Landed Society in Cumberland and Westmorland,
c. 1440-1485 - The Politics of the Wars of the Roses

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by

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Traditionally, the north-west of England in the mid-fifteenth century has been seen as being under the total dominance of the Nevilles, the Earls of Salisbury and Warwick, and their successor in the north Richard Duke of Gloucester. This thesis aims to correct that impression by examining the political structures that operated in the counties of Cumberland and Westmorland in the period between c.1440 and 1485, and the relationships between the magnates in question and local society. In doing so, it finds an emphasis on continuity and co-operation within the local community that did not always go hand-in-hand with the magnates' expectations of service. The power-struggle at court eventually imposed factionalism on the region against its wishes. The magnates continued to emphasise the necessity of being served by men who had proved themselves loyal, and divided authority in the region by only extending it to men who had actively supported the Yorkists in 1459-61. After 1471, Edward IV showed more care in how he dealt with the region. Instead of allowing his brother the Duke of Gloucester carte blanche, he restricted his influence by using his own agent, Sir William Parr. Gloucester’s interest was restricted to financial matters only until the Scottish war of 1480. After his usurpation the shallow base of his support in the region became apparent, and few men took part in the “northern plantations”. Richard still had plans to conquer south-west Scotland and much of his patronage was geared towards this. His subsequent failure undermined his limited support in the north-west and, in 1485, the locality had little difficulty in adjusting to the Tudor regime.
Cumberland and Westmorland
in the Fifteenth Century
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Preface

Before acknowledging some of the innumerable debts that I have accumulated during the writing of this thesis, mention needs to be made of the way I have approached the presentation. All references are given in full the first time only, and thereafter in short form. All books have been published in London unless otherwise stated. Any errors, factual or otherwise, are mine.

Above all, my thanks must go to my supervisor, Dr D.T. Williams, without whose inspirational teaching I would never have become interested in medieval England, and, without whose suggestion of a suitable topic, this thesis would never have begun. I am grateful to the interest shown throughout by Professor Tony Pollard of the University of Teesside, whose comments on some of the early drafts of the thesis were most useful. I must also thank Dr John Willmott and Dr Bill Sheils of the University of York for their comments on some of the early chapters, and Professor Michael Podro who provided much support and advice. Dr Richard Hoyle of the University of Central Lancashire very kindly allowed me to see the transcripts of the records of the King’s Bench for the northern counties, made by Rosemary Hayes and Henry Summerson, which he is currently editing for publication. Although I was not able to use them in the thesis, they did contribute significantly to my understanding of the region. Leicester University Arts Faculty Research Board, the Richard III Trust, the Newby Charitable Trust and the Ian H. Karten Trust all provided valuable financial assistance. My thanks also to His Grace, the Duke of Devonshire, His Grace, the Duke of Northumberland and the Honourable Mr Simon Howard for allowing me to research their family documents. The staff of all the records offices were all exceedingly generous with their time, but I am particularly grateful to those of the Cumbria Record Offices at both Carlisle and Kendal who had to put up with me the most. Likewise, those at Leicester University Library, especially the staff in the Stack, have been very patient and helpful throughout.
Finally, I shall allow myself the luxury of a few more personal dedications. Firstly, my parents have been a constant source of support and encouragement, especially during the dark days, for which they have my undying love and admiration. Many others have shown kindnesses, both large and small, that have all contributed in one way or another to the completion of this work. There is not enough space to name them all, but in particular I would like to thank Annie Morgan for her constant encouragement, and her willingness to share my weaknesses for coffee and cream cakes. Others deserving of mention include Mike, Becky, Kath, Sara, Ness, Charlotte (X2), Jim, and especially Paul. Last, but not least, is the person to whom this thesis is dedicated, who has made life such a pleasure.

Λιακή μου – αξιόζεις τον κοπό.
INTRODUCTION

The quality of "northernness", recognised in literature since the thirteenth century, has in recent times led to academic discussion about just what it meant to come from the medieval north. The north-south divide has become itself the object of study and, for the past thirty years or so, all aspects of "northern history" have come under scrutiny in the journal of that name produced by the University of Leeds. Indeed, the question posed - and admirably answered by a southerner, Professor Le Patourel - at a colloquium held in 1975, "Is Northern History a Subject?", has led to numerous other conferences and researches aimed at placing the study of the region in its proper context¹. "The North", as Le Patourel noted, is not easy to define despite the common belief, as apparent today as it was in the fifteenth century, that it constituted a separate region of the country with distinctive linguistic and behavioural characteristics. Within that province however, whether it stretches from the Nene, the Trent, or the Humber, there are numerous sub-regions, each with a strong sense of local identity². Despite all of its historical inaccuracies the "Wars of the Roses" fought out each year between the Yorkshire and Lancashire cricket teams is intense; no Cumbrian would wish to be confused with a Northumbrian; no self-respecting Geordie, born within sight of the Tyne, would allow you to mistake him for a Teessider.

If such attitudes of local pride are so prevalent today with all the benefits of modern transport and communications, then they must have been twice as strong


in the fifteenth century. Recent scholarship has quite rightly questioned the efficacy of treating the north of England in this period as a whole, and begun to look at much smaller regions as meaningful areas of analysis. There were large numbers of variations in areas of life such as tenurial conditions, political structures and economy both within the north and between the north and the south. Many of these were due to the variety of geographical landscapes, but it is impossible to come to any conclusions about what constituted "the north" other than that it was - and is - a "state of mind". As Professor Pollard has pointed out "the north", to the citizens of Carlisle, meant Scotland. For the anyone else from "the south" (unless they were involved in crown administration), it was a "needfully imprecise, cultural construct".

There is no reason why the north should be subject to special treatment, or given dispensation from the rigours of intellectual examination, just because it exists as a unique "state of mind". As far as the political history of the fifteenth century is concerned this process was begun nearly forty years ago by Professor Storey. It has progressed most notably with the work of Professors Pollard, Hicks, and Horrox, but they are by no means the only ones. This is not to say, however, that all of the north has been given similar treatment. The dominant figures in the fifteenth century north were the Percies, the Nevilles and Richard Duke of Gloucester, and work has naturally tended to concentrate on them. It has

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done, however, because of their impact on the national political scene that was (thanks to the geographical location of the capital) based in the south. The Percy-Neville feud in the 1450s stoked the fires of civil war; the Earl of Warwick's northern hegemony in the 1460s gave him the power to replace Edward IV; Gloucester's usurpation of the throne was likewise grounded on his northern affinity. The men involved did not become famous because they were from the north - the Duke of Gloucester could hardly lay claim to that - but because they altered the course of the country’s political history\(^6\). That they did so using their northern supporters is largely irrelevant. Other magnates existed and were just as influential on national affairs - the Duke of York in the 1450s, the Duke of Buckingham in 1483 and the Stanleys in 1485春天 to mind, but they were not the only ones. The extent to which the "northern" magnates were successful has recently been called into question. Their activities, stemming from the political misjudgements of both Percy and Neville, have been described as "quasi-military alarms and excursions which, in the end, signified very little"\(^7\). Richard of Gloucester's achievements in 1483-85, although hardly the result of a quasi-military alarm, were likewise transient. His plans for the massive chantry at York, his Council of the North, his northern plantations, even his dynasty, all came to an end with his death. Most surprisingly, it was the northern following on which he had relied so much that was the agent of his downfall. After the battle of Bosworth there seems to have been little heart-searching and, when the chance came to avenge him at the battle of Stoke, his Middleham affinity refused to become involved.

Important as these studies have been, they have tended to concentrate on what might be called “affinity politics”. This, it is now recognised, does not give a true picture of political structures and the influences at play within the various elements of the national polity\(^8\). Significant though these magnate affinities were, they cannot be presumed to have been totally dedicated to the pursuit of their lords’ careers. Loyalty was (and still is) above all else a personal attribute. If we are to understand not only the motivations of the magnates, but also

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\(^6\) Dobson, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

\(^7\) Op. cit.

the reasons for their apparent successes and more obvious failures, then we need to understand that their position in the political firmament was not always the same as that of their supporters. As peers of the realm and the king's greatest subjects they expected to be given a role in government as "natural councillors". To see them solely in this light, however, creates a bias which has dogged the perspective of historians up to the present day. Magnates were powerful because they controlled land. This gave them not only wealth but political influence at the local level and, more importantly in the context of the Wars of the Roses, access to manpower. As such, their relationship with their estates was all-important. Not only that, but even the most powerful nobleman could only dominate small regions and he was, for the most part, reliant on his relationship with other local, smaller landowners for political control of larger areas. “Politics” is too broad a term to be taken as a whole, and can be broken down into four main elements based on the court, parliament, the locality and bureaucracy. It was not just a national concern, but one that affected all aspects of landowning society.

The governance of the country could not be controlled from the throne without the help of a large number of small landowners operating within a locality, many of whom probably had no physical contact with the king or their magnate lords throughout their lifetimes. We cannot, therefore, fully understand how or why men such as the Earl of Warwick and Richard of Gloucester behaved as they did without understanding the society of which they were a product. Court politics was one arena in which they operated, local politics was another, and although they were not mutually exclusive there was a huge difference between the two. This difference, in terms of the balance between constitutionalism on a national or local scale, was mainly one of gradation. Magnates and yeomen were both landowners with concerns of lordship, but they were at opposite ends of the spectrum. While they all operated within a basic political framework predicated on hierarchy, what is commonly termed "bastard feudalism", their outlook was consequently different. For a magnate his

\[9\] Carpenter, Locality and Polity, pp. 618-20.

\[10\] Harriss, op. cit., pp. 1-17.


estates were a source of income which provided him with the means (in terms of leisure and finance) to exercise political authority. For a yeoman they were a livelihood that could not be put at risk lightly. Their worlds were different, with magnates seeing a wider, although incomplete, picture of the national polity, and the local gentry being concerned with the preservation of provincial political stability so that their livelihood could be protected. For them, that meant a local society that could withstand the external pressures of magnate dominance and crown interference.

In terms of political history, therefore, an understanding of the practicalities of monarchy in the fifteenth century can be enhanced by a greater familiarity with local society. This balance between "locality and polity" is fundamental, but we need to understand just what a locality was. As indicated above, and as has been shown elsewhere, "the north" is too big and too diverse to be regarded as one. Until recently it was the county that was taken to be the most acceptable definition and studies of the gentry and local society have taken shire boundaries as their limits. The work of Pollard and Carpenter, though, has shown just how meaningless such administrative boundaries were to local society. It is still, however, the most useful definition for historians to use because the evidence is organised along county lines, and so this study also takes as its basis the old counties of Cumberland and Westmorland. As will be seen below they formed a coherent regional unit even then, but it was slightly different from the modern-day Cumbria. They also contained perhaps the most misinterpreted "region" of the fifteenth century, the border with Scotland. Romantic ideas of reivers and their lifestyles, free from the shackles of authority, living by their wits and cunning have been around since the ballads of the sixteenth century were written (and possibly even from the early fifteenth century). They are the mainstay of tourism in places such as Carlisle and

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13 Carpenter, Locality and Polity, pp. 615-16.


16 Carpenter, op. cit., p. 10.
Hexham, but their existence had little impact on the rest of northern society. The crown's administration of Cumberland was certainly geared towards the defence of the border but the local community, as a whole, was run along traditional lines. Gentry families existed, flourished, declined, and governed the shire just as they did anywhere else in the country. Assertions that the whole of Cumberland, Westmorland and Northumberland were a border region where the king's law was a dead letter and violence was endemic have now been shown to be incorrect. Shire administration and royal justice were important and the evidence, although limited, does not indicate that they were inherently weaker than elsewhere where they had jurisdiction.

Carlisle, as Dr. Summerson has shown, was a centre of regal authority throughout the period and remained loyal to the crown in the most difficult of circumstances.

This view of the far northern shires has come about in large part because of the reliance on the records of central government which is necessary, but this does not mean that local records have nothing to tell us. They are hopelessly inadequate for a traditional political study of the mid-fifteenth century, but only because they tell us little about traditional “affinity” politics. The same, however, could

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be said for most counties, even Warwickshire. The importance of local material lies not so much in adding to our knowledge of political events but in giving us an insight into the workings of local society. As Carpenter has shown, this is the necessary prerequisite of developing our understanding of political life. This thesis is much more limited in scope than Carpenter’s monograph, however. It is aimed at placing Cumberland and Westmorland into the wider picture of national politics during the period of Yorkist influence, not at reconstructing local society. To do so, though, still requires an understanding of the region in social terms in order to give us the background on which to paint the finer details of political events.

**THE REGION**

The counties of Cumberland and Westmorland were unique in their isolation from the rest of the country. Situated in the far north-west they were bounded by two strong political boundaries to the north and south, and virtually enclosed by geographical barriers. To the north, the international border with Scotland provided the upper limit of the country and, since the early part of the century, had cut off the local landowning society from their Scottish counterparts. To the south, the Duchy of Lancaster and its administrative centre at Lancaster provided the richest source of crown patronage north of the Trent, but it was also restricted to Lancashire men. The only man to hold office on both sides of the county line, Sir Edward Beetham, was appointed a JP in both Westmorland and Lancashire in January 1471, but he held lands in both and was a trusted Neville supporter. Certainly none of the Duchy’s officers in the fifteenth century came from Cumberland or Westmorland except for one lawyer, William Thornburgh. On the eastern side of

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21 Carpenter, op. cit., p. 12.


24 He was appointed escheator of the Duchy of Lancaster during pleasure in 1495 and was also on the commission of the peace for Cumberland, but by this time he had settled in Cartmel, part of Lancashire Over-the-Sands - R. Somerville, *The History of the Duchy of Lancaster*, (2 vols., 1953-54), i, p. 466; *CPR 1494-1509*, p. 634.
the counties lay the barrier of the Pennines, and in Cumberland the only main crossing point was the road between Carlisle and Newcastle. In Westmorland, at the south end of the Eden valley, there was a passage over the moors from Brough to upper Teesdale and Barnard Castle, and further south, near Sedbergh, was a road over Abbotside Common to Leyburn and Middleham. Although Sedbergh was on the Yorkshire side of the boundary, a track ran westwards over Hutton Common to Kendal. Other pathways and droving roads existed, but these were the main roads over the Pennines.25

The western edge of Cumberland was bounded by the Irish Sea and the Solway Firth, and to the south it met Westmorland and Lancashire Over-the-Sands, also known as Furness. Starting in the east, the county boundary ran along the line of a brook falling off the Pennines, until it met the River Eden just south of Penrith. It then followed the River Eamont upstream to Ullswater, passed along the length of the lake and over the highest peaks of the Lakeland dome. It met the boundary with Lancashire at Wrynose Pass and then followed the River Duddon to the sea. From Wrynose Pass, the Lancashire border with Westmorland travelled due east to the head of Windermere, then round the southern rim of the lake so that all of it was included in the northern county. Halfway along the lake’s eastern side, the border looped around the northern edge of Cartmel Fell and followed a line due south to the Kent estuary. It met the Lancashire coast a mile or so to the south, near Silverdale, and wended its way eastwards across country until it met the Yorkshire border on the Pennine ridge.26 Between them, the two counties contained a population of approximately 30,000 people, of whom about 19,000 came from Cumberland.27 Most, of course, have left no record of their passing but the wealthy minority, the gentry who left some mark in the historical records, whether they be classed as “greater” or “lesser”, “county” or “parish”, number in the region of 50 families for the two counties combined.

Just as important as these external boundaries were the internal


26 See map.

divisions. Geographically, the Lakeland dome dominated the two counties, but it was not high enough to be impassable nor large enough to prevent passage around it. To the west, north and east lay a continuous lowland region, the lower half of the Solway Plain and the Eden valley. Most of this land lay in Cumberland and had more in common with the area on the other side of the Scottish border than it did with Westmorland. The main problems facing arable agriculture in the region - apart from the fear of Scottish raids - was the wet weather and consequent drainage. In the south there were some small areas of such land in Kentdale and Lonsdale, but for the most part farming was based on animal husbandry, especially sheep. Such grain as was produced was mainly barley and oats, used as winter fodder for livestock rather than to feed the human population\textsuperscript{28}. The reliance on pastoral farming created a population with a strong sense of familial loyalty which, although strongest among the border clans, also permeated throughout all levels of northern society\textsuperscript{29}. It also created the conditions which kept the far north-west in an economic depression from about 1300 to about 1450\textsuperscript{30}. Sheep murrains, and population decrease due to starvation and the plague, led to falling rents and empty tenements, much of which was blamed on Scottish depredations. There is no doubt that, throughout the north, men blamed their economic woes on the Scots and tried to exploit the proximity of the border to gain reductions and remissions from royal taxes. The Dacres of Gilsland had the best excuse and certainly their lands were vulnerable, but the extent to which they suffered from Scottish raiders is open to question. The claim made in the \textit{inquisition post mortem} of Humphrey Lord Dacre in 1485 that his lands in Brampton had lain waste and uncultivated for the past sixty years because of these incursions does seems rather extravagant\textsuperscript{31}.


Political structures within the two counties played a crucial role in the events of the Wars of the Roses, but their boundaries had originally been set by the geographical features of the region. The division of Cumberland after the Norman Conquest had created nine baronies, as well as the demesne lands of Carlisle and the royal Inglewood Forest, which by the fifteenth century were dominated by a handful of lords. The most important of these were the Percy Earls of Northumberland who had gained control of the baronies of Wigton, Allerdale, Cockermouth, and a moiety of Copeland which included Egremont, by the marriage of the first Earl to the heiress Maud de Lucy in 1386. All these territories were collected under the title of the honour of Cockermouth and the Earls enjoyed juris regalia there, which had probably first been granted by Henry I to the first barons of Copeland and Allerdale. Similar rights also applied to the lordship of Millom, which had been held in chief by the Huddlestons since c.1240 through marriage to the heiress of Adam de Boyvil, whose family had been in possession since at least 1125. In effect, although the king's feudal rights continued within the lordships, the county sheriff had no jurisdiction and outlaws could only be tried in manorial courts. Law and order was in the hands of the local lords, and criminals who fled into the lordships could not be pursued without their permission. Although they were not

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32 Barrow, "The Pattern of Lordship", p. 127.

33 Winchester, op. cit., pp. 13-33; see also R.S. Ferguson, A History of Cumberland (1898), pp. 157-219.


35 Winchester, op. cit., pp. 14-19; the rights are described in Placita de Quo Warranto Temporibus Edwardi I, II et III (Records Commission, 1818), pp. 112-13.


37 Reid, King's Council, pp. 7-11; H. Summerson, "Crime and Society in Medieval Cumberland", in TCWAAS, n.s. vol. 82 (1982), p. 113.
totally independent, they enjoyed a measure of freedom which made co-operation with royal officers voluntary rather than obligatory.

The east of the county was a mixture of private estates and royal demesne. The most significant landlords here were the Dacres, who held the baronies of Burgh and Gilsland, and by the mid-fifteenth century they were the only family of noble rank who actually resided in the region. The only other baronial interests were Lord Greystoke’s barony of Greystoke, but he was mainly resident at his estate at Hinderskelfe in Yorkshire (now Castle Howard) and the Neville honour of Penrith. This belonged to the countess of Westmorland, but in 1437 she leased it to the Earl of Salisbury along with the lordships of Middleham and Sheriff Hutton in Yorkshire, at the generous rate of £400 per year. The royal lands were limited to the barony of Liddel, next to the Scottish border, and the forest of Inglewood, but control of Carlisle castle and its associated lands was important in maintaining a centre of crown interest.

Mingled amongst these was a host of smaller estates that had been divided from the larger baronies over the centuries. Families such as the Leghs of Isell enjoyed a measure of independence within the liberties, a situation enhanced by the almost total absence of resident lords. The Percies did visit Cockermouth on occasion but never for very long, and in the 1440s and 1450s it was used as a satellite estate on which to hide miscreants or to train heirs-in-waiting. The gentry who formed the Cockermouth affinity had to govern themselves. The Nevilles likewise were unwilling to spend any length of time away from Middleham and the court. The Earl of Salisbury was criticised on occasion for his absenteeism from the West March, and he preferred to use deputies such as his son, Sir Thomas Neville, or

38 CIPM H.VII, i, 157.


41 See below, p. 36.
the more local Lord Dacre when he could\textsuperscript{42}. After 1461 the Earl of Warwick likewise showed little inclination to remain in the north once the Lancastrians remnants had been defeated, and there is no evidence of Richard of Gloucester having visited Carlisle until 1482\textsuperscript{43}. As such, the local gentry had little choice but to develop at an early stage the type of self-reliance that Dr. Carpenter has identified in Warwickshire in the 1440s. This characteristic of far northern society has immense implications in both social and political terms, especially with regard to our understanding of the first crisis of the Wars of the Roses, the Percy-Neville feud and the factionalism of the 1450s.

A similar pattern of feudal lordship delineated by physical barriers can be seen in Westmorland, although there is evidence to suggest that in the south of the county the position was more complicated\textsuperscript{44}. There were two main baronies which between them covered virtually the whole county - to the north that of Westmorland or Appleby, and to the south that of Kendale. The latter had been subdivided over the centuries until by the mid-fifteenth century it existed in five parts, two of them held by the Countess of Richmond, one by the Duchess of Bedford (together known as the Richmond Fee), one by the Parrs of Kendal and one, the Lumley Fee, by Lord Lumley\textsuperscript{45}. It enjoyed some jurisdictional freedoms, and in the early sixteenth century it was being called a liberty\textsuperscript{46}. The barony had been exempted from paying \textit{noutegeld}, the forerunner of cornage, in 1189 and ten years later the owner, Gilbert Fitz Reinfred, paid £100 to King John for confirmation of his rights\textsuperscript{47}.


\textsuperscript{43} See below, pp. 82-83, 157.

\textsuperscript{44} Winchester, \textit{Landscape and Society}, pp. 18-19.

\textsuperscript{45} Nicolson & Burn, i, pp. 30-63; R. Ferguson, \textit{A History of Westmorland} (1894), pp. 115-24.

\textsuperscript{46} E.g. \textit{L & P Henry VIII}, v, 453; vi, 139. Reid, \textit{King’s Council}, pp. 7-11, makes a distinction between baronies and honours, but it does not seem to be borne out in this case.

\textsuperscript{47} Cornage was the local system of land tenure, and amounted to a tax paid in lieu of military service - F. Ragg, “Early Barton: Its Subsidiary Manors and Manors Connected Therewith”, in \textit{TCWAAS}, n.s. vol. 24 (1924), pp. 296-301; T. Graham, “Cornage and Drengage”, in \textit{TCWAAS}, n.s. vol. 28 (1928), pp. 78-95.
These included, in addition to the quittance of cornage, the right of gallows and pit and "holding his peace in his lands in Kendale". As such the sheriff of the county had no jurisdiction in the barony, with the rights of distraint for fines, small debts and offences committed at fairs and markets being held by the stewards of the various moieties. In 1532 William Parr was able to claim that it was the ancient custom in the barony for him to administer justice in all strife, as his grandfather, father and uncle had done. The barony, however, still had a role to play in the defence of the border and exemption from cornage did not mean absolution from service on the March. In 1572 it was regarded as an ancient custom that all men from the barony between the ages of sixteen and sixty should be ready to serve the warden "at the west marches at Carlisle" at their own costs.

The division with the barony of Westmorland, which was held by the Cliffords, was dictated by the geographical shape of the Eden valley. Within it the Cliffords did not enjoy the same regalian freedoms as existed in Kendale, but their authority was still immense. There were no other significant landowners there, not even the crown, and in 1209 they had been granted the shrievalty in perpetuity. Sessions of the peace and commissions of gaol delivery met at Appleby, but the men brought before them had all been indicted by Clifford officers and the itinerant justices were entertained at Clifford expense. During the period covered by this thesis, however, there is very little evidence concerning their lordship. They were for the most part under attainder and from 1461 to 1485 they lost control of all of their northern estates, including their caput honoris at Skipton and the castles and lordships of Brougham, Brough, Appleby, Pendragon, Mallerstang and Whinfell in


49 L & P Henry VIII, vi, 661.

50 Ibid., v, 445.

51 Nicolson & Burn, i, pp. 47, 49.

Westmorland. No manorial accounts exist for this period, and the reconstruction of their affinity, which is possible for the Nevilles and Percies, cannot be achieved with any degree of certainty. Like the Percies, they did not reside in the county. As such, the only resident lords were the Parrs of Kendal and it is they who dominate in the period, not the Cliffords.

The most important political institution in the region was not the existence of these independent liberties in the two counties, but the West March towards Scotland. It had evolved during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to provide a protective barrier against Scottish raids, and within its boundaries a special set of laws had developed - March law - which dealt with infractions of truces and cross-border incidents. Administered by a warden, this could be applied anywhere within Cumberland and Westmorland. The various commissions issued to wardens of the West March in the fifteenth century all gave them the capacity to set up “warden courts” within the liberties as well as without. Outside the region they had no power, although in practice there was, as Dr. Summerson has shown, a large element of co-operation between officers from the Scottish as well as the other English Marches. The centre of their authority, however, was Carlisle. By the mid-fifteenth century the official title of the office was “warden of the town and castle of Carlisle and the West March”, and clearly the primary role of the warden, in the eyes of the crown, was to maintain the garrison and defences of the town. Indeed, in the Act of Attainder passed by Edward IV’s first Parliament some Lancastrians were

53 Chatsworth House, Bolton Abbey MSS, Clifford Household Accounts, etc., 1, Receipts and Payments 1510-11, f. 55.

54 Rot. Parl., v, pp. 476-83.


57 Summerson, op. cit., pp. 29-42.

58 E.g. PRO E.404/70/3/73, E.404/74/1/1.
accused of “bringyng the...Scotts and enemys to his Cite of Carlile...the key of the Westmarches”\(^{59}\).

The use of local barons and landowners in the office in the fourteenth century had created a coincidence of need, where defence of the border meant the protection of their own estates. In return for service on the borders their tenants enjoyed reduced rents, and the burden of knights' fees in the northern counties was markedly less than elsewhere in the country\(^{60}\). With the introduction of outsiders as wardens in the mid-1380's, however, it became necessary to pay them huge fees so that they could maintain suitable garrisons for the defence of the border\(^{61}\). The fees varied from warden to warden and between the marches, according to whether or not the officer was in favour at court or the degree to which the king needed his support. Generally, however, the larger fees in the East March reflected the greater number of border garrisons that had to be kept. The system was open to exploitation, but it did not give the magnates control over large numbers of professional soldiers. The Earl of Warwick's wages as warden of the West March in the 1460s were £1250 per year in peacetime. This was just enough to employ about one hundred men (assuming two archers for every man-at-arms, being paid 6d. and 12d. per day respectively), but this takes no account of his deputy’s wages nor his profit margin\(^{62}\). Rather, the office gave the wardens the right to call on large numbers of men for service when required for the defence of the realm and, in the civil wars of the 1450s, such experienced troops were extremely valuable if they could be persuaded to serve\(^{63}\). Perhaps more importantly, it gave them a presence at court that the crown could ill-afford to ignore.

Civil war, however, was not expected at the mid-point of the fifteenth century. More importantly to the king, the wardenries had usurped royal authority in vital strategic areas, and so control of the wardens became of paramount concern. The ease with which the Scots were able to involve themselves in 1461, and the

\(^{59}\) Rot. Parl., v, p. 478.


\(^{62}\) His brother was employed for £333.13s.8d. p.a. in 1457 - PRO E.327/183; Madox, Formulare Anglicanum, pp. 102-3.

length of time the Lancastrians were able to hold out in the castles of the East March, is testament to their importance. While the crown was strong this posed little problem, and attempts could even be made to reduce the wardens' fees. In 1436 the office of warden of the West March was actually put up for auction with successively lower bids being entered by the interested parties\textsuperscript{64}. As the crown became weaker during the following decades, it became open to exploitation and the Nevilles were able to secure the wardenship for longer periods at higher wages.

In order to see the importance of the wardenship in its true perspective, however, it is necessary to understand the extent of its jurisdiction. Since Rachel Reid's article in 1917 and her subsequent monograph in 1921, which traced the early development of the marches and wardens, the only other work has been Professor Storey's analysis of the evolution of the latter from the late fourteenth to late fifteenth centuries, made in 1957\textsuperscript{65}. Miss Reid demonstrated that the warden's authority had originated from that enjoyed by the sheriff of Cumberland in the thirteenth century, but her assumption that it was limited by the various liberties in the county, where the sheriff's writ did not run, was incorrect\textsuperscript{66}. Professor Storey showed that the intrusion of magnates into the office in the 1380's was a result of royal weakness and John of Gaunt's aggression, but he made no attempt to define what the marches actually were. The wardens were charged with the administration of March law and the defence of the borders, and from c.1315 they were given authority over the royal border fortresses of Berwick and Carlisle and their garrisons\textsuperscript{67}. In addition they received other powers at various times, such as that of arranging for truces and abstentions of hostilities, but all were geared towards the defence of the Marches. The wardenships were powerful institutions, there can be little doubt about that, but there were limitations to their authority. Perhaps the most important right, and the one that has received the most attention, was that of arraying all able-bodied men within the March. However, such musters were for the defence of the realm and the men were not available to him as a private army willing to serve anywhere. Their

\textsuperscript{64} Dunning, \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{65} See above, n. 55 for references.


\textsuperscript{67} Reid, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 482.
main concern was not the private quarrel of the warden but the protection of their own property and families.

In her work, Miss Reid demonstrated quite clearly that the warden had no authority over domestic matters but only over business concerning March law, and that "without an ordinary commission of the peace he could not punish felony nor even a breach of the peace" 68. The administration of domestic justice was in the hands of the sheriff, not the warden, and the two had to work together in order for both systems of law to be effective. The sheriff's jurisdiction in Cumberland, however, was limited to the region around Carlisle and down the Eden valley as far as Penrith. As a result, the warden's authority over the whole March was dependent upon his role as a justice of the peace 69. He did not, therefore, hold vice-regal or quasi-regal authority, but merely had martial control of the March. It was a well-established principle that breaches of March law, whomever they were perpetrated by, could only be prosecuted in the Warden courts, but this did not mean that the wardens had powers to attach offenders. In 1453 an Act of Parliament, in response to a petition complaining that the wardens, "for their singular lucre and sometimes for malice", had been attaching men from outside the March shires, gave those attached outside the Marches the power to seek redress and treble damages 70. The warden's authority was dependent on his ability to co-operate with domestic law officers, but with at least four liberties in Cumberland and two covering the whole of Westmorland this was far from easy. Control of the wardenship was certainly not the same as command of the counties.

SOCIETY

This mixture of independent lordships, political structures and geographical boundaries had been a part of the two counties since their inception in the twelfth century, and as such they substantially influenced the development of local society. An in-depth analysis of the social impact of these three features would be worthy of a thesis in its own right, and there is space enough to give only a brief overview here. There were, as a consequence of the geographical features, very few

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68 Ibid., pp. 483-84; idem, King's Council, p. 26.


places where there was a free intermingling of men from different counties. The gap in the Pennines between Brampton and Haltwhistle in the north was one such place, as shown by the presence of one of the Featherstonehaughs, from Alstondale in Northumberland, amongst the rebels in Carlisle in 1470\textsuperscript{71}. The largest landowners in the region, the Dacres, had as tenants of their barony of Gilsland in 1485 (which adjoined the Northumbrian border) men such as Owen Lord Ogle, Sir Gerard Widdrington and Sir John Middleton of Belsay, all from Northumberland\textsuperscript{72}. The city of Carlisle was a centre for trade, with its hinterland extending across the Scottish border and into Northumberland, and the common threat of border infractions provided a basis for mutual considerations. Featherstonehaughs are known to have married with Salkelds and Crackenthorpes, and at some point in the 1450s Thomas Batty complained to the Chancellor that they were among those who had hoodwinked him into binding himself to an arbitration to be decided by men who were related to his protagonists\textsuperscript{73}.

There were two other major areas where such intermingling occurred, one centred around Penrith where Cumberland met Westmorland, and one in the south-east of the region where Kendale and Lonsdale merged into Lancashire. As would be expected, families from either side of the county borders intermingled freely. For example, the Sandfords of Askham in Westmorland held property in Penrith in Cumberland, as did the Wilkinsons of nearby Butterwick\textsuperscript{74}. In the south, the Tunstalls of Thurland in Lancashire and their neighbours, the Harringtons at Hornby, both enjoyed marriages with the Parrs of Kendal\textsuperscript{75}. Other links also existed, and there was a high level of intermingling between families from throughout the region through

\begin{enumerate}
\item CPR 1467-77, p. 214.
\item CIPM H.VII, i, 157.
\item Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, i, p. 147; Early Chancery Proceedings Bundle 10/291; Storey, "Disorders in Lancastrian Westmorland", p. 79; Cardew thesis, p. 327; F. Ragg, "De Lancaster", in TCWAAS, n.s. vol. 10 (1910), pp. 411-12.
\item CRO D/Lons/AS.79, 80, 83.
\end{enumerate}
marriage and landholding\textsuperscript{76}. Some families were, of course, more sought after than others because of their wealth or political status, while other families sought to preserve their established local ties or to consolidate their estates. The end result was a high degree of social and regional endogamy.

Geographically the two counties are dominated by the Lakeland dome. Although it was a barrier it was not impassable, and neither was it large enough to prevent contact being made around its circumference. The Curwens of Workington, for example, had a major estate at Thornthwaite on the shores of Lake Bassenthwaite held of the Earl of Northumberland, but had another estate of the same name in Westmorland, at the head of what is now Haweswater reservoir\textsuperscript{77}. Their neighbours in Westmorland, the Louthers of Louther, also held lands from the Percies in Cumberland\textsuperscript{78}. On his attainder in 1487 Sir Thomas Broughton’s estates were concentrated in Furness and south-west Cumberland, but he also held lands in Keswick\textsuperscript{79}. The Crackenthorpes, based in the Eden valley near Penrith, also had a member of the family in Cockermouth in the 1450s\textsuperscript{80}. The barriers of the Pennines and the Irish Sea, although likewise hindering social expansion, did not prevent it. In 1454 four men from the Penrith area relinquished their right as feoffees over lands in Ullesby in Cumberland to the heiress of John Laycock, who had married a man from Grimsby\textsuperscript{81}. The Redmanes held lands in both Yorkshire and Westmorland, and the Middletons of Lonsdale were a cadet branch of the Middletons of Belsay in Northumberland\textsuperscript{82}. The daughter of William More, from Winscales near Workington,


\textsuperscript{77} CRO D/Lons/KE.23b; F. Ragg, "De Culwen", in TCWAAS, n.s. vol. 14 (1914), pp. 417-22; J. Curwen, “Thornthwaite Hall, Westmorland”, in TCWAAS, n.s. vol. 7 (1907), pp. 143-42.

\textsuperscript{78} Ragg, "De Culwen", pp. 417-18.

\textsuperscript{79} LRO DDK/2/6.

\textsuperscript{80} C. Moor, "Crackenthorpe of Newbiggin", in TCWAAS, n.s. vol. 33 (1933), pp. 43-97; CRO D/Lec/29/3, f. 1.

\textsuperscript{81} CRO (Kendal) WD/Crk/M.60.
married an Irishman, Finian Maknely, and gave her inheritance to Sir Christopher Curwen in 1447\(^83\).

For the most part, however, families from the region did not stray far afield. For example, of the eight known marriages made by the children of Sir Thomas Curwen of Workington (d. 1474), all but one were to men or women from the two counties\(^84\). This was to a large extent due to the result of the physical features surrounding the region. Not only did they make it more difficult to travel beyond the counties, but they created a relative shortage of land. Expansion of landholdings was difficult and the land supply was limited, so the price was forced up. The common practice in the region in the early sixteenth century was to settle on a marriage portion of approximately ten times the value of the jointure given to the couple by the groom’s family, which acted as a deterrent to outsiders\(^85\). Marriage contracts from the fifteenth century show a similar calculation, with portions varying between eight and twenty times the value of the lands, although most fell within the range eight to thirteen\(^86\).

The higher up the social scale, however, the easier it was to break out of this pattern of regional endogamy. Thus Lord Thomas Dacre was able to marry the daughter of Ralph Earl of Westmorland and half-sister to the Earl of Salisbury, and his sons, Thomas and Ralph, married a daughter of Sir William Bowet of Norfolk and Eleanor, a daughter of William Lord Fitzhugh respectively\(^87\). Two sons of Sir John Huddleston of Millom married daughters of the Earl of Warwick and his brother Lord Montague, but this was in the 1460s when their father was in favour, and Warwick’s daughter was illegitimate. Sir John himself married a rich widow from Norfolk, and Sir William

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\(^{83}\) CRO D/Cu/4/16.

\(^{84}\) J. Curwen, History of the Ancient House of Curwen, pp. 92-93; the exception was a daughter who married an unknown Widdrington from Northumberland.

\(^{85}\) L & P Henry VIII, iv(i), 189; see also iii(ii), 3178, 3210, 3264, 3649; iv(i), 162 for the negotiations.

\(^{86}\) E.g. CRO D/Ay.1/142; CRO (Kendal) MSS Great Book of Record, ii, pp. 470-71; CRO D/Sen.2/Eglesfield, 16th April, 12 H.VII.

\(^{87}\) Complete Peerage, iv, pp. 7, 17-18.
Parr also found himself a wealthy dowager before returning to the north to marry the fourteen year old daughter of Lord Fitzhugh in 1475\textsuperscript{88}.

The system of landholding, and the absence of resident magnates, had created a dichotomy where upland regions, often defined as forests, were under direct baronial rule whereas in the lowland regions most estates were held by semi-autonomous gentry\textsuperscript{89}. Magnate influence in the liberties was weakened by their persistent absenteeism, and their dominance was certainly not a foregone conclusion. The owners of small estates had a relative degree of independence and were not automatically members of one of the large affinities. Thus the Brisco family, lords of the manors of Crofton and Dundraw, and the Dalstons of Waverton remained parochial and made no impact on local politics, despite being surrounded by lands held by the Percies and Dacres, and even leasing their own property back to these lords\textsuperscript{90}. The Leghs of Isell were in a more delicate position, but they still retained a relatively neutral position. Their estates had been independent of the barony of Allerdale since the reign of Edward II, despite being only five miles from Cockermouth, but the only time in the fifteenth century they are recorded as receiving a fee from the Percies was in 1453/54. This was at the height of the feud with the Nevilles, but a decade later they had successfully switched sides\textsuperscript{91}.

Such parochialism as displayed by the Briscos did not suit everybody, and a significant number of independent families became involved in both local and national politics. The Moresbies of Scaleby in Cumberland and Hutton Roof in Westmorland are one such example. They traditionally held the stewardship of Penrith, serving in that office under the Earl of Salisbury, the Earl of Warwick, Richard of Gloucester and Henry VII, but they are not known to have been tenants there\textsuperscript{92}.

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\textsuperscript{88} H. Cowper, “Millom Castle and the Huddlestons”, in \textit{TCWAAS}, n.s. vol. 24 (1924), pp. 201, 207-8; Parr’s first wife was the widow of Thomas Colt who, although originally from Carlisle, had moved to Essex by 1461 - Wedgwood, \textit{Biographies}, pp. 208-9.

\textsuperscript{89} Winchester, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{90} Ferguson, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 64-66, 83-86; \textit{CIPM H.VII}, i, 157.

\textsuperscript{91} Ferguson, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 45-47; CRO D/Lec/29/3.
The Salkelds of Corby had been granted their manor in chief by Edward III, but Richard Salkeld's meteoric career in the 1460s was based exclusively on Warwick's patronage. Similarly the Parrs of Kendal held a quarter of the barony of Kendale in chief, but it was through their connections with both local magnates and the crown that they achieved regional paramountcy. Since it was such families as these who came to dominate local politics it is with their careers that this thesis is mainly concerned, but it is important to remember that they existed within a locality. They were useful to the magnates and the crown because they were able to provide a link with local society, and their role was to implement policies while maintaining the balance between the contradictory forces involved in lordship and bastard feudalism. The vast majority of landed society was not involved in the rule of the shire, but the intermingling of political systems in the region demanded a high degree of co-operation. If a warden lost the trust of men in the liberties, he became ineffectual in redressing cross-border incidents and maintaining peace between England and Scotland. His main concern, therefore, if he were to be successful, had to be the preservation of local co-operation rather than the implementation of personal dynastic goals.

Just because political authority was invested in relatively few men does not mean that they were able to operate independently of local society. Their whole up-bringing was based on mutual co-operation. Perhaps the clearest evidence of how this mutual reliance affected the whole of society comes from the extant marriage contracts. These were legal documents drawn up to ensure that an agreement made in good faith would not be broken, and as such they included a clause binding the two parties to abide by the conditions set out. The ones that still exist for the region were mainly drawn up by lesser gentry families for their eldest sons, but they all follow a similar pattern which must have been the accepted local form. Indeed, as will be seen, a form of contract that was common elsewhere might be accepted on the odd occasion, but it would not necessarily be adopted. The

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93 Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 133-34, 134-35n, 162. The epitaph belongs to this Richard Salkeld, not Sir Francis as stated by Ferguson.

94 See below, p. 25.
general pattern of all such agreements made throughout the country was as follows. Firstly, the parties involved would identify themselves and declare themselves accorded and agreed that the groom and the bride would marry before a specified date. The groom's party would then declare a feoffment (or jointure) to be made to the couple of lands worth a specified amount, for which the bride's party would then agree to pay a sum of money (the portion), usually in instalments. The groom's father (or the groom if he was arranging his own marriage) would then agree not to alienate any of his lands, so that they would all descend to his heir. Certain amounts were sometimes set aside for his wife's dower and for any younger children, but such arrangements could just as easily have been made elsewhere. Finally the parties would bind themselves to fulfil the agreement, usually by a monetary obligation of a specified amount that was set above the value of the portion.

It is this final clause which reveals the degree of trust and hence mutual reliance within the locality. The common form of all contracts shows that they were probably drawn up by lawyers, but the variations within each one were expressions of personal intent. A marriage in Lancashire made in 1463 was placed entirely in the hands of arbitrators, with both sets of parents submitting to bonds "to abyde & performe ye awarde ordenance and dome of Thomas Gerard and Thomas Assheton knyghtes toychnge ye mariag...wythe all articles & materes pertenyng". The contract was signed not by the families but by the arbitrators, so if it was broken it immediately involved third parties. It is always dangerous to derive too many conclusions from one document, but it was not until 1519 that a contract was arranged in Cumberland under the same conditions. This contrasts with an

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95 Although absent from the marriage contracts of the eldest sons, they may have been made elsewhere - CRO D/Sen.2/Eglesfield, February 14th 1440/41. The marriage of an heir was as good a time as any to arrange for the future disposal of an estate, especially after the 1297 Statute of Westminster which introduced feoffments to use. Not only would it have been insisted on by the bride's parents but it gave any younger sons warning of their status and removed any doubt concerning the future - S. Payling, "The Politics of Family: Late medieval Marriage Contracts", in Pollard and Britnell, eds., *The McFarlane Legacy*, p. 21-47.

96 North Yorkshire County Records Office, ZON/2/1, kept at Hovingham Hall. I would like to thank Sir Marcus Worsley for his kindness in showing me this document.

97 CRO D/Lons/AS.110.
agreement made at Penrith in 1456, which rested solely on the integrity of the parties involved. The Louthers and Lancasters were “acordett and fully agrett” and that for “all there articles and covenands aboue rehersett trewly to be fulfild and performed aytther partye bynys them till other by this indenture and ar thar to bodily sworne”\(^{98}\).

In the 1464 contract between the Aglionbies and Ratcliffes the parties bound themselves and their heirs by bonds of one hundred marks, thus invoking the integrity and the dignity of the whole family and making them equally responsible for ensuring that the marriage was completed. The contract, though, was still only bipartite - no other parties apart from the immediate families were involved\(^{99}\). In 1468 came the first break with mutual reliance. The Threlkelds and the Louthers met at Penrith, the nearest town to their respective patrimonies, and called on men from as far away as Windermere and Carlisle as witnesses. No monetary bond was invoked in the contract itself, although it is unlikely that one was not made elsewhere, but it was the only time that witnesses were called upon in such large numbers for a marriage agreement\(^{100}\). This contract is unique to the area, however, being influenced to a large extent by the Clifford lawyers at Skipton\(^{101}\) and the format used was not to be repeated in the West March. The Sandford/Clibburn agreement of 1471 once again relied on mutual trust, with both parties being “ayder to odyr bodily sworne on the mesboke”\(^{102}\), but the next two agreements, those of 1472 and 1488, show another development in the terms of surety. They included elements of the four previous settlements, although the influence of the 1468 contract must be doubted. Both follow the same pattern - firstly, the parties are bodily sworn to each other to keep the terms that had been agreed, but then comes the telling phrase\(^{103}\):-

\[^{98}\text{CRO D/Lons/LO.111.}\]

\[^{99}\text{CRO D/Ay.1/142.}\]

\[^{100}\text{CRO (Kendal) MSS Great Book of Record, ii, pp. 476-77.}\]

\[^{101}\text{Sir Lancelot Threlkeld had married Margaret, the widow of John Lord Clifford who had been killed just prior to the battle of Towton. Undoubtedly he made the most of the new resources at his disposal - Complete Peerage, iii, p. 294. See below, pp. 102-103.}\]

\[^{102}\text{Durham Records Office D/SL.13/1/2, p. 149. Not only were the Sandfords and Clibburns close neighbours, but they were also lord and retainer - CRO D/Lons/BM.119.}\]
and so for the more sowety aithre parte hath fonden sufficient persons
to be bonden for thame by obrigacion in fyve hundreth m[ar]ks. In
witnes herof the parties forseid to the part[i]es of this endenture
enterchaungeable hath sette [th]are seales.

It is clear that by 1472 the word of a gentleman was no longer a sufficient guarantee
of compliance. Other people were being called on to provide monetary bonds and, in
effect, to act as witnesses to the business side of the transaction. The families of the
bride and groom thus became removed from any direct obligation to each other and
the burden of responsibility was placed on their friends and associates.

By removing the immediate families from the perceived responsibility of
ensuring that the agreements were kept and by placing it in the hands of
intermediaries, an important objective had been achieved. The foundation of trust
had been broadened so that the actions of the families affected not just each other
but also their standing and dignity within the locality. The use of third parties thus
became enshrined in the contract itself, even though the reliance on arbitrators to be
found in Lancashire did not become apparent in the far north-west until 1519. It was
still the locality which provided the most cohesive element in West March society, not
the magnate affinity or the law. Whether it was as a result of its relative isolation or
the widespread existence of independent liberties, the region proved to be
conservative and reluctant to accept change for its own sake. As has been seen the
development of legal contracts was at least sixty five years adrift, and it has been
shown elsewhere that linguistically the spread of the London written standard in legal
documents was not uniform. Cumberland and Westmorland lagged well behind
counties such as Cheshire and Lancashire which had much stronger ties with the
crown104, perhaps because of an innate conservatism which had preserved pre-
Conquest Celtic influences until well into the fourteenth century105. It was within this
framework of local conservatism and self-reliance that the political events of the Wars
of the Roses were acted out.

103 This phrase is taken from the 1488 contract (CRO D/Lons/AS.87) but that of 1472 expresses the
same sentiments, albeit not quite so clearly - CRO D/Lons/WG.15.

104 M. Benskin, "Some Aspects of Cumbrian English, Mainly Medieval", in L. Brievik, A. Hille, S.
Johansson, eds., Essays on English Language in Honour of Bertil Sunby (Oslo, 1989), pp. 13-46,
esp. pp. 19-23 - my thanks to the author for providing me with a copy of his article.

THE THESIS

It is the aim of this study to review the history of the old counties of Cumberland and Westmorland in the fifteenth century in the light of recent research into the nature of localism and bastard feudalism. Christine Carpenter’s reservations concerning the over-reliance on McFarlane’s suggestion (of an examination of magnate affinities rather than the politics of the court) apply equally to the north-west as they do to the midlands\textsuperscript{106}. Hitherto work on the region has emphasised the importance of the magnate affinities and the role that they played in both local and national politics, but in doing so it has distorted our view by excluding the possibility of local influences\textsuperscript{107}. Magnate affinities were important, especially from 1455 onwards, but they were rarely large enough to completely dominate a shire and, despite their traditions of service, they were created from within a locality\textsuperscript{108}. The over-reliance on, and (according to Carpenter) the misinterpretation of McFarlane\textsuperscript{109}, has led to the influence of localism upon the noble affinity being ignored. The attitudes and political machinations of men at court have been imposed onto those who rarely strayed further than the county town.

The underlying theme throughout the thesis is the importance of local attitudes and expectations towards the way the north-west was governed. The movement towards the locality has coincided with a re-examination of many of our assumptions concerning the bastard feudal relationship, which is now seen as being

\textsuperscript{106} Carpenter, \textit{Locality and Polity}, pp. 3-8; idem, “Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane”, in Pollard and Britnell, eds., \textit{The McFarlane Legacy}, pp. 175-206, esp. p. 198; see also the comments made by the editors in the introduction, pp. xvi-xvii.


\textsuperscript{108} Carpenter, \textit{Locality and Polity}, pp. 34, 288-89.

\textsuperscript{109} Idem, “Before and After McFarlane”, p. 198.
more personal than was once thought. This has enormous implications for our understanding of late medieval politics since it can, when used in conjunction with other evidence, validate assumptions of individual preference in the analysis of political actions. The difference between ordinary and extraordinary members of an affinity, first identified by J.M. Bean in 1953, is only just being recognised and it is no longer possible to assume that all retainers felt equal loyalty to their lord.

This thesis is aimed at separating court and local politics and examining the counties from the regional rather than the national perspective, while at the same time taking into account fluctuations within the affinity structure. It does so by examining the careers of the most influential men in the region, both noble and gentry, and the impact that they had on local politics. It concentrates on appointments made to the most important shire offices - sheriff, escheator, and commissions of the peace - and assesses the extent to which local expectations played a role in the governance of the region. The period in question, from c.1440 until the death of Richard III in 1485, can be easily divided into three sections. The gradual increase in the volume of evidence from 1461 and the dominant influence of Edward IV's brother, first as Duke of Gloucester and later as king, make such divisions sensible. The first section is an examination of the Nevilles and their exercise of power in the counties. Chapter One looks at the Earl of Salisbury's tenure as warden and the ways in which his quarrel with the Percies affected his authority. It shows that the essence of Cumbrian society was cooperation between affinities regardless of any antagonism between their lords. It offers a brief survey of Percy lordship over the honour of Cockermouth and a reappraisal of the activities of Lord Egremont in the 1450s. The second chapter, beginning in 1461, looks at the Earl of Warwick's administration of the wardenship of the West March and his impact on the two counties. It attempts to answer the question why, despite his overwhelming territorial and administrative dominance, he failed to establish any depth to his lordship. When he needed the support of his northern following in 1471, it was divided and did not respond decisively in his favour.

The second section examines Edward IV's second reign, during which Richard Duke of Gloucester was the dominant figure in the north of the country. He

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111 Bean, Estates, p. 87; cf. idem, From Lord to Patron: Lordship in Late Medieval England (Manchester, 1989), pp. 185-90; M. Hicks, Bastard Feudalism (1995), pp. 84-90.
was appointed Warden of the West March in August 1470 and gradually increased his grasp of the royal perquisites in Cumberland until, in January 1483, he was granted by Parliament the rule of the county and palatinate status over a swath of territory in south-west Scotland. In order to understand the impact that his lordship had on the north-west region as a whole, his interests there need to be put into context. It also needs to be appreciated that, when he was first given authority there, he was little more than seventeen years old. For these reasons, Chapter Three examines his career up to 1483 as a whole. It highlights the development of some elements of his character, and traces his practical education as a lord in the north. In doing so it becomes clear that Edward IV was not so trusting of his youngest brother as some would have us believe. The crisis of 1470-71 had highlighted the dangers of “over-mighty lords” in the north and the need for the crown to re-establish a strong presence in the region. Chapter Four looks at the mechanisms used by the crown to secure the north-west, and identifies Sir William Parr as the principal royal agent. The two families most closely affiliated with Gloucester, the Huddlestons and the Musgraves, received only limited patronage in the region and clearly his lordship there was subdued. Although primarily a crown servant Parr was also close to Gloucester, but the nature of that relationship was not as clear-cut as that between master and servant. Under close scrutiny of the evidence it appears that, although there was no open conflict between the two, Richard probably had to accept Parr’s presence on sufferance because of the latter’s close relationship with the king. The final chapter of this section looks at how the two counties were governed in the light of these findings. The central role of Sir William Parr becomes apparent, with the majority of appointments in the region going to men associated with him.

The final section examines the interval between the deaths of Edward IV and Richard III, from April 1483 to August 1485. The period was dominated by events in the south, and the role that Richard’s northern supporters played in them. Chapter Six examines the protectorate, and the way in which Gloucester expanded his influence in the north-west. It then goes on to look at the role that the West March had to play in the suppression of the Buckingham rebellion and the rule of the south. It shows that those from the region who benefited from Richard’s patronage at this time were relatively few. The last chapter, in trying to identify why this might have been, deals with events in the north. Richard’s ambitions for his Scottish palatinate did not disappear immediately after he usurped the throne, but continued until the death of his son in March 1484. One reason why men from the north-west had not been rewarded after the Buckingham Rebellion, however, was due to these
continuing aspirations. Having expected to reap the benefits of the invasion, they were left with little to show for their loyalty to their king. Richard had a determination to be obeyed which led him to an attack on the independence of the wardenships. Combined with the end of the Scottish war, this caused widespread discontent in the border region. As a result Richard felt unable to trust his north-western affinity, and an examination of the royal appointments in the counties shows that he had to import his own trusted servants to ensure that his will was carried through. In the run-up to the battle of Bosworth, his support in the West March was fading and, with his death, localism once again triumphed.
Part 1

The Nevilles
CHAPTER 1

The Percies, The Nevilles and the Wars of the Roses, c. 1440-1461

The feud between the Percies and the Nevilles played a crucial role in the developing crisis of the 1450s because of its contribution to the collapse of royal authority. It was the most obvious and violent result of Henry VI’s weakness of character before the first battle of St. Albans because it spilled over onto the national stage, with the two families allying themselves to opposing factions. In doing so they made a major contribution to the struggle for power, centred on possession of the king, which reached a climax in 1459-61. The area covered by this study, the old counties of Cumberland and Westmorland, played a considerable role in this feud because it contained two opposing affinities. The Percies had held the honour of Cockermouth since 1398 and the Nevilles - first the Earl of Westmorland and later his most favoured son, Richard Earl of Salisbury - had dominated the wardenship of the West March since 1399. Interpretations of the feud, however, have tended to analyse the conflict from the point of view of the magnates themselves without taking due account of the local situation and interests. This has been a result, in part, of the concentration of evidence in the national records but also it has been due to the belief that magnates and their affinities dominated local society: a conviction which has recently come under question.

As has been seen in the introduction the wardenship of the West March did not necessarily give the incumbent a wide-ranging local influence nor the ability (let alone the desire) to create a large retinue in the region. In addition, the prevailing atmosphere throughout the two counties was one of concord rather than

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3 Carpenter, Locality and Polity, pp. 4-8.
rivalry, and the need for co-operation between different institutions for the effective administration of both national and international justice militated against the local gentry becoming involved in a feud that was of no obvious benefit to them. A concern for the preservation of local stability sat at odds with the pressures exerted by the Percies and Nevilles on their respective affinities. In the light of this, a reappraisal of this particular feud becomes necessary.

In order to realise how the feud affected Westmorland and, in particular, Cumberland the first step is to understand the respective affinities. That of the Percies is the easier to examine because of the existence of some accounts relating to the honour of Cockermouth in the fifteenth century. Those most relevant to this study are the four receivers’ accounts which exist for 1441-42, 1453-54, 1461-62 and 1484-85 because they include lists of extraordinary fees, but there are also a number of ministers’ accounts for other years in the same period. The receivers’ accounts are particularly useful for the light they shed on the state of the Percy affinity in Cumberland for the years in which they were drawn up, but they do need to be treated with a certain degree of caution. They only exist, for example, for the years in which the Percy family was facing some form of crisis. The conflict with the Nevilles had flared up in early 1442, and in 1453-54 it had turned into an open feud. The year 1461 was the first of the attainder that the family suffered after the death of the third earl at the battle of Towton, and 1485 saw the fourth earl’s problems with Richard III come to a head. There were probably other accounts which have since disappeared, but it would seem that at times several years would pass without one being made. In 1454, for example, Thomas Crackenthorpe was

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4 The receivers’ accounts are CRO D/Lec/29/2, 29/3; PRO SC.6/1121/11; CRO D/Lec/29/8 - this last account was misdated by Bean as being from 1482-83 - Estates, p. 130. The first membrane of the roll is damaged, but it has been dated in a later hand as being for the second year of Richard III. Internal evidence, however, shows that it was compiled at Michaelmas 1485, in the first year of Henry VII. The relevant ministers’ accounts are Alnwick CM X.II.3, Box 3(a), a damaged account from 1470-71, and CRO D/Lec/1A/302 from 1482-83.

described as being a new retainer although his fee dated from November 1447. The records which do survive, therefore, come from years when the identity of the affinity was particularly important for some reason, but the implication of the 1454 account is that at other times in this early period the Percies had no need of such a record. Their control of the liberty was so complete that they were complacent about their lordship there. It is these early accounts, from 1442 and 1454, which are the most significant in this chapter, not only because of the national political crisis but also for the light that they shed on the practical exercise of bastard feudal relationships.

Table 1 - Ministers on the Percy Estates in Cumberland 1454 - 1485

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of Comparison</th>
<th>1456/61</th>
<th>1461/71</th>
<th>1471/79</th>
<th>1479/83</th>
<th>1483/85</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Coincidental manors/bailiwicks</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Men Continuing in Office</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Turnover</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to evaluate the extent to which local society - in this case the Cockermouth affinity - was affected by the political crisis of the 1450s, it is first of all necessary to establish how it had functioned beforehand. The core of the affinity was the group of administrators, the majority of whom came from minor local families, who were employed to ensure the smooth running of the liberty. The first receiver's account shows that the second Earl of Northumberland was paying a total

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6 CRO D/Lec/29/3.

7 CRO D/Lec/29/3; PRO SC.6/1121/11.

8 PRO SC.6/1121/11; Alnwick Castle X.II.3, Box 3(a).

9 Alnwick Castle X.II.3, Box 3(a); CRO D/Lec/29/5.

10 CRO D/Lec/29/5; CRO D/Lec/1/A/302

11 CRO D/Lec/1/A/302; CRO D/Lec/29/8.
of £143.19s.6½d. in both ordinary and extraordinary fees in 1442, that is, fees paid for the fulfilment of an office and fees of retainer respectively. There were about nineteen separate offices which received fees, although that number could vary to include one-off appointments - thus John Says, retained for life as the trumpeter of Cockermouth castle, and Roger Beby, the master carpenter of Cumberland in 1442, were not replaced after their deaths. The actual numbers of office holders could also vary, since some men had multiple tenures. William Dykes was steward of the courts in Cockermouth, and both a magistrate and forester in Westward forest in 1442; Thomas Richeman was likewise a clerk of the courts in both Cockermouth and Copeland. In 1485 Edward Ratcliffe held four offices (lieutenant, steward of the courts, magistrate of Westward and feodary) and John Lamplugh held two (he was both steward and magistrate of the forests of Eskdale and Wasdale).

Most of the honour, however, was run by unpaid bailiffs and prepositors who changed on a regular basis. Professor Hicks, by examining the account rolls of 1454 and 1479, found that only three out of 43 ministers and two annuitants had survived. He concluded that men had lost interest in serving the Percies due to Richard of Gloucester's presence in the region, but by 1483 that support was re-emerging. Thus it is assumed that after 1471 the sheer size, wealth, authority and power of the Duke of Gloucester proved to be too strong for the fourth Earl. The Percy affinity was "unable to compete" and "faded away", despite the mutual agreement of 1474 not to poach each other's retainers. The 1479 account, however, was not made by the receiver and so it does not list in full the number of fees being paid, so it is impossible to come to any conclusion about the size of the retinue at that time. A comparison of the ministers’ and receivers’ accounts between 1454 and 1485 shows, in fact, a high degree of turnover among the lesser officials, even over a short period of time (see Table 1). Some families were more prominent in office-holding than others - for example, Richard Whyte,

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12 CRO D/Lec/29/2.

13 CRO D/Lec/29/2; 29/8.


15 A point made by Bean - Estates, pp. 86-87.
bailiff of Caldbeck Upperton in 1454, had been replaced in 1485 by William Whyte. Robert Johnson, bailiff of Wilton and Drigg and Carleton in 1454, was replaced by other men by 1471, but a Thomas Johnson was bailiff of nearby Eskdale and Wasdalehead. Sir Thomas Lamplugh was succeeded by John Lamplugh as bailiff of Wigton and Waverton in the same year. There was also a core of professional administrators who remained in office for a number of years. John Stanger was bailiff of Derwentfells for life, and James Jakson was reeve of three manors in 1483 and five in 1485.

It was sometimes stated in the account whether an office was held for life or during pleasure, but more often than not nothing was said. Among those who enjoyed life tenure in 1442 was the lieutenant of the honour, Sir Henry Fenwick. Since Cockermouth was a satellite of the main patrimony it was probably only visited occasionally by the Earls of Northumberland. Rather, the estates seem to have been used as a place to give younger members of the family some experience of estate management. Lord Egremont was sent there in the late 1440s and in September 1459 the future fourth earl was in residence, acting as a witness to a feoffment by Alexander Highmore\textsuperscript{16}. There is no concrete evidence of there being any visitations by the earls themselves during the period, although the dates when men were retained which were noted in the various accounts may be significant. Without further confirmation, however, they cannot be taken as being absolute proof since the retainers could just as easily have travelled to their lord. Taking the first account as an example, two men - John Lamplugh and Nicholas Irton - were retained on the 2nd and 3rd September 1441 respectively, but it is not known where. For most of 1442, however, the second earl appears to have been in London, initially at Parliament and subsequently to sort out his differences with the Earl of Salisbury\textsuperscript{17}. Four payments totalling over £200 were delivered to him there between February and July 1442, and in late August and September he was on his estates in Northumberland and Yorkshire. Two further payments, made in October and November after the end of the account, were also sent to London\textsuperscript{18}.

\textsuperscript{16} CRO D/HGB/1/164, 165.

\textsuperscript{17} Warner and Lacey, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 212.

