sides of the Atlantic questioned this involvement. Issues such as burden sharing and differences in world strategic views surfaced once again. It was interesting to note that despite the dissolution of the two blocs and the radical re-arrangement of spheres of interest in the international arena, European leaders remained divided in their opinions regarding two very important matters. The first one was connected to what was needed to keep the US involved in Europe and the second to whether the Europeans actually wanted to construct an independent, integrated defence and security policy. In regard to continuity, Deighton observed that ‘it is an ironic but inescapable fact that for Western Europeans the two great security conundrums of the Cold War remain much the same in the post-Cold War period’. (Deighton 1997: 169).

There are, however, a number of historical differences between the conditions in 1954 and those prevailing at the beginning of the 21st century. First of all, the motives behind the various attempts towards the building of a common European defence and security policy varied considerably. In the 1950s, the main target of these efforts was to contain and control a re-armed Germany. A re-armed German state was vital for the defence of Europe against
the USSR, but there were always reservations, mainly entertained by the French Republic, regarding the future attitude of Germany (Grosser 1963: 554). According to the French perspective, West Germany should not be too powerful to pose any threat to France, but it should be militarily strong enough to provide a screen against USSR aggression and possible attack. In the 1960s, the containment of Germany still figured high among the priorities of the proposed defence initiatives. However, during this period this goal was accompanied by a will to escape from US patronage and to limit European dependence on US military capabilities for its defence (Grosser 1963: 564). Further up the timeline, the 1970s were shadowed by two oil crises, the Arab-Israeli conflicts and the struggle for détente. Added to these, the launch of Brandt’s Ostpolitik fuelled integration efforts. In the 1980s little progress was effected in the spheres of security and defence apart from a few declarations, which culminated in importance with the Venice declaration (European Community 1980). The Venice declaration was initiated after the successive crises in the Middle East revealed that the European Community and the US held significantly different perspectives concerning the resolution of the Middle-Eastern question. Finally, the motivation behind defence initiatives in the 1990s can be placed on the will of European states to strengthen European defence capabilities under the light of the Kosovo crisis and the threats posed to European security by international terrorism. Crises have always been the spark that ignited European initiatives for the structuring of a policy of common defence and security. Hence, it can be argued that Europe was never at any point ahead of the developments. Rather, it found itself perennially responding to them, first with a series of declarations, and when the circumstances allowed, with a more robust action plan.

A second major difference between the first steps in a common European security and the current state of affairs is that the US is no longer a priori willing to guarantee Europe’s
security as it was during the Cold War. More importantly, it is no longer self-evident that the United States should guarantee Europe’s security. Given this caveat, if EU states fail in their attempt to establish a more independent security policy they might be doing so without the safety net of a US backdrop; at least not in the way this worked in 1954, when the EDC project fell through.

Thirdly, it is a fact that in the era of nuclear deterrence that was the Cold War, Europe could not provide for its defence. At present, nuclear war appears to constitute a further remote possibility. Projecting into the near future at least such a threat could not be considered to be at the top of the security agenda of European states. Currently, the most relevant security threats are that of intra-state conflicts and of terrorism. Both these types of threats underline the necessity for the EU to assume a dynamic role in its own defence. In fact, the United States on their part are urging European states to be more active in the management of their own security issues with the ultimate purpose of lessening the American burden (Albright 1998).

The fourth thing that has changed considerably during this period of fifty years is the degree of integration of European security institutions. The WEU lay dormant for the most part, NATO was little involved with the activities of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the EPC was reluctant to expand its modest security aspects (Duke 2000: 293). This situation has changed drastically in the last twenty years. The WEU became integrated with the European Union and through the ESDI, NATO increased its links with the EU to a greater extent (NATO Secretariat 2001: 97). There is room for more progress of course, especially as far as European Union integration mechanisms are concerned, but still great steps forward have been made. Presently, the degree of integration
achieved has been such that it can be argued that the success or failure of ESDP is not something that will leave NATO or the OSCE unaffected.

Finally, the role of NATO has changed radically after the conclusion of the Cold War. The threats faced no longer involve an attack on a member state or the containment of Germany. Rather, efforts are concentrated on the handling of crises in the southern flank of the Alliance and on intra-state conflicts. This shift in focus facilitates the management of these crises since now frictions come from within the organisation and not from outside (Duke 2000: 294). Post-WW debates over the issue of European defence integration were largely academic in nature because of the specific circumstances of the Cold war and the dependence to the USA for Europe’s defence. The nature of post-Cold War debates, on the other hand, is rather more pragmatic since now they are more relevant to the actual future arrangements with respect to Europe’s defence without the guarantee of the USA.

**Conclusion: European Strategic Culture**

The first fifty years of the European Community were characterised by a sense of inactivity in the areas of security and defence. It was only with the introduction of ESDP after the St Malo Summit that the Union started to develop a common strategic culture; one that was no longer defined by inactivity and by unanimous declarations of no precise application, but one that advanced pro-action and active involvement in the affairs taking place outside the physical borders of the Union.

The first steps towards creating the foundations for a common European strategic culture can be placed in the early 1950s with the efforts to launch the EDC. It was during this process that co-operation, based on common values and common interests, was put on the table for the first time. The attempt failed miserably but the seed was planted. The ‘Gymnich’ meetings with their increased frequency of consultation were indications of what was yet to
come. By nature, strategic culture is not something that can be achieved overnight, nor in a year, not even in a decade. It is a process directly related to the passage of time and demands common formative periods. In this line of reasoning, the last fifty years do constitute a loosely defined common formative period, at least for the West European states. The steps taken were of variable speed and direction. Nevertheless, it is the process that counts. Brussels-based institutions and committees are expected by many commentators to be able to promote convergence in strategic thinking and culture in the area of use of force (Howorth 2002; Cornish and Edwards 2001; Martinsen 2003). Through that process, even in periods of stagnation for European integration such as the 1960s and the 1980s, the very fact that European elites maintained fora, either through the ‘Gymnich’ formula or through more official channels, where they could meet and discuss constituted in itself progress towards the forging of a common European strategic culture. The extent of interaction between European elites can be argued to have a bearing on an improved understanding of one another. By extent, this process of socialisation can facilitate the arrival to a common appreciation regarding, in our case, issues of security and as a consequence, to the proposition of commonly accepted solutions.

The introduction of different institutions within the framework of the Union these past fifty years has contributed greatly to the increased socialization of member states and the fostering of a common way of thinking and a common reaction to challenges. As much as this common approach and common culture is prevalent in the lower levels of EU administration it progressively diminishes as one goes higher up in the administrative pyramid (EUMS staff 2004). The move of all elements involved in crisis management (military staff accompanied by political and intelligence workers of units such as the Directorate General for External Affairs, the Policy Unit and the Joint Situation Centre)
from the Justus Lipsius building to the purpose-adapted Kortenberg building was a meaningful step towards integrating the various levels of power at the EU’s disposal during a crisis (Messervy-Whiting 2004: 84). In addition, the day-to-day socialization that this merging of ‘tools’ has brought about within EU institutions has promoted the forging of a common mentality and approach towards foreign relations and crisis management. According to an EU official, the first day that uniformed officials were seen wandering inside EU corridors they became the cause of many a turned head, awaking anti-militarist reflexes amongst employees (EUMS staff 2004). Today, military uniforms form part of the EU landscape and their presence has become inconspicuous (EUMS staff 2004). EU officials at this level have cultivated their sense of membership to an institution and manage to resist their own national preferences and mentalities in favour of the new organizational culture that has emerged (EUMS staff 2004). Nevertheless, on a practical level, when there is need for common positions and common actions on high politics issues, these are repeatedly hindered by displays of national interests. Similarly, when common opinions are actually forged, unilateral defection often follows (Glarbo 1999: 642).

Experiments concerning group dynamics have proven the degree to which these can influence individual cognitions, feelings and behaviours (Smith and Mackie 2000; Hogg 2005). Recent studies on the way that EU group dynamics influence individual ideas and practices have argued that there is an observed shift from national preferences towards a jointly constructed notion of a European public good without resource to processes of power-based bargaining (Fouilleux et al. 2005; Egeberg et al. 2003; Juncos and Pomorska

25 The Kortenberg building satisfied all the parameters of security for the sensitive areas of intelligence and crisis management.

26 A characteristic example is the debacle caused by the position of Poland over EU voting procedures (June 2007). Briefly, Poland threatened to block the drafting of the EU constitution if its voting rights within the EU were compromised by the proposed changes inherent in the Constitution (BBC news online 2007a)
Credibility, personal ability and expertise are often considered more important than the nation of origin of an EU representative (Egeberg et al. 2003: 20). As one diplomat claimed: “You have representatives from small Member States that can make a huge impact on and you have representatives from big Member States (...) that in spite of the size of their country do not influence the negotiations” (quoted in Juncos and Pomorska 2007). Furthermore, a ‘co-ordination reflex’ has been observed in the workings of EU committees and more specifically to the PSC (Pijpers et al. 1988: 56; Glarbo 1999: 643). The reflex refers to the habitual tendency by national diplomacies to arrive to policy proposals with co-operation partners before an ensuing unilateral or bilateral action is implemented (Glarbo 1999: 644). In the words of an insider: « [l’]habitude de travailler ensemble rend plus facile, et aussi plus normale, la recherche d’un consensus dans une situation nouvelle » (de Schoutheete, quoted in Glarbo 1999: 644).

The Venice Declaration was the product of such a process. In spite of its declaratory element, it constitutes a pivotal document in the history of the EU since it outlines the earliest official position of the EEC on a foreign policy issue. The importance of this document is accentuated by the fact that at present, almost thirty years after its production and after several EU enlargements, it remains the prototype of EU policies to the Middle-East.

After the end of the Cold War, European forces were liberated from the pressures of the ‘Eastern threat’. The very need for a more coherent foreign policy exercised by EU forces, at once required and induced progress towards a common strategic culture. All defence- and security-related initiatives aided, implicitly or explicitly, the creation of the essential preconditions for the development of a common strategic culture within the Union. These foundations can be identified as the culture of common interest, the idea of co-operation on various levels and, in essence, the ability to identify what constitutes common interest, as

27 “The practice of working together facilitates, as well as normalises, the quest for a consensus in a novel situation,” Author’s translation.
opposed to remaining entrenched to national ones. A common strategic culture of course cannot be created overnight. It is the product of long-term socialisation and collaboration from the part of the EU elites on issues of common interest. The inclusion of the Petersberg tasks in the TEU was an important step towards the framing of a common defence policy. This move anticipated the provisions that formulated the ESDP, as the Petersberg tasks were endorsed verbatim in the Treaty of Amsterdam. The significance of the Petersberg tasks therefore also lies in their being the cornerstone upon which expectations of EU common defence policy objectives would be built and expanded (European Union 1992: Article 17). Another crucial development was the introduction of the position of the High Representative as it put a face to ESDP structures and provided a focal point to all those that worked in the field. By creating, in effect, the position from scratch, Solana managed to create an organisational culture by himself, thus raising the bar for future High Representatives very high (author’s interview 2005). A further step towards the development of a common European strategic culture was the establishment of the ESDC in 2005 (European Council 2005a). The European Security and Defence College was established with the explicit aim, **inter alia**, to support the forging of a common security culture in the Union. Indeed, the ESDC represents a major step towards that direction. Bringing people together has always been a significant aspect of the process of exchanging ideas and interacting with different cultures. The last couple of enlargements (1 May 2004 and 1 January 2007) have increased the number of cultures and mentalities in the EU from fifteen to twenty seven making integration ever more challenging. The purpose of the ESDC is to provide a training environment for all the potential workers of the EU, where they would be offered a more integrated opportunity to familiarize themselves with the structures of the Union. Socialisation is the first step towards the forging of a common culture, amongst disparate members. The former furnishes the common base upon which to build the latter.
This base is more readily provided by the orientation courses that the ESDC offers alongside the crisis management courses.

Another issue worth noting here is the different motivations of member states. Behind their willingness to support specific operations or initiatives, it is well-documented that each member state (Howorth 2000a; Meyer 2006; Mace 2004; Ulriksen et al. 2004), more often than not, has an individual reasoning alongside the official one. This individualism can be seen as a testament to the persistence of state politics and to the resilience of national interest in continuing to lay the rules of the game, regardless of recent and past advancements in integrationist policies. By consequence, when the Union, through the ESS, advances a break apart from the tradition of soft power and advocates a strategic culture that “…fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention” (European Council 2003n: 11) it is not with the same heart that all member states follow. This is precisely the Achilles heel of the entire European edifice; that individualism that member states exhibit whenever an important decision affecting national interests is to be made. This being the current state of affairs, it is only in time and only in the case of a sufficient convergence between national and European Union interests that we will eventually be in a position to speak of a common European strategic culture, as we have defined it earlier in this thesis. Until that time comes the interests of some member states might be converging, overlapping even, but will not necessarily be common throughout. This does not negate the possibility and indeed the probability that a common European strategic culture will emerge around crisis management as this is defined in the Petersberg tasks.

As far as our three proposed pillars of European strategic culture are concerned, one cannot fail but recognise that there was very little consideration afforded to them in the early years of European integration. It is only as we move to the close of the twentieth century that we
observe steps being taken towards that direction. In the case of the principles of just war on an individual state level, as much as they have been prevalent in the European intellectual (philosophical, religious and political) tradition they have, nevertheless, failed to be represented in actual policy implementations. We have plenty of examples in the last 50 years of wars by major or lesser European powers that did not satisfy to the slightest these principles. France fought dearly for its colonies (Vietnam, Algeria) Portugal for its part in Africa as well as Belgium. The case was worse for the European community as a whole as, especially in the early years, it lacked a foreign affairs dimension from its structure. Only with the introduction of CFSP with the Maastricht Treaty and the formulation of the ESDP later on do we see the principles of humanitarian intervention taking centre stage in EU discourse (Solana 2000) and documents, the ESS being a principal example of this change (European Council 2003n). In the area of actual policy implementation the principles of humanitarian intervention are slowly taking a more centre stage, as we are going to show in the next chapter, but still a lot has to be done until we can talk for a consistent and unified application of these principles.

Conversely, multilateralism was introduced early on in EEC/EU affairs. Even as a spin-off from membership to NATO and the OSCE or even WEU, multilateralism was always present in European affairs. Europeans governments realised early on that weakened as they were after two World Wars, their only option forward was to cooperate amongst themselves within an institutional framework that would bind its members to participation. In fact, it was one of the express reasons for the creation of the EEC to promote co-operation, i.e. to introduce multilateralism as a tool in solving crises and boosting progress and prosperity within its sphere of influence.
The European journey to union started as an inward looking one, aiming to bring peace to a suffering continent. The inward looking era ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Since then Europe has tried to reassert itself in the world stage. With the launch of the CFSP and the ESDP, the EU gradually started to look beyond its geographical borders and endeavoured to extend its influence where its interests lay. The outward orientation of the Union was the progressive outcome of its increasing confidence in its abilities to intervene successfully in non-European territories. Hence, the first EU military operation, *Artemis*, took place only when all the “pieces were in place” and only when there was a high degree of confidence that it would end up in success (author’s interview 2006). Since then, the amount of EU operations outside European Union borders has increased both in scope and in range with the EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) being currently the farthest away operation from Brussels yet launched (European Council 2005b).

The history of the defence initiatives of the second half of the twentieth century in Europe is not conclusive in its results as far as the creation of a strategic culture is concerned. It tells, however, an interesting story that can help us contextualise the progress that has been made in the last decade or so and appreciate the reasons that contributed to the emergence of a strategic culture now, as opposed to fifty years ago during the failed EDC project. In the period before the Maastricht Treaty, where the Union did not, in effect, possess any effective foreign or defence policy mechanism of its own, it is not possible to shed light on how it viewed the use of force nor how it perceived the prospect of its role as the coordinator of an integrated European foreign or defence policy. Progress pre-1992 was characterised by small steps frequently without concrete aims, which in the end were more often than not heavily watered down. They were, nevertheless, steps towards increased co-operation. Timing was crucial for the development of strategic culture, as a common European foreign
and defence policy during the Cold war would be an unworkable concept. As soon as that threat disappeared, the confidence of the EU about its abilities increased and it became more assertive about its place in the world arena. A common strategic culture could not be forged during the early years of European integration efforts. Political and strategic hindsight dictates that this was an unrealistic expectation. It can be argued that a strategic culture has started to develop after the Kosovo crisis and the initiation of the ESDP. It is currently in the process of being defined and having its unique parameters clarified. It is the purpose of the following two chapters to assess and elaborate on the existence of elements that foster the development of a European strategic culture in the operations and the documents that the EU has put forward since then.
Chapter V

EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

The European Union has shown repeatedly in the past that it has a major difficulty in coordinating its policies in the area of foreign and security affairs. The latest testament to this weakness was illustrated clearly in the events surrounding the war with Iraq in 2003. The EU did not manage to raise a single voice on the issue apart from some statements of principle that had little to offer to actual events. EU was divided between pro-war and anti-war nations with tensions rising and creating one of the worst crises inside the Union. Due to the profound differences between France and the United Kingdom on the matter, it was deemed by senior EU officials at the time that a common foreign and security policy as envisaged by the draft constitutional treaty of the EU would be very hard to implement (Roxburgh 2003). According to euro-sceptics, who found succour in this discord, “Iraq demonstrate[d] the futility of the EU’s pretensions” (Roxburgh 2003). On the other hand, the integrationists felt that the crisis would have been avoided “if the EU had one vote, Germany, France, Britain and Spain would have to agree and speak with one voice. Europe’s world view would prevail” (Roxburgh 2003). However, the aftermath of this precarious situation, which included the collapse of the Brussels European Council on the EU constitutional treaty in December 2003, had a certain advantage: it highlighted to European leaders that the absence of a shared threat assessment was a key element in defining the dissonance over Iraq.