\textsuperscript{18} CRO D/Lec/29/3.
The payments made to the earl in this year, totalling £286, came to 55% of the revenues from the honour, which totalled £515.8s.1d. In comparison the amount spent on fees came to approximately 28% of the total revenues, roughly one half of the profits. When these are further broken down into ordinary and extraordinary fees, then we see that 17% was spent on administration and 12% on retaining. These figures are by far the smallest - in 1454 the total revenues had dropped by more than £120 to about £394, but the total spent on fees had risen to just over £200, just over 50% of the revenues. Of these the total paid in ordinary fees had remained about the same at £85.15s.8d. (a fall of just under one pound), but the extraordinary fees had more than doubled to £125.17s.2d. The fall in revenues, however, meant that these figures had now risen to 22% and 32% of the total income from the honour respectively.

The reason for this rise in extraordinary fees has long been attributed to the feud with the Nevilles which, although it may well have had its origins in the dispute of 1442, only became noticeably violent in 1453. It is worth noting, however, that despite his control of the wardenship the Earl of Salisbury held no lands in Cumberland or Westmorland until after the death of his mother, Joan, Countess of Westmorland, in 1440. Although in 1437 he had rented his mother's lordship of Penrith, together with the lordship of Middleham, for £400, he sub-let it again in 1441 to Bishop Lumley of Carlisle, the warden, for three years. It was probably only after it returned into his hands that he began to create an affinity in the north-west.

19 The figures differ from those given by Bean, *Estates*, pp. 19-28, but the accounts are open to interpretation. Throughout, the total fees which would normally have been paid in a full year have been calculated, rather than using the sums actually paid out. In addition, there is some difficulty in establishing which fees belong to which category - for example, Thomas Cuthbertson is named as an official, but his post is not known and his fee is recorded as being a new grant during pleasure. He has been included in the list of ordinary fees but Margaret Warcop, retained for life at £2 p.a., had probably replaced Emmote Shether, who in 1442 was receiving the same amount as the former "mistress" of the household. Since her office is not mentioned, however, Margaret’s has been included as an extraordinary fee. Cf. Bean’s discussion of bastard feudalism, *ibid.*, pp. 87, 95-97.


Middleham was by far the most lucrative of the Neville lordships in the north, being worth approximately £1000 to Warwick and Richard of Gloucester in the 1460s and 1470s, but the value of Penrith in the fifteenth century is more difficult to ascertain\textsuperscript{23}. On the Countess of Westmorland’s death it was valued by the escheator, Thomas Curwen, at £51.2s., but the crown immediately ordered another assessment, this time by Ralph Lord Greystoke and William Lord Fitzhugh, which found it to be worth little more than £35\textsuperscript{24}. *Inquisitions post mortem* are notoriously unreliable as guides to the value of estates, usually because they tend to underestimate, but Curwen was one of the Percy retainers at Cockermouth and he had perhaps been following instructions to be over-zealous in his inquiries. Whether or not the revenues had been affected by Scottish raids is not clear, with that excuse only being provided for the barony of Liddale which sat next to the border, but the crown was interested in actual value rather than revenues. The purpose of the enquiry, as with any *inquisition post mortem*, was to assess how much the estates were worth so that an entry fine could be charged by the crown as tenant-in-chief, so a temporary loss of income due to “devastation by the Scots and rebels” was irrelevant. The fine was usually set at one year’s revenues so it was in the crown’s interests to find a higher valuation, and the only way for Salisbury to reduce it - perhaps to a level which did reflect the actual income of the lordship - was to ensure that the assessment matched the revenue. It would seem, therefore, that the Greystoke enquiry seriously undervalued the estates.

Other evidence appears to bear this out. The next extant account of the honour dates from 1528-29, by which time it was held by the crown and had absorbed the forest of Inglewood, but revenues of Penrith and its members of Salkeld, Langwathby, Gamelsby, Crosby Carlaton and Soureby came to £214.19s.\textsuperscript{25}. Even allowing for the inflation of the early sixteenth century a rise in value of over 600% is astronomical. By 1529, however, there was no need to try to disguise the actual value of the estates so this is a more accurate reflection of its worth than the 1440 survey. Indeed, it is not far off the value attributed to the estates by the crown in December 1459 when, in an attempt to clear the Earl of Northumberland’s wages

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} PRO SC.6/1085/20; PRO DL.29/648/10485.
\item \textsuperscript{24} PRO SC.6/1124/3.
\item \textsuperscript{25} PRO SC.6/H.VIII/478, ff. 8-8v.
\end{itemize}
arrears as warden of the East March, he was granted £200 p.a. from the honour and its issues.  
Whatever the actual income was, Penrith was not the only source of revenue for the Earl of Salisbury in the region. In the 1457 indenture with his third son, Sir Thomas Neville, who was retained as constable of Carlisle castle for three years with wages of £333.6s.8d. in peace and £500 in time of war, only £11.12s.5½d. was allocated from Penrith. The majority of the deputy's wages were paid from Neville revenues in Cumberland allocated to them as part of their wages as wardens of the West March - the fee-farm of Carlisle, the "Fitz Waulter landes" in the barony of Egremont, the cornage in the county, the meadows and pastures of Swift, the profits of the fisheries of the "Frithnet" and on the Esk, Plumpton Lawn in Inglewood, and the profits to be had from the warden courts, worth a total of £321.14s.2½d. In addition Salisbury's brother, George Lord Latimer, held four manors in the two counties which had a combined income of about £100 per annum in the 1460s, and after his sudden decline into idiocy in 1451 Salisbury became their custodian. The problem of establishing the precise level of Neville income in the region are difficult to overcome because of the absence of details from Penrith, but excluding the honour it came to at least £420, of which just over £320 came from Crown grants associated with the wardenship. When this is compared with the value of the Percy estates, worth £515.8s.1d. in 1442, then it becomes more apparent that, although their incomes from the region were probably equivalent, Neville authority was based more on their offices than on their ability to provide leadership within the locality based on their territorial dominance.

It was control of the wardenship that gave the Nevilles economic parity with the Percies, but this was of little value in areas such as the honour of Cockermouth or the Clifford's barony of Westmorland where territorial lordship dominated. It's value as a resource for retaining in the region was also strictly limited,

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26 CPR 1452-61, pp. 578-79.

27 PRO E.327/183; Madox, Formulare Anglicanum, pp. 102-3.


29 Complete Peerage, vol. vii, pp. 479-82; CRO D/Lec/28/28, 29. During the 1450s the combined income rarely exceeded £70 - CRO D/Lec/28/27; Alnwick CM X.II.3, Box 2 (f).

30 CRO D/Lec/29/2. The 1454 account does not give a true picture on revenues from the honour.
since the incomes which derived from it in the locality were hardly sufficient for the
employment of a deputy, and the wardens' immense wages could not be paid in full
from local Crown revenues. The surplus requirement - some £930 in the case of the
West March - could have been used to create a substantial affinity but it was probably
paid directly from the king's coffers into those of Salisbury or Warwick and the
chances of any of it making its way to the far north were remote31. The deputy
maintained a small household in Carlisle but its main purpose was probably
administrative and the numbers of local landed notables retained through its auspices
was probably small32. If the estimate of the value of the honour of Penrith made
above is reasonably accurate, then it clearly could not have sustained an affinity of
any great significance, and certainly nothing to compare with the Percies. What was
immensely more important to landed society in the region was the political influence
which accrued to the incumbent warden through his position at court and which might
manifest itself in the control of local offices or other favours. It is far from easy,
however, to ascertain the extent to which the Nevilles' ascendancy in the locality was
due to the wardenship, their landed presence, their central role in national politics, or
a combination of all three. In order to do so it is necessary to try to analyse their
affinity and the role it played in the two counties, but the absence of financial records
from the major Neville holdings (the wardenship and the lordship of Penrith) makes
such a task difficult and the resulting conclusions should only be taken as a rough
guide. The decade from 1450 to 1460 presents many pitfalls because of the
interference of dynastic rivalries, and the difficulties of attributing loyalties to men in
the preceding years based upon their behaviour during this decade and in later years
are legion33. Professor Storey attempted to identify Neville adherents in the early
1450s by examining commissions and legal records from the end of the decade but to
use this method to classify earlier generations treads on dangerous ground34. It can
be used, however, as an indication if it is accepted that families who eventually
supported the Nevilles, especially prior to 1459, had some leanings towards them as

31 Cf. Storey, End of the House of Lancaster, p. 117, who assumes a large affinity existed.

32 See n. 27 above.


34 Storey, End of the House of Lancaster, pp. 118-23.
lords during the run-up to the crisis of the 1450s. There is some reliable direct
evidence, such as indentures of retainer and contemporary petitions, but for the most
part it is necessary to employ a certain amount of caution. By first trying to identify
the general areas of support for both the Nevilles and their main rivals, the Percies, in
the period from 1420 to 1450 and then focusing on the more definite Neville
adherents in the run-up to the Yorkist era, it should be possible to arrive at some
tentative conclusions concerning the extent of their overall position in Cumberland
and Westmorland.

The Percy affinity is much easier to identify due to the receivers’
accounts for Cockermouth. Families such as the Fenwicks, Leghs, Penningtons,
Curwens and Highmores were long-term tenants and retainers while the Ratcliffes,
Lamplughs and Louthers were tenants, and the latter two were retained on at least
one occasion. In addition the Bellinghams and Crackenthorpes had joined them by
1453, possibly in response to local feuds. Of the twenty nine known sheriffs of
Cumberland during the period 1420 to 1450, seventeen came from these families. Of
the remaining twelve, one - Thomas Beauchamp in 1442 - cannot be positively linked
to either faction prior to 1460, and eleven came from families who supported the
Nevilles during the 1450s. Of these, however, four officers - William Stapleton in
1420, Sir Thomas Moresby in 1424, Christopher Moresby in 1428 and 1438, and
Thomas Delamore in 1430 - may have had no connection with Salisbury at the time
of their appointment. Only three men held the remaining six terms, all in the 1440s
from the time that the disagreement with the Percies first flared up, and they can all
be identified with the Nevilles during the following decade. John Skelton served in
1440, 1445 and 1450 and he was accompanied by Sir William Stapleton in 1441 and
Thomas Delamore in 1443 and 1447. Skelton and Delamore were both part of the
elite group allowed to prosecute their debtors in the court of Chancery during
Salisbury's chancellorship in 1454, and Delamore was the sheriff who complained to

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35 Storey, "Disorders in Lancastrian Westmorland", pp. 69-80; M. Rowling, "John Clybborne's Appeal
to the Earl of Salisbury", in TCWAAS, n.s. vol. 63 (1963) pp. 178-83.

36 Christopher Moresby was named as a conservator of the truce with Scotland in his latter year, but
Salisbury was not warden at this time - Foedera, v(i), p. 47; Storey, "Wardens", p. 613.


38 Lists Sheriffs, p. 27.
the council of Lord Egremont's excesses in 1453\(^\text{39}\). At the time of his death in 1458 Stapleton held land from Salisbury, but this is his only known connection\(^\text{40}\).

Although these figures can only be taken as a very rough guide, it is clear that the Nevilles had little interest in the shrievalty until their disagreement with the Percies began in the early 1440s, and until this time the wardenship had little impact on local affairs. The beginning of Salisbury's effort to control the office came at a time when he was not the warden and so had no reason to be in the far north. Between December 1436 and December 1443 Marmaduke Lumley, Bishop of Carlisle, was warden of the West March\(^\text{41}\) but from November 1440 to November 1443 three out of the four sheriffs were Salisbury's men and even the fourth (Thomas Beauchamp, a lawyer from Carlisle) may well have been. The timing may have been coincidental, but the first evidence of possible conflict between the two magnates, the valuation of the honour of Penrith by Thomas Curwen, dates from the same time, November 1440\(^\text{42}\). Initially, the basis of Neville support was very narrow with only two men - Thomas Delamore and John Skelton, both lawyers - dominating the shrievalty in the 1440s and a possible third, Roland Vaux, holding the escheatorship twice in the same decade\(^\text{43}\). The Percies, on the other hand, were able to draw on the established landed wealth of the counties to represent them. Their sheriffs during the 1440s included Sir Thomas and Christopher Curwen, John Broughton and Thomas Crackenthorpe, and their escheators Sir Henry Fenwick and Thomas Crackenthorpe again.

Salisbury's policy with regard to retaining would seem to support this impression that the wardenship of the West Marches was not held in high esteem by

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\(^{40}\) Cardew thesis, p. 92.


the majority of landed society. Since there are no accounts from his offices or lands which might list the fees he paid in the region we must rely on other evidence to build up a picture of his support in the two counties. We are fortunate in possessing a number of indentures of retainer which he made with men from Cumberland and Westmorland in the years during which he was warden of the West March. Altogether there are five but Lord Greystoke, retained in 1447 at Sheriff Hutton, received his fee from Barnard Castle with the implication that his service was expected in Yorkshire rather than in the north-west. The remaining four indentures were made with Sir Henry Threlkeld of Yanwath in 1431; Sir Thomas Dacre (Lord Thomas Dacre's eldest son) in 1435; Walter Strickland of Sizergh in 1448; and Richard Musgrave of Hartley in 1456. Of these, the first two men died before Salisbury but the other two went on to serve his son in the 1460s. All four men received their fees from the lordship of Penrith, not from the profits of the wardenship. Dr. Summerson's suggestion that the warden's wages were used for retaining, therefore, is not confirmed in these cases. They would, however, have been expected to raise troops in time of war but not necessarily to serve on the borders - Sir Henry Threlkeld, for example, was retained specifically to fight in France. Thus, the implication is that they were receiving fees as the leading figures in their particular areas to serve their lord as any other retainer would.

The indentures are little different from any others of the period, although Salisbury's indenture with Richard Musgrave on 22nd November 1456 is quite instructive about the limits of the Earl's authority in the region. Musgrave was the grandson and heir of Sir Richard Musgrave, who had married the daughter of the 8th Lord Clifford. He had had two sons, Thomas and Richard, hereafter Richard (II).

44 All the indentures have been published - Jones and Walker, eds., "Private Indentures", pp. 150, 157-58, 158-59, 162-63 for Dacre, Greystoke, Strickland and Musgrave respectively; F. Ragg, "An Indenture in English of 1431", TCWAAS, n.s. vol. 9 (1909) pp. 282-86 for Threlkeld. The originals are at Northants. R.O. Fitzwilliam (Milton) MSS 2049, 2052 for Dacre and Greystoke; CRO D/Mus./H.123 for Musgrave; CRO D/Lons./T.51 for Threlkeld. The Strickland indenture is kept at Sizergh Castle, Cumbria.

45 Sir Walter Strickland was commissioned to arrest rebels in Westmorland on 6th June 1461; Musgrave received a similar commission in February 1462, and was on the commissions of array in November 1461 and June 1463 - CPR 1461-67, pp. 34, 66, 132, 280.

46 Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, ii, p. 407.
Thomas in turn had married Joan Stapleton (the daughter and heiress of William Stapleton of Edenhall) but he had died before 1456 when his eldest son, Richard (III) Musgrave, was retained by the Earl of Salisbury. As one might expect Richard (III) was contracted to serve the earl in peace and war against all men except the king, Lord Clifford, his mesne lord and brother-in-law, and Lord Dacre, to whom he must also have been retained\(^\text{47}\). He was to receive a fee of ten marks while his grandfathers, Sir Richard Musgrave and William Stapleton, were still alive, which was to increase to ten pounds if one of them died and to twenty marks once both were dead. He was clearly being retained for his ability to raise troops and as his estates (and thus his local influence) increased by inheritance, so did his fee\(^\text{48}\).

Politically, Salisbury was not in a strong position at this time. He had thrown in his lot with the Duke of York, and at the first battle of St. Albans in May 1455 he had been jointly responsible for the deaths of, amongst others, the second Earl of Northumberland and the eighth Lord Clifford\(^\text{49}\). He had played an important role in York's second protectorate but that had come to an end in February 1456 and since then the faction had been struggling to contain Queen Margaret's animosity\(^\text{50}\). Not surprisingly the ninth Lord Clifford had little desire to come to an amicable settlement, and the poaching of one of his close relatives and major tenants as the retainer of one of his greatest enemies can have done little to pour oil on the troubled political

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\(^\text{47}\) CRO D/Mus./H.123; Complete Peerage, ix, pp. 437-38; F. Ragg, "The Feoffees of the Cliffords, from 1283 to 1482", in TCWAAS, n.s. vol. 8 (1908), p. 309.

\(^\text{48}\) Sir Thomas Dacre's indenture is identical in this respect. Cf. Bean, From Lord to Patron, p. 104, who surmises that Dacre's fee was to be increased because Salisbury was prepared to pay more to have a peer as a retainer.


\(^\text{50}\) Griffiths, Henry VI, ch. 24.
In Salisbury's eyes, Musgrave's loyalties must have been borderline, and in an attempt to regulate against treachery it was decreed that:

...the said Richard shal not assist the said lordez [Clifford and Dacre] ne neither of them in his person, [nor] his men, with counsel ne otherwise ayenst the seid Erl.

From Musgrave's point of view, however, such a clause could make him guilty of treason if Salisbury ever took the king's part again even if his actions were no more than fulfilling his military obligations to his other lords, so he ensured that he had some protection from future vengeance:

...in case it lust the seid Ric[hard] to labour as a tretour for the wele of any suche matere, the said Erl agreeth him not to take in that bihalve the same Ric[hard] to eny straungenesse or displeasour.

Such legal protection was of little use in the heat of battle, but full-blooded civil war was hardly expected when the indenture was made. This rather strange clause shows above all else that Salisbury was seen as a man of honour, since there would have been little point in insisting on its inclusion if there had been no expectation of it being kept, but the language also reveals his contempt for his impertinent vassal. The indenture as a whole, however, is an example of how the gentry faced the difficulties of the 1450s and how they were able to exploit the increasing factionalism at the court for their own benefit. Multiple allegiances were quite common but it was hardly expected that magnates would resort to violence to settle their differences. When they did, they found that in order to defend themselves a loyal affinity was essential and they had to increase their expenditure accordingly. Not only that, but the increased demand for service placed the gentry in a stronger position to negotiate for higher fees and other returns for their loyalty. Thus Musgrave was able to command the same fee as Sir Thomas Dacre had done twenty years before.

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51 Ibid., p. 805. At the 1458 “Loveday” Warwick had to accept responsibility for Lord Clifford’s death in 1455 and pay his family compensation - Armstrong, op. cit.

52 CRO D/Mus/H.123.

53 Hence the increase in extraordinary fees paid out of Cockermouth from eleven in 1442 to nineteen in 1454 - CRO D/Lec/29/2, 29/3.

was a man whom Salisbury felt he had to have as a retainer despite (or perhaps because of) his obviously close connections with the Earl's political enemies.

As has been mentioned already, all of the fees Salisbury paid were taken from his own lands at Penrith, not from his wages as warden\textsuperscript{55}. In none of these indentures did he use his title of office, but when engaged on relevant March business he did employ it. In 1458 when granting letters of denization to one Johanna Gray in Carlisle, he styled himself as warden of the West March towards Scotland\textsuperscript{56}. These contracts were not, therefore, linked to the Earl as warden of the West March but to his ability to provide the benefits associated with a magnate lord. In fact, as the warden, he did not need to retain anyone since he had the right to array all men in the two counties whenever necessary\textsuperscript{57}. In making the indentures Salisbury did not use his title of warden which he surely would have done if his main concern was the March. His office undoubtedly brought him into contact with the local gentry since he was expected to be in residence\textsuperscript{58}, but it was his position at court and the benefits which were thus provided which were attractive to them. They wished to serve him as a magnate, not as the warden, and expected the rewards of service that a great lord with influence at the heart of government could provide.

The necessity of co-operation in the defence of the border meant that Salisbury had to employ men from throughout Cumberland and Westmorland to act as his agents in mustering troops. Thus, when the treaty with Scotland was finalised in November 1449 its signatories included Sir Henry Fenwick and Sir Richard Musgrave, as representatives of The Earl of Northumberland and Lord Clifford respectively. The same men were named as conservators of the truce in 1451\textsuperscript{59}. They were probably appointed as such by Salisbury, but it is impossible to

\textsuperscript{55} See above, p. 44.

\textsuperscript{56} CRO D/Lons./C.58.

\textsuperscript{57} See above, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{58} A condition of service which he found difficult to comply with. When Lord Dacre made his "proffer" in 1435 he undertook to "duelle with in the castell of Karlele wher no Wardein afore this tyme hath mede no continuel duelling..." He went on to ask that "...who ever be Wardein...be charged for to hold continuel abidyng there for the kynges a\textsuperscript{v}vaill and the availle of alle the lond." P.R.O. E.315/52/258, printed in Dunning, "Thomas, Lord Dacre and the West March", p. 98.

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Foedera}, v(ii), pp. 16-19, 34-37.
tell to what extent this might have diluted their allegiance to their other lords. Multiple allegiances were fairly common and benefited everyone as long as friction between lords was under control, so there is no reason to suppose that either Fenwick or Musgrave felt any conflict of interest at this time\textsuperscript{60}. Both continued to be used in this capacity throughout the 1450s but we can only guess at whether they considered loyalty to a particular lord as being more important than their loyalty to the region and its defence, which in effect was translated as allegiance to the king. At some point Musgrave at least considered it to be more advantageous to strengthen his links with the Nevilles, and allowed his grandson to be retained by him - by 1461 he had become a Yorkist. Fenwick was a typical example of a gentry retainer. Born in Alnwick castle, he served the Percies in Northumberland before being appointed lieutenant of Cockermouth. He died in 1458 before he was forced to make a choice between Neville and Percy, but it is worth noting that of his six daughters and heirs, five were married to men who later became Yorkists\textsuperscript{61}. It remains to be seen why and how Salisbury was able to lay claim to the allegiance of such old warriors, who had served their respective lords all their lives.

\textbf{I}

We now have two colours painted on the backdrop to the political events of the 1450s. On the one hand there is the localism described in the introduction which engendered co-operation rather than antagonism. On the other is the increasingly bitter conflict between two magnates who were equally balanced financially, but one of whom was established in land and the other reliant on crown offices. It struggle included not only a direct attack on the Percy’s right and title, but also the control of one of the major domestic offices in the county through men who, although capable, were not part of traditional political society\textsuperscript{62}.

\textsuperscript{60} Horrox, “Service”, p. 72; Hicks, \textit{Bastard Feudalism}, p. 90.

\textsuperscript{61} \textit{History of Northumberland}, vol. xii, pedigree opp. p. 352.

\textsuperscript{62} Warner and Lacey, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 211-17; men such as Delamore and Skelton were usually limited to the escheatorship - between 1400 and 1440, 34 of the 42 known sheriffs were knights or from knightly families (81%). Between 1441 and 1460 this was reduced to 11 out of 20 (55%).
The effect of these aggressive tactics on the locality is impossible to
gauge without further enquiry, and it is not possible to reach the same conclusion as
Dr. Carpenter did for Warwickshire.\footnote{Carpenter, \textit{Locality and Polity}, pp. 478, 599.} She sees the increasing ability of local
society to fend for itself as a result of the withdrawal of effective magnatial
leadership, but this was not the case in Cumberland and Westmorland at that time.
If anything, the magnate families there were being more pro-active and local
society, used to fending for itself, had to adjust to their increased involvement. This
can be illustrated by the arbitrations concerning the Threlkeld family of Yanwath
near Penrith, made in 1446 and 1453. The first was the result of a marriage gone
wrong. Sir Richard Musgrave’s daughter, Mabel, had been betrothed or married to
William, the eldest son of Sir Henry Threlkeld but he had died, quite possibly before
the wedding. She had, however, made entry on the lands given in dowry which Sir
Henry wanted to reclaim. The judgement was made by a selection of men from all
parts of the region who were met at Carlisle, quite possibly on March business - Sir
Henry Fenwick was the most prominent, and he was joined by William Stapleton,
Sir Thomas Strickland, Robert Warcop, Alexander Highmore and Thomas
Borgham.\footnote{CRO (Kendal) WD/Ry/92/91.} It was agreed that Mabel should lease the lands back to Threlkeld and
two others, John Warwick and Alexander Highmore for £10 p.a. - they had no
interest in them but that way she was assured of receiving her money. At no point
was resort to a higher authority mentioned, and clearly local society was quite
capable of finding solutions to its own problems.

In 1453, the Threlkelds were in trouble again. Sir Henry had died, and
his widow, Alice, was having difficulty in claiming her dower from his heir, Lancelot.
This time, judgement was handed down in her favour by Lord Egremont, who had
arrived in Cumberland in 1449.\footnote{Storey, \textit{End of the House of Lancaster}, p. 109.} Although he had the \textit{advice} of virtually all of the
Cockermouth affinity the final decision was his and his alone, with the first person
singular being used throughout the document.\footnote{CRO (Kendal) WD/Ry/92/93.} Lancelot was to make over all of
the disputed lands in a manner to be agreed with his mother’s lawyers, or else he was to suffer the consequences. By this time, then, the same elements in local society were relying on a single lord rather than their equals to provide them with justice, the sole reason being that he was available. It cannot be that they had lost all sense of self-reliance within this short space of time, merely that it had been covered by the imposition of a more hierarchical structure.

A second important conclusion can be derived from this arbitration. It was made at Egremont, and included only members of the Cockermouth affinity with but one exception, John Huddleston of nearby Millom. It is the first evidence of a polarisation in local society relating to the Percy Neville feud. The escalation of violence in 1453 was, in part, a result of the decision made by the second Earl of Northumberland to place Lord Egremont on the Cockermouth estates. This aggressive and unruly young man was granted an annuity of £35 and made chamberlain of the honour, a new position which placed him above the lieutenant, Sir Henry Fenwick. The intention was probably to provide him with an education in a quiet backwater without giving him total control. He was not allowed to retain men himself, but his influence was such that his followers found advancement anyway. He was, by nature, a violent and irresponsible character who had little respect for the law or for anyone whose opinion differed from his own. He represented all that was bad about the English aristocracy, and by 1450 he had drawn approbation from the normally mild-mannered Henry VI. When violence between the Percies and Nevilles erupted in 1453 he was the perfect choice to be the agent of destruction, but in reality he had been responsible more than any other man for “the beginning of sorrows”.

The most famous confrontation between the two families was at Heworth Moor, near York, in August 1453. Although it ended in a stalemate it was the culmination of a series of riots, and commissions were issued to deal with all of them. When Professor Griffiths examined the commissions’ findings as part of his analysis of the Percy-Neville feud, he came to the conclusion that Lord Egremont was able to lead the Cockermouth affinity en masse across the Pennines to take

67 CRO D/Lec/29/3.

68 Storey, End of the House of Lancaster, p. 125; title of ch. 9.

69 PRO KB.9/149/5/2, 149/6/8, 149/11/16.
part in the riots and the confrontation at Heworth\textsuperscript{70}. A closer analysis, however, shows that this was not the case. The first commission, headed by Sir Anthony Lucy to enquire into various disturbances, names twenty two men as coming from Cumberland or Westmorland but only two - Richard Berwis, clerk of the courts in Westward, and William Legh esquire - were receiving fees from Cockermouth. Of the others, John Pele may have been a relative of the Thomas Pele who was the prepositor of Lorton in 1454 and two Bellinghams - both called Robert - came from Burneside, the home of Henry Bellingham\textsuperscript{71}. None of the other names appear in the accounts, and none can be linked with any of the major families of the affinity. Sixteen of them were yeomen, one was a miller and one was a Scotsman, known, rather predictably, as Jock. At this stage, then, it was Egremont's hired thugs who were making trouble, not the Percy affinity as a whole.

The evidence relating to Heworth Moor makes it equally clear that there was hardly any support for Egremont from the Cockermouth retinue. The indictment of those present includes some 710 names, but of these only twenty three men came from Cumberland or Westmorland, including Lord Egremont, Sir Richard Percy and eight other men who were receiving fees from the honour\textsuperscript{72}. Of these eight names, however, six have lines through them, indicating that in fact they may not have been there at all. Rather, they had been included as a matter of course because they were known Percy retainers - only Sir John Pennington and John Swinburne were actually there. The list of those crossed out represents the cream of the affinity, but it must remembered that they had been retained by the Earl of Northumberland, and not his son. The fact that they refused to serve Lord Egremont did not seem to count against them, however, despite being grounds enough for them to lose their fees. In the following year they continued to be paid, perhaps an indication that Egremont's violent activities were not fully condoned\textsuperscript{73}.

\textsuperscript{70} Griffiths, “Local Rivalries”, pp. 594-98.

\textsuperscript{71} PRO KB.9/149/6/8; CRO D/Lec/29/3.

\textsuperscript{72} PRO KB.9/149/11/16; Griffiths, op. cit., p. 598.

\textsuperscript{73} They were Sir Henry Fenwick, lieutenant and constable of the honour for life for £20; Sir William Martindale, the steward, receiving £10 p.a.; John Broughton esquire, receiving £6.13s.8d.; Henry Bellingham, retained for £8; Sir Thomas Curwen, who was receiving £18.6s.8d. in fees; and William Legh esquire, receiving £6.13s.8d. - CRO D/Lec/29/3.
Some men who were present at Heworth, although named as coming from Cockermouth, may have joined the foray as part of other affinities. John Clifford, soon to become the ninth Lord Clifford, is named in the indictment and a number of the family's Westmorland affinity may also have taken part. As has been seen, the commission was not always concerned with accuracy. William Sandford was a Clifford tenant who came from Askham in Westmorland and had no connection with the Percies. Roland Kirkby may have been from the family of that name in Kirkby Thore who held land from the Cliffords, but in 1467 he was named as being of Bolton in Furness
74. Anyone who came from Cumberland or Westmorland it seems, if they were not known to the commissioners, were described as being “formerly of Cockermouth”.

Almost as important as the list of those included in the indictments are the names of those who were not. John Huddleston, the lord of Millom, was closely associated with the Percy affinity although he did not receive a fee. His estates were surrounded by those belonging to the Percies or their adherents and he could not afford to antagonise them, but neither did he have to follow their lead. He had married one of the daughters and co-heirs of Sir Henry Fenwick sometime before 1450, when his second son was born, and in January 1453 he had been an advisor to Lord Egremont
75. His companions included Sir Henry Fenwick, his father-in-law, Sir Thomas Curwen, Sir John Pennington, Sir William Martindale, John Broughton, William Legh, John Eglesfield, Henry Bellingham and John Swinburne, all but one of whom were retained at Cockermouth
76. One of his younger brothers, Oliver, was named as being at Heworth but from 1454 onwards John switched his allegiances away from the Percies and towards the Nevilles. His first public appointment was to the commission of the peace in June 1453, at the height of Egremont's activities in Cumberland, but there is no evidence that this was a result of Neville influence. However, in November 1454 (at the end of the Duke of York's first protectorate) he


75 His second son, also John, was born at about that time - Wedgwood, Biographies, pp. 476-78; CRO (Kendal) WD/Ry/92/93. See above, p. 49.

76 CRO D/Lec/29/3. Eglesfield was from a minor Workington family.
was pricked as sheriff of Cumberland for what must have been a very difficult year, and to make his job in the east of the county a little easier he was also made steward of the courts of Penrith.

Also missing from the indictment are the two main families from the Clifford affinity in Westmorland, the Threlkelds of Yanwath and the Musgraves of Hartley. Little is known about the Threlkelds during this period but they survived the crisis of 1459-61 intact. Musgrave, as has been seen, had served on the March and his grandson was soon to become a retainer of the Earl of Salisbury. Even though they were not part of the Percy affinity, Lord Egremont was supported by the Cliffords so their absence is important. Clifford authority in the north part of Westmorland was almost unchallenged, but they had failed to carry the respect of the locality and were unable to raise much support at this juncture.

These, however, were not the only riots against the Nevilles which were led by Lord Egremont. In 1453 the outgoing sheriff of Cumberland, Thomas Delamore, presented a petition to Parliament complaining that “toon half of the Shire has been divided from tother”, and in 1457 Salisbury had to forego £23.11s.7½d. of arrears from Bolton in Allerdale because of damage done “in the time of dispute between Sir Thomas Neville and Lord Egremont”. Much has been made of Delamore’s petition to highlight the endemic violence in northern society, or to justify the belief that the Percy-Neville feud split local society down the middle, but it needs to be put into perspective. The only reason that it succeeded in being heard in Parliament is because it was sponsored by the Earl of Salisbury, who at that time had the support of the Duke of York, and it ought to be seen as an instrument of his policy rather than as a true reflection of the local situation.

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77 CPR 1452-61, p. 663; NRO ZHW/1/88; Lists Sheriffs, p. 27. No-one had served in 1453-4, and Hugh Louther had to be forced to take up office in the year following - Wedgwood, Biographies, pp. 557-8.

78 Foedera v(i), pp. 16-19, 34-37; see above, pp. 43-46.

79 Rot. Parl., vi, p. 63; CRO D/Lec/29/27, f.2.


81 Griffiths, Henry VI, pp. 582-84.
The petition is recorded in the Parliamentary rolls of 1472 but it was actually presented after the end of Thomas Delamore’s year as sheriff, which had ended in November 1453. Although it is undated, the first session of Parliament at which it could have been presented began on February 14th 1454. The king had not been able to appear in public for the past seven months, and the Duke of York had been commissioned to act on his behalf. The Nevilles had been forced into lending their support to York after the Percies had managed to gain that of the Duke of Exeter. This last session of Parliament saw a concerted attack by the Yorkist faction on the Percies - and Lord Egremont in particular - to which must be added Delamore’s bill. In response to a petition, a bill was passed which allowed for the punishment of peers who failed to respond to writs issued to them concerning their involvement in breaches of the peace. Such miscreants were to be summoned before the Chancellor and were to forfeit all their offices and other possessions. In the case of a repeat offence then they were to lose their title and their seat in Parliament. It was immediately followed by a bill stating that Egremont and his brother, Sir Richard Percy, had made great affrays and riots in Yorkshire, Cumberland, Westmorland and Northumberland and disobeyed repeated summonses to appear before the council. A writ was to be issued out of the Chancery, therefore, ordering them to appear before the Chancellor.

Delamore’s petition was used to establish before Parliament still further that Egremont was out of control. It can be divided into two sections, neither of which has any relevance to the other. The first part consists of the attack on Egremont, but it comes to no conclusion. It therefore merges into the second section, which contains the main thrust of the petition, concerning the remission of charges to the sheriff’s account for revenues which Delamore was unable to collect. It concludes by asking that it be taken on trust that he has done his best to collect the revenues, but such petitions were commonplace. There are numerous examples amongst the Sheriff’s Accounts in the Exchequer, and there was no need

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82 Rot. Parl., vi, pp. 63-64; Lists Sheriffs, p. 27.
83 Wedgwood, Registers, pp. 177-78; Griffiths, op. cit.
84 Rot. Parl., v, pp. 266-67.
for this one to appear in Parliament unless it was needed for some other purpose. That was, most obviously, to show that Lord Egremont’s activities had extended into counties other than Yorkshire and against men other than the Nevilles. Delamore claimed that Egremont had threatened, in the presence of others, to cut off his head and that when he had sent his deputy sheriff and bailiffs to collect the king’s debts in various parts of the county, they had been grievously wounded and beaten by Egremont’s men. As a result of these threats to life and limb Delamore claimed, perhaps a little disingenuously, that he had sent word to Salisbury to the intent that he should bring it before the king and council.

There is no reason to suppose that these events did not happen but they had no bearing on Delamore’s ability as sheriff to collect his revenues, most of which came from in and around Carlisle. In the second part of the petition in which he details the lost income, he makes no mention of Egremont or his activities. In fact, he stated that the revenues were depleted due to great ruins and decays and had not been raised by sheriffs for a long time, a turn of phrase identical to that used by Sir Thomas Curwen in a similar petition after the end of his term of office in 1450. Of the £40 demanded by the Exchequer from the perquisites of the county, only £6 could be found. Of a further £36 from thirty two other farms, only £8 could be raised since Delamore “ne wote not where viii of thise fermes lye”. A further £11 from the royal demesnes could not be collected because of destruction by the Scots and the floodwaters of the River Eden. In total the sum of £94 could not be raised and, because of these great charges, previous sheriffs had estranged themselves from the office. Delamore even confessed to his own reticence about taking the office until he had been put in comfort and trust that he would be discharged of all sums he could not levy. The charges made against Egremont were not an integral part of his petition, but had been added to the initial draft to confirm in the minds of Parliament that he was as uncontrollable as Salisbury claimed.

II

86 E.g. PRO E.199/62/1, 2.

87 PRO E.28/80/42; Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, ii, p. 441.
Because the Duke of York’s first protectorate is the point at which factionalism became endemic in English court politics it has often been assumed that this must also have been the case in local politics as well, yet this does not necessarily follow. The problem of trying to analyse events in the 1450s and 1460s is that it is so difficult to separate noble factionalism, which was played out at court, from local sentiment. County officials and commissioners were all, with the exception of members of Parliament, appointed by the crown. A preponderance of men from one affinity in local office did not reflect the opinions of local society, but rather the level of influence their master had with the king. In fact, it is almost impossible to find any evidence of factionalism within the local community until late in 1460, even though this may be due to an absence of evidence. This is not to say that factionalism did not exist, but it should not be taken as read. The government of the day, whichever party held the balance of power, had to be careful to ensure the defence of the realm whatever the domestic situation. As a result, until 1459 there continued to be a mix of men from both Percy and Neville affinities appointed to the various commissions in Cumberland and Westmorland. Even in the final two years of the crisis when men were forced into one camp or the other, Yorkist or Lancastrian, it is still difficult to see exactly who in the local arena supported which faction.

The appointments to commissions of the peace are more often than not taken as an indication of who belonged to each particular alliance. Thus, for Professor Storey, all those who were appointed in 1453-54 by the Nevilles, lost their positions in December 1459 when the Lancastrian party resumed control of Henry VI, and regained them in 1461, were out of necessity Yorkists from the time of their initial appointment. The Coventry Parliament of 1459 was indeed dedicated to rooting out Yorkist sympathies throughout the country, but it was only at this late stage that the Lancastrians felt the necessity to do so. Prior to that they were content to allow the commission in Cumberland to proceed unhindered, and they saw no need to change that in Westmorland although it had been nominated by the

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88 Harriss, “Dimensions of Politics”, pp. 1-7; Cf. Carpenter, *Locality and Polity*, p. 9, who sees them both as part of the same process.


Yorkists only five months previously, in July 1459. The Lancastrian party had not been out of power for any length of time, and it had had the chance to change appointments to its favour - indeed, it did so in other counties. It would seem, therefore, that it did not see the necessity of doing so in the West March because it trusted the commission to act with prudence. Similarly on three occasions, in 1456, 1458 and 1459, members of the Cockermouth affinity were pricked as sheriffs of Cumberland. While the last of these, Sir John Pennington, could be said to have been a partisan appointment, the other two could not. Sir Thomas Curwen, sheriff in 1456, probably supported Edward IV in the 1461, and of Sir Henry Fenwick’s six daughters, five were married to men who at one time or another were Yorkists. Until late in 1459 many of those who sat as JP’s who are presumed to have been Yorkists were not regarded as such by the Lancastrians. Likewise, the supposedly Lancastrian sheriffs must have been acceptable to the Yorkist wardens. Obviously there was some bias - no man could act completely independently of his lord - but until the crisis at the centre of government had reached a point of no return, the governance of the shires was presumed to be effective.

The tradition in the counties of the West March had been to ensure that all magnates with an interest in the shires were represented on the commissions of the peace. This is more obviously the case in Cumberland than in Westmorland because of the Clifford’s dominance of the latter, but it can be seen there too. By looking at commissions appointed before the Percy-Neville feud developed and comparing them with those appointed later in the 1450s, it is possible to see a balance being maintained between the rival affinities. The first disturbances in Cumberland seem to have been in early 1452, but at this time neither Percy nor Neville were in a position to influence the commissions substantially, the first of which was appointed on May 9th of that year. It was

91 CPR 1452-61, pp. 663, 680.


headed as a matter of course by the bishop of Carlisle, the Earls of Northumberland and Salisbury, Lord Dacre of Gilsland (who served Salisbury in the March\textsuperscript{95}) and two justices, Sir Thomas Fulthorpe and Peter Adern. It included seven other men, of whom two were retained by the Percies\textsuperscript{96} and at least one, Thomas Delamore, had Neville links\textsuperscript{97}. Of the remaining four, it is impossible to say for certain whether or not they were part of one of the rival affinities, but their sympathies probably lay at Cockermouth. Sir Nicholas Ratcliffe held his manor of Derwentwater from the Percies but he was not retained by them. Hugh Louther was later to be appointed a reluctant sheriff during the Duke of York’s second protectorate, but he also held lands of the Percies and his brother, William, was receiving their fee\textsuperscript{98}. William Stapleton came from Edenhall near Penrith and his grandson, Richard Musgrave, was to be retained by Salisbury four years later, but there is nothing else to link him to the Nevilles and he died in 1458\textsuperscript{99}. Robert Carlyle was a lawyer who, probably preceded by his father, had served on every commission of the peace since 1399\textsuperscript{100}.

The overall balance of the commission favoured the Percies, and perhaps for this reason it failed to quell the violence. Another commission was appointed on 11th July, to which was added Sir Thomas Neville, Thomas Colt and Thomas Burgham. Sir Thomas had been sent to the county by Salisbury at about the same time as Egremont arrived, but neither Thomas Colt nor Thomas Burgham owed him allegiance. Burgham’s loyalties are unknown, but Colt, the MP for

\textsuperscript{95} PRO. E.326/B.6435.
\textsuperscript{96} Sir Henry Fenwick and Sir John Pennington - CRO D/Lec/29/2, 29/3.
\textsuperscript{97} See above, p. 55; Lists Sheriffs, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{98} PRO C.140/51/20; F. Ragg, “De Culwen”, in TCWAAS, n.s. vol. 14 (1914), pp 417-18; W. Thompson, “The Derwentwaters and the Ratcliffes”, in TCWAAS, n.s. vol. 4 (1904), pp. 289, 299-300; Wedgwood, Biographies, pp. 557-58. Both brothers were appointed to collect the sheriff’s revenues in November 1454.
Carlisle, is better known as one of the Duke of York’s servants who at this time was not one of the Nevilles’ allies 101. The developing feud was a cause of concern within the royal council but care was being taken not to favour one side or the other. Even in the following year, at the peak of Egremont’s career as a dissolute thug, the balance was maintained. In the commission of June 16th 1453 the only new appointment was John Huddleston, who replaced Ratcliffe. Despite his links with the Nevilles he enjoyed a good relationship with the Cockermouth affinity, and his influence on the commission would have been conciliatory rather than antagonistic 102.

The new appointments gave Salisbury’s voice extra weight on the commissions, they did not give him control. Even after the Nevilles and the Duke of York had joined forces and were in control of the throne during Henry VI’s first bout of illness, there was no attempt to oust the Percy element. The only addition made on 22nd May 1454 was that of the Duke of York himself, but that was a matter of form rather than anything else. The balance on the commission between Percy and Neville was seen as its greatest strength.

It was only with the Coventry Parliament that factionalism was introduced to the shire. By this time Lord Dacre and Sir Henry Fenwick had both died, but Salisbury and Sir Thomas Neville, John Huddleston, Hugh Louther, William Stapleton, Thomas Delamore, Thomas Colt and Thomas Burgham were all omitted. They were replaced by Lord Dacre’s heir, Sir Thomas Curwen, William Legh, Thomas Broughton and Richard Bewley. Apart from the new Lord Dacre, whose place stemmed from his position as the only resident nobleman in the March, all of the other justices were from families retained by the Percies 103.

It would be wrong to see the new commission as a Lancastrian effort to eradicate Yorkist influence, but rather as an attempt by the Percies to impose their control over the shire at the expense of the Nevilles. The second Earl of Northumberland had been killed, possibly on the orders of the Nevilles, at the first

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102 See above, pp. 51-52.

103 CRO D/Lec/29/3.


battle of St. Albans in 1455. His successor, with good reason, bore malice towards them, but this was the first occasion on which he had been able to take such affirmative action\textsuperscript{104}. The Yorkists were in disarray after their defeats at Ludlow and Blore Heath and had lost control of Henry VI but, as has been seen, not all of the justices of the peace appointed in 1454 can be said to have been of that party. Despite being appointed sheriff during the Duke of York’s second protectorate Hugh Louther, had at first refused to accept the office. His links with the Nevilles notwithstanding, John Huddleston was still closely involved with the Cockermouth affinity and acted as an arbitrator in a dispute involving the clerk of the mines there, Thomas Stanlawe, in April 1459\textsuperscript{105}. He was also present at the Coventry Parliament, thinking it prudent enough to obtain a general pardon on the day after the new commission was appointed and cannot be described as a Yorkist at this time\textsuperscript{106}.

A similar process can be seen in Westmorland, this time balancing the influences of Salisbury and the Cliffords. There are no similar records from that county which provide the same wealth of information as the Cockermouth accounts, but the justices appointed from 1454 onwards provided a broad cross-section of local opinions. The first commission for a decade was issued on 14th March in response to Lord Egremont’s continued activities and was headed by Salisbury, the Earl of Westmorland and Lord Clifford, with the two justices of the northern circuit Peter Adern and Sir Thomas Fulthorpe. Of the eight other gentry involved, no faction was dominant. Sir Richard Musgrave was probably employed by Salisbury as an officer of the March and his grandson was soon to be retained by him, but there is no evidence that he had repudiated his allegiance to the Cliffords. He was one of their tenants in Great Musgrave, Moreton, Soulby, Crosby Gerard and Melkington, all in Westmorland\textsuperscript{107}. Sir Thomas Strickland of Sizergh had stronger ties to Salisbury. His son, Walter, had been retained by him in 1448 and he himself was the steward of the

\textsuperscript{104} Armstrong, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{105} CRO D/Stan/1/21; CRO D/Lec/29/3.

\textsuperscript{106} CPR 1452-61, p. 527.

\textsuperscript{107} CRO D/Mus/H.123; F. Ragg, "Appendix to `The Feoffees of the Cliffords'", in \textit{TCWAAS} (1922), pp. 337-343.
Latimer estates at Heversham from at least 1447\textsuperscript{108}. Traditionally, they were stewards of the Bedford fee of the barony of Kendale (which had been in Salisbury’s hands periodically), and that gave them the power to array men for service on the March\textsuperscript{109}. Robert Warcop of Smardale had married one of Musgrave’s daughters and was to be retained by Warwick in 1462, but like his father-in-law his affiliations are unclear at this time\textsuperscript{110}. Henry Bellingham had been retained at Cockermouth in 1453 and much has been made of his involvement in the Percy-Neville feud. His, however, was one of the crossed-out names in the indictment of those present at Heworth, and by 1456 he was a king’s esquire, serving as steward of the Richmond fee of the barony of Kendale\textsuperscript{111}. His commitment to the Percies seems to have been a temporary expediency which came to an end soon after Egremont’s confrontation with the Nevilles. William Lancaster probably came from Hertsop, near Penrith. In November 1455 he was appointed as sheriff of Westmorland during pleasure by the Duke of York’s second protectorate because of the minority of John, the ninth Lord Clifford, a post he held for at least four years. However, he replaced another supposed Neville supporter, Christopher Moresby, and there is no indication that he was being favoured by Salisbury. He had been deputy sheriff under the Cliffords from at least 1450 until 1454 and was restored to the post because of his experience\textsuperscript{112}.

The final three members of the commission, the only new appointments, were Thomas Burgham of Brougham, John Hilton and John Wharton of Kirby Thore. Little is known about any of them but Thomas held lands directly from the Cliffords and


\textsuperscript{110} PRO E.327/185; Jones and Walker, eds., op. cit., pp. 169-70; Madox, Formulare Anglicarum, pp. 104-5; Nicolson & Burn, i, p. 594; Complete Peerage, ix, p. 437.

\textsuperscript{111} CRO D/Lec/29/3; Griffiths, "Local Rivalries", p. 600; CPR 1452-61, pp. 335, 342.

\textsuperscript{112} Lists Sheriffs, p. 151; CFR 1452-61, p. 150.
Wharton was a sub-tenant of Sir Ralph Pudsay, a Yorkshire retainer of the Earl of Northumberland\textsuperscript{113}.

The Yorkist policy in Westmorland, as it was in Cumberland, seems to have been aimed at preserving local society in its entirety rather than trying to factionalise it in their favour. Two further commissions were appointed in the same year, on 21st May and 12th July 1454. The only changes in the first were the addition of the Duke of York and the Earl of Warwick, the first appearance of the latter in the north, but the second saw the replacement of the two justices and the omission of Henry Bellingham in favour of Sir Thomas Parr. It is not clear why this should have been, but Parr had begun to move into the Neville camp from at least 1447, when he was steward of the Latimer estates of Warcop and Morland in Westmorland\textsuperscript{114}. He had been involved in a feud with Bellingham for some time and, although it had apparently been laid to rest in 1449-50, the latter's involvement with the Percies may indicate that it had flared up again and that Parr was using his Neville connection against him\textsuperscript{115}. If that was the case then the change in the commission represents a substantial reinforcement of the Neville position, though it still did not give them overall control.

The next commission came exactly two years later. In the intervening time Lord Clifford had been killed with the second Earl of Northumberland at the first battle of St. Albans, and Sir Thomas Strickland had died. Despite being a minor, John Clifford took his father's place. William Lancaster was replaced by his namesake of Sockbridge, probably because of his appointment as sheriff, and Robert Warcop was replaced by John Crackenthorpe of Holgill. Again, the reason is unclear. Six months later Warcop was part of the unashamedly Neville commission appointed to inquire into the lands held by Thomas Lord Dacre in Cumberland and Westmorland at the time of his death, so perhaps he was excluded to maintain the balance\textsuperscript{116}.

\textsuperscript{113} Ragg, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 341-42; Pudsay also had links with Salisbury - Pollard, \textit{North-Eastern England}, pp. 248, 270.

\textsuperscript{114} CRO D/Lec/28/3.


\textsuperscript{116} \textit{CPR 1452-61}, p. 435. The other commissioners were Sir Thomas Neville, Sir William Parr, Christopher Moresby, Henry Hutton, Roland Vaux and John Tunstall.
Crackenthorpe, though, was later to be included in the first commission of the peace after the Yorkist victory at Towton and his mother held lands in the county from the Nevilles\(^{117}\). At this time, however, the Yorkists were out of favour so perhaps he was regarded as being a Clifford man. If he is to be reckoned to be a Neville sympathiser, then his appointment only helped to maintain Salisbury's interest in the commission without giving him the whip hand. Lancaster of Sockbridge cannot be linked to any faction at this point and, if we are necessarily circumspect about the loyalties of Musgrave, Burgham, Hilton and Wharton, then only Parr can be said for certain to have been a Neville adherent. He was elected as MP for Westmorland in 1455, received a pardon in October of that year (having been at the battle of St. Albans) and was included in the Dacre commission in February 1457\(^{118}\).

The final commission before the final Lancastrian defeat was appointed on 19th July 1459. The Yorkist party was in control, but the justices named retained a balance of interests. John Lord Clifford was the most noticeable casualty, but his unmitigated hatred of those who had murdered his father had much to do with this. The Earl of Westmorland was still included, though not too much weight should be attached to his appointment since he had little influence in the region. The commissioners were men who were acceptable to the Nevilles and the Duke of York, but they were not necessarily part of the Yorkist affinity. Sir Thomas Parr was - he was soon to be attainted for his role at Blore Heath and Ludlow - but there is little to show where the loyalties of the others lay. Sir Richard Musgrave continued as an elder of the shire; William Lancaster, Thomas Burgham, John Crackenthorpe and John Wharton also carried on as before\(^{119}\).

The main concern of the council up until December 1459, whether controlled by Yorkists or Lancastrians, seems not to have been the exploitation of faction at a local level but the maintenance of the co-operation that was vital if the March counties were to provide a meaningful defence against Scottish raids. The wisdom of this policy can be seen at work in the response to Scottish incursions: the

\(^{117}\) CPR 1461-67, p. 575; PRO. C.140/7/6.


\(^{119}\) The commission was mistakenly issued to John Crackenthorpe's father, Robert, who had been dead since 1438 - Moor, "Crackenthorpe of Newbiggin", pp. 70-71.
commissions of array in December 1457. Again, both Percy and Neville affinities
were represented in Cumberland, but neither to a disproportionate degree. Sir Henry
Fenwick and Sir John Pennington represented Cockermouth; Sir Thomas Neville (the
constable of Carlisle by this point), John Skelton and Thomas Delamore were for the
Nevilles; the balance was held by Hugh Louther and Thomas Burgham. The same
equilibrium can be seen in Westmorland, although it appears to favour the
Lancastrians. Sir Thomas Parr was the most partisan of Salisbury’s adherents; Sir
Richard Musgrave was relatively neutral with ties to both lords, but John
Crackenthorpe of Holgill, William Lancaster, John Hilton and John Wharton were
possibly closer to the Cliffords. Henry Bellingham was a crown servant, included as
steward of the Richmond fee. It was, however, a reasonable balance which, under
normal circumstances, would not have caused anyone to bat an eyelid.

This unity of purpose between the different affinities at the local level
makes it possible to discern in only a few cases who supported which party in the
national arena prior to 1459, such as that of Sir Thomas Parr. Personal animosities
seem to have been the central issue for him, however, rather than any firm ideological
commitment to the Yorkists. His main protagonist was Henry Bellingham who,
despite a brief flirtation with the Percies, remained loyal to the crown throughout the
1450s and beyond. His presence at Cockermouth with Lord Egremont, however,
forced Parr to seek out a lord able to withstand the Earl of Northumberland’s influence
both locally and at court. It was as the Nevilles became more deeply embroiled in the
Duke of York’s attempts to establish influence over the throne that Parr was dragged
into treason.

Parr, however, was an exception. He was certainly useful to the
Nevilles as the most powerful resident landowner in Westmorland, but he was not
representative of local sentiment in the two counties. The general principle, it seems,
was that loyalty to one’s lord was tempered by the more important consideration of
loyalty to the crown. It has already been suggested elsewhere that this was the case
in Carlisle, but that principle ought to be extended throughout the two counties.

120 CPR 1452-61, p. 407.
121 Ibid., pp. 335, 342, 409.
122 Summerson, “Carlisle and the English West March”, pp. 96-97.
There were, of course, exceptions, as Sir Thomas Parr shows, but only when personal considerations became paramount. It was only after 1459 that the pressures being exerted by the collapse of royal authority began to play a part in local politics as first one magnate, then another, was able to control the throne.

This can be illustrated by examining the behaviour of two men, one reckoned to have been a Yorkist and one a Lancastrian. John Huddleston of Millom, as seen, was a reluctant Yorkist because of the geographical position of his estates. The Coventry Parliament of November 1459, however, was in the hands of men unused to the subtle exercising of influence rather than of brute power, and he lost his position as a JP in Cumberland in favour of Percy retainers. There is no evidence that he was involved in the battles of the previous month, but he was probably removed because of his Neville connections and he was cautious enough to obtain a general pardon on the following day\textsuperscript{123}. From this point on, however, he probably moved closer to the Yorkists. He had already stood surety in October 1458 for Sir Thomas Harrington, one of Salisbury's retainers at Middleham, for which he received a pardon when the Yorkists regained their pre-eminence\textsuperscript{124}. Again, his activities during 1460 are unknown but he may well have been part of Salisbury's army. Many of the Yorkist supporters were rewarded for their loyalty by the grant of crown lands in October and November 1460. On 20th November, as a squire of the body, Huddleston received the royal demesne lands beside Carlisle and the lease of some closes in Inglewood for the very reasonable sum of £8.13s.4d., along with the portership of Newcastle\textsuperscript{125}.

The Dacres of Naworth suffered attainder and forfeiture after the death of Lord Ranulph at the battle of Towton, and for that reason they have been labelled as Lancastrians\textsuperscript{126}. Being based so close to the border, they were natural allies for any warden since it was their lands which bore the brunt of any Scottish incursion and their tenants who would be the first to be called on to organise a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{123} CPR 1452-61, pp. 527, 680.
\item \textsuperscript{125} CFR 1452-61, p. 286; CPR 1452-61, p. 631.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Rot. Parl., v, p. 478; Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, ii, p. 444.
\end{itemize}
retaliatory raid. In the late fourteenth century they had been used by the Crown as custodians of West March, who received money for providing troops when needed but did not receive a wage, and in 1435 Lord Thomas felt himself to be experienced enough to make a bid for the wardsmanship. He was employed by Salisbury in the defence of Carlisle during the Scottish war of 1448 and there is no reason to suppose that he did not continue in his service. During the 1450s he continued to serve on the commissions of the peace until his death in 1458, but the passage of his titles and lands to his heir male, Richard Fiennes, rather than his heir general, Ranulph, marked the onset of a period of crisis for the family which was to last until well into Edward IV's reign.

Lord Thomas's eldest son, also Thomas, had died leaving as his sole heir a daughter, Joan. She had married Richard Fiennes of Sussex and the barony, which was uniquely held in tail general rather than tail male, passed to him rather than to the second son, Ranulph. Although he would have been disappointed, Ranulph had little cause for complaint since the terms of the original grant of the title were well known, and under the circumstances he could have had little expectation of inheriting it. There is some evidence to suggest that Lord Thomas had tried to get around the problem by entailing his northern lands to his younger sons just before his death, although Joan probably remained the heir to the southern estates. In December 1457 he enfeoffed the barony of Burgh to the use of his third son, Humphrey and, although no similar evidence exists for Ranulph, it seems unlikely that one was not made. It has been suggested that Ranulph supported the Lancastrians because Fiennes was a staunch Yorkist, and if he had been attainted then Ranulph, being the next heir, might have benefited. However, this was far from certain and depended on Joan not marrying again and being childless, as well as on her not being able to obtain a pardon (an unlikely event given Henry VI's forgiving nature). Rather, he saw the path to advancement as being loyal service to the king rather than involvement in factional


128 PRO E.326/B.6485.

129 Complete Peerage, iv, pp. 8-9, 18.

130 Castle Howard A.1/169.

131 Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, ii, p. 444.
politics and he continued to serve the crown, whoever was in control, until his death. At the Coventry Parliament of December 1459 he was appointed to the commissions of the peace and array in Cumberland and he was rewarded with a grant of £40 p.a. for his good service against the king’s rebels, an indication perhaps of his presence at Blore Heath or Ludlow. In April 1460 he was appointed to the much depleted commission of array in Cumberland and Northumberland, showing the level of trust which the Lancastrians had in him, but once the Yorkists had recaptured Henry VI at the battle of Northampton he showed no compunction in serving them equally faithfully. In late July 1460 he was being employed in the defence of the West March and in October he was included on the commission to expel those who had taken over the Neville castles of Pontefract, Wressle and Penrith. In the following month he headed a commission to arrest those guilty of unlawful gatherings and sieges, which included the power of the warden to call on the lieges of Cumberland and Westmorland if necessary, and which was virtually a roll-call of Yorkist supporters. He may have been part of the Lancastrian force which destroyed the Duke of York and Earl of Salisbury’s tenements in York towards the end of 1460, but as late as March 6th 1461 the Yorkists believed him to be loyal and made a special proclamation that he, his tenants and his lands should be protected. He was killed at the battle of Towton on 29th March 1461 fighting for Henry VI and it is possible that he was attainted for this reason, but he had been consistent in his fidelity to the crown and would probably have served Edward IV just as faithfully if he had lived. Other men who submitted after the battle were received into the king’s grace without difficulty and it may have been his heir, Lord Thomas’s third son Humphrey, whose

132 CPR 1452-61, pp. 560, 570, 663.


134 See below, p. 69.


continued resistance to the Yorkists resulted in the family’s forfeiture in November 1461\(^{137}\).

However strong the reluctance of local gentry to become involved in the personal quarrels of their magnate leaders, at times they had no choice. When one faction controlled the king, it tried to ensure that it’s supporters were appointed to carry out its wishes. Thus, although prior to 1459 the Yorkists were careful to ensure a fairly even mix of affinities on commissions of the peace and of array, lesser commissions such as that appointed to enquire into Lord Dacre’s lands in 1458 could be more partisan\(^{138}\). Headed by Sir Thomas Neville, the constable of Carlisle, it also included Sir Thomas Parr, Thomas Delamore, John Tunstall, Roland Vaux of Triermain and Robert Warcop, all of whom had strong Neville connections. The odd man out was John Tunstall, who was one of Salisbury’s servants at Middleham. He had been elected the MP for Cumberland in 1453 but otherwise was unknown in the county\(^{139}\). The other men may have been included because of their local knowledge, but at least one of them, Christopher Moresby, went on to serve the Yorkists, being appointed sheriff in November 1460\(^{140}\). Earlier in the decade, however, he had had to juggle his allegiances to different lords. He served as the deputy sheriff in Westmorland under Lord Clifford in 1454 and remained as their chief forester of Whinfell until his death, and he may have also held land of the Percies\(^{141}\). Of the last, Henry Hutton, little is known. He was escheator in 1452 but does not appear again\(^{142}\).

Once the crisis reached its final stages, however, towards the end of 1459, then it became increasingly important for the faction in power to ensure that its orders were carried out and so it becomes more obvious who they regarded as being loyal. Thus the November commission of the peace in Cumberland was limited to...

\(^{137}\) CCR 1461-68, pp. 55-56; Complete Peerage, iv, p. 18; Rot. Parl., v, p. 478.

\(^{138}\) CPR 1452-61, p. 435.

\(^{139}\) Ibid., p. 335; Wedgwood, Biographies, pp. 881-82.

\(^{140}\) Lists Sheriffs, p. 27.


\(^{142}\) Lists Escheators, p. 27.
Percy retainers, and the subsequent commission of array was packed with the same men\textsuperscript{143}. When the Yorkists regained control of the king in the following year they appointed Lord Dacre to recapture the castle of Penrith, which had fallen to John Lord Clifford\textsuperscript{144}. In November 1460 he was joined by Sir Richard Musgrave, Sir Thomas Parr and his two eldest sons, William and John, John Huddleston, Richard Salkeld, Christopher Moresby, James Harrington and Nicholas Leyburn of Cunswick in Lonsdale, a Harrington kinsman, on a commission to arrest those guilty of unlawful gatherings and sieges in Cumberland and Westmorland\textsuperscript{145}. Of these, Salkeld, from Corby near Carlisle, had been escheator in 1455 and sheriff in 1457, both appointments coming at times when the Yorkists were in control of the king. During the 1460s he was to be one of the most energetic and staunchest of Warwick’s supporters in the region, no doubt because of his proximity to the wardenship.

A number of others have been identified by Professor Storey as being Neville adherents in the 1450s because of their court cases in Chancery, namely Roland Vaux, John Skelton of Armathwaite, Thomas Delamore and Hugh Louther. Of these there can be little doubt about Delamore and Vaux, but the evidence for the others is inconclusive. Skelton certainly held lands from Salisbury at the time of his death in 1458, but he had also been one of the king’s sergeant-at-arms since 1437, not necessarily at the Nevilles’ behest. His family’s subsequent history is difficult to trace and it is not known how they behaved in 1459-61\textsuperscript{146}. Louther, on the other hand, was closely linked with the Percies and he had to be forced to take up the office of sheriff by the Duke of York’s regency council in 1455 - hardly the behaviour of a committed retainer. In 1459 he was dropped from the bench by the Coventry parliament and in 1461 he was restored, but otherwise he did not benefit from Neville patronage. While his interests remained fairly parochial, however, his relatives were able to exploit his links with the Nevilles and Percies. One of his brothers, Robert, was one of Salisbury’s servants and his son, Richard, was appointed as feodary of

\textsuperscript{143} CPR 1452-61, p. 560, 663. They were Sir Thomas Curwen, Sir John Pennington, William Legh, Thomas Broughton, Richard Bewley and Robert Carlyle.

\textsuperscript{144} CPR 1452-61, p. 603.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., pp. 651-52.

\textsuperscript{146} Lists Sheriffs, p. 27; Wedgwood, Biographies, p. 770; F. Parker, “The Development of Inglewood and an Account of the Skeltons of Armathwaite and the Ristwalds of Highead”, in TCWAAS, n.s. vol. 12 (1912), pp. 9, 14-16.
Knaresborough, part of the Duchy of Lancaster of which Warwick was chief steward\(^\text{147}\). Another brother, William, had received a fee of 100s. from the Percies in 1454, but in 1461 he was able to use the family connection and on 17th November he was made a forester of Inglewood\(^\text{148}\).

The problem of assessing the actual strength of the Neville following in Cumberland and Westmorland on the eve of the battle of Towton is complicated by the fact that they won. Men who had managed to avoid becoming involved could have taken the opportunity of the Lancastrian defeat to join the winning side, and even those who had fought and lost felt no dishonour in submitting to the new regime\(^\text{149}\). We can be reasonably sure about the Parrs, Huddleston, Salkeld, Vaux, Delamore, Moresby (although not which one) and, judging from his later appearance on commissions, Sir Richard Musgrave, as well as a handful of others. The mainpernors used to hand out rewards in November 1460 would suggest that generally, however, active Neville support was neither strong nor particularly widespread. They were Robert Colville, John Laton, William Beetham, Richard Salkeld and John Bost, all of whom lived in or around Carlisle (as did Moresby, Vaux, and Delamore), and of these only Colville received a grant\(^\text{150}\). Laton and another man, Edward Thornburgh, had been criticised in the Coventry Parliament for having been retained by “great men” and interfering with sessions of peace and the assize on their behalf\(^\text{151}\). Although Salisbury is not named, Laton had acted as his collector of cornage in Cumberland in the 1450s and went on to serve Warwick, but Thornburgh is otherwise unknown\(^\text{152}\). We cannot be so sure about Hugh


\(^{148}\) CRO D/Lec/29/3; CPR 1461-67 p. 61.


\(^{151}\) Rot. Parl. v, p. 283.

\(^{152}\) CRO D/Lec/28/7, f. 3.
Louther. It is impossible to say which path he would have taken if the result of the battle had been reversed. In March 1461, it must remembered, the Yorkists had little going for them. The Duke of York and the Earl of Salisbury had been killed, and the Earl of Warwick had lost control of Henry VI at the second battle of St. Albans. Although they held the capital, some twenty one of the English nobility were ranged against them and they were outnumbered on the battlefield by three to two. Given the chance, most men would have tried to remain neutral. It is hardly surprising, therefore, to find two men believed to have been Neville supporters, John Denton and John Aglionby, in Carlisle on the eve of the battle using Sir John Pennington, the Lancastrian sheriff, as a witness to a land sale.

Although they won, little is known about who fought for the Yorkists. Warwick was there but he probably raised most of his troops in the midlands and the south, and there is no evidence of anyone from Cumberland or Westmorland fighting on his behalf, although this is not to say that they did not do so. Similar problems arise when trying to assess the strength of Lancastrian support. Only two men from the region are known to have been killed at Towton, Lord Dacre and Thomas Crackenthorpe, but given the level of casualties there must have been others whose names have not survived. Only one hundred and thirteen men were attainted after the battle, and of those only seven can be linked to the region. The bill of attainder, however, was not passed until November 1461, giving men the opportunity to make their peace with the new regime. With the exception of Lord Dacre, who was killed on the battlefield, the names may well be of those who carried on the fight after the battle, either at Cockermouth or Carlisle. Henry Bellingham, who had been knighted by Lord Clifford after the battle of Wakefield, was one of the few men who refused to accept the new regime and remained loyal to Henry VI. He was taken prisoner at the siege of Naworth in 1462 and was


154 CRO D/Ay.1/135, 136, 137.

155 “Annales”, p. 776 also names John Crackenthorpe, but both men of that name are known to have been alive after the battle - Moor, “Crackenthorpe of Newbiggin”, pp. 56, 72-73; CIPM H.VII, ii, 820; Ross, op. cit., for a discussion of casualty figures.

156 W. Metcalfe, Book of Knights Banneret, Knights of the Bath, and Knights Batchelor, etc (1885), p. 2; for most of what follows see J. Lander, Crown and Nobility, 1450-1509 (1976), pp. 133-34.
pardoned, but he fled to join the Lancastrians holding out at Bamburgh. He was attainted again, and was eventually captured when Harlech castle fell in 1468. Pardoned later the same year, he joined Henry VI during the Readeption and on 20th July 1471 a commission was issued to his long-standing rival Sir William Parr to arrest him and twelve others who had fought with the wrong standard\textsuperscript{157}. Re-attainted, nothing more is heard from him until 1483, by which time he had been retained by Sir William, but it was not until after the fall of the House of York that his forfeiture was reversed and his son was able to make entry on his lands\textsuperscript{158}. Sir William Legh of Isell, no more than four miles from Cockermouth, had been granted an annuity of ten marks for life on 26th January 1452, and was the only member of the group of men entrusted with the commission of the peace by the Coventry Parliament to be attainted. He managed to obtain a general pardon on 5th February 1462, but within days he had been implicated in the Earl of Oxford's conspiracy and a reward of £100 was offered for his capture. This was claimed by Robert Skelton of Carlisle by the end of the month and he was executed, probably at Tower Hill, on 1st March\textsuperscript{159}. Robert Bellingham was a kinsman of Sir Henry who had been indicted for rioting in May 1453, but had avoided the confrontation at Heworth. There is no record of him being retained by the Percies, although he was one of those named as being “formerly of Cockermouth”\textsuperscript{160}. Three other men - Thomas Stanley of Carlisle, Gavin Lamplugh and Richard Kirkby - may well have had Percy connections of some kind. Stanley may be a corruption of Stanlawe (the clerk of mines at Cockermouth), the Lamplugh family had a long history of service to the Percies in Cumberland and Kirkby may have been a kinsman of Roland Kirkby named in the 1453 indictments\textsuperscript{161}.

Other men are known to have been slow to come to terms with the new regime, although they were not all attainted. In July 1461 a commission was issued by the triumphant Yorkists ordering the arrest of some dissident members of

\textsuperscript{157} CPR 1467-77, p.288.

\textsuperscript{158} Harl. 433, ii, p. 153; Lander, \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{159} CRO D/Lec/29/3, f.1; PRO E.404/72/1/113; Scofield, \textit{Edward IV}, i, p. 233-4.

\textsuperscript{160} PRO KB.9/149/6/8, 149/11/16.

\textsuperscript{161} CRO D/Lec/29/2, 3; n. 160 above.
the Cockermouth affinity, John Broughton and “Gamaliel” Pennington, probably Sir John the Lancastrian sheriff, and an unknown third, James "Iryell" (possibly Tyrell?). Even including these men, however, only a very small number of the Percy affinity seem to have been involved and some - including Sir Thomas Curwen, Sir Thomas Lamplugh and Henry Swinburne - were quickly being employed by the Yorkists. Again, this is not to say that they were not present at Towton. It would have been perfectly feasible for them to have fought for Henry VI as the legitimate king and, once he had been defeated, to continue in service to the throne, now occupied by Edward IV. Some of them, like Sir John Pennington, may have been employed by the Lancastrians to garrison Carlisle or Cockermouth, but once the new king was established there seems to have been little difficulty in men accepting the practicalities of the situation and giving their allegiance to Edward IV.

The systems of lordship in operation in Cumberland and Westmorland in the decades preceding the Wars of the Roses and the interdependency of the noble affinities were far more complicated than has hitherto been recognised. Salisbury’s affinity as warden of the West March probably included men from the Percy and Neville retinues, but this is not to say that they necessarily preferred his lordship. Certainly before 1453 there is no indication that this was the case and until 1459 there was a remarkable degree of co-operation within local society. If bands of hired troublemakers roamed the countryside they were specific in their targets and did not have the support of the local communities. Law and order within the region was not at the mercy of magnate faction, and the fact that Salisbury’s followers had to resort to intimidation in the county court, situated as it was in Carlisle, shows that he was unable or unwilling to interfere willy-nilly. The major families of both counties were quite reluctant to become involved in the Percy-Neville feud and even in late 1460 very few had committed themselves.

This means that we cannot be sure about the level of support enjoyed by either family at this time. The Nevilles appear to have had the advantage, if only because they had to take a more active interest in the region as wardens, but even so the majority of their active support seems to have come from in and around Carlisle. They were, however, well aware of the importance of consensus politics at the local level and tried to maintain a semblance of balance on local commissions,

\[162\] See below, pp. 94, 98.
as did the Lancastrian government prior to 1459. Unfortunately, we know much less about their rivals, and it is difficult to establish just how effective Percy or Clifford lordship was at this time. Although the absence of evidence is not the same as negative evidence, one can surmise that the activities of the young and inexperienced harmed their cause. Lord Egremont was a deeply unattractive character and he alienated the traditional affinity, at least from himself. The deaths of the second Earl of Northumberland and the eighth Lord Clifford at the first battle of St. Albans, accidental or not, left the families’ fortunes in the hands of two young and aggressive men who, when given the opportunity in December 1459, introduced factionalism into local political society for their own ends.

The most noticeable absentee from this chapter has been the Earl of Warwick, appointed joint warden of the West March with his father in 1453, but this is because he had no interest in being in the region\textsuperscript{163}. He was only named once in relation to the border, as a conservator of the truce signed at Newcastle on 14th August 1451\textsuperscript{164}. He need not have been present at its signing, however, and we have no reason to suppose that he later fulfilled his duties in person. Similarly, he was included on commissions of the peace after he became warden, and even there it is not known whether he actually took part in them\textsuperscript{165}. It was only with his father’s death at the battle of Wakefield that he inherited the wardenship in his own right, and in July 1461 he secured a new appointment for a further ten years\textsuperscript{166}. He became the most dominant nobleman in the region, but at the head of an affinity with whom he had had little or no personal contact. It remains to be seen in the next chapter just how successful he was in maintaining his father’s affinity.

\textsuperscript{163} Rot. Scot., ii, pp. 372-73.

\textsuperscript{164} Foedera, v(ii), p. 37.

\textsuperscript{165} CPR 1452-61, pp. 663, 680.

CHAPTER 2

The Earl of Warwick and the West March, 1461-1471

When the Earl of Warwick inherited his father’s authority in the West March, he was placed at the head of a strong following based in and around Carlisle. During the next decade he was to become the most powerful territorial lord that the region was to see throughout the fifteenth century, with control not just over the March, the honour of Penrith, the Latimer estates and the forest of Inglewood, but also the honour of Cockermouth and, in Westmorland, the forfeited Clifford lands. He was the king’s lieutenant in the north and together with his brother, John Lord Montague, later Earl of Northumberland and Marquis Montague, he headed every major commission and controlled every panel of enquiry throughout Northumberland and Yorkshire as well as Cumberland and Westmorland.

Even after the Nevilles’ deaths in 1471 Richard of Gloucester, the king’s brother, is seen as only having been able to establish himself as lord in the north by marrying into Warwick’s family and assuming the mantle of centuries of Neville lordship.

This analysis of Warwick’s lordship is, on the face of it, very compelling, fitting neatly as it does into our conception of the "over-mighty lord" that he undoubtedly was, but it leaves us with a major dichotomy. The vast liberties in the north of England are seen as having created a strong feudal-based lordship amongst the tenants in which loyalty was focused on the lord of the liberty rather than the crown. The end of the decade marked a return to the political upheavals.


4 Carpenter, Locality and Polity, p. 484.
characteristic of the end of the 1450s and it is hardly surprising that most people sat back to let the major combatants fight things out between themselves. Given the Nevilles' total dominance in the north of England and its major regional and county offices for so many years, however, it is surprising that they were not able to gather more support for their cause in 1471. When Edward IV arrived at Ravenspur he was not supported by the newly re-instated Percy Earl of Northumberland, ostensibly because his affinity still remembered the slaughter of Towton and had not forgiven the Yorkists, but neither was he stopped by the disaffected local gentry. The Marquis of Montague allowed him to advance peacefully by his castle at Pontefract and he may have been planning to support Edward against his brother\(^5\). When the Nevilles faced Edward IV across the heath near Chipping Barnet in April 1471, they were supported by men from the midlands and the south but by few, if any, from their northern affinities\(^6\). This mass desertion from the Neville banner must be reckoned to be one of the key factors in Edward's successful reclamation of the throne, since a large and active northern force could have changed the outcome of his campaign dramatically. This fact was not lost on the author of the "Arrivall", but he was more concerned with the muted antagonism of the Percy affinity in Yorkshire than with the Neville affinity itself. He may have been trying to play down the role it had had as a part of a policy of reconciliation, but its inactivity led to there being hardly a mention of Warwick's northerners in any of the other contemporary chronicles\(^7\). Indeed, Warwick seems to have had difficulty in maintaining the loyalty of those in the county

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\(^5\) M. Weiss, "A Power in the North?", in *Historical Journal* (vol. 19, 1976), pp. 506-7; "The Historie of the Arrivall of King Edward the Fourth", in *Chronicles of the White Rose* (Bohn's Library, 1845), pp. 31-96, at p. 45, n. 12. Although found dead on the field at Barnet, Warkworth reports the rumour that he was killed by one of Warwick's men as he prepared to join Edward's army - "Warkworth's Chronicle", in *ibid.*, p. 145.


from which he took his title, and the “Arrivall” is keen to highlight the role played by the Parrs and the Harringtons, two of the earl’s staunchest supporters in the north-west, in Edward’s triumph. After the battle of Barnet, although the Earl of Oxford and a few northerners fled to Scotland and a rebellion in the north briefly threatened, most men were quick to make their peace with Edward and within three months Richard of Gloucester had been established at Middleham.

Personal inadequacies aside, Warwick’s failure to achieve a greater measure of support in 1471 has been ascribed to his long absences in the north earlier in the decade. Yet it is his failure here, in the heart of the region where he apparently felt most at home, that needs to be explained. If the earl’s authority could be so easily subdued in his two strongholds, Warwick and Middleham, then what of his more peripheral interests? A number of local followers managed to capture and hold Carlisle castle twice, but they were easily subdued on both occasions and there is little to suggest that there were widespread disturbances.

The collapse of his authority caused less upheaval in the region than did the Lancastrian defeat at Towton. While there is a distinction to be made between loyalty to a royal dynasty and to a nobleman, in 1471 Warwick represented the House of Lancaster and any residual support in the far north for Henry VI ought to have been revived, but there seems to have been very little. Henry Bellingham once more led his family against the Yorkists, but he did so in Cumberland. There is no evidence of anyone from the north making their way to join Queen Margaret’s army in the south-west, as did the Lancastrian lords in London. In 1461 Warwick had had the open support of two major local families, the Huddlestons and the Parrs, yet in 1471 he managed to keep neither of them on his side. The Parrs have become famous for their loyalty to Edward, but there is some evidence that the Huddlestons becoming involved with Edward IV despite their close personal ties to the earl. Two of John

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8 Carpenter, Locality and Polity, pp. 512-13; “Arrivall”, p. 46.


10 Carpenter, op. cit., p. 503.


12 CPR 1467-77, p. 266; Ross, op. cit., p. 164.
Huddleston’s sons had married into the Nevilles, one to an illegitimate daughter of Warwick (about as close as a non-nobleman could get) and one to a daughter of Lord Montague. A third son, Thomas, was probably a member of Richard III’s household and killed in the fighting of 1471. The crucial questions, then, concerning Warwick’s time as warden of the West March and undisputed lord of the north, involve not only his lordship and how it was exercised but also with how the locality regarded his rule.

I

Although the eventual extent of Warwick’s lands in Cumberland and Westmorland were without parallel, even by Richard of Gloucester, he did not achieve his dominance there immediately. His first grant was of the office of warden in July 1461, backdated to the first day of Edward IV’s reign, but it was not until April 1462 that he was granted the Clifford lands in Westmorland and it was another three years before he was granted Cockermouth. Though he did not receive letters patent for his appointment as keeper of the forests north of the Trent until 21st November 1466, he had been granted the custody of all offices which had been held by his father on 5th May 1461, and he is named in that office on the account of the forest revenues from 1461-62. There is little to suggest, however, that he was actually physically present in the county in the first year of Edward’s reign. When the siege of Carlisle was raised in July 1461 it was done so by Lord Montague, and in the following year it was Montague again who brought Humphrey Dacre to heel.

In the aftermath of the battle of Towton, the Lancastrian remnants fled to Scotland. Within weeks they were on the offensive and, with their Scottish allies, a small group of them, including Humphrey Dacre, invaded the West March and laid siege to Carlisle. Another group led by the Earl of Wiltshire, who may have fled straight from the battlefield, ensconced themselves in the castle at Cockermouth.

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14 PRO E.101/133/21; CPR 1461-67, pp. 95, 540.

15 Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, ii, p. 446.
The subjugation of these rebellions, as they now were, was left in the hands of local men. Warwick and the king were still in Yorkshire when Richard Salkeld first defeated Wiltshire at Cockermouth and then forced his way into Carlisle to strengthen the castle garrison. By doing so he gave Montague enough time to bring troops over the Pennines to raise the siege. At about the same time, on 10th May, commissions of array were issued in the two counties and these provide the best evidence of whom Warwick saw as being part of his affinity. He and his brother headed both of them, and they were joined in Cumberland by Sir Richard Musgrave, Sir Thomas Parr, John Huddleston, Thomas Middleton of Lonsdale and Richard Salkeld, who was named as the sheriff\(^{16}\). The same men were joined in Westmorland by Sir Ralph Greystoke and Parr’s second son, John, who was also appointed sheriff by June of the following year. Although it is tempting to see this group of men as having supported the Nevilles in battle, it is wise to be cautious. Sir Thomas Parr was reputed to have been killed at Wakefield, but otherwise the men who are known to have been in London in late 1460 are the most probable candidates\(^{17}\). These, however, did not include Musgrave or Middleton. In fact Sir Richard was at least 60 years old, having been knighted in Henry V’s French wars, so all in all it seems unlikely that he took part in the battle\(^{18}\).

As has been seen already, Dacre’s involvement with the Lancastrians may have been the result of his elder brother’s death at Towton, defending the legitimate regime against the usurping Yorkists. After the siege of Carlisle had been lifted he fled back to Scotland before joining Henry VI on a raid into Durham, in which it was hoped to arouse Lancastrian support in the palatinate by showing the king and raising the royal standard. The expedition, however, was a dismal failure and he returned to his castle at Naworth. At about this time he captured and imprisoned a royal serjeant-at-arms for possessing a pedigree showing Edward IV’s “true and verray lynyall descent”, and he remained at liberty until Lord Montague forced his submission in July 1462\(^{19}\). Perhaps his experiences with Henry VI had shown him the

\(^{16}\) CPR 1461-67, p. 561-62, 575.

\(^{17}\) “Annales”, p. 775; See above, p. 71.

\(^{18}\) Complete Peerage, ix, p. 437; Nicolson & Burn, i, pp. 253-54.

folly of continuing to support a king who, whatever his personal qualities, was by this
time incapable of ruling effectively. His surrender was made "under certain
agreements" ("sub certis appunctuamentis") and was followed by a journey to London
to seek the king's pardon at Westminster. The tenor of these "agreements" is
unknown, but Dacre's authority on the borders was vital to the defence of the region
and it is likely that he promised to serve the Crown in return for being allowed to enjoy
his estates. Despite being attainted, in November 1462 he took part in the campaign
against the Northumbrian castles still in Lancastrian hands as Lord Dacre of the
North\textsuperscript{20}. An inquisition made in 1465 found that he had continued to receive the
revenues from his lands from 1463 onwards, and on 21st June 1468 he was granted
a general pardon\textsuperscript{21}.

Dacre's \textit{quid pro quo} was as necessary for him as it was for the
Yorkists. His loyalty to the Lancastrians must have been strained when the Scots
devastated his lands in 1461 despite his presence in their army, but even so he could
afford to remain steadfast to a king without a throne. In 1461 his family was on the
verge of extinction and its titles were in question. His brother had been childless
when killed and Humphrey, the last male heir, was as yet unmarried. He may have
felt honour-bound to avenge his brother's death in some way - the blood-feud was a
strong tradition among the border families - but ultimately his concerns for his estates
which surrounded Carlisle were paramount. These militated against any long-term
resistance and by mid-1462 he was ready to surrender to Montague. His family was
well connected with the Nevilles, Ranulph having been married to Eleanor, the
daughter of Lord Fitzhugh, but in 1462 the lack of an heir and the dispute with his
niece and her husband threatened his inheritance\textsuperscript{22}. However strongly he may have
felt about the Yorkists, his own survival and that of his direct blood-line took
precedence.

The Neville presence in Carlisle and the north-west during the first year
of Edward's reign seems to have depended on Lord Montague. Warwick may have

\textsuperscript{20} Rot. Parl. vi, p. 43; "Annales", \textit{op. cit.}; Gairdner, ed., \textit{Three Fifteenth Century Chronicles}, pp. 157-
58.

\textsuperscript{21} Weiss thesis, pp. 143-44, citing PRO C.145/322; \textit{CPR 1467-77}, p. 90.

\textsuperscript{22} Complete Peerage, iv, p. 18.
visited the city in the late spring of 1462, when a group of men-at-arms were at readiness in York to ride there with him. At about the same time, towards the end of April, he retained three Westmorland men while he was at Middleham. This coincided with a spate of unrest in Westmorland, but he also met the widowed Queen of Scotland, Mary of Guelders, on two occasions, at Dumfries in May and at Carlisle in July. Just how long he spent in the region is unknown, but his army was large enough to do severe damage to the lands around Rose Castle, seat of the Bishops of Carlisle, eight miles south of the city.

As far as Warwick’s duties on the March went, there is only one known commission to him, to redress grievances relating to the truce in the West March on 23rd June 1464, but there is no evidence of him having been in attendance. He was more active in the north-east, however, where Lancastrian resistance continued until 1464. He was appointed to various commissions to treat with the Scots until the end of that year, which were to meet at either York or Newcastle. There is nothing else to suggest that he visited Carlisle after the summer of 1462 and for the most part he employed deputies as his father had done, preferring his brother Lord Montague and, after his promotion to warden of the East March in June 1463 until at least 1466, his brother-in-law Lord Fitzhugh. Even before the Lancastrian threat had been

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24 Three commissions of the peace were issued in the county that year, in March, June and December - *CPR 1461-67*, p. 575.


27 *Foedera*, v(ii), pp. 124-25. The commission was issued on 11th June to meet the Scots at Locmabenstone on the given date. This was the traditional meeting place for march days, when wardens would balance out the “attemptates” made by each side against the other - T. Rae, *The Administration of the Scottish Frontier 1513-1603* (Edinburgh, 1966), p. 50; Summerson, “Early Development”, esp. p. 33.


extinguished at the battle of Hexham, Warwick’s interests were turning to European matters and settling the increasing unrest in Warwickshire, and away from the north. Just how active Warwick was in the north-west is impossible to say, but it is worth noting that in Professor Ross’s account of Lancastrian resistance in the north, the earl is more conspicuous by his absence than by his martial deeds. Indeed, during this early period of Edward IV’s reign the earl earnt himself the reputation of being “governor of the realm” and was at the heart of government, witnessing forty one of the forty six royal charters issued between 1461 and 1466. Since we know that Edward was hardly ever in the north, and never in the north-west, we can safely assume that Warwick spent relatively little time there also. If that is the case, then the counties of Cumberland and Westmorland still needed to be governed and it is the purpose of this chapter to explore the mechanisms by which this was achieved.


As has been seen in Chapter One, the actual extent of the Neville affinity in the region was quite limited, being centred on Carlisle and the honour of Penrith. It was also one which had been created by Warwick’s father, the Earl of Salisbury, and his younger brother, Sir Thomas Neville, both of whom had been killed at or soon after the battle of Wakefield in December 1460. The immediate implications of their deaths for the affinity were not that great, since the pressures on them as Yorkists prevented any leakage to other lords, but in the longer term it meant that a whole new set of relationships had to be developed with their new lord, the Earl of Warwick.

The expectation under normal circumstances was of continuity, with men serving the sons as they had the fathers. The introduction of new talent was accepted within reason, and favouritism, even if not encouraged, was an integral part of every affinity, royal, noble or gentle. The problem for the lord of whatever rank was to find the balance between rewarding talent, friendship and social standing. Even in theory this sounds quite complicated. There was no guarantee that a lord would take to a servant’s son as he had to the father, nor that a new lord would prefer the counsel of wiser heads over younger, and perhaps hotter, blood. The Percy affinity in Cumberland, created by the second Earl of Northumberland, had distanced itself from Lord Egremont in the early 1450s. Likewise the Clifford affinity in Westmorland seems to have begun to favour the more considered lordship of Salisbury than that of John Lord Clifford. This leads to a second important point, that if personal lordship was not a continuous and constant feature, stagnation and decline could set in. The Neville interest in the north-west was by far the most active in the 1450s and they were able to attract support from the more traditional retinues. For the servant, then, there was a large element of luck involved in whether or not they found service to be of benefit. Traditional loyalties could be stale, but moving to a new lord might have depended on personal factors of which we remain ignorant.

For a magnate as great as the Earl of Warwick, with interests in all parts of the country, the difficulties of balancing the contradictory forces within his following increased with the addition of each separate affinity. It is as misleading to talk of the Neville’s “northern” retinue as it is to talk of “the north” as an homogenous region, and

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32 Hicks, Bastard Feudalism, pp. 93-99.
connections between the Yorkshire and Cumberland followings were few and far between. Not only did the balance within each affinity to be maintained, but also did that between the two separate groups. Families such as the Huddlestons, for example, were on a par with the Conyers and possibly even the Fitzhughs, yet their separation from Warwick’s person which came as a natural consequence of his preference for Yorkshire over Cumberland must have had an impact on their overall loyalty.

This disposition towards the counsel of his Middleham affinity can be seen most clearly in the negotiations that took place with the Scots throughout the 1460s. Apart from the commission to redress grievances at Lochmabenstone in June 1464, men from the West March were excluded from any involvement in negotiations with the Scots concerning truces. Although other commissions for the redress of grievances may have existed, those concerning negotiations are probably reasonably complete and they show that the Nevilles paid little attention to the interests of the West March. For example, the commission issued on 5th April 1464 to arrange an extension of the truce signed four months previously was granted to the Bishop of Exeter, George Neville, Warwick, Montague, Lords Greystoke and Ogle, two lawyers (James Goldwell and Thomas Kent), Sir James Strangways, Sir Robert Constable and Roger Thornton. Of these Lord Ogle had been retained at Middleham, and Lord Greystoke, Strangways, Constable and Thornton were all Neville servants from the region around York. There was no representative from the March itself. Later in the year, on 9th October, another commission was issued, this time to treat for a permanent peace with the Scots, with negotiations to take place at Carlisle on November 6th. It was given to Lord Montague, now Earl of Northumberland, Lord Greystoke, Sir Henry Fitzhugh, John Lord Scrope of Bolton, Sir James Strangways and two lawyers, Master Richard Andrew, deacon of York Minster, and Master John Lounede. It is unlikely that the Nevilles had any altruistic intention in excluding men who were too closely involved with cross-border violence, to prevent them from becoming too upset at the prospect of peace. Rather, they were more concerned with ensuring that their own will was obeyed. Lord Ogle was also omitted from the

33 See above, pp. 1-2.


negotiations, and Fitzhugh’s inclusion was probably due to his position at Carlisle. His main interest was in service to Warwick rather than in representing the views of the West March gentry, and their exclusion from any form of representation cannot have been popular\textsuperscript{36}.

Although Warwick did appoint deputies, to what extent even they remained in the north-west is uncertain. Montague, appointed some time in 1461, was responsible for raising the siege of Carlisle in 1461 and ending Humphrey Dacre’s resistance at Naworth in June 1462, but there is no other local evidence to place him at Carlisle. After he had been appointed warden of the East March in June 1463, however, he wrote to his successor, Lord Fitzhugh, asking him to be good lord to John Aglionby, the mayor of Carlisle, and the presence of his coat of arms above the gate of the castle is an indication of his importance to the city\textsuperscript{37}. Fitzhugh is more elusive. In 1466 he was apparently being paid one thousand marks in time of peace and one thousand pounds in time of war, but apart from his appearance on commissions of the peace from 1463 onwards he is conspicuous in the local records only by his absence\textsuperscript{38}. If the details of Fitzhugh’s wages can be relied upon, then clearly Warwick had little interest in the office himself. They were twice as large as those paid to Sir Thomas Neville in 1457 and gave Fitzhugh the opportunity to employ a deputy himself\textsuperscript{39}. The constableship of the castle seems to have been the senior active position which fulfilled the role of the warden and his deputy. In 1463 the office was held by Richard Salkeld, and he may well have continued in office until he was replaced by Sir William Parr in 1470\textsuperscript{40}.

It is possible, of course, that evidence for both Montague and Fitzhugh has not survived but what does remain indicates that everyday control of the shires was in the hands of local men. Arbitration settlements, as has been seen, were easily made by the gentry among themselves if no lord was present but, once one was on

\textsuperscript{36} See \textit{Foedera}, v(ii), pp. 119, 123, 124, 124-25, 127, 131-32, 136, 142 for other commissions.

\textsuperscript{37} CRO D.Ay.1/146, 149; \cite{Summerson}, \textit{Medieval Carlisle}, ii, pp. 461-62.

\textsuperscript{38} \cite{Dugdale}, \textit{Baronage}, i, p. 405; \cite{CPR 1461-67}, pp. 561-62, 575.

\textsuperscript{39} PRO E.327/183; \cite{Madox}, \textit{Formulare Anglicanum}, pp. 102-3.

\textsuperscript{40} \cite{Summerson}, \textit{Medieval Carlisle}, ii, p. 462; \cite{CPR 1467-77}, p. 209.
the scene, they deferred to the senior authority\textsuperscript{41}. Those which have survived from the 1460s, however, make no mention of the deputy wardens when surely their presence, and their closeness to Warwick, would have made them particularly attractive as arbiters. Instead, they show a devolution of authority back to local structures. In March 1465 Sir John Pennington and Sir Thomas Lamplugh relied on men from southern Cumberland to settle their differences, despite Lamplugh being the sheriff. The dispute had arisen over some land belonging to Pennington in Preston in Kendale, which Sir Thomas claimed as his own. He had beaten up Pennington’s tenant and the tenant’s wife, and claimed 33s. from his lands in Cumberland as part of the sheriff’s farm\textsuperscript{42}. Lamplugh, riding his luck as a Yorkist, perhaps, had pressed his claim with vigour. Given the opportunity, he would surely have tried to pick someone who would have supported his position due to the pressures of providing “good lordship”. The arbiters chosen, however, were all men from the Cockermouth region. He may have been banking on his position within the Yorkist administration of the affinity to favour him, but Pennington also had strong ties to it, albeit from before 1461. Who was chosen by which of the antagonists is not known, but they included Dr. Stanlawe, the prior of St. Bees, Sir John Huddleston, Sir William Martindale, Thomas Eglesfield, the parson of Dean, Christopher Curwen, Richard Eglesfield and Robert Lamplugh. The judgement they handed down came out firmly against Sir Thomas. He was ordered to pay compensation to the distressed tenant and to submit to the decision of six of his tenants and six of Pennington’s as to who owned the disputed land. The money he had taken from the Cumberland estates was to be paid to Sir John Huddleston and, if it was found when he made his account to the Exchequer at the end of his term of office that it was not owed as part of the sheriff’s revenues, then Sir John was to hand it to Pennington.

The over-riding impression one receives from this particular dispute is of the central role of Huddleston. He comes across as being fair-minded and concerned for the continued health of local society, even if this meant passing judgement against a fellow Neville adherent and in favour of a known Lancastrian. Where was Fitzhugh in all this? Perhaps Lamplugh thought that Huddleston would have favoured him more, but obviously he did not. One can ask the same question of Fitzhugh in the following year when he was meant to be Warwick’s deputy. In February 1466 there

\textsuperscript{41} See above, pp. 49-50.

\textsuperscript{42} CRO D/Pen/47/22.
was a small rising near Millom involving Roland Kirkby, and a couple of Penningtons and on this occasion those sent to subdue it were Sir John Huddleston and his son Richard, Sir William Parr, William Harrington and Roland Thornburgh. Although Fitzhugh was given the power to redress grievances of the truce at Lochmabenstone in June 1464, and named on the commission to treat with the Scots at Carlisle for a permanent peace in October, there is nothing beyond the end of that year to link him to the north-west. The only other time he took part in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy was in October 1466 when Warwick was named for the last time on a commission to redress grievances at Newcastle, and soon after he was given a licence to go on pilgrimage to Jerusalem. If Fitzhugh did spend any time at Carlisle because of his office, it seems that such visits were rare and made little impact on the local community. The governance of the shires was left in the hands of the local gentry.

The best way to see who the Nevilles relied upon in Cumberland and Westmorland in the 1460s is to examine the commissions and officers who were appointed in the two counties. Given Warwick’s complete dominance in the region, and the collapse of Percy and Clifford authority, it is reasonable to assume that such appointments, although made by the crown, had his stamp of approval. As has been seen, in the 1450s the Earl of Salisbury had been careful to maintain some sort of balance between the various affinities in the counties, even when he was in a position to wipe out any Percy or Clifford influence, but the violence of 1459-61 had polarised attitudes within the aristocracy and this in turn was reflected in shire appointments. Warwick never seems to have developed the same spirit of reconciliation as Edward IV did, and from 1461 onwards he ensured that his own men were virtually unchallenged. The commission of array, in May 1461, was appointed before either Warwick and Montague had visited the region and had had the chance to assess the actual level of Lancastrian resistance. It was, therefore, a reflection of the men in whom they had the most trust. In fact, apart from the occupation of Cockermouth

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43 CPR 1461-67, p. 492; see above, p. 87.

44 Foedera, v(ii), pp. 124-25, 127.


46 See above, pp. 56ff.

47 See above, p. 80.
and the siege of Carlisle, Lancastrian sympathy was very subdued, almost non-existent. In late May “Gamaliel” Pennington, Thomas Broughton and the unknown James “Iryell” were making trouble in Furness Fells, and Sir Thomas Parr, John Huddleston and others were dispatched on June 6th to bring them before the king in Chancery\(^48\). The subsequent commissions of the peace, named in Cumberland on 10th September and 8th December and in Westmorland on 20th November, were equally one-sided. We have here, perhaps, a reason for the failure of Warwick’s lordship in the far north. Whereas his father had always sought to balance the commissions of the peace, even in the later 1450s, those appointed in the 1460s were dominated by Yorkists. In Cumberland, the first commission included John Huddleston, now knighted, Richard Salkeld, Nicholas Ridley, Robert Carlile, Hugh Louther, Robert Warcop senior and Richard Musgrave junior. Of these Ridley is unknown and Carlile, although a Percy retainer appointed to the December 1459 commission by the Coventry Parliament, was a time-serving lawyer\(^49\). The odd one out is Sir Thomas Curwen, another Percy man, but one who obviously did not support his lord’s political affiliations. Apart from being included so early on in the commissions, he also took part in the campaign against the Northumbrian castles in June 1462\(^50\). All of the others had some Neville links. In Westmorland, similarly, the commission was dominated by Sir Richard Musgrave the elder, Sir Thomas Parr and his son, Sir William. With them were John Crackenthorpe of Holgill, a Clifford man in the 1450s, Thomas Batty and Robert Duket. Batty was probably a Parr retainer, since in December 1461 he was made a forester of Whinfell under John Parr, but he is otherwise unknown\(^51\). He continued to serve on commissions in Westmorland on and off until 1483, but Duket had disappeared by the time the next commission was appointed in December 1461. He came from the family of Greyrigg in Lonsdale which served the lords of Middleham, but that small group of Lonsdale families, which

\(^48\) CPR 1461-67, p. 34. The other commissioners were Sir Edward Beetham, Walter Strickland, Nicholas and James Layburn of Cunswick and William Harrington.

\(^49\) CRO D/Lec/29/3; see above, p. 58.

\(^50\) CRO D/Lec/29/3; Gairdner, ed., Three Fifteenth Century Chronicles, pp. 157-58.

\(^51\) CPR 1461-67, p. 86.
included the Middletons, Harringtons and Tunstalls, made little impact on political life in Cumberland or Westmorland\textsuperscript{52}.

Duket was not the only change made in late 1461. Sir Thomas Parr had died and Batty was also dropped, to be replaced by Robert Warcop senior, Ralph Blenkinsop, Thomas Spence and Nicholas Taverner. The first two of these were probably close to Warwick, since within months two of their kinsmen had been retained by him\textsuperscript{53}; of the latter two, nothing is known. Thomas Batty reappeared on the commission in March 1463 and this group remained until January 1471. The only other significant change was the addition of Sir Henry, later Lord Fitzhugh in December 1463, who had replaced Montague as constable of Carlisle in July of that year\textsuperscript{54}. The Cumberland commission remained equally static, with Fitzhugh and Richard Bewley, another lawyer, being added in 1463.

With the exception of Curwen, the old Percy affinity was completely excluded from public office. Both Robert Carlyle and Richard Bewley had received fees as magistrates or clerks of Westward forest, but they were professional lawyers and their loyalty to the Percies cannot be presumed. The shrievalty of Cumberland and the escheatorship of the two counties, which before 1460 had been divided between the various affinities, became the exclusive preserve of Warwick’s servants. Of the ten appointments between March 1461 and November 1470, the last year of Warwick’s influence, only five men held the office of sheriff in Cumberland - Richard Salkeld (March 1461, 1465, 1470), Roland Vaux (November 1461, 1462, 1466), Sir John Huddleston (1463, 1468), Sir Thomas Lamplugh (1464) and Sir William Legh (1469). No sheriff accounted for 1467, and John Appleby, Warwick’s receiver, was given a pardon exempting him from the task\textsuperscript{55}. Of the men who held office, Salkeld, Vaux and Huddleston are well known as Neville servants but Lamplugh and Legh came from families more closely associated with the Percies. However, they were also part of the Huddleston affinity and their appointment to office was probably due to him. Lamplugh had been appointed as master forester of Eskdale and Wasdale at


\textsuperscript{53} PRO E.327/185, also printed in Madox, \textit{Formulare Anglicanum}, pp. 104-5; PRO E.326/B.6415, also printed in Jones and Walker, eds., “Private Indentures”, pp. 169-70.

\textsuperscript{54} See above, p. 87.

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Lists Sheriffs}, p. 27.
the same time as Huddleston was made lieutenant of Cockermouth in 1461, and Legh was to become his son-in-law. In Westmorland the shrievalty belonged to the Cliffords but, due to the attainder of John Lord Clifford in November 1461, the office reverted to the crown. In June 1462 it was granted to John Parr for life yet, on April 11th 1465, at the same time as he extended his control to include the honour of Cockermouth, it was granted to Warwick. Only one of his deputies is known, Ralph Blenkinsop in 1467, and at Michaelmas 1470, after Warwick’s forfeiture, it was granted back to Parr.

The escheatorship, which covered both counties and which should have been representative of both, was likewise kept exclusively in Neville hands. John Huddleston, appointed in November 1460, may have continued until November 1464; he was succeeded by Christopher Moresby junior, who in turn was replaced by Robert Colville (1465) and William Botham (1466). Botham is unknown, but Colville was the second son of Isabel, heiress of Piers Tilliol, who had held the lordship of Scaleby in chief, and he had stood mainprise for Sir Thomas Neville in November 1460. In 1467 came the only known Westmorland appointment, Alexander Musgrave, and from then on the Huddlestons dominated again with the appointments of Sir John’s second son, also John, Sir William Legh’s son, Thomas, and in November 1470 John Huddleston junior for a second time.

The officers reflect not just the total Neville dominance of the two posts but, within their affinity, the superiority of Sir John Huddleston. The shrievalty of Cumberland did not extend over his lands, nor those of Cockermouth which he controlled, so it is somewhat surprising to find him having such a hold over it. Of the nine known appointments four were from the Huddleston bloc and five came from the


57 CPR 1461-67, p. 434.

58 Lists Sheriffs, p. 151.

59 Lists Escheators, p. 27.

60 R. Ferguson, ed., Denton’s Accompmt, pp. 154-55; CFR 1452-61, p. 289. His claim to the lordship came second to that of the Moresbies.
Carlisle connection of Salkeld and Vaux. The escheatorship was more open but, considering that it was meant to be representative of both counties, there were very few appointments from Westmorland. The Huddleston connection again dominated this office, holding it seven times, with Moresby, Colville and probably Botham coming from the Carlisle affinity and only Alexander Musgrave coming from Westmorland. Warwick’s new lands had virtually no representation in public appointments during his decade in control of the region, and it seems that maintaining a balance between the various interests in the March was not uppermost in his mind.

III

The man who stands out as being the most important of Warwick’s local retainers in Cumberland in the 1460s is Sir John Huddleston. Probably involved in the battles of the early part of the year, he was knighted between July and November 1461 and served as a JP, sheriff and escheator throughout the decade. His most important role in county affairs, however, was as the Yorkist-appointed lieutenant of the honour of Cockermouth. The estates had been forfeited after Edward IV’s victory at Towton and, although the necessary Act of Attainder, dated November 4th, was not passed by Parliament until 21st December, he was acting as if they were crown property by the beginning of August. On the 3rd of the month he appointed Henry Thwaytes as receiver-general of all the Percy lands, and on the same day he made a grant of £200 from the Yorkshire estates to Eleanor, the Earl’s widow, until her dower was arranged properly. Thwaytes had been the receiver of the Yorkshire estates since the 1450s and had proved to be a useful addition to the Percy’s household staff. Generally reckoned to be a Lancastrian because of his links to the earls of Northumberland he was, rather, a bureaucratic administrator with little

61 Moresby also held some land in the south of Westmorland - Ragg, “Appendix”, pp. 339; idem, “Feoffees of the Cliffords From 1283 to 1482”, in TCWAAS, n.s. vol. 8 (1908), pp. 309, 329.

62 Scofield, Edward IV, i, p. 227.

63 CPR 1461-67 pp. 26, 42.
interest in national politics, who was able to make the change to serving his new masters with ease\textsuperscript{64}. Despite Edward IV’s swiftness in making use of the Percy estates, he had yet to develop the contempt for Parliamentary procedure which marked the second period of his reign. It was not until he was sure that the Act of Attainder was to be passed that he began to treat the honour as personal property, rather than as if he were a temporary custodian. Sir John Huddleston may have been ordered to hold the castle of Cockermouth after it was captured from the Earl of Wiltshire, but letters patent making him lieutenant of the honour were not issued until the Act of Attainder had been accepted. On 20th December John Hewyk was appointed as auditor of the Percy estates in the King’s hands, and in the next three days a further three grants relating specifically to the honour were made. Henry Swinburne was made bailiff of Allerdale, Sir John Huddleston lieutenant of the honour and constable of the castle, and Sir Thomas Lamplugh was appointed master forester and steward of Eskdale and Wasdalehead\textsuperscript{65}.

Hewyk was another financial administrator linked to the Percies in Yorkshire in the 1450s. In December 1459 he was one of those commissioned to enquire into the forfeited possessions of the Duke of York, the Earl of Salisbury and other rebels in the county, and was appointed as a JP. Like Thwaytes he was easily able to make the transition from Lancastrian to Yorkist and by 1465 he had become Warwick’s chaplain at Middleham\textsuperscript{66}. Each of the Cockermouth grants was made for life, indicating perhaps (as in Huddleston’s case) service to the Yorkist cause earlier in the year. There has to be a suspicion that although they came from the crown they were made at Warwick’s request but, apart from Huddleston, this is unlikely to have been the case. Thwaytes and Hewyk were employed for their knowledge and expertise, but Warwick did not easily forgive his enemies or their servants and may well have been reticent about employing them. Huddleston’s appointment was the crucial one at Cockermouth, but the other two were relatively minor figures who came from families that had, and were to continue to have, a tradition of service to the Percies. William Lamplugh had been the prepositor of

\textsuperscript{64} Bean, Estates, pp. 100-2, 134n.

\textsuperscript{65} CPR 1461-67 pp. 87, 105, 149.

\textsuperscript{66} CPR 1452-61, pp. 564, 683; PRO SC.6/1050/20.
Cockermouth in 1442 and John Lamplugh had been retained for a fee of ten marks in the same year. Henry Swinburne had acted as receiver of the honour in 1454. Any connection they might have had with Warwick is impossible to prove, but both were close to Huddleston. Lamplugh was married to another of Sir Henry Fenwick’s daughters and in 1456 Huddleston’s sister had married a Robert Swinburne from Northumberland. It is not known what fees they received in 1461, but in 1485 Swinburne was still bailiff of Allerdale and was being paid 60s.8d., and a John Lamplugh, possibly Sir Thomas’s son, was receiving £11 for the same offices in Eskdale and Wasdale. Huddleston’s fee was the same as that paid to the Percy servants, £20 for the lieutenancy and £10 for the constableship.

In effect, Huddleston was being given overall responsibility for the whole honour and with it the task of placating a potentially powerful group of enemies. In the months after his usurpation Edward IV followed a policy of reconciliation towards the defeated Lancastrians, with varying degrees of success, and Huddleston was charged with implementing this course of action in a strategically vital area. A rebellion in this part of the county, supported by the Lancastrians still active in Scotland, could have destabilised the whole of the north-west. If the failure of the affinity to support the siege of Carlisle in May and June 1461 speaks volumes about it’s collective lack of commitment to the Lancastrian cause, its continued pacifism was not to be expected and Huddleston was probably ordered to garrison the castle from an early stage. It is not until December 14th, however, that letters patent were issued to Henry Thwaytes ordering him to pay Sir John sufficient money for a garrison of eighty men from the issues of the honour. Thwaytes accordingly travelled to the north-west and, on December 27th, paid Sir John over £205.

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67 CRO D/Lec/29/2, 29/3.


69 CRO D/Lec/29/8.

70 CRO D/Lec/29/2, 29/3; CPR 1461-67, p. 87..

71 Ross, Edward IV, pp. 47, 50, 51-2, 58, 62.

72 PRO SC.6/1121/11.
We can only guess at the methods that Huddleston used to pacify the Cockermouth affinity since the only extant receiver’s account, made by Thwaytes for the year 1461-62, makes no mention of any fees being paid, either ordinary or extraordinary. Indentures of retainer were between particular individuals and their lord and came to an end with the death of either, so the old Cockermouth affinity, although still a vibrant social unit, in theory disappeared the moment that the third earl was killed at Towton. However, it seems likely that Thwaytes was using the traditional practice of Yorkshire. In that county, the wide dispersal of estates meant that fees were recorded in bailiff’s accounts, rather than those of the receiver as they were in Cumberland.

There is no evidence regarding Huddleston’s position as lieutenant of Cockermouth after the honour had been granted to Warwick, but there is no reason to suppose that it was changed. He was still a central figure in shire administration and in maintaining local cohesion, and by 1466 two of his sons had married daughters of Warwick and Montague. He had taken over from Sir Thomas Neville as the steward of Bolton-in-Allerdale in 1461 and in January 1470 he once again arbitrated in a dispute between two Carlisle men, John Denton and Robert Brisco, which had come to blows. Huddleston, it seems, had become the senior Neville figure in the county by this time but his interests were not so much the promotion of Neville lordship but the maintenance of local stability. It must be remembered that he was the lord of his own liberty too, which was surrounded by Percy manors. It was in his interests to heal divisions within the community, not to increase them by excluding the Percy affinity from involvement in government, law and order and defence of the border. This may well be one reason why he was hesitant about becoming involved in Warwick’s rebellion of 1471. Nothing is known of Sir John’s activities, but other members of his family were involved on Edward IV’s behalf. Initially his two youngest sons, William and Thomas, were proscribed in April 1470 for supporting Warwick, but Sir John himself was pardoned on May 4th. Twelve

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73 As for n. above.

74 Bean, Estates, pp. 86-87.

75 CRO D/Lons/D.64; CRO D/Lec/28/27, 28/28; see above, pp. 79-79, 88-89.

76 CPR 1467-77, pp. 208, 218-19.
months later his sons were apparently fighting for Edward, and Thomas was probably killed at either Barnet or Tewkesbury fighting with Richard of Gloucester. Although included in the Readeption government's commission of the peace in February 1471, Huddleston himself probably avoided the fighting. In May 1472 he was rewarded for his loyalty to the crown with a grant of the king's moiety of the barony of Egremont, in compensation for his loss of office at Cockermouth.

Warwick’s control of the honour seems to have made little impact on the Cockermouth affinity itself. Although it had lost its leadership there is no evidence of any individual being retained by Warwick during this period. Again, this could be due to the lack of surviving material but his refusal to allow it any role in county affairs indicates otherwise. Either he felt that he had no need of their services or else they felt that he had nothing to offer. Employment prospects in the offices of the West March were limited, and for a man to blatantly seek out the dominant lord might well have been regarded as impolitic to say the least. There were, however, occasions for military service which again show a lack of sympathy for the Lancastrians by the Cockermouth men. Late in 1462 Edward had to arrange for an expedition to the north-east after the castles of Alnwick, Bamburgh and Dunstanburgh opened their gates to Margaret after her return from France. He left London on 3rd November and by the 6th of the month letters patent were on their way to Warwick to raise the king's standard in the north, to resist the enemies of France and Scotland who were disturbing the "tranquillity" of the realm. On short notice Edward managed to summon "almost the entire nobility of England", comprising two dukes, seven earls, thirty one barons and fifty nine knights. Included in this number were Lord Dacre of the North, John Huddleston, John Crackenthorpe, Sir Richard Duket, Thomas Lamplugh, Sir Thomas Curwen and his son Christopher. Dacre had been captured when his castle of Naworth had fallen that summer, and John Crackenthorpe and Richard Duket were from Westmorland. Lamplugh and Huddleston had benefited from the King's generosity, and Sir

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77 In 1477 he was mentioned in the duke’s endowment of Queen's College, Cambridge, as being one of his “servanders and lovers” - Ross, “Servants and Lovers”, pp. 2-4.

78 CPR 1467-77, p. 312, 610.

79 Scofield, Edward IV, i, p. 262; CPR 1461-67, p. 231; Ross, Edward IV, p. 50.

Thomas Curwen had been included in the first commission of the peace in the county. Despite this obvious sympathy for the Yorkists, Curwen failed to attract any more patronage from them. In late 1471 he petitioned the king for his son to be granted the portership of Carlisle on account of his own long and loyal service, but it was refused\textsuperscript{81}.

Huddleston’s role as governor of the Percy estates was shared from 26th February 1462 with Richard Salkeld. He was granted the rule of the Percy estates between the Derwent and Caldew (i.e., between Cockermouth and Carlisle) for his role in ending the siege of Carlisle, provided he answered to the Exchequer for any surplus over £200\textsuperscript{82}. He did not, however, have the same local presence as Huddleston enjoyed and it may have been for this reason that he struggled to keep up with his payments. A warrant for his arrest was issued to the sheriff of Westmorland on March 14th 1464, and a writ was issued from the Exchequer ordering the distraint of all of his lands because he had failed to render account for the possessions of the Earl of Northumberland\textsuperscript{83}.

Salkeld was a Neville retainer rather than a Yorkist, and possibly the Earl of Warwick’s possession of the honour was designed to protect him from further prosecution. On April 11th 1465 he secured a grant of the Percy and Clifford estates in the north-west including Cockermouth (as well as the shrievalty of Westmorland for life) provided he continued to render £100 to Salkeld and his heirs male\textsuperscript{84}. This cut the value of Salkeld’s original reward in half, but on 15th July he was recompensed when he was granted eight manors (worth £145.\textsuperscript{-.}1d. in 1454) for £20 p.a. and pardoned of all issues received by him from the grant of 1462, an

\textsuperscript{81} CRO D/Cu/1/1; Ragg, “De Culwen”, pp. 423-25; the office went to Roland Thornburgh instead - CPR 1467-77, p. 264.

\textsuperscript{82} CPR 1461-67, p.106; there were 20 manors in his grant, worth £223.6s.\textsuperscript{1}d. in 1454 - D/Lec/29/3; to put the grant into perspective, at the end of his life, including his wife’s inheritance, he held estates worth £71.16s.2d. - CRO D/HC/2/1/21.

\textsuperscript{83} CPR 1461-67, pp. 346; PRO E.199/7/39/1.

\textsuperscript{84} CPR 1461-67, pp. 434-35.
improvement of some £25 p.a.\textsuperscript{85}. It seems that Salkeld was out of favour with Edward IV, and on 23rd July 1467 his grant was reduced to five manors, worth £100.9s.11\frac{1}{2}d., returning his total income to the original £200 mark\textsuperscript{86}. Although he may have fallen from the king’s grace, Warwick, it seems, was still keen to provide him with good lordship. On June 15th 1468, at a time when no sheriff was active, Salkeld was granted £170 for his great costs and charges in having had to ransom himself from the Scots, as well as being the late sheriff in 1465-66\textsuperscript{87}. It is quite probable that Salkeld’s failure to make proper account of the Percy estates had turned the king against him, and only Warwick’s intervention enabled him to recover the costs of service.

In a final twist before the reinstatement of the 4th Earl of Northumberland, on 22nd February 1469 Warwick received an exemption from the £100 due to Salkeld, as well as the three remaining manors from the grant of July 1465 and a reversion of Salkeld’s grant of July 1467\textsuperscript{88}. One cannot assume that this was necessarily Warwick’s doing. Although such grants often came as the result of petitions, it is equally possible that Edward was fed up with subsidising Warwick’s lordship of Salkeld and, with the rift between him and the Nevilles growing, decided to bring it to an end. Certainly Salkeld’s actions during the Reademption show no indication of disaffection with his lord. He served Warwick as the constable of the city and castle of Carlisle and in the summer of 1470 he held them against the king’s wishes. His resistance, however, seems to have been non-violent. The citizens of Carlisle easily subdued his forces and on July 4th were rewarded £20 by Edward for reducing the castle, and Sir William Parr was appointed its constable\textsuperscript{89}. The rebellion, however, along with that of Lord Fitzhugh in Yorkshire, had had the desired effect of distracting the king in the north while the

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., pp. 460-1, 466; CRO D/Lec/29/3. There were two manors of Caldbeck - Upperton and Underfell - worth £14.17s.10d. and £19.5s.7d. respectively.

\textsuperscript{86} CRO D/Lec/29/3; CPR 1467-77, p. 25. This particular grant seems to be out of place, and may have been misdated for 1462.

\textsuperscript{87} PRO E.404/74/1/38.

\textsuperscript{88} CPR 1467-77, p. 136.

\textsuperscript{89} PRO E.404/75/3/56; CPR 1467-77, pp. 209.
Earl of Warwick and the Duke of Clarence landed in Cornwall, and Edward was forced to flee the country. In September, with Warwick in control of Henry VI, Salkeld and eighty others from Carlisle and its environs received a pardon, and he was given back his office\(^90\). After Edward’s flight he held it for the Readeption government but, following the Yorkists’ victories at Barnet and Tewkesbury, all resistance in the north crumbled and he quickly submitted, receiving a second pardon in July 1471\(^91\).

Although Salkeld’s second “rebellion” had gone no further than the temporary occupation of the castle, until Sir William Parr came to replace him again, other men were less willing to forsake their allegiance to the Nevilles even if it led them into treason. At the same time as Salkeld received his first pardon William, Joan and Nicholas Musgrave and eight others, all of Edenhall, and two men from Carlisle were also restored to the king’s grace\(^92\). Sir Richard Musgrave had been less active under Warwick than under Salisbury, but his grandson and heir, Richard (III), received the benefits of having attached himself to the Nevilles in 1456. William and Nicholas were his two brothers. Initially their grandfather was probably given a similar role on the Clifford estates in Westmorland as Sir Richard Huddleston had been at Cockermouth, but on not quite such a large scale. In February 1462 he was appointed as constable and bailiff of the attainted Clifford castle of Pendragon and the lordships of Brougham and Kirkby Stephen for a fee of £10, three months before they were granted to Warwick, and he served on the commissions of array and the peace in both Cumberland and Westmorland in 1461 and 1463\(^93\). As with Huddleston, he was an ideal candidate to heal the divisions caused by the defeat of the Lancastrians. His mother and grandmother were the daughter and sister of the 8th Lord Clifford, and the Musgraves had held lands in the Eden valley from them since at least 1283\(^94\). His family was related by marriage to the Thornburghs, Crackenthorpes, Lancasters, Sandfords and Warcops and he may also have held

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\(^90\) Ibid., pp. 214-15.

\(^91\) “Arrivall”, pp. 84-85; CPR 1467-77, p. 277.

\(^92\) Ibid., p. 215.

\(^93\) CPR 1461-67, pp. 66, 74, 143, 189, 280, 562.

\(^94\) Complete Peerage, ix, pp. 437-38; Ragg, "Feoffees", p. 304.
lands from the Parrs. He had the personal connections, the political authority, the reputation and above all the trust of the locality, all the right ingredients for repairing the fabric of local society. However, Sir Richard died in 1464 and it seems that his grandson continued in the same role, as he began to appear on commissions regularly from that year. His importance lay in the pivotal role he enjoyed in local society, so much so that despite his political affiliations he was regarded as indispensable by Edward IV after the Readeption. On July 20th 1471, two days before Salkeld received his second pardon, a commission was issued to Sir William Parr, Sir John Parr, Sir Thomas Strickland and Sir Christopher Moresby to arrest and bring before the king and council Musgrave’s mother and his three younger sons, William, Nicholas and John, as well as Sir Lancelot Threlkeld, Thomas Sandford, Thomas Skelton of Branthwaite, William Lancaster and four Bellinghams, all of whom had suffered forfeiture. Musgrave himself was excluded because Edward IV could ill afford to alienate any further elements of local society at this time. Although he had successfully defended his crown he had been shaken by the treachery of his closest ally and of his own brother. In the early days after the battle of Tewkesbury he was still unsure as to how deep the rot had penetrated. By targeting the rest of his family he left Musgrave under no illusion as to what might happen to him if he continued to give undue preference to his old lord, but at the same time it gave him the opportunity to prove his loyalty to his king.

The commission is the only evidence we have of the mixing of Neville supporters with Lancastrian remnants. The Bellinghams, led by Henry, were still staunch supporters of Henry VI. His loyalty to the Lancastrian dynasty may have been commendable, but it brought him and his family years of hardship. However, he can be regarded as being lucky not to have been involved in the battle of Tewkesbury, which might well have cost him his life. Edward IV, although generous to his enemies who claimed loyalty to the previous dynasty as their motivation for rebellion, was only prepared to give such men one chance and


96 CPR 1467-77, p. 288.

Bellingham had already had two. A number of them, who had been pardoned and had subsequently returned to Lancastrian service, were executed after the battle\textsuperscript{98}.

Sir Lancelot Threlkeld of Yanwath, who was the son of the Sir Henry Threlkeld retained by Salisbury in 1431, might have been expected to carry on his father’s loyalties, but he preferred service to the Cliffords. He had been on bad terms with his father and quarrelled with his mother over her dower rights in the 1450s. His immediate lord was Lord Greystoke who held Yanwath from the Cliffords, but he did not enter his service\textsuperscript{99}. Rather, he seems to preferred to be in Skipton, where he was in the fortunate position (for him, at least) of being in the company of Margaret, the young wife of John Lord Clifford and heiress of Lord Vescy, when she was widowed in March 1461. By the end of the year they were married\textsuperscript{100}. Margaret, his second wife, was no more than seventeen years old at the time and one suspects that her circumstances could best be described as tragic. Despite elevating his social position he does not seem to have benefited a great deal from the marriage. Margaret must have been able to claim some of her previous husband’s lands in dower, but the rest of the estates were granted to Warwick in 1462 and Threlkeld seems to have played little part in their governance, either in Westmorland or Craven. In June 1463 he was commissioned to array the men of Westmorland in response to risings in the county in support of Henry VI, but he does not appear again until the Readeption, when he was appointed as a JP\textsuperscript{101}. The only evidence of his existence in the 1460s is the marriage contract he signed with the Louthers in 1468, which was obviously influenced by his contacts at Skipton and may have been the result of some sort of feud, but just what that might have been is impossible to say\textsuperscript{102}.

Of the other men named in the commission, only Thomas Sandford can be linked with Warwick. In April 1462, at about the same time as he was granted the Clifford lands in Westmorland, the earl had retained a group of at least

\textsuperscript{98} Ross, \textit{Edward IV}, p. 172.


\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Complete Peerage}, iii, p. 294.

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Foedera} v(ii), pp. 114-15; \textit{CPR 1461-67}, p. 280; \textit{CPR 1467-77}, p. 610.