The year 2004 included a plethora of new initiatives by the EU in areas directly related to foreign policy. Such included the development of a civil crisis management branch within the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), renewed diplomatic initiatives towards countries such as Iran, Turkey, and the Ukraine, the decision for the formation of battle
groups and the European gendarmerie, the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA), the launch of operation *Eujust Themis* in Georgia and *Althea* in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the new 2010 Headline Goal and, finally, the founding of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). Ultimately, the year 2004 was a milestone in EU history on a political level as well: it marked the enlargement to 25 Member States on 1 May, the renewal of the entire Commission and the European Parliament, the signing of the draft Constitution by the 25 Heads of State on 1 October –resulting in particular in the appointment of Javier Solana as the future Union Minister for Foreign Affairs– and the initial implementation of the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted by the European Council in December 2003. One of the basic premises of the ESS was that the EU “need[s] to develop a strategic culture” (European Council 2003n: 11). The ESS derives its importance from the fact that it makes an honest effort in codifying many elements of the European strategic culture in a single document that is accepted by all member states. No other EEC/EU document endeavours explicitly to provide a strategic framework for the use of force. All previous foreign policy documents, such as the Venice declaration and the different TEUs, stopped short or long from such a result. This chapter will attempt to explore the impact that the endorsement of the ESS document and subsequent security-related declarations by the European Union had on the development of a common European strategic culture. This premise will be tested against the three pillars of strategic culture that we have introduced in chapter III, i.e. the principles of ‘humanitarian intervention, the outward orientation of foreign policy and the commitment to multilateralism. Our purpose will be to examine whether the ESS (and its related documents) provide support for the aforementioned pillars.

**The Journey Towards the European Security Strategy**

The European Union, until the introduction of ESS, distinctively lacked a single comprehensive document that would tabulate its foreign policy goals and guidelines. At the
time of writing (2007), most member states of the European Union have such concrete
documents (France MOD 2002: ; United Kingdom 2003: ; German MOD 2006) but they
diverge greatly in the way that they approach issues on foreign and defence policy
guidelines,28 naturally focused on national needs and interests. The procedural aspect of
foreign policy formation within the EU involved that member states first formulated their
own foreign policies and then tried to find common ground with their counterparts. The
result of this intergovernmental understanding was that European leaders, in search of more
robust common strategic action plans for the future, commissioned Javier Solana to draw up
an EU security strategy. The first airing of this effort took place at the Thessaloniki summit
in June 2003 (European Council 2003I) and culminated in the voting of the European
Security Strategy at the Brussels European Council in 12 December 2003 (European Council
2003k: ; 2003n).

The international context surrounding the ESS was dominated by the war in Iraq, which in
practice was less of a nuisance than a convenience to its drafters, as it provided them with
the justification for the production of a more robust document. The lack of a specific UN
mandate concerning military involvement in Iraq in March and the fragmented EU backing it
received had created rifts and a widespread crisis of confidence within both the EU and
NATO. In stark contrast to their past collaboration in driving the creation of the Common
European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), France and the UK found themselves
leading the opposing sides. In the EU as a whole, normal CFSP processes were sidelined or
bypassed entirely. At the same time when notional EU ‘Common Positions’ were being
drafted and executed Solana’s position was being undermined by decisions taken by pro- or

28 For an updated list of European white papers see: http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html accessed 24 May 2007
anti-invasion groups of states.\textsuperscript{29} Observers worldwide noted that Europe’s divisions reflected a generalised inability of the Union to come to terms with the ‘new threats’ agenda that had guided the US Administration’s policies ever since 9/11. This agenda primarily involved terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the ‘rogue’ and ‘weak’ state regimes that have become associated with both threats (Jabko and Parsons 2005: 1). The pressing issue at the back of most observers’ minds was to what extent the hybrid composition of the EU, being an institution half-way between a state and an organisation, whose decisions were mostly based on unanimity and with a cumbersome legal framework to authorise its moves, could respond to the new realities of power and could assert its responsibilities in the new world system, where the ‘enemy’ made use of such unconventional methods of warfare (such as suicide terrorism) and could not be more alien to European mentality (Bailes 2005: 9). These reservations marked the backdrop against which Europe had to reassert its unity and improve its performance. However, by the time of the Iraq crisis the EU had already begun laying the foundations towards those objectives. More specifically, by 2003 the Union had adopted unanimously a number of significant positions that were in principle opposed to or critical of non-Iraq related aspects of the Bush Administration policy. A few examples of this opposition included the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on limiting emissions relevant to climate change, the accession to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) set to handle cases of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity to which the US opted out, as well as a series of transatlantic trade disputes.\textsuperscript{30} In regard to more concrete institutional dynamics, the Berlin Plus agreement, which provided the solution to the EU-NATO relations problem at the end of 2002 and the rapid launch of the first EU military and police operations redirected attention back to more

\textsuperscript{29} See for instance the ‘Letter of the Six’ supporting the war against Iraq (José María Aznar et al. 2003)

\textsuperscript{30} See further (Kuehler 2002)
fundamental issues, such as the need for a clearer ESDP policy framework. Last but not least, the work of the European Convention in 2002 and the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) which followed it, aiming at drawing up a new (and more comprehensible) EU ‘constitution’, created a climate in which it seemed pertinent and even necessary to re-organise the conceptual framework of the CFSP and the ESDP and to give them a similarly fresh articulation.

As early as 1980 with the Venice Declaration the EU had tried to establish some common ground with respect to foreign policy and the values that should underline it. Three years later the Solemn Declaration came to establish the need for the EEC to speak with a common voice on issues of foreign policy and place a special value to the multilateral approach needed in solving them. Back in 1999 with the definition of the ‘Headline Goal’, which provided the EU with military and civilian capabilities for crisis management, the lack of an overall strategic framework became obvious. In Article 11, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (European Union 2000: Article 11) did try to define the objectives of the CFSP, but these were statements of principle rather than policy objectives and hence far too general for any real practical usage by member states. As far as the role of the military instrument just created, the TEU stipulated the types of operations that the EU could launch. This was done by including in the text the so-called Petersberg tasks as originally defined by the WEU, in Article 17 –humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (European Union 2000: Article 17)– but without providing any guidelines as to the circumstances under which the use of military force could be considered. The issue was brought back to light at the back of 9/11 and the Iraq debacle making EU member states more willing to start considering an exercise in strategic thinking; something that was impossible during the first years of ESDP.
The individual motivations for each state might have been different, ranging from defining a distinctive ‘European way’ to preserving the transatlantic partnership, or somewhere in between. Whatever the individual motivation might be, the important thing was that the debate was brought in the foreground and the effort to translate policy practice in strategy had commenced (Biscop 2005: 13). Parallel to this endeavour was the European Convention and the Draft Constitution that it produced. Many during that period called for the formulation of a strategic concept which:

would develop the notions of comprehensive security, including conflict prevention, democracy building and economic development and also cooperative security with neighbouring regions, but – in order to be credible- should also contain a military capability underpinning the policies of the Union (European Convention 2002a: 4)

The final report of Working Group VIII on defence did state that

the concept of security is very broad, by nature invincible, and one that goes beyond the purely military aspects of covering not only the security of States but also the security of citizens. On the basis of this broad concept of security, the CFSP and the ESDP which forms part of it promote international security founded on multilateral solutions and respect of international law. Conflict prevention is a key element in the approach followed by the EU in international relations. The ESDP allows the EU military options over and above the civil instruments of crisis prevention and management (European Convention 2002b: 3-4)

The concept was not developed any further since it was out of the mandate of the Working group. That was done with the development of the European Security Strategy document. The process for that was set in motion with the Gymnich meeting of EU Foreign Ministers at Kastellorizo (Greece) on 2–3 May 2003. On that occasion, Solana was mandated to produce a ‘European strategy concept’ and present it at the next European Council. This
timing would also ensure that it was ultimately available for the next EU–US Summit (General Affairs and External Relations Council 2003b). In the weeks that followed the European Council mandated Solana and his team to consult with experts from within the EU and its think-tanks, but also from beyond, including the USA. Nevertheless, despite these consultations the drafting was kept under the close direction of a few key individuals.\footnote{31 The team featured, inter alia, the Head of the Council Secretariat’s External and Politico-Military Affairs Department, diplomat and author Robert Cooper and the Head of Javier Solana’s Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, Christoph Heusgen.}

The rationale behind this controlled supervision was that it offered the chance to maintain a ‘personal’, non-bureaucratic and user-friendly style (Bailes 2005: 11).

This first endorsement of the ESS occurred in parallel with the signing of the Accession Treaties of the ten new EU members that were expected to join the Union fully in the spring of 2004. The ESS pinpointed threats both beyond and within the borders of the Union, highlighting mainly terrorism and religious extremism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organised crime. Through concrete spatial references, it related the former two to threats associated with Middle-Eastern states and the latter with the Balkans (European Council 2003n: 3-4).

In line with the user-friendly focus, particular effort was put into keeping the document short. The final draft consisted of only sixteen pages. Under the title ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, this version was introduced by Solana at the Thessaloniki European Council meeting on 16 June 2003 (General Affairs and External Relations Council 2003a: 120). An indication of its positive reception was that, without substantial discussion, it was agreed on 20 June to welcome its recommendations and to commission Solana to present an ‘EU Security Strategy’ for adoption by the next European Council in December:
"…The European Council …tasks the SG/HR to bring this work forward, to further examine our security challenges, in close co-operation with Member States and the Commission, with a view to submitting an EU Security Strategy to the GAERC in order to be adapted by the European Council in December. This strategy should also encapsulate Member States’ interests and citizens’ priorities and constitute a living document subject to public debate and to review if necessary.” (European Council 2003: ¶ 54)

In the interim, between the Thessaloniki recommendations and the December EU Council, Solana worked with ‘Member States and the Commission’ to refine the text, which ‘should also encapsulate Member States’ interests and citizens’ priorities’. The resulting version was still not considered finalised, as, according to the Council’s mandate, it constituted ‘a living document subject to public debate and to review as necessary’ (European Council 2003; 2004). But let us review the follow-up steps after the Thessaloniki European Council more closely. To begin with, three research conferences were organised and held in Rome (19 September), Paris (6–7 October) and Stockholm (20 October) under the overall coordination of the EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS). The primary aim of these colloquia was to bring together academics and other independent experts from all parts of Europe, as well as extra-European powers like China, Russia and the USA, and join them in discussion with EU officials. The focus of the debates would be centred on the original document and in making suggestions both for a revised draft and for future action regarding the issues of threat prevention and management, EU objectives, military and political capabilities and policy coherence. The remainder of the timeframe, between October and December, was devoted to internal discussion between member states and the Commission. This intense round of consultation on all levels resulted in a number of amendments to the June text, which included changes of

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32 Summaries of the findings of these seminars can be found at the EU-ISS site [http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.html](http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.html), accessed 7 June 2007.
sequence and a number of more limited, albeit important, modifications on wording. The changes in sequence included the moving higher up in the text of the section regarding the motivations behind terrorist actions and the increased emphasis on “rule-based international order”. As for the wording, the toning down of WMD from the “single most important [security] threat” in the June text to “potentially the greatest threat for our security” in the December draft is exemplary. Changes of emphasis aside though, the document retained its initial character and style, as well as its user-friendly brevity. The resulting final draft was adopted, without considerable opposition, by the European Council at Brussels on 12 December (European Council 2003k). Solana, along with the next in line presidency (Republic of Ireland, January-June 2004) and in coordination with the Commission, were charged with the task to ‘present, as appropriate, concrete proposals for the implementation of the . . . Strategy’ (European Council 2003k).

Targets after ESS

The targets set by the EU with the ESS were long-term and in some respects could be considered as rather idealist. It follows that achieving a consensus on these would be an equally long process. In order to be perceived as something other than pure rhetoric these goals had to be supplemented by more concrete short to medium targets that could be readily measured in terms of success or failure. Such an approach would contribute to a more realistic evaluation of the document and the strategies involved. To that end, Solana proposed four short to medium goals that the EU should focus on immediately after the launch of the ESS. More specifically, it was decided by the European Council of December 2003 that in the short- and medium-term the main areas of follow-up for the ESS would centre on a) Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), b) the Greater Middle East, c) the fight against terrorism and d) the promotion of effective multilateralism, with the UN at its core.

33 Consider for instance the idealist nature of the statement propagating increased co-operation with the US: “acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world.”
At the time, no more specific deadlines or procedural instructions were laid down. What immediately strikes one as remarkable was the specific choice of these targets. Largely, they did not constitute anything innovative or radical for EU practices. Rather, they can be considered ‘old-fashioned’, simply concentrating on the obvious and skilfully avoiding the controversial. For years, Europe has been engaged with efforts to facilitate the Middle-Eastern peace process (e.g. with the 1980 Venice Declaration and through financing the Palestinian cause). In BiH, the presence of a European Commission delegation dates back to 1996, while EU funds have been committed to the area since 1991. In accordance to the political situation in BiH, EU objectives have constantly evolved from humanitarian aid to post-war reconstruction, leading to the present, where the Union is actively supporting BiH to reach EU economic and political standards. As far as EU relations with the UN are concerned, since the establishment of the CFSP in 1992 the European Commission, as the porte-parole of EU member states in areas where it has exclusive authority (such as trade and agriculture), has actively sought to coordinate EU policies with the UN. The importance of strengthening co-operation between the UN and the EU was re-emphasized in the Göteborg European Council of June 2001. It is intriguing to note that there was no reference to the burning, at the time, issue of Iraq, in an effort to avoid exacerbating the already consuming controversy in the inner circles of the Union. It is indicative that, at a time when there should have been a clear focus on actions and strategies for areas such as the Middle East and the Caucasus, the bulk of EU activity was concentrated on sub-Saharan Africa, ostensibly in view of the successful Operation ‘Artemis’. One therefore observes that while in theory the mandates of the ESS tipped the threat assessment agenda amongst EU members towards
homogenization, in practice, action was reserved for areas where controversy was minimal (author’s interview 2006). The same can also be argued for the European strategic culture. While a good case can be made in favour of its development and certainly of the desire for its formulation, it is clearly dependent on issues that create the least controversy and that enjoy EU-wide acceptance, thus remaining both shallow and narrow in character. But, let us look at these four targets in turn:

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

In June 2004 the European Council in Brussels endorsed a comprehensive EU strategy for BiH (European Council 2004o), which was explicitly identified as a mandate following from the endorsement of the ESS in December 2003. While the aim of this strategy was essentially to put BiH ‘irreversibly on the track towards EU membership’ (Solana 2004a), it also included a set of general, accompanied by more specific, measures to improve the coherence of the various activities and instruments of the EU in BiH. The special aim was to prepare the field for the impending EU takeover of the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) under operation Althea in BiH.

The EU launched the military operation European Union Forces (EUFOR) Althea in BiH, on 2 December 2004 in a seamless transition from the NATO SFOR mission (European Council 2004d).³⁴ This was the third military operation in the framework of the ESDP, following the EU military operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the EU military operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

³⁴ ‘Althea’ brings into mind the herb Althaea, named after the ancient Greek words ἀλθαία (althaea) and ἀλθαίνω (althaino) meaning to cure, to heal. Althaea Officinalis, commonly known as marsh mallow, was known to be used in medicine already since antiquity and is said to cure different kinds of ailments, Théophr. Historia Plantarum 9.15.5, LSJ (1968), s.v. ἀλθαίαι, ἀλθαίνω. Althaia is also a tragic figure in Hellenic mythology, known for having prevented her son’s fatal destiny by removing a burning branch from the fire, the incineration of which was to procure his death, (Apollodorus, Bibliotheca I VIII.1.3) (Hart et al. 1968). She is mistakenly attributed sometimes as a Greek goddess of healing. Nevertheless, the literary topos of delivering from death by fire serves as a strong metaphor for the peace-keeping and reconstruction program of the homonymous EU operation in BiH. See the history of EUFOR in BiH, http://www.euforbih.org/history/history.htm., accessed 19 July 2007.
Althea was, nevertheless, the first operation of such a comprehensive scope in terms of the range of instruments it intended to use and also in terms of strategy. For the first part, almost half a dozen times larger (7,000 deployed troops) than Artemis (1,400) and even more so than Concordia (350), Althea was by far the largest military operation the EU had ever launched. As such, it was linked to the previous civilian crisis management operations in place, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) and the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM). Also, unique to that operation was the fact that in addition to the twenty two EU members that participated, eleven more countries had contributed troops, two of which were Muslim states.35

In terms of strategy, Althea’s mission was much broader than those of the other EU operations. Set as the provision of support for the building of regional peace, security and democracy36 it was an ambitious task. So much so, that alongside the NATO SFOR precedent, it did not allow for the setting of specific timelines for engagement.37 Overall, however, operation Althea was instrumental in reinforcing the political engagement of the EU, its assistance programmes and its ongoing police and monitoring missions in BiH. It provided support to the ongoing Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which was designed to help BiH and other Western Balkan states to make further progress towards European integration, paving their way to future accession.38

The main objectives of EU assistance towards that goal were to help consolidate the peace process and foster inter-entity co-operation; to help ethnic reconciliation and the return of refugees and displaced persons; to help establish functioning institutions and a viable democracy; to lay the foundations for

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35 These were: Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Morocco, Norway, New Zealand, Romania, Switzerland and Turkey.