\textsuperscript{102} See above, p.25.
three men, including Sandford, in an effort to extend his following in the region. All of their families were Clifford tenants and none can be positively linked with the earl before this. Sandford came from Askham in the north of the county, near Penrith, as did Christopher Lancaster, but Thomas Blenkinsop was from Helbeck near Brough and Robert Warcop was from Smardale. Warwick’s receiver in Westmorland, Thomas Warcop, must have been retained beforehand and he was ordered to pay the men their fees of five marks each from the issues of the county. Lancaster was the son of Hugh Lancaster of Sockbridge, the brother and heir of William, and was married to a sister of Richard (III) Musgrave. On 25th March 1471, eleven days after Edward IV landed at Ravenspur, he was involved in a minor dispute with Sandford over some land in nearby Ellerbeck which went to arbitration. One of the arbitrators named was a William Lancaster who later joined Sandford in rebellion, but the last rebel, Thomas Skelton, is unknown.

Despite being retained by Warwick, Christopher Lancaster managed to avoid becoming embroiled in the Readeption crisis. Of the others, Blenkinsop also kept his head down and Warcop had died in 1467. A fifth local retainer, Thomas Hutton of Hutton John, also avoided the troubles. Sandford’s inclusion amongst the rebels, therefore, needs some further explanation. He was closely associated with the Neville administration, but always at a minor level and, although his family’s records are among the fullest of any for this period, he made little impression on county affairs. His only office came in 1464, when he was appointed

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106 CRO D/Lons/AS.67.

107 CPR 1467-77, p. 13.

by Sir John Huddleston as his deputy escheator of the land in Cumberland between
the rivers Eamont and Louther\textsuperscript{109}. In the following year he was able to call on the
four central figures of Warwick’s administration in the region, Huddleston, Sir
Thomas Lamplugh, Richard Musgrave junior and Sir William Parr, to act as his
arbitrators in his dispute with John Salkeld of Rosgill\textsuperscript{110}. His close association with
these figures could have pulled him either way in 1470, but along with Christopher
Lancaster he had married one of the sisters of Richard Musgrave and he obviously
felt closest to his wife’s family\textsuperscript{111}.

The Parrs of Kendal, who had supported the Nevilles so loyally in the
1450s, were (along with the Harringtons) the most surprising of Edward IV’s allies in
1471, so much so that they received special mention by the author of the
“Arrivall”\textsuperscript{112}. The relationship between Parr and Neville, however, had been centred
on Sir Thomas Parr and the Earl of Salisbury, and by the end of 1461 both of them
were dead. Thomas’s eldest son, William, inherited the family estates and lordship
in the barony of Kendale but his second, John, entered crown service. Sir William
obviously benefited from Warwick’s patronage, but perhaps not to the extent that
has been supposed. He sat on all commissions of the peace in Westmorland
between 1461 and 1470, and in February 1462 he was appointed to arrest all those
inciting rebellion in the border counties along with Sir John Huddleston, Sir Richard
Musgrave, Richard Salkeld, Roland Vaux and his brother, John\textsuperscript{113}. In June 1463 he
was appointed to the commission of array in Westmorland which was loaded with
Warwick’s supporters\textsuperscript{114}. Although he was involved with Warwick in redressing
grievances against the Scots in 1464 he was, like the rest of the West March, kept out
of any negotiations for a truce, even when they were to be held at Carlisle\textsuperscript{115}. In July

\textsuperscript{109} CRO D/Lons/AS.60.

\textsuperscript{110} CRO D/Lons/AS.61.


\textsuperscript{112} “Arrivall”, pp. 45-46.

\textsuperscript{113} CPR 1461-67, pp. 132, 575; CPR 1467-77, p. 634

\textsuperscript{114} CPR 1461-67, pp. 280.

\textsuperscript{115} See above, p. 86.
1468 he used the Earl as a feoffee, a sign of his recognition of Warwick’s power, however, rather than one of favour. In July 1469 he may have fought at the battle of Edgecote with Robin of Redesdale, but the only chronicle to place him there, Waurin, confuses the battle with Tewkesbury\textsuperscript{116}.

Warwick’s capture of Edward IV in July 1469 gave him control of the country, a time he used to exact personal revenge on his enemies. His regime, however, lacked any sense of legitimacy and by October 1469 Edward once more had the upper hand\textsuperscript{117}. Early in 1470 Warwick and Clarence tried to distract Edward with a rebellion in Lincolnshire, and by this time Parr was in their camp. He was used by the earl in his negotiations with the king, but his brother easily persuaded him of the hopelessness of the rebels’ position and he switched his allegiance\textsuperscript{118}. John Parr had been a squire of the king’s body since November 1461, and he may have been part of Richard of Gloucester’s household\textsuperscript{119}. This gave Sir William another option than service to a man who, although powerful, was not his natural lord. He joined the royal forces before Warwick fled to France and in May 1470, having received a pardon as part of the general amnesty to the earl’s followers, he was appointed as constable of Carlisle\textsuperscript{120}.

Apart from his inclusion on the commissions in Westmorland there is relatively little to link Sir William directly to Warwick in terms of service. His marriage to Thomas Colt’s widow was probably the result of his connections to Middleham and at some point he served as Warwick’s constable of Carlisle, but this may have been in late 1470 after the Readeption\textsuperscript{121}. This would have been entirely


\textsuperscript{121} Wedgwood, Biographies, p. 208-9; PRO DL.29/648/10485. In 1474 he was still owed £10 as part of his wages.
consistent with the local principle of loyalty to the monarchy, rather than to the individual monarch. Most of the family’s patronage, however, seems to come as a result of John’s links with the crown. The two brothers seem to have been very close and were often granted patronage jointly, but the largest grant that they received in the 1460s - the forfeited Bellingham lands, worth £100 p.a., in February 1463 - were in the crown’s gift and cannot be linked to Warwick at all. On 22nd December 1461, at the time the Act of Attainder was passed by Parliament, John was granted the offices of steward of the Clifford lands and chief forester of Whinfell forest. It seems that the king was lining him up to be his agent in Westmorland, but in April 1462 Warwick stepped in to claim the Clifford lands for himself. John was to lose out consistently to Warwick’s aggrandisement. He was compensated in June 1462 for the loss of the stewardship with a grant of the shrievalty of the county for life, an extremely lucrative office, but this was also was taken from him and given to Warwick in 1465. The major benefit the brothers did get from their association with the Nevilles was the stewardship of the Latimer estates of Warcop and Morland, granted to John in 1461. Although he received only a small fee of 40s., it gave him power to array men when called upon for the defence of the March. This, however, was a relatively small addition to their dignity. Sir William certainly did not enjoy the same level of authority that was granted to Huddleston or even to the Musgraves, and on the death of Sir Richard (I) in 1464 he seems to have been overlooked in favour of the young grandson, Richard (III), for control of Westmorland. This might have been expected since his lands did not extend into the northern part of the county, but it meant that in 1471 he had less reason to support Warwick.

Although these were the major figures in Cumberland and Westmorland during the 1460s, either because of their influence within the county or on the events at the end of the decade, they were not the only ones. Roland Vaux carried on in Neville service and was appointed to the commission of the

122 CPR 1467-77, p. 255.

123 CPR 1461-67, p. 95.


125 CRO D/Lec/28/8.
peace in the Cumberland by the Readeption government. This differed from its predecessor by the exclusion of Sir Thomas Curwen and the addition of Vaux, Sir Lancelot Threlkeld and Thomas Batty. Christopher Moresby, son of the Christopher Moresby who had supported Salisbury in the 1450s, had carried on his father’s tradition of service to the Nevilles. In 1467 he was Warwick’s steward at Penrith, an office he was to make his own, and in the same year he was a knight of the shire for Westmorland. However, he had married one of the sisters of Sir William Parr by 1471 and he won his knighthood at the battle of Tewkesbury.

Support for the Nevilles within Carlisle was led by the Dentons and Aglionbies, though Dr. Summerson has shown how loyalty within the city remained to the crown throughout 1469-71. John Denton had married one of the daughters and co-heirs of Sir Henry Fenwick, and on 13th November 1461 he was appointed to the commission of array in Cumberland. At about the same time he petitioned the king for various lands and incomes, claiming that his long service to Edward IV had been at his own costs. Sometime after this he tried to exploit his connections by complaining that Thomas Lord Dacre had extorted the manor of Ainstaple from him because of his support for Edward IV, but the inquisition into Humphrey Dacre’s attainted lands in 1464-65 listed it as Dacre’s still. He was part of the ruling oligarchy in Carlisle and in 1467 he and his younger son, Thomas, were the electors who sent his first son, Henry, to parliament as an MP for the city. The Aglionbies are less well documented. John Aglionby was close enough to the Nevilles to think it wise to obtain a general pardon on 5th February 1460 in which his alias was “of

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126 CPR 1467-77, p. 610.


129 CRO D/Lons./D.62.


131 Wedgwood, Biographies, p. 270.
Pontefract", and during the early part of the decade he served Lord Montague while he was deputy warden. In 1464, as mayor, he received an annuity of 40s. from Montague, recently appointed earl of Northumberland, and a letter of recommendation to his successor as lieutenant of Carlisle, Lord Fitzhugh.\footnote{CRO D/Ay.1/134, 146, 149 - see above, p. 87.}

Warwick’s support in Westmorland was less secure. The Parrs’ defection had undermined it quite significantly, and the new commission of the peace appointed in January 1471 had seven new members. Both Sir Edward Beetham and Sir Richard Redmane were Yorkshire gentry who held lands in the south of the county but had played no part in political life there. Beetham was steward of Heversham for Warwick but this seems to have been his only involvement in the county, and like Redmane he had to be drafted in to bolster the crumbling Neville affinity.\footnote{CRO D/Lec/28/28.} Joining them were John Fleming, from Coniston in Furness, Richard (III) Musgrave, Thomas Sandford, John Machel the elder and Edward Thornburgh of Appleby. This was his first local appearance since being accused by the Coventry Parliament of perverting the course of justice, but on 5th November 1460 he had acted as a mainpernor for William Beetham in a grant of part of the sheriff’s farm in Carlisle.\footnote{See above, p. 71; PRO E.199/62/1; CFR 1461-71, p. 278.}

## IV

In early 1471 Warwick’s support in the far north-west was limited to two areas, based on the castle of Carlisle and the honour of Penrith, which coincided with his father’s established centres of lordship. His new acquisitions in the west of Cumberland and northern Westmorland were, it seems, united in their ambivalence towards him. The pardons issued to Richard Salkeld and others in July 1471 probably represent the total number of rebels in Carlisle at that time and, although the number of Musgraves and others named with them might lead us to underestimate the size of the rebellion in southern Cumberland, it was quickly

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\footnote{CRO D/Lec/28/28.}
dissipated once news of the Yorkist victory had spread. The general sentiment in the two counties, as displayed by the citizens of Carlisle in 1470, was probably of loyalty to the *de facto* king, Edward IV. The gentry, the bedrock of support on whom any magnate relied, sought stability in and good governance from their king, and for the most part were not unduly concerned with the political machinations of the court\(^{135}\). Edward IV had shown himself to be a capable ruler, much more so than Henry VI had been in his later years, and the desire for effective royal government which had underpinned the latter’s deposition had been satisfied\(^{136}\). Those who had supported the Yorkists in 1459-61 had been able to justify their actions because of the incompetence of Henry VI, but the same could not be said of Edward IV in 1470. As soon as Warwick put forward a different option to the *de facto* ruler he crossed the line from legitimate action into treasonous behaviour and he found his support deserting him. In the event only a small number of northerners - the "Arrivall" says 600 men, Warkworth says 300\(^{137}\) - actively supported the Yorkists but the neutrality of the north-western counties counted against the earl\(^{138}\).

In the ten years Warwick had control of the far north he had failed to attract much long-term personal support of his own. This is surprising in the circumstances. His actions in supporting the Lancastrian claims to the crown may have been perceived as treachery by his contemporaries but his relationship with the north, reckoned by so many to have been so strong, in reality lacking the depth to survive the immense pressures created by his political manoeuvring.

The question remains whether this was due to his personality or a complacent attitude to power. Warwick experienced a similar difficulty in maintaining support in Warwickshire throughout the 1460s, which Dr Carpenter has attributed to his personal failings rather than to his absence from the region\(^{139}\). He

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\(^{135}\) Harriss, "The Dimensions of Politics", pp. 7, 10, 14-15.

\(^{136}\) Carpenter, *Locality and Polity*, p. 484.

\(^{137}\) "Arrivall", p. 46; "Warkworth's Chronicle", p. 121.


\(^{139}\) Carpenter, *op. cit.*, pp. 513-15; he was certainly in the south from 1465 onwards - see Ross, *Edward IV*, pp. 104ff. As early as 1463 his interest in diplomacy with France was distracting him from the north - *ibid.*, pp. 55-56; Scofield, *Edward IV*, i, p. 292.
was, however, more often in that county towards the end of the decade than he was in the early part, a situation which is the reverse of that in the far north-west. The evidence from there suggests that, even though he was occasionally in the north, he had little to do with Cumberland or Westmorland and relied on a network of deputies to ensure his lands and offices in the region were run effectively. Since lordship, or more importantly “good lordship”, was constructed on a foundation of personal relationships between lord and servant, the lack of intimate contact that he had with men from the region must have been a major factor in his failure to ensure any more than nominal support in 1471.140

This, however, cannot be the only reason for his lack of success. He was well regarded by his contemporaries and sorely missed after his death by many people, including Edward IV. Whatever his personal failings might have been, although his support in Cumberland wavered it still existed in the traditional Neville strongholds. What he lacked was a loyal follower of the local stature of Lord Sudeley who was able to raise Warwickshire for him.141 Given his treatment at the hands of the Earl of Warwick in the 1460s this occasioned some surprise from Dr. Carpenter, but Sudeley had to make a personal decision as to where his greater loyalties lay, with the greatest magnate in the country or with the legitimate king. A similar decision had to be made by the four main Neville retainers in Cumberland and Westmorland.

The split which divided the Neville affinity of north-west in half cannot be attributed to a single factor, but each of the main characters had his own reasons for following his chosen path. For Richard Salkeld, the choice must have been quite easy. Although territorially independent, he owed his advanced position in local affairs to Warwick’s patronage and it seems likely that he was being protected by him from the wrath of Edward IV. Unfortunately we know very little about the Musgraves, but the Parrs were in a very different position. Sir William was struggling to find his way within the Warwick affinity and most of the family’s patronage in the 1460s had come as a result of his brother’s position at court. In 1469 William had followed his lord, but there is no evidence of him having received an extraordinary fee from the earl. In early 1470, when Warwick was ready to raise

140 R. Horrox, “Service”, p. 73.

his banner against the king, his brother’s presence in the royal camp helped ease his passage from one army to the other and he probably replaced Salkeld as constable of Carlisle. When Edward fled the country in October, his position became distinctly uncomfortable and he had little hesitation in joining the royal army on its return in March 1471. Most surprising of all, however, is the case of the Huddlestons. The family was extremely close to Warwick and his brother, yet in 1471 they appear to have been fighting against them. Although Sir John was careful to stay at home his son Thomas was apparently killed fighting for Richard of Gloucester.

This brings into focus the issue of loyalty. It was expected by all lords, be they gentry, magnates or kings, but when they came into conflict men were forced to make a choice as to whom they would follow. The expectation was that service to one’s superior would bring its just rewards but, when that service was obviously treasonous then hard questions had to be asked of where one’s loyalties lay. In 1460-61 the issue for the men of the north-west had been complicated by the obvious incompetence of the king and his party. In 1471 Warwick stepped over the line from acting in the best interests of the nation to acting on his own behalf, thus making the choice relatively easy. There were doubts about his actions in Warwickshire, but in Cumberland and Westmorland there was an added incentive. If the country as a whole was in disarray, then as likely as not the Scots would try to take advantage and invade. This had happened in 1461 when they had been encouraged by the Lancastrians, and there must have been a real fear that the same might happen again.

It was in the best interests of the region throughout the period to support a strong king, one who in turn could protect their lands from the ravages of war. This concern for the locality, so apparent in the 1440s and 1450s, had been missing from Warwick’s lordship in the 1460s. As a result his support in the region was weak, or at the least it was shallow. Even his steward of Penrith, Christopher Moresby, fought against him\(^{142}\). Moresby was a brother-in-law of the Parrs, which gave him an alternative network to operate in than the Neville affinity, but he still felt strongly enough to forget his traditional sense of loyalty to his lord and to take up arms against him. Like Parr and Huddleston, he was not a Neville tenant and it is here that we find a fundamental weakness in the basis of Warwick’s authority. Lords were able to enforce loyalty amongst their tenants by threatening to take their lands from them, but

\(^{142}\) NRO ZHW/1/92; he was knighted after the battle of Tewkesbury - Metcalfe, *Book of Knights*, p. 3.
Neville power in the region was based on their offices rather than their landed possessions. The Parrs and the Huddlestons were independent lords in their own right, and were not totally reliant on the Earl of Warwick.

This difference between administrative lordship and land lordship is important. Unless an office was hereditary, such as the shrievalty of Westmorland, men were less likely to commit themselves to the office-holder, especially if he was in competition with a local landowner, since there was no guarantee that he could protect their interests in the long term. The Neville landed interest was limited to the honour of Penrith and, although it gave them some basis for a traditional affinity, it was not until the 1450s that Salisbury began to make any headway against the entrenched positions of the Cliffords and Percies, attracting the Musgraves from the former and the Huddlestons and Louthers from the latter.

When the Earl of Warwick became warden in his own right in 1461 he was faced with a very different situation. Percy and Clifford authority in the region had been destroyed, their lands claimed by the crown, and the conflict over the previous two years had created an atmosphere of mistrust in the country as a whole. Although this may not have pervaded as far as the remote localities in the north-west, it had dominated life at court where Warwick was based. He had little experience of the needs of northern society, and he saw no reason to treat it any differently from elsewhere. Perhaps in the belief that he was offering good lordship to his own affinity, he encouraged its dominance of the region to the exclusion of all other interests. The limitations of that affinity are shown by the small number of men who held the major offices in the counties during the decade. It was fortunate for both the earl and the locality that one of them was Sir John Huddleston. In general, however, Warwick's tenure of the wardenship, and his promotion of men such as Salkeld above their natural station, lacked the subtlety of his father and was counter-productive. His lordship, although it provided for his affinity as a whole, did so unequally. This was hardly an unexpected consequence of lordship, but when it is considered in conjunction with the divisive effect that it had on a naturally cohesive society, then it helps to answer the question posed by Warwick's undoubted lack of support in the region.
Part II

Richard, Duke of Gloucester
CHAPTER 3

Richard, Duke of Gloucester:
The Experience of Authority, 1470-1483

The central problem for any historian of Richard III, both before and after his assumption of power in 1483, is that his responsibility for the disappearance of the Princes in the Tower has coloured our perceptions of his whole character. Although the “Tudor myth” grew not so much from a need to justify the new regime, but rather from a natural sensitivity about the dangers of upsetting wealthy patrons and wilful kings, it provided the basis of Shakespeare’s Tragedy of King Richard III. This play has provided most people with the archetypal villain they can love to hate, even if Shakespeare’s characterisation has little to do with historical reality. Although literary scholarship has rightly limited itself to the aesthetic delights of the play, and criticised historians for their over-bearing adherence to the search for truth, the latter have in recent years made huge advances in our understanding of Richard as a man. He was neither the demon portrayed by Shakespeare, nor the saintly character as portrayed by some of his apologists. He was acquisitive, selfish and avaricious, prone to “impulsive expediency”, and most historians would now accept that he was at least responsible


for the deaths of the Princes in the Tower\(^5\). He could also be a personable and popular lord, and when he usurped the throne in 1483 he did so at the head of a northern affinity so powerful that the mere threat of its approach was enough to make the citizens of London capitulate to him\(^6\). He operated from a position of lofty moral condescension which allowed him to justify his actions as necessary for the good of the realm\(^7\). His extensive use of his northern connections during the following two years is well known, principally due to the work of Dr. Horrox\(^8\), but actual proof of these links before 1483 is more limited and evidence for the northwest, in particular, is hard to come by. There has been a tendency, therefore, to assume that his lordship in Cumberland was similar to that which he exercised at Middleham, where financial records have shown a large degree of continuity between the Warwick and Gloucester affinities\(^9\).

No real distinction has been made between the separate regions under Richard’s control in the north prior to 1483, although differences have been found between his stewardship of the Duchy of Lancaster and elsewhere. All too easily it has been assumed that he was, in Professor Kendall’s famous observation, “Lord of the North”\(^10\). This much-used phrase is one of those intriguing little epithets which, although containing an element of truth, also presumes a great deal. In one


\(^6\) The northern army was within four days of London by the time that its citizens petitioned Richard to take the throne. Although it was his soldiers already present that had given him the power to act, the threat of the northerners’ approach was enough to prevent any serious opposition - Horrox, *Richard III*, p. 120; Ross, *Richard III*, p. 94.


\(^8\) Harl. 433; Horrox, *Richard III*; idem, ed., *Richard III and the North*.


sense he was “Lord of the North” by 1482 - he had retained the Earl of Northumberland, Lord Greystoke, Lord Dacre, Lord Scope, Lord Fitzhugh, Lord Conyers, and including the Duchy of Lancaster of which he was steward, his authority could be said to have stretched from coast to coast, and from the borders to the Trent. He was the royal agent in the north, but effective control, as Warwick found to his cost, involved much more than merely this type of overlordship.

Although Richard was in theory the master of these individual men, they in turn remained the lords in their own demesnes and, though he could call on them - and through them their tenants - to serve him on particular occasions, theirs was still the rule in their own countries. For the vast majority of people in the north, even the gentry, Richard was a distant figure, and their lives were subject on a daily basis to more local loyalties. Richard might have been the agent of the king’s law, but he did not collect rents nor appoint those who sat in judgement in manor courts outside of his own territorial dominion. The reward for his loyalty to Edward was a gradual extension of his regional influence, but there was a subtle difference between this and the territorial dominance enjoyed by a lord over his own estates.

There has been a widespread confusion amongst historians of the exact nature of Richard’s hegemony in the north-west, partly due to the general tendency to see “the north” as an homogenous entity, which it patently was not, and partly the result of misinterpreting the evidence. Professor Kendall’s monograph is one of the best examples of the former, although he is by no means alone, and even such luminaries as Professor Ross are capable of the latter. In his seminal study of Edward IV, Ross uniquely gave Richard total authority over Westmorland as well as Cumberland, probably due to a mistaken assumption about the extent of the Clifford barony of Skipton and his powers as warden. There is no precedent for this, but unsurprisingly it has influenced subsequent studies. The evidence for


12 Kendall, Richard III, pp. 105ff.; see also Scofield, Edward IV, ii, pp. 5-6.

13 Ross, Edward IV (1974), pp. 199-200. None of the histories prior to Ross mention Westmorland, although Rachel Reid also believed Gloucester to have control of the county. Sir George Buck overstated matters by calling Richard lord warden of all the marches, Earl of Carlisle and governor of Carlisle, none of which he was, but all others have seen him as dominating Cumberland - Reid, King’s Council, pp. 45-46; G. Buck, History of King Richard III, p. 20; J. Gairdner, History of the Life and Reign of Richard III (Cambridge, 1898), p.19. Ross repeated his error in his subsequent study on Richard III (1981), p.53. Dr. Horrox, following Ross’s lead, also saw Richard as dominating
Cumberland is more convincing - in addition to the wardenship Richard had gathered under his wing virtually all available royal patronage in the county by mid-1475, and the parliamentary grant of a county palatine in 1483, taken at face value, seems to confirm his almost total control. It was not, however, as grand a gesture as it appears at first sight, and this alone should make us think again about just how far Edward was prepared to loosen his grip on his brother’s reins.\textsuperscript{14}

If we are to challenge these particular suppositions concerning the extent of Richard’s power in the far north-west, then we ought to re-consider also the assumption that he regarded all of his territories and offices throughout the north equally and exploited them all similarly, one that does not sit easily with his reliance on Middleham as the centre of his northern affairs. As Professor Pollard has pointed out, in June 1483 Richard summoned help first and foremost from the north-east, and the list of those present at his coronation on July 6th includes men predominantly from that region rather than the north-west.\textsuperscript{15} The evidence, it has to be said, is much fuller for this lordship than for any other of his lands or offices, but this is surely a reason for spending more time on examining his other regional interests. The implicit supporting theory is that Richard had an active rather than passive concern for these extremities which stretched back to the time of his first appointment there in 1470, when he was only seventeen years old.\textsuperscript{16} This is little more than a reversal of the demonic maturity with which Shakespeare portrayed him, and takes no account of his development, like any other human being, from an adolescent into adulthood. Although young aristocrats were treated and educated as if they were young adults, and despite his military blooding at Barnet and Tewkesbury, he lacked experience in politics and in the successful creation and maintenance of a following based on his own landed tenure. Not only was he in need of a guiding hand at court, but at a more local level he needed experience at

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\textsuperscript{15} Pollard, North-Eastern England, pp. 316-41, esp. p. 317; A. Sutton, P. Hammond, eds., \textit{The Coronation of Richard III} (Gloucester, 1983), pp. 271-73; see below, p. [CHAPT. 7].

\textsuperscript{16} Ross, \textit{Richard III}, pp. 53-54; Horrox, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 51-52.
dealing with tenants, retainers and rivals which only the governance of a noble patronage could provide.

Finally, Richard’s lordship in the north cannot be seen in its true context unless his other affairs are taken into account. Once again that phrase “Lord of the North” has shaped our perceptions of him, and the implicit belief is that his attention throughout the 1470s was focused on the region. Much of the evidence of his involvement in regional affairs, however, comes from the end of the decade and the early 1480s, when he was involved in the Scottish war. We should not be too surprised, therefore, to find that he viewed his northern lands and offices as a means to an end rather than an end in themselves. Northerners certainly expected to benefit from his connections at court, but this does not mean that Richard saw himself as being merely a conduit for royal favour and patronage. The corporation of York, for example, used him in 1476 to petition the king on their behalf, but his visits to the city were quite rare until he became involved in the Scottish war and was made lieutenant of the north. Usually, his correspondence with the city’s aldermen was carried on through the use of messengers and heralds. For most of the 1470s Richard’s concerns were probably concentrated on the court at Westminster. The quarrel with Clarence was centred on the king and Gloucester’s position as a royal brother made him one of Edward’s natural councillors. His rightful seat, and the one which he surely must have seen as his true position, was at Edward’s side helping to govern the country rather than on a cold, windy hillside in Wensleydale. His territories were important to him in the same way that land was vital to any lord, and his offices were a reflection of his standing with the king, but any analysis of Richard’s impact on the north must also consider his role and presence at court.


18 Dobson, ed., Chamberlains’ Account Rolls, pp. 152, 155, 163-64, 171.
In mid-1471, Richard Duke of Gloucester was virtually unknown in the north of England. Most of his life until then had been spent in other parts of the country, although he may have visited Middleham while he was a member of Warwick's household. It was not until March 1470 that he made his first known venture to the north-west, however, marching from Wales to north Lancashire to impose peace between the Harringtons and Stanleys. That same month Warwick and Clarence had fled to Calais and, given the swiftness with which the king acted to remove his brother from the lieutenancy of Ireland, it might be presumed that he treated Warwick likewise and removed him from the wardenship of the West March. At first he probably kept the office in his own hands, and on May 7th he appointed Sir William Parr as his lieutenant.

Traditionally, the defence of the northern borders had been shared between the Percies and the Nevilles, and during the spring and early summer of 1470 Edward's thoughts turned to re-establishing the balance of power which had been disturbed by the crisis of the 1450s. Despite his apparent loyalty, Edward could not trust the Marquis of Montague to abandon his brother and on 25th June 1470 he replaced him as warden of the East March with the newly re-instated fourth Percy Earl of Northumberland. Such a move once more divided control of the East and West Marches between Percy and Neville respectively, but Montague, it seems, received little compensation for the loss of income from his wages as warden and the northern rebellions of July 1470 were a response to his discontent at this shoddy treatment. Lord Fitzhugh gathered his affinity at Ravensworth, Richard Salkeld and the Musgraves led a rising in Cumberland and, although they were relatively small, these rebellions were enough to pull Edward and his entourage, including Gloucester, to the north. Montague made no effort to

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20 Ross, op. cit., p. 144.
21 CPR 1467-77, p. 209.
22 Storey, "Wardens", p. 615
23 Ross, op. cit., pp. 150-52; CPR 1467-77, pp. 214-16; Pollard, North-Eastern England, pp. 310-11
suppress this public endorsement in the hope that Edward would be forced to reconsider, especially since the new Earl of Northumberland, either lacking the support or the confidence to act decisively, had made little headway in re-imposing order\textsuperscript{24}. The king took a different view, however, and on 18th August he ended the Neville connection with the West March by appointing Gloucester as the warden\textsuperscript{25}. As the king Edward was relying on the laws of treason to bring the Marquis into line, but when he ordered him to raise troops to fight Warwick's invasion, Montague turned them against him and forced his flight to the Low Countries in September 1470\textsuperscript{26}.

Richard was warden for only three weeks before he fled the country with Edward and he hardly had time to think about the implications of being responsible for the north-west border, let alone develop an interest in the region. Warwick presumably took over the office again at the same time that Montague was re-instated in the East March, and his supporters took over the running of Carlisle once more\textsuperscript{27}. When Edward returned to England in late March 1471 he was soon joined by former Neville adherents from the far north-west such as the Parrs, Huddlestons and Harringtons, but this change of allegiance was due to disaffection with Warwick rather than the eighteen-year-old Gloucester's influence. After the final defeat of the Lancastrian party he resumed his office as warden as if nothing had happened, but Edward still needed to find him a suitable power base to reflect his status\textsuperscript{28}. In short, Edward needed to find land enough to give Gloucester the basis of an hereditary estate which he could use to create a following of his own, and the death of Warwick was the ideal opportunity\textsuperscript{29}. On June 28th 1471


\textsuperscript{25} PRO E.404/71/950; \textit{Foedera}, v(ii), p. 176.

\textsuperscript{26} Scofield. \textit{op. cit.}, i, p. 539; Ross, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 151.

\textsuperscript{27} Storey, "Wardens", pp. 607-8, 615; \textit{CPR 1467-77}, p. 277.

\textsuperscript{28} No indenture exists for 1471 and it is presumed that his old contract continued until August 1473 - Storey, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 615.

\textsuperscript{29} Horrox, \textit{Richard III}, pp. 29-30; \textit{CPR 1467-77}, pp. 260, 266; cf. Ross, Richard III, p.24, who sees the grant as a reward for services. The rest of this paragraph is based on Hicks, \textit{Richard III as Duke of York}.
Gloucester received a grant of the Neville patrimony, that is the castles and lordships of Middleham, Sheriff Hutton and Penrith which had come to the family through the marriages of the earls of Salisbury and Warwick to the heiresses of Montague and Beauchamp and Despenser respectively. Under the laws of inheritance all of Warwick's lands should have been divided between his two daughters, with his widow taking her dower, while the patrimony itself ought to have gone to his nearest male heir, George Duke of Bedford. After the battle of Barnet, however, Edward had declared all of Warwick's lands forfeit and granted them to Clarence as reward for his change of allegiance in April 1471. All of the lands to which his wife, Isabel, Warwick's eldest daughter, had an hereditary claim (i.e. all those which would normally have been shared between her and her younger sister) were thus given to the king's eldest brother.

This division of Warwick's lands favoured Clarence, but by the end of the year the Duke of Gloucester was pursuing the youngest daughter, Anne, with the intention of marriage. It is too much to presume any genuine love interest between the two - politics was far too important. From Edward's point of view she was a perfect match for Richard, since she represented the most powerful magnate family in the kingdom but did not bring with her the dangers of close kin hungry for political power. More importantly, perhaps, the marriage provided a solution to the problem of Clarence. Having granted him such a huge reward in April, Edward realised that he had created another “over-mighty subject” even more powerful than the Earl of Warwick. He must have known Clarence’s character as well as anyone and, once the euphoria of victory had died away, he had second thoughts about the amount of authority he had given him. In particular, he realised the necessity of keeping him out of the north. It was this region under the Nevilles that had caused him the most trouble, and he was not prepared to allow Clarence to establish himself there.

It is in this light that we ought to view the marriage between Gloucester and Anne Neville, as the result of Edward IV’s machinations. As far as Richard was concerned he needed a bride to match his status as a royal duke, but Anne was a very risky proposition. She had no lands to bring with her as a suitable marriage portion, and to claim them was guaranteed to bring him into a headlong

clash with Clarence. The impossibility of his position was quite startling. As Professor Hicks has amply illustrated, "Clarence's case [concerning the Warwick inheritance] was perfectly logical; Gloucester's was so hopelessly illogical that the conflicting elements could only be reconciled by royal support." 30 What is equally clear, though, is that Gloucester would never have taken up the challenge unless he had been sure of royal backing in the first place. It was quite normal for ordinary courtiers to consult with the king about the nature of a royal grant before it was given, and it is inconceivable that the matter would not have been discussed by Edward and Richard before it became common knowledge. 31 It is a moot point as to whose idea it was. Richard certainly needed a bride, but if Edward was having second thoughts about his generosity to Clarence in April then the best chance he had to weaken his errant brother was to use Gloucester.

The attempt to weaken Clarence in early 1472 was itself against justice, since from the outset he had been granted his lands for life. Even if the method by which he had obtained the Warwick inheritance in the first place was unjust, however, Edward could not admit that this without implicating himself. Gloucester had just reached his nineteenth birthday and, despite his royal upbringing, he is hardly likely to have had the confidence to challenge one elder brother unless he was sure of the support of the other. In fact, it was well known that Edward was siding with Richard against Clarence. In February 1472 it was reported by John (II) Paston that "The Kynge entretyth my lorde of Clarence for my lord of Gloucester." This gives implicit confirmation of the weakness of Richard's position and how much he was reliant on Edward's support, but it is hardly surprising that Clarence was in no mood for compromise. "Ilt is seyde," Paston wrote, that "he answerythe [to Edward] that [Gloucester] maye weell have my ladye hys suster in lawe, butt they schall parte no lyvelod..." 32

Clarence's position, however, was not strong. Both morally and politically he was on very shaky ground because of his double betrayal, first of his


brother in 1469-70 and then of Warwick in 1471. Significantly, the grants he had received from Edward had been given by royal charter and were not yet hereditary. Technically he was within his rights, but he had forfeited any claim to protection. At the family conference at Sheen in March 1472, under threat of resumption, he was forced to accept the partition of the Warwick lands to provide Anne with a suitable marriage portion. In return, he was granted the earldoms of Salisbury and Warwick and some property in London. The settlement marked a temporary truce between the brothers and gave Gloucester the chance to consolidate his lands and offices. It was at this time that work was begun on the cartulary which was compiled with the intention of allowing him to maximise his rights. Included in the collection are a copy of Warwick's 1461 indenture for the office of warden of the West March, and documents relating to the northern forests including Inglewood in Cumberland. Although the latter may have represented some personal interest, Gloucester had been made Keeper of the Forests north of the Trent on 18th May 1472 and it could reflect a more professional outlook. A little over a month later, on 20th June, Gloucester sought to extend his influence in Cumberland by taking over some of the royal rights in the county. He was to receive all subsidies and duties apart from those relating to the wool trade; all sturgeon; parcels of the demesne lands of Carlisle castle; the king's fishery on the River Eden and the sheriff's 'frithnet'; and certain enclosures in Inglewood. These grants enlarged his role as the royal agent in the north and were to a certain extent a devolution of authority, but there is no evidence that he took any personal interest in them or even used them as a source of patronage. They may well have been used as this, being farmed out at a favourable rate to gain local support, but equally likely is that they were used to pay for the defence of the West March or to increase the size of his coffers at

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36 CFR 1471-85, 116.
Middleham. Like his predecessors, Richard probably employed deputies throughout the time he held the office of warden rather than fulfilling the office himself, and their wages probably came from local revenues rather than from bullion being shipped in from the south. In 1457 Salisbury and Warwick had had the power to grant the sheriff's “frithnet”, lands in Inglewood and other supposedly royal perquisites to their deputy warden, Sir Thomas Neville, with the balance being made up from a small payment from Penrith.

Soon afterwards, Gloucester became involved in a dispute with the fourth Earl of Northumberland over the limits of their spheres of influence, and from mid-1473 the feud with Clarence flared up again. The disagreement with Northumberland is further evidence of Gloucester's political inexperience, and arose from his attempts early in 1473 to retain Sir John Widdrington, Northumberland's sheriff since 1471, and other of the earl's servants past and present. It was an unwritten rule that one lord should not try to retain another’s man, as Sir William Plumpton found out when he tried to inveigle himself into the Earl of Northumberland’s affinity, and Gloucester was quickly reprimanded. He was called before the royal council in May 1473 and by July 28th 1474 relations between the two had improved enough for Gloucester to retain Percy. The matter ought to have been settled there, but, with Edward's connivance, Richard was about to receive a lesson in politics. First of all, on 14th August 1474, the Earl of Northumberland was granted the shrievalty of Northumberland for life for a farm of £100 and Sir John Widdrington was made his deputy. Thus Richard, who had

37 The earliest evidence of a deputy warden comes from February 1475 - *Foedera*, v(iii), p. 58. See Chapters 4 and 5 below.

38 PRO E.327/183; Madox, *Formulare Anglicanum*, pp. 102-3.


41 CPR 1467-77, p. 467; *Lists Sheriffs*, p. 98.
previously enjoyed the services of an independent sheriff, was now served by a
man who owed his position and thus primary loyalty to another. Secondly, on
November 7th, Richard was hit with two further blows. Richard Curwen, son of
Gilbert Curwen of Caton in Lancashire, a servant of the king's steward Lord Stanley
and the second son of Sir Thomas Curwen of Workington (d. 1470), was appointed
as sheriff of Cumberland, and Gloucester lost his foothold in Northumberland when
Widdrington was replaced by John Lilburne the younger.

These appointments underlined just how dependent Richard was on
Edward's good will and how easy it was for the king to make life difficult for him.
Richard had already been in conflict with the Stanleys and the appointment of one
of their men would have been particularly galling. The shrievalty was central to
the warden's control of domestic justice in both Cumberland and Northumberland
and without it the warden's job could have been made impossible. As the royal
agent in the north Richard was expected to behave in a befitting manner, but by
trying to undermine the Earl of Northumberland's authority in his own county he had
failed to live up to these expectations. It was not until February 18th 1475 that
Edward relented and granted Richard the keeping of the Cumberland shrievalty on
the same terms as Percy held that of Northumberland, and almost immediately
Curwen was replaced by Sir John Huddleston.

Gloucester's difficulties with the Earl of Northumberland were of his
own making, but they were short-lived and there is no indication of either of them
holding a grudge against the other. From 1475 onwards Richard made sure that
Northumberland was treated with due respect, especially in Yorkshire. Sir William
Plumpton was told categorically that Richard would not interfere in the earl's affairs,
knights of the shire and sheriffs were mutually acceptable, and there is no evidence
of any jurisdictional conflict between the two in the city of York. Rather, any
problems were settled by compromise. There was a willingness to avoid friction,

42 Hicks, Bastard Feudalism, p. 90.


45 CPR 1476-77, p. 485; Lists Sheriffs, p. 27.
characterised by the earl giving way to his social superior if necessary, and in 1483 it was Northumberland who commanded the northern army whose presence subdued London and allowed Richard's usurpation\textsuperscript{46}. It lies in sharp contrast with Gloucester's dispute with Clarence, which was bitter and protracted. Clarence had held back from delivering the estates he had promised to Richard at Sheen in the hope that his marriage to Anne would not receive the necessary papal dispensation, and by the end of May 1473 Richard had probably petitioned Edward for his further support. By June 3rd Warwick's widow, the dowager countess, had left her sanctuary at Beaulieu and was being conveyed towards the north by Sir James Tyrell. Rumours circulating in London saw Edward as being responsible and Clarence as being in opposition, and tensions were high. "Men loke afftre they wot not what," John (II) Paston wrote, "But men by harneys fast. The Kynges menyall men and the Duke of Clarauncys are many in thys town..."\textsuperscript{47}.

Edward was hoping that by placing the Countess of Warwick in Gloucester's custody he could pressure Clarence into releasing the lands promised at Sheen, but her stubborn refusal to be any part of the plan to disinherit her family was of no use to him whatsoever. Clarence stuck to his guns and the rift between him and his brothers grew until, by November 1473, there was the danger of an open breach in the royal family. John (II) Paston sensed the tension in London when he wrote to his brother on the 6th of that month that "the worlde semyth quesye heer." Edward's household men were arming themselves, and it was rumoured that Clarence was prepared to use force to show how "he wolde but dele wyth the Duke of Gloucester"\textsuperscript{48}. Although Edward was the main catalyst in the dispute, Clarence's anger was more easily directed against his more vulnerable younger brother and the king, in the public eye at least, was able to take on his allotted role of independent arbiter.

Edward intended, Paston reported, "to be as bygge as...bothe [Clarence and Gloucester], and to be a styffelere atweyn them"\textsuperscript{49}. By November

\textsuperscript{46} Stapleton, ed., Plumpton Correspondence, pp. 31-32; Kirby, ed., Plumpton Letters and Papers, p. 51; Hicks, "Dynastic Change", pp. 86-88; Ross, Edward IV, pp. 201-2.

\textsuperscript{47} Paston Letters, ed. Davis, i, p. 464; Hicks, Clarence, p. 117

\textsuperscript{48} Paston Letters, ed. Davis, i, p. 468.

\textsuperscript{49} Op. cit.; Hicks, "Warwick Inheritance", p. 122.
22nd the situation was under control, and Paston surmised the two dukes had been reconciled by the award of the king. In fact, Clarence had been forced into submission by Edward carrying out his threat to refuse him exemption from the forthcoming Act of Resumption. Because his estates had been granted to him by royal assent, and were not hereditary, Edward was able to make Clarence's future enjoyment of them dependent upon his reaching a compromise with Richard. The final settlement as enshrined in the acts of parliament of July 1474 and February 1475 gave neither brother exactly what they wanted. Although it finally laid the damaging dispute to rest, it cannot have healed the emotional rift between the three brothers. The Warwick estates were divided geographically with Gloucester receiving those north of the Trent and in Wales, while Clarence was given those in the east midlands, East Anglia and the south east\(^{50}\). Thus Edward achieved his aim of weakening Clarence and removing him from an area where he had the greatest potential to create trouble. In the strongly hierarchical social structure of the fifteenth century, the only man capable of standing up to a royal prince was another who held the same rank. Richard’s elevation in the north of the country was more the result of family politics than it was of Edward’s desire to create a strong regional hegemony under his younger brother\(^{51}\).

As soon as matters between the royal brothers were settled, Edward was busy planning for his proposed invasion of France. Richard was included in these from an early stage, and in late 1474 he was contracted to provide 120 men-at-arms and 1,200 archers\(^{52}\). He was in France by July 1475 where he was granted an extension of his rights in Cumberland, probably as reward for his appearance with more than his quota of men\(^{53}\). He was officially given the right to appoint a deputy sheriff as well as being granted the rest of the demesne lands of Carlisle castle, the £40 fee farm of the city and all royal rents, farms and fisheries in the

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\(^{51\text{ Cf. Ross, op. cit., pp. 343-44.}}\)

\(^{52\text{ Scofield, Edward IV, ii, p. 117; Ross, Edward IV, p. 221; Lander, Crown and Nobility, p. 234-35, fn. 60.}}\)

\(^{53\text{ Scofield, op. cit.}}\)
county, except for Inglewood. The following month he was present, albeit reluctantly, at the Treaty of Picquigny. His disapproval of Edward's swift acceptance of Louis XI's terms is well known, but, faced with a fait accompli, like so many others he finally acquiesced to the French king's bribery and on August 13th he witnessed the treaty. Edward's return to England was hardly glorious, accompanied as it was by taunts that his army had been driven from France by venison pasties and fine wine, and there was widespread concern at his use of public taxes for a venture which had resulted in nothing apart from his own gain.

Just what effect Gloucester's experience in France had on his relationship with Edward will probably never be discovered, since his activities in the years immediately after his return from France are difficult to ascertain. As in the years before 1475, he probably shared his time between the court and his northern estates. Riots in Yorkshire in early 1476 demanded the attention of both himself and Northumberland, and in July he accompanied the coffins of the Duke of York and the Earl of Rutland on their journey from Pontefract (where they had lain since 1461) to the church at Fotheringhay, which had been endowed with a college to pray for their souls. He was in London in November 1477, and in January 1478 he was present at the marriage of his nephew, the young Duke of York, to Anne Mowbray. He remained there to attend the Parliament that attainted Clarence in the same month, but by March he was at Middleham, perhaps distancing himself from the degradation of George, Duke of Bedford. By April, however, he appears to have been back at court when he was appointed as an ambassador to treat with the French.

Between 1471 and Clarence's death in February 1478 he had often

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54 CPR 1467-77, p. 556.


56 Ross, Edward IV, pp. 235-36.

57 Scofield, Edward IV, ii, p. 167.


59 Scofield, Edward IV, ii, pp. 205, 210, 231; Foedera, v(iii), p. 81; Ross, Edward IV, pp. 239-45; idem, Richard III, p. 33; Hicks, Clarence, p. 145; Rot. Parl., vi, p.194-95; Wedgwood, Register, p. 428.
attended the royal council, acting as a witness to numerous royal charters, but from
this time on he reportedly spent more and more time in the north. While his
brother had been alive there had been a focus for all of the personal tensions
present within the royal council, but once he was permanently removed this energy
had to find another outlet. The Woodvilles had been central to the plans to attain
Clarence, and in the following years their personal ambitions led Edward into what
has been described as "a frontal assault on the ark of the covenant of any land-
owning society - the law of inheritance". In 1483 Dominic Mancini was relating the
belief that Richard was so overcome by grief at his brother's death that
"Thenceforth he came very rarely to court. He kept himself within his own lands
and set out to acquire the loyalty of his people through favours and justice", but it
seems unlikely that Mancini's assertion that the hatred between Gloucester and the
Woodvilles apparent in early 1483 extended so far back. Rather, his withdrawal
from the court after 1478, if it happened at all prior to the Scottish war in 1480, was
due to the removal of his key protagonist there. He had at least condoned
Clarence's death and he had benefited from the stock of lands, offices and titles
freed by the attainder. Once Clarence had been removed, Richard had more time
to spend on his northern affairs rather than being embroiled in the filial in-fighting
that characterised the early 1470s. He was an energetic young man, educated in
the martial traditions of the aristocracy, who had been dismayed and disappointed
at the opportunity missed in 1475 to show off English chivalric prowess. It is hardly
surprising to find him seeking an outlet for his energy by supporting the northerners'
desire for a war against the Scots.

60 Ross, Richard III, p. 34.
63 Horrox, Richard III, pp. 92-93.
64 Ross, Richard III, pp. 33-34.
65 Cf. Grant, "Richard III and Scotland", p. 121; Ross, Edward IV, pp. 7-9, 278; idem, Richard III, pp.
The conflict against Scotland was engineered by Edward IV for his own political purposes. It sits at odds with his policy of peace and reconciliation which had been pursued from 1464 until November 1479 and many explanations have been offered. It cannot simply be accounted for, however, by blaming the Scots for prevarication, the French for interfering or the borderers' natural aggressiveness, although each played a part. James III was unable to control his younger brother, the Duke of Albany, who escaped from Edinburgh to Dunbar after his arrest in February 1479 and encouraged cross-border raids while he fled to France. Louis XI saw this as an opportunity to distract Edward from his ambitions on the continent by encouraging James III to break the truce with England. Scottish raids across the border continued into late 1479 but James III had no control over them and some retaliation seems to have come from the English side. This in itself, though, was no cause for war. Such cross-border infractions were common-place and a legal system of redress had evolved to diffuse tensions. March days were held at regular intervals to deal with infractions of truces, and a system of international law provided for the punishment of offenders and the legal redress of grievances. The Scottish king was having great difficulty in raising the money for Princess Margaret's marriage, but again, that in itself was insufficient reason for the English to go to war. Edward’s main concern towards the end of his reign was the collection of money, and there was little to be gained from committing himself to a conflict from which he had little to gain. The likelihood is that all of these reasons had a part to play in his decision to go to war, but even

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68 N. MacDougall, James III: A Political Study (Edinburgh, 1982), pp. 143-44; A. Grant, op. cit., pp. 119-20.

69 Cal. Doc. Scot., iv, Appendix 1, no. 28; Ross, Edward IV, pp. 278-79.


71 MacDougall, James III, p. 142.
when added together they are not totally convincing. There must have been other reasons in his mind why a war was necessary, and it seems probable that one of them was the desire to keep Gloucester occupied.

It is worth having a closer look at Edward’s motivations in late 1479. Since 1474 he had made particular efforts to encourage peaceful relations between England and Scotland. Initially this had been due to his plans to invade France which demanded a secure northern border, but even after 1475 he continued this peaceful policy, arranging firstly for the marriage of his daughter, Cecily, to the young Prince James, and then for James III's sister, Margaret, to Anthony, Earl Rivers. This diplomatic tack continued with no sign of change until the meeting of the royal council in November 1479 when, as Professor Pollard suggests, Richard’s voice was probably instrumental in the decision to start a war. Undoubtedly he voiced the opinion of his northern connection, and to a certain extent he may have shared their antipathy towards the Scots, but the final decision belonged to the king. Richard was to become one of the main beneficiaries of the war, and his involvement must be suspected, but Edward must also have felt that there was some benefit for him and the kingdom as a whole. He was particularly sensitive about northern opinion after the Readeption Crisis, and his Scottish policy was certainly ill thought of in the north - rumours that his subjects there were unhappy would have been a powerful incentive to give them what they wanted, especially if he expected it to cost him nothing. Edward’s main concern, however, was with his continental policy and it made no sense for him to become embroiled in a conflict with the Scots. His disastrous expedition in 1475 had left many wary of providing

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72 See below, p. 138.


74 As late as November 23rd Edward was prepared to issue a safe-conduct to James and 1,000 others so that they could pass through England on pilgrimage - *Foedera*, v(iii), p. 126, misdated 1482, corrected in Dunlop thesis, p. 90; Pollard, *North-Eastern England*, p. 242.

75 Pollard, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-36, 242; see below, pp. 158-161.


77 Pollard, *op. cit.*, p. 236.
funds for such an adventure again, and he was initially unwilling to ask Parliament for taxation for the purpose. By 1480 Edward's finances seem to have been solid, but they relied on his French pension to keep him solvent and much of his diplomatic policy was dictated around finding husbands for his daughters without paying any marriage portions. As a result he was becoming increasingly wary of making any financial commitment, so the war in the north was a risky venture. In order for it not to upset his European policy it had to succeed but, even against the Scots, he was to find that this could only be done by investing huge sums in men and material. At first, however, he made no contribution towards its costs, and he expected his brother to fight the war with the resources at his disposal in the Marches and Yorkshire. Undoubtedly Richard asked for a military venture, but Edward must have known the implications. He was not one to indulge his brother, however, and he can only have agreed to it because of the anticipation of gain for himself. Popularity in the north was one reason, but the prospect of giving his brother a task that would keep him busy and enhance his dignity must have been enticing.

Gloucester's role in the war was central. Initially, Edward's refusal to pay for it meant that no preparations were made at all - only on May 12th 1480 was Richard made the king's lieutenant-general with power to call out all the king's lieges in the marches towards Scotland and the adjacent counties, including Durham. No campaign was organised, but raids took place (mainly in the east) on either side of the border. During the winter of 1480-81 a naval fleet was arranged, but the failure of the English to make any significant headway inspired Edward to promise a

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78 His reputation preceded him, however, and the proposed marriage of his son, Edward, to the daughter of the wealthy Duke of Milan foundered on his avarice - Ross, *Edward IV*, pp. 246-47, 284, 386.


80 Ross, *Edward IV*, p. 279. See also the undated letter in Richard's hand asking for money, which probably comes from this time - H. Ellis, ed., *Original Letters Illustrative of English History* (11 vols. in 3 series, 1824-45), 2nd series, i, pp. 143-44.


more personal contribution, and Gloucester was demoted. Some effort was made to raise an army during 1481, but any attempts at a campaign petered out in Edward’s own apathy in the face of “adversa tempestas”. After two campaigning seasons without any decisive action the pressure on Edward to provide enough resources for a sizeable army was growing, especially since the dramatic collapse of his continental policy. The English treaty with Burgundy, signed in the summer of 1480, gave Louis XI the excuse to stop payments of the pension and to lay plans for a diplomatic broadside aimed at Edward. The English king’s greed was becoming legendary and Louis was able to exploit this to keep him quiet. The Burgundians were pressing Edward for military assistance against the French, which he politely refused citing his Scottish commitments, but he was also being wooed by the promise of the next instalment of his pension from the French. Due at Easter 1481, Louis kept Edward waiting until August with the assurance of a restatement of the proposed marriage between the Dauphin and Princess Elizabeth. In direct contravention of his promises to the Burgundians, Edward then agreed to a peace between England and France which was to last for a century after the death of either monarch. In doing so he destroyed his relationship with his long-standing allies, but the promise of an extra 60,000 crowns each year (on top of the 50,000 crowns pension) as part of Elizabeth’s marriage portion was too much to resist.

The agreement with Louis XI brought Edward another opportunity to achieve a victory in the north. The Duke of Albany, James III’s brother, had been in exile in France since 1479, and Louis may have offered him as an inducement to sign the peace. He was hoping to deflect Edward away from pursuing his intended European policy by giving him an incentive to continue the war against the Scots, and in April 1482 Albany arrived in England. Arrangements for some sort of attack on Scotland were well under way by then, with benevolences being agreed upon in November 1481 and collected from March 1482, but plans for a full-scale

83 Ross, Edward IV, pp. 279-80.


85 For what follows, see Ross, op. cit., pp. 253, 285-86.


invasion were probably not considered until Albany had arrived. He and Edward rode north to Fotheringhay in late May to meet Richard, who had just completed his first raid into south-west Scotland, burning the area around Dumfries. It was there that the agreement which was to dominate English foreign policy for the rest of Edward’s reign was decided upon. 

The Treaty of Fotheringhay, signed on June 11th 1482, was designed to secure the northern frontier so that Edward could concentrate once more on mainland Europe, but it had other advantages for him, too. He had in Albany a ready-made puppet king for Scotland who had little to bargain with. In return for placing him on the throne, Edward demanded a substantial area of south-west Scotland as well as the fortress of Berwick. Albany also had to promise to acknowledge English suzerainty within six months of becoming king; to end the ‘Auld Alliance’ for ever; and to divorce his French wife so that he could marry Princess Cecily. The agreement promised Edward everything and Albany nothing. Apart from securing his northern border, the grant of Annandale, Liddesdale, Eskdale and Ewesdale gave him the opportunity of providing a more permanent outlet for Richard’s martial interests. This was the area which Gloucester had just ridden across, and it was probably at his insistence that it was included in the treaty, but it was at this time that the plan for the so-called palatinate granted by Parliament in January 1483 was also formulated. The lands granted by Parliament were more extensive, reflecting other events between the two dates. There is no indication of them being given palatinate status in the Fotheringhay agreement, but this was a matter of domestic policy and not relevant to any discussions with Albany. On June 1st 1482, however, ten days before the treaty was signed, Richard was pardoned the arrears of all his perquisites in Cumberland as long as they did not exceed 10,000 marks. This was the same figure he was to

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89 Foedera, v(iii), pp. 120-21. If he was unable to obtain a divorce, he was to promise the marriage of his heir, should he have one, to Edward.

be paid under the Parliamentary grant in lieu of his wages as warden once it had become hereditary\textsuperscript{91}. The implication is that Edward agreed to give him the royal revenues in Cumberland and palatine status in southern Scotland as early as June 1482. this is confirmed by the appearance of John Green (one of Richard’s servants in the Duchy of Lancaster) as escheator of Cumberland and Westmorland later that year\textsuperscript{92}. The only additional royal perquisite granted to Richard in January 1483 that he did not already enjoy was the appointment of this office. Escheators were crown appointments, made to supervise the lands, offices and other appurtenances which had fallen into the king’s hands\textsuperscript{93}. This meant that, although Richard had been granted the revenues of the royal perquisites in Cumberland, he was still dependent on Edward IV’s officers for their identification and for assessments of their value. His concern to take control of the appointment himself is an indication that he did not feel that he was receiving what was rightfully his.

The problem of providing suitable patronage for Gloucester without giving him too much influence had long troubled Edward, and the potential problem of a royal uncle (although not expected imminently) was acute. While Clarence had been alive there had been a natural focus for Richard’s energies, but after 1478 they needed another outlet. By concentrating Richard’s attention in the north Edward hoped to keep him occupied and to deflect him from interfering in other domestic policies. Once English suzerainty over Scotland was confirmed a strong military presence would have been necessary, which Richard’s palatinate would have provided. Edward probably realised just how unpopular the Fotheringhay treaty would be amongst the Scottish nobility, but he believed strongly in the principle of loyalty to the \textit{de facto} king and probably expected the Scots to abide by it also. In this he miscalculated\textsuperscript{94}. Denial of English sovereignty was the bedrock of Scottish diplomacy, so it’s abandonment by a puppet king was likely to cause civil

\begin{itemize}
  \item[91] CPR 1476-85, p. 338.
  \item[92] Lists Escheators, p. 24; Somerville, \textit{History of the Duchy of Lancaster}, i, p. 466.
  \item[94] See below pp. 158-161 for his contempt of the Scots. Compare his concerns to highlight the legitimacy of his dynasty with his determination to be obeyed - Ross, \textit{Edward IV}, pp. 299-300, 399-400.
\end{itemize}
war\textsuperscript{95}. Even with control of Berwick in the east and the western borders, the English would have been hard-pressed to make good their claims and would have been sucked into a conflict that would have diverted Edward from his continental ambitions for many years\textsuperscript{96}.

Although a sound plan in theory, it still had to be put into operation. The scheme had probably been planned out since the time that Albany had first agreed to come to England, but it was so detrimental to his interests that it could not be put into operation until he was in Edward’s hands\textsuperscript{97}. Money for the campaign was already being raised through the unpopular benevolences, and in late July 1482 the English army besieged Berwick. It was a massive force, some 20,000 strong, but, crucially for the outcome of the campaign, it was only retained for a period of four weeks\textsuperscript{98}. There was, obviously, no expectation that it would be needed for longer than this, and it gives us a clue about the English strategy.

The main reason for the siege was to draw the Scots into battle. Berwick was the responsibility of the Scottish king and he had to pay for its upkeep and garrison himself, whereas taxation raised through the Scottish Parliament only paid for the other strongholds along the borders\textsuperscript{99}. The English hoped that by handing down such a challenge, James III’s pride in his personal fortress would draw him into accepting a direct confrontation in which he would be overwhelmed by the sheer might of their army. The Scottish king and nobility could then be legitimately decimated, and any opposition to Albany wiped out. Since arriving in England he had been using the title of “king of Scotland”, but this was probably Edward’s idea rather than his own. The English were clearly hoping to place him on


\textsuperscript{96} A. Grant, “Richard III and Scotland”, p. 126.

\textsuperscript{97} The ten day gap between the grant of 10,000 marks to Richard and the final signing of the Fotheringhay treaty is perhaps an indication of how hard Albany resisted the plan, but he was in no position to bargain. Cf. MacDougall, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 153, who sees Albany as a more willing accomplice.


\textsuperscript{99} MacDougall, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 149-50.
the Scottish throne\textsuperscript{100}, but in doing so they had forgotten about the future James IV. Just what “natural causes” may have struck him down we shall never know, nor if Albany actually intended to take the throne for himself. Prince James had been born in October 1473 and was less than nine years old, and with James III dead Albany would have been the natural choice as Protector. In the minimum of eight years of control this would have given him, there was plenty of time to make a settlement with England\textsuperscript{101}. The future of Scotland as an independent nation rested on the outcome of the proposed battle.

The plan very nearly worked. James III had mustered his troops and was on his way south to Berwick, but other of the Scottish lords were more realistic about their chances. Instead of risking their lives in battle they preferred to use the “traditional way of coping with English invasions”, by making discretion the better part of valour\textsuperscript{102}. James was arrested by his half-uncles at Lauder on July 22nd, his army disbanded and he was placed under lock and key in Edinburgh castle. It was only after news of these events reached Richard that his army moved north, and he reached Edinburgh unopposed at the end of the month\textsuperscript{103}. Having failed to destroy the Scottish king and his nobility, he had little choice but to try a more direct approach. The English plan still had some chance of success if Albany could be placed on the throne. Once in Edinburgh, however, it became clear that the Scottish lords would not countenance the deposition of his brother - paradoxically, it was the coup at Lauder that had saved James III. Whether or not he did so with Richard’s approval, Albany saw his best chance of finding a foothold at court in coming to an agreement with those lords still loyal to James. On 2nd August he arranged to be welcomed back into the fold and forgiven for conspiring with the English, as long as he swore allegiance to his brother and the lords of the realm\textsuperscript{104}. On the following day he may have promised to Richard that he would uphold the

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., pp. 152-53.

\textsuperscript{101} My thanks to Roland Tanner for making this point.

\textsuperscript{102} A. Grant, op. cit., p. 124-25.

\textsuperscript{103} MacDougall, op. cit., pp. 158-68, esp. p. 166.

\textsuperscript{104} Foedera, v(iii), p. 122.
Fotheringhay agreement, but no evidence of this remains\textsuperscript{105}. Whether or not this actually happened, what is important is that when Gloucester left Edinburgh three days later, he did so still believing that Albany was loyal.

This was not quite what Edward had intended, but under the circumstances it was the best that either he or Richard could have expected. With James III in disgrace Albany was at least the dominant nobleman, and short of destroying Edinburgh there was little more that the duke could have done before his army’s wages ran out\textsuperscript{106}. Such violence would have been counter-productive since it would have hardened Scottish resolve against Albany. After accepting the Edinburgh merchants’ promise to repay the marriage portion of Princess Cecily should Edward wish it, and that James’ sister Margaret would be sent to England to marry Earl Rivers, he withdrew to Berwick\textsuperscript{107}. He only just got back there within the allotted month and almost immediately, on August 10th, the majority of his army was disbanded. Couriers were sent to London with news of what had happened and Edward, it seems, was at this time quite content with the situation. On 22nd August he issued a safe conduct for Princess Margaret (whose marriage portion was her most attractive attribute). Three days later he wrote to Pope Sixtus IV praising the restraint of the English in Edinburgh for not spoiling Albany’s welcome home, claiming that the greatest achievement of the campaign had been the capture of the town and fortress of Berwick\textsuperscript{108}. The castle did not fall, in fact, until 24th August, so Gloucester must have written to Edward in expectation of it’s imminent surrender\textsuperscript{109}, proof that he still saw the Fotheringhay agreement as being valid. The contract had given Albany fourteen days to relinquish the castle after he was given control of the throne, or at a time to be agreed upon by mutual

\textsuperscript{105} MacDougall, op. cit., p. 169.