37 The NATO SFOR was scheduled to remain in BiH for 18 months and its presence lasted for over a decade.

38 The SAP was officially endorsed by the EU and the Western Balkan states including BiH during the Zagreb Summit in 2000, see Zagreb Summit Final Declaration in (Zagreb Summit Declaration2000)
sustainable economic development and growth; and to bring the country closer to EU standards and principles (European Council 2004k). The problematic aspect of this whole process was that, under the supervision of the High Representative for BiH, the country was not a proper independent state. Rather, it was an international protectorate of NATO and now of the EU. In order to have any long-term success the state itself should be strengthened. To the present, one could argue that the results of this effort have been disappointing (author’s interview with EUMS staff 2006). It is indicative that the Office of the High Representative, set to expire at the end of June 2007, was extended for one additional year.39 Thus, the EU has found itself not only engaged in securing the implementation of a peace agreement, but also in the process of state building.

Among its short-term successes, operation Althea can count the fact that it has managed to increase deterrence and reassure local populations of their security by promoting its visibility and establishing its credibility from the outset. EUFOR, perceived as the military force responsible for safe-keeping, has also gained support with the local authorities. Whilst not a police force, EUFOR has been considered instrumental in the fight against organized crime by putting pressure on such networks and by developing and reinforcing the capacity of local police and law enforcement agencies against them (author’s interview with EUMS staff 2006). Through establishing co-operation with the local authorities, EUFOR has been able to upset the flow of support to the inductees of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Considering all of the above, the EUFOR presence in BiH has contributed, in a complementary way, to the creation of a more stable and secure

environment, in compliance with the mandates of the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement.\(^{40}\) While the EU intervention in BiH does not involve the use of hard power it can clearly satisfy the principles postulated by the ‘just’ war tradition. Its main aim was to redress the transgressions that the people of BiH had suffered during the civil war and ensure that hostilities in the region were not rekindled.

**Middle East**

In theory, the resolution of the Middle-Eastern Question features high on the EU agenda ever since the Venice Declaration in 1980, which included the formulation of the basic stance of the EU regarding the Middle East Peace Process (European Community 1980). In practice, however, no autonomous and innovative action has been taken outside of the framework set by the *Roadmap for Peace in the Middle East* developed in association with Russia, the UN and the US (also known as the ‘Quartet’ of international powers) in 2003 (European Council 2004\(^{o}\)). The same line of policy, which envisaged a permanent two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by 2005, was maintained in the European Council meeting in Brussels in June 2005 (European Council 2005\(^{c}\)). In spite of the fact that the Roadmap had demonstrably failed to deliver its objectives within the set timeframe, the EU reiterated that it welcomed all progress and reasserted its support of the Quartet Roadmap and all the past resolutions and declarations (European Council 2005\(^{c}\)).\(^{41}\) Apart from statements of purpose, the EU has been actively involved in the area as the main economic sponsor of the Palestinian Authority since 2000 (author’s interview with Representative to CIVCOM 2006). Just for the year 2006 the European Commission has allocated from the Community Budget around €330 million for the Palestinian people under the auspices of the *Temporary*

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\(^{40}\) In February 2007, operation *Althea* implemented a downsizing of mission numbers from 7,000 troops to a force of 2,500. The move is relative to the fulfilment of *Althea* objectives (European Council 2007).

\(^{41}\) i.e. The Venice Declaration of 1980, the Berlin Declaration of 1991 and the Seville Declaration of 2002.
*International Mechanism* (TIM).\(^{42}\) These funds targeted areas such as the promotion of social and economic reforms in Palestine, humanitarian assistance to refugees and more medium-term institution building. The results of this massive fiscal investment are questionable and some have argued counter-productive (Steinberg 2004). The fact remains, however, that the EU recognises the significance of the area in the world system and values stability in the region. The specific inclusion of the Middle-Eastern Question in the ESS document and the importance it is granted “Regional Conflicts […] impact on European interests directly and indirectly […] above all in the Middle East”, (European Council 2003n) underpins the argument that the EU is becoming more concerned with its near abroad in a proactive way. The ESS document highlights the realisation that, as the EU enlarges and member states’ interests begin to converge, the responsibility to act according to its increasingly more credible status as a global actor becomes more pressing. As revealed by EU involvement in the Middle East and elsewhere this realisation has translated to the Union’s increasing outwards-oriented approach to its objectives.

**Fight against Terrorism**

Even though the fight against terrorism does not fall directly under the realm of the ESDP, it is nevertheless the area that has seen the most concrete action by the EU. The EU’s own “War on Terror” started after the 11 March 2004 bombing in Madrid that was consequently linked with al-Qaeda. The EU anti-terrorist programme did not involve the robust reaction and subsequent action of the US after 9/11, despite the fact that the ESS in itself is in tune with the US approach in identifying the worst-case scenario as a nexus between WMD proliferation, terrorist networks and rogue states (United States 2002); Rumsfeld ABC

interview, 2002 #509}. According to the ESS “the most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction. In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for States and armies” (European Council 2003n). Instead, the European response involved a mixture of tools aimed at increasing the soft power capabilities of the Union, i.e. enhancing intelligence and police co-operation among member states. These tools ranged from the introduction of the position of a senior EU Anti-Terrorism Coordinator answering directly to Solana at Brussels,43 to the inclusion of the ‘solidarity’ commitment in the event of terrorist attacks in the draft of the Constitution (article 42). The latter was designed for immediate adoption by all EU members. These proposals by the EU were included in the European Council Declaration on the aftermath of the Madrid bombings, on 25-26 March 2004 (European Council 2004e). On the “Declaration on Solidarity against Terrorism” the European Council emphasized that to that end member states “shall mobilise all the instruments at their disposal, including military resources” (European Council 2004e). While this statement could be interpreted as a green light for the use of all the military resources of the Union with the goals to prevent, protect and assist (European Council 2004e), in practical terms, it can be viewed as fostering the allowance for a more robust coercive action against terrorist elements and terrorist retreats, hitherto lacking from EU strategic planning. Irrespective of which interpretation one chooses to emphasise, this statement of intent manages to bring the use of force to the foreground of the EU security agenda. The required consensus in the decision-making processes of the member states implies a sharing of risks and responsibilities, which, in turn, points to a corresponding sharing of instruments and policies, hence marking a step closer to the formation of a common strategic culture.

43 Gijs de Vries, the former Dutch deputy Interior Minister, who was first appointed to this position, was quickly nicknamed the Anti-Terrorism Czar.
A few months later, in 26 June 2004, the EU, along with the US signed the “EU-US Declaration on Combating Terrorism” on the Summit of the two powers in Dromoland Castle (European Council 2004c). In the spirit of the ESS, which highlighted the working partnership between the EU and the US as “irreplaceable” (European Council 2003n), this document outlined the various areas of EU-US cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The objectives of this cooperation targeted a deepening in international consensus and the enhancement of international efforts to combat terrorism. An increased effort to prevent access by terrorists to financial and other economic resources, as well as the maximizing of common capacities to detect, investigate and prosecute terrorists and prevent terrorist attacks was deemed of utmost importance. Finally, additional measures that would enhance security in transportation and would ensure effective systems of border control were deemed necessary. The concluding part of the agreement included a pledge in developing capabilities for dealing with the consequences of terrorist attacks and the long-term foreign policy goals of countering the underlying conditions that allow for the proliferation of terrorist action (i.e. lack of democratic institutions, rule of law etc.) and of taking proactive measures against third countries whose “commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced” (European Council 2004c).

Following that, on 22 November 2004 the General Affairs and External Relations Council produced a document entitled “Conceptual Framework on the ESDP Dimension of the Fight against Terrorism” (European Council 2004c). In line with the previous declarations on combating terrorism as well as the ESS, it also tried to tabulate the different ways in which available assets could contribute in a concerted way to European efforts in this context. The Framework clarified the six basic principles based on which the ESDP would make its contribution to the ‘war on terror.’ These principles included: a) the solidarity
between EU member states, b) the voluntary nature of the asset contributions of member states, c) a clear understanding of the terrorist threat and the full use of available threat analysis, d) cross-pillar co-ordination in support of the EU common aim in the fight against terrorism, e) co-operation with relevant partners. The final principle ascertained the complementary nature of the ESDP contribution, in full respect of the responsibilities of the member states in the fight against terrorism and with due regard to considerations of appropriateness and effectiveness.

The document placed particular emphasis on the necessity for concerted action by member states and the “effective and swift cross pillar co-ordination” (European Council 2004c). Multilateralism was therefore put into the centre of European strategy against terrorism in two ways: as a cross institution and as an EU internal practice. Further, it recognised four main areas of action for the European Union under the ESDP, which included prevention, protection, response and consequence management and support to third countries in the fight against terrorism. In this respect, it accentuated the interoperability between military and civilian capabilities; an area that has long suffered from a lack of co-ordination (author’s interview with Representative to CIVCOM 2006). The Framework concluded with several concrete proposals that were deemed suitable for implementation in the immediate future. To begin with, these proposals included the incorporation of the terrorist threat in all relevant scenarios in the framework of the Headline Goal 2010, the Requirements Catalogue 2005, as well as the future Civilian Headline Goal. As far as intelligence was concerned, the Framework promoted the further cooperation and exchange between Defence Intelligence Organisations, with the aim of covering the range of terrorist threats that could affect EU interests both within as well as outside of the Union. In addition, the elaboration of a detailed report, which would include proposals based on real life incidents and experiences
from the field of military and civilian interoperability, was recommended for the consideration of the Council. The immediate and very real aim of this report was to maximise efficiency in civilian protection in the event of a terrorist attack. In the case of material preparations, it was emphasized that the improvement of the protection of all personnel, materials and assets deployed under Title V of the TEU constituted a priority. Similarly, it was highlighted that ongoing work in view of deepening and widening the content of the military database of military assets and capabilities relevant to the protection of civilian populations against terrorist attacks should be consolidated and that cooperation with third countries should be strengthened. Further, it was proposed that a visible and effective rapid response protection capability, which would be a component of EU-led crisis management operations, should be developed. Finally, the Framework authors deemed the enhancement of cooperation with NATO, in all relevant fields for the fight against terrorism, necessary (European Council 2004c).

In 2005, the efforts of the European Council in the area of security were mainly directed towards the implementation of these guidelines. At its meeting in Brussels on 16-17 June 2005, the Council did not have anything new to add concerning the current EU strategy against terrorism. It merely reaffirmed its resolution against it and sponsored the improvement of efforts in the implementation of past declarations (European Council 2005c). A report by the EU Anti-Terrorism Coordinator, de Vries, stated that while a lot of issues had been resolved, mainly those that fell under the second pillar, (such as the European arrest warrant, the setting up of the European Agency for Management of the External Borders and issues concerning the boycotting of the financing of terrorist groups), and while co-operation with the US had been “extremely positive”, there was still a lot to be
done in order to satisfy all the demands of the Action Plan to combat terrorism adopted in June 2004 (de Vries 2005).

In dealing with terrorism the EU has taken a distinctively different position compared to that of the US. While the US stresses the unilateral use of force as its tool in the ‘war on terror,’ the EU has demonstrated its preference for a more balanced approach, which encompasses a variety of tools in addition to the use of force. All EU resolutions and subsequent actions have at their centre the need for multilateral solutions and sponsor holistic approaches to the threat of terrorism. In regard to the question we posed at the beginning of this chapter, i.e. whether the ESS and the subsequent security-related documents support the development of an EU strategic culture, it can be argued that the dossier of terrorism exhibits elements of all of the three main pillars of strategic culture that we identified in Chapter III. To begin with, if one accepts the premise that the only just reasons for intervening militarily are to protect the basic human rights of life and liberty, then the EU anti-terrorist agenda, which, as mentioned above, seeks to prevent terrorist threats, protect civilians and democratic institutions and assist third countries in the event of a terrorist attack, fulfils these criteria. Secondly, the EU has recognised that terrorism is as much an internal problem as it is an external one. To this effect it has paid equal attention to both fronts. As the largest humanitarian aid provider in the world the EU has been able to use its bargaining power as a soft weapon to assist and, if need be, to coerce terrorist supporting states into revising their practices. Such an approach requires the outward orientation of the EU as it demands its vigilance for the identification of potential culprits and the taking of the appropriate actions. Last but not least, multilateralism is the cornerstone of the EU approach to the terrorist threat. The Dromoland Declaration and the Conceptual Framework put the co-operation

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44 Consider the suspension of EU and US aid to Palestine after the election of a Hamas-led government in January 2006, on the grounds that Hamas is considered a terrorist organisation. This move has led to a Palestinian financial crisis.
with other actors such as the US and EU member states at the heart of EU strategy. The EU is explicit in its lack of support for unilateral actions, at times compromising military effectiveness. It is a firm supporter of the use of the full array of tools in the fight against terrorism, all the more so perhaps because it has not yet reached the desired level of confidence in regard to its military capabilities, which can arguably be considered as the basis for the unilateralism of the US (Kagan 2002b; 2003).45

**Promoting effective multilateralism**

An ‘effective multilateral system,’ as defined by the ESS, denotes “the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order” (European Council 2003: 9). This concept refers to the global order and for the EU it is a non-negotiable principle that should guide world politics. ‘Effective multilateralism’ has been a core feature in EU foreign policy ever since the adoption of the ESS in December 2003. The same does not apply to the strong emphasis placed by the EU on the centrality of the role of the United Nations, which was introduced almost a decade earlier. Solana has famously argued that without the United Nations framework, “international relations would amount to nothing more than destructive competition” (Solana intervention Solana 2004a) The earliest articulation of the weight Europeans placed on collaboration with the UN dates back to the Common Concept of the WEU in 1995, where the importance of the strengthening of co-operative mechanisms for security and stability based on the principles of the UN Charter was acknowledged (WEU Extraordinary Council of Ministers 1995). Reflecting this spirit, two important documents were signed prior to the ESS in September 2003; the EU/UN Joint Declaration (European Council 2003o) and

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45 Consider the statement of the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, on the eve of seeking UN approval for the Iraq invasion. He made clear that this action did not mean that “we lose our option to do what we might think is appropriate to do”, see (Kagan 2002a).
the Commission’s Communication on EU/UN relations subtitled “The Choice of Multilateralism” (Secretary- General of the European Commission 2003). These documents focused on a comprehensive strengthening and mainstreaming of EU-UN relations and mapped out a framework for the co-operation of these two bodies in the field of crisis management (European Council 2004p).

The European Council of 17-18 June 2004 contributed significantly to the strengthening of the bonds between the EU and the UN in practical terms. It was agreed to explore further the modalities under which the EU could provide military capabilities in support of the UN, whilst granting that work concerning the provision for civilian capabilities still needed to be carried out (European Council 2004o). In addition, the Council settled for an EU contribution to the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. Importantly, an effort was made to address the gap between the up-to-120-day period of EU battle-group intervention and the force-generation process of the UN. Suggestions were made in the EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations document, included in the annexes of the Irish Presidency Conclusions presented on the same Council, which introduced the “bridging” and the “stand-by” models (EU- UN 2004: 119). The bridging model aimed at using EU forces as advance elements in order to buy time for the UN to prepare for a new operation or to re-organise an existing one (e.g. Operation Artemis). The stand-by model, which according to the Conclusions required complicated collaboration with the UN and whose feasibility necessitated further qualification, would consist of “an over the horizon reserve” or an “extraction force” provided by the EU in support of a UN operation. These developments reflected a positive new dynamic in EU-UN relations. However, they also betrayed a lack of political will amongst EU member states to tackle macro issues that bear upon the effectiveness of multilateralism, such as the reform of the UN, especially as regards the authorization processes for the use of force. The General Secretary of the UN,
Kofi Annan, acknowledged in September 2005 that “We have not yet achieved the sweeping and fundamental reform I […] believe is required” (BBC news online 2005c).

The EU has demonstrated so far that the flexing of its collective muscles can produce concrete results. According to Gowan, Iran’s apparent willingness in December 2003 to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) protocol had “more to do with the determination of Europe’s big three (the UK, France and Germany) than a Pauline conversion in the mullahs’ attitude to nuclear weapons” (Gowan and Leonard 2004: 8). Equally, at the same time, a World Trade Organisation (WTO) decision, prompted by a firm EU threat for sanctions of £2.2bn against the US for illegal trade tariffs on steel imports, forced President George W. Bush to surrender his plans (BBC news online 2003a). The EU is institutionally well-equipped to act in a multilateral framework. The phrase “effective multilateralism” captures both elements of the EU’s chosen path when acting internationally. On the one hand, ‘multilateralism’ essentially means institutionally legitimate (i.e. accepting constraints on action). On the other hand, ‘effective’ means pragmatic and conditional (i.e. envisaging exceptions and adaptation to legal rules in order to gain freedom of action). The crucial middle ground the EU wishes to occupy lies between legal rules and strategic necessity. According to Quille, strategic action requires both effective implementation and a constant search for multilateral consensus (Quille et al. 2005: 19). Of course, there is the heretic and much criticised view by Robert Kagan who has argued that the EU conceives of multilateralism as another way to constrain US behaviour (Kagan 2003).

In his annual CFSP speech, delivered in the 2005 Conference of the International Security Information Service (ISIS), Solana concluded by addressing the issue of multilateralism. He stated that the EU should continue to adhere to its principles and support multilateral regimes (Solana 2005). He emphasised that the need for collective international action to
tackle global threats—i.e. terrorism and organised crime—is generally accepted within EU
decision making circles. However, the failure of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review
Conference in May of the same year and the limited scope of the proposed UN reform
package showed that in practice collective action was difficult to organise. According to
Solana, one way to promote multilateral co-operation would be to mobilise regionalism. This
objective is clearly stated in the ESS: “Regional organisations also strengthen global governance”
(European Council 2003n). A channel, through which the EU promotes regionalism within
the EU, but also with its immediate neighbours by land and sea, is the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Its professed aim is to discourage the formation of renewed
dividing lines within the enlarged Union and its “near abroad”. Since its establishment in
2004, the Policy has proven instrumental inter alia in facilitating visa and re-admission
procedures for frequent travellers, such as students, businessmen and journalists and in
promoting bilateral and multilateral dialogue on key issues such as energy, public health and
the environment. Other regional organisations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Southern Common Market
(MERCOSUR) and the African Union (AU) are expected to make an equally important
contribution to a more orderly world (Solana 2005; European Council 2003n).