\textsuperscript{106} It had only been retained for twenty eight days, and it was due to be disbanded on August 11th - Grant, op, cit., p. 124; MacDougall, op. cit., pp. 168-69.

\textsuperscript{107} Foedera, v(iii), p. 122; Scofield, ii, p. 347.

\textsuperscript{108} Foedera, v(iii), p. 123; Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs, Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice...Volume 1, ed. R. Brown (1864), pp. 145-46.

\textsuperscript{109} Scofield, ii, p. 348.
Richard returned to Berwick on August 10th, and it is more than just coincidence that the surrender happened exactly fourteen days later. Edward’s closing comments to the Pope confirm that he believed the Fotheringhay plan was still on course, and reveal the true reason behind the 1482 campaign. “It now remains for your Holiness to complete the work by monitions, for we would that these two nations should be as united in heart and soul as they are by neighbourhood, soil and language...”

The continuation of the Crowland Chronicle, describing the events of the summer of 1482, has done much to muddy the waters surrounding Anglo-Scottish relations. The author, writing after 1485, spent little time on the Scottish war, and compressed the first two years into little more than a couple of sentences. It is the expedition of July and August 1482 which holds his attention for longest, because of the costs, but he does not speak from a point of view of one informed about the overall strategy. The continuation was “written from the vantage point of a high official...at one remove from the inner circle of Edward’s family and cronies: it is the Whitehall kind of history...” It is one man’s attempt to analyse what would now be called current affairs, and despite protestations of neutrality and no “conscious introduction of falsehood, hatred, or favour”, it is a flawed account. Throughout there is a bias towards finances and against the north, “whence”, most famously, “all evil spreads”. It cannot, therefore, be taken at face value, especially where the north of England and Richard of Gloucester are concerned, yet many historians have taken it’s comments concerning the 1482 expedition as at least an approximation of the truth. The chronicler’s main aim in his description of the expedition was to underline the cost, and to establish Richard as the main

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110 Foedera, v(iii), pp. 120-21.

111 Cal. State Papers Venetian, i, p. 146.


113 Ibid., p. 78.

114 Ibid., pp. 183, 191.
cause of the Yorkist dynasty’s financial crisis. In doing so, he used a mixture of fact and fiction, providing an element of plausibility to his personal agenda. The expense of maintaining the garrison at Berwick was, if victualling is taken into account, in the region of 10,000 marks as he stated, but the cost of the 1482 expedition was nowhere near the total implied. The wages bill of Richard’s army for the month in the field came to £13,092, but even allowing for the chronicler’s conflation of the war as a whole with the 1482 expedition, only a total of £36,863 is known to have been paid out up until the capture of Berwick. As warden of the West March, and with the warden of the East March as his retainer, Gloucester was able to call on all men within the border counties, quite legitimately, to serve him for the defence of the realm without paying them a penny. The city of York paid for the soldiers it sent with Gloucester both to Dumfries and to Edinburgh, but it had to wait until September 1483 before it received the freedom from tolls in return for their expenses. The main brunt of the costs was being borne by the northern counties, not the crown, and were impossible for any bureaucrat to assess with any degree of accuracy. There is no way that anyone, either then or now, could estimate whether the war had “diminished the substance of the king and the kingdom by more than £100,000 at the time”.

The chronicler’s closing comments on Edward’s state of mind have often been taken to indicate the disastrous nature of the expedition. Given his tendency towards conflation and his general antagonism towards Richard, though, our interpretation of this particular passage ought to be re-appraised. “King Edward”, he says, “was grieved at the frivolous expenditure of so much money although the recapture of Berwick alleviated his grief for a time.” This is the only evidence we have for Edward’s attitude towards the war as a whole, and it may well reflect his concerns at being sucked into the conflict in 1479-80. It certainly cannot be assumed to epitomise his attitude in the summer of 1482. Indeed, all the other evidence points towards his active support of the Fotheringhay plan because of its


116 Scofield, ii, pp. 303 n. 4, 315, 316, 333, 344 n. 3.


118 Crowland Chronicle, p. 149.
potential for high rewards at a relatively low cost. The capture of Berwick was certainly something that pleased him “for a time”, since it indicated to him that his plans were on course. It gave him the jewel of the Scottish king’s defensive array, in itself a source of immense pleasure, but Richard’s agreements with the Edinburgh merchants concerning the marriages of the Scottish Margaret and the English Cecily gave him an increasing dynastic stake in Scotland at no extra charge. Within days of hearing about the agreement a safe-conduct was issued for Margaret’s journey south, and orders were sent for the payment of her dowry. In a further display of contempt for the Scots, he decreed that it was to be delivered to the Earl of Northumberland at Berwick, no doubt to be used to pay for the garrison there. Furthermore, Richard had agreed that Edward would send word by All Hallows’ Eve whether or not he would consent to Cecily’s marriage to Prince James. In a further act designed to antagonise, he waited until the last minute before despatching his privy messenger to say that he was no longer prepared to see the match take place.\footnote{Foedera, v(iii), pp. 124-25.}

In mid-November, Edward suddenly became aware that he had lost control of events in Scotland. At about the time of Michaelmas Albany, isolated politically, had freed James III from captivity. He did so in the hope of re-establishing his position at court and securing his political future, and in doing so he had in effect forsaken the Fotheringhay agreement. When Edward’s messenger reached Edinburgh in late October he found James III on the throne being supported by his brother. With a summons already issued (probably at Albany’s insistence) for Parliament to meet in early December, the Scots were in no mood to make any concessions, promises notwithstanding.\footnote{MacDougall, op. cit., pp. 170-71.} Edward’s rather curt demands for the repayment of Cecily’s dowry, delivered on 27th October, were met with an equally terse reply two days later that made it quite clear that the Edinburgh merchants had no intention of handing over the money.\footnote{Foedera, v(iii), pp. 124-25.}

More importantly, the messenger gained a sense of the political atmosphere in Edinburgh. Given the two weeks that it would have taken him to

\footnote{Foedera, v(iii), pp. 124-25.}
make what must have been a reluctant return journey, it was not until mid-
November that Edward was fully appraised of just how awry his plans had gone.
Initially, it seems, his anger was directed against Gloucester for having misled him
as to the extent of his victory in August. He removed him from the constabulary of
England on November 14th, but he also immediately began to plan his revenge
against the Scots. Orders were given on November 13th for Berwick to be
victualled and garrisoned, and on November 15th he issued writs for Parliament to
meet in January 1483 to vote taxes, rather euphemistically, for “the hasty defence
of the realm”\textsuperscript{122}.

The situation in Scotland was still extremely fluid with three separate
factions jockeying for political control\textsuperscript{123}. When Parliament in Edinburgh met on
December 3rd James III was able to use his natural pre-eminence to his advantage
and, despite Albany being given the impression of having established himself at the
king’s right hand, it was the king’s policies which prevailed. Orders were given for
the resumption of the quest for a peaceful settlement to the conflict with England.
The Estates, mindful of the dangers of the king putting his own person at risk on the
battlefield, asked that Albany be made lieutenant-general of the realm and to
defend the borders on his brother’s behalf. The duke probably considered this
petition sufficient but it was only a request, not an order. The office could only be
granted by royal commission since James was still \textit{compos mentis}, so while he
accepted the supplication, he was under no obligation to carry it out. It became
clear after the dissolution of Parliament on December 11th that he had no intention
of delivering such powers to Albany. The duke was still at court on December 25th,
but by the end of the month he had retired to his castle at Dunbar with a handful of
supporters to plot another \textit{coup}. It was quickly discovered, and in a last desperate
attempt to strengthen his hand he reverted to sending his friends as envoys to
England to treat with Edward on the basis of the Fotheringham agreement\textsuperscript{124}.

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Foedera}, v(iii), p. 126; Ross, \textit{Edward IV}, p. 290 n. 3. His anger against his brother seems to have
quickly been tempered since Gloucester was once more using his title of constable by January 4th -

\textsuperscript{123} MacDougall, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 174-80, on which the rest of this paragraph is based.

\textsuperscript{124} It had been agreed there that he would accept English sovereignty within six months of him
gaining possession of the Scottish crown and the “more part” of the country unless he was first
granted an extension - \textit{Foedera}, v(iii), pp. 121-22, 127.
One of Edward’s first acts in the English Parliament after it met on January 20th was to make public the secret clause of that treaty. This gave Gloucester total control of the regalia in Cumberland, the warden of the West March in heredity, palatinate status over extensive lands in southern Scotland and a one-off grant of 10,000 marks. These Scottish territories now included the whole of the Scottish West March, Wachopsdale and Clydesdale, a significant increase of authority that would have given him control of all lands west of Tweeddale and the Pentland Hills as far north as Glasgow. Rather than being the result of further negotiations with Albany, it reflected Edward’s frustration and disappointment at the way in which matters had developed in late 1482. Although Albany’s envoys probably did not reach London until after the act had been passed, it seems unlikely that they could have made any impression on its content. Indeed, although Edward entertained them according to their status, the subsequent treaty, signed on February 11th, was little more than a humiliating dictation of terms. It reaffirmed the Fotheringhay agreement and prepared the ground for another English campaign in Scotland, but this time aimed at conquest rather than installing a puppet regime. By March 31st Albany was to inform the wardens of the English marches, Gloucester and Northumberland, of all of his “subjects, lovers and well-willers”, who were to be protected by a truce that was to encompass them for the following twelve months. Albany was to continue working to take the Scottish crown, and the two English wardens were to provide him with three thousand archers at Edward’s expense. Once the duke had control of the crown, he was in turn to assist Edward “unto the final conquest of the realm of France”. This final treaty of Edward IV’s reign, signed within a month of his death, is usually taken to show just how clearly he regarded Scotland as a side-show compared to his main interest, which was to defeat Louis XI. However, it makes no mention of the grant just made to

125 Rot. Parl., vi, pp. 204-5.


127 Scofield, Edward IV, ii, pp. 359-60.


129 E.g. Scofield, op. cit., p. 360.
Gloucester, and it may have been designed to deflect Albany's attention from the impending invasion while providing the English with an unwitting *agent provocateur* in Scotland. The Commons had already voted for a tenth and a fifteenth for the hasty and necessary defence of the realm, but Edward was unwilling to trust Albany to the extent he had done in 1482. If the duke was gullible enough to adhere to the treaty then well and good, but if he did not then nothing was lost.

Most of the Scottish war took place in the East Marches. There is no evidence to suggest how it was fought in the West March apart from the single raid on Dumfries in 1482, but it probably took the usual form of raid and counter-raid. The citizens of Carlisle felt concerned enough to petition Edward for money to repair the city walls, and lands in the north of Cumberland seem to have suffered 130. The only evidence of involvement relating to the gentry of the West March comes from the lists of those who were knighted or made bannerets on two occasions when Gloucester was besieging Berwick. The first time was on 22nd August 1481, and none of the twenty six men so honoured by the duke came from Cumberland or Westmorland. A further eighteen men were dubbed by the Earl of Northumberland, however, and included in these was Christopher Curwen of Workington 131. The next occasion was on 24th July 1482, as the army prepared to invade Scotland. There are two extant lists, which differ slightly. The first, compiled by William Metcalfe from material in the College of Arms, lists thirty four bannerets and thirty six knights 132. All of the bannerets were honoured by Gloucester, but the knights were dubbed by their respective lords - Gloucester (fourteen), the Duke of Albany (four), the Earl of Northumberland (three) and Lord Stanley (fifteen). Of the bannerets, four had links with the West March but only two - Sir Thomas Broughton and Sir Richard Huddleston, son of Sir John - were resident there. Of the other two Sir Richard Ratcliffe had long been resident in Yorkshire and Sir William Redmane was probably living on his estates at Harewood near Leeds rather than those at Levens in Westmorland 133.

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131 Metcalfe, Book of Knights, p. 6.


133 See below, pp. 201-202.
The second list comes from the Plumpton family deeds, but it is not known whether it is still in existence. It was transcribed from the original in the early seventeenth century and this later copy was published in 1898. It contains more detail, and is probably a more accurate. In all, it gives the names of thirty nine men who were knighted, of whom Gloucester dubbed fourteen, Albany four, Northumberland four and Lord Stanley fifteen. The bannerets, of whom there are thirty eight, are divided into three sections depending on which part of the army they were in. Those in the main battle (sixteen) are mainly associated with Gloucester, and include Sir Richard Huddleston. Those in the vanguard (sixteen) were mainly Northumberland’s retainers, and include Sir Thomas Broughton. Only six were “Ban[er]etts by my Lord Stanlay”. Apart from Huddleston and Broughton, the only other man from the West March was John Pennington, knighted by the Earl of Northumberland. Overall, the absence of men from the north-west in Gloucester’s retinue is striking. The lists ought to be treated with some care, though, for while the campaign was being fought in the east, the west also needed to be kept safe. Many of the gentry from Cumberland or Westmorland who were called to arms would have served in their home counties. Despite this, the preponderance of men from Yorkshire in Gloucester’s retinue does indicate where his greatest support lay - the glory and honour of battle was reserved for those who were closest to him.

II

Many of the traits, characteristics and even policies which become more apparent in Richard of Gloucester after he ascended the throne can be seen in his career up until 1483. His avaricious nature, already identified by Professor Hicks, was as much to the fore in the north-west as it was in Yorkshire, but this should not lead us to assume that he had any more than a financial interest in exercising his lordship there. With the first positive identification of him in Cumberland coming as late as April 1482 he, like Warwick, seems to have treated


135 Hicks, Richard III as Duke of Gloucester, pp. 31-33.
his offices there as a source of income rather than a responsibility. His “impulsive expediency” can likewise be seen in his swift decision to dedicate his life to acquiring a territorial stake in south-west Scotland little more than a month after seeing it for the first time. His ability to react swiftly when faced with a critical situation is apparent in the way he led his army to Edinburgh once the plan to destroy the Scottish army had failed.

Perhaps most importantly, Richard’s willingness to use servants of his own choosing, rather than trusting to the loyalties of men he did not know or believe in, can be seen in his imposition of John Green as the escheator of Cumberland and Westmorland in November 1482 as soon as he had the power to do so. This was to become his favourite tactic in dealing with the rebellion of November 1483 but its use at this early stage, in a region where his lordship has been reckoned to be so strong, raises some important questions. There is no doubt that he had supporters in Cumberland - Lord Dacre was his deputy warden, for example - and he may have been using the opportunity merely to reward a dedicated servant whom could not be rewarded from other sources. If so, he was doing it at the expense of his local following. The imposition of an outsider into the office was guaranteed to unpopular, and there must have been a better reason than trying to provide good lordship for only one minor official. Rather, we ought to reconsider the extent of Richard’s interest in the two counties and how much of an impact his lordship, both territorial and administrative, had on the region prior to 1483.

CHAPTER 4

Richard of Gloucester and Sir William Parr:
National Government and Local Lordship, 1470-1483

Edward IV had long recognised the need to strengthen royal influence in all parts of the kingdom, and he had tried to address the problem in the 1460s by creating a series of regional hegemonies. In the far north, however, he had miscalculated the balance between regal authority and magnatial supremacy by placing his total reliance in the Earl of Warwick and Lord Montague. In 1470 he had sought to redress the balance by re-instating the Percy Earl of Northumberland, but the appointment of Richard of Gloucester as warden of the West March had the potential of creating another over-mighty subject. Gloucester’s regal status placed him head and shoulders above any other magnate in the region and, in hindsight, gave him the opportunity to establish a regional hegemony even larger than that enjoyed by Warwick. In order to establish the true picture of Richard’s position in the far north-west, however, we need first to understand the conditions under which Edward granted him his authority. Once again assumptions have tended to predominate, and Edward is seen as having solved the problem of resurrecting the crown’s tarnished image in the north by repeating the mistakes he had made with the Nevilles, but on an even grander scale. The far north-west, however, was a particularly sensitive area. Close to Scotland, and full of seasoned fighting men, it had played a considerable part in the troubles he had experienced 1469-71. Could he really trust it to his youngest brother, given the example set by Clarence?

Edward’s actions in placing Richard of Gloucester in the north seem to make no sense unless one ignores the events of the previous two years. We know that the king was an able politician, if lacking the guile of Louis XI, yet most historians have taken his appointment of Richard as warden of the West March at

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1 Ross, Edward IV, pp. 70-83.

2 Cf. op. cit., pp. 334ff.

3 E.g. op. cit., pp. 186, 199.
face value. They have accepted, therefore, that Edward was relying on little more than familial affection to retain Gloucester’s loyalty. Richard had certainly shown his willingness to serve his brother and this may have been an element in Edward’s thinking, but the example set by Clarence did not augur well. The issue when considering the West March, however, was more complex than the problem of establishing Gloucester in a position worthy of his dignity. The king had to ensure that the far north did not lose sight of the fact that its primary loyalty was to him as monarch. Carlisle was one of the key fortresses defending the northern borders, and its loss would have been a severe blow. Dr Summerson has recently suggested that Carlisle’s civic life was guided by the principle of obedience to the de facto king, and certainly Lord Dacre followed this concept in 1459-61, but, as with all conventions, it was open to interpretation⁴. The Yorkist dynasty had virtually been founded on the Duke of York’s claim to be able to challenge the king if he was surrounded by evil councillors, and once the principle was established it could be used again. Warwick’s rebellion in 1469 had been justified in exactly the same way. He had even cited the deposition of Henry VI (in which Warwick himself had played a major role) as supporting evidence of Edward’s inherent unsuitability to govern⁵. No doubt many of those involved in the rebellions of 1470 believed that they were exercising their new-found ability to show the king the error of his ways. It was a dangerous political precedent to set, since it yet again resulted in the de facto monarch being replaced at the whim of the people. It allowed for the horrifyingly democratic idea of the nation choosing who was to govern them, rather than God. The challenge facing Edward once he had re-claimed the throne was to bolster his divine right to the crown. He needed to create a framework of lordship that could effectively control the regions which had been the most volatile and ready to challenge his intention to govern in the manner he thought best fit.

In addition, Edward needed to reward those men who had remained his most devoted supporters during the Readeption Crisis. The “Arrivall” mentions only three people by name, whose loyalty to their king enabled him to defeat the Nevilles at the battle of Barnet - William Lord Hastings, who raised the Midland

⁴ Summerson, “Carlisle and the English West March”, p. 97; Richard Salkeld could have legitimately claimed to have been following this principle in 1470-71.

⁵ Ross, Edward IV, p. 130.
shires, and from the north Sir James Harrington and Sir William Parr. The career of Lord Hastings is well known. Already a prominent member of the royal household, he became the most important figure in the Midlands, inheriting the Earl of Warwick’s mantle. In the Duchy of Lancaster, the Harringtons were, for a while at least, able to challenge the supremacy of the Stanleys, until their dynastic problems caught up with them. In the far north-west, Sir William Parr was to become the most prominent non-nobleman of his generation. He is, however, seen as being part of the Gloucester affinity despite the fact that the majority of his patronage came from the crown. In May 1470 he was appointed lieutenant-warden of the West March by Edward IV. On July 11th 1471 he and his brother, John, a squire of the body, were granted jointly in tail male all the Clifford lands in Westmorland. On the same day, Margaret, countess of Richmond, and her husband, Sir Henry Stafford, exchanged the countess's part of the Richmond Fee of the barony of Kendale for a rent of £190 for the rest of her life. Apart from the Parrs five other men were included in the consortium that took over the Fee, but there is no doubt that Sir William and Sir John held the main interest. The group was firmly dominated by the Parrs, and it shows the extent of their influence within the north-west. Three of the men involved, Sir Christopher Moresby, Sir Thomas Strickland and William Harrington, were brothers-in-law to Sir William, and the first two of these had been knighted with Sir John after the battle of Tewkesbury.

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6 Arrivall, pp. 45-47.

7 Dunham, Lord Hastings’ Indentured Retainers, pp. 15-26; Ross, Edward IV, pp. 73-75.


10 CPR 1467-77, pp. 209, 264. Sir William already knew their value, as he was the escheator who returned the inquisition post mortem on Thomas Lord Clifford in 1455 - CRO (Kendal) WD/Hoth., Box 34/D1.


fourth, Sir John Pilkington, was also involved in crown service. He had been knighted at Tewkesbury as well and had previously been one of Edward’s squires of the body, but from 1469 he had been attached to Gloucester’s household. His acquisitiveness resulted in him gaining interests throughout the country, including the reversion of offices at Sandal and Wakefield, lands in Ireland, Lancashire and Yorkshire and offices in the Duchy of Lancaster, and eventually he became closer to Richard than to the king. The final man, Thomas Metcalfe, came from the family of Nappa which had made a career out of service at Middleham. At least nine of the family had been retained by Warwick by 1466, and a further seven, including Thomas, had been employed as estate officials. His brother, Miles, had been Warwick’s attorney-general and was later to serve Gloucester in the Duchy of Lancaster. Thomas was to be retained by Richard on August 20th 1471 and another relative, Brian, was retained on October 6th. At this early stage, however, Gloucester’s affinity in the north was in its infancy and it is more likely that he was being used by the king to favour the Parrs.

Sir William Parr’s influence in the north-west was consolidated by the grant of the shrievalty of Westmorland to his brother. First given the office in 1461, he had lost it to the Earl of Warwick in 1465. Presumably it was returned to him in 1470-71 since by November 1471 he was once more rendering accounts to the Exchequer. The office was extremely lucrative, far more so than the shrievalty in Cumberland. After Sir John’s death in mid-1475 it was granted to Sir William and he petitioned the king for a pardon of his brother’s arrears of the office, totalling £3447.13s.3½d. Sir William was also sheriff of Cumberland in 1472-73 and sat


16 Ibid., p. 126. William Harrington had also been retained by Warwick, in January 1462, for £10 p.a. - p. 45. Miles Metcalfe continued to serve Gloucester as deputy steward of the Duchy of Lancaster - Horrox, Richard III, p. 44.

17 PRO E.199/62/2.

18 Ibid.
on commissions of the peace in the county from 1473 until his death. He was used on numerous other commissions, including those of array in Cumberland in 1472 and 1476, and of oyer and terminer in 1476. He was a JP in Westmorland from 1471 until 1483, was an MP for Westmorland in 1472-75 and 1483, and for Cumberland in 1478\(^\text{19}\).

Although it was Sir John Parr who had formed the closest links with the court, Sir William also had connections there which survived his brother’s death. In June 1471 he was appointed as comptroller of the royal household and in February 1474 he was made a Knight of the Garter\(^\text{20}\). In April 1475 he resigned his office as comptroller, presumably to deal with his family affairs after his brother’s death, but in June of the same year he was appointed an executor of Edward IV’s will and given a special licence to make a feoffment of all of his estates before joining the French expedition\(^\text{21}\). He was present at the signing of the Treaty of Picquigny in August 1475, but his whereabouts after that are unknown until May 1478, when he was possibly in York\(^\text{22}\). He may well have stayed on in preparation for the visit of Edward IV in September, but by November he was in London acting as a feoffee for the king\(^\text{23}\). In March 1481 he again acted as one of Edward IV’s feoffees and later that year he was once more appointed as comptroller of the royal household\(^\text{24}\). In November 1482 he was on the commission that replaced Gloucester as constable of England, but his public career ground to a halt after Edward’s death on April 9th 1483\(^\text{25}\). At the royal funeral, on April 20th, as both comptroller and the representative “man-at-arms”, he led the mourners in making

\(^{19}\) Lists Sheriffs, p. 27; CPR 1467-77, pp. 288, 348-50, 426, 490, 606, 610, 635; CPR 1476-85, pp. 214, 556-57, 576-77; Wedgwood, Biographies, pp. 663-64.

\(^{20}\) Wedgwood, Biographies, pp. 663-64.

\(^{21}\) James, "Sir William Parr, Part II", pp. 110, 115 n. 32; Rot. Parl., vi, p. 122; CPR 1467-77, pp. 531-32.

\(^{22}\) Foedera, v(iii), p. 65; Dobson, ed., Chamberlains’ Account Rolls, p. 170.

\(^{23}\) CPR 1476-85, p. 241; CCR 1476-85, 733, 778.

\(^{24}\) Cal. Charter Rolls, p. 253; James, op. cit., p. 115.

\(^{25}\) CPR 1476-85, p. 217; Foedera, v(iii) p. 126. See below, pp. 211-213, 220-221.
offerings to Edward’s corpse before it was interred. According to custom, he threw his staff of office into the open grave to signify the end of his relationship with the dead king.  

Certainly until his brother’s death, Sir William Parr was used extensively by Edward IV in his control of the north. His appointment to the various commissions in Cumberland, where his landed influence was mainly dependent upon his wife’s estates, is an indication that his influence was being bolstered by royal favour. In fact, until the permanent truce with Scotland was signed in September 1473, he was the principal representative of the West March in the negotiations. He appears to have continued as the lieutenant of Carlisle castle from 1470 until at least March 1475, but it is not until April 1478 that there is any indication that he may have lost his office. In that month Humphrey Lord Dacre called himself “lieutenant of Carlisle” in a letter to the city of York. He was confirming to the mayor and aldermen that a certain Roland Brice had been “ane Inglishman borne”, but on whose authority Dacre held office is not known. He had been serving as Richard’s “locumtenentes” since at least February 1475, but this was at a time when Parr was still lieutenant of the castle. It is possible that the lieutenancy of Carlisle castle was still in Edward’s gift in 1478, in which case Dacre’s appointment may have been due to him rather than to Gloucester.

Even though Parr’s closest links were with the crown, there is no doubt that he was also familiar with Richard. His tenure of the lieutenancy of Carlisle would have been impossible without Gloucester’s tacit acceptance, and from 1475 onwards he seems to have forged a stronger relationship with the Middleham affinity. In the previous year he had married Elizabeth, a daughter of


27 He had married the widow of the Duke of York’s servant, Thomas Colt, who had originally come from Carlisle - Wedgwood, Biographies, pp. 208-9.

28 Foedera, v(iii), pp. 6, 12, 18, 29-30, 33.


30 PRO E.404/76/1/86; Foedera, v(iii), p. 58.
Lord Fitzhugh (d. 1472) by Alice Neville, a sister of Cecily, Duchess of York, which made him a cousin to both Edward IV and Richard of Gloucester. At some point between February and April 1475 he and his brother, Sir John, were presented with a gift of a single pike by the city of York, possibly at the same time as similar presents were given to Richard, the Earl of Northumberland, Lord Greystoke and others of Richard’s council. He is reputed to have been part of the English army which invaded Scotland in July 1482 and, when in November 1482 Richard lost the constableship of England temporarily, it was placed in the hands of Parr, Sir James Harrington and Sir James Tyrell.

The close relationship that Sir William obviously had with Richard did not begin until after his marriage to Elizabeth Fitzhugh. As a cousin to the crown he was in a strong position to defend his authority against the encroachment of other Gloucester retainers, and to establish himself as one of the core of royal servants so vital to Edward IV’s kingship. What is interesting is that he was used in this role in the north, where Gloucester is supposed to have reigned supreme. It is important to remember that his advancement came from his relationship with Edward IV, rather than his brother. Despite working so closely with Richard there is no evidence that he ever served on his council, although this does seem likely. If he was employed as such, however, it was probably because he was so close to Edward. Like Lord Hastings, Parr was important enough for even the king’s own brother to sit up and take notice.

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31 James, op. cit., pp. 109-10.
32 Dobson, Chamberlains’ Account Rolls, p. 152.
34 Ross, Edward IV, pp. 64-83. I disagree with the strength of Professor Ross’s assertion that in his second reign Edward relied solely on his immediate family and a few trusted members of the nobility to govern the localities - ibid., pp. 334-37.
35 Reid’s assertion that this was the case is based on the mistaken belief that Gloucester controlled the barony of Kendale - King’s Council, pp. 44-46.
The importance of Sir William Parr to Edward IV's control of the West March can be seen more clearly when it is realised that Richard of Gloucester played little or no part in the exercise of his position as warden. As the holder of that office the county of Cumberland was within his sphere of influence, but the extent to which he exercised his personal authority in the region was a different matter. The evidence suggests that, even more than Warwick, he was less interested in actually fulfilling his duties as warden than in collecting the wages. Despite the best efforts of local historians, there is nothing to prove that he visited Cumberland prior to his raid on Dumfries in May 1482 although it is possible that he was at Penrith in 1471\textsuperscript{36}. Other evidence suggests a marked reluctance to go anywhere near the border. Until the outbreak of hostilities there were four commissions issued to meet the Scots at Alnwick to redress cross-border grievances, as well as the embassy to arrange the marriage of Prince James to Princess Cecily and a commission to discuss fishing rights on the River Esk in the West March, none of which included Richard\textsuperscript{37}. Sir William Parr was included on the commissions to redress grievances in his own right, but only once was anyone named as Gloucester's deputy\textsuperscript{38}. The duke certainly had the opportunity to become involved in international diplomacy if he had so wanted, and as warden he certainly had a responsibility to ensure the "prevention of such great enormities and mischiefs as have frequently undone the Borders" and to "do justice upon all complaints"\textsuperscript{39}. Warwick had been named to several commissions to arrange treaties and to redress grievances between 1461 and 1469, and he is known to

\textsuperscript{36} Dr Summerson's exhaustive research has failed to find a link - Medieval Carlisle, ii, pp. 463-65; M. Craster-Chambers, "Penrith Castle and Richard Duke of Gloucester", in The Ricardian, V, no. 86 (1984), pp. 374-78; J. Curwen, "Penrith Castle", in TCWAAS, n.s. vol. 18 (1918), pp. 178-79; J. Haswell, "The Castle of Penrith", in TCWAAS, n.s. vol. 7 (1907), p. 289 makes reference to a deed signed by him at Penrith in 1471, but it is no longer extant.

\textsuperscript{37} Foedera, v(iii), pp. 6, 12, 18, 29-30, 33, 44, 58.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., pp. 6, 12, 18, 29-30, 33. The deputy was Humphrey Lord Dacre, appointed to meet the Scots on the banks of the Esk to discuss fishing rights on 6th March, 1475 - ibid., p. 58.

\textsuperscript{39} Nicolson & Burn, i, p. xii.
have been present at such meetings at Newcastle on at least two occasions. It would seem, therefore, that Richard just did not have any interest in taking part in the maintenance peace along the border.

The truce signed at Alnwick on 28th September 1473, just over two years after he took up the office, confirms this. There had been complaints about the frequency of March days for the redress of grievances, and during the negotiations it was agreed that:

"...where Sleuth and Negligence hath bene, in Tymes pasit, othir be Lordis Wardains, Lieutenants or thare Deputis, in Default of Metyng and Kepyng of Dayes of Redresse upon the Bordours, in tyme cumming they shall be more diligent and Wakyng upon the Observyng and Kepyng of the Diette of Metyng, and Redresse alle suche Compleyntis as is aggreet..."

This stinging criticism reflected more onto the deputy warden than Richard himself, but, since he was ultimately responsible, any complaints had to be addressed through him. In March or April 1475 Edward was forced to reprimand his brother again. James III had taken advantage of Edward's plans for an invasion of France to push for the settlement of several matters concerning the borders so that "a diligent and spedey provision wold be sett yn alle goodely hast...so that yn [Edward's] absence shuld happe noon inconveniences...". The implicit threat of the "Auld Alliance" was enough for Edward to take seriously and to remind both of his wardens of their duties. His ambassador, Alexander Legh, was to apologise to the Scots for the failure of the commissioners appointed to settle the dispute over fishing rights on the Esk to appear at the given time. He was also to ensure that Gloucester and Northumberland were aware of their responsibilities as wardens and that they made hasty arrangements for March days to redress infractions of border law. In addition Gloucester, as Admiral of England, was to be told that a day had to be appointed when all those with grievances concerning "attemptates by see" could deliver their bills to his lieutenants at Alnwick, and that he should arrange with his

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41 Foedera, v(iii), p. 34.

42 BL Cotton MS Vespasian CXVI, f. 121-22, printed in D. Dunlop, "The Redresses and Reparacons of Attemptates": Alexander Legh's Instructions from Edward IV, March - April 1475", in Historical Research, vol. 63 (1990), pp. 340-53, on which article the following paragraph is based.
counterpart in Scotland for the redress of grievances. Furthermore, he was enjoined "to sett a spedy sadd and just direction therin, such as may be for the goode of peax and rest of thoo partys in the kyngis absence." At the end of the instructions, almost as an afterthought, it was stated:

“Item, where the kynge of Scottes wrote to the kynge for restitucion of the dispoille of two shippes whereof the oon was robbe by the Mary floure...the kyng wol that my lord of Gloucestre be spoken with in that partye, consideryng that the saide shippe was his att that tyme.”

Clearly, Richard’s attitude towards his offices of warden and admiral was rather ambivalent. Reprimanded twice, he was again the butt of criticism in 1477 when Edward once more told James III that he had instructed his brother to "see due reformacion to be had according to right and custom of the said Marches"43.

This correspondence between the monarchs, however, is no proof of any reprimand being issued. Edward’s communications with James expressed an apparent concern for peace, but the instructions given to Alexander Legh in 1475 betrayed a rather different attitude which implicitly condoned the wardens’ earlier dissimulation. Firstly Legh had been told to make reasonable excuses for the non-appearance of the commission to discuss the fishgarths on the Esk. The reason to be given was that, since Legh’s recent return from Scotland with the names of the Scottish commissioners, Edward had been unable to find lords of like estate who (as it had been stated in the treaty of 1474) were not borderers44. As the time appointed for the meeting fell during Parliament, those whom Edward had thought the most necessary could not be spared. He hoped, therefore, that James would "be glad to appease the saide variaunce with lytyll besynesse consideryng that hit is but a small thing of weight for so grete princes to varye for.” Secondly, he was to assure the Scottish king that swift reparation would be made for the loss of his ship, but that none had been made so far because no proofs of the value of the manifest had been received. However, in anticipation of James replying that they could not be delivered because of the English failure to attend the appointed march days, then Legh was to "allege such matiers, causes and excuses as my lordes of


44 Foedera, v(iii), p. 53.
Gloucestr and Northumbreland wol instruct hymme uppon by the waye as he gothe northward."

The instructions reveal most obviously just how desperate Edward was to ensure peace during the time he planned to spend in France\textsuperscript{45}. Taken with other evidence, however, they reveal a pattern of institutionalised contempt for Scottish attempts at the peaceful redress of cross-border tensions. The commission regarding the fishgarths on the Esk was agreed upon on December 3rd 1474, when it was agreed that lords from both sides - but not borderers - would visit the river to settle the dispute "by Inquisition and Recorde taken of the Eldest & Feithfulest Persones of the Marches there"\textsuperscript{46}. The English commission was appointed on February 22nd 1475 to meet the Scots on March 6th on the banks of the river, and consisted of the bishops of Durham and Carlisle, Lord Dacre (Gloucester's \emph{locumtenentes}), Lord Greystoke, William Potman (a prior at Beverley and a canon at York), Ralph Mackerell (deacon of Chester-le-Street and doctor of law) and Sir James Strangways\textsuperscript{47}. Both Dacre and Greystoke held lands in Cumberland and Dacre was certainly one of the "border lords" forbidden by the agreement. The two bishops were triers of petitions in Parliament, and Dacre and Greystoke are presumed to have been there as peers of the realm\textsuperscript{48}. None of the others were at Parliament by right, but this does not preclude their presence there rather than in Yorkshire. It would have taken time for them to gather and, whether by fault or design, they did not make it to the appointed meeting. Parliament had been in session since 25th January and Edward had had plenty of time to have arranged a postponement if he had so wanted. Legh had been sent north soon before that to deliver the first instalment of Cecily's marriage portion and was in Edinburgh on February 3rd, and a little bit of forethought on Edward's part could have prevented any misunderstanding\textsuperscript{49}. That nothing was done to stop the Scots from making a wasted journey at the worst time of the year, that the English

\textsuperscript{45} See Dunlop, \emph{op. cit.}, pp. 343-44, 347.

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Foedera}, \emph{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Ibid.}, v(iii), p. 59.

\textsuperscript{48} Wedgwood, \textit{Registers}, pp. 401-2, 405-6.

commission was appointed so late, are indications at best of Edward's laxity and at worst of a deliberate attempt to create difficulties. His subsequent attitude, knowing that James III could not afford to make an issue out of such a "lytyll besynesse", is similar to that seen in the early sixteenth century in the correspondence between Lord Thomas Dacre and Cardinal Wolsey. Typically, Dacre believed that no oath made to a Scot was binding and the cardinal spoke of duplicity “after the accumulable Scottish manner”\(^50\). There was a contempt of Scotland reaching to the highest level of the English government then, but even in the late fifteenth century diplomacy was conducted with an air of haughty disdain.

This lack of concern that Richard showed for fulfilling his office with vigour also seems to have affected the way he treated his officers, and despite Sir William Parr's links with the king he had to struggle to collect his wages as lieutenant of Carlisle. Gloucester had initially been retained on 17th August 1470 to serve from the following day for wages of £1,250 in peacetime, and twice that in war\(^51\). The agreement was on the same financial terms as Warwick had enjoyed\(^52\), and the implication was that any deputies that Richard wished to employ had to be paid out of these wages. This did not happen. Sir William Parr had to petition the king, and on 20th February 1473 a warrant was issued to the Exchequer to pay to “our right wellbeloved Sir William Parr, lieutenant under our dearest brother Richard...one hundred marks by tallies...in part payment of the wages for the keeping of the said West Marches”\(^53\). Part of the problem was that Richard was not receiving regular payment of his own wages from the crown. Two years later, on 16th March 1475, Sir William once more had to petition Edward. This time he was owed £542.17s. by Richard and it was again ordered to be paid direct from the Exchequer, and deducted from the £3,049.6s.6½d. owed to the duke for his salary\(^54\). Despite the problems Richard was facing, one must wonder about the state of his relationships with both Sir William and Edward IV.

\(^{50}\) L & P H.VIII, 3(ii), 1886, 1950.

\(^{51}\) PRO E.101/71/950.

\(^{52}\) PRO E.404/72/3/36.

\(^{53}\) PRO E.404/75/3/63.

\(^{54}\) PRO E.404/76/1/86.
It is clear that Parr was having more success in claiming his wages from the king than from Richard, despite ostensibly being employed by the duke. It is equally clear that Gloucester was having difficulty in making sure he was paid, but he was reluctant to put himself into debt and to provide Parr with “good lordship” until the money came through. Sir William’s petitions might have been the result of Gloucester’s close links with the king, but this cannot be proved, and the difficulties he experienced in claiming his wages lead one to question just how close he was to the duke at this time. In fact, Sir William’s own close ties with Edward may have been a point of contention between him and Gloucester. Despite the Exchequer records stating that he was lieutenant warden, they do not say that he was actually appointed by Richard. In his first petition he was called “lieutenant under our dearest brother”, and in the second he was “lieutenant to our said brother”, both of which statements are a little ambiguous. In none of the commissions appointed to deal with the Scots is he called Gloucester’s lieutenant. It is perhaps significant that the only occasion on which the title “locumtenentes” is used it is applied to Humphrey Lord Dacre on the 22nd February 1475, less than a month before Sir William’s second petition. It would seem entirely possible that Edward had forced Sir William’s appointment onto Richard in 1471 and that the duke was stuck with paying the wages of someone whom he did not want in office.

That this was the case seems to be borne out by further evidence from the Exchequer. In 1470, Gloucester was recorded in its accounts in customary terms as the warden and captain of Carlisle town and castle and the West March. His commission in that year is rather vague, though, calling him “warden and commissioner-general of the West Marches” - it does not use the more traditional phrase, although he was granted all the usual powers associated with the office which included the right to appoint deputies. By 20th February 1480, however, when he was retained in office for a further ten years, the terms and conditions of his contract as recorded in the Exchequer had changed. This time he was to be

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55 See above, p. 158.
56 *Foedera*, v(iii), p. 58.
57 PRO E.101/71/950; E.404/69/210, 70/3/73, 74/1/1.
58 *Foedera* v(ii), p. 176.
warden only, and no longer captain as well, of the town, castle and March, and his wages had been reduced to 1,200 marks (£800) in peacetime and £1000 in time of war\textsuperscript{59}. The main cost of the wardenship was in maintaining a professional garrison in the castle, since other watches along the border could be kept by men holding lands by border service\textsuperscript{60}. Thus, once he was no longer responsible for the castle, the warden’s wages could be cut quite significantly. It may well have been the difficulties that Richard experienced with Sir William Parr which forced the separation of the castle from the wardenship, but it was the result of a royal policy to establish a stronger degree of control in the far north-west.

The refusal to give Richard the traditional responsibilities of the wardenship had to be compensated for in other ways, and it is this which provides an explanation for the duke’s increasing control over the regalia in Cumberland. Edward hoped initially to maintain the facade of having a noble warden by bribing his brother with lands and incomes equivalent to the constable’s wages, but it was an unworkable situation. If Richard was to be criticised for failing to fulfil his duties (as he was frequently) then he had to be responsible for his officers, and this was not possible while he did not control their appointment. However frustrating it might have been for Gloucester to be warden in name only, it was a necessary step for Edward to take in order to break the culture of reliance on magnatial military authority in the region that had been accepted by both the crown and the locality for so long.

\section*{II}

Edward IV’s main concern in Cumberland and Westmorland was to prevent the creation of another “over-mighty lord” and to re-establish the sense of primary allegiance to the crown. Carlisle, and more specifically its castle, was the

\textsuperscript{59} PRO E.404/77/1/28.

\textsuperscript{60} McDonnell, “Antecedents of Border Tenant Right”, pp. 22-30.
main centre of royal authority in the region. It was vital for him to maintain his control over it, but he also had to ensure that magnatial hegemony was not allowed to progress unchecked. In this he was helped by two factors. Firstly, the dominant lords in the region after 1471 were Richard of Gloucester and Henry Percy, fourth Earl of Northumberland, both of whom were entirely dependent on him for their position. In fact, the marches seem to have been divided into spheres of influence from an early stage in his second reign, and Northumberland, as Warden in the East, made no attempt to extend his lordship in Cumberland. The second factor, which cannot have been apparent until well after his initial appointment, was Richard’s own indifferent attitude towards lordship in the north-west. This may well have been, in part at least, because of the limits which Edward placed on his authority in the region. He seems, however, to have cared little for the welfare of either lands or offices for which he was not ultimately responsible or had no hereditary interest.

The extent of the limitations that Edward IV placed on Richard’s lordship in Cumberland is shown by the grant concerning the honour of Penrith. The first grant, made in June 1471, mistakenly placed it alongside Middleham and Sheriff Hutton in Yorkshire, but on 14th July Gloucester was properly granted both the castle and lordship and all other lands there which had been entailed to Warwick, which included some Clifford estates. Soon after he confirmed Sir Christopher Moresby in his office of steward of the honour, and appointed his brother, James, as bailiff. The grant furnished Gloucester with the potential to create an affinity and to maintain a household in Cumberland. The fact that he did so at both Middleham and Sheriff Hutton has led to the assumption that this was the case at Penrith also, despite the existence of precious little evidence. In fact, the grant was only intended as an interim settlement until the fate of the Warwick inheritance had been given the colour of legality, but the dispute between Clarence

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61 Summerson, “Carlisle and the English West March”, pp. 94, 97. The frequent use of the phrase “warden of the town and castle of Carlisle and of the West Marches” in the Exchequer accounts is informative.

62 CPR 1467-77, pp. 260, 266.

63 The document, D/Mus/P.14, cited by Horrox, Richard III, p. 51, now appears to be missing. Moresby had been steward under Warwick since at least August 1467 - NRO ZHW/1/92. It is not known whether his brother had held any post.
and Gloucester over the estates was not to be resolved for a further three years\textsuperscript{64}. It seems to have been a common practice for Edward, during his second reign at least, to act on matters concerning forfeiture long before they were confirmed by Parliament\textsuperscript{65}. When the Clifford lands in Penrith were granted to Roland Thornburgh on 26th February 1474, therefore, it is probable that this marks the time when the fate of the honour was settled\textsuperscript{66}. Six days earlier Sir Christopher Moresby had granted the keeping of the passage across the Solway Firth, which seems to have been a new office, quite possibly created to compensate for a loss of influence elsewhere\textsuperscript{67}. When the Warwick lands were divided between his daughters and their husbands in July 1474, therefore, it seems likely that the details of the final settlement (not made until the 23rd and 24th February the following year) had already been in force for at least five months\textsuperscript{68}. This agreement gave Gloucester the castles and lordships of Middleham and Sheriff Hutton and extended his influence in Yorkshire by giving him the perquisites of Richmond castle as well. His influence in Cumberland, however, was to be restricted. Although he was to continue to enjoy the profits from the lordship, crucially, the castle of Penrith was excluded from the grant.

It is possible that Richard himself saw the future of his lordship as being in northern Yorkshire rather than in Cumberland, and he was prepared to forego his influence in the north-west in exchange for extending his control of the region around Middleham. He may have visited Penrith in 1471 and seen the poor state of the castle there, deciding that it was not worth his while to repair it\textsuperscript{69}. However, this was his only stronghold in the county, and without it he had no

\textsuperscript{64} Hicks, “Warwick Inheritance”, pp. 120-23.

\textsuperscript{65} Ross, \textit{Edward IV}, p. 347.

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{CPR 1467-77}, p. 424.

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 423.

\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Rot. Parl.} vi, pp. 100-1, 124-25. The grant to Gloucester was given through letters patent on 20th February 1475, three days before it was agreed by Parliament - \textit{CPR 1467-77}, p. 483.

\textsuperscript{69} Local legend has it that on his visit he stayed at a local inn rather than in the castle - Craster-Chambers, “Penrith Castle”, pp. 374-78. See also Haswell, “The Castle of Penrith”, p. 289; Curwen, “Penrith Castle”, pp. 178-79.
household on which to base an affinity. Carlisle was a royal fortress but if he controlled it he could have created a strong following in the north-west, as Warwick had managed to do at Calais in the 1460s. This, however, would have demanded a constant presence and close personal involvement in border affairs, something to which he showed no inclination. On balance, it seems more likely that Gloucester was content to profit from his landholdings in the county without extending his personal authority there.

The 1475 settlement of the Warwick inheritance is central to our understanding of Gloucester’s authority in Cumberland since, even if it was made at Edward’s volition, it must have been made with Richard’s agreement. Neither was in a position to go against the other, with Clarence waiting in the wings to make as much political capital as possible from any sign of weakness in their relationship. The loosening of Richard’s grasp on Penrith effectively disabled any chance of creating an affinity that could have wielded authority in his name, apart from one based on the wardenship. This office, however, was only temporary and his indentures had to be constantly renewed, so any retinue attached to it would not have developed a sense of loyalty without constant personal reassurance. As a result, his interest in the county remained mainly financial. This is not to say that he did not use the incomes from the lordship to fee extraordinary retainers - we know of one such case - but he was unable to create a household that could have acted as a ruling council over his territories there. The one indenture of retainer that he did make which has survived, with Henry Denton in October 1473, does not grant the fee from Penrith but from a couple of closes in Inglewood. It is instructive about his personal attitude towards his position in the county that he was prepared to give up his only residence there, an indication that he saw his lands and offices as no more than a useful source of revenue. The implication is that, although some men may have received extraordinary fees, the majority of his retainers in the

70 A point made by Dr. David Grummitt at the Fifteenth Century Colloquium in Huddersfield, September 1997. See also Hicks, *Bastard Feudalism*, pp. 164-65 for the importance of the personal element in lordship.

71 Thomas Hutton of Hutton John, a minor local figure who had first been retained by Warwick - see below, p. 175.

72 CRO D/Lons/D.65.
county were administrators, concerned with the management of his lands and offices rather than extending his influence to make the county part of his “country”.

Although we have little evidence from Penrith, Gloucester also held the Latimer estates in Cumberland and Westmorland. His control over these was only temporary, but his rule of them was little short of disastrous. On the death of George, Lord Latimer in December 1469, the wardship of his grandson and heir, Richard, passed to Thomas Bourchier, Archbishop of Canterbury. The manor of Bolton in Cumberland thus passed into his custody, but the Westmorland estates of Heversham, Morland and Warcop were assigned to Lord Latimer’s widow, Elizabeth, as part of her dower. Both Bourchier and Elizabeth exchanged direct control of the estates with Gloucester for a life rent, but if either Richard or Elizabeth were to die then the estates would have reverted to the crown\(^3\). Gloucester’s tenancy could not, therefore, be used to retain extraordinary retainers. He could not guarantee that he would be able to continue to pay any fees once the estates passed out of his hands: they could only be used as a source of revenue. Throughout the 1470s and early 1480s the surplus income from the estates was paid into Richard’s coffers, often through the hands of his receiver-general Christopher Wansforth\(^4\).

There are three sets of ministers’ and receivers’ accounts of the Latimer estates during Richard’s tenure, including the collection of cornage in Cumberland, which exist for the years 1475-76, 1479-80, and 1480-81\(^5\). Although they do not give us a complete picture, they do show that there were increasing and extreme financial difficulties. The four manors were divided into three groups according to their geographical location - Bolton in Allerdale, half-way between Carlisle and Cockermouth; Warcop and Morland, which straddled Appleby in the Eden valley; and Heversham, about five miles south of Kendal. Apart from the local bailiffs, there were five officers concerned with their administration. The most senior of these was the receiver of all the Neville/Gloucester lands in Cumberland.


\(^4\) Alnwick CM Box 2 (j), (k), (l).

\(^5\) See n. above, on which the next three paragraphs are based.
and Westmorland, which thus included Penrith, who was also the collector of cornage and received a fee of 100s. Under him sat the auditor, who probably operated from Penrith, who received 40s. per year. Next in line came the stewards of each of the three groups of estates who were also paid 40s. each.\footnote{The bailiff of Warcop and Morland also received a fee from the central accounts, worth 60s. 8d. per year.}

The first two offices, the receiver and auditor, were held by William Musgrave and William Werdale respectively throughout the period of the accounts. Musgrave came from the family of Edenhall that had remained loyal to Warwick in 1471 and he was one of those whom Sir William Parr had been commissioned to arrest in July of that year\footnote{CPR 1467-77, p. 288.}. This was his first account, and it is the first sign of his rehabilitation after his rebellion. The previous receiver, William Blodhere had held the office since at least 1455, but he had just died and his executor was busy clearing his debts. Werdale, on the other hand, was a career administrator who was also an auditor of Middleham in 1473-74 and it was probably his father, Robert, who had held the same posts under both Salisbury and Warwick.\footnote{CRO D/Lec/28/27, 28, 29, all f. 1 for the Cumberland offices; PRO SC.6/1050/20, f. 13 and DL.29/648/10485, f. 12 for Middleham.} The stewardship of Bolton remained in the hands of Lord Dacre, who had replaced Sir John Huddleston, from 1475 onwards. The office was of little value financially but it complemented his deputy wardenship and provided him with an additional source of manpower for the defence of the border. Similarly, Heversham complemented the barony of Kendale and Sir William Parr retained the stewardship there throughout. The only office to change hands during the period of the accounts was the stewardship of Morland and Warcop. During the 1460s it had been held by Sir John Parr and after his death it was given to Sir William, but by 1479 it was in the hands of the receiver, a more obvious Gloucester servant. In September of the following year, however, the aged widow of Lord Latimer finally died and all of her estates were resumed by the crown, since her grandson and heir was still a minor\footnote{PRO C.140/77/73; Complete Peerage, vii, pp. 480-81.}.

Gloucester was usually careful to ensure the reversion of temporary grants and wardships, and it is perhaps another indication of his lack of enthusiasm for...
maintaining a presence in the north-west that he did not seek to retrieve them\textsuperscript{80}. On 11th June 1481 Robert Clifford, who never became part of the Gloucester affinity, was granted a rent of £40 from the three Westmorland estates\textsuperscript{81}.

Gloucester’s attitude may have been informed to a certain degree by the critical state of the estates’ finances when they left his hands. Including cornage from the whole county, worth £50.7s.5d., the revenues from the Latimer lands came to approximately £150 each year, of which £16.8d. was paid in fees. In late 1475 when William Blodhere died, he left the accounts in a relatively healthy state, although he owed £61.6s.8d. in arrears. By the time the next account came to be made, however, at the feast of St. Martin’s in Winter 1476 (November 10th to 12th), his executor, Nicholas Coldale, had paid back all but £22.19s.2d.\textsuperscript{82} From then on, William Musgrave’s tenure as receiver was nothing short of catastrophic. Cornage was not collected in that year, probably because Musgrave did not realise that it was one of his duties, and by the end of 1479 the estates had total arrears of over £218, rising to £235.8s.3½d. in 1480\textsuperscript{83}. Although revenues from rents seem to have been falling, just as they were on the Percy estates\textsuperscript{84}, such immense arrears speak of the grossest mismanagement which reflects badly on Gloucester as a lord. It is evident that he was more concerned with providing Musgrave with a sinecure than with making the estates work. Such a wasteful use of resources is also apparent in his stewardship of the Duchy of Lancaster, where revenues from the north parts fell by about £700 between 1464 and 1479\textsuperscript{85}. There, however, there was a council charged with the overall conduct of the duchy, and from 1475 it was actively trying to educate those officers most at fault. In February 1482, though, it

\textsuperscript{80} Hicks, Richard III as Duke of Gloucester, \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{81} CPR 1476-85, p. 274; Horrox, Richard III, p. 59.

\textsuperscript{82} CRO D/Lec/28/27.

\textsuperscript{83} D/Lec/28/28, 28/29. The majority of arrears was amassed before the Scottish war, and was the result of mismanagement rather than destruction.

\textsuperscript{84} Bean, Estates, pp. 22-29.

\textsuperscript{85} Somerville, History of the Duchy of Lancaster, i, p. 254.
bit the bullet and complained directly to Gloucester that it was due to his inefficiency - and that of his deputies - that the duchy north of the Trent had fallen into decay\(^{86}\).

III

This detailed examination of Richard of Gloucester’s wardenship, and the extent of his other interests in Cumberland, has revealed a picture far different from that hitherto believed to be the case. After 1471 Edward IV was not prepared to allow his youngest brother to step directly into Warwick’s shoes, either as warden or as a territorial lord in Cumberland. This was partly a result of his need to reward men such as the Earl of Northumberland and Sir William Parr, but he was equally unwilling to grant a regional hegemony of the strength enjoyed by Warwick to anyone, even his own brother. Just because Richard of Gloucester was favoured over Clarence in the early 1470s does not mean that he was able to exploit Edward’s generosity, and the king was careful not to give him too much power\(^{87}\). As a result, Gloucester’s interest in exercising lordship in the county was probably driven by his financial needs above all else.

This careful approach by Edward was perhaps due to his experiences with Clarence in 1469-70, but it may also have been based on a recognition of some of Richard’s less obvious characteristics. He seems to have been rather petulant at times, and reticent to serve his king unless he got his own way. His attitude towards the wardenship and his other interests in Cumberland and Westmorland speaks more of his concerns for pecuniary gain, and for providing for his closest friends rather than for exercising good lordship in the interests of the local community. It is difficult to see how William Musgrave’s continued service on the Latimer estates could have been justified otherwise. The regalia in Cumberland were primarily of financial interest to him, although the shrievalty held an obvious importance as the domestic arm of the warden’s authority\(^{88}\). As has been seen in

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\(^{86}\) They underlined their point by sending him a copy of the articles relating to his duties - \textit{ibid.}


\(^{88}\) Revenues from the shrievalty, however, were well in excess of £100 - PRO E.199/66/1.
the previous chapter, its grant to Richard in February 1475 probably came as a result of the division of the East and West Marches into specific spheres of interest, but the timing is of significance in another respect. It seems to have been at the same time that Richard’s concerns over the extent of Sir William Parr’s authority came to the fore, and it may have been at this time that the captaincy of Carlisle was separated from the wardenship. If Richard was trying to consolidate his rule in the north-west at this time, it was because he felt slighted rather than because he had suddenly developed an interest in the region.

Although Sir William Parr was the most important royal agent in the West March during Edward IV’s second reign, he would have had no hope of competing with Gloucester as a lord if Richard had chosen - or been allowed - to make his presence felt. Although this was not an issue in 1471, it seems likely that the presence of a second independent royal official who enjoyed the king’s favour in a manner akin to Lord Hastings would eventually have put Richard’s nose out of joint. While Edward was still alive there was little that he could do but to accept Parr’s influence, but the sudden nose-dive which Sir William’s career took after April 1483 is an indication of Richard’s concerns. As the decade progressed, however, Sir William seems to have moved closer to the Gloucester affinity rather than away from it. Once his independent and semi-royal status had been established by 1475, there was little that Richard could do other than to try to absorb him into his retinue and thus add Parr’s influence to his own. With the Fitzhugh lands and authority being so important in the Richmondshire district, he had little option but to include their lord in his local affinity. He had given away his household at Penrith the previous year, and Carlisle was in Parr’s hands. With Edward still supporting Sir William there was little chance of Richard confronting him directly, since he could not afford to antagonise his brother. By 1475 he had already experienced political embarrassment over his attempts to support the Harringtons against the Stanleys and to extend his sphere of influence into the East March, and his agreement to the separation of Carlisle castle from the wardenship left him with no option but to allow Parr to continue as the main royal agent in Cumberland.

89 See below, pp. 211-213; also pp. 220-221, for Sir William’s fate.

Just how active Sir William was as an agent of Richard of Gloucester in the north is impossible to say, because we cannot determine to what extent he saw service to the duke as being an extension of his service to Edward\textsuperscript{91}. There is nothing to indicate that he enjoyed special favour from Gloucester in the same way as did men such as Sir Richard Ratcliffe, or even the Huddlestons, apart from the rather nebulous evidence of the lieutenancy of Carlisle. Even if he had been appointed to that office by Richard, however, one must doubt whether he saw his primary duty as being to serve Gloucester rather than to work for the good of the realm. The time when he is known to have been lieutenant, and struggling to collect his wages, coincided with the period when he was most active as Edward’s negotiator with the Scots. The importance to Edward of securing his northern border in 1471 should not be under-estimated. By 1480, however, he probably had a bit more confidence in his brother’s abilities to govern. The grant of palatine status to the West March in 1482-83 does not really fit with his earlier policy of restricting Gloucester’s influence in the north, but it needs to be put in context. It virtually guaranteed Gloucester’s involvement in the north for the foreseeable future, and freed Edward from the responsibility of prosecuting a war that it is doubtful he wanted to fight in the first place. His premature death in 1483 has been attributed to years of self-indulgent gluttony, and it should not surprise us to find that his faculties were beginning to fail by the previous year\textsuperscript{92}. Certainly his senses must have been dulled, so perhaps it is not so startling that he should give in to pressure from his brother to allow him a greater role in the north.

\textsuperscript{91} Cf. Horrox, \textit{Richard III}, pp. 60-61, who sees Parr’s authority in Westmorland as being a result of his connection to Gloucester.

\textsuperscript{92} Ross, \textit{Edward IV}, pp. 414-15.
CHAPTER 5

Richard of Gloucester and Local Governance, 1471-1483

On the face of things, Richard of Gloucester’s hegemony in Cumberland was so complete that he ought to have dominated the entire shire. As has been seen, however, the principle royal agent in the north-west was first and foremost a servant of Edward IV, and only after that was he one to Richard. The implication has to be that regional government was exercised in the king’s name, rather than in Gloucester’s. As Edward’s second reign progressed, however, Richard’s interest in the north-west increased. After the initial grant of the regalia in 1472 he claimed the shrievalty in 1475, and in 1482 he decided to commit himself to creating his own palatinate in the region. At the same time, Sir William Parr’s interests began to take him away from Cumberland and Westmorland and into Yorkshire and the south. There is nothing to indicate, however, that Edward IV’s basic principle of ensuring that the region remained in the hands of those he could trust changed - one must assume that by 1482 he believed his brother capable of being an effective governor. Initially, however, he was more careful, and any examination of the distribution of the regional offices between 1471 and 1483 must bear this in mind.

A second important point to remember is that despite his control of the regalia, Gloucester did not control the public offices until he secured the shrievalty in 1475 and the escheatorship in 1482. During the 1460s the Earl of Warwick had completely dominated every aspect of public service in the West March, from sheriffs and escheators to justices of the peace and members of Parliament, because Edward had been willing to allow him to do so. In the 1470s, however, when he was more wary of the dangers of allowing over-mighty subjects to become too dominant, all these appointments need to be examined a little more closely to see exactly where the main influence came from.

Thirdly, in 1471 Gloucester was completely new to the region, and from thenceforth he showed little inclination to stay there. The personal element in lordship was a vital ingredient in the formation of strong loyalties\(^1\). From the

\(^1\) Hicks, *Bastard Feudalism*, pp. 164-65.
servant’s point of view, patronage and rewards were more likely to come their way if they had frequent personal contact with their lord than if they did not. Sir William Parr probably had the greatest degree of interaction with Gloucester because of his connections at court and in Yorkshire, but his primary sense of loyalty was to the crown. Richard also needed to create his own affinity in the region to deal with his interests there in his absence. We need to identify this following before it is possible to see the extent to which he was able, or willing, to exercise lordship in the West March.

I

As with the Earl of Warwick, one of the main difficulties to be faced in trying to reconstruct the Gloucester affinity in the north-west is the absence of evidence from Penrith and the wardenship. Only one indenture of retainer between Gloucester and a man from Cumberland exists, that made with Henry Denton of Carlisle on October 1st 1473\(^2\). There is no indication of where it was written and it follows the same pattern as those made by Warwick in 1462 with the small group of men from Westmorland. It is at least an indication of Gloucester’s intention to create an armed following in the West March, but it does not show how he intended to use it. The Dentons were part of the ruling oligarchy in the city and five years later Henry was to become the mayor\(^3\), so it seems likely that his service to Richard was predicated on the political influence it gave him within Carlisle. Thomas Hutton of Hutton John, near Penrith, had been granted an annuity by Warwick in August 1461 for his “good and acceptable service” and in 1473 Gloucester confirmed the award, and repeated it in December 1475\(^4\). The award was to be charged to the demesne of Penrith, but this is the only evidence we have of an extraordinary retainer receiving a fee from the lordship under Gloucester. This is not to say that


others did not exist - both Warwick and Gloucester paid local fees from local estates and evidently saw the Middleham affinity as a separate entity, a fact reflected in the lack of representation of men from Cumberland or Westmorland in its ranks in the 1460s and 1470s. Only one man retained at Middleham, Thomas Louther, can be linked to the region. He was retained on 16th October 1473 by letters dormant at the rate of 2d. per day, indicating that his service was during pleasure rather than for life\(^5\). His exact provenance is unknown, but it is likely that he was related to the Louthers of Louther.