**European Strategic Culture in light of EU objectives after the ESS**
The ESS set two over-arching goals for the EU in the world arena. The first consisted of
transforming authoritarian and failing states—particularly in the Middle East and the former
Soviet Bloc, as well as in its ‘neighbourhood’— into democratic and well-governed political

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entities. The second involved an attempt to ensure that multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and the International Criminal Court remained relevant enough to avoid being side-lined by great powers such as the US, China and Russia. In another more introspective approach Solana granted that the long-term targets of the ESS were somewhat more ambitious:

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\text{[\ldots] beyond that vision of the world and of the Union’s role in the world, the European Security Strategy has another virtue, of a more institutional kind: as it is a long-term project, it also acts as a general framework for the CFSP, within which the specific priorities of each European Union presidency must now be handled. It therefore enhances the continuity of the Union’s security and defence policy, long before the provisions laid down in this area by the draft European Constitution are implemented. (Solana 2004b: 7)}
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One of the main drafters of the document, Robert Cooper, recognized in an unofficial capacity, that “once horizons have been broadened to achieve consensus, one must return to the business of developing more precise strategies and implementing policies” (quoted in Quille et al. 2005: 20). In effect, however, it has yet to be clarified how the ESS will offer a focus for consolidating the security gains from enlargement, (namely stability and integration) and provide the impetus to extend that security to neighbouring states. According to Quille, this ought to build on the success of enlargement and its focus on ‘stabilization’ and ‘partnership’ without ruling out ‘integration’ (Quille 2004: 427). It is without a doubt that the greatest success of enlargement was the process itself. It served as the carrot and the stick to the difficult adjustment process that the former Soviet Bloc states faced. It acted as the light at the end of a long tunnel towards prosperity and democracy and it helped in stabilising these countries in the fragile first years of their autonomous existence. Employing the same
tactic to the new outer ring of the Union is the challenge that the ESS has to face since the prospect of membership is not an a priori given.

The document itself is surprisingly well written, almost to a textbook level. It manages to identify all the main new threats that the EU is facing in the post Cold War era and embraces a more general definition of security and of what that means for a modern state. It is not merely concerned with security policy in the narrow sense, (i.e. the politico-military or ‘hard power’ dimension), but in effect covers all dimensions of the EU external actions in a distinct and ambitious comprehensive approach (i.e. including economic, political and legal instruments alongside military ones) (Biscop 2004: 42). In doing so, it correctly categorizes the various threats onto a scale of importance. While it is concerned with global warming, energy security and various regional crises, it puts more emphasis on four main threats to European security: terrorism, WMD proliferation, failed states and organized crime. This evaluation of threats coincided with the evaluation presented and explained in the US National Security Strategy document (United States 2002). The effort to bridge in a way a part of the trans-Atlantic rift, caused over the Iraq invasion, and the reality of sharing the same threat assessment as the US can be justified by the international political climate at the time. Nevertheless, the ESS cannot be seen as a transcript of the US National Security Strategy. While it acknowledges the same threats, it succeeds in proposing a fundamentally different approach to their solution. The ESS stresses that “today’s threats are more dynamic and more complex […] none of [them] is purely military; each requires a mixture of instruments” (European Council 2003n: 7). The US National Security Strategy (United States 2002) does refer to the use of ‘soft power’ policy instruments, such as humanitarian aid, the boosting of trade relations and democratization, as a source for solutions, but the actual implementation of these is primarily reserved for the war on terrorism and compromised by the dominance of
the military instrument. The EU approach to security and its commitment to the resolution of crises and threats through a mixture of tools alongside the military ones is far more robust in its comprehensiveness than that put forward by the US. The EU has already created a tradition, especially after the learning curve that was the crisis in Kosovo, in dealing with security threats in this way. There must be a kernel of truth in Kagan’s argument that part of the driving motor behind the emphasis on institutional, multilateral solutions is that the EU does not possess the military capabilities of the US. However, the pragmatics of this realisation cannot detract from the fact that the EU is in the process of marking its own identity in the international arena and the promotion of its strongest assets, which belong to the realm of ‘soft power’ capabilities, can reflect a positive contradistinction to the ‘hard power’ paraded by the US. This preference is strongly reflected in the ESS and the effect that it has in the forging of a distinct EU strategic culture.

The US and the EU do not differ extensively in the way they perceive the world and the threats that are out there, although there is an unmistakeable disparity in the intensity with which these threats are perceived as such. The most striking divergence, as we have seen above, can be found in the solutions adopted stemming from the underlying different strategic cultures. It has become clear that the EU is prepared to invest time and money in peaceful threat resolution to a scale that the US is not. The US on their part, especially after 9/11, is far more willing to mobilise its military power. The case is similar to that of two doctors who disagree on how to treat the infected leg of a patient. One prescribes that the leg should be amputated, while the other that a combination of pharmaceutical treatments should be followed. Therefore, what divides the two doctors is not so much the diagnosis, as their proposed method for treatment. It must be noted nevertheless that in today’s complex world single treatments are often unsuccessful. Especially in the field of security, a
comprehensive approach is more in tune with the former’s ongoing re-conceptualisation. In this case, in effect, the answer lies on the correct ratio of force versus economic or political incentives/coercion. Kagan, in his controversial book *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, which built on his immensely influential article of the previous year, argued that the policies the EU and the US follow are very much dictated by their respective capabilities (Kagan 2002b; 2003). It is a reasonable deduction, which finds application in the case of the NSS and the ESS that if one of the doctors has laser technology at his/her disposal, while the other merely homeopathic medicines, their chosen recipe for treatment will follow closely.

Another important element of the European Security Strategy is the introduction of the notion of prevention and the tackling of threats before they escalate to crises: “conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early” (European Council 2003n: 6). It is interesting to note that the original version of the ESS made use of the term ‘pre-emption’, as opposed to the term ‘prevention’ that was included in the final draft. According to Schwarz and Hadik’s *Strategic Terminology* a ‘pre-emptive strike’ is an “armed attack motivated by the conviction that an enemy attack is under way or is irreversibly imminent”. Also known as a ‘forestalling blow’ or an ‘anticipatory attack’, the pre-emptive strike differs from the so-called ‘preventive’ strike or war in that in the latter the enemy still has the option of desisting from his planned aggression (Schwarz and Hadik 1966: 108). In both drafts of the ESS, however, pre-emption and prevention accordingly were not necessarily linked to military tools, or to war for that matter. On the contrary, the notion of prevention in the final draft anticipated the use of the entire range of tools at the disposal of the EU. In a carrot and stick policy, financial benefits and economic sanctions were to be put in the service of “preventive engagement.” The ESS explicitly describes the multiple tools at its disposal and stresses that they can be used to
bring reform and better standards of governance to those states that threaten the stability of
the international arena. The section with the strategic objectives of the EU concludes with a
‘threat’ against all these states that “have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society.”
It states that “those who are unwilling to [rejoin the international community] should understand that
there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union” (European Council
2003n: 10). The ESS here exposes the soft negotiating muscle of the EU. It is implied that
abiding to the dictates of international law is a precondition to having good relations with the
EU and that major deviations from the norms that it prescribes will not be viewed positively.
It is also implied that depending on the circumstances, the EU reserves the right to act
appropriately, even if the meaning of this is left entirely vague.

The ESS nevertheless fails to address several key questions: under which circumstances
could the EU be justified in deploying its military assets? Would humanitarian and security
crises be the foremost justifications for military intervention? Most of all, what constitutes a
preventive strike? Such questions are left unanswered in the document. The ESS, however,
does stress the need for the development of a strategic culture that ‘fosters early rapid and when
necessary robust intervention’ (European Council 2003n: 11) and the projection that the first line of
defence for the Union ‘will often be abroad’ (European Council 2003n: 7). Both these qualitative
elements give a hint for the future course of a European strategic culture. They underline the
intention of the EU to adopt a concerted and hitherto more outward looking approach to its
security, which identifies the defence of its interests beyond its borders. The ESS’ emphasis
on prevention rather than reaction to potential crises marks the proactive basis for this
culture. A characteristic example of this pro-activeness observed in practice is the
involvement of the EU (and more zealously of the EU-3 –Germany, France and the United
Kingdom) in the inspection of the nuclear program in Iran (Overhaus 2007). The difference
between the soft-power EU approach vis-à-vis the hard-power of the US could not be more pronounced.

Regarding capabilities, the ESS stresses the significance of the pooling of the most valuable resources amongst member states, thus recognizing the institutional importance of common assets and the urgency for improving their pooling mechanisms. The document correctly identifies the incoherence of the EU regarding the deployment of various instruments, but also concerning the lack of coordination between member state policies and between different regions, as a serious drawback in the successful implementation of EU decisions. It stresses that a special effort should be made in this area if the EU wants to have any serious success in the areas of terrorism and organized crime. At the same time, in a move designed to ease the anxiety of the US and the UK on the development of an overly autonomous European defence capability, particular reference is made to the issue of EU-NATO cooperation, emphasizing the strengthening of their bonds through their shared objectives: “NATO is an important expression of [the transatlantic] relationship” (European Council 2003n: 9, 12).

Finally, the entire document underlines the importance of co-operation amongst nations on a global level, according to the prescripts of ‘effective multilateralism.’ It seems only natural that the first ever EU security strategy would place such importance on co-operation and multilateralism. The EU is in itself the product of a process that involved the identification of common interests and the formation of common goals to suit those interests, initially in the fields of trade and the economy. Multilateralism has since defined EU outlook on international affairs and, as is evident from any European integration textbook, lies at the core of all integrationist thought. After all, the ESS is a document of intent; a calibrated expression of how the EU should streamline co-operation between EU member states by
providing guidelines on how to best address the challenges of the changing international security environment.

The EU has become increasingly conscious of its neighbourhood. Building security in its “near abroad” is one of the major strategic objectives of the European Security Strategy. Addressing the anticipated regional security threats, such as weapons smuggling, extremist religious groups or issues of border security concerns the Union, not only as an organisation in charge of crisis management operations, but also as an institution intimately involved with its region. However, the ESS has another distinct target, which is to stabilise international crises. Military operation Althea in BiH and the diplomatic initiative concerning the containment of nuclear proliferation in Iran could be viewed as two distinct but complementary strands of a single EU security policy. Irrespective of their regional and international character respectively they can be regarded as parts of the same common commitment to security on the part of the EU. Nevertheless, the ability of the EU, or the lack thereof, to project power and intervene positively in international crises depends far more on concerted political will than military hardware. The former is, more often than not, absent. In the run-up to the March 2002 presidential elections in Zimbabwe, the EU failed to make a co-ordinated use of threats to reduce aid, deploy election monitors and impose economic sanctions, whether targeted or full (CNN 2002). More recently, Iran has repeatedly declined EU proposals for resolving concerns over the country’s nuclear program. It was only in August 2005 that Iran finally removed the seals from UN inspected sites related to its nuclear program (BBC news online 2005b). Since then, despite efforts from the EU-3 (otherwise referred to as the Troika) the UN and the US, Iran is making steady steps towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons (BBC news online 2007b). EU member states have
different interests in different areas of the world. Hence, their policies do not necessarily (as we see from the above examples) merge so to project a common stance.

Since the publication of the ESS in 2003, international conditions have favoured its bringing to life. Most important of all the relevant documents, the Draft Constitution of the EU seems to have been drawn in line with the letter and the spirit of the ESS. Despite the fact that the adoption of the Constitution as a whole was dropped in the European Council of December 2003, its security clauses were retained in the final draft of the text that was agreed upon during the Irish Presidency of 2004 (Inter Governmental Convention 2003). It has also since become evident that a modus operandi was gradually coming under way, which, in good time, would allow for the follow-up and report on the different dossiers. As a prominent authority on European Security saw it, “the Strategy [was] the basis for the elaboration of scenarios” (Biscop 2004: 40).

If one had to criticise the EU for its foreign and security policies, then any criticism would be based not on what has been achieved so far, but on the underlying reasoning behind the choice of targets to be followed up. It can be argued that, to all intents and purposes, the EU avoided entangling itself in issues that were too controversial or that were not in the immediate interests of the majority of its members (author’s interview 2006)’s evidence for that stand the efforts of the Italian presidency, in particular, towards the strengthening of EU/UN relations; a target where most EU member states demonstrated a distinct interest in (Representative to CIVCOM 2006). As far as the Middle East, the Balkans and terrorism were concerned, these had acquired a dynamism of their own by international developments and could not be ignored. Conversely, issues having to do with the Caucasus region or Iraq were almost completely sidelined. Following from the above, one observes that what progress has been made could never be considered as revolutionary or innovative. Rather, it
was firmly based on the evolution of already emerging foreign policy orientations that were increasingly being acknowledged by member states as common. Furthermore, the way that the different dossiers were treated was normally under the second pillar and lacked any substantial inter-pillar approach. Exception to this rule was the dossier on terrorism. Because of its nature it was the only dossier that managed to go over and above the pillar system and incorporate a more overarching approach, (in this case between the CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) work in the third pillar).

The ESS has not been able to guide the Union’s foreign and defence policy towards a common denominator. It is rather a tool created to serve, and not all that well for that matter, the different dynamics of ‘realpolitik’ in the EU. The European Security Strategy could be functioning at its best when a broader consensus on EU policies would be present and where it would be able to bring coherence and clarity (author’s interview 2006). The ESS cannot be expected to function if its purpose is to bring states within the disciplines of a common foreign policy at a time when they are clearly not ready to. Having said that, the major question remains: How will the existence of the ESS inform the way future crises will be handled? Will EU member states revert to the ESS for inspiration and work within its framework towards solving them? Or will it remain a dead letter when actual controversies are rising? The jury is still out.

**European Strategic Culture**

In terms of European strategic culture specific elements, the ESS is a very important document for the European Union because it sets the tone for the way that the Union should act and interact with its environment. One could even claim that in the future the ESS document could be considered one of the formulating documents for European strategic culture. Of course due to our inability to predict the future with any degree of
certainty we can only assume and imagine how this document will affect the European strategic culture in the way that the Union is approaching the use of force and the way it perceives itself. In this part of this chapter, we will try to test the ESS against our three pillars of the European strategic culture as we have presented them in chapter III.

Being a short document of just sixteen pages and written in an intentionally general way, the ESS does not include all those elements that would or would not support our thesis on the nature of the European strategic culture. However, it can present us with hints for different elements of it. Hints that can help us identify nonetheless the degree that ESS supports our proposition.

**Principles of humanitarian intervention**

We will begin by the principles of humanitarian intervention. The European Security Strategy states that the EU is ‘*committed to upholding and developing International Law*’ (European Council 2003n: 9). This means that, apart from cases where intervention takes place with the consent of the parties (e.g. in the case of FYROM) the Union will only intervene when international law is being violated. This statement offers a cloak of morality to the Union’s motives for intervention. The downside is that it leaves a lot to be clarified in terms of the specific conditions that the EU will intervene, whether for instance a UN mandate is required or not. Although the Strategy does not explicitly state so, the Director of the Policy Unit, Christoph Heusgen has expressly confirmed that “*Military intervention […] is only the last resort of EU policy*” (Heusgen 2004: 7). This is strengthened by the fact that while in earlier versions of the Strategy there were references to ‘pre-emptive’ attacks following the American model, in the final version it has been replaced by ‘preventive engagement’ a wording that was needed to relax the disagreements of a wide range of academics, policy makers and, more importantly, the German government (Meyer 2006: 133).
On the issue of proportionality of tools utilised in any given crisis while the strategy does not go into details, it does not however fail to give some directions. The directions aim at highlighting the need for diverse tools customised for any given crisis. It stresses that ‘none of the new threats is purely military; nor can it be tackled by purely military means’ and it goes on to proclaim that ‘each requires a mixture of instruments’ (European Council 2003n: 7). It continues by providing a toolbox of measures for five different types of problems, proliferation, terrorism, failed states, regional conflicts and organised crime. The toolbox ranges from export controls and political and economic pressures to intelligence, police and military means. What is important to stress here is that through this list the Strategy emphasises the need for a combination of tools each customised and proportional to the specific problem at hand at any given time. It stresses that military options are not the cure for all disease, but rather a mixture with political and economic tools represent the optimum solution; ‘the full spectrum of instruments’ (European Council 2003n: 11).

Outward looking

The outward looking element of strategic culture and more specifically the global or regional element are very clearly portrayed in the Strategy and in all the other EU documents stemming from it. The ESS outlines the global role of the Union in its first page “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world” (European Council 2003n: 1). This first statement sets the tone for the rest of the document. The first chapter of the document is spent in describing the global challenges and the threats that haunt the globe. It links regional problems such as AIDS, poverty and other diseases to Europe’s own security through the effect they have on it. The document continues by describing the five key threats to global security, i.e. terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. It is interesting to note that the global role of the EU is conceived under a veil of ethical terms, solidarity defence of human rights
and defence of democracy (Aggestam 2007: 22). However, being a security document addressed to policy makers it does not overlook at the same time the linking of these threats with the real interests of the Union members. Therefore, migratory movements and Europe’s energy dependency are highlighted as two of the most serious effects of global instability and turbulence caused by the aforementioned issues (European Council 2003n: 3). Further on, the document recognises the importance of geography and states that “the first line of defence will often be abroad” by “promoting a ring of well governed countries.” Hence, it is clear that an effort is made to relate the Union’s vital interests with its outside environment especially since globalisation has changed the structure of the world. The document recognises that in such an environment security cannot be achieved by being merely concentrated on internal issues but a proactive engagement, towards the rest of the world, should be on top of the policy list.

**Multilateralism**

Finally, as far as multilateralism is concerned, one can safely posit that it is the core idea behind the ESS. Its centrality can be understood throughout the document. It is not surprising that multilateralism is at the core of the strategy since it lies at the very core of the Union itself. As a hybrid between a state and a multinational organisation, the European Union is solidly based on multilateral ways of functioning and its policies are always a product of some wider consensus of some sort, or at the very least of some kind of minimum common denominator decision process. The strategy starts with the statement that “No single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own” (European Council 2003n: 1). Further on, under the heading ‘effective multilateralism’ the Strategy aims to implement the comprehensive approach at the global level. Through this qualitative description of multilateralism, the Strategy aims to distance itself from mere wishful thinking about the subject and move to a more realistic (i.e. enforceable) concept.
Conclusion

The ESS is perhaps the most important official document to date that can be deemed to play a part in the forging of a common European strategic culture. Of course, one must always bear in mind that the ESS carries no legal binding authority whatsoever. Its greatest achievement is that it adds a collective ‘we’ to EU foreign policy. Although prompted by the divide over Iraq, the ESS represents the culmination of efforts in the last decade in the area of security in Europe. However, it offers much less than an all-inclusive security agenda. Lacking a concrete action plan, the ESS is a living document, subject to evolution according to changes in the international security environment. In terms of institutionalising a distinct strategic culture, the ESS can only be successful if current and future EU policy makers refer back to its methods and goals as guidance for their decisions. Irrespective of the fact that such suppositions may or may not be confirmed in the future, the ESS will always be of seminal significance to future students of European strategic culture because of its novelty in the area of EU foreign affairs. Its importance, directly related to external courses of action will increase or, indeed, decrease depending on the degree that it will inform EU policies in the future. The mere existence of the document in itself has no value other than the reality of the driving force behind it; the collective, and distinctly ‘European’ intent of EU member states towards comprehensive security. It is its implementation that will be the acid test for its importance and endurance. The operations described in the following chapter will provide this testing range, which will inform us whether the ESS contains a common Strategy that can indeed be implemented, (hence providing a solid base for the creation of a European strategic culture), or constitutes institutional rhetoric that can be discarded as just a side show composed by Brussels bureaucrats for internal consumption.
Since the launch of the first ESDP mission in 2003, EU crisis management operations have constantly grown in number and scope. The latter has expanded geographically as well as functionally. In the military domain, we have had Berlin-Plus based as well as autonomous operations, short-term ones like *Artemis* and long-term ones like *Althea*. In the civilian domain, there was a move from ‘traditional’ police missions to rule of law ones like *Themis*, and from border monitoring assistance to disarmament and security sector reform. Geographically speaking, the initial focus on the Balkans—the true raison d’être of the ESDP—soon became complemented by operations in sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus region, Gaza and even Indonesia. Some of these missions have had a mainly symbolic character, while others have been more substantial. Each new mission was seen as an opportunity to improve EU policy-making capacity in order to achieve a greater consistency and coherence in integrating the different policy instruments of the EU and to ensure a consensus amongst member states (Cornish and Edwards 2005: 807). Taken all together, they have contributed to the building of an *acquis sécuritaire* that can now, in turn, allow the Union to feel more confident about the future.

In this chapter, we will examine the operations that fall within the military domain. We will focus on three military operations: *Concordia* in the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), *Artemis* in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and *Althea* in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The focus on these three operations can be justified in two ways. The first reason is historic since they constitute the first three military operations under
EU leadership. The second reason for our choice is that despite obvious similarities between the three, each operation exhibits a different element of innovation in the way the EU responded. Operation Artemis was the very first autonomous out of area operation undertaken by the EU, Concordia was the first operation to be executed with the cooperation of NATO under the ‘Berlin-Plus’ agreement and finally, Althea, in terms of troop deployment and administrative organisation, was the biggest and most complex operation that the European Union had yet embarked on.

This chapter will be organised in the following way. First, we will provide a brief analysis of the EU decision-making process concerning the setting up of military operations. Then, we will continue with a brief historical context for each of these EU operations in view of highlighting their similarities and differences. Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of this thesis, we will examine these EU-led operations in order to establish whether they can be viewed as containing indications for the emergence of a common European strategic culture. This will be done by assessing the specific characteristics of these operations against the pillars proposed in chapter III concerning the makeup of a common European strategic culture, namely adherence to the principles of the humanitarian intervention, an outward orientated approach and multilateralism.

**EU military decision-making process**

Before we embark on the specific description of the operations in question it is necessary to describe briefly the EU military decision-making process, in order to put them in the appropriate context. Our analysis covers developments between the years 1998 and 2005 and therefore the institutional modalities introduced after that point will not be dealt with as they go beyond the scope of this thesis. The decision-making process of the EU concerning military operations up until 2005 was largely defined by the Nice Treaty and the modalities
that have been put in place since then (European Council 2004a). According to those, the EU will consider an emerging crisis and will consult with others, especially NATO, in order to examine the available options. Military operations take place under an EU Joint Action, meaning that actions taken remain under the political and strategic control of the EU, even in the cases where NATO or other organizations’ assets are used (European Council 2001b). The military dimension to any crisis is examined by the EU Military Committee (EUMC), drawing on the expertise of the EU Military Staff (EUMS). More specifically, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) advises the Military Committee to request an “Initiating Directive” from the Military Staff. The Military Staff then drafts a document and forwards it to the Military Committee. After the Military Committee add their comments, the document is returned to the PSC. There it remains subject to the approval of the PSC. At this stage this document is known as the “Initial Planning Directive” and it includes the guidelines for military action (European Council 2001b: 194). At an appropriate juncture, following the development of a Crisis Management Concept, the Council will approve a general political assessment and a cohesive set of options. This allows the EUMC to issue a Military Strategic Option Directive to the Director General of the EUMS (DGEUMS) formally inviting him/her to draw up one or a series of Military Strategic Options (MSO).

Once the European Council has adopted the decision to take action, including a selection of MSOs, the European Council appoints an Operation Commander (Op Cdr) and designates a chain of command, which could result in the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) becoming an Operational Headquarters (OHQ). The selection of the Force HQ (FHQ) may occur simultaneously or, if alternatives are available, await the consideration and
The most likely Command and Control (C2) template will be based on a framework nation model. Following the Council decision to take action, the EUMC issues an Initiating Military Directive (IMD) to the Op Cdr, which directs him/her to begin operational planning. Once the military capacity comes into place, a strategic concept is then needed as the framework for the day-to-day policies of the ESDP (EUMS staff 2004). Since it involves military operations, which are the ultimate instrument of foreign and security policy and the use of which demands great care and legitimacy, the ESDP requires very clear guidelines as to when and where interventions are conceivable. This results in the generation of a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and an Operation Plan (OPLAN). Ultimately it prompts the generation, direction, deployment, sustainment and recovery of a joint force. This process is more linear than in NATO, which can conduct operational planning in parallel at various levels. This state of affairs is principally due to the decision not to establish a permanent EU command structure that would duplicate that of NATO (EUMS staff 2006). Although the exact C2 arrangements for any EU-led Civil Military Operations (CMO) are mission-dependent and would require a case by case analysis, the chain of command for the same operations encompasses three levels of command, as outlined in Figure 2.

During the early stages of the crisis and the consideration of the MSOs, the Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC) functions as per normal in its national capacity. EU crisis management procedures, however, envisage the need for the EUMS to draw on operational planning expertise (i.e. planning staff from either EU Member States and/or NATO). The

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48 In this model a 'lead nation' or 'framework nation' takes operational command, by providing the bulk of the forces on the ground, thus increasing the ability for operations without problems as simple as the lack of common language for communications or equipment that are not compatible with each other. It was first introduced in Operation Artemis with great success.
cohesion of EU member states in carrying out European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) missions is critical. Ultimately, national governments decide whether to contribute their troops to a particular ERRF deployment. Under the Amsterdam Treaty, member states that opt out of an action need not fund it in the instance of military operations. Consequently, strong political will and cooperation is important for sharing resources and moving forward with such missions (Lindborg 2001).

Figure 2 EU C2 Arrangements (author’s graph)
Concordia

On 31 March 2003, following the request of president Trajkovski, head of State of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), operation Concordia, the first military operation of the European Union, supplanted the NATO-run operation Allied Harmony. This operation, which fitted in a global crisis resolution strategy scheme led by the EU, witnessed the very first instance of the implementation of the decision-making process of the ESDP and was the first operation launched using NATO assets under the Berlin-Plus framework. It was also the first EU military crisis management operation in the Balkans. This signaled the beginning of a deepening concern of the Union for the area, which has contributed to the current status of the EU as the leading organization in the region.

The Background

The European Union was right from the outset one of the main participants in crisis management in FYROM. During the period of the crisis, its operation was restricted to the employment of limited political and economical means. However, after the outbreak of armed conflict in the northwest of FYROM in spring 2001, there was rising pressure by the international community for the European Union to intervene (author’s interview with EUMS staff 2004). The EU acting in close coordination with NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) managed to bring to the negotiation table political representatives from both the Slavo-Macedonian and the ethnic Albanian Macedonian sides. On 13 August 2001 an agreement was signed in Ohrid (FYROM and Albanian representatives 2001), according to which the Albanian minority was given political rights, national sovereignty was established throughout the whole of the country and UCK fighters were given amnesty for the length of the period of the fights in exchange for their disarmament.

49 Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (Kosovo Liberation Army)
Responsibility for the implementation of the Ohrid agreement was split between the two organizations (EUMS staff 2006). NATO with operation Essential Harvest was responsible for the military side while the EU was responsible for economic and other forms of assistance. It is important to note here that even though the Treaty of Nice did allow the EU to conduct military crisis management operations, ESDP was not sufficiently developed at that point to support such operations. NATO was considered to be adequate in providing the military muscle wherever it was needed. Moreover, NATO was more qualified to provide the international military presence in FYROM due to its long-standing experience in keeping the peace in the Balkans. This experience had resulted into well-established and invaluable connections and trust with UCK and the locals. Put simply, NATO provided the muscle for the proper implementation of the agreement, while the EU was responsible for furnishing the economic support (Mace 2004: 48).

The first phase of the international crisis management in FYROM 2001/02 served to underline the absence of military capacity in the EU’s crisis management repertoire to complement its extensive political, economic and financial tools (EUMS staff 2006). The wars of the Yugoslav succession in the early 1990s had already revealed that the European Union was unable to take action in order to prevent a humanitarian disaster even if this took place right in its ‘back yard’. The fundamental lesson that was learnt from these experiences was that proactive measures by peaceful means were necessary for conflict prevention. Nevertheless, the willingness and ability to use hard force should also be available as an option. EU member states made an effort to ameliorate this condition and in the 1999 European Summits in Helsinki and Cologne, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was launched (European Council 1999a: ; 1999b). This envisaged both civilian and military abilities for crisis management.
The EU involvement

Three years after the launch of the ESDP, its institutional structure had progressed so far that the European Union deemed it feasible to introduce its first operational deployment. Thus, in March 2002 at the Council meeting in Barcelona, the European Union Ministers of Foreign Affairs stated the readiness of the European Union to organise a follow-up mission on NATO’s operation in FYROM (European Council 2002b: 48). This project depended upon the satisfaction of certain conditions (elections in FYROM, explicit invitation for intervention by the government of FYROM and the conclusion of the ongoing discussions between the European Union and NATO). This statement acquired a more concrete form in the EU Council summits in Seville in June 2002 and in Copenhagen in December 2002 where the Union announced its expressed will to replace NATO’s mission *Allied Harmony* after the expiration of its mandate in autumn 2002 (European Council 2002c: ; 2002d).

In accordance with these conditions, on 17 January 2003 President Trajkowski extended a formal invitation to the EU High Representative Javier Solana for launching an operation to replace the expiring NATO operation *Allied Harmony* (European Council 2003h: 30). The invitation was attached to the condition that any action taken would have been in agreement with NATO and with FYROM authorities. In a further letter on 13 March 2003, President Trajkowski restricted the prospective duration of a possible European Union-led operation in his country to a maximum of six months. These two letters, as well as the UN Security Council resolution 1371 (United Nations Security Council 2001) from 26 September 2001 formed the legal (from an international law perspective) and political basis respectively for the European Union-led military operation in FYROM. These legal preconditions and the need for international approval gained through the UN, placed political legitimisation and by extent multilateralism firmly at the forefront of EU policies.
On 27 January 2003, the European Council agreed on a Joint Action Document (European Council 2003h). *Inter alia*, the EU confirmed its readiness to take over from NATO in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Its purpose would be to facilitate the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. On 18 February, following from a decision by the Political and Security Committee, a Committee of Contributors was set up (European Council 2003j). This committee was to be the main forum where contributing states would collectively address questions relating to the employment of their forces in the operation. On 17 March 2003 the essential agreement with NATO was concluded, known as the Berlin-Plus Agreement, (EU- NATO 2003). Its further particulars were laid down in a series of letters exchanged between the EU and NATO since December of the previous year.50 On 18 March 2003, the European Union Council approved the *Concordia* OPLAN (European Council 2003c). Its precise mission was to conduct an operation in FYROM under OHQ (Operation Headquarters) command. Its purpose was to implement the Ohrid agreements, while the overall objective following the crisis of 2002, was to stabilize the country as well as the region.

On 31 March 2003, Operation *Concordia* was launched. The structure of the operation was designed to create a distinct EU chain of command that nonetheless recognized the operational need for coordination with NATO (EUMS staff 2006). France acted as the ‘framework nation’ for the entire mission. Of the approximately 350 staff involved, 90 per cent came from thirteen of the member states (exceptions were Ireland and, by virtue of its special exemption clause, Denmark) and the rest from as many as fourteen ‘third’ countries [see Figure 3 below]. The *Concordia* chain of command remained under the political control and strategic direction of the EU. However, close links were maintained with NATO at all

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50 The exchange of letters from December 2002 that sets the terms of the relevant ‘permanent arrangements’ are classified documents.
levels. At the highest level, the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) maintained regular contact with the North Atlantic Council (NAC) throughout the operation (Representative to CIVCOM 2006). At the operational level EU–NATO coordination was built into the structure of *Concordia* by the co-location of headquarters and the ‘double-hatting’ of key personnel (EUMS staff 2004). A principal example is the Operation Commander, Admiral Rainer Feist, and NATO’s Deputy Supreme Commander Allied Forces Europe (DSACEUR). As Operation Commander, he reported on operational matters to EU bodies alone (European Council 2003h). However, he also continued to discharge his functions as DSACEUR. An interesting anecdote preserved by Elmar Brok, a German MEP, may be given on this account. In correspondence between the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee and the DSACEUR, Admiral Feist replied in August 2003 using stationary that bore the letterhead ‘EU-Operation Headquarters’ – SHAPE, Mons, stressing his role as commander of EU military operations in FYROM (Gnesotto 2004: 182).

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Figure 3 Personnel contribution from EU members and Third Countries, Source EU Council in (Grevi et al. 2005)
In accordance with Berlin Plus, the *Concordia* Operation Headquarters was located within the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Brussels, while Force Headquarters (HQ) was co-located within NATO HQ Skopje. The latter commanded the remaining NATO forces in FYROM. Acting as a link between Operation HQ and Force HQ, an EU Command Element (EUCE) was located at Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH) in Naples, this being the NATO Joint Force Command for Balkan operations. Key *Concordia* personnel in Naples were also ‘double-hatted’ (Mace 2004: 482). The Chief of Staff of AFSOUTH was appointed Chief of Staff of the EU Command Element (EUCE) and this dual NATO–EU appointment allowed the EUCE Chief of Staff to be represented within the Joint Force Command for the coordination of all EU–NATO military issues in theatre. This enabled Operation *Concordia* to benefit from the Alliance’s considerable experience in mounting Peace Support Operations in the Balkans. However, within the EU there were divergent opinions about the creation of the Command Element (EUCE). On the one hand, it was argued that the creation of the EUCE in Naples added yet one more layer to the chain of command and consequently “did not respect the political control of the PSC” (Courlay 2003). On the other hand, a member of the European Military Staff (EUMS), indicated that the chain of command operated well from a military perspective and that it was simply a question of the EU institutions becoming accustomed to what was simply another layer in the command chain (EUMS staff 2006).
Strategic Culture

*Concordia* fulfils many of the principles for humanitarian intervention. The operation’s mandate included the creation of a secure and stable environment such as could safeguard the implementation of the Ohrid Framework agreement. *Concordia* forces helped greatly in the disarming of militia and the fostering of a feeling of security, lacking since the events of 2002. With their frequent patrols, EUFOR also became a regulating security element in the daily life of the ethnic communities (Augustin 2005: 57). Securing a stable environment and contributing to the security of the area do constitute just causes for intervention and can scarcely be played down in diplomatic language as pretexts for hidden agendas. On the issue of acting under proper authority and declarations the EU intervened on the basis of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1371 (United Nations Security Council 2001), which authorised the operation and following from the letters of invitation by the government of FYROM itself. Further to those UN Resolutions, the EU with its own
Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP (European Council 2003h) and Council Decision 2003/202/CFSP (European Council 2003c) decided at its highest level to authorise such a mission and publicise its aims and purposes. Regarding the issues of using force as a last resort and its effectiveness, it can be argued that this prerequisite is applicable in the case of Concordia. Forces were not sent at the first instant but only when they would support a specific agreement (the Ohrid agreement). The fact that there have not been serious breached of security during the running of the operation bears testament to its effectiveness. Adherence to the humanitarian intervention principle is also evident from a reading of the EU rules of engagement (RoE). In principle, EU operations operate under specific RoE, which are mostly similar in all operations:

“The use of force policy will reflect the authority to use necessary force consistent with mission accomplishment and self-defence, the principles of necessity and proportionality and the observance of international law. Moreover, it will permit the protection of International Community personnel, mission essential property and categories of personnel designated by the OpCdr” (European Council 2004b: 15).