Only a few other men are known to have served Gloucester, all of them in some official capacity. The most significant of these was Humphrey Lord Dacre, who served as Richard’s lieutenant-warden from at least February 1475\(^6\). The Moresbies, Sir Christopher and his brother James, owed their offices of steward and bailiff of the honour of Penrith to Parr. Sir Christopher had served Warwick in that office prior to 1471 but he was married to one of Sir William’s sisters and he joined his brothers-in-law at Barnet and Tewkesbury, where he was knighted\(^7\). James’s career throughout the 1470s seems to have relied more on his connection to Sir William than to Richard. He was an elector of Cumberland in 1472, returning Parr’s candidates, and by July 1476 he was serving Edward IV as a yeoman of the chamber. In 1480 he was granted the portership of Carlisle castle in succession to another Parr man, Roland Thornburgh, but after Richard’s accession to the throne he remained out of favour until after 1485\(^8\).

None of the men who had dominated Cumberland and Westmorland under Warwick in the 1460s, the Huddlestons, the Musgraves and Richard Salkeld, were able to compete with the influence that Parr had. The Huddlestons had perhaps not been forward enough in displaying their loyalty to Edward IV and Musgraves and Salkeld had backed the wrong side in 1470-71. The king’s long memory meant that they had little chance of success in the following decade. They were, however, still important figures within the region. As such they were still

\(^5\) PRO DL/29/648/10485, f. 12.

\(^6\) Foedera, v(iii), p. 58.

\(^7\) NRO ZHW/1/92; James thesis, pp. 415-19; Metcalfe, Book of Knights, p. 3.

\(^8\) CPR 1467-77, p. 596; CPR 1476-85, pp. 133, 181, 189; Wedgwood, Biographies, p. 611; see below, pp. 184, 199ff.
important to the duke, despite being out of favour with Edward, and all of them found advancement in his service. When Richard usurped the throne in 1483, it was these men who formed the core of his north-western support.

The Huddlestons of Millom were the least affected of the three families, but even so they struggled against Parr’s overwhelming dominance. Sir John Huddleston had been a central figure in Warwick’s control of Cumberland, and he had linked himself very closely with the Nevilles. His eldest son had married Warwick’s illegitimate daughter and his third had married Isabel, daughter of the Marquess Montague, but in 1471 he appears to have supported Edward if only by his neutrality. He made no appearance during the Readeption Crisis himself but his youngest son, Thomas, was probably killed during the battles of 1471 fighting beside Gloucester. In 1477 he was gratefully remembered by the duke in his endowment of Queen’s College, Cambridge, as one of his “servanders and lovers”. Sir John’s role in Warwick’s Cumberland had disappeared when the honour of Cockermouth had been given back to the Percies in 1470, but in March 1472 he was granted the lordship of Egremont by Edward for the rest of his life, without having to render account, in return for the loss of his offices. Such local influence could not be matched by anything Gloucester had to offer, but he retained his close links with Middleham. Although there is no evidence of him having been retained, he was a frequent advisor to the duke at Middleham and he was Gloucester’s first sheriff after he secured the office in 1475. In July of that year, after he had been granted the right to appoint a deputy, Gloucester may have passed that power on to Sir John.

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11 CPR 1467-77, p. 312.


13 W. Hutchinson, History of the County of Cumberland (2 vols., Carlisle, 1793-97, reprinted Wakefield, 1974, for Cumbria County Library), vol. i, p. 528.
The evidence concerning the rest of his family is equally difficult to interpret unless we accept that Richard’s interest in exercising his authority within Cumberland was limited. Sir John’s eldest son, Richard, made no impression in the county before the Scottish war apart from being escheator in 1473-74. In 1482, however, he accompanied Richard on the invasion of Scotland and was both knighted and made a banneret, a dual honour reserved only for the most eminent servants. The second son, also John, had a much more successful career as a crown servant, but this had begun in the 1460s. Through his connections at court he married the widow of Christopher Harcourt. In the early 1470s he may have been appointed to office at the duke’s castle and lordship of Sudeley in Gloucestershire, but in March 1478 Richard exchanged his interest there in return for consolidating his authority in Yorkshire. In the same month, as a king’s esquire, John was appointed as steward and receiver of the lordship and constable of the castle there. In 1480-81 he was the escheator of Hampshire and Wiltshire, and in the following year he held the same office in Gloucestershire. The third surviving son, William, also remained in the north where he was Gloucester’s receiver in Cumberland and Westmorland, but like his brother Richard his only public position was as escheator. If the Huddlestons were close to Richard, and the weight of evidence certainly suggests this, then it did them little good in pursuing public office in the north.

The Musgraves suffered even more from an exclusion from public office, especially in the 1470s. Based at Edenhall in Westmorland, they had no hope of competing with the Parrs in that county after 1471 and, unlike the Parrs and Huddlestons, they had failed to secure a foothold in the royal household during the previous decade. Richard (III) Musgrave, the head of the family, began to be re-

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14 Lists Escheators, p. 27; Metcalfe, Book of Knights, pp. 6-7; Gibbons, ed., “Gentlemen Knighted at Hutton Field”, pp. 83-84. The other two men similarly advanced were Edward Stanley and John Grey of Wilton.

15 Horrox, Richard III, p. 56.

16 CPR 1476-85, p. 93.

17 CPR 1476-85, p. 314; CFR 1471-85, 643; Lists Escheators, pp. 53, 147; Wedgwood, Biographies, pp. 477-78.

18 Lists Escheators, p. 27; CFR 1471-85, 697.
appointed to commissions in Westmorland from November 1475, which could only have happened with Parr’s acknowledgement, and his brother, John, was appointed escheator of the two counties in 1477. A second brother, William, served as Gloucester’s receiver in Cumberland and Westmorland from 1476, and his uncle, Richard (II), was appointed to the commission of array in Westmorland with him in 1480.  

Richard Salkeld suffered the most from his failure to select the right side in 1470-71, for two main reasons. The first was due to his position in the local social hierarchy. His advancement in the 1460s had been solely due to Warwick’s patronage, and he had felt less secure about deserting his lord than did men who enjoyed independent lordship within their own liberties. His own lands were relatively small and, once his patron had been removed, his fall was that much greater. The second reason was his lack of personal empathy with Edward IV. His failure to pay the revenues from the honour of Cockermouth into the Exchequer had got him into frequent trouble, and he had only survived with Warwick’s protection. After 1471 he lost all of his influence and it was not until 1479 that he again served in public office as the escheator, quite a come-down for a one-time sheriff and governor of a quarter of the shire. Interestingly, the opinion in which he was held by Edward was not shared locally. In 1472 he was elected to Parliament as one of the knights of the shire for Cumberland along with Sir John Parr, at a time when Sir William Parr was the returning officer. This must have been an attempt by Sir William to rehabilitate Salkeld with the king, but it did not work. Even Gloucester seems to have been wary about employing him directly, although he may have served as one of Lord Dacre’s deputies on the March. There is nothing to tie him


20 See above, pp. 99.

21 Lists Escheators, p. 27; Lists Sheriffs, p. 27.

22 Wedgwood, Biographies, p. 738.

to the duke before the usurpation, but in November 1483 he took the opportunity to show how willing he was to serve the new king.\textsuperscript{24}

\textbf{II}

Lordship in the middle ages can be defined as the amount of influence that a man had over a particular area of land, whether that was a few scattered fields or a kingdom, and the magnitude of that influence is measured by the amount of patronage he was able to extend to his followers from the control of that land.\textsuperscript{25} The best measure of who was dominant in a particular region is to examine the offices and lands available there and to see who was appointed to them, and by examining their other activities to try to link them to a particular lord. By this method it has been possible to reconstruct affinities in the Duchy of Lancaster, Gloucestershire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Warwickshire, Cornwall and Yorkshire in the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{26} Indeed, Richard of Gloucester’s reputation as “Lord of the North” is built on such a methodology, even if it has not been particularly thorough. On the face of things Richard’s control of Cumberland was virtually complete by 1475, but the problem is that analysis has stopped here and has not examined how the patronage within his gift was distributed. By looking at the public offices in the county, and the various commissions that were appointed there during the period, then we can establish more accurately the actual extent of his lordship during Edward’s second reign.

The problem faced in making such an analysis is to understand the delicate balance that Edward had to achieve between giving Richard too much power and allowing him to exploit his over-mighty status, or restricting him too much

\textsuperscript{24} See below, p. 235.

\textsuperscript{25} Hicks, \textit{Bastard Feudalism}, pp. 158-59.


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and risking alienating him as he had Clarence in 1469. While Edward could not afford to make too many appointments which might run against Gloucester’s interests, neither could he allow his brother total control. It is here in particular that Sir William Parr’s value was the greatest. First of all he was well-known in the region. He had been active there throughout the 1460s and of his six sisters, five were married to men from the north-west. In addition to Lord Dacre, Sir Christopher Moresby, and Sir Thomas Strickland, he also had as his brothers-in-law Sir William Harrington and Thomas Ratcliffe of Derwentwater27. He was a pivotal figure in West March society and could act as the main conduit of royal patronage into the region. Moreover, he knew the region and how it was used to functioning. As has been seen, the emphasis had traditionally been on co-operation between the various affinities in the mutual interests of defence28. Warwick had failed to understand this properly and had lost the support of counties as a result. If Edward was to re-establish the strength of loyalty to him as king that he expected, then he could not afford to ignore the needs of the locality. To do that, he needed the advice of someone who knew and understood just what these were.

The shrievalty was generally the most important public office available within a county so it was a natural focus for Gloucester’s attentions. In Westmorland, however, the office had been granted first to Sir John Parr and, after his death, it had gone to Sir William29. In Cumberland it’s effectiveness was much reduced. It carried some additional weight because of the existence of the March, but the extent of the sheriff’s authority was limited by the independent liberties of Cockermouth, Egremont and Millom, as well as the baronies of Burgh and Gilsland. The office was the natural corollary of the wardenry since the latter’s powers were limited to dealing with infractions of international law, leaving domestic difficulties to be dealt with by the sheriff30. The concentration of the office’s authority in and around Carlisle, however, meant that initially at least Edward was reluctant to allow it to fall into the hands of the warden. The first sheriff of Cumberland to be


28 See above, Chapter 1.

29 PRO E.199/62/2; CPR 1467-77, p. 531.

30 See above, p. 18; Reid, King’s Council, p. 25.
appointed after Tewkesbury was Parr’s brother-in-law, Sir Christopher Moresby and the second was Parr himself. As lieutenant of the castle Parr had an interest in Carlisle, but the shrievalty was more useful in the March as a whole and Richard obviously balked at allowing an extension of his authority. He was perhaps beginning to realise just how influential Parr was and sought to restrict him by securing control of the shrievalty, and for the next two years the office seems to have been controlled by Sir John Huddleston. He was sheriff himself in that year and he was followed by his son-in-law, Sir William Legh of Isel. The 1474 sheriff, Richard Curwen, was a sharp reminder to Gloucester that he was still dependent on his brother but in early 1475, after Richard had regained control, it was Sir John who was appointed his deputy. The only other known deputy sheriff, however, John Crackenthorpe of Holgill, held the office in 1479 but he had no known connection with the Huddlestons. Rather, he was probably closer to Sir William Parr, since his lands fell within the barony of Westmorland. By this time, however, Parr was moving closer to Richard, and the duke may have had some influence over the appointment.

The second most important office, the escheatorship, actually had an inflated value because it extended over both Cumberland and Westmorland, including the liberties. It was of less particular value to the warden than the shrievalty but was more important to the crown. In general it seems to have been divided between Parr and Huddleston, and usually it went to the man who did not hold the shrievalty. During 1471 and 1472 while Parr controlled the sheriff’s office, it was Huddleston’s men who became escheators. The first to hold the office, in July 1471, was Thomas, son of Sir William Legh and in November he was replaced by Sir Thomas Lamplugh, brother-in-law of Huddleston’s wife. John Salkeld of Rosgill in Westmorland, who held the office in 1472-73, was more closely associated with Parr, being chosen to represent Westmorland in the Parliament of the same year. With his relatives he had supported Warwick during the


32 Lists Sheriffs, p. 27; Ragg, “Feoffees”, p. 315.

33 See above, p. 181.

34 Both Huddleston and Lamplugh had married daughters and co-heiresses of Sir Henry Fenwick - Lists Escheators, p. 27; History of Northumberland, vol. xii, pedigree opp. p. 352.
Readeption, and he had been one of those pardoned in September 1470 and July 1471 with his kinsman, Richard, for holding Carlisle castle against the king\textsuperscript{35}. He had been involved in a long-running dispute with Thomas Sandford of Askham and in 1472 the latter was forced to submit to an arbitration settlement made by the Parr brothers\textsuperscript{36}.

As with the shrievalty, Gloucester tried to take a greater degree of control over the appointment of the escheatorship in 1473. In that year Sir John Huddleston’s relative Sir William Legh was the sheriff, and his son Richard was appointed as escheator. In the following year, however, Edward IV recognised the imbalance and the equilibrium was restored with another Parr candidate, Roland Thornburgh, being selected. He had been appointed as porter of Carlisle castle on July 8th 1471 at a time when Parr was lieutenant, and in February 1474 he had been granted the Clifford lands of Penrith and Carleton in Cumberland at Gloucester’s expense. In 1477 when he renewed the grant of the portership it was as a king’s servant, and this time he secured it for life. He did not enjoy it for long, however, since he had apparently died by January 1480 when his offices were redistributed to two yeomen of the chamber, James Moresby and William Ryther, neither of whom were Richard’s men\textsuperscript{37}.

The following years show a similar swing back and forth between Huddleston and Parr nominees, but eventually Gloucester’s dominance began to show. From 1475 onwards, with Parr becoming more closely associated with Richard, he was less able to withstand the pressures to succumb to Gloucester’s wishes. In 1475 the escheatorship was held by William Curwen of Workington, whose grandmother had been a Huddleston\textsuperscript{38}. In 1468 she had released to him her

\textsuperscript{35} Wedgwood, Biographies, p. 738; CPR 1467-77, pp. 214, 277.

\textsuperscript{36} CRO D/Lons.AS.67, 68.

\textsuperscript{37} CPR 1467-77, p. 264; CPR 1476-85, pp. 36, 169, 181. Thornburgh had strong ties with the Cockermouth affinity in 1478/9, but his position could have been the result of his connection with Parr rather than the cause of it - CRO D/Lec/29/5, f. 9. Reports of his death may have been premature, since a man of the same name continued to be appointed to commissions of the peace during Richard’s reign, and was still working locally in November 1485 - CPR 1476-85, p. 556; CRO D/Stan/1/23. See above, p. 176, for Moresby.

\textsuperscript{38} Curwen, History of the Ancient House of Curwen, p. 78.
rights to the farm of the manor of Preston Patrick, and in 1471 his father had unsuccessfully petitioned for him to be appointed porter of Carlisle, losing out to Thornburgh. The escheator in 1476, Robert Warcop, whose son, also Robert (d. 1467), had been retained by Warwick in 1462, held lands in Warcop in Westmorland as part of the old Clifford barony of Westmorland (for which he paid socage) and from the Latimer lordship there, for which he had paid no rent while Parr was the steward. In 1477 the office went to John Musgrave, and the next known escheator was Richard Salkeld in 1479.

Musgrave’s family was closely associated with the duke, and his appointment is the first indication of Gloucester’s influence over the office becoming apparent. Salkeld is not known to have been a Gloucester servant at the time when he held office, although it is likely that this was the case. In 1478 his name was second on the list of those who supported Roland Brice’s claim of English nationality, and he was obviously an important figure in Carlisle at that time. In 1472, though, he had been chosen as an MP for Cumberland with Sir William in control of the election, and he might also be counted as part of his affinity. If so, then we can see a degree of co-operation and merging between the Gloucester and Parr interests. Parr, however, had failed to resurrect Salkeld’s public career in the early part of the decade and he may have moved towards Gloucester as a result. He may have held the escheatorship for two years, but in 1481 William Huddleston was appointed. Even though the office was now being dominated by families associated with Gloucester, he was still being restricted to men who came from the locality who were as much influenced by their position within the county as by their loyalty to him. This sense of localism, important though it was for maintaining local unity, did not necessarily work in favour of the local magnate. Gloucester’s interests were not the same as those of the March community and, where he was looking to accrue wealth an influence, the escheators were probably more concerned with maintaining a sense of continuity. For this reason, Richard felt it necessary to include the grant of the escheatorship in the terms of the Fotheringhay agreement.

39 Ibid., p. 90; CRO D/Cu/1/1, printed in Ragg, "De Culwen", pp. 423-25.

40 Ragg, "Feoffees", p. 327; Alnwick CM X.II.3, Box 2(k), f.2.

which gave him so much of the regalia in Cumberland. The escheatorship covered both counties, not just Cumberland, so his claim to it gave him more than he needed. It did, however, give him another hold over the March as a whole, including the Parr estates. The final appointment before he became king, that of John Green who was unknown in the north-west, was the duke’s alone, and it is significant that he chose an outsider instead of a local man\textsuperscript{42}.

The appointments of crown officers show that, from about 1475 onwards, Richard of Gloucester began to exert a much stronger grip over Cumberland, although it is still possible to see the vestiges of Parr’s influence until about 1481. It seems likely, however, that Edward was only willing to allow Richard to have control of the shrievalty because of its limited influence, and because many of the shrieval farms were allocated to the warden for his wages anyway. Many of the perquisites granted to Gloucester in 1472 and 1475 had been in the hands of Salisbury and Warwick in 1457 when they retained Sir Thomas Neville as their deputy\textsuperscript{43}. By 1475, however, the office’s financial value to the crown was limited. Ever since Richard Salkeld had been granted £170 from its issues on the 15th June 1468, each successive sheriff had petitioned for an allowance of that amount against the issues of approximately £250. That sum was usually granted to them in tallies at the beginning of their year in office, and the costs passed on to the next account\textsuperscript{44}. The escheatorship, however, shows that, although he was able to influence the men chosen to hold the office, Gloucester did not feel that he could control them to the extent that he wished to. If he had been able to, he surely would not have insisted on being granted the right of appointment in 1482 and using his own servant who was unknown in the region.

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\textsuperscript{42} Possibly from Essex, Green was appointed as escheator of Lancashire as soon as Richard became king in July 1483 - Somerville, \textit{History of the Duchy of Lancaster}, i, p. 466.

\textsuperscript{43} PRO E.327.183; Madox, \textit{Formulare Anglicanum}, pp. 102-3.

\textsuperscript{44} PRO E.199/62/1; E.404/74/1/38, 75/2/82, 75/3/55; \textit{Cal. Doc. Scot.}, iv, 1379, dated 13th July.
Once again, the importance of localism has become apparent. Men from the region had a strong concern for maintaining a sense of unity and for preventing any one lord from dominating unduly. This had been the custom which had been followed successfully until the late 1450s and, despite Warwick’s attempts to force his own affinity’s total dominance, the established sense of loyalty to the king before all others was still strong. The crown’s officers, however, were relatively unimportant throughout the two counties - the shrievalty in particular was very restricted. Of greater importance to the locality, and perhaps a better indicator of the crown’s attitude towards the counties, were the commissions charged with exercising justice in the region. It is within these that it is possible to see just how far Edward IV was prepared to go in allowing his brother’s influence to predominate.

Only three commissions of the peace were appointed in Cumberland during Edward’s second reign, but their composition reflects the concern to achieve a balance between the different power blocs in the county. The first was appointed on 20th June 1473, and included a wide range of men. It was headed as a matter of course by the dukes of Clarence and Gloucester and the Earl of Northumberland, and included two justices of the northern circuit, Richard Nele and William Jenney. The local notables included Humphrey Lord Dacre, Sir William Parr, Sir Thomas Lamplugh, Sir John Crackenthorpe, Sir William Legh, Sir Thomas Curwen, Sir Thomas Broughton, Sir Christopher Moresby, another John Crackenthorpe, Roland Thornburgh, John Appleby, William Bewley and Richard Huddleston. Of these, only Parr, Huddleston and Moresby are known to have had links with Gloucester at this time, but it is likely that Dacre and possibly Legh did as well. Of the others, Sir Thomas Lamplugh was the Percy-appointed receiver of the honour of Cockermouth and Curwen and Broughton were members of the affinity. Curwen had been feed from the honour since 1442; Broughton’s father had been feed in 1442 and 1453. Broughton was later to become lieutenant of the honour and one of

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45 Reid, King’s Council, p. 26.

46 CPR 1467-77, p. 610.


48 See above, p. 183.

49 CRO D/Lec/29/2, f. 1; 29/3, f. 1.
Richard’s most famous partisans, but at this time there is nothing to link him to Gloucester apart from the possibility of having served together during the Readeption. The two Crackenthorpes, Thornburgh, Appleby and Bewley were all probably lawyers. Appleby and Bewley were most likely based in Carlisle and may have been involved in the administration of the March. Appleby had been the deputy sheriff and coroner of Cumberland in 1462 under Sir John Huddleston and in 1467-68 he had acted as farmer of the royal appurtenances in the county instead of the sheriff. Although he had links with Warwickshire and had thrived in Warwick’s service, he survived the Readeption intact. In May 1473 he acted as a mainpernor for Sir Christopher Moresby and in 1478 he was elected an MP for Carlisle. Bewley, on the other hand, was closer to the Percies. During the 1470s he was employed as the clerk in their forest courts of Westward, but in 1478 he was working with Thornburgh and it may have been his position in Carlisle which brought their patronage.

Although the commission shows a mix of Gloucester and Percy adherents, it is also a combination of men associated with Sir John Huddleston and Sir William Parr. Huddleston’s connection was the most numerous, but Parr’s was the most influential. Huddleston himself was omitted, but Sir Thomas Lamplugh and Sir William Legh were his relatives by marriage, and Richard was his eldest son. Legh, however, was also retained at Cockermouth and in 1478 was receiving a fee of ten marks. In addition, Huddleston’s role as lieutenant of Cockermouth in the previous decade would have brought him into contact with Curwen and Broughton. Curwen certainly had Yorkist sympathies, having served in

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50 CRO D/Lec/1/A/302, f. 3.
51 CCR 1461-68, p. 42; Lists Sheriffs, p. 27.
52 CFR 1471-85, 208; Wedgwood, Biographies, p. 15; Carpenter, Locality and Polity, p. 646.
53 CRO D/Lec/29/5, f. 45; CRO D/Lons/WH.8; Wedgwood, op. cit., p. 57.
55 CRO D/Lec/29/5, f. 45.
the campaign to capture the Northumbrian castles in 1462, and in 1471 he had petitioned for his son to be granted a royal office because of his own long and faithful service\textsuperscript{56}. Although there is no evidence of a social link between the Huddlestons and the Broughtons, they lived no more than five miles apart and probably knew each other well.

On Sir William Parr’s side, the most important figure was Lord Dacre. He was Parr’s brother-in-law, but his position in the county was not strong at this time - he was still involved in a dispute with his cousins, the Dacres of the South, over his rightful inheritance, which was yet to be settled by the king in Parliament\textsuperscript{57}. Sir Christopher Moresby, although a Gloucester servant, was also Parr’s son-in-law and this family tie should not be overlooked. Roland Thornburgh owed his promotion to Parr, and his inclusion on the commission ought to be seen as being due to his influence also\textsuperscript{58}.

The other men are more difficult to pin down, but the likelihood is that they were included because they were known to either Parr or Huddleston. These were the two men who probably had the most influence in the county - one at court, the other at Middleham - and it is they who would have been asked by their lords to name men who could be trusted. Appleby was a known associate of Moresby, and was probably selected by Parr; Bewley’s career at Cockermouth may have pre-dated the Readeption, in which case his links to Huddleston might have been significant. The Crackenthorpes are impossible to place accurately. Sir John probably came from Holgill in Westmorland. He had married a Musgrave and had served on various commissions of the peace in his home county in the previous decade\textsuperscript{59}. The other Crackenthorpe probably came from Newbiggin in the same county\textsuperscript{60}. Both families held some of their estates from the Cliffords, and their

\textsuperscript{56} CRO D/Cu/1/1; See above, p. 98.

\textsuperscript{57} Rot. Parl., vi, p. 73.

\textsuperscript{58} See above, p. 183.

\textsuperscript{59} Wedgwood, Biographies, p. 233; Moor, “Crackenthorpe of Newbiggin”, pp. 72-73; Ragg, "Early Owners of Edenhall”, pedigree opp. p. 226; Lists Sheriffs, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{60} Moor, op. cit., pp. 53, 90, appears to confuse the two.
involvement in the commissions may have been a result of the Parrs’ control of those lands\textsuperscript{61}.

This first commission of the peace shows that Edward IV’s main concern was to establish a sense of equilibrium in the county, which could not be achieved by relying on one over-mighty subject to govern it for him. There were too many interests involved, most notably the Cockermouth affinity. During the 1460s it had been completely excluded from any position of authority by the Earl of Warwick, but clearly Edward wanted to give it at least some voice in the administration of the shire once again. The rehabilitation of the fourth Earl of Northumberland may have had something to do with this. Edward was trying to recreate the balance of power that had worked so well in the first half of the century, but the results were rather different than he had hoped for. When the Earl of Salisbury had been warden of the West March there had been a deliberate attempt to involve all affinities in the administration of the region, but the upheavals of 1459-61 meant that this was no longer possible. This was not because those affinities were now incapable, but because the incumbent wardens refused to trust them. During the 1460s Warwick had relied totally on his own men. In the 1470s the East and West Marches were divided into separate spheres of interest in which neither warden was allowed to interfere with the other.

Whether or not this policy was desired on Edward’s part is impossible to say, but it came about as a result of Gloucester’s attempt to expand his authority into Northumberland in 1473. The resulting settlement between him and Henry Percy prevented either from claiming any office previously held by the other, and from retaining any servant already retained by the other\textsuperscript{62}. This barred Gloucester from employing any of the Cockermouth affinity in the defence of the March as Salisbury had done, even if he had wanted to. Like the Earl of Warwick, however, Edward IV had a tendency to rely on men whom he knew he could trust, and so the appointments to crown offices remained in the hands of known Yorkists\textsuperscript{63}. During the 1470s, though, Edward was more concerned to find ways of reinforcing loyalty to the crown among a larger proportion of the population. The Earl of

\textsuperscript{61} Ragg, “Feoffees”, p. 315.


\textsuperscript{63} Ross, \textit{Edward IV}, pp. 301, 323-30.
Northumberland was also a loyal subject, and had been given back his family’s possessions in order to bring them round to supporting the Yorkist dynasty. His affinity could not, therefore, be ignored.

There were only two other commissions of the peace in Cumberland, one on 10th November 1475 and one on 28th April 1481. No new personnel were added, but Lamplugh, Broughton, Sir John Crackenthorpe, Appleby and Richard Huddleston were omitted from them both. The only other casualty, Clarence, was omitted after his death, but he had had no impact on the proceedings anyway. It is not clear why it was felt necessary to slim the commission down, but both Percy and Gloucester lost representatives. Of the remaining JP’s, Curwen and Legh were part of the Cockermouth connection, but Dacre, Parr, and Moresby - and thus by extension Bewley and Thornburgh - were more closely associated with Gloucester. More importantly, however, it shows that Sir William Parr’s influence was growing at the expense of the Huddlestons. Of those who had been excluded at least three were Huddleston representatives and their position, closely linked as it was to the Cockermouth affinity, was similarly weakened.

The undermining of the Huddleston bloc is particularly interesting because of their close links with Middleham. During the 1470s this was where their main patronage came from and they can be more readily identified with Gloucester than they can with Edward. Parr, on the other hand, was predominantly a crown servant. It did not matter, therefore, that of the other JP’s two - Dacre and Moresby - were Richard’s retainers. The chief authority on the commission was Parr. The only men who were independent of him were the bishop, Legh, Curwen and Bewley, the lawyer. The king was therefore safe in the knowledge that justice in the county would be dispensed according to his wishes first and foremost. While Gloucester’s interests coincided with those of the crown then the commission could be described as being his, but with a loyal and dedicated crown servant included who enjoyed such a strong influence over at least three other members of the bench then there was little chance of private justice being handed out.

Richard’s concerns for impartial justice are known to have extended only to cases involving others, so the restriction of his influence in a region where he had a great deal of potential influence is worth noting.\(^{65}\) The other commissions

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64 CPR 1467-77, p. 610; CPR 1476-85, p. 556.

appointed in the county also reflect Edward’s concerns. The commission of array appointed on March 7th 1472 was part of a series of thirty four to deal with general unrest throughout the country, each of which was headed by Clarence and Gloucester, so their involvement in any one place was minimal.\(^{66}\) They were joined by the Earl of Northumberland in the four northern counties, so again his personal impact in Cumberland and Westmorland is in doubt. The main burden, as always, fell on the local men. In Cumberland they were Sir Humphrey Dacre (he did not receive his baronage until 1473), Sir William Parr, Sir Thomas Lamplugh, Sir John Crackenthorpe, Sir William Legh, Sir Thomas Curwen and Sir Thomas Broughton. This is the first sign of Dacre’s rehabilitation after his attainder in 1461, even though he had been pardoned in 1462 and had probably served the Nevilles on the border.\(^{67}\) Parr was probably included as lieutenant of Carlisle but the main strength of the commission lay at Cockermouth. This may be an indication of where the centre of the disturbances lay, and the Huddleston influence was strong in Lamplugh and Legh, but for the first time since 1461 the Cockermouth affinity was being given some responsibility in the county. Despite Gloucester heading the commission, his affinity is virtually non-existent. Only Parr could be classed in this category, but his position lieutenant of Carlisle was probably not due to Richard.\(^{68}\)

There were three other commissions appointed in Cumberland prior to 1483, which show Parr’s overwhelming influence. On August 3rd 1474 Sir William Legh was appointed by himself to enquire into wool and other merchandise that was not reaching the staple of Calais, a complaint which appears to have been levelled against the honour of Cockermouth in particular.\(^{69}\) Legh was the sheriff that year, which is probably the reason for him being named, but there was little he could do by himself. A similar commission was issued in Westmorland, however, with which he was expected to co-operate, and that was dominated by Parr.\(^{70}\) Two years later, on August 3rd 1476 a commission of oyer and terminer to enquire into forgery in

\(^{66}\) CPR 1467-77, pp. 348-52, esp. pp. 349, 350.

\(^{67}\) See above, p. 81; Rot. Parl., vi, pp. 44-45.

\(^{68}\) See above, pp. 162-163.

\(^{69}\) CPR 1467-77, p. 490.

\(^{70}\) See below, p. 197
Cumberland and Westmorland was given to Lord Dacre, Sir Richard Nele, Sir William Parr, Sir Thomas Strickland, Sir Christopher Moresby, John Crackenthorpe of Holgill, and John Wharton of Kirby Thore, most of whom (with the exception of Nele, the judge) can be linked to Sir William 71. Dacre, Moresby and Crackenthorpe’s connections have been described already 72. Strickland was another of Parr’s brothers-in-law and had been knighted with Moresby and John Parr after the battle of Tewkesbury 73. Wharton had been part of the Clifford affinity in the 1450s and had been one of Thomas Lord Clifford’s feoffees, as well as a JP for Westmorland from 1454 to 1461 74. Nothing is known of him during the 1460s, but his relative Geoffrey Wharton had entered the king’s service by 1467, probably with the Parrs, and by 1473 was a serjeant-at-arms 75. By the 1470s John too had made his peace with the Parrs, quite possibly thanks to Geoffrey, and he once more began to appear as a JP in Westmorland 76.

The final commission, to array troops to fight in the war against Scotland, was issued on June 20th 1480 and reflected the emergence of Gloucester’s influence in the county 77. Apart from Richard and Northumberland, it included Lord Dacre, Parr, Sir John Huddleston, Moresby, Legh, Broughton, Richard Huddleston, Richard Salkeld and Thomas Ratcliffe of Derwentwater (father of Sir Richard, he was another of Parr’s brothers-in-law) 78. By this time Parr was moving away from the north-west, and his influence there was diminishing as his absences became longer. Lord Dacre and Moresby again were the most important Gloucester servants, but all of the other appointments probably came as a result of

71 Ibid., p. 606.
72 See above, pp. 189.
73 James thesis, pp. 415-19; Metcalfe, Book of Knights, p. 3.
74 CRO (Kendal) MSS Great Book of Record, ii, p. 407; CPR 1452-61, p. 680.
75 CPR 1467-77, pp. 31, 50, 261.
76 CPR 1467-77, p. 634; CPR 1476-85, pp. 576-77.
77 Ibid., p. 214.
78 James, op. cit., pp. 416-18 - see above, p. 181.
his influence. Sir John Huddleston’s name may have been included to give his son’s name some weight since by this time he appears to have been resident in Cambridgeshire, where he was a JP from February 1481. Sir Thomas Broughton’s geographical connection with the Huddlestons has already been noted, and it may well have been through them that he first came to Gloucester’s attention. However, he is not known to have received any patronage from Richard until 1483. His inclusion on various commissions during the 1470s was probably a reflection of his status within the Cockermouth affinity but his appointment as lieutenant of the honour in late 1479 came out of the blue. As one of Northumberland’s servants he could not be retained by the duke, and so when he was made a banneret by Gloucester on 24th July 1482 it was probably at the earl’s request. Richard Huddleston was to be similarly honoured at the same time, but Richard Salkeld’s career was only just beginning to recover. Sir Richard Ratcliffe, on the other hand, had long been associated with Gloucester and his father’s involvement in the 1480 commission indicates how influential he was with Richard by then. He had been knighted after the battle of Tewkesbury and had married the widow of Christopher Boynton, on whose lands at Sedbury, near Barnard Castle in Durham, he settled. He was steward of Barnard Castle for Gloucester from at least 1476, and on 10th February 1479 he was one of the duke’s feoffees. In 1480 he represented Gloucester on the commission of array in Northumberland, and in 1482

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79 CPR 1476-85, p. 555.

80 LRO DD/K/2/6. Sir Thomas is not known to have received any fee from Cockermouth prior to that. The previous lieutenant of Cockermouth, Sir Lancelot Threlkeld, had died during that year and a certain William Norman had been paid five shillings for watching over his body. Sir Thomas was certainly the incumbent by Michaelmas 1482 - CRO D/Lec/29/5, f. 32; D/Lec/1/A/302, ff. 3-3v; Gibbons, ed., “Gentlemen Knighted at Hutton Field”, pp. 83-84.

81 Metcalfe, Book of Knights, pp. 6-7; cf. Gibbons, op. cit., which states that he was part of the Earl of Northumberland’s vanguard at the time.

82 See above, p. 155.

he was made a banneret during the Scottish campaign. As a younger son he had been forced to leave Cumberland to seek out patronage, but whether he arrived at Middleham with Richard in 1471 or whether he was introduced later by his maternal uncle must remain conjecture.

Just because Gloucester was not so concerned with his authority in Cumberland and Westmorland does not mean that men there were not interested in him. The region was dominated by his sphere of influence as warden, even if in practical terms this was left in the hands of others, and service within this sphere offered the prospect of promotion into royal circles. Such men, however, tended to be of little importance within the shire or, like Ratcliffe, younger sons who left the region to seek a living elsewhere. There can be no doubt that Thomas Ratcliffe’s appointment to the commission of 1480 was the result of his son’s position and it shows just how far the balance had swung in Richard’s favour once the Scottish war had begun. Taken with the re-emergence of the Huddlestons this is the best indicator we have of Gloucester’s personal interest in Cumberland and Westmorland expanding. Only when he needed to, when the Scottish war demanded manpower, did Gloucester consider the far north-west as anything other than a source of income.

IV

The commissions appointed in Westmorland were, above all else, a reflection of the Parr interest in the county and unsurprisingly there is little to show that Richard had any sway. Taking the commissions of the peace, there was not much change in their personnel between the first, on May 6th 1474, and the fourth, on April 27th 1481. The Duke of Clarence (until his death), the Duke of Gloucester, the Earl of Northumberland and the two judges, Richard Nele and William Jenney, were appointed as a matter of course, but the next most important JP, Humphrey Lord Dacre, was there not just in his role as the resident (and


85 The other two were appointed on November 10th 1475 and October 27th 1476 - CPR 1467-77, pp. 634-35; CPR 1476-85, pp. 576-77.
therefore most active) deputy warden of the March but also as Parr's brother-in-law. Parr's presence on the commission is hardly a surprise, and neither is that of Sir Thomas Strickland or Sir Christopher Moresby. The other four members all owed their appointments to Parr. John Wharton was the most successful and he was beginning to re-establish himself in the county, but the other three, Nicholas Taverner, Thomas Batty and William Gilpin were little more than yeomen. Taverner had served on all commissions of the peace from December 1461 until the Readeption, and Gilpin had been pardoned on December 2nd 1471 as a yeoman of Sleddale in Westmorland, just to the north of Kendal. Batty had a long history of service to the Parrs. In 1455 he had been on the jury of inquisition post mortem led by William Parr that had enquired into the lands held by Thomas Lord Clifford at his death. In December 1461 he had been appointed as one of the foresters of Whinfell on the same day that John Parr was made the chief forester.

The manor of Whinfell was granted to Warwick as part of the Clifford lands in the following year and he took control of the forest when he was given custody of the king's forests north of the Trent, which explains Batty's presence as a JP in Cumberland during the Readeption. He remained loyal to the Parrs, though, and in 1475-76 he was the reeve of Warcop while Parr was the steward.

Together, these men represented the core of the Parr following in the early 1470s, but as the decade progressed so the affinity developed. The subsequent commission of the peace, in November 1475, included Richard Musgrave and Thomas Middleton at the expense of Gilpin. Musgrave's case is interesting. Although he himself had not been named as a rebel in July 1471 all the rest of his family had been, and his failure to support Edward IV led to his exclusion from public office. His family, however, became closely associated with Gloucester and his brother, William, was soon to take over as the receiver of the Latimer estates. Richard's inclusion in the commission, therefore, may have been due to

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86 See above, p. 192.

87 CPR 1461-67, p. 575; CPR 1467-77, pp. 257, 634.

88 CRO (Kendal) WD/Hoth./Box 34/D.1; CPR 1461-67, p. 86.

89 CPR 1461-67, pp. 186, 189, 540; CPR 1467-77, p. 610; Alnwick CM X.II.3, Box 2(j), f. 1v.

90 See above, p. 168.
pressure from Gloucester. Thomas Middleton was the son of Sir Robert Middleton of Leighton in Lancashire, who had married Agnes, the daughter of Roger Beetham, the younger brother of Sir Edward Beetham of Beetham in Westmorland. After Edward's death in 1472 his estates passed to Agnes, and Thomas was settled on them. His family name was common throughout the north of England and other branches had strong links with Middleham, but neither he nor his father can be tied to Gloucester before 1483. In 1476, however, his father obtained a dispensation for Thomas's marriage to Joanne, the daughter of Sir Thomas Strickland and the subsequent wedding placed him firmly in the Parr circle.

The only other person to serve as a JP was Christopher Batty, Thomas's son, who was appointed on October 27th 1476. The final commission, in April 1481, contained no changes and shows that in the area of law enforcement Westmorland was still Parr's own country despite Gloucester's increased concern with Cumberland, a fact testified to by the various other commissions appointed during the period. The commission of array of May 1472 was almost identical to the first commission of the peace, with only Gilpin excluded, but the enquiry into goods being smuggled past the staple of Calais in 1474 reflected the problems associated with a liberty franchise in the heart of the region. Richard Barowe may have had Parr connections, since in 1471, with Richard Moresby, he had been granted the keeping of Roger Beetham's lands. His strongest links were with the Earl of Northumberland, however, and in August 1472 he had been appointed as approver of subsidies and customs on Holy Island. The other member of the

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91 Wedgwood, Biographies, pp. 61-62; Nicolson & Burn, i, pp. 627-28; Farrer, Records Relating to Kendale, ii, p. 284.


94 CPR 1467-77, p. 350.

95 Ibid., p. 490.

96 CPR 1461-67, p. 60; CFR 1471-85, 46, 122. See also CPR 1467-77, p. 605; CPR 1476-85, p. 200.
commission, Robert Lamplugh, was probably related to the receiver of Cockermouth, Sir Thomas Lamplugh\textsuperscript{97}. Taken with the Cumberland commissioner, Sir William Legh, this points to the honour being the source of the trouble\textsuperscript{98}.

The commission of oyer and terminer in the two counties in August 1476 has been seen already to have been at Parr's nomination\textsuperscript{99}, but the final commission of array in June 1480 shows how his authority was being undermined by Gloucester. For the first time the duke was able to make his presence felt more strongly. It was headed, of course, by Gloucester and Northumberland and, with Parr himself excluded, the balance of the commission lay with the duke. Lord Dacre and Sir Christopher Moresby were his retainers, and the Musgraves, Richard (II) and Richard (III), probably owed their presence to their links with him. The other members were more closely associated with Parr, but their influence was undermined by his absence. Sir Thomas Strickland and Thomas Middleton were included, as were James Pickering, William Thornburgh, Thomas Wharton and Reginald Warcop\textsuperscript{100}. The Pickerings of Killington in Westmorland were tenants of the Parrs but James was married to one of Christopher Moresby's daughters\textsuperscript{101}. Thornburgh was probably the son of Roland, whose family came from Maud's Meaburn, near Penrith, part of the old Clifford lands, but he had established himself in the Furness region of Lancashire\textsuperscript{102}. The Warcops of Smardale were probably also Parr followers, and Wharton was the son of John Wharton of Kirby Thore, whose relative Geoffrey was a yeoman of the chamber\textsuperscript{103}.

It is not known why Parr was excluded from the commission. There is no evidence of him being elsewhere, but he was beginning to resurrect his career at

\textsuperscript{97} He had acted as an arbitrator in a dispute between Sir John Pennington and Sir Thomas Lamplugh in 1465 - CRO D/Pen./47/22.

\textsuperscript{98} See above, p. 192.

\textsuperscript{99} See above, p. 193.

\textsuperscript{100} CPR 1476-85, p. 214.


\textsuperscript{102} See above, p. 183.

\textsuperscript{103} See above, p. 193.
court and it may have been his own choice to be absent. Given his overwhelming influence in the county it is a surprising omission, especially when his continued presence in Cumberland is considered. Perhaps he felt secure enough of his authority in his home county to allow others to carry the burden while he concentrated on his commitments elsewhere. The lack of evidence for the last two years of Edward’s reign makes it impossible to come to any firm conclusions about what was happening to Parr’s authority in the region, but by December 1481 he no longer saw himself as being from the north-west. He still had to travel north on occasion to deal with his estates, but in that month in witnessing a grant, probably of a marriage portion, he was recorded as Sir William Parr of Westminster.\(^{104}\)

There is one final piece of evidence, the returns for Parliament, which show perhaps more clearly than anything else that Parr’s authority in the far north-west was far from nominal, and that Edward IV relied on his influence more than he did Gloucester’s. Elections to Parliament were perhaps the most important public offices available within a shire, and to be able to farm them out was a good indication of the power and influence that a lord was able to wield. From McFarlane onwards, historians have used lists of MP’s to demonstrate a lord’s dominance over a county.\(^{105}\) During the 1450s and 1460s aristocratic control of both shire and borough elections in Cumberland and Westmorland was complete. All of the shire MP’s during this period can be identified as followers of either Percy, Neville or York, but at least they all had local connections. The borough elections returned seventeen MP’s of whom only four are known to have been resident.\(^{106}\) During the 1470s, however, there is little evidence of magnatial interference. There were eight seats in Cumberland and Westmorland, two from each county and two from each county town, Carlisle and Appleby respectively, but of these the two from Appleby were generally reserved for crown nominees.\(^{107}\) Returns exist for the Parliaments

\(^{104}\) CRO D/Lons/BM.120.


\(^{106}\) Ibid., p. 502; idem, “The ‘Revolution’ in Northern Borough Representation”, pp. 44-47. Richard Bewley was probably a resident as well as the three identified by Dr. Jalland.

of 1472-75 and 1478, and these show that, apart from Appleby, all the other seats were controlled by the Parrs rather than by Gloucester. In 1472 Sir William was sheriff of Cumberland, and secured the return of his brother and Richard Salkeld for the county and Robert Skelton and John Coldale for Carlisle. Skelton had long been associated with the Yorkists, having been rewarded with £100 for capturing Sir William Legh in 1462, but although he was certainly acceptable to the regime there is nothing to tie him to Gloucester. Coldale was certainly in Parr's debt. He had been made a forester of Inglewood for life on May 1st 1467 but in October 1471 Robert Boste tried to exploit the recent upheavals by denouncing him as a rebel and seizing his office. Coldale in turn petitioned the king, and on 27th November a writ was sent to Sir William Parr to summon Boste into Chancery to explain why he should not be stripped of his position. By the end of April 1472 he had failed to appear and Coldale was re-instated. In Westmorland, Sir John Parr as sheriff secured the return of his brother and another Salkeld, John of Rosgill. He had been involved in a long-running dispute with the Sandfords, and his service to the Parrs enabled him to involve them on his behalf. In June 1472, no more than three months before he was elected, the dispute with Sandford had gone to arbitration again. Sandford's bond was increased to 500 marks, but this time he was faced by both Sir William and Sir John Parr rather than Salkeld. They were both to present their cases to independent arbitrators, but if no settlement was reached by a particular date then Sandford was to submit to the award of the Parrs themselves.

The Parliament of 1478 was of particular importance to Edward IV, since it was called in order to impeach his brother. He did his utmost to pack it with his supporters, so that there would be no hitch in the proceedings. The shire

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108 For what follows, see Wedgwood, Register, pp. 410, 420.

109 The return is printed in Wedgwood, Register, opp. p. cvi.

110 PRO E.404/72/1/113.

111 CPR 1467-77, pp. 16, 280, 341.

112 CRO D/Lons/AS.68.

113 Ross, Edward IV, pp. 343-44.
representatives for Cumberland in 1478 were Sir William Parr and James Moresby, Sir Christopher's younger brother, and those for Carlisle were Edward Redmane and John Appleby. Moresby had benefited from the Parr connections with the court and by July 1476 he was a yeoman of the chamber, but despite his position as bailiff of Penrith he never seems to have settled in Gloucester's service. Appleby, a lawyer, had long been associated with Carlisle and had served as a JP for Cumberland in 1473. He was an associate of Sir Christopher Moresby, and again it is a moot point as to whether his election was due to his acceptability to Parr or to Gloucester. Redmane, who was no more than twenty two and training to be a lawyer, was the younger brother and heir of Sir William Redmane, of Harewood in Yorkshire and Levens in Westmorland, who himself was elected knight of the shire for Westmorland. Sir William had married Margaret, the sister of Sir Thomas Strickland, in 1458 and had inherited his estates as recently as 1476, of which Levens was held from the Parrs. It seems likely that while his father had been alive he had lived on the family's satellite estates in Westmorland, gaining experience of land management, and his heart was certainly there rather than in Yorkshire. When he died in 1482 he asked in his will that his body should be buried at Heversham. His father had been retained at Middleham and Edward was later to be as well, but there is no such evidence for Sir William. He was, however, made a knight banneret by Gloucester at Hutton Field on July 24th 1482.

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114 See above, p. 176.
116 Wedgwood, *Biographies*, pp. 611, 709-10; CPR 1467-77, p. 596.
family had always concentrated on their Yorkshire estates and held office there rather than in the north-west, and this was the first sign of them becoming involved in Cumberland and Westmorland. With Sir William Parr’s increasing influence in Yorkshire and his links to Redmane through the Stricklands, this may have been as much due to him as it was to Gloucester.

The impression gained is that it was local influence that mattered in the Cumberland elections. Gloucester himself seems to have had little personal interest in them, otherwise it would seem more likely that the Huddlestons would have figured somewhere. The same was true in Westmorland, where Parr as sheriff was the returning officer and Sir William Redmane was joined by Sir William Harrington. Harrington, of West Leigh in Lancashire, was a kinsman of the Harringtons of Hornby, and was yet another of Sir William’s brothers-in-law. He was later to serve Richard as king, being given lands and a role in local affairs in Kent, but there is nothing to tie him to Richard as duke. He had been retained by Warwick in the 1460s out of Middleham, but there is no evidence of any such connection from the 1470s and his election in this case seems to have been due to his family connections.

V

The overall absence of direct ducal influence in the elections for Parliament in 1478 show most clearly that Edward did not trust Gloucester in the north-west as much as he did Sir William Parr. Despite Gloucester’s apparently overwhelming authority in Cumberland, all of the evidence points towards Parr as being the man who actually exercised power in the region during the second half of Edward IV’s reign, at least until the Scottish war began. Richard’s interest in the county was only financial until that time, but even then it was not until the idea was raised in 1482 of creating a personal fiefdom in the north-west that it was anything more than nominal. Money went out of the county, not into it. The Latimer

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121 Wedgwood, Register, pp. 434, 444. See James, “Sir Thomas Parr”, p. 21 for the family’s traditional dominace of elections in the shire.

accounts show that most of the revenues were paid to the receiver of Middleham\textsuperscript{123}, and Carlisle struggled to get the money awarded by the king for the repair of its walls. Eventually the mayor had to travel to London in December 1481 to collect £59 of the £100 that had been allocated\textsuperscript{124}. Until Edward, Richard and the duke of Albany met at Fotheringhay in late May 1482 it seems to have been crown policy to prevent Gloucester from developing a political concern in the county. The grants of regalia in 1472 and 1475 did not give him any political authority, but rather we should see them as compensation for his loss of influence to Sir William Parr.

Given the experience of 1469-71 and the spectacular failure of his policy of regional hegemonies in the north, it is not surprising that Edward thought twice about giving Gloucester the same degree of freedom as he had allowed Warwick. Instead, he sought to re-establish the principle of loyalty to the king by strengthening direct royal authority in the region. However much he favoured Gloucester over Clarence he needed to cut the Gordian Knot of the wardenship, and he did this by inserting his own servant into the chain of command.

The maintenance of Carlisle castle as a truly royal garrison was important in restricting the authority of the warden or his deputy, but it was control of the county’s offices and commissions that was vital in weaning the locality off its dependence on magnatial power. For this Edward had to be reliant on a local man to act as his agent who was both undeniably loyal but also dependent on royal favours for his. Parr eschewed magnatial factionalism as the main cause of the political upheavals of the previous twenty years, and throughout the 1470s we see him trying to heal the divisions that it had created. After 1471 it was probably him rather than Richard who ensured that the Cockermouth affinity was represented on commissions and in local office, and he tried to re-establish Richard Salkeld’s career as a public servant. Having served as sheriff of Cumberland himself in 1472 he understood the office’s limitations and it may well have been on his advice that Richard’s principle servants in the county, the Huddlestons, were allowed to take control of the office. The same applies to the escheatorship. It was the commissions of the peace which were the balancing force in the north-west, since whichever lord the sheriff was serving he could not secure an unsafe conviction in the face of a broad cross-section of the various affinities.

\textsuperscript{123} Alnwick CM X.II.3, Box 2 (j), (k), (l).

\textsuperscript{124} CRO D/Lons/C.61.
The fact that it was Parr and not Richard of Gloucester who was chosen for the role of re-establishing royal authority in Cumberland is instructive about Edward’s attitude towards his brother. The dangers of creating “over-mighty subjects” were fresh in his mind and, despite Richard’s loyalty in 1471, he could not take the chance that one day he might behave in the same manner as Clarence. They certainly shared some common characteristics - all three brothers were skilled debaters, as witnessed by the Crowland chronicler, and they were also by turns both generous to their supporters yet avaricious. Another family attribute that has been added to the list is their occasional lack of political acumen, quite possibly the result of arrogance[^125]. Edward displayed it wonderfully in his dealings with Marquis Montague in 1470 when he lost his throne, and again in the 1480s when he was consistently wrong-footed by Louis XI. Clarence’s obstinate refusal to accept a degree of moral responsibility for his earlier treachery by failing to come to an amicable settlement with his brothers in the early 1470s led inexorably to his impeachment. Gloucester’s rather ham-fisted attempt to undermine the Earl of Northumberland’s affinity in 1473 is outstripped by his belief in August 1482, obviously communicated to his brother, that the duke of Albany would remain loyal to the agreement made at Fotheringhay.

Perhaps, in Edward’s case at least, this judgement is a little harsh, since one can only admire his absolute refusal to give Gloucester any political authority in Cumberland and his promotion of Parr in his stead. The skill lay in giving Richard the trappings of power - the wardenship, control of the royal appurtenances, even the shrievalty - which at least did not diminish his honour as Warwick’s successor in the north, but at the same time excluding him from any effective jurisdiction. There was an element of luck involved, with a number of factors coinciding to provide Edward with opportunity, but being able to exploit good fortune effectively is the mark of a capable politician. Warwick’s presence in both Cumberland and Westmorland had been immense but his treason and death, coupled with the re-instatement of the Earl of Northumberland and the necessity of rewarding Parr’s timely display of loyalty, gave him the chance to break up the Neville power bloc. From the start, it seems, Richard was warned to stay out of Cumberland, and he does not seem to have attempted to make any inroads

unrelated to the wardenship. Rather, it seems that he accepted the political restrictions placed on him in return for financial remuneration, an agreement that was formalised by the removal of Penrith castle from the settlement of the Warwick inheritance.

The use of Sir William Parr, and the way in which Gloucester was kept out of the county, demonstrates that there was a distinction to be made between the royal and ducal affinities. Although there is some evidence of them merging together, Edward was also careful to discriminate between the two where necessary. Service to one did not preclude service to the other, but those from the region who advanced during the 1470s were the ones who gave Edward priority over his brother. The men from Cumberland or Westmorland who were most closely associated with Richard after his usurpation, the Huddlestons, Musgraves and Sir Thomas Broughton, were all but excluded from power in the county during the 1470s. Parr’s authority was not absolute, but the channel of royal patronage depended on finding favour with him. Thus the Sandfords of Askham, minor players in the 1460s, were unable to make any impression in the following decade. Thomas Sandford had been Sir John Huddleston’s deputy in the honour of Cockermouth from 1464, but in 1471 he had remained loyal to Warwick and, with the Musgraves, he suffered forfeiture. At the time he was involved in a long and damaging dispute with John Salkeld of Rosgill, which went to arbitration several times but was not resolved until the latter’s death in 1480. In August 1465 Sandford gave a bond of £200 to abide by the award of several named arbitrators, and at this time he had Sir William Parr on his side, but by 1472 Salkeld had managed to make Parr his own lord.

This is not to say that Gloucester had no power in the region at all. With retainers such as Lord Dacre and Sir Christopher Moresby prominent, and his increasingly close links to Parr himself, he had a measure of influence. He was, however, forced to rely on the “Parr connection” to the exclusion of his own probable favourites, the Huddlestons and the Musgraves. Because of Sir William’s close links with Edward IV there was no way that Richard could get past him.

126 CRO D/Lons/AS.60; CPR 1467-77, p. 288.

127 CRO D/Lons/AS.82.

128 See above, p. 200.
only way was to work with him. For this reason, we ought to see in Richard’s motivations for going to war with the Scots in 1480 not just the chance to exercise some of his martial muscles, but also to extend his influence in the north as a whole.
Part III

Richard III
The reigns of Edward V and Richard III were dominated by events in the south of the country. Beginning with Edward IV’s untimely death at Windsor on April 9th 1483, all the decisive incidents of the period took place south of the Trent. On April 30th Richard captured the Prince of Wales at Stony Stratford, and two months later he usurped the throne in a palace revolution. The immediate reaction was muted, but widespread opposition soon engulfed the southern counties. The most striking feature of his reign was the imposition of his trusted northern servants into lands and offices in the areas most troubled by this rebellion. Even his death on 22nd August 1485 was outside the region he had made his own.

This is not to say, of course, that the north of the country had no impact on these two reigns. In fact, quite the contrary. It was Richard’s northern troops who supported his protectorate and provided the threat that prevented any opposition to his usurpation in London. It was a northern army that quelled the Buckingham Rebellion, and northerners who were “planted” in the south of the country to reinforce crown authority. Finally, it was the desertion of Richard’s northern retainers that led to his untimely demise at Bosworth. It is impossible to write a history of any region of the north of England during this period without examining the role it had in shaping events in the south.

The current orthodoxy is that both Cumberland and Westmorland played as important a role in Richard III’s reign as did his Yorkshire affinity, especially with regard to the “plantations”. Although there is little evidence of its involvement, Professor Ross saw the use of families such as the Musgraves and Huddlestons as evidence of the north-west’s importance in Richard’s plans as a whole. The previous section, however, has shown that during the 1470s their

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involvement in his affinity did not enable them to acquire more than a slender grasp over authority in the region. It was only once the Scottish war had begun that Richard was able to use them instead of having to rely on Sir William Parr’s influence. This chapter starts by looking at the ways in which Richard was able to extend his power in the region during the Protectorate. It goes on to examine the event that changed the whole direction of his reign, the Buckingham Rebellion. Dr. Horrox identified the northern affinity as being central to Richard’s control of the southern counties, but an examination of the list of land grants made towards the end of his reign tells a different story. Out of the 168 men named, whereas “three dozen or so” came from the north-east, only four can be identified as being normally resident in Cumberland or Westmorland. The list is incomplete and, as will be seen, other men received different benefits, but certainly nowhere near as many as would be expected. The north-west, in fact, has closer parallels with Richard’s affinity in East Anglia than with that from Yorkshire. Only three men from that region received any benefit from the Buckingham Rebellion. One of them, Sir James Tyrell, already had lands in the south-west, and the second, Sir Robert Chamberlain, had to wait until March 1485 and the death of Sir Richard Huddleston. The third, Thomas Radcliffe, who has been confused with the father of Sir Richard Ratcliffe, was a yeoman of the crown from Suffolk who was granted various offices in Exeter. Dr. Horrox’s explanation of this phenomenon, that his retainers there were “presumably...simply too useful where they were”, deserves further investigation.

The most important point to realise about Richard while he was Duke of Gloucester is that he was not a prince but a magnate, albeit with royal blood in his veins. In early 1483 he was fourth in line to the throne. Edward IV’s death brought him one step nearer but with two princes before him, one of whom was only

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2 Harl. 433, i, pp. xxx-xxxii; iii, pp. 140-55, esp. pp. 141, 144, 145. They were Sir Thomas Broughton, John Musgrave, Edward Ratcliffe and John Wharton, but others with links to the county included Sir Richard Ratcliffe and Edward Redmane; Pollard, North-Eastern England, p. 353.

3 Horrox, Richard III, p. 192, and n. 38.

4 Harl. 433, i, p. 201; ii, p. 73; iv, p. 164; CPR 1476-85, pp. 399, 473, 490.
a year or so away from being of marriageable age, there was little likelihood of him ever reaching it. This is not just the view of the modern historian, but it must also have been the contemporary opinion of the country at large. For that reason when Edward IV had decided to exercise more personal rule over the north-west, there was little that Richard could do about it. It also meant that Richard had never had a taste of absolute power. Throughout his life he had always been subordinate to his brother.

It is now accepted that Richard’s capture of the Prince of Wales at Stony Stratford on April 29th 1483, as the young Edward was being escorted to London by his Woodville mentors, was not part of a long-term plan to take the throne. Rather, it was part of the power struggle that immediately engulfed the royal council from the moment that Edward IV had died. Once Richard had control of the Prince, he was able to have himself named as Protector and the Woodvilles were all but destroyed\(^5\). The emphasis at this stage was on continuity. Gloucester portrayed himself as the best man to maintain the stability of the realm, and the Woodvilles as the disruptive element. Concerns about their role after the coronation of Edward V were widespread in the royal circle, and many of Edward IV’s household accepted that the duke represented the best chance of a smooth transition between the two kings. Even in July 1483, just after Richard had taken power, he made relatively few changes to local power structures. Most commissions remained unchanged, and most royal officers continued to enjoy their positions. The implication, as Dr Horrox noted, was that “where no changes were made, it was because Richard believed the men were reliable”\(^6\). The same principle can be applied to appointments made prior to the usurpation. Gloucester assumed loyalty unless proven otherwise, so when the Woodvilles fell it was only their offices which were redistributed, not those of their servants\(^7\).

It is in these circumstances that the commissions of the peace appointed on May 24th 1483 ought to be viewed\(^8\). Whether or not he was planning to usurp the throne at this time, Gloucester’s protectorate was dependent upon the

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\(^8\) *CPR 1476-85*, p. 556, 576.
support of the royal household and the maintenance of a sense of continuity. The best way to achieve this in the shires was to appoint men who had held influence under Edward IV's rule. In the north-west, however, the situation was slightly different from the rest of the country because of Richard's newly-acquired personal interest, but stability was still the key. He could not flood the region with his own imported appointments without alienating local society, but for the first time he had the chance to alter the balance of power in his own favour. Before, Sir William Parr had probably had as much say over the various appointments made by the king as Gloucester had, even though the Scottish war had tipped the balance in Richard's favour. Now, for the first time, Gloucester was able to use the men whom he wanted. The commission of the peace for Cumberland at his command thus continued to comprehend Parr because of his central position in the royal household and ties with the Fitzhughs, but it was extended to include some of Richard's own supporters. Sir Richard Huddleston, Sir Thomas Broughton and Sir Thomas Legh were the local men added to replace Sir William Legh, who had probably died. Whereas before the balance had been held by Parr, since no man could act against him without opposing the king, it was now held by Gloucester. As the Protector, he was now the supreme authority in the realm and even Parr had no choice but to serve him. The influence that Parr had at court and in the north, however, could not be ignored. He was still the comptroller of the royal household and a Knight of the Garter, and his exclusion would have undermined Gloucester's claim to represent the continuity of the Yorkist regime. This did not mean, however, that his influence in the north-west could not be swamped by the appointment of men more favourable to the duke. Sir Richard Huddleston had been made a banneret by Gloucester in 1482 and the other two were members of the Cockermouth affinity 9. The Earl of Northumberland was one of Gloucester's staunchest supporters and the inclusion of his men must be seen as tipping the scales towards the duke. Not only that, but those who were perhaps on the borderline due to their previous links to Parr would have swung towards Gloucester, since he now represented the crown interest in the county. Lord Dacre's office in the West March took on new importance with the grant of the palatinate, and John

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9 Metcalfe, *Book of Knights*, pp. 6-7; Gibbons, ed., “Gentlemen Knighted at Hutton Field”, p. 84; CRO D/Lec/302/A/1.
Crackenthorpe may well have been employed as Gloucester's receiver in Cumberland by this time\(^\text{10}\).