In terms of its size, Concordia was proportional to the objectives at hand, which did not require the provision of hard security but were restricted to policing and supporting the local authorities in the implementation of the Ohrid agreement.

As the first EU military operation, the launch of Concordia inevitably set a precedent for the multilateral approach that the Union wanted to introduce and observe. Concordia was launched after the explicit authorisation of the UN Security Council and the support of the EU member states. The Operation was used as a template for the organisation of future EU operations under a multilateral framework. In addition to that, Concordia broke new ground in that its forces included elements from the military forces of third countries in an effort to
provide a more inclusive approach to crisis management and to involve as many players as possible. While the Operation did not require a large force projection by the EU nor did it involve engagement far from the EU organisational centre, *Concordia* did constitute a first step towards testing the waters in orchestrating military operations, as well as coordinating military and civilian cooperation for the management of crises. The Balkan states do not lie outside the geographical definition of Europe and in fact, their majority is already or on track to becoming members of the EU with full rights and obligations. This does not negate the fact however, that at the time *Concordia* was launched the Balkan wars and the ensuing refugee crisis were considered to be outside threats that required an outward oriented policy, which necessitated the incorporation of actions in territories outside the borders of the Union.

**Artemis**

Operation *Artemis* was officially launched on 12 June 2003 in the African Continent. It was the first EU military operation launched both independently from NATO, as well as beyond the borders of Europe. It was conducted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and placed within the framework of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1484 (United Nations Security Council 2003a) adopted on 30 May 2003. It also fell within the European Council’s Joint Action adopted on 5 June 2003 (European Council 2003i). According to the UNSC resolution, the operation was limited to an area around the Ituri region, and specifically the town of Bunia, and restricted in time until 1 September 2003. Its force was of an interim emergency nature in the sense that it was designed to enable MONUC (Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo) to discharge its mission in the region of Bunia more effectively.
The Background
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a country as large as Western Europe had been suffering harsh internal conflict for nearly five years. The result of this prolonged state of hostilities was the weakening of any notion of rule of law and any sense of security and trust between the different ethnic groups. Although the causes of the conflict in the region were indigenous, neighboring countries with vested interests saw it to their advantage to fuel and perpetuate a state of confusion in the area. The hostilities soon came to involve nine governments, a dozen guerilla movements as well as a huge number of smaller armed groups and militias. The competition between Uganda and Rwanda, both of which had sent their military forces to DRC or were engaged in a proxy war over DRC resources, had exacerbated the conflict. Gross atrocities, including ritual cannibalism, were conducted on a massive scale (Ulriksen et al. 2004: 510). More than 3.5 million people are estimated to have died in the so-called Congo Crisis since 1998 (United Nations Security Council 2003b: 17). In Luanda in September 2002, following intense international pressure, Uganda agreed to withdraw its forces from the DRC by the end of that year and transfer control to the government of Kinshasa. In April 2003 under the guidance of MONUC, the Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC) finally started operating with swift and considerable success. However, as soon as the last Ugandan troops left the region extreme violence escalated again. MONUC had failed in its mission because its presence was weak both in numbers and in its mandate. The fragility of MONUC was of such an extent that it had difficulties in protecting its own personnel from being increasingly targeted by the warring factions (Jackson 2003: 1). In the face of a potential catastrophic humanitarian situation in Ituri the Secretary General appealed to the UN members to form a coalition of the willing to end the humanitarian disaster and work as

51 For more on the DRC conflict, see reports from the International Crisis Group available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1174&d=1.
a temporary bridge arrangement before the possible deployment of a reinforced UN presence (United Nations Security Council 2003b).  

The EU Involvement
As the Cold War ended, the EU became increasingly involved in African affairs. EU member states dispatched forces to UN operations in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda and Somalia. However, due to the increased commitments undertaken in the Balkans, as well as difficulties on the ground, European peacekeeping in Africa soon diminished dramatically.

The common understanding was that Africa was divided into competing Anglophone and Francophone regions (Ulriksen et al. 2004: 509). In spite of this divide, the Anglo-French summit of November 1994 managed to reach an agreement on two seemingly separate issues that have since converged. The first was an initiative to strengthen European military capabilities, which resulted in the creation of the European Air Group (Buchan and Clark 1994). The second was a plan to boost African peacekeeping capabilities. Britain would train forces from Anglophone African states, while France would do the same for Francophone states. The Franco-British summit in St. Malo (1998) (Franco-British Summit 1998) marked a turning point and those in Cahors (2001) (Franco-British Summit 2001) and Le Touquet (2003) (Franco-British Summit 2003) continued to strengthen cooperation along both tracks. In other words, the French and British initiatives for the development of European cooperation in security and defence progressed hand in hand with initiatives to strengthen cooperation on security issues in Africa. The two were finally linked in Operation Artemis (Ulriksen et al. 2004: 509).

With the situation in Bunia escalating all through April and the UN proving increasingly incapable of handling it, the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-

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52 See also the (International Crisis Group 2003)
Marie Guehenno raised the first call for international intervention on 9 May 2003 (United Nations Security Council President 2003). Kofi Annan endorsed this appeal on the next day (Annan 2003a). Addressing the international community and all states with relevant capabilities, he entreated them to “make every effort to quickly address” the situation in Bunia (Annan 2003b). Soon after his appeal, Annan announced that France had agreed to participate in the creation of a force to stabilize the situation (Annan 2003b). France made its participation conditional upon three issues. First, France was to be granted a UN chapter VII mandate. Second, countries involved in the conflict (DRC, Uganda and Rwanda) would have to support officially its intervention and finally, that the operation would have to be limited in time and scope. Preparations for operation Mamba, as the French initially code-named Artemis, started in effect one month before the actual launch on 12 June 2003. It is fair to assume that the French had ready-made contingency plans for such eventualities in Africa that could easily be adapted to suit an EU operation. This could account for the remarkable speed of preparations. In addition, the political climate inside the EU was ripe for such an action. The planning for Artemis was made in the midst of the transatlantic rift over Iraq. Therefore, for some, Operation Artemis was viewed as the ideal vehicle towards the process of healing some of the injuries caused to the EU caucus and as contributing to the institutionalisation of the EU as an independent international actor (EUMS staff 2006). As early as mid-May, there were discussions amongst EU member states on the prospect of dispatching a humanitarian relief force in Bunia (Representative to CIVCOM 2006). On 8 May, the EU updated its common position in support of the Peace Process in DRC, in which it condemned the violence in Ituri and urged the full implementation of MONUC’s mandate (European Council 2003b). The UN Secretary General himself approached Javier Solana with a request for such action. Additionally, France was not alone in its willingness to send troops to the area. Other EU member states as well as the US did not object to the
prospect. United States compliance can be explained by its involvement in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which admittedly had stretched its forces (EUMS staff 2004). On 19 May, the Political and Security Committee requested Solana to draft a feasibility report on a possible EU military operation in the DRC (EUMS staff 2004). Solana’s first estimate was that such a force would be ready for deployment in a minimum of two months (Ahto Lobjakas 2003). Nevertheless, despite his predictions the force was on the field in less than a month, as testament to the potential of concerted political will on the part of EU member states.

France was the principal EU nation that stirred events towards taking military action in the Congo. According to one source quoted by Grignon, it was the Africa desk of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs that first introduced the idea of putting the whole operation under the EU banner (Grignon 2003: 3). Whether it was seen as a way to advance France’s
European policy and/or as an additional security measure given the problems that had arisen in previous French operations in the area, such as Operation Turquoise in Rwanda, is still not clear. Conversely, it has been suggested that EU officials in the Council saw it as a profitable opportunity as well, but their rationale centered primarily on going beyond the rift over Iraq and on boosting the ESDP. Most likely, all these aspects played their part in the launch of the operation. It is interesting nevertheless to reflect on whether such strong political will to drive the operation forward would have existed had it not been for the controversy over the Iraq war.

On 30 May, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1484 defining the mandate for Operation Artemis. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter it authorized, “the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in Bunia in close cooperation with MONUC” (United Nations Security Council 2003a). The IEMF was to contribute to the stabilization of security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia. It was to protect the airport and the camps of internally displaced persons in the area, and, if necessary, protect the civilian population as well as UN and other humanitarian personnel there. The deployment of the IEMF was authorized until 1 September 2003, in order to buy time for the UN to achieve the reinforcement of MONUC in Bunia by mid-August. The resolution authorized the contributing states to the IEMF to take all necessary measures to fulfil the mandate. It demanded that all Congolese parties and all states in the African Great Lakes area cooperated with the IEMF and MONUC to stabilize the situation and also that they ended the supply of arms to the militants (United Nations Security Council 2003a).

On 3 June, the European Council approved the framework for EU action in response to the crisis in Bunia, which outlined the objectives under which the EU forces would operate. On 5 June, the Council Joint Action on the European Union military operation in the DRC was
adopted (European Council 2003i). This document established the line of command and the roles and responsibilities of the PSC and the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) regarding the operation. The Council, assisted by Solana, retained final decision-making authority over the objectives and the termination of the operation. The PSC, in accordance with article 25 of the Treaty of the European Union (European Union 2000), was appointed to exercise political control and strategic direction of the operation and was explicitly given powers to change the operational plan (OPLAN), the Chain of Command and the Rules of Engagement. The PSC was also authorized to set up a Committee of Contributors if third states (non-EU members) expressed interest in providing significant military contributions. The EUMC was tasked with monitoring the operation and reporting regularly to the PSC. In sharp contrast to the secretive practices of traditional French unilateral interventions, Operation Artemis was subject to close multilateral political and military scrutiny (European Council 2003i). Solana, assisted by the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region and acting in close coordination with the EU presidency, formed the primary point of contact for the UN, the authorities of the DRC and neighbouring countries. In the field, the Force Commander maintained contacts with MONUC and other international actors (European Council 2003i). Building upon the EU Framework Nation Concept adopted on 24 July 2002, the Council Joint Action (European Council 2003i) described the command structure of Operation Artemis in detail. France was appointed as the Framework Nation and the Operational Headquarters was placed at the Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Operations in Paris. Bruno Neveux, the Général de Division, was appointed as Operation Commander there. The Operation Commander (OpCdr) reported to the Chairman of the EUMC. Général de Brigade, Jean-Paul Thonier, was selected as Force Commander. The appointed HQ and commanders were tasked with the preparation of an OPLAN and the groundwork for the deployment of the force. On 8 June, the first draft of the OPLAN
issued by the OpCdr and the Framework Nation was sent to the EUMS and to the EUMC. On 9 June, the EUMC revised the EU OPLAN and forwarded it to the PSC on 10 June at the Force Generation Conference in Paris. The new OPLAN, along with the rules of engagement, were finally approved by the EU Council on 12 June. The deployment of the force was also authorized by the same decision (European Council 2003d).

As the Framework Nation, France contributed the bulk of the forces on the ground (about 85%). Around 2,000 troops were deployed: 1,100 in Bunia, 750 in Entebbe (Uganda) and 100 in Kampala (Uganda). Most of these forces were French. Sweden contributed 70 troops and the UK 100 engineers (Ulriksen et al. 2004: 516). The rest of the contributing nations were limited mainly to providing aircraft or staffing the Operational Headquarters in Paris. Almost 50% of the Paris HQ was staffed by officers from the other twelve contributing nations. The theatre-level force Command HQ was based in Entebbe. Its personnel was primarily French but with a strong multinational element, including non-Europeans. The transport operation was carried out mainly by Belgian, Brazilian, Canadian and French as well as by chartered Antonov-124 strategic transports. The tactical transport aircraft served on the 300-km Entebbe–Bunia route, while Airbus-310s and DC-8s served as strategic transports on the 6,000-km Europe–Entebbe route alongside the far more capable Antonovs (Ulriksen et al. 2004: 516). At the height of the operation, 700 personnel were stationed at Entebbe Airport in Uganda. In their majority, they were employed at the operational support and logistic base run by a detachment from the 1st Regiment du Train Parachutiste (Ulriksen et al. 2004: 516). The French unit based in Entebbe and Kampala was coherent, prepared and highly experienced in operations in Africa. It is worth commenting that the amount of French troops on the ground was far greater in relative terms from those serving in the HQ.
Of course, it is doubtful whether the French would have accepted anything different since that would have compromised the coherence of their units in the field (EUMS staff 2006).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Provision of forces or force elements</th>
<th>Provision of personnel to OHQ and/or FHQ</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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</table>

Figure 6 Personnel Contributions Source Fact Sheet on the *Artemis*, July 2003, Council of the European Union (European Council 2003g). Note: OHQ stands for Operation Headquarters, FHQ stands for Force Headquarters

Operation *Artemis* was terminated as scheduled on 1 September 2003 giving its place to the new enhanced MONUC force; an 18000-strong multinational force under a new mandate and rules of engagement that were more robust. Considering its limited mandate in time and scope *Artemis* can be deemed a success. It managed to ameliorate the conditions in the area of Bunia for the local population and to create the necessary conditions that would facilitate the humanitarian work of the various NGOs.
Strategic Culture

*Artemis* was launched to put an end to the humanitarian crisis that was taking place in the Ituri region. It managed to restore security in the region, a large number of refugees returned home and a significant disarmament of local militia took place, albeit in a restricted area. Responding to some initial skirmishes with Lendu militia on 14 June through to more serious clashes with the UPC in early July that reportedly left 20 militiamen dead, the IEMF left no doubt as to its willingness to use force. This force was not directed against any one party in particular but against any challenges to the IEMF’s authority or threats to the security of the population. The fact that Operation *Artemis* required the use of military tools places a greater emphasis on the evaluation of the humanitarian intervention principles in their narrowest sense. In terms therefore of just cause and right intention it is clear that the EU intervened to check an impending humanitarian catastrophe. On 9 May 2003, the UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations warned of an impending disaster in Bunia, with the possibility for “massive killing of civilians” (UN News Service 2003). Not all accept this justification though. It has been claimed that the reasoning behind the EU intervention in Bunia was not as primarily humanitarian in nature as it was proclaimed to be. Ulriksen et al. have argued that, in view of the transatlantic rift over the issue of Iraq, the EU felt compelled to make a manifest gesture of its military force and coherence (Ulriksen et al. 2004: 513). This interpretation helps explain the willingness of France to assume a leadership position in this common European endeavour. Traditionally, France has been the most ardent proponent of an EU military capability, which would be independent from NATO. French and British initiatives for the development of European co-operation in security and defence progressed hand in hand with initiatives to strengthen co-operation on security issues in Africa (Ulriksen et al. 2004: 509). The war in Iraq and the crisis in DRC furnished the EU with a ‘balancing act’ opportunity vis-à-vis the US. In the event that the situation in Bunia
developed into another Srebrenica, then this would prove ruinous for EU prestige and UN credibility. However, as testament to the unified will of the EU regarding this Operation we must not forget that the DRC was a country of little geo-strategic importance, which nevertheless required the engagement of a robust military force from the part of the EU. In spite of this imbalance, agreement was so widespread that even non-aligned countries, such as Sweden, advocated EU intervention in the area (Meyer 2006: 134). As far as the humanitarian intervention principles of acting in the proper authority and conforming to public declaration are concerned, the operation was conducted under a UN resolution (1484) (United Nations Security Council 2003a) and the EU itself operated under the Council Joint Action 2003/423 (European Council 2003i) and the Council Common position 2003/432 of 12 June 2003 (European Council 2003d). In terms of the use of violence as a last resort, the taking into account of the probability of success and the proportionality of forces used, every effort was taken by the EU command, and more specifically by the French, to minimize risks by using the appropriate forces in the tactical level and by sticking to the agreed schedule of one month and the agreed geographical limits of jurisdiction for the force.

Of the three operations in question, Artemis is the one that most brought to the foreground the increasingly outward orientation of EU policies. It took place in a country in central Africa, which held no vital interests for EU member states but which presented a host of practical difficulties when it came to the actual approach of the areas where the humanitarian crisis was developing. Artemis set the benchmark for future EU operations and in effect solved conclusively the out-of-area debate in Brussels corridors. No place was deemed geographically so removed from the EU that if action was needed and agreed upon by member states, it would not be taken.
In terms of multilateralism, the launch of the operation in DRC, as the previous operation in FYROM, was dependent on a specific UN Security Council Resolution and special attention was paid to securing the widest consensus possible. For practical purposes, the ground forces deployed in DRC came from a few nations, namely France and Sweden, with only small contributions from other EU nations. This makeup, however, was not reflected in the composition of the Operation HQ personnel in Paris, which was far more multinational.

**Althea**

*The Background*

Following the breakdown of the Yugoslav state, war erupted in Bosnia in 1992. It was brought to an end three years later with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995. From that point forward, the UN’s International Police Task Force (IPTF) was entrusted with the maintenance of local stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). In what constituted its first civilian crisis management operation under the ESDP, the European Union stepped in on 1 January 2003 to relieve the UN/IPTF and assume responsibility over local stability until 31 December 2005 (European Council 2002a). While the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) was officially set to start in 2003, its Planning Team had already been in the region for more than eight months setting up the transition from the IPTF, which had been deployed there for seven years.

*The EU Involvement*

The EU started preparations for a possible military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina as early as April 2004. These preparations included the circulation of draft versions of a General Concept of operations including the main military parameters, an outline of the intended structure of the executive police element and how the EU could use its forces in assisting
local authorities in the fight against organized crime (European Council 2004h; 2004i). The General Concept was approved by the Council on 26 April 2004 (European Council 2004l). Following that, the EUMS was authorized to begin consultations on the Military Strategic Option (MSO) to support the General Concept for a possible ESDP mission in Bosnia Herzegovina, which would include a military component. The MSO was finalized on 14 June 2004 (EUMS staff 2006). NATO agreed at the Istanbul Summit of 28-29 June 2004 to terminate the operation of its Stabilization Force (SFOR) by the end of 2004. This decision signaled the Alliance’s support for a takeover and pushed the EU into accelerating the formal preparations (NATO 2004). Althea would be carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, on the basis agreed with NATO under the Berlin-Plus agreement.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1551 provided the legal mandate for Althea (United Nations Security Council 2004a) and included an explicit reference to the EU’s decision to launch an operation in BiH at the end of 2004. The mandate followed a letter of 29 June 2004 from the Irish Foreign Minister, representing the European Council Presidency, setting out the Union’s intentions to involve itself in the crisis by dispatching a mission to the ground (United Nations Security Council 2004a). The UN Security Council further clarified that the current ‘status of forces agreements’ that provided an important legal framework and that also set the boundaries of military operations and other activities for SFOR, would apply provisionally to the EU mission (United Nations Security Council 2004a).

53 The specific drafts are not available to the public (2007) but their existence is verified through the EU document register.
With its Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP (European Council 2004m) the European Council announced on 12 July the readiness of the European Union for an ESDP mission in BiH and authorized the OPC to prepare the corresponding CONOPS, OPLAN and RoE. It was decided that the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU would exercise the political control and strategic direction of the operation, under the responsibility of the Council. Decision-making authority with respect to the objectives and termination of the military operation would remain vested in the Council, assisted by the SG/HR. The EU Military Committee (EUMC) would monitor the proper execution of the military component of the mission. General John Reith, currently Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), was appointed EU Operation Commander, while Major General David Leakey became the EU Force Commander. The EU Operation Headquarters was located at...
NATO SHAPE, following a welcome display of flexibility on behalf of the French, who initially opposed such an arrangement. Non-EU NATO members, such as Norway and Turkey, as well as other third countries, including Canada, Chile, Argentina and Morocco participated in the operation. Third countries were granted co-decision making powers on an operational level, which would be relative to their contributions. Overall strategic direction, however, remained in the hands of the PSC and the EUMC. The next step towards the launch of Althea was taken on 13 September when the EU External Relations Council approved the CONOPS prepared by the OPC (European Council 2004b). Soon afterwards, the OPC produced the OPLAN that was ready for approval by the PSC on 6 October 2004 and the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) on 11 October 2004 (EUMS staff 2004). On 22 November, the UNSC, under resolution 1575, recognised EUFOR as the legal successor to SFOR under unified command and control, which would fulfill its mission in relation to the implementation of Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Dayton/Paris Agreement. EUFOR would have the main peace stabilisation role under the military aspects of the Peace Agreement (United Nations Security Council 2004b). On 25 October Operation Althea was authorized by the Council to be launched on 2 December 2004 (European Council 2004d). The key objectives of Althea were defined as: the provision of deterrence and continued compliance with the responsibility to fulfill the role specified in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH and contribution to a safe and secure environment in BiH, in line with its mandate. The final objective was to achieve core tasks in the OHR's Mission Implementation Plan and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP).
<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Non-EU NATIONS TROOPS IN THEATRE</th>
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<th>Sub Total EU NATIONS 5,093</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of troops in EUFOR 5,949</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8 Number of Troop contributions from EU and Third Countries in 2003 Source: European Union Fact Sheet 2003. (European Council 2004k)

**Strategic Culture**

*Althea* adhered to most of the principles for humanitarian intervention prescribed by the combined mandates of both the SFOR mission as well as its own. The explicit aims to provide deterrence and to contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH provided Althea with a solid just cause for intervention (European Council 2004b: 6). In terms of right
intentions, the sincerity of EU willingness to take over from NATO in BiH in order to contribute to the stabilisation of the area has not been doubted. The only side motive that one could pin on the EU would be its apparent eagerness for the strengthening of its Foreign and Security Policy. In this light Althea could be viewed as the testing ground upon which the EU would prove to its members and to the world that it can manage a large and complex military operation. On the issue of authority and public declaration, Althea’s legitimisation has been confirmed by multiple resolutions. United Nations Council Resolution 1551 provided the legal mandate for the operation (United Nations Security Council 2004a). UNCR 1575 authorised the establishment of an international stabilisation force in BiH as a legal successor to NATO’s SFOR (United Nations Security Council 2004b). Further to these UN Resolutions, the EU issued its own Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP (European Council 2004m) and Council Decision 2004/803/CFSP (European Council 2004d), where the mission was authorised at the highest level and its aims and purposes were made available to the public.

On the issues of last resort and effectiveness of the mission as well as its proportionality, Althea can only be judged as a continuation of the previous NATO operation in the area. However, one can claim that NATO’s operation SFOR did adhere to these conditions. SFOR was initiated following the Dayton Accords. In this case, the last resort element and the success element were satisfied since the United States was guaranteeing the operation under NATO, support for which was provided by a pre-signed agreement and no action was taken before that. The proportionality element was also satisfied since the amount of forces utilized was gradually reduced over the duration of the mission subject to the improving conditions on the ground. Further to the proportionality element, one must add the issue of the relationship of the EU forces with the local population. Although the specific Rules of
Engagement are not available for public scrutiny, (they are still -2007- deemed sensitive material), it becomes clear from interviews conducted with EUMS staff that they provide rules governing the conduct of troops towards the local populace in matters ranging from armed response to threats to contacts on a more individual level (European Council 2004b; ; EUMS staff 2006).

As far as satisfying the outward oriented element of the proposed pillars that support a European strategic culture Althea follows the same reasoning as Concordia. BiH is currently outside the borders of the EU but has been involved in pre-accession negotiations ever since its inclusion in the 1999 SAP and its ‘potential EU candidacy’ that was proclaimed the year after in the Feira European Council (European Council 2000b). This being the case, it was in the EU’s interest to facilitate the post-war restitution process in BiH, consolidate democratic institutions and promote the social and economic development that would bring the country on a par with European standards. The principle of multilateralism was adhered to in Althea. This is evident from the introduction of a UN Security Council Resolution preceding the official take over from NATO forces and the incorporation of personnel and contributions originating not only from EU member states but from third nations as well.

Comparing the Operations
Each of the three operations presented in this chapter marks certain unique developments in the EU military structure and is important in its own right. Reiterating some of our initial claims, we have chosen to examine operation Concordia as the first that was performed under the 2003-agreed “Berlin-Plus” arrangements concerning the use of NATO assets and capabilities, as well as the collocation of EU Operation headquarters at SHAPE and the appointment of DSACEUR as Operation Commander. Operation Artemis was deemed important as the first operation of the EU to take place outside the geographic boundaries of
Europe. It put an end to the ‘out-of-area’ debate that was looming during that period in Brussels corridors, by conveying the message that Africa is an area of possible deployment and that the role of the European Union is indeed a global one. By conducting an operation such as *Artemis*, rapidly and without making use of NATO assets, the EU also affirmed that it was capable of performing as an independent actor in the international arena. Finally, *Althea* was the first EU operation to raise the stakes so high in terms of the number of troops deployed in the theatre of operations. It was by far the largest and most ambitious operation of its kind. One could indeed argue that *Althea* succeeded in creating new pressures for the credibility and coherence of the ESDP just by virtue of its size and its success in managing an inherently challenging situation.

However, the three operations differ as much as they are alike, as is clear from figure 9. All of them were conducted with the express consent of the host countries and a UN resolution constituted a standard prerequisite for their receiving the green light from EU capitals. Mostly of a practical nature, the ESDP operations so far have dealt mainly with post-conflict stabilisation outside the territories of EU member states. Greater robustness was required only during *Artemis*. They all had a strong military element even though they were not exclusively military operations. All three contained civilian elements but always under a military command, a trend that has only recently (2006) changed with the EU *Aceh* operation in Indonesia, where for the first time the head of the operation is a civilian. The ESDP operations discussed here were conducted for humanitarian reasons, but so far, no EU operation has had to be launched in response to imminent and direct threats or aggression. Only *Artemis* can be considered by any account as a crisis management operation. The other two have been conducted in territories more or less pacified where stability and development, and not so much security, were the issues. That difference is amply portrayed
in the time that was spent in discussing and planning the launch of each operation. In the case of *Artemis*, the urgency of response is reflected in the fact that preparations were limited to almost two weeks from UN Resolution 1484 until its launch, while *Concordia* took roughly three months to get under way since the invitation by FYROM. Finally, *Althea* required more than eight months from the General Concept report in 23 April 2004 until its launch in 2 December 2004.

![Table of EU operations comparison](image)

Figure 9 Comparison of EU operations

Another important element of comparison is participation in ESDP operations, which seems to have varied quite significantly over the past few years. *Concordia* lined up all EU members
and candidates, albeit mostly in symbolic numbers. Similarly, Althea was quite well ‘attended’. Artemis, on the other hand, was practically carried out by two EU members only, namely France and Sweden. Similar variations apply to the participation of “third” countries –in terms of sheer number, relevance, diversity, and regional focus. Concordia instituted for the first time the participation of third states in EU forces, a trend that has remained in practice ever since with all EU military operations containing resource contributions from third countries to various degrees. In military operations, France and the UK have mostly acted -more or less explicitly– as the ‘framework nation’. Concordia and Artemis were the two operations based on the ‘framework nation concept’ adopted in 24 July 2002 by the Council. For both of them, the framework nation appointed was France.

In terms of access to NATO assets as outlined in the ‘Berlin-Plus’ agreement only two of the operations examined benefited from it. Concordia and Althea, both taking place in the Balkans, were the only ones to have accessed NATO assets; in fact neither of them would have been possible without such an arrangement. In terms of timeframes, personnel strength and follow up missions we also observe significant disparity. On the one hand, we have Concordia, which took over as a follow up to the EU Police Mission (EUPM) and was succeeded itself by another EU operation; operation Proxima. On the other hand, we have Artemis, which served as bridge between two UN operations in DRC and Althea, which came as a follow up to NATO operation SFOR in BiH. The range of duration of the operations in question ranged from one month in operation Artemis to six months in operations Concordia and Althea. Artemis specifically was according to Robert Cooper “…the only military operation of which I have had direct experience that ended exactly on time” (Gnesotto 2004: 191). In terms of troop strength we observe a great disparity from the 350 of Concordia to the 1800 of Artemis,
culminating in the 7000-strong operation *Althea*, which constituted the largest military operation of the EU to date.

**Conclusion: European Strategic Culture**

In chapter III, it was argued that a common European strategic culture should be based on three pillars. First, it should be focused on the principles of humanitarian intervention, which comprise just cause, right intention, use of force as last resort, high probability of success and proportionality of the forces used. In the absence of a clear ethical or humanitarian goal, no military intervention should be undertaken. Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that minimisation of collateral damage is an arch principle for any successful military intervention and deserves as much notice as the desire for minimal force casualties. Second, European strategic culture for reasons of geography and geopolitics should be outward oriented with an arm able to reach beyond the geographical limits of the Union. Last, but certainly not least, should come the need for the largest possible consensus amongst member states and the international community before the launch of any given military operation. This prerequisite brings the necessity for UN authorization prior to any such move to the foreground and places multilateralism at the heart of any EU policies and operations.

Let us consider now how the three operations in question fare under the above criteria. The humanitarian intervention principles as we have presented them earlier in this thesis include different elements. Military intervention has to adhere to a just cause having the right intention. It should be introduced by the proper authority and appropriate public declaration and it should come as the last resort. The forces used should be proportional to the threat faced and finally there should be a positive humanitarian outcome (Wheeler 2000: 33). The ‘humanitarian’ element is perhaps the most difficult to test, since it requires the ability to distinguish between the discourse used to justify the intervention in any given crisis and the
real motives behind it. Given the difficulties faced by “mature status-quo oriented consumerist democracies” in mobilising public support for military intervention (Everts 2002), it has been argued that coercion by military means will rarely be employed unless it is seen to have a clear ethical or humanitarian goal (Hyde-Price 2004b: 340). In an enlightening survey performed by Meyer (Meyer 2006: 190) more than 75% of his sample supported that military force should be used to stop human suffering and death in third countries. It becomes clear then that, no matter what the alleged reasons behind any intervention may be, at least the rhetoric supporting it has to show evidence of a humanitarian approach. The probability of success of a mission, even if not overtly addressed by member states, is an issue that is always a priority in decision-making. Keeping in mind the risk-averse nature of many EU governments, both concerning the possibility of human casualties but also the endangerment of the ESDP project itself, the EU has predictably so far only intervened in areas where success was almost guaranteed (Aggestam 2007: 5).

All three operations under examination here do include a strong humanitarian element and, hence fulfill in various degrees the principles of humanitarian intervention. We must stress that for all EU operations the crucial issue that governs attitudes towards the use of force for member states of the European Union is that of casualties. In a survey conducted amongst EU élites by Meyer, mixed answers were given on whether military force should only be deployed if the risk for the specific country’s troops to sustain casualties is small. The survey sample as seen in Figure 10 is split almost in half (Meyer 2006: 191). It seems that a serious qualifying point for intervening is if this can happen with no or at best minimum casualties for the contributing country.
Military Force should only be deployed, if the risk for your country’s troops to sustain casualties is small

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Poland</th>
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<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agree, but…</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disagree, but…</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
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Figure 10 Deployment of Troops vs casualties. Source: (Meyer 2006: 191)

Multilateralism is the one aspect that all three operations fulfilled despite certain sporadic critiques that Artemis was “a French operation with an EU cover” (Grignon 2003: 3). While there is always the fear that EU policies can be used as a Trojan horse for the pursuit of national agendas, the problem can be bypassed. It has already been agreed that future EU operations will be considered only if their objectives are in support of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. This means that operations are likely to be launched only in those cases where the EU has already secured a coherent approach. Under the CFSP, all three of the aforementioned operations have been launched under conditions of unanimity and with a UN mandate authorizing and legitimizing them. As an example of the legitimising power of the UN, one can present the case of German opposition to Artemis. At the initial stages of discussion for Artemis Germany was strictly opposed to the prospect of EU involvement in Africa. The basis of its opposition was Germany’s belief that its resources would be used by former colonial member states of the EU in order to intervene in places of no actual EU interest. The Iraq crisis, looming large during that period, highlighted to both the UK and Germany the necessity of a UN resolution prior to engagement. The UN authorisation was
therefore to some extent manufactured by the HR to provide ambassadors with the right ammunition in their effort to convince Germany to concede to Artemis (Meyer 2006: 135).

The debate over outward oriented strategies was addressed constructively very early in ESDP history with Artemis. Artemis underlined the will of EU member states to project EU actions beyond the territorial confines of Europe, thus transforming the EU into a global player. Building on this will, the UN has repeatedly asked for the EU’s help in tackling regional crises, first in DRC and then in BiH. Only recently has the global reach of the EU been accentuated with the Aceh mission in Indonesia, which constitutes the area farthest from Europe where EU forces operate, albeit largely in a civilian operation. Following Artemis, the special needs in capabilities for expeditionary operations and power projection were amply highlighted in numerous reports and debriefings (Faria 2004: ; Gnesotto et al. 2004: ; Grignon 2003: ; Howorth 2005). Concordia and Althea both support the outward oriented outlook of the EU. They have taken place in areas close to the EU (FYROM and BiH respectively), which have been described as the inner abroad of the Union. The need for this area, which by definition belongs to neither the realm of domestic nor truly ‘foreign’ affairs, to be stable and pacified has been repeatedly stressed as bearing an impact on the security and prosperity of the EU itself.