The similar commission in Westmorland shows an equally fluid state of affairs, and it is indicative of Gloucester using the vast increase in his power to extend his influence into Parr's own country\(^\text{11}\). Parr himself was excluded for the first time in more than a decade, but his personal interest in the county seems to have been on the wane. Four other men were also dropped, all of whom had been totally dependent on Parr for their position. Thomas Middleton, his son-in-law, was the most prominent, but the others had been little more than yeomen who may have been effective, but who did not have the status to match their authority. Thomas and Christopher Batty, Nicholas Taverner and John Wharton were omitted, to be replaced by Sir Christopher Moresby, Edward Redmane, John and Anthony Crackenthorpe and James Pickering. Although all of these men could also be linked to Parr, their strongest allegiance now was to Gloucester. Moresby was Parr's son-in-law but was also steward of Penrith. Although he had served before on commissions of the peace in Westmorland he had been excluded from them since 1475, possibly because of his growing allegiance to the duke. Redmane had also become a part of the duke's affinity by 1483. In 1478 his election as an MP for Cumberland had probably been due to his brother's relationship with Parr\(^\text{12}\), but Sir William Redmane had died in September 1482 and the family estates passed to Edward as the next heir. William had been made a banneret by Gloucester in July 1482 during the Scottish campaign and Edward was able to make use of this connection for his own advantage. On 10th May 1483, at a time when Parr was out of favour, Redmane was able to secure a re-evaluation of the family estates in Westmorland and control over allocation of the dower to his brother's widow\(^\text{13}\). The Crackenthorpes, father and second son, were almost certainly Richard's servants.

\(^{10}\) He was Richard's deputy sheriff in Cumberland in 1477 and he was receiver by October 1483 - _Lists of Sheriffs_, p. 27; _Harl. 433 ii_, p. 28.

\(^{11}\) CPR 1476-85, p. 576.

\(^{12}\) See above, p. 201.

by this time but why the eldest son Ambrose should have been passed over in favour of Anthony is unknown\textsuperscript{14}. Pickering came from Killington in Lonsdale, near Kendal, and very little is known about him. He was, however, married to Sir Christopher Moresby’s daughter and was probably included because of this\textsuperscript{15}. All of these men had links with Parr, but with Richard in a position of absolute authority their appointment at this time must be regarded as being due to him. The commission only had power in the barony of Westmorland, which Parr dominated because of his control of the Clifford lands there. It sent a clear signal to him that his political dominance in the far north was at an end, and that from then on any influence he had beyond his own lands was on Richard’s sufferance.

There was only one new piece of patronage that came the way of the north-west as a result of Richard’s coup and the fall of the Woodvilles. Thomas Grey, Marquis of Dorset, who had forfeited his lands early in May, had held some estates in Lancashire and Cumberland including the lordship of Millom\textsuperscript{16}. Sir Richard Huddleston was made their receiver and bailiff of Copeland, and granted an annuity of twenty marks from the issues of the Dorset lands\textsuperscript{17}. At this time the duke may still have seen his future as lying in the far north-west, and his hold over Cumberland was so complete that he had little reason to worry about creating a large affinity. The Protectorate was not going to last for ever, and once Edward V was ruling in his own right then Gloucester would have needed some other interests. Firstly, although only one grant, it does appear to fit into the pattern of his exercise of patronage which became apparent later in his reign\textsuperscript{18}. By giving all of the offices to one man he did not take full advantage of the patronage at his disposal, but he did so in the full knowledge that Cumberland had little option but to obey him. Secondly, it displays his lack of options. There was, quite simply, no-one else in his affinity whom he could trust with authority in that region of the county.

\textsuperscript{14} Moor, “Crackenthorpe of Newbiggin”, p. 73; see above, n. 10.


\textsuperscript{16} CIPM H.VII, i, 621, 969; Horrox, Richard III, p. 91.

\textsuperscript{17} Harl. 433, i, pp. 39-40, 74.

\textsuperscript{18} Horrox, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 266-67, 316-17.
This was not a problem early in 1483, but as his reign progressed the narrow base of his support in throughout the country was to become increasingly important\(^\text{19}\).

The problem of Richard's future plans in late May and early June 1483 is crucial to our understanding of his usurpation. The assertion of the contemporary chroniclers, Crowland and Mancini, that he was already scheming to take the throne, has been shown by Professor Ross to be flawed\(^\text{20}\). Although some men may have had suspicions that Richard planned to take the throne after his *coup* at Stony Stratford, by late May he had done nothing else untoward. The coronation planned for the 22nd of June would have ended the Protectorate, however, and the evidence shows that Richard wanted to extend his role beyond that time.

Parliament had been called for June 25th and the draft speech of Bishop Russell, the chancellor, clearly indicates that Richard was hoping to break with tradition and to extend his hold on power until Edward V came of age\(^\text{21}\).

The speech provides us with an important insight into the operation of the Protectorate and how Richard saw its development. Clearly he expected to be given "the tutele and oversyght of the kynges most roialle persone durynge hys...yerses of tendirnesse". The main business of Parliament was to grant the powers of Protector to Richard, "so behoffulle and of reason...tylle rypenesse of yeres and personelle rule be...concurrente togedyr" in Edward V. The second item on the agenda, however, was taxation. Russell also wove into his speech the theme of "the execucion of the defence of thy Reme, as wele ageynste the open ennemies as ageynste the subtylle and faynte fryndes of the same"\(^\text{22}\). Since Scotland was the only country with whom England was at war at that time the reference is obvious but, by raising the spectre of the "subtylle and faynte fryndes", the French, Russell played on the traditional xenophobia.

Edward IV had always had to struggle with Parliament when he wanted to raise money for wars, often because he used the money to line his own pockets,  

\(^{19}\) *Op. cit.*, pp. 265-68.


\(^{22}\) All quotes are taken from Nichols, *op. cit.*, pp. xlvii-xlix, unless otherwise stated.
but Richard was hoping that it would be more sympathetic towards him. Russell chastised the nobles and commons roundly for having little faith in their monarchs, saying:

"Yf ever the nobles and peuple of this londe were kynde to any of ther princes, if they hadd at eny tyme a good truste of justice...Iff therefor hit greved them not to renewe by auctoryte of parliamente syche grauntes as were thought yn the tyme of other kynges cowd not well be spared...who can thynke but that the lorde and commens of thys londe wylle as aggreaibilly pourvey for the sure mayntenaunce of [Edward's] hygher estate as eny of their predecessours have done to eny other of the kynges of Englonde afore..."

He had set the scene by comparing the country to a human body and by placing the crown at its centre, in the stomach. "That bodye is hole and stronge whois stomake and bowels is ministered by the utwarde membres...for when they be fedd they fede agayne, yeldynge un to every parte of the bodye that withoute the whyche no man may leve". In his final summing up, Russell pleaded, "God graunte that thys mater [the extension of the Protectorate] and syche othir of necessite [my italics] owithe to be furst moved for the wele of the kyngge and the defense of thys londe, maye have goode and breff expedicion yn thys hyghe courte of parliament".

Given the long-standing mistrust between Parliament and the Yorkist kings, the request for taxes so early in Edward V’s reign needs to be considered carefully. First of all, since Russell had been appointed by Richard, it must be assumed that his speech is a fair representation of Richard’s intentions, at least as far as the bishop was aware. There is, of course, the possibility that Richard was planning to take the throne but had not yet included any of his colleagues in his schemes. This, however, seems unlikely. The rather ham-fisted attempts to justify the usurpation in the first few days by attacking his own mother’s virtue, as chronicled by Mancini, do not speak of any depth of thought. Not surprisingly she took umbrage, and the attack was switched to the legitimacy of Edward IV’s marriage to Elizabeth Woodville. Other evidence also points to Richard being quick to use decisive action when it was needed, but lacking the capacity to think through the consequences.

Although Professor Ross has cast doubt on the veracity of Mancini’s anecdote, it


24 Mancini, Usurpation, pp. 95-97.

25 Horrox, op. cit., p. 325.
should not be dismissed out of hand\textsuperscript{26}. He was, after all, there at the time and, although his interpretations do not match the standards expected of modern historians, his actual knowledge of events is without parallel\textsuperscript{27}.

Russell’s speech is, therefore, as close as we are likely to get to knowing just what Richard’s actual intentions really were in early June 1483. Apart from extending the Protectorate, his long-term aim was to use this extra time in power to bring the full weight of the realm behind an invasion of Scotland. Edward IV had shown himself extremely reluctant to commit funds to this because of his dream of establishing his country at the centre of European diplomacy. Richard did not share those hopes. He had been involved in the Scottish war for three and a half years and at every turn he had been thwarted by a lack of funds. Even the grant of the palatinate had been made conditional upon Richard paying for any future campaigns himself. If the petition brought before Parliament in 1484 to substantiate his claim to the throne is anything to go by, he saw himself as a great warrior whose “Princely Courage, and memorable and laudable Acts in diverse batalls, which we by experience know ye heretofore have done” were an added justification\textsuperscript{28}. Just where these experiences were, however, was not declared - as a great warrior, he had not actually won any set conflict himself. Although he had fought at Barnet and Tewkesbury in 1471 he had not been in command, and the French campaign of 1475 had been a military debacle. Even in 1482 he had failed to bring the Scots to battle, and the capture of Berwick was by prior arrangement. His most significant martial achievement to date had been the burning of the small town of Dumfries. In the early summer of 1483 his reputation as a soldier was at stake, and his next campaign was going to be the invasion of south-west Scotland. Although it is not stated explicitly that the money to be raised in taxes was to be devoted to the Scottish campaign, this was the obvious implication.

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\textsuperscript{26} Ross, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 88-89, n.80.

\textsuperscript{27} Hanham, \textit{Richard III and His Early Historians}, pp. 30-31.

On June 26th 1483, Richard was proclaimed as the third king of England of that name. In his own mind the usurpation had been a complete success. He was the *de facto* monarch and his attempts to show his right *de jure* had met with no opposition. The Woodvilles had been disgraced, and the council had been cowed by the swift justice meted out to Lord Hastings. His policy, therefore, remained much the same as it had done during his Protectorate with the emphasis lying on the continuity that he represented. His attitude towards lordship under normal circumstances was entirely conventional, allowing local men the rule of the shires in the king's name^29^.

Apart from a handful of men who had interests at court as well as on their own estates, the vast majority of the gentry in England had concerns that were predominantly parochial. Local society was incredibly robust and resistant to outside interference, and could not be changed overnight. A lord could stamp his authority on a region, but that could only be done from within existing structures and by the promotion or demotion of local men, and this in turn was dependent on the amount of patronage available to him. Lucrative offices were usually temporary in nature, since only in rare cases were they hereditary and even then they could be subject to an Act of Resumption. More often than not they were given for life or during pleasure, or even in some cases for a fixed term (as in the wardenship of the Marches), so the establishment of a permanent following based on such tenure was nigh on impossible. Once the present incumbent died or was removed, he might have been succeeded by a stranger, perhaps even his political enemy, so the affinity was always wary of becoming too closely associated with any one individual. The solution for the gentry was to see service as being to the office, not the office-holder. The Woodville affinity in East Anglia was the result of the queen’s control of the Duchy of Lancaster estates in the south, and many of their servants owed more loyalty to the crown than they did her. When forced to make a choice in early 1483, most of them remained loyal to the throne and the “Woodville” affinity disintegrated with hardly a whisper^30^.


quickly chose the Duke of Buckingham as their new lord\textsuperscript{31}. The safest way, therefore, to ensure a political following was to have a strong landed presence.

The cardinal importance of establishing political control from within local society was not overlooked by Richard, but in the weeks following his usurpation he firmly believed that he had achieved it. He interpreted the lack of opposition and the presence of so many Yorkists at his coronation as firm evidence that even the staunchest of Edward IV’s supporters recognised the strength of his position and accepted him as their king\textsuperscript{32}. Possession of the throne, coupled with the rather transparent claims of his nephews’ bastardy, made him their monarch both \textit{de facto} and \textit{de jure}. He expected in return complete loyalty, and behaved as if this was indeed the case. To have acted otherwise would have been to admit the shallowness of his claim, but the previous three months had shown that he was a man capable of taking swift and decisive action if he felt under threat. The continuity so apparent in the early weeks of his reign shows that he felt secure, but from late July there were a series of conspiracies to free Edward V and his brother from the Tower. His response, characteristically violent and single-minded, was to sanction their murder. Once news of their deaths had leaked out - and it had to in order to have the desired effect of stopping the conspiracies - the steady trickle of easily controlled plots soon became a torrent of rebellion. Throughout southern England there was a series of risings which lasted from early September until late November.

Before the murder of the princes, the plots aimed at rescuing them from the Tower of London had been easily foiled. The southern counties had provided the mainstay of Edward IV’s support and while the princes remained in London as a focus they remained a hotbed of discontent\textsuperscript{33}. The princes’ removal was, therefore, a logical step to take. To do that by arranging for their deaths was hardly a precedent - Richard II had suffered a similar fate and, more importantly to Richard III, so had Henry VI - but the nature of the crime was particularly heinous for three reasons. First of all, Edward V was still regarded by many as being the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} Horrox, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 149-51, and for the rest of the paragraph.
\item \textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 98, 149-51.
\end{itemize}
rightful king. Opposition to Richard had been confounded by the speed of his actions in June and the presence of his northern army, but the claims of the boy king's illegitimacy were not widely believed. Secondly, he was untested. Both Richard II and Henry VI had been on the throne for long periods before they were deposed and had proved themselves to be inept, but Edward had been king for less than three months and had never governed in his own right. The guiding principle was that a king ought to rule in the best interests of the country and the Wars of the Roses had been fought over Henry VI's alleged inability to do this, but Edward V had not even been given the chance to reign. Thirdly, and in some respects most importantly, the two princes were still children. Richard III had attacked the political foundations of the English state by usurping the throne. His blatant self-interest must have been difficult enough for men to swallow, but in murdering his nephews he was destroying the social fabric that clothed the body politic. The family structure was important at all levels of society, but amongst the gentry and aristocracy it took on a new meaning because of land. A patrimony was not regarded as the personal property of an individual landowner, but an inheritance that gave some stability and security to past and future generations. Marriages were made perhaps with an eye to creating a political alliance, or to resolving a dispute that affected the stability of the society in which the families moved, but most importantly they were made to beget children - hopefully males - who could continue the family name.

The influence of the family structure within landed society should not be underestimated. In the early 1470s the younger Harrington brothers had tried to take advantage of their new-found fame with Edward IV to disinherit their nieces, and Gloucester had been one of those sent to punish them, so he was well aware of the implications of abusing an inheritance. His own experiences with the Warwick lands may have lulled him into believing that anything was possible if it was given the colour of legality by royal approval, but again Warwick had had a

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35 Carpenter, Locality and Polity, p. 258.


37 CPR 1467-77, p. 426.
chance to prove his credentials as a lord and peer of the realm and had failed. Edward V and his brother, Richard duke of York, were innocent of any crime and represented the greatest inheritance in the country. If their position was so vulnerable then no other family and no other patrimony could regard itself as being safe.

The effects of the princes' murders were most obviously felt in the south, where Richard's influence as Duke of Gloucester had been the weakest. The Buckingham Rebellion, a series of uncoordinated albeit connected risings, paradoxically doomed to failure by its namesake's involvement, effectively removed a large number of the middle rank of landed society on whom the crown had relied for local government. Richard suddenly found himself faced with the problem of creating a new group of local landed notables on whom he could depend to exercise justice and power in his name. His solution is well known. Rather than promoting men with local knowledge he preferred instead those whom he felt he could trust. Some southern gentry who had supported him during the Rebellion were rewarded, but a large number of northerners were granted lands and political influence in the counties most affected. This reliance on his northern affinity was not limited to those of whom he had personal knowledge, but it also included the followers of his most trusted retainers.

It is generally assumed that Richard's support in the north was broadly based, but the list of men who attended his coronation on July 6th show that it came predominantly from the north-east. Although the list is probably incomplete, it is large enough to give some indication of the balance of support. Only three men from the north-west are named. Lord Dacre was accompanied by his eldest son, Thomas, who was to act as one of the king's henchmen, and Sir Richard Huddleston. Added to these is Sir William Parr, who was scheduled to play an important role in the coronation, carrying the canopy above the new king's head with Sir Richard Ratcliffe, amongst others. On the whole, however, Parr's position


at court was under threat. Although he had managed to weather the usurpation and was still regarded as trustworthy by Richard, his influence had been based on his close relationship with Edward IV. He was included in the commission of the peace for Cumberland appointed on the first day of the new reign, and five weeks later he was also named on the commission to assess and collect subsidies. He had, however, lost much of his influence at court, and by the date of the coronation Sir Robert Percy had taken over as comptroller of the royal household.

Parr’s loyalty to the new regime should not be taken as read. Many other of Edward's household men attended Richard's coronation and were appointed to similar commissions in other counties, only openly showing their disapproval once it was known that the two princes were dead. Because of his pivotal role in Edward IV's control of the north-west, Parr's fate under Richard III is of particular interest. There is, however, very little evidence to tell us what happened to him. He was present to swear allegiance to the new Prince of Wales on August 24th and his wife remained firmly ensconced at court as one of the royal ladies-in-waiting. In a rather obvious act of sycophancy, she even named her newly-born daughter after the queen. All that can be said is that he died at some point between the end of August and 3rd December, by which time a receiver had been appointed to his lands in Westmorland. It is possible, however, that he was dead by November 5th when Sir Richard Ratcliffe was appointed sheriff in the county, an office Sir William had held for life.

One further piece of evidence places his death in early November. On July 30th 1484 Richard III wrote to his receiver of the Parr lands ordering him to continue paying an annuity of £20 to Sir Henry Bellingham according to the indenture he had made with Sir William.

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42 CPR 1476-85, pp. 396-97, 556, 576-77. In both counties the personnel were the same as had been appointed to the bench on May 24th, and they reflect Richard's faith in the success of his coup - see above, p. 210.


45 Wedgwood, Biographies, pp. 663-64; James, op. cit.

46 Harl. 433, ii, pp. 43-44.

47 CFR 1471-85, 796; CPR 1467-77, p. 531.
money was to be paid from the feast of St. Martin last past (between the 10th and 12th of November) for as long as the estates were in royal hands. The reference cannot be used to give a precise time for Sir William's death, since dating was often rounded up or down to the nearest religious feast day, but it does at least indicate roughly when it happened.

The timing of his death, falling as it does in the midst of the Buckingham Rebellion, is suspicious to say the least. His gradual fall from grace was showing little sign of coming to an end and his steady loss of influence to men with closer personal ties to Richard meant he had more of an interest in seeing Edward V on the throne than Gloucester. If it were not for his northern connections then he would be seen as a prime candidate for taking part in the Buckingham Rebellion. By this time, however, he could hardly be classed as a northerner and even he saw himself as belonging to London, so his possible involvement in the plots against Richard should not be discounted out of hand. If he did take part in the Rebellion, however, there is nothing to show it. There is no outward indication that his lands were forfeited, he was not attainted, and his widow certainly fared better than those of other rebels. His heir was a minor, however, and so all of his lands passed into the king's hands anyway, and on April 8th writs *diem clausit extremum* were issued to the escheators of Yorkshire, Northumberland, Westmorland and Lancaster.

On closer scrutiny, though, the evidence does not seem to be quite so solid. The grant of the shrievalty of Westmorland to Sir Richard Ratcliffe may have been innocuous, but life grants under the Yorkists were dependent on continuous loyal service and Richard III, even more than his brother, was not shy when it came to retrieving those made to unfaithful servants. The office was extremely lucrative,

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49 CRO D/Lons/BM.120. He held the manor of Netherhall in Essex by right of his first wife - James, “Sir William Parr, Part I”, pp. 105-6.


51 CFR 1471-85, 740.

but one must question also why Richard felt it necessary to use Ratcliffe rather than one of his more local servants. Ratcliffe was originally a native of the county but there were others who were far better placed to administer justice on Richard’s behalf. Deputies could easily be employed, and no doubt were, but the presence of such an illustrious crown servant in this region at this time may not be as innocent as it at first seems.

Parr’s widow was apparently quite well treated. She did not receive her dower and jointure immediately but she was granted the equivalent sum, as well as a further £100 for the keeping of her son, from the issues of Sir William’s northern estates. Such generosity on paper was more difficult to collect in practice. In late 1484 she petitioned Richard because his receivers were refusing to pay her, thanks to an order issued in March of that year that all profits from Westmorland and the Parr lands were to be sent to Carlisle for the expenses of the household there. Richard wrote to the men concerned on January 23rd 1485 declaring that it was never his intention that they should deprive Elizabeth, his "dere and wellbeloved Cousine", of the moneys due to her from the "Dowar and Jointor made unto her by her late husbande Sir William Parre whom god pardone".

Elizabeth Parr’s success in gaining her money over a year after her husband’s death does not give any indication about his activities in late 1483, although the rather cryptic call for heavenly intervention is open to interpretation. She was the sister of Richard Lord Fitzhugh, one of Richard’s staunchest supporters and a cousin of Queen Anne, as well as being a lady-in-waiting. Her connections may have been enough to over-ride any stigma there was concerning her husband. There was nothing to gain by denying her jointure and dower, but a great deal to be had by allowing it. By the end of 1484, when she petitioned the king, Richard was increasingly reliant on his Middleham affinity for support and he could not afford to upset one of it’s key figures. He had always been exceedingly generous to his affinity and his treatment of Elizabeth Parr was no more than the practical exercise of good lordship, but there was already a precedent for someone in Elizabeth’s position. Early in his reign Richard had granted another of his widowed relatives, Katherine Neville, the wife of William Lord Hastings, the keeping of all of her husband’s inherited lands during her son’s minority. She also received

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53 PRO E.199/62/2.

54 Harl. 433, ii, pp. 120-21, dated between the 20th and 23rd of March 1484 - ibid., 191-92.
the manor of Loughborough and the wardships of the Earl of Shrewsbury and Edward Trussell, but other grants made by Edward IV to his chamberlain were resumed. The Parr lands were similarly divided by Richard III between the patrimony and grants from the crown, with separate receivers being appointed for the county and the Parr moiety of the barony of Kendale. The main patronage that Sir William had received from Edward IV had been the Clifford barony of Westmorland which had been granted to him and his brother in tail male. In 1475 after his brother's death he had received a special licence to enfeoff them before going to France, in case he should die there. Although both receivers were ordered to ensure that Elizabeth Parr received her dower and jointure this may well have been because Sir William had granted them from all of his lands, not just the patrimony, but the fact that Richard III saw a clear difference between the inherited and the granted lands is significant. With so many similarities between the careers of Sir William and Lord Hastings it is quite possible that the manner of their deaths mirrored each other too. The evidence is inconclusive, but the possibility that Parr died as a result of involvement in the Buckingham Rebellion should not be ignored.

The roles that other men from the north-west played in the unrest in the south all concerned its suppression. When Richard first heard about the Rebellion in late September 1483, he called upon his northern affinities to provide troops. Many would have been ready-armed because of the Scottish war, and the Crowland Chronicler specifically states that many came from the northern marches. There are few details as to who joined the king, but a partial reconstruction can be made by looking at other evidence, such as personal arrangements for the impending conflict and royal grants made while Richard himself was in the south-west. Lord Dacre, for instance, made a feoffment of all of his lands in Westmorland on 4th October 1483, including some to be held jointly with his wife. Although the Rebellion petered out without any major confrontation,
it was impossible for men to judge the risks beforehand and it was common for
arrangements for the future to be made before riding off to war.\textsuperscript{60} A similar
feoffment, made by Sir James Harrington on or about the 9th of October, probably
marks the army's progress southwards.\textsuperscript{61}

More can be gleaned from looking at the royal patronage handed out in
November and December 1483, since the fact that a number of men from
Cumberland and Westmorland were close enough to the king to petition for rewards
indicates that they had formed a part of that northern army.\textsuperscript{62} On November 12th
while Richard was at Exeter Richard Denton, son of Henry Denton, another retainer,
was granted an annuity of five marks from the issues of Penrith.\textsuperscript{63} Sixteen days
later Sir Richard Huddleston was made constable of the town and castle of
Beaumaris for life and sheriff of Anglesey during pleasure, offices worth £40 and
£20 respectively under the Lancastrians.\textsuperscript{64} He was granted the master forestership
of Snowdon in the following week, on the same day that Reynold Warcop, Sir
Richard Ratcliffe's brother-in-law, was granted an annuity of twenty marks from the
Parr lands.\textsuperscript{65}

Richard Denton's reward was one of the smallest annuities given
under Richard III's seal and he probably had little impact on the campaign, but
Warcop's was more substantial and in line with others given to lesser gentry. Sir
Richard Huddleston's was commensurate with those granted to other favourites.
Beaumaris was one of three strategic fortresses in north Wales guarding the Menai

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\textsuperscript{60} Cf. the will of the Earl of Northumberland, made on 27th July 1485 - Testamenta Eboracensia Vol. III, pp. 304-10.

\textsuperscript{61} LRO/DDTo/Box H.1, a quitclaim of his lands to his feoffees.

\textsuperscript{62} Horrox, op. cit., pp. 184-86 for a discussion of how patronage was distributed; cf. Ives, ed., Letters and Accounts of William Brereton of Malpas, pp. 21-28 for "The Traffic in Crown Offices" under Henry VIII.

\textsuperscript{63} CRO D/Lons/D.65; CPR 1476-85, p. 368; Harl. 433, i, p. 89.


\textsuperscript{65} Harl. 433 ii, p. 43-44; CPR 1476-85, p. 372; History of Northumberland, x, pedigree between pp. 280-81.
Straits, each of which was put in the charge of one of Richard's trusted servants. Thomas Tunstall, brother of Sir Richard Tunstall and a squire of the body, was appointed the constable of Conway and Sir William Stanley, a knight of the body, was given the same position at Caernarvon. The three castles usually carried garrisons of twenty four men paid for by the crown, and the principal offices fees of between £20 and £40. Each of the three men received their office because of their loyalty to Richard, but from here on their careers differed markedly. Sir William Stanley's was the most spectacular. He was already the chamberlain of the county palatine of Chester and, in addition to being paid to hold the wardship of George Earl of Shrewsbury, he was granted an annuity of £20 during the earl's minority. He also held the wardship of Laurence Dutton of Chester, and early in the reign received orders to take possession of the manors of Bromfield and Yare in the Welsh marches, with the town of Wrexham and Holt castle, and the lordship of Thornbury in Gloucestershire. The value of the lands he received is not known, but his offices and annuities (excluding the £40 for constableship of Caernarvon) were in excess of £70. Thomas Tunstall also received grants of lands and offices in addition to the constableship of Conway. On 19th November 1483 he was given a reward of £20, eleven days before he was granted his office and in February 1484 he was made sheriff of Caenarvonshire. He did not receive an annuity, but he was granted the manor of Gotherington in Devon worth £40 as early as 12th April 1484, although he did not receive letters patent until August 14th.

In contrast to these two Sir Richard Huddleston seems to have had difficulty in keeping hold of his patronage, let alone extending it. He had been made receiver of the Marquis of Dorset's lands in Cumberland and Lancashire for life during Edward V's reign, but when the offices were re-granted in the first month

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66 Griffiths, op. cit., pp. 71-72; Harl. 433, i, pp. 95, 139; iii, p. 251; CPR 1476-85, p. 368.

67 Harl. 433, i, p. 126; ii, pp. 17, 18, 22, 161; iii, pp. 8, 197, 250.


69 Harl. 433, i, p. 126; iii, pp. 197, 250. See Jones, "Richard III and the Stanleys", pp. 27-50.

70 Harl. 433, ii, pp. 39, 91.

71 CPR 1476-85, p. 479; Harl. 433, i, p. 204; ii, p. 125; iii, p. 154. He appears to have had some difficulty in collecting his rents from Gotherington before the letters patent were issued - ibid., II, pp. 141-42.
after Richard's usurpation they were only given during pleasure 72. More than the others he seems to have had difficulty in establishing his authority in north Wales. As early as February 1484 he was forced to ask Richard for permission to victual the castle from Ireland, and for a letter demanding that the local inhabitants deliver him enough firewood for his household. In response to these and other problems, his garrison was also doubled in size with the addition of a further twenty four men 73. Tied down in north Wales, he lost the receivership of the Dorset lands in the north to Thomas Harrington in March 1484. He was, however, granted the next advowson of Aldingham in Furness which was worth about £40 74, but he did not receive any lands or annuities to match those given to Tunstall. The value of the master forestership of Snowdon is unknown, but it was unlikely to have been much, and the shrievalty of Anglesey may well have been a poisoned chalice 75. His only other grant was of the keeping of the park of Great Baddow in Essex for life. This was only worth 60s.10d. each year, but it had already been granted in November 1483 to John Kendale, Richard III’s secretary, so it is unlikely that Huddleston ever laid hands on it’s profits 76. He did receive one other grant, but he did not hold it for long. He was probably appointed as receiver of Ulverston and Thurnham in Lancashire early in the reign, but in July 1484 Richard ordered him rather brusquely to hand over all the incomes he had collected to Geoffrey Frank and to cease his office 77. He received no compensation, but his health may have been failing and he is presumed to have died by March 1485, when his offices were redistributed 78.

72 CPR 1476-85, p. 363; Harl. 433, i, pp. 39-40, 74.


74 Victoria County History of the County of Lancaster (8 vols., 1906-14) vol. 8, pp. 325-26. Valued at over £50 in 1291, its value had been decimated by the Scottish raids of the early fourteenth century. Since most of the income was from tithes of corn, however, its value in 1484 was probably close to the £39.18s.11d. noted in the Valor Ecclesiasticus in 1535.


76 CPR 1476-85, p. 367; Harl. 433, i, pp. 201, 269; iii, p. 205.

77 Harl. 433, ii, pp. 150-51. It may have been in response to this loss that he was granted the parkership of Baddow.

78 CPR 1476-85, pp. 509-10.
Other men from the north-west who received patronage in the south at some time during the reign were also probably being remembered for their part in suppressing the revolt. Of these, the three that stand out the most are Sir Thomas Broughton, Edward Redmane and John Musgrave. Broughton, the lieutenant of Cockermouth, cannot be linked to Richard until he was granted lands in Devon worth over £101 and the stewardship of Dartington and Bovey Tracy, worth a further hundred marks each year. On at least two other occasions he also received additional payments, worth approximately a further £100. He seems to have moved down to the county since he was no longer named on commissions in Cumberland, but he was regularly appointed to those in Devon and Cornwall throughout the rest of the reign. His first appointment came on 5th December 1483 and, even though Richard had returned to London by then, he must already have had a foothold in the county. Although the notice of his grant of lands is undated in Richard III’s registers, on December 1st the Earl of Northumberland had been given seven manors in Devon in the same areas as Sir Thomas’s were. It seems likely, therefore, that Broughton's lands were given to complement those of the Earl and to allow him to administer them if necessary.

Edward Redmane, as has been seen, had entered Richard's affinity just before Edward IV's death so it is unsurprising to see him accompanying him to the south-west. Along with Lord Scrope of Bolton and Halneth Mauleverer, he was appointed on November 13th 1483 to arrest all rebels in Devon and Cornwall and to confiscate their lands. He had been made sheriff of Somerset and Dorset in the previous week, and he was appointed a JP in Wiltshire on December 5th. Despite his ambitious progress he was still a junior member of Richard's affinity, and his rewards seem to have been hard-earned. During 1484 he appeared on commissions to assess subsidies in Somerset and Yorkshire in February, and to

79 CRO D/Lec/1/A/302 ff. 3-3v; Harl. 433, i, pp. 136, 167 237; ii, p. 166; iii, p. 140.

80 CPR 1476-85, pp. 396, 397, 490, 493, 556, 558. His office at Cockermouth was probably taken over by Edward Ratcliffe - CRO D/Lec/29/8, f. 1.


82 See above, p. 212.

83 CPR 1476-85, pp. 371, 577; CFR 1471-85, 797.
array men in Devon and Wiltshire in May, in Wiltshire in July, and in Dorset in December. He was also appointed to the commission of oyer and terminer in Devon in July - all of this in addition to his duties as a sheriff and JP. As a reward he eventually received a grant of lands in Somerset and Wiltshire on 30th November 1484 worth £84.9s.6d., for which he paid only £6 in rent, although he had been the receiver of at least some of these lands since February.

John Musgrave’s role in the royal affinity only seems to have begun with the Buckingham Rebellion. He must have been known to Richard before this through his brothers, and he had served as the escheator of Cumberland and Westmorland in 1477. There is no other evidence of him receiving any patronage from Richard, however, until December 1483. Along with Edward Redmane he was appointed to the commission of the peace in Wiltshire on the 5th of that month, and soon after he became the constable of Salisbury castle. He represented the town in Parliament in January 1484, and in August he received confirmation of his office. That same month he was granted the laund of Clarendon park and the rangership of Groveley forest, which together had been worth over £18 under Edward IV. At the end of the year, however, he received over £27 from the sheriff, Edward Hardgill, for holding the offices. He served on the commissions of array in the county in May and December, took over from Hardgill as sheriff in November, and received lands worth over £102 in and around Salisbury as his incentive to remain in the south.

Musgrave came from the family that was the most successful of any from Cumberland or Westmorland in exploiting Richard III’s generosity. Their accomplishments are all the more striking since they did not have a head start by having a court connection with Edward IV. John had three older brothers, all of whom received some patronage from Richard III, but their close links to the king

84 CPR 1476-85, pp. 397, 399, 425, 488, 492-93.
86 Lists Escheators, p. 27.
87 CPR 1476-85, pp. 481, 577; Harl. 433, i, pp. 240-42; iii, pp. 198-99; Wedgwood, Biographies, p. 620.
88 CPR 1476-85, pp. 399, 507, 491; CFR 1471-85, 797, 860; Harl. 433, iii, p. 145.
89 The Huddlestons were not really a northern family by this time - see below, pp. 232-233.
brought them other rewards too. Richard, the eldest, remained in the north and served on all of the commissions appointed in Westmorland during the reign, but was granted an annuity of £40 from the honour of Tickhill. Although receiving the fee of a squire of the body he never seems to have been accorded that title, but in December 1483 he was appointed as lieutenant of the lordships of Redesdale and Coquetdale in Northumberland by Sir Robert Tailbois\textsuperscript{90}. William Musgrave had been appointed as Gloucester's receiver of his lands in Cumberland and Westmorland as early as 1475, but had swiftly proved his ineptitude. In 1480 the Latimer estates in Westmorland reverted to the crown after the death of Elizabeth Latimer, who had held them in dower, and it may have been at this time that Richard reorganised his financial concerns in the counties. Once he became king it was certainly necessary and he appointed John Crackenthorpe and Richard Claybere as his receivers in Cumberland and Westmorland respectively, and relegated Musgrave to the Latimer estates alone\textsuperscript{91}. In compensation he was rewarded with an annuity of £20 from the Latimer estates, and he continued to play an active role in the administration of the Carlisle household as Richard's agent. He retained two men on the king's behalf, including the third brother, Nicholas, for twenty marks, and was a petty-captain of the garrison with ten men under his command\textsuperscript{92}. He also played an active role in extending Richard III's control over Westmorland, appearing on the bench from December 1483 and on the commissions of array appointed in May and December 1484\textsuperscript{93}.

John Musgrave is archetypal of the sort of man who found favour with Richard III. The younger - in this case youngest - son of a northern gentry family with long-standing connections to Middleham, there was little to keep him in his home county and everything to gain by serving his king in the south. He was, however, the only such example from either Cumberland or Westmorland. The other main beneficiaries of Richard's northern plantations - Sir Richard Huddleston, Sir Thomas Broughton and Edward Redmane - were all the senior members of their


\textsuperscript{91} Alnwick CM X.II.3, Box 2 (j)(k)(l); Harl. 433, ii, pp. 28,162, 191-92.


\textsuperscript{93} CPR 1476-85, pp. 397, 492, 577.
families in the counties. Huddleston was the only one who had a father who was still alive, but Sir John had already moved to the south, leaving Sir Richard to look after the family interests in Cumberland\textsuperscript{94}. Sir John Huddleston was already well established in Cambridgeshire by 1481 when he was first appointed a commissioner of the peace there, and he went on to become Richard III's senior representative in the county. Although it was not badly affected by the 1483 rebellion, he showed no inclination to take on any additional responsibilities. The parkership of Much Walden in Essex was his only office outside the county, worth 60s.10d. p.a., but he did act as the sheriff of Cambridgeshire from 1484. He continued as a feoffee for Richard and he was certainly granted favourable treatment, but it was his past connection to Middleham and his relationship to the Queen which was important\textsuperscript{95}. He was not part of the "northern invasion" but rather a retired elder statesman. By 1482 he was being feed by Edward IV as the bailiff and keeper of Barnoldswick wood and chase in the honour of Tickhill, part of the Duchy of Lancaster. The appointment may have been due to Richard, as the steward of the Duchy, but it also seems that he was receiving an annuity of fifty marks from the issues which was beyond the duke's competence to grant. Throughout Richard's letters patent and registers of the privy seal the granting of annuities followed a common form. First came the recipient's name, followed by the terms of the grant, be it a fee or an office. Thus, for example, Richard Musgrave was to receive "an Annuyte of xl li during his lif of the Revenues of Ticle" and William Lee "Thoffice of keping of the Counselle Chambre dore at Westminster". When Sir John petitioned the crown, however, it was written that he "hathe confirmed unto him [my italics] an Annuyte of fyfty markes to be taken and perceived during his lif of the lordship of Barnolswyke", implying that it had been granted some time before\textsuperscript{96}.

The Huddlestons are, along with the Musgraves, often used as an example to show the extent of Richard III's connections in the north-west, but the evidence is rather misleading\textsuperscript{97}. Only one member of the family came south with

\textsuperscript{94} His last appointment in Cumberland was the commission of array in June 1480, but in March 1482 he rented 27 acres of land in Cleahall, Cumberland - CPR 1476-85, p. 214; CFR 1471-85, 699.

\textsuperscript{95} CPR 1476-85, p. 505; CCR 1476-85, 1168, 1445.

\textsuperscript{96} Harl. 433, i, p. 222. My italics.

\textsuperscript{97} Horrox, Richard III, pp. 266-67.
him in 1483 and it’s senior figure was already well established in Cambridgeshire. It was Sir John’s his second son, John (II), who made the most of his connections with Richard but he too had moved south long before 1483. The two are often confused, not least in the indexes of the Patent Rolls, but John (II) was not knighted until at least 1489\textsuperscript{98}. He seems to have entered crown service in 1478, after being ordered to appear before the king's council concerning a dispute between his family and the abbey of Furness\textsuperscript{99}. On March 13th, less than three months after receiving his summons, he was made constable of Sudeley castle in Gloucestershire and steward and receiver of the lordship there as a king's esquire. He may have held office there while the castle had belonged to Gloucester, but by October 1482 he was an usher of the royal chamber\textsuperscript{100}. By the time Edward IV died he had already been the escheator of Wiltshire and of Gloucestershire\textsuperscript{101}. He was, therefore, already well-established as a crown servant long before Richard became Protector, and seems to have taken on board the vital fact that service was to the institution, not the individual\textsuperscript{102}. He was one of those who made a smooth transition to the new regime and his progression to the commission of the peace in Gloucestershire in May 1483 undoubtedly owed something to his brother’s presence in the ducal affinity\textsuperscript{103}. He was appointed sheriff in November and became one of Richard’s principal agents in the south Welsh marches. On 18th January 1484 he was made steward of several forfeited estates in Worcestershire, by which time he was an esquire of the body. On March 6th his offices at Sudeley were confirmed to him for life. Five weeks later he was made steward, constable and porter of Monmouth and three other castles (parcel of the Duchy of Lancaster) with the usual wages and an annuity of one hundred marks. Altogether, his net income from these alone

\textsuperscript{98} Wedgwood, Biographies, pp. 477-78.

\textsuperscript{99} CCR 1476-85, 129.

\textsuperscript{100} CPR 1476-85, pp. 93, 314; Horrox, Richard III, p. 84. See above, p. 178.

\textsuperscript{101} Lists Escheators, pp. 53, 56, 117.

\textsuperscript{102} Horrox, Richard III, p. 326.

\textsuperscript{103} CPR 1476-85, p. 560.
exceeded £100, but early in February 1485 he was also appointed steward of the Duchy of Lancaster estates in Gloucestershire during pleasure\textsuperscript{104}.

Like his father and brother, John (II) did not receive any land grants during the reign, but this was not necessarily a disadvantage. The fees paid for offices did not always represent the full range of benefits available, and often the duties could be performed by deputies. Sir John Huddleston's office in Essex was honorary and it is quite probable that, since he was being rewarded with Duchy offices, John (II)'s position in South Wales was equally nominal\textsuperscript{105}. Even the Huddleston presence at Beaumaris, despite all the apparent difficulties, may only have been occasional. The constables of the Welsh castles were allowed to appoint deputies, but they had to make frequent visits if that was the case\textsuperscript{106}. Sir Richard still had family commitments in Cumberland and continued to be appointed to commissions there until the summer of 1484\textsuperscript{107}, and the two other members of the family who were granted offices in the same region were not expected to fulfil them in person. Henry Huddleston was a fourth son of Sir John but, like John (II), he had already moved south. He was the sheriff of Northamptonshire in 1472-73 and in March 1482 he was being called a gentleman of London\textsuperscript{108}. In 1484 he was appointed as \textit{rhaglaw} (constable) and steward of Menai and Rhosfawr in Anglesey and another Huddleston, James, called a king's servant in his letters patent, was granted the keeping of a ferry in the same region\textsuperscript{109}.

The patronage given to the Huddlestons seems to have come as much from their court connections prior to 1483 as from their links to Middleham, and they seem to have regarded it as an additional source of income rather than as a signal to move location in the king's service. This is in contrast to the Musgraves

\begin{footnotes}
\item[104] CPR 1476-85, pp. 379, 448; Harl. 433, i, pp. 88, 153; iii, p. 205; Somerville, History of the Duchy of Lancaster, i, p. 648.
\item[105] Horrox, Richard III, p. 258.
\item[106] Griffiths, “Patronage, Politics and the Principality of Wales”, p. 71.
\item[107] CPR 1476-85, p. 400. Although the commission of the peace appointed in June 1483 continued to the end of the reign, Sir Richard need not have been an active member - \textit{ibid.}, p. 556.
\item[108] CFR 1471-85, 133, 699.
\end{footnotes}
who are not known to have established themselves at court, but the member of their family who benefited the most did so by moving south. The importance of having a connection with Richard III before the start of the Buckingham Rebellion, either through Middleham or the court, has been underestimated. This is shown most convincingly by the minor patronage distributed to other men from the far north-west, many of whom came from the barony of Westmorland and probably came south in 1483 as part of the Musgrave affinity. William Sandford, who became bailiff of Trowbridge in Wiltshire, was the son and heir of Thomas Sandford of Askham whose wife, Margaret, was an aunt to the Musgraves\textsuperscript{110}. Roland Machel, who was used to possess lands in Kent forfeited by Sir George Brown in early 1484, came from Appleby\textsuperscript{111}.

Those who received the greatest patronage also had some other link to Richard. The annuity granted to Reynold Warcop has already been mentioned - he was probably the husband of Agnes, another aunt of the Musgrave brothers, prior to his marriage to Thomasine, Sir Richard Ratcliffe’s sister\textsuperscript{112}. John Wharton of Kirby Thore was appointed constable of Betchworth castle in Surrey and steward of nearby Bletchingly with wages of £10. In addition, he was granted lands in Oxfordshire worth £20.6s.8d. and a reward of £10 from the issues of Appleby while a relative, Thomas, was made porter of Betchworth\textsuperscript{113}. The Whartons probably joined the Musgrave troops in 1483, but they also received some extra help from their connections already established with both Middleham and the court. Michael Wharton had been retained was clerk of works at Middleham by September 1483 and another relative, Geoffrey, was confirmed as one of the king's serjeant-at-arms on 3rd November 1483 with wages of £18.5s. He had held the post since July 1471, and on 24th May 1484 he was granted an annuity of £10 by letters patent\textsuperscript{114}. As such, the Whartons were the only other family from the north-west who could measure up to the Musgraves in terms of the number of grants they received.

\textsuperscript{110} Harl. 433, i, p. 159; ii, p. 43; Hutchinson, \textit{History of Cumberland}, i, p. 273

\textsuperscript{111} Harl. 433, ii, pp. 83, 87.

\textsuperscript{112} Hutchinson, \textit{op. cit.}; see above, p. 225.

\textsuperscript{113} Harl. 433, i, p. 150; ii, pp. 79, 120; iii, p. 141.

\textsuperscript{114} PRO DL 29/648/10485; Harl. 433, i, pp. 92, 186; ii, p. 25; iii, p. 197; CPR 1467-77, p. 261; CPR 1476-85, pp. 367, 444.
John Wharton's case is particularly interesting because of his prior record of service to Sir William Parr. He had served on various commissions in Westmorland during the 1470s and had been a justice of the peace until May 1483 when he was replaced by men more amenable to Gloucester. His subsequent promotion is an example of how quickly men could assimilate themselves to a change of lordship, but it reflects also the multiple connections that underpinned local society. The stability of the whole country depended on such men who had no direct links to the crown and were thus able to divorce themselves from the violent personal changes taking place. In doing so they utilised the personal connections that they had with shire gentry of the first rank, who tended to become more firmly attached to individual monarchs. These families might survive a change of ruler, but the balance of power within a shire would sometimes change and new favourites would emerge to replace old ones. In 1483 Sir William Parr, who had dominated Westmorland in the 1470s, became *persona non grata* and the Musgraves, who had been subdued politically, came into their own because of their connection to Middleham. As a result, they suddenly became more popular as witnesses and feoffees. The Sandfords of Askham had been closely linked to them in the 1460s and in 1471 had suffered as a result, but they seem to have cut their ties during the next dozen years. Floating on the edges of political society, Thomas Sandford had called on John Musgrave to act as surety for an arbitration in 1472, but from then on he busied himself with more parochial matters. He arbitrated in local disputes and, when his long-standing foe John Salkeld of Golber died in 1477, that dispute too was laid to rest by settlement with his widow\textsuperscript{115}. All of his interests until Richard's reign began were local, but after his son had gone south to serve the king he decided to make a feoffment of all his possessions, and in June 1484 he once again turned to John Musgrave\textsuperscript{116}.

With the exception of Sir Richard Huddleston and Sir Thomas Broughton, no man from Cumberland received any patronage in the south of the country from Richard III. Lord Dacre is the most obvious exception, but in late March 1484 he was granted an annuity of one hundred marks from the issues of Cumberland. At about the same time Richard Salkeld was granted an annuity of

\textsuperscript{115} CRO D/Lons/AS.68, 73.

\textsuperscript{116} CRO D/Lons/AS.84.
£20, backdated to the previous Michaelmas\textsuperscript{117}. He had been pricked as sheriff of Cumberland in November 1483 but his account ran from the previous Easter, and he must have already been serving as Richard's deputy by this time\textsuperscript{118}.

Two other men also received substantial annuities from the issues of Penrith. Sir Christopher Moresby had been in Richard's service since 1472 as the steward of the honour and in May 1484 this was extended to include the rule of the tenants there\textsuperscript{119}. In addition to his fee of 100s., he was also granted an annuity of £35. Sir Thomas Strickland, who had remained loyal to Sir William Parr, was granted the smaller sum of twenty marks on July 5th\textsuperscript{120}. The scale of the fees brought Dacre, Salkeld and Moresby into line with other members of the royal household, but Strickland’s was the equivalent of a squire of the body, not a knight\textsuperscript{121}. In the first three cases they are known to have been in Richard's service prior to Edward IV's death, but Strickland's reward, smaller and later than the rest, reflected his previous history of service.

Apart from Sir Thomas Broughton, the Cockermouth affinity does not seem to have received any benefit from the Buckingham Rebellion. Given the presence of the Earl of Northumberland and his lieutenant of the honour on the expedition of late 1483 then it was probably well represented, but as with Dacre its men may have been sent home with the promise of future patronage. At about the same time, however, it seems that Edward Ratcliffe, Sir Richard’s younger brother, began to play an important role in its affairs. He was the fifth son of Thomas Ratcliffe of Derwentwater and, although favoured by his father, he had made no impact on locality. In 1480 Thomas had disinherited his eldest son, John, in favour of Sir Richard and Edward had been the second beneficiary\textsuperscript{122}. There is no other

\textsuperscript{117} Harl. 433, i, pp. 148, 170; CPR 1476-85, pp. 388, 424.

\textsuperscript{118} CFR 1471-85, 797; Lists Sheriffs, p. 27. See above, p. 221.

\textsuperscript{119} Harl. 433, i, p. 185; CPR 1476-85, p. 453.

\textsuperscript{120} D/Mus/P.14, cited by Horrox, Richard III, p. 51; CPR 1476-85, pp. 487; Harl. 433, i, p. 189.

\textsuperscript{121} The grants to Moresby and Salkeld call them "king's servant". Dacre was called "king's kinsman" since his mother, Philippa Neville, was the Earl of Salisbury's sister and great aunt to Queen Anne - Complete Peerage, iv, pp. 18-20.

\textsuperscript{122} History of Northumberland, x, pedigree between pp. 280-81; Thomson, “The Derwentwaters and Radcliffes”, pp. 302-3.
indication of his existence until late 1483 when he was rewarded for his part in the suppression of the southern rising with the grant of lands worth £100 in Wiltshire, and from May 1484 he began to appear regularly on commissions in Cumberland and Westmorland\textsuperscript{123}. Some personal standing with a man who was so obviously one of the new king’s most trusted friends and advisors was valuable, even for a man of the Earl of Northumberland’s stature. One way to achieve this to engage him in a debt of obligation by heaping rewards on members of his family. The Ratcliffes had never before been Percy retainers, and they had always been minor figures in the Cockermouth affinity\textsuperscript{124}. Now they now took on a new importance, and after the Buckingham Rebellion an opportunity arose for the Earl to show his appreciation of their new-found status. Sir Thomas Broughton’s reward for his service to Richard was to be moved to Devon as the principal royal agent in the county, which left free the office of lieutenant of Cockermouth, and it was probably at this time that his wage was converted to a fee and the office was granted to Edward Ratcliffe\textsuperscript{125}. His father, Thomas, was not so ambitious and probably remained in the earl’s service. He was retained for a fee of £10, and was to be remembered by him in his will\textsuperscript{126}.

It is a feature of Richard’s patronage of Cumberland and Westmorland men in the aftermath of the Buckingham Rebellion that lands and offices in the south only went to those who had taken part in the campaign. There is no absolute proof of this, but the dating of many of the grants indicates that these men were close to Richard during the winter of 1483 in some capacity, and it was most likely a physical one. Richard was not a great long-term planner but frequently acted on the


\textsuperscript{124} CRO D/Lec/29/5, f. 1.

\textsuperscript{125} See above, p. 228; CRO D/Lec/29/8, f. 1.

\textsuperscript{126} CRO D/Lec/29/8, f. 1; Testamenta Eboracensia, Vol. III, p. 308.
spur of the moment and much of the patronage - especially that distributed before he returned to London in early December - was probably to men who were within his sight. There was, however, the problem of how to get close enough to the king to be noticed and this leads to the second feature of the grants, that they all went to men who had some connection either with Middleham or with the court at Westminster. The two families who received the greatest rewards in the south had links to both - between them, eleven members of the Huddleston and the Wharton families benefited. Of the others Sir Richard Ratcliffe’s brother stands out, and Sir Thomas Broughton’s similar-sized grant was probably due to the favour of the Earl of Northumberland. The smaller beneficiaries likewise had a connection, usually as part of the group surrounding one of the major figures. William Sandford, for example, was probably part of the Musgrave affinity, and Roland Machel had the Appleby connection to the Whartons. The third feature worth noting is that no men from the heart of the West March around Carlisle received any lands or offices in the south. Although Lord Dacre, Moresby and Salkeld may well have taken part and they eventually received generous annuities, Richard’s policy was to keep them in the north. The Crowland Chronicler is specific in mentioning that it was the March men who were sent home first, before Richard returned to London in December, but they must have been aware of the huge rewards being dispensed. The fact that they received nothing is an indication that Richard had other designs for them, and was still planning to use them in southern Scotland in the near future.

127 Crowland Chronicle, p. 169.
CHAPTER 7

Richard III and the North-West of England, 1483-1485

The Buckingham Rebellion and the subsequent northern plantations has tended to dominate the study of the reign of Richard III. It should not be forgotten, however, that until he became king one of his main concerns was the prosecution of the Scottish war. His aim since June 1482 had been the creation of an independent palatinate in southern Scotland and the grant of the Cumberland regalia was designed not so much to complement this goal as to provide the springboard for achieving it. After Edward IV's death in April 1483 these plans were put on hold while the usurpation crisis developed, but they were not forgotten. As has been seen, even in early June 1483 Richard was hoping for a long Protectorate that would enable him to continue with his northern ambitions. There was nothing to indicate that he gave up his aspirations in south-west Scotland after taking the throne, and he certainly considered Carlisle to be one of the central bastions of his authority. After the usurpation he immediately embarked upon a building programme at all of the castles he considered to be important, including the Tower of London, York, Kenilworth, Tutbury, and Dunbar, and on September 22nd 1483 he appointed Thomas Neville "to doo make for us certaine brikewarke" at Carlisle. The first step was to improve the defences by constructing a gun tower in the south-east curtain wall, but that was as far as the building programme went. No doubt there were other improvements envisaged, since the single tower by itself was little more than a show-piece, but his change of policy in early 1484 and his continued financial difficulties probably stopped them.

1 See above, pp. 214-216.

2 R. Brown, M. Colvin, and A. Taylor, eds., History of the King's Works Volume 2: The Middle Ages (HMSO 1963), pp. 558, 600, 764-65; Harl. 433, ii, p. 20; Ross, Richard III, p. 143. Nine months later John Blenkinsop was rebated 15s. of rent for allowing his land to be used by the craftsmen - Harl. 433, ii, pp. 143-44.

Any schemes that Richard had for the completion of his proposed Scottish campaign were overtaken by events. The Buckingham Rebellion was at first little more than an expensive distraction, but in the longer term it severely dented any intentions for the invasion of Scotland. Initially, it forced Richard into temporary negotiations to stall any Scottish attack while he was busy in the south. His first approach to the Scots, in response to their embassy, was made on September 17th before he knew of the extent of the Rebellion, but he may well have seen prevarication until the following year as being the best course. It was too late in the year to organise a proper campaign, and the delay would have given him a chance to deal with the minor insurrections he seemed to be facing in the south. It was a well-known tactic and it gave him the chance to make suitable preparations for a full-scale invasion. About a week later, however, he arranged for a temporary truce to last for two months, until the end of November, and it was at about this time that he first became aware of the scale of the Rebellion. Diplomatic negotiations could take months, and often it was enough to dangle the prospect of peace before the Scots in order for them to cease hostilities. James III certainly wanted peace at this time, but he was not above taking advantage of domestic uncertainties in England if he could do, as his dealings with Edward IV in 1474-75 show. It therefore made sense for Richard to appear as if he, too, wanted to start negotiations for a long-term settlement. That way he could deal with the revolt at home at his leisure, and the first stage was to arrange a temporary truce to last until ambassadors could meet. As Dr. Grant has shown, however, his commitment to peace was shallow. In December 1483, when he next wrote to James III, he was pulling back from a commitment to peace and claimed that no truce could be made at that time.

The second result of the Buckingham Rebellion was that it compelled Richard to dispense huge quantities of patronage in an attempt to secure loyalty in some, and to reward it in others. There was, as a result, a knock-on inflationary

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4 Harl. 433, iii, pp. 50-51; MacDougall, James III, p. 209.


6 See above, pp. 159-159.

7 Harl. 433, iii, p. 51; see Grant, op. cit., pp. 128-29 for a discussion of the negotiations.
effect since men sought at least equality of treatment whether they had gone south with the king or remained in the north\textsuperscript{8}. The natural consequence was that the proportion of revenues from the ducal estates devoted to extraordinary fees shot up and, although the evidence from Penrith is missing, there is no reason to suppose that it was different from Middleham or Sheriff Hutton\textsuperscript{9}. During his reign he ordered annuities worth £105.6s.8d. \textit{p.a.} to be paid from the issues of Penrith\textsuperscript{10}. To this must be added Henry Denton’s annuity of fourteen marks (£9.6s.8d.), granted in 1473, bringing the total to at least £114.12s.8d. in extraordinary fees\textsuperscript{11}. In addition, at least £17.2s.8d. was being paid each year to various officers. Sir Christopher Moresby had probably been paid 100s. since 1471 as the steward, and the porters of Carlisle and Penrith castles received 4d. per day each, or £6.1s.4d. \textit{p.a.}\textsuperscript{12}. The total known expenditure of £132.15s.4d. must have been close to the gross revenues of the lordship, since Lord Dacre’s annuity of one hundred marks (£66.13s.8d.) had to be charged to the revenues of the county\textsuperscript{13}. Money that at one time could have been devoted towards victualling an army or maintaining a garrison was now being swallowed up in fees.

Thirdly, as the rebels found their way to Brittany, the Tudor threat took on new meaning and began to look more menacing. As the months went by and there were more disturbances aimed against Richard III, he was forced to counter the threat. He improved defences along the south coast and became involved in various diplomatic manoeuvres to try to capture Tudor, all of which diverted money away from the north\textsuperscript{14}. In mid-February 1484 he was still intending to lead a summer campaign in person, but news of Scottish intentions to invest the Duke of

\textsuperscript{8} Horrox, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 310-12.

\textsuperscript{9} Pollard, \textit{North-Eastern England}, pp. 353-54, but cf. Weiss thesis, Table 1 on p. 181, who shows that revenues from Middleham were already fully extended by 1474.

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Harl. 433}, i, pp. 89, 170, 185, 189; ii, pp. 119, 133-34; \textit{CPR 1476-85}, pp. 368, 424, 453, 487.

\textsuperscript{11} CRO D/Lons/D.65.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Harl. 433}, i, pp. 174, 170, 185; \textit{CPR 1476-85}, pp. 389, 424, 453.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Harl. 433}, p. 148; \textit{CPR 1476-85}, p. 388.

\textsuperscript{14} Horrox, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 275-77.
Albany's castle at Dunbar, in English hands since April 1483, induced him to send an invitation to talks in early March\textsuperscript{15}. This was probably just another attempt to delay Scottish action until he was ready to take the initiative himself, but his son's death in early April 1484 seems to have changed his mind. He was deeply shocked on a personal level by this unforeseen catastrophe\textsuperscript{16}, but in political terms it proved to be very damaging. He had built his case for usurping the throne upon the supposed bastardy of Edward's sons - behind this, however, lay the real basis of his claim, which was of continuity\textsuperscript{17}. As an alternative to Edward V, Richard was not just an adult with a proven bloodline and a track record of "good lordship", but he came as a complete package with a legitimate marriage - there could be no doubt about that - and a male heir. The emphasis on continuity extended to his whole family.

The Crowland Chronicler recognised the wider importance of the prince's death "on whom, through so many solemn oaths, all hope of the royal succession rested"\textsuperscript{18}. Clearly Richard had pinned much on his having a legitimate heir, not least in his governance of the north. He had probably planned to use the prince as an extension of his own rule in the region and after his death he was forced to make arrangements for a new royal council to take his place. That all took some time to arrange - the new Council of the North Parts under the Earl of Lincoln was not created until the end of July\textsuperscript{19} - but in the meantime it meant a reassessment of his goals and ambitions in the north. It seems to have been at this time that he made up his mind to make peace with Scotland rather than to continue prosecuting the war\textsuperscript{20}. On April 13th a herald was ordered to wait at Berwick for

\textsuperscript{15} Halliwell, Letters of the Kings of England, i, pp. 156-57; MacDougall, James III, pp. 188, 209; Foedera, v(iii), p. 143.

\textsuperscript{16} Crowland, p. 171; Ross, Richard III, p. 129.

\textsuperscript{17} Horrox, Richard III, pp. 136-37.

\textsuperscript{18} A. Sutton, "Richard III's `Tytylle and Right': A New Discovery" in The Ricardian, IV (1977), pp. 2-7; Grant, "Richard III and Scotland", p. 133. Dr. Grant dates Richard's change of heart towards Scotland as coming after his son's death.

\textsuperscript{19} Pollard, op. cit., p. 356.

\textsuperscript{20} Grant. op. cit., pp. 132-33.
Scottish ambassadors until May 15th, two weeks longer than the March safe-
conducts had been granted for, and if they arrived and agreement was reached
then a general truce was to be proclaimed throughout the borders until the end of
October\textsuperscript{21}. This initiative was ignored by the Scots, perhaps seeing it as another
example of English procrastination, and they proceeded with the siege of Dunbar\textsuperscript{22}.

Although Richard was determined on peace, it could not be at any
price. He could not be seen to be capitulating to the Scots and he had to preserve
English sovereign territory at all costs, so the fate of Dunbar was non-negotiable at
that time. His plans for a summer campaign were shelved, but a fleet of ships
based at Scarborough patrolled the east coast, defeated the Scottish navy and kept
Dunbar in supplies\textsuperscript{23}. By mid-July another invitation had been sent to the Scots,
and from then on a truce was swiftly arranged. Safe conducts were granted by
Richard on August 6th, and James III gave his commission to his ambassadors on
August 31st. They arrived at Nottingham on September 12th and the truce was
signed just over a week later on September 20th\textsuperscript{24}.

In the meantime, the final action of the war took place in the Scottish
West March on July 22nd. It was a miserable affair and had little bearing on the
negotiations. Although mentioned briefly in the Crowland Chronicle the only source
to provide any substantial detail is George Buchanan's sixteenth century History of
Scotland\textsuperscript{25}. According to him the rebel Scots, the Duke of Albany and the Earl of
Douglas, with a force of some 500 men, made their way to Lochmaben unopposed,
"desirous of trying the affections of the people towards them." The implication is
that, in contemporary terminology, an abstinence of war was in force by this time.
Once there, they were not opposed by any Scottish troops but "from some sudden
quarrel, a battle ensued, which was fought with various success, according as
assistance was brought to one side or the other from the neighbourhood." This was

\textsuperscript{21} Harl. 433, iii, p. 71; the safe-conduct is in Foedera v(iii), p. 162, misdated 1485..