In chapter III we introduced the three pillars upon which a European strategic culture should be based. In this chapter, we ascertained that these pillars are indeed present in the military operations of the Union. It has become evident thus that the EU has already incorporated a strategic culture, albeit a limited one, in its functioning. The three operations we have examined exhibit a number of similarities both in their planning phases and in their actual execution. The similarities are to be found in their organisational structure and hierarchies, but also in the realm of principle. The Union satisfies in each of these operations,
and in various degrees, the principles of humanitarian intervention and it manages to abide by them under both the spirit and the ‘flesh’ of multilateralism. What is more, the fact alone that the EU has embarked on military operations as far removed from Europe as with *Artemis*, stresses the fact that an outward orientation outlook is ingrained within the EU approach to international affairs and its envisaged role as a global agent. It would take the study of many more operations and the test of time in order to draw more conclusive insights into the nature of the nascent European strategic culture. It can be safely posited, however, given the above discussion, that these three operations contributed greatly towards a common European strategic culture.
Chapter VII

CONCLUSION

The aim of the conclusion is to address the original proposition, as expressed in the introduction and present the findings of this thesis. The proposition that was put forward asserted that the European Union possesses a strategic culture, albeit a limited one. This limited strategic culture is based on three pillars. The first consists of adherence to the principles of humanitarian intervention, as these have evolved through the tradition of just war theory and through the writings of Saint Augustine and Hugo Grotius to the moral wars of Tony Blair. The second pillar involves an EU foreign policy that would be less introvert and more outward oriented than it has been in the past. Last but not least, multilateralism will constitute the basic tenet for any intervention, military or not. In inspecting the validity of the proposition I will address each of the research questions that guided this thesis in turn. To begin with, I will look at the question of the appropriate framework for analysing EU strategic culture. This will be followed by a discussion on the application of this framework to relevant European strategic documents and particular examples of military interventions by the EU. In doing so I will summarise the results of the analysis conducted in chapters II and III as applying to the former question and chapters IV, V and VI to the latter. In the second part of this conclusion I will readdress my proposition and present the findings of this thesis as shaped by the examination of the research questions. I will end this conclusion with suggestions on how the cultivation of a stronger European strategic culture could be facilitated and recommendations for further research.
Aims and objectives

Providing a framework for analysis customised to the European Union

An important shortcoming of the literature on strategic culture is the fact that it is constructed for dealing with nation-states and not with multinational agents like the European Union. The EU is not the classic Westphalian international actor, nor is it an organisation of the defensive type that we have seen rising in the years after the end of World War II. It is rather a hybrid agent, which exhibits traits of both a state and an international organisation. In this respect, it is very difficult to apply to it frameworks and analytical tools that have been designed for a different type of structure. Based on these premises, I decided that the framework for analysis introduced by Booth and Macmillan (Booth and Trood 1999: 363) provides enough analytical potency so as to allow us to plot the strategic culture of the European Union in a consistent and coherent way. This framework is differentiated from other research methods in the field in that it includes a set of questions that can offer a more comprehensive approach to the issue. The foremost appeal of the Booth and Macmillan framework, however, is its adaptability not only to the particular circumstances of individual countries but, in our case, to groups of countries. It is not a rigid framework but one that provides the researcher with the possibility to test a wide variety of different parameters that affect a nation’s strategic culture. In accordance with the specific characteristics of their case study, the researcher could focus on the most applicable parameters. The framework revolved around three major sources for strategic culture. These sources, as defined by Booth and Macmillan, included geography and resources, historical experiences and political structure and defence organization. Given the flexibility of the framework the author’s task was to apply it with caution to the case of the European Union, always bearing in mind that not all of its questions were relevant to the EU.
Is there a common European strategic culture?

The next step of the thesis was to apply the Booth-Macmillan framework to the European Union. The application necessitated the analysis of three major areas, which according to the framework, consisted of the geography and the resources of the Union, its historical experiences and its political and military organisation. The results of this analysis provided a fairly complete image of the European Union as it stands today and the implications of the aforementioned parameters to its strategic culture. Following from this analysis, therefore, the strategic culture of Europe is based on the principles of humanitarian intervention i.e. just cause, the use of force as a last resort, securing means proportional to the end in sight and ensuring that the intervention will have a positive humanitarian outcome. No foreign intervention will be possible if these prerequisites do not provide at least part of its justification. Following the importance of human life and human rights, minimization of collateral damage will be an added prerequisite for any operation. Given its current geographical and geopolitical situation European strategic culture will be outward oriented. This essentially means that European armed forces need to restructure away from their Cold War emphasis on collective territorial defence towards expeditionary operations of power projection. Finally, European strategic culture will be based firmly on the idea of multilateralism and the attainment of consensus prior to any future intervention. The use of force will be permissible only as a measure of last resort and only under the authorization of the UN. In the recent past, the latter was bypassed in the Kosovo campaign. Individual states, through NATO, supported military intervention, explicitly or implicitly, without a UN Security Council resolution. By stressing the need for UN authorisation, the EU tries to differentiate itself from NATO. Since Kosovo, there has been a great push towards the inclusion of UN authorisation in the absolute prerequisites for military intervention, from the part of the EU. The rhetoric at least, as presented in the European Security Strategy, is
explicit on that need (European Council 2003n: 9). It remains to be seen whether EU member states will strictly adhere to this guideline and preserve it as a prerequisite for any future foreign interventions.

In order to validate the applicability of the three pillars of European strategic culture, one has to examine them against real conditions. I have decided that the best way to assess their relevance would be to assess them against the rhetoric and strategic actions of the European Union that took place within the period 1998-2005, which is the set timeframe for this thesis. In regard to the rhetoric of the EU I have focused on those documents that best described the strategic concept of the EU after the introduction of the ESDP. Of those, the one that provided the most coherent articulation of a European strategic concept was the European Security Strategy. The endorsement of this document by the Heads of State and Government in the European Council in Brussels on 12 December 2003 accentuated its pan-European importance, adding to its value as the testing ground for traces of a European strategic culture (European Council 2003n). Following a thorough analysis of the document and the themes that underlined it, I found that they corroborated with our initial proposition. In regard to EU actions of strategic importance I have decided to examine three EU military operations that took place between the introduction of the ESDP and the year 2005. The choice of focus on the operations Concordia, Artemis and Althea was based on their inclusion of a military aspect. An analysis and comparison of the decision-making procedures behind the three operations, as well as their organisation and execution, led to the conclusion that they indeed supported the original proposition of a limited European strategic culture based on three pillars. All three operations presented the author with enough evidence to support that an EU strategic culture, as revealed in the context of foreign military intervention, is indeed premised on the principles of humanitarian intervention, outward orientation and
multilateralism. A study of both the ESS, as well as the EU military operations, has revealed that a common EU strategic culture of sorts had already begun to take shape during the period in question.

**Revisiting the initial proposition**
The central aim of this study has been to analyse the distinct elements of a potential European strategic culture and their representation in the rhetoric and strategic actions of the Union with special emphasis in the years of ESDP existence. The final objective was to test these against the initial proposition for the existence of a specific, albeit limited European strategic culture. During the course of this thesis I focused on EU statements and documents of strategic importance, as well as military operations undertaken by the Union in the period after the introduction of ESDP. However, I deemed it necessary to include a brief study of the history of EU defence initiatives from the end of World War II to the end of the Cold War. The purpose of this was to provide a deeper understanding of the origins of European strategic culture, which is by definition the result of a long historical process. A vital area of this study, one that tied the proposition with actual developments, was the examination of documents produced by the EU that were of strategic importance, such as the ESS and of EU military operations on the ground.

Ever since the first efforts towards institutionalised co-operation that were to form the basis of the EU, member states found themselves set on a journey without being fully aware of its final destination. European élites were, as they still are today, inconclusive and in disagreement regarding the level of integration that the Union should aspire to. Nevertheless, this did not inhibit cooperation and communication between the initial member states and the newcomers at later stages. This cooperation was in itself the greatest success of the newly-born European Community. It gave the opportunity to the European élites to rub
shoulders and get to know one another better through frequent meetings, both formal and informal. The bases were laid during that period for the understanding of each other’s positions, which led later on to the forging of common ones. The process was not without obstacles; consider the empty-chair crisis of 1965, the veto of de Gaul for Britain’s accession and Thatcher’s rebate debacle, to name but a few. Nevertheless, in spite of the setbacks the Community emerged stronger and managed to go forward with increased cooperation in the areas of economics, trade and cross-border regulations. The end of the Cold War let the genie out of the bottle for European affairs and the EEC (and later on the EU), was faced with dilemmas that had never been seriously considered before. Its security was no longer underwritten by the United States and the threats that it faced were very different from those of the Cold War. Back in the 1950s the European citizens had shelved the problem of collective security as being something remote from their immediate concerns. As long as this situation endured there could have been no real expectations for the initiation of the post-WWII generations into a modern defence culture.

In the period immediately after the end of the Cold War, the outbreak of the Balkan wars and especially the Kosovo crisis of the late 1990s revealed to all EU member states that the EU lacked a coherent common approach to its foreign affairs. If one wants to be precise, the EU actually lacked a common approach to foreign affairs altogether. The Kosovo crisis, therefore, acted as the catalyst for the introduction of a more robust and coherent EU foreign and security policy. The agreement between the United Kingdom and France in St-Malo to present a common front in the sphere of international relations was the push that set the wheels in motion since, in effect, it meant that this new field of co-operation had the blessing of the two militarily most powerful EU member states. Following St-Malo, the Union started putting in place the institutions needed for such a policy to be effective.
through a series of EU summits that resulted in the signing of various treaties. This ongoing project is of extraordinary dimensions, if only for the fact that one has to introduce to a purely civilian organization a completely different mentality in regard to foreign policy.

Looking back at the history of the European Union, one can trace the effect of its different formative stages on the creation of a European strategic culture. If the cooperation initiatives following WWII provided the canvas upon which a possible European strategic culture could be drawn, it was only after the Kosovo war and the initiation of ESDP that the EU exhibited clear traits of a strategic culture. However, it was with the decision in St-Malo that the Union actually began to cultivate a common strategic culture that would fit within its institutional framework. Nothing of the sort can be said to have existed before.

The establishment of the first EU institutions and the active participation of EU forces to different crises around the world prompted the gradual formation of elements of a strategic culture. This process is too recent for one to be able to extract irrefutable insights about the composition of European strategic culture. Nevertheless, if one looks closely they can identify recurrent characteristics included in the relevant EU strategic documents and operations. In studying in depth the European Security Strategy and analysing the objectives of the three EU operations, the basic traits of a common European strategic culture become apparent. Both sections of this study that focus on the rhetoric and its implementation by the Union suggest that there is indeed a European strategic culture, albeit a limited one based on the principles highlighted in Chapter III; the principles of humanitarian intervention, outward orientation and multilateralism.

True to its proclamations in documents of strategic importance, the European Union has only launched operations that fulfilled the principles of humanitarian intervention. All three
missions discussed in this thesis included in their justification strong humanitarian elements. While operation *Artemis* was launched to thwart an imminent humanitarian catastrophe, the other two missions were launched in order to avert the possibility of a new humanitarian crisis (*Althea*) or prevent the relapse to an old one (*Concordia*). In all three operations the conditions for a justifiable forceful intervention existed and were adhered to with great diligence by EU member states and institutions. The missions were planned and set on the ground after a specific EU resolution was secured; the forces deployed, as well as the tools they were allowed to use in the duration of their presence in the field, were proportional to their task. Finally, the level of risk that was involved in the actual realisation of the operations was limited to well under acceptable levels, as in operation *Artemis*. In the same vein, the discourse used to justify the operations to the public was not misleading, but directed towards the effective dissemination of information regarding EU intentions and the reasoning behind them, to the extent of course that it did not compromise operational security and efficiency.

The very fact that EU operations did not take place within the frontiers of the EU supports the element of an outward orientated policy. The determination of the EU to invest human and material resources in order to pursue its policies abroad highlights a shift from the introspective strategic outlook of the past to one that has matured and is being exported with increased confidence outside the narrow EU borders. The ring of EU interests has expanded with time from the Balkans to include farther removed places like Indonesia, with operation *Aceh*, Africa with operation *Artemis* and the Caucasus, where the EU operates missions such as *Themis*, even if these deploy mainly non-military instruments.

The multilateral element, as an integral part of EU strategic culture, is the most readily recognizable. Multilateral practices have traditionally been at the core of the Union and hence
they are embedded in all its organisational and executive structures. The three operations under examination in this thesis readily fulfil this element. They were all approved by the European Council and, despite some scattered initial objections the decisions for their launch were unanimous. The UN was kept in the loop throughout the planning process and the implementation of the operations and indeed the UN Security Council in a further multilateral gesture authorised all three of them with specific resolutions.

The European Security Strategy is until now (2007) the only document of purely strategic ambition in EU discourse. Providing a loose framework upon which EU strategic action would be organised, it is also the sole document that can provide the researcher of strategic culture with more concrete insights. The ESS, however, as a document of intent, does not represent the definitive structure of EU strategic planning. The strength of such documents lies precisely in the fact that they provide a framework, an outline for action and not the action itself. The lack of a prescriptive element allows the executive that produced them the freedom to adjust to different eventualities. The ESS, therefore, does not address specifically all the principles of humanitarian intervention. It does provide, however, the impetus that they should be used in the planning and launching of a robust EU response to crises. The only issue that the ESS is specific on is the need to make use of the entire range of tools available when addressing threats and during crisis management. This does not exclude the use of military tools.

Expressly set apart as one of its main targets, multilateralism is at the core of the ESS. The promotion of ‘effective multilateralism’ is an attempt to ground the term and thus limit its use to realist levels in an attempt to avoid the enthusiasm of idealism. Multilateralism is highlighted by the explicit mentioning of the need for cooperation between the various international organisations whilst aiming at international security. The ESS is very explicit on
the importance of outward orientation policies; after all it is a foreign policy document. According to the threat assessment put forward in the ESS, the Union has to be engaged with its near and wider abroad, since this has been deemed the likeliest origin of threats against its security.

The evidence leaves us with the picture of a relatively narrow and shallow European strategic culture based on three pillars and stemming from Brussels. As far as role perception and identities are concerned, there is broad support for the positioning of the EU as a global actor, who would possess an outward oriented policy with a commitment to the promotion of humanitarian causes and peace as its foundation. EU strategic culture cannot be directly compared to that of NATO because of their fundamental divergence in nature and structure.

To begin with, NATO has a different role to fulfil. It is a defence alliance, as opposed to the EU, which is a union of nations, and it is characterised by the pre-eminence of the US in its ranks and decision-making processes. Unlike the EU, the defensive role that NATO was set up to play does not restrict its use of force. Operations that cannot find justification within the EU framework, especially without the relevant authorisations, can be supported by NATO structures and in accordance with its mission statement. Over the past decade the EU has geared towards a new direction regarding the coordination of its foreign policy. This does not mean however that progress made has reached a definitive juncture. European strategic culture is still in its formative stages. National identities and cultures are still strong and changes in governments and circumstances can have a significant effect on the whole process. The changing dynamics of a growing European Union is not a particularly conducive factor towards further consolidation. It is by far a more complicated process for a Union of 27 to agree on a certain issue, let alone coordinate their foreign policies, than for a Union of 15, whose members also had a longer-standing experience of cooperation.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that a European strategic culture is a utopian pursuit. On the contrary, as we have seen the process is well under way in both EU rhetoric and practice. The issue that remains to be seen, therefore, is whether this drive towards greater coordination of foreign policy will endure. For lack of ability to predict the future, this task is reserved for the next generation of researchers of European strategic culture. On its part, this thesis has demonstrated that for the period between the introduction of the ESDP until the year 2005, a strategic culture based on the accumulated historical experience of European co-operation since its inception and the more recent willingness of member states to expand their co-operation in the field of foreign policy has appeared. By force of the recent nature of these developments this strategic culture can only be described at this stage as limited. We have, however, been able to single out its main recurrent characteristics, which exhibit a Kantian faith in the principles of humanitarian intervention, effective multilateralism and an increasing concern for assuming a global role in the international arena, diverting the focus of foreign policy beyond the geographical borders of the European Union.

**Thesis contributions**

This thesis has brought together disparate literatures on the subject of strategic culture and focused on its application to the European Union. In studying the European strategic culture this thesis built upon the Macmillan-Booth model for the analysis of strategic cultures. By making the relevant adaptations it devised an original customised framework that suited the research question. This thesis has also provided, to the extent of my knowledge, a more comprehensive assessment of EU limitations regarding strategic coordination, than hitherto available, which will inform policy makers in a pan-European level. Finally, this thesis has presented a new composition of the narrative surrounding EU strategic action that can be used as the starting point for further related academic research.
Suggestions for forging a deeper and wider European Strategic Culture

In the European Security Strategy Javier Solana stated that “we need to develop a strategic culture” (European Council 2003n: 11). I believe that strategic culture cannot be enforced upon any member state of the EU, nor equally that it is possible for its specific characteristics to be dictated by an intergovernmental institution such as the European Council. However, the EU can provide the appropriate conditions for its development. The way forward is through an increased socialisation of EU citizens. This can be achieved by strengthening existing exchange programmes between military institutions and by the compulsory participation of the relevant personnel in joint training courses that will focus on the new tasks that EU forces will have to rise to. On an institutional level the formation of a core coordinating body for organising exchanges between national military training schools can greatly enhance the process and widen the experience of participants. The creation of the European Defence and Security College (EDSC) is a step forward but its ‘virtual’ character inhibits it from providing the level of integration required. The next step would be the creation of a permanent institution along the lines of an EU Academy that would be compulsory for all employees of the Union. The French École Nationale d' Administration could serve as the model. This EU Academy could serve as the melting pot where students from all member states would be given the opportunity to combine their learning of EU structures with intense socialization in an international environment, forge friendships and strengthen common understandings and, by extension, acquire a common culture that would serve them later on in their careers in European institutions. At the national level, the creation of a permanent network between the national institutions of member states and their involvement in European military and civilian training programmes could also prove conducive to the development of a common strategic culture.
Suggestions for further research

Any author undertaking the task of writing a study on European strategic culture at this point in time should be prepared to acknowledge from the outset that the finished product will be tentative and incomplete. This thesis has made the best possible use of the available evidence on EU documents and operations of significance for the creation of a common strategic culture. The data currently available, however, spreads over no more than a decade (1998-2005) and a handful of documents. The consequences of the dearth of material and their proximity in time to the present can only be remedied by studies that would have the benefit of a detached hindsight. This will be achieved when more time intervenes between the researcher and their object of study. In order to heighten the levels of accuracy one would also have to include in their research of a European strategic culture as many manifestations of a common strategic intent on the part of the Union as possible. The research therefore on this field is still ongoing. Distance in time is an important factor that would add a higher degree of specificity to the findings. As the European project evolves so will the factors that affect strategic culture become more prominent and increase in clarity, thus making the study of strategic culture more conclusive. Yet, even though the literature contains significant gaps that are not likely to be covered in the immediate future, it remains still a rapidly expanding one. Each year there is a variety of welcome new additions in terms of monographs, anthologies, journal articles and papers. Colin S. Gray (Gray 1999b: 49) has asserted that, in effect, the usefulness of the study of strategic culture lies not so much in its perceived ability to predict future patterns of behaviour but, rather, in its role as an indicium in explaining present state behaviour. For the student of EU politics such approaches offer a useful framework for understanding the recent as well as the more distant past.
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