\textsuperscript{22} MacDougall, op. cit., pp. 209-10.

\textsuperscript{23} Crowland, p. 173; Harl. 433, i, p. 272; ii, pp. 145, 149-50; Grant, op. cit., pp. 134-35.

\textsuperscript{24} Gairdner, ed., Letters and Papers Illustrative of...Richard III and Henry VII, i, pp. 59-61; Foedera, v(iii),

\textsuperscript{25} G. Buchanan, History of Scotland, Trans. J. Aikman (Glasgow, 1848), ii, pp. 152-53, first published as
Rerum Scoticarum Historia (Edinburgh, 1582).
no pitched battle between forces of the opposing realms but rather it appears to have been a squabble between borderers arising from the indiscriminate use of a few choice words. Since each side was able to draw on local reinforcements the "English" forces probably came from the border clans later known as reivers\textsuperscript{26}. Douglas was captured and Albany escaped, but rather than returning to England he fled to France. Richard had not approved the expedition and Albany, knowing he was in disgrace, forsook his erstwhile lord and the fate that awaited him in England for a life of political oblivion, but of freedom, on the continent. He was not to enjoy it for long, however, since he was impaled on a broken lance at a tournament in the following year, and buried in Paris\textsuperscript{27}.

The treaty of Nottingham provided for a three year truce and the marriage of James III's son to Richard's niece, Anne de la Pole. Dunbar was excluded from the settlement, and any fighting around it was not to be regarded as a breach of the agreement. The other clauses concerned the operation of March law. Wardens and their lieutenants were to be denounced as traitors and rebels if they made war across the border in time of truce, and royal councillors were to meet at regular intervals to arrange reparations for cross-border infractions. Dr. Grant's analysis of the treaty shows quite clearly how closely Richard himself was involved in the negotiations, and also the extent to which he was undermining the traditional role of the March wardens\textsuperscript{28}. It was a feature of Richard's reign that he was concerned to extend royal authority into the north. Lordship was individual by nature and so, by extension, was kingship\textsuperscript{29}. Richard's actions in keeping the wardenship of the West March and the stewardship of the Duchy of Lancaster in his own hands did set a precedent for the future, but they were all offices that he had controlled as Duke of Gloucester\textsuperscript{30}. The creation of the Council of the North, though, shows that by the summer of 1484 he was wanting to extend and increase his personal control over the whole of the north of England, including the Marches.

\textsuperscript{26} Crowland, p. 173.

\textsuperscript{27} MacDougall, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 211-212; Grant, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 135-36.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 140-145.

\textsuperscript{29} See comments by Professor Harriss on the nature of kingship - “The King and His Subjects”, in Horrox, ed., \textit{Fifteenth Century Attitudes}, pp. 119-20.

This was hardly what was expected by the far northern magnates, but he might have been able to carry them with him if the Scottish war had continued. As far as the two Marcher lords, Percy and Dacre, were concerned, they had probably supported Richard's bid for the throne on the implicit understanding that in return they would receive rewards not just of monetary patronage but also an extension of authority. In the Earl of Northumberland's case he was probably looking to replace Gloucester as the king's lieutenant in the whole of the north-east; in Dacre's it was the prospect of pushing the border a further thirty miles or more to the north. His lands were particularly vulnerable to Scottish attacks and he would have welcomed the security of a buffer zone. The new territories would have needed a local lord to control them in the king's name and he was one of the best placed candidates. To be denied this authority by the creation of a new royal Council and then to lose their existing powers to it must have been, as Dr. Grant has rightly said, due cause for resentment. The failure to continue with the Scottish war did little more than to rub salt in the wounds.

The relationship between Richard III and his far northern supporters in aftermath of the Buckingham Rebellion needs to be understood if we are to make sense of not only his reign but also his defeat at Bosworth. The Earl of Northumberland in particular was one of the main beneficiaries of Richard's munificence in late 1483 and early 1484. He had commanded the northern army from April 1483 while Gloucester had been concerned with the Protectorate, and in June it was he who led it south to support the usurpation. In May his contract as warden of the East and Middle Marches had been renewed for a further year, and he was appointed captain of Berwick for six months with a garrison of 600 men.

He played a central role in the coronation ceremony, carrying one of the swords

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31 Ibid., pp. 358-60.

32 CIPM H.V, i, 10, 157; R. Storey, “Manor of Burgh-by-Sands”, p. 128; Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, ii, p. 464.


34 Ross, Richard III, pp. 87-88; Pollard, op. cit., pp. 342-43.

before the king's canopy. During the Buckingham Rebellion he once more led his troops in support of Richard and was rewarded with the de Brian inheritance (scattered throughout the southern counties of Devon, Dorset, Somerset, Sussex, Surrey, Kent, Essex and Suffolk) and the lordship of Holderness in the East Riding of Yorkshire. He was appointed as Great Chamberlain of England in Buckingham's place and the Act of Attainder passed against the first earl in 1408 was revoked.

His land grants, it seems, were initially only meant to include the de Brian inheritance. Although in the first grant the lands were given to him in tail general, by the time the list of Richard's patronage came to be drawn up in early 1485 they were only being held for the term of his life. Moreover he had them rent free, paying only for lordship of Holderness at the usual rate of a shilling in the mark. Possibly the Earl was seeking to concentrate his power in the north in the expectation of taking over the role Richard had played as Duke of Gloucester, but the grants are an indication that by the time that the list of patronage was drawn up he was out of favour with Richard. Holderness was given to the earl and his second son, Alan, in tail male and in the long term the lordship would not have become part of the Percy patrimony. Given that the de Brian lands were restricted to a life holding only, none of Northumberland's land grants would have increased his authority in the long term. Together with the removal of his political role in the Marches, this provided a strong case for disaffection.

Richard's continued interest in the Scottish palatinate meant that the major county gentry of Cumberland did not benefit from his patronage as much as might have been expected. Those who went south in October 1483 have been identified already, but while the country was in a state of war the borders could not be left unattended for too long. At the same time as Lord Dacre was making

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37 Harl. 433, i, pp. 97, 134; ii, pp. 39-40; iii, pp. 152-53; CPR 1476-85, pp. 367, 409; see Bean, Estates, pp. 116-21 for the de Brian inheritance; Warner and Lacey, "Neville vs. Percy", pp. 212-13 for the attainder and its effects.

38 Harl. 433, i, pp. xxxii-xxxiv, 134; , p. 152.


40 See below, pp. 248-252.

41 See above, pp. 224-225, 237ff.
preparations to go south Richard ordered his receiver in Cumberland, John Crackenthorpe, to pay up to 500 marks for the expenses of the household at Carlisle castle, so a quite substantial garrison was probably already in place\textsuperscript{42}. Unfortunately, as with so many of the grants in the Harleian manuscript, the rewards given to the Cumberland men are impossible to date accurately\textsuperscript{43}. Those to Dacre and Richard Salkeld were made in March 1483 at the latest, but Sir Christopher Moresby may have had to wait until May and Sir Thomas Strickland, less surprisingly considering his close links with Sir William Parr, until July\textsuperscript{44}. He was, strictly speaking, a Westmorland man, and he was the only one of this group not to be included in the royal household. Dacre was called “king’s kinsman” because of his mother, Philippa Neville, had been the great aunt of Queen Anne, and both Salkeld and Moresby were “king’s servants”\textsuperscript{45}.

Without knowing when the grant was first made any firm conclusions are impossible, but the prospect that Strickland's annuity, and maybe even that of Moresby, were made after Richard had decided on peace with Scotland ought to be considered. The situation is also complicated by not knowing whether Dacre, Salkeld and Moresby, although employed by Richard, were receiving any extraordinary fees prior to 1483. Moresby's annuity may have been an increase over a previous fee, but his new grant gave him not only an income of £40 but also \textit{juris regalia} over the lordship of Penrith, an increase in power commensurate with Sir Richard Huddleston’s promotion at Beaumaris\textsuperscript{46}. It is the first example of Richard III delegating some of the authority he had enjoyed in the north as Duke of Gloucester, but it is less a sign of Moresby's favour than of Richard's change of attitude towards Cumberland. It seems unlikely that he would have made the grant unless he had no longer had any intention of invading Scotland, and he may well have seen it as being in the way of compensation. Strickland's annuity is interesting

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\textsuperscript{42} Harl. 433, ii, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Op. cit.}, i, pp. xxv, xxvii-xxviii.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{CPR 1476-85}, pp. 185, 189.
\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Complete Peerage}, iv, pp. 18-20.
\textsuperscript{46} Other of Richard's retainers had their annuities increased when he became king - Pollard, \textit{North-Eastern England}, p. 354.
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because it shows Richard extending his lordship into southern Westmorland. At about the same time as it was entered onto the patent rolls Richard wrote to his receiver of the Parr lands ordering him to continue paying an annuity of £20 to Sir Henry Bellingham, just as Parr had paid him during his life. His following in southern Westmorland was not strong and, with the Council of the North being created to rule in his name, he needed some agents in every part of the region. He already had financial supervision of the Parr lands and Sir Richard Ratcliffe, as sheriff, gave him control of the judicial system in the north of the county, but he needed a local following in order to ensure that the daily administration of the region ran smoothly.

The Cockermouth affinity was a separate entity, but the appointment of Edward Ratcliffe as its lieutenant in effect brought it into the royal domain. This can be seen by its representation on the commission of array, appointed on May 1st 1484, in Edward Ratcliffe and Thomas Curwen. Curwen was one of the senior members of the affinity and had served on county commissions from time to time, but Ratcliffe had only just been appointed lieutenant of the honour. Undoubtedly this had happened because of his brother’s close links with the crown, but the Earl of Northumberland had probably little expectation that his relations with Richard would take such a turn for the worse. Edward Ratcliffe’s loyalties lay with his brother and Richard III, and once the earl found himself excluded from the king’s inner circle he also discovered that his control over Edward, and hence the Cockermouth affinity, was broken. The commission of May 1484 also included the Prince of Wales (a scribal error), the Earl of Lincoln, the Earl of Northumberland, Lord Dacre, Sir Richard Ratcliffe, Sir Richard Huddleston, and Sir Christopher Moresby. Even if Richard’s concern to be obeyed was not yet making itself felt at a local level, it was displayed in his appointments. The Council of the North was not yet in operation but even so its skeleton was in existence, and it can be seen reaching out to include the far north at a very early stage. The traditional representation of Northumberland and Dacre was swamped by Richard’s own men.

48 See above, p. 242.
49 See above, pp. 237-237.
50 CPR 1476-85, p. 400.
The Earl of Lincoln’s inclusion was indicative of the role that Richard had planned for him, but the real power on the commission was in the hands of his other retainers. The royal will was adequately represented by the inclusion of Huddleston, Moresby, and Edward Ratcliffe, but Sir Richard Ratcliffe was the key figure. He was, it seems, being given the same role by Richard as Sir William Parr had been by Edward IV. Acting as the nexus of royal power, the king’s pleasure could be made known and enforced. Even if he was not present because of his other commitments, his brother would have been able to express his - and thus Richard’s - wishes.

Although on the surface Richard III seems to have successfully established his lordship in Cumberland and Westmorland by mid-1484, in reality it was based on shifting ground. The March men who had helped him in 1483 had not been rewarded as had the others who had taken part. Instead, they were expecting large rewards in the future campaign against Scotland that seemed to be so imminent. There is no reason to suppose that any of them knew of Richard’s plans since the negotiations with the Scots had been carried out in secret\(^{51}\), so when summons were issued in August 1484 to meet the king at Nottingham in early September, they were probably unaware that peace was in the offing. The Earl of Northumberland was certainly present to sign the treaty, and on September 5th Lord Dacre may have been present when he was appointed the lieutenant-general of the West March\(^{52}\). The commission called him, for the first time, a king’s councillor and gave him the power to arrange all necessary meetings between English and Scottish commissioners to redress grievances in the West March. Not only that, but he was granted the right to nominate those commissioners and to grant safe-conducts for the Scots. Richard was expecting him to take over the administrative element of the wardenship, even though the right to nominate is not quite the same as the right to appoint.

Dacre’s inclusion as a royal councillor was a recognition of his role as the effective warden, but Richard may also have been looking for his advice in the forthcoming negotiations as well as trying to buy his support. It seems, however, that he did not receive it or, if he did, it was unwelcome. When the Scottish

\(^{51}\) Harl. 433, ii, p. 105-6.

ambassadors arrived at Nottingham Richard took personal control of the negotiations, only appointing his ambassadors on September 20th, the day that the treaty was signed\(^53\). Although the Earl of Northumberland was included, Lord Dacre was not. The complete list included the bishops of Lincoln and St. Asaph, the Duke of Norfolk, Northumberland, Thomas Lord Stanley and his son Lord Strange, Lord Grey of Powys, Lord Fitzhugh, John Gunthorpe (keeper of the privy seal), Thomas Barowe (keeper of the Chancery rolls), Sir Thomas Brian (Chief Justice of the King's Bench), Sir Richard Ratcliffe, William Catesby and Richard Salkeld\(^54\). It is an indication that Dacre was opposed to the treaty that he was not included in the list of ambassadors. In his place, as the sole representative of the West March, was Richard Salkeld whose position at the table was justified by him being made an esquire of the body\(^55\). The ambassadors reflect the main impetus behind the negotiations, and the lack of overall far northern representation amongst them is just one more sign of the narrow basis of Richard's support in the region. Although the Earl of Northumberland was included as warden of the East and Middle Marches he probably spent as much time at court as in the far north and all of the others, with the exception of Salkeld, were courtiers. The decision to find a peaceful settlement had been made long before, and Richard's advisors at the talks were chosen accordingly.

Included in the treaty was a list of men from either side of the border charged with ensuring that the truce was maintained. Heading the English side was the Earl of Lincoln, already the leader of the Council of the North\(^56\). The majority of the others, in sharp contrast to earlier practice, were part of the Middleham connection or had little association with the borders\(^57\). Ralph Lord Neville, Lord Greystoke, Lord Fitzhugh and the Lords Scrope of Bolton and Masham were all close to Richard and so were Sir John Conyers, Sir Edmund Hastings and William

\(^{53}\) Grant, "Richard III and Scotland", pp. 140-41.

\(^{54}\) Foedera, v(iii), p. 153.

\(^{55}\) Previously he had only been a "king’s servant" - CPR 1476-85, p. 424.

\(^{56}\) Grant, op. cit., p. 143.

\(^{57}\) E.g., Foedera, v(i), p. 47; v(ii), pp. 16-19, 45-47.
Conyers is already well known as the pivotal figure in the Middleham affinity and Hastings, Greystoke's son-in-law, was a royal councillor who probably played an important role in the Council of the North. Claxton, from the palatinate of Durham, had been rewarded with lands in Somerset worth £66.15s.1d. for the role he played in putting down the Buckingham Rebellion.

Richard’s concern to extend his authority in the north can be seen in the other appointments made specifically for each March. The Earl of Northumberland was named, but his supporting representation was limited to Sir Robert Constable, Sir Hugh Hastings and Sir William Eure who, despite being part of the Earl’s affinity, also had ties with Richard. Not only that, but they came from Yorkshire, where Richard’s influence was strongest, rather than Northumberland. Constable came from Flamborough in the East Riding and, although he was not retained by Richard, his son Sir Marmaduke was; Hastings was initially a Percy retainer, but he entered Richard's service in a minor capacity soon after 1471 and by September 1483 he too was a knight of the body. Eure was Constable's son-in-law and had also entered royal service.

A similar concern can be seen in the West March. Lord Dacre's position as Richard's deputy warden meant that he was included, but the others display the lack of depth to Richard's support in the region. Unlike for the east, where his exclusion from influence in Northumberland forced him to rely on men from Yorkshire, he was able to name local men. Sir Christopher Moresby and Richard Salkeld are no great surprise, but with them were named William Musgrave and, quite bizarrely, Sir John Huddleston. Musgrave's failings as an administrator on the Latimer estates had led him to a petty-captaincy at Carlisle with ten soldiers in his command, but he was still a relatively minor local figure. By this time, however, he may well have been acting as the royal agent in the city rather than

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61 Horrox, Richard III, pp. 42, 63, 216-17, n. 124.
Henry Denton or Lord Dacre\textsuperscript{62}. It is significant that on September 24th 1484 a warrant was sent to the auditor of the Latimer estates ordering him to clear all of Musgrave’s debts run up in crown service. It included a generous allowance of £10 for his costs at Carlisle and the wages for his ten soldiers for the past six months, as well as granting him the standard annuity for a squire of the household\textsuperscript{63}. Musgrave was not a particularly effective retainer, and certainly not one of the inner circle of Richard's supporters, but suddenly his continued loyalty had become important. Huddleston's inclusion can only be explained by his unofficial role as Richard's advisor and the lack of any other strong representation from Cumberland. He no longer lived in the county and was soon to be appointed sheriff of Cambridgeshire, but Richard had no-one else whose name would carry such weight with the Scots\textsuperscript{64}.

Together with the ordinances of the Council of the North, the Nottingham treaty shows unequivocally that Richard was pursuing a deliberate policy of extending his personal control into the Marches\textsuperscript{65}. The truce included the schedule for a series of March days along the length of the border, to arrange for the redress of grievances. Once again, the names of those commissioned reveal the unpopularity of Richard’s conciliatory policy towards Scotland. The recently appointed lieutenant-general of the West March was excluded and the mandate was given to Nicholas Ridley, a Northumberland squire, Richard Salkeld and William Musgrave\textsuperscript{66}. The exclusion of Dacre and Sir Christopher Moresby show how deep-rooted the disaffection was within what would normally be regarded as Richard III's affinity in the north-west. For the first time since 1471, Richard Salkeld reached the heights of power that he had enjoyed in the 1460s. The commission illustrates Richard’s determination to be served by men whom he could trust implicitly not just in the south, but throughout the realm. If Dacre and Moresby were prepared to doubt the wisdom of his policies, then he was quite ready to depend on men of lesser status who did not question his orders.


\textsuperscript{63} Harl. 433, ii, p. 162.

\textsuperscript{64} See above, p. 231.

\textsuperscript{65} Grant, “Richard III and Scotland”, pp. 143-44.

\textsuperscript{66} Foedera, v(iii), p. 155.
Ridley’s inclusion, not just in the West but also the East and Middle Marches, is evidence of just how thinly spread were the foundations of Richard’s support in the border counties. It was a bold move to so obviously undermine the traditional hegemony of the border barons and, in the long term, it would have given him an unparalleled level of authority across the whole region. It foreshadowed and was even more extensive than Tudor policy, which was forced to return to a reliance on the border magnates as the active wardens, but the short length of Richard III’s reign meant that the policy never had the chance to develop to its full potential. Richard, better than anyone, knew just how wasteful the wardenships were. He was clearly moving towards the use of subordinates who were more dependent on royal favour, and who were prepared to serve him for a realistic wage. To do that, however, he also needed to break the hereditary influence that Lord Dacre and the Earl of Northumberland had over the Marches. As the king he was able to command the obedience of all men, even the retainers of other lords, so it was perfectly feasible for him (in theory) to by-pass them and to use men who, in other circumstances, would have remained beyond his reach. As Duke of Gloucester, warden of the West March or lieutenant-general of the north Richard may have had direct authority over Dacre and Northumberland but he did not have the same control over their retainers. He could expect the loyalty of lesser men because he was their lords’ lord and a representative of royal authority but he could not employ them directly in his own service, as he found out when he had tried to retain Sir John Widdrington in 1473. Until he became king it was impossible for him to act in the far north without the support of these magnates, but after that he was - technically, at least - in a position to call upon any man to serve him in any capacity.

Richard’s ability to innovate in order to achieve his goals can be seen in the subsequent Great Commissions for all three Marches. Scheduled from mid-November, they were probably intended to make a final settlement of all grievances

67 See Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, ii, pp. 466ff., and idem, “Carlisle and the English West March”, pp. 104-5 for a discussion of the wardenry under Henry VII.

68 His own fee as warden had been £1000 during the war, of which he had paid his deputy no more than £200 - PRO E.404/77/1/28; Harl. 433, ii, p. 136.


70 See above, pp. 126-128.
and, as such, required the presence of the warden or his deputy. At first glance this may seem to be contrary to Richard's putative intentions to do away with the wardenships. The Earl of Northumberland, however, was one of the witnesses to the signing of the treaty and was obviously still close to Richard at this point, even if royal policy was not running in his favour. Even if the wardenships were set to disappear, Richard still needed to give the impression of having the support of the local magnates so that the Scots would have faith in the treaty. By arranging such Great Commissions he was therefore able to reassure the Scots that he had the backing of his two great border magnates and, to a lesser extent, encourage the two men that he still saw them performing a significant role. He was, however, careful to limit their potential influence. They were no longer appointed according to their offices but only as significant individuals, and they were surrounded with men from his own circle who could ensure that his policies were fulfilled. In the West March Lord Dacre was to be accompanied by Lord Fitzhugh, Sir Richard Ratcliffe, Sir Christopher Moresby and Richard Salkeld; in the East and Middle Marches the Earl of Northumberland was joined by Lord Greystoke, Lord Scrope of Masham, Sir William Gascoigne and Sir Robert Constable. The commissions were granted to those men or any three of them. Although on the surface that might have allowed Dacre and Northumberland to dominate proceedings, with the Middleham men being optional extras in case Richard's faith in their willingness to serve him honestly was tested, in reality they were being given little leeway. In the West March, for example, Salkeld in particular was more closely associated with Richard III than with Dacre by this point. Even if Moresby was not in favour of peace, he had received so much patronage from the king that he would have been foolish to give even the slightest hint that he was not committed to the settlement. At least one other commissioner would have been closely linked to Richard, and any failure to implement the royal will would have become known. On the other commission Gascoigne and Constable, although both Percy retainers, came from Yorkshire rather than Northumberland and had links to the king. Gascoigne was receiving an annuity of £20 from Tickhill and, like Constable, was included in the lists of reliable gentry drawn up in early 1485. The commissions, therefore, while giving the impression of wide-ranging support, were in reality a feint that was meant to put across that idea to the Scots without allowing the Marcher lords any real influence.

71 Harl. 433, i, p. 200; iii, p. 239. The Earl of Northumberland does not feature in the lists, although this may have been because he was not regarded as being resident in Yorkshire - ibid., i, pp. xxxiv-xxxv.
That Richard was keen to establish peace as quickly as possible can be seen from the proposed timing of the various commissions. The first attempt to redress grievances on the West March was to be on October 24th, little more than a month from the signing of the treaty, and the Great Commission was due to meet three and a half weeks later on November 18th. Such a timetable was hopelessly unrealistic. The Scots did not ratify the treaty until October 21st, by which time it was too late to arrange the necessary safe-conducts for the first of these meetings. The second, the Great Commission, was not really necessary but it gave Richard the chance to use his own men. James III could easily have seen through the ploy, since there had never been a need to duplicate commissions for the redress of grievances before. The various delays meant that it was not until December 2nd that Lord Dacre, Richard Salkeld, John Crackenthorpe and William Musgrave were appointed to treat with the Scots. Dacre may have acknowledged the fait accompli and signalled his willingness to Richard to be involved, thinking it better to participate in some capacity than not at all. His inclusion, however, might just as easily have been the result of Richard's need to include a “big name” to give the commission some political force. Sir Christopher Moresby's exclusion is worth noting, especially in the light of the other appointments. Salkeld seems to have become Richard's principal deputy by this time, but John Crackenthorpe and William Musgrave were not in the same league. Crackenthorpe was the royal receiver in Cumberland and probably had some legal training. Although he had been Richard's deputy-sheriff in the county on at least one occasion this was his first involvement in March affairs. There was perhaps a case for a financial official to be included, since the method of redressing grievances was to tot up the value of goods stolen from either side, to subtract one from the other and to settle the balance, but it hardly necessary for some-one of Crackenthorpe's importance to take part. Any minor clerk could have done the necessary sums, so his name must have appeared for other reasons. Likewise, Musgrave was little more than a

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72 Foedera, v(iii), p. 156.

73 Ibid., p. 157.

74 Harl. 433, ii, p. 28; Lists Sheriffs, p. 27; the Crackenthorpes traditionally sent their sons to be educated at Lincoln's Inn - J. Foster, ed., Lincoln's Inn Register of Admissions, 1420-1893, vol. 1, pp. 8, 21.

75 Nicolson & Burn, i, pp. xi, xxxi-xxxvii.
petty captain but his loyalty to Richard was the important factor. These were men whom the king felt he could trust the most, but they were not those who had traditionally been appointed in the crown’s service.

The extent to which Richard’s faith in local men had been undermined is clearly shown by the last piece of evidence relating to the West March, a safe-conduct for English ambassadors to travel to Lochmabenstone to reform the truce, as stipulated in the treaty of Nottingham, issued on April 18th 1485. The names of those commissioned by Richard for that purpose included three men from his Middleham affinity and only two from the border counties. Sir Richard Ratcliffe’s services were being used increasingly in the north and he was a key figure in the Council based at Sandal. Thomas Metcalfe had been retained by Richard in 1471 and created chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster on the day after his coronation. William Claxton, as has already been seen, was one of Richard's most important adherents in the palatine of Durham. These were obviously the men in whom Richard III had faith to carry out his orders, and their preferment over the Earl of Northumberland and Lord Dacre shows just how insignificant these latter men had become in his plans for the border region. The other ambassadors were to be Nicholas Ridley and Richard Salkeld, who by this time must be seen as Richard’s true deputies in the far north. Even so, they did not have the king’s complete trust. Lord Dacre died on 30th May 1485, when his son was only eighteen years old, and he was replaced as deputy warden of the West March by Sir Richard Ratcliffe rather than Salkeld or Ridley. Again, the appointment reaffirms the almost total reliance of Richard on his inner circle by this time. It is also indicative of the debilitating paranoia he had about extending that circle, even into areas where he ought to have been able to command a great deal of support. Cumberland in particular should have been his, and he should have been able to look on it as his own country. That he was not able to do this cannot necessarily be taken as an indication of his failings as a monarch. The short length of his reign means that all of his policies are placed under the microscope, and in doing so they are not always seen in proportion.

76 Foedera, v(iii), p. 162.


78 PRO C.81/1531/9, 66; Horrox, Richard III, p. 217.
It did not have to be the case that men such as Lord Dacre were
disloyal in any way, but by disagreeing with Richard's policies they became tainted
in his eyes and untrustworthy. Indeed Dacre’s authority was still needed locally.
Along with the Earl of Northumberland he headed commissions of array in both
Cumberland and Westmorland on December 8th 1484\textsuperscript{79}, and on March 25th 1485
he was commissioned with virtually the whole of Richard's following in Cumberland
and northern Westmorland to recapture the Musgrave's castle at Hayton. Sir
Richard Ratcliffe, his father Thomas and brother Edward, Sir Christopher Moresby,
Richard Salkeld, William Musgrave and John Crackenthorpe were the mainstay of
the commission, and they were joined by Richard Musgrave junior and Richard
Louther\textsuperscript{80}. This was the final display of Richard's "good lordship" towards his
following in the region, such as it was, but it was at the expense of his relationship
with the Earl of Northumberland. William Colville, owner of Hayton castle in
Cumberland, had died in the late summer of 1479 leaving two daughters as his
heirs. William and Nicholas Musgrave had married them and petitioned Edward IV
to be allowed to keep the lands. The inheritance was contested by the women's
uncle, Robert, who claimed the existence of a feoffment to use of his grandfather's
will. This, he maintained, had granted the estates to William Colville in tail male,
thus making him the next heir\textsuperscript{81}. In February 1480 the escheator in Cumberland,
Richard Salkeld, was ordered to take the fealty of the Musgraves and to divide the
Colville lands equally between them by right of their wives\textsuperscript{82}. Colville appealed, and
on 27th September 1481 the case was heard at York. Despite being able to
provide witnesses, Robert was unable to provide the document in question - indeed,
his main witness testified to having destroyed it in an effort to preserve the interests
of the heiresses - and the Musgraves were finally granted the estates\textsuperscript{83}.

The Colvilles, however, were part of the Martindale affinity who had
close links to Cockermouth. Sir William Martindale had been the steward there in

\textsuperscript{79} CPR 1476-85, p. 492.

\textsuperscript{80} CPR 1476-85, pp. 545-46.

\textsuperscript{81} Ferguson, ed., \textit{Accompt}, pp. 153n-54n.

\textsuperscript{82} CFR 1476-85, 513, 526, 558.

\textsuperscript{83} Ferguson, \textit{op. cit.}
1453 and George Martindale, probably his son, was being feed by 1478\(^8^4\). They, quite naturally, were dissatisfied with the decision and early in 1485 they resurrected the dispute by occupying Hayton. The move had obviously been planned for some time and they were not too careful about who heard about it, since Richard had already issued one proclamation to be read at Hayton, Carlisle and Cockermouth for the keeping of the peace. Before it could be read, however, two Martindales, two Colvilles and others took the castle. They were well supported it seems, since those commissioned were given the authority to raise the posse of the county if necessary, and the fact that the proclamations were to be read at Hayton suggests a degree of local sympathy.

Special commissions such as this were meant to bring the full moral weight of the locality against miscreants, not just royal disapproval. Their success was based on the acknowledgement by regional society that some of its members had overstepped the boundaries of acceptable behaviour and that it was in the best interests of their social group that they be brought to book. There is a direct comparison that can be made here with the case of the Harringtons in 1473 who, under similar circumstances, abducted their nieces and holed themselves up in Hornby castle\(^8^5\). On that occasion Richard of Gloucester was ordered to resolve the situation, along with a selection of local gentry that included several members of the Middleham affinity, where the Harringtons had also retained in the 1460s\(^8^6\). The Colvilles were not so important a family, but the principle of applying moral force remained the same. In theory the commission did that by including members of the Cockermouth affinity, but they were so closely allied to Richard that any local influence they had must have been seen as coming from royal favour. Thomas and Edward Ratcliffe were both receiving fees from Cockermouth by 1485, but probably only because of Sir Richard's connections, and they could hardly claim to be representative of the affinity. Thomas Ratcliffe, however, was to be remembered in the Earl of Northumberland's will written four months later and may represent a resurgence of the Earl's local influence, despite the presence of his youngest son\(^8^7\).

\(^{8^4}\) CRO D/Lec/29/3, f. 1; CRO D/Lec/29/5, f. 5.

\(^{8^5}\) Jones, "Richard III and the Stanleys", p. 37.

\(^{8^6}\) PRO SC.6/1050/20; CPR 1467-77, p. 426.

\(^{8^7}\) Testamenta Eboracensia, Vol. III, pp. 304-10, esp. p. 308.
Richard Louther also had some ties to the Percies, since his family held their manor of Wythop from the Earl of Northumberland\textsuperscript{88}, but geographically his family was closer to the Musgraves. The commission, therefore, ranged the royal affinity against the Cockermouth affinity, with little effort to try to include the latter in the process of making peace in the locality.

Throughout the summer of 1485, Richard was faced by the prospect of an invasion led by Henry Tudor. The rebel forces eventually landed at Milford Haven on August 7th and four days later the king was writing letters to his subjects commanding them to assemble armed troops to resist "oure rebelles and traitours"\textsuperscript{89}. By August 20th he had assembled approximately 10,000 men at Leicester and two days later he was killed trying to strike down Henry in the thick of battle, at a place called Sandeford beside Bosworth Field. The details of the battle are well known and need not be rehearsed here, but the role of Richard's northern troops was fundamental to the eventual outcome\textsuperscript{90}. The third wing of his army, under the Earl of Northumberland, played no part in the battle and fled the field untested. These, surely, were among the most experienced troops at hand and Richard's failure to use them effectively is one of the many mysteries surrounding the final hours of his life. He may have been keeping them in reserve for the final moments of the conflict when their skills at butchery would have been all the more effective. Perhaps he mistrusted them, or he may even have issued orders that were ignored\textsuperscript{91}. What is clear, however, is at the moment when he most needed them they did not respond. After charging down the northern side of Ambion Hill to attack Henry as he made his way towards the Stanleys, Richard became isolated and vulnerable to a flanking attack. Sir William Stanley took the opportunity to do


\textsuperscript{90} See most recently D. Williams, \textit{The Battle of Bosworth Field} (Bosworth Publications, second edition, 1996); also M. Bennett, \textit{The Battle of Bosworth} (Gloucester, 1985); Ross, \textit{Richard III}, pp. 210-226.

just that, ordering his forces to swoop down on the royal bodyguard. It was at this point, when Richard was fighting for his life, that any commander worth his salt would have intervened on his behalf, and the fact that the Earl of Northumberland did not do so must count against him. It may have been deliberate, planned treachery, although his treatment immediately after the battle indicates that Henry was in doubt about this\textsuperscript{92}. The Earl, however, was not a decisive man. In 1471 he had been particularly ineffective when faced with the opposing forces of personal loyalty to Edward IV and an affinity that still blamed the king for the devastation of the battle of Towton\textsuperscript{93}. In 1485 he was faced with an equally difficult problem. On the one hand his personal loyalty to Richard may have been in doubt, and he may already have been in contact with Tudor. On the other, his Yorkshire affinity were immensely loyal to the king because of the myriad of social contacts with his retainers, and even his lieutenant of Cockermouth had been seduced into royal service. He may have decided before the battle to sit on the fence and to see in which direction the winds of fortune blew, but Richard's sudden charge and the Stanleys' counterattack forced him to make an instant decision. He may have consciously decided that he would abandon his king at that point, but the pressure of the situation must have been absolutely overwhelming and it is quite possible that he did not decide anything until it was too late\textsuperscript{94}. Once Richard's standard had fallen, and knowing the battle was over, he may have fled, but both the Crowland Chronicle and Polydore Vergil imply that he was captured on the field\textsuperscript{95}.

The main problem concerning the battle of Bosworth for historians of the north of England is the almost total lack of evidence concerning who was actually there. The subsequent Act of Attainder affected only twenty eight men out of the 10,000 or so who were present in the royal army, and none of these came

\textsuperscript{92} Hicks, "Dynastic Change", p. 92.

\textsuperscript{93} See above, pp. 122.

\textsuperscript{94} Cf. Hicks, "Dynastic Change", p. 97, and Richmond, "1485 And All That", pp. 177-78, both of whom suggest an active decision by the Earl. Ross, Richard III, pp. 221-22 submits that the alignment of his troops prevented his intervention, while Pollard, North-Eastern England, p. 362-63 proposes indecision.

from the north-western counties\textsuperscript{96}. The only other evidence as to who might have been there comes from the ballads written to eulogise the Stanleys' contribution to the victory. "Bosworth Fielde" and "Ladye Bessiye" were both written some time after the events they describe, ostensibly by some-one who was actually there\textsuperscript{97}. They are not infallible, however, being as much a guide as to who ought to have been there as to who really was, and poetic licence or perhaps ignorance of local figures adds to the complications\textsuperscript{98}. "Ladye Bessiye" gives little detail of men from the far north-west, saying only that Lord Dacre fled the battle, at which point Richard realised that he was going to die\textsuperscript{99}. It is an interesting detail, shifting the blame away from the Earl of Northumberland, but it is the only source that mentions it and it cannot be taken as being reliable. "Bosworth Fielde" has a few more details, but they are little more forthcoming. Lord Dacre is said to have raised "the North cuntrye", but in the long list of knights that follows only seven out of the total of sixty seven names can be associated with Cumberland, and only one with Westmorland. Sir Richard Ratcliffe was said to have been joined by his brothers, William and Thomas; Thomas Lord Dacre's brother, Ralph, was joined by Sir Christopher Moresby, Sir Thomas Broughton and Sir John "Hurlstean" (perhaps Huddleston?). Only William Musgrave had a link to Westmorland\textsuperscript{100}. These need to be qualified. Sir Richard Ratcliffe did not have brothers called William or Thomas, but it is likely that his father (who was a Thomas) and brother (Edward) were called upon to serve with either the Earl of Northumberland or Richard\textsuperscript{101}. Ralph Dacre could have been little more than sixteen at the time and if present was probably there as a squire. Most noticeable, however, is the absence of Richard Salkeld\textsuperscript{102}. The balladeer may

\textsuperscript{96} Rot. Parl., vi, pp. 275-78.

\textsuperscript{97} J. Hales, F. Furnivall, eds., Bishop Percy's Folio Manuscript, iii (1868) pp. 233-59, 319-63.


\textsuperscript{99} Bishop Percy's Folio Manuscript, pp. 361-62, lines 1027-34.

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., pp. 244, 247.

\textsuperscript{101} History of Northumberland, x, pedigree between pp. 280-81.

\textsuperscript{102} Cf. Summerson, “Carlisle and the English West March”, pp. 103-4, who has identified several different names, including Alexander Highmore; Pollard, North-Eastern England, pp. 363-65. As elsewhere, everyone from the north-west was knighted in the poem regardless of their actual status.
have been working from memory when he wrote down the names of those supposed to have been at the battle and he certainly made plenty of mistakes elsewhere, but Salkeld as the effective deputy warden may have been ordered to remain in the north to defend the borders against a possible Scottish attack. Although the “Ballad” cannot be relied upon as much as Professor Ross would have us believe, at least in the case of the Cumbrian gentry it is probably reasonably close to the truth in reflecting the actual numbers of gentry who felt bound to serve Richard.

II

It is impossible to make sense of Richard III’s time on the throne without breaking it down into its constituent parts on the national stage, but the relationship between the crown and the localities was obviously affected in different ways by the events which shaped the protectorate and reign. The situation in the south was dominated by the Buckingham Rebellion and this had implications for the north, but in the end it was the Middleham affinity that received the most benefit. For the counties nearer to the border it was the death of the Prince of Wales that proved to be the major turning point. The resulting Council of the North extended royal power into the region as never before to the detriment of the March lords, requiring the use of new agents who were less independent. This was not so much a matter of policy, but rather Richard’s reaction to the opposition he experienced to his plans for a treaty with the Scots. He expected the complete loyalty of his subjects and complete obedience to the royal will, and if he did not receive it then he felt no compunction in removing the miscreants from positions of authority.

The experiences of Cumberland and Westmorland under Richard III are in many respects a microcosm of his rule of the country as a whole, and the treatment that they received at his hands was not so different from that experienced by the southern counties. His affinity was not extensive at the start of the reign and, although it grew, he did not rely on it to do his will. Instead he placed his own men in positions which gave him the maximum level of control, often at the cost of traditional power structures. He understood well that a balance of power could be achieved through the use of one or two key individuals and, if there was no one
whom he could trust locally, he imported them. His control of Cumberland in early 1483 was in the hands of his financial officials, men who relied on him totally for their position. He preferred Richard Salkeld over men of superior social status because he was dependent on royal service for his authority, and thus he was more willing to serve without question. He made Sir Richard Ratcliffe the key figure in both Cumberland and Westmorland not just for patronage, but to ensure that the counties operated according to his wishes. Just as in the south, he did not try to impose a whole new ruling class but he imported a small number of pivotal figures to guarantee that his rule was obeyed.

The extent to which he was prepared to go to achieve this is reflected not just in the treatment of Lord Dacre after the Treaty of Nottingham, but also by his use of Edward Ratcliffe to undermine the Earl of Northumberland’s control of the Cockermouth affinity. The guiding principle that kings had to be obeyed had as a quid pro quo the implicit understanding that, in return for loyalty, a lord would be allowed to govern in his own “country”, and Richard took advantage of this. It made sense for a lord to allow men from his retinue to move into royal service and even to promote relatives of men with influence, but to impose an outsider onto a local affinity because of his connections was a dangerous precedent. Ratcliffe’s promotion at Cockermouth was a direct result of his brother’s influence and no doubt it was encouraged by Richard. Initially, no doubt, it served the Earl’s purposes but once the king’s interests had diverged from those of his far northern supporters, then he was able to use Ratcliffe to impose his will. The Earl, while retaining his financial interest, effectively lost any political control over his western lordship.

This key factor of obedience to the royal will was so important to Richard that he was unable to trust men who had any independent standing, hence his rejection of Lord Dacre in favour of Richard Salkeld. His reliance on the Middleham affinity was almost total but, by promoting it and its interests, he cut himself off from the rest of the kingdom, not just the south. Men were still prepared to serve him because he was the monarch - there was, as Dr. Horrox has observed, “a fundamental sense that the king ought to be obeyed” - but there was the expectation in return that patronage and power would be distributed fairly evenly.

103 Horrox, Richard III, pp. 197-98

This, however, was not happening and, although at first it was the nobility who suffered the most because they were naturally closest to the king, eventually the whole country would have been affected to a far greater extent. The fact that this did not occur was due to Richard’s untimely death, but this in turn was due to his failure to govern in the manner that was expected of him. His behaviour did not so much presage that of the Tudors as provide them with a superlative example of what could happen if they upset too many of their natural supporters. Henry VII was not a “new monarch” but the last great medieval one, relying on the tried and tested methods of government\textsuperscript{105}.

The whole of Richard’s reign can be seen as a series of lurches from one expedient to another. Apart from his desire to remain on the throne and to be obeyed at all costs it is difficult to see any consistent policy. This is due, in large part, to the short length of his reign. If he had survived the “trial” of Bosworth and continued in power then it would be possible for the historian to identify his long-term goals, but as it is he has left us a legacy of inconsistency and broken promises to try to decipher\textsuperscript{106}. Initially, it seems, he was intent on prosecuting the Scottish war but he was distracted from this by the Buckingham Rebellion. His distribution of patronage in the winter of 1483-84 indicates that the conquest of south-west Scotland was still one of his central goals, but the death of his son caused a reassessment. His support in the far north, however, was predicated on the continuation of that conflict and by seeking a peaceful settlement with the Scots he undermined the loyalty of his following in the region. Instead of working to revive it, however, he took the easy option of turning to his tried and tested following and so, in effect, pulled the carpet from under the feet of his far northern adherents. The Earl of Northumberland seems to have suffered the most, but Lord Dacre and the Cumberland elite were likewise ignored in favour of a handful of new men whose rise was usually predicated on their Middleham connection.

Whether or not Richard’s actions in the north-west diminished his support there so much that his servants failed him at Bosworth is impossible to tell from the surviving evidence. The transition to the new regime, however, was very smooth and, with the exception of the Ratcliffes, there seems to have been very


\textsuperscript{106} “Had he defeated Tudor at Bosworth there is no reason why he should not have gone on...to die in his bed, respected if not much loved” - Horrox, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 327.
little change. Sir Christopher Moresby was serving on commissions throughout the north by September 25th 1485 and in March 1486 he was confirmed in his post at Penrith. Richard Salkeld continued as the deputy warden for six months and was then replaced by Lord Dacre, but he remained a force in the county. The Musgraves were not penalised and by December 1485 three of them were acting as royal receivers in Cumberland and Westmorland. In Westmorland, the restoration of Henry Lord Clifford gave the county its traditional lord once more, and he began to serve on commissions in the county for the first time. The men who suffered the most came, paradoxically, from the Cockermouth affinity. They were, however, those who had served Richard rather than the Earl of Northumberland. Sir Thomas Broughton lost his southern lands and, although he retained his fee from the honour, he may not have recovered his position as lieutenant there. Edward Ratcliffe was removed from office at the earliest opportunity and his fees were only for part of the year 1484-85, although he was later to be employed as the feodary and steward of the courts.

Richard’s exercise of power was intensely personal and self-aggrandising, and was not used for the benefit of the realm as a whole. The experiences of the Musgraves illustrate the nature of his patronage - although the eldest brother received the highest annuity and he was involved in local government, the second brother enjoyed the most prominent role locally despite his obvious incompetence. The third brother was almost totally ignored and the fourth was granted extensive lands and offices in the south. Such advancement by younger members of a family had always existed and was actively encouraged, but it had never before happened on such an immense scale. In small doses it was an integral part of social mobility, since it provided a small window of opportunity for young men to advance themselves to a position they would not have been able to attain by remaining at home, and it bolstered the social order rather than


108 Ibid., pp. 56-57, 73; Rot. Scot., p. 272.


110 CPR 1485-94, pp. 56-57, 73, 91.

111 CRO D/Lec/29/8, f. 1; D/Lec/29/7, f. 1.
undermined it. The occasional “high-flyer” was not a threat to the established conventions of patriarchy. On the scale it was practised by Richard III, though, it challenged social conventions throughout the country by creating a new class of politically active men who in one fell swoop had leap-frogged their familial superiors. Edward Ratcliffe was the fifth son of a minor local family, yet he ruled the Cockermouth affinity ahead of families such as the Curwens, Lamplughs, Martindales and Penningtons. In the long-term, perhaps, Richard might have instigated the type of social re-organisation seen during the later Tudors, but in 1485 his hold on the throne was not secure enough to allow his individualistic policies to go unchallenged.

There were few men in England able or willing to challenge Richard’s authority in the summer of 1485, but at Bosworth it only took two to bring his reign to a premature end. Lord Stanley and the Earl of Northumberland had both received lands and offices in excess of £650 from Richard, but so had Sir Richard Ratcliffe. Even though both of them held honorary positions at court, Stanley as constable of England and Northumberland as chamberlain, neither of them could hope to match the influence over the king enjoyed by Ratcliffe or Catesby. Their sense of social status and honour demanded at least some role in government. If they had been allowed to act as Richard’s "natural councillors" then perhaps they could have accepted Ratcliffe’s position, but their exclusion from the royal council in favour of the Cat, the Rat and the Dog must have been difficult for them to swallow. The fault lies with Richard. Personal favouritism was a natural element of politics which, although having many things in common, was seen as being quite separate from good lordship. To blatantly shower favours on a handful of men whose greatest achievement, socially as well as politically, was to be friends with their masters, was the cause of much discontent, especially if they were seen to be exploiting their position. Every generation of kings had spawned a different example of favourites - Piers Gaveston and the Despensers under Edward II; de Vere, de la Pole and Burley under Richard II; the earls of Suffolk and Somerset under Henry VI. Even Edward IV had been criticised in his first reign for the

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favours he showed the Woodvilles, even though most of the opprobrium was directed at the queen’s family rather than the king himself\textsuperscript{114}. As William Catesby found to his cost after Bosworth, noblemen who had been spurned by their king could be a vindictive lot\textsuperscript{115}.

\textsuperscript{114} Ross, \textit{Edward IV}, pp. 92ff.

CONCLUSIONS

“Love God and thy Prynce...”

In the winter of 1487, the Earl of Lincoln and others planned a rebellion against the new Tudor dynasty, using the pretender Lambert Simnel as their figurehead. They arrived in Ireland in May where Simnel, as the Duke of Clarence’s son Edward, was crowned as the rightful king of England. In early June they set sail for England and on the 4th a force of about 6,000 men landed at Piel Castle on the Furness peninsular. They had been encouraged to land there by one of the conspirators, Sir Thomas Broughton, who believed that the whole of the country around would rise in support of the last Yorkist. In this, he was sadly mistaken. The rebels gained more assistance from the Harringtons in Lancashire and from Middleham, where Richard III’s memory was held in greatest esteem, but they were ill-prepared to meet the royal army at the battle of Stoke on June 24th. They were cut to pieces, and Henry VII secured his position on the throne¹.

Relatively few men were attainted after the battle. Only twenty six suffered forfeiture, of whom no more than five came from the north-western counties. Sir Thomas Broughton and his brother John had been joined by Clement Skelton, Thomas Blenerhasset and Alexander Appleby. A possible seventh man was Richard Middleton who may have come from Lonsdale, but his links were with the Harringtons (who were also attainted) and Middleham rather than with Westmorland². News of the rebellion must have been spread throughout Cumberland and Westmorland, since Skelton and Blenerhasset all came from the Carlisle region, and Appleby also had links with the city.

The battle of Stoke shows that loyalty to Richard III in the north-west, if it had ever existed in any strength, had been easily replaced. Only a few diehards had joined Lincoln’s standard, and most men refused to become involved. Sir John Huddleston, who had taken to Furness Fells the previous year with


² Rot. Parl., vi, pp. 397-402.
Thomas Broughton in protest at the new regime, did not take part. The central concern for a united loyalty to the \textit{de facto} monarch was still strong. This, however, was less to do with a belief in the constitutional right of the monarch to govern as he thought best fit than it was with self-preservation. The most pressing need in the locality was the defence of the region against Scottish invasions, which tended to happen more frequently in times of domestic crisis. If there was a violent change of king, and the regional gentry were sucked into the political upheavals, then their estates were left more vulnerable to outside attack. By ignoring the complex political machinations of the nobility at Westminster, therefore, and concentrating on remaining loyal to the throne regardless of who occupied it, the region provided itself with a means of protection.

This, at least, seems to have been the theory. That it was in operation in the 1450s can be seen in the reluctance of the Cockermouth affinity to become involved in the Percy-Neville feud, and it was certainly in operation in Carlisle in 1469. It explains the actions of the Huddleston family in their reluctance to join either faction, Lancastrian or Yorkist, until after the Coventry Parliament of 1459, and their desertion of the Nevilles in 1471. What it does not do, however, is to account for the behaviour of the Parrs. They had been close to the Nevilles in the 1450s, but they used the opportunity to establish strong links with the crown. Their service during the Rededption and in the following decade or so was based on a more personal sense of loyalty to Edward IV than on regionalism.

The reasons for this were two-fold. First of all, lordship and loyalty were based on the personal connection between a lord and his servant. During the 1460s the Earl of Warwick did not provide Sir William Parr with the degree of local influence that he expected. Most local patronage went to other men in the region, and Sir William’s main source of reward was his brother’s connection at court. This came under attack from the earl and, as a result, the extent to which he was prepared to follow Warwick into treason was undermined. His reward for supporting Edward IV in 1471 was to be made the most important crown agent in the West March, with a direct line of access to the throne. Unfortunately, his death in late 1483 has removed any evidence of how this sense of loyalty might have been changed by Richard III’s usurpation, and we have no sure way of knowing just how much he relied on his personal connection with Edward.

This brings us to the second point concerning Sir William Parr. He came from the most southern part of Westmorland, a good sixty five miles away from the border, an area that was influenced as much (if not more) by families such
as the Harringtons as it was by the threat of Scottish incursions. They were quite willing to challenge the crown, despite being ardent Yorkists, because they were in almost constant conflict with the Stanleys. It has not been part of this thesis to explore the influences on political society in northern Lancashire, but for the Harringtons at least their motivations had a strong personal element. With Kendale being well-protected from raiders, and less dependent upon a sense of unitary loyalism, then it seems likely that the Parrs had the luxury of allowing personal motivations to override their regional ones.

The strength of regionalism in the far north-west cannot be explained simply by the presence of the Scottish border. In addition, one must also consider the attitudes of the local aristocratic leadership. The Percies, Nevilles and Cliffords were the three main lords yet none of them were ever resident in Cumberland or Westmorland. Rather, deputies were employed to manage their estates or offices for them, and although there is some evidence of loyalty to individual lords developing, it does not seem to have been widespread. The carvings of various noble badges made on the walls of Carlisle castle, for example, are now believed to have been made by bored soldiers. They were employed by the wardens and thus owed them their livelihood. There is little sense of the honour of Cockermouth being particularly loyal to the Percies and their cause in the later 1450s. Similarly, the most important Clifford servants in Westmorland, the Musgraves, were happier in the service of the Nevilles.

The main difference between the three magnate families was the extent to which they interfered in local politics to further their own particular ends. Throughout the 1440s and 1450s the Earl of Salisbury, as the warden of the West March, had probably had the most influence over crown appointments. He seems to have made a conspicuous effort to include both the Percy and Clifford affinities in the administration of the March and of local justice. This was probably a long-standing principle and it was accepted by the older noblemen, but the deaths of the second Earl of Northumberland and the eighth Lord Clifford brought the younger, more aggressive generation to the fore. Both the third earl and ninth lord blamed the Nevilles for their fathers' deaths and they were, therefore, more willing to use any means at their disposal to undermine them. Given the opportunity in December 1459 they introduced factionalism into the north-west, but in doing so they threatened the traditional values of local society. Whereas before localism had been actively encouraged, it was now being attacked.
To what extent this shift of attitudes affected the Cockermouth affinity and its response to the crisis of 1460-61 is impossible to say. It does not seem to have been a willing participant in the battles of that winter and resistance during the following summer months was sporadic and ineffectual. Only four men from the region were indicted of rebelling, and even they were probably second sons - one of them, "Gamaliel" Pennington, was actually named after a New Testament character who advocated a cautious “wait and see” policy instead of rushing headlong into conflict. During the following decade, however, the affinity was punished for having the wrong lord. It was excluded from all local offices, which instead were placed in the hands of men who were closely associated with the Earl of Warwick. If it was impetuous Lancastrians who had first breached the principles of regional equality, the change was embraced by the new lord of the Nevilles.

One must question here Warwick’s ability to act as a good lord. He saw the promotion of his own retainers at the cost of the local customs as being the key to establishing his authority in the region. The advancement of Salkeld, Huddleston and Musgrave above all others did not work, however, and in 1471 he enjoyed only limited support. He had tried to establish his own lordship and a sense of loyalty to himself rather than to the throne, but in doing so he had to deny the majority of the two counties any involvement in the government of their own locality. It was something that they were used to having, and it shows above all else Warwick’s failure to understand the nature of local society in the north-west.

One area where Warwick did succeed in suborning loyalty to the throne was, paradoxically, in the royal castle of Carlisle. Edward IV had given him control of it in 1471 and he had employed his own garrison there under the leadership of Richard Salkeld. The castle was, in Edward’s own words, the key to the West March, and he recognised his mistake in allowing such a vital fortress into the wrong hands. He was fortunate in now having a royal servant, Sir William Parr, through whom he could re-establish the predominant sense of loyalty to the throne. The parallels between the careers of Parr and that other favoured royal servant, William Lord Hastings, are quite striking. Hastings had been in royal service the longer and was closer to the king, but from 1471 Parr ought to be seen as one of Edward’s inner circle and probable confidantes. Where Hastings was used to take control of the Calais garrison once more, Parr was used at Carlisle. His local

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connections, his upbringing in the locality and his consequent understanding of how the region operated were invaluable in trying to recreate the conditions under which the West March could operate most effectively.

These conditions could not be fully accomplished because Parr was not solely responsible for the March. His duties had to be shared with the warden, Richard Duke of Gloucester. Gloucester’s main centre of authority, though, was in Yorkshire, at the old Neville stronghold of Middleham, and until at least 1474 he was busily engaged in securing his rights from his brother, the Duke of Clarence. Any interest he had in extending his authority into Cumberland was above all else financial, and it was almost by accident that he came to enjoy the office of sheriff for life. During this time it was Parr who was acting as Edward’s agent on the north-west border, being involved with negotiations with the Scots, dominating the elections to Parliament and the appointments of justices of the peace. Even after 1475, when Gloucester probably began to take a greater interest in the north, he does not seem to have extended this interest into the north-west. It is only with the advent of the Scottish war in 1480 that this happened. The war was, for the most part, fought out in the East March, by land and sea. There is no evidence of Gloucester being active in the West March until April and May 1482 and it was at this point, when he saw how fertile was the land to the north of the border, that he decided on acquiring it for himself. The palatinate was decided upon the next month, and for the next two years he dedicated himself to achieving it.

The central problem facing Edward IV in 1471 had been how to deal with his brothers. They are usually dealt with in isolation, but this is to create a false distinction between the two. Clarence was the more troublesome for Edward, but this is not to say that he regarded Gloucester as being more loyal. He showed a marked reluctance to give him responsibility in the north, despite his offices there, but rather he seems to have used him as a counter-weight to Clarence’s ambitions. Once Clarence was dead, however, there was nothing to keep Gloucester in check. One of the principle motivations for Edward involving the country in the war with Scotland seems to have been the necessity of giving his youngest brother something to do. Richard was not interested in diplomacy, and only received one ambassadorial appointment, but rather he saw himself in the finest martial traditions of his age. His disappointment at the failure of the French campaign in 1475 is almost tangible, even today, and his influence over the outbreak of hostilities in 1480 was instrumental. Edward, on the other hand, was becoming consumed with the idea of defeating Louis XI of France, either diplomatically or militarily, and was
not interested in an expensive diversion to the north. Richard was initially expected to fight the war with the resources already at his disposal and, when he failed to achieve any significant victory, Edward was forced to take a more personal interest. Gloucester’s raid on Dumfries showed what he was capable of, given the proper means. The Fotheringhay agreement was the result of a trade-off between the two brothers. Richard was to be made hereditary warden of the West March and given control over the whole Solway basin. This would have kept him occupied in the north for the foreseeable future, probably for the rest of his life. In return, he was to receive a one-off payment of 10,000 marks and Edward was to fund a single all-out campaign to destroy the Scottish nobility and impose a puppet regime that would willingly cede the south-west corner of Scotland. The plan failed because of the unexpected coup against James III, and meant that Edward had to commit himself to a second campaign in the north before he could concentrate on his European ambitions.

The follow-up attack on the Scots was interrupted by Edward’s untimely death in April 1483. Richard’s subsequent Protectorate and usurpation of the throne are generally seen as being goals that he willingly embraced, but in reality they were an interruption of his northern ambitions. Bishop Russell’s speech written for Edward V’s proposed first Parliament show that Richard’s primary concern was the prolongation of the Protectorate so that he could continue his Scottish campaign unmolested, but this time with the financial resources of the whole country behind him. Even after the Buckingham Rebellion he still intended to pursue the palatinate, and he sent home the men from the West March with scant reward for their labours in the south. Only after the death of his son in March 1484 did he accept the reality that his position on the throne was so insecure, and his finances so dire, that he could not afford any involvement in the north. By pulling back from his commitment to war, however, he was forced to renege on his agreement with the Cumberland gentry who had supported him in 1483.

Richard’s lordship in the north-west had never been particularly strong. He had never enjoyed the overwhelming dominance that the Earl of Warwick had, and throughout the 1470s his control of the wardenship had always been tempered by the presence of Sir William Parr. His concern to be obeyed meant that, in the 1480s, he preferred to import men into the region to represent him rather than relying on local talent. It is an indication that the primary concern within the locality was still one of unity in the face of a common enemy when a royal magnate whose sphere of interest was dominant did not feel that he had control.
Instead, Richard was forced to rely on the expedient followed by Edward IV of using a man as a royal agent who was so closely associated with the crown that the royal will had to be obeyed. The fact that he had to rely on Sir Richard Ratcliffe, and through him his brother Edward, demonstrates just how tenuous was Richard III’s hold over the north-west.

It is unlikely that anyone from the region would have been disloyal to Richard since he was the de facto king, but they did not have to like him or his policies. When called upon to serve him against the Tudor invasion in the summer of 1485, they did at least turn up. The way in which he dealt with the region was more to do with his own failure to recognise the unique structures and needs of local society than it was with any implicit threat of rebellion. The importance of maintaining a solid front to counter any Scottish threat, real or supposed, overrode any considerations of widespread disaffection with royal authority turning into open revolt.

In order to properly understand the impact that the various magnates who controlled the office of warden of the West March had on the region, it is necessary to realise that they did not need to exercise their authority in person. Indeed, all of them during the period are known to have employed deputies at some time or other. Although we do not know the exact length of time these deputies served, neither do we know of any period when the actual wardens fulfilled their duties themselves. Certainly their other obligations kept them away from the north-west for long periods of time. This has immense implications for our understanding of the way in which their lordship was exercised. The degree of loyalty expected by magnates could not be maintained without personal contact or by allowing the local gentry a large degree of influence. Salisbury, it seems, understood this more than did Warwick or Gloucester. Both of these men tried to ensure loyalty in the region by using men they believed trustworthy, but they refused to extend that trust beyond their narrow circle. Thus Warwick’s lordship depended on only four men, and Gloucester resorted to importing agents to represent him. Once he became king, however, the situation changed in his favour. The predominant local political theory demanded obedience to him as the de facto monarch, but he was still unable to extend that into popular support.

The dominant theme of this thesis has been the importance of localism in the governance of the far north-west, and its triumph over magnatial interference. Apart from the decade in which the West March was controlled by the Earl of Warwick, magnate authority in the region was subdued by, and dependent
upon, the attitudes prevalent within the shires. The basis of this was that loyalty was owed first and foremost to the crown and only secondly to a magnate, even in parts of the two counties where noble influence ought to have been the strongest. It is this which separates the region from other areas of the country. It was a long-standing tradition that made the region ready to embrace the greater involvement in local affairs that the crown sought from 1471 onwards. In the early sixteenth century this attitude found expression in a more lasting form. The prior of Carlisle Cathedral priory, Simon Senhouse, when redecorating the ceiling of the solar in his official residence, did so with the intent that “wythin thys placys they shall have prayers every daye in the yere. Love God and thy prynce, and thy neydis not fear thyne enemyes”.

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D/Ca City of Carlisle MSS
D/Cu Curwen of Workington MSS
D/Ha Hough, Halton & Soal, Solicitors
D/HC Howard of Corby MSS
D/HG Howard of Greystoke MSS
D/HGB Blencow Family of Blencowe MSS
D/Hud Huddleston of Milom MSS
D/Lec Leconsfield Deeds, Cockermouth
D/Lons Lonsdale MSS
D/Mus Musgrave MSS
D/Pen Pennington of Muncaster MSS
D/Sen Senhouse MSS
D/Van Fletcher-Vane of Hutton-in-the-Forest MSS
D/Wyb Wyburgh MSS

b) Kendal
WD/Crk Crackenthorpe MSS
WD/D Wilson of Dallam Tower MSS
WD/Hoth Hothfield MSS
WD/Ry Fleming of Rydal MSS

DURHAM

DD/St. Strathmore MSS
LANCASHIRE

DDCa  Cavendish of Holker MSS
DDCl  Clifton of Lytham MSS
DDCm  Shuttleworth, Dallas & Crombleholme, Preston, MSS
DDF  Farington of Worden MSS
DDFz  Fitzherbert-Brockholes of Claughton MSS
DDHe  Hesketh of Rufford MSS
DDHp  Hopwood of Hopwood MSS
DDHu  Hutton of Hutton MSS
DDIn  Blundell of Ince Blundell MSS
DDK  Stanley, Earls of Derby MSS
DDL  Finch, Johnston & Lynn, Preston, MSS
DDLk  Mather of Lowick MSS
DDMa  Marton of Capernwray MSS
DDTo  Townley of Townley MSS
DP/397  Standish of Duxbury MSS
RCHy  Hornby Catholic Mission Papers

